Assimilation of Migrants into the British Labour Market

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Abstract

This paper discusses the extent to which migrants to Britain have been assimilated into the workforce. Migration into Britain has increased over the last 25 years, with a big increase in inflows in recent years. The paper shows that when a migrant worker first arrives they experience a pay gap with native born counterparts of over 30% for men and 15% for women. This pay penalty declines with years spent in Britain. For migrant men it takes 20 years to eradicate this difference. For migrant women just 4-6 years. Different nationalities experience different rates of assimilation, with Europeans catching up the fastest but Asian men showing little signs of catching up at all. More recent entry cohorts of migrants have fared better but this is largely because they enter with a smaller pay penalty rather than experience faster wage growth.

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1. Introduction

This paper examines the situation of immigrant workers in Great Britain. In keeping with the literature we use the term assimilation to describe the process of convergence between migrants and their native born counterparts in an outcome of interest such as average earnings. It has been widely documented (see for example Wadsworth, 2003) that immigrant workers tend to face disadvantage in the labour market, both in terms of their employment and earnings experience. However, this work also shows that the experience of immigrants is very heterogeneous. Immigrants from different ethnic backgrounds tend to fare differently. But also immigrants who have been in Great Britain for longer also tend to do better. This phenomena has been well documented for other countries. In particular, the work of Borjas (1995, 1999) has examined the assimilation of immigrants into the US. However, there is little work on the assimilation of immigrants into the British labour market. Chiswick (1980) was the first to analyse this issue. More recently, Bell (1997) examines assimilation of wages of different immigrant groups using retrospective data from the General Household Survey.

In this paper, we use data from the Lifetime Labour Market Database (LLMDB) to examine the assimilation of immigrants into the British labour market. This is the first time these data have been used for such a purpose. This database is described extensively in CASEpaper 132. It is a longitudinal data set derived from a 1% random sample of National Insurance records and contains a host of labour market information and immigrant status from 1978/79. The analysis we present in this paper covers the period 1978/79-2003/04. One feature of these data is that we have information on migrants who entered Britain from 1975 to the present day. Both the longitudinal nature of the data and the large sample sizes make it ideal for the analysis of labour market assimilation. In addition, since we have information on the individual's country of birth we can also examine whether immigrants from different parts of the world have a different experience in the British labour market. In the next section we outline the data we are using in more detail and highlight some of the potential problems with it. We then go on to present some descriptive statistics on the estimated number of immigrants, and wage rates of immigrants compared to non-immigrants in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 then presents some descriptive material on assimilation and section 7 some statistical models of assimilation that control for other factors. Section 8 summarises our findings.

2. Data

The data used in this paper is the Lifetime Labour Markets Database (LLMDB). We will provide only a short description here. For a more detailed discussion of this data please refer to CASEpaper 132. It is essentially a 1% random sample of individuals drawn from National Insurance records for each tax year from 1978/79 to 2003/04. Because the same 1% is sampled each year we can construct a longitudinal dataset

that follows individuals for up to 25 years of their working lives. This means that we have information on over 700,000 individuals for varying time periods. The data contain information on annual earnings from employment and spells of self employment and benefits receipt. Information is also held on date of birth, sex, postcode of home address and date of death (where applicable). We can build a unique picture of individuals following them through spells of employment, self employment, and benefit receipt over a substantial portion of their working lives.

A key component for this part of the project is an additional data set containing information on immigrants into Great Britain. These data contain an observation for all immigrants who are assigned a National Insurance number after 1974. Information is recorded on date of entry into Britain, the migrant's nationality and the country from which they entered Britain. The entry date here is the actual date someone enters Great Britain. However, this is only recorded when the immigrant applies for an NI number. As such there may well be a time lag in these data, since individuals do not necessarily apply straight away. We will return to this issue later.

There are a number of strengths that these data have over survey data. Firstly, since the data is a 1% sample of all NI numbers, we have a very large dataset of immigrants. Secondly, the data enables us to follow the same individuals over time for up to 26 years. Thirdly, since the data is from administrative records, the accuracy is very good. There are a number of disadvantages with the data. Firstly, it does not contain any information on skills or education. Secondly, it is difficult to know when an immigrant leaves Great Britain again (indeed when anyone leaves Great Britain).

3. How many immigrants are there in Great Britain?

1

The first stage of this research was to use the data to estimate how many immigrants are entering Great Britain each year. Figure 1 uses our LLMDB data to plot the number of new arrivals each year between 1977/78 and 2003/04. Note that these figures are grossed up to population estimates (by multiplying by 100). One important thing to remember is that these are new arrivals who apply for an NI number. Not all immigrants will do this and so these should be seen as a lower bound estimate of the number of immigrants. What we see is that in the late 70s and early 80s, there were about 100,000 new immigrants each year. Immigration then rose through the second half of the 1980s to around 200,000.¹ Immigration then rises strongly in the late 1990s to around 300,000. These trends show some major changes in the inflow of immigrants over this period. However, our data does not capture the even larger changes that have occurred since 2003 and the entry into the EU of the accession countries. Figure 1 also plots data from DWP estimates of the number of inflows for 2000/01 to 2004/05 using 100% records data on NI allocations (DWP, 2006). The numbers coincide well with our estimates from LLMDB. However, we see a huge

Note that the blip in the data in 1997 is an artefact of the administration system moving from NIRS1 to NIRS2 and the computerisation of records.

jump in the series so that in 2004/05 over 460,000 immigrants enter Great Britain. Our data on migrants does not cover this later period at present but it is reassuring to see our estimates are close to those of the DWP.

In fact, since the DWP estimates are based on stated year of entry they do not capture the most recent wave of immigration. Table 1 reports data from the DWP on the number of new NI numbers actually allocated in each year (note this is different from year of arrival). This shows that immigration increased to over 650,000 in 2005/06. This represents about 1% of the British population and is unprecedented in UK history. Most of this recent immigration is from accession countries, with Poland topping the list with 170,000 entrants. Another key fact to emerge from this table is the changing origin of migrants from different parts of the world. In 2002/03, the former commonwealth countries accounted for much of the new migrants. However, by 2005/06 this picture had changed considerably with a growth in migration from Eastern European countries.

The focus in this paper is not so much on this recent increase in immigration, which is for future work, but on the experience of immigrants over the period since 1978/79 to 2003/04. Our data enables us to look at pay rates among migrants. An important question is the extent to which immigrants are disadvantaged in the labour market, and whether this disadvantage is lessened as they remain in Great Britain. As such, we will examine some key characteristics of immigrants over time.

4. Some characteristics of migrants

Figure 2 plots a break down of the immigrant numbers in figure 1 into males and females. Perhaps surprisingly, the number of male and female immigrants is very similar. In addition, there are similar increases in both series as immigration rises over time.

Table 2 uses our data to extend the picture from Table 1 and presents a break down of the percent of migrants from different regions of the world for various time periods between 1979-81 and 2003-04. Throughout our analysis we use nationality (country of birth) rather than the country from which an individual arrives from to denote origin country; this gives a clearer picture of migration and avoids the problem of non-EU residents entering Britain from an EU country being counted as EU migrants. A few key facts stand out. The inward migration of British citizens living abroad has been quite important, although these have fallen as a proportion of all immigrants over time. Immigration from the EU is high, with some 25% of immigrants coming from EU countries in the late 1970s. This increased to almost 40% in the mid 1990s after the advent of the single market. However, it has dropped off in recent years as immigration from Africa and Asia has risen. But the largest change in recent years has been the increase in immigration from the EU accession countries; in the late 1990s they accounted for under 5% of all immigration but this has increased to close to 20% in 2003/04, and will have increased further since then. This changing mix of the

migrant population could well have important implications for assimilation into the British labour market, particularly as the proportion of new migrants who speak English is likely to change over time.

Table 3 presents the age at which migrants arrive into Great Britain. In general migrants tend to be young. A quarter of those migrants arriving between 1979 and 1981 were under 20 years old and over 80% under 30 years. Very few individuals migrate in their 40s or 50s. The age composition has changed somewhat over time with a decline in the proportion under 20 and a growth of migration among the over 30s. However, the average migrant still tends to be in their 20s, with 65% below the age of 30 in 2003-04. Tables 4 and 5 present the same information for male and female migrants. The age composition is similar across the sexes, with some indication that women arrive slightly younger than men.

Clearly, the typical age of a migrant is much lower than that among the population of natives. This may have implications for assimilation into the labour market. Indeed, we will examine differences in assimilation for those who arrive young compared to those who arrive somewhat older, and, in many cases, with more labour market experience in their home country.

5. How do immigrants fare in the labour market?

Usually when we are looking at how individuals perform in the labour market we would examine two key indicators; whether they are employed or not, and the wage rate that they receive in work. For example, Wadsworth (2003) shows that migrants tend to fare badly both in terms of their employment rates and the wages they can obtain once in employment. Our focus here will be on wages. We restrict our analysis to wages for a number of reasons. Firstly, in the economics literature, an individual's wage is an indicator of their productivity in work.² We may expect the productivity level of migrants to be low on first entry into a country. It may be that their language skills hinder them or they may have to learn new technology or working practices. Over time we would expect a migrant to build up these skills and for their productivity to increase.

Secondly, our data make it difficult to examine employment rates of migrant workers. We have no problem with identifying those who are in work. However, to estimate a rate of employment (i.e. the percent of all migrants in employment) we need to know the number of migrants living in Great Britain (the stock). This is more difficult in our data since it is not easy to tell when someone has left Great Britain. Other research shows that many migrants do leave, either for their home country or for another country. The problems of trying to get numbers on leavers is not unique to this data set and much of the recent media coverage on immigrant numbers has at the heart of it

² In the absence of non-market determinants of wages such as unions or firm power to exploit workers or discrimination.

this problem that the UK government does not record when someone leaves the country.³

Wage Rates

Our data provides us with good measures of earnings in the tax year. We can also estimate how many weeks an individual has worked in the year to calculate average weekly pay for the year. Figure 3 presents the average pay of immigrants and non-immigrants for the period 1978/79 - 2003/04.⁴ We see here that real wages of migrants lagged behind those of native workers in the 1980s and early 1990s. These wage differences are fairly significant, of the order of a 10% wage difference. Figure 4 presents the average relative pay of migrants to natives, which is perhaps somewhat easier to interpret. We have seen that this wage ratio has tended to increase over time as migrant wages have caught up with non-migrants. In fact since the late 1990s migrant's average weekly wages have exceeded those of native workers.⁵ The wage gap between migrants and non-migrants in the 1980s and early 1990s largely existed for males. For women, we get a very different picture whereby the average weekly wages of immigrant women are higher than those of non-immigrants. This gap has also increased over time.⁶

Again we can examine pay differences for migrants from different regions of the world. Figure 5 presents the relative weekly wage of migrants by continent of origin to native workers. We saw that all migrants were earning less than non-migrants in the 1980s but this wage gap varies for those from different continents. EU immigrants and those from Australasia, Africa, Asia, and the Far East did worse. But there has been a general catching up among all of these groups. In recent years, migrants from Australasia, Europe and those already with British nationality are faring well. Those

³ There are a number of approaches we could take to estimate leavers. In the data we have it does actually record if someone notifies the Inland Revenue that they are abroad. The main reason this is done is to protect NI liability. However, it is probably likely that very few leavers actually do this. A second approach is to make an assumption that an immigrant who has been inactive for some time has left the country. For example, if an immigrant is not observed in employment or on benefits for some time then we may well assume they have left Great Britain. We believe that without extensive validation work we could not provide robust estimates of employment rates.

⁴ Note that these are raw wages. It is common practice in the study of immigrant wages to control for some characteristics such as age. We will turn to this later when we examine assimilation of wages.

⁵ Here we are examining migrants who registered for an NI in Great Britain after 1974. As such, the earlier periods of our data will contain mostly younger migrants who have had little time in Great Britain, whereas in the later years the composition of the migrants stock will be older and more experienced. This may explain why the wage gap has closed over time. In our analysis of assimilation we control for these composition effects.

⁶ One reason for this may be that these are weekly wages and we do not know whether someone is a part time worker or not. It may well be that part time work is more prevalent among non-immigrants

doing less well are from Asia and the Middle East and in particular, new migrants from Accession countries are falling behind, with sharp falls in real wages in recent years.

6. The assimilation of immigrants with time in Great Britain

We know that some immigrants have been in Britain for a relatively short period of time, while others have been here much longer. The average figures on wages may well hide some important differences that are associated with time spent in Britain. There is a reasonable amount of evidence to suggest that when an immigrant first arrives in a country they experience more difficulty in getting a job and achieving a good wage. However, as they spend more time in the host country their employment and wages converge towards those of the natives or non-immigrants. Common reasons put forward for this are skill or language acquisition. Most of the evidence that we have on assimilation comes from the US (see Borjas, 1999 for a survey) with very few papers looking at assimilation in the UK (Chiswick, 1980 and Bell, 1997). The main reason for the lack of evidence is lack of good data. The Bell paper uses repeat cross sections from the General Household Survey which has retrospective questions about when and where from immigrants arrived. This sort of data is limited because it is retrospective in that it cannot control for the immigrants who have left the UK prior to the survey taking place. It is not unreasonable to assume these will be immigrants who did less well in terms of wages and employment and consequently we will get a biased picture of assimilation.

We take two approaches to examining assimilation. We firstly present the raw wage changes for migrants with time spent in Great Britain. Then we go on to estimate econometric models of assimilation, which control for various other factors such as individual's age, year of entry into Great Britain, etc, all of which may have an impact on labour market performance.

Wage assimilation

Figure 6 reports wages for immigrants, split by the time they have spent in Britain. Newly arrived migrants typically earn a wage that is about 70% of the non-immigrant wage. The migrants wage slowly catches up over time. It is only after about 7-9 years in Great Britain that the immigrant wage has converged to the non-immigrant wage. As immigrants stay for longer than this their wages overtake those of natives. One must be a little careful here since we have not yet controlled for age differences; and immigrants with over 10 years in Great Britain are likely to be older and have more labour market experience than the typical native.

Figures 7 and 8 present these wage assimilations for males and females. Some important differences emerge. Assimilation for male immigrants appears to take longer. The average wage for male immigrants does not converge with that of natives until they have been in Great Britain for over 10 years. For women, the average wage has caught up after only a about 2-3 years. One possible explanation for this is part

time employment. Here we have information on weekly earnings, but no information on hours of work. It may well be that female migrants are more likely to work full time than their native counterparts. If we could analyse hourly wages we may well see slower catch up among migrant women.

There does not appear to be any changing pattern of assimilation over the time period we are looking at here but the wages of new arrivals seem to be rising relative to native born workers, particularly for women.

The basic story emerging here is one of low relative wages on entry into Britain for migrants. This wage gap narrows rapidly in the first few years in Great Britain but takes some time for it to finally disappear. This catch up is faster for women, whose wages converge with native women's after approximately 3 years, compared to over 10 years for men. These differences may be arising because we are looking at raw wage differences. In order to make a proper assessment of assimilation we need to estimate wage equations that enable us to control for various other factors such as age and cohort of arrival. We turn to this in the next section.

7. Statistical Estimates of Assimilation

In this section we present results from statistical models of assimilation. These models are important since they allow us to take account of factors that may be affecting an individual's earnings but are correlated with immigrant status or years in Great Britain. For example, immigrants on average tend to be younger than the general population and are likely to earn less simply because they have fewer years of labour market experience. If we ignore this fact then we will get a biased estimate of the wage gap between migrants and native workers.

We estimate a statistical model whereby wages are determined by the following key factors; current age, years since arrival and current year. The table below shows the categories that these different factors can take. Current year runs from 1978/79 to 2003/04.

| Current Age | Years since arrival |
|-------------|------------------------|
| Under 20 | 1yr |
| 20-24 | 2-3yrs |
| 25-29 | 4-6yrs |
| 30-34 | 7-9yrs |
| 35-39 | 10-14yrs |
| 40-44 | 15-19yrs |
| 45-49 | 20+yrs |
| 50-54 | |
| 55-59 | |

The "Year since arrival" variable shows us the degree to which a migrant assimilates in terms of their wages. We estimate our model separately for men and women since we have already seen some differences in assimilation in the raw wages above. We also estimate this model for migrants from different regions of the world and then for different arrival cohorts.

Let us now turn to examine our estimates of assimilation; how those wage differences with native workers change with years spent in Great Britain. Figure 9 presents our estimates of assimilation for migrant men and women. On arrival, both male and female migrants face a significant wage penalty compared to a similar aged native worker. This penalty is larger for males at over 30%, while for female migrants their weekly wages are around 15% below similar aged native women. This wage gap closes as migrants build up increasing years of experience in the British labour

market. There is little change in the first year in Britain but then after 2-3 years this penalty has fallen to 20% for men and about 5% for women. For migrant women, the wage gap has disappeared after some 4-6 years, whereas for men it takes up to 20 years to completely eradicate the wage difference.

Assimilation may also take longer for different nationalities. We estimated our model separately for those migrants from different regions of the world and indeed we do see some significant differences emerging. Figure 10 and 11 present the assimilation of migrant men and women by nationality; Europeans, Africans and Asians. All migrants face a significant pay gap on arrival in Great Britain, although that is a large variation across the different nationalities. European men are paid a little under 30% below native men, whereas Asian men are paid some 45% less on arrival. In addition, assimilation rates over time are different for the groups. Men from Asia tend to fare the worst; their wages are still some 25% lower than native workers even after 20 years in Great Britain and the wage gap appears to have stopped closing. European men close the wage gap the fastest in just 7-9 years, whereas African men close this gap in about 15 years.

The results for women are somewhat different. African women experience the lowest pay gap on arrival at 9%, compared to over 23% for Asian women. European and African women close this pay gap the fastest. However, in contrast to Asian men, Asian women do eventually catch up, albeit after some 20 years in Great Britain.

Have rates of assimilation changed?

One question of interest is whether the speed with which migrant workers assimilate into the British labour market may have changed over time. In order to answer this question we need to estimate our model separately for migrants arriving in Great Britain at different time periods. We therefore estimate our model for migrants arriving in 1975-80, 1985-90 and 1995-2000. Figures 12 and 13 present the assimilation results from these models for male and female migrants. For migrant men we see some slight differences emerge between the cohorts. The wage gap at arrival appears to have fallen over time, so that while the cohort of migrants that arrived in 1975-80 faced a 40% wage penalty, those arriving in 1995-2000 experienced a pay penalty of approximately 32%. Assimilation does not appear to have changed much between the migrant cohorts. Those arriving in 1975-80 and 1985-90 both take up to 20 years to close the wage gap with native workers. However, the rate at which the different cohorts close the pay gap does not appear to be very different. It is the different entry wages that make the difference.

The results by cohort for women are presented in figure 13. Again the pay penalty on arrival appears to have fallen over time; with those arriving in 1975-80 entering with a wage gap of over 20% and those arriving in 1995-2000 experiencing a gap of 13%. The rate of assimilation is again not very different between the cohorts, although the 1975-80 cohort does appear to experience slower wage growth. The difference between the 1985-90 and 1995-2000 cohorts in the time it took to achieve wage parity

is largely explained by the differences in wages at entry, and not by wage growth after entry.

Changes over time for different nationalities

Figures 14-16 present results on assimilation for European, African and Asian men respectively. Some differences in how different cohorts fare emerge across these groups. Assimilation of European men appears unchanged over time. However, for African men, the most recent cohort (1995-2000) fare much better than those who arrived prior to this. Again, much of the differences emerge due to a lower pay gap at arrival into Great Britain, rather than faster catch up. In fact, wages of African men arriving in 1995-2000 grow much slower than those arriving earlier. The results for Asian men are more mixed, with the more recent cohorts faring less well over time.

The same results for women are presented in Figures 17-19. We see that for all nationalities, the more recent cohorts are doing better in terms of wage catch up. Although, this is largely due to higher entry wages, rather than faster wage growth over time.

8. Summary and conclusions

In this paper we have examined the assimilation of migrants into the British labour market using a unique data source derived from administrative records. Our results show increases in migration over the period 1975 to 2006, with some big inflows in recent years associated with entry of Accession countries into the EU. We show that wages of migrants are typically lower than those of native workers, by that these wage differences vary with years in Great Britain. Our econometric models of assimilation suggest that it takes the typical male migrant some 20 years to eradicate the wage penalty with their native counterparts. For women, assimilation is faster with wage differences in assimilation between different nationalities and also different entry cohorts. More recent cohorts of migrants appear to be faring better in terms of their wages. However, the reason for this is not faster wage growth over time but a lower wage gap on arrival in Great Britain.

Given the time period covered by our data, we are not able to examine the assimilation of the recent migrants from Accession countries. We have seen in our results that entry wages appear to be rising for more recent cohorts. However, for the very recent migrants from Accession countries, wages appear to be falling on entry into Great Britain. It is left to future work to uncover the extent to which these wage differences are eradicated over time.

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
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
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
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
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
Figures and Tables





















































Table 1: Overseas Nationals entering the UK and allocated a NI number

| 2002/03 | | 2003/04 | | 2004/05 | 5 | 2005/06 | | |
|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--------------|-------|--|
| Total | 349.2 | | 370.7 | | 439.7 | | 662.4 | |
| India | 25 | India | 31.3 | Poland | 62.6 | Poland | 171.4 | |
| Australia | 18.9 | South Africa | 18.4 | India | 32.7 | India | 46 | |
| South Africa | 18.6 | Australia | 17.1 | Pakistan | 20.3 | Lithuania | 30.5 | |
| Pakistan | 16.8 | Pakistan | 16.8 | South Africa | 19.3 | Slovakia | 26.4 | |
| France | 13.8 | Portugal | 14 | Australia | 16.6 | South Africa | 24 | |

| Table 2: Nationality of New Arrivals | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Percent of migrants from different Continents | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1979-81 1984-86 1989-91 1994-96 1999-01 2003-04 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Accession states | 1.75 | 0.96 | 0.81 | 2.31 | 4.71 | 19.82 | | | | | |
| Africa | 7.45 | 9.19 | 13.80 | 13.11 | 16.31 | 13.72 | | | | | |
| Central Asia | 11.42 | 10.88 | 9.76 | 9.16 | 15.93 | 17.27 | | | | | |
| Australasia and Oceania | 11.22 | 10.85 | 11.83 | 10.93 | 7.52 | 6.79 | | | | | |
| European Union (excluding accession states) | 24.93 | 34.54 | 33.23 | 38.32 | 24.14 | 20.97 | | | | | |
| East Asia | 7.14 | 5.00 | 5.12 | 3.72 | 7.88 | 7.30 | | | | | |
| Middle East | 2.76 | 2.12 | 2.03 | 1.42 | 3.53 | 1.13 | | | | | |
| Other | 8.39 | 3.11 | 1.10 | 0.58 | 0.78 | 0.33 | | | | | |
| Other European | 1.04 | 1.58 | 3.33 | 3.93 | 6.97 | 4.33 | | | | | |
| The Americas | 6.67 | 7.33 | 7.39 | 7.32 | 7.88 | 5.27 | | | | | |
| British | 17.22 | 14.45 | 11.59 | 9.22 | 4.34 | 3.07 | | | | | |

| Table 3: Age of New Arrivals | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--|--|--|
| Percent of migrants arriving at different ages | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1979-81 1984-86 1989-91 1994-96 1999-01 2003-04 | | | | | | | | |
| Less than 20 years | 25.64 | 18.36 | 14.32 | 11.34 | 9.73 | 4.99 | | | |
| 20-24 years | 36.49 | 39.54 | 37.43 | 38.03 | 30.46 | 32.06 | | | |
| 25-29 years | 20.15 | 21.75 | 24.94 | 26.53 | 30.2 | 30.84 | | | |
| 30-34 years | 7.95 | 9.84 | 11.9 | 12.3 | 13.93 | 14.85 | | | |
| 35-39 years | 35-39 years 3.67 4.79 5.31 5.81 6.97 6.97 | | | | | | | | |
| 40-44 years | 2.66 | 2.43 | 2.41 | 2.66 | 4.2 | 4.73 | | | |
| 45-49 years | 1.72 | 1.48 | 1.67 | 1.58 | 2.45 | 3.16 | | | |
| 50-54 years | 0.67 | 0.88 | 0.83 | 1.08 | 1.34 | 1.55 | | | |
| Over 55 years | 1.04 | 0.93 | 1.2 | 0.67 | 0.7 | 0.87 | | | |

| Table 4: Age of New Arrivals - Males | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|--|--|--|
| Percent of migrants arriving at different ages | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1979-81 | 1984-86 | 1989-91 | 1994-96 | 1999-01 | 2003-04 | | | | |
| Less than 20 years | 24.68 | 15.92 | 12.23 | 9.87 | 9.45 | 4.68 | | | | |
| 20-24 years | 32.53 | 36.47 | 33.32 | 31.81 | 28.16 | 30.38 | | | | |
| 25-29 years | 20.86 | 24.28 | 25.88 | 30.02 | 31.78 | 30.74 | | | | |
| 30-34 years | 9.41 | 11.13 | 14.94 | 14.9 | 14.89 | 16.45 | | | | |
| 35-39 years | 4.38 | 6.07 | 6.58 | 6.89 | 7.22 | 7.37 | | | | |
| 40-44 years | 3.25 | 2.77 | 2.93 | 2.91 | 4.22 | 4.48 | | | | |
| 45-49 years | 2.48 | 1.44 | 1.93 | 1.68 | 2.2 | 3.4 | | | | |
| 50-54 years | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 1.34 | 1.37 | 1.76 | | | | |
| Over 55 years | 1.56 | 1.06 | 1.36 | 0.6 | 0.71 | 0.72 | | | | |

| Table 5: Age of New Arrivals - Females | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|--|--|--|--|
| Percent of migrants arriving at different ages | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 1979-81 | 1984-86 | 1989-91 | 1994-96 | 1999-01 | 2003-04 | | | | |
| Less than 20 years | 26.51 | 20.67 | 16.48 | 12.8 | 10.02 | 5.35 | | | | |
| 20-24 years | 40.09 | 42.44 | 41.65 | 44.25 | 32.75 | 34.05 | | | | |
| 25-29 years | 19.5 | 19.35 | 23.96 | 23.04 | 28.64 | 30.95 | | | | |
| 30-34 years | 6.63 | 8.62 | 8.77 | 9.71 | 12.98 | 12.94 | | | | |
| 35-39 years | 3.02 | 3.58 | 4 | 4.73 | 6.72 | 6.49 | | | | |
| 40-44 years | 2.12 | 2.12 | 1.87 | 2.42 | 4.19 | 5.01 | | | | |
| 45-49 years | 1.03 | 1.51 | 1.39 | 1.49 | 2.7 | 2.87 | | | | |
| 50-54 years | 0.51 | 0.91 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 1.32 | 1.29 | | | | |
| Over 55 years | 0.58 | 0.81 | 1.03 | 0.74 | 0.68 | 1.05 | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |