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Poverty, Ideology and Terrorism: The STAM Bond

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Poverty, Ideology and Terrorism: The STAM Bond

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This article focuses on the role of ideology in the decision of people who are not from societies' worst-off socioeconomic groups to join a left-wing terrorist organization. Taking up the sociological perspective of Max Weber, Clifford Geertz, and Raymond Boudon, the author introduces the concept of the "terrorist of the first hour" and considers ideology as a type of social bond. The concept of ideology is here broken down into four dimensions: Social, Temporal, Affective, and Moral (STAM bond). This article also presents data on the ages, sex, educational level, and occupation of the Italian people arrested (2,730) or convicted (528) for crimes of terrorism from 1970 to 2011. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice.[1]

Krueger's Analysis and the Case of Italian Terrorists

How important is ideology in the choice of men and women who do not come from the poorest layers of society to join a terrorist group? Can sacrifice,[2] the search for meaning,[3] and existential anxiety,[4] be more important than hunger and lack of education?

After analyzing data from the most reliable research into the socioeconomic status of terrorists, Alan B. Krueger concluded that material deprivation and lack of education are not important causes of support for terrorism or involvement with terrorist activity.[5] It is true, if anything, that: "Most terrorist organizations are composed of people drawn from the elite."[6]

Whether the problem is addressed in terms of individual motivations or structural propensities,[7] more recent studies do not confirm the common-sense explanation that terrorism is directly caused by poverty or lack of education.[8] It is not true that people become terrorists because they have nothing to lose.[9] On the contrary, there is general agreement that terrorist organizations are for the most part made up of people with relatively greater economic and intellectual resources than the relevant segment of the population. The data and documents dealing with the major terrorist groups formed in Western Europe during the Cold War period seem to suggest that Marta Krenshaw's insight was correct: "Not all those who are discriminated against turn to terrorism, nor does terrorism always reflect

objective social or economic deprivation. In West Germany, Japan, and Italy, for example, terrorism has been the chosen method of the privileged, not the downtrodden."[10]

Despite some limits of the data in possession of the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice, Italian data regarding people arrested or convicted of terrorism also shows that the percentage of Italian terrorists who are graduates is much higher than the national average, while the percentage of subjects who completed middle school tends to coincide with the national figure in the case of people convicted of terrorism, and is much higher than the national average in the case of those arrested; moreover, the percentage who completed primary school is less than half the national average in the case of those convicted and almost 30 percent less than the national average in the case of those arrested.

It can be clearly observed in Figure 1 and Figure 2 that the educational level of the group of individuals arrested or convicted of terrorism is much higher than the national average. This gap is even greater if we examine the professions of those convicted of terrorism. In many cases, those arrested refused to answer questions about their education or profession. However, we have data on 200 subjects which reports a very limited number of professions (Figure 3). Concerning sex, we have 2,125 men (78 percent) and 605 (22 percent) women of those who were arrested for terrorism (Figure 4); 421 males (80 percent) and 107 females (20 percent) of those who were convicted of terrorism (Figure 5). Data provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice is accurate with regard to the age of Italian terrorists (Figures 6 and 7). Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain to which terrorist groups convicted individuals belonged. Not all those arrested or convicted were members of the Red Brigades. It should be made clear, in fact,

■ Educational level (%) of subjects arrested for terrorism (N=2,333).

■ Educational level (%) of the resident population in Italy according to the 1981 census. Data regarding subjects aged 19 to 64 years.

Figure 1. Educational level of subjects arrested for terrorism versus Italian average, 1981 census [%]. The Italian data are taken from: ISTAT (1985). 12th General Census of Population, 25 October 1981. Vol. II. Book/Part 3. Data on the structural characteristics of population and housing. Part 3—Italy. Central Institute of Statistics. Rome 1985. In particular, pp. 316–317, Table 14—resident population of 6 years and older by sex, age and level of education. The percentages of census data were calculated on subjects' schooling data from 19 to 64 years. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners the Ministry of Justice. These data regard individuals arrested for crimes of terrorism from 1970 to 2011, 2,730 persons (2,125 men and 605 women aged between 16 and 79 years). The data relating to the educational level of 2,730 individuals arrested for terrorism displays some limitations: data from 397 subjects are missing, so we have data of 2,333 subjects.

■ Educational level of subjects convicted of terrorism (N=376).

■ Educational level of the resident population in Italy according to the 1981 census.
Data regarding subjects aged 19 to 64 years.

Figure 2. Educational level of subjects convicted of terrorism versus Italian average, 1981 census, [%]. The Italian data are taken from: ISTAT (1985). 12th General Census of Population, 25 October 1981. Vol. II. Book/Part 3. Data on the structural characteristics of population and housing. Part 3—Italy. Central Institute of Statistics. Rome 1985. In particular, pages 316–317, Table 14—resident population of 6 years and older by sex, age and level of education. The percentages of census data were calculated on subjects' schooling data from 19 to 64 years. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. This set of data deals with those convicted of crimes of terrorism: 528 persons (421 men and 107 women aged between 18 and 79 years), our data displays some shortcomings as it lacks information on 152 subjects, so we have data of 376 subjects.

that between 1969 and 1982, various underground organizations used 657 different names to claim responsibility for acts of political violence.[11] The Red Brigades were the most well-known terrorist group active in Italy. How many people joined the Red Brigades? We can try to answer to this question using data collected by "Sensibili alle Foglie"—the Publishing House founded by Renato Curcio after his release from prison—which collected data on the sex, age, and level of education of people prosecuted for joining

Figure 3. Professions of subjects convicted of terrorism, $N = 200$ [%]. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. These data regard individuals convicted for crimes of terrorism from 1970 to 2011. We have data on 200 subjects, displaying a very small number of professions.

Figure 4. Composition of age groups of subjects arrested for terrorism, $N = 2.730$ [%]. The Italian data are taken from: ISTAT (1985). 12th General Census of Population, 25 October 1981. Vol. II. Book/Part 3. Data on the structural characteristics of population and housing. Part 3—Italy. Central Institute of Statistics. Rome 1985. In particular, pages 316–317, Table 14—resident population of 6 years and older by sex, age, and level of education. The percentages of census data were calculated on subjects' schooling data from 19 to 64 years. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. These data regard individuals arrested for crimes of terrorism from 1970 to 2011, 2,730 persons (2,125 men and 605 women aged between 16 and 79 years).

the Red Brigades from 1970–1982. Curcio and his present wife Maria Rita Prette—a former female terrorist born in 1962—used unofficial channels to carry out painstaking research according to which 911 people were prosecuted for being members of the Red Brigades.[12]


Figure 5. Composition of age groups of subjects convicted of terrorism, $N = 528$ [%]. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. This set of data deals with those convicted of crimes of terrorism: 528 persons (421 men and 107 women aged between 18 and 79 years).

Figure 6. Gender distribution of people arrested for terrorism, $N = 2730$ [%]. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. This set of data deals with those arrested for terrorism: 2,730 persons (2,125 men and 605 women aged between 16 and 79 years).

As regards sex, we have a comprehensive description: 683 males (75 percent) and 228 females (25 percent) (Figures 8). As regards age, data is lacking on 102 of the subjects (equal to 11 percent of the total), (Figure 9). The highest percentage is of those between 21 and 35 years old (74 percent of prosecuted people). As regards educational level, we have data concerning 667 subjects, with data missing for another 244 (26.8 percent) (Figure 10). Thanks to "Sensibili alle Foglie" we know that 198 people prosecuted for joining the Red Brigades between 1970–1982 had a degree (21.7 percent).

Obviously, being prosecuted does not mean being convicted of terrorism, but it is clear enough that—not unlike the militant Red Army Faction (RAF)[13]—the typical Red Brigades member is neither poor nor exploited. Can we, therefore, conclude that poverty and lack of

**Figure 7.** Gender distribution of people convicted of terrorism, $N = 528$ [%]. Data on Italian terrorists were provided by the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice. This set of data deals with those convicted of crimes of terrorism: 528 persons (421 men and 107 women aged between 18 and 79 years).

Figure 8. Gender distribution of people prosecuted for joining the Red Brigades (1970–1982), *N* = 911 [%]; data collected by "Sensibili alle Foglie."

AGE	%	n.
under 20	3,5	32
21-25	29,8	271
26-30	30,9	282
31-35	13,3	121
36-40	5,4	49
41-45	2,4	22
46-50	1,3	12
more than 51	2,2	20
missing data	11,2	102

Figure 9. Composition of age groups of people prosecuted for joining the Red Brigades (1970–1982), *N* = 911 [%]; data collected by "Sensibili alle Foglie."

Figure 10. Educational level of people prosecuted for joining the Red Brigades (1970–1982), *N* = 911 [%]; data collected by "Sensibili alle Foglie."

education are in no way connected with the decision to join a terrorist organization such as the Red Brigades?

The question is a complex one.

Empirical evidence suggests that the typical Red Brigades member "is fundamentally an altruist"[14] who does not aim at "personal profit,"[15] and is of a relatively young age. He is not from societies' worst-off socioeconomic groups, but is deeply shocked by the poverty and exploitation of others because of his ideology.[16]

The Causal Power of Ideology

The assumption that motivates this study is typically Weberian: the actions of individuals depend on their mental states or their representations of the surrounding world.[17] The Red Brigades have what Raymond Boudon has called "situated rationality."[18] Influenced by their social context of reference, they interpret the world in the light of a specific ideology that has the power to guide choices and actions.[19] Ideology—to recall Clifford Geertz's words—is at the same time a "source of meanings" and a "program" that provides a framework for behavior and urges to action.[20] Taking up the sociological perspective of Max Weber and Clifford Geertz, a militant of the Red Brigades is here considered as "an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun."[21]

I take ideology to be these webs.

For this reason, "It is essential to understand the ideologies or worldviews of practitioners of terrorism on their own terms, and not to exclude them from analysis because they appear 'irrational' in a conventional sense."[22]

Although caution should be exercised when making generalizations about the motivations of terrorists, which can differ from case to case[23]—all Red Brigades multiple murderers draw our attention to the causal power of the ideology that they regarded as the necessary, albeit inadequate, condition for accepting the idea of killing and being killed.

The Red Brigades was the most representative Italian terrorist organization during the "years of lead." An analysis of their documents from 1970 until their final murder, committed on 2 March 2003,[24] provides us with seven elements that are characteristic of their mentality in order to rebuild their worldview from within: (a) radical catastrophism,[25] (b) waiting for the end,[26] (c) obsession with purity,[27] (d) identification of evil,[28] (e) obsession with purification,[29] (f) exaltation of martyrdom or desire to be persecuted,[30] (g) purification of the means through the end.[31]

Red Brigades ideology produces a characteristic "discourse," which can be summarized as follows: The world has been plunged into an abyss of pain and misery (*radical catastrophism*) because of the actions of certain categories of people (*identification of evil*) who deserve to be exterminated (*obsession with purification*). Before the world ends (*waiting for the end*) one must isolate oneself to protect oneself from rampant moral corruption (*obsession with purity*) and rejoice in being persecuted, because the sacrifice of life is evidence of spiritual purity (*desire to be persecuted*). The end is such that it justifies the use of murder (*purification of the means through the end*).

Ideology as Relational Process

The numerous testimonies of the Red Brigades multiple murderers and their biographies suggest that poverty and lack of education count in an indirect way or as motivational factors of an ideological kind. Our hypothesis is that the Red Brigades member does not

kill to defend his socioeconomic status. He or she accepts the idea of killing because killing is right and proper. A Red Brigades militant who admires Pol Pot helps us to understand the obsession with purification: "If I win, I do not want any positions or honors. I just want the job of getting rid of our enemies, all those who have to be got rid of. It'll be a difficult task because there will be millions of people who have to be eliminated. That's what I want to do after [the revolution]."[32]

The ideology of the Red Brigades should not be understood only as a synonym for abstract thought but also as "concrete thinking," or better as an "instrument of collective action."[33] It is powered by a sociopsychological process which occurs within a particular social form—the revolutionary sect—characterized by a type of interaction that encourages the deployment of murderous violence.[34] Following the analysis of Clifford Geertz—who suggested considering ideology "in the discrimination of its social and psychological contexts"[35]—the ideology of the Red Brigades is considered here as a sociopsychological process, experienced daily in its relationship with the revolutionary sect which is a "dynamic whole or social system characterized by the perceived interdependence among its members."[36] Our ideal type of Red Brigades murderer filters reality through a particular pattern of perception that has the effect of turning the victim into a semiotic construct.[37] The typical Red Brigades's member could not exist without having first embraced an ideology, but the ideology is not in itself sufficient to cause somebody to kill. In order to shoot, the support of the revolutionary sect—which has the task of providing psychological, motivational and logistical means: weapons, false documents, belongings, money, and so on—is required.

In a chorus of testimonies, Red Brigades multiple murderers stated that the reduction of victims into symbols is a necessary condition for accepting the idea of killing. In the words of the left-wing Italian terrorist Silveria Russo: "Everything was mediated by ideology and thus by seeing people as symbols. For me, that judge or another person who it was decided to remove was a symbol, was not a person. . . . We absolutely did not pose the question of the man who lived behind that symbol."[38] Or, to recall the words of another Red Brigades murderer on the causal power of ideology:

> We lived with the problem of death within a larger ideology, so, I don't know how, I found myself directly killing people. . . . It was like carrying out a work routine. And that is the aberration, the incredible thing about the ideology, because you have an ideology that you're on one side with your friends, and on the other side there are enemies, and enemies are a category, or are functions, are symbols, not men. And so treating these people with the symbolism of the absolute enemy means that you have a relationship of absolute abstraction with death.[39]

Considering Ideology as a Relational Process Offers Several Advantages

First, it frees us from the scholastic vision of ideology that states that the real Red Brigades member or the true Islamic terrorist is one who has direct and in-depth knowledge of *Capital* or of the Koran. This way of structuring the discourse on ideology has been a major obstacle in understanding its causal power. One may be a Marxist with only an indirect and superficial knowledge of the works of Marx, just as one may be a Catholic without having ever read the Bible: for centuries, Christianity and Islam governed the behavior and thoughts of millions of illiterate people. To claim that the Red Brigades were not driven

to act by ideology because they had not thoroughly studied the writings of Marx means adopting an objective criteria of rationality that departs from a proper situational analysis, and is a betrayal of Weberian methodology. To focus on the causal power of ideology, we must not ask whether terrorists have a complete understanding of capitalism or the Koran, but rather if their faith is so deep that it drives them to kill. According to the conception of ideology as a relational process, revolutionary Marxism is not composed of a set of books, but from individual action affected by interaction with the other members of the revolutionary sect. It is possible to be a fanatical Marxist who has never read Marx just as it is to be violently Nazi without knowing Hitler's *Mein Kampf*.

Second, the conception of ideology as a relational process helps us to see more clearly a typical characteristic of the Red Brigades member: the tenacity with which he tries to force all the complexity of reality into a few analytical categories. A left-wing terrorist is not a man who spends his life reading: he is a man who is tenaciously fighting to affirm a system of ideas he considers infallible.

The Red Brigades's strategic resolution of 1975 affirms that technological development would come to such a level of perfection that it would be impossible to steal cars. And yet—it says in the document—capitalists prevent the sale of overly sophisticated car alarms in order to help the thieves in their work: the poor cannot buy cars but they can steal, allowing the sale of new cars which fuel the cycle.

Marx knew nothing of Fiat cars, but had stated that the aim of the capitalist is to accumulate money. From the perspective of the Red Brigades, Marx's analysis and explanations of the car theft correspond perfectly.

Red Brigades members write:

> Marginal individuals are a product of the capitalistic society in its current stage of development and they are continually increasing in number. They are used by the capitalistic society, since it is a consumer society, as consumers. But they are consumers without wages. Hence "criminality" is born. Capitalism's economic use of criminality lies in the fact that it helps destroy the goods needed to continue the cycle. To make it clearer, it is entirely possible to produce thief-proof cars, but this is not in Fiat's interest.[40]

Third, the conception of ideology as a relational process shifts the focus of the sociologist from the psychology of the individual to the kind of interaction that characterizes daily life in a revolutionary sect. If ideology is a way of thinking and acting, and not a pile of books, there must be someone to confirm the correctness of our thinking and our actions. Marx wrote that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, but without saying precisely when this collapse would occur. The Red Brigades member must search for clues as to whether the fated day is at hand or not. He is the protagonist of what he thinks, but ideology imposes very narrow mental confines. The Red Brigades member has some conceptual categories at his or her disposal: relations of production, productive forces, alienation, labor, exploitation and surplus value. It is upon these categories that he or she depends to decipher the world. But the world is continually changing, and this forces him or her to organize these "ideological tools"[41] in ever-new ways as the Red Brigades claiming responsibility for the murder of Massimo D'Antona demonstrates (20 May 1999).[42] Just as meaningful is the Red Brigades claiming responsibility for murder of Marco Biagi (19 March 2002).[43]

Ideology as a Social, Temporal, Affective, and Moral (STAM) Bond

Upon the basis of the perspective adopted, ideology can be considered as a type of social bond. This social bond develops within a broader historical–political context that, in the case of the Red Brigades, experts on Italian terrorism have reconstructed in detail and that we should always keep in mind.[44] "The disorder that began with *il Sessantotto* was on a scale and of a resilience without equals in the industrialized world."[45] During the 1960s and '70s, Italy underwent a major transformation that "vomited up a new magma"[46]—to use the words of multiple murderer Red Brigades member Raffaele Fiore—where the webs of significance of the Red Brigades was forged. The Italian social context—in which the "burden of fascism"[47] played an important role—was characterized by the "prevailing sensation of the inevitability of revolution."[48]

That said, if ideology is a social bond and not a pile of books, we must try to understand what factors allow ideology to live day by day, filling the everyday life of the Red Brigades murderer. We must prepare ourselves to observe how ideology flourishes. To this end, the concept of ideology has been broken down into four dimensions: Social, Temporal, Affective, Moral.

Social Dimension

The social dimension of the ideological bond refers to the number of ties between members of the terrorist group and those belonging to other social groups. All Red Brigades members explain that the decision to join the revolutionary sect means an end to all contact with the outside world. Red Brigades member Patrizio Peci explains that the Red Brigades murderers have no relations with the outside world. Their mental universe develops in total isolation from the surrounding environment. Segregation—which Peci calls "going underground"—produces people who live "outside of the world": "When you live underground for a long time, as I did for over three years, even the strangest things start to seem normal to you, because you end up meeting only other people in the same condition as yourself, you live outside of the world. Then one day [when you leave the revolutionary sect], you're faced with different experiences, and so you ask yourself, What am I doing, who am I, why?"[49] Isolation from the world around drastically reduces the possibility of the ideological conception of the world being challenged. Without what students of religious fundamentalist sects call "negative feedback,"[50] the processes of radicalization of ideology may be developed more effectively. Discipline is very strict in the Red Brigades. Every moment of the militant's life is subjected to a serious of rigorous rules. The Red Brigades—explains the terrorist Valerio Morucci—lead "a hidden life at all times."[51]

And this life is a "nightmare."

Going underground, testifies one terrorist, "…Isn't easy, you have to live a double life and to keep the rules religiously and behave accordingly. . . . Going underground is a *nightmare* that follows you month after month and year after year, never changing."[52] The Red Brigades member Raffaele Fiore recalls: "If you wanted to carry out what they asked, you had to be very strict with yourself. This meant giving yourself rules; you needed an iron self-discipline, starting as soon as you got up."[53] "Life in the Red Brigades," Raffaele Fiore continues, "was all-absorbing and highly demanding."[54]

There is no moment in the day that is not taken up by the obsessive thought of the fear of being killed. The life of Red Brigades members is subject to suffocating control, even in their own homes.

The internal document *Security and Work Rules*, presumably dating back to 1974, regulates all the Red Brigades movements. Particularly significant is the fact that

> the house belongs to the organization which lends it to the militant. It has to be managed according to *specific and unbreakable rules, equal for all*. . . . When a comrade takes possession of one of the organization's houses, the first task is to create, in the minutest detail, a well-defined *social character*. . . . The role that a comrade has assumed must be consistent with his or her everyday life. If, for example, a person has taken the role of craftsperson, he or she has to leave home before eight in the morning and not return until 12:30; he or she has to leave again at 2 p.m. and return at 7 or later. This means that comrades have to organize a specific timetable for their work (appointments, investigations, etc.).[55]

In the document, the "bleak furnishings"[56] permitted (a radio or television, a first-aid box, basic living necessities for at least two militants) are also described; how to file bills, the type of keys to use, the noises to avoid so as not to arouse the neighbors' suspicions, how to do the shopping or buy newspapers, the rules for going to cafes and restaurants: everything is governed by rigid guidelines. There are also clear instructions on looking after a car—also belonging to the organization—and on keeping it clean inside. Even how to look in the rear-view mirror. Dressing, combing your hair, tending your beard, nothing escapes the all-seeing eye of the revolutionary sect.

Valerio Morucci, in his *Ritratto di un terrorista da giovane* (Portrait of a Young Terrorist) has described the mental dimension of the terrorist through his daily dialogues. It is a flood of obsessive, maniacal thoughts and gestures, repeated *ad infinitum,* that divides the Red Brigades from the surrounding world.[57]

In sum, "the self sacrifice of living apart gave proof of suitable devotion to the cause of revolution."[58]

Temporal Dimension

The temporal dimension of the ideological bond is represented by the amount of time spent with peers. The decision to hide forces Red Brigades member to spend their days with other Red Brigades members. Members of a revolutionary sect love, talk, eat and sleep with one another: "You cut off relations with your family," another Red Brigades multiple murderer explains, "You don't talk with anyone else but the Red Brigades."[59] As Red Brigades member Anna Laura Braghetti stated, the Red Brigades militant "Must be like a ghost"[60] for all those who are not members of the Red Brigades. Salvatore Ricciardi—a Red Brigades murderer who has never repented nor distanced himself from terrorism—recently stated that he had contact only with those who made up his group.[61] His physical and psychological survival depended on the group, to which he had handed over his life. To avoid arrest or death he could only count on his comrades. There is no chance at all of getting away, physically or mentally, from the Red Brigades, exactly like fundamentalist sects in which any contact with the outside world is forbidden. It is impossible to escape the group for those who are charged with killing: "All links with the outside world were dangerous," Raffaele Fiore recalls, "So it meant that love affairs had to be created inside the organization."[62]

Emotional Dimension

Attachment to others is the emotional dimension of the ideological bond. When members of a terrorist group are very close to one another, the fear of challenging shared values and consequently losing the esteem and friendship of comrades increases. After his arrest (19 February 1980) Patrizio Peci decided to cooperate with the police. He revealed the names of all the Red Brigades members known to him except that of his girlfriend, Maria Rosaria Roppoli, who gave herself up to the police rather than flee abroad. So as not to sever the emotional bond with the revolutionary sect, she decided to give herself up to the police, preferring life imprisonment to freedom.[63] If Patrizio Peci was a traitor, Maria Rosaria Roppoli felt a duty to prove to her comrades that she had never betrayed the revolutionary ideology. In addition, the emotional dimension of the ideological tie makes the "sacrificial" choices made by many terrorists, such as Cesare Di Lenardo—who withstood torture to the limits of human endurance rather than reveal the names of their companions—less incomprehensible.[64]

Moral Dimension

The moral dimension of the ideological bond regards the content of the ideology. The content of ideology is extremely important because it indicates what to think and do. There is a difference between the behavior of those whose ideology calls for hatred of the Jewish people and the behavior of those whose ideology calls for the promotion of religious tolerance and rejects violence. In the case of the Red Brigades, the moral dimension of ideology is formed through an educational process in several phases, culminating in the dehumanization of the political enemy. This process has been defined as the "pedagogy of intolerance."[65] According to the STAM model, a Red Brigades member kills after he or she has completed an ideological journey in which the victim is stripped of his humanity. The ideology intervenes before acting, and not after. The dehumanization of the enemy comes before his physical elimination. The ideology is the "primum movens" that unleashes the homicidal fury and not a simple process of *a posteriori* justification. Shedding blood, to quote the left-wing terrorist Mario Ferrandi, is the result of "an absurd ideological inspiration."[66] The terrorist Maurizio Costa prefers to express himself in these terms: "We'd actually already eradicated people before killing them."[67] The Red Brigades member Enrico Baglioni considers it "a moral responsibility to permit the value of life to be ousted by ideology."[68] For the terrorist Enrico Fenzi, thanks to ideology "human life didn't count for anything."[69] According to another Red Brigades member, Enrico Galmozzi: "We didn't even consider life. This is the highest level of ideological degeneration in the opposition to the enemy. We didn't consider them as real people, as mothers, fathers, married men."[70] Mario Moretti states: "I would never kill a person,"[71] which is why the left-wing terrorist Silveria Russo points out, "we never raised the issue of the person living inside that symbol."[72] Before settling on a victim, another member of the Red Brigades recounts, you have to find a reasoning, an idea, a phrase to punish. Only afterwards do you start hunting the person who is responsible for them. You come up against an "impure" thought and spend your days obsessed by this unbearable presence. You search, read the papers, participate surreptitiously in political party meetings, until you discover the carrier of the "infected" message. You do not yet know your victim, but will manage to find him through his words. Once you're on his track you have to decide upon the punishment. Kill him or kneecap him?

In the words of the female witness interviewed by Donatella Della Porta:

> You make a person match a political need. That is, today I have the job of attacking the Christian Democrat Party in a district where a certain type of discourse is being made, but you don't go and take it out on the walls . . . so let's see who's making this speech and then you're off, that is, you start looking for him. It's as if you were raising your receptive antennas to understand where this message is coming from, then you read the papers, you participate undercover in the meetings of these people, you try to see and understand; then you've picked him out and so he's physically targeted, he's the one responsible, it's him at this time, there's already a logical process in which there's no relationship, in which you've already decided that he's the guilty one. Then you arrive and what makes the difference is the punishment, that is, what punishment should I give to this person guilty of these things? You go there and you have this fierce sense of justice . . . for all the speeches that are there inside. So he isn't even that person any longer, that person is emptied, and he's blamed for other crimes, has other responsibilities. . . . He becomes another person, another thing . . . a small cog in the monstrous machine that is destroying us all. . . . When you reach that point, you can't help being totally involved, you can't feel any emotion, you're someone who's administering justice, who's affirming values and therefore has no place for hate. . . . In your heart of hearts you tell yourself: I'm forced to do this thing.[73]

The pedagogy of intolerance completes its "discourse" when the enemy is no longer seen as a human being. To eliminate the enemy, explains Red Brigades member Raffaele Fiore, multiple murderer, you have to degrade the relationship between people to that between "animals." Before shooting, "All the efforts humanity has made to recognize itself as such have to be eradicated: It was like returning to the very beginning of man's journey, when he didn't recognize the other person as a fellow creature, but as an animal from which to defend himself, to kill, to eat. . . . At that juncture we looked on the others not as people but as an authority which had to be stripped of its power."[74]

One of the most peculiar characteristics of the pedagogy of intolerance, described so well in this testimony, can be found in its typically parasitological language.

The enemy is a "worm."

More precisely, political enemies are "filthy worms,"[75] "shit,"[76] "swine,"[77] "pigs,"[78] "rabid dogs,"[79] "drudges,"[80] "wretches,"[81] "filthy bastards,"[82] "monsters,"[83] and "zionist pigs."[84]

The stronger the process of internalization of the values conveyed by the ideology, the more difficult it is for the individual to take a critical attitude toward his or her own worldview. These four dimensions of the ideological bond are interrelated. It follows that the weakening of one of them involves a chain reaction that causes the weakening of the others. The causal power of ideology is directly proportional to the intensity of its social, temporal, emotional and moral ties. The ideological purity of Red Brigades members is not measured in a school examination but on the basis of the amount of violent action that they manage to produce in line with a certain worldview. "The yardstick to apply to the ideology," wrote Giovanni Sartori, "is practical, is the criterion of effectiveness."[85] Following the assassination of Aldo Moro, Red Brigades member Valerio Morucci, who had taken part in the massacre in Via Fani (16 March 1978), felt his moral connection with

the ideology falter.[86] Thus began a critical reflection that called into question all aspects of revolutionary militancy until his ousting from the Red Brigades.

Terrorists of the First Hour

Different from what Marc Sageman wrote in his excellent book *Understanding Terror Networks*,[87] this study led us to conclude that ideological shock precedes entrance into the Red Brigades. Sageman cites serious and reliable data, which show that some Red Brigades members read Marx after their arrest and not before. According to Sageman, this shows the secondary role of ideology in choosing to become a terrorist.

Apparently, scientists are still divided between those who support the causal power of ideology, like Luciano Pellicani,[88] and those who, like Donatella Della Porta, deny that ideology is one of the causes for collective behavior.[89] In order to observe the causal power of ideology, one must first isolate a particular type of terrorist that this article proposes to call a "terrorist of the first hour." The general question "does ideology determine the decision to become a terrorist?" leads down a blind alley. Beginning from the observation that not all terrorists act with the same ideological determination, we need to formulate the question in a way that seems sociologically more useful: "In what cases does ideology determine the choice to become terrorists?"

To clarify this point, it might be useful to distinguish between *terrorist of the first hour* by *terrorist of the second hour*. The former have strong ideological motivations, for understandable reasons: the decision to found a terrorist group, or to join one in its early stages, involves many risks—including arrest, torture and death[90]—and very few or almost no reward in terms of individual benefits.

I realize that it would be possible as well as interesting to introduce further distinctions. We could talk, for example, about third and fourth hour terrorists, but I do not wish to examine that question here. In this article, my aim is to isolate the characteristics of the purest type of terrorist that, in my opinion, is the terrorist of the first hour, the one who is willing to give up a safe and prosperous life and to face death, imprisonment, and torture in order to affirm his ideological convictions. Only the terrorist of the first hour is the terrorist by vocation, the terrorist in his incandescent state. In the words of Margherita Cagol to her mother (1969): "We now have the opportunity to change this society and it would be criminal (towards humanity) not to exploit it. We must do everything possible to change this system, because *this is the profound meaning of our existence*. These things are not impossible, you know, mum. They are serious and difficult things that are really worth doing. . . . Life is too important to waste or fritter away in stupid chatter or squabbles. Every minute is vital."[91]

The logic of the *free rider*—of which James S. Coleman speaks in his study on the costs and benefits of revolution for the individual[92]—does not seem to apply to the terrorist of the first hour, such as Zouheir Riabi.[93]

The terrorists of the second hour, however, may also join for less intensely ideological reasons (including material rewards), but this depends largely on the success achieved and the size reached over time by the terrorist group. According to data on the rise and consolidation of Palestinian terrorism (22 July 1968–22 March 2000), success seems to be the best recruitment strategy for terrorist groups.[94] The case of the Red Brigades is no exception to this rule.

Following the assassination of Aldo Moro (9 May 1978) hundreds of young extremists demanded to be enrolled in the Red Brigades, the doors of which were kept closed by the will of its leader, Mario Moretti, who feared that by expanding the organization would lose

its character of an elite movement based on the idea of militancy as an ideological choice. The question addressed to aspiring Red Brigades members at the time of enrollment was: "The statistics say that you will die or be arrested within six months. Are you sure you want to enlist?"[95] So, in addition to asking: "Why does one become a terrorist?" we must also ask at what stage of the life of the terrorist organization the individual asks to be enrolled. This does not mean that terrorists of the second hour are not acting under the impulse of a fierce ideological determination.[96] It means, more precisely, that the murderous fury of the terrorist of the first hour has its trigger in ideology. In our model, the ideology comes before the act of killing and not after. The terrorists of the first hour are men and women who, despite belonging to an elite,[97] have consciously chosen to consign themselves to a "living hell"[98] (to use the words of another multiple murderer Italian terrorist). It is no coincidence that the women of the Red Brigades—not unlike those of the Rote Armee Fraktion[99] or the Nihon Sekigun[100]—speak of entering the terrorist organization as a "sacrificial gesture"[101] that provides dramatic sacrifices, including the abandonment of all family relationships, the prohibition of seeing one's children and the obligation to have abortions.[102]

A paradigmatic case is that of Red Brigades member Adriana Faranda, one of the kidnappers of Aldo Moro, who was imprisoned in an apartment for two months after having confessed to her companions her desire to see her daughter again. She was accepted back into the group when she became convinced that sacrifice for the revolution was the greatest act of love toward children, to whom she could never have passed down a world as ugly as that of the bourgeoisie and capitalists.[103] The documents of the Red Brigades and the testimony of its militants of the first hour in part reflect a state of mind similar to that found in the documents and testimony of the main proponents of Al Qaeda, who claim to have no attachment to material goods and to be willing to do anything to defend the values in which they believe. In an interview with CNN broadcast 12 May 1997, bin Laden said: "We love death upon the way of God as much as you love life, we do not fear anything, we even hope for such a death."[104]

These are the typical words of a terrorist of the first hour. Whether the reference is to God or to Marxist ideology, the terrorist of the first hour does not fear death and has no consideration for material goods or for the "pleasures of life."

Terrorists of the First Hour: Four Examples (Cagol, Curcio, Franceschini, Moretti)

The Red Brigades were founded by Margherita Cagol, Alberto Franceschini, and Renato Curcio in September 1970. Their biographies are particularly useful for the purposes of our discussion. First, they confirm that terrorists of the first hour do not resort to violence because they are desperately poor. Second, they help understand the causal power of ideology that, in all the cases considered above, precedes the decision to kill. Cagol, Franceschini, and Curcio first embraced a radical ideology and then organized their ideas in military terms.

Margherita Cagol embraced the revolutionary ideal in the years when she was a sociology student at the University of Trento. She graduated with honors on 26 July 1969, under the guidance of Francesco Alberoni, with a thesis on the workforce during the phases of capitalist development.[105] Born in Sardagna di Trento, 8 April 1945 and dying 5 June 1975 during a shootout with the police, Margherita Cagol belonged to a middle-class provincial Catholic family. Most of the information available on the traits of her personality come from the testimony of his sister Milena, six years older, who, in an interview a few days after Margherita's death, spoke of a "very normal childhood"[106] and an extended and loving family environment.

The youngest of three sisters, Margherita is described as a lively and intelligent little girl, very determined to be respected but not at all eager to show off. His father owned a perfume shop, while her mother, who worked in a pharmacy, was deeply Catholic and had a great deal of influence on her daughter's upbringing: "In my sister's childhood there is no . . . trauma, or oppression, or lack of affection, nor any distress."[107] Margherita's teens were characterized by a life spent mostly at home with a father who was a strict traditionalist but also very affectionate and thoughtful. Margherita accepted her upbringing with good grace, never showed signs of rebellion and felt that it was "very natural" to be under her father's control. Every year, the Cagol family could afford to holiday for a whole month during the summer and to ski during the winter. Margherita had an intense relationship with prayer and faith, understood as a concrete commitment to the needy. At the age of twenty she was engaged in voluntary work in hospices, where she assisted the elderly and the sick: "That was her way of being religious, totally interior: the same as our mother. A spirituality in fact and not in form."[108]

Margherita's relationship with a Jesuit priest who preached in the church of San Francesco Saverio was particularly important: "These sermons are good for me," she said, "they satisfy me." At this stage of her life—in which she sought in religion the answers to her existential questions—she joined the Trento Sociology Faculty (1965), where she had her first encounter with politics, an issue that she had never heard talk of in her family. At the age of twenty years, Margherita Cagol is a conformist Catholic girl of middle-class extraction with a very mild and charitable temperament. She has never had boyfriends, does not go out with boys, is completely uninvolved in politics, attends church, has no family conflicts, and assists the elderly and sick. In the University of Trento she encounters marxist-revolutionary doctrine in a context of profound social unrest and gets engaged to Renato Curcio, whom she marries on 1 August 1969 in a Catholic-Waldensian ceremony.

If Margherita Cagol represents the Catholic soul of the Red Brigades, Alberto Franceschini represents the revolutionary tradition of Italian communism.

Born in Reggio Emilia on 26 October 1947, his was a rigidly communist upbringing. His grandfather, a founder of the Italian Communist Party in 1921, was first arrested by the fascists and then sent into internal exile as a "dangerous person." On 25 July 1943—the day of the fall of Benito Mussolini—he escaped and joined the partisans. Alberto's father, however, was a laborer. He was taken by the fascists in 1944 and sent to Auschwitz to build ovens. When he realized what was happening to the Jews, he fled to Italy. Similarly dramatic stories deeply affected the imagination of Alberto, whose childhood was defined wholly by politics. At age five he was taken to a Communist Party branch, where he spent his free time with the children of other militants. Everybody wore the uniform of the youth party. During early adolescence he developed a deep resentment toward classmates from wealthy families. His books and notebooks were the only ones to be paid for by the state but had a state stamp on the cover that aroused a deep hatred in him: "That stamp made me different from everyone else. I was ashamed of my diversity and tore off the covers with the mark of poverty."[109] One day he was called to the desk of the teacher who humiliated him in front of his classmates with these words: "Instead of destroying the books and notebooks that we give you, you should be grateful. You should thank us because we offer you the opportunity to study. And your family does not even deserve anything, because you live off Stalin's gold."[110] When told of the events, Alberto's father went to school and publicly slapped the teacher.

Alberto grew up in an extremely tense family atmosphere because of the continuing conflict between his Stalinist grandfather, and his father, who supported the process of de-Stalinization initiated by Khrushchev. At home there were daily discussions and

arguments about political issues. Unlike the Cagol family, the Franceschini family was highly politicized. Radio Prague and Radio Moscow were the only stations that could be listened to in their house. The grandfather, full of anger at not having been able to bring about the communist revolution in Italy, encouraged his grandson, a teenager, to pick up where he had left off. When the television showed images of Alberto's arrest (1974) he was happy and proud to have a grandson who fought in the Red Brigades. Alberto was powerfully affected by the influence of his grandfather—who he considered the most important figure in his life—especially his glorification of revolutionary violence.

At the age of thirteen, he participated in an anti-fascist demonstration in Genoa (7 July 1960) at which five youths were killed by the police. Franceschini was horrified by what he saw. The following year he joined the youth movement of the Communist Party with whom he would always have an unstable and conflictual relationship. In 1967, he met some young militants of the Communist Party who would form the core of leadership for future Red Brigades. Of particular importance were meetings with the communist partisans who had fought against the Nazis, some of whom showed them the places where they had buried weapons used against the Germans that had never been surrendered to the Americans. Alberto Franceschini enrolled in the School of Mining Engineering at the University of Bologna with the future goal of going to Cuba to build oil wells. His choice of university was driven by ideology. In 1968 he met Renato Curcio at a rally in Trento. The clashes and the climate of insubordination that marked 1968 convinced him that a revolution was really possible in Italy. This belief radicalized his criticism of the Communist Party until the final break caused by the election of Enrico Berlinguer as deputy secretary at the national congress in Bologna in 1969. Luigi Longo remained the formal leader of the party, but, given his poor health, Berlinguer assumed leadership with a line that was critical of the Soviet Union and open to the Christian Democrat party. Coming as he did from a family of landed gentry, Berlinguer was considered the symbol of the moral corruption of the Communist Party: "For us," writes Franceschini, "he was an enemy."[111]

Renato Curcio had a much more difficult childhood and adolescence than Cagol and Franceschini. He was born 23 September 1941 in Monterotondo, a town in the province of Rome, to Jolanda Curcio, a girl of eighteen. Jolanda worked as a maid in the house of an elderly woman where she met Renato Zampa, the man who would father Renato following a fleeting relationship. Curcio took his father's name and his mother's surname. Lacking the resources to keep the child, Jolanda decided to entrust him, when he was a few months old, to a family in Torre Pellice, a village in the mountains of Piedmont. At the age of ten, Curcio was confronted with the "dramatic decision"[112] of being transferred to a college of priests in the outskirts of Rome. He rebelled, closing himself in ". . . Quasi autistic silence and denial."[113] He did not speak or study and escaped several times. He failed school and was again transferred to another town. This time they sent him to Imperia, where he was entrusted to another family until the age of fifteen. His rebellion continued and his studies at school continued to be unsuccessful. At fifteen he was employed as a lift operator in a hotel in Milan for a short period. He then resumed his studies and graduated. In the fall of 1961 he was hired by Pirelli, a factory in Milan. Factory life seemed to him a "nightmare"[114] from which he wanted only to escape. While walking alone along a street in Milan and with no plan in mind, he decided to hitch a ride with a stranger and start a new life. By chance, he found himself in Genova, the first town he encountered along the way. There, he spent a year being "a bit of a crook and a bum" and during which he lived "on the edge."[115] He slept on a bench, and lacked the basic necessities for survival. One night, he befriended a young runaway who invited him to move in with his girlfriend, a prostitute. Curcio distributed bundles of newspapers at newsstands, was a stevedore and a

waiter. Slowly, he slipped into alcoholism and started taking Methedrine. He was unwell, and his life began to collapse: "It was a hellish period in which I came to the edge of extreme mental confusion."[116] His friend, now fallen into the abyss due to his alcoholism, was hospitalized, and Curcio became convinced that the experience in Genova was a dead end street. Some time before, in a bar near the harbor, a man had mentioned the opening of the Faculty of Sociology in Trento. He liked the idea. He said goodbye to his friend in hospital and, "as light as a feather"[117] took the train to Trento. In autumn 1963, he attended his first lessons in sociology. He passed all the exams, but decided not to graduate because he considered the degree a "bourgeois" qualification.

Mario Moretti joined the Red Brigades a year after their founding but it was he who led them the longest, from 1974 to 1981. In his autobiography, Moretti claims to come from a very poor communist family.[118] Numerous documents from the period of his childhood contradict this claim, however, his family being of lower middle-class, and not proletarian, origins. Born 26 January 1946 in Porto San Giorgio (Ascoli Piceno), Moretti received a Catholic education. During the years of elementary school, he assiduously attended the parish youth group and went to middle school in a religious institution: the Salesian College in Macerata. Of all his classmates, he was the only one to continue his studies at high school.[119] At the age of sixteen, he lost his father and his studies were funded by generous donations from a noble family in Milan, which owned a great deal of land and properties: the Casati Stampa di Soncino family. During his high school years, Mario Moretti professed fascist ideas and was a convinced admirer of Benito Mussolini. Some fellow students, interviewed in 2003, remember Mario Moretti as a "hot-headed" militant wearing the Basque typical of young fascists. After graduating in 1966, he moved to Milan, to his rich benefactors *palazzo*. On 16 January 1967, thanks to his education, he began working in a factory as a technician-clerk, and not as a laborer. He also had the opportunity to enroll in the Economics Faculty of the Sacro Cuore Catholic University of Milan. The university he had chosen was prestigious and entry required a letter of recommendation, which Moretti received from Luigi Campanelli, a priest in Porto San Giorgio. According to Sergio Flamigni, Moretti's biographer, "The Moretti family—the father a broker in the livestock trade, the mother a music teacher, and four children (two boys and two girls)—is not of proletarian, but rather of petit-bourgeois, extraction, and is not communist but ultra-Catholic and right-wing."[120] When he arrived in Milan, Moretti was "without a real ideology,"[121] which he would acquire in the heated climate of the Sixties.

Cagol, Franceschini, Curcio and Moretti attended university. Some of them, like Cagol and Curcio, with brilliant results.

With the exception of Franceschini, who had a precocious political socialization, at the age of twenty Cagol, Curcio, and Moretti knew nothing of politics. Their lives were marked by the acquisition of a particular ideology in a context of intense "social mobilization."[122] According to their testimonies, and contemporary documents,[123] ideology gave them a particular "perception pattern" with which they attributed new meaning to their lives and the world around them. It is no coincidence that all the Red Brigades multiple murderers claim that adhering to revolutionary ideology was the most important moment of their lives. Among the many testimonies, that of Red Brigades member Anna Laura Braghetti, one of the kidnappers of Aldo Moro, is worth remembering: "Our only medium then was the ideology. . . . The ideology was the crime which allowed me to enter the Red Brigades and strike against other people. But it was also the crime which went against my own existence. Against all our lives."[124] No less significant are the words of Alberto Franceschini: "We were just drug addicts, drug users of a particular type, of ideology. It only takes a few cubic centimeters and you are done for life."[125]

Conclusion

When a terrorist group is on the rise and has access to extensive economic and relational resources, there is less risk involved in becoming a terrorist from the standpoint of the individual, as the probabilities of killing are considered more likely than those of dying. When, instead, a terrorist group is taking its first steps or is in decline, resources are limited. In this case, becoming a terrorist involves higher risks, because the odds of dying or being arrested are greater than those of killing. The power of ideology helps to explain how it is possible that some individuals—despite belonging to an *elite*—agree to face death, torture, or life imprisonment instead of the benefits and privileges associated with their social status or that of their families. Ideology alone is not enough to make a terrorist. However, the terrorist of the first hour is still an individual motivated by a deep ideological faith. Terrorists of the first hour conceive of terrorism as a vocation.

Once the choice to join a left-wing terrorist group has been made, the individual must face a second problem that should be conceptualized in a distinct manner: the question of killing. Dozens of militants, who had had a middle-class and nonviolent upbringing, faced the problem of shooting other people in cold blood. The STAM bond helps us to understand the sociopsychological conditions that assist in pulling the trigger.

In addition, the STAM bond makes the sacrificial choices made by many terrorists, such as Maria Rosaria Roppoli or Cesare Di Lenardo, more comprehensible. Enduring torture requires incredible strength with no material reward. Such behavior cannot be explained by making reference to economic structures or politico–historical context. The Weberian view of research, which invites examination of the world through the terrorists' eyes, appears particularly useful in reconstructing the rationality of apparently irrational behavior.

Notes

1. The research was conducted between February and July 2011. The author wishes to sincerely thank Sebastiano Ardita—the Director of the General Department of Prisoners of the Ministry of Justice—who gave authorization to collect data on Italian people arrested or convicted of terrorism of which only the Ministry of Justice is in possession. This article considered only data regarding terrorists working to subvert internal order. The articles of the Italian Penal Code regarding "internal" terrorism are articles 270, 270 bis, and 306, and since 2001 further articles have been introduced in order to combat international terrorism.

2. Alison Jamieson, "Identity and Morality in the Italian Red Brigades," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (1990), pp. 508–520.

3. Megan K. McBride, "The Logic of Terrorism: Existential Anxiety, the Search for Meaning, and Terrorist Ideology," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (2011), pp. 560–581.

4. Simon Cottee and Keith Hayward, "Terrorist (E)motives: The Existential Attractions of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 12 (2011), pp. 963–986.

5. Alan B. Krueger, *What Makes a Terrorist. Economics and the Roots of Terrorism* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2007), p. 2: "The evidence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation or inadequate education as an important cause of support for terrorism or of participation in terrorist activities."

6. Ibid., p. 44.

7. According to the results of Alberto Abadie's research: "Terrorist risk is not significantly higher for poorer countries, once the effects of other country-specific characteristics such as the level of political freedom are taken into account." Alberto Abadie, "Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism," *American Economic Review* 62 (2006), pp. 50–56. Other recent empirical studies challenging the view that poverty creates terrorism are: James A. Piazza, "Rooted in Poverty? Terrorism, Poor Economic Development and Social Cleavages," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18

(2006), pp. 159–177; Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckovà, "Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Casual Connection?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17 (2003), pp. 119–144; Alan B. Krueger and David D. Laitin, "Kto Kogo?: A Cross-Country Study of the Origins and Targets of Terrorism," in Philip Keefer et al., ed., *Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

8. Joseph Kahn and Tim Weiner, "World Leaders Rethinking Strategies on Aid to Poor," *The New York Times*, 18 March 2002, p. 3.

9. Claude Berrebi, "Evidence about the Link Between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians," *Peace Economic, Peace Science and Public Policy* 13 (2007). In Berrebi's words: "The resulting evidence suggests that both higher education and standard of living are positively associated with participation in Hamas or PIJ and with becoming a suicide bomber."

10. Martha Crenshaw, "The Causes of Terrorism," *Comparative Politics* 13 (July 1981), p. 383.

11. Donatella della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism: The Italian Case," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (1992), p. 151.

12. Progetto Memoria, *La mappa perduta* (Dogliani: Sensibili alle Foglie, 2007), pp. 60–62. On 7 February 2011, the author asked Maria Rita Prette for information on the methodology used to collect data. Maria Rita Prette refused to answer (Maria Rita Prette's e-mail, 7 February 2011). After Maria Rita Prette's refusal, the author had a conversation with Paolo Persichetti (8 October 2011), an unrepentant Red Brigades militant who is currently under arrest for being convicted of Licio Giorgieri's murder (20 March 1987). According to Paolo Persichetti, Maria Rita Prette collected data on the Red Brigades thanks to the assistance of the lawyers who defended militants of the Red Brigades between 1970–1982. Such lawyers would have been the source of the detailed data published by Sensibili alle Foglie Publishing.

13. Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Political Terrorism," in Margaret G. Hermann, ed., *Political Psychology. Contemporary Problems and Issues* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986), p. 383.

14. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 37. In Hoffman's analysis: "Finally, the point should be emphasized that, unlike the ordinary criminal or the lunatic assassin, the terrorist is not pursuing purely egocentric goals; he is not driven by the wish to line his own pocket or satisfy some personal need or grievance. The terrorist is fundamentally an *altruist.*"

15. Walter Laquer, *Storia del terrorismo* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1978), p. 177.

16. As Gérald Bronner wrote: "Terrorist is in no way amoral. On the contrary, he is extremely sensitive to what he perceives as injustice. These feelings inspire him to cross the line. This sensitivity allows him to violate the rules of ordinary morality because he considers that superior rules exist. . . . Whether terrorists come from the extreme left, extreme right or from a background of religious inspiration, what is remarkable is not a form of moral insensitivity, but rather an exaggerated sensitivity. A sensitivity so deep that it appears that there is no possible comparison or compensation in the mind of the determined extremist. We must attempt to define this mental incommensurability because it is the first step towards solving the enigma of terrorism." Gérald Bronner, "Paradox of Terrorism: the Enigma of Mental Incommensurability," Unpublished manuscript. The article is a development of Gérald Bronner, *La pensée extrême* (Paris: Denoël, 2009).

17. Max Weber, *Economia e società* (Turin: Edizioni di Comunità, 1999, vol. I), p. 13. On the causal power of mental representations in Max Weber's sociology, cf. Anthony Giddens, *Capitalismo e teoria sociale. Marx, Durkheim, Weber* (Milan: il Saggiatore, 1975), p. 253.

18. On the concept of "situated rationality," cf. Raymond Boudon, *L'ideologie. L'origine des idées reçues* (Paris: Fayard, 1986); It. tr., *L'ideologia. Origine dei Pregiudizi* (Turin: Einaudi, 1991), p. 135. An excellent introduction to Boudon's sociological perspective is Enzo Di Nuoscio, *Le ragioni degli individui. L'individualismo metodologico di Raymond Boudon* (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 1996).

19. As Max Taylor and John Horgan wrote: "Efforts to understand terrorism in terms of abnormal, individual, or other special motivations similarly seem inappropriate, and to the extent that psychology can contribute to this debate, there seems to be little or no evidence of particular or

distinctive individual qualities being associated with the terrorist." Cf. Max Taylor and John Horgan, "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (2006), p. 585. Taylor and Horgan suggest to see terrorism "as a process rather than a state."

20. Cf. C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basik Books, 1973), p. 203.

21. Ibid., p. 4.

22. Martha Crenshaw, "The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21th Century," *Psychology* (June 2000), p. 410; Walter Reich, "Understanding Terrorist Behavior: The Limits and Opportunities of Psychological Inquiry," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 261–279; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 65–85; Ehud Sprinzak, "The Process of Delegitimization: Towards a Linkage Theory of Political Terrorism," in Clark McCauley, ed., *Terrorism and Public Policy* (London: Frank Cass, 1991), pp. 50–58; Ehud Sprinzak, "Right-Wing Terrorism in a Comparative Perspective: The Case of Split Delegitimization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 1 (1995), pp. 17–43.

23. Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 1 (2005), pp. 6–7.

24. The analysis of the Red Brigades ideology is based on the following documents: (1) Testimonies of Red Brigades members who had killed; (2) Trial affidavits; (3) Documents claiming responsibility for attacks, kidnappings, thefts, assaults, injuries and murders; (4) Strategic resolutions; (5) Documents commemorating Red Brigades members killed by the police; (6) Private letters written by Red Brigades members to their families; (7) Red Brigades leaflets and writings on the walls in cities or in factories, for which responsibility has been claimed or ascertained; (8) Interviews with unrepentant militants of the Red Brigades who are still imprisoned.

25. The Red Brigades document in which the catastrophic-radical concept of history is expressed most fully is "Gocce di Sole nella Città degli Spettri" [Drops of Sun in the City of Ghosts], written by Renato Curcio and Alberto Franceschini in a 1982 short book. The world, they write, has become a "total factory." Men are engulfed by the shadows and wander around like "ghosts," swallowed up by capital "that suffocates and kills everything." Egoism triumphs. There are no longer any spaces for freedom. The most elementary needs are trampled on. Capital has taken over bodies and minds. No one, except the Red Brigades, is aware of this, because the "system" plays with its victims. Reality is just a show; happiness is self-deception. A happy person is a person who does not see. Only the Red Brigades know, see, and live. All the others are caught up in a "nonlife." A new social formation has been formed, called the "computerized metropolis." It's a huge prison, which one can escape from only with the extensive use of violence and by launching a "total social war." With high-flown and apocalyptic language, Curcio and Franceschini define "war as the mother/father of everything, a distinction that destroys everything to change it into something else. War as destruction/construction." Revolutionary violence is "humanity's greatest conscious act." Humanity will be saved after a revolutionary apocalypse that will devastate the world completely through a "catastrophic and revolutionary implosion/explosion." A minority of the "elect" have the task of destroying the "city of ghosts" to restore "light" to the kingdom of darkness." According to Curcio and Franceschini, the future of humanity is in the hands of the Red Brigades. Cf. Renato Curcio-Alberto Franceschini, *Gocce di Sole nella Città degli Spettri* (Rome: Corrispondenza Internazionale, 1982), pp. 8, 264, 266. On Renato Curcio's personality during the years in which he was a student in the University of Trento, see the testimony of Franco Ferrarotti, "Le origini di Curcio," *Paese Sera* (4 February 1976). Franco Ferrarotti who was Curcio's professor, speaks of a "millenary rage" that possessed the Red Brigades members he knew personally.

26. The terrorist Anna Laura Braghetti lived in "A time of waiting, looking for a way to change the world and attempting to understand if the Red Brigades were an instrument for making the revolutionary dream come true." Cf. Anna Laura Braghetti, *Il prigioniero* (Milan: Mondadori, 1998), p. 15. The terrorist Gianluca Codrini said that the Red Brigades considered themselves "knights

of a bloody apocalypse." Cf. Gianluca Codrini, *Io, un ex brigatista* (Naples: Editrice Fiorentino, 1981), p. 18. The terrorist Enrico Fenzi was convinced the revolution would be an "apocalypse" that would regenerate the world. He never wondered about the future. His millenarianist faith nailed him to the "here" and "now." In his words: "I've never had any particular ability to imagine the new, I've never contributed to a novel and positive scenario! No, I'd say there was an apocalyptic type of vision rather than a vision projected towards the future." Cf. Enrico Fenzi, *Armi e bagagli. Un diario dalle Brigate rosse* (Genoa-Milan: Costa & Nolan, 1998), p. 214. Before joining the Red Brigades, Enrico Fenzi was an esteemed Professor of Italian Literature at the University of Genova. Richard Drake wrote that: "It all began with the idea of revolution. Fenzi believed in this the way a properly catechised Roman Catholic believed in the communion of saints and life everlasting. Unlike his Catholic counterpart, Fenzi did not think that the millennium awaited in the indefinite future. For him the period of general righteousness and happiness, when a man could enter his house justified, was literally at hand. Capitalism, he thought, was a 'dying dinosaur.'" See, Richard Drake, "Ideology and Terrorism in Italy Autobiography as Historical Source," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (1992), p. 48.

27. "I felt cleaner, that is I was good and the others were evil," recounts left-wing terrorist Roberto Minervino. Cf. Roberto Minervino talking to Luigi Guicciardi, *Il tempo del furore: il fallimento della lotta armata raccontato dai protagonisti* (Milan: Rusconi, 1988), p. 304. The Red Brigades have always shouted to the entire world that they were animated by a "fatal" and "despotic" purity aimed at repressing the impure in the name of an unshakable faith. Valerio Morucci, *La peggio gioventù. Una vita nella lotta armata* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004), p. 114. "We were the saviors," states the terrorist Roberto Rosso, "and we wanted to bring people convincing values to judge with." Testimony of terrorist Roberto Rosso to Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della repubblica* (Milan: Mondadori, 1995), p. 378.

28. The terrorist Nitta's testimony merits particular attention because it summarizes, with extreme clarity and incisiveness, the typical traits of the Red Brigades's identification of evil. Nitta recounts that encountering the materialistic concept of history was the decisive moment of his life. After having embraced Marx's texts: "My tensions lead me to identify the duty of the revolution with my need-duty to fight against 'evil'. I will finally understand the children of Biafra with their swollen bellies and I'll have enemies to face. Imperialism, capitalism, a class-conscious society and the exploitation of man on man, for me symbolised the incarnation of evil, the enemy to destroy, everything that I couldn't nail down found a response in the fideist value of revolution." Testimony of terrorist Nitta to Diego Novelli and Nicola Tranfaglia, *Vite sospese. Le generazioni del terrorismo* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007), p. 190.

29. A Red Brigades militant who admires Pol Pot helps us to understand the obsession with purification: "If I win, I do not want any positions or honors. I just want the job of getting rid of our enemies, all those who have to be got rid of. It'll be a difficult task because there will be millions of people who have to be eliminated. That's what I want to do after [the revolution]." Cf. The testimony of a Red Brigades member cited in Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della repubblica*, p. 221. As Valerio Morucci admitted: "The Red Brigades had another politics. Or rather the same politics but taken to the extreme. They were asking the other politics to be 'pure'. Just as Savonarola asked it of 'his' Church. Purifiers of the world or exterminating angels [These were the Red Brigades]." Valerio Morucci, *La peggio gioventù. Una vita nella lotta armata*, p. 143. These are Barbara Balzerani's words: "We were an underground group which couldn't just close an office, perhaps a newspaper office, return the keys to the landlord and wait for better times at some other address. In that war, in which political bargaining was almost absent, we had introduced the logic of all or nothing, of winning or dying. And in between nothing." Barbara Balzerani, *Compagna luna* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1998), p. 87. To decipher the BR universe, the words of the multiple killer Antonio Savasta are illuminating. Between the end of April and the beginning of May 1982, he testified for twenty-seven hours during eight sessions of the first "Moro trial." Presiding Judge Santiapichi, after having invited Savasta to testify to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro without expatiating in ideological speeches, was told that Aldo Moro's kidnapping and execution could only be understood in the terms of a specific ideology, according to which enemies deserved only to be exterminated. "Moro 1," Rome Court of Assizes, Trial Records, 28 April 1982,

reel 2, p. 4. Savasta's testimony is also mentioned in Richard Drake, *Il caso Aldo Moro* (Milan: Marco Tropea Editore, 1996), pp. 61–66. "In those years," the terrorist Mario Ferrandi recalls, "we never asked ourselves what base we had to build, the only thing we knew was that the present had to be destroyed." Cf. Interview with Mario Ferrandi, *Una pistola per riconquistare il paradiso*, "il Manifesto," 7 March 1984. The enemy, explains the BR murderer Enrico Galmozzi, can only be tackled "in terms of destruction." I quote from the testimony of Enrico Galmozzi—assassin of Enrico Pedenovi, MSI (Italian Social Movement) provincial councillor killed in Milan on 29 April 1976—to Guicciardi, *Il tempo del furore. Il fallimento della lotta armata raccontato dai protagonisti*, p. 60.

30. In the words of the Red Brigades, the person who embraces the revolution is "the Christ who sacrifices himself to redeem humanity." Cf. Terrorist Enzo Fontana to Giorgio Bocca, *Noi terroristi. Dodici anni di lotta armata ricostruiti e discussi con i protagonisti* (Milan: Garzanti, 1985), p. 42.

31. Red Brigades terrorist Margherita Cagol, in a letter of 1969 to her mother, states that bourgeois society oppresses us; it "rapes" our lives continuously. We are never free, even when we think we are. Happiness is an illusion. It's the fruit of the manipulation of minds which "the system" uses to guarantee its own survival. The world has to be destroyed to be totally recreated. Those who don't fight to bring down society are guilty of a crime against humanity. In the words of Cagol to her mother: "We now have the opportunity to change this society and *it would be criminal (towards humanity)* not to exploit it. We must do everything possible to change this system, because this is the profound meaning of our existence. These things are not impossible, you know, mum. They are serious and difficult things that are really worth doing. . . . Life is too important to waste or fritter away in stupid chatter or squabbles. Every minute is vital." Cf. "Letter from Margherita Cagol to her mother (1969)," in Progetto Memoria, *Sguardi ritrovati* (Rome: Sensibili alle Foglie, 1995), p. 70. In the words of Mario Moretti: "We chose the armed struggle because every other road was closed, we felt forced to it. Forced to do dreadful things. . . . Just as in war, where they do dreadful things because they're considered terrible and necessary." Mario Moretti, *Brigate rosse. Una storia italiana*, ed. Carla Mosca and Rossana Rossanda (Milan: Mondadori, 2007), p. 49. Margherita Cagol, in a letter dated 18 September 1974, reassures her parents about her health. She tells them that her husband, Renato Curcio, was arrested because of an informant and that she has no intention of interrupting her fight for the good of humanity. The armed struggle is the only way to go and her battle is "just and sacrosanct": "Dear parents, I write to tell you not too worry too much about me. . . . Now it is up to me and all the comrades who want to combat this rotten bourgeois power to continue the fight. Please don't think that I'm irresponsible. . . . What I'm doing is just and sacrosanct, history will prove me right as it did for the Resistance in '45. But you'll say, are these the means to use? Believe me, there are no others. This police state relies on the strength of its weapons and those who want to fight it have to use the same means. . . . Therefore my revolutionary choices, despite Renato's arrest, remain the same . . . no prospect shocks or frightens me." *Letter from Mara Cagol to her parents* (18 September 1974) in *Dossier Brigate rosse 1969–1975. La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime Br*, vol. I, ed. Lorenzo Ruggiero (Milan: Kaos, 2007), pp. 249–250. In the document *claiming responsibility for the murder of Marco Biagi* (19 March 2002), violence is the only tool to free the world of unhappiness: "Power cannot therefore be achieved without revolutionary violence." Cf. "Red Brigades Claiming Responsibility for Murder of Marco Biagi." The whole text is available at http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/documenti/archivio/doc0046.htm

32. The testimony of a Red Brigades member cited in Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della repubblica* (Milan: Mondadori, 1995), p. 221.

33. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge § Kegan, 1953); It. tr., *Ideologia e utopia* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1957), p. 7.

34. Cf. Alessandro Orsini, *Anatomy of the Red Brigades. The Religious Mindset of Modern Terrorists* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011), pp. 66–82.

35. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, p. 196.

36. Jacob M. Rabbie and Hein F. M. Lodewijkx, "A Behavioral Interaction Model: Toward an Integrative Theoretical Framework for Studying Intra and Intergroup Dynamics," in Erich Witte and James H. Davis, eds., *Understanding Group Behavior. Small Group Processes and Interpersonal Relations*, vol. II (Mahwah, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), p. 269. See also Jacob M.

Rabbie, "A Behavioral Interaction Model: Toward a Social-Psychological Framework for Studying Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (1991), pp. 134–163.

37. The Red Brigades, having had a bourgeois and nonviolent upbringing, had the problem—the first and most important problem—of breaking free of this family education to accept the idea of killing. Before killing, Red Brigades members explain, one must make a sociopsychological journey that transforms the victim into a symbol. You could say that the Red Brigades had to bypass what Randall Collins has called the "barrier of confrontational tension and fear." Cf. Randall Collins, *Violence. A Micro-Sociological Theory* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 19.

38. Testimony of the terrorist Silveria Russo to Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della repubblica*, pp. 383–385.

39. Testimony of a released Red Brigades member to Donatella Della Porta, *Il terrorismo di sinistra* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1990), pp. 181–182.

40. "Risoluzione della direzione strategica delle Brigate rosse: April, 1975," in vol. I, *Brigate rosse 1969–1975. La lotta armata nei documenti e nei comunicati delle prime Br*, (Milan: Kaos, 2007), p. 355.

41. On the concept of ideology as a "toolbox," I am indebted to Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 2 (1986), pp. 273–286.

42. "Red Brigades Claiming Responsibility for Murder of Massimo D'Antona." The whole text is available at http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/documenti/archivio/doc0047.htm

43. "Red Brigades Claiming Responsibility for Murder of Marco Biagi." The whole text is available at http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/documenti/archivio/doc0046.htm

44. Marco Rimanelli, "Italian Terrorism and Society, 1940s–1980s: Roots, Ideologies, Evolution, and International Connections," *Terrorism* 4 (1989), pp. 249–296; Ernesto Fiorhxo, "Terrorism in Italy: Analysis of a Problem," *Terrorism* 3–4 (1979), pp. 261–270; Leonard Weinberg, "Patterns of Neo-Fascist Violence in Italian Politics," *Terrorism* 3–4 (1979), pp. 231–259; Anonymous, "Phenomenological and Dynamic Aspects of Terrorism in Italy," *Terrorism* 3–4 (1979), pp. 159–170; Vittorfranco S. Pisano, "A Survey of Terrorism of the Left in Italy: 1970–78," *Terrorism* 3–4 (1979), pp. 171–212; Lawrence L. Whetten, "Italian Terrorism: Record Figures and Political Dilemmas," *Terrorism* 3–4 (1978), pp. 377–395.

45. Robert Meade, *The Red Brigades: the Story of Italian Terrorism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 16. See also Sidney G. Tarrow's study of the cycle of protest that swept across Italy from the late 1960s through the early 1970s. Sidney G. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).

46. Raffaele Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, ed. Aldo Grandi (Milan: Rizzoli, 2007), p. 64. Raffaele Fiore is a Red Brigade multiple murderer, who never repented nor distanced himself from terrorism.

47. Peter Fritzsche, "Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the '68 Movement or 'Burden of Fascism'?" *Terrorism and Political Violence* 4 (1989), pp. 466–481.

48. Novelli and Tranfaglia, *Vite sospese. Le generazioni del terrorismo*, p. 191. This is the full testimony of the terrorist Nitta: "My political culture was dominated by a sensation of the inevitability of revolution and the facts I witnessed further convinced me."

49. Patrizio Peci, *Io, l'infame*, ed. Giordano Bruno Guerri (Milan: Mondadori, 1983), p. 30.

50. Cf. Lorne L. Dawson, *Comprehending Cults: The Sociology of New Religious Movements* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

51. Valerio Morucci, *A guerra finita. Sei racconti* (Rome: ManifestoLibri, 1994), p. 78.

52. A terrorist, called "Claudio," in an interview by "Panorama," 6 June 1978, p. 162.

53. Raffaele Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, p. 82.

54. Ibid., p. 57.

55. *Security and Work Rules*. Red Brigades' internal document, presumably dating back to 1974. Now in *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, pp. 311–312.

56. The expression is Anna Laura Braghetti's, who recounts that the Red Brigades lived in "anonymous apartments, with bleak furnishings; we ate hurriedly with plastic plates and glasses, without worrying about the form." Braghetti, *Il prigioniero*, p. 26.

57.   Valerio Morucci, *Ritratto di un terrorista da giovane* (Casale Monferrato: Piemme, 1999), pp. 157–158.

58.   Alison Jamieson, "Entry, Discipline and Exit in the Italian Red Brigades," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 2 (1990), p. 8.

59.   These are the words of a Red Brigades multiple murderer who was recently freed after spending 30 years and 6 months in prison. This Red Brigades member was interviewed by the author between 4 and 7 p.m. on 7 September 2011 in a bar near the *Vittorio Emanuele II* Central National Library in Rome. Before beginning the interview he asked that his voice not be recorded and that his name not be revealed, but did, however, allow the author to use a notebook to write down what he said. He was born in 1940 and had graduated from high school, and he entered the Roman column of the Red Brigades in 1977, abandoning his wife and daughter: he was part of the Brigades' leadership during the most violent years of Italian terrorism (Aldo Moro was kidnapped in Rome 16 March 1978). Today, he claims to hope that Italy will soon return to the climate of insurrection and civil war of the seventies. However, he repeatedly claimed to be pessimistic about such a possibility because, he said, conditions were unfavorable for a new wave of terrorism due to the lack of a serious revolutionary vanguard and a suitable political and cultural Italian context. He was arrested in 1980, and he now works in a small bookshop and has a very modest income that covers only his room and board.

60.   Anna Laura Braghetti, *Il prigioniero*, p. 34.

61.   Salvatore Ricciardi, *Maelstrom. Scene di rivolta e autorganizzazione di classe in Italia (1960–1980)* (Rome: DeriveApprodi, 2011), pp. 51–52.

62.   Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, p. 105.

63.   Peci, *Io, l'infame*, p. 99.

64.   According to a verdict of guilty, the Red Brigades member Cesare Di Lenardo was tortured by the Italian police during the days of the James Lee Dozier kidnapping. On 15 July 1983, Italian judges convicted the following policemen of torture: Delio Amore, Giancarlo Aralla, Carmelo Di Janni, and Fabio Laurenzi.

65.   Orsini, *Anatomy of the Red Brigades. The Religious Mindset of Modern Terrorists*, pp. 59–92.

66.   Testimony of terrorist Mario Ferrandi to Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della Repubblica*, p. 373.

67.   Ibid., p. 380.

68.   Ibid., p. 382.

69.   Ibid., p. 408.

70.   Testimony of red brigadist Enrico Galmozzi to Luigi Guicciardi, *Il tempo del furore: il fallimento della lotta armata raccontato dai protagonist,* p. 60.

71.   Testimony of Red Brigades member Mario Moretti to Sergio Zavoli, *La notte della Repubblica*, p. 330.

72.   Ibid., p. 383.

73.   This is the testimony of an anonymous left-wing Italian terrorist interviewed by della Porta, *Il terrorismo di sinistra*, p. 182.

74.   Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, p. 89.

75.   "Communiqué no. 2—D'Urso Campaign." Red Brigades document of 15 December 1980. The whole text is available at http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/documenti/archivio/doc0060.htm

76.   Enrico Fenzi, *Armi e bagagli: un diario dalle Brigate rosse* (Genoa and Milan: Costa § Nolan, 1998), p. 52.

77.   "Class against Class: Class War," in *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, p. 118. This is a document attached to the leaflet "Red Brigades. Proletarian Revolutionary Communist Newspaper," issued in Milan during 1971.

78.   "Red Brigades Leaflet Claiming Responsibility for Automobile Burning" (issued in the Lorenteggio district of Milan on 15 January 1972). In *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, p. 149.

79.   "Communiqué claiming responsibility for Macchiarini kidnapping" (issued in Milan on 3 March 1972). Idalgo Macchiarini was a Sit-Siemens manager, in *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, p. 151.

80. Fiore, *L'ultimo brigatista*, p. 95.

81. "Crush the Fascists in Mirafiori and Rivalta! Throw Them out of Our Factories and Our Districts." Red Brigades Leaflet issued in Turin on 26 November 1972, in *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, p. 194.

82. "Red Brigades Leaflet Claming Responsability for Brescia Attacks," *Controinformazione*, 7–8 June 1976.

83. "Fogli di lotta di sinistra proletaria: July-October 1970," in *Dossier Brigate rosse*, vol. I, p. 77.

84. "Red Brigades Claiming Responsability for Murder of Former Mayor of Florence Lando Conti." Document of Red Brigades Communist Combatant Party (BR-PCC) issued on 10 February 1986. Lando Conti, member of the Republican Party, was killed on via Togliatti on 10 February 1986, close to his home. The epithet "filthy Zionist pig" refers to Giovanni Spadolini, with whom Landi was a close collaborator. The document is now available at http://www.brigaterosse.org/brigaterosse/documenti/archivio/doc0101.htm

85. Giovanni Sartori, *Elementi di teoria politica* (Bologna: il Mulino, 1987), p. 117.

86. Valerio Morucci, *La peggio gioventù. Una vita nella lotta armata*, p. 192.

87. In his analysis of the Red Brigades and Red Army Faction, Marc Sageman has assigned a secondary role to ideology in explaining willingness to become terrorists. See Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 131. In Sageman's words: "The ideology of the group became a rationalization for action and put them 'at war' with society. Social involvement preceded ideology; many of the captured terrorists started reading Marx only in prison"; "Both the German and Italian cases independently demonstrate the importance of social bonds in joining a terrorist organization. In both cases, social bonds came first, and ideology followed" (p. 133). Sageman cited the following authors to support his thesis: K. Wasmund, "The Political Socialization of West German Terrorists," in *Political Violence and Terror: Motifs and Motivations*, ed. Peter Merkl (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 191–228; Peter Merkl, "West German Left-Wing Terrorism," in *Terrorism in Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995); Donatella Della Porta, "Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: Italian Left-Wing Terrorism," *International Social Movement Research*, 1 (1988), pp. 155–169; Donatella Della Porta, "Political Socialization in Left-Wing Underground Organizations: Biographies of Italian and German Militants," *International Social Movement Research* 4 (1992), pp. 259-290.

88. Luciano Pellicani, *Revolutionary Apocalypse. Ideological Roots of Revolutionary Terrorism* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 2003).

89. Donatella Della Porta, *Il terrorismo di sinistra*, pp. 123–124.

90. On the use of torture by the Italian police to fight terrorism, see Marco Clementi, *Storia delle Brigate rosse* (Rome: Odradek, 2007), pp. 318–321. See also Progetto Memoria, *Le torture affiorate* (Dogliani: Sensibili alle Foglie, 1998), which collects the testimonies of Red Brigades' members who were tortured.

91. *Letter from Margherita Cagol to her mother* (1969) in Pino Casamassima, *Il libro nero delle Brigate rosse* (Rome: Newton Compton, 2007), p. 39.

92. James S. Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990). It. tr., *Fondamenti di teoria sociale* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2005), pp. 623–628.

93. An example of what I call "terrorist of the first hour" is represented by Zouheir Riabi, an Al Qaeda–affiliated Tunisian network that operated out of the Milan area in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Zouheir was reportedly died in a massive shootout with Tunisian forces that occurred outside of Tunis in January 2007. Cf. Lorenzo Vidino, "The Buccinasco *Pentiti*. A Unique Case Study of Radicalization," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (2011), pp. 398–418.

94. See Alan M. Dershowitz, *Why Terrorism Works. Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).

95. Nicola Rao, *Colpo al cuore. Dai pentiti ai metodi speciali: come lo Stato uccise le Brigate rosse* (Milan: Sperling&Kupfer, 2011), p. 5. Members of the Red Brigades were not wrong: David

Rapoport estimated that the life expectancy of about ninety percent of terrorist groups is less than a year. Cf. David Rapoport, "Terrorism" in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds., *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, vol. II* (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 1067.

96. Many of the second hour Red Brigades members have refused to take advantage of the Italian State law of the 29 May 1982, which allows terrorists to get out of jail after a few years in exchange for cooperation with the police. Cf. Robert H. Evans, "Terrorism and Subversion of the State: Italian Legal Responses," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 3 (1989), pp. 324–352. In Latina prison, for example, there is a maximum-security unit that houses five Red Brigades members who have been imprisoned for the last thirty years, and who continue to affirm their support for terrorist violence.

97. Cf. Stefan T. Possony, "Giangiacomo feltrinelli: The millionaire dinamitero," *Terrorism* 2(3–4) (1979), pp. 213–230. Feltrinelli, one of Italy's leading capitalists, played an important role as a key organizer of European and South American terrorism. He lost his life trying to blow up a power pylon, which carried much of the electricity supplied to the urban areas of Milano.

98. These are the words of the fascist terrorist Pierluigi Concutelli in his autobiography *Io, l'uomo nero. Una vita tra politica, violenza e galera* (Venice: Marsilio, 2008), p. 61. Pierluigi Concutelli was sentenced to life imprisonment for having killed four people and is considered one of the most ferocious Italian terrorists. Never repenting, he was arrested 13 February 1977. Particularly ferocious was his murder of Carmine Palladino, a suspected terrorist who was cooperating with the police (12 August 1982). The murder, which occurred in the prison of Novara, was executed with the cord of a ping-pong net disguised as trainer laces in order to avoid the controls of prison guards and to approach the victim without arousing suspicion. From Concutelli's testimony: "Palladino died because I wanted to prevent somebody like him, an informer, continuing to damage my side, the comrades who still wanted to oppose the regime, men who were sacrificing themselves for an idea, for a utopia with no possibility of success" (p. 205).

99. Stefan Aust, *Der Baader Meinhof Komplex* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1986). It. tr., *Rote Armee Fraktion. Il caso Baader Meinhof* (Milan: il Saggiatore, 2009), p. 83.

100. Chiara Camoriano, *Nihon Sekigun. L'armata rossa giapponese* (Rome: Edizoni Nuova Cultura, 2005). On the case of the Nihon Sekigun, see Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Death by Defeatism and Other Fables: The Social Dynamics of the Rengo Sekigun Purge," in Sugyiama Lebra Takie, ed., *Japanese Social Organization* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), pp. 195–224; Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Hijackers, Bombers, and Bank Robbers: Managerial Style in the Japanese Red Army," *Journal of Asian Studies* 1 (1989), pp. 724–740; Bernard Beraud, *La Gauche Révolutionnaire au Japan* (Paris: Seuil, 1996); Meredith Box-Gavin McCormack, "Terror in Japan," *Critical Asian Studies* 1 (March 2004); David Tharp, "The Red Army: Fusako Shigenobu's Progress From 'Little Kindnesses,'" *Far Eastern Economic Review* 25 (June 1978); William R. Farrell, *Blood and Range. The Story of the Japanese Red Army* (Boston: Lexington Books, 1990); Michaël Prazan, *Les Fanatiques. Histoire de l'Armeé Rouge Japonaise* (Paris: Seuil, 2002); Bruce Roscoe, "The Red Army Threat: To Tokyo Dismay, Israel Frees a Fanatical Japanese Terrorist Fighting for the Palestinian Cause," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 22 (June 1985).

101. The testimony of a Red Brigades member to della Porta, *Il terrorismo rosso*, p. 174.

102. On the practice of abortion in the Red Brigades, see, among many others, Braghetti, *Il prigioniero*, pp. 31–32. See also Renato Curcio, *A viso aperto*, ed. Mario Scialoja (Milan: Mondadori, 1993), pp. 44–45; Patrizio Peci, *Io, l'infame*, p. 103; Silvana Mazzocchi, *Nell'anno della tigre. Storia di Adriana Faranda* (Milan: Baldini § Castoldi, 1994), pp. 55–56.

103. Testimony of Adriana Faranda to Isabel Pisano, *Io, terrorista. Parlano i protagonisti* (Milan: Marco Tropea Editore, 2004), p. 186.

104. *Al-Qaida Dans le Texte: Ecrits d'Oussama Ben Laden, Abdallah Azzam, Ayman Al-Zawahiri et Abou Moussab Al-Zarqawi/Sous la Direction de Gilles Kepel et Jean-Pierre Milelli* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2005), It. tr., *Al-Qaeda. I testi* (Bari: Laterza, 2006), p. 44. The interview with bin Laden was carried out in Afghanistan by Peter Arnett and Peter L. Bergen. For a description of this interview, see Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc, Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001).

105. Piero Agostini, *Mara Cagol. Una donna nelle prime Brigate rosse* (Venice: Marsilio, 1980), pp. 62–63.

106. Massimo Fini-Claudio Lazzaro, "Intervista a Milena Cagol," *L'Europeo*, 20 June 1975. Today also in Progetto Memoria, *Sguardi ritrovati*, pp. 74–77, from which I quote.

107. Ibid., p. 76.

108. Ibid.

109. Alberto Franceschini, *Che cosa sono le Brigate rosse*, ed. Giovanni Fasanella (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004), p. 19.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 31.

112. Curcio, *A viso aperto*, p. 18.

113. Ibid.

114. Ibid., p. 21.

115. Ibid., p. 23.

116. Ibid., p. 25.

117. Ibid., p. 26.

118. Moretti, *Brigate rosse. Una storia italiana*, p. 5.

119. Ibid.

120. Sergio Flamigni, *La sfinge delle Brigate rosse. Delitti, segreti e bugie del capo terrorista Mario Moretti* (Milan: Kaos, 2004), pp. 7–8.

121. Moretti, *Brigate rosse. Una storia italiana*, p. 14.

122. Gino Germani, *Sociologia della modernizzazione* (Bari: Laterza, 1971), p. 94.

123. Among contemporary writings, a letter that Renato Curcio wrote to his mother in November 1974 is particularly interesting. The letter is now available in many books such as *Il labirinto rivoluzionario*, vol. II, edited by Domenico Settembrini (Milan: Rizzoli, 1979), p. 295; Alessandro Silj, *Mai più senza fucile* (Florence, Vallecchi, 1977), p. 57; "Scritto di Renato Curcio dal carcere di Casale" published by the periodical *ABC*, 9 (March 1975). Many fragments of the two letters from Margherita Cagol to her mother (respectively, of 28 November 1969 and the Autumn of 1974) have also been published by Progetto Memoria, *Sguardi ritrovati*, pp. 70–72. The same letters are also in Pino Casamassima, *Il libro nero delle Brigate rosse*, p. 39.

124. The words of Anna Laura Braghetti to Silvana Mazzocchi, *Nell'anno della tigre. Storia di Adriana Faranda*, p. 14.

125. Alberto Franceschini, *Mara, Renato e io. Storia dei fondatori delle Brigate rosse* (Milan: Mondadori, 1998), p. 204.