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Public Policy and the Economic Wellbeing of Elderly Immigrants

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Public Policy and the Economic Wellbeing of Elderly Immigrants

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Abstract

In this paper we document the economic outcomes of elderly immigrants to Canada. Our objective is to describe the extent to which elderly immigrants may have low income (are “in poverty”) and their interactions with the Canadian income transfer system. The study has two main parts. First, using a combination of administrative and survey data, we describe the age dimensions of immigration to Canada since 1980, and the evolution of policies directed towards older immigrants (i.e., immigration selection, and eligibility for age-related social security programs). Second, using the SCF and SLID surveys spanning 1981 through 2006, we document the composition and levels of income for immigrants to Canada. We estimate the degree to which older immigrants support themselves, either through working, or living with relatives, as well as the degree that they rely on various income transfer programs, especially OAS, GIS, and Social Assistance (SA). We also summarize their overall living standards, and the extent to which they live in poverty (have “low incomes.”) Throughout the paper, we also explore the family dimensions to the outcomes of older immigrants: distinguishing between individual and family sources of income, as well as outlining differences in the living arrangements (family structure) of older immigrants, and the implications for measures of their well-being

Key Words: Immigration; Retirement; Public Pensions; Living arrangements and family structure.

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Executive Summary

Several government policies target older immigrants to Canada. From the outset, immigration policy is tailored to maximize the economic contribution of immigrants, and even for those admitted for humanitarian or family reasons, to select those immigrants most capable of supporting themselves. On average, with possibly weaker labor market attachment or earnings capacity, older immigrants are less likely to meet these criteria. Beyond immigrant admission policy, once in Canada older immigrants in principle could be eligible for age-related transfers; however, several key policies limit their ability to tap the Canadian income maintenance system. What then becomes of older immigrants? Are the legal restrictions on income-support programs binding? Are older immigrants supported by other family members? Do they work more than other similarly aged Canadians? Or are they marginalized, ending up at the bottom of the income distribution, not just relative to other older Canadians, but also relative to other immigrants?

In this paper we address these questions in two ways. First, we provide a detailed overview of the policies that are relevant for older workers. Second, we use data from 1981 through 1986 to document the composition and level of income for older immigrants. Our focus is on transfer income (most directly linked to government policy), and on the “bottom line” living standards.

In addition to the direct discussion of Canadian immigration and old-age support policies, our research addresses (or raises) more general questions and conceptual issues concerning: Retirement behaviour in the presence of public transfer programs; Family dimensions of labor supply/retirement behaviour and the provision for old age; Immigrant assimilation and the role of the family; The measurement of living standards, and especially how to incorporate differences in living arrangements; The distributional impacts of public policy; and the credibility of restrictions in access to public programs.

In our policy review, we confirm that immigration policy is largely designed to discourage the immigration of older individuals. For economic immigrants assessed by the point system, there are no age-related points awarded after age 53. Most older immigrants (e.g., those 55 and older) are admitted through the Family Class, usually sponsored by relatives (working-aged children). Sponsors must commit to “Undertaking” that restricts the ability of sponsored relatives to collect social assistance. Sponsors must also meet minimum income criteria, so that older immigrants – even in the family class – are highly selected. Using administrative data, we show that the share of immigrants aged 45-64, and older than 65, has been declining steadily over time, though such immigrants (combined) still account for almost 20 percent of all immigrants.

In principle, older immigrants could be eligible for income support from three main federal and provincial sources: Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and Social Assistance (SA). OAS is normally available to all Canadians aged 65 and older. Immigrants, however, face several restrictions: There is a minimum residency period of 10 years in order to receive any benefits; The level of

benefits (once eligible) depends on years of residency (pro-rated on a base of 40-years residence for full benefits). Some eligibility can be transferred from abroad, depending international social security agreements. The GIS is an income-tested “top-up” to the OAS. Base legibility is determined by the same residency requirement as OAS. However, with the “super-GIS” introduced in 1984, those with a partial OAS can have their benefits topped up to the maximum level of OAS/GIS. In principle, such immigrants with only 10 years of residence (with very low incomes) may therefore qualify for the maximum OAS/GIS. Finally, because of the commitment made by their sponsors (the undertaking), most new immigrants are not eligible to receive SA. That said, SA may be used to offset shortfalls from OAS/GIS (and even low Canada/Quebec Pension Plan).

Our empirical analysis is then directed towards confirming whether these policy restrictions are evident in the income composition of older immigrants, and furthermore, where older immigrants end up in the income distribution. We use two main sources of data. For the period 1981 through 1997 we use the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), and for 1997 through 2006, we use the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID). To maintain focus in the paper, we restrict our analysis to men 20 years and older, highlighting the outcomes for men aged 60 to 64 (nearing “retirement”), and mean aged 65 and older (“potentially retired”). We also draw comparisons between different groups of immigrants: those in Canada 0 to 9 years (“new immigrants”, unlikely eligible for OAS/GIS); those resident 10-19 years (“medium residency”); and those in Canada more than 20 years (“long time residents”).

The key outcomes we explore are the composition of income, especially income received from key transfer and pension programs (OAS/GIS, CPP/QPP, SA), as well as labor market earnings (related to retirement behavior). We also compare outcomes based on individual income to those using family income – allowing for the fact that older immigrants may live with adult children, so that individual income would be a poor proxy for actual material living standards. For family-based income, we also report the share of immigrants that fall below Statistics Canada’s “Low Income Measure,” as an indicator of poverty. We report results as raw means, as well as regression-adjusted estimates that adjust more finely for age, years in Canada, year, and location.

For recent immigrants 65 years and older (those in Canada less than 10 years), we find that individual income is lower in many dimensions. Overall transfers are especially low for this group, reflecting much lower levels of OAS/GIS benefits (consistent with policy restrictions). The one exception is that this group collects significantly higher Social Assistance (SA). The “medium term” immigrants (10-19 years in Canada) collects the highest level of transfer income, both compared to other immigrants as well as native-born Canadians (65 and older). This primarily reflects higher OAS/GIS payments, probably due to the GIS top-ups. While the individual-based income picture is quite grim, it brightens modestly when we look at family-based income measures. Despite the evidence of family support, new immigrants 65 and older are significantly more likely to live in poor households than other Canadians 65 and older. New immigrants aged 60-64 also have very poor outcomes. They are not eligible (by age) for OAS/GIS, and are

heavily reliant on SA. We also find that comparing the SLID to the SCF results, that outcomes for older immigrants are deteriorating over time.

In summary, our evidence suggests that older immigrants, especially those in Canada less than 10 years, have very poor economic outcomes. We also find that these poor outcomes are compounded (though not caused) by ineligibility for age-related transfer programs. Among a variety of questions raised for future research, we highlight the difficult problem of designing immigration policy to legitimately encourage younger, more productive immigrants, while at the same time supporting those needy elderly immigrants who cannot support themselves, and whose families are also unable to do so.

1.0 Introduction

A number of government policies target older immigrants to Canada. First, immigrants in the skilled worker class are evaluated by a point system that only awards points to individuals aged 17 to 53, assigning zero points to those 54 and older. Second, a number of Canada's income security programs link benefits to the length of residency in Canada. Therefore, elderly immigrants who pass the first hurdle, either by gaining sufficient points on other characteristics or entering Canada in another class (e.g., family, refugee) may face limited access to the resources that most elderly Canadians rely on. Finally, those entering by the family class are at least nominally denied access to social assistance by the "undertaking" signed between the sponsoring family and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. While each of these policies would appear to discourage the immigration of elderly persons who might end up poor, they also potentially condemn those elderly immigrants who nevertheless find themselves in this state. These possibilities are of particular interest given recent evidence that immigrants comprise an important sub-group among Canada's poor, and the elderly poor in particular.¹

At least one premise for these policies is that elderly immigrants might easily become a burden on Canadian taxpayers. For example, those elderly still young enough to work must confront the limited labour market opportunities faced by all older workers. As a result, they might rely on social assistance or cycle through dead end jobs and Employment Insurance. The restrictions on income security programs would appear to limit benefits to those who have made sufficient "contributions" in the past. Extending benefits to those with short tenures in Canada would represent a transfer from Canadian taxpayers to these new arrivals. Finally, the sponsorship provisions for family class immigrants provide an explicit expression of the fear that some entrants might become a burden. In principle, family class entrants are not allowed to access social assistance over their first ten years in Canada. As we document below, the family class has historically been the primary means of entry for older immigrants.

¹ Using Canadian Census Data, Picot and Hou (2003) find that the "low-income rate" is generally rising for all immigrant cohorts from 1980 to 2000 (controlling for year effects), especially so for the most recent entering cohorts. Veall (2008) documents low income rates (LIM) for all seniors in tax year 2004, and highlights that recent immigrants comprise almost one-sixth of poor Canadians over 65 years old.

To investigate the possible consequences of these policies for elderly immigrants we provide new evidence on their entry to Canada, their representation among the poor, and how the composition of their income changes with time in Canada. Throughout the analysis we draw comparisons to comparable outcomes of younger immigrants and the elderly native born.

There is very little research on these issues, as previous research was focused differently on documenting low-income rates among all immigrants (Hou and Picot, 2002; Xu, 2002), inequality among immigrants (Zandvakili, 2002), or living arrangements of the elderly (Boyd, 1991; Basavarajappa, 1998 and 1999). Older immigrants have drawn more recent attention. In a series of papers for CIC, Dempsey (2004, 2005, and 2006) provides a statistical portrait of the incomes of elderly immigrants using income tax data. She shows that income sources vary by both the class by which immigrants arrive in Canada and the number of years since their arrival, with most recent immigrants at the greatest disadvantage relative to immigrants who have been in Canada longest. Veall (2008) uses tax-based records from 2004 to study the LIM rates of the elderly in Canada, and includes tabulations by immigrant status. While there are significant limitations of defining “family” income from the tax records, he finds very high LIM rates among recent immigrants. Boyd and Kaida (2008) use the 2001 PUMF Census files to study links between ethnicity, immigrant status, living arrangements, and LICO status. They also underscore the importance of elderly immigrants as a sub-population of the elderly poor. While most authors (e.g., Veall (2008) and Milligan (2008)) correctly point out that Canada has a relatively low rate of poverty among the elderly, and the trend in poverty rates is strikingly favourable, immigrants are an important exception.

These studies point to important economic and policy questions concerning older immigrants. First, public pensions and transfer programs are often credited for a significant part of the decline in elderly poverty rates. However, older immigrants are often ineligible for these transfers (or can only collect a fraction of the benefits). Comparisons between immigrants and natives provide another potential dimension by which to evaluate the importance of such programs. Second, in the absence of such transfers, older immigrants must support themselves in other ways. Strategies include working longer, or

living with adult children. Third, these studies raise questions about Canadian immigration policy and the role of age in determining eligibility.

In our analysis of recent historical immigration patterns, we find that restrictions on elderly immigration have kept elderly immigrants to Canada at low levels as a proportion of total immigration. Government policy, in principle, makes it difficult for elderly immigrants to collect age-related or other social transfers, especially in their first ten years in Canada. In practice, total income from public programs collected by the most recent immigrants (those with less than ten years in Canada) is found to be significantly higher than that received by comparable natives in the 60 to 64 age group, but significantly lower in the group aged 65 and older. After ten years in Canada, total public transfers are similar for immigrants and natives, for both those aged 60-64, and those over 65. These patterns largely line up with what we would predict based on policy. For the 60-64 year olds, differences in transfers are driven by immigrants' higher use of Social Assistance. For those over 65, the differences can be attributed to OAS/GIS. With less than ten years in Canada, the level of OAS/GIS is low (but not zero) for immigrants. When immigrants become eligible to collect a prorated level of OAS after residing in Canada for ten years, they also become eligible to "top up" their otherwise low OAS benefits with a "super" GIS. Taken together, our results suggest that elderly immigrants do make considerable use of government programs. Nevertheless, low income rates are higher for many immigrants, especially those in Canada for less than ten years.

Our analysis also identifies two important differences between the outcomes of elderly immigrants in the 1980/90s and the 2000s. First, in the most recent period we observe a deterioration in the relative outcomes of elderly immigrants (age 60-64 and 65+) who have been in Canada 10 to 19 years. Their income gap relative to the native born is higher, as is their low income rate (measured by LIM). Second, in the later period for the 65+ age group we observe significant increases in the employment rates of the native born and immigrants who have been in Canada 20+ years. The employment rates of immigrants of this age who have been in Canada less than 20 years actually fall. Therefore, a "retirement gap" has emerged among these groups of the elderly.

Our paper is organized as follows. In the next section we use administrative data to document the age and class of immigration to Canada since 1980. We follow this in Section 3 with a detailed description of the public policy pertaining to older immigrants: policies that directly affect admission, age-related income support programs, and their interaction. The fourth section contains our core empirical results: an analysis of the levels and composition of income by age and immigrant status. We use the *Survey of Consumer Finances* (SCF) for the years 1981 through 1997, and the *Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics* (SLID) for 1997 through 2006. Throughout our analysis, we highlight differences in individual incomes between older immigrants and similar native-born Canadians, as well as differences in family incomes. Older immigrants have significantly different living arrangements than the native-born, and the family dimension makes a noticeable difference to their living standards. Even with help from their families, however, we find that older immigrants have significantly worse economic outcomes than comparable native-born.

2.0 Patterns in the Age and Class of Immigrants to Canada

In Figures 1 through 5 we explore trends in the class composition and age structure of immigration to Canada. Because the point system explicitly rewards youth and characteristics associated with youth, it should be relatively difficult for an older individual to enter Canada in one of the economic/independent classes. Instead, it is more likely that they would enter through the family class or the refugee class.

Figure 1 shows the relative share of immigrants entering through the refugee, family and economic classes over the last 25+ years. While there is some variation in the refugee share, there is no dramatic trend over the period. In contrast, starting in the mid 1990s the share of economic class immigrants expanded steadily while the share of family class immigrants declined. By 2000 a new steady state appears to have been reached where the economic class makes up more than 50 of all entrants and the family class just over one-quarter.

In Figure 2 we graph the overall share of immigrants in two older age groups—aged 45-64 and aged 65+—over time. The share aged 45-64 appears to regularly cycle between 10 and 15 percent. The share aged 65+, which held steady around 5 percent until the mid 1990s has recently declined by roughly 50 percent.

Figures 3 and 4 relate the information in the previous two graphs. Here the shares of each age group entering through the economic, family and refugee classes are graphed. The shares of 45-64 year olds entering in the economic and family classes change quite dramatically over the period. The share in the family class falls from near 75 percent to below 50 percent by the end of the period. The share in the economic class rises from 20 percent to close to 50 percent. In Figure 4 it is clear that the overwhelming majority of immigrants 65+ enter through the family class—over three-quarters of them in any year—although there is a small nod to the trend towards more economic class immigrants at the end of the period. In summary for most of our sample period the majority of either age group is not evaluated under the point system,²

Another perspective on this issue is provided in Figure 5. Here we graph the shares of the family class represented by the older immigrant groups. In many years older immigrants make up a significant fraction of this class, and average just under one-third more recently.

Therefore, older immigrants are typically a significant fraction of family class immigrants, and as Figures 3 and 4 show the family class are, at least historically, the majority of older immigrants. As explained in detail below, entrants by the family class are explicitly denied access to social assistance programs over their first ten years in Canada. All immigrants in these age groups will have limited time to build up credit for OAS pension or CPP/QPP pensions. While the recent overall trend is to a higher proportion of economic immigrants, the class shares tend to fluctuate over time. For example, it is only in the last ten years that the economic class has represented the majority of all immigrants.

² The remaining share enters through the refugee and “other” classes.

3.0 Public Policy towards Older Immigrants

3.1 Regulations Regarding Family Class Admission

Individuals wishing to sponsor a family class immigrant must be either citizens or permanent residents of Canada and at least 18 years of age. Immigrants can apply for citizenship after 3 years residency in Canada. Permanent residency is conferred when an immigrant receives their visa.

The main categories of relatives who are eligible to be sponsored are

- Fiancés, legal spouses and common law partners who are at least 16 years of age,
- Natural and adopted dependent children (unmarried and under age 22 or a full time student or disabled),
- Adoptees under age 18,
- Parents, grandparents and brothers and sisters (unmarried and under 18 years old).

There are also special provisions that permit the sponsorship of dependent relatives with no other means of support,³ only relatives, or the last relative remaining abroad. Finally, more distant relatives may be indirectly sponsored by a given application. For example, sponsored immigrants may be accompanied by their dependent.⁴

Sponsors must sign a contract with the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration called an “undertaking.” This contract outlines the sponsor’s promise to financially support the sponsored immigrants for a period of up to 10 years. The contract is intended to ensure that the sponsored immigrants do not become dependent on the Canadian social assistance system. The support period is three years for spouses, common law partners or dependent children aged 22 or older and 10 years for dependent children under age 22⁵ and all other sponsored immigrants. The terms and conditions of the undertaking are presented in the appendix.

³ For example brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews or grandchildren who are orphaned, under 18 years of age and not a spouse or common-law partner.

⁴ They may also be accompanied by dependent disabled persons.

⁵ The period for these children is ten years or until age 25, whichever comes first.

The sponsor also signs a Sponsorship Agreement with the sponsored immigrant. This outlines their mutual obligations; the sponsor's commitment to support the sponsored immigrants, and the sponsored immigrant's commitment to make every effort to be self-supporting.

In addition to the undertaking, sponsors must also demonstrate their ability to support the persons they have sponsored (as well as their dependents). This is done by evidence of an income stream free of debts that exceeds the Low Income Cut-off for a household made up of their current dependents and the sponsored immigrants. The incomes of several co-sponsors can be pooled to satisfy this test. Finally, this income test is typically waived for spouses and dependent children.

3.2 Immigrants' Access to Canadian Social Assistance and Income Security Programs

The undertaking at least nominally prohibits family class immigrants' access to social assistance (SA) benefits for a period of up to 10 years. Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) documentation stresses that the undertaking is a legal contract and that any violations of the terms could have legal implications including the repayment of any social benefits received. That said, there is some evidence that family class immigrants do end up on social assistance within the support period. Thomas (1996) concludes that sponsorship default is "a significant and costly problem" in Toronto. The social assistance rate among households headed by a sponsored family class immigrant was 13.9 percent in October 1994, just shy of the rate among the general population. From another perspective, the author estimates that up to 17 percent of sponsorships agreements were in default and that this accounted for between 10 and 12 percent of the social assistance caseload in Toronto at this time.

All immigrants face limited access to other income support programs by program rules. For the elderly, three of the most important programs are Old Age Security (OAS), the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and the Allowance. Old Age Security is a demogrant, available to all individuals starting at age 65, subject to certain residency requirements (but not to any income test). It is not available to individuals who have been in Canada less than 10 years. For individuals under age 25 on July 1, 1977 or anyone who did not live in Canada prior to July 1 1977 regardless of age,

- A full pension is payable if the individual has lived in Canada for 40 years since age 18;

- A prorated pension is payable to individuals with a minimum of 10 years of residence.

The prorating fraction is $\min[\text{YOR}/40, 1]$ where YOR refers to years of residency in Canada. For example, 20 years of residency would qualify an individual for one-half a pension. Therefore, immigrants with less than 10 years residency are denied benefits and immigrants who have been in Canada for just over 10 years will receive very small pensions.⁶

Before July 1, 1977, there are different rules for individuals who were over 25-years-old: a full pension is payable with a minimum of 20 years of residence, while a prorated pension is not available. Therefore, the 1977 OAS reform involves a change that raises the full-benefit residence requirement from 20 years to 40 years, and a change that provides a prorated benefit to elderly immigrants after 10 years of residence. In principle, the second change benefits those who have been in Canada 10-19 years, while the first change derives disadvantages to those who have been in Canada 20-39 years.

GIS is an income-tested supplement to the OAS pension. Eligibility is conditional on being in receipt of a full OAS pension. Since July 1984, however, new rules allow those in receipt of a partial OAS pension to receive a “super” GIS. In fact, the rules provide additional income to these individuals to offset the short fall in their OAS pensions. The maximum super GIS benefit is equal to the difference between a full OAS pension plus the maximum GIS benefit (given marital status and spouse's eligibility for OAS and the Allowance) and the partial OAS pension for which these individuals are eligible. Therefore, these individuals are potentially made as financially well off as they would be if they were eligible for a full OAS pension. The major difference is that the full amount of the supplement is subject to a 50% income test, including the part that offsets the pro-rated OAS pension.

Taken together with the 1977 OAS reform, the 1984 GIS reform clearly benefit those who have been in Canada 10-19 years. These immigrants move from a situation of no financial support to a situation of potentially receiving income equal to the sum of a full OAS pension and a full GIS benefit although a higher proportion of the transfer is income tested relative to the case of the native born. For

⁶ These residency criteria appear to be applied at the time of application. Therefore, an individual eligible for a prorated pension could increase their entitlement by delaying receipt. Note, however, that at most YOR's between 10 and 40 the implied rate of increase in the pension is less than actuarially fair for people of this age.

those who have been in Canada 20-39 years, the 1984 GIS reform potentially offsets the disadvantage of the OAS reform, again acknowledging that a higher proportion of the benefits is income tested.

The 1984 reform appears to have had an unintended consequence for recent immigrants who came from a country with a social security agreement with Canada (Tamagno 2007).⁷ Most of these agreements allow immigrants to use the sum of years participating in both their home country's and Canada's social security programs to establish eligibility for an OAS pension, although the amount of the benefit is calculated based solely on years in Canada. Therefore, an immigrant who had participated in their home country program for at least nine years and who had at least one year in Canada would have the required 10 years for an OAS pension. If the number of years in Canada were one they would receive 1/40 of a full pension. However, once in receipt of this partial OAS they became eligible for the super GIS to top up the missing OAS benefit. Over time, sponsored immigrants from countries with social security agreements with Canada appeared to be using this route to qualify for small OAS pensions and large GIS benefits. In effect, the partial OAS and super GIS benefit appeared to be taking the place of the financial support promised in the undertaking.

In 1996 new rules were put in place to address this perceived abuse. First, sponsored immigrants are no longer eligible GIS benefits, except in cases in which their sponsor is dead, is convicted of a criminal act involving the immigrant, is declared legally bankrupt or is imprisoned for a term of more than six months. Second, a full GIS benefit is only available to persons who had been resident in Canada for 10 years. Those with less than 10 years residency (but who qualified for a benefit through a social security agreement) would receive a pro-rated benefit. Certain groups of immigrants were exempted from the new legislation.⁸

The Allowance is a program that provides benefits to individuals aged 60-64 who are married to an OAS pensioner, or to widows who are aged 60-64. The maximum benefit is equivalent to the sum of a full OAS pension and GIS, and is subject to an income test in its entirety. Sponsored legal or common

⁷ Our description of this episode follows Tamagno (2007).

⁸ The old rules applied to individuals already in Canada by March 6, 1996 who 1) were in receipt of GIS (for as long as they were eligible for GIS) or 2) who might be eligible for a GIS in the future (but only to December 2000).

law spouses or sponsored widows are not eligible for these benefits over the period their undertaking is in force.⁹

It is clear then that many of these regulations reinforce the sponsor's responsibility for a sponsored immigrant's welfare over an initial period in Canada. The remaining restrictions that emphasize residency appear to relate an individual's benefits to the period that they potentially contributed to Canadian tax coffers, but this intent is effectively undone for lower income individuals by the GIS reform. Over our period of interest the proportion of OAS pensioners in receipt of a GIS benefit trends downward from almost 53 percent in 1980 settling at just over 36 percent since 2000 (HRDC 2007).

Social Assistance (SA), often called "welfare," helps people in need who are not eligible for other benefits. As funded by provincial or municipal governments, eligibility rules and the amounts paid are different across regions.

A final, major, public, source of income to seniors is the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP). These are contributory pensions and benefits are related to an individual's lifetime earnings. There are no special provisions for immigrants, although clearly their benefits will be directly related to the length of time they have lived and worked in Canada. Benefits are available as early as age 60,¹⁰ and eligibility is conditional on having made at least one valid contribution to the program.

4.0 Empirical Analysis

We now turn to a detailed analysis of the incomes of older immigrants. Is there evidence that older immigrants have poor economic outcomes, and are unable to attain the living standards of similar-aged Canadians, or other immigrants? Is there prima facie evidence that these a related immigrants restricted access to Canada's Income Security programs?

⁹ The exceptions are 1) individuals who were receiving a pension in March 1996 or before; or 2) individuals who were residing in Canada or had resided in Canada as a Canadian citizen or permanent resident before March 7, 1996 and will receive a pension in January 2001 or before.

¹⁰ In early 1980s, the initial age for both the CPP and QPP was 65. Starting in 1984 for Quebec, and in 1997 for other provinces in Canada, a new rule allows an individual to initial benefits as early as age 60.

4.1 The Benchmark

In order to measure the extent to which elderly immigrants are poor, or evaluate their access to income from government programs, we need a benchmark. In most immigration research the native born are used as a reference group to calibrate the behaviour of the foreign born (e.g., the economic assimilation of immigrants). While at a general level any group might serve this purpose, the requirements become stricter if the convergence of the immigrant and benchmark groups is supposed to have any meaning.

In many dimensions the working assumption of Canada's immigration system is that we do not want to admit individuals who turn out to be just like the native born. To demonstrate this point we draw a sample of native-born males, aged 15 and over, from the 2001 individual files of the Canadian census, and evaluated them according to the point system applied to economic class immigrants in 2002. In some dimensions our evaluation was likely overly generous, as all individuals received the maximum points for arranged employment (10 points) and adaptability (10 points).¹¹ That said, the average point total within this group was 64.3. Citizenship and Immigration Canada adjusted the "passing" mark for skill-class immigration applicants from 75 to 67 on September 18, 2003. According to the old threshold, the overall "failure" rate was 79 percent ranging from 95 percent for individuals aged 65+ to 66 percent for those aged 25-44.¹² Using the newer passing mark the overall failure rate falls to 45 percent. In either case, the point system attempts to select individuals who are more like a minority, rather than a majority, of the native born.

A similar point is implied by the restrictions imposed on family class immigrants. As described above, these immigrants are denied access to social assistance programs over their first 10 years in

¹¹ We assign zero point in experience to individuals who worked mainly part-time weeks in 2000 or to those who were not working in 2001. Presumably a fairer allocation of the points for arranged employment would take account of the unemployment and non participation rates of males in different age groups. Adaptability takes account of spouse's education as well as the presence of family in Canada, and previous years of labour market experience or post secondary education in Canada. The census data does not have sufficient information to account for these factors. The implementation of the point system follows the self assessment test available at <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/skilled/index.html>.

¹² One reason for this result is that points for education include both degree and years of schooling requirements. In the census data some individuals satisfied the degree requirements but not the years requirement.

Canada. There are few segments of the native born population in which the social assistance participation rate is zero.

While these points argue for holding immigrants to a higher standard than the native born, luck both good and bad also plays a roll in people's economic status. Furthermore, any researcher who has estimated a standard human capital earnings equation knows that the inputs to the point system explain at best a minority of the cross section variation in labour market outcomes.

In our analysis we use the native-born as one of our points of comparison lacking an obvious, better alternative. Given the preceding discussion, however, it is difficult to know whether convergence (or similarity) in the behaviour of the native and foreign born should be viewed as a positive or negative development. This discussion also points to another important caveat of interpretation: the potential difficulty of extrapolating results from current immigrants to future elderly immigrants. The current older immigrants are highly selected. Family sponsors must also be able to financially support their parents before they are allowed to immigrate. Thus, only higher income sponsoring families, and elderly immigrants with decent income potential, can participate in the current family program. Elderly immigrants are thus "double" positively selected by both the government (as explained above) and the sponsoring family.

4.2 The Basic Idea

Our primary objective is to document the living standards of older immigrants, and to trace their means of financial support. The analysis is, in principle, quite simple: we look directly at the various income sources and totals, for older immigrants, comparing them to native-born elderly. Our main statistical tool will be a comparison of means across various age-immigrant group cells, either with straight (unadjusted) averages, or by regression analysis. The two main age groups we investigate are:

- Men aged 60 to 64 (*A6064*): these men are approaching retirement, not yet eligible to collect OAS/GIS. Those with enough years of work experience can also collect CPP/QPP and retire early. Men in this age group, especially if they have low skills, may have relatively weak earnings potential

or labor force attachment. For newly arrived immigrants, the problems of being an older worker may be compounded. On the other hand, they are less likely to have pensions and other sources of income that facilitate retirement.

- Men aged 65 and older (*A65P*): these men are normally retired, collecting their full entitlements to CPP/QPP and OAS/GIS, as well as private pensions. For this group, we expect the differences in outcomes between the native-born and immigrant populations to be most stark.

We also subdivide the immigrants into different sub-samples, depending on how long they have lived in Canada:

- New immigrants, who have lived in Canada from 0 to 9 years (*YSM09*, or *I1*): These immigrants, with YSM between 0 and 9 years, are most affected by the government restrictions on OAS/GIS. Some proportion of them are also covered by family commitments through the undertaking. At the same time, these new immigrants may have the same problems as other younger immigrants to Canada, facing difficulties in earning wages at the same level as comparable native-born.
- Intermediate immigrants, who have lived in Canada from 10 to 19 years (*YSM1019*, or *I2*): Many of these immigrants will be eligible for at least a partial OAS/GIS, and may also have accumulated some years of work experience towards the CPP/QPP. At the same time, they may be less able to rely on younger family members.
- Longtime immigrants, who arrived in Canada more than 20 years ago (*YSM20P*, or *I3*): This group, with YSM greater than or equal to 20, may have similar outcomes to the native born. Under certain restrictive assumptions, this group of immigrants provides evidence as to the outcomes that older immigrants may experience, the longer they are in Canada.

While we will be comparing outcomes across these three groups of immigrants, only some of the difference in outcomes can be attributed purely to differences in time lived in Canada (YSM). Some of the differences may also stem from cohort effects. We do not attempting to disentangle the dynamic “YSM” effects from the more permanent immigrant arrival effects.

Throughout our analysis, we can therefore compare the outcomes of immigrants of different vintages each other and to the native-born. The other dimension in which we can draw comparisons is across age groups: younger immigrants (i.e., 50 year olds) who have been in Canada a similar number of years, have probably faced similar economic conditions and difficulties in adjusting to life in Canada, as the older immigrants. In this sense, we can identify immigrant-specific “age effects.”

A final line of comparison is between individual and family-level incomes (and outcomes). For the native-born, the distinction may not be important (for men), except to the extent that income (or lack thereof) from their wives may affect the living standards of men. For older immigrants, especially those who have been sponsored, and if they are living with their adult children, family living standards may be much better than what we would conclude on the basis of individual income alone. Indeed, Boyd and Kaida (2008), using the 2001 census, suggest that family support can offset low incomes (private and transfers) earned by the elderly immigrants themselves.

4.3 The Data Sources

Our analysis is based on two surveys. First, *The Survey of Consumer Finances* (SCF) 1981 to 1997, gathered annually¹³ by Statistics Canada until 1997. This survey is nationally representative, with the individual files covering between 66,000 and 90,000 individuals over the age of 15 each year. The survey details various income sources at the individual level, allowing tracking the of individual income composition over time, for both immigrants and native-born Canadians. The series of SCFs ends in 1997, making it necessary to extend our inference to post-1997 years using other data. In this paper, we employ the *Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics* (SLID), in which categories of major income sources are typically kept identical to those in the SCF.¹⁴ We use the SLID for the years 1997 through 2006.

There are at least two major discontinuities between the two surveys that limit comparisons between them. First, starting in 1999, all income of social assistance is assigned to the female spouse in

¹³ The SCF lacks the survey in 1983, which is the only missing year from 1981 to 1997.

¹⁴ The SLID is not necessarily the best data set to extend the SCF in other categories. For example, Robb et al. (2003) find that the *Labour Force Survey* (LFS) serves as a better extension of the SCF series in terms of information about wage and education.

the SLID data. Since our empirical analysis focuses on males aged 65 or older, and the social assistance is a major public program that provides cash transfers to recent elderly immigrants, this change makes it difficult to merge the values of social assistance from the two surveys at the individual level. To some extent, we are able to deal with this by looking at household, as well as individual-level data. Second, the sample sizes are smaller in the SLID than the SCF. Especially as we are focusing on a small sub-population (e.g., newly arrived immigrants over 65 years old), this leads to some very small cell sizes. This largely explains why we ultimately pool samples across years.

4.4 The Regression Specification

While the raw averages across groups will be informative, our main results are based on the regression-adjusted estimates. Our basic regression specification for the SCF sample is:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^4 \gamma_j \cdot AGEG_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 \phi_k \cdot YSM_{ki} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{k=1}^3 \pi_{kj} \cdot YSM_{ki} \cdot AGEG_{ji} + \beta' YD_{it} + \sum_{l=1}^L \delta_l \cdot LOC_{li} + \rho D8678_{it} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \rho_j \cdot AGEG_{ji} \cdot D8678 + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where:

Notation	Definition
y_{it}	• The dependent variable for individual i at time t .
$AGEG_{ij}$	• An indicator of whether individual i is in age group j : 20-29; 30-44; 60-64; 65+ ($j = 1, 2, 3,$ and $4,$ respectively). The omitted age group is age 45-59.
YSM_{ki}	• A dummy indicating whether an individual is in a given immigrant cohort ($I1$ ($YSM09$); $I2$ ($YSM1019$); $I3$ ($YSM20p$)). Native-born are the omitted (base) group.
YD_{it}	• A vector of year dummies
LOC_{li}	• An indicator of whether an individual lives in a given location (province \times city-type).
$D8678_{it}$	• An indicator for years 1986, 87, and 88; it is used to capture the abnormal peak of SA income during the three years.

Because we are pooling across time periods, it is important to adjust as much as possible for year-effects. To the extent that immigrant characteristics are also changing over time (e.g., YSM and age are both increasing over time), it is important to try and disentangle these effects in a multivariate setting. It also permits us to control for regional effects, as prices and incomes vary across locations: some of the differences between immigrants and natives may be understated, since immigrants are more likely to live in high income, high price cities, compared to the native elderly. We would therefore like to base comparisons on within-location differences in outcomes. The regression also allows us to more formally test hypotheses concerning differences across various groups. The specification for the SLID sample is almost identical:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^4 \gamma_j \cdot AGEG_{ji} + \sum_{k=1}^3 \phi_k \cdot YSM_{ki} + \sum_{j=1}^4 \sum_{k=1}^3 \pi_{kj} \cdot YSM_{ki} \cdot AGEG_{ji} + \beta' YD_{it} + \sum_{l=1}^L \delta_l \cdot LOC_{li} + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

The only difference is that we do not control for the 1986-87-88 spike.

The regression equations have two key components: (1) The base age profile that applies to both immigrants and natives (γ_j); and (2) the base differences across immigrant groups (ϕ_k) and the immigrant-specific age profiles, (π_{kj}). The base age profile applies directly to natives, but is also the “base” for immigrants. If there are changes in the dependent variable with age, the t -value on the γ_j will reflect the significance. This allows us to see how income varies across the life-cycle, between older Canadians and younger Canadians (i.e., what components of income are “age-related”?) The set of coefficients π_{kj} – the coefficients on interactions of YSM_{ki} with age groups – give the specific effects in age profile for immigrants of YSM_{ki} , compared to natives of the same ages. Are the age-profiles steeper or flatter for immigrants? The base immigrant-effect is given by ϕ_k , the coefficient on the immigrant indicator. Combining the immigrant-specific effect in age profile and the base immigrant-effect, the total difference between the outcome y_i for an immigrant of a given age, and a same-aged native-born

individual is given by the sum, $\phi_k + \pi_{kj}$. We report whether the estimated difference is statistically significantly different from zero (at the 5% level), i.e., whether immigrants of a given age have different outcomes than similar aged natives. To simplify the notation throughout the paper, we denote the three immigrant groups by YSM09, YSM1019, and YSM20P. In the tables, the corresponding immigrant groups are labeled *I1*, *I2*, and *I3*, respectively.

For both samples, we pool across years. This forces the age and YSM coefficients to be constant across time, and impedes our ability to explore trends in the basic patterns. There is no question we would rather allow interactions between time and our key age-immigrant coefficients. Unfortunately, the sample sizes are too small to permit the identification of a trend (let alone year effects). The small samples also reduce our ability to look at a number of within-group questions, notably the variance of outcomes among older immigrants. In future research, we expect the full census files to be helpful in addressing these questions. That said, we can look at one time-dimension: the SLID versus the SCF. Assuming the surveys are otherwise comparable, differences in the two samples may reflect differences across the two broad time periods: 1980s to mid-1990s, and the mid-1990s to the present. The pooled samples each allow us to relatively precisely measure “long run” differences in incomes across the immigrant-age cells.

4.5 Results

A: Means (SCF, 1986 to 1997)

Table 1 shows mean differences for a “balance sheet” of income sources for men aged 65 and older, for native-born and the three immigrant groups, using data from SCF. It is divided into three panels: (1) In the top panel we report the unconditional mean incomes by source; (2) In the middle panel we report the proportion of individuals that have a particular source of income; and (3) In the bottom panel we show the corresponding unconditional family per capita mean income for the individual: low income seniors may, for example, live with high income children, and thus have higher living standards than would be suggested by their individual income.

We begin with “private” sources of income to distinguish from tax financed sources. Total Earnings include earnings from wage, salaries, or self-employment, and are thus related to labour market activity. Just over 14 percent of the native-born have income from this source, earning a total of \$3,162 per year. Immigrants are less likely to work to varying degrees (negligible for YSM20P). More recent immigrants earn less, but perhaps surprisingly the most recent group earns more on average those in Canada 10 to 20 years. Turning to investment income, recent immigrants earn substantially less than the native born (by almost \$1700 per year), but immigrants who lived in Canada more than 20 years earn more. One category where new immigrants do earn more than the native-born (and other immigrants) is in “Other Private Income.” It is difficult to identify the precise source of this difference. A plausible candidate, however, is public-pension income from abroad. Finally, newer immigrants earn less than half as much money from private pensions as the native-born: over half of the native-born earn receive private pensions, compared to 25% and 35% for immigrants who have been in the country 0-9 and 10-19 years. The gap in pensions alone contributes over \$5000 to the gap between the incomes of new immigrants and the native-born. Tallying together the various sources of private income, new immigrants earn about \$4400 less than the native-born, and immigrants who lived 10-19 years in Canada have a larger (\$6000) gap. There is no appreciable gap between the native-born and immigrants who have been in Canada a long time.

We next turn to public sources of income. The first is CPP/QPP, which is a contributory program, so that benefits are based on past contributions. Not surprisingly, native-born earn the most from CPP/QPP, while the most recent immigrants earn the least. This adds about \$4,500 to the income gap between the native-born relative to recent immigrants, and over \$2,000 to the gap between natives and medium-term immigrants.

A second set of public sources is the various transfer programs. Social Assistance (SA) participation rates are much higher for immigrants than the native-born elderly: 18 percent of the native-born receive SA, compared to 27 percent of YSM09, and 34 percent of YSM1019. The unconditional mean benefits are around \$1,500 for recent immigrants, compared to \$200 for native-born, and over \$500

for YSM1019. There are negligible differences in the level of EI benefits, though the magnitude of this program is relatively small for the elderly (given the employment history requirement, and that they are mostly retired). There is, however, a striking difference in the OAS/GIS benefits received by immigrants and natives. The native-born elderly receive on average \$7,000 per year. Because they are not generally eligible, very few recent immigrants (YSM0-10) receive OAS benefits, and the unconditional mean benefit is only \$850 (a difference of over \$6000). Immigrants who have been in Canada 10-19 years will only qualify for a pro-rated (reduced) level of OAS. However, they receive even a *higher* level of total benefits as the native-born ((\$7500). While we cannot confirm it in this table, presumably this is due to program rules that provide higher GIS benefits to offset lost OAS benefits to those in receipt of a partial OAS pension. Also, this group is entitled to lower levels of CPP/QPP and again absent other sources of income the income tested GIS benefit will help make up the difference. Therefore, it appears that lower OAS pensions (and CPP/QPP) are offset to some extent for the immigrant elderly of both YSM09 and YSM1019. For YSM1019 the offset is intentionally provided by the GIS, while for YSM09 the offset is effectively provided by social assistance. Note that in the latter case this has the effect (to some extent) of “downloading” support for recent elderly immigrants to municipalities and provincial governments.

Taken together, the most recent elderly immigrants receive just less than half as much government support as the native-born. To the extent that some of this income comes from social assistance, and these immigrants are admitted primarily through the family class, the family sponsorship program does not appear to be working as intended. Also notable is that immigrants who have been in Canada longer (10-19 years) receive more transfer income than the native-born. This suggests that their limited time in Canada does is not enough to allow them to accumulate enough retirement income from other sources to support themselves in old age.

In the last row of this panel, we report the levels of total income. Elderly native-born earn about \$30,600 per year, compared to about \$17,100 for recent immigrants, and \$22,800 for medium-term immigrants. Long-term immigrants have almost identical incomes to the native-born. For elderly immigrants who have not been in Canada very long (at least 20 years), there is thus a sizeable difference

between their incomes and similar aged-native-born. The difference of \$8,000-\$13,000 could easily lead to substantial differences in living standards.

Because elderly immigrants live in extended households, we may get a more accurate picture of their living standards by looking at the income levels of the households in which they reside. In the last panel we report means of per capita income. One striking result is that the move to the per capita measure eliminates most of the differences across groups in private income. For example, where the most recent immigrants have much lower private income compared to natives on an individual level, at the household level the per capita amounts are very similar for the two groups.

Differences across groups in transfer income remain in the per capita figures, so that per capita total income for households with elderly new immigrants is still lower than that for the native-born. However, the gap is considerably smaller when we use family, as opposed to individual income as our measure of living standards. That said, simple per capita calculations are probably too crude for general welfare comparisons, especially if the immigrant households also have children, or if there are economies of scale in consumption. More sophisticated adjustments can be made (see, for example Deaton and Paxson, 1998), and these adjustments may be important.¹⁵ But the basic point is unlikely to change: older immigrants lower incomes are partially offset by the incomes of family members.

The average family size for the native-born is about 2 people (i.e., a husband and his wife), while it is almost double, at 3.7 people for elderly new immigrants. Even those elderly who lived 10-19 years in Canada live in relatively large families (3 people per household). Further research is required before we can document the precise nature of these family arrangements. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that these immigrants are living with adult relatives (e.g., sponsoring children).

One measure of “welfare” that does take living arrangements (family structure) into at least partial account is the Statistics Canada measure of “Low Income” (LIM). The LIM is based on the median

¹⁵ In addition to Deaton and Paxson 1998, see Deaton (1997), Deaton and Muellbauer (1986), and Rothbarth (1943) for a discussion of issues of welfare measurement when family structure varies by age (and along other systematic dimensions). The full census files provide an excellent resource for extending our analysis in this dimension, as the larger census data sets permit better measurement of family arrangements.

adjusted family income in Canada.¹⁶ Household have income “below the LIM” if their income is below the LIM level. Adjustments are made for family size, as well as the number of children, in order to partially control for differences of “needs” across families with different age-composition and size. Given the difference by immigrant status, this is a consequential adjustment. As shown in the last rows of Table 1, only 3.5% of native-born Canadians have income below the national after tax LIM (for all age groups!). This compares to 22% of households with recent elderly immigrants. Note that this implies that 22% of older recent immigrants live in poor households. One interesting question is whether these are the richer or poorer of immigrant households. The SLID and SCF sample sizes are too small to answer this question.¹⁷ The LIM rate of the YSM1019 group is still double that of the native-born, but at 6.8% is not nearly as large as the rate for recent immigrants. Immigrants who have lived in Canada a long time have very low LIM rates (2.4%).

B: Means (SLID, 1997 to 2006)

In Table 2 we show the comparable results for the SLID sample. Rather than repeat results that are the same in the two surveys, we just highlight results that are noticeably different than in the SCF sample. Note that differences may be due to differences in the time period, or the surveys.

The gap in private income is larger in the SLID than the SCF, driven largely by a growing gap in pension income. The native-born earn over \$13,000 in private pension income (over 50% higher than the SCF sample), while pensions for recent immigrants are still relatively small (\$4,700). Also, the other private income of the most recent immigrants is much smaller in the SLID. If this income is capturing foreign pension income, this may be related to the changing source country composition of Canadian immigration. More recent immigrants may be more likely to have come from countries without well developed systems of public and private pensions.

¹⁶ See Milligan (2008) for a detailed discussion of the LIM headcount rate as a measure of “poverty,” as well as other possible poverty-lines. We thank Kevin for providing his time-consistent set of before and after-tax LIMs that cover the span of the period of our analysis.

¹⁷ This is another example of extensions and future research that can exploit the full-sample census.

The employment rates of both the native born and the YSM20+ immigrants are 9 to 10 percentage points higher than in the SLID, but the employment rates of the more recent immigrants are lower. Therefore, there is a retirement gap for the more recent immigrants that we did not see in the SCF data.

The gap in CPP/QPP benefits is about the same magnitude (although the gap for YSM1019 is now much larger), and there remains a large gap in Social Assistance income, even with the problems of SA assignment in the SLID. Recent immigrants collect about \$900 more SA income.

Recent immigrants (YSM09) collect very little OASGIS compared to everyone else (as before). The level of OASGIS collected by YSM1019 is again higher than the level for the native-born. It seems that the GIS is fully offsetting reductions based on OAS eligibility.

For family incomes, labour earnings are much more important for immigrant elderly (as in the SCF). Per capita earnings are almost \$6000 higher per capita for recent immigrants (compared to natives), even while individual earnings are lower for immigrants. Thus, the gap in living standards would be at least \$6000 greater if it wasn't for the earnings of other family members (a simple measure of the importance of living arrangements to the wellbeing of older immigrants). Also, once again moving to the per capita measure evens out the levels of private income across groups.

Family sizes are even larger for immigrants (compared to natives) in the SLID (4.5 family members, compared to 2.0 for native-born). Finally, the percentage of recent elderly immigrants living in households below the LIM is almost the same as the SCF: 20.1%. What is new here is the higher rate for the YSM1019 group than in the SCF.

C: Regressions

Tables 3A and 3B show the regression results based on the SCF, while Tables 4A and 4B show the corresponding coefficients based on the SLID sample. We report the main regression coefficients in these tables. As can be seen, there are a lot of coefficients. As previously noted, the age-coefficients A6064 and A65P show the base age-profiles, i.e., how much income changes as someone becomes turns 60 to 64, or becomes older than 65, compared to when they were 45-59 (setting aside age and cohort

effects). For Earnings (in Table 3A), for example, we see that earnings drop by \$21,600 as someone ages to A6064 (e.g., early or partial retirement), and \$40,500 by age A65P (full retirement). The interactions between immigrant status and the age profile show the extent to which immigrant outcomes *change* differentially than the native-born. For earnings, we see that the interaction effect for YSM09 (I1) and A6064 is not significantly different than zero. This means that earnings drop for new immigrants (turning 60-64) as much as for natives (i.e., there is no offsetting behavior for new immigrants). For the YSM1019 group, however, their interaction effect is positive, suggesting that compared to similar aged native-born, these older immigrants have a smaller drop in earnings as they age. It also implies that the “age penalty” for earnings is smaller for the YSM1019 immigrants than for native-born. For immigrants of this vintage over 65 years old, there is no difference from the native-age profile. In the last column of Table 3A, we report results for Total Income. Total income drops for everyone as they age: about \$11,600 for A6064, and \$20,400 for A65P. For recent immigrants, the “age penalty” is even greater among men aged 60 to 64 (by over \$5,500). In other words, while acknowledging that older men have lower incomes than younger men, and newer immigrants have lower incomes than the native born, recent immigrants aged 60-64 have even lower incomes. For recent immigrant men over 65, their incomes only drop as much as the native born: in other words, their immigrant status does not compound with their age: like younger immigrants their incomes are much lower than natives, and like older natives, their income is lower than young immigrants.

In order to determine whether these results imply net differences in outcomes between immigrants and natives, we need to add the base immigrant effect to the age-immigrant interaction. We test and report the combined differences between immigrants and natives for each vintage of immigrants, as well, for both A6064 and A65P. The results are reported in Tables 5 (SCF) and Table 6 (SLID). It is on those results that we will focus our discussion

The first column of Table 5 shows the adjusted difference in incomes between recent immigrants aged 60 to 64, and similarly aged native-born (based on the SCF). The difference in earnings is over \$16,000 (and statistically significant). Combining sources of private income, there is just over a \$24,000

gap. That is a very large difference, and reflects a combination of factors, including very poor labour market opportunities. These immigrants are in no position to retire, yet they also have low earnings opportunities.

This group of immigrants also collects considerably more social assistance (almost \$800 per year more than natives). That is essentially the only form of transfer income that they can collect. Summing across all sources, these individuals have almost \$25,000 less income than the native-born. The results based on family per capita incomes are slightly less bleak: the gap falls to \$15,700 per year, mostly because these elderly live in households with a lower private-income “penalty.” Finally, the percentage of these individuals below the LIM is quite high: 7 percentage points higher than the native born.

The second column reports the results for the medium-term immigrants of the same age group (A6064). This group is in a much better position, based on a swing of over \$20,000 in private income. Immigrants in the YSM1019 category earn \$4700 more than native-born and they collect fewer government transfers. Overall their net individual income is lower than comparable natives by \$4,000 (although this is insignificantly different than zero). For these immigrants, family living arrangements make less of a difference (given the relatively positive individual incomes) than for the YSM09. Indeed, they live in families with essentially the same per capita incomes as the native-born, and their LIM rates are lower than natives. Finally, the third column shows results for longer-term immigrants: immigrants of this vintage generally have better outcomes than comparably aged natives.

The last three columns show the regression-adjusted results for men aged A65P that ought to line up with the results from Table 1. For the YSM09 immigrants, we continue to see economically and statistically significantly lower private incomes, higher SA benefits, and much lower OASGIS benefits. Overall, the total income gap with natives is a substantial \$19,500. As in Table 1, the family income results greatly equalize the difference in private income for this group. There remains a sizeable (\$12,000) total income gap, and an after tax LIM rate 20 percentage points higher than the native born. For the YSM1019 immigrants, the most notable finding is their significantly higher collection of transfer income (especially OASGIS and SA). As with the YSM09 immigrants, their family income paints a

relatively better picture, though their LIM rate is still almost 5 percentage points higher than the native-born.

In Table 6 we report the comparable results based on the SLID. What is new here for the A6064 group is that now both the YSM09 and YSM1019 immigrant groups have significantly worse outcomes than the native-born (not just the YSM09). The YSM09 total income gap is larger, despite the fact that their relative receipt of SA benefits has grown. Moving to the family level again lessens the difference because on a per capita basis the earnings deficit is smaller. For the YSM1019 group there is a new much larger deficit in private income. This appears to be related to a much larger deficit in pension income and earnings below the level for the native born. The proportion of families in this group below the LIM is also higher than in the SCF, although the difference is not statistically significant.¹⁸

For the A65P group, we find significantly worse outcomes in the SLID than the SCF, for both YSM09 and especially the YSM1019 group. Even at the family level the per capita total income deficit of the YSM1019 group is almost twice as large as it was in the SCF. The poverty rates implied by the LIM are about the same for the YSM09 but twice as large for the YSM1019. Clearly, more recent immigrants over 65 years old are doing very poorly in terms of living standards, despite collecting more transfer income (especially OASGIS for the YSM1019 immigrants, and SA for the YSM09 immigrants).

5.0 Conclusions

5.1 Summary

As noted in the introduction, government policy explicitly discourages the immigration of older individuals and curtails their participation in government programs if they do enter Canada. To some extent these policies appear to work as they are intended. Elderly individuals represent a smaller proportion among immigrants than they do within the native-born population. Recently arrived older immigrants have lower levels of transfer income.

¹⁸ We have some concerns about the distinction between YSM09 and YSM1019 in the SLID samples, and are investigating whether the SLID results are robust (for example, comparing results to the census).

For the most recent YSM09 immigrants within the A65P age group this means lower levels of OAS and GIS. Both the YSM09 and YSM1019 immigrants within this age group naturally have lower levels of CPP/QPP. While the restrictions on access to income security benefits for these immigrants are not arbitrary, they have a predictable consequence: they contribute to lower income for these groups. These negative income effects are mitigated to some extent by both government policy and individual action. The super GIS unravels the residency restrictions on OAS benefits and likely lies behind relatively high levels of OAS/GIS benefits for YSM1019 immigrants. YSM09 immigrants have higher levels of social assistance benefits. Finally both these groups of immigrants fare better on a per capita family basis as larger family sizes compensate for much of their deficit in private income. Despite these offsetting effects, these older immigrants live in significantly poorer households than native-born Canadians. The after tax LIM rate for the most recent immigrants is about 20 percentage points higher than the rate for the native-born. For long-term immigrants (YSM20+), there are no disadvantages, suggesting that 20 years in Canada is enough to achieve parity with the native-born (over 65).

We also observe large income gaps for immigrants who are 60-64 years of age. This is especially true for the most recent immigrants, and appears to be driven mostly by low earnings. The recent immigrants of this age also collect higher levels of social assistance. There is also a growing gap in private pension income, reflecting the higher levels of pension income for native-born Canadians, and possibly the growing tilt of immigration towards countries where private pensions are unusual (i.e., developing countries).

While our ability to discern trends over time is frustrated by small sample sizes a number of differences between the SCF and SLID samples stand out. First, the medium term immigrants appear significantly worse off in the most recent data. In the earlier data their overall outcomes were not far off the native born, but more recently they sit somewhere between the outcomes of the native born and the most recent immigrants. We observe this development for both the 60-64 and 65P age groups. Second, a “retirement gap” has emerged in the SLID data between the recent and medium term immigrants on one hand, and the native born and longer-term immigrants on the other. This is due to a strong increase in the

employment of the latter group in the SLID data. One possible explanation of this development is that a higher portion of the transfer income of more recent immigrants is income tested; either SA or the super GIS. This imposes high marginal tax rates on additional earnings for this group. Regardless of the reasons for this development it further contributes to income differences across these groups

While the results of our analysis are fairly straightforward, their implications for policy are not. There is a certain appeal in restricting access to income security programs that are implicitly funded on life cycle tax payment or explicit contributions. It could become very costly to simply allow new entrants to Canada instant access to these programs. That said, our analysis suggests that restricting access to these programs has direct implications for the economic welfare of new immigrants. As noted in our introduction, “While each of these policies would appear to discourage the immigration of elderly persons who might end up poor, they also potentially condemn those elderly immigrants who nevertheless find themselves in this state”.

Our results also suggest a number of important paths for future research. The small sample sizes in the SCF and SLID impose a binding constraint on our ability to explore heterogeneity of outcomes among older immigrants, and to better compare older immigrants to other immigrant groups (especially along dimensions of family structure). The small sample sizes also make it difficult to draw sharp inferences concerning trends, or time patterns. These are questions that can be better addressed using the full samples of the censuses. Given our findings about the importance of family structure, one clear question for future research concerns the role of immigrant families – and the consequences for these families – in supporting elderly relatives. Finally, while there are severe data limitations, as Milligan (2008) notes, consumption data can paint a different picture of poverty than income, especially taking housing into account. To the extent that consumption and expenditure data have information on immigrant status, it would be worth exploring the interactions between family structure, housing, and the resulting poverty levels of older immigrants. Our results based on income may understate the true extent of poverty among elderly immigrants, and any adverse effect of their support on sponsoring families.

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7.0 Appendix

7.1 The Undertaking

The Terms and Conditions of the “undertaking” (excerpted from *Application to Sponsor and Undertaking*, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Form IMM 1344 A (07-2004) E)

G. UNDERTAKING

I undertake to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and his or her family members who accompany him or her to Canada, if they are not self-supporting. I promise to provide food, clothing, shelter, fuel, utilities, household supplies, personal requirements, and other goods and services, including dental care, eye care, and other health needs not provided by public health care. I understand that the money, goods or services provided by me must be sufficient for the sponsored people to live in Canada.

I promise that the sponsored person and his or her family members will not need to apply for social assistance.

I make these promises so that the sponsored person and his or her family members listed on this undertaking can be admitted to Canada as permanent residents. I understand that the sponsored person and his or her family members will be admitted solely on the basis of their relationship to me (as sponsor) and that they do not need to have the financial means to become established in Canada.

I understand that the validity period of this undertaking begins on the day on which the sponsored person enters Canada if that person enters Canada with a temporary resident permit or, if already in Canada, on the day on which the sponsored person obtains a temporary resident permit following an application to remain in Canada as a permanent resident, and in any other case on the day on which the sponsored person becomes a permanent resident. The length of the undertaking will vary according to the relationship of the sponsored person and his or her family members to me (as sponsor) and their age and it ends:

- A. if the sponsored person is my spouse, common-law partner, or conjugal partner, on the last day of the period of 3 years following the day on which they become a permanent resident;
- B. if the sponsored person or family member is a dependent child of the sponsor or of the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner and is less than 22 years of age when they become a permanent resident, on the earlier of
 - the last day of the period of 10 years following the day on which they become a permanent resident, or
 - the day on which they reach 25 years of age,
- C. if the sponsored person or family member is a dependent child of the sponsor or of the sponsor's spouse, common-law partner or conjugal partner and is 22 years of age or older when they become a permanent resident, on the last day of the period of 3 years following the day on which they become a permanent resident; and
- D. if the sponsored person or family member is a person other than a person referred to above, on the last day of the period of 10 years following the day on which they become a permanent resident.

I understand that the undertaking remains in effect no matter what may change in my life. For example, if I am divorced, change jobs, become unemployed, and/or go back to school, I will still be responsible to the sponsored person and his or her family members I am sponsoring or for whom I am co-signing.

I understand that, pursuant to section 135 of the Regulations to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, if I breach any of my sponsorship obligations I will be in default. I also understand that I will be in default if a government makes a payment that I have promised to repay in this undertaking. For example, if I fail to provide for the basic requirements of the sponsored person and his or her family members and they receive social assistance during the validity period of the undertaking, I will be in default. I understand that I will continue to be in default until the amount of benefits received are repaid in full or repaid to the satisfaction of the government concerned.

I understand that all social assistance paid to the sponsored person or his or her family members becomes a debt owed by me to Her Majesty in right of Canada and Her Majesty in right of the province concerned. As a result, the Minister and the province concerned have a right to take enforcement action against me (as sponsor or co-signer) alone, or against both of us.

The Minister and the province concerned may choose not to take enforcement action to recover money from me if the default is the result of abuse or in other circumstances. The decision not to act at a particular time does not cancel the debt. The Minister and the province concerned may recover the debt when circumstances have changed.

I understand that I will not be allowed to sign or co-sign an additional application to sponsor another person under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its Regulations if I am in default of any sponsorship undertaking. This holds true for both this undertaking and any past undertakings where I have not satisfactorily paid back my debts.

7.2 “Other Income” SCF

Description of “Other Money Income” in *Microdata File Documentation, SCF, 1997*:

OTHER MONEY INCOME

Description: this variable gives the sum of amounts reported by the individual on account of other money income not included in the previous variables.

Included in this amount are:

- (a) Money received for the care of children being cared for on behalf of the Children's Aid Society.
- (b) Income received from abroad in Canadian dollar equivalent (excluding interest and Dividends.)
- (c) Non-refundable scholarships and bursaries.
- (d) Alimony, separation allowance and child support payments.
- (e) Royalties on books, oil wells, etc.
- (f) Strike and sick pay from trade unions.
- (g) Payments from an income maintenance insurance plan or a guaranteed annual wage plan.
- (h) Severance pay or retiring allowances (not regular pension benefits), etc.
- (i) Money from persons outside this household to help with household expenses.

7.2 “Other Income” SLID

Description of “Other Income” in *Guide for Cross-Sectional Public-Use Microdata File, SLID, 2002*:

This sub-total includes all items of market income not included elsewhere. Among them are support payments received (also called alimony and child support). The coverage of other items depends at least to some extent on the method of income data collection, whether from administrative income tax records or by interview. Those items which are included on line 130 of the T1 tax return are well covered. These include, but are not restricted to, retirement allowances (severance pay/termination benefits), scholarships, lump-sum payments from pensions and deferred profit-sharing plans received when leaving a plan, the taxable amount of death benefits other than those from CPP or QPP, and supplementary unemployment benefits not included in wages and salaries.

Table 1
Sample Means: Individual and Family Per Capita Incomes, by source
Men, 65 years and Older, SCF

	Native-Born	Imm 1 (YSM < 10)	Imm 2 (10 <= YSM < 20)	Imm 3 (YSM 20+)
Individual Incomes:				
Total Earnings	\$3,162.00	\$2,318.30	\$1,873.11	\$3,738.96
Investment Income	\$4,592.71	\$2,870.63	\$3,199.01	\$5,042.94
Other Private Income	\$385.07	\$3,705.36	\$959.12	\$568.71
Pension Income	\$8,386.69	\$3,246.46	\$4,736.29	\$7,651.09
Total Private Income	\$16,527.69	\$12,140.75	\$10,767.54	\$17,003.51
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	\$198.79	\$1,575.42	\$514.38	\$280.64
EI Benefits	\$84.64	\$100.26	\$133.93	\$76.56
OAS/GIS Benefits	\$7,073.67	\$857.98	\$7,439.61	\$6,868.55
Child Tax Benefits	\$7.71	\$56.89	\$34.58	\$6.18
Other Government Transfers	\$278.36	\$290.28	\$284.18	\$284.68
Total Transfer Income	\$8,137.34	\$3,672.81	\$8,630.84	\$7,916.20
Total Income	\$30,607.78	\$17,126.12	\$22,869.11	\$31,120.60
Proportions non-zero:				
Total Earnings	0.142	0.119	0.121	0.141
Investment Income	0.580	0.385	0.446	0.604
Other Private Income	0.055	0.312	0.101	0.091
Pension Income	0.541	0.246	0.353	0.543
Total Private Income	0.795	0.644	0.664	0.823
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	0.179	0.269	0.339	0.241
EI Benefits	*	*	*	*
OAS/GIS Benefits	0.993	0.141	0.952	0.992
Child Tax Benefits	*	*	*	*
Other Government Transfers	0.549	0.583	0.627	0.508
Total Transfer Income	0.997	0.765	0.981	0.996
Total Income	1.000	0.894	0.997	1.000
Family Income Per Capita:				
Total Earnings	\$3,655.10	\$7,160.54	\$7,125.44	\$5,109.39
Investment Income	\$3,909.89	\$2,042.20	\$2,720.49	\$4,415.14
Other Private Income	\$300.40	\$2,255.28	\$813.50	\$434.29
Pension Income	\$5,232.30	\$1,747.69	\$2,385.72	\$4,669.27
Total Private Income	\$13,101.69	\$13,205.72	\$13,048.91	\$14,634.64
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	\$213.68	\$930.87	\$313.38	\$243.14
EI Benefits	\$160.80	\$215.11	\$289.36	\$122.99
OAS/GIS Benefits	\$5,884.45	\$450.30	\$4,787.88	\$5,493.15
Child Tax Benefits	\$11.27	\$105.75	\$55.82	\$11.49
Other Government Transfers	\$200.69	\$180.88	\$201.74	\$208.86
Total Transfer Income	\$6,794.75	\$2,305.18	\$5,774.37	\$6,340.92
Total Income	\$23,923.30	\$16,154.18	\$20,803.79	\$25,077.77
Family Size	2.059	3.760	2.992	2.184
Family Income Below LIM (AT)	0.035	0.228	0.068	0.024
Family Income Below LIM (BT)	0.093	0.276	0.128	0.060
Sample Size	49,722	568	613	8,819

Notes: 1/ Based on pooled SCF sample, 1986-1997; 2/ All dollar figures reported in constant 2006 values, deflated by the CPI; 3/ Imm1, Imm2, and Imm3 are immigrant samples, based on years in Canada (YSM): 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 20+ years; 4/ Major sources of income are highlighted in bold, while sub-components are indented (and not bold); 5/ Family size is the number of people in the economic family; 6/ Family Income Below LIM: is the proportion of individuals with per capita total income below the Low Income Measure (LIM), defined in the text. "AT" refers to "After Tax" income, while "BT" refers to "Before Tax" income; 7/ * indicates that the number is too small for release from the RDC (i.e., it is essentially zero).

Table 2
Sample Means: Individual and Family Per Capita Incomes, by source
Men, 65 years and Older, SLID

	Native-Born	Imm 1 (YSM < 10)	Imm 2 (10 <= YSM < 20)	Imm 3 (YSM 20+)
Individual Incomes:				
Total Earnings	\$2,522.56	\$1,195.50	\$2,266.57	\$3,412.24
Investment Income	\$3,460.02	\$1,353.76	\$2,217.78	\$3,207.84
Other Private Income	\$504.03	\$735.75	\$1,151.74	\$447.65
Pension Income	\$13,033.60	\$4,710.75	\$3,588.83	\$11,856.15
Total Private Income	\$19,522.12	\$7,995.76	\$9,224.92	\$18,924.03
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	\$48.86	\$936.61	\$283.16	\$27.64
EI Benefits	\$85.75	\$66.38	\$78.72	\$70.13
OAS/GIS Benefits	\$6,354.49	\$1,971.95	\$7,506.78	\$6,147.64
Child Tax Benefits	\$1.78	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$1.76
Other Government Transfers	\$645.41	\$538.38	\$940.22	\$946.73
Total Transfer Income	\$7,136.29	\$3,513.32	\$8,808.88	\$7,193.91
Total Income	\$33,480.49	\$13,051.75	\$19,386.65	\$33,304.63
Proportions non-zero:				
Total Earnings	0.231	0.091	0.093	0.220
Investment Income	0.576	0.254	0.314	0.601
Other Private Income	0.188	0.159	0.100	0.200
Pension Income	0.700	0.194	0.251	0.699
Total Private Income	0.860	0.526	0.484	0.858
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	0.027	0.106	0.183	0.022
EI Benefits	*	*	*	*
OAS/GIS Benefits	0.963	0.270	0.920	0.955
Child Tax Benefits	*	*	*	*
Other Government Transfers	0.587	0.728	0.750	0.603
Total Transfer Income	0.973	0.834	0.961	0.965
Total Income	0.999	0.925	0.995	1.000
Family Income Per Capita:				
Total Earnings	\$3,632.75	\$9,549.27	\$8,461.19	\$5,597.85
Investment Income	\$3,022.15	\$976.60	\$2,117.25	\$2,838.46
Other Private Income	\$470.73	\$481.77	\$888.00	\$460.63
Pension Income	\$8,675.57	\$2,698.79	\$1,972.00	\$7,822.53
Total Private Income	\$15,812.77	\$13,730.61	\$13,460.94	\$16,730.03
C/QPP Benefits				
Social Assistance	\$138.92	\$1,262.03	\$420.10	\$111.76
EI Benefits	\$121.94	\$162.16	\$277.21	\$101.36
OAS/GIS Benefits	\$5,420.95	\$885.35	\$4,228.90	\$4,866.44
Child Tax Benefits	\$14.53	\$177.86	\$142.27	\$22.65
Other Government Transfers	\$459.85	\$429.64	\$591.52	\$646.73
Total Transfer Income	\$6,156.38	\$2,918.03	\$5,662.05	\$5,749.02
Total Income	\$26,984.84	\$17,204.81	\$19,805.34	\$27,499.65
Family Size	2.038	4.543	3.692	2.301
Family Income Below LIM (AT)	0.031	0.201	0.106	0.026
Family Income Below LIM (BT)	0.080	0.249	0.187	0.054
Sample Size	36,206	225	495	6,720

Notes: 1/ Based on pooled SLID sample, 1987-2006; 2/ All dollar figures reported in constant 2006 values, deflated by the CPI; 3/ Imm1, Imm2, and Imm3 are immigrant samples, based on years in Canada (YSM): 0 to 9 years, 10 to 19 years, and 20+ years; 4/ Major sources of income are highlighted in bold, while sub-components are indented (and not bold); 5/ Family size is the number of people in the economic family; 6/ Family Income Below LIM: is the proportion of individuals with per capita total income below the Low Income Measure (LIM), defined in the text. "AT" refers to "After Tax" income, while "BT" refers to "Before Tax" income; 7/ * indicates that the number is too small for release from the RDC (i.e., it is essentially zero).

Table 3A
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients
Individual Income, SCF
(standard errors in parentheses)

	Earnings	Invest	Other (P)	Pension	Private	CPP/QPP	SA	EI Benefits	OAS/GIS	Child Tax	Other (G)	Transfers	TOTAL
A6064	-\$21,607.00 (504.2)	\$1,135.00 (111.9)	\$326.90 (77.02)	\$5,813.00 (145.9)	-\$14,330.00 (527.9)	\$2,118.00 (35.60)	\$291.40 (31.14)	-\$157.70 (30.99)	\$168.70 (9.943)	-\$205.40 (3.986)	\$126.10 (24.50)	\$605.80 (55.66)	-\$11,606.00 (512.6)
A65P	-\$40,526.00 (248.6)	\$2,873.00 (112.1)	-\$268.20 (46.37)	\$6,577.00 (96.82)	-\$31,348.00 (305.6)	\$5,260.00 (21.61)	-\$451.80 (13.05)	-\$930.00 (15.74)	\$7,067.00 (13.44)	-\$234.70 (3.167)	-\$48.00 (10.66)	\$5,643.00 (30.97)	-\$20,446.00 (299.8)
Imm 1 (I1)	-\$17,838.00 (1208)	-\$974.00 (199.2)	-\$64.47 (267.8)	-\$1,473.00 (125.2)	-\$20,347.00 (1327)	-\$273.20 (28.99)	\$586.40 (119.1)	\$227.00 (87.54)	\$54.08 (2.183)	\$273.20 (25.24)	\$68.86 (49.06)	\$1,176.00 (165.1)	-\$19,444.00 (1294)
I1 × A6064	\$1,652.00 (1736)	-\$353.20 (452.4)	-\$208.40 (341.9)	-\$4,862.00 (408.7)	-\$3,782.00 (1866)	-\$1,533.00 (155.7)	\$209.40 (286.7)	-\$52.79 (194.4)	-\$168.50 (9.530)	-\$40.62 (48.97)	\$29.26 (141.1)	-\$217.00 (470.0)	-\$5,532.00 (1822)
I1 × A65P	\$12,008.00 (1271)	-\$1,591.00 (403.3)	\$2,973.00 (406.7)	-\$4,021.00 (411.8)	\$9,364.00 (1520)	-\$4,125.00 (132.2)	\$596.40 (209.5)	\$167.20 (99.38)	-\$6,201.00 (105.3)	-\$119.80 (30.83)	-\$47.76 (53.32)	-\$5,331.00 (272.5)	-\$91.17 (1503)
Imm 1 (I2)	-\$4,137.00 (997.7)	-\$990.70 (246.2)	-\$299.60 (80.57)	-\$1,405.00 (110.4)	-\$6,837.00 (1112)	-\$162.80 (27.77)	-\$67.79 (57.25)	\$161.00 (64.02)	\$50.59 (1.893)	\$205.90 (17.84)	-\$21.70 (21.91)	\$400.40 (113.1)	-\$6,599.00 (1090)
I2 × A6064	\$8,842.00 (2379)	\$289.20 (792.0)	\$271.90 (370.8)	-\$4,654.00 (460.3)	\$4,747.00 (2674)	-\$1,457.00 (172.8)	-\$66.56 (183.7)	-\$91.64 (163.6)	-\$83.38 (31.35)	-\$130.70 (28.04)	\$36.19 (180.1)	-\$738.40 (354.5)	\$2,551.00 (2576)
I2 × A65P	-\$693.50 (1086)	-\$1,085.00 (609.0)	\$810.70 (171.1)	-\$2,454.00 (453.0)	-\$3,419.00 (1405)	-\$1,977.00 (164.3)	\$394.10 (83.30)	\$206.60 (85.85)	\$267.40 (150.4)	-\$91.34 (21.86)	\$45.87 (25.80)	\$506.80 (215.2)	-\$4,889.00 (1382)
Imm 3 (I3)	-\$44.76 (541.9)	\$23.89 (142.5)	-\$151.90 (66.72)	-\$1,070.00 (60.07)	-\$1,244.00 (576.2)	-\$38.54 (21.77)	-\$236.40 (24.59)	\$74.65 (35.89)	\$50.86 (1.586)	\$80.85 (7.890)	\$30.36 (25.38)	\$16.95 (55.86)	-\$1,266.00 (561.7)
I3 × A6064	\$4,612.00 (1376)	\$260.20 (315.9)	\$367.70 (197.8)	-\$2,013.00 (251.2)	\$3,228.00 (1501)	-\$469.60 (80.57)	-\$29.93 (62.64)	\$191.60 (77.28)	-\$8.39 (25.67)	-\$26.07 (9.664)	\$75.30 (61.05)	-\$14.16 (129.5)	\$2,744.00 (1465)
I3 × A65P	-\$3,681.00 (592.5)	-\$79.08 (254.6)	\$270.90 (79.63)	-\$190.20 (182.1)	-\$3,678.00 (697.9)	\$126.20 (57.69)	\$380.10 (27.90)	\$222.00 (37.64)	-\$158.40 (29.81)	-\$39.56 (8.136)	-\$6.64 (27.73)	\$301.20 (71.29)	-\$3,251.00 (683.5)

Notes: 1/ Selected age coefficients from Specification (1). A6064 refers to men aged 60 to 64, while A65P is men aged 65 and older. Other coefficients (age and covariates) are not reported; 2/ The omitted age category is age 45-59, while the omitted “immigrant” category is native-born; 3/ Based on pooled SCF sample of men 20 years and older, 1981-1997; 4/ All nominal values deflated by the 2006 deflator; 5/ Sample size is 534,657; 5/ The dependent variables vary by column, corresponding to each income source (defined in the paper, and corresponding to Table 1). SA refers to “Social Assistance”, “Other (P)” refers to “Other Income from Private Sources”, while “Other (G)” refers to “Other Income from Government Sources.”

Table 3B
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients
Per Capita Family Income, SCF
(standard errors in parentheses)

	Earnings	Invest	Other (P)	Pension	Private	CPP/QPP	SA	EI Benefits	OAS/GIS	Other (G)	Transfers	TOTAL	LIM-A	LIM-B
A6064	-\$8,916.00 (278.6)	\$1,239.00 (95.88)	\$211.90 (36.74)	\$3,164.00 (77.71)	-\$4,302.00 (303.7)	\$1,305.00 (24.09)	\$196.60 (21.28)	-\$73.79 (19.53)	\$230.20 (12.41)	\$61.71 (13.11)	\$556.20 (35.99)	-\$2,440.00 (293.6)	0.052 (0.003)	0.068 (0.004)
A65P	-\$20,391.00 (135.2)	\$2,835.00 (81.37)	-\$65.57 (22.04)	\$4,194.00 (59.49)	-\$13,432.00 (180.2)	\$3,488.00 (16.76)	-\$253.40 (9.901)	-\$554.30 (10.57)	\$5,675.00 (15.69)	-\$14.49 (7.325)	\$4,930.00 (24.21)	-\$5,014.00 (176.1)	-0.049 (0.002)	-0.012 (0.002)
Imm 1 (I1)	-\$12,593.00 (496.2)	-\$905.90 (88.31)	-\$113.20 (77.27)	-\$910.20 (56.64)	-\$14,524.00 (523.8)	-\$274.50 (14.78)	\$159.30 (58.54)	-\$81.00 (37.72)	-\$86.31 (6.850)	-\$17.39 (20.36)	\$74.45 (74.62)	-\$14,724.00 (509.1)	0.143 (0.012)	0.165 (0.013)
I1 × A6064	\$3,815.00 (830.4)	-\$791.10 (212.5)	-\$31.38 (165.3)	-\$2,684.00 (178.9)	\$300.70 (888.1)	-\$993.40 (79.42)	-\$73.31 (134.6)	\$125.00 (105.5)	-\$238.00 (13.36)	\$41.05 (64.36)	-\$336.50 (198.9)	-\$1,029.00 (844.6)	-0.072 (0.026)	-0.039 (0.030)
I1 × A65P	\$11,865.00 (622.3)	-\$1,611.00 (275.2)	\$1,823.00 (208.1)	-\$2,719.00 (315.4)	\$9,355.00 (775.7)	-\$2,895.00 (74.23)	\$455.60 (117.1)	\$349.30 (52.53)	-\$5,243.00 (61.83)	-\$3.27 (22.86)	-\$4,338.00 (145.2)	\$2,122.00 (776.1)	0.058 (0.023)	0.029 (0.024)
Imm 1 (I2)	-\$4,454.00 (499.5)	-\$844.40 (117.8)	-\$156.80 (38.93)	-\$793.40 (48.59)	-\$6,250.00 (552.8)	-\$158.80 (15.09)	-\$160.50 (26.97)	-\$56.18 (29.97)	-\$4.37 (12.00)	-\$24.35 (16.39)	-\$126.20 (63.24)	-\$6,535.00 (541.8)	0.004 (0.006)	0.012 (0.007)
I2 × A6064	\$7,428.00 (1419)	-\$193.30 (388.3)	\$264.50 (262.6)	-\$2,393.00 (340.8)	\$5,104.00 (1569)	-\$890.60 (92.19)	-\$35.30 (82.97)	\$53.98 (78.44)	\$2.49 (62.59)	\$35.57 (92.67)	-\$266.00 (171.8)	\$3,948.00 (1518)	-0.048 (0.019)	-0.050 (0.021)
I2 × A65P	\$4,170.00 (667.7)	-\$953.10 (496.3)	\$600.80 (116.2)	-\$2,060.00 (225.9)	\$1,759.00 (873.5)	-\$1,619.00 (102.5)	\$276.70 (45.22)	\$348.40 (58.53)	-\$1,025.00 (140.1)	\$26.12 (20.20)	-\$591.20 (163.0)	-\$451.60 (839.2)	0.043 (0.014)	0.035 (0.017)
Imm 3 (I3)	-\$1,854.00 (256.1)	-\$226.70 (69.32)	-\$83.92 (30.37)	-\$639.70 (32.64)	-\$2,806.00 (278.0)	-\$70.28 (13.34)	-\$195.40 (14.63)	-\$37.69 (18.45)	\$40.60 (9.085)	\$3.24 (13.04)	-\$152.00 (31.21)	-\$3,029.00 (270.3)	-0.018 (0.003)	-0.015 (0.003)
I3 × A6064	\$3,987.00 (686.2)	\$214.70 (188.8)	\$128.10 (85.34)	-\$983.80 (140.9)	\$3,349.00 (750.1)	-\$240.00 (52.30)	-\$45.34 (39.28)	\$173.70 (42.19)	-\$20.53 (26.67)	\$56.85 (36.32)	\$41.70 (79.02)	\$3,151.00 (728.6)	-0.017 (0.007)	-0.025 (0.008)
I3 × A65P	\$8.76 (348.7)	\$313.40 (213.7)	\$168.20 (42.14)	-\$196.30 (110.4)	\$298.30 (465.2)	\$57.07 (40.58)	\$274.40 (18.22)	\$158.90 (20.74)	-\$224.90 (36.07)	\$8.23 (15.24)	\$150.60 (52.33)	\$506.00 (457.6)	0.023 (0.004)	0.009 (0.005)

Notes: 1/ These coefficients are from the same specifications as described in Table 3A. The key difference is that the income measures are based on family per-capita income, as opposed to individual income (as was the case in Table 3A); 2/ The LIM is an indicator variable as to whether the individual lives in a family with income below the Low Income Measure (LIM). LIM-A is based on "After Tax" income, while "LIM-B" is based on before-tax income.

Table 4A
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients
Individual Income, SLID
(standard errors in parentheses)

	Earnings	Invest	Other (P)	Pension	Private	CPP/QPP	SA	EI Benefits	OAS/GIS	Child Tax	Other (G)	Transfers	TOTAL
A6064	-\$29,118.00 (742.9)	\$908.30 (219.0)	\$622.30 (109.4)	\$9,457.00 (219.7)	-\$18,128.00 (810.7)	\$3,551.00 (47.44)	-\$110.60 (31.04)	-\$218.00 (23.52)	\$95.84 (10.85)	-\$27.14 (1.997)	\$293.10 (49.02)	\$32.58 (62.03)	-\$14,544.00 (796.9)
A65P	-\$45,147.00 (436.8)	\$1,846.00 (142.7)	-\$626.70 (61.94)	\$10,721.00 (129.2)	-\$33,212.00 (493.3)	\$6,408.00 (22.84)	-\$403.90 (14.79)	-\$649.70 (14.34)	\$6,379.00 (17.24)	-\$30.34 (1.690)	\$51.35 (22.50)	\$5,346.00 (34.74)	-\$21,458.00 (486.2)
Imm 1 (I1)	-\$25,007.00 (1525)	-\$1,066.00 (158.4)	-\$858.90 (102.5)	-\$2,260.00 (148.8)	-\$29,189.00 (1539)	-\$363.10 (20.45)	-\$14.41 (88.77)	\$114.40 (83.11)	\$45.82 (5.170)	\$57.55 (25.36)	\$56.95 (98.50)	\$259.60 (162.7)	-\$29,292.00 (1521)
I1 × A6064	\$9,245.00 (2377)	-\$680.40 (576.6)	-\$671.60 (178.6)	-\$5,760.00 (1191)	\$2,122.00 (2610)	-\$3,583.00 (50.42)	\$1,361.00 (615.1)	\$462.20 (267.5)	-\$89.59 (13.92)	-\$48.39 (25.42)	-\$355.70 (125.2)	\$1,331.00 (676.3)	-\$130.00 (2517)
I1 × A65P	\$17,944.00 (1553)	-\$1,415.00 (362.2)	\$938.20 (198.1)	-\$5,832.00 (1308)	\$11,632.00 (2122)	-\$4,834.00 (280.7)	\$1,065.00 (259.0)	\$188.60 (92.02)	-\$4,665.00 (247.4)	-\$44.79 (25.66)	-\$101.70 (107.3)	-\$3,557.00 (376.7)	\$3,241.00 (2159)
Imm 1 (I2)	-\$12,421.00 (1636)	\$85.05 (595.1)	-\$548.10 (212.1)	-\$2,273.00 (127.2)	-\$15,164.00 (1739)	-\$320.70 (26.99)	-\$141.20 (52.61)	\$167.30 (65.76)	\$51.98 (4.694)	\$13.47 (14.19)	-\$39.46 (72.34)	\$51.79 (117.5)	-\$15,433.00 (1722)
I2 × A6064	\$10,876.00 (3168)	-\$1,778.00 (817.1)	\$810.80 (1896)	-\$9,389.00 (274.9)	\$517.40 (4279)	-\$3,052.00 (168.6)	-\$67.28 (75.33)	\$333.40 (212.3)	\$64.43 (107.1)	-\$13.04 (14.07)	-\$380.40 (105.5)	-\$63.57 (266.8)	-\$2,598.00 (4237)
I2 × A65P	\$5,409.00 (1667)	-\$1,731.00 (720.5)	\$973.40 (608.9)	-\$7,237.00 (552.3)	-\$2,580.00 (1978)	-\$5,084.00 (148.9)	\$416.70 (66.84)	\$156.70 (75.13)	\$1,191.00 (199.2)	-\$4.62 (13.90)	\$388.30 (98.46)	\$2,148.00 (257.4)	-\$5,517.00 (1927)
Imm 3 (I3)	-\$421.10 (1440)	\$238.60 (520.9)	-\$221.60 (117.1)	-\$1,197.00 (112.5)	-\$1,603.00 (1564)	\$97.72 (39.54)	-\$253.10 (28.60)	\$63.08 (34.38)	\$42.80 (3.880)	-\$3.37 (3.500)	\$265.70 (61.30)	\$114.90 (74.88)	-\$1,390.00 (1551)
I3 × A6064	\$1,092.00 (1854)	-\$429.20 (585.8)	\$452.00 (312.6)	-\$2,477.00 (510.9)	-\$1,365.00 (1990)	-\$742.40 (124.2)	\$172.50 (61.99)	\$65.01 (59.94)	-\$73.11 (12.97)	\$9.72 (3.803)	\$307.60 (157.5)	\$482.00 (178.2)	-\$1,625.00 (1955)
I3 × A65P	-\$3,465.00 (1468)	-\$668.60 (555.6)	\$105.30 (120.7)	-\$415.10 (324.0)	-\$4,444.00 (1640)	\$259.80 (62.45)	\$246.40 (28.79)	\$198.30 (37.33)	-\$210.80 (39.10)	\$10.29 (3.531)	\$84.80 (74.21)	\$329.20 (95.88)	-\$3,855.00 (1624)

Notes: 1/ Selected age coefficients from Specification (1). A6064 refers to men aged 60 to 64, while A65P is men aged 65 and older. Other coefficients (age and covariates) are not reported; 2/ The omitted age category is age 45-59, while the omitted "immigrant" category is native-born; 3/ Based on pooled SCF sample of men 20 years and older, 1981-1997; 4/ All nominal values deflated by the 2006 deflator; 5/ Sample size is 292,019; 5/ The dependent variables vary by column, corresponding to each income source (defined in the paper, and corresponding to Table 1). SA refers to "Social Assistance", "Other (P)" refers to "Other Income from Private Sources", while "Other (G)" refers to "Other Income from Government Sources."

Table 4B
Income -age profiles, by source of income: Key coefficients
Per Capita Family Income, SLID
(standard errors in parentheses)

	Earnings	Invest	Other (P)	Pension	Private	CPP/QPP	SA	EI Benefits	OAS/GIS	Other (G)	Transfers	TOTAL	LIM-A	LIM-B
A6064	-\$13,421.00 (394.1)	\$1,063.00 (138.1)	\$514.40 (70.00)	\$5,935.00 (142.4)	-\$5,917.00 (441.7)	\$2,283.00 (34.83)	-\$28.91 (27.38)	-\$136.40 (15.17)	\$119.20 (13.55)	\$163.80 (28.43)	\$48.78 (43.20)	-\$3,585.00 (430.2)	0.035 (0.005)	0.040 (0.005)
A65P	-\$24,449.00 (224.7)	\$2,031.00 (87.72)	-\$263.40 (42.02)	\$7,195.00 (84.67)	-\$15,499.00 (265.3)	\$4,563.00 (19.88)	-\$370.60 (13.87)	-\$422.00 (9.954)	\$5,270.00 (18.18)	\$45.99 (14.04)	\$4,437.00 (28.17)	-\$6,498.00 (259.3)	-0.079 (0.002)	-0.050 (0.003)
Imm 1 (I1)	-\$18,289.00 (632.2)	-\$945.50 (68.50)	-\$553.80 (68.88)	-\$1,502.00 (55.50)	-\$21,307.00 (643.1)	-\$414.30 (14.96)	-\$51.43 (57.72)	-\$86.67 (30.80)	\$7.97 (30.78)	-\$82.21 (33.41)	\$92.47 (83.72)	-\$21,629.00 (619.6)	0.155 (0.018)	0.189 (0.019)
I1 × A6064	\$9,998.00 (1211)	-\$642.60 (372.0)	-\$655.30 (100.2)	-\$4,880.00 (343.0)	\$3,821.00 (1211)	-\$2,251.00 (48.43)	\$664.50 (303.4)	\$563.90 (202.6)	-\$239.60 (35.71)	-\$162.00 (47.47)	\$720.60 (337.9)	\$2,291.00 (1140)	-0.125 (0.045)	-0.157 (0.047)
I1 × A65P	\$19,715.00 (899.5)	-\$1,444.00 (223.4)	\$424.10 (112.8)	-\$3,954.00 (1152)	\$14,777.00 (1493)	-\$3,964.00 (95.94)	\$1,178.00 (214.0)	\$291.00 (47.44)	-\$4,632.00 (119.1)	\$92.21 (54.87)	-\$3,173.00 (258.1)	\$7,640.00 (1459)	0.050 (0.039)	0.022 (0.040)
Imm 1 (I2)	-\$11,379.00 (718.9)	-\$280.50 (220.7)	-\$399.40 (110.8)	-\$1,469.00 (58.21)	-\$13,525.00 (768.2)	-\$362.40 (16.20)	-\$154.10 (38.15)	\$5.06 (46.52)	\$99.84 (23.92)	-\$66.66 (33.95)	\$57.77 (80.16)	-\$13,830.00 (754.2)	0.051 (0.011)	0.067 (0.012)
I2 × A6064	\$11,376.00 (1626)	-\$1,378.00 (372.7)	\$203.10 (949.2)	-\$5,676.00 (184.9)	\$4,508.00 (2183)	-\$2,032.00 (75.44)	\$110.80 (107.7)	\$179.80 (95.49)	-\$70.52 (103.8)	-\$186.90 (47.50)	-\$58.66 (181.6)	\$2,418.00 (2159)	0.011 (0.039)	-0.025 (0.039)
I2 × A65P	\$11,325.00 (860.3)	-\$1,060.00 (439.6)	\$625.00 (345.4)	-\$5,325.00 (253.8)	\$5,589.00 (1044)	-\$3,961.00 (65.52)	\$460.10 (66.07)	\$334.30 (70.88)	-\$1,218.00 (161.2)	\$223.40 (49.72)	-\$203.30 (196.4)	\$1,425.00 (1007)	0.038 (0.019)	0.064 (0.024)
Imm 3 (I3)	-\$1,849.00 (650.9)	\$131.00 (171.3)	-\$174.60 (62.19)	-\$816.60 (59.66)	-\$2,721.00 (715.7)	-\$36.19 (25.53)	-\$256.10 (26.12)	-\$6.97 (21.43)	\$59.59 (12.27)	\$104.40 (31.31)	-\$56.73 (48.26)	-\$2,814.00 (704.4)	-0.021 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.005)
I3 × A6064	\$2,970.00 (1028)	-\$296.40 (263.7)	\$132.10 (201.0)	-\$2,151.00 (285.3)	\$669.50 (1109)	-\$606.60 (83.31)	\$138.90 (58.54)	\$80.14 (38.13)	-\$15.38 (32.05)	\$159.30 (82.50)	\$352.20 (111.9)	\$415.10 (1079)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.011)
I3 × A65P	\$552.90 (672.1)	-\$472.40 (216.2)	\$89.90 (67.24)	-\$307.90 (228.7)	-\$129.30 (781.5)	\$16.91 (51.88)	\$242.60 (27.66)	\$142.50 (24.00)	-\$572.80 (40.90)	\$97.34 (40.14)	-\$94.68 (68.09)	-\$207.10 (768.2)	0.028 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)

Notes: 1/ These coefficients are from the same specifications as described in Table 4A. The key difference is that the income measures are based on family per-capita income, as opposed to individual income (as was the case in Table 4A); 2/ The LIM is an indicator variable as to whether the individual lives in a family with income below the Low Income Measure (LIM). LIM-A is based on "After Tax" income, while "LIM-B" is based on before-tax income.

Table 5
Estimated Difference Between Immigrants and Same-Aged Native-Born
Based on Coefficients Reported in Tables 3A and 3B, SCF
(* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level)

	A6064			A65P		
	I1	I2	I3	I1	I2	I3
Individual Income Measures:						
Total Earnings	-\$16,186*	\$4,705*	\$4,567*	-\$5,831*	-\$4,830*	-\$3,726*
Investment Income	-\$1,327*	-\$701	\$284	-\$2,565*	-\$2,075*	-\$55
Other Priv. Income	-\$273	-\$28	\$216	\$2,909*	\$511*	\$119*
Pension Income	-\$6,335*	-\$6,059*	-\$3,083*	-\$5,493*	-\$3,859*	-\$1,260*
Total Priv. Income	-\$24,129*	-\$2,090	\$1,983	-\$10,983*	-\$10,255*	-\$4,922*
C/QPP Benefits	-\$1,806*	-\$1,620*	-\$508*	-\$4,398*	-\$2,140*	\$88
Social Assistance	\$796*	-\$134	-\$266*	\$1,183*	\$326*	\$144*
EI Benefits	\$174	\$69	\$266*	\$394*	\$368*	\$297*
OAS/GIS Benefits	-\$114*	-\$33	\$42	-\$6,147*	\$318*	-\$108*
Child Tax Benefits	\$233*	\$75*	\$55*	\$153*	\$115*	\$41*
Oth Gov Transfers	\$98	\$14	\$106	\$21	\$24	\$24*
Transfer Income	\$959*	-\$338	\$3	-\$4,155*	\$907*	\$318*
Total Income	-\$24,976*	-\$4,048	\$1,478	-\$19,535*	-\$11,488*	-\$4,517*
Per Capita Family Measures:						
Total Earnings	-\$8,778*	\$2,974*	\$2,133*	-\$728	-\$284	-\$1,845*
Investment Income	-\$1,697*	-\$1,038*	-\$12	-\$2,517*	-\$1,798*	\$87
Other Priv. Income	-\$145	\$108	\$44	\$1,710*	\$444*	\$84*
Pension Income	-\$3,594*	-\$3,186*	-\$1,623*	-\$3,629*	-\$2,853*	-\$836*
Total Priv. Income	-\$14,223*	-\$1,146	\$542	-\$5,168*	-\$4,491*	-\$2,508*
C/QPP Benefits	-\$1,268*	-\$1,049*	-\$310*	-\$3,170*	-\$1,778*	-\$13
Social Assistance	\$86	-\$196*	-\$241*	\$615*	\$116*	\$79*
EI Benefits	\$44	-\$2	\$136*	\$268*	\$292*	\$121*
OAS/GIS Benefits	-\$324*	-\$2	\$20	-\$5,329*	-\$1,029*	-\$184*
Child Tax Benefits	\$139*	\$64*	\$31*	\$141*	\$82*	\$25*
Oth Gov Transfers	\$24	\$11	\$60	-\$21	\$2	\$11
Transfer Income	-\$262	-\$392*	-\$110	-\$4,264*	-\$717*	-\$1
Total Income	-\$15,753*	-\$2,588	\$122	-\$12,601*	-\$6,987*	-\$2,523*
Below LIM-A	0.071*	-0.044*	-0.034*	0.200*	0.047*	0.005*
Below LIM-B	0.125*	-0.038	-0.040*	0.194*	0.047*	-0.007


Notes: 1/ Each column reports the total estimated difference in income between the immigrants from a particular age group (A6064 or A65P) and YSM vintage (I1, I2, or I3), and the same aged native-born. These are based on the estimated coefficients reported in Tables 3A and 3B. 2/ Numbers for sub-components of income may not exactly equal the sub-totals due to rounding;

Table 6
Estimated Difference Between Immigrants and Same-Aged Native-Born
Based on Coefficients Reported in Tables 4A and 4B, SLID
(* indicates statistically significant at the 5% level)

	A6064			A65P		
	I1	I2	I3	I1	I2	I3
Individual Income Measures:						
Total Earnings	-\$15,762*	-\$1,544	\$671	-\$7,063*	-\$7,012*	-\$3,886*
Investment Income	-\$1,746*	-\$1,693*	-\$191	-\$2,480*	-\$1,646*	-\$430*
Other Priv. Income	-\$1,531*	\$263	\$230	\$79	\$425	-\$116*
Pension Income	-\$8,019*	-\$11,662*	-\$3,674*	-\$8,091*	-\$9,510*	-\$1,612*
Total Priv. Income	-\$27,067*	-\$14,646*	-\$2,968*	-\$17,557*	-\$17,744*	-\$6,047*
C/QPP Benefits	-\$3,946*	-\$3,373*	-\$645*	-\$5,197*	-\$5,405*	\$358*
Social Assistance	\$1,347*	-\$208*	-\$81	\$1,051*	\$276*	-\$7
EI Benefits	\$577*	\$501*	\$128*	\$303*	\$324*	\$261*
OAS/GIS Benefits	-\$44*	\$116	-\$30*	-\$4,620*	\$1,243*	-\$168*
Child Tax Benefits	\$9*	\$0	\$6*	\$13*	\$9*	\$7*
Oth Gov Transfers	-\$299*	-\$420*	\$573*	-\$45	\$349*	\$351*
Transfer Income	\$1,591*	-\$12	\$597*	-\$3,297*	\$2,200*	\$444*
Total Income	-\$29,422*	-\$18,031*	-\$3,015*	-\$26,051*	-\$20,950*	-\$5,246*
Per Capita Family Measures:						
Total Earnings	-\$8,291*	-\$2	\$1,121	\$1,426*	-\$54	-\$1,297*
Investment Income	-\$1,588*	-\$1,659*	-\$165	-\$2,389*	-\$1,340*	-\$341*
Other Priv. Income	-\$1,209*	-\$196	-\$43	-\$130*	\$226	-\$85*
Pension Income	-\$6,382*	-\$7,145*	-\$2,967*	-\$5,456*	-\$6,794*	-\$1,125*
Total Priv. Income	-\$17,486*	-\$9,017*	-\$2,052*	-\$6,530*	-\$7,936*	-\$2,851*
C/QPP Benefits	-\$2,665*	-\$2,394*	-\$643*	-\$4,378*	-\$4,323*	-\$19
Social Assistance	\$613*	-\$43	-\$117*	\$1,127*	\$306*	-\$13
EI Benefits	\$477*	\$185*	\$73*	\$204*	\$339*	\$136*
OAS/GIS Benefits	-\$232*	\$29	\$44	-\$4,624*	-\$1,119*	-\$513*
Child Tax Benefits	\$195*	\$80*	\$31*	\$200*	\$170*	\$38*
Oth Gov Transfers	-\$244*	-\$254*	\$264*	\$10	\$157*	\$202*
Transfer Income	\$813*	-\$1	\$296*	-\$3,081*	-\$145	-\$151*
Total Income	-\$19,338*	-\$11,412*	-\$2,399*	-\$13,989*	-\$12,404*	-\$3,021*
Below LIM-B	0.030	0.062	-0.020	0.205*	0.089*	0.007*
Below LIM-A	0.032	0.042	-0.022	0.211*	0.131*	-0.008*


Notes: 1/ Each column reports the total estimated difference in income between the immigrants from a particular age group (A6064 or A65P) and YSM vintage (I1, I2, or I3), and the same aged native-born. These are based on the estimated coefficients reported in Tables 4A and 4B. 2/ Numbers for sub-components of income may not exactly equal the sub-totals due to rounding;

Figure 1




Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents*, Research and Evaluation Branch

Figure 2




Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents*, Research and Evaluation Branch

Figure 3




Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents*, Research and Evaluation Branch

Figure 4



Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): *Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents*, Research and Evaluation Branch

Figure 5



Notes: Authors calculations based on Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2007): Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview, Permanent and Temporary Residents, Research and Evaluation Branch