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Nicolas L. Jacquet , Serene Tan

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On the Segmentation of Markets*

Nicolas L. Jacquet[†]

Serene Tan[‡]

Singapore Management University

National University of Singapore

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Abstract

This paper endogenizes the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is non-transferable. We depart from standard matching models where all agents are assumed to be in a unique meeting place by assuming the existence of infinitely many meeting places and allowing each agent to choose which meeting place to be in. The market is thus allowed to be segmented into different meeting places, and agents not only get to choose who to match with, but also who they meet with. We show that in equilibrium all market structures feature perfect segmentation where agents match with the first person they meet. All these market structures have the same matching pattern, implying that the value of search to each agent is the same. Although perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is nevertheless greater than in standard models.

Keywords: search, matching, segmentation, market structure

JEL classifications: J42, D83

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[†]Please address all correspondence to Nicolas Jacquet. Email: njacquet@smu.edu.sg. Address: 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903.

[‡]Email: serenetan@nus.edu.sg. Financial support from the National University of Singapore is gratefully acknowledged.

1 Introduction

The issue of how heterogeneous agents form matches was first examined in the works of Gale and Shapley (1962) and Becker (1973) in a frictionless environment. Recent work has extended this analysis by incorporating search frictions so as to capture the idea that it takes time to meet someone.¹

Implicit in these models is the assumption that agents are all searching within a marketplace. If one considers a model with homogeneous agents and non-transferable utility, this assumption is natural: in the marriage market context, as no male (female) is better than any other male (female) *a priori*, the expected payoff to a female (male) from matching with any male (female) is the same. However, once *ex ante* heterogeneity is introduced, assuming that search is conducted in one marketplace is no longer innocuous.

Suppose there is an objective ranking of both males and females. Since agents use a reservation strategy, i.e., each male (female) will have a lowest female (male) type he (she) will agree to match with, an agent typically spends time meeting people he will never match with, either because the person he meets is below his reservation type or his own type is below the reservation type of the person encountered. As agents do not necessarily match with the first person they meet, they impose a congestion externality on each other. Standard matching models, by assuming that all heterogeneous agents search randomly in one marketplace, do not address this congestion externality.

Take a standard search model, which has been examined in McNamara and Collins (1990), Burdett and Coles (1997) and Bloch and Ryder (2000). They show that when agents' types are distributed over the interval $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ and the utility a type x agent receives from matching with a type y agent is y , in equilibrium, agents partition themselves into distinct classes where agents in each class match only with other agents in their class.² That is, a *class structure* is formed. It is clear that agents from each class are imposing a congestion externality on all other classes. Intuitively, an easy way to get around this externality will be to take all agents in a given class and put them in their own marketplace,

¹A non-exhaustive list includes McNamara and Collins (1990), Lu and McAfee (1996), Burdett and Coles (1997), Burdett and Wright (1998), Eeckhout (1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Smith (2002).

²Smith (2002) and Eeckhout (1999) show that more generally a class structure is also obtained when the utility an agent gets from matching is log-modular, i.e., $u(x_1, y_1)u(x_2, y_2) = u(x_1, y_2)u(x_2, y_1)$.

so that they meet only other agents from their class. This way, each agent faces the same expected quality of a match, but will now be matching at a faster rate.

However, this reasoning assumes that agents' reservation strategies are left unchanged, which is not true in equilibrium. Take agents from the first class who are now in their own marketplace. The highest type agents in this new marketplace now have a different reservation strategy because the composition of agents in this new marketplace is different. In fact, they will be more picky about whom they agree to match with by increasing their reservation type. In other words, in this new marketplace consisting only of class 1 agents, we get the result that a class structure is obtained once again. Now take the new class 1 agents in this marketplace. They are again in a marketplace with agents they will not agree to match with if they were to meet. Why not form their own marketplace to increase their matching rate? If we continue reasoning this way, a natural question is whether this process goes on *ad infinitum* so that each type of agent is in its own marketplace?

This paper builds on the existing literature by assuming the aforementioned utility specification, and extends it by allowing for the existence of infinitely many marketplaces. We characterize steady-state equilibria when the distribution of types of agents in each marketplace is known to everyone, each agent is free to decide which marketplace to search in, and once he has decided to go to a particular marketplace search is conducted randomly there. Moreover, an equilibrium has to be such that it is not possible to create a new marketplace that would attract people.

In our paper, by allowing for many marketplaces, and for each agent to choose which marketplace to position himself in, segmentation arises as an equilibrium phenomenon. Second, by making the distribution of agents in each marketplace public knowledge, agents can make an informed decision as to which marketplace to search in. Hence, search is no longer forced to be completely random and each agent can direct his search towards the best marketplace for himself. Agents not only get to choose who to match with, they also choose who they meet with.

We show that all equilibria feature *perfect segmentation* in that agents match with the first person they meet, and all equilibria have the same class structure, which is finite. This implies that perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium. Yet our model does not have the congestion externality that is present in standard search models since agents match with the first person they meet. And since there is only one implied class

structure that is supported in equilibrium, the value of search for each type of agent in any equilibrium is the same.

In light of our result, standard matching models can be interpreted in two ways: the entire economy is studied, as we do, but everyone is searching in a unique marketplace, or one can think of these models as studying one marketplace in isolation with the types of agents taken as given. In the former, our results imply that standard results with partial segmentation like Burdett and Coles (1997) are no longer equilibria when segmentation is allowed. In the latter case, our model, by endogenizing the market structure, pins down the set of types in each active marketplace.

Examples of segmentation of markets are plentiful. In the marriage market, the rich and beautiful tend to search for a partner among the similarly rich and beautiful, and do so by going to fancy bars and cafés, whereas the Average Joe goes to the neighborhood pub to meet his Average Jane rather than fancy bars because he knows he would not be able to find a match there.³ Although our paper is closest to the marriage market because of the non-transferable utility assumption, segmentation of markets is observed in other markets and our analysis is thus relevant. In the labor market for fresh graduates for instance, the most desirable employers do not search randomly but among a subset of students from the best schools, and the best students from the best schools tend to concentrate their search among these firms, thereby forming their own search market; the next-best firms and the next-best students, knowing they cannot match with the best students and firms respectively, form their own marketplace, and so on. By obtaining segmentation as an equilibrium outcome, our paper is able to shed some light on the mechanism behind the segmentation observed in these markets.

The organization of our paper is as follows. The following section presents the standard model where everyone is in one marketplace. Section 3 sets up the model where there are multiple marketplaces and agents are allowed to choose where to search in. In section 4 we construct an equilibrium with perfect segmentation. Section 5 characterizes all the other equilibria. Section 6 discusses the main points and assumptions of the model, and section 7 concludes.

³Some might say that fancy bars charge higher prices than local pubs for drinks; segmentation is thus done at least partially through price discrimination. We would argue that a man looking for a match can have two beers at a fancy bar rather than four beers at his local pub if he is really searching for a match.

2 The Standard One Marketplace Model

2.1 Setup

Time is continuous. The economy is populated by a unit mass of infinitely lived agents who discount the future at rate $r > 0$ and who wish to form bilateral matches. Agents are characterized by their type x which belongs to $X = [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$, with $\underline{x} > 0$. All agents agree on how to rank one another, and agents' types are revealed upon meeting each other. When a type x agent matches with a type y agent, the former receives utility y ; the utility an agent receives therefore depends entirely on his partner.⁴ This implies that all agents prefer to match with the highest possible type. When unmatched, an agent enjoys a flow utility normalized to zero so that being matched yields a higher flow payoff than being unmatched.

All agents start their life unmatched, and because of search frictions it takes time for agents to meet. More specifically we assume agents meet according to a Poisson process with parameter λ , where this parameter is constant, i.e., independent of the measure of unmatched agents searching for a partner.⁵ Although being unmatched is undesirable, it does not necessarily mean that an agent will match with the first person he meets. This is because he may prefer to wait for a better match, so “meeting” is distinct from “matching.”

When an agent matches, he leaves the pool of searching agents forever and we assume that he is replaced by a clone. This clones assumption ensures that G , the cumulative distribution of singles' types, is stationary and independent of the matching pattern.⁶ Although not essential for our results, we assume that G has full support and is differentiable on X , and g denotes its density function.

Like Becker (1973), Shimer and Smith (2000), and Smith (2002), among others, this paper is a partnership model. Although numerous matching models consider two sides of the market, a partnership model is equivalent to a model with two sides being symmetric and restricted to using symmetric strategies. Obviously the partnership model employed in this paper cannot explain non-symmetric behavior, but we leave it for future research.

⁴We assume this utility specification to simplify the exposition; a more general utility function can be adopted where a type x agent receives $u(x, y)$ when matching with a type y agent, with $u(x, y)$ log-modular. Jacquet and Tan (2004) adopt this more general specification and show that the results are unaffected.

⁵Section 6.2 discusses the implications of increasing returns in the meeting technology.

⁶This assumption can be relaxed via introducing an exogenous inflow of new agents to endogenize the distribution of unmatched agents as in Burdett and Coles (1997) and Smith (2002). In the former, it is shown that this can result in multiple steady-state distributions of singles.

2.2 The Steady-State Equilibrium

We focus on steady-state equilibria where agents use stationary strategies. For two agents with types x and y to match when they meet, x needs to accept y and y needs to accept x . That is, there needs to be a double coincidence of wants. The problem a type x agent faces is: given the set of types of agents $\Omega(x)$ who accept a match with him, what types of agents should he accept? By standard arguments, $u(x)$, the value of being unmatched for agent x , satisfies

$$ru(x) = \lambda \int_{\Omega(x)} \text{Max} \{y - u(x), 0\} dG(y). \quad (1)$$

An agent x will accept a match with y if and only if $y \geq u(x)$,⁷ that is, he uses a reservation strategy. If we consider two agents with types x_1 and x_2 , $x_1 > x_2$, agents accepting a type x_2 agent also accept a type x_1 agent. Therefore an agent with type x_1 cannot fare worse than an agent with type x_2 , meaning that $u(x_1) \geq u(x_2)$ and therefore reservation strategies are non-decreasing in type. Proposition 1 states the existence of a unique equilibrium, which we call the Burdett-Coles (*BC*) equilibrium, and characterizes its structure.

Proposition 1 *For any G , when there is one marketplace, an equilibrium exists and is unique. It is characterized by a finite, and strictly decreasing, sequence of reservation strategies $\{u_j^{bc}\}_{j=1}^{J^{bc}}$, $u_{j^{bc}}^{bc} \leq \underline{x}$, where $u_0^{bc} \equiv \bar{x}$, and for all $j \geq 1$, u_j^{bc} solves*

$$u_j^{bc} = \frac{\lambda}{r} \int_{u_j^{bc}}^{u_{j-1}^{bc}} [G(u_{j-1}^{bc}) - G(y)] dy. \quad (2)$$

All agents with attributes in $X_1 = [u_1^{bc}, \bar{x}]$ share the same reservation type u_1^{bc} , and for all $j > 1$, all agents with attributes in $X_j = [u_j^{bc}, u_{j-1}^{bc}]$ share the same reservation type u_j^{bc} .

We will not formally prove the proposition as it will only reproduce proofs available in the literature, but let us lay out the intuition. Consider first the \bar{x} agents. They are accepted by everyone since they are the highest type. As reservation strategies are non-decreasing, and \bar{x} agents have $u(\bar{x})$ as their reservation type, all agents whose types are in the interval $[u(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$ are also accepted by everyone. But since one's type affects one's payoff only through whom one can match with, agents who have the same opportunity set will have identical reservation strategies, and thus $u(x) = u(\bar{x}) \equiv u_1^{bc}$ for all $x \in [u_1^{bc}, \bar{x}]$. These

⁷We use the convention that if an agent is indifferent between staying unmatched or matching with an agent, he chooses to match.

agents therefore match only with each other, and we say that they are class 1 agents. Now consider agents of type $(u_1^{bc} - \varepsilon)$ for $\varepsilon > 0$ arbitrarily small. They will like to match with agents in class 1, but will not be accepted as they are below class 1 agents' reservation type. However, all other agents not in class 1 will accept them since they are the best agents not in class 1. By the same argument as above, one can find a reservation type u_2^{bc} such that all agents with attributes in $[u_2^{bc}, u_1^{bc})$ choose the same reservation type u_2^{bc} , and therefore match only with each other, thereby forming the second class. It is easy to see from here that this reasoning applies to agents with types in $[u_3^{bc}, u_2^{bc})$ and so on, until one reaches a class with reservation type equal to or less than \underline{x} .

We therefore obtain a class structure $\{X_j\}_{j=1}^{J^{bc}}$ in this BC economy where agents whose types fall in the interval X_j belong to the same class, and they are class j agents: two agents from that class will match if they were to meet, and none of these agents will match with any agent not in their class, either because they are below the reservation type of the agent met, or that agent's type is below their own reservation type. Note that agents in the last class, J^{bc} , have a reservation type weakly less than \underline{x} .

This class structure makes it clear that with search frictions and *ex ante* heterogeneity, agents will not generally be able to match with all types of agents in the economy, but only with a subset. And agents who will never match with each other impose an externality on each other by reducing the rate at which they meet agents they will actually match with. In the present case of a class structure, if one could partition the economy into several marketplaces with each marketplace populated by agents of a given class, keeping the acceptance strategy of the members of each class unchanged, there would be a Pareto improvement: each agent's expected quality of a match is unchanged and he matches at a higher rate since he then matches with the first person he meets. Hence, agents of different classes no longer impose externalities on each other as they are searching in different marketplaces. However, when agents are split this way their reservation strategies will correspondingly change to reflect the new distribution of types in their new marketplaces.

3 The Generalized Model with Multiple Marketplaces

From now on the economy consists of countably many marketplaces.⁸

⁸We will show that there are only a finite number of classes in equilibrium, and thus allowing for the set of meeting places to be a *continuum* would not modify the results about the class structure.

We assume that agents can move freely between marketplaces at no cost, and agents of the same type are allowed to search in different marketplaces. The distribution of types in each marketplace is assumed to be public knowledge so that each agent makes an informed decision when choosing which marketplace to go to. We maintain the assumption of random search within each marketplace.

We denote by X^n the set of types searching in marketplace n , with supremum \bar{x}^n and infimum \underline{x}^n ; and by G^n and ω^n the *cdf* of types and the mass of agents searching in marketplace n respectively.⁹ A market structure M is defined as the sequence $\{X^n, G^n, \omega^n\}_{n=1}^N$ where N is the number of active marketplaces. Given a market structure, each type of agent has a value of search in each of the active marketplaces, and we denote by $u^n(x)$ the value of search in marketplace n for a type x agent. Hence, $u^n(x)$ satisfies

$$ru^n(x) = \lambda \int_{\Omega^n(x)} \text{Max} \{y - u^n(x), 0\} dG^n(y), \quad (3)$$

where $\Omega^n(x)$ is the set of types of agents in marketplace n willing to match with an agent of type x . We define an equilibrium as follows:

Definition 1 A *steady-state equilibrium* is a market structure $M = \{X^n, G^n, \omega^n\}_{n=1}^N$ and a level of utility $u(x)$ for each type $x \in X$ such that:

(i) $u^n(x) \leq u(x)$ for all n , $u^n(x) = u(x)$ if $x \in \text{Supp}(G^n)$, where $u^n(x)$ satisfies (3);

(ii) $G(x) = \sum_{n=1}^N \omega^n G^n(x)$; and

(iii) there does not exist a distribution G^0 and a function $\alpha : X \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

(a) for all x ,

$$\alpha(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } u^0(x) > u(x) \\ 0 & \text{if } u^0(x) < u(x), \end{cases}$$

and $\alpha(x) \in [0, 1]$ if $u^0(x) = u(x)$, where $u^0(x)$ satisfies (3) for $n = 0$ with

$$G^0(x) = \frac{\int_{\underline{x}}^x \alpha(y) dG(y)}{\int_{\underline{x}}^{\bar{x}} \alpha(y) dG(y)}; \text{ and}$$

(b) there exists an x where $u^0(x) > u(x)$.

The first part of the definition states that in equilibrium each agent searches in the best marketplace for himself. Since we have not restricted agents of the same type to search

⁹In this paper we use superscripts to denote the meeting place and subscripts to denote the class.

in the same marketplace, two or more marketplaces can yield the same value of search to agents of a given type, and one can have $u^n(x) = u(x)$ with no type x agent searching in marketplace n .

The second equilibrium condition is simply a market clearing condition in that if we were to put all agents searching in all the active marketplaces into one marketplace we would get back the initial population.

As this paper is interested in segmentation as an equilibrium phenomenon, in the spirit of that we allow new marketplaces to be created. So in equilibrium, it must be true that there is no payoff in creating a new marketplace, which is what part *(iii)* of the definition of equilibrium deals with. More precisely, it is not possible to select a group of agents with types in $X^0 \equiv \{x \mid \alpha(x) > 0\}$, such that all of them are no worse off than in their original marketplaces, and if agents of a given type are strictly better off there then all agents of that type are searching in this new marketplace. The last requirement, *(iii)(b)*, imposes a non-redundancy condition since the new marketplace must make at least one type of agents strictly better off.

One can think of this economy as having competitive market makers who can each create a marketplace, like in Moen (1997). Each market maker can advertise the desired types he would like to have in his marketplace, but just as he cannot force an agent to go to his marketplace, he also cannot exclude agents from his marketplace. Although an agent can choose to search in any marketplace, he will self-select into the one which he expects to be the best for himself, and in equilibrium this marketplace is the one the market maker intended him to go to. Furthermore, in equilibrium it must not be possible for a market maker to be able to create a new marketplace which will attract agents.

As an example, think of marketplaces as bars or clubs, and market makers as bar or club owners. In this economy with multiple bars, agents of the same type need not all be in the same bar. But in equilibrium, it must be true that no agent will like to switch bars. And at the same time, if there is room for a bar owner to step in to create a new bar that would attract some agents because at least some of them can be made strictly better off, and all other agents intended to be there no worse off, then this cannot be an equilibrium. So equilibrium in this economy also requires that there is no payoff in creating a new marketplace which will attract some agents.

In the standard model with one marketplace a class was defined as the set of agents

who match with each other if they were to meet. Once we introduce many marketplaces this definition still holds, but now two agents of the same class need not be in the same marketplace. Given an equilibrium market structure M , there will be a class structure within each marketplace n by applying Proposition 1.¹⁰

4 A Perfect Segmentation Equilibrium

Since one important motivation of this paper is to address the inefficiencies in standard random search papers resulting from the search externalities that agents who meet but will never match impose on one another, we first want to find out if there exists an equilibrium where agents do not suffer such externalities. We call these equilibria Perfect Segmentation Equilibria or *PSE*. In this section we show that a *PSE* indeed exists, and we do so by constructing one. We focus here on constructing an equilibrium with the simplest possible market structure in that all agents of the same type search in the same marketplace (*Assumption 1*, or *A1* thereafter) and the set of types of agents searching in a given marketplace is either a singleton or an interval (*Assumption 2*, or *A2* thereafter).

Under *A1* and *A2*, if the set of types searching in marketplace n , X^n , is an interval, the distribution of types is

$$G^n(x) = \frac{G(x) - G(\underline{x}^n)}{G(\bar{x}^n) - G(\underline{x}^n)} \text{ for all } x \in X^n,$$

and the mass of agents in marketplace n is $\omega^n = (G(\bar{x}^n) - G(\underline{x}^n))$. Since both the cumulative distribution and the mass of agents can be recovered from X^n for each active marketplace n , a market structure in this case is simply defined as $M = \{X^n\}_{n=1}^N$. Our strategy in constructing an equilibrium satisfying *A1* and *A2* is to characterize market structures where all agents search in the best marketplace for themselves before checking for which of these there is no payoff to creating a new marketplace.

4.1 Characterizing the Market Structure

Let us first consider agents of type \bar{x} and let us assume that they are in a marketplace by themselves, say marketplace 1. From equation (3), when $X^1 = \{\bar{x}\}$, the reservation type of

¹⁰The proof of proposition 1 in this case needs to be generalized to allow the set of types in a given meeting place to be non-connected. We do not provide the formal proof, but the intuition should suffice to convince the reader that the result carries over.

\bar{x} agents in this marketplace is

$$u^1(\bar{x}) = \frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda} \bar{x},$$

which is strictly less than \bar{x} as long as λ is finite, i.e., as long as there are search frictions. Any agent with type $x \in [u^1(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$ could therefore match in marketplace 1 since his type is higher than the reservation type of the best agents. And given that \bar{x} agents are the best agents around and that the first marketplace is populated exclusively by \bar{x} agents, the value of search among all active marketplaces is the greatest in marketplace 1, provided that an agent can match there. It follows that if $X^1 = \{\bar{x}\}$, agents with types in $[u^1(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$ are not searching in their best marketplace, which cannot be true in equilibrium.

More generally, under *A1* and *A2* a *PSE* must be such that the marketplace where the top agents search, say marketplace 1, is made up of one class, i.e., $u^1(x) = u_1 \leq \underline{x}^1$ for all $x \in X^1$, and it either contains the whole population, in which case $\underline{x}^1 = \underline{x} \geq u_1$, or not, in which case $\underline{x}^1 = u_1 > \underline{x}$. To show this, following the argument used to derive the class structure in the standard one marketplace case, one knows that all agents with types in $[u^1(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$ and who search in marketplace 1 accept to match with one another, and therefore all belong to the same class, and u_1 denotes their common reservation type.

If $u_1 \leq \underline{x}$, then there is only one class in the economy, all agents have a value of search of u_1 , and $\underline{x}^1 = \underline{x}$. Then we have already found a market structure $M = \{X\}$ inducing perfect segmentation and where all agents search in the best marketplace for themselves.

The more interesting case is when $u_1 > \underline{x}$. Then there is more than one class in the economy, and it must be that $u_1 = \underline{x}^1$. Since we are constructing a *PSE*, $\underline{x}^1 \geq u_1$. Moreover, $\underline{x}^1 \leq u_1$, because if not an agent with type $x \in [u_1, \underline{x}^1)$ would obtain a value of search there of u_1 , which is the greatest value of search he can hope for since the distribution of types in marketplace 1 first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of types of any other marketplace. Therefore, $\underline{x}^1 = u_1$.

In both cases u_1 must satisfy

$$ru_1 = \lambda \int_{u_1}^{\bar{x}} (y - u_1) \frac{dG(y)}{1 - G(u_1)}. \quad (4)$$

Suppose there exists a $u_1 > \underline{x}$. Then given this u_1 , the marketplace containing the best agents not in the first class, say they are in marketplace 2, must also contain one class since we are looking for a *PSE*. The common reservation type of agents in this second marketplace, and class, is thus $u_2 \leq \underline{x}_2$. Following the earlier reasoning we used in constructing the first

class, it must be clear that if $\underline{x}_2 > u_2 \geq \underline{x}$, then agents with types in $[u_2, \underline{x}_2)$ would not be searching in the best marketplace for themselves. Hence, for market structures satisfying *A1* and *A2*, if the second marketplace is to contain one class, then the set of types of agents searching in marketplace 2 is either $[u_2, u_1)$ when $u_2 > \underline{x}$, or $[\underline{x}, u_1)$ when $u_2 \leq \underline{x}$, i.e., $X^2 = [\max\{u_2; \underline{x}\}, u_1)$, where in both cases u_2 solves

$$ru_2 = \lambda \int_{u_2}^{u_1} (y - u_2) \frac{dG(y)}{G(u_1) - G(u_2)}.$$

Reasoning recursively, it is clear that a market structure under *A1* and *A2* featuring perfect segmentation and where all agents search in the best marketplaces for themselves is characterized by a finite sequence $\{u_j\}_{j=1}^J$, $u_J \leq \underline{x}$, where for all j , u_j solves

$$ru_j = \lambda \int_{u_j}^{u_{j-1}} (y - u_j) \frac{dG(y)}{G(u_{j-1}) - G(u_j)}, \quad (5)$$

with $u_0 \equiv \bar{x}$. Agents with types in X_j form the j -th class of the economy, where $X_1 = [u_1, \bar{x}]$, $X_j = [u_j, u_{j-1})$ for all $1 < j \leq J$. The sequence is finite because for all $j \geq 2$,

$$u_j < \left(\frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda}\right) u_{j-1} < \left(\frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda}\right)^j \bar{x},$$

where the first inequality is from (5) and the second inequality from successively applying the former. This implies that so long as λ is finite, there exists a finite K such that $(\lambda/(r + \lambda))^K \bar{x} \leq \underline{x}$, and therefore there is a finite $J \leq K$ such that $u_J \leq \underline{x} < u_{J-1}$.

The next lemma (whose proof is in the Appendix) establishes the existence of such a sequence of reservation types, gives a sufficient condition for uniqueness, and compares these reservation types with those in the *BC* economy.

Lemma 1 *For any G , and for market structures satisfying *A1* and *A2*:*

(i) *there exists a sequence $\{u_j\}_{j=1}^J$, $u_J \leq \underline{x}$, where for all j , u_j solves (5), with $u_0 \equiv \bar{x}$;*

(ii) *if G is such that $d\hat{x}(z; y)/dz \leq 1$, where $\hat{x}(z; y) = \int_z^y x dG(x)/(G(y) - G(z))$, then the sequence is unique; and*

(iii) *if $J^{bc} > 1$, then $u_j > u_j^{bc}$ for all $j \leq J^{bc}$, and therefore $J \geq J^{bc}$.*

The intuition behind the possible multiplicity of classes' lower bounds is as follows. Suppose that the right tail of g is very "thin" so that few people are at the top of the distribution, and that we have found u_1 such that all agents with types in $X^1 = [u_1, \bar{x}]$ form

exactly one class when in one marketplace by themselves. Thus, u_1 solves (4), which can be rewritten as

$$u_1 = \frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda} \hat{x}(u_1; \bar{x}),$$

where $\hat{x}(z; \bar{x}) = \int_z^{\bar{x}} y dG(y) / (1 - G(z))$ is the average type in marketplace 1 when its infimum type is z and all agents with types above z search in marketplace 1. Suppose g is such that there are a lot of agents with types just below u_1 , when those agents are added to marketplace 1, the marginal type \underline{x}^1 decreases, and the average type will at first decrease by less. The reservation type of the agents originally in the first marketplace thus falls, but by less than the marginal type, and therefore two classes appear. But because a lot of agents with lower attributes are being added, it is possible that eventually the average type in marketplace 1, $\hat{x}(\underline{x}^1; \bar{x})$, drops faster than \underline{x}^1 does. In this case the reservation type of the top agents decreases faster than \underline{x}^1 , and therefore another value $\tilde{u}_1 < u_1$ can be found such that all agents with types in $[\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$ form exactly one class when in one marketplace by themselves. From here one can intuit that if G is such that the average type $\hat{x}(\underline{x}^1; \bar{x})$ always decreases by less than the marginal type \underline{x}^1 , then there is a unique u_1 such that $u_1 = (\lambda / (\lambda + r)) \hat{x}(u_1; \bar{x})$.¹¹ This is the condition given in part (ii) of lemma 1. It turns out that a sufficient condition for this to be true¹² is that $(1 - G)$ is log-concave.^{13,14}

When there is more than one class in the *BC* economy, Lemma 1 establishes that the reservation type of a class in a *BC* economy is strictly lower than the reservation type of the corresponding class in a market structure that is part of a *PSE*. The intuition for why this is so is the following. In the *BC* economy with more than one class, agents meet other agents they will not match with, whereas in a *PSE* since each marketplace consists of only one class, and hence class 1 agents can be more picky about who they match with. For all other class j agents, their reservation types are increasing in the upper bound of their marketplaces, so $u_j > u_j^{bc}$ for all $j \leq J^{bc}$. Therefore, there are at least as many classes in

¹¹We would like to thank Espen Moen for suggesting to us this interpretation using marginal and average types.

¹²The proof is available from the authors upon request.

¹³A function is said to be log-concave if its log is concave.

¹⁴With an endogenous distribution of singles and a unique marketplace, Burdett and Coles (1997) show that a sufficient condition for uniqueness of the class structure is that $(1 - G)$ be log-concave. It is worth noting this is also sufficient for uniqueness when the overall distribution of unmatched agents is exogenous but there are many marketplaces and there is perfect segmentation. In their paper the endogeneity of the distribution of singles comes from the matching pattern, whereas in this paper it originates from the endogeneity of the set of types in a given marketplace.

an economy with segmentation than in the BC economy.

When there is only one class in the BC economy, it might be possible to find a $u_1 > \underline{x}$ such that if all agents with types in $[u_1, \bar{x}]$ search in one marketplace, then they all have the same reservation type u_1 , but this cannot be guaranteed. For instance, as established in lemma 1, if $(1 - G)$ is log-concave the average type $\hat{x}(\underline{x}^1; \bar{x})$ always decreases by less than the marginal type \underline{x}^1 . Hence, since $(\lambda/(\lambda + r))\hat{x}(\bar{x}; \bar{x}) = (\lambda/(\lambda + r))\bar{x} < \bar{x}$, and $u_1^{bc} \leq \underline{x}$, i.e., $(\lambda/(\lambda + r))\hat{x}(\underline{x}; \bar{x}) \leq \underline{x}$, then $u_1 = (\lambda/(\lambda + r))\hat{x}(\underline{x}^1; \bar{x}) < \underline{x}^1$ for all $\underline{x}^1 \in (\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$.

4.2 Creation of a New Marketplace

Denoting by u_1^* the highest first class lower bound solving (4), we will now show that among the lower bounds solving (4), only u_1^* is such that no class 1 agent can be made strictly better off from the creation of a new marketplace 0. Consider the market structure $M = \{X^n\}_{n=1}^N$ such that $X^1 = [u_1, \bar{x}]$ with u_1 solves (4), and $u_1 < u_1^*$. It is clear that there is a payoff from creating a new marketplace with G^0 and α such that

$$\alpha(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{for } x \in X^0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad ; \text{ and } G^0(x) = \frac{G(x) - G(u_1^*)}{1 - G(u_1^*)}, \text{ for all } x \in X^0,$$

where $X^0 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$. All agents meant to search in marketplace 0, i.e., those with types in X^0 , enjoy a value of search there of u_1^* which is strictly greater than the value of search in marketplace 1, u_1 . And since the lower bound of marketplace 0 is also the reservation type of its inhabitants, the value of search there for all other agents is zero since they would not be able to match there. Hence, agents with types not in X^0 have a greater value of search in their original marketplaces, which is consistent with $\alpha(x) = 0$ for all $x \notin X^0$.

We now show that if $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ no class 1 agent can obtain a greater value of search than u_1^* in a new marketplace 0. We have two cases to consider, whether marketplace 0 contains one or more classes. Let us first consider the former case, and suppose that it is possible to find a G^0 and a function α such that all agents initially in marketplace 1 and whose types are in X^0 are better off, with some of these agents strictly better off, i.e., $u^0(x) \geq u_1^*$ for all x , and $u^0(x) > u_1^*$ for some x , $x \in X^0 \cap [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$. But since marketplace 0 contains one class, $u_1^* < u^0 \equiv u^0(x)$ for all $x \in X^0$. It is straightforward to see then that all agents with types in $[u^0, \bar{x}]$ must be intended to search in marketplace 0 since they would anyway be accepted by all agents with types in $[u^0, \bar{x}] \cap X^0$, and they would enjoy a value of search of $u^0 > u_1^*$ in the new marketplace. Hence, given that the set of types in this

new marketplace must include all agents with types in $[u^0, \bar{x}]$, X^0 must either be $[u^0, \bar{x}]$ or X , and $\alpha(x) = 1$ for all $x \in [u^0, \bar{x}]$. But since u_1^* is the highest solution to (4), it is not possible to have $u^0 > u_1^*$ for all $x \in X^0$ where this new marketplace contains only one class.

If, however, the new marketplace contains two classes or more, it can also be shown (see the proof of the next lemma which is in the Appendix) that no agent with type in $[u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ would fare strictly better in the new marketplace than in marketplace 1. We thus have the following lemma:

Lemma 2 *If a market structure $M = \{X^n\}_{n=1}^N$ is such that $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$, then there does not exist a G^0 and an α satisfying part (iii) of the equilibrium definition for which $u^0(x) > u_1^*$ for some $x \in (X^0 \cap X^1)$.*

The intuition for lemma 2 as to why class 1 agents when $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ cannot fare strictly better in the new marketplace is that since there are now agents they will not match with when they meet they must be less picky about whom they match with, i.e., their reservation type is no higher than u_1^* .

We now turn our attention to the other classes, and marketplaces. If we denote by u_2^* the highest of the u_2 solving (5) for $u_1 = u_1^*$, it is clear that for all other possible reservation types for the second class a new marketplace can be created for all agents with types in $[u_2^*, u_1^*)$ and all these agents are strictly better off there. So only u_2^* can be an equilibrium lower bound.

Since Lemma 2 established that if a market structure is such that $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ it is not possible to create a new marketplace that would make some class 1 agents strictly better off, we will now show that if a market structure is such that $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ and $X^2 = [u_2^*, u_1^*)$, then it is not possible to create a new marketplace 0 that can make some of these class 2 agents strictly better with none of them being worse off. If we first consider the possibility of creating a new marketplace not containing any agent whose type is in $[u_1^*, \bar{x}]$, we can follow the reasoning used for class 1 to show that it is not possible to create a new marketplace 0 yielding a value of search greater than u_2^* to any agent with type in $[u_2^*, u_1^*)$.

But if we now consider creating a new marketplace 0 which contains some class 1 agents, could some class 2 agents be made better off in the new marketplace? It can be shown in this case (see the proof of the next lemma which is in the Appendix) that this is not possible. We then have the following lemma:

Lemma 3 *If a market structure $M = \{X^n\}_{n=1}^N$ is such that $X^1 = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$ and $X^2 = [u_2^*, u_1^*)$, then there does not exist a G^0 and an α satisfying part (iii) of the equilibrium definition for which $u^0(x) > u_2^*$ for some $x \in (X^0 \cap X^2)$.*

The intuition for this result is the following. If some class 1 agents are to search in this new marketplace 0 then they should be no worse off in it than in marketplace 1. This implies that these agents do not match with any agent of type below u_1^* in the new marketplace either. Hence, class 2 agents do not get to match with better type agents than in marketplace 2 by searching in the new marketplace, and on the contrary they get to meet agents they will not match with, and this can only drive down their reservation type.

Having shown that class 2 agents cannot do better than being in their own marketplace where the reservation type of these agents is u_2^* , given u_2^* , we can solve for class 3 agents' highest lower bound u_3^* , and so on, until we reach the lower bound $u_{J^*}^* \leq \underline{x}$. This sequence of lower bounds $\{u_j^*\}_{j=1}^{J^*}$ for the J^* classes is such that each agent searches in his best marketplace, and there are no payoffs from creating a new marketplace.

We thus have the following proposition:

Proposition 2 *The market structure $M^* = \{X^{*n}\}_{n=1}^{J^*}$ and levels of utility $u(x) = u_n^*$ for $x \in X^{*n}$, all n , where $X^{*1} = [u_1^*, \bar{x}]$, $X^{*n} = [u_n^*, u_{n-1}^*)$ for all $n = 2, \dots, (J^* - 1)$, $X^{*J^*} = [\underline{x}, u_{J^*-1}^*)$, and such that u_n^* is the highest solution to*

$$ru_n = \lambda \int_{u_n}^{u_{n-1}^*} (y - u_n) \frac{dG(y)}{G(u_{n-1}^*) - G(u_n)},$$

$u_{N^*}^* \leq \underline{x} < u_{N^*-1}^*$, is a PSE. The number of active marketplaces is finite, and $J^* \geq J^{bc}$.

5 Other Equilibria

We have constructed a PSE satisfying A1 and A2, and we now want to consider all possible market structures, i.e., those not satisfying A1 and A2 and also where some agents do not necessarily match with the first person they meet. Before showing which market structures can be equilibrium market structures we show that even when A1 and A2 are relaxed, all market structures where agents search in their best marketplace induce an economy-wide class structure, i.e., there exists a sequence of disjoint intervals $\{X_j\}_{j=1}^J$ such that agents with types in X_j match with each other if they meet, but they do not match with any agent

whose type is not in X_j . Let us start with the first class. It must naturally contain the \bar{x} agents, and we know that reservation strategies are non-decreasing, so $u(x) \leq u(\bar{x})$ for all x . If an agent with type $x \in [u(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$ searches in a marketplace with value of search $u(x) < u(\bar{x})$, then he has a profitable deviation by joining a marketplace containing \bar{x} agents since he will be accepted by everyone with types in $[u(\bar{x}), \bar{x}]$, and will therefore enjoy a value of search of $u(\bar{x})$ there. Denoting $u(\bar{x})$ simply by \tilde{u}_1 , we then have that all agents with types in $X_1 = [\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$ must share the same reservation type \tilde{u}_1 , and they all belong to the same class. Repeating the argument recursively, it is clear that a market structure M such that no agent wishes to change marketplace must display an economy-wide class structure $\{X_j\}_{j=1}^J$ such that $X_1 = [\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$, $X_j = [\tilde{u}_j, \tilde{u}_{j-1})$ for all $j \geq 2$, $\tilde{u}_J \leq \underline{x}$.

We then have the following proposition which establishes that in equilibrium all agents match with the first person they meet (the proof is in the appendix).

Proposition 3 *An equilibrium must feature perfect segmentation.*

The intuition for this result is as follows. For simplicity, let us consider market structures satisfying *A1* and *A2* where at least one marketplace has more than one class. Consider $M = \{X^n\}_{n=1}^N$ such that $X^n = X^{*n}$ for all $n < K < J^*$, and marketplace K of M contains more than one class. But for this to be possible, the lower bound of K must be $\underline{x}_K < u_K^*$. If the relative mass of agents in the classes of K , except for the first, is zero, then all these agents have a value of search in K which is 0 because the probability they will meet someone they can match with is 0, and hence they must prefer another marketplace. So the relative mass of agents in the classes of K , except the first, must be strictly positive, in which case the reservation type of the first class in K , u_1^K , will be strictly lower than u_K^* since these agents now have a strictly positive probability of meeting agents they will not match with, and hence are less picky. Hence, a marketplace 0 can be created for agents with types in $[u_K^*, u_{K-1}^*)$, which makes all these agents strictly better off.

Since market structures where some agents do not match with the first person they meet have been ruled out, we are left with considering market structures where agents of the same type can search in different marketplaces and type sets are not necessarily intervals, and yet agents match with the first person they meet.

Lemma 4 *Let $M = \{X^n, G^n, \omega^n\}_{n=1}^N$ be a perfectly segmented market structure where agents search in the best marketplace for them. Then there exists a market structure*

$\widehat{M} = \{\widehat{X}^n\}_{n=1}^{\widehat{N}}$ equivalent to M in that all agents fare the same in both cases.

Because we are considering market structures featuring perfect segmentation, the sets of types of the marketplaces class 1 agents search in are such that $\cup_{n \in \Gamma_1} X^n = [\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$, where Γ_j denotes the set of marketplaces containing agents in class j . From (3), \tilde{u}_1 is such that for all marketplaces $n \in \Gamma_1$,

$$r\tilde{u}_1 = \lambda \int_{X^n} (y - \tilde{u}_1) dG^n(y).$$

Since in this case $\sum_{n \in \Gamma_1} \omega^n G^n(x) = G(x)$ for all $x \in [\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$, multiplying both sides of the above equation by ω^n and summing up over all marketplaces in Γ_1 , we obtain (4). Hence, a market structure M where class 1 agents search in more than one marketplace is equivalent to another market structure M' , where all agents from class 1 of M are searching in one marketplace and all the other marketplaces are identical. These two market structures are equivalent since all classes are identical, and therefore they yield the same level of welfare for each type of agent.

Repeating the argument recursively, it is clear that for a perfectly segmented market structure M such that $\cup_{n \in \Gamma_1} X^n = [\tilde{u}_1, \bar{x}]$, $\cup_{n \in \Gamma_j} X^n = [\tilde{u}_j, \tilde{u}_{j-1})$ for all $j = 2, \dots, (J-1)$, and $\cup_{n \in \Gamma_J} X^n = [\underline{x}, \tilde{u}_{J-1}) \subseteq [\tilde{u}_J, \tilde{u}_{J-1})$, where \tilde{u}_k solves

$$r\tilde{u}_k = \lambda \int_{X^n} (y - \tilde{u}_k) dG^n(y), \quad (6)$$

for $n \in \Gamma_k$, we have that, given \tilde{u}_{k-1} , \tilde{u}_k also solves (5), which proves the equivalence result.

The intuition behind this result is simple. Rewrite equation (6) for $k = 1$ as

$$\tilde{u}_1 = \frac{\lambda}{r + \lambda} \int_{X^n} x dG^n(x),$$

where $\int_{X^n} x dG^n(x)$ is the average type in marketplace n , $n \in \Gamma_1$. This implies that all marketplaces containing class 1 agents have the same average type. Hence, if we were to put all class 1 agents together in one marketplace, the average type does not change, and therefore their reservation type stays the same.

There are potentially many market structures that are equivalent in that they imply the same class structure. For instance, consider a market structure with marketplaces 1 and 2 where X^2 is an interval $(\underline{x}^2, \bar{x}^2)$ and $X^1 = [\tilde{u}_1, \underline{x}^2] \cup [\bar{x}^2, \bar{x}]$, they both share the same reservation type \tilde{u}_1 , and all agents of the same type search in the same marketplace. If we assume that G is uniform, then $\tilde{u}_1 = (\lambda / (r + \lambda)) ((\underline{x}^2 + \bar{x}^2) / 2) = (\lambda / (r + \lambda)) ((\tilde{u}_1 + \bar{x}) / 2)$, and

all $\bar{x}^2 = \bar{x} - \gamma$ and $\underline{x}^2 = \tilde{u}_1 + \gamma$ for some $\gamma \in (0, (\bar{x} - \tilde{u}_1) / 2)$ are possible boundaries for X^2 . In this case, there are a continuum of ways to split the first class into two marketplaces, each having the same average type as the original marketplace. And if we further consider splitting the first class in more than two marketplaces, and allow agents of the same type to search in different marketplaces, the possibilities expand even more.

Since we have shown that there is no payoff in creating a new marketplace when the market structure is M^* , market structures equivalent to M^* are also equilibrium market structures, and all these equivalent market structures share the same class structure. Take a market structure $M = \{X^n, G^n, \omega^n\}_{n=1}^N$ such that for any active marketplace k , $X^k \subseteq X^{*j}$ and $(\lambda / (r + \lambda)) \int x dG^n(x) = u_j^*$ for some j , and $G(x) = \sum_{n=1}^N \omega^n G^n(x)$. Then M is an equilibrium market structure. On the contrary, all other market structures not satisfying *A1* or *A2* cannot be part of an equilibrium because they are equivalent to perfectly segmented market structures that are not equilibrium market structures. Hence, even though the set of equilibrium market structures is potentially large, there is a **unique** equilibrium class structure and all agents fare the same in all equilibria. These results are summarized in the following proposition:

Proposition 4 *A market structure $M = \{X^n, G^n, \omega^n\}_{n=1}^N$ is an equilibrium market structure if and only if its implied class structure is that implied by M^* , and therefore for all $x \in X^{*j}$, $j = 1, \dots, J^*$, $u(x) = u_j^*$.*

We view the above proposition that says, in equilibrium, a number of active marketplaces can yield the same value of search to some types of agents, as interesting. This can help explain why, for example, there are so many different bars or clubs which are very similar to one another, and where people are indifferent to going to any of them, and seem to randomize on different nights where to go to.

6 Discussion

6.1 Comparison to the Search and Matching Literature

In frictionless assignment models which were first studied by Gale and Shapley (1962), when agents have the same objective ranking over types, as is the case in this paper, the solution features perfect assortative matching. For instance, the solution to an assignment problem

with symmetrically distributed males and females features the top male matching with the top female, the next best male matching with the next best female, and so on.¹⁵

Standard search and matching models do not deliver this result of perfect assortative matching. In particular, for search models which have log-modular utility functions (our paper uses a special case of this), the class structure result is obtained, where matching sets are intervals. Hence, there is some form of positive assortative matching among agents, but it is no longer perfect, unlike in frictionless assignment models. When we introduce segmentation the degree of positive assortativeness is greater than that of standard one marketplace matching models. But because of the presence of search frictions sorting is nevertheless less than perfect.

Several other papers have dealt with market segmentation, but in different ways. Bose's (2003) paper also considers segmentation of markets and is therefore related, but his model has only two types of agents (traders), with heterogeneity being in the number of units of goods the traders can hold on to (either one or two units), and he does not endogenize the market structure. Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) consider a model with segmentation of the labor market in which segmentation arises because of technological constraints: to be productive in a job a worker needs a minimum level of skills, and if a worker is employed in a firm with a technology below his skill level, he is no more productive than if he had the minimum skill required. This perfect complementarity between skills and technology ensures that low type agents do not find it profitable to deviate to marketplaces with agents of types above theirs, and hence they obtain perfect assortative matching. Lang *et al.*'s (2005) model of labor market segmentation is a directed search model, and thus is not directly comparable to ours.

Competitive search equilibrium models of Moen (1997) and Mortensen and Wright (2002) feature a market-maker who creates marketplaces through posting wages/prices, thereby allowing each agent to choose which marketplace to go to. As the waiting time is implicitly priced, agents sort themselves into the correct marketplaces, with the market tightness adjusting to internalize the search externalities. Search externalities are internal-

¹⁵Formally, the only stable assignment rule Ψ is such that $\forall i \in I$ with type $x(i)$, the agent he is assigned to is $j = \Psi(i)$ such that $x(j) = x(i)$. Obviously it must be that $\Psi(j) = i$, or $\Psi(\Psi(i)) = i$, i.e., an agent is his partner's partner. This implies the matching sets $\Lambda(\cdot)$ are singletons and $\forall x \in X$, $\Lambda(x) = x$. This is because in a one-sided assignment model, when we split agents into two subsets, I_1 and I_2 , such that they have the same *cdf* which is the *cdf* of the whole population, we obtain the result since Ψ is a measure preserving bijection between I_1 and I_2 .

ized in our model just like in competitive search models because each agent is able to direct his search towards the right marketplace.¹⁶

Bloch and Ryder (2000) is also related to our work. They consider a matchmaker who, for a fee, can match agents instantaneously. Agents then choose either to pay the fee and be matched by the matchmaker or search for a partner in one marketplace with search frictions. The two main differences between their approach and ours are: we allow for many marketplaces whereas they consider only two, and in our model search frictions are present in all marketplaces. Damiano and Li (2004) also consider a matchmaking model, but in their case the matchmaker can create different marketplaces, and charge a different fee for each of them.

Our paper differs crucially from sectoral models like the ones of Hosios (1990), Davidson *et al.* (1987, 1988) and Uren (2003). In these models, each firm belongs to one of two sectors, and only workers are mobile. The spirit of our model is to allow *all* agents to move freely between marketplaces.

6.2 The Meeting Technology

In order to focus on the sorting effects it was assumed throughout the paper that the meeting technology displays constant returns to scale so that the measure of agents in each marketplace does not matter for the rate at which agents meet. It is natural to ask if the results obtained are robust to the introduction of increasing returns, as segmentation then becomes less attractive since the meeting rate is lower than if everyone is searching in one marketplace.

To answer this, let us deal with a market structure where all agents in the same class are in the same marketplace. As long as the increasing returns are not too strong, the results obtained, apart from the ones about welfare, hold. Consider the case where $\lambda'(\mu^n) > 0$, where $\lambda(\mu^n)$ is the meeting rate in marketplace n when μ^n is the measure of agents searching in n . If we try to construct a perfectly segmented equilibrium, u_1 , the lower bound of the

¹⁶Our paper is also related to the recent literature that has considered the use of money, either in the context of a cooperative matching game as in Corbae *et al.* (2003), or with more than one meeting place as in Matsui and Shimizu (2005). In these models, preferences are heterogeneous in the sense that when there are K types of agents, an agent typically consumes good k and produces good $k + 1 \pmod{K}$, so there is no objective ranking of types, unlike in our paper.

first marketplace and of the first class must satisfy

$$u_1 = \frac{\lambda(1 - G(u_1))}{r} \int_{u_1}^{\bar{x}} (y - u_1) dG^1(y),$$

which can be rewritten as

$$u_1 = \frac{\lambda(\mu^1)}{r\mu^1} \int_{u_1}^{\bar{x}} (1 - G(y)) dy.$$

In the one marketplace case $\lambda(\mu^1)/\mu^1$ is replaced by $\lambda(1)$ in equation (2). It is then clear that the ratio $\lambda(\mu^1)/\mu^1$ is crucial. If it is decreasing in μ^1 , then all the possible equilibrium lower bounds for the first marketplace, which are also the equilibrium reservation types of the first class, are greater than the lower bound of the first class when everyone meets in one marketplace. And since the maximum equilibrium lower bound of a marketplace with one class is still increasing in its upper-bound, the only equilibrium must be perfectly segmented, and it displays a larger number of classes than the one marketplace case. It is easy to show that this analysis carries over for all other classes. This case corresponds to a meeting technology being less than quadratic.¹⁷

It is clear that with increasing returns in the meeting technology the equivalence result of lemma 4 no longer holds, and market structures where agents of the same class search in more than one marketplace cannot be part of the equilibrium. To see this, consider our previous example where the first class is split between marketplaces 1 and 2 where X^2 is an interval $(\underline{x}^2, \bar{x}^2)$ and $X^1 = [u_1, \underline{x}^2] \cup [\bar{x}^2, \bar{x}]$, where u_1 is the common reservation type of these agents. If we regroup them in marketplace 1, the meeting rate increases as there are now more agents searching there. Hence, the top agents of the first class will increase their reservation type above u_1 , and two classes appear. So the highest possible lower bound for the first class is obtained when all the agents of that class search in the same marketplace.

It is worth noting that if $\lambda(\mu)/\mu$ is constant, which corresponds to the case where the meeting technology is quadratic, then the class structure obtained for *PSE* with connected sets is identical to the Burdett and Coles class structure. In that case the increasing returns are just enough to offset the congestion externality, in that the rate at which agents meet the “right” types is unchanged whether there is segmentation or not.¹⁸ More generally, one can see that all market structures with connected sets display the same class structure.

¹⁷The meeting function is quadratic if the number of matches quadruple when the measure of searching agents doubles. In this case the probability that an agent meets someone doubles.

¹⁸See Teulings and Gautier (2004) for a search and matching model with heterogeneous agents and a quadratic matching function.

7 Conclusion

We endogenize the market structure of an economy with heterogeneous agents who want to form bilateral matches in the presence of search frictions and when utility is non-transferable. We allow for the existence of infinitely many marketplaces and for each agent to choose which marketplace to be in. In equilibrium all market structures feature perfect segmentation, and although perfect assortative matching cannot be obtained in equilibrium, the degree of assortativeness is nevertheless greater than in standard models. Furthermore, all these market structures have the same class structure, implying that all agents fare the same in all equilibria.

Appendix

Proof of lemma 1: From (2) and integrating by parts the right-hand sides of (5), we have that u_j^{bc} and u_j solve $\widehat{\Phi}(u_j^{bc}; u_j^{bc}) = 0$ and $\Phi(u_j; u_{j-1}) = 0$ respectively, where

$$\widehat{\Phi}(z; y) \equiv z - (\lambda/r) \int_z^y (G(y) - G(x)) dx, \text{ and } \Phi(z; y) \equiv z - (\lambda/r) \int_z^y \frac{G(y) - G(x)}{G(y) - G(z)} dx.$$

(i) We have that $\Phi(0; \bar{x}) = -(\lambda/r) \int_0^{\bar{x}} [(1 - G(x))] dx < 0$ and, by L'Hospital, that $\lim_{z \rightarrow \bar{x}} \Phi(z; \bar{x}) = \bar{x} > 0$. Hence, since Φ is continuous, the Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists a $u_1 = \phi(\bar{x}) \in (0, \bar{x})$ such that $\Phi(\phi(\bar{x}); \bar{x}) = 0$. Applying the reasoning recursively, we have that given $u_{j-1} > \underline{x}$, there exists a $u_j = \phi(u_{j-1})$, and the sequence ends once we find $u_J = \phi(u_{J-1}) \leq \underline{x}$.

(ii) u_j solves $u_j = (\lambda/r) \int_{u_j}^{u_{j-1}} [(G(u_{j-1}) - G(x)) / (G(u_{j-1}) - G(u_j))] dx$, which can be rewritten as $u_j = (\lambda / (\lambda + r)) \widehat{x}(u_j; u_{j-1})$. We then have $T(0; u_{j-1}) = -(\lambda / (\lambda + r)) \widehat{x}(0; u_{j-1}) < 0$ and $T(u_{j-1}; u_{j-1}) = (r / (\lambda + r)) u_{j-1} > 0$, where $T(z; y) \equiv z - (\lambda / (\lambda + r)) \widehat{x}(z; y)$. Hence, if T is strictly increasing there exists a unique u_j such that $T(u_j; u_{j-1}) = 0$. Since $dT(z; y)/dz = 1 - (\lambda / (\lambda + r)) d\widehat{x}(z; y)/dz$, this is guaranteed if $d\widehat{x}(z; y)/dz \leq 1$. It follows a unique sequence $\{u_j\}_{j=1}^J$ exists if $d\widehat{x}(z; y)/dz \leq 1$ for all $y \in (\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$ and $z < y$.

(iii) It is clear that $\widehat{\Phi}(z; y) > \Phi(z; y)$ for all $(z, y) \in ([\underline{x}, y) \times X) \setminus (\underline{x}, \bar{x})$, and $\widehat{\Phi}(z; y) = \Phi(z; y)$ for $(z, y) = (\underline{x}, \bar{x})$. Hence, if $u_1^{bc} > \underline{x}$, $u_1 > u_1^{bc} = \widehat{\phi}(\bar{x})$ where $\widehat{\phi}(\bar{x})$ is such that $\widehat{\Phi}(\widehat{\phi}(\bar{x}); \bar{x}) = 0$. Since $\Phi(z; y)$ is increasing in z , $\widehat{\Phi}(x; y) > \Phi(z; y)$ for $x > y$, all $y \geq \underline{x}$. It follows that if $u_1^{bc} > \underline{x}$, then $u_2 = \phi(u_1) > \phi(u_1^{bc}) > \widehat{\phi}(u_1^{bc}) = u_2^{bc}$, and so on. ■

Proof of lemma 2: If there is only one class in marketplace 0, the proof has been done in the main text. For the case where there are two or more classes, suppose $u^0(\bar{x}^0) > u_1^*$. It must then be that $\alpha(x) = 1$ for $x \geq u^0(\bar{x}^0)$, and hence, X^0 is of the form $[u^0(\bar{x}^0), \bar{x}] \cup Y$ for some set Y . But then from (3), $u^0(\bar{x}^0)$ solves

$$ru^0(\bar{x}^0) = \lambda \int_{u^0(\bar{x}^0)}^{\bar{x}} (y - u^0(\bar{x}^0)) \frac{dG(y)}{(1 - G(u^0(\bar{x}^0))) + \omega^0(Y)},$$

where $\omega^0(Y) \equiv \int_Y \alpha(y) dG(y)$ is the mass of agents with types in Y searching in 0. It follows that for all $\omega^0(Y) \geq 0$, $u^0(\bar{x}^0) \leq u_1^*$, and for all $\omega^0(Y) > 0$, $u^0(\bar{x}^0) < u_1^*$, which finishes the proof. ■

Proof of lemma 3: It has been shown in the main text that if the new marketplace does not contain any class 1 agent then $u^0(x) \leq u_2^*$ for all $x \in (X^0 \cap X^2)$, all G^0 and an α satisfying part (iii)

of our definition of equilibrium. Now suppose that some class 1 agents search in the new marketplace 0, and suppose that at least some agents originally in the second marketplace are strictly better off in the new marketplace, and enjoy a value of search of $u^0 > u_2^*$ there so that $\alpha(x) = 1$ for all $x \in [u^0, u_1^*]$. However, because class 1 agents cannot be made strictly better off, as proven in lemma 2, for them to be in 0 it must be that $u^0(x) = u_1^*$ for all $x \in (X^0 \cap X^1)$. Thus, none of these agents will match with agents with types less than u_1^* . Thus, from (3) the value of search in marketplace 0 for agents with type $x \in [u^0, u_1^*]$ is $ru^0 = \lambda \int_{[u^0, u_1^*]} (y - u^0) dG^0(y)$, which can be rewritten as

$$ru^0 = \lambda \int_{[u^0, u_1^*]} (y - u^0) \frac{dG(y)}{(G(u_1^*) - G(u^0)) + \tilde{\omega}^0},$$

where $\tilde{\omega}^0 = \omega^0(X^0 \setminus [u^0, u_1^*])$ is the mass of agents in marketplace 0 with type not in $[u^0, u_1^*]$. But there does not exist a $u^0 > u_2^*$ solving the above equation. This finishes the proof. Note that actually agents originally in class 1 who are now in 0 will actually get a value of search lower than u_1^* for all $(G(u_1^*) - G(u^0)) > 0$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3: Consider M such that some agents do not match with the first person they meet. These agents belong to at least two different classes. Let us consider the one made of the better agents of the lot, say class j . The value of search for these agents must solve $r\tilde{u}_j = \lambda \int_{\tilde{u}_j}^{\tilde{u}_j-1} (y - \tilde{u}_j) dG^n(y)$ for all $n \in \Gamma_j$. If the market structure satisfies *A1* and *A2*, then Γ_j is simply a singleton. If we denote by ω_{-j}^n the mass of agents in marketplace n not belonging to class j , multiplying both sides by ω^n for all n , integrating by parts the RHS, and summing up over n , we obtain

$$r\tilde{u}_j = \lambda \int_{\tilde{u}_j}^{\tilde{u}_j-1} \frac{(G(\tilde{u}_{j-1}) - G(x))dx}{(G(\tilde{u}_{j-1}) - G(\tilde{u}_j)) + \sum_{j \in \Gamma_j} \omega_{-j}^n},$$

since $\cup_{j \in \Gamma_j} X^j$ must contain the interval with upper bound \tilde{u}_{j-1} and lower bound \tilde{u}_j . Defining $\tilde{\Phi}(x; z, \omega) \equiv x - (\lambda/r) \int_x^z [(G(z) - G(x)) / (G(z) - G(x) + \omega)] dx$, it is obvious that for any non-zero ω , $\tilde{\Phi}(x; z, \omega) > \Phi(x; z)$ for all x for a given z . Moreover, it can be shown that $\tilde{\Phi}(x; z, \omega)$ is strictly increasing in x , and since $\tilde{\Phi}(\underline{x}; z, \omega) < 0$ and $\tilde{\Phi}(z; z, \omega) > 0$ for $z > \underline{x}$, we have that there exists a solution $\tilde{\phi}(z, \omega)$ to $\tilde{\Phi}(x; z, \omega) = 0$. It follows that $\phi(z) > \tilde{\phi}(z, \omega)$ for all $\omega > 0$. Setting $z = \tilde{u}_{j-1}$, we have that $\tilde{u}_j^* = \phi(\tilde{u}_{j-1}) \geq \tilde{u}_j = \tilde{\phi}(\tilde{u}_{j-1}, \sum_{j \in \Gamma_j} \omega_{-j}^n)$, with strict inequality if $\sum_{j \in \Gamma_j} \omega_{-j}^n > 0$. Since the relative mass of agents not in class j searching in marketplaces in Γ_j must be non-zero (otherwise these agents have a zero probability to match in these marketplaces, which cannot be true in equilibrium since this entails a value of search of zero), we have $\tilde{u}_j < \tilde{u}_j^*$. Hence, there is a payoff of creating a new marketplace 0 since if we choose α such that $\alpha(x) = 1$ for $x \in [\tilde{u}_j^*, \tilde{u}_{j-1}]$ and zero otherwise, all agents in this new marketplace are strictly better off there than in their original marketplace. And no other agent wishes to join. ■

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