

Determinants of Asian Democratisation
(1981-2005)

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Attestation of Authorship

"I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, nor material which to a substantial extent has been submitted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institution of higher learning."

Md. Abul Kalam Azad

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The author alone assumes responsibility for the conclusion of this research work and any errors it may contain.

Abstract

As a culturally distinctive region, Asia was chosen as the sample for this study. This empirical study investigated what the major trends of democratisation were in Asia between 1981 and 2005: why some countries became democratic while other countries failed to follow suit during that period. The main research hypothesis was: “That is it was mainly economic development that drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005”. Although some studies have studied the impact of economic development on democratisation in Asia, their findings have been inconclusive and focuses sometimes different.

[To investigate the research hypothesis, 24 Asian countries were selected...measurement tools used etc...]

For this research work, statistical and case study methods were applied. The data used in the analyses were collected from established data sources e.g. Freedom House (Freedom in the World, n.d.) and United Nations Statistics Division (UN Stat, n.d.). Repeated Measures in Linear Mixed Modeling (LMM) were used to analyse the quantitative data. Three case studies supplemented the findings of statistical analyses. Historical information and institutional and legal facts were also used in the case studies.

This study found that increases in the level of economic development along with its equitable distribution in society and positive roles of political actors increase the level of democratisation in Asia. Some pro-democratic political and social institutions, such as tradition of parliamentarianism, and international organisations, for example Bretton wood institutions, also led to democratisation. A low extent of national political divide was found to result in a considerably high level of democratisation in a country where confrontation between major political forces is the main feature of politics. This study also found that a partial democracy with Asian values, economic legitimacy, a lack of corruption and a “systematic control” over opposition politicians can survive, and is not prone to higher level of democratisation.

The Taiwan case revealed that, amongst other factors, the role of political actors and economic equity along with economic development is also vital for democratisation. The Singapore case explained how a “hybrid regime” in a rich country outsmarts democratisation. The study of Bangladesh provides an idea about other elements, e.g. lower level of political confrontation, that push for higher levels of democratisation.

Chapter One: Introduction

Two most attractive attributes of democracy are that it works in favour of at least the majority of a country and allows everybody to become a part of the “majority” through open competition. These features clearly differentiate democracy from autocracy. Since the power is in the hands of few in an autocracy, it is usually used for the advantage of the few. On the other hand, many people share the power in democracy, so it is “used or at least attempted to be used” in the interests of many in democracy (Vanhanen, 2003, p. 2). Also, in the case of recruitment of autocratic leadership of a country, a few people impose their decision on the “many” while the opposite happens in democracy. Although, in the modern democratic practice, the ruling party or party alliance apparently replaces the “many”, the qualities of parties and/or party leaders and the forces of “many” determine the political values of the parties and/or the party leaders in open contest. Ideally, parties and leaders in a democracy approximate products in a free market economy, where the quality of the products and market forces determine prices. Therefore, Azad (2004a) terms democracy as self-operated as it just needs a free and open society to run, rather than requiring command, which is mandatory for running any forms of autocratic systems. A socialist political system is not attractive as it is open just to socialists, although sometimes it is described as “collective democracy” (Commons, 1935, p. 214). “Imposed democracy” such as in Afghanistan and Iraq is also not self-operated as it is regulated in association with external command (Enterline & Greig, 2005).

The attractive features of democracy mentioned above imply some of its drawbacks at the same time. One of these is dominance of majority and, therefore, there is an obvious chance for victimisation of the minority to take place. Besides, our general perception of the electoral system is that well-off individuals have more opportunities to be elected than the poor ones because money is generally powerful enough to earn party nominations and popular votes as well. Moreover, according to Ross (2006), democracy works more for rich people than the poor ones. Democracies spend more money on education and health than non-

democracies, but these benefits seem to favour the middle- and upper-income group of people. However, despite all of these shortcomings, the history of democracy both in terms of practice and theory is not too short as its merits outshine its demerits.

The Greeks first instituted the generally accepted ideals of democracy in the ancient era of the West (Wollheim, 1958). Then the French Revolution in eighteenth century pushed for democracy in the modern age (Wejnert, 2005). Since the French Revolution and the United States “Declaration of Independence” of 1776, democratic systems have proliferated across the world. As early as the 1800s, democratic systems spread in various parts of North and South America, in Europe and Africa, and by the end of the nineteenth century, in Asia. Although most of the first democracies were not consolidated, a steady increase in the number of democratic transitions, most remarkably over the past three decades, signaled the coming democratisation of the world (Doyle, 1983; Fukuyama, 1992; Grassi, 2002; Gurr, Jagger, & Moore, as cited in Wejnert, 2005). Communist systems, including the Soviet Union, collapsed in the late ‘eighties and early ‘nineties, leading to an end of the cold war. In the wake of the end of the cold war, democratic transitions took place in a number of ex-communist countries in Eastern Europe and Asia (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). International society, too, has increasingly attached importance to democratic ideals. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace on 31 January 1992 insisted that “respect for democratic principles at all levels of social existence is crucial” (Mayall, 2000, p. 61). At the same time, the European Union was pressing their ex-communist neighbour states to establish their democratic credentials before “joining the club”. The Commonwealth in its 1991 Harare Declaration also pledged to work with renewed vigour to promote the fundamental democratic values of the organisation (Mayall, 2000). One of the democratic values of the Commonwealth is that a country with military government can lose her their membership. For example, Pakistan was suspended from this organisation in 2007 for the second time in eight years for emergency rule, and Fiji was suspended in 2006 after a military coup (Pakistan suspended from

Commonwealth, Nov. 22, 2007). Thus, the democracy of early Greek city states has been becoming internationalised through a long period of time.

The issue of democratisation in Asia, especially in East Asia, is quite interesting as this is a distinct region with its own culture which, at least apparently, goes against liberal democratic ideals, such as those of popular sovereignty and individual liberty (Hu, 1997). The Asian culture refers to “Asian values”, or “Confucian values”, that prioritise familialism or communitarianism over individualism, the latter being a basic ingredient of western liberal democracy. Confucianism puts high value upon family-oriented moral qualities such as filial piety and deference to authority (O'Dwyer, 2003). Jayasuriya (1998) identifies three principles of Confucian values: familial and communitarian duty; discipline in politics, in the family and in the workplace; and duty and discipline as organic notions of state and society, which are intimately associated with the common “good”. Thus, these characteristics of Asian values provide a powerful normative framework for both political and economic systems. As political systems, some sort of illiberal or even authoritative political regimes were established and have worked in a number of East Asian countries e.g., China, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan from the 1950s through to the 1980s (Brownlee, 2009; Means, 1996; Mutalib, 2000; Juan, 2001).

Under the supervision of such political regimes and as a result of economic systems derived from Confucian values, some parts of this region have been noticeably developed since 1970s. Some political leaders have attributed their respective economic successes to applying a body of Asian values (O'Dwyer, 2003). Echoing this claim, Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen (Sen, 1998), views that the last few decades have witnessed a remarkable economic progress, which began as a unique achievement in Japan but has gradually become a general accomplishment of Asia. This economic success has been guided by the Asian culture as well as the distinctiveness of its politics. The Asian culture draws directly on the experience of fast economic development in a number of Asian economies, i.e., Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and lately China.

It is, according to the economic development or modernisation theory (Burkhart & Beck, 1994; Diamond, 1992; Lipset, 1959; Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992), assumable that such economic development led democratisation in Asia. However in some countries, for example India which is democratised but with poor economic health, this notion is not fully supported. Besides, a number of countries with high economic development still stick to authoritarianism in compliance with their Confucianism or Asian values (e.g., country a, country b). So, our topic of interest is democratisation in Asia with a focus on economic development as one of its major determinants. This topic is explained at the end of Literature Review (Chapter Two) and the research questions are operationalised in the Methodology chapter (Chapter Three).

In addition to the distinctiveness of Asian region discussed above, there are some academic rationales that provided an incentive to undertake this research project. Firstly, this project is considered the first of its kind on Asia in terms of topic, sample and temporal aspect. Although there are some studies on Asian democratisation, they are either limited to just primary causes of democratisation; some sub-regions of Asia; or go beyond the geographic boundary of Asia (discussed in the Literature Review, Chapter 2) and/or solely depend on quantitative data. This study also has some limitations but they appear both fewer and less wide-ranging than those in the studies reviewed (discussed in Chapters Two and Nine) as far as the research question/s and sample of this study are concerned. Secondly, this project aimed to determine the level of democratisation and its factors in Asia as well as Asian's component individual countries over 25 years from 1981 to 2005 which could have enormous implications for respective cases. Third and finally, this project opens a considerable number of new possibilities for future research on democratisation. Besides, it is hoped it will be helpful as a source of data for new studies.

This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter One introduces the research topic and makes a statement on the research problem that was investigated. Chapter Two contains reviews of on-going debates on the relationship between economic development and democratisation; notes gaps in the literature; and how this study

intended to address these gaps. Chapter Three describes the investigation's methodology. This description includes details of the operationalisation of the research question/s and hypotheses measures of democratisation, definitions of other variables, statistical methods and models and methods for case studies. Chapter Four describes the state of democracy according three indices of democracy (Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen) in the study sample with graphical presentation that provides a preliminary knowledge about them. The main statistical analyses performed (not case studies) are presented in Chapter Five. That chapter includes correlation tests between economic development and democratisation; regression analyses with three separate measures of democracy as dependent variables; graphical explanations of the variables used in the models; and country-wise explanations with graphical presentation. Three case studies are described in Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. The cases are Taiwan, Bangladesh and Singapore. Chapter Nine discusses the research findings. The concluding chapter (Chapter Ten) identifies the possible shortcomings of the study, future research directions in the field and the study's implications. Finally, the references and appendices used in this study are presented at the end of last chapter (Chapter Ten).

This empirical study investigated what the major trends of democratisation were in Asia between 1981 and 2005: why some countries became democratic while other countries failed to follow suit during that period. Although some studies were found that relate to the impact of economic development on democratisation in Asia, their findings are inconclusive and focuses are sometimes different. This study argues that increases in the level of economic development, along with its equitable distribution in society and positive roles of political actors, increase the level of democratisation in Asia. Some pro-democratic political and social practices and institutions, e.g., tradition of parliamentarianism, and international organisations, e.g. Bretton Wood institutions, may also support democratisation. Besides, a low extent of national political divide has proved to result in a considerably high level of democratisation in countries where confrontation between major political forces is the main feature of politics. However, this study also found that a partial democracy with Asian values, economic legitimacy, a lack

of corruption and a “systematic control” over the opposition politicians can survive well, and is not prone to higher level of democratisation

Chapter Two: Literature Review

The analysis of democratisation in Asia presented here builds on a large and somewhat heterogeneous body of literature in the social sciences in general and political science in particular. This review of existing literature concentrates primarily on the relationship between economic development and democracy, then the relationship between other factors and democracy and, finally, on Asian regional context of democratisation.

Upon examination of the literature on democratisation, two themes are evident. The first one is that researchers have used either case study, cross-national analysis or comparative historical study methods. The second theme is that results of past studies have mostly been varied and inconclusive over time. Because of focusing on some particular issues relating to democratisation, and the varying and inconclusive nature of past studies, this section does not consistently maintain a chronological sequence throughout the presentation of the literature. Although the study time-range is 1981-2005, the aim of the review was to cover most of the important studies published from 1935 through the current year 2009 in order to have an up-to-date working knowledge of the topic.

Economic Development and Democratisation

Inspired by modernisation theory, Lipset (1959) found a strong empirical correlation between per capita income and democracy. He argued that democracy emerges in a society as it modernised, a process he associated with rising urbanisation, an increased importance of industry, higher educational attainment and the increasing "complexity" of a society. He puts emphasis on the social conditions conducive to democracy, and related democracy to the level of economic development. According to his theory, the wealthier a nation, the greater the chance it would sustain democracy. When he tested this hypothesis using

empirical evidence, he found that the levels of wealth, industrialisation and education are much higher in more democratic countries than for less democratic ones. Moore (1966) and Luebbert (1991) linked subsequent political regimes to initial social conditions, such as the class structure and the organisation of agriculture, and the strength of the bourgeoisie. In Moore's (1966) theory, democracy emerges when agriculture has been commercialised and is no longer characterised by feudal or semi-feudal labour relations, and where the bourgeoisie are strong. Besides, proto-modernity, defined as a rich demographic and institutional inheritance rooted in the preindustrial past, is theorised to lay the foundations of pluralism and class structure, in essence allowing some states to democratise more easily than others (Crenshaw, 1995). Crenshaw (1995), in a longitudinal, cross-national analysis using data from 83 countries, found robust support for the importance of modernity and proto-modernity to the growth of democracy. On the other hand, it has also been found that democracy and income influence each other. Burkhart (1997) operationalised measures of democracy and income distribution for 56 countries over the years 1973-1988, and through pooled two-stage least-squares estimation found that democracy and income distribution have nonlinear effects on each other.

Using political freedom indicators, electoral archives, and historical resources for 174 countries in the period 1960–2005, Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008) identified 63 democratic transitions, 3 reverse transitions from relatively stable democracy to autocracy and 6 episodes of small improvements in representative institutions. They then used their data set to test theories on the prerequisites for democracy in those countries that entered the “third wave” as non-democracies. Their results suggested that democratisation is more likely to emerge in affluent and especially educated societies. Economic development and education were also identified as key factors determining the intensity of democratic reforms and how quickly democratic transitions occurred. These results appear robust, holding across controls like the social environment (religion and fractionalisation), natural resources, trade openness and proxies of early institutions.

Actors, not economic development.

In the 1970s, many political scientists attacked “the approaches of modernisation, or economic development”. Rustow (1970), Linz and Stepan (1978) and Linz (1978) considered that whether or not democracy collapsed was not determined by socioeconomic structures or conditions, but was instead a result of specific choices by the relevant actors. O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986) later discussed various interactions between the relevant groups and the types of situations and dilemmas that might emerge during the period between the end of an authoritarian regime and the initiation of democracy. These studies emphasise that the will and decisions of relevant actors create democracy. Modernisation theory was also attacked by O’Donnell (1973), who argued that the collapse of democracy in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s undermined confidence in the income-democracy relationship and the idea that modernisation promoted democracy. He pointed out that the military coups had happened in the richest Latin American countries, for example Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.

Weak relationship between development and democracy.

Some researchers have found a weak relationship between economic development and democracy. In a statistical study of about 130 countries looking at the linkage between democracy and development, Ersson & Lane (1996) conclude that there is a need for caution in linking democracy with economic development. They assert that the correlation between democracy and economic growth is very weak, as is the correlation between democracy and income redistribution. Indeed, Gasiorowski (2000) argues that political democracy may have a negative impact on macroeconomic performance, especially in developing countries. He suggests that democracy engenders a high inflation rate and slower economic growth in underdeveloped countries as a result of unrestrained competition for resources and pressures of fiscal deficits. As such, the nature of a political regime may not necessarily determine the rate of economic growth and development in a country.

What makes a difference in economic development therefore, as Leftwich (1996) argues, is not the regime type or mode of political governance, but the nature of the state. According to him, the type of state, whether developmental or not, is quite crucial to the objective of economic development. He (Leftwich, 1995) defines the developmental state model by identifying its six major components: (1) a determined developmental elite; (2) relative autonomy; (3) a powerful, competent and insulated economic bureaucracy; (4) a weak and subordinated civil society; (5) an effective management of non-state economic interests; and (6) repression, legitimacy and performance. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Lomongi (2000) in their study maintain that there is no trade-off between democracy and economic development, and economic development does not tend to generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies.

Bellin (2000) found in his case studies that capital and labour are contingent, not consistent, democrats. This contingency, moreover, is not random. He found that support for democratisation depends on whether capital and labour see their economic interests served by the authoritarian state. This support, in turn, is shaped by two key factors for each social force. For capital, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and fear of social unrest. For labour, democratic enthusiasm hinges on its level of state dependence and aristocratic position in society. In Bellin's (2000) case studies the relationship was an inverse one, with higher values of dependency, fear, and aristocracy translating into reduced enthusiasm for democratic reform. Based on his work, Bellin (2000) concludes that in many late-developing countries a number of factors including extensive state sponsorship, the structural weakness of social forces, pervasive poverty, and the evolution of democratic discourse have led capital and labour to ally with authoritarian states rather than championing democratisation.

Multivariate Causation

A large number of scholarly works highlight the multivariate nature of causes of democratisation and its consolidation. Those causes include economic development. Dahl's (1971) theory of democratisation is that incumbents will democratise when either the cost of tolerating the opposition falls, so that they are prepared to enfranchise them; or the cost of suppression become too high. As part of his theory, he makes a series of empirical claims about factors which are likely to influence these costs and hence the likelihood of democratisation. In terms of mechanisms, As part of his theory, Dahl (1971) maintains that democracy arises when power is widely distributed in society, a situation he terms "pluralistic" order. It is when society becomes pluralistic, something induced for example by income growth and industrialisation, that the costs of suppression become high, and simultaneously the costs of toleration become low.

Also focusing on a multivariate explanation, Huntington (1991) has proposed a complex web of factors which influence democratisation, and argues that the factors vary according to which "wave" of democracy one considered. For example, with respect to the First Wave before the First World War he emphasizes the importance of factors such as modernisation, urbanisation, the creation of a middle class and decreasing inequality In the Second Wave his emphasis shifts to the impact of the Second World War and the collapse of empires With respect to the Third Wave, Huntington lists five factors as being important which are: (1) a crisis of authoritarian legitimacy created by economic recession induced by the oil shocks of the 1970s and the international debt crisis of the 1980s; (2) the income growth and increase in education experienced in the 1960s; (3) change in the attitude of the Catholic church; (4) changes in the attitudes of international institutions, the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and (5) "snowballing" or demonstration effects which led to contagion and the international dissemination of democracy.

Lipset (1994) also attributes democratisation to a large number of factors besides the level of economic development. These other factors include social equality, market economy, centrality of political culture, freedom of media, assembly and religion, rights of opposition parties, rule of law, human rights, legitimacy, popular election, and a strong civil society. Barro (1999) also discovered a number of positive and negative factors of democracy. In a panel study of over 100 countries from 1960 to 1995, he found that improvements in the standard of living predicted increases in democracy, as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights. He also found that the propensity for democracy rises with higher per capita GDP, greater levels of primary schooling, and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment. In addition, Barro (1999) found that for any given standard of living, democracy tends to fall with urbanisation and with a greater reliance on natural resources. Also, in his study democracy has little relation to country size but rises with the middle-class's share of income. The apparently strong relation of democracy to colonial heritage mostly disappears when the economic variables are held constant. Similarly, controlling for these economic variables weakens the relationship between democracy and religious affiliation. However, negative effects on democratisation from both Muslim and non-religious affiliations remain intact even when economic variables are allowed for (Barro, 1999) .

Muller (1995) has argued that the impact of economic development on democratisation varies by another economic factor: that of income inequality. According to him, the relationship between the level of economic development and the level of democracy found in most quantitative cross-national research implies that the largest gains in democracy are experienced by countries at intermediate levels of development. During the 1960s and 1970s, however, middle-income countries were more likely to register declines in democracy than increases. Muller (1995) explains this anomaly with the hypothesis that income inequality affects democracy, and this effect often counteracts the positive influence of economic development. Because intermediate levels of economic development are associated with the highest levels of income inequality, the independent negative effect of income inequality on change in level of democracy explains the declines in democracy in middle-income countries.

Further, Acemoglu & Robinson's (2006) theory has allowed them to make comparative static predictions that "holding other things equal, a decrease in inequality makes a highly unequal society more likely to democratise." (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006, p. 52). In a particular highly unequal society, such as South Africa in the 1980s, democratisation may be caused by falling inequality (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). However, their work could not find evidence that falling inequality is necessary or sufficient to induce democratisation. In a highly unequal non-democratic society one might see inequality fall but democratisation does not take place because something else changes as well (for example, maybe the extent of globalisation changes) which decreases the appeal of democratisation (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006)

Vanhanen (2003) has maintained that economic and intellectual resources are the dominant explanatory factors of democratisation, and that this explanation is universally applicable. He explains democratisation from the viewpoint of power distribution and, according to him, the distribution of political power is dependent on the distribution of power resources, which he defines as economic and intellectual resources. To test this empirically, he used the "Index of Democratisation" (ID), which is based on the combination of two objective and measurable aspects of democracy highlighted by Dahl: (1971) competition and participation. In Vanhanen's (2003) study, an indicator of direct democracy, the referendum, was included in the participation variable. To operationalise resource distribution, Vanhanen used three versions of the "Index of Power Resources" (IPR), which constitute different combinations of his improved variables of resource distribution. The author's research findings suggested that there would be a positive correlation between the IPR and the ID, and that countries tend to cross the threshold for democracy at about the same level of IPR.

Other Factors

Economic Crisis.

Haggard & Kaufman (1995) concentrated on demonstrating the importance of economic crises for precipitating democratisation and then focused on the interaction between democratisation, economic policy reform, and democratic consolidation. Their work suggests that the primary link between crises and democratic transitions is that crises breed social discontent against non-democratic regimes.

Economic reform.

Economic liberalisation has been found to be associated with democratisation in some studies. Cui (1997) questioned the relationship between privatisation and democratisation in the post-communist countries and whether privatisation would hinder or promote the consolidation of these infant democracies. Cui (1997) developed a typology of privatisation strategies, and explored their effects on the transition to, and the consolidation of, democracy. Cui (1997) found that privatisation has eased the transition to democracy, in the sense that power is shifting from the old political elite into a new economic elite. However, he also concluded that privatisation as practiced so far in Russia and Eastern Europe makes the consolidation of democratic regimes difficult as privatisation programmes have generated huge income inequalities and social dissatisfaction.

In turn, Melich (2000) has examined several aspects of the specific dynamics between the economic and political spheres during the transformations in Eastern Europe, bringing to attention some of the inadequacies in the attempts to graft liberal models of capitalism on societies with distinct cultural characteristics and existing in a different historical era. Liberal economic transformation appear to have made the democratisation process problematic and extremely painful in Eastern European societies (Malich, 2000). Kwon (2004), through his empirical analysis, has also presented evidence supporting the argument that the impact of economic reform on democratisation is contingent upon regional context. While

economic reform has had a negative impact on democratisation in Latin America, its effects in the post-socialist countries have been positive. The results suggest that the effect of economic development on democracy seem to be generalisable across regions, while the effect of economic reform on democratisation is regionally-bounded. The evidence presented in this study suggests that a context-bound approach towards the impact of economic reform on political democratisation should be pursued.

Sociological approaches.

An alternative theoretical approach to democratisation stems from the sociological literature on the origins of state institutions. These arguments, mostly associated with Tilly (1990) and applied to Africa by Herbst (2000), see the origins of democracy emerging in the process of state formation. Kings needed resources, particularly taxes, to fight wars. In order to induce elites to pay taxes, Kings had to make concessions, one form of which was the creation of representative institutions. According to this argument, democracy emerged as a quid pro quo between Kings and elites; where elites were granted representation in exchange for taxes (Herbst, 2000).

This research on state formation has inspired analyses of democratisation by some scholars, for example Bates & Lien (1985) and Bates (1991). These scholars have argued that democracy, like the origins of representative institutions more generally, is a concession made by authoritarian rulers in order to raise taxation. The more elastic the tax base, the harder it is for authoritarian rulers to raise taxes without agreement, and the greater the likelihood of concessions – hence democracy. Bates (1991) points out that democracy is less likely in an agrarian society since land is easier to tax, than it is in a society dominated by physical or human capital. Moreover, he makes the argument that authoritarian rulers will be more willing to abide by democracy if they fear it less. He connects this lack of fear to their economic power with respect to democracy – democrats

cannot hurt previous elites a lot if the elites have sufficient economic strength; perhaps because taxing the elite leads to a collapse in the economy.

Some researchers see a link between some other social aspects and democratisation. Jahanbegloo (2000) has found that the success of the democratisation process is determined not only by the state but also by the society. Citing the Iranian experience, he says that “fourth generation” Iranian intellectuals – mostly younger thinkers in their thirties and forties – has a strategic role to play in building a strong civil society. Regarding the influence of other sociological aspects on democratisation, Aubrey (2001) has queried the link between gender, development, and democratisation in Africa while focussing on ongoing political transitions in Kenya and Ghana. She has looked specifically at the marginalisation of women in the public life of African politics, where men continue to both control state structures and determine the neophytes in the public domain. Aubrey (2001) has also questioned whether or not this dawn of political transitions can bring democracy back in without bringing women in, with the same equal citizenship rights as men. Letki & Evans (2005) have argued that the relationship between social trust and democratisation in East-Central Europe implies a rather different ‘top-down’ process, in which levels of trust reflect, rather than influence, the effectiveness of political and economic institutions. Social trust forms a major component of current conceptions of social capital and as such has been attributed with a significant role in providing the social context for the emergence and maintenance of stable, liberal democratic polities and effective economies.

Political institutions.

A number of researchers have found a relationship between democratisation and some particular political institutions. Rose & Shin (2001), for example, have observed that countries in the “third wave” of democratisation (occurring during the 1970s and 1980s, according to Huntington, 1991) have introduced competitive elections before establishing basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of law, institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors. Because of

the lack of those basic institutions, most third-wave countries are currently incomplete democracies.

There has been extensive debate among students of democracy over the merits of different types of constitutional design. For the most part, discussion has focused on the relative advantages and drawbacks of the three major modes of structuring the relationship between the executive and legislative branches: parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism. That debate has yielded some very useful insights, but it has also been largely inconclusive. Fish (2006) has proposed a new and arguably more fruitful way of thinking about how political institutions influence democratisation, one that examines the capacity or power of specific offices. In particular, this paradigm focuses upon the strength of the legislature and its consequences for the advance of democracy. The evidence shows that the presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for democratisation. Earlier, Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi (2000) also found almost the same thing. They found parliamentary form of government is more helpful for democracy than other forms of government. Vanhanen (2004) sought explanations for the success and failures of the process of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa. His point of departure is the idea that the distribution of power and resources in a society is crucial for success of democratisation. The comparative analysis confirmed this idea, both on the global level and for the sub-Saharan countries in particular.

Kim & Lee (2009) however, in their quantitative analysis of ninety-three developing countries in the Third World, found it hard to conclude that any one of three forms of government – parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential -- has better performed for democratisation than the others do. Their empirical study demonstrated that the difference between the performances of two types of constitutional designs for democracy differs by different variables and especially regions. The results of their research suggest that the significance of constitutional designs for democratisation is less obvious than some scholars have suggested. As a political institution, constitutional designs seem to be an outcome of political process rather than a causal factor of democratisation. In Kim & Lee's (2009)

view, although all of the developing countries, regardless of the kind of constitutional designs, are eager for a stable democracy, many of them have been “interrupted” democracies for various reasons. Besides, they argue, each constitutional system has its own strengths and weaknesses and it is hard to argue that political outcomes depend singularly on the choice of constitutional designs.

Harris (2005), in his case study of South Africa found that the development and effective performance of democratic political systems requires the establishment of honest and competent public bureaucracies that avoid political partisanship and demonstrate respect for the diverse values and interests of the populations they serve. He argued that especially important in democratising the state is the development and practice of the norms of secondary democracy. The practice of these norms of mutual respect, fairness, and collaboration create the essential culture or *modus vivendi* of democracy Harris (2005). His case study found that the democratisation process requires the members of the state bureaucracy to practice the norms of secondary democracy in their daily relations with one another and in their relations with the citizenry. Waylen (1998), explored the themes of democratisation, participation and accountability, through the analysis of gender and simultaneous economic and political reform in Argentina, Chile and Peru. As a result of his findings he has argued for a framework which examines both the activities of the actors involved as well as the structures and institutions which constrain them. Bunce (2003) also found that popular mobilisation and nationalist mobilisation often function to support democratisation. He studied democratisation in the 27 post-socialist countries that emerged from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in order to evaluate some of the assumptions and arguments in the literature on recent democratisation in southern Europe and Latin America.

International factors.

There are some international factors that influence democratisation. Whitehead (2001) has outlined, and elaborated on, three main headings under which international developments regarding democratisation can be grouped and

analysed — contagion, control, and consent. The “contagion” heading refers to mere geographical proximity, whereby democratisation in one country encourages or facilitates democratisation in a neighbouring country, carrying no implications as to mode or content of transmission. The “control” heading involves policy direction by an external third-party power, and accounts for variations in speed, direction, limits, and mechanisms of transmission. The “consent” heading adds the essential ingredient of the democratisation process, namely, the complex set of internal, social, and political factors, which promote receptivity towards the democratisation agenda, and recognizes that democratisation within a country cannot convincingly be wholly ascribed to external agencies.

Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi (2000) have examined the American role in the advancement of democracy worldwide since the end of the cold war. First, they explored to what extent classical political theory — particularly realism and liberalism — help understand the promotion of democracy. Next, they looked at the strategic and political motivations behind this policy and how it relates to other key goals in US international relations. Finally, they found the impact that American democracy promotion has had in different regions and countries. Rupnik (2000) has observed that the mechanism of European Union democratises its member countries although the countries have to abandon part of their sovereignties to the EU. As an institution, the EU’s democratic modus operandi, transparency, and accountability are not always obvious, even to citizens of its current member states. Barany (2004) has argued that NATO expansion has important consequences both for the democratic prospects of its new members and for the Alliance itself. He is of the opinion that by providing the security essential for successful democratisation as well as positive changes in specific policy areas, NATO may have made even more of a contribution than the European Union to Eastern Europe’s democratic transformation and that by engaging in a politically driven enlargement, NATO may risk its effectiveness as a military alliance.

Sørensen (2000) has argued that although many Third World countries have experienced the beginnings of democracy, a large proportion of them are stuck in

the initial phases of a democratic transition. International actors have contributed to this outcome by: (1) failing to appreciate the role of nationalism and political community; (2) overemphasizing economic and political liberalism; and (3) supporting elite-dominated democracies. Sørensen (2000) explored the connection between democratisation and state strength, citing examples of transitions in Africa. Ndulo (2003) also discusses, in the context of globalisation, the challenges facing Africa in the democratisation process.

According to Schwartzman (1998), by the year 1996 66 per cent of the countries of the world were using elections to choose their top leaders. This wave of democratisation was accompanied by a paradigm shift that caused the large number of historically clustered democratisations. Schwartzman (1998), examined numerous renderings of the linkage between globalisation and democratisation, including a favourable climate for democracy, global economic growth, global crises, foreign intervention, hegemonic shifts, and world-system contraction.

Foreign aid has also been found to be an important international factor of democratisation. Gazibo (2005) compared the democratisation process in Benin and Niger in the decade from 1989 to 1999 and emphasises the influence of external donors with regard to their economic support of democratisation. He argued that the capacity of foreign aid to foster democratisation depends largely on its timing, particularly in critical moments of the democratic process.

The disappointing results of international democratisation efforts have often been attributed to domestic conditions that make it difficult for democracy to be established or survive. Brown (2005) maintains that the democratisation process is largely an endogenous one and that significant structural impediments exist. He has argued that international actors, though for the most part absent from current theories of democratisation, can nonetheless play a very important role in promoting or preventing democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Paradoxically, Brown (2005) believes that the role of donors in promoting a rapid transition to a multiparty system actually can impede further democratisation. For better results, he maintains, a better understanding of and commitment to the process are

required. Competing economic, commercial and strategic interests, however, prevent donors from making a more positive contribution (Brown, 2005).

Membership of an international organisation (IO) has been found to be another component of the international factors that have a relationship with democratisation. Mansfield & Pevehouse (2006) have argued that democratisation is an especially potent impetus to IO membership. Democratising countries are likely to enter IOs because leaders have difficulty credibly committing to sustain liberal reforms and the consolidation of democracy. Chief executives often have an incentive to solidify their position during democratic transitions by rolling back political liberalisation. Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to carry out democratic reforms, especially if the organisation is composed primarily of democratic members. Tests of this hypothesis, based on a new data set of IOs covering the period from 1965 to 2000, confirm that democratisation spurs states to join IOs (Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006).

Nelson & Wallace (2005) examined the impact of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on democracy in recipient countries from 1974 to 2002. From their results they derived five hypotheses linking the IMF to democracy: 1) Political conditions associated with loans agreements have a direct effect on domestic political institutions; 2) The IMF functions as a commitment device allowing liberalising elites to initiate reforms; 3) IMF programmes allow governments to deflect blame for painful reforms and thereby mitigate anti-democratic opposition; 4) IMF programmes harm economic growth, causing increased income inequality, which may exert negative pressures against democracy; and 5) IMF programmes may differ in their effects cross-regionally (Nelson & Wallace, 2005).

Overall, it seems that the IMF has a positive impact on democracy in countries that have participated in its Extended Fund Facility programme. However, consideration of the IMF impact within a regional context varies by measure of democracy. Nelson & Wallace (2005) found in a model with Polity democracy index as dependent variable that IMF has had a strongly positive impact on democracy in Eastern Europe and Africa while having the opposite effect in Latin

America and East Asia. On the other hand, they found positive results in case of Latin America and East Asia too in a model with Freedom House index as dependent variable.

Diffusion.

Some studies have focused on democratisation from the view point of diffusion. O'Loughlin et al.(1998) examined the relationship between the temporal and spatial aspects of democratic diffusion in the world system since 1946. They found strong and consistent evidence of temporal clustering of democratic and autocratic trends, as well as strong spatial association (or autocorrelation) of democratisation. Their analysis used an exploratory data approach in a longitudinal framework to understand global and regional trends in changes in authority structures. Their work revealed discrete changes in regimes that run counter to the dominant aggregate trends of democratic waves or sequences, demonstrating how the ebb and flow of democracy varies among the world's regions.

Dealing with a question of how the countries in Europe and Asia, which began their post-communist journey from similar starting points, are different from each other in terms of democratisation, Kopstein & Reilly (2000) have offered an explanation of geographic proximity. They have observed that all of the big adopters of democratisation and marketisation like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and perhaps the Baltic States and Slovakia share the trait of being geographically close to the former border of the non-communist world. On the other hand, countries like Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the former non-Baltic Soviet republics have made far less progress as they have been in a geographical location different from the formers'. This suggests the spatially dependent nature of the diffusion of norms, resources, and institutions that are necessary to the construction of political democracies and market economies in the post-communist era.

Chou (2004) investigated how international actors influence democratisation by focusing on two leading states of recent democratisation in East Asia and East Europe — Taiwan and Hungary. His analysis supported the following points: (1) In

Central Europe, the Soviet presence was a decisive overriding obstacle to democratisation, no matter how favourable domestic conditions may have been in countries like Hungary. The constraints were gradually lifted under Gorbachev, finally opening the possibility for a successful transition to democracy. Furthermore, the policies of various European institutions like the EU, The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe, and NATO were becoming crucial stabilizing elements in the consolidating process. The integration into Western institutions began to act as an external democratic force. (2) In East Asia, the global trend towards economic liberalism did exert some positive impact on the transition to democracy.

Wejnert (2005) has identified two major sets of factors influencing democratisation. One set characterises endogenous or internal features of countries, and may be referred to as “socio-economic development” factors; and the other set characterises exogenous variables that influence democratisation via forces at work globally and within the region in which a country resides; this set may be referred to as “diffusion” processes. Wejnert (2005) found that development indicators are robust predictors of democracy when they are assessed alone, but their predictive power fades with the inclusion of diffusion variables. In particular, diffusion predictors of spatial proximity and networks are robust predictors of democratic growth in both the world and across all regions. The results demonstrate that regional patterns in democratisation are evident, and hence world analyses are only the first approximation to understanding democratic growth.

Gleditsch & Ward (2006), for example, have argued that the spatial clustering in democracy and transitions suggests that international factors play a prominent role in forging democracies as well as influencing their durability. Democracy often comes about as a result of changes in the relative power of important actors and groups as well as their evaluations of particular institutions, both of which are often influenced by forces outside the country in question. The scope and extent of connections with other democratic countries in a region can strengthen support for democratic reform and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies.

Results from applying a transition model have demonstrated that international factors can exert a strong influence on the prospects for transitions to democracy, and the spatial clustering in democracy and transitions cannot adequately be explained by the hypothesized domestic social requisites of individual countries (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006).

External operation.

Against the backdrop of the American invasion of Iraq, a new concept of democracy — “imposed” democracy — has surfaced (Enterline & Greig, 2005). The American policymakers termed their invasion as a “process of democratisation” and in 2003 linked this sort of democratisation with greater peace, democracy, and prosperity in the Middle East. Enterline & Greig (2005) have elaborated on this regional-level policy argument theoretically and have tested it empirically on a global sample of states from the twentieth century. They differentiated between the impact of fully and weakly democratic externally imposed polities on regional interstate war, democratisation, and economic growth. They concluded that: (1) fully democratic externally imposed polities reduce war (as occurred with Japan), while weakly democratic externally imposed polities increase it (as in Iraq); (2) fully democratic externally imposed polities do not stimulate democratisation, while weakly democratic externally imposed polities undermine democratisation; and (3) fully democratic externally imposed polities stimulate prosperity, while weakly democratic externally imposed polities undermine prosperity.

Cognitive ability.

Rindermann (2008) discovered a positive linkage between cognitive ability and democracy. This assumption has been confirmed by positive correlations between education, cognitive ability, and positively valued political conditions. These longitudinal studies at the country level allow the analysis of causal relationships. It has been shown that in the second half of the 20th century, education and

intelligence had a strong positive impact on democracy, rule of law and political liberty independent from wealth (GDP) and chosen country sample.

Negative factors.

Recent studies have increasingly identified negative factors that hinder democracy. Venter (2003) focused on political developments in Zambia to illustrate how a government elected on a “democratic ticket” can become corrupted by the conscious development of a personality cult, and how the hunger for power can lead to the erosion of democratic values, electoral fraud, and the near breakdown of a relatively well-functioning multiparty system. McMahon (2004) has found that African leaders have only grudgingly permitted multi-party politics under donor pressure. There remains a current of underlying scepticism towards political parties among African leaders, and arguments exist against multi-party politics. Venter (2003) maintains that while individual elements of these arguments may have some validity, the conclusion that the leaders have drawn that party activity should be constrained, if not prohibited, is not consonant with democratic governance.

Whitaker (2005) has focused on how a strategy of challenging political opponents’ citizenship may help disqualify or discredit them. By examining specific examples in Côte d'Ivoire and Zambia, he has explored the implications of this strategy. Whitaker (2005) has concluded that while citizenship rights are clearly important in any democracy, their explicit manipulation for the ruling party's political purposes is a risky approach that threatens to slow or even reverse the process of democratisation. At best, the resulting widening of social cleavages reduces the likelihood of democratic consolidation. At worst, it plants the seeds for future political conflict and possibly even war (Whitaker, 2005).

Doig & Marquetteb (2005) have observed that the growth of global corporations is synonymous with the spread of market capitalism. Market capitalism looks to regulated market economies and stable growth to expand; and this, in turn, assumes that states are committed to economic liberalisation and the reduction in

the barriers to trade (Doig & Marquetteb, 2005). Such preconditions are assumed to be achievable through the promotion of democratisation — the “liberal democratic” model of government, now the favoured developmental template of multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. One major challenge to the liberal democratic approach is the degree of corruption at state and local level—and a major indicator of the acceptance of such an approach is whether corruption is being addressed. As agencies that espouse a strong ethical stance internationally, corruption has appeared to be a highly visible reform issue for them during the 1990s (Doig & Marquetteb, 2005).

Another negative factor of democratisation found is the “ hybrid regime”. Brownlee (2009) assessed the causal effects of hybrid regimes, and the post–cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratisation. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, he found that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy. That is, vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown (Brownlee, 2009).

On Asia.

Overall, relatively few studies addressing democratisation in the Asian context have been carried out to date. The relevant literature that was identified as part of this study could generally be divided into at least two sub-regional types: East Asian or more specifically Southeast Asian; and South Asian. Central Asia as home to new independent states liberated from erstwhile Soviet Union has been a part of literature on democratisation in ex-communist states rather than Asian. West Asia, generally characterised as a region of Muslim monarchies, has so far failed to attract democratisation researchers. So, Asian democratisation literature has mainly addressed the Southeast or East Asian context, followed by South Asian.

Neher (1991) has found that democratisation correlates positively with high economic growth rates in the Southeast Asian societies with a few exceptions. The semi-democracies of Thailand and Malaysia have the highest rates of growth, in contrast to Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, all of which have relatively closed polities and the lowest growth rates. According to Neher (1991), Singapore, because of its city-state character, and Brunei, because of its oil revenues and small population, cannot be compared with other Southeast Asian countries. Koppel (1993) has highlights issues concerning the processes of democratisation in Southeast Asia and the roles played by foreign aid in supporting or undermining democratisation prospects and processes. Japan, as the biggest economy in the region, has the power to lead democratisation in Asia but it has not done that so far. And even if Japan played any role in this area, it has been under the influence of Western pressure and only for a limited time. After violent actions against democracy movements in Beijing, Rangoon, Bangkok and Dili, Japan tried to avoid applying economic sanctions and where it was forced to implement sanctions or suspend aid under Western pressure, it took the first opportunity to resume its trading programme (Arase, 1993).

Referring to South Korea and Taiwan, Thompson (1996) found that late democratisation followed late industrialisation. The demobilisation of labour and the dependency of business that accompanied successful export-driven industrialisation delayed pressures for an earlier transition to democracy in these two developmental states. In South America, and much of the rest of the Third World on the other hand, an economic crisis helped prompt pro-democracy movements which were often supported by strong labour movements. Successful “developmental dictators” were better able to contain docile unions and business groups in several countries in the Asia-Pacific (Thompson, 1996).

Much as modernisation theory predicts , the rise of civil society in South Korea and Taiwan has been drawn in large part from the growing middle class which was created by relatively high levels of economic development. But the cases of Malaysia and Singapore suggest an emerging middle class is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic transition. While middle class-backed pro-

democracy movements were repressed and only “pseudo” parliamentarianism practised, a justification for tight state control in terms of “Asian values” (defined in brief earlier) was offered even after considerable economic advances had been achieved. This both strengthened rulers’ will to rule undemocratically and weakened the opposition’s ability to challenge them in these two countries.

“Asian culture” or, in other words, “Asian values” or “Confucianism” dominates East Asian political literature. Jayasuriya (1998) has identified and evaluated three approaches to the analysis of Asian values ideology: (1) the “culturalist” argument which suggests that certain values are immanent in the Asian cultural system, which in turn are seen as fashioning a distinctive political and economic system; (2) an “instrumental” argument which endeavours to emphasise the role of Asian values as a political strategy of authoritarian political leaders; and (3) a “structural” argument, which locates Asian values as a specific ideological formation of a distinctive configuration of East Asia's illiberal state tradition and late capitalist development.

In particular, one structuralist perspective termed “reactionary modernism”, an ideological hybrid of reaction and modernity, is believed to capture the distinctiveness of Asian values. Jayasuriya (1998) has argued that this perspective has considerable value in enhancing the analysis of Asian values ideology in East Asia. According to him, the main features of the Asian variant of reactionary modernism are — use of technology and competition in the world market; application of values that are indispensable to economic functioning and performance (discipline, individual responsibility); a future orientation; and distrust and hostility towards pluralist politics. Jayasuriya (1998) has argued that in Singapore for example, a kind of anti-political “polities” have emerged

On the economic front, anyone can agree with the observation that economic progress in East Asia has been noticeable for the last few decades and authors like Sen (1998) maintain that the success can be explained by theories on the role of Asian culture, as well as the political distinctiveness of the region. Sen (1998)

has noted that the economic development began as a unique achievement in Japan and has gradually become a general accomplishment of Asia in general and of East Asia in particular.

In turn, Ota (n.d.), in an investigation into the relationship between types of political regime and economic growth in 16 developing Asian countries during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, found that high economic growth has been achieved neither by authoritarian regimes nor by democratic regimes, but by regimes in the range of semi-authoritarian to semi-democratic. In addition, refuting Jayasuriya (1998) in political terms, Hsieh (2000) has maintained that a political culture based on so-called Asian values with a strong group consciousness is not necessarily detrimental to democratisation. Citing the example of Taiwan, he has argued that this country decided to move towards democratisation despite its Confucian heritage. Attitudinal change on the part of both the general public and the political elites was certainly an important factor, but the emergence of a quasi-pluralistic social order may have been more consequential (Ota, n.d.) Therefore, O'Dwyer (2003) has suggested that the suspicion that some East Asian governments have distorted Confucian philosophy for ideological purposes is well founded. He has argued that the democratic reform of Confucian community and organisational life, coupled with the instituting of civil freedoms, will help preserve the continuity of Confucian moral traditions cherished in a number of East Asian societies in the present period of social and economic change (O'Dwyer, 2003). . .

O'Dwyer (2003) does not put forward his views of democratic reform in East Asia as a liberal democratic ideal. Rather, he proposes it could be taken as a hypothesis about the beneficial consequences that may follow from fostering a democratic ethos in the community life of East Asian societies that are either engaged in the process of democratisation or contemplating the democratic revitalisation of their political and social institutions (e.g., South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, or Japan). O'Dwyer (2003) believes Japan's legal and political institutions closely resemble those of Western countries, and individual liberties are legally protected (although post-war Japanese governments have not explicitly associated themselves with Confucianism).

During the past two decades, many East Asian states have made transitions to democracy founded on basic political liberties and freely contested elections (Reilly, 2007). A little-noticed consequence of this process has been strikingly congruent reforms of key political institutions such as electoral systems, political parties, and parliaments. Across the region, these reforms have been motivated by the common aims of promoting government stability, reducing political fragmentation, and limiting the potential for new entrants to the party system. As a result, similar strategies of institutional design are evident in the increasing prevalence of “mixed-member majority” electoral systems, new political party laws favouring the development of aggregative party systems, and constraints on the enfranchisement of regional or ethnic minorities (Reilly, 2007). Comparing the outcomes of these reforms with those of other world regions, there appears to be an increasing convergence on an identifiable “Asian model” of electoral democracy (Reilly, 2007).

Kalinowski (2007), in a study of Indonesia and Korea, found that democratic institutions are conducive to market-oriented reforms and, as result, democracies are better able to survive economic crises than authoritarian regimes. He (2007) examined the role of the neo-middle class in the democratisation of newly industrialized countries — South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. analysis Kalinowski’s (2007) analysis indicated that the involvement of the neo-middle class in democratic transition depends on the efforts of the state to incorporate it into the political and economic structure. In cases where the social schism was too large, the middle class took an active role in democratisation. Kalinowski (2007) points out the tendency of the middle class to be co-opted by the ruling elite.

Loh (2008) has traced the rise and evolution of civil society in four Southeast Asian countries — the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. In that study the analysis distinguished between “procedural” democracy, perhaps best characterized by electoralism; and “participatory: democracy, which stresses everyday rights, interests, perspectives and involvement of civil society and argues

that democratisation is not meaningful if it is not accompanied by participatory democracy (Loh, 2008).

In contrast to all the studies discussed above regarding democracy, many Southeast Asian peoples, who collectively own their states, do not reject authoritarian rule. Carlson & Turner (2008), using 2006 and 2007 public opinion data from the AsiaBarometer Survey of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Singapore, examined popular perceptions of democracy and democratic principles and practices. They found that, in terms of general public support for a democratic system, strong majorities in all countries responded positively. However, when examining citizen orientations towards the democratic system in combination with the alternative regimes, it became clear that many respondents may have embraced democracy, but did not reject rule by the military, rule by strong leaders or rule by experts. In some countries, a sizable percent of respondents accepted two or three non-democratic regimes (Carlson & Turner, 2008),.

Wagner (1999) has described South Asia as a region of fragmented democracies where a constitutionalist approach to state-building is handled by a soft state that is experiencing insufficient economic growth and has a multiethnic society. He maintains, however, that fifty years after independence and the various attempts and endeavours directed towards state- and nation-building, the amount of political progress that South Asia has seen is remarkable despite all its various social and economic problems. Chadda's (2000) thesis is also that there is more than one path to democracy. He argues that South Asia uses the distinctive "third way" of democratisation. The primary characteristic of this third way is that implementation and consolidation of democratic procedures are pursued simultaneously. In Chadda's (2000) observation, democracy in South Asia is firstly, a tool of nation-building. Secondly, democracy is a process of making compacts and bargains between the state and its parts arrived at through free and fair contestation (Chadda, 2000). Vanhanen (2003) has concluded that the success of democracy depends on the distribution of economic and political power among various social

groups and their elites rather than a high level of economic development and that, therefore, democracy has survived in India in spite of its poverty.

The work by Lee (2002) is one of the major studies which has been carried out completely in the Asian regional context. This study implicated political protests as having had significant and consistent effects on Asian democratisation. However, in sharp contrast, the study also found that economic development, economic crisis, civic culture, and British colonial experience did not have significant impacts on democratisation in the Asian setting. Lee (2002) identified that the political protests in the “third wave” Asian countries share some common characteristics. Firstly, college students sparked off a series of political demonstrations. Secondly, the middle class served as the backbone for the pro-democracy movements. Thirdly, many opposition leaders formed a national pro-democracy organisation through which they orchestrated demonstrations joined by students and middle class people. And finally, the political demonstrations had a snowball effect both at the domestic and the international levels, and never stopped until the pro-democracy movement demands were met.

Challenging the findings of Lee (2002), Azad (2004b) has provided evidence that there were both economic and non-economic factors that influenced democratisation in Asia and has argued that the impact of economic development on democracy was positive. However, that study also found that the effects of economic development on democratisation were accounted for by circumstances unique to each country, and were not strong enough to form part of the explanation of the level of democracy in Asia except as part of each country's unique experience (Azad, 2004b).

Croissant (2004) has observed two trends of democratisation in South, Southeast and Northeast Asia. Firstly, he found that in most of the democracies in the region, the institutionalisation of political rights exists side by side with the stagnation or decline of the rule of law and civil liberties. Secondly, he maintains that the quality of democracy in the different countries is growing further apart. Croissant (2004) has proposed a framework for the systematic analysis of why and how defective

democracies originate, and painted a sceptical outlook on the prospects for liberal democratic development in Asia. In his study, Croissant (2004) focused on four categories of potential causes accounting for defects of democracy: social and economic determinants; cultural and historical variables; “stateness” and nation-building; and political institutions.

Linder, Wolf & Bächtiger (2005) examined the causes of democratisation in Asia and Africa by addressing the hypothesis that while actors’ intentions may certainly matter for democratisation, they are not necessarily sufficient to set a country on a continuous democratic path; rather, successful democratisation depends just as much on favourable political, cultural and economic factors. Their study of 62 African and Asian countries in the period from 1965 to 1995 found that power sharing and the cultural element of low familism were the strongest predictors of democratisation, while high levels of familism was a significantly negative predictor. Controlling for cultural and political factors, economic factors are barely significant.

Conclusion

As the discussion above on relationship between economic development and democratisation shows, this review found a larger number of studies examining the causes of democratisation, than addressing the impact of democratisation on economic development. It is proposed here that the issues which are related to causes of democratisation can be divided into three categories (Appendix 1.1) which are listed below.

1. The theory of modernisation or economic development as the cause of democratisation has been at the centre of debate. Participants of this debate have included (in chronological order): Lipset (1959); Moore (1966); Rustow (1970); O’Donnell (1973); Linz and Stepan (1978); Linz (1978); O’Donnell & Schmitter (1986); Luebbert (1991); Neher (1991); Crenshaw (1995); Ersson & Lane (1996); Leftwich (1996); Thompson (1996); Burkhart

(1997); Bellin (2000); Przeworski, et al., (2000); and Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008).

2. Multivariate models have been used to test economic development, along with other variables, to find causal factors of democratisation. This trend is found in the work of Dahl (1971); Huntington (1991); Lipset (1994); Muller (1995); Barro (1999); Vanhanen (2003); Azad (2003b); Bächtiger (2005); and Acemoglu & Robinson's (2006).
3. Quite a large number of other elements (e.g., pro-democracy political institutions, supportive social catalysts and international factors) have been found to influence democratisation. There are both case studies and comparative studies, which have been carried out in global, regional and country contexts. Among the regions, Central and Eastern Europe (where the formerly socialist countries are located) have received the most attention followed by Africa, Latin or South America and East Asia. Although, as this review mentioned earlier, Asia is a distinct region and some parts of this region have attained remarkable economic development for the last few decades, only a few studies on the impact of economic development on democratisation (e.g., Lee, 2002; Azad, 2004b; Croissant, 2004; Linder & Bächtiger, 2005) have been carried out in the context of the whole of Asia. Besides, the findings of these studies have so far been inconclusive and the focus of the studies have sometimes been different. For example, as discussed previously, Lee (2002) found no significant impact of economic development on democratisation, while Azad (2004b) found a positive association. Further, Croissant (2004) has implied that something in Asian social, economic, cultural and historical developments, stateness and nation-building and political institutions may be responsible for defective democracies. In addition, Linder & Bächtiger (2005) have found that economic factors are barely significant when cultural and political factors are held constant. So, given these varied and inconclusive results, the relationship between economic development and democratisation in Asia is fertile ground for further study.

Chapter Three: Study Design

This thesis began with a focus on the topic of study, and a statement of the research question in the Introduction (Chapter One) followed by a review of related literature in Chapter Two. This chapter begins by explaining the research objective by operationalising and defining the research questions and hypotheses, and then concludes by describing how those research questions and hypotheses were investigated in order to achieve the research objective.

Study Objective, Research Questions and Hypotheses

The main hypothesis and research question of this study were based on the findings of the literature review. The main research question was, therefore: “Why did some countries become democratic and other countries failed to become democratic in Asia between 1981 and 2005?” The main hypothesis was: “That it was mainly economic development that drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005”.

The theory behind this hypothesis, as proposed by Lipset, 1959; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Diamond, 1992; and Burkhart & Beck, 1994, was that economic development or modernisation is closely associated with increases in industrialisation, urbanisation and education that drive democratisation. Economic development on the one hand, promotes a society where the middle class becomes majority and, on the other hand is linked with an increased level and quality of education and urbanisation, which in turn increases the level of political consciousness of the population and promotes political attitudes conducive to democracy (e.g., interpersonal trust, rights and tolerance of opposition).

The secondary research question of this study was: “What other factors have influenced democratisation, with particular attention to countries that do not conform to the main hypothesis?” The hypothesis for this question was: “Some elements other than economic development have positive or negative effects on

democratisation”. The research objective was to investigate these research questions/ and hypotheses.

In the main research question and hypothesis, the key words, concepts and ideas were “Asia”, the time range “between 1981 and 2005”; “democratisation” and “economic development”. And in the secondary question and hypothesis, the key concept was “some elements other than economic development”. The section below discusses the definition of “Asia” and time-range used in this study, while the remainder will be addressed in the in the next section of this chapter.

Selection criteria for “Asia” and ”Country”.

Asia comprises a total of 52 countries (*Current Time & Time Zone for the continent of Asia*, n.d; *CIA-The World Factbook*, n.d). This study is limited to 24 out of those 52 countries. The reasons for excluding some countries from this study are discussed later. So, in this study, “Asia” means the 25 countries which are listed below (Table 3.1) along with their three-digit short-forms (*ISO Alpha-3 code*, n.d.), (However, in the case of data analysis with Polity as dependent variable (see below), the total number of countries was limited to 22, as Polity does not cover Brunei and Maldives). These short-forms were used for the statistical analyses in this study.

Table 3.1*List of countries under study*

Country	Country code
Afghanistan	AFG
Bangladesh	BGD
Bhutan	BTN
Brunei	BRN
Cambodia	KHM
China	CHN
India	IND
Indonesia	IDN
Japan	JPN
North Korea	PRK
South Korea	ROK
Laos	LAO
Malaysia	MYS
Maldives	MDV
Mongolia	MNG
Myanmar	MNR
Nepal	NPL
Pakistan	PAK
Philippines	PHL
Singapore	SGP
Sri Lanka	LKA
Taiwan	TWN
Thailand	THA
Vietnam	VNM

Among the larger sized countries under study, only China has some regions that are not included in the available databases about China. These Chinese regions

are Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau. Among these three, Taiwan was considered a “country” in this study as most of the databases used here provide Taiwan data separately from China. Hong Kong and Macau were omitted in this study. Regions within all other countries under study were included in the data about the respective countries; no regions were omitted or treated separately.

The countries and territories which are parts of Asia but were not included in this research were (in alphabetical order): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, British Indian Ocean Territory, East Timor, French Southern Territories, Georgia, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Macau, Oman, Palestinian Territory, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. There were reasons why we excluded these countries from our study. Firstly, Middle Eastern countries were excluded as they are more “Middle Eastern” than “Asian”. Although these countries are situated in the continent of Asia, they form a separate “Middle East” region with some special political cultural characteristics such as traditional monarchies and Islamic values that mismatch those of other countries within this study.

Secondly, Central Asian countries (formerly USSR states) were excluded because their characteristics are arguably very different from most of the other Asian countries included in this study. For example, those countries were parts of Soviet Socialist Republic and won liberation just between late ‘eighties and early ‘nineties. East Timor is also a newly independent country on the world map. Thirdly, territories were not covered in this study as they are not independent countries and other countries govern them. Finally, previous studies on democratisation in Asia (e.g., Lee, 2002; Azad, 2004b; and Croissant, 2004) have not included these countries in their samples.

Selection of time-range and year.

The time-range for a study on the same topic as this study (Azad, 2004b) was from 1975–2000, against a backdrop of noticeable development in Asia over the last few decades. This study has a timeframe that includes a slightly later period than the earlier one: 1981 through to 2005. The variable “Year” covers each of

these years; that is “1981, 1982, 1983...2005”. A number of issues were deciding factors in making this new time range. Firstly, the 14 year period of interest in this study is compatible with the 15 year period of the research cited above (Azad, 2004b) which focused on exactly the same topic. Secondly, and importantly, this current study has covered a later time period which includes part of the “third wave” of democratisation (Huntington, 1991) and the on-going new wave. Thirdly, this time range includes combination of the cold war and cold war free eras. Finally, more data are available from the year 1981 in some time-series databases than earlier (e.g., freedom of the media).

Investigation into the Research Questions and Hypotheses

According to the research questions and hypotheses, the study objective was to test if there are any impacts of GDP per capita and other variables on democratisation; and if so to what degree. To achieve this aim, this study included four broad-based steps:

1. Defining and identifying measures of the variables relating to the research questions and hypotheses, and a providing a description of data about them.
2. Evaluating the state of political regimes in Asia during the 1981-2005 period in order to have a preliminary knowledge about them (Chapter Four).
3. Conducting statistical analyses of data to measure causal relationships of GDP per capita and other independent variables associate with democratisation (Chapter Five).
4. Carrying out case studies to supplement the findings of statistical analyses (Chapter Six).

The following sections explain how each of these steps contributed to achieving the study’s overall research objective.

Definition and selection of variables, measures and data

Democracy and Democratisation.

The term “Democratisation” refers to the way a state moves to a democratic regime type: “to a more open, more participatory, less dictatorial society within the territory of that state” (Ghali, 1996, p.1). More accurately, it may be likened to it a process in which democracy takes place and grows. So, the first challenge of this study was to develop reliable and informative conceptual definitions and then empirical and operational measures of democracy.

There has been a great deal of controversy over this issue in political science mostly because there is some disagreement over what actually constitutes a democracy. However, whatever the nature of such disagreement is, this study focused on two vital characteristics of democracy, as articulated in Chapter One: firstly, democracy works at least for the majority; and secondly the majority is chosen through an open competition. So, in this study the definition of democracy has focused on these two points which in fact talk about democratic rule and competition; and the former is determined by the latter. The examination of the supporting literature presented below clarifies this definition.

According to Schattschneider (1960, p.141): "Democracy is a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organisations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process." Aron (1969, p. 41) describes the competition occurring in a democracy as “peaceful rivalry for the exercise of power”. He uses the phrase "exercise of power" here to mean temporary control. Pennock (1979, p.9) believes democracy to be “a rule by the people” where “the people” includes all adult citizens not excluded by some generally agreed upon and reasonable disqualifying factor. In his view, “rule” means that “public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals” (Pennock, 1979, p. 9). To Powell (1982, p.3), democracy is a system which is “characterised by competitive elections in which most citizens are eligible to participate." Schmitter & Karl (1991) put emphasis on governance. In their view,

"Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives" (Schmitter & Karl, 1991, p.76). Vanhannen (1997) also focuses on political competition, participation and governance:"Democracy is a political system in which different groups are legally entitled to compete for power and in which institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people" (Vanhannen, 1997, p.31)

Dahl (1998) has proposed a relatively comprehensive definition of democracy that includes the elements of most of those discussed above, and addresses the two basic points of democracy of interest to this study. He argues that democracy provides opportunities for: 1) effective participation; 2) equality in voting; 3) gaining enlightened understanding; 4) exercising final control by the people over the agenda; and 5) inclusion of adults; The political institutions that are necessary to pursue these goals are: 1) elected officials; 2) free, fair and frequent elections; 3) freedom of expression; 4) alternative sources of information; 5) associational autonomy; and 6) inclusive citizenship. Dahl's (1998) conditions for democracy were found to be the closest to the theory of democracy put forward in this study.

The next question was which measure of democracy this study should use. Three main factors were considered.:

1. Whether a measure incorporates Dahl's conditions for democracy, particularly as these elaborate on the theoretical standing on democracy taken in this study.
2. Whether the area of interest is measuring the level of democracy or in making a simple distinction between democracy and non-democracy. These first two factors have been the principle concerns of researchers in this area. Lipset (1959), Lipset (1994), Barro (1999), Azad (2000b) and a host of other works have used the level of democracy while some other works (e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000) have found the distinction between democracy and non-democracy more interesting. This study has focused on the former as the levels of the conditions that impact on democracy (as

discussed above) vary between countries and are, therefore, more comparative.

3. Which measure of democracy was most compatible with our study sample in terms of the coverage of countries and time-frame.

Selection of measurement tools

Scholars have developed a number of indices designed to measure democracy (Appendix 3.1). The conceptualisation of democracy underlying the various indices differs in some respects. Methodological variations are also found. Some indices with a scale measure degrees of democracy; some are dichotomous, distinguishing only between democracy and non-democracy; some others are trichotomous, with a third category coming between democracy and the purer forms of dictatorship. All of those indices have both strengths and weaknesses mainly in terms of reliability and error (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). Among those indices, a selection was made from those that measure "level" of democracy, rather than those that endeavour to distinguish between "democracy" and "non-democracy". From those measuring the democracy "level", the "Freedom House", "Polity" and "Vanhanen" measures were selected, as they:

- were more-or-less compatible with the conceptualisation of democracy; and:
- best fitted the study sample in terms of size, coverage of countries and time-frame (Appendix 3.1).

In addition, two reasons led to the selection more than one index. Firstly, some of the differences between the indices result in some corresponding differences in their datasets (Appendix 3.2). Secondly, these indices have been used both individually and combined in different studies. For example, Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) have used the Freedom House and Polity indices together, Kim & Lee (2009) used the Freedom House and Vanhanen indices together, while Rindermann (2007) has used all these three indices together. In addition, O'Loughlin et al. (1998); Barro (1999); and Kown (2004), for example, have used the Freedom House index while Wejnert (2005) the Polity index. Definitions,

methodologies, advantages and disadvantages of these three measures of democracy are discussed below.

Freedom/ Freedom House democracy index.

This study's primary measure of democracy was based on the Freedom House indices (also referred to here as "Freedom House") (*Freedom in the World*, n.d.), which have been used by many other scholars in quantitative work on democracy (e.g., Barro, 1999; Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Azad, 2004b). Freedom House hosts two indices: Political Rights and Civil Liberties. To develop these indices, it conducts surveys on the basis of two separate checklists (Appendix 3.3). The Political Rights checklist focuses on electoral process, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government, and some other additional discretionary political rights questions. Freedom House considers the extent to which a system offers voters the opportunity to choose freely from among candidates, and to what extent the candidates are chosen independently of the state. The Political Rights checklist also focuses on whether there are effective opposition political party(ies) or group(s); and whether rights of cultural, ethnic, and religious minority groups are considered and upheld.

The Freedom House Civil Liberties checklist highlights freedom of expression and belief, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. They cover all the countries and the year-range under this study (1981-2005). Both Political Rights and Civil Liberties scores range from 1-7, representing most to least (Appendix 3.4). According to Freedom House methodology (*Freedom House Methodology*, n.d.), a country with a 1-2.5 average combined score of these two components is categorised as "Free", 3-5.5 as "partly Free" and 5.5-7 as "Not-Free" (Appendix 3.4). In this study, every country's "each year's scores" for Political Rights and Civil Liberties were aggregated to produce a democracy score, which ranged from 2-4 points. Then, because the lower figures represent bigger values in the original numerical Freedom House data, the figures were rearranged so that the larger figures represented larger values to help with the interpretation (Appendix 3.5). Thus, on the 2-14 point scale, "2" means least democracy while "14" means most democracy.

Without doubt, the components of Political Rights and Civil Liberties measures are relevant with regard to construct validity; they cover essentially the entire range of basic democratic criteria. The problem, however, is that there are some other things that seem dubious or irrelevant to the measurement of democracy as conceptualised in this study. For example, where political rights are concerned, the treatment of traditional monarchies can be challenged. It is questionable whether an unspecified “consultation with the people” (Appendix 3.3) can substitute for elections as a method for according influence to the population. The checklist for civil liberties also features such components as free enterprise, property rights, a lack of corruption, and equality and independence in work and family life. It could be argued that values such as these do not belong among the basic procedural criteria of democracy although often thought to be linked.

In summary, the Freedom House indices appear to perform poorly methodologically; however, are strong in regards to construct validity. The great majority of measurements employed seem to be relevant from a conceptual standpoint. The checklists include all necessary basic components although the measures also include are some additional components as noted above, which were not regarded as essential for this study. .

Polidem/ Polity democracy index.

The second measure of democracy used was the Polity IV democracy index (also referred to here as “Polity”) (*Polity IV Annual Time-Series*, n.d.), which has also been used by many other researchers (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006). According to the Polity project¹, a mature and internally coherent democracy might be operationally defined as one in which political participation is fully competitive, executive recruitment is elective, and constraints on the chief executive are substantial (*Polity IV Dataset Users’ Manual*, n.d.). The Polity democracy index ranges from 0 (least democracy) to 10 (most democracy) and is derived from

¹ (a US-based political conceptual scheme that deals with political regime characteristics and transitions which covers from the year 1800-present)

coding the competitiveness of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and the constraints on the chief executive.

According to the Polity Project, fully competitive political participation is ensured with the presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders. In addition, institutionalised constraints are needed on the exercise of executive power (*Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual*, n.d.). In this study, three standardized authority codes in the Polity democracy index: -66, -77 and -88; were considered least (0) democracy in this study. The three standardised authority codes, according to the *Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual* (n.d.) are explained below.

The Polity Index's three standardised authority codes.

Code of -66: A -66 represents a period of "interruption". Operationally, if a country is occupied by foreign powers during war, terminating the old form of government (polity) then re-establishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, the Polity index codes the intervening years as an interruption until an independent polity is re-established. If foreign powers intervene during an "interregnum period" (coded as "-77" as explained below) in order to provide assistance in re-establishing political order within the polity, the period of foreign intervention is coded as an interruption until a new polity emerges and establishes independent authority. Periods of interruption are also coded for the participants involved in short-lived attempts at the creation of ethnic, religious, or regional federations.

Code of -77: A code of -77 indicates periods of "interregnum," where there is a complete collapse of central political authority. This absence of central authority is most likely to occur during periods of internal war. Moreover, like the -88 ("transition" code explained below) and -66 codes, a -77 is entered for the year in which the interregnum began, regardless of the month of its origin, and for each year prior to the year in which central authority is regained or a new polity is established. Two warnings are associated with the -77 code:

1) If the interregnal period results in the formation of a new polity, and it is less than a year, the period is usually incorporated without separate mention in the "transition period" of the next polity (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual (n.d.).

2) If a country is occupied by foreign powers during wartime, terminating the old polity, then re-establishes a polity after foreign occupation ends, the intervening years are coded as an interregnum if a "new" polity is established (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, (n.d.). Code of -88: A -88 code indicates a period of transition. Some new polities are preceded by a "transition period" during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be so established, in a procedure involving constitutional conventions and referenda. During this period of transition, all indicators of authority characteristics are scored -88.

The Polity index appears to be weakest in construct validity. For example, in terms of free and fair elections, it lacks questions touching on the breadth of the suffrage and the correctness of elections; and does not address the actual power attached to elective offices. In addition, it is not clear what the relevance is of constraints on the executive from a fundamental democratic standpoint. On the one hand, a measure of executive constraints registers cases of unlimited power, a condition marking strongly authoritarian systems. On the other hand, the distribution of power between the executive and parliament in democratic countries is also counted. As a result, France appears more democratic during periods of "cohabitation" than during periods when the president's party forms the government.

Polity's strength is that it displays its components in disaggregated fashion, country by country, so that the material can then be re-processed using other methods of aggregation. It also shows how the coding (with different units of scale for each component) is carried out. As a consequence, this index is often given high marks for its methodology. However, Polity's prime defects lie on the conceptual level. The connection between operative measurements and basic democratic criteria is weak. It is also worth noting that one factor, constraints on

the executive, influences the overall rating of countries above all others. This is, however, the ones component above all others which seems most dubious from the standpoint of construct validity.

Vandem/ Vanhanen democracy index.

The third measure of democracy used for this study was Vanhanen's Democracy Index (also referred to here as the "Vanahanen") (*Vanhanen's Index of Democracy*, n.d.). This index is composed of two indicators: Political Competition and Political Participation. These indicators are combined into the Index of Democratisation by multiplying them and dividing the outcome by 100 (*Polyarchy Dataset Manuscript Introduction*, n.d.). Here competition is measured by the opposition parties' share of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections or both, and a minimum threshold of democracy is a 30 plus percent share. The opposition parties' share is calculated by subtracting the ruling party's share from 100 per cent. If the ruling party gets, for example, 40 percent of the votes, the share of the opposition parties is 60 percent. If data on the distribution of votes are not available, the value of this variable is calculated on the basis of the distribution of seats in parliament.

On the other hand, the percentage of the population which actually voted in the same elections, is used to measure the degree of participation. The total population has been selected as the basis of calculation because more statistical data are calculated on total populations rather than on age structures of electorates. In this case, a minimum threshold of democracy is 10 percent. This percentage is calculated from the total population, not from the adult or enfranchised population. In the case of Index of Democracy, 5.0 index points is the minimum threshold of democracy. The Index of Democracy was used in this study. The strength of this index lies in its simplicity. It has only a few components, and it is relatively easy to get information about them. It has accordingly proved possible to extend this index over an unusually long period. Furthermore, the index is based on simple statistical data, which makes the coding easy and reliable. Thus, Vanhanen's trump card is the limited reliance on subjective judgements.

Vanhanen (*Polyarchy Dataset Manuscript Introduction*, n.d., p.18) himself states: “I think that it is better to use simple quantitative variables with certain faults than more complicated indicators loaded with weights and estimates based on subjective judgements”.

What is gained by using a more simplified approach, however, brings with it costs in other regards. This index has serious defects in conceptual terms. The measurements it applies disregard most of democracy’s procedural ingredients. This index does not attempt to measure the level of civil and political liberties, which Diamond, Linz & Lipset (1990) regard as one of the three important dimensions of democracy. Besides, the electoral components Vanahan does include (*Polyarchy Dataset Manuscript Introduction*, n.d) are too broad to accurately measure particular scenarios which may arise in different countries. For example, a high rate of electoral participation could be seen as a democratic quality criterion; but only if the basic democratic criteria are met. If the elections are rigged or the assembly chosen lacks power, the participation in question is unimportant. Nor does this measurement take account of the possible use of compulsory voting, or the fact that the proportion who vote is smaller in countries with a young population. Party competition, for its part, is in principle a better measurement, since it reflects an aspect of electoral competition. The fault lies in the way it is used: a premium is automatically awarded to countries with a high degree of party fractionalisation. On account of the pronounced party divisions and mandatory voting, for example, Italy became most democratic country in 1992 in the Polity index. Finally, a highly skewed distribution results when these measurements are multiplied by one another. On a scale of 0 to about 40, nearly half of cases have a value of 1 or less over long periods.

Summary of democracy measures selected

The above discussion on three measures of democracy — referred to here as “Freedom House”, “Polity” and “Vanhanen“ — has identified that while each has both advantages and disadvantages, there are some similarities between them in

terms of the key characteristics of democracy. These are, according to the indices, that democracy includes:

1. a rule of elected people;
2. free and fair elections; and
3. competition and people's participation to ensure free and fair elections.

The indices major dissimilarities are that while the Freedom House index encompasses political, social and economic aspects of a society, other two focus on political institutional aspects only. Furthermore, among the political institutions, Polity puts additional importance on constraints on the chief executive while Vanhanen is limited to just political competition and participation. Because of such dissimilarities, this study used three democracy indices instead of one. On the other hand, the similarities between the indices (as described above) justified their selection for this study as they seem heart of democracy. As Huntington (1991, p.6) states in this regard: "The central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern."

GDP per capita/ Economic development.

This study used GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development. GDP per capita is GDP in current prices in US dollars divided by the population of each country (*UN Stat Conversions and Formulas*, n.d.). The data have been collected from UN Statistics Division (UN Stat, n.d.), which cover the study's sample across all years and all countries but Taiwan. The data about Taiwan's GDP per capita were collected from a Taiwan government source, which uses the same formula for calculation of GDP per capita as the UN Statistics Division uses (*Taiwan Statistics*, n.d.).

Researchers in the area of democratisation have so far used a number of indicators of economic development, where GDP per capita figures prominently. The works that have used GDP per capita as an economic indicator include Barro (1999); Przeworski et al. (2000); Lee (2002); Kown (2004); Azad (2004b); Linder & Bächtiger (2005); Acemoglu & Robinson (2006) Mela (2009); Brownlee (2009); Kim & Lee (2009). In addition, some researchers (e.g., Wejnert, 2005) have used

GNP (Gross National Product) per capita while others have used some other indicators of economic development (e.g., natural logarithm of energy consumption per capita: Bollen, 1979). On the whole, researchers in the area of democratisation have tended to use growth or change over time in GDP per capita as an indicator of economic development. The section below reviews the relevant literature to explore the relationship between GDP per capita and economic development.

Generally, economic development is a process whereby simple, low-income national economies are transformed into modern industrial economies. Economic development projects have typically involved large capital investments in infrastructure (roads, irrigation networks, etc.), industry, education, and financial institutions (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, n.d). The World Bank Group (*The World Bank Group Glossary*, n.d.) regards economic development as being a qualitative change and restructuring in a country's economy in connection with technological and social progress. In their view, economic development is closely linked with economic growth. It is notable here that there are some other concepts such as “development”, “human development” are used in contemporary socio-economic research, which may sound similar to “economic development”. This study did not cover those concepts.

Definition of GDP per Capita.

The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER, n.d.) defines GDP, or Gross Domestic Product, as the total market value of goods and services produced within a given period after deducting the cost of goods utilised in the process of production. GDP per capita is calculated by dividing either nominal or real GDP for a given year by the population in that year. Nominal GDP is expressed in current prices (i.e., in common dollars). Real GDP is expressed in constant prices (i.e., in the dollar values of a particular year, which is known as the base period). Real GDP is in effect nominal GDP after adjustment for inflation. Changes in real GDP are often referred to as volume increases in GDP, and are a measure of economic growth. Real GDP per capita is frequently used as an

indicator of how “well off” a country is, since it is a measure of average real income in that country.

Conceptually, economic development and GDP per capita are very closely related concepts. Economic development involves an increase in production of goods and services while GDP per capita calculates the market value of those goods and services. The World Bank Group (*The World Bank Group Glossary*, n.d.) states: “The main indicator of economic development is increasing GNP² per capita or GDP per capita, reflecting an increase in the economic productivity and average material wellbeing of a country's population”. That is why many researchers in the field of democratisation use GDP per capita as the indicator of economic development, which was mentioned earlier in this section. Accordingly, this study also used GDP per capita as the economic development indicator in this thesis.

Estimates of GDP used in this study were at constant 1990 prices in unit US dollars. Although GDP this study used GDP as the indicator of economic development, it has some weaknesses. It is not a complete measure of economic well-being. For example, it covers only market sector activities, and does not therefore include unpaid work. Nor does GDP take account of negative effects of economic activity, such as environmental degradation. Above all, GDP per capita is an average measure; all the people of a country are not equal in terms of wealth. The inadequacies of this measure will be one of the drawbacks of this study, which is addressed further in the Discussion chapter (Chapter Seven) of this thesis.

Although the UN Statistics Division, a globally recognised organisation, is the source of GDP per capita data, there are some possibilities of error in it. According to the UN Statistics Division (*UN Stat Methodology for Data Estimation*, n.d.), annual collections of the national accounts statistics reported to the United Nations Statistics Division by the countries in the form of the National Accounts Questionnaires are supplemented by estimates based on data and proxy

² Gross National Product

economic indicators derived from national and international sources. The sequence or priority of data sources sought to supplement reported data are: publications or internet websites of National Statistical Offices; publications or internet websites of Central banks or relevant government ministries; economic surveys and estimates prepared by the Economic Commissions of the United Nations; estimates and indicators available from other international organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other international institutions; studies prepared by experts under the United Nations technical cooperation programmes; and economic reports and studies by regional development banks. The price series are converted into US dollars by applying the corresponding exchange rates as reported by the IMF.

This study used GDP per capita data in different forms for different purposes.

These were:

GDP: These were the raw time series data about GDP per capita in US dollars covering all the 24 countries and 25 years for each country in the study. The graphical presentations in Chapter Five, used the average of this raw GDP data about each country for the whole period under study.

GDP_cat: A variation was found in GDP per capita between the countries under study. For example, Japan's GDP per capita was US\$ 35,593.00 in 2005 while Myanmar's GDP per capita was just US\$ 249.00 (Appendix 3.6). When this diversity was identified, the continuous GDP data were placed into four categories. If all countries had been included in one series it would seem that countries with large disparities were being compared with one another which could be misleading. On the other hand, using low and high GDP categories could assist in explaining different high and low levels of democracy in various countries, which addresses part of this study's main research question (mentioned in the beginning of this chapter). Some scholars (e.g., Muller, 1995; Lee, 2002) have used such economic categories of countries in their samples to measure the effects of those categories on democracy. Muller (1995) listed countries in descending order of GDP per capita and groups them as high-income, upper-middle-income, middle-

income, low-income, and Communist regimes. Lee (2002) assigned countries in his sample to four different categories depending on their GNP (Gross National Product) per capita.

The World Bank (n.d.) categorises countries on the basis of each country's Gross National Income (GNI) for the current year. As this study used GDP per capita, and covers the 1981-2005 period; and since GDP, GNP, GNI vary over time in terms of amount, the above country categorisation procedures used by other researchers and the World Bank were not considered appropriate for this study. Accordingly,, in this study all 24 countries were divided into four categories on the basis of each country's average GDP per capita in US dollars for 25 years (1981-2005). The four categories ranged from very low to very high GDP countries. . The categories, and their respective codes, were:

1 =Very High GDP countries (\$168-297 or less GDP per capita)

2=High GDP countries (\$394-669 GDP per capita)

3=Low GDP countries (\$800-3,159 GDP per capita)

4= Very Low GDP countries (\$7,738-26,829 or more GDP per capita).

Explanation of the categorisation process is shown in Appendix 3.6, and Chapter Five (Table 5.1) explains which country belongs to which GDP category.

Four correlation graphs were produced for each of the democracy measures discussed earlier (Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen). The four graphs had the following GDP category labels as independent (x) variables:

GDP_VH: Very High GDP per capita.

GDP_H: High GDP per capita.

GDP_L: Low GDP per capita.

GDP_VL: Very Low GDP per capita.

The correlation graphs are presented in Chapter Five (Figures 5.3-5.5).

Form or forms of government.

Przeworski et al., (2000) used this variable to measure its influence on democracy. The forms of government were coded: "1" if parliamentary; "2" if strong president; and "3" if if the president was directly elected by an assembly. In this study, data

were collected from the *Database of Political Institutions* (Beck et al, 2001). The reliable side of this variable is that its definition is very clear and it is easy to extrapolate data along with respective histories for each country. However countries may have a parliamentary form of government that appears like a presidential one because the prime minister, using strong party command, played their role in almost the same way as president does in the presidential form of government. This lack of ability to distinguish between such cases may limit the utility of this variable.

To measure the impact of the forms of government on democratisation, the different forms were divided into three categories with arbitrary codes. Definitions of these categories are given below.

1 = Parliamentary: Countries in which the legislature elects the chief executive are parliamentary, with the following exception: if that assembly or group cannot easily recall the elected person (if they need a two-thirds majority of votes to impeach, or must dissolve themselves while forcing the elected person out) then the system is considered presidential.

2 = Strong Presidential: Systems with unelected executives are considered strong presidential form of government.

3 = Presidential: Systems with presidents who are elected directly or by an electoral college, whose only function is to elect the president.

Form_N: For use in graphical presentation in Chapter Five, the forms of government were divided into three scalar categories to give them least-to-most value in terms of expected relationships with democracy. Those categories were: “1” for Strong Presidential; “2” for Presidential; and “3” for Parliamentary form of government. This variable was used for graphical presentation to assist analysis, in order to make comparisons between countries with regard to their average status with “form of government” and “democracy” score for the whole period under study, i.e. Figures 5.19, 5.39 and 5.59. In the graph, the Y axis shows least to most (bottom to top) democracy scale, X axis represents least to most (left to right) scalar categories for the forms of government (i.e., Strong Presidential, Presidential, and Parliamentary) while the points where the average democracy

score and the average status with forms of government for each country meet are indicated by the name of the countries. The data and codes for democracy and medium scores for each country for the period under study were averaged in the graphical presentations. Definitions of the categories used for the graphical presentations are the same as the ones of the categories in “Form or forms of government “discussed immediately above.

Media.

A country’s media may have an impact on the modes of regime, and in Asia the media in many countries seem to be restricted. In this study, Freedom House media data (*Freedom of the Press*, n.d.) were used to measure if there was any impact of media on democratisation. Mela (2009) uses this data to investigate the relationship between corruption and lack of the freedom of media. The Freedom House media index rates countries annually in terms of the freedom of media on the basis of their surveys (Appendix 3.7). The survey questionnaire includes laws and regulations that influence media content, political pressures and controls on media content, economic influences over media content, repressive actions (e.g., killing of journalists, physical violence against journalists, or facilities, censorship, self-censorship, harassment, expulsions).

There are both print and broadcasting media ratings in the Freedom House dataset. From the years 1981-1988, there were separate ratings for the two media but from 1989-2005 they were unified. Countries were rated as “Free”, “Partly Free” and “Not-Free” for both media forms separately. First, the ratings for the media were coded: “Free” as 1; “Partly Free” as 2; and “Not-Free” as 3. Then, the separate ratings for the two media were added and quantified as follows:

1 = both print and broadcasting media were not free;

2= both print and broadcasting media were partly free, or one of them was partly free while the other was either not free, or free;

3= both print and broadcasting media are partly free.

As well as using this media variable in a regression model as an independent variable, to assist in analysis this variable was used for graphical presentation

(Figures 5.21, 5.41 and 5.61 in Chapter Five in order to compare the countries' average media status and democracy scores for the period under study. In the graphs created to explore this variable, the Y axis shows least to most (bottom to top) on the democracy scale, the X axis represents least to most (left to right) scalar categories of media (i.e., Not-Free, Partly-Free and Free) while the points where the average democracy score and the average media status for each country meet are indicated by the name of the countries. The data and codes relating to democracy and media for each country for the whole period under study are averaged in the graphical presentations.

One significant limitation of this variable is that the Freedom House survey does not assess the degree to which the media in any country serve responsibly or maintain ethical standards. So, it may be considered weak side of this variable.

Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton).

International organisations, especially lending organisations, set a number of conditions for their member countries to be eligible for loans. These conditions include good governance, human rights and transparency along with a number of other factors.. As international lending agencies Bretton Wood institutions are unparalleled as their operations are worldwide and of great volume. According to *World Bank/ About Us* (n.d.), Bretton Wood organisations include: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); The International Development Association (IDA); The International Finance Corporation (IFC); The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and The International Centre for Settlement and Investment Disputes (ICSID). To measure the effect of these institutions on democratisation, the countries under this study were divided into two categories with arbitrary codes:

- 1 = member of any Bretton Wood institutions;
- 2 = not a member of any Bretton Wood institutions.

Bretton_N: To create the graphs presented in Chapter 5, the countries were divided into two scalar categories to give them least-to-most values: "1", if not a

member of any Bretton Wood institutions while “2” if a member of any Bretton Wood institutions. (Note these categories reversed the coding as presented above). This variable was used in a graph to compare countries’ average membership status with Bretton Wood institutions and their democracy score for the whole period under study (as shown in Chapter Five, Figures 5.20, 5.40 and 5.60). In the graph, the Y axis shows least to most (bottom to top) on the democracy scale, X axis represents least to most (left to right) scalar categories of status with Bretton Wood institutions (i.e., not member and member) while the points where the average democracy score and the status with Bretton Wood institutions for each country meet are indicated by the name of the countries. The graphs average the data and codes relating to democracy and Bretton Wood institutions for each country over the whole period under study. In contrast to the use in this study, Mansfield & Pevehouse (2006) use international organisations as dependent variable while democratisation was independent.

Overall, when evaluating the use of the Bretton variable for use in this current study, the definitions of and data for this variable appeared reliable. However, by including this variable in this study, many other international organisations such as UN bodies and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) have been omitted despite being active in the Asian region, because they are not included in the Bretton measure. It may weaken the validity of the variable by not measuring international organisations as a whole.

In conclusion, most of the variables used in the proposed study and data about them appear mostly valid and reliable, although potential limitations have been noted. Importantly, data for a number of variable variables do not cover some of the years of the 25-year period and countries under study, which may place limitations on the research outcome.

Evaluation of the state of political regimes.

Through the use of graphical presentation, Chapter 4 describes the state of political regimes in this study’s sample. This description is divided into three

sections with three separate measures of democracy and their datasets: Freedom House, Vanhanen and Polity. To aid interpretation, countries raw democracy scores, according to the three selected democracy indices, were calculated into percentage points in each graph. Each of the indices was transformed into an index of 0-100: Freedom House from a 2-14 point index (Appendix 3.8); the Polity from a 0-10 point index (Appendix 3.9); and the Vanhanen index was converted in a two stage process where the 0-33 range of democracy scores in the study sample were recalculated into a 0-10 point index, that index was converted into a 0-100 index (Appendix 3.10).

Statistical analysis.

This study's research hypothesis was that economic development and some elements other than economic development drove democratisation in Asia. Thus "democratisation/ democracy" was the dependent variable, and "economic development" and "elements other than economic development" were the independent variables. The three measures of democracy (Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen) were analysed separately.

Each analysis began with calculating correlations, to examine on how much impact economic development had on democratisation in each of the four GDP categories of countries. The correlations provided an indication of the degree of relationship between economic development and democratisation within each GDP category of each of the countries in the study. Regression analysis was used to explain the impact of each GDP category on democratisation within Asia. The regression model used forms of governments (Form), Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton), freedom of print and electronic media (Media) and years (Time) as independent variables ("elements other than economic development") in addition to GDP per capita (economic development) as the main independent variable. For regression analysis, this research employed Linear Mixed Models (LMM). The LMM manages data where observations are not independent. The LMM is a further generalisation of the General Linear Model (GLM), designed to better

support analysis of a continuous dependent variable for random effects, hierarchical effects and repeated measures (Garson, 2008).

Repeated measures is a multi-level modelling approach included in the LMM. “Multi-level mixed models are based on a multi-level theory which specifies expected direct effects of variables on each other within any one level, and which specifies cross-level interaction effects between variables located at different levels” (Garson, 2008). The LMM deals with observations at more than one level in terms of unit of analysis.

Cross-sectional, longitudinal, or time-series data can be regarded as special forms of nested data. Garson (2008) and Kato, Herbert, Verdellen, Hagenaaars, Van Minnen, & Keijsers (2005) considered the use of this form of nested data as “repeated measures” in the LMM. This study of democratisation used 25 years (Time) in each of the 24 countries in a two-level model. Previous studies (e.g. Snijders, 1996; Verbeke et al., 2001; Wejnert, 2005; Schroeder, 2008) have also used such a model. In the literature, most of the analyses have used longitudinal data from designs in which “measurements are taken repeatedly within one session which could last for a day, a month, a year or even a decade depending on the nature of the study” (Kato et al., 2005, p. 712). This study applied the repeated measures component of the Linear Mixed Model to the yearly structured data.

Observations in repeated measures are often correlated rather than independent (e.g., before-after studies, time series data, and matched-pairs designs). This study’s data was time-series, and the format was one year per row and, thus, 25 rows per country included (as the time-frame of the study sample was 1981-2005). Each data row also contained a three-letter country identification code (the country code mentioned earlier), and whatever effects were modelled (e.g., GDP_cat; Form; Media) as independent variables while democracy was listed as the dependent variable. According to Garson (2008), data used for repeated measures in the LMM are “conventionally” but not necessarily mean-centred. In

this study, since all the independent variables were categorical while only the dependent variable was continuous, the data were not mean-centred.

A two-level model was used in this study design. There is a considerable amount of literature on using the two-level model for the analysis of time-series data. (e.g., Snijders, 1996; Verbeke et al., 2001; Wejnert, 2005; Schroeder, 2008) The “repeated” option in the LMM models within-subject variance (i.e., variance in the same subjects over time). One may create a model in which “level 1” is within-subjects for the variance among repeated measures for given subjects on average, and “level 2” is the between-subjects variance, with the subjects considered a random effect.

In this study, “country” was the subject, and 25 observations (25 years — from 1981 to 2005) were the repeated measures. A model was created where level 1 is within-countries for the variance among the observations over 25 years (Time) for the countries on the average. On the other hand, level 2 was between-countries variance, with countries considered a random effect. “Country” was thus both the subjects’ variable and the grouping variable (Combinations), meaning country was level 1 as subjects’ variable and level 2 as combinations’ variable

The data were analysed using the Mixed Models (Linear) programme of SPSS 15.0 for Windows that implements Repeated measures. That programme generated two tables from the output: a “Tests for Fixed Effects” table and a “Tests of Covariance Parameters” table. If the F-test for a Factor(s) variable was found significant on the “Fixed Effects” table, the democracy score was determined to vary by that variable of measurement within the same country. On the “Tests of Covariance Parameters” table, if "Intercept[Subject=id]" was significant by the Wald test, then it was determined that democracy scores varied between countries. For example, if the estimates for the intercept were 750 and the estimate for the residual parameter was 250, with no other parameters, then 75 per cent of the variance in democracy score would be attributable to variability between countries.

A graphical method was applied for the residual analysis and the following data were used for these: PRED_1; RESID_1; U_Resid. Those data other than U_Resid were generated by running the Repeated measures in the LMM programme and checking them after clicking “Save” in SPSS. U_Resid data were calculated by subtracting FXPRED_1 from PRED_1 following Landau & Everitt (2003).

After running Repeated measures-LMM, a number of graphs were generated from the model to explore interactions between categories of GDP per capita and year and then to further examine the degree to which each category (GDP per capita, form of government, media and membership or non-membership of Bretton Wood institutions's) contributed to democracy. After this variable-wise explanation, using results displayed in four graphs, a -country-wise analysis was carried out focusing on each country's average democracy score by GDP per capita, form of government, media category and membership of Bretton Wood institutions. Variable-wise analysis indicated how much democracy or non-democracy each variable caused in Asia while country-wise analysis provided an indication of how much democracy each variable caused in each country.

Case studies

Case studies were used to adequately address some of this study's research questions. The results of the quantitative analyses (presented in Chapter Five) indicated that mainly economic development, positive political and social institutions and international organisations like Bretton Wood institutions have driven democratisation in Asia. While those findings indicated that a number of rich countries (e.g., South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) had high levels of democracy during the period under study, there was evidence that some countries with considerably lower level of economic development had also achieved high levels of democracy in that same period (e.g., India). In addition, the data presented in Chapter Five show that some rich countries like Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia have not been democratised to a great degree, while some other

countries like Bangladesh and Mongolia have achieved moderately higher level of democratisation despite poverty, media that are not fully free, and relatively young parliamentarianism.

Three countries were chosen as case studies to explore these variations. Singapore was selected to represent one of the “outlier” countries; and Taiwan to represent a country conformant to the study’s main hypothesis (that economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005). Because it appeared that the results of the statistical analyses presented in Chapter Five did not adequately explain democratisation in some countries (such as Bangladesh and Mongolia), Bangladesh was selected as a third case study (see also the conclusion of Chapter Five). The case studies were intended to give life to the statistical data by providing a lively and detailed picture of the individual countries selected, and possibly avoiding potentially erroneous conclusions. Methodologies for the case studies are described in the respective case study chapters (Chapters Six, Seven and Eight).

Chapter Four: State of Democracy in Asia

The Introduction and the Methodology chapters (Chapters One and Two) provide a detailed background and explanation of “democracy” as applied in this study. Three measures of democracy were selected that were most compatible with the philosophical understanding of democracy underpinning the study, as well as being suitable for the study sample : Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen. The Methodology chapter (Chapter Three), discusses the differences between these three measures of democracy; however on the whole they support the viewpoint taken here about democracy.

This chapter focuses on the state of democracy and democratisation in each country of the study sample as well as in Asia in general over time from 1981 through 2005, according to the three measures of democracy. In addition, the discussion also focuses on a comparison of those measures. The chapter begins with reviewing the findings regarding individual countries and concludes with the results for Asia as a whole.


Results for Individual Countries in Asia

Afghanistan.

Afghanistan (AFG) has for centuries been caught in the middle of great power and regional rivalries. Its population had their first real prospects for peace in years in late 2001 after American-led military strikes and Afghan opposition forces routed the ultra-conservative Taliban movement (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). Of the 25 years of monitoring reviewed here, Afghanistan, a South Asian country, had zero democracy for a total of 18 years on the Freedom House scale. It spent five years with a score of 16.67 percent democracy; one year with 25 percent and one year with a democracy score of 33.33 percent (Appendix 4.1 & Figure 4.1). A total of nine changes took place in the country’s democracy scores, four of which were negative, while five were positive. Afghanistan had a zero

democracy score for 17 years from the beginning of the study period (1981-1997), while for the last four consecutive years starting from 2002 the country successfully avoided a zero democracy score, and ended the the study period in 2005 with its highest democracy score of 33.33 percent.

Figure 4.1. State of democracy in Afghanistan, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



However, according to Polity and Vanhanen indices, Afghanistan was with zero democracy during the whole period we observed (Appendix 4.1 & Figure 4.1). And, because of Afghanistans’ zero democracy scores on the Polity and Vanhanen indices, the Freedom House index was left invariable, producing no results when correlations were calculated. The number of observations (years) by Freedom House and Polity was 25 each while by Vanhanen was 20 (Appendix 4.25).

Bangladesh.


Bangladesh (BGD), another South Asian country, has a quite long history of military rule. The 1975 assassination of President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman by soldiers precipitated 15 years of often-turbulent military rule and continues to polarise Bangladesh politics. The country's democratic transition began with the resignation in December 1990 of the last military ruler, General H. M. Ershad, after weeks of pro-democracy demonstrations (Hoq, 1994).

According to Freedom House, democracy in Bangladesh rose to 75 percent in 1991, with this transition, , and scores ranged between 58.33 percent and 75 percent until 2001. Notably, there was a considerable instability in the Freedom House democracy score for Bangladesh during the 25-year period (Appendix 4.2 & Figure 4.2). The country experienced 12 changes in its democracy score, five of which were positive and seven negative. Bangladesh had two years with a score of 75 percent democracy, five years each with 66.67 percent, 58.33 percent, and 50 percent; then three years with 41.67 percent, and again with 33.33 percent, and finally two years of 25 percent. There were no zero scores recorded in the 25 years of this study. While the country's democratic score jumped to 75 percent in 1991 from the previous year's 33.33 percent, it was short-lived. The score then fell to 66.67 percent in 1993 and fluctuated between 58.33 and 66.67 percent until the year 2001. For the last four consecutive years of this study period the democracy score was at a decade low of 50 percent. This country witnessed a much higher rate of instability in its democracy score between the years 1981 and 1990; scores rose and fell seven times in 10 years, ranging between 25 percent and 58.33 percent.

On the Polity scale, the whole 25-year period for Bangladesh is divided into two parts in terms of the level of democracy. Polity did not find any democracy in the first part — the first decade under study. In the last part, starting from 1991, the democracy score jumped to 60 percent that stayed in the same position until 2005, the final year included in this study (Appendix 4.2 & Figure 4.2). On the other hand, the country's democracy score on the Vanhanen index is divided into several parts rather than Polity's two parts. On the Vanhanen scale, the

Bangladesh score in the first year (1981) was 25 percent democracy, followed by four years with a score of zero democracy, then another four years with 13 percent democracy and again one year of a zero score in 1990. In the last decade of the study period, Bangladesh had a continuous growth in its democracy score: the score jumped from zero in 1990 to 43.05 percent in 1991; remained the same until 1995, and then rose again to 51.52 percent in 1996 where it stayed until the year 2000, the final year covered by Polity (Appendix 4.2 & Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2. State of democracy in Bangladesh, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




However, despite considerable differences in the findings of the three indices described above, their data for Bangladesh correlated at the high (0.01) levels (2-tailed). Freedom House’s Pearson correlation with Polity was .775 and with Vanhanen was .914 while the same between the latter two was .950 (Appendix 4.25).

Bhutan.

On the Freedom House scale, the democracy score for Bhutan (BTN), a South Asian monarchy, descended quite precipitously from a plateau during the first two-thirds of the 25 year period under study (Appendix 4.3 & Figure 4.3). There were five changes in the country's democracy score, three of which were negative while two were positive. From the years 1981-1988 the country's democracy score was 33.33 percent. Then, the score fell to 25 percent in 1989 and remained at the same level until 1991, but decreased to 8.33 percent in 1992 and zero in the next year. Before recovering some ground in 1998, Bhutan continued with a zero percent Freedom House democracy score for five years from 1993. The 8.33 percent democracy score continued from 1987-2001 and increased to 25 percent in 2002, did not change until 2005.

Figure 4.3. State of democracy in Bhutan, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




According to both Polity and Vanhanen indices, Bhutan scored at zero percent democracy during the whole period under study (Appendix 4.3 & Figure 4.3). And, because of Bhutan's zero democracy scores on these indices, the Freedom House index was left constant, so no correlation was found between the indices. in regard to Afghanistan (Appendix 4.25).

Brunei.

Brunei (BRN), a hereditary sultanate, got its first written constitution in 1959 that provided for a legislative council. In 1962, the leftist Brunei People's Party (PRB), which sought to remove the sultan from power, won all 10 elected seats in the 21-member council. But the results were annulled and then a PRB-backed rebellion ensued, which was crushed and the sultan then assumed constitutionally authorised emergency powers for a stipulated two-year period. However, these powers have since been renewed every two years, and elections have not been held since 1965 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). This Southeast Asian country, according to the Freedom House scale, experienced variations in its democracy score from between 8.33 and 25 percent for the whole study period of 25 years (Appendix 4.4 & Figure 4.4). The country had 25 a percent democracy score for more than half of the whole period, nine years of 16.67 percent and three years of 8.33 percent democracy. There were five changes in the country's democracy score, three of which were positive. In 1988, the score fell to 16.67 from the previous 25 percent and stayed there for another year. It rose to 25 percent in 1990 and was unchanged for another year. However, the democracy score declined again to 8.33 percent in 1992, a score which lasted for three years. In 1995, the democracy score rose to 16.67 percent and continued until 2001. The score increased to 25 percent in 2002 and lasted for the rest of the years under study.

Figure 4.4. State of democracy in Brunei, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



Among the other two indices, the Polity does not cover Brunei, while the Vanhanen recorded zero democracy scores for this country during the entire 20 years that it covered (Appendix 4.4 & Figure 4.4). Because of these factors, the Freedom House measure remained constant and there was no correlation between the three democracy indices in relation to Brunei (Appendix 4.25).

Cambodia.


According to Freedom House 2006 Country Report, (n.d.), after winning independence from France in 1953, Cambodia (KHM) was ruled in succession by King Norodom Sihanouk, the US-backed Lon Nol regime in the early 1970s; and the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979. Vietnam invaded it in December 1978 and installed a Communist government in January 1979 under the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP). During the 1980s, the KPRP government fought the allied armies of Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge, and a former premier, Son Sann. An internationally-brokered peace deal signed in 1991 formally ended the war and put the impoverished country on the path to multiparty

elections, although the Khmer Rouge continued to wage a low-grade insurgency from the jungle (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

On the Freedom House scale, Cambodia (another Southeast Asian nation) had a score of zero democracy for the first 10 years of the 25 years included in this study (Appendix 4.5 & Figure 4.5). In the remaining 15 years, the country had its highest democracy score of 41.67 percent and lowest of 8.33 percent, but the decade of the 1990s was notably unstable. The country scored 16.67 percent democracy in 1991 and 1992, and 41.67 percent in 1993 and 1994. From the years 1995-2000, the democracy score was 16.67 percent except for the year 1997 when it was 8.33 percent. During the last five years, the score was steady at 25 percent. The country experienced six changes in its democracy score, four of which were positive while two were negative.

On the Polity scale, for the first half of the study period Cambodia's democracy score was lowest, but higher in the second half (Appendix 4.5 & Figure 4.5). The country had a zero democracy score for the first 12 years until 1992. During the remaining 12 years, it had a 30 percent democracy score, except for one zero score in 1997. According to the Vanhanen index, among the 20 years where it collected data in the study period, the first 12 years Cambodia scored zero percent democracy, and after that the score improved but stayed between 17.5 and 16.19 percent (Appendix 4.5 & Figure 4.5). During the last eight years, it scored 17.5 percent democracy until 1996 and then 16.19 percent through to the year 2000 except one zero score in 1997.

Figure 4.5. State of democracy in Cambodia, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




However, despite some differences in the findings of their observations, democracy data from the three indices for were found to be highly correlated ((0.01) level (2-tailed)). Freedom House’s Pearson correlation with Polity was .817 and with Vanhanen is.776 while the same between the latter two was .999 (Appendix 4.25).

China

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been in power since 1949. Aiming to tighten the party’s grip on power, CCP chief Mao Zedong led several brutal, mass ideological campaigns that resulted in millions of deaths and politicised nearly every aspect of public life between 1966 and 1976. Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping emerged as China’s (CHN) paramount leader. While maintaining the CCP’s monopoly on power, Deng scaled back the party’s role in everyday life and launched China’s gradual transition from a central planning system to a

market economy. The party showed its intent to hold on to power at all costs with the June 1989 massacre of hundreds, if not thousands, of student protesters in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

Figure 4.6. State of democracy in China, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



This Northeast Asian country's democracy scores, according to the Freedom House scale, formed three eras: 16.67 percent for the first eight years, zero for the middle nine years and 8.33 percent for the last eight years of the 25-year period under study (Appendix 4.6 & Figure 4.6). A total of two changes occurred in the country's democracy score, one of which was positive. The positive change took place in 1998 and the score lasted until the end of the period under study.


On both Polity and Vanhanen indices, China had zero democracy for the whole period observed through these indices. No correlations were found between the democracy indices for China (Appendix 4.6).

India.

India (IND) achieved independence from Britain in 1947, since then it has been under a parliamentary regime. The centrist, secular Congress Party ruled continuously for the first five decades of independence, except during periods of opposition from the years 1977-1980 and from 1989-1991 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). On the Freedom House scale this South Asian country enjoyed a score of 75 percent democracy for 18 years, including the first ten years and the last eight years of the observed 25-year period, and its democracy score never fell below 50 percent (Appendix 4.7 & Figure 4.7). However, during the middle seven years from 1991-1997, the country's democracy scores fluctuated somewhat. The first two years were scored at 58.33 percent democracy, the mid-three years 50 percent and the last two years 66.67 percent. A total of four changes took place in the country's democracy score, two of which were positive and two others negative.

On the Polity scale, India was scored at higher levels of democracy than on Freedom House and Vanhanen scales. It had 80-90 percent democracy on the Polity scale during the whole study period (Appendix 4.7 & Figure 4.7). The country spent the first 14 consecutive years with 80 percent democracy and the last 10 consecutive years with 90 percent democracy. According to the Vanhanen measure, India's democracy score ranged between 49.7 percent and 75.97 percent during the index's covered period of 20 years (1981-2000) (Appendix 4.7 & Figure 4.7). On the Polity measure, India spent the first three years with a 49.7 percent democracy score, then five years with a score of 50 percent and then its score jumped to 62.91 percent in 1989, where it remained for another year. The score again decreased to 53.13 percent in the following year, and remained the same until 1995. In 1996, it increased to 73.4 percent and 75.97 percent in 1997. Then the final two years of the Polity rating (1999-2000), the country had a score of 50.24 percent democracy.

Figure 4.7. State of democracy in India, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




Although all the indices show relatively high levels overall of democracy in India, there are some differences between the trends of democracy scores according to the three indices. Because of this, although Polity data have a positive correlation of .543 with Vanhanen’s, it has an insignificant negative correlation with Freedom House data (Appendix 4.25).

Indonesia.

Indonesia (IDN) won full independence from the Netherlands in 1949. After several parliamentary governments had collapsed, the republic's first president Sukarno concentrated power in the presidency in 1957. With the army's support, General Suharto rebuffed Sukarno's efforts to stay in power and in 1968 formally became president. By January 1998, the rupiah's slide had sent food prices soaring. Suharto resigned on May 21 following months of unprecedented anti-government demonstrations. After Suharto’s resignation, democratic transition started in Indonesia (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). In line with this transition,

according to Freedom House scale democracy scores for this Southeast Asian nation posted rose for three consecutive years until 2000 and there were no changes until 2005 (Appendix 4.8 & Figure 4.8). The democracy scores grew from 16.67 percent in 1997 to 33.33 percent in 1998, then to 50 percent in 1999 and to 58.33 percent in 2000. The 58.33 percent democracy score was the country's highest during the 25-year study period. Other than this, the country spent the first three years with a 33.33 percent democracy score, then four years with 25 percent, another two years with 33.33 percent, and then three years with 25 percent again. Directly after those years, Indonesia's lowest democracy score was recorded as 8.33 percent from the years 1993-1995. In 1996, the score rose again to 16.67 percent. A total of eight changes took place in the country's democracy score, of which five were positive while three were negative.

Figure 4.8. State of democracy in Indonesia, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



On the Polity scale, after the first 18 consecutive years with a zero percent democracy score (1981-1991), this country's democracy scores ranged between 70 and 80 percent (Appendix 4.8 & Figure 4.8). The score went up to 80 percent in 1999 and stayed there for another year before going down to 70 percent in 2001

for three years. Indonesia concluded the study observation period by returning to a democracy score of 80 percent. However, the highest score for this country on the Vanhanen scale was just 39.74 percent which was recorded in both 1999 and 2000, the last two years of Indonesia's 20-year history on this scale (Appendix 4.8 & Figure 4.8). The country recorded just 10.02 percent to 13.06 percent democracy on the Vanhanen scale for the first 18 years. It started the 20-year period with a 12.76 percent democracy 1981; then scored 13.06 percent democracy from 1982-1986; 10.02 percent democracy from 1987-1991; 12.64 percent from 1992-1996 and 10.82 percent in 1997 and 1998.


However, despite considerable differences in the findings of their observations described above, data of the three indices correlated at the high level for Indonesia. Freedom House's Pearson correlation with Polity was .886 and with Vanhanen was .701 while the correlation between the latter two is .989. Freedom House and Polity made 25 observations each regarding Indonesia Vanhanen made 20 (Appendix 4.25).

Japan.

Following its defeat in World War II, Japan (JPN) adopted a U.S.-drafted constitution in 1947 that provided for a parliamentary government, renounced war, and ended the emperor's divine status. Created through a 1955 merger of two conservative parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) dominated Japanese politics during the cold war and presided over the economy's spectacular postwar growth (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.), According to Freedom House, this Northeast Asian country enjoyed 100 percent democracy scores for 10 consecutive years (1981-1990) and its democracy score was never below 83.33 percent during the 25-year study period (Appendix 4.9 & Figure 4.9). During that period there were three changes in Japan's democracy score, two of which were negative. From 1981-1990 Freedom House recorded a level of 100 percent democracy and, with an exception of two years, a democracy score of 91.67 percent from 1991-2005. The exception was a score of 83.33 percent democracy in 1993 and 1994.

According to the Polity index, Japan enjoyed 100 percent democracy scores during the whole 25 years period of the study, proving to be the most outstanding democracy in Asia on Polity's scale (Appendix 4.9 & Figure 4.9). Also on the Vanhanen scale, Japan registered high scores of democracy ranging from 75.07 percent to 95.23 percent for their data collection period of 20 years (Appendix 4.9 & Figure 4.9). After recording a score of 78.5 percent democracy in 1981 and 1982, this country experienced a fall of its score to 76.92 percent in 1983 that continued until 1985. Japan's democracy score fell to again slightly to 75.05 percent in 1986 which lasted until 1989. In 1990, the democracy score increased to 85.51 percent and stayed at the same level for the next three years. The democracy score reached 95.23 percent in 1993 and continued until 1995. The score declined to 80.83 in 1996 and this score was steady until it experienced another fall to 72.69 percent in 2000.

Figure 4.9. State of democracy in Japan, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



Although all three indices show relatively high levels of democracy in Japan, there are some differences between the trends of democracy scores according to the

three indices. These differences lead a strong negative correlation of $-.742$ between Freedom House and Vanhanen indices while Polity data could not be computed for correlation as it is invariable in regard to Japan (Appendix 4.25).

Korea (North).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PRK) was established in the northern part of the Korea Peninsula in 1948, three years after the United States occupied the south of the peninsula, and Soviet forces the north (in 1945), following Japan's defeat in the World War II. North Korea invaded South Korea in 1950 in an attempt to reunify the peninsula under Communist rule. Drawing in the United States and China, the ensuing three-year conflict killed up to two million people on both sides and ended with a ceasefire rather than a peace treaty (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). According to all three scales — Freedom House, Polity, and Vanhanen — North Korea, a Northeast Asian country, recorded a zero percent democracy score during the whole 25-year study period (Appendix 4.10).


Korea (South).

The Republic of Korea (ROK) was established in 1948. During the next four decades, South Korea's military rulers crushed left-wing dissent; kept the country on a virtual war footing in response to the threat from Communist North Korea; and oversaw an industrialisation drive that transformed a poor, agrarian land into one of the world's largest economies. South Korea's democratic transition began in 1987, when the military leader Chun Doo-hwan gave in to widespread student protests and allowed his successor to be chosen in a direct presidential election (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). On the Freedom House scale this Northeast Asian country experienced steady growth in its democracy scores during the entire 25-year period under study, and for the last 18 years had scores ranging from 75 percent to 91.67 percent (Appendix 4.11 & Figure 4.10). The country scored 83.33 percent democracy for 11 consecutive years until 2003; 75 percent for five years from 1988-2002; 50 percent for one year in 1987; 41.67 percent for two consecutive years in 1985 and 1986; 33.33 percent for one year in 1984 and 25 percent for the first three years. For the last two years of this study

South Korea had a score of 91.67 percent democracy. A total of six changes took place in the democracy score over the observed period, and there were no negative ones. The changes took place in 1977, 1979, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988 and 1993.

On the Polity scale too, South Korea's democracy scores grew steadily during the period under study. After scoring zero percent democracy for the first seven years, Korea's score jumped to 70 percent democracy in 1988 and stayed at the same level until moving up to 80 percent in 1998. The country retained this 80 percent score until 2005 the last year of measurement considered in this study (Appendix 4.11 & Figure 4.10). The Vanhanen index also recorded a steady growth in democracy scores for South Korea over the whole period and it became the only country that recorded 100 percent democracy on the Vanhanen index (Appendix 4.11 & Figure 4.10). After scoring 7.33 percent democracy for the first four years and 8.56 percent for the next two years, the country registered a score of 100 percent democracy in 1987. In the next year the score fell slightly to 99.08 percent, but it was unchanged until it fell again to 90.31 percent in 1992. Then the country had 90.31 percent democracy score through to 1995; 90.7 percent in 1996; and 93.35 percent from 1997-1999. It had 86.43 percent democracy in 2000.

Figure 4.10. State of democracy in Korea (South), 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




All three democracy indices were strongly correlated with each other. The Pearson correlation of Freedom House with Polity was .963 and with Vanhanen was .908 ;while the same between Polity and Vanhanen two is .865 (Appendix 4.25).

Laos.

This Southeast Asian nation won independence from Paris in 1953. The Communist Pathet Lao (Land of Lao) seized power in 1975 following the Communist victory in neighbouring Vietnam. The guerrillas set up a one-party state under Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane's LPRP party. Since then, Laos (LAO), a Southeast Asian country, has still been under one-party system (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). On the Freedom House scale, this country recorded two lowest categories of democracy rating during the 25-year study period (Appendix 4.12 & Figure 4.11). It experienced zero democracy from 1981 through 1987 and 8.33 percent democracy from 1988 through 2005.

Figure 4.11. State of democracy in Laos, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



According to the Polity index, Laos had a zero democracy score during the whole 25-year study period (Appendix 4.12 & Figure 4.11), although it scored 1.31 percent democracy during the last four years. This country had a zero percent democracy score for the first 16 years of the 20-year period measured on the Vanhanen scale (Appendix 4.12 & Figure 4.11). In regard to the measurement of democracy in Laos, none of the three indices correlated with any other (Appendix 4.25).

Malaysia.


Malaysia (MYS) was founded in 1963. The ruling National Front coalition has won at least a two-thirds majority in all general elections since 1957 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). A Southeast Asian country, Malaysia showed five changes in its democracy score, of which three were negative and the scores registered an overall downward trend until 2002 (Appendix 4.13 & Figure 4.12). On the Freedom House scale, from 1981-1983 Malaysia's democracy score was

58.33 percent; from 1984-1987 it was 50 percent; from 1988-1997 the score was 41.67 percent; and from 1998-2002 it was 33.33 percent. However, the country showed signs of recovery by posting a 41.67 percent democracy score in 2003 and 50 percent for two consecutive years (2004 and 2005). The country spent its single longest time during the 25-year period with 41.67 percent democracy for 11 years and shortest with 58.33 percent for three years.

On the Polity scale, Malaysia measured at moderate levels of democracy for the 25 years but the last nine years witnessed a downward trend (Appendix 4.13 & Figure 4.12). It remained at a 50 percent democracy score from 1981-2004 and then at 40 percent until 2004.

On the Vanhanen index, the democracy score of Malaysia fluctuated between 33.93 percent and 45.11 percent during the period of 20 years (Appendix 4.13 & Figure 4.12). The country began the study observation period with 34.2 percent democracy score on the Vanhanen; then the score declined to 33.93 percent in 1982 and stayed on the same level for the next four years until increased in 1986 to 36.55 percent. After having a score of 36.55 percent democracy for the next four years, the country recorded its highest level of democracy of 45.11 percent for five consecutive years from 1991. Then the democracy score fell back to 34.5 percent in 1995 and was steady at the same level for the next four years. However, the country experienced its second highest democracy score of 41.5 percent on the Vanhanen scale during the last two years of the 20 year period.

Figure 4.12. State of democracy in Malaysia, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Fredem_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




The Freedom House index had a positive correlation of .534 with the Polity however had a negative one (-.475) with Vanhanen for the Malasian democracy data. There was no significant correlation between Polity and Vanhanen (Appendix 4.25).

Maldives.

President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom has ruled the country since 1978, when he won his first of five, five-year terms under the country's tightly controlled presidential referendum process. Under the 1968 constitution, Maldivians cast straight yes-or-no votes in such referenda on a single candidate chosen by the Majlis (parliament). A 1998 constitutional amendment allowed citizens to declare their candidacies for the presidential nomination, although candidates cannot campaign for the nomination. In October 1998, Gayoom won the approval of a reported 90.9 percent of participating voters (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). Maldives (MDV), a South Asian country, democracy scores trended

downwards on the Freedom House scale, where two negative changes and one positive change took place (Appendix 4.14 & Figure 4.13). During the first five years, the country's democracy measure was 33.33 percent. In 1986 the democracy score decreased to 25 percent, which survived until 1992. But it fell further to 16.67 percent in 1993, and the country spent five years with this score. The democracy score increased markedly to 25 percent in 1998, the only positive change in the country's 25 year history, and that 25 percent score remained unchanged until 2005.

Figure 4.13. State of democracy in Maldives, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



According to the Vanhanen index, Maldives' democracy score ranged between 4.17 percent and nine percent during the 20-year period until the year 2000 (Appendix 4.14 & Figure 4.13). This country scored 4.17 percent democracy in 1981 and 1982.; then 3.67 percent from 1983-1987; 3.04 percent from 1988-1992; 7.42 percent from 1989-1997 and nine percent from 1998-2000. Polity does not cover this country. So, correlation was measured for Maldives between just two


indices, and there was a negative correlation of $-.548$ between the Freedom House and Vanhanen scores (Appendix 4.25).

Mongolia.

In 1921 the Soviet Union backed a Marxist revolution in Mongolia (MNG) that led to the creation in 1924 of a single-party state under the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). For the next 65 years, Mongolia was a Soviet satellite state. Mongolia's democratic transition began in 1990, when the MPRP responded to pro-democracy protests by legalising opposition parties and holding the country's first multiparty elections (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). After the transition, this Northeast Asian country experienced a sharp upward trend of democracy, according to scores on the Freedom House scale, . On that scale, the country experienced three changes in its score, all of which were positive (Appendix 4.15 & Figure 4.14). The score remained at zero for the first nine years until 1989. From zero percent, it jumped to 50 in 1990 and the next year went to 75 percent, a score which lasted until 2001. The score increased to 83.33 in 2002, which continued until the last year of this study.

On the Polity scale, at the beginning of the study's observation period this Northeast Asian country had a zero percent democracy score; but at the end of that period had a score of 100 percent (Appendix 4.15 & Figure 4.14). Its democracy scores changed three times but all changes were positive. For the first nine years until 1989, the country registered a score of zero democracy; 40 percent in 1990 and 1991, 90 percent from 1992-1995 and 100 percent for the remaining years. On the Vanhanen scale at the start of the study period (1981) Mongolia had a zero democracy score and at the end (2000) scored 57.6 percent democracy (Appendix 4.15 & Figure 4.14). As with the Polity index, Mongolia's scores changed three times but all changes were positive.. For the first nine years until 1989, the country on Polity index had zero democracy, 40 percent in 1990 and 1991, 90 percent from 1992 through 1995 and 100 percent for the rest of the years until 2005..

Figure 4.14. State of democracy in Mongolia, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




All three indices of democracy correlated in regard to the measurement of democracy in Mongolia. The Pearson correlation of the Freedom House with Polity and Vanhanen scores was .966 and .944 while the correlation between Polity and Vanhanen scores was .996 (Appendix 4.25).

Myanmar.

After being occupied by the Japanese during World War II, Myanmar (MNR) achieved independence from Great Britain in 1948. The military has ruled this country since 1962, when the army overthrew an elected government buffeted by an economic crisis and a raft of ethnic-based insurgencies (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). A Southeast Asian country, Myanmar's democracy scores on the Freedom House scale ranged between zero and 8.33 percent, during the whole period under study (Appendix 4.16 & Figure 4.15). Three changes took place in the scores and two of them were negative. On the Freedom House index Myanmar spent a total of 22 years with zero democracy score and the remaining

three years with 8.33 percent. After spending the first two years of the study with a 8.33 percent democracy score, Myanmar’s score fell to zero in 1983, then rose briefly to to 8.33 percent again in 1988 and returned to zero again in 1989.

Figure 4.15. State of democracy in Myanmar, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




On both Polity and Vanhanen scales, Myanmar’s democracy score remained at zero during the whole study period (Appendix 4.16 & Figure 4.15). Correlation tests could not be calculated for these indices (Appendix 4.25).

Nepal.

King Prithvi Narayan Shah unified this Himalayan land in 1769. King Mahendra banned political parties in 1960, and in 1962 began ruling through a repressive *panchayat* (village council) system. In 1990, National Congress (NC) party and a coalition of Communist parties organised pro-democracy rallies that led King Birendra to legalise political parties in the same year. An interim government introduced a constitution that vested executive power in the prime minister and cabinet and turned Nepal (NPL) into a constitutional monarchy. The king can wield

emergency powers and suspend many basic freedoms in the event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic depression. Nepal's first multiparty election in 32 years was held in 1991 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

Figure 4.16. State of democracy in Nepal, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



,According to Freedom House, this South Asian country witnessed an overall upward trend of democracy until 1992 when it enjoyed a second year of a 75 percent democracy score, but after that the scores trended downwards from the next year until 2005. Nepal began the 25-year period with a 58.33 percent democracy score, and had it's longest period of stability in scores between 1991-1998 at that score; and ended the study period with a score of 25 percent with some fluctuations in the middle period (Appendix 4.17 & Figure 4.16). A total of eight changes occurred in the democracy score, two of which were positive while six were negative. From 1981-1988, the country's democracy was 58.33 percent; it dropped to 41.67 percent in 1989; then increased to 50 percent in 1990 and again to 75 percent in 1991; and then fell to 58.33 percent in 1993. From the years 2002-2005 the Nepalese democracy score declined every year according to Freedom

House. The democracy score in those four years were 50, 41.67, 33.33 and 25 percent respectively. Over the 25-year period the country spent one year with 25 percent democracy; one year with 33.33 percent; two years with 41.67 percent; 17 years with 58.33 percent democracy; two years with 50 percent democracy and two years with 75 percent democracy.

Also, on the Polity scale, Nepal's democracy scores show two trends on average. The country reached a 70 percent democracy score between 1999 and 2001, after starting the study period with a score of just 20 percent, but dropped to a 10 percent score in 2005 (Appendix 4.17 & Figure 4.16). Nepal had a 20 percent democracy score from 1981-1989; a 50 percent score from 1990-1998; a score of 70 percent from 1999 through 2001, and a 10 percent score during the last three years. According to Vanhanen index, the country's democracy scores marked almost the same trend as on the Polity scale. The country scored zero democracy from 1981-1989, 16.7 percent in 1990; 37.6 percent from 1991-1993, and 39.48 percent from 1994-1998 (Appendix 4.17 & Figure 4.16).

A significant Pearson correlation was found between the Polity and both the Freedom House and Vanhanen indices. The correlation between Polity and Freedom House was .513 while it was .858 between Polity and Vanhanen. However, no correlations were found between Freedom House and Vanhanen (Appendix 4.25).


Pakistan.

Pakistan (PAK) came into existence in 1947 as a Muslim homeland. Following a nine-month civil war, East Pakistan achieved independence in 1971 as the new state of Bangladesh. Deposing civilian governments at will, the army has ruled Pakistan for 26 years since its independence (Freedom House 2006; Country Report, n.d.). On the Freedom House scale, the democracy scores of Pakistan, another South Asian country, showed a volatile pattern and underwent eight changes during the 25-year period under study (Appendix 4.18 & Figure 4.17). Of the changes, four were negative. Pakistan had a 16.67 percent democracy score

during first four years of this study; then the score rose to 41.67 percent in 1985; to 66.67 percent in 1988; then fell to 50 percent in 1990, and fell further to 41.67 percent in 1991. The democracy score rose again to 50 percent in 1993; fell to 41.67 percent in 1996; then fell further to 16.67 percent in 1999; and finally increased to 25 percent in 2000, which lasted until 2005.

On the Polity index, Pakistan registered a score of zero percent democracy for 13 years out of the 25 years under study (Appendix 4.18 & Figure 4.17). Of the zero-scoring years, seven were consecutively at the beginning of the study period (1991-1997) while six consecutive years were at the end (1999-2005). In the middle period of measurement, for nine consecutive years the country had a score of 80 percent democracy (from 1988 through 1996); and two years of 70 percent democracy in 1997 and 1998. According to the Vanhanen Index, Pakistan registered scores of zero percent democracy for nine years out of the 20 years of observation (Appendix 4.18). Seven consecutive years of zero scores were at the beginning of the study period while two consecutive years were at the end. In the middle of the study period the country had a democracy score of 34.41 percent for two years (1988 and 1989); a score of 35.15 percent from 1990-1992; a 31.31 percent score from 1993-1996 and 14.13 percent scores in 1997 and 1998.

Figure 4.17. State of democracy in Pakistan, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



The three indices were correlated in regard to the measurement of democracy in Pakistan. The Pearson correlation of Freedom House with Polity and Vanhanen was .798 and .767 respectively while that between Polity and Vanhanen was .954 (Appendix 4.25).

Philippines.


The Philippines (PHL) was once one of Southeast Asia's wealthiest countries, but has been plagued since the 1960's by economic mismanagement, widespread corruption, insurgencies, and 14 years of dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos. According to Freedom House 2006 Country Report (n.d.), following a blatantly rigged election, Marcos was forced out of office in February 1986 by massive street protests and the defections of key military leaders and units. Marcos's opponent in the election, Corazon Aquino, took office. Although she came to

symbolise the Philippines' return to elected rule, Aquino managed to implement few deep political or economic reforms while facing seven coup attempts (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

Although there was some instability in the score, on the Freedom House scale the Philippines shows considerable growth in democracy (Appendix 4.19 & Figure 4.18). The Philippines started the 25-year period with a 33.33 percent democracy score and ended with a score of 75 percent. For 13 years it scored 75 percent and above for democracy; and for five years scored 66.67 percent; for three years scored 58.33 percent; for one year scored 41.67 percent; for two years scored 33.33 percent democracy and one year scored 50 percent. The democracy score changed 11 times, seven of which were positive, while were four negative. The positive changes occurred in 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1995 and 1996.

According to the Polity index, the Philippines registered just two scores during the whole period under study (Appendix 4.19 & Figure 4.18). Over the 25-year period the Philippines started with a zero democracy score and ended with a score of 80 percent. It spent the first six years with a zero percent democracy score; while in the last 18 years it scored 80 percent democracy. The Vanhanen scale shows an upward trend in Philippine democracy from 1981-1997. The Philippines made a considerable growth in its democracy score during the Vanhanen measurement period (Appendix 4.19 & Figure 4.18). In the 20-year period the Philippines started with 15.03 percent democracy score and ended one of 64.13 percent. It spent the first five years of the 20 years with a 15.03 percent democracy score; six years from the year 1986 with one of 50.69; another six years from 1992 with a score of 72.33 percent democracy and the last three years with a score of 64.13 percent democracy.

Figure 4.18. State of democracy in Philippines, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



The three indices of democracy were correlated in terms of the measurement of democracy in Philippines. The Pearson correlation coefficient between Freedom House with Polity and Vanhanen was .792 and .724 respectively, while the one between Polity and Vanhanen was .871 (Appendix 4.25).


Singapore.

Located along major shipping routes in Southeast Asia, Singapore (SGP) became fully independent in 1965 under Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. Under Lee, the People's Action Party (PAP) transformed a squalid port city into a technology hub and regional financial center while restricting individual freedoms. The PAP won every seat in every election from 1968 to 1981, when the Workers' Party's J. B. Jeyaretnam won a seat in a by-election. Lee handed power in 1990 to Goh Chok Tong, an economist by training. Goh has largely continued Lee's conservative policies and maintained the PAP's dominance in parliament. In the January 1997

elections, the PAP won 81 out of parliament's 83 seats (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

This Southeast Asian Country's Freedom House democracy scores oscillated between two scores: 33.33 percent for eight years and 41.67 percent for 17 years concluding the study's 25-year period on the former score (Appendix 4.20 & Figure 4.19). According to the Freedom House scale, from 1981-1992 the country scored 41.67 percent democracy. During the 25-year period, there were four changes in the country's democracy scores. The positive changes took place in 1996 and 2002 with a return to 41.67 percent democracy scores in both cases. The negative changes occurred in 1993 and 1997 where the scores dropped to 33.33 percent democracy.

Figure 4.19. State of democracy in Singapore, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



On the Polity scale, Singapore registered a low democracy of score of 20 percent for the whole study period of 25 years (Appendix 4.20 & Figure 4.19). According to Vanhanen index, Singapore started the 20 year period with a 19.17 percent democracy score and ended with a score of 25.31 percent; while its highest score

of 58.83 percent democracy was recorded in the middle of the period (1989-1990) (Appendix 4.20 & Figure 4.19). The country scored 19.17 percent democracy over the first three years; 36.37 percent democracy for four years until 1987; 58.83 percent for three years until 1990; 32.98 percent for six years until 1996; and 25.31 percent for the last four years of the Vanhanen measurement period.

However, it was not possible to find a relationship between the democracy indices as their data could not be calculated (Appendix 4.25).


Sri Lanka.

Since independence from Great Britain in 1948, political power in this South Asian island nation has alternated between the conservative United National Party (UNP) and the leftist Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). While the country has made impressive gains in literacy, basic health care, and meeting other social needs, its economic development has been stunted and its social fabric tested by the civil war that began in 1983. The conflict initially pitted several Tamil guerrilla groups against the government, which is dominated by the Sinhalese majority. The war arose in the context of long-standing Tamil claims of discrimination in education and employment opportunities, as well as a series of anti-Tamil riots predating independence (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

From the first year the study period through to 1995, on the Freedom House scale this Sri Lanka's (LKA) democracy score decreased from 75 percent to 41.67 percent (Appendix 4.21 & Figure 4.20). However, the democracy score started increasing again from 1996, and stabilised at 58.33 percent until 2005. A total of five changes occurred in Sri Lanka's democracy score, two of which were negative and three positive. The negative changes were to 58.33 percent and 41.67 percent in 1983 and 1989 respectively. The positive changes were in 1996, 1997 and 2003 to 50 percent, 58.33 percent and 66.67 percent respectively. The country spent two years with 75 percent, 12 years with 58.33 percent democracy, one year with 50 percent democracy, three years with 66.57 percent democracy and seven years with 41.67 percent democracy.

The Polity index records indicate that Sri Lanka scored moderately high levels of democracy over the whole period of 25 years. It enjoyed 70 percent democracy scores in 2001 and 2002; and 60 percent on that scale for the rest of the years (Appendix 4.21 & Figure 4.20). On the Vanhanen scale, Sri Lanka started the measurement period of 20 years with a score of just 15.85 percent of democracy but finished with 69.2 percent score (Appendix 4.21 & Figure 4.20). This South Asian country's democracy score rose to 55.58 percent in 1982 where it remained until the score declined in 1988 to 48.54 percent. In 1994, Sri Lanka's democracy score rose again to 57.45 percent and remained unchanged until another increase to 66.25 percent took place in 1999.

Figure 4.20. State of democracy in Sri Lanka, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.




However, no statistically significant correlations were found between the democracy indices in regard to Sri Lanka (Appendix 4.25).

Taiwan.

Taiwan (TWN) is located some 100 miles off the southeast coast of China, and became the home of the KMT or Nationalist government-in-exile in 1949, when Communist forces overthrew the Nationalists following two decades of civil war on the mainland. While Taiwan is independent in all but name, Beijing considers it to be a renegade province of China and has long threatened to invade if the island formally declares independence. Taiwan's democratic transition began in 1987, when the KMT government lifted martial law imposed 38 years earlier. Taiwan's first multiparty legislative elections were held in 1991 and the first direct presidential elections in 1996 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

Figure 4.21. State of democracy in Taiwan, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



According to Freedom House, Taiwan's democracy scores grew steadily and reached 100 percent at the end of the 25-year observation period (Appendix 4.22 & Figure 4.21). It spent seven years with a 33.33 percent democracy score, one year with a score of 41.67 percent; two years with a score of 50 percent; one year with a score of 58.33 percent; four years with a score of 66.67 percent; six years with a score of 83.33 percent; and three years with a score of 91.67 percent

democracy. A total of 13 changes took place in the democracy score, and among them 10 were positive.

Similarly, the Polity index also tracks Taiwan's gradual increase in its democracy score from zero in 1981, to 100 percent 2005 (Appendix 4.22 & Figure 4.21). During the first six years, Taiwan had a zero democracy score on the Polity index. In 1987, the democracy score increased to 20 percent until 1992 when it increased dramatically to 70 percent. After continuing with a 70 percent democracy score for four years until 1995, Taiwan's score rose to 80 percent democracy in 1996 and then increased again 1997 to 90 percent democracy. The country's democracy score was steady at 90 percent until it reached 100 percent in 2004.

On the Vanhanen index, Taiwan's democracy score never declined significantly during the 20 years to 2000 covered by this index with a nominal exception in 1995 (Appendix 4.22 & Figure 4.21). Although this country had a zero democracy score for the first nine years of the Vanhanen measure, its score continued to increase until it reached 87.6 percent in the year 2000. In 1990 and 1991 Taiwan's score was 20 percent, from 1992-1994 it was 18.43 percent and in 1995 it was 18.4 percent. In 1996 the country's democracy score increased markedly to 67.92 percent where it remained for another year. It rose further to 70.54 percent in 1998 (and was the same in 1999) and increased again to 87.6 percent in 2000.

The three democracy indices correlated significantly in regard to the measurement of democracy in Taiwan. The Pearson coefficients of Freedom House with Polity and Vanhanen were .934 and .882 respectively; while the one between Polity and Vanhanen was .882 (Appendix 4.25).


Thailand.

Thailand (THA) is the only Southeast Asian nation which has never been colonised by a European country. Beginning with a 1932 military coup that transformed the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, the army ruled periodically for the next six decades. The army seized power in 1991, when it

overthrew a hugely corrupt elected government. After soldiers shot dead more than 50 pro-democracy protesters in Bangkok in March 1992, Thailand returned to civilian rule when the country's revered monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, convinced the military to appoint a civilian prime minister (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.).

On the Freedom House scale, this Southeast Asian country has experienced an unstable but moderately upward trend in its democracy scores (Appendix 4.23 & Figure 4.22). In the first five years of the study period, Thailand's democracy score was 58.33 percent, and the last eight years it was 75 percent. In the middle time period (1981-1985), for two years Thailand had a score of 75 percent democracy in 1989 and 1990; one year of 33.33 percent in 1991; two years of 50 percent in 1993 and 1994; two years of 58.33 in 1992 and 1995; and another two years of 66.67 percent in 1996 and 1997. A total of eight changes occurred in the country's Freedom House democracy scores, six of which were positive.

Figure 4.22. State of democracy in Thailand, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



The Polity index also recorded an upward democratic trend in Thailand during the period under study (Appendix 4.23 & Figure 4.22). Thailand spent the first seven years of the observation period with a 30 percent score; then three years with 40 percent and one year with a 10 percent score in 1991. After those scores, the country had a 90 percent democracy score for the remaining the 13 years.

The Vanhanen measure shows an upward trend in Thai democracy as well during the scale's 20-year period; starting with a score of 10.49 percent democracy and finishing with a score of 45.2 percent (Appendix 4.23 & Figure 4.22). Thailand spent the first two years of the study period with a score of 10.49 percent democracy; three years from 1983-1985 with a score of 12.73 percent democracy; years 1986 and 1987 with a score of 15.35 percent democracy; three years from 1988 with a 16.96 percent democracy score and the year 1991 with just a zero democracy score. From the year 1992 the country's democracy score started increasing again. For three years until 1994 the democracy score was 18.69 percent, in 1995 it was 20.1 percent and for the last four years the score was 45.2 percent.


Among the indices of democracy, the Vanhanen index correlated with both Freedom House and Polity measures. The correlation between Vanhanen and Freedom House was .637 and .736 between Vanhanen and Polity. However, no correlation was found between the Freedom House and Polity indices (Appendix 4.25).

Vietnam.

Vietnam (VNM) gained independence in 1954. At the time of independence, the country was divided into the French-supported Republic of South Vietnam and the Communist-ruled Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north. Following a decade-long war that killed tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians, North Vietnam defeated the U.S.-backed South in 1975 and reunited the country in 1976 (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). According to the Freedom House index, the democratic scores of this Southeast Asian country fluctuated between 8.33 percent and zero with the exception of a 16.67 percent democracy score in

the last year of this 25-year study (Appendix 4.24 & Figure 4.23). Of the observed 25 years, the country was with a zero democracy score for 14 years, and a 8.33 percent score for 10 years. There were six changes in the democracy scores, of which four were positive while two were negative.

Figure 4.23. State of democracy in Vietnam, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) measure.



On both the Polity and Vanhanen measures, Vietnam scored zero democracy for the whole period under observation (Appendix 4.24 & Figure 4.23). And there was no correlation between the democracy indices in regard to Vietnam as the data could not be calculated. (Appendix 4.25).

The discussion above, describing the state of democracy in the 24 countries under study, identifies both similarities and differences in the results of the three democracy indices. Because of the similarities and differences between the three indices of democracy, there are both similarities and differences between the three rankings of the countries in the table below, which was drawn with use of the data from the respective indices (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1.
Rankings of countries as per three measures of democracy (from highest to lowest scoring): Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem)

Freedom	Polidem	Vanhanen
1. Japan	1. Japan	1. Japan
2. India	2. India	2. South Korea
3. South Korea	3. Thailand	3. India
4. Philippines	4. Sri Lanka	4. Sri Lanka
5. Thailand	5. Philippines	5. Philippines
6. Taiwan	6. Mongolia	6. Malaysia
7. Sri Lanka	7. South Korea	7. Singapore
8. Nepal	8. Taiwan	8. Mongolia
9. Bangladesh	9. Malaysia	9. Bangladesh
10. Mongolia	10. Bangladesh	10. Taiwan
11. Malaysia	11. Nepal	11. Thailand
12. Singapore	12. Pakistan	12. Nepal
13. Pakistan	13. Indonesia	13. Pakistan
14. Indonesia	14. Singapore	14. Indonesia
15. Maldives	15. Cambodia	15. Afghanistan
16. Brunei	16. Vietnam	16. Brunei
17. Bhutan	17. Afghanistan	17. Bhutan
18. Cambodia	18. Bhutan	18. Cambodia
19. China	19. China	19. Maldives
20. Laos	20. Laos	20. China
21. Afghanistan	21. Myanmar	21. North Korea
22. Vietnam	22. North Korea	22. Myanmar
23. Myanmar		23. Laos
24. North Korea		24. Vietnam.


Source: This table is based on three separate SPSS outputs (Appendix 4.26) using the three indices of democracy: Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen.

Trend in Asia as a whole.

Democratisation in Asia as a whole trended upward during the period under study according to all three measures of democracy. However, although all three indices recorded increases in the amount of democracy in Asia, there were some differences in the trends and levels of democracy as measured by them (Figure 4.24).

Freedom House began the study period with an average 32.64 percent democracy score for Asia in 1981 and ended the period in 2005 with a 42.71 percent average score, with only a few fluctuations during the 25-year period. Overall, the Freedom House index indicated a 10 percent change over the period (Appendix 4.27). On the other hand, the Polity index found a 27 percent change in the amount of democracy over the same 25 years. It gauged Asia's average democracy score as being 16.36 percent in 1981, an assessment which then increased to 43.18 percent in 2005 (Appendix 4.27). The change in the amount of democracy on the Vanhanen index was more than that shown on the Freedom House scale and less than what the Polity index has put forward. Vanhanen found an average score of 11.43 percent democracy in Asia in 1981 and 31.33 percent in 2000, the final year for that index. However, there were some differences between the averages (means) of the democracy scores as measured by the three indices (Appendix 4.27).

Figure 4.24. Trend of democratisation in Asia, 1981-2005, on three scales: Freedom_PC, Polidem_PC and Vandem_PC.



Vandem_PC covers 20 years from 1981 to 2000

Error bars: 95% CI

Conclusion

In conclusion, it is important to underline some major issues raised in the discussion above. Firstly, a small number of countries were responsible for the bulk of the upward trend in Asian democracy over the 1981-2005 study period (e.g., Japan and India). In contrast, a large number of countries were found with no or very little democracy, according to the mean democracy scores for each of the scales (e.g., Afghanistan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea, and Vietnam).

Secondly, each of the democracy indices has shown an upward trend in democratisation during the 25-year study period. As seen in many countries, democratisation generally expanded and increased dramatically in Asia since the beginning of 1990's. Finally, some differences were found between the indices in regard to the trend and level of democracy both within countries and across Asia as a whole over time.

The next chapter (Chapter Five) presents the results of statistical analyses using the three indices of democracy separately as the dependent variable. The findings presented above may be helpful in interpreting those results, as well as informing the Discussion and Conclusion chapters (Chapters Nine and Ten).

Chapter Five: Quantitative Analyses of Democratisation in Asia

Introduction

The last chapter (Chapter Four) described the state of democracy and democratisation in Asia; however no attempt was made to find its determinants. This chapter focuses on the causal relationship between democracy/democratisation in Asia and some other elements. As stated in the study's research questions and hypotheses (Chapter Three), economic development is the element of primary concern here, as measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita. The Methodology chapter (Chapter Three) has already provided a definition of GDP per capita in Asia. So, this chapter provides an operational description of GDP per capita in Asia, and then presents the results of three separate statistical analyses using the three indices of democracy (i.e., Freedom House, Polity and Vahanen) as dependent variables.

GDP and Country Categories

The Methodology chapter described how, in this study, GDP per capita in Asia was divided into four categories (from Very Low to Very High) and then each of the 24 countries was also divided into four groups. Table 5.1 below shows the four groups of countries belonging to their respective categories of GDP per capita. Among the four categories of GDP per capita, the mean value of GDP in the Very High category is exceptionally high when compared the other categories (as shown in Figure 5.1). Also, there are no meaningful relationships between any categories and the year, although the averages for each of the categories indicate remarkable levels of growth in 2005, the final year included in this study, in comparison to 1981, the study's first year of observation (Figure 5.1 & Appendix 5.1).


Table 5.1***Countries categorised according to level of GDP per capita***

Very low	Low	High	Very high
Afghanistan	Bhutan	Indonesia	Brunei
Bangladesh	China	Malaysia	Japan
Cambodia	India	Maldives	South Korea
Laos	North Korea	Philippines	Singapore
Myanmar	Mongolia	Thailand	Taiwan
Nepal	Pakistan		
Vietnam	Sri Lanka		

The countries with Very High GDP per capita registered an average GDP per capita of US\$ 8,231 in 1981. The amount increased to US\$ 24,046.6.17 GDP per capita in 2005. Although during the whole period a number of fluctuations took place, the last five years witnessed a continuous growth. The average GDP per capita of the countries belonging to the High GDP category was US\$ 859.8 in 1981 and US \$2,568.8 in 2005. Countries in this category achieved a steady growth in their mean GDP per capita for the ten years to 1996 and the four years to 2005. However, other parts of the period were not linear for their GDP per capita growth for that group.

The average GDP per capita for the countries with Low GDP per capita was US\$ 385.71 in 1981, which increased to US\$ 1,026.14 in 2005. The average GDP for this group showed a significant steady rise from 1999-2005 with considerably high jumps in the last few years. The mean GDP per capita of the countries with “Very Low” GDP per capita increased from US\$ 150.86 in 1981 to US\$ 398.71 in 2005 with a few pauses or rebounds in its slow but continuous growth over the whole period.

Figure 5.1. Categories of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) and their interactions with time (Year), 1981-2005



Analysis of Democratisation

As noted earlier, the analyses of democracy and democratisation are divided into three sections: one section for each of the three measures of democracy. Each section, in turn, has two major parts of analysis. These are: (1) correlations on how much impact economic development has on democratisation in each of the four GDP categories of countries; (2) regression analysis for whole Asia. Correlation analysis can prove an indication of the degree of relationship between economic development and democratisation for individual countries within each GDP category. The regression analyses can be used to help explain the impact of every GDP category on democratisation in presence of some other elements within Asia.

The regression analysis section has two more sub-sections: variable-wise explanation and country-wise explanation. Variable-wise explanation shows how much democracy/ non-democracy each variable causes in Asia while country-wise explanation provides an idea of how much democracy each variable causes in

each country. Thus, country-wise explanation focuses on the variation of democracy between the countries with regard to different independent variables.

Using the Freedom House index of democracy.

Correlation analyses: There were different levels of correlation between GDP per capita and democratisation within different GDP categories of countries. On average the Very High category of GDP per capita impacted on the increase in the level of democratisation over time in the five countries in this category (Figure 5.2). No significant relationships were found between economic development and democratisation in the countries with High GDP per capita (Figure 5.3) because of some special regime characteristics, which are discussed later in this chapter. On the other hand, countries with Low GDP per capita had a strong positive association with democratisation (Figure 5.4). The countries with Very Low GDP had a weak positive impact on democratisation (Figure 5.5) implying that there were some other elements that also help countries democratise.

Figure 5.2. A strong positive relationship between Very High GDP per capita (GDP_VH) and democratisation (Freedom) in Asia, 1981-2005




Figure 5.3. There is no relationship between High category of GDP per capita (GDP_H) and democratisation (Freedom) in Asia, 1981-2005




Figure 5.4. A strong positive association between Low GDP per capita (GDP_L) and democratisation (Freedom) in Asia, 1981-2005





Figure 5.5. A weak positive association between Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_VL) and democratisation (Freedom) in Asia, 1981-2005



Regression analyses: As shown in Table 5.2., the country mean of Freedom House rated democracy (Intercept) was 4.23, which was statistically significant. The relationship with Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1) with democracy (Freedom) was strong (sig .002) and it is therefore predicted that the wealthiest Asian countries will tend to be more democratic than the poorest Asian countries.

For the countries with Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1), the predicted democracy on the Freedom House scale was 3.45 points more than for the countries with Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=4), when all other variables in the model were held constant. High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=2) and Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=3) also had positive effects on democratisation although their associations with democratisation were not significant statistically, but were very

close to it (sig .088 and .058 respectively). These findings indicate that for the countries with High GDP per capita and Low GDP per capita, democracy was predicted to be 1.75 points and 1.80 points respectively more than for the countries with Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=4), when other variables in the model were held constant.

Table 5.2

Estimates of Fixed Effects of forms of government (Form), Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton), freedom of media (Media), GDP per capita (GDP_cat) and years (Time) on democracy (Freedom).

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Df	T	Sig.
Intercept	4.231063	.807955	44.445	5.237	.000
[Form=1]	1.104293	.284524	506.481	3.881	.000
[Form=2]	-1.195438	.278938	518.285	-4.286	.000
[Form=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Bretton=1]	3.087892	.397323	497.530	7.772	.000
[Bretton=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media=1]	-3.607001	.291693	581.070	-12.366	.000
[Media=2]	-1.825054	.231364	581.370	-7.888	.000
[Media=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[GDP_cat=1]	3.449295	.985348	18.961	3.501	.002
[GDP_cat=2]	1.753492	.973595	18.131	1.801	.088
[GDP_cat=3]	1.802489	.889939	18.209	2.025	.058
[GDP_cat=4]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
Time	.029538	.008234	581.798	3.588	.000

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Forms of government were very strongly associated (sig.000) with democratisation in Asia. For the countries with parliamentary form of government (Form=1), the predicted democracy was 1.1 points more than for the countries with presidential form of government (Form=3), when other variables were held constant. On the other hand, a country with a strong president not elected by the people (Form=2) tended to be 1.2 points less democratic than the countries with a presidential form. Bretton Wood institutions were also found to have a fairly strong (sig.000) impact

on Asian democratisation on the Freedom House scale. Democracy was predicted to be 3.1 points more in the member countries (Bretton=1) of the Bretton Wood institutions than in the non-member countries (Bretton=2).

The relationship of both the freedom of electronic and print media with democracy was also found to be very strong (sig.000). It was predicted that the countries with Not-Free media (Media=1) are 3.60 points and a country with Partly-Free media (Media=2) are 1.82 points less democratic than the countries with Free media (Media=3); when other variables in the model were held constant. Year (Time) was also significantly (sig.000) associated with democracy. For one year's increase in time during the 25-year study period from 1981 to 2005, democracy tended to be 0.03 units higher on the average in the sample.

Table 5.3

Estimates of covariance parameters on democracy (Freedom)

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.
Residual	1.656372	.098791	16.766	.000
Intercept [subject = Country] Variance	2.663463	.917584	2.903	.004

The estimates of covariance parameters (Table 5.3) suggested that both the within-country (Residual) and between-country (Intercept) parameters were significant. The significance of the Intercept (Intercept=Country) suggested that the democracy scores do vary between countries. The estimates for Intercept (subject=Country) variance (2.66) and Residual (1.65) revealed that the majority (61.72 percent) of the variance in democracy scores was attributable to variability between the 24 Asian countries rated by Freedom House in the study (estimated intra-class correlation $2.66 / (2.66 + 1.65) * 100 = 61.72$ percent).

Graphical methods were used to examine residuals. The histogram is a frequency plot obtained by placing the data in regularly spaced cells and plotting each cell frequency versus the centre of the cell. Figure 5.6 illustrates an approximately normal distribution of residuals. A normal density function was superimposed on

the histogram. Figure 5.7 also features a normal distribution in the estimates of random effects of countries under this study. Figure 5.8, showing estimates of predicted values for democracy, also looks approximately normal. The Figure 5.9 plotting Residuals versus Predicted Values seems to be normal, as it shows a "wedge-shaped" distribution. A fit line was superimposed at the total and an interpretation line added that helped to show the trend. The reference line at 0 emphasized that the residuals were split about 50-50 between positive and negative. There were no systematic patterns apparent in this plot. So, the conclusion here was that effects of the independent variables on the dependent democracy (Freedom) were generally strong.

Figure 5.6. Estimates of error term (Residuals) on democracy (Freedom)




Figure 5.7. Estimates of random effects for countries on democracy (Freedom)




Figure 5.8. Estimates of predicted values for democracy (Freedom)






Figure 5.9. Residuals vs. predicted values for democracy (Freedom)



According to the statistical analysis (Table 5.2), the group of Very High GDP countries had the largest influences on democracy followed by the group of Low GDP countries. The countries with Very High GDP per capita had a mean democracy (Freedom) score of 7.40 in 1981 and 10.40 in 2005 on the 2-14 point scale (Figure 5.10 & Appendix 5.2). They experienced some fluctuations in their democracy score over the period but a steady progress was noticed from 1997 through 2005. The average democracy score in the countries with High GDP per capita increased to 8.00 in 2005 over 25 years from 7.20 in 1981 with a remarkable instability during the period (Figure 5.10 & Appendix 5.2). However, over the period 1993-2005 the average democracy score made small steady increases, and there were no falls. The group of Low GDP countries made a quiet progress in their mean democracy score as it reached increased from 5.71 in 1981

to 6.86 in 2005, with some expected minor fluctuations during the study period (Figure 5.10 & Appendix 5.2). The average democracy score of the countries with Very Low GDP per capita changed very little over the study period of 25 years (Figure 5.10 & Appendix 5.2). It increased from 4.14 in 1981 to 4.71 in 2005, with a short-lived development of score 5 and above during the period 1991-1994.

Figure 5.10. How much democracy (Freedom) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2005




GDP per capita in US dollars (current prices)

Among three forms of government (Form), Parliamentary system had the largest impact on democracy (Freedom) followed by Presidential and then Strong President elected by the parliament (Figure 5.11 & Appendix 5.3). However, the mean democracy score of the countries with a Parliamentary form of government showed a downward trend during the period of 25 years although there was no linearity in this pattern. The democracy score was 10 in 1981 but it was 7.75 in 2005. The countries with Strong President elected by the parliament showed a slight upward trend in their average democracy score during the period. Their score increased from 3.56 in 1981 to 4.60 in 2005 with noticeable fluctuations during the whole period of time. The Presidential form of government, contrary to

parliamentary ones, witnessed an upward trend in attaining democracy score. The countries with this government system achieved a democracy score of 8 in 2005, whereas it was 5 in 1981.


Figure 5.11. How much democracy (Freedom) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2005



The member countries of Bretton Wood institutions recorded more democracy than non-member countries did (Figure 5.12 & Appendix 5.4). However, the democracy score of the non-member countries registered a sharp upward trend during the period of 25 years while it was almost steady in the case of member countries. The member countries started the 25 year period with 6.35 democracy score and finished the period with 7.14 with some fluctuations during the whole period. However, the non-member countries had a mean democracy score of 3.75 in 1981, while in 2005 their mean democracy score was 8, a more than double increase in 25 years; although there were some declines during that period. The years 1990 and 1991 marked a sharp rise and fall respectively in the level of democracy in non-member countries, which can be largely attributed to a rise in n


democracy scores Mongolia and Taiwan (1990) and then a fall in Taiwan (1991) (Appendix 5.5).

Figure 5.12. How much democracy (Freedom) Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton) hosts, 1981-2005



As shown in Figure 5.3, the media (Media) categories had differential impacts on democracy over the study period: Free media had a fairly large impact; Partly Free media had a medium impact while Not Free media had little impact (Figure 5.13 & Appendix 5.6). The mean democracy score of the countries with Free media was 12.50 at the beginning and 13.33 at the end of the 25-year period; and there were a considerable number of fluctuations. The countries with Partly Free media had an average democracy score of 7.89 in 1981, which increased to 9.29 in 2005 after having some bumpy rides. The mean democracy score of the countries with Not Free media was 3.42 in 1981, which rose to 4.46 in 2005 after a long struggle of 25 years.

Figure 5.13. How much democracy (Freedom) different levels of media (Media) hosts, 1981-2005



Country-wise explanation: Chapter Four described the considerable variation found amongst countries with regard to democracy over time which has implications for the regression analysis in this chapter (Table 5.3). This study found a number of inconsistencies in regard to democratisation in the 24 countries included. Firstly, some countries belonging to the category of Very High GDP per capita and High GDP per capita were found to have the highest levels and longest periods of democracy while some countries belonging to the same categories were not found to have attained such high levels of democracy (Figure 5.14 & Figure 5.15). Secondly, a number of countries which belonged to the categories of Low and even Very Low GDP per capita attained a considerably high level of democracy (Figure 5.16 & Figure 5.17).

Figure 5.14. Levels of democracy (Freedom) in the five wealthiest Asian countries (Very High GDP countries), 1981-2005




Figure 5.15. Levels of democracy (Freedom) in the five wealthy Asian countries (High GDP countries), 1981-2005




Figure 5.16. Levels of democracy (Freedom) in the seven poorest Asian countries (Low GDP countries), 1981-2005





Figure 5.17. Levels of democracy (Freedom) in the seven poorest Asian countries (Very Low GDP countries), 1981-2005



Japan (JPN), South Korea (ROK) and Taiwan (TWN) from the category of Very High GDP per capita accounted for a large proportion of the average democracy score for all the years from 1981-2005 (Figure 5.18, 5.14 & Appendix 5.7). Japan had the highest single country mean democracy score of 13.32 points and the highest single country GDP per capita of US\$ 26,829 (averaged for the all years from 1981 through to 2005). South Korea and Taiwan had a GDP per capita of US\$ 7738 and US\$ 9614, and attained democracy scores of 10.24 points and 9.56 points respectively. The characteristics of these three countries include factors that were found in the analysis described above to be associated with higher levels of democracy: parliamentary and presidential forms of government (Figure 5.19); and partly free or free media (Figure 5.21). Japan and South Korea are also members of Bretton Wood institutions (Figure 5.20) that were also found in the above analysis to have some influence on democratisation.

Figure 5.18. Relationship between mean democracy (Freedom) and mean GDP per capita (GDP), 1981-2005: association by individual countries






Figure 5.19. Relationship between mean democracy (Freedom) and forms of government (Form_N), 1981-2005: association by individual countries




On the other hand, Singapore (SGP) and Brunei (BRN) who were also in the Very High category of GDP per capita, had a poor levels of democracy as there were some elements that hindered democratisation or there was lack of some elements that would help boost democratisation: both countries had almost not-free media and Brunei became member of Bretton Wood institutions late (Figures 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 & Appendix 5.7).

Figure 5.20. Relationship between mean democracy (Freedom) and Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton_N), 1981-2005: association by individual countries



India (IND), the second biggest democracy according to ranking in Chapter Four, belonged to the category of Low GDP per capita. This country scored an average 10.40 points of democracy, and a GDP per capita of just US\$ 394 (Figure 5.16, 5.18 & Appendix 5.7). This high level of democracy could be because this country had a parliamentary form of government, was a member of Bretton Wood institutions and the media was a little bit more than Partly-Free (Figure 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 & Appendix 5.7). In addition, Nepal and Bangladesh with Very Low GDP per capita also scored above average democracy over the study period. Those countries also have some other elements associated with democratisation, including parliamentary form of government, membership of Bretton Wood institutions and nearly Partly-Free media (Figure 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 & Appendix 5.7) which may have helped them democratise.

Figure 5.21. Relationship between mean democracy (Freedom) and different levels of freedom of media (Media), 1981-2005: association by individual countries,



This study found that Myanmar (MMR), Afghanistan (AFG), Laos (LAO), Vietnam (VNM), and China (CHN) were the countries of least democracy, as their average democracy scores for the period under study were under 3 on the 2-14 point democracy (Freedom) scale (Appendix 5.7). Their low level of democracy is mostly attributable to: poverty, as they belonged to either the Very Low or Low category of GDP per capita; Strong Presidential forms of government; and Not-Free media (Figure 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 & Appendix 5.7). North Korea (PRK), the only no-democracy nation in the sample, had all the elements identified in this study that cause non-democracy: poverty (Low GDP per capita), Strong Presidential form of government, Not-Free media and non-membership of Bretton Wood Institutions (Figure 5.16, 5.17, 5.18, 5.19, 5.20, 5.21 & Appendix 5.7).

Using the Polity index of democracy.

Correlation analyses: The correlation modelling the Polity-rated democracy index (Polidem) as dependent variable, and GDP per capita as independent variable,

found that economic development had a positive effect on democratisation in Asia. All four categories of GDP per capita had strong positive impacts on growth of democracy in the countries within the respective GDP categories (Figure 5.22, Figure 5.23, Figure 5.24 and Figure 5.25).

Figure 5.22. A strong positive influence of Very High GDP per capita (GDP_VH) on democratisation (Polidem) in Asia, 1981-2005




Figure 5.23. A strong positive influence of High GDP per capita (GDP_H) on democratisation (Polidem) in Asia, 1981-2005




Figure 5.24. A strong positive influence of Low GDP per capita (GDP_VH) on democratisation (Polidem) in Asia, 1981-2005





Figure 5.25. A strong positive influence of Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_VL) on democratisation (Polidem) in Asia, 1981-2005



Regression analyses: As shown in table showing the summarized estimates of fixed effects (Table 5.4), the relationship of Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1) with democracy (Polidem) was not statistically significant but as it was close to that level (sig .095), it was considered partially significant. It was predicted that the richest Asian countries tended to be more democratic than the poorest Asian countries. For the countries of Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1), the predicted democracy on the Polity scale was 2.5 points more than for the countries of Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=4), when all other variables in the model were held constant. High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=2) was not significant in this model. However, Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=3) had a strong (sig .038) positive influence on democratisation in comparison to the Very Low GDP per capita. Those findings indicated that for the countries Low GDP per capita, the democracy could be predicted to be 2.7 points more than for the countries of Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=4), holding other variables in the model constant.

The relationship of parliamentary form of government was found to be very strong (sig.000) with democratisation in Asia. For countries with parliamentary form of government (Form=1), the predicted democracy was 2.77 points more than for the countries with presidential form of government (Form=3), holding other variables constant. On the other hand, with a strong negative influence (sig.006), countries with strong president not elected by the people (Form=2) tended to be 0.94 points less democratic than the countries with presidential form. Bretton Wood institutions also had a strong (sig.000) impact on Asian democratisation on the Polity scale. Democracy was predicted to be 4.89 points more in the member countries (Bretton=1) of the Bretton Wood institutions than in its non-member countries (Bretton=2).

The association between both freedom of electronic and print media with democracy was also very strong (sig.000). It was found that countries with Not-Free media (Media=1) were 4.2 points and countries with Partly-Free media

(Media=2) were 2.53 points less democratic than the countries with free media (Media=3), when other variables in the model were held constant. Year (Time) was also significant (sig.000). For one year's increase in time during the 25-year period from 1981 to 2005 under study, democracy tended to be 0.09 units higher on the average.

Table 5.4

Estimates of Fixed Effects of forms of government (Form), Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton), freedom of media (Media), GDP per capita (GDP_cat) and years (Time) on democracy (Polidem).

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	-1.428543	1.166596	40.317	-1.225	.228
[Form=1]	2.767667	.348387	503.906	7.944	.000
[Form=2]	-.944033	.342027	497.340	-2.760	.006
[Form=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Bretton=1]	4.879181	.663273	325.997	7.356	.000
[Bretton=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media=1]	-4.198391	.375297	534.404	-11.187	.000
[Media=2]	-2.530597	.280832	531.193	-9.011	.000
[Media=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[GDP_cat=1]	2.536938	1.422711	14.741	1.783	.095
[GDP_cat=2]	1.475141	1.399659	13.910	1.054	.310
[GDP_cat=3]	2.738114	1.197654	14.043	2.286	.038
[GDP_cat=4]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
Time	.094473	.010154	535.947	9.304	.000

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 5.5***Estimates of covariance parameters on democracy (Polidem)***

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.
Residual	2.406798	.149980	16.047	.000
Intercept [subject = Country] Variance	4.820150	1.889836	2.551	.011

The estimates of covariance parameters (Table 5.5) suggested that both the within-country (Residual) and between-country (Intercept) parameters were significant and since the Intercept (Intercept=Country) was significant, it was concluded that democracy scores do vary between countries. The estimates of the Intercept (subject=Country), variance (4.82), and Residual (2.40) indicated that the majority (66.76 percent) of the variance in democracy scores was attributable to variability between the 22 Polity-rated Asian countries under our study (estimated intra-class correlation $4.82/(4.82+2.40)*100=66.76$ percent).

As above, graphical methods were used to examine residuals. The histogram is a frequency plot obtained by placing the data in regularly spaced cells and plotting each cell frequency versus the centre of the cell. The Figure 5.26 illustrates an approximately normal distribution of residuals. A normal density function is superimposed on the histogram. Figure 5.27, presenting estimates of random effects of countries under this study, also features a good approximation of a normal distribution. Figure 5.28 also shows an approximately normal distribution. Figure 5.29, plotting Residuals versus Predicted Values seems to be normal, as it has produced a "wedge-shaped" distribution. A fit line has been superimposed at total, and an interpretation line added, that helps to show the trend. So, on the whole, the independent variables had strong effects on the dependent variable of democracy (Polidem).

Figure 5.26. Estimates of error term (Residuals) on democracy (Polidem)




Figure 5.27. Estimates of random effects for countries on democracy (Polidem)




Figure 5.28. Estimates of predicted values for democracy (Polidem)






Figure 5.29. Residuals vs. predicted values for democracy (Polidem)



According to the results shown Table 5.1 and Table 5.4, the group of Low GDP countries had the largest influences on democracy, followed by the group of Very High GDP countries. The Figure 5.30 shows that the countries with Very High GDP per capita had a mean democracy (Polidem) score of 3 in 1981, and 8 in 2005 on the 0-10 point Polity scale. Those countries experienced no declines in their democracy score over the 25 year period (Appendix 5.8). The average democracy score in the countries with High GDP per capita increased to 7 in 2005 over 25 years; up from 2 in 1981 with a only one decline in 1995. The group of Low GDP countries made a some progress in their mean democracy score over the study period as it reached 5 in 1995, after an initial score of 2 in 1981; however they lost one point in 2002 so that group’s score fell to 4; a score that remained until 2005. The average democracy score of the countries with Very Low GDP per capita made a slight but steady progress until 1991. It increased from a 0 score in 1981 to 2 in 1991, but fell to a score of 1 in 2002 which lasted until 2005.

Figure 5.30. How much democracy (Polidem) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2005



GDP per capita is in US dollar (current prices)


Among the three forms of government (Form), Parliamentary system had the largest impact on change in democracy (Polity) over time followed by Presidential and then Strong President elected by the parliament (Figure 5.31 & Appendix 5.9). However, the mean democracy score of the countries with Parliamentary form of government showed almost no change during the period of 25 years. Their average democracy scores were 5 in 1981 and 6 in 2005. The countries with Strong President elected by parliament had a slight upward trend in their average democracy score during that period. Their score was 0 in 1981 and 2 in 2005 with some fluctuations over that time. Countries with Presidential form of government, in contrast to Parliamentary forms, experienced an upward trend in democracy scores. The countries with Presidential system of government had an average democracy score of 5 in 2005, which was 0 in 1981.

Figure 5.31. How much democracy (Polidem) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2005




The member countries of Bretton Wood institutions recorded higher mean democracy (Polidem) scores on the 0-10 point Polity scale than non-member countries did (Figure 5.32 & Appendix 5.10). However, the average democracy scores of the non-member countries registered a sharp upward trend during the period of 25 years while it was almost steady in case of member countries. The member countries started the 25 year period with a democracy score of 2 and finished the period with score of 4 with some variations over that period. On the other hand, the non-member countries had a mean democracy score of 0 in 1981, and a mean score of 5 in 2005.

Figure 5.32. How much democracy (Polidem) Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton) hosts, 1981-2005



As shown in Figure 3.3, the study found the media (Media) categories had differential impacts on democracy: Free media had a fairly large impact; Partly Free media had a medium size impact while Not Free media had little impact (Figure 5.33 & Appendix 5.11). The mean democracy score of the countries with Free media was 8 in 1981, and 9 in 2005 and there were a considerable number of fluctuations over the 25-year study period. The countries with Partly Free media had an average democracy score of 2 in 1981, which increased to 7 in 2005 after having some bumpy rides. The mean democracy score of the countries with Not Free media was 0 in 1981 and 1 in 2005 after a long struggle of 25 years.

Figure 5.33. How much democracy (Polidem) different levels of media (Media) hosts, 1981-2005



Country-wise explanation: The study found considerable variation between the countries in the study with regard to democracy over time, which has implications for the regression analysis (Table 5.5). A number of country characteristics associated with democratisation were found in the study with Polity as the measure of democracy. Firstly, one country with Very High GDP per capita attained a low level of democracy (Figure 5.34). Secondly, a number of countries from the categories of High, Low and even Very Low GDP per capita attained high levels of democracy (Figures 5.35, 5.36, 5.37). Thirdly, the countries with the lowest average democracy scores were clearly found to have Very Low or Low GDP per capita, Strong Presidential or Presidential form of government and Not-Free or nearly Not-Free Media (Figures 5.38, 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 & Appendix 5.12).

Figure 5.34. Levels of democracy (Polidem) in the four wealthiest Asian countries (Very High GDP countries), 1981-2005



Figure 5.35. Levels of democracy (Polidem) in four wealthy Asian countries (High GDP countries), 1981-2005




Figure 5.36. Levels of democracy (Polidem) in seven poor Asian countries (Low GDP countries), 1981-2005




Figure 5.37. Levels of democracy (Polidem) in the seven poorest Asian countries (Very Low GDP countries), 1981-2005






Figure 5.38. Relationship between mean democracy (Polidem) and GDP per capita (GDP), 1981-2005: association by individual countries



GDP per capita is in US dollars (current prices)

Among the four countries with Very High GDP per capita, only Japan was found to have a high level of democracy. Japan scored the highest mean democracy of the 1-10 point Polity democracy scale, and had the highest single country GDP per capita of US\$ 26,828.76 (Figure 5.34, 5.38 & Appendix 5.12). This country also had a full-scale (for the whole 25 year period under study) parliamentary form of government, membership of Bretton Wood institutions and Free media, the three other factors this study has found positively associated with democratisation (Figures 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 & Appendix 5.12). South Korea and Taiwan, from the category of Very High GDP per capita, had moderate mean democracy scores for the whole 25 year period (Figures 5.38), but they, especially Taiwan, showed a strong upward trend in both democratisation and economic growth (Figure 5.34 & Figure 5.12). Neither South Korea and Taiwan had a full-scale parliamentary form of government and Free media, and Taiwan did not have membership of Bretton Wood institutions (Figures 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 & Appendix 5.12).


Figure 5.39. Relationship between mean democracy (Polidem) and forms of government (Form_N), 1981-2005: association by individual countries



On


On the other hand, Singapore — which is also from the Very High category of GDP per capita — had a poor level of democracy (2 points of the 1-10 Polity scale) (Figure 5.34 & Appendix 5.12). This is because there were some elements in Singapore that hindered democratisation. For example, the country had almost Not-Free media (Figure 5.41 & Appendix 5.12).

Figure 5.40. Relationship between mean democracy (Polidem) and Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton_N), 1981-2005: association by individual countries



India was ranked as the second biggest democracy on the Polity scale (Chapter 4) and placed in the category of Low GDP per capita. This country had a mean democracy score of 8.44 points, and a GDP per capita of just US\$ 393.84 (Figure 5.36, 5.38 & Appendix 5.12). Democratisation in India was possible because this country had a full-scale parliamentary form of government, was a member of Bretton Wood institutions and the media was more than Partly-Free (Figures 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 & Appendix 5.12). Also, Bangladesh and Nepal, with Very Low GDP per capita and Pakistan with Low GDP per capita, had almost near-average democracy scores over the 25-year period (Figures 5.36, 5.37, 5.38 and Appendix 5.12) as they had a parliamentary form of government, membership of Bretton Wood institutions, and nearly or Partly-Free media (Figures 5.39, 5.40, 5.41 & Appendix 5.12).

Figure 5.41. Relationship between mean democracy (Polidem) and different levels of freedom of media (Media), 1981-2005: association by individual countries



This study found Vietnam, Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Laos, Myanmar and North Korea to be countries with the least (zero) democracy (Figures 5.36, 5.37 & 5.12). Their most common feature was that they all had Not-Free media (Figure 5.41 & Appendix 5.12). The other more-or-less common features were poverty, as they all belonged to Very Low or Low category of GDP per capita, and Strong Presidential or Presidential form of government (Table 5.1, Figure 5.39 & Appendix 5.12). In addition to these three, North Korea had non-membership of Bretton Wood Institutions (Figure 5.2.20 & Appendix 5.2.10).

Using the Vanhanen index of democracy.

Correlation analyses: The correlation analyses modelling Vanhanen-rated democracy (Vandem) as dependent variable and GDP per capita as independent variable found that economic development had a positive effect on democratisation in Asia. All four categories of GDP per capita had strong positive impacts on the increase in democracy (Vanhanen scores) in the countries within

the respective GDP categories (Figure 5.42, Figure 5.43, Figure 5.44 and Figure 5.45).

Figure 5.42. A strong positive relationship between Very High GDP per capita (GDP_VH) and democratisation (Vandem) in Asia, 1981-2000




Figure 5.43. There is no relationship between the High GDP per capita (GDP_H) and democratisation (Vandem) in Asia, 1981-2000




Figure 5.44. A strong positive association between Low GDP per capita (GDP_L) and democratisation (Vandem) in Asia, 1981-2000





Figure 5.45. A weak positive association between Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_VL) and democratisation (Vandem) in Asia, 1981-2000



Regression analyses: Table 5.6 shows that the country mean of Vanhanen-rated democracy (Intercept) was 5.25 points and was statistically significant. The relationship between Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1) and democracy (Freedom) was found to be strong (sig .013) and it is predicted that the richest countries in Asia tend to be more democratic than the poorest countries in the region. For the countries of Very High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1), the predicted democracy score on the Vanhanen scale was 7.65 points more than for the countries of Very Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=4), when all other variables in the model were held constant.

A significantly negative relationship (sig.000) was found between a strong president not elected by the people and democratisation in Asia as measured on the Vanhanen scale. For the countries with such strong presidential form of government (Form=2), the predicted democracy was 5.42 points less than for the countries with presidential form of government (Form=3), holding other variables constant. Bretton Wood institutions also had a strong (sig.000) impact on Asian

democratisation on the Vanhanen scale. Democracy was predicted to be 5.38 points more in the member countries (Bretton=1) of the Bretton Wood institutions than in non-member countries (Bretton=2).

Association of both the freedom of electronic and print media with democracy was also very strong (sig.000). It was predicted that countries with Not-Free media (Media=1) are 10.31 points and countries with Partly-Free media (Media=2) are 5.28 points less democratic than the countries with free media (Media=3), holding other variables in the model constant. Year (Time) was also significant (sig.000). For one unit (year) increase in time during the 20-year period (1981-2000) observed by Vanhanen included in this study, democracy tended to be 0.30 units higher on the country-average.

Table 5.6

Estimates of Fixed Effects of forms of government (Form), Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton), freedom of media (Media), GDP per capita (GDP_cat) and years (Time) on democracy (Vandem).

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	5.254510	2.486810	58.100	2.113	.039
[Form=1]	.877465	.960241	382.207	.914	.361
[Form=2]	-5.422876	.898067	390.404	-6.038	.000
[Form=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Bretton=1]	5.381709	1.323122	352.542	4.067	.000
[Bretton=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media=1]	-10.317650	.989351	462.273	-10.429	.000
[Media=2]	-5.288450	.761173	462.839	-6.948	.000
[Media=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[GDP_cat=1]	7.651043	2.819517	20.642	2.714	.013
[GDP_cat=2]	1.733491	2.772372	19.426	.625	.539
[GDP_cat=3]	4.201668	2.532070	19.445	1.659	.113
[GDP_cat=4]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
Time	.305234	.034152	464.901	8.937	.000

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Table 5.7***Estimates of covariance parameters democracy (Vandem)***

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	Wald Z	Sig.
Residual	14.839172	.993991	14.929	.000
Intercept [subject = Country] Variance	21.245956	7.179458	2.959	.003

The estimates of covariance parameters (Table 5.7) suggested that both the within-country (Residual) and between-country (Intercept) parameters were significant and since the Intercept (Intercept=Country) was significant it appears that democracy scores did vary between countries. The estimates for Intercept subject=Country) variance (21.24) and Residual (14.83) demonstrated that the majority (58.88 percent) of the variance in democracy scores was attributable to variability between the 24 Vanhanen rated Asian countries included in the study (estimated intra-class correlation is $21.24/(21.24+14.83)*100=58.88$ percent).

As for the above two multivariate models, graphical methods were used to examine residuals. The histogram is a frequency plot obtained by placing the data in regularly spaced cells and plotting each cell frequency versus the centre of the cell. Figure 5.46 illustrates an approximately normal distribution of residuals. A normal density function was imposed on the histogram. Figure 5.47 also features a not too bad shape of the Histogram presenting estimates of random effects of countries under this study. Also, Figure 5.48 also looks approximately normal. Figure 5.49 plotting Residuals versus Predicted Values seems to be normal, as it indicates a "wedge-shaped" distribution. A fit line at total was superimposed and an interpretation line added that helps to show the trend. So, the study has found that effects of the independent variables on the dependent democracy variable (Vandem) are generally strong.

Figure 5. 46. Estimates of error term (Residuals) on democracy (Vandem)




Figure 5.47. Estimates of random effects for countries on democracy (Vandem)




Figure 5.48. Estimates of predicted values for democracy (Vandem)






Figure 5.49. Residuals vs. predicted values for democracy (Vandem)




According to the regression analysis (Table 5.6) the group of Very High GDP countries (Table 5.1), had the largest influence on democracy scores (Vandem) followed by the group of Low GDP countries. The countries with Very High GDP per capita had a mean democracy score of 7.04 in 1981 and 18.25 in 2000 on the 0-33.54 point Vandem scale (Figure 5.50 & Appendix 5.13). The average democracy score in the countries with High GDP per capita increased to 13.39 in 2000 over 20 years, from 5.14 in 1981. The group of Low GDP countries made some progress in their mean democracy score as it reached 11.14 in 1996, an increase from 3.14 in 1981; however over the four years after 1996 they lost a total of three points to end with a score of 8.48 in 2001. The average democracy score of the countries with Very Low GDP per capita made a little but steady progress from 1986 through 1996. The score increased from 0 in 1982 to 5.20 in 1996, but finished in the year 2000 with 4.20 points.

Figure 5.50. How much democracy (Vandem) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2000




Among three forms of government (Form), parliamentary system had the largest impact on democracy (Vandem), followed by presidential and then strong president not elected by the people (Figure 5.51 & Appendix 5.14). However, the mean democracy score of the countries with Parliamentary form of government showed little increase over time in comparison with countries with presidential form of government during the period of 20 years of Vanhanen measurement included in the study.. The average democracy scores of the countries with parliamentary form of government were 9.96 in 1981 and 13.84 in 2000. The countries with a Strong President elected by parliament showed a slight upward trend in their average democracy score during the period. Their score was .75 in 1981 and 2.75 in 2000 with some fluctuations during the whole period of time. The presidential form of government, in contrast to the parliamentary form, experienced a steady increase in in their average democracy score over the period. The countries with this system of government had an average democracy score of 12.53 in 1999, which was 1.83 in 1981.

Figure 5.51. How much democracy (Vandem) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2000




Overall, over the 20 years of the Vanhanen measurement included in this study, the member countries of Bretton Wood institutions recorded more democracy than non-member countries did (Figure 5.52 & Appendix 5.15). However, the average democracy scores of the non-member countries registered a sharper upward trend during the period of 20 years than member countries did. The member countries started the 20 year period with 4.56 democracy score and finished the period with 10.02 with some ups and downs during the period. On the other hand, the non-member countries had a mean democracy score of 0 in 1981; while they had a score of 14.69 in 2005.

Figure 5.52. How much democracy (Vandem) Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton) hosts, 1981-2000



This study found that the media (Media) categories had proportional impacts on democracy: Free media had fairly a large impact; Partly Free media had a medium size impact while Not-Free media had little impact (Figure 5.53 & Appendix 5.16). However, the mean Vanhanen democracy score of the countries with Free media was almost unchanged in comparison with the countries with Partly Free media over the period of 20 years. The mean democracy score of the countries with Free media was 26.33 in 1982, and 27.07 points in 1997. The first and the last few years of the period of 20 years witnessed lesser scores than those (15.83 in 1981 and 23.12 in 2000). The countries with Partly Free media had an average democracy score of 5.62 in 1981, which increased to 17.77 in 1997. The mean democracy score of the countries with Not Free media was .74 in 1981 and 3.89 in 2000 after slow progress over 20 years.

Figure 5.53. How much democracy (Vandem) different levels of media (Media) hosts, 1981-2000



Country-wise explanation: As with the above two democracy indices, there was also a considerable variation between the countries with regard to average democracy scores on the Vanahen index (Vandem) over time which again had implications for the regression analysis (Table 5.7). The study found a number of country characteristics related to democratisation. Firstly, some countries belonging to the category of Very High GDP per capita had the highest level of democracy; secondly, some other countries with Very High GDP per capita did not attain high level of democracy; thirdly, a number of countries that belong to the categories of Low and even Very Low GDP per capita attained a considerably high level of democracy (Figures 5.54, .5.55, 5.56, 5.57).

Figure 5.54. Levels of democracy (Vandem) in 5 wealthiest Asian countries (Very High GDP countries), 1981-2000




Figure 5.55. Levels of democracy (Vandem) in 5 wealthy Asian countries (High GDP countries), 1981-2000




Figure 5.56. Levels of democracy (Vandem) in 7 poor Asian countries (Low GDP countries), 1981-2000






Figure 5.57. Levels of democracy (Vandem) in 7 poorest Asian countries (Very Low GDP countries), 1981-2000



Japan (JPN) and South Korea (ROK) from the category of Very High GDP per capita scored highly on the Vanhanen index of democracy (Figure 5.54, Figure 5.58 & Appendix 5.17). Japan had the highest single country mean democracy score of 27.27 points and the highest single country GDP per capita of US\$ 25,165.20. South Korea with an average GDP per capita of US\$ 6405.10 scored an average 22.83 points of democracy. These two countries also had a number of other characteristics associated with democracy, including: parliamentary and presidential forms of government, partly free or free media and membership of Bretton Wood institutions; all factors that were found in this study to positively influence democratisation (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17).

Taiwan as a new democracy had a mean democracy of 11.38 points (Figure 5.58) but its trend of democratisation is quite impressive (Figure 5.54). In Taiwan, there were more-than Partly-Free media and nearly strong presidential form of government until 1996 and non-membership of Briton Wood institutions (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17). Singapore, with Very high GDP per capita, attained a poor average democracy score over the 181-2000 period. It had a parliamentary form of government, membership of Bretton Wood institutions but nearly Not-Free media during the whole 20 year period (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17).


Figure 5.58. Relationship between mean democracy (Vandem) and GDP per capita (GDP): association by individual countries, 1981-2000



GDP per capita is in US dollars (current prices)

On the other hand, Brunei (BRN) a country also from the Very High category of GDP per capita, had an average score of zero democracy on the Vanhanen scale (Figure 5.58) as there were some elements that hindered democratisation or there was lack of some elements that would help boost democratisation over time: Brunei had Not-Free media and Presidential form of government. Also, it became a member of Bretton Wood institutions relatively late (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17).

Figure 5.59. Relationship between mean democracy (Vandem) and forms of government (Form_N): association by individual countries, 1981-2000




India and Sri Lanka, the third and fourth highest democracy according to Vanhanen rankings (Chapter 4), belonged to the category of Low GDP per capita (Table 5.1). India had a mean democracy score of 18.55 points on the Vanhanen scale, with a GDP per capita of just US\$ 352.85 (Figure 5.58 & Appendix 5.17). It was possible to achieve this high level of democratisation because India had full-scale parliamentary form of government, was a member of Bretton Wood institutions and the media was more than Partly-Free (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17) during the whole period of 20 years.

Sri Lanka with Partly-Free media, membership of Bretton Wood institutions and Presidential and Parliamentary forms of government during 1981-2000 period had 17.70 points mean democracy (Figures 5.56, 5.58 & Appendix 5.17). Also, Bangladesh and Nepal had the almost lowest GDP per capita in the study sample (Figure 5.58 & Appendix 5.17) but enjoyed a low-but-considerable amount of democracy of 9.19 and 6.40 points respectively on the Vanhanen scale. Nepal had full-scale parliamentary form of government, membership of Bretton Wood


institutions and Partly-Free media, and Bangladesh had parliamentary form of government for the last 15 years of the 25 year period, membership of Bretton Wood institutions and nearly partly free media (Figures 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17).

Figure 5.60. Relationship between mean democracy (Vandem) and Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton_N): association by individual countries, 1981-2000



This study found Afghanistan, Brunei, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Laos, Maldives, North Korea, Myanmar, and Vietnam to be the countries of least democracy as they had 2 points or less on the Vanhanen scale over the 1981-2000 period (Appendix 5.17). The most common feature of these countries was that they all had Not Free media. The other more or less common features were poverty as most of them belong to Very Low or Low category of GDP per capita, and a Strong Presidential or Presidential form of government (Figures 5.58, 5.59, 5.60, 5.61 & Appendix 5.17). In addition to these, North Korea had non-membership of Bretton Wood Institutions (Figure 5.60 & Appendix 5.17).

Figure 5.61. Relationship between mean democracy (Vandem) and different levels of freedom of media (Media): association by individual countries, 1981-2000



Conclusion

From the different statistical analyses above it is evident that the main research hypothesis has, with some exceptions, proved true: that mainly economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. The evidence to support this argument, was presented above, and is summarised here.

Firstly, 11 of the 12 correlation tests in this chapter, four each for every GDP category in each section with each one of three democracy indices, found that GDP per capita influences democratisation. Among the 11 correlations, 10 found a strong effect of GDP per capita on democracy. Among the total 12, only correlation tests modelling High category of GDP per capita (the second GDP category) and the Freedom House democracy scores across the respective countries had no relationship between them. Among the remaining 11, only one correlation test modelling Very Low category of GDP per capita, the lowest category, and the

Freedom House democracy score found a weak relationship between them. Secondly all three regression models with three separate dependent variables also supported the findings of correlation graphs. One of the common findings of these models was that Very High GDP per capita has had a significant effect on democratisation and the effect is more than what Very Low GDP per capita has. Overall, these findings lead to a generalisation that the level of economic development has had a positive effect on the level of democratisation in Asia; that is, the level of democratisation increased as the level of economic development rose. Thus, a higher level of economic development produced a higher level of democratisation while a lower level of economic development caused a lower level of democratisation. As a result, countries with different levels of economic development have different levels of democracy.

However, there are two exceptions. Firstly, although a number of rich countries, (e.g., South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) were described as having high levels of democracy in the country-wise explanation in this chapter, at the same time the findings indicated that the level of democratisation did not improve in some rich countries even though the level of their economic development shows continuous improvement (e.g., Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore). This was because these countries have been beset with some anti-democracy influences which will be explored in the case study on Singapore (Chapter Eight) and in the Discussion (Chapter Nine). Secondly, some countries with considerably lower levels of economic development achieved high levels of democracy (e.g. India). In those cases, factors such as: parliamentary form of government; free or partly free media; membership of Bretton Wood institutions and some other elements influenced democratisation; factors which are also explained earlier in this chapter.

There are some countries, however (e.g., Bangladesh and Mongolia), which achieved a considerable level of democracy despite poverty, without even an average level of freedom of media or a tradition of parliamentarianism; although the findings presented above indicate these factors helped Bangladesh get democratised (explained in the sub-sections titled “Country-wise explanations” in this chapter). So, even if the the evidence presented above is not sufficient to

adequately explain democratisation in countries like Bangladesh these explanations provide evidence that some “elements other than economic development” have positive effects on democratisation.

The next three chapters present three case studies. The Taiwan case study will explore how economic development is associated with democratisation (Chapter Six); the Singapore case study shows how a modern wealthy country is yet to have considerable level of democracy (Chapter Seven); while the Bangladesh study presents how a country achieved a moderately higher level of democracy despite poverty, below-average freedom of media and not-too-old parliamentarianism (Chapter 8).

Chapter Six: Case study — Democratisation in Taiwan

Introduction

The evidence presented in the last chapter (Chapter Five), largely supported the study's main hypothesis that mainly economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. The country-wise exploration of democratisation in the same chapter found that a number of rich countries (e.g., South Korea, Japan and Taiwan) had high levels of democracy. But that chapter dealt with only statistical analyses which focused on averaged, numerical results across the countries under study, rather than focusing on the detailed process of democratisation in each country.

The case study on Taiwan presented in this chapter aims at providing a deeper understanding of the democratisation process and thereby, supplements the findings of the statistical analyses in Chapter Five. In order to make it easier to follow, this chapter is divided into the following sections: Introduction, Methodology, Literature, Statistical Analysis, Historical Interpretation and Conclusion.

Literature

According to the literature relating to democratisation in Taiwan, it is seen as an authoritarian regime which led a rapid economic growth, which in turn helped democratise the regime. Authoritarianism in East Asia is described in a number of works as a result of Confucianism or 'Asian values' (e.g., Jayasuriya, 1998; Ling & Shih, 1998; Thompson, 2001; O'Dwyer, 2003) and in some other views it is compared with Leninism or communism which involves a high level of centralised political decision-making characterised by single-party rule and a political culture intolerant of popular dissent (e.g., Cheng, 1989; Neher & Marley, 1995). So, as a Confucian-capitalist state Taiwan was institutionally committed to a rapid economic growth that

eventually democratised the island through some social developments (Ho, 1987; Cheng, 1989). The social developments took place as the national wealth which was achieved through the process of economic development was distributed equitably in the society (Chan & Clark, 1991). Those social developments included equitable increases in income and quality of life (Wong, 2003) which also raised the level of political consciousness of the Taiwan population. Thus, such a society witnessed a period of democratic transition, resulting in the consolidation and growth of democracy (Cheng & Haggard, 1992; Wu, 1995 as cited in Selya, 2004).

For the growth and consolidation of democracy, Lin, Chu & Hinich, (1996) found that the three conditions that provide incentives for competing elite groups to accept the values of democratic institutions and avoid confrontational strategies already exist in Taiwan. They are: (1) the existence of new, crosscutting issues; (2) the differential advantages of competing elite groups in mobilizing support on different issues; and (3) the possibility of coalitional realignment in both electoral and legislative politics.

Wong (2003) has offered an explanation for the politics of “democratic deepening” in Taiwan. pp. 235-236 He found four main stages of political development in Taiwan’s experience of democratisation:

1. Equitable economic growth during the pre-democratic period in Taiwan fostered a normative expectation for socio-economic equity and state intervention for the public good, an expectation that has continued to persist into the democratic period.
2. Democratic competition in Taiwan created incentives for politically entrepreneurial actors to introduce and consequently legitimate progressive political issues as part of the political mainstream.
3. Tightening electoral competition during the 1990’s and the increasingly important role of societal actors in agenda setting

facilitated the continuous development of progressive political legislation.

4. The ongoing mobilisation of pro-independence Taiwanese identity reinforced the politics of democratic deepening. Nation-building in Taiwan was an integral part of democratic reform.

The above discussion on existing literature suggests that equitable economic development made some socio-economic changes in Taiwan, which crafted democratic political institutions, pro-democracy leaderships and new political issues that turned the island into a democracy. While the Taiwan case substantiates the main hypothesis that mainly economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005, in addition, a greater understanding is gained of how economic development related to social and political changes that influenced the process of democratisation in Taiwan.

Methodology

This case study addressed the question of how economic development has influenced democratisation in Taiwan. The years covered in this study were generally 1981-2005. However, as far as the purpose of explanation of a level of democratisation is concerned, the said time-frame is not rigid. Thus, especially for historical analysis, this case study covered the period of time from the year of retrocession of Taiwan from Japan to China in 1945 to the recent past. Democracy was measured on only one of the measurement scales — the Freedom House index. Freedom House was chosen for this case study as it is the primary index amongst the three measures — Freedom House, Polity, and Vanhanen — used for the main analysis in Chapter Five, and fully fitted the sample in terms of both coverage of countries and year-range.

A mixture of statistical and historical analyses methods were used to address the research question for this chapter, as mentioned above. In particular, to investigate the question of what the major factors of democratisation were in Taiwan, the analysis was divided into three sub-sections: correlation tests, regression analysis, and historical/ institutional explanations.

This study's main hypothesis is based on an economic development or modernisation theory which proposes that economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. So firstly tests of correlation examined the relationship between economic development (using GDP per capita) and democratisation (using the Freedom House index) in Taiwan. According to the economic development theory, (addressed in Chapter Three), education, urbanisation, and consciousness of the population are the major attributes of an economically developed society. So, in addition to GDP per capita, the study used correlation tests to examine the association of some of those elements with democratisation through a general graphical presentation as a part of the historical explanation in this chapter. A description of data about these elements is included in the "Variable definitions and labels" section below.

The correlation tests found a strong positive association between economic development with democratisation in Taiwan (as presented in Chapter Four). Regression analysis was used to explore the association further and identify the determinants of democratisation. Repeated measures as Linear Mixed Models (LMM) was used for the regression analysis (as discussed Chapter Three). The regression analysis for the Taiwan case study was applied in the same way as the main analyses in Chapter Five. The one difference in the use of LMM for the case study was that the subject (Country) variable was not used, because in the case study there was just one country (Taiwan), and because of this there was no issue regarding variation between countries. The regression model applied to the case study used the same variables as the main analyses described in Chapter Five (with Freedom House rated democracy (Freedom) as the dependent variable while GDP per capita (GDP_T), form of government (Form_T) and Media (Media_T) were independent variables). One variation was that the variable for Bretton

Wood institutions (Bretton) was not used in this case study as Taiwan was never a member country of Bretton Wood institutions during the period under study. Variable definitions and labels are discussed below.

Variable definitions and labels.

Freedom/ Democracy: The definitions, measurement scale and data for the Freedom House democracy scores were the same for the case study as for the main analysis (described in Chapter 3); except only Taiwan's Freedom House data were used.

GDP_T: GDP per capita as the indicator of economic development (explained in detail in Chapter 3) was used as the independent variable in the statistical analyses for this case study. The raw data about GDP per capita in US dollars in current prices was converted into GDP per capita in US\$ 10,000 (GDP_T). Instead of the GDP_cat variable which was used in the analysis of all 24 countries with different sizes of GDP per capita, (GDP_T) was used here without any categorisation as Taiwan is just a one country. GDP_T was used in both correlation tests and regression analysis.

Media_T: This variable was used in the case study on Taiwan. The definition and data of Media_T were the same as of Media used in the main analysis. In this case study, Media_T=1 means full-free media; while Media_T=2 means partly-free Media. Not-free media is absent in Taiwan case.

Form_T: This variable was used in the Taiwan case study. The definition and data of Form_N were the same as of Form used in our main analysis. Here, Form_T=1 means President elected directly while Form_T=2 means President not elected directly.

Urbanisation: Urbanisation was used as a variable in graphical presentation in this case study. Data were collected from *National material capabilities* data (NMC, n.d.), which includes all the cities with a population greater than 100,000. The

NMC records the numbers for urban populations in thousands and. its urban population index has been developed on national census data; however several countries do not tabulate urban population. In those cases, this index fills in the gaps assisted by information from surveys, multinational sources and demographic experts who publish data based on their own estimation procedures. So, this variable may have questionable reliability.

Know/ Knowledge: Knowledge was also used as a variable in graphical presentation in this case study. Vanhanen's Index of Knowledge Distribution was applied to measure impact of knowledge on democratisation. This knowledge data were the arithmetic mean of the percentage of students and literates (Teorell & Rothstein, 2007). Vanhanen's number of students in universities and other higher education institutions is per 1000,000 inhabitants of the respective country. The value 5,000 of students is set equivalent to 100 per cent. On the other hand, literates are as percentage of adult population of the country.

Historical explanations: Historical information was used to supplement the findings of the statistical analyses.

Results of Statistical Analyses.

Correlation tests.

Correlation tests found that economic development had a strong positive effect on democratisation in Taiwan between 1981 and 2005 (Figure 5.14 & Figure 5.18). According to economic development or modernisation theory, economic development increases income and urbanisation, and since urbanisation includes a high standard of education, industrialisation and quality of life, it raises consciousness of the population that helps democratise a country (Burkhart & Beck, 1994; Diamond, 1992; Lipset, 1959; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992). Accordingly, in the context of Taiwan's democratisation, economic development (GDP_T) was found to have an association with an increase in the level of urbanisation (Figure 6.1.) and urbanisation has a strong positive effect on the level

of democratisation (Figure 6.2). Also, as shown in Figure 6.3, demonstrates the strong impact of economic development (GDP\$) on democratisation.

Figure 6.1. A strong positive effect of economic development (GDP_T) on urbanisation (Urbanisation) in Taiwan, 1981-2005




Figure 6.2. A strong positive effect of urbanisation (Urbanisation) on democratisation (Freedom) in Taiwan, 1981-2005





Figure 6.3. A strong positive effect of economic development (GDP_T) on democratisation (Freedom) in Taiwan, 1981-2005



Regression analysis.

In a regression analysis, economic development was found to have a strong positive impact on democratisation in Taiwan between 1981 and 2005. That is, as economic development increased, democratisation scores rose. According to the Table 6.1, for every \$10,000 increase in GDP per capita (GDP_T), the democracy measure (Freedom) rose 3.17 points, when other variables in the model were held constant. Form of government also had an association with the country's democratisation. For the Presidential form of government (Form_T=1), the predicted democracy was 1.7 points more than for the Strong president not elected by the people (Form_T=2) in Taiwan, when other variables in the model were held constant. Other elements such as Full-free media (Media_T=1) and Year (Time) also had positive influences on Taiwanese democratisation but those were not statistically significant.

Table 6.1.


Fixed effects of forms of government (Form_T), categories of freedom of media (Media_T), economic development (GDP_T) and years (Time) on democratisation (Freedom)

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	4.936955	.540693	20	9.131	.000
[Form_T=1]	1.697098	.829817	20	2.045	.054
[Form_T=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media_T=1]	.249873	.861895	20	.290	.775
[Media_T=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
GDP_T	3.173735	1.566313	20	2.026	.056
Time	.059472	.105975	20	.561	.581

During the period of 25 years under study, there was generally a sharp upward trend in Taiwan's GDP per capita and democracy scores (Figure 6.4 & Appendix 6.1). The country's GDP per capita stood at US\$ 15,668 in

2005, the final year of the 25 year period, which was just US\$ 2,743 in 1981, the first year of the period. There appeared to be few fluctuations over the time. Accordingly, the country's democracy score rose from a lower-medium score of 6 in 1981, to the highest possible score of 14 on the 2-14 Freedom House scale in 2005, the final year of the period.


Figure 6.4. Democratisation (Freedom) by economic development (GDP_T) in Taiwan, 1981-2005



GDP per capita is in 1000 US dollars (current prices)

With a strong president not elected directly, the Taiwanese democracy score oscillated between 6 and 10 from 1981-1995 (Figure 6.5 & Appendix 6.2). During the last 10 years of the 25 year period the democracy score rose steadily from 10, to finish as 14, the highest score on the Freedom House scale, in 2005.

Figure 6.5. Democratisation (Freedom) by forms of government (Form_T) in Taiwan, 1981-2005



Historical Interpretations.

After the Second World War, Japanese colony Taiwan was retroceded to China under its Nationalist (Kuomintang-KMT) government in October 1945 (Huebner, 1987). Basically, the Taiwan society was different to China’s when they first rejoined in 1945 after fifty years of Japanese colonisation of the island. The Japanese colonisers promoted education and provided infrastructure for the island’s early industrialisation, while suppressing political dissent. During Japanese colonisation, Taiwan’s population thus experienced marginal social mobilisation and formed its identity mainly as a result of economic development under an authoritarian and efficient colonial regime (Wu, 1989). The whole island shared a unified system of administration, law, education, commerce and agriculture under the colonial state. Colonial rule had also introduced new cultural values and world views,

under which Taiwan was accorded a semi-peripheral status superior to China within the Japanese empire (Chu & Lin, 2001).

Under these Taiwanese circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek along with his followers and the KMT government including a million-strong number of troops retreated from mainland to Taiwan around the end of 1949 (Selya, 2004). Soon after arriving, Chiang Kai-shek took a number of political, military and economic developmental approaches seemingly, it is suggested, to fight communists and regain mainland China. He reorganized his civilian followers and military forces into an efficient political mechanism that made Taiwan a corporatist state based on the close alliance of party, government and military (Cheng, 1989).

The KMT functioned as the centre of the whole system and penetrated systematically into every sector of the Taiwan's society (Clough, cited in Kau, 1996). The state power was concentrated in the executive, while the legislature became a rubberstamp of the executive and judicial independence existed in name only (Kau, 1996). According to the 1946 Chinese constitution, the president exercised executive power, appointed the prime minister, and could dissolve the legislature (Legislature Yung). The Executive Yuan, or cabinet, consisted of ministers appointed by the president on the recommendation of the Prime Minister (*Freedom in the World*, n.d.). The "Temporary Provision during the Period of Mobilisation for Suppressing the Communist Rebellion"(Leng.& Lin,.1993, p.805) was adopted in 1948 and three other controls were implemented: martial law, non-formation of opposition parties and tight restrictions on freedom of the press in the name of emergency provided legal basis for suspending citizens' civil constitutional rights (Kau, 1996; Cheng, 1989).

Thus, after successfully rebuilding the state system, the KMT was in a position to dominate social developments in Taiwan for four decades until it was challenged by a rising civil society (Wu, 1989). In such an authoritarian state, the KMT was able to bring private sector industries and businesses in line with the party policies and political command through judicial use of economic rewards and punishments (Kau, 1996). Besides, the KMT government itself looked after a huge sector of state and party enterprises (Gold, 1986; Wu, 1987 as cited in Kau, 1996). This kind of governmental administrative system helped develop the Taiwan economy.

During the years 1949-1953, the KMT government implemented an agricultural reform programme with a view to preventing communist insurgence in the countryside, laying the foundation for post-war economic reconstruction and having a more equitable pattern of economic growth (Chu & Lin, 2001). The agriculture sector was reformed in three stages. First, in early 1949, farm rent was limited to a maximum of 37.5% of the total main crop yield. Second, in June 1951, public land formerly owned by Japanese nationals was distributed on easy terms, preferably to the tenant claimants. Third, in 1953, landlords were obliged to divest themselves of their holdings above a minimal size and sell out to their tenants under the Land-to-the-Tiller Act (Amsden, 1979).

During the 1950s the island witnessed an economic recovery based on import substitution and agricultural modernisation through the three-phased land reform programme; strong growth in population and employment rates; a lower inflation; and continued US aid until the mid-1960s (Ho, 1987; Selya, 2004). By the late '50s, Taiwan's domestic market was almost saturated by the imports that were substituting industry (Cheng, 1989). The island received US\$ 4.1 billion in aid from the USA during the period of 1949-1967 (Ho, 1987).

On the other hand, with the steady removal of American aid after the early 1960s, the KMT had to put more emphasis on strengthening the local economy and economic reforms which set the island on a path of export-oriented industrialisation (Chu & Lin, 2001). It took the implementation of a 19-point programme of economic and financial reform throughout the bureaucracy in 1960 to make these changes (Neil, as cited in Chu & Lin, 2001).

Another reason for Taiwan's economic acceleration through export trade was a favourable world trade atmosphere which lasted from 1947, when the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was signed, to the 1981-82 global recession. As a result, during the period 1973-1982 Taiwan's exports expanded two and half times while the total world export trade increased by just 30 percent (Ho, 1987). Taiwan's foreign trade was characterized by a fair degree of concentration. Many firms participated in the export trade. In 1966, for example, 3,935 firms exported a total of US\$ 569 million worth of industrial and agricultural goods (Amsden, 1979).


By the 1970s, economic growth had brought major changes to Taiwan society. Average annual per capita income had increased from US\$ 50 in 1941 to US\$ 3,175 in 1985. The average annual rate of economic growth was 11 percent from 1964 to 1973 and 7.7 percent from 1974 to 1984. Despite increasingly severe export competition from mainland China (in terms of labour costs) and South Korea (in terms of high-technology goods), Taiwan's 1985 exports totalled almost \$34 billion, with the United States taking 48 percent of the total and Japan 11 per cent (Chou, 1987).

During the period of 1980s, there was a trend in Taiwan of replacing labour with capital; growing of high technology and high value-added industries;

refocusing on agriculture through land consolidation; and moving to reduce trade dependency on Japan and the US (Selya, 2004). Since the beginning of 1990s the Taiwan economy had gained maturity. It opened domestic markets to foreign investors and venture capitals and liberalized trade in anticipation of admission to the World Trade Organisation (Selya, 2004).

Until the 1960s, the KMT's economic development programmes were aimed at economic benefits and their impacts on military preparations for fighting communists and regaining mainland China, but from the sixties the prospect of achieving this goal faded as the US support of Taiwan proved strictly limited and when communist China announced the completion of its atomic project in 1964 (Cheng, 1989). Since then, equitable distribution had increasingly been one of the main focuses of Taiwan's economic development, because the Chinese mainlanders, as a minority population in Taiwan, needed to quickly legitimate the KMT party-state with the support from native Taiwanese. The arrival of the KMT during the late 1940s and subsequent efforts by the authoritarian regime to politically suppress the Taiwanese and impose Chinese culture on them has led to a deep-seated enmity between the two ethnic groups. So, the authoritarian regime reasoned that growth with equity was an economic payoff by the ruling regime, in exchange for political peace (Wong, 2003).

Figure 6.6. Economic inequality (Gini coefficient) in Taiwan, 1953-2000




Ho (1987) has argued that the implementation of land reforms during 1949-1953 and adoption of economic reforms in the late 1950s and early 1960s were largely responsible for Taiwan's equitable economic development. Land reform forced the redistribution of land and institutionalized private property rights. In 1949, 70 percent of farmers in Taiwan were tenant farmers; a decade later, 85 percent of them owned land (Wong, 2003). More important was the equitable outcome of Taiwan's industrial development. The triumph of export-oriented industrialisation provided a new ground for co-operation between the KMT state and the native society, gradually shifting economic power from the state to the private business community, and creating a new outward-looking business elite comprised primarily of owners of small and medium-sized enterprises (Chu & Lin, 2001). The authoritarian developmental state actively prevented the concentration of industrial capital by focusing on the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) rather than large industrial conglomerates. Ninety-eight per cent of all firms in Taiwan were considered to fall into the SME category

(Wong, 2003). So, capital was never concentrated in the hands of the few, creating a sense of upward mobility for all Taiwanese workers and entrepreneurs (Wong, 2003).

With the rapid economic development, Taiwan's relatively egalitarian distribution of income has been able to be sustained throughout the post-war period. The distribution of income improved markedly, with the gini coefficient, a statistical measure of the distribution of household income, decreasing from .56 in 1953 to .44 six years later in 1959 (Erik, cited in Wong, 2003; and Figure 5.1.6). By 1970, the gini coefficient decreased to .29, indicating a more equal income distribution. The gini coefficient in Taiwan hovered around .30 from the 1970s through to the 1990s (Figure 6.6 & Appendix 6.3), making the distribution of income in Taiwan one of the most egalitarian in both the industrial and developing worlds. The wage differentials during the 1980s, when Taiwan's economy became more diversified, were minimal among workers employed in different industrial sectors. In 1983, the average wage for heavy industrial workers was only 8 percent higher than the mean wage across all manufacturing industries (Wong, 2003).

Figure 6.7. Increasing urban population (U_Pop) in Taiwan, 1940-1995



Urban population is in percentage of total population


Such economic development, accompanied by equity, brought about some socio-economic changes, such as increased income, expanded urbanisation and developed political consciousness (Cheng & Haggard, 1992; Wu, 1995 as cited in Selya, 2004). Urbanisation itself is associated with higher rates and standards of education, quality of life, higher life expectancies and concentrated availability of citizens (NMC documentation, n.d.). It could be argued that economic development led to the strengthening of these elements which created a huge middle class. In 1940, just 11 per cent of the Taiwanese population led urban lives while in 1995, 55.1 percent of the total population were urban,, indicating increasing levels of urbanisation (Appendix 6.4; Figure 6.7). Accordingly, the number of urban population increased from 8,710,000 in 1981 to 13,508,000 in 2001 (Appendix 6.5).

Education levels also increased in tandem with rising levels of urbanisation . In 1978, the number of people in Taiwan's labour force with college and graduate degrees was 265,000, while in 2005 it was 1,733,000 (Appendix

6.6; Figure 6.8). Enrolment rates on the island compare favourably with those of most developed countries. Participation rates at the senior high school level similarly approximate those of Western industrialized nations (Lucas, 1982). Fully 99.57 percent of all children aged six to twelve attend elementary school, and 94.21 percent of the relevant-age population is enrolled in junior high school (Chen Kao-tang, ed., cited in Lucas, 1982).

Life expectancy at birth also increased remarkably. The average male life expectancy was 65.8 years in 1965 while it was 72.7 years in the year 2001. Similarly, the life expectancy of females reached 78.5 years in 2001, increasing from 70.4 years in 1965 (Appendix 6.7). Thus, these characteristics of an urban society coupled with impressively decreasing income inequality helped a huge urban middle class emerge on the island. The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese considered themselves to be from the middle class (Hagen Koo, cited in Wong, 2003). Chou (1987, p. 280) states: "The middle class now constitutes an estimated 30-50 per cent of the total population. Over 46 per cent of the population has attended at least junior middle school."

Figure 6.8. Number of workers with college or university degree (Education) in Taiwan, 1978-2005




Along with the socio-economic developments described above, a number of socio-political and demographic changes have taken place in Taiwan . Indigenisation of the KMT and the government was one of them. Although the whole population of Taiwan is in fact Chinese, some 80 per cent of them migrated from China in the beginning of seventeenth century, while the rest immigrated in the middle of twentieth century after 1949 (Amsden, 1979). Because of long gap between the two arrivals, 85 percent of the island population was conventionally counted as Taiwanese (Chou, 1987).

The KMT government launched its military conscription in Taiwan as early as 1951, but it increased when most mainlander soldiers reached decommission age in the early 1960s. For the professional officer corps, large-scale replacement by native Taiwanese came much later as the military academies recruited more rigorously from the offspring of the mainlander veteran families, and the native Taiwanese consciously avoided

military careers (Chu & Lin, 2001). But the trend of increasing indigenisation was inevitable and accelerated over time (Chu & Lin, 2001).

In 1959, native Taiwanese accounted for 56.5 percent of the overall civil service, but only 37.3 per cent of the civil servants were working for central government. By the end of 1991, their percentage in the overall civil service was 71 per cent and among those working for central government, 66.2 per cent (Chu & Lin, 2001). The indigenisation of the state necessarily transformed the profile of the KMT membership and eventually the outlooks of the party leadership. In 1952, Taiwanese held only 3.1 per cent of the KMT Central Committee positions but that representation gradually increased to 53.3 percent through to 1993 (Appendix 6.8; Figure 5.1.9).

Figure 6.9. Percentage of KMT Central Committee positions held by Taiwanese (Mean Taiwanese in KMT) 1952-1993



In addition, a civil society and different student activist groups were developed, centring on the National Taiwan University (NTU), Taiwan's

most prestigious institution of higher education. Throughout much of the period of the KMT regime on the island, the political structure largely prevented the emergence of a strong civil society among students (Wright, 1999). For the first time, students became involved in a dissident activity which was protesting against some of Taiwan's diplomatic setbacks (Wright, 1999). Those setbacks included the US decision to grant Japan management of the disputed Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands in the spring of 1971 ignoring Taiwan's claim to those islands; Taiwan's loss of a seat in the UN; de-recognition of Taiwan by Japan in 1972; and the breaking of formal diplomatic relations by the United States in 1979 (Wright, 1999; Cheng, 1989). These diplomatic setbacks led the well-educated young elite to "acquire new conceptions of the role of politics in their lives and new goals for which they may strive" (Cheng, 1989, p. 484).

Between 1969 and 1972, student activist groups conducted several social surveys and challenged the structural deficiencies of the KMT regime, especially the legitimacy of the National Congress that had not faced re-election since 1946 (Cheng, 1989). In an opinion poll the public praised the government for its economic policies but condemned its diplomatic performance. These issues played an increasingly prominent role in electoral campaigns and legislative debates (Chou, 1987). In 1973, the regime introduced several policy changes including re-election of National Congress representatives and recruitment of many young highly educated Taiwanese for party and government positions (Cheng, 1989).

Off-campus, by 1977 a number of Dangwai (dissidents) groups began to publish journals and publicly support candidates for political office. Afraid and unable to become active on campus yet inspired by these dissidents, some students joined in the Dangwai activities (Wright, 1999). In the wake of the US de-recognition of Taiwan, Dangwai organisation and activism

further mushroomed by late 1979. Thus, it was mainly a crisis of Taiwan's international legitimacy that helped the emergence of a civil society and student activists groups, and provided the initial impetus for an eventual transition to democracy (Lin, Chu, & Hinich 1996). Arguably, this civil society belonged to the middle class of Taiwanese society, which developed within an environment of equitable economic development.

By the late 1970s, a new group surfaced in political opposition to the KMT regime. In the local election of 1977, a loosely co-ordinated opposition group, the Tangwai (literally outside the KMT) party, emerged and made considerable gains in support in the elections of local offices and Provincial Assembly seats (Chu & Lin, 2001). Unlike most of the previous independent candidates whose influence was largely confined to intellectual circles, the new opposition established a political identity as well as building electoral support on a platform that emphasized democratic reform and Taiwanese identity (Wright, 1999).

In the election of the Taoyuan county magistrate, a riot in Chungli stopped the local KMT officials from vote-rigging and restrained the KMT leadership from using coercive measures during the incident. It helped the opposition to overcome an important psychological threshold (Chu & Lin, 2001). Thus, "the 1977 election set in motion a drive to form an island-wide alliance among the opposition candidates based on an updated belief about the vulnerability of the regime" (Chu & Lin, 2001, p. 120).

Since 1983 the Tangwai had escalated its confrontation with the regime on the issue of Taiwan's future. Many Tangwai leaders linked the goal of democratisation directly to the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-determination (Lin et. al., 1996). Finally on 28 September 1986, on the eve of the 1986 election, Tangwai leaders announced the formation of

an opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in defiance of the official ban (Chou, 1987). After that, three more political parties were formed up until 2005, and thus one-party authoritarianism has gradually been transformed into a multi-party system (Appendix 6.9).

Following those events, the KMT split into a number of factions. As the legitimating function of the electoral mechanism rose, the power equation between the party leadership and local factions gradually shifted in favour of the latter (Chu & Lin, 2001). More and more Taiwanese within the party lost their fear and asked questions that began to drain the KMT of its monopoly of power and domination by mainlanders. They called for Taiwan-first policies and pointed to the need for a Taiwanese party chairman and a Taiwanese president (Hood, 1996). Unfortunately, the KMT could not find viable alternatives to using local factions in mobilising electoral support. A deliberate effort by Chiang Ching-kuo to replace the local faction representatives in the party with young native cadres groomed by the party in the early 1970s met with stringent resistance and was eventually abandoned (Chu & Lin, 2001).

By the early 1990s, the local factions grouped together were called the “mainstream” faction while the remainder were regarded as “non-mainstream”. Primarily, Taiwanese constituted the mainstream faction while the non-mainstream faction was dominated by the mainlanders and their children who had been born in Taiwan (Hood, 1996). The leverage of the party over the mainstream faction declined as the local administrative apparatus and quasi-state organisations were increasingly staffed by native bureaucrats affiliated with local factions (Chu & Lin, 2001). It is argued here that the local people in the mainstream faction had been in favour of political liberalisation or, in other words, democratisation.

Finally, the stance of key political actors gradually moved towards non-authoritarianism. The response of the KMT leaders to the growth and increasing militancy of the opposition was, until late 1985, a mix of selective repression combined with institutional liberalisation (Chou, 1987). Despite opposition from the security bureaucracy and many mainlanders, President Chiang Ching-kuo had been trying to accommodate the Tangwai as it developed. As early as 1978, he directed KMT officials to meet with Tangwai figures but such contacts stopped after the Tangwai's relatively poor performance in the 1983 elections (Chou, 1987).

President Chiang tried to broaden his social support by recruiting more native Taiwanese to the party and state leadership and upgrading the industrialisation process with large-scale infrastructure projects. This culminated in his decision to nominate Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, as the vice-president and his official successor in March 1984 (Chu & Lin, 2001). With the passing away of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988, Lee Teng-hui took charge of political reform. The intra-party power struggle between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions expedited the trend of "Taiwanisation", which provided the impetus for abandoning the KMT's commitment to Chinese nationalism; partially checked the natural tendency of the entrenched incumbent elite to restrict the scope of democratic reform; and facilitated ideological accommodation of the opposition's views on the issue of democratic reform and national identity (Chu & Lin, 2001).


Alongside the economic, socio-economic, socio-political and demographic changes discussed above, a series of political developments had also been taking place slowly during the 1950s and 1960s, in line with government-sponsored reforms, and the emergence of opposition forces and their corresponding demands (Kau, 1996). These developments included:

- local elections being permitted in 1950;

- the creation of a Provincial Assembly in 1951. Popular elections for Provincial Assembly were held in 1959 under the then existing one-party system (Cheng, 1989; Selya, 2004);
- lifting travel restrictions in 1969-75;
- electing new members to the National Assembly and Legislative and Control Yuans in 1969, 1972 and 1973;
- Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, becoming Premier in 1972 and the President in 1978; and
- Chiang Kai-shek dying on 5 April 1975 and being succeeded by Vice President Yen Chia-kan (Selya, 2004).

Since 1986, political liberalisation has overtaken all the gradual movement that had been made in that direction over the past 40 years. Taiwan's first opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was established in 1986, and legalised in 1989 (Chou, 1987). Opposition candidates competed openly in local elections in 1986-1987. The KMT ended 38 years of martial law in 1987. The press was deregulated and new papers were allowed to enter the market on January 1, 1988 (Tien & Cheng, 1997). Then, in 1989, reforms were introduced including the legalisation of civil organisations and the end to the Kuomintang monopoly over the Central Election Commission (Wu, 1989). Amongst the voters too, the KMT had gradually been losing its popularity since 1972, while the opposition forces had been gaining support (Figure 6.10. & Appendix 6.10)

Figure 6.10. Voters for authoritarian KMT party (KMT) and Opposition forces (Non-KMT and TW_DPP) in Legislative Yuan elections, 1972-1992



In 1991, the National Assembly voted to repeal the Temporary Provisions and some time later President Lee declared an end to the state of emergency. Finally, Article 100 of the Criminal Code was revised; and this removed the last obstacle to the freedom of speech in Taiwan (Tien & Cheng, 1997). After the abolition of the Temporary Articles in May 1991 and three phases of KMT-directed constitutional revision in the first half of 1990s, most of the legal obstacles that hindered the normal functioning of a representative democracy had been removed. Taiwan's first multiparty legislative elections were held in 1991–92 and the first direct presidential election took place in 1996 (Wright, 1999). Chen Shui-bian's victory in the 2000 presidential race, as a candidate of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, ended 55 years of KMT rule (Lin, 2006). Chen won re-election in March 2004 (Chan, 2004).

The source for the transformation of a system based on one-party authoritarianism to one of democracy was the inherent contradiction between the political imperative to limit electoral pluralism and the success of state-sponsored economic modernisation (Chu & Lin, 2001). The KMT elites concentrated on regime preservation through economic development and equitable distribution after they retreated to the island. Through economic development and equitable distribution, a huge urban middle class emerged as a power centre other than the state because, in material terms, “property and wealth, as any good Marxist will note, are the ultimate sources of power” (Wu, 1989, p. 385). On the other hand, local elections during the 1960s and 1970s steadily evolved into a major institution to assimilate emerging economic and social forces into the political system, and were an indispensable vehicle for the political ascent of the native elite (Chu & Lin, 2001).

Conclusion

Based on the findings presented and discussed above in regard to factors influencing Taiwan’s democratisation, it is argued that equitable economic development increased the political consciousness and strength of Taiwan’s population by improving the rate and quality of education, quality of life and expanding an urban middle class. At the same time political actors played pro-democracy roles; all of which resulted in democratisation. Also, it is noted that since the KMT consolidated its regime in Taiwan, the economy recorded steady growth (Appendix 6.7 & Appendix 6.11). Besides, because the economic development and national wealth had been distributed in the society equitably, that led to a sharp reduction of economic inequality (Appendix 6.3). In line with economic developments, a series of socio-political and political developments also took place (Appendix 6.12).

In the case of democratisation of Taiwan, therefore, it is concluded that a high economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth created a less unequal (see Gini coefficients) society that hosted a huge urban middle class with high rates of education, raised political consciousness and an increased freedom of media. This middle class had grown up in the decades of economic and socio-political developments, so were assimilated into the process of so-called “Taiwanisation” or indigenisation of the KMT, its mainstream faction, and civil society. Finally the political actors, who had been changing and adapting over the years, responded by translating the popular demand for higher levels of democratisation into reality.

Chapter Seven: Case study — Singaporean Democracy

Introduction

Based on the results of statistical analyses, Chapter Five found that some rich countries (e.g., Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore) were outliers in relation to the main hypothesis that economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. Singapore was chosen from among those “outlier” countries as a case study in order to investigate why such a rich country had been restricted to such a low level of democracy. To carry out this investigation and to make the chapter easier to follow, this chapter is divided into the following few sections: Introduction, Methodology, Literature, Statistical Analysis, Historical interpretation and Conclusion.

Literature

Singaporean political literature has mainly been centred on two major issues: regime character and its legitimacy. The People's Action Party (PAP) that has dominated Singapore's politics since its pre-independence period practices a form of politics that puts an emphasis on elitism, Confucianism, and pragmatism (Milne & Mauzy, 1990). PAP leader Lee Kaun Yew “fashioned a distinctive state around the Confucian principles of discipline, difference and advancement through merit” (Neher & Marley, 1995, p. 131).

Since the British colonial master granted a constitution for Singapore in 1958, Singaporeans have practised universal adult franchise in regularly held elections; opposition parties have contested elections; and votes have been counted fairly. But, the election results, so far, have created a single party rule of the PAP as this party is pre-eminent and has tolerated a weak opposition; and much of citizen involvement is depoliticised as civil organisations have been absorbed into government, “much like in the corporatist state of fascist Italy” (Neher & Marley, 1995, p.133). As a result, Singapore’s democratic institutions that were inherited

from the British colonial era have not been able to work fruitfully (Means, 1996). So, despite the superficial appearances of a competitive political system, notably regular elections involving a range of political parties, Singapore is a de facto one-party state (Rodan, 1998). The "Asian Values" argument simply provides a justification for the ruling party to deny certain political and civil rights to its citizens (Englehart, 2000). Englehart (2000) termed it an authoritarian state. Legitimacy of such a regime in Singapore has been tied to its continued economic development, as the government attributes the economic successes and achievements of the city-state to some qualities of the political leadership (Leong, 2000). "Even in the midst of the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and early 1998, Singapore's economy was relatively better off compared to other countries in the region" (Leong, 2000, p. 438).

Asian values pave the way for a doctrine of developmentalism which suggests that, until prosperity is achieved, democracy remains an unaffordable luxury. In this context, authoritarian rulers in the Asia Pacific cited Thompson (2001) in claiming that Western democracy hinders rapid development and thus must be delayed until substantial development has been achieved. This doctrine attributes high economic growth rates to certain characteristics of Asian values that "include hard work, frugality, discipline, and teamwork" (Thompson, 2001, pp. 156).

The PAP has had a two-thirds majority in the legislature ever since independence in 1965. With the enviable economic prosperity that was ably chartered by the government, the Singaporean multiracial electorate has given its continuous mandate to the PAP government in every election since 1959 (Mutalib, 2002). This dominance shapes the republic's democratic orientation, an orientation that political commentators and analysts such as Mutalib (2000) describe as an "illiberal democracy" while Diamond (2002), classifies it as an "electoral autocracy – a state that has elections without democracy" (p.24)... Underlining its exceptional stability, Diamond (2002) notes that of the seven electoral autocracies that existed around the world in the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore is one of only two (the other being Malaysia) that has survived as such. Some scholars find Singapore as a dominant party system which is almost authoritarian. Inoguchi (2006) says,

“Singapore enjoys one-party dominance which seems to be at times close to authoritarianism” (p. 213).

Sim (2006), through an examination of Singapore’s regime, has suggested a new approach for understanding authoritarianism based on the theory of hegemony. The biggest strength of hegemony theory is its sensitivity to how history, culture and ideology can come together to engender countervailing forces to stabilise and legitimise authoritarian regimes and arrest the drift towards democracy, and thus offer a genuine response to the question of why authoritarianism endures.

Singapore, as a developmental state, undertook an active government role to promote national wellbeing. The PAP government became convinced early on that the economic system would not be sufficiently spontaneous, market-adaptive and innovative unless the government assumed a significant and directive role (Bellows, 2006). As a result, the state of Singapore has not been developed as a liberal democracy with deep civil liberties and failsafe checks against the abuse of government power. The executive dominates the legislative and judicial branches of the state (George, 2007). Meritocracy has been the main ideological resource for justifying Singaporean authoritarian government and its pro-capitalist orientations. Through competitive scholarships, stringent selection criteria for party candidacy, and high ministerial salaries, the ruling People’s Action Party has been able to co-opt talent to form a “technocratic” government for an “administrative state” (Tan, 2008, p. 7).

Many Southeast Asian publics, including Singaporeans who collectively own their states, do not reject authoritarian rule. Carlson & Turner (2008) used 2006 and 2007 public opinion data from the AsiaBarometer Survey of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia and Singapore to examine popular perceptions of democracy and democratic principles and practices. In terms of general public support for a democratic system, strong majorities in all countries responded positively. However, when examining citizen orientations towards the democratic system in combination with the alternative regimes, it became clear

that many respondents may have embraced democracy, but did not reject rule by the military, rule by strong leaders or rule by experts.

Brownlee (2009) assessed the causal effects of hybrid regimes (a combination of democratic and authoritarian contents, e.g., Singapore), and the post-cold war period itself, on regime breakdown and democratisation. Using a dataset of 158 regimes from 1975 to 2004, and a discrete measure for transitions to electoral democracy, he found that competitive authoritarian regimes are not especially prone to losing power but are significantly more likely to be followed by electoral democracy: vigorous electoral contestation does not independently subvert authoritarianism, yet it bodes well for democratic prospects once incumbents are overthrown.

In fact, the existing literature on Singapore politics discussed above as a whole suggests that a mixture of British-style democratic institutions and the so-called Asian values has produced a political system which is neither fully democratic nor hardcore authoritarian. Nonetheless, the chief legitimating factors for this system are continuous economic development and a lack of corruption in government functions.

Methodology

This case study addresses the potential reasons why the level of democracy in Singapore did not increase following the increased levels of economic development between the years 1981 and 2005. Coverage of years for this study is generally 1981-2005 but as far as the purpose of explanation of the level of democratisation is concerned, this time-frame is not rigid. Thus, especially for historical explanation, this case study has covered the period of time from the year of the country's independence, 1965, to the recent past. Democracy was generally measured on only one measurement scale, i.e., Freedom House. The reason why Freedom House was chosen for this case study is the same as mentioned in the Methodology section of the case study on Taiwan in Chapter Six. However, the

Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem) scales were also used for a comparison between these three indices with regard to democracy in Singapore.

A mixture of statistical, historical and institutional analysis methods was used to address the research question for this chapter. In particular, to investigate the question why a rich state like Singapore had a low level of democracy, the analysis was divided into four sub-sections: a comparison between three democracy indices (Freedom House, Polity and Vanhanen) with regard to Singapore; correlation tests; regression analysis; and then historical/ institutional explanations.

This study's main hypothesis is based on an economic development or modernisation theory which proposes that economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005 . So firstly correlation tests examined the relationship between economic development (using GDP per capita) and democratisation (using Freedom House index) in Singapore. According to the theory of economic development, (addressed in Chapter 3), a large middle class, urbanisation (which includes better rate and quality of education), higher living standards, and raised levels of consciousness in the population are the major attributes of an economically developed society. However, since 100 percent of the population of Singapore have been urban since the founding of this country, only the factors of GDP per capita and consciousness of the population (Know) were used in correlation tests to explain their socio-economic association with democratisation

Since the correlation tests found a strong negative association of economic development with democracy in Singapore, Freedom House was used as the only dependent variable in the regression analysis. Independent variables in the analysis were GDP per capita (GDP_S), categories of the freedom of media (Media), and year (Time) along with a new democracy-related independent variable, electoral self-determination (Elect). Two independent variables, form of government (Form) and Bretton Wood institutions (Bretton) which were used in the main statistical analyses for the whole sample (Chapter Five) were not used in this

chapter because there are no variations in the data about these two variables as Singapore has had parliamentary form of government and membership of Bretton Wood institutions for the whole period under study. For regression analysis, we use repeated measures as Linear Mixed Models (LMM), the same as used, defined and described in Chapter Three and Chapter Six.

This case study used the same variables of the Freedom House democracy index (Freedom) and human knowledge (Know) as were used in the case study of Taiwan. Definitions of those variables as applied in this chapter are also the same as for the case study of Taiwan in Chapter Six. The Polity and Vanhanen data used are only for Singapore, and their definitions are the same as mentioned in the Methodology chapter (Chapter Three). Other variables and concepts used in this chapter are defined below.

GDP_S/ GDP: The raw data about GDP per capita (GDP) in US dollars in current prices was converted into GDP per capita in US\$ 10,000. (GDP_S). Instead of GDP_cat as used in the analysis of all 24 countries with different sizes of GDP per capita, (GDP_S) was used here without any categorisation as Singapore is just one country.

Media_S: The definition and data source of Media_S is as the same as Media used in the main analysis. In this case study, Media 1 means not-free media while Media 2 means partly-free.

Election/ Electoral credibility: This variable indicates to what extent citizens enjoy freedom of political choice and the legal right and ability in practice to change the laws and officials that govern them through free and fair elections. This right is sometimes known as the right to self-determination. Cingranelli & Richards (2008) developed this data set based on the reports by Amnesty International and the United States Department of States. According to them, a score of 0 indicates that the right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice during the year in question. A score of 1 indicates that while citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfilment of

this right in practice. Therefore, in states receiving a 1, political participation was only moderately free and open. A score of 2 indicates that political participation was very free and open during the year in question and citizens had the right to self-determination through free and fair elections in both law and practice.

In this study the variable was converted into 'Election' and its three categories are 'Not free election', 'Partly free election' and 'Free election'. The codes were converted as follows: a score of 1 (Not free election) indicates that the right to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice during the year in question; a score of 2 (Partly free election) indicates that while citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfilment of this right in practice because political participation was only moderately free and open; a score of 3 (Free election) indicates that political participation was very free and open during the year in question and citizens had the right to self-determination through free and fair elections in both law and practice.

Use of legal techniques to suppress the opposition and critics: To observe the trend of government repression of the opposition and media from 1981 through 2005 in Singapore, a database was created, as no database like this was found available for use. This database was needed to explain how the Singaporean regime controls the opposition and media. Here, "Systematic control over the opposition and media" is defined as: lawsuits/arrests or fines/sentences against leaders or their political parties which are legally allowed to do politics in Singapore (which does not include Communists or Islamic militants) and similar actions against electronic, print and web-based media and the people working for them; and introduction of or amendment to a law to strengthen the governments' hand in such a regard.

To be included in the data set for this study, such accusations or actions needed to be carried out by the government/ ruling party / courts during the period from 1981 to 2005 and were scored as follows: a score of '1' each was allocated for each incident or introduction of repressive law, charge/lawsuit/arrest/warrant of

arrest, fine/sentence and effect of that on the accused (e.g., loss of parliamentary seat and fleeing abroad) no matter how many people are involved in one incident. An extra '1' was assigned for each person's fine of more than \$3,000.00 Singapore dollars, as in that case the country's law disqualifies a Singapore citizen for standing for parliamentary for five years. Bankruptcy and loss of parliament seat were together assigned 1.

All the data about these incidents were collected from newspapers/scholarly journals/books through sources such as: Freedom House, US Department of State HR survey reports, a Singaporean academic website on journalism (Presspedia.journalism.sg), and academic electronic databases. Electronics databases from which the materials were downloaded included: Academic Search Premier, Project Muse, Proquest, Jstor, and Scopus. The keywords used for search were: Singapore politics, opposition, history, slander, libel, damage, case, lawsuit, contempt, fine, sentence, jail. The survey reports used were Freedom House Country Reports and US Department of State Human Rights Reports from 2001 to 2008 that cover all big older incidents too.

Cases under the Internal Security Act (ISA) were not covered in this study as the Singapore government has not used the ISA to hold suspects on political charges since the early 1980s, especially following the last arrests under the ISA in 1988, although it has detained at least six people under the act for alleged espionage since 1997 (*Freedom House 2002 Country Report*, n.d.).

All the data were at first aggregated on a yearly basis, then the graphical data were presented on a five-yearly basis.

As such publications generally cover all important events, this database is reliable to a considerable extent. However, there is still uncertainty about the coverage of the incidents. For example, In 2005, *The Economist*, the *International Herald Tribune*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and *The Wall Street Journal Asia*, paid large fines or had their circulation restricted in lawsuits filed by ruling party stalwarts (*Freedom House 2006 Country Report*, n.d.). As only *Freedom House*

2006 Country Report (n.d.) mentioned this information and it did not give details about if there were separate 5 lawsuits, a score of '1' was allocated for each of the 5 print media.

Politicians: In this study, the term "Politicians" in Singapore refers to moderate politicians, not armed communists or militant/ religious terrorists.


HDI: The Human Development Index (HDI) is composed of three dimensions represented by indices: Life expectancy index, Education Index, and GDP Index. The data codes code mean that the bigger the number the better the HDI. This variable was used for graphical presentation in the case study on Singapore. Human Development Data are collected from UNDP (UNDP, n.d.).

Statistical Analyses

Facts of democracy and economic development: The amount of democracy in Singapore (as defined by average democracy scores and democracy scales) during the 1981-2005 period varied on the three democracy scales of Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem) (Figure 7.1 & Appendix 7.1), and no correlation was found between those scales as the data could not be calculated (Appendix 7.2).


On the 2-14 Freedom House scale, Singapore democracy hovered between scores of 6 and 7, and the last half of the period under study was largely dominated by the score of 6. The 0-10 Polity scale recorded only one score, 2, for Singapore during the whole 1981-2005 period. However, the 0-33 Vanhanen scale shows a quite variation in the country's democracy score and large variation in scores between the first year, 1981, and the scale's last covered year, 2000. On this scale, Singapore's democracy score was 6.43 at the beginning of the 20-year period, 19.73 was in the middle and 8.49 at the end.

Figure 7.1. Variation of democracy in Singapore on three scales: Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (vandem), 1981-2005




On the other hand, contrary to the country’s low democracy scores, Singapore recorded a huge level of economic development during the same period of (Figure 7.2 & Appendix 7.2). During the period of 25 years under study, there was in general an upward trend in GDP per capita but not in democracy scores (Figure 7.1 & Appendix 7.1). The country’s GDP per capita stood at US\$ 26,968 in 2005, the final year of the 25 year period, which was just US\$ 5,638 in 1981, the first year of the period with a few minor fluctuations over time. In contrast, the country’s democracy scores did not increase, but remained static at low levels for about one-third of the study period.

Figure 7.2. Economic development (Mean GDP_S) in Singapore, 1981-2005



Correlation tests: According to modernisation theory, economic development increases income and urbanisation and since urbanisation includes higher standards of education, increased industrialisation and improved quality of life; it raises the consciousness of the population which helps democratise a country (Lipset, 1959). In the context of Singapore where 100 per cent of the population has been urban since its founding, this study found that economic development (GDP) raised the level of consciousness (Know) of the Singapore population (Figure 7.3). However, both consciousness (Figure 7.4) and economic development (Figure 7.5) factors had a strong negative effect on democracy in Singapore.

Figure 7.3. Strong positive effect of economic development (GDP) on consciousness (Know) of the population in Singapore, 1981-2005



GDP per capita is in US dollar in current prices

Figure 7.4. A strong negative effect of consciousness (Know) of the population on democracy (Mean Freedom) in Singapore, 1981-2005





Figure 7.5. A strong negative effect of economic development (GDP) on democracy (Mean Freedom) in Singapore, 1981-2005



GDP per capita is in US dollar in current prices

Regression analysis: The results from the regression analysis provided some more details about the negative effect of economic development on democracy in Singapore, along with the effects of some other elements as independent variables. According to Table 7.1, for every \$10,000 higher GDP per capita (GDP_S), democracy (Freedom) goes 0.6 point down when all other variables in the model were held constant. All other variables (Election, Media and year (Time)) in the model were also found to have negative effects on democracy in Singapore but those were not statistically significant.

Table 7.1
Estimates of fixed effects of economic development (GDP_S), electoral credibility (Election), Media_S and year (Time) on Singaporean democracy (Freedom), 1981-2005

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	T	Sig.
Intercept	7.278286	.451058	19	16.136	.000
GDP_S	-.633024	.299385	19	-2.114	.048
[Election=1]	-.622833	.658510	19	-.946	.356
[Election=2]	.005372	.454978	19	.012	.991
[Election=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media_S=1.00]	-.046562	.201372	19	-.231	.820
[Media_S=2.00]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
Time	.036354	.029956	19	1.214	.240

a. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

For twenty-three years of the whole 25-year period under study, results of the regression analysis showed that while citizens had the legal right to self-determination, there were some limitations to the fulfilment of this right in practice because political participation was only moderately free and open (Figure 7.6). One year (1997) recorded that citizens' rights to self-determination through free and fair elections did not exist in law or practice; However, one year (1985)

registered that political participation was very free and open and citizens had the right to self-determination through free and fair elections in both law and practice.

Figure 7.6. Democracy (Mean Freedom) in Singapore by electoral credibility (Election), 1981-2005





Figure 7.7 and Appendix 7.4 present the results of regression analysis for the categories of the freedom of media. The findings reveal that the country had not experienced full freedom of media during the 25 years time during this study, rather it had experienced 16 years of not-free media and nine years of partly-free media. The country had not-free media during the first five years and the last 11 years; and partly-free media in the middle of the study period.

Figure 7.7. Democracy (Mean Freedom) in Singapore by categories of the freedom of media (Not free media, Partly free media), 1981-2005



Institutional & historical investigations

The above section examined the relevant statistical material concerning factors influencing the low level of democracy on Singapore. The section below investigates the socio-economic and political history, along with the institutional characteristics of Singapore, to better explain the main finding of the statistical analysis in this chapter: that economic development has had a negative effect on democracy in Singapore. To this effect, the investigation below highlights firstly, the country’s socio-political and institutional attributes which are related to the Freedom House definition of democracy (discussed in the Methodology chapter). Secondly, there is a discussion of how Singapore’s economy has developed in the context of such a socio-political and institutional environment; and finally there is a

focus on how a potential upward trend in the level of Singapore's democracy was stymied and even moved downward in a situation of high economic development that generally moved upward.

Socio-political & institutional attributes: Located along major shipping routes in Southeast Asia, Singapore was a British colony until 1963 and was occupied by the Japanese during the World War II. It became a state within the Malaysian federation in 1963 for two years, and then became fully independent in 1965 (George, 2007). The first Prime Minister was Lee Kuan Yew. Under him, the ruling PAP transformed a squalid port city into a regional financial centre and an exporter of high-tech goods. At the same time, Lee restricted individual freedoms and stunted political development (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.).

Singapore is a small country with a land area of 647.5 km (Haque, 2004). It is a multi-ethnicity country. The country's total population was 3.2 million of whom 78 percent were Chinese, 14 percent Malays, 7 percent Indians, and 1 per cent others in 2000 (Mutalib, 2002). The government actively promotes racial harmony and equity in Singapore's multi-ethnic society, and there is no legal discrimination. However, the government occasionally infringes on citizens' rights to choose housing by enforcing its policy of assuring ethnic balance in public housing, in which most Singaporeans live (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.). Despite government efforts to boost their educational achievement, ethnic Malays have not on average achieved the schooling and income levels of ethnic Chinese or Indians and reportedly face unofficial discrimination in private sector employment (*USSD Country Report*, 2006, March 8). Generally, there is no major religious discrimination.

According to the 2000 census, religious composition of the country at that time was: Buddhist 42.5 percent; Muslim 14.9 percent; Taoist 8.5 percent; Hindu 4 percent; Catholic 4.8 percent, other Christian 9.8 per cent; other 0.7 per cent; none 14.8 per cent (CIA, 2006). All religions are allowed to worship freely, but meetings of Jehovah's Witnesses are banned because the group's roughly 2,000 members refuse to perform compulsory military service. Jehovah's Witnesses adherents can

still practice their faith, however. The Societies Act stipulates that all religious groups register with the government (*Freedom House 2004 Country Report*, n.d.). Besides, gender discrimination is also generally absent in Singapore. Women enjoy the same legal rights as men in most areas, and many are well educated and hold professional jobs. Relatively few women, however, hold top positions in government and the private sector (*USSD Country Report*, 2006, March 8).

Singaporeans enjoy limited rights to privacy, expression of opinion, and unionism. The government generally respects citizens' right to privacy, but the issue is not specifically addressed in the constitution and the government maintains the right to search a person or property without a warrant. The government is also believed to monitor telephone and Internet communications (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.). The Trade Unions Act permits union activities in Singapore. But almost all unions are affiliated with the National Trade Unions Congress, which freely acknowledges that its interests are closely aligned with those of the PAP. Collective bargaining is commonplace, and strikes are legal — except for workers in the water, gas, and electricity sectors — but rare (Bellows, 2006). Academics of public universities and political research institutions are not entirely free from government influence, since all such institutions have direct government links. The PAP government prohibits public discussion of sensitive racial and religious issues and closely regulates political speech (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.).

Singapore's press control regime performs its role not so much by crude and illiberal control but through political and punitive coercion (Tan, 2008). It allows the media to report mistakes, corruption, and be critical of some policies but not to erode the public respect for elected office holders or the political leadership (Tey, 2008). In fact, the PAP government exercises some systematic control over media. Two companies, Singapore Press Holdings Ltd. (SPH) and MediaCorp, own all newspapers in the city-state; one is government-controlled, and the other, though private, has close ties to the government. So, editorials and news coverage generally reflect governmental policies. Journalists face pressure from the ruling party not to oppose the government's goals, and so often avoid reporting on

sensitive topics including alleged government corruption or nepotism or on the supposed compliance of the judiciary. However, newspapers increasingly are carrying letters, columns, and editorials critical of governmental policies. (*USSD Country Report*, 2006, March 8). The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act allows authorities to restrict the circulation of any foreign periodical whose news coverage allegedly interferes in domestic politics. All television channels and radio stations, except for some entities (e.g., the BBC World Service) are operated by government-linked companies (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.). The government screens and sometimes censors films, television programs, videos, music, books, and magazines, mainly for excessive amounts of sex, violence, and drug references. The PAP has, however, loosened some restrictions on the arts in recent years, and the Censorship Board's standards were developed taking into account the views of a citizen advisory panel. In any case, censorship of sex and violence has strong public support. The government controls the Internet by licensing Internet service providers, which filter and may even block material that the government considers objectionable (*Freedom House 2003 Country Report*, n.d.).

The government is allowed to detain suspects without trial under both the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Criminal Law Act (CLA). The ISA historically has been applied mainly against suspected Communist security threats, but the government has recently used the law to detain suspected Islamic terrorists. Judicial review of the substantive grounds of detentions under the ISA and of the constitutionality of the law itself is prohibited (Margolin, 2005 & Freedom House 2005 Country Report, n.d.). The government uses the CLA to detain mainly organised crime and drug-trafficking suspects (*USSD Country Report*, 2004, February 25). Meanwhile, the Misuse of Drugs Act allows authorities to commit without trial suspected drug users to rehabilitation centers for up to three years (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.).

Constitutionally, the Singapore judiciary is independent. However, laws that limit judicial review allow for some restrictions in practice. Moreover, government leaders historically have used court proceedings, in particular defamation suits,

against political opponents and critics. This practice and consistent awards in favour of government plaintiffs have led to a perception that the judiciary reflects the views of the executive in politically sensitive cases (*USSD Country Report*, 2001, February 23). Rather than protecting free speech and critical reporting, the judiciary protects the reputation of PAP leaders by awarding them a higher quantification of damages (Tey, 2008) as many judges, especially Supreme Court judges, have ties to the PAP and its leaders (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.).

The 1966 Societies Act permits only groups registered as political parties or associations to engage in organised political activities. The government has historically denied registration to groups it considered a threat to public order. Besides, Singaporeans must get police permits to hold public talks or to make political speeches, and public assemblies of more than five people must receive police approval (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.).

Singapore inherited the British Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. The first Parliamentary election in Singapore was held in 1959 when it was still a British colony, and the nationalist People's Action Party (PAP) won 43 of 51 seats (Neher & Marley, 1995). However, ever since its victory in that election and its subsequent uninterrupted rule, the PAP, originally led by Lee Kuan Yew, "has governed the country in a manner distinct from its inherited (Westminster) model" (Mutalib, 2002, p.659). Although the 1959 constitution allowed for the right of citizens to change their government peacefully, periodic elections are held on the basis of universal suffrage, and voting is compulsory, citizens cannot in practice change their government democratically (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.). In practice, the ruling PAP dominates the government and the political process, and uses a variety of indirect methods to handicap opposition parties (*USSD Country Report*, 2006, March 8). Though general elections are free from irregularities and vote rigging, the PAP's manipulation of the political system means that they cannot be termed fair. Opposition parties are constrained by the ban on political films and televised programs; the curtailing of expressions of political opinion by the threat of libel or slander suits; strict regulations and

limitations on associations, including political associations; and the PAP's influence on media and judiciary, among other things. The net result is that there is no effective opposition (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.). Besides, the PAP leaders call elections when they think the situation is favourable for them, e.g., during an economic boom (Neher & Marley, 1995). Sometimes, an election is announced just a couple of weeks before the voting day which puts the opposition parties in trouble with regard to electoral preparation, e.g., organisation of nominations (Marsh, 2006). Moreover, the government requires candidates for all seats to pay a deposit of a substantial amount of money (S\$13,000 or US\$7,123) that is forfeited if the candidate does not win 12.5 percent of the vote (Marsh, 2006).

Table 7.2.

Results of Singaporean parliament elections, 1968-2006

Year	Number of Total seats	Number of PAP seats	% PAP seats	% Votes for PAP	Number of Opposition seats
1968	58	58	100	86.7	0
1972	65	65	100	70.4	0
1976	69	69	100	74.1	0
1980	75	75	100	77.7	0
1981	1 (by-election)		1
1984	79	77	97.468	64.8	2
1988	81	80	98.765	63.2	1
1991	81	77	95.061	61	4
1997	83	81	97.590	65	2
2001	84	82	97.619	75.3	2
2006	84	82	97.619	66.6	2

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. (n.d.); Singapore Elections. (n.d.).

In the 10 general elections held since the country's independence until 2006, the ruling PAP has never won fewer than 95 percent of parliamentary seats and opposition parties have never occupied more than four seats in parliament (Table 7.2). Singapore's first prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, led the government for thirty-one years, and his successor, Goh Chok Tong, for fourteen years. Political successions, including the accession of country's third Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, have been carefully planned and have always been on the PAP's own terms (George, 2007).

From the discussion above, it is concluded here that Singapore is not a democracy; it is at best a partial democracy. Actually, the governing leaders of modern Singapore were mindful of the vulnerabilities confronting a multi-ethnic island state not endowed with any natural resources, decided as a matter of conscious policy to shape the political institutions of the new state so that they would support the policies of the government (Mutalib, 2002). So, under the socio-political arrangement discussed above, the ruling PAP has led the country's strong economic development.

Economic development.

Singapore was founded as a British trading colony in 1819. It subsequently became one of the world's most prosperous countries with strong international trading links and with per capita GDP equal to that of the leading nations of Western Europe (CIA, 2006). Located at a nexus in trade routes linking Europe with East Asia and Oceania, its prosperity in the colonial era was based upon this location factor and subsequent phases of industrial and commercial development (Grice & Smith, 1985).

During the colonial era Singapore prospered on the twin pillars of free-trade and immigration free of restriction, establishing an economic supremacy over the rest of Southeast Asia by controlling the bulk movement of its commodity exports. The distribution of capital in the port was such that European funds, principally British, centred on the commercial and finance houses directly controlling trade (Grice &

Smith, 1985). However, in 1959 when self-government was achieved, Singapore was still predominantly a non-industrial society with no tradition in manufacturing or indigenous capitalist enterprises (Grice & Smith, 1985); and with just fish and deepwater ports as available natural resources (CIA, 2006). Throughout the 1950s unemployment ranged between 10 and 15 per cent, accentuating existing housing and social problems fuelled continually by a population that was growing at 4.4 per cent per annum, one of the fastest rates in the world in 1957.

Thus, the incoming PAP administration reckoned that rapid industrialisation was essential to combat these mounting social and economic problems (Grice & Smith, 1985). Hence, a strategy of export-orientated industrialisation was adopted. To the PAP, the multinational companies appeared the ideal ally for this strategy. So, in addition to the already attractive geographical location, a number of socio-economic and political requirements had to be met to create a suitable climate for foreign investment and economic development (Grice & Smith, 1985). It can be argued that most of the met requirements were contaminated with authoritarian contents (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3

Major requirements met for foreign investment and economic development in Singapore

-- A strong, honest, effective, and interventionist government existed since pre-liberation period

-- An 'open-door' policy adopted soon after the independence and an institutional framework established in 1968

-- Cheap and very controlled labour force available since the National Trades Union Congress run by the government established in 1961

-- A stable and docile population built by implementing urban development and public housing programme, birth control, strict immigration policy and introduction of English as principal teaching language since 1960s

-- Throughout the 1970s the state increasingly involved in economic activities in either competition or partnership with foreign and local private enterprise

-- The National Wages Council established in 1972 to set national wage adjustment guidelines annually.

Source: Grice & Smith (1985); Bellows (2006); Lim, as cited in Grice & Smith, (1985)

As a result of all these changes, Singapore's economy had developed remarkably by the year 1982. Its total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased from S\$ 2,122 million in 1960 to S\$ 15,675 million in 1982. Among the major economic sectors, manufacturing, finance and business grew to such levels that their

contributions to the total GDP almost doubled within a period of little more than two decades. The transport and communications sector also made tremendous progress. Its contribution to the total GDP was S\$ 14.2 million in 1960 whereas it reached S\$ 19.5 million in 1982. On the other hand, the already slim agriculture and fishing sector got slimmer in terms of its contributions to the GDP which went down from S\$ 3.8 million to S\$ 1million during the same period (Table 7.4).

Table 7.4.


Percentage contributions to Singapore's GDP (S \$ million -- 1968 market prices) 1960-1982

Major sectors	1960	1970	1975	1978	1982
Agriculture/fishing	3.8	2.8	1.9	1.5	1
Manufacturing	11.9	20.4	24.1	26.1	21.5
Finance/ Business	11.3	14	14.6	13.9	20.7
Transport/ Communications	14.2	11	11.3	14	19.5
Trade	35.9	29.2	26.9	26.3	23.2
Total GDP	2,122	5,107	8,790	10,089	15,675

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics as cited in Grice & Smith (1985).

The invest-abroad policy of the PAP government also had achieved substantial success, and investments increased each year. The mission of the government International Enterprise Singapore, formerly the Singapore Trade Development Board, was to assist Singapore-based companies in investing and making the right foreign connections abroad, and helping them to find overseas partners. One objective of this mission was to make Singapore the base for foreign businesses to expand into the region in partnership with local Singapore companies (Bellows, 2006). By the year 2003 Singapore's direct equity investment reached US \$89.727 billion which was just US \$0.818 billion in 1981 (Appendix 7.5). Similarly, the outwards flow of Foreign Direct Investments as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation increased almost five fold from an average of 8 percent for the years 1985-95 to 38.3 percent in 2001 (Appendix 7.6).

Figure 7.8. Singapore's Human Development Indices trend, 1975-2005



In line with a massive economic development (GDP per capita) comparable to the world's leading rich and democratic countries (Table 7.5), Singapore had been on the list of countries attaining High Human Development since 1975 (UNDP, n.d.). Its Human Development Index (HDI) score stood at 0.922 in 2005, which was close to that of Denmark, New Zealand and the United States (Appendix 7.7), after increasing from 0.729 in 1975 (Figure 7.8 & Appendix 7.8). The life expectancy at birth in Singapore was higher than that of the US, its colonial master the UK, and Denmark. Economic inequality in Singapore went below that in the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand. Education enrolment (combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education for 2005) surpassed that of Japan. Use of cellular phones was also higher in Singapore than in the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Finland and Japan (Table 7.5). Since economic inequality is considerably low in Singapore, we can say economic development had been fairly distributed in this country, on the whole.

Table 7.5.***Some socio-economic and demographic indicators: A comparison between Singapore and some democratic countries***

Country	Life expectancy at birth	Education Enrolment ratio (%)	Cellular use (per 1000 people)	GDP per capita	Economic inequality
Australia	80.9	113.0	906	45590	37.24
Canada	80.3	99.2	514	43368	37.53
Denmark	77.9	102.7	1,010	57257	30.62
Finland	78.9	101.0	997	46371	33.13
Iceland	81.5	95.4	1,024	62033	33.54
Japan	82.3	85.9	742	34225	41.19
NZ	79.8	108.4	861	31219	39.49
Singapore	79.4	87.3	1,010	36370	35.38
UK	79	93.0	1,088	45549	35.62
USA	77.9	93.3	680	45047	38.28

Notes: Education enrolment ratio is combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary education for 2005. Life expectancy at birth is for 2005; Physicians (per 100,000 people) is for 2000-04; Cellular subscribers (per 1,000 people) is for 2005. GDP data is for 2007. Economic inequality data are the estimates of gross household income inequality.

Sources: UNDP. (n.d.); UN Statistics Division. (n.d.); Kum & Galbraith (n.d.).

The PAP government has been known for its transparency and a relative lack of corruption. The country had been among the 10 most transparent and least corrupt countries since 1995; the first year when Transparency International started its global survey of corruption (Transparency International, n.d) up until 2008. The country was ranked third in 1995, fifth for six consecutive years from 2001 and fourth for 2007 and 2008. According to the annual rankings of the 10

least corrupt countries from 1995 to 2008, Singapore on an average was more transparent and less corrupt than the US, the UK and Australia (Appendix 7.9).

It can be argued, on the basis of above discussion, that the authoritarian content of the Singapore regime, along with a lack of corruption, helped implement substantial economic development and that the benefits had been distributed more or less equitably within the society, as elaborated above. In return, Singaporeans had been keeping the PAP in power by votes for the last four decades. So, it is presumable that such an economic performance coupled with lesser amounts of corruption operated as major legitimating factor of this partial democracy led by the PAP.

Democratic development, authoritarian measures.

After two decades of strong economic development (Grice & Smith, 1985), some signs of the beginnings of a democratic development also surfaced in Singapore. From the 1981 by-election through to 2006, the PAP were losing parliamentary seats in every election, and until the 2006 general election (the last one covered in this study) a constant, although minimal, presence of the Opposition was in Parliament (Table 7.2). From 1984-1997 the percentage of votes for the PAP was also declining noticeably (Table 7.2).

However, it is believed that the ruling PAP, noticing their declining trend and relying on their economic legitimacy, applied its successful systematic control over the already weak Opposition by taking some calculated steps. To assist analysis, those steps were divided into two sections: introduction of some additional categories of parliamentary seats in order to co-opt rising non-PAP figures in the system of PAP rule, and an increasing use of legal techniques on Opposition politicians and critics. These two strategies are explained below.

Introduction of additional categories of parliamentary seats: In 1984, the government introduced the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) law. The law specified that if the Opposition failed to win any seat in the general election, then the three highest-scoring Opposition candidates would sit in

parliament as NCMPs. To qualify, however, an Opposition candidate had to obtain at least 15 per cent of the constituency's votes, and in the event that the Opposition managed to win three or more seats, the NCMP practice would cease (Mutalib, 2002). The non-elected MPs cannot vote on constitutional or financial questions. As Opposition parties refused to seize that slightly humiliating opportunity, the NCMPs have drifted into oblivion (Margolin, 2005).

In 1988, the PAP government carried out another electoral reform which provided for Group Representation Constituency (GRC). Goh Chok Tong, at that time Prime Minister Lee's deputy, argued that the GRC was necessary to ensure that Singapore's Parliament would forever be multiracial in composition and representation (Goh, cited in Mutalib, 2002). Under the GRC proposal, multiple-member constituencies were created and teams of candidates contesting these constituencies were to include at least one candidate belonging to the Malay, Indian or other minority communities (Neher & Marley, 1995).

The GRC proposal was another factor that held back the Opposition as it was difficult for them to field viable slates for parliament's multimember districts (*Freedom House 2002 Country Report*, n.d.). The GRC system shifted the focus of elections from the qualities and other personality traits of individuals to that of the overall strength and past record of the party (Li & Eklit 1999 as cited in Mutalib, 2002) and disadvantaged Opposition parties, which had been gaining votes on the strength and charisma of individual figures (Mutalib, 2002).

In 1990, Nominated MP (NMP) was introduced. Like the NCMPs, NMPs are not eligible to vote on money and constitutional bills or on motions of "no confidence" (Rodan, 1998). NMP candidates were not to be a member of any political party and did not have to contest an election. Potential candidates were expected to be those who have distinguished themselves or who have special knowledge and practical experience in the professions, commerce, industry, social service or people from an under-represented group of the population. Prior to their formal appointment by the president, NMP nominees undergo an interview process by a parliamentary select committee headed by the Speaker and composed of about a

dozen MPs, mostly cabinet ministers, and one Opposition member (Mutalib, 2002). So, instead of opening up space for civil society, the PAP state is in effect expanding its own space (Rodan, cited in Rodan, 1998).

Use of legal techniques on Opposition politicians & critics: In tandem with the introduction of the additional categories of parliamentary seats mentioned above, since the early 1980s, especially following the last arrests under the ISA in 1988, the PAP leaders started exercising greater, more systematic control over Opposition politicians and media (Rodan, 1998) to marginalise their roles in working against the PAP rule.

To this end, as explained in the following paragraphs, the PAP introduced new laws, strengthened old ones, and got different cases, especially libel and contempt cases, filed against Opposition leaders and the foreign press while influencing local media. Tax controls were also used liberally to discourage or ruin opponents. But, since the 90s, legal suits for libel have tended to become the most formidable instrument of victimisation (Margolin, 2005). The PAP government and leaders had been winning irresistible successes in these cases (*Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d.) as the courts, somehow, have been in favour of them (Means, 1996; Margolin, 2005; *Freedom House 2005 Country Report*, n.d). For the Opposition politicians and critics, the cases resulted in the loss of large amounts of money to pay fines, imprisonment, loss of seats in parliament and ineligibility to contest parliamentary elections (explained in Appendix 7.10). This study found 95 such incidents using a set of search criteria described in the methodology section of this chapter. These incidents averaged five-yearly, and were generally on the rise from the year 1981 through to 2005 (Figure 7.9 & Appendix 7.11).

Figure 7.9. Number of incidences of legal techniques used to control Singaporean Opposition politicians and critiques, 1981-2005





Figure 7.10. Percentage of uncontested parliamentary seats in Singapore, 1991-2001



The legal techniques of controlling the Opposition and critics had been very efficient: “opponents and critics lose their time, energy and money trying to defend themselves, and, in such a violent world, it is difficult to mobilise world opinion against mere fines” (Margolin, 2005, p. 98). This technique along with the introduction of some new categories of parliamentary seats successfully made the opposition weaker. As a result, the number of uncontested seats which go to the PAP on nomination day, had increased continuously since 1991 through 2001 (Figure 7.10 & Appendix 7.12) as the Opposition parties were short of candidates (*The Old Singapore Story*, 2001, November 5). Thus, the PAP arrested its decreasing monopoly in parliament, cutting out the already weak democratic elements of the regime.

Conclusion: How the Singapore Regime Outsmarts

Democratisation

Based on the evidence of this study presented above, it is argued that whatever the Singaporean regime is called by scholars it is in fact not more than a partial democracy. Its authoritarian content, along with a lack of corruption, helped bring in a high level of economic development and distribute the benefits of that fairly equally throughout society, which in turn legitimises such a political regime. Although economic development legitimises such a regime, it has failed to increase the level of democracy in the country, which does not fit this study's main hypothesis that mainly economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. In fact, after two decades of strong economic development, some signs of a beginning of democratic development were witnessed in Singapore as the PAP evidently started losing parliamentary seats since 1981.

But the PAP government successfully arrested their declining trend by introducing some additional categories of parliamentary seats to co-opt rising non-PAP figures in the PAP system of rule, and by increasing the use of legal techniques to control opposition politicians and critics (especially media). As a result, the Opposition was further marginalised and the fielding of their candidates in elections declined, which led to a continued increase in the percentage of uncontested parliamentary seats since 1991 while economic development (GDP per capita) has been continuing (Figure 7.2).

Thus, over the period of this study, the democratic content of the Singapore regime weakened further while economic development got higher. Such opposite direction of the movement of democracy score and economic development results in a negative effect of economic development (GDP_S) on democracy (Freedom) as shown in the regression analysis (Table 7.1). Finally, the Singapore case suggests that a partial democracy with Asian values, economic legitimacy, a lack of corruption and a 'systematic control' over the Opposition can survive well, and is not prone to higher level of democratisation. Against such backdrop, a key political

actor, Lee Hsien Loong who has held the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Prime Minister of this country, in an interview with a PAP journal dismissed any prospect of further democratisation in Singapore (Leeas cited in Marsh, 2006)..

Chapter Eight: Case Study — Democratisation in Bangladesh

Introduction

In Chapter Five, the main statistical analyses used four independent variables: economic development indicated by GDP per capita, forms of government, Bretton Wood institutions, levels of freedom of media and years (Time). It seems that these variables do not adequately explain democratisation in some countries, e.g., Bangladesh and Mongolia, as there might be some unknown elements that led democratisation.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the findings indicated that Bangladesh achieved a considerable level of democracy during the 1981-2005 period under study when this country also had poor economic health, a below-average freedom of media and no tradition of parliamentarianism. So, the main objective of the case study of Bangladesh in this chapter is to discover what factors have actually caused democratisation in this country. To carry out this investigation and to make the chapter easier to follow, this chapter is divided into the following few sections: Introduction, Methodology, Literature, Statistical Analysis, Historical Interpretation and Conclusion.

make our presentation user-friendly, we divide this chapter into a few sections: Methodology, Literature, Statistical analysis, Historical and institutional interpretation and Conclusion.

Literature

Most of the existing literature relating to Bangladesh politics focuses on political instability rather than democratisation, as the country has been subject to some degree of political instability during the whole period of its existence until 2005. Also, in the democratisation literature, the subject of “democratic transition” receives more attention as a more directly relevant topic for Bangladesh than the long term process of democratisation, mainly because after the transition in 1991, political instability engulfed the immediate possibility of achieving the latter.

In the view of Talukdar Maniruzzaman (Maniruzzaman, 1992), the autocratic government fell at the end of 1990 because President General (Retired) Hussein Mohammad Ershad failed to maintain good relationships with the military, intellectuals, students, and major political parties. Actually, the fall of the then autocratic regime is mostly attributed to a student-led mass upsurge, withdrawal of military support from President General Ershad and the Western donor community's threat to reduce their aid levels on the ground of corruption (Kochanek, 2000). Moreover, at crucial moments in 1987, 1990 and 1996 civil society in Bangladesh played some important roles so that politicians became united in opposition to the government and then successfully reformed the country's political institutions (Wilkinson, 2000). Lee (2002) also identified political protests as a primary cause of democratisation and found no relationships between economic development and democratisation in Bangladesh.

It is very evident that instability is the major political phenomenon in Bangladesh, which impedes good governance and democratisation, and the root of this phenomenon is confrontation between two main political forces (Kochanek, 2000). In an investigation into this political instability, Hossain (2000) argues that confrontational politics as practiced by the two leading archrival political parties, the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), is a manifestation of an in-built undemocratic political culture in which each party seeks to monopolise state power as if the other party does not even have the right to exist.

Ahmed (2003) had observed that the system of a non-party caretaker government; the involvement of external patrons like international election observers and donors; and the development of democratic intelligence have played key roles in democratisation in Bangladesh. However, he also identified a "dominant tendency" of the two "supreme" leaders - Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, chief of the BAL and the BNP respectively -- as the main stumbling block to the growth of parliament as an effective institution.

To summarise, the existing literature relating to democratisation in Bangladesh highlights a number of possible reasons for democratisation. These are: declining relationships between the autocratic government and different influential groups (e.g., the army, students, political parties) in 1990; anti-autocrat protests; role of civil society; non-party caretaker government; and different international actors (e.g., donors). However, this democratisation literature about Bangladesh does not focus on the elements which may influence the democratisation process - i.e., economic development, form of government, freedom of media, etc., - which were used as independent variables in the main statistical analyses for all the countries in the study in Chapter Five.

The most common feature in Bangladesh literature is the political instability and confrontational politics that hinders democratisation. Since the variables used in the main analyses were different from Bangladesh literature and there are different views about the reason for democratisation in Bangladesh in the literature, the case study deals with the issue of democratisation in Bangladesh from the viewpoint of this country's common political feature: i.e., political confrontation.

Methodology

This case study was designed to address the question: "What are the major factors of democratisation in Bangladesh between 1981 and 2005?" The research hypothesis was that "There was a sharp national political divide in Bangladesh, and a low level of the divide led to high levels of democratisation". A statement on "national political divide" is made later. Coverage of years for this study was generally 1981-2005 but as far as the purpose of explanation of a level of democratisation is concerned, the said time-frame is not rigid. Thus, especially for historical explanation, this case study covered the period of time from the year of the country's independence, 1971, to the recent past. Democracy was measured on only one measurement scale, i.e., Freedom House. The reason why Freedom House was chosen for this case study is the same as mentioned in the Methodology section of the case study on Taiwan in Chapter Six.

A mixture of statistical, historical and constitutional analysis methods were used to address the research question mentioned above. In particular, to investigate the question of what the major factors of democratisation were in Bangladesh, the analysis was divided into three sub-sections: correlation tests, regression analysis, and historical/ constitutional explanations.

The study's main hypothesis was based on economic development or modernisation theory that economic development drove democratisation in Asia between 1981 and 2005. So firstly, tests were conducted to assess any correlation between economic development (using GDP per capita) and democratisation (using Freedom House index) in Bangladesh. According to the economic development theory (addressed in Chapter Three), a substantial middle class, urbanisation, which includes better rate and quality of education, improved living standards, and raised consciousness (human knowledge) of the population are the major attributes of an economically developed society. So, in addition to GDP per capita, these urbanisation (Urbanisation) and human knowledge (Know) factors were used to explain their association with democratisation in correlation tests.

Since the correlation tests for Bangladesh have shown a weak positive association of economic development with democratisation, that indicates that there are some other elements that influence democratisation in Bangladesh. To examine the influence of those elements, a new independent variable, national political divide (Divide), was used, along with some other independent variables in a regression model where democratisation (Freedom) was dependent variable. For regression analysis, repeated measures as Linear Mixed Models (LMM) was applied, the same as used, defined and described in Chapter Three and Chapter Six.

This case study used the same variables of democracy (Freedom), urbanisation (Urbanisation), and human knowledge (Know) as were used in the Taiwan case study. Definitions of these variables for this case study are also the same as those for in the case study of Taiwan in Chapter Six Other variables and concepts used in this chapter are defined below.

Divide/ National political divide: In their election analyses, Chowdhury (2006) and Babu (2008) found a division in voters in Bangladesh. In their view, generally voters were in part either pro-BAL or anti-BAL. This view led to the development of the concept of national political divide as applied in this study. It is apparent from the literature that, during the whole history of Bangladesh, two political forces have been fighting or competing against each other in major political events, such as the liberation war in 1971, military coups in 1975, and elections which are discussed in detail in the section titled “Historical and constitutional explanations” in this chapter. For regression analysis, this variable was labelled as: 1 for high level of national political (Divide=1); and 2 for low level of national political (Divide=1).

GDP_B: GDP per capita (GDP_B) was in US\$ 100 for this case study of Bangladesh. The raw data about GDP per capita was converted into GDP in US\$ for better presentation of its influences. The source and definition of this raw data were the same as described in Chapter Thress. The reason for using GDP_B instead of GDP_cat, which was used for the statistical analyses of all 24 countries in the study as described in Chapter Five, is the same as mentioned in the case of Taiwan in Chapter Six.

Media_B: This variable was used in the case study on Bangladesh. The definition and data source of Media is as the same as the one used in the main thesis. In this case study, Media 1 means Full-free media, Media 2 means Partly-free while Media 3 is Not-free media.

Major political party: A major political party is defined in this study as the party which is generally voted to the parliament i.e., Bangladesh Awami League, Bangladesh Nationalist Party, Jamaat-e Islami and Jatiya Party.

Corruption: The concept ‘Corruption’ used in this study is the same as what Transparency International (TI), a Berlin based organisation, uses to prepares its Corruption Perception Index (CPI) every year covering countries all over the world. TI defines corruption as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain

(Transparency International, n.d.). Often, the term “misuse” or “abuse” is further defined to apply only to illegal actions. The TI Corruption Perception Index ranks countries in terms of the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It is a composite index, a poll of polls, drawing on corruption-related data from expert and business surveys carried out by a variety of independent and reputable institutions. The TI corruption score ranges from between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) and –999 if no data are available.

Political corruption: Political corruption was used as a concept in the case study of Bangladesh. Following the Transparency International’s definition of corruption, this study’s definition of political corruption is “abuse of entrusted state power for political gain for private life and/or for own group and/or for own party and/or for own alliance or, in other words, against rival leader, and/or rival party, and/or rival alliance”. Political corruption is considered to be more detrimental to a society than any other forms of corruption as it can influence the illegal transfer of the kinds of political power that is most influential in a society.

Statistical Analysis

Correlation tests: According to economic development or modernisation theory (described in Chapter Three and Chapter Six), this study used urbanisation (Urbanisation), consciousness of the population (Know) and economic development (GDP_B) as independent variables for testing those variables’ correlation with democratisation (Freedom) in Bangladesh. Economic development (GDP_B) was found to have a strong positive association with increase in urbanisation (Figure 8.1), and urbanisation had a strong positive association with the levels of consciousness (Know) of the population (Figure 8.2). However, neither urbanisation nor consciousness had strong impact on democratisation (Figure 8.3 & Figure 8.4). Those two variables had a weak relationship with democratisation implying that there were some elements other than economic development, which have strong associations with an increase in democratisation in Bangladesh.

Figure 8.1. A strong positive effect of economic development (GDP_B) on urbanisation (Urbanisation) in Bangladesh, 1981-2001




Figure 8.2. A strong positive effect of urbanisation (Urbanisation) on consciousness (Know) of the population in Bangladesh, 1981-1999




Figure 8.3. A weak positive effect of consciousness (Know) of the population on democratisation (Freedom) in Bangladesh, 1981-1999





Figure 8.4. A weak positive effect of economic development (GDP_B) on democratisation (Freedom) in Bangladesh, 1981-2005



Regression analysis. According to the Table 8.1, low national political divide (Divide=1) had a significant robust impact on democracy. For low national political divide (Divide=1), the predicted democratisation was 4.79 points more than for high national political divide (Divide=2) holding other variables in the model constant. The country’s partly free electronic and print media may also have had a significant influence on democratisation. For partly free media (Media_B=2), the country’s democracy was predicted to be 2.17 points more than for not-free media (Media_B=3) holding other variables in the model constant. Economic development (GDP_B) and year (Time) also had effects on democratisation in Bangladesh but these were not statistically significant.

Table 8.1.

Fixed effects of national political divide (Divide), categories of freedom of media (Media_B), economic development (GDP_B) and years (Time) on democratisation (Freedom)

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	-.770628	4.410409	20	-.175	.863
[Divide=1]	4.794438	1.436645	20	3.337	.003
[Divide=2]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media_B=1]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
[Media_B=2]	2.178151	.727864	20	2.993	.007
[Media_B=3]	0 ^a	0	.	.	.
GDP_B	2.767840	2.240870	20	1.235	.231
Time	-.075375	.199848	20	-.377	.710

In fact, in 1991, a democratic transition took place in Bangladesh with the democracy score reaching its highest score of 11 on the Freedom House scale when the country's national political divide was at its historically unique low and media acted to its unique fully free extent while GDP per capita kept its normal growth trend (Appendix 8.1, Figure 8.5 & Figure 8.6). Besides, negative effects of high national political divide (Divide=2) and not-free media (Media=3) also offset the impact of economic development on democracy.

Apart from a few years of democratic transition after 1990 and the one year of the election of President Justice Sattar in 1981 in which most of the political parties took part (Huq, 1994; Kochanek, 2000), the democracy scores during the period under study were noticeably low and unstable with the national political divide level high and the media partly free and not-free, although there was in general a steady growth of GDP per capita (Appendix 8.1, Figure 8.5 & Figure 8.6). In 1991 and 1992 the country achieved its highest democracy score of 11 points with a

GDP per capita of just US\$ 282 and US\$ 272 respectively thanks to influences of a low national political divide and full-free media. In 2005 the democracy score was its lowest at 8 points during the post-transition era while GDP per capita was its highest at US\$ 422. A high national political divide and not-free media combined together in 1995 to reduce the democracy score to this extent (Appendix 8.1).

Figure 8.5. Democratisation (Mean Freedom) by Low and High national political divide (Divide) in Bangladesh, 1981-2005





Figure 8.6. Democratisation (Mean Freedom) by different levels of the freedom of media (Media) in Bangladesh, 1981-2005



Historical & Constitutional Explanations

National political divide and democratisation: Before the creation of Pakistan by dividing India, Muslim League leaders observed that there had been two nations in India – Hindus and Muslims who needed two separate independent states. This demand, along with a plan for its implementation, was specified in the resolution of Lahore conference of the All India Muslim League in 1940 (Islam, 1981). Accordingly, Pakistan was established in 1947 on the basis of a Muslim nationalism that included the eastern part of the then Indian state of Bengal. But in 23 years to 1970, East Bengal, more recently called East Pakistan (the land of today’s Bangladesh) emerged as a secular ethnic Bengali nation against Pakistani Muslim nationalism through a continuous movement for cultural, economic and political rights (Choudhury, 1972). This movement was led mainly by the Awami League, which was a breakaway faction of All Pakistan Muslim League, while opposed by Jamaat-e Islami (JI), Nezam-e Islam (NI) and three factions of Muslim League (ML). During the liberation war Awami League was the largest unparalleled political party in the history of today’s Bangladesh, while those Islamic

parties had a minor support base among the population according to the 1970 election results (Appendix 8.2). That split could be considered to be the initial stage of political division into today's Bangladesh.

During the country's war of liberation against Pakistan in 1971, the Bangladesh government in exile in India was formed with and run by AL leaders. AL leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) was president of this government although he was in a Pakistani prison during the whole period of the war (Huq, 1994). This government's main job was to free Bangladesh from Pakistani occupation forces. On the other hand, a number of pro-Pakistani political parties including Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim League factions collaborated with the occupation forces in fighting the Bangladesh liberation war with an aim of keeping today's Bangladesh united with Pakistan (Khan, 1976). Leaders of these political parties led Razakar, Al-Badr, Al-Shams, and other armed organisations who, in collaboration with Pakistani occupation forces, fought Bangladesh freedom fighters. Some pro-China radical (armed) communist parties, like the East Pakistan Communist Party (a Marxist-Leninist Party), were also against liberation of Bangladesh (Huq, 1994).

After independence, the BAL government headed by Mujib cancelled the Bangladesh citizenship and voting rights of some collaborators, banned religion-based political parties and introduced secularism and Bengali culture and language-based ethnic Bengali nationalism as state principles in the country's first constitution in 1972 (Huq, 1994). During the 1972-75 period a number of pro-China radical communist parties who were against the 1971 liberation of Bangladesh (including the East Pakistan Communist Party led by Abdul Huq, and East Pakistan Sarbahara Party led by Shiraj Shikdar) waged armed revolution, and the government followed a policy of repression on them. In addition, the NAP (Bhasani) and Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), who had participated in the liberation war, also favoured the revolutionary line and took a hard stand against the BAL government (Maniruzzaman, 1975). So, up to this stage, the oppressed anti-liberation forces such as the JI and ML, and radical communist parties, have constituted politically the country's anti-BAL forces.

On 25 January 1975, the Mujib government replaced multi-party democracy with a one-party system launching the Bangladesh Krishak-Shramik Awami League (BAKSAL) as a broad-base, single national political platform. Six months after the floatation of BAKSAL, President Mujib was killed along with most of his family members in a bloody military coup on 15 August 1975. A number of mid-level military officers including Majors Faruque, Rashid, Dalim, and Captain Bazlul Huda declared themselves as the coup leaders (Khan, 1976).

Soon after the coup, Major Dalim announced that the name of the country had been changed from “People’s Republic of Bangladesh” to “Islamic Republic of Bangladesh”, and there were allegations that the new President Khandakar Mostaque Ahmed had participated in US-initiated attempts to prevent the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan. Besides, the new President Mostaque favoured closer ties with Pakistan, and the Pakistan President at that time, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, became the first to recognise the new Bangladesh government (Time, 1975). However, the military rulers did not officially change the country’s name to Islamic Republic as it was assumed that would upset the regional power — India (Khan, 1976).

So, it appears that most of the reasons behind the August coup originated from Mujib’s stand on secularism, independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan and Mujib’s use of some undemocratic steps. However, the August coup was the beginning of a prolonged 15 year military rule until 1990 (Rahman, 2001). During this period, the military rulers arranged a number of elections to legitimize their rule and clung to power by using the Election Commission for their own purposes (Akram, & Das, 2006).

In less than three months after the anti-AL government was established through August coup, a pro-BAL military government led by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf took over through a military coup on 3 November 1975 (Khan, 1976). Brigadier Khaled Musharraf declared himself as Chief Martial Law Administrator by removing President Khandakar Mostaque Ahmed and the military officers who led

the August coup. He also arrested Major General Ziaur Rahman, who had been promoted as Chief of Army Staff after the August coup.

The Musharraf government survived just for four days. Musharraf and a number of his fellow military officers were killed and his government was ousted in a counter military coup on 7 November 1975 which installed an anti-BAL government led by General Ziaur Rahman (Datta, 2005). In this coup General Zia was freed from prison and took over as the head of the government. General Zia, through promulgating military ordinances, reinstated the cancelled citizenship of the people who allegedly fought against the Bangladesh liberation, lifted the ban on religious politics and reintroduced the multi-party system, and replaced secularism with Islamic values and ethnic Bengali nationalism with Islam-based Bangladeshi nationalism in the constitution (Karzon, 2001). He also introduced a provision in the constitution to legalize the killing of Mujib, keeping the question of the killings beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In addition, General Zia rehabilitated the August coup leaders and gave them positions in different Bangladesh missions abroad (Huq, 1994).

General Zia, in his demilitarisation process, formed the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) with leaders and personalities of mostly anti-BAL political forces like Muslim League factions, the pro-China National Awami Party (NAP-Bhasani), the anti-BAKSAL faction of the BAL and a considerably large number of non-party individuals, many of whom supported ML (Appendix 8.3). Since the independence of Bangladesh, the NAP (Bhasani) has been one of the main Opposition parties and harshly criticizes India and the ruling BAL's pro-India foreign policy (Huq, 1994).

Points to note here include that some new elements were added to the existing Islamic anti-liberation forces, such as the JI and ML, to fight the BAL; and there was a divide in the Bangladesh military forces into two groups: freedom fighters and non-freedom fighters. Non-freedom fighters, who are known as pro-Pakistani, were still in the Pakistan military forces during the liberation war and were repatriated to Bangladesh after the war. Their rival faction, the freedom fighters

were known as pro-Indian, some whom left the Pakistan military forces in 1971 and then fought for liberation of Bangladesh; and some others who were recruited soon after the liberation war. These two factions were in conflict against each other several times including 15 August, 3 November and 7 November in 1971 (Khan, 1976 & Maniruzzaman, 1992).

At this stage, it can be maintained Bangladesh conceptually became a Muslim state, almost like another Pakistan, with non-secular ideals in the ruling elements while there were secular components in the Opposition led by the BAL. This political development is compatible with the original Lahore Resolution adopted in 1940 at the All Pakistan Muslim League conference which determined that there would be a number of Muslim “states” in the Muslim majority regions of the then India. In 1946, at another conference of the party legislators, the word “states” as used in the Lahore Resolution was replaced with “state” and accordingly the state of Pakistan was the only one created (Islam, 1981). By establishing a “Muslim” Bangladesh, the missing “s” of “states” was recovered.

Political power got transferred to a new hand in the anti-AL forces, through the last military coup that took place on 24 March 1982, where General Ershad forced the BNP government led by President Justice Abdus Sattar to hand power to him. This is coup may be described as an internal power handover within the anti-BAL forces, as General Ershad and his Jatiya Party (JP) followed Zia’s and the BNP’s basic anti-BAL policies and principles. His government upheld Islamic values, Bangladeshi nationalism and went even further by declaring Islam as the state religion in the constitution (Karzon, 2001; & Appendix 8.6). Ershad also kept active the constitutional provisions prohibiting a trial for the killings of Mujib and his family members (Karzon, 2001).

None of the political parties welcomed the martial law proclaimed by General Ershad. They all initiated almost identical protest actions, demanding the withdrawal of martial law and restoration of democracy, but they maintained their political divisional stance: the parties with secular orientation formed a 15-party alliance led by the BAL; while the anti-BAL parties led by the BNP formed a 7-

party alliance for the anti-Ershad movement (Huq, 1994). The alliances were not united against the Ershad regime until December 1990. The BAL and some of its allied parties backtracked from the on-going anti-Ershad movement and participated in the 1986 parliamentary election organized by Ershad government to legitimize its rule (Huq, 1994).

By the year 1990, all the political stakeholders outside the government realised that a free and fair election was not possible with General Ershad in power. So the demand for resignation of the Ershad government and a general election under a non-party caretaker (interim) government was ultimately transformed into a united anti-Ershad movement by the two archrival political alliances. On 29 November 1990 the AL-led 8-party Alliance, the BNP-led 7-party Alliance and the left leaning 5-party Alliance³ announced in a joint declaration that they all would participate in the elections only when conducted by a non-party caretaker government; but before that the Ershad government would have to be forced to resign and an interim caretaker government formed. After that, the Election Commission would be reconstituted by the caretaker government to hold free and fair elections of a “sovereign” parliament (Maniruzzaman, 1992).

It should be pointed out that this joint declaration was the first ever meaningful consensus between the two conflicting political forces. Under this agreement the Ershad government was forced to step down in an anti-government outburst and mass uprising. In the makeover process, the Vice President Moudud Ahmed at that time resigned and the nominee of the three alliances Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was installed as the Vice-President of the Ershad government. Then General Ershad stepped down from the presidency giving his charge to Chief Justice Shahabuddin, who emerged as the country's Acting President and headed the non-party caretaker government. Subsequently, he appointed 17 Advisers to his caretaker government. Then the non-party interim government held an election of a “sovereign” parliament in a fairly free and fair manner in 1991 (Choudhury, 2006). The BNP won the election and formed a

³ 5-party Alliance components were in the AL-led 15-party Alliance until 1986 parliament election. The issue of participating in that election divided them into two alliances

government. In the same year, a parliamentary form of government was then reintroduced as BAL-led opposition parties and the anti-BAL parties, especially the ruling BNP, reached a consensus on it.

Although there were no formal electoral alliances, there was an understanding between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami that they would support each other in the constituencies where either of them had no chances to win against the AL candidates. This understanding helped the BNP to win the election (Choudhury, 2006). Then Jamaat-e-Islami MPs supported the BNP to form government as the BNP emerged as a single majority party with just 139 out of 299 declared parliamentary seats, which was not enough to form a government (Appendix 8.4). One other important point was that Ershad's JP did not support the BNP either in the election or in forming a government, although the JP was a Bangladeshi nationalist party with an Islamic orientation like the BNP (Maniruzzaman, 1992). Apart from the AL, other parties with secular orientation won a negligible number of seats and did not support the BNP (Appendix 8.4).

Consistent with the fall of an autocratic regime, freedom of the media also increased to the highest level possible, with Freedom House including Bangladesh on their annual list of world's full-free media in 1991 (*Freedom of the Press*, n.d.). A number of new newspapers also started publication with a new orientation in the new socio-political environment. The *Daily Star* and a Bengali newspaper the *Daily Ajker Kagoj* were such examples. In addition, the BNP government allowed BBC and CNN to telecast their popular news programmes through Bangladesh Television. However, the Bangladesh Television, Radio Bangladesh, two daily newspapers — *The Bangladesh Times* and the *Daily Bangla* — and a magazine *Bichitra*, were still state-owned and controlled and run by the government. So apart from 1991, during the remaining four years of the government's five year term the media were rated by the Freedom House index as partly free (*Freedom of the Press*, n.d.).

However, after the 1991 elections, the AL said that there had been a subtle rigging of the elections, which changed the AL's victory to the BNP's, and within three

years the two arch rival political forces locked their horns again. In March 1994, the Awami League lost a by-election in Magura, its traditional stronghold. Accusing the government of widespread rigging in the by-election, all parliamentary opposition parties, led by the BAL, boycotted the sessions of Parliament from March to December 1994, demanding that the government table a bill which would provide for the holding of all future parliamentary elections under non-party caretaker governments (Kochanek, 1997).

The Government summarily rejected the opposition demand, arguing that it was unconstitutional and illegal. In response, 147 opposition MPs of the 330-strong Parliament resigned en masse on 28 December 1994 after nine months of boycotting. Thereafter, the opposition parties turned to the street, adopting several disruptive tactics to dislodge the Government (Ahmed, 2003). The Government finally dissolved the Parliament in November 1995 and held elections for membership of the new Parliament in February 1995, which all the opposition parties boycotted. The BNP won the elections but found it extremely difficult to govern the country. Under serious public and political pressure, Parliament enacted a bill in March 1996 providing for the holding of all future parliamentary elections under a non-party caretaker government (Kochanek, 1997). After that, the BNP Government resigned and a non-party caretaker Government took over.

According to the Thirteenth Amendment to the Bangladeshi Constitution, the main features of the non-party caretaker government are:

- (a) after dissolution of parliament a not-more than 11-member non-party caretaker government headed by a Chief Advisor takes over and the President appoints the Chief Advisor and Advisors from among the citizens who have no party identity and no intention to be candidate in the ensuing election. In getting selected as Chief Advisor, retired judges get top priority;
- (b) the caretaker government is collectively responsible to the President;
- (c) the Chief Advisor is appointed by the head of state while other advisors are selected as per advice of the Chief Advisor;

- (d) the Chief Advisor hold the status of Prime Minister while an advisor enjoys the status of a minister;
- (e) the non-party caretaker government discharges its functions as an interim government and carries on just routine jobs, and except in the case of necessity it does not make any policy decisions;
- (f) the caretaker government assists the Election Commission to hold general elections impartially, fairly and peacefully;
- (g) this caretaker government is dissolved on the date a new Prime Minister assumes their office (Appendix 8.5).

Under the constitutional provision for non-party caretaker government, a parliamentary election was held in June 1996, which the AL won (Appendix 8.4). In this election, all three major parties with Islamic orientation – the BNP, the JP and the Jamaat-e-Islami — competed separately (Choudhury, 2006). There were no formal or informal alliances among these three anti-AL parties because Jamaat-e-Islami also was an opposition party that staged protests against the BNP government, along with the BAL, demanding constitutional provisions for a routine non-party caretaker government to be in charge during every Parliamentary election.

Ershad's JP was not comfortable with the BNP because Ershad came to power by forcefully dislodging the BNP government in 1982; the BNP had consistently tried to force General Ershad to step down; and the BNP had filed different cases against the General during its 1991-96 rule. This political situation divided the anti-AL votes into at least three parties – BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and JP; a division which led to the BAL victory in 1996 elections (Choudhury, 2006). The JP MPs then supported the BAL in forming government as the BAL had insufficient parliamentary seats to form the government itself.

After the BAL had come to power, the first private television channel, Ekushey TV, started airing its programmes. The new TV channel with both satellite and terrestrial capacity became popular in a short span of time, especially for its news programmes. The BAL government also stopped publication of all state-owned

newspapers and magazines. However, the Bangladesh Television and Bangladesh Betar (radio) were still state-owned and under government control. During the whole five year tenure of the Hasina-led BAL Government, this country's media was rated as partly free by Freedom House (*Freedom of the Press*, n.d.).

However, after the elections the BNP alleged vote rigging and manipulation of the election results that had brought the AL to power. During the tenure of the Sheikh Hasina government, the BNP-led seven-party opposition alliance resorted to strike actions to remove the BAL Government. The longest *hartal* organized by the alliance under the Hasina administration lasted 60 hours from November 9 at 9 am to 9 pm on November 11 in 1998 (Shehabuddin, 1999). The main opposition BNP party boycotted parliament proceedings for more than two years, accusing the Speaker of holding a 'partisan' attitude and demanding that it be given more opportunities to speak. The BNP also sought to legitimize its boycott on other grounds, including alleged government repression of the opposition parties and its refusal to release opposition activists from jail (Ahmed, 2003).

Despite these protest actions, the AL Government managed to finish its official tenure and stepped down accordingly. It was the first time after a democratic transition in Bangladesh that a government had completed its five year official tenure and voluntarily resigned at the end of term, according to the country's constitution. In all other cases, the incumbent governments were either dislodged by military coup or by popular movement before their tenure were completed, or itself dissolved parliament and held a mid-term election.

On 1 October 2001, another parliament election was held under the non-party caretaker government. An electoral alliance led by the BNP won the election with a big margin (Appendix 8.4). This time four Islamic/ Bangladeshi nationalist parties with an Islamic orientation, including the BNP and the Jamaat-e-Islami, formed an electoral alliance while Ershad's JP was non-aligned. This arrangement gave the alliance electoral victory and they assumed power (Choudhury, 2006).

After the elections, the AL said that the caretaker government had played a partisan role in favour of the alliance, which had influenced the election results.

Apart from the year 2002, where the media were rated as partly-free, Freedom House rated Bangladesh print and electronic media as not-free from 2001 through to 2005. During that period, journalists frequently faced pressure from organized crime groups, political parties, the government, and Islamic fundamentalists, and practiced some self-censorship. A number of journalists were killed, injured, arrested and tortured in police custody. Although the constitution provides for freedom of expression subject to "reasonable restrictions," the media were constrained by national security legislation as well as sedition and criminal libel laws and the 1974 Special Powers Act which allows detentions of up to 90 days without trial (Freedom of the Press, n.d; Reporters Without Borders, n.d; & The Committee to Protect Journalists, n.d.).

The state owned most broadcast media coverage usually favoured the ruling party. Private broadcast outlets were required to air government-produced news segments as a condition of their survival. Ekushey Television, the country's pioneering independent broadcaster, was forced to close in August after the Supreme Court upheld the High Court verdict withdrawing its license in 2002. The new broadcast licenses that were issued in 2005 were allegedly given to those with close political connections with the ruling BNP (US Department of State, n.d.). Foreign publications were subject to censorship, and foreign journalists and press freedom advocates encountered increasing difficulties in obtaining visas to enter Bangladesh and were put under surveillance while in the country (Freedom of the Press, n.d.). Political considerations influenced the distribution of government advertising revenue and subsidized newsprint, upon which most publications were dependent (Freedom of the Press, n.d.).

Although the archrival political forces criticized the election results whenever they lost, the parliament elections held in 1991, June 1996 and in 2001 are considered to be the most free and fair. International and national observers and the public commended those elections (Akram & Das, 2007). Commenting on the factors

determining the election results, Choudhury (2006) & Babu (2008) observed that voters were generally divided into two political forces when supporting the parties of their choice. The number of voters belonging to the BAL forces was substantially smaller than those belonging to the anti-BAL forces and that was why the anti-BAL forces won elections whenever the parties belonging to that side formed an alliance. Alternatively, the BAL forces won elections whenever the anti-BAL parties could not form an alliance (Choudhury, 2006). Voters generally followed their older family members while choosing to support either of the two forces, because family loyalty was still fundamental in Bangladesh (Babu, 2008).

On the basis of the historical information discussed above, it is argued here that there has been a sharp national political divide in Bangladesh since its pre-liberation era. The country's major institutions — political parties, military and even the population — were divided into two national political forces: BAL forces and anti-BAL forces. The anti-BAL forces included the anti-liberation forces during the war of liberation era; the pro-Pakistani faction of the Bangladesh military; anti-Indian political parties; and the anti-BAKSAL faction of the BAL. The most common properties of the BAL forces and anti-BAL forces were secular orientation and Islamic orientation respectively.

Table 8.2.
National political divide in Bangladesh

BAL forces	Anti-BAL forces
Bangladesh Awami League (BAL)	Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)
	Jamaat-e Islami (JI)
	Jatiya Party (Ershad)

According to the election results, the BAL, BNP, Jatiya Party (Ershad) and Jamaat-e-Islami were the major political parties throughout the period under study (Appendix 8.4). The BAL, the party of assassinated leader Mujib who led the Bangladesh liberation, was the only party belonging to the BAL forces while the anti-BAL forces were conceptually composed of the BNP, JP (Ershad) and JI

(Table 8.2). The historical information discussed above indicates that the BAL had an appearance of secularism, and a belief in language and culturally-based ethnic Bengali nationalism. The BAL believed that Mujib was the most commendable national political hero as he was the founder of the Bangladesh nation and supported pro-India regional policy. At the same time this party adopted an anti-Pakistan regional policy and was opposed to radical communists.

On the other hand, the anti-BAL parties were commonly opposed to secularism, Bengali nationalism, Sheikh Mujib as top national leader, and regarding India as a neighbouring friend. At the same time they supported Islamic values and pro-Pakistan regional policy (Appendix 8.6). While the BAL forces of the country were led only by the one party, BAL, the anti-BAL forces were led by different parties or groups for different periods of time: for example some mid-level military officers assumed command soon after the August 1975 military coup: General Zia and his BNP from November 1975 through 1982, and General Ershad and his JP from 1982 to 1990. In period of democratic transition from 1991 through to 2005, the anti-BAL forces were led by the BNP (Table 8.3).

The anti-BAL parties were divided into two sections: one section was comprised of democrats who believed in Islamic values and culturally-based Bangladeshi nationalism, while other section believed in Muslim nationalism and wanted to establish an Islamic political system. However, parties in both the sections participated in the country's electoral democracy and they were called "nationalist forces" for the purposes of getting them aligned (Choudhury, 2006).

Table 8.3.
Rules of two conflicting political forces in Bangladesh

Dates	Heads of forces BAL governments	Heads of anti-BAL Governments	Basis of coming to power	Parties/groups
1972-75	Sheikh Mujib		Election	BAL
August 1975		Some mid-level military officers	Military coup	Military
November 1975	Brigadier Khaled Musharraf		Military coup	Military
1975-81		General Ziaur Rahman	Military coup	Military, BNP
1981-82		Justice Sattar	Election	BNP
1982-90		General Hussein Mohammad Ershad	Military coup	Military, JP
1991-96		Khaleda Zia	Election	BNP
1996-01	Sheikh Hasina		Election	BAL
2001-06		Khaleda Zia	Election	BNP

Sources of historical information: Khan (1976); Maniruzzaman (1992); Huq (1994); Kochanek (2000); and Ahmed (2003).

In one sense, the anti-BAL bloc may be called “anti-Mujib” forces because firstly, most of the people and political parties of these forces did not want to accept Mujib as the paramount leader of the country’s liberation war instead of Moulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, the leader of NAP (Bhasani) at that time, or even General Zia. Besides, they regarded Mujib as being responsible for breaking up the “Muslim country” of Pakistan; the introduction of secularism; making India a friend; and the introduction of one party system in 1975 (Huq, 1994).

There were some small political parties which conceptually belonged to the BAL forces as their main attributes were somewhat similar to those of the BAL. They were in the BAL-led 15-party alliance which later formed a five-party alliance during the anti-Ershad movement (when some of previously radical communist parties e.g., the JSD started complying with democratic practices instead of armed revolution) (Huq, 1994). The most known of those parties were the Communist Party of Bangladesh; JSD; the Workers Party; the National Awami Party (Mozaffar); and the Ganotantri Party (Appendix 8.7). According to their manifestos, their objective was to establish a communist system through democratic process. But these parties were not really of benefit to the BAL forces during elections, because they just had a small voter base and mainly the AL, BNP, JP and JI dominated the election results (Appendix 8.4).

However, the impact of the smaller parties was not negligible on anti-government protest action. During the campaigning against the rule of General Ershad, these parties were initially part of the 15-party alliance led by Awami League, but then they formed their own five-party alliance to assist two other alliances, the BNP led seven-party alliance and the AL led eight-party alliance, to force General Ershad to step down (Huq, 1994).

However, there were some political developments that could not be explained with the two forces theory. For example, the JP (Ershad), while being a component of the anti-BAL forces in theory, did not align with the anti-BAL forces, rather the JP helped the BAL form government after the June 1996 election. It may be argued that this type of exception could be explained by proposing there were two types of enmity between all three sides involved: direct enmity and indirect enmity. For example, according to this argument, during the British colonial era in India, both the British Government and Hindus were the direct enemies of Muslims, as the Hindus directly lost power to the British, and the British directly took power from Muslims. The British government as the foreign occupant was obviously an enemy of Hindus but it was just an indirect enmity because the British did not seize power from Hindus. As a result, it was comparatively easy for Hindus to extend

cooperation to the colonial power and further advance themselves while it was comparatively hard for Muslims to that.

Accordingly, in Bangladesh, the JP (Ershad) and the BAL were the direct enemies of the BNP because JP founder General Ershad took power in a military coup from the BNP; and the BAL lost their power in a military coup in 1975 to the anti-AL forces that eventually helped found and the BNP and allowed them to flourish. In elections or political movements, direct enemies generally join different formal or informal alliances, while indirect enemies were united in the same formal or informal alliances no matter which blocs they belonged to, or remained non-aligned. Besides, another exception could have happened if, for example, there was a small break-away faction of the BNP in an electoral or any sorts of political alliance with the BNP. Actually, no general rules for this type of faction have so far been found in Bangladesh's history. Activities and impacts of such factions have varied by situation, and were not strong enough to make a significant difference in the political developments under the two forces system.

From the above discussions, it is observed that the two archrival national political forces reached a unique consensus in 1991, in setting up the non-party caretaker government. During the same year, the country's first widely acceptable free and fair election was held under this caretaker government and the country attained its highest degree of democracy. Apart from 1991, the two forces were in confrontation for the whole life of the country and from 1991 onwards the country's democracy score was lower, but the score did not go back to the pre-transition period. This, the system of non-party caretaker government was working somehow and still having a positive influence on democracy.

Tools for fighting each other: Apart from the unique consensus in 1991, the confronting political forces have used two tools to fight each other: direct, undemocratic tools mostly used during the period until the democratic transition took place; and indirect, undemocratic tools mostly in use during the period starting after the democratic the transition. Those tools were used in order to

achieve and remain in power or to block opponent forces from achieving or remaining in power; or to unseat the sitting opponent government.

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Direct undemocratic tools: Direct undemocratic tools generally appeared tyrannical and went directly against democracy. The main such undemocratic tools used for political gains were the (1) cancellation of voting rights of some alleged liberation war criminals without trial in 1972; (2) banning religion-based political parties in 1972; (3) introduction of one-party system; and (4) military coups.

Indirect undemocratic tools: Indirect undemocratic tools were generally based on political cunning which was disguised as democracy. The main such indirect undemocratic tools used for political gains were: 1) financial corruption; 2) abuse of democratic rights; and 3) political corruption. Each of those mechanisms is explained below.

1) Financial corruption: The conflicting political forces considered money as one of the key factors in winning elections. Because this, they gave priority to nominating candidates with money in elections. “The political parties nominate hoodlums, businessmen and unscrupulous industrialists as candidates for winning parliamentary and other elections” (Akram & Das, 2006, p.1). Political parties very often broke the time-frame and went over the set limit for spending money in electioneering (Akram & Das, 2007). Generating money was also quite easy by using government position in Bangladesh which was rated world’s most corrupt country for five consecutive years until 2005 (Transparency International, n.d.). Thus, we are convinced that financial corruption was a double-edge sword: Political parties spent big amount of money in electioneering to influence election results and when they were in power tried to earn more than that using their positions.

2) Abuse of party rights: Among the advantages that political parties took by abusing their democratic rights were general strikes (locally called *hartal*), blockades, public meetings and rallies, and boycotts of parliament. Both the rival political forces, while in opposition, used these democratic rights as an instrument

in a bid to drag down an elected government instead of waiting for next election (Rahman, 1993 as cited in Rahman, 2001). Opposition parties enforced general strikes and blockades in order to press the government to meet their demands. During these protest actions, all sorts of economic activities, modes of transport, and government and private offices stopped. Opposition parties held public meetings on different streets blocking normal traffic. The country was shut down for more than 300 days in the 1990s during the two political regimes (Hossain, 2004). General strikes were costing Bangladesh around \$80 million per day and became the symbol of Bangladesh's economic and social paralysis (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1996).

Political corruption: Political corruption can be regarded as more detrimental to a society than any other forms of corruption as it can illegally help transfer political power to an unaccountable person, group or party. But this study has found no instances of trial of or punishment of any persons or organisations involved in political corruption in Bangladesh, although occasionally some people received some sort of punishment or at least faced trial for financial corruption.

Such political corruptions found in history of Bangladesh were: 1) amendment to the constitution without required referendum; 2) legalising military coups; 3) government recruitments and postings of partisan people to do election-related jobs rather than employing someone affiliated with one of the confronting political forces; 4) preparation of fake voter rolls, and 5) politicisation of the caretaker government. It is maintained that each of these actions violated the fundamental democratic principal that the people are the owners of a country and they have to be free to choose their representatives and make decisions on necessary issues in an unquestionably free and fair manner to run the state affairs.

Violating the constitutional provision (Article 142 (1A)), the Parliament on 25 January 1975 passed the 4th Amendment to the Constitution which took effect duly without having any referendum on the issues of the amendment. The AL with a two-thirds majority moved the bill on 25 January 1975 in Parliament and after just a 70 minute discussion it was passed by voice votes the same day (Huq, 1994).

This amendment, on the one hand, transformed the country's multiparty democracy to a one party system and, on the other hand, altered a parliamentary form of government to presidential one. These elements changed the provisions of Articles 48 and 56 (Form of Government) of the Constitution which compulsorily required a referendum (Appendix 8.8)

At least 12 military coups occurred during the period under study, which completely went against basic democratic rules. Among those only three (15 August 1975, 7 November 1975 and 24 March 1982) are considered successful as their leaders survived and ruled the country for a considerable period of time. In all cases of unsuccessful military coups, the coup leaders and participants faced trial in court martial and many of them received capital punishment. In contrast, not one of the three successful coups faced such trial. Rather, they had the unsuccessful coup leaders tried and their own coups made legal through constitutional amendment (Maniruzzaman, 1992).

General Ziaur Rahman, who emerged as the supreme leader after the 7 November 1975 coup, got his own party and political alliance established and elected to the Parliament that legalised all his, and the previous coup leaders', actions including coups. The 1982 coup leader General Ershad followed General Zia's method of legalising his role as coup leader and ruler of the country. Then, after coming to power in 1991, the BNP (from which General Ershad took power by force) arranged the trial of Ershad for a number of just financial corruption cases. In turn, when the the BAL came to power in 1996, it removed the legal barrier to bring to trial those responsible for the killing of Mujib and his family members and some other national leaders. It also got some financial corruption cases filed against the Prime Minister of the BNP Government, Khaleda Zia.

Other than these killings and financial corruption cases, no actions were taken by any governments during the period under study to try any of the successful military coup leaders and rulers. However, a business organisation, who had business interests in Bangladesh in 2000, challenged the validity of the Martial Law Regulation 7 of 1977. Upon hearing its petition, on 29 August 2005 the country's

High Court cancelled the Fifth Amendment to the country's constitution which had legalised the successful military coups of 1975; and declared military rule from 15 August 1975 through to 9 April 1979 illegal (What the verdict was, 2005, May 4). But the leading anti-BAL party, BNP and its allies, have moved against this verdict. The BNP introduced that amendment to legalise the 1975 coups, which based on anti-BAL ideals of religious politics and legalised military coups and rules by military officers including BNP founder General Ziaur Rahman. At the time of publication, the issue was still under trial t (Leave-to-appeal petitions filed with SC against HC verdict, 2009, May 26).

The BNP-led four-party alliance government, during their 2001-2006 tenure, appointed Justice Aziz as Chief Election Commissioner (CEC). The BAL opposition questioned his appointment and activities as CEC. Despite opposition from the BAL forces and a court ruling that the Election Commission's job was to update the existing voter roll, not to prepare a fresh one, the Election Commission during Aziz's tenure prepared a new voter list. Compared to the previous one, the number of voters on the new voter list increased 21.77 percent (Akram & Das, 2006). However, the Supreme Court in March 2007 cancelled that voter roll as it was not the Election Commission's job to prepare such a fresh voter list instead of updating the old one ("HC declares void electoral roll", 2007, March 28). In December 2007, the High Court declared "illegal" the appointment of Justice MA Aziz as the chief election commissioner who preceded the current CEC ("Aziz's appointment as CEC was illegal for holding dual offices", 2007, December 13).

During the tenure of CEC Justice AZIZ, in September 2005 the Election Commission recruited 300 Upazila (the field-level administrative unit of the government) Election Officers (UEOs) allegedly with BNP backgrounds. All major opposition parties, backed by investigations by national dailies, alleged that the UEOs were selected on a partisan basis (Akram & Das, 2006). After the departure of Justice Aziz as CEC, and the BNP-led 4-party Government, because of widespread protest and criticism, all the UEOs had to take a merit examination; but their employers have not yet been investigated or tried for such recruitment.

The two political forces also tussled over the composition of the caretaker government. A parliamentary election was supposed to be held in 2006 with the (apparently) last retired Chief Justice Hasan heading the caretaker government. However the BAL forces alleged that the BNP-led alliance government had increased the retirement age for judges from 65 to 67 in order to make sure Justice Hasan was the last retired Chief Justice and so he would be the first person to have the opportunity to head the non-party interim government. In the face of violent protest by the BAL alleging that Justice Hasan was previously a BNP activist, Justice Hasan refused to head the caretaker government. Then President Iajuddin Ahmed, who was elected as a BNP nominee, without trying two other options specified in the constitution (described earlier), went straight to the last option and made himself the head (Chief Advisor) of the non-party caretaker government on 29 October 2006 (National Democratic Institution, 2006). So far, these corruption charges have not been investigated and tried.

Summary of the Findings of the Bangladesh Case Study

In a nutshell, this empirical study encompasses a number of arguments. Firstly, a sharp national political divide was found to be the principal determinant of Bangladesh politics. One side was led by the BAL forces while other side by the anti-BAL forces. When the degree of division was low, the country tended to be more democratic; when the degree of division ran high, the country tended to be more non-democratic. The divide was uniquely low during the year 1991 as the country's two archrival political forces jointly introduced a system of non-party caretaker government. Under the supervision of this type of interim government, the three parliamentary elections held in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001 were by and large free, fair and mostly accepted in the electoral history of this country. However, democracy was not consolidated even after 1991 onwards. Consistent with the national political divide running high again, the country's democracy score weakened between 1991 and 2005 but the score did not go back to the pre-transition period's, as the system of non-party interim government was still somehow working and having a positive influence on democracy.

Secondly, apart from the year 1991, the national political divide was generally high for the whole life of the country. During the period from independence through to 1990, the ruling political forces used electoral malpractices, parliamentary majorities and military coups as the major instruments to achieve and remain in power, and marginalize the rival political forces. From 1991 onwards, the ruling political forces abused their parliamentary majority, by trying to manipulate and use government institutions like the non-party caretaker government, the electoral commission, the general administration and law enforcing agencies as a means of gaining electoral victory and fighting rival forces. They also earned lots of money by misusing their positions and power and spent those funds in electioneering and some other purposes designed to fight the opposition forces. On the other hand, the opposition forces abused their so-called democratic rights by boycotting parliamentary sessions; staging general strikes, blockades, processions, and rallies which blocked normal public movement; and clashed with law enforcers in order to unseat an elected government. Thirdly, the ongoing nature and strength of the political divide weakened and reduced the significance of the impact of a generally continuous economic development on democratisation.

Finally, some direct and relatively indirect non-democratic tools impeded the democratisation process. During the post-transition era, no use was made of direct non-democratic tools such as military coups, but there was plenty of use of indirect non-democratic tools. In this era, ruling political forces tried to use financial and political corruption as catalysts for their restoration to power; while opposition political forces abused their democratic rights in a bid to force the ruling political forces to step down.

Conclusion

The findings of this study on Bangladesh show that there was a continuous political confrontation between two archrival political forces since the country's independence 1971. This confrontation divided the country politically into two forces. These have been termed BAL forces and anti-BAL forces. It is argued that

the extent of the national political divide determined the country's level of democracy: as the divide runs low, the country tends to have higher levels of democracy; as the divide runs high, the country tends to be less democratic. In 1991, a unique low divide produced a system of non-party caretaker government that kept working as a catalyst for power transfer in a democratic way from one government to another even after the divide had become as high as before. However, the level of democracy did decrease as the political divide once again became high after 1991 onwards. Economic development had some impact on democratisation but that impact was not substantial enough to form part of explanation. The more effective and significant contributions of a low national political divide and free and partly free media to democratisation, on the one hand, made the influence of economic development insignificant. On the other hand, the more effective and significant contributions of high national political divide and not-free media to lower levels of democratisation offset the positive influence of economic development.

Chapter Nine: Discussion

This chapter presents an overview and interpretation of the research results. The sections below bring together and summarise the major research findings from the various chapters and compare the results found by using three different dependent variables in three regression analyses. Finally, the findings of this study are compared with the ones of other, closely related, previous studies.

This project began with a question of longstanding interest to social scientists — which factors are mainly responsible for democratisation in the Asian context? Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight provided answers to this question from three different standpoints. Firstly, a higher level of economic development along with its equal distribution throughout society, and positive roles of political actors, drove a higher level of democratisation in Asia in the period 1981-2005. Secondly, some pro-democratic political and social institutions, and international organisations have also led democratisation. In addition, a low level of national political division resulted in a considerably higher level of democratisation in a country where confrontation between major political forces is the main feature of politics. Thirdly and finally, contrary to the first hypothesis, the level of democracy did not go up in line with the level of economic development in some rich countries, as some other elements successfully deterred the growth in democracy, and even reduced the level of democratisation. Explanations of these three standpoints are given below.

To explain the economic association of democratisation, countries in the sample were divided into four categories according to their respective GDP per capita (described in Chapters Three & Five). Two (Freedom House and Vanhanen) of our three regression analyses with three separate measures of democracy as dependent variables (the difference are discussed later in this chapter) suggested that a Very High category of GDP per capita (first category) had a positive impact on democratisation in Asia as a whole in comparison with a Very Low GDP (fourth category) per capita. All scatter plots with two (Polity and Vanhanen) of the three indices of democracy as the dependent variable revealed that all the GDP

categories had strong positive influences on democracy. The scatter plots with Freedom House democracy scores as the dependent variable indicated a strong relationship between economic development and democracy in Very High GDP and Low GDP countries, but no relationship between economic development and democracy in the High GDP countries (the second category) and a weak positive impact of Very Low GDP per capita (the third category) on democratisation.

However, it is of interest to note that Brunei and Singapore, included amongst the five Very High GDP category countries, and Malaysia and Maldives from the five High GDP countries, were identified as less or the least democratic amongst the countries in the study. The case studies on Taiwan (Chapter Six) and Singapore (Chapter Seven) provided some more detailed background information on these findings and more evidence to explain the apparent anomalies. The Taiwan case revealed that a pro-democratic role of political actors was needed to enhance the level of democratisation even after considerable economic development. A high level of economic growth and equitable distribution of wealth created a less unequal (Gini coefficient) society that included a substantial urban middle class with high rates of education, raised political consciousness and an increased freedom of media. This middle class was assimilated into the process of Taiwanisation or indigenisation of the KMT and civil society, etc. Then the political actors, who had been changing and adapting over the years, responded by translating the popular demand for higher level of democratisation into reality.

In explanation of the third standpoint that some elements deter, and even reduce the level of democracy in some rich countries, the case study of Singapore provides some ideas in this context. The Singapore case suggests that a hybrid regime constructed with the ingredients of Confucianism, authoritarianism and democracy, that enjoys legitimacy because of the high level of economic development and a lack of corruption, can actually deter the growth of, and even reduce the level of democratisation. The findings indicate that a sort of popular authoritarian regime, along with a lack of corruption, helped bring about a high level of economic development in Singapore and achieved a relatively fair distribution of

income throughout society, which in turn has legitimised the PAP government since the country's independence. However, after two decades of strong economic development, some signs of the beginnings of democratic development were witnessed in Singapore as the PAP evidently started losing parliamentary seats since 1981 by-election. But the PAP government successfully arrested their declining trend in support by introducing some additional categories of parliamentary seats to co-opt rising non-PAP figures into the PAP system of rule, and by increasing the use of legal techniques to control opposition politicians and critics. The legal techniques included enactment of laws restricting individual freedom and freedom of the press; filing libel lawsuits; and alleged use of the judiciary in favour of the ruling PAP. As a result, the Opposition became more marginalised and the democratic content of the Singapore regime weakened further.

To explain democratisation in the poor countries (categorised as Low and Very Low GDP per capita countries) in the sample, the measures form of government, media and membership or non-membership of Bretton Wood lending institutions were used as independent variables alongside economic variables. The analyses described and displayed on different tables and plots in Chapter Five revealed that a parliamentary form of government, free or partly free media and membership of Bretton Wood institutions influenced democratisation, especially in the countries with Low and Very Low categories of GDP per capita, such as. India. But some countries, for example Bangladesh and Mongolia, were found to have achieved a considerable level of democratisation without noticeable economic development, or a tradition of parliamentarianism, and with a below-average freedom of the media. The case study of Bangladesh (Chapter Eight) goes a considerable way towards providing an explanation as to why that might be. A continuous political confrontation between two archrival political forces have created a longstanding and deep national political divide and the extent of such a political divide was found to determine the country's level of democracy: as the divide runs low, the country tends to be more democratic; as the divide runs high, the country tends to be less democratic.

In accordance with the theoretical discussion above, economic development coupled with pro-democracy roles of political actors has led to democratisation in three of five Very High GDP countries -- Japan, South Korea and Taiwan and another three of five High GDP countries -- Philippines, Thailand and new-century Indonesia. However, a lack of pro-democracy actions from political actors has kept Brunei and Singapore (Very High GDP countries) and Malaysia and Maldives from the (High GDP countries), at low levels of democracy, making them less or least democratic.

On the other hand, a Parliamentary form of government; and/or free or partly free media; and/or membership of Bretton Wood institutions; and/or a low extent of national political divide; has led to higher levels of democratisation in India, Sri Lanka, Mongolia and Pakistan from Low GDP countries, and Bangladesh and Nepal from Very Low GDP countries. Economic development might have “had a sort of association” with democratisation in these countries, as noted earlier from scatter plot results which indicated that Low GDP per capita had a positive impact on their levels of democracy (Chapter Five). On the other hand, poverty and/or lack of pro-democracy roles of political actors, and/or a strong president not elected by the people, and/or not-free or partly free media and/or non-membership of Bretton Wood institutions and/or a high extent of national political divide caused a low level of democratisation in Afghanistan, Bhutan, Cambodia, Laos, North Korea, Myanmar and Vietnam from Very Low GDP countries and China from Low GDP categories.

The impact of different factors varied somewhat by measure of democracy too. The regression analyses with Freedom House (Freedom) and Vanhanen (Vandem) indices of democracy as dependent variables suggested that economic development had a positive effect on democratisation in Asia. The Very High category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat=1) generally had an impact on democratisation in the countries under this GDP category. An insignificant impact of economic development on democratisation was found in the countries with High GDP per capita (GDP_cat=2) and Low GDP per capita (GDP_cat=3). Besides, some other elements (e.g., parliamentary form of government, free or partly free

media and membership of Bretton Wood institutions) played a key role. These elements also helped democratise the countries with Very Low GDP, as economic development had a weak positive impact on democratisation.

However, the analysis with the Polity ratings of democracy (Polidem) as the dependent variable suggested that economic development significantly influenced democratisation in the countries in the low category of GDP per capita while influences of economic development are somewhat insignificant in the Very High and High GDP countries (Table 9.1). In the Literature review (Chapter Two) it was noted that the results of Nelson & Wallace's (2005) study on impact of the IMF on democratisation in different regions of the world varied by measure of democracy. Their model with Polity democracy index as dependent variable found that the IMF has had a strongly positive impact on democracy in Eastern Europe and Africa while having the opposite impact in Latin America and East Asia. On the other hand, the model with the Freedom House index as the dependent variable provided positive results in case of Latin America and East Asia too.

Table 9.1

Comparison between three Repeated Measures-LMM outputs using three separate measures of democracy as dependent variables: Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem).

Parameter	Freedom Estimates	Polidem Estimates	Vandem Estimates
[Form=1]	1.268636 (.000)	2.626456 (.000)	.787335 (.423)
[Form=2]	-1.158947 (.000)	-.913503 (.009)	-5.404641 (.000)
[Form=3]	0(a)	0(a)	0(a)
[Bretton=1]	3.150882 (.000)	4.730630 (.000)	5.442755 (.000)
[Bretton=2]	0(a)	0(a)	0(a)
[Media=1]	-3.771735 (.000)	-4.136148 (.000)	-10.316540 (.000)
[Media=2]	-1.957973 (.000)	-2.487631 (.000)	-5.361486 (.000)
[Media=3]	0(a)	0(a)	0(a)
[GDP_cat=1]	3.387996 (.002)	2.572214 (.085)	7.682389 (.013)
[GDP_cat=2]	1.709010 (.091)	1.530356 (.282)	1.780221 (.529)
[GDP_cat=3]	1.815061 (.053)	2.710767 (.036)	4.225281 (.112)
[GDP_cat=4]	0(a)	0(a)	0(a)

Notes: "a" means This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Figures in brackets in the Estimates columns show significance level.

This variation in the impact of factors on different measures of democratisation originates from the differences between the definitions of democracy and the

availability/ non-availability of both temporal and spatial data. The Freedom House democracy score is defined as a combination of political rights and civil liberties that encompass political, social and economic aspects of a society. On the other hand the Polity democracy score mainly focuses on political and institutional aspects. The Polity measure of democracy is defined as one in which political participation is fully competitive, executive recruitment is elective, and constraints on the chief executive are substantial.

The Vanhanen democracy index is composed of two indicators: Political Competition and Political Participation. These are combined into the Index of Democratisation by multiplying them and dividing the outcome by 100. Also, among the three indices, only Freedom House covers all the countries and years (Methodology Chapter 3) of our sample. Polity does not cover two countries, Brunei and Maldives, while Vanhanen covers all countries but not the years from 2001 to 2005. However, these three indices of democracy were found to be significantly correlated (Table 9.2).

Table 9.2***Correlation between three democracy indices: Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem)***

	Freedom	Polidem	Vandem
Freedom Pearson Correlation	1.000	.541**	.836**
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
N	600.000	600	480
Polidem Pearson Correlation	.541**	1.000	.872**
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
N	600	600.000	480
Vandem Pearson Correlation	.836**	.872**	1.000
Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
N	480	480	480.000

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

The argument made in this study, that democratisation is led by the in-built characteristics of economic development in Asia, is compatible with the basic concept of economic development or modernisation theory (Lipset, 1959; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Diamond, 1992; Burkhart & Beck, 1994), in combination with the idea of multivariate explanation of democratisation (Lipset, 1994). However, in the Asian context, the work described here is unique by addressing and overcoming the limitations of some of the previous works in this area, and generating new findings. Similar to the findings of the current study, Neher (1991) also found that democratisation correlates positively with high growth rates but this observation was limited to just the Southeast Asian part of Asia. Lee (2002) used almost the same sample as the current study, however could not find any significant impacts of economic development on democratisation. Rather, Lee (2002) found that political protests are a primary cause of Asian democratisation, matching the Aristotelian theory of revolution that revolution could convert a

tyranny or an oligarchy directly into a democracy (Tilly, 2000). Azad (2004b) found that the effects of economic development on democratisation were accounted for by circumstances unique to each country, and were not strong enough to form part of the explanation of the level of democracy in Asia except as part of each country's unique experience.

Croissant's (2004) findings are not specifically relevant to this study as his work focused on the development of defective democracies in Asia while the focus here is on the causes of democratisation. Croissant (2004) observed two trends of democratisation in Asia. First, the institutionalisation of political rights coexists with stagnation or decline of the rule of law and civil liberties in most of the democracies. Second, the quality of democracy in the different countries is growing further apart. Linder & Bächtiger's (2005) findings are close to those reported here as they discovered favourable political, cultural and economic factors as the causes of successful democratisation. However their sample and methodology were different from our ones. Their work covered 62 countries from two continents, Asia and Africa, and they used just quantitative methods (Linder & Bächtiger, 2005) while this study covered 24 countries solely from Asia and used both statistical methods and case studies.

So, based on the discussion above, it is maintained here that the originality of this study and its contribution to the body of knowledge in the topic area are substantial. However, at the same time it is recognised that this study does have some limitations, just like any other. These limitations are discussed and emphasised in the next chapter (Chapter Ten) when proposing areas for future research. Despite its limitations however, the findings of this study do have a number of implications, which are also discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

This chapter discusses the limitations of this work and the opportunities it presents for future analysis. Finally, the implications of the findings are presented in terms of the priority areas for future study in this area.

Limitations and Future Directions

No single piece of research can hope to give a thorough answer to any question worth asking, and this study has some shortcomings that should be addressed with more research. Below, a number of issues are identified about which are considered to be limiting to some degree. Those issues are: coverage of political situations in the continent of Asia, and geographic contiguity; a large dependence on the use of qualitative data; use of different measures of democracy and the extent of their data; the database on systematic control over the Opposition and media in Singapore; and backtracking from democratisation.

Firstly, the case study of Taiwan found that equitable distribution of economic development in the society and political actors have played a key role in democratisation in conjunction with rapid economic development. However, when an attempt was made to generalise this finding in relation to the whole sample, it was not possible to test the influences of economic equity or inequality on democratisation from an Asian perspective, mainly due to the non-availability of data for many of the countries and years included in this study. So, an area that future researchers need to focus on is the influence of economic equity as a factor of Asian democratisation.

Secondly, in this study, "Asia" means just 24 selected countries whereas there are physically 52 countries and territories in the Asian continent (as discussed in Chapter Three). So, more than half the countries in the Asian continent were left out of this study on various grounds. Middle Eastern countries were excluded as they have some special political and cultural characteristics such as traditional

monarchies, and Islamic values that mismatch those of the other Asian countries under study.

New Central Asian countries were left out because their case is totally different from the most of other Asian countries as they were parts of the Soviet Socialist Republic and won liberation only between late 'eighties and early 'nineties. Thus, it is understandable that the 24 countries covered in this study have some sort of similarities as they are found in three neighbouring regions of Asia – North, South and East.

So, the factors involved in exclusion and inclusion of various countries in the study sample indicates that geographic contiguity might have implications for different political situations in the continent. This study neither covers the whole of Asia, nor does it use any geographic variables to measure if they have any influences on democracy. So, it could be beneficial to conduct a study including the whole Asian continent, using the variable of geographic contiguity.

Thirdly, the findings reported here are largely based on quantitative data, other than three case studies. The case studies also do not represent all four categories of countries divided on the basis of the amount of GDP per capita (as discussed in Chapter Three): Taiwan and Singapore are from the category Very High GDP per capita while Bangladesh is from Very Low GDP group of countries. Although it is a quite difficult to collect and manage qualitative data for such a big sample, the lack of such data might undermine the findings of this study. So, future studies could potentially further address areas of inconsistent,, inconclusive or contradictory findings by using more qualitative data.

Fourth, this study used three different measures of democracy — the Freedom House index, the Polity democracy index and the Vanhanen democracy index — as dependent variables for three separate statistical analyses. Among these three, only Freedom House covers all years and countries in the sample. Polity covers all years but only 22 countries out of 24 leaving Brunei and Maldives out. Vanhanen covers all 24 countries but for the years from 1981 through 2000 instead of 1981-

2005. These omissions may cause errors in evaluating of the findings. Further research with full data can be helpful with this.

Next, in the case study on Singapore, a set of data was needed on the use of legal techniques to control the Opposition politicians and media to explain how the PAP government has arrested their weakening trend in Parliament. As there was no such database, one was compiled on the basis of information collected from the resources accessible from New Zealand (Chapter Seven). As it was not possible to carry out a thorough investigation into all possible sources of information, it cannot say that this database is without doubt 100 per cent correct. As a result, the possible unreliability of this data set could lead to incorrect findings in this study. So, there is scope for future researchers in this area to develop this database and accordingly improve the findings.

Finally, possible causes of democratisation were identified according to the study research questions/ hypotheses (Chapter Three). At the same time, it is observed that some countries have backtracked from a democratisation path; e.g., Nepal has re-entered into absolute monarchy; and Pakistan has gone back under military rule. However, unfortunately, at this stage it is not possible to examine whether a decline in economic development or other what factors may have prompted their u-turn. Future studies are expected to fill this gap.

Thus, it is obvious that this study does have a number of limitations that might undermine the findings to some extent. But at the same time, its implications for policy cannot be ignored, and these are discussed below.

Implications

There are far-reaching policy implications of this study's findings for individual countries as well as for the external actors that deal with them. There are many countries in the Asian regions, and these have long been struggling for democracy: they can be guided by the findings of this study.

The six key findings of this study and the implications for democratisation policy in Asian countries are presented below.

1. Since economic development along with its equitable distribution has been proven a key factor of democratisation, countries can adopt all-out efforts to boost their economies and then distribute the wealth in the society equitably. They can prioritise developmental projects so that their GDP per capita increases and economic inequality goes down to a considerable level. If economic development with equity takes place in the society, rates of literacy, higher education and socio-political consciousness of the population will increase which is supposed to assist in leading to a higher level of democratisation.
2. According to the findings from the case study on Taiwan, the role of political actors is necessary for democratisation even if there are other prerequisites including economic development and its equitable distribution. Such political roles could emerge from government, the Opposition or civil society.
3. As the study results have indicated, pursuance of membership in international finance organisations like Bretton Wood institutions could also help increase the level of democratisation in a country. There are two possible ways that membership with these institutions could facilitate democratisation. Firstly, these institutions provide long term loans with affordable interest rates, which help develop the economy (Gazibo, 2005). Second, borrowing countries have to meet a set of conditions, including good governance (Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2006).
4. Since the results in the study indicated that parliamentarianism is the best promoter of democracy in comparison with the two other forms of government examined, presidential and strong president not elected by the people, the introduction of a parliamentary form of government could also make contribution to the democratic development of a country.

5. Establishing more freedoms for the media through regulation, incentives and awareness could be an effective method of pursuing higher levels of democracy. Although the process of freeing a country's broadcasting and print media is chiefly influenced by the ruling political actors, it could also be promoted by Opposition politicians and civil society people.

6. There may be some countries which experience confrontational politics and strong levels mistrust between their leading political parties; who do not trust each other to be leader of an interim government under which national elections are held. These political parties use all possible means to cling to power and never accept election results whenever they lose. As a consequence, unrest is common in the political life of those countries. In such cases, introduction of non-party caretaker governments could be helpful and prove to be democracy-friendly. This was found in the case study of Bangladesh (Chapter Eight), where two confronting political forces agreed to set up such interim government for the sake of holding free and fair general elections.

In conclusion, concerning the factors impacting on democratisation in Asia, it can be said that although this study has a number of shortcomings, it has made an original contribution to the body of knowledge in the long debated area of the relationship between economic development and democratisation. This study appears to be unique, as the review of existing literature did not locate any other comparable work. The spatial focus of this study was on Asia; the temporal range was 1981-2005; and the methodology was a mixture of quantitative and qualitative approaches. Although a few studies were found related to the impact of economic development on democratisation in Asia, their findings have been inconclusive and sample and/or methodology and/or objectives are sometimes different.

Overall, the findings of this study were that the factors that drive democratisation are equitable economic development along with positive roles of political actors and some political and international institutions. The study also identified the reasons why a country has not achieved a high level of democracy even after

achieving high economic growth for a long time. Moreover, it was discovered that a lower national political divide causes higher democracy, and higher divide leads to lower democracy. It is hoped that future researchers will continue to fill in the gaps in knowledge left by this study. However, despite the shortcomings discussed above, it is also hoped this study will have implications for increased levels of democratisation in Asia as well as elsewhere by influencing public policies (as identified just above).

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Appendices

Appendix 2.1. Major literature on democratisation: studies, samples and issues/ factors

Study	Context/sample	Issue/ factor
		Economic development/modernisation
Lipset (1959)	World	
Moore (1966)	World	
Luebbert (1991)	East Europe	
Neher (1991)	Southeast Asia	
Crenshaw (1995)	World	
Thompson (1996)	South Korea, Taiwan	
Burkhart (1997)	World	
Papaioannou & Siourounis (2008)	World	
Rustow (1970)	World	Actors vs. economic
Linz and Stepan (1978)	World	development
Linz (1978)	World	
O'Donnell & Schmitter (1986)	World	
O'Donnell (1973)	South America	
Ersson & Lane (1996)	World	Weak impact of economic
Leftwich (1996)	World	development
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub & Limongi (2000)	World	
Bellin (2000)	World	
		Multivariate causation
Dahl (1971)	World	(economic development, economic equity,
Huntington (1991)	World	political and social factors,
Lipset (1994)	World	time and country or regional factors, etc)
Barro (1999)	World	
Muller (1995)	World	
Acemoglu & Robinson's (2006)	World	
Vanhanen (2003)	World	
Azad (2003)	Asia	
Bächtiger (2005)	Asia	

		Other factors
Haggard & Kaufman (1995) Cui (1997)	World Post-socialist countries	Economic crises and liberalisation
Melich (2000) Kwon (2004)	East Europe Latin America and post-socialist countries	
Tilly (1990) Herbst (2000) Bates & Lien (1985) Bates (1991). Jahanbegloo (2000) Aubrey (2001) Letki & Evans (2005) Carlson & Turner (2008) He (2006) Loh (2008) Rose & Shin (2001) Wagner (1999) Chadda (2000) Fish (2006) Przeworski et al. (2000) Kim & Lee (2009) Harris (2005) Bunce (2003) Reilly (2007). Kalinowski (2007)	Europe Africa World World Iran Africa East-Central Europe East Asia East Asia Southeast Asia World South Asia South Asia World World World Third world South Africa Post-socialist states East Asia Korea, Indonesia	Sociological approaches and social factors (Civil society Gender, development Social trust Popular perception Middle class Civil society Rule of law, civil society) Political institutions (Constitutionalism Political institutions Parliamentarianism No effects of forms Competent bureaucracy Popular mobilisation Political institutions Political institutions)
Koppel (1993) Cox, Ikenberry & Inoguchi . (2000) Rupnik (2000) Barany (2004) Ndulo (2003) Gazibo (2005) Brown (2005) Mansfield & Pevehouse (2006) Nelson & Wallace (2005) O'Loughlin et al.(1998)	Southeast Asia World Europe NATO Africa Africa Africa World World World	International factors (American promotion, European Union, NATO expansion, globalisation, Foreign aid, international actors, international lending organisations, democratic diffusion, geographic proximity, external operation)

Kopstein. & Reilly (2000)	Post-socialist states	
Chou (2004)	E. Asia & C. Europe	
Wejnert (2005)	World	
Gleditsch & Ward (2006)	World	
Enterline & Greig (2005)	World	
Rindermann (2008)	World	Cognitive ability
Venter (2003)	Zambia	Negative factors
Whitaker (2005)	Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia	(electoral fraud, disqualifying or discrediting ,
Brownlee (2009)	World	opponents, corruption,
Jayasuriya (1998)	East Asia	hybrid regime, etc)
Sen (1998)	East Asia	Asian culture (Asian values,
Hsieh (2000)	East Asia	Confucianism)
O'Dwyer (2003)	East Asia	Pro-democracy movements
Lee (2002)	Asia	Defective democracy
Croissant (2004)	Asia	

Sources: This researcher constructs this table from the review of literature (Chapter 2) and their References

Appendix 3.1. Major democracy indices

Name of indices	Covered countries	Covered Year/s
Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, & Przeworski (1996)	141	1950-90
Arat (1991)	152	1948-82
Bollen (1980;	113	1960
1991;	123	1965
1993)	153	1980
Coppedge & Reinicke Polyarchy (1991)	170	1985
Freedom House (n.d.)	World (number varies)	1972-present
Gasiorowski Political Regime Change (1996)	97	Independence-1992
Hadenius (1992)	132	1988
Polity IV (n.d.)	161 (22 Asian countries)	1800-2005
Vanhanen (n.d.)	187	1810-2000

Sources: Munck & Verkuilen, 2002; Polity IV Annual Time-Series, n.d. & Freedom In the World, n.d.)

Appendix 3.2. Comparison between Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem) democracy indices* in terms of average democracy scores for 24 countries for 25 years (1981-2005)*****

Country	Freedom	Polidem	Vandem
AFG	2.68	0	0
BGD	8.24	3.6	9.19
BRN	4.4		0
BTN	4.32	0	0
CHN	2.96	0	0
IDN	6.08	2.12	4.905
IND	10.4	8.44	18.547
JPN	13.32	10	27.273
KHM	3.6	1.44	1.9885
LAO	2.72	0	0.088
LKA	8.68	6.08	17.701
MDV	5		1.778
MMR	2.12	0	0
MNG	7.8	5.76	10.398
MYS	7.28	4.56	12.79
NPL	8.64	3.52	6.3985
PAK	6.32	3.48	5.4965
PHL	9.92	6.08	16.865
PRK	2	0	0
ROK	10.24	5.36	22.827
SGP	6.68	2	11.38
THA	9.56	6.4	7.0375
TWN	9.56	5.16	7.8655
VNM	2.48	0	0

*Freedom House scale is 2 (lowest) to 14 (highest), Polity is 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest) and Vanhanen is 0 (lowest) to 33 (highest).

** Polity covers 22 countries

*** Vanhanen covers 20 years to 2000

Sources: Freedom In the World. (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 3.3. Political Rights and Civil Liberties checklist

According to Freedom House Methodology (n.d.), Political Rights and Civil Liberties checklists, and methods for country rating are--

Political Rights Checklist:

A. Electoral Process

1. Is the head of state and/or head of government or other chief authority elected through free and fair elections?
2. Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?
3. Are there fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, fair polling, and honest tabulation of ballots?

B. Political Pluralism and Participation

1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?
2. Is there a significant opposition vote, de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?
3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group?
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?

C. Functioning of Government

1. Do freely elected representatives determine the policies of the government?
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption?
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it operate with openness and transparency?

Additional discretionary Political Rights questions:

- A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the system provide for consultation with the people, encourage discussion of policy, and allow the right to petition the ruler?
- B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?

(NOTE: For each political rights and civil liberties checklist question, 0 to 4 points are added, depending on the comparative rights and liberties present [0 represents the least, 4 represents the most]. However, for additional discretionary question B only, 1 to 4 points are subtracted, as necessary.)

Civil Liberties Checklist:

A. Freedom of Expression and Belief

1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?
(Note: in cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the survey gives the system credit.)
2. Are there free religious institutions, and is there free private and public religious

expression?

3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free of extensive political indoctrination?
4. Is there open and free private discussion?

B. Associational and Organizational Rights

1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion?
2. Is there freedom of political or quasi-political organization? (Note: this includes political parties, civic organizations, ad hoc issue groups, etc.)
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private organizations?

C. Rule of Law

1. Is there an independent judiciary?
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct civilian control?
3. Is there protection from police terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?
4. Is the population treated equally under the law?

D. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights

1. Is there personal autonomy? Does the state control travel, choice of residence, or choice of employment? Is there freedom from indoctrination and excessive dependency on the state?
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, or organized crime?
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage partners, and size of family?
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation

Source: Freedom House Methodology (n.d.).

Appendix 3.4. Political Rights and Civil Liberties ratings, and country Status

Political Rights (PR):

Total Raw Scores	PR Rating
36-40	1
30-35	2
24-29	3
18-23	4
12-17	5
6-11	6
0-5	7

Civil Liberties (CI):

Total Raw Scores	CL Rating
53-60	1
44-52	2
35-43	3
26-34	4
17-25	5
8-16	6
0-7	7

Country Status:

Combined Average of the PR and CL Ratings	Country Status
1 to 2.5	Free
3 to 5.5	Partly Free
5.5 to 7	Not Free

Source: Freedom House Methodology (n.d.).

Appendix 3.5. Transformation of Freedom House Political rights and Civil liberties ratings (7-1) into 2-14 points Freedom House democracy index

Political rights	Civil liberties	Democracy (1)	Demcracy (2)
1	1	2	14
2	2	4	12
3	3	6	10
4	4	8	8
5	5	10	6
6	6	12	4
7	7	14	2

Source: This researcher constructs 2-14 points Freedom House democracy scale on the basis of Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties scales

Appendix 3.6. Countries' average annual GDP per capita, and their GDP category (GDP_cat)

Country	Average GDP per capita in US \$	GDP_Cat	Category label
AFG	214	4	Very Low
BGD	297	4	Very Low
BRN	15913	1	Very High
BTN	617	3	Low
CHN	669	3	Low
IDN	800	2	High
IND	394	3	Low
JPN	26829	1	Very High
KHM	233	4	Very Low
LAO	274	4	Very Low
LKA	651	3	Low
MDV	1444	2	High
MMR	168	4	Very Low
MNG	483	3	Low
MYS	3159	2	High
NPL	188	4	Very Low
PAK	541	3	Low
PHL	847	2	High
PRK	590	3	Very Low
ROK	7738	1	Very High
SGP	16131	1	Very High
THA	1781	2	High
TWN	9614	1	Very High
VNM	240	4	Very Low

Source: GDP data are collected from UN Statistics Division (UN Stat Basic Data Selection, n.d.).

Appendix 3.7. Freedom of the press ratings

Freedom House below describes the way how they rate the freedom of the press in different countries across the world.

“Criteria:

This study is based on universal criteria. The starting point is the smallest, most universal unit of concern: the individual. We recognise cultural differences, diverse national interests, and varying levels of economic development. Yet Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.

The operative word for this survey is everyone. All states, from the most democratic to the most authoritarian, are committed to this doctrine through the UN system. To deny that doctrine is to deny the universality of information freedom—a basic human right. We recognize that cultural distinctions or economic underdevelopment may limit the volume of news flows within a country, but these and other arguments are not acceptable explanations for outright centralized control of the content of news and information. Some poor countries allow for the exchange of diverse views, while some developed countries restrict content diversity. We seek to recognize press freedom wherever it exists, in poor and rich countries as well as in countries of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds.

This survey does not assess the degree to which the press in any country serves responsibly, reflecting a high ethical standard. The issue of "press responsibility" is often raised to defend governmental control of the press. Indeed, a truly irresponsible press does a disservice to its public and diminishes its own credibility. However, governmental efforts to rein in the press on the pretext of making the press "responsible" have far worse results in most cases. This issue is reflected in the degree of freedom in the flow of information as assessed in the survey.

Sources:

Our data come from correspondents overseas, staff and consultant travel, international visitors, the findings of human rights and press freedom organizations, specialists in geographic and geopolitical areas, the reports of governments and multilateral bodies, and a variety of domestic and international news media. We would particularly like to thank other members of the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX) network for providing detailed and timely analyses of press freedom violations in a variety of countries worldwide.

Methodology:

Through the years, we have refined and expanded our methodology. Recent changes to our methodology are intended to simplify the presentation of information without altering the comparability of data for a given country over the 25-year span or the comparative ratings of all countries over that period.

Our examination of the level of press freedom in each country currently comprises 23 methodology questions divided into three broad categories: the legal environment, the political environment, and the economic environment. For each methodology question, a lower number of points is allotted for a more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment. The diverse nature of the questions seeks to encompass the varied ways in which pressure can be placed upon the flow of information and the ability of print, broadcast, and Internet-based media to operate freely; in short, we seek to provide a picture of the entire "enabling environment" in which the media in each country operate. Each country is rated in these three categories, with the higher numbers indicating less freedom. A country's final score is based on the total of the three categories: a score of 0 to 30 places the country in the Free press group; 31 to 60 in the Partly Free press group; and 61 to 100 in the Not Free press group.

The legal environment category encompasses an examination of both the laws and regulations that could influence media content and the government's inclination to use these laws and legal institutions to restrict the media's ability to operate. We assess the positive impact of legal and constitutional guarantees for freedom of expression; the potentially negative aspects of security legislation, the penal code, and other criminal statutes; penalties for libel and defamation; the existence of and ability to use freedom of information legislation; the independence of the judiciary and of official media regulatory bodies; registration requirements for both media outlets and journalists; and the ability of journalists' groups to operate freely.

Under the political environment category, we evaluate the degree of political control over the content of news media. Issues examined include the editorial independence of both state-owned and privately owned media; access to information and sources; official censorship and self-censorship; the vibrancy of the media; the ability of both foreign and local reporters to cover the news freely and without harassment; and the intimidation of journalists by the state or other actors, including arbitrary detention and imprisonment, violent assaults, and other threats.

Our third category examines the economic environment for the media. This includes the structure of media ownership; transparency and concentration of ownership; the costs of establishing media as well as of production and distribution; the selective withholding of advertising or subsidies by the state or other actors; the impact of corruption and bribery on content; and the extent to which the economic situation in a country impacts the development of the media.

Checklist of Methodology Questions for 2005

A. Legal environment (0-30 points)

1. Do the constitution or other basic laws contain provisions designed to protect freedom of the press and of expression and are they enforced? (0-6 points)
2. Do the penal code, security laws, or any other laws restrict reporting and are journalists punished under these laws? (0-6 points)
3. Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state and are they enforced? (0-3 points)
4. Is the judiciary independent and do courts judge cases concerning the media impartially? (0-3 points)
5. Is freedom of information legislation in place and are journalists able to make use of it? (0-2 points)
6. Can individuals or business entities legally establish and operate private media outlets without undue interference? (0-4 points)
7. Are media regulatory bodies, such as a broadcasting authority or national press or communications council, able to operate freely and independently? (0-2 points)
8. Is there freedom to become a journalist and to practice journalism? (0-4 points)

B. Political environment (0-40 points)

1. To what extent are media outlets' news and information content determined by the government or a particular partisan interest? (0-10 points)
2. Is access to official or unofficial sources generally controlled? (0-2 points)
3. Is there official censorship? (0-4 points)
4. Do journalists practice self-censorship? (0-4 points)
5. Is media coverage robust and does it reflect a diversity of viewpoints? (0-4 points)
6. Are both local and foreign journalists able to cover the news freely? (0-6 points)
7. Are journalists or media outlets subject to extralegal intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor? (0-10 points)

C. Economic environment (0-30 points)

1. To what extent are media owned or controlled by the government and does this influence their diversity of views? (0-6 points)
2. Is private media ownership transparent, thus allowing consumers to judge the impartiality of the news? (0-3 points)
3. Is private media ownership highly concentrated and does it influence diversity of content? (0-3 points)
4. Are there restrictions on the means of journalistic production and distribution? (0-4 points)
5. Does the state place prohibitively high costs on the establishment and operation of media outlets? (0-4 points)
6. Do the state or other actors try to control the media through allocation of advertising or subsidies? (0-3 points)
7. Do journalists receive payment from private or public sources whose design is to influence their journalistic content? (0-3 points)
8. Does the economic situation in a country accentuate media dependency on the state, political parties, big business, or other influential political actors for funding? (0-4 points)"

Source: Freedom of the Press Methodology. (n.d.).

Appendix 3.8. Transformation of 2-14 Freedom House democracy index into 0-100 points index

2-14 point Index	0-100 point Index (Percent)
2	0
3	8.33
4	16.67
5	25
6	33.33
7	41.67
8	50
9	58.33
10	66.67
11	75
12	83.33
13	91.67
14	100

Source: This researcher constructs 0-100 points Freedom House democracy index on the basis of Freedom House methodology on construction of Political rights and Civil liberties indices (Freedom House Methodology, n.d.)

Appendix 3.9. Transformation of 0-10 Polity democracy index into 0-100 points index

0-10 point Index	0-100 point Index (Percent)
0	0
1	10
2	20
3	30
4	40
5	50
6	60
7	70
8	80
9	90
10	100

Source: This researcher constructs 0-100 points Polity democracy index on the basis of Polity methodology on construction of its 0-10 points index (Polity IV Dataset Users' Manual, n.d.).

Appendix 3.10. Transformation of 0-33 scores into 0-10 points Vanhanen democracy index

Raw points (0-33 points)	0-10 point Index	0-100 point Index (Percent)
0	0	0
1-3	1	10
4-6	2	20
7-9	3	30
10-12	4	40
13-15	5	50
16-18	6	60
19-21	7	70
22-25	8	80
26-29	9	90
30-33	10	100

Source: This researcher constructs 0-100 percent Vanhanen democracy index on the basis of 0-33 democracy scores of the countries under study according to the Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.).

Appendix 4.1. Afghanistan: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	16.67	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0
1992	16.67	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	16.67	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0
2002	16.67	0	0
2003	16.67	0	0
2004	25	0	0
2005	33.33	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.2. Bangladesh: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	58.33	0	24.45
1982	33.33	0	0
1983	25	0	0
1984	25	0	0
1985	33.33	0	0
1986	41.67	0	12.67
1987	41.67	0	12.67
1988	41.67	0	12.67
1989	50	0	12.67
1990	33.33	0	0
1991	75	60	43.05
1992	75	60	43.05
1993	66.67	60	43.05
1994	66.67	60	43.05
1995	58.33	60	43.05
1996	66.67	60	51.52
1997	66.67	60	51.52
1998	66.67	60	51.52
1999	58.33	60	51.52
2000	58.33	60	51.52
2001	58.33	60	
2002	50	60	
2003	50	60	
2004	50	60	
2005	50	60	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.3. Bhutan: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	33.33	0	0
1982	33.33	0	0
1983	33.33	0	0
1984	33.33	0	0
1985	33.33	0	0
1986	33.33	0	0
1987	33.33	0	0
1988	33.33	0	0
1989	25	0	0
1990	25	0	0
1991	25	0	0
1992	8.33	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	8.33	0	0
1999	8.33	0	0
2000	8.33	0	0
2001	8.33	0	0
2002	25	0	0
2003	25	0	0
2004	25	0	0
2005	25	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.4. Brunei: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	25	0
1982	25	0
1983	25	0
1984	25	0
1985	25	0
1986	25	0
1987	25	0
1988	16.67	0
1989	16.67	0
1990	25	0
1991	25	0
1992	8.33	0
1993	8.33	0
1994	8.33	0
1995	16.67	0
1996	16.67	0
1997	16.67	0
1998	16.67	0
1999	16.67	0
2000	16.67	0
2001	16.67	0
2002	25	
2003	25	
2004	25	
2005	25	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.5. Cambodia: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	16.67	0	0
1992	16.67	0	0
1993	41.67	30	17.5
1994	41.67	30	17.5
1995	16.67	30	17.5
1996	16.67	30	17.5
1997	8.33	0	0
1998	16.67	30	16.19
1999	16.67	30	16.19
2000	16.67	30	16.19
2001	25	30	
2002	25	30	
2003	25	30	
2004	25	30	
2005	25	30	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.6. China: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	16.67	0	0
1982	16.67	0	0
1983	16.67	0	0
1984	16.67	0	0
1985	16.67	0	0
1986	16.67	0	0
1987	16.67	0	0
1988	16.67	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	8.33	0	0
1999	8.33	0	0
2000	8.33	0	0
2001	8.33	0	0
2002	8.33	0	0
2003	8.33	0	0
2004	8.33	0	0
2005	8.33	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.7. India: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	75	80	49.7
1982	75	80	49.7
1983	75	80	49.7
1984	75	80	48.42
1985	75	80	48.42
1986	75	80	48.42
1987	75	80	48.42
1988	75	80	48.42
1989	75	80	62.91
1990	75	80	62.91
1991	58.33	80	53.13
1992	58.33	80	53.13
1993	50	80	53.13
1994	50	80	53.13
1995	50	90	53.13
1996	66.67	90	73.4
1997	66.67	90	73.4
1998	75	90	75.97
1999	75	90	50.24
2000	75	90	50.24
2001	75	90	
2002	75	90	
2003	75	90	
2004	75	90	
2005	75	90	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.8. Indonesia: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	33.33	0	12.76
1982	33.33	0	13.06
1983	33.33	0	13.06
1984	25	0	13.06
1985	25	0	13.06
1986	25	0	13.06
1987	25	0	10.02
1988	33.33	0	10.02
1989	33.33	0	10.02
1990	25	0	10.02
1991	25	0	10.02
1992	25	0	12.64
1993	8.33	0	12.64
1994	8.33	0	12.64
1995	8.33	0	12.64
1996	16.67	0	12.64
1997	16.67	0	10.82
1998	33.33	0	10.82
1999	50	80	39.74
2000	58.33	80	39.74
2001	58.33	70	
2002	58.33	70	
2003	58.33	70	
2004	58.33	80	
2005	58.33	90	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.9. Japan: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	100	100	78.5
1982	100	100	78.5
1983	100	100	76.92
1984	100	100	76.92
1985	100	100	76.92
1986	100	100	75.07
1987	100	100	75.07
1988	100	100	75.07
1989	100	100	75.07
1990	100	100	85.51
1991	91.67	100	85.51
1992	91.67	100	85.51
1993	83.33	100	95.23
1994	83.33	100	95.23
1995	91.67	100	95.23
1996	91.67	100	80.83
1997	91.67	100	80.83
1998	91.67	100	80.83
1999	91.67	100	80.83
2000	91.67	100	72.69
2001	91.67	100	
2002	91.67	100	
2003	91.67	100	
2004	91.67	100	
2005	91.67	100	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.10. Korea (North): State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.11. Korea (South): State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	25	0	7.33
1982	25	0	7.33
1983	25	0	7.33
1984	33.33	0	7.33
1985	41.67	0	8.56
1986	41.67	0	8.56
1987	50	0	100
1988	75	70	99.08
1989	75	70	99.08
1990	75	70	99.08
1991	75	70	99.08
1992	75	70	90.31
1993	83.33	70	90.31
1994	83.33	70	90.31
1995	83.33	70	90.31
1996	83.33	70	90.7
1997	83.33	70	93.35
1998	83.33	80	93.35
1999	83.33	80	93.35
2000	83.33	80	86.43
2001	83.33	80	
2002	83.33	80	
2003	83.33	80	
2004	91.67	80	
2005	91.67	80	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.12. Laos: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	8.33	0	0
1989	8.33	0	0
1990	8.33	0	0
1991	8.33	0	0
1992	8.33	0	0
1993	8.33	0	0
1994	8.33	0	0
1995	8.33	0	0
1996	8.33	0	0
1997	8.33	0	1.31
1998	8.33	0	1.31
1999	8.33	0	1.31
2000	8.33	0	1.31
2001	8.33	0	
2002	8.33	0	
2003	8.33	0	
2004	8.33	0	
2005	8.33	0	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.13. Malaysia: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	58.33	50	34.2
1982	58.33	50	33.93
1983	58.33	50	33.93
1984	50	50	33.93
1985	50	50	33.93
1986	50	50	36.55
1987	50	50	36.55
1988	41.67	50	36.55
1989	41.67	50	36.55
1990	41.67	50	45.11
1991	41.67	50	45.11
1992	41.67	50	45.11
1993	41.67	50	45.11
1994	41.67	50	45.11
1995	41.67	40	34.5
1996	41.67	40	34.5
1997	41.67	40	34.5
1998	33.33	40	34.5
1999	33.33	40	41.5
2000	33.33	40	41.5
2001	33.33	40	
2002	33.33	40	
2003	41.67	40	
2004	50	40	
2005	50	40	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.14. Maldives: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	33.33	4.17
1982	33.33	4.17
1983	33.33	3.67
1984	33.33	3.67
1985	33.33	3.67
1986	25	3.67
1987	25	3.67
1988	25	3.04
1989	25	3.04
1990	25	3.04
1991	25	3.04
1992	25	3.04
1993	16.67	7.42
1994	16.67	7.42
1995	16.67	7.42
1996	16.67	7.42
1997	16.67	7.42
1998	25	9
1999	25	9
2000	25	9
2001	25	
2002	25	
2003	25	
2004	25	
2005	25	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.15. Mongolia: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	0	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	50	40	23.43
1991	75	40	23.43
1992	75	90	58.53
1993	75	90	58.53
1994	75	90	58.53
1995	75	90	58.53
1996	75	100	70.36
1997	75	100	70.36
1998	75	100	70.36
1999	75	100	70.36
2000	75	100	57.6
2001	75	100	
2002	83.33	100	
2003	83.33	100	
2004	83.33	100	
2005	83.33	100	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.16. Myanmar: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	8.33	0	0
1982	8.33	0	0
1983	0	0	0
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	0	0	0
1988	8.33	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0
2000	0	0	0
2001	0	0	0
2002	0	0	0
2003	0	0	0
2004	0	0	0
2005	0	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.17. Nepal: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	58.33	20	0
1982	58.33	20	0
1983	58.33	20	0
1984	58.33	20	0
1985	58.33	20	0
1986	58.33	20	0
1987	58.33	20	0
1988	58.33	20	0
1989	41.67	20	0
1990	50	50	16.7
1991	75	50	37.6
1992	75	50	37.6
1993	58.33	50	37.6
1994	58.33	50	39.48
1995	58.33	50	39.48
1996	58.33	50	39.48
1997	58.33	50	39.48
1998	58.33	50	39.48
1999	58.33	70	27.34
2000	58.33	70	27.34
2001	58.33	70	
2002	50	10	
2003	41.67	10	
2004	33.33	10	
2005	25	10	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.18. Pakistan: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	16.67	0	0
1982	16.67	0	0
1983	16.67	0	0
1984	16.67	0	0
1985	41.67	0	0
1986	41.67	0	0
1987	41.67	0	0
1988	66.67	80	34.41
1989	66.67	80	34.41
1990	50	80	35.15
1991	41.67	80	35.15
1992	41.67	80	35.15
1993	50	80	31.31
1994	50	80	31.31
1995	50	80	31.31
1996	41.67	80	31.31
1997	41.67	70	14.13
1998	41.67	70	14.13
1999	16.67	0	0
2000	25	0	0
2001	25	0	
2002	25	0	
2003	25	0	
2004	25	0	
2005	25	10	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.19. Philippines: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	33.33	0	15.03
1982	41.67	0	15.03
1983	33.33	0	15.03
1984	50	0	15.03
1985	58.33	0	15.03
1986	66.67	0	50.69
1987	83.33	80	50.69
1988	75	80	50.69
1989	75	80	50.69
1990	66.67	80	50.69
1991	66.67	80	50.69
1992	66.67	80	72.33
1993	58.33	80	72.33
1994	58.33	80	72.33
1995	66.67	80	72.33
1996	75	80	72.33
1997	75	80	72.33
1998	75	80	64.13
1999	75	80	64.13
2000	75	80	64.13
2001	75	80	
2002	75	80	
2003	75	80	
2004	75	80	
2005	75	80	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.).

Appendix 4.20. Singapore: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	41.67	20	19.17
1982	41.67	20	19.17
1983	41.67	20	19.17
1984	41.67	20	36.37
1985	41.67	20	36.37
1986	41.67	20	36.37
1987	41.67	20	36.37
1988	41.67	20	58.83
1989	41.67	20	58.83
1990	41.67	20	58.83
1991	41.67	20	32.98
1992	41.67	20	32.98
1993	33.33	20	32.98
1994	33.33	20	32.98
1995	33.33	20	32.98
1996	41.67	20	32.98
1997	33.33	20	25.31
1998	33.33	20	25.31
1999	33.33	20	25.31
2000	33.33	20	25.31
2001	33.33	20	
2002	41.67	20	
2003	41.67	20	
2004	41.67	20	
2005	41.67	20	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.21. Sri Lanka: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	75	60	15.86
1982	75	60	55.58
1983	58.33	60	55.58
1984	58.33	60	55.58
1985	58.33	60	55.58
1986	58.33	60	55.58
1987	58.33	60	55.58
1988	58.33	60	48.54
1989	41.67	60	46.99
1990	41.67	60	46.99
1991	41.67	60	46.99
1992	41.67	60	46.99
1993	41.67	60	46.99
1994	41.67	60	57.45
1995	41.67	60	57.45
1996	50	60	57.45
1997	58.33	60	57.45
1998	58.33	60	57.45
1999	58.33	60	66.25
2000	58.33	60	69.2
2001	58.33	70	
2002	58.33	70	
2003	66.67	60	
2004	66.67	60	
2005	66.67	60	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.22. Taiwan: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	33.33	0	0
1982	33.33	0	0
1983	33.33	0	0
1984	33.33	0	0
1985	33.33	0	0
1986	33.33	0	0
1987	41.67	20	0
1988	50	20	0
1989	58.33	20	0
1990	66.67	20	15.41
1991	33.33	20	15.41
1992	66.67	70	18.43
1993	50	70	18.43
1994	66.67	70	18.43
1995	66.67	70	18.4
1996	83.33	80	67.92
1997	83.33	90	67.92
1998	83.33	90	70.54
1999	83.33	90	70.54
2000	91.67	90	87.6
2001	91.67	90	
2002	83.33	90	
2003	83.33	90	
2004	91.67	100	
2005	100	100	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.23. Thailand: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	58.33	30	10.49
1982	58.33	30	10.49
1983	58.33	30	12.73
1984	58.33	30	12.73
1985	58.33	30	12.73
1986	66.67	30	15.35
1987	66.67	30	15.35
1988	66.67	40	16.96
1989	75	40	16.96
1990	75	40	16.96
1991	33.33	10	0
1992	58.33	90	18.69
1993	50	90	18.69
1994	50	90	18.69
1995	58.33	90	21.88
1996	66.67	90	20.1
1997	66.67	90	45.2
1998	75	90	45.2
1999	75	90	45.2
2000	75	90	45.2
2001	75	90	
2002	75	90	
2003	75	90	
2004	75	90	
2005	25	90	

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.24. Vietnam: State of democracy, 1981-2005, as Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) observe.

Year	Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	0	0	0
1982	8.33	0	0
1983	8.33	0	0
1984	8.33	0	0
1985	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0
1987	8.33	0	0
1988	8.33	0	0
1989	0	0	0
1990	0	0	0
1991	0	0	0
1992	0	0	0
1993	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0
1996	0	0	0
1997	0	0	0
1998	0	0	0
1999	0	0	0
2000	8.33	0	0
2001	8.33	0	0
2002	8.33	0	0
2003	8.33	0	0
2004	8.33	0	0
2005	16.67	0	0

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.25. Correlation between Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC) by country

Country			Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
AFG	Freedom_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	20	20	20
BGD	Freedom_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.775**	.914**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.775**	1	.950**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.914**	.950**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
BRN	Freedom_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.
		N	25	0	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	0	0	0
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	20	0	20

BTN	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 25	. ^a 25	. ^a 20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	. ^a 25	. ^a 25	. ^a 20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	. ^a 20	. ^a 20	. ^a 20
CHN	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 25	. ^a 25	. ^a 20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	. ^a 25	. ^a 25	. ^a 20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	. ^a 20	. ^a 20	. ^a 20
IDN	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 25	.886** .000 25	.701** .001 20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.886** .000 25	1 .000 25	.989** .000 20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	.701** .001 20	.989** .000 20	1 20
IND	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation Sig. (2-tailed) N	1 25	.122 .562 25	-.040 .868 20

	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.122	1	.543*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.562		.013
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	-.040	.543*	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.868	.013	
		N	20	20	20
JPN	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	-.742**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	-.742**	. ^a	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	
		N	20	20	20
KHM	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.817**	.776**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.817**	1	.999**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.776**	.999**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
LAO	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	.367
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.112
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20

	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.367	. ^a	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.112	.	
		N	20	20	20
LKA	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.077	-.131
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.714	.583
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.077	1	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.714		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	-.131	. ^a	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.583	.000	
		N	20	20	20
MDV	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	-.548 [*]
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.012
		N	25	0	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	0	0	0
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	-.548 [*]	. ^a	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.012	.	
		N	20	0	20
MMR	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	20	20	20

MNG	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.966**	.944**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.966**	1	.996**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.944**	.996**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
MYS	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.534**	-.475*
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.006	.034
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.534**	1	.187
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.006		.430
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	-.475*	.187	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.034	.430	
		N	20	20	20
NPL	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.513**	.394
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.009	.085
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.513**	1	.858**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.009		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.394	.858**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.085	.000	
		N	20	20	20
PAK	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.798**	.767**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20

	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.798**	1	.958**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.767**	.958**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
PHL	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.792**	.724**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.792**	1	.871**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.724**	.871**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
PRK	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	20	20	20
ROK	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.963**	.908**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.963**	1	.865**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20

	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.908**	.865**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20
SGP	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	.328
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.157
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.328	. ^a	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.157	.	
		N	20	20	20
THA	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.203	.637**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.332	.003
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.203	1	.736**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.332		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.637**	.736**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.003	.000	
		N	20	20	20
TWN	Freedem_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	.934**	.882**
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.934**	1	.858**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	.882**	.858**	1
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	
		N	20	20	20

VNM	Freedom_PC	Pearson Correlation	1	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Vandem_PC	Pearson Correlation	. ^a	. ^a	. ^a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	20	20	20

a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant.

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 4.26. Rankings of countries according to three SPSS outputs

Estimates of fixed effects of countries on Freedom House rated democracy

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	2.480000	.333483	576	7.437	.000
[Country=AFG]	.200000	.471617	576	.424	.672
[Country=BGD]	5.760000	.471617	576	12.213	.000
[Country=BRN]	1.920000	.471617	576	4.071	.000
[Country=BTN]	1.840000	.471617	576	3.901	.000
[Country=CHN]	.480000	.471617	576	1.018	.309
[Country=IDN]	3.600000	.471617	576	7.633	.000
[Country=IND]	7.920000	.471617	576	16.793	.000
[Country=JPN]	10.840000	.471617	576	22.985	.000
[Country=KHM]	1.120000	.471617	576	2.375	.018
[Country=LAO]	.240000	.471617	576	.509	.611
[Country=LKA]	6.200000	.471617	576.000	13.146	.000
[Country=MDV]	2.520000	.471617	576.000	5.343	.000
[Country=MMR]	-.360000	.471617	576	-.763	.446

[Country=MNG]	5.320000	.471617	576	11.280	.000
[Country=MYS]	4.800000	.471617	576	10.178	.000
[Country=NPL]	6.160000	.471617	576	13.061	.000
[Country=PAK]	3.840000	.471617	576	8.142	.000
[Country=PHL]	7.440000	.471617	576	15.776	.000
[Country=PRK]	-.480000	.471617	576	-1.018	.309
[Country=ROK]	7.760000	.471617	576	16.454	.000
[Country=SGP]	4.200000	.471617	576	8.906	.000
[Country=THA]	7.080000	.471617	576	15.012	.000
[Country=TWN]	7.080000	.471617	576	15.012	.000
[Country=VNM]	0(a)	0	.	.	.

a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
Dependent Variable: Freedom.

Estimates of fixed effects of countries on Polity rated democracy

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	2.63162E-014	.457013	528	.000	1.000
[Country=AFG]	-2.63162E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=BGD]	3.600000	.646314	528	5.570	.000
[Country=BTN]	-2.63162E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=CHN]	-2.62149E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=IDN]	2.120000	.646314	528	3.280	.001
[Country=IND]	8.440000	.646314	528	13.059	.000
[Country=JPN]	10.000000	.646314	528	15.472	.000
[Country=KHM]	1.440000	.646314	528	2.228	.026
[Country=LAO]	-2.57708E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=LKA]	6.080000	.646314	528	9.407	.000
[Country=MMR]	-2.63162E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=MNG]	5.760000	.646314	528	8.912	.000
[Country=MYS]	4.560000	.646314	528	7.055	.000
[Country=NPL]	3.520000	.646314	528	5.446	.000
[Country=PAK]	3.480000	.646314	528	5.384	.000
[Country=PHL]	6.080000	.646314	528	9.407	.000
[Country=PRK]	-2.56305E-014	.646314	528	.000	1.000
[Country=ROK]	5.360000	.646314	528	8.293	.000
[Country=SGP]	2.000000	.646314	528	3.094	.002
[Country=THA]	6.400000	.646314	528	9.902	.000
[Country=TWN]	5.160000	.646314	528	7.984	.000
[Country=VNM]	0(a)	0	.	.	.

- a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
 b Dependent Variable: Polidem.

Estimates of fixed effects of countries on Vanhanen rated democracy

Parameter	Estimate	Std. Error	df	t	Sig.
Intercept	-2.44249E-014	1.332255	.000	.000	1.000
[Country=AFG]	2.08722E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=BGD]	9.190000	1.662225	456.000	5.529	.000
[Country=BRN]	2.08722E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=BTN]	2.08722E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=CHN]	1.73195E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=IDN]	4.905000	1.662225	456.000	2.951	.003
[Country=IND]	18.546500	1.662225	456.000	11.158	.000
[Country=JPN]	27.273000	1.662225	456.000	16.408	.000
[Country=KHM]	1.988500	1.662225	456.000	1.196	.232
[Country=LAO]	.088000	1.662225	456.000	.053	.958
[Country=LKA]	17.701000	1.662225	456.000	10.649	.000
[Country=MDV]	1.778000	1.662225	456.000	1.070	.285
[Country=MMR]	1.46549E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=MNG]	10.398000	1.662225	456.000	6.255	.000
[Country=MYS]	12.790000	1.662225	456.000	7.695	.000
[Country=NPL]	6.398500	1.662225	456.000	3.849	.000
[Country=PAK]	5.496500	1.662225	456.000	3.307	.001
[Country=PHL]	16.864500	1.662225	456.000	10.146	.000
[Country=PRK]	1.50990E-014	1.662225	456.000	.000	1.000
[Country=ROK]	22.827000	1.662225	456.000	13.733	.000
[Country=SGP]	11.380000	1.662225	456.000	6.846	.000

[Country=THA]	7.037500	1.662225	456.000	4.234	.000
[Country=TWN]	7.865500	1.662225	456.000	4.732	.000
[Country=VNM]	0(a)	0	.	.	.

- a This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.
b Dependent Variable: Vandem.

Appendix 4.27. Amount of democracy in Asia, 1981-2005, as per Freedom House (Freedom_PC), Polity (Polidem_PC) and Vanhanen (Vandem_PC)

Year		Freedom_PC	Polidem_PC	Vandem_PC
1981	Mean	32.64	16.36	11.43
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	28.330	29.527	19.419
1982	Mean	32.29	16.36	12.07
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	27.508	29.527	21.449
1983	Mean	30.55	16.36	12.07
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	26.881	29.527	21.240
1984	Mean	30.90	16.36	12.74
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	26.860	29.527	21.692
1985	Mean	32.64	16.36	12.80
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	27.465	29.527	21.681
1986	Mean	33.33	16.36	14.97
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	28.340	29.527	22.736
1987	Mean	35.07	20.91	18.69
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	29.177	31.909	28.686
1988	Mean	38.19	28.18	20.79
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	28.859	34.865	29.071
1989	Mean	35.42	28.18	21.33
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	31.205	34.865	29.768
1990	Mean	36.46	31.36	23.96
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	29.674	34.544	30.153
1991	Mean	36.46	32.73	24.44
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	28.638	34.666	29.143
1992	Mean	38.20	40.91	27.48

	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	29.887	38.410	29.648
1993	Mean	34.37	42.27	28.65
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	28.900	37.408	29.878
1994	Mean	35.07	42.27	29.17
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	29.486	37.408	30.269
1995	Mean	35.76	42.27	28.86
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	29.639	37.914	30.058
1996	Mean	38.20	43.18	31.98
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	32.407	38.961	31.601
1997	Mean	37.85	41.82	31.35
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	32.875	40.076	32.635
1998	Mean	40.28	43.64	31.97
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	32.009	39.466	31.942
1999	Mean	39.58	45.00	31.66
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	32.157	40.208	31.441
2000	Mean	40.97	45.00	31.33
	N	24	22	24
	Std. Deviation	32.221	40.208	31.057
2001	Mean	41.32	45.00	
	N	24	22	
	Std. Deviation	31.992	40.089	
2002	Mean	42.71	42.27	
	N	24	22	
	Std. Deviation	29.927	40.348	
2003	Mean	43.06	41.82	
	N	24	22	
	Std. Deviation	30.063	40.076	
2004	Mean	44.10	42.73	
	N	24	22	

	Std. Deviation	30.936	41.079	
2005	Mean	42.71	43.18	
	N	24	22	
	Std. Deviation	30.724	40.636	
Total	Mean	37.12	33.64	22.89
	N	600	550	480
	Std. Deviation	29.552	37.259	28.498

Source: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.).

Appendix 5.1. Categories of GDP per capita in US\$, 1981-2005

	Very high	High	Low	Very low
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	8231.00	859.80	385.71	150.86
1982	7957.00	896.60	410.00	151.00
1983	7821.20	914.60	424.86	157.29
1984	7958.60	965.60	424.57	167.57
1985	7700.40	914.20	418.71	171.43
1986	7894.00	876.00	449.29	168.71
1987	9398.20	927.60	479.00	171.00
1988	10861.20	1042.60	497.29	175.14
1989	11756.20	1155.80	502.43	189.57
1990	12868.20	1282.00	505.00	195.14
1991	14362.40	1401.80	484.00	201.00
1992	15659.40	1596.00	483.14	210.43
1993	17145.40	1748.00	487.86	212.57
1994	19012.80	1933.60	499.29	227.71
1995	21454.80	2209.20	531.00	261.57
1996	21117.20	2420.60	591.29	273.43
1997	20276.00	2293.00	610.86	274.43
1998	16974.80	1715.60	610.86	242.43
1999	18534.20	1894.60	616.86	255.71
2000	20626.80	1991.00	640.86	269.00
2001	18544.40	1901.00	652.86	265.86
2002	18672.20	2024.80	697.29	297.71
2003	19951.20	2193.20	780.86	318.14
2004	22293.20	2427.60	881.71	356.86
2005	24046.60	2568.80	1026.14	398.71

Source of data: UN Stat (n.d.)

Appendix 5.2. How much democracy (Freedom) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2005

	Very high	High	Low	Very low
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	7.40	7.20	5.71	4.14
1982	7.40	7.40	5.71	3.86
1983	7.40	7.20	5.43	3.57
1984	7.60	7.20	5.43	3.57
1985	7.80	7.40	5.86	3.57
1986	7.80	7.60	5.86	3.71
1987	8.20	8.00	5.86	3.86
1988	8.80	7.80	6.29	4.43
1989	9.00	8.00	5.57	3.71
1990	9.40	7.60	6.14	3.57
1991	8.40	6.60	6.14	5.00
1992	8.80	7.20	5.86	5.29
1993	8.20	6.20	5.71	5.00
1994	8.60	6.20	5.71	5.00
1995	9.00	6.60	5.71	4.71
1996	9.60	7.20	6.00	4.57
1997	9.40	7.20	6.14	4.43
1998	9.40	7.80	6.57	4.57
1999	9.40	8.20	6.14	4.43
2000	9.60	8.40	6.29	4.57
2001	9.60	8.40	6.29	4.71
2002	9.80	8.40	6.71	4.71
2003	9.80	8.60	6.86	4.57
2004	10.20	8.80	6.86	4.57
2005	10.40	8.00	6.86	4.71

Sources of data: UN Stat (n.d.); Freedom in the World (n.d.)

Appendix 5.3. How much democracy (Freedom) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2005

	Parliamentary	Strong president elected by parliament	Presidential
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	10.00	3.56	5.00
1982	10.00	3.67	4.75
1983	9.83	3.56	5.00
1984	9.67	3.56	5.22
1985	9.67	3.56	5.78
1986	9.83	3.56	5.89
1987	9.83	3.89	6.11
1988	9.67	3.88	6.90
1989	9.57	3.71	5.70
1990	9.43	3.71	6.10
1991	8.57	4.38	6.44
1992	9.25	4.88	5.63
1993	8.50	4.75	5.13
1994	8.33	3.67	5.78
1995	8.11	3.67	6.22
1996	8.56	2.60	6.80
1997	8.33	2.60	6.90
1998	8.56	3.20	7.10
1999	8.11	3.60	7.10
2000	8.63	4.00	7.00
2001	8.75	4.00	7.00
2002	8.63	4.00	7.80
2003	8.63	4.00	7.90
2004	8.63	4.00	7.82
2005	7.75	4.60	8.00

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001)

Appendix 5.4. How much democracy (Freedom) Bretton wood institutions (Bretton) host, 1981-2005

	Member	Non-member
	Mean	Mean
1981	6.35	3.75
1982	6.30	3.75
1983	6.05	3.75
1984	6.10	3.75
1985	6.35	3.75
1986	6.45	3.75
1987	6.65	4.00
1988	7.10	4.00
1989	6.65	4.25
1990	6.40	6.25
1991	6.67	4.33
1992	6.81	5.00
1993	6.38	4.33
1994	6.38	5.00
1995	6.32	6.00
1996	6.55	7.00
1997	6.50	7.00
1998	6.82	7.00
1999	6.73	7.00
2000	6.86	7.50
2001	6.91	7.50
2002	7.14	7.00
2003	7.18	7.00
2004	7.27	7.50
2005	7.14	8.00

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.)

Appendix 5.5. Sudden increases in the levels of democracy (Freedom) in three non-member countries of Bretton wood institution in 1990

Year	Brunei	Mongolia	Taiwan
1981	5	2	6
1982	5	2	6
1983	5	2	6
1984	5	2	6
1985	5	2	6
1986	5	2	6
1987	5	2	7
1988	4	2	8
1989	4	2	9
1990	5	8	10
1991	5	11	6
1992	3	11	10
1993	3	11	8
1994	3	11	10
1995	4	11	10
1996	4	11	12
1997	4	11	12
1998	4	11	12
1999	4	11	12
2000	4	11	13
2001	4	11	13
2002	5	12	12
2003	5	12	12
2004	5	12	13
2005	5	12	14

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.)

Appendix 5.6. How much democracy (Freedom) each media category (Media) hosts, 1981-2005

	Not free	Partly free	Free
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	3.42	7.89	12.50
1982	3.36	7.73	14.00
1983	3.27	7.36	14.00
1984	3.27	7.45	14.00
1985	3.58	7.73	14.00
1986	2.90	7.77	14.00
1987	3.00	7.75	13.00
1988	3.64	8.45	12.50
1989	3.33	7.57	11.40
1990	3.67	7.88	11.50
1991	4.00	8.00	9.80
1992	3.00	8.11	11.00
1993	2.90	7.25	10.00
1994	2.90	7.82	11.33
1995	3.46	8.88	11.67
1996	3.46	9.50	12.33
1997	3.31	9.63	12.33
1998	3.69	9.71	12.00
1999	3.50	8.33	11.67
2000	4.07	9.50	11.83
2001	4.08	8.60	11.83
2002	4.79	9.00	11.80
2003	4.71	9.67	12.00
2004	4.79	9.86	13.00
2005	4.86	9.29	13.33

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 5.7. Mean democracy (Freedom) and its factors by country, 1981-2005

Country	Freedom	GDP	Form_N	Breton_N	Media
AFG	2.68	214	2	2	1
BGD	8.24	297	2.56	2	1.76
BRN	4.4	15913	2	1.44	1
BTN	4.32	617	2	2	1
CHN	2.96	669	1	2	1
IDN	6.08	800	1	2	1.72
IND	10.4	394	3	2	2.2
JPN	13.32	26829	3	2	3
KHM	3.6	233	1.96	2	1
LAO	2.72	274	1	2	1
LKA	8.68	651	2.08	2	1.92
MDV	5	1444	2	2	1.4
MMR	2.12	168	1.68	2	1
MNG	7.8	483	1.88	1.6	1.76
MYS	7.28	3159	3	2	1.52
NPL	8.64	188	3	2	1.96
PAK	6.32	541	2.44	2	1.8
PHL	9.92	847	2	2	2.44
PRK	2	590	1	1	1
ROK	10.24	7738	1.72	2	2.64
SGP	6.68	16131	3	2	1.36
THA	9.56	1781	3	2	2.24
TWN	9.56	9614	1.4	1	2.48
VNM	2.48	240	1	2	1

Note: all the data in this table are averages for 25-year period from 1981 to 2005

Sources: This researcher averaged these data collected from Freedom in the World (n.d.); UN Stat (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 5.8. How much democracy (Polidem) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2005

	Very high Mean	High Mean	Low Mean	Very low Mean
1981	3	2	2	0
1982	3	2	2	0
1983	3	2	2	0
1984	3	2	2	0
1985	3	2	2	0
1986	3	2	2	0
1987	4	4	2	0
1988	5	4	3	0
1989	5	4	3	0
1990	5	4	4	1
1991	5	4	4	2
1992	7	6	4	2
1993	7	6	4	2
1994	7	6	4	2
1995	7	5	5	2
1996	7	5	5	2
1997	7	5	5	2
1998	7	5	5	2
1999	7	7	4	2
2000	7	7	4	2
2001	7	7	4	2
2002	7	7	4	1
2003	7	7	4	1
2004	8	7	4	1
2005	8	7	4	1

Sources of data: UN Stat (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.).

Appendix 5.9. How much democracy (Polidem) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2005

	Parliamentary	Strong president not elected by people	Presidential
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	5	0	0
1982	5	0	0
1983	5	0	1
1984	5	0	1
1985	5	0	1
1986	5	0	1
1987	5	0	2
1988	5	0	4
1989	6	0	3
1990	6	0	3
1991	6	1	4
1992	7	2	4
1993	7	2	4
1994	6	1	4
1995	6	1	4
1996	6	0	5
1997	6	0	5
1998	6	0	5
1999	6	2	5
2000	6	2	5
2001	6	1	5
2002	6	1	5
2003	6	1	5
2004	6	2	5
2005	6	2	5

Sources of data: Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001)

Appendix 5.10. How much democracy (Polidem) Breton wood institutions (Breton) host, 1981-2005

Year	Member Mean	Non-member Mean
1981	2	0
1982	2	0
1983	2	0
1984	2	0
1985	2	0
1986	2	0
1987	2	1
1988	3	1
1989	3	1
1990	3	2
1991	4	1
1992	4	4
1993	4	4
1994	4	4
1995	4	4
1996	4	4
1997	4	5
1998	4	5
1999	5	5
2000	5	5
2001	5	5
2002	4	5
2003	4	5
2004	4	5
2005	4	5

Sources of data: Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.)

Appendix 5.11. How much democracy (Polidem) each media category (Media) hosts, 1981-2005

	Not free	Partly free	Free
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	0	2	8
1982	0	2	10
1983	0	2	10
1984	0	2	10
1985	0	2	10
1986	0	2	10
1987	0	3	9
1988	1	4	9
1989	0	4	8
1990	0	5	8
1991	1	5	7
1992	0	6	7
1993	0	5	8
1994	0	6	8
1995	1	8	8
1996	1	8	8
1997	1	8	9
1998	1	7	9
1999	1	6	9
2000	1	8	9
2001	1	6	9
2002	2	5	9
2003	1	7	9
2004	1	7	9
2005	1	7	9

Sources of data: Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 5.12. Mean democracy (Polidem) and its factors by country, 1981-2005

Country	Polidem	GDP	Form_N	Breton_N	Media
AFG	0	214.32	2	2	1
BGD	3.6	297.36	2.56	2	1.76
BTN	0	616.72	2	2	1
CHN	0	669.28	1	2	1
IDN	2.12	799.6	1	2	1.72
IND	8.44	393.84	3	2	2.2
JPN	10	26828.76	3	2	3
KHM	1.44	232.72	1.96	2	1
LAO	0	273.6	1	2	1
LKA	6.08	650.84	2.08	2	1.92
MMR	0	167.64	1.68	2	1
MNG	5.76	483.32	1.88	1.6	1.76
MYS	4.56	3159.2	3	2	1.52
NPL	3.52	188.28	3	2	1.96
PAK	3.48	541.2	2.44	2	1.8
PHL	6.08	847.04	2	2	2.44
PRK	0	590.48	1	1	1
ROK	5.36	7737.76	1.72	2	2.64
SGP	2	16130.68	3	2	1.36
THA	6.4	1780.56	3	2	2.24
TWN	5.16	9613.68	1.4	1	2.48
VNM	0	239.8	1	2	1

Note: all the data in this table are averages for 25-year period from 1981 to 2005

Sources: This researcher averaged these data collected from Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); UN Stat (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 5.13. How much democracy (Vandem) each category of GDP per capita (GDP_cat) hosts, 1981-2005

	Very high	High	Low	Very low
	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	7.04	5.14	3.14	1.17
1982	7.04	5.14	5.04	.00
1983	6.94	5.26	5.04	.00
1984	8.09	5.26	4.98	.00
1985	8.17	5.26	4.98	.00
1986	8.05	8.00	4.98	.61
1987	14.18	7.80	4.98	.61
1988	15.63	7.87	6.29	.61
1989	15.63	7.87	6.91	.61
1990	17.36	8.44	8.07	.80
1991	15.63	7.30	7.60	3.86
1992	15.24	10.18	9.29	3.86
1993	15.89	10.48	9.10	4.70
1994	15.89	10.48	9.60	4.79
1995	15.89	9.98	9.60	4.79
1996	18.27	9.86	11.14	5.20
1997	17.94	11.42	10.32	4.42
1998	18.11	10.98	10.44	5.20
1999	18.11	13.39	8.95	4.62
2000	18.25	13.39	8.48	4.62

Sources of data: UN Stat (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.).

Appendix 5.14. How much democracy (Vandem) each form of government (Form) hosts, 1981-2005

	Parliamentary	Strong president not elected by people	Presidential
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	9.96	.75	1.83
1982	11.85	.76	.81
1983	10.76	.76	2.77
1984	11.65	.76	2.77
1985	11.65	.81	2.77
1986	11.84	.81	4.57
1987	11.84	4.10	4.57
1988	13.18	.42	8.33
1989	13.64	.48	7.13
1990	15.39	1.22	7.49
1991	13.87	2.05	9.05
1992	14.73	3.76	8.92
1993	14.97	4.49	9.10
1994	14.03	1.74	10.66
1995	13.75	1.74	10.66
1996	14.22	.85	12.28
1997	13.58	.81	12.37
1998	14.28	.81	12.24
1999	12.60	2.75	12.53
2000	13.84	2.75	11.40

Sources of data: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001)

Appendix 5.15. How much democracy (Vandem) Bretton wood institutions (Bretton) host, 1981-2005

	Member Mean	Non-member Mean
1981	4.56	.00
1982	4.81	.00
1983	4.82	.00
1984	5.08	.00
1985	5.10	.00
1986	5.97	.00
1987	7.45	.00
1988	8.29	.00
1989	8.51	.00
1990	8.90	3.26
1991	9.04	1.72
1992	10.14	2.06
1993	10.59	2.06
1994	10.78	2.06
1995	10.18	3.09
1996	10.56	11.39
1997	10.33	11.39
1998	10.51	11.83
1999	10.40	11.83
2000	10.02	14.69

Sources of data: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.)

Appendix 5.16. How much democracy (Vandem) each media category (Media) hosts, 1981-2005

	Not free	Partly free	Free
	Mean	Mean	Mean
1981	.74	5.62	15.83
1982	.58	5.77	26.33
1983	.58	5.82	25.80
1984	1.11	5.79	25.80
1985	1.02	5.82	25.80
1986	.00	7.25	25.18
1987	.00	8.91	21.09
1988	1.11	10.12	21.09
1989	.63	7.78	21.61
1990	.94	9.99	25.00
1991	1.57	11.34	19.35
1992	.10	12.70	20.77
1993	.84	12.70	19.76
1994	.84	14.17	22.80
1995	2.71	15.81	22.80
1996	2.71	17.44	26.77
1997	2.05	17.77	27.07
1998	2.51	16.97	25.90
1999	2.61	13.14	23.73
2000	3.89	14.16	23.12

Sources of data: Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 5.17. Mean democracy (Vandem) and its factors by country, 1981-2005

Country	Vandem	GDP	Form_N	Breton_N	Media
AFG	0	216.2	2	2	1
BGD	9.19	275.55	2.45	2	1.9
BRN	0	14966.35	2	1.3	1
BTN	0	508.65	2	2	1
CHN	0	498.35	1	2	1
IDN	4.91	744.7	1	2	1.65
IND	18.55	352.85	3	2	2.25
JPN	27.27	25165.2	3	2	3
KHM	1.99	203.4	1.7	2	1
LAO	0.09	241.25	1	2	1
LKA	17.7	561.1	2.1	2	2
MDV	1.78	1197.35	2	2	1.5
MMR	0	156.4	1.6	2	1
MNG	10.4	464.15	1.85	1.5	1.65
MYS	12.79	2867.4	3	2	1.65
NPL	6.4	175.7	3	2	2.1
PAK	5.5	515.55	2.55	2	1.75
PHL	16.86	805.25	2	2	2.4
PRK	0	617.85	1	1	1
ROK	22.83	6405.1	1.65	2	2.55
SGP	11.38	14363.8	3	2	1.45
THA	7.04	1644.85	3	2	2.2
TWN	7.87	8502	1.25	1	2.35
VNM	0	175.6	1	2	1

Note: all the data in this table are averages for 20-year period from 1981 to 2000

Sources: This researcher averaged these data collected from Vanhanen's Index of Democracy (n.d.); UN Stat (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001); World Bank/ About Us (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 6.1. Mean democracy (Freedom) and GDP per capita by year in Taiwan, 1981-2005

Country	Year	Freedom	GDP per capita (US \$)
Taiwan	1981	6	2743
Taiwan	1982	6	2711
Taiwan	1983	6	2876
Taiwan	1984	6	3199
Taiwan	1985	6	3314
Taiwan	1986	6	3974
Taiwan	1987	7	5291
Taiwan	1988	8	6357
Taiwan	1989	9	7634
Taiwan	1990	10	8132
Taiwan	1991	6	9008
Taiwan	1992	10	10589
Taiwan	1993	8	11077
Taiwan	1994	10	11991
Taiwan	1995	10	12906
Taiwan	1996	12	13527
Taiwan	1997	12	13904
Taiwan	1998	12	12679
Taiwan	1999	12	13609
Taiwan	2000	13	14519
Taiwan	2001	13	13093
Taiwan	2002	12	13291
Taiwan	2003	12	13587
Taiwan	2004	13	14663
Taiwan	2005	14	15668

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Taiwan Statistics (n.d)

Appendix 6.2. How much democracy each Form of government in Taiwan accounts for, 1981-2005

Country	Year	President not	President elected
		elected	
		Mean	Mean
Taiwan	1981	6	.
Taiwan	1982	6	.
Taiwan	1983	6	.
Taiwan	1984	6	.
Taiwan	1985	6	.
Taiwan	1986	6	.
Taiwan	1987	7	.
Taiwan	1988	8	.
Taiwan	1989	9	.
Taiwan	1990	10	.
Taiwan	1991	6	.
Taiwan	1992	10	.
Taiwan	1993	8	.
Taiwan	1994	10	.
Taiwan	1995	10	.
Taiwan	1996	.	12
Taiwan	1997	.	12
Taiwan	1998	.	12
Taiwan	1999	.	12
Taiwan	2000	.	13
Taiwan	2001	.	13
Taiwan	2002	.	12
Taiwan	2003	.	12
Taiwan	2004	.	13
Taiwan	2005	.	14

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Beck et al. (2001)

Appendix 6.3. Declining economic inequality (Gini) in Taiwan, 1952-2000

Year	Gini
1953	0.56
1959	0.44
1970	0.29
1990	0.3
2000	0.3

Source: Wong, 2003

Appendix 6.4. Increasing urban population in Taiwan, 1940-95

Country	Year	% Urban population
TWN	1940	11
TWN	1950	20.7
TWN	1955	23.4
TWN	1960	25.9
TWN	1965	27.9
TWN	1970	36
TWN	1975	39.7
TWN	1980	47.2
TWN	1985	50.2
TWN	1990	52.9
TWN	1995	55.1

Source: Selya, 2004.

Appendix 6.5. Increasing urban population in Taiwan, 1981-01

Country	Year	No. of urban population (in 1000)
TWN	1981	8710
TWN	1982	9077
TWN	1983	9281
TWN	1984	9484
TWN	1985	9772
TWN	1986	10177
TWN	1987	10511
TWN	1988	11834
TWN	1989	11004
TWN	1990	11280
TWN	1991	11404
TWN	1992	11909
TWN	1993	12007
TWN	1994	12132
TWN	1995	12333
TWN	1996	12545
TWN	1997	12689
TWN	1998	12956
TWN	1999	13099
TWN	2000	13302
TWN	2001	13508

Source: NMC (n.d)

Appendix 6.6. Taiwan's labour force with college & graduate degrees

Country	Year	No. labourer (Unit: 1000 persons)
TWN	1978	265
TWN	1979	287
TWN	1980	331
TWN	1981	350
TWN	1982	360
TWN	1983	387
TWN	1984	413
TWN	1985	419
TWN	1986	452
TWN	1987	495
TWN	1988	532
TWN	1989	565
TWN	1990	596
TWN	1991	609
TWN	1992	643
TWN	1993	704
TWN	1994	732
TWN	1995	800
TWN	1996	858
TWN	1997	938
TWN	1998	1005
TWN	1999	1065
TWN	2000	1123
TWN	2001	1169
TWN	2002	1271
TWN	2003	1391
TWN	2004	1542
TWN	2005	1733
TWN	2006	1951
TWN	2007	2161
TWN	2008	2389

Source: DGBAS (Taiwan government)
(<http://win.dgbas.gov.tw/dgbas03/bs7/sdds/english/calendar.htm>)

Appendix 6.7. Leading development indicators of Taiwan, 1952-2001

Indicators	1952	2001
GNP per capita	US \$196	US \$12,941
Government spending:		
On military	59.30%	11.40%
On education	7.80%	20.90%
On social security	5.60%	28.70%
Urban population	20.70%	68.89%
Life expectancy at birth:		
Male	65.8 (1965)	72.7
Female	70.4 (1965)	78.5

Source: Selya, 2004.

Appendix 6.8. Taiwanese on the KMT Central Committee, 1952-93

Year	Positions (%) held by Taiwanese
1952	3.1
1957	6
1963	5.4
1969	6.1
1976	14.6
1981	19.3
1988	34.4
1993	53.3

Source: Kau (1996).

Appendix 6.9. Several stages of party system change, 1949-2005

Years	Party/ parties
1949 to 1977	KMT, Independents
1977 to 1986	KMT, Independents, Tangwai
1986 to 1993	KMT, DPP
1993 to 2000	KMT, DPP, NP
2000 to 2001	KMT, DPP, NP, PFP
2001 to 2005	KMT, DPP, NP, PFP, TSU

Source: Lin (2006).

Appendix 6.10. The votes (%) for KMT and its Opposition in the Legislative Yuan elections, 1972-92

Year	KMT	Non-KMT	TW/DPP
1972	73.1	26.9	
1975	77.61	22.39	
1980	71.91	28.09	13.02
1983	69.41	30.59	18.86
1986	66.73	33.27	24.55
1989	59.22	40.78	29.02
1992	52.51	47.49	30.79

Source: Chao & Ramon (2000).

Appendix 6.11. Major stages of Taiwanese economic development

Year	Stages of economic development
1945-49	Retrocession; Lack of clear economic policy as government focuses attention on war against communists
1950-59	Recovery; Rehabilitation based on import substitution and agricultural modernisation through land reform; Dependent on US aid; Inflation brought under control;
1960-69	Export orientation with planning and attracting foreign direct investment as mechanisms; surplus rural labour and low wages basis for industry; US aid ends;
1970-79	Adjustment: Industrial upgrading with emphasis on heavy industry and petro-chemicals; competition from other Asian countries, especially from China; wages double
1980-89	Industrial restructuring: Replacing labour with capital Growth of high technology and high value added industries; Refocusing on agriculture with land consolidation; Move to reduce trade dependency on Japan and the US; Taiwanese entrepreneurs urged/permitted to invest in Southeast Asia and China
1990-	Maturity: Opening of domestic markets to foreign investors and venture capitals Trade liberalisation in anticipation of admission to World Trade Organisation Tight labour market, especially in dirty industries relieved by use of guest workers

Source: Selya (2004).

Appendix 6.12. Major stages of Taiwanese democratisation

Year	Stages of democratisation
1949-86	Limited democracy; local elections permitted, 1950; Provincial Assembly created, 1951; popular elections for Provincial Assembly, 1959; overseas travel restrictions 1969-76; Chiang Ching-kuo becomes Premier, 1972 then President in 1978; Chiang Kai-shek dies, 5 April 1975 and was succeeded by Vice-President Yen Chia-kan; Chungli incident 1977; Kaoshiung incident, 1979; Opposition candidates compete openly in local elections
1986-87	Kuomintang Central Committee authorises a 12-member task force to study issues involved in restructuring of National Assembly, granting local autonomy, lifting martial law, permitting civic organisations, furthering social reform and initiating party reform Democratic Progressive Party formed Martial Law lifted 1987-91: Constitutional reform Second national elections held Council of Grand Justices sets end of 1991 as deadline for involuntary retirement of legislature Legalisation of civil organisations end to Kuomintang monopoly over Central Election Commission 1992-94: Election of national representatives 1994: Continued constitutional reforms; Direct elections of Mayors of Taipei and Kaoshiung; Direct popular election of President and Vice-President
1987-91	Constitutional reform; second national election held, with retirement of older representatives to National Assembly Chiang Ching-kuo dies on 13 January 1988, succeeded by Taiwan born Lee Tung-hui; 1989 reforms include legalisation of civil organisation and an end to KMT monopoly over the Central Election Commission
1992-94	Election of national representatives
1994-05	Continued constitutional reform; direct elections of mayors Taipei and Kaoshiung cities, 1994; first direct presidential election held in 1996; opposition Democratic Progressive Party wins Presidential election in 2000, ending 55 years of KMT rule; Democratic Progressive Party candidate reelected President in 2004

Source: Selya (2004); Chu & Lin (2001); Chan (2004); Lin (2006).

Appendix 7.1. Mean democracy on Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem) scales by GDP per capita (GDP raw) in Singapore, 1981-2005

Country	Year	Freedom	Polidem	Vandem	GDP raw
SGP	1981	7	2	6.43	5638
SGP	1982	7	2	6.43	6057
SGP	1983	7	2	6.43	6730
SGP	1984	7	2	12.2	7093
SGP	1985	7	2	12.2	6532
SGP	1986	7	2	12.2	6517
SGP	1987	7	2	12.2	7326
SGP	1988	7	2	19.73	8904
SGP	1989	7	2	19.73	10332
SGP	1990	7	2	19.73	12234
SGP	1991	7	2	11.06	13952
SGP	1992	7	2	11.06	15671
SGP	1993	6	2	11.06	17820
SGP	1994	6	2	11.06	20929
SGP	1995	6	2	11.06	24132
SGP	1996	7	2	11.06	25794
SGP	1997	6	2	8.49	25890
SGP	1998	6	2	8.49	21589
SGP	1999	6	2	8.49	21057
SGP	2000	6	2	8.49	23079
SGP	2001	6	2		20864
SGP	2002	7	2		21151
SGP	2003	7	2		21879
SGP	2004	7	2		25129
SGP	2005	7	2		26968

Sources of data: Freedom in the World. (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.); Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.); UN Stat (n.d.)

Appendix 7.2. Correlation between Freedom House (Freedom), Polity (Polidem) and Vanhanen (Vandem) with regard to Singaporean democracy (SGP), 1981-2005

Country			Freedom	Polidem	Vandem
SGP	Freedom	Pearson			
		Correlation	1	.a	0.328
		Sig. (2-tailed)		.	0.157
		N	25	25	20
	Polidem	Pearson			
		Correlation	.a	.a	.a
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
		N	25	25	20
	Van_raw	Pearson			
Correlation		0.328	.a	1	
Sig. (2-tailed)		0.157	.	.	
	N	20	20	20	

Note: 'a' means that the data cannot be computed because .
at least one of the variables is constant

Sources of data: Freedom in the World. (n.d.); Polity IV Annual Time-Series (n.d.);
Vanhanen's Index of Democracy. (n.d.)

Appendix 7.3. Mean democracy (Freedom) by categories of election credibility in Singapore, 1981-2005

Year	Not fair election Mean	Partly fair election Mean	Fair election Mean
1981		7	
1982		7	
1983		7	
1984		7	
1985			7
1986		7	
1987		7	
1988		7	
1989		7	
1990		7	
1991		7	
1992		7	
1993	6		
1994		6	
1995		6	
1996		7	
1997		6	
1998		6	
1999		6	
2000		6	
2001		6	
2002		7	
2003		7	
2004		7	
2005		7	

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Cingranelli & Richards (2008)

Appendix 7.4. Mean democracy (Freedom) by categories of the freedom of media in Singapore, 1981-2005

Year	Not free media Mean	Partly free media Mean
1981	7	
1982	7	
1983	7	
1984	7	
1985	7	
1986		7
1987		7
1988		7
1989		7
1990		7
1991		7
1992		7
1993		6
1994		6
1995	6	
1996	7	
1997	6	
1998	6	
1999	6	
2000	6	
2001	6	
2002	7	
2003	7	
2004	7	
2005	7	

Sources of data: Freedom in the World (n.d.); Freedom of the Press (n.d.)

Appendix 7.5. Singapore's direct equity investment abroad in US \$ billion

Year	Amount
1981	0.818
1991	9.127
1995	27.676
1999	34.876
2003	89.727

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics (as cited in Bellows, 2006)

Appendix 7.6. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) flows as percentage of gross fixed capital formation

Year(s)	1985-95	1999	2000	2001
Outward flows	8(Average)	19.4	22.2	38.3

Source: Bellows, 2006

Appendix 7.7. Human development indices: A comparison between Singapore and some democratic countries, 2005

Countries	HDI
Australia	0.962
Canada	0.961
Denmark	0.949
Iceland	0.968
Japan	0.953
New Zealand	0.943
Singapore	0.922
United States	0.951
United Kingdom	0.946

Source: UNDP (n.d.)

Appendix 7.8. Singapore's Human Development indices trend

Year	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2005
Indices	0.729	0.762	0.789	0.827	0.865	0.922

Source: UNDP (n.d.)

Appendix 7.9. Top ten least corrupt countries for each year during 1995-2008

Countries	1995 rank	1996 rank	1997 rank	1998 rank	1999 rank	2000 rank	2001 rank	2002 rank	2003 rank	2004 rank	2005 rank	2006 rank	2007 rank	2008 rank
Australia	7	10	8	8	9	9	9	9
Canada	5	5	5	6	5	5	7	7	9	10
Denmark	2	2	1	1	1	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	1	1
Finland	4	4	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	5
Iceland	5	6	6	4	4	2	4	1	2	6	7
Luxemburg	10	9	8
Netherlands	9	9	6	8	8	9	8	9	7	10	7	8
NZ	1	1	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	3	2
Norway	10	6	7	9	9	7	10	9	8	8	8	10
Singapore	3	7	9	7	7	8	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4
Sweden	6	3	3	3	4	4	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	3
Switzerland	8	8	10	10	10	7	7	7	8	6
UK	10	10
Austria	10	10

Source: This researcher draws this table on the basis of information from Transparency International. (n.d.).

Appendix 7.10. Database of legal techniques used to systematically control the Opposition and critiques in Singapore, 1981-2005.

1981-1985: During the period from 1981 to 1985, just three incidents of application of legal techniques took place to systematically control PAP's opponents and critiques. In 1983, the Official Secrets Act transformed even innocuous economic statistics into state secrets, and makes provision for punishment to whoever unveils them, even if only prior to their official release (Margolin, 2005). In October 1985, Dow Jones Publishing Co., proprietors and publishers of Asian Wall Street Journal (AWSJ); Melanie Margaret Kirkpatrick, author of defamatory editorial; Fred Zimmermann, editor and publisher; Paul Gigot, editorial page editor; Singapore Newspapers Services Pte. Ltd., printer John Tan Yew How, manager and part owner of Total Subscription Services, Singapore's distributor, were charged with several contempt of court cases for publishing, printing and distributing an editorial. Dow Jones Publishing Co. was fined S\$6,000; Kirkpatrick S\$4,000; Zimmermann S\$3,000 and Gigot, who rewrote the editorial, S\$2,000. Singapore Newspapers Services and John Tan were fined S\$500 each. (Singapore Courts vs Asian Wall Street Journal, n.d.).

1986-1990: The next five years (1986-1990) witnessed 18 incidents of application of the PAP's legal techniques to control its opponents and critiques. The Newspaper and Printing Presses Act was amended in 1986, which empowered the government to impose restrictions on foreign press and reduce drastically the circulation of foreign periodicals (Margolin, 2005; Chew, 1994). (Under the same law the government already had an indirect authority to influence the editorial policy of a local newspaper as it had required shares of the publishing company) In November 1986, the leader of Singapore's parliamentary opposition and the Workers' Party, Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, was sentenced to a month in prison and stripped of his seat in the legislature. The action against the politician came after a four-year legal battle in which he was tried twice for the same purported charges: fraud and making false statements about party funds that he transferred to avoid having them impounded as costs in a lawsuit (Crossette, 1986, November 16). In 1987, Asiaweek was gazetted and its circulation reduced from 10,000 to 500 copies as it did not publish an unedited government letter (Seow, 1998). In February 1987, Malaysian English-language tabloid, The Star, was accused of defaming Prime Minister Lee and his PAP government in two articles published in February (Lee Kuan Yew vs The Star, n.d.). On 18 Mar 1987, S. Dhanabalan, leader of the house of Singapore Parliament, accused Workers' Party leader Jeyaretnam as editor, publisher and printer of of the party's publication The Hammer of contempt for an article titled "Committee of Privileges Hearing/Jeya Denied Fair Hearing" published in its January/February 1987 issue. The complaint was referred to the parliamentary committee of privileges which found Jeyaretnam guilty and fined him S\$25,000 (Dhanabalan vs Jeyaretnam, n.d.) In Dec 1987, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew filed a libel suit against Derek Davies, editor-in-chief of Far Eastern Economic Review; Michael Malik, Singapore correspondent; Publishers and Printers as an article entitled "New Light on Detention" published by the Review on December 17, 1987 had accused him of abusing his office through the arrest of 16 church workers suspected of a "communist plot" under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (Seow,

1998). On 6-7 May 1988, Francis Tiang Siew, President of the Law Society, was arrested under the ISA on May 6 on an accusation of conspiring with US diplomat Hendrickson against the Singapore government. He was released on July 16 but was charged with attempting to evade taxes on commission and bank interest amounting to \$36,850 (Singapore Government vs Hendrickson & Seow, n.d.). In August 1988, Opposition Workers' Party leader Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam was charged with slander by Prime Minister Lee for an electioneering speech made on August 26th, in the 1988 general elections. Jeyaretnam was found guilty of slander and ordered to pay Lee S\$260,000 in damages (Lee Kuan Yew vs J.B. Jeyaretnam, n.d.). In 1989, the London Privy Council has lost its position as court of final appeal for all Singapore cases but those involving capital punishment, life imprisonment or civil cases in which both sides agree to such recourse in February and early April (Margolin, 2005). In 1989, in the Lee v. Davies and Others libel case filed in December 1987, a sum of S\$230,000 in damages was awarded to Lee in 1989 (Tey, 2008). In December 1989, Prime Minister Lee commenced libel suits in against Peter Kann, Dow Jone's president-publisher, the editors, publishers, printers and distributors of the Asian Wall Street Journal in both Singapore and Malaysia, and the Review in Malaysia (Seow, 1998). In December 1990, the government amended the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act again which took effect 1 December 1990. The new law required "any foreign publication which publishes more than 300 copies of each edition, and reports on politics and current affairs in any country in southeast Asia", to apply for a permit, renewable annually; appoint an agent in Singapore to receive any legal notices; post a security deposit of S\$200,000 with the Singapore government. Previously, the act only affected publications that print and publish in Singapore (Seow, 1998).

1991-1995: During the 1991-1995 period, 20 incidents took place. On 11 January 1991, a Singapore court ruled on January 11, 1991 that the Asian Wall Street Journal, its editor and publisher were guilty of contempt over Dow Jone's president-publisher Peter Kann's criticisms that the Singapore court was influenced by the Prime Minister. They were fined S\$9,000 and ordered to pay legal proceedings (Attorney General vs Peter Kann, n.d.). In May 1991, the Lee vs Star suit filed in February 1987 was settled out of court on May 13, 1991, with the Star agreeing to publish a public apology in a prominent position on the their front page, withdraw unreservedly its allegations, and pay RM200,000 in damages and the full costs of the proceedings, estimated at RM70,000 (Lee Kuan Yew vs The Star, n.d.). Workers' Party candidate Gopalan Nair for Bukit Merah constituency in the 1991 elections, was charged with contempt of court in 1991, as he at an election rally allegedly have cast aspersions on the system of promotion of judges in the Subordinate Courts." Nair was found guilty and fined S\$8,000 by a High Court judge. He was later ordered to pay S\$13,000 to the Singapore government for legal costs (PAP vs Gopalan Nair, n.d.). Wee Han Kim, Workers' Party member, at a Workers' Party Labour Day rally was accused of implying nepotism in Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's rise to political power in 1992. Wee had to pay approximately S\$223,000 in total for legal costs, advertisement for a public apology and damages of S\$100,000 to each of Lee Kuan Yew, senior minister, and Lee Hsien Loong (The Workers' Party of Singapore, n.d.). In January 1993, former secretary general of People's Front, Leong Mun Kwai, was charged with criminal trespass at the Ministry of Labour building. He wore a white T-shirt

with Chinese words on it and a plastic handcuff on his left hand, distributing pamphlets of his articles commenting on the ministry's restrictions on the employment of foreign workers. Leong was sentenced to five weeks of imprisonment for criminal trespass (Ministry of Labour vs Leong Mun Kwai, n.d.). In 1993, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, secretary-general of the opposition Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), was dismissed from his teaching position at the National University of Singapore for alleged irregularities involving the use of research funds. In the context of this case, his department chairman, who was a PAP MP, successfully sued Chee for defamation (USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). In December 1994, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew filed a civil libel suit regarding a write-up published in The International Herald Tribune, which led the writer, British lecturer Christopher Lingle, to leave Singapore. The write-up have viewed that some authoritarian regimes in the region use "a compliant judiciary to bankrupt opposition politicians" (Margolin, 2005). In January 1995, because of Lingle's write-up, a Singapore judge ordered Christopher Lingle, The International Herald Tribune, and its publishers and Asia editor to pay fines and court costs that are expected to total tens of thousands of dollars (Shenon, 1995, January 18). In July 1995, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his son, deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, won a libel suit against the International Herald Tribune for an article written by Philip Bowering, published in August 1994. In this case, the High Court ordered the International Herald Tribune to pay US\$638,000 in damages to Lee Kuan Yew, his son and Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, and Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (Rodan, 1998). In November 1995, five Indian PAP MPs S. Jayakumar, S. Chandra Das, S. Vasoo, K. Shanmugam, and R. Sinnakaruppan commenced legal proceedings against the author of an article Balakrishnan, and the editor of The Hammer Jeyaretnam, and its publisher. The article published in The Hammer allegedly opined that the Indian MPs used the Tamil Language Week to advance their own political careers. Damages of S\$235,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs. Jeyaretnam was declared bankrupt and barred from Parliament after he had failed to pay the final installment (PAP MPs vs The Hammer, n.d.).

1996-2000: Twenty-eight incidents took place during the 1996-2000 period. In 1996, Parliament enacted a new broadcasting law in 1994, formally extending the government's jurisdiction to electronic communication. The authorities followed up in July 1996 with new regulations that in different ways regulated, restricted and limited the capacity of Internet operators, service providers and users especially in regard to political and religious matters (Rodan, 1998; USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). In April 1996, a court ordered Christopher Lingle to pay former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew \$71,000 in libel damages filed earlier for his articles published in 1994 by The International Herald Tribune that accused Mr. Lee of using Singapore's courts as a tool of repression (AP, 1996, April 12). In December 1996, Parliament levied fines in excess of \$36,000 against Dr Chee Soon Juan and three other SDP members, claiming that they had committed perjury and other offenses during the proceedings of a special parliamentary committee examining government health care subsidies (USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). During December 1996 and January 1997, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and 10 other PAP leaders sued Tang Liang Hong, a Workers' Party candidate in the 1997 elections, as he called them liars during election campaigns when the PAP leaders

accused him as a Chinese nationalist bigot. Following the elections, Tang fled the country (Juan, 2001). In January 1997, while on their way to meet Tang Liang Hong abroad, Mrs Tang Liang Hong and her daughter were stopped by immigration officers at the causeway exit. Mrs Tang's passport was confiscated and she was made a co-defendant in the lawsuit. Later, their assets were seized (Juan, 2001). In May 1997, a Singapore court ordered opposition leader Tang Liang Hong to pay \$5.7 million to Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and 10 other PAP leaders in the defamation lawsuit. Judge Chao Hock Tin awarded \$1 million to Mr. Goh and \$1.6 million to another senior leader, Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore acts against leader of opposition, 1997, May 30). In September 1997, JB Jeyaretnam was found guilty of defaming Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at an election rally as he allegedly told the crowd police reports had been filed against the Prime Minister and his PAP colleagues. He was ordered by Justice J. Rajendran to pay \$20,000 in damages plus legal fees. After a subsequent appeal by Mr Goh, the damages awarded were increased five-fold, to \$100,000 (Ingram, 1998). In February 1998, Tang Liang Hong was declared bankrupt by the High Court after failing to pay damages and interests owed to PAP leaders. Assets belonging to him and his wife were seized. In addition, the Singapore government charged Tang Liang Hong with thirty-three counts of tax evasion and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest during his exile (Juan, 2001). In March 1998, the Films Act was amended to ban political films and videos. The Government justified the ban as protecting politics from sensationalism, innuendo, and inaccuracy. The legislation defines a party political film as one "made by any person and directed toward any political end in Singapore" or one that contains "partisan or biased references on any political matter" (USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). In July 1998, the Government passed the Computer Misuse (Amendment) Act, the Electronic Transactions Act and the National Computer Board (Amendment) Act. Under the amended CMA, the police have got lawful access to data and encrypted material in their investigations of offenses as well as other offenses disclosed in the course of their investigations. Under the ETA, they have been given broad powers to search any computer for an offence related to the act without a warrant (USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). In September 1998, the Undesirable Publications Act was amended to include CD-ROMS, sound recordings, pictures, and computer-generated drawings, and to raise the fine for distribution or possession of banned publications. The Government also publicized the list of banned English-language publications, which is made up primarily of sexually-oriented materials, but also includes some religious and political materials (USSD Country Report, 2000, February 23). In December 1998, JB Jeyaretnam and Workers' Party were ordered by the High Court to pay ten members of a committee which organised the first Tamil Language Week in 1995, including PAP MP R. Ravindran, \$265,000 in defamatory damages plus legal costs for the 14-day trial (Margolin, 2005). On 29 December 1998 & 5 January 1999, opposition leader Dr Chee Soon Juan was jailed twice for giving two speeches at Raffles Place one on 29 December 1998 and other one on 5 January 1999 without a licence. For both convictions he was fined a total of \$3,900 but chose instead to serve two prison terms of seven and 12 days. -- Chee's colleague, Wong Hong Toy, was also imprisoned for 12 days after refusing to pay a fine for adjusting the microphone and the volume of the speaker respectively (Freedom House 2002 Country Report, n.d.). In March 1999, Dr Chee Soon Juan was fined for selling his

book, *To Be Free*, without a permit. He had pleaded not guilty to the charge as book stores and vendors had refused to sell his books out of fear of prosecution. In May 2000, Parliament passed the Political Donations Act. Apart from disallowing political organisations from receiving foreign funding, the Act also prohibits anonymous contributions of more than \$5000 in any financial year. The Home Affairs Minister has the freedom to define which civil societies are political in nature and are thus bound by the law.

2001-2005: During the years from 2001 to 2005, 29 incidents took place. In January 2001, JB Jeyaretnam was declared bankrupt after missing by one day the deadline for a S\$265,000 payment to eight PAP politicians. As a bankrupt he was effectively disqualified from the 2001 elections, thrown out of parliament and barred from practicing law. The damage award stemmed from a 1995 article in the Workers' Party newsletter that described the PAP politicians who had organized a Tamil cultural festival as "government stooges". (Freedom House 2002 Country Report, n.d.). In February 2001, the Public Entertainments and Meetings Act was revised to double the fines for holding a public talk or delivering a political speech without a police permit from \$5,000 to \$10,000. In April 2001, Parliament passed a law that allows punishment of foreign news broadcasters deemed to be "engaging in the domestic politics of Singapore." The rules are similar to those placed on the foreign print media in 1986. In August 2001, Parliament passed new laws to restrict political campaigning on the internet. According to the new laws, all political websites have to register with the authorities; non-party political websites are not allowed to campaign for any party, election surveys and exit polls are banned. In November 2001, police arrested internet critic Robert Ho Chong as he had posted articles before the general elections urging opposition candidates to enter polling stations, as did the PAP leaders in the 1997 elections (George, 2007). In May 2002, the police aborted a Labour Day rally outside the Istana State compound by arresting speakers Dr Chee Soon Juan and Gandhi Ambalam (Freedom House 2003 Country Report, n.d.). In July 2002, Dr Chee Soon Juan was charged and convicted with violation of the Public Entertainment and Meetings Act for speaking at the Speakers' Corner in February to criticize the government's enforcement of the headscarves ban in public schools. The S\$3,000 fine imposed on Chee meant that he cannot stand in a parliamentary election for 5 years (USSD Country Report, 2006, March 8). In August 2002, Bloomberg news service publicly apologized and agreed to pay S\$595,000 in damages to Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew for an internet-distributed column which had alleged that Ms Ho Ching, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's wife, was promoted to the senior position in government investment firm Temasek Holdings because of her relationship with the senior leadership (USSD Country Report, 2005, February 28). In the same month, a court ruled that there will be no trial for the defamation suits brought by PM Goh Chok Tong and SM Lee Kuan Yew against Dr Chee Soon Juan for comments Chee made during the 2001 election campaign. In a summary judgment pronounced by the registrar, Chee was found guilty of defamation (USSD Country Report, 2005, February 28). In October 2002, Dr Chee Soon Juan was charged under Public Entertainment and Meetings Act for holding an unauthorized "People Against Poverty" rally on Labour Day outside the Istana. Chee was fined \$4500 and his colleague Gandhi Ambalam was fined \$3000. Chee chose to serve a 5-week prison sentence rather than paying the fine

(Freedom House 2003 Country Report, n.d.). In November 2003, the Computer Misuse Act was amended to allow government agencies to patrol the internet and swoop down on hackers suspected of plotting to use computer keyboards as weapons of mass disruption. Violators of the Act such as website hackers can be jailed up to three years or fined up to \$10,000. An online poll showed that 70 percent of respondents felt the new laws gave the authorities too much power, and they were afraid they were being watched. In September 2004, The Economist paid S\$380,000 in damages plus legal costs to PM Lee Hsien Loong and MM Lee Kuan Yew in a lawsuit brought by them as it ran an article mentioning "a whiff of nepotism" upon the appointment of the Prime Minister's wife, Ho Ching, as chief executive of Temasek Holdings ((Tey, 2008; USSD Country Report, 2006, March 8). In January 2005, Dr Chee Soon Juan in a defamation charge was ordered by the High Court to pay \$500,000 in damages plus legal costs to MM Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong for comments made by Chee during the 2001 election campaign. (USSD Country Report, 2006, March 8). In September 2005, FinanceAsia.com, an Asian online publication, in a case issued an apology and agreed to pay an unspecified amount of damages and legal costs to PM Lee Hsien Loong, SM Goh Chok Tong and MM Lee Kuan Yew for an article about the Lee family and Temasek Holdings (USSD Country Report, 2006, March 8). In 2005, The Economist, the International Herald Tribune, the Far Eastern Economic Review, and The Wall Street Journal Asia, paid large fines or had their circulation restricted in lawsuits filed by ruling party stalwarts (Freedom House 2006 Country Report, n.d.).

Appendix 7.11. The number of incidents organised to systematically control the Opposition and media in Singapore, 1981-2005.

Year	Incidents
1980-85	3
1986-90	18
1991-95	20
1996-00	28
2000-05	29

Source: Dataset constructed by the researcher from the information in Appendix 7.10 by using methodology described in the Methodology section of this chapter under the sub-heading "Use of legal techniques on the Opposition and critiques"

Appendix 7.12 Contest in Singaporean parliament elections, 1968-2006

Year	Total seats	%Contested seats	Uncontested seats	%Contested seats	Uncontested seats
1968	58	7	51	12.068	87.931
1972	65	57	8	87.692	12.307
1976	69	53	16	76.811	23.188
1980	75	38	37	50.666	49.333
1984	79	49	30	62.025	37.974
1988	81	70	11	86.419	13.580
1991	81	40	41	49.382	50.617
1997	83	36	47	43.373	56.626
2001	84	29	55	34.523	65.476
2006	84	47	37	55.952	44.047

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union. (n.d.); Singapore Elections. (n.d.).

Appendix 8.1. Democratisation (Freedom) Vs. GDP per capita in US dollars, media status and national political divide,1981-2005

Country	Year	Freedom	GDP (in 100 US dollars)	Media	Divide
BGD	1981	9	2.09	2	2
BGD	1982	6	1.88	2	2
BGD	1983	5	1.99	2	2
BGD	1984	5	2.16	2	2
BGD	1985	6	2.18	2	2
BGD	1986	7	2.27	2	2
BGD	1987	7	2.41	2	2
BGD	1988	7	2.54	2	2
BGD	1989	8	2.73	3	2
BGD	1990	6	2.82	3	2
BGD	1991	11	2.82	1	1
BGD	1992	11	2.72	2	2
BGD	1993	10	2.83	2	2
BGD	1994	10	3.07	2	2
BGD	1995	9	3.27	2	2
BGD	1996	10	3.35	2	2
BGD	1997	10	3.47	2	2
BGD	1998	10	3.49	2	2
BGD	1999	9	3.53	2	2
BGD	2000	9	3.49	2	2
BGD	2001	8	3.58	3	2
BGD	2002	9	3.44	2	2
BGD	2003	8	3.88	3	2
BGD	2004	8	4.11	3	2
BGD	2005	8	4.22	3	2

Sources: Democratisation (Freedom) data from Freedom in the World (n.d.); GDP data from UN Stat (n.d.); Media data from Freedom of the Press (n.d.); and national political divide dataset is constructed by this researcher.

Appendix 8.2. Position of political parties in the Pakistan National Assembly elections 1970 in East Pakistan

Party	% votes parties got
Awami League	75.11
National Awami League (pro-Moscow)	2.06
Pakistan Democratic Party	2.81
Muslim League (Convention)	2.81
Muslim League (Council)	1.6
Muslim League (Qaium)	1.07
Jamaat-e Islami	6.07
Jamaat-e Ulama-e-Islam	0.92
Jamiat o Nejam-e-Islam	2.83
Other parties*	1.25
Independents	3.47

*Other parties included National Awami Party (Bhasani), Pakistan Jatiya League, Krishak-Shramik Party, Ganamukti Party, Pakistan National Congress and Islami Ganatantri Dal.

Source: Pakistan Election Commission (1972) (as cited in Huq, 1994).

Appendix 8.3. Previous party identity of Parliament Members (MPs) belonging to BNP, 1981

Previous party identity	Number of MPs	% MPs
Bangladesh Muslim League	40	16
National Awami Party (Bhasani)	37	15
Awami League	22	9
United Peoples Party	8	3
Democratic League	5	2
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal	3	1
National Awami Party (Mozaffar)	2	1
Other political parties*	15	6
Student organizations**	15	6
Non-party personalities***	100	40
Unknown	3	1
Total	20	100

* Other political parties included National League, Islamic Democratic League, Pakistan Democratic Party and Peasant-Labour Party

** Student organisations which had relationship with Awami League, Jatiya Samajtantrik Da and Communist Party of Bangladesh

***Many of non-party personalities were sympathetic to Mushlim League

Source: Bangladesh Parliament (1981); and Harun 1979 (as cited in Huq, 1994).

Appendix 8.4. Won Parliament seats by parties in elections , 1991-2001

Party	Election 1991	Election 1996	Election 2001
Bangladesh Awami League (BAL)	88	146	62
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)	140	116	199
Bangladesh Krisak-Shramik Awami League	5
Jamaat-e Islami Bangladesh (JI)	18	3	17
Jatiya Party-Ershad (JP-Ershad)	35	32	14
Communist Party of Bangladesh	5
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Shiraz)	1
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Rab)	1
Workers Party	1
National Awami Party (Mozaffar)	1
Ganatantri Party	1
Others including independents	5	2	8
Total	300	300	300

Source: Bangladesh Election Commission

Appendix 8.5. Non-party care taker government (as per Bangladesh Constitution, Chapter IIA)

Article 58B. Non-Party Care-taker Government

(1) There shall be a Non-Party Care-taker Government during the period from the date on which the Chief Adviser of such government enters upon office after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved by reason of expiration of its term till the date on which a new Prime Minister enters upon his office after the constitution of Parliament.

(2) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall be collectively responsible to the President.

(3) The executive power of the Republic shall, during the period mentioned in clause (1), be exercised, subject to the provisions of article 58D(1), in accordance with this Constitution, by or on the authority of the Chief Adviser and shall be exercised by him in accordance with the advice of the Non-Party Care-taker Government.

(4) The provisions of article 55(4), (5) and (6) shall (with the necessary adaptations) apply to similar matters during the period mentioned in clause (1).

Article 58C. Composition of the Non-Party Care-taker Government, appointment of Advisers, etc.

(1) Non-Party Care-taker Government shall consist of the Chief Adviser at its head and not more than ten other Advisors, all of whom shall be appointed by the President.

(2) The Chief Adviser and other Advisors shall be appointed within fifteen days after Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved, and during the period between the date on which Parliament is dissolved or stands dissolved and the date on which the Chief Adviser is appointed, the Prime Minister and his cabinet who were in office immediately before Parliament was dissolved or stood dissolved shall continue to hold office as such.

(3) The President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired last and who is qualified to be appointed as an Adviser under this article:

Provided that if such retired Chief Justice is not available or is not willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Chief Justices of Bangladesh retired next before the last retired Chief Justice.

(4) If no retired Chief Justice is available or willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Judges of the Appellate Division retired last and who is qualified to be appointed as an Adviser under this article:

Provided that if such retired Judge is not available or is not willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall appoint as Chief Adviser the person who among the retired Judges of the Appellate Division retired next before the last such retired Judge.

(5) If no retired judge of the Appellate Division is available or willing to hold the office of Chief Adviser, the President shall, after consultation, as far as practicable, with the major political parties, appoint the Chief Adviser from among citizens of Bangladesh who are qualified to be appointed as Advisors under this article.

(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, if the provisions of clauses (3), (4) and (5) cannot be given effect to, the President shall assume the functions of the Chief Adviser of the Non-Party Care-taker Government in addition to his own functions under this Constitution.

(7) The President shall appoint Advisors from among the persons who are-

qualified for election as members of parliament;

not members of any political party or of any organisation associated with or affiliated to any political party;

not, and have agreed in writing not to be, candidates for the ensuing election of members of parliament;

not over seventy-two years of age.

(8) The Advisors shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Chief Adviser.

(9) The Chief Adviser or an Adviser may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the President.

(10) The Chief Adviser or an Adviser shall cease to be Chief Adviser or Adviser if he is disqualified to be appointed as such under this article.

(11) The Chief Adviser shall have the status, and shall be entitled to the remuneration and privileges, of a Prime Minister and an Adviser shall have the status, and shall be entitled to the remuneration and privileges, of a Minister.

(12) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall stand dissolved on the date on which the prime Minister enters upon his office after the constitution of new parliament.

Article 58D. Functions of Non-Party Care-taker Government

(1) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall discharge its functions as an interim government and shall carry on the routine functions of such government with the aid and assistance of persons in the services of the Republic; and, except in the case of necessity for the discharge of such functions its shall not make any policy decision.

(2) The Non-Party Care-taker Government shall give to the Election Commission all possible aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general election of members of parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially.

Article 58E. Certain provisions of the Constitution to remain ineffective

Notwithstanding anything contained in articles 48(3), 141A(1) and 141C(1) of the Constitution, during the period the Non-Party Care-taker government is functioning, provisions in the constitution requiring the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister or upon his prior counter-signature shall be ineffective."

Source: BD Constitution (<http://www.pmo.gov.bd/constitution/>)

Appendix 8.6. Main attributes of four major political parties

Attributes	BAL	BNP	JP	JI
Religion-politics relationship	Secular	Pro-Islamic	Pro-Islamic	Islamic
Role during liberation war	Pioneer	Not born	Not born	Anti-liberation
Focus of national identity	Bengali ethnicity	Bangladesh citizenship	Bangladesh citizenship	Bangladesh citizenship
Mujib/Zia as top national leader	Pro-Mujib, anti-Zia	Pro-Zia, anti-Mujib	Anti-Mujib
Relationship with neighbouring countries	Pro-Indian but anti-Pakistan	Pro-Pakistan and Middle-East but anti-Indian	Pro-Pakistan but Middle-East but anti-Indian	Pro-Pakistan but Middle-East but anti-Indian
Foreign policy	Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)	Islamic solidarity and NAM	Islamic solidarity and NAM	Islamic solidarity
Economic policy	Laissez-fair	Free economy	Free economy	Islamic economic system
Political ideologies	Pro-leftist and progressive	Pro-rightist with Islamic spirit	Pro-rightist with Islamic spirit	Islamic political system

Sources of information and ideas: Huq, 1994; Hossain, 2001.

Appendix 8.7. Main attributes of pro-BAL forces parties

Parties	Programme	Religion	Top national leader	National identity	Neighbouring friend, foe
Communist Party of Bangladesh	Communism	Secular	Sheik Mujib	Bengali	Pro-India, ant-Pakistan
Ganatantri Party	Communism	Secular	Sheik Mujib	Bengali	Pro-India, ant-Pakistan
Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal	Communism	Secular		Bengali	Ant-Pakistan
National Awami Party (Mozaffar)	Communism	Secular	Sheik Mujib	Bengali	Pro-India, ant-Pakistan
Workers Party	Communism	Secular		Bengali	Ant-Pakistan

Sources of information and ideas: Huq, 1994;

Appendix 8.8. Amendment to the constitution (as per Bangladesh constitution articles)

142. Power to amend 91* * any provision of the Constitution

90[(1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution-

(a) any provision thereof may by 92[amended by way of addition, alteration, substitution or repeal] by Act of Parliament:

Provided that-

(i) no Bill for such amendment 91* * shall be allowed to proceed unless the long title thereof expressly states that it will amend 91* * a provision of the Constitution;

(ii) no such Bill shall be presented to the President for assent unless it is passed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number of members of Parliament;

(b) when a Bill passed as aforesaid is presented to the President for his assent he shall, within the period of seven days after the Bill is presented to him assent to the Bill, and if he fails so to do he shall be deemed to have assented to it on the expiration of that period.

93[(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), when a Bill, passed as aforesaid,, which provides for the amendment of the Preamble or any provisions of articles 8, 48 94[Or] 56 95* * * or this article, is presented to the President for assent, the President, shall within the period of seven days, after the Bill is presented to him, cause to be referred to a referendum the question whether the Bill should or should not be assented to.

(1B) A referendum under this article shall be conducted by the Election Commission, within such period and in such manner as may be provided by law, amongst the person enrolled on the electoral roll prepared for the purpose of election to 96[Parliament].

(1C) On the day on which the result of the referendum conducted in relation to a Bill under this article is declared, the President shall be deemed to have-

(a) assented to the Bill, if the majority of the total votes cast are in favour of the Bill being assented to; or

(b) Withheld assent therefrom, if the majority of the total votes cast are not in favour of the Bill being assented to.]

97[1D) Nothing in clause (1C) shall be deemed to be an expression of confidence or no-confidence in the Cabinet or Parliament]

98[(2) Nothing in article 26 shall apply to any amendment made under this article.]

Source: BD Constitution (<http://www.pmo.gov.bd/constitution/>)