

FISCAL INTERACTIONS AMONG EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. DOES THE EU MATTER?

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Abstract

We use a panel of European countries to investigate whether or not governments interact with their neighbors when they decide their fiscal policy; we consider both taxes and expenditures, at aggregate and at separate aspects of policy. We analyse possible different competitive behaviours and find evidence of fiscal interdependencies consistently with the literature on tax and yardstick competition. For corporate taxes, the regression results suggest that European countries follow large countries in order to attract capital; for income taxes and public expenditures, instead, fiscal interactions exist but they are mainly due to yardstick competition. Finally, we have found the countries are interdependent with each others before joining the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent.

JEL Code: H2, H77, H87, D7.

Keywords: yardstick competition, tax competition, intergovernmental relations, international fiscal issues, regionalisation.

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1. Introduction

Do countries compete with each others in order to attract tax bases? Do voters care about foreign policy makers' fiscal choices when they make their voting decisions? Do policy makers respond to foreign fiscal policies? All these questions are related by the idea that state's fiscal policies are dependent on their neighbours' policies and the common view is that the ongoing process of globalisation has contributed to these interdependencies in several ways. First, in more open economies, capital and investment are more free to move internationally, and this is making governments more responsive to other governments actions in order to attract tax base; second, more circulation of information and ideas has made it easier for people to compare different countries performances and to get "the full picture" both with respect to the "goodness" of their domestic policies and to the possibility of developing their business plans abroad. Moreover, as a consequence of globalisation, countries' national borders are becoming weaker and less defined;¹ as a result, in order to survive and preserve their interests, countries are getting together to sign agreements of mutual cooperation and form unions. The case of Europe and the European Union is an interesting example of these phenomena, and it is also the subject of this paper. In particular, we address the question whether or not European governments influence each others in determining their fiscal choices, and whether or not there is a role played by the EU as an Institution in affecting the level of fiscal interactions.

There are three main theoretical explanations why countries should be affected by their "neighbors" when they determine their policy choices; all these rely on the common assumption that countries behave strategically with each others.

The first explanation is based on the idea that there exist expenditure externalities among jurisdictions and therefore state policy choices are not independent from each other. An example of these type of externalities is the amount of public investments in infrastructures in a country (such as roads, airports, rail-tracks) whose benefits spill over in neighboring countries, and lower the level of investments in the latter countries,

¹There is a widespread ideas of retreat of States. Among them : "Where states were once the masters of markets, now it is the markets which . . . are masters over the governments of states" (Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State*, 1996), "The glue holding nation-states together, at least in economic terms, has begun to dissolve". (Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State*, 1996); "Foreign trade and investment have now become the ultimate yardsticks for evaluating government actions..(there is) a remarkable consensus on the imperative of global economic integration." (Dani Rodrik, *Trading in Illusions*, Foreign Policy magazine, 2001).

because of free riding behavior.

The second type of interdependence is based on the idea that citizens can evaluate the performances of their policy makers by comparing the same policy choices taken by the neighboring countries' policy makers. In the case domestic policy makers perform worse than foreigners, citizens "punish" them by not voting for them the next elections. Policy makers anticipate voters behavior and "follow" their neighboring colleagues' choices. This idea of "yardstick" competition has been initially explored by Besley and Case (1995), who also confirm the theory by finding evidence for this using data from U.S. States. More recent works include Besley and Smart (2003), Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli (2003, 2004).

The third type of explanation why fiscal choices are not independent is based on the tax competition literature: countries compete with their neighbors in order to attract tax bases. The theoretical literature on tax competition is now voluminous, an important branch of it develops the well-known Zodrow-Mieszkowski-Wilson (ZMW) model (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, (1986), Wilson, (1986)) of tax setting with mobile capital in various directions (see Wilson, (1999) for a survey).

Alternative to these theories of strategic interactions; Manski (1993) suggests that fiscal choices appear to be interdependent not because countries behave strategically but because they actually follow a "common intellectual trend" that drives fiscal choices in the same directions. A situation like this occurs for example because policy makers meet at various international meetings,² and they are able to discuss and share views on fiscal policies, or, alternatively, an influential international organization or a famous economist has expressed their opinions or recommendations about policy issues.

However, even if there are various theories of fiscal policy interdependencies, when we want to empirically test the theory, for all these cases the common way to proceed is to estimate "fiscal reaction functions", i.e. parameters which indicate whether any particular fiscal authority will change a tax rate or an expenditure level in response to changes in the same variable by other authorities. This empirical literature was initiated by a pioneering study by Case, Hines and Rosen (1993), who estimate an empirical model of strategic interaction in expenditures among state governments in the US. Our paper is a contribution to this literature; we estimate fiscal reaction functions for European states fiscal policies; we think that our study is distinctive in several ways.

²Like various G7, G8 meetings or the Finance Ministers of the EU members meet regularly in the ECOfin Councils.

First, to our knowledge, it is the only paper investigating together both taxes and public expenditures, and not only at aggregates but at separate aspects of policy. This is an important issue that has not received enough attention (see Wildasin (2004)) for a discussion). Second, this is the first paper in this branch of the literature using the full set of western European countries.³ Specifically, on public expenditures side, existing studies are so far based on US States datasets; they are the already mentioned Case, Hines and Rosen (1993) and Baicker (2005) who basically replicates Case, Hines and Rosen's paper using different econometric techniques. On tax side, most of the existing empirical works on tax reaction functions has employed data on local (business) property tax rates (Brueckner, 1998, Brett and Pinkse, 2000, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998), or on local or state income taxes (Besley and Case, 1995, Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998). The only exceptions are Besley, Griffith and Klemm (2001) and Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) who estimate reaction functions for OECD countries and Altshuler and Goodspeed (2004) who study reaction functions for a subset of European countries. More in detail, we estimate reaction functions for taxes, on income and capital, and public expenditures, both aggregated and disaggregated (education, health and defence), using a dataset on western European countries for the period 1970-99. The aim of the analysis is three-fold. First, we test whether or not fiscal choices are independent among European countries (i.e. if the coefficient of the reaction function is non zero).

Second, we extend the analysis to determine whether these interdependencies are due to strategic interactions (tax, yardstick competition, fiscal externalities) or just common trend; this is mainly based on the distinction between the characteristics of the different fiscal choices, the responsiveness to them by voters and the type of neighbours with whom to interact. To anticipate the flavour of the analysis that will be developed in detail in the next section; corporate taxes mainly affect firms' location and investments⁴ but only a minority of voters, therefore any strategic behavior by governments should be related to tax competition to attract tax bases rather than to yardstick competition to please voters. Income taxes, instead, hit income from labour, the less mobile factor, and are

³with the exception of Altshuler and Goodspeed (2004) -who use a dataset on Western European countries to investigate the existence of fiscal interdependencies. However, they consider only a subset of EU Countries and study only capital and labour taxes. Moreover their paper also differs in the way taxes are calculated, they use a backward measure of taxes based on the ratio between tax revenue and GDP, while we use instead directly the tax rates set by governments and we consider also public expenditures

⁴See Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002) for a discussion about that.

of interest for most of voters; therefore any kind of interdependence should be linked to yardstick competition. If governments behave strategically toward their voters in order to be reelected, we should especially find positive sloped reaction functions for those expenditures which are most visible to voters such as education and health. Governments could also try to compete with other countries, in order to attract investments and therefore tax base, by undertaking investments in infrastructures (see on this topic Wooders and Zissimos (2001)). All these type of interdependencies imply that the reaction functions are positively sloped; but if, instead, they are related to positive fiscal externalities between countries we should expect a negatively sloped reaction function. This could be the case, for example, for expenditures in defence of friendly countries.

Finally, we investigate whether or not there is an "EU effect", in other words, if being a member of the European Union may determine a different level of fiscal interactions. For example, if countries join the EU to lower the competitive pressure from a more and more globalised world and operate in a more protected environment, on one hand, this should lower the level of fiscal interactions due to a competitive behavior; but, on the other hand, since there are less competitive barriers among members, this should also higher interactions between member states. Similarly countries outside the EU should have higher level of interactions because they operate in a more open environment and also may want to follow EU states in order to being accepted in the EU.

The results support the idea that states act interdependently when they take their policy decisions both with respect to expenditures and taxes; however, with different motivations. For corporate taxes, for example, consistently with the previous empirical studies on tax competition, the regression results suggest that European countries compete with each other in order to attract capital and, in particular, following big countries. For income taxes and public expenditures, instead, we have found that fiscal interactions exist but are mainly due to yardstick competition, mainly with respect geographical neighbor and "leader" countries. Moreover, consistently with our expectations, the results for disaggregated public expenditures suggest that governments behave strategically only with respect to those expenditures which are more directly comparable such as expenditures in education.

Finally, we have found the countries are more interdependent with each other before they join the EU, and than, once they are in, they become more independent. This behavior is possibly due to the fact that countries who want to join the EU want to show to other EU members that they share similar policies in order to be accepted and also

Table 1. Characteristics of different types of interactions

	Yardstick competition	Tax Competition	Positive Externality	Common Trend
Coefficient Sign	Positive	Positive	Negative	Positive
Type of fiscal choice	Voters care about: Health , Education.	Mobile Tax Base: Capital Tax	Expenditures spill over in other jurisdictions	
Neighbours	-Jurisdictions with similar characteristics (GDP distance) -Big and important jurisdictions (GDP-EU) -Geo. close jurisdictions	-Open Jurisdictions (Trade) -Big and important jurisdictions (GDP-EU)	-Geo. close jurisdictions	-No specific neighbour (uniform)
Timing	More in election year	Not specific	Not specific	Not specific

because the EU provides a safer environment where countries need to compete less with the outside world but interact more among themselves.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses how we can distinguish different competitive behaviors based on the analysis of types of choices, neighbors and responsiveness by citizens. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology, section 4 the data and, section 5 the results. Discussion and conclusions are in the last part of the paper.

2. Testing the theories

As mentioned in the introduction, when we want to test empirically different models of fiscal interactions, the common way to proceed is to estimate fiscal reaction functions. However, as it stands, it is not possible to distinguish the true nature of these interdependencies. In this section we explore how we can overcome to this problem by extending the analysis to take into account different types of fiscal choices and neighbors, and responsiveness by citizens to policies. We use Table 1 to make our point.


In the columns we distinguish between the four theoretical explanations of fiscal policy dependencies: yardstick competition, tax competition, positive externality and common

trends. The first three are due to a strategic behavior y governments while the latter is due to a common "intellectual trend". We analyze them in turn in relation to four characteristics: i) the expected sign of the reaction functions' coefficients, ii) the type of fiscal choices relative to the degree of interest by voters, the mobility of the tax base and the possibility of spillovers, iii) the type of neighbors with whom it is likely to interact and, finally, iv) the timing of the interactions.

Yardstick competition occurs when policy makers in one jurisdiction adjust their policies in response to neighboring jurisdictions' policy changes because citizens make their voting decisions based on the comparison between domestic and foreign policies. Voters do not cast their vote for the incumbent if they think she has not performed well enough. So, anticipating their behavior, policy makers will cut (raise) taxes or expenditures if neighbors cut (raise) theirs; this implies that the sign of the reaction function's coefficient has to be positive under this hypothesis. Moreover, it is more likely that yardstick competition occurs with respect to those policies whose voters care most, like, for example, expenditures in education or income taxes, rather than capital taxes. To give an idea, it is useful to think about the victory in the UK general elections of the Labour Party over the Conservative Party after over twenty years. One of the keys of the success of Tony Blair's political campaign has been recognized to be the stress put on service delivery, like the famous slogan "Education, Education, Education". It is also likely that policy comparisons mainly occur with respect to geographically close countries or countries with similar characteristic or important and big countries. Finally, another characteristic of yardstick competition, not in common with the other types of interactions, is that it is very likely that interaction will be higher in the period of elections when voters make their final voting decisions.

Like for yardstick competition, the coefficient of the reaction function in the case of tax competition has to be positive. However, the main feature is that the tax base has to be mobile, and this is clearly the case for capital taxes, which hit firms and investments which are highly mobile across countries, especially in more open economies. The countries which whom it is more likely to engage competition to attract tax bases are more open countries, or leader countries. We do not expect, in principle, any different strategic behavior in the period of election, since, also, capital taxes are not usually of interest for voters.

The main difference between the case of (positive) externality and all the other behaviors is that the expected coefficient of the reaction function has to be negative; because



of free riding behavior. Also, it will mainly occur with respect to geographically close countries and, elections should not interfere with the level of interactions.

Finally, if it is only a common trend that drives countries policies in the same direction, we should expect a positive sign of the interaction coefficient, but not a specific pattern in the type of countries which whom to interact and, no different interactions because of elections.

Now, with the help of Figure 1, we illustrate how we proceed in the analysis. We begin with the estimation of the fiscal reaction functions, and we check if the interactions coefficient is significantly non-zero, in that case, trivially, there are no interactions. If the coefficient is negative, it is the case of positive fiscal externality, if it is positive, instead, we proceed further by checking if there is a higher level of interaction in the period of elections. If this is the case, it almost certainly the case for yardstick competition. If it is not the case, and, in addition, there is not a specific pattern in the type of state which whom the interactions occur, the most likely explanation is a common trend. If countries react more with their neighbors or with leader countries and the tax base is mobile, the main explanation is tax competition; alternatively, if the tax base is not mobile, we are possibly in the presence of amenity competition.

3. Empirical Specification

As discussed in the previous sections, all theoretical models of strategic interactions have the same empirical predictions that state i fiscal choices (either public expenditures or level of taxation) in year t , E_{it} , are a function of its neighbors same fiscal choices, E_{jt} . In practice, we allow E_{it} to depend on a vector of state specific controls X_{it} , and, since we estimate using pooled cross-sectional time series data, we include a state fixed effect α_i .

This gives a specification in the most general form of

$$E_{it} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \theta_{ij} E_{jt} + X_{it} \beta + u_{it}$$

where $i = 1, \dots, n$ denotes a state, and $t = 1, \dots, T$ a time period, α, β , and θ are unknown parameters, and u_{it} is a random error.

However, this cannot be estimated as it stands, as there are too many parameters θ_{ij} to be estimated. The usual procedure in this case is to estimate

$$E_{it} = \alpha_i + \theta' A_{it} + X_{it} \beta + t_{it} \gamma + u_{it} \quad (3.1)$$

where A_{it} is the weighted average of other states' fiscal choices

$$A_{it} = \sum_{j \neq i} w_{ijt} E_{jt}$$

and w_{ij} are exogenously chose weights, normalized so that $\sum_{j \neq i} w_{ijt} = 1$, and $w_{ijt} = 0$ if state j is not a "neighbor" or if $j = i$.

We consider six possible weighting schemes for (3.1), based on the analysis developed in the previous section. The first is very simple, weights are assumed to be *uniform*, i.e. $w_{ij}^U = \frac{1}{n-1}$, all i, j . This will give us an useful benchmark and, in the case it works well, will be in support of the hypothesis of "common intellectual trend", since, under this hypothesis there should not be any difference in the degree of country neighborliness.

The second set of weights are constructed such that to support the hypothesis of strategic interactions (either tax or yardstick competitions) and they are based on different concepts of neighborliness: they are *geographical distance*, *GDP per capita distance weights*, *GDP and EU weights*. The first two are based on the idea that countries follows countries close to them either geographically or with similar economic structure; the latter two

introduce the concept of following a leader, which is represented either by the biggest countries or by the EU as a whole.

For *geographical distance* weights the element of our weighting matrix are constructed such that

$$w_{ij}^D = \frac{1}{d_{ij}} / \sum_j \frac{1}{d_{ij}}$$

where d_{ij} is the geographical distance between the capital of state i and state j . In the case competition occurs between states with similar economic or demographic characteristics, we construct a weighting matrix based on the *inverse of the distance between GDP per capita*, where each element is constructed as follow:

$$w_{ijt}^{GD} = \frac{1}{|GDPpc_{it} - GDPpc_{jt}|} / \sum_j \frac{1}{|GDPpc_{it} - GDPpc_{jt}|}, \text{ with } j \neq i;$$

note that contrary to most of the previous studies we allow the matrices to be time variant.⁵

If countries follow a "leader" or a group of them, the weighting schemes that should work better are respectively the one assigning higher weights to countries with higher GDP,

$$w_{ijt}^G = \frac{GDP_{jt}}{\sum_j GDP_{jt}}, \text{ with } j \neq i,$$

or calculated as GDP weighted average of EU members,

$$w_{ijt}^{EU} = \begin{cases} \frac{GDP_{jt}}{\sum_{j \in EU_t} GDP_{jt}} & \text{if } j \in EU_t, j \neq i \\ 0 & \text{if } j \notin EU_t, j \neq i \end{cases},$$

where EU_t is the set of states that are EU members at time t .

Finally, we use another set of weights that are merely designed to represent tax competition behavior, with these weights we assign higher values to countries that have more open economies and, therefore, should be the main competitors in the race for attracting tax bases. In this setting, they are based on *country openness* (here as trade as proportion of GDP),⁶ in order to overcome the problem of temporary fluctuation and endogeneity of this variable we average three years together and than we lagged the resulting set of

⁵Previous studies like Case, Hines and Rosen used matrices based on the average of a variables over time.

⁶We have tried FDI/GDP weights with similar results and therefore we have omitted them.

weight of three years, more formally our last set of weight is

$$w_{ijt}^O = \frac{\sum_s TRGDP_{jt-s}}{\sum_j \sum_s TRGDP_{jt-s}}, \text{ with } s = 3, 4, 5, \text{ and } j \neq i.$$

In summary, the *a priori* choice of the weights is arbitrary, however after the estimations are carried out it is possible to assess their goodness by selecting the regressions that produces higher and more significant coefficients and, in this way, understand better the nature of these interdependencies.

Moreover there are two econometric issues determined by the presence on the RHS of the equation (3.1) of the dependent variable. First, if states do react to each others' fiscal choices, then A_{it} is endogenous and correlated with the error term u_{it} , we therefore we use an IV approach. For this purpose and we need some source of variation correlated with neighbors' fiscal choices but uncorrelated with the error term. One potential source of variation is neighbor X s. So we create neighbor values for these variables multiplying them by the same weights used for weighting the fiscal variables and we use the weighted average of neighbors' control variables as instruments. We test the validity of the instrument set using the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions.⁷

Second, if neighbors are subject to correlated random shocks, this determines a correlation between states' fiscal choices, which can be erroneously interpreted as causal influence. So if we omit in the regressions variables that are spatially dependent, these variables enter in the error term, and this complicates the estimation of (3.1). However Kelejian and Prucha (1998) have demonstrated that even in the presence of spatial error dependence, the IV method yields a consistent estimation of θ .⁸

Moreover, while we would like to include time dummies, to capture shocks in each period which are common to all countries, this is not generally feasible (see Devereux,

⁷This is carried out using `ivreg2` in Stata.

⁸If we do not take into account spatial error dependence in equation (3.1), this would not bias the estimation of θ but it would reduce the efficiency of the estimation and produced biased standard errors. There are two more ways in addition to IV method to deal with this. One approach is to use maximum likelihood to estimate (3.1) taking into account of the error structure, this methodology has been explored by Case et al. (1993). The other way is to estimate (3.1) by ML under the hypothesis of error independence and rely on hypothesis tests to verify the absence of spatial correlation. Examples of this approach can be found in Brueckner (1998), Saavedra (2000) and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). Anselin et al (1996) suggest a robust test that can be employed to detect the presence of spatial error dependence, which is based on the analysis of the residual generated by regressing the dependent variables on the exogenous variables using OLS.

Lockwood and Redoano, 2002, for an explanation). However, we do allow for unobserved factors varying over time as far as possible by also including country-specific time trend in all our regressions.

Another issue is that, in practice, our fiscal choices are serially correlated, perhaps because abrupt changes in the system are likely to be costly to governments, either because of adjustment costs, or because such changes may be blocked at the political level by interest groups. We therefore present t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by country which are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004).

Finally, we also present dynamic versions of model (3.1) by adding the lagged dependent variable, E_{it-1} .

$$E_{it} = \alpha_i + \delta E_{it-1} + \theta A_{it} + X_{it}\beta + t_{it}\gamma + u_{it} \quad (3.2)$$

The presence of the lagged dependent variable together with fixed effect generate another additional methodological problem. In short panels, the *Within Group* estimator is biased downward⁹. To deal with this problem we employ the GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond in addition to the IV estimator of the interaction term, A_{it} . The GMM estimator first-differences the estimating equation and uses lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier as well as lags of the RHS variables as instruments.¹⁰

4. The Data

We use annual data on the Western European states¹¹ over the period 1970 -1999. We consider several specifications of the model, where the variable E_{it} takes in turn the aggregated and disaggregated level of per capita public expenditures, and income and capital tax rates.

⁹Under the *within group* transformation, the lagged dependent variable becomes $E_{i,t-1}^* = E_{i,t-1} - \frac{1}{T-1}(E_{i,2} + \dots + E_{i,T})$. So if T were large enough the bias above would be insignificant and the problem disappear (see also Roodman, 2006).

¹⁰This is implemented in Stata using `xtabond2`.

¹¹We consider Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.

On the expenditures side we use aggregated and disaggregated public expenditure both per capita and as a proportion of GDP.¹² In particular we consider *total public expenditures* (TOT_{it}), public expenditures in *education* (EDU_{it}), *health* (HEA_{it}) and, *defence* (DEF_{it}). These data have been collected from IFS- Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. *Table 2* and *3* present summary statistics for these variables. In particular, if we disaggregate the figures by countries (*table 3*), we observe that despite there being a lot of variation among countries on the level of public expenditure, which depends mainly on country-specific characteristics, they all seem to follow a quite similar pattern as shown in *graphs 1* and *2*.

About the nature of possible interactions of states' public expenditures, we expect that their existence is mainly due to yardstick competition, rather than to tax competition; since interstate mobility of residents in Europe is quite low and it mainly based on the labour market conditions rather than provision of public good. Another possible explanation of public expenditures interdependencies among states could be also related not to strategic interactions but to a common "intellectual" trend, as suggested by Manski (1993), that drives countries fiscal choices in the same directions. *A priori* we can predict that yardstick competition occur with respect to those expenditure which are more observable and more of interest by voters, like Health or Education. Moreover, with respect to the weight matrix, if a common intellectual trend rather than strategic interactions are the reason for expenditure interdependences, we should expect that the coefficient of the interaction term in the case of the unweighted matrix is not performing any worse than the other alternative settings.

On the side of the tax variables, we use measures of income and capital taxes. These two taxes are both important, they overall account for more than 40% of the tax revenue. The tax base, in the first case, is represented by the income of companies and it is highly mobile across countries, in the second case, by the income of residents and is less mobile but hits the majority of citizens. Therefore if there exist strategic interactions in corporate taxes these should be mainly due to competitive behavior by governments in order to expand their tax bases. Again, it is not possible to rule out *a priori* the hypothesis of a common trend; but we have to rely on the comparison of performances of the different weighting matrices. Any strategic interactions in income taxes, instead, should mainly

¹²We only report result for teh case of per capita expenditures, since the results are better, and, also, because this measure is not affected by GDP variation across countries which may determine variations in expenditures not due to policy making decisions.

be related to government behavior trying to persuade their voters about the goodness of their actions. So, if governments are concerned about tax competition, we should expect a higher interaction of the factor more mobile, the capital, compared to the less mobile, labour, as pointed out by Besley, Griffith and Klemm (2001). If governments are, instead, more concerned about possible yardstick competition, we would expect higher interactions with respect to the taxation of the factor owned by the majority of voters. In this case income taxes should be more interdependent than corporate taxes. If, again, the hypothesis of a common intellectual trend is the correct one, we should not expect a worse performance by the uniform weights compared to the other specifications. For the income tax we use the *top income marginal rate* (TIN_{it}); for the capital tax we use the *statutory corporate tax rate* ($CAPTAX_{it}$).¹³ The main source for statutory tax rates is the Price Waterhouse -Corporate Taxes - A Worldwide Summary, and, for income taxes, we use the top income rate, from Price Waterhouse - Individual Taxes- A Worldwide Summary. We can observe that for most of the countries there has been a decrease in both statutory and income tax rates.¹⁴

Moreover we use a set of time varying variables X_{it} which are conventionally assumed to affect the determination of the above fiscal choices. For descriptive statistics refer to *table 2* in the Appendix. These variables include:

1. *Socio-demographic characteristics*: total population ($POPUL_{it}$), proportion of population less than 14 years old and over 65 ($PYOUNG_{it}$ and $POLD_{it}$ respectively), population density ($PDENS_{it}$), proportion of women ($PFEM_{it}$).
2. *Economic variables*: GDP per capita ($GDPPC_{it}$), and, finally, two measures of country openness: foreign direct investment ($FDIGDP_{it}$) and total trade ($TRADEGDP_{it}$) as a proportion of GDP.

¹³An alternative measure of capital taxes is proposed by Mendoza et al (1994), and it is based on the ratio of tax payments to a measure of the operating surplus of the economy. This approach is not ideal for analyzing the competition between jurisdictions over taxes on corporate income because, it does not necessarily reflect the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest in a particular location, because tax revenues depend on the history of past investment and profit and losses of a firm, and also the aggregation of firms in different tax positions, and also, this measure can vary considerably according to underlying economic conditions, even when tax regimes do not change; the variation is therefore due to factors outside the immediate control of the government (see more on this in Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002)).

¹⁴For a possible explanation see Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2002).

3. *Political variables.* EU_{it} , is equal to 1 if the country is member of EU and 0 otherwise, $GOVPARTY_{it}$ measures Cabinet composition in term of left parties in percentage of total cabinet post, $WOMENPARL_{it}$ measures the composition of women in the parliament, finally $ELECT_{it}$ is equal to 1 if there is an election in that year (both executive or legislative). Political variables in this dataset come from two sources: *Comparative Political Dataset*¹⁵ and *Database of Political Institutions*.¹⁶

5. Results

We estimate several versions of models (3.1) and (3.2), which represent the reaction functions of one country's fiscal choices to other countries decisions. We summarize our results in six sets of tables, one for each type of fiscal choices; moreover each set of tables is formed by three tables. Tables denoted with letter *a* present regression results for the static model in (3.1); the results for the dynamic version of the model (3.2) are in tables denoted with letters *b* and *c*. In tables *cs* the lagged dependent variable (A_{it-1}) is estimated using GMM estimator. In all our specifications, since the interaction term A_{it} , appearing on the RHS of (3.1) and (3.2), is endogenous and correlated with the error term, we instrument it by creating the weighted average of the controls variables X_{it} , using the same weights using for weighting the fiscal variables.

The fiscal choices taken into account (E_{it}) are the aggregated and disaggregated (Health, Education and Defence) level of public expenditures per capita and two different types of taxes: corporate taxes and income taxes. In all our specifications we condition on year dummies, and country-specific linear time trend (t_{it}). In the first case we want to control for unchanging characteristics of a state that may have an impact on policy choices, in the second case we want to control for macroeconomic shocks.

Tables 4 report the regression results for the aggregated public expenditure. In table *4a*, we present the results for the static model, (3.1). The coefficients of the neighbor average aggregated public expenditures (A_{it}) are always very significant and positive for all our different weights. The weights that perform better are GDP (0.970) and uniform weights (0.899), the worst is Openness. The controls do not perform particularly well in the regressions, the *p* values in most of the cases are below the threshold. It seems that

¹⁵ Available at http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/mitarbeiter/ru_armingeon/CPD_Set_en.asp

¹⁶ Available at <http://www.worldbank.org/research/bios/pkeefr.htm>

being member of EU, having an high proportion of women in Parliament and being ruled by a left wing party determine higher public expenditures. Moreover the composition of population affects the level of public expenditure, having an higher proportion of old and young people lowers (surprisingly) the level of expenditure (possibly because of income constraint); large countries have higher public expenditure per capita, possibly determined by diseconomies of scale. Finally more open countries have smaller governments, one possible explanation is because they may have to compete more internationally and therefore lower their taxes (for more about that see the "efficiency hypothesis" in Garret and Mitchell (2001)¹⁷). Table 4b presents the result for the dynamic version of the model. The interaction coefficients become, as expected, much lower and less significant, but still always positive. GDP and uniform weights are still the ones with better results, but now the coefficients are respectively 0.438 and 0.424. The lagged dependent variables is always significant and positive, in all our specifications the coefficients are in the neighborhood of 0.7. The control variables are overall slightly more significant than in the previous set of equations and still present the same signs. Surprisingly the coefficient of GDP per capita is negative and significant, this can be related with efficiency hypothesis, where in order to compete and attract tax base countries have to lower taxes and public expenditures. Table 4c reports the results for the dynamic model using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Comparing table 4b and 4c, we note that the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are higher in table 4c, as we expected. The interaction coefficients are also higher and always significant, and also it is confirmed that GDP and Uniform weights are the ones that perform better. The coefficients of the controls variables present the same trend as in the previous tables. So, in principle, this seems to suggest the idea that either there is a common trend driving public expenditures in the same direction or, alternatively, policy makers follow big countries' behaviors when they decide their public expenditure setting, possible because of yardstick competition. However we need additional tests for confirming the hypothesis, these will be the subject of our next section.

Table 5 presents regression results for public expenditure in Defence, an *a priori* analysis of the characteristics of these type of expenditure suggests that it very unlikely that we are in the presence of expenditure competition hypothesis; the more likely strategic

¹⁷Garrett and Mitchell (2001) find a negative relationship between government spending and openness to trade in OECD countries. One possible explanation for this result is the so called "efficiency effect": high taxation (especially of capital income) reduces the competitiveness of national firms in international markets and returns to investors so that there is an incentive for government to lower taxes and public expenditures (also because of internal and external pressures).

behavior could be either due to yardstick competition or driven by fiscal externality, unless it is just a common trend. Since in the period taken into account all the countries in the sample were "friends" the possible externality would have to be a positive one, so the regression coefficients should be negative; i.e. if neighbors higher expenditures in defence a state can lower its expenditures because it is protected by its "friend", and it can free ride. However, as we can see from the tables, this is not our case: the coefficient of the interaction terms are always positive and significant in all our specifications. Table 5a present the static version of the model, the coefficient of the interaction terms are always very high (higher than the same model in table 1). The weights that presents better results are *Openness* (0.819) and *Uniform* (0.777). The demographic controls suggest that expenditures are lower when the proportion of young people is high, this may reflect the preference of this group of people toward this type of expenditures, and in large countries, probably because of economies of scale. The set of political variables weakly suggests that the proportion of women in parliament lower these expenditures, election instead have opposite results. Being an EU member also increases public expenditures in defence. Finally, countries with higher GDP and more open have higher expenditure in defence.

Tables 5b and 5c present the dynamic version of the model. As expected the lagged dependent variables is always positive and significant, but lower than the equivalent table 4b. The interaction terms are always significant and positive; the sets of weights producing better results are as above *Openness* (0.41 in table 2b and 0.37 in table 2c) and *Uniform* (0.38 in table 2b and 0.46 in table 2c).

The results for public expenditures in Health are reported in tables 6. In the static version of the model there is a weak evidence of fiscal interactions in public expenditure on health in European countries. The only set of weights that presents some significant results is GDP distance (coefficient of interaction term is 0.75). The control variables suggest, predictably, on one hand, that being large and rich, a member of EU and ruled by the left wing party determines higher expenditures in health. On the other hand that having a high proportion of women in Parliament and an open economy have a negative impact on Health expenditures. The dynamic version of the model presented in table 6b, confirms and strengthens the suggestion that there are not many interdependencies on health expenditures going on. The lagged dependent variable is always significant and around 0.64 in all our specifications. The control variables present generally the same trend as in the previous set of tables. Similar comments apply to table 6c, where the

GMM estimation is applied; the main difference is that, as expected, the lagged dependent variables have here higher coefficients and the interaction terms lower coefficients than in the corresponding regressions presented in table 6b.

Public expenditures in Education are in *tables 7*. The static version is in table 7a . Here the interaction terms are positive but not very significant, the weights that perform better are geographical distance, GDP and uniform; in the first two cases the coefficient is even bigger than 1. Open countries and EU members have lower expenditures in education, while countries ruled by left wing parties higher. The dynamic versions of the model are in table 7b (IV estimation) and 7c (GMM estimation), where the lagged dependent variable is always positive and very significant and the coefficient is always well above 0.7. The interactions term present positive coefficients but significant only for the case of GDP distance in table 7b, better results instead are presented in table 7c where the interaction term is significant in most of the cases (apart from GDP and EU). The control variables behave in the same way as presented in table 7a.

Tables 1 to 4 have presented preliminary results for aggregated and disaggregated public expenditures, in all our specifications moving from the static version to the dynamic version of the model we improve the estimation because the lagged dependent variable is always very significant and positive, confirming that, like the theory suggests, public expenditure decisions are greatly based on previous years decisions. We also have presented two versions of model (3.2) using different econometric techniques, in both cases the results are quite comparable, and, as we expected, the lagged dependent variables are in most cases higher when GMM estimator is applied. In general GDP, geographical distance and uniform weights are the ones that presents better results, this could, in the first instance, suggests a possible presence of yardstick completion, but further analysis will be developed in the next session.

The results for the statutory corporate tax rate are summarized in *table 8*. For each of the weights we find that the coefficient of the average tax rate of the neighboring countries is always positive and significant and always above 1, which means that if neighbors lower their taxes by 1 point countries react by lowering it more than 1. However the introduction of the lagged dependent variables, presented in tables 5b and 5c, lowers dramatically the interaction coefficient in all our specifications, where the coefficients are in all cases below 0.4, but still significant in all our specifications. The weights that perform better are GDP (coefficient equal to 0.38) Openness (coefficient equal to 0.31), EU (coefficient equal to 0.32) and Uniform (coefficient equal to 0.32). The lagged dependent variable is positive

and significant in all our specifications and it lies between 0.68 and 0.70 in table 8b, and between 0.61 and 0.75 in table 8c. The demographic variables are the ones that are more significant and suggest, surprisingly, that larger countries have lower taxes, and higher proportion of young people higher taxes.

Finally, table 9 presents results for *income tax rate*; the results are very similar to the previous set of tables, where the coefficients of the interaction term are positive, very high and always significant in the static model, and they become much lower in the dynamic version of the model (in this case however the results in tables 9b and 9c differ more). The weights that work better are GDP (0.355), Uniform (0.267) and Openness (0.24), but in tables 6b they are respectively 0.35, 0.26 and 0.24, while in tables 9c they are higher and equal to 0.74, 0.52 and 0.59.

In summary, we can observe that for all the fiscal choices taken in to account, the dynamic specification seem to represent reality better and the interaction terms are always positive and in most of the cases significant. In the next session we carried out additional tests to investigate further the nature of these fiscal interactions.

5.1. Yardstick competition vs other theories

In this section we investigate further interdependences in fiscal choices in order to distinguish different competitive behavior. We try to do this by exploiting the definition of yardstick competition. As we said earlier, yardstick competition occurs when citizens make their voting decisions based on the comparisons of fiscal policies between domestic and neighbor policy makers' choices. Policy-makers anticipate voters behavior and move their policy decisions in the same directions as their neighboring policy makers. If this is the case, policy-makers should be particularly concerned about their neighbor colleagues' actions in the period of elections. A straightforward way of testing for this is to interact the variable A_{it} with the election dummy $elect_{it}$, and estimate two different interaction coefficients, one for the year of election ($elect_{it} * A_{it}$) and one for all the other period $((1 - elect_{it}) * A_{it})$.¹⁸

¹⁸Another possibilities that have been explored but not reported in this paper, is to use instead of election-year dummy the year-before-election dummy, or two run two separate regressions, one for the election years, and the other for the other years. In the first case the results where better using election year interaction, and in the second case we did not want to allow all the other coefficient to vary because we wanted to focus on the interaction coefficient.

So if the hypothesis of yardstick competition were true we should observe the coefficient of $elect_{it} * A_{it}$, being higher and more significant than the coefficient of $(1 - elect_{it}) * A_{it}$. There should not be instead any different behavior in election time for the other type of fiscal interdependences.

The results for this version of the model are reported in *table 10*. We present the results using the dynamic version of the model because it is the one that better represents reality, we report the regression results only for the IV estimation. We note that the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is always positive and significant in all our specifications. We focus our analysis on the comparison of the interaction term coefficients. If we look at *table 7* we can clearly see that the coefficient of $elect_{it} * A_{it}$ for aggregated public expenditure is always much higher and more significant than the one of $(1 - elect_{it}) * A_{it}$. So public expenditures setting is much more dependent on neighbors in the period of election, in particular with respect to GDP (coefficient equal 0.66) and geographical distance weights (coefficient equal 0.63). This is a clear indication of yardstick competition that occur mainly with respect to important and geographically close countries, which is still consistent with the theory of yardstick competition because it is easier for people to compare fiscal choice of countries for whom information are more widespread. If we look at the results for disaggregated public expenditures we can see that this result is weakly confirmed for expenditures in Education and Defence, where the eA_{it} coefficients are higher than neA_{it} but their significance is generally lower. There is no sign of yardstick competition for expenditure in Health, a common intellectual trend seems to be the most likely explanation.

On the tax side, the interaction coefficients for statutory taxes do not present a clear pattern, as we expected *a priori*, so we can clearly reject the yardstick competition hypothesis, the most likely explanation is tax competition, which is driven by leader countries, since the weight that perform better is GDP weight. For income taxes, for which there a theoretical possibility of yardstick competition, given the nature of these taxes, the results are not completely clear, they weakly support the hypothesis of yardstick competition. The election year interaction coefficient are much higher than the non-election ones, but they are not statistically highly significant. The weight that performs better is the GDP weight (coefficient equal to 1.83), but we cannot rule completely out the hypothesis of common trends.

5.2. Does the EU matter?

Finally, our last task is to investigate whether or not being a member of the European Union has an effect on government behavior, either in the sense of making fiscal choices more or less interdependent on other partners. Note that in our dataset at the beginning of the period only six¹⁹ countries out of seventeen were EU members and at the end they all had joined the EU but Switzerland and Norway.

In the first instance, one may think that it more likely that EU members are more interdependent because they move in a similar competitive and institutional environment and are subject to similar budget and political constraints, moreover policy makers have more occasions to meet and discuss formally or informally their plans. However it is also possible that the opposite can occur, EU non-members are less "protected" than their EU partners and have to operate in a more open and competitive environment, and therefore it is possible that they engage in a more competitive behavior than their EU counterparts. Another possibility is that they may try to mimic EU states behavior because they want to join the EU and therefore they want to convince EU states to accept them.

To test this hypothesis of different competitive behavior between EU members and non-members we proceed similarly as in the previous session, we multiply the EU_{it} dummy by the variable (A_{it}) and we estimate two different coefficients for EU ($EU_{it} * A_{it}$) and non-EU countries ($(1 - EU_{it}) * A_{it}$). The results are reported in *table 11*.

Interactions in disaggregated public expenditures present a very different pattern depending on whether or not a state is member of the European Union: EU states follow mainly "leader" countries and other EU states (which is to some extent overlapping since the largest countries in the sample have been members of the EU since the beginning of the period taken into account), while non-EU states appear to follow mainly more open countries. Moreover, the coefficients of the interaction terms for non-EU states is generally higher than for EU states. This is an indication that non EU states "compete" more with the outside world especially with more globalized partners and then, once they are in the EU, interact less with the outside world but more among each other, even if the level of interaction is lower. So in other words, it seems that the "EU" effect is to lower the level of interaction- competition and redirect it toward other EU members. This is broadly confirmed by expenditures in defence. Public expenditures in education and health present a different pattern; there seem to be an high interdependencies among

¹⁹They were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

EU members but no interdependence at all among non-members, the coefficients are not, however, very significant. Corporate taxes present similar results to aggregated public expenditure where competition is usually higher among non-EU countries especially toward more globalized countries, while EU members compete mainly among themselves but with less intensity, which makes the EU a kind of "safer" environment for countries to compete. A different picture emerges instead from the results for income taxes, there is a very low interaction among EU members and very high among non EU; this could work like a way for future EU members to signal that they are ready to join because their fiscal policy are very aligned with the EU, and once they are in, they behave more freely.

6. Summary and Conclusion

In this paper we have estimated reaction functions for a set of fiscal variables, both on the expenditure and tax side. The aim of the paper was three-fold; first to determine whether or not these reaction functions have a non-zero slope, second to investigate their nature (in case they exist), third to examine if there is an EU effect.

The theory mainly distinguishes between four theoretical models of competitive behavior which generate similar empirical specifications. In order to assess whether these interactions exist because governments try to attract tax bases (tax competition), to please voters (yardstick competition), or because there exist fiscal externalities, or just because of a common trend. We have relied on *a priori* hypothesis based on the characteristics of the above mentioned fiscal choices and then carried out some additional estimations.

First, with respect to corporate taxes, consistently with the previous empirical studies on tax competition, we have found that the slope of the reaction function is generally positive and significant. In particular, the regression results suggest that tax competition occurs in Europe mainly with respect to big "leader" countries.

Second, we have found evidence of a similar governments' behavior in income taxes' setting and public expenditures' decisions. In both cases the reaction functions are always positively sloped and the weights that perform better are those based on GDP and geographical distance; in addition to this, if we interact A_{it} with the election dummy and we re-estimated the model, this coefficient is always higher and more significant than the one interacted with the non-election dummy, this is especially true for aggregated public expenditures. This seems to confirm our *a priori* hypotheses about a possible existence of

yardstick competition among European countries, with respect to geographically close and “leader” countries. Moreover, consistently with our expectations, the results for disaggregated public expenditures suggest that governments behave strategically mainly with respect to those expenditures which are more directly comparable such as expenditures in education.

Finally, interesting and surprisingly, we have found the countries are interdependent with each other before they join the EU, and then, once they are in, they behave more independently. This behavior is possibly due to the fact that countries who want to join the EU want to show to other EU members that they have "aligned" policies for being accepted and also because the EU as an Institution provides a safer environment where countries need to compete less with the outside and more among themselves.

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Appendix

Table 2. Summary Statistics and Data Sources.

Variable	Definition	Source	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
TOT* _{it}	Per Capita Aggregated Public Expenditure	IMF- GFS	510	7765.738	3510.021	1454.487	17815.45
DEF* _{it}	Per Capita Public Expenditures in Defense	IMF- GFS	510	453.2789	218.6797	94.99315	950.9248
EDU* _{it}	Per Capita Public Expenditures in Education	IMF- GFS	510	673.6145	431.9319	42.18002	1744.896
HEA* _{it}	Per Capita Public Expenditures in Health	IMF- GFS	510	692.8419	578.5732	14.13589	2611.358
CAPTAX _{it}	Statutory Corporate Tax rate	OTPR at otpr.org	510	0.5633353	0.1633065	0.115	0.91
TIN _{it}	Top Income Tax rate	OTPR at otpr.org	510	0.3711412	0.1144252	0.03	0.56
TRADEGDP _{it}	Total Trade as proportion of GDP	WB-WDI	510	74.77028	42.36072	26.1591	258.9947
FDIGDP _{it}	FDI inflows as proportion of GDP	WB-WDI	418	1.539613	3.458893	-.6727549	56.86825
PYOUNG _{it}	Proportion of population less than 14 yrs old	WB-WDI	510	20.819	3.555802	14.37633	31.32965
POLD _{it}	Proportion of population more than 65 yrs old	WB-WDI	510	13.767	1.880502	9.161963	17.89806
PDENS _{it}	Population Density	WB-WDI	510	131.2181	111.6224	11.88694	466.4994
PFEM _{it}	Proportion of women	WB-WDI	510	51.09029	0.6623244	49.7279	52.8862
POPUL _{it}	Total population	WB-WDI	510	21,800,000.00	24,100,000.00	339,800.00	82,100,000.00
GDPPC* _{it}	GDP per capita	WB-WDI	509	21700.75	9900.295	5947.931	71575.19
GOVPARTY _{it}	Left party members in the Government (from 0 to 5)	CPD	491	2.610	1.413	1	5
ELECT _{it}	Election year Dummy	CPD	510	.282	.450	0	1

* Variables are expressed at prices 95.

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Fiscal Variables: mean by Countries.

State	TOT* _{it}	DEF* _{it}	EDU* _{it}	HEA* _{it}	CAPTAX _{it}	TIN _{it}
AUT	8926.44	238.934	851.7853	1118.16	0.58	0.45
BEL	10789.4	544.9941	1395.03	184.3257	0.64	0.42
CHE	8840.73	765.1275	268.4094	1441.846	0.25	0.11
DEU	7033.48	523.1541	52.79612	1296.287	0.55	0.50
DNK	11099.6	608.4646	1183.706	238.782	0.56	0.39
ESP	3532.13	155.4136	196.6576	209.1964	0.60	0.34
FIN	7075.57	335.3861	929.0599	527.0771	0.50	0.36
FRA	9369.96	604.835	745.8128	1651.906	0.59	0.44
GBR	6060.55	698.9667	175.8224	813.8511	0.61	0.43
GRC	3471.73	380.0008	314.9144	292.8287	0.56	0.42
IRL	4906.49	185.3613	688.9524	792.3411	0.61	0.42
ITA	6792.71	247.9011	590.5705	734.663	0.62	0.30
LUX	11511.5	245.1886	1061.874	287.7775	0.55	0.37
NLD	10782.6	575.3349	1289.345	1340.934	0.64	0.42
NOR	9473.67	734.8749	605.7893	500.7318	0.45	0.28
PRT	2965.88	203.3218	261.4009	208.2823	0.64	0.28
SWE	9385.03	658.4817	839.5212	139.3221	0.63	0.38

Table 4. Aggregated public expenditures

**Table 4a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.899 [3.52]***	0.797 [2.94]***	0.777 [2.85]**	0.97 [3.16]***	0.582 [3.23]***	0.569 [3.27]***
$elect_{it}$	-51.313 [0.51]	-41.917 [0.42]	-49.358 [0.47]	-45.702 [0.45]	-36.095 [0.36]	-49.707 [0.49]
$womenparl_{it}$	25.376 [1.04]	25.443 [1.04]	27.076 [1.02]	25.809 [1.08]	16.817 [0.67]	23.308 [1.01]
$govparty_{it}$	45.57 [1.22]	46.727 [1.27]	47.221 [1.22]	47.742 [1.40]	37.344 [0.95]	42.93 [1.18]
EU_{it}	256.998 [1.17]	216.812 [0.97]	320.231 [1.24]	268.78 [1.18]	249.732 [1.07]	243.196 [1.09]
$gdppc_{it}$	-0.108 [1.47]	-0.099 [1.15]	-0.128 [1.78]*	-0.113 [1.40]	-0.125 [1.40]	-0.118 [1.55]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-15.987 [0.90]	-16.482 [0.91]	-21.68 [1.22]	-19.638 [1.09]	-31.349 [1.75]	-15.615 [0.86]
$pyoung_{it}$	-161.237 [1.06]	-172.125 [1.16]	-104.924 [0.61]	-268.21 [1.68]	-365.894 [2.42]**	-208.562 [1.40]
$pold_{it}$	-140.047 [0.78]	-161.451 [0.83]	-59.301 [0.30]	-191.812 [1.03]	-297.172 [1.47]	-160.741 [0.86]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	0.423 [1.88]*	0.442 [2.06]*	0.354 [1.54]	0.551 [2.54]**	0.542 [2.70]**	0.441 [2.07]*
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 4b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(LSDV-IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.697 [10.62]***	0.717 [12.03]***	0.722 [11.64]***	0.711 [10.97]***	0.736 [13.52]***	0.705 [11.38]***
$elect_{it}$	0.424 [2.25]**	0.318 [2.07]*	0.259 [1.77]*	0.438 [1.86]*	0.199 [2.18]**	0.285 [2.00]*
$womenparl_{it}$	-44.492 [0.44]	-47.292 [0.41]	-45.967 [0.42]	-42.771 [0.38]	-47.903 [0.43]	-47.903 [0.43]
$govparty_{it}$	9.169 [0.54]	7.79 [0.48]	7.255 [0.45]	8.973 [0.58]	3.741 [0.22]	8.545 [0.54]
EU_{it}	46.422 [1.39]	46.317 [1.42]	45.693 [1.36]	47.344 [1.43]	42.573 [1.34]	45.499 [1.37]
$gdppc_{it}$	100.858 [1.00]	78.592 [0.87]	111.907 [1.09]	103.974 [1.05]	85.996 [1.01]	94.698 [0.94]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-0.118 [5.89]***	-0.12 [5.26]***	-0.137 [6.67]***	-0.121 [4.80]***	-0.134 [5.67]***	-0.119 [5.58]***
$pyoung_{it}$	-13.398 [1.24]	-14.108 [1.29]	-16.42 [1.45]	-15.084 [1.38]	-19.537 [1.66]	-12.83 [1.22]
$pold_{it}$	-130.6 [1.97]*	-149.572 [2.22]**	-142.816 [1.97]*	-181.644 [2.60]**	-225.765 [2.97]***	-145.571 [2.31]**
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	-80.643 [0.81]	-88.994 [0.87]	-55.253 [0.59]	-102.822 [1.00]	-134.145 [1.30]	-89.131 [0.87]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 4c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.822 [9.81]***	0.791 [10.25]***	0.785 [7.98]***	0.873 [19.03]***	0.967 [14.33]***	0.921 [18.75]***
$elect_{it}$	0.610 [2.05]**	0.624 [2.08]**	0.466 [2.04]**	0.606 [2.61]***	0.223 [2.16]**	0.295 [2.07]**
$womenparl_{it}$	-18.212 [0.19]	-38.253 [0.38]	-26.296 [0.29]	-23.946 [0.27]	-22.886 [0.25]	-37.248 [0.35]
$govparty_{it}$	41.842 [1.57]	10.127 [0.43]	-12.121 [0.50]	21.732 [1.06]	10.755 [0.36]	36.615 [1.73]*
EU_{it}	37.606 [0.85]	4.611 [0.18]	25.298 [0.68]	16.310 [0.55]	25.215 [0.68]	21.063 [0.79]
$gdppc_{it}$	254.751 [0.78]	379.126 [1.11]	277.501 [0.99]	200.068 [0.81]	63.175 [0.36]	281.659 [0.86]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-0.072 [1.57]	0.008 [0.24]	-0.054 [0.90]	-0.062 [1.48]	-0.138 [3.18]***	-0.044 [1.91]*
$pyoung_{it}$	-6.997 [0.86]	-8.703 [1.15]	-8.644 [1.24]	-11.118 [1.49]	-22.054 [2.02]**	-13.666 [1.34]
$pold_{it}$	31.688 [0.75]	22.262 [0.81]	4.548 [0.16]	-34.731 [0.99]	-8.731 [0.23]	-57.727 [1.08]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	-170.166 [0.89]	6.688 [0.08]	30.993 [0.73]	-122.880 [1.26]	-145.334 [1.19]	-180.735 [0.84]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.01	0.009	0.013	0.027	0.22	0.018
AR(1) (p>z)	0.067	0.065	0.097	0.069	0.069	0.5
AR(2) (p>z)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hansen p-value						

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 5. Public Expenditures in Defence

**Table 5a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
A _{it-1}						
WA _{it}	0.777 [5.26]***	0.640 [6.17]***	0.623 [5.63]***	0.580 [5.33]***	0.425 [3.91]***	0.819 [5.58]***
elect _{it}	1.152 [0.72]	1.285 [0.78]	0.842 [0.44]	1.351 [0.81]	2.402 [1.35]	1.448 [0.90]
womenparl _{it}	-1.072 [0.54]	-1.406 [0.66]	-1.898 [0.87]	-1.230 [0.62]	-1.157 [0.47]	-1.198 [0.57]
govparty _{it}	1.946 [0.68]	2.134 [0.75]	2.159 [0.76]	1.627 [0.59]	1.712 [0.65]	1.855 [0.66]
EU _{it}	16.797 [1.45]	17.748 [1.45]	22.936 [1.75]*	16.297 [1.52]	17.112 [1.57]	16.603 [1.50]
gdppc _{it}	0.007 [1.53]	0.007 [1.65]	0.006 [1.38]	0.007 [1.65]	0.007 [1.35]	0.007 [1.41]
tradegdpi _{it-1}	-0.331 [0.92]	-0.388 [1.08]	-0.363 [1.02]	-0.446 [1.13]	-0.752 [1.49]	-0.635 [1.63]
pyoung _{it}	-16.418 [2.20]**	-18.692 [2.52]**	-18.540 [2.44]**	-14.846 [2.10]*	-29.116 [3.58]***	-18.593 [2.43]**
pold _{it}	14.248 [1.43]	12.044 [1.25]	14.747 [1.44]	14.953 [1.52]	2.354 [0.23]	11.466 [1.15]
popul _{it} *10 ⁴	-0.302 [3.25]***	-0.281 [3.10]***	-0.293 [2.73]**	-0.340 [3.81]***	-0.255 [2.82]**	-0.285 [3.02]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 5b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(LSDV-IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
A _{it-1}						
WA _{it}	0.532 [6.41]***	0.551 [6.65]***	0.571 [6.78]***	0.534 [6.42]***	0.582 [7.22]***	0.540 [6.58]***
elect _{it}	0.386 [4.44]***	0.295 [4.93]***	0.272 [3.84]***	0.277 [4.95]***	0.202 [4.06]***	0.416 [5.09]***
womenparl _{it}	3.152 [1.41]	3.299 [1.44]	3.183 [1.32]	3.269 [1.45]	3.911 [1.64]	3.315 [1.48]
govparty _{it}	-0.328 [0.27]	-0.443 [0.36]	-0.628 [0.51]	-0.388 [0.32]	-0.298 [0.22]	-0.378 [0.31]
EU _{it}	1.035 [0.63]	1.079 [0.67]	1.052 [0.65]	0.868 [0.55]	0.846 [0.57]	0.980 [0.61]
gdppc _{it}	7.620 [1.35]	7.821 [1.38]	9.706 [1.58]	7.457 [1.50]	6.821 [1.39]	7.328 [1.40]
tradegdpi _{it-1}	0.004 [1.92]*	0.004 [2.01]*	0.004 [1.76]*	0.004 [2.07]*	0.004 [1.78]*	0.004 [1.82]*
pyoung _{it}	0.126 [0.69]	0.126 [0.73]	0.158 [1.02]	0.082 [0.44]	-0.041 [0.16]	-0.029 [0.15]
pold _{it}	-5.816 [1.29]	-6.910 [1.58]	-6.483 [1.50]	-5.450 [1.28]	-10.354 [2.31]**	-6.396 [1.37]
popul _{it} *10 ⁴	13.048 [2.03]*	11.753 [1.92]*	12.908 [2.12]*	13.156 [2.12]*	7.518 [1.30]	11.782 [1.88]*
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 5c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
A _{it-1}						
WA _{it}	0.566 [5.40]***	0.725 [10.20]***	0.707 [10.59]***	0.671 [8.38]***	0.750 [9.11]***	0.683 [8.37]***
elect _{it}	0.462 [4.24]***	0.261 [4.95]***	0.241 [3.30]***	0.271 [4.10]***	0.220 [5.20]***	0.375 [5.78]***
womenparl _{it}	3.855 [1.31]	3.946 [1.32]	4.179 [1.38]	4.779 [1.62]	4.868 [1.78]*	4.246 [1.55]
govparty _{it}	1.775 [0.90]	0.249 [0.21]	0.393 [0.28]	0.013 [0.01]	0.346 [0.30]	0.936 [0.67]
EU _{it}	1.960 [1.25]	0.748 [0.65]	1.370 [1.15]	1.564 [1.30]	1.322 [1.05]	1.716 [1.43]
gdppc _{it}	-9.961 [0.62]	1.396 [0.17]	-4.125 [0.60]	-12.946 [1.17]	-9.752 [0.98]	-10.981 [1.11]
tradegdpi _{it-1}	0.006 [3.23]***	0.004 [2.75]***	0.005 [3.02]***	0.004 [2.47]**	0.005 [3.07]***	0.006 [6.29]***
pyoung _{it}	1.026 [3.37]***	0.805 [2.97]***	0.732 [2.73]***	0.859 [2.81]***	0.317 [1.22]	0.561 [2.45]**
pold _{it}	0.418 [0.12]	1.481 [0.60]	-1.569 [0.60]	2.586 [0.98]	-0.415 [0.22]	0.696 [0.29]
popul _{it} *10 ⁴	20.387 [3.05]***	16.153 [4.48]***	14.921 [2.19]**	21.745 [3.56]***	15.368 [4.40]***	19.405 [3.47]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.008	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.011	0.012
AR(1) (p>z)	0.322	0.226	0.232	0.271	0.233	0.265
AR(2) (p>z)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hansen p-value						

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 6. Public Expenditures in Health

**Table 6a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.805 [1.20]	0.811 [1.50]	0.745 [2.39]**	0.311 [0.93]	0.477 [1.76]*	0.895 [1.19]
$elect_{it}$	3.882 [0.47]	3.179 [0.39]	6.227 [0.67]	4.138 [0.53]	6.119 [0.75]	4.653 [0.55]
$womenparl_{it}$	-15.026 [2.34]**	-14.628 [2.31]**	-12.881 [2.03]*	-14.195 [2.30]**	-13.397 [2.26]**	-14.732 [2.33]**
$govparty_{it}$	18.048 [1.94]*	16.264 [1.68]	20.712 [2.45]**	17.190 [1.82]*	17.282 [1.85]*	18.701 [2.02]*
EU_{it}	48.053 [0.73]	48.223 [0.71]	36.844 [0.58]	49.362 [0.72]	49.224 [0.74]	50.411 [0.73]
$gdppc_{it}$	0.044 [1.86]*	0.045 [1.90]*	0.053 [2.19]**	0.044 [2.12]*	0.046 [2.46]**	0.043 [1.90]*
$fdigdpi_{t-1}$	-36.834 [1.88]*	-38.997 [1.81]*	-33.911 [1.57]	-38.981 [1.86]*	-39.888 [1.84]*	-41.116 [1.85]*
$pyoung_{it}$	-15.382 [0.72]	-22.520 [1.03]	-26.717 [1.15]	-23.737 [1.20]	-17.557 [0.85]	-24.280 [1.16]
$pold_{it}$	-23.570 [0.69]	-29.764 [0.82]	-30.814 [0.88]	-27.676 [0.86]	-26.846 [0.84]	-36.241 [1.04]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^4$	0.962 [3.71]***	0.895 [3.23]***	0.865 [3.05]***	0.996 [4.06]***	0.908 [3.30]***	0.970 [3.63]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 6b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.649 [14.54]***	0.648 [14.62]***	0.638 [14.12]***	0.641 [14.13]***	0.640 [13.96]***	0.651 [15.27]***
A_{it}	0.391 [0.86]	0.272 [0.88]	0.216 [1.13]	0.140 [0.84]	0.290 [1.19]	0.631 [1.15]
$elect_{it}$	1.864 [0.30]	1.487 [0.25]	2.382 [0.40]	1.945 [0.32]	3.321 [0.50]	2.556 [0.38]
$womenparl_{it}$	-9.904 [2.67]**	-9.778 [2.73]**	-9.394 [2.63]**	-9.606 [2.75]**	-8.995 [2.56]**	-9.680 [2.59]**
$govparty_{it}$	10.603 [2.32]**	9.934 [2.28]**	11.396 [2.61]**	10.297 [2.33]**	10.319 [2.39]**	11.179 [2.42]**
EU_{it}	42.248 [1.15]	40.893 [1.14]	37.216 [1.08]	42.590 [1.19]	44.301 [1.27]	46.224 [1.15]
$gdppc_{it}$	0.017 [1.38]	0.016 [1.40]	0.018 [1.55]	0.017 [1.51]	0.019 [2.00]*	0.018 [1.50]
$fdigdpi_{t-1}$	-32.873 [1.69]	-34.203 [1.67]	-32.881 [1.54]	-34.032 [1.66]	-34.329 [1.63]	-34.997 [1.63]
$pyoung_{it}$	-13.989 [1.29]	-16.680 [1.42]	-17.723 [1.58]	-17.918 [1.47]	-15.213 [1.35]	-19.923 [1.50]
$pold_{it}$	-10.128 [0.61]	-12.673 [0.83]	-12.862 [0.80]	-12.226 [0.81]	-12.030 [0.79]	-18.485 [1.15]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^4$	0.709 [4.22]***	0.686 [4.43]***	0.686 [4.53]***	0.728 [4.16]***	0.681 [4.09]***	0.714 [4.10]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 6c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Competition
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP Distance	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.806 [18.88]***	0.707 [7.98]***	0.737 [7.54]***	0.744 [7.59]***	0.754 [7.87]***	0.762 [8.86]***
A_{it}	0.167 [0.70]	0.082 [0.20]	0.196 [0.72]	0.128 [0.50]	0.218 [0.56]	0.239 [0.56]
$elect_{it}$	1.320 [0.12]	0.184 [0.03]	-0.504 [0.08]	1.976 [0.29]	2.566 [0.35]	1.328 [0.21]
$womenparl_{it}$	-5.151 [2.72]***	-13.119 [3.04]***	-17.448 [2.74]***	-9.789 [1.46]	-10.562 [1.64]	-12.900 [2.46]**
$govparty_{it}$	5.669 [1.43]	4.076 [1.03]	4.761 [0.99]	8.258 [1.49]	7.638 [1.41]	5.856 [1.13]
EU_{it}	28.587 [1.19]	57.693 [1.18]	164.563 [1.27]	104.718 [0.87]	114.875 [1.00]	95.447 [1.20]
$gdppc_{it}$	0.011 [2.09]**	0.018 [2.26]**	0.033 [2.15]**	0.032 [1.57]	0.033 [1.72]*	0.020 [1.70]*
$fdigdpi_{t-1}$	-33.483 [6.37]***	-49.880 [2.36]**	-54.555 [2.10]**	-49.977 [1.79]*	-49.846 [1.77]*	-47.205 [1.97]**
$pyoung_{it}$	1.482 [0.28]	20.114 [1.47]	33.102 [1.86]*	9.154 [0.64]	12.229 [0.98]	10.771 [1.15]
$pold_{it}$	-18.468 [1.78]*	-32.749 [1.51]	-49.241 [1.21]	-36.362 [1.41]	-36.590 [1.41]	-37.998 [1.55]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^4$	0.000 [3.66]***	0.000 [1.16]	0.000 [1.00]	0.000 [1.52]	0.000 [1.46]	0.000 [1.39]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared						
AR(1) (p>z)	0.002	0.029	0.052	0.047	0.053	0.045
AR(2) (p>z)	0.361	0.28	0.233	0.246	0.236	0.258
Hansen p-value	1	1	1	1	1	1

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 7. Public Expenditures in Education

**Table 7a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.876 [2.87]**	1.176 [2.33]**	0.752 [1.59]	1.791 [1.79]*	0.549 [1.66]	0.587 [2.57]**
$elect_{it}$	-3.997 [0.55]	-2.520 [0.34]	-2.543 [0.30]	-3.781 [0.52]	-3.190 [0.41]	-4.057 [0.56]
$womenparl_{it}$	0.130 [0.02]	-0.166 [0.03]	1.284 [0.22]	0.836 [0.15]	-0.399 [0.08]	0.064 [0.01]
$govparty_{it}$	8.386 [1.45]	8.198 [1.43]	8.498 [1.49]	8.778 [1.55]	7.153 [1.14]	7.815 [1.36]
EU_{it}	-110.967 [1.92]*	-113.662 [1.98]*	-81.542 [1.37]	-108.785 [1.86]*	-105.788 [1.68]	-108.377 [1.88]*
$gdppc_{it}$	0.007 [1.54]	0.012 [1.69]	0.004 [0.98]	0.008 [1.42]	0.005 [0.91]	0.008 [1.52]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-2.046 [1.64]	-1.549 [1.01]	-2.598 [1.88]*	-2.375 [1.86]*	-3.246 [2.67]**	-2.118 [1.70]
$pyoung_{it}$	-12.043 [0.73]	-9.350 [0.57]	-3.279 [0.22]	-15.695 [0.96]	-31.414 [1.50]	-15.106 [0.89]
$pold_{it}$	-31.986 [0.87]	-36.948 [0.85]	-27.145 [0.74]	-38.498 [1.01]	-42.985 [1.03]	-33.279 [0.90]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	-0.247 [0.10]	-1.350 [0.52]	-1.715 [0.76]	-0.892 [0.40]	0.769 [0.32]	0.039 [0.02]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 7b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.794 [12.85]***	0.792 [12.68]***	0.780 [11.98]***	0.793 [12.83]***	0.791 [12.81]***	0.792 [12.58]***
A_{it}	0.263 [1.31]	0.143 [0.97]	0.129 [1.94]*	0.307 [1.23]	0.068 [0.67]	0.235 [1.36]
$elect_{it}$	-2.105 [0.32]	-2.100 [0.32]	-2.022 [0.30]	-2.195 [0.33]	-2.181 [0.33]	-2.044 [0.31]
$womenparl_{it}$	0.516 [0.21]	0.338 [0.14]	0.602 [0.24]	0.535 [0.22]	0.313 [0.13]	0.559 [0.23]
$govparty_{it}$	5.961 [2.26]**	5.757 [2.29]**	5.875 [2.25]**	5.897 [2.25]**	5.630 [2.24]**	5.839 [2.27]**
EU_{it}	-14.836 [0.72]	-14.153 [0.69]	-10.438 [0.53]	-13.739 [0.68]	-13.269 [0.66]	-14.856 [0.73]
$gdppc_{it}$	-0.002 [0.50]	-0.002 [0.52]	-0.003 [0.75]	-0.002 [0.57]	-0.003 [0.64]	-0.001 [0.36]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-1.862 [3.08]***	-1.957 [3.02]***	-2.081 [2.87]**	-2.031 [2.94]***	-2.165 [2.87]**	-1.809 [3.10]***
$pyoung_{it}$	-14.535 [1.84]*	-15.549 [1.87]*	-14.044 [1.83]*	-16.137 [1.94]*	-18.277 [2.05]*	-15.014 [1.86]*
$pold_{it}$	-12.298 [1.06]	-11.767 [1.03]	-10.888 [0.98]	-12.589 [1.13]	-12.561 [1.08]	-13.529 [1.11]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	0.796 [0.69]	0.846 [0.70]	0.669 [0.61]	0.822 [0.69]	0.110 [0.86]	0.811 [0.70]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 7c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.735 [9.54]***	0.808 [10.65]***	0.811 [18.64]***	0.869 [10.64]***	0.885 [13.13]***	0.793 [13.12]***
A_{it}	0.615 [1.82]*	0.703 [1.97]**	0.461 [2.05]**	1.109 [1.32]	0.209 [1.32]	0.599 [1.82]*
$elect_{it}$	-0.831 [0.13]	0.475 [0.08]	-0.540 [0.09]	-1.559 [0.27]	-0.977 [0.17]	-1.235 [0.20]
$womenparl_{it}$	-1.103 [0.21]	0.663 [0.20]	-0.247 [0.04]	1.284 [0.30]	3.022 [0.82]	3.619 [0.58]
$govparty_{it}$	4.734 [1.70]*	7.274 [1.59]	4.475 [1.21]	3.781 [1.42]	4.734 [1.94]*	2.641 [0.65]
EU_{it}	-27.396 [0.73]	-2.990 [0.09]	22.150 [0.58]	26.891 [0.49]	12.939 [0.29]	28.669 [0.53]
$gdppc_{it}$	0.013 [2.40]**	0.016 [2.40]**	0.008 [1.51]	0.008 [1.21]	0.007 [1.29]	0.015 [2.40]**
$tradegdpi_{it-1}$	-1.271 [1.73]*	-2.211 [2.34]**	-3.260 [2.76]***	-2.676 [2.71]***	-2.809 [2.48]**	-1.632 [1.79]*
$pyoung_{it}$	-16.788 [1.74]*	-31.341 [1.96]*	-22.708 [1.71]*	-26.385 [2.45]**	-30.786 [2.43]**	-30.422 [2.63]***
$pold_{it}$	-23.518 [0.77]	-25.378 [1.21]	-41.205 [1.22]	-24.922 [0.76]	-30.465 [0.83]	-48.753 [1.04]
$popul_{it} \cdot 10^3$	0.000 [1.28]	0.000 [0.36]	0.000 [0.62]	0.000 [0.79]	0.000 [0.96]	0.000 [0.03]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.079	0.052	0.068	0.063	0.07	0.09
AR(1) (p>z)	0.315	0.245	0.279	0.277	0.331	0.287
AR(2) (p>z)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hansen p-value						

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 8. Statutory Tax Rates

**Table 8a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	1.113 [5.40]***	1.063 [4.20]***	1.065 [4.11]***	1.283 [6.24]***	1.124 [5.35]***	1.154 [5.24]***
$elect_{it}$	0.001 [0.26]	0.001 [0.29]	0.000 [0.01]	0.001 [0.19]	0.001 [0.42]	0.001 [0.26]
$womenparl_{it-1}$	0.244 [0.13]	0.217 [0.11]	1.309 [0.63]	0.712 [0.33]	0.856 [0.44]	0.287 [0.15]
$govparty_{it}$	-0.001 [0.15]	-0.001 [0.41]	-0.002 [0.54]	0.000 [0.02]	0.000 [0.14]	-0.001 [0.16]
EU_{it}	0.001 [0.07]	0.003 [0.12]	0.000 [0.02]	0.001 [0.06]	-0.001 [0.07]	0.000 [0.01]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	0.034 [0.10]	-0.079 [0.20]	0.065 [0.17]	0.193 [0.59]	0.128 [0.38]	0.106 [0.30]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.064 [0.09]	0.271 [0.30]	-0.195 [0.24]	0.361 [0.51]	0.271 [0.38]	0.000 [0.00]
$pyoung_{it}$	0.014 [1.77]*	0.011 [1.31]	0.011 [1.25]	0.018 [2.35]**	0.015 [1.82]*	0.013 [1.54]
$pold_{it}$	0.004 [0.41]	-0.001 [0.08]	-0.007 [0.90]	0.002 [0.20]	-0.001 [0.09]	0.001 [0.14]
$popul_{it}10^7$	-0.389 [4.28]***	-0.374 [3.50]***	-0.397 [3.43]***	-0.510 [5.07]***	-0.436 [4.22]***	-0.385 [4.00]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 8b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.685 [19.46]***	0.703 [23.78]***	0.698 [20.76]***	0.684 [19.33]***	0.689 [21.46]***	0.693 [20.99]***
A_{it}	0.329 [3.32]***	0.265 [2.97]***	0.274 [2.60]**	0.378 [3.63]***	0.321 [3.79]***	0.310 [3.20]***
$elect_{it}$	-0.002 [0.75]	-0.002 [0.75]	-0.003 [0.83]	-0.002 [0.76]	-0.002 [0.69]	-0.002 [0.75]
$womenparl_{it-1}$	0.235 [0.39]	0.238 [0.42]	0.519 [0.79]	0.380 [0.57]	0.416 [0.67]	0.255 [0.44]
$govparty_{it}$	0.001 [0.56]	0.001 [0.45]	0.000 [0.28]	0.001 [0.63]	0.001 [0.56]	0.001 [0.56]
EU_{it}	0.005 [0.55]	0.005 [0.64]	0.005 [0.52]	0.005 [0.55]	0.004 [0.49]	0.005 [0.57]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	-0.129 [1.14]	-0.177 [1.52]	-0.137 [1.12]	-0.824 [0.68]	-0.106 [0.98]	-0.121 [1.05]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.198 [0.59]	0.301 [0.85]	0.176 [0.53]	0.287 [0.91]	0.267 [0.82]	0.215 [0.63]
$pyoung_{it}$	0.009 [3.49]***	0.008 [2.93]***	0.008 [2.65]**	0.010 [3.75]***	0.009 [3.19]***	0.008 [3.13]***
$pold_{it}$	0.005 [0.96]	0.003 [0.67]	0.002 [0.43]	0.004 [0.86]	0.003 [0.66]	0.004 [0.80]
$popul_{it}10^7$	-0.195 [5.54]***	-0.184 [5.25]***	-0.191 [5.67]***	-0.230 [5.88]***	-0.206 [5.18]***	-0.190 [5.17]***
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 8c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.616 [5.63]***	0.749 [12.91]***	0.699 [8.47]***	0.716 [9.46]***	0.711 [10.18]***	0.635 [7.50]***
A_{it}	0.371 [2.34]**	0.231 [2.07]**	0.274 [1.95]*	0.207 [1.56]	0.247 [1.84]*	0.345 [1.97]**
$elect_{it}$	-0.003 [0.91]	-0.003 [0.76]	-0.003 [0.77]	-0.003 [0.69]	-0.002 [0.70]	-0.003 [0.76]
$womenparl_{it-1}$	0.000 [0.08]	-0.001 [1.01]	0.001 [0.59]	0.000 [0.24]	-0.001 [0.37]	0.000 [0.03]
$govparty_{it}$	0.000 [0.16]	0.000 [0.31]	0.000 [0.10]	0.000 [0.34]	-0.001 [0.53]	-0.001 [0.58]
EU_{it}	0.059 [1.24]	0.018 [1.53]	0.012 [1.18]	0.045 [1.51]	0.028 [1.50]	0.040 [1.35]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	0.002 [0.78]	0.001 [0.41]	0.000 [0.05]	0.000 [0.01]	0.003 [0.81]	0.002 [0.58]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.000 [0.98]	0.000 [0.23]	0.000 [0.36]	0.000 [0.25]	0.000 [0.97]	0.000 [0.63]
$pyoung_{it}$	0.003 [0.55]	0.004 [0.92]	0.004 [0.86]	0.001 [0.29]	0.002 [0.46]	0.001 [0.22]
$pold_{it}$	0.005 [0.37]	0.007 [1.36]	0.012 [1.82]*	0.004 [0.43]	0.006 [0.74]	0.008 [0.73]
$popul_{it}10^7$	0.000 [0.22]	0.000 [2.07]**	0.000 [1.15]	0.000 [1.08]	0.000 [1.74]*	0.000 [0.73]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared						
AR(1) (p>z)	0.1	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.009
AR(2) (p>z)	0.51	0.598	0.612	0.504	0.596	0.597
Hansen p-value	1	1	1	1	1	1

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 9. Income Tax Rates

**Table 9a. Static Model: all sample
(IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}						
A_{it}	0.958 [2.69]**	0.824 [2.63]**	0.576 [2.39]**	1.188 [3.06]**	0.834 [2.83]**	1.015 [2.62]**
$elect_{it}$	-0.003 [0.82]	-0.003 [0.87]	-0.004 [1.48]	-0.004 [1.31]	-0.003 [0.82]	-0.003 [0.83]
$womenparl_{it}$	0.001 [0.19]	0.001 [0.21]	0.002 [0.53]	0.002 [0.38]	0.002 [0.38]	0.001 [0.17]
$govparty_{it}$	0.008 [1.54]	0.008 [1.55]	0.006 [1.22]	0.007 [1.45]	0.008 [1.55]	0.008 [1.52]
EU_{it}	-0.036 [1.25]	-0.038 [1.23]	-0.022 [0.86]	-0.030 [1.14]	-0.039 [1.44]	-0.038 [1.33]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	-0.065 [0.12]	-0.138 [0.26]	-0.154 [0.26]	0.135 [0.23]	0.095 [0.16]	-0.004 [0.01]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.297 [0.23]	0.596 [0.41]	0.974 [0.78]	0.513 [0.46]	0.961 [0.81]	0.214 [0.19]
$pyoung_{it}$	-0.004 [0.24]	0.000 [0.02]	0.005 [0.31]	-0.002 [0.14]	0.006 [0.39]	-0.001 [0.05]
$pold_{it}$	-0.013 [0.37]	-0.011 [0.31]	-0.001 [0.05]	-0.009 [0.28]	-0.009 [0.30]	-0.013 [0.40]
$popul_{it}10^8$	0.740 [0.40]	0.400 [0.22]	0.460 [0.26]	0.940 [0.49]	-0.060 [0.03]	0.670 [0.36]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.96	0.96	0.96
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 9b. Dynamic Model: all sample
(LSDV-IV Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.708 [15.27]***	0.715 [14.58]***	0.709 [15.01]***	0.705 [16.47]***	0.710 [15.28]***	0.710 [15.36]***
A_{it}	0.267 [2.36]**	0.182 [2.22]**	0.141 [2.01]*	0.355 [2.48]**	0.220 [1.92]*	0.238 [2.08]*
$elect_{it}$	-0.004 [0.86]	-0.004 [0.87]	-0.005 [0.95]	-0.005 [0.94]	-0.004 [0.84]	-0.004 [0.86]
$womenparl_{it}$	0.183 [0.12]	0.210 [0.13]	0.551 [0.34]	0.409 [0.25]	0.387 [0.24]	0.173 [0.11]
$govparty_{it}$	0.004 [1.68]	0.004 [1.68]	0.003 [1.43]	0.003 [1.58]	0.004 [1.69]	0.004 [1.65]
EU_{it}	-0.006 [0.65]	-0.005 [0.62]	-0.002 [0.22]	-0.004 [0.48]	-0.006 [0.81]	-0.006 [0.67]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	0.206 [0.12]	-0.144 [0.08]	-0.145 [0.07]	0.845 [0.43]	0.574 [0.28]	0.184 [0.10]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.249 [0.04]	1.898 [0.32]	2.554 [0.46]	0.564 [0.12]	2.249 [0.41]	0.909 [0.17]
$pyoung_{it}$	0.004 [0.70]	0.005 [0.89]	0.006 [1.10]	0.005 [0.76]	0.007 [1.13]	0.005 [0.85]
$pold_{it}$	-0.007 [0.62]	-0.005 [0.47]	-0.003 [0.31]	-0.006 [0.57]	-0.005 [0.52]	-0.006 [0.56]
$popul_{it}10^8$	-0.031 [0.54]	-0.044 [0.77]	-0.041 [0.72]	-0.024 [0.41]	-0.054 [0.91]	-0.036 [0.63]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97	0.97
AR(1) (p>z)						
AR(2) (p>z)						
Hansen p-value						

**Table 9c. Dynamic Model: all sample
(GMM Estimation*)**

Hypotheses	Yardstick competition					Tax/Expenditure
	Common Trend	Tax/Expenditure Competition			Competition	
Weights	Uniform	Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
E_{it-1}	0.530 [4.06]***	0.667 [7.73]***	0.615 [5.22]***	0.434 [3.67]***	0.490 [2.95]***	0.543 [5.57]***
A_{it}	0.529 [2.97]***	0.336 [2.65]***	0.333 [2.20]**	0.746 [3.16]***	0.383 [2.02]**	0.594 [3.72]***
$elect_{it}$	-0.006 [1.22]	-0.008 [1.40]	-0.008 [1.51]	-0.008 [1.97]**	-0.007 [1.76]*	-0.003 [0.51]
$womenparl_{it}$	0.008 [1.50]	-0.001 [0.44]	0.002 [0.35]	0.009 [1.64]	0.007 [1.53]	0.005 [1.33]
$govparty_{it}$	0.003 [0.64]	0.004 [0.85]	0.001 [0.16]	-0.003 [0.49]	-0.002 [0.30]	0.002 [0.78]
EU_{it}	-0.074 [1.16]	-0.025 [0.69]	-0.037 [1.18]	-0.031 [0.60]	-0.030 [0.57]	-0.037 [0.99]
$gdppc_{it}10^5$	0.000 [0.75]	0.000 [0.37]	0.000 [0.98]	0.000 [0.86]	0.000 [0.09]	0.000 [0.96]
$tradegdpi_{it-1}10^6$	0.000 [0.12]	0.000 [0.62]	0.000 [0.39]	0.000 [0.33]	0.001 [1.12]	0.001 [0.16]
$pyoung_{it}$	-0.004 [0.40]	0.006 [1.11]	-0.006 [0.44]	0.006 [0.46]	0.015 [1.49]	-0.011 [1.01]
$pold_{it}$	-0.015 [0.87]	-0.005 [0.77]	-0.018 [0.72]	-0.013 [0.64]	-0.004 [0.20]	-0.033 [2.77]***
$popul_{it}10^8$	0.000 [0.48]	0.000 [0.61]	0.000 [0.57]	0.000 [0.11]	0.000 [0.53]	0.000 [1.14]
Observations	470	470	470	470	470	470
R-squared	0.01	0.012	0.007	0.015	0.016	0.017
AR(1) (p>z)	0.067	0.065	0.097	0.069	0.069	0.5
AR(2) (p>z)	1	1	1	1	1	1
Hansen p-value						

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 10. Dynamic Model: testing for Yardstick Competition
(IV Estimation*)

Fiscal Choices	Hypotheses	Common Trend	Yardstick competition				Tax/Expenditure Competition
			Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	
	Weights	Uniform					Openess
TOT	E_{it-1}	0.572 [9.13]***	0.598 [10.36]***	0.673 [6.69]***	0.697 [10.06]***	0.717 [10.59]***	0.692 [10.90]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	0.552 [2.43]**	0.635 [2.27]**	0.584 [0.83]	0.666 [1.98]*	0.545 [2.78]**	0.373 [1.76]*
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.279 [2.38]**	0.021 [0.08]	0.320 [0.92]	0.326 [0.96]	0.126 [1.03]	0.295 [1.11]
DEF	E_{it-1}	0.497 [4.47]***	0.536 [4.59]***	0.507 [3.76]***	0.565 [6.16]***	0.580 [6.83]***	0.533 [6.10]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	0.723 [1.43]	0.651 [1.05]	0.983 [1.52]	0.525 [0.94]	0.342 [1.20]	0.787 [1.33]
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.213 [0.83]	0.129 [0.41]	0.009 [0.04]	0.203 [1.02]	0.160 [1.38]	0.233 [0.88]
HEA	E_{it-1}	0.650 [14.73]***	0.656 [14.19]***	0.709 [21.22]***	0.728 [15.56]***	0.713 [18.49]***	0.725 [16.24]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	0.403 [0.36]	0.674 [1.49]	0.362 [0.73]	0.593 [1.21]	0.655 [1.25]	0.944 [1.01]
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.537 [0.75]	0.583 [1.00]	0.463 [0.94]	-0.092 [0.49]	0.076 [0.27]	0.336 [0.46]
EDU	E_{it-1}	0.776 [14.51]***	0.790 [11.45]***	0.757 [12.37]***	0.779 [14.42]***	0.811 [17.75]***	0.763 [13.93]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	0.663 [1.55]	0.344 [0.20]	0.574 [0.94]	0.886 [1.08]	0.019 [0.09]	0.569 [0.96]
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.278 [1.44]	0.285 [0.29]	0.022 [0.12]	0.336 [0.81]	0.083 [0.30]	0.020 [0.06]
CAPTAX	E_{it-1}	0.657 [13.49]***	0.658 [14.44]***	0.665 [15.27]***	0.684 [19.33]***	0.661 [12.80]***	0.685 [18.64]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	-0.182 [0.15]	-0.768 [0.82]	-0.430 [0.48]	0.007 [0.01]	1.288 [1.40]	-0.239 [0.12]
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.720 [1.28]	0.955 [2.12]*	0.674 [1.83]*	0.544 [1.42]	0.074 [0.24]	0.589 [0.73]
TIN	E_{it-1}	0.617 [7.56]***	0.663 [10.92]***	0.714 [10.29]***	0.679 [9.90]***	0.694 [13.55]***	0.673 [9.58]***
	$elect_{it} * A_{it}$	1.414 [1.70]	0.063 [0.08]	0.144 [0.14]	1.838 [1.24]	0.875 [1.03]	1.445 [1.40]
	$(1-elect_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.344 [0.87]	0.466 [0.79]	0.092 [0.25]	-0.206 [0.38]	0.035 [0.10]	-0.030 [0.10]

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 11. Dynamic Model: testing for EU effect
(IV Estimation*)

Fiscal Choices	Hypotheses	Common Trend	Yardstick competition				Tax/Expenditure Competition
			Geographic Distance	GDP Distance	GDP	EU	Openess
TOT	E_{it-1}	0.637 [10.83]***	0.663 [14.80]***	0.670 [12.12]***	0.680 [20.04]***	0.674 [17.19]***	0.678 [13.34]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.279 [1.27]	0.517 [1.88]*	0.165 [0.66]	0.436 [3.22]***	0.370 [3.04]***	0.191 [1.16]
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.935 [2.73]**	0.375 [0.66]	0.615 [1.76]*	0.290 [0.96]	0.410 [2.34]**	0.710 [2.01]*
DEF	E_{it-1}	0.505 [4.59]***	0.525 [4.54]***	0.556 [6.40]***	0.556 [6.40]***	0.572 [6.84]***	0.543 [6.63]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.240 [1.20]	0.296 [2.48]**	0.024 [0.10]	0.024 [0.10]	0.267 [3.58]***	0.267 [2.15]**
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.585 [2.09]*	0.281 [1.60]	0.529 [1.52]	0.529 [1.52]	0.133 [1.77]*	0.588 [2.50]**
HEA	E_{it-1}	0.670 [10.05]***	0.661 [13.12]***	0.738 [12.87]***	0.697 [16.51]***	0.718 [19.06]***	0.706 [16.74]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.568 [0.74]	0.717 [1.08]	0.744 [1.08]	0.118 [0.67]	0.444 [1.30]	0.481 [0.85]
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.285 [0.49]	0.394 [1.17]	0.530 [1.58]	0.256 [1.23]	0.107 [0.54]	0.756 [1.16]
EDU	E_{it-1}	0.840 [9.48]***	0.781 [9.51]***	0.796 [8.34]***	0.795 [10.65]***	0.802 [12.35]***	0.788 [10.01]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.540 [1.55]	0.273 [1.30]	0.122 [0.80]	0.477 [0.97]	0.158 [1.14]	0.263 [1.01]
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	-0.063 [0.10]	0.356 [1.32]	0.059 [0.27]	0.401 [0.64]	-0.134 [1.40]	0.291 [1.33]
CAPTAX	E_{it-1}	0.637 [10.83]***	0.663 [14.80]***	0.670 [12.12]***	0.680 [20.04]***	0.674 [17.19]***	0.678 [13.34]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.279 [1.27]	0.517 [1.88]*	0.165 [0.66]	0.436 [3.22]***	0.370 [3.04]***	0.191 [1.16]
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.935 [2.73]**	0.375 [0.66]	0.615 [1.76]*	0.290 [0.96]	0.410 [2.34]**	0.710 [2.01]*
TIN	E_{it-1}	0.634 [10.45]***	0.668 [11.11]***	0.718 [14.70]***	0.709 [15.66]***	0.709 [16.43]***	0.706 [15.29]***
	$EU_{it} * A_{it}$	0.465 [1.94]*	0.148 [0.40]	0.040 [0.28]	0.218 [1.52]	0.166 [1.34]	0.128 [0.81]
	$(1-EU_{it}) * A_{it}$	0.828 [2.92]**	0.510 [1.86]*	0.247 [1.20]	0.601 [1.82]*	0.338 [2.04]*	0.767 [2.23]**

Robust t statistics in brackets

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

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