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**One Nation Under a Groove?
Identity and Multiculturalism in Britain**

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Abstract

There is a lot of evidence that identity matters for behavior. There is a widespread belief that societies will function better if they manage to establish a common sense of identity among the population. And there are also contemporary fears that this common identity is threatened in several countries. In this paper we investigate the correlates of various measures of identity in the UK, a country currently greatly concerned about a perceived failure to build a common identity from a collection of diverse cultures. We find that the alleged failure to establish a British identity among ethnic minorities is exaggerated – for most their ethnicity and religion seem no barrier to a British identity. But there is a segment of the white population that clearly feels neglected and alienated, and are hostile to the multicultural agenda.

Keywords: Identity, Multiculturalism

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Introduction

There is considerable evidence that ‘identity matters’, that many individuals think of themselves as part of a social group and that this membership has consequences for individual behavior, for behavior towards others with the same identity and towards those who do not share that identity. How societies function is then likely to be affected by the number and type of social groups within it so the nature of identity becomes a matter of public concern. Because there is very considerable evidence that people behave more pro-socially towards those they perceive as being of the same identity (starting perhaps with Tajfel, 1970) it is a common belief that countries should seek to create a sense of common identity among its citizens, what we might call ‘nation-building’¹. This need is most acute in societies whose populations come from a diverse collection of cultures². In many countries, there are those who argue that there has been a serious failure in ‘nation-building’. In the United States, Huntington (2004) expressed concern that Mexican immigrants are failing to adopt an American identity and the values that traditionally go with that. In Britain – the focus of this study – a certain smug satisfaction that it had been relatively successful in building a multicultural society has turned to dismay as some young Britons turn suicide bombers. The result has been an active debate about ‘Britishness’³.

But, although there is a widespread belief that it is desirable to have a common sense of identity, there is much less agreement about how this is best achieved. For example, the British government has traditionally taken the view that ethnic and religious minorities are more likely to feel part of Britain if allowed or even encouraged to retain their traditional cultures. However, others have argued that such a policy preserves differences, leads to fragmentation and does not give individuals sufficient freedom to craft their own identity (see, for example, Sen, 2006). But, in spite of the fact that many commentators have very strong views on the subject, we have remarkably little large-

¹ For example, Kymlicka (2002, p267) “the common national identity provides a source of trust and solidarity that can accommodate deep disagreements over conceptions of the good life”

² According to Putnam (2007, p137) “one of the most important challenges facing modern societies.... is the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced societies”. He also argues that a retreat to cultural homogeneity is not an option.

³ To give but one example, Gordon Brown’s speech to the Fabian Society on the future of Britishness <http://www.fabians.org.uk/events/speeches/the-future-of-britishness>

scale quantitative evidence on the factors associated with feeling a part of society. To present some data that sheds light on these questions is the purpose of this paper. We use data from the UK's 2007 Citizenship Survey to investigate the relationship between various measures of identity and other variables that have been thought related to these outcomes like ethnicity, religion, measures of integration, perceptions of fairness etc. It should be admitted from the outset that we do not have a clean research design with exogenous variation in the variables we include on the right-hand side of our regressions so that what we are estimating are correlations and not necessarily causal effects. In many cases (we will give some examples but we are sure that readers can generate many others) there will be plausible explanations for our findings that are not true causal effects. We will try to avoid interpreting our findings using language that smacks of causal effects though we may not always succeed in this to every readers' satisfaction.

Nevertheless we do not think of our exercise as completely pointless. Knowing what correlations are in the data does restrict the set of possible models to those that can explain that correlation. And it is important to remember that this is an area where many have very strongly-held views but there is little in the way of quantitative evidence of the sort we present. In such a vacuum we believe that even problematic correlations can be of interest.

The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section we try to explain why a common sense of national identity has been regarded as important for the well-being of a society. We then use work on identity to develop hypotheses about the factors that might be associated with identity. The second section describes our data and the third section considers the associations between identity and the factors identified as likely to be important. The fourth section draws some tentative implications for contemporary debates about 'multiculturalism' in Britain. The fifth section concludes.

Our findings support the view that people who feel well treated are more likely to feel they belong to or identify with Britain. We also find no evidence that certain religious or ethnic groups are less likely to feel they belong to Britain. However, our results do indicate that there is a problem with segments of the white population who have come to feel that they are neglected and discriminated against.

1. Identity

Who Cares?

There is now a considerable body of evidence from all parts of the social sciences that identity matters for behavior. This is partly because the ‘rules’ for membership of a group generally require certain behaviour from individuals, often to mark the individual as a member of the group. Some of these prescribed behaviours may be regarded by others as undesirable even if the consequences fall wholly or largely on the individual (see, for example, Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005, on ‘acting white’).

But, identity also matters for behavior towards others. A general feature of groups (and one that is arguably essential for them to be stable) is that one behaves in a more pro-social way towards other members of the same group and less pro-socially to outsiders (in some cases, it may be that a group actively causes harm to outsiders) - see Hogg and Vaughan (2005) for an accessible introduction to this literature. Essentially one puts a greater weight on the welfare of someone who is part of one’s group than one does on the welfare of an outsider.

From this perspective, it is easy to understand why it is widely believed that it is desirable for those in a country to have a common sense of national identity. To give an example, suppose a society consists of two groups who do not care about each other – a majority and a minority who differ in their preferences in some way. If decisions are made by majority vote, there is a danger that the majority will enact policies that are very disadvantageous to the minority – John Stuart Mills’ ‘tyranny of the majority’. In turn, the minority may then, realizing the impossibility of achieving more desirable outcomes peacefully through the ballot box, resort to violence or the threat of it in an attempt to get the majority to take its grievances seriously.

The idea is that if, by creating a common sense of national identity, both groups think of the other as part of a wider in-group, then the effective distance in preferences will be reduced and less extreme outcomes will be produced. Although the minority do not have political power, the majority will, in part, internalize the welfare of the minority, so that the policies enacted will be less harmful to the minority. And, because the minority now internalize, in part, the welfare of the majority they will be less likely to threaten harm to obtain a more desirable outcome. We do have evidence of costs from

diversity that is usefully surveyed by Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). They review evidence like that presented by Easterly and Levine (1997) that ethnic fragmentation leads to lower growth in Africa and Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) that public good provision is lower in US cities with higher levels of ethnic diversity. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005, p794) conclude that there is “overwhelming evidence” that public good provision is lower in fragmented societies”.

Fostering a common sense of national identity is designed to reduce fragmentation – political philosophers sometimes express this nicely as trying to align the boundaries of ethical communities with those of political communities. But, even once one has accepted the desirability of ‘nation-building’, one has to try to understand what factors are likely to be associated with a common sense of identity. For that, one needs a theory of why people choose the identities they do.

Hypotheses

Theories of ‘identity’ are very much in their infancy and we make no pretence here to do more than sketch factors that might be thought to be important. We structure our discussion around the general framework used by those who have introduced identity concerns into economics – see, for example, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) or Shayo (2009).

In order to help structure our thoughts, consider the following very stylized way of thinking about when people choose to be a member of a group. Assume that individuals have to make a decision, x_i – this could be multi-dimensional but to convey the basic ideas we will speak as if it is one-dimensional. There is a value of x_i , \tilde{x}_i which is the optimal value for individual i if they were an isolated individual – this will be affected by the individual’s tastes which themselves might be influenced by, for example, the culture of their parents. We assume there is a quadratic loss function for

$-\frac{1}{2}c_i(x_i - \tilde{x}_i)^2$ for deviations of actual behavior from the individual optimum. The

parameter c_i can be thought of as a measure of how flexible an individual is or how strongly they adhere to their original values.

Individuals can also choose to be a member of a group, g . We will assume that group g offers a benefit B_g to members (this might be some utility one gets from not feeling alone or because one gets some utility from the status of the group (Shayo, 2009) or because, as discussed above, one can expect material help from others who regard you as part of their group). However, this benefit may be contingent on behavior. Assume that the group has an optimal desired behavior, x_g^* , and reduces benefits as behavior deviates from this according to a quadratic loss function with parameter b_g . The parameter b_g can be thought of as a measure of how tolerant or inclusive a group is.

Putting this together, the overall utility for individual i if they choose to be a member of group g and take action x_i can be written as:

$$U_i(x_i, g) = -\frac{1}{2}c_i(x_i - \tilde{x}_i)^2 + B_g - \frac{1}{2}b_g(x_i - x_g^*)^2 \quad (1)$$

If the individual does choose to be a member of group g then they will choose the following action:

$$x_i = \frac{c_i \tilde{x}_i + b_g x_g^*}{c_i + b_g} \quad (2)$$

So that the optimal action is a weighted average of the individual and group optima with the weight on the individual optimum being larger the less flexible is the individual and the more tolerant is the group. The maximized value of utility is given by:

$$U_i(x_i, g) = -\frac{1}{2} \frac{c_i b_g}{c_i + b_g} (\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*)^2 + B_g \quad (3)$$

Group g is less appealing to individual i the larger the gap between individual and group optima $|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*|$ and the less flexible is the individual i.e. a higher c_i . A group is also less appealing, the less tolerant it is i.e. the higher is b_g . But the larger the group benefits B_g the more appealing is a group. One can then understand why less tolerant groups tend to offer higher levels of mutual benefits to those who are deemed members of the group – otherwise they would clearly lose out in the competition among groups for members. Note that in this set-up, whether individual i becomes a member of group g depends partly on their individual characteristics – here (c_i, \tilde{x}_i) – but also on how they perceive

they will be treated by the other members of that group – here captured by the parameters (B_g, b_g, x_g^*) .

Although this is a very simple set-up, we think it is a useful way to think about how individuals decide on their identity. Although it is a model that uses the word ‘choice’, it is capable of capturing the idea that, because the criteria for membership of a particular group are set by others, they may be impossible for some individuals to fulfil. For example if having a white skin is regarded as a requirement for having British identity by those who are white, ‘British’ is an identity unavailable to ethnic minorities – in this case one might think of skin colour as the x , that white Britons do not tolerate any deviations from ‘whiteness’ i.e. b_g is very high and that the costs of making one’s skin white for an individual are also very high i.e. c_i is very high. In this case one can think of the net benefits to non-whites of membership of the ‘British’ group as being very negative.

So, our general approach is to try and think about the costs and benefits of having a British identity. We now move to a discussion of the data we use.

2. Data

The data we use in this paper comes from England and Wales.’ 2007 Citizenship Survey (CS) administered by the Department for Communities and Local Government⁴. This survey has been conducted (though under varying names) every two years since 2001. The sample is approximately 10,000 adults in England and Wales with an additional boost sample of 5,000 adults from minority ethnic groups which allows a large enough sample from those groups for statistical analysis. The survey asks questions about a wide range of issues, including race equality, faith, feelings about their community, identity, and various measure of social capital.

In this paper we examine how certain outcome variables are associated with certain characteristics of the individual and the neighbourhood in which they live, for different sub-samples of the community.

⁴ See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/racecohesionfaith/research/citizenshipsurvey/> for more details.

Sub-Samples

In most of the analysis we focus on 3 sub-samples though not all of the outcome variables are relevant for all of them. The first sub-sample is the UK-born who describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’. This is obviously the largest group in the population as a whole but, because the CS over-samples ethnic minorities they are under-represented in our analysis sample. Although it might be taken for granted that this group feels British, we shall see that this is not the case and understanding why is of considerable interest.

Our second sample is non-white first-generation immigrants i.e. those born abroad. These are of obvious interest because they will have come from cultures that may be different from British norms and their integration into British society is seen as an important matter of public concern. Our third sample is the non-white British born – for the most part these will be the children of the second sub-sample. They are of particular interest because of fears that they adhere more closely to the culture of the countries from which their parents originated than to British values (see, for example, Algan and Cahuc, 2009, Fernandez and Fogli, 2009, for evidence pertinent to this). For the non-white ethnic groups we reduce the 13 categories in the original survey to 8 – Mixed, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African, Chinese and Other. This is because sample sizes are very small for some of the other groups.

This way of dividing the sample does exclude white immigrants and the white UK-born who do not describe their ethnicity as ‘white British’. We exclude them because they are a small part of the sample (under 5% - as there is no explicit boost sample for them) and because they are a very heterogeneous group comprising, for example, those of Irish origin (who we know from other work are very reluctant to adopt a British identity – see Manning and Roy, 2006), recent Eastern European immigrants and some Middle Eastern immigrants. Any inference about the outcomes for these groups are unreliable so we think it best to say nothing about them. Table 1 presents the proportions of the three sub-samples in our data and the weighted proportions (the weights being intended to reproduce the UK population as a whole).

Table 1 also presents some basic demographics. The white natives are older, on average than the immigrants who in turn are older than the UK-born minorities. The gender mix is similar. In terms of education both of the non-white sub-samples are more

likely to have a degree but the immigrants are also more likely to have only foreign or no qualifications (see table A.1 in appendix A for details of the education coding). The ethnic mix of the foreign- and UK-born minorities is also different – the UK-born have more Black Caribbeans and more mixed race (who are mostly a Black-white mix). Recent immigrant groups like the Bangladeshis and Black Africans are under-represented in the UK born. In terms of religion 80% of the white natives report being Christian with 17% reporting no religion and very small numbers other religions. The minority sub-samples are more likely to have some religion but are also different in their type of religion – there are as many Muslims as Christians.

Identity Variables

The CS asks a number of questions about national identity and sense of belonging. First, there is a question about national identity. Respondents can report multiple national identities. Here we restrict attention to those who report a British identity (which means at least one of British, English, Scottish or Welsh) – we denote this variable by BRITID⁵. Table 3 shows that almost all white natives report a British identity so it is not interesting to analyse answers to this question for this group. For non-white natives, the reported levels of British identity are lower but still very high at 95%, perhaps higher than many might expect. For non-white immigrants reported levels of British identity are lower – 58%. These findings are in line with those reported using Labour Force Survey data in Manning and Roy (2006). One problem with this outcome variable is that it may be interpreted in a very legalistic way so that one reports a British identity if one holds a British passport (Manning and Roy, 2006 show that, for immigrants, citizenship is very strongly though not perfectly associated with reporting a British identity). In terms of the theoretical framework sketched above, many respondents may consider the criterion for having a British national identity to be ‘I have a British passport’. For this reason we also analyse other questions asked in the CS.

⁵ It is an interesting and important question to consider how the recent devolution of political power to Scotland and Wales affects sub-national identities in the UK. But this is not our main focus of interest here so we ignore it.

First, there is a question “to what extent do you agree or disagree that you personally feel a part of British society?” - FEELBRIT. This is a 4-point scale with 0 representing ‘strongly disagree’ and 1 ‘strongly agree’. The mean response for our sub-samples are reported in Table 2. - as one can see there are similar levels of responses for all three sub-samples which might indicate that the UK has done a good job in making immigrants and their children feel a part of British society or that it has succeeded in alienating a non-trivial portion of the native white section. But, just because there are similar overall levels reported for the three sub-samples does not mean the factors associated with feeling part of society are the same and we shall see they are not.

There is also a question on ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to Britain?’, - BELONGBRIT - a 4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very strongly’. Table 2 again shows similar levels of sense of belonging among the 3 sub-samples. This is correlated with FEELBRIT but the level of correlation is low.

Finally, it is interesting to compare this with the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood and the local area with responses to the question on ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate neighbourhood?’, - BELONGNEIGH –and ‘How strongly do you feel you belong to your local area?’-BELONGLOC. Both variables are coded on a 4-point scale with 0 representing ‘not at all strongly’ and 1 ‘very strongly’. Again, all 3 sub-samples show similar levels in these variables.

All of these variables relate to the individual’s sense of their own identity. But it is equally, if not more important, to consider the perception of your identity by others. We may well think it a problem if whites do not think of non-whites as British even if the non-whites themselves do. The CS has a number of questions which help us to get at this. First there a question –DUALID -“How much do you agree or disagree that it is possible to fully belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity?”coded on a 4-point scale where 0 is “strongly disagree” and 1 is “strongly agree”. Here we do see differences between the sub-samples the non-whites are much less likely than the whites to see a potential conflict. There is a certain ambiguity in interpretation but it does not seem likely that the whites think there is a conflict between their religious and cultural identity and feeling British – rather they are almost certainly

referring to the religious and cultural identities of ‘others’. Here we can see some ground for concern – whites do not have as positive a view on this question as non-whites. There is also a question FECONF on ‘whether the respondent ever feels a conflict between religion and national identity’ – a five-point scale with 0 being never and 1 all the time. Non-whites report more personal conflict than whites.

Independent Variables

On the right-hand side of the equations we estimate we include the usual demographics (gender, age, education, and region) but we are particularly interested in variables which reflect factors that might be thought to be associated with the extent to which someone thinks of him/herself as British. . We draw up a list of these factors based on an inclusive list of what others in the literature or public debate have hypothesized to be important. The factors we consider are:

- ethnicity
- religion
- English language proficiency
- Mixing
- Discrimination
- economic situation

Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 3. In what follows we try to use the framework described earlier for why the variables we use might be expected to be correlated with identity.

Ethnicity

A central part of debates about national identity in Britain has been about whether ethnic minorities feel a part of Britain. There are a number of reasons why they might be less likely than whites to feel a part of Britain. First, it is very likely that non-whites are the children of immigrants so (following research like Algan and Cahuc, 2009; Fernandez and Fogli, 2009) may have cultural values different from the white majority i.e. high values of $|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*|$. But, it could also be that non-whites might say they do not feel British because they do not feel accepted by the white majority part of society so perceive the

group benefits B_g to be low or the white majority as intolerant of deviations from white norms – a high value of b_g .

We include variables that relate to self-described ethnicity and also variables which can be thought of measuring the intensity of ethnic identification (see Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2008) for other ways of doing this). The strength of ethnic identification could be interpreted as being about how much one is attached to the culture of one's forebears i.e. to the value of c_i . The CS contains two measures of the strength of ethnic identification – there is a question which asks ‘how important is your ethnic background to your sense of who you are’ (IMPETH) and a variable (IMPFO) which asks a similar question about the country from which the family came originally. Table 3 shows the average values of these variables for our 3 sub-samples – both of the non-white sub-samples attach more importance to ethnicity with similar level of importance of ethnicity between UK-born and immigrants but with higher importance of family origin for immigrants. However, white natives do show quite high levels of both of these variables.

Religion

Most, if not all, religions, mandate certain behaviours on the part of its adherents and encourage parents to transmit these values to their children. So, we might expect those who are religious to have relatively high values of c_i . This will then act to reduce the benefits of membership of any group with norms of behavior very different from that of the religion i.e. a high value of $|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*|$. Although all religions probably contain some element of this, it is possible that it is more relevant for some religions than others. For example, a key part of radical Islamist ideas is that the first (and perhaps only) loyalty of Muslims should be towards Muslims of any nationality – the ‘umma’. If these views are widely held we might expect to see low levels of British identity among Muslims. This is one reason to control for religion – the categories being Christian, Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Other and None. We also have some controls that measure the intensity of religious devotion – whether the religion is being actively practiced, the importance of religion to one's sense of identity, and the importance of religion for where you live, where you

work, who your friends are and what school you send your children to. We combine all of these measures into a single measure – IMPORTREL – which measures the importance of religion to the individual⁶. Table 3 shows that religion is least important to the white natives and most important for the non-white immigrants. There are significant differences in the importance of religion across religions – it is most important to Muslims (in line with the findings of Bisin et al, 2008) but there is not a clean division between them and others – Sikhs and Hindus lie between the Muslims and Christians in the importance of religion.

Language Proficiency

It is commonly argued that language proficiency is critical in enabling people to be full citizens. Policy changes in the UK in recent years have been directed towards ensuring that immigrants are sufficiently proficient to be able to hold down a job and mix with those outside their culture. In terms of the model developed above, one could argue that having a common language means people are more likely to care about the same things so that norms of behavior are more likely to be similar i.e. the value of $|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*|$ will be reduced.

The CS contains a number of variables relating to proficiency in English. We combine four such measures - whether English is the main language spoken at home, and the level of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing into a single composite measure ELANG⁷. As one would expect English proficiency is highest for white natives, followed by non-white natives and non-white immigrants. It is worth noting that very few non-white natives report any problem with English so, as one might expect, all language problems affect only the first generation. In this context it is worth noting that there has been little or no dissent in the UK from the view that all education should be in English so bilingualism is not the issue it is in some other countries (see, for example, Aspachs-Bracons et al 2008a,b, or Angrist et al, 2008)

⁶ Details of the construct of this and other composite measures can be found in Appendix A.

⁷ Unfortunately the routing of the questions does not ask about proficiency for those who speak English at home (and we assume they are proficient) even though there are, for example, well-known literacy problems among segments of the white native population.

Mixing

Fears are often expressed about how much mixing there is between cultures in Britain – it is argued that some groups mix very little outside their own ethnic group and that this hinders their participation in British society. There is a large literature on how attitudes towards ethnic and religious groups that differ from your own is affected by contact with those groups – Putnam (2007) provides an excellent discussion. Put simply, the ‘contact’ hypothesis suggests that mixing makes one more favorably inclined to other groups, but the ‘conflict’ hypothesis suggests that it simply brings conflict into the open. The ‘contact’ hypothesis could be interpreted as predicting that people will become more tolerant of the difference of others, i.e. mixing acts to lower b_g , that it makes people more similar in terms of norms i.e. it lowers $|\tilde{x}_i - x_g^*|$, or that it makes individuals more flexible i.e. it lowers c_i . On the other hand, the ‘conflict’ hypothesis might suggest that groups become less tolerant of diversity when there is competition among groups as they need to work harder to preserve their advantages.

The CS contains a number of variables related to this. First, there is a measure of the proportion of non-whites in the ward in which the respondent lives (PETHWARD) – this is only recorded as deciles across wards. This is hard data from the 2000 Census. As can be seen from Table 3, the non-white sub-samples are more likely to live in wards with many non-whites. The UK-born minorities are only marginally less segregated residentially than the immigrants.

Secondly there is a variable about perceptions of the ethnic mix in the local area (ETHAREA). This is a 4-point scale taking the value 0 if everyone is the same ethnicity as the respondent and 1 if less than half are the same ethnicity. Whites are more likely to live in an area with lots of the same ethnicity as one would expect.

These variables might be expected to reflect the opportunities for mixing but there are also some more direct questions about actual mixing. There are questions about the proportion of friends of the same ethnicity, and how often one mixes with people of a

different ethnicity in various environments⁸. The variable MIXING is a composite extracted from ten variables (see table A.7 in appendix A for details). Table 3 shows that white natives are least likely to have friends of a different ethnicity (perhaps not surprising given the proportions in the population) but that there is more mixing for non-white natives than non-white immigrants. In interpreting results using this variable it is important whether one thinks of the mixing as unavoidable or a choice. The mixing questions ask about some domains e.g. shops where mixing is probably unavoidable if you live in an ethnically diverse community, but other domains e.g. the home where one has total control. Mixing across different domains is strongly correlated so we prefer to think as this being a variable affected primarily by the nature of the local community rather than a choice variable of the individual.

Discrimination

We have emphasized that whether one feels part of a group is likely to be affected by how one thinks one is treated by that group. If one thinks one is treated badly or unfairly then it is plausible to believe one is less likely to feel part of the group or choose that identity in terms of the model sketched earlier one might think that the group offers low benefits to this individual, a low B_g , or that is intolerant of this individual's differences from the group norms – a high b_g . Hence, perceptions and experience of discrimination might be expected to be important and the CS contains a number of questions on this topic.

We include three composite variables. The first, GOVDISCRIM, is a composite variable derived from the responses to questions on whether the respondent thinks one is treated worse, better or the same as people of other races by 15 public-sector organizations from doctors, local councils through to the criminal justice system. Table 3 shows that non-whites are more likely than whites to think they will be treated worse but it is non-white natives who perceive this most. But, it is also worth noting that white natives also

⁸ There are also more specific questions about the ethnicity of close friends but large numbers of missing values limit the usefulness of these questions.

show a level of perceived discrimination not massively lower than non-white immigrants⁹.

The variable discussed above is about discrimination experienced or perceived by public-sector bodies. But it is also quite likely that how one is treated by other people in everyday interactions is important in influencing values. To capture this we use a variable, RESPECT, which is a composite variable constructed from responses to questions about whether one feels treated with respect in 4 settings. Table 3 shows generally high levels of respect but slightly lower among immigrants than both native sub-samples.

The two variables related to discrimination discussed so far have both been about how any discrimination affects one's personal experiences. But it may also be the case that perceptions of general discrimination (even if not directed towards oneself) are also associated with particular identities. For example, if one believes that members of a group discriminate against some others whose welfare one cares about, that might make one less likely to identify with that group. So we construct a variable, GENDISCRIM, from responses to questions about the general level of discrimination in British society. The responses to these questions are, unsurprisingly, correlated with the personal experiences but not perfectly. This can be seen from Table 3 where whites report similar levels of general discrimination to non-white natives – perhaps interestingly it is the non-white immigrants who report the lowest levels of discrimination in British society.

Economic Situation

It is sometimes argued that economic disadvantage (whether from discrimination or other causes) is a powerful source of disillusion. In terms of the framework sketched above, suppose that economic success is a norm valued by a group and that group benefits are less for those who are not economically successful. The poorer will receive lower levels of benefit from membership in this group so are less likely to identify with it.

⁹ It is perhaps worth noting that there are differences across ethnic groups in the organizations perceived to treat them worse – blacks are especially likely to single out the police and criminal justice system, whites the housing authorities and local councils. Asians report discrimination fairly evenly spread across organizations.

We include a variable, INCOME, which is a composite measure of the economic situation of the respondent and includes among other variables an index of deprivation of the area one lives¹⁰ (see table A.6 in appendix A). Table 3 shows that, as expected, whites have higher levels of economic well-being than non-whites¹¹. Non-whites are more likely to live in deprived neighbourhoods.

Pro-Sociality

In the framework we have sketched, identity is likely to be affected by the behavior of others with whom one comes into contact as how one is treated by them affects perceived group benefits. Accordingly we construct a variable, NEIGHPROSOC, to capture measures of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood using questions on vandalism, safety and neighbourhood cohesion. Table 3 shows the lowest levels for non-white natives. For completeness we also investigate the association of identity with own of pro-social behavior - we construct a measure, PROSOCIAL, derived from questions on volunteering, civic activity and charitable donations. Table 3 shows similar levels of pro-sociality for the two native sub-samples and a somewhat lower level for immigrants.

3. Results

We now turn to our analysis of the associations between the variables described above and the variables we treat as outcomes. We reiterate once more that these are correlations not causation and will try to be careful in interpreting the associations we find. One other general point of warning – it is tempting when looking over the results to be drawn to those coefficients that are significantly different from zero. But statistical significance is also influenced by sample size and, for a given sample, (loosely) by the variance of the variable. So more variables will tend to be significant in the white native sample than the non-white samples because the sample size is larger. And the ‘Muslim’ dummy will tend to be more significant than the ‘Sikh’ dummy because the proportion of Muslims is higher than that of Sikhs. So, one needs to look at the size of coefficients as

¹⁰ See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/> for details of how this is computed.

¹¹ See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/> for details of how this is computed

well as their significance. There are a large number of variables in a large number of regressions in what follows – we try to structure our discussion of the results in the following way. We discuss which variables seem to have similar effects for our three sub-samples and then which have different effects. We then offer an interpretation in terms of the framework we set out previously.

In the final row of each regression we also report an estimate of the dependent variable using a reference individual that is the same for all three sub-samples except for ethnicity which must differ for the whites and non-whites. For the non-whites our reference person is an Indian though ethnicity effects turn out to often be rather small so our results are not very sensitive to that choice.

Let us now consider the association of these questions with the independent variables discussed earlier. Results for BRITID are reported in table 4, for FEELBRIT and BELONGBRIT in table 5, for BELONGNEIGH and BELONGLOC in Table 6, and DUALID and FECONF in Table 7. For BRITID – having a British national identity – we do not report results for white natives as 99% of them report a British national identity. For foreign born non-whites the marginal effects from a probit equation are reported in the first column of Table 4 – for UK-born non-whites the marginal effects are reported in the second column.

For the foreign-born non-whites, the variables that are significantly associated with reporting a British national identity are the following: First, recent immigrants are less likely to report a British national identity, as are those whose English proficiency is weak. There is some variation across ethnic groups with Black Africans, Chinese, other and mixed ethnicities being significantly less likely to report a British national identity than the omitted category of Indians – Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are more likely to report a British national identity though the difference is not significant. Stronger identity with the country of origin is associated with being less likely to report a British national identity. Religion is not very important, a finding in line with Manning and Roy (2006) – if anything, Muslims are more likely to report a British national identity. Immigrants perceiving that they live in areas with higher proportion of other ethnicities are less likely to report a British national identity. Quite a lot of variables have estimated marginal effects that are not significantly different from zero.

The marginal effects for British-born non-whites are reported in the second column. These effects are all a lot smaller in magnitude than those for the foreign-born because of the differences in the mean of the dependent variable – 58% of the foreign-born report a British national identity compared to 95% of the British-born. For UK-born minorities, those with a strong ethnic identity are less likely to report a British national identity but those who live in areas with higher proportion of ethnic minorities are more likely to. The ethnicity effects are different from those seen in the immigrants but none of them are significantly different from zero.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these findings is that religion in general and being Muslim in particular is not significant. There is widespread concern that radical Islam is pushing the idea that Muslims should feel a common identity with fellow Muslims elsewhere in the world – the ‘umma’ - and not with non-Muslims in their own country¹². In fact 4 out of 1783 Muslim respondents did take advantage of the open-ended nature of the national identity question to list their identity as ‘Muslim’. These views do exist, and the people who hold them probably have the potential to cause problems out of proportion to their numbers, but are rare - most people think of religion and national identity as separate categories.

Another set of variables that are perhaps not as significant as one might have expected relate to the proportion of non-whites in the ward, the perception of ethnic diversity and the extent of personal mixing. There are some significant correlations here – but the pattern is mixed so it is hard to draw any very definite conclusions.

The dependent variable of Table 4 – whether one reports a British national identity – has the potential problem that it might be interpreted by many respondents in a very legalistic way – e.g. Manning and Roy (2006) showed that being a UK citizen (a variable not in our data set here) was very strongly correlated with national identity. Table 5 turns attention to two other variables that are unlikely to produce a legalistic response – FEELBRIT and BELONGBRIT. These two questions are similar in many respects and the pattern of responses are also similar so we will discuss them jointly,

¹² For example, one of the July 7 London bombers (British-born but whose parents were from Pakistan) appeared in a video and said “your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters”, with the use of the words ‘your’ and ‘my’ clearly expressing the people with whom he identified.

pointing out any important differences. We first describe the main results and then offer an interpretation.

First, there are some factors that have strong associations with the sense of belonging for all three of our sub-samples. Perhaps the most striking is that those who feel treated with respect, that they are not discriminated against and that British society is not discriminatory are much more likely to report that they feel they belong. This simply suggests that people are more likely to feel alienated if they feel they are treated badly. There is also some suggestion that individuals who are more pro-social or live in pro-social neighbourhoods and (less strongly) who mix more are more likely to feel they belong though these effects are not always significant or even have the same sign for all sub-samples. The old in all three sub-samples are more likely to feel they belong.

Turning to differences across sub-samples, whites with a strong ethnic identity are much more likely to feel they belong. There is some evidence that those in areas with more non-whites are less likely to feel they belong. Turning to the non-white sub-samples, the Black, Chinese and other ethnic groups are less likely to report a sense of belonging than the South Asian, though the coefficients are only significant for BELONGBRIT. A stronger sense of ethnic identity raises the sense of belonging for the immigrants but reduces it for the British-born. Both non-white sub-samples are less likely to report a sense of belonging if they live in wards with many other non-whites though these coefficients are often not significantly different from zero. Religion appears to be unimportant. More recent immigrants are much less likely to report that they feel they belong.

Table 6 turns to consider the factors associated with feeling that one belongs to the neighbourhood and local area. The responses to these questions are similar so we discuss them jointly. Some of the factors that are strongly associated with a sense of belonging to Britain also are strongly associated with a sense of belonging to the neighbourhood or area – this is particularly true of the impact of the discrimination and respect variables. The extent of own pro-sociality and the degree of pro-sociality in the neighbourhood is very strongly associated with feeling that one belongs to the neighbourhood. Pro-social individuals are much more likely to feel they belong though the causality may well be that they contribute to the community because they feel they

belong. Those with a strong sense of ethnic identity are more likely to feel they belong. But the effect of some variables is different – for example, the more educated white natives are less likely to feel they belong to the local area, although they are more likely to feel they belong to Britain. This is perhaps because they have wider horizons.

In terms of differences between sub-samples, whites in high minority areas are significantly less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are the educated and the irreligious. Women and the rich are significantly more likely to report a feeling that they belong. For the non-white sub-samples, the Chinese and, to a less extent, the Black groups, are less likely to report that they feel they belong, as are those who live in areas with fewer of their ethnic group. Religion and religiosity are, once again, unimportant.

A number of general conclusions emerge from this. First, that you have to treat people well if you want them to feel they belong and identify with a group, whether that group is a nation or a neighbourhood. This is by far the strongest effect. Secondly, having a minority ethnicity and religion is not strongly associated with a reduced sense of belonging. Thirdly, living in an area with people like you does seem to have an effect, albeit quite weak, on whether one feels one belongs. And one striking feature is that the fitted values for representative individuals are quite similar for all sub-samples suggesting that the degree of belonging and British identity is very similar for whites and non-whites, foreign- and British-born.

But, as discussed earlier in the paper, the differences in the outcomes we have considered so far are a product both of individual preferences that influence whether people do not want to belong and the behavior of others which influences whether people can belong or how they are treated if they do. It is hard to disentangle which results come from which of these two routes. To try to get some idea of which of these aspects are important we turn to an analysis of some questions that relate to perceptions about whether national and religious/cultural identities are in conflict. The results for these variables are reported in Table 7.

The first variable, DUALID, is the response to the question of whether one thinks one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity. The question is phrased in a somewhat unfortunate way as it seems to imply that there is a clear 'British' cultural and religious identity but we suspect the respondents understand

what is intended by the question – whether non-whites and non-Christians can be a part of Britain. A striking fact is that the average value of the response for the representative individual is only slightly lower for whites than non-whites in spite of the fact that the raw differences in means reported in Table 2 are quite different. The reason is that the old white British are more likely to perceive a conflict than the young and the native white sample is older than the other samples.

In all three sub-samples those who feel they are treated with respect are significantly more likely to believe that diversity is possible. For both UK-born groups, perception of discrimination is associated with being less likely to believe that diversity is possible. Non-Christians and those non-whites with a strong sense of ethnic identity all believe it is possible. Whites who mix more and live in more diverse neighbourhoods are more likely to think it is possible. It is generally true that all ethnic and religious minorities think it is possible to belong to Britain and to preserve their heritage.

The last three columns of Table 7 analyzes the responses to a question about whether the respondent generally has ever felt any conflict between national identity and religion. Again, the fitted values for the reference individuals are similar for all three sub-samples. Those who feel they are treated with respect are less likely to perceive such a conflict, as are those who live in pro-social neighbourhoods. Non-Christians and the more religious are more likely to perceive a conflict. Non-whites living in areas with more people like them are more likely to perceive a conflict. Women and the old are less likely to perceive a conflict.

Summary

We think that the most striking result from these regressions is that people who feel they are treated fairly and with respect are more likely to feel that they belong. Minorities, whether ethnic or religious, do not perceive any inevitable conflict between feeling British and maintaining their cultural heritage. This is true of all religions – in particular, Muslims do not stand out in any way in this regard. There is some evidence that people are more likely to feel they belong when surrounded by people like them but the effect is not very large. It should be said that the effect of these variables on sense of

belonging is stronger than on national identity per se – perhaps not surprising if national identity has a strong legal component to it.

4. Relationship to Policy Debates

What do our results suggest about the very active debate about identity in contemporary Britain? It might be useful to give a brief background on British policy towards the assimilation and/or integration of immigrants. After the second world war, large-scale immigration into the UK started in the 1950s and by the 1960s there was an active discussion about the appropriate policy response. What emerged as the dominant idea is well-summarized by the following quotation from the Home Secretary Roy Jenkins in 1966: “I do not regard [integration] as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishman... I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance”. This led to the early (by European standards) legislation against discrimination (the first law being the 1965 Race relations Act) and a generally sympathetic attitude to allowing cultural and religious exemptions to laws and practices e.g. allowing Sikh motorcyclists to wear turbans instead of helmets and Muslim policewomen to wear the hijab on duty. There was a belief that if natives were hospitable to immigrants, the minorities would, in return, come to feel part of the wider community – just one big happy family. The reality was often far from this rosy picture – there were riots in many British cities in the early 1980s and various organizations, notably the police, have been widely criticized for institutional racism. But more recently there has been a feeling that this strategy of multiculturalism has failed to create a common core of values, primarily because it offered minorities more than it asked from them in return and that some communities chose not to integrate into the wider society. Events like the London bombings of 2005 have shocked people into thinking something has gone badly wrong. For example, the chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (the government body charged with fighting discrimination) argued in a TV interview that multiculturalism was leading to

segregation, saying that “too many public authorities particularly [are] taking diversity to a point where they [are] saying, ‘actually we’re going to reward you for being different, we are going to give you a community centre only if you are Pakistani or African Caribbean and so on, but we’re not going to encourage you to be part of the community of our town’. The reaction has included not just a wringing of hands but also substantive changes to policy – immigrants becoming citizens now have to pass a test on language, culture and history designed to mould their values into those deemed appropriate.

Our results suggest that Britain has been relatively successful in creating a common sense of identity among minorities and that the emphasis of policy on acting against discrimination and not worrying about segregation or religious and ethnic diversity is probably the right approach for making minorities feel they belong. Attempts to force minority groups to become more like the white natives are likely to create a perception of unfairness and discrimination and hence be counter-productive. But it is worth reflecting that we do have some evidence that one outcome of this strategy is that a non-trivial fraction of the white population feel they are treated badly and discriminated against and that this acts to reduce their sense of belonging. So, the problem may be that the sense of belonging among white natives is lower than one might have expected.

We should also mention here one other issue that has been important. We have documented the sense of belonging and identity but have said nothing about what, if anything, is required of the individual for them to say they belong i.e. what behaviours and attitudes are needed to be able to say you identify with Britain. There are those who believe that because Britain has asked too little from immigrants it has made it too easy for them to feel that they belong. This relates to a more academic debates about what should be contained in ‘nation-building’ programmes, designed to create a common sense of national identity. For some a ‘thin’ conception based on a common language and acceptance of political institutions are enough, for others something deeper is needed. For example, Barry (2001, p83) states that “the problem is that the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities” and that “British seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British citizenship rather than one with significant

affective cognitive or behavioural connotations”. In terms of the conceptual framework sketched in this paper, this can be thought of as an argument that Britain has become too tolerant, that b_g has become so low, that ‘British’ identity has no consequences for behavior. Note that in (2), $b_g = 0$ will imply that group membership is attractive but that it has no consequences for behavior, which is set at the individual optimum.

The variables we have analyzed in this paper cannot be used to address these issues but a companion paper (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009) investigates values more directly. That paper concludes that there is no evidence that large proportions of minorities have attitudes inconsistent with liberal democracy.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have sought to explore the correlations between various measures of identity and variables that measure experiences, interactions, and integration that commentators have argued to be important determinants of identity. Here we try to draw some general conclusions.

First, we tend to find that people who feel well treated are more likely to feel they belong or identify with Britain. There do not appear to be any inevitable irresolvable conflicts between religions and cultures. We interpret these findings as lending support to the traditional British multicultural project of making immigrants and their cultures feel welcome and respected and fighting discrimination, without worrying too much about where minorities choose to live or how much they mix with white natives. The fears that the separation between communities that results might be creating alienation among minorities do not appear well-founded.

But that conclusion is probably too complacent. While the British multicultural project may be the right way to make minorities feel a part of the wider society, it pays little or no attention to white natives. And our findings indicate that there is a problem with segments of the white population who have come to feel that they are neglected and discriminated against. That segment is not very well-educated, and living in neighbourhoods with high proportions of ethnic minorities. It is not too much of a leap of the imagination to guess that this is the group from which the far-right British National Party (BNP) draws its support. For example the Guardian newspaper on November 20

2008 contained a quote from an ex-prominent conservative who is now a member of the BNP that “The way the country is at the moment, there is no major party, whether it be Conservative, Labour or Liberal Democrat, looking after the indigenous population.”

Are the fears of this segment of the population justified or not? The same newspaper that day quoted “a worried Labour MP, whose constituency is about 98% white and appears to have the most BNP members, told the Guardian it was sometimes difficult to address concerns of communities ‘stirred up by malicious and false information’. We do have some results that suggest some degree of inaccuracy – this group of the population think there is more conflict between cultural and religious identity and belonging to Britain, than do the minorities themselves¹³. But there is perhaps some degree of neglect in the sense that it is hard to describe a policy towards these views except condemnation even when that reinforces the sense of neglect among this group.

So, it may be that the biggest danger with multiculturalism is not that it fails to create a sense of belonging among minorities but that it has paid too little attention to how to sustain support among the white population.

¹³ Another example would be the 2009 Gallup Co-exist Index <http://www.muslimwestfacts.com/mwf/File/118267/Gallup-Coexist-Index-2009.aspx> which found that only 42% of the non-Muslim British public who had a view thought Muslims were loyal to Britain compared to 93% of British Muslims.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Demographics

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	47.65	41	30.3
Female	0.52	0.47	0.51
Married/cohabiting	0.65	0.64	0.38
Education	3.03	3.13	3.56
<i>Ethnicity</i>			
White	1	0	0
Mixed	0	0.04	0.15
Indian	0	0.26	0.24
Pakistani	0	0.13	0.2
Bangladeshi	0	0.068	0.047
Black Caribbean	0	0.08	0.18
Black African	0	0.17	0.06
Chinese	0	0.04	0.03
Other ethnicity	0	0.18	0.08
<i>Religion</i>			
Christian	0.8	0.32	0.36
Buddhist	0.002	0.03	0.006
Hindu	0.0003	0.17	0.1
Jewish	0.004	0.001	0.0005
Muslim	0.001	0.34	0.31
Sikh	0	0.05	0.08
Other religion	0.02	0.02	0.03
No religion	0.17	0.05	0.1
Sample size (unweighted)	7842	3935	1596
Unweighted proportion	0.58	0.29	0.12
Weighted proportion	0.91	0.058	0.026

Notes: Descriptive statistics are computed using individual sampling weights.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Identity Variables

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
<i>Dependent variables</i>			
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity	0.99	0.58	0.95
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of British Society	0.81	0.78	0.78
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging to Britain	0.76	0.75	0.72
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of belonging to immediate neighborhood	0.68	0.68	0.68
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging to local area	0.64	0.64	0.65
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity	0.57	0.72	0.7
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict between national identity and religion	0.14	0.19	0.27

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A for a detailed variable coding. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined also in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10).

Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables

Variable	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are	0.63	0.8	0.8
IMPFO: Importance of family's origin to your sense of who you are	0.68	0.78	0.7
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion	0.24	0.47	0.4
ELANG: English Proficiency	1.99	1.44	1.9
PETHWARD: Decile of the proportion of non-whites in the ward	5	9	8.8
ETHAREA: Perception of the proportion of people of the same ethnicity in the local area	0.32	0.81	0.78
MIXING: Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups	0.34	0.57	0.64
GOVDISCRIM: Discrimination by government organizations	1.96	2.07	2.16
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect	0.8	0.81	0.8
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society	1.83	1.7	1.85
INCOME: Economic situation	2.43	1.88	1.91
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality	2.34	2.3	2.15
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality	0.11	0.08	0.1

Notes: Descriptive statistics are weighted averages computed using individual sampling weights. Higher values are associated with (stronger) support of relevant statements/questions, see appendix A for a detailed variable coding. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscrim, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined also in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10).

Table 4: Results for British Identity

	(1)	(2)
Dependent variable	Belonging to Britain	
<i>Independent variables</i>	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.0290** (0.00923)	-0.00517 (0.00457)
Female	-0.00168 (0.0203)	0.00443 (0.00835)
Mixed ethnicity	-0.178*** (0.0531)	0.00847 (0.0200)
Pakistani	0.0591 (0.0418)	0.0137 (0.0130)
Bangladeshi	0.0774 (0.0505)	0.00400 (0.0201)
Black Caribbean	0.0798 (0.0462)	0.0144 (0.0200)
Black African	-0.105* (0.0417)	-0.0234 (0.0409)
Chinese	-0.164* (0.0665)	-0.0773 (0.0884)
Other ethnicity	-0.144*** (0.0366)	-0.0125 (0.0306)
IMPETH	-0.0267 (0.0444)	-0.0402* (0.0204)
IMPFO	-0.137** (0.0433)	-0.0172 (0.0170)
non-Christian		
Hindu	0.0661 (0.0376)	-0.0304 (0.0442)
Muslim	0.104*** (0.0316)	-0.0339 (0.0311)
Sikh	-0.0309 (0.0560)	-0.0207 (0.0409)
Other religion	-0.0148 (0.0510)	-0.0438 (0.0483)
No religion	-0.0320 (0.0549)	-0.0555 (0.0316)
IMPORTREL	0.0654 (0.0439)	-0.0425* (0.0185)
ELANG	0.106*** (0.0190)	
PETHWARD	-0.00398 (0.00926)	0.00655* (0.00293)
ETHAREA	-0.0309* (0.0128)	-0.00870 (0.00465)
MIXING	-0.0157	0.0186

	(0.0515)	(0.0224)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.0308 (0.0488)	-0.0193 (0.0185)
RESPECT	0.0467 (0.0736)	-0.00785 (0.0311)
GENDISCRIM	0.0256 (0.0243)	0.0109 (0.00957)
Education	-0.00455 (0.00494)	0.00350 (0.00233)
INCOME	0.0412* (0.0168)	0.00696 (0.00710)
NEIGHPROSOC	-0.0131 (0.0200)	0.00228 (0.00846)
PROSOCIAL	-0.0255 (0.146)	-0.0148 (0.0647)
came to UK in the last 5 years	-0.534*** (0.0218)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago	-0.295*** (0.0324)	
R-squared	0.266	0.098
Observations	3170	1365
	0.75	0.96
Fitted value for reference individual	(0.03)	(0.03)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

Table 5: Results for Sense of Belonging to Britain

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Feeling part of Britain			Belonging to Britain		
<i>Independent variables</i>	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.005** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.004 (0.006)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.013 (0.007)
Female	0.007 (0.006)	-0.018** (0.008)	0.007 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.008)	0.027** (0.013)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.035 (0.023)	0.001 (0.025)		-0.076*** (0.024)	-0.043 (0.032)
Pakistani		0.003 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.023)		-0.023 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.029)
Bangladeshi		0.019 (0.021)	-0.004 (0.035)		0.015 (0.022)	-0.056 (0.042)
Black Caribbean		-0.036 (0.020)	-0.036 (0.025)		-0.066*** (0.021)	-0.087*** (0.032)
Black African		-0.011 (0.017)	-0.034 (0.031)		-0.027 (0.018)	-0.090** (0.041)
Chinese		-0.069** (0.031)	-0.039 (0.043)		-0.136*** (0.032)	-0.080 (0.047)
Other ethnicity		-0.013 (0.014)	-0.035 (0.028)		-0.039** (0.015)	-0.131*** (0.036)
IMPETH	0.052*** (0.011)	0.014 (0.018)	-0.050** (0.024)	0.095*** (0.012)	0.031 (0.019)	-0.045 (0.028)
IMPFO		0.028 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.021)		-0.024 (0.017)	0.014 (0.024)
non-Christian	-0.037 (0.020)			-0.039 (0.022)		
Hindu		0.010 (0.016)	-0.018 (0.027)		-0.012 (0.017)	-0.045 (0.033)
Muslim		0.0001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.024)		0.008 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.031)
Sikh		-0.016 (0.022)	-0.014 (0.027)		-0.016 (0.022)	-0.010 (0.034)
Other religion		-0.040 (0.022)	-0.078** (0.034)		-0.043** (0.021)	0.016 (0.034)
No religion	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.023** (0.010)	-0.069*** (0.026)	-0.021 (0.025)
IMPORTREL	0.006 (0.015)	-0.031 (0.019)	-0.016 (0.025)	0.025 (0.016)	-0.039** (0.019)	-0.010 (0.029)
ELANG		0.033*** (0.008)			0.037*** (0.008)	
PETHWARD	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.012** (0.005)
ETHAREA	0.004	-0.003	0.014**	0.001	-0.009	0.016**

	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)
MIXING	0.022	0.021	0.060**	-0.012	0.028	0.074
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.038)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.121***	-0.094***	-0.176***	-0.132***	-0.158***	-0.244***
	(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.030)
RESPECT	0.241***	0.178***	0.208***	0.274***	0.131***	0.235***
	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.052)
GENDISCRIM	-0.071***	-0.075***	-0.068***	-0.079***	-0.077***	-0.073***
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.017)
Education	0.005***	-0.001	0.004	0.007***	-0.008***	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
INCOME	0.002	-0.006	-0.010	-0.009	-0.009	-0.024**
	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.010)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.008	-0.002	0.018	0.019**	-0.006	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.014)
PROSOCIAL	0.121***	0.150**	0.074	0.016	0.059	-0.055
	(0.037)	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.044)	(0.067)	(0.086)
came to UK in the last 5 years		-0.094***			-0.109***	
		(0.012)			(0.013)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago		-0.045***			-0.063***	
		(0.015)			(0.016)	
R-squared	0.089	0.129	0.150	0.103	0.170	0.172
Observations	5666	3124	1478	5681	3152	1474
Fitted value for reference individual	0.84	0.82	0.86	0.75	0.82	0.88
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to "Christian" and ethnicity for non-whites being "Indian".

Table 6: Results for Sense of Belonging to Neighborhood and Local Area

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Belonging to neighborhood			Belonging to local area		
<i>Independent variables</i>	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	0.021*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)	-0.002 (0.008)
Female	0.023*** (0.007)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.040*** (0.015)	0.019*** (0.007)	-0.008 (0.010)	-0.021 (0.015)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.040 (0.027)	0.007 (0.037)		-0.039 (0.027)	-0.003 (0.037)
Pakistani		0.014 (0.020)	0.045 (0.031)		0.014 (0.019)	0.022 (0.032)
Bangladeshi		0.027 (0.023)	0.015 (0.049)		0.010 (0.024)	0.053 (0.047)
Black Caribbean		-0.024 (0.025)	0.008 (0.037)		-0.023 (0.024)	-0.048 (0.037)
Black African		-0.037 (0.021)	-0.035 (0.048)		-0.042** (0.021)	-0.049 (0.048)
Chinese		-0.099*** (0.034)	-0.149*** (0.055)		-0.102*** (0.033)	-0.099 (0.053)
Other ethnicity		-0.033 (0.018)	0.009 (0.041)		-0.033 (0.017)	0.003 (0.038)
IMPETH	0.056*** (0.013)	0.043 (0.022)	0.024 (0.033)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.031 (0.021)	0.013 (0.033)
IMPFO		0.041 (0.022)	0.047 (0.028)		0.039 (0.020)	0.038 (0.028)
non-Christian	-0.031 (0.023)			-0.004 (0.023)		
Hindu		0.001 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.042)		-0.006 (0.020)	-0.096** (0.041)
Muslim		-0.005 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.034)		0.016 (0.017)	-0.052 (0.033)
Sikh		-0.028 (0.026)	-0.038 (0.042)		-0.004 (0.026)	-0.091** (0.042)
Other religion		0.003 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.040)		0.057** (0.023)	0.025 (0.034)
No religion	-0.036*** (0.011)	-0.034 (0.029)	-0.063** (0.030)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.015 (0.028)	-0.079*** (0.028)
IMPORTREL	0.031 (0.018)	0.037 (0.023)	0.003 (0.033)	0.044** (0.018)	0.027 (0.022)	0.008 (0.033)
ELANG		-0.001 (0.009)			0.013 (0.009)	
PETHWARD	-0.005*** (0.002)	-0.010** (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.007*** (0.002)	-0.008 (0.004)	0.006 (0.006)
ETHAREA	-0.0001 (0.006)	-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.017 (0.009)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.006)	-0.021** (0.009)

MIXING	0.017 (0.019)	0.049 (0.025)	-0.034 (0.042)	0.023 (0.019)	0.049 (0.025)	0.047 (0.041)
GOVDISCRIM	0.004 (0.017)	-0.056** (0.026)	0.001 (0.032)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.041 (0.026)	0.013 (0.032)
RESPECT	0.234*** (0.029)	0.172*** (0.038)	0.263*** (0.058)	0.237*** (0.029)	0.210*** (0.036)	0.283*** (0.056)
GENDISCRIM	-0.089*** (0.011)	-0.113*** (0.013)	-0.121*** (0.021)	-0.108*** (0.011)	-0.101*** (0.012)	-0.139*** (0.020)
Education	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.002)	-0.008*** (0.002)	-0.003 (0.004)
INCOME	0.012** (0.005)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.012)	0.009 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.008)	-0.022 (0.012)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.044*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.010)	0.025 (0.016)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.022** (0.010)	0.019 (0.017)
PROSOCIAL	0.355*** (0.048)	0.274*** (0.074)	0.271*** (0.089)	0.271*** (0.049)	0.245*** (0.071)	0.058 (0.098)
came to UK in the last 5 years		-0.109*** (0.014)			-0.072*** (0.014)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago		-0.059*** (0.019)			-0.064*** (0.019)	
R-squared	0.115	0.144	0.110	0.096	0.126	0.117
Observations	5682	3155	1476	5684	3158	1480
Fitted value for reference individual	0.7 (0.01)	0.72 (0.02)	0.65 (0.04)	0.64 (0.01)	0.68 (0.02)	0.66 (0.04)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.

Table 7: Results for Views about conflict between National and Religious/Cultural Identity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dependent variable	Belonging to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity			Conflict between national identity and religion		
<i>Independent variables</i>	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born	White British	Non-white Immigrants	Non-white British-born
Age	-0.012*** (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)	0.010 (0.008)	-0.019*** (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.017 (0.010)
Female	0.007 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.010)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.034*** (0.010)	-0.029** (0.011)	-0.025 (0.018)
Mixed ethnicity		-0.021 (0.029)	0.009 (0.036)		0.033 (0.035)	0.029 (0.046)
Pakistani		0.017 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.031)		-0.006 (0.024)	0.007 (0.036)
Bangladeshi		-0.042 (0.028)	0.019 (0.044)		-0.065** (0.029)	-0.009 (0.054)
Black Caribbean		-0.018 (0.026)	0.035 (0.037)		0.025 (0.028)	0.029 (0.049)
Black African		0.019 (0.022)	0.061 (0.043)		0.001 (0.024)	-0.008 (0.055)
Chinese		0.060 (0.032)	0.016 (0.057)		0.007 (0.042)	0.120 (0.086)
Other ethnicity		-0.010 (0.019)	0.008 (0.039)		0.032 (0.021)	-0.021 (0.049)
IMPETH	-0.023 (0.014)	0.074*** (0.024)	0.052 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.030)	0.075 (0.048)
IMPFO		0.015 (0.021)	0.012 (0.027)		0.028 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.040)
non-Christian	0.066*** (0.022)			0.031 (0.028)		
Hindu		0.087*** (0.021)	0.078** (0.040)		0.048** (0.023)	0.064 (0.049)
Muslim		0.088*** (0.017)	0.111*** (0.032)		0.099*** (0.020)	0.091** (0.041)
Sikh		0.060** (0.029)	0.096** (0.040)		0.109*** (0.031)	0.045 (0.048)
Other religion		0.033 (0.024)	0.056 (0.041)		0.085*** (0.032)	0.054 (0.051)
No religion	0.018 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.028)	0.031 (0.027)	0.024 (0.029)	0.156** (0.076)	-0.030 (0.063)
IMPORTREL	0.024 (0.020)	0.003 (0.023)	0.024 (0.032)	0.152*** (0.024)	0.124*** (0.028)	0.142*** (0.043)
ELANG		-0.001 (0.009)			-0.003 (0.011)	
PETHWARD	0.003 (0.002)	0.004 (0.005)	0.006 (0.006)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.012 (0.008)
ETHAREA	0.008 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	0.015 (0.009)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.024*** (0.008)	-0.033*** (0.011)

MIXING	0.103*** (0.019)	-0.006 (0.025)	0.062 (0.040)	0.047 (0.025)	0.019 (0.030)	0.110** (0.051)
GOVDISCRIM	-0.144*** (0.018)	0.022 (0.027)	-0.077** (0.032)	0.002 (0.024)	0.022 (0.033)	0.117*** (0.042)
RESPECT	0.139*** (0.030)	0.118*** (0.038)	0.097 (0.053)	-0.200*** (0.040)	-0.149*** (0.044)	-0.165** (0.072)
GENDISCRIM	-0.081*** (0.011)	0.011 (0.013)	-0.054*** (0.019)	0.009 (0.015)	0.025 (0.014)	0.040 (0.024)
Education	0.009*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.013*** (0.002)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009 (0.005)
INCOME	-0.010 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.001 (0.007)	0.007 (0.010)	-0.0001 (0.014)
NEIGHPROSOC	0.0001 (0.009)	0.001 (0.010)	-0.001 (0.015)	-0.041*** (0.012)	-0.042*** (0.012)	-0.048** (0.019)
PROSOCIAL	-0.001 (0.050)	0.147** (0.071)	0.102 (0.084)	0.025 (0.063)	0.078 (0.084)	0.096 (0.113)
came to UK in the last 5 years		0.005 (0.013)			-0.038** (0.016)	
came to UK 6/7 years ago		0.004 (0.019)			0.0001 (0.021)	
R-squared	0.076	0.043	0.058	0.092	0.087	0.134
Observations	5463	3033	1444	2174	2392	948
Fitted value for reference individual	0.59 (0.01)	0.63 (0.02)	0.63 (0.04)	0.12 (0.02)	0.09 (0.02)	0.11 (0.05)

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. The sample size is relatively smaller for specifications (4), (5) and (6) because the relevant question was asked only to those who responded to preceding questions that both national identity and religion are important for them. Importrel, elang, mixing, govdiscrim, respect, gendiscr, income, neighprosoc, prosocial are summated scales defined in appendix A (see tables A.2-A.10). Fitted values for the reference individual were computed using the same values for all independent variables across the three subsamples (sample mean values were used for continuous variables and the category value closer to the sample mean value for categorical variables) with religion set to “Christian” and ethnicity for non-whites being “Indian”.

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APPENDIX A: Details of Construction of Composite Variables

Table A1: Variable definitions

Variables	Scale	Coding
BELONGBRIT: Strength of feeling of belonging to Britain	4-point	1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly
BELONGLOC: Strength of feeling of belonging to local area	4-point	1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly
BELONGNEIGH: Strength of feeling of belonging to immediate neighborhood	4-point	1: very strongly, 0: not at all strongly
BRITID: Whether reports British national identity	Binary	1: yes, 0: no
DUALID: Extent to which agrees that one can belong to Britain and maintain a separate cultural and religious identity	4-point	1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree
EDUCATION	4-point	6: degree or equivalent, 0: no qualification
ETHAREA: Perception of the proportion of people of different ethnicity in the local area	4-point	1: less than half, 0: all the same
FECONF: Extent to which feels a conflict between national identity and religion	5-point	1: all of the time, 0: never
FEELBRIT: Extent to which feels a part of British Society	4-point	1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree
IMPETH: Importance of ethnic background to your sense of who you are	4-point	1: very important, 0: not important at all
IMPFO: Importance of family's origin to your sense of who you are	4-point	1: very important, 0: not important at all
PETHWARD: Proportion of non-whites in the ward	10-point	10: highest density, 1: lowest density

Summated Scales

The following tables include detailed information about the construction of summated scales used as independent variables in our regressions. Each summated scale is computed as the average of the underlying single indicators (items) used to construct it. In particular, we reversed the coding of items where appropriate so that higher values of all items are associated with higher values of the scale (in this way the scale takes only positive values). Higher values of scales are associated with more or stronger support with the relevant statement (construct) the scale represents, e.g. higher values for the scale ELANG ("English Proficiency") imply better command of English, higher values of GENDISCR imply more discrimination in society, higher values of GOVDISCRIM are associated with more discrimination by government institutions and so forth.

Table A.2: Summated Scale for Proficiency in English, Items Information and Cronbach's Alpha

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
ELANG: English Proficiency	ENGHOME: Whether English is the main language spoken at home	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	1	0.5	0.87	0.81
	Reading: English Reading level	5-point; 1: very good, 0: cannot read English	1	0.9	1	
	SPEAKING: English speaking level	4-point; 1: very good, 0: poor	1	0.87	1	
	WRITING: English writing level	5-point; 1: very good, 0: cannot write English	1	0.88	1	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights.

Table A.3: Summated Scale for Discrimination in Society, Items Information and Cronbach's Alpha

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
GENDISCRIM: Discrimination in society	RELINC: Religious prejudice in Britain today compared to five years ago	3-point; 1: more, 0: less	0.8	0.71	0.8	0.51
	RELPREJ: Extent of religious prejudice in Britain today	4-point; 1: a lot, 0: none	0.68	0.62	0.75	
	SRESPECT: Extent to which agrees that the local area is a place where residents respect ethnic differences between people	4-point; 1: definitely disagree, 0: definitely agree	0.35	0.3	0.34	
	STOGETH: Extent to which agrees that local area is a place where people from different backgrounds get on well together	4-point; 1: definitely disagree, 0: definitely agree	0.35	0.31	0.35	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weight

Table A.4: Summated Scale for Discrimination by Government Institutions

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
GOVDISCRIM: Discrimination by government organizations	<i>How would you be treated from the following public organizations:</i>					0.86
	RDIS01: A local doctor's surgery	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.5	0.5	0.5	
	RDIS02: A local hospital	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.5	0.51	0.51	
	RDIS03: The health service generally	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.5	0.51	0.53	
	RDIS04: A local school	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.49	0.51	0.53	
	RDIS05: The education system generally	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.49	0.52	0.56	
	RDIS06: A council housing department or housing association	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.61	0.55	0.57	
	RDIS07: A local council	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.54	0.52	0.55	
	RDIS08: A private landlord	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.35	0.54	0.56	
	RDIS09: The courts	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.49	0.54	0.61	
	RDIS10: The Crown Prosecution Service	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.48	0.54	0.61	
	RDIS11: The police	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.48	0.54	0.61	
	RDIS12: Your local police specifically	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.42	0.58	0.68	
	RDIS13: The immigration authorities	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.45	0.56	0.63	
	RDIS14: The Prison Service	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.41	0.56	0.64	
	RDIS15: The Probation Service	3-point; 1: worse than other races, 0: better than other races	0.41	0.58	0.66	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

Table A.5: Summated Scale for the Importance of Religion

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
IMPORTREL: Importance of religion	IMPREL: Importance of religion to your sense of who you are	4-point; 1: very important, 0: not important at all	0.45	0.8	0.7	0.75
	RELACT: Whether actively practicing religion	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.24	0.73	0.54	
	RELFRI: Extent to which agrees that religion affects who your friends are	Binary; 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree	0.17	0.29	0.28	
	RELLIV: Extent to which agrees that religion affects where you live	Binary; 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree	0.2	0.36	0.31	
	RELSCH: Extent to which agrees that religion affects what school you send you children to	Binary; 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree	0.32	0.29	0.33	
	RELWRK: Extent to which agrees that religion affects where you work	Binary; 1: strongly agree, 0: strongly disagree	0.15	0.26	0.23	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

Table A.6: Summated Scale for Economic Situation

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
INCOME: Economic Situation	INDEP: Index of deprivation in ward ¹⁴	10-point; 1: least deprived; 0: most deprived	0.53	0.32	0.33	0.4
	LOGY: Natural logarithm of equivalised household income	Continuous; Measured in £000	1.67	1.31	1.2	
	NOINCOM: Whether respondent has no income	Binary; 1: no, 0: yes	0.97	0.92	0.92	
	OWNRENT: Type of accommodation	3-point; 1: own occupier, 0: social housing	0.8	0.62	0.71	
	WORK: Whether household head is in work	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.65	0.66	0.69	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

¹⁴ See <http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/neighbourhoodrenewal/deprivation/deprivation07/> for details of how this is computed.

Table A.7: Summated Scale for Mixing with People from Different Cultural and Religious Groups

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
MIXING: Mixing with people from different ethnic and religious groups	MXCLUB: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at a club/organisation	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.32	0.45	0.57	0.87
	MXFRIENDS: Proportion of friends of the same ethnic group	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.19	0.47	0.6	
	MXFVOL: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups in formal volunteering	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.44	0.6	0.62	
	MXHOME: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at respondent's home	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.31	0.53	0.65	
	MXIVOL: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups in informal volunteering	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.22	0.53	0.55	
	MXNURS: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at child's crèche/nursery	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.37	0.67	0.7	
	MXPUB: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at a pub/cafe	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.38	0.47	0.59	
	MXSHOP: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at shops	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.5	0.74	0.76	
	MXWORK: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at work	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.63	0.82	0.9	
	MXWORSH: Frequency of social mixing with people from other ethnic / religious groups at a place of worship	6-point; 1: daily, 0: never	0.17	0.49	0.4	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

Table A.8: Summated Scale for Neighbours Prosociality

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
NEIGHPROSOC: Neighbours prosociality	ABANDON: How much of a problem in the local area are abandoned cars	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.86	0.81	0.8	0.83
	DRUGS: How much of a problem in the local area are people using/dealing drugs	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.65	0.62	0.53	
	DRUNK: How much of a problem in the local area are people being drunk	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.66	0.64	0.59	
	NOISE: How much of a problem in the local area are noisy neighbours	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.81	0.76	0.72	
	RUBBISH: How much of a problem in the local area is rubbish lying around	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.6	0.6	0.53	
	SPULL: Extent to which agrees that people in this neighbourhood pull together to improve the neighbourhood	1: definitely agree, 0: definitely disagree	0.59	0.6	0.53	
	SSAFE: How safe would you feel walking alone in this neighbourhood after dark	1: very safe, 0: very unsafe	0.67	0.63	0.64	
	TEEN: How much of a problem in the local area are teenagers hanging around	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.64	0.68	0.64	
	VANDAL: How much of a problem in the local area is vandalism/graffiti	4-point; 1: not a problem at all, 0: very big problem	0.86	0.81	0.8	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

Table A.9: Summated Scale for Own Prosociality

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
PROSOCIAL: Own prosociality	CHGROUP: Whether give money to charity in the past 4 weeks	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.77	0.68	0.74	0.82
	CIVACT: Whether engaged in any civic activity in the last 12 months	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.09	0.07	0.12	
	EMPVOL: Whether involved in any employer volunteering scheme in the last 12 months	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.55	0.57	0.62	
	EMPVOFT: Frequency of employer volunteering in the last 12 months	3-point; 1: at least once a week, 0: less often than once a month	0.23	0.28	0.2	
	FGROUP: Whether involved in formal volunteering during the last 12 months	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.43	0.32	0.45	
	FUNPD: Whether given any unpaid help during the last 12 months	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.66	0.62	0.7	
	FUNOFT: Frequency of unpaid help in the last 12 months	3-point; 1: at least once a week, 0: less often than once a month	0.5	0.44	0.46	
	INHELP: Whether involved in informal volunteering during the last 12 months	Binary; 1: yes, 0: no	0.64	0.54	0.68	
	INHELPOFT: Frequency of informal volunteering in the last 12 months	3-point; 1: at least once a week, 0: less often than once a month	0.39	0.38	0.39	
	PTRUST: Trust in people in general	3-point; 1: people can be trusted, 0: can't be too careful	0.43	0.32	0.31	
	STRUST: How many of the people in the neighbourhood can be trusted	4-point; 1: many, 0: none	0.77	0.64	0.62	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights

Table A.10: Summated Scale for the Extent the Individual is Treated with Respect

Summated scale	Items used in scale construction	Item Coding	Item Means			Alpha
			<i>White British</i>	<i>Non-white Immigrants</i>	<i>Non-white British-born</i>	
RESPECT: Extent individual feels is treated with respect	REHEAL: Extent to which feels is treated with respect when using health services	5-point; 1: all the time, 0: never	0.83	0.83	0.82	0.73
	REPUB: Extent to which feels is treated with respect at public transport	5-point; 1: all the time, 0: never	0.73	0.77	0.73	
	RESHOP: Extent to which feels is treated with respect when shopping	5-point; 1: all the time, 0: never	0.77	0.81	0.79	
	REWORK: Extent to which feels is treated with respect at work	5-point; 1: all the time, 0: never	0.84	0.83	0.84	

Notes: Item means are computed using individual sampling weights.

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