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**Marta Biancardi e Francesco Ciardiello**

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Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Largo Papa Giovanni Paolo II, 1,  
71100 Foggia (Italy), Phone +39 0881-75.37.30, Fax +39 0881-77.56.16

# New Approaches in Coalition Stability

F. Ciardiello\*, M. Biancardi†

University of Foggia  
Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics  
Largo Papa Giovanni Paolo II, 1  
Foggia 71100 (Italy)

## Abstract

In this paper we propose the state of art in the theory of coalitional games in effectiveness form without bargaining between coalitions. We study some solution concepts: The largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994); the largest cautious consistent set (Mauleon et al., 2004); the credible consistent set (Bhattacharya, 2002); standard stable behaviors (Xue, 1998). A series of examples, showing main features and differences between these solutions, are presented in order to outline some drawbacks and positive aspects in the philosophical framework of stability concepts.

**keywords:** coalitional games; stable sets; farsightedness.

**Jel Classification:** C62; C71.

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\*e-mail: f.ciardiello@unifg.it

†e-mail: m.biancardi@unifg.it