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expressed are the authors' alone and not necessarily those of the World Bank and its Executive Directors, nor the countries they represent.

## Abstract

For decades, earnings from farming in Latin American countries have been depressed by pro-urban and anti-trade biases in own-country policies and by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. These policies have reduced national and global economic welfare, hampered agricultural trade and economic growth, and may well have added to income inequality and poverty in the region. Since the mid-1980s, however, the region has reduced its sectoral and trade policy distortions and some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting aspects of their farm policies. This paper synthesizes results from a World Bank research project that provides (a) price-comparison based measures of the extent to which national policies have changed farmers' price incentives since the 1960s in eight Latin American countries, (b) partial equilibrium indexes of the impact of national farm policies on agricultural trade and economic welfare, (c) general equilibrium estimates of national trade, welfare and poverty effects of global reforms retrospectively since the early 1980s and prospectively as of 2004, (d) comparisons with similar estimates for Asia, Africa and high-income countries, and (e) a discussion of prospects for further pro-poor policy reform of agricultural price and trade policies.

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# **Agricultural and trade policy reforms in Latin America: impacts on markets and welfare**

For decades, earnings from farming in Latin American countries have been depressed by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies, exchange rate controls, export taxes, and by governments of richer countries favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. As well, a considerable degree of sector differentiation in import restrictions has yielded a high differentiation in sectoral protectionism. These past policies have reduced national and global economic welfare, hampered agricultural trade and economic growth, and may well have added to income inequality and poverty in the region.

From a peak in the distortionary levels in the mid 80s, however, the region has undergone reforms which have reduced in a large extent its sectoral and trade policy distortions, while some high-income countries also have begun reducing market-distorting aspects of their farm policies. Still, many trade-reducing price distortions remain between sectors, as well as within the agricultural sectors of most Latin American countries.

This paper summarizes results from a recent World Bank research project that provides (a) price-comparison based measures of the extent to which national policies have changed farmers' price incentives since the 1960s in 8 Latin American countries, (b) partial equilibrium indexes of the impact of national farm policy reforms on the volume of agricultural trade and on their economic welfare cost, and (c) general equilibrium estimates of national trade, welfare and poverty effects of global reforms since the early 1980s to 2004, which are compared with the projected effects of removing remaining distortions in agriculture and other goods markets, and further reform in regional policies.

These results are part of a global research project seeking to improve our understanding of agricultural price and trade policy interventions and reforms in Asia, Africa, Europe's transition economies, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean.<sup>1</sup> The core of this project is a new set of annual time series estimates of assistance to and taxation of farmers over the past half century for 75 countries that together account for more than 90 percent of the world's population and agricultural output (Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).

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<sup>1</sup> The regional studies are Anderson and Martin (2009), Anderson and Masters (2009), Anderson and Swinnen (2008), and Anderson and Valdés (2008). Together with comparable studies of high-income countries, they form the basis for a global overview volume (Anderson 2009).

The Latin American sample involves eight countries, comprising the big four economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico; Colombia and Ecuador two countries which rely to a great extent on agriculture; the Dominican Republic, the largest Caribbean economy; and Nicaragua, the poorest country in Central America. Together, in 2000–04, these countries accounted for 78 percent of the region's population, 80 percent of the region's agricultural value added, and 84 percent of the total gross domestic product (GDP) of Latin America.

The key characteristics of these economies—which account for only 4.5 percent of worldwide GDP, but 7.7 percent of agricultural value added and more than 10 percent of agricultural and food exports—are shown in table 1. The table reveals the considerable diversity within the region in terms of stages of development, relative resource endowments, comparative advantages and, hence, trade specialization, and the incidence of poverty and income inequality. In particular, income inequality is high throughout the region compared with the rest of the world; the Gini coefficient is near or above 0.5 and averages 0.52. This is well above the Gini coefficient for Africa and Asia. Likewise, the Gini coefficient for land distribution is high in Latin America: 0.58 for Chile, but above 0.7 for Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, compared with an average of less than 0.5 in Asia (World Bank 2007). Even so, there is comparatively little absolute poverty except in the poorest tropical parts of the region.

Though it relies on nearly twice as much agricultural land per capita as the rest of the world, Latin American agriculture is characterized by concentrated land ownership and a structure of production whereby medium and large commercial farms contribute the bulk of agricultural output. It is also a region with a high degree of urbanization. These features are important in understanding the forces behind agricultural policies. So, too, is the fact that, until a few years ago, most countries in the region were experiencing a high degree of macroeconomic instability and high inflation. The manipulation of food prices for urban consumers in an attempt to reduce inflation was (and, in Argentina, still is) a dominant feature driving farm pricing policy.

Most Latin American countries have gone through a process of major economy-wide policy reforms, which began, for some countries, approximately in the mid-1980s (or the 1970s for Chile) and, for others, in the mid-1990s. Reforms centered on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, deregulation, and some privatization of state agencies. There was a considerable reassessment of the role of government in guiding economic

development. Agricultural policies were an integral part of this reform process, although not the principle motivation of the reforms.

This paper begins with a brief description of the evolution of agricultural and trade policies, then it is provided a short description of the methodology used by the authors of the individual case studies to estimate the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to agricultural producers, the corresponding consumer tax equivalent (CTE) facing domestic buyers of agricultural products, the relative rate of assistance (RRA) between the farm and nonfarm tradable sectors, partial-equilibrium indexes of trade and welfare, and general equilibrium estimates of national trade, welfare and poverty effects of global reforms retrospectively since the early 1980s and prospectively as of 2004. A synopsis of the empirical results showing the changing extent of price distortions is then provided for each country, and the continental averages are compared with those of Asia and Africa. The paper concludes by drawing out implications of the findings, including for poverty and inequality and for possible future directions of policies affecting agricultural incentives in Latin America.

### **The evolution of agricultural and trade policies**

From the late 1950s until approximately the mid-1980s, agricultural price interventions in the region were largely a by-product of a development strategy to encourage import-substitution industrialization. This policy also raised budgetary resources in the form of import tax revenue, which was supplemented in some countries through agricultural export taxes. Both sets of approaches harmed the region's most competitive farmers and were offset only slightly by farm credit and fertilizer subsidies.

From the late 1950s until early 1990s, there were concerns about high rates of inflation, especially where urban populations had strong political influence. Policy makers were under pressure to avoid large increases in food prices, which would potentially impact wage rates and thereby accelerate inflation.

In addition to fiscal and inflation objectives that made farm export taxes attractive, there was, in the 1950s and 1960s, a widespread belief among the region's policy makers and followers of the structuralist school associated with Prebisch (1950, 1959, 1964), that the efficiency losses generated through the extraction of rents in agriculture were low and that the main impact would be to reduce land rents and land values. The prevailing view at the time

was that farmers in Latin America were unresponsive to price incentives. While the belief in this unresponsiveness has now largely disappeared, a few countries—Argentina is one—still tax agricultural exports to generate fiscal revenues and lower consumer food prices.

By the 1980s, there was disillusionment with the results of the import-substitution strategy and wider acceptance of theoretical developments regarding the causes of inflation and macroeconomic instability in general. During the 1980s and early 1990s, a macroeconomic framework designed for open economies gradually displaced the closed economy approach in most Latin American countries. Governments introduced economy-wide reforms with special emphasis on macroeconomic stabilization, deregulation, unilateral trade liberalization, and privatization.

The goal of the reformers was to create a better climate for productivity and private investment in all economic sectors, including agriculture. In most Latin American countries, the major change in trade policy was the partial or total removal of most quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, the elimination of export taxes, and a program of gradual reduction in the levels of import tariffs. This yielded incentives to move resources from import-competing to export-oriented sectors, including in agriculture, which enhanced competitiveness and led to greater integration with the world economy.

By the mid-1990s, intervention in the foreign exchange markets was recognized as the most important —“price distortion” affecting the agricultural economy. At the outset of the reforms, it was expected that trade liberalization and the reduction of the fiscal deficit would lead to a depreciation of the real exchange rate (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés 1988, 1991). Yet, the reforms were followed by a significant appreciation of the currency that was associated with the opening of the capital account, greater inward foreign investment, and a major increase in domestic real interest rates. Reforms in the service sector also played a critical role. Deregulation and privatization had a major impact on the availability in the marketplace of the more-reliable and lower-cost services used in agriculture such as ports, airlines, and shipping transport.

The timing of reforms differed somewhat across countries. Colombia, for example, became a more open economy through export promotion beginning in 1967; it adopted a more ambitious liberalization of trade in 1990 and then went into a policy reform reversal beginning in 1992.

In Chile, the controlled markets of 1950 to 1974, accentuated during Allende’s land reform years (1971-73) were followed by radical economic reforms toward trade



liberalization, deregulation, and privatization between 1978 and 1982, before a second phase of reforms beginning in 1984.

Mexico introduced strong policy changes starting in the mid-1980s, before the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement. The changes involved more openness, deregulation, and privatization, a reduction in credit subsidies, and major changes in the role of government in the marketing of farm products.

A wide variety of policy instruments have been applied to influence agricultural prices, even during the post-reform period. Colombia, for example, has had minimum support prices, in addition to import tariffs, price compensation schemes, procurement agreements, a monopoly on grain imports by a government agency, export licenses and subsidies, and safeguards on imports; moreover, until 1990, all imports of inputs were subject to prior import licenses. Then, in 1995, tariffs and tariff surcharges associated with price bands on more than 100 products were introduced.

Mexico is another leader in interventions, including in the transition from highly government-controlled markets before the mid-1980s to more market-oriented policies. Its policies include price support programs (before the mid-1980s and in conjunction with state trading), credit and input subsidies, and direct income payments to farmers (*ProCampo*).

Argentina has simpler interventions. Agricultural exportables that are also wage goods have been subjected to export taxes, complemented by export bans in some years. The return to sizeable export taxes in late 2001 and their subsequent rises has been controversial, with the most recent rises leading to prolonged protests by farmers in urban areas in mid-2008.

## **The extent of distortions to agricultural incentives in Latin America**

### ***a. Methodology: Quantifying the extent of distortions***

To quantify government-imposed distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free markets, Anderson et al. (2008) suggest the first step is to compute the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each farm product. This is the percentage by which government policies have raised gross returns to farmers above what they would be without the government's intervention (or lowered them, if  $NRA < 0$ ). A weighted average NRA for all covered products can then be derived using the value of production at

undistorted prices as weights.<sup>2</sup> This NRA is similar to the producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) computed by OECD (various years), except that the latter are expressed as a percentage of the distorted price. To that NRA for covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for non-covered products (on average around 30 percent of the total) and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms of assistance or taxation. Each farm industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with its status sometimes changing over the years), so as to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the two different groups of covered tradable farm products. We also generate a production-weighted average NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), defined as:

$$RRA = 100 * [(100 + NRA_{ag}^t) / (100 + NRA_{nonag}^t) - 1]$$

where  $NRA_{ag}^t$  and  $NRA_{nonag}^t$  are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural (including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.<sup>3</sup> Since the NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA (since the weighted average  $NRA_{nonag}^t$  is non-negative in all our country case studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s sectoral policy regime has an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias.

In addition to the NRA, we also consider the extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) is computed as the percentage by which the price that consumers pay for their food exceeds the international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the NRA and the CTE can arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers (adjusted to the farmgate level) to differ from those received by producers; but in the absence of such differences, the CTE for each tradable farm product is

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<sup>2</sup> Our definition of a policy-induced price distortion follows Bhagwati (1971) and Corden (1997) and includes any policy measure at a country’s border (such as a trade tax or subsidy, a quantitative restriction on trade, or a dual or multiple foreign exchange rate system, or any domestic producer or consumer tax/subsidy/restraint on output, intermediate inputs or primary factors of production (except where needed to directly overcome an externality, or where it is set optimally across all products or factors, for example as a value added tax to raise government revenue).

<sup>3</sup> Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That is, it is *relative* prices and hence *relative* rates of government assistance that affect producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third sector producing only nontradables.

assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions and the CTE for nontradable farm products is assumed to be zero.

***b. Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture***

On average, agricultural price and trade policies in Latin America reduced farmer earnings in the postwar period through to the 1980s. The extent (when expressed as a nominal tax equivalent) peaked at more than 20 percent in the 1970s, but still averaged close to 10 percent in the later 1980s (table 2). The only focus countries in our sample that received positive assistance from farm policies during that period were Chile and (at least from the late 1970s, but only to a minor extent) Mexico and Colombia. Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Ecuador each had negative rates of assistance that averaged well above 20 percent for at least one five-year period, and, apart from the Dominican Republic, each had a negative average NRA even in the 1990s, as did Nicaragua. However, by the mid-1990s, Brazil and the Dominican Republic had joined Chile and Colombia in that they had positive average NRAs. Meanwhile, Mexico had raised its assistance considerably before engaging in reform following negotiations to join the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade Agreement, while Argentina had all but eliminated its discrimination against its exporters in the 1990s, only to reinstate explicit export taxes again in late 2001 when it abandoned its fixed exchange rate with the U.S. dollar and nominally devalued its currency by two-thirds.

The average NRA for all agriculture for the region in the 1990s and the first half of the present decade was slightly positive, at around 5 percent (figure 1). The strong antitrade bias of the past has diminished somewhat but is still evident in figure 1, which shows the average NRAs for agriculture's import-competing and export subsectors in the region.

There is little in the way of domestic producer subsidies or taxes, on average, in the region. The main exceptions are positive domestic support measures in Mexico and slightly negative measures in Argentina. Non-product-specific assistance accounts to only one or two percentage points during the past four decades. Input price distortions have also contributed little, on average, to the overall regional NRA in agriculture, reducing the negative value slightly in the 1980s and adding slightly to the positive value during the past decade or so.

***(c) Assistance to nonfarm sectors and the RRA***

The anti-agricultural policy bias of the past was caused not only by agricultural policies but also by sectoral policies affecting industrial activities. The significant reduction in border protection for the manufacturing sector and the indirect impact of this on the drop in the price of nontradables after the initiation of the reforms, together with the deregulation and privatization of services, also have been important influences on incentives affecting intersectorally mobile resources. The reduction in assistance to nonfarm tradable sectors may have been as responsible for the expansion in agricultural exports since the early 1990s as the reduction in direct taxation on these agricultural exports.

Quantifying this distortion in nonfarm tradable sectors as accurately as the quantification of the distortion in agriculture has not been possible. National case study authors have had to rely on applied trade taxes (for exports, as well as imports) rather than undertaking price comparisons for all nonfarm goods, and, hence, they have not captured the quantitative restrictions on trade that were important in earlier decades but that have been less important recently. Nor have they captured distortions in the services sectors; many of these sectors now produce tradables (or would do so in the absence of interventions preventing the emergence of this production). As a result, the NRAs for nonfarm importables are underestimated, and the decline indicated is less rapid than the decline that actually occurred. The situation is similar for nonfarm exportables, except that the actual NRAs would have been negative in most cases. Of these two elements of underestimation, the former bias probably dominated. Thus, the case study authors' estimates of the overall NRA for nonagricultural tradables should be considered as lower-bound estimates; this is especially true as we go back in time, so that the decline indicated by the NRA is less rapid than it actually was.<sup>4</sup>

Despite these methodological limitations, the estimated NRAs for nonfarm tradables prior to the 1990s are sizeable. For Latin America as a whole, the average value of the NRAs for nonfarm tradables has steadily declined throughout the past four decades as policy reforms have spread. This has therefore contributed to a decline in the estimated RRA among farmers. Thus, the RRA has fallen from more than -30 percent in the 1970s to an average of almost zero in 2000-04 (see table 3), and this appears to have been caused as much by falling positive NRAs among nonfarm producers as by falling negative NRAs among farmers (in figure 2). The extent of the change in RRAs among individual countries over the past two

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<sup>4</sup> This bias is accentuated in those cases where distortions to exchange rates are not included. Exchange rate distortions have been included only in the studies on the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, and these economies are too small for their inclusion to affect noticeably the weighted average NRAs and RRAs for the region as a whole.

decades is striking, particularly in the case of Brazil and the Dominican Republic (the virtual disappearance of negative RRAs) and of Colombia (a switch from negative to positive RRAs).

Similar estimates of distortion have been undertaken for Asia and Africa, making it possible to compare the extent of reforms in Latin America with those other developing country regions. Figure 3 summarizes those findings (see Anderson 2009, Ch. 1 for details). It reveals that Latin American countries have reformed considerably more than countries in Africa, and like Asia they now have an average RRA of close to zero. However, apparently its policy regimes were not as negative towards farmers as those of Asia during the final one-third of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

*(d) Consumer tax equivalents of agricultural policies*

The extent to which farm policies impact on the retail consumer price of food and on the price of livestock feedstuffs depends on a wide range of factors, including the degree of processing undertaken and the extent of competition along the value chain. We therefore attempt only to examine the importance of the impact of policies on the buyer's price at the level where the farm product is first traded internationally and, hence, where price comparisons are made.<sup>5</sup>

If there were no farm input distortions and no domestic output price distortions such that the NRA was entirely the result of border measures such as an import or export tax, then the CTE would equal the NRA for each covered product. Because the behind-the-border distortions are relatively minor in Latin America, and because the NRA tended to be positive for import-competing products and negative for exportables until recently, the weighted average CTE for the region has thus been negative for most of the period. It averaged around -15 percent until the 1990s and was marginally above zero thereafter (table 4).

**Partial equilibrium indexes of trade and welfare effects of national farm policies**

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<sup>5</sup> The consumer tax at the retail level is probably smaller in percentage terms but larger in value terms, because of the addition of marketing margins in the processing, distribution and retail parts of the value chain. To obtain weights to make it possible to sum up across commodities and countries, we calculate the volume of apparent consumption simply as production plus net imports and then value the result at undistorted prices.

What impact have these distortions had over time on trade and national economic welfare? One way to indicate the impact of the distortions to covered farm products has been suggested by Anderson and Neary (2005), who developed a family of so-called trade restrictiveness indexes. More recently Lloyd, Croser and Anderson (2009) have built on that family of indexes for situations (as in agriculture) where there are differences between consumer and producer price distortions. Their trade (or welfare) reduction index, TRI (or WRI), makes use of the above NRA and CTE estimates for each farm product to answer the question: what ad valorem trade tax, if applied uniformly to all farm products, would provide the same reduction in national agricultural trade (economic welfare) as the current structure of NRAs and CTEs? An important aspect of the WRI in particular is that it takes into account that the welfare cost of a price-distorting policy measure is proportional to the square of the NRA for that measure.

Estimates of these TRIs and WRIs, which have the virtue of being comparable across countries and over time, are reported in table 5. Since the mid-1980s they have declined considerably for Brazil and Chile, and also for Argentina and Ecuador until recent reversals. For the region as a whole, its time path for these indicators again has followed Asia's and been more substantial than in Africa.

### **Computable general equilibrium modeling of effects of price and trade policies**

While the above indexes of trade and welfare reduction offer very useful indications over time of how much agricultural price and trade policies have been distorting national farm sectors, they are nonetheless only partial in the sense that reforms to policies in other sectors – which may have an indirect effect on farmer incentives – are not taken into account. Furthermore, there is an interest in numerous other economic consequences beyond national agricultural trade and economic welfare. And with reforms going on elsewhere in the world at the same time as Latin America has been reforming its policies, what are the net effects on Latin America of this global reform movement?

To satisfy such additional interests and questions, the best available economic assessment tool is a global economy-wide model. For most of this decade, the World Bank has been using a global computable general equilibrium model known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugge 2005) to form the basis for the World Bank's standard long-term projections of

the world economy and for much of its trade policy analysis (see, e.g., World Bank 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006). Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009) recently used that model first to quantify the net economic effects of trade-related policy changes globally since the early 1980s to 2004, and then to compare them with prospective effects of removing remaining policy distortions to global goods markets. While no-one anticipates a move to completely free markets globally in the near future, the comparison with the 1980-84 results provides a sense of perspective on what is still in prospect relative to what the world has already been through in terms of policy changes over the past quarter century. The prospective analysis also serves as a benchmark to suggest what is at stake in terms of further reforms via WTO rounds of multilateral trade negotiations. At the same time, by showing how different the trade patterns of various countries would be without distortion, such results also provide a better indication of agricultural comparative advantages in different parts of the world than is available by looking at actual trade and self-sufficiency indicators in the current distortion-ridden situation.

The LINKAGE model is a relatively straightforward CGE model, in which factor stocks are fixed, producers minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers maximize utility, and all markets are cleared with flexible prices. There are three types of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between extensive and intensive farming; livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibilities between pasture and intensive feeding; and all other sectors reflect standard capital/labor substitution. There are two types of labor, skilled and unskilled. There is a single representative household per modeled region, allocating income to consumption using the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating domestic absorption between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import demand is allocated across source countries to determine the bilateral trade flows.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> In terms of model closure, government fiscal balances are fixed, with the fiscal objective being met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. The current account balance also is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this implies that ex ante changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real exchange rate. For example, if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases and additional imports are financed by increasing export revenues. The latter typically is achieved by a depreciation of the real exchange rate. Finally, investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment comes from changes in the savings behavior of households and from changes in the unit cost of investment. The model only solves for relative prices, with the numéraire, or price anchor, being the export price index of manufactured exports from high-income countries. This price is fixed at unity in the base year.

The model is calibrated to 2004 using the pre-release of Version 7 of the GTAP global protection database (see [www.gtap.org](http://www.gtap.org)). This is amended by replacing its agricultural distortions for developing countries (which are mostly based on applied tariff rates only) with NRAs and CTEs that reproduce those estimated, using domestic-to-border price comparisons, by authors of the developing country case studies in the World Bank project, as compiled by Valenzuela and Anderson (2008). Valenzuela and Anderson also provide a set of distortions for the period 1980-84, again aiming to reproduce trend distortion rates in the country case studies. Both periods' distortions are summarized for Latin American countries and other regions in table 6.

Several key findings from the global economy-wide modeling study by Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and Anderson (2009) are worth emphasizing. First, the policy reforms from the early 1980s to 2004 improved developing country economic welfare by \$73 billion per year, and removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would add another \$65 billion per year. This suggests that in a developing country welfare sense the world had moved nearly half of the way towards freeing up goods trade over that quarter century. For Latin America, the corresponding welfare gains are \$7.1 and \$15.8 billion per year (table 7). Since the Latin American region represents barely one-tenth of the population of developing countries, its per capita gains were slightly above that for other developing country regions during the past quarter-century and twice as high as for high-income countries. This is largely because 60 percent of those prospective welfare gains from global liberalization would come from agricultural and food policy reforms.

Second, the share of global farm production exported (including intra-EU trade) in 2004 was slightly smaller as a result of those reforms since 1980-84 (11.4 instead of 13.1 percent), because of less farm export subsidies (table 8). Agriculture's 11 percent share in 2004 contrasts with three times that for other primary products and more than twice that for all other goods – a 'thinness' that is an important contributor to the volatility of international prices for weather-dependent farm products. If the policies distorting goods trade in 2004 were removed, the share of global production of farm products and food that is exported would rise from 11.4 to 15.4 percent, thereby reducing instability of prices and quantities of those products traded. This would benefit Latin America especially, given that agriculture and food products are 2.2 times more important to its exports than to the rest of the world's exports.

Third, the developing countries' share of the world's primary agricultural exports rose from 43 to 55 percent, and its farm output share from 58 to 62 percent, because of those



reforms, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and sugar. Removing remaining goods market distortions would boost their export and output shares to 64 and 65 percent, respectively. Because of the importance of farm products in the exports of Latin America, it enjoys exceptionally large proportions of those developing country share gains.

Fourth, the average real price in international markets for agricultural and food products would have been 13 percent lower had policies not changed over the quarter century to 2004. Evidently the impact of reforms in high-income countries (including the cuts in farm export subsidies) in raising international food prices more than offset the opposite impact of reforms (including the cuts in agricultural export taxes) in developing countries over that period. By contrast, removing remaining distortions as of 2004 is projected to raise the international price of agricultural and food products by less than 1 percent on average (Table 9). This is contrary to earlier modeling results based on the GTAP protections database (e.g. those in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006) which suggested they would rise by 3.1 percent or, for just primary agriculture, by 5.5 percent). The lesser impact in these new results is because export taxes in developing countries based on the above NRA estimates are included in the new database (most notably for Argentina) whose removal would offset the international price-raising effect of eliminating import protection and farm subsidies elsewhere.

Fifth, accompanying the price changes are changes in output, exports and imports of farm products. For Latin America, output would have been about 7 percent lower and exports 21 percent lower in 2004 had the reforms after the early 1980s not taken place, compared with just 3 percent lower and 5 percent *higher* for other developing countries, respectively. However, while farm output would increase even more in Latin America if remaining distortions as of 2004 were removed (by 27 percent), they would increase by only 7 percent in other developing countries on average. For the world as a whole, these results suggest farm trade would have been two-thirds bigger in real value terms had the past two decades of reform not occurred. On the export side that is almost entirely due to high-income countries, whose exports would have been more than twice as large had they not lowered their export subsidies and developing countries not lowered their export taxes. If the distortions as of 2004 were removed, global trade would be boosted by

two-fifths (table 10).

Sixth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in agriculture) would have been 5 percent lower without the reforms of the quarter century to 2004, and 10 percent lower in Latin America, which is many times more than the

proportional gains for non-agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 were removed, net farm incomes would rise a further 37 percent for Latin America and 6 percent for all developing countries, compared with just 2 percent for non-agricultural value added (table 11). As well, returns to unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms – would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that liberalization. In Latin America that is also true except for land rents, which are affected even more positively than unskilled labor. Together, these findings suggest both inequality and poverty globally could be alleviated by such reform, given that three-quarters of the world's poor are in farm households in developing countries (Chen and Ravallion 2008); but in Latin America inequality reforms may have increased inequality in so far as agricultural land is still owned by the wealthy.

### **Poverty, inequality and policy implications**

The most salient feature of price and trade policies in the Latin American region since the 1960s is the major economic reforms, including significant trade liberalization, in most countries during the later 1980s and early 1990s. Overall levels of nonagricultural protection have declined considerably, most significantly in the industrial sector, and there have been reforms in the service sector (deregulation and privatization). Both changes have improved the competitiveness of the agricultural sector. By way of summarizing the key findings, the following features of the Latin American experience of the past 40 or more years are worth highlighting.

*The region has seen a gradual movement away from the taxation of farmers relative to nonagricultural producers since the 1970s, and the emergence of positive assistance for agriculture since the early 1990s.* The gradual fall in the estimated (negative) RRA for the region, from as high as –40 percent in the early 1970s to less than –2 percent in the past decade, has not been dissimilar to trends in Africa and Asia, but is nonetheless dramatic. Instead of being effectively taxed nearly US\$17 billion per year, as occurred in the 1980s (or US\$400 per person working in agriculture), farmers in the region now enjoy support worth more than US\$5 billion per year, or nearly US\$125 per person employed on farms. An exception is Argentina, where there was a reversal of policy reform that involved a step back to direct export taxation in late 2001, though this has to be seen in the context of the massive

devaluation in Argentina at that time when the country abandoned the fixed parity with the U.S. dollar. Thanks to the devaluation, Argentina continued to contribute to the rapid growth of Latin America's share in the global exports of farm products that was stimulated by the gradual elimination of anti-agricultural policies.

*The dispersion across Latin America in average NRAs and RRAs for farmers has not diminished much despite the reforms in all countries, nor has the dispersion in NRAs among farmers within each Latin American country including a strong antitrade bias in assistance rates.* This means there is still lots of scope for reducing distortions in the region's use of resources in agriculture. This finding also indicates that political economy forces are at work in each country and that these are not changing greatly relative to the situation in other countries over time.

*Because the agricultural taxation or assistance is mostly due to trade measures, movements in the CTE closely replicate changes in farm support or taxation, which means that, before the reforms, food prices were kept artificially low, but, in recent years, they have been above international levels on average.* It also means there is considerable variation in CTEs across products and across countries in the region. The CTEs (like the NRAs) are highest for milk, rice, and sugar, but are negative, on average, for maize, beef, and soybeans.

*The decline in negative RRAs has been caused as much by cuts in protection in nonagricultural sectors as by reforms in agricultural policies.* This underscores the fact that the reductions in distortions in agricultural incentives in the region have been part of a series of economy-wide reform programs and have not been caused merely by farm policy reforms.

*The recent and prospective reforms have benefitted unskilled workers in the region but have benefitted landholders even more.* That suggests domestic income and wealth redistribution policies may need to be adjusted in Latin America if reforms are to not exacerbate inequality in the region.

The assistance trends are encouraging in that they signal the long period of encouraging import substitution in the industrial sector and of taxing primary exports, which so heavily discriminated against the agricultural sector in Latin America, has been largely relegated to history. However, as the above summary makes clear, this does not mean that policies are no longer distorting agricultural incentives. And, if Latin America were to follow the policy path chosen by more-advanced economies that involves increasing agricultural assistance as per capita incomes rise, there may be even more distortion in the future. This suggests that vigilance will be needed among economic policy advisors in the years to come.

Meanwhile, the opposite policy problem remains in Argentina, where explicit export taxation was reintroduced in late 2001 and has been increased a number of times since then.

Trade taxes, whether on agricultural imports to reduce import competition for the benefit of poor farmers, or on agricultural exports to lower the cost of food for the urban poor, are not the most efficient way to reduce poverty (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004). Trade policy instruments are almost never the first-best way to reduce poverty. On the contrary, food trade taxes may even worsen poverty, depending on the earning and spending patterns of poor households and on the alternative tax-raising instruments available. Far more preferable would be microeconomic reforms to mitigate the deep-seated structural problems affecting the competitiveness of factor and goods markets. This is because the reforms have accentuated the differences between commercially oriented farmers and farmers who are less prepared to take advantage of economic reform. Although countries have adopted various policies to mitigate the human costs of economic adjustment (especially since the mid-1990s), there were in some cases adverse effects on rural poverty and traditional agriculture was often left behind (Spoor 2000; Valdés and Foster 2007). Many countries in the region have implemented safety net programs to aid all poor, including direct income transfers and conditional cash transfers to families in agriculture. The challenge for the years ahead is to improve the coverage and effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs. Such programs are not only good in fighting poverty, but can contribute to investments in human capital and can, by acting as a form of guaranteed compensation, reduce political obstacles to further economic reforms.

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
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to exportable, import-competing and all<sup>a</sup> agricultural products, Latin America region, 1965 to 2004

(percent, weighted average across countries)




Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).




Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradable products and relative rate of assistance,<sup>a</sup> Latin America region, 1965 to 2004

(percent, weighted averages across eight countries)



<sup>a</sup> The RRA is defined as  $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{non-ag}}^t) - 1]$ , where  $\text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^t$  and  $\text{NRA}_{\text{non-ag}}^t$  are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).

Figure 3: Relative rates of assistance, Africa, Asia, and Latin America,<sup>a</sup> 1965 to 2004

<sup>a</sup> 5-year weighted averages with value of production at undistorted prices as weights. In Asia, estimates for China pre-1981 are based on the assumption that the nominal rate of assistance to agriculture in those earlier years was the same as the average NRA estimates for China in 1981-89.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson (2009).

Table 1: Key economic and trade indicators, Latin America and other regions, 2000-04

	Share (%) of world:			National rel. to world (world=100)			Agric trade special- ization index <sup>b</sup>	Pov- erty incid- ence <sup>c</sup>	Gini index for per capita income <sup>d</sup>
	Pop'n	Total GDP	Agric GDP	GDP per capita	Ag land per capita	RCA <sup>a</sup> ag & food			
<b>LA focus countries</b>	<b>6.49</b>	<b>4.49</b>	<b>7.73</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>219</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>52</b>
Argentina	0.61	0.54	1.04	89	426	541	0.85	5	51
Brazil	2.88	1.54	3.38	54	184	355	0.66	8	57
Chile	0.25	0.22	0.24	86	120	386	0.63	2	55
Colombia	0.70	0.24	0.77	35	132	264	0.25	7	59
Dominican Rep	0.14	0.06	0.18	41	54	474	0.29	3	52
Ecuador	0.20	0.07	0.16	33	80	487	0.59	16	44
Mexico	1.62	1.82	1.89	112	133	64	-0.17	7	46
Nicaragua	0.08	0.01	0.06	14	169	952	0.26	44	43
<b>Other LA countries</b>	<b>1.84</b>	<b>0.84</b>	<b>2.05</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>
<b>All Latin America</b>	<b>8.33</b>	<b>5.33</b>	<b>9.78</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>
Africa	11.71	1.67	6.04	14	148	na	na	32	na
Asia (ex. Japan)	50.76	10.37	36.65	20	34	80	-0.03	19	36
Western Europe	6.31	28.66	15.43	454	46	106	-0.03	na	
United States and Canada	5.14	32.67	10.82	636	186	119	0.08	na	40
Australia and New Zealand	0.38	1.54	1.57	405	2454	354	0.62	na	35

<sup>a</sup> Revealed comparative advantage index is the share of agriculture and processed food in national exports as a ratio of that sector's share of global exports.

<sup>b</sup> Primary agricultural trade specialization index is net exports as a ratio of the sum of exports and imports of agricultural and processed food products (world average =0.0).

<sup>c</sup> Percentage of the population living on less than US \$1 per day.

<sup>d</sup> The poverty incidence and Gini index are for the most recent year available between 2000 and 2004, except for Ecuador where they refer to 1998. The weighted averages for the focus countries use population as the basis for weights.

Source: Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2007), compiled mainly from World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture,<sup>a</sup> Latin America and other regions, 1965 to 2004

(percent)

	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04
Argentina	-22.7	-22.9	-20.4	-19.3	-15.8	-7.0	-4.0	-14.9
Brazil <sup>c</sup>	-6.1	-27.3	-23.3	-25.7	-21.1	-11.3	8.0	4.1
Chile	16.2	12.0	4.5	7.2	13.0	7.9	8.2	5.8
Colombia	-4.7	-14.8	-13.0	5.0	0.2	8.2	13.2	25.9
Dominican Rep.	5.0	-17.5	-21.2	-30.7	-36.4	-1.0	9.2	2.5
Ecuador <sup>c</sup>	-9.6	-22.4	-15.0	5.9	-1.0	-5.3	-2.0	10.1
Mexico	na	na	na	2.9	3.0	30.8	4.2	11.6
Nicaragua <sup>c</sup>	na	na	na	na	na	-3.2	-11.3	-4.2
<b>LA focus countries<sup>a</sup></b>	-7.2	-21.0	-18.0	-12.5	-10.9	4.2	5.5	4.8
Africa	-11.3	-14.7	-12.7	-7.9	-1.0	-8.9	-5.7	-7.3
Asia (excl. Japan)	-25	-25	-24	-21	-9	-2	8	12
Western Europe	68	46	56	74	82	64	44	37
U.S. and Canada	11	7	8	13	19	16	11	17
Australia and N. Zealand	10	8	8	11	9	4	3	1
Developing countries	-22	-24	-22	-18	-8	-2	6	9
High-income countries	35	25	32	41	53	46	35	32
All focus countries	6	0	2	5	17	18	17	18

<sup>a</sup> Weighted average for each country, including product-specific input distortions and non-product specific assistance as well as authors' guesstimates for non-covered farm products, with weights based on gross value of agricultural production at undistorted prices.

<sup>b</sup> Ecuador and Brazil 1965-69 column refers to 1966-69 data; and Nicaragua 1990-94 column to 1991-94 data.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).

Table 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to non-agricultural industries, Latin American region, 1965 to 2004

(weighted averages for 8 focus countries, percent)

	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04
NRA, covered products <sup>a</sup>	-13.0	-25.1	-19.6	-14.6	-14.3	0.9	0.8	2.7
NRA, non-covered products	-3.3	-15.5	-15.0	-10.9	-13.1	0.7	3.8	2.1
NRA, all agric. products <sup>a</sup>	-8.6	-21.7	-18.1	-13.6	-14.0	0.8	1.7	2.5
<b>Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>-7.2</b>	<b>-21.0</b>	<b>-18.0</b>	<b>-12.5</b>	<b>-10.9</b>	<b>4.2</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>4.8</b>
<b>NRA, just tradables:</b>								
All agricultural tradables <sup>b</sup>	-9.3	-23.0	-19.0	-12.9	-11.2	4.4	5.5	4.9
All non-agricultural tradables	15.9	27.8	23.3	18.5	16.8	7.3	6.6	5.5
<b>Relative rate of assistance, RRA<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>-21.4</b>	<b>-39.8</b>	<b>-34.2</b>	<b>-26.6</b>	<b>-24.0</b>	<b>-2.7</b>	<b>-1.0</b>	<b>-0.6</b>

<sup>a</sup> NRAs including product-specific input subsidies.

<sup>b</sup> NRAs including non-product-specific (NPS) assistance, that is, the assistance to all primary factors and intermediate inputs as a percentage of the total primary agricultural production valued at undistorted prices.

<sup>c</sup> RRA is defined as  $100 * [(100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^{\text{t}}) / (100 + \text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^{\text{t}}) - 1]$ , where  $\text{NRA}_{\text{ag}}^{\text{t}}$  and  $\text{NRA}_{\text{nonag}}^{\text{t}}$  are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).

Table 4: Percentage consumer tax equivalent of policies affecting covered farm products,<sup>a</sup>  
Latin American countries, 1965 to 2003

(percent, at primary product level)

	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-03
Argentina	-27.6	-27.2	-25.2	-23.4	-16.6	-5.7	0.0	-9.1
Brazil	2.1	-25.4	-19.8	-25.8	-26.5	-23.1	-2.1	-1.3
Chile	7.1	1.5	2.8	9.0	23.8	18.1	14.2	10.7
Colombia	7.2	-13.4	-5.3	27.4	20.8	16.2	33.9	49.7
Dominican Rep.	12.9	-7.1	-7.7	-27.8	-31.4	7.8	16.6	3.5
Ecuador	-10.5	-25.7	3.9	35.0	17.4	-3.3	4.6	18.5
Mexico	na	na	na	-1.3	0.8	22.3	-1.9	9.9
Nicaragua	na	na	na	na	na	10.5	10.6	9.0
<b>LA focus countries</b> (weighted average) <sup>b</sup>	-4.7	-22.1	-16.2	-13.4	-12.3	-2.7	1.4	5.1

<sup>a</sup> Assumes the CTE is the same as the NRA derived from trade measures (that is, not including any input taxes/subsidies or domestic producer price subsidies/taxes).

<sup>b</sup> Weights are consumption valued at undistorted prices, where consumption (from FAO) is estimated as production plus imports net of exports plus change in stocks of the covered products.

Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) based on estimates reported in Anderson and Valdés (2008).

Table 5: Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes, by country and region,<sup>a</sup> all covered tradable farm products, 1960 to 2004

(percent)

(a) Trade Reduction Indexes

	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04
Argentina	30	27	28	25	23	18	7	3	13
Brazil	na	12	28	19	20	13	11	0	0
Chile	9	-7	-15	4	8	24	17	14	8
Colombia	14	5	8	8	18	11	5	12	-13
Dominican Republic	60	25	21	27	37	34	57	30	37
Ecuador	na	12	15	34	45	26	3	7	16
Mexico	na	na	na	12	16	13	26	8	17
Nicaragua	na	na	na	na	na	na	11	22	18
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Asia</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Europe's transition econs.</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>na</b>	<b>-4</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>High-income countries</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>

(b) Welfare Reduction Indexes

	1960-64	1965-69	1970-74	1975-79	1980-84	1985-89	1990-94	1995-99	2000-04
Argentina	32	30	28	27	24	19	10	8	17
Brazil	na	16	43	36	42	39	34	8	7
Chile	53	27	28	28	16	34	23	18	13
Colombia	28	23	22	26	40	25	25	35	58
Dominican Republic	78	42	44	46	50	55	89	48	59
Ecuador	na	37	48	59	71	44	20	24	32
Mexico	na	na	na	43	48	42	54	30	33
Nicaragua	na	na	na	na	na	na	29	31	26
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Africa</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Asia</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Developing countries</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>High-income countries</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>38</b>

<sup>a</sup> Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices.

Source: Anderson and Croser (2009), based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).

Table 6: Structure of price distortions in global goods markets,<sup>a</sup> 1980-84 and 2004  
(percent)

	1980-84				2004			
	Primary Agriculture	Agriculture and Lightly Processed Food		Other goods	Primary Agriculture	Agriculture and Lightly Processed Food		Other goods
		Domestic Support	Export Subsidy	Tariff		Domestic Support	Export Subsidy	Tariff
Argentina	0.0	-20.9	0.0	15.8	0.0	-14.8	0.0	5.8
Brazil	5.0	-17.1	3.2	33.4	0.0	0.0	4.8	8.9
Chile	-3.0	0.0	4.8	6.2	0.0	0.0	2.4	1.8
Colombia	-0.6	1.0	21.7	22.8	0.0	0.0	21.6	9.8
Ecuador	0.0	-13.7	28.6	10.3	0.0	0.0	13.4	10.4
Mexico	14.3	-9.6	19.1	6.8	1.2	0.0	6.2	3.4
Nicaragua	0.0	-2.8	10.9	3.9	0.0	-2.8	9.6	3.9
Rest of Latin America	-1.7	0.3	9.9	9.9	-1.7	0.3	9.9	9.9
<b>All developing countries</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>-11.0</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>21.8</b>	<b>7.5</b>
Africa	-0.3	-2.5	17.0	12.6	-0.8	0.1	20.4	11.2
East Asia	-5.6	-21.5	24.3	29.6	-0.3	0.0	41.6	6.7
South Asia	3.5	-7.1	10.7	72.6	7.2	1.7	6.9	20.2
Latin America	3.8	-9.6	9.8	15.7	-0.2	-1.4	7.2	6.7
Middle East	-12.4	0.0	7.5	5.7	-12.4	0.0	7.5	5.7
E. Europe and C. Asia	0.8	-2.6	13.8	9.6	0.8	-0.3	15.9	4.8
<b>High-income countries</b>	<b>6.6</b>	<b>20.9</b>	<b>24.0</b>	<b>2.4</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>22.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>
<b>WORLD TOTAL</b>	<b>2.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>10.1</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>3.3</b>

<sup>a</sup> Using value of production at undistorted prices as weights.

Source: Authors' calculations based on Anderson and Valenzuela (2008).



Table 7: Economic welfare impact of going back to 1980-84 policies, and full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by country/region, 2004

(relative to the 2004 benchmark data, in 2004 US dollars and percent)

	Going back to 1980-84 price distortions in 2004				Full liberalization of remaining price distortions as of 2004			
	<b>Total real income change p.a. (\$billion)</b>	<i>Change in income due just to change in terms of trade (\$billion)</i>	<b>Total real income change as percentage of 2004 benchmark<sup>a</sup></b>		<b>Total real income change p.a. (\$billion)</b>	<i>Change in income due just to change in terms of trade (\$billion)</i>	<b>Total real income change as percentage of 2004 benchmark<sup>a</sup></b>	
Argentina	-1.7	0.1	-1.4	(0.1)	3.2	-0.7	2.6	(-0.6)
Brazil	-5.3	6.8	-1.2	(1.6)	6.8	5.6	1.6	(1.3)
Chile	0.1	0.7	0.1	(1.0)	0.3	0.2	0.4	(0.3)
Colombia	2.5	2.5	3.5	(3.5)	2.2	0.7	3.1	(1.0)
Ecuador	-0.6	0.3	-2.5	(1.2)	2.0	1.1	8.2	(4.4)
Mexico	-2.6	3.6	-0.5	(0.7)	-0.7	-3.4	-0.1	(-0.6)
Nicaragua	0.0	0.0	0.6	(0.0)	0.0	0.0	1.3	(0.4)
Rest of Latin America	0.5	-0.2	0.1	(-0.1)	2.0	-1.0	0.5	(-0.3)
<b>All developing countries</b>	<b>-73.1</b>	<b>49.3</b>	<b>-1.0</b>	<b>(0.7)</b>	<b>64.9</b>	<b>-12.2</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>(-0.2)</b>
North Africa	0.6	0.1	0.3	(0.0)	0.9	-2.8	0.5	(-1.5)
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.4	1.7	-1.0	(0.5)	0.0	-3.2	0.0	(-0.9)
East Asia	-61.5	19.9	-2.2	(0.7)	30.1	-1.0	1.1	(0.0)
South Asia	-10.8	6.5	-1.7	(1.0)	-0.4	-3.9	-0.1	(-0.6)
Latin America	-7.1	13.7	-0.4	(0.8)	15.8	2.5	1.0	(0.2)
Middle East	2.6	0.4	0.5	(0.1)	4.2	-0.2	0.8	(0.0)
EEurope & Central Asia	6.5	7.1	0.5	(0.6)	14.2	-3.6	1.2	(-0.3)
<b>High-income countries</b>	<b>-159.9</b>	<b>-50.8</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>(-0.2)</b>	<b>102.8</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>(0.1)</b>
<b>World total</b>	<b>-233.0</b>	<b>-1.5</b>	<b>-0.8</b>	<b>(0.0)</b>	<b>167.7</b>	<b>-1.0</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>(0.0)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Numbers in parentheses refer to that due to terms of trade effects.

Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).

Table 8: Impact on shares of agricultural and food production exported, by country/region of going back to 1980-84 policies and full liberalization of global merchandise trade

(percent)

	2004 benchmark	Going back to 1980-84 policies	Full global liberalization
Argentina	42.3	31.6	47.0
Brazil	20.7	13.3	32.5
Chile	37.6	34.7	40.0
Colombia	13.6	32.0	29.0
Ecuador	28.2	21.2	47.5
Mexico	7.7	6.8	9.2
Nicaragua	27.6	31.4	31.9
Rest of LAC	14.6	15.0	26.8
<b><i>All developing countries</i></b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>9.5</b>	<b>16.9</b>
North Africa	6.3	7.9	20.6
Sub-Saharan Africa	13.8	13.5	19.3
East Asia	8.4	7.7	15.1
South Asia	3.7	2.4	7.5
Latin America	18.1	16.3	28.2
Middle East	7.4	14.2	17.2
Eastern Europe & Central Asia	6.8	9.1	11.1
<b><i>High-income countries</i></b>	<b>13.0</b>	<b>15.9</b>	<b>14.1</b>
<b><i>World total<sup>a</sup></i></b>	<b>11.4</b>	<b>13.1</b>	<b>15.4</b>

<sup>a</sup> Including intra-EU trade

Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).

Table 9: Impact on real international product prices of going back to 1980-84 policies and full liberalization of global merchandise trade

(percent relative to 2004 baseline)

	<b>Going back to 1980-84 policies</b>	<b>Full global liberalization</b>
Paddy rice	-11.6	6.6
Wheat	-15.4	1.4
Other grains	-27.5	2.7
Oil seeds	-8.6	-2.4
Sugar cane and beet	-0.5	-2.0
Plant-based fibers	0.8	2.9
Vegetables and fruits	2.8	1.8
Other crops	2.6	1.0
Cattle sheep etc	0.5	-1.1
Other livestock	-2.0	-2.1
Raw milk	0.4	-0.2
Wool	-1.9	3.3
Beef and sheep meat	-15.0	4.6
Other meat products	-45.5	0.6
Vegetable oils and fats	-1.4	-1.9
Dairy products	-8.5	3.8
Processed rice	0.6	2.9
Refined sugar	-2.5	1.3
Other food, bevs. and tobacco	0.1	-1.3
Textile and wearing apparel	1.4	-1.2
Other manufacturing	0.3	-0.2
Merchandise trade	-1.2	-0.2
Agriculture and food	-12.6	0.3
Primary agriculture	-5.9	0.9
Agric & lightly processed food	-17.6	1.3

*Note:* Model numéraire is the export price index of high-income countries' manufactured exports

*Source:* World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).

Table 10: Impact on agricultural and food output and trade, by country/region of going back to 1980-84 policies and full liberalization of global merchandise trade

(relative to benchmark data, percent)

	Going back to 1980-84 policies			Full liberalization		
	Output	Exports	Imports	Output	Exports	Imports
Argentina	-19.9	-36.7	27.8	37.8	95.6	81.8
Brazil	-18.2	-48.5	30.7	45.3	100.7	94.8
Chile	-11.0	-7.8	12.7	4.7	11.3	15.8
Colombia	48.6	292.6	110.4	14.6	161.4	81.7
Ecuador	-15.6	-69.6	-12.7	46.1	198.7	71.8
Mexico	-2.3	-54.0	12.6	-0.4	5.8	4.3
Nicaragua	2.8	26.1	16.8	2.9	21.6	19.4
Rest of Latin America	-4.6	-0.2	32.2	25.7	175.9	30.4
<b><i>All developing countries</i></b>	<b>-3.2</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>50.3</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>40.4</b>
North Africa	-0.7	35.2	21.4	17.3	377.2	62.5
Sub-Saharan Africa	4.3	15.5	50.0	1.9	41.9	32.3
East Asia	-5.4	-0.2	51.2	4.0	77.4	37.4
South Asia	-2.8	-41.2	12.3	0.0	108.3	33.2
Latin America	-6.9	-20.6	26.8	26.8	106.4	29.8
Middle East	7.1	154.2	58.6	21.5	222.7	12.1
EEurope & Central Asia	-2.6	53.4	91.6	-2.6	79.7	77.6
<b><i>High-income countries</i></b>	<b>11.0</b>	<b>110.8</b>	<b>78.3</b>	<b>-13.1</b>	<b>-4.0</b>	<b>38.3</b>
<b><i>World total<sup>a</sup></i></b>	<b>3.6</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>66.9</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>39.1</b>	<b>39.1</b>

<sup>a</sup>(excluding intra-EU trade.

Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).

Table 11: Impact on sectoral value added, agricultural and all-sector policy changes of going back to 1980-84 policies and full liberalization of global merchandise trade

(relative to 2004 benchmark data, percent)

	Going back to 1980-84 policies		Full liberalization	
	Agric	Non-agric	Agric	Non-agric
Argentina	-25.5	13.1	103.5	13.8
Brazil	-24.9	1.6	42.6	4.2
Chile	-1.8	1.3	5.5	0.9
Colombia	13.6	15.3	53.5	1.5
Ecuador	-35.4	-1.9	126.0	6.7
Mexico	-4.0	1.8	0.3	-1.0
Nicaragua	5.1	-0.4	2.4	2.3
Rest of Latin America	0.0	-0.2	28.7	-0.6
<b><i>Developing countries</i></b>	<b>-4.9</b>	<b>-0.4</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>1.9</b>
North Africa	-0.3	0.3	-1.1	0.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.1	-0.3	-0.8	-0.5
East Asia	-8.9	-2.8	4.7	3.5
South Asia	-2.2	2.7	-6.7	-0.3
Latin America	-9.8	2.7	37.0	2.3
Middle East	-1.1	-0.8	25.4	0.9
EEurope & Central Asia	1.5	-0.1	-5.2	0.3
<b><i>High-income countries</i></b>	<b>36.2</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>-14.7</b>	<b>0.1</b>
<b><i>World total</i></b>	<b>8.8</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>-1.2</b>	<b>0.5</b>

*Source:* World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).

Table 12: Impact of going back to 1980-84 policies of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real factor prices,<sup>a</sup> by country/region

(relative to the benchmark data, percent)

(a) Going back to 1980-84

	Unskilled wages	Skilled wages	Capital <sup>b</sup> user cost	Land <sup>b</sup> user cost	Aggregate CPI	Food CPI
<i>Developing countries</i>	<b>-2.1</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>-1.5</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.4</b>
North Africa	0.3	0.1	-0.2	-1.1	0.3	-0.7
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.1	0.6	1.2	-1.5	-1.4	-3.1
East Asia	-4.5	-3.7	-3.4	-6.2	0.7	1.9
South Asia	-4.1	-4.7	-1.7	-6.6	5.4	4.7
Latin America	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-8.1	2.2	0.2
Middle East	0.6	0.7	0.2	-4.3	-1.2	-3.9
EEurope & Central Asia	0.2	-0.1	0.2	4.1	-0.2	-1.6
<i>High-income countries</i>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>-0.4</b>	<b>102.1</b>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-1.2</b>
<i>World total</i>	<b>-0.1</b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>21.1</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>-0.5</b>

(b) full global merchandise trade liberalization as of 2004

	Unskilled wages	Skilled wages	Capital <sup>b</sup> user cost	Land <sup>b</sup> user cost	Aggregate CPI	Food CPI
<i>Developing countries</i>	<b>3.5</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.9</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>-0.9</b>	<b>-2.8</b>
North Africa	7.0	7.7	5.3	-0.5	-5.2	-7.2
Sub-Saharan Africa	3.2	3.2	3.8	0.2	-3.8	-4.9
East Asia	4.0	3.4	3.3	1.9	0.1	-2.7
South Asia	-0.6	2.3	1.2	-6.2	-1.6	0.3
Latin America	4.5	1.4	1.9	21.1	1.2	3.2
Middle East	8.3	2.9	4.7	43.8	-3.3	-10.5
EEurope & Central Asia	1.7	3.2	2.6	-4.5	-2.3	-4.5
<i>High-income countries</i>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>-17.9</b>	<b>-0.6</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
<i>World total</i>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>-0.7</b>	<b>-3.2</b>

<sup>a</sup> Nominal factor prices deflated by national aggregate consumer price index (CPI), column 5<sup>b</sup> The user cost of capital and land represents the subsidy inclusive rental cost.

Source: World Bank LINKAGE model simulations from Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugge and Anderson (2009).