



Centre for
International Cooperation
and Security

The impact of armed violence on poverty and development

Full report of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative
March 2005

Centre for International Cooperation and Security
Department of Peace Studies



MAKING KNOWLEDGE WORK

The Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative

This study was commissioned by the UK Government's Department for International Development (DFID) and has been conducted by a team at the Centre for International Cooperation and Security (CICS) of the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK. It is one of four projects undertaken as part of the Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative (AVPI), which has funded research into understanding how and when poverty and vulnerability are exacerbated by armed violence. This study, "The Impact of Armed Violence on Poverty and Development", aims to document this relationship which DFID feels is widely accepted but not confirmed. This report synthesises the findings of 13 country case studies. In addition it has a practical policy-oriented purpose and concludes with programming and policy recommendations to donor government agencies.

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Executive summary

This study examines the extent to which armed violence and small arms and light weapons (SALW) possession and usage, impoverishes individuals, groups, societies and states in various armed violence situations. The objective of the study is not only to advance and clarify understandings and knowledge in this area, which has been largely neglected in policy and research, but also to inform programme design and evaluation. In addition, it offers suggestions on how donors and agencies working in the field of armed violence/SALW and development can work better together to alleviate poverty.

The links between SALW usage/possession and poverty are diffuse and difficult to disaggregate and demonstrate. Many of the impacts are indirect, and disentangling SALW impacts from the impacts of armed violence is very difficult in practice. Many interviewees in the field, for example, were unable to distinguish between the two. The term “armed violence”, therefore, is used as a rubric to include small arms and light weapons (SALW) availability, but also the social and political nexus in which they are used. In addition, the term “armed violence situations” is employed; this embraces more than simply the availability of arms and violent acts carried out by SALW to include the totality of a situation in which armed violence is persistent and endemic. This allows us to investigate the emergence and impact of both a general climate of insecurity, fear and impunity, and adapted business and livelihood patterns based on violence, which tend to result from SALW possession or usage.

The findings that emerged from the case studies both confirmed and, in some instances, challenged existing thinking and preconceptions as to the impacts of armed violence on poverty. Key findings included the following:

- 1) **Armed violence has had almost entirely negative impacts** in terms of displacement, damage to education, health, and agriculture, and impoverished large sections of communities and populations.
- 2) In almost all the internal conflicts examined, **gross domestic product (GDP) declined** under the impact of armed violence. However, some communities were relatively unaffected by armed violence. Due to the localised nature of armed violence, areas of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil and Nairobi, for example, were relatively insulated from major impacts of armed violence (although both experienced loss of tourist revenue).
- 3) **Gun cultures and an acceptance of violence** as a legitimate way to settle differences are often a feature of prolonged armed violence. In the absence of effective police and justice systems this often leads to the impoverishment of individuals and groups who are unable to protect themselves or leave communities where violence is endemic. Armed violence tends to create cycles of insecurity, particularly at the community level, that are very difficult to reverse through programming, and which have long-term poverty implications.
- 4) Armed violence almost invariably **disrupts traditional conflict management and resolution mechanisms**, and empowers sections of the population who regard themselves as above, or not bound by, traditional ways of mediating disputes. At the same time, armed violence tends to erode “traditional” justice

- systems as community figures and those who are traditionally conferred with powers to arbitrate disputes are targeted or chased out of communities by insurgents, rebels and armed groups who wish to exert control over communities. This can disturb well-established justice and dispute settlement systems which have been sometimes shown to limit violence within and between communities.
- 5) Armed violence may in some instances **create potential opportunities for social and institutional change** that can lead some individuals out of poverty. In the cases dealing with armed violent conflict, a motivation for armed violence is frequently to overthrow or undermine existing orders that are seen as backward or oppressive. By-products of armed violence-induced change have included: potential new livelihood opportunities for women who often take on work that would have been traditionally regarded as reserved for men; and a willingness to assert rights rather than suffer inequities in silence (often as a result of the breakdown of respect for traditional authority). International intervention by the UN and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) in post-conflict settings, for example, has led to many people being exposed to new ways of looking at entitlements and rights. However, the potential of these changes to lift individuals out of poverty has not been fully exploited. Often civilians find that the “old ways” reassert themselves.
 - 6) **Some civilians require SALW for both livelihood and protection purposes.** To deprive certain groups or individuals of SALW is to make them vulnerable and quite possibly unable to support or protect themselves. This is particularly the case in instances of inter-community conflict (as in Northern Kenya between pastoralists) where there is a lack of over-arching protection from the state. However, as several case studies show, situations of insecurity can give rise to damaging arms races where groups and communities seek to acquire more weapons to counter the perceived threat of other groups, and violence escalates.
 - 7) As armed violence situations persist, “grievance” is frequently replaced by or manipulated by “greed” as those with SALW see opportunities to enrich themselves – often with an impoverishing impact upon others. Alternative economies thereby develop, often with regional and international links, that are based on activities normally considered “illegal”, and which can be conceived of as **“business out of the barrel of a gun”** and beyond the law. Such patterns, including drug routing, conflict minerals and natural resources and arms trading, cannot be ignored, but are difficult to reverse.
 - 8) Evidence from the case studies was inconclusive as to whether there were clearly differentiated dichotomies between rural and urban impacts of armed violence. However, a **clear rural impact was the devastation of many rural communities and the movement of the displaced into urban areas.** In many of the case studies this was very marked, and there is little evidence that individuals are returning to rural areas in substantial numbers even when a measure of security has been restored. This has had serious consequences in term of poverty with many civilians, particularly youths, being unable to find sustainable livelihoods in urban settings and slipping into criminality and

- subsistence living. The loss of expertise and labour in many rural communities, as well as the destruction of farming, has had an impoverishing impact.
- 9) A consistent finding across virtually all the case studies has been the **involvement of the state in armed violence against civilians and the lack of protection** it has offered to civilians targeted by rebel groups, militias, gangs and criminals. Often the state has lacked the means, as well as the will, to protect civilians. These findings point to the need to both introduce security sector reform (SSR) and also ensure that the state has the capacity to defend its citizens. Sometimes, SSR involves reductions in state forces, but the possibility exists that the state may have to be more heavily armed to protect civilians.
 - 10) SALW misuse can **damage good governance and the development of democracy by strengthening the hand of criminal elements and corrupt politicians and businessmen**. In addition, it can encourage exasperated and frightened communities to embrace gun culture and draconian measures to combat armed violence, as is evident in the El Salvador case study. It can also increase dependence on the politics of patronage and corruption, as in Kenya.
 - 11) Virtually **uncontrolled arms flows across borders** have been reported in most of the case studies. This supply, sometimes deliberately fostered by neighbouring governments or movements, sometimes simply reflecting the regional and international marketing networks, fuels both political conflict and organised criminality, thereby exacerbating poverty. More effective protocols and programmes to control these flows require cross-border and inter-state initiatives as well as enhancing national capacities through customs, police, and other reforms.
 - 12) **Different circumstances of armed violence have different impacts on poverty and development**. Some of these include: the level of development of the country involved; the pattern of armed violence experienced, such as location and whether civilians are targeted or not; whether the state continues to provide services or whether it has broken down or is implicated in the armed violence; the stage of armed violence; the extent to which armed violence has become an integral component of economic activity; and the spread of SALW.
 - 13) These case studies show that programming to address armed violence has not been sufficiently connected with mainstream developmental programming. Neither has it sufficiently connected with SSR which is a critical dimension in re-establishing state legitimacy, its monopoly on the use of force, and its ability to protect citizens. Furthermore, DDR (disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration), development and relief programming could more rigorously target areas such as the causes of armed violence, gun cultures, community security, civilian weapons, vulnerable groups, and build upon some of the socio-economic changes that armed violence initiates.
 - 14) Economies of peace should be built that identify the political economy of armed violence in order to build on any “positive” features, such as new trading links that emerge from conflict, while at the same time reversing negative factors such as corruption.

- 15) There is a need to prioritise community security in programming. This security dimension has frequently been neglected. However, confidence-building measures, such as weapons-free zones and the rebuilding or use of traditional mediation and conflict-resolution mechanisms, have the capacity to stabilise communities and avert outbreaks of armed criminality as well as the social divisions that sometimes develop following conflict.
- 16) Armed violence further puts at risk the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) whose attainment is already in doubt in many developing countries regardless of violence. Across the MDG indicators, the case studies show, armed violence has the impact almost invariably of holding back development. In the case of eradicating extreme poverty, for example, the case studies show that armed violence leads to loss of livelihoods, unemployment, displacement and changes in household composition that further impoverishes and makes the attainment of this MDG virtually impossible. This suggests that the MDGs could benefit from being assessed in a framework that takes armed violence strongly into account.

Section 1: Introduction and approach

1.1 Objectives of study

This study examines the extent to which “armed violence” impoverishes individuals, households, communities, national economies and societies in various situations. As is explained in Section 1.3 below, “armed violence” is given a particular meaning – as a rubric to include small arms and light weapons (SALW) availability, but also the social and political nexus in which they are used. The objective of the study is not only to advance and clarify understandings and knowledge in this area, but also to glean policy and programming recommendations as to how donors and agencies working in the field of armed violence/SALW and development can work better together to alleviate poverty.

Examining the poverty implications of armed violence situations is important for a number of reasons.

- 1) Developmental programming, including poverty reduction work, does not historically tend to fully engage with armed violence. This has some potentially serious consequences, not least the capacity of armed violence to curtail or hamper development and plunge large numbers of people further into poverty.
- 2) There has been an emerging body of research over the past few years on SALW and their impact upon development in general, as well as on security, but very little on the specific linkages between the possession and usage of SALW and impoverishment. This study seeks to address some of these gaps in knowledge.
- 3) Armed violence has the capacity to impinge upon the realisation of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other key donor targets in a number of significant ways. Also, its persistence and all-too-frequent recurrence undermines peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (PCR).
- 4) If the lives of the poor or impoverished are to be improved, it is unlikely that this can be achieved without considering insecurity – which is a central part of any armed violence situation.

1.2 Methodology

A key objective of this study was to disentangle and catalogue the impact of armed violence and associated insecurity (or, conversely, patterns of security and protection) on poverty, primarily through an analysis of the 13 case studies (listed in Box 1 below), as well as evidence from other countries when appropriate. The main indicators selected were those where preliminary research showed there were likely to be significant impacts on poverty. These were:

- 1) Impoverishment through displacement;
- 2) Differentiated impacts by gender and vulnerability;
- 3) The damaging of macro-economic activities including production, exports, public finances and social services;
- 4) Damage to education and health;
- 5) Livelihood alterations and depletion;
- 6) The emergence of exploitative, alternative political economies;
- 7) Damage to social capital and coping strategies.

1.3 Concepts and definitions

This study integrates concepts and thinking from the fields of security and development and seeks to connect them. In particular, it seeks to give a specific meaning to the key terms used in this study:

- 1) **Armed violence.** This is employed as a useful umbrella term to link:
 - a. The availability of SALW and;
 - b. Their use and threat of use to commit acts of violence, the purposes of such violence, and the type of violence perpetrated.

- 2) **Armed violence situations.** This term embraces more than simply the availability of arms and **violent acts** carried out by SALW to include the totality of a social situation in which armed violence is persistent and endemic. In all of the case studies, the emergence of a general **climate of insecurity, fear and impunity**, which tends to result from SALW possession or usage, and a **political economy of violence**, which is, after all, merely business from the barrel of a gun, were found to be just as important defining circumstances as violent acts. These different elements of the armed violence situation each have distinct implications for development and poverty and all may have immediate and/or long-term impacts on poverty.
 - a. **Actual acts of direct violence** (physical harm, rape, use of SALW to terrorise people). These have both direct (e.g. loss of life) and indirect impacts (e.g. changes in household composition).
 - b. The **climate of insecurity, fear and impunity** (through the threat of use of SALW, restrictions on movement etc) will impact on people's ability to conduct livelihood activities.
 - c. The **"political economy of violence"** (including illicit economic activities such as extortion, production and smuggling of drugs and conflict minerals and natural resources, land grabbing, money laundering and corruption) will change the circumstances in which people and communities seek their livelihoods, bringing prosperity to some and impoverishment to others.

The "armed violence situations" studied here can be conceptualised in terms of two categories:

- a. **Armed violent conflict:** a situation where armed violence is being used by one or more parties in the context of a *political conflict*, characteristically an internalised conflict. The case studies include countries where the armed violence is **on-going** (Nepal, Northeast India, Chechnya), as well as countries in the early stages of **transition** from armed violent conflict (Southern Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Algeria).
- b. **Violent organised criminality:** systematic use of armed violence for criminal and related purposes (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; Nairobi, Kenya; El Salvador).

As with all typologies, in real situations the categories may overlap or several types of armed violence may be present in any one case. In particular, it was found that in all of the cases of armed violent conflict, violent organised criminality existed as part of the emergence of exploitative, alternative political economies.

- 3) The terms ‘**poverty**’ and ‘**impoverishment**’ used in this report go well beyond the monetary measure to cover the whole area of human security, including well-being, access to essential services, and peaceful and effective governance mechanisms to guarantee social protection.

Box 1: The case studies¹

Armed violent conflict	Violent organised crime and social disorder
<i>Eastern Africa</i>	
SOUTHERN SUDAN	NORTHERN KENYA
SOMALIA	Nairobi
<i>West Africa</i>	
SIERRA LEONE, Nigeria	Nigeria
<i>South Asia</i>	
NEPAL	
Sri Lanka	
Northeast India	
<i>Other regions</i>	
Algeria	RIO DE JANEIRO
Chechnya	El Salvador

1.4 The significance of SALW

The channels of supply for SALW in the case studies analysed were varied. In Sierra Leone and Southern Sudan, supply from neighbouring states was an important source. It was a factor, if less so, in Sri Lanka and Algeria. Cross-border trade was a factor in Northern Kenya, Nairobi, Northeast India and Nigeria, as well as Somalia. In other situations of armed violent conflict, rebels were able to obtain SALW from government garrisons or deserters, as in Nepal. In the case studies dealing with armed violent conflict, it has generally not been the case that the prior availability of SALW was the decisive factor in opposition groups opting for violent means. Rather, it was generally the case that the availability of SALW was drawn upon once a commitment to armed violence was made. In most violent armed conflicts, the drivers of violence were long-standing injustices and bad governance, rather than the possession or availability of SALW.

It has proved difficult to collect data that specifically demonstrate a direct correlation between increased weapons flows and consequent or subsequent rises in armed violence over specific time frames. However, there is strong evidence that increases in weapons flows have empowered armed groups and rebels to engage in more

¹ The MAIN cases that were originally selected and which received most attention are in capital letters. The remaining supplementary studies provide valuable data to allow wider coverage.

widespread or intensive violent activities and to strengthen their grip on societies and in war-torn states in a way they were unable to do so prior to the availability of SALW. It has also been difficult to attribute direct “causal” links between SALW availability and impacts on poverty. It is clear that the spread of weapons *per se* is not the sole cause of armed violence in any of the cases studied here, or the many others reported in other literature.

The difficulties are, in part, one of disentangling SALW and trying to give some weighting to it as one factor among several others operating, including disruption of populations, economies, livelihoods etc, and often simultaneous drought, floods or other environmental disasters. There are further complications. Many of the impacts are indirect, shaped by the social, political and economic context and intervening variables. Moreover, SALW availability interacts with other factors, thereby often mutually amplifying effects and fundamentally changing situations. The report, therefore, does not always try to distinguish SALW impacts from the more general and aggregate impacts of the overall “armed violence situation”, of which SALW flows and availability are an essential ingredient.

However, even if it is not possible to isolate the impact of SALW, it is possible to explore whether its availability at a particular historical moment may have been a decisive “triggering” factor, signalling a qualitative shift in a situation. The most clear-cut example of a triggering impact was in the case of the western part of Northern Kenya, where the sudden availability of modern SALW at a distinct moment following a raid on an armoury in nearby Uganda arguably acted to fuel the violence. What could be regarded as a traditional aspect of pastoral life, livestock raiding moved to a higher level of harmful impact to the livelihood system. More cattle were being stolen, leaving families destitute. However, even in this case, the concomitant process of the commercialisation of cattle raiding, in turn, had an impact on the upsurge in violence, loss of livelihoods and thus displacement. The findings of the Somalia case study offer a different example. A much longer diffusion of weapons through three decades of inter-state wars and Cold War arms supply increased the intensity and scale of violence between relatively small, informal groups representing clans and sub-clans when those antagonisms exploded after the overthrow of the state in 1991.

Arms availability has also led to community elders, in Kenya and elsewhere, having less control over young men who have become increasingly engaged in violence. In Nigeria, arms flows and availability seem to have increased since 1999 as insecurity within society increases and the state seems to be unable to protect civilians and is indeed sometimes targeting them. Evidence of more powerful weapons being acquired and an increasing militarization of society are compounded by the ease with which SALW can be moved into Nigeria across borders. In Northeast India, the proliferation of armed groups has been fuelled by the easy availability SALW and has contributed to social tensions escalating into armed conflict.

Furthermore, in Sierra Leone and Algeria, SALW availability made possible the sustainability of an armed violent conflict. Among the case studies, in only three – Somalia, Sudan and Northern Kenya – can it be said that SALW are dispersed throughout the population. Elsewhere they are more or less effectively limited to the organised parties to the violence.

In a number of the case studies, traditional weaponry, such as sticks and machetes (in Sierra Leone), kukris (a Gurkha knife used in Nepal), swords (in Algeria), and poison arrows (in Meghalaya, Northeast India) have been used in acts of violence. The impact of traditional weaponry in terms of casualties and the climate of fear it can create can be just as powerful as that caused by SALW, as indicated in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where machetes were used. However, there is evidence that traditional weapons are often used for different purposes than SALW. In Sierra Leone, for example, machetes and other implements were used to cut off limbs and mutilate to create an environment of fear, as well as to discourage farmers from working on their farms. At the same time, in some case studies, traditional weapons were used to defend communities from rebels when SALW were not available, or were limited.

Section 2: The impact of armed violence – key findings

In this section of the paper we catalogue the various impacts of armed violence and armed violent situations on poverty and development. In all of the sections, the direct and indirect effects on poverty and processes of impoverishment are identified.

2.1 Casualties and disabled

All of the case studies confirm previous research that the human cost of armed violence spreads far beyond combatants, criminals and state security forces to civilians. The deliberate targeting of civilians by rebel forces and the state security sector was witnessed to devastating effect in Southern Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Algeria. However, it continues to be men, particularly young men, who are the most common perpetrators and victims of armed violence. This is borne out in all of the case studies. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, young men are 24 times more likely than women to be killed by armed violence; while men between the ages of 15 and 29 are twice as likely to die from armed violence as the rest of the male population.² In Colombia, men are 14 times more likely to die of gunshot wounds.

Box 2: Youth and armed violence in Nigeria

The huge youth population in Nigeria, estimated by the UN to be 25 million, which is economically, socially and politically deprived, are among the main perpetrators of armed criminality and “gangsterism”. The problems of ethnicity, politics and religion, to an extent obscure the fact that much armed violence is carried out by the young and represents a normalisation of gun culture among them and the emergence of a culture of impunity.

For example, the description “Area Boys” embraces unemployed, opportunistic young people (predominantly males) living in Lagos (although they can be found in other parts of Nigeria), many of whom are taking drugs. They are easily mobilised for armed violence and are known to be prone to unleash violence with both SALW and traditional weaponry. There is no precise data on their number, but educated estimates put it at several thousand. Area Boys have traditionally had some positive connotations and have been seen by some as providing services to the community. However, they started to turn into a negative phenomenon in the late 1980s as a result, in part, of government economic adjustment programmes that exacerbated unemployment and resulted in cutbacks on social service provision, and of the increase in narcotic trading and consumption in Lagos. Embittered/disadvantaged youths are likely to be particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the temptations of taking up arms, or joining armed groups.

2.1.1 Impacts of casualties and disabled on poverty

The removal of large numbers of men from the population has major knock-on effects on society as a whole. The poverty implications are manifold. Generally, it denies countries labour power and skills. In some situations, such as in the case of Southern

² Dreyfus *et al* (2003).

Sudan, the high number of male casualties has had a huge impact on gender demographics. In Bahr-el-Gazaal and Upper Nile, for example, it was found that there were more than two women to every male resident. The huge numbers of female-headed households (discussed in section 2.4.4) in many of the case studies (Sri Lanka, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Algeria, for example) is the result of the over-representation of men in the casualty figures.

Armed violence not only creates widows, it also creates disability. In Algeria, for example, the last census in 1998 counted 1.6 million disabled people, about 5 per cent of its total population.³ Not only does this have an impact on these people's ability to earn a livelihood, it also impacts on health and social services. (This is discussed in section 2.5.2.)

2.2 Displacement

Apart from direct casualties and the injured, the biggest direct impact of armed violence is the creation of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). UNHCR global figures for refugees stood at over 17 million as of 1 January 2004. In 2003, overall numbers of IDPs were estimated to have remained constant at around 24.6 million. While there are no disaggregated figures for conflict-induced displacement, agencies such as UNHCR regard armed violence as the key driving force behind most refugee flows.

2.2.1 Causes of displacement

The creation of refugees and IDPs are a recurrent feature in all of the case studies that deal with armed violent conflict, but hardly at all in the case of violent organised criminality. In Northern Kenya, however (a case which straddles the two categories), the upsurge in livestock raiding has displaced and made destitute households and entire communities. Most of the violence-induced displaced are women and children, this is because men are more often killed or join the militias/military (see section 2.1). This has clear poverty implications due to the rise in female-headed IDP families (in Sri Lanka it has been estimated that 60 per cent of IDP families are headed by women; in Somalia this figure rises to 75 per cent) and thus puts an increased burden on women (see section 2.4.4). Nepal, however, offers an interesting contrast in that the majority of displacement has been caused by men fleeing Maoist or government forces. In some cases, displacement has been the outcome of people fleeing a violent situation, such as Somalia and Sierra Leone; on other occasions it has been the result of a deliberate policy by parties to the conflict, such as the targeting and deliberate displacement along ethnic, religious or other fault lines, such as in Southern Sudan, Algeria and Northeast India. In all of the case studies, however, the poverty impacts of violence-induced displacement, discussed below, are clear.

2.2.2 Poverty impacts of displacement

The most immediate and devastating impact of violence-induced displacement, whether cross-border or internal, in most of the case studies (Sierra Leone, Northeast India, Somalia, Southern Sudan, Sri Lanka, Algeria, Chechnya, Northern Kenya) was

³ *El Watan*, 3 March 2002.

the resultant loss of access to land, property, jobs, assets and therefore means of livelihood. In the case of Northern Kenya, it was the destruction of assets (cattle) through armed violence that triggered the displacement. The displaced, denied their livelihoods and traditional support structures, tend to be the poorest of the poor. In Northern Kenya, for example, 81 per cent of Turkana displaced to Kalokol location are living below the poverty line.⁴ This impoverishment extends to lack of access to health services and education, food insecurity, and increased morbidity and mortality. In Somalia, IDPs account for over 50 per cent of the Somali population identified as chronically food insecure. The displaced are also more vulnerable to infectious and communicable diseases. Many die from preventable and treatable infections, often exacerbated by malnutrition. Amongst the Chechen displaced, for instance, TB and HIV/AIDS have been spreading rapidly because of inadequate living conditions.

In refugee/IDP camps, employment opportunities are sporadic or non-existent and opportunities outside of camps depend on relations with the local community and whether their skills match local demand. IDPs and refugees living in host communities also often have limited economic opportunities. For example, over a third of Chechnya's displaced are living in Ingushetia (200,000). Given the high unemployment rate in Ingushetia (73 per cent in 2003), there are very limited job opportunities. For most IDPs, the move from the countryside to urban areas has had an impoverishing effect. In the southern town of Belet Weyne in Somalia, for instance, newly arrived IDPs lodged in small huts, had no access to land, and relied solely on casual labour, such as collecting rubbish. In the case of Sierra Leone, the massive inflow of people into the capital city Freetown, fleeing violence in the countryside, put a strain on already overstretched infrastructure and services, and led to the creation of new squatter settlements. This had clear poverty implications for the individuals and families concerned: many had to resort to petty trading or begging to survive. However, their absence also impacted upon rural areas by denying them skills and expertise in sectors such as agriculture. This is likely to have a major long-term impact on the future agricultural productivity of Sierra Leone. In the case of Algeria, the violence-induced exodus from rural areas has led to an acute housing crisis in urban areas, a generalised deterioration in urban public services and living conditions, and to increased levels of criminality, violence, prostitution, and unemployment.

Overall, the experience of violence-induced displacement is impoverishment – in some cases this can be long term. There are many examples like the case of Southern Sudan where many returnees arrived home too late for the planting season or lacked seeds or tools. In some situations, for example because of ethnic cleansing, it was not possible for the displaced to return to their communities. This was true for parts of Northeast India and parts of Southern Sudan. The intensity or reversibility of the poverty experienced by the displaced will depend, to a large extent, on the length of displacement. In the case of Sri Lanka and Somalia, some IDPs have been displaced in camps in miserable conditions for a decade or more.

⁴ Kenya Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003.

2.2.3 Poverty impacts of abductions and sexual violence

Refugees and IDPs fleeing from violence often experience further violence. In Sierra Leone, for example, 13 per cent of IDP household members reported incidents of war-related abductions, beatings, killings, sexual assaults and other abuses, while 9 per cent reported war-related sexual assaults. Women and girls are vulnerable to violence and sexual abuse (for example, the current situation of women in western Sudan leaving camps after dark to collect firewood), or are forced to trade sexual favours for food, shelter or physical protection. In Colombia, 36 per cent of IDP women have been raped or sexually humiliated by the security forces, paramilitaries and guerrilla groups.⁵ In Somalia and Southern Sudan, displaced women experienced rape, abduction and forced marriage. The long-term poverty impacts of gender-based violence are explored in section 2.4.1 below. The displacement of families from their communities and traditional support networks also exposes children to abductions and forced recruitment to rebel movements. In Sri Lanka, for instance, displaced young Tamil children, often orphans, have been systematically recruited by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) since the mid 1980s. This is discussed in greater detail in section 2.3.2 below.

While both refugees and IDPs suffer the same consequences of armed violence, the latter do not have the same legal and institutional support that host governments and UNHCR are obliged to provide for those who have managed to cross an international border. In 2003, some seven million IDPs, nearly a third of the world's internally displaced population, were estimated to be partly or fully excluded from any assistance by the UN.⁶

2.3 Impact of armed violence on children

Between 1990 and 2000, over two million children⁷ were killed in intra or interstate wars. In addition, approximately six million have been wounded or disabled, and one million have been orphaned.⁸ Many of these deaths and injuries have been caused by SALW due to their wide availability, portability and use. In the case of Colombia, approximately 4,000 children are killed by small arms every year.⁹ In addition, in Northern Kenya, where cattle raiding once took place using traditional weapons in hand-to-hand fighting, the use of guns has meant that killing of humans is much more indiscriminate; this has meant that more children are being killed in the raids. Being "caught in the crossfire", so to speak, is also evident in El Salvador where many children have been seriously injured or killed as a result of stray bullets. However, on occasions, children have been targeted directly, such as in Chechnya. The continual threat of death and abuse at the hands of militias and security forces is common to both situations of armed violent conflict and violent organised criminality.

⁵ Global IDP Project, www.idpproject.org.

⁶ Global IDP Project, www.idpproject.org.

⁷ According to the Convention on the Rights of the Child accepted by all but two countries (the USA and Somalia) "a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, maturity is attained earlier."

⁸ Valencia, June 2001.

⁹ Watchlist, 2004.

2.3.1 Poverty implications

In situations of armed violent conflict (such as existed in Sierra Leone, Somalia and Southern Sudan), children are exposed to many dangers due to the breakdown of the social fabric. On occasions this has meant abduction or forced recruitment to militias. These experiences all have devastating poverty implications. In Southern Sudan, children (and women) were abducted for forced labour or as a commodity to be traded. Slave raiding was perpetrated by government-backed militia as a tool of war to terrorise the population. The numbers are contested, however, with some NGOs, such as Amnesty International and International Crisis Group, believing that as many as 200,000 have been enslaved. Forced abductions have become a growing, lucrative criminal trade and another underlying perpetuator of conflict in the region.

In a number of the case studies, the loss of a parent has meant destitution and a life on the street. In Mogadishu, Somalia, a 2003 UNICEF survey found that 19 per cent of children or their siblings had, at some stage, been living on the streets. These children were forced to eke a living from guarding cars, collecting garbage and engaging in small-scale sales of cigarettes and foodstuffs. These activities yielded barely enough to meet their basic needs.¹⁰ In addition, in some cases it was found that children living on the streets of cities often become the targets of 'social cleansing', a disturbingly neutral term for what is, in fact, the killing of 'undesirable' children by vigilantes, police and shopkeepers. In Altos de Cazuca, a district in southern Bogota, Colombia, there were reportedly over 150 deaths of children and young people in the first nine months of 2003.¹¹

2.3.2 Child soldiers

Given that some modern SALW are light, extremely portable and require little training, children have become a popular source of recruitment for militias, particularly as they tend to be more malleable and less questioning of authority. Forcible recruitment to armed groups was a factor in a number of the case studies involving violent armed conflict. It is estimated that 300,000 child soldiers are currently fighting around the world with 120,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. At least 30,000 children and adolescents in Uganda, for instance, have been abducted by the Lord's Resistance Army.¹² In Somalia, a 2003 UNICEF survey reported that 5 per cent of children surveyed in Mogadishu said that they or their siblings had carried a gun or been involved in militias.¹³ In the cases of Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, child soldiers were used by the armed groups. In Sierra Leone, it is estimated that around 12 per cent of all combatants were children, although one estimate puts it at 25 per cent: 6,787 child soldiers passed through DDR.¹⁴

Although there are no disaggregated figures which show the involvement of very young children as opposed to youths, in the case of Sudan there is evidence that boys as young as nine were forcibly recruited for the Sudan People's Liberation Front (SPLA). In addition to the use of force, however, children often have compelling

¹⁰ UNICEF Somalia, (2003).

¹¹ Watchlist 2004, p.23.

¹² Women's Commission, 2004, p.3.

¹³ Unicef, 2003.

¹⁴ UNDP, 29 April 2002, p67.

motivations to join armed groups and take part in armed violence. In Chechnya, children orphaned in the conflict have become a major source of recruits for the militant groups. While in Sierra Leone, where political power in communities was very much related to age, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) found willing recruits in youths who had transgressed the traditional authorities. As much as child soldiering is abusive and destructive and is likely to cause psychological trauma, it may also be a rational livelihood decision in a situation where alternatives are not available. This is clear in the case of Sri Lanka, where the LTTE provide a generous benefit package to the parents of child recruits.

Where children are involved in urban criminal activities the benefits of carrying weapons are potentially equally lucrative. For example, in Colombia and Kenya, children in urban areas are able to earn up to the equivalent of \$US100 for killing a policeman.¹⁵ However, youths who join armed urban gangs, such as those that exist in El Salvador, Brazil and Nairobi, are most vulnerable to becoming both a perpetrator and a victim of gun violence (see section 2.1 above).

2.3.3 Disruption to schooling

In addition to these devastating direct impacts of armed violence on children, there are a number of indirect impacts likely to have long-term poverty implications. In the situations of armed violent conflict, schooling was frequently disrupted through the closure of schools, curfews and displacement. In Churachandpur in Manipur, for instance, ethnic clashes brought education to a halt. In the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo it is estimated that as much as 70 per cent of children do not have access to school.¹⁶ Very often schools are destroyed during a conflict. In East Timor, for instance, during the Indonesian repression in 1999, 90 per cent of school buildings were destroyed or badly damaged.¹⁷ Similarly in the Mozambican civil war, 45 per cent of primary schools were destroyed.¹⁸ In situations of long-term chronic conflict and insecurity, consistent investment in schooling is not a priority.

The long-term impact of lack of access to education can be clearly seen in areas of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLA, where the net enrolment ratio into primary schools is only 20 per cent. The resulting lack of educated professionals (there are only 30-40 lawyers for the whole of south Sudan, a territory as large as Germany and France combined) is likely to add to the country's governance problems.¹⁹ In Somalia, the loss of a whole generation of anyone with higher education has been described as a national disaster. Armed violence has a severe negative impact on children's abilities to lead normal healthy lives, become educated and employed, and ultimately to escape from poverty.

Despite the protections guaranteed them under international law, many children continue to suffer grinding poverty and abuse due to armed violence and insecurity. In

¹⁵ Muggah and Berman 2001, p.29.

¹⁶ Watchlist 2003, p.18.

¹⁷ Black 2001, p.22.

¹⁸ Black 2001, 19.

¹⁹ NSCSE & UNICEF, 2004.

Sierra Leone alone, an estimated 36,000 children were affected by armed violence in 2001, including child soldiers, camp followers, street children and IDPs.²⁰

2.4 Impact on women

Women can be both victims and agents of armed violence. Across the case studies, women, as a group, faced specific impacts of armed violence: through displacement (see section 2.2); sexual violence; as combatants; through increased status and workload and through an increase in women-headed households.

2.4.1 Sexual violence

Despite the fact that there is a growing incidence of men suffering rape in situations of armed violent conflict (such as in the recent conflict in Bosnia), the case studies showed that it is still overwhelmingly women and girls that are subjected to sexual violence at the hands of the state security sector, armed rebel groups and armed criminal gangs. However, a distinction needs to be made between those cases where the sexual abuse of women was opportunistic (perpetrated by rapists, bandits, thieves) and those where sexual violence was systematic and used as a weapon of war. The systematic use of sexual violence was widespread in the case studies of armed violent conflict (Southern Sudan, Chechnya, Algeria, Northeast India and Sierra Leone), and was used as a way to dishonour and humiliate not just women, but the enemy group.

The abduction of women and girls for prostitution was evident in Colombia (35,000 to 50,000 women and girls were trafficked abroad in 2000²¹) and the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the DRC, most were captured from villages by armed groups active in the country who work with the traffickers. In the case of Sierra Leone, rebel commanders took young women as “wives”; this euphemism masks the reality of sexual violence and exploitation. Taking women as “war booty” was also evident in Algeria.

In all of the cases, sexual violence, even the murder of women and girls, appears to have been carried out with impunity, particularly when the violence was carried out by the state security sector. In Nepal, for example, rape is very common by the armed police and to a lesser extent by the Royal Nepalese Army. In the case of Chechnya, gang-rapes by the Russian military are believed to be one of the main reasons for the radicalisation of Chechen women and their recruitment for suicide bombing missions.

In El Salvador, Nairobi and Brazil, sexual abuse of women was largely opportunistic, although in El Salvador, young women gang members experience sexual violence and some undergo gang rape as their right of passage into the gang. In Somalia, traditional cultural restrictions against violence on women and girls seem to have limited their being targeted, but it did not prevent it. In the majority of the case studies, there were indications of high societal levels of violence against women. For instance, in El Salvador, an estimated 57 per cent of women suffer physical violence at the hands of their partners; and in 2003, 238 women were killed by their spouses.²² This confirms

²⁰ UNDP, 29 April 2002, p67.

²¹ Watchlist 2004.

²² Amaya Cóbar and Palmieri, 2000, p.75.

other research which suggests that domestic abuse increases during and after conflict. Post-conflict stress, combined with a lack of economic prospects and a reduction in basic services, contribute to the dynamics of domestic violence after war. In Cambodia in the mid 1990s, for example, a study conducted by Unifem found that as many as 75 per cent of women experienced domestic violence.²³

The direct consequences for women victims of sexual violence are manifold: psychological trauma, pregnancy, and the spread of sexual infections and HIV. In addition, however, sexual violence has specific poverty implications. Stigmatisation as prostitutes, loss of spouses and prohibition of future marriage, and rejection by family and community members is common in all the case studies. Such treatment, in turn, limits women's access to livelihood assets such as land and labour and cuts them off from sharing in social capital. These impacts, which are likely to have long-term poverty implications, were evident in Sierra Leone.

2.4.2 Women combatants

A significant body of literature has recently emerged which challenges the relegation of women to the role of mere passive victims of armed violence by charting women as agents of violence. Although there is no hard data, in many of the case studies, anecdotal evidence suggests that increasing numbers of women are taking part in armed violence as either combatants or gang members, with its concomitant risks. Women have joined militant groups in Chechnya and Northeast India; they account for over 30 per cent of the LTTE fighting force in Sri Lanka, and, it is alleged, over 33 per cent of the ranks of the Maoists in Nepal. However, this very much depended on the policies and strategy of the insurgent group. For example, the Maoists in Nepal and the LTTE in Sri Lanka actively recruit women, while in Algeria women were excluded from the Islamist groups.

By taking up arms, these women expose themselves to the same sort of violence normally experienced by combatants. In Nepal, for example, the number of women killed by the police rose from three in 1996 and 1997 combined to 44 in 1998, thus indicating a rise in the participation of women and the serious targeting of women by the police. In the cases of violent organised crime (particularly El Salvador and Brazil), women do participate, albeit in smaller numbers. In Northern Kenya, women are not directly involved in the cattle raiding, however they play an important role in goading young men into action.

In a few of the case studies, particularly Sri Lanka and Nepal, the involvement of women as combatants has helped to empower them to challenge traditional gender roles. However, their perceived or real empowerment and other gains in emancipation during the conflict are rarely sustained in the following period. In Sri Lanka, for example, women ex-combatants are not seen as suitable women to marry. Despite greater expectations of equality, women ex-combatants often face ostracism in their community and betrayal by male comrades who expect them to revert to pre-conflict gender roles – as observed, for example, in Nicaragua and Eritrea. The reversal of these gains was also evident in many of the case studies (such as Southern Sudan and Sierra Leone) for women in wider society.

²³ Rehn & Johnson, 2002.

In the few case studies analysed where DDR has been instigated, women were frequently left out of DDR programmes and were often poorly reintegrated into communities following conflict. In Sierra Leone, women were particularly neglected, there was a low participation rate in the Stopgap programme (5 per cent), although steps were subsequently taken to address this, and wives of ex-combatants were excluded from National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) programmes. Furthermore, follow-up in terms of reintegration support to women ex-combatants was poor. In Sri Lanka, attempts at reintegration will need to take account of social stigma issues, particularly associated with barriers to marriage in the case of LTTE women ex-combatants, who are comparatively numerous.

2.4.3 Women's status and workload

In all of the cases of armed violent conflict, women's economic roles appear to have expanded. In Algeria, for example, violence-induced impoverishment has forced significant numbers of married women to work outside the home. Changes in the demographic and social composition of households and communities have resulted in shifts in gender and age allocations of labour, with women bearing a disproportionate share of the workload. In Northern Kenya, this appears to have had a positive effect on women's decision-making power within the household: women enjoy greater control over deciding the use of returns from their economic activities. In Nepal, women have found themselves less bound by traditional structures, although this is clearly also the outcome of a deliberate policy by the Maoist rebels.

For some women this has had a potentially liberating and empowering effect (e.g. Sierra Leone and Nepal), while in others this expansion in women's economic roles merely served to increase their domestic burden. Women in Southern Sudan, for example, who have lost husbands and sons to the war have been forced to take on any livelihood activities, from collecting grass and cutting wood to building *tukuls* (grass huts), sowing and cultivating the fields, brewing and selling local beer and trading goods in the market. Women in Yirol County, southern Sudan, complained that this increased burden was more or less institutionalised even when the men returned.

The added responsibilities women have are often transferred to younger girls within the family thereby disrupting their schooling. In Chechnya and Somalia, for example, children, and young girls in particular, are forced to substitute for the loss of women's domestic labour. This shift of responsibility, therefore, has had adverse impacts on the welfare and future of female household members.

2.4.4 Women-headed households

In all of the case studies dealing with armed violent conflict there has been a dramatic increase in the number of households headed by women. In Southern Somalia, for example, the figure is as high as 40 per cent (a proportion higher than almost anywhere else in Africa) and among IDPs is 75 per cent. Women heads of households are particularly disadvantaged. Not only do they face the increased burden of meeting the subsistence and other basic needs of dependents, but they are also often amongst the poorest groups. In Yirol County in Southern Sudan, for example, 15-25 per cent of households categorised as "poor" in 2000 and 20-30 per cent of households

categorised as the “poorest” were headed by widows. There were virtually no widow-headed households in the middle and better-off income categories. Similarly, in Algeria, women-headed households, particularly those living in rural areas, account for a disproportionate share of the population categorised as the “absolute poor” (see Box 3).

Box 3: Women-headed households in Sri Lanka

There has been a significant increase in women-headed households due to the large numbers of men killed or lost through migration throughout the war. This increase is seen primarily in the Tamil communities in the north-east. In the Sri Lankan context this has serious and gendered implications for families, communities and societies. Tamil culture accords a very low status to widows, and women living alone without a male family member are looked upon with suspicion and suffer various forms of social exclusion. The biggest problem for widows trying to support themselves and their children is the fact that even if they do manage to find some source of income, an almost insurmountable feat in itself, people in their communities often assume that this money must have come from prostitution.

2.5 Socio-economic impacts of armed violence

The disruption of economic activity through either direct attacks by armed groups and/or the state security sector (in the case of armed violent conflict) or through the general climate of insecurity and fear (in all of the case studies) has had a number of (almost entirely) negative impacts on the economy and society, which tends to confirm the findings of other studies.²⁴

2.5.1 Macro-economic impacts

In all of the case studies, armed violence was an overall drain on the economy. The overall cost of the conflict in Nepal has been estimated by the World Bank at around US\$300 million²⁵; and it has been estimated that the Government of Sudan was at one time (during the 1990s) spending US\$1 million a day on the war. (See Appendix 4 for figures on military and social expenditures across the case studies.) In the cases of violent armed criminality, the negative impacts on macro economic performance were largely due to the indirect impact of the climate of insecurity. Figures for 2002 show that Brazil spent 10 per cent of its GDP on combating criminal violence²⁶; the 1997 figure for El Salvador is a staggering 25 per cent of GDP. Brazil expressed concerns in 2004 about the impact of the climate of insecurity on tourism. Perception of violence and insecurity as a result of crime in Nairobi and ethnic conflicts in other parts of Kenya in the 1990s contributed to a loss of tourists up to 2002, since when there has been some recovery as it is perceived that security is improving. Nepal and Sri Lanka also experienced a negative impact on tourism.

²⁴ Particularly the study by F. Stewart, *et al.*, 2001, which remains one of the few systematic analyses of the macro-economic impact of civil wars.

²⁵ According to sagenepal@hotmail.com, 20 May 2002.

²⁶ The figures for 1995 were 5 per cent, representing a two-fold increase in just seven years.

In all of the case studies, the general climate of insecurity deterred investment and generally disrupted socio-economic activity. Insecurity, for example, is central to the abandonment of large farmlands in Benue, Nigeria, a state considered to be the “food basket” of Nigeria. This has implications for Nigerian food security. In Somalia, large amounts of capital, labour and agricultural land remain underutilised because of insecurity. In many of the case studies, the impact of insecurity contributed to the decline of business confidence and the flight of capital. For example, in Nagaland, Northeast India, a recent study showed that the private sector does not fully invest its profit back into the country but diverts it to businesses elsewhere as a fall-back if violence increases. Such direct impacts on business can also be seen in the Delta region of Nigeria where the incessant armed maritime attacks, which disrupt local fishing and water-based businesses, has put Nigeria in the unenviable position of being third in the world for maritime insecurity. The Nigerian government has estimated that Nigeria has lost US\$2 billion to the bunkering activities of sea pirates in the Delta region.²⁷

Economic growth was almost always negatively affected (to varying extents), in all of the case studies. In Sierra Leone, declines in economic performance can be directly traced to periods where armed violence was at its height and to specific conflict incidents, such as when the RUF seized mines in 1995 and again when it invaded Freetown in January 1999. SALW-armed combatants were able to close down or divert production in diamond mining areas which led directly to economic growth plummeting in Sierra Leone. In the case of Chechnya, the destruction of oil wells, processing infrastructure and pipelines has sharply reduced oil production and related activities, which has created a dismal economic situation.

The shrinkage of economic activities and its knock-on effects had, in many of the case studies, significant impoverishing impacts on large sections of the population. In situations of armed violent conflict, consumption and GDP per head invariably fall. In Somalia, for example, annual GDP per capita dropped in the period of civil strife from US\$280 in 1989 to US\$226 in 2002.²⁸ In countries which suffered massive displacement and the destruction of lives and properties due to armed violent conflict (such as Sierra Leone, Somalia and Nigeria), this limited the ability of people to earn a living and thus save and invest. In Sierra Leone, figures for 1999 show an estimated 70 per cent of the population were unemployed, of which 55 per cent were youth, and the majority of industry was closed down.²⁹ While in Chechnya, unemployment from 2002 to 2004 was between 85 per cent and 90 per cent.³⁰

2.5.2 Diminished social expenditure and increased social needs

In the majority of the case studies, the heavy financial cost of armed violence meant that the share of government expenditure going to the security sector invariably rose, and public provision of social services fell (see Appendix 5). In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for instance, investment in security is twice that of education, five times that of health,

²⁷ *Vanguard*: Lagos, 9 March 2005.

²⁸ UNDP, 2002.

²⁹ ILO, February 2000, p.1.

³⁰ “Russian Federation: Limited Income Sources for Most Households in Chechnya (2002),” *Global IDP Database*, 2004.

and 50 times that of housing.³¹ In a country where one of the major causes of armed violence is linked to social exclusion, lack of investment in social services is likely to exacerbate tensions.

One exception to this trend was Sri Lanka, which in the 1990s maintained more or less the same social expenditure levels at almost 10 per cent of the national budget, although military expenditure did increase to a peak of 17 per cent by 2000. Sri Lanka, however, already had higher levels of per capita GDP than most developing countries, a history of pro-poverty programmes, and its export industries were based in areas not subject to armed violence. In addition, the UNDP Human Development Report 2003, reports that there was an unequal distribution of social expenditure between Tamil and Sinhalese areas.

In all of the case studies, the impact of armed violence on the provision of social and public services was negative. In the cases of armed violent conflict, wholesale destruction of medical facilities and schools are likely to have a long-term impact, particularly on the poor and vulnerable who are more dependent on state provision. Two decades of armed violent conflict in Sudan has meant that several generations have grown up with little or no access to formal education. In Assam, Northeast India, public health centres have been abandoned in the areas affected by inter-ethnic violence. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, it is estimated that 50 per cent of health facilities were lost due to armed rebels deliberately destroying them and displacing staff as part of their strategy to create chaos and undermine the state.³²

The financial costs of rebuilding these facilities are huge. However, the health costs, in particular, are incalculable. Severely diminished medical facilities in the most violence-prone areas will be called upon to cope with health demands heightened by the violence itself. Casualties have to be treated as long as the armed violence persists; however, these also leave a legacy. Large numbers of disabled people, particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, where there has been deliberate maiming, will require long-term medical treatment as well as livelihood support. Evidence shows how armed violence may be associated with the intensification of malaria, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other illness, and an increase in infant and adult mortality rates (particularly, among our cases, in Sudan, Somalia and Nepal).³³ As a result of destroyed facilities, reduced expenditure and the increased burden on medical services, many of the most vulnerable sectors of these societies – the weak, aged and young – are likely to die of largely treatable illnesses.

2.5.3 Trade, exports and exchange

Trade, exports and exchange were invariably affected. In all of the case studies dealing with armed violent conflict, supplies and transportation were severely disrupted. In the case of Sierra Leone, for instance, a tactic of the RUF was to surround key towns and enforce a siege, making normal patterns of trade impossible. Fewer lorries are now transporting goods than before the conflict. Armed violent conflict in the Upper Nile throughout 1999 rendered important markets inaccessible to families in Bahr el Ghazal. Such loss of trade has severe impacts on livelihood

³¹ *O Globo* (13/04/02).

³² World Bank, 22 January 2003, p.5.

³³ World Bank, 2003.

strategies. On occasions, such as in Sierra Leone and Somalia, regional trading patterns were altered as alternative avenues for trade were sought. In the majority of the case studies, loss of trade and access to markets negatively impacted on people's livelihoods.

Assumptions that people retreat into producing their own subsistence when their normal production for sale is disrupted, is contradicted by some of our evidence. Some livestock areas of Somalia, for example, have moved more into formal exchange rather than barter of animals and have become more reliant on purchased food rather than livestock as subsistence.

2.5.4 Loss/depletion of livelihoods

In all of the case studies there has been a decline in the livelihoods of the majority of households, especially in rural areas. In Northern Kenya, Southern Sudan, Somalia, Algeria and Sierra Leone, armed violent conflict has had a massive impact on the rural asset base and on other factors of production in agriculture. Access to arable land has been lost by removals, appropriation, land-mines or despoliation; livestock, implements, and seeds have been lost, stolen or sold off to survive; and irrigation systems have been destroyed or neglected. In these, and other countries, there have been knock-on effects on agriculture from curtailed trade and mobility and other impacts listed in the sub-sections above. The Director-General of FAO (Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN) recently gave a dramatic estimate of the massive scale of these impacts, suggesting that the net loss to agricultural production attributable to armed violence in Africa from 1970 to 1997 was US\$25 billion – equivalent to 75 per cent of all aid in that period.³⁴

The proliferation of SALW associated with livestock raiding in Northern Kenya has accelerated impoverishment and is now more devastating an impact than drought. In southern Turkana the size of many household herds has diminished to the point of material insignificance, forcing a shift away from a livestock-based existence towards a greater dependence on earning cash in a context where there are few alternative sources of income generation. Loss of livestock is also a major problem for many households in Southern Sudan: in Bahr el Ghazal, an estimated 40 per cent of households have lost all of their animals; and in Ruweng County in Upper Nile the herds of the traditionally pastoralist Ngok Dinka were reduced by 75 per cent during the Nuer raids of 1996 and 1997 forcing many households to switch to purely agricultural activities. In Somalia, the overall climate of insecurity and the political economy associated with that insecurity has had a massive impact on incomes and livelihoods in the most productive agricultural areas, while drier, pastoral areas have suffered less severely.

In Somalia, there is a direct correlation between poverty and persistent armed violence: of its 18 regions, the eight with incomes lower than the national average are all insecure areas of the centre-south of the country. These regions also have higher rates of malnutrition and higher levels of infant and child mortality. However, the loss of livestock assets is not universal; herders in more secure areas have more livestock. In Sierra Leone and parts of Nigeria agricultural activities have been severely

³⁴ Jacques Diouf, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Dec 2004

disrupted as a result of looting of crops, the destruction of agricultural tools and rural infrastructure by armed groups and soldiers, and the forced abandonment of land by farmers fleeing to more secure areas. In the case of Sierra Leone, production of rice, the main food staple in the pre-war period, fell drastically, accounting for only 20 per cent of pre-war levels. Agricultural production did, however, continue in some areas where the RUF was dependent on local communities for food supplies, and in some areas held by the Civil Defence Force (CDF) where agriculture was maintained to feed both fighters and civilians.

2.5.5 Restrictions on mobility

Restrictions on mobility have had a major – if indirect – impact on people’s lives and livelihoods in all of the case study areas. In Northern Kenya, insecurity in Turkana has had a highly negative impact on the mobility of livestock and access to some of the best grazing lands. This is most acute in drought years, and can have a devastating impact on livestock productivity and mortality. Access to livestock markets is equally disrupted by insecurity, with the consequence that pastoralists have to sell at much reduced prices, often to itinerant traders. In Nepal the establishment of checkpoints by the authorities and the destruction of bridges by Maoists have had a significant impact on transport and trade and people’s mobility, increasing the time spent going to markets in some instances from about half an hour on foot to a three-day hike.

Box 4: Livelihood assets in Nepal

In Nepal, the direct impact of the conflict on livelihoods is differentiated across groups in large part according to their position vis-à-vis the rebel Maoist’s People’s War strategy. Initially, there were instances of village landowners being attacked, but these became less common in subsequent years. There has been relatively little attempt to introduce land reform or land redistribution in the areas under Maoist control. However, moneylenders and rural banks have been targeted. In one area, Rolpas, the Maoists established a rural cooperative bank which offers loans at low rates; moneylenders have also been forced to moderate their terms and conditions, as well as writing off debts. In addition, the Maoists have tried to control corruption, bribery and patronage in local level institutions under their control; and black marketers have been punished. In this case, therefore, the poor (and women) have generally experienced a reduction in exploitation and oppression, as a result of pressure from the Maoists and the disruption of traditional village social practices. However, this should be balanced against the extreme fear and uncertainty that exists, the increase in female-headed households and the impact of infrastructure projects delayed or stopped because of fear of Maoist attacks.

The siege of towns (such as Bo Town in Sierra Leone and Ruweng in southern Sudan) by rebels and/or militias cut town populations off from trade with neighbouring areas preventing people from accessing food and other essential supplies, and denying farmers of a market for their produce. Elsewhere, for example in Northeast India, fear of rape by security forces has forced women to reduce the time they work outside of the home to daylight hours. Similarly, in El Salvador and Nairobi the overall climate of insecurity resulting from random criminal violence and highly visible gang activity has severely hampered people’s mobility.

2.5.6 Survival and coping strategies

In all of the case studies dealing with armed violent conflict, displacement was one method of survival in the face of direct violence, which had direct and in some cases long-term poverty implications for the displaced (see section 2.2). The many individuals and families that remained within their communities experienced a depletion of livelihood assets and restrictions on mobility, and were forced to use survival and coping strategies. However, on occasion, these strategies have themselves been undermined. In several countries, the poor were no longer able to count on support from kin or neighbours. In Northern Kenya, for example, diminishing herd sizes and increasing impoverishment among the Turkana has undermined traditional relations of reciprocity and thus one important traditional survival strategy. People interviewed in Turkana claim that it is now more difficult to rebuild herds through borrowing and receiving gifts of livestock from stock associates. The depletion of herds and the breakdown of these relations of reciprocity have forced many households to diversify their activities. However, diversification is a transition that appears to burden women in particular (see section 2.4.3).

Some of the other survival strategies employed included joining militia groups, prostitution, or criminal activities. In Chechnya, for example, many young men, faced with high levels of unemployment, have joined the militants in order to survive; others have become involved in illegal activities, such as drug trafficking. In Sierra Leone, women, girls, and boys have been forced into prostitution in order to ensure their short-term survival, with the concomitant risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The development of an illicit economy was common across all of the case studies, for some being involved in illicit activities was a necessary tactic for survival, for others it allowed their enrichment at the expense of the many.

2.5.7 The political economy of armed violence

All the case studies reveal new or transformed economic activities and linkages. In the absence of state capacity to curb these activities, armed groups and armed criminals use the opportunity to engage in illicit activities. Such economic activities are commonly dependent on the use, or threat of use, of arms. The specific forms found in the case studies are summarised in Box 5, which also underlines the extent of these activities. These indicate the many warlords, political operators, arms traders, drug dealers and other “businessmen”, plus international businesses who stand to gain from this kind of political economy and who may have a stake in reinforcing the armed violence situation. In Sierra Leone, for example, control of the diamond fields became a key strategic objective of the conflict. “Conflict minerals” or other natural resources such as timber are at the root of illicit trade in several other countries. Fund raising through drug trafficking was also evident in Northeast India and Chechnya. “Taxation” of businesses and households was evident in many of the case studies: Sri Lanka, Northeast India, Algeria and Nepal; while hostage-taking with a view to extracting ransom emerged as another source of enrichment in Nigeria, Northeast India and Chechnya. In these cases, combatants enriched themselves through the power of the gun by seizing government and private assets.

In several of the violent organised crime case studies it also emerged that, even where violence appeared random and individual, it was, in fact, highly organized; it becomes a “business”. In Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the rise in armed criminality is mainly due to the growth of criminal organizations associated with the illegal commerce of drugs and firearms. Similarly, in El Salvador, the emergence of youth gangs is intricately linked to the drug trade and organized crime. In Nairobi armed gangs are linked up in large syndicates, and, in turn, with commercial networks that dispose of the vehicles they car-jack and other booty. In Nairobi and in Northern Kenya (as in other countries), these groups are networked into political channels, thereby receiving some political protection.

Box 5: The political economy of armed violence

Country	Political economy of armed violence
N. Kenya	Commercialisation of cattle raiding; involvement of businessmen and politicians. Corruption within local government.
Nairobi	Violent organised crime by gangs with links to groups in business or politics. Extortion, “tithes” on buses, roadblocks.
S. Sudan	Militias looted livestock and were involved in slave trading. Judiciary and civil authorities implicated. Corruption at state level.
Somalia	Almost all of the economy is “informal”. Trade in weapons. Regional trade in the narcotic, <i>khat</i> .
Nepal	“Taxation” of areas under Maoist control. “Fundraising” from bureaucrats, teachers and local businesses.
Sri Lanka	Some parts of the LTTE territory criminalised and controlled by budding landlords. “Taxation” of areas under LTTE control. Extortion, kidnapping.
Northeast India	Gun-running, drug trafficking. Well-established links between insurgent groups and local politicians. “Taxation” of areas under rebel control. Extortion, abductions.
Rio	Criminal organisations and gangs associated with illegal commerce of drugs and firearms.
El Salvador	Drug trade and links with organised crime. Youth gangs. Petty criminality.
Chechnya	Drug smuggling and extortion, particularly at checkpoints. Underground “oil” economy (i.e. small-scale refineries).
Sierra Leone	Combatants depended on diamonds; armed robbery, including roadblocks; and looting.
Nigeria	Armed criminality transformed into organised banditry, piracy, extortion of so-called “taxes” from civilians at roadblocks; protection money paid to vigilantes; bunkering and hostage taking.
Algeria	Roadblocks, extortion, arms and drug smuggling. Local mafia.

Most of these criminal economic activities are of a nature that impoverishes or bypasses the many while benefiting the few. In Sudan, the “cleansing” of communities to give government control over the oil-fields lead to massive displacement and induced famine. The trafficking in people that has occurred targeted the poor and condemned many to social exclusion. The commercialisation of livestock associated with the increased scale of rustling in Northern Kenya and Somalia meant that some locals and officials accumulated on a significant scale, but mainly at the expense of poorer households and of the pastoral economy generally.

In many situations the poor may become dependent as clients of the new political entrepreneurs who emerge in these political economies of armed violence. For example, the businessmen and politicians behind the cattle raiding in Northern Kenya operate through local agents who recruit young men for whom there are limited economic opportunities. The mobilisation of unemployed youth is also evident in Nigeria where political elites utilise the pool of unemployed youth to intimidate electorates and disrupt campaigns, thus indicating a close connection between political competition, especially elections, and armed violence.

In many of the case studies it was found that there has been a substantial criminalization of politics. State corruption was a significant factor in many of the cases, both as a trigger of armed violence and as an obstacle to an ending to it. For example, in Northeast India there is overwhelming evidence of a complex web of collusion between insurgent groups and various political parties and politicians, and in Nairobi criminal acts are carried out by organized gangs with links to groups in business and/or politics.

2.5.8 Counterinsurgency operations and the climate of impunity

In all of the case studies there was a general problem of a climate of fear. Outright state brutality was evident in a number of cases. On occasions this has helped fuel armed violence. For example, the Sudanese government’s well-documented scorched-earth policy in the areas surrounding the oil fields in Western Upper Nile and around the planned oil pipeline. In a number of the case studies, heavy-handed counter-insurgency operations have deepened insecurity and helped create a culture of impunity. In the case of Nepal, the government’s all-out assault on the Maoist rebellion since 2001 has increased the intensity of the violence. This is also the case in Northeast India and Chechnya, where Government of India forces and Russian forces, respectively, have been accused of excessive use of force and human rights abuses with little or no legal protection for civilians. The state security service in Nigeria sometimes use their legal possession of SALW to instil fear and secure compliance with extra-legal demands, not least the collection of illegal taxes (*kola*) at check-points and for extra-judicial arrests. In Rio and El Salvador, the police are one of the sources of violence, and while changes are afoot (including attempts at community policing), the police continue to be feared by many people. In El Salvador, as elsewhere, continuing impunity and violence have contributed to the erosion of democratic expectations.

In all of these cases, abductions, “disappearances”, extra-judicial killings, torture and rape, reflect a situation where the official forces of law and order are no longer reliably such. In Southern Sudan, a vicious cycle was created whereby the increased

availability of arms in civilian hands fuelled widespread lawlessness and disorder. Local conflicts quickly spiralled out of control and thieves and looters committed crimes without an effective deterrent. Exposure to high levels of violence, armed or otherwise, in turn, transmits a culture of violence and impunity to the next generation.³⁵ In Colombia, two out of three displaced children have witnessed the murder or attempted murder of a family member.³⁶ The impact of such exposure to violence can be seen in Sierra Leone where community organisations speak of an increase in youth violence and the propensity of young people to use violence to settle disputes. Armed violence in Nairobi is carried out with a new degree of impunity and an indifference to hurting people – a result, in turn, of the corruption in the police, security services and the judiciary. This climate of insecurity and fear of violence has helped to fuel a growing private security sector.

2.5.9 Private security and vigilante groups

Armed violence and the resulting climate of insecurity have led many communities, particularly in urban settings, to employ private security companies and/or rely on armed groups for protection. In El Salvador, for example, there are currently 70,000 private security agents in operation, whereas the National Civil Police has an active force of only 20,000 officers.³⁷ However, here, as in Nigeria, it is the wealthier sections of society who have been able to fortify their properties while the poor have been left vulnerable to robbery. In the case of Nigeria, poor communities have turned to vigilante groups for protection: it was estimated in 2001 that 487 vigilante volunteers were engaged in Kaduna city, covering 4,386 houses. In Nairobi, where both security firms and vigilantes operate, security firms are the largest employment sector.³⁸

In virtually all of the situations of armed violent conflict, armed criminality flourished under cover of the chaos and breakdown in social order. In Sierra Leone, for example, many individuals lost their homes and possessions through armed robbery, while in Southern Sudan and Somalia widespread looting and destruction had a devastating impact on livelihoods. The breakdown of law and order reinforced the desire of the wider population to possess a gun for protection. In El Salvador, for example, in a UNDP survey, 92 per cent of respondents who possessed SALW said that it was for protection for themselves and their families.³⁹

2.5.10 Impacts on family structures

In many of the case studies it was found that armed violence has had some fundamental, long-term, indirect impacts which are reshaping whole societies and communities. In particular, we found that armed violence has changed family membership patterns. Many of our cases reported significant increases in the number of women-headed households (see section 2.4.4); and in some extreme cases, such as Rwanda, we see the emergence of child-headed households. Many families in countries affected by armed violent conflict and violent organised criminality cannot,

³⁵ Boyden *et al*, 2002, p.33-34.

³⁶ Stohl *et al* 1999, p.11.

³⁷ Melara, 2001.

³⁸ Ebo, A., 2003, p.20.

³⁹ PNUD/UNDP, 2003, p.133.

therefore, rely on two adult livelihood earners and are denied the role model and contribution of adult males. The impoverishing effects of these changes in family structure are considerable, such as restricted access to land, unemployment and social exclusion.

2.5.11 Impact on social capital

Social capital refers to those networks and norms that provide cohesion and mutual cooperation in society. This can be both positive (such as inclusive support networks, civil society organisations, and traditional means of conflict resolution) and negative (such as traditional gender and generational hierarchies, and community spirit organised around violence, e.g. “gang culture”). Social capital can be a mechanism for maintaining order within and between communities, which has the potential for managing violence; or mechanisms for mutual help, which can contribute to “coping strategies” in emergency. In most situations of armed violence, these mechanisms have received major disruption. Prolonged armed violence promotes a change in basic attitudes – to neighbours, to other communities and ethnic and religious groups – most clearly seen in an erosion of trust. In all of the case studies armed violence has disrupted social capital. This has an impact on poverty in a number of ways. The norms whereby kin or community members provided the means to survive in emergencies have generally been weakened, although still survive in some instances (see section 2.5.6).

Traditional means of governance and conflict resolution were damaged in Northern Kenya and Sierra Leone. In the case of Northern Kenya, the upsurge in armed violence and cattle raiding has merely served to accelerate a process going on for several decades. While in Sierra Leone, the inequities and rigidities of the traditional chieftdom system was partly to blame for youth discontent, and a major factor in the conflict, thus creating an uneasy stand off between tradition and new ideas in the (re)creation of social capital in the post-conflict era. The undermining of elders’ traditional authority as a mechanism of social control of young men was a common finding among the case studies. This loss of control seems particularly hard to reverse. In Somalia, there was traditionally a hierarchy of mechanisms from the clan level down to the group that took on communal responsibility for paying *dia* (blood money). In many areas, but not all, such payment of recompense and other procedures have fallen by the wayside.

In some of the case studies, fear of armed reprisal worked to destroy familial and neighbourly relations. In Nepal, for example, the spontaneity with which people used to help those in trouble appears to be vanishing because of a fear of being victimised by either the Maoists or the state security forces. And the general climate of fear and insecurity has hampered participation in local community politics in El Salvador – in a community in Soyapango, meetings had to be held outside the area because of death threats. Some of these impacts are immediately reversible upon a decline in armed violence. In Southern Sudan, for example, community-based organisations and women and youth groups have flourished in the presence of relative security. However, in situations where the armed violence has been fractured along ethnic or religious lines, relations between these groups have declined as they retreat into themselves. Peaceful coexistence and socio-economic ties between different ethnic,

religious and communal groups in parts of Nigeria, for example, has given way to bitter armed confrontation in some areas.

Nevertheless, on occasion, the experience of armed violence prompted a community spirit to ensure community security, build peace and provide support for those in need. This was evident in Northern Kenya (see Box 6 below) and Northeast India. In both Manipur and Nagaland, Northeast India, vibrant women's movements campaign against army atrocities as well as awareness campaigns for women to protect themselves against crime and violence. However, in Sierra Leone, as indeed for many of the case studies, trust between neighbours was undermined by high levels of insecurity in places such as Freetown. In Sierra Leone, this has the potential to hamper recovery.

Box 6: Armed violence and social capital in northern Kenya

Wajir in north-east Kenya demonstrates how social capital has been organised very effectively to build peace through the Wajir Peace and Development Committee. This is regarded as one of the most successful examples of a community-led peace initiative. Another, but different, community response to armed violence is evident in Turkana. As insecurity intensified in the early 1980s, the Turkana responded by creating *arumrums* – large residential units and grazing associations that comprise up to several hundred families. These have multiplied across southern Turkana in response to escalating armed violence in key grazing environments. Besides providing safety in numbers, *arumrums* have clear leadership structures, homeguards and collective decision-making. One condition of membership, however, is ownership of a gun. Interviewed Turkana emphasised the importance of social networks for protection and defence.

2.5.12 “Peace dividends”

The case studies where armed violent conflict has been substantially reduced offer some positive findings. Notably in Southern Sudan, the Wunlit peace covenant, which resolved fighting between the major tribal communities of the Nuer and the Dinka, had immediate effects: cross-border cattle rustling declined dramatically; internal and cross-border regional trade resumed; the relative security allowed for surplus grain production; hundreds of displaced returned to their old homes; several abducted women and children were returned; and Nuer fleeing from government bombardment around the oil areas even sought refuge in Dinka lands. The benefits of security to the livestock economy are also evident through the actions of local peace and development committees in north-east Kenya, and the decline of armed violence in Somaliland and other peaceful regions of Somalia.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the end to the 20-year conflict has brought about a spontaneous return of displaced Tamils to the north and east and a building boom in those areas (although some of these have been devastated by the recent tsunami). These provide examples of immediate, almost automatic reversal of some of the negative impacts of armed violence. However, this is not true for all of the case studies where the reversal is not automatic and may require some active intervention. In Sierra Leone, for example, although the improved security situation has stopped the

killings and the experience of armed violence has triggered a revulsion against SALW, there has not yet been a recovery of the production of the main staple food, rice, and in fact many civilians have become poorer.

Section 3: The case studies

Brief summaries of findings from the 13 case studies are presented below. These allow a fuller picture of the range of consequences of armed violence, and the possibility to see these in context. They allow us, in Section 4, to look at whether some circumstances have a greater (or less) impact on poverty and development, which in turn holds implications for the policy and programme recommendations in Section 5.

Nine of the countries studied are in three regions. These regions help to shape the patterns of armed violence in the individual country:

- *Eastern Africa*: Somalia, (Southern) Sudan, Kenya (Nairobi and Northern Kenya)
- *South Asia*: Nepal, Northeast India, Sri Lanka.
- *West Africa*: Sierra Leone, Nigeria

The remaining four cases are presented on their own – not because their regional contexts are insignificant but simply because they were isolated cases in our study.

3.1 East Africa

The “region” to which our case study countries Somalia and Sudan belong, is often referred to as the “Horn of Africa”, which is a geographically defined area generally taken to also include Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Sometimes the definition of “region” is widened to include Kenya and Uganda, as these seven countries are members of the Inter Governmental Agency for Development region (IGAD). In the past decade, it has also become common, especially in reference to international politics and violent conflict, to refer to the “Greater Horn of Africa”, which also embraces the troubled countries of the African Great Lakes – Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Whatever definition is used, this is a region in which armed violence is widespread and it is seemingly endemic. The only two wars between independent African states have taken place in the Horn (Ethiopia-Somalia in the 1970s; Eritrea-Ethiopia, 1998-2000). All but one of the countries of the Greater Horn have experienced civil wars or major risings against the state, and their present regimes have come to power “through the barrel of the gun” in one sense or other. The exception, Kenya, has been prey to armed violence on a significant scale, as our Northern Kenya and Nairobi cases show, even if this has not challenged central political power. But the livestock rustling analysed in the Kenya case study below has a cross-border spread involving pastoralists in the nearby areas of Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Not surprisingly these various armed violence situations infect each other. Refugees flee across borders. Rebels retreat across them for sanctuary. Clashes between and among ethnic groups have cross-border dimensions. The region is awash with weapons. There is an extensive network of regional trade with links to the wider world. Somalia is presently a hub for much of this, but at other times other countries have been central. For over 30 years arms have been supplied on the direct initiative of governments to groups engaged in armed struggle in neighbouring countries.

Governments' provision of tit-for-tat logistical and political support as well as SALW to their neighbour's rebels has become entrenched in a pattern of "mutual intervention".⁴⁰ Past Ethiopian governments fully supported Somali movements that brought down the former Somali regime, and then continued their wars against each other, while opposition movements in the Somali regions of Ethiopia (as well as the Eritrean and Tigray liberation movements) received backing from Somalia. In the past, Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea have supported the SPLA against the Sudan government; Eritrea continues to do so. The long drawn-out peace negotiations in Somalia in the past two years have seemed on the point of foundering amidst claims that neighbours are taking sides. Eritrea and Ethiopia, after their war, were accused of fighting a "proxy war" in Somalia.

Linked by patterns of armed violence, the region has united in peace efforts. In the mid-1990s IGAD, originally an organisation for regional economic cooperation, especially with regard to famine, declared that armed violence was as much the cause of famine as drought. It therefore developed a peace-building and armed violence reduction capability. It can claim the near success of an extended negotiation process in Sudan and Somalia. It has also been developing a "conflict prevention, management and resolution" programme. These include a conflict early warning and response structure that has thus far concentrated on the fighting between pastoralists in four cross-border zones.

All four case studies presented in this section have a complex array of regional linkages – in terms of aggravation of armed violent conflicts, in the spread of SALW, in the escalation of criminal armed violence, and in complicating peace-making and armed violence reduction initiatives.

3.1.1 Somalia⁴¹

Somalia represents an extreme case. It has experienced a long period of insecurity and instability, and its people have been subject to a wide range of armed violence. Following the overthrow of the military regime in 1991, it has experienced the longest period without a state structure or institutions of any country in modern history. A period of intense armed conflict for power between factions based around the clans that make up Somali society eventually gave way to an unresolved stalemate in the capital and the south-central areas. Fighting between smaller militia groups who preyed on the population has continued in most of these areas. In the north-east and north-west, a degree of security was slowly negotiated – these areas have enjoyed relative stability and the state-type administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively, which offer examples of control of SALW and armed violence. The case thus allows for analysis of several stages and types of armed violence and of the context of the lack of a functioning state, but also comparison of the different processes at work in areas of much greater or lesser armed violence and impoverishment.

⁴⁰ Cliffe, 1999.

⁴¹ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Somalia" by Lionel Cliffe. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

The context of armed violence

The Republic of Somalia that came into being in 1960 has been subject to intense armed violence for most of its existence (and before). It has experienced military coups, inter-state war, insurgencies, civil war and “institutionalised disorder”, and insecurity. Likewise SALW, as well as heavy weapons, have been widely spread since colonial times, supplied by Cold War powers, neighbouring governments and an active illegal market.

The contending parties in the period of crisis since the demise of the state in 1991 have been:

- Factional militias, mainly clan-based,
- Business militias,
- Private security guards,
- Freelance armed groups (*mooryan*).

The main problem with SALW is their spread to “civilians”. In reality, it is their possession by these armed groups that represents a threat now and to a future peace. Without alternative livelihoods there would appear to be no solution. However, the juxtaposition of critically insecure with stable regions, which were also awash with SALW, demonstrates that their availability alone is not a single explanatory “cause” of impoverishment.

Even without a functioning state, Somali society and culture has a varied set of institutions and norms for reducing armed violence and resolving conflict. For the most part these were not sufficient to hold the recent violent conflicts at bay and the structures themselves have been further eroded and distorted in the process. Nevertheless, they have been an important mechanism for building security and reducing armed violence in the stable regions – far more successful than the 14 formal peace conferences sponsored by external powers.

Impacts of armed violence

Somali culture imposes strict taboos against violence on women and children. Although this may have limited their being targeted it has not prevented it. The tradition of women marrying out of their clan or sub-clan to help build bridges in resolving conflict has also been eroded, although women have been active in peace-making. The long period of instability has spawned its own war economy characterised initially by seizure of public assets, then by extortion, hijacking, piracy, protection rackets, including those directed at NGOs and relief operations, seizure of land and property and trade in the local narcotic, *khat*. Some have enriched themselves at the expense of the impoverishment of the many and have a vested interest in insecurity.

However, new enterprise in livestock trading, simple but hi-tech telecommunications and private airlines have been developed by businessmen with an interest in promoting peace. Some analysts have pointed to economic growth in such areas but these have been confined to the more stable areas, to those with the resources, and have left out or forced others into impoverishment. The result at the macro-economic level has been to reverse the patterns of regional differentiation, with poorly-endowed pastoral areas in the north now having higher income levels than formerly better-off

areas, especially the main agricultural areas in the South. This is a dramatic demonstration of the impact of armed violence on poverty.

The most direct impoverishment has been experienced by the refugees in neighbouring countries and especially by the internally displaced, together estimated at 800,000. They live in unsanitary and inadequate housing with little access to clean water, health care or education, and most are among the “very poor” in surveys. The proportion of their households headed by women is even higher than among the ordinary population, where it has grown significantly in the period of insecurity. Women’s lives have also been changed by the trend against marrying outside the clan. Communities have become more inward-looking as they seek loyalty.

The overall climate of insecurity and the political economy associated with that insecurity have had massive indirect impacts on incomes and livelihoods. The most productive agricultural areas have been hardest hit through contests over land and destruction of irrigation works, but pastoralism has also been limited in access to grazing, in some areas by increased competition for scarce resources and limited access to markets. One measure of these impacts is that GDP per capita has fallen from US\$280 in 1989 to US\$226 in 2002. However, regional differences again correlate with the levels of armed violence, with all the regions of Somaliland and Puntland being above the national average. Health and educational provision and literacy levels have similarly fallen, with a partial recovery in the past few years as a result of private provision, which places it beyond the means of the poorest, and of NGO services.

Somalia stands poised today at the start of a long negotiated peace process with all contending factions now accepting a new government-in-formation. All agree that disarmament is one of the greatest needs, but also potentially the most complex issue in the transition. Realists believe that it may be possible to get agreements between major factions to decommission heavy weapons such as the mounted guns called “technicals”, but that dependence on SALW for livelihoods and protection and the widespread lack of trust will mean general small arms disarmament may have to be approached gradually. However, lessons on disarmament and on building community-based security networks can be learned from the experience of Somaliland and Puntland. These issues are related to, and will have to be planned in conjunction with, the massive problem of providing alternative livelihoods for armed young males.

3.1.2 Southern Sudan⁴²

Southern Sudan has experienced prolonged civil war, with the second on-going phase beginning in 1983. There are two conflicts: one is north-south, between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the southern opposition primarily led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A); and a second conflict, which is south-south, between factions of the southern rebel movement who have fought each other for leadership of the southern cause and for control over territory and access to resources. The GoS has fuelled the south-south conflict through its effective strategy of counter-insurgency. The GoS has supported southern and Arab militias, not least with weapons, in order to fight the war “by proxy”. Both sides have armed the

⁴² This is an executive summary of a longer report “Armed violence and poverty in Southern Sudan” by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Regina Burns Mackenzie. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

population of southern Sudan. Civilians have been deliberately targeted in the war, with the widespread destruction of assets and of livelihoods. This has had a hugely impoverishing effect on a population of over seven million.

Differential impacts of armed violence

Three areas of southern Sudan demonstrate the differential impact of armed violence. The first is Bahr el Ghazal, particularly the Lakes sub-region. Bahr el Ghazal has mostly suffered from north-south conflict, although there has been politicised inter-ethnic fighting between the Nuer and Dinka tribes since 1991. The SPLA has provided rudimentary governance. In comparison, Upper Nile, the second area, has suffered from much more severe inter-ethnic, inter-factional fighting and a “scorched earth” policy by the GoS in the oil-producing areas. There is virtually no system of governance. It is one of the worst-affected parts of southern Sudan, and recovery has been much slower than elsewhere since the cessation of hostilities over two years ago. The third area, covered by the 1999 Wunlit peace agreement, provides lessons from an important local level, peace-building initiative. These comparisons underline the importance of understanding the underlying dynamics of conflict in order to analyse the specific impact of armed violence on poverty and development.

Local people assess the risk of violence from southern and Arab militias as greater than the risk of conventional warfare between the GoS and rebel movements. Some of the militias that have been armed – particularly the Arab *Murahilin* – have been driven by economic interest (or greed). The southern militias have been driven more by local and tribal grievances and by cattle raiding. All the militias have been rewarded by the seizure of assets from their looting, including livestock and people; a thriving slave trade has developed, afflicting large numbers of women and children.

In the words of one chief, “nowadays everyone has a gun”. For the majority of the population their motive for being armed is protection against this destructive form of counter-insurgency warfare, in the absence of security provided by either the GoS or the rebel movements. For some, especially young men, the motive has transformed into an offensive one as the barrel of the gun becomes the easiest way to accumulate wealth (usually through livestock) and to assert control over scarce resources.

Breakdown of tradition conflict resolution mechanisms

Years of war and the proliferation of small arms has led to the breakdown of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Killing, particularly of women and children, is no longer taboo. This shift in attitude is particularly associated with the years after the split in the SPLA in 1991 when inter- and intra-ethnic fighting escalated. Social capital has been both a casualty and perpetrator of conflict. One of the consequences of the counter-insurgency tactics has been the breakdown of traditional agreements and relationships between different ethnic groups that may previously have shared resources, enjoyed relationships of exchange and even inter-married. The backing and arming of certain groups has caused them to turn their guns against each other and has fuelled power struggles over natural resources such as grazing land. At the same time as groups have segregated, they have turned inwards for protection.

Impacts of armed violence

Two decades of civil war in southern Sudan have resulted in huge loss of life. In the field work for this case study, every interviewee from the Lakes and Upper Nile Regions recounted tales of loss of family members and of looted livestock. Abductions have had a similarly debilitating and traumatising impact. Slave raiding has been perpetrated by government-backed militia as a tool of war to terrorize the population. Women and children were abducted as forced labour or as a commodity to be traded in the north. The scale is disputed and unknown, but is substantial; some NGOs reckon up to 200,000 people have been enslaved.

War has also caused widespread displacement. Sudan now has more IDPs than any other country in the world. Displacement may be seasonal, often taking place during the dry season during the critical periods of planting and harvesting. For some, it has been a more or less continual state over many years. Fleeing from place to place makes it very difficult to re-establish livelihoods and to recover. IDPs are very vulnerable to banditry along the roads. When some have been able to return, especially after a long period, it is to find that their land has now been taken over and occupied by the SPLA. Whilst some host communities have absorbed IDPs well, in other areas it has fuelled tension, even conflict, where there has been competition for scarce resources. IDPs in northern Sudan have been exploited as a cheap and readily available source of labour.

War has had a devastating impact on livestock, the mainstay of the pastoralist and agro-pastoralist economies of the Lakes sub-region and Upper Nile, mainly through looting. In parts of Bahr el Ghazal, it was estimated that 40 per cent of households lost all their cattle.⁴³ Insecurity has limited access to vital grazing areas in the dry season to water points and to major markets only to further deplete livestock herds. Lack of milk is a major loss of sustenance during the “hunger gap”, especially for young children. Crop production has also been depressed by war-related violence through the destruction of crops and the displacement of labour. Fear of attack meant that some communities stopped cultivating.

The asset-stripping nature of the war has meant that the better-off are often more vulnerable to attack. This has a knock-on effect on poorer households if they can no longer rely on wealthier relatives for support or for labour. Displacement has also destroyed kinship support as families fleeing from conflict have become more spread out over large areas.

The war has been especially hard on Sudanese women. They now outnumber men by a significant margin, which means they must carry the burden of supporting all dependents. This involves a hugely increased workload. Yet, they do not have land rights. Widow-headed households have become some of the poorest in the region. In Yirol County, they represent 20-30 per cent of the “poorest” category of households and 15-25 per cent of the “poor” category.⁴⁴

One of the most devastating cases of the destruction of livelihoods, displacement and impoverishment on an appalling scale has happened in the areas surrounding the oil

⁴³ Deng 2003.

⁴⁴ WFP, Annual Needs Assessment, Yirol County, 2000-2001.

fields in western Upper Nile, as a result of the GoS's "scorched earth" policy. The policy was intended, it is alleged, to ensure that no one would ever return home so that oil exploration could proceed "unhindered".

At the meso level, the war has had a devastating impact on social infrastructure. Several generations have grown up with little or no access to formal education causing a knock-on lack of professional human capacity to build governance and the judicial system, for example. For years, in SPLA areas, development objectives were subordinated to military objectives. High and unregulated taxation to support the SPLA war effort was a further drain on already depleted household resources. Trade and exchange routes and relationships have also been disrupted by conflict, which can severely compromise coping strategies in times of stress when pastoralists would normally sell livestock to buy food and non-food items. Access to humanitarian relief, a life-saving resource for many, is unpredictable and frequently severed in the areas of greatest fighting. Insecurity has caused agencies to withdraw, sometimes when they are needed most, and denial of access has been a tool of war used with fatal consequences by the GoS.

This was never more evident than in the run-up to the Bahr el Ghazal famine in 1998. Asset depletion through looting (particularly by the destructive activities of the warlord Kerubino), SPLA attacks on towns causing massive displacement, and denial of access of humanitarian agencies by the GoS caused appalling famine marked by some of the highest mortality rates ever recorded. Within one decade there have been at least three serious famines in southern Sudan, all conflict-related, constituting the most extreme form of impoverishment and death.

The cost of the civil war on livelihoods in southern Sudan is attributed more to the destructive activities of southern militias than it is to direct attacks by the GoS army. As a result, areas of southern Sudan controlled by the SPLA have some of the worst human development indicators in the world, which are substantially lower than other parts of Sudan. For example, gross national income per capita is estimated to be less than US\$90 per year, about four times lower than income per capita in the rest of the country. Meanwhile, some have grown rich through a war economy that has flourished in the last two decades – warlords, government officials and politicians and some SPLA leaders. They have benefited from looting and other predatory means of acquiring assets.

Peace and recovery

The 1999 Wunlit Peace Covenant effectively ended seven and a half years of politicised inter-tribal fighting between the Dinka and the Nuer, which throws up some important lessons. It shows the importance of restoring trust in society to re-establish security and to mitigate the impoverishing impact of war, particularly destructive asset-stripping. However, the Wunlit experience also shows that communities can relapse into conflict when the underlying causes are not addressed, including external political influence, weak governance and rule of law.

Recovery programming must be integrated, combining investment in development (for example, in water, health and education) with investment in governance (for example, in the police, judiciary and protection). Failure to address the latter will almost certainly result in a waste of resources in the former. Yet, there is no point in

disarming before security is guaranteed and before local people trust the governance systems. Currently, the possession of weapons is regarded as an essential part of people's livelihood strategies to protect themselves.

In the short term, the international community must do all it can to support the peace agreement between the GoS and SPLM/A, including advocacy to end militia activity. It must also support local-level, people-to-people peace processes. In the longer term, the international community must invest in governance and strengthening the rule of law. Disarmament plans must be linked to longer-term rehabilitation and recovery only when sufficient trust has been built between local people and properly functioning governance systems.

3.1.3 Northern Kenya⁴⁵

The Northern Kenya case study is an example of armed violence in the periphery, in the remote, semi-arid northern districts of the country. The economy is principally dependent upon pastoralism, and armed violence is mostly associated with livestock raiding. The case study focuses on two contrasting districts of northern Kenya: Turkana in the north-west, which has endured a particularly intense couple of decades of armed violence; and Wajir in the north-east which, after a bloody history, has enjoyed something of a "peace dividend" in recent years, due to local peace-building efforts by the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC).

The context of armed violence

Although livestock raiding is an inherent feature of the pastoralist economy, it appears to have become increasingly violent since the early 1980s as small arms became more widely available. It is now associated with higher and less discriminate loss of human life and greater livestock losses. The conflict dynamics that fuel livestock raiding are complex and extend far beyond a simple "competition for scarce resources" model. The weakness of government, specifically of state security institutions, means that criminal activity can flourish, particularly in the form of "commercialised" livestock raiding. Instability has sometimes been encouraged for electoral purposes. The wider regional dynamics are also critical, as northern Kenya borders with Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, all of which have had, or are currently experiencing, violent civil wars. They are thus associated with lawlessness and the unchecked flow of small arms. The use of arms in northern Kenya has to be understood in this wider context.

There are three key reasons why pastoralists have been arming themselves:

- 1) To protect themselves against hostile groups;
- 2) To defend their animals against other armed pastoralist communities;
- 3) For offensive purposes, to steal livestock from other pastoralist communities.

There are deep-seated cultural values associated with cattle raiding, e.g., to prove that a young man is ready for manhood, and often to acquire the bride price which has been steadily increasing in recent years as poverty has deepened. Traditionally, elders oversaw raiding and there were established conflict resolution mechanisms, although raiding was still associated with loss of life. In many areas, these traditional means of governance have been weakened as young men have armed themselves and attained

⁴⁵ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Northern Kenya" by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Jeremy Lind. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

wealth through the barrel of the gun. Nevertheless, traditional leadership is still strong in Turkana. Wajir provides a very interesting example of local people taking the initiative to promote peace in the face of spiralling violence with the establishment of the WPDC in 1995. As livestock raiding has become commercialised, powerful and well-connected businessmen and politicians have become involved. Corruption and impunity are at the heart of this flourishing criminal activity. Unemployed young men, for whom there are limited economic opportunities, provide good recruits.

The impact of armed violence

Quantifying the impact of armed violence on poverty is difficult, not only because of problems of attribution, but also because of a lack of relevant time-series data. Nevertheless, we can safely conclude that armed violence has hastened the long-term decline of pastoralism in northern Kenya, which is directly associated with greater impoverishment. Most Turkana admit that they are poorer today than they were before the frequency of armed violence increased in the early 1980s. For example, in southern Turkana most households have lost animals to bandits at least once in the year. The size of many household herds has diminished to the point of material insignificance. In the absence of alternative economic opportunities, this creates irreversible conditions of poverty. Ironically, as asset bases are depleted, the need for cash to purchase food increases. Raided households have to engage in an increasing number of non-livestock work activities, the burden of which falls disproportionately on women. There has also been a rise in the number of women-headed households as men have been killed. In the worst-case scenario, when a household's entire herd is stolen, displacement and destitution quickly follow, especially if the raid affects the whole community.

Insecurity has a very negative impact on the mobility of livestock and access to some of the best grazing lands. This is most acute in drought years and can have a devastating impact on livestock productivity and mortality. Access to livestock markets is similarly disrupted by insecurity with the consequence that some pastoralists have to sell at much reduced prices often to itinerant traders. The effect of violent conflict on social infrastructure can be very damaging, as civil servants leave the respective district and health centres and schools close. Aid-funded development programmes are terminated prematurely. However, the experience of Wajir District shows how quickly social infrastructure can recover and aid investment can start to flow when relative peace is restored. At the macro level, the commercialisation of livestock raiding results in a tremendous drain of livestock out of the pastoralist economy. In Samburu, this was in the region of US\$5 million over a three to four year period.⁴⁶ Combined with the other negative effects of livestock raiding, this simply contributes to the widening poverty gap between pastoralist areas and the rest of the country, which is ultimately a threat to Kenya's stability and security.

The starting point for any aid programming is to understand that the widespread holding of arms is not the issue, rather it is understanding the *use* of arms in the wider context of local and regional conflict dynamics. Response to violent conflict, which is driven by security concerns alone is doomed to failure, including short-term and unilateral disarmament initiatives. Rather, it is the root causes that must be tackled through coherent policies that engage all agencies. Pastoralists must be given a greater

⁴⁶ Ibrahim & Jenner, 1996.

voice in the development of any such policies. Helping pastoralists restock or finding alternatives to pastoralism are important to offer an alternative livelihood to living by the gun especially to disenfranchised young men. Positive examples of local level peace-building, as in Wajir, must be built on, but above all must be linked to national policy level and supported with real political will. In border areas, like Turkana, such initiatives can only be successful if they are regional. There must also be greater investment in collecting and analysing data that shows the impact of conflict and violence on livelihoods over time, not least to understand and monitor the impact of various peace efforts. Finally, aid donors have an important role to play in ensuring that their assistance is also geared to tackling the root causes of conflict, but with a long-term commitment and in a coordinated and coherent way.

3.1.4 Nairobi⁴⁷

The capital city of Kenya, Nairobi, provides an example of high levels of crime (particularly violent crime), even compared with most African cities of similar size. At one level or another, much of this criminal violence can be said to be “organised”. There is also a widespread climate of fear that results from this. At a macro level, the widespread violent organised crime is perceived to be posing a threat to the national economy, as well as affecting the livelihoods and well-being of city residents.

The context of armed violent criminality

As with other cities studied, the sources of armed violence owe much to its origins and its geography. Established only 100 years ago, for most of its life Nairobi was planned to provide homes and services for the colonial settlers brought in by the British. As well as commercial and industrial areas, it spawned affluent and dispersed residential suburbs reaching into the mountains to the north and west. No estates were specifically provided for African town dwellers until 1950. They tended to congregate in unofficial “squatter” slums, with no property or other rights and subject to periodic bulldozing. This pattern was altered only to the extent that the new African business and political elites gravitated to the middle class, formerly exclusively white, suburbs and way of life. Slums developed, being more or less tolerated though still occasionally bulldozed, as the city trebled in size from one million in 1970.

The resulting geographical pattern today is one of slightly denser affluent suburbs with inferior estates and vast slums, some adjacent to the suburbs but most in distant parts of a dispersed city. These latter areas now house two million of the three million inhabitants of Nairobi, who are marginalised and feel politically and economically excluded. This exclusion has intensified in recent years as a result of an earlier expansion of education which deposits 300,000 primary school leavers and 190,000 into the labour market annually. However, jobs are almost non-existent due to a decade-long observation of prescriptions by international financial institutions, with the resulting decrease in wages, disinvestment and further impoverishment.

⁴⁷ This is an executive summary of a longer report “A City under Siege: Formalised Banditism and the Militarisation of Urban Engagements in Nairobi, 1991-2002”, by Musambayi Katumanga. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

Types of armed criminality

In the past decade the pattern of armed violence has evolved in a variety of ways:

- Criminal acts are no longer typically perpetrated by individuals and small groups but by, or under the banner of, organised gangs, typically with links to groups in business and/or politics.
- Crime is becoming increasingly violent: not just more crimes against the person, but robberies, car-jacking etc are becoming increasingly accompanied by physical harm.
- Armed violence is carried out with a new degree of impunity, and an indifference to hurting people or to the prospects of being held to account.

The major gangs are often based on one slum area or “location”. Their names are evocative: “Taliban”, “Army of Embakasi”, or the “Boys of Baghdad”. The most notorious and extensive, *Mungiki* (“masses” in the Kikuyu language), has an overtly populist political image and claims to be a membership organisation on a massive scale. One of the gangs’ roles is protection of their area and/or its leaders, who may sometimes be landlords. This role may involve them in attacks on neighbouring locations. They also provide muscle for political leaders, and have played a part in the political struggle between the government and opposition up to the election of an alternative government in 2002. Thus, it is simplistic to see the armed violence in Nairobi as merely isolated acts of criminality, or to try and deal with it solely as a law-and-order issue or in terms of policing. It is more organised, with links to politics and state institutions; it is couched in ideological terms to do with redressing inequalities and exclusion, and thrives on the context of corruption.

In addition to the indirect involvement of individuals within government and politics, there has been a clear element of state violence in Kenya as a whole including Nairobi. In the 1990s the most dramatic examples of this in Kenya were the “ethnic clashes” that preceded the elections in 1992 and 1997, which were widely believed to have been started by the previous regime. Less dramatic but systematic repression was familiar in the city.

Arms have circulated in the city for 50 years, ever since the “Mau Mau” rebellion against British colonial rule. They have become more widespread in the past 20 years as guns have circulated through the region from the war in Uganda in the 1980s and from Somalia in the 1990s. One survey suggests that around 10 per cent of the urban population possess small arms – so they are common but not pervasive.⁴⁸ However, guns are not the weapon of choice in many acts of physical attack. The same survey brings out the extent of violent crime – 18 per cent of residents had been victims at least once in the last year – but in only 14 per cent of attacks on men and 8 per cent on women were guns used; physical force or knives were more common. However, these figures relate just to crimes classified as “physical attacks on the person”. They understate the overall role of arms as a means of enforcement in such acts as car-jacking, road-blocks, “tithes” on buses, extortion, and in gang fights.

The impact of armed violent criminality

The widespread criminal violence and its increasing scale and impunity create a climate of fear. The Intermediate Technology Development Group survey recorded

⁴⁸ Stavrou, 2002.

that 52 per cent of all respondents said they worried about crime all the time and 35 per cent did so sometimes.⁴⁹ There was an overwhelming view that corruption is widespread and underpins the armed violence (96 per cent of respondents). The resulting attitude was one of a fatalism that nothing can be done. The new government, which came to power in early 2003, faces a major challenge in its efforts to change this perception.

The patterns of armed violence add up, in large part, to a set of struggles over contested space: between one slum area's 'defenders' and those of a neighbouring location; between landlords' enforcers and those of tenants; between one set of mini-bus operators and their rivals; between gang members and the homes and vehicles of the affluent.

One dangerous area looked at in this survey of the city suggests that about a quarter of the 10,000 *mutatu* (mini-bus) vehicles are held up in any one year. It is estimated that there is a surcharge of around 25 per cent to cover this risk – an expense that heightens the cost of commuting for the poor who rely on them. Estimates of the loss of valuables taken at gun-point are US\$2m per year; an average loss of US\$40 each time it happens to poor people surviving on less than US\$1 per day. As well as increasing the cost of fares, operators invest in guards and enforcers, which further raises costs but also escalates the violence. Many people, especially women, are afraid to take the long, dangerous journeys from slum areas to places where work might be found. Other costs to the poor include rent increases enforced by thugs and protection which has to be paid. The "bandit economy" benefits a few but very much at the expense of Nairobi's many poor.

As well as direct losses, the violent organised criminality in Nairobi also affects the macro-economy, particularly in two dimensions. Tourism, Kenya's largest export earner, is always sensitive to fears of violence. In 1997, in the wake of major clashes in and around Mombasa (which is the centre of the coastal tourist industry), there was a measurable reduction in the number of foreign tourists. Kenya's (and particularly Nairobi's) increasing image as an unsafe place is likely to have a long-term impact on tourism. Kenya's economy is also likely to be affected if, as the UN suggested in 2001, Nairobi's security rating is downgraded. The city is host to the largest UN headquarters in Africa, and is the international headquarters of bodies such as the UN Environment Programme. Such a security downgrading would have a dramatic impact on this presence which would have a major multiplier effect on the Kenyan economy.

3.2 South Asia

South Asia is home to 1.4 billion people – 22 per cent of the world's population. Two common features of the countries that comprise the region are widespread and severe poverty and gross inequalities of wealth and income. On average, one third of the population is below the poverty line in the SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) countries, while the ratio of inequality⁵⁰ in South Asia ranges between 7 and 9.5. Furthermore, as stated recently, "poverty in South Asia is coupled

⁴⁹ Stavrou, 2002.

⁵⁰ Defined as the ratio in income share or consumption between the richest 10 per cent and the poorest 10 per cent.

with socio-economic tensions, armed insurgencies, gender discrimination and violence, child labour and appalling inequality between the rich and the poor.”⁵¹

The case studies on armed violence and poverty in South Asia involve Sri Lanka, Nepal and North East India – all three on the periphery of the sub-continent, representing very different historical and contemporary situations, but revealing certain common themes and issues. In the case of Sri Lanka, armed violence has been associated primarily with a struggle for secession and independence on the part of groups claiming to represent Tamil interests; in the case of Nepal, with an armed struggle by self-proclaimed Maoists for a revolutionary transformation leading to a socialist transition under the leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). Northeast India, a vast and heterogeneous region, effectively isolated from the rest of India and treated by the Government of India (GoI) as a general security zone, provides examples of a plethora of conflicts centred on ethnic or national identity and on struggles over access to resources and “development”.

SALW are an integral part of armed violence and their availability ensures that casualty rates are significant. Access to weapons and ammunition through the market is important, but so too is the capture of weapons from “the opposition”. The resources with which arms are purchased derive from the appropriation of resources from local populations supplemented by contributions from diaspora communities. In all of these conflicts, while the major source of casualties is armed violence between “rebel” groups and state security forces, there is evidence of other forms of violence, including clashes between rival groupings ostensibly seeking similar objectives, violence against specific sections of the population, and “internal” violence as punishment and deterrence aimed at ensuring control over the various movements. In all cases, the main perpetrators of armed violence are young and adult men (although the active involvement of women and children as fighters and supporters should not be underestimated); the victims, however, include children, women and older people, as well as the young and adult men who are the main fighters.

If the armed violence itself is a consequence of deep feelings of anger and resentment associated with perceptions of inequality, marginalisation, deprivation and disadvantage – what might be termed “unfair poverty” – there can be little doubt that the conflicts themselves have immediate negative impacts on all those involved, affecting lives and livelihoods. The disruption involved is often associated with a deterioration in the quality of lives and in the capacity of livelihoods to provide material well-being. IDPs, in particular, are clearly adversely affected.

On the other hand, conflict, if effectively resolved, can lead to the positive reconstruction of social and economic structures and practices, and general improvement in welfare and well-being. A good deal depends on the way in which rebellions and insurgencies are dealt with and how far the underlying social and political concerns can be resolved by the state and other supporting agencies, including development agencies and NGOs. If armed violence is the extension of politics by other means, resolving the political issues is likely to prove the key to reducing conflict, even though there may be a role for linking this with de-escalation of violence and arms control.

⁵¹ SAAPE, 2003, p.2.

3.2.1 Nepal⁵²

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal began in the mid-western hills in February 1996 and is on-going. What started as a limited uprising involving a few hundred has developed over eight years into a major guerrilla movement which now involves some 125,000 men and women armed with SALW. Against the Maoists are ranged the armed police and, more recently, the Royal Nepalese Army whose numbers exceed those of the Maoist fighters and which have generally superior weaponry. The impact of the conflict has been widespread and significant. Around 10,000 people in all have been killed since 1996 (the majority of them since 2001), a climate of fear and insecurity has been created, with direct and indirect effects on the lives of hundreds of thousands of Nepalis, and finally, the insurgency has generated a profound political crisis (as intended by the Maoists).

The context of armed violence

Nepal is one of the world's poorest states, with average per capita income significantly less than US\$1 a day. Nearly half the population lives in absolute poverty. Health status is poor, infant mortality and maternal mortality rates are high, literacy is below 50 per cent (particularly for females) despite improvements in school enrolment, and access to government services is limited, particularly for those in remote areas with limited resources. The physical environment is harsh, the terrain rough and the climate unpredictable. Rain-fed farming is risky and those with marginal non-irrigable land are particularly vulnerable to landslides and erosion, poor yields and low output. Other sources of income have become more important in recent years, but these also are often unreliable and unstable – again, particularly for the poor who have fewer resources and less effective social networks, and therefore more limited access to dependable and relatively high-return income sources. Lives for most rural Nepalis are a struggle for survival; insecurity is the norm, particularly for those with the poorest access to key assets and sources of income, who are the most vulnerable to “normal” stresses and to external shocks. Poverty is exacerbated by social and cultural discrimination, associated with Hindu religious doctrine and directed particularly towards *dalits* (literally “untouchables”) and most ethnic minorities. Women suffer from gender discrimination and in some parts of the country patriarchy is overwhelming.

The social and political environment in Nepal fails to provide security and support for the poor and disadvantaged. All too often, government agencies fail to reach them, or remain inaccessible; and when government agencies do reach them, it is often those agencies more concerned to control and restrict the livelihood activities of the poor and disadvantaged than to assist and support them. When they encounter the state, it is more frequently in its role as the guardian of law and order than as an agency for development or for social justice. The formal rights of the more vulnerable sections of Nepali society have remained unrecognised in practice for the most part. The advent of multi-partyism in 1990 failed demonstrably to undermine fundamentally conservative power structures at national and local levels. Armed violence is, for the Maoists, an extension of politics by other means, to further a revolution to transform Nepal and thereby eventually reduce poverty, inequality and social injustice.

⁵² This is an executive summary of a longer report “Armed violence and poverty in Nepal” by David Seddon. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

The progress of the conflict

The insurgency began in the poor, relatively isolated mid-western hills, where support for the Maoists had historically been strong. The conflict developed slowly and unevenly over five years, with armed police deployed against the Maoists. Early in 2001, peace talks took place despite the massacre of the entire royal family in June. In the new national and international (post-9/11) political context, the talks broke down. In November, the ceasefire ended, the Maoists launched major assaults on various targets – including the barracks of the Royal Nepalese Army – and the government declared a State of Emergency. While the total number of those killed in the years between 1996 and 2002 amounted to around 4,000 deaths, a further 6,000 deaths occurred between mid-2002 and mid-2004. As armed violence grew so too did human rights abuses. As the conflict escalated it also became increasingly “internationalised”. The USA, UK and India have increased aid and provided weapons, technical assistance, and training to the government.

The insurgency and armed violence

The Maoist insurgency was a classic guerrilla operation from the outset: the majority of those involved were armed only with sticks, stones, knives (the famous Gorkhali knives or kukris) and a minority with small arms – hand guns, breech-loading rifles and explosives. For the first few years, government and development agencies treated the insurgency largely as a law-and-order issue to be dealt with by the armed police, who undertook a major operation in 1998 to crush the rebellion. Not only did this operation fail, it stimulated a further expansion of the insurgency, so that by 2000 it could no longer be regarded as a localised, marginal or transitory phenomenon. The conflict intensified after 2001 but remains limited to SALW, for the most part.

Social and economic impact

The direct impact of armed violence is on those involved in the fighting; 10,000 have lost their lives and many more been injured; an even greater number have suffered psychological trauma. The impact on the mass of the population is largely *indirect*. Lives have been disrupted, there has been a decline in social capital, a climate of fear and insecurity has been created. Livelihoods have been affected, in part, by specific measures (curfews, blockades etc), which have reduced the movement of goods and commercial activity. Those adversely affected include not only the better-off, many of whom are threatened directly by the Maoists and all of whom are threatened indirectly by the Maoist project, but also the poor, many of whom have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the state security forces and even more of whom have experienced a general decline in social capital and an environment of increasing fear and insecurity over the past eight years. Internal displacement and rural emigration have been significant consequences of the wider disruption of rural life.

On the other hand, it would be difficult to argue that poverty has increased. Many of those migrating seek employment in the towns or abroad and the effect will be to increase reliance on non-farm income and remittances, which may actually benefit the poor. The very poor have experienced a reduction in levels of exploitation and oppression, as a result of pressure from the Maoists and the disruption of “traditional” village social relations. Development efforts by NGOs working in the field have been obliged to follow “best practice” and focus on poverty alleviation.

Armed violence has led to considerable death and destruction, disruption and dislocation; but it has also transformed traditional social structures and practices in ways that have positive benefits for the poor and socially disadvantaged. If a way can be found for a political compromise whereby similar forces for progressive change could be deployed, without the use of guns, then progress can be made in alleviating poverty.

3.2.2 Sri Lanka⁵³

Macro-economic effects of the conflict

Sri Lanka exhibits certain exceptional qualities in that its economy grew on average faster during the war than in the pre-war period. In addition, its growth compares favourably with other developing countries not at war. However, there have been considerable fluctuations in Sri Lanka's growth rates that correspond with episodes of armed violence in the country. The Sri Lankan economy could have grown at a much higher rate if it did not have to bear the costs of the war. In contrast with other foreign-exchange constrained economies at war, Sri Lanka's exports did not drop dramatically during the conflict, though greater investment levels in the absence of conflict could have led to higher exports. It is significant, however, that the major export-earning industries are concentrated outside the war area and so have been fairly isolated from disruptions. In contrast, the war has had a severe impact on tourist earnings and employment. Others assert that the lost potential economic growth of Sri Lanka is greater than has been acknowledged and that high defence expenditure is the primary cause of economic problems. Defence expenditure as a proportion of the GDP in Sri Lanka is the second highest in South Asia and has surpassed social expenditures since 1995. Peaks in expenditure match up with periods of heightened violence and security problems.

SALW, DDR, and crime and violence

The question of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) into society of ex-combatants from both sides of the conflict is one of the most significant political and developmental issues currently facing Sri Lanka. The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) at the time of writing was about to launch a reintegration programme for a limited number of ex-combatants and their families from both sides of the conflict, intended as a pilot for a larger future programme should a political settlement be achieved. Problematic categories of combatants not covered by the programme are deserters from both the army and the LTTE; retired LTTE members; certain categories of child soldiers; the Home Guards and the National Armed Reserve; and state-funded and armed members of Tamil groups opposed to the LTTE. In the design of DDR programmes, these potentially vulnerable categories need to be targeted as well as those more immediately visible. For all ex-combatants the problems of finding employment, supporting their families and settling into civilian roles are considerable, but for female ex-soldiers there are some gender-specific issues. Reintegration programmes need to address gendered issues in a more radical way including grappling with the needs of female ex-combatants in an emancipatory way rather than reinforcing expected gender roles and inequalities.

⁵³ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Sri Lanka" by Miranda Alison. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

Sri Lanka also faces the related problem of the threat to society posed by ex-combatants. Particularly troublesome is the category of Sri Lankan state military deserters, of whom it is estimated there are over 50,000. Evidence from other contexts suggests that reducing one type of violence can actually lead to an increase in other types, particularly when there is a problem with SALW left over from a conflict, consequently ceasefires and peace processes often witness an increase in economic and inter-personal crime. This appears to be occurring in Sri Lanka, where violence all over the country seems to be on the increase. Further, other contexts also suggest that in the post-conflict era the wartime proliferation of SALW contributes to a rise in levels of domestic violence against women. Data in this area appears to be lacking in Sri Lanka and is vitally needed. However, existing local initiatives that combat domestic and sexual violence should be supported and funded.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Over the course of the conflict more than 800,000 Tamils were displaced within Sri Lanka, over 84,000 sought refuge in India, and hundreds of thousands more in other parts of the world, making up one of the world's largest IDP populations and one of the western world's largest groups of asylum seekers. For IDPs without recourse to family support or the opportunity to migrate abroad, camps ("welfare centres") became the only option. Poverty in the camps is often severe, residents suffer health problems and their basic needs are often not met. The main bulk of the IDP population live in the Vanni and the Jaffna peninsula, which have been particularly badly impacted by the war, but there are significant numbers of IDPs in the east too. The economic marginalisation of the area as a result of the war, the widespread exodus and displacement of skilled workers and educated people, and the huge devastation caused to the infrastructure has had significant impacts in terms of poverty. Within IDP camps access to employment has been sporadic, food and health care are significant problems and maintaining good standards of education has been difficult. IDPs in the eastern camps seem to have better nutrition and health than those in the north, but often a worse relationship with the security forces, especially in the Trincomalee area.

Women have experienced more continuity than men in regard to their normal gender tasks and identity, but have also changed gender relations too – many women work in paid employment outside the camps, though some have also suffered resistance to these changes by men. The steps some IDP women have made and continue to make towards greater agency and empowerment should be encouraged and supported by development agencies, but ongoing dialogue with IDP men is a necessary part of this process to ensure that women do not suffer a backlash from men in their own communities. Finally, the steady flow to the north-east since the ceasefire of spontaneously returning IDPs, refugees and migrants is a significant issue affecting Sri Lanka's potential for development. The pressures on government services and UN and aid agency assistance for returnees are significant. Many attempt to return to their land and homes on their own initiative, where water, sanitary and other services and infrastructure may be inadequate or non-existent and the prospects for income generation are grim. Land disputes are also likely. One of the biggest problems faced by returnees is that of anti-personnel landmines, despite the partial de-mining done so far.

Female-headed households, vulnerable women and livelihood strategies

With large numbers of men killed or lost through migration or abandonment throughout the war there has been a significant increase in female-headed households. This increase is seen primarily in the Tamil communities in the north-east but some Sinhalese communities in the south also now have greater numbers of female-headed households, as a result of the violent JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) insurrection in 1987 to 1989. This has serious and gendered implications for families, communities and society more broadly. Tamil culture accords a very low status to widows, and women living alone without a male family member are looked upon with suspicion and suffer various forms of social exclusion. A significant problem for lone women trying to support themselves and their children is the fact that even if they do manage to find some source of income generation, people in their communities often assume that this money must have come from prostitution. Organisations such as the Centre for Women's Development, which help women establish livelihoods, including training them in unconventional skills, should be supported.

3.2.3 Northeast India⁵⁴

The seven states of Northeast India (NEI) – Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura – have witnessed a large number of conflicts for over five decades. These have been fuelled by a number of issues: land distribution, immigration, ethnicity, religion, and political autonomy. More than half a million people have lost their lives to insurgency in the area since Indian independence in 1947. Since the 1990s there has been a proliferation of insurgent groups representing various tribes and ethnic communities. There are currently 72 insurgent groups in NEI.

The context of armed violence

Geographically isolated from “mainland” India and economically underdeveloped, NEI is home to around 220 indigenous groups and over 160 “scheduled tribes”. Throughout the 20th century, these societies have been going through a process of transition from shifting cultivation to settled agriculture, from clan control of land to commodification of land, urbanisation and cultural change. This has attracted large-scale immigration, particularly from Bangladesh. However, a system of “protective discrimination” restricts the access of “non-tribals” to land ownership, business and trading licenses and access to elected office. An unintended consequence of this system is that there is a perception that scheduled tribes who have a “homeland” have managed to insulate themselves against these changes. Thus a “homeland” has become something to which all ethnic groups aspire. However, given the ethnic patchwork quilt of some regions, such an aspiration has fuelled tribal insurgent groups to use brutal tactics to forcibly displace “unwanted” groups thus allowing land for a homeland. This means that in addition to the wars being waged against the Government of India (GoI) and the regional states by insurgents groups, there are also conflicts within the various communities.

The parties to the violence

The parties to the violence are the GoI, the regional states, and a plethora of secessionist groups. The first armed insurgencies of the Nagas, Mizos and Manipuris

⁵⁴ This is an executive summary of a longer report “Armed violence and poverty in Northeast India” by Mandy Turner and Binalakshmi Nepram. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

were later supplemented with secessionist groups fighting for tribal rights in other parts of NEI. The proliferation of state structures in the region over the past 30 years was one of the strategies used by the GoI to try to foster stakeholders in the Indian Union. However, this federalism is largely cosmetic given the existence of an alternative *de facto* structure of government that manages counterinsurgency operations and is directly controlled by the home ministry in New Delhi. The GoI alternates between political pacification and development interventions on the one hand and military cleansing of areas on the other. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which gives the security forces excessive powers including shoot to kill, and the huge deployment of security forces, has helped develop a culture of violence and impunity. The use of collective punishment techniques, human rights abuses and the fact that power lies with the military apparatus, has further alienated northeast Indians from “mainland” India. This militarisation is a huge obstacle to peace in the region.

The role of SALW

According to many commentators, the proliferation of armed groups is being fuelled by the easy availability of SALW. This easy availability helps to escalate social tensions into armed conflict, helps to reduce the timescale between setting up a group and it becoming a full-scale guerrilla group making a political impact, and fuels a growing network between insurgent groups. There are no figures on gun possession in NEI, however, there are an estimated 63 million firearms in South Asia. Many of the insurgent groups, fuelled by funds from drug trafficking and extortion, have more modern arms and equipment than the state police. This has assisted them in criminal activities such as extortion, allowed them to kill with impunity, and helped them to dominate the political arena. Insurgent groups gain SALW from a number of sources: arms left over from the conflict in Cambodia and the arming of the mujahideen in Afghanistan; arms from other South Asian insurgent groups; arms from China, Bangladesh and Pakistan; and from the Myanmar arms bazaar.

The political economy of violence

The various militant groups across NEI have been substantially criminalised. Many are involved in gun-running and drug-trafficking, as well as extortion and abduction. It has been alleged that the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has collected more than Rs5bn (£50m) through extortion, abduction and kidnappings.⁵⁵ Another source of funds for insurgent groups is the imposition of taxation in areas under their control. In addition, there is overwhelming evidence of a complex “web of collusion” between insurgent groups, politicians and political parties. A large quantity of the northeast states’ revenues are siphoned off and distributed to a well-established nexus of politicians, administrators and insurgent organisations. For example, sources estimate that of the Rs11.65bn made available in Assam for rural development from 1992 to February 1998, less than Rs4bn went into legitimate schemes.⁵⁶ This criminalisation of politics and crisis of governance is a significant obstacle to peace.

Impact of armed violence on poverty and development

There is a strong culture of violence in the region with a lack of respect for human life and human rights. The size of the security forces and their deployment within communities has had many adverse impacts: high levels of physical and sexual

⁵⁵ Maitra, 2002, p.90.

⁵⁶ Sahni, 2000.

violence, prostitution, substance abuse and harassment. Counterinsurgency operations and inter-ethnic violence has displaced large amounts of people, who are the most vulnerable in terms of poverty, insecurity and poor health. Violence against women and children has also increased. The impact on the wider economy is felt through: a drain on resources due to the systems of “taxation” and the effects of the frequent *bandhs* (general strikes); the decline of business confidence and a flight of capital, either directly by intimidation, kidnapping and extortion, or indirectly through the general climate of fear; and disruptions to the provision of services such as health and education.

Recommendations

There are a number of issues that need to be addressed for armed violence to be reduced in the area. The key to a stable future lies in the demilitarisation of the area and a community-based development programme which deals with local concerns over the distribution of resources. In addition, the GoI should be encouraged to develop an assistance package for IDPs and should allow international observers such as UNHCR, and NGOs, access to refugees and IDPs in the region.

3.3 West Africa

West Africa is a highly unstable region that has experienced internal and cross regional conflicts, high levels of underdevelopment, unaccountable militaries, and virtually uncontrolled regional/international flows of SALW. There are said to be seven million SALW in the region. Regional and national arms restrictions have not been fully effective in preventing weapons reaching individuals/groups involved in armed criminality, economic exploitation, and activities against state authorities.

Furthermore, military and humanitarian/developmental interventions have not been able to fully stabilise or reverse key conflicts in the region, some of which run the risk of restarting. Confidence in the state is declining in key countries, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone, corruption is growing, and civilians are falling deeper into poverty. West Africa contains 11 of the world’s 20th poorest states. And ethno-religious difficulties seem to be increasingly emerging in countries such as Nigeria. UN peacekeeping operations in places such as Sierra Leone (1999), Liberia (2003), and Côte d’Ivoire (2004), may have checked violence, but future violence cannot be discounted. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has intervened in conflicts such as Sierra Leone and Liberia, but has, like the African Union, been unable to underwrite regional security.

A number of linked dynamics are undermining attempts to bring security/stability to the region and are contributing to poverty:

SALW flows. Weapons-flows into Sierra Leone during the civil war (1991-2002) exacerbated the duration and intensity of the war, contributed to the impoverishment of civilians and undermined the capacity of the state to provide security and social services. Arms flowing out of Sierra Leone are being used in other conflicts or for criminal activities in places such as Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. Arms collection programmes across the region have been incomplete.

Youth issues. The West African population contains an increasing number of youths (43.5 per cent are under 15 years old) many of whom are unemployed, poor, and living in urban settings where they often get caught up in crime, drugs and violence.

Refugee flows. There has been massive displacement across West Africa, not only in civil wars, but also in states such as Nigeria that are not at war. Over half of Sierra Leone's population was displaced during the conflict.

Conflict linkages: Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire. Ex-combatants are freely moving between conflict zones sometimes preying on civilians and exacerbating conflict. Furthermore, many West African governments and armed groups have become involved in conflicts in neighbouring states.

Resource exploitation and economic slowdowns. Corrupt officials, mercenary and armed groups, militias, and militaries have been involved in resource exploitation across the region, often at the expense of local communities and the poor (as in the Niger Delta, Nigeria). GDP has experienced rapid dips in countries in conflict and has failed to fully recover to pre-conflict levels. Widespread destruction of infrastructure, social services, and agriculture due to armed violence has contributed to impoverishing sections of the population across the region.

3.3.1 Sierra Leone⁵⁷

Sierra Leone represents an interesting case study in that it involves extensive external programming to address SALW possession/usage, and also some atypical outcomes that resulted from armed violence and SALW usage.

The context of armed violence

The conflict involved the rebel RUF, civil defence forces (CDF), the national army, neighbouring countries and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), as well as the UN, the UK and mercenary forces. SALW played a significant part in the duration and intensity of the conflict – for example, enabling the RUF to sustain the conflict for 11 years with only a few thousand combatants. However, traditional weapons and implements also played a significant part in the conflict – they were used for community protection, for example, and many deaths/atrocities were committed with them rather than with SALW. Furthermore, most civilians did not acquire SALW during the conflict.

SALW possession

Prior to the conflict, Sierra Leone did not have a weapons problem or a gun culture. During the conflict unknown quantities of guns passed through the country. Weapons were supplied by and through neighbouring countries. Western governments and arms dealers also supplied combatants. However, this has not resulted in widespread weapons display or possession post-conflict. Most civilians did not acquire SALW during the conflict. Extensive DDR and SALW programming collected some weapons (over 70,000 in the formal DDR process) but arms caches, domestic weapons, weapons for sale, and easily accessible regional supplies mean ready access to weapons exists. Arms embargoes proved ineffective. Nevertheless, the carrying, display, or the use of arms, and the incidence of armed criminality have not risen significantly post-conflict. There is an aversion to guns amongst much of the population.

⁵⁷ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Sierra Leone" by Jeremy Ginifer. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

Insecurity and SALW

The possession/use of SALW created high levels of rural and urban insecurity, particularly in the absence of state protection. This had drastic impoverishing effects. The RUF typically used SALW to lay siege to communities, to extort goods and labour from civilians, to seize recruits and for plunder and pillaging to sustain the conflict and for personal enrichment. They were also used for revenge, humiliation and other “psychological” purposes. CDF, which had fewer SALW, tended to use them for community defence, to establish control over communities, and for combating RUF, as well as personal and group enrichment. Army units and ECOMOG forces used SALW to fight the rebels and sometimes to rob and intimidate communities. The impact of these uses on Sierra Leone was catastrophic with many communities becoming totally insecure with few supplies coming in, few viable livelihoods, food shortages, and no form of protection. However, in some communities, CDF and government forces managed to maintain forms of community security and development. Ultimately, it was the use of SALW and other weapons by the CDF and Kamajors, and external forces, that enabled the RUF to be defeated and armed violence to be terminated.

Impact of armed violence

The impact of armed violence and SALW usage on GDP can be directly traced to conflict incidences. The coup by SALW-armed army elements in May 1997, for example, contributed to real GDP plunging 20 per cent in 1997. Retarded GDP damaged the government’s capacity to deliver social services. In periods of relative peace GDP rose. GDP has yet to fully recover. Furthermore, key industries on which Sierra Leone depended were damaged by armed violence. The RUF closures of mines and industries at gunpoint also impacted directly upon the rural poor who were dependent on them for income.

The destruction of houses and robbery impoverished most civilians. The majority of householders had their houses destroyed or were evicted at gunpoint in conflict zones and they lost many possessions. Displacement often made civilians dependent on subsistence strategies. Many households are yet to recover. Sieges impoverished communities. SALW-armed rebels cut off the supplies to many towns and villages by shooting or intimidating lorry drivers seeking to keep roads open and feed starving civilians. Many people in besieged towns were impoverished or even starved; communities have yet to fully recover. Many lorry drivers are without work. Patterns of trade/transportation were negatively changed. The violence changed trading patterns – communities and markets that formerly had trading links could no longer maintain these activities because of the dangers of armed violence. In the post-conflict period the old patterns of trade have not necessarily been renewed.

Farmers lost their livelihoods as they were too fearful of armed combatants to farm. Furthermore, they were often robbed and their equipment destroyed. There was a decline in nutrition as SALW attacks on civilians in towns such as Makeni and Bo Town forced many to flee into the bush and survive on “bush” products. Many suffered from malnutrition or were ill and unable to work or support their families. Patterns of agriculture were changed, and rice output slumped because rice farmers risked being shot. Limited farming of root crops took its place, but this was less nutritious. Following the conflict, rice production still has not recovered and prices have rocketed.

Schools and hospitals were destroyed by SALW-armed rebels curtailing or seriously hampering the delivery of social services. Education opportunities were curtailed and employment opportunities were lost. Many children and youths missed the key years of their education either because they were combatants or they were prevented from attending schools because of armed violence. Many have been unable to find employment in the post-conflict period. Social service professionals have been impoverished. The shooting and intimidation of teachers and others in the social services reduced many to the level of the long-term poor. There was a decline in health due to the acceleration of disease associated with the deepening of armed violence, with no real provision of drugs or safe water. Population movements, overcrowding, and poor sanitary conditions stimulated by armed violence further exacerbated disease outbreaks. The poor health of many Sierra Leoneans pushed, and continues to push, many further into poverty.

Violence committed with SALW and other weapons within both urban and rural settings seriously undermined trust, reciprocity and networks. Social transactions that traditionally provided some sort of safety net for the impoverished were damaged. Neighbours robbed each other, many poor took the opportunity to rob the rich, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were eroded in places such as Freetown where in 1997-8 armed violence became routine in certain areas of the city. Declines in social capital seem to have hampered recovery.

Women were targeted by armed combatants and attacked, raped, used as slaves or spies, and taken as commander's wives, among other things. Once raped they often suffered poor health and were frequently unable to re-marry. Many became dependent upon petty trading to survive and slipped deeper into poverty. Many disabled people were left to fend for themselves during the conflict and sunk further into poverty. Youths sometimes managed to enrich themselves during the conflict through armed robbery, but this has not generally been sustained following the end of the conflict and sustainable employment is elusive.

Some civilians were impoverished while some combatants were enriched. A goal of armed violence was to plunder and civilians were robbed of their possessions at gunpoint. Government buildings were also looted. Some combatants, government officials, and outsiders with a stake in the conflict enriched themselves and have not subsequently been called to account. There is a creeping concern about security in some districts where drugs and anti-social behaviour are increasing. Future outbreaks of armed robbery and violence by impoverished individuals cannot be ruled out.

Many of the displaced moved from the countryside to urban areas but have failed to find sustainable livelihoods. Their absence has also impacted upon rural communities denying them skills and expertise and adding to impoverishment. Civilians who fled Sierra Leone for neighbouring countries have frequently been abused and have found it hard to find viable livelihoods on returning.

SALW possession enabled some communities to defend themselves. Ultimately, it was the use of SALW and other weapons by the CDF and Kamajors and external forces, including the British, which enabled the RUF to be defeated and armed violence to be terminated. Furthermore, in some CDF-held areas SALW protection enabled livelihoods to be maintained. A consequence of SALW usage has been the emergence in civil society of an aversion to the display, possession and usage of

SALW, which is generally regarded as unacceptable. This potentially has reined in armed violence and its capacity to disrupt recovery. Sierra Leone has not become a militarised society/state. The use/possession of SALW during the conflict has not led to significant surges in post-conflict armed violence, unlike many other conflicts, despite rising poverty. Key factors explaining this may include a reaction/revulsion to armed violence in Sierra Leone and also the presence of international military forces. Changing trading patterns benefited some traders. They shifted trade to neighbouring countries or new regions, for example. This has brought financial benefits. Employment in service industries in Freetown has increased. However, there are fears this may not be sustainable as internationals leave Sierra Leone.

Implications for programming

The programming undertaken in Sierra Leone to address weapons issues during the conflict did not fully collect SALW or prevent renewed outbreaks of conflict until late on. Weapon supplies into Sierra Leone were not curtailed, and remain largely open. In addition, appropriate or sustainable livelihoods have not been found for a number of ex-combatants. Vulnerable groups were also neglected. Civilian concerns tended to be neglected in favour of those of ex-combatants. Subsequent follow-up SALW programming has addressed some of these concerns. However, the underlying causes of conflict that underpinned weapons acquisition, such as youth marginalisation and poor governance remain, despite being targeted by developmental programming. Nevertheless, an international presence still underpins security in Sierra Leone and acts as deterrent to weapons possession, display and usage. Whether non-violence can be maintained when the international presence diminishes or terminates remains open to question.

The experience of Sierra Leone suggests that the following elements may usefully be integrated into future programming:

- ❑ Community security and confidence-building. Unprotected communities particularly suffered the consequences of SALW and were impoverished. This implies the need for appropriately trained police and army contingents (through SSR) that fulfil their duty to protect civilians and communities.
- ❑ International/regional SALW controls. Improved international and regional controls over licit and illicit arms transfers to conflict zones.
- ❑ Comprehensive regional/localised arms collection. The latter needs to particularly target civilian weapons. Regionally coordinated arms collection programmes are vital to avert the intensification or potential resurgence of armed violence through intra-regional arms circulations.
- ❑ More targeted interventions to secure livelihoods for ex-combatants. Opportunities/needs assessments are particularly important to avoid the poor targeting that has sometimes been associated with DDR.
- ❑ Build upon civil society capacities to reverse gun cultures and the militarisation of communities/societies. Civil society and locals have the best understanding of how armed violence comes about and the capacity to engage with it through traditional mechanisms. This needs to be built upon. In Sierra Leone, community re-acceptance of ex-combatants has been relatively high, despite the atrocities committed. DDR and other forms of programming still do not fully engage with the capacities of locals to reverse the militarization of communities, although Arms for Development (AfD) programming is making progress in this area.

- ❑ Identify and target vulnerable groups. Vulnerable groups such as the disabled, children, and women were not adequately provided for in much DDR and associated programming. They continue to be disadvantaged three years after the end of the conflict.
- ❑ *Root causes of weapons acquisition need to be addressed.* Sierra Leone shows that the targeting of conflict triggers, such as poor governance, corruption, and exclusion, are vital if an increasing demand for SALW is not to emerge some time in the future. This may take the form of SALW acquisition for armed robbery as poverty rises, or arms acquisition for protection purposes or to further political objectives.
- ❑ *Poverty issues.* It is a major priority to address the increasing poverty in Sierra Leone in order to prevent potential outbreaks of popular discontent and armed violence. One lesson that emerges from Sierra Leone is that prioritising poverty reduction during DDR/SALW programming is essential to assist in preventing individuals such as ex-combatants becoming recruits to future armed violence.
- ❑ *Linking security and development.* In Sierra Leone, as in other post-conflict contexts, there was a lack of connection between the security and developmental components of DDR. SALW programming, such as AfD programmes, have addressed some of those gaps but the need to strengthen these linkages is paramount in armed violence and poverty programming.

3.3.2 Nigeria⁵⁸

The context of armed violence

Armed violence in many areas of Nigeria has escalated since 1999 and is destabilising and impoverishing communities. Vigilante groups have sprung up that both protect and extort from local communities. Rival gangs in towns such as Lagos are engaged in armed violence against each other and also against state security forces with civilians caught in the crossfire. Furthermore, a gun culture has been established and there has been a progressive militarisation of society. SALW are freely available and both regional and state controls are minimal. The state is doing little to protect civilians against armed violence and in fact some state agencies are involved or complicit in robbing and persecuting sections of the population. All this has contributed to an insecure environment where mass displacements are taking place, communities are targeted on ethno-religious lines, livelihoods are difficult to maintain, and extortion and insecurity are leading to a growth in private security.

SALW, arms racing and security sector reform

SALW are becoming endemic in Nigeria and the pace of acquisition and the lethality of weapons are rapidly increasing. There is neither sufficient programming to directly address SALW possession, nor the will or capacity within the state security services, to fully deal with this problem. State security services are part of the problem, often reacting disproportionately to sub-state violence or targeting certain communities for reprisals. Further security sector reform (SSR) is required. Limited SSR measures took place in 1999 when the government retired large numbers of senior and middle-ranking officers and there has been minor follow up. However, SSR that addresses some of the deep-rooted problems in the security sector is required, including

⁵⁸ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Nigeria" by Jeremy Ginifer and Olawale Ismail. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

measures to deal with retired personnel who are, it appears, diffusing SALW and technical knowledge.

“Arms racing” patterns have been established in Nigeria, where armed groups and the security sector seek to acquire more sophisticated and lethal weapons to counter acquisitions by rival groups. SALW display has created a climate of fear and coercion; there is fear of hidden weapons and the fact that in many areas anyone could be carrying a gun and that violence might suddenly erupt. A gun culture and impunity has increasingly been established in Nigeria since 1999, particularly among the young. Civilians living in certain conflict zones exist in a state of fear particularly given the possession of SALW by virtually all sectors of society including the young, students, vigilantes, militias, armed groups, politicians, and religious movements.

The impact of armed violence

Severe poverty impacts have followed from SALW possession and usage. **Massive displacement** has taken place in many conflict areas. After months, or even years, many civilians still do not regard it as safe to return. As a consequence, many markets are no longer operating and fleeing civilians have been reliant on subsistence living. Towns, particularly in the Delta region, are open to frequent attack by armed gangs or the security services. This has led to severe **interruptions to economic activities** and the fear of imminent future attacks has disrupted normal trade-related activities, including fishing. Large areas of farmland in places such as Benue, which has been considered the food basket of Nigeria, have been abandoned with consequences, not just for that area, but for the rest of Nigeria.

The practice of **extorting “taxes”** on highways coming in and out of places such as Lagos has led to traders raising their prices for key goods such as food produce and consequently contributing to the further impoverishment of the poor. The threat and actual use of armed violence by armed groups, vigilantes, and robbers, has led to communities retreating into themselves and often has stimulated the growth of **private security services** (for those who can afford them) and vigilante “protection” for the poor. **Social capital** has been severely eroded by SALW possession and usage. Communities have split along ethnic and religious divisions in the face of increasing insecurity and attacks by security forces.

Programming and related findings

State and regional control of flows of SALW, both internally and externally, need to be significantly improved if any brake on rampant armed violence in Nigeria is to be exerted. Measures need to be taken to address security sector dissemination of weaponry to armed gangs and other actors. This should include prosecution of individuals involved. However, action in this area will be difficult given current networks of corruption within the system. The security sector needs to respond in a more proportionate way to challenges to state authority and outbreaks of armed violence. Ex-security sector personnel are contributing to the diffusion of SALW and, it is also thought, to the diffusion of knowledge and expertise on how to use and maintain SALW.

Programming which addresses SALW possession needs to be urgently set in motion. Existing programming does not, in the main, seem to be directly addressing this issue.

This might include AfD-type programming that actually offers incentives for communities to hand in arms, as well as programming that addresses the fractures between communities. Extensive confidence-building measures will also be required, quite possibly involving regional and international connections, in cooperation with the Nigerian government, as well as civil society.

Reversing the gun culture and militarization of society is an urgent, albeit extremely problematic, priority in Nigeria. The rapid pace of the militarisation of society since 1999 is startling and shows signs of deepening. Sensitisation measures would be a good starting point, but gun culture seems so entrenched that this will be difficult to reverse. Unless the state security forces are able to extend security to its citizens SALW will continue to have utility. Security sector reform is urgently required to establish faith in military forces and in the police.

3.4 Algeria⁵⁹

Algeria offers the opportunity to analyse an Islamist⁶⁰ conflict in a middle-income country, and it reveals the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, all of whom were civilians.

The context of armed violence

As an oil-rich country, Algeria would have been a huge prize for the pan-Islamist movement. The violence that erupted in 1992 between Islamist insurgents and the military clearly was a struggle for control of the state. Although SALW played a key role in the insurgency, the sword was the terrorists' weapon of choice. In the mid-1990s, the government armed citizen militias, a step that was critical in defeating the rebels, as was US support for the government after September 11th 2001. Security has been re-established in most large cities, where many have sought refuge. The war was coming to an end but still causing more than 500 deaths each year, and insecurity is preventing the return of the displaced.

The impact of armed violence

Over the course of the conflict, armed violence has resulted in the direct killing of some 100,000 and has transformed threatening behaviour (robbery, extortion, rape, and kidnapping) into murderous acts. Lately the violence has degenerated into criminality. Ethnic cleansing is not a feature of this conflict nor is the recruitment of female combatants. As with most civil conflicts, it is not possible to give separate tallies for the deaths of civilians and combatants, nor is there data on which weapons caused more deaths.

The main indirect impact of armed violence is an exacerbation of the urban housing shortage, especially as the conflict has displaced some 1.5 million people. Levels of poverty rose between 1988 and 1995 but appear to have stagnated since then. There are undocumented claims of increasing inequality, which some assume is due to the conflicts but others believe is related to ongoing economic liberalisation policies. Women have suffered, not only because the war increased the number of widows and fear has destroyed social capital, but because the Islamists targeted women and girls

⁵⁹ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Algeria" by Meredith Turshen. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

⁶⁰ The term Islamist is used to indicate a political project and is distinguished from the religion of Islam.

in the attempt to impose their ideology. Beginning in the 1980s, the government was already making concessions to the Islamists, sacrificing women's rights.

3.5 El Salvador⁶¹

One of the most powerful conflicts to affect Central America in the 1980s was that in El Salvador (1980-1992), resulting in the death of more than 80,000 citizens. The 1992 Peace Accords are widely recognised as having put an end to the 12-year war, but have been accused of failing in their mission to bring an end to pervasive violence and to build a new and more equal society.

The context of armed violent criminality

Although El Salvador is now characterised as a middle-income country, in 2001, the UN estimated that almost a half of El Salvador's population continue to live in precarious conditions.⁶² Over a decade since the formal cessation of its political conflict, El Salvador remains one of the most unequal societies in the world, ranking 0.54 on the GINI index, with over 40 per cent of its population living in conditions of poverty.⁶³ Efforts to build a meaningful peace and implement developmental progress have been hampered by continuing high levels of armed violence. Within Latin America, El Salvador stands out as one of the most violent countries. The boundaries between the definition of "armed violence" and "crime" are somewhat nebulous in the El Salvador context, since SALW are used in much criminal activity. Random criminal violence and highly visible gang activity have contributed to a situation where fear and insecurity still characterise everyday life for many citizens. This has exhibited itself through a sharp rise in street crime, a growing gang culture and high levels of violence in the "private" sphere.

In addition to the massive challenges and costs of post-war reconstruction (US \$1,826 million as calculated on the signing of the Peace Accords in 1992),⁶⁴ the last decade has seen a series of natural disasters that have further retarded the country's development. Together with historic structural inequalities and the weakening of the social fabric, the end of the war left a huge inactive workforce. This was, at least in part, a result of the demobilisation of military groups, who received very little support for reintegrating into civil life. However, it was also exacerbated by the scarcity of sources of employment. The period of post-war reconstruction coincided with the implementation of a stringent neoliberal agenda and structural adjustment policies. This severely limited public services and reduced sources of employment. The Land Transfer Programme (PTT) stipulated by the peace accords was limited in its scope and only included registered combatants. Added to the massive circulation of arms, a historic lack of respect for the rule of law and weak state institutions, this combination of factors has allowed other long-standing social conflicts/problems to be brought to the fore and generate new spaces for armed violence. Some demobilised groups have been accused of becoming involved in organised crime, especially ex-members of the military. The fledgling National Civil Police (PNC) that was formed after the signing of the Peace Accords was ill-equipped to deal with the wave of crime and violence.

⁶¹ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in El Salvador" by Mo Hume. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

⁶² UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001.

⁶³ UNDP, Human Development Report, 2001.

⁶⁴ Dunkerley, 1993.

There has been a steady erosion of confidence in the security forces in the last decade and this is reflected in the growing privatisation of the security apparatus: there are currently an estimated 70,000 private security agents in operation whereas the PNC has an active force of approximately 20,000 officers.⁶⁵

The impact of armed violence

Research undertaken during the 1990s estimated that anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 murders occurred each year in El Salvador, a country of just over 6 million inhabitants. This recorded average murder rate more than doubled from 1991 (43.5 per 100,000 inhabitants) to 1994 (over 100 per 100,000 inhabitants).⁶⁶ One observer has argued that the 1990s will have seen more violent deaths than the war years. Figures for other violent crimes are similarly high, with 25,548 violent crimes reported in 1998.⁶⁷ One of the most notable legacies of the civil war has been the extreme militarisation of society. At a conservative estimate, there are some 400,000 - 450,000 arms in the hands of civilians. Around 35.7 per cent (14,000) of these are legally held.⁶⁸ This translates into two firearms for every 10 adults. There are an estimated four million firearms in the hands of civilians in Central America.

Post-war violence in El Salvador has exacerbated existing social cleavages. Fear and mistrust work together to undermine social capital in many ways and create a vicious circle for the reproduction of violence. The disintegration of social networks has further reinforced the existing fragmentation and political and socio-economic polarisation of society, and public spaces for collective action have been reduced. Communities' capacity to deal with conflict is limited and violence has become part of everyday neighbourhood interaction. For example, squabbles between neighbours often result in physical fights and weapons (knives, pistols etc) are sometimes used. Drunken fights are aggravated by the use of SALW, as are traffic incidents. Figures from the PNC, estimate that 86 per cent of murders are caused by "social violence", such as family disputes, fights between neighbours etc. According to sources from the PNC, SALW are used in around 85 per cent of homicides.⁶⁹

Emergence of youth gangs (maras)

In the past decade, one of the most dramatic developments in the pandemic of violence has been the emergence of youth gangs (*maras*). Largely made up of young men from low-income neighbourhoods, *maras* have become synonymous with terror and insecurity. The groups are heavily armed and use knives, home-made weapons (firearms and grenades) and legally and illegally held SALW in their activities. Figures estimate that there are anywhere between 10 and 30,000 active gang members in El Salvador.⁷⁰ Few rehabilitation and prevention programmes exist for gang members and state responses to gangs have been largely repressive; for example, the *Super Mano Dura* (Super Iron Fist) legislative measures that have been implemented to combat the problem.

⁶⁵ Melara, 2001.

⁶⁶ Cruz (2003: 19), citing De Mesquita, 2002.

⁶⁷ Cruz *et al.*, 1998, pp. 4-6.

⁶⁸ Cruz *et al.*, 1998, p.25.

⁶⁹ Interview with PNC (September, 2004).

⁷⁰ El Diario de Hoy, 24 July, 2003, interview with PNC.

Violence is not experienced by all members of society in the same way and it is often the poor who are more vulnerable to extreme violence. It is important to emphasise that poverty does not cause violence and not all poor people are violent. In situations where poverty and inequality overlap, armed violence is employed as an option by some people, with particular lethality when these conditions coincide with SALW use.

In urban areas, high density and overcrowded housing, limited access to basic services and limited livelihood opportunities have put increased pressures on communities, with an accompanying explosion in violence. There are few spaces in Salvadoran society that are free from violence and the threat of violence and the problem of violence is also serious in rural areas. Urgent action is needed to address the problem of violence in a holistic manner, since current state programmes tend to be largely repressive and both state and non-state prevention programmes are limited in terms of both resources and scope. The devastating effect of SALW on current levels of violence should not be underestimated, contributing to levels of violence and also the destruction of human capital. Reforms to the current firearms legislation are urgent. Existing laws are lax and highly permissive. There is a widespread culture of SALW use in El Salvador and educational programmes targeted on the dangers of SALW are necessary. Some steps have been taken by the UNDP's *Violence in a Transitional Society* Programme; however, these need to be replicated throughout the country.

3.6 Chechnya⁷¹

Chechnya's independence movement kindled a highly destructive and bloody civil war about two years after the Soviet Union's disintegration. The ongoing armed violence merits a thorough analysis due to its large number of civilian and military casualties, its massive damage to the rural and urban areas, farming and industrial installations and infrastructure, its long-term impact on the Chechen people's lives and livelihoods and its potential to spread to other parts of Russia and neighbouring countries. Evidence suggests that armed violence will continue in some form in the foreseeable future.

The context of armed violence

The roots of the current armed violence can be traced back to Russia's forcible annexation of Chechnya in the 19th century. Since then, Chechens have fought the Russians on an on-and-off basis to regain their independence. The fading of the Soviet government's authority in its final years paved the way for an independence movement in Chechnya and later to its practical independence, until 1994 when the Russian government used force to regain control over it. However, in 1996 Moscow's failure to achieve that objective made it tolerate Chechnya's practical independence until 1999 when it sent its troops back to the republic.

The first (1994-96) and second (1999-) rounds of the Chechen armed violence have resulted in tens of thousands of civilian and military casualties. Due to the Russian forces' extensive and indiscriminate use of heavy weapons, the armed violence has turned most rural and urban parts of Chechnya into rubble. However, the Russian

⁷¹ This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Chechnya" by Hooman Peimani. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

military is still unable to fully control Chechnya and the armed violence could well expand to the neighbouring republics (Ingushetia and Dagestan) and Georgia.

Armed violence in Chechnya has pitted the Russian military and the pro-Moscow Chechens against the Chechen militants organised in many small fighting units. The latter can be broadly divided into two groups. The Chechen militants have mostly resorted to guerrilla warfare, while the Russian troops have largely launched massive classical military operations using their heavy conventional military assets. This has ensured the extensive destruction of much of Chechnya and heavy civilian casualties, while proving ineffective in uprooting the Chechen militants.

SALW and heavy weapons became widely available almost all over Russia in the early 1990s due to the Soviet Union's collapse. This enabled the Chechens to resort to arms in 1994. However, it was the Chechens' aspirations for independence and statehood and not availability as such that led to the initiation of armed violence.

The impact of armed violence

Ongoing armed violence has heavily damaged Chechnya's cities and villages, its infrastructure, industries, agriculture and health and educational systems. It has also made nearly half of the Chechen population (about 600,000 people) internally displaced and forced about 100,000 non-Chechen ethnics, forming the bulk of its professional strata, to leave Chechnya. This has resulted in major damage to the republic's functioning, including its oil-dependent economy, which Moscow has taken only limited efforts to revitalise. As reflected in the high unemployment rate of 85 per cent in 2004, Chechnya still lacks a viable economic system capable of producing adequate numbers of well-paid employment opportunities.

Armed violence-created poverty in Chechnya is extensive; almost the entire Chechen population lives below the poverty line. The armed violence has especially affected socially vulnerable groups (pregnant women, infants, children, the youth, invalids, the elderly and orphans). Poverty in Chechnya will spread and become worse should armed violence continue. Yet, it is not an irreversible process. An end to armed violence and the achievement of a durable peace would certainly prepare the ground to reverse the poverty trend, provided all necessary domestic and foreign resources were available – an uncertain assumption.

Armed violence has had a major social impact on the Chechens. Its by-products include the formation of a large number of female-headed families and orphans. It has also forced many children to take on greater family responsibility with a concomitant damaging impact on their physical and mental health and education.

Positive aspects of Chechen social capital (e.g. strong family ties), do not serve as a disincentive to armed violence. The damage to family cohesion (e.g. loss of family members and/or their persecution by the Russian forces), loss of home and the lack of opportunity for a peaceful and predictable life in Chechnya have created enough hatred among the Chechens, in particular the younger generation, to ensure the continuation of armed violence.

Armed violence has affected Chechen women as victims of grave human rights abuses directed against them as women (e.g. gang rape), and as armed combatants.

Many Chechen suicide bombers have been women who have been subjected to Russian military abuses.

The overall lowering of living standards all over Russia since 1991 has put it on course in the opposite direction to achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Given the depth of Chechnya's destruction, it will be especially difficult for Moscow to achieve the MDGs there. Apart from obstacles such as inadequate resources, as experienced throughout Russia, in the case of Chechnya the continuation of armed violence and therefore the continuing destruction of its infrastructure and a prevailing sense of human insecurity are two major barriers to achieve the MDGs as long as the armed conflict continues.

Implications for aid programming

Armed violence and SALW programming should be taken into consideration when international donors programme their aid packages. However, for particular reasons, including the fact that Chechen is not an aid recipient, such consideration does not apply to the Chechen case, so denying the international donor community the leverage to push for its desired objectives towards the reduction of armed violence.

3.7 Rio de Janeiro, Brazil⁷²

The objectives of the study of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, were broader than those of the other case studies. As well as assessing the links between armed violence and poverty, it also sought to assess and review the impact of SALW projects on small arms availability/misuse and poverty, by studying one set of initiatives by Viva Rio, the Brazilian NGO.

The context of armed violence

The causes of violence in Rio de Janeiro are multi-faceted. High levels of inequality and physical, social and economic exclusion are some of the principal causes. This combines with cultural factors such as *machismo* and the draw of perceived higher social status and identity through joining gangs. The availability of guns, cocaine and the marijuana industry exacerbates the problem. The lack of an integrated public security strategy coupled with a violent and corrupt police, and a judiciary and prison system which is ineffective, are also contributing factors. The political and economic history of Brazil has played a part: the transition from dictatorship to democracy; rapid and unplanned urbanisation; and shifts in labour market requirements to higher skill levels to meet new demands, resulting in high unemployment and frustration felt by those with some education which is nevertheless insufficient to secure a job in the formal economy.

Rio is one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil. However, the extreme inequality and social exclusion of a significant proportion of the population stands out as one of the major faultlines and a cause of violence. The presence of firearms, especially amongst drug traffickers in *favelas*,⁷³ is the biggest cause of firearm homicide. The residents of

⁷² This is an executive summary of a longer report "Armed violence and poverty in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil" by Lydia Richardson and Adele Kirsten. The full report is available at www.bradford.ac.uk/cics.

⁷³ A *favela* is defined by Rio city government's complementary law no. 16 of 1992, as: "A predominantly residential area, characterized by occupation of the land by low-income populations, precariousness of urban

favelas are stigmatised both in terms of location of residence and colour. The *favelas* are illegal settlements, which has meant that the state largely ignores them. This lack of state presence has made them more susceptible to their *de facto* control by drug factions, which, in turn, makes it harder for development to take place and limits outsiders entering, whether these are businesses or development/violence control or prevention projects. *Favelas* are often built on environmentally protected land, which used to be forests, and are characteristically on steep slopes above the city, which makes them vulnerable to mud slides in heavy rain. This adds to the legislative difficulty of granting the land to the residents legally.

In terms of income, the residents of *favelas* are not necessarily living below the poverty line. However, their relative poverty lies in their vulnerability and social exclusion. In 1995 the city of Rio spent five per cent of GDP on combating violence (excluding private security). The most relevant MDG in relation to Rio is education (63 per cent of *favela* residents in the Municipality of Rio have not achieved a primary certificate – i.e. less than eight years of education). The culture of machismo creates a climate in which violence is seen as a norm, so contributing to incidents of violence. This is evident in the prevalence of domestic violence against women and men's desire to join drug gangs, seeing guns as a source of power and identity.

The perpetrators and victims of armed violence in Rio de Janeiro are primarily the police, drug traffickers (mainly young men of 14-29 years old), and civilians caught in the crossfire. *Favelas* are the main locations of gun violence but criminal violence does occur in other parts of the city. The principal types of armed violence are organised drug gang fighting for territorial control; police use of arms; armed robbery and petty crime.

Viva Rio

The selection of Rio as a case study was in part due to the existence of a well known and respected NGO in the fight against armed violence – Viva Rio. Founded in 1993 in response to gun violence in the city of Rio, its overall goal is to build a culture of peace by reducing gun violence and building social inclusion. It has a holistic approach which includes working at local (community), municipal, state and Federal levels. It also plays a role in the MERCOSUR region.⁷⁴ Viva Rio articulates well the links between reducing violence and increasing social inclusion and is trying to address both in practice. The use of the media has been an integral part of its strategy. The target groups are: 14-29 olds (mainly men) living in *favelas*, the police, the Federal and state judiciary, and wider society.

It was found that Viva Rio's projects were strong on ensuring financial sustainability and able to mainstream projects into the state system; however, they could be stronger in relation to strengthening local community organisations and empowerment. Viva Rio was effective in raising awareness around the dangers of guns; in the removal of "surplus" guns from society (although not necessarily those currently being used in armed violence); and demonstrated a partnership with the state. They were also successful in piloting initiatives in social inclusion and police reform, some of which

infrastructure and public services, narrow and irregularly aligned roads or passage-ways, plots of irregular form and size, and unlicensed constructions that do not conform to legal standards."

⁷⁴ Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay.

have been mainstreamed by the state (e.g. *telecurso*). Some of the key successes of Viva Rio are that its community projects are located within *favelas*, its staff are largely from the same community, it has political buy-in, and it has a sophisticated communications campaign (including the use of communications for raising awareness and embedding media organisations within Viva Rio). In addition, it has established databases to build statistical data and evidence to support projects and campaigns and it has conducted research to ensure that the context and risk and protection factors are fully understood in order to focus policy and interventions. It has also used communication to establish links across isolated community groups in conflict (e.g. Via Favela). Its diverse funding sources have been a successful strategy as Brazilian sources have become relatively less important compared to international sources over the past few years. It has a wide network of high-level contacts within and outside Brazil, and partnerships with local and international business.

Developing indicators

Another objective of the Rio study was to highlight existing or possible future indicators for monitoring and measuring the links between armed violence and poverty, and the ways in which an organisation or project could design an intervention to address these issues in a holistic manner. The following indicators were seen as particularly important (where they are being measured, the results are given in brackets):

- Degree of public support for civilians not carrying guns (to be tested through a national referendum in 2005).
- Numbers of guns collected (120,000 from July to September 2004).
- Changes in level of trust between police and community (demonstrated through respondents of the community policing programme, the GPAE).
- Use of violence by police reduced (to be tested through the GPAE) .
- *Favela* organisations able to continue projects without Viva Rio's presence.
- Attitudinal change of individuals of target age and wider society in relation to gun possession and misuse, building a culture of peace, social responsibility, socio-economic mobility outside drug gangs.
- Change in degree of socio-economic inclusion.
- Degree of interaction between programmes (either within or outside Viva Rio), addressing the multi-faceted nature of armed violence, its causes, perpetrators and victims.

Recommendations

Partnerships for development should be built. Partnerships should also be developed with the multiple public security forces, which do not currently have an integrated policy to combat violence. If poverty is seen as synonymous with inequality and exclusion, then urban violence is one of the dimensions of poverty. If it is seen purely in absolute and not relative terms, and as an income measure, then it is not possible to conclude that violence arises from poverty. However the poor, without coping mechanisms, are often worse affected by violence – economic, social, intimidation and fear – than those who can afford to protect themselves e.g. by hiring private security. The police are often more abusive to the poor as they have the least power to defend themselves.

There needs to be an integration of small arms reduction and development specialists, policy makers and practitioners. This can be done by understanding each others' perspectives and starting from the common ground of analysing who is most affected by both poverty and armed violence. Small arms research and SALW intervention projects often focus on the weapon as the entry point, whereas development practitioners tend to focus on people. This contributes to the current gap between these two groups. Viva Rio shows that by focusing on both the weapon and those most affected by its misuse (thereby with the emphasis on people), this allows for greater opportunity for dialogues and partnership between SALW control and development practitioners in the more effective pursuit of the same outcomes.

Section 4: Key findings

4.1 Main impacts of armed violence

Some of the most important effects of armed violence which emerged in the analysis of the case studies and which are likely to have a long-term impact on poverty and development in the case studies are summarised below.

- The scale of casualties has often been enormous and leaves a legacy of orphans, widows and disabled persons requiring long-term care.
- Armed violence often leads to massive disruption of lives and significant proportions of national populations are displaced, internally or as refugees, especially where there has been ethnic or other forms of “cleansing”. In almost all the situations reviewed in the case studies, displacement means loss of assets, which threaten lives in the immediate emergency phase, and livelihoods in the long-term.
- The targeting of women and children varied in the case studies but there is strong evidence of long-term trauma and social exclusion.
- There was considerable destruction of physical infrastructure. Social services were frequently destroyed or under-funded (for example in Somalia at one stage there were no secondary schools or universities operating) and key social services personnel fled areas of attack or even emigrated.
- Armed violence creates a pervasive climate of fear and insecurity and can seriously affect rural communities and city neighbourhoods, by directly devaluing the quality of life, but also indirectly undermining economic opportunities as, for example, people are often scared to travel to work or markets. It also undermines trust, coping strategies and social capital generally.
- As people take their own initiatives to adjust to the realities of armed violence, new livelihoods and economic activities evolve, but often they benefit the few through exploitation of the poor.
- The combined consequences of disruption, destruction, insecurity and an economic system based on violence will have a considerable impact on poverty and development by inducing famine, malnourishment, the spread of HIV, and unemployment.

4.2 Identifying circumstances where armed violence exacerbates poverty

This section isolates some of the differing circumstances that have had a determining influence on the kind of impacts armed violence has had on poverty and development.

4.2.1 Level of development

The case studies tend to confirm findings of the macro-economic forecasting approaches that the vulnerability of livelihoods and economies, the degree of impoverishment and the difficulty of recovery are greater in countries that rank lower on the UNDP Human Development Index.⁷⁵ As Appendix 3 details, of the 12 country

⁷⁵ Collier *et al.*, 2003.

case studies, four were ranked as having Low Human Development (Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, we have included Somalia in this section although it is not ranked), while the other eight are classified as having Medium Human Development (Nepal, Sudan, India, Algeria, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Brazil and Chechnya). Sudan and Nepal, however, are at the edge of the dividing line between the two categories, with little to differentiate them from Low HDI ranking.

Among our cases, Sri Lanka and Algeria were the only ones experiencing violent conflict that seemed to more or less sustain levels of social expenditure. In addition, the overall impact of armed violence on their macro-economies appears to have been contained. This is also the case for those countries experiencing violent organised criminality – El Salvador and Rio de Janeiro. Low HDI countries appear to experience a more devastating collapse of infrastructure, perhaps because they have so little, and, for example, few alternative routes when roads are destroyed or become unsafe.

4.2.2 Patterns of armed violence

Some of the characteristics or patterns of armed violence vary in the impact they have on poverty and underdevelopment.

Location of violence

The case studies suggest that if the location of the violence is confined to one region, particularly if it is a more peripheral area, the overall impact on the national economy is likely to be contained. This confirms findings from other research.⁷⁶ Thus, in Sri Lanka, although the north and its people suffered major impacts on livelihoods from armed violence, the tourist industry and other important sectors were relatively unscathed. And in Algeria, the oil and gas installations were not significantly targeted, in contrast to Nigeria and Sudan. However, in Sudan, figures indicate that social indicators for the country as a whole improved significantly during the 1990s.⁷⁷ However, this was largely attributable to improvements in the North, which was only indirectly (and to a limited extent) affected by the civil war, whereas in Southern Sudan the situation appears to have worsened. From the late 1990s, when the government gained effective control of the oil fields from the SPLA, there was a major improvement in the economy and in government revenues – although this bounty fuelled the war rather than improved services.

Targeting civilians

The strategies and tactics of combatants vary with their goals and have differing impacts on development and poverty. Our case studies include examples of “wars of liberation” typical of earlier decades (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Southern Sudan), where rebels may seek to provide services to people in a bid to win “hearts and minds” and where government counterinsurgency may attempt to sever links between fighters and people by force. The situation in Nepal seems to show that there may have been some social benefit to the poor in some communities from these tactics. However, while areas in Southern Sudan under continuous SPLA control may also have benefited in similar ways, this was undermined in some areas by violent conflict between factions and counterinsurgent tactics bent on area “cleansing” and induced starvation. Among

⁷⁶ Such as Stewart *et al*, 2001, and Collier *et al.*, 2003.

⁷⁷ Luckham *et al*, 2001.

other cases surveyed, there were struggles for state power often between ethnic factions, including those in government, which often led to ethnic “cleansing” or other forms of deliberate, enforced displacement, as opposed to a side effect (e.g. Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Chechnya).

The extent to which women and children have been targeted across the case studies varies. In some of them, some degree of restraint, whether as deliberate policy, partial respect to indigenous values, or just incidentally, seems to have been practiced. In Somalia, for example, there seems to be a legacy of restraint, although some observers suggest this has eroded significantly recently.

In organised city violence contexts, such as in El Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, the combatants and victims seem to be largely confined to young men, although this is not the case to the same extent in Nairobi.

4.2.3 The fate of the state

The degree to which a state functions as a protector of civilians and continues provision of social and other services has a considerable impact upon impoverishment. By definition, the emergence of armed violence shows some erosion of the effectiveness of the state: it has lost its monopoly on the use of violence, and its mechanisms for resolving disputes peaceably will have been impaired. These processes may have been in motion before an overt escalation of armed violence, but will be a concomitant of any persistent armed violence situation.

The ability of the state to provide services is likely to be an important determining factor in how far poverty is exacerbated by armed violence. The country among the case studies that was most unable to underwrite these services was Somalia – it has been without a state structure in some areas for 14 years, although state-like authorities have emerged in some areas and non-state provision of some services has taken place.

Sudan, Nepal, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka are examples where some areas were effectively beyond state power, during past and on-going conflict. This implies that interventions must go beyond the appropriate strengthening of state structures and functions, and should consider involving these de facto “authorities”, whether for delivering humanitarian assistance (as in the UN’s Operation Lifeline Sudan), supporting livelihoods in the midst of conflict (which is much rarer), or rebuilding local capacities and promoting recovery after “peace”.

4.2.4 Stages of armed violence

A distinction was made earlier between countries where violent conflict is on-going as opposed to resolved, and those where armed violence is in the form of violent organised criminality. It must be stressed, however, that the distinction between on-going and post-conflict is not clear cut in many armed violence situations. Even where there has been a formal peace agreement, low-level violence may persist, as in Sri Lanka, or the transition process may lead to violent political conflict giving way gradually to criminality, as has occurred in El Salvador, sometimes using the same SALW and the same personnel.

The transformation from one mode of armed violence to another is a matter of real concern in Sudan, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. There is also a real threat of the resumption of violent conflict when peace agreements break down, as happened in Sudan in the 1970s and Angola in the 1990s. Indeed, it has been suggested that the crucial transition to reduce a reversion to armed violence may last as long as 10 years.⁷⁸

Post-conflict situations face less impoverishing circumstances and these may have changed sufficiently to allow peace dividends to click in – although that process will not be automatic.

The above suggests that policy and programmes could benefit from being less concerned with the formal distinctions of “in conflict” and “post-conflict” and provide a range of humanitarian, peace-making and development inputs at all stages of armed violence when appropriate. Measures to ensure sustainable peace should not just be short-term and restricted to DDR or measures such as peace operations. Situations of violent organised criminality will also need their own package of arms reduction, peace-making and alternative livelihoods programmes.

4.2.5 The type of political economy of violence

The extent to which armed violence becomes an integral component of economic activity and the varied forms it takes amplifies impoverishment, as well as providing riches for some. For example, war-torn economies such as Colombia and Afghanistan in which the trafficking and production of cocaine, opium or other drugs are endemic, represent an extreme case. Drugs processing, transport and export dominates the economy and politics, and drug production has the capacity to dominate agriculture in whole regions. The macro-economic effect of these activities is to typically generate surplus, often held off-shore, but this distorts social benefits for the people as a whole. Many smallholder farmers may be drawn into production; they may receive a slightly better return than from alternative crops, but the price they pay is becoming enmeshed in an economy based on violence. None of our cases involve both dimensions of the drug economy, but the trafficking, if not production, is a basic ingredient of the armed violence that distorts the economies and politics of El Salvador, Rio de Janeiro, Chechnya, Northeast India and Somalia.

Struggles over the control of minerals and other resources may also drive armed violence. The kind of resource being fought over can dictate the spread of armed violence. The tactics used to wrest control also vary: in Sudan it involved inducing famine and using “scorched earth” tactics; in Sierra Leone it was forced labour by diamond miners often at the point of a gun. Illicit operators can enrich themselves, producers and others employed may get livelihoods above subsistence levels, but among the main beneficiaries is the global economy. Illicit minerals or timber changes hands through international commodity traders often below world prices. In a world where commodity trade is generally to the disadvantage of poor countries, the developing countries involved in an economy of armed violence have even less leverage.

⁷⁸ Collier, 2003.

Overall, the direct economic effects of mineral exploitation will be mixed with some beneficiaries, some losers, and many marginalized or cast into a dependence on criminal ways of making a living. But the end product is often armed violence, and it is the perpetuation of that situation which prevents “normal” development.

In general, in circumstances where large numbers are dependent on the alternative economy, it would be disastrous to undermine such livelihoods prematurely, before some alternative livelihoods are in place. In a post-conflict situation, such as in Sri Lanka, Sudan and Somalia, recovery and development strategy should be planned to build on and re-orient the economic sectors that depend on violence rather than ignore or suddenly destroy them. Finally, there has to be a political component of these strategies which addresses how to confront, deflect, or sideline powerful actors who depend on and seek to perpetuate violence.

4.2.6 The spread of SALW

Clearly, there is likely to be some correlation between the numbers of weapons relative to population and the scale of violence, and thus in turn the scale of impact on development. However, there are cases – e.g. regions within Somalia such as Somaliland – where other circumstances, particularly political processes of peace-making and arms reduction, curtail the impacts even though arms are readily accessible. However, there are also cases where SALW have spread far beyond the control of armed groups into society at large. In stable times, states seek to control access to SALW among the population; in some cases, faced with conflict, governments have encouraged or directly facilitated the distribution of SALW to militias (Sudan and Sierra Leone), to ethnic groups favoured in a patronage system (Kenya), or informally and corruptly from security services to criminal elements they are allied with (El Salvador, Rio de Janeiro and Nairobi).

In such circumstances insecurity is likely to be ultimately heightened. The wider the spread of SALW in society, and the absence of any control over distribution, the more difficult it will be to disarm the population, and the greater the likelihood that new forms of violence will emerge making it more difficult to reverse impoverishment. Thus prospects for sustaining the new peace agreements in Somalia and Sudan, for example, will be complicated by the widespread availability of SALW, which may prolong the insecurity and hamper development. In these circumstances, disarmament may have to be approached differently to mainstream DDR approaches.

Section 5: Implications for intervention policy & programming

The clear evidence of the interconnection between armed violence and underdevelopment and impoverishment raises the question of what can be done in situations of armed violence and, if possible, the reversal of impoverishment. The strategic responses to armed violence identified by our research are:

- Making peace: the ending or reduction of armed violence through negotiated agreements, or at least temporary ceasefires, aid corridors, and embargoes on targeting civilians, including women and children.
- Reduction or control of arms: while disarming warring armies may depend on “peace”, some gun-free arrangements may be possible beforehand. This is also an important option in areas of violent organised crime.
- Reversing impoverishment and underdevelopment through sustained support during violent conflict transitions and through providing appropriate development support during conflict (and not just emergency relief), particularly for livelihoods.

These strategic responses need to be integrated in an **overall strategy** otherwise relief or development initiatives may disrupt peace agreements or negotiations. Equally, if the poverty impacts of armed violence are to be avoided or reversed, sustainable peace and curtailment of societal violence is a necessary condition. Donors and other actors engaged in poverty reduction should consider strategies and programming that creates environments, particularly at the community level, where SSR, good governance, SALW and DDR programming can be undertaken in an integrated fashion. The connections between poverty and armed violence also require an even stronger emphasis on poverty-reducing development. In general, it may be useful to **integrate armed violence considerations into mainstream developmental programming** to make it more conflict-sensitive.

There is a particular challenge in promoting such an integrated strategy as few of the mechanisms for this are currently in place.

- In countries going through **transformations from armed violence**, such as Sri Lanka, Sudan, Somalia, Sierra Leone and Algeria, linkages exist between developmental programming that potentially addresses root causes of armed violence (including poverty), political initiatives for supervising and maintaining “peace”, and DDR/SALW programming which is more oriented to managing weapons. However, there is potential for these to be strengthened.
- In situations of **continuing violent conflict** (such as Nepal, Northeast India and Northern Kenya) the development-beyond-relief and peace-making agendas would benefit from more integration.
- In situations of violent criminality (such as El Salvador and Rio), more attention needs to be given to linking arms reduction with providing alternative livelihoods (for young men especially) taking into account social exclusion and violence.

Some of the key issues for programming are those of developing an integrated approach and approaches to relief-development-security issues in situations of on-going armed violence, and situations of transition from armed violence.

5.1 An integrated approach

A common finding across most the case studies is the need to integrate interventions and programming and operationalise concepts such as human security, the Millennium Development Goals, rights-based approaches and social protection. This includes:

- Coordinating arms reduction initiatives and peace-making/keeping measures.
- Linking armed violence reduction with humanitarian relief and development.
- Developing holistic “conflict, security and development” strategies.
- Drawing upon multi-disciplinary surveys incorporating poverty, social exclusion and vulnerability assessment, “drivers of change” analysis, livelihoods analysis, and an informed understanding of the politics of power and marginalisation, and SALW reduction-focused assessments.

These will need to be backed up by effective coordination between governmental, civil society and even rebel or rebel-associated bodies; specialist agencies in the field; and international, national and local levels and initiatives.

An integrated approach implies: detailed and regular consultation; “conflict sensitivity” and development and relief work (at programme and project level); and the planning of policy in armed violence situations on the basis of an analysis of the dynamics of conflict and the humanitarian and development needs of the population. How far it is possible to achieve such integration through linking the management of relief, development and security is still a contentious issue. The “failures” in the mid-1990s (in places such as Somalia) of international approaches that sought to mediate armed violent conflict, maintain the peace in transition, and effect a transition from relief to development (after earlier “successes” in Mozambique and Namibia), prompted a rethink. An innovation has been for UN and other international development agencies to become more engaged in situations of armed violent conflict. In Somalia, the UNDP has usefully come to play a more central and coordinating role and is now engaged in joint planning with the World Bank, regional bodies and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body.

5.2 Policy and programming in situations of ongoing armed violence

The first task in situations of armed violent conflict is to convince development agencies to get involved. The legacy of the “relief now, development once there is peace” formula persists in practice even though it is recognised in debates as inappropriate. It remains difficult to get action to provide livelihood support in the midst of fighting, or to encourage “opportunistic” development projects during lulls in fighting.

Another obstacle to be overcome is the tendency of development agencies in non-armed violent situations to work with or through governments. When a government is being challenged or is a party to armed violence, there is even greater need to work through civil society bodies, NGOs and the relief and development bodies associated with both sides of the violent conflict. Indeed, developing mechanisms for cooperation in humanitarian and development provision may assist in peace-making

and arms reduction – as seen in the successful Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transition (NMPACT) in Sudan, and in district peace and development committees in northern Kenya.

Box 7: 2005 peace agreement in Sudan and programming issues

As this report was being finalised, the long-sought final agreement to end the war between the North and South in Sudan has been signed and its implementation is due to begin. The challenge will now move from promoting political agreement to ending or reducing armed violence and providing humanitarian relief, which have been the main priorities of international actors, to sustaining the peace and reversing poverty.

The new tasks to which international actors need to respond in an appropriate and coordinated way include:

- Monitoring the cease-fire and the standing down and redeployment of troops.
- The disarmament and demobilisation of some ex-combatants.
- The return and rehabilitation of hundreds of thousands of displaced and refugees.
- The setting up of a regional government in the South and fostering good governance there and in the new joint administration throughout the country.
- Ensuring the agreement leads to a resolution, rather than an escalation, of the conflicts in Darfur and eastern Sudan, and emphasising long-term development, especially poverty reduction.

There is also a need to:

- Build on past efforts by Operation Lifeline Sudan, and the efforts of international agencies and NGOs to continue to deliver relief aid, which is still needed in the transition.
- Build on the structures set up by SPLA in the South, particularly in terms of judicial and local administrative, in creating a regional government and encouraging wider representation including civil society.

Coordination will be a major challenge. It will need to involve a range of indigenous actors (such as civil society organisations and NGOs), regional bodies (IGAD, AU), and international agencies (UN peacekeepers, specialist agencies, donors plus political and diplomatic interventions). Many, but not all, have been involved in the peace-making stage which has yielded some useful experiences that can be built upon. In the Nuba Mountains, one of the three “contested” areas that has required special provision in the agreement, there is a model of community-led cooperation across frontlines and contesting forces, and over a range of activities from relief distribution, to conflict resolution, to longer-term development through NMPACT.

Much of the analysis in this report focuses on post-conflict programming, such as DDR and SALW initiatives, which primarily take place following conflict. However, there are important strands of programming which take place during conflict and

which have the capacity to contain armed violence and alleviate poverty and which need to be linked into a continuum of programming. The findings of this report suggest that actions to resolve violent conflict and reduce arms and their usage, humanitarian interventions to relieve the manifold social costs of armed violence, and programmes to promote pro-poor development need to be part of a single agenda in situations of armed violence. In other words, policies should be conceived as having three inter-related dimensions: of **security, relief and development**.

These interconnections must embrace, but go beyond, the policy debates of the 1990s as to whether relief actors should adopt developmental approaches in long-duration conflicts – the “relief-development continuum” issue – and how to ensure relief (or development) efforts do not exacerbate violent conflict. These issues are still pertinent in situations where armed violence is still ongoing (in our case studies this applies to Nepal, Northern Kenya, Chechnya, Northeast India and Nigeria). Two other considerations in such situations emerge from our findings. First, the enormous costs of armed violence can be reduced by appropriate “development” interventions: in other words there should be a development programme *during* and not just after violent conflict. Second, seeking an end to violence and promoting peace is likely to make an enormous contribution to development in the long-run; i.e. “peace dividends”.

In the case studies which are seen as “post-conflict”, such as Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan, a security-development-relief approach relates especially to DDR programmes. These have to recognise the precariousness of “peace”, the need to avoid slippage back to violent conflict or into violent criminality, and how to implement long-term development and recovery (and how crucial security is to such processes). The security-development-relief approach, equally, implies specific policies and programmes in situations of violent organised criminality (such as in Rio de Janeiro, El Salvador and Nairobi).

The recommendations below explore what can be done in conflict situations.

- **Community confidence-building:** There is a need to work with local leaders and groups during armed violence to establish mechanisms to diffuse the roots of conflict and disputes as they arise and strengthen democracy and civil society. There should be local buy-in and engagement in these activities.
- **Vulnerable groups.** Action is required on vulnerable groups during armed violent conflict, not, as is often the case, largely after the conflict. Groups such as the disabled and children are particularly vulnerable and assistance strategies and livelihood options should be developed for IDPs, which the case studies show are usually among the most vulnerable groups. NGO access to IDPs is particularly important.
- **Long-term perspectives.** These types of programming should ideally be long-term in character with both early engagement (through, for example, early warning) and continuing activity into the post-conflict and long-term development phases.
- **Mitigating security-sector abuses.** Programming needs to help civil society and work with governments to mitigate the impact of security sector abuses against civilians and the encouragement this gives to the arming of civilians. This has been evident in places of armed violence such as Nigeria and Brazil, but also in civil wars such as in Nepal.

- **Security and peacekeeping.** Peacekeeping and peace operations during conflict have a major impact upon both post-conflict reconstruction and development outcomes. They can create secure conditions by mediating between warring parties, helping restore legitimate authorities, or maintaining the peace following a peace agreement. However, they can become part of the problem and engender local resentment. In addition, peace-building programming associated with peacekeeping operations are not always integrated or connected with long-term development. In fact, the two can work against each other. This suggests that the impacts of peacekeeping need to be taken into account in poverty reduction.

5.3 Programmes in situations of transition from violent armed conflict

The case studies show that for programmes in situations of transition from violent armed conflict there are some considerable challenges and dilemmas. If the poverty impacts of armed violence are to be reversed as armed violence diminishes, donors and other actors engaged in poverty reduction need to consider strategies and programming that create environments, particularly at the community level, where SSR, good governance, SALW and DDR programming is undertaken in an integrated fashion. Reintegration should be consistent with strategies for broader recovery and development. Some of the shortfalls and key issues for programming are discussed below.

5.3.1 Linkages between SALW/DDR and poverty-reduction programming

Developmental and SALW/DDR programming, the case studies show, does not tend to be integrated. Developmental programming, for example, that addresses some of the root causes of armed violence such as social, employment, and educational exclusion, does not tend to be connected to programming that directly addresses armed violence, such as DDR programming. It seems unlikely that development can be fully effective unless it takes into account the socio-economic changes brought about by violence. There are likely to be opportunities for both forms of programming to be mutually reinforcing. This is particularly the case in terms of poverty-reduction programming which has a potentially large contribution to make, for example, to the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities. Connecting efforts to secure livelihoods for ex-combatants as part of DDR/SALW programming to wider development programming, such as micro-credit is important. DDR (see section 5.2.8) and the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of IDPs should be consistent with long-term demographic planning (see section 5.2.12).

5.3.2 Addressing motivations for armed violence

SALW programming needs to address more precisely the motivations that lead people, particularly young men, to acquire and use SALW. In addition, programming also needs to address more effectively their livelihood options if key groups are not to return to armed violence. Building sustainable livelihoods, not only for ex-combatants, but also for other groups who may be vulnerable to resorting to armed violence, is essential. Much programming, particularly in terms of DDR, has been ineffective in building livelihoods that are responsive/appropriate to and sustainable in local conditions. DDR programming, for example, has sometimes trained ex-combatants in skills for which there is little or no demand in communities to which

they have returned. In addition, in some circumstances, such as Rio de Janeiro, it may be profitable to link SALW programming with crime, drugs and justice programmes.

5.3.3 Addressing root causes

Such programming should seek to address issues such as exclusion from political participation and formal job markets, stigmatisation of certain groups, and the lack of economic and educational opportunities for many individuals and groups who have resorted to violence. It should also include reversing poor governance and corruption, addressing inequities that are sometimes associated with traditional society leaderships, and reversing poverty. It was noticeable that in virtually all the case studies armed violence has arisen in countries or areas where poverty and impoverishment was pronounced.

5.3.4 Prioritising SSR to prevent armed violence and impoverishment

In many of the case studies, the security sector has either proved weak or ineffectual, and/or has used SALW indiscriminately. The case studies highlight the need for reform of the security sector. Unaccountable, inappropriate, and ineffective security sectors have the capacity to damage development and impoverish people through violence, extortion and predatory behaviour, which themselves can become a source of grievance and a driver of armed violence. SSR, therefore, has a critical role potentially in reversing some of the insecurities that lead to poverty impacts. A well-trained police force, conversant with human rights, is more likely to inspire confidence in communities to hand in illicit weapons, and assist in dealing with armed criminality concerns. In some contexts this approach has borne fruit, with police being persuaded to adopt non-traditional approaches to weapons collection, such as weapons awareness raising as well as improvements in stockpiling and registration. In El Salvador, for example, the police implemented public awareness raising activities in schools, and in SALW campaigns. In Rio de Janeiro, celebrities from television, sport and rap music were used in campaigning and advocacy work.

Reform of the military is a pressing issue in all the case studies. National armies have routinely been involved in attacks on civilians during conflicts and armed violence situations. Certain communities live in fear of the security services and this has helped contribute to the rise of vigilantes and armed groups. However, army reform has been sluggish in many of the case studies and effective oversight has proved difficult to establish not least because parliamentarians and oversight bodies have often been unable to hold them to account. If programming fails to reform national armies there is every prospect of returns to conflict through coups or the resurrection of internal rebel factions.

Programming also needs to engage urgently with the rise in private security and non-state actors such as vigilante groups and security guards that have accompanied armed violence and a lack of state protection, but which often lack effective oversight and accountability.

5.3.5 SALW and community protection

SALW can offer protection to communities and even allow development or poverty reduction to go ahead. This tricky issue has not been confronted head on in policy and programming for understandable reasons. It opens up the question of whether international assistance should, in certain circumstances, strengthen government or

community capacities to resist armed insurrection or criminality and what conditionalities should be sought to safeguard against the misuse of such weaponry. The Maoist rebellion in Nepal has had as one of its stated objectives the reduction of income inequalities in Nepal and there is some evidence that the poor in some areas under Maoist control have experienced improvements in their living standards. In Sierra Leone, the CDF, through protecting some communities against rebel and government attacks, prevented them becoming more impoverished. The impact of the arms supplied by the UK to the Sierra Leone army, which ended up in the hands of CDF, are difficult to gauge but seemed to have played a part in preventing the rebel RUF taking Freetown and prevailing in the civil war. However, to what use these arms have subsequently been put is not clear. Certainly, state weakness, as well as state repression, has been a factor in the rise of armed violence and spiralling poverty in some of the case studies.

5.3.6 Prioritising community security

Community security should be a key priority for programming. Almost all the case studies indicate that meaningful development is highly problematic when SALW are widely owned in situations of violence or potential violence. Even small quantities of SALW can empower groups, as with the emergence of youth gangs (the *Maras*) in El Salvador, to exert a disruptive influence out of proportion to their size, and often over extremely short timeframes. Community confidence building should be prioritised in DDR and SALW programming. Confidence building needs to be reinforced at the community level by measures such as weapons-free zones/communities which have the capacity to create space for development to take place.

5.3.7 Utilising traditional conflict resolution

Donor programming needs to engage more comprehensively with traditional mechanisms to avert violence. Few case studies indicate that this has happened. In places such as Sudan and Northern Kenya, traditional mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms have historically helped avert disputes getting out of hand and settled compensation claims. However, SALW possession and usage has undermined these mechanisms by empowering individuals and groups who tended to have little respect for customary laws and practices. Traditional conflict resolution mechanisms might usefully be resurrected once weapons collection has taken place and a measure of security has been established in communities. However, opportunities to challenge the ways in which these mechanism can be discriminatory (e.g. against women) should be pursued.

5.3.8 DDR and small arms and light weapons initiatives

Some DDR/SALW programmes have been operationally ineffective – leaving many weapons uncollected – or have found it difficult to address localised or community armed violence. Programming recommendations include weighing up carefully when disarmament is appropriate; and engaging with civilian weapons, including “traditional” weaponry. Disarmament is not necessarily an appropriate or immediate response in all situations of armed violence, particularly when approached in a piecemeal fashion or without adequate analysis of the security context as faced by vulnerable communities. Much DDR programming, in particular, assumes that disarmament is the answer to insecurity. However, a number of the case studies demonstrate that disarmament has the potential to be destabilising and threaten the livelihoods of many. Pastoralists in Northern Kenya, for example, in a cycle of

expanding gun ownership, had no alternative but to resort to weapons, when available, for the protection of their herds and their very survival. Some disarmament programmes have actually endangered the capacity of pastoralists to survive and have further impoverished them. This suggests that programming needs to weigh up carefully when disarmament is appropriate. This may involve supporting community or group security before proceeding to the disarmament phase.

In relation to this, DDR and arms collection/reduction initiatives should:

- Not normally be initiated unless insecurity has already been reduced.
- Not implemented in isolation from violence-reduction initiatives in neighbouring areas and across borders. Care should be taken to avoid premature or unbalanced disarmament where it might increase relative impoverishment and insecurity, as happened in Northern Kenya/Uganda.
- Not be initiated without a development component that offers alternative livelihoods or undertaken without considering the transformation of the political economy of violence and addressing the underlying causes of armed violence.
- Where appropriate, at an early stage, SALW in the hands of civilians and combatants should be collected to avoid a drift into violent organised criminality.

5.3.9 Collecting civilian weapons

Programming needs to engage more with civilian weapons. Civilian weapons are often left uncollected during disarmament and DDR programmes. In many of the case studies SALW were freely available, enabling, in the absence of effective gun controls and legislation, criminal elements to terrorise communities. If the emergence of criminal groups is to be avoided, civilian disarmament or gun controls will need to be initiated and the reassertion of local or state authority established. However, this will need to be phased and undertaken in a sensitive manner. This implies the creation of local structures of good governance, SSR, and mechanisms under which the state can assume, or resume, legitimacy as the provider of law and order. It may also imply donor support to the implementation and public awareness raising of new regulations.

5.3.10 Engaging with traditional and home-produced weapons

Programming is largely ignoring the issue of traditional and home-made weapons. This needs to be given greater priority. It is tempting to side-step traditional weapons issues as this can be culturally or politically sensitive and more complicated in control terms (e.g. weapons such as machetes may be essential tools in livelihood activities). In some contexts, traditional weapons' possession and usage has not appeared to lead to extreme violence and may seem a "lesser evil" than the proliferation of SALW which often leads to cycles of killings and dislocations. However, as Algeria, Sierra Leone and Rwanda show, traditional weapons can be used to terrorise and destabilise communities. One means of addressing traditional weapons usage is to re-assert traditional control mechanisms – such as the oversight of elders – or sensitisation measures that create taboos against usage.

5.3.11 Strengthening reintegration

Faultlines in reintegration need to be addressed. Ex-combatants in many of the case studies remain without viable livelihoods after conflict and many are engaging in armed criminality and violence. In countries such as El Salvador and Somalia, the failure to reintegrate, or reintegrate effectively, in the 1990s is now having

considerable adverse consequences. When reintegration is initiated it needs to be long-term and have strong community buy-in, and it needs higher levels of funding. Further, as the case studies show, it needs to be more comprehensive in its coverage, in particular incorporating armed groups that often fall outside reintegration processes, but which have the capacity to contribute to insecurity and hold back development.

5.3.12 Rural-urban displacement

Programming is urgently needed to address the drift of many civilians from rural to urban areas during and following armed violence. Almost all the case studies showed this trend. While this cannot be solely attributed to armed violence, it is clear that armed violence has accelerated the process in countries such as Sierra Leone. The impact of this movement has been to impoverish many rural persons who have been unable to find sustainable or suitable livelihoods in urban areas. Further, the withdrawal of labour and expertise from rural areas has led to many of them becoming depopulated and impoverished.

5.3.13 Addressing “gun cultures”

Changing attitudes to gun culture and the use of violence as a norm of inter-group or personal relations should be a key task of programming. This is being undertaken in some SALW programming, such as in El Salvador and Rio de Janeiro, but is rarely attempted in DDR programming. Greater emphasis should be placed on sensitisation and community mobilisation against SALW possession. Such measures have the capacity to produce a real and valuable sense of improved security through averting subsequent post-conflict criminality as well as community and domestic violence which often impacts on the poor. If this is not the case, there may be a reliance on vigilante protection in poorer communities, which often has abusive dimensions, as well as private and unaccountable security personnel employed by the wealthier who are often targeted for armed robbery.

5.3.14 Vulnerable groups

Targeting groups that are particularly likely to suffer impoverishment because of their vulnerability in armed violence situations is fairly well-established. However, it is not sufficiently nuanced or comprehensive to address the disadvantages that many vulnerable groups face, or, it would seem, to lift them out of poverty. There are special difficulties associated with vulnerable groups – not least the disabled who tend to be sidelined and impoverished during and after armed violence – that remain largely unaddressed. DDR and SALW programming, for example, recognises that women combatants are a special group that need protection during demobilisation/reintegration, but it does not tend to factor in some of the difficulties that women face, nor do they tend to provide sufficient follow-up.

5.3.15 Building upon armed violence-induced social change

Programming is not making the most of opportunities to build upon social change brought about through armed violence. Armed violence creates conditions where some individuals and groups experience for the first time a sense of empowerment through the breakdown of sometimes repressive social structures. Some displaced persons, the case studies show, were exposed to human rights instruction in camps that enabled them to approach post-conflict situations with a desire for change. While armed violence is accompanied by much suffering, it can release individuals and

groups from bonds that have been holding them back. Local government reforms and elections may help build upon the desire of individuals and groups to make a break with the inequities of the past. In certain contexts, such as Nepal, women took a bigger role in agriculture while men were away fighting. Some of these changes might be backed up with programming that seeks to exploit the momentum behind social change. This must however be sensitive to (and informed about) existing deep-rooted cultural norms: for example, encouragement to women to quickly take up more “modern” and Western-conceived roles post-conflict could put them in danger of a violent backlash from male-dominated, traditional and religious sensitivities.

Section 6: Conclusions

The impacts of armed violence and armed violent situations on poverty and development charted in this report are considerable. The capacity of armed violence to curtail or hamper development and plunge large numbers of people further into poverty is clear. If the lives of the poor or impoverished are to be improved, it is unlikely that this can be achieved without considering insecurity, which is frequently caused or exacerbated by armed violence.

6.1 Impact on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

The MDGs are at risk from armed violence in a number of ways:

- **Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.** Our case studies reinforce the perception that this goal will be difficult to meet in the countries concerned due to the loss of livelihoods, unemployment, displacement and changes in household composition through the experience of armed violence.
- **Achieving universal primary education.** This goal is unlikely to be met in many of the countries in this study, in part due to the destruction of schools, disruption to schooling and diversion of state revenues from social expenditure to military spending.
- **Promoting gender equality and empowering women** is being challenged through the impoverishment of women, an expansion in their workload, an increase of women-headed households, and an increase in gender-based violence. However, some of the case studies showed that the removal of men from communities and homes and a decline in traditional structures, on occasion, allowed women greater freedom.
- **Reducing child mortality** is unlikely to be met in situations of armed violence where the indiscriminate killing of civilians, including children, has grown, and where armed violence has led to the closure or destruction of medical facilities and the impoverishment or killing of personnel working in the health sector. Further, the absence or short supply of certain drugs has meant that curable diseases have taken a heavy toll on children during periods of armed violence.
- **Improving maternal health** is likely to be severely hampered due to the destruction and disruption of the health infrastructure.
- **Combat HIV/AIDS and other diseases.** Many of the case studies showed that disruptions to health services and sanitation, poor living conditions for the displaced, and an increase in sexual violence and prostitution provide fertile ground for the spreading of malaria and HIV/AIDS. In addition, the introduction of infected combatants into some countries where HIV/AIDS was not previously prevalent has further damaged progress to combat it.
- **Ensure environmental sustainability.** The development of slums on the outskirts of large towns due to people fleeing violence in the countryside in many of the case studies will challenge this goal, as will the destruction of access to safe drinking water and sanitation caused by widespread infrastructure destruction, mineral exploitation and deforestation.

6.2 Key recommendations

6.2.1 Develop an integrated approach

A key finding that emerges from the case studies is that programming to address armed violence is often limited in scale and scope. Better linkages need to be made between development programming that potentially addresses root causes of armed violence, including poverty, and DDR/SALW programming which is more oriented to managing weapons. This coordination has yet to be fully realised either under the UN or other international bodies or ad hoc networks. Also, if this coordination is to be realised there are some pertinent issues to address – is a division of labour compatible with bilateral agencies' plans? And what role should NGOs play? If the poverty impacts of armed violence are to be minimised or reversed, donors and other actors engaged in poverty reduction may consider developing, for example, holistic “conflict, security and development” analyses that incorporate poverty, social exclusion and vulnerability assessment, “drivers of change” analysis, livelihoods analysis, anthropological analysis and the more traditional SALW reduction-focused assessments.

6.2.2 Build a peace economy

It seems unlikely that development programming can be effective unless it takes into account the socio-economic changes brought about by violence, particularly given that the case studies show a transformed political economy towards criminal activities and, on occasions, a substantial criminalisation of politics. Development programming should, therefore, identify the political economy of armed violence in order to build on any positive features (such as new trading links) and reverse the most debilitating (such as corruption). This applies equally to post-conflict situations, situations of ongoing violence, and situations of armed violent criminality.

6.2.3 Promote alternative livelihoods

Promoting and providing alternative livelihoods for those most likely to revert to armed violence and those taking part in the illicit economy should be a priority, and this element should be strengthened in DDR programmes. Building confidence between ex-combatants and civilians is a priority that can contribute to avoiding the future alienation and criminalisation of ex-combatants. Equally important is the restoration of livelihood assets of the most impoverished and vulnerable that have borne the brunt of armed violence situations (particularly women and child-headed households).

6.2.4 Prioritise community security

Consideration should be given to making community security a key priority for programming. Almost all the case studies indicate that meaningful development is highly problematic when SALW are widely owned in situations of violence or potential violence. Confidence-building measures such as weapons-free zones should be supported, as should the rebuilding of traditional mediation and conflict-resolution mechanisms where these are appropriate. Programming should also help civil society work with governments to mitigate the impact of security sector abuses against civilians and encourage security sector reform. SALW initiatives should re-double efforts to mop up weapons left over from DDR programmes, continue to engage with civilian weapons, and raise awareness of the damaging impacts upon communities of weapons possession/usage. SALW in the hands of civilians, as well as combatants,

should be collected to avoid a drift into violent organised crime or renewed outbreaks of armed violence or conflict. However, it is important to realise that disarmament is not necessarily an appropriate or immediate response in all situations of armed violence, particularly when it is approached without adequate analysis of the security context faced by vulnerable communities. Disarmament is not necessarily the answer to insecurity. Furthermore, care should be taken to avoid premature or unbalanced disarmament where it might increase relative impoverishment and insecurity, as happened in Northern Kenya/Uganda, or being implemented in isolation from violence-reduction initiatives in neighbouring areas and across borders. Social and cultural measures to challenge and move societies away from 'gun cultures' should also be given priority.

6.2.5 Try to reduce impacts during armed violence situations

There are important strands of programming which take place during armed violence situations that have the capacity to contain armed violence and alleviate poverty. In particular, the enormous costs of armed violence can be reduced by appropriate development interventions *during* conflict, particularly assistance strategies for vulnerable groups such as children and displaced people. The impacts of peacekeeping should also be taken into account in poverty reduction programming.

Appendix 1: Acronyms

AVPI Armed Violence and Poverty Initiative

CDF Civil Defence Force

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations

GDP Gross domestic product

IDP Internally displaced people

INGO International non-governmental organisations

LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

PCR Post-conflict reconstruction

RUF Revolutionary United Front

UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees

SALW Small arms and light weapons

SPLA Sudan People's Liberation Army

SSR Security Sector Reform

Appendix 2: The availability of SALW and the nature of armed violence

	SALW availability/supply	Nature of armed violence
N. Kenya	Increased availability of SALW leads to shift in scale and type of armed violence; regional flows of SALW from Uganda and Southern Sudan.	Cattle raiding.
Nairobi, Kenya	Gangs arm through theft and trade.	Theft, car-jacks, extortion.
S. Sudan	Government-supplied militias; SLA obtained from neighbours and trade, spread to own militias.	Government aerial bombardment; fighting between government and SPLA troops; banditry; cattle raiding; looting; raping women; burning villages; inter-factional fighting; abducting and selling women and children.
Somalia	Build up before and after independence from superpowers. Armouries burgled; ex-soldiers disperse and sell.	“Clan cleansing”; seizure and destruction of land and other assets. Extortion, road-blocks for money and relief supplies.
Nepal	Limited to army and rebels, latter from seizures and trade.	Guerrilla war and counter-insurgency.
Sri Lanka	Supply from rebels from neighbouring countries; army deserters.	Guerrilla and other fighting with counterinsurgency in certain areas.
NE India	Rebels from neighbouring countries, regional arms flows, leftovers from Cambodian conflict.	Attacks on government facilities and garrisons; counter-insurgency. Inter-communal violence
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil	From market, national production.	Gang competition, fights with police, control and patronage in <i>favellas</i> .
El Salvador	Remnants of the civil war.	Pervasive street crime; gang fights.
Chechnya	From ex-Soviet armouries.	Confrontation between Russian army and rebels.
Sierra Leone	From seizures, neighbouring countries, northern and Middle East arms supplies.	Rebels attack communities; competition for control of diamond fields; atrocities against civilians.
Nigeria	SALW trade across porous borders ‘becoming endemic’.	“Ethnic” clashes; uprisings in Niger Delta; government repression and retaliation; gang fights and extortion in cities.
Algeria	Government heavily armed; insurgents capture and get from outside countries.	Indiscriminate terror on civilians; attacks on government installations.

Appendix 3: Human Development ranking for the case studies

Medium human development	
57	Russian Federation (incl. Chechnya)
72	Brazil (incl. Rio)
96	Sri Lanka
103	El Salvador
108	Algeria
127	India
139	Sudan
140	Nepal
Low human development	
148	Kenya (incl. NE Kenya and Nairobi)
151	Nigeria
177	Sierra Leone
No figures	Somalia

Appendix 4: Figures for Refugees and IDPs in the case studies

Countries	Refugees⁷⁹	Internally displaced⁸⁰
Sierra Leone	70,570	7,500 (2004)
Sudan	1 million (1993) 606,179	2 million ⁸¹ (1993) 4 million (2004)
Kenya	3,164	350,000
Somalia	800,000 (1992) 402,152	556,000-1.6m (1991/92) 300,000-350,000 (2004)
Nigeria	24,417	250,000
Nepal	1,230	100,000-200,000 (2003)
Northeast India	No disaggregated figures. Total for India 13,704	157,000-250,000 ⁸²
Sri Lanka	1 million fled during civil war ⁸³ 121,988	386,000 (2003)
El Salvador	5,658	1,000,000 ⁸⁴
Brazil	378	N/A
Chechnya	No disaggregated figs. Total for Russia 96,407	600,000
Algeria	11,671	1.5 million
Global	17.084m	24.6m

⁷⁹ All figures are from UNHCR and are for end of year 2003 unless otherwise stated.

⁸⁰ All figures are from The Global IDP project unless otherwise stated.

⁸¹ Both figures for 1993 Figures refer to Southern Sudan only.

⁸² USCR quotes 157,000 but these are most likely a gross underestimation of the numbers. Individual reports on the Global IDP project and other estimates from USCR puts the figure nearer 250,000.

⁸³ Figure from UNIFEM.

⁸⁴ It is estimated that 1m people were displaced within the region as a result of political conflict.

Appendix 5: Military and social expenditures in case studies and selected other countries, 1985-2002

	Milit. Exp. as % of GDP, educ, & health, 1985-1996			Military & social expenditures (% of GDP) 1998-2002				
	% of GDP		% of Education & Health (1991)	Military			Education	Health
	1985	1996		1998	2000	2002	1998-2000	2000
Algeria	1.7	4.0	11	4.0	3.5	3.7	-	3.0
Angola	15.1	6.5	208	11.3	4.8	3.7	2.7	2.0
Brazil	0.8	2.1	23	1.4	1.3	1.6	4.7	3.4
Burundi	3.0	5.1	42	6.6	6.0	7.6	3.4	1.6
Chad	2.9	4.0	74	0.9	1.6	1.4	2.0	2.5
DR Congo	1.5	2.8	71	42.8	-	-	-	-
Congo	1.9	1.9	...	-	-	-	4.2	1.5
Djibouti	7.9	5.4	...	4.4	-	-	3.5	3.4
El Salvador	4.4	1.5	66	0.8	0.9	0.8	2.3	3.8
Eritrea	NA	8.4	...	35.3	36.1	23.5	4.8	2.8
Ethiopia	17.9	2	190	6.7	9.6	5.2	4.8	1.8
India	3.0	2.8	65	2.2	2.3	2.3	4.1	0.9
Kenya	3.1	2.2	24	1.5	1.8	1.7	6.4	1.8
Liberia	2.4	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal	1.5	0.9	35	0.8	0.9	1.4	3.7	0.9
Nigeria	1.7	3.5	33	0.9	0.8	1.1	-	0.5
Mozambique	8.5	3.7	121	2.2	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.7
Russia	NA	6.5	132	[3.1]	[3.7]	[4.0]	4.4	3.8
Rwanda	1.9	6.8	...	4.4	3.8	4.3	2.8	2.7
Sierra Leone	1.0	...	[23]	-	(3.6)	(2.2)	1.0	2.6
Somalia	6.2	-	-	-	-	-
South Africa	2.7	2.2	41	1.5	1.6	1.6	5.5	3.7
Sri Lanka	3.8	6.5	107	4.2	4.5	3.1	3.1	-
Sudan	3.2	5.8	44	1.8	2.9	2.8	-	1.0
Uganda	1.8	2.4	18	2.3	2.1	2.4	2.3	1.5
SSA	3.1	3.2	...	4.8	5.7	5.9	-	-
All LDCs	4.3	2.5	72					
All Developing countries	7.1	3.7	63	-	-	-	-	-

Figures for 1985-1996 reproduced from Luckham, et.al. 2001, Appendix 1: 54; Military and social expenditure figures for 1998-2002 from SIPRI military expenditure by country 1994-2002 & UNDP Global Human Development Report 2003, respectively.

Appendix 6: Military expenditures & selected socio-economic indicators for selected conflict-affected countries 1998-2002

Countries	Military Expenditures % of GDP			GDP (% p.a.)			growth GNI per capita			Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)			Under-5 Mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)			HD Rank
	1998	2000	2002	1998	2000	2002	1998	2000	2002	1998	2000	2002	1998	2000	2002	
Angola	11.3	4.8	3.7	6.8	3.0	15.3	520.0	470.0	710.0	-	172.0	154.0	-	260.0	260.0	164
Burundi	6.6	6	7.6	4.8	-0.9	3.6	140.0	110.0	100.0	-	121.0	123.0	-	204.0	208.0	171
Chad	0.9	1.6	1.4	5.9	-0.6	9.9	220.0	190.0	210.0	-	118.0	117.0	-	200.0	200.0	165
DR Congo	42.8	-	-	-1.6	-7.0	3.0	110.0	90.0	100.0	-	128.0	129.0	-	205.0	205.0	167
Congo	-	-	-	3.7	8.2	3.5	530.0	510.0	610.0	3.7	8.2	3.5	530.0	510.0	610.0	140
Djibouti	4.4	-	-	0.1	0.7	1.6	790.0	830.0	850.0	-	102.0	100.0	-	146.0	143.0	153
Eritrea	35.3	36.1	23.5	1.8	-13.2	1.8	220.0	180.0	190.0	-	65.0	59.0	-	89.0	80.0	155
Ethiopia	6.7	9.1	5.2	-1.9	5.7	2.7	110.0	110.0	100.0	-	116.0	114.0	-	176.0	171.0	169
Liberia	-	-	-	29.7	20.4	3.3	110.0	130.0	140.0	-	157.0	157.0	-	235.0	235.0	-
Mozambique	2.2	2.5	2.4	12.6	1.5	7.7	200.0	210.0	200.0	-	130.0	128.0	-	208.0	205.0	170
Rwanda	4.4	3.8	4.3	8.9	6.0	9.4	250.0	260.0	230.0	-	118.0	118.0	-	203.0	203.0	158
Sierra Leone	-	[3.6]	[2.2]	-0.9	3.8	6.3	150.0	130.0	140.0	-	167.0	165.0	-	286.0	284.0	175
Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sudan	1.8	2.9	1.6	6.4	5.1	5.5	340.0	340.0	370.0	-	65.0	64.0	-	97.0	94.0	138
Uganda	2.3	2.1	2.8	4.91	5.5	6.71	290	270	240	-	85	83	-	145	141	147
Sri Lanka				4.7	6.0	4.0	850.0	890.0	850.0	-	17.0	16.0	-	20.0	19.0	99

Sources: Military expenditure figures for 1998-2002 from SIPRI 1994-2002; Socio-Economic Indicators from World Bank World Development Indicators; HD rank (for 175 countries) from UNDP Global Human Development Report 2003

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