Armed violence and poverty in Brazil
A case study of Rio de Janeiro and assessment of Viva Rio
for the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative
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Executive summary

The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) has commissioned the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) at Bradford University to carry out research to promote understanding of how and when poverty and vulnerability is exacerbated by armed violence. This study programme, which forms one element in a broader "Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative", aims to provide the full documentation of that correlation which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. It also aims to analyse the processes through which such impacts occur and the circumstances which exacerbate or moderate them. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government agencies.

This report on Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, is one of 13 case studies (all of the case studies can be found at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics). This report is the result of an 11-day visit to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 2004. Wider research and information were used to complement the stakeholder interviews held during this period. The authors would like to thank Julia Buxton and William Godnick for comments on an earlier draft. The analysis and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or policy of DFID or the UK government.

Armed youth in the favelas

Source: Dowdney/Viva Rio (2002)

Executive summary

This report is the result of an 11-day visit to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in September 2004. Wider research and information were used to complement the stakeholder interviews held during this period. The objectives of the study were to:

- Contribute to the UK Government Department for International Development-(DFID) funded Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) global research study on the links between armed violence and poverty.
- Contribute to the AVPI global study on assessing and reviewing the impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW) projects on small arms availability/misuse and poverty.
- Support the case study organisation (Viva Rio) with its internal reflection on strategy and impact.

Causes of violence in Rio de Janeiro are multi-faceted. High levels of inequality and physical, social and economic exclusion from the formal system are some of the principle causes. This combines with cultural factors such as *machismo* and the draw of perceived higher social status and identity through joining gangs. The availability of guns, cocaine and the marijuana industry exacerbates the problem. The lack of an integrated public security strategy coupled with a violent and corrupt police, and a judiciary and prison system which is ineffective, are also contributing factors. The political and economic history of Brazil has played a part: the transition from dictatorship to democracy; rapid and unplanned urbanization; and shifts in labour market requirements to higher skill levels to meet new demands, resulting in high unemployment and frustration felt by those with some education but insufficient to secure a job in the formal economy.

Perpetrators and victims of armed violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily the police, drug traffickers (mainly young men of 14-29 years old), and civilians caught in the crossfire. *Favelas*[1] are the main locations of gun violence but criminal violence does occur in other parts of the city. The principle **type of armed violence** is organised drug gang fighting for territorial control; police use of arms; armed robbery and petty crime.

The selection of Rio as a case study was in part due to the existence of a well known and respected Non-Governmental Organisation in the fight against armed violence - **Viva Rio.** Founded in 1993 in response to gun violence in the city of Rio, its overall goal is to build a culture of peace by reducing gun violence and building social inclusion. It has a holistic approach which includes working at local (community), municipal, state and Federal levels. It also plays a role in the MERCOSUR[2] region. The use of the media has been an integral part of its strategy. The **target groups** are:

- 14-29 olds (mainly men) living in *favelas*.
- Police.
- Federal and state judiciary.
- Wider society.

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[1] A *favela* is defined by Rio city government's complementary law no. 16 of 1992, as: "A predominantly residential area, characterized by occupation of the land by low-income populations, precariousness of urban infrastructure and public services, narrow and irregularly aligned roads or passage-ways, plots of irregular form and size, and unlicensed constructions that do not conform to legal standards".

[2] Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

One objective of this research was to highlight either existing or possible future **indicators** for monitoring and measuring the links between armed violence and poverty, and the ways in which an organisation or project could design an intervention to address these issues in an holistic manner. The following indicators were seen as particularly important (where they are being measured, the results are given in brackets):

- Degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (To be tested through a national Referendum in 2005).
- Numbers of guns collected (120,000 from July to September 2004).
- Changes in level of trust between police and community (demonstrated through respondents of the community policing programme (GPAE) (Could be monitored in more depth in the future).
- Use of violence by police reduced (To be tested through the GPAE).
- *Favela* organisations able to continue projects without Viva Rio's ongoing presence
- Attitudinal change of individuals of target age and wider society in relation to gun possession and misuse, building a culture of peace, social responsibility, socio-economic mobility not through drug gangs.
- Change in degree of socio-economic inclusion.
- Degree of interaction between programmes (either within or outside Viva Rio) addressing the multi-faceted nature of armed violence, its causes, perpetrators and victims.

Sustainability and impact of Viva Rio's programmes
- Strong on ensuring financial sustainability and ability to mainstream projects into the state system.
- Could be stronger in relation to strengthening local community organisations and empowerment.
- Impacts: raising awareness around danger of guns.
- Effective in removal of 'surplus' guns from society, although not necessarily those currently being used in armed violence.
- Demonstration of partnership with the state.
- Pilot initiatives in social inclusion and police reform, some of which have been mainstreamed by the state (e.g. *telecurso*).

Key success factors of Viva Rio:
- Community projects are located within *favelas*.
- Staff within projects are largely from the same community.
- Political buy-in.
- Sophisticated Communications Campaign: use of communications for raising awareness, embedding media organisations within Viva Rio.
- Piloting initiatives which are suitable for state mainstreaming.
- Put in place databases to build statistical data and evidence to support projects and campaigns.
- Use of research to ensure that the context and risk and protection factors are fully understood in order to focus policy and interventions.
- Using communication to establish links across isolated community groups in conflict (e.g. Via Favela).
- Developed partnerships with the state.

- Diverse funding sources have been a successful strategy as Brazilian sources have become relatively less important compared to international sources over the last few years.
- Partnership with local and international business.
- Wide network of high level contacts within and outside Brazil.

Challenges faced by Viva Rio which could be relevant to other organisations if they are looking to adopt a holistic approach:
- In spite of the difficult situation in *favelas* due to control by the drug factions, more emphasis could be placed on building on existing community structures and empowering partners at local level.
- Although Viva Rio has a holistic approach to addressing violence, it is still "projectized" within the organisation. This means that some projects have little understanding of how they fit with other projects being implemented by VR and others in achieving the overall goal. It will therefore be important to build space for greater internal communication and reflection (this is partly being addressed through the design of a Human Security Centre due to open in 2005, and through monthly meetings of team coordinators).
- The evaluation of impact is currently weak, partly due to lack of resources. This is in the process of being strengthened with wider surveys of impact due to be commissioned. However, the often non-attributable nature of impacts to any one situation, project or organisation combined with the small-scale of some of the community interventions makes this a particularly challenging element but a vital part of any organisational strategy that seeks to address complex social issues such as the reduction of violence.

Conclusions in relation to armed violence and poverty / social exclusion in Rio:
- Rio is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. However the extreme inequality and social exclusion of a significant proportion of the population stands out as one of the major fault lines and a cause of violence.
- The presence of firearms, especially amongst drug traffickers in *favelas* is the biggest cause of firearm homicide.
- The residents of *favelas* are stigmatized both in terms of location of residence and colour.
- The *favelas* are illegal settlements which have made the state largely ignore them as areas of the city. This lack of state presence has made them more susceptible to the de facto control by drug factions, which in turn makes it harder for development to take place and limits outsiders entering, whether these are businesses or development/violence control or prevention projects.
- In terms of income, the residents of *favelas* are not necessarily below the poverty line. However their relative poverty lies in their vulnerability and social exclusion.
- In 1995 the city of Rio spent 5 per cent of GDP on combating violence (excluding private security).
- The most relevant MDG in relation to Rio is education (63 per cent of *favela* residents in the Municipality of Rio have not achieved a primary certificate – i.e. less than 8 years of education).
- The culture of machismo creates a climate in which violence is seen as a norm, contributing to incidents of violence. This is evident in the prevalence of domestic

violence against women and men's desire to join drug gangs, seeing guns as a source of power and identity.

- *Favelas* are often built on environmentally protected land, which used to be forests. They are characteristically on steep slopes above the city, which makes them vulnerable to mud slides in heavy rain. This adds to the legislative difficulty of granting the land to the residents legally.
- Partnerships for development need to be built in the context of Brazil and Rio. Partnerships need to be built with the multiple public security forces, which do not have an integrated policy to combat violence.

Conclusions pertaining to Viva Rio (VR) in relation to the links between poverty/ social exclusion and violence:

- VR articulates well the links between reducing violence and increasing social inclusion and is trying to address both in practice. The levels of intervention are at community/*favela* and municipal, state and federal levels. They are also researching these issues in Brazil and other MERCOSUR countries together with other partners.
- VR has shown the importance of understanding the complex reality of these interlinked phenomena and the need to address them holistically. However not every project needs to address both issues.

Conclusions on the differences and common ground between development and small arms specialists:

- Small arms research and SALW intervention projects often focus on the weapon as the entry point, whereas development practitioners tend to focus on people as the entry point. This contributes to the current gap between these two groups. The Rio and Viva Rio case study has shown that by focusing on both the weapon and those most affected by its misuse, thereby with the emphasis on people, this allows for greater opportunity for dialogues and partnership between SALW control and development practitioners in the more effective pursuit of the same outcomes.
- These differences currently have implications for how the categorisation of comparable contexts occurs.

Recommendations to AVPI:

- Define clearly the types of armed violence which the case studies are addressing (i.e. urban violence; post-conflict violence and reintegration; etc)
- This research project demonstrated the importance of understanding the broad contextual links between armed violence and poverty in order to more effectively assess the impact of SALW intervention projects. As a result of effectively combining these two dimensions of the AVPI global research project (as was done in the case of Rio), the recommendation is then to integrate these two dimensions in the final synthesis report.
- A holistic approach is recommended in order to identify the root causes of poverty and violence, who are the victims and perpetrators of armed violence and why. Only then is it possible to see which project interventions are most relevant, and for which purpose.
- Use of language and definitions is vital to clarify in the introduction to the synthesis of findings. If poverty is seen as synonymous with inequality and

exclusion then urban violence is one of the dimensions of poverty. If it is seen purely in absolute and not relative terms, and from an income measure then it is not possible to conclude that violence arises from poverty. However the poor, without coping mechanisms, are often worse affected by violence - economic, social, intimidation and fear – than those who can afford to protect themselves e.g. by hiring private security. The police are often more abusive to the poor as they have the least power to defend themselves.

- There is a wealth of comparative research in relation to urban violence from a development perspective.

- Using this research and the other relevant studies on this issue, next steps should be to develop context specific case studies of good practice. Stronger evaluation of impact within projects would help to determine what strategies or combination of strategic interventions are most effective.

Recommendations to government and donor policy makers:

- There needs to be an integration of small arms reduction and development specialists, policy makers and practitioners. This can be done by understanding each others' perspectives and starting from the common ground of analysing who is most affected by both poverty and armed violence.

- There is a wealth of information on each issue which this research has contributed to. However, meetings between these two groups should be a pre-requisite if development in areas of high armed violence is an objective.

1. Introduction

1.1 Objectives of the study

- Contribute to the UK Government Department for International Development-(DFID) funded Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI) global research study on the links between armed violence and poverty, especially the impact of armed violence on poverty.
- Contribute to the AVPI global study on assessing and reviewing the impact of small arms and light weapons (SALW) projects on small arms availability and poverty.
- Support Viva Rio with its internal reflection on strategy and impact.

1.2 Methodology

Two consultants spent 11 days in Rio de Janeiro in September 2004 to carry out stakeholder interviews and focus group discussions. Adèle Kirsten, had a historical knowledge of Viva Rio and was able to draw on her experience and interviews held in Rio between 2002 and 2003; as well as her experience in activism in South Africa; and a reference point of urban armed violence in Johannesburg. Lydia Richardson brought a knowledge of DFID and international donor interventions; poverty reduction strategies in Latin America; and a comparative analysis of urban armed violence and its impacts on poverty in El Salvador, having completed the case study for AVPI in relation to a UNDP project in El Salvador in February 2004.

Due to the short time available for this field visit, secondary information was first collected which provided some statistical and qualitative information, and which was discussed and clarified during the visit. A final discussion with the director and international relations manager of Viva Rio helped to verify some of the findings and conclusions and enabled the consultants to give feedback and some initial recommendations to the organisation.

Annex 1 provides a list of people interviewed in the course of the field research. Three visits were made outside Rio's city centre – two to *favelas,* i.e. (Maré and Rocinha) and one to a small town, 250 km south west of Rio, i.e. (Resende). The purpose of these visits was to observe both the reality of armed violence and poverty in the State of Rio and to see some of Viva Rio's projects in these locations.

The complex relationship between the nature of violence experienced in Rio, to that of poverty, in particular social exclusion, meant that a choice had to be made on the definition of poverty. The term social exclusion is relatively new[3] and is itself a relative term in that differences in societal norms can lead to major differences in its definition. Its particular definitional characteristics must be therefore be understood as society specific.[4] The EU defines social exclusion as 'a process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live.'[5] Although both absolute and relative poverty are discussed

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[3] The first use of the term is attributed to Lenoir, French Secretary of State for Social Action in Government in 1974 when he was referring to people who did not fit into the norms of industrial societies.
[4] Laderchi, Saith and Stewart (2003).
[5] Ibid.

and analysed in the context section, in the analysis and conclusions, poverty has been defined as a relative rather than an absolute phenomenon. Therefore poverty is defined in terms of vulnerability, low self-esteem and feelings of social and economic exclusion, rather than just on a per capita income basis. Including the concept of social exclusion therefore involves a relative approach to the definition of poverty which includes focusing on the processes and dynamics which allow deprivation to arise and persist. The associations therefore between armed violence and poverty are far greater in this context than if a purely per capita income definition had been used.

This report is structured in three main parts:
- Context and relationship between armed violence and poverty.
- Viva Rio's approach to armed violence and poverty with examples of some of their programmes
- Conclusions and Recommendations

1.3 Acknowledgements

2. Description of poverty and armed violence in Rio de Janeiro

2.1 Context

Brazil is South America's biggest and most influential country. It has the 15th largest economy in the world. It is the 5th largest country in the world in population, with 176 million inhabitants. Annex 2 highlights some statistics on how Brazil is progressing towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals. 8.2 per cent of the population earn less than 1$ per day. In per capita income terms, it is classified by the World Bank as an upper middle-income country. 2002 figures show a Gross National Income (GNI) of US$ 494.5 billion and US$ 2,830 for GNI per capita. However, in spite of its income status, extreme inequalities are characteristic of Brazil, both between and within regions and cities, of which Rio de Janeiro is one example. Rio's levels of inequality are stark. The richest one percent have 12 per cent of the city's per capita income, whereas the poorest 50 per cent have only 13 per cent.[6] Rio is the second largest city in population and GDP. Rio has approximately 5,550,000 inhabitants, with 10,190,000 in its metropolitan area (1996 data).[7]

Brazil's history of colonisation and military dictatorship is one of dispossession, exclusion and repression. After more than twenty years of military dictatorship (1964-1985), the country entered a period of democratisation. All these factors have in one way or another contributed to the particular type and levels of violence, social dislocation and poverty which characterise Brazil at the beginning of the 21st century. The Portuguese colonisation (1500 - 1822) brought many Africans to Brazil as slaves. The poorest region of the country is the North East where many Afro-Brazilians live.

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[6] Consorcio Parceria 21(2002).
[7] UN Habitat.

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However many Afro-Brazilians moved to the cities to escape poverty and settled in informal settlements known as *favelas*. As a result of rapid urbanization during the 80s coupled with a general economic decline, Rio's informal sector grew rapidly and by 1998, 36 per cent of the city's economically active population was in the informal sector. This exacerbated the existing inequalities of wealth and contributed to Rio becoming the city with the largest number of absolute poor people (3.64 million) and the highest inequality index in Brazil – a Gini coefficient of 0.673[8] in 1999.[9] The population living in *favelas* in the urban periphery grew by 50.7 per cent.[10] The collapse of the industrial and construction sectors in Rio has also contributed to rising male unemployment, while the rise of the predominantly female-staffed service sector has added to economic insecurity as the majority of workers in services have no contracts or legal protection. The relocation of the federal capital from Rio to Brasília in 1960 also had a significant impact on industry, commerce and public investment, which increased unemployment and absolute/relative poverty in Rio.[11]

The *favelas* are spread around different parts of the city, in corridors on hills, on the coast, on mountains skirts, and in the interior. In 2003, the Pereira Passos Institute registered the existence of 618 *favelas* in the city of Rio de Janeiro. In the year 2000, *favelas* had a total population of over one million inhabitants, representing around 19 per cent of the total population in the city, and some of the largest *favelas* have over 100,000 residents (17 per cent of a total population of 5.9 million).[12] However the poor (measured in income terms) also live in inner-city slums, illegal, sub-divisions, and run-down estates. A World Bank study in 1999 estimated that less than one third of Rio's poor live in *favelas*.[13] The expansion of *favelas* in Rio formed part of the expansion of the city between 1950 and 1980.[14] The state's policy in relation to *favelas* has changed over time, initially forcibly resettling the population (which often resulted in violence) and incorporating the inhabitants into the city with the provision of some basic services such as schools, lighting and drainage. However, the main problem of illegal land tenure remains, with only very few cases of legalisation. The current government's programme to socially and physically integrate the *favelas* is called Favela-Barrio.[15] There are some strong organisational structures within the *favelas* such as neighbourhood associations and church groups. However the power in almost all *favelas* rests with drug trafficking gangs who have become a recognised 'socio-political force'.[16] They maintain their 'political power' and enforce social order through a complex relationship with *favela* residents which involve a double tactic of support from the community for a set of behavioural codes, such as only gang members being allowed to own guns, and punitive violence for non-compliance. This forms part of the 'law and order' in *favelas*.[17]

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[8] This is higher than the national average of 0.61 (UNDP 2003) making it one of the most unequal cities in one of the world's most unequal countries. (0=equality; 1=extreme inequality).

[9] Cardoso and Lago (1993) in Fiori, Riley and Ramirez (March 2000).

[10] Lago (2002) in Fiori, Riley and Ramirez (March 2000).

[11] Comment by Julia Buxton, senior research fellow, CICS, 25/11/04

[12] In Wakely and Riley (September 2003); and Alba Zuluar, personal interview, 23/09/04.

[13] In Fiori (March 2000).

[14] Fiori, Riley and Ramirez (March 2000).

[15] Government programme of urbanization infrastructure and land regularization in *favelas*; some of the smaller *favelas* in Rio have gone through this process, whereby the state injects resources into making *favelas* into legal neighborhoods with access to government provided infrastructure.

[16] Dowdney (2003: p52).

[17] Ibid.

A form of class apartheid exists between the *favelas and* other areas of the city[18]*:* the discrimination against and stigmatisation of those living in *favelas* is in fact more marked than income differentials. The resulting feeling of exclusion is described by one of the residents of Rocinha: "The very existence of a *favela* is a violence. Why do we have to live on the top of the hills just like goats? Like others can live in the asphalt[19]".[20]

Viva Rio and others have tried to reduce this stigmatisation by showing that *favelas* are part of the population and economy and therefore should not be ignored, either by the state or the private sector. For example, *favela* residents receive some services, are economic consumers and political party candidates canvass in these areas. Statistics show that in class terms, it is not either class A or E but C (62 per cent) who predominantly live in *favelas.*[21]

Other factors which need to be borne in mind when understanding the context of violence and social inequality are the high education drop out rates. Without the primary certificate it is almost impossible to get a job in the formal sector. Although the majority of young men between 14 to 24 years have 4-7 years of education, that does not prevent them from turning to armed drug gangs. This is not so much because of poverty and a lack of education but because of low self-esteem, with the perception that joining gangs provides a route to improved social status and is a source of identity and power. Women on the other hand, often become pregnant at a young age which is rumoured to give a feeling of identity. The police are also a source of violence in Brazil and the history of military rule means that they are armed and often heavy handed, which in turn contributes to the mistrust of the police by the civilian population. During the dictatorship they were an agent of political repression and were known for their use of torture and human rights abuses, and although police practice has changed over the last ten years, they continue to be feared by many people. There has been an "increase in police violence and brutality since the political transition, especially towards the poorer citizens who are considered the 'dangerous classes'."[22] In 2003, 621 civilians were killed by the police in Rio.[23]

After 13 years of President Cardoso's social democratic government which increasingly practised neo-liberal economic policies, Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva was elected as president. When he took office in January 2003, it was the first left wing government in 40 years. He promised political and economic reforms and pledged to eradicate hunger. More recently he has been seen to incorporate the fight against violence as part of his political agenda on the international stage.[24]

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[18] Medrado (August 2004).

[19] Asphalt is the term used to describe the wealthy suburbs, implying good roads and infrastructure.

[20] Kirsten (2004).

[21] The definition of class is not based on income. It is an index called "Brazilian Criteria for Social Classification", established by ANEP (National Association of Market Research Enterprises), which uses as criteria: 1) ownership of a set of consumption goods (TV, radio, refrigerator, oven, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, bathroom, car, maid) and 2) educational level of head of family and of the person interviewed.

[22] Landman (2003:31).

[23] "Rio de Janeiro 2003", Amnesty International Press Release (28 August 2003).

[24] O Globo (Sept 2004: 22).

2.2 Progress in relation to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The MDGs have not been designed to reflect the specific reality of Rio. Extreme poverty and hunger are not as relevant to the development agenda in Rio as social exclusion. Combating violence and improving the rule of law are very relevant in this context but they do not appear within the MDGs. However, the more relevant MDGs relate to:

- Education which is of a very low quality in government schools. Many residents of *favelas* do not obtain the primary school certificate (eight years of schooling) which means that they are less likely to get a job in the formal economy.

- Partnership for development is a relevant goal as many institutions are fragmented within the government system. Police for example operate at three levels (federal, state and municipal) with little integration either at policy level or in practice. Partnerships between government, civil society (including the private sector) is also uncommon. There is very little international development aid in Rio. The Official Development Assistance to Brazil is given in Annex 3. However those present (e.g. World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, UN-Habitat) do appear to be cooperating. As can be seen in Annex 2 one indicator for this is the partnership for development MDG "youth unemployment rate (percentage of total labor force ages 15-24)". This is highly relevant to the issue of violence and the statistics for Brazil are getting worse - 6.7 per cent in 1990 compared to 17.9 per cent in 2001.

- Environmental sustainability is highly relevant due to the environmental vulnerability of the *favelas* in part due to the steep topography of the land and in some cases polluted water sources.

- Brazil has a very good policy on HIV/AIDS and treatment is relatively accessible and subsidized by the state.

- Limited figures were available for Rio's maternal mortality. The MDG statistics show maternal mortality at 260 per 100,000 live births. Health facilities are in need of improvement.

2.3 Armed violence in Brazil and Rio

After the political transition from dictatorship to democracy in the late 1980s, Brazil experienced a "dramatic increase in crime levels, especially violent crimes"[25]. One of the reasons for the growth in violent crime, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, was the growth of criminal organisations associated with the illegal commerce of drugs and firearms.[26] The gangs and their 'private armies' are in control of much of the urban space in the *favelas* and this has had a significant impact on the strategies adopted by the police with regard to reducing gun violence as well as those adopted by civil society organisations such as Viva Rio. [27]

A variety of factors contributed to the growth in violence in Brazil in the 1980s: increasing urbanization, the socio-economic crises, the changing population demographics, contestation over public services, and the lack of an integrated public safety strategy. The expansion of drugs and arms trafficking in the principal cities of

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[25] Landman (2003:6).
[26] Viva Rio (2001); Landman (2003:18).
[27] Kirsten (2004).

Brazil changed "the patterns of criminality both with respect to the age of the actors and the lethality of their acts".[28] The growth of drug related violence came with the expansion of cocaine production in Colombia from the early 1980s onwards, coinciding with the economic recession in Brazil.[29] There was also an important diversification of South American trafficking routes in the 1990s when Mercosur came into effect (easing border restrictions and freedom of goods and movement) and in response to enhanced enforcement efforts against drug shipments flowing northwards out of Colombia. Counter-narcotics enforcement activities in Rio have been undermined by police corruption and lack of funding. High rates of crime and violence in Latin American cities are not an urban-specific phenomenon but create a particular set of problems in urban areas and have become a 'serious development constraint'.[30] This will be illustrated throughout the paper, particularly in the example of rising armed violence in Rocinha.

Within *favelas*, a primary source of violence is related to the drug gangs, although it is estimated that only 1-2 per cent of *favela* residents are involved.[31] The primary perpetrators are young men between the ages of 14-29 years. They are also the primary victims. However, often civilians are killed during inter-gang armed violence either in the 'cross-fire' or as a result of offensive police operations. Women are involved increasingly in the gangs, although not on the front line

There is a wealth of information on the relationship between violence, poverty and drug gangs, not just in Rio, but also in Latin America. We will just touch on the key features of this phenomenon in Rio. Although the drug gangs have been in Rio since the 1950s there have been significant changes in the nature of their operations since the 80s. This is characterised by 'increased territorial disputes between armed groups that dominate different *favelas*'; increased use of violence and more sophisticated and greater firepower; and increased organisational management and structures.[32] Many of these changes came about as a result of the trade in cocaine. This mode of operation has effectively led to a 'territorialisation' of *favelas*.[33] What this means is that there is an increasing need for gangs to take control of more and more territory, either within a particular *favela* or across several *favelas*. This can lead to so-called 'border clashes' or invasions. However, the drug factions have been built on pre-existing local structures of control and protection that existed in the 50s.[34] The growth and power exercised by the gangs in *favelas* has partly been possible due to the absence of the state in these areas. As Dowdney observes: "they have created a control system based on violence or the threat of violence whereby they receive community protection in exchange for offering what the state has failed to provide: the maintenance of social order, support, economic stimulation and provision of leisure activities."[35]

There is relative calm when one gang controls an area, but when there are territorial disputes, violence erupts. The narco-traffic gangs maintain a relative peace and social order by intimidation, sometimes through overt violence, and at others through

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[28] Fernandes, Phebo & Dreyfuss (2003).
[29] Interview with Pablo Dreyfus, September 2004
[30] Moser et al. (2003).
[31] Estimates are very difficult to verify. Surveys are more likely to be qualitative than quantitative.
[32] Dowdney (2003).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

increasingly controlling some services in the *favela* (e.g. taking over supply of gas). For young men with limited education, lack of opportunity and feelings of stigmatisation, the gangs provide some form of social cohesion, order, apparent opportunity, status and identity, and security (at their discretion) at the cost of intimidation. This actually further exacerbates their social exclusion from the economy and society.

Victims of gun violence

Brazil has one of the highest homicide rates in the world at 29.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. Over the last ten years 300,000 homicides have been committed in Brazil, the majority committed with a firearm in urban crime and violence.[36] Young men are the group most affected by gun violence. Those between the ages of 15-29 years are twice as likely to die from guns than the rest of the male population. The risk of death by firearm in Brazil is 2.6 times that in the rest of the world. Although Brazil only represents 3% of the global population, their firearm homicides represent 7% of the world total. For young men between the ages of 15-29 years, the homicide rate is 113.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. Over a period of almost 20 years the firearm related deaths for young men between the ages of 15-19 years has risen dramatically from 35% of all non-natural deaths in 1983 to 65% in 2001.

In Rio, guns are the primary cause of non-natural death for young men between the age of 15-19 years (65%), exceeding car accidents and natural causes. In 1999, 13% of Brazilians died from external causes and of these, 27% were from firearms, just over 31,000. Another distinguishing feature of gun deaths in Brazil are the differences between men and women. For Brazil firearms death rate for men is 34.9 per 100,000 whereas for women it is 2.6
per 100,000. In Rio the gap between men and women remains high with 79.5 per 100,000 for males and 4.3 per 100,000 for females.

Arms industry

Brazil is the largest manufacturer of small arms and light weapons in the MERCOSUR region and its armaments industry produces and exports arms and ammunition, successfully penetrating the international markets. The industry lacks effective regulation over the production, trade and use of firearms, contributing to the high levels of firearm violence, particularly in high-density urban areas such a Sao Paulo and Rio.[37] Although Brazil has two of the most internationally well known gun manufacturers (Rossi and Taurus), their contribution to the economy is regarded as insignificant by some researchers.[38] Contrary to popular opinion, the majority of guns used in crime in Rio are locally manufactured and a significant proportion are legal. Of all the guns recovered between 1950 to 2003, 33.1 per cent were formally legally registered guns. Over 50 per cent of guns recovered in this same period were either Rossi or Taurus, of which 78 per cent were either revolvers or pistols.[39]

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[36] Pablo Dreyfus et al (2003), Small Arms Control in MERCOSUR, Latin American series no3. Interntaional Alert and Viva Rio.
[37] Pablo Dreyfus et al (2003), Small Arms Control in MERCOSUR, Latin America Series, No 3. International Alert and Viva Rio.
[38] Dreyfuss (2004).
[39] Ibid.

Costs of violence

Both the state and its citizens absorb the costs of violence. In 1995, Brazil spent 5 per cent of its GDP on combating criminal violence, which increased to 10.2 per cent in 2002. Annex 4 gives some figures for the cost of violence for the city of Rio. Investment in security is twice that of education; five times that of health; and fifty times that of housing. In 2002, in a middle class neighbourhood (Tijuca), violence made the real estate value drop by 60 per cent.[40]

The public health cost is great and Rio accounts for 19 per cent of all Loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) lost compared to cancer which accounts for 10.3 per cent.[41]

3. Viva Rio

3.1 Background

Viva Rio is a non-governmental organisation (NGO) based in Rio de Janeiro. It started in 1993 as an organised response from civil society to two incidents of armed violence by the police against innocent civilians. Viva Rio works primarily in the city and the State of Rio de Janeiro and is increasingly working in other States mainly in partnership with government and like-minded NGOs such as Sou da Paz in São Paulo. Viva Rio also plays an important role in MERCOSUR, assisting in the development of regional small arms control measures.

3.2 Viva Rio's approach to addressing armed violence and poverty reduction/social exclusion

Although Viva Rio was established in response to the high levels of violence in Rio de Janeiro, it soon discovered that it could not just focus on reducing armed violence through gun control and police reform. There was a growing understanding that reducing violence requires a multifaceted approach, involving long-term solutions which included changing the culture of machismo, increasing levels of social inclusion and developing a culture of non-violence. The director of Viva Rio believes that given the nature of violence in Rio it is neither possible nor effective to maintain a 'single issue' focus on firearms as the primary cause of violence.[42] Therefore, Viva Rio began to bring the two key elements of violence in the city together: that of the availability and misuse of firearms and high levels of social exclusion. In 1996, Viva Rio began implementing projects at the grass roots level, deepening their engagement with the marginalised and those most affected by gun violence. At the same time Viva Rio recognised that solutions to urban violence required strategies that engaged with a number of role-players such as the state, civil society, at risk groups and the media.

Viva Rio has a holistic approach to reducing violence. It is able to combine a complex and diverse set of activities and objectives working towards the long term vision of a peaceful social order resulting in what has been described as 'an evidence based strategy for advocacy and action.'[43] Although it recognises firearms as the primary

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[40] O Globo (13/04/02).
[41] Brinceño-León (1999) in Moser et al (2003).
[42] Interview with Rubem César Fernandes, Director of Viva Rio, 26/10/02.
[43] Email from William Godnick, Interntiaonl Alert, 25/11/04.

tools of violence it does not just focus on gun control and disarmament but also addresses the issue of police reform, a key requirement for reducing violence. Viva Rio is also clear that the social exclusion of many of Rio's residents is another key factor contributing to the violence and argues that unless the issue of social exclusion is addressed, violence will not abate. Therefore, Viva Rio describes its strategy as a dual focus which integrates violence reduction efforts and social inclusion. It does this through focusing on two broad areas (programmes):

- Public Security and Human Rights
- Social Inclusion/Development

The organogram of Viva Rio (Diagram 1) illustrates the structure and key areas and projects.

DIAGRAM 1: Viva Rio Organogram

Source: Viva Rio presentation: 15/09/04.

The Public Security and Human Rights programme includes projects such as small arms control, security sector reform and conflict mediation. The key objectives of the social inclusion programme are to improve people's access to the job market through improved education levels, building self-esteem and improved economic and social mobility. This includes projects such as the *Viva Cred* and the *telecurso.* An important component of both programmes is their focus on the at risk group of youth between the age of 15-29 years. However, there is a greater emphasis on this target group in the social inclusion programme, as one of the key factors contributing to young men joining the drug gangs is lack of self-esteem, poor education levels and lack of alternatives both in terms of employment and identity. The Children in Organized Armed Violence project (COAV) which itself has several different activities under its umbrella, is the one project which seems to straddle most easily both of Viva Rio's

two key programme areas and has activities under both the Youth at Risk Project and the Small Arms Control project. Viva Rio also has several cross cutting themes such as research, monitoring mechanisms, training (includes citizenship classes) and communication.

Viva Rio is a large NGO with over a hundred employees and over a thousand more who receive some monetary gain as a result of being involved in a Viva Rio project. They have nearly 400 projects in the city of Rio, concentrated mostly in the north and the west zones. Although their primary focus is the city and the State of Rio they now have 51 projects in other states in Brazil. Their extensive reach has in part been due to the over 700 partnerships they have formed, ranging from educational and religious institutions through to private enterprise and neighbourhood associations. Viva Rio's growth is also reflected in their annual income which has increased from US$600,000 in 1995 to almost US$6m in 2003 - its average annual income for the last five years.

Several of Viva Rio's projects will be discussed in more detail to illustrate their integrative approach. Annex 5 provides more detailed analysis of the various projects across the two key programmes, identifying key objectives, indicators and relative impact on both violence and poverty reduction.

3.3 Public Security and Human Rights Programme

The primary objective of this programme is to increase levels of safety and security[44] within the city of Rio and increasingly across the State. It does this through four projects:

a) Small Arms Control
- Legal reform, which includes the Buy Back campaign and a referendum on a ban on civilian possession in 2005
- National Plan on Small Arms and Ammunition Control
- MERCOSUR

b) Security Sector Reform
- Training programme for police
- Community Policing in *favelas* (GPAE)
- Municipal Public Safety Plan – pilot in Resende and two other sites chosen

c) Conflict Mediation
- Citizens Rights counters established in *favelas*

d) Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV)
- Fight for Peace Boxing Club
- Rescue
- Research
- PROASP (Public Security Actions Programme)

3.3.1. The Small Arms Control Project

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[44] In Portuguese, the word Segurança, means both safety and security.

3.3.1.1 Overview of project

The Small Arms Control project is also referred to as the Reduction of Armed Violence Program or the Program on Disarmament. This programme has three key objectives:

- to reduce the demand for guns
- to reduce the supply of firearms
- to control existing firearms stocks both within the state as well as in civilian hands

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Box 1: *Rio Sem Armas* – buy-back programme

The Brazilian government declared a national firearms amnesty (voluntary weapons collection) from 15 July to 23 December 2004.

Objective:
To remove firearms from the civilian population in order to reduce the potential for guns to be stolen and/or used in crime and to reduce the number of gun deaths and injury in the home.

Partnership:
A unique state/civil society partnership. Viva Rio is co-coordinating the buy back programme, which includes a communications campaign to raise awareness, building networks, sharing information and establishing collection points. The Government is collating data and processing the funds.

Cost:
$R 30 million (US$10m) allocated. A further $R60million (US$20m) is needed. Amounts of $R100 -$R300 are paid, depending on type and numbers of guns handed in i.e US$33 for a pistol and US$100 for an automatic weapon.

Target group:
Law-abiding gun owners. Data shows the majority are over 50 years. Initially, primarily men but increasingly women.

Incentives:
Not wanting the gun to get into the 'wrong hands'; fear of robbery to steal the gun; direct or indirect experience of violence; people tired of the violence; money.

Collection points:
Major focus in three cities – São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Pernambuco. (Parana on its own steam). Viva Rio established one collection point at the VR offices where guns are immediately destroyed; one at TV ROC on outskirts of Rocinha; and a mobile collection point in partnership with TV Globo. Two sites in Sao Paulo in partnership with Sou da Paz. Federal govt. established five collection points.

Impact:
120,000 guns collected from July to September 2004. This is small compared to the numbers that exist in the country. Mainly 9mm, old, but functional guns.

Challenges:
VR dissatisfied with the lack of state support and involvement in the campaign. Partly due to municipal elections due 3 October. Need broad national network of collection points and to extend deadline to maximise impacts.

VR does this through three key activities:

- Campaigning for a new national firearms law
- Developing an integrated national plan for Brazil on Small Arms and Ammunition Control through information systems, tracing programs and capacity building of the police to operate the systems

Developing regional small arms control regimes through information production and exchange, increased border controls in MERCOSUR, and training NGOs on SALW issues in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In 2001 an NGO disarmament network was formed with members from MERCOSUR countries. The network shares research data, holds seminars, established a website in 2002 and conducts training on advocacy and campaigning strategies on SALW.

Although this project has a very explicit and distinct focus on small arms control and has limited interaction with the community development projects, most staff articulate the overall aims of the SALW project as integrating the efforts of violence reduction as a necessary component to create the conditions which can bring services to areas where the state is not present, and where people are largely excluded from the socio-economic system, in particular the economic markets.

The primary focus of this project has been influencing public policy through research aimed at influencing state practice and mobilising public opinion in support of these policies.

3.3.1.2 Campaigning for new Firearms Legislation

Viva Rio has campaigned for stricter national firearms legislation since 1999. The *'Rio, Abaixe essa Arma'* (Rio, Put that Gun Down) campaign mobilised support for a change in the firearms legislation, collecting over a million signatures supporting the banning of the commerce of small arms in Brazil.[45]. The use of research and the collection of data on types of firearms used in gun related crime in Rio were critical in building Viva Rio's relationship with the state. It increased the state's confidence in the NGO sector and enhanced VRs ability to contribute to the debate on security and firearms control.[46]

In December 2003 the Disarmament Statue was passed which restricts firearm ownership through increasing the age limit and introducing gun registration. It also increases penalties for illegal possession and trafficking. The law does not just focus on the control of civilian ownership but also requires the centralization of all firearm related data with the federal police as well as the marking of ammunition sold to the security forces. An innovation in the law, enacted in July 2004, provides for a future national referendum on the banning of civilian firearms ownership, expected to be held in 2005.

One of the factors which make arms control work difficult in Rio and in Brazil, is the strong machismo culture combined with an attitude that having a gun makes you safer. Although the law's primary objective is to reduce the supply of guns and control stocks, it also addresses demand through questioning the ownership of guns as a positive social norm. Challenging this is done through a sophisticated media and

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[45] 1,312,929 audited signatures were collected.
[46] Interview with Pablo Dreyfuss (Viva Rio), 2/06/03.

communications campaign which includes posters, banners, radio commercials and websites. The government amnesty programme has provided Viva Rio with an opportunity to articulate its disarmament message through the very public nature of the campaign, and to measure its impact by the numbers of guns being handed in.

The objectives of this project are integrated through its activities, particularly in addressing issues of demand and supply simultaneously. A good example of this is the Buy Back campaign (see box 1).

3.3.1.3 Children in Organised Armed Violence (COAV): The *Fight for Peace* Boxing Club

The *Fight for Peace* Boxing club is one of the only Viva Rio projects that is explicit about its intention to encourage young men (and now women) not to go into the armed drug gangs. The target group is youth between the ages of 15-24 years, with a specific emphasis on those between 15-17 years of age as this is when they are most vulnerable to becoming both a perpetrator and a victim of gun violence. Although small, this project has had a significant impact on the lives of individuals (See Box 2).

Box 2: *Fight for peace* – Sergio's story[47]

Sergio* is a 19-year-old man who lives in Maré and works at the *Fight for Peace* boxing club. He has been coming to the club since he was 14 years old. He had a disruptive childhood and comes from a fragmented and socially dislocated family. The one constant parental influence in his life has been his paternal grandmother. His father has been in prison for 10 years for armed robbery, and prior to that he served three years for assault. Sergio was by his own admission a 'naughty' child – he bunked school, enjoyed partying, and got involved in fights and petty crime such as shoplifting and assault. He left school after grade three. Although he was exposed to the drug gangs and has cousins involved in the gangs (two of his aunts were killed in gang related activity), he was never attracted to them. He attributes this lack of interest as "just something inside of me." At 15 he heard about the Boxing club and decided he wanted to join and learn how to fight properly. When he arrived he discovered that it was more than a boxing club: there were all these rules which included no fighting outside the club and obligatory attendance at the citizenship classes. Sergio thinks the main object of the project is to create champions inside and outside the ring. He feels that the project has not changed who he is – he still likes to party and he has always been against the drug gangs. What it did change is that it reduced his chance of being killed. Maré is a violent community and he thinks that he could have been killed given what he was doing. It also gave him a job and self-esteem. He is back at school in the fourth grade. As the father of a 3-year-old boy he has hopes for his child: to grow up in this community, go to school, then university and live a good life. He has his own hopes: to write up his life story when, as he says, "I am a complete winner."

Sergio's story is similar to many others who join the club. However, unlike him, some of the club members have been involved in the armed drug gangs. The club offers these young men the opportunity to develop an alternative identity, through helping

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[47] Name has been changed to protect identity

build their self-esteem, developing a culture of rights, responsibilities and duties and thereby creating greater opportunity for entering the formal economy. Sergio may also be similar to many other young men who are not in the club, whose daily experience of violence may have made them both immune to it and also accepting of it as a norm. In a survey[48] done with young men in the *favelas*, a significant number do not see their communities as violent, although the majority recognised that there are high levels of violence where they live. This may also be because the violence is primarily concentrated between the drug gangs and not directed at them.

3.4. Social Inclusion and Development Programme

The primary objective of this programme area is to provide opportunities for income generation and to improve access to and levels of education. All the projects in this programme operate mainly in the *favelas*. The education project in particular has an intended focus on the at risk group although this is not explicitly stated and survey results show that the group making most use of this service are in the 20-29 year age group.[49] This means that the pre-20s at risk group need interventions that do not just address the issue of education.

The programme has two key projects, each with a number of activities:

3.4.1   Community development

- Viva Cred grants credit to small businesses; training
- Fair Trade is a cooperative of over 300 seamstresses; technical and managerial training
- Future stations – computer centres that give people access to the Internet, provide training and assist in seeking employment. A total of 11 stations with an average of 3000 visitors a month.

3.4.2 Education

- Telecurso – an accelerated education programme
- First Job – assisting people in preparing and obtaining a job
- Sports and Art – primary center is the Crianca Esperanca in Cantagalo

3.4.2.1 Telecurso

Viva Rio in partnership with the Roberto Marinho foundation initiated the *'telecurso'* programme: an accelerated learning course, operating primarily in low-income neighbourhoods. The *'telecurso'* is a video-based curriculum, approved by the State Secretary of Education and taught by live instructors. Students receive their elementary school certificate after ten months which is equivalent to seven years of formal schooling. Without this certificate it is almost impossible to enter the formal job market. Since 1997, more than 60,000 students have participated in these courses.[50] No follow up has been done on any of these students but with the imminent

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[48] Dowdney (2003).
[49] Viva Rio presentation, Rio de Janeiro, 2004.
[50] Viva Rio (2003).

state roll-out programme a monitoring component has been included. Although the main aim of the *'telecurso'* is to increase people's opportunity to participate in the formal economy, it also seeks to build social inclusion. It does this through including citizenship classes in the curriculum. Eucrezio Ribeiro, one of the co-ordinators of the *'telecurso'* says, 'what we (VR) created was to work with socially excluded people, to create jobs, to turn people into social actors and to create community leadership.'[51]

The *telecurso* project demonstrates three key elements which are present in almost all of Viva Rio's projects: using a methodology of pilot projects; partnership with the state; and developing public policy. The pilot project methodology has enabled Viva Rio to test out an idea to determine its feasibility and then replicate it if the pilot demonstrates success. Included in this strategy is developing partnerships with the state to either assist in the replication of these successful projects, through funding or partnerships, or to wholly take over the project, thereby mainstreaming it. The *'telecurso'* was one of Viva Rio's first major successful projects in disadvantaged communities and it was also one of the first examples of a successful and positive partnership with the state. They entered into a partnership with the Labour department and the city mayor to establish 144 telesalas (classrooms). From the outset, Viva Rio's intention was that this partnership would influence government to develop an education policy for 'dropouts'[52], eventually taking over the entire project, with Via Rio maintaining links through the local leadership and continuing its role in building social citizenship. The expanded and fully state-supported up-scaling of this project was launched on 6 October 2004.

Similar to the *Fight for Peace* project, it is able to make a difference in an individual person's life. Here is one example.

Box 3: *Telecurso* – Patricia's story *

Patricia is 16 years old and has been in the telecurso programme since May 2004. Three years ago her family moved to Resende from Rio, to escape the violence. When they first arrived in Resende they lived in a corner house of an alleyway, which served as a drug sales point. She witnessed a lot of gun violence: young men being killed; sometimes they were forced by the drug gangs to hide drugs, weapons and even the young gang members. It took the family a long time to settle. Her mother was unable to get her into a local school as they were all full. She spent two years out of the formal schooling system before joining the telecurso. Her mother is a domestic worker and her stepfather a street cleaner. She has a younger brother who is intellectually disabled and needs a lot of care.

Patricia feels that there are other kinds of violence in *favelas* such as beatings, neglect and abuse of children and alcohol abuse which leads to fighting. Although she is afraid of the armed drug gangs she says they have not affected her in any way (as in being drawn in) and that she stays away from them. She feels that living with the gangs is both good and bad – the good being that it teaches you how to live in difficult circumstances and survive and not get involved. It is bad because of the killings and gunshots you hear at night. She feels that the only way violence will change in *favelas* is to give people more opportunity to get jobs and training. She feels the *telecurso* is not enough on its own – that many more programmes are needed which include sports. However, she also believes that violence is for those who want to get involved and that although the alternatives are limited they are there.

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[51] Interview with Eucrezio Ribeiro, 25/10/02, in Kersten (2004).
[52] Term used to describe students who leave school before completing their elementary education

> For her the link between violence and poverty is very clear – if she has to go for a job interview she will immediately be stigmatised if she says where she lives as people see *favelas* as both violent and poor. This will negatively impact on her ability to get a job. The most important part of the *telecurso* for her is that she can do it at night which enables her to take other classes during the day and perhaps do some small jobs. What she likes most is discussing issues that are important in the community such as discrimination and drugs.
> * *Names have been changed to protect identity*

Both examples of young people who have benefited from Viva Rio's projects in *favelas* demonstrate the complex relationship *favela* residents have to violence in their community, in particular to the drug gangs. Their 'apparent' acceptance of the levels of violence in their communities as well as their understanding of how it limits their opportunities reinforces Moser's view that the complexity of violence means "that its relationship with poverty is neither uni-directional not straightforward."[53] These stories also illustrate the impact of violence on the livelihood, well-being and security of the disadvantaged or poor on the one hand, and on the other, how "poverty and inequality levels mean that the poor are frequently held responsible for much of the crime and violence in the cities".[54] They also show the negative impact that violence has on family structure and function and social dislocation.

Both examples demonstrate the impact that social exclusion and feelings of stigmatisation and lack of self-esteem have on slowing down or delaying the development of skills and confidence for completing school and preparing for the job market. These two young people do not want to leave their communities, despite the high level of violence and social disruption.

4. Exploring the impact of armed violence on poverty and development

Understanding the impact of armed violence on poverty and development within the context of Rio is best illustrated through a case study of a particular community which after having experienced several years of 'relative peace', erupted into violence in early 2004.

Box 5: Case study of Rocinha

Relative calm

Rocinha is one of the largest and wealthier *favelas* in Rio. It has a population of at least 120,000 living on two hillsides between two upper-middle class areas of Rio.[55] This number is disputed by residents in the community who claim that it could be as high as 300,000.[56] It is seen as an anomaly compared to other *favelas* due to its size and relative wealth. It has paved roads in some sections and precarious electricity cabling. 63 per cent of *favela* residents in the Municipality of Rio have not got their primary certificate (less than 8 years of education), with the average years of schooling for Rocinha residents being 3.13 years. This means that the likely earning capacity of these residents is dramatically reduced:[57]

Comparison of average earning capacity (in Reals – R$) per education level

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[53] Moser et al. (2003).
[54] Ibid.
[55] Medrado (2004).
[56] Rocinha focus group interview, 31,05/03.
[57] Viva Rio, from PME/IBGE data 1997.

Illiterate	1 - 4 years of study	5 to 8 years of study	9 to 11 years of study	More than 12 years
R$ 232	R$ 297	R$ 326	R$ 503	R$ 1263

In a focus group with Rocinha residents (May 2003) there was consensus that Rocinha was a safe community in which to live, as there had not been any violence over the last eight to ten years. What residents meant by this was that if there was any violence it happened on the outskirts of their community, that they were not directly in the 'firing line' and that they were able to carry on with their normal day-to-day activities such as attending night school, opening a small business and organising community meetings. This attitude towards the violence in their community is partly influenced by the view that 'we cannot see the violence. We have to look past it.'[58] They acknowledged that their primary experience of violence was that of being excluded from the formal job market, feelings of stigmatisation and lack of educational and economic opportunities.[59]

Viva Rio has several projects in this community including a future station, a Viva Cred office and the Balcau de Direitos. The *telecurso* also has several classes in Rocinha. Rocinha also has a history of organising around social issues such as greater service delivery which is done through residents associations (e.g. UPMMR – union for improvement of Rocinha's residents) and other civil society organisations such as the churches.

Outbreak of war

One of the reasons for this 'relative peace' is because Rocinha has been controlled for many years by one drug faction, Comando Vermelho (CV - Red Command). For example, the *favela* of Complexo de Maré is as large but much more violent as three drug factions fight for territory there.

On the night of 8th April 2004, war broke out.[60] There were 24 hours of shootings, confusion and violence. The cause of the violence: a dispute between two armed drug gangs for domination of the territory. The CV which had been in control of this community for many years first experienced some internal power struggle in the months leading up to the outbreak of armed violence and then was challenged for territorial control by another drug faction, Amigos dos Amigos (ADA). This outbreak of violence was both unexpected and also predicted. It was unexpected because Rocinha has a history of no particular loyalty to a particular faction (one of the explanations for the relative peace). It was predictable because from January 2004 there were rumours about the increasing factionalism within CV and between CV and ADA. The situation felt unstable and people felt unsafe but also impotent in preventing the situation from turning violent.

Role of the police

On 2nd January 2004 the police entered Rocinha, with the rumour: 'there's going to be a war.'[61] Their presence was interpreted as being based on good police intelligence – they knew there was going to be a battle for territorial control. However, despite this knowledge, their presence which was supposedly a preventive measure, exacerbated the situation. One criticism, is that the police were unable to intervene in any way on the night of the outbreak. In the end, their prior knowledge and heavy presence did not stop the outbreak of violence. During the height of the violence, approximately 1200 police were stationed in Rocinha.

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[58] Interview Carlinhos Costa, 17/09/04.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Almost everyone referred to the outbreak of violence as 'war'.
[61] Interview with Carlinhos Costa, 17/09/04.

People are ambivalent about the police: on the one hand, they are critical of the police role an on the other, were pleased that they were around. Carlinhos Costa believes that this lack of effective policing is primarily due to the lack of a comprehensive and integrated policy approach to public safety at State and Federal government level. When the 'war' ended, the police left.

Impact

Five people were killed in the 24 hours of heavy armed violence. Of these only one was a drug trafficker, the others were civilians – two women and three men. Two of the victims were killed in the first few minutes of the 'war' when all the lights were shot out as the ADA moved into Rocinha. However, in the months leading up to the outbreak of violence, there had been a heavy police presence and they were responsible for 16 deaths from January through to May 2004.

The most noticeable impact of the violence was the complete lack of civic activity in the community on the day after the outbreak of the 'war.' Everything was closed. People stayed in their homes for 24 hours: children did not go to school, adults did not go to work, and students were unable to attend night classes or use the future station. Those working night shift either did not go to work or stayed at their place of work for several nights until they felt safe to return home. Some people lost their jobs either because they failed to arrive at work for several days or small businesses had to close or reduce staff because of a significant drop in earnings. Resident's routines were severely disrupted and for several weeks after people remained fearful and uneasy. However, residents also felt more united after the violence and wanted to come together in solidarity to support and reinforce existing social networks, with a desire to return to the previous 'relative peace.' Carlinhos believes that the 'war' is not over as the issue of territorial domination has not been resolved. In the streets of Rocinha, there remain some signs that the CV has not completely disappeared from people's affections: most of the CV graffiti has been obliterated with ADA graffiti but on the high walls and in obscure nooks the CV graffiti remains together with their favourite slogans.

The immediate and short-term impacts of violence on this one community are clear: loss of life; loss of income; loss of economic activity; increased feelings of insecurity and fear; and changing social relations. The long-term impacts are unclear but may include increased possibilities of renewed outbreaks of violence, more deaths and greater levels of insecurity, which in turn will also negatively impact on economic activity, and the disruption of routine life.

5. Conclusions and recommendations

Viva Rio's success is in large part due to combining their long-term vision of a peaceful social order with short-term achievable objectives which address some of the immediate issues through activities such as weapons collection programmes and the boxing club project. What this demonstrates is that effective SALW interventions are a collective of initiatives with overlapping goals over time and not a finite project that delivers concrete results based on a project log frame alone. Their success is also not dependent on one single donor or project. Rather these results have been achieved because of a combination of international, foundation and NGO donors over time who have continued to invest in an already successful process.[62]

One focus of this research was to highlight either existing or possible future **indicators** for monitoring and measuring the links between armed violence and

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[62] Comment by William Godnick, International Alert and peer review, 25/11/04

poverty, and the ways in which an organisation or project could design an intervention to address these issues. The following were seen as particularly important (where they are being measured, the results are given in brackets):

- Degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (to be tested through national referendum in 2005).
- Number of guns collected (120,000 from July to September 2004).
- Changes in level of trust between police and community (demonstrated through respondents of the community policing programme (GPAE); could be monitored in more depth in the future).
- Use of violence by police reduced (to be tested through the GPAE).
- *Favela* organisations able to continue projects without Viva Rio's presence.
- Attitudinal change of individuals of target age and wider society in relation to building a culture of peace, social responsibility, socio-economic mobility not through drug gangs.
- Change in degree of socio-economic inclusion.
- Degree of interaction between programmes (either within or outside Viva Rio) addressing the multi-faceted nature of armed violence causes, perpetrators and victims.

Sustainability and impact of Viva Rio's programmes
- Strong on ensuring financial sustainability and ability to mainstream projects into the state system.
- Could be stronger in relation to strengthening local community organisations and empowerment.
- Impacts: raising awareness around danger of guns.
- Effective in removal of guns from society, although not necessarily those currently being used in armed violence.
- Demonstration of partnership with the state.
- Pilot initiatives in social inclusion and police reform, some of which have been mainstreamed by the state (e.g. *telecurso*).

Key success factors of Viva Rio:
- Community projects are located within *favelas*.
- Staff within projects are largely from the same community.
- Political buy-in.
- Sophisticated Communications Campaign: use of communications for raising awareness and embedding media organisations within Viva Rio.
- Piloting initiatives which are suitable for state mainstreaming.
- Put in place databases to build statistical data and evidence to support projects and campaigns.
- Use of research to ensure that the context and risk and protection factors are fully understood in order to focus policy and interventions.
- Using communication to establish links across isolated community groups in conflict (e.g. Viva Favela).
- Developed partnerships with the state.
- Diverse funding sources have been a successful strategy as Brazilian sources have become relatively less important compared to international sources over the last few years.
- Partnership with local and international business.

- Wide network of high level contacts within and outside Brazil.

Challenges faced by Viva Rio which could be relevant to other organisations if they are looking to adopt a holistic approach:

- In spite of the difficult situation in *favelas* due to control by drug factions, more emphasis could be placed on building on existing community structures and empowering partners at local level.
- The evaluation of impact is currently weak, partly due to lack of resources. This is in the process of being strengthened with wider surveys of impact due to be commissioned. However, the often non-attributable nature of impacts to any one situation, project or organisation combined with the small-scale of some of the community interventions makes this a particularly challenging element but a vital part of any organisational strategy that seeks to address complex social issues such as violence reduction.

Conclusions in relation to armed violence and poverty / social exclusion in Rio:

- Rio is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. However the extreme inequality and social exclusion of a significant proportion of the population stands out as a major fault line and a cause of violence.
- The presence of firearms, especially amongst drug traffickers in *favelas* is the biggest cause of firearm homicide.
- The residents of *favelas* are stigmatised both in terms of location of residence and colour.
- The *favelas* are illegal settlements which have made the state largely ignore them as areas of the city. This lack of state law has made them more susceptible to de facto control by drug factions, which in turn makes it harder for development to take place and limits outsiders entering whether these are businesses or development/violence control or prevention projects.
- In terms of income, the residents of *favela* are not below the poverty line. However their relative poverty lies in their vulnerability and social exclusion.
- 1995 figures show that the City of Rio spends 5 per cent of GDP on combating violence (excluding private security).
- The most relevant MDG in relation to Rio is education (63 per cent of *favela* residents in the Municipality of Rio have not achieved their primary certificate – i.e. they have less than 8 years of education).
- The culture of machismo creates a climate in which violence is seen as a norm, contributing to incidents of violence. This is evident in the prevalence of domestic violence against women and men's desire to join drug gangs, seeing guns as a source of power and identity.
- *Favelas* are often built on land which is environmentally protected which used to be forests. They are characteristically on steel slopes, above the city which makes them vulnerable to mud slides in heavy rain. This adds to the legislative difficulty of granting the land to the residents legally.
- Partnerships for development need to be built in the context of Brazil and Rio. An example of this is the multiple public security forces which do not have an integrated policy to combat violence.

Conclusions in relation to the links between poverty/ social exclusion and violence for Viva Rio (VR):

- VR articulates well the links between reducing violence and increasing social inclusion and is trying to address both in practice. The levels of intervention are at community/ *favela* and municipal, state and federal levels. They are also researching these issues in Brazil and MERCOSUR together with other partners.

- VR has shown the importance of understanding the complex reality of these interlinked phenomenon and the need to address them holistically. However not every project needs to address both issues.

Conclusions in the differences and common grounds between development and small arms specialists:

- Small arms research and SALW intervention projects often focus on the weapon as the entry point, whereas development practitioners tend to focus on people as the entry point. This contributes to the current gap between these two groups. The Rio and Viva Rio case study has shown that by focusing on both the weapon and those most affected by its misuse, thereby with the emphasis on people, this allows for greater opportunity for dialogues and partnership between SALW control and development practitioners in the more effective pursuit of the same outcomes.

- These differences have implications for how the categorisation of comparable contexts occurs.

Recommendations to AVPI:

- Define clearly the types of armed violence which the case studies are addressing (e.g. urban violence; post-conflict violence and reintegration; etc)

- This research project demonstrated the importance of understanding the broad contextual links between armed violence and poverty in order to more effectively assess the impact of SALW intervention projects. As a result of effectively combining these two dimensions of the AVPI global research project (as was done in the case of Rio), the recommendation is then to integrate these two dimensions in the final synthesis report.

- A holistic approach is recommended in order to identify the root causes of poverty and violence, who are the victims and perpetrators of armed violence and why. Only then is it possible to see which project interventions are most relevant, and for which purpose.

- Use of language and definitions is vital to clarify in the introduction to the synthesis of findings. If poverty is seen as synonymous with inequality and exclusion then urban violence is one of the dimensions of poverty. If it is seen purely in absolute and not relative terms, and from an income measure, then it is not possible to conclude from this case study that violence arises from poverty. However the poor, without coping mechanisms, are often worse affected by violence - economic, social, intimidation and fear – than those who can afford to protect themselves e.g. by hiring private security. The police are often more abusive to the poor as they have the least power to defend themselves.

- There is a wealth of comparative research in relation to urban violence from a development perspective.

- Using this research and the other relevant studies on this issue, next steps should be to develop context specific case studies of good practice. Stronger evaluation of

impact within projects would help to determine what strategies or combination of strategic interventions are most effective.

Recommendations to government and donor policy makers:

- There needs to be an integration of small arms reduction and development specialists, policy makers and practitioners. This can be done by understanding each others' perspectives and starting from the common ground of analysing who is most affected by both poverty and armed violence.
- There is a wealth of information on each issue which this research has contributed to. However, meetings between these two groups of donors, officials and practitioners should be a pre-requisite if development in areas of high armed violence is an objective.

Annex 1 – List of people interviewed

Name	Position	Institution
Rubem César Fernándes	Director	Viva Rio
Jessica Galeria	Translator	Viva Rio
Maria Helena Moreira Alves	Coordinator of International Relations	Viva Rio
Marcelo de Sousa Nascimento	Statistics	ISER
Ilona Szababó de Carvalho	Institutional Relations, Public Security and Human Rights	Viva Rio
Antonio Rangel Bandeira	Coordinator of SALW Control Project	Viva Rio
Luciane Patrício, Veronica dos Anjos, Elizabeth Albernaz.	GPAE/Community Policing. PROASP. Municipal public Safety Plans	Viva Rio
Teófilo Calvacanti	Coordinator of Viva Cred	Viva Cred
Marta Ramos	Coordinator of Community Development	Viva Rio
Marcos Antônio Maranhao Costa	Coordinator of Telecursos	Viva Rio
Pablo Gabriel Dreyfus	Senior Researcher, Small Arms Control Project	Viva Rio
Luciana Phebo	Researcher and Project Coordinator	ISER
Fernando Patiño	Human Settlement Officer	UN-Habitat
Renata Bernardes	Consultant	Viva Santa, Agenda 21 Local de Santa Teresa
Dante Quinterno	Director	TV Roc and TV Favela
Dr Bernardo Sorj	Professor of Sociology	Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)
José Marcello Zacchi	Design consultant for Human Security Centre	Viva Rio
Luis Eduardo Madeiro Guedes	Coordinator of Monitoring	ISER
Ubiratan de Oliveira Angelo	Colonel / GPAE	Military Police of Rio de Janeiro
Leila Lino	PROASP – assistant on the youth at risk project	Viva Rio
Leriana Figueiredo	Coordinator of Luta pela Paz	Viva Rio
Vitor Belo da Silva	Manager Luta pela Paz	Viva Rio
Carlinhos Costa	Coordinator of Public Security & Human Rights	Viva Rio
Rafael da Rocha Guimaraes	Intern at Rocinha Future Station	Viva Rio
Josephine Bourgois	Disarmament project	Viva Rio
Ben Lessing	Senior researcher in Disarmament project	Viva Rio

Name	Position	Institution
Bernice van Bronkhorst	World Bank	
Emmanuel Rodrigo Pereira; Alexandra Paula Alves; Luiz de Carvalho.	Civil Voluntário	Citizens Council, Resende/Conselho Cidadão e Serviço
José Roberto Pereira Sampais	Vice- President of the Conselho and Chemical Workers Union (Sindicato dos Quimicos do sul Flumiunse)	Conselho Cidadão e Serviço
Eleides Rubert	President of Local Area One.	Conselho Cidadão e Serviço
Kleber Luis de Sousa Ismar Costa e Silva Carlos Eduardo dos Santos	Procurador Jurídico Municipal Monitoring section	Civil Municipal Guard, Resende
Eduardo Mehoas	Mayor	Mayors Office, Resende
Dra. Tânia Tereza Medeiros Carvalho	Coordinator of the Resende Public Order Plan - Mayors office	Prefeitura de Resende
Bruno Vaz Sasson	Secretary of Safety, Transport and Traffic	Prefeitura de Resende
Camila Fidelix Nascimento, Eliniens Larian Gomes, Debora da Paz Perliera	Orientadora de Aprendizagem Jerusa	Prefectura de Resende
Carolina Carvalho Cacador; Tatiana S. Carvalho Alvarenga	Advocate; intern advocate	Balcão de Directos, Resende (Citizens Rights Counter)
Monica Nascimento	Municipal Public plan	Viva Rio
Nilma Soares Barros	Coordinator of CAMUR	Centro de Atenção à Mulher de Resende (CAMUR)/Women's Centre)
Bebiana dos Santos	Counsellor	Centro de Atenção à Mulher de Resende (CAMUR)/Women's Centre)
Elizangela Gonçalves	Commandant of the Municipal Guards	Resende
Kleber Luis de Sousa	Procurador Jurídico Municipal – Municipal Guards	Resende
Ismar Costa e Silva	Monitor – Municipal Guards	Resende
María Lucia Camargo	Victim - domestic violence & recipient of services	CAMUR

Name	Position	Institution
Ariele Asarecida de Paula	Student	Tele-sala - Novo Surubi
Daiana de Freitas	Student	Tele-sala - Novo Surubi
E.M. Maria Dulce	Teacher	Tele-sala - Novo Surubi
Itamar Silva	Community development worker	IBASE
Alba Zaluar	Independent researcher	
Alexandre C. de Santos; Delaine Martins Costa; Maria da Graça Ribeiro das Neves; Rosimere de Souza	Local governance, gender, organisation and management; human rights	Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration (IBAM)
Michel Misse	Dept. of sociology	Federal University of Rio
Thais Corral	General Coordinator	Human Development Network
Ignacio Cano	Professor dept of Social Sciences	State University of Rio de Janeiro
Florência Fontan Balestra	Coordinator of Municipal Public Safety Plan	Viva Rio
Patricia Rivero	Sociologist and researcher in ISER and Disarmament project	ISER
Virgínia Garcez	Manager of programme	People who make peace (Gente faz paz)
Sue Fleming (via telephone)	Social Development Advisor	DFID, Brasilia
Aurélio Mesquita	Participant in Viva Cred programme	Rocinha
Luke Dowdney	Researcher and coordinator of Children in Armed Violence Project	Viva Rio

Annex 2: Brazil's progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

Brazil Country Profile	1990	1995	2001	2002
Click on the indicator to view a definition				
1 Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger	*2015 target = halve 1990 $1 a day poverty and malnutrition rates*			
Population below $1 a day (%)	..	..	8.2	..
Poverty gap at $1 a day (%)	..	..	2.1	..
Percentage share of income or consumption held by poorest 20%	..	..	2.4	..
Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under 5)	7.0	5.7	..	..
Population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption (%)	12.0	10.0	9.0	..
2 Achieve universal primary education	*2015 target = net enrollment to 100*			
Net primary enrollment ratio (% of relevant age group)	86.4	89.7	96.5	..
Percentage of cohort reaching grade 5 (%)	71.7	70.8	..	..
Youth literacy rate (% ages 15-24)	91.8	94.1	94.2	..
3 Promote gender equality	*2005 target = education ratio to 100*			
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)	..	..	103.1	..
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)	102.9	102.8	103.3	..
Share of women employed in the nonagricultural sector (%)	40.2	44.1	45.7	..
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)	..	7.0	..	..
4 Reduce child mortality	*2015 target = reduce 1990 under 5 mortality by two-thirds*			
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000)	60.0	48.0	39.0	37.0
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	50.0	41.0	35.0	33.0

Immunization, measles (% of children under 12 months)	78.0	90.0	95.0	93.0
5 Improve maternal health	*2015 target = reduce 1990 maternal mortality by three-fourths*			
Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	..	..	260.0	..
Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total)	71.9	87.6	..	..
6 Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases	*2015 target = halt, and begin to reverse, AIDS, etc.*			
Prevalence of HIV, female (% ages 15-24)	..	..	0.5	..
Contraceptive prevalence rate (% of women ages 15-49)	..	76.7	..	..
Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS	..	..	130.0 thousand	..
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)	..	..	64.0	62.4
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)	..	..	8.0	9.8
7 Ensure environmental sustainability	*2015 target = various (see notes)*			
Forest area (% of total land area)	65.6	..	63.0	..
Nationally protected areas (% of total land area)	..	4.2	4.4	6.7
GDP per unit of energy use (PPP $ per kg oil equivalent)	5.8	6.6	7.1	..
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	1.4	1.6	1.8	..
Access to an improved water source (% of population)	83.0	..	87.0	..
Access to improved sanitation (% of population)	71.0	..	76.0	..
Access to secure tenure (% of population)	..	..	..	..
8 Develop a Global Partnership for Development	*2015 target = various (see notes)*			
Youth unemployment rate (% of total labor force ages 15-24)	6.7	11.4	17.9	..
Fixed line and mobile telephones (per 1,000 people)	65.0	93.4	385.1	423.8

Personal computers (per 1,000 people)	3.1	17.3	62.9	74.8
General indicators				
Population	148.0 million	159.5 million	172.4 million	174.5 million
Gross national income ($)	414.5 billion	589.6 billion	532.9 billion	494.5 billion
GNI per capita ($)	2,800.0	3,700.0	3,090.0	2,830.0
Adult literacy rate (% of people ages 15 and over)	82.0	84.7	86.4	..
Total fertility rate (births per woman)	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.1
Life expectancy at birth (years)	65.6	66.9	68.1	68.6
Aid (% of GNI)	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
External debt (% of GNI)	26.7	23.2	46.3	52.5
Investment (% of GDP)	20.2	22.3	21.2	20.3
Trade (% of GDP)	15.2	17.2	27.4	29.4

Source: *World Development Indicators database, April 2004*

Note: In some cases the data are for earlier or later years than those stated.

Goal 1 targets: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.

Goal 2 target: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling.

Goal 3 target: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005 and to all levels of education no later than 2015.

Goal 4 target: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate.

| Goal 5 target: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio. |
| Goal 6 targets: Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the spread of HIV/AIDS. Have halted by 2015, and begun to reverse, the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. |
| Goal 7 targets: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources. Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers. |
| Goal 8 targets: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries. Address the Special Needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth. In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications. |

Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org/idg/IDGProfile.asp?CCODE=BRA&CNAME=Brazil&SelectedCountry=BRA

ANNEX 3: Development Assistance Funding for Brazil

Brazil

Receipts	2000	2001	2002
Net ODA (USD million)	322	349	376
Bilateral share (gross ODA)	72%	59%	62%
Net ODA / GNI	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%
Net Private flows (USD million)	16 988	11 576	1 113

For reference	2000	2001	2002
Population (million)	170.1	172.4	174.5
GNI per capita (Atlas USD)	3 610	3 060	2 850

Top Ten Donors of gross ODA (2001-02 average)		(USD m)
1	Japan	171
2	EC	76
3	Germany	59
4	France	38
5	IDB SPEC. OPER. FUND	19
6	United States	18
7	Netherlands	15
8	United Kingdom	14
9	Italy	7
10	Spain	6

Bilateral ODA by Sector (2001-02)

Legend:
- ■ Education
- ■ Health & Population
- ▨ Other social sectors
- □ Economic Infrastructure & Services
- □ Production
- ■ Multisector
- ▨ Programme Assistance
- □ Action relating to Debt
- ▯ Emergency Assistance
- ■ Other & Unallocated/Unspecified

Sources: OECD, World Bank.

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ANNEX 4: Cost of Violence in Rio

	US$ million
City of Rio de Janeiro per year	**2, 058.2**
City GDP, 1995	**43,039.0**
Health costs and years of life lost due to premature death or disability	**801.8**
1. Direct medical costs	**31.6**
2. Cost of years lost due to premature death	**770.1**
3. Cost of years lost due to disability	**0.04**
B. Material losses and security costs	**1,256.4**
1. Gross social costs	**571.4**
1.1 Costs of public security	**489.5**
1.2 Costs of justice (1.2.1 + 1.2.2)	**81.9**
1.2.1 Court system	**58.8**
1.2.2 Penal system	**23.2**
1.3 Costs of private security	**Not estimated**
1.4 Effects on private investments and growth	**Not estimated**
2. Social transfers	**684.9**
2.1 Insurance	**542.9**
2.1.1 Life and hospitalization	**30.8**
2.1.2 Protection of goods	**512.1**
2.2 Direct material losses	**142.0**

Source: Leandro Piquet Carneiro and Luciana Phebo, ISER (1998) in a comparative international research conducted by IDB

Note: Private security and economic impacts such as tourism and in real state values were not estimated. If they were, the % of GDP could rise from 5% to 7%.

Annex 5: Examples of some of Viva Rio's strategies to reduce violence and social exclusion

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
Sport For Risk Group	Provide alternatives to young men and women at risk of going into drug gangs	Fight for Peace Boxing club	Numbers involved Citizens responsibility Reduced violence	Young men and women age 15-17	Local neighbourhood associations Save the Children Sweden Dreams come true	Small scale impact in relation to numbers involved	Increased self-esteem New identity Improved recognition in community	No obvious link
Credit Scheme	Provide credit to small businesses in favelas	Viva Cred	Employment generation Financial growth of the business	Community entrepreneurs	IDB BNDES (National Development and Social Bank) UNIBANCO (Private Bank)	Untested	Favela industry has been connected to formal financial system. Economic mobility. Survey of Rocinha	Income generation
Fast Track Education	Second chance for those not completed	Community Telecourse at primary level	Numbers of primary certificates	Favela residents above age of	Local Neighbourhood Associations,	To be tested Note: correlate	68000 students since 1997 Improved self	Education

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
	primary school education over the age of 15. Link same students to computer training through digital inclusion.		issued Awareness of rights and social responsibilities Number of students improving employment status. Improved socio-economic mobility.	15 years with 4-7 years of study	Churches and NGOs Education Foundation – Roberto Marinho State Secretary of Labor City Secretary of Labor To be mainstreamed by Rio State October 2004	death by gun and target group.	esteem and responsibilities and rights	
Digital Inclusion	Improve access to information through the Internet and skills applicable to the job market	Future Station	Number of people using skills learned to improve employment status Development of self esteem. Improved socio-economic mobility.	Favela residents with emphasis on use.	Local Neighbourhood Associations and NGOs IDB European Community World Bank	Untested	Improved self esteem and responsibilities and rights Increased ability to access information	Education

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
Citizen Rights	To inform favela residents about their rights and responsibilities to society. To provide mediation	Legal Advice Centre	Number of people satisfied with solutions	Favela residents	Local Neighbourhood Associations, Churches and NGOs Universities Ministry of Justice Radio Globo (for mobile service)	Using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms especially in domestic and labour violence.	Women successful in receiving child maintenance grants Improved self esteem and responsibilities and rights	Equality of gender
Small Arms Control	Reduce number of guns in circulation Raise awareness of danger of guns. Change in firearms law and information system.	Buy back programme. Development of national information system. Advocacy and advice to federal government.	Willingness of society to hand in guns Level of society's tolerance to guns Use of guns. Change in law and effective implementation.	Society and federal government.	Victims associations Media Churches and other local associations Federal and state police City Governments Ministry of Justice	Impact on tolerance of guns in society Removing guns from circulation; 119,640 collected by 1/10/04.	Untested	Partnership for development

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
Community Policing	To reduce demand and use of guns / ammunition. Build trust and improve community police relations. Establish rule of law in favelas. Catalyst for local social inclusion and local development.	GPAE	Reduced used of violence against civilians. Reduced levels of fear. Police view favela residents as equal citizens. Reduced gun use.	State level police Favela residents	Local Neighbourhood Associations and Churches Military Police State Public Security Secretariat	Reduced number of gun deaths in pilot sites Unclear but could measure reduced levels of fear in future	Testimonies of reduced levels of fear. Acted as catalyst for state and civil society projects.	Partnership for development
Municipal Public Security Plan and Implementation	Reduce violence in the municipal area Integrate state institutions. State and civil society. City assumes	Resende Municipal Plan of Public Order	Reduce levels of violence. Level of cooperation within state institutions dealing both with security	Population of Resend and public institutions	Resende Mayor's Office Local Associations Municipal Secretary of Security, Transport and	Reduction in homicide.	Traffic accidents as indicator of rule of law and citizens rights	Partnership for development

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
	responsibility for implementation of plan.		and socio-economic issues. Cooperation between the state and civil society.		Traffic Municipal Guard			
Information Systems	Provide Data for statistical analysis and monitoring of government and VR to inform policy decisions.	Cross-cutting	The use of data to improve impact of decisions made on violence reduction	Government institutions (Justice and Police) and VR Media	ISER Govt. statistical data Ministry of Health Data Public Security Data	To be tested	To be tested.	Partnership for development
Communication	Focus public attention on armed violence and social inclusion. Raise profile of VR. Improve quality of	Web sites Branded and issue based merchandise Media campaigns Street marches. Events.	Level of knowledge of VR Change in public opinion. Influence public policy.	Society Government.	Websites: local community media Radio: over 200 local community radios All three main newspapers in	To be tested.	To be tested.	Partnership for development. Health (campaign against dengue). Environment (e.g. water

Intervention strategy	Objectives	Project Name / Activities	Indicators	Target Group	Partners	Impact on violence	Impact on poverty/ social exclusion	Link to MDG
	public debate. To integrate communication between conflicting communities.				Rio TV Globo Several advertising agencies, such as Giovanni, VS Scalla, Artplan, W/Brasil			pollution).

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Useful web sites

Viva Rio: http://www.vivario.org.br/
Viva Rio Projects:
- Children in Armed Violence Project: http://www.coav.org.br/
- Favela radio: http://www.vivafavela.com.br/
- Disarmament Programme: http://www.desarme.org
- Fight for Peace: http://www.lutapelapaz.org.br
World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org
UN-Habitat: http://www.unhabitat.org/
BBC: http://www.bbc.co.uk
DFID: http://www.dfid.gov.uk
Mayor's office, Rio de Janeiro: http://www.armazemdedados.rio.rj.gov.br