

# No. 9035

# AGGREGATION AND THE "RANDOM OBJECTIVE" JUSTIFICATION FOR DISTURBANCES IN COMPLETE DEMAND SYSTEMS

by Michael R. Baye, 330.115.121 Dennis W. Jansen and Qi Li

June 1990

ISSN 0924-7815

# Aggregation and the "Random Objective" Justification for Disturbances in Complete Demand Systems

Michael R. Baye" Texas A&M University Dennis W. Jansen Texas A&M University

Qi Li

Texas A&M University

April 1990

#### Abstract

This paper demonstrates that, under plausible ergodicity conditions, the "random objective function" justification for disturbances in complete demand systems is not relevant when aggregate data are employed. In fact, we show that if the sole source of disturbances in individual demand equations is individualspecific unobservables and aggregate data are employed, then the implied errors in demand and share equations are almost surely zero.

\*Research Fellow, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University.

.

#### 1 Introduction

A nagging criticism of empirical analyses of complete demand systems is the *ad hoc* tacking on of disturbances.<sup>1</sup> Recent advances in economic theory (see Brown and Walker (1989); Chavas and Segerson (1987); and McElroy (1987)), provide a microeconomic rationale for the inclusion of random errors in *individual* demand equations. In essence, this line of research assumes that some components of the individual objective functions are known only by the individuals, and that the econometrician models these unobservables as varying across individuals according to some distribution function. In the context of consumer demand theory this is known as the *random utility model*; see Brown and Walker.

An important implication of the random objective function justification for disturbances is that additive disturbances and neoclassical restrictions together imply heteroskedasticity. Thus the random objective function explanation for disturbances is important not only because it provides a rationale for including errors in demand equations, but also because it suggests that heteroskedasticity may be at the root of the pervasive rejections of neoclassical consumer demand theory.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that, under plausible ergodicity conditions, the random objective function justification for (and the resulting heteroskedasticity of) disturbances does not apply to models based on aggregate data. In essence, there is a potential *fallacy of composition*: the fact that individual demands are subject to heteroskedastic errors does not imply that demand models based on aggregate data possess heteroskedastic errors. In fact, we show that if the sole source of disturbances in individual demand equations is individual-specific unobservables, as is implied by the random objective function approach, then the implied errors in demand (or share) equations based on aggregate data are almost surely zero. Moreover, our results hold regardless of whether individual demands satisfy the conditions of exact linear or nonlinear aggregation.

2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>See, for instance, Barten (1977).

### 2 The Random Utility Model and Individual Demand

For expositional convenience, we shall present our results in the context of neoclassical consumer theory and Brown-Walker's random utility model. Consider an economy consisting of a H individuals, each of whom attempt to maximize utility subject to a competitive budget constraint:

$$\max_{x^h} \{ U^h(x^h, \epsilon^h) : p \cdot x^h \le y^h \}.$$
(1)

Here,  $U^h: \Re_{++}^n \times \Re^m \to \Re$  is individual h's (ordinal) quasiconcave utility function that is assumed to be regular strictly quasiconcave in the *n*-vector of commodities,  $x^h$ ; *p* is the vector of prices corresponding to  $x^h$ , and  $y^h$  denotes the income of individual  $h.^2$  The distinguishing feature of the random utility model is that the utility of individual h depends on an *m*-vector of "disturbances,"  $\epsilon^h$ , which are known by the individual but are not observable by the econometrician.

The vector-valued function that solves equation 1 (the Marshallian demand vector) is denoted by

$$x^{h} = g^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h}).$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

In order to empirically implement the above theory, one must first impose structure on  $g^h$ . Typically, the structure imposed involves an additive disturbance vector, so that the Marshallian demand vector of consumer h is given by

$$x^{h} = g^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h}) \equiv f^{h}(p, y^{h}) + v^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h}),$$
(3)

where  $v^h$  is an  $n \times 1$  disturbance vector induced by the distribution of  $\epsilon^h$ , and is assumed to satisfy  $E[v^h | p, y^h] = 0$  and  $var(v^h | p, y^h] = \Omega^h(p, y^h)$ . The specification in equation 3 is termed the *additive RUM <u>demand</u> specification*. Thus, the random utility model provides a microeconomic basis for incorporating additive disturbances in complete demand systems.

Unfortunately, for the deterministic part of equation 3  $[f^h(p, y^h)]$  to satisfy the neoclassical Slutsky symmetry restrictions, it is known that the disturbance vector

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Note that this analysis assumes all individuals face the same *exogenous* price vector, p. This assumption is not innocous; see Anglin and Baye (1987).

 $v^h$  must be functionally dependent on p,  $y^h$ , or both.<sup>3</sup> Thus, given a time series of observations on the consumption behavior of *individual* h, the underlying vector of disturbances are almost everywhere heteroskedastic.<sup>4</sup>

As an alternative, one might consider writing the components of equation 2 in share form

$$w_i^h \equiv \frac{p_i x_i^h}{y^h} = \phi_i^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h), (i = 1, 2, \dots, n)$$
(4)

and assume the share equations involve an additive disturbance term. In this case individual h's share equation for good i is given by

$$w_i^h = \phi_i^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h) \equiv \psi_i^h(p, y^h) + v_i^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h), \tag{5}$$

where again,  $v_i^h$  is the disturbance term for the *i*th good induced by the distribution of  $\epsilon^h$ . The vector of  $v_i^h$ 's are assumed to satisfy  $E[v^h \mid p, y^h] = 0$  and  $var(v^h \mid p, y^h] = \Gamma^h(p, y^h)$ . The specification in equation 5 is termed the *additive RUM share* specification.

As is the case for the additive run demand specification, for the deterministic part of equation 5  $[\psi_i^h(p, y^h)]$  to satisfy the neoclassical Slutsky symmetry restriction, the disturbance vector  $v^h$  must be functionally dependent on p,  $y^h$ , or both.<sup>5</sup>

To summarize, the RUM model and additive errors implies heteroskedastic errors in individual demand and share equations.

## 3 The Random Utility Model and Aggregate Behavior

Many empirical studies of demand analysis are based on aggregate time series data, and it is thus important to examine implications of the random utility model for econometric models based on aggregate data. Our first proposition reveals that the random utility model is not generally an appropriate justification for the presence of disturbances in *per capita* demand equations. First, however, we introduce

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>See Brown and Walker's Theorem 2.

See, Brown and Walker's Theorem 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>See Brown and Walker's Theorem 3.

Definition 1 (Ergodic) A discrete parameter process  $\{v_i^h\}$  is said to be ergodic if  $\lim_{H\to\infty} var(\overline{v_i}(H)) = 0$ , where  $\overline{v_i}(H) = \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} v_i^h$ .

**Proposition 1** Suppose an economy consists of H individuals whose behavior implies an additive RUM <u>demand</u> specification, as in equation 3. If the individual disturbance vectors,  $v^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h})$  [h = 1, 2, 3, ..., H] are ergodic,<sup>6</sup> then the error in aggregate per capita demand is almost surely zero for large H.

Proof. Summing equation 3 over h yields

$$\sum_{h=1}^{H} x^{h} = \sum_{h=1}^{H} g^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h}) \equiv \sum_{h=1}^{H} f^{h}(p, y^{h}) + \sum_{h=1}^{H} v^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h}),$$
(6)

so that the vector of per capita demand functions for an economy with H individuals is given by

$$\overline{x}(H) \equiv \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} x^{h} = \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} f^{h}(p, y^{h}) + \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} v^{h}(p, y^{h}, \epsilon^{h})$$
(7)

$$= \phi(p, y^1, y^2, \dots, y^H) + \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} v^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h).$$
(8)

But since  $\{v_i^h\}$  forms an ergodic sequence with zero mean, it follows that (cf. Parzen, p. 72)

$$\lim_{H\to\infty}\overline{v_i}(H) \equiv \lim_{H\to\infty}\frac{1}{H}\sum_{h=1}^{H}v_i^h(p,y^h,\epsilon^h) = 0.$$

Remark 1 It is important to note that Proposition 1 holds whether or not individual demand vectors satisfy the conditions of exact linear aggregation. However, when individual preferences satisfy the (Gorman) conditions for exact linear aggregation, the individual demands are linear in income and thus

$$\overline{x}(H) \equiv \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^{H} f^{h}(p, y^{h}) \equiv f(p, \overline{y}(H)),$$
(9)

where  $\overline{y}(H) = \sum_{h=1}^{H} y^{h}/H$  is per capita income. One example of a demand system that satisfies these conditions is the linear expenditure system.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>A vector is ergodic if each component is ergodic.

Our next proposition deals with aggregate budget share equations, since many empirical studies that employ aggregate data are based on budget share specifications.<sup>7</sup> We first present the following lemma, which is used to prove our Proposition 2.

Lemma 1 Suppose the sequence of individual disturbances for good i,  $v_i^h$ , has a bounded covariance kernel,  $cov(v_i^h, v_i^j)$  [h, j = 1, 2, ..., H]. Then a necessary and sufficient condition for the individual disturbances to be ergodic is

$$\lim_{H \to \infty} cov(v_i^H, \overline{v_i}(H)) = \lim_{H \to \infty} \frac{1}{H} \sum_{j=1}^H cov(v_i^H, v_i^j) = 0.$$

Proof. See Parzen, pp. 74-75.

The Lemma states that a stochastic process is ergodic if and only if the covariance between the sample mean of the individual disturbances and the last sampled individual's disturbance approaches zero as the number of individuals in the sample approaches infinity. We use this result to prove that the random utility model is not generally a justification for errors in aggregate share equation models.

**Proposition 2** Suppose an economy consists of H individuals, whose behavior implies additive RUM share specification, as in equation 5. Further suppose that the ratio of the maximum individual income to the average income is uniformly bounded, in the sense that there exists a fixed number, G, such that  $Y_U/\overline{y}(H) \leq G < \infty$  for all H, where  $Y_U = \max_h \{y^h\}$ . Then if the individual disturbance vectors,  $v^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h)$ ,  $h = 1 \cdots H$ , are ergodic, the error term in a budget share model based on aggregate data is almost surely zero for large H.

*Proof:* Note that the budget share for good i appearing in models based on aggregate data can be written as

$$\overline{w}_i \equiv \frac{\sum_{h=1}^H p_i x_i^h}{\sum_{h=1}^H y^h} = \sum_{h=1}^H \theta^h w_i^h, \tag{10}$$

where

$$\theta^h = \frac{y^h}{\sum_{h=1}^H y^h}$$

<sup>7</sup>Examples include Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Christensen Jorgenson and Lau (1975).

is individual h's fraction of total income in the economy. Applying equation 10 to equation 5, the budget share based on aggregate data is given by

$$\overline{w}_i = \sum_{h=1}^H \theta^h \psi_i^h(p, y^h) + \sum_{h=1}^H \theta^h v_i^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h).$$
(11)

We will show that the last term in equation 11, namely

$$\overline{z_i}(H) = \sum_{h=1}^{H} \theta^h v_i^h(p, y^h, \epsilon^h),$$

tends to zero under the conditions of the theorem. By Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show that  $Cov(z_i^H, \overline{z_i}(H))$  tends to zero as H tends to infinity, where

$$z_i^h \equiv H \theta^h v_i^h \equiv rac{y^h}{\overline{y}(H)} v_i^h.$$

Now<sup>8</sup>

$$\begin{split} Cov(z_i^H \overline{z_i}(H)) &= \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^H cov(z_i^H, z_i^h) \\ &= \frac{1}{H} \left(\frac{1}{\overline{y}(H)}\right)^2 \sum_{h=1}^H cov(y^H v_i^H, v_i^h y^h) \\ &\leq \left(\frac{Y_U}{\overline{y}(H)}\right)^2 \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^H Cov(v_i^H, v_i^h). \end{split}$$

But by the ergodicity of  $v_i^h$ ,  $\lim_{H\to\infty} \frac{1}{H} \sum_{h=1}^H Cov(v_i^H, v_i^h) = 0$ . Since

$$\left(\frac{Y_U}{\overline{y}(H)}\right)^2 \le G < \infty,$$

it follows that  $Cov(z_i^H \overline{z_i}(H)) \to 0$  as  $H \to \infty$ . By the corrolary, this implies

$$\lim_{H\to\infty}\overline{z_i}(H)=0$$

as required. D

Remark 2 Note that Proposition 2 holds whether or not individual demand vectors satisfy the conditions of exact aggregation. However, when individual preferences satisfy the (Muellbauer, 1975) conditions for exact nonlinear aggregation, then

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>We assume, without loss of generality, that the covariances are positive.

$$\overline{w_i} \equiv \sum_{h=1}^{H} \theta^h \psi^h(p, y^h) \equiv \psi(p, y^*(y^1, \dots, y^H, p)),$$

where  $y^{\bullet}$  is usually interpreted as the "representative" consumer's budget level. One demand system that satisfies these conditions is Deaton and Muellbauer's (1980) almost ideal demand system.

Thus if income is bounded, in the sense that the ratio of the highest individual income to average income is finite as the population grows to infinity, then the ergodicity of errors in individual budget share equations implies that the errors in the aggregate budget share equation converges to zero in large populations.

The conditions of the theorem would be violated, for example, if one individual had all the income, because then  $Y_U/\overline{y}(H) = H$ , which is unbounded. On the other hand, the condition clearly holds if income is evenly distributed, since in this case  $Y_U/\overline{y}(H) = 1$ . Further, if a subset of the population containing K members receives all of the income, and if income is equally divided among the K members, then

$$\frac{y_U}{\overline{y}(H)} = \frac{y/K}{y/H} = \frac{H}{K}.$$

If K/H is a fixed proportion (e.g. 1%) then H/K is finite, and the conditions of the theorem are satisfied.

#### 4 Examples

A (trivial) example of a situation where the individual disturbance vectors satisfy the conditions of Propositions 1 and 2 is the case where the individual disturbances,  $v_i^h$ , are independently and identically distributed *across individuals*.<sup>9</sup> The following three nontrivial examples show how the use of aggregate data can lead to RUM errors that are almost surely zero.

**Example 1** Consider an economy where, at each point in time, the individual disturbance vectors in equations 3 or 5 are correlated within families. Formally,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>In this case, Proposition 1 is not very revealing because the per capita errors tend to zero by the law of large numbers.

let  $M_k$  denote the number of individuals in family k, and let  $F_k$  denote the set of individuals belonging to family k.

Then

$$cov(v_i^h, v_i^j) = \begin{cases} \sigma_{ii}^k & \text{if } h, j \in F_k \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Now let  $M = \max_k \{M_k\}$ , and  $\sigma_{ii} = \max_k \{\sigma_{ii}^k\} < \infty$ . Hence

$$var(\overline{v_i}(H)) = \frac{1}{H^2} E\left[\sum_{h=1}^{H} v_i^h\right]^2 \le \frac{1}{H^2} \left[\frac{H}{M} M^2 \sigma_{ii}\right] = \frac{M}{H} \sigma_{ii},$$

which tends to zero as  $\frac{M}{H}$  tends to zero.

Thus, if the maximal family size relative to the total size of the population tends to zero for large populations, and disturbances are only correlated among individuals in the same family, the random utility model cannot explain the presence of disturbances in demand models based on aggregate data.

Example 2 Suppose that, an a given point in time, disturbances are correlated across individuals according to

$$v_i^h = \rho_i v_i^{h-1} + \eta_i^h,$$

where  $\eta_i^h$  is  $iid(0, \sigma_{\eta_i}^2)$  and  $\rho_i \in [0, 1)$ . Further assume that  $var(v_i^1) = \sigma_{\eta_i}^2/\tau_i$ , where  $\tau_i$  is an arbitrary positive number. Then one can show that

$$\max_{h} \{ var \ v_{i}^{h} \} = \max\{\frac{\sigma_{\eta_{i}}^{2}}{1-\rho_{i}^{2}}, \frac{\sigma_{\eta_{i}}^{2}}{\tau_{i}} \} = \sigma_{ii}.$$

If the agents are indexed according to their geographic location, this specification may be interpreted as a situation where each individual's disturbance for a good is related to that of his "neighbor," and these disturbances follow an AR(1)-type specification. In other words, individual disturbances are geographically correlated.<sup>10</sup>

In this instance, it is immediate that, for j = 0, 1, 2, ...,

$$cov(v_i^h, v_i^{h+j}) = \rho_i^j var(v_i^h) \le \rho_i^j \sigma_{ii},$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>See Bronars and Jansen (1988) for an empirical application of time series methods to data ordered on a two dimensional lattice (i.e. geographically).

which tends to zero as j tends to infinity. Using Lemma 1, one can show that this implies  $v_i^h$  is ergodic. Hence, under the conditions of this example, the errors in models based on aggregate data are almost surely zero for large H.

**Example 3** As a final example, suppose the total population, H, can be decomposed into a N groups, with  $M_k$  individuals in group k, and let  $F_k$  denote the set of individuals belonging to group k [k = 1, 2, ..., N]. For concreteness, one can think of the groups as individuals living within a given square mile of real estate. Thus,  $H = M_1 + M_2 + \cdots + M_N$ . Suppose that individuals within a group have disturbances that are perfectly correlated, and the disturbances between groups are correlated as an AR(1)-type process. This example is relevant, for example, when rainfall is the unobservable variable (the  $\epsilon^h$ ) from the econometrician's point of view, and where there is a correlation across geographic space in the amount of rainfall.

More formally, suppose that for  $h \in F_k$  and  $j \in F_l$  with  $k \ge l$ 

$$cov(v_i^h, v_i^j) = \rho_i^{k-l} \sigma_{ii}^l,$$

where again  $\rho_i \in [0, 1)$ . As before, let  $M = \max_k \{M_k\}$ , and  $\sigma_{ii} = \max_k \{\sigma_{ii}^k\} < \infty$ . Hence

$$\begin{aligned} var(\overline{v_{i}}(H)) &= \frac{1}{H^{2}}E\left[\sum_{h=1}^{H}v_{i}^{h}\right]^{2} \\ &\leq \frac{1}{H^{2}}\{(M_{1}^{2}+M_{2}^{2}+\dots+M_{N}^{2})\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ M_{1}(M_{2}\rho_{i}+M_{3}\rho_{i}^{2}\dots+M_{N}\rho_{i}^{N-1})\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ M_{2}(M_{3}\rho_{i}+M_{4}\rho_{i}^{2}+\dots+M_{N}\rho_{i}^{N-2})\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ \dots \\ &+ M_{N-1}M_{N}\rho_{i}\sigma_{ii}\} \\ &\leq \frac{1}{H^{2}}\{(M_{1}+M_{2}+\dots+M_{N})M\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ M_{1}M(\rho_{i}+\rho_{i}^{2}+\dots+\rho_{i}^{N-1})\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ M_{2}M(\rho_{i}+\rho_{i}^{2}+\dots+\rho_{i}^{N-2})\sigma_{ii} \\ &+ \dots \end{aligned}$$

$$+ M_{N-1}M\rho_i\sigma_{ii} \}$$

$$< \frac{1}{H^2}M\sigma_{ii}\left\{H + (M_1 + \dots + M_{N-1})\left(\frac{1}{1-\rho_i}\right)\right\}$$

$$< \frac{M}{H^2}\sigma_{ii}H\left(1 + \frac{1}{1-\rho_i}\right)$$

$$< \frac{M}{H}\left(\frac{2\sigma_{ii}}{1-\rho_i}\right),$$

which tends to zero if M/H tends to zero as H tends to infinity. Thus, if the number of individuals within each group are much less than the total population, the individual disturbances are ergodic and the errors in models based on aggregate data are almost surely zero.

**Remark 3** When  $M_k = 1$  for all k, Example 3 reduces to Example 2. When  $\rho_i = 0$ , Example 3 reduces to Example 1.

### 5 Conclusion

The RUM model is useful for modeling errors in individual demand and share equations when one has access to cross-section data. However, the results in this paper reveal that RUM specification does not always imply errors in demand or average share equations when *aggregate* data are employed. Roughly speaking, the act of aggregating these disturbances across a large population of individuals results in an aggregate specification with errors that converge to zero.

Two important papers cited in the literature on the random objective justification for errors are Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1975). Since both of these papers utilize aggregate time series data, our results suggest it is not obvious that their rejections of neoclassical theory were due to failure to account for RUM-generated heteroskedacity.

#### References

- Anglin, Paul M. and Baye, Michael R., "Information, Multiprice Search, and Costof-Living Differences Among Searchers." Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987): 1179-1195.
- Barten, Anton P., "The Systems of Consumer Demand Functions Approach." Econometrica 45 (1977): 23-51.
- Bronars, Stephen G. and Jansen, Dennis W. "The Geographical Distribution of Unemployment in the U.S.: A Spatial Time Series Analysis." Journal of Econometrics 38 (1987): 251-279.
- Brown, Bryan W. and Walker, Mary Beth. "The Random Utility Hypothesis and Inference in Demand Systems." Econometrica 57 (1989): 815-829.
- Christensen, Laurits, Jorgenson, Dale W. and Lau, Lawrence J., "Transcendental Logarithmic Utility Functions." American Economic Review 65 (1975): 367-383.
- Chavas, Jean-Paul and Segerson, Kathleen, "Stocastic Specification and Estimation of Share Equation Systems." Journal of Econometrics 35 (1987): 337-358.
- Deaton, Angus, and Muellbauer, John, "An Almost Ideal Demand System." American Economic Review 70 (1980): 312-326.
- McElroy, Marjorie B. "Additive General Error Models for Production, Cost, and Derived Demand or Share Systems." Journal of Political Economy 95 (1987): 737-757.
- Muellbauer, J., "Aggregation, Income Distribution, and Consumer Demand.," em Review of Economic Studies 62 (1975): 525-543.

Parzen, Emanuel, Stochastic Processes, Holden-Day, 1962.

## Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:

(For previous papers please consult previous discussion papers.)

No.	Author(s)	Title
8916	A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman and A. van Soest	Quantity Rationing and Concavity in a Flexible Household Labor Supply Model
8917	F. Canova	Seasonalities in Foreign Exchange Markets
8918	F. van der Ploeg	Monetary Disinflation, Fiscal Expansion and the Current Account in an Interdependent World
8919	W. Bossert and F. Stehling	On the Uniqueness of Cardinally Interpreted Utility Functions
8920	F. van der Ploeg	Monetary Interdependence under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regimes
8921	D. Canning	Bottlenecks and Persistent Unemployment: Why Do Booms End?
8922	C. Fershtman and A. Fishman	Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search Equilibrium
8923	M.B. Canzoneri and C.A. Rogers	Is the European Community an Optimal Currency Area? Optimal Tax Smoothing versus the Cost of Multiple Currencies
8924	F. Groot, C. Withagen and A. de Zeeuw	Theory of Natural Exhaustible Resources: The Cartel-Versus-Fringe Model Reconsidered
8925	O.P. Attanasio and G. Weber	Consumption, Productivity Growth and the Interest Rate
8926	N. Rankin	Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a 'Hartian' Model of Imperfect Competition
8927	Th. van de Klundert	Reducing External Debt in a World with Imperfect Asset and Imperfect Commodity Substitution
8928	C. Dang	The D <sub>1</sub> -Triangulation of R <sup>n</sup> for Simplicial Algorithms for Computing Solutions of Nonlinear Equations
8929	M.F.J. Steel and J.F. Richard	Bayesian Multivariate Exogeneity Analysis: An Application to a UK Money Demand Equation
8930	F. van der Ploeg	Fiscal Aspects of Monetary Integration in Europe
8931	H.A. Keuzenkamp	The Prehistory of Rational Expectations

No.	Author(s)	Title
8932	E. van Damme, R. Selten and E. Winter	Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit
8933	H. Carlsson and E. van Damme	Global Payoff Uncertainty and Risk Dominance
8934	H. Huizinga	National Tax Policies towards Product- Innovating Multinational Enterprises
8935	C. Dang and D. Talman	A New Triangulation of the Unit Simplex for Computing Economic Equilibria
8936	Th. Nijman and M. Verbeek	The Nonresponse Bias in the Analysis of the Determinants of Total Annual Expenditures of Households Based on Panel Data
8937	A.P. Barten	The Estimation of Mixed Demand Systems
8938	G. Marini	Monetary Shocks and the Nominal Interest Rate
8939	W. Güth and E. van Damme	Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game
8940	G. Marini and P. Scaramozzino	Monopolistic Competition, Expected Inflation and Contract Length
8941	J.K. Dagsvik	The Generalized Extreme Value Random Utility Model for Continuous Choice
8942	M.F.J. Steel	Weak Exogenity in Misspecified Sequential Models
8943	A. Roell	Dual Capacity Trading and the Quality of the Market
8944	C. Hsiao	Identification and Estimation of Dichotomous Latent Variables Models Using Panel Data
8945	R.P. Gilles	Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange Economy with an Arbitrary Communication Structure
8946	W.B. MacLeod and J.M. Malcomson	Efficient Specific Investments, Incomplete Contracts, and the Role of Market Alterna- tives
8947	A. van Soest and A. Kapteyn	The Impact of Minimum Wage Regulations on Employment and the Wage Rate Distribution
8948	P. Kooreman and B. Melenberg	Maximum Score Estimation in the Ordered Response Model

No.	Author(s)	Title
8949	C. Dang	The D <sub>2</sub> -Triangulation for Simplicial Deformation Algorithms for Computing Solutions of Nonlinear Equations
8950	M. Cripps	Dealer Behaviour and Price Volatility in Asset Markets
8951	T. Wansbeek and A. Kapteyn	Simple Estimators for Dynamic Panel Data Models with Errors in Variables
8952	Y. Dai, G. van der Laan, D. Talman and Y. Yamamoto	A Simplicial Algorithm for the Nonlinear Stationary Point Problem on an Unbounded Polyhedron
8953	F. van der Ploeg	Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Substitution and Consumption: The CARA-LQ Problem
8954	A. Kapteyn, S. van de Geer, H. van de Stadt and T. Wansbeek	Interdependent Preferences: An Econometric Analysis
8955	L. Zou	Ownership Structure and Efficiency: An Incentive Mechanism Approach
8956	P.Kooreman and A. Kapteyn	On the Empirical Implementation of Some Game Theoretic Models of Household Labor Supply
8957	E. van Damme	Signaling and Forward Induction in a Market Entry Context
9001	A. van Soest, P. Kooreman and A. Kapteyn	Coherency and Regularity of Demand Systems with Equality and Inequality Constraints
9002	J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran	Forecasting, Misspecification and Unit Roots: The Case of AR(1) Versus ARMA(1,1)
9003	J. Driffill and C. Schultz	Wage Setting and Stabilization Policy in a Game with Renegotiation
9004	M. McAleer, M.H. Pesaran and A. Bera	Alternative Approaches to Testing Non-Nested Models with Autocorrelated Disturbances: An Application to Models of U.S. Unemployment
9005	Th. ten Raa and M.F.J. Steel	A Stochastic Analysis of an Input-Output Model: Comment
9006	M. McAleer and C.R. McKenzie	Keynesian and New Classical Models of Unemployment Revisited

No.	Author(s)	Title
9007	J. Osiewalski and M.F.J. Steel	Semi-Conjugate Prior Densities in Multi- variate t Regression Models
9008	G.W. Imbens	Duration Models with Time-Varying Coefficients
9009	G.W. Imbens	An Efficient Method of Moments Estimator for Discrete Choice Models with Choice-Based Sampling
9010	P. Deschamps	Expectations and Intertemporal Separability in an Empirical Model of Consumption and Investment under Uncertainty
9011	W. Güth and E. van Damme	Gorby Games - A Game Theoretic Analysis of Disarmament Campaigns and the Defense Efficiency-Hypothesis
9012	A. Horsley and A. Wrobel	The Existence of an Equilibrium Density for Marginal Cost Prices, and the Solution to the Shifting-Peak Problem
9013	A. Horsley and A. Wrobel	The Closedness of the Free-Disposal Hull of a Production Set
9014	A. Horsley and A. Wrobel	The Continuity of the Equilibrium Price Density: The Case of Symmetric Joint Costs, and a Solution to the Shifting-Pattern Problem
9015	A. van den Elzen, G. van der Laan and D. Talman	An Adjustment Process for an Exchange Economy with Linear Production Technologies
9016	P. Deschamps	On Fractional Demand Systems and Budget Share Positivity
9017	B.J. Christensen and N.M. Kiefer	The Exact Likelihood Function for an Empirical Job Search Model
9018	M. Verbeek and Th. Nijman	Testing for Selectivity Bias in Panel Data Models
9019	J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran	Evaluation of Moments of Ratios of Quadratic Forms in Normal Variables and Related Statistics
9020	A. Robson	Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Social and Private Attitudes to Risk
9021	J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran	Evaluation of Moments of Quadratic Forms in Normal Variables

No.	Author(s)	Title
9022	K. Kamiya and D. Talman	Linear Stationary Point Problems
9023	W. Emons	Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration
9024	C. Dang	The D <sub>2</sub> -Triangulation for Simplicial Homotopy Algorithms for Computing Solutions of Nonlinear Equations
9025	K. Kamiya and D. Talman	Variable Dimension Simplicial Algorithm for Balanced Games
9026	P. Skott	Efficiency Wages, Mark-Up Pricing and Effective Demand
9027	C. Dang and D. Talman	The D <sub>1</sub> -Triangulation in Simplicial Variable Dimension Algorithms for Computing Solutions of Nonlinear Equations
9028	J. Bai, A.J. Jakeman and M. McAleer	Discrimination Between Nested Two- and Three- Parameter Distributions: An Application to Models of Air Pollution
9029	Th. van de Klundert	Crowding out and the Wealth of Nations
9030	Th. van de Klundert and R. Gradus	Optimal Government Debt under Distortionary Taxation
9031	A. Weber	The Credibility of Monetary Target Announce- ments: An Empirical Evaluation
9032	J. Osiewalski and M. Steel	Robust Bayesian Inference in Elliptical Regression Models
9033	C. R. Wichers	The Linear-Algebraic Structure of Least Squares
9034	C. de Vries	On the Relation between GARCH and Stable Processes
9035	M. R. Baye, D.W. Jansen and Q. Li	Aggregation and the "Random Objective" Justification for Disturbances in Complete Demand Systems

