

# Security Analysis of DRBG Using HMAC in NIST SP 800-90

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**Abstract.** HMAC\_DRBG is a deterministic random bit generator using HMAC specified in NIST SP 800-90. The document claims that HMAC\_DRBG is a pseudorandom bit generator if HMAC is a pseudorandom function. However, no proof is given in the document. This article provides a security analysis of HMAC\_DRBG and confirms the claim.

**Key words:** NIST SP 800-90, pseudorandom bit generator, HMAC, pseudorandom function

## 1 Introduction

*Background.* Random bits are indispensable to every cryptographic application. However, it is not easy to prepare sufficient amount of truly random bits in general. Thus, most applications use a cryptographic mechanism that is called a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG). It stretches a short sequence of random bits to a long sequence of bits that are indistinguishable from truly random bits in practice.

HMAC\_DRBG is a deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) specified in NIST SP 800-90 [3]. It is claimed in NIST SP 800-90 that HMAC\_DRBG is a PRBG if HMAC is a pseudorandom function (PRF). However, no proof is made public as far as the authors know.

*Contribution.* This article presents a security analysis of HMAC\_DRBG. The result supports the claim in NIST SP 800-90 mentioned above. This article does not provide new techniques and just uses well-known ones in the analysis. In spite of this fact, the contribution of this paper is still important since HMAC\_DRBG is expected to be widely used in practice.

HMAC\_DRBG consists of three algorithms. They are instantiate, reseed and generate algorithms. The instantiate/reseed algorithm is used to produce/refresh a secret key. The generate algorithm produces a binary sequence from a secret key given by the instantiate or reseed algorithms. This article gives a proof for the pseudorandomness of HMAC\_DRBG on the assumption that the instantiate and reseed algorithms are ideal. Namely, a secret key given to the generate algorithm is selected uniformly at random by each of them.

*Related Work.* NIST SP 800-90 specifies four DRBG mechanisms: Hash\_DRBG, HMAC\_DRBG, CTR\_DRBG and Dual\_EC\_DRBG. Hash\_DRBG and HMAC\_DRBG are based on hash functions. CTR\_DRBG uses a block cipher in the counter mode. Dual\_EC\_DRBG is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. A security analysis of these DRBGs was presented in [9]. However, the discussion was quite informal. A security analysis of CTR\_DRBG was also presented in [7]. Brown and Gjøsteen [6] provided a detailed security analysis of Dual\_EC\_DRBG.

There also exist some other approved DRBGs in ANSI X.9.31 [2], ANSI X.9.62-1998 [1] and FIPS PUB 186-2 [11]. The security of these algorithms was discussed in [8] and [10].

HMAC was proposed by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk [5]. It was proved to be a PRF on the assumption that the compression function of the underlying iterated hash function is a PRF with two keying strategies[4]. Actually, HMAC is used as a PRF in many cryptographic schemes.

*Organization.* This article is organized as follows. Definitions of a pseudorandom bit generator and a pseudorandom function are given in Sect. 2. A description of HMAC\_DRBG is presented in Sect. 3. Results on security analysis of HMAC\_DRBG are shown in Sect. 4. Concluding remarks are given in Sect. 5.

## 2 Preliminaries

Let  $a \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} A$  represent that an element  $a$  is selected uniformly at random from a set  $A$ .

### 2.1 A Pseudorandom Bit Generator

Let  $G$  be a function such that  $G : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ . Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a probabilistic algorithm which outputs 0 or 1 for a given input in  $\{0, 1\}^l$ . The goal of  $\mathcal{D}$  is to tell whether a given input is  $G(k)$  for  $k$  selected uniformly at random or it is selected uniformly at random. The advantage of  $\mathcal{D}$  against  $G$  is defined as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_G^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) = \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(G(k)) = 1 \mid k \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^l] \right| ,$$

where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by  $\mathcal{D}$  and the uniform distributions on  $\{0, 1\}^n$  or  $\{0, 1\}^l$ .  $G$  is called a pseudorandom bit generator (PRBG) if  $l > n$  and  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D})$  is negligible for any efficient  $\mathcal{D}$ .

### 2.2 A Pseudorandom Function

Let  $H$  be a keyed function such that  $H : K \times D \rightarrow R$ , where  $K$  is a key space,  $D$  is a domain, and  $R$  is a range.  $H(k, \cdot)$  is denoted by  $H_k(\cdot)$ . Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a probabilistic algorithm which has oracle access to a function from  $D$  to  $R$ . The goal of  $\mathcal{A}$  is to tell whether the oracle is  $H_k$  for  $k$  selected uniformly at random or it is a

function selected uniformly at random.  $\mathcal{A}$  first asks elements in  $D$  and obtains the corresponding elements in  $R$  with respect to the function, and then outputs 0 or 1.  $\mathcal{A}$  makes the queries adaptively:  $\mathcal{A}$  makes a new query after receiving an answer to the current query.

Let  $F$  be the set of all functions from  $D$  to  $R$ . The advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  for  $H$  is defined as follows:

$$\text{Adv}_H^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) = \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H_k} = 1 \mid k \xleftarrow{\$} K] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^f = 1 \mid f \xleftarrow{\$} F] \right| ,$$

where the probabilities are taken over the coin tosses by  $\mathcal{A}$  and the uniform distributions on  $K$  or  $F$ .  $H$  is called a pseudorandom function (PRF) if  $\text{Adv}_H^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A})$  is negligible for any efficient  $\mathcal{A}$ .

### 3 HMAC\_DRBG

HMAC\_DRBG is a DRBG using HMAC in NIST SP 800-90 [3]. It consists of three algorithms: an instantiate algorithm, a reseed algorithm and a generate algorithm. The instantiate algorithm is used to produce a secret key. The reseed algorithm is used to refresh it. These algorithms are out of the scope of the article. They also use HMAC to produce the secret keys. However, the security of the outputs is not based on the secrecy and randomness of the keys given to HMAC but the data given to HMAC via message input. From this viewpoint, we may say that they abuse HMAC.

We only assume that the keys produced by the instantiate and reseed algorithms are ideal. Namely, we assume that a secret key given to the generate algorithm is selected uniformly at random.

The generate algorithm produces a binary sequence for a given secret key. A description of this algorithm is given in the following part. The instantiate and reseed algorithms are given in Appendix A for reference.

*Notation.* HMAC is simply denoted by  $H$ . Let  $n$  denote the output length of  $H$ . Let  $\text{null}$  denote an empty sequence. Concatenation of binary sequences  $x$  and  $y$  is denoted by  $x\|y$ . The symbol  $\|$  is sometimes omitted.

#### 3.1 Internal State

The internal state of HMAC\_DRBG includes  $K \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $V \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and a reseed counter  $d \geq 1$ .  $K$  and  $V$  are assumed to be secret. The reseed counter  $d$  is an integer variable indicating the number of requests for pseudorandom bits since instantiation or reseeding.

#### 3.2 The Function Update

The function `Update` is used in the generate algorithm to produce a secret key  $(K, V)$  for the next invocation of the generate algorithm. It is described as follows.

Update( $K, V, adin$ ):

1.  $K = H(K, V || 0x00 || adin)$
2.  $V = H(K, V)$
3. If  $adin = \text{null}$ , then return ( $K, V$ )
4.  $K = H(K, V || 0x01 || adin)$
5.  $V = H(K, V)$
6. Return ( $K, V$ )

$adin$  is an optional additional input. Update is shown in Fig. 1.




Fig. 1. The function Update


### 3.3 The Algorithm Generate

The generate algorithm Generate produces a binary sequence  $s$  for given secret  $(K, V)$  and an optional additional input  $adin$ . It is described as follows.

Generate( $K, V, adin$ ):

1. If  $d > w$ , then return an indication that a reseed is required.
2.  $(K, V) = \text{Update}(K, V, adin)$  if  $adin \neq \text{null}$
3.  $tmp = \text{null}$
4. While  $|tmp| < \ell$  do:
  - (a)  $V = H(K, V)$
  - (b)  $tmp = tmp \| V$
5.  $s$  = the leftmost  $\ell$  bits of  $tmp$
6.  $(K, V) = \text{Update}(K, V, adin)$
7.  $d = d + 1$
8. Return  $s$  and  $(K, V)$

The maximum sizes of parameters are given in Table 1.  $w$  is called a reseed interval. It represents the total number of requests for pseudorandom bits between reseeding. If  $adin$  is not supported, then the step 6 is executed with  $adin = \text{null}$ . Generate is given in Fig. 2.



**Fig. 2.** The algorithm Generate. The update of the reseed counter  $d$  is omitted.

**Table 1.** The maximum sizes of parameters

parameter	maximum size
$ adin $	$2^{35}$ bits
$\ell$	$2^{19}$ bits
$w$	$2^{48}$

## 4 Security Analysis

For simplicity, we assume that  $\ell$  is a multiple of  $n$ . Thus, the output length of **Generate** is  $\ell + 2n$ . We analyze the security of a generator  $G : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{w\ell}$  defined as follows:

- $G(K, V)$ :
1.  $(K_0, V_0) = (K, V)$
  2.  $s = \text{null}$
  3. for  $i = 1$  to  $w$  do
    - (a)  $(s^i, K_i, V_i) = \text{Generate}(K_{i-1}, V_{i-1}, adin_{i-1})$
    - (b)  $s = s \| s^i$
    - (c) Return  $s$

We make  $adin_i$  implicit in the notation of  $G(K, V)$ , because the analysis given in the remaining parts does not depend on the value of  $adin_i$ . It depends only on whether  $adin_i = \text{null}$  or not.

### 4.1 If $adin = \text{null}$

First, notice that we cannot prove the pseudorandomness of  $G$  directly from that of **Generate**. **Generate** is not a PRBG if  $adin = \text{null}$ . Let  $q = \ell/n$  and  $\text{Generate}(K, V) = s_1 \| s_2 \| \cdots \| s_q \| K' \| V'$ , where  $s_j \in \{0, 1\}^n$  for  $1 \leq j \leq q$ . Then,  $V' = H_{K'}(s_q)$ . Thus, it is easy to distinguish  $s_1 \| s_2 \| \cdots \| s_q \| K' \| V'$  from a truly random sequence of length  $\ell + 2n$ .

We introduce two generators  $G_{01}$  and  $G_{02}$ .  $G_{01} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell+2n}$  is described as follows:

- $G_{01}(K, V)$ :
1.  $s = V$
  2.  $tmp = \text{null}$
  3. While  $|tmp| < \ell$  do:
    - (a)  $V = H(K, V)$
    - (b)  $tmp = tmp \| V$
  4.  $s = s \| tmp$
  5.  $K = H(K, V \| 0x00)$
  6.  $s = s \| K$
  7. Return  $s$

$G_{02} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n}$  is described as follows:

- $G_{02}(K, V) :$
1.  $s = V$
  2.  $V = H(K, V)$
  3.  $s = s \| G_{01}(K, V)$
  4. Return  $s$

The only difference between  $G_{01}$  and  $G_{02}$  is that  $G_{02}$  calls HMAC more than  $G_{01}$  by one time.

Let  $G_0 : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{w(\ell+n)+n}$  be a generator which, for a given  $(K, V)$ , produces a sequence

$$\begin{cases} s_0^1 s_1^1 \cdots s_{q+1}^1 & \text{if } w = 1 \\ s_0^1 s_1^1 \cdots s_{q-1}^1 \| s_{-1}^2 s_0^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-1}^{w-1} s_0^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \| s_{-1}^w s_0^w \cdots s_{q+1}^w & \text{if } w \geq 2 \end{cases},$$


where

1.  $s_j^i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,
2.  $s_0^1 s_1^1 \cdots s_{q+1}^1 = G_{01}(K, V)$ , and
3.  $s_{-1}^i s_0^i s_1^i \cdots s_{q+1}^i = G_{02}(s_{q+1}^{i-1}, s_q^{i-1})$  for  $2 \leq i \leq w$ .

A diagram of  $G_0$  is given in Fig. 3. Notice that  $G(K, V)$  is a part of  $G_0(K, V)$ . It is obvious if  $w = 1$ . For  $w \geq 2$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} G(K, V) &= s_1^1 s_2^1 \cdots s_{q-1}^1 \| s_{-1}^2 s_1^2 s_2^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-1}^{w-1} s_1^{w-1} s_2^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \| s_{-1}^w s_1^w s_2^w \cdots s_q^w \\ &= s_1^1 s_2^1 \cdots s_q^1 \| s_1^2 s_2^2 \cdots s_q^2 \| \cdots \| s_1^{w-1} s_2^{w-1} \cdots s_q^{w-1} \| s_1^w s_2^w \cdots s_q^w, \end{aligned}$$

where  $s_{-1}^{i+1} = s_q^i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq w - 1$ . Thus,  $G$  is a PRBG if  $G_0$  is a PRBG. We will discuss the security of  $G_0$  in the remaining part.



**Fig. 3.** A diagram of the generator  $G_0$ .  $c$  represents the concatenation with  $0x00$ . The Update functions are surrounded by dashed rectangles.

We first show that both  $G_{01}$  and  $G_{02}$  are PRBGs if HMAC is a PRF. For an algorithm  $A$ , let  $t_A$  be the running time of  $A$ .

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_{01}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for HMAC such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{01}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) + \frac{q(q-1)}{2^{n+1}} .$$

$\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(\ell)$  and asks at most  $q + 1$  queries.

*Proof.* Let  $F_{*,n}$  be the set of all functions from  $\{0, 1\}^*$  to  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . Let  $\hat{G}_{01}(\rho, \cdot)$  be a generator obtained from  $G_{01}$  by replacing HMAC with a function  $\rho \in F_{*,n}$ . Let

$$\begin{aligned} P_0 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{01}(K, V)] , \\ P_1 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid \rho \xleftarrow{\$} F_{*,n} \wedge V \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n \wedge s \leftarrow \hat{G}_{01}(\rho, V)] , \\ P_2 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+2n}] . \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\text{Adv}_G^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) = |P_0 - P_2| \leq |P_0 - P_1| + |P_1 - P_2| .$$

Let  $\hat{G}_{01}(\rho, V) = \hat{s}_0 \hat{s}_1 \cdots \hat{s}_{q+1}$ , where  $\hat{s}_j \in \{0, 1\}^n$  for  $0 \leq j \leq q + 1$ . If  $\rho \xleftarrow{\$} F_{*,n}$ , then  $\hat{G}_{01}(\rho, V)$  and a random sequence of length  $\ell + 2n$  is completely indistinguishable as far as  $\hat{s}_{j_1} \neq \hat{s}_{j_2}$  for every  $j_1$  and  $j_2$  such that  $0 \leq j_1 < j_2 \leq q - 1$ . Notice that  $\hat{s}_j \neq \hat{s}_q \| 0x00$  for every  $0 \leq j \leq q - 1$ . Thus,

$$|P_1 - P_2| \leq \frac{q(q-1)}{2^{n+1}} .$$

On the other hand, for  $|P_0 - P_1|$ , it is easy to see that we can construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for HMAC, using  $\mathcal{D}$  as a subroutine, such that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) \geq |P_0 - P_1| ,$$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(\ell)$  and asks at most  $q + 1$  queries.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_{02}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{02}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) + \frac{q(q+1)}{2^{n+1}} .$$

$\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(\ell)$  and asks at most  $q + 2$  queries.

*Proof.* The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1.  $\square$

For  $w \geq 2$ , let  $G_{02}^{(w-1)}$  be a generator which calls  $G_{02}$  ( $w - 1$ ) times successively. Namely,

$$G_{02}^{(w-1)}(s_{q+1}^1, s_q^1) = s_{-1}^2 s_0^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-1}^{w-1} s_0^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \| s_{-1}^w s_0^w \cdots s_{q+1}^w .$$



**Lemma 3.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_{02}^{(w-1)}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists a distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}'$  of  $G_{02}$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq (w-1)\text{Adv}_{G_{02}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') .$$

$\mathcal{D}'$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + (w-2)t_{G_{02}} + O(w\ell)$ .

*Proof.* For a given input  $s \in \{0,1\}^{\ell+3n}$ , the distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}'$  behaves as follows:

1. Select  $2 \leq r \leq w$  uniformly at random.
2. If  $r \geq 3$ , then select  $s_{-1}^2 s_0^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2, \dots, s_{-1}^{r-1} s_0^{r-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{r-1}$  uniformly at random.
3. Let  $s_{-1}^r s_0^r \cdots s_{q+1}^r = s$ .
4. If  $r < w$ ,  $s_{-1}^i s_0^i \cdots s_{q+1}^i = G_{02}(s_{q+1}^{i-1}, s_q^{i-1})$  for  $r+1 \leq i \leq w$ .
5. Call  $\mathcal{D}$  with  $\mathbf{s} = s_{-1}^2 s_0^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \parallel \cdots \parallel s_{-1}^{w-1} s_0^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \parallel s_{-1}^w s_0^w \cdots s_{q+1}^w$ .
6. Output  $\mathcal{D}$ 's output.

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Adv}_{G_{02}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') \\ &= \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}'(G_{02}(K, V)) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}'(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n}] \right| \\ &= \left| \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}(K, V)] \right. \\ & \quad \left. - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n}] \right| . \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}(K, V)] \\ &= \sum_{u=2}^w \Pr[r = u \wedge \mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}(K, V)] \\ &= \sum_{u=2}^w \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}(K, V) \wedge r = u]}{w-1} \\ &= \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}^{(w-1)}(K, V)]}{w-1} + \\ & \quad \sum_{u=3}^w \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_{02}(K, V) \wedge r = u]}{w-1} . \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n}] &= \sum_{u=2}^{w-1} \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n} \wedge r = u]}{w-1} \\ & \quad + \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{(w-1)(\ell+n)+2n}]}{w-1} . \end{aligned}$$

There may exist a better distinguisher for  $G_{02}$  than  $\mathcal{D}'$  with the same running time. Thus, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{02}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') \geq \frac{1}{w-1} \text{Adv}_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) .$$

The running time of  $\mathcal{D}'$  is at most  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + (w-2)t_{G_{02}} + O(w\ell)$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 4.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_0$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exist distinguishers  $\mathcal{D}'$  for  $G_{01}$  and  $\mathcal{D}''$  for  $G_{02}^{(w-1)}$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{G_{01}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') + \text{Adv}_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}'') .$$

$\mathcal{D}'$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}} + O(w\ell)$ , and  $\mathcal{D}''$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(w\ell)$ .

*Proof.* Let

$$\begin{aligned} P_0 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid (K, V) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n} \wedge s \leftarrow G_0(K, V)] , \\ P_1 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s_0^1 \cdots s_{q+1}^1 \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell+2n} \wedge s \leftarrow s_0^1 \cdots s_{q-1}^1 \parallel G_{02}^{(w-1)}(s_{q+1}^1, s_q^1)] , \\ P_2 &= \Pr[\mathcal{D}(s) = 1 \mid s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{w(\ell+n)+n}] . \end{aligned}$$

Then, there exist  $\mathcal{D}'$  and  $\mathcal{D}''$  such that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) &= |P_0 - P_2| \leq |P_0 - P_1| + |P_1 - P_2| \\ &\leq \text{Adv}_{G_{01}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') + \text{Adv}_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}'') . \end{aligned}$$

The running time of  $\mathcal{D}'$  is  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{G_{02}^{(w-1)}} + O(w\ell)$ . The running time of  $\mathcal{D}''$  is  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(w\ell)$ .  $\square$

The following theorem directly follows from Lemmas 1, 2, 3 and 4. It implies that  $G_0$  is a PRBG if HMAC is a PRF.

**Theorem 1.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_0$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for HMAC such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq w \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) + \frac{wq(q+1)}{2^{n+1}} .$$

$\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + w(q+2)t_{\text{HMAC}} + O(w\ell)$  and asks at most  $q+2$  queries, where the length of each query is at most  $n+8$ .

*Remark 1.* Suppose that SHA-1 is the underlying hash function of HMAC. Then,  $n = 160$ . Suppose that  $w = 2^{48}$  and  $\ell = 2^{11} \times 160 (\leq 2^{19})$ . Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq 2^{48} \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) + \frac{1}{2^{90}} ,$$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  runs in time  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + 2^{60}t_{\text{HMAC}} + O(2^{66.3})$  and makes at most 2050 queries. The big-O notation is abused here.  $O(2^{66.3})$  is upper bounded by  $c \times 2^{66.3}$  for some positive constant  $c$ .

*Remark 2.* Suppose that SHA-256 is the underlying hash function of HMAC. Then,  $n = 256$ . Suppose that  $w = 2^{48}$  and  $\ell = 2^{19}$ . Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq 2^{48} \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}) + \frac{1}{2^{186}} ,$$

where  $\mathcal{A}$  runs in time  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + 2^{60}t_{\text{HMAC}} + O(2^{67})$  and makes at most 2050 queries.

#### 4.2 If $\text{adin} \neq \text{null}$

If  $\text{adin} \neq \text{null}$ , then the analysis is similar but tedious. We first define several generators.

Let  $g_{10} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$  be a generator such that

$$g_{10}(K, V) = V \| H(K, V \| 0\text{x}00 \| \text{adin}) .$$

Let  $g_{11} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3n}$  be a generator such that  $g_{11}(K, V) = s$ , where  $s$  is obtained as follows:


1.  $V_1 = H(K, V)$
2.  $V_2 = H(K, V_1 \| 0\text{x}01 \| \text{adin})$
3.  $s = V \| V_1 \| V_2$

Let  $g_{12} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3n}$  be a generator such that  $g_{12}(K, V) = s$ , where  $s$  is obtained as follows:

1.  $V_1 = H(K, V)$
2.  $V_2 = H(K, V_1 \| 0\text{x}00 \| \text{adin})$
3.  $s = V \| V_1 \| V_2$

The generators  $g_{10}$ ,  $g_{11}$  and  $g_{12}$  are depicted in Fig. 4.

Let  $G_{10} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell+3n}$  be a generator equivalent to  $G_{02}$  defined in the previous subsection.



**Fig. 4.** A diagram of the generators  $g_{10}$ ,  $g_{11}$  and  $g_{12}$ . The Update functions are surrounded by dashed rectangles.  $c0$  represents the concatenation with  $0\text{x}00 \| \text{adin}$ , and  $c1$  represents the concatenation with  $0\text{x}01 \| \text{adin}$ .

Using the generators defined above, we further define two generators  $G_{11}$  and  $G_{12}$ .  $G_{11} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell+4n}$  is described as follows:  $G_{11}(K, V) = s_{-2} s_{-1} \cdots s_{q+1}$ , where

1.  $V_1 K_1 = g_{10}(K, V)$
2.  $s_{-2} V_2 K_2 = g_{11}(K_1, V_1)$
3.  $s_{-1} s_0 \cdots s_q s_{q+1} = G_{10}(K_2, V_2)$

$G_{12} : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell+6n}$  is described as follows:  $G_{12}(K, V) = s_{-4} s_{-3} \cdots s_{q+1}$ , where

1.  $s_{-4} V_1 K_1 = g_{11}(K, V)$
2.  $s_{-3} V_2 K_2 = g_{12}(K_1, V_1)$
3.  $s_{-2} V_3 K_3 = g_{11}(K_2, V_2)$
4.  $s_{-1} s_0 \cdots s_q s_{q+1} = G_{10}(K_3, V_3)$

Now, we are ready to discuss the pseudorandomness of  $G(K, V)$ . Let  $G_1 : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{w(\ell+4n)}$  be a generator which, for a given  $(K, V)$ , produces a sequence

$$\begin{cases} s_{-2}^1 s_{-1}^1 \cdots s_{q+1}^1 & \text{if } w = 1 \\ s_{-2}^1 s_{-1}^1 \cdots s_{q-1}^1 \| s_{-4}^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-4}^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \| s_{-4}^w \cdots s_{q+1}^w & \text{if } w \geq 2 \end{cases},$$

where

1.  $s_j^i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,
2.  $s_{-2}^1 s_{-1}^1 \cdots s_{q+1}^1 = G_{11}(K, V)$ , and
3.  $s_{-4}^i \cdots s_{q+1}^i = G_{12}(s_{q+1}^{i-1}, s_q^{i-1})$  for  $2 \leq i \leq w$ .

Notice that  $G(K, V)$  is a part of  $G_1(K, V)$ . It is easy to see if  $w = 1$ . For  $w \geq 2$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} G(K, V) &= s_{-2}^1 s_{-1}^1 \cdots s_{q-1}^1 \| s_{-4}^2 s_{-1}^2 \cdots s_{q-1}^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-4}^{w-1} s_{-1}^{w-1} \cdots s_{q-1}^{w-1} \| s_{-4}^w s_{-1}^w \cdots s_{q+1}^w \\ &= s_{-2}^1 s_{-1}^1 \cdots s_q^1 \| s_{-4}^2 s_{-1}^2 \cdots s_q^2 \| \cdots \| s_{-4}^{w-1} s_{-1}^{w-1} \cdots s_q^{w-1} \| s_{-4}^w s_{-1}^w \cdots s_q^w, \end{aligned}$$

where  $s_{-4}^{i+1} = s_q^i$  for  $1 \leq i \leq w-1$ . Thus, we discuss the pseudorandomness of  $G_1$  in the remaining part. We only present the results since the proofs are similar.

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $g_{10}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for HMAC such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{g_{10}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}).$$

$\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(n)$  and asks 1 query.

**Lemma 6.** *Let  $g$  be  $g_{11}$  or  $g_{12}$ . Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $g$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exists an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  for HMAC such that*

$$\text{Adv}_g^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}).$$

$\mathcal{A}$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(n)$  and asks at most 2 queries.

**Lemma 7.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_{11}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exist  $\mathcal{D}_0$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_1$  and  $\mathcal{D}'$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{11}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq \text{Adv}_{g_{10}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}_0) + \text{Adv}_{g_{11}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}_1) + \text{Adv}_{G_{10}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') .$$

$\mathcal{D}_0$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{g_{11}} + t_{G_{10}} + O(n)$ .  $\mathcal{D}_1$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{G_{10}} + O(n)$ .  $\mathcal{D}'$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(n)$ .

**Lemma 8.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_{12}$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exist  $\mathcal{D}_1$ ,  $\mathcal{D}_2$  and  $\mathcal{D}'$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_{12}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq 2 \text{Adv}_{g_{11}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}_1) + \text{Adv}_{g_{12}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}_2) + \text{Adv}_{G_{10}}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}') .$$

$\mathcal{D}_1$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{g_{11}} + t_{g_{12}} + t_{G_{10}} + O(n)$ .  $\mathcal{D}_2$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + t_{g_{11}} + t_{G_{10}} + O(n)$ .  $\mathcal{D}'$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + O(n)$ .

The following theorem directly follows from Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and 8. It implies that  $G_1$  is a PRBG if HMAC is a pseudorandom function.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a distinguisher for  $G_1$  which runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}}$ . Then, there exist adversaries  $\mathcal{A}_1$  and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{G_1}^{\text{prbg}}(\mathcal{D}) \leq w \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}_1) + 3w \text{Adv}_{\text{HMAC}}^{\text{prf}}(\mathcal{A}_2) + \frac{wq(q-1)}{2^{n+1}} .$$

$\mathcal{A}_1$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + w(q+8)t_{\text{HMAC}} + O(w\ell)$  and asks at most  $q+1$  queries, and  $\mathcal{A}_2$  runs in  $t_{\mathcal{D}} + (w+1)(q+8)t_{\text{HMAC}} + O(w\ell)$  and asks at most 2 queries.

## 5 Conclusion

We have shown that the binary sequence generation algorithm of HMAC\_DRBG is a PRBG if HMAC is a PRF. Future work includes analysis of the instantiate and reseed algorithms of HMAC\_DRBG.

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## A The Instantiate and Reseed Algorithms of HMAC\_DRBG

The internal state of HMAC\_DRBG includes  $K \in \{0,1\}^n$ ,  $V \in \{0,1\}^n$ , and a reseed counter  $d$ .  $data$  is the entropy source.  $adin$  is an optional additional input.

*The Instantiate Algorithm.* The instantiate algorithm `Instantiate` is described as follows:

- ```

Instantiate( $data, nonce, adin$ ):
1.  $seed = data || nonce || adin$ 
2.  $K = 0x0000 \dots 00$ 
3.  $V = 0x0101 \dots 01$ 
4.  $(K, V) = \text{Update}(seed, K, V)$ 
5.  $d = 1$ 
6. Return  $(K, V)$  and  $d$ .

```

If  $adin$  is not supported, then the first step of the procedure is replaced by

$$seed = data || nonce .$$

*The Reseed Algorithm.* The reseed algorithm **Reseed** is described as follows:

**Reseed**( $K, V, d, data, adin$ ):

1.  $seed = data || adin$
2.  $(K, V) = \text{Update}(seed, K, V)$
3.  $d = 1$
4. Return  $(K, V)$  and  $d$ .

The input  $(K, V)$  to **Reseed** is given by the latest **Generate**. If  $adin$  is not supported, then the first step of the procedure is replaced by

$$seed = data .$$