

Time Allocations and Reward Structures for US Academic Economists from 1995–2005: Evidence from Three National Surveys

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Abstract

Using survey data collected in 1995, 2000 and 2005 from US academic economists, in which respondents were asked to indicate what percentage of their work time they allocate to research, teaching and service activities, and also how their departments and schools weight research, teaching and service in determining annual raises and making promotion and tenure decisions, we find these economists were allocating more time to teaching even though perceived departmental and school incentives provided a clear premium for research. The overall samples did not show major changes in their allocation of time from 1995–2005, but there were different responses at different types of schools, with increased time spent on research by faculty at doctoral schools while at masters' and baccalaureate schools more time was devoted to teaching. We use regression analysis to investigate factors that affect how different faculty members allocate their time between teaching and research. In addition to Carnegie school classifications and related school characteristics, faculty members' gender and rank were significant predictors of how economists allocate their time. Male economists, particularly among assistant professors at research universities, spent less time on teaching and more time on research than female economists.

JEL classification: A20, A22

1. Introduction

In this paper we report survey data on time allocation decisions made by US academic economists, and investigate factors that explain those allocations. We combine data from national surveys conducted in 2005 (Watts and Becker, 2008) and in 1995 and 2000 (Becker and Watts, 1996, 2001), which they used to identify teaching methods in undergraduate economics courses. Our focus here is on questions from the background sections of these surveys, in which respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of time they allocated to teaching, research, and service, and the weightings they felt their departments assigned to each of these activities for decisions on annual raises and, separately, for promotion and tenure decisions.

The limited research on factors affecting how faculty members allocate time to different activities has been noted before (Gautier and Wauthy, 2007; Toutkoushian, 1999). The earlier research almost always considers faculty members across fields and departments, focusing on rank/tenure or other variables that

presumably affect all faculty members in much the same way, or on general problems and issues such as the difficulty of accurately measuring output in research, service and especially teaching. A large share of this work has been done by economists, who not surprisingly focus on the effects of incentives facing faculty. But despite that, the previous studies rarely deal with faculty members from economics or any other particular discipline, as we do here – although a few make some comparisons across faculty from different disciplines.

By drawing on the three national surveys of US economists, we are first able to see how well these responses match with the responses of faculty members from the cross-discipline surveys that are featured in most of the earlier research. But our focus on economists and the factors that are important in their time allocation decisions also leads us to consider issues that might have different effects from what is or might be seen in most other fields. The most notable such factor is gender, which has been shown to play some (relatively modest) role across faculty from all disciplines, but may have more impact in economics given the historical under-representation of females in economics – at least in the United States – that has been documented both in terms of the shares of undergraduate and graduate degrees awarded, and the share of faculty members at different ranks and types of schools.¹ After briefly reviewing earlier studies on these topics, we use the three national surveys of US economists to develop new findings on these topics and issues.

2. Literature review

Becker (1979) provided an early theoretical model of the expected effects of raising weights assigned to research or teaching, given differences in the ability to quantify and agree upon measures of faculty performance. Flemming (1991) raised additional questions about measures of research output, and how those measures can be subject to different incentive issues and to the mix of pure vs. applied research.

A 1994 report from the U.S. National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) found full-time faculty reported working more than 50 hours a week, on average, with more time devoted to research at research-intensive institutions. A 1997 NCES study using data from the 1993 National Survey of Postsecondary Faculty (NSOPF) found that full-time faculty spent, on average, 54% of their time teaching and 16% on research, with men spending a higher percentage of time (18% vs. 12%) on research, and a lower percentage (55% vs. 62%) on teaching. Using the same NSOFP data, Bellas and Toutkoushian (1999) found that after controlling for race, experience, marital status, number of children, age, highest degree, rank, field and Carnegie classifications of institutions, women spent only 3% more time teaching than men, and 2% less time on research. They also found that men reported working about two hours a week more on the job than women, but only about one hour a week after controlling for the same factors listed above.

Also using the NSOPF data, Walstad and Allgood (2005, p. 182) concluded that many economics professors at research universities had 'a low regard for teaching and a high regard for research' – and did not find that to be true for professors in other social sciences, the biological or physical sciences, mathematics and statistics, engineering, or business. They found physical and biological scientists were closer to economists' views than respondents from other academic disciplines, 'but not nearly as extreme in the views of the teaching and research tradeoffs as... economics professors' (pp. 182–3). In a later working paper using the NSOPF data, Allgood and Walstad (2006) found a bi-directional but asymmetric substitution effect in faculty allocations of time to research or teaching, with a 10% increase in time spent

¹ See annual reports of the American Economic Association's Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession, published in the annual May *Proceedings* volumes of the *American Economic Review* (or in recent years in the supplementary online *Proceedings*); annual reports on bachelor's degrees awarded in economics drawn from the AEA Universal Academic Questionnaire, published by John Siegfried in the *Journal of Economic Education*; and Ginther and Kahn (2004).

on research leading to a 1.5% decrease in time spent on teaching, and a 10% increase in time spent on teaching reducing time spent on research by 8.5%.

For a sample of US faculty members from the arts and sciences, Singell, Lillydahl and Singell (1996) found that most differences in faculty time allocations were accounted for by structural differences between universities with different research orientations. They also found that faculty characteristics reinforced the different institutional missions, and concluded that self-selection will condition university policies intended to change faculty behaviour – for example in trying to direct more faculty time to teaching at research universities.

Milem, Berger and Dey (2000) found that faculty could devote more time to both teaching and research, and that substitutions between teaching and research might be unidirectional, so that spending less time on teaching could lead to spending more time on research, but devoting less time to research would not lead to spending more time on teaching.

Becker, Lindsay and Grizzle (2003) argued that many universities require faculty to do both research and teaching because stronger students choose to attend universities where faculty are doing more research. They report a strong negative relationship between faculty time devoted to teaching and time doing research.

Laband and Tollison (2003) found a substantial increase in the emphasis on research at US and other universities from 1974–96, tied to stronger incentives for faculty to increase research output (including higher salaries, reduced teaching loads and increased support for travel to conferences). Measured by the share of uncited papers, however, which remained constant at 26%, they found no improvement in the quality of research published.

Gautier and Wauthy (2007, p. 274) argued that faculty time allocation across teaching and research is 'largely a matter of taste and incentives' and support university-wide 'yardsticks' to allocate research funds as a way to improve both teaching and research. Einarson and Clarkberg (2004) found that the time faculty report spending with students outside the classroom is not affected by reported faculty work time constraints, but is affected by faculty having children and by differences in beliefs about the educational role of faculty members.

Link, Swann and Bozeman (2008) reported that time allocations by science and engineering faculty at top US universities are affected by tenure, promotion, and other career path issues, with full professors spending more time on service and less time on teaching and research. Long-term associate professors spend more time teaching and less time on research. Female faculty members appear to allocate more time to service and less time to research.

3. Data

The 1995, 2000 and 2005 mail surveys from which our data are drawn were all five pages long, with few changes in items across the different years. In 1995, 2947 economists were selected either as academic members of the American Economic Association (AEA) or as college/university teachers of economics listed by College Marketing Guide (CMG), a private company that offered mailing lists of US college and university instructors. Unfortunately, for the 2000 and 2005 surveys mailing lists of AEA members by employee type were no longer available. Instead, in 2000 a sample of 3103 economists was drawn entirely from CMG lists. In 2005 the CMG lists were no longer available, so lists of economics instructors were purchased from Market Data Retrieval (MDR), a private company that offered mailing lists of various groups, including college teachers in different disciplines. The 2005 survey was mailed to 3711 academic economists.

In all three surveys fixed-interval sampling was used to identify the questionnaire recipients from the respective source lists. In 1995 the response rate was 21%, in 2000 it was 19%, and in 2005 it was 13%. Results from all three surveys are based on opportunistic samples and self-reported data. There is no way of knowing whether respondents are representative of all US teachers of undergraduate economics courses, but our intuition is that those with greater interest in teaching were more likely to complete and return surveys. Even if this is true, it is not clear that would lead to a predictable bias in responses to the questions of interest in this paper. For example, instructors more interested in teaching might be likely to report higher percentages of time spent on teaching and higher weights on teaching for annual raise and promotion/tenure decisions because they have found positions that reward teaching, either at departments and schools that emphasise good teaching or working as teaching specialists in more research-oriented departments. On the other hand, they might report higher percentages and weights on research if they feel the research demands they face at their schools are excessive. Consequently, we have not attempted to adjust for any possible bias resulting from sample selection issues.

Definitions for variables on faculty members' personal time allocations and departmental incentives – indicating the percentage of time instructors report spending in teaching, research and service, and the weightings these same respondents feel their institutions assign to these activities in awarding annual raises or promotion and tenure – are reported in Table 1. Mean responses and standard deviations are provided for 1995, 2000 and 2005.² Percentages do not sum to 100 because some respondents could view their time allocation as including activities other than teaching, research and service, including administration.³

As reported in Harter, Becker and Watts (2004), from 1995 to 2000 economists were allocating more time to teaching even though their perceptions of departmental and school incentives (for promotion and tenure decisions as well as annual raises) provided a clear premium for research. The disparity in time allocation and reward structures continues in the 2005 data. Specifically, for the overall sample we see almost no change in faculty time allocations from 2000 to 2005, with US economists spending a little over half of their time on teaching, a little over 20% on research, and about 9% on service activities. This is very much in line with findings from the NSOPF data for faculty from all departments, reported above.⁴

Other than a slight decrease in the perceived weightings assigned to research, the relative weightings on teaching, research and service for promotion and tenure decisions changed very little from 2000 to 2005 in the overall sample. For annual raises the importance of both teaching and research decreased slightly from 2000 to 2005, perhaps reflecting a general funding environment over that period in which most US departments and schools were, in practice if not in word, giving across-the-board raises more often than differentiating on merit. But in general there was very little change in the structure of incentives from 2000 to 2005.

² The mean values are slightly lower and the numbers of observations slightly higher here than the basic results reported in Watts and Becker (2008) because we are focusing on a sub-section of the survey and made some minor adjustments. Specifically, if a respondent reported percentages for the weights on promotion and tenure decisions that totalled 100 but left some entries for those variables blank, it seemed clear the blanks represented a zero so we replaced the blanks with zeros. We did the same for variables on department weights for annual raise decisions and faculty time allocation percentages. For some variables this increased the number of observations and lowered mean values.

³ Tables of *z*-statistics for differences in the mean values reported in Tables 1 and 2, across the three survey periods, are available on request. We make no attempt to draw statistical inferences because of the nature of the survey data.

⁴ Guest and Duhs (2002) provide survey evidence for economists in Australia, and conclude that rewards for teaching are too low in Australian schools to promote better student ratings of teaching. They also note the limited use of teaching methods that engage students in learning.

	1995			2000		2005
Variable definition	n	Mean	n	Mean	n	Mean
Proteach – weight in percentage that teaching has in school decisions about promotion and tenure	556	44.13 (25.95)	534	49.00 (24.31)	401	49.85 (22.59)
Proresearch – weight in percentage that research has in school decisions about promotion and tenure	557	43.68 (27.90)	531	37.52 (25.74)	400	35.42 (24.06)
Proservice – weight in percentage that service has in school decisions about promotion and tenure	555	11.94 (9.77)	529	13.15 (10.34)	401	13.89 (9.89)
Annteach – weight in percentage that teaching has in school decisions about annual raises	478	37.53 (27.32)	420	41.02 (26.71)	297	38.09 (26.18)
Annresearch – weight in percentage that research has in school decisions about annual raises	480	40.49 (28.57)	415	36.86 (26.48)	295	35.84 (27.47)
Annservice – weight in percentage that service has in school decisions about annual raises	478	12.19 (12.75)	414	12.36 (11.28)	295	13.16 (12.10)
Teach – percentage of work time devoted to teaching	588	51.96 (22.96)	567	55.85 (21.92)	455	56.45 (23.60)
Research – percentage of work time devoted to research	587	29.54 (22.06)	564	22.82 (18.88)	450	22.52 (20.77)
Service – percentage of work time devoted to service activities	na	na	562	9.09 (8.57)	451	9.32 (8.95)

Table 1 Variable definitions and mean values(standard deviations in parentheses)

There are several possible explanations for the disproportionate amount of time spent teaching, compared to the reward structures for teaching and research. Teaching loads and large class sizes in economics courses (both in absolute terms, and compared to class sizes in other disciplines) may require more time than the mix reflected in departmental or school incentives; or additional time spent on research may not reliably lead to more publications, and so have a lower expected return than additional time spent on teaching; or as a matter of tastes economics faculty at most schools may prefer to spend more time teaching than doing research.

The 1995 and 2000 data showed interesting differences in time allocation and incentive structures for baccalaureate and doctoral institutions, however, so to determine whether these differences persisted in

2005, in Table 2 we break down the time allocation (part A) and incentive results (part B) across different types of institutions using three Carnegie classifications – bachelor's, master's, and doctoral institutions. There were insufficient responses from associate-degree-granting institutions in the 2005 survey to include that as a fourth group.

Table 2 Means of percentages of faculty time allocations and departmental incentives by

 Carnegie Classification of Institution (standard deviations in parentheses)

Faculty time variables (percentages)	1995 values	2000 values	2005 values
	Baccalaure	eate Institutions	
Teach	47.08 (19.19) n=98	61.13 (17.79) n=113	64.29 (19.82) n=101
Research	32.65 (19.89) n=98	17.22 (14.50) n=112	14.60 (12.43) n=100
Service	na	10.00 (9.26) n=112	9.76 (7.86) n=100
	Master	s Institutions	
Teach	56.03 (20.16) n=134	57.60 (19.83) n=193	59.97 (21.32) n=157
Research	24.63 (16.93) n=134	19.80 (14.14) n=190	19.87 (17.45) n=157
Service	na	9.60 (8.34) n=191	9.80 (8.01) n=157
	Doctora	al Institutions	
Teach	64.70 (20.95) n=99	48.51 (19.02) n=72	45.69 (23.57) n=162
Research	16.48 (15.40) n=98	29.01 (18.85) n=72	33.38 (24.06) n=159
Service	na	9.98 (8.11) n=72	8.71 (10.36) n=160

Table 2A Faculty time allocations

Table 2B Departmental incentives

Departmental incentives variables	1995 values	2000 values	2005 values
	Baccalaure	eate Institutions	
Proteach	34.02	59.81	59.43
	(16.48)	(17.69)	(16.31)
	n=96	n=110	n=100
Proresearch	54.91	25.75	24.87
	(19.25)	(16.30)	(14.74)
	n=96	n=109	n=99
Proservice	10.92	15.93	15.64
	(6.90)	(11.43)	(8.74)
	n=96	n=108	n=99
Annteach	31.92	49.58	42.06
	(15.92)	(26.91)	(28.21)
	n=83	n=77	n=71
Annresearch	52.60	24.59	21.72
	(20.87)	(19.25)	(20.57)
	n=83	n=76	n=70
Annservice	11.72	14.49	16.06
	(8.94)	(10.81)	(13.18)
	n=83	n=76	n=70
	Master	s Institutions	
Proteach	50.78	50.23	54.84
	(17.23)	(17.48)	(16.06)
	n=131	n=179	n=137
Proresearch	33.32	32.81	29.93
	(16.97)	(17.84)	(16.11)
	n=131	n=179	n=136
Proservice	15.69	16.02	15.34
	(9.16)	(8.89)	(7.91)
	n=131	n=178	n=137
Annteach	40.09	41.40	44.49
	(26.26)	(25.16)	(24.43)
	n=110	n=142	n=90
Annresearch	28.77	30.57	30.04
	(22.32)	(21.82)	(21.68)
	n=110	n=142	n=89
Annservice	13.94	13.34	14.03
	(13.55)	(11.95)	(10.11)
	n=110	n=141	n=89

Departmental incentives variables	1995 values	2000 values	2005 values	
	Doctora	al Institutions		
Proteach	61.08	39.71	30.56	
	(18.93)	(15.04)	(16.23)	
	n=96	n=68	n=130	
Proresearch	22.52	49.29	57.57	
	(15.90)	(18.41)	(21.07)	
	n=96	n=68	n=131	
Proservice	16.35	11.28	10.52	
	(11.57)	(7.32)	(8.46)	
	n=96	n=68	n=131	
Annteach	53.44	40.98	28.56	
	(27.62)	(16.97)	(17.04)	
	n=77	n=58	n=113	
Annresearch	21.91	45.31	56.09	
	(18.30)	(19.86)	(23.24)	
	n=77	n=58	n=113	
Annservice	16.53	12.31	11.06	
	(14.79)	(7.15)	(9.04)	
	n=77	n=58	n=113	

Table 2B Departmental incentives (cont.)

We find only small changes in time allocations in 2005 for any of the different types of schools, but the direction of changes are different at different types of schools. At bachelor's and master's institutions there is a small increase in time devoted to teaching, and at bachelor's institutions there is a small decrease in time devoted to research. Conversely, at doctoral institutions we see a small decrease in time spent on teaching and a small increase in time spent on research. This probably signals that faculty at the different types of schools are being held to different kinds of performance standards.

That is supported by comparing changes in incentives structures from 2000 to 2005, when there is a decrease in the weightings for both teaching and research in determining annual raises at bachelor's institutions and an increase in the importance of teaching for both promotion/tenure decisions and annual raises at master's universities. Conversely, at doctoral institutions the relative weighting for teaching declined while the importance of research increased. Although faculty at the doctoral schools still continue to report spending nearly half of their time on teaching – and considerably more time than the perceived weights for teaching in departmental and school incentive structures – over time the faculty at these schools do seem to be responding to a rising premium on research. Those internal incentives from departments are no doubt reinforced by a growing difference in compensation levels for economists at doctoral/research schools, compared to other schools with more of a teaching mission, as reported annually in the May *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* volume.

4. Determinants of time allocations

To investigate the determinants of time allocations reported by academic economists, we report results from ordinary least squares regressions in which the dependent variables are the percentages of time allocated to either teaching or research. Independent variables include both individual respondent characteristics – gender, rank, whether or not the respondent speaks English as a first language, and membership in the American Economic Association (AEA) – and institutional characteristics such as the Carnegie classification for respondents' schools, the average size of principles classes and average teaching loads for faculty in the respondents' departments, and weightings assigned to teaching and

Variable name	N	Mean
Assoc – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie classification of Associate	1696	0.10 (0.30)
Bacc – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie classification of Baccalaureate	1696	0.19 (0.40)
Masters – dummy variable = 1 for schools with Carnegie classification of Masters	1696	0.29 (0.46)
Male – dummy variable = 1 for males	1663	0.80 (0.40)
Instructor – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of Instructor or Lecturer	1636	0.09 (0.29)
Asst – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of Assistant Professor	1636	0.20 (0.40)
Assoc – dummy variable = 1 for faculty with rank of Associate Professor	1636	0.27 (0.45)
Other Rank – dummy variable = 1 for teaching assistants, adjunct professors, emeritus professors, or other miscellaneous ranks	1636	0.03 (0.16)
English1 – dummy variable = 1 for faculty who speak English as their first language	1663	0.89 (0.31)
Class Size – average size of principles classes in the respondent's department	1382	66.34 (90.10)
SemLoad – the average semester teaching load for tenure and tenured-track faculty in the respondent's department	1444	3.10 (1.05)
1995 Dummy – dummy variable = 1 for responses from the 1995 survey	1696	0.37 (0.48)
2000 Dummy – dummy variable = 1 for responses from the 2000 survey	1696	0.35 (0.48)
AEA Member – dummy variable = 1 for respondents who report that they are AEA members	1635	0.64 (0.48)

Table 3: Additional variable definitions and mean values for combined (1995, 2000 and 2005)responses (standard deviations in parentheses)

research activities for promotion and tenure decisions. We also included dummy variables to indicate the year for each survey response – 1995, 2000 or 2005 (the omitted category).⁵

In Table 3 above we report descriptive statistics for the additional variables included in the OLS regressions, based on data from all three surveys. Most respondents are male and speak English as their first language. The largest number of respondents – but not a majority – taught at doctoral institutions.

As expected, the variables for Carnegie classification were highly correlated with other variables measuring institutional characteristics, such as average class size in principles courses and weightings for teaching and research activities in the respondents' promotion and tenure or annual raise decisions.⁶ Therefore, to test whether the Carnegie classifications had the expected effects on time allocations for teaching and research, we first used OLS to regress only the Carnegie classification variables on our dependent variables. We report these results combining all three survey datasets in Tables 4A (using percentage of time spent on teaching as the dependent variable) and 4B (using percentage of time spent on research as the dependent variable). The omitted comparison groups are the Carnegie Doctoral and Research classifications – the separate Carnegie classification for Research schools was dropped before the 2005 survey was conducted, so for 1995 and 2000 we combined the Doctoral and Research classifications. It is clear that respondents from the Research and Doctoral institutions spend more time on research and less time on teaching than respondents at schools with the other classifications.

Carnegie Classification	Coefficient	<i>p</i> value			
ASSOCIATE	31.718	0.000			
BACCALAUREATE	12.588	0.000			
MASTERS	12.782	0.000			
Constant	38.035	0.000			
n = 1609					

Table 4A: OLS regression for Carnegie Classifications:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching

adjusted R-squared = 0.17

⁵ The reports by Becker and Watts cited above, reporting responses on teaching and assessment methods from these three surveys, were remarkably consistent over the three survey periods; but of course that does not mean that how faculty members allocated their time across teaching and research, or their perceptions of how their schools and departments were rewarding teaching and research over this 15-year period, would also be so uniform. To test that we estimated the equations reported below in Tables 5–7 (except that initially we did not include the AEA membership variable) for each of the survey years. We then compared the estimated equations using F tests. The null hypothesis of no difference between the pairs of estimates for different years was rejected for all equations with time spent on teaching as the dependent variable. It was nearly rejected for the research equations for 1995 and 2000 (p = 0.07) and 1995 and 2005 (p = 0.09), but not rejected for 2000 and 2005. Because an AEA mailing list was used to draw most of the 1995 sample but not the 2000 and 2005 samples, as noted above, we added the AEA membership variable and re-estimated the annual equations and F tests, feeling that membership in AEA was likely to signal more interest in research activities. Although that lowered some of the F values the same results persisted for the teaching equations, and the null hypothesis was still rejected in the research equations for 1995 and 2005. Therefore, in the final estimates reported here, we add binary variables to indicate the year in which the survey results were provided and include the AEA membership variable.

⁶ Many of the simple correlation coefficients with the school classifications were higher than 0.5 (for absolute values), including teaching loads and weightings for teaching and research in promotion and annual raise decisions.

Carnegie Classification	Coefficient	p value				
Associate	-29.824	0.000				
Baccalaureate	-13.832	0.000				
Masters	-13.917	0.000				
Constant	35.086	0.000				
n = 1599						
adjus	ted R-squared = 0.20					

Table 4B: OLS regression for Carnegie Classifications:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research

As a robustness test, and because of the change in the Carnegie classifications before the 2005 survey, we also ran regressions for each of the three survey data sets individually, and with the combined data sets for 1995 and 2000. Those results are not reported here but are available on request. The results were quite stable, with signs for all variables unchanged in all of the regressions.

In Tables 5A and 5B we replace the variables for Carnegie classifications with variables for instructors' personal characteristics and the institutional variables such as class size, semester teaching load, and rewards for teaching and research that were correlated with the Carnegie classifications.⁷ The first column of results includes observations from faculty at all schools, regardless of the Carnegie classification of the school. The next four columns show results for faculty at each of the four Carnegie Classifications (again combining the Doctoral and Research classifications, which had been merged by 2005).

For the set of academic rank variables, our omitted category was full professors and endowed chairs. We include an 'Other Rank' variable here to identify teaching assistants, adjunct professors and a few others who do not fit traditional rank categories for regular faculty. Not surprisingly, except for the 'Other Rank' group and at the Associate Schools where teaching loads for all faculty members are very high, we find that most respondents spend more time on teaching than the full professors and endowed chairholders, who normally have more experience in teaching their courses. But those differences are only significant for the instructor/lecturer group (and even there not in the Associate schools), and for the Other Rank group at the Doctoral and Research Schools. Instructors and associate professors spend less time on research than full professors, but assistant professors reported spending more time on research (except at the Associate schools). That coefficient is significant for the overall sample and at Doctoral/Research schools – almost certainly a reflection of promotion and tenure incentives.

⁷ We lose 300–400 observations by including the class size and semester load variables in the regressions. In an attempt to avoid losing these observations we tried using indicator variables when mean values for these variables were inserted for the missing values. This worked reasonably well for the Semester Load variable but not for the Class Size variable, which exhibited considerably more variation. Using the indicator variables for just Semester Load saved only 127 observations and did not affect signs for other variables, so we dropped all use of the indicator variables.

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)
MALE	-2.341	6.530	-3.207	-2.933	-4.356
	(0.098)	(0.130)	(0.209)	(0.241)	(0.095)
INSTRUCTOR/	11.279	-0.584	23.451	13.238	19.021
LECTURER	(0.000)	(0.892)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.000)
ASSISTANT	1.865	–0.569	5.181	2.722	-1.703
PROFESSOR	(0.215)	(0.907)	(0.081)	(0.272)	(0.540)
ASSOCIATE	1.982	5.578	-0.561	2.303	2.140
PROFESSOR	(0.136)	(0.241)	(0.821)	(0.299)	(0.388)
OTHER RANK	-5.494	-5.781	-3.113	25.044	-20.097
	(0.162)	(0.398)	(0.657)	(0.173)	(0.006)
ENGLISH FIRST	1.694	12.728	-0.422	1.391	0.596
LANGUAGE	(0.363)	(0.059)	(0.917)	(0.611)	(0.874)
WEIGHTING FOR TEACHING IN P&T DECISION	0.292 (0.000)	0.258 (0.001)	0.257 (0.000)	0.370 (0.000)	0.130 (0.025)
PRINCIPLES CLASS	-0.014	–0.083	-0.015	-0.095	-0.001
SIZE	(0.031)	(0.002)	(0.670)	(0.021)	(0.946)
SEMESTER LOAD	4.732	4.954	3.694	3.991	8.496
	(0.000)	(0.172)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.220	4.236	-3.342	1.941	9.175
	(0.119)	(0.349)	(0.344)	(0.435)	(0.001)
2000 DUMMY	1.724	5.500	-3.603	3.589	5.996
	(0.201)	(0.185)	(0.134)	(0.111)	(0.028)
AEA MEMBER	-3.666	-4.853	-2.627	-3.739	-4.720
	(0.003)	(0.196)	(0.273)	(0.057)	(0.064)
CONSTANT	27.074	15.240	40.471	27.381	20.761
	(0.000)	(0.450)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.002)
n	1104	115	253	387	349
ADJUSTED R- SQUARED	0.31	0.22	0.25	0.18	0.27

Table 5A OLS regression for individual and school variables:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegi Classification – coefficient (p value)
MALE	2.160	-0.533	1.725	3.443	2.300
	(0.056)	(0.806)	(0.399)	(0.053)	(0.343)
INSTRUCTOR/	-5.859	0.915	-12.801	-10.706	-12.423
LECTURER	(0.002)	(0.671)	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.002)
ASSISTANT	4.567	-1.254	1.853	2.551	10.231
PROFESSOR	(0.000)	(0.611)	(0.431)	(0.149)	(0.000)
ASSOCIATE	-1.703	-4.577	-1.090	-0.010	-2.902
PROFESSOR	(0.108)	(0.057)	(0.580)	(0.995)	(0.207)
OTHER RANK	-2.774	-2.864	-4.252	-5.701	-1.141
	(0.373)	(0.404)	(0.442)	(0.662)	(0.866)
ENGLISH FIRST	-7.990	-3.157	-6.676	-9.212	-6.230
LANGUAGE	(0.000)	(0.342)	(0.040)	(0.000)	(0.074)
WEIGHTING FOR	0.265	0.469	0.251	0.351	0.161
TEACHING IN P&T DECISION	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
PRINCIPLES CLASS	0.011	-0.004	0.025	0.040	0.007
SIZE	(0.043)	(0.776)	(0.357)	(0.182)	(0.388)
SEMESTER LOAD	-4.664	1.238	-4.487	-4.783	-9.259
	(0.000)	(0.522)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.071	2.418	4.980	-0.003	0.349
	(0.067)	(0.281)	(0.088)	(0.999)	(0.886)
2000 DUMMY	-0.419	0.797	2.547	-3.194	-1.339
	(0.697)	(0.700)	(0.182)	(0.047)	(0.597)
AEA MEMBER	4.477	5.951	2.934	4.514	5.349
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.124)	(0.001)	(0.023)
Constant	29.864	-0.339	25.562	28.881	45.940
	(0.000)	(0.975)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
n	1097	113	251	384	349
Adjusted R-Squared	0.42	0.24	0.38	0.35	0.34

Table 5B OLS regression for individual and school variables:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research

Faculty members who spoke English as their first language generally spent significantly less time on research than non-native English speakers. This may be because the native-English speakers were more likely to be at schools that put more emphasis on teaching, while the non-native English speakers were more likely to be at schools that placed a higher value on research. Using a chi-squared test, we found a statistically significant difference in the distribution of native English speakers versus non-native English speakers across the different Carnegie classifications of schools. Specifically, there were fewer non-native speakers at Associate and Baccalaureate schools.

The signs on the variables for departmental weightings of teaching and research activities in promotion and tenure (P&T) decisions – as perceived by respondents – have the expected signs and the coefficients are significant. The same is true for variables on class size in principles courses and faculty semester teaching loads: at schools where principles classes are smaller and faculty members teach more courses, respondents report spending more time teaching and less time doing research – although these results are not always significant for the ranges of class sizes and teaching loads reported within a particular Carnegie group of schools.

The dummy variables indicating which annual survey a respondent completed are only significant in the teaching equation for the Doctoral/Research schools, and in the research equation for the overall sample only for the 1995 survey only at the 0.10 level. As noted above, the 1995 sample was the only group drawn largely from an AEA mailing list, and the AEA membership variable does indicate that economists who are AEA members report spending significantly more time on research and less time on teaching.

Noting that there are both gender and rank effects on how academic economists allocate their time, we used interaction terms to investigate whether women and men at different ranks allocate their time differently. First we looked at the effects of gender and gender*rank interaction terms, while dropping the individual rank variables, to explore the effect gender may have on time allocations if women have different career paths and timelines across academic ranks, compared to males. Then we dropped the individual gender variable and used the different rank variables with the set of rank*gender interaction terms, to investigate the effect of rank if the distribution of male and female faculty members across ranks is different. In both sets of estimations using interactive terms we drop the Other Rank respondents who were included in Table 5, to focus on respondents in regular faculty positions (i.e. ranks of Instructor/Lecturer, Assistant Professor, Associate Professor or Full Professor/Endowed Chairs).

As reported in Table 6A, investigating whether gender makes a difference in how time is allocated to teaching and research by faculty members with different ranks, we find that although males spend less time teaching there are statistically significantly positive interaction effects for males who are instructors. For the results from all types of schools, using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on MALE, MALE*INSTRUCTOR, MALE*ASSISTANTPROF, and MALE*ASSOCPROF are all zeroes, we find an F value of 6.72 (with four degrees of freedom and 1069 observations) with a *p* value of 0.000. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a difference between males and females. In the estimations for different types of Carnegie schools, we reject the null hypothesis at Baccalaureate and Doctoral/Research schools (with *p* values of 0.00) but not for Associate and Masters' schools (with p values of 0.73 and 0.13, respectively).

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)
MALE	-4.214	6.703	-3.585	-4.811	-6.208
	(0.007)	(0.206)	(0.205)	(0.074)	(0.030)
MALE*INSTRUCTOR/	12.423	-1.616	27.128	12.387	19.982
LECTURER	(0.000)	(0.736)	(0.000)	(0.040)	(0.000)
MALE*ASSISTANT	0.442	–2.296	4.886	0.588	-3.046
PROFESSOR	(0.261)	(0.670)	(0.142)	(0.833)	(0.333)
MALE*ASSOCIATE	1.548	0.677	-1.268	2.682	2.234
PROFESSOR	(0.278)	(0.897)	(0.635)	(0.263)	(0.400)
ENGLISH FIRST	1.775	12.396	–0.885	1.575	0.985
LANGUAGE	(0.335)	(0.066)	(0.820)	(0.566)	(0.792)
WEIGHTING for TEACHING in P&T DECISION	0.289 (0.000)	0.237 (0.004)	0.249 (0.000)	0.367 (0.000)	0.159 (0.007)
PRINCIPLES CLASS SIZE	-0.015	-0.087	0.007	-0.100	-0.001
	(0.026)	(0.001)	(0.840)	(0.015)	(0.888)
SEMESTER LOAD	4.765	5.171	3.923	4.059	8.406
	(0.000)	(0.158)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.431	6.069	-3.240	1.667	8.195
	(0.088)	(0.200)	(0.342)	(0.505)	(0.002)
2000 DUMMY	1.700	6.042	-2.769	3.158	5.314
	(0.206)	(0.151)	(0.239)	(0.163)	(0.051)
AEA MEMBER	-4.039	-5.834	-2.878	-3.636	-6.127
	(0.001)	(0.146)	(0.215)	(0.065)	(0.016)
Constant	29.481	17.050	40.465	29.767	23.345
	(0.000)	(0.407)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
n	1081	106	247	386	342
Adjusted R-squared	0.31	0.23	0.27	0.18	0.27

Table 6A OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender and career paths:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching

We also investigated the gender and rank interactions using the percentage of time spent on Research as the dependent variable. As reported in Table 6B, we found there are statistically significant negative interaction effects for males who are instructors and positive interaction effects for males who are assistant professors. Once again using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on MALE, MALE*INSTRUCTOR, MALE*ASSISTANTPROF, and MALE*ASSOCPROF are all zeroes, for the results from all types of schools we find an F value of 10.65 (with four degrees of freedom and 1062 observations)

with a p value of 0.000 and again reject the null hypothesis of no difference between males and females. In the estimations for different types of Carnegie schools, we reject the null hypothesis at Master's and Doctoral/Research schools (with p values of 0.01 and 0.00 respectively), but not for Associate and Baccalaureate schools (with p values of 0.42 and 0.49, respectively).

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)
MALE	0.855	0.574	0.515	2.537	–0.673
	(0.490)	(0.833)	(0.821)	(0.184)	(0.795)
MALE*INSTRUCTOR/	-7.222	–0.409	-9.389	-11.125	-16.213
LECTURER	(0.001)	(0.866)	(0.116)	(0.013)	(0.000)
MALE*ASSISTANT	5.527	-1.803	1.894	3.596	12.358
PROFESSOR	(0.000)	(0.503)	(0.478)	(0.071)	(0.000)
MALE*ASSOCIATE	-1.796	-4.855	-0.105	-0.108	-3.764
PROFESSOR	(0.114)	(0.068)	(0.961)	(0.949)	(0.119)
ENGLISH FIRST	-8.201	-3.181	-7.058	-9.406	-6.491
LANGUAGE	(0.000)	(0.347)	(0.026)	(0.000)	(0.056)
WEIGHTING for RESEARCH in P&T DECISION	0.264 (0.000)	0.477 (0.000)	0.243 (0.000)	0.354 (0.000)	0.155 (0.001)
PRINCIPLES CLASS	0.012	-0.005	0.008	0.040	0.008
SIZE	(0.030)	(0.717)	(0.771)	(0.177)	(0.281)
SEMESTER LOAD	-4.704	1.346	-4.620	-4.735	–9.583
	(0.000)	(0.499)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.042	2.142	4.855	0.449	0.498
	(0.071)	(0.368)	(0.091)	(0.801)	(0.833)
2000 DUMMY	-0.175	0.616	2.716	-2.802	-0.768
	(0.870)	(0.772)	(0.150)	(0.082)	(0.755)
AEA MEMBER	4.545	5.053	3.327	4.504	5.630
	(0.000)	(0.011)	(0.075)	(0.001)	(0.014)
Constant	31.164	–0.986	27.532	29.220	49.494
	(0.000)	(0.929)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
n	1074	104	245	383	342
Adjusted R-squared	0.42	0.22	0.37	0.36	0.36

Table 6B OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender and career paths:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research

Finally, as reported in Tables 7A and 7B, we investigate the possible effect of rank that might be related to differences in the distribution of men and women across different ranks. We found that all of the ranks listed in the table spend more time teaching than the omitted category of full professors and endowed chairs, except for Instructors and Assistant Professors at Associate Schools, where teaching loads for all

faculty members are very high. In the results for all schools we find statistically significant negative interaction effects for male assistant professors. Using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that therefore reject the null hypothesis to conclude that rank and gender interact. In the estimations for different types of Carnegie schools we reject the null hypothesis for Baccalaureate and Doctoral/Research schools (with *p* values of 0.00), but not for Associate and Master's schools (with *p* values of 0.43 and 0.07, respectively).

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)
INSTRUCTOR/	7.872	-6.870	6.421	18.180	18.608
LECTURER	(0.086)	(0.360)	(0.694)	(0.164)	(0.012)
ASSISTANT	6.435	–5.279	8.137	9.273	4.660
PROFESSOR	(0.005)	(0.598)	(0.063)	(0.014)	(0.241)
ASSOCIATE	4.461	19.819	1.972	1.719	5.548
PROFESSOR	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.608)	(0.685)	(0.204)
MALE*INSTRUCTOR/	4.603	7.509	20.624	-5.834	1.390
LECTURER	(0.367)	(0.336)	(0.245)	(0.682)	(0.870)
MALE*ASSISTANT	-5.948	5.843	-3.374	-8.637	-8.049
PROFESSOR	(0.019)	(0.576)	(0.489)	(0.039)	(0.071)
MALE*ASSOCIATE	–2.854	-16.976	-3.255	0.995	-3.642
PROFESSOR	(0.247)	(0.113)	(0.415)	(0.821)	(0.420)
ENGLISH FIRST	1.808	12.007	-0.539	1.648	0.836
LANGUAGE	(0.327)	(0.074)	(0.891)	(0.547)	(0.823)
WEIGHTING for TEACHING in P&T DECISION	0.291 (0.000)	0.280 (0.001)	0.256 (0.000)	0.370 (0.000)	0.143 (0.017)
CLASS SIZE	-0.015	-0.084	-0.010	-0.095	-0.002
	(0.028)	(0.001)	(0.764)	(0.022)	(0.808)
SEMESTER LOAD	4.722	5.130	3.747	4.074	8.577
	(0.000)	(0.156)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.188	5.672	-3.610	1.390	8.629
	(0.124)	(0.227)	(0.291)	(0.579)	(0.001)
2000 DUMMY	1.620	6.447	-3.151	3.173	5.639
	(0.228)	(0.123)	(0.179)	(0.162)	(0.039)
AEA MEMBER	-4.013	-4.280	-2.896	-3.758	-5.232
	(0.001)	(0.267)	(0.218)	(0.055)	(0.041)
Constant	25.301	17.757	36.918	24.533	16.808
	(0.000)	(0.375)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.008)
n	1081	106	247	386	342
Adjusted R-squared	0.32	0.25	0.27	0.18	0.27

Table 7A OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender distribution across rank:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on teaching

Table 7B OLS regression with interaction terms investigating gender distribution across rank:Dependent variable = percentage of time spent on research

Variable	All Carnegie Classifications – coefficient (p value)	ASSOC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	BACC Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	MASTER Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)	DR/RES Carnegie Classification – coefficient (p value)
INSTRUCTOR/	-2.434	3.963	-28.634	-10.741	-5.225
LECTURER	(0.503)	(0.299)	(0.028)	(0.249)	(0.431)
ASSISTANT	0.994	-1.438	1.207	-2.497	4.644
PROFESSOR	(0.585)	(0.817)	(0.729)	(0.353)	(0.199)
ASSOCIATE	-2.460	-4.828	–2.967	-1.932	–0.958
PROFESSOR	(0.192)	(0.347)	(0.338)	(0.523)	(0.809)
MALE*INSTRUCTOR/	-4.749	-3.977	18.826	-0.188	-11.050
LECTURER	(0.242)	(0.306)	(0.182)	(0.985)	(0.148)
MALE*ASSISTANT	4.612	0.054	0.584	6.258	7.892
PROFESSOR	(0.022)	(0.993)	(0.881)	(0.036)	(0.052)
MALE*ASSOCIATE	0.742	0.325	2.397	2.008	–2.668
PROFESSOR	(0.704)	(0.952)	(0.455)	(0.522)	(0.517)
ENGLISH FIRST	-8.064	-3.341	-6.466	-9.386	-6.210
LANGUAGE	(0.000)	(0.326)	(0.041)	(0.000)	(0.068)
WEIGHTING for RESEARCH in P&T DECISION	0.263 (0.000)	0.474 (0.000)	0.261 (0.000)	0.355 (0.000)	0.151 (0.002)
CLASS SIZE	0.012	–0.005	0.006	0.037	0.008
	(0.030)	(0.726)	(0.816)	(0.216)	(0.257)
SEMESTER LOAD	-4.725	1.035	-4.653	-4.767	-9.627
	(0.000)	(0.603)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
1995 DUMMY	2.038	2.240	5.173	0.443	0.159
	(0.072)	(0.348)	(0.069)	(0.804)	(0.947)
2000 DUMMY	-0.221	0.653	2.707	-2.917	-1.008
	(0.836)	(0.760)	(0.147)	(0.073)	(0.684)
AEA MEMBER	4.440	5.232	2.561	4.489	5.162
	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.172)	(0.001)	(0.026)
Constant	32.003	0.790	27.859	31.828	49.324
	(0.000)	(0.942)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
n	1074	104	245	383	342
Adjusted R-squared	0.42	0.22	0.38	0.35	0.36

Looking at the same question but using the percentage of time spent on Research as the dependent variable, with results reported in Table 7B, we found significantly positive interaction effects for male assistant professors. In the results for all schools, using an F-test to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the rank variables and all of the gender and rank interaction terms are zeroes, we find an F value of 7.46 (for six degrees of freedom and 1060 observations), with a *p* value of 0.000, and reject the

null hypothesis that rank and gender do not interact. In the estimations for different types of Carnegie schools we reject the null hypothesis for Master's and Doctoral/Research schools (with *p* values of 0.03, and 0.00, respectively), but not for Associate and Baccalaureate schools (with *p* values of 0.40 and 0.16, respectively).

Taken together, these results suggest that male and female faculty members behave differently, particularly at the rank of assistant professor, with males reporting that they spend more time doing research than females. The typical ages for assistant professors are the same ages at which it is most common for families to have young children, so female faculty members are perhaps spending more time in child bearing, child care, and other household production activities. They might also be working at different kinds of schools, either due to their own preferences and self-selection of jobs or because of differences in the job offers they receive. We compared the gender distribution across Carnegie classifications using a Chi-squared test and fail to reject the null hypothesis whether the Research and Doctoral classifications are combined or not. Specifically, combining the classifications we find $\chi^2_3 = 2.44$ with a *p* value of 0.487, and not combining the classifications we find $\chi^2_4 = 7.47$ with a *p* value of 0.113.

5. Conclusions, policy implications, and some speculations

Although we noted some periods in which departmental incentives for teaching versus research exhibited modest changes, in general across all types of schools the incentive structures and faculty behaviours are more notable for stability than for change. However, there are important and persistent differences in incentives and behaviours across different types of schools – measured here using Carnegie classifications – and for faculty members with different personal characteristics, including gender and academic rank.

Salary differentials for US economists at research versus teaching institutions have increased sharply over the past decade, as reflected in annual reports that appear in the *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*. Adding that observation to our findings from these survey data raises and highlights an interesting and provocative question: are we witnessing an increasingly sharp demarcation between 'two nations' of economics departments, based on which departments have faculty who regularly publish in established economics journals and which do not? Economists at different kinds of schools appear to perceive these kinds of differences in the incentive structures they face, and allocate their time in different ways in response to those incentives. But at the same time, at all kinds of schools academic economists report devoting a disproportionate amount of time to teaching, compared to their perceptions of how teaching and research are rewarded at their schools.

The finding that rank affects how economists at different points in their academic careers allocate time to teaching and research activities is not surprising or necessarily troubling. But considered together with the apparent differences in career patterns or choices for male and female economists, which affect the distribution of time to teaching and research activities, this may represent an important issue that deserves more investigation and discussion. The gender finding is in some ways the most interesting and challenging issue to face and interpret. But the truth is earlier research in economic education has not been able to provide conclusive answers on why females are less likely to major in economics than males at the undergraduate level (at least in the United States), or to go on to graduate school and faculty positions at all kinds of schools. Some of the possible answers that have been suggested for these outcomes, such as gender role-model effects from female faculty to female students, have been heavily discounted or at least not well or consistently supported.

Similarly, at a very general level it could be suggested that positions in research/doctoral schools require greater time commitments to succeed and remain current with research skills and knowledge, and entail more risk in receiving tenure and salary increases. That could lead many female economists who want to have children and be very active in child care to seek positions in teaching schools; or female economists

might find teaching relatively more rewarding than males, on average. But it is also possible that predominantly male faculty in large, research departments engage in (statistical) discrimination against females in hiring or promotion decisions. Our findings cannot confirm or refute any of these possible explanations.

Moreover, considering the gender issue across academic fields and at other age levels further complicates things. For example, there are technical fields (notably science and medicine) that women today pursue far more than they did in the past, and at much higher levels than we see in economics. And the attitudes and experiences female students have at the precollege level are almost certainly important in shaping their choice of majors in general, and their early decision not to major in economics in particular. At the precollege level, gender differences are already widely observed in economics assessments, and perceptions (including peer perceptions) of economics as a difficult and somewhat technical subject probably discourage some women from taking courses or majoring in economics. But there must be other forces at play, too, because again we do see many women are majoring in other technical and difficult subjects, perhaps because they find the kind of work done in those areas more rewarding or interesting, or because those fields are perceived as being more welcoming and open to female students and young professionals. Those kinds of questions will probably have to be addressed in studies of precollege students, rather than studies of current faculty members. Our findings suggest that it is important for that kind of work to be done, because there are differences in how male and female faculty members in economics departments choose to do their jobs, and those differences may well be larger and more difficult to change than in other fields.

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