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Windows Into Public Attitudes Towards Redistribution

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In July of 2009, the House Democrats proposed a new income tax "surcharge" to finance a major reform of the US health care system. These taxes were geared exclusively to upper-income taxpayers, the top 1.2%. The reactions of politicians, tax experts, and commentators to the proposed surtax provides a window into the diverse and often conflicting attitudes that the public holds on income redistribution through taxation. In this paper, we initially look at the reactions to the proposed tax and then present research shedding further light on public attitudes towards redistribution.

The proposed surcharge for couples in the House bill called for an additional 1 percent of income between $350,000 and $500,000; 1.5 percent for incomes between $500,000 and $1,000,000 and 5.4 percent on incomes of excess of $1 million. For individual filers, the ranges would be $280,000 to $400,000; $400,000 to $800,000; and over $800,000 with the corresponding rates. Moreover, if "savings" in health costs envisioned by the bill did not materialize, the bottom two surcharge rates would increase to 2 and 3 percent respectively. Assuming, as under current law, that the top federal tax rate increases to 39.6 percent and including state income taxes, the Tax Foundation calculated that marginal effective tax rates for the highest brackets would exceed 50 percent in 39 states.[1]

One of the first reactions came from Democrat Congressmen who represented high income districts. After the last election 14 of the top 25 richest districts were represented by Democrats. Several Democrats voted against the bill and others journeyed to the White House to express their concerns to the chief of staff. While it is one thing to campaign for taxing the rich, "the game changes when abstractions on taxing the rich turn into reality." [2] When even the 100th most expensive zip code has a median house price of $1.62 million, some affected taxpayers with $350,000 family income would not consider themselves as especially wealthy.[3]

Prior research suggests that higher income people are less likely to support redistribution, but that attitudes are not homogenous among income groups.[4] Congressmen, even from wealthy

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[1] Tax Foundation, Fiscal Fact No, 178, July, 2009.
[2] For the quote and a discussion of this issue, see Jonathan Weisman, "Democrat's New Worry: Their Own Rich Voters," *Wall Street Journal*, July 20, 2009. As we shall see, even in "abstract" settings, there is considerable diversity among high income individuals on the desirability of redistribution.
[3] Forbes, "America's Most Expensive ZIP Codes," August 27, 2009. In 2009, less than half of those were in California.
[4] See Reed-Arthurs and Sheffrin (2009) and Hite and Roberts (1991).

districts, are thus likely to face some divergence of opinions.   This leads us to our first research question:

1) How diverse are attitudes towards redistribution within and between the very low-income and the very high-income taxpayers?

A second reaction, from tax policy experts, was that taxing the rich to pay for universal health care was poor policy. There were several variants of this objection. Several were political in nature; for example, the rich should be taxed to finance our "existing" structural deficits, not for new programs or that the political equilibrium taxing the rich to pay for mass programs was unstable.[5] But another critique of the policy stressed the "benefit" view of taxation, which is rooted deeply in psychological notions of "equity theory and social exchange theory." The public expects some linkages between taxes paid and benefits received. Joseph Thorndike of Tax Analysts made this argument explicit: "Financing a mass program with a class tax is not a good idea….It obscures the connection between taxes paid and taxes received—a connection that's necessarily tenuous for many government programs, but not for health care."[6] Our second research question is:

2) How important are perceptions of benefits of government programs with respect to support for taxation and redistribution?

The final reaction returned to the long-standing debate on disincentives. The small business argument was raised repeatedly with opponents of the tax raising the specter of punitive taxes on unincorporated businesses while proponents of the tax emphasized that it applied to a very small fraction of the universe of small businesses. However, other commentators worried about either reductions of work effort, or perhaps more plausibly increased tax avoidance. Denying that Atlas would shrug, Bruce Bartlett was still concerned: "The truth is that rich people aren't going to suddenly stop working in protest or move to some lower-taxed nation, and the economy isn't going to collapse if they are forced to pay a bit more in taxes. The real problem is

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[5] Robert Reischauer expressed the first view, Leonard Burman, the second. See, Jackie Calmes, "Obama's Pledge to Tax Only the Rich Can't Pay for Everything, Analysts Say," *New York Times*, August 1, 2009.
[6] Quoted in Bruce Bartlett, "Tax the Rich," Forbes, July 10, 2009.

that higher tax rates will encourage the wealthy to spend more of their time and resources engaging in tax avoidance rather than making money."[7]   This leads us to a third research question:

3) Does the public believe that higher taxes reduce economic activity or reported taxable income and, if so, how does this affect their beliefs about redistribution?

I. Heterogeneity in Attitudes Towards Redistribution

Recent surveys have shown some support for taxation and redistribution similar to that proposed in the healthcare reform package. This paper will focus on one such survey, sponsored by the Tax Foundation and conducted by Harris International in 2009. This survey asked 2,002 adults detailed questions about the perceived fairness of the current tax system and the government's role in income redistribution. Of particular interest to our analysis was the following question: *"Would you support or oppose the government redistributing wealth by a much higher income tax on high income earners?"* Respondents rated their reaction as strongly oppose, somewhat oppose, neither support or oppose, somewhat support or strongly support. These responses were coded from 1 for strongly oppose, to 5 for strongly support. On average, respondents are largely neutral to redistribution with an average score of 3.3 out of 5. However, this masks a great deal of heterogeneity in the data. As Figure 1 shows, preferences for redistribution are actually bi-modal, with 33% of respondents strongly supporting such redistribution and 23% of respondents strongly opposed to it.[8]

[Figure 1]

Standard utility maximization theory predicts the desire to redistribute income is strongly correlated with the respondent's own self-interest. Respondents who directly benefit from redistribution are likely to support it, while those who are harmed by redistribution are likely to oppose it. In the context of the health care proposal those with earning $280,000 or more will lose money on net, while those with lower earnings are likely to gain from it. If pecuniary interests dominate decisions regarding redistribution then all high income earners should oppose redistribution and the afore-mentioned protests by Democrat Congressmen are justified.

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[7] Bruce Bartlett, "Robin Hood Tax Policy," Forbes, July 17, 2009.
[8] 119 respondents without an opinion on the redistribution question were excluded from the analysis.

However, studies by Fong (2001), Alesina and Ferrara (2005), Reed-Arthurs and Sheffrin (2009 working paper) and others have shown that direct pecuniary consequences are one of *many* factors influencing demand for income redistribution. Race, gender, views on the determinants of wealth, expected future income, political affiliation and knowledge of the tax system also play rolls in the demand for redistribution. Are these other factors enough to overcome self-interest or does support for redistribution break down purely along income tax brackets? Figure 2 plots the level of support for redistribution by the rich (those earning $150,000 to $200,000 and those earning over $200,000) and the poor (those earning less than $15,000 and those earning $15,000 to $25,000). We see that while the majority of subjects take a self-interested position, about 25% vote contrary to direct pecuniary incentives. Of these, 15% of the poor *strongly* oppose redistribution while 19% of the rich *strongly* support redistribution. At least in the abstract, not all high earners oppose redistribution through higher tax rates.

[Figure 2]

Are the respondents who vote counter to pecuniary incentives fundamentally different from their more self-interested colleagues? Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 compare the characteristics of high income individuals who support redistribution with high income individuals who oppose it. Two major differences emerge. First, those supporting redistribution are much more likely to be affiliated with the Democratic Party and to have a self-described liberal ideology. Supporters average a self-declared 5.83 on a 7 point scale of liberal ideology, while the average member of the opposition scored herself as a 2.15. This result is expected since redistributive policies are one of the largest differences between party platforms. Perhaps more interesting is the general satisfaction that those who support redistribution have with the tax system. Those opposed to redistribution are significantly more likely to feel the tax system needs a complete overhaul (85% compared to 34%), that their current tax rate is too high (94% compared to 14%) and the estate tax should be eliminated (100% compared to 25%). Those who support redistribution feel the maximum fair tax rate is 13 percentage points higher than those who oppose redistribution. Of those opposed to redistribution 73% feel taxes and benefits should be reduced compared to 6% of those who support redistribution.

Columns 3 and 4 compare low income supporters and opponents of redistribution. We find supporters and the opposition differ in several demographic characteristics.   Respondents opposed to redistribution are on average 7 years younger than those in favor of redistribution.

Young respondents tend to have a steeper earnings trajectory than those with more work experience. This difference in age is consistent with respondents considering future earnings as well as present income. Poor families with children are less likely to support redistribution. This is unexpected since these same poor families are the most likely to receive substantial net flows from redistribution through the Earned Income Tax Credit, Medicaid, and similar programs. Political ideology and party affiliation are again strongly linked with the desire to redistribute wealth: those supporting redistribution are significantly more liberal and more likely to align with the Democratic Party. Unexpectedly, a larger percentage of low income earners opposed to redistribution itemize income tax deductions compared to those who support redistribution. There may be a systematic difference in employment or other circumstances that both cause people to itemize their income tax deductions and to oppose redistribution.[9] For example, those who are self-employed may be more likely to itemize tax deductions. They may also be less risk averse and thus less likely to support social safety net programs and redistribution to the poor. We again find views on tax rates and government provided social services to be significantly different at the 5% level. Of poor who do not support redistribution, 69% think the government should reduce both taxes and services, while only 20% of those in favor of redistribution feel taxes and services should be reduced.

[Table 1]

II. Benefits and Redistribution

Equity theory proposes that when individuals feel they are unjustly rewarded or penalized relative to their peers, they will take action to restore the equity in their interpersonal relationships. In the context of taxation – those who feel their tax rates are disproportionately high relative to the benefits they receive may oppose additional redistribution, wish to overhaul the income tax system or take other corrective action. Here we ask how important perceptions of the benefits from government programs are in determining general support for taxation and for redistribution in particular. The Tax Foundation survey provides a unique platform to answer this question. Subjects were asked: "*Thinking about all the government services you use during a year – national defense, roads, public schools ... and so on – how much would you say these are worth to you in dollars for one year?*" The median respondent valued all government

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[9] Another, perhaps less likely, possibility is that people who oppose redistribution are more likely to underreport their income and itemizing deductions facilitates this underreporting. Thus, some low income itemizers actually have much higher earnings and are simply responding to pecuniary incentives.

services at $2,000 and 90% of responses fell between $12 and $24,000. We use two measures of benefits to analyze the relationship between benefits received and support for redistribution. First we consider the log of perceived benefits. Second we consider the net benefit received from government programs, calculated as perceived benefits less estimated tax paid in 2008.[10].

The relationship between perceived benefits and support for taxation can be complex. First, it is possible that the average citizen does not consider the value of government provide services when forming general opinions of taxation and redistribution. Next, if preference formation is very simple, support for taxation may be increasing in the total perceived worth of benefits regardless of actual taxes paid. This would be the case if people base satisfaction on the value of the benefits received without mentally accounting for how much they pay in taxes. If the average taxpayer takes a more nuanced view, support for taxation may be increasing in the net return from taxation as measured by the difference between perceived benefits and total taxes paid.

Table 2 examines the relationship between the benefits variables and four measures of support for taxation. We report the marginal effects from a series of probit regressions. Standard errors are robust and are clustered by state of residence. Columns 1 and 2 examine the relationship between the measures of perceived benefits and the demand for redistribution. A one percent increase in perceived benefits at the mean is associated with a 0.035% increase in the probability of supporting redistribution. Extrapolating this result indicates that a $2,000 increase in perceived benefits at the mean (roughly) increases the probability of supporting redistribution by 1%. While this finding is statistically significant, it is only one eighth of the size of the effect of being female and seventh of the size of the effect of moving from a 3.7 to a 4.7 on a seven point political ideology scale. In Column 2, the measure of net benefits appears to be unrelated to the desire to redistribute income. Columns 3 and 4 show that higher levels of perceived benefits and net benefits increase the demand for additional benefits and taxes. People who believe they currently benefit from government programs are more likely to support additional programs in the future.

The second half of Table 2, looks at dissatisfaction with the current tax system. Columns 5 and 6 address the relationship between believing ones own tax rate is too high and our measures

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[10] Estimated tax burden was calculated using NBER's TaxSim program. Since precise income levels were not reported, we assumed total family income equal to the midpoint of the reported income range.

of perceived benefits, while columns 7 and 8 look at the desire to overhaul the entire federal tax system. As expected, we find that as perceived benefits and net benefits increase, respondents are significantly less likely to express dissatisfaction with their tax rate and the tax system in general. However even at the mean, these effects are small. An increase of $1,000 in net benefits is associated with a 0.6% decrease in the probability of thinking ones own tax rate is too high. This is only one seventh the size of the effect of moving left one point on a seven point political ideology scale. A similar significant and small negative correlation is found between the desire to completely overhaul of the federal tax system and measures of perceived benefits.

[Table 2]

From Table 2 we conclude that high valuations of government services are associated with increased support for redistribution through taxation. However, these effects are small in magnitude compared to those of political ideology, party affiliation, gender and other factors. The size of the benefit coefficients may be biased downward by measurement error. Respondents showed a tendency to round answers to the nearest $1,000, thereby obscuring the relationship between benefits and desired redistribution. Further, respondents may not know exactly how much they receive in benefits and are only working with vague notions of value when comparing benefits to taxes paid or when responding to questions of redistribution.

When looking at the demand for redistribution, the log of benefits was significant and of the expected sign more often than the net benefit variable. One possible interpretation is that, contrary to the benefit view, people do not make a direct link between how much they pay in taxes and the amount they receive in benefits. They are more sensitive to their own subjective valuations of total government benefits evaluated separately from total tax burden. Alternatively, the net benefit variable may be more sensitive to the measurement error discussed above.

III. Experimental Evidence on Incentives and Preferences for Redistribution

High marginal tax rates, such as might result from the health care proposal, decrease the reward for economic effort and may decrease reported taxable income or labor supply at the intensive margin for single earner families and at the extensive margin for duel earner families. Slemrod and Bakija (2008) note that it is unknown whether "people consider the economic consequences of more or less progressive tax structures" when they respond to questions about

redistribution. "Do their responses refer to what they think would be fair if progressivity had no cost, or do they refer to what is fair taking into account those costs?" In this section, we present the results of an experiment designed to determine whether people consider the costs of progressivity when forming opinions about desired levels of redistribution. [11]

In our experiment, one hundred and fifty student volunteers completed a computer-based survey. One half of the sample was prompted to think about incentive effects using the following question: "Some economists think that taxing income might discourage people from working. Hypothetically, if you could earn \$25 for one hour of work, but had to pay 20% of that in taxes, would you choose to work the hour? (You would earn \$20 after taxes if you chose to work)." This question was repeated with tax rates of 40%, 60% and 80%. All volunteers were then asked how much four hypothetical families, earning \$25,000, \$50,000, \$100,000 and \$225,000 respectively "should pay in taxes." Volunteers entered desired tax rates as a percentage of total income and were required to raise a total of \$80,000. These raw tax rates were converted then into Suits index values to measure the overall demand for redistribution and the associated Lorenz curves are graphed in Figure 3. [12]

If respondents are typically unaware (or forget to consider) costs of progressivity when making judgments about questions of fairness, but believe such costs should play a role in determining levels of redistribution, then one would expect that subjects receiving the reminder about these incentive effects will have a different tax distribution than control subjects. Equal levels of progressivity between the treatment and control groups <u>either</u> indicates that respondents feel the costs of progressivity should not be factored into answers about fairness or that all respondents factor such costs into their answers regardless of whether they are reminded of such costs. To distinguish between these cases, consider the following. Each respondent's perceived cost of progressivity is a function of the rate at which she feels is sufficient to deter earnings. Assume that there is some level of heterogeneity in perceived costs and that the tax rate which will deter the respondent is correlated to the rate that the respondent feels will deter others. Then

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[11] See our Working Paper, Reed-Arthurs, Sheffrin (June 2009) for a complete analysis of the data and results from this experiment. Our experiment does not consider the tax avoidance activities highlighted by Bartlett.

[12] The Lorenz curve is found by ranking families according to income, then graphing the cumulative tax burden born by these families on the y-axis and the cumulative income earned on the x-axis. The Suits Index value is calculated by taking one minus the ratio of the area under the Lorenz curve to the area under a 45 degree line which represents a proportional tax.[12] If a tax is progressive then the cumulative tax burden falls below the 45 degree line when graphed against cumulative income and the Suits Index will be a number between 0 and 1. If a graph of the tax burden falls above the diagonal line the tax schedule is regressive and the Suits Index has a value between 0 and 1.

if respondents are factoring in the cost of progressivity when determining tax schedules, the maximum tax rate they assign should be correlated with the maximum rate at which they are willing to work. If people feel costs have no place in a question about fairness then the distribution of tax burdens of the treatment and control group should be equal and top end tax rates and the respondents willingness to work will be uncorrelated.

[Figure 3]

Figure 3 displays the Lorenz curves for the experiment's treatment and control groups. These curves are virtually identical, and a two group difference-in-means test on the Suits Index values shows no statistically significant difference.[13] This indicates <u>either</u> that respondents feel the costs of progressivity should not be factored into answers about fairness or that all respondents factor such costs into their answers regardless of whether they are reminded of such costs. If respondents are factoring in the cost of progressivity when determining tax schedules, the maximum tax rate they assign should be correlated with the maximum rate at which they are willing to work. In fact, the correlation between the maximum assigned rate and the maximum rate the subject is willing to work is a negligible 0.007 with a t-statistic of 0.09. Further, one might expect that if respondents are factoring in the cost of progressivity, they may avoid assigning tax rates above which they are willing to work. In fact at least 17% did just that.[14] There is convincing evidence that the average survey respondent does not consider the cost of progressivity when determining desired tax rates – nor does she think it is relevant.

IV. Conclusions

Research on public attitudes does illuminate some aspects of the debate on taxes on high income individuals to fund healthcare. We find there is substantial variation in levels of support within income groups and many wealthy democrats support high income taxes on high earners in the abstract. Thus, Democratic congressmen should hear a wide range of views even from their wealthy constituents. Strict adherents of the benefit view of taxation are correct in their assumption that taxpayers who perceive generally higher benefits from government programs are

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[13] T statistics of -0.32 and -0.86 respectively.

[14] 37 respondents assigned rates above the last level at which they said they were willing to work; 13 respondents assigned rates higher than the level at which they were not willing to work. Given the discrete nature of the data, the percentage assigning rates higher than levels at which they would stop working would fall between these two numbers.

more likely to support redistribution, even after controlling for income. This effect is small relative to factors like political ideology; however it may be understated due to measurement error. Finally, experiment results suggest that the average respondent doesn't care if Atlas shrugs. She makes judgments on redistribution based on perceptions of fairness, not on incentive effects. While this is fine for the general public, legislators must take a more nuanced view in forming policy towards redistribution.

Figure 1
Support for Government Redistribution by Much Higher Tax on High Income Earners

Figure 2: Support for Redistribution by Income Group

**Figure 3: Comparison of Progressivity of Treatment and Control Group Distributions**

Table 1
Cluster Analysis: Tax Foundation Data

	Income Greater than $150,000		Income Less that $25,000	
	Strongly Oppose	**Strongly Support**	**Strongly Oppose**	**Strongly Support**
Demographics				
Age (Years)	49.2	50.2	39.1	46.3
Age_18_29	8%	7%	55%	30% [1]
Age_30_49	45%	38%	11%	20%
Age_50_64	41%	47%	22%	25%
Age_65_Plus	6%	8%	12%	25%
Any Children	23%	12%	21%	8% [1]
Number of Children	1.04	0.37	0.70	0.35 [1]
Married	88%	72%	28%	20%
Single	6%	12%	36%	50%
White	81%	80%	73%	79%
Education	16.21	16.18	12.75	13.21
Employment				
Employed Full Time	57%	58%	18%	26%
Retired	7%	13%	18%	30%
Looking For Work	8%	2%	14%	13%
Income	$ 213,725	$ 200,668	$ 14,799	$ 16,212
Political Affiliation				
Liberal (Scale 1 to 7)[3]	2.15	5.83 [2]	2.65	4.50 [2]
Democrat (Scale 1 to 7)	1.97	6.30 [2]	3.28	5.33 [2]
Tax Practices				
Itemize Deductions	86%	96%	29%	12% [1]
Standard Deduction	14%	4%	44%	80% [2]
Other				
Tax System Somewhat or Very Complex	99%	100%	91%	88%
Should Completely Overhaul Tax System	85%	34% [2]	54%	34% [1]
Should Eliminate Estate Tax	100%	25% [2]	87%	71% [1]
Maximum Fair Tax Rate	20.35	33.16 [2]	19.13	14.15 [1]
Value of All Gov't Benefits	$ 17,279	$ 22,863	$ 4,527	$ 3,563
Personal Tax Rate Too High	94%	14% [2]	44%	37%
Decrease Services and Taxes	73%	6% [2]	69%	20% [2]
Increase Services and Taxes	1%	58% [2]	0%	22% [2]
Observations	35	19	41	110

Notes:

[1] Difference in means test significant at the 5% level.

[2] Difference in means test significant at the 1% level.

[3] Self-rated on a 7 point scale where 1 is extremely conservative and 7 is extremely liberal.

Table 2: Role of Perceived Benefits in Support for Taxation

	Support Redistribution		Increase Taxes and Services		Tax Too High		Overhaul Federal Tax System	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Ln(Benefits)	0.035***		0.023***		-0.051***		-0.015*	
	(0.009)		(0.004)		(0.010)		(0.009)	
Net Benefits (000s)		0.001		0.002***		-0.006***		-0.003**
		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.002)		(0.001)
Female	0.079**	0.043	-0.014	-0.022	0.005	0.015	-0.179***	-0.158***
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Married	0.049	0.063	0.007	-0.006	-0.024	0.009	-0.066**	-0.046
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.032)
Number of Children	-0.025	-0.038*	-0.017**	-0.024**	-0.009	-0.022	0.057***	0.042**
	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Black	-0.089	-0.096	0.006	-0.020	-0.031	0.016	-0.112*	-0.084
	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.061)	(0.068)
Age	0.014**	0.012*	0.002	0.001	0.027***	0.028***	0.027***	0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Age Squared	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
High School	-0.218**	-0.208**	-0.086**	-0.102***	0.011	0.038	0.126	0.141
	(0.089)	(0.105)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.119)	(0.136)	(0.121)	(0.133)
Some College	-0.121	-0.051	-0.042	-0.049	0.065	0.077	0.140	0.136
	(0.092)	(0.113)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.113)	(0.129)	(0.114)	(0.124)
College	-0.191**	-0.116	-0.054**	-0.058*	0.081	0.082	0.061	0.045
	(0.083)	(0.107)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.117)	(0.130)	(0.130)	(0.134)
Graduate Education	-0.174**	-0.080	-0.041	-0.046	0.004	-0.015	0.110	0.099
	(0.089)	(0.111)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.131)	(0.144)	(0.121)	(0.124)
Income: $25,000 - $35,000	0.059	0.064	-0.034*	-0.028	0.127	0.086	0.053	0.029
	(0.081)	(0.076)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.083)	(0.078)	(0.070)	(0.067)
Income: $35,000 - $50,000	0.060	0.083	-0.048***	-0.037**	0.236***	0.153***	0.161**	0.127*
	(0.086)	(0.083)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.067)	(0.066)
Income: $50,000 - $75,000	-0.132**	-0.117	-0.062***	-0.041**	0.180***	0.048	0.083	0.034
	(0.067)	(0.072)	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.068)	(0.070)
Income: $75,000 - $100,000	-0.057	-0.031	-0.046***	0.007	0.261***	0.079	0.134**	0.069
	(0.071)	(0.075)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.069)
Income: $100,000 - $150,00	-0.078	-0.032	-0.062***	-0.005	0.267***	0.015	0.131**	0.016
	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.013)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.064)	(0.069)
Income: Over $150,000	-0.251***	-0.181*	-0.045***	0.109	0.210***	-0.199*	0.148**	-0.017
	(0.076)	(0.105)	(0.017)	(0.109)	(0.075)	(0.105)	(0.073)	(0.089)
Income: Not Reported	-0.126*		-0.053***		0.205***		0.068	
	(0.077)		(0.012)		(0.070)		(0.061)	
Unemployed	0.074	0.049	-0.020	-0.026	-0.004	0.037	0.125*	0.129*
	(0.057)	(0.059)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.068)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.068)
Retired	0.051	0.046	0.014	0.018	-0.020	-0.037	-0.095*	-0.066
	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.070)
Liberal (Scale 1 to 7)	0.067***	0.064***	0.017***	0.017***	-0.042***	-0.044***	-0.037***	-0.037***
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Democrat (Scale 1 to 7)	0.089***	0.088***	0.018***	0.021***	-0.011	-0.009	-0.020***	-0.024***
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Regional Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1944	1693	1944	1693	1944	1693	1944	1693

Probit regression, reporting marginal effects.

Robust standard errors (clustered by state) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Omitted categories: male, single, non-black, age 18 to 29, less than high school education, income < $25,000, live in West