

2 Narrative, Memory, Health and Recurrence: Conceptual Notes

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In Orson Welles's film *Citizen Kane* a reporter seeks the secret of Kane's life through interviews with those closest to him - especially the riddle of his last word - 'rosebud'. Bernstein, a long-term associate, suggests it might be a girl Kane met many years ago. The reporter is sceptical but the elderly Bernstein replies that he still remembers probably at least once a month a girl dressed in white he only saw for a moment getting off a ferry years gone by. Welles himself described in a chat show interview a similar 'recurrence' he had experienced - a girl with red dress on bus seen only briefly but, nevertheless, frequently remembered over the intervening years. (1)

The autobiographical process, the one in which Dickens's *David Copperfield* will participate, becomes an act of self-creation. It repeatedly draws attention to the fictive status of the self, especially through the appropriation of other narrative conventions. (Frank, 1984, pp.8-9)

The following is a series of conceptual notes - ideas for consideration as elements for analysis of narratives, including the telling of the life, the construction of past/present and future through memory, the formation of 'personal myths', and 'self-images' of health. It is not the usual style of article with aims stated, research outlined and ends achieved but a number of provisional theoretical ruminations constituting a work in progress (as perhaps all writing is).

Life, Memory and History

The individual life can be conceived as an historical entity as formed within memory:

Life is historical insofar as it is comprehended in its course of movement in time and the causal nexus that originates in this way. This is possible owing to the representation of this sequence in a memory that reproduces not the individual but the nexus itself in its various stages. What memory achieves in the apprehension of a life process is attained in history by establishing the connection between the

objectivations of life encompassed by objective mind in its movement and effects.
(Dilthey in Habermas 1972, p.215)

Totality of the Threads of Life

The individual life and social life are in continual tension - these 'totalities' are in a 'struggle' (Simmel in Frisby, 1994, p.24). 'Fragments' of our knowledge are only partly a correspondence to the totality, which is converted by us:

we follow some prefigured possibility and, as it were, carry out an ideal programme. Our practical existence, though inadequate and fragmentary gains a certain significance and coherence, as it were, by partaking in the realisation of a totality.
(Simmel in Frisby, 1994, p.25-6)

We must investigate the analysis of individual lives, the 'delicate' and 'invisible threads', which are 'woven' between individuals to understand the 'productive, form-giving forces', which create the 'web of society':

On every day, at every hour, such threads are spun, are allowed to fall, are taken up again, replaced by others, intertwined with others. Here lie the interactions - only accessible through psychological microscopy - between the atoms of society which bear the whole tenacity and elasticity, the whole colourfulness and unity of this so evident and so puzzling life of society. (Simmel in Frisby, 1994, p.30)

Time and Transcendence

Time is a fundamental part of human existence - within our creation of meaning and the construction of our 'life' we are situated, and situate ourselves, with the interweaving of past, present and future:

Time Transcended - Human time is characterised by transcendence and this is expressed in many distinct ways. All human action, for example, is embedded in a continuity of past, present, and future, extends into the past and future; and constitutes those horizons whilst binding them in a present. Habits and traditions, goals, wishes and intentions, values and meanings, even pragmatic action, are only possible with such temporal extensions. (Adam, 1990, p.127)

We have shifted our conceptions of time, space and speed through technological innovation but there are implications for how we perceive our life and health (Adam, 1990, p.127):

We need to de-alienate time: reconnect clock time to its sources and recognise its created machine character. As such, concern with the multiple time dimensions of

our lives is no mere theoretical, academic exercise; rather, it is a strategy for living. For this purpose, temporal time, the symbol of life, needs to be allowed to take a position of high visibility. Recognizing time running out as our creation, temporal time as present-creating becoming, and both as fundamental to our lives enables us to review the mutual implication of time and health and gives us choice for action While birth-death and the rhythmic boundaries of the environment fundamentally entail becoming, clock time's invariable repetitions confront us with that which is irrevocably gone, with the relentless entropy of physical processes and with absolute finitude. (Adam, 1995, p.54)

Time, Transcendence and Spirit

Time as becoming and creative - as recurrent rather than mere repetition brings with it transcendence, an awareness of 'finitude' and the 'construction of 'immutability' - and should be 'conceptualised as coeval'. The reflection and application of meaning to the 'life' within our narration bring the consciousness and transcendence of time (Adam, 1990, p.127).

The life of the Spirit is not that life which shrinks from death and seeks to keep itself clear of all corruption, but rather the life which endures the presence of death within itself and preserves itself alive within death. (Hegel in Lefebvre, 1968, p.11)

Time and Human Freedom

While time as becoming, creative and reflective can bring a 'transcendence' in the realization of life as recurrence, it may also bring its constraints - not merely, as in the regular clock time of the machine, but also in the awareness of 'passing' in life as recurrence itself - if unresolved, as non-transcended, by remaining mere routine replay:

Human liberation therefore necessarily contains the vision of the struggle against time. We have seen that the Orphic and Narcissistic images symbolize the rebellion against passing, the desperate effort to arrest the flow of time - the conservative nature of the pleasure principle. If the 'aesthetic state' is really to be the state of freedom, then it must ultimately defeat the destructive course of time. Only this is the token of a non-repressive civilization. (Marcuse, 1969, p.155)

The Individual Project

As individuals we define and re-produce ourselves within our life 'project'; we reflect and objectify our existence in giving it meaning. In the narrative timing

of our activities and sense of self we include the opportunities of the material world and exercise 'choice':

Man (sic) defines himself by his project. This material being perpetually goes beyond the condition which is made for him; he reveals and determines his situation by transcending it in order to objectify himself - by work, action, or gesture. The project must not be confused with the will, which is an abstract entity, although the project can assume a voluntary form under certain circumstances. This immediate relation with the Other than oneself, beyond the given and constituted elements, this perpetual production of oneself by work and *praxis*, is our peculiar structure. It is neither a will nor a need nor a passion, but our needs - like our passions or like the most abstract of our thoughts - participate in this structure. They are always *outside of themselves toward ...* That is what we call existence, and by this we do not mean a stable substance which rests in itself, but rather a perpetual disequilibrium, a wrenching away from itself with all its body. As this impulse toward objectification assumes various forms according to the individual, as it projects us across a field of possibilities, some of which we realize to the exclusion of others, we call it also choice or freedom.

(J.-P. Sartre, 1968, p.150-1)

Individual Projects and Time

The 'real' confronts us while we construct and represent it through 'idealisation' - through the 'typifications' of individuals, events and material objects. We associate meaning with these phenomena and transfer our conceptualisations to others deemed to be of a similar kind by trans-idealisation - through the application of 'biographical templates', which guide action. Through retrospection we cast back - through circumspection we revise, through repetition we re-apply typifications as biographical templates in the new situation. Repetition is a feature of memory - the action or thought is done again; memory casts for the nodal points (epiphanies, turning points, cf. Denzin, 1989; Horrocks et al., 2002) of life, those happenings that may be for a second in time or for years, which are now (and have been) subject to multiple interpretation/re-interpretation. Such nodal points (epiphanies, turning points) are both meaningful and meaning-empty - they are points of 'recurrence' and of mystery within the 'life project' which 'time' and 're-time' our experiences. Temporality is an inextricable part of everyday 'reality', while our 'life time' is also understood as finite and a source of anxiety:

The temporal structure of everyday life confronts me as a facticity with which I must reckon, that is, with which I must try to synchronize my own projects. I encounter time in everyday reality as continuous and finite. All my existence in this world is continuously ordered by its time, is indeed enveloped by it. My own life is an episode in the externally factitious stream of time. It was there before I

was born and it will be there after I die. The knowledge of my inevitable death makes this time finite *for me*. I have only a certain amount of time available for the realization of my projects, and the knowledge of this affects my attitude to these projects. Also, since I do not want to die, this knowledge injects an underlying anxiety into my projects. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.41)

Forms of Recurrence

The life project is not fully coherent or unchanging but in a state of becoming - while it can return to the past it is not 'stuck' but subject to 'recurrence' - the return of past events, relationships, experiences and objects into present consciousness. A number of types of recurrence can be isolated - although in 'practice' they can be interconnected:

- a) 'Spontaneous' Recurrence - as involuntary, unconscious to conscious recurrence; previous events, objects, relationships, emotions, and sensations may appear as if 'spontaneously' within the present consciousness although due to some clear association with elements of the 'now' or in some connection with current activities which is undisclosed to the mind.
- b) Remembering as Recurrence - the function of reminiscence - 'When did it happen?', 'What did I do?', 'Yes, I remember that also!', 'That was an enjoyable occasion'. This is the conscious thinking about the past brought into current consciousness and actions. By implication, narrative is not merely a linear time construction - but subject to 'recurrence' or 'repetition':

The analysis of plot as configuration has already led us to the threshold of what could be called 'narrative repetition'. By reading the end into the beginning and the beginning into the end, we learn to read time backward, as the recapitulation of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences. In this way, the plot does not merely establish human action 'in' time; it also establishes it in memory. And memory in turn repeats - re-collects - the course of events according to an order that is the counterpart of the stretching-along of time between a beginning and an end.' (Ricoeur, 1981, p.179)

- c) Return as Recurrence - re-living, re-envision, re-story, re-enact. This type takes two forms: firstly, a return to 'relive' specific events, relationships, experiences and objects which become 'nodal' - perceived as significant in life and subject to repeated 'recovery'. Here there is a search for missed, hidden or alternative meanings - 'truths' which can be uncovered. Secondly, there is the more manipulative re-envision, re-story and re-

enactment which is not merely to find the 'clues' to past circumstances but to ask 'What if' - 'Could things have been different if I had done that?' This is the 'fantasy' of the alternative life or lives - the life story could have been different.

Recurrence brings a re-emotionality in pondering 'as if', 'if only': regret and relief, happiness and sadness, secrets and lies, and failures and successes. Decisions made and possible decisions re-assessed or seen for the first time as a life path (even as still possible) by re-visualisation, re-wording of dialogue, re-enacting of relations as alternative circumstances are lived in the 'unreal'. In this sense, we have 'parallel' lives of the then, but also of the now and the 'to come' - as interweaving narrative registers. We have self-stories, which are not merely of the 'real', but also of 'fantasy' - it is at this interconnection that 'personal myths' are formed.

- d) Totality and Recurrence - this refers to the 'materiality' of collective objects which continuously or repeatedly face the individual:

Sartre goes on to state the theme developed further in the *Critique* that the reality of collective objects of study consists in *recurrence*. This recurrence shows that totalization is never achieved and that totality never exists as more than a detotalized totality. These collectivities exist in such a way that they reveal themselves immediately to action and to perception. We shall always find in each to them a concrete materiality (movement, buildings, words, and so on) which sustains and manifests a process which erodes it. (Cooper, 1971, p.48)

Narrative, History and Time

Narrative is inseparably related to time - as events are plotted into story:

... every narrative combines two dimensions in various proportions, one chronological and the other nonchronological. The first may be called the episodic dimension, which characterizes the story as made out of events. The second is the configurational dimension, according to which the plot construes significant wholes out of scattered events. (Ricoeur, 1981, p.174)

The implication of the two dimensions is that narrative functions not just establish the emotions and actions of humanity but 'also bring us back from within-time-ness to historicity, from 'reckoning with' time to 'recollecting' (Ricoeur, 1981, p.174; see Roberts, 2002a, pp.123-4).

When considering memory and the 'repetition' of past events and other elements - 'recurrence as return' - a deeper function of narrative can be discerned:

Yet the concept of repetition implies still more: it means the 'retrieval' of our most fundamental potentialities, as they are inherited from our own past, in terms of a personal fate and a common destiny. The question, therefore, is whether we may go so far as to say that the function of narrative - or at least of a selected group of narratives - is to establish human action at the level of authentic historicity, that is of repetition. (Ricoeur, 1981, pp.179-80)

Narrative Registers

We have a variety of narratives within our lives - such as tragedy, romance, and so on - but these 'genres' are a mix of more basic forms (see Gergen and Gergen, 1984; Gergen, 1999). Other dimensions of narrative subject to narrative analysis include the way in which individuals provide 'metaphors' or 'aphorisms' to summarise their lives, the structural shifts and time components of stories/plot within accounts, and the conversion or life change in beliefs and behaviour (eg. in religion, politics) (see Lieblich et al., 1998; Riessman, 1993; Roberts, forthcoming, b). Stories and metaphors are used within 'narrative registers' - the important life strands where individual, family, group and institutional biography (eg. the cv, the career in the organisation, see Roberts, 2002b) intersect, as in work life or education. Other registers relate to the family (ancestors, relations, and immediate family members), and friendships overlapping with sexual-romance life. Of importance also is the health life, as composed in the interface of body and self, and individual and societal conceptions and expectations. These various registers connect: the colleague may become a partner, in the linkage between work and health 'life', or homework life in the family business. There is also the mix of the family and health story - childhood illnesses, the death of a parent, the inheritance of particular characteristics and propensities. These mixed narrative registers are the broad areas of life within which the 'biographemes' (cf. Barthes) of the individual life project is composed - the defining elements of life as perceived and constructed by the teller.

The Properties of Narrative

Recurrence based on the association and interrogation of epiphanal or nodal points in the past can provide biographical templates, which are modified in the present to inform current and contemplated action in 'similar' relationships and events. Biographical templates are the emotions, outlook and experiences, which are carried as expectations and 'lessons' which make up the project of life. The process of recurrence in the life project is not simply linear - chronological laying out of the 'life' - but a movement to and fro between past-present-future or more accurately, for example, the past through the future, the

present through the past, and so on. It is also a process that takes place between biographical registers - we create and recreate ourselves in interrelated 'fictive' and 'real' terms, again, one through the other, as we 'fantasise' and re-interpret alternative pasts, presents and futures. Through recurrence we interrogate the 'mystery' of our lives - the interface between self and society, the meaning of our life project and the ongoing relations we form with others - the bodily changes that arise, the social boundaries we traverse, and the fluctuating emotions we exhibit as we experience education, family, work, community or nation (see, for example, Erben ed, 1998, Roberts, 1995, 1998, 1999a). We narrate our lives to others, and in doing so to ourselves; we narrate 'out loud' in conversation, in texts in constructed artefacts and also in our own minds. Through narrative we organise and select from our life experiences - it is part of the 'human imagination' (Bruner, 1990, p.43). 'Narrative' can be said to have a number of 'properties':

Perhaps its principal property is its inherent sequentiality: a narrative is composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings involving human beings as characters or actors ... Their meaning is given by their place in the overall configuration of the sequence as a whole - its plot or *fibula* ... it can be 'real' or 'imaginary' without loss of its power as a story ... It is this unique sequentiality that is indispensable to a story's significance and to the mode of mental organization in terms of which it is grasped ... it specializes in the forging of links between the exceptional and the ordinary ... a culture must contain a set of norms, it must also contain a set of interpretive procedures for rendering departures from those norms meaningful in terms of established patterns of belief ... It is this achievement that gives a story verisimilitude.

(Bruner, 1990, pp.43-50)

Narrative Tone

The narrative tone is the persistent orientation or mood - the fears or hopes, the fatalism or optimism - which is exhibited in the institutional and group registers of life and may be at variance with the 'objective' life circumstances (see McAdams, 1993, pp.47-48):

It reflects the extent to which a person dares to believe that the world can be good and that one's place can be more or less secure within it. This belief is prerational, prelogical ... We see, therefore, that narrative tone may be applied to many different kinds of stories in life - from narrative explanations of one's disease to the larger personal myths that people create to provide their entire lives with unity and purpose ... We draw on the entire spectrum of comic and tragic narrative possibilities in making sense of our lives.

(McAdams, 1993, pp.48-50)

The Personal Myth

The recurrence of the past in memory is enabled by the 'personal myth' - the return to nodal points in life in which significant meanings are sought as the individual tries to uncover and decipher the coherence of their lives (see Hankiss, 1981; Peneff, 1990; Roberts, 2002a, pp.124-6; Roberts, 2003, forthcoming, a). Personal myths are a constructed resource used by the individual to interpret the past and are involved in the shaping of the everyday life of the present, including the anticipation of future prospects. They provide 'meaning, unity and purpose' for life' (McAdams, 1993, p.265). The personal myth 'arrests time' (cf. Levi-Strauss on myth and music) by seeking the ending in the beginning, and a new 'fantasised path' in a repeated return to origins.

Rewriting the Self

The narration of the self is undertaken within the experience or interpretation of time; multiple selves are constructed - the secret or public, the 'real' and the 'fictive', the past, present and future selves - through which emotions (love, hate, fear, anxiety) are created and lived (see Roberts, 1996; Roberts, 2002a, pp.66-71). Past selves are re-lived, re-visualised, and revised; future selves are 're-hearsed' - thought about and pictured in action. Memory, time and the 'writing' of the self are intertwined as the past self (or selves) and reconstituted through interpretive work (Freeman, 1993). Life historical knowledge is reformulated in the re-creation of the self, as both an interpretive and recollective process:

... in which we survey and explore our own histories, toward the end of making and remaking sense of who and what we are ... What, though, are the implications of this perspective? Is life historical knowledge essentially retrospective? Or is it more appropriately formulated 'prospectively', with what happens earlier determining, with the inexorability of fate itself, what later will be? Could it be both? It could indeed ... (Freeman, 1993: pp.6, 23)

Health Narratives, Time Perspectives, and Memory

We understand our lives through the experience and construction of time/narrative - through time perspectives composed as a tense (eg. the past in the future) and orientation (a mood). Narratives of health - accident, disability and illness - exhibit these various usages of time. A range of health narratives is possible eg. nostalgic, unpredictable, and restitution narratives (see Smith and Sparkes 2001, 2002; see also, Sparkes, 2002) (see diagram below). Such health

narratives involve a search for meaning in the shift in life events: possible explanations (fate, accident, or responsibility), continuity and coherence, in the before-after of the change in health - and, importantly, a review and possible revision of the image of self (eg. the 'continuing self', the 'restored self'). Experiences of health are 'narratively framed' according to time and memory (see Michielsens, 2002).

The following diagram is a 'work in progress' that attempts to relate how individuals move between conceptions of time and may shift in image of self, or seek to maintain the same conception, despite the change in bodily characteristics and abilities. The diagram is intended to give the flow between the conceptions (as exhibited in interviews, conversations) rather than merely provide a static, box model of narrative, memory and time.

Health Narratives, Time Perspectives, and Memory (2)

| PAST | PRESENT | FUTURE |
|--|--|---|
| 1. PAST <[PAST-past | 2. PAST <PRESENT-past | 3. PAST <FUTURE-past |
| The PAST as/in the past | The PRESENT as/in the past | The FUTURE as/in the past |
| Typical Statements: 'I was fit then' 'My health is not the same' | Typical Statements: 'My health is the same now' 'I can still physically manage what I could' | Typical Statements: 'I will be as I was before' 'My health will be restored' |
| Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Nostalgia Finality | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Reflection | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Restitution |
| Self-Image - The Lost Self | Self-Image - The Retained Self | Self-Image - The Restored Self |
| ←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←← | ←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←← | ←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←← |
| 4. PRESENT <PAST-present | 5. PRESENT <PRESENT-present> | 6. PRESENT <FUTURE-present |
| The PAST as/in present | The PRESENT as/in the present | The FUTURE as/in the present |
| 'I am what I was' 'I can still do what I could' | Typical Statements: 'I take my health day to day' 'I live for now' | Typical Statements: 'My health will not change' 'My situation will be the same' |
| Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Reminiscence | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Contemporality, Engrossed | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Prediction |
| Self-Image - The Continuous Self | Self-Image - The Immediate Self | Self-Image - The Continuing Self |
| →→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ | →→→→→→→→→→→→←←←←←←←←←←←← | ←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←←← |
| 7. FUTURE >PAST-future | 8. FUTURE >PRESENT-future | 9. FUTURE [>FUTURE-future |
| The PAST as/in the future | The PRESENT as/in the future | The FUTURE as/in the future |
| Typical Statements: 'I will be as good as new' 'I will be as I was then' | Typical Statements: 'I'm getting better already' 'My life is already changing' | Typical Statements: 'What will the future bring?' 'I do not know what is in store for me' |
| Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Myth construction Legacy | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Portent Anticipation | Narrative Orientation: examples (+ - =) - Fear Unknown Chance Unpredictable |
| Self-Image - The Return to a Former Self | Self-Image - The Emerging Self | Self-Image - The Possible Self |
| →→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ | →→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ | [→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→→ |

KEY:

Time Perspective: Composed of a dominant Time Tense and a Time Orientation. An individual or group gives meaning to life by arranging and interpreting experience ('framing') by the use of a 'time tense' (eg. FUTURE-past: 'past as/in the future') and by 'statements' (views, perceptions) that form part of a more general 'orientation' (outlook, mood - eg. nostalgia).

Time Tense: Experiences are arranged and placed by 'reading' through past-present-future or some other combination, eg. 'past as/in the future - the future interpreted with reference to an 'understanding' of the past. Time tenses may vary in a single text or be used according to situation.

Direction of Time Perspective Construction: ←<<<<<<<<<: Indicates the direction of the individual reading of experience as a time tense eg. 'FUTURE-to-past' - the FUTURE is read according to/through an 'understanding' of the 'past'. So, while there appears to be a similarity within each of the box pairs below and it is difficult to construct sufficiently different 'typical statements' - the direction of the 'time tense' is clear (eg. PRESENT-to-past rather than PAST-to-present). PRESENT-past (box 2) and PAST-present (box 4), FUTURE-past (box 3) and PAST-future (box 7), FUTURE-present (box 6) and PRESENT-future (8).

Self-Image: - the conception of the self-held by an individual related to the time tense. An individual will in 'reality' hold aspects of more than one self-image or be moving between them.

Time Break: - '[' or ']' is a break in time tense, cf. future as not known/past as gone.

Typical Statement: Expressions in oral or written form, which indicate (or summarise) a time tense.

Narrative-Time Orientation: The general 'mood', 'outlook', 'imagery', 'mythology' of the individual or group regarding the past, present and future as located in current everyday circumstances - as indicated by a general metaphor, statement or summary in a narrative of a life. It may reflect a pessimism (+); optimism (+); or neutral (=) in mood (see McAdams's idea of 'narrative tone' (see earlier) - McAdams, 1993, pp.47-50).

The Dilemmas of Understanding the Life

Barthes (1973) summarised his study of 'mythologies' - the study of daily objects from advertisements, to toys, to photographs of politicians - in a manner applicable to the study of individual lives. There is a dilemma of attempting to understand a life, a life that can never fully be comprehended or reproduced.

It seems that this is a difficulty pertaining to our times: there is as yet only one possible choice, and this choice can bear only on two equally extreme methods: either to posit a reality which is entirely permeable to history, and ideologize; or, conversely, to posit a reality which is *ultimately* impenetrable, irreducible, and in this case, poetise. In a word, I do not yet see a synthesis between ideology and poetry ... the search for the inalienable meaning of things. The fact that we cannot manage to achieve more than an unstable grasp of reality doubtless gives the measure of our present alienation: we constantly drift between the object and its demystification, powerless to render its wholeness. For if we penetrate the object, we liberate it but we destroy it; and if we acknowledge its full weight, we respect it, but we restore it to a state which is still mystified.

(Barthes, 1973, pp.158-9)

Further, in the collection of narratives - or auto/biography - are we in academic practice, inextricably bound to 'dominant' or other social forms of biography - the institutional monitoring of careers; the guides to life in magazines, 'reality' and 'talk show' tv, self help books for health and life-style, and advertising imagery and imperatives? In being associated with such practices are we subject to certain prevailing assumptions, such as a social myth-making of a 'complete' individual life?:

... the genres of autobiography and biography cannot represent what they claim to represent, namely the 'whole' life of a person. Furthermore, this 'whole' person is in any case a fiction, a belief created by the very form of auto/biography itself. We are accustomed to classify autobiography as non-fiction, and yet it may be useful to think of it not as such, but as a mythical construct of our society and our social needs.

(Evans, 1999, p.1)

As we are presented with institutional or other biographies of the 'individual' are we within a social myth-making which 'idealises' the 'individual' to fit the registers of health, education, family, work, community and nation. Institutional (and group and family) constructions of the 'individual' are the resources and restraints through which our personal life projects and self-images are formed and made unique according to experience and recurrence. Our own narrative and related forms of research which seek to reveal, represent and empower may be closer to the biographical 'storytelling' in the broadcasting and other media than we at first realise:

Is it not more likely then that new discourses and voices that empower the periphery at one and the same time fortify, enhance, and solidify the old centres of power? In short, are we not witnessing the old game of divide and rule?

(Goodson, 1995, p.98)

Notes:

- (1) Unfortunately, I do not have a record of Welles's talk show interview - it is based on my memory of it!
- (2) An earlier version of this diagram was introduced in three papers presented at 2nd European Sociological Association Conference, Budapest, 1995; Auto/biography Study Group Annual Conference, Manchester, 1995; and Biographical and Memory Research Group, Seminar Series, University of Huddersfield, 1997. Published versions can be found in Roberts 1999b, and Roberts, forthcoming, a.

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