Security Culture, Strategic Approach and the Implementation and Operationalization of European Security*

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Resumo
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A inclusão do termo “estratégia” no documento sobre Estratégia de Segurança Europeia (ESS) gerou um intenso debate sobre se a União Europeia (UE) é detentora, partilha ou se deve ter uma abordagem estratégica comum em matéria de política externa. O artigo revê o debate tradicional e actual sobre cultura estratégica, examinando a utilidade do conceito no contexto das dimensões de implementação e operacionalização da Política Comum de Segurança e Defesa (PCSD). O conceito de cultura estratégica é frequentemente empregue no âmbito das políticas de defesa dos Estados e das alianças formais encontrando-se centrado em torno das percepções de ameaça e das condições de supremacia militar. Estas premissas não se adequam aos objectivos de segurança da UE, às suas práticas políticas e escolha de instrumentos de segurança. O artigo propõe uma distinção entre cultura de segurança e abordagem estratégica, relacionando-as com os processos de implementação e operacionalização da PCSD. Esta perspectiva permite avaliar como é que os princípios orientadores da segurança Europeia informam a cultura de segurança da UE e o processo de transformação de princípios em instrumentos de política de segurança poderá determinar as condições para uma abordagem estratégica mais eficiente da UE no contexto da segurança internacional.

Abstract
The inclusion on the European Security Strategy (ESS) document of the term ‘strategy’ set off an intense debate, whether or not the EU had, shared or is required to have a common strategic approach to international affairs. The article reviews the traditional and current debates about strategic culture, assessing the utility of the concept in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) implementation and operationalization. The notion of strategic culture is frequently used with reference to states’ defence policies and formal military alliances being focused on threat perceptions and on the conditions of military supremacy. These premises fit poorly to European security goals, policy practices and choice of security instruments, for which a distinction between security culture and strategic approach is introduced and related with the processes of implementation and operationalization of CSDP. This enables to assess how the principles that inform the EU’s security culture and the transformation of principles into security policy instruments may set the conditions for a more efficient EU’s strategic approach to international security.

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Introduction

The inclusion in 2003 of the term ‘strategy’ on the European Security Strategy (ESS) document triggered an intense debate, prompting as many doubts as expectations on how the European Union (EU) security and defence dimensions would be implemented and operationalized.¹ Some believe that the EU would have to adjust to the new security conditions following the Kosovo campaign, the 9/11 and the American-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A few forecasted the divisive perils of competition and duplication due to further developments of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Others denied it purpose and efficiency due to lack of a common strategic culture, military doctrine and robust military capabilities, able to match those of NATO and of its most proficient allies. These assumptions reflect two interpretations about strategic culture. One that relates strategic culture to warfare. Another that acknowledges that its operationalization is supported by collective defence and military might. The importance of discussing traditional and new approaches to security culture and strategic approach is twofold. First, it adds conceptual clarity to the notions of security culture and strategic approach, raising analytical problems of interest to academic research. It helps explaining how policies are translated into security instruments and tasks. Second, it contributes to understand the specificities and advantages of CSDP of importance to policy practitioners.

The article assesses the emergence of a EU security culture and strategic approach in relation to the implementation and operationalization of CSDP in a twofold manner.² First, it reviews the traditional and current debates about strategic culture discussing their current utility to understand European security. The notion of strategic culture is commonly used with reference to the international stance of states and formal military alliances, based on perceptions of enmity, threat and military supremacy. These premises are unhelpful if we are to understand CSDP goals and security practices. Consequently, a distinction between security culture (relating principles and security practices) and strategic approach (connecting political will to security instruments) is introduced and related with the processes of implementation and operationalization of CSDP. The article examines how the institutionalization of security practices and instruments influences the EU approach to international security, following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.

² Implementation refers to ‘development of will and capacity’ (Howorth, 2007, p. 180) to render a policy credible and efficient.
This assessment is twofold. First, it analyses how the implementation of CSDP as a process of transformation of political will into institutionalised policy goals and policy practices embodies the emergence of security culture. Second, it analyses how operationalization as a process of transformation of political will and security practices into policy instruments contributes to the edification of a EU strategic approach to international security.

**A Review of the Debate on Strategic Culture**

The debate about strategic culture is neither new nor consensual, comprising different considerations with respect to the units and levels of analysis, depending on the disciplinary context in which it is used. A number of authors discuss strategic culture in terms of a grand strategy, strategic advantage or defence policies of major strategic players. Some of these labels are used in relation to the role of domestic bureaucracies, the use of military forces and military defence of national interests. Traditional insights on strategic culture are biased at the unit of analysis level in three ways. First, they focus on the processes of formulation and implementation of strategic culture by state agencies. Second, they are centred on how great powers shape the strategic culture of other actors. Third, they concern the role formal alliances have in operationalizing strategies. The analytical complexity grows when one moves to the different levels of analysis considered. Some accounts suggest that strategic culture results from the structural power relations established among hegemonic powers with respect to military capabilities (Walt, 1990; Snyder, 1977; Klein, 1991; Gray, 1999, 2007; Johnston, 1995; Lantis, 2005). From a Foreign Policy Analysis and organizational culture perspective (Kier, 1995; Williams, 1997; Baumann, 2009) strategic culture is rooted in the domain of governmental elites and domestic bureaucracies (See also Legro, 1996; Behnke, 2000). Perspectives on normative theory perceive strategic culture as being informed by norms in the conduct of war (Weizsäcker, 1969, p. 2; Finnemore, 1996, p. 154, pp. 159-160, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 70, pp. 72-76). According to these views, national elites are the main agents of strategic culture and conflict management, and warfare its main goals.

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3 Accounts on strategic culture can be divided into three generations of scholarship. The first focuses on the role of hegemonic actors in warfare. The second regards how organizational culture influences elites’ strategic thinking in foreign policy formulation. The third concerns the improvement of methods of analysis, rather than who are the relevant units of analysis. For detailed accounts on these three generations of scholarship, see Booth, 1994; Walt, 1991; Desch, 1998; Johnston, 1995; Williams, 1996; Gray, 1999 and Lantis, 2005.
Gray (2007, p. 4) notes that ‘strategic cultural understandings are difficult to achieve and even more difficult to operationalize’. This happens not only due to a lack of consensus regarding the relevant objects of analysis, but also due to the absence of shared methods of analysis across disciplines.\(^4\) Classical definitions consider national interest, military empowerment and war winning as central features of strategic culture, departing from the notion that strategic dominance regards advantageous military position and that threat containment is primarily achieved by military means (Snyder, 1990, p. 4 and p. 7; Gray, 1999, pp. 136-51; Gray, 2007, p. 11; Klein, 1991, p. 5; Johnston, 1995, p. 46; Rynning, 2003, p. 490). These approaches reflect conceptualisations about the effects of strategic culture with respect to power relations, not in terms of inducement of policy change by means of international cooperation, empowered international institutions and comprehensive approach to security. Snyder (1977), who first coined the term, defines strategic culture as a persistence and distinctive approach (to nuclear weapons) in the face of ‘changes in the circumstances that give raise to it, through processes of socialization and institutionalization’.\(^5\) He perceives it as a form of legitimating relations among opponents. Gray addresses strategic behaviour as that relevant to the use of force for political purposes (Gray, 1999, p. 50). Klein (1991) defines strategic culture as a ‘set of attitudes and beliefs held by a military establishment concerning the political objective of war.’\(^6\) Johnston (1995) claims that strategic culture is a system of assumptions about the ‘orderliness of the strategic environment’ expressed in various ways notably the role of war, the nature of the adversary, the threat it poses and the efficient use of force against it.\(^7\) Rosen (1995, p. 12) sustains that strategic culture is sourced in the sub-set of political-military decision-makers, explaining how their behaviour determines choices about going to war. Lantis (2002, p. 94) observes that strategic culture provides the setting that determines ‘strategic policy patterns’. Part of the literature reviewed understands the notion of strategic culture as being unitary at purpose level (Gray, 1999, p. 51; 2007, p. 6) leading to conclude that all actors share similar strategic goals, which results in dismissing those actors whose external relations are not driven by military supremacy and war. Classical contributions on strategic culture adopt an approach based on broad generalisations (all actors behave alike on behalf of national interests) and causality (war as the main instrument to safeguard interests) (See Bull, 1968, p. 600; Gray,

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\(^7\) Johnston (1995, p. 46).
2007, p. 3; Rosen, 1995, pp. 13-14; Johnston, 1995, p. 49; see also Williams, 1996, p. 243). Similarly, perspectives that conceptualise strategic culture based on the roles organizational culture of state bureaucracies and military agencies have in framing and solving security problems, are less suitable to analyse the EU security culture and strategic approach. They consider that war winning and military supremacy determine relations among international actors and that technological and military superiority are the best comparative advantages of any international actor.

In a EU context, global security is both a normative and strategic goal. On the one hand, it acknowledges the universal right to peace, security and prosperity. On the other, it seeks to universalize, sometimes even to impose, a particular vision about security and a way to attain it. Despite the implicit EU instrumental focus (for instance how it ensures stability in the periphery to guarantee the stability of its core), its security stance is attained through observation of the principles of UN Charter (primacy of a rule-based international order), ‘effective multilateralism’ (international institutions and international regimes) and preventive action (use of political, economic and legal conditionalities) (European Council, 2003; Council, 2004, Council, 2007).

During the last decade, the EU evolved from a position of security beneficiary to that of a comprehensive security provider. This situation led to the adoption of new security roles focused on prevention of crisis, conflicts and rehabilitation of fragile societies and to further institutionalisation of CSDP based on the agreement of Military and Civilian Headline Goals, on the constitution of organs of political, strategic and military guidance and on the approval of the ESS.

Recent insights suggest different concerns from those of classical views (See Howorth, 2010; Biscop, 2007; Biscop, 2009, 2009a; Howorth, 2009; ISS, 2008, 2008a,b; CSDP Handbook, 2010; Martin, 2007; Venesson, 2010). They stress the importance of global values, successful norm incorporation, adaptive nature of strategic culture and suggest the possibility of operationalizing strategic culture beyond warfare. The distinct purpose of the EU as a security community and of CSDP as a policy

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8 Cf. Lepgold & Lamborn, 2001. For a discussion on the supremacy of positivist, rather then interpretivist approaches in security studies, see Duffield et al. 1999.
9 See also McDonald (2008, p. 570). Organizational culture is as much determinant over strategic choice and action, as strategic choice and action tends to be self-confirming of beliefs and security practices of specific security communities.
11 As the ESS Implementation Report notes military commitments were prioritised in line with resources, see European Council (2008, p. III.A.).
12 Adler (2008) argues that “the community (is bind) together through the collective development of a shared practice...[that]... constitutes the normative and epistemic ground for action...”
instrument requires a different approach to strategic culture. The EU new security competences result in a strategic focus that comprehends, but evolves beyond strategic bargaining and military power. The EU’s security regime is global in reach, preventive, multilaterally oriented, based on civilian and military resources, humanitarily focused and governance centred. Recent accounts explain better the emergence of security and strategic cultures among non-state actors like the EU by introducing five main elements. First, security culture entails processes of adaptation, versus the traditional idea that strategic culture has a static nature that is, all actors struggle for national interest and power. Second, they adopt a comprehensive approach to security problem solving, versus the classical focus on war winning. Third, they combine the use of military and civilian means versus the strict use of military resources. Fourth, relations among EU bureaucracies are interdependent versus the idea that national elites have an autonomous position regarding their international peers. Fifth, international socialisation plays a crucial formative role in security culture and strategic behaviour, versus the independent posture of states.

Various descriptions of strategic culture offer useful accounts to understand the EU security culture and its emergent strategic approach. Some surmount the state centric and military focus of classical notions, defining strategic culture as the ‘nations’ traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour’, as well as ‘particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force’ (Booth, 1990, p. 121 and pp. 125-126). It places the notion of strategic culture at the community level, it acknowledges its adaptive nature and highlights the relevance of value-based aspects of security. Cornish & Edwards (2005, p. 802) add trust and recognition to the procedural aspects of institutionalisation of a strategic culture, describing it as ‘the political

(p. 199); it is a “...process of... identity formation... where culture, common values and interests...” are shared (p. 200). Adler claims that through a community of practice perspective, it is possible to explain international change and adaptation. This is accomplished by replacing the security dilemmas and deterrent-based practices with security community practices that diffuse peaceful change via self-restraint (p. 220). Brackets added.

13 Some authors (Krause 1999) distinguish between strategic culture and security culture. While strategic culture is a purposeful dimension that gathers ‘both a societal or domestic and an international or externally oriented dimension (p. 12). Security culture depicts a dimensional policy, which entails ‘enduring and widely shared beliefs and traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the way in which a state’s (...) interests(...) with respect to security are perceive’ (p. 14). Meyer (2004, p. 4) offers a more workable definition of security strategy by considering it as a way to ‘prevent conflicts from evolving in the first place or to pursue certain security interests in a coherent and sustainable way.’ See also Rogers (2009, p. 836).

14 See also Toje (2009, p. 4).
and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere’. These authors note that strategic culture is not a prerogative of military alliances (Cornish & Edwards, 2001, p. 596), a perspective also shared by Biscop (2007, p. 9) who considers that ‘no useful analysis of EU strategy can be limited to military strategy’. Martinsen includes the use of civilian means, as an important resource to implement strategies. He defines strategy as the ‘threat of or legitimate use of force or the use of civilian means, in a situation where force is deemed a relevant option’ and strategic culture as consisting of the ‘aspects of security that are relevant to the externally oriented concept of strategy’ (2003, p. 9), thus differentiating between internal and international dimensions of security and strategy. Rasmussen (2005, p. 70) observes that strategic culture is about the ‘nexus between the political, strategic and military or operational dimensions of strategy’. Meyer’s (2005, p. 528) definition connects value-based elements to the way policy choices are ranked. He considers strategic culture as ‘comprising the socially transmitted identity derived from norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour that (...)help to shape and rank a set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence goals’. Margaras (2009, p. 5 and p. 14) observes that actorness may help assessing the EU’s strategic culture, being its strategic dimension primarily focused on out-of-area operations. Staden et al. (2000, p. 5) argues that a European strategic concept regards an instrumental link between the EU’s military capabilities and its political objectives, underlining the functional and material aspects of strategy.

Other contributions address the institutional conditions that lead to the development of strategic culture, rather than discussing the conceptual framework that informs it. These views consider institutionalisation of decision-making organs and policies as formative stages of strategic culture, given that it sets the political and procedural conditions necessary to select and rank goals and define the strategies to pursue them. The report authored by Lindley-French & Algieri (2005, p. 7) argues that policy institutionalisation and capacity building are necessary phases to the empowerment of a EU strategic approach. Similarly, Quille (2004, p. 430) points out that strategic culture depends from the development of institutions.

15 Later Meyer (2006, p. 20) added to the definition of strategic culture ‘norms, ideas and patterns of behaviour shared by the most influential actors.’ Emphasis added. See also Toje (2010, pp. 18-20).
16 Quoted with the author’s permission. See also Margaras (2010, p. 5).
17 This report was elaborated in the framework of the project Europe’s Global Responsibility.
as policy frameworks. These authors consider that strategic culture develops as institutionalization progresses, a perspective we share and that we consider crucial to the process of implementation of CSDP.

A number of authors find the foundations of the EU strategic approach in its foreign policy practice by stressing specific external dimensions of it (in particular in relation to NATO and the US), its scope (global) and relational dimension (consistency, coordination and coherence) within and across EU policies. Conversely to the last contributions reviewed, Shapiro & Witney (2009, p. 7) show that the problem pertaining to the development of a EU strategic approach does not lay on ‘institutional innovation’, but on a change of Europe’s approach to other international actors, namely NATO and the United States. Everts (2003, p. 1) categorizes the global dimension of EU foreign policy and Bailes (2005, p. 15) the global (beyond national interest) and post-national (beyond sovereignty and territory) dimensions of the ESS, as distinctive features of EU foreign policy and strategic approach to international affairs. In order to improve its international position, Biscop suggests (2009a, p. 10 and p. 35) that regular assessments of EU policies must be complemented with better coordination and consistency, improving the EU’s strategic approach towards other international players.

The ESS emphasizes both value-based, functional and operational requisites, when addressing the EU’s strategic approach in terms ‘that foster early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ (European Council, 2003). We claim that ESS conveys what can be identified as a ‘European security culture’ based on: shared rights and values (rule-based), identifiable risks (scarcey of natural resources, military threats and energy resources), selective strategic priorities and ways to address them (Nunes, 2011, forthcoming). Through the ESS, the EU ranks and articulates specific security concerns such as: implementation of effective multilateralism in the framework of the UN, fight against terrorism, development of a strategy towards the Middle East and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina (European Council, 2004). Further, the ESS provides a narrative for the strengthening of the European security identity, conveying what Freedman calls a ‘sense of cause, purpose and mission’ (Freedman, 2006, p. 23). The ESS offers an agreed base of goals and strategies that work as a consensually agreed platform for the Union’s external action. In 2008, these goals and strategies were assessed by the Report on the Implementation of ESS. The document reiterated the value of preventive strategies, institutional multilateralism and international regimes as core

18 For a detailed account on how the EU identifies and securitizes threats in the context of current international security, see Nunes (2011), forthcoming.
instruments for the implementation of the ESS (European Council, 2008).

Having reviewed a number of views on strategic culture, we conceptualize the EU security culture as comprehending the prevailing principles and security practices shared by Member States and conveyed by European institutions when addressing security problems. While security culture informs the security goals the EU chooses to pursue in the context of its external relations, strategic approach shapes its security practices providing the instruments to solve security problems.

**Implementing European Security**

This section examines how the implementation of CSDP contributes to strengthen the EU security culture based on three intertwined and mutually reinforcing dimensions: development of security governance (above state level), comprehensive approach (inclusive and broad dimension of EU security) and willing compliance (actors ‘participation results from political will, not from strategic hegemony or dependency). In the context of this article, implementation refers to the transformation of political will into policy goals and security policy processes, led above state level, which render the EU security policy substance and scope.

**EU security governance**

Two aspects facilitate the emergence of CSDP at a governance level. On the one hand, current international threats deem necessary alternative forms of security management beyond states (see Kirchner, 2006, pp. 948-949; Krahmann, 2003, p. 13; Webber et al., 2004, p. 5), given that governments and national military administrations are no longer able to address, coordinate and solve global security problems. On the other, further institutionalisation and interdependence of European security enables that

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20 The introduction of a contextual positioning of security principles and practices in this definition relates to the assumption that security is an adaptive process not a static condition. See also Kavalski (2008, p. 434, p. 440, p. 442).

21 This occurs for reasons of legitimacy and legality, impediment due to lack of material resources or absence of political will.
more policies are formulated at the EU level. The evolution of European security from European Security and Defence Identity to CSDP provides evidence of consolidation of a shared system of security governance, where the European level emerges as a ‘necessary framework for the elaboration of security policy, without necessarily implying integration’ (Webber et al, 2004). CSDP comprises common institutions and policy processes that ‘guide and restrain’ (Keohane, 2002, p. 15; Toje, 2009, p. 18) the interests and security practices of Member States. The implementation of CSDP results from the institutionalization of norms, thus reducing the ‘costs of instrumental decision making’ (Gehring & Oberthür, 2009, p. 136) and shaping the European security ‘community of practice’ (Adler, 2008; Adler & Barnett, 1998) committed to normative restraint in the use of force. CSDP does not aim at guaranteeing the EU a dominant position based on strategic supremacy, strategic bargain and military strength.

As pointed out by the ESS document, ‘none of the new threats is purely military nor can any be tackled by purely military means’ (European Council, 2003). According to Smith (2007, p. 456) and Meyer (2006, p. 41 and pp. 140-143) the EU is a unique security actor with less focus on pre-emptive military action and military defeat than on preventive diplomacy, reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction (also Meyer, 2005). These tasks are based on forms of international cooperation anchored to institutions, as foreseen in the ESS. The EU security governance is embedded in cooperation with other international organizations and international regimes under the label of ‘effective multilateralism’ (European Council, 2003, 2008; Council, 2004). The Union’s security culture is framed at a governance level being reliant on strong institutions of global governance, in particular the UN, by promoting regional cooperation acknowledging the value of multilateralism and by expanding the reach of international law pursuing its international activism in accordance to the mandates and principles of the UN Charter (European Council, 2008).

**Comprehensive approach to security**

The so-called new threats of terrorism, radicalization, organised crime, intractable and violent conflicts and arms proliferation rather than being unfavourable to

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22 Meyer (2004, p. 7) notes that European strategic culture is not replacing national strategic cultures.
25 See also Nunes (2011), forthcoming.
CSDP, came to stress the importance of a security approach focused on causes, rather than on consequences (European Council, 2003). It highlighted the utility of a EU people-based centred on the causes of insecurity and concerned with relating the internal and external dimensions of security (European Council, 2003). The EU conveys a security culture that departs from a principle of cosmopolitan responsibility, global in reach, cooperative in mode and humanitarian in focus (European Council, 2003, Biscop, 2007, p. 14) guided by a conviction on ‘benevolent progress’ of societies (Rynning, 2003, p. 487). The EU endorses a security culture focused on individuals and human communities as its main security referents not states, territories or military adversaries. It covers a transformational policy project based on multilateral and inclusive approach to security. This comprehensive approach encompasses military and non-military aspects of security management (European Council, 2008; European Council, 2003; Lisbon Treaty, 2007), close cooperation among EU organs and policy programmes (Council 2007, pp. 11-18; Council, 2010, p. IX) and with other international institutions (European Council, 2003, p. III) adopting an inclusive approach to the dimensions of security, governance and development. The EU, through CFSP and CSDP, embodies a distinct form of security governance that crosses policies and includes multiple intervening actors within and outside the Union. It is comprehensive in the sense it includes foreign, security, humanitarian and economic dimensions of crisis management and conflict prevention. This distinctiveness strengthens its broad-range approach to security, drawing on a diversity of foreign and security policy resources to deal with security challenges from humanitarian aid, to security sector reform and state building (Council, 2008).


28 On the notion of referent object, see Buzan et al (1991, p. 26).

29 For a detailed account regarding how the various EU actors operate in the context of crisis management, see Hadden (2009, pp. 46-49).
Willing Compliance and Coalescent Responsibilities

A last element relevant for the development of a EU security culture regards the process of participation of Member States in European security, based on the willing compliance and on the coalescence of responsibilities among EU policy actors. The voluntary basis of political participation determines that adherence of participant states in European security is bound by political will, not by strategic hegemony or dependency that is, compliance does not occur due to ‘threats and payments’ (Nye, 2004, p. 15). The implementation of CSDP happens on the basis of ‘loose cooperation’ (Howorth, 2007), willing Europeanization of foreign and security policy (Radaelli & O’Connor, 2009; Torreblanca, 2001; Nunes, 2006), institutionalised cooperation and multilateral coordination (Smith, 2004, 2006; E. Smith, 2007; Bono, 2004). The implementation of European security is both guided by constitutive norms based on willing compliance (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 42, Protocol 10) and conditioned by Members States constitutional constraints, other multilateral commitments with respect to international organizations (Articles 28, 42) and bilateral arrangements with other strategic partners. CSDP is also bound by certain categories of regulative norms (e.g. Treaty of Lisbon Article 5, 28, 29, 31, 34, European Commission, 2006; EU Concept, 2006; EU Code Conduct, 1998; Directive 2009) with formal prescriptive effect. The lack of a strict regulative dimension of CSDP is acknowledged by some authors as a highly effective way to implement European security and an indicator of its normative strength (Pape, 2005; Nye, 2004). While for others, it is at the origin of severe setbacks on the agreement on goals, capabilities and effective international engagement (Hyde-Price, 2004; Everts, 2003; Brooks & Wohlforth, 2005), thus compromising the development of a common strategic approach to international affairs. The inclusive nature of European security allows Member States to participate on CSDP according to their preferences, specific degree of expertise, level of civilian and military resources available and observation of Member States constitutional constraints (e.g. Ireland, Denmark and Germany until 1997).

The specific character of EU security culture also results from the intervention of multiple policy actors with shared responsibilities. The reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon codify better the vertical distribution of responsibilities (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007; Reh, 2009, p. 646) among various policy actors tasked with external representation functions, strategic guidance and coordination of the civilian/military,

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30 Europeanization in this context regards both formal (adoption by Member States’ administrations of regulative measures) and informal (incorporation of value-based measures) top down impact of EU’s policies over Member States administrations and policies.
security/defence and aid/development dimensions of the EU external action. The European Council, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Lisbon Treaty, Article 27) and related supporting organs, the President of the European Council (Article 15), the Commission (Article 17) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) held various responsibilities in the domain of policy coordination, implementation and strategic guidance of CSDP. The ESS itself identifies key threats and strategic objectives that require the contribution of different policy actors and policy dimensions to help preventing, containing or solving security problems (Council, 2003, Part I II; Council 2010a). The institutionalisation of military and political organs (EU Military Committee, Military Staff and Political and Security Committee) (Council Decision, 2001, 2001a, 2005) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability strengthen the EU political and strategic outlook.

Various are the views whether or not the EU shares a strategic culture. Those that deny its existence, argue that it lacks an agreement on ranked strategic priorities and suffers from insufficient military capabilities to address threats (Hyde-Price, 2004; Margaras, 2009; Rynning, 2003; Anderson & Seitz, 2006; Toje, 2005, 2010). These perspectives are reinforced by the fact the contributions agreed on the Headline Goals since 1999, reveal a propensity to pledge and build up capabilities, before outlining the goals, the strategies and the scenarios where they may be used (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010, p. 3; Nunes, 2006; Bono, 2004; Staden et al, 2000; Bailes, 2005). The perspectives that advocate the emergence of a EU security culture are based on acknowledged shared principles (democracy, rule of law, human rights) and specific security practices (security governance, comprehensiveness and coalescence) relying on two observations. First, that the normative foundation is the base of EU security dimension, not military dominance, territorial control and strategic bargain. Second, that its inclusive, broad and voluntary nature is regarded as the EU best comparative advantage when compared to other security organizations (Bailes, 2005; Meyer, 2006; Cornish & Edwards, 2005; Howorth, 2007; Smith, 2007; Biscop, 2009a). These views frequently presented as irreconcilable, contain useful elements to explain how the implementation of CSDP generates and is generated by an emergent EU security culture. While values and principles shape perceptions, expectations and policy actions, strategies guide security practices. The CSDP draws international leverage from its value-based stance, advocating the primacy of the rights of individuals over those of states (cosmopolitan approach to security) and a conviction on the universalization of moral rights. This value-based stance underpins

31 For accounts concerning the type of operations the EU should conduct, with which priorities and in which scenarios see Biscop (2009a), Gnesotto (2009) and Howorth (2009, 2010).
legitimacy, capacity and willing compliance to respond to the new demands of international insecurity founded on the EU preventive and comprehensive approach to security.\textsuperscript{32} Such approach is translated into the EU’s ability to address broadly to current security challenges, providing a security framework that NATO and Member States tend to mimic.\textsuperscript{33} The development of a EU security culture crosses policy domains and practices of multilateral and international cooperation to safeguard the Union’s interests and those of human communities in unstable regions. The implementation of CSDP is an adaptive process dependent from Member States’ political willingness, from the EU institutional, political and operational developments and from structural conditions of international insecurity.

**Operationalization of CSDP**

The operationalization of CSDP entails a process of transformation of political will and policy goals into policy instruments shaped by two orders of elements: substantive and procedural. Substantive aspects pertain to the fact that the ESS was drawn during a contending political momentum following the 9/11, the terrorist attacks of London and Madrid and the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the fact the ESDP emerged during a new threat configuration, it was not specifically designed to address it, even considering that there was motive and urgency to strengthen the EU as a more proactive and committed strategic actor. The security logic underlining European security is not based on a zero-sum approach driven by military gains, but rather by a transformative security project based on global dimensions of security, capacity building and strong reliance on international cooperation. The procedural development of CSDP occurred amid the disturbing effects of fight on terrorism and growing concerns with arms proliferation, failed states and fragile societies, which reinforced the idea that the operationalization of security comprehended more than military solutions (Council, 2004). In the face of broader and less well-defined challenges to security, the Lisbon Treaty adopted various steps leading to procedural operationalization of CSDP. The Treaty set a single institutional framework to improve consistency, coherence and monitorization

\textsuperscript{32} Lindley-French et al.\textsuperscript{(2010, p. 2)} define comprehensive approach as a “cross-governmental generation and application of security, governance and development services, expertise, structures and resources over time and distance in partnership with host nations, host regions, allied and partner governments and partner institutions, both governmental and non-governmental.”

\textsuperscript{33} See also Biscop (2007, p. 14).
of policies by various EU actors (High Representative, the Commission, the Council and European Defence Agency). The Treaty incorporated additional politically binding clauses and instruments necessary to a more effective operationalization of the military and civilian Headline Goals.

Two new provisions were agreed in order to improve the EU response to direct threats and crisis: the Solidarity Clause and the agreement on mutual aid in case of an armed aggression. The Solidarity Clause (Treaty of Lisbon, Article 222) contribution to a new form of EU security management is twofold: a better articulation between international and internal dimension of security and the introduction of a natural disaster relief component. This clause connects the internal and external dimension of security and links man made with non-man made threats or calamities. The Mutual Defence Clause (Article 42.7), activated in case Member States fall victims of an armed aggression against their territory, imposes a legally binding obligation to Member States to engage in the common defence and politically presses them for a common response. Both provisions underline the dimension of willing and regulative compliance of European security as referred earlier.

Two other mechanisms were institutionalised avoiding a standstill of CSDP: enhanced cooperation and Permanent Structured Cooperation. Enhanced cooperation was extended to the Union’s non-exclusive competences’ (Article 20) enabling that those decisions, which the Union cannot attain as a whole, provided that at least nine Member States participate in it, can still be implemented (Article 338 (2)). This provision enables overcoming the effects of political unwillingness, constitutional constraints or those derived from other multilateral or bilateral commitments of Member States (Article 327) over the EU external action.

The institutionalisation of a mechanism of Permanent Structure Cooperation (PSC) facilitates the constitution of flexible coalitions, able to carry out civilian and military tasks (Article 43), according to a ‘principle of a single set of forces’ (Treaty of Lisbon, Protocol 10) strengthening the coercive capability to CSDP. The mechanism of PSC by setting higher functional criteria for the participation of Member States will claim for a better definition of the EU’s strategic goals and priorities in international affairs. Five aspects can be pointed out about the impact of PSC on European security. First, PSC binds up political will with operational capability to commit forces, namely combat units for periods that may mediate between 30 and 120 days (Protocol 10, Article 1). Force commitments will imply a better definition

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35 See also Gnesotto (2009, p. 37).
36 On PSC see also Biscop (2008).
of the security goals to be attained, of the conditions in which forces will be employed and a more adequate selection of resources. Consequently, eligibility to participate will be determined by willingness to share risks and commit resources based on prior operational experience. As Freedman (2004, p. 16) observes, combat and command experience of large units of troops are crucial for the development of future EU military doctrine. This will give the lead to those participating states that are strategically more capable (in particularly regarding deployability, interoperability and sustainability), technologically better equipped and experienced in expeditionary warfare. It is likely and desirable that those strategically more capable will be the ones to influence the outline the EU strategies, if operational efficiency is to be retained. Article 42 of the Treaty reinforced the provisions of the Protocol on PSC, supported on a concept of willing, generated among those who have made ‘more binding commitments’ and the concept of able among those ‘whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria’ and that have participated in the ‘most demanding missions’ (Article 42(6), see also Biscop, 2004a). The concept of willing does not pertain to a mere symbolic manifestation of political support, but to effective engagement and efficient performance. In the absence of a deeper level of military integration, further operationalization of CSDP is strengthened by the possibility envisaged by the Council to hand over the execution of certain security tasks to a framework nation, in order to protect the Union’s values and interests (Article 42(5). This provision applies on the base of political willingness and real capability to carry out a given security task, namely command and control functions (Article 44). Second, the PSC functional and organizational demands will press for a better definition of strategic priorities, types of missions and choice of theatres where to operate (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010, p. 9). International engagement ought to be based on well-defined strategies and high level of readiness and preparedness, based on a clear mandate before, during and after crisis and conflicts, thus avoiding the propensity to let capabilities determine strategic goals. In this context, the EDA’s Comprehensive Capability Development Process is an important point of departure to harmonize security goals, to assess which capabilities are needed, for which mission, with what planning, command/control structure and financing. Third, the operationalization of PSC will require better interoperability, suggesting


The future role of EDA will depend on two developments. First, on the growing receptiveness of Member States administrations to top-down monitoring of procurement and validation of ability and performance to take part in military missions at the European level. Second, from an agreement on the legal empowerment of EDA’s role.
a need for procurement harmonisation at the national level, within services and among participant states and similar doctrines of force employment and conduct of operations. Fourth, PSC call for a process of force accreditation based on efficiency, strengthening the EDA’s role to monitor and evaluate national contributions with respect to capabilities. Fifth, it will offer governments the opportunity to introduce reforms in the armed forces and to review national procurement policies on the base of tangible goals, cost-effectiveness and real operational requirements essential to the development of a coherent strategic approach to international affairs. Consequently, it may lead governments to an effective centralisation of defence management under a EU framework. This may allow overcoming ‘inter-service rivalry and defence industries’ lobbying (Witney, 2008, p. 32), which result in unnecessary duplications. Procurement projects must meet real operational necessities, thus mitigating defence establishments’ idiosyncrasies and interests.8 This will demand a more balanced defence spending, where procurement efforts have to meet actual and future strategic targets.

Permanente Structured Cooperation will encourage Member States to develop and deepen cooperation, between the military and non-military dimensions of CSDP and to strengthen the conditions for the operationalization of a European strategic approach, based on functional requirements. These demands will involve:

- Harmonising CSDP goals and policies, improving consistency;
- Harmonising EU force concepts, increasing efficiency;
- Pooling resources in situations of higher operational complexity, enhancing performance;
- Sharing capabilities within national armed forces and among participant states, reducing the global costs of operations;
- Promoting cooperation in the field of training and logistics, furthering interoperability;
- Providing incentive to role specialisation, where appropriate (Protocol 10, Article 2(b), particularly on what regards strategic facilitators such as: command, control, communications and strategic mobility;
- Enhancing expeditionary capability in the framework of CSDP, enhancing European actoriness.

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8 For a view on the impact of inter-organizational competition on defence cooperation, see Baumann (2009, pp. 5-10).
The European Defence Agency (EDA) will also concur to the enhancement of the Union’s strategic approach. The EDA may contribute to a process of harmonization of policies and capabilities by monitoring and assessing the contributions of Member States with regard to capabilities (Protocol 10, Article 3). It was also entrusted with the task to identify and implement measures required to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, identifying the required European capabilities and armaments policy (Article 42).

Many claim that the edification of a European strategic approach requires a better definition of strategic choice, purpose and scope. Nonetheless, a EU strategic approach is already emerging, when security challenges lead to decisions with implications in the security field; procedures of consultation on security and defence are institutionalised and security tasks are conducted. All this is more than a formalization of political consensus. It derives from shared believes about security goals, means and ends. The limitations to the operationalization of CSDP, especially on occasions of international crisis, are more likely to depend from European governments domestic constraints than to the inability of the EU to deliver as a security provider. In situations of international instability, where military alliances and great powers are unwelcomed or unsuitable, the EU may prove to be the better security partner due to its self-portrayed image as a normative and benign security actor. The CSDP is not a device to counter-weight classical security dilemmas, but a policy to address, prevent and manage broader security problems, complementing and filling important security gaps that other security organizations are unable to meet, in particularly in the domain of crisis and conflict prevention and post-conflict management.

Conclusions

The article discussed traditional and new approaches to strategic culture having considered the various units and levels of analyses and the extent to which they are helpful to explain a EU strategic approach to international affairs. Established views on strategic culture are based on states’ bureaucracies as the enablers of strategy; on military threat as an essential condition for strategies to emerge; on military superiority, bargain and warfare as the ends of strategies and military resources as the best mean to accomplish them. These elements proved to fit poorly to European security. The EU does not share a strategic culture in the classical sense, given its value and normative approach to security, its wide-ranging way to address security problem-solving and its complex set of external relations binding
the field of security with those of governance and development. European security culture emerges from a security regime where stability is a normative goal and international cooperation the main instrument to accomplish it. We overcame the difficulties inherent to classical notions of strategic culture by analysing how political will is transformed into security policy instruments and actions. We sought to solve the weak relation found in the literature between security culture based on principles and security practices, and strategic approach pertaining to policy action and instruments. The article connected security perceived as a condition necessary to stability, to strategy as the way to perpetuate or restore security in a situation of contending interests. This distinction was then applied to the analysis of CSDP, respectively from the point of view of implementation (institutionalization of policy goals, policies and processes) and operationalization (presence of policy instruments enabling security action).

The EU strategic culture results from patterns of differentiation that, although consistent with in-group representations are not necessarily structured around the notions of enmity, military superiority or strategic gain. In classical views, states’ administrations have the monopoly of strategic culture, being formal alliances responsible for its operationalization. This reflects conceptualisations of security and strategy that may shape the subjective perceptions of national security and defence administrations, but that offer little explanation about the EU emergent security culture and strategic approach, as depicted in the ESS and assessed by the Implementation Report. The CSDP, despite being intergovernmental, is implemented and operationalized with the intervention of various policy actors, crossing policy issues and policy domains. The EU security culture is comprehensive in scope, incorporating the levels of security, governance and development, with a strong focus on institutional multilateralism. Its inclusive strategic approach induces cooperation rather than rivalry and competition. The EU emergent security culture departs from attempts to universalize a demo-liberal value-base system (democracy, rule of law, human rights and international law). This means that the conduct underpinning the EU security culture is not strictly related to the interests of Member States’ administrations and EU organs and representatives, but drawn from international norms and principles, under the auspices of the United Nations Charter.

The article asserts that the implementation of CSDP comprehends diverse preferences of Member States, European institutions and communities of security and defence experts. A number of shared understandings among Member States can be identified concerning the principles that guide the EU’s international action (democracy, human rights, good governance and international law) shaping its
security practices (multilateralism, preventive action, ownership and post conflict management). The articulation between implementation of European security and security culture will be stronger, as security challenges increase interdependence among Member States and external conditions require further institutionalization of EU policies. This will contribute to the hybridization of security cultures and strategic focuses among EU policy actors and Member States.

The development of a EU strategic approach, namely through CSDP, has less to do with a military advantageous dimension of EU security than with a preventive and global outlook towards actual or potential security challenges. The EU strategic focus will comprehend, but evolve beyond the use of military force. This approach is attained by promoting regional and international cooperation, by inducing effective and legitimate ownership of security problem-solving and by actively engaging, if and when required, with military means.

The response to security problems will be less guided by Member States’ strategic outlooks, than by how much external threats and domestic conditions will demand for better multilateral solutions. The development of EU security will not progress as integration deepens, but rather as interdependent security among states narrows. The prioritisation of strategic goals will be conditioned by the future developments of a EU’s strategic culture and strategic approach, intended to tone down negative representations of Other. This occurs at a time when Member States, especially those who are major contributors to European security (UK, France, Germany and The Netherlands), are adopting public discourses and policy measures in the domain of national security, emigration and counter-terrorism that may hamper the perceptions of a benign and normative EU. Further research is necessary on the CSDP transformational global project (as commonly addressed in the context of foreign and security policy) and the more territorial and regulated dimension of the Union’s internal security dimension, in order to evaluate how the course of these two policy dimensions will affect the EU’s strategic approach to international affairs.

The articles suggests that the institutionalization of instruments like Enhanced Cooperation and PSC by placing a higher level of functional demand on participant states are likely to improve consistency, enhance performance and reduce the costs of international missions. A fully fledge CSDP will claim for internal reforms of national defence administrations, better coordination between the military and civilian dimensions of security and improved cooperation with other security organizations, if a balance between cost-efficiency is to be achieved.

Further developments of European security and a better definition of its strategic focus will depend on various steps. First, the agreement on a method of European
strategic review based on successful security practices drawn from lessons learnt. Second, the security, governance and development dimensions of the EU external relations will require a better and mutually reinforcing coordination among EU institutions and Member States administrations. Third, adjust the EU policies and instruments to what the Union does better based on wide-ranging resources and broad expertise, in particular in preventive crisis management and post-conflict resolution, strengthening its comparative advantage as compared to other security organizations. Fourth, the EU should provide the security goods, which states individually are no longer able to deliver and complementing or taking the lead, where other international security organizations are unable or unwilling to intervene.

The future of European security depends on well-defined policy goals, strategies and stronger capabilities, but also on how national security and defence administrations will perceive the advantages of European security. The current budget constraints and the general climate of ontological insecurity pose challenges to the development of structures of security governance, in Europe and in the transatlantic context. In the absence of security organizations, states will be unwilling on their own to allocate scarce resources to respond to security challenges and threats. In their presence, they face the choice to balance their economies and justify cuts in public spending, while fulfilling the financial and material demands of common and collective security. This situation will press the EU for a more efficient implementation and operationalization of CSDP guided by tangible goals, preventive strategies and selective security tasks, notably crisis and conflict prevention, state reconstruction and development. A consensus on the EU’s future security tasks is likely to be more relevant than a perfectly harmonized strategic culture, born out of complex hybridization of Member States security cultures.

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