

CBM
R
8414
8414
1996
NR.80

entER
for
Economic Research

Discussion paper



* C I N O 1 4 4 1 *



Tilburg University



Center
for
Economic Research

8414
1996
80

90

No. 9680

**BLOCKS, LIQUIDITY, AND CORPORATE
CONTROL**

By Patrick Bolton and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

R 6

September 1996

+ corporate ownership
+ control
+ liquidity
V free riding

ISSN 0924-7815

PATRICK BOLTON*

ERNST-LUDWIG VON THADDEN**

Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

January 1995

This version: August 1996

An earlier version of this paper has circulated under the title “The Ownership Structure of Firms: The Liquidity – Control Tradeoff (in the Privately Held Firm)”. We are grateful to the Studienzentrums Gerzensee (ESSET 1995) for its hospitality, and to the Schweizerischer Nationalfonds, the Center for Economic Policy Research (London), and the Ente Luigi Einaudi for financial support. We have received helpful comments from Philippe Aghion, Gabriella Chiesa, Jürgen Dennert, Mathias Dewatripont, Denis Gromb, Oliver Hart, Jürgen Siebel, Jean Tirole, and Josef Zechner. An anonymous referee and the editor have made suggestions which greatly improved the original version.

* London School of Economics, ECARE, Université Libre de Bruxelles, CentER, Tilburg, and CEPR.

** DEEP, Université de Lausanne, and CEPR.

Abstract:

The paper develops a simple model of optimal corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analysed. The main question addressed is how to reconcile the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with control of management, which is effective only with some degree of ownership concentration. One option is for a firm to create and maintain a controlling block, thus limiting ownership dispersion. Another is to seek maximum ownership dispersion and rely on secondary trading to create a controlling interest when needed. The paper analyses these options and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure.

Key Words: Ownership Structure, Corporate Control, Liquidity, Ownership Concentration, Block Pricing, Free Rider Problem.

1) Introduction

The recent incomplete contracting approach in Corporate Finance has considerably improved our understanding of how small firms determine their capital structure. The basic setting considered in this line of research is one where a founder-manager seeks funding from one or several financiers. The main premise is that the founder-manager, in her dealings with the financiers, is primarily concerned with maintaining her private benefits of control. For small firms these are often quite large relative to the financial returns. Thus, for a small firm the problem of determining the financial structure often reduces to the problem of how to obtain funding by giving away as little control as possible to the financiers. Of course, most financiers insist on some form of protection, so that the final compromise reached in most financial contracts for small firms is one resembling a debt contract (or a venture capital contract) which protects the founder-manager's control as long as the firm is performing adequately.¹

This perspective for small firms does not extend naturally to large firms, since the private benefits of control of the managers for these firms are likely to be small relative to the firm's monetary returns, so that the protection of these benefits is no longer an overriding consideration. Moreover, large firms tend to have more dispersed ownership and therefore less effective investor control. If anything, the main control problem for large firms seems to be how to get investors or shareholders to exert more control. Indeed, this is the problem that the recent literature on corporate governance has focused on.²

Interestingly, there is little variation across nations in the capital structure of small firms, while for large firms the problem of inducing more effective investor control has been tackled very differently. In broad terms, there have been two different responses. In the US and the UK primarily, share-ownership in large firms is widely dispersed, turnover is high, and investor control is often exerted through the threat of takeovers. In other countries, share-ownership is more concentrated, turnover is much lower, and control is exerted, if at all, by the largest shareholders (or debtholders). Three countries that exemplify this type of financial system are Germany, France and Japan.³

¹ For a recent discussion of this literature see Hart (1995).

² Surveys of recent research on corporate governance are Kojima (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1995). For a discussion of the recent policy debate on corporate governance see also The Economist (1994).

³ For a description of the main differences between the financial systems of the US and the UK, on the one hand, and Germany, France and Japan, on the other, see Franks and Mayer (1994) and Kojima (1995).

When evaluating the differences of these two types of systems, it is important to realise that the issue is not whether ownership concentration per se is desirable or not. The issue rather is how often and at what points in a firm's life ownership should be concentrated. One alternative for the design of ownership structure is persistent ownership concentration, where a large blockholder is expected to exercise control of management continuously; the other is ownership dispersion, with reliance on secondary market trading to create concentration whenever necessary for intervention in managerial decision making. This paper develops a framework in which the costs and benefits of the two systems – dispersed ownership combined with a takeover mechanism on the one hand, and large controlling blocks (or "noyaux durs"), on the other – can be evaluated. The benefits of dispersion are mainly greater market liquidity and better risk-diversification.⁴ The benefits of concentration are that effective shareholder control, when it is needed, is more likely. Our main hypothesis is that there is a tradeoff between these two benefits and that control and liquidity represent two sides of the same coin: improving one means impairing the other.

Several empirical studies have documented that the liquidity of a stock is larger the larger the market capitalization of the firm. The explanations for this finding that are usually given relate in one way or another to the presence of transactions costs which limit market participation.⁵ Thus, for example, if market makers face set-up costs, the number of market makers dealing in a stock will be increasing – and, therefore, liquidity will be increasing – in the market capitalization of that stock. Similarly, if market participants face information asymmetries, the number of investors willing to invest in information acquisition in a particular stock will be increasing in the anticipated gains from trade and, hence, in the stock's market capitalization.

This argument immediately implies that when a firm decides to set up a controlling block, it reduces the number of shareholders who can participate in the trade of the firm's stock and, therefore, effectively reduces the market capitalization, and hence the liquidity, of its stock. This is the principal mechanism relating concentration and liquidity in our model.

Besides limited market participation by potential shareholders, the model builds

⁴ The model we develop focuses on the liquidity benefits of dispersion. We abstract from risk-diversification issues mostly to keep the model tractable. For an analysis of the impact of risk sharing on corporate control see Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994).

⁵ See for example, Demsetz (1968), Brennan (1975), Merton (1987), Grossman and Miller (1988), Pagano (1989), and Allen and Gale (1994).

on two other key assumptions. First, it is assumed that some degree of ownership concentration does indeed improve control of management and, therefore, increases firm value. There is a large body of cross-sectional evidence in support of this assumption,⁶ but there are also well-known counterexamples. These include the cases of large owners who have managed the company for very long periods (Johnson et al., 1985), or of management-affiliated blockholders who allow management to dilute share value away from other shareholders (Wruck, 1989). We are aware of these cases, but we do not consider them in this paper.

Second, it is assumed that by exercising control a (large) shareholder incurs net private costs. This assumption may appear stronger than the first one, in light of some of the empirical evidence on the pricing of corporate control transactions. Barclay and Holderness (1989), for example, find that large blocks of shares mostly trade at a premium, which they argue results from private benefits accruing to the blockholder. As we discuss in Section 3, however, the empirical evidence on block pricing reflects several different elements of which the costs of controlling management are only one.⁷ Indeed, our main justification for focussing on the costs rather than the benefits of control is empirical. If private benefits of control were, in general, more important than private costs, corporate governance would be a relatively minor problem: the real problem would be to select among the bids for large blocks of shares who volunteer to control management. This is not the typical situation we observe in the US, to which the above mentioned studies refer – the importance of blockholders with private benefits of control notwithstanding.

Building on these assumptions, our model yields several simple and interesting insights. In particular, the analysis shows that a firm is more likely to choose a dispersed ownership structure, other things equal, if there is more active trading in its secondary market and if regulation facilitates takeovers as a means to acquire control. Complementing this, we find that greater liquidity trading in the secondary market by itself facilitates takeovers by reducing free-riding. These observations shed some new light on the issue why the US and the UK have such different capital and governance structures in large firms from those observed in Germany, France or Japan. In particular, in the

⁶ For publicly traded firms in the U.S. see, for example, Jensen and Warner (1988), Wruck (1989), or Barclay and Holderness (1991). For evidence on French and German listed companies, see Franks, Mayer, and Renneborg (1995).

⁷ Barclay and Holderness (1989), in view of the sizeable number of discounts in their sample, “suggest that block ownership involves private costs as well as private benefits” (Barclay and Holderness, 1989).

US and the UK the takeover mechanism is much less restricted, there are stricter legal restrictions on institutional equity holdings, and secondary market participation by institutional investors is greater and more frequent.⁸ All these features favor ownership dispersion in our model.

More generally, our analysis shows that both types of ownership structure – concentrated or dispersed ownership – can be optimal, depending on the characteristics of the firm and the environment in which it operates. Our comparative statics results show that higher average liquidity demand of investors, lower costs of controlling management, higher potential benefits from correcting managerial failures, and higher transactions costs for secondary market trading all favour a dispersed ownership structure, and vice versa for concentration. Our model is set up to apply in principle to both listed and unlisted firms. Concerning unlisted firms, it is therefore interesting to note that the above characteristics hold – at least to a first approximation – for law and accounting partnerships, which are well-known examples of private firms with dispersed ownership structures (see, e.g., Hansmann, 1995).

For publicly listed companies, where empirical data are best, our model provides a new explanation for why equity block purchase agreements usually are priced at sizeable discounts, while trades of existing blocks are not.⁹ Our explanation is that single shares and blocks, when traded, must reflect the anticipated costs of corporate control equally, since, by arbitrage, one type of seller cannot be treated differently from another. Anticipating that he will not be fully compensated for holding the block in future trading, however, a block purchaser will demand a discount at the issue stage.

There is a large literature related to several aspects of our model. This literature almost exclusively is concerned with large listed companies, whereas the argument of the present paper applies to privately held firms, as well. A closely related paper is Pagano and Röell (1995), who consider a privately held firm with a large shareholder who needs to increase its capital base by bringing in new shareholders. The firm has the option of remaining private and introducing another set of large shareholders, or going public and getting a new set of small shareholders. The benefit of the former option is that the firm does not have to pay listing costs. The downside is that there may be excessive monitoring by large shareholders (as in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1994))

⁸ In the US, for example, actively managed pension funds hold shares for an average of only 1.9 years (Kojima, 1995), and on the NYSE alone, institutions account for 72 percent of trading volume.

⁹ See Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Hertz and Smith (1993) for a description of the empirical puzzle.

and that the stock is less liquid.

Merton (1987) introduces asymmetric information in the standard CAPM to obtain a model in which investors only trade in the limited number of shares about which they have information. His model gives rise to the type of limited market participation we consider in the present paper – in fact, our model of secondary market trading can be interpreted as a reduced form of Merton’s model for one single stock –, but Merton (1987) does not consider corporate control issues.

Shleifer and Vishny (1986) analyse how large shareholders can facilitate takeovers. In their model concentration has no downside. Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) take a similar view to ours on the benefits of large shareholder intervention, and ask to what extent these benefits can be realized by risk-averse investors who optimize their portfolio choice. Kahn and Winton (1995) argue that market liquidity can undermine effective control by a large shareholder by giving him excessive incentives to speculate rather than monitor. In contrast, Holmström and Tirole (1993) argue that insider trading by a large shareholder provides incentives to monitor management but results in a higher cost of capital for the firm.

Recent papers that are related to our analysis of the free-rider problem are Zingales (1995) and Gromb (1993), who show how free riding by small shareholders can be used to increase the ex-ante value of the firm. Also, Bebchuk (1994) considers the problem of the trading mechanism of controlling blocks when large shareholders obtain both monetary and private benefits of control; he contrasts the equal opportunity rule (according to which minority shareholders can participate in the sale of a block on the same terms as large ones) and the market rule (where no distinction is drawn between shareholders according to the size of their holdings).

In an interesting historical study, Bhidé (1993) has argued that political considerations have helped shape the development of U.S. capital markets towards higher liquidity and lower investor activism, thus providing evidence for one manifestation of the tradeoff studied in our paper. We come back to his study in Section 4 below.

Finally, it is worth mentioning a recent study by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) who take quite a different perspective on the observed international differences in ownership concentration. They regress ownership concentration on several measures of law and law enforcement in different countries and argue that the lack of adequate minority shareholder protection in Germany, France and Japan relative to the US (and the UK) may be a cause for the differences in financial systems. We shall discuss more of the relevant empirical literature in the main body of the paper.

The organisation of the rest of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 analyses the two polar forms of ownership structure relevant in the present model, and Section 4 evaluates the tradeoff between the two. Section 5 concludes with some remarks about the scope of the analysis.

2) The Model

Consider a firm that operates for two time-periods, $t = 1, 2$. At time $t = 0$, the original owners want to sell the firm and issue shares, which give rights to the firm's future returns. We assume that because of transaction costs these claims cannot be split into arbitrarily fine units, so that the number of shares, M , is finite.¹⁰

There is a large number of potential investors in the firm's shares. To simplify our analysis, we assume that investors are sufficiently wealthy to buy up the whole firm if they wish.¹¹ Each investor i can invest in a safe, liquid asset whose net rate of return is normalized to zero, or in shares of the firm. If there are n investors each buying h_0^i shares in $t = 0$, the initial ownership structure is (h_0^1, \dots, h_0^n) , with $\sum_{i=1}^n h_0^i = M$. We denote the price of the firm at the issue date in $t = 0$ by V_0 .

Even if investors can afford to buy the whole firm they may not want to, for liquidity reasons. Following Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and others, we model investors' demand for liquidity as follows. Each investor has liquidity needs in the future, which arise either in period 1 or 2. At time $t = 0$, the timing of these needs is unknown to everybody, and all investors have the following identical expected utility from consumption in periods $t = 1$ and $t = 2$:

$$u(c_1, c_2) = qc_1 + (1 - q)c_2. \tag{1}$$

¹⁰ M is an exogenous constant to the model, determined by the costs of trading, and typically smaller than the physical number of shares. On the NYSE, for example, 56 percent of trading volume is accounted for by trades of blocks of 10, 000 or more shares. Hence, following Demsetz (1968), M is determined by the following logic: the easier it is to trade the firm's shares, the lower can be the values traded, hence, the smaller is the shares' effective denomination, and the higher M .

¹¹ Introducing wealth constraints is conceptually not difficult, but technically somewhat complicated, and does not change our main results. We discuss wealth constraints as we go along in the analysis and in the Conclusion.

When investors buy shares, they do not know exactly when they will want to consume. If they want to consume early (which happens with probability q), then they have to sell their shares; if they want to consume later, they may buy more shares. The consumption shocks of investors are assumed to be independent. Thus, even though investors are identical *ex ante*, they generally have different liquidity needs *ex post*, and qV_0 can be interpreted as average liquidity demand by existing shareholders. We shall refer to investors who want to consume early as “impatient” and to those who can wait until period $t = 2$ as “patient”. The preferences specified in (1) provide the simplest possible specification of liquidity preferences.¹²

The trading of shares following the liquidity shocks in $t = 1$ typically depends on the institutional framework in which the firm operates. The specific structure of trading is largely irrelevant for our analysis, and we choose the simplest: We assume that after preference shocks have been realised, aggregate liquidity demand becomes publicly known and the following three-stage bidding game is played.

1. Patient investors simultaneously make unrestricted offers for shares.
2. If there are two or more identical offers, one is selected at random.
3. All owners can tender their shares to the selected buyer at the offered price.

This mechanism implies maximum competition between potential buyers and resolves the coordination problem between identical bids which can cause existence problems.¹³ Furthermore, outside investors and existing owners bid for shares on equal terms.

Having defined liquidity needs and trading, we now turn to the firm’s return structure and, consequently, to the problem of corporate control. We assume that the firm has stochastic returns in $t = 1$ and $t = 2$ which are both determined and publicly observed in $t = 1$ and, for simplicity, assumed to be identical.¹⁴ With probability π the

¹² In particular, these preferences exhibit risk neutrality with respect to intra-period consumption. We could have used a more general specification without, however, gaining much further insight. See Jacklin (1987) and von Thadden (1994) for a discussion of more general approaches to modelling liquidity preferences.

¹³ Because we assume below that an owner can invest a fixed cost in order to control management, the number of shares bought either in Walrasian trading or under standard Bertrand competition determines profits. Therefore, without a coordination stage such as 2. the payoff functions of market participants are not upper-hemicontinuous. The assumption that liquidity demand becomes known before trading simplifies the analysis without qualitative consequences.

¹⁴ All we use in the analysis is that first-period returns are (imperfectly) informative about second-period returns.

firm earns high returns, $y = R$ in both periods and with probability $1 - \pi$ returns are low, normalised to $y = 0$. However, in the bad return state the firm can be reorganized, which generates an added value L , $R > L > 0$, in period $t = 2$.

The problem of corporate control arises from the fact that after the sale of the firm in $t = 0$, the firm is run by managers who always prefer continuation to reorganization.¹⁵ Therefore, reorganisation can only be brought about by outside intervention, which typically costs time and resources. We model this by assuming that an owner who intervenes in the bad state improves firm value from 0 to L in $t = 2$, but incurs net private costs of $C < L$. With efficient intervention, the firm's value is, therefore, given by

$$V^* = \pi 2R + (1 - \pi)(L - C). \quad (2)$$

We denote per-share-values by lower case letters, e.g. $r = R/M$, $v^* = V^*/M$, etc. Because it is typically difficult to get a group of owners to act collectively in the common interest (Diamond, 1984), we assume that intervention costs cannot be shared among owners, they must be borne individually. This implies that only a single owner with a large enough stake in the firm will intervene in the bad state. In other words, intervention will occur only if its private gain exceeds its cost.

A final and key assumption, which makes the model non-trivial, concerns the secondary market for shares. As discussed in the introduction, market participation for any given stock is typically limited by information costs. In the present context this means that there is only a limited number of investors who are able to value and willing to buy shares from existing shareholders when trading in $t = 1$. We model this by assuming that outside investors – those who have not bought shares in $t = 0$ – are less willing to intervene in the bad state and, therefore, are only ready to bid 0 in that state. Hence, in the bad state, they provide liquidity only at a discount. This assumption is stronger than necessary for our analysis, but it allows us to capture in a simple way the notion that selling out and “active investing” can be conflicting policies, with potentially different impacts on firm value.¹⁶

¹⁵ These managers may well be among the owners of the firm. The important point is that their private interest in running the firm is stronger than the value of cash flow improvements achievable by reorganisation.

¹⁶ The notion of limited market participation can be modelled by different assumptions of different sophistication. We have chosen the simplest one. One alternative, which gives slightly more complex formulae and the same results, would be to assume that only a limited number of investors can distinguish the good and the bad return states.

We close the description of the model by recapitulating the timing of activities in the following time-line.

– Figure 1 here –

3) Concentration versus Dispersion

As noted above, only an owner who internalises the costs of control will intervene and force management to take the efficient continuation/reorganization decision in the bad return state. This is the case if and only if his shareholding h^i after trading in $t = 1$ satisfies

$$h^i l \geq C.$$

Let T denote the smallest solution to this inequality, which we take for simplicity to be integer. It is worth pointing out that the fraction T/M necessary to internalise the cost of controlling management may be well below the threshold of 50 per cent, or other majorities required formally for full corporate control. In the U.S., for example, blocks of 10 - 20 per cent, if established in a publicly traded company, already can be associated with significant share price increases due to improved corporate control.¹⁷ In fact, if applied to publicly listed U.S. companies, our model should be restricted to blocks of this size or smaller. As Barclay and Holderness (1989) document for large block trades of NYSE and Amex firms, block premia in such trades can be substantial for blocks of more than 25 per cent, indicating important private benefits, but are smaller for blocks below 25 per cent. Since our model focusses on the private costs of corporate control rather than on the benefits, the model should be restricted to smaller block sizes when applied to the group of firms studied by Barclay and Holderness (1989).¹⁸

The key determinant of the tradeoff between liquidity and control in our model is that achieving a certain level of concentration reduces the number of owners. This, in turn, because outsiders only buy up shares at a discount in the bad state, reduces the number of trading partners in the secondary market who are ready to provide liquidity

¹⁷ See, e.g., Wruck (1989), and Barclay and Holderness (1991). As these studies show, usually the share price response depends on the nature of the large blockholder.

¹⁸ But see the discussion following Lemma 1 below.

in all states. Hence, concentration of ownership, while improving the incentives for the control of management, reduces valuable trading possibilities for all shareholders.

On the other hand, maximum dispersion of shares among initial owners increases trading opportunities among those who potentially will pay the full price for shares in the bad state, but may lead to a value reducing lack of control because of persistent ownership dispersion. Notice that dispersion in $t = 0$ does not necessarily imply that there is dispersion in $t = 1$, after liquidity trading. Indeed, one of the patient owners may buy enough shares from the impatient owners in the bad state to assemble a stake of T or more, necessary for efficient intervention. Thus, the relevant question for the firm – and the main question addressed in this paper – is whether the old owners, when selling out, should create a controlling block of shares, hoping that it persists, or whether initial ownership should be dispersed, which creates more trading opportunities in secondary trading, with the hope that a controlling block emerges when necessary in the secondary market.¹⁹ In this section we consider these two alternatives in turn. In the next, we determine under what circumstances either of these ownership structures dominates.

3.1 Concentrated Ownership

Maximum dispersion of shares is obtained when there are as many owners as shares, M . With a controlling block the maximum number of owners is $M - T + 1$, because at least one investor holds a block of at least T shares. Yet, when the firm creates a controlling block at date $t = 0$, à priori it is not clear that the initial controlling owner will actually control the manager at date $t = 2$ and enforce the efficient continuation/reorganization decision.

The reason is that an initial large owner may himself be impatient, in which case he is only concerned about selling his shares at the highest price. In this case it is possible in principle that he disperses his block in such a way that no large owner emerges ex post. However, under the trading structure considered here and under the assumption of no wealth constraints, concentration will necessarily persist in the secondary market. The reason for this result is the assumption of non-anonymous trading. Under the given trading structure, the blockholder has no choice but to sell his block to one buyer, if he wants to sell. More generally, as long as trading is non-anonymous, any attempt by the large owner to unload his block of shares with several buyers would immediately be reflected in the price, which in turn would remove the incentive to disperse the

¹⁹ It will become clear in a moment that there are no other potentially optimal structures.

block. Hence, if there is at least one patient shareholder, the large owner either sells his shares as a block or keeps them.²⁰ In both cases the large block persists, and the efficient continuation/reorganization decision is taken. If none of the initial shareholders is patient, the block and all other shares must be sold to outsiders, in which case the problem of ex-post concentration is irrelevant.

If the initial ownership structure consists of one large block and a fringe of small owners, ex-post trading in shares has the following structure.

Lemma 1: Suppose the firm in $t = 0$ has $M - T + 1$ owners, one holding T shares and the others each one share. If in $t = 1$ there are at least two patient owners, then shares trade at the price

$$b(I, r) = r \tag{3}$$

in the good return state, and

$$b(I, 0) = l - \frac{C}{T + I} \tag{4}$$

in the bad state, where I is the number of impatient small owners. In the bad state, the block is preserved, and the blockholder's ex-post position is worth $Tb(I, 0)$, regardless of whether he is patient or impatient.

Proof: In the good state, corporate control is not an issue and (3) holds trivially. Suppose that $\tilde{y} = 0$, the large owner is patient, and at least one small shareholder is patient, as well. Then bids by outsiders are irrelevant, because bidding among insiders alone will drive the price up beyond what outsiders are ready to pay (that is 0).²¹ If a small patient shareholder wins the bidding with a bid of b , the maximum number of shares he will attract is $T + I$ (the block and all impatient shares), which will be worth to him $(T + I)(l - b) + l - C$. Hence, the optimal bid by the large shareholder, $b(I, 0)$, keeps the small patient owners indifferent between bidding or not and satisfies:

$$(T + I)(l - b(I, 0)) = C, \tag{5}$$

which implies (4). By (5), the large owner's profit from making this bid and attracting the impatient shares is the same as the profit from selling his stake at this price, namely $Tb(I, 0)$.

²⁰ This lack of anonymous trading reflects the importance of the initial ownership structure, in contrast to completely anonymous ownership. In Bolton and von Thadden (1996), we consider anonymous trading as an alternative.

²¹ We assume throughout that bidders do not use weakly dominated strategies, a standard assumption in auction theory.

If the large owner is impatient and $I \leq M - T - 2$, the optimal bid by a small owner satisfies (5) by the same argument.

q.e.d.

Simple as it is, the lemma contains several interesting insights. First, the large block is not broken up in liquidity trading, except possibly for the extreme case of every owner being impatient. This is consistent with the empirical evidence.²² Second, expected future intervention costs are partially borne by the small impatient shareholders. Single shares trade at less than their first-best value, and patient shares are not traded at all.

Third, if in the bad state the large block is sold, it trades at the same price as single shares, because the anticipated intervention costs are correctly priced. At first glance, this may look surprising, given the empirical evidence on premia on large block trades for publicly listed companies in the U.S. (Barclay and Holderness (1989), Mikkelsen and Regassa (1991)). These studies find large variations of premia and discounts and positive median block premia.²³ Two observations resolve this discrepancy. First, when regressing block premia on block size with a sample split at 25 per cent, Barclay and Holderness (1989) find a large and significant point estimate for block sizes above 25 per cent, and a negative, though insignificant coefficient below 25 per cent.²⁴ As noted above, for this group of firms our focus on private costs, rather than benefits of control is therefore only justified when blocks are not too large.

Furthermore, the block trades considered in our model are seller-, and not buyer-initiated. The available evidence (see, e.g., Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987)) suggests that seller-initiated trades are accompanied by significantly lower, sometimes even negative block premia.²⁵

Hence, our model does not incorporate all elements of block pricing. It would be

²² See, e.g., Barclay and Holderness (1989), who find that "the limited evidence available suggests that large blocks are seldom broken up."

²³ For their sample of block trades of NYSE and Amex firms between 1978 and 1982, Barclay and Holderness (1989) find a median premium for large blocks of shares of 15.7 per cent, and block discounts in 20 percent of the transactions.

²⁴ These estimates refer to block premia per share (their regression 4 in Table V), which is the measure considered in Lemma 1.

²⁵ Note, however, that Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987) only consider blocks which are large in dollar terms, and typically not in percentage terms. We know of no study distinguishing between seller- and buyer-initiated trades of large percentage blocks. Yet, such differences seem to be plausible also for those blocks, given the wide variations of block discounts/premia documented by Barclay and Holderness (1989) and, in a related context, by Wruck (1989).

quite possible to include bargaining over block sales and buyer-initiated trades into the model (e.g., by introducing outsiders with random private benefits in $t = 1$, as in Grossman and Hart (1988)), which would generate positive average block premia. Yet, we have preferred to focus on the simpler model with only liquidity trading.

Proposition 1: The ex-ante value of the firm with at least one large owner is maximized when there is exactly one large owner with a stake equal to T and all other owners hold only one share. The block is priced at a discount, and the firm's ex-ante value is

$$V_0^c = 2\pi R + (1 - \pi)(1 - q^{M-T+1})(L - C). \quad (6)$$

Proof: To have more than one large owner reduces liquidity and does not provide any improvement in the ex-post reorganization/continuation decision. To have a single large owner with a stake strictly greater than T reduces liquidity and again does not improve ex-post efficiency. This establishes that firm value is maximized by having exactly one large owner with a stake T . By Lemma 1, the expected value of the large owner's block is

$$\begin{aligned} v_B = & (1 - q)q^{M-T}(V^* - (M - T)\pi r) \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{M-T-1} \binom{M-T+1}{i} q^i (1 - q)^{M-T+1-i} T(\pi b(i, r) + (1 - \pi)b(i, 0)) \\ & + (q^{M-T+1} + (M - T)(1 - q)q^{M-T})T\pi r, \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

and that of a single share

$$\begin{aligned} v_S = & (1 - q)q^{M-T}(V^* - (M - T)\pi r) \\ & + \sum_{i=0}^{M-T-1} \binom{M-T}{i} q^i (1 - q)^{M-T+1-i} (\pi r + (1 - \pi)l) \\ & + \sum_{i=1}^{M-T-1} \binom{M-T}{i-1} q^i (1 - q)^{M-T+1-i} (\pi b(i, r) + (1 - \pi)b(i, 0)) \\ & + (q^{M-T+1} + (M - T)(1 - q)q^{M-T})\pi r. \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Since $V_0^c = v_B + (M - T)v_S$, (6) follows from (7) and (8) by direct computation. A further straightforward computation shows that

$$\begin{aligned} T v_S - v_B = & (T - 1)(1 - q)q^{M-T}(V^* - (M - T)\pi r) \\ & + T \sum_{i=0}^{M-T-1} \binom{M-T}{i} q^i (1 - q)^{M-T+1-i} \frac{(1 - \pi)C}{T + i}, \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

which is positive.

q.e.d.

Thus, the liquidity cost of having a large owner at date $t = 0$ is measured entirely in terms of the implied reduction in the number of owners from M to $M - T + 1$. The simplicity of the expression for V_0^c comes from the assumption of no wealth constraints. With such constraints, an additional cost of creating a large block is that this block may have to be split up for some realizations of liquidity shocks, thus eliminating the efficiency gains relating to corporate control.

The fact that the block is priced at a discount at the issue date may seem surprising, because, by (3) and (4), the shares will trade at their ex-post value in the good state and in the bad state impatient owners will subsidize the blockholder for the future monitoring costs. Since everybody has the same liquidity preferences ex ante, one might expect the costs to be borne equitably at the issue date, and therefore to observe no block discount. This is not the case, however, for two reasons which are both reflected in formula (9). First, as shown in Lemma 1, small impatient shareholders only bear part of the expected monitoring costs ex post. For the remaining part of these costs, the large blockholder must be compensated ex ante. This corresponds to the second term on the right hand side of (9).

The second component of the block discount is due to an inherent public goods problem in the design of ownership structure. From the point of view of the individual investor, a minimum ownership stake in $t = 0$ is desirable, because this maximizes his liquidity benefits without impairing corporate control ex post. This feature of free-riding on liquidity provision is quite general;²⁶ it manifests itself in the present model through the fact that every owner, regardless of his stake, has the same chance of benefitting from liquidity trading ex post. In order to persuade an investor to take on more than the one share necessary to obtain this benefit, such shares must receive an additional discount, which is given by the first term on the right hand side of (9). It is in this sense that the blockholder must be compensated for reduced liquidity in the present model.

Empirically, the discounting of blocks at the issue date is well documented. Wruck (1989) finds small, but significant discounts for block equity placements of NYSE and Amex firms.²⁷ Consistent with the prediction of the above proposition, she suggests

²⁶ See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) for an analysis of the public goods problem in liquidity provision in interbank lending.

²⁷ For reasons we do not know, Wruck measures the discount with respect to the market price one day

that the pricing reflects compensation for reduced liquidity and for “factors other than reduced liquidity”.

In a similar vein, for a sample of private equity placements also covering OTC firms, Hertz and Smith (1993) report mean discounts of 20.1 per cent.²⁸ They, too, “think it unlikely that a pure illiquidity effect can explain the magnitude of the discounts we find”, and suggest as an additional explanation, in the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984) and slightly different from our explanation, costly monitoring by the blockholder at the issue date. In a quite different institutional context, Molin (1996) reports a mean discount of 15.9 per cent on private equity placements on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. As another possible application of the above argument, it has been pointed out to us that holding companies in Belgium and Germany generally trade at a discount to the value of their portfolios. We do not have the data to verify this systematically. If this is true, however, it provides another manifestation of the discount established in Proposition 1.²⁹

3.2 Dispersed Ownership

When there is no concentration at date $t = 0$, the main question is whether an owner who is large enough to control management emerges after trading in the secondary market in the bad return state. The main factor preventing the emergence of a controlling block at date $t = 1$ is free-riding by small patient owners. Small patient owners are willing to sell their shares to a large owner only at the ex-post value of these shares. Hence, if in the bad state a controlling block were to emerge with probability one, then small patient owners would only be willing to sell their shares at a price l . But no bidder would offer to buy shares at that price in order to build a controlling block, because he needs to be compensated for the intervention cost C . For this reason, the emergence of a controlling block in secondary trading is not guaranteed. There is, however, an important factor favoring the emergence of a controlling block: liquidity selling by the impatient owners. To determine when and how a controlling block emerges, we need to study in detail the response of individual owners to buy offers in secondary trading.

before the announcement date. Given that average abnormal returns from day -1 to day 0 alone in her sample are 1.9 per cent, her numbers underestimate the block discount as more naively defined.

²⁸ For the 30 cases where they could ascertain that the placement was with a single investor, the mean discount is still 11.7 per cent.

²⁹ Because holding companies typically provide real control services, their case is different from the more controversial case of closed-end mutual funds (see, e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)).

The key observation here is that small owners considering their selling decision are aware that their decision will have an effect on the overall probability of success of a tender offer. In our model owners are not atomistic; thus, even if there are many owners, each owner is aware that he may be pivotal with some probability. As is well known from the theory of takeovers (see Kovenock (1984), Bagnoli and Lipman (1988), and Holmström and Nalebuff (1992)), when owners are pivotal there are many Nash equilibria in such tender games. However, one important feature distinguishes our model from this literature: owners differ according to their impatience to consume. As in the case of concentrated shareholding discussed above, impatient owners will tender their shares with probability one. But the best response of patient owners is not necessarily unique.

Our problem differs in another way from the existing literature in that we have competition between identical potential bidders, as soon as there are at least two patient owners. Thus, in our model the equilibrium tender offer at date $t = 1$ must be such that the owner making the offer is indifferent between remaining a small patient owner and attempting to build a controlling interest. As will be shown below, in the bad state this adds a binding restriction on trading.

In the good state, regardless of liquidity demand, shares trade at their ex-post value, r , and their allocation is irrelevant for the value of the firm. In the bad state, however, because of the need for intervention, we have to distinguish two cases of liquidity trading; one where the number of impatient owners is at least $T - 1$, and the other where it is strictly less than $T - 1$.

In the first case equilibrium is easy to characterize. If all owners are impatient, they sell out to an arbitrary outsider at the competitive price 0. If there is exactly one patient owner, he also bids 0 (or slightly more) and acquires the firm at a discount reflecting his insider position. More interestingly, if the number of impatient owners, I , satisfies $T - 1 \leq I \leq M - 2$, a controlling block can still be built solely with impatient shares, and therefore emerges with probability 1. Each patient owner, by remaining small, gets l in the bad state. Since the successful bidder makes a bid strictly below the ex-post value of the share, all patient owners hold on to their shares. On the other hand, all impatient owners sell. Thus, if the outstanding bid is b , the new controlling owner gets $l(I + 1) - C - bI$. The equilibrium bid is then given by $l(I + 1) - C - bI = l$, which implies

$$b(I, 0) = l - \frac{C}{I}. \quad (10)$$

The equilibrium bid $b(I, 0)$ has exactly the same structure as the one in the case of concentrated shareholding, (4). Whereas with concentrated shareholding the controlling stake exists *ex ante* and is known to persist, here such a stake does not exist, but is known to emerge with certainty in the bad state. Notice that the controlling interest emerges despite free-riding by all the patient owners. Ironically, the intervention cost is entirely borne by the impatient owners. In effect, impatient owners subsidize one patient owner to exercise control in the firm in the future, so that they can sell out in the present. This yields an interesting twist to the famous thesis of “exit, voice, and loyalty” (Hirschman, 1970) as possible responses to organizational failures. Here, owners wishing to sell out can indeed choose the “exit” option. However, although the firm’s future does not interest them anymore, they have to pay the price of future corporate control; “exit” is costly.

In the case where the number of impatient owners is smaller, $I < T - 1$, things are more complicated. Since in this case there are several Nash equilibria in the tender game between patient owners in the bad state, we shall follow the literature and focus on the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Note that, since we suppose that there is maximum dispersion *ex ante*, each owner has only one share to sell at date $t = 1$. Thus, all patient owners are identical. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to suppose symmetric equilibrium behaviour by patient owners.

We begin by introducing some notation. Suppose one patient owner makes an offer to buy shares in the bad state. Let $P = M - I - 1$ denote the number of the remaining patient owners. As indicated above, let m be the (symmetric) equilibrium probability of selling for each of these P owners. Let S denote the number of patient shares sold in equilibrium. S is a random variable on $\{0, \dots, P\}$ with density

$$\sigma^P(S; m) = \binom{P}{S} m^S (1 - m)^{P-S}.$$

Let $K = T - I - 1$ (≥ 1) denote the minimum number of patient shares the offer has to attract in order to generate a controlling stake. Finally, let

$$Q_K^P(m) = \sum_{s=K}^P \sigma^P(s; m)$$

denote the equilibrium probability that the tender offer attracts at least K patient shares out of P .

In equilibrium, each of the P potential sellers of shares must be indifferent between selling and not selling. This implies the following relationship between the outstanding bid, b , and the selling probability $m \in (0, 1)$:

$$b = Q_K^{P-1}(m)l, \quad (11)$$

where the left hand side is the (sure) gain from selling and the right hand side the expected gain from holding on to the share. Given b and m , the bidder's expected profits are

$$\Pi = \sum_{s=K}^P \sigma^P(s; m)((I + 1 + s)l - C) - \sum_{s=0}^P \sigma^P(s; m)(I + s)b. \quad (12)$$

The crucial observation now is the following.

Lemma 2: For every bid satisfying (11) one has $\Pi < 0$.

The proof of Lemma 2 is in the Appendix. Lemma 2 implies that, whenever there are not sufficient impatient shares to guarantee the success of the tender offer, free-riding makes the concentration of shares in the bad state impossible. Any bid which is high enough for patient owners to consider selling – as given by (11) – is too high to pay off for the bidder. Conversely, a bid which is sufficiently low to allow the bidder to recoup the future intervention costs does not attract any patient shares. Hence, if $I < T - 1$, dispersion persists with probability 1 in the bad state, and the free-rider paradox, established by Grossman and Hart (1980) for the case of atomistic owners, prevails.

The intuition why there is such a stark contrast between the case of high and low liquidity trading is the following. If liquidity demand is high in the bad state, bidders can extract enough value from impatient owners to recoup the intervention costs (as shown in (10)). On the other hand, as soon as a bid needs patient shares to succeed, it has to pay these shares a premium to keep them from free-riding. However, because the bidder cannot discriminate between patient and impatient owners, he has to pay this premium to the impatient owners, too, which makes the bid too expensive.³⁰

Lemma 2 now immediately implies:

³⁰ Like in most models of free-riding, allowing for bids which are conditional on obtaining 100 percent of the shares would resolve the problem formally. However, this is not appealing empirically.

Proposition 2: If the firm starts out with dispersed ownership in $t = 0$, concentration in the bad state obtains with probability

$$\lambda = \lambda(q, T, M) = \sum_{i=T-1}^{M-1} \binom{M}{i} q^i (1-q)^{M-i}. \quad (13)$$

The ex-ante value of the firm is given by

$$V_0^d = 2\pi R + \lambda(1 - \pi)(L - C). \quad (14)$$

Thus the control cost of having no large initial owner is measured entirely in terms of the probability that ownership fails to become concentrated when necessary ex post. As in the case of Proposition 1, all ex-post distortions in liquidity trading wash out ex ante. If *all* owners or if *too few* owners are impatient, efficient corporate control fails in the bad return state, but for two different reasons. In the first case, no shareholder *wants* to take on the responsibility (and the costs) to control management, in the second case no one *is able* to do it, because of excessive free-riding by other shareholders.

In practice, of course, a controlling interest is not always built through a simple tender offer as here. If an owner decides to raise his ownership stake in response to perceived managerial failures, he may be able to buy out some other owners at lower prices, reflecting the imperfections of management control. However, through rising share prices and disclosure requirements the information will get into the market. The above analysis suggests that if information disseminates too quickly or if takeovers are very costly, owners will prefer to give up building a controlling interest altogether.³¹

4) Evaluating the Tradeoff

The previous section has analysed liquidity trading and firm value under the two relevant ownership structures of our model. In this section we discuss how the choice

³¹ Note that Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 do not depend on our assumption that outsiders are less willing to control management than existing owners. This is because the problem is caused by free-riding of existing owners. If there are more than $M-T+1$ patient owners, a tender offer must fail regardless of the number of potential bidders.

between the two structures is influenced by the characteristics of the firm and its environment. Comparing the expressions for V_0^c and V_0^d in equations (6) and (14), resp., shows immediately that $V_0^c > V_0^d$ if and only if

$$1 - q^{M-T+1} - \lambda > 0. \quad (15)$$

This simple condition is a concise description of the tradeoff between the costs and benefits of the two ownership structures. If ownership is dispersed, there is a larger group of investors to trade with, but only a reduced chance, measured by λ , of efficient corporate control, due to free-riding. Under concentration, corporate control is provided by the large owner, but because of reduced trading opportunities owners benefit from it only with a reduced probability, $1 - q^{M-T+1}$. As (15) shows, the tradeoff depends only on three variables: average liquidity demand q , the total number of shares M , and the efficient controlling stake, $T = \frac{C}{L}M$. Other variables, in particular π and R , the determinants of the firm's cash flow, do not enter. This is a consequence of our assumption that the costs and benefits of ownership concentration only accrue in bad cash flow states. If ownership structure matters in all states, the comparison becomes more complicated.

We first turn to the question of how ownership structure is affected by the investors' average demand for liquidity, q .

Proposition 3: There is a critical value $\bar{q} = \bar{q}(T, M) \in (0, 1)$ such that concentrated ownership in $t = 0$ is optimal for $q < \bar{q}$, and dispersed ownership is optimal for $q > \bar{q}$.

Proof: Ignoring the dependence of λ on T and M for the moment and writing $\lambda = \lambda(q)$, we have $\lambda(0) = \lambda(1) = 0$ and, by straightforward calculation,

$$\lambda'(q) = M \binom{M-1}{T-2} q^{T-2} (1-q)^{M-T+1} - M q^{M-1}.$$

Denote the left hand side of (15) by $g(q, T)$. We have $g(0, T) = 1$, $g(1, T) = 0$, and

$$g_q(q, T) = -(M - T + 1)q^{M-T} - \lambda'(q), \quad (16)$$

hence $g_q(1, T) > 0$. A further straightforward calculation shows that $g_q(q, T) = 0$ implies $g_{qq}(q, T) > 0$. Hence, g as a function of q can have only local minima. By the above, it therefore has exactly one zero, \bar{q} , in $(0, 1)$.

q.e.d.

At one level, Proposition 3 is intuitive and straightforward: when q is large there is a high value of liquidity (which favours dispersion), and when q is low there is a low value of liquidity (which favours concentration). However, this only concerns the demand for liquidity. The less obvious part of Proposition 3, which our analysis brings out, is that this is also a supply phenomenon. By the assumption of no wealth constraints and maximum ex-post competition for shares, the supply of liquidity is a constraint only when all shareholders want to sell out simultaneously in the bad state. This happens with probability $(1 - \pi)q^n$ where n is the number of initial shareholders. With the remaining probability of $1 - (1 - \pi)q^n$, shareholders get the full ex-post value of their shares in both return states, i.e. shares are fully liquid. If q is large, this probability is relatively small, so that increasing it by increasing n is relatively valuable. If q is small, on the other hand, lacking liquidity is relatively less likely and, therefore, reducing n to achieve better corporate control is relatively more valuable.

Proposition 3 implies, in particular, that if investors are patient, ownership concentration is more likely. This implication is consistent with a particular institutional feature of corporate finance in Germany. Under German corporate law, firms can reinvest some of their employees' pension contributions into the own business, as part of the firm's liabilities (*Pensionsrückstellungen*). This possibility is widely used and effectively makes the employees long-term investors in their firm. Although formally our model does not have heterogenous investors, it is easy to see that adding a group of patient investors to the pool of investors in the model has the same effect as increasing average investor patience, i. e. favouring concentration. Comparing the ownership structures of German and U.S. or U.K. firms, ownership concentration is indeed one of the most striking differences: in the U.K., 16 percent of the largest quoted firms have an owner with a stake of at least 25 percent, against 85 percent in Germany (Franks and Mayer, 1994).

We now turn to the relative cost of shareholder intervention. This cost, measured by the size of the efficient intervention stake T , is influenced by two parameters of the model, the actual cost of intervening, C , and the benefit brought about by intervention, L .

Proposition 4: When T increases, the threshold level of average liquidity demand, $q(T, M)$, increases; hence, concentration is more likely to be efficient.

Proof: We have, for $T \leq (M + 1)/2$.

$$g(q, T + 1) - g(q, T) = (1 - q)q^{T-1} \left(\binom{M}{T-1} (1 - q)^{M-T} - q^{M-2T+1} \right). \quad (17)$$

It is not difficult, but lengthy, to verify that this expression is positive if $g(q, T) = 0$. Furthermore, from the proof of Proposition 3, $g_q(\bar{q}(T, M), T) < 0$. This implies the desired result. The case $T > (M + 1)/2$ is similar.

q.e.d.

Proposition 4 states that if intervention becomes relatively more costly (T increases), concentration becomes more valuable at the margin. In other words, when average liquidity demand q is such that investors are indifferent between concentration or dispersion, an increase in the relative cost of intervention makes concentration more attractive than dispersion. Cross-sectionally, one should therefore observe more concentration of ownership if the relative costs of intervention are higher.

This prediction corresponds well to the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) about ownership concentration in large U.S. firms, and also casts some new light on their theoretical arguments. They, too, argue that the costs of monitoring are an important explanatory variable for ownership concentration. They proxy these costs, which are directly unobservable, by the volatility of the exogenous factors influencing corporate performance.³² Empirically, they indeed find that firms with higher earnings and stock price volatility tend to have a more concentrated ownership structure. At the same time, however, they predict that ownership concentration should also depend positively on the “control potential”, i.e. the potential gain from controlling management. Since they measure this variable again by earnings and stock price volatility, they find support for this hypothesis. Our analysis suggests that this might be too quick a conclusion, driven by the fact that Demsetz and Lehn (1985) do not model all the costs of concentration. Indeed, in our model, L can be considered to be a good proxy for the “control potential”: the higher L , the larger the gain from intervention in the low return state. Proposition 4 now implies that, with C held constant, increasing L should on average decrease concentration. Why this discrepancy? The reason is that an increased benefit from control does not only render *ex-ante* concentration more attractive, but also makes it easier to achieve *ex post*, by lowering the stake necessary for efficient intervention. Therefore,

³² “disentangling the effects of managerial behavior on firm performance from the corresponding effects of these other, largely exogenous factors is costly” (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985).

because ex-ante concentration has costs in terms of liquidity, ownership dispersion, with its reliance on ex-post trading to achieve intervention, becomes more attractive.

Finally, we look at how ownership structure varies with the number of shares, M , which we have argued reflects the transactions costs of trading. Because the comparative statics become more difficult, we only do them asymptotically.

Proposition 5: For small values of M , both ownership structures, dispersion or concentration, can be optimal, depending on the other parameters. If M tends to infinity, concentration always dominates.

Proof: Because $C < L$, $q^{M-T+1} \rightarrow 0$ and λ is bounded away from 1 for $M \rightarrow \infty$. Hence, (15) holds for M large enough. For $M = 2$ (which necessitates $T = 2$) the left hand side of (15) becomes $(1 - q)(1 - 2q)$, whose sign depends on q .

q.e.d.

Proposition 5 states that if shares can be arbitrarily finely divided, concentration of ownership is always preferable to dispersion. This is intuitive, because in this case even under ownership concentration the total number of owners, $(1 - \frac{C}{L})M + 1$, can be made large, thus achieving good liquidity without costs in terms of corporate control. This result confirms a conjecture offered by Bhide (1993) in a study of corporate governance issues of publicly traded U.S. companies. Bhide suggests that combining a thick secondary market for shares with the presence of a large controlling block can potentially solve the corporate governance problem. Our analysis shows that, in the framework of our model, this is correct, if shares are arbitrarily divisible. On the other hand, if transactions costs of trading are taken into account, the denomination of shares is typically bounded below by the costs of transacting, and thick secondary markets can no longer be taken for granted. In fact, secondary market liquidity then is one element in the design of corporate ownership structure. and more generally of capital market structure, which is subject to the tradeoff analysed in this paper.

5) Conclusion

The present paper has developed a simple framework in which to analyze costs and benefits of ownership concentration, if the efficiency of corporate control and secondary

market liquidity are both taken into account. An important assumption has been that, in some circumstances, the number of investors holding the firm's stock can be important for secondary market trading. This assumption, which relies on the idea that firms are not monitored perfectly by the market, is a convenient simplification of the general insight that market participation is limited by transaction costs.

A second simplifying assumption of the analysis has been to ignore wealth constraints. This assumption allows us to obtain simple expressions for the pricing of shares in ex-post trading, because in each contingency owners have enough wealth to pay the ex-post value of all impatient shares. If this is not the case, ex-post competition becomes more complicated. However, under reasonable pricing mechanisms the two important qualitative features of ex-post ownership remain unchanged: with ex-ante concentration the controlling block, and hence efficient corporate control, persists in bad states of nature, whereas with ex-ante dispersion a controlling block fails to emerge if liquidity trading is low. For our analysis to hold, this is all that counts (cf. Propositions 1 and 2), because ex-post distortions and redistributions wash out ex ante by symmetry.

One unrealistic implication of the present model should be pointed out, namely the prediction that in the long run there is a tendency for ownership to be concentrated. This implication results from the assumption that the firm is put up for sale once and trade afterwards takes place mainly among existing owners, who sell out over time. This assumption ignores the fact that if the firm has been in the hands of a potentially decreasing number of owners for long enough, it may be put up for sale to attract a new group of (possibly dispersed) owners. Incorporating this feature into a dynamic model of ownership change yields an alternating structure of dispersion and concentration, which is more appealing empirically. We consider such a structure in Bolton and von Thadden (1996) in the context of a model of overlapping generations of investors.

To conclude the paper, it is worth noting that the general problem raised in this paper does not only apply to equity financing. Conceptually, the liquidity-control trade-off is also relevant to debt financing. Thus, one of the benefits of bank financing is that, with a sufficiently large stake, a bank may be willing to monitor the firm and guide managerial decisions. Of course, since the bank itself is not a major stockholder it may not take the ex-post efficient continuation decision. But, even if the bank does not necessarily act in the interest of stockholders, it is likely that its interests are more in line with those of other debt holders. However, for other debt holders, the cost of having a large bank is some lack of liquidity. This is why bond financing may sometimes be

preferred to bank financing. An interesting question concerning bond financing then is why there does not seem to be a parallel for bonds to the notion of a controlling interest for stocks. Is this due to regulatory restrictions? Is it due to the fact that with most bonds bondholders are unlikely to ever be in a position where they can exercise control? These are questions for further research.

Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2

Denote by

$$E_K^P(m) = Q_K^P(m) E[S|S \geq K] = \sum_{s=K}^P s \sigma^P(s; m)$$

the expected number of patient shares including and above the threshold level that are sold in equilibrium. Using the fact that $C = lT$, expected profits from bidding b , given by (11) in the main text, then are

$$\Pi = (1 - \pi)lE_K^P(m) - (1 - \pi)lKQ_K^P(m) - (I + mP)(b - \pi r) + \pi r. \quad (A1)$$

Notice that

$$(1 - m)Q_K^{P-1}(m) = \sum_{s=K}^P \left(1 - \frac{s}{P}\right) \binom{P}{s} m^s (1 - m)^{P-s} = Q_K^P(m) - \frac{1}{P} E_K^P(m). \quad (A2)$$

Inserting (A2) into (10) and all into (A1) yields

$$\Pi = \frac{(1 - \pi)l}{1 - m} \left[\frac{M - 1}{P} E_K^P(m) - (m(M - T) + T - 1) Q_K^P(m) \right] + \pi r. \quad (A3)$$

Denote the term in square brackets in (A3) by $F(m)$. We have

$$Q_{K-1}^{P-1}(m) = Q_K^{P-1}(m) + \binom{P-1}{K-1} m^{K-1} (1 - m)^{P-K}.$$

Therefore,

$$F'(m) = \left((M - 1)K - P(T - 1) - mP(M - T) \right) \binom{P-1}{K-1} m^{K-1} (1 - m)^{P-K} - \frac{F(m)}{1 - m}. \quad (A4)$$

Remembering that $P = M - I - 1$ and $K = T - I - 1$, we have for $m > 0$,

$$(M - 1)K - P(T - 1) - mP(M - T) < 0. \quad (A5)$$

(A4), (A5), and the fact that $F(0) = 0$ imply that $F(m) < 0$ for $m \in (0, 1)$.

q.e.d.

References:

- Admati, A., P. Pfleiderer and J. Zechner (1994), "Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium," *Journal of Political Economy* 102, 1097-1130.
- Allen, F. and D. Gale (1994), "Limited Market Participation and Volatility of Asset Prices," *American Economic Review* 84, 933-955.
- Bagnoli, M. and B.L. Lipman (1988), "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," *Review of Financial Studies* 1, 89-110.
- Barclay, M. and C. Holderness (1989), "Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations," *Journal of Financial Economics* 25, 371-95.
- Barclay, M. and C. Holderness (1991), "Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control," *Journal of Finance* 46, 861-78.
- Bebchuk, L.A. (1994), "Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control", *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 103, 957-993.
- Berle, A.A., and Means, G.C. (1933), *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York: Macmillan.
- Bhattacharya, S. and D. Gale (1987), "Preference Shocks, Liquidity, and Central Bank Policy," in Barnett and Singleton (eds.), *New Approaches in Monetary Economics*, CUP.
- Bhude, A. (1993), "The Hidden Costs of Stock Market Liquidity," *Journal of Financial Economics* 34, 31-51.
- Bolton, P. and E. von Thadden (1996), "Corporate Governance and the Liquidity - Control Tradeoff," mimeo, ECARE et Université de Lausanne.
- Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi (1994), "Large Shareholders, Monitoring and Fiduciary Duty", mimeo, LSE.
- Demsetz, H. (1968), "The Cost of Transactions," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 82, 33-53.
- Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985), "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," *Journal of Political Economy* 93, 1155-1177.
- The Economist: A Survey of Corporate Governance*, 1994.
- Franks, J. and C. Mayer (1994), "Ownership and Control," mimeo, Oxford University.
- Franks, J., C. Mayer and L. Renneborg (1996), "The Role of Large Share Stakes in Poorly Performing Companies," mimeo, LBS.

- Gorton, G. and S. Pennacchi (1990), "Financial Intermediation and Liquidity Creation", *Journal of Finance* 45, 49-71.
- Gromb, D. (1993), "Is One-Share-One-Vote Optimal?", mimeo, Financial Markets Group, LSE.
- Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1980), "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," *Bell Journal of Economics*, 11, 42-64.
- Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1988), "One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control," *Journal of Financial Economics* 20, 175-202.
- Hansmann, H., *The Ownership of Enterprise*, New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
- Hart, O. (1995), *Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure*, OUP.
- Hertzel, M. and R. Smith (1993), "Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately," *Journal of Finance* 48, 459-485.
- Hirschman, A. (1970), *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*, HUP.
- Holmström, B. and B. Nalebuff (1992), "To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free Rider Problem" *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*, 1, 37-62.
- Holmström, B and J. Tirole (1993), "Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring," *Journal of Political Economy* 101, 678-709.
- Holthausen, R., R. Leftwich, and D. Mayers (1987), "The Effect of Large Block Transactions on Security Prices: A Cross-Sectional Analysis," *Journal of Financial Economics* 19, 237-67.
- Jacklin, Ch.J. (1987), "Demand Deposits, Trading Restrictions, and Risk Sharing", in: E.C. Prescott, N. Wallace (eds.), *Contractual Arrangements for Intertemporal Trade*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 26-47.
- Jensen, M. and J. Warner (1988), "The Distribution of Power among Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors," *Journal of Financial Economics* 20, 3-24.
- Johnson, W.B., R. Magee, N. Nagarajan, and H. Newman (1985), "An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Managerial Labor Market," *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 7, 151-174.
- Kahn, Ch. and A. Winton (1995), "Ownership Structure, Liquidity Demand, and Shareholder Monitoring," mimeo. Northwestern University.

- Kojima, K. (1995), "Corporate Governance: An International Comparison," mimeo, Kobe University.
- Kovenock, D. (1984), "A Note on Takeover Bids," mimeo, Purdue University.
- La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1996), "Law and Finance", mimeo, Harvard University.
- Lee, Ch., A. Shleifer, and R. Thaler (1991), "Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle," *Journal of Finance* 46, 75-109.
- Merton, R.C. (1987), "A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information," *Journal of Finance* 42, 483-510.
- Mikkelson, W. and H. Regassa (1991), "Premiums Paid in Block Transactions," *Managerial and Decision Economics* 12, 511-517.
- Molin, J. (1996), "Shareholder Gains from Equity Private Placements: Evidence from the Stockholm Stock Exchange," mimeo, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Myers, S. and N. Majluf (1984), "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions when Firms have Information that Investors Do not Have," *Journal of Financial Economics* 13, 187-221.
- Pagano, M. and A. Röell (1995), "The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring and Liquidity," mimeo, ECARE.
- Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1986), "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," *Journal of Political Economy*, 94, 461-88.
- Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1995), "A Survey of Corporate Governance," mimeo, Harvard University.
- von Thadden, E.L. (1994), "Intermediated versus Direct Investment: Optimal Liquidity Provision and Dynamic Incentive Compatibility," mimeo, Universität Basel.
- Wruck, K.H. (1989), "Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence from Private Equity Financings," *Journal of Financial Economics* 23, 3-28.
- Zingales, L. (1995), "Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public," *Review of Economic Studies*, 62, 425-448.




Figure 1

No.	Author(s)	Title
95116	F. Kleibergen and H. Hoek	Bayesian Analysis of ARMA models using Noninformative Priors
95117	J. Lemmen and S. Eijffinger	The Fundamental Determinants of Financial Integration in the European Union
95118	B. Meijboom and J. Rongen	Clustering, Logistics, and Spatial Economics
95119	A. de Jong, F. de Roon and C. Veld	An Empirical Analysis of the Hedging Effectiveness of Currency Futures
95120	J. Miller	The Effects of Labour Market Policies When There is a Loss of Skill During Unemployment
95121	S. Eijffinger, M. Hoeberichts and E. Schaling	Optimal Conservativeness in the Rogoff (1985) Model: A Graphical and Closed-Form Solution
95122	W. Ploberger and H. Bierens	Asymptotic Power of the Integrated Conditional Moment Test Against Global and Large Local Alternatives
95123	H. Bierens	Nonparametric Cointegration Analysis
95124	H. Bierens and W. Ploberger	Asymptotic Theory of Integrated Conditional Moment Tests
95125	E. van Damme	Equilibrium Selection in Team Games
95126	J. Potters and F. van Winden	Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study
9601	U. Gneezy	Probability Judgements in Multi-Stage Problems: Experimental Evidence of Systematic Biases
9602	C. Fernández and M. Steel	On Bayesian Inference under Sampling from Scale Mixtures of Normals
9603	J. Osiewalski and M. Steel	Numerical Tools for the Bayesian Analysis of Stochastic Frontier Models
9604	J. Potters and J. Wit	Bets and Bids: Favorite-Longshot Bias and Winner's Curse
9605	H. Gremmen and J. Potters	Assessing the Efficacy of Gaming in Economics Educating
9606	J. Potters and F. van Winden	The Performance of Professionals and Students in an Experimental Study of Lobbying
9607	J. Kleijnen, B. Bettonvil and W. van Groenendaal	Validation of Simulation Models: Regression Analysis Revisited
9608	C. Fershtman and N. Gandal	The Effect of the Arab Boycott on Israel: The Automobile Market
9609	H. Uhlig	Bayesian Vector Autoregressions with Stochastic Volatility

No.	Author(s)	Title
9610	G. Hendrikse	Organizational Change and Vested Interests
9611	F. Janssen, R. Heuts and T. de Kok	On the (R,s,Q) Inventory Model when Demand is Modelled as a compound Bernoulli Process
9612	G. Fiestras-Janeiro P. Borm and F. van Megen	Protective Behaviour in Games
9613	F. van Megen, G. Facchini, P. Borm and S. Tijs	Strong Nash Equilibria and the Potential Maximizer
9614	J. Miller	Do Labour Market Programmes Necessarily Crowd out Regular Employment? - A Matching Model Analysis
9615	H. Huizinga	Unemployment Benefits and Redistributive Taxation in the Presence of Labor Quality Externalities
9616	G. Asheim and M. Dufwenberg	Admissibility and Common Knowledge
9617	C. Fernández, J. Osiewalski and M. Steel	On the Use of Panel Data in Bayesian Stochastic Frontier Models
9618	H. Huizinga	Intrafirm Information Transfers and Wages
9619	B. Melenberg and B. Werker	On the Pricing of Options in Incomplete Markets
9620	F. Kleibergen	Reduced Rank Regression using Generalized Method of Moments Estimators
9621	F. Janssen, R. Heuts and T. de Kok	The Value of Information in an (R,s,Q) Inventory Model
9622	F. Groot, C. Withagen and A. de Zeeuw	Strong Time-Consistency in the Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model
9623	R. Euwals and A. van Soest	Desired and Actual Labour Supply of Unmarried Men and Women in the Netherlands
9624	M. Khanman, M. Perry and P.J. Reny	An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism: Imperfect Information Without Common Priors
9625	C. Eaves, G. van der Laan D. Talman and Z. Yang	Balanced Simplices on Polytopes
9626	H. Bloemen and A. Kalwij	Female Employment and Timing of Births Decisions: a Multiple State Transition Model
9627	P. Bolton	Strategic Experimentation: a Revision
9628	C. Fershtman and Y. Weiss	Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences

No.	Author(s)	Title
9629	P.M. Kort, G. Feichtinger R.F. Hartl and J.L. Haunschmied	Optimal Enforcement Policies (Crackdowns) on a Drug Market
9630	C. Fershtman and A. de Zeeuw	Tradeable Emission Permits in Oligopoly
9631	A. Cukierman	The Economics of Central Banking
9632	A. Cukierman	Targeting Monetary Aggregates and Inflation in Europe
9633	F. de Roon, C. Veld and J. Wei	A Study on the Efficiency of the Market for Dutch Long Term Call Options
9634	B. van Aarle, L. Bovenberg M. Raith	Money, Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt in a Monetary Union
9635	G. van der Laan, D. Talman and Z. Yang	Existence of and Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy with Indivisibilities and Money
9636	I. Brouwer, J. van der Put C. Veld	Contrarian Investment Strategies in a European Context
9637	M. Berg, F. van der Duyn Schouten and J. Jansen	Optimal Service Policies to Remote Customers with Delay-Limits
9638	F.C. Drost and C.A.J. Klaassen	Efficient Estimation in Semiparametric GARCH Models
9639	A.G. de Kok and F.B.S.L.P. Janssen	Demand Management in Multi-Stage Distribution Chain
9640	D.A. Freund, T.J. Knesner A.T. LoSasso	How Managed Care Affects Medicaid Utilization A Synthetic Difference-in-Differences Zero-Inflated Count Model
9641	M.J. Lee	Instrumental Variable Estimation For Linear Panel Data Models
9642	W. Härdle, E. Mammen and M. Müller	Testing Parametric versus Semiparametric Modelling in Generalized Linear Models
9643	C. Dustmann, N. Rajah and A. van Soest	Part-Time Work, School Success and School Leaving
9644	S.C.W. Eijffinger and M. Hoeberichts	The Trade Off Between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness
9645	R. Sarin and P. Wakker	A Single-Stage Approach to Anscombe and Aumann's Expected Utility

No.	Author(s)	Title
9646	J.P. Ziliak and T.J. Kniesner	The Importance of Sample Attrition in Life Cycle Labor Supply Estimation
9647	P.M. Kort	Optimal R&D Investments of the Firm
9648	M.P. Berg	Performance Comparisons for Maintained Items
9649	H. Uhlig and Y. Xu	Effort and the Cycle: Cyclical Implications of Efficiency Wages
9650	M. Slikker and A. van den Nouweland	Communication Situations with a Hierarchical Player Partition
9651	H.L.F. de Groot	The Struggle for Rents in a Schumpeterian Economy
9652	R.M. de Jong and J. Davidson	Consistency of Kernel Estimators of heteroscedastic and Autocorrelated Covariance Matrices
9653	J. Suijs, A. De Waegenare and P. Borm	Stochastic Cooperative Games in Insurance and Reinsurance
9654	A.N. Banerjee and J.R. Magnus	Testing the Sensitivity of OLS when the Variance Matrix is (Partially) Unknown
9655	A. Kalwij	Estimating the Economic Return to Schooling on the basis of Panel Data
9656	M. Lind and F. van Megen	Order Based Cost Allocation Rules
9657	A. van Soest, P. Fontein and Rob Euwals	Earnings Capacity and Labour Market Participation
9658	C. Fernández and M.F.J. Steel	On Bayesian Modelling of Fat Tails and Skewness
9659	R. Sarin and P. Wakker	Revealed Likelihood and Knightian Uncertainty
9660	J.R. Magnus and J. Durbin	A Classical Problem in Linear Regression or How to Estimate the Mean of a Univariate Normal Distribution with Known Variance
9661	U. Gneezy and J. Potters	An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation Periods
9662	H.J. Bierens	Nonparametric Nonlinear Co-Trending Analysis, with an Application to Interest and Inflation in the U.S.
9663	J.P.C. Blanc	Optimization of Periodic Polling Systems with Non-Preemptive, Time-Limited Service
9664	M.J. Lee	A Root-N Consistent Semiparametric Estimator for Fixed Effect Binary Response Panel Data
9665	C. Fernández, J. Osiewalski and M.F.J. Steel	Robust Bayesian Inference on Scale Parameters

No.	Author(s)	Title
9666	X. Han and H. Webers	A Comment on Shaked and Sutton's Model of Vertical Product Differentiation
9667	R. Kollmann	The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing Current Account Model with Nominal Rigidities: A Quantitative Investigation
9668	R.C.H. Cheng and J.P.C. Kleijnen	Improved Design of Queueing Simulation Experiments with Highly Heteroscedastic Responses
9669	E. van Heck and P.M.A. Ribbers	Economic Effects of Electronic Markets
9670	F.Y. Kumah	The Effect of Monetary Policy on Exchange Rates: How to Solve the Puzzles
9671	J. Jansen	On the First Entrance Time Distribution of the $M/D/\infty$ Queue: a Combinatorial Approach
9672	Y.H. Farzin, K.J.M. Huisman and P.M. Kort	Optimal Timing of Technology Adoption
9673	J.R. Magnus and F.J.G.M. Klaassen	Testing Some Common Tennis Hypotheses: Four Years at Wimbledon
9674	J. Fidrmuc	Political Sustainability of Economic Reforms: Dynamics and Analysis of Regional Economic Factors
9675	M. Das and A. van Soest	A Panel Data Model for Subjective Information on Household Income Growth
9676	A.M. Lejour and H.A.A. Verbon	Fiscal Policies and Endogenous Growth in Integrated Capital Markets
9677	B. van Aarle and S.-E. Hougaard Jensen	Output Stabilization in EMU: Is There a Case for an EFTS?
9678	Th.E. Nijman, F.A. de Roon and C.Veld	Pricing Term Structure Risk in Futures Markets
9679	M. Dufwenberg and U. Gneezy	Efficiency, Reciprocity, and Expectations in an Experimental Game
9680	P. Bolton and E.-L. von Thadden	Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

P

Bibliotheek K. U. Brabant

RLANDS



17 000 01254672 8