CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY: AN OVERALL VIEW

Shao-Chuan Leng

School of Law
University of Maryland
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies

General Editor: Hungdah Chiu
Executive Editor: Mitchell A. Silk
Managing Editor: Shirley Lay

Editorial Advisory Board
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, Lafayette College
Professor James Hsiung, New York University
Dr. Lih-wu Han, Political Science Association of the Republic of China
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Professor Choon-ho Park, College of Law and East Asian Law of the Sea Institute, Korea University, Republic of Korea

Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society
All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law,
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion contained therein.

Subscription is US $10.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu.

Price for single copy of this issue: US $2.00

ISSN 0730-0107

© Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies
CHINA'S NUCLEAR POLICY: AN OVERALL VIEW*

Shao-chuan Leng**

To date, the People's Republic of China still suffers from a distinct military inferiority in relation to the superpowers. Nevertheless, its modest but growing nuclear-missile capabilities do constitute an important factor in global strategic balance and arms control efforts.

This paper proposes to analyze China's nuclear policy and its international implications. It will begin with an examination of China's nuclear capability and strategic doctrine and then will follow with a discussion of the Chinese position toward arms control and disarmament (ACD), particularly Beijing's recent role in ACD negotiations.

DEVELOPMENT OF A NUCLEAR DETERRENT

It is a well-known fact that the PRC under Mao Zedong made an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weapons for security and prestige reasons, despite his frequent denunciation of the atomic bomb as a mere "paper tiger." A recent press report reveals how deeply the Chinese pride was hurt by the "Soviet betrayal" in 1959 concerning the sharing of atomic secrets. According to an article in the Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), China gave its first atomic bomb the code name of "596" to remember the "shameful" June of 1959 when the "perfidious" Russians tore up a 1957 agreement to aid China in making the A-bomb and withdraw from China their specialists including experts in atomic energy. Prompted by the Soviet

---

* This is a revision of the following two papers: one presented to the 77th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1981, and the other presented to the 24th Annual Meeting of the American Association for Chinese Studies, November 1982.

** Doherty Professor of Government and Chairman for the Committee on Asian Studies, University of Virginia.

action, the Chinese went ahead to research and detonate their first atomic bomb successfully on October 16, 1964, all on their own effort. "Our ancient nation which has long been looked down upon by some foreigners," said a commentary of the Liberation Army Daily, "has finally accomplished something that our forefathers were unable to do and that some foreigners thought only they themselves could accomplish."

China's first nuclear device on October 14, 1964 was a 20 kiloton (KT) atomic bomb. On June 17, 1967 the PRC successfully tested a 3 megaton (MT) range hydrogen bomb. Thus China showed "a first-rate research, development, and production capability" by making the transition from fission to fusion in less than three years. A Chinese author took pride in pointing out that it took 7, 5, and 8 years respectively for the United States, England, and France to achieve the same transition. Since 1967 more than 20 nuclear tests have been conducted by the PRC, ranging from tactical weapons to hydrogen bombs. The latest blast, amounting to between 200 KT and 1 MT, was held on October 17, 1980. All told, China now has stockpiles of several hundred fission and fusion weapons.

Since April 1970 the PRC has launched twelve space satellites. It sent into orbit a cluster of three satellites by a single rocket on September 20, 1981. China's twelfth satellite, launched on September 4, 1982, was viewed as an indication that the PRC has probably perfected both solid and liquid fuel technology for rocket engines. According to Zhang Jun, Chinese Minister of Astronautics Industry, China is developing a new type of three-stage liquid-fuelled rocket

---


5. For China's nuclear tests, see Appendix. Events up until the early 1970s may be found in one of many articles by Alice Langley Hsieh. See her "China's Nuclear-Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental," China Quarterly, No. 45, (January-March 1971), pp. 85-91.


7. For early developments, see Hsieh. "Regional," supra note 5, pp. 91-94.

8. UPI, Beijing, September 22, 1981.

to launch a geo-stationary satellite and a big near-earth orbital satellite in the days to come.\textsuperscript{10}

In terms of its strategic missiles deployed, China possesses about 50 medium-range ballistic missiles, MRBM's (CSS-1), with a range of 1,100 km, 65-85 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, IRBM's (CSS-2), with a range of 2,700 to 5,600 km, 4 multi-stage intercontinental ballistic missiles, ICBM's (CSS-3), with a limited range of 6,000-7,000 km, and 4 full-range ICBM's (CSS-4), with a range of 13,000 km.\textsuperscript{11} The successful test of a full-range ICBM in May 1980 demonstrated the impressive progress of the Chinese nuclear-missile program and the potential of Chinese missiles to reach any site in the Soviet Union as well as the West Coast of the United States.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition, China has some 90 TU-16 medium strategic bombers with a radius of action up to 3,000 km. It also test-fired in October 1982 its first submarine-launched missile from a nuclear-powered submarine, making the PRC only the fifth country to have successfully developed an SLBM.\textsuperscript{13}

On balance, the Chinese nuclear force has been improving steadily but its value as a viable deterrent is still arguable. Although widely dispersed, China's missiles currently operational are mainly liquid-fuelled, thus vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. In order to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear deterrent, Beijing can be expected to continue an effort to develop a mobile land-based, seaborne or airborne strategic force.

**CHINA'S CHANGING STRATEGIC DOCTRINE**

The official doctrine that has shaped the PRC's military strategy and tactics in the last three decades is Mao's doctrine of "people's
war." With a special emphasis on political indoctrination and mobilization of the masses, it seeks to compensate for China's inferiority in weaponry by maximum use of manpower and revolutionary tactics. As a defense plan against a technologically superior enemy, it advocates a protracted war waged by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with support of some 100 million militia forces to overwhelm the invader.

Thus far, Beijing has not made public any well-defined nuclear strategy but appears to have adopted the concept of minimum deterrence.


the Chinese have pursued the policy of continuing the development of a nuclear deterrent on the one hand, and emphasizing the defensive strategy of "people's war" on the other. They may expect that the announced determination to fight protracted defensive war, along with China's prudent external posture and pledge not to use the bomb first, will minimize the danger of a preventive attack. In fact, Beijing's establishment of an American connection and its current efforts to form an international united front against "hegemonism" are also part of its overall strategy to improve national security and to gain time for further nuclear development.16

In the context of China's drive toward modernization, there seems to be a consensus among the Chinese elite on the need to modernize China's armed forces. Nevertheless, a debate is continuing about the pace, nature, and means of this modernization. Illustrative is the fact that despite the recent reorganization of leadership structure the plan to restore military ranks is yet to be implemented. Still, the move is under way in the PRC to upgrade its national defense.17

While continuing to pay lip service to the concept of "people's war," Chinese leaders now call for the modernization of strategy and weapons to meet the changing nature of warfare. "In the present stage in which science and technology is developing by leaps and bounds," Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian wrote in 1978, "we shall be the subject to attack if we do not master all the weapons as well as the struggle tactics and methods which the enemy already possesses or may possess."18 In an article written in 1981, the late Deputy

---

Footnotes:


Chief of Staff of the PLA Yang Yong described Mao Zedong’s military though as still the guideline for army building and warfare today. It must be studied, however, with a scientific attitude of “seeking truth from facts” and “with the realities of our army and the demands of modern warfare in mind.” Only by scientifically drawing upon both Chinese and foreign experiences and by continuously seeking progress and improvement, he said, can the Chinese army be sure of success in its modernization and in any future war against aggression.19

In a commentary dated January 15, 1983, the Liberation Army Daily described the strategic policy of the PLA as one of “active defense.” Since military campaigns against Vietnam, the commentary said, the PLA has “streamlined its training procedures, focusing on organization of different services to fight in coordination under modern conditions.” It also “has paid particular attention to foreign armies and modern wars, examined the requirement of actual combat, and outlined tactics to defeat an army with superior equipment.”20

The PLA’s move in the direction of modernization and of revising its strategy and tactics was underscored by recent military exercises. In 1981 a large-scale coordinated combat exercise took place in North China (near Zhangjiakou), involving ground and air forces.21 In 1982 a joint PLA maneuver was conducted in Ningxia, involving the assumed use of tactical nuclear weapons.22

As a part of the overall picture, the Chinese appear to be starting the reassessment of their strategic thinking in the nuclear field. Beijing’s successful test of a full-range ICBM in May 1980, for instance, has been viewed by some observers as a sign that the Chinese strategy is moving from a minimum deterrence against one superpower to a more balanced two-pronged deterrence policy.23 To be

China's Nuclear Policy

Sure, the shift may not be so dramatic or imminent, for the Chinese have continued to picture the ICBM test as an important contribution to the cause of "international struggle against hegemonism." However, the development of Chinese ICBM force will doubtless enable Beijing to adopt a more flexible and independent strategic posture relative to Washington's policy. In this regard, there is a striking similarity between Chinese and French positions. Comparable to France in nuclear capability, the PRC is showing increasing interest in the complexities of nuclear strategy in general and the French decision to manufacture the neutron bomb and the role of tactical nuclear weapons in particular. Commenting on the French situation, the Beijing Review says:

France has spent some 53,600 million U.S. dollars since 1960 to develop nuclear arms. Still, compared to the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, France's is rather insignificant and it is this that has led French military experts to redesign their national defense to current realities. Here the research and manufacture of the neutron bomb figures prominently.

The implications of Chinese current interest in tactical nuclear weapons, the simulated use of which was reported in the 1982 Ningxia military exercise, suggest that notwithstanding its "no-first-use" pledge, the PRC may conceivably contemplate the compelled use of tactical nuclear weapons against superior invading forces in the name of self-defense.

Chinese Policy Toward Arms Control and Disarmament

The PRC's perception of security interest and the international balance of force has conditioned its stand on ACD issues. For years the Chinese have consistently advocated total nuclear disarmament and opposed the Superpowers' efforts to limited arms control. The


27. Shao-chuan Leng, "Arms Control and Disarmament in Chinese Global Policy,"
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, for example, have been denounced by Beijing as a "sham." According to Chinese spokesmen, the SALT agreements have actually permitted a fierce nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union and particularly enabled the latter to speed up the development of new and even more sophisticated strategic weapons.28

China has been and remains opposed to the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the proposed comprehensive test ban treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Time and again, the Chinese have argued that these treaties are deceptive traps designed by the superpowers to disarm non-nuclear powers and that neither China nor other "peace-loving" countries should accept their restrictions.29 Chinese development of nuclear weapons has been justified as necessary for self-defense and the elimination of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear duopoly and blackmail. In every announcement of Chinese nuclear testing since 1964, the PRC has repeated the pledge that "it will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons" and has challenged the other nuclear powers, especially the superpowers, to do the same.30

The PRC has also refused to join the other superpower-supported agreements such as the Outer Space Treaty, the Sea-Bed Treeties, the Convention Banning Biological Warfare, and the Convention on Environmental Warfare, even though it has no quarrel with the basic ideas of these treaties and has often found its negative stand contrary to the wishes of the majority in the UN General Assembly.31 By the same token, Beijing has objected to the convening of a world disarmament conference repeatedly proposed by the Soviet Union unless certain conditions are met. First, the prerequisites for the conference are a no-first-use pledge by all nuclear countries, particularly by the United States and the Soviet Union, and the withdrawal by the superpowers of all their armed forces, including their nuclear missile forces, from abroad. Second, the aim of the

30. For the Chinese government's statement announcing the first nuclear detonation on October 16, 1964, see Break the Nuclear Monopoly, Eliminate Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), pp. 1-5.
31. Leng, supra note 27, pp. 169, 179.
conference should be the complete prohibition and thorough de­
struction of nuclear weapons. According to the report of a UN Ad
Hoc Committee in 1982, China and France continued to hold the
view that the convening of any world disarmament conference
"would serve no practical purpose in the present international polit­
ical climate." 

Despite China's opposition to the superpower-sponsored arms
control measures, it has been positive in approaching some other
ACD matters. The PRC has signed the treaty of Tlateloco to honor
the Latin American nuclear-free zone. It is on record in favor of the
establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones in Asia, the Pa­
cific, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Central
Europe, and Africa. In spite of their public opposition to the NPT,
the Chinese have tacitly followed a nonproliferation policy. There is
no evidence that China has aided any country in nuclear develop­
ment. Recent reports about China's "nuclear trade" with South
Africa and Pakistan's "planned nuclear tests on Chinese territory"
have been strongly denied by Beijing and Islamabad respectively.
All things considered, the PRC's interests cannot conceivably be
served by nuclear proliferation, especially if Taiwan and South Ko­
rea acquire nuclear weapons.

In an apparent attempt to woo Third World countries, Beijing
has shown in recent years more flexibility in its ACD posture. This
was evidenced by the Chinese participation in the Tenth Special Ses­
tion of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978 at the
initiative of the nonaligned countries. The Special Session revital­
ized as the deliberative body on ACD issues the Disarmament Com­
misson to be composed of all UN members. It also replaced the
Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) with
an enlarged Committee on Disarmament (CD) as the new negotiat­
ing body for global disarmament, composed of all five nuclear states
and 35 non-nuclear stages.

32. Speech by Chiao Kuan-hua at the Plenary Meeting of the 28th Session of the UN
General Assembly, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973, p. 24; "Speech by Huang
Hua, Chairman of Chinese Delegation," Peking Review, Vol. 20, No. 41 (October 7,
1977), p. 39; "Varying Degrees of Support for World Disarmament Conference Re­
34. Leng, supra note 27, pp. 170-174.
supra note 27, pp. 235-236.
To the UN Disarmament Commission, the Chinese delegation put forward in May 1979 a "comprehensive programme of disarmament." One novel feature of the Chinese plan was the call for superpowers to begin immediately reducing and destroying their nuclear armaments by stages:

When substantial progress has been made in the destruction of their nuclear weapons, thus closing the huge gap between their nuclear arsenals and those of the other nuclear states to the satisfaction of the majority of states, the other nuclear states shall then join them in negotiation for the total destruction of nuclear weapons.

Departing from China's past policy, the present plan also attached equal importance to the reduction of conventional armaments and asked the Soviet Union and the United States to be the first to greatly reduce their conventional arsenals. Again only "when substantial progress has been made in this regard, the other militarily significant states shall join them in reducing conventional armaments according to reasonable ratios."

A number of other points presented in the Chinese programme were obviously designed to appeal to the Third World. The following may be cited as examples. The actual process of disarmament "should benefit the economic and social development of states." No denuclearization agreement should deprive non-nuclear states of "their right to use nuclear energy and develop their nuclear industries for peaceful purposes." The organization and procedures of the disarmament machinery "should be free from superpower manipulation and control and should fully reflect the demands and wishes of all states in the world." The role of the United Nations in disarmament was given a special endorsement by the Chinese plan:

The UN General Assembly shall be kept informed of progress in all bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. All parties to disarmament negotiations should earnestly consider and respect the recommendations and calls made by the General Assembly.

Finally, the Chinese plan included the total prohibition and destruction of all chemical and biological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and a reiteration of Beijing's previous proposals for the establishment of nuclear-free zones, the withdrawal of all foreign troops, the dismantling of foreign military bases, and the undertaking by all nuclear powers, particularly the Soviet Union and the United States, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear states. In June 1982 Huang Hua, China's Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, expounded the PRC position on the disarmament issue in a speech before the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament. He blamed the superpowers for the lack of any real progress in disarmament since 1978, pointing out that they "are not all sincere about disarmament and have instead stepped up arms expansion." He then reiterated several points China had made before, i.e., the superpowers must reduce their arms first, conventional and nuclear disarmament should be carried out simultaneously, all states should participate in disarmament negotiations on an equal footing, etc.

Four measures were outlined in the disarmament proposal Huang and his delegation presented to the UN General Assembly. First, all nuclear states should reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Pending this, they should undertake unconditionally not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. Second, the Soviet Union and the United States should stop testing, improving, or manufacturing nuclear weapons and reduce by 50 percent all types of their nuclear weapons and means of delivery. Third, to move towards conventional disarmament at the same time, all countries should undertake not to use conventional forces for armed intervention or aggression and must withdraw troops from foreign soil immediately. The superpowers again should take the lead in substantially reducing their conventional forces. Only after this would China and other major powers join in conventional disarmament. Fourth, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited.

In spite of repeating many of China's old themes, the 1982 proposal nonetheless contained something new. For the first time the PRC committed itself to engage in actual nuclear arms control arrangements after a 50 percent nuclear arms reduction by the Soviet Union and the United States. China also proposed an international

---

40. For the text, see *Beijing Review*, Vol. 25, No. 28 (July 12, 1982), p. 11.
verification group be established to monitor the implementation of disarmament measures and to report to the UN General Assembly.\footnote{Ibid.}

There have been other manifestations in recent years of Beijing's increasingly active role in ACD matters. Early in 1980 the PRC participated for the first time, as a regular member, in the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Chinese delegates there have continued to expound China's well-known stand on a number of ACD issues and to blame the superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, for intensifying international tensions and creating obstacles for disarmament negotiations.\footnote{UN Doc. CD/PV. 105 (February 12, 1981), pp. 17-20; XINHUA, Geneva, August 4, 1981.} Since 1980 the PRC has also joined the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space. As said in its national paper, "China is ready to play an active role in this international organization, and, together with other countries, will strive to make a continuing contribution to the exploration and peaceful use of outer space."\footnote{UN Doc. A/CONF. 101/AB/13 (June 16, 1981), p. 3.} In both the Committee on Disarmament and the Legal Sub-committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, Chinese representatives have stressed the need for adopting measures to prevent the militarization of outer space, including elaborating international law on the issue.\footnote{The China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), p. 358.}

Even more significantly, the PRC lately is making a noticeable shift from its strong objection to any inspection of Chinese nuclear facilities by foreign powers or international groups like the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to both Chinese and American sources, good progress has been made between Beijing and Washington over a cooperation agreement in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.\footnote{XINHUA, Washington, July 14, 1983; Don Oberdorfer, "Arms Sale of $250 Million Set for Taiwan," The Washington Post, July 16, 1983, p. A15.} Under such an agreement inspection would be required by American law to ensure that nuclear material and high technology exported to China from the U.S. is used solely for civilian purposes. Furthermore, the PRC is currently in the process of entering negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency to discuss China's entry into this UN affiliated body whose purpose is to develop peaceful use of the atom and to prevent its diversion into military channels. Along with this, Beijing is also reportedly prepared to take other steps to comply with international norms in...
the nuclear area.\textsuperscript{46}

While continuing to abstain from voting on UN resolutions for stopping nuclear tests,\textsuperscript{47} the PRC has been showing an increasing interest in the worldwide anti-nuclear, peace movement. Speaking before the UN General Assembly in 1982, Huang Hua said,

In recent years the people of Europe, Japan, the United States and elsewhere have launched a mass movement against the nuclear arms race of the two superpowers and for preventing nuclear war. We fully understand and sympathize with their concern for peace and for the prevention of war.\textsuperscript{48}

Acknowledging the presence of divergent and complex forces behind the peace and anti-nuclear movement, a \textit{Hongqi} (Red Flag) author nevertheless contended in a 1983 article that "on the whole, the mass movement reflects the people's just desire for peace and resentment against war, with their main efforts directed at the United States and the Soviet Union who are responsible for intensifying the arms race."\textsuperscript{49}

CONCLUSION

As noted in the preceding pages, China's nuclear policy regarding both weapon development and arms control has consistently aimed at the improvement of its unfavorable position in the existing military balance. Its current strategic imperative remains to be the deterrence of the Soviet Union through individual and joint international efforts.

To some observers, Beijing's disarmament plan makes good sense in the context of its nuclear position.\textsuperscript{50} To others, certain Chinese ACD propositions appear self-righteous and contradictory. Cited as an example for criticism is Beijing's contention that Chinese nuclear weapons work toward peace, while those of the superpowers, particularly the Soviet Union, work toward war.\textsuperscript{51}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{51} Kim, \textit{supra} note 37, p. 230.
\end{flushright}
Be that as it may, the present trend indicates that the Chinese are showing a greater interest in ACD matters while continuing the drive for a credible nuclear deterrent. Given its growing strategic capability and increasing interactions with the Third World countries, before too long the PRC may conceivably ease or abandon its opposition to the superpower-sponsored but UN-supported arms control measures and become actively as well as seriously engaged in major international ACD negotiations. After all, confronted with economic and technological constraints, the Chinese should know that their long-term interest lies not in a costly and dangerous arms race but in staged and realistic denuclearization leading to an eventual sharp reduction if not elimination of nuclear weapons by all powers. Much, however, still depends upon the superpowers to lead the way in showing bold statesmanship in the global politics of disarmaments.
### CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Delivery System</th>
<th>Test Site</th>
<th>Warhead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/16/64</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Ground (tower)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/14/65</td>
<td>40KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-4)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5/09/66</td>
<td>300KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/66</td>
<td>30KT</td>
<td>Missile (SS-4 IRBM) to Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/28/66</td>
<td>500KT</td>
<td>Ground (tower)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17/67</td>
<td>3MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/24/67</td>
<td>25KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>N.A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/27/68</td>
<td>3MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/22/69</td>
<td>25KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/29/69</td>
<td>3MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/70</td>
<td>3MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/18/71</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Ground (tower)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/07/72</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Ground (tower)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/18/72</td>
<td>200KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Atomic warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/27/73</td>
<td>2MT+</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/17/74</td>
<td>500MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/27/75</td>
<td>200KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/23/76</td>
<td>200KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/26/76</td>
<td>200KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/17/76</td>
<td>200KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/17/76</td>
<td>4MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/17/77</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/15/78</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Ground (tower)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/14/78</td>
<td>50KT</td>
<td>Underground</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Fission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/14/78</td>
<td>20KT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Tactical weapon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/16/80</td>
<td>1MT</td>
<td>Air (TU-16)</td>
<td>Lop Nor</td>
<td>Thermonuclear warhead</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  


### Occasional Papers/Reprints Series
#### in Contemporary Asian Studies

500 West Baltimore Street  
Baltimore, MD. 21201  
U.S.A.  
(301) 528-3870

#### 1977 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>32 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu)</td>
<td>45 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van der Kroef)</td>
<td>31 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows)</td>
<td>22 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh)</td>
<td>148 pp. Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook Hong)</td>
<td>80 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser)</td>
<td>22 pp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 8 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-07-3
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp. $1.00

No. 9 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-08-1
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp. $3.00

No. 10 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-09-X
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment — Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David Simon) 217 pp. Index $5.00

No. 11 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-10-3

No. 12 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-11-1

1978 Series

No. 1 - 1978 (13)
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-12-X
Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. Misra) 31 pp. $1.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-13-8
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, with contributions by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung and James W. Morley) 207 pp. Index $3.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-14-6
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh) 227 pp. Index $3.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)
ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-15-4
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp. $1.00
No. 5 - 1978 (17)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-16-2
The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp.  $1.00

No. 6 - 1978 (18)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-17-0
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.  $1.00

A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp.  $2.00

No. 8 - 1978 (20)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-19-7
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp.  $2.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-20-0
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 pp. Index  $2.00

1979 Series

No. 1 - 1979 (22)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-21-9
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah Chiu) 54 pp.  $2.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-22-7
Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chinese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp.  $2.00

The Dragon and the Eagle — A Study of U.S.-People's Republic of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 pp.  $3.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-24-3
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William Tay) 108 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-25-1
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp.  $2.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-26-X
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index  $3.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-27-8</td>
<td>U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies (Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-28-6</td>
<td>China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-29-4</td>
<td>The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy)</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-31-6</td>
<td>Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-33-2</td>
<td>Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>$1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-34-0</td>
<td>China's New Criminal &amp; Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-35-9</td>
<td>China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan &amp; Ka-che Yip)</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1981 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year (Issue)</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1981 (38)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-37-5</td>
<td>Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1981 (39)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-38-3</td>
<td>Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1981 (40)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-39-1</td>
<td>Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China (Edited by James C. Hsiung)</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1981 (41)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-40-5</td>
<td>China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1981 (42)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-41-3</td>
<td>China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1981 (43)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-42-1</td>
<td>Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1981 (44)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-43-X</td>
<td>Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1981 (45)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-44-8</td>
<td>Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen)</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1982 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year (Issue)</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1982 (46)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-45-6</td>
<td>Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1982 (47)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-46-4</td>
<td>Kampuchea, The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Van der Kroef)</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 - 1982 (49)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-48-0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan's Security and United States Policy: Executive and Congressional Strategies (Michael S. Frost) 39 pp.</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1982 (50)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-49-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Revolution in Japanese Law, Society and Politics (Lawrence W. Beer) 35 pp.</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 6 - 1982 (51)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-50-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies, 1981-1982 (Edited by David Salem, Roy Werner and Lyushen Shen) 67 pp.</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 7 - 1982 (52)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-51-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Law and Justice: Trends Over Three Decades (Hungdah Chiu) 39 pp.</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 8 - 1982 (53)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-52-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: A Constitutional Dilemma (Theodore McNelly) 16 pp.</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1983 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essays on Sun Yat-sen and the Economic Development of Taiwan (Maria Hsia Chang and A. James Gregor) 60 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Revised edition) (Parris H. Chang) 48 pp.</td>
<td>$2.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 3 - 1983 (56)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-55-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media-Coverage on Taiwan in The People's Republic of China (Jörg-M. Rudolph) 77 pp.</td>
<td>$3.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 1983 (57)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-56-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transit Problems of Three Asian Land-locked Countries: Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos (Martin Ira Glassner) 55 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1983 (58)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-57-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China's War Against Vietnam, 1979: A Military Analysis (King C. Chen) 33 pp.</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The People's Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control (David Salem) 325 pp. Index</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View (Shao-chuan Leng) 18 pp. $2.00

The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress (Hung-mao Tien) 30 pp. $3.00

Trouble Over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Ying-jeou Ma) 300 pp. Index $10.00 (Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and Politics Series, No. 4 ISBN 0-942182-63-4 $15.00)
MARYLAND STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW AND
POLITICS SERIES

(The following books are published under the auspices or co-aus­pices of the East Asian Legal Studies Program of the University of Maryland School of Law. The views expressed in each book reflect only those of the author. All books published in hard cover edition.)


Forthcoming


* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc., 500 West Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland 21201. (Tel. (301) 528-3870).
ORDER FORM
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A.

Check One:
☐ Please Send:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS:
Starting issue ________

Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00 for overseas.)

My check of U.S. $ _________ is enclosed ________ copy(s) of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request billing before making payment) (Make check payable to OPRSCAS)

Please send book to:
Name/Corp./Library:
Address: (Please include zip code)