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HESITATION: AN ANALYSIS OF *CANDIDE*

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ABSTRACT

Candide calls into question its merit as literature or philosophy because it draws its reader into *eisegesis*. The act of interpreting *Candide* is never a cool judgment. The enigmatic ending forces the reader to see that acts of judgment are appetitive: Desires shape judgment; judgment plies desire. *Candide*'s behavior reveals eighteenth century interest in "the body," which was the scientist's chief tool in entering "the void" to explore the integrity of new knowledge. We see this body interest in Locke's *Essay* and, through a concept of "hesitation," we can see that Voltaire absorbed Lock's view of the interconnection between judgment and appetite. *Candide* teaches us to be aware of this relationship (i.e., we learn to hesitate). Interestingly, many modern scholars interpret *Candide*'s hesitation in accordance with Rousseau's anthropology. Whether this is right or wrong, *Candide* does begin an exploration of humanity's place in "the void" and, in so doing, an investigation into human nature itself. However we define "human nature" we must inevitably deal with the question *Candide* himself asks: "Why was anything created?" By dealing with this question—whether we reject its metaphysical trajectory or not—we reveal our appetites.

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that *Candide* causes paranoia in its critics.¹ This is because *Candide* draws its readers into confession. *Candide* draws out the reader's testimony even as the reader seeks to draw out the text's meaning. *Exegesis* inevitably becomes *eisegesis* and, therefore, the text causes paranoia for a critic's job is to be critical not narcissistic. The difficulty occurs because Voltaire, following Locke, portrayed a world in which judgment and volition interconnect. To judge the text is to reveal one's own will. For Locke the will is shaped according to its appetites and seeks to obtain a possible good, in judging the text, a reader reveals what she perceives to be good (i.e. what she desires). In *Candide*, judgment molds desire and desire plies judgment. We argue for what we perceive to be good, and in this way we reveal our own testimonies. By drawing out testimony instead of proving a point, *Candide* plays a game with its readers and, in doing so, calls into question its own seriousness as a philosophical and literary work.

One will ask: "Is *Candide's eisegesis* 'old-fashioned' irrationalism?" Or, "Is Voltaire 'holding reason suspect' by caricaturing Leibniz?" Or, again, "Does *Candide's* clandestine behavior mean it plays an 'irresponsible game' instead of participating responsibly in serious science?"²

¹ Douglas Bonneville, *Voltaire and the Form of the Novel* (Oxford: the Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institute, 1976), 128. He writes that critics of *Candide* must be "self-conscious to the point of paranoia."

J. G. Weightman, "The Quality of *Candide*," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 159. Weightman writes that *Candide* "is a parable of an aspect of the human plight. It is a pilgrim's progress, only this pilgrim can find no meaning in life nor establish any relationship with the transcendent." Critics become paranoid because *Candide* challenges our own systems of judgment. When we try to interpret the tale, we are drawn into observing our human plight and it is this plight the story teaches us about.

² Voltaire's satire does not lapse into "old-fashioned irrationalism" or hold reason suspect. Someone might claim this today because in the contemporary academic climate, "postmodern" thought has been accused of such irresponsible behavior. Terry Eagleton, in *After Theory*, points out that modernity and postmodernity are known for holding reason suspect. The suspicion makes it difficult to distinguish between legitimate complaints and "old-fashioned irrationalism," he writes. Eagleton's idea is mentioned here because we must understand contemporary

The answer to these questions is “No.”³ *Candide* is not an irrational or irresponsible game. The eighteenth century saw serious scientists writing satires on their own lab reports.⁴ *Candide* is no different; it is a silly-serious investigation into the relationship between abstract principles and the people who hold them. In the eighteenth century there was “tonal harmony” between satire and science. *Candide*’s refusal to prove anything, but instead drawing out testimony, is characteristically eighteenth century. I claim that the text teaches the reader to become aware of interpretation as the willful commitment that it is. Readers learn to see their interpretation as both appetitive and rational. For example, the answer to the question “Are metaphysical connections broken?” reveals our own appetites, our own willful commitments to use our judgment in a certain way. In the world of *Candide*, no argument can be conducted without considering the testimony—and the body—of the remonstrator.

To support this overarching claim, in Chapter One, I claim that the eighteenth century used the human body to explore “the void.” “The void” could have been a transatlantic voyage, a cave, language, the cosmos or jokes. In each “void,” the human body entered the spaces—or horizon—and began a documentation process that inevitably stopped where the body grew tired (i.e., failed). As chaos theory helps us understand, failure of the body serves science in increasing knowledge. The decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no less the case for *Candide*’s desire for

readings of *Candide* to better understand the eighteenth-century. Terry Eagleton, *After Theory* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 70.

³ I. O. Wade, “Voltaire and *Candide*,” *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press), 1966, 142. In his own day, Voltaire’s tale caused a dilemma. In 1759 the *Journal encyclopedique* wrote an article summarizing the story that reveals “that *Candide* can neither be taken seriously nor dismissed lightly.”

J. G. Weightman, “The Quality of *Candide*,” *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 151. This is perhaps why the tale “started triumphantly by being banned in Paris and Geneva, and has gone on selling ever since.”

⁴ Kevin L. Cope, “Elastic Empiricism, Interplanetary Excursions, and the Description of the Unseen: Henry More’s Cosmos, John Hutton’s Caves, and Georg Friedrich Meier’s Quips.” *Imagining the Sciences: expressions of new knowledge in the “long” eighteenth century* (New York: AMS Press, 2004), 139. Additionally, he argues that satire and science has a “tonal harmony” in the eighteenth-century. Humor fit into scientific analysis both as an object of research and as a tool of that same research (145).

Cunegonde, which motivates the tale, as it is for an explorer's desire to climb a mountain range. As supplies run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles and sags, we document "the void" in which humans exist. Unfortunately, many *Candide* scholars do not take this principle into account while reading *Candide*. Rather than see the failure of Candide's desire as instructive, *Candide* scholars, more often than not, reveal the influence Rousseau has had on modern and postmodern thought: Failure of desire coincides with a loss of being. Such a conclusion is a mistake when approaching *Candide*. In *Candide*, Voltaire affirms Locke's epistemology.

In Chapter Two, by building off this eighteenth-century emphasis on the human body, we can see that John Locke, specifically, used the human body and a "reverse-mode" of explanation to explore testimony and consent. Testimony, not rigorous data, began the rationalization process. This is to say, Locke was more interested in integrity than "proof." The integrity of a testimony that recounts the explorer's adventure is more important than the quantity or rigor of data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the first step in the eighteenth-century criteria of certainty.

In Chapter Three, we will see that Locke's concept of *uneasiness* reveals how, in the "reverse-mode," volition and judgment interconnect. More to the point: A novelist who aligns himself with Locke's epistemology, instead of Rousseau's, will create a novel distinctly different than those novels that seek to capture the three-dimensional, emotional vitality of the main character. A 'Lockean novel' will teach "hesitation" as the reader learns to study the relationship between judgment and volition. In a Lockean novel, the reader is encouraged to "step-back" or "hesitate" with respect to immediate impulses. The attainment of happiness is a technical problem rather than an emotional or "desire" problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving).

In Chapter Four, a close reading of *Candide* reveals that meals are a tool used to practice “hesitation” and investigate integrity.

In Chapter Five, the presence of *Candide*’s meals argues against the claim that Candide’s hesitation proves his “dehumanization,” “desexualization,” or “absurdity.” The presence of meals also challenges the claim that money and a free market become the new principles of community life. Meals are tools that balance various aspects of one’s life and so cultivate a mutually fulfilling community. Habits, not a free-market, bring health to the community.

In Chapter Six, we will discuss the fact that for the eighteenth century, with its focus on limitation and the human body, the study of limitation lead to the proper study of humanity: Humanity itself. This is to say, the focus on the limitation of human knowledge and the human body leads Candide to ask the only truly existential question: “Why does anything exist?” The obsession with “the void” and how the human body explored this void led quite easily to a question the answer to which must necessarily lie outside the limit of human existence—an answer that must come from “the void” itself.

Finally, at the end of Chapter Six, I will conclude by summarize my findings. These findings are basically that *Candide* confesses its readers by revealing each reader’s testimony. This *eisegesis* is scientifically helpful when one’s goal is integrity rather than proof. The eighteenth century used the body and its testimony to explore “the void.” The body became the measure for this exploration and, as a result, the questions that rise out of bodily experience (example: “Why does anything exist?”) were the proper study of humanity. Our response to this question—whether we answer it or deny it—reveals our own willful commitments to perceived good. *Candide* teaches us that our appetites determine how we use our judgment. Likewise, our judgments can determine how we use our desire. By exploring the relationship between abstract

principles and the human body, eighteenth-century satire served science responsibly by revealing the integrity of the scientist's position in relation to her object of analysis.

CHAPTER ONE

I beg of you, gentlemen, explain for me this phrase,
all is well, I don't understand it.⁵
 -Voltaire

The Void and the Body

Introduction

I claim that *Candide* teaches the reader to become aware of interpretation as an act of will. Readers learn to see their interpretation as both appetitive and rational. For example, the answer to the question “Are metaphysical connections broken?” reveals our own appetites, our own willful commitments to use our judgment in a certain way. In the world of *Candide*, no argument can be conducted without considering the testimony—and the body—of the remonstrator.

To support this overarching claim, here in Chapter One, I claim that because the eighteenth century was obsessed with “limits,” thinkers used the human body to explore “the void.” In each “void,” the human body entered the spaces—or horizon—and began a documentation process that inevitably stopped where the body grew tired (i.e. failed). As chaos theory helps us understand, failure of the body serves science in increasing knowledge. The decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no less the case for Candide’s desire for Cunegonde, which motivates the tale, as it is for an explorer’s desire to climb a mountain range. As supplies run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles and sags, we document “the void” in which humans exist. Unfortunately, many *Candide* scholars do not take this principle into account while reading *Candide*. Rather than see the failure of Candide’s desire as instructive, *Candide* scholars, more than not, reveal the influence Rousseau has had on Modern and Postmodern thought: Failure of

⁵ Voltaire, “Well, Everything is Well,” *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 86.

desire coincides with a loss of being.⁶ Such a conclusion is a mistake when approaching *Candide*. In *Candide*, Voltaire affirms Locke's epistemology.

Eighteenth Century Limitation

The eighteenth-century mind was obsessed with "limits" and "expansion."⁷ H. N.

Brailsford writes in his biography *Voltaire* that for Voltaire, "philosophy" meant learning where

⁶ Robert Wokler, "Ancient Postmodernism in the Philosophy of Rousseau," *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Wokler writes that, after their deaths, Voltaire and Rousseau are lumped together "as if these two fiercest ideological enemies of the whole eighteenth century were some homogeneous Gilbertonsullivan compound" (421). Wokler's analysis is to show that modern thought and society is much indebted to Rousseau. For example, Wokler writes, "Across what would now be termed different disciplines, Rousseau managed to probe and uncover some of modernity's deepest faults, and to my mind, the flawed world that he portrayed throughout his writings was not only his but also ours" (438). He writes: "Although they are unfortunately seldom noticed, there are many features of Rousseau's philosophy that address the empty formalism and abstract foundationalism of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics in terms later to be embraced by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and their followers" (419). And, "The connection between *savoir* and *pouvoir* is not just a Marxist or Nietzschean or postmodernist and Foucauldian theme. It forms the kernel of the critique of what may be termed the Enlightenment Project itself by one of its main protagonists who, to use Hegelian language, was the *an sich aber nicht fur sich*, that is, who was part of it but in large measure did not subscribe to it" (420). Also, concerning language, Wokler writes, "[Rousseau's] understanding of the trappings of civilization is, to my mind, even richer than Foucault's, not least because in Heideggerian fashion, he understood the force of language and metaphor and the ways in which, through language, individuals became the victims not just of one another's abuse of power but also of their own ideals, subjugated by their own conjugations, as it were, running headlong into their chains, thinking themselves free" (421). Concerning government: "Rousseau set out to explain that our political institutions were themselves responsible for the crimes they were purported to solve, providing solutions to problems of which those solutions were in fact the cause" (423). Maybe most importantly for this paper is Rousseau's concept of *la liberte morale* which had as its most distinctive feature a "peculiarly reflexive element of self-prescription. Every morally free agent, Rousseau insisted, was required to follow rules established only within the depths of his own conscience in a self-reliant manner, free from the influences of all other persons" (425). "Because of ideals like those listed above," Wokler writes, "I should like, however, to conclude these reflections on Rousseau's ancient postmodernism by addressing not his role in the French Revolution that failed to occur but rather the significance of his classical republican ideals with respect to the Revolution that *did* take place, whose greatest success and failures alike were to earn from his the status of chief poet and acknowledged legislator of the age of modernity we still inhabit" (430).

Another, more specific example of how scholarship absorbs Rousseau can be seen in the article written by Karlis Racevski entitled "Candide's garden re-visited, again: the post-modern view of the enlightenment." Racevski writes that as we study *Candide* we rediscover something: "The modest recommendation offered at the conclusion of Voltaire's philosophical tale seems to fit quite nicely the mood of our own [postmodern] age. Which means that we are rediscovering something Voltaire believed in profoundly—namely, that the recourse to abstract systems and metaphysical explanations is the way to delusion and catastrophe; and that constant vigilance, critical attention, and skepticism are still the best weapons for confronting the reality of the human condition" (310). Karlis Racevskis, "Candide's garden re-visited, again: the post-modern view of the enlightenment," *Studies on Voltaire and the eighteenth century* 303 (1992): 310.

⁷ In a paper discussing the interest in "eruptive" and "expansive" knowledge, Dr. Kevin Cope rhetorically asks, "Whence this persisting taste for the eruptive? Scholars of eighteenth-century literature usually ascribe the popular taste for scientific drama to the nascent interest in the sublime, per the writings of Edmund Burke,

to stop asking questions.⁸ The same is true of Voltaire's teacher, Locke. Locke was the first modern philosopher to investigate the limit and scope of human knowledge and the prominent place knowledge has in modern philosophy is due to his work.⁹ Locke wanted to know what objects were appropriate for reason to investigate. He wanted to identify what it was appropriate for humans to discuss with certainty.¹⁰

This emphasis on limitation brings up an interesting question: Copleston coolly asks Locke, "How can we know the mind's scope if we do not let the mind go as far as it can?" Or, said another way, "If we *mention* an object that we cannot deal with, have we not already begun dealing with it?"¹¹ Philosophy can reach too far; philosophy might not reach far enough. And so we must ask, "How do we know when we are finished philosophizing?"

Oddly enough, the notion of progress allowed eighteenth-century thinkers to escape the seriousness of the problem: They *began* investigations and allowed posterity to complete the project.¹² For example, we see eighteenth-century scientists "entering the void" and applying

Immanuel Kant, and a bevy of ardent poets. Even in the eighteenth century, however, that taste depended on several supplemental factors: on a knowledge of far-away places; on the means to travel to those places so as to pain, reflect upon, or verify them; and on a general enlargement of the idea of what cultured persons should be discussing—on a new commitment to "immensity," whether in the range of useful information or in the sheer magnitude of objects that interested cultivated people." Kevin L. Cope, "Age of Reason, An Age of Eruptions, Some Ages of Immensity: The Future of Eighteenth-Century Values," Lecture (The 2008 East Lecture at Lynchburg College, Lynchburg Virginia), 4.

⁸ H. N. Brailsford, *Voltaire* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 122.

⁹ Frederick Copleston, "John Locke (1)," *A History of Philosophy, Volume V: Modern Philosophy, the British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 71.

Also, G. A. J. Rogers, "The Intellectual Settings of Locke's Essay," *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 9. "Locke actually, in many respects, created what we know as philosophy."

¹⁰ Copleston, "John Locke (1)," 72.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Cope, "Elastic Empiricism," 138. Cope writes, "The phrase used on every grant application [today], 'more research is needed,' loaded as it is with suggestions of incompleteness and incompetence, may have its origins in the relentless quest for multiplicity that spans early modern science."

John A. McCarthy, "Beyond a Philosophy of Alternatives: Chaos, Cosmology and the Eighteenth Century," *Disrupted Patterns: on chaos and order in the Enlightenment* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 26. McCarthy points out that this emphasis on "beginning" research drove Kant crazy: "Surveying the intellectual landscape," McCarthy writes, "[Kant] remarked that the genesis of intellectual inquiry from dogmatism to skepticisms to the physiological foundations of thought (Locke) had led to a pervasive 'indifferentism,' a kind of laissez-faire attitude in intellectual

rationality to it.¹³ Whether the void was the cosmos, language, the sea or jokes, in each space rationality begins with the scientist's presence. The eighteenth-century thinker used the human body to measure the void. That is, the body exhausts itself for science's sake; the body is science's chief tool in the rationalization of uncharted horizons. For the eighteenth-century mind, the joy of a vigorous hike in the mountains—camera and journal in tow—was not very different from snuggling up with *Tristram Shandy* for the afternoon. The human brought rationality along with her and her presence alone, as a body, began the exploration (and therefore rationalization) of the space.¹⁴

Copleston, in summarizing aspects of the French Enlightenment, touches upon a fundamental commitment of the Enlightenment mind: The movement was not a cool, scientific one. For eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire, the passions rule reason. “Without the passions,” Copleston explains, “there would be no human progress.”¹⁵ Human passions and reason complement one another in the search for scientific truth. The human body with its pleasure, excitement and pain begins the philosophizing and rationalizing process.

pursuits. A ‘chaos’ of approaches had resulted, he claimed, which obfuscates any attempt in the sciences to establish standards of rational analysis and logical rigor. [...] He saw the lack of order an opportunity for new beginnings. The potential—indeed, the need—for a new beginning is what fascinated him.”

¹³ Cope, “Elastic Empiricism.” Such exploration can be seen in the life's work of eighteenth century researchers like Henry More, John Hutton, and Georg Meier. Dr. Kevin Cope, in his essay “Elastic Empiricism,” analyzes these researchers' works and shows how each scholar analyzed and imposed rationality onto a different void (109). Such thinkers reveal eighteenth-century impulses to explore the “unseen.” Cope explains that the eighteenth-century scientist had “invisibilitarian inclinations” (113). He writes that human society rationalizes the void; the eighteenth-century scientist would “play up” the mysteriousness of a void just as often as she would “explain away” mysterious expanses. That is, science ‘opened up’ a discussion instead of controlling, defining and ending exploration. This can be seen in research on laughter which explains jokes but also makes jokes and adds to their mystery (142).

¹⁴ Clearly this is much different than the contemporary relationship between desire and science. Rather than prove science's downfall via the body (and with its violent sexuality), the eighteenth century body served science. For example, Rene Pomeau writes that, in *Candide*, “Optimism and pessimism are experienced, not so much as ideas, but as contrasted modes of existence.” Rene Pomeau, “Providence, Pessimism, and Absurdity,” *The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 137.

¹⁵ Frederick Copleston, “The French Enlightenment (I),” *A History of Philosophy, Volume VI: Modern Philosophy, From the French Enlightenment to Kant* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 24.

But, for the eighteenth century, “to begin” was the point. The emphasis of eighteenth-century thinker on “beginning” a process that would later conclude helps us understand *Candide’s* “hesitation.” Also, eighteenth-century, forward-thinking, void-entering excitement is why “hesitation” is so important to understand: As we will see, Modern scholars read *Candide’s* ending as representing a “dehumanization,” a “desexualization” and an portrayal of the “tragic sense of life.”¹⁶ Modern scholarship reads *Candide’s* hesitation as eloquently expressing his humiliation. For people who believe, just as modern philosophy emphasizes, that we must “know with certainty” to begin working productively, *Candide* is indeed humiliated.

But *Candide’s* physical presence, his body-as-body in the world has already begun speaking despite his verbal silence.¹⁷ He hesitates to speak, but his body has a language of its own. His body has already begun to rationalize and order his world. Although he hesitates to conclude in an eloquent deluge of words like Pangloss and refuses to slouch pathetically into despair with Martin, he does not hesitate to have a body. It is this body that begins the rationalization process for the eighteenth-century thinker. His intellectual commitment to

¹⁶ Theodore E. D. Braun, “Chas, Contingency, and *Candide*,” *1650-1850; ideas, aesthetics and inquiries in the early modern era* 6 (2001): 202.

¹⁷ Kevin L. Cope, “Introduction,” *Talking Forward, Talking Back* (New York: AMS Press, 2002), vii. The importance of the body to come into contact with the object of analysis strikes a sharp contrast to academic research that has been conducted in the 1980s and 1990s: “No verb was more common than ‘apply,’ no noun more common than ‘method’—as if the interpretation of John Dryden’s verse or Aphra Behn’s prose analogized the application of routine mechanical techniques to predictable tasks.” “It is no wonder,” Cope continues, “that literary criticism now labors under the sense of never having made *contact* with the works that were *approached*” (vii). Cope points out that texts remain passive and mute while critics dissect them; contemporary criticism does not cultivate dialogue between humans. Each new approach to the text does not admit its own historical moment but pretends to approach literature from outside of time [...] and literary tradition” (viii). The human body, with its perspective attached, is no longer appropriate for research. But this is a problem because “Restoration and eighteenth century authors often entered into self-conscious conversations with futurity” (ix). Eighteenth-century texts call for human readers, not for laboratory tools.

Rudiger Ahrens, “Epilogue,” *Talking Forward, Talking Back* (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 382. The book *Talking Forward, Talking Back* seeks to participate as a compilation of essays designed, not to prove positions, but to begin new dialogues. This is an important development because it affirms “the revelation of truth as a metaphysical telos” instead of merely “different kinds of practice.” Dialogue encourages different perspectives of objectivity whereas “proving someone else wrong” implies that the wrong-doer should stop being herself and do as you do.

“hesitate” is a decided attempt to balance his body with his mind, to cultivate the conditions for hope. And hope is evidence for things unseen.

The Eighteenth-Century Chaotic Void

The discussion of “the void” and the particular human body that explores it brings up “chaos theory.” Chaos theory helps us understand how radical attention to particularity translates to abstraction. When a particular human body enters a space, we inevitably start discussing abstractions like morality. Chaos theory helps us understand why this is the case. Terry Eagleton explains, “The eighteenth century developed aesthetics not as the language about art—but as a way of investigating bodily experience. Moral talk was talk about the body. Their talk hovered ambiguously between the physical and spiritual.”¹⁸ The body and its particularity (something Eagleton observes postmoderns use to claim the downfall of “Objectivity”¹⁹) is the very medium that secures Objectivity.

This emphasis on morality is an important aspect of eighteenth century exploration of “limitations.” Aaron Santesso writes: “Two hundred years before chaos theory, Burke was anticipating the interest in the liberating “uncertainty” inherent in encountering works of seemingly disordered complexity. This interest would set the stage for a number of literary uses of chaos during the Romantic period.”²⁰ This pleasure of disorder and relativism has since been

¹⁸ Eagleton, *After Theory*, 155.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 103-5. Commitments place a person ‘here’ or ‘there.’ Our bodies give us perspectives of the truth just like our minds give us perspective of the truth. As a result, to be a relativist is to be a racist.

²⁰ Aaron Santesso, “Aesthetic Chaos in the Age of Reason,” *Disrupted Patterns: on chaos and order in the Enlightenment* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 46. “Radical shifts in the estimation of chaos began to take place long before the advent of modern chaos theory. One of the most significant of these shifts occurred during the supposed ‘Age of Reason,’ when artists and critics began to forge a new understanding of chaos as an aesthetic rather than theological concept.”

inherited by postmodernity.²¹ But this inherited interest in disorder is a lot different than the interest of eighteenth-century writers who used the language of the body to “touch new vistas of knowledge”: Eighteenth-century interest in disorder applied insofar as a disorder seemed to be a vast uncharted territory awaiting documentation and analysis; they did not interest themselves for disorder-for-disorder’s sake.²²

That *Candide* would interrupt Pangloss’ explanation and focus attention on the body was by no means an isolated event. Writers of the eighteenth century were increasingly interested in morality, in how the body relates to the general universal principles that govern human society (for example, in how syphilis might affect a belief in Optimism).²³ Satire was the perfect space to explore this relationship. But, the eighteenth century did not share contemporary scholars’ rejection of metaphysics. The body began metaphysical investigation. Cope outlines how an approach that analyzed what was “behind” what was known led to knowledge that focused on limits but always attempted to move beyond these limits.²⁴ Voltaire refocused attention on the body, but this re-attention was not meant as a rejection of “the spiritual.” Of course, the recurring acts of violence that scar the bodies of the tale must be understood, but just as violence argues for “meaninglessness” for a modern scholar, so too the body, although scarred, begins a rationalization of the void for the eighteenth-century thinker.

²¹ Terry Eagleton, *After Theory*, 67-68; 70-71. Eagleton writes: “Postmodernity gets off the ground when it is no longer a matter of nagging information about the world, but a matter of the world as information. [...] This] radical assault on fixed hierarchies of value merged effortlessly with that revolutionary leveling of all values known as the marketplace” (67-68). Eagleton goes on to say that the 1960s and 70s saw an attempt made by theory to get beyond itself. Theory began to study “impossible desires” and hoped these would be an exorbitant move (70). Postmodern thought saw reflection as being part of the problem and so it turned to “those things that baffle it: desire, the body, pleasure, etc.” (71).

²² Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 109.

²³ Brailsford, in *Voltaire*, comments on how Voltaire’s history, although not systematic, was typical of the age’s shift from interest in final causes to sufficient causes. He writes that Voltaire made the jump from “speculation over final causes to the tracing of efficient causes” (48).

²⁴ Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 113.

What is more, not only does the presence of a human body begin a moral discussion, but satire itself, as a “chaotic medium,” resists moral annihilation. Cope writes, “True chaos, total disorder, is too categorical for cynical satire. Whenever a satirist appears on the scene, thoroughgoing anarchy disappears. A satiric universe that generates a moralist is a universe that resists moral annihilation.”²⁵ Annihilation is not possible because satirists need a physical position in order to enact satire: “Satirists’ hopes for social stability are perplexed by the fact that they must start their works *somewhere*. They may pretend to omniscience, but they almost always identify their physical position”—like a theatrical “Demonstrator”²⁶ in a French drawing room, for example. Cope does on to explain that,

The fact that satirists reside in this world, that they are *somewhere*, opens them to abuse. Tragedians can execute their characters knowing that they will be backed up by a transcendental Nemesis. Satirists, alas, are ordinary lunch-pail packers working on the corner. [Satire] is always self-satiric, for its spatio-temporal positioning is incongruous with its categorical judgments.²⁷

Intentional chaos, disorder and confusion were not damaging or “irresponsible” behaviors in the eighteenth-century author’s mind. Simply by being a writer who wrote a satire, the author affirms an order even if this order is not present in the text. Although a satire does not overtly “prove” any position, the satiric text does challenge the integrity of the satirized object and the author. It is the human body—with its physical presence and its testimony—that saves the satirist from annihilation. To satirize one’s self and one’s culture is a lot different than committing suicide.

The body grounded the caustic, satiric impulse making it responsible. But the body also helps the scientist move “beyond” the body. Like the satirist who includes her own body in the

²⁵ Kevin L. Cope, “Algorithmic Apocalypse: Chaos, Cognitive Science, and the Conditions of Satire,” *Talking Forward, Talking Back: Critical Dialogues With the Enlightenment* (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 366.

²⁶ William F. Bottiglia, *Voltaire’s Candide: Analysis of a Classic* (Geneva: Institut et Musee Voltaire, 1964), 77. *Candide* implies a concrete audience as it is performed. In this it is like a play.

²⁷ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 364.

objects mocked, a scientist used the body as a tool to get “beyond” the body itself. For the empiricist of the time, the body, like any other scientific tool, was not the point at all:

Researchers of the eighteenth century show “a surprising lack of enthusiasm for the ‘experience’ that was allegedly the focus of its attention.”²⁸ While we do find “imaginary literary discourses in Berkeley, Hume, Descartes, and Kant, we do not find a deluge of the serious ‘technical reports’” that we would assume are there.²⁹ Looking to study empirical writing of the eighteenth century will reveal more “talk than data, more art than experience.”³⁰ Cope notes that “By developing theories and definitions as to what was tangible and what was mere chimera, those in the empiricist school inadvertently drew attention to what was *not* part of the sensory field.” For John Locke and Immanuel Kant, for example, short paragraphs defining and explaining sensually intuited ideas are dwarfed by extended passages on intellection, reflection, language, communication, and a host of other semi- and non-empirical matters.”³¹ And, “Procedurally if not methodically, early empiricism was split between the refocusing of attention on day-to-day, easily accessible experiences and probing into unknown, presently unseen places and spaces.”³² The body was the tool that began the scientist’s work, but it was not ultimately the object of analysis. The hope in progress pushed researchers toward the “presently” unseen. They sought expansion and development of discoveries. The eighteenth century thinker was interested in what was *not* visible, but it was “heroic scientific efforts”—and heroically satiric literature—that revealed these invisibilities and showed them for what they were.³³ Any place of conflict, confusion, and irrationality—“void”—was of greatest interest to the eighteenth century.

²⁸ Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 109.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 109-10.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 110.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 110-11.

³² *Ibid.*, 112.

³³ *Ibid.*, 112.

Scientists did not do science only in a lab with precise, controlled experiments. They brought rationality into caves, into jokes, and into the cosmos.³⁴

The Modern Response to Hesitation

A general understanding of how “the body” served science helps us challenge some interpretations of Candide’s “hesitation” at the end of the story. Candide’s hesitation leads many scholars to conclude that metaphysical connections are broken once and for all. That is to say, Candide’s hesitation is synonymous with the failure of metaphysics; if we cannot know for certain, then we cannot believe. Hesitation coincides with the loss of the light of God and modern thought casts its tragically dark shadow across the earth. For these scholars, *Candide* portrays the tragedy of human life, its absurdity and ridiculousness. The hesitation at the end of

³⁴ The studies Cope analyzes in his article, for example, are all meant as “test case sketches” for later research. The studies were not meant to be exhaustive, “rigorous” studies at all (Cope, “Elastic Empiricism,” 114). Dr. Cope observes that the phrase “more research is needed,” which often ends a study, may have come from this early modern period of the sciences, which relentlessly sought new knowledge (“Elastic Empiricism,” 138).

J. Paul Hunter, “Literary Theory and Literary Practice, The Example of Pope,” *Talking Forward, Talking Back: Critical Dialogues With the Enlightenment* (New York: AMS Press, 2002), 320. Hunter says that “literary analysis” was not a “marginal” area of eighteenth-century culture. The categories of thought had not yet been divided into schools, thinkers were *virtuoses* who excelled in many fields. Not until later did literature become merely an “aesthetic” endeavor.

Theodore Ziolkowski, “Religion and Literature in a Secular Age: The Critics Dilemma,” *The Journal of Religion*, Vol. 59, No. 1. (Jan., 1979): 19, 34. Ziolkowski writes, “It was the overriding concern of scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to reconcile the Bible with the exciting new discoveries in history and the natural sciences” (19). And, “It is perhaps the ultimate irony of secularization that the hermeneutical techniques originally evolved for the interpretation of sacred text are now sometimes used by a secular criticism to demonstrate the literary shortcomings of explicitly religious works or, conversely, to expose the literary qualities of works that have co-opted religious motifs, images, symbols, and typological patterns for wholly antireligious purposes” (34). Science investigated belief, but this investigation aimed to show how belief was rational. Science’s posture was hopeful with respect to belief.

The tonal harmony of satire and science can be connected very easily to Locke, whose thought Voltaire took as a given (Brailsford, 121). Brailsford writes that as Voltaire understood it, philosophy “was an attitude of mind rather than a system. He had read Locke and Berkely, Descartes, Malbranche and Leibniz, and was content to count himself the grateful pupil of the first of these thinkers [i.e. Locke]. Brailsford continues by saying that Voltaire “accepted without modification Locke’s analysis of the process of knowledge, with him rejected innate ideas, and derived all experience from the impressions of the senses. He was firmly persuaded of the existence of God, the Creator.” Voltaire understood this “attitude” to be a form of restraint: “When Voltaire turned to the proper study of mankind, he found himself wholly unable to give any definite meaning to the idea of the soul, and he questioned whether philosophy would ever probe the secret. He tells us that true philosophy consist of knowing where to stop” (122).

the story affirms this dark portrayal and reveals *Candide's* denial of ultimate meaning. To encourage this denial of meaning, it is argued, *Candide* resists theoretical interpretation just as any survey of *Candide* scholarship reveals.

For example, *Candide's* moral “darkness” and the overall loss of meaning led one scholar, Theodore E. D. Braun, to focus attention on an analysis of recurring elements of the story.³⁵ Braun observes that the story “argues consistently against teleological interpretations of human life and advances a sense of the contingent, unpredictable nature of Nature.”³⁶ Braun shows that recurring elements of the story allow for a continued and gradual “darkening” of the story and an ultimately “tragic sense of life.”³⁷ Braun points out that the end of the tale is really only the “opening of a new tragedy”—the pattern of order/disorder will continue even though the tale is over.³⁸

This “darkening”³⁹ helps communicate the “implicit moral lesson” of the tale.⁴⁰ In *Candide*, Voltaire is communicating something about how ignorance and evil are closely tied. In

³⁵ Braun, 195. Braun participates in a discussion of “chaos theory” and its revelatory relationship with literature. Basically, chaos theory helps explain how a meaning-resistant text can still communicate meaning. Braun summarizes chaos theory saying: “chaos theory helps us see the order in apparent disorder, to make sense out of texts that seem to lead nowhere” (Braun, 200). Chaotic systems are, Braun quotes a scientist, “both deterministic and unpredictable, [chaotic systems] raise questions of free will and determinism” (Braun, 200). Thus Braun commences an analysis to find the order beneath the disorder of *Candide*.

The point of studies on chaos is that chaos can be studied at all: Chaotic systems all contain an order in the midst of disorder. Dr. Cope calls this the cliché chaos theory statement: “One cliché of both popular and professional writing on chaos theory is the official denial that chaos is chaotic. Dilettantes and professionals alike inevitably open their jottings on chaos by distinguishing old-fashioned literary chaos, with its dark whirlpools, grotesque gothicisms, and raucous cacophonies, from modern mathematical chaos, with its clean computer-drawn patterns and mathematically generated images. Modern chaos, the refrain goes, is the highest form of organization; it must be distinguished from our obsolete, colloquial understanding of chaos as plain old disorder.” Kevin L. Cope, “Locke didn’t have it all locked up: Locke on the Emergence, Development, and Branching of Knowledge, Education, Politics, Religion, and Hairdressing,” *Disrupted Patterns: on chaos and order in the Enlightenment* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000), 91.

³⁶ Braun, 201.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 202.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 200-201. “Darkening” is a product of characteristics of “chaos theory.” Other characteristics of chaos theory are *sensitivity to initial conditions*, *recursive symmetries between scale levels* and *nonlinearity*. All these elements of chaos help explain how *Candide* becomes “dark,” i.e., presents a tragic view of human life.

⁴⁰ Braun, 206.

the tale, stupidity and violence often follow upon one another's heels.⁴¹ The safety of the final garden is really only ignorance; the characters will soon encounter another, more tragically violent force.

Of course, the interplay of peace and violence relates back to the problem of Optimism: How can humanity exist in an evil, yet God-centered, universe? Braun writes: "Candide might not yet be able to accept a chaotic world view, but he can reject a Providential one that seems to leave little room for free will."⁴² Braun completes his analysis of *Candide* with the statement: "We are back, so to speak, at the beginning, the pattern is about to recur. Chaos will reign."⁴³ Braun sums up the story like a pessimistic modern scholar. The moral lesson relates to the garden where we see a brief happiness but anticipate that a new violent event overshadows this peace. Candide's hesitation—his failure to explain his life—cries out that God and evil cannot exist together. Because evil remains with us, we must jettison God and accept chaos.

But as an overview of eighteenth-century use of the body reveals, physical violence can have an opposite meaning. No, Candide does not have an "answer," but he does have a new habit: Cultivation. Braun does not consider that it is this new habit which makes the garden possible. Whether another violent act sweeps over them or not will not stop them from enacting this new habit. "To cultivate" does not require a garden beforehand. Cultivation creates a garden.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Also, Roy S. Wolper, "Gull in the Garden?" *Eighteenth-century Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 2. (Winter, 1969). Wolper also argues for a moment of calm in a recurring tragedy-order-tragedy rhythm. Candide does not really secure anything that will help him stop this pattern. Wolper writes: "Candide's belief that safe gardens can continue in the world marks his blindness to experience; similarly, Pangloss' 'tout est bien' proves irrelevant to the dark realities around him. Both have missed the meaning of their travels" (270). Wolper connects stupidity with evil and argues that this connection is "the pulse that unifies Candide" (273). Wolper argues that the final garden scene is foolish because the food that they produce will not remain only theirs. Limiting yourself to a smaller and smaller garden will not correct the problems of vice and evil.

⁴² Braun, 207.

⁴³ Ibid., 209.

The body helps create meaning. For the eighteenth century, the body serves science. A habit of the body works against the “darkening” that violence might bring about.

Hesitation as “Chaotic Decay”

Braun’s thoughts about *Candide*’s “darkness” occur within a thread of dialogue concerning chaos theory. Chaos theory helps to explain how satire challenges meaning-creating systems without bringing these systems to ultimate destruction. The concept of “branch points” is helpful. A branch point is that moment just before “closure” or the breakdown of a system where a system “leaps” and reaffirm a new, “higher” order—an order that includes the decay of the first system as part of the new order. A branch point is where the system reaches its limit and branches into an order that was previously invisible.

At the moments when a system is going to become tragically “disordered” again, it branches into a new order; it does not “close” into disorder but affirms a new kind of order.⁴⁴ Chaos theory does not explain a closed, tragic circle of one kind of order crashing into disorder. Chaos theory explains decay and how this decay destroys one kind of order only to affirm another, higher order. This second order includes the decay and failure of the first order.

⁴⁴ Kevin L. Cope, “Algorithmic,” 366. Dr. Cope writes that chaos, when represented by satire, cannot be a true chaos: “True chaos, total disorder, is to categorical for cynical satire.” The “branch point” in chaos theory is, in part, responsible for “paradigm shifting”: “Postmodernist criticism is nowadays ‘paradigm shifting’ owing to pressure from ‘chaos theory.’ Chaos ‘theory’ problematizes the very idea of a general theory of literature, of genre, or of anything else. Rather than seeking comprehensive explanations, chaos theory characterizes the *process* by which a *variety* of deluxe phenomena, from ocean waves and planetary orbits to thinking minds and literary genres, emerge from complex events. Emergence and dissolution converge in a single constructive process—much as satire simultaneously creates and uncreates ideals. Despite its nominal disorderliness, ‘chaos theory’ draws heavily on the orderly world of cybernetics. The nearest of kin to that other postmodernist technology, ‘cognitive science,’ chaos theory comprehends scientific minds as well as scientific inquiries.” He continues, “Satire wouldn’t be satire without cautionary notes. Nothing is more misleading than facile analogies between literature and science. No one should argue that satire is like chaos theory. Chaos theory is concerned with immediate facts and unexpected results. Highly literal, it concentrates on particular data points. Highly metaphorical, it permits an instant identification of phenomena at different ‘scales’ or levels of organization. Highly metonymical, it replaces analogy with actuality” (340-41).

Chaos theory shows how a system's decay produces new, different meaning. Cope observes that chaos theory shows that "degeneration produces information" and that, "information and satire have a common, if slippery, foundation: decay."⁴⁵ Chaos theory shows that "decay" does not necessarily result in loss of meaning; rather, it results in different meaning. Although different, this new meaning is no less meaningful. Such is the case with *Candide*. Each scholar must put forward an interpretation of the central metaphor because Voltaire does not explain his hesitation over Optimism. The decay of the text forces us to supply order; how we incorporate "decay" into a meaningful statement reveals the tale's lesson: We reveal the integrity of our own beliefs as we try to fit decay into an interpretation.

Braum rejects Providence while affirming "darkness" and all its relativism. But, "never relativistic, chaos theory focuses on particulars while it affirms a teleology of form [...] it deals with particular phenomena [...] yet it suggests a more general, enticingly flexible understanding of "nature."⁴⁶ Cope argues that satires are neither completely relativistic nor do they really conclude. Cope points out that an iterative system moves freely between particularity and abstraction.⁴⁷ Chaos theory helps us conceptualize how the eighteenth century's radical focus on particularity (i.e., the body) helps document and explore the radically abstract (i.e. metaphysics). Chaos theory also helps us see that the body argues against modern pessimism: Just by exploring, the body starts a rationalization process and although no overt conclusion has been

⁴⁵ Cope, "Algorithmic," 345.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 342-3. Inversely, some scholars interpret *Candide* as using the body to breakdown the "ideal" rather than move towards it. For example, Josephine Grieder, in "Orthodox and Paradox," writes that in *Candide*, "The rhetorical vocabulary of the ideal world may be substituted for vocabulary normally employed in describing the real world, or it may be made to explain an inescapable, actual condition. The result in either case is a discreditation of the ideal world which orthodox rhetoric is assumed to express. The discreditation arises, in the first instance, from the following: substitution of an ideal term for a real term necessitates its continual repetition, since the real occurs so frequently; and at last the repetition empties it of all its ideal sense" (487). She argues that repetition destroys objectivity. The eighteenth-century mind did not see repetition in this way.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 344.

offered in *Candide*, the physical commitment to cultivate begins a meaning-creating system. Cultivation attempts to fit failure into a higher order. Cultivation hopes all things.

The eighteenth-century void and the modern void greatly differ from one another. Whereas today the body (and its desire) “proves” the failure of science’s dominion, the eighteenth century used the body to explore the void until the body itself became exhausted. Failure of the body, not science, was the important event because at the point of failure, knowledge increases. The “decay” of desire produces knowledge, and knowledge overcomes evil. Failure has a lesson for anyone who wants to learn about integrity.

Candide’s Failure

A cynical man will point out that Candide foolishly falls in love with Cunegonde without realizing that half the world’s population will sufficiently do the job. But this is not how desire works. At least, this is not how Voltaire understood human desire. As we shall see in *Candide*, for Voltaire—as for Locke, Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle—what determines the will serves both as its efficient and formal cause.⁴⁸ This means that Ms. Cunegonde is not just one fish among many; she stimulates Candide to act, and it is she herself who tantalizingly offers Candide happiness. Her body is his formal cause. Through her body, he thinks he will reach his happiness.

For Candide, a belief in Optimism, and “happiness” in general, coincided with his attainment of Cunegonde’s body. This connection between thought and material is not

⁴⁸ Vere Chappell, “Power in Locke’s Essay,” *The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 149. Locke saw limitation and determination as kinds of “causation” that act to shape the will. Locke, like Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle, specifies that whatever determines the will serves both as an efficient cause (prompting the agent to act) and as a formal cause (an option, or a specific action by which to direct one’s willing). So, for Candide, Cunegonde stimulates his happiness and it is she herself who will work as his formal cause.

coincidental. In *Candide*, concepts are knit into the sinew of the human body; human bodies affect concepts and are affected by them. Because judgment connects to the appetites, Candide's belief in the goodness of the world coincides with his ability to attain a specific woman.

The connection between body and mind creates a violent world: sexual beauty in particular is consumed, traded and mutilated to help facilitate self-fulfillment. For example, Candide sees Cunegonde with "hungry eyes"⁴⁹ and Cunegonde herself, after a separation from Candide, sees his naked body and is filled with desire for him; she tells him that her mind was full of the "touch" of their first sexual encounter. Her attraction is not a noble one; she, like Candide, values the stimulation of her own senses over the companionship he offers her.⁵⁰ And here we engage a central problem for *Candide*.

Candide's happiness has a formal cause: Cunegonde. But Cunegonde, too, seeks happiness through formal causes. She seeks happiness through means that complicate Candide's pursuit of happiness—for she herself is his formal cause. This conflict is not isolated. All the characters seek happiness through some formal cause, often embodied in another character. The characters jerk one another about violently; each tries to attain their own perceived good by using whatever formal cause might be available. As a result, we see a world of manipulation, robbery, torture, rape, murder, and cannibalism. The characters use one another to try to reach the goodness they perceive. Inevitably their desires conflict with one another.

Developing this theme of manipulation, Moishe Black, in "The Human Body in *Candide*," analyzes the representation of the human body in *Candide*. An overwhelming number

⁴⁹ Voltaire, *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 14.

⁵⁰ Moishe Black, "The Place of the Human Body in *Candide*," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 278 (1990): 184.

of “body” nouns fill the tale.⁵¹ While looking at various kinds of physical violence, Black argues that the human body is continually present and always closely tied to violence. Black jokingly points out that the tale is so violent that characters die more than once. Black argues that characters harm even without intention (for example, through transmitting syphilis).⁵² The tale reveals a world of anti-agency, a world where strong hungers go unsatisfied in a cold, violent world. Each act results in unforeseen consequences and the goodness a character reaches for through a formal cause does not necessarily materialize. The tale shows a world of complicated and unpredictable effects to any desire. No matter how sincere or forceful, desires remain anti-agents in the character’s lives.⁵³ In a word, desire fails.

Modern Response to Failure

Failed desire leads most *Candide* scholars to argue that the story proves that metaphysical connections are illusory. Modern *Candide* critics, who think in this way, summarize *Candide* as

⁵¹ Ibid., 174, 177. While Rousseau equated evil with pain, Voltaire thought evil was closely associated with “ignorance.” Pain is an expression of this ignorance but is not itself evil. In fact, pain can be said to teach a lesson by revealing ignorance and thereby illuminating the path to knowledge and pleasure. Black discusses various kinds of violence and reveals how violence and pain relate back to bodies and their ignorant owners. “Mutilation” is one type of violence that Black focuses on. This mutilation is extreme to the point cannibalism (174). Like cannibalism, benevolent acts are manipulative. In the tale, an act of kindness is never “for its own sake” but is meant as a means to satisfy selfishness. Kindness is a kind of “currency” in the tale by which characters hope to attain their desires. The characters do things for other people’s bodies but only when they want something in exchange (177). Cannibalism is a natural extension of the selfishness of the tale: When there is nothing else to eat, someone’s body is consumed. The characters pursue pleasure for themselves. An increase in pleasure coincides with an increase in knowledge.

⁵² Ibid., 177.

Also, Edwin Grobe, “Discontinuous Aspect in Voltaire’s *Candide*,” *MLN* (French Issue) 82, no. 3 (May, 1967): 338. Grobe analyzes the importance of how each character disrupts the others and argues that, “The continuity of one man’s existence is fashioned out of the discontinuity visited by force or deception upon the existence of another” (338).

⁵³ Black, 182. Interestingly, Black points out that the body is absent from Eldorado. It should be added that when the body is absent, there is “singleness of mind.” Voltaire says that utopia is possible only where everyone agrees and has identical values, but human bodies deny the possibility of such agreement. Desires, and the human body itself, imply and include an “excessiveness” that we cannot control or escape—not even in a cabin at the edge of Paris. What is more, the body and its peculiar experiences create for each person “different ideas”; with the body, there can be no “singleness of mind.” We will see that this is an expression of Locke.

revealing a denial of purpose, pleasure and meaning.⁵⁴ As a result, at the end of the story, the only “hope” Candide might have is a “grim determinism” to cultivate.⁵⁵ Bonneville, in *Candide and the Form of the Novel*, asserts that, at the end of *Candide*, all metaphysical connections, including love,⁵⁶ are broken.⁵⁷ Bonneville writes, Voltaire realizes that “love is the only physical drive susceptible of abstraction.”⁵⁸ And so, Bonneville interprets, “Candide [...] is filled with events which are calculated to be destructive of love as an intellectualized concept.” What is more, “in *Candide* the destruction of the ideal is systematic and complete.”⁵⁹

Bonneville argues that with the destruction of metaphysical connections, Candide is “a man dehumanized” when “after literally a lifetime of body- and soul-rending experience he is repulsed by the very object of his quest.”⁶⁰ Bonneville continues his claims by stating that “*Candide* transcends the rest of Voltaire’s productions and perhaps the rest of Enlightenment literature” because, “[h]aving brought his hero to this pass,” Voltaire “is faced with either a nihilistic conclusion of the necessity of constructing an ethic without violating the esthetic principles to which he has committed himself.”⁶¹ In this plight, writes Bonneville, “No

⁵⁴ Morris Weitz, *Philosophy in Literature: Shakespeare, Voltaire, Tolstoy and Proust* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), 13. For an example of Candide meaning an “absurdity.” For an example of Candide as an example of “stupidity and its relationship to evil” see Wolper’s “Gull in the Garden” (275); and, an example of Candide as being “a heroic modern break from the need to make metaphysical connections” see Bonneville’s *Voltaire and the Form of the Novel*, 129.

Also, Andre Morize, “The Moment of Candide,” *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 110. Like Bonneville, Andre Morize argues that “[*Candide*] ends with a word in behalf of work and effort. Metaphysics is a snare and a delusion, action is good and fruitful. Candide, having seen so much cannot believe that all is over; but, mellowed by his experiences of universal evil, he now counts only on himself to create a tolerable existence.”

⁵⁵ Arthur Scherr, “Candide’s Garden Revisited: Gender Equality in a Commoner’s Paradise,” *Eighteenth-Century Life* 17, no. 3 (Nov 1993): 53.

⁵⁶ Against this scholar, this Thesis proposes a deeper, fuller understanding of Love. Love implies faithfulness or fidelity. As it is said, “Love hopes all things.” Love is “future orientated” and is therefore continually seeking the development of both its and other’s fulfillment. Love refuses to admit that metaphysical connections have been broken. This deeper, fuller understanding of Love is in alignment with Locke.

⁵⁷ Bonneville, 39.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

abstraction, says [*Candide*], endows life with meaning, not even when the abstraction is based on such a primary vital force as love. Meaning is derived from the productive fulfillment of the individual's potential. In the miniature society of *Candide's* garden, each character is doing what he does best."⁶² And so Bonneville summarizes *Candide*.

But, while *Candide* portrays a violent world where desire fails, this world does not necessarily result in dehumanization. Failure teaches. If the eighteenth-century emphasis on the body is understood, we can see that the failure of the body instructs a human and new habits will lead to greater pleasure. The body, not abstraction, endows life with meaning. That is, the body builds meaning into abstractions; the body serves scientific exploration of "the void."

This constructive use of failure can be supported in *Candide*: *Candide's* faithful servant Cacambo informs *Candide* of Cunegonde's tragic ugliness. *Candide* grimly responds, "Ah, beautiful or ugly [. . .] I am an honest man, and my duty is to love her forever."⁶³ While this sounds delightfully stoic, *Candide* begins to stew in self-pity. Unfulfilled desire is depressing. Modern scholars are quick to emphasize this.

But *Candide* does not remain depressed. A few lines later *Candide* asks Martin, "Who in your opinion is more to be pitied, the Emperor Achmet, the Emperor Ivan, King Charles Edward, or myself?"⁶⁴ Martin responds: "I have no idea [. . .] I would have to enter your hearts in order to tell." They continue the conversation:

Ah, said *Candide*, if Pangloss were here, he would know and he would tell us. I can't imagine, said Martin, what scales your Pangloss would use to weigh out the miseries of men and value their griefs. All I will venture is that the earth holds millions of men who

⁶² *Ibid.*, 40.

⁶³ *Candide*, 69. Earlier in the story he said that Cunegonde's beauty and his virtue are the only solid things. A page after the above quotation, he reveals this response to Cacambo to be empty of meaning. He marries Cunegonde to spite her brother who opposes their marriage. Also, earlier in the tale he slept with another woman making his commitment to one woman rather silly. As a result, he has neither joy nor virtue. He is not honest, he has not married a beautiful woman, and it was not his duty to marry her.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

deserve our pity a hundred more times than King Charles Edward, Emperor Ivan, or Sultan Achmet.⁶⁵

This snippet of dialogue reveals a subtle shift in which Candide begins to anticipate the anti-agency of his desire instead of only thinking of his goal. He begins to pay attention to the formal causes that influence his desire. At the end of the story, Candide begins to compare his failure to everyone else's failure. He realizes that everyone fails to attain fulfillment; no one is happy. Candide tries to understand how fulfillment or happiness is possible for anyone, ever. He pauses in his quest for self-fulfillment and considers the importance of human anti-agency itself; he investigates the possible lesson in failure-as-failure.

He thinks about how an adjustment of one's habits will result in greater fulfillment. By using one's body in a new, different way (cultivation) one can use one's body to create order and ground abstractions in rationality. Habits connect bodies to abstractions.

Modern Epistemology: Locke versus Rousseau

Candide's new found perspective at the end of *Candide* reveals the profound differences between Locke and Rousseau's epistemology. Rousseau and Locke both focus on the senses, but they say radically different things about "sense data." Rousseau has obviously influenced modern and postmodern thought, which in turn has influenced contemporary Voltaire critics. We can see this influence in particular when contemporary scholars argue that Candide is dehumanized and desexualized and works without meaning or purpose.

In Rousseau, morality is the "unthwarted and unperverted development of man's natural passions and feelings."⁶⁶ This means that "to exist" is "to feel."⁶⁷ For Rousseau, "We have an

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Copleston, "Rousseau (1)," *A History of Philosophy: Volume VI, Modern Philosophy from the French Enlightenment to Kant* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 77.

autonomous, rational will or practical reason whereby man in his higher nature, so to speak, legislates for himself and pronounces a moral law to which he, in his lower nature, is subject. And this law is universal [and also called the “general will”]. This autonomous will [...] is an obvious anticipation of the Kantian ethic.”⁶⁸ For Rousseau, desire is perfect unto itself. It is human society that corrupts, thwarts and perverts one’s original perfection. As a result, a loss of desire coincides with a loss of being.

Rousseau emphasizes an immediacy and “sincerity” of feeling which leads modernity and postmodernity to associate truth with strong feelings. When such scholarship finds that *Candide* lacks strong feelings, they argue that he has experienced a loss of being. If *Candide* hesitates to come to a conclusion or experiences thwarted desire, he therefore must have experienced a loss of being, be dehumanized or desexualized.

Voltaire absorbed Locke’s thought and Locke perceived human knowledge in a radically different way than Rousseau. For Locke, interpersonal knowledge begins with an agreement between ideas. That is, “knowledge” is the “perception of agreement between ideas.”⁶⁹ Ideas can be sense data, concepts and universal ideas (Copleston points out that this careless use of the term “idea” scarcely serves the cause of clarity⁷⁰). We can see the radical difference between Locke’s and Rousseau’s epistemology. For Rousseau, the individual’s unadulterated, immediate

George Armstrong Kelly, “A General Overview,” *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11. He points out that Rousseau “put moral truth ahead of all speculative fact; or, rather, it will be made the unifying fact, the test and core of all reality. All method in Rousseau flows from this principle.”

⁶⁷ Copleston, “Rousseau (1),” 78. Copleston explains, “Our feelings are “immediate apprehensions or intuitions rather than feeling in the sense in which the sentiment of pity is a feeling.”

⁶⁸ Copleston, “Rousseau (2),” *A History of Philosophy: Volume VI, Modern Philosophy from the French Enlightenment to Kant* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 96.

⁶⁹ Copleston, “Locke (3),” *A History of Philosophy: Volume V, Modern Philosophy, The British philosophers from Hobbes to Hume* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 109.

Also, Martha Brandt Bolton, “The Taxonomy of Ideas,” *The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 69. For Locke, Ideas are fundamental. Ideas account for the content of all conscious states. They account for what consciousness is made of.

⁷⁰ Copleston, “Locke (2),” 77.

impressions of the world are the height of knowledge. Human society only serves to corrupt these first impressions. In contrast, Locke establishes knowledge in what Rousseau anathematizes: Society.

For Locke, knowledge begins at the point we perceive an agreement between our ideas about the world. For Locke, immediate impressions are not knowledge; knowledge comes about only after first impressions are brought into agreement with the larger society. *Perceiving* an agreement between ideas is knowledge. As we will see in the next two chapters, Locke's search for agreement helps us understand why Voltaire has Candide "hesitate" at the end of the tale.

Conclusion

The eighteenth-century focus on limitation is important for *Candide* because its subject is "human nature" itself. Eighteenth-century empiricist focused on the failure of the body—or on the "blocks" and "invisibilities" reason encounters.⁷¹ By rationally investigating "the void," eighteenth-century thinkers hoped to probe beyond the blocks and invisibilities reason encounters. This epistemological commitment is important because, with *Candide*, human nature is the object the text analyzes and also the tool that advances our knowledge about metaphysical commitments. *Candide* does not document the slow loss of meaning, but probes into the mysteries surrounding human existence. The body is essential for this exploration.

As I develop my argument about how *Candide* teaches the reader to become aware of interpretation as the willful commitment that it is, we must first see that because the eighteenth century was obsessed with limits, thinkers used the human body to explore "the void." The void could have been a transatlantic voyage, a cave, language, the cosmos or jokes. In each void, the human body entered the spaces—or horizon—and began a documentation process that inevitably

⁷¹ Cope, "Elastic Empiricism," 113.

stopped where the body grew tired (i.e., failed). As chaos theory helps us understand, failure of the body serves science by increasing knowledge. The decay of desire teaches lessons. This is no less the case for Candide's desire for Cunegonde, which motivates the tale, as it is for an explorer's desire to climb a mountain range. As supplies run out, blisters form or skin wrinkles and sags, we document "the void" in which humans exist. Chaos theory helps us understand why satire and science has a "tonal harmony" in the eighteenth-century. As this harmony between satire and science shows, Candide's failure is not meant to argue against metaphysics or show his dehumanization. Failure did not coincide with a loss of being in Voltaire's Lockean world. *Candide* critics reveal their commitments to Rousseau's understanding of desire and immediate impressions when they advance interpretations that associate hesitation with a loss of being.

CHAPTER TWO

Though [Candide] talked this way,
he did not neglect the food.
-Voltaire

The Body and Locke's Reverse-Mode

Introduction

To further develop my argument that *Candide* teaches the relationship between judgment and will (and how to “hesitate”), we will look more closely at how John Locke used the body to ground knowledge in testimony. By building off the eighteenth-century emphasis on the human body, we can see that John Locke, specifically, used the human body and a “reverse-mode” of explanation to explore testimony and consent. Testimony, not rigorous data, began the rationalization process. This means that, Locke was more interested in the integrity of a position than “proof.” The integrity of a testimony that recounts the explorer’s adventure is more important than the quantity or rigor of data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the first step in the eighteenth-century criteria of certainty.

Locke's Systematicity

Candide’s shift from seeking the goal of his own happiness to thinking about “failure” reveals the Lockean world that influenced Voltaire. The world of *Candide* is the world of Locke.⁷² We see the connection between Locke and Voltaire through their treatment of human desire and their mutual interest in testimony rather than proof.

⁷² Brailsford, *Voltaire*, 121. Voltaire absorbed Locke’s thought completely: “[Voltaire] had read Locke [...] and was content to count himself [a] grateful pupil.” Voltaire “accepted without modification Locke’s analysis of the process of knowledge, with him rejected innate ideas, and derived all experience from the impressions of the senses.”

G. A. J. Rogers, “The Intellectual Setting and Aims of the Essay,” *The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 31. And, Voltaire praised Locke’s *Essay* as being “a natural history of the human soul.”

For Locke, knowledge was a “fitting” of “truth-seeking to the truth-supporting world.”⁷³

For example, Locke writes:

First, Our simple ideas are all real, all agree to the reality of things: not that they are all of them the images or representations of what does exist; the contrary whereof, in all but the primary qualities of bodies, has been already shown. But, though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is; yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness, pain, &c., being in us the effects of powers in things without us, ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations; they are real ideas in us, whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves. For, these several appearances being designed to be the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with, our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose, and are as real distinguishing characters, whether they be only constant effects, or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves: the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitution of real beings. But whether they answer to those constitutions, as to causes or patterns, it matters not; it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds; that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea, more than what it has received.⁷⁴

Order was from confusion “wring.”⁷⁵ Because knowledge was a “fitting” of self to world, a stronger desire did not answer the problematic relationship of the two. Fulfillment is technical, a matter of organization and discipline. Left to themselves, human desires act as anti-agents. They must be controlled and organized so they “make sense.” “Knowing” is equivalent to perceiving the agreement between ideas.⁷⁶

Because knowledge is perceiving an agreement—or a “fit”—between self and world, Locke and Voltaire emphasize the personal nature of knowledge: They focus on testimony. To advance this concept, both writers use a “metaphor” instead of a proposition. Locke discusses

⁷³ Kevin Lee Cope, *Criteria of Certainty: Truth and Judgment in the English Enlightenment* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1990), 103.

⁷⁴ John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Barnes and Noble Publishing, 2004), 2. 30. 2.

⁷⁵ Cope, *Criteria*, 103. Cope explains that this eighteenth-century conception of truth spurred Laurence Sterne (author of *Tristram Shandy*) and others to write novels that were deliberately confusing. Order and rationality was something that worked against disorder; order was found only after disorder was engaged. A confusing novel taught us about our own abilities to engage disorder.

⁷⁶ Copleston, “Locke (3),” 109.

“consent” which is “agreeing together”; Voltaire concludes his story with the enigmatic “cultivate your garden.” This behavior causes problems because with these metaphors, there is no “analytic sense of what a rational person ought to [consent to or cultivate].”⁷⁷ Locke was not interested in proving something as being “right or wrong” as, for example, we can see from his underdeveloped proofs of God’s existence.⁷⁸ Locke was interested in seeing if a body of knowledge—like scripture or the Christian tradition—had a congruity with reason.⁷⁹ Locke was concerned with the effects of a belief, not the truth-value of the belief itself.⁸⁰ And so we learn the *process* of fitting ourselves to the world instead of following an Objective guidebook. Locke

⁷⁷ Jules Steinberg, *Locke and Rousseau and the Idea of Consent: An inquiry into the liberal-democratic theory of political obligation* (Westport: Greenwood Press), 1978. To see how this metaphor works in Locke’s thought, it is helpful to look at a scholar who objects to Locke’s “metaphorical” thoughts. The reasons for the rejection of Locke’s metaphor of consent reveals something about the scholars who have come after Locke: Steinberg makes an interesting point. Locke’s political thought has been objected to because of its “metaphorical” nature. For Locke, “consent” is a metaphor for “acting rationally,” but what does he mean by “acting rationally? His precise meaning is not clear given his metaphor. Unfortunately, a metaphor of explanation does not indicate what motivation one has to actually act in accordance with reason itself. Locke’s metaphor—as metaphors will—shrouds human life in mystery, and modern philosophers usually equate mystery with nonsense.

For Locke, the consent upon which government rests is merely a “formal conformity” but not necessarily something more “substantive” (60). What is more “substantive” than Locke’s metaphor is, of course, Rousseau’s understanding of consent which conveniently connects consent to moral obligation.

Ultimately, “consent” really is not the point at all because, Steinberg writes, its presence or absence does not matter as much as an “analytic sense of what rational individuals ought to consent to” (75). The *performance* of agreement does not matter as much as the *feeling or motivation* of agreement. Rousseau rejects Locke, Steinberg writes, because Locke does not provide us with a good moral obligation to obey the law (81). Additionally, Rousseau argues that consent needs “sameness of soul”—the same “ought” for all those obligated under the law—and is therefore unattainable in a morally diverse, pluralistic society (82). Locke’s metaphor assumes “shared moral beliefs,” but these just are not possible in a pluralistic society (82). Steinberg does not realize that for Locke, performance influences feelings and could eventually create “shared moral beliefs.”

Because of moral autonomy, Locke’s metaphor breaks down; it is too mysterious to compel real, specific political action. Steinberg connects Kant to the discussion saying that because humans are morally autonomous, we have freedom to do what we ought to do. We can act selfishly or unselfishly as we see fit (17).

Rogers, “Aims,” 14. Unlike his critics, Locke did not believe that certainty was attainable. He thought that seeking certainty was “whistling in the wind.” Certainty is always modest and provisional because human knowledge is always fallible and therefore “mediocre.” And, while the task of the philosopher is to “remove nonsense” (“Aims,” 30), human knowledge is very limited (32).

⁷⁸ Cope, “Emergence,” 99. “Because he is interested in the “fit” between a knower and the world, Locke zeros in on divergent areas of Christianity, particularly *miracles*. Locke immediately focuses on the apparent conflicts and seeks consent between reason and religious belief.” Interestingly, by seeking “consent,” Locke focuses on “testimony” rather than proof. The testimony of many witnesses is enough to make a fact a fact (Cope, “Emergence,” 99). For Lock, knowledge is perception and agreement, not cold, depersonalized “data” (Cope, *Criteria*, 105).

⁷⁹ Cope, “Emergence,” 98.

⁸⁰ Cope, *Criteria*, 103.

affirmed metaphors such as “consent” instead of offering his readers an analytic sense of what they should consent to do. Like Locke, Voltaire offered his own metaphor: “Cultivation.”

The Process of Consent: “The Reverse-Mode”

Scholars are not sure about *Candide*’s central metaphor for the same reason philosophers reject Locke’s “consent” as being unclear. Both writers fail to explain themselves. Instead, readers learn a process of consent. Voltaire and Locke do not help uncover the dictates of reason or what can legitimately motivate “cultivation.” Locke, like the eighteenth-century thinkers who predated him, sought out conflicts and applied reason to them.⁸¹ Locke’s “philosophizing” is a system of explaining how these conflicts exist and how they can be resolved. His thoughts are not aimed at proof; he accounts for the process leading to resolution or consent.

For Locke confrontation is essential for knowledge and is the “foundation of explanation and the explanatory mode.”⁸² Locke “stabilizes but asserts the priority of a world of artifice.”⁸³ Artifice for Locke, Cope explains, is the “relation of evidence to explanatory discourse” which “ceases to be a one-way affair; his human world and its real counterparts parallel, lead to, and sometimes collide with one another.”⁸⁴ The world of systematicity is an artificial one; it is a

⁸¹ In his book *Criteria of Certainty*, Cope analyzes Locke’s thoughts in light of the Restoration era thinkers—those writers who wrote immediately before Locke historically. Cope writes, “For writers working before John Locke”—writers like Rochester, Halifax, and Dryden—“the fun of explanation often results from the defiant juxtaposing, interrupting, and complicating of prefabricated theories that someone else believes to be true.” And, he says, “This [...] bashing of truth is an essential ingredient of [the] philosophizing rhetoric. Truth, or more precisely, the reaction against the failure to attain truth is a motivating, if unsolvable, problem for the rakish intellectual of the Restoration era” (Cope, *Criteria*, 93). Cope shows that Locke continues the project started by these Restoration era writers: “The project of extending, enlarging, and also comprehending the world of explanatory discourse” (Cope, *Criteria*, 95). And, “[Locke] is of signal importance, however, for his presentation of human knowledge as a device for comprehending everything, including those contrasts, contradictions, truths, errors, and theories for which Rochesterian, Halifaxian, and Drydenian philosophizing begins” (Cope, *Criteria*, 94).

⁸² *Ibid.*, 95.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

world of consent; it is a world of contracts and social development. Confrontation is essential for the creation of these “artificial” developments.

Confrontation reveals testimony and, with differing testimonies, integrity. This is because all “consent” starts with the identification of positions of conflict. Locke thought that conflicts produced developments. He called these developments “consent.”⁸⁵ Locke writes:

And hence it follows that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums; our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.⁸⁶

Conflicts produce discussions. These discussions move from disagreements to agreement. These agreements are real “knowledge” and as certain as mathematics.⁸⁷ For Locke, each person’s knowledge—each testimony—stabilizes and validates the agreement.

Differing opinions and perspectives are helpful because they advance knowledge. “To understand” or “to know” is to agree together about something. It is upon agreement, “consent,” that “a commonwealth is built.”⁸⁸ Locke believed that civilization was a result of a process of moving from disorder to order, of moving from disagreement to agreement. This process of agreement is called “developmentalism.”⁸⁹ Thus for Locke, society and education⁹⁰ were not

⁸⁵ Ibid., 96.

⁸⁶ Locke, *Essay*, 4. 4. 7.

⁸⁷ Cope *Criteria*, 96.

Locke writes, “Moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics” (*Essay*, 4. 4. 7).

⁸⁸ Cope, *Criteria*, 96.

⁸⁹ Cope, “Emergence,” 92.

⁹⁰ Locke hoped that his “developmentalism” would carry every researcher “further and further afield” rather than let them reach a common goal (Cope, “Emergence,” 98). In education, for example, this impulse to explore is dramatically different than legislation to “Leave No Child Behind.” The idea that there is some fundamental body of knowledge that is somehow necessary for everyone to master—without regard for their individual aptitude—is alien to Locke’s theory of education. Of interest is the impulse to “validate” seemingly superfluous tasks like Humanities Studies with more weighty science-based fields of knowledge. This need for validation explains why an English major might turn to philosophy, history and science to validate what she is already good at—reading books.

ever “complete”; rather, they were more or less *mature*. Maturity did not mean “completion.”⁹¹ For Locke, the process of philosophy was not an attempt to complete the system. It was just that: a process. We can see that a book like *Tristram Shandy* known for being “totally insane” is really just the first step in this rationalization process.

Locke’s task as a philosopher was to implement and teach the technique of this process.⁹² The point of this process was to create shared beliefs (versus explaining what shared beliefs we do have). Shared beliefs are the “public faces” of the private process and result from experiences.⁹³ Shared experiences create shared beliefs. Locke writes:

[T]here is nobody who does not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he has the idea of it in his memory, and actually looking upon it: of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are more distinguishable one from another. And therefore he has certain knowledge that they are not both memory, or the actions of his mind, and fancies only within him; but that actual seeing has a cause without.⁹⁴

Experiencing the sun and believing something about it are intimately connected. For Locke, experience and relations are not produced by ideas. Ideas do not have a special power over and above dirt, apples, and sunny afternoons. Ideas include rather than represent or correspond to things.⁹⁵ Cope explains that for Locke, “The relation of perception [i.e., ideas] is not in an experience but as a kind of immediate, reflexive explanation of an experience.”⁹⁶ This immediate, reflexive explanation of experience focuses Locke on testimony rather than data; similarly, Locke sought consent not “proof.”⁹⁷

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁹² Cope, *Criteria*, 97.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Locke, *Essay*, 4. 11. 5.

⁹⁵ Cope, *Criteria*, 98.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁹⁷ Cope, *Criteria*, 103. Locke is not interested in “propositional truth” but in explaining how propositional truths are first “apparent truths” (103). Locke writes in the *Essay*: “But it is not in that metaphysical sense of truth which we inquire here, when we examine, whether our ideas are capable of being true or false, but in the more ordinary acceptation of those words: and so I say that the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances there, none of them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our

Beliefs are very closely related to actions. When we believe certain things, we act in certain ways; when we act in certain ways, we believe certain things.⁹⁸ This explains why Locke was not interested in proof or in giving a reader an analytic sense of what obligation a person had to “consent.” Rather than discuss abstract truth-claims, Locke wanted to discuss how society works. Cope writes: “Locke wants to talk about social processes not philosophical ruminations.”⁹⁹ For example, Locke says:

Unless the mind had a distinct perception of different objects and their qualities, it would be capable of very little knowledge, though the bodies that affect us were as busy about us as they are now, and the mind were continually employed in thinking. On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several, even very general, propositions, which have passed for innate truths;--because men, overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent, impute it wholly to native uniform impressions; whereas it is truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind, whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same, or different.¹⁰⁰

The knowing and consenting process is a technique of interacting with other people. Interacting with other people, consenting and philosophizing are all other names for “work”; that is, the work of explaining is closely tied to the work of living. Working out how you live and thinking about your life are closely tied. Thus, it can be said that Locke’s *Essay* is “the explanation mode in reverse.”¹⁰¹ Living produces thought and different lifestyles are necessary for different ideas.

minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them” (2. 32. 3).

⁹⁸ Mark Hulliung, “Rousseau, Voltaire, and the Revenge of Pascal,” *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 62. A text like *Candide* can offer its readers an experience, which will begin the process of knowledge. A text could force a reader to act in certain ways. A new behavior produces new thoughts. Mark Hulliung explains that, “In general, Voltaire finds that our physical and emotional health depends on rejecting all versions of Christian dualism, whether Pascal’s or the Cartesian separation of body and mind found in the Jansenist Arnauld or the Oratorian Malebranche. Wrapping himself in Locke’s epistemology and psychology, Voltaire argues that no one can withdraw his soul from the world, for where our body is, so too is our mind.”

⁹⁹ Cope, *Criteria*, 96.

¹⁰⁰ Locke, *Essay*, 2. 11. 1.

¹⁰¹ Cope, *Criteria*, 101.

In his *Essay*, Locke is showing how a person makes connections and produces relations or “discovers relations” and gives them to other people.¹⁰² This mode of explanation illumines why Voltaire has his characters work, but does not take time to explain why or how *Candide* is no longer “hesitating” but has resolved his dilemma. Work itself will resolve the dilemma. Like the *Essay*, *Candide* teaches *how* this reverse-mode works instead of proving that it is right. *Candide* teaches us how to focus on work and build meaning and hope into our lives.

Candide's Work

This “reverse-mode” challenges anyone who believes that pain is the ultimate evil. In the reverse-mode, failure teaches the path that we should tread. For Locke and Voltaire, failure stabilizes, critiques and helps define the concepts we believe. The reverse-mode helps reveal the integrity of a belief. In systematicity, Voltaire sought integrity, not proof. He focuses on failure not to break metaphysical connections but to reveal the integrity of those connections (if they do exist). He uses a metaphor—versus a proposition—to draw the reader into revealing his or her own belief about metaphysical connections (i.e. his or her own testimony). Voltaire’s job is to draw out our testimony. Once we offer our testimonies, the rationalization has started.

This is essential for *Candide*: Habitual actions (like “cultivation”) create the possibility of holding previously untenable beliefs (like, for example, Optimism).¹⁰³ The habit of cultivation can produce a belief in Optimism, but Optimism cannot stand alone. Concepts require a foundation in the body and in human practice. In Locke’s world, we can “believe to know” just

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Manfred Kusch, “The River and the Garden: Basic Spatial Models in *Candide* and *La Nouvelle Héloïse*,” *The Past as Prologue: Essays to Celebrate the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of ASECS in AMS Studies in the Eighteenth Century* 28 (New York: AMS, 1995): 9. The habit is the point of the story: Manfred Kusch argues that, “The concept of the garden as a fixed structure is deemphasized in favor of the more important concept of the process of cultivation” (9). The physical space is not the point so much as the habit of development that the characters adopt.

as we can “know to believe.” It is work which *produces* purpose, pleasure and meaning. The work we do changes what we know about the world; it is through “cultivation” that life takes on meaning. Before Candide starts cultivating, he has no hope, no faith, and no active belief in Optimism. It is work itself that produces these beliefs. In *Candide*, there is no certainty before faithful work.

Meals

Testimony, not data or an individual’s desire, begins knowledge. Candide must fit his desire to the world to “make sense” out of himself and his desires. That his desire fails is not a problem: failure reveals an ill-fit of desire to the world. As a result of failure, he must adopt a new habit. He must reshape his desire to correctly fit the world.

As the garden community comes together at the end of the tale, they begin to pool their mutual needs and “cultivate” ways of sating their desires. Happiness becomes a matter of consent, not violent, individualistic “grasping.” Candide notices that meals provide differing fulfillments; their fulfillment does not require the destruction of any one person’s desire—meals are systems of relationship that balance and fulfill mutually. Like gardens, meals supply an assortment of fulfillments. At the end of *Candide*, Candide seeks to “cultivate” non-violent assortments of fulfillment: meals.

“Cultivating a garden” becomes a metaphor for fitting human desire to the world. Just as the stomach is made for food, humans are made to fulfill their desires.¹⁰⁴ This fulfillment occurs

¹⁰⁴ *Candide*, 65. Candide and company are excited to meet an man who has never been happy: Lord Pocourante (61). He has never known pain of grief, which is incidentally because he is completely bored. Lord Pocourante is a man without any desire for anything. Voltaire offers the reader a riddle of human desire: wanting anything desperately opens up the possibility of desperate disappointment; the greater one’s desire, the greater one’s potential for disappointment. Lord Pocourante is a perversion of human desire for, as Martin observes, he is not happy with anything. “The best stomachs,” Martin points out, “are not those which refuse all food” (65). And, “There is no pleasure in having no pleasure” he tells Candide (65). With this scenario, Voltaire helps to capture

through agreement. Agreement begins with testimony and shared, public performance. *Candide* is an exploration of how fulfillment is possible. Cultivating a garden will produce food; food will produce a meal; meals, as we shall see, will produce hope and agreement with Optimism.¹⁰⁵

Candide realizes the need for meals when he meets the Turk. They discuss politics. They sit down to a meal; they eat. The Turk's daughters attend them and perfume their beards after the meal:

You must posses, Candide said to the Turk, an enormous and splendid property? I have only twenty acres, replied the Turk; I cultivate them with my children, and the work keeps us from three great evils, boredom, vice and poverty. Candide, as he walked back to his farm, meditated deeply over the words of the Turk. He said to Pangloss and Martin: --This good old man seems to have found himself a fate preferable to that of the six kings with whom we had the honor of dining.”¹⁰⁶

Candide makes a connection between ethical action, philosophy, and food; he finds the key to stabilizing his own desires and helping his desires fit the world: meals. “Cultivation” of meals through a diverse array of forces—money, marketplace, labor, sexuality, etc.—balance all the various aspects of human life. Fulfillment comes “indirectly” to human life, or from “the ground up.” Happiness is reached through a reverse-mode.

Conclusion

Eighteenth-century “body” emphasis led Locke to focus attention on *how* the process of consent happened. He focused on testimony not proof. The *Essay* shows us a “reverse-mode” of

Candide's dilemma for the reader. Candide is unsuccessful in his desire for Cunegonde, but he would be wrong to desire nothing.

¹⁰⁵ *Candide*, 44. “After a good meal, Candide was inclined to agree with Pangloss.”

¹⁰⁶ *Candide*, 71.

explanation where explanations, abstractions and meaning-giving systems begin with the body. The integrity of a testimony that recounts the explorer's adventure is more important than the quantity or rigor of data compiled. The human body, not the laboratory, is the first step in the eighteenth-century criteria of certainty. As a result of this influence, it is no surprise to find that *Candide* focuses on the body and the body's habits. Habits, not immediate, unadulterated impressions, bring about the connection between self and world. Habits bring about fulfillment.

CHAPTER THREE

Deo erexit Voltaire.
-Voltaire

Hesitation

Introduction

To further develop Locke's concepts in order to illumine *Candide*, we will see that Locke's concept of *uneasiness* reveals how, in the "reverse-mode," volition and judgment interconnect. More to the point: A novelist who aligns himself with Locke's epistemology, instead of Rousseau's, will create a novel distinctly different than those novels that seek to capture the three-dimensional, emotional vitality of the main character. A "Lockean novel" will teach "hesitation" as the reader learns to study the relationship between judgment and volition. In a Lockean novel, the reader is encouraged to "step-back" or "hesitate" with respect to immediate impulses. This means that in a novel like *Candide* the attainment of happiness is a technical problem rather than an emotional or "desire" problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving).

Metaphor Versus Realism

As we just saw, for Locke, outward-directed practices influence inward psychological processes. For Locke, sincerity and the "guts" of emotional or ideological commitments are not as important as "outward," shared behavior. That is, the performance of the body amends the content of the mind. This is to say that for Locke affirming a behavior is more important than identifying a correct emotional response. Locke's reverse-mode reveals itself very expressively in *Candide's* overall behavior and particularly in the metaphor the text advances. Particularly, we

can see *Candide*'s uniqueness as a novel¹⁰⁷ when we compare *Candide*'s "symbolic text"¹⁰⁸ to the "emotional realism" of a novel by Rousseau.¹⁰⁹

As we will see, the rejection of Locke's political metaphor of consent is not an isolated rejection of metaphor. Authors and philosophers after Locke and Voltaire affirm, at least unconsciously, the rejection of metaphor in exchange for the clarity of emotional realism.

Artistic practice follows the rest of modernity by taking Rousseau as its ideological inspiration

¹⁰⁷ Is *Candide* even a novel? Scholars have debated this topic extensively. Bonneville, in *Voltaire and the Form of the Novel*, writes, "Since *Candide* success is undiminished after more than two centuries, and since it seems to gain in stature from the diversity of interpretations, the inevitable conclusion is that it is not watered-down satire, but that it is more than satire" (13). Bonneville argues that *Candide* is a novel, but is a different sort than the "sentimental novels" that dominated the next century.

Also, Frederick Copleston, "Rousseau (2)," *A History of Philosophy, Volume VI, Modern Philosophy, From the French Enlightenment to Kant* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 98. Copleston writes concerning Rousseau: "In the development of literature Rousseau exercised a powerful influence not only on French but also on German literature [...] Rousseau was not the originator of the literature of sensibility, even if he gave to it a powerful impetus."

Bonneville argues that *Candide* must be a novel because of its lasting influence reveals a complexity that only a novel explains (15). Bottiglia, on the other hand, argues that the tale is merely a "philosophic tale" (43), a "chamber-piece" (56), or a "dramatic monologue" (54). Whatever it is, *Candide* certainly is complex enough to continue to be an engaging topic of analysis. For this thesis, *Candide* is assumed to be a novel and, more specifically, a "satire." Novels are parasitic in form; they absorb and use multiple genres, forms and voices to communicate their meanings. Satire itself can be seen as a characteristic of novel discourse or as its own independent "genre." I am assuming that satire is a characteristic of novel discourse and interchange the term "novel" for the term "satire."

¹⁰⁸ Bonneville, in *Voltaire and the Form of the Novel*, writes, "Voltaire does not undertake, with the blandishments of rhetoric to capture the psyche of his reader. Rather than encourage a 'willing suspension of disbelief' Voltaire calls upon the reader to respond intellectually to his symbolic experience, to 'realize' this experience not by participating emotionally or kinesthetically in the action, but by giving it meaning. Indeed, the real meaning of *Candide* is that which the enlightened reader is able to extract from his own discrete experience and impose upon the truly essential event in the book. The more physical, intellectual or emotional knowledge [the reader] brings to the book, the better [the reader] is bound to 'understand' it" (16). To summarize, Bonneville believes that *Candide* is a novel that behaves like a poem. The language and events "evoke" a response from the reader (17). The reader must impose his or her life experiences onto the text to make sense of it. This, I argue as this thesis unfolds, is why there are so many interpretations to the text. When the reader imposes a reading *eisegetically*, the integrity of that reader's position can be explored.

¹⁰⁹ Victor Gourevitch, "The Religious Thought," *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 203. We can see the differences in Rousseau's and Voltaire's epistemology revealed in their artistic expressions. Victor Gourevitch argues that emotions are what draw Rousseau away from Voltaire's pessimistic thoughts about life. Gourevitch writes, "When Voltaire claims that nobody would be prepared to live his life over again [...], Rousseau counters that this may be how swaggers feel who make a show of scorning death by setting too low a stock by the goods of life, or the malcontent rich, or melancholy men of letters [...]. Such people who like Voltaire himself, enjoy life and cling to it all the while they claim that we suffer more evils than we enjoy goods are manifestly in bad faith [...]. They fail to acknowledge 'the sweet sentiment of existence'."

instead of Locke or Voltaire.¹¹⁰ The practice of expressing the three-dimensional emotional realism of a main character—as Rousseau does—aims to capture an analytic sense of what a rational human is thinking or feeling. *Candide* is striking because this documentation of his “inwardness” is exactly what we do not get. For Modern thought following the eighteenth century, secret thoughts and feelings are more valuable than performance or outward-directed social processes like testimony and consent.

It is true that Rousseau’s emphasis to express “emotional vitality” does help overcome a certain kind of epistemological dilemma (are these emotions sincere? Are they justified? Are my beliefs true?). But *Candide*’s metaphor offers us a different kind of solution to the modern

¹¹⁰ Frances K Barasch, “The Grotesque as a Comic Genre,” *Modern Language Studies* 15, No. 1. (Winter, 1985), 9. Part of the depersonalization of *Candide* comes by way of the funny horror of the actions: The story is not redemptive if we fail to draw back. One way of “drawing back” is of course through laughter. Frances K. Barasch argues, “Novels in the grotesque genre have as a common bond a structural reliance on horror perceived through a saving comic vision of humanity.” She continues to argue that, “The comic element in the grotesque is the saving element, a creative vision in face of destructive forces. To ignore the comic element in the grotesque or to fail to perceive the grotesque as a comic genre is to miss the affinities of meaning between early writers like Voltaire or Rabelais and [modern authors].”

What is more, “laughter” also helps bring about consent: Brian Boyd, in “Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor,” points out that among persons who could compete, if a cooperative relationship is formed, more is accomplished for both parties. Cooperation only exists within a group of potential competitors. As a result, cooperation inherently involves conflict. There is a constant need for rules of play and for punishments when rules are broken. “In play,” Boyd writes, “principles of fair play and teamwork promote cooperation, while rules, referees and disqualifications punish deviations. Humor can also be used to group levels to promote cooperation—by its self-rewarding nature and by reinforcing the recognition of shared expectations—and to discourage or punish non-cooperation or deviance” (11). Laughter critiques those who are not playing by the rules; laughter secures cooperation by punishing non-cooperative behavior. In this way, laughter is seen as a social corrective. This laughter is how we “connect” to other people—we laugh together. This “connection” is very different than Rousseau’s.

Bonneville compares one of Rousseau’s novels to Voltaire’s and says that Rousseau’s novel is personalized to the extreme while Voltaire’s work is the very epitome of “depersonalized experience, for both emotional intensive and psychological intricacy are purposefully minimized.” Bonneville continues by saying that the nineteenth-century French tradition inundated the novel form with “Romanticism, Realism and Naturalism.” As a result, “*Candide*’s technical lessons were thus obscured as the novel tended to amplify the personal and particular” (43).

In addition to this Voltaire scholar, Frederick Copleston, in “Rousseau (2),” comments on Rousseau’s influence with the novel form: Although Rousseau “was not the originator of the literature of sensibility,” his influence over the developments in philosophy and literature are not limited to the eighteenth-century. Copleston observes, “In [...] aspects of his thought, political, educational and psychological, he looked forward to the future. And some of his problems, such as that of the relation between the individual and the State, are obviously as real now as when he wrote, even if we would give to his questions different formulations” (100).

epistemological dilemma: As we will see, the different approaches coincide with different understandings of “human nature.”

Three-Dimensional, Emotionally Realistic Novels

Critics point out that *Candide* is not really a novel because the story does not have the “three-dimensional emotional vibrancy characteristic of other novels.”¹¹¹ An analysis of “emotional vibrancy” reveals how Voltaire is in conflict with the novel tradition that came after him. *Candide* is distinctly flat and artificial. Part of the superficial style that Voltaire expresses in the story comes by way of the narrator—or better, “Demonstrator”—who is said to “perform” the work and thereby infect the audience with his own attitude towards the represented objects.¹¹² *Candide*’s audience adopts the Demonstrator’s view of the events; the audience does not resonate with the life of the characters. Instead the audience resonates with a posture or a “distance” encouraged by the Demonstrator. Like a puppet master, this Demonstrator infects *Candide* with artificiality—two-dimensionality—and invites the audience to share a feeling of aloofness and superiority.¹¹³ The aloofness that the Demonstrator encourages renders Candide himself, as a character, flat and emotionally unappealing. This would be problematic for Rousseau, and others, as truth comes by way of feeling and a loss of feeling coincides with a loss of being.¹¹⁴ But for Voltaire, this emotional disengagement or “distance” from immediate events is essential for answering epistemological dilemmas.

¹¹¹ William F. Bottiglia, *Voltaire’s Candide: Analysis of a Classic* (Geneva: Institut et Musee Voltaire, 1964), 66.

¹¹² Bottiglia, 67, 70.

¹¹³ Bottiglia, 67, 70.

¹¹⁴ Wolper, 275. Wolper, in *An Analysis of Candide*, argues that Candide experiences a loss of feeling of generosity. This loss coincides with a loss of being.

I connect Wolper’s argument back to Rousseau because, as Copleston comments, for Rousseau, “to exist is to feel; our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas” (“Rousseau (1),” 78). Copleston explains that by “feelings” Rousseau meant “immediate apprehension or intuition

Bonneville stresses the *Candide*'s "flatness," and actually compares the text to a poem: "As with a poem," he explains, "the value [of *Candide*] is evocative."¹¹⁵ Bonneville continues, "Voltaire [...] believes that the further one is from direct experience, the more comprehensible it becomes."¹¹⁶ That is, Voltaire thought that getting some "distance" from a situation would help make that situation more comprehensible. This belief is in stark contrast to Rousseau, who thought truth was in a first impression.¹¹⁷

Bonneville explains that Voltaire, to help attain a distance from direct experience, distorts time or "duration." Bonneville writes, "Since duration is largely emotional, its absence serves to heighten the intellectuality of Voltaire's world."¹¹⁸ Without duration, Voltaire creates a world with very little emotion. He creates a "flat" world, a world of two-dimensional, puppet-like

rather than feeling in the sense in which the sentiment of pity is a feeling" (78). Wolper condemns *Candide* because he no longer spontaneously responds to the world outside of his garden. As we will see, "hesitation" is an idea that directly opposes Rousseau's belief in "feelings" (i.e. immediate apprehension) as being existence itself.

¹¹⁵ Bonneville, 17.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹¹⁷ For Rousseau morality is the "unthwarted" and "unprevented" development of man's natural passions and feelings. Copleston clarifies saying that for Rousseau "feelings" were immediate apprehensions or intuitions, rather than "pity." "To exist," Copleston summarizes, "is to feel." ("Rousseau (1)," 77-78).

Samuel Rickless, "Locke's Polemic Against Nativism," *The Cambridge Companion to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 33. Add to this difference Locke's attack on "Nativism": For Locke there are no innate ideas. Nativism believed that a fundamental axiom existed that could not be proved (nor needed to be). One such "fundamental" idea is the idea of duty. This rejection of the importance of "duty" is paramount in understanding how Voltaire and Locke differed from later modern and postmodern thought which developed around Rousseau and Kant's ideas of emotional impressions and the duty that Reason dictates.

¹¹⁸ Bonneville, 27. This distortion of time is particularly interesting as it is time that serves to allow for the embodiment of ideas. Bottiglia writes a very interesting thought when compared to Bonneville's claim that *Candide* is "timeless." Bottiglia writes: "Scholars who find Voltaire superficial, incoherent, and even chaotic, because he is not a systematic thinker, fail to grasp what Goethe, himself artistically and morally profound, must have felt by sympathetic resonance: that Voltaire introduces into thought the fourth dimension demanded by the dynamics of social life, that he rejects the ivory-tower illusion of conceptual fixity and incorporates ideas into the stream of time, that instead of designing a pretentious thought structure he evolves an attitude, that he inclines to make Being a function of Becoming" (40).

Erich Auerbach, "Tone, Pace, Insinuation," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1991), 141. Auerbach writes, "Voltaire arranges reality so that he can use it for his purposes. There is no denying the presence, in many of his works, of colorful, vivid, everyday reality. But it is incomplete, consciously simplified, and hence—despite the serious didactic purpose—nonchalant and superficial. As for the stylistic level, a lowering of man's position is implied in the attitude prevailing in the writing of the Enlightenment, even when they are not as impertinently witty as Voltaire's. The tragic exaltation of the classical hero loses ground from the beginning of the eighteenth century. Tragedy itself becomes more colorful and clever with Voltaire, but it loses weight." Voltaire distorts reality to make his point. The distortion erases emotion from his world. As a result, the tragedy is comic and the comedy is tragic. Voltaire's *Candide* is silly-serious, a distorted realism.

characters that the audience should analyze, laugh at, mock and do anything but resonate with emotionally. This is fundamentally important for understanding Voltaire and Locke: If duration is distorted, then we necessarily distort the presentation of emotion. To achieve his purposes of “distance,” Voltaire had to treat emotions fundamentally different than Rousseau. Emotions and all immediate responses only add to epistemological dilemmas, they do not help solve them.

By way of comparison, Bonneville observes that Rousseau’s *Novelle Heloise* was published at the same time as *Candide* and offers novel critics a problem because of the obvious “formal range” that these two novels exhibit.¹¹⁹ Bonneville points out, “Rousseau’s ‘novel’ is personalized to the extreme [...] while Voltaire’s work is the very epitome of depersonalized experience, for [in Voltaire] emotional intensive and psychological intricacy are purposefully minimized.”¹²⁰ Following from Rousseau, the nineteenth-century French tradition overwhelmed the novel with Romanticism, Realism, and Naturalism.¹²¹ As a result, “*Candide*’s technical lessons were thus obscured as the novel tended to amplify the personal and particular.”¹²² Bonneville argues that this difference in *Candide* forces us to approach the text differently than we approach Rousseau’s novels. We do not “resonate” with the hero; rather, we resonate with the hero’s dilemma.

Bonneville writes, “Once again, what is vital in *Candide* is not the person of the hero, it is his dilemma.” All novels are about epistemological dilemmas. Novels dominate artistic expressions when epistemology becomes the dominant discipline.¹²³ Rousseau and Voltaire both invite the reader to share the main character’s dilemma; what is important in all novels is how

¹¹⁹ Ibid., 43.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Mikhail M. Bakhtin, “The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays,” *Theory of the Novel: A Historical Approach* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000), 325.

the reader is supposed to share in the solution to the dilemma. For Voltaire, the solution is disengagement, or “distance” from emotion and immediate responses.

Bonneville continues, “The objectivity, or objectification striven for in the new novel is accomplished in *Candide*, for intellectual identification is achieved with minimal physical or psychological involvement.”¹²⁴ The technical nature of *Candide*’s dilemma is itself difficult to grasp as postmodern scholarship itself is steeped in Rousseau’s thought. To understand *Candide*’s dilemma we must understand “human nature” differently than Rousseau does. This difference can be seen in human volition and the technical, intellectual lessons our wills must learn. That is, conflicts of desire should not be fled from; rather, conflicts of will teach a person about their ignorance and how to overcome it. Happiness, in *Candide*, results from adopting new habits.

Candide’s Dilemma

The novel, as a dominant genre of a particular age, only develops when knowledge replaces memory as the “source of power for the creative impulse.”¹²⁵ We see the novel rising out of a culture dominated by oral tradition (where memory was prized above information). The novel becomes the dominant genre when epistemology becomes the dominant discipline¹²⁶ because it is determined by “experience, knowledge and practice.”¹²⁷ The novel explores the development of an individual and the attempts made by that individual to become happy. Of course, there are different ways of conducting this exploration. Rousseau and Voltaire each have

¹²⁴ Bonneville, 46.

¹²⁵ Bakhtin, 325.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 326.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 325-26.

their own way of engaging the epistemological dilemma that accompanies modern life. They each thought happiness came about in different ways.

A novel presents the reader with a dilemma via excessive information. To make sense of the whirligig world, the reader must assimilate and control the information. The reader must read the novel just as life must be “read.” Thus *Candide* inspires disconnection, indeterminacy, and a “semantic open-endedness” characteristic of all novels¹²⁸ and challenges knowledge, dogma, and all meaning-giving systems by leaving the reader in doubt about the meaning of the text. Doubt about the text coincided with doubt about one’s own life. A novel helps the reader overcome challenges to epistemology by being analogous to the reader’s real life. Of course, how *Candide* is analogous to life is different than Rousseau’s analogy. The two styles are different because each assumes something different about what “human being” is and how life should be engaged. One expresses the inner thoughts and feelings of the main character; the other ignores thoughts and feelings to better express cause and effect relations. For one, truth is tied to immediate, emotional responses; for the other, truth relates to perception, judgment and volition.

In *Candide*, the epistemological dilemma reaches a crescendo at the end when Candide tells everyone to “cultivate your garden.” Instead of feeling at peace with a concluding statement, the audience is left wondering if Candide’s motivation to cultivate his garden is nihilistic, despairing, apathetic, or hopeful.¹²⁹ Is he a hero? Is he a fool? Although we can see

¹²⁸ Ibid., 323.

¹²⁹ Bonneville, 127. So while critics challenge *Candide*’s novel-ness because of the lack of direct emotional engagement, direct emotional engagement is not the only path to novel discourse. Voltaire’s choice to force the reader into disengagement is an opposite move from other novelists who sought to connect the reader to a realistic narrative. Unlike Rousseau, Pascal, Proust, Camus, or Joyce, “Voltaire does not undertake, with the blandishments of rhetoric to capture the psyche of his reader [...] Voltaire calls upon the reader to respond intellectually to his symbolic experience, to ‘realize’ this experience not by participating emotionally [...] but by giving meaning” (Bonneville, 16). Finding Candide’s motivation to cultivate the garden is how modern readers participate in the story. But such disengagement causes its own type of problems. At the end of the novel, we are left without the typical “emotional engagement” of a novel and without the hard and fast conclusion of an academic essay. We did not cry and we did not get an answer to the question of Optimism. Instead we reveal our own positions.

his outward performance, we do not know his motivations—the guts—of his behavior. The interpretive confusion concerning Candide’s motive is essential to the story and to *Candide*’s “novel-ness,” but one can quickly see that this dilemma is dramatically different than other novels. In a novel by Rousseau, we would have insights into the emotional life of the main character that would tell us what he meant by “cultivation.” His motivation would be more important than his performance.

Lockean Hesitation

Candide encourages “distance” from sense data; said another way, *Candide* encourages us to “step back” from ourselves—just as we “step back” from an emotional engagement of the text. In a word, *Candide* encourages us to “hesitate.” The text teaches us the importance of distrusting immediate impulses in preference for acting upon judgment. Most scholars associate Candide’s hesitation with his denial of metaphysical claims. This is not necessarily the case. The presence of hesitation in the text reveals an important feature of Locke’s thoughts on volition and what forces shape our decision-making processes.

In summary, Chappell writes that “volition,” for Locke, “is one kind of thought.”¹³⁰ This means that, for Locke, “a being that is able to will must have a faculty of understanding and so be capable of cognitive thought, and indeed rationality.”¹³¹ This is dramatically important for understanding *Candide*’s hesitation. In taking the position that volition was intellectual, Chappell observes, Locke aligned himself, “perhaps unwittingly,” with Thomas Aquinas for whom this very point is so central.¹³²

¹³⁰ Chappell, “Power,” 143.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Frederick Copleston, “St. Thomas Aquinas--VIII: Knowledge,” *A History of Philosophy, Volume II* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 380-82, 392. Copleston explains Aquinas’s thoughts on volition by saying that the

For Locke, like Aquinas and Aristotle, what determines the will serves both as an efficient cause (prompting the agent to act) and as a formal cause (an available option, or specific action that directs one's will).¹³³ This means that each person must judge and seek out the perceived way to satisfy his or her own will. In this, Locke is both an egoist and a hedonist.¹³⁴ Personal happiness is the highest good and, Chappell writes, it is happiness which "determines the will."¹³⁵ Volition is stimulated and defined by available choices; each choice is a potential way for attaining the ultimate end of one's life, happiness. So judgment and desire work together to analyze options and move toward what will bring about happiness. For Locke, "goodness" depends upon perception and it is perception that motivates the will to reach out for a desired end. As a result, Chappell writes, "what is best" is synonymous with "what will or is likely to produce or lead to the most pleasure for a person, either in the next moment or at some time in

will is appetitive and therefore cannot be understood apart from its natural object of desire. The natural object of desire, for Aquinas is beatitude, happiness or "the good" in general. Because the will and knowledge relate, humans can turn away from assenting that something is good. Humans can reject a possible good as being good. For example, a human can turn away from assenting that an argument for God's existence is adequate. In Aquinas, the will and the mind are connected; judgment and appetites interconnect. But there is no compelling, necessary connection between "the good" and the particular means to attain "the good" (i.e. one man will say God is the ultimate good while another man will say, "no, God is not the ultimate good."). This means that humans can see each particular life-situation from "different sides." Every situation, and every desire, can be interpreted as either bad or good (that is, ultimately leading—or not leading—to "the good"). Copleston explains, for Aquinas, "Judgment belongs to reason, but freedom of judgment belongs immediately to the will." And, "Because knowledge is sensual, we cannot have knowledge of non-sensual objects. We cannot have metaphysical knowledge."

The connection between Locke and Aquinas is important because for both thinkers humans are free to prove God's existence or to disprove God's existence. We can affirm that metaphysical connections do or do not exist. With respect to *Candide*, we can argue that Candide's failed desire proves metaphysical connections do not exist; or, we can argue that Candide's failed desire teaches a lesson about how to "thrive" as a human. Ultimately, the reader's own act of will in applying judgment to the text is the hinge upon which an interpretation swings.

¹³³ Chappell, 149.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 150.

Also, Frederick Copleston, "Locke (4)," *A History of Philosophy, Volume V: Modern Philosophy, The British Philosophers from Hobbes to Hume* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 124. Copleston disagrees with this "offhand" claim that Locke is a hedonist. Copleston explains that for Locke pleasure is not the ultimate good. Pleasure is a technical product of "the good." This means that good and evil relate to pleasure but only in a technical sense. When we obey a law we receive pleasure from the lawgiver. For Locke, pleasure does not "equal" goodness, or *visa versa*. Good produces pleasure. That is, pleasure and "the best of all possible worlds" must be created, grown and cultivated out of technical, habitual actions.

¹³⁵ Chappell, 150.

the future.”¹³⁶ While Locke might be an egoist and hedonist, he also admits that choices are not always easy to differentiate. It is possible that an immediate perceived good might not satisfy “best.” That is, what is perceived to be “best” might actually be the result of ignorance. Thus, Locke proposes a concept of “uneasiness.”¹³⁷

“Uneasiness” is a constant state of mind that results from desire. To explain: Humans are always developing their self-fulfillment. There is always an absent good from our lives.

“Uneasiness” is the result of the potential loss of present pleasure and the arrival of new pain.¹³⁸

The possibility of greater good includes the possibility of loss of what little goodness one already possesses. Freedom, then, for Locke, is not simply a matter of the “will” reaching out for a desired object. Objects of desire all look good, and, as a result, humans suffer from indecision.

We do not know whether an action will bring about more self-fulfillment or lessen our fulfillment. The world contains nothing that is pristinely desirable; everything is a shade of good.

Locke writes that uneasiness determines any voluntary action.¹³⁹ The choices we make are not just a matter of the will but are the result of the perceived goodness of the desired object. Desires themselves—and human volition—can be weak, strong, mature or immature. For Locke, feelings, emotions, ignorance and heredity help determine the will. Impressions, inclinations, enjoyment and all the “subjective babble” of human experience shape human choices. Unlike Socrates, Chappell writes, the will for Locke is weak, insecure, and unsure of itself.¹⁴⁰ Humans are profoundly indecisive by Locke’s account.

¹³⁶ Ibid., 154.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 152.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

But there is hope for the indecisive will: These multiple choices allow humans to suspend the will entirely. Humans are free to “hesitate.”¹⁴¹ The power to hesitate allows humans to keep the decision making process from being merely affective. Hesitation allows us to act only on “mature impulses.” Through hesitation Locke thought we could keep our desires from determining our wills; we can shape desires to produce the most healthful results for our communities and ourselves. Hesitation allows us the time to develop our weak wills. We can culture new habits in ourselves that help us engage the world and thereby attain happiness.

Of course this suspension of desire is brief,¹⁴² but it allows one a chance to judge a situation with greater skill. A human’s desire changes with suspended action; after suspension, a situation takes on a new perspective. A weak, immature desire may die or develop into maturity. Through suspension of the will, humans can shape their desires and thus determine their own wills.¹⁴³ As a result, this hesitation is the source of all liberty.¹⁴⁴ Hesitation allows one to escape an impulse as well as entirely deny the importance or legitimacy of an impulse.

For Locke, volition and judgment intimately relate. Humans can “turn away” from what they judge to be in inappropriate means to happiness. One’s ignorance or one’s knowledge of the world shapes what good one seeks to attain. As with *Candide*’s desire for Cunegonde, he cannot be chastised for wanting her. According to Locke, the will is appetitive and, therefore, cannot be

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 153.

¹⁴² Ibid., 154.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

Locke, in the *Essay*, writes: “This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their constant endeavors after, and a steady prosecution of true felicity,—That they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular think which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good. For, the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to then, to take care not to mistake or miss it; and so necessarily puts then upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. [...] This, as seems to me, is the greatest privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I desire it may be well considered, whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this,—That they can suspend their desires, and stop them from determining their will to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires” (*Essay* 2. 21. 54).

¹⁴⁴ Chappell, 155.

understood apart from the context within which it finds itself. Candide cannot seek “a woman” in general; he seeks the one woman who stimulated his desire. But he is able to *interpret* his desire for her as being either good or bad.¹⁴⁵ That he desires her is not enough to prove her goodness for him. His desire for her might not be the best path to his happiness, but it might be. The lesson in the text is that the impulse to attain Cunegonde is not the gauge of truth; an immediate impulse can be interpreted as being good or evil.

As we will see later, this freedom to interpret a desired object as either good or evil is precisely the cause for both Candide’s and the reader’s dilemma. Candide must interpret his world and decide if he will cultivate. When he does decide to cultivate, the reader must decide to what good Candide is directing himself. The reader questions, “How is cultivation going to bring about happiness?” Or, “To what happiness is this cultivation aimed?” Rather than answer this question for us, *Candide* shows us this dilemma. As a novel, *Candide* represents an analogous situation the reader faces in his or her own life: “What will bring about my own happiness?” And although we see the performance of cultivation, we do not know to what good this cultivation is aimed.

Eisegesis in Candide

What is remarkable about *Candide* is how the text calls forth the reader’s own beliefs about the world in order to answer the dilemma. Said another way, *Candide* demands *eisegesis*. In “drawing out” the meaning of the text, the text “draws in” the reader’s understanding about the world. In keeping with Locke’s understanding of the woven relationship of volition and

¹⁴⁵ Copleston, “Aquinas—VIII: Knowledge,” 382. Copleston explains what this means, in regard to Aquinas’ understanding of desire, by explaining that going on a walk can be said to be good for the health, but also bad with respect to time management). Human desire allows for the interpretation of events in different ways so as to arrive at different immediate goods. It is unknown, of course, how these immediate perceived goods will affect the attainment of one’s ultimate goal, happiness.

judgment, in judging the text interpretatively, the reader inevitably imposes her will upon the text. Judgment and will coincide; to interpret is to move toward a perceived good. The reader interprets the “goodness” or “badness” of *Candide*’s act of cultivation. This interpretation is necessarily an act of volition and reveals the reader’s position or testimony.

With some texts, *eisegesis* is damaging. For example, when a text is trying to prove a truth-claim. But this is not the case with *Candide*. Bonneville touches upon this idea when he explains that *Candide* is evocative in the same way that poetry evokes meaning from a reader’s personal experiences. *Candide*’s readers connect to the story not by emotional resonance, but by *eisegesis*. In *Candide* finding the correct reading of the text—of explaining what “cultivation” means “once and for all”—is beside the point. The point of the text is that we see our attempts at exegesis as *eisegesis*. The point of *Candide*, and how it helps readers engage the modern epistemological crisis, is by revealing to the reader the relationship between judgment and volition. *Candide* teaches its readers to become aware of the complexity of decision-making; *Candide* teaches that any interpretation is also a commitment of the will to affirm (or pursue) a certain kind of “goodness.” An act of criticism is a testimony of the critic’s life.

What this means is that hesitation over metaphysical connections does not equal rejection of metaphysical connections. Hesitation allows for the adjustment of one’s desire towards a perceived good. When the will is engaged, hopefully a better solution to the problem will reveal itself. After we have “stepped back” from a situation, hopefully we can engage the situation with a well-informed judgment-will. If *Candide*’s cultivation signals the end of metaphysics, it is ourselves who have broken them, not the text.

Hesitation adjusts the emphasis humans place on the “inside” of another person and instead focuses attention on public behavior. Public behavior will necessarily influence and shape—according to Locke’s view—the secret insides of each individual member of society.

“Secret insides” adjust because of the reverse-mode of explanation; ideas include things. Performance, by itself and without “sincerity,” efficaciously produces sincerity later. By analogy, “Loving” one’s neighbor is virtuous whether or not you “feel” like loving your neighbor. For Locke, the performance of love is enough. Unlike Kant and Rousseau,¹⁴⁶ the motive for Love is not “duty.” It is an attempt to make public life thrive. Love is active and positive versus the negative, duty-oriented moral code, which emphasizes one’s own emotions or one’s own understanding on what reason dictates. For Locke, the performance of love is enough; the feeling of love—the sincerity—will follow the act. Also, the actual positive, “outward” expression of love is the point, not the inward duty. “Love” is actively cultivating a thriving community not acting according to your duty.

Voltaire offers us a solution to frustrating, dilemma-riddled situation. Humans are free to suspend commitment, but can seek productive action on other fronts. If we are aware that interpretations are also willful commitments to perceived goods, we can learn to suspend our wills (that is, hesitate). Humans are free briefly to suspend commitment to Leibniz while still committing to cultivate a garden.

¹⁴⁶ Copleston, “Rousseau (2),” 96-97. Copleston on the connection between Rousseau and Kant and the “inward” morality they encourage: For Rousseau, “We have an autonomous, rational will or practical reason whereby man in his higher nature, so to speak, legislates for himself and pronounces a moral law to which he, in his lower nature, is subject. And this law is universal [also called the “general will”]. This autonomous will [...] is an obvious anticipation of the Kantian ethic. It may be objected that the Kantian will is purely rational, whereas Rousseau emphasizes the fact that reason would be ineffective as a guide to action unless the law were graven on men’s hearts in ineffaceable characters. The rational will needs a motive force which lies in man’s fundamental impulses. This is true. It is true, that is to say, that Rousseau emphasizes the art played by *le sentiment interieur* in man’s moral life. But there is no intention of suggesting that Rousseau’s theory of the general will and Kant’s theory of the practical reason are one and the same thing. The point is simply that there are elements in the former’s theory which are susceptible of development in a Kantian direction. And Kant was certainly influenced by Rousseau’s writings.”

Integrity

Candide problematizes interpretation. Postmodern “anti-science” scholars will glory in this while conservative scholars will complain that forcing readers into *eisegesis* is not helpful. But *Candide*, along with eighteenth-century satire, is “aggregative and integrative rather than strictly conservative and didactic.”¹⁴⁷ Instead of arguing for a position over and above some other position, *Candide* encourages many, many positions and readings. These readings coincide with different “perceived goods.” Such proliferation is a sign of how Voltaire thought certainty arose, or was “wrung,” from confusion. Certainty was not reached only through rigorous experiment; it was reached through testimony and consent. The admittance of testimony and consent into any criterion of certainty heralds a shift from “proof” to “integrity” as the goal of the discourse.

“Taste” and Integrity

If satire is the “process of finding meaningful measures between abstract form and irrefragable meaning,”¹⁴⁸ then satire’s job is to explore the space between a principle (example, “This is the best of all possible worlds”) and the particular human who holds this position—a person who has syphilis or has unhappily married an ugly woman. Satire is this process of finding these measurements. Satire does not prove the rightness or wrongness of Leibniz for example; rather, satire helps us relate Leibniz to life, to see if Leibniz, in fact, “makes sense” given our position within the world. Through the world of *Candide*, Voltaire shows how volition

¹⁴⁷ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 346.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 349.

and judgment relate. The “meaningful measurements” between abstract ideas and particular human lives relate to “perceived good.”

When a reader begins to see how judgment and volition relate, she will develop a sense of her personal taste. Satire teaches readers to focus attention on important data and so cultivate taste.¹⁴⁹ What data we do focus on reveals our own commitments. In humans, “taste” and “stereotypes” are very similar: Both are basically “a template under which similar data can be conveniently conjugated.”¹⁵⁰ Dr. Kevin Cope points out that stereotypes are “the stock and trade of satire. They stand between the two great branches of cognitive theory: “modeling” (devising a theory about the structure of the world and then acting on it) and heuristics (doing whatever works with little regard for its metaphysical foundations).”¹⁵¹ Satire’s way of positioning itself

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 352. That we share in *Candide*’s dilemma means we share his “frame problem.” Cope writes, “To understand satire is not so much to understand what satire ‘is’ as to inquire after its cognitive conundrums.” He asks: “What sort of mental action does satire require?” The answer to this question is that satire makes the reader consider his or her own position in relation to the object being satirized. Satire presents each reader with the “frame” problem of cognitive science (Ibid., 353).

Like satire, the “frame problem” resists solution for the same reason satire resists closure. “Even a small closed system with a small number of variables can generate more ‘frames’ than any mind could ever assess (think again of the first ellipsis, during the second meal of *Candide*, and the use of the word “love.” The problems that ensued were the result of different perspectives, or frames, for interpreting the action.) With its endless lists of impertinence and abuses, satire dramatizes the frame problem” (Ibid., 353). Satire takes as its object the frame—the limit or perspective—of each reader. Satire shows how we cannot perform all the “mental actions” (Ibid., 353) necessary to get outside of our own perspectives on determinism and freewill. Satire challenges our assumptions about these ideas; satire does not itself participate as a “voice” in the discussion of “which is right: freewill or determinism?” The technical, epistemological dilemma discussed in *Candide* implies an alternative view of human nature than Rousseau’s. For Rousseau, problems of any kind are overcome when a person becomes free of society’s influence. But, for Voltaire, the solution to the “frame problem” is actually society itself. Civilization helps us pick between frames and so helps us focus on which mental actions are necessary to answer our dilemmas. For this reason *Candide* causes paranoia in anyone wanting to make statements about the tale (Bonnevillie, 128: “Any criticism of [Voltaire’s] works should be self-conscious to the point of paranoia”).

Cope explains that, basically, the element needed to break the frame problem is taste. (About “taste”: *Candide* asks us to develop together a standard of judgment—taste. This standard does not rise out of objective, rigorous historical-grammatical readings of the text *per se*, but out of the whole wealth of readings throughout history. Taste rises out of testimony and consent. As a result, metaphysical connections are made or broken based on testimony and consent, not on “data” or “statistics.” Taste does not deny the subjectivity of human perspectives to arrive at truth but attempts to align human subjectivity to the objective truth. Taste implies a radical attention to particulars rather than to a disconnected objective standard. Also, taste encourages a degree of humility.)

To come to a conclusion about a frame problem is to learn to choose between various alternatives and portions of information. For a robot to come to a conclusion about a set of data, that robot must learn to ignore most of the data and focus only on a well-chosen slice of its overall knowledge (Cope, “Algorithmic,” 354).

¹⁵⁰ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 354.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

between these two ways of answering problems explains *Candide's* constant hesitation as he deliberates over Pangloss' models and Martin's heuristic approach to existence.¹⁵² *Candide* has an ambiguous ending because it is functioning exactly like satire always functions: It bombards the reader with information and forces the reader to filter this information, to take a side, to develop a model or act heuristically.¹⁵³ How we solve the problem reveals taste. The act of judging the text is an act of the will or a movement towards a perceived good.¹⁵⁴ It seems then that we can interpret better or worse than one another, and these degrees reveal our errors. We can be misinformed or immature or have perverse appetites with unhealthy consequences. Whatever our interpretations, they reveal our appetites and preferences. It can be said that the best reading will have the best results for the whole community.

An Example from Voltaire's Life

"Taste" helps us understand Voltaire's behavior as a satirist. For example, we can see how he explored the meaningful relationship between abstraction and himself when he erected a church on his own property at Ferney. Upon the building Voltaire ensconced a placard that read: "Deo erexit Voltaire."¹⁵⁵ We can see his exploration of the "meaningful measures" between "man-made" religion versus "God-breathed" religion. While seeing his wit, we can observe Voltaire's satiric position between "modeling" and "heuristics." He expresses the conflict

¹⁵² *Candide*, 44. Martin's last statement in the text is that they all should stop contemplating because contemplation makes their lives more difficult. Instead they should endure patiently. Candide does not agree or disagree with this statement. All Candide does is encourage them all to help produce food. The production of food and meals themselves are, I think, the condition for the possibility for Candide to agree with Pangloss: "After a good meal, Candide was inclined to agree with Pangloss [i.e. be Optimistic]."

¹⁵³ Cope, "Algorithmic," 355. Cope begins a paragraph that connects the "frame problem" to human psychology. There are obviously connections to be made between Locke's explanations of how human experience becomes rational. Cope explains that reason "lags behind" the quick encapsulated faculties of the mind as it makes metaphysical connections (i.e. assimilates the encapsulated faculties).

¹⁵⁴ When we seek integrity, the question to ask is, "Who is my neighbor?" not, "What is my duty?"

¹⁵⁵ Brailsford, 97. That is, "Voltaire built this for God."

between objective truth and the subjective experience of objectivity; he does not “explain” anything. He merely expresses the conflict.

Voltaire’s actions in mounting this placard are those of satire: Satire does not attempt a purely objective approach by straight away discussing the object of analysis. Rather satire achieves objectivity by “culturing ideas and motifs in different media.”¹⁵⁶ Satire is not good at presenting issues “objectively”; satire is good at discovering “myriad manifestations of self-similar viciousness.”¹⁵⁷ Satire is good at showing again and again the same “universal” error.¹⁵⁸ Satire, like *Candide* and Voltaire’s placard, does not challenge the existence of God or whether or not scripture is divine. Satire challenges the integrity of the church being there at all. Satire asks: is this church actually “for” God as worship or merely an expression of man’s power and the dominance of a few over the many? Our answer to this question is our own testimony: It is ourselves, not satire, which proves—through testimony and consent—that metaphysical connections are broken or not.

We see that God gives us power to build; or, we see that God need not exist at all for we can build for ourselves: “We build for God” settles itself between these two interpretations. Our interpretation of this phrase reveals our own commitments to what we perceive as “good.” To become aware of this conflict we must disengage emotionally; we must hesitate. We must consider where we ourselves stand in relation to work and God.

¹⁵⁶ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 359.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., 362. To reveal the “universal error,” satire has to disrupt a “habit-saturated experience” like going to church or reading a story and trying to derive a lesson from it. Cope writes: “All minds have ad hoc cognitive traditions [like asking to distinguish between games and seriousness]. Conservative, they hesitate to change their approaches to experience. Long-term but not unchangeable, habits of mind account both for the mind’s susceptibility to surprise and for its flexibility—its ability to make new traditions [...]. Satire exploits the mind’s habit of reifying its habits. [...] The best satirists befuddle habit-forming readers” (363).

Textual Evidence

By quickly looking at a sequence of murders Candide perpetrates, we can better understand how Voltaire is encouraging us to participate with Candide's technical dilemma, rather than resonate with him emotionally. Also we will see how this technical dilemma relates to the "integrity" of positions instead of "proving" any particular position.

When Candide meets Cunegonde after the *auto-da-fe* in Spain, she is currently making a decent wage by renting her virtues to the Grand Inquisitor and a Jew. After Candide kills both of them in a moment of confusion, Cunegonde exclaims: "How is it that you, who were born so gentle, could kill in two minutes a Jew and a prelate?" Candide responds: "When a man is in love, jealous, and just whipped by the Inquisition, he is no longer himself."¹⁵⁹ Candide watches himself murder in the same way that the reader watches Candide murder. His response to his own actions is that of a surprised, disinterested observer.

This emotional disengagement is increased later when Candide meets and kills Cunegonde's brother after the Baron calls Candide an "insolent dog" for desiring Cunegonde."¹⁶⁰ Candide and his servant, Cacambo, flee and the Demonstrator explains: "Candide and his valet were over the frontier before anyone in the camp knew of the death of the [Baron]. Foresighted Cacambo had taken care to fill his satchel with bread, chocolate, ham, fruit, and several bottles of wine." That night they sit down to eat and rest, but Candide says: "How do you expect me to eat ham when I have killed [...] the Baron, and am now condemned never to see the lovely Cunegonde for the rest of my life?" The Demonstrator interjects: "Though [Candide] talked this way, he did not neglect the food."¹⁶¹ Here the reader is further disengaged from Candide, who is himself experiencing an emotional disengagement from his second murder. He acts and feels in

¹⁵⁹ *Candide*, 17.

¹⁶⁰ *Candide*, 30.

¹⁶¹ *Candide*, 30.

dramatically different ways. Both the reader and Candide are becoming increasingly cool and intellectual about the events. As a result of this mutual disengagement, the reader and Candide himself share in the epistemological dilemma: What formal cause will bring about happiness?

The emotional “distancing” does not end here: The reader and Candide draw further back from immediate emotional responses as the events unfold. Immediately after the conversation about the ham, “The two wanderers heard a few weak cries which ... arose from two girls, completely naked, who were running swiftly along the edge of the meadow, pursued by two monkeys who snapped at their buttocks. Candide was moved to pity; he had learned marksmanship with the Bulgars, and could have knocked a nut off a bush without touching the leaves. He raised his Spanish rifle, fired twice, and killed the two monkeys.”¹⁶² The incident ends with Candide and his valet realizing that they have just murdered the women’s lovers. This leaves Candide in a terrible intellectual muddle. Following his immediate emotional impulses was the wrong decision; his feelings betray him.

This intellectual confusion is highlighted when, explaining why Candide should have known that the women were enjoying the monkey business, Cacambo says: “You see how people make mistakes who haven’t received a measure of education.”¹⁶³ Cacambo points out that Candide’s evil actions are not tied to too much education—and too much social influence—but to a lack of education and social influence. As the tale progresses, Candide hesitates more and more as he tries to discern how to act correctly. He “pulls back” from sincerity and emotional impulses.

But, although greater experience erodes the certainty of his knowledge, his hesitation is not the result of the failure of “metaphysical connections” or because human life is “absurd.” He

¹⁶² *Candide*, 31.

¹⁶³ *Candide*, 32.

hesitates because he is not sure how to bring about his own happiness. He hesitates because he is unsure of which formal cause will be the most efficacious in bringing about his “perceived good.” What is more, Candide also realizes that his perception of what is good and bad might be wrong. He hesitates so he can come to better conclusion about himself and his world.

Cultural Evidence: Rococo

Like the immediate impulses Candide learns to hold suspect, a “pulling back” from cultural expressions is also encouraged. To further understand how *Candide* explores the “meaningful measure” between life and principles or theories about life, an understanding of *rococo* is helpful. Voltaire’s epic tragedies were an expression of an overall cultural sensibility that falls under the *rococo* style.¹⁶⁴ This style exhibits itself most obviously in the lavish, pointless floral decorations seen in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century French palaces. The

¹⁶⁴ Henry Carrington Lancaster, *French Tragedy in the Time of Louis XV and Voltaire, 1715-1774* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1950), 624, 608, and 84.

In his day, Voltaire was famous for writing classical epic tragedies. He did very well for himself as a playwright, earning most of his wealth and cultural influence from the stage. In eighteenth century France, the stage had a unique place as it approximated the “town meeting” of later democracies (Brailsford, 15). Theatre offered one of the only platforms available at the time for discussing contemporary ideas and morals. Voltaire used it for such and promoted liberal values (Brailsford, 30) and the ideas of the Enlightenment “philosophes” (Lancaster, 3), but his plays were not accepted without reservation. An example of French censorship of the time is seen in that, of seven plays Voltaire wrote at the end of his life, four were never performed because of their extreme “anti-clerical” nature (Lancaster, 596). So while Voltaire did challenge his culture, his plays reaffirmed, latently, the norms and values of his stratified and dogmatic society. He did help change his culture, but not radically.

Even though Voltaire critiqued his culture, his plays still led to social preferment and success in a time when such success meant the reaffirmation of oppression. It was this reaffirmation of the system that led to the deterioration of the genre of epic literature (Lancaster, 2). “Since tragedies,” like those Voltaire wrote, “led to social preferment, many writers may have been inspired by this consideration rather than by the urge of the creative imagination” (Lancaster, 2). One might add that social preferment also took precedence over social critique. Evidence of this can be seen in *Candide* itself, which posits an “ideal” that has the errors of a pre-Revolution France. *Candide*’s utopia has features that remind one of eighteenth-century France: Namely, grand houses, property, and slaves. Voltaire writes that everyone in Eldorado is “of the same mind” (38). But then, Voltaire writes, “After this long conversation, the old gentleman ordered a carriage with six sheep be made ready, and gave [Candide and his friend] twelve of his servants for their journey to the court” (38). Voltaire’s writing moves away from contemporary values while also reaffirming those same values.

Because Voltaire’s dramatic works were “classical exercises in form,” not orchestrations built off of and exploring emotion like the works of modern playwrights (Brailsford, 10), modern readers have trouble relating the epic mythological themes to real life (Brailsford, 16, 17. Note: *Candide* does not have a three-dimensional vitality but it does challenge our need for epistemological and hermeneutic security. While we do not weep with Candide, his dilemma is our own).

novel is perfect for an investigation of integrity because it includes itself in the attack upon convention¹⁶⁵ and includes the author's language in the objects parodied.¹⁶⁶ Voltaire uses *rococo* language, but mocks this language; he parodies the impetus of his own fortune and influence. Such parody fits right into the form of the novel, which, as a form of literature, did not "rise" so much as "disintegrate" all the other genres.¹⁶⁷ Specifically, the novel corrupted epic literature by parodying and inciting comic familiarity.¹⁶⁸

Candide's overall style has been described by some critics as being *rococo* because, like the lavish style itself, Voltaire's form dominates his content.¹⁶⁹ "*Rococo* art" as the dominant eighteenth-century artistic expression, "reflects the spiritual paralysis of the parasitical, decadent aristocracy, which [had] no sense of responsible purpose, which [could] therefore only look back wistfully to the great age preceding it, which refus[ed] to grapple with ultimates or to make any serious commitments, and which [sought] escape from boredom by means of cynical or

¹⁶⁵ Bottiglia, 323.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 333.

¹⁶⁷ Mikhail M. Bakhtin, "The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays," 322.

¹⁶⁸ Bakhtin, 330.

¹⁶⁹ Bottiglia, 48. He argues over this issue by pointing out that "form" alone is never great. He writes: "One cannot help wondering how a style can achieve genuine greatness, if its content is patently inferior to its form" (45). Later he argues: "All this is not to say *Candide* does not have traces of rococo. It does, but they are assimilated by a different attitude, reworked into a novel synthesis [...] these traces of rococo do not impair, let alone destroy, the artistic unity of *Candide*. [...] It includes rococo elements, but goes beyond them, and in the process transforms their quality, renews their meaning."

An example of this can be seen in the first paragraph of the *conte*: "There lived in Westphalia, in the castle of the Baron of Thunder Ten-Tronckh, a young man on whom nature had bestowed the perfection of gentle manners. His features admirably expressed his soul, he combined an honest mind with great simplicity of hear; [sic] and I think it was for this reason that they called him *Candide*. The old servants of the house suspected that he was the son of the Baron's sister by a respectable, honest gentleman of the neighborhood, whom she had refused to marry because he could prove only [2,000 years of uninterrupted nobility], the rest of his family tree having been lost in the passage of time" (*Candide*, 1).

The "content" of this passage is quickly passed over because of the style and tone of the narrator. Take the second sentence as an example: The structure of the sentence sets itself up as a compliment unless *Candide*'s "honest mind" is synonymous for "weak mind." It all depends on the narrator's tone of voice and the style of delivery. But this ambiguity becomes clearer as the narrator moves on to more obvious jabs at *Candide*'s bastardhood and the pretentiousness of the German nobility. Thus, in the first paragraph, Voltaire begins his juxtaposition of form and content, of frivolous excess against a cruel reality. The speed of delivery helps reflect the superfluous excess of *rococo* art. The reader quickly understands that, in this story, a honeyed glaze of fun and frivolity guilds a much darker content, and that Voltaire obviously may or may not mean what he says.

Pyrrhonic prose.”¹⁷⁰ Voltaire used the emblem of his irresponsible time—with all its irresponsible dreaming—to challenge this same irresponsibility. He asks how this value, this aesthetic, relates to life. Voltaire creates a violent, frivolous tale to express the relationship and test the fidelity of his culture. Knowing the *rococo* style is helpful in seeing that, in *Candide*, Voltaire is using a dominant convention of his age to move beyond this same convention. Or said another way, satire allows Voltaire the medium by which to explore the relationship between this style and the real world that the audience lives in.

Like Voltaire does with *rococo*, satire bombards the reader with information, with the epic ideal or the values of any particular age. Such a bombardment forces the reader to filter this information, to take a side in relation to this information, to develop a model of rationality that explains the information or to act heuristically.¹⁷¹ The style and frivolity of *Candide* clearly is an expression of *rococo*, but this same style and frivolity draws attention to what is happening in the real world just outside the gate. In effect, the audience sits and laughs at how they are sitting and laughing while people are starving outside.

Example from a Critic

The inability to see how *Candide* challenges integrity leads some scholars to demand only one reading of the text; they want to prove their position over and above another position. For example, one *Candide* scholar in particular hopes to use serious, rigorous reading skills to secure a single reading, a single meaning to the tale. Bottiglia summarizes various divergent readings of Voltaire and says: “This variety of learned opinions makes it plain that there is

¹⁷⁰ Bottiglia, 47.

¹⁷¹ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 350 and 354.

something wrong here [in *Candide*], either with Voltaire or with his readers.”¹⁷² Bottiglia connects these many interpretations with a failure to communicate. Many meanings are wrong; there can be only one. He writes: “Voltaire’s readers, not Voltaire, have created the problem posed by the conclusion of the tale.”¹⁷³ The reason, he says, for this difference is, first, inattention to what other critics have said and, second, differences in approach and method. He writes,

No critic with whose work I am acquainted had probed the meaning of the Conclusion by analyzing it rigorously and exclusively in *vacu*, i.e. without reference to its biographical and historical backgrounds. Some of the interpretations listed are appreciations set down by ‘empirics’; some are evaluations arrived at by historians of ideas—the former, however much endowed with aesthetic sensitivity, lack method. Through the years, by gradual exposure and trial-and-error observation, they have developed an often perceptive, but not always dependable, intuitive taste. The later have method, but they tend to treat the work of art as though it were simply another historical document. In theory they may pay lip-service to the idea that *Candide* must be studied with a due respect for its literary form and content. In practice they violate its artistic integrity.¹⁷⁴

Of course an aesthetic that values only serious, disinterested analysis will not see that a proliferation of readings is the first step in Satire’s “aggregative and conservative” process. If satire is meant to reveal integrity of the reader’s position, it certainly has done just that. Bottiglia reveals his own commitment to solve hermeneutic and epistemological problems through rigorous and disinterested research. *Candide* helps us see his commitment.

Conclusion

Candide’s poetic language, which culminates in the mysterious “cultivation” metaphor, draws out the reader into engaging Candide’s dilemma. An emotionally “three-dimensional” novel does not challenge a reader in this way. The metaphor forces us to hesitate. Hesitation teaches us how to shape our desires and work toward public good. Cope writes, “Satirists pine

¹⁷² Bottiglia, 100.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

after Edenic gardens, but none expects or even wants their return, for the vector of both civilization and satire points in only one way: forward.”¹⁷⁵ Part of this “forward movement” is to “tune up” the skills of a scholar to read, to analyze “coherency.” Satire encourages a “flexible, connectionist literary habit.”¹⁷⁶ The scholar who approaches satire in search of a straightforward argument is missing the point. “Satire,” Cope explains, “promotes a non-ideological criticism that relentlessly adjusts to deviant evidence.”¹⁷⁷ Satire teaches the process of how consent results when divergent testimonies perceive agreement.

For the body to be able to “shape” concepts and for belief to influence knowledge, volition must be connected to judgment. The reverse-mode reveals how our own judgments are acts of will, not just the cool, objective perceptions of an analytic reason. The eighteenth century, on the whole, believed that the passions moved reason.¹⁷⁸

The eighteenth-century satirist used the body as a tool to explore the void. Voltaire has aligned himself with Locke’s epistemology, stressed the outwardness of performance and left the reader to interpret the motivation of this performance. The concept of *uneasiness* helps us understand that judgment and will interconnect. To interpret Candide’s performance means we must reveal what we perceive to be good. Candide encourages us to judge our immediate impulses rather than to obey them. This means that the attainment of happiness is a technical

¹⁷⁵ Cope, “Algorithmic,” 372.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 375.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 376. In this satire functions just like Locke’s conception of human knowledge of making deviant evidence fit within its understanding of the universe.

Dr. Cope argues, in “Algorithmic,” “Chaos theory shows how, when applied to Restoration satire, the collapse of critical schools can herald new self-reviving and eminently satirical theories of satire” (376). He writes: “On the one hand, chaos theory answers the needs of the conservatives and the aesthetics by emphasizing the artistic properties and formalist tendencies of satire; on the other hand, it assuages the revolutionaries by recognizing the peremptoriness of satiric behavior and by destabilizing classical genres and presenting literary and specifically satiric conversation as components in a far more miscellaneous, far more heteroglossic picture” (376).

¹⁷⁸ Copelston, “French Enlightenment,” 24-25. He explains that the Enlightenment was not “cool and scientific” but was ruled by the passions: “Without passions there would be no human progress” (24). He explains that for the eighteenth-century Enlightenment writer, humans are their passions. The true nature of a human is found in the passions, not in the reason (25).

problem rather than an emotional or “desire” problem. In a Lockean novel, failure of desire does not coincide with a loss of being but is the condition for becoming fully human (i.e., thriving).

CHAPTER FOUR

Candide was inclined to agree with Pangloss
especially after a good meal.¹⁷⁹
-Voltaire

Textual Evidence

Introduction

The reverse-mode and “hesitation” reveal themselves most obviously in *Candide*’s meals. The text stresses the failure of human desire. To highlight failure, the text constantly interrupts itself and refuses to offer the reader an analytic sense of what motivates the final action of the tale. Rather than participate in judgment-making, the text draws attention to the relationship between judgment and volition. Because of the interrelationship between judgment and volition, adopting new habits (i.e., changing behavior) can lead to human flourishing. The most important habit Candide learns to adopt is the habit of eating meals with his friends. Meals are an expression of the reverse-mode and “hesitation” at work.

Interruptions

Candide encourages a “stepping back” or a “distancing” from the events of the story. Rather than enter the story and “resonate emotionally,” a reader draws back and analyzes the events. Performances that have mysterious motivations are one way that readers are “drawn in.” Another way the text draws in is through interruptions.

There are a number of ways the text interrupts itself. Punctuation sometimes interrupts, while others times events and characters interrupt one another. In one way or another, interruptions reveal failure. As the story develops, the reader’s epistemological dilemma—and Candide’s—is intertwined with this failure to get what is desired. The interrupting text is itself an

¹⁷⁹ *Candide*, 44. That is, Candide agrees with the tenants of Optimism after eating a good meal.

example of life; the text represents how, although we aim at a particular good, humans are not always able to attain that good nor is this perceived good always best.

As we have discussed, Candide's desire for Cunegonde motivates the tale. He seeks the good pleasure of her body. Candide fails to enjoy the spontaneous pleasure associated with Cunegonde's body, but he discovers other forms of spontaneous pleasure: meals. Meals are one of the many recurring, interrupting elements of the tale. Through meals (and their "cultivation") the reader is given an opportunity to solve the problem of human desire. Meals relate intimately to the solution between volition and judgment; meals help us deal with faulty judgments and immature desires. By "cultivating" meals we develop habits of self-control that balance perceived goods with actual goods.

Ellipses

Voltaire goes to a lot of trouble to help the reader notice the habitual, yet still spontaneous, eating of meals. The reader anticipates a conclusive statement or a resonance with the emotions of the main character. Instead the reader sees Candide perform a habit. Voltaire wants to teach "hesitation" and how volition and judgment interrelate. There are various ways the tale interrupts itself, but the most obvious can be seen literally with a piece of punctuation:

The ellipsis.¹⁸⁰ Perhaps the best example of the "interrupting ellipsis" is on page forty-seven,

¹⁸⁰ *Candide*, 4, 11, 47, 65 and page 77. In addition, "non-ellipsis" interruptions happen at important intervals such as during the Lisbon aftermath, with the dervish, and in the final phrase of the tale—Candide's, "Yes Pangloss, that is well said, but let's cultivate our garden." All of these are elliptical in nature. This coherent whole, of course, relates to the "bestness" of their worlds. The ellipses are part of a more general pattern of interruption that occurs throughout the whole story. There are many "non-punctuation" interruptions as well. For example, Pangloss hoped to "reason" with the dervish and the dervish slammed the door in his face. This is a more dramatic example than ellipsis, but the same effect. The final interruption, although not an ellipsis, comes at the final line of the text when Candide punctuates Pangloss' thoughts with his "That's well said Pangloss, but let's cultivate." No ellipsis is used, but the point is the same—the movement of the text (toward conclusion) is interrupted. Unlike the dervish, Candide is gentle, but a shift in perspective is encouraged.

chapter twenty-one. This chapter's caption reads *Martin and Candide Reason Together*. The conversation happens on a ship as they travel to Bordeaux where Candide hopes to hear word of his Cunegonde. The conversation is a repetition of other conversations already recorded in the text.¹⁸¹ The conversation pertains to Leibniz and is central to knowing if Leibniz is "right or wrong" as it is Cunegonde they seek. Here, an extended quotation is helpful:

--By the way, said Candide, do you believe the earth was originally all ocean, as they assure us in that big book [the Bible] belonging to the ship's captain?
 --I don't believe that stuff, said Martin, nor any of the dreams which people have been peddling for some time now.
 --But why, then, was this world formed at all? Asked Candide.
 --To drive us mad, answered Martin.
 --Aren't you astonished, Candide went on, at the love which those two girls showed for the monkeys in the land of the Biglugs that I told you about?
 --Not at all, said Martin, I see nothing strange in these sentiments; I have seen so many extraordinary things that nothing seems extraordinary any more.
 --Do you believe, asked Candide, that men have always massacred one another as they do today? That they have always been liars, traitors, ingrates, thieves, weaklings, sneaks, cowards, backbiters, gluttons, drunkards, misers, climbers, killers, calumniators, sensualists, fanatics, hypocrites, and fools?
 --Do you believe, said Martin, that hawks have always eaten pigeons when they could get them?
 --Of course, said Candide.
 --Well, said Martin, if hawks have always had the same character, why do you suppose that men have changed?
 --Oh, said Candide, there's a great deal of difference, because freedom of the will . . .
 As they were disputing in this manner, they reached Bordeaux.¹⁸²

Critics have drawn every kind of conclusion about this, and it is possible to add to this wealth of interpretations by arguing that these interruptions are not meant to break metaphysical connections at all, but to find the integrity of these connections. Scholars like Bottiglia approach this historical "problem" with a renewed vigor for rigorous scientific scrutiny. Bottiglia asks for "method" to be "applied." Other scholars say *Candide* means that life is "absurd" and that we should just "cope" with it—for example, Morris Weitz in *Philosophy in Literature: Shakespeare, Voltaire, Tolstoy and Proust*. Still other scholars say that *Candide* is an example of a "freed" modern scholar, a person no longer enslaved to the need to make metaphysical connections.

All these interruptions—ellipses and non-ellipses—work together toward the same end: They all move the reader's attention away from "reasoning together" toward an awareness of the context of this "reasoning together." Some scholars find this "context-awareness" to mean that Voltaire was against metaphysical connections, but according to the behavior of satire, it is more likely Voltaire simply wanted to challenge the integrity of metaphysical claims. It is we critics who reveal our own beliefs when we argue for or against metaphysical connections.

¹⁸¹ Example: The old woman's story in chapters eleven and twelve echo the scenario of chapters twenty and twenty-one as the characters attempt to set their lives into perspective, to "add everything up" to a coherent whole.

¹⁸² *Candide*, 47.

And so, abruptly, the chapter ends. While Candide launches into his thoughts on “freedom of the will,” the Demonstrator¹⁸³ of the tale silences the conversation with an ellipsis. This ellipsis interrupts the conversation itself and the sailing adventure.¹⁸⁴ This interruption communicates that nothing new happens intellectually or physically even though the characters are straining all their energy to make sense of their lives and to “get somewhere.” They try to prove and disprove truth-claims. The Demonstrator cuts them off to draw attention to the fact that the characters are repeating themselves. They circle the globe and circle concepts without being able to conclude: They fail.

What failure means is up for debate, but the broken adventures, with their broken conversations, ask readers to see the failure itself. We are asked to see the trajectory of the tale towards the goal and the failure to reach the goal. It is important that the characters keep repeating snippets of conversation about Optimism and that they keep eating food and keep failing to reach their conclusions. Eventually we can study this pattern of failure for what it is.

Meals

In a seventy-page story, meals pop up some forty-two times. That is, a meal occurs on every other page. They are pointless at first, but the repetition slowly builds meaning into the meals. Examples of interrupting meals are everywhere in the tale. For example, a meal is the setting for Candide’s first moment alone with Cunegonde. After eating, they meet behind a

¹⁸³ Bottiglia, 77. Voltaire loved puppets, so it is not surprising to find a “puppet” feel to Candide. Also, the Demonstrator—like a puppet master—could “perform” the story before a live audience in a French drawing room or at a dinner party.

¹⁸⁴ Unlike chapter five, which records a “passage adventure” in great detail (chapter five is subtitled “A Storm, A Wreck, Earthquake, and What Happened”), this ellipsis deletes everything meaningful that happened, both action-adventures and rational discourse. This is because the reader is asked to see the whole conversation as a repetition.

curtain; they kiss.¹⁸⁵ Candide is immediately thrown out of the castle. A page later, Candide is hungry again. Army officers offer him food; Candide begins his second meal of the tale.¹⁸⁶ Overjoyed by the generosity of the army officers, Candide accidentally joins the military. Candide finally escapes and, again seeking food, meets Jacques who helps him become financially stable.¹⁸⁷ Candide, helping others find food, is reunited with Pangloss.¹⁸⁸ And so the tale progresses at a wild pace. As these examples show, meals act as catalysts for the adventure but also continually interrupt adventures. The reader is likely to skip over the meals in her haste to see if Candide reaches his goal of Cunegonde.

By chapter twenty-six, meals have taken on special significance. Chapter twenty-six is entitled *About a Supper With Six Strangers and Who They Were*. During this “adventure,” Candide is excited to dine with six dethroned kings. Candide hears their troubles and is actually able to lend a king money. Later, Candide exclaims with excitement: “That was a most unlikely experience we had at Venice. Nobody ever saw, or heard of, six dethroned kings eating together at an inn.”¹⁸⁹ Martin, Candide’s pessimistic travel partner, responds, “It is not more extraordinary than most of the things that have happened to us [. . .] That [meal is] a trifle which does not deserve our notice.”¹⁹⁰ Martin sees the meal as common an object as any other. Martin just tries to endure life, but Candide thinks the meal is of special significance. Martin’s skepticism will not allow him to agree.

By chapter twenty-six, we are encouraged to analyze the significance of the meal. Meals help us overcome evil somehow. For Candide, meals are an important part of the answer to his

¹⁸⁵ *Candide*, 2.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 68.

epistemological dilemma. The reader is free to fall somewhere between these two readings of the meal: Maybe the meal is just another random item in the story, but maybe the meal is of special significance. Either way, this is very different from how the reader “passes over” the first meals of the text.

This “meal-focus” is further encouraged when Candide, a page before the final enigmatic conclusion, compares his meal-with-the-six-kings to the meal with the Turk. The text reads, Candide “meditated deeply over the words of the Turk” and said to his friends: “This good man seems to have found himself a fate preferable to that of the six kings with whom we had the honor of dining.”¹⁹¹ Candide makes a connection between his meals. His connection further encourages the reader to analyze meals as an important event that relates directly to human happiness (that is, to the attainment of one’s desire). Although this may not be a metaphysical connection, it is a connection nonetheless, and Candide passionately holds to this connection and begins to cultivate like the Turk. The success or failure of metaphysical claims gets “covered over” as Candide focuses on eating food. He exchanges a search for Optimism with a search for good meals. This shift is slow but it marks a break with the “goal-oriented” reading. The text affirms a metaphor instead of a truth-claim.

The Problem of “Immediate” Impressions: An Example of “Love”

How we understand failure tells us about ourselves. Whether failure breaks all metaphysical connections or teaches us about them, our readings of the text reveal our own metaphysical or anti-metaphysical commitments. Integrity reveals itself in the face of failure.

In *Candide*, the failure is total: linguistic, ethical and conceptual. Interestingly, *Candide’s* linguistic, ethical and conceptual failure coincides with Candide’s sincerity. His “immediate”

¹⁹¹ Ibid., 76.

judgments—his lack of hesitation—leads to the failure of everything in his world. The most obvious example of this “total” failure is in the use of the word “love” throughout the tale. In fact, what “love” means becomes an underlying element of the tale. To discuss the treatment of “love” (*aimer*) opens our discussion to the multifarious decay Candide encounters.

He wants it to be the best world, which for him means marrying his idol, his love, his Cunegonde. He wants Leibniz as whole-heartedly as he wants Cunegonde: the two are knit together for Candide. The textual interruptions keep Candide from getting his ideal love and from consistently believing Leibniz. Sincerity does not help; stronger commitments do not help. The word “love” keeps causing trouble. During the second meal (and the first occurrence of an ellipsis), Candide has this painful conversation with a couple of army officers. The army officers approach him in the hopes of recruiting him. This scene starts a theme of miscommunication that continues throughout the whole text: A gesture can mean more than the character wants it to and identical words are used in divergent ways in different contexts. Bottiglia wants to overcome these ambiguities with heightened method. But Voltaire presents another way of overcoming these problems: Meals. Candide is, of course, thinking only of Cunegonde:

They [the officers] beg him to accept a couple of crown, he takes them, and offers an I.O.U.; they won't hear of it, and all sit down at table together.

--Don't you love dearly . . . ?

--I do indeed, says [Candide], I dearly love Miss Cunegonde.

--No, no, said one of the gentlemen, we are asking if you don't love dearly the King of the Bulgars.

--Not in the least, says he, I never laid eyes on him.

--What's that you say? He's the most charming of kings, and we must drink his health.

--Oh, gladly, gentleman; and he drinks.

--That will do, they tell him; you are now the bulwark, the support, the defender, the hero of the Bulgars; your fortune is made and your future assured.

Promptly they slip irons on his legs and lead him to the regiment.¹⁹²

¹⁹² Voltaire, *Candide, A Dual-Language Book* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993), 8. This whole “adventure” between Candide and the army begins with a misunderstanding about the word “love.” The officers ask: “N'aimez-vous pas tendrement.” And the text records Candide's responds as literally: “Oh! Oui, repondid-il, j'aime tendrement Mlle Cunegonde.” Although all the men use the same words (the verb “aimer” and the adverb

For a few days Candide is not really sure how he became a hero in the army, but it is true. He managed to communicate things that he did not mean. This scenario is not singular. Throughout the story, language refuses to behave seriously, reliably or with precision. Love, as exemplified here, can mean more than one thing within the same context. It is no wonder that scholars too have trouble discussing the tale with precision. Love causes Candide a lot more trouble—as it will for any young man. It is this trouble that causes scholars to argue that the tale breaks down metaphysical connections.¹⁹³

Just because Candide uses language sincerely does not mean anyone else does or, if they themselves are sincere, that they have the same sincere meaning. Sincerity and “meaning well” are not enough for Candide’s problems. The immediate impulse to use the words “dearly love”

“tendrement”), their meanings are not the same. The “dearly love,” although the same word, is not the same meaning for each person. The army officers mean “loyalty to their sovereign” while Candide means “romantic love.” The language here is not being used incoherently. Both meanings of “dearly love” are possible given certain different contexts. But that is the problem: Different context result in different meanings.

¹⁹³ For example, by page sixteen, Cunegonde and Candide are reunited. After she watched him suffer the flogging at the Auto-da-fe, Cunegonde tells Candide: “My mind was full of the kiss which I gave you behind the screen, on the day I saw you for the last time” (*Candide*, 16). We can take her expression at face value, but Cunegonde is working as a prostitute for a Jew and a priest. Her words and her life relate problematically. Candide ignores this and rejoices in his “love.”

Nelly Severin, “Hagiographic Parody in Candide,” *The French Review*, Vol. 50, No. 6. (May, 1977), 844. Severin argues that Cunegonde’s name comes from a saint who proved her fidelity by walking across red-hot plowshares barefoot. Severin argues that Voltaire mocks virtue through this name. Voltaire does mock, but the point is that religious virtue “fit” with life.

After Candide kills the Jew and the priest, Candide, Cunegonde, and the old woman are forced to flee for South America. As they travel, Cunegonde tells Candide, “I love you with all my heart” (*Candide*, 19). The same verb “aimer” is used for both uses). Candide candidly accepts her words as truth, but, once they arrive at the house of the Buenos Aries governor, the meaning of Cunegonde’s love is not so certain. The police arrive in hot pursuit of the priest’s murderer and something peculiar happens concerning “love.” The old woman advises Cunegonde by saying, “You cannot escape [with Candide] and you have no fear. You are not the one who killed [a priest and a Jew], and, besides, the governor, who is in love with you, won’t let you be mistreated. Sit tight” (*Candide*, 26). Although he uses the same words as Cunegonde and the old woman, obviously Candide’s emotions, and his love, are strikingly different. And so, as the events of the story unfold, the meaning of “love” decays. Candide means one thing; Cunegonde another.

Candide is devastated when he has to abandon Cunegonde. The text reads: “Candide wept: O my beloved Cunegonde! Must I leave you now, just when the governor is about to marry us! Cunegonde brought from so far, what will ever become of you?” (*Candide*, 27). Of course the governor had no intention of marrying Candide and Cunegonde, but the ever-sincere Candide only takes people, and their words, at face value. He is unable to see “below the surface” or compare words with actions and arrive at more balanced conclusions. “Love” is used to reveal Candide’s isolation and ignorance of the many possible uses of words. Candide is unaware of the true complexity of interpersonal communication. Rigorous definitions would solve this linguistic problem, but here, in practice, the problem does not stop at the linguistic level.

does not mean two people act upon the same impulse. Only hesitation and an emotional distancing would help him understand how his use of “love” is different than someone else’s. Then he could “agree together” with another person about the use of the words.

The problem with “love” reveals another problem: Candide does not know himself; he does not understand how to relate his desire to the world. For example, after Candide kills the Jew and the priest, Cunegonde panics because her financial security is lost. She accosts Candide by saying: “How is it that you, who were born so gentle, could kill in two minutes a Jew and a prelate?” Candide defends himself by saying that he is not acting *sincerely*, that he is not *feeling* like himself. He says, “Why dear girl, [...] when a man is in love, jealous, and just whipped by the Inquisition, he is no longer himself.”¹⁹⁴ Confusion over what words themselves mean is one problem, but confusion over what one’s will is is another much more complex problem. Candide’s inner life becomes as muddled as his external life; he is plagued with subjective babble. The noise of the world infects him with confusion. The assortment of possible “formal causes” through which he might attain his happiness is daunting and it leaves him confused about his own intentions.

Candide appears to be as confused as Cunegonde about how he is able to kill. He “means” to act one way, but acts another. He knows what he wants, but he does not know which action will get what he wants. This “self-confusion” is increased later when Candide kills for a third time. He says: “Alas dear God! [...] I am the best man in the world, and here are three men I’ve killed already, and two of the three were priests.”¹⁹⁵ Candide sincerely does not understand himself just as he sincerely does not understand how to interpret the world.¹⁹⁶ And the two kinds

¹⁹⁴ *Candide*, 17.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁹⁶ Wolper, 275. Wolper argues that Candide is helpful at first and then not as helpful later. I think this is wrong. Candide tries to help, yes. But his is not actually helpful if you pay attention to the result of his help.

of knowledge go hand-in-hand: How we use words and what we intend by them correlates with our desires. Candide may know he wants Cunegonde, but he does not know how best to get what he wants and unfortunately his belief in Optimism is contingent upon his success. That is, his belief in Optimism is contingent upon his acting correctly so as to obtain happiness. His knee-jerk reactions put him further from his goal and muddy his psychological waters. His tendency to be gentle is corrupted as he strives harder and harder to make sure that this is the best of all possible worlds, i.e., attain his lover. As he experiences more, he begins to hesitate more and more.¹⁹⁷

Just like his untested use of words like “dearly love,” his spontaneous beliefs about himself and his world are a constant cause of deep problems. These spontaneous beliefs are then catalysts for dramatic salvation experiences. He reacts to the surface of this world, to the first possible interpretation, and these interpretations are consistently mistaken. His mistakes are both

Scherr argues opposite Wolper saying that it is a sign of Candide’s wisdom that he finally abandons his “compassion” and instead isolates himself and develops his garden.

¹⁹⁷ Another example from the text: Specifically looking, again, at pages twenty-seven through thirty-three, Candide’s confusion about what he wants and how to get it dramatically reveals itself. To summarize: Candide flees for his life to another South America country and leaves Cunegonde behind. There he meets a fellow German: Cunegonde’s brother the Baron! Before they recognize each other, the German says: “God be praised [. . .] since he is German, I can talk to him” (*Candide*, 28). After they recognize each other, Candide says: “What a miracle!” (*Candide*, 28). They talk; they eat. When Candide confesses his hope to marry the Baron’s sister, the Baron’s warm tones abruptly end. The Baron says: “You insolent dog!” (*Candide*, 30). Candide then quickly kills the Baron. Immediately (as quoted in the above paragraph) Candide cries out: “Alas, dear God!” and laments his third killing (*Candide*, 30). Candide and his servant Cocambo flee. They eat salted ham and Candide cries salted tears. He laments that he will never regain Cunegonde after killing her brother. As they talk and eat, they hear a noise in the jungle. Two women are being chased by two monkeys. Candide quickly shoots the two monkeys and rejoices saying, “God be praised! [. . .] I’ve saved those two poor creatures from great danger” (*Candide*, 31). A wonderfully sarcastic line! Are the monkeys or the women more dangerous? Candide is quickly silenced when he sees the women turn and weep over the bodies of the slain monkeys. He murdered the women’s lovers! Candide sincerely laments and expresses his confusion. Later that night, the women complain to the natives who then capture Candide and his servant. The natives prepare to eat Candide and his servant; Candide sincerely laments more. Just before they die, Cocambo proves to the natives that they are actually friends—yesterday he and Candide killed a Jesuit priest (the Baron). The natives rejoice and release Candide and Cocambo. This turn of events launches Candide into sincere praise and adoration for the Americans. He says: “What a people [. . .] What men! What customs! If I had not had the good luck to run a sword through the body of Miss Cunegonde’s brother, I would have been eaten on the spot” (*Candide*, 33).

outwardly directed actions and feelings of compassion or love. He consistently acts and feels incorrectly; he fails.

Sincerity and spontaneous feelings are a serious problem for Candide. The oscillation is made more apparent with his exclamations, his “alas” and his “God be praised.” Each is a certain, committed interpretation of the events. Although each is sincere, total, and committed, some later event keeps changing the interpretation of the previous event. Every interpretation he offers is an extreme position that quickly becomes an error of judgment. He is too quick; he is too candid. He is a mirror who reflects the most immediate, superficial interpretation possible and so he oscillates from praise to despair at every turn of the story.

A Stabilizing Meal

The answer to failure is not rigor or a stronger impulse. The answer is stabilization, limitation and control. The answer is technical. Candide’s tool for accomplishing these necessities is a meal. Candide’s “stability” is a disconnection from sincerity and immediate interpretation of a situation. He tries to limit every impulse and balance himself. He hesitates. To do this he establishes a context by which he can stabilize, limit and control sense data. Meals help him make better judgments.

Before he begins to hesitate, Candide’s oscillation between praise and despair continues and becomes more and more extreme.¹⁹⁸ As his moments of depression become darker and darker, Candide seeks a miserable travel partner. Candide advertises his desire for a travel

¹⁹⁸ In Eldorado, Candide thinks, “All is for the best.” He now has money to rescue and provide for Cunegonde. As they travel to fetch her, more and more money is lost until Candide laments that the only solid things in life are virtue and the joy of seeing Cunegonde again (*Candide*, 41). Yet, Candide is still Optimistic until he is robbed of almost everything and meets a slave whose body has been mutilated. Candide says: “Optimism is a mania for saying ‘well’ when we’re in hell” (*Candide*, 41). After this he sheds bitter tears which clearly mark a move away from Pangloss’s Optimism in to deep despair.

partner and holds a contest at an inn. Candide has dinner with twenty miserable souls to determine who is *most* miserable:

Candide wanted to choose among the leading candidates, so he picked out about twenty who seemed companionable enough, and of whom each pretended to be more miserable than all the others. He brought them together at his inn and gave them a dinner, on condition that each swear to tell truthfully his entire history. He would select as his companion the most truly miserable and rightly discontented man, and among the others he would distribute various gifts. [...] At last he decided in favor of a poor scholar [...] who was in fact a good man, had been robbed by his wife, beaten by his son, and deserted by his daughter, who had got herself abducted by a Portuguese.¹⁹⁹

Martin, the pessimistic scholar, wins the contest. And two things happen indirectly: First,

Candide has a meal to help him choose between the stories. He establishes a context to order,

control and focus his interpretation of multiple stimuli. The meal establishes a situation that

helps to stabilize each story in relation to all the others. Second, the semantic problems do not

go away. The meal helps Candide listen and distinguish between good and bad acting but

Candide cannot really know, with absolute certainty, that the stories he is hearing are true.

Although they swear, there is a measure of faith involved. And when they get right down to it,

Candide is just picking the best actor. But the meal helps Candide navigate this ambiguity. The

“injustice” the nineteen losers feel confirms the problems. They all exert an effort to portray

themselves as the most “truly miserable” person present. After Martin wins, the others want

compensation for their effort.²⁰⁰

As Candide and Martin travel together, they talk of their troubles. But the Demonstrator makes an important distinction between the two men:

However, Candide had one great advantage over Martin, [...] he still hoped to see Miss Cunegonde again, and Martin had nothing to hope for; besides, [Candide] had gold and diamonds, and though he had lost a hundred big red sheep loaded with the greatest treasures of the earth, though he had always at his heart a memory of the Dutch merchant’s villainy, yet, when he thought of the wealth that remained in his hands, and

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 34-44.

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

when he talked of Cunegonde, especially just after a good dinner, he still inclined to the system of Pangloss.²⁰¹ Here we see Candide swing back to Pangloss' view, and this just four pages after one of his lowest points. The objectivity of Leibniz's view (the rightness or wrongness of Optimism) changes depending on Candide's subjective perspective. Interestingly, it is not argumentation but physical pleasure that fills Candide with hope and an agreement for Pangloss' system. The meal itself is the anchor that grounds Candide's hope and helps him understand the objective truth about his world.²⁰²

When Candide is full of food, he has hope and believes Leibniz; when he is empty, he despairs. Like the oscillating interpretations of the events of his life, the language and concepts Candide and Martin share are transitory and provisional. Their beliefs are provisional; their acceptance or denial of propositions is provisional. There is nothing transcendent about "hope" or "love" in the story. The subjectivity of their experiences affects their commitment and experience of "hope" and "love." They "work out" faith in Optimism or "work out" doubt in such concepts.²⁰³ This is the explanation made in reverse.

Coherence is built out of contracts. Love, hope and faith in Optimism are reaffirmed each day as the characters relate their lives to the concepts. They all live within a system and each part of the system influences the other parts. Use of language and human desire itself, in *Candide*, become coherent only in relation to other words or other desires. As a result, their philosophic commitments and their love are intricately related to and influenced by their bodies.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 44.

²⁰² This passage brings up an important instance of oscillation: the word "hope." At times this word is used sarcastically; at other times, the word is used with complete sincerity. Like "love" the word "hope" changes depending upon the speaker and the situation. Going into detail here really does not help me unpack my argument anymore than I already have, but it is helpful to relate "hope" to the concept of Optimism. The word—and the concept—grows full or empty in accordance with the circumstances. In *Candide*, the stomach's fullness or emptiness coincides with the fullness or emptiness of a concept.

²⁰³ Martin captures this transitory, existential reaffirmation of belief when he says, after something horrible happens, "I am more a Manache than ever." Belief is not a secure place; they are continually fitting their intellectual commitments to life.

The truthfulness of Optimism or the reality of love is built out of faithful commitments to the unseen reality of these ideas. Optimism and love are built, not agreed to and then implemented. Work is first, then the product of work grows into existence: Optimism, belief in God or love.

Another Meal

The reverse-mode of explanation and hesitation reveal themselves more fully with Paquette.²⁰⁴ Paquette is one of the “returns” that gives Candide hope of attaining his ultimate goal, Cunegonde. When Candide and Martin meet Paquette, they make a wager concerning her happiness. To Candide, she and the man she travels with —Brother Giroflee—appear happy. Martin, being a miserable wretch, disagrees. To test Paquette and her male companion, Candide says, “I’ll invite them to dinner.”²⁰⁵ And so Candide repeats his process by which he became friends with Martin. A meal becomes the tool that Candide uses to match the first appearances of a situation with reality he uses the meal to build a linguistic and conceptual relationship. By sharing a meal, they establish a context by which to understand one another better. He uses meals to get past the “sincerity” problem, to stabilize language and to decipher motivations.

During the meal, Paquette “pours forth her heart.”²⁰⁶ She says, “I was perfectly innocent when you knew me” (at which time, remember, she gave Pangloss syphilis) and, “My innocence would never have saved me if I had not been rather pretty.”²⁰⁷ Her words obviously slip into ambiguity until she says that she is “obliged to continue this abominable trade [of prostitution] which you men find so pleasant and which for us is nothing but a bottomless pit of misery.”²⁰⁸

²⁰⁴ This we will see later is Paquette’s error. Through her mistake, Candide develops his understanding of why “cultivation” and not “more money” is the solution to human happiness.

²⁰⁵ *Candide*, 58.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 59.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

Even though her worlds are not consistent, her life, in relation to her words, reveals the truth of her story. As Martin comments later: “To really know someone, you have to see them at home.”²⁰⁹ Candide uses a meal to help establish a context to communicate the truth about her life.

So Martin wins the bet. Candide is convinced that Paquette is not happy. And so, with Paquette, Candide appears to be learning. He is not oblivious of the *act* of the meal as he was with the Bulgars. He is using the meal to come to agreement about language, actions and concepts. The meal stabilizes and fills him up and puts him in the best possible frame of mind. By using meals, he limits the violence of his own desire and escapes the problems that plague his earlier attempts at pity.

Candide's Problem

Candide's non-violent solution is money. Upon Paquette he dumps a huge amount of money and believes that this will solve her problems. If she can use this money to buy food, she will be happy—full of Optimism. She will be able to lead a good life and be in peace. He repeats this solution on the six dethroned king, believing that the answer to human unhappiness is an influx of money—money that will let a person “get what they want.”

This non-violent solution seems to do the trick until we meet Paquette again. When we meet Paquette again, she is even unhappier than before Candide's generous gift. The text reads:

One thing served to confirm Martin in his detestable opinions, to make Candide hesitate more than ever, and to embarrass Pangloss. It was the arrival one day at their farm of Paquette and Brother Giroflee, who were in the last stages of misery. They had quickly run through their three thousand piastries, had split up, made up, quarreled, been jailed, escaped, and finally Brother Giroflee has turned Turk. Paquette continued to ply her trade [prostitution] everywhere, and no longer made any money at it.²¹⁰

²⁰⁹ Ibid., 61.

²¹⁰ Ibid., 75.

Candide's non-violent expression of pity fails. Although he read her situation correctly, he was unable personally to fix Paquette's unhappiness. In fact, Paquette is worse off than before.

Money does not answer her needs.²¹¹ Candide "hesitates" because although he was no violent this time, he still fails.

Candide's private desire to help Paquette remains only "subjective babble"²¹² until he acts out and gives her money. His gift is not enough to make her happy. Money does not let Candide communicate his meaning (i.e. make Paquette become fulfilled). As a result, Candide hesitates because it is money that he hoped would get him Cunegonde. His best option—a non-violent, financial investment—does not fix his world. Fulfillment proves to be a very complicated thing, especially in a world where each person seeks her own notion of fulfillment through whatever formal causes are available.

Candide fails because, in the reverse mode of explanation, Paquette herself must "work out" her own happiness. He cannot "give" her the answer. She cannot buy it or receive it from another person. In *Candide* self-fulfillment is reciprocal. While society does cause frustration and does reveal anti-agency, it is only through society that fulfillment develops. Money is not enough to bring fulfillment although it certainly helps.

The idea is that fulfillment, in Candide, comes indirectly or from an assortment of goods. To truly help Paquette, Candide must help her help herself. Candide must help her cultivate her happiness, but what happiness is and how to cultivate it are not things Candide knows. He does not know what sufficient reasons will make his life "best." The health of the community will reveal how cultivation is working. The habit of cultivation will be adjusted to maximize the

²¹¹ This is a fact of the text that neither Wolper nor Sherr deal with (more on this issue in the next chapter).

²¹² Dr. Cope explains that, as Locke understood language, private thoughts do not make any sense until they are made public. Once they are made public, they are changed and qualified until they are, essentially, "agreed upon" by the community. By himself Candide cannot have spontaneous acts of compassion. He needs to express compassion through a contract with his community.

community's effort to "thrive." In *Candide's* case specifically, the performance of cultivation is an exploration of what formal causes will develop into his happiness. In *Candide*, only after feeding the body can the mind commit to a concept. Only after weeding a garden will the earth produce abundant food. In the reverse mode—the world of systematicity, we do not begin with certainty and then believe; we believe and then are certain. We cultivate certainty; we leap faithfully into the stability of Leibniz.

Conclusion

Candide advances a metaphor—a performance—without giving a motive for this performance. As we explain this performance, we reveal our own testimonies; as we tell why we would or would not cultivate, we reveal our own perceived goods. *Candide* shows us the system we live in and read from. In this way, analyzing *Candide* results in a proliferation of readings because metaphors need interpretation. As has been said before, Voltaire takes as his satiric object human nature itself. The true lesson of the tale is that we see our interpretations as acts of will and, therefore, as appetitive. In *Candide*, Voltaire is not being pessimistic about language, love or metaphysics. He is showing how humans use language and concepts as part of their physical existence. As the treatment of "love" reveals, semantics are consensual, too.²¹³ Language is a way of "explaining the world" to other people.²¹⁴ It is only through consent, through mutual agreement, that language works.

Like language, *Candide's* desire for Cunegonde is "subjective babble" until it exists in the world.²¹⁵ Desire does not "make sense" by itself; only within a group can desire become

²¹³ Cope, *Criteria*, 102.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 107.

²¹⁵ Cope, "Emergence," 102. Dr. Cope explains that for words and knowledge are "subjective babble" for Locke until they exist in society and are agreed upon. Cope writes: "Lockean language undergoes a doubly chaotic

knowledge. The contract regulates violent acts such as the individual's misreading or misapplying of desire in some way.²¹⁶ As Candide and company work to feed themselves, they establish the condition for living in the best of possible worlds. As they work and make their lives better, their beliefs about the goodness of the world necessarily follow from these habits.²¹⁷ A faithful habit of cultivation eventually produces a garden. Work is the technical and day-to-day expression of "Love." It moves toward an end, but it does not pay much attention to what particular end it will reach. That this is the lesson of the tale can be seen in the treatment of Pangloss: Despite all the bodily violence and mutilation, one thing never happens to him: His tongue is never cut out.²¹⁸ All Pangloss is asked to do is "bridle" his tongue. This "bridling" is not a silencing of judgment, but for judgment to serve responsibly, to arise out of the work of a community and to admit its own appetitive nature. Pangloss is quick to see the end of all their

transformation; first it moves from a collection of discrete experiences to a general terminology, from this or that ball or this or that broom to "ball" and "broom" as a category identifier; then, more wonderously [sic] still, language passes from the private dialogue inside the individual head to a social medium of information exchange, from millions of idiosyncratic, internal languages to a conventional code that everyone understands. These transformations are fundamental and essential rather than quantitative or qualitative; internal babble turns into coherent code, then coherent code metamorphoses from a personal denotative system into a medium of communication" (102).

²¹⁶ This idea of contracts as meals fits perfectly with the criticism I offered of Scherr who argued that money regulates violence. The problem with money is that, while it is a product of some contracts, it does not help unify moral and linguistic differences. Meals, on the other hand, unify humans in all these ways. Cope writes: "Dominion, even God's, cannot exist until someone invents the artificial idea of 'property.' Everything known is known through ideas; as products, ideas are artificial; things artificial lead to artificing powers; and artificing powers, for the ever-ethical Locke, have no meaning outside of the production of artifacts" (*Analogies*, 109).

²¹⁷ It is important to notice that "the garden" is not a physical place at all. Gardens are the result of a habit of work, not a place.

²¹⁸ No one in the tale has a body that is as distorted as Pangloss'. There could be various reasons for this, but one of them is that Voltaire wants to show how Pangloss is disconnected from his own body. Just as he ignores Jacques' plight or that of the citizens of Lisbon and instead *proves* how justified the death and destruction are, so too he ignores his own body. Voltaire doles out a healthy portion of violence in response to this blindness. As we progress, we will see why such blindness to the body problematizes human life and the system of the world. It is the body that allows the "reverse mode of explanation" to work.

A. O. Lovejoy, "The Principle of Plenitude," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 121. Lovejoy points out that, "The philosophers of optimism were [...] desirous of proving was that reality is rational through and through, that every fact of existence, however unpleasant, is grounded in some reason as clear and evident as an axiom of mathematics." Candide hesitates to come to a conclusion because he does not yet see the rationality for his life. He waits for further developments.

efforts, but Candide interrupts him in the final line of the tale to draw his attention to the body, to work and to the habits of cultivation that will make his buoyant beliefs mean anything.

Candide, like all novels, explores an epistemological dilemma. Unlike other novels, *Candide* asserts a metaphor that the reader must explain. In the explanation, the reader's testimony inevitably reveals itself. As the reader compares this testimony to other critics, the integrity of the testimony is tested and, eventually, a consensus can be reached. Locke was interested in differing opinions and how these opinions led to consensus. Affirming Locke's values, Voltaire's satire encourages diverse opinions. Voltaire, like Locke, does not judge between the truthfulness of the individual opinions. The proliferation of opinions was the first step in the consenting process. To build consent, we must start by identifying testimonies. *Candide's* central metaphor draws out the reader's testimony and so begins the consenting process. By asserting a mysterious metaphor, Voltaire echoes Locke's own interest in "integrity" instead of "proof." Both Locke and Voltaire teach the reader about the process of consent. This process finds practical expression in meals. As the text reveals, eating meals becomes the context that allows a human to analyze immediate impulses. Meals help us see how volition relates to judgment. As we read *Candide*, we must participate in this lesson by revealing our own appetites as we interpret Candide's motivation for cultivating his garden.

CHAPTER FIVE

Hedonists are just Puritans in rebellion.
-Terry Eagleton

A Loss of Being

Introduction

The presence of meals in *Candide* argues against the claim that *Candide*'s hesitation proves his "dehumanization," "desexualization," or his "absurdity." The presence of meals also challenges the claim that money and a free market become the new principles of community life. I argue that meals are tools that balance various aspects of one's life and so cultivate a mutually fulfilling community. Specifically, cultivating meals is the performance of Love.

Voltaire Versus Rousseau

Rousseau influences contemporary understandings of desire.²¹⁹ This can be seen in particular critics of Voltaire's *Candide*. The problem—if there is one—results from different

²¹⁹ Robert Wokler, "Ancient Postmodernism in the Philosophy of Rousseau," *The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 418-443. Wokler writes that, after their deaths, Voltaire and Rousseau are lumped together "as if these two fiercest ideological enemies of the whole eighteenth century were some homogeneous Gilbertonsullivan compound" (421). Wokler's analysis is to show that modern thought and society is much indebted to Rousseau. For example, Wokler writes, "Across what would now be termed different disciplines, Rousseau managed to probe and uncover some of modernity's deepest faults, and to my mind, the flawed world that he portrayed throughout his writings was not only his but also ours" (438). He writes: "Although they are unfortunately seldom noticed, there are many features of Rousseau's philosophy that address the empty formalism and abstract foundationalism of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century metaphysics in terms later to be embraced by Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and their followers" (419). And, "The connection between *savoir* and *pouvoir* is not just a Marxist or Nietzschean or postmodernist and Foucauldian theme. It forms the kernel of the critique of what may be termed the Enlightenment Project itself by one of its main protagonists who, to use Hegelian language, was the *an sich aber nicht fur sich*, that is, who was part of it but in large measure did not subscribe to it" (420). Also, concerning language, Wokler writes, "[Rousseau's] understanding of the trappings of civilization is, to my mind, even richer than Foucault's, not least because in Heideggerian fashion, he understood the force of language and metaphor and the ways in which, through language, individuals became the victims not just of one another's abuse of power but also of their own ideals, subjugated by their own conjugations, as it were, running headlong into their chains, thinking themselves free" (421). Concerning government: "Rousseau set out to explain that our political institutions were themselves responsible for the crimes they were purported to solve, providing solutions to problems of which those solutions were in fact the cause" (423). Maybe most importantly for this paper is Rousseau's concept of *la liberte morale* which had as its most distinctive feature a "peculiarly reflexive element of self-prescription. Every morally free agent, Rousseau insisted, was required to follow rules established only within the depths of his own conscience in a self-reliant manner, free from

understandings of “technique” and how technique relates to human desire. Expressions of Rousseau’s understanding of human desire keep popping up in contemporary culture. It is no surprise that one finds critics of Voltaire analyzing the text in light of the categories of desire which Rousseau himself defined. According to Rousseau, a loss of desire coincides with a loss of being. Because Rousseau and Voltaire were fierce ideological rivals it is important to understand how Voltaire might have viewed desire differently. The difference can be seen in how he treats spontaneity and immediate impulses. Building off of the last chapter, we will see that a technical habit of cultivation produces a spontaneous enjoyment of food.

For Rousseau, society kills spontaneity and with it freedom, pleasure and joy. In contrast, for Voltaire and Locke, spontaneous desires are never coherent by themselves. Every word, every desire must be disciplined, limited, controlled and brought into relation to other people’s desires. Coherency is itself a product of a contract. Only in a contract do desires make sense. Human reason and spontaneous pleasure are both products of such contracts.

As already presented, there exists a proliferation of readings on *Candide*. This proliferation of readings rises out of the tendency of the text to interrupt itself and advance an unexplained metaphor. Another reason for a proliferation of readings is the different understandings of what a “human” actually is. *Candide* satirizes human nature; what this nature is and how we understand it will change the nature of the satire because as we explain the metaphor, our eisegetical readings reveal what we believe about “humanity.”

the influences of all other persons” (425). “Because of ideals like those listed above,” Wokler writes, “I should like, however, to conclude these reflections on Rousseau’s ancient postmodernism by addressing not his role in the French Revolution that failed to occur but rather the significance of his classical republican ideals with respect to the Revolution that *did* take place, whose greatest success and failures alike were to earn from his the status of chief poet and acknowledged legislator of the age of modernity we still inhabit” (430).

Two Scholars Apply Rousseau to Candide

For example, to have an ordered and fruitful society, the garden party must abandon sexuality at the gate: Arthur Scherr, in “Candide’s Garden Revisited: Gender Equality in a Commoner’s Paradise,” argues that gender equality in Candide’s garden results from the switch from a medieval economic system (which prized rank over skill) to a free market economy.²²⁰ The garden party exchanges spontaneous excitement and discovery for a “grim determination” to cultivate the garden.²²¹ Money brings about the freedom necessary for a healthy, gender-equal society; money becomes the new norm, which will allow productive skillful work to occur. Scherr champions the economic switch he sees being made at the end of *Candide*. The ending of *Candide* marks, in Scherr’s view, the “desexualization” of the characters as money, rather than sexuality or rank, becomes the organizing factor of the economy. Money becomes the impetus for a “gender equal” garden and the new norm for the modern world.²²² The garden marks a loss of being and pleasure.

²²⁰ Scherr, “Equality,” 46 and 53.

Arthur Scherr, “Voltaire’s *Candide*,” *Explicator* 59, no. 2 (Winter 2001): 74-76. Scherr wrote a short piece in “The Explicator” about how Jacques is not necessarily a “self-giving” person at all, but is a template for the final garden scene when *Candide* and company abandon pity and take up “self-interest” and a “determinism to work” as their motivation.

²²¹ Scherr, “Equality,” 53. But if money gives no value outside the market, then this self-realization is as problematic as the slave’s mutilation. There is nothing outside the market to judge between the two ways of making and using money. Scherr says that Candide’s new standard of value is “self-interest.”²²¹ But this position is frustrated when Candide continues to try to help his friends—not himself (i.e. he does not go find a beautiful wife). The slave’s plight, and that of Paquette are serious problems and Voltaire wants to offer a solution. Scherr’s reading—the capitalist model—claims that “by helping myself, I help others.” But Candide’s actions are saying something subtly different: The self itself arises out of the community not as an original, pure thing that a community corrupts. Candide does not propose a plan, a theory, or a goal. He encourages everyone to begin to participate in a new habit: working.

Scherr sees *Candide* as representing a shift from metaphysical and theological “fanatical devotion” to utilitarian, middle-class interests in “consequences.” (Like his history, Voltaire does mark a shift from the teleological “grand” narratives of the past to an interest in immediate consequences.) While this is correct that Voltaire moves to focus attention on particulars and their immediate consequences, the tale is not as completely “modern” as Scherr interprets it as being. The tale still points beyond itself to an “ideal”—it is just that what this ideal actually is, we do not know.

²²² Because of this argument Scherr makes, an easy connection can be made between his analysis and Terry Eagleton’s analysis of contemporary capitalism.

Like many postmodern and cultural theorists, Scherr reveals a postmodern preoccupation with sex²²³ and, with this preoccupation, a belief that desire and society are diametrically opposed. In this view of sex, we find housed an element of Rousseau's thought. Scherr sees only two moments of "spontaneous pleasure" (i.e., sex) in *Candide*.²²⁴ He writes that the characters abandon these marvelous moments of pleasure in order to start grimly working. For Scherr, work and pleasure are cut off from one another. Duty and fulfillment are irreconcilable. The characters abandon the possibility of becoming fulfilled and instead take up a disciplined and rigorous responsibility. The mechanism of "working hard" excludes the orgasm of pleasure. Because the height of pleasure is sex, the characters must abandon their sexuality in order to enter the financial stability of the garden. Pleasure and political success are incompatible. According to Scherr's reading of *Candide*, society and the marketplace come into essential conflict with the nature of human desire. For one to succeed, the other must end. To be pleased sexually and spontaneously is to live a life outside of society. To live in the garden requires a loss of being.

²²³ I am not being a puritan, but am trying to point out, as Eagleton does, that "hedonists are just Puritans in rebellion" (*After Theory*, 5). Eagleton responds to contemporary Literary Theory by saying that studies on sex help "put paid" to the powerful myth that "pleasure falls outside the realm of knowledge, and thus is dangerously anarchic." These studies have helped to demolish the puritan dogma that seriousness is one thing and pleasure another." Eagleton continues his analysis of Theory's sex studies and says that hedonists are puritans in rebellion: "Both of them equate truth with earnestness. Old-style puritanical capitalism forbade us to enjoy ourselves, since once we had acquired a taste or the stuff we would probably never see the inside of the workplace again" (5). An analysis of pleasure need not be merely an analysis of sex. For example, Scherr writes, "Which are the *conte's* most joyous moments? These seem to be *Candide's* first sensual encounters with Cunegonde behind the screen, and the incident in chapter 16 when the Oreillon girls cavort with their simian "amants" shortly before *Candide* kills them. The two episodes have in common the participants' unabashed, instinctive behavior and childlike passionate intensity, traits that are depressingly absent from *Candide* generally, with its pervasive tone of cynicism and clever mockery, its endless catalogue of catastrophe" (53).

Moishe Black also connects happiness to sex. Sex is actually "the short road to happiness" (180).

²²⁴ Scherr mentions the "monkey scene" and the scene, at the beginning, when Cunegonde catches *Candide* behind the curtain and kisses him (52). But he ignores the constant spontaneous enjoyment of food. For example, just before *Candide* kills the monkeys, he blubbers about Cunegonde while stuffing his face in an apparently completely spontaneous way. He cannot help himself; he enjoys food regardless of his emotional state.

Scherr fits in with those cultural theorists²²⁵ who defer metaphysical questions and limit themselves to justifying “what works” or “what practical reason we have for doing what we do” rather than seeking a better way of doing things. Today, there is no pressing need to legitimize one’s lifestyle. Rather, it is enough to justify what one does.²²⁶ Scherr says as much when he limits himself to sufficient causes (sociology) and leaves the “metaphysical issues” to other scholars. Like a good modern scholar, Scherr and many other scholars are eager to point out that Voltaire focuses on particulars—or nips metaphysical speculation in the bud—and so “frees” us from this nagging call to explain everything. The idea is that once “free” we can live as best we can.

But, Voltaire is ultimately saying something else about desire. Voltaire is not being relativistic but is seeking the integrity of metaphysical connections. We can know this because of the proliferations of readings the tale produces. For example, to explain more fully how *Candide* encourages a proliferation of readings, a contrast between Scherr and Wolper is helpful. In an opposite way from what Scherr argues, Wolper laments that the very move Scherr praises—the move to work grimly in the garden—is the expression of *Candide*’s foolishness. Wolper argues that when *Candide* and company selfishly think only of themselves and of their small community instead of the “other” and “the world,” they represent a subtle vice rather than the often-celebrated virtuous work ethic. Virtue—true virtue—Wolper writes is considerate “of other, not self; the world, not the little group only.”²²⁷ Wolper argues that, although *Candide* “has taken in friends, he has not advanced in his *generosity*. In fact, Wolper moans, *Candide* was initially

²²⁵ “Cultural Theory” is post-deconstruction and includes thinkers like Rorty and Fish. Cultural Theorists and “Anti-Theorists” (as Eagleton calls Rorty and Fish particularly) are lumped together in what Eagleton calls “postmodern thinkers.”

²²⁶ Eagleton summarizes these ideas and points out Stanley Fish and Richard Rorty as being examples of the contemporary “anti-theory” as Eagleton calls it (*After Theory*, 54).

²²⁷ Wolper, 276.

more generous: He helped strangers, not just associates. For example, “he gave his last florins to the beggar-Pangloss, and he pitched in and helped the survivor of the earthquake.”²²⁸

Wolper forgets to mention all the other ways Candide’s “generosity” damages his world; Wolper does not see that Candide’s desires and his compassion are themselves anti-agents in his world. By prizing “selflessness” as Wolper does, Wolper reveals his own misunderstanding of virtue.²²⁹ Wolper associates strong feelings with virtuous actions and seems to care more about “feelings of generosity” than the result of these feelings. Wolper laments that the characters are *reduced* to “functions” (i.e., not feeling).²³⁰ And he says that a loss of feeling coincides with a loss of being.²³¹ The mechanistic quality of the garden kills the feelings that give humans moral value. Wolper writes that Candide is a dunce because he closes his eyes to the suffering of his neighbors, and “vainly believes that appetitive evil can be fenced out, to blindly miss the grim implications of stupidity, to leave unfulfilled the growth of human potential.”²³² For Wolper, the

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ C. S. Lewis has some thoughts about virtue and “duty.” This goal-oriented fulfillment, as already mentioned, comes by way of Kant. Eagleton was not the first person to make this connection: C. S. Lewis said as much when he wrote the *The Weight of Glory*. Lewis approaches the problem from another angle: He is concerned with people who build a sense of virtue off of “denying themselves,” rather than a positive and “fulfilling” principle. He is speaking to a mass audience in a then predominantly Christian culture. Perhaps the Cultural Theory Eagleton is responding to is a correction of the Stoicism to which Lewis is addressing himself. Lewis wrote: “If you asked twenty good men today what they thought the highest of the virtues, nineteen of them would reply, Unselfishness. But if you had asked almost any of the great Christians of old, he would have replied, Love. You see what has happened? A negative term has been substituted for a positive, and this is of more than philological importance. The negative idea of Unselfishness carries with it the suggestion not primarily of securing good things for others, but of going without them ourselves, as if our abstinence and not their happiness was the important point. I do not think this is the Christian virtue of Love. The New Testament has lots to say about self-denial, but not about self-denial as an end in itself. We are told to deny ourselves and to take up our crosses in order that we may follow Christ; and nearly every description of what we shall ultimately find if we do so contains an appeal to desire. If there lurks in most modern minds the notion that to desire our own good and earnestly to hope for the enjoyment of it is a bad thing. I submit that this notion has crept in from Kant that the Stoics and is no part of the Christian faith. Indeed, if we consider the unblushing promises of promises and the staggering nature of the rewards promised in the Gospel, it would seem that Out Lord finds out desires not too strong, but too weak. We are half-hearted creatures, fooling about with drink and sex and ambition when infinite joy is offered us, like an ignorant child who wants to get on making mud pies in a slum because he cannot imagine what is meant by the offer of a holiday at the sea. We are far too easily pleased.”

In addition to Lewis, Eagleton explains that Kant divorced fulfillment from duty (*After Theory*, 124).

²³⁰ Wolper, 275.

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

“reduction” of Candide’s life is itself an evil. The mere existence inside a garden represents his foolishness. What Candide needs, Wolper argues, is to “be generous.”²³³

Although they each respond to *Candide* in radically different ways, Scherr and Wolper agree in their understandings of desire. One wants technicality without feeling while the other wants feeling without technicality. Neither scholar can connect technique to desire (or see how desire serves science). Sherr praises the new value of grimly determining to work; Wolper laments the loss of spontaneous feelings of compassion and the limitations, the “smallness,” of the garden. In both scholars, although their readings are very different, there exists a dominant element of Rousseauian thought: Pleasure is spontaneous and therefore strongest when sexual; because pleasure is spontaneous, technicality is anathema. Both scholars read the tale in terms of this category of pleasure. For them, the rigors of duty destroy the possibility of fulfillment.

Technically Produced, Spontaneous Pleasure

Neither scholar considers that it is possible to cultivate “exuberant, exploratory eating” or generosity that actually helps make life better for everyone. But this is exactly what happens in the tale. Work provides the “spontaneous pleasure” of enjoying food. In this story, food and pleasure are *technical* affairs—not orgasmic spontaneous impulses, but pleasant nonetheless. As technical affairs, it is possible that admittance into the garden requires not a de-sexualization but a re-sexualization, not de-humanization but a re-humanization.

The discussion between failure of desire and fulfillment lands us in an analysis of what is “human nature.”²³⁴ *Candide* can be read as presenting a much different sort of “human nature”

²³³ Wolper writes, “Early on Candide is better” morally. That is, he was more generous (276).

²³⁴ To discuss postmodern desire and respond to contemporary scholarship requires a new definition of human nature. Terry Eagleton discusses such definitions in his book. Eagleton asks questions of both Literary Studies and Philosophy. These questions would hopefully start a shift in discussions past Cultural Theory, which

than the one Wopler and Scherr build their arguments upon. Of course, what “human nature” means is a cause for immediate debate. One view is “prescriptive,” the other “descriptive.”²³⁵

One view of “human nature” sees the world as tragically maiming the human. In response to this

has dominated English and Philosophy studies since the nineteen-sixties. To have this discussion, Eagleton had to address the “metaphysical apathy” of Cultural Theory and it is to this metaphysical apathy that Terry Eagleton writes. Against the relativism that permeates contemporary academics, he argues for objectivity. But he makes his arguments for objectivity through the dominant concept of Cultural Theory: Desire. He uses the same “anarchical force” which carries contemporary postmodernists beyond the confines of science into a blissful and sexually pleasing future, but instead of radical freedom, Eagleton argues for “technique.”

His analysis of desire leads him into a discussion and critique of contemporary understanding of “human nature.” For this reason, he is extremely helpful in responding to contemporary critics who analyze Voltaire. Eagleton’s response to postmodern thoughts about desire echoes Voltaire’s treatment of desire in *Candide*. This desire relates to economic concerns and to the relationship between “pleasure” and “work.” According to Rousseau, to live with people means limiting your desire and thereby causing yourself pain (the ultimate evil for Rousseau). Voltaire sees pain and evil as rising out of ignorance. Knowledge, not isolation, alleviates pain and fits desires with the world. Pleasure rises out of work done with in a community, not out of isolation.

Scherr is not alone in his appraisal of money as a new norm of the modern world. Money is perfect for a normless society. In a “normless society” money becomes the only norm (Eagleton, 16). In the capitalist market, money becomes the new standard. But while money is a great way to move beyond rank, sexuality and feudal systems, money has problems too. Voltaire both submits a promising model in reaction to his culture’s problems, but, too, he critiques the model he proposes. For example, in the text, money drives the Dutchman to mutilate the slave and then to take advantage of *Candide*. What *Candide* finds at the end in a way to secure the good money brings while minimizing the evils. Scherr ignores the failure of money completely.

Eagleton explains that money does not allow for human fulfillment because fulfillment is one good among many others. Eagleton observes that Kant is in part responsible for this phenomenon in modern culture. Kant divorced “fulfillment” from “duty” (Eagleton, 124). Or fulfillment is arrived at indirectly and is not an “end”; fulfillment rises out of multiple goods. Money can buy things but it cannot secure the “multiple goods” needed for fulfillment.

As a standard, money allows for the exploitation of anyone—as long as it is for a good price (Eagleton, 19). Money works much like “equality” works in contemporary culture. Equality is a current watchword for gender relations. The idea is that equality will make everyone happy, but this rarely happens. Equality, like money, is like medicine: they can promote health, but only negatively. Equality and money both protect against tyranny or disease, but cannot of themselves promote fulfillment. C. S. Lewis says as much in his *That Hideous Strength*. Ransom discusses gender relations and equality with the hero of the story saying, “Obedience—humility—is an erotic necessity” (490). The idea he expresses is that a mutually satisfying relationship requires positive acts of service—humble obedience—on the part of both partners. In a parallel fashion, money frees interpersonal relationships from the domination of rank or class, but it hardly cultivates the spicy, mutually satisfying interaction between people called “love.” Money does not cultivate a habit of humble service. As Paquette reveals, money will not bring fulfillment. It can alleviate an uncomfortable state, but it cannot bring about a habit of cultivation.

Because of money and a consumer culture, pleasure and desire become “ends” to which people strive; pleasure becomes a goal rather than an indirect product or thing-that-is-built. Pleasure is “purchased” not cultivated. That is, pleasure is not the product of many different kinds of goods; it is a commodity, or an object to be consumed. Paquette is the most obvious example of this problem. Money affects her like a winning lottery ticket: it is quickly spent and she is more miserable than before. Either her failure to attain desire means that life requires a loss of being (Rousseau), or her failure teaches her something about what it means to be human.

²³⁵ Eagleton, 121.

tragedy, the more a person desires, the more one can attain.²³⁶ Another view sees the restrictions that the world places on human life as being instructive. When these restrictions were flouted, the Greeks called this hubris.²³⁷ Both views of “human nature” ask the question: What must I do to prosper or thrive. The answer for the first view is stronger desire; the answer for the second view is a “technical” answer.

Both Scherr and Wolper’s criticism exist within the first view of desire: fulfillment is to be found in excessive feelings or not at all. But in the second view of human nature, humans have to struggle to become themselves—to be a good human is to *reshape* your desire to correctly fit reality, to desire only what you *should* desire (versus what you *could* desire). Such a reshaping is the means to become most fulfilled.²³⁸

²³⁶ Eagleton discusses this difference between views of “human nature” and cites Macbeth as an example of the issue. He says, Shakespeare represents “a quarrel between those who see the constraints of human nature as creative ones and those for whom being human is a matter of perpetually going beyond them” (118).

²³⁷ Eagleton also cites this term as he responds to a postmodern understanding of human desire (118). This term occurs in a section where Eagleton observes that death is always arbitrary; death is always an unwelcome interruption of a good thing—life (116). If life were a matter of “ends,” this would not be the case. If life were a matter of reaching an end, once a person had fulfilled his or her “end,” death would be welcome. But this is obviously not the case. Life is good for its own sake.

Candide forces knowledge of “death” upon the reader. We are asked to notice “interruptions.” Edwin Grobe writes that death is what most obviously proves his thesis because death is the ultimate expression of interruption: “The ultimate expression of the discontinuous character of human existence is, of course, the fact of death” (334). This, for Grobe, proves that because human life is interrupted, Candide can only “seek continuity within himself” (345).

²³⁸ As a historical animal, a human wants to think in “teleological terms” about her life. For this reason we seek specific pleasures or “more money” thinking that through these ends we will be satisfied. Eagleton believes this is a mistake as it covers over the difference between “living for its own sake” and “getting enough pleasure to make life worth itself” (Eagleton, 115). Eagleton argues that human life, and human pleasure, are not meant to “aim” at a goal at all; rather, human life should be a “delight in and of itself” and “for its own sake.” Eagleton agrees this because, he says, happiness is the result of many different goods rather than an “end” of some one thing. Happiness rises indirectly out of an assortment of goods.

Eagleton argues that happiness is about what humans *are like*, not *what they like* (Eagleton, 126). For this reason, the technique of being a fulfilled human is an objective, not a subjective affair. Like all techniques happiness is an action, a practice, not a “feeling” that imbues a life. To be fulfilled is to act in certain ways; to practice certain habits (Eagleton, 121).

Joseph Kronick, in “The Ancient Quarrel Revisited: Literary Theory and the Return to Ethics” illumines Eagleton’s thoughts. He uses Eagleton’s argument to help himself explain how “aesthetic distance allows us to transform the incomprehensibility of human destruction into a legitimation of human reason, and it does so by transforming particularity into the universal” (42). Kronick argues that Eagleton, in *After Theory*, references the power of tragedy to highlight our human need to encounter failure in order to flourish (42). Kronick disagrees with Eagleton’s use of tragedy because tragedy destroys the “aesthetic distance” humans need in order to recognize what failure means (i.e. to transform particular experiences into universal truths). It is difficult to follow Kronick’s

Attaining a perceived good does not necessarily provide humans with happiness. Because a formal cause provides the medium by which a human attempts to gain happiness, a myriad of options mushroom around a person's life. Humans can never know for sure what choices will bring about happiness. All humans can do is cultivate many different kinds of goods and allow happiness to rise indirectly out of the assortment.

With a different understanding of "human nature," we can see *Candide* differently. How we answer the failure of human desire reveals something of ourselves rather than something about the text. As a satire, the tale is ambiguous because it is challenging our own meaning-creating systems; *Candide* reveals our own prescriptive or descriptive definitions of "human nature." It is possible to read *Candide* as teaching the reader to dialogue with others about the meaning of the text, to engage in an analysis of all the sundry understandings of "human nature" and discover which meaning-giving system has the best answer (even if that answer has metaphysical strings attached). According to Lockean standards of rationality, this *best* answer will be revealed through testimony and consent, not emotions or analytic proof.

Conclusion

Technique and desire relate to "love." If love is merely sexual, then *Candide* would appear to condemn love and all metaphysical connections (as Bonneville argues). But if desire can be shaped to "fit" the world, and thus be made "coherent," then love has not been destroyed.

thought here, but, apparently, what this means is that Kronick has never laughed at himself—which is precisely what Voltaire is encouraging his readers to do for in *Candide* we see Voltaire's "grimace." Joseph De Maiste, in "Voltaire's Greatness," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), says that Voltaire's "much-vaunted wit is far from unblameable; the laugh it raises is never legitimate; it is a grimace" (179). Gustave Flaubert responded similarly to Voltaire: In "Voltaire's Humanity," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), Flaubert says, "As for novels, Voltaire wrote just one, which is a summary of all his works [...] His whole intelligence was an implement of war, a weapon. And what makes me cherish him is the disgust I felt for his followers, the Voltaireans, those people who laugh at great things. Did he laugh, himself? He ground his teeth" (185). In *Candide*, although we laugh, we retain our distance from ourselves.

Given a descriptive definition of human nature, love is seen lying closely to objectivity.²³⁹ Both Wolper and Scherr see Candide moving away from compassion: Scherr sees Candide as grasping to reason; Wopler sees Candide as foolishly isolating himself from the wisdom of generous feelings. But, according to Eagleton's understanding of "human nature," behavior like Candide's can be seen as an expression of the technique of love—neither coldly "reasonable" nor generously emotive.

For those who argue that Candide has been dehumanized, meals are problematic. Meals stiff-arm the quick rush towards metaphysical apathy as well as protect against the melancholic laps into selfishness. Meals capture the moment of hesitation between uncertainty about

²³⁹ "Objectivity," Eagleton writes, "lies closely to love: a selfless openness to the needs of others" (Eagleton, 131). Love is a "radical acceptance" that allows us to see others for what they are (Eagleton, 131). He goes on to write, "[It is] only through being the means of your self-fulfillment that I can attain my own and visa versa" (Eagleton, 122). Eagleton says that we fulfill ourselves only when we forget about ourselves and help someone else become fulfilled. Eagleton calls this view "politicized love" and sets it in contrast to capitalism's self-serving consumerism. Eagleton observes that "self-realization" is too complicated to not argue about, but he wants to make a point: In our global culture today, we have become "moral capitalists," we think only of "ends," of reaching our goal (Eagleton, 123). We do not think of our lives as being for their own sake; we do not try to help each other toward a mutual enjoyment of life. This goal orientation permeates everything in contemporary culture (Eagleton, 124). It is no surprise to find it in readings of *Candide*.

For a thinker like Aristotle, happiness—although not "orgasmic pleasure"—is still a life that is "thriving or flourishing" (Eagleton, 124). Eagleton connects thriving with serving others because self-fulfillment comes when we stop thinking only about ourselves and focus on the context in which we exist. It is this context we should serve; we should make this context thrive. As such, thriving or "well-being" is one good among others, the result of many different kinds of goods. Virtue is a technique of being human, a habit and not an affair of "the heart" (Eagleton, 125).

All actions require a setting in time, and are like "narrative," Eagleton says. One cannot just snap and be fulfilled or make enough money to arrive at happiness (Eagleton, 128). Flourishing is a complex issue and because it is both public and private—a subjective experience (me) with an objective rubric (technique)—Aristotle did not think there was a distinction between ethics and politics (Eagleton, 128). Eagleton goes on to say, "Ethics is in Aristotle's view the science of human desire, since desire is the motive behind all our actions" (129). Unlike Rousseau, a good government would create good citizens; citizens would learn to amend their desires and construct a thriving, mutually fulfilling society. Politicized love is a radical attention to a particular context with an eye for better future conditions. Politicized love is a "form of teleology," but has a radical attention to a particular place and time. Politicized love balances a larger cultural and political context with one's immediate community. It is global, but only after being radically local.

In contrast to the liberal view of government which lets each "thrive" apart from the others in his or her own gated community or ghetto, this "politicized love" is a government structure that makes "self-realization as far as possible reciprocal" (Eagleton, 122). Such an order would require a limited, restricted frame of interaction—gardens, perhaps—but would also demand that this limited space be based not on a physical space at all. The foundation for a thriving community is not the physical space, but the habit, the technique of service that binds each person to the others. Such a technique would teach the world's communities how to guard against vice, boredom and starvation.

metaphysical claims and the rejection of a larger community. Cultivation of meals is a middle way, a habit of work that focuses radically on particulars but works toward developments. After a good meal, one is inclined to make metaphysical claims.

As seen earlier, Paquette's goal-oriented desire kept her from happiness. As she spends money to become fulfilled, fulfillment slips away. Fulfillment is not a commodity to be bought. Fulfillment comes only indirectly (or from a bouquet of different good things). What saves Candide and company at the end is a new habit.

If Voltaire is arguing for contracts to be established, then perhaps he does not mind metaphysical connections at all, but wants to ensure that any commitment to a metaphysical principle is grounded in a place and time, is contractual and efficacious for a particular group of people. Some read Voltaire as "playing for keeps" concerning God and metaphysical connections,²⁴⁰ but such a reading misunderstands the tale's behavior. The emphasis eighteenth-century thinkers place on "the body" and how "the body" was the chief tool of exploring "the void."

A focus on meals results in a distancing from immediate emotional sincerity. The reader is not caught up into the vivid emotional life of *Candide*, but this does not equal a loss of being. A loss of emotional sincerity does not coincide with a loss of being. Emotional sincerity—like intellectual commitments—only come after cultivating meals. Instead of emoting, we are taught to hesitate with Candide while we cultivate. After cultivation we will be better suited to respond emotionally and intellectually to our context our desires will be submitted to our judgment. By

²⁴⁰ Weitz, *Philosophy in Literature*, 13 and 16. Weitz writes: "It is plot the plot, of *Candide*, not the characterization or the dialogue that carries the acknowledged major philosophical theme of the novel: that optimism is absurd." Weitz continues his analysis and says that by making these claims, Voltaire is "playing for keeps" in his critique of God's presence and the nature of evil (16).

focusing on meals, Candide learns to fit his emotions to his world, to understand other people and help them attain their fulfillment. In *Candide*, the characters learn how to perform Love.

CHAPTER SIX

Blah, blah, blah.
-Critical

A Sign full of Absence

Introduction

Here, we will move to discuss the implication of the eighteenth century's focus on limitation and the human body. The implication is that, under these circumstances, the proper study of science became the human nature that studied Nature. The study of limitation led to the proper study of humanity: humanity itself. This is to say, the focus on the limitation of human knowledge and the human body leads *Candide* to ask the only truly existential question: "Why does anything exist?" The obsession with "the void" and how the human body explored this void led quite easily to a question the answer to which must necessarily lie outside the limit of human existence—an answer that must come from "the void" itself.

Additionally, at the end of this Chapter, I will conclude the thesis by summarizing my findings. These findings are basically that *Candide* confesses its readers by revealing each reader's testimony. This *eisegesis* is scientifically helpful when one's goal is integrity rather than proof. The eighteenth century used the body and its testimony to explore "the void." The body became the measure for this exploration and, as a result, the questions that rise out of bodily experience (example: "Why does anything exist?") were the proper study of humanity. Our response to this question—whether we answer it or deny it—reveals our own willful commitments to perceived good. *Candide* teaches us that our appetites determine how we use our judgment. Likewise, our judgments can determine how we use our desire. By exploring the relationship between abstract principles and the human body, eighteenth-century satire served

science responsibly by revealing the integrity of the scientist's position in relation to her object of analysis.

Signifying Absence

While the physical garden might be destroyed or "decay" with some new, violent force, as long as the characters continue practicing the habit of work, they will always be cultivating gardens anywhere they go. The security of the garden is actually not the physical space at all. The garden is the habit of cultivation, and cultivation makes the garden possible. The garden is a result of and is itself the habit of work.²⁴¹ Digging in the mud, over time, will create a garden. The garden at the end of *Candide* will be destroyed, but the garden does not prove anything anyway. The habit of work is what creates the garden. The commitment to work is the only proof that this is the best of all possible worlds, but committing to work also admits that this world is not yet its best.

²⁴¹ Robert M. Adams, "Candide on Work and Candide as Outsider," *Candide: The Norton Critical Edition* (New York: Norton and Company Press, 1966), 165. Adams writes that Candide's work is not a product but is a process. He writes that there is no positive content to Candide's labor. The work of cultivating a garden is a negation; "cultivation" is an avoidance of the three evils that corrupt human life: vice, poverty and boredom (168). Unfortunately, Adams does not see this negation as an apophatic utterance about humanity's place on earth. For him, the characters are reduced to "mechanism" (170).

But this claim that the character have been reduced to mechanisms leaves out the possibility for a process to actually attain a "positive content." But this is what Candide does. He hesitates to commit to a position, but lets his body develop the possibility for his holding a commitment. The reverse-mode is a negative commitment. The reverse-mode is a commitment to process, but this commitment is not a reduction. This "negativity" is important as we think about Leibniz:

Frederick Copleston, "Leibniz (4)," *A History of Philosophy IV: Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Leibniz* (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 326. "God, according to Leibniz, always acts for the best, so that the world must be the best of all possible worlds. Absolutely speaking, God could have created a different world, but, morally speaking, He could create only the best possible world. This is the metaphysical optimism of Leibniz [...] And, given this optimistic position, it is clearly incumbent on Leibniz to explain how it is that the evil in the world does not constitute its refutation." Copleston continues his discussion by pointing out that, "By saying that the world is the best of all possible worlds Leibniz did not mean to imply that it has at any given moment attained its maximum state of perfection: it is constantly progressing and developing" (331). Voltaire has Candide hesitate with respect to committing to an explanation of the world's evil. Candide commits to a habit of cultivation. In this habit, Candide attempts to adjust his life so as to limit evil. As he limits evil, he participates in making the world he exists in "the best" one possible. It is a mistake to see Candide's hesitation as a denial of metaphysical connections. The habits we adopt shape both the world and our minds. We cannot judge the world without affirming the appetitive goodness we perceive in it.

As long as the characters continue cultivating, they will have food. If they have food, they will have hope. If they have hope, they will believe it is the best of all possible worlds. In a way, the habit of work is a sign full of absence. Although it is not there yet, the habit of cultivation demarcates where the garden will reveal itself. The public performance of their labor becomes a sign of the absent garden, but, because they work, the sign becomes “full” of its absence. Over time the garden will arrive as promised and as hoped for. They cultivate what they do not yet have: a garden. But it is only this cultivation—the habit of work—that will create a garden at all. In this progressive reach into the future, we see how the eighteenth century mind sought limits and used the body to search beyond these limits. The hesitation to agree with Pangloss or with Martin does not mean Candide does not know anything. He knows the power of performing a habit.

Candide's Existential Question

Candide works, but he does not demand that this work have ultimate meaning yet. He hesitates to claim that his work is either “for the best” or “a complete waste of time.” He just works. Candide’s work affirms the connection that all his experiences have affirmed: meals are good even if he does not have an answer to his questions. But, in the reverse-mode, habits influence concepts. He does not know yet, but that is not a problem as long as he works. As he works, his ideas will develop just as his body develops a garden out of the disordered void of the countryside. Candide’s body brings rationality to his world. He reaches the limit of his knowledge and there he focuses on the performance of a habit. His body will answer his epistemological questions.

One such question sticks out dramatically from the text: In one of the many superfluous discussions that pepper the tale, Candide asks his pessimistic travel partner: “Why [...] was this world formed at all?” Martin responds with his insightful answer: “To drive us mad.”²⁴² The question-and-answer sequence between Candide and Martin opens the text to an investigation, which makes most modern scholars nervous. This question (“Why does anything exist?” or “Why was anything created?”) is the only truly existential question²⁴³ because it asks after the nature of human existence itself. The question asks about what it means for a human to be “mad,” sane or healthy. This question is really a question about happiness. The question admits that the intellect—both the body and the mind—does not exist in the world peacefully. There is a problem of pain; humans are frustrated. Like “work,” Candide’s question is full of absence. To ask after existence is to begin an inquiry that leads one into the void of the world and the void of one’s self: “[The] question ‘Why anything?’ confronts reason as a question about the *esse* of creatures, about that which is most fundamental to them as their ‘actuality’, their standing over against there being nothing at all. And it is there, in their deepest reality, that creatures reveal the Creator who has brought them to be, *ex nihilo*, so that as the question gets closer and closer to God, it gets deeper and deeper into, not further distance from, the creature.”²⁴⁴ In asking questions about the nature of human rationality, Candide and Martin begin an investigation that explores “the void” but does so through the intimacy of their own bodies. In the deepest intimacy of their failed desire, Candide and company must discover what failure teaches them about the world. The answer to their dilemma is wrapped up in the definition we give to human nature. Defined according to Locke and Aquinas, a rational judgment about the world is an appetitive act

²⁴² *Candide*, 47.

²⁴³ Denys Turner, *Faith, Reason and the Existence of God* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 257.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 256-57.

of will. Objective judgments about “the void” reveal, intimately, the subjectivity of the person judging. To discuss the void, we must discuss the human body. In discussing the nature of the human body we discuss the nature of the void.

The similarity between Locke and Thomas Aquinas has already been touched upon with respect to volition. To add to this relationship, both thinkers emphasize that a human’s existence implies an Existence that is its own cause. This is to say, human rationality’s proper object is “being.” Copleston scratches his head as he points out that Locke left his arguments for God’s existence woefully underdeveloped (unlike Thomas Aquinas, of course).²⁴⁵

Interest in “integrity” seems to be the difference between Aquinas and Locke: Although Locke aligns himself with Aquinas and Aristotle in connecting judgment to volition, he does not use his judgment to investigate “Being.” Instead he focuses on showing how “integrity” and testimony contribute to the consenting process.

Like Locke, *Candide* explores the meaning of being by focusing on bodily violence and unfulfilled hungers. But in *Candide*, as in Locke, the exploration begins with the body. Locke focuses attention on how, to have any idea in our heads at all, we must be acted upon. We must experience something to have a concept of it; we know things when they act upon us.²⁴⁶ It is the body that develops the question, “Why was this world created?” And so *Candide* helps us understand Locke’s odd behavior at leaving his arguments underdeveloped: Affirming the question “Why does anything exist?” takes as its “proper study” humankind. *Candide*, like Locke’s *Essay*, limits itself to articulate “how it is” to exist, or “to be” rather than prove what that existence means. The *Essay* and *Candide* are performances that show *how* human life is. This performance, like all performances, must be investigated: “What is the motive for this

²⁴⁵ Copleston, “Locke (3),” 117.

²⁴⁶ Copleston, “Locke (3),” 118.

action,” the reader asks. This question can be answered any way a critic wants to answer it. But whatever the critic does with the question reveals that critic’s awareness of her “being”—that is, in reading, the critic must give her own testimony. The process of consent begins with testimony and the particular human body that embodies that testimony.²⁴⁷

Contemporary atheists will completely deny the question “Why does anything exist?” The idea is that we do exist, so be quiet and endure it. An atheist will affirm a belief that we should limit ourselves to question that “can” be answered. But if what atheists deny to reason “is the possibility of an enquiry which takes us beyond anything the best science asks about, then [atheists] betray their own scientific calling, and something fundamental to being human, that is to say, to what is ‘rational,’ is denied in the process.”²⁴⁸ The question Candide asks Martin demands that we consider what “human nature” is and how humans reach happiness. Candide’s question and his “dark” hesitation do not break metaphysical connections. The conflict of Candide’s desire with his world *might* demand an expressible but ultimately unknowable

²⁴⁷ Copleston, “Locke (4),” 140. For example, Locke’s pursuit of testimony, instead of “proof,” infects his political theories with a “metaphorical” defect. There is nothing in them that endures though time; while being of great historical importance. His theory of “consent” is very dated and so radically historic as to be useless (138). Copleston writes: “[W]e may also note Locke’s failure to give any thorough analysis of the concept of the common good. He tends to assume without more ado that the preservation of private property and the promotion of the common good are to all intents and purposes synonymous terms” (139). He continues, “[I]t does not follow that even within the framework of his own historical circumstances Locke could not have given a more adequate account of the function of political society and of government. There is something wanting from his account which was present both in Greek and in mediaeval political thought, even if in a rudimentary form” (139). Copleston does justly affirm that the principles behind Locke’s consent are those that need to be continual reaffirmed in every society. That government, he writes, should promote the common good was as important in Locke’s day as it was in Thomas Aquinas’ (139). But again, in Locke’s “vagueness,” we can see his desire to affirm something other than an analytic sense of what a rational individual ought to consent to.

Locke advances a concept whose metaphorical nature troubles philosophy, but it is precisely metaphor that encourages (like poetry) the reader to add her experiences to the meaning of the text. In this, the “weakness” of metaphor becomes strength: Vague metaphors like consent and cultivation reveal the testimonies of those who engage them. Once a testimony is revealed, the integrity of that testimony can be challenged. This is the aim of eighteenth-century satire, which advances ambiguity and “meaninglessness,” but which still has a “tonal harmony” with science.

Ultimately, the precision of science and the mystery of metaphor have parted company in modernity. In this Kierkegaard is right: the path turns to the side; we can proceed to truths that have no regard to the individual and grasp an analytic sense of what reason dictates, or we can turn away and investigate the testimony and integrity inherent in subjectivity.

²⁴⁸ Turner, 259.

Metaphysical Object. Or, said in another way, “If ideas are rooted in our human animality, reason (and its ideas) can open up, in its own kind, into the mystery which lies unutterably beyond it, for it can, out of fidelity to its own native impulse, ask the question which it knows it could not answer, the asking being within its powers, the answering being in principle beyond them.”²⁴⁹

What is a human’s native impulse? Is Candide at his most human when he asks, “Why does anything exist,” or is he at his most imbecilic? How we answer this question is a testimony of how we choose to use our rationality, of how we decide to judge the world. The question “Why does anything exist” analyzes the human system itself. Yet this “human” question also leaves itself open to an answer that could come from “beyond” the human system.

Conclusion and Summary

When the proper study of humankind is humanity, we can see how “believing to know” cultivates faithful certainty just as “knowing to believe” cultivates modern doubt. It is the work of satire to force the reader-critic into revealing where she stands as a human being in relation to the meaning of the final metaphor (“cultivation”). In the satiric world, the text will force each reader to reveal his or her commitments and in the process of engaging other readers, the integrity of our own perspectives will be challenged. Each of us proceeds as we will, but our “judgment” serves whatever we will.

As we have seen, *Candide* serves science by drawing out testimony. *Eisegesis* serves science when that science assumes volition and judgment are interconnected. When volition and judgment influence one another, “integrity” is as important as “proof,” for we only prove what

²⁴⁹ Turner, 261. Turner ends his book asking questions about why Christians do not argue with the atheists and “stand on the ground of the atheists’ denials and [...] challenge them on shared rules of contest (262). Such a failure to contest concedes the territory of reason itself (262).

we perceive as good. In this interplay between desire and judgment we can see how the eighteenth-century scientist used the human body to explore “the void.” The human body became the chief tool in measuring the void, in exploring and in discovering what kind of world this is.

The emphasis on the body can be called a “reverse-mode” of explanation because the body’s habits influence the mind’s judgments. Locke offers us an example of this mode while *Candide* serves to teach us what this mode looks like. Satire, like *Candide*, serves science’s void-entering investigations by revealing that our responses to this question—whether we answer it or deny it—reveals our own willful commitments to pursue perceived good. In this way, satire helps reveal the integrity of a scientist’s position in relation to her object of analysis.

Rather than demand an answer to this question, *Candide* affirms a metaphor of performance: Cultivation.

Specifically, as we saw in Chapter Four, *Candide*’s meals become examples of the reverse-mode and “hesitation.” The reverse-mode and hesitation help us balance our lives and fit our bodies to the concepts we believe. As we read the story and interpret, we are forced to see these interpretations are affirmations of what we each perceive to be good. Because of different understandings of what “human nature” is and the different goods we can “move towards,” *Candide* has cultivated a diverse body of criticism. In engaging *Candide*, we must engage Rousseau and the influence his thought has had on current definitions of “human nature.”

The emphasis on the body naturally gives rise to the body’s basic question: “If I am finite, yet exist, what caused my existence?” This question—a question that rises naturally out of bodily experience—was the proper study of humanity in the eighteenth century. To understand “the void” a scientist had to understand the body’s experience of that void. To pursue greater

levels of objectivity, the body's place in relation to objectivity had to be accounted for. Integrity of research was as important as the research itself. As a result enactment and habits were essential elements in the discovery of truth. The body explored, discovered and cultivated the truths the intellect grasped. Love was a performance in the face of the void; life was a question that the void answered even if the answer was apophatic.

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