The Licensing Condition on the Realization of Performative Clauses in English: A Case Study of the ISE-Because Construction

Summaries of the Papers Read at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the Tsukuba English Linguistic Society

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Tsukuba English Studies

Volume 32

Page range 205-208

Year 2013-10-31

URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00123100
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The joint research examines the licensing condition on the realization of performative clauses in English, from the perspective of “the hearer-based principle (Horn (1984)).” A series of Hirose’s studies characterize English as a “public-self centered” language (Hirose (in this volume)). Following his characterization, sentences without performative clauses in English can be assumed to be unmarked, i.e., even if a sentence without a performative clause is uttered, it is commonly understood that s/he speaks for the communication to others.

(1) {??I tell you that/φ} today is Sunday.

There seems to be a counterexample to the Hirose’s claim, however. A linguistic expression concerning us is illustrated in (2).

(2) Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. I say surprisingly because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish. (Bill Bufond, What Went Wrong?)

In explaining the reason why the speaker employed the relevant expression in the preceding sentence, the construction can be used. The because-clause in the second sentence, which modifies the I say in the main-clause, provides the reason why the speaker chose the expression surprisingly in the first sentence. Following Kanetani (2012), we will call this type of construction the ISE-because construction, in which IS stands for I SAY and E for Expression.

Notice that I say in the ISE-because construction is used performatively. Several diagnostics differentiate performative verbs from the others. One involves the tense form. It is generally accepted that the performative verb must be in the present tense (cf. Ross (1970)). Similarly, the verb say in the ISE-because construction is limited to the present tense form.

(3) Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. I {say/*said} surprisingly because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish.

The second diagnostic distinguishing the verbs from one another involves
performative adverbial modification. The performative verbs can be modified by a performative adverbial (e.g. #Reluctantly I whisper to you that I bought a present.). The verb say in the ISE-because construction can be modified by reluctantly or hesitantly.

(4) Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. {Reluctantly /Hesitantly} I say “surprisingly” because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish.

The third diagnostic distinguishes performative and other verbs by embedding clauses in which they occur in a performative clause. If a verb in a clause is used performatively, the clause cannot be embedded in a performative clause (e.g. *I must tell you that I say to you that prices slumped.). The ISE-because construction is not permitted to be embedded in a performative clause, as exemplified in (5).

(5) Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. I must tell you that I say surprisingly because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish.

These diagnostics show that the verb say in the ISE-because construction serves as a performative verb.

One remarkable characteristic of the ISE-because construction is that I say in the construction basically may not be omitted as shown in (6).

(6) Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. ??Surprisingly because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish. (cf. (2))

This characteristic seems to contradict the fact that the sentence with a performative clause like I say to you today is Sunday is conversationally unusual in English (cf. Lakoff (1972, 1973), Brown and Levinson (1987)).

In certain context, however, the illocutionary force need not to be realized with I say. For example:

(7) The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. Reputed, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it. (Hirose (1992:82))
In (7), the act of saying the expression *Reputed* is not linguistically manifested, but the construction remains fully acceptable.

The question arising here is in which context the omission of *I say* of the ISE-because construction is allowed. To answer this question, we adopt Hirose’s (in this volume) claim, in which the English language requires the grammatically full manifestation of a propositional content in conformity with “the hearer-based principle (Horn (1984)),” which says, “Say as much as you can” (for the reason why English impose such a requirement, see Hirose (in this volume)). Thus, for example, the fact that pronouns in English as in *He is rich* may not usually be deleted can be attributed to the hearer-based principle.

Based on this property of English proposed by Hirose (in this volume), we claim the following: *I say* in the ISE-because construction is required to be realized because it is grammatically constitutive of a proposition which is usually manifested. However, to the extent that the hearer-based principle is observed in one way or another, *I say* in the ISE-because construction can be omitted.

One of the contexts in which the hearer-based principle is observed is where the omission of *I say* does not cause any ambiguity. The relevant examples are repeated as in (8).

(8) a. Surprisingly, Tod is known and mocked and otherwise celebrated for his squeamishness. ??Surprisingly because I happen to know Tod isn’t squeamish. (= (6))

b. The Blackwell collection was reputed to be the most valuable private collection in the world. *Reputed*, because no one outside of invited guests was permitted to see it. (= (7))

In (2), for example, if *I say* is omitted as in (8a), *surprisingly* can be interpreted as the adverb which modifies the because-clause. Thus, it can be said that the ISE-because construction in (8a) does not follow the hearer-based principle because it is not fully informative in order for the hearer to interpret the sentence in question. In (8b), on the other hand, the ISE-because construction without *I say* does not give rise to ambiguity like (8a), because the participle *reputed* is not construed as the modifier of the because-clause. Hence, the hearer-based principle is observed.

We will provide two more arguments that are adduced in favor of the analysis given above. First, let us consider the following example:

(9) Figure 2 shows the theoretical response of the filter. *(I say)* “theoretical,” simply because it is unrealistic to expect any signal to be
As with the ISE- because construction in (8b), the I say in the ISE- because construction in (9) is optional, because its omission does not cause any ambiguity like (8a). In other words, the ISE- because construction without I say is adhering to the hearer-based principle.

Another piece of evidence is given in (10):

(10) Unfortunately, perhaps, a person in some cases can be HIV positive for several years without having AIDS. When they finally get AIDS they are often able to work for some time, and with treatment live a fairly normal life for several years. *(I say) unfortunately, only because those diseases that are readily visible get treatment quicker.

(Kanetani (2012:4))

In this example, if the I say is omitted, the unfortunately in the ISE- because construction is found to be suspended in the air by virtue of a considerable distance between the ISE- because construction and the sentence containing the expression unfortunately. This example shows that the hearer-based principle requires the use of the I say to make the sentence interpretable.

From the above analyses, it can be concluded that the ISE- because construction without I say becomes acceptable when its omission does not cause any violation of the hearer-based principle.

In this joint research, we have solved the question why I say in the ISE- because construction is usually not omitted, even though the absence of English performative clauses is unmarked. We have revealed that the verb say in ISE- because construction is grammatically constitutive of a proposition, as well as a performative verb. Any propositional content is necessary to be manifested in English, in conformity with the hearer-based principle. Thus, the presence of I say in the ISE- because construction is unmarked. In addition, we have further shown that to the extent that the hearer-based principle is observed in one way or another, I say in the ISE- because construction can be omitted. We conclude that the presence of I say in the ISE- because construction is not a counterexample to Hirose’s claim. Our conclusion may be count as supporting evidence for his claim.