# Social Capital in the European Values Study Surveys

Ton van Schaik Tilburg University The Netherlands May 2002

Country paper prepared for the OECD-ONS International Conference on Social Capital Measurement London, September 25-27, 2002

# Social Capital in the European Values Study Surveys

Ton van Schaik<sup>1</sup>
Tilburg University
May 2002

#### **Contents**

- 1. Introduction (3)
- 2. Defining social capital (4)
- 3. Measuring social capital (8)
- 4. Example: Social capital in European regions (11)
- 5. Further research (13)

Appendix: Four dimensions of social capital (15)

Table 1: Overview of the participating countries in the EVS-project (18)

Table 2: Interpersonal trust (19)

Figure 1: Publications on social capital (20)

Figure 2: Trust scores at NUTS1 levels in Europe (21)

References (22)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Professor of Economics at Tilburg University (TU). This paper heavily draws upon contributions of Wil Arts, Professor of Sociology (TU), Sjoerd Beugelsdijk, PhD student (TU), Loek Halman, Program Director of the 1999/2000 EVS, and senior-researcher at TU Work and Organization Research Centre (WORC), and discussions in the TU Multidisciplinary Working Group on Social Capital. Ton van Schaik: <a href="mailto:schaik@kub.nl">schaik@kub.nl</a> and <a href="mailto:http://few.kub.nl/economics/schaik/news.html">http://few.kub.nl/economics/schaik/news.html</a>

#### 1. Introduction

The European Values Study is a large-scale, cross-sectional, and longitudinal survey research project on basic human values, initiated by the European Values Systems Study Group in the late seventies, at that time an informal grouping of academics. Now, it is carried on in the setting of the foundation in the Netherlands<sup>2</sup>, using the (abbreviated) name of the group European Values Study (EVS)<sup>3</sup>.

This project launched at the end of the seventies, aimed at investigating fundamental value patterns in Western Europe. A large scale survey was conducted in all countries of the EC in 1981, as well as in Spain, the Scandinavian countries, etc (at that time not all of them members of the EC). The research project aroused interest in many other countries, where colleagues and research institutions joined the project (Stoetzel, 1983; Harding et al. 1986).

In order to explore value changes, a second wave of surveys was fielded in 1990 in again all EC countries (minus Greece) as well as in Hungary, the Scandinavian countries, South Africa, Japan, the United States, and Canada. In Austria, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, the Baltic States, and the former German Democratic Republic the survey was conducted for the first time by associated research teams (Ester et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1997)<sup>4</sup>.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In the Netherlands, there are several suppliers of social data. CentERdata for example is a survey research institute, specializing in Internet-based surveys. The CentERpanel is a panel of some 2000 households in the Netherlands. The members of those households fill in a questionnaire on the Internet every week (http://cdata4.kub.nl/eng/more).

The most important supplier of social data in the Netherlands is Statistics Netherlands (CBS) via surveys on persons and households. Statistics Netherlands has designed an integrated system of social surveys. Both this integrated survey and the programme used to build it are called POLS (http://www.cbs.nl/nl/publicaties/publicaties/algemeen/a-125/1998/nos-98-2.pdf).

POLS is a continuous survey of various aspects of living conditions. It integrates several individual and household sample surveys covering subjects like health, justice and time use. All surveys are linked by a joint questionnaire containing general questions about demographic and socio-economic featutures.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For more information see the EVS website: http://evs.kub.nl and Halman (2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In 1995-1997 the World Value Survey carried out a wave of research in a large number of Western and non-Western countries. They aim at a better coverage of non-Western societies and analyzing the development of a democratic political culture in the emerging Third Wave democracies. The 1999/2000 survey in Europe has been coordinated by EVS, while WVS coordinated the surveys outside Europe in 2000/2001. Both EVS and WVS will exchange data in the (near) future, enabling researchers of both projects to make global comparisons of basic human values.

In 1999 a third wave was organized in all European countries, except for Norway and Switzerland, Albania and parts of former Yugoslavia.

#### Table 1

Table 1 gives an overview of the participating countries in the EVS-project, including the sample sizes in these countries. The EVS questionnaire was developed to measure basic value orientations in important domains of life such as religion and morality, socio-economic life, politics, work, leisure time, family, marriage, and sexuality. Halman (2001) is the source book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study surveys<sup>5</sup>.

#### 2. Defining social capital

Economists show an increased interest in the role of culture in relation to economic development. Although Hofstede's publications (1991, 2001) have contributed to the incorporation of the role of culture and cultural differences in the field of business economics, mainly international management, this is not the case for general economics. However, since the mid eighties there is a revival in the study on the determinants of economic growth. This new or modern growth theory has resulted in a number of empirical studies, in which traditional inputs labour and capital are complemented with human capital and indicators that proxy institutional and geographical differences between countries. Since the pioneering work of Kormendi and Meguire (1985) growth empirics have become rather popular. However, as Temple (1999) argues, despite this large stream of research there is only limited progression in this field. He concludes his survey of empirical growth literature by writing: 'Some of the most interesting thinking on economic growth is to be found on the borders of political science and sociology' (Temple, 1999: 146).

In this line economists introduced social capital as an important determinant of macroeconomic performance in their analysis. Although the way economists use a traditionally sociological concept like social capital can be criticised (Fine, 2001), it is probably one of the most successfully introduced 'new' concepts in economics in the

4

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See for more information: http://evs.kub.nl and Halman (2001).

last decade. The increase of publications on social capital in the past ten years illustrates this 'new wave' (see Figure 1).

#### Figure 1

Although the concept of social capital is not new to the social sciences, it was Putnam (1993)<sup>6</sup> and his *Making Democracy Work* who made the concept attractive to modern economic, social and political theories. Social capital is considered an important factor with regard to social relationships (Coleman, 1990), the family (Boisjoly et al., 1995), a working democracy (Putnam 1993), and economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1997). In this sense, social capital relates to several basic dimensions of social life. According to Coleman, social capital constitutes a basic component of a logic of action, which eases social cooperation and the attainment of collective common goods. Thus, social capital allows 'the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable in its absence' (Coleman 1990: 302). Using such arguments, Putnam assumed the 'civic community' and social capital to be a basic prerequisite for a well functioning democracy and a prosperous society. 'When trust and social networks flourish, individuals, firms, neighbourhoods, and even nations prosper' (Putnam, 2000: 319). No wonder that the genesis, maintenance, and workings of social capital have gained importance in economics and the other social sciences.

Despite its widespread attention, the concept of social capital is far from clear. In his book *Making Democracy Work*, Putnam identifies social capital as a rather abstract and vague phenomenon. Social capital, he says, 'refers to features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and social networks' (Putnam, 1993: 167). He proceeds by giving a number of examples to illustrate what he considers as social capital, how it works, etc. From these examples, it remains, however, unclear what the relationships are between the various components of social capital. On one moment he argues that they are self-reinforcing and cumulative (Putnam, 1993: 177), on other occasions he regards them as a special form of social capital or as another form of social capital, or as one special feature of it (Putnam, 1993: 170). In other words, it is unclear whether or not the components of social capital are at the same level or if one

5

influences the others in causal terms. Putnam explains that social trust can arise from related sources: norms of reciprocity and networks (Putnam, 1993: 170), and that accordingly networks and norms should be prior to trust.

In his more recent book *Bowling Alone*, Putnam (2000) defines social capital in similar terms. 'Social capital refers to connections among individuals -social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arises from them' (Putnam, 2000: 19). In the rest of his book, the evidence for the collapse of American community is found in declining levels of engagement in social networks and voluntary associations<sup>7</sup>. It thus seems as if Putnam confines the concept of social capital to the connectedness of people. This connectedness is also recognized in other attempts to define or describe social capital. According to Coleman (1990) for example social capital has to do with people's ability to associate with each other.

A major contribution to social capital theory was made by Fukuyama (1995) in his book on Trust. He argues that interpersonal trust is basic for a wide variety of social relationships to emerge. He also argues that since transactions costs are low in instances of mutual trust, interpersonal trust is basic to a flourishing economy. 'If people who have to work in an enterprise trust one another .... doing business costs less' (Fukuyama, 1995: 27). Mutual trust eases the co-operation between individuals. Trust is a 'synthetic force within society' (Simmel, 1950: 326). Social capital thus refers to qualities in social relationships which enhance the capacity of the participants to achieve their interests and which at a more general level constitute a resource for social development. These important qualities are interpersonal trust, mutual supportiveness, shared norms and understandings. Following Coleman, one can say that the core of social capital is trust which is based on norms of generalized reciprocity. 'Generalized reciprocity refers to a continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time unrequited or imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now should be repaid in the future' (Putnam, 1993: 172). Thus, one does something for someone else not because one expects immediately repayment, but in the vague expectation that the other might do

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> With co-authors Leonardi and Nanetti.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Sobel (2002) calls the negative consequences of the decline in social capital the most frustrating part of Putnam's book.

something in return for you in the (near) future. Generalized reciprocity thus involves a degree of uncertainty, risk, and vulnerability (Newton, 1999: 4). Here the relationship with trust is clear. One relies on the firm expectation that the other will do something in return for what one has done for the other. Thus generalized reciprocity is based on mutual trust. The other way around, it can be argued that mutual trust is, in a way, the same as generalized reciprocity.

Another major component of social capital is engagement in social relations or involvement in social networks. The more socially involved people are, the greater the opportunity to build reciprocal relationships and to generate interpersonal trust. Trust not only is necessary to get involved in 'networks of civic engagement' (Putnam, 1993: 171), it is also necessary to continue a social relationship. 'Social relationships die out if not maintained; expectations and obligations wither over time; and norms depend on regular communication' (Coleman, 1990: 321). Social relations constitute a capital asset of the individual, that is 'a resource that, once accumulated, can be drawn on or accessed as needed.... (a resource) that make possible otherwise impossible goals' (Boisjoly et al., 1995: 609). In other words, social networks are regarded a kind of prerequisite to build up social capital. Engagement in networks and a dense social network is a necessary condition for the emergence of social capital. As Portes (1998: 6) stated, 'the consensus is growing in the literature that social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures'. Social networks enable the mobilization of social contacts from which an individual can benefit. In other words, social connections affect an individual's life changes (Putnam, 2000: 319). However, connectedness must not only exist objective, the ties must be of a specific kind. They must be trusting and reciprocal (Paxton, 1999: 93).

Although we have not defined the concept of social capital very concise here, it will be clear that basic to the notion of social capital is that people spend their resources on others, that people invest in each other and that people can mobilize the resources of others. Not only of significant others that are near and dear, but also of more distant and generalized others. The main components of social capital are, trust, norms of reciprocity, and engagement in networks. How these components are mutually related

is not further discussed here. It appears difficult to decide upon the relationships and possible causal chains.

#### 3. Measuring social capital

The popularity and frequent use of the concept of social capital has not yet eventuated in unanimity on the way it should be defined, nor on how it should be measured and empirically assessed. The literature on social capital reveals a wide variety of definitions and measurements, and it has been concluded that 'measurements of social capital are made in rather a hoc, pragmatic and unsystematic ways' (Flap, 1999: 19). An effective, reliable measurement is still lacking, perhaps because of the multidimensional nature of the concept. From our introductory discussion it is obvious that social capital is a multifaceted phenomenon which needs multiple indicators.

There seems to be some agreement on the main constituents of social capital, although the exact relationships between these components remain unclear. A basic component of social capital is, according to Fukuyama, trust (Fukuyama, 1995: 26). Although Putnam did not define social capital very concise, in his view it takes the form of qualities of social relationships, e.g., trust, norms of reciprocity, and engagement in social networks. How these components are mutually related is not further specified. For instance, is trust prior to engagement in networks or do networks generate trust? 'There is an obvious chicken-and-egg problem in deciding which comes first: norms of trust and reciprocity without which networks cannot be created; or networks which help create norms of trust and reciprocity' (Newton, 1999: 7).

An attractive measurement model combines the components Putnam refers to and the suggestions of Paxton (1999) and Knack and Keefer (1997). The measurement of social capital includes four dimensions: 1) interpersonal trust, 2) institutional trust, 3) participation in civil society (formal and informal), and 4) trustworthiness of the respondents themselves <sup>8</sup>.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The appendix lists the constituent questions of these dimensions in EVS.

Interpersonal trust is measured by the question: 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?'. Two replies were possible: 1. Most people can be trusted; 2. Can't be too careful (have to be very careful). This trust indicator stands central in a recent paper of Zak and Knack (2001) on the relation between trust and economic growth. They present a general equilibrium growth model, which predicts that (i) higher trust increases investment and growth; (ii) homogeneous societies exhibit higher trust, and thereby investment and growth; (iii) egalitarian distributions of income enhance trust, and thereby raise investment and growth; (iv) discrimination lowers trust, reducing investment and growth; (v) there is a low-trust poverty trap. Zak and Knack conclude that trust itself is positively and significantly related to growth in every case when it is included in growth regressions with a measure of formal institutions or of social distance. The results support the model's prediction that formal institutions and social homogeneity increase growth in part by building trust.

Following the suggestion of Paxton (1999) *Institutional trust* or 'confidence in institutions' is the second dimension of our measures of social capital. The institutions included are: the church, the armed forces, the education system, the press, the trade unions, the police, the parliament, the civil service, the social security system, the European Union, the United Nations Organization, the health and care system, and the justice system.

The third dimension is *Participation in civil society* or 'engagement in social networks'. This can refer to two forms of engagement: engagement in informal networks or relations (being socially active) on the one hand, and formal networks or relations (being a member of and/or doing voluntary work for an organization) on the other. To begin with the first kind of participation, the degree to which one is *informally connected* is measured by four indicators tapping the amount of time one spends with friends, with colleagues from work or outside the workplace, with people at church, mosque or synagogue, and with people in clubs and voluntary associations. The answer possibilities ranged from 1 = every week, 2 = once or twice a month, 3 = a few times a year, 4 = not at all).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The measure is based on data from the World Values Surveys (WVS), conducted in three waves,

An indicator for the degree of people's involvement in social networks can be found in the number of organizations one is an active member of. In the questionnaire the respondent was asked whether he/she is an active member, an inactive member or not a member at all of a great number of organizations. According to Putnam, it does not matter so much what kind of organization one is an active member of. 'Networks of civic engagement, like the neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, sports clubs, mass-based parties, [....], represent intense horizontal interaction.

Networks of civic engagement are an essential form of social capital' (Putnam, 1993: 173). EVS distinguishes membership from being a volunteer. Membership is defined by simply counting the numbers of organization people say they are a member of. Voluntary work is also a count based on the number of organizations one is doing voluntary work for.

Finally, the fourth dimension, *Trustworthiness* or 'norms of reciprocity', is indeed more difficult to measure by the EVS data. In order to investigate such norms empirically, we decided to follow the suggestion of Knack and Keefer (1997). According to them, the norms of reciprocity are defined by 'attitudes toward cooperating with anonymous others in prisoner's dilemma settings. [....]. Our measure of civic cooperation reflects respondents' own stated willingness to cooperate when faced with a collective action problem; it thus can be thought of as "trustworthiness" (Knack and Keefer, 1997: 1258). Thus, civic cooperation appears from the willingness to put the groups or some one elses interest ahead of pure individual interests. Civic cooperation means that people do their share in collective endeavours (Stolle and Rochon, 1999: 197). In other words, free-riding is disapproved. This disapproval of free-riding can be tapped from a battery of questions about the justification of behaviours like: 'claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to' and 'cheating on taxes if you have the chance'. Stolle and Rochon also included 'avoiding a fare on public transport' (Stolle and Rochon, 1999: 209), and Knack and Keefer, who used the EVS 1990 values data set also, not only included the degree to which 'avoiding a fare on public transport' but also the degree to which 'failing to report damage you've done accidentally to a parked vehicle' can be justified (Knack

1981, 1990, and 1996 (Inglehart et al, 2000).

and Keefer, 1997: 1256). However, these two items were not available in EVS 1999. Instead we have included: (1) Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to; (2) Cheating on tax if you have the chance; (3) Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else; (4) Lying in your own interest; (5) Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties, and (6) Paying cash for services to avoid taxes. The degree of justification was assessed by 10 point scales ranging from 1 (= never) to 10 (= always) justified.

Applying factor analysis we find country means on the four components of social capital and the correlations between them, both at the individual level and the aggregate level. The results reveal that indeed social capital is a multi-faceted phenomenon. At the individual level the associations are rather modest, and particularly the links between trust and participation in civil society appear low. At the macro level these associations appear stronger, quite as expected.

#### 4. Example: Social capital in European regions

This section summarizes an analysis of the relation between social capital and economic growth for European regions (Beugelsdijk and van Schaik, 2001). Data are taken from the European Value Studies (EVS). The set comprises 7 countries, i.e. France, Italy, Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom. In order to compare the data on norms and values with regional economic data we used the Eurostat definition of regions. The regional level in our analyses is the NUTS1 level. This implies that France consists of 8 regions, Italy 11 (including Sicily and Sardinia), Germany 11 (former eastern regions excluded), Spain 7, The Netherlands 4, Belgium 3, and the UK 10 (including Scotland, excluding Northern Ireland). The total number of regions equals 54.

Similar to Knack and Keefer (1997) we used the following question from the European Values Study to asses the level of trust in a society is <sup>10</sup>: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?".

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This is question 8 from EVS, i.e., the dimension Interpersonal trust in the Appendix.

#### Figure 2

As can be seen in Figure 2 on trust, the regional scores on trust differ considerably within Europe. When looking at countries, we see for example that the Netherlands are rather homogeneous in terms of trust, but regions in Italy differ a lot. Putnam (1993) seemed right in the case of Italy, when describing the differences between the Northern and the Southern regions. The North has higher scores on trust than the South. However, at first sight such a picture for Europe as a whole cannot be obtained. While some researchers have suggested that religion, especially Protestantism, correlates with trust (Inglehart 1990, Knack and Keefer 1997: 1283), our regional analysis suggests this is not the case. Traditional Catholic regions in the South of the Netherlands, Flanders, Madrid and the North of Italy all fall in the group of regions that have the highest scores on trust (0.447-0.646), far above average.

Following Knack and Keefer, we measure the average number of groups cited per respondent in each country. However, the hypothesized benefits of network embeddedness may not be captured when taking passive membership of groups and associations. Therefore, we have taken active membership of a number of associations instead of passive membership.

The question we use to measure group membership, is stated as follows<sup>11</sup>: 'which, if any do you belong to?' Active membership is measured by the question: 'which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for?'. The categories are mentioned in the appendix (dimension 3). The scores are obtained by taking the average score per region of respondents answering yes to the question mentioned above. Furthermore, we have calculated regional scores on the Putnam and Olson groups corresponding to Knack and Keefer's analysis at a country level. The Putnam groups refer to membership of B) religious organizations, C) education, arts, music or cultural activities and J) youth work. The Olson groups consist of membership of D) trade unions, E) political parties of groups, and I) professional associations..

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This is question 5 from EVS, i.e., the dimension Participation in civil society in the Appendix.

In order to test if trust and group membership are related to economic growth, we have taken a standard growth framework, which includes initial level of GDP per capita, the investment ratio and the school enrolment ratio. This analysis shows several things. First, social capital in terms of trust is not related to economic growth at the regional level in Europe. Second, Knack and Keefer's distinction between Putnam and Olson groups does not yield additional insights. The findings on Olson groups are not robust. However, the main implication of this study is that social capital in terms of (active) group membership contributes to regional economic growth in Europe.

Our findings regarding active membership may have implications for policymakers. We showed that social capital in terms of active volunteering work is positively related to regional economic growth. Does this mean that governments may want to increase active membership of all kinds of associations? Does this imply that policymakers need to take a new look at the relation between labour and leisure? It is clear that a number of factors that policymakers can influence are related to the degree of associational activity. However, as long as we do not exactly know the mechanism between active membership and regional economic growth, it is too early to formulate clear policy implications.

#### 5. Further research

Future research in comparative economics should focus on the exact mechanisms through which social capital in terms of associational activity influences the wealth of nations. Theory argues that associational activity may promote the spillover of knowledge in networks and, second, may limit the costs of free riding through feelings of collectivity. However, there is no clear understanding how these mechanisms exactly work. The importance of (active) membership of all kinds of associations for (regional) economic growth may lead to a re-thinking of the relation between work and spare time. But before actual policy plans in this field are developed, we need to know more about the mechanism between active group membership and (regional) economic growth. The current attempts and activities of the Worldbank in the field of social capital and developing countries are worth mentioning. The importance of network relationships and the promotion of

associational activity have led to a number of successful development projects. Increasingly, the Worldbank acknowledges that social capital may play a crucial role in the reduction of poverty and the success of development programs. Social capital is integrated into Worldbank policies in a number of ways<sup>12</sup>. Nevertheless, these initiatives mainly focus on developing countries and the question remains if the relationship between social capital and economic growth is the same for rich and poor countries. A related question is if the lack or abundance of social capital influences the success of the regional development programs in the less favored regions of Europe. It would be interesting in future research to relate the degree of success of the Structural Funds of the EU in certain regions to the presence (or absence) of social capital.

\_

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> For an overview of the Worldbank social capital initiatives we refer to <a href="http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/bank2.htm">http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/bank2.htm</a>

# **Appendix: Four dimensions of social capital**

### 1. Interpersonal trust

Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you  $8^{13}$ can't be too careful in dealing with people? (1981-1990-1999/2000)<sup>14</sup>

Α	Most people can be trusted	1
В	Can't be too careful	2
	Don't know	-1
	No answer	-2

#### 2. Institutional trust

58<sup>15</sup> Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all? (1981-1990-1999/2000. In italics not in 1981, in bold not in 1990) (Code one answer for each item)

		A greated	atQuite	Not very much	None at all	Dk	Na
A	The church	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
В	The armed forces	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
C	The education system	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
D	The press	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
E	Trade unions	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
F	The police	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
G	Parliament	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
Н	Civil service	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
I	The social security system	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
$\boldsymbol{J}$	The European Union	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
L	<b>United Nations Organization</b>	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
$\mathbf{M}$	Health care system	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
N	The justice system	1	2	3	4	-1	-2

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Refers to item 8 in the EVS 1999/2000 questionnaire. The whole questionnaire can be found in Halman (2001) and the EVS website: <a href="http://evs.kub.nl">http://evs.kub.nl</a>
<sup>14</sup> This question was asked in three waves: 1981, 1990 en 1999/2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Refers to item 58 in the EVS 1999/2000 questionnaire.

## 3. Participation in civil society (formal and informal)

<u>Formal participation</u> (membership and doing voluntary work for organizations, 1981-1990-1999/2000.

However, 1981 not always exactly the same. In italics items which have slightly been changed since 1981. Items in bold not included in 1981.

- 5 Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organisations and activities and say ...
  - a) which, if any, do you belong to? (Code all mentioned under (a))
  - b) which, if any, are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for? (Code all mentioned under (b))

		a	b
$\boldsymbol{A}$	Social welfare services for elderly,		
	handicapped or deprived people	1	1
$\boldsymbol{B}$	Religious or church organisations	1	1
C	Education, arts, music or cultural activities	1	1
D	Trade unions	1	1
E	Political parties or groups	1	1
F	Local community action on issues like		
	poverty, employment, housing, racial equality	1	1
G	Third world development or human rights	1	1
H	Conservation, the environment, ecology,		
	animal rights	1	1
I	Professional associations	1	1
J	Youth work (e.g. scouts, guides, youth		
	clubs etc.)	1	1
K	Sports or recreation	1	1
L	Women's groups	1	1
$\mathbf{M}$	Peace movement	1	1
N	Voluntary organisations concerned with		
	health	1	1
O	Other groups	1	1

(Informal participation: next page)

#### Informal participation

I'm going to ask how often you do certain things. For each activity, would you say you do them every week or nearly every week; once or twice a month; only a few times a year; or not at all? (Interviewer: Code 'Not applicable' when respondent is not involved in work, church or club) (1999/2000)

		Every Week		A few times a year	Not at all	Dk	Na Nap
A B	Spend time with friends Spend time with colleagues from work or your profession outside	1	2	3	4	-1	-2
	the workplace	1	2	3	4	-1	-2 -3
C	Spend time with people at your						
D	church, mosque or synagogue Spend time with people in clubs and voluntary associations	1	2	3	4	-1	-2 -3
	(sport, culture, communal)	1	2	3	4	-1	-2 -3

#### 4. Trustworthiness

Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card. (Read out statements reversing order for alternate contacts. Code one answer for each statement) (1981-1990-1999/2000. In italics only in 1999/2000)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	-1	-2
Neve	er							Al	ways	Dk	Na

- A Claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to
- B Cheating on tax if you have the chance
- C Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)
- E Lying in your own interest
- G Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties
- O Paying cash for services to avoid taxes

Table 1: An overview of the participating countries in the EVS-project\*.

Country	1999/2000	1990	<u>1981</u>
Austria	1522	1460	
Belarus	1000		-
Belgium	1912	2792	1145
Bulgaria	1000	1034	-
Canada		1730	1254
Croatia	1003	-	
Czech republic	1908	2109	
Denmark	1023	1030	1182
Estonia	1005	1008	-
Finland	1038	588	
France	1615	1002	1200
Germany	2036	-	-
East-Germany	999	1336	-
West-Germany	1037	2101	1305
Great Britain	1000	1484	1167
Greece	1142		
Hungary	999	999	
Iceland	968	702	927
Ireland	1012	1000	1217
Italy	2000	2018	1348
Latvia	1013	903	
Lithuania	1018	1000	
Luxembourg	1211		
Malta	1002		
The Netherlands	1004	1017	1221
Northern-Ireland	1000	304	312
Norway		1239	1051
Poland	1095	982	-
Portugal	1000	1185	
Romania	1146	1103	
Russia	2500		-
Slovenia	1006	1035	-
Slovakia	1331	1136	-
Spain	1200	2637	2303
Basque	1200 1204	1064	
Catalonia		2121	054
Sweden	1015	1047	934
Ukraine	1193	1926	2225
USA		1839	2323


• Including sample size in these countries. Source: Halman (2001)


Table 2: Interpersonal trust\*


"Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?"

	most people	cannot be	
	can be trusted	too careful	N
France	22.2	77.8	1557
Great Britain	29.8	70.2	954
Germany	34.8	65.2	1935
Austria	33.9	66.1	1293
Italy	32.6	67.4	1946
Spain	38.5	61.5	1131
Greece	19.1	80.9	1064
Malta	20.7	79.3	988
Belgium	29.3	70.7	1826
Netherlands	59.7	40.3	997
Luxembourg	25.9	74.1	1160
Denmark	66.5	33.5	986
Sweden	66.3	33.7	974
Finland	58.0	42.0	1016
Iceland	41.1	58.9	925
Ireland	35.2	64.8	994
Northern Ireland	39.5	60.5	967
Estonia	22.9	77.1	954
Latvia	17.1	82.9	987
Lithuania	24.9	75.1	957
Poland	18.9	81.1	1061
Czech Republic	23.9	76.1	1869
Slovakia	15.7	84.3	1288
Hungary	21.8	78.2	980
Romania	10.1	89.9	1115
Bulgaria	26.9	73.1	924
Slovenia	21.7	78.3	982
Croatia	20.5	79.5	969
Belarus	41.9	58.1	908
Ukraine	27.2	72.8	1156
Russia	23.7	76.3	2416
Total	30.5	69.5	37279

\*Source: Halman (2001)








<sup>\*</sup> Broad definition: all combinations of "social" and "capital". Strong definition: only the combination "social capital". Search engine: online contents NL: all journals that can be found in Dutch universities and libraries. (Collected by Sjoerd Beugelsdijk)

Figure 2: Trust scores at NUTS1 levels in Europe<sup>16</sup>



-

<sup>16</sup> Source: Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2001): http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/center/2001/doc/102.pdf

#### References

Beugelsdijk, S.; and van Schaik, A.B.T.M. 2001. Social capital and regional economic growth, CentER Discussion Paper 2001-102. Available at: http://greywww.kub.nl:2080/greyfiles/center/2001/doc/102.pdf

Boisjoly, J.; Duncan, G.J.; and Hofferth, S. 1995. Access to Social Capital. *Journal of Family Issues* 16:609-631

Coleman, J.S. 1990. Foundations of social theory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

European Values Surveys, http://www.evs.kub.nl

Ester, P; Halman, L and De Moor, R (eds.). 1994. *The Individualizing Society*. Tilburg: Tilburg University Press.

Flap, H. 1999. Creation and returns of social capital. A new research program. *La revue Tocqueville/The Tocqueville Review* XX:5-26.

Fine, B. 2001. Social Capital versus Social Theory. London: Routledge.

Fukuyama, F. 1995 *Trust: the social virtues and the creation of prosperity.* New York: The Free Press.

Gulati, R. 1995. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. *Academy of Management Journal* 38.1:85-112.

Halman, L. 2001. *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*. Tilburg: EVS, WORC, Tilburg University.

Halman, L; and Vloet, A. 1994. *Measuring and Comparing Values in 16 Countries of the Western World*. Tilburg: WORC

Harding, S; Phillips,D; and Fogarty, M. 1986. *Contrasting Values in Western Europe*. Houndsmill: MacMillan

Hofstede, G. 1991. Cultures and organizations, software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill.

Hofstede, G. 2001. *Culture's consequences; comparing values, behaviors, institutions and organizations across nations.* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.) Beverly Hills: Sage publications.

Inglehart, R. 1990. *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Inglehart, R. 1997. *Modernization and postmodernization: cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press.

Inkeles, A. 2000. Measuring social capital and its consequences. *Policy Sciences* 33:245-268.

Knack, S., and Keefer, P. 1997. Does social capital have an economic pay-off? A cross country investigation. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 112.4:1251-1288.

Kormendi, R.C., and Meguire, P.G. 1985. Macroeconomic determinants of growth; cross country evidence. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 16:141-163.

Newton, K. 1999. Social capital and democracy in modern Europe. Pp.3-24 in J.W. van Deth et al. (eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Paxton, P. 1999. Is social capital declining in the United States? A multiple indicator assessment. *American Journal of Sociology* 105:88-127.

Portes, A. 1998. 'Social capital; Its origins and applications in modern sociology', *Annual Review of Sociology* 24: 1-24.

Putnam, R.; Leonardi, R.; and Nanetti, R.Y. 1993. *Making democracy work*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. 2000. *Bowling alone: the collapse and revival of American community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Simmel, G. 1950. The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press.

Sobel, J. 2002. Can We Trust Social Capital? *Journal of Economic Literature* 40:139-154.

Stolle, D; and Rochon, T.R. 1999. 'The myth of American exceptionalism: a three-nation comparison of associational membership and social capital'. Pp. 192-209 in J.W. van Deth et al. (eds.), *Social Capital and European Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.

Stoetzel, J. 1983. *Les Valeurs du temps présent: une enquête europénne*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Temple, J. 1999. The new growth evidence. *Journal of Economic Literature* 37:112-156.

Williamson, O.E. 1998. Transaction cost economics: how it works; where it is headed. *De Economist* 146:23-58.

Woolcock, M. 1998. Social capital and economic development: toward a theoretical synthesis and policy framework. *Theory and Society* 27:151-208.

Zak, P.J., and Knack, S. 2001. Trust and Growth. The Economic Journal 111:295-321.

schaikoecd.doc