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Developing Countries' Participation in the World Trade Organization

Many developing countries are not participating in the World Trade Organization as much as they should. What can be done about it?

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Summary findings

In the 1960s and 1970s developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather than the GATT as the main institution through which to promote their interests in international trade. But beginning with the Uruguay Round in the mid-1980s, their attitude changed, many more of them became members of the GATT, and a significant number played an active role in negotiations.

Michalopoulos analyzes developing countries' representation and participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO) as of mid-1997 to determine how developing countries can effectively promote their interests and discharge their responsibilities under the rules and agreements of the new organization.

He concludes that although many developing countries are actively participating in the new process, more than half of the developing countries that are members of the WTO participate little more than they did in the early 1980s and have not increased their staffing, despite the

vastly greater complexity of issues and obligations. Institutional weaknesses at home are the main constraints to effective participation and representation of their interests at the WTO.

To make their participation more effective, Michalopoulos recommends that the developing countries establish adequately staffed WTO missions based in Geneva; failing that, pooling their resources and representation in Geneva; and being sure to pay their dues, which are typically small. He recommends that the international community place higher priority on programs of assistance in support of institutional development of poorer countries aimed at enhancing their capacity to participate in the international trading system and the WTO — and that the WTO review its internal rules and procedures to ensure that inadvertently they do not make developing countries participation more difficult.

This paper is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to collaborate with the World Trade Organization in developing approaches for the more effective integration of the developing countries in the international trading system. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896, fax 202-522-1159, Internet address ltabada@worldbank.org. March 1998. (34 pages)

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Developing Countries' Participation in the World Trade Organization

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The Participation of the Developing Countries in the WTO

Summary Findings

Throughout the 1960's and 1970's developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather than the GATT as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in international trade. Beginning with the Uruguay Round in the mid 1980's however, the developing countries attitude changed: Many more became members of the GATT and a significant number played an active role in the Uruguay Round negotiations. The paper analyses the representation and participation of the developing countries in the WTO as of mid-1997 in order to determine whether the developing countries can effectively promote their interests and discharge their responsibilities under the rules and agreements of the new Organization.

The paper concludes that a duality in the representation and participation of developing countries in the WTO has emerged: On the one hand there are many developing countries which have increased significantly their capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organization. Their participation in formal and informal decision making processes is substantial, although they frequently do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may diverge and result in the forming of different coalitions. On the other hand, there is an even larger group of primarily smaller and lower income developing countries, which account for more than 50% of total WTO developing country membership, for which effective representation and participation in the Organization's activities is still a serious problem. Their situation has changed little since the early 1980's. Most are not represented in Geneva and hence can not effectively participate in the consultations leading to the development of consensus on which the WTO is based. Their staffing has not increased significantly, while the complexity of the issues and the number of meetings and obligations in the WTO has multiplied significantly.

For many developing countries and especially for the least developed and some of the smaller island economies, institutional weaknesses are the major constraints in both meeting their obligations under the WTO and in effective participation in the Organization and representation of their interests. Institutional development is a complex process, that takes a great deal of time. As a consequence, the solution of the problems of representation of the developing countries in the WTO is neither easy nor amenable to quick, stroke- of- the- pen changes in policies or rules.

The major recommendations for more effective participation are as follows:

First, participation would be enhanced through the establishment of adequate staffed WTO Missions based in Geneva. Measures to increase effective representation in Geneva, however, should be taken *pari passu* with measures to strengthen the institutional capacity at home, as part of a broader decision to become more effectively integrated in the international trading system. Developing countries need to initiate efforts to strengthen the policy making and implementation capacity of institutions that affect their ability to trade as well as to seek assistance for this purpose from international donors and the WTO itself.

Second, for some countries with very small international representation in general, it may not be optimal use of scarce human and material resources to set up such Geneva Missions. In such cases, the main objective should be twofold: (a) to ensure that they have adequate information flow on the issues handled by the WTO and how they affect their interests; and (b) to identify like minded countries or groups which do have effective representation, develop a process of consultation with them and thereby obtain some assurance that their interests are reflected on an ongoing basis. To this end, countries need to explore *inter alia* whether they can pool their resources and representation in Geneva in the context of regional groupings to which they belong, or alternatively, whether they can second one or more staff to already established Missions in Geneva of like-minded countries.

Third, countries need to ensure that the effectiveness of their participation is not impaired by such matters as not paying their membership dues. The amounts involved are typically very small; falling in arrears in their payments can not be a cost effective policy even in circumstances of countries facing serious budget constraints.

Fourth, the international community should place higher priority to the more effective integration of the developing countries in the international trading system and their participation in the WTO. While many developing countries have made great strides in this connection, institutional weaknesses are glaring and impose serious constraints in many others, especially the Least Developed. Donors in general, and the Bretton Woods institutions, UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC in particular, should increase their support and assistance to well co-ordinated programs of institutional development that enhance the capacity of developing countries -- whether on the Least Developed country list or not-- to participate effectively in the international trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations in the WTO. Such an institutional strengthening is a *sine qua non* for effective representation of developing country interests in the WTO, as well as for the accession to the WTO of countries which are not yet members.

Fifth, the WTO should undertake a review of its internal rules and procedures--such as the rule that delegations of countries presenting cases before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) include only government employees--to ensure that they do not inadvertently prejudice the effective participation of developing countries. It would also appear desirable for the WTO to increase the resources it allocates from its own budget to provide assistance to developing countries to enable them to discharge the obligations entailed by membership in the Organization as well as to assist others to accede. This does not necessarily mean that the WTO should increase its own staffing for undertaking technical assistance activities. It does mean that the WTO should allocate an appropriate amount of resources from its budget to the tasks of supporting effective participation of all its membership in its activities and assisting needy non-members in their accession process, so as to become a truly global institution.

THE PARTICIPATION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO

I. Introduction

Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, developing countries viewed UNCTAD rather than GATT as the main institution through which they could promote their interests in international trade. Their representation in GATT reflected these priorities: Many developing countries were not members, and of those that were, a large number did not maintain official representatives resident in Geneva, but instead used representatives in other European capitals to cover GATT matters -- for ACP countries usually their Mission to the EU in Brussels. Moreover, their participation in GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Round, was "passive" in that they did not engage in a significant way in the mutual exchange of concessions on a reciprocal basis (Whalley, 1987).

Beginning with the Uruguay Round, developing countries' attitude towards participation in the GATT and, subsequently, in the WTO changed significantly: Many developing countries played a very active role in the Uruguay Round negotiations; and a large number decided to become members of WTO. This attitude change reflects a number of complex and inter-related developments: Developing countries, in general, have become more effectively integrated in the international trading system, and several have become major exporters of manufactures. Trade policies in many countries have been liberalized, favouring an outward orientation and lower protection. And, there has been a growing appreciation of the importance of observing international rules in the conduct of trade as well as the need to safeguard trading interests through effective participation in the activities of the new organization.

The establishment of the WTO has resulted in further changes which place additional demands on developing countries for their effective participation: First, the WTO covers a variety of new areas, such as services, standards, intellectual property rights, all of which require additional institutional capacity in member governments both for more effective representation in Geneva and in their home

capitals. Second, the WTO, unlike GATT, has been engaging in a number of on-going negotiations in the liberalization of different sectors which require continuous active involvement by member countries. Three such negotiations, on Basic Telecommunications, Information Technology Products and Financial Services were concluded in 1997 and more are in store starting in 1999, as part of the built-in agenda of the Uruguay Round.¹

A key question that arises at present is whether developing countries' representation at the WTO is adequate for the pursuit of their effective participation in the activities of the Organization and, through it, the promotion of their interests in the expanding range of issues being addressed. This issue is of special importance because the WTO, like the GATT before it, is a member driven organization, meaning that the bulk of the analytical work, the development of proposals as well as the negotiation of agreements falls on the member countries and their representatives.

This paper analyses participation of developing countries at the WTO as of mid-1997. The focus is on three main issues: (a) representation, as reflected in the existence or not of a Mission of adequate size dealing with WTO matters located in Geneva; (b) participation in the affairs of the new Organization, as reflected in the allocation of formal chairmanships in the various WTO councils and subsidiary bodies and in the informal processes that characterize WTO governance and decision making; and (c) institutional capacity in home capitals, which is necessary for both effective representation and participation. Based on this analysis, the last part of the paper draws a number of conclusions and recommendations for the more effective participation of developing countries in the WTO.

¹The participation of the developing countries in these negotiations will be only noted in passing rather than analyzed in depth. The participation of the developing countries in the Uruguay Round has been discussed extensively elsewhere (see especially Croome 1995, Martin and Winters 1996, and UNCTAD and WTO, 1996), and is not going to be addressed in this paper.

II. The Data

The basic information used for the analysis of representation was provided by the WTO/GATT Directories issued in 1982 and in August of 1987 and 1997. These Directories have a listing of all staff working in each member country Mission dealing with WTO/GATT matters as well as the location of the Mission. The listings contain only professional staff -- secretarial and support staff (drivers etc.) are excluded; and are usually headed by an Ambassador, permanent representative of the country to the WTO/GATT. As noted above, the representation may be from a Mission in Geneva, from a Mission elsewhere in Europe or in a few cases from a Ministry in the capital of the country itself. They are all listed in the WTO/GATT Directories -- whose format has changed little over the years; they have just become thicker.

The period covered is of interest because it looks at the WTO/GATT representation at three different points in time, each associated with a distinct period in the organization's activity: 1982 is before the beginning of the Uruguay Round, 1987 is a year after the Uruguay Round was launched, and 1997 is the present -- ten years later, when the WTO has been established and the implementation of the Round is in full swing.

The Directories also contain a listing of the officers of the Organization and all subsidiary bodies, committees, working groups etc. as well as their country affiliation which is used in the discussion of participation in WTO activities. Chairmen have traditionally played a relatively active role in the GATT and the WTO -- their role has not been purely cosmetic. An organization like the WTO -- and previously the GATT -- which works with consensus despite the fact that the countries represented are very different in their economic size, presents complex challenges in designing decision making structures that result in an equitable representation of the interests of all participants. Chairmanships play a role in this effort to maintain a reasonable balance of interests. Thus, the share of chairmanships

and other offices held by the developing countries could shed some light on their involvement and potential influence in the organization, especially over time.

Both measures -- committee chairmanships and location and size of mission staffing obviously by themselves do not necessarily imply effectiveness. The quality and effectiveness of committee chairmen and staff varies and there is no way to take account of such differences in a systematic fashion.

There is also a concern as to whether staff, listed in the Directories as working on WTO/GATT matters, actually work only on these matters, or have responsibilities regarding other Geneva based international organizations as well, dealing with unrelated issues, such as for example ILO. Practice regarding who gets listed in the Directories relative to what they actually do tends to vary: A majority of both developed and developing countries operate joint Missions -- i.e. Missions housing representatives to all international agencies in Geneva whose formal head is the Ambassador accredited to the UN. In these cases most of the staff listed in the WTO Directory also appear in the UN Directory - usually, but not always, with an explicit WTO designation. But there is a significant group of both developing and developed countries operating separate WTO Missions headed by a different Ambassador and often reporting to a different Ministry in their capitals. The establishment of separate WTO Missions increased noticeably following the establishment of the WTO and may have been partly the result of the setting of a separate WTO headquarters agreement with the Swiss authorities.² Thus, there appears to be no systematic bias as between developing and developed countries concerning a divergence between their formal designation in the WTO Directories and what they actually work on or on the basis of whether there is a separate WTO Mission or not.

On the other hand, to the extent that a large number of developing countries are represented in Geneva by very small Missions, then the greater the likelihood that staff in these missions, whatever

²Although in these cases as well, the Ambassador accredited to the UN is typically senior in rank. See UN Directory, Geneva, 1997.

their formal designation, would have to deal with other matters as well and hence their capacity to deal with WTO matters diluted. However, the use of the measure itself, counting heads, tends to introduce an offsetting, small country bias: At the limit, each country represented has no less than one representative. A very small country with a minute proportion of world trade would still have a representative -- and an influence disproportionate to its trade share -- while a country like the US or a group of countries like that of the EC whose trade or GNP may be many hundreds or even thousands of times larger would not be expected to have Missions of proportionate size.³

But of course, numbers and formal representation and chairmanships do not tell the whole story. Informal arrangements work along with and sometime supersede the formal committee structure and arrangements. Information on these informal processes of developing consensus is hard to document. In some cases, the groups involved and their membership is a matter of public record. In other cases, they are not, and the analysis presented here has had to rely on personal interviews with the information provided on condition of no attribution.

Finally, it was not possible to undertake a systematic analysis of institutional constraints and requirements for effective representation and participation in the WTO for all developing countries. The main new data presented on this issue are based on the "Trade Related Technical Assistance Needs Assessments" prepared by a number of Least Developed Countries in the context of the High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries' Trade Development held in Geneva in October 1997.

³It was also thought that Mission size would also be affected by a country's geographical proximity to Geneva. Were this to be an important factor, it would tend to bias downward the Mission size of developed, European countries. It turns out, that if that bias exists, it does not show in the statistics, as the European countries are substantially represented in Geneva -- both through their national missions and, for EC matters, through the EC. On the other hand, the distance of most developing countries from Geneva means that participation in the activities of the organization by representatives from their capitals is quite costly and raises the importance of having effective representation located in Geneva.

III. Membership

The first point to note is the familiar one that developing countries now account for 74% of WTO membership compared to 66% in 1982 (Table 1). Only one new member, Liechtenstein, was added over the period that could be considered a developed economy. The overwhelming majority of the 43 new members added, the bulk since 1987, have been developing countries and, most recently a number of transition economies. Membership increased slightly -- by seven countries in the period 1982-1987, notably with the inclusion of such large developing countries as Mexico; and exploded with the addition of 36 new members hence (see Table 1).⁴ At present, total WTO membership accounts for over 90% of world exports, compared to slightly more than 75% in 1982. The largest exporting countries/territories currently not members are China, Chinese Taipei, Russia and Saudi Arabia.⁵

Over the same period, the proportion of world exports accounted by developing country members of the WTO increased even more, from 11% in 1982 to 19% in 1996 (Table 1). This was both because of an increase in developing country membership, and because of the rapid expansion of developing country exports in the 1990's. Overall however, developing countries continue to represent a much larger proportion of WTO membership than their share of international trade.

The data on membership nonetheless, disguise the fact that a large number of developing countries have been at any point in time formally "inactive" for not having paid their WTO dues for more

⁴The following countries or groups are defined as "developed" and "other" for the purposes of this paper: "Developed" include the fifteen members of the European Communities, the representative of the European Commission, the four EFTA countries (Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland), Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States; "Other" include Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia (not a WTO member); all remaining countries and territories are classified as "developing".

⁵WTO members can be countries or customs territories, such as e.g. Hong Kong, which has been a member while formally a colony of the UK and now a part of China. Similarly, the European Communities are a member with a separate delegation from those of the 15 fifteen constituent states. For purposes of simplicity, the paper uses the term "country" whatever the legal status of the member may be.

than three years.⁶ At the beginning of 1997, 23 developing countries/territories were so designated. Such a designation implies that they are not able to receive technical assistance from the organization, nor have their representatives chair WTO bodies, the withholding of a number of other privileges, such as the distribution of documents etc.⁷ Another seven developing countries were more than one or two years in arrears and were therefore barred from chairing WTO bodies. Thus, thirty developing countries i.e. about a third of the total membership, was barred from chairmanships. Twenty of these were least developed countries. Fifteen had no Missions in Geneva and many others had only token representation.

IV. Representation

Location of Missions. Today, while 64 developing countries members maintain WTO Missions in Geneva, 26 others continue to be represented by Missions or Embassies elsewhere in Europe and seven more list as their representatives people located in Ministries at their own capitals (see Table 2a and Annex). Two thirds of those with representation from other capitals in Europe used their Brussels mission; while the remainder were spread between Bonn, London and Paris (See Annex). The proportion of developing countries members of the WTO or GATT actually represented in Geneva declined slightly between 1982 and 1997 from 69% to 66% respectively, despite the fact that a number of countries such as Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe, moved their representation from elsewhere in Europe to Geneva (See Annex). By contrast, all developed country members of the WTO, with the exception of Liechtenstein, and all transition economies have a Mission in Geneva. The decline in the proportion of developing countries with Geneva representation is to a considerable extent due to the inclusion as WTO members at its establishment, based on simplified procedures, of a large number of smaller developing countries whose governments had previously been applying the GATT on a *de facto* basis.

⁶These rules are contained in GATT/PC/7, L\7578

⁷According to a recent WTO Council decision, Least Developed countries in arrears are no longer being barred from receiving technical assistance from the Organization..

There are two main reasons for the continued representation of many developing countries from outside Geneva: (a) many of the smaller ACP countries consider their main international trade policy issues to involve relations with the EC rather than the WTO and thus locate their representatives in Brussels, from where they also are supposed to follow WTO issues; (b) in addition, a number of the new members are very small island economies that have very few representatives abroad and simply can not afford separate Missions in Geneva. Of the 29 least developed countries members of the WTO, only 12 had representation in Geneva. Similarly, practically all of the small island economies were represented from missions in Europe or from capitals.

There is little doubt that representation from Brussels or another Mission in Europe can cause difficulties, delays and sometimes confusion in the participation of the activities of WTO in Geneva. The limitations and constraints to effective participation in the WTO that derive from lack of representation in Geneva have been noted many times (Blackhurst 1997, UNCTAD 1997); and they have been recently documented in the case of Sierra Leone, a least developed country with representation to the WTO from Brussels.⁸

Size of Missions. At present, the total staff of missions working on WTO matters in Geneva as well as developing countries representatives working in European capitals numbers 540, of whom 347 represent developing countries, 168 developed countries and 25 other, mostly transition economies. This is more than double the number that worked on GATT issues in 1982, with most of the increase occurring since 1987.⁹

⁸See Beatrice Chaytor and Michael Hindley, A Case Study of Sierra Leone's Participation in the World Trade Organization, Cameron: 1997.

⁹This is much larger than the expansion of WTO secretariat staff over the same period -- which went from 340 in 1982 to 383 in 1987 and 515 in 1997, using the Directory as the basis. The two listings are not comparable, however, because the secretariat list includes support staff. As the professional staff in the secretariat -- excluding interpreters and translators, does not exceed 200, both the absolute and the relative increase of WTO professional secretariat staff over the period is likely to have been much smaller than the expansion of Mission staff.

The increase in the total head count is in smaller part due to the increase in WTO membership and in larger part due to an increase in the average size of Missions dealing with WTO matters. The average size of Mission increased from 2.9 persons per mission in 1982 to 3.3 persons in 1987 and to 4.1 persons in 1997, an increase of over 40%, with most of the changes occurring in the decade since 1987.¹⁰

The average size of Mission increased both for developed and developing countries. The average size Mission for developed countries increased from 4.1 persons in 1982 to 6.7 persons in 1997 or more than 50%. For developing countries the average rose exactly by 50% from 2.4 to 3.6 persons per Mission (see Table 2).¹¹ Thus, the difference in the average size of Mission actually increased over the past fifteen years.¹²

The fact that the average Mission for the developing countries continues to be substantially lower and the difference with developed countries is increasing, should not necessarily be interpreted as an indicator of relative capacity for effective representation on issues of interest at the WTO for the developing countries as a whole. This is because in this, as in so many areas, the average for developing countries is quite misleading as it disguises very large variations.

At the one extreme is a group of LDCs or small, low income countries as well as a large number of small island economies (for example, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines etc) with little trade and basically only nominal representation. The average size of Mission for these countries was only 1.2 persons.

¹⁰Only five countries (Burundi, Gabon, Malaysia, Portugal and Congo) had less mission staff working on WTO/GATT issues in 1997 than in 1982 -- and in only a few of these cases it would appear that the reductions were policy driven.

¹¹The average size of mission in the "other" category, mostly transition economies, did not change.

¹²Recall that "Mission" is defined to include representatives to the WTO/GATT listed in the Directories irrespective of whether located in Geneva or elsewhere. The differences are actually somewhat smaller if one compares only the countries with Missions in Geneva.

At the other extreme are the ASEAN countries and Korea whose average size of WTO Mission in Geneva is in excess of 8 persons, (headed by Korea and Thailand with more than fifteen each) and thus substantially greater than the average Mission from developed countries. Representation from Latin American countries averages about 5.5 persons per Mission -- i.e. close to developed countries, and similarly for other developing countries like India and Egypt.

Discussions with representatives of Missions from both developed and developing countries suggested that they are all hard pressed to cope with the increased number of meetings and activities of the WTO. According to one estimate (Blackhurst 1997a), there were approximately 40-45 scheduled WTO meetings in the average working week in 1995-1996. To this one must add all the other informal gatherings for consultations that occur among delegations outside formal settings to develop consensus.

Based on informal estimates developed in consultation with a number of Missions, just to follow the topics of the various WTO bodies and attend their meetings requires a staff of at least 4-5 people, and the average is increasing.¹³ If one uses this yardstick, it is clear that, as of mid 1997, a very large number of developing countries did not meet it. Assuming for example, that effective representation in the WTO requires a Mission in Geneva of a size of at least three staff (including the head of the mission) -- which is actually smaller than the minimal range judged as adequate, 33 developing countries and territories did not meet it because they did not have a Mission in Geneva; another 17 had a Mission, almost always as part of a joint UN mission, but with less than three staff (including the head of Mission) assigned to WTO tasks. In addition, there were another six countries, which while having a nominally adequately sized Mission in Geneva, (in all cases, joint with the UN and thus harder to judge on the division of responsibilities) had arrears problems, as a consequence of which either they were formally "inactive" or could not have their representatives elected to WTO bodies. This gives a total of 56, or close to 60% of the total developing countries members of the WTO being in some fashion handicapped in being effectively represented.

¹³This is consistent with the estimate for a minimum size mission presented in Blackhurst 1997b).

At the same time, there are perhaps 30-35 developing countries including those already noted and several others which by virtue of their interest in the WTO, the staffing of their Missions and the leadership of their representatives, play a very active role in the affairs of the organization. They are the ones which provide the bulk of the formal leadership structure of the WTO and they are the ones that are being consulted when informal consultations to develop a consensus take place.

V. Participation

Chairmanships. The analysis of chairmanships includes not only chairmen but also vice-chairmen who had been appointed to a number of the main bodies of the organization and subsidiary committees, often in order to maintain a balance between developing and developed countries.

The analysis distinguishes between chairmanships (including vice-chairmen) of two main groups: The first group of "important" chairmanships includes those of the main constituent bodies, such as the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the GATT Council and later the WTO Council on Goods, Services etc as well as chairmanships of the permanent organs of the GATT and later of the Committee structure of the WTO.¹⁴ The second group of "less important" chairmanships, includes those of various ad hoc working groups and other entities established under lesser "authority" -- i.e. those under the multilateral codes of the GATT, under plurilateral agreements of the WTO, working parties for accession etc. The distinction is somewhat arbitrary: Under the reorganization following the establishment of the WTO, a number of groups that functioned before under a "lower authority" of a multilateral code, such as the anti-dumping committee, or customs valuation were incorporated into the more formal committee structure of the WTO. But the breakdown is helpful in bringing out some interesting points about developing country representation and is used primarily for this purpose.

¹⁴The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the GATT Contracting Parties have been included in the list of "important" chairmanships although their functions were mostly ceremonial. According to GATT practice these positions were held by representatives of countries which the previous year held the same positions in the GATT General Council.

The main findings are presented in Table 3. The Table shows that over the fifteen years covered, developing countries increased substantially the absolute number of "important" chairmanships they hold. Indeed, both in 1987 and in 1997 they held in absolute terms more important chairmanships than the developed countries (but not by a large margin). In all cases their proportion of chairmanships is lower than their share of the total membership of the institution but higher than their share of international trade.

The distribution of the very top leadership positions of the GATT (Chairman and three Vice Chairmen of the Council) in 1982 and 1987 seems to have been very carefully balanced: In each instance the Chairman was either from a developed or developing country (rotating on an annual basis) and the three vice-chairmen, one each of a developing country, a developed one and a country in transition (though they were not called that then!).

Similar balance exists at the very top of the WTO leadership positions at present involving the positions of the Chairman of the General Council (Brazil) the Chairmen for the Councils of Goods (Norway), Services(Korea) and TRIPS (Chile), the Dispute Settlement Body(New Zealand), the Trade Policy Review Body (Pakistan) and key Committees. Indeed, there is a pattern of informal rotation for the top positions, with the understanding that Chairmanships -- which are for one year -- previously held by a developed country would be succeeded by a developing country and vice -verca.¹⁵

The picture that emerges from looking at the other, lesser chairmanships however, is entirely different. Both in 1982 an in 1987, very few chairmanships went to developing countries. This is in part due to the fact that most of the groups involved focused on the activities of the implementation of the multilateral codes in which developing country participation was very limited. Developing

¹⁵Interestingly enough, very few of these top leadership positions are held by representatives of the EC, the US or Japan. At the same time the Chair of the Committee on Trade and Development which deals exclusively with developing country issues, has traditionally been held by somebody from a developing country.

countries focused their interest then on -- and maintained the chairmanships of -- such groups as the Trade and Development Committee, relations with ITC and similar entities which had been created to address primarily the interests of the developing countries -- not the institution as a whole.

The situation has changed little in the WTO where the developing countries again hold proportionately few of the leadership positions in bodies dealing with the implementation of two remaining plurilateral agreements but also very few of the chairmanships of the many working parties set up for accession of new members. A number of the accession working parties have been in place for several years and their chairmen, mostly from developed countries, continue even after they have left their positions in Geneva. At the same time, there is proliferation of committees and working groups relative to the number of available high level, experienced developing country representatives that have time to devote to the expanding range of WTO tasks. If one judges that there are about 30-35 developing countries active in WTO affairs, their Ambassadors or senior WTO representatives hold the chairmanships of 31 WTO bodies or other Committees. This is not a bad score, given that several of these Ambassadors also have to represent their countries at other international organizations in Geneva.

The implications of the findings on chairmanships should not be exaggerated. They do suggest that the WTO as an institution is formally flexible enough to accommodate an increasing interest on the part of developing countries. Whether this translates into moving forward issues of importance to the agenda of the developing countries is a somewhat more complex issue, however. Preparation and presentation of issues does not hinge primarily on the holding of chairmanships or leadership positions. It is based on a lot of preparatory work and institutional capability in capitals; it is also based on the development of points of common interest with similarly minded countries and delegations.

Informal Consultations. Any institution such as the WTO, and the GATT before it, which is based on consensus must develop a variety of processes both formal and informal, in order to reach decisions. In principle, any single member of the institution can block a decision by casting a negative

vote. It was clear, even in the context of the GATT where the developing countries had a majority of the votes but played a decidedly lesser role, that it would be futile to attempt to exercise voting strength either to block major progress or to force developed countries to implement obligations not freely accepted (Evans 1968). In practice there is rarely, if ever, any voting. This puts a premium on consultation, both formal and informal, that builds consensus.

As the WTO now has more than 130 members, it is very difficult to conduct consultations, or for that matter any kind of business activity, when everybody has to be consulted about everything. Thus, while the General Council, the ultimate decision making body where all members are represented, as well as all the various subsidiary bodies and committees meet frequently, informal consultations take place even more often. When issues of importance to the Organization as a whole require consultations, these usually involve the Director General and a smaller group of members, that include the major trading countries, both developed and developing, and others who are judged to be representative of the views of the remaining membership. The actual composition of this group (called the "Green Room Group" because it meets at the Director General's green conference room) tends to vary by issue. But on issues of general importance to the organization it could consist of upwards of thirty members. Given that in such meetings, the representative of the European Commission speaks on behalf of the fifteen members of the European Communities, developing countries, typically form the majority of "voices" in such consultations.¹⁶

¹⁶For a period in the late 1970's and early 1980's an effort was made to formalize the establishment of a smaller group of countries which would be used as a vehicle for regular consultations in the GATT. This so called "Consultative Group of Eighteen" included 10 developing countries. Although from time to time there have been suggestions to revive such a group in the context of the WTO, it has not been possible to reconstitute such a group, in part because of difficulties in accommodating all the various countries who would want to participate, because they would not feel that other members would adequately represent their interests. As a consequence the present loose and flexible consultation formula has remained in place. It is interesting in this regard that neither the weighted voting nor the related representation formula, whereby one country represents a number of others (frequently of vastly different level of development) present in the decision making bodies of the IMF and the World Bank, has been at all in favour in the WTO. It also interesting to note that despite the disparity between trade weights and voting strength, both the GATT and the WTO have been able to function perhaps for the reasons discussed by Evans (1968).

Developing countries often do not have a common position on major issues before the WTO. There is a Developing Country Group in the WTO that holds consultations from the time to time; and the developing countries consult on trade policies issues of importance to them in the context of the G-77 in UNCTAD. However, the establishment of common positions, that will encompass all the developing countries members of the WTO as a group, is becoming more of a challenge as there are growing disparities in their income levels, their trading interests, their integration in the international economy, their institutional capacities and their participation in WTO affairs. Some of these countries, e.g. Korea, Mexico and Turkey, are also members of the OECD and on some issues share the outlook of the developed countries members of that group. Others, find that, on some issues, their interests tend to coincide with developed country members and hence participate in groups with mixed developed-developing country memberships.

Agriculture is one such issue. The "Cairns Group", perhaps the most well known and formal of these groups, consists of a mixed membership of exporters of agricultural products, and includes such countries as Australia, but also Argentina, Hungary and Thailand. The interests of these exporters may at times be quite different from those of a large number of developing countries which are net importers of foodstuffs.

Two other informal groups of mixed membership are worth noting: The so called "Invisible Group" consists of officials from trade ministries of major trading countries, balanced between both developed and developing countries (including the so-called "quad" group of Canada, the EC, Japan and the US, but also such developing countries as Brazil, India and Korea). It meets in Geneva, perhaps twice a year, with the participation of the Director General to discuss, usually in general terms, upcoming issues of importance to the WTO. The other, is the so called "Beau-Rivage Group", which includes the Geneva based representatives of a number of smaller countries both developed and

developing, that share an active participation in WTO affairs and a commitment to the multilateral trading system.¹⁷

In addition to these groups, the development of a consensus involves numerous other meetings in formal or informal settings. For example, developing countries consult in regional groupings, such as the Africa group or ASEAN as well as in context of groups with a wider agenda such the G-15, or in the context of sectorally oriented bodies such as International Textiles and Clothing Bureau or in smaller caucuses among like-minded countries whose composition sometimes includes both developed and developing countries. The 30-35 developing countries with an active representation at the WTO are usually important participants in these consultations. One of the problems that some developing countries have voiced is that they lack an institutional structure such as the one provided by OECD for the developed countries in which to undertake research and analyses as well as develop proposals of interest to a large group of developing countries, which can then be presented at the WTO for consideration by its full membership.¹⁸

The Agenda, New Issues and Agreements. Partly because of the lack of such a forum and partly because of their own institutional weaknesses, many developing countries feel handicapped in contributing to setting the WTO agenda. As in other fields, the largest number of participants in the recently concluded agreements on Telecommunications, Information Technology and Financial Services agreements reached in the WTO during 1997 are developing countries. However, the initiative for all three agreements, as well for the "new issues" that have emerged on the WTO agenda following the Singapore Ministerial, came in large measure from the developed countries, which also account for the bulk of world trade in the goods and services involved. At the same time, it is quite clear that

¹⁷This is similar in composition and orientation with the "De la Paix Group" active during the Uruguay Round.

¹⁸On some issues, e.g. investment, developing countries continue to look to UNCTAD as an institution in which such analyses and positions can be developed. UNCTAD has also provided a forum for discussion of broader aspects of a trade policy agenda for developing countries (see e.g. UNCTAD 1997).

none of the agreements could have been put in place without the active support provided by a number of developing countries from East Asia and Latin America.

VI. Institutional Capacity

Effective participation in the WTO and representation of developing country interests depends critically on the development of an adequate institutional capacity in the developing countries themselves. The increasing range and complexity of issues handled by the WTO, some of which are becoming very technical, implies that the capacity of developing countries to participate effectively in the work of the WTO will depend very heavily on the analytical capacity and strength of the governmental and other institutions handling the range of WTO issues in capitals. This is all the more so in the WTO, a member driven organization, with a very small secretariat, where a great deal of the analysis of issues and development of positions is done by the members, usually in capitals.

Institutional weaknesses of developing countries have received formal recognition in the Uruguay Round agreements which contain provisions for special and differential treatment of developing countries in a number of areas especially in Sanitary and Phytosanitary, Standards and TRIPS, permitting longer implementation periods and/or the provision of technical assistance to strengthen their institutional capacity to meet their obligations under the agreements. Developing countries face a variety of challenges in this regard: the drafting of appropriate legislation and regulations, the meeting of procedural notification requirements, the staffing of government institutions with technical personnel able to implement the policies and commitments undertaken and the monitoring of trading partners' implementation of WTO obligations to assess whether market access has been unfairly denied or trade rights infringed -- as well as to prepare an appropriate response (UNCTAD and WTO, 1996).

These weaknesses have been clear for some time, especially in the context of Africa (Oyejide, 1997). They are frequently glaring for the more than 50 developing countries with weak

representation at the WTO -- and some others as well; and they were amply documented in the recent assessments of technical assistance needs prepared by least developed countries in connection with the High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least Developed Countries' Trade Development (HLMLDCTD), which took place in Geneva in October 1997. All eleven needs assessments completed so far requested assistance in strengthening domestic institutions that support international trade including, for example, through staff training of Trade Ministries and Customs Offices, preparation of legislation and regulations, and the development of a local capacity to enable countries to participate more effectively in future discussions and negotiations especially in the "new issues" handled by the WTO (See WT/COMTD/IF/1-11).

Given these weaknesses, it is often very difficult for countries to undertake the analytical work required for the development of new initiatives or for responses to proposals prepared by others. As Oyejide notes, as long as "particular countries were willing to subordinate their interests to those generally articulated by and broadly acceptable to all developing countries, their participation was not particularly resource intensive at the individual country level. Because interests were not extensively differentiated, it was not necessary to be adequately represented at every meeting, nor was it required for such representatives to be supported by full documentation and background information on each issue being discussed and for the negotiators to receive prompt and adequate instructions from their home capitals. The more differentiated nature of their participation has called for support of the types which have never systematically built up over the years" (Oyejide, 1990, p.442).

In the absence of institutional capacity in the government, countries have had also to rely on outside consultants to represent them at meetings in the WTO. When this is done without a presence in Geneva, it can lead to confusion and misunderstandings as the Sierra Leone experience of representation at the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment suggests (Chaytor and Hindley, 1997). Unless these weaknesses start to be addressed, merely strengthening these countries' representation in Geneva will not go very far in enhancing their participation in the WTO.

The main burden for strengthening institutional capacity has to be borne by the developing countries themselves. However, as Jan Pronk, Chairman of the HLMLDCTD, stated in his opening statement to the meeting "...foreign assistance can help, but often did not. Too often supply driven assistance and incoherent diagnoses from a wide range of development agencies, undercut the domestic will to reform: too much expatriate technical assistance and proliferation of donor schemes overtaxed the domestic capacity to reform and led to confusion and duplication."¹⁹

A systematic review of the assistance efforts of the international community in support of trade development in developing countries is beyond the scope of this paper. Some of the themes and conclusions drawn from the HLMLDCTD however, are worth noting both because of their relevance to the LDCs whose problems of effective participation in the WTO are most acute and because of their wider applicability to other developing countries.

An important conclusion of the meeting is that it is not the lack of assistance as such that is the problem, but rather that it has been supply driven, not effectively coordinated and the reforms supported are not "owned" by the recipient countries. In recent periods, assistance in the trade field has declined significantly from some donor agencies, e.g. UNDP. In the case of the World Bank, the focus on trade development in general has declined by comparison to the late 1980's and early 1990's. The World Bank shut down its Geneva office in the early 1990's and the share of its trade related operations relative to the total operations approved in the 1996 fiscal year was half of what it was in fiscal year 1991 (Nogues, 1997).²⁰ The WTO on the other hand, has increased its technical co-operation activities. But the bulk of the financing for these activities, perhaps as much as three quarters in any

¹⁹WTO High Level Meeting on Integrated Initiatives for Least-Developed Countries' Trade Development, Chairman's Opening Statement, Geneva, October 27, 1997.

²⁰Nogues notes in this connection that, "It would be a historical error of major proportions for the Bank to conclude that because so much has been achieved (in trade reform), there remains no significant progress to be expected from investing additional intellectual and financial resources in this area." (Nogues, 1997, p.94).

given year, is funded by trust funds provided by bilateral donors, while the WTO itself typically allocates for technical co-operation activities less than one per cent of its total annual budget.

In order to help address some of the problems faced by the Least Developed Countries the HLMLDCTD adopted an Integrated Framework for trade related technical assistance to support LDCs. The framework envisages the preparation of needs assessments for technical assistance by the LDCs themselves which are then discussed at Roundtables with the six agencies involved in the effort (IMF, ITC, UNDP, UNCTAD, World Bank and WTO) plus other interested donors, in order to develop an integrated program of technical assistance activities which focus primarily on institution building.

Beyond the Integrated Framework, deliberations at the HLMLDCTD raised two other issues: That helping LDCs strengthen their institutional capacity may require not only technical assistance, but also financial assistance *inter alia* for human resource development and trade finance; and that problems of the LDCs are shared by other low income developing countries, and that the differences are primarily a matter of degree.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations

The analysis suggests the emergence of a duality in the representation and participation of developing countries in the WTO: On the one hand there are many developing countries which have increased significantly their capacity to participate in WTO activities in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round and whose representatives are playing an active role in the decisions of the organization. Their participation in formal and informal decision making processes is substantial, although they frequently do not speak with one voice as their interests, depending on the issue, may diverge and result in the forming of different coalitions. This is very much consistent with had been anticipated at the time of the Uruguay Round (Whalley, 1987).

This does not imply that the consultation process always results in the development of a consensus that reflects the interests of the majority of the developing countries. For example, many developing countries felt that in advance of the Singapore Ministerial, their views on some issues, for example the future work of the WTO on investment, were not fully taken into account. But, if there was a problem in that regard, it could not be traced to the absence of effective representation.

On the other hand, there is an even larger group of primarily smaller and lower income developing countries, which account for more than 50% of total WTO developing country membership, for which effective representation and participation in the Organization's activities is still a serious problem. Their situation has changed little since the early 1980's. Most are not represented in Geneva and hence can not effectively participate in the consultations leading to the development of consensus on which the WTO is based. Their staffing has not increased significantly, while the complexity of the issues and the number of meetings and obligations in the WTO has multiplied significantly.

The fact that the average size of mission increased both for developed and developing countries reflects the increasing complexity and range of issues handled by the WTO. This is probably the main reason for these increases in staffing during a period of explosive improvements in telecommunications and hence in the ability of governments to increase their missions' capacity to communicate rapidly with capitals -- and thereby reduce the needs for stationing staff abroad.

For many developing countries and especially for the least developed and some of the smaller island economies, institutional weaknesses are the major constraints in both meeting their obligations under the WTO and in effective participation in the Organization and representation of their interests. But, it must be recognized that institutional development is a complex process, that takes a great deal of time. As a consequence, the solution of the problems of representation of the developing countries in the WTO is not going to be easy and is not often amenable to quick, stroke-of-the-pen changes

in policies or rules. This being said there are a number of things that can be done, some of which should start now, although their payoff may be long term.

First, developing countries which are not members of the WTO, should apply to accede. There is little to be gained by not being members and the potential that membership offers easily outweighs the costs, especially if one were to consider the risks of adverse discrimination resulting from staying outside the organization that sets the rules by which world trade is conducted. Perhaps the main benefits from participation derive from agreeing to and being legally bound by rules and procedures which pose obstacles to increasing protection in the future as well as access to a dispute settlement body which treats all members equally, irrespective of trading power. For these reasons, membership is beneficial even for countries or territories which are unable to develop in the short run the institutional capacity and the requirements for effective participation discussed earlier.

Second, developing countries which are already members, need to ensure that the effectiveness of their participation is not impaired by such matters as not paying their membership dues. The amounts involved are typically very small; falling in arrears in their payments can not be a cost effective policy even in circumstances of countries facing serious budget constraints.

Third, the matter of effective participation through Geneva Missions of the appropriate size is a complex issue for which there are no general solutions. For some countries with very small international representation in general, it may not be optimal use of scarce human and material resources to set up such Missions. In such cases, the main objective should be twofold: (a) to ensure that they have adequate information flow on the issues handled by the WTO and how they affect their interests; and (b) to identify like minded countries or groups which do have effective representation, develop a process of consultation with them and thereby obtain some assurance that their interests are reflected on an ongoing basis. Some of the alternatives that countries need to explore in this connection are first, whether they can pool their resources and representation in Geneva in the context of regional groupings

to which they belong; and second, to determine whether they can second one or more staff to already established Missions in Geneva of like-minded countries.²¹

For other countries, measures to increase effective representation in Geneva should be taken *pari passu* with measures to strengthen their institutional capacity at home, as part of a broader decision to become more effectively integrated in the international trading system. For these countries as well, adequate information flow to the appropriate ministries or other decision making bodies in capitals is essential and should be addressed at the earliest. At the same time, they need to initiate efforts to strengthen the policy making and implementation capacity of these institutions as well as to seek assistance for this purpose from international donors and the WTO itself.

The Integrated Framework of Trade Related Technical Assistance for the Least Developed Countries should be of help to this group of countries. These countries may also benefit from assistance provided by the Swiss authorities in setting up a physical presence in Geneva. But institutional weaknesses are not limited to the least developed countries; nor should technical and other assistance to strengthen these capacities. Indeed, the Uruguay Round agreements call for the provision of technical assistance to all developing countries in a number of areas, such as SPS and standards. Yet, few developing countries have sought such assistance so far.

Fourth, the WTO should undertake a review of its internal rules and procedures to ensure that they do not inadvertently prejudice the effective participation of developing countries. An example of one such rule is the provision that delegations of countries presenting cases before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) include only government employees. This implies that developing countries with very

²¹Blackhurst (1997b) recommends that a minimum number of representatives of each WTO mission be funded through the budget of the WTO, much as the Executive Directors and their staff are funded by the budgets of the World Bank and the IMF. While on the face of it such a proposal may seem to have merit, it is not feasible without a major redefinition of the WTO as an institution. The reason is that, unlike the WTO, the Executive Directors of the Bretton Woods institutions play a dual role: they are both representatives of their governments and officers of the two institutions.

limited government legal staff could not include in their delegations foreign lawyers hired to advise them on their cases. While the appellate body and one of the panels, have ruled in recent cases to permit such lawyers to participate, this is one example of a rule that inadvertently may prejudice developing country participation in the WTO. There may be others which should be reviewed, especially in the context of the forthcoming review of the DSB.

Fifth, the international community should place higher priority to the more effective integration of the developing countries in the international trading system and their participation in the WTO. While many developing countries have made great strides in this connection, institutional weaknesses are glaring and impose serious constraints in many others. Donors in general, and the Bretton Woods institutions, UNDP, WTO, UNCTAD and the ITC in particular, should increase their support and assistance to well co-ordinated programs of institutional development that enhance the capacity of developing countries -- whether in the Least Developed country list or not -- to participate effectively in the international trading system, and to permit them to meet their obligations in the WTO. Such an institutional strengthening is a *sine qua non* for effective representation of developing country interests in the WTO, as well as for the accession to the WTO of countries which are not yet members.

Finally, keeping in mind that the WTO is not a development assistance institution, it would still appear desirable that WTO review the resources it allocates from its own budget to: (a) staffing of analyses on issues of interest to developing country members, (b) technical assistance to developing countries to enable them to discharge the obligations entailed by membership in the Organization and (c) support of the accession process of others. Developing country members can promote their interests in such a review through active participation in the WTO Committee on Budget , Finance and Administration.

Issues of interest to developing countries and strengthening their institutional capacity involve many parts of the Organization and its Secretariat. It is important that the Secretariat be adequately

staffed to handle these matters, while preserving the character of the WTO as a member driven institution.²² Also, ensuring adequate resources to provide technical assistance does not necessarily mean that the WTO should increase its own staffing for undertaking technical assistance activities. It does mean that the WTO should allocate an appropriate amount of resources from its budget to the tasks of supporting effective participation of all its membership in its activities and assisting needy non-members in their accession process, so as to become a truly global institution.

²² The Development Division (with only about two and one half professional staff, excluding the Director, working on strictly development issues) is only one of several Divisions working on issues of actual or potential importance to developing countries; others include Trade Policies Review, Trade and Environment, Agriculture and Textiles. Many developing countries also believe that greater progress is needed in staffing the WTO Secretariat with developing country nationals in order to improve the staff's understanding of developing country problems.

TABLE 1

GATT/WTO Membership and World Trade

1982-1997

Countries/Territories	GATT/WTO Membership						World Exports					
	Number			Per cent			Value in US \$ Billion			Per cent of World Exports		
	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997
Developed	24	24	25	27.3	25.3	19.1	1,168	1,734	3,554	62.5	69.7	69.4
Developing	58	65	97	65.9	68.4	74.0	211	348	972	11.3	14.0	19.0
Others	6	6	9	6.8	6.3	6.9	57	84	97	3.0	3.4	1.9
Total GATT/WTO Members	88	95	131	100.0	100.0	100.0	1,436	2,166	4,623	76.8	87.1	90.3
Non-Members							434	322	495	23.2	12.9	9.7
Total World							1,870	2,488	5,118	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: WTO, Statistical Yearbook 1997; WTO Directory, 1982, 1987, 1997.

TABLE 2a

Country Membership and Representation GATT/WTO 1982-1997
By Location and Number of Mission Staff

Countries/ Territories	1982						1987						1997					
	Geneva		Europe		Capitals		Geneva		Europe		Capitals		Geneva		Europe		Capitals	
	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff	No.	Staff
Developed	24	99					24	120					24	166		1	1	2
Developing	40	120	14	15	4	5	45	147	15	21	5	5	64	277	26	60	7	7
Others	6	16					6	18					9	25				
Total	70	235	14	15	4	5	75	285	15	21	5	5	97	468	26	61	8	9

TABLE 2b

Countries/ Territories	1982			1987			1997		
	No. of Countries	Staff	Staff/ Country	No. of Countries	Staff	Staff/Country	No. of Countries	Staff	Staff/Country
Developed	24	99	4.1	24	120	5.0	25	169	6.8
Developing	58	140	2.4	65	173	2.7	97	344	3.5
Others	6	16	2.7	6	18	3.0	9	25	2.8
Total	88	255	2.9	95	311	3.3	131	538	4.1
Developing (Geneva)	40	120	3.0	45	147	3.3	64	280	4.4

Source: GATT/WTO, Directory 1982, 1987, 1997.

TABLE 3

Country Composition of Chairmen/Vice-Chairmen

Countries/Territories	GATT 1982-1987				GATT 1982-1987				WTO 1997			
	Permanent Committees & Organs				All other Committees under certain Arrangements, MTN Codes, Panels and Groups				General Council and Subsidiary Bodies, Committees and WPs, DSB, TPRB		All Other Working Parties and Committees (Plurilateral Agreements, Accessions, etc.)	
	1982		1987		1982		1987		1997			
	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent	No.	Per Cent
Developed	7	46.6	4	33.3	19	70.4	20	61	18	45.0	22	66.5
Developing	7	46.6	7	58.3	7	26.9	12	39	20	50.0	11	33.5
Others	1	6.8	1	8.4	1	3.7	0		2	5.0		
Total	15	100.0	12	100.0	27	100.0	32	100.0	40	100.0	33	100.0

Source: GATT/WTO Directory 1982, 1987, 1997

ANNEX

Country Membership and Representation GATT/WTO 1982-1997

By Location and Number of Mission Staff

	Geneva			Europe			Capitals		
	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997
Antigua-Barbuda					1L ¹	2L			
Angola			1						
Argentina	4	3	7						
Australia	3	5	8						
Austria	2	3	6						
Bahrain			2						
Bangladesh	3	3	4						
Barbados				1Br ²	1Br	3Br			
Belgium	2	3	8						
Belize						1Br		1	
Benin		6		1Br		3Br			
Bolivia			3						
Botswana									1
Brazil	4	6	11						
Brunei			3						
Bulgaria			1						
Burkina Faso				1Br	1Br	6Br			
Burundi	3	3	1						
Cameroon	1	3	3						
Canada	5	6	9						
Central African Republic	1							1	1
Chad				1Br	1P ³	3Br			
Chile	3	3	7						
Colombia	3	2	5						
Congo			1	1Br	3Br				
Costa Rica			4						
Cote d'Ivoire	2	2	3						
Cuba	3	3	5						
Cyprus	2	2	2						
Czech Republic	2	2	3						
Denmark	3	3	4						
Dominica			2						

	Geneva			Europe			Capitals		
	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997
Dominican Republic	2	2	3						
Djibuti			1						
EC	9	13	18						
Egypt	6	5	10						
El Salvador			5						
Equador			2						
Fiji			1						
Finland	4	3	5						
France	4	6	6						
Gabon	6	1	2						
Gambia						1Br	1	1	
Germany	5	9	8						
Ghana	3	4	3						
Greece	2	2	5						
Grenada						1Br			
Guatemala			2						
Guyana				1L	1L	1L			
Guinea									1
Guinea-Bissau						1Br			
Haiti	1	1	2						
Honduras			2						
Hong Kong	(3) ⁴	5	6						
Hungary	4	5	4						
India	3	3	5						
Indonesia	5	6	7						
Ireland	2	2	4						
Iceland	2	2	4						
Israel	3	3	3						
Italy	3	4	5						
Jamaica	3	3	3						
Japan	12	15	22						
Kenya	1	2	3						
Korea	5	7	17						
Kuwait	1	2	2						
Lesotho						3Br			
Lichtenstein						1Be			2

	Geneva			Europe			Capitals		
	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997
Luxemburg	2	2	2						
Macau						5Br			
Madagascar	3	2	3						
Malaysia	4	3	3						
Malawi				1Bo ^s	1Bo	1Bo			
Maldives								1	1
Mali						4Bo			
Malta	2	1	3						
Morocco		2	5						
Mauritius			4	1Br	1Br				
Mauritania				1Br	1Br	2Br			
Mexico		7	8						
Mongolia			2						
Mozambique									1
Myanmar	3	2	3						
Namibia						3Br			
Netherlands	3	3	4						
New Zealand	3	5	5						
Nicaragua	3	3	3						
Niger				1Br	3Br	3Br			
Nigeria	4	1	7						
Norway	3	3	6						
Pakistan	2	2	4						
Papua New Guinea						1Br			
Paraguay			4						
Peru	4	4	6						
Philippines	3	3	7						
Poland	2	2	4						
Portugal	3	2	2						
Qatar			1						
Romania	3	2	3						
Rwanda				1Bo	3Bo	1Bo			
St. Christ. & Nevis						1L			
St. Lucia						4Br			
St. Vincent & Grenadines									1
Senegal	2	2	2						

	Geneva			Europe			Capitals		
	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997	1982	1987	1997
Sierra Leone				2R ⁷	1Br	2Br			
Singapore	3	3	5						
Slovakia			2						
Slovenia			2						
Solomon Islands						2Br			
South Africa	3	5	6						
Spain	6	7	10						
Sri Lanka	1	1	3						
Swaiziland									1
Sweden	3	5	4						
Switzerland	3	3	5						
Surinam				1H ⁸	1H	5Br			
Tanzania	2	7	5						
Thailand		5	18						
Togo				1P	1P	1P			
Trinidad	4	5	5						
Tunisia			3						
Turkey	6	4	7						
Uganda			5						
United Arab Emirates			2						
United Kingdom	4	4	5						
United States	8	10	10						
Uruguay	2	4	7						
Venezuela			6						
Yugoslavia	2	4							
Zaire (Dem. Rep. of Congo)	4	3	1						
Zambia			4		1L		2		
Zimbabwe		5	4				1		

¹ L = London

² Br = Brussels

³ P = Paris

⁴ Listed separately in UK mission in 1982

⁵ Bo = Bonn

⁶ Be = Berne

⁷ R = Rome

⁸ H = Hague

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