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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

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
SOUTH SUDAN

BY

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POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

IN

SOUTH SUDAN

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STUDENT NO: 201614148

SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD) IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES TO BE AWARDED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FORT HARE- SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: PROF. P.B. MONYAI

DEDICATION

THIS RESEARCH WORK IS DEDICATED TO ALL DISPLACED AND

VULNERABLE PEOPLE OF SOUTH SUDAN

RESTORATION IS COMING TO YOU SOON

DECLARATION

I **David Annan (Student Number 201614148**), hereby declare that the dissertation, titled "Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development in South Sudan," for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Development Studies at the University of Fort Hare, is my own work and it has not previously been submitted for assessment or completion of any postgraduate qualification to another University or another qualification.

David Annan   Supervisor: Prof. P.B. Monyai

David Annan

Date: 16 August 2019   Date: _____

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ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

"For I see peace and development coming to South Sudan".

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ABSTRACT

The primary goal of this study was to identify possibilities for a common ground for reconciliation and restoring law and order through internally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) in South Sudan to prevent the recurrence of violent conflict and to attain peace, socio-economic and sustainable development.

The existing literature about PCRD is mainly written by authors, policymakers and scholars who mostly support externally driven interventions and operations of ready-made 'solutions' to complex problems in war-torn countries without exploring internally driven approval to solve these conflicts. It is because of the failure of these externally driven approaches and the absence of a common goal for reconciliation that this study has been conceived to explore alternative approaches for reconciliation and post-conflict settlement to restore responsible law and order, build resilient good governance and to build legitimate state institutions in South Sudan.

To better understand in-conflict and post-conflict societies and their needs, the study uses a qualitative methodology approach through explorative and interpretative mechanisms to purposely put together face-to-face interviews of people's opinions on the current civil conflict in South Sudan. The findings indicate that for peace to be restored there is a need for an internally national dialogue and reconciliation and external actors must support locally driven initiation to enable lasting peace to prevail in South Sudan.

The research uses cosmopolitan conflict transformation resolution (CCTR) to demonstrate perspective and knowledge of the South Sudanese on peace-building to provide an alternative contribution to efficient intervention in the South Sudan conflict. Without peace there cannot be effective lasting development and without development, it is almost impossible to establish lasting peace. Hence, the study views PCRD more as a sustainable development intervention through an internally driven approach than a market-biased political process to prevent relapse of violent conflict in South Sudan.

ETHICS

The research ethical integrity was approved by the University Research Ethic committee (UREC) of the University of Fort Hare. Ethics number: **MON321SANN01**

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU – African Union

CCTR – Cosmopolitan Conflict Transformation Theory

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement

DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration

DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement

ECOWAS – Economic Committee of West African States

ECPF – ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework

EU – European Union

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GOSS – Government of South Sudan

IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

IFIs – International Financial Institutions

IMF – International Monetary Fund

LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MDTF – Multi-Donor Trust Fund

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PCRD – Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development

PIC – Peace Implementation Council

SDRA – Swedish Defence Research Agency

SPLA – Sudan People's Liberation Army

SPLM – Sudan People's Liberation Movement

SSR – Security Sector Reform

TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNMIL – United Nation Mission in Liberia

UNMISS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

US – United States

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER ONE

1.1. Introduction

Countries coming out of violent conflict face extreme challenges. Violent fighting leads to death, destruction, injury, displacement and human rights violations, establishing a scar of physical and psychological blueprint that takes long to go away. Economies and government institutions are damaged; social relations and infrastructure are mostly destroyed. Over the past few decades, most conflicts fought around the world have been between organised groups within countries, not between sovereign countries (Collier 2010:121).

It is imperative to say that conflicts are not always internal affairs as they vigorously affect the regions, neighbours and in some cases affect the world. The negative impact comes through the spread of violent fighting and political instability beyond borders, arms trafficking, refugee flows and mostly disruption of trade between countries and the movement of goods and services. Ending violent conflict is only part of a process of recovery and stabilisation and this can be achieved through vigorous and comprehensive socio-economic reconstruction, development, peacebuilding and state-building (Dayton & Kriesberg 2009:5).

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) includes short-term humanitarian assistance, relief and medium- to long-term reconstruction and development to avoid relapse into violent conflict. Key aspects of reconstruction comprise rebuilding of physical infrastructure, creation of an inclusive and

accountable governance system, economic recovery and repair of social relationships to avoid relapses into conflict (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009:130).

From this perspective, PCRD goes beyond rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure and housing the displaced to include a wide range of activities such as: disarmament, demobilisation of combatants, the return of refugees, and reconciliation, thereby combining repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructure with the interventions aiming at rebuilding institutions of war-torn countries (Barakat & Zyck 2009).

From 1956, Sudan was an umbrella nation comprising of North and South states. However, the country's independence failed to reassure southerners, and over the years a protracted and violent conflict developed and raged between north and south for many years. This post-colonial experience united southerners, setting them on a collision course with the north (Jok 2011:2).

Despite the many disagreements among southerners, some of them at times very violent, the experience of the war, including Khartoum's counter-insurgency tactics against civilians in the south, convinced much of the southern population that the north, represented by the government in Khartoum, was their common enemy, and that all southerners should set aside their differences and unite in resistance. This resistance lead to the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) in 2005 between the north and south. The CPA gave birth to South Sudan to be an independent state (Jok 2011:2).

The case of South Sudan is critical; a country with a population of around 12 million people which is highly diverse ethnically and linguistically and formed from 10 southern states of Sudan. South Sudan gained its independence as the newest country in the world in 2011 but because of ethnic division in 2013, the country has been engulfed in civil war till today and all the gains the country made have been destroyed by the violent conflict.

The quest for coercive power (leadership) to control the country and to have complete access to the rich natural resources of the country by one ethnic group to the neglect of the others, and the immediate sacking of the Vice President (Riek Machar) in 2013, resulted in the violent ethnic conflict in South Sudan. South Sudan is seen as a failed state as political rivalry between the Dinka (President Salva Kiir) and the Nuer tribes (opposition leader, Riek Machar) has become a full-blown violent conflict or a civil war. Because of this, there is weak administrative capacity and a militarised approach to governance and politics. This has often heightened tribal differences among the population (Schomerus & Allen 2010:15).

The situation in South Sudan is an indication that if the underlying drivers of conflicts are not addressed and resolved properly, they can undermine stability and peace in a country and possibly lead to the resumption of fighting.

NEPAD (2005: 6) emphasises that after conflict, urgent need for social reconstruction and development is required. One primary aim of post-war

reconstruction and development is to "address the underlying drivers of difference and to lay the basics for societal decency and feasible peace" (NEPAD 2005: IV).

In South Sudan external multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and International Alert are providing humanitarian assistance through food parcels and loans, and the East Africa block (IGAD) is mediating and negotiating for peaceful settlement and setting up refugee camps for the affected victims of the conflict (rehabilitation). However, interventions are short-term and do not bring long-term peace and stability to South Sudan.

For peace to be restored and to last, there is a need to effectively address the underlying cause of war, which in the case of South Sudan is the failure to find a common ground among the warring factions which indicates lack of committed leadership. If countries fail to address grievances that lead to crises and fighting, they risk remaining "caught in horrible cycles of contention, hardship, lose hope and persevering insecurity" (Kozul-Wright & Rayment 2011:199).

South Sudan is one of the newest developing countries in the world where experience in post-conflict reconstruction is lacking. Notwithstanding, the recent conflict/civil war compels it to attempt recovering, reconstruction, development and building lasting peace and national restructuring (state-building); hence, this study focuses on post-conflict recovery and development in South Sudan. The essence is that in destroying the infrastructure, public utilities and communications because of

conflict, there is a need to rebuild the country and establish long-term peace and stability in South Sudan.

It is imperative to mention that positioning PCRD within the discipline of development studies, Mac Ginty & Williams (2009:6) point out that development is not only about economics, but also about social, political and institutional issues. Socio-economic reconstruction and development are integral parts of post-conflict recovery efforts.

Without reconstruction, inclusive development, livelihood improvements, poverty eradication and delivery of basic services to the population in the aftermath of conflict, it is unlikely that there can be long-term stability and peace. Post-conflict reconstruction and development are not about economics, development and physical reconstruction but also about social recovery, security improvements, state-building, reconciliation and institutional reforms and development (Schomerus & Allen 2010:81).

In the aftermath of conflict, there is a need to rebuild countries and establish long-term peace and stability. Post-conflict recovery efforts are to establish stability, security, rule of law, good governance, promote social justice and reconciliation and finally enhance the socio-economic well-being of the citizens in a stable environment in the affected country (Hamre & Sullivan 2002:89).

This study focuses on PCRD. It does not concentrate solely on physical and economic reconstruction and development endeavours; it also focuses on post-

conflict long-term stabilisation, state building and security improvement and building legitimate governance structures in South Sudan.

1.2. Problem statement

The crisis in South Sudan that started in December 2013 manifests clear signs of failure to find common ground among the warring parties and a lack of committed leadership. The affected parties are failing to negotiate and find a common goal around which to build a political consensus for reconciliation and for post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Lack of reconciliation and post-conflict settlement have influenced the limit and validity of the state to distribute, administer and direct resources toward development, education and enhanced expectations for everyday comforts. The state has become weakened, capable civil servants have fled to other countries and in some cases, states in South Sudan have been scattered/displaced completely with non-existent infrastructure (Menocal 2010:2).

This situation in South Sudan impedes the creation of vigorous instruments to manage the conflict. As of now, failure to develop a common vision of administration inside the new constituted administering group, whose individuals are drawn from previous warring parties, (the Dinka tribe and Nuer tribe), prompts factionalism that makes diverse government work experience some miscommunication as opposed to national good (UNDP 2010:6).

Although the united nations and multilateral donor agencies are assisting in the reconstruction of South Sudan by giving humanitarian assistance and foreign aid through the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), this external driven aid approach falls short as it is a short-term reconstruction mechanism that does not stop the relapse into conflict and does not bring lasting peace and stability in South Sudan (UNDP 2010:8).

The use of externally driven approaches to reconstruct economies of South Sudan through UNMISS and other multilateral donor agencies after violent conflict by giving humanitarian assistance, foreign aid and imposition of external ideologies through loans and a free market has resulted in arms trafficking to South Sudan, thus creating multiple openings for violence as guns are easily accessible in the country and as a result the hope to stop the re-emergence of conflict in South Sudan is very dim.

It is because of the failure of these externally driven approaches and the absence of a common goal for reconciliation that this study has been conceived to explore alternative approaches for reconciliation and post-conflict settlement to restore responsive law and order, building resilient good governance (democratisation) and building legitimate state institutions in South Sudan.

1.3. Research questions

➤ What can be the common ground for reconciliation in South Sudan?

- What are the strengths and weaknesses of externally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development mechanisms in South Sudan?

- How can state institutions restore law and order in South Sudan?

- How can post-conflict practices and approaches be improved to bring lasting harmony and socio-economic stability in countries emerging from conflicts/civil war?

1.4. Objective of the study

The primary goal of this study is to identify possibilities for a common ground for reconciliation and restoring law and order through an internally driven PCRD in South Sudan for local participation and state-building that is critical towards preventing the recurrence of violent conflict.

This study's specific objectives are to:

- Examine factors that lead to the resumption of conflict in South Sudan.

- Analyse the strengths and weakness of externally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development mechanism in South Sudan.

- Identify opportunities for building strong and responsive state institutions in South Sudan

- Explore alternative policies that can assist internally driven PCRD capacity to enable citizens to participate in policy formulation and implementation to attain socio-economic development and sustainable peace.

1.5. Justification for the study

The existing literature about PCRD is mainly written by authors, experts, academics and policymakers who support externally driven interventions and operations of ready-made 'solutions' to complex problems in war-torn countries.

Authors like Grant (2007:443), examine external measurements of post-conflict recovery contending that the United Nations, respective givers and transitional Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) have been instrumental in giving truly necessary external help amid the phase of common wars and the post-war period. However, while this help is a much-appreciated wellspring of external support for PCRD endeavours, it is limited, like any other source. Reconstruction must address elusive issues of underlying drivers of the conflict to avert relapses into violent clashes and this for the most part is disregarded. To this end, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009:69), argue that post-war stability and peace "depend as much on socio-economic inclusion as they do on more overt security or identity related issues".

Krause and Jutersonke (2005:447), give a critical outline of the contemporary routine of PCRD contending that contemporary post-conflict operation rests upon the presumption that a modern social-designing methodology could supplant or fast track a procedure of state formation that happens artificially as opposed to state formation that occurs through mutual concern of all citizens. However, numerous PCRD programmes have been directed to solve short-term conflict stability through aid intervention with minimal self-reflection on the basic needs of the affected country in conflict in the long term.

A large portion of academic writing basically deals with post-conflict reconstruction, financial reconstruction and improvement since the mid-1990s and does not make an unequivocal connection between the record of neo-liberalism and its reasonableness for financial reconstruction and advancement in the aftermath of conflict (Panye & Philips 2010; Willis 2011). This is a noteworthy imperfection claiming neo-liberalism has influenced externally determined PCRD and a liberal peace system. Hence, this is a flaw because, if different creators had fundamentally grilled the record of neo-liberal strategies and approaches and analysed their reputation in the developing world since the 80s, this may have driven them to address whether comparable arrangements, projects and impositions were proper for nations desolated by conflict. This examination basically analyses the record of neo-liberalism and exhibits its inadmissibility for post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Therefore, it is important to state that many PCRD processes are centred on externally driven practices to build and reconstruct using external theories in the aftermath of conflict without confronting the grassroots of the conflict as in the case of South Sudan where the manifestation of the conflict is as result of failure to find common ground among the parties (Dinka and the Nuer tribe) and a lack of dedicated leadership to steer the country forward.

This study views PCRD more as a sustainable development intervention than a market-biased political process and it examines and analyses the constraints to institutional reforms and shows how the influence of external PCRD is inclined to

have had an impact on local participation and state-building that are critical towards preventing the relapse of South Sudan into violent conflict.

It is imperative to state that the study challenges the way 'mainstream' actors, academics, experts and policymakers have been approaching PCRD since the end of the Cold War. Authors like Easterly (2006:7) and Mc Ewan (2009:14) state that contemporary use of the terms 'West' and 'Western' is political, not geographical. These terms refer to western liberal democracies as organised in neo-liberal fashion as these countries control major international agencies that promote 'free trade', security and military terms. This study explores experiences of countries that went through externally and internally driven PCRD such as Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa to think through the possibilities of internally driven PCRD and local state-building institutions through reconciliation and building of effective governance structure in South Sudan that are sustainable to bring long-term peace and development.

1.6. Delimitations of study

A major constraint the researcher experienced was the limited time spent in South Sudan as the states are geographically far apart and the researcher did not have the capacity to cover an expansive number of respondents and travel around the whole country.

Also, because of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, some states were still not safe to travel to for research purposes. As such, the researcher limited findings and

interviews to Juba, the capital town of South Sudan, where people from almost all states within South Sudan are currently living because of better security as compared to other states. As such the study was able to obtain views of respondents from different states.

The study focuses on medium- to long-term socio-economic recovery, institutions (state-building) and stability in South Sudan. The study did not focus on some aspects of PCRD. For instance, the humanitarian aspect was not the focus of the study as its purpose is not to promote medium- to long-term reconstruction and development but only offers immediate short-term relief to displaced people (Shurke & Buckmaster 2005:738).

Also, peacekeeping as a concept was not the focus of the study as it forms an integral part of post-conflict recovery efforts because it targets fighting and monitors ceasefire in the aftermath of conflict through the deployment of foreign soldiers. The study looks beyond peacekeeping and shifts focus onto medium- to long-term recovery through restoring responsible law and order, building legitimate governance and state building in South Sudan.

1.7. Conclusion

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) includes short-term humanitarian assistance, relief and medium- to long-term reconstruction and development to avoid relapse into violent conflict. Key aspects of reconstruction comprise the rebuilding of physical infrastructure, creation of an inclusive and

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accountable governance system, economic recovery and repair of social relationships to avoid relapses into conflict (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009:130).

Socio-economic reconstruction and development are vital in peacebuilding. Without peace there cannot be efficient and lasting development and without development, it is almost impossible to establish lasting peace. Effective government structure, employment openings, better infrastructure, basic services and improving the living conditions of the citizens of South Sudan involves establishing a lasting peace within the economy. For this reason, establishing proper security, building state institutions and development of a stable political environment are important for socio-economic reconstruction and lasting development in South Sudan. The study analyses how effective internally driven PCRD can bring long-lasting peace and development to avoid relapse into violent conflict in South Sudan. The chapter concludes with the research outline of the study.

1.8. RESEARCH CHAPTER OUTLINES

Chapter One

The chapter provides a general introduction to the study and explains the focus of the study on post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). The study outlines the problem statement of the research that the crisis in South Sudan that started in December 2013 manifests clear signs of failure to find common ground among the warring parties and a lack of committed leadership. The affected parties

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are failing to negotiate and find a common goal around which to build a political consensus for reconciliation and for post-conflict reconstruction and development.

Research questions have also been outlined and the primary goal of this study is to identify possibilities for a common ground for reconciliation and restoring law and order through internally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) in South Sudan for local participation and state building that is critical towards preventing the recurrence of violent conflict.

Furthermore, the study justifies itself by challenging the way 'mainstream' actors, academics, experts and policymakers have approached PCRD since the end of the Cold War. It puts into context and critically explores experiences of countries that went through externally and internally driven PCRD to unpack results and practices, recommend possible improvements to current approaches and explore the possibility of internally driven PCRD local state-building institutions through reconciliation and building of effective governance structure in South Sudan that are sustainable to bring long-term peace and development. Finally, the chapter concludes by looking at the delimitations of the study.

Chapter Two – Socio-economic profile of South Sudan

The chapter profiles South Sudan and discusses the context of issues around post-conflict reconstruction and development. It provides a contextual background about post-conflict recovery in South Sudan and provides a historical background to the

violent conflict in the country and the approaches and interventions currently being used to end the conflict but focuses only on post-conflict periods.

Chapter Three – PCRD frameworks

The chapter looks at post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) frameworks, African Union framework, key aspects and dimensions of PCRD, socio-economic dimensions of PCRD and externally driven PCRD, looking at the role players like the United Nations, World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and ownership in externally driven PCRD operations.

Chapter Four – Literature review

This chapter reviews relevant concepts, relevant literature provides a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues, arguments and concerns related to externally driven PCRD and highlights the gap in the literature that the study explores.

The chapter defines key concepts and aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and development and places PCRD in study context, explores its main arguments, approaches and practices.

The literature review chapter is divided into sections: Section one focuses on the key definitions and concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and positions PCRD within development discipline; Section two focuses on the theoretical underpinning of development, conflict and foreign aid and unpacks various approaches and practices

related to internally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development in South Sudan.

Chapter Five – Research methodology

This chapter discusses research design, methodology, sample, data collection and analysis, validity and reliability of the study, ethical considerations and how questions were handled.

Chapter Six – Field research findings

This chapter discusses and identifies issues raised and discussed by participants in each theme. It presents research findings gathered through semi-structured and open-ended in-depth interviews with selected individuals, officials and policymakers from or working in South Sudan.

Chapter Seven – Reflection on findings

The chapter discusses and analyses the findings from South Sudan on institutions, challenging post-civil conflict environment, post-conflict security enhancement, local politics and the involvement of the international community in PCRD operations.

Chapter Eight – Recommendations

This chapter confronts the main problem of the study and affirms whether the study has addressed the focus through the findings and whether the main objective has been achieved. Findings derived from the in-depth interviews in South Sudan are

analysed, compared with the data, concepts, ideas and arguments from the literature review and the contextual background chapters.

It is divided into two sections: the first section presents key findings about internally driven PCRD that emerged from the data collected in the study; section two discusses the prospects for an alternative/improved approach to post-conflict reconstruction and development by offering recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE OF SOUTH SUDAN

2. Introduction

The Republic of South Sudan became the world's newest nation and Africa's 55th country on 9 July 2011. The renewed conflicts in December 2013 undermined the development gains achieved since independence and worsened the humanitarian situation. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, more than 4.2 million people have been displaced both internally and to neighbouring countries, and about 5.3 million (nearly half the population) face severe food insecurity. Without conflict resolution and a framework for peace and security, the country's longer-term development and prosperity are threatened.

South Sudan is the most oil-dependent country in the world, with oil accounting for almost the totality of exports, and around 60% of its gross domestic product (GDP).

Table 1. **South Sudan population statistics**

POPULATION	**12,854,137 (est.)**
POVERTY LEVEL	**50.6% (Est.)**
UNEMPLOYMENT	**18.5% (Est.)**

LITERACY	**32.0 (%) in 2016**
GDP	**US$ 9.015 billion (2016)**
GDP PER CAPITAL	**US$ 1,500 (Est.)**
LIFE EXPECTANCY	**56.81 years (2016)**

South Sudan currently has a population of around 12 to 13 million. The country is one of the most diverse ethnic groups in the African continent with more than sixty ethnicities. However, due to prolonged conflict, there is a low level of education, more than 30 percent of the population have no basic level of education and only a few schools are established in South Sudan. Moreover, there is a high rate of unemployment among the population and the level of poverty is very high. According to the WHO (2016), there is a more than 50 percent poverty rate. Although subsistence farming is one of the practices of the nation, many conflicts along tribal lines have decreased the life expectancy of the population. The life expectancy of South Sudanese is between 58 and 60 years due to poverty and lack of proper amenities to stimulate and regulate the health and proper livelihoods of the people of South Sudan (WHO 2016).

2.1. Historical background of South Sudan.

South Sudan, the freshest country in the globe, was at one time a substantial piece of Sudan. The dispute among what is currently Sudan and South Sudan is routinely grasped through their chronicled ancestry: many years of abuse and slave exchanging by the "Middle Easterners" (Arabs), followed by colonisation by the United Kingdom and Egypt. The Arab clans at first arrived in Sudan from Upper Egypt during the medieval times, with explorative occupation in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, it is difficult to clarify Sudan's current clashes from one single point. While religion, race, financial misuse, and imperialism are overall significant components in the tragedy, none of these variables completely clarifies the circumstance (Johnson 2003:21).

Since Sudan existence, the general population living in its southern part take pride in a more significant number of shared characteristics between them that contrasts with populace of northern counterpart in different ways. The uniqueness within the southern gatherings incorporates diverse methods of income generation particularly itinerant cattle rearing and vocation with rich dynamic religious and social conventions (Kulusika 1998:36).

2.1.2 The arrival of the Egyptians

The Egyptians arrival in1880 to Eastern Africa for developing ivory and slave trade conquered Northern Sudan. Between 1880 and 1885s, a driven nationalist rebellion started to shape up contrary to the Egyptian and British tenet. The British and

Egyptians were later crushed in 1885 as the nationalist rebellion sets up a religious government in Khartoum (Bartos & Wehr 2002: 8).

The continued armed conflicts led to recaptured of the power of Sudan by Britain in 1890s. In 1899, Egypt and Britain concurred on a joint legislature of Sudan. The British in 1930 announced the "Southern Policy" authoritatively expressing what had been the North and South. By considering the North and South in numerous social and cultural contrasts, they administered them as different regions (Johnson 2003:21).

Egypt left Sudan in 1940. Because of their departure, British and Khartoum unexpectedly chose to combine the two regions into a single managerial area. The Arabic language was made the dialect of government in the South. Sudan started to griped authority in 1946 and the South anticipating autonomy and mastery by the Sudan led an organised rebellion in Torit in 1955. The revolts built up a huge secessionist development in the South, called the "Anyanya". The Anyanya battled considerable measure of inner division and unsteadiness, much like the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) in the second war.

However, in 1956, autonomy was conceded to Sudan as a single country, but civil hostilities broke out in Sudan between 1955 and 1972. Sudan picked up authenticity (legitimacy) in the 1970s and peace for the first time prevailed. Western nations started providing the government with weaponry. The United States offered Sudan

hardware, planning to neutralise Soviet help against collective Ethiopians and Libyans.

It is important to state that immediately after the first civil war had ended, Chevron discovered strong oil fields in the Upper Nile and southern Kordofan districts. Presently, oil is found all through Southern Sudan. In 1980, Khartoum attempted to redraw the cut-off points of Southern Sudan, trading oilfields toward the North. When their attempt failed, Khartoum took the place by force (Iyob & Khadiagala 2006:27).

Repeated violation of the Addis Ababa Agreement by the north prompted expanded agitation in the south and another general war occurred in the vicinity in 1983 and 2005. The Sudanese government authoritatively cancelled the Addis Ababa Agreement and partitions the south into three locals. The southern provincial government was broken down. President Nimiety established a strong Islamic law, changing Sudan into a Muslim Arab state. As a result of the Islamic law, rebellions occurred through South and destructive powers was developed (Jacon et al 2012:489).

In July 1983, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), drove by the late John Garang, was formed in Ethiopia. Civil war seethed through the South. The SPLA fought government forces and endeavoured to take control. Towns through the South were over and again assaulted and demolished, oppression and slavery ended up noticeably across the South.

In 1989, Al-Mahdi advanced toward consenting to peace arrangements, he was expelled in the conflict, and Omar al-Bashir seized control. The fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF), headed by hardline Islamist Hassan al-Turabi, supported Al-Bashir. The new government wildly supported the Islamic code through Sudan, prohibiting unlawful associations, political gatherings, and other non-religious foundations.

In 1993, a peace development for Sudan was sought for after by Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Kenya under the sponsorship of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, there was no impact and strife in Sudan heightened. Peace was at last expedited between Southern radicals and the legislature of Sudan on January 9, 2005.

The Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, allowing self-governance for the South for six years, after which the South would have the chance to vote to withdraw. These assertions required a permanent truce and sharing of oil incomes. Islamic law stays in the North, while its utilisation in the South was chosen locally. Per the CPA, a referendum was signed to be held in 2011 to decide whether Southern Sudan would remain as part of Sudan or withdraw and advanced freedom. The general population of Southern Sudan anticipated an open door for peace and stability, following a twenty-one-year struggle that destroyed many lives (Jok 2011:1; CPA 2005: 87).

In April 2010, Sudan held its first national elections in more than 20 years. Major opposition parties refused to participate due to extortion. Omar Hassan al-Bashir won Presidency of Sudan with 68% of the vote. Salva Kiir became the President of the Republic of Southern Sudan with 75% of the vote and on January 9th, 2011 Southern Sudanese voted in a referendum predetermined in the 2005 CPA to choose if local South Sudan would isolate itself from the North and become an autonomous country. The South won majority of the votes and set in motion a transition into self-sufficiency. The Republic of South Sudan commended its birthday on July 9th, 2011 as an autonomous state and on July 14th, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan joined the United Nations as the world's 193rd country (Le Riche & Arnold 2012:109; El- Nour 2011:1-2; Herr 2011:1).

Since South Sudan came into existence after long wars of liberation. It inherited poor infrastructure, limited capacity to governance, weak institutions, economic crisis and violent ethnic divisions after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005. South Sudan have more than sixty cultural and linguistic groups, each of which have a stronger sense of citizenship in their tribes than in the nation. The multiple ethnicities are what bind them together by its history of struggle for freedom and collective opposition to the North. The formation of the leadership of the South Sudan Liberation Movement under the leadership of the late John Garang, transcended ethnic boundaries campaigning for unity of purpose during the wartime with the North, broadcasting a nation for South Sudan. The concept and conviction about separate nationhood led to the referendum of self-determination in 2011.

Despite violent discord and the creation of militias that fought bitter wars or conflict against each other within the South Sudan Liberation Army, the country remained focused on the need for unity and ranks in their struggle. However, after independence in 2011, internal political rivalries along ethnic lines became the order of governance and the state's inability to provide the anticipated peace dividends and fruits of independence led to continued violence insurgencies in the country (Sudd institute 2013:2).

Ethnic relations in the South Sudan have been to a great degree unpredictable because of allegations that the Dinka, South Sudan's biggest ethnic group, have overwhelmed the government and there are cases of brutality by "Nuer and Dinka" commanded armed force staff. However, in 2013, during the leadership meeting at the state house the deputy president was sacked, which was pursued as ethnic factionalism between the two leaders, the president representing the "Dinka tribe" and the vice president representing the "Nuer tribe". Immediately after the sacking, internal conflict begun in the country where the two most densely ethnic groups confronted and killed each other for the reason of neglect and to occupy the top position of the country. This civil conflict, which started in 2013 until now, has displaced more than two million people and killed thousands of innocent people. This indicates that South Sudan has to start post-conflict reconstruction and development from scratch as all the gains have been washed away by violent conflict (Jok, 2013:2).

2.2. Causes of conflict:

2.2.1. Political Competition on Ethnic Grounds

Since the signing of the CPA in 2005 and autonomy in 2011, ethnic strife has been the reason of contention between various tribes in South Sudan for top military positions. It is activated by sentiments of avoidance from national positions and rivalry over political space, which truly began as rivalry between key political figures is now transformed into ethnic loyalties and is now the reason for rivalry for top positions.

Even though this contention happens in urban settings among top political elites, it regularly plays out in country zones with physical showdowns of conflict occurring in towns and profoundly affecting rural occupants (Jok 2013:7-8).

The ethnic competition that has been left unaddressed by the government, which includes both tribes in the central government and local residents in border areas could pose genuine dangers, conceivably rendering the new republic so temperamental as to be ungovernable. Its ability to destabilise the nation originates from the way such ethnic-based rivalry for political space and assets separates the general reflection of sharing of national assets (Sudd institute 2013:7).

2.2.2. Ethnic Violence

South Sudan is encountering legislative issues where one ethnic group control government for the principle of ensuring its own tribe gain mastery over other ethnic gatherings. More than 60 tribes can be recognised in South Sudan; however, two

major tribes are the "Dinka and the Nuer Tribe" are shielding an ethnic tribe from control by others; a turnaround control is formed where the ethnic tribe in control forces itself and rules over others and this typically raises struggle and political insecurity.

Endeavouring to incapacitate one group at any given moment has implied that all groups always have to protect themselves even at their work stations. This has been the situation with Nuer-Dinka clashes on the outskirts along Warrap and Unity states and within Jonglei, where endeavours have been made to incapacitate one tribe just for its individuals to be butchered and demobilised (Sudd institute 2013:3).

In November 2011, for instance, only four months after independence, the Sudan people's liberation army (SPLA) in Eastern region of Warrap state sent troops to cease cows of Dinka residents. Their ranges were assaulted and incapacitated in two days by the Bul Nuer from Mayom County of Unity State because of tribal adversaries (Jok 2013:7-8).

For some ethnic groups, their increasing encounters with ethnic conflict is seen as common savagery which is serious and confirmed that the end of the North-South war and the self-determination of South Sudan may have small significance for them as far as their day-today security is concerned. According to Jok (2013:8), "many people say that self-determination has just ended a specific sort of war but has left wellsprings of uncertainty most significant to them unmitigated". Thus, the

government should painstakingly consider its commitment to secure its residents across the country.

2.2.3. The Evolution of the Crisis with the SPLM

The current conflict in the nation, which some global media houses have misrepresented as an ethnic clash, exuded from an internal battle for political power within the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). It must be recalled that the SPLM was a political gathering, which battled an extended war of freedom against different administrations in Khartoum, was never a resilient body. From its commencement, there have been power struggle, ideological and political contrasts, and even key contrasts within the association. These distinctions take after ethnic or local blame lines, prompting ethnic savagery. Tragically, these vicious contrasts have never been convincingly settled (Lacher 2012: 5; Jok 2013:4).

They were calmed amid the war in a legitimate concern for accomplishing autonomy against the most despised foe, the then Government of Sudan. In this manner, the SPLM can best be depicted as a creation of different political intrigue gatherings, armed forces, and tribal or ethnic pioneers joined against a typical adversary, a union that is not grounded in any group or shared ideological fate.

After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, it was hoped that for development, the SPLM, would be changed into a political party to champion the solidarity of the general population of South Sudan on new premise and lead the general public towards accomplishing full social change and advance

peaceful environment, uniformity, equity, and successful livelihoods for the population. Given the conditions under which the then Government of Southern Sudan worked, it merits a great deal of credit since SPLM figured out how to put together all different military groups under the SPLA, however, this projection made a disconnected protection underpinning in the nation because of the way the military was assembled together (Jot 2013:9).

On the political front, no significant change occurred and rather what happened is presently known as "a major tent approach" in which persuasive people are positioned in the administration, and the rebel groups were remunerated into stopping rebellion (Sudd institute 2013:3).These convenience approach of rewards for rebel groups to stop fighting has created an incentive for savagery to continue and people in the government are creating fighting so to hold on to power and challenge the chairmanship of the SPLM/A.

2.2.4. Leadership contest

The days paving the way to the festival of South Sudan's second commemoration of independence introduced a strained political atmosphere in Juba that was really causing open worry in the nation. This political circumstance features the breaks within the top decision-makers of the country, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Obviously, its merits specifying that what have now unmistakably turn into a three-way control battle among President Salva Kiir Mayardit, Vice President Riek Machar, and the SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amum Okiech has

been a circumstance going back to the 2008 SPLM National Convention (Sudd institute 2013:3).

While power challenge over governance is an ordinary thing to expect in the life of any political association, this present situation within the SPLM is creating crisis that could hamper the establishment of the nation. To put an end to such circumstance and contain any conceivable spillover into the general population, the SPLM should have managed its inward power wrangling through the hierarchical structures and intervening components, for example, the legislative constitution.

While keeping the Movement's progressive system is excellent, it exhibits a test to non-military personnel governance, which should be based on singular goals, experience, benefits, and honesty, and it apparently undermines democratic systems. The present situation positively epitomises this reality with the understanding that initiative must be gotten to on the request of wartime status, this obviously implies authorities can just climb to the highest position in government without general election from the population (Diing Akol 2013: 6)

A look at the current political crisis, it is clear that the government has no instruments for controlling individual forces. The President, the Vice President, and the Secretary General of the government have turned out freely against each other and it shows that there is no instrument within the government to impugn and limit these people from taking an interior position to amass and destroy the country.

The formal processes through which the government can have discussion and address basic issues of governance appear insignificant. The apparent absence structures to channel review and authorities are in some cases compelled to open up to the world on matters that could some way be resolved internally within the country (Diing Akol 2013: 6)

In addition, the rejection of governors appointed by the states to overlook the affairs of the 10 provincial states undermines the states' power in the government to properly legislate and run the country smoothly because of the way these governors are appointed through ethnic lines mainly for the Dinka group who support the president of South Sudan. Moreover, the present power struggle within the SPLM proceeds unabated and it has divided the government into two opposing force which causes great tension and continued violent in South Sudan.

These situation causes uneasiness for the citizens, consequently a furious aching for an answer to keep up peace and national solidarity is strongly echoing in the many displaced citizens for redress, put a stop to violent conflict, and reconstruct what has been destroyed through the conflict.

2.2.5. Patronage, corruption and impunity

The signing of CPA (2005) between Sudan and the SPLA has been followed with massive increase fraud in government departments. The government has misused its financial and political generosity turning into a "Kleptocracy" where political forces are sourced to secured riches (De Waal 2014:2).

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The president reshuffled the government in July 2013 and removed prominent elites like the vice president and elites' ministers in the struggle for independence accusing them of corruption (Lunn 2016). Majority of these elites have played a leading role in the political and economic struggle in the post-autonomy and in the wake of their removal from government, they all joined the opposition to form a coalition to furnished resistance. The conflicting parties have sought to strengthen power on their loyalist particularly from their ethnic tribes (Lunn 2016).

According to Aljazeera (2014), $ 4 billion of state funds was stolen at the ministries. The president accused the opposition party for stealing and demanded a return of the state funds. It was later reported that only 1.5% of the state fund was retuned (Aljazeera, 2014) notwithstanding this, the civil conflicts have killed tens of thousands and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced (international crisis group 2014b:20).

2.2.6. Militarisation and arm trafficking

The linkage between violent conflict and militarisation in South Sudan is an established process. Ever since the relapsed into conflict in 2013, there has been a rise in military expenditure and thus outstripping socio-economic spending. This has created grievances and massive resentment among the citizens because the government is using for more than 70% of state revenue to strengthen itself and fight the opposition to the neglect of the livelihood improvement of the people of South Sudan (Schumman 2010:108).

The South Sudan government tries to import modern systems of weapon in fulfilling its function as the guardian of authority and legitimacy and this has often resulted in high militarisation and proliferation of arms among the civilians (Brieldlid & Arensen 2014; Small arm survey 2014). Light weapons and small arms proliferation (LWSARP) are among the major causes of the conflict in South Sudan. The country remains a territory for the multiplication of small arms because of their affordability, openness and the porosity of the encompassing fringes and the legitimate system of their utilisation (Keili 2008). Edeko (2011:55-80) states that west Africa host more than 7 to 10 million of the world's illegitimate weapons and they are plainly within the control and command of west Africa insurgents' groups. The illegal arms within and across South Sudan have contributed to an increase of the current violent conflict, easy mobilisation of coup d' tat, unconstitutional overthrow of governments and ever-growing war fatalities and tribal conflict in South Sudan (Ero & Ndinga-Mavumba 2004).

It is important to say that small arms multiplication constantly brought about the conflict in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali and Niger to mention just a few. For instance, according to Keili (2008:2), light weapons were distributed by the government to assist the civil wars in Liberia and Cote d' ivory. Keili further mentions that the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) rebel group got missiles from the Guinean government to assassinate civilians in Monrovia for the duration of the conflict in Liberia (Keili 2008:3).

It is therefore imperative to say that South Sudan have too much trafficking light weapons which is easily accessible and given to the youth on ethnic loyalty to topple and killed innocent civilians which has resulted in the civil unrest since 2013 (Jok 2013:2).

2.2.7. Weak institutions

The history of prolonged conflicts and wars has deprived the government of effective institutional structure. The nation experiences shortcoming of state institutions, non-appearance of establishment and absence of institutional capacity within the state and where they exist these establishments are managed on ethnic identity and many unqualified personnel are running the institution because of their affiliation and ethnic identity (De Waal 2014).

The current civil war in South Sudan greatly affects the nation to share, rule and standardise toward growth, wellbeing of citizens, and education of the people. The country has become impoverished because of the civil war and the few skilled servants have fled to neighbouring countries. In destroying the state as a result of power greed by leaders, communication and other critical institutional structures, the civil conflict restricts the efficiency of the institutions in South Sudan. The country must resolve problems creating the violence and establish institutions and structures that will enable rule of law to govern to address the socio-economic problems the country is facing after a prolonged civil war.

2.2.8. Oil as a cause of conflict

Before the abominable clash emitted in December 2013, South Sudan was already demonstrating the indicators of a resource curse. Ninety-eight percent of the administration is yearly spending plan and 80 percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is received from oil, making South Sudan the most oil dependent nation on the planet (Nyathon et al, 2006).

Instead of proper utilisation of this income to put resources into good management and institutions to enhance employments, the legislature financed mostly military and security personnel. At the highest point of this, SPLA government authorities had stolen a great amount of the incomes from this segment and stored it outside the country (Tiitmamer & Awolich, 2015).

In addition, Juba the capital city of South Sudan was profiting a great deal from oil currency to the detriment of different states. The control of oil in South Sudan among war veterans and quest to control the oil has resulted in a massive number of deaths of innocent citizens and all the gains that were showing in the areas where oil is tapped has been brought to nothing as a result of the violent conflict. Houses have been burnt down to ashes, innocent civilian survivors had to flee their home to seek shelter in the bushes, and some narrowly escaping to the refugee camps set up in Ethiopia.

2.3. Effects of conflict in South Sudan

South Sudan's struggle is a standout amongst the most serious compassionate emergencies right now, which has massively caused huge amount of wretchedness and annihilation on honest natives. As progressive statement from the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNMISS, the AU and universal associations have recorded, there have been various, rehashed occurrences and examples of genuine and methodical savagery against innocent people, and these individuals were targeted because of their ethnic origin (Human Rights Watch 2016; Tewodros 2015).

Moreover, numerous citizens have been assaulted and murdered in their homes, and places of sanctuary, including chapels, mosques, doctor's facilities, and in government offices. Thousands have been displaced from their homes, more than 1.5 million of them within the nation (Tewodros, 2015:7). Genuine infringement of international law, net infringement of universal human rights law and human rights abuses had been caused by all parties involved in the contention including assaults against innocent citizens, assault against women, children and different violations of sexual brutality, self-assertive capture and confinement, snatching, deprivation of liberty and enforced disappearance (Tewodros,2015).

Other than these human costs, the food security circumstances have crumbled indefinitely taking many lives. Although it is hard to measure the decrease in South Sudan's population because of contention, the economy impacts have turned out to be progressively obvious, and the nation's monetary position has disintegrated as government incomes have diminished. This has brought about budgetary limitations

and the surrender of government intention to expand investment (WFP, 2015; King, 2015).

Furthermore, looking at economic outcomes, the vicious clash has caused huge demolition of infrastructure identified with wellbeing, education and training, transportation and interchanges alongside the loss of private resources and flight of budgetary capital abroad. These economic effects might be considerably more noteworthy when indirect expenses are included, including lost speculation, efficiency decays, reduced work opportunities and expanded violations. Other than human expenses and economic effect of brutal clash in South Sudan, the general population of South Sudan experiences a disintegrated in social capital, loss of trust among and between individual from family units, groups and ethnic gathering and intensification of inter and intra-community conflicts (King, 2015).

In addition to its consequence on South Sudanese citizens, the present conflict in South Sudan has an external consequence to the citizens and the nation. Also, due to the location of South Sudan close to neighbouring state like Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya and others would eventually be forced either implicitly or explicitly to shoulder the political and socio-economic consequences of the South Sudanese current conflict (Mehari & Abel,2013).

Along these lines, the accompanying sub-areas given principal significance to the examination of various potential political and social results of the present conflict of South Sudan upon the Horn of African nations. Uganda is exceedingly influenced by

the unsteadiness in South Sudan to its region. Specifically, Uganda has been tested by its worry that unsteady South Sudan would turn into a place of refuge to the Lord Resistance Army (LRA), which has worked in Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo (International Crisis Group, 2014). Monetary benefit for Uganda has been depleted because of contention in South Sudan.

Awolich (2014) states that Uganda is the biggest exchanging accomplice of South Sudan, trading in espresso coffee, motors, steels and different farming items, adding up to millions of dollars yearly. Furthermore, South Sudan utilises a huge number of Ugandan citizens, particularly in the administration sector, producing a lot of income yet this has been diluted by the conflict in South Sudan (Lunn, 2016).

Sudan's noteworthy capability of bringing in continuous stream of oil from South Sudanese fields was greatly tested. Although it has lost three quarters of the oil field jointly with the separation of South Sudan, South Sudan oil is a critical source of income to Sudan (IRIN, 2014). However, Sudan is bothered by Uganda's intervention into the contention since both were supporting renegades of each other (Mehari and Abel, 2013). Additionally, the convergence of exiles from South Sudan into the neighbouring surroundings of Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda is a noteworthy result, which nations of the horn of Africa need to think about.

Unfortunately, if the present civil war in South Sudan continues the probability of refugee influx creating pressure in host countries of Horn of Africa is expected to worsen (United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2015).

Indeed, Ethiopia endured remarkably because of Nuer outcast stream convergence around Gambela district. The expansion in number of Nuer's tribe has been a noteworthy issue since Ethiopia is presently experiencing the legislative issues of majority number in the government legislative framework since control of legislative is allotted in direct extent to the number of inhabitants in the nation's socio-ethnic groups. The Gambella district in Uganda is still experiencing a standout among the most combative divided ethnic groups, the Anuak and the Nuer, over control of territory, which has resulted into conflict (Dereje, 2014).

Hence, the enormous inundation of displaced people since the flare-up of the second Sudanese civil war in 1983 and the present South Sudanese civil war has drastically changed the district's demography. Ethiopian economic enthusiasm for South Sudan is in question because of the violent conflict. Like Kenya and Uganda, Ethiopia has a large number of residents working in South Sudan. In addition, the Ethiopian Airline and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia used to have solid hold. However, since the conflict, various Ethiopians and Ethiopian institutions have left the nation putting a strain on the nation's capability of procuring outside money and work for its residents (Mehari & Abel, 2013).

The emergency conflict in South Sudan has taken away all financial advantages that Kenya appreciates from South Sudan. Moreover, brutality in South Sudan additionally upset Kenya's intention to give an elective exchange (trading) path to South Sudan to transport its oil, by the port of Lamu (International Crisis Group, 2014).

However, if history is anything to go by, then, history serves as a manual for the future; it empowers us to gain from our oversights and abstain from rehashing them. That implies the present legislature of Salva Kiir should address the underlying drivers of contention (emergency of administration) by seeking after equitable administration and reinforcing security approaches through reconstruction and development.

2.4. A quest for PCRD in South Sudan

Post-conflict reconstruction and development in South Sudan can be seen as a mixture of internally and externally driven. After the signing of relative peace in 2005 of the CPA, numerous multilateral external actors namely the UN, AU, World Bank and international aid agencies and NGOs have been flogging in South Sudan. These external actors normally channel and align themselves in given only assistance in the form of aid and not completely helping to stop to relapse into conflict and setting in a recovery and development in the affected nations. Notwithstanding these, South Sudan government has tried to settle and implement programmes of peaceful PCRD on their own.

2.4.1. From war to a fresh start

Most countries affected and infected with conflict emerge from civil wars with heavily destroyed infrastructure and lacking proper and efficient institutions of governance. The republic of South Sudan is one of the excellent places that the violent conflict had destroyed and, in many aspects, had to start from scratch after history of decades of continuous civil war and destruction.

For instance, the first civil war between North and South that started on the eve of independent in 1953 and lasted until 1972. After a decade of relative peace, the second civil war began in 1983 and lasted until 2005 when the CPA was endorsed. It is important to mention that both these wars were fought over marginalisation, power, race, basic needs, religion, ethnicity, control of resources and above all self-determination.

However, when the CPA ended the protracted civil war between the two rival nations, North and South in 2005, the republic of South Sudan was left with massive challenges. The central government and military dictatorship in Khartoum greatly marginalised South Sudan socially, economically, political and even culturally as they continued with the British colonial policies and rules since the 1956 independence (Deng 2007:93; Heleta 2010: 34).

Jok (2011:12) mentions that South Sudan has to start its recovery from a situation of extreme poverty and underdevelopment with weak skills and virtually non- existence of government institutions (Joint Assessment Mission 2005:56).

Collier (2010:76) states that the South "inherited an economic landscape that was virtually empty". Without basic infrastructure, total deficiency of skilled public servants and basic service delivery structures, what South Sudan need from 2005 was construction rather than reconstruction (Jooma 2005:2).

2.4.2. Reconstruction and development against Humanitarian aid

According to the Institute for Security Studies (ISS 2010:2), reconstruction and development have basically been absent from South Sudan, although the 2005 CPA did bring relative peace and the 2011 referendum on autonomy, the country lost six years in terms of reconstruction and development. Notwithstanding this, the international actors or local actors (ISS 2010:2) based the main post-conflict priorities on humanitarian assistance security as a reason behind the absence of any recovery and development.

Distribution of relief aid and humanitarian assistance are short-term programmes in post-conflict that these aid agencies focus on. Economic reconstruction and development in the medium and long-term are aimed at reducing poverty and accelerate growth and sustained economic recovery (NEPAD 2005:12). Looking at the current civil war in South Sudan, many parts of the country are in dire need of humanitarian aid during the widespread of violent conflict. Severe famine and drought, many donors and bilateral organisation have still not moved from basic short-term humanitarian support to a post-conflict reconstruction and development stage due to the reason that many of these agencies are restricted by short-term funding of vicious cycle which prevent long-term projections and proper planning (Schomerous & Allen 2010:7).

Schemerous and Allen (2010:10) mentions that many external organizations like the World Bank saw the region as a continuous humanitarian case without thinking about reconstruction and development. Only after obtaining autonomous in July

2011 that some donors decided to effect change and made a shift from aid assistance to development (Barber 2011:7), and in South Sudan, the government constantly shifts its attention toward protection of its interest, security positions in a massive political struggle with its counterpart, the Northern government in Khartoum.

2.4.3. PCRD steps by citizens

Heleta (2013:174) mention that the oil revenue gave an opportunity to South Sudan people to initiate a peace-building and reconciliation process, which brought many of who fought against each other during the decades of civil wars between the North and South into the same umbrella as a result of the oil revenues. Oil accounted for majority of Sudanese export deriving billions of US dollars annually and these were shared between the government in the North and South (Mailer & Poole 2010:25). A push for consistent negotiations led to the signing of the Juba declaration in 2006 by the government of South Sudan (GOSS) and several southern armed groups (International Crisis Group 2011a: 1). This process shocked the external actors as the negotiations took place behind the close doors and many often, unconventional methods such as buying of support, loyalty and cooperation was used (Thomas 2009:26; Heleta 2013: 174). Even though the 2011 independence brought relative peace and stability to war-torn South Sudan and gave them socio-economic and political freedom, the country still is unable to assist the displaced from the previous wars and provide basic services to the citizens due to the government focused on taking care only for the military called the Southern people's liberation army (SPLA)

which according to Brenthurst Foundation (2010: 23) has taken more than 40% of government funds annually since the CPA era.

Moreover, inadequate and lack of dedicated skill capacity in the government and other institutions has been another reason for lack of locally driven PCRD (ICG 2011b: 5). lack of education or higher education in South Sudan by the military personnel has been a great challenge as majority of the senior officials have not even attain any form of education but carry portfolio purely based on the military affiliations to the government as they stood side-by side in arms during the darker days of civil wars. Grawert (2007:390) posits that the country lacks skilled personnel who can run trade, service sector and they lack leadership abilities of running an enterprise let alone run a government, hence, they fully depends on labour force from border countries to fill those gaps.

Furthermore, limited basic services have been a problem for the country for many years because of the government and local agencies inability to deliver to the citizens. For instance, NGOs and aid agencies' have been delivering more than 85% of primary healthcare services due to lack of local health workers, facilities and resources (Mailer & Poole 2010:24).

Since 2005, weak governance and a militarised approach to governance and politics often heighten "tribal differences among the population, with more powerful groups and tribes controlling power and suppressing the minorities (Schomerous &Allan 2010:15; Heleta 2013:175). In the medium to long term, the internal SPLM politics

and its ability to manage the sensitive ethnic and regional "fault lines" will to a great extent determine South Sudan political and economic stability.

Moreover, South Sudan government was unable to do more in terms of recovery, development and services delivery establishment due to an extensive patronage system of governance aimed at buying political support and loyalty (De Waal 2010:19). It is important to mention that when aid agencies are the sole provider of service delivery to a country and emergencies assistance in the absence of legitimate government, it looks like a wartime arrangement and these measures are only a short-term that does not bring long-term sustainability and economic stability to the fragile South Sudan.

2.4.4. Security as a prerequisite for reconstruction

Small Arms Survey (2009:1) posits that inadequacy of internal security within war-torn countries has destroyed many governments in their quest to disarm population after civil war. Civilian disarmament programmes have been scarcely conducted and normally takes place along rearmament rather than disarmament as it fails to solve internal violent conflicts.

Notwithstanding Juba declaration and improved security upgrades in the country, many tribal settlers across the nation have experienced constant outbreaks of violence and cow rustling since the signing of the CPA. The current war that ensued in 2013 between these leaders has killed tens of thousands and more than 2.5

million citizens have been displaced because of the outbreak (Al Jazeera & BBC news report of 2016).

International Crisis Group (2011b: 10) states that there have been several rebellions within the country by local in seven out of the ten states of South Sudan via insurgents dissatisfied by the election results and lack of social amenities since April 2010 elections. This civil war and insecurity nave immensely impacted on the livelihoods of the people (Barber 2011:20).

The United Nation Security Council (UNSC) mandated the UNMISS to foresee and monitor ceasefire and help the joint Northern and Southern army unit for peacekeeping. However, these reform security sector of UNMISS have been found wanting as they do nothing in South Sudan as they watch civilians killings or people being displaced to neighbouring country Uganda (Schumman 2010:108).

The police force who are supposed to uphold the internal security of the nation and the rule of law have failed miserable due to the lack of capacity, education and training, equipment and infrastructural capabilities. Both the international organisations and government of South Sudan have failed to protect the civilians as lack of effective police force is depriving the country of the peace they dearly fought. Multilateral agencies have totally ignored the police force of South Sudan and concentrated their efforts in transformation agendas and the modernisation of the army without practically empowering the police force who are closely linked to the civilian up keep and wellbeing against any external attacks. In addition, in situation

where they support, they only provide a certain portion of financial assistance for police training, which is not enough to maintain the economies of South Sudan (Defence Web, 24 November 2009).

2.4.5 Conclusion

Political, economic, social and cultural factors are the main triggers of conflict in the developing world. Clover (2004) sees the causes of intrastate and interstate violent conflicts to be rooted in political grievance, economic and social inequalities within groups and poor governance within the state. The chapter has profiled socio-economic background of South Sudan. It identifies the factors that lead to the civil conflict. Since the nation obtained independence in 2011, it has not made any stride and government institutions are at the lowest point. Hence, all the gains the country made prior to and during independence had been destroyed by the ethnic conflict in the country. As a result, there is a need for national dialogue, reconciliation and reconstruction after the violence to restore lasting peace and development. It has shown how all indications that fighting in South Sudan will continue to spill to several neighbouring countries as fighting on different side continue in South Sudan.

This is not an atmosphere the African continent want to see and experience. For the sake of innocent citizens, women, children of South Sudan who continue to die daily and are being displaced from their native country-seeking refugee elsewhere, there is a need for a lasting solution to the civil conflict in South Sudan.

The chapter has been historical in nature. Firstly, it presented a brief historical background of South Sudan and highlighted some of the challenges that trigger the conflict. Among the factors are leadership contest, weak institution, militarization and arm trafficking, ethnic violence. This has become the edifice on which violence was laid for resolution of South Sudan conflict. To date, rebel and militia groups continue to hold large part of the country subjecting the civilian population to prolonged instability and civil strife. In addition, more strategies by external communities to intervene have fuelled the conflict further. The international community are only providing short-term humanitarian assistance to South Sudan rather than medium-to-long-term reconstruction and development to establish a lasting peace in South Sudan.

CHAPTER THREE

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK IN AFRICA

3. Introduction

The chapter defines the Africa Union legal framework, some success, weakness and some gaps of the AU; analyse the magnitude of post-war reconstruction and development framework in Africa and place PCRD on the research context. It also explores its main trends and present various arguments, approaches and practices and the role external driven organisation such as the World Bank, United Nation and the IMF Play in PCRD to ensure peace on the African continent.

3.1.1. The introduction of African Union (AU) PCRD Framework

Conflict is part of human life and it comes in different shapes and has recurrent decimal in every political system. Because of rival opinions, competing needs and opposing interest, conflict arises in societies and the classification of conflicts can be grouped into intra-group and inter-group, intra-personal and inter-personal (Heywood 2007). Ethnic, border conflicts, civil wars and genocides are rampant in Africa and specific examples are Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda, South Sudan are just a few instances of conflict on the African continent (Collier & Hoeffler 2004).

Hence, the rising trend of intra/interstate conflicts in Africa gave birth to the formation of the Africa Union in September 2009. The African Heads of States issued a declaration calling for the formation of the African Union (AU) at the summit in Durban, South Africa, the AU was officially launched and the first Assemble of the

Heads of States was convened. The formation of the AU was heralded as an event of great magnitude for the continent. The AU was formed with the main mission of speeding up integration in the continent to enable Africa to play its rightful role in the global economy while at the same time addressing the myriad of economic, political and social problems currently plaguing its member states. Pertinent among them was reconstruction and development of nations afflicted with conflict (Murithi, 2009:69-82; International Colloquium Report 2012).

In May 2013, a meeting by the Africa Union (AU) assembly of the Head of States and governments adopted a landmark declaration during the 50th anniversary of the organisation. During the assembly, they vowed that Africa would not bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation and made a commitment to end conflict on the continent by 2020 with the caption of "Silencing the Guns by 2020" (AU press release 2017).

 Hence, the AU 68th meeting held in January 16th, 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia unleased a master plan focusing on the initiatives and practical steps towards the fulfilment of "silencing the guns by 2020". The Human and economic costs of these conflicts had had an adverse consequence on cross-border and national because it has increased the number of refugees and internally displaced persons across Africa and the escalation of small and light weapons in many Africa countries (AU Press Release 2017).

However, with the AU continued engagement with member states on conflict prevention and management of resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and development as well as peace-building initiatives, much progress is made through signing and implementation of peace agreement emerging from decades of conflict and instability. Article 3 of the Constructive Act of the AU states that the AU shall unequivocally promote peace, security and stability on the African continent. As outlined in Article 3 of the Protocol of peace and Security Council (PSC), the objectives of the PSC are to:

Promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the Africa people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development; Anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstance where conflicts have occurred, the peace and security council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace making and peace building for the resolution of these conflicts; Promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent resurgence of violence; Coordinate and harmonies continental efforts in the prevention and combating international terrorism in all aspects; Develop a common defense policy for the union, in accordance with Article 4(d) of the Constructive Act; Promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts (International Colloquium Report 2012).

Since the formation of the Africa Union, it has had some success stories in its operation on the Africa continent. For instance, the AU deployment mission to Burundi where transition to self-rule was marred by ethnic violence between the Hutu and the Tutsi minority. In 2003, the AU dispatched a peacekeeping mission with the task to protect, disarm, demobilize and reintegrate combatants after the failure of the Arusha Peace, Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi signed in 2000 to consolidate peace process, and the ceasefire agreement in 2002 failed (Rodt, 2011:1-27).

The African union made a concerted effort to prevent genocide in the great lakes region and played a great role in the ceasefire agreement. The AU troops prevented and protected the returning politicians who took part in the transitional government and provided a favourable condition for the United Nations troops which joined in 2004 (Murithi, 2008:69-82).

In addition, there was a massive outcry of invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by the neighbouring countries of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia during the conflict in DRC in 1998 between the government of Congo and the armed rebel groups. The AU ensured that all the parties sat together in a regional effort and all internal and external discrepancies of the conflict was ironed out which resulted in the formation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement which was able to address the concerns of the rebel groups and the neighbouring countries to withdraw and allowing election to be held in DRC.

Furthermore, the AU has also played major roles by brokering a power-sharing agreement and deployment of strong force to support elections in the Comoros in May 2006, by providing a strong security presence that eased the passage of democracy (Kutesa 2009). Also, after the military coup in Niger, the Africa Union prevented crisis in the country by suspending the country's membership in 2010 and demanded a return to constitutional order which was adhered by Niger and order was restored (Africa Briefing Report 2011).

Although, the Africa Union has had many successes in mediation on the African continent, it has also been criticised for lack of good communication tools; positive visibility and management capacity especially in the recent crisis in South Sudan, Libya and Côte d`Ivoire. These weaknesses have destroyed some of its credibility, relevance and complete authority in the continent. Africa Briefing Report (2011) states that, the AU roadmap to resolving conflict in Libya crisis was not given a proper attention by the international community because the AU lost its credibility due to the interplay factors such as perception- the popular protest in Libyan and the Middle East seen as the "Arab spring" rather than an African issue. Hence, the AU mediation proposal was totally rejected by the opposition, which insisted on Gaddafi departure, which ultimately led to the death of Gaddafi.

Marangio (2012) states that the AU reveals its weakness of peacekeeping mission in Somalia and the inadequacy of the mission to curb the civil war in the ethnic homogeneous country of Somalia. The Africa Union mission in Somalia which was established with the purpose of bring stability, promote dialogue and facilitate the

provision of humanitarian aid and create long-term peace since 2007, has failed completely as insurgent groups are currently still causing chaos in Somalia (Pasic 2013).

It is imperative to mention that although the AU is putting efforts post-conflict reconstruction and development to stop occurrences of violent conflict within the African continent, there are major gaps in their implementation strategies such as insecurity, intimidation, exploitation, and the exclusion of some segments of the society continues even after peace agreement. Impunity and lawlessness leave former victims and vulnerable groups unprotected. The poor implementation of disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, and weak security sector reforms result in little attention to human security and continue proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the markets of Africa. (AU Release Report 2017).

Furthermore, the AU inability to rebuild better livelihoods frustrates integration and rehabilitation and secondary low -level conflict continue to cause displacement in war-torn countries in Africa especially South Sudan (Africa Briefing Report 2011).

Moreover, major gaps continue to exist in the Africa Union on how to manage political governance and transition of war-torn states like South Sudan, weak state institutions and lack of capacity limit the ability to provide a comprehensive administrative, public services, and guidelines to affected nations. Redress for victims of abuse is not sure as impunity prevails; abuses continue to be perpetrated on women and children and other vulnerable groups even after the end of conflict.

Newly constituted security bodies have little training or capacity to protect human rights. Soldiers and combatants are converted to civilians' police with little or no training (AU release report 2017).

Therefore, for Africa Union to perform effectively in post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts in Africa, they should engage development actors and international financial institutions like the World Bank in PCRD efforts; develop comprehensive program for local capacity building at AU level and encourage Africa leaders to practice free and fair democratic practices to ensure that resurgence of violent becomes minimal. Moreover, the Africa Union should endeavour to depoliticise Africa states ethnic/religious difference by the African states and try to promote national mechanism for swift conflict resolution when conflict arises.

3.1.2 The Magnitude of PCRD

Post-conflict reconstructions are efforts aimed at "rebuilding and transforming the state institutions, society and economy to consolidate peace" and prevent relapse of conflict emerging (Lacher 2007:238). Barakat and Zyck (2009:1071) states that the primary objectives of PCRD are to "reactivate economic and social development" that had been disturbed or vandalised during the violent conflict and "create peaceful surroundings that will stop relapse into violence".

Kofi Annan (1998:19) juxtaposes that without reconstruction and development after conflict, stability and long-lasting peace is allusive. According to the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD 2005: 5) policy framework on reconstruction and

development, the sole objective of PCRD are building and consolidation of long-lasting peace, stabilisation and stopping further and future violence.

Post-conflict reconstruction according to Hamre & Sullivan (2002:89) is a process that draws to establish the rule of law, security and good governance, promote reconciliation and justice and enhance the socio-economic well-beings of the citizens. Furthermore, Gueli (2008: 84) mentions that PCRD is a "foreign intervention that aims to rebuild a country devastated by war".

Woodward (2011: 106) points out that the aftermath of post-conflict period is often marked by "continuation of the conflict to define the new nation". In addition, El-Bushra (2006: 230) emphases that civil wars are fought over power and control of the resources of the state. Warring parties during this period channels their energy from military to political means and fights over political and economic power and allocation of state resources.

Moss (2007:2) argues and separate development into individuals and economies. He mentions that development of individual simply means or involves assisting citizens of a country to find opportunities so that they can have a better livelihood and cater for the immediate families. Development of economies is aimed at "creating economic growth to raise the average incomes and reduce the number of people living under the average poverty line". In analysing Moss argument, it sets perfectly with PCRD agenda because there is an urgent need to help the affected individuals

in the middle of violent conflict and economies structure within that country need to recover and improve all institutions after conflict destruction.

The primary motive of every peace-building is to create and establish a stable environment after conflict and try as much as possible to prevent relapse and establish a long-lasting peace (Paris 2005: 767). Every project set out to bring peace building are aimed at addressing the underlying grievance that lead to the conflict. David (2001: 12) mentions that the goals of peace building are reconciliation, reconstruction based on the establishment of security and democracy and the transformation into capitalist system looking at externally driven peace efforts.

Human rights, rule of law, promotion of accountability, infrastructure reconstruction, return of displaced people, economic reconstruction and development and humanitarian relief are all activities of post-conflict peace-building initiatives (Sorbo 2004: iv). Peace building is a long-term process that requires creativity and patience because there is more destruction, ongoing fighting and as a result, it is very challenging to establish stability, security and peace.

(Anstey 2006:128; Karbo 2008:115; Ali and Matthews 2004:6) argue that peace-building seeks to bring change and enhance socio-economic and communal relationship in the conflict-torn nations and that peace-building tries to "revive the country's economy", to rebuild and restore normalcy in the affected country.

Newman (2009: 42) writes that most powerful external actors like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nation (UN) most at times

dramatised and releases post-conflict peace-building as an apolitical exercise that solely depends on the readiness and availability of funds, coordination and good planning among them to the detriment of the local and international politics. Therefore, peace building is practically a political work in terms of the balance of local power and most powerful nation's interest and agenda.

It is important to mention that although every country quest for recovering from violent conflict has its own general needs and therefore certain issues needs to be considered when planning PCRD; political and livelihood rehabilitation; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former warring combatants (DDR), economic reconstruction and the impact of foreign assistance, social need and security sector reform (SSR). NEPAD framework also tries to address the "nexus between peace, security, humanitarian and development discourse after conflict and juxtaposes five important elements to PCRD"; political transition, security, governance and participation (democracy), socio-economic development; human rights, justice and reconciliation and resource and coordination management (NEPAD 2005 iv).

However, one of the key elements in creating sustainable development and building a lasting peace is the rebirth of functional institutions (Menocal 2009:1). Restoration of nation power over any monopoly of coercion is the establishment of better political institutions and creating a participatory and respect for human rights and basic provision of social services to its citizens.

State building, good governance restructure and socio-economic reconstruction are recovery aspects of PCRD and a precondition for the establishment of security in the short-term and establishment of legitimate and functional institutions, economic growth, political stability, and development after conflict is a long-term project for PCRD (Putzel & Di John 2012: v; Dobbins 2008:82).

Dixon and Nel (2012: 256) argues that PCRD and peace-building are steps to "bring to justice those who have perpetrated conflict crimes, while simultaneously engaging in a wider process of reconciliation among all those involved in the violent conflict". Building good relationships after conflict is necessary in order to heal the wounds of the affected and to ensure that transitional justice takes place for lasting peace.

3.1.3. Component of Economic PCRD

Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2011: 198) include that post-war recuperation needs to occur in stages. Conflict nations need to build up security, strengthen stability and peace. This should be trailed by economic recovery and reconstruction. They contend that the last stage should be establishment of a development path determined largely by own priorities and resources.

Collier (2010: 88) composes that moderate economic reconstruction after conflict builds danger of proceeded insecurity and more often relapse into conflict. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 69) take note that post-conflict reconstruction and peace depend as much on financial incorporation as they do on more clear security or personality related issues. in particular, socio-economic recreation, advancement and

development that are not comprehensive and do not enhance ways of life of the whole populace can prompt further unsteadiness, wrongdoing and even relapse to violent conflict (Mac Ginty &Williams 2009: 33; Panic 2011: 181). Highlighting the connection amongst social and financial issues in post-conflict recreation and advancement, Simpson (1997: 476) composes that "we can revamp the social texture and arrange political settlements, however unless we meet individuals" monetary needs, those assertions are worth practically nothing. According to the NEPAD (2005: 11-12), socio-economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of violent conflict includes "recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction of basic social and economic services as well as the return, resettlement, reintegration and rehabilitation of populations displaced during the conflict".

In effect, Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 130) include repair of social connections decimated amid the conflict. Critical short, medium and long- term financial projects proposed by NEPAD (2005: 11-12) are immediate humanitarian relief; restoration and remaking of physical infrastructure; arrangement of social administrations, for example, education, wellbeing, and social welfare; monetary development and advancement through harmonious business trading, and legitimate and administrative change. Short-term programmes concentrate primarily on compassionate humanitarian aid and appropriation of poverty alleviation. In the medium and long- term, economic restructuring and development, plan to diminish destitution and give economic recuperation and maintained development and more

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importantly, medium and long –term socio-economic projects as "midway imperative for lasting peace." (Ali & Matthews 2004: 3)

Murshed (2002: 387-92) accentuates the significance of social advancement and (re)establishment of social contract amongst nationals and governments in the fallout of conflict and contends that medium-to-long term monetary improvement cannot occur without social security. He takes note that "rebuilding of peace" in war-torn social orders "requires the reconstitution of the social contract" among the local groups, including formal and informal settlement about rules on tranquil harmony, determination of contention, diminishment of destitution, reasonable sharing of assets and economic development. Violent conflicts significantly influence social orders, pulverising economic framework and social relations process to the extent that "so much global aid recovery process appears to be practically oblivious in regard to social disengagement to the essential need to revamp social relations" (Simpson 1997: 475).

Although there is no acknowledged hypothesis on how peace is manufactured, alongside the requirement for democratic institutions, economic development is crucial in that it diminishes conflict (Brabandere 2014:7; Donias & Knorr 2013:54-57). Economy, peace, and security-related segments of post-conflict peace building are well and firmly associated. Economic reconstruction, peace and security are mutually reinforcing, and, at the same time, interdependent; economic stability will not be sustainable without peace, and at the same time, peace will not be easily achieved without a firm commitment to economic growth (Del Castillo 2003:6; Brabandere

2014:7). For instance, DDR can win if the economy is creating job opportunities for former combatants. This has likewise been unequivocally perceived by the Security Council. From a strategy point of view, economic reconstruction is especially fundamental in post-conflict circumstances since it is vital not just for short-term stability and the arrival to commonality, but for long- term development and improvement.

Frequently, economic unsteadiness is one of the components that spark violent conflict; economic reconstruction is an important device in keeping viciousness from recurring (Maiese, 2013:5). While it is difficult to settle conflict situation, economic development follows democratic order. In answer to the inquiry whether the legislature should first concentrate on setting up law-based establishments or the social and economic advancement of the State, by far most of the members in South Sudan favoured development to occur before democratisation (Roberts, 2013:7).

Within the economic reconstruction process, attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role. This is to be seen within the broader context of the objective of economic reconstructions activities in post-conflict situations: opening domestic markets to foreign investors conforms to the liberal market policies underlying economic reconstruction in post-conflict societies due to the involvement of organizations such as the IMF, the IFC and the World Bank. (UNCTAD 2009:15). Hence, opening the economy to foreign investors often is part of the reforms imposed by these organizations to gain access to international funds and financial assistance (Yelpaala, 2010:30)

3.2. The role of externally driven PCRD

This section will examine externally driven PCRD and the role major agencies such as the United Nations, World Bank and other multi-lateral agencies play in post conflict reconstruction. Below are some of the role players in PCRD.

3.2.1. United Nations

Since the mid-1990s, the association United Nation (UN) has advanced impressively and has been included in arrangements to end violent clashes, peace agreement and peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and improvement, peace-building and state-building (Duffield 2007: 26). In current cases, the UN has gone similarly as assuming control, full governance of the state and running the nations, for example, in the case of Kosovo and East Timor (Zaum 2006: 455).

The United Nations was built up in the repercussions of the Second World War to address the issues of worldwide peace and security and forestall future world, local, universal and common intrastate conflicts (Tschirgi 2006: 47). Even though the UN has been effective in keeping a different universe conflict, the association's capacity to manage local and internal violent clashes throughout the world has regularly been constrained because of superpower legislative issues amid the Cold War.

As far as post-conflict reconstruction is concerned, the UN was for the most part required in peacekeeping and truce keeping. Aside from the workplace of the UN Secretary General that deal with peace-building issues and UN missions, different UN organizations deal with compassionate humanitarian and development matters in

conflict-torn and post-war nations. One of the primary UN organisation working on PCRD is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), helping nations that are coming out of savage clash to "assemble independence" and give fundamental needs and human development to their populaces. In addition, the UNDP frequently fills in as "nation facilitator" of all UN exercises (Busumtwi-Sam 2004: 335).Hough (2004: 3) contends that capable nations see associations, for example, the UN as simple "unions of alliance between states."

On account of its complex hierarchical structure, it is troublesome for the United Nations to be successful in post-conflict operations. The UN is partitioned into 47 elements, which are controlled by various unit nations. Because of the steady "political haggling and rivalry" between UN members, these units scarcely ever collaborate or incorporate their arrangements and projects (Campbell 2008: 557-9).

Fearon and Laitin (2004: 32) contend that the UN is not appropriate to lead large post-conflict operations since it is unequipped for "resolute actions." Campbell (2008: 561) believes that significantly more hazardous is the way that post-conflict arrangements of different UN units and sub-units are frequently not driven by the necessities in nations rising up out of conflict yet by the needs and commands of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its powerful members. Although the UN has been playing important role in ensuring that conflicts between conflicting parties between conflicting parties are resolved, they normally fall short of their role as an actor of mediation because reconstruction are almost left to local peripheries.

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For example, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) of 2003 was a mix of a customary peacekeeping mission endowed with the errand of supporting the usage of the truce agreement and peace procedure for the most part, and the components of peace building. Since the mission had "managerial" assistance, for example, the protecting of civilians, supporting philanthropic and human rights exercises, and aiding the security segment change program (UNSC 2003). The circumstance in Liberia, is striking on the grounds that economic reconstruction had a critical impact in the post-conflict circumstance. It is intriguing to take note of that the Security Council outsourced a great part of the exercises around there to different agencies other than the UN mission, also with no unequivocal command to that impact. This happened because of Liberia, as well as because of other African States where ECOWAS has been exceptionally dynamic in participating in post-conflict economic change exercises (UNSG 2011).

Additionally, in 2011, the Security Council approved the foundation of a United Nations Support Mission for Libya (UNSMIL). UNSMIL is a unique political mission which gives the UN a restricted command to "bolster Libyan national endeavours" in re-establishing open security and advancing the control of law, setting up constitution making and constituent process, re-establishing open government, advancing and ensuring human rights, and, strikingly, making prompt attempt for economic recovery. However, the UN could not perform that order to effect (UNSG 2011).

The United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), that was set up in 2011, a day prior to South Sudan independent, is commanded to help the

administration in practicing its obligation in different stages, for example, security, political cooperation, and human rights. The mission's order was strengthened and expanded after the emergency in South Sudan in December 2013. Security Council Resolution 1996 contains some intriguing references to financial advancement; however, these references only require UNMISS to give reinforce peace combination and in this manner cultivating longer-term State-building and economic development (UNSC 2014:2155).

While many of these missions have a clear political objective in addition to the more traditional peacekeeping mandate, which consists essentially of assisting the State's (transitional) government in restoring political stability and supporting the organisation for free and fair elections, it is notable that post-conflict activities in the past decade have not been set up as comprehensive peace-building missions.

Accordingly, economic reconstruction, considered in past missions as an imperative piece of the peace-building, was relinquished for more conventional commands which join components of customary peacekeeping and a few parts of more present day peace-building, for example, constituent help, philanthropic help, human rights scrutiny, and every so often this is thought to be a particular wellspring of the contention help with the administration of characteristic assets.

According to Mearsheimer (1995: 340), such nations make worldwide institutions, for example, the UN to keep up or increase their power of political influent; they have to create institutions of governance as a superpower in assisting PCRD nation. These

institutions are on a very basic level "fields for carrying on control connections" among nations and as a result of this setup, prompts a circumstance where the UN can do just what its member states choose to do. If UN members, and especially from the Security Council, are not keen on post-conflict operations, the UN-drive operations would not occur (Polman 2004: 5).

3.2.2. The role of World Bank

Since its initiation has been the "main supplier of convention and information about how nations should develop". Decades past, the bank has turned into the biggest supplier of loan advances and foreign aid on the planet (Calderisi 2006: 5; McEwan 2009: 169). The activity behind the establishing of the World Bank in the 1940s was to build up a foundation that would help nations obliterated in the Second World War through arrangement of long-term loans and support. The initial name of the World Bank portrays its underlying reason: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (Moyo 2010: 11). Since its establishment, the Bank has been solidly controlled by the United States, with each of its leaders a US resident. After post-Second World War reconstruction was finished, the World Bank proceeded with its reality, concentrating on the arrangement of long-term advances and formative guidance keeping in mind the end goal to encourage economic development and basic changes all through the world (Brown 1995: 69; Moss 2007: 126; Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 65-6; Willis 2011: 40).

In the 1960s, the bank supported extensive state-possessed framework ventures; when this approach did not bring coveted outcomes, in the 1970s, its concentration

moved to littler tasks, for example, enhancements in education and training, wellbeing(health) or rural development; since the late 1970s and all through the 1980s, the World Bank moved its concentration again to basic changes in the creating scene, attempting to impact government policies, for example, open spending, exchanges and privatisation of state-claimed undertakings; when the above methodologies neglected to bring success, the bank changed its plan at the end of the day in the 1990s, this time advancing the Western neo-liberal incentive and good governance, democratisation and financial progression of nations (Moss 2007: 126-7; Barbara 2008: 309). Despite being a financial institution, World Bank's work is "deeply political since the economic reform agenda fundamentally affects the political balance and access to resources" (Moss 2007: 80) in both the developing and post-war countries.

Busumtwi-Sam (2004: 335) mentions that, the World Bank is the "absolute most imperative global money related organization that is involved in peace-building." Ruiters and Giordano (2009: 5) take note that the bank was the main worldwide foundation which built up a post-Cold War system for managing nations rising up out of violent conflict. The bank asserts that its quality lies in plan and execution of recovery strategies that help large scale monetary adjustment and revamping of institution after conflict (World Bank 1998: 3). In 1997, the World Bank built up a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit and a Post-Conflict Fund. In the subsequently years, the bank ended up plainly as one of the principle drivers of post-war reconstruction and inclusive development; in 2008 alone, the World Bank spent over

US $3 billion being developed help to post-conflict and "delicate" nations (Zoellick 2008: 67).

In detailing its structure for supporting movement of nations from fighting, the Bank is guided by the accompanying standards. The Bank is a worldwide association with a command, characterised in its Articles of Agreement, to back and encourage reconstruction and development in its member nations. The Bank is not accountable for peacebuilding or peacekeeping. It is not an administrative body for borrowing nations. These are elements of the United Nations and certain territorial associations. Under the express arrangements of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank does not scrutinize the political character of a member and should not meddle in the local political undertakings of a member state. The Bank does not work in the domain of a member without the endorsement of that member. Finally, the Bank is not a relief agency.

Post-conflict reconstruction begins by supporting the move from battle to peace in the affected country through the changing of the country's monetary framework. Given the possibility of intrastate conflict, the formal discontinuance of dangers does not suggest that the strategy of move is done, regardless of the way that it speaks about reconstruction. Reconstruction does not suggest just recreation of "physical infrastructure," nor does it basically imply a remoulding of the financial structure that existed before the onset of conflict. Brutal conflict, if it does not stop and proceeds for a long time, changes an overall population, and an entry to the past may not be possible or appealing. The role of external agencies, including the World Bank, is not

to implement this process but, rather, to support it. Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives: to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and to support economic and social development.

Economic reconstruction stands on the success of this evolution and on the rebuilding of the local economy and reinstatement of access to external resources. These objectives imply that the World Bank must assist in an integrated package of reconstruction assistance to; Jump-start the economy through investment in key productive sectors; create the conditions for resumption of trade, savings, and domestic and foreign investment; and promote macroeconomic stabilisation, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.

Re-establishing the framework of governance is achieved by strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organisations of civil society to work effectively, repair important physical infrastructure, including key transport, communication, and utility networks, rebuild and maintain key social infrastructure; that is, financing education and health, including recurrent costs, target assistance to those affected by war through reintegration of displaced populations, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, revitalisation of the local communities most disrupted by conflict through such means as credit lines to subsistence agriculture and microenterprises, and support for vulnerable groups such as female-headed households, Support landmine action programmes, where relevant, including mine surveys and demining of key infrastructure, as part of

comprehensive development strategies for supporting a return to normal life of populations living in mine-polluted areas, and normalise financial borrowing arrangements by planning a workout of arrears, debt rescheduling, and the longer-term path to financial normalisation but these objectives are sometimes lacking in post-conflict setting which re-escalate the violent conflicts again especially if the nation is not a member state or does not have enough ground to receive assistance from the World Bank.

Working conditions in post-conflict nations, with their restricted government limit, delicate political balances, and outrageous time weights, worsen the dangers of inversions, misfortunes, and disappointments. The dangers of doing normal business are substantially higher than in "typical" developing nations. They incorporate dangers identified with an inability to accomplish a satisfactory profit for the assets contributed, due to restored threats, execution troubles, setbacks in contributor financing, and so forth; dangers to the Bank's notoriety related with the impression of disappointment in extend usage or of inclination; and, security dangers to Bank staff working in post-struggle nations. To this end, many external actors like the World Bank are not doing enough to ensure that long-term peace and stability prevail in the affected countries.

3.2.3. International monetary Fund (IMF)

Since the 1970s, the IMF has been giving loans to the developing countries in exchange for a right to influence and/or impose policy changes the IMF experts think are the best for these countries (Moss 2007: 106). The stated role of the

International Monetary Fund is to facilitate the international financial system, promote macro-economic stability and provide short-term loans to countries facing financial crises (Moss 2007: 118; Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 65; Willis 2011: 41).

Decision making and voting rights at the IMF are based on the economic and financial power of member countries. Developed countries are almost in full control of decision-making at the IMF. Since its inception, all IMF's presidents have come from Western Europe, while the United States is the only member that has veto power (Stiglitz 2002: 12).

Helman and Ratner (1993: 8) point out that when the IMF deals with countries which are the recipients of its loans and credit, the organisation sets country's inflation targets, foreign exchange reserves and other fiscal mechanisms; if the recipients want to retain access to funding, they have no choice but to comply with the IMF's demands and policy prescriptions. However, IMF's macro-economic stabilisation policies, such as public expenditure cuts, often have negative side-effects in the developing world and countries emerging from violent conflict, "eroding public institutions and weakening the capacity of states to provide social safety nets, health, education, law and order" (Willett 2005: 576-7).

According to Stiglitz (2002: xiii), all decisions made by the IMF are based on the free market ideology. Easterly (2006: 129-30) writes that supporting unstable governments with loans, which is one of the key roles of the IMF, is "unavoidably a political act." The IMF is also one of the major promoters of the neo-liberal economic

agenda. Countries hoping to receive loans from the IMF are required to accept impositions from the organisation such as structural adjustments and adoption of the neo-liberal macro-economic framework (McEwan 2009:173).

While the IMF does not have a specific post-war unit like the World Bank, economic reconstruction after war is seen as "an important concern" for the organisation (Stevenson 2000: 51-2). Apart from providing loans to countries that are recovering from war, the IMF also provides technical assistance and advice on macro-economic issues. As in the case of other developing countries, post-war countries are required to strictly comply with the IMF demands and economic policy impositions if they want to receive funding.

3.2.4. Bilateral Donors

A huge sum of money and technical specialised guide and help for PCRD is given straightforwardly to conflict- torn nations by multilateral contributors. The measures of money given by respective givers, for example, the United States are regularly and significantly more than what the UN can spend on post-conflict reconstruction (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy & Jones 2004: 376). As a rule, bilateral assistance to post-conflict nations reflects key, economic and geopolitical interests of benefactor governments (Englebert &Tull 2008: 138).

Numerous nations around the globe have government offices which advance their foreign policy and arrangement interests through philanthropic and development work. One of the best-known government organisations working in these fields is the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The United States government formed USAID in 1961 to coordinate initiatives aimed at countering the communist threat by providing military and development aid, advice and support around the world. Mark Berger (2006: 17) and Moss (2007:118) adds that the USAID was established to provide aid as a "tool of US foreign policy". While the USAID exists to advance US foreign strategy interests, it displays its work as far as philanthropic and specialised assistance, goodwill, care and sympathy (McEwan 2009: 184).

Over the past decades, the US and other Western militaries have turned out to be real players in certain reconstruction and development operations, both amid and after brutal conflict. A prime case of this is the US Department of Defense's driving part in re-building endeavours in Iraq (Dobbins 2008: 67; Fishstein & Wilder 2012: 13). Over the last few years, China has also become a major bilateral donor globally, providing extensive financial aid and loans to the developing world and countries recovering from war.

The principle reason developing nations are chosen to Chinese guidance and assistance is the fact that beneficiaries do not need to necessary fit in with Chinese strategy policies keeping in mind the end goal to get loans and aid (Tull 2006: 466; Dowden 2009: 166). As Boyce (2008: 35) states, China is just inspired by building up world's normal assets and exchange, leaving belief systems and approach solutions out of the connections.

Although bilateral donors are playing a great deal in giving philanthropic and development assistance, including nations afflicted by conflict, these helps are short of to bring more stability to the affected countries going through conflict reconstruction. They outline their associations with beneficiaries of help in collective terms that shun the ideas of progression they see in conventional benefactors' engagement with developing nations.

When it comes to engagement with conflict-affected states, bilateral donors, like traditional donors, are interested in supporting poverty-reduction and encouraging conditions favourable to foreign direct investment. Notwithstanding, they are more focused on technical assistance rather than capacity building and their funding tends to be bilateral and not directed at civil society organisations, something that traditional donors do.

It is imperative to mention that most at times, bilateral donors do not favour conditionality and tying assistance to good-governance reforms or environmental policies, although some countries like Brazil and South Africa do support strengthening democratic practices. Bilateral donor's assistance to post-conflict states is also shaped by their own history of exploitation by colonial powers as well as of internal conflict as in the case of South Sudan, South Africa; or ongoing internal battles in Turkey. However, despite bilateral donors cooperating in a variety of international forums, the differences among them are also significant and they are not developing a unified, alternative model to the liberal peace building model promoted by traditional donors.

It is important to note that although bilateral and traditional contributors alike observe connectivity amongst security and development, significant contrasts stay in how that linkage should be understood. While there are additionally contrasts among rising givers by the way they conceptualise the connection amongst security and improvement, one of the basic concerns is about securitisation of development arrangements and considering destitution to be the sole reason for worldwide conflicts (Paczynska 2016:9).

3.2.5. Regional organisations

The African Union has been involved in numerous conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building efforts on the African continent. In 2005, NEPAD published the "African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework" as an African agenda for post-conflict reconstruction and development. While NEPAD's policy framework looks promising on paper, there has not been much done since 2005 to put it into practice. Murithi (2006:21) states that the main problem with implementation is the fact that the African Union and NEPAD do not have resources and capacity to implement the framework. Regional organisations are often closely involved in PCRD operations. For example, the European Union and Organisation for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been involved extensively in Bosnia and Kosovo; dealing with human rights, rule of law, democratisation, police, institutional and education reforms and many other issues (Krasner 2004: 102).

Regional associations' role play in issues of peace and security has for quite some time been perceived. For instance, in a 1992 report, the previous UN secretary

General Boutros-Ghali states that "regional courses of action or organizations …
have a potential that should be used in preventive democracy, peace-building,
peace-making and post-conflict peace-building" (UN motivation for Peace 1992:8).

For instance, Economic committee of West African states (ECOWAS) policy
documents on post-conflict settlements convert into training when it arranges and
negotiate peace contract. The 1996 peace agreement amongst the government of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUFSL) is a valid
example. This contract or agreement incorporates an article on the socio-economic
dimension of the conflict (Aning et al. 2010:300).

According to the understanding, Sierra Leone's economic policy should be guided by
the "improvement of the country's profitable limit through significant grassroots
interest in the rebuilding and development of the nation" and provision of equal
opportunities particularly to those in the farmland and the urban poor to engage them
to contribute adequately to basic leadership which influences their livelihoods (Aning
et.al 2010:300).

Also, the AU and ECOWAS have both "created mission structures "to oversee
peace-building interventions" (Ajayi 2008:5) The AU's PCRD arrangement and
ECOWAS's Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) both have the objective of
planning "more encompassing methodologies towards the administration of conflict
(Ajayi 2008:5). According to the Swedish Defense Research Agency (SDRA),
ECOWAS has accomplished a lot from its "strategies and systems controlling peace

and security", of which a "key achievement" has been "the affirmation of the need to address main drivers of conflicts in its conventions and systems for peace and security" (Elowson & Mac Dermott 2010:9).

Another key accomplishment has been ECOWAS's endeavours to "change from an ECOWAS of states to an ECOWAS of the people groups". The aim is to bring the association's conflict prevention endeavours nearer to the concept and idea of human security" (Nieuwkerk 2012:20).

3.2.6. Nongovernmental organisations and Relief agencies

Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 133) posits that many international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and aid agencies are involved in PCRD operations around the world. These NGOs gives direct assistance and collaborative support through their work in conflict-torn countries, concentrating mainly on hunger, poverty, medical assistance, education, human rights, development and democratisation.

Although, the power of NGOs and aid agencies are much less, financial blow and influence as bilateral donors or IFIs, they are still powerful actors in post-conflict settings. In some cases, they provide basic services that are normally provided by local authorities as in case of South Sudan where local health care worker and constantly lacking and unavailability of resources do not exist or if they do in minimal form, the aid agencies are working and delivering massive assistance to the needed (Mailer & Poole 2010:24).

NGOs, apart from doing or assisting in humanitarian aid, they also raise money from the public and implement their own development programmes and projects, NGOs and relief agencies are often contracted by multilateral donors to implement projects in countries emerging from conflict (Willis 2011: 109).

3.2.7. The nexus of externally driven PCRD

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatant, constitutional and socio-economic reforms, reconstruction of infrastructure, reconciliation among warring parties, running of nations by foreign governments, provision of security and organisation of democratic elections are all part of externally driven activities for probing peacebuilding and peacekeeping by external agencies. Externally determined PCRD work by the UN, bilateral contributors, IFIs, global NGOs and relief organizations is all focussed to social change, political structures and more importantly in the after math of conflict is profoundly meddling political work (Duffield 2010: 5). Normal post-conflict intervention by external actors according to Goodhand, "do not exist". External organisation working in post-conflict settings are always involved in "highly political contexts and will be seen as political actors themselves." Goodhand (2006: 261).

Theories that underpin international relations can contend that externally determined PCRD operations are both realistic and optimist. They are realist since their key points are to "contain conflict in the affected developing nations and its worldwide repercussions" and additionally to advance national security, geopolitical or potentially monetary premiums of effective nations (Newman, Paris & Richmond

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2009: 4; Brahimi 2007: 3). They can be viewed as optimist since their exposed point is to "spare individuals in war-desolated nations through instruction, financial motivations and the space to create develop political institutions" designed according to Western democracies (Chesterman 2003: 1).

Although there may be idealist tendencies among some external agencies, the large majority of externally driven PCRD operations since the end of the Cold War have been based on realism, where key priorities are not establishment of "positive peace," welfare and livelihood improvements in post-war countries but containment of violent conflict "in the interest of international peace and stability or particular hegemonic interests" (Newman 2009: 48).

Most post-Cold War externally driven operations have been shaped by the concept of liberal peace, which assumes that a rapid transmission or imposition of neo-liberal and democratic norms and values, combined with Western-style institutions, would create conditions for lasting peace and prosperity (Wolpe & McDonald 2008: 141).

Externally driven post-war recovery, peace-building and state-building operations in the aftermath of the Cold War have in most cases been "coercive and interventionist… drawn on rigid blueprints and guidelines" (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 221). Woodward (2011: 107) contends that global agencies see post-war period as a minute when they can impact "key change" and "regulate their own arrangements and inclinations through local laws and procedural standards, specialized assistance and heading of economic related guidance.

However, even though externally driven PCRD operations have been "real endeavours in worldwide legislative issues" over the decades (Liden, Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009: 590). Collier (2010: 75) brings up, contemporary externally driven post-conflict reconstruction methodologies and practices "are still in their earliest stages" and require broad considering and research to improve them.

3.2.8. Restricted capacity of citizens

One of the fundamental reasons used to legitimise externally driven PCRD operations is the supposition that nations rising out of conflict lack the ability to recoup and create development on their own without foreign intervention. Although, conflict-torn nations confront significant limited challenges. Some nations are limited with respect to economic advancement and development even before the flare-up of conflict. In different nations, many skilled and talented people die in wars while others leave and begin their lives somewhere else; and a great number of them stay away forever even after peace is set up in their nations.

Advocates of external assistance assert that war-torn nations and additionally developing nations require foreign specialists to help them with transforming institutions, financial development and working towards building local capacity. External management help is frequently observed as a satisfactory substitute for incapable or lacking local capacity in post-war nations (Doyle & Sambanis 2000: 795). Majority of overseas development assistance to the developing world and countries recovering from war is spent on external experts offering technical assistance (Moss 2007: 120).

However, there are also countless cases where key advisory positions are given to inexperienced individuals or people without any knowledge of local conditions. In the post-US invasion of Iraq, young and inexperienced American college graduates in their early twenties, which hardly any previous work experience apart from the interns for members of the US Congress, ended up writing the Iraqi Constitutions and setting up privatisation of the public enterprise. Some of these young Americans were tasked with setting up and running of Iraq's stock exchange (Easterly 2006:273) while others managed budgets of tens of billions of dollars without having any previous experience in financial management (Mac Ginty &Williams 2009:50).

Multilateral organisations such as the USAID regularly send consultants to the "third world" and post-war countries without first consulting with local governments, which are to receive assistance. These "experts," often lacking basic knowledge of what is happening or what the real needs are, often offer "generalised advice delivered from rules of thumbs and so-called best practices" (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 102).

Many times, officials like the police force recruited around the world for the UN peacekeeping and peace-building missions are often individuals who were dismissed in their own countries as unfit and incompetent for police work. These same people are then sent to go to post-conflict countries and "teach" locals about "effective" policing and the rule of law (Fearon & Laitin 2004: 32).

Local capacity building is lauded by external actors, analysts and academics as key for post conflict recovery success and long-term stability. Some authors see capacity

building as a main priority that needs to be supported by donors (Nathan 2007: 40). However, in cases where there is a lack of capacity and skills, local officials and people need to be provided with extensive training in order to be able to meaningfully contribute to rebuilding of their societies (Wolpe & McDonald 2008: 141). Capacity building is a precondition for long-term peace and stability and "if societies do not develop their own capacity and infrastructures for peace, peace is unlikely to be sustained" (Kumar 2006: 11).

In most cases, however, capacity building is not the key priority and receives small fraction of donor funding for post-war operations. For instance, in South Sudan, the country with enormous developmental and capacity needs after four decades of conflict, destruction and complete lack of education, the international community earmarked only US $ 22.7 million specifically for capacity building (Mailer & Poole 2010:23). Most importantly a great amount of this was not spent on capacity building at all but on clearing the payroll of government and other institutions of government "ghost workers" and many international organisations working in South Sudan between 2005 and 2010 could not agree on capacity building strategy but instead each organisation had its own capacity building gaols and programmes often competing over donor funding and local participant in need of training and support (Schomerus & Allen 2010:95). Woodward (2011: 103) conceives that global associations much of the time purposely would prefer not to enhance local capacity since that would mean they do not have to give benefits any more, losing lucrative ventures and generously compensated occupations in the process.

3.2.9. Unrestricted power and exemption of external actors

In legitimising their work, some authors posit that political elites from nations coming out of violent conflict intentionally invite external agencies to come and drive PCRD in order to bring peace, long-term stability and prosperity (Paris & Sisk 2007: 9). However, external agencies often assign themselves managerial tasks and responsibilities through peace agreements that are more often coordinated and mediated, written and even forced by the same external actors or through self-authorisation by the UN Security Council. For instance, in East Timor and Kosovo, the Unite Nations administration became de facto government with too much unrestricted power or "self-authorisation" by the UN Security Council mandates. Citizens of those countries were never ever consulted about the missions and the extent of power to be given to external agencies (Korhonen 2001: 499).

Tadjbakhsh (2011: 2) composes that universal peace-builders assert that the authenticity of their frequently operations "originates from the global agreement around liberal peace and the regularising power of worldwide institutions, for example, the UN."

External operations give boundless official, administrative and legal powers and aggregate resistance to external military and non-military personnel work force. Aside from unlimited influence given to external agencies, insusceptibility for outer performing actors in any post-conflict circumstance is extremely risky given that they are over the tenets and laws they are attempting to set up (Lemay-Hebert 2009:67; Richmond &Frank 2007:1).

Wolfrum (2005: 696) thinks that if external agencies such as the UN want to "perform the functions of a state" in post-war settings, they need to stop finding excuses and asking for immunity for their staff and "act within the same legal framework as democratic states committed to human rights and the rule of law." It is imperative to say that if crimes committed by international actors can be brought to justice and prosecuted in a domestic or international court of law, hardly any country will be interested in taking part in post-war operations. (Fearon & Laitin 2004: 34)

3.2.10. Externally driven PCRD ownership

PCRD process and operations are recognised in majority of policy documents drafted by international agencies and western multilateral donors state that local ownership involvement is paramount for PCRD (NEPAD 2005:21). Newman (2009: 50) mentions that the local participation and ownership by international organisations and donors are "superficial" not more than a "lip service" (Tschirgi 2006: 60; Boege et al. 2008: 15) More often than not, external actors "flout the principle of local ownership and impose their models and programmes on local actors" (Nathan 2007: 6).

Mac Ginty (2010: 399) notes that from the "conception, design, funding, timetable, execution and evaluation," post-war programmes and projects are carried out by external actors to suit Western political, economic, security and strategic agendas. At the same time, programmes and operations are presented to the Western public as missions of charity and goodwill and are supposed to represent the care,

compassion, morals, values and enlightenment of the Western world (Handrahan 2004: 433).

Tadjbakhsh (2011: 3-4) writes that since the early 1990s, externally driven operations have failed to "recognise the agency and capacity of local institutions" and people. Hence, government and civil society's leaders in countries that experiencing externally driven PCRD "often have limited chances to manifest themselves or to be heard" (Doornbos 2003: 59). In addition, local voices are almost completely excluded from the academic and policy-oriented conversation about PCRD; in most cases the outsiders, mainly Westerners, are involved and consulted (Liden, Mac Ginty & Richmond 2009: 593).

This creates a situation where experts and policymakers working for powerful international institutions which work in developing and post-conflict countries consult mainly Western experts and documents prepared by Western researchers and academics. While they may have a theoretical and even some practical understanding of conflicts, poverty, instability and torment in the "third world," there is a real need to ask the people from the affected countries to become part of the discussions that are making decisions about their own future. As Nathan (2007: 7) points out, "the bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained."

Easterly (2006: 293) argues that many Western academics, analysts and policy-makers "suffer from the patronising assumption that only the West can keep locals in

the "third world" from killing each other." Similarly, Laurie Nathan (2007: 7) thinks that Western donors and experts suffer from the superiority complex and this leads them to impose "solutions" on "third-world" peoples, their leaders and governments. Thus, the "very nature of international reconstruction efforts suggests that the knowledge, capacity, strategies and resources of external actors are crucial ingredients for successes" (Englebert &Tull 2008:134).

Cox (2001: 19), for example, argues that economic policies and reforms in the aftermath of war should be formulated, designed and implemented by external actors instead of "waiting for local institutions to develop to the point where they can formulate and implement their own policies".

However, instead of recognising local agency capacity and supporting it, several authors argue that if external actors do not intervene to "save" countries ravaged by war, design and drive post-war recovery operations, these countries will never stabilise, build peace, reconstruct and develop. Richmond (2011: 37) notes that external actors often depict local people in post-war countries as "homogenous and disorderly, whose needs and aspirations do not conform to liberal standards" and who cannot escape conflict, poverty and lawlessness without Western peace-builders and state-builders.

Paris (2004: 2006), for example, thinks that international peace-builders and administrators are the "key to creating a competent, professional, law-abiding bureaucracy" in countries ravaged by war. Similarly, Christian Schaller (2009: 6)

claims that building sustainable peace after war depends on external actors taking over significant, if not all, authority over governance and decision-making.

Søbjerg (2007: 483) goes even further and claims that people in countries emerging from violent conflict may not know what is best for them. She argues that their decision-making may be based on "passion and irrational impulses" and "in the name of their own good" outsiders should act on their behalf through a trusteeship system or international administration until they are once again capable of running their own lives as well as their societies and institutions. This thinking, according to Hancock (2009: 19), resembles the Western aid industry's portrayal of the "third world" peoples as "fundamentally helpless," unable to survive if the rich and powerful from the West do not "intervene and save them from themselves."

Korhonen (2001: 528) notes that all too often, local people in post-war countries "become outsiders in the processes of international administrations that are there to offer the country a new starting point." Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1075) came to the conclusion that the recipient states and institutions have often been "relegated to observer status in much of their countries" recovery" by donors, IFIs, international NGOs and aid agencies.

Hancock (2009: 124-5) notes that this has been the practice of the international aid and development industry since the 1960s and nothing has significantly changed since then. External actors still make decisions in the name of citizens and institutions in the developing world and countries emerging from war. Even when

local people are consulted, they are in most cases left out of the decision-making process.

3.2.11. One-size approach

Elbadawi, Hegre and Milante (2008: 451) contend that post-conflict operations amid a scope of PCRD projects and arrangements need to keep going for no less than ten years after the formal end of conflict. As indicated by Samuels (2005: 734), it takes no less than fifteen years to "create new institutions or political societies - particularly following an inheritance of persecution or a harming institutional culture." Similarly, post-conflict economic development cannot occur rapidly; it takes years, even decades, and includes a "complex and typically chaotic development of social orders and economies" (Moss 2007: 10).

Thomas (2005: 3) adds that development is a slow process, an "evolution of habits, mentalities and ways of being" which cannot take place overnight. Apart from the lack of capacity in countries emerging from civil war, those affected by fighting are traumatised, disillusioned and often divided along ethnic or religious lines; social cohesion is damaged, economies and infrastructure are destroyed and government institutions are dysfunctional or non-existent and unable to provide even the most basic services to the population (Samuels & von Einsiedel 2003: 3; Murithi 2006: 16; Paris & Sisk 2007: 1).

Where wars are fought over ethnic or religious differences, divisions will stay for quite a long time, even decades after war. These issues and difficulties confronting

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post-conflict nations require a long- term responsibility regarding rebuilding, development, peace-building and state working with a specific end goal to "standardise and repair financial, political and social channel of neighbourhood social cooperation's" (Busumtwi-Sam, Costy & Jones 2004: 363).

The length and degree of post-Cold War global inclusion in war-torn nations have now and again relied upon the significance of such nations to the world forces and their interests (Uvin 1999: 20). Because of geopolitical and key interests of effective nations, PCRD and in-conflict stabilisation and operations have gone on for over 10 years in nations, for example, Sudan, Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Iraq and often times Western forces chosen to adopt a long-term strategy so as to convey peace and stability to the area and keep any future war. (Chesterman 2003: I).

In other cases, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, external actors have aimed for quick political and socio-economic solutions to complex post-conflict situations attempting to rebuild and reconstruct countries in a few years (Sørbø 2004: 16). Specker (2008: 1) adds that contemporary externally driven post-war operations are often limited to short-term and ad-hoc solutions, focusing on humanitarian and emergency assistance, establishment of security and democracy promotion through elections. Abiew and Keating (1999/2000: 91) argue that, while beneficial in some ways, short-term measures can do "more harm than good" in the end.

Boyce 2008: 45; Elhawary, Foresti & Pantuliano (2010: 5) explain how short-term "solutions" cause harm: looking for "quick fixes," external actors often side-line local authorities and provide post-war assistance and support directly through international organisations and experts, thus undermining long-term capacity and legitimacy of the state.

Concerning externally driven PCRD operations, in a perfect world, there should be sufficient time to design, discover assets and staff and find out about neighbourhood, histories and advancements in post-conflict nations. As a rule, be that as it may, most externally driven operations are built up earnestly, with indeterminate subsidising and "without political sureness" (Chesterman 2001: 13).

In addition, Sandole (2010: 35) points that PCRD operations have so far been mainly "reactive, ad hoc and minimalist," aiming to achieve only "negative peace" in war-torn countries. In addition, short-term solutions inevitably involve short-term postings and frequent staff turnover. Several authors think that external actors need to reduce staff turnover and have committed personnel working for a number of years on specific PCRD operations instead of spending a year or less in post-war countries (Menocal 2009: 4).

Belloni (2007: 106) argues that reasoning behind short project cycles and "quick fixes" is that external actors aim for short-term efficiency and "instant gratification" at home. This often implies ignoring local actors, their knowledge; skills and aspirations because working with locals could prolong the PCRD process. External actors

frequently approach war-torn countries with "one size- fits-all" and "template-style" interventions (Mac Ginty 2008: 157). Often, this is due to donor red tape, financial constraints and bureaucracy, leading to programmes and projects "with a high level of pre-determined detail, inhibiting flexibility and responsiveness to local circumstances" (Nathan 2007: 7).

Doornbos (2003: 57) writes that the "recipe-thirsty international community appears inclined to search for readily available programmes and interventions, irrespective of the factors that have led to actual crisis situations." The "solutions" offered by external actors are often outdated, ignoring local demands and contexts; time and again, this has been a self-defeating process and has not led to stability in the recipient countries (Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 5).

Berdal (2009: 29) adds that international organisations, governments, donors and experts regularly approach post-war situations "in terms of easily transferable templates or universally valid planning assumptions." It is important to remember that this tendency to design replicable solutions is nothing new; IFIs and development experts have been trying for decades to come up with development theories, approaches and blueprints that would fix problems in the developing world (Easterly 2006: 321).

3.2.12. Effect of externally driven on local socio-economic relations

Regardless of the possibility that their underlining point is to help nations rising out of war/conflict to recoup, restructure and grow, external driven operations and help can

totally contort post-conflict social orders and their inner financial relations, making new issues abound. Too much post-conflict aid can overwhelm local institutions, which often lack capacity to plan and implement big projects and programmes. In addition, large amounts of money can distort local socio-economic and political systems, instigating fierce competition over the control of funds and leading to corruption (Goodhand 2006a: 289; Nathan 2007: 57-58).

Furthermore, as Pham (2006: 25-6) points out, local markets in post-war countries could be "irreparably distorted" by the presence of foreign troops, civilian personnel, NGO aid workers and the restructuring of the economy to service and accommodate the influx of foreigners. For instance, in Mozambique, foreign aid financed more than 50% of government budget in 2007 (AFDB/OECD 2008:465) forcing the government to be more accountable to donors who provided the funding rather the local citizens. As a result of that, Misra (2002: 17) posits that the presence of many external agencies can lead to a development of "parasitic" economic environment, such as a thriving prostitution and arms trade industry that existed to serve peacekeepers and peace-builders in many countries in Africa since the early 1990s.

3.2.13. Accountability

Transparency and accountability of local officers and political elites to the nationals is the key for transformation and standardisation of nations coming out of conflict/ war. Mediations by donors much of the time, advance outside projections while sidelining internal responsibility, transparent governance (Englebert & Tull 2008: 139). Chandler (2006: 30) explains that aid conditionality, imposed by bilateral donors and

institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, often creates a situation where "non-Western states… are more accountable to international policy-makers than to their own people."

In the current externally driven PCRD setup, apart from local political elites being accountable to donors and not their population, there is no exist mechanisms that would make donors and other international actors accountable to citizens and institutions in post-war countries (Boyce 2008: 15; Egnell 2010: 473).

Korhonen (2001: 526) writes that external actors and administrators working for the UN or other international organisations are "virtually untouchable by any social or legal consequences of their administrative conduct." Even if they make fundamental mistakes and negatively influence reconstruction, development, peace building and state building after war, they know they will not be held accountable and will be able to leave these countries without any fear of having to answer difficult questions or be prosecuted.

3.2.14. The contributions of external agencies

It would be regrettably unfair to be critical only on external agencies work without looking at the bright and positive contributions they offer to PCRD in affected countries. External agencies often provide help and relief assistance to countries recovering from conflict. Multilateral and international organisations such as the AU, UN, and USAID are helping end violent conflict through diplomatic negotiations (Woodward 2011: 96)

Peacekeeping operation from international organs whether from the UN, NATO or the AU try very much to assist with post-conflict stabilisation and peace-keeping missions in many war-torn zones and post-conflict deadlock countries around the world (David 2001:23). In the aftermath of fighting, international agencies and various organisation assist refugees and displaced persons, assist with emergency and humanitarian aid, help to rebuild destroyed infrastructure and institutions, try as much as possible to deliver basic services such as health care, sanitation and support to vulnerable groups such as children and women (Paris 2004:106).

3.2.15 Conclusion

The chapter has attempted to interrogate and contextualize the literature on South Sudan and peace-building interventions. The role of external actors within South Sudan peacebuilding. The section noted that most of the works done by scholars contain narratives that collaborate and modify only externally driven practices to PCRD in peacebuilding interventions. These has led to a robust scholarly debate about the nexus of external actors' intervention and conflict transformation. The chapter examined this debate and highlighted the neglected realities of external actors' role in peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan.

The chapter examined the role the African Union, the World Bank and other multilateral donors have contributed towards PCRD. It also argued with various authors that short-term "solutions" cause harm and looking for "quick fixes," and that, external actors often side-line local authorities and provide post-war assistance and

support directly through international organisations and experts, thus undermining long-term capacity and legitimacy of the state.

However, the section noted that many scholars have carried out theoretical studies on PCRD that suggest the difficulties multinational organisation face while trying to resolve conflicts in host countries. Such challenges included economic, social, physical and psychosocial construction of their lives after wars.

However, the review of many literatures lacked empirical backing of external PCRD success role in medium-to-long-term peacebuilding intervention. Given that South Sudanese are a party in the on-going conflict or ending conflicts either as victims or perpetrators, they understand the dynamics of the root causes of the conflict in their country better than the external actors. Therefore, the need to probe the attitudes and perceptions towards peacebuilding in South Sudan can be done internally.

CHAPTER FOUR

LITERATURE REVIEW

4. Introduction

This chapter surveys relevant concepts and provide a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues, arguments and concerns related to externally driven PCRD and highlight the gap in the literature that the study explores. The chapter define key concepts and aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and development and place PCRD in study context, explore its main arguments, approaches and practices.

The literature review chapter is separated into two sections: section one focuses on the key definitions and concepts of post-conflict reconstruction and positioning PCRD within development discipline, section two focuses on the conceptual framework underpinning PCRD, conflict and foreign aid and focus on unpacking various theoretical underpinning approaches and practices related to internally driven post-conflict reconstruction and development in South Sudan.

4.1. Section One

The study considers in its headings and through the parts utilised certain terms/ideas or a catchphrase, which section one of these chapters defines, conceptualises and operationalises in its context. The key concepts are development, conflict, peace, peace-making and peace-building, civil war, post conflict reconstruction, state-

building, fragile states, post-conflict and post-war, aligning PCRD within development context.

4.1.1 Conflict and development

Consistent with Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 2-3) states that, theories of war and theories of development "have in large part developed in isolation from each other", prior to the 1990s, many development actors, professionals and practitioners worked in struggle and around war areas but did not work "on conflict" associated problems (Tschirgi 2006: 47). Recent past decades, development and conflict practitioners have begun exploring how development and conflict relate to each other. This change came about resulting from the increase in the range of civil conflicts within and the outcome of the cold war. The urge by means of numerous institutions and people is to locate ways to address these violent conflicts, minimise their effects on human beings, countries and ensure that there is no relapse in the future (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 2).

Through the years, conflict and development experts realised that equitable development can contribute to conflict prevention and that in the case of nations emerging from violent conflict, post-conflict reconstruction and development are essential for lasting harmony and stability. It is critical to cite that the study focus on PCRD processes and practices in the aftermath of violent conflict that can help build and consolidate lasting peace and stability and save resurgence into the future.

4.1.2 Key concepts definitions

Development: long- term activities for supporting national targets, for example, accomplishing financial objectives, and decreasing destitution (Moss 2007:2).

Violent conflict: an "intentional struggle between collective actors that involves the application of significant social power for the purpose of injuring, disrupting or destroying human beings, human psyches, material property and/or socio-cultural structures" (Himes 1980:104).

Civil War: a violent conflict between organised groups within a country in which at least one thousand people are killed annually (Collier 2010:133). Woodward (2011:106) defines civil war as a "contest among rivals' parties" over the control of the state. According to Paris (2005:1) civil wars are violent conflicts within a country, fought by people who reside in that country.

Fragile state: a state whose institutions are powerless against emergency and breakdown (Putzel 2001:1).

Failed state: a state where governmental authority ceases to function across the territory; a state that cannot provide a basic security, law, order and services to its citizens (Milliken & Krause 2003:2; Yannis 2003:66).

Post-war reconstruction: it includes short-term humanitarian assistance and relief to medium to-long-term reconstruction and development. Key aspects of post-war reconstruction are rebuilding of physical infrastructure, creation of an inclusive and

accountable governance system, economic recovery and repair of social relationships (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009:130).

Post-War development: aims to "reactivate" economic and social development that was disrupted during the violent conflict (Barakat & zyck 2009:1071-2).

Post-war peace-building: involves policies and programmes aimed at creation of stable environment after armed conflict; the essential objective of peace-building is to prevent the arrival of contention and fighting and create a long-term stability and peace (Paris 2005: 767).

State-building: involves building or reproducing of establishments of administration capable for giving nationals physical, social and monetary security (Chandler 2006:1).

4.1.3 Development and Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD)

Krause and Jutersonke 2005; Paris 2005; Barakat and Zyck 2009, argue that the status quo of safety, stability and peace-building need not be alienated from socio-financial reconstruction and improvement after war/conflict. They factor out that protection and peace-building are geared toward preventing further violence within the quick-to-medium term. They see reconstruction and improvement as long-term strategies geared toward restructuring struggle-torn societies and advertising economic growth (Busumtwi-Sam 2004:317). The lack of integration of development, conflict control, governance, peace-building and other fields has undermined peace-building and post-struggle restoration efforts since the early 1990s (Sandole

2010:78). Stabilisation, peace building and socio-financial reconstruction and development should not be separated (Boyce &Pastor (1998:42). Stabilisation and peace-constructing are key stipulations for economic reconstruction and improvement while at the same time economic reconstruction, improvement and growth can help consolidate peace and stability and save resurrection of violent conflict.

Kofi Annan (1998:19) stated, "Except there is re-construction and development after conflict, there can be little desire for development or long-lasting peace". Socio-financial reconstruction and improvement are "quintessential elements of peace-constructing". Peace and development are variables that may be jointly reinforcing in post-battle conditions (Mac Ginty & Williams (2009:2). In the same vein, NEPAD (2005:2) voiced out that "without peace there can be no feasible change and without improvement, it is difficult to set up long lasting peace". Allen (2010: 81) adds that "peace holds a means", a distance beyond peacefulness or definitely absence of conflict and establishment of lasting peace requires improvement in livelihoods, services along with better infrastructure, employment possibilities, and efficient government structures. Socio-economic reconstruction can reinforce peace within the lengthy-term. The establishment of safety, nation-building and development of a solid political environment are as crucial as socio-economic system reconstruction and development

The transition from violent battle to stability is by no means a linear and easy process but is full of surprising incidents and difficulties. Binns, Dixon and Nel

(2012:260) point out that in maximum instances, "there is little distinction between conflict and post-war periods". A formal give up of battle (war) does not constantly bring an end of warfare and fighting. In most instances, some contour of conflict keeps coming among various organisations, especially groups which are unhappy with a peace deal or military defeat (Campbell 2008:557; Binns, Dixon & Nel 2012:260). Conflict and animosity among adversaries do not stop overnight with the formal statement of the cease of civil wars and hostilities. In a few instances, conflict keeps through small–scale violence and proxy combating, at the same time it could move from within ethnics to political institutions. Because of these motives, the study utilises "post-conflict" approach rather than the mainstream term "post-war".

4.1.4. Political reconstruction of PCRD

According to the World Bank, every PCRD support needs to, along with further targets, "re-establish the framework of governance through strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the businesses of civil society to work correctly" (World bank 1998:.4). The discourse on political recreation incorporates a new political framework in post-conflict states for peacebuilding, governance and the rule of law (sørensen 1998:3).

Reconstruction politically means, "reaching an agreement regarding political priorities and power-sharing" and "calls for the established order and development of legitimate, responsible and capable establishments which make certain a minimal degree of safety and protection of all citizens' rights" (Sørensen 199: 3).

Calame (2005:18) states that the urgent segment of restoration requires an all-inclusive governmental authority because of the vital necessity for speedy, massive scale reaction to conflict catastrophe. He said that a flourishing reconstruction tactics is by dividing the obligations of tasks with local corporations. "Power balance is vital for public reputation of this system: vital government can ensure continuity and local administrators can reply more without delay to community wishes all through the manner of reconstruction" (Calame 2005:18).

Areas where the government in power is simply vulnerable to presume the role because of conflict, the expression "failed state" has been used in several writing. Time is frequently linked with a nation's incapability to release its nucleus primary responsibilities, due to shortage of capability to achieve (Dom & Gordon 2011). The occurrences happen when basic services and features mentioned within the communal agreement between nation and populace become difficult to supply and the state loses its negotiating power with its people (OECD, 2008).

Verdeil (2015:1) puts it "post-war reconstructions are controversial and politically charged". PCRD pertains to the political machine that appears after the conflict, it is obviously suffering from the converting power relationship among various actors within the political system dominating the war-torn countries within the aftermath of violent struggle. The post-struggle framework might be composed formally by means of the peace transactions and agreement like the cases of Rwanda and Uganda (Dayton Peace Accord in 1995). In the two cases, organisation and government had separated the political characters of the contention and subsequently the partners

stakeholders` in formal peace transactions will choose the formal power relations for the post-conflict stage.

4.1.5. Economic re-building

Economic reconstruction and development are a key priority for post-conflict recovery. It guides the formation for economic re-building of infrastructure and basic services delivery. Economic restoration of failed state coming out from conflict is a distinctive, confused and multi-faceted process and it takes shape on individual and national levels, each in a legitimate and unlawful way (Sørensen 1998).

Since recovery of livelihoods is the foundation of any dynamic re-building, it is far important to perceive the significance and guideline intended for this healing through the primary actors such as the central government, international organisations and the private sector with their capacity in the recovery system. Calame (2005:5) clarifies that amid post-conflict circumstances, when the local experts are "broken" or disrupted to offer a stage for proficient mediation, the non-public funding fills the empty space and transforms into a replacement for civil specialist because the conflict has profoundly affected the communities, destroy economic infrastructure and social relations in the process.

The importance of socio-economic development and re-establishment of social contract between the government and community in the aftermath of conflict is critical. Murshed (2002:387-92) argue that medium-to-long-term economic development cannot take place without social stability. For economic rebuilding to

take place, it requires restoration of peace and reconstruction of the social contract among communities, peaceful co-existence, eradication of poverty, conflict resolution and national dialogue, fair sharing of state resources and economic growth.

Hence, Simpson (1997:475) mention that for whatever reason, "so much international aid for the economic recovery of reconstruction process almost seems blind to this social dislocation and to the vital and basic need to rebuild economy social relations". Therefore, international communities should bring proper economic development models that can fit a particular post-conflict country needs to help improve the economy. Proper training should be conducted for local people on how to run effective government to stimulate growth and development.

4.1.6. Social Capital Re-building

A social re-building aspiration tries to restore the social framework of the public and it tries to offer people with medicinal services, education and distinctive offerings. It also offers socio-cultural components for the misfortunes caused by conflict. It endeavours to produce a comprehensive social environment, to construct and adapt to the reasons for the contention with the aim to decrease the risk of re-establishment of viciousness (Sørensen 1998; Bouta et al., 2005).

The actions frequently encompass; therapy of social offerings (schooling, healthcare and additionally consists of reacting to warfare-related sickness and trauma), social incorporation like creating avenues for ex-combatants, and schooling for displaced people including women. Offering those necessities is critical to permit people to

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contribute towards PCRD process. It is far critical to design projects of social reconstruction, as it is tremendous for reconstruction and building peace.

The present day intrastate armed violent conflicts target social establishments with immediate targets at large social degeneration. Nations are indebted to comply with global values to decrease direct damage to civilians in battle among states. In contrast to warring factions in intrastate war, in which practices nonstop assaults on civilians, tribal/ethnic cleaning, and mindfully tries to wreck inhabitant infrastructure (Sørensen 1998, kumar2001).

Hence, the social services experiences loss of investment because of redistribution of investment to the army sector and shortage of personnel because of factors brought about by the conflict. Further, due to intimidating health problems, conflicts additionally create struggling, agony, displacement, killing and so forth which progressively wear down citizen's sense of worth and self-belief (sørensen 1998).

The essential role player in social reconstruction are government institutions. They must try to ensure basic human rights, disperse national assets equally within the country and improve local communities and empower citizens through training and development.

4.1.7 Reconstruction vs. recuperation (recovery)

African Union (2007:1) argues that in preference to reconstructing societies and returning them to reputable state, post-conflict engagement need to be

transformative and result in establishment of solid and non-violent societies (African Union 2007: 1).

Barakat and Zyck (2009: 1072) argue that scholars who write about PCRD should move from the usage of the time period "reconstruction" as this will suggest the return to pre-warfare status but rather, they recommend the term "recovery" which, in line with them, implies a transformation into something higher. Although the above stated tricky connotation associated with the time period "reconstruction", this study examines the term in connection with physical, economic and socio-political recovery, reconstruction and improvement in warfare-torn nations.

4.1.8 State building vs. Nation-building

State-building is a procedure of re-constructing legitimate institutions of governance competent of imparting general public with physical and financial protection (chandler 2006: 1). Nation-building, on the other hand involves creation of a common identification and nationality among humans residing within the identical area of a country. Even though the terms "State-building" and "nation-building" differ extensively, many authors do now not seem to worry and recognise the difference (Fearon & Laitin 2004: 5). Von Hippel (2000: 96) argues that in many instances, the time period "nation-building" sincerely means "state-building," including that the false impression is due to the truth that many analysts and policy-makers confuse the time period "state" with "nation" (Rondinelli & Montgomery 2005: 15).

4.1.9 Addressing root causes of violent warfare

Krasner and Pascual (2005: 159) argues that if root causes of a violent warfare are not addressed and resolved, it can undermine balance of stability and peace after conflict and possibly lead to resumption of combating in the distance future. NEPAD (2005: 6), postulates that the aim of PCRD is to "deal with the foundation reasons of the conflict and to put the guidelines for social equity and sustainable peace"

Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2011: 199) states categorically that if nations fail to cope with grievances that led to fighting, they risk ultimate "caught in horrible cycles of war, denial, depression and continual lack of confidence", therefore addressing root causes of conflict is critical for peace-making.

Many instances, civil conflicts have "a couple of complicated and deep rooted" reasons (Nathan 2010: 1) which might be hard to tune and pick out, issues that result in the outbreak of warfare may not be the prime issues after some years of fighting. For these types of reasons, addressing and resolving root causes of violent conflict can be utopian and not possible, much like attempts to "make poverty history," quit all conflicts and convey long-lasting peace round the world. Modern violent conflicts often do now not have truly "identifiable reasons that can be absolutely understood and for which "solutions" can be generated" (Goodhand & Hulme 1999: 24). Ultimately, relative peace and stability can be done and sustained even without resolving root reasons of conflict, with post-apartheid South Africa being the top instance (Call 2008: 190). It is therefore vital to pick out violent conflict

with the intention to layout programmes and policies which could lead to advantageous post-conflict transformation.

SECTION TWO

4.2. Theories underpinning the study

4.2.1. Neo-liberalism

Neo-liberalism, also known as neo-liberal economic theory, came in the late 1970s as an answer to perceived failures of other development theories and approaches. Since the 1980s, neo-liberalism has dominated development thinking, planning and policy-making (Payne & Phillips 2010: 86; Willis 2000: 29).

This was mostly because of the ascendance of globalisation, disintegration of control over capital flight, state wastefulness and defilement and crumple of the Soviet Union, and communism in the late 1980s (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 11). The broad concentration on neo-liberalism is because of its significant impact on the liberal peace structure, the main externally driven post-conflict recuperation approach since the age of Cold War.

McEwan (2009: 30) states that Neo-liberalism "lectures limitation on state mediation and social spending and the conspicuousness of the market". The main factors of neo-liberal approach are restricted government, private sector as the driver of development, costs controlled by business sectors and absence of insurance for inefficient enterprises (Payne & Phillips 2010: 93). This approach sees unregulated markets as motors of development and improvement, which would "stream down

and advantage all" individuals from social orders that take after neo-liberal plan (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 11).

Defenders of neo-liberalism in the late 1980s thought of an all-inclusive plan for advancement and development known as the "Washington Consensus." Stiglitz (2002: 16) composes that the Washington Consensus is an accord between the IMF, World Bank and United States Treasury about "right" approaches for poor nations. Advocates of the Washington Consensus contended that widespread neo-liberal medicines were the main aim for developing nations, asserting that neo-liberalism was incontestably positive and "resistant to sensible addressing" (Payne & Phillips 2010: 94).

Key elements of this plan were development of free markets, economic and trade liberation, privatisation, deregulation, (Barbara 2008: 309) and abrogation of obstructions that keep outside companies from entering local markets (Klein 2007: 204), while in the meantime underestimating the state device in both the public and economic circles (Barakat & Zyck 2009: 1073; Willis 2011: 56).

Over the past decades, Washington Consensus approaches have been forcefully advanced, supported and forced on developing nations recouping from conflict by IMF, World Bank and other Western-controlled associations. This forcibly impositions came through with conditions to advances and help which constrained economies monetary and institutional changes and rebuilding, known as "structural adjustment projects" (Payne &Phillips 2010: 96).

Auxiliary modification programmes, created in the West and forced on the developing nations (Willis 2011: 56), requested from beneficiary nations not just economic changes and rebuilding along the neo-liberal lines, additionally political changes and request that beneficiaries becomes a liberal democracy (Paris 2004: 30) and in order to accomplish this plan, advocates of neo-liberalism demanded forcing "general" principles, "once in a while giving an idea to the social and political ramifications in the beneficiary countries of what they were doing" (Dowden 2008: 87).

Be that as it may, despite all endeavours, changes, arrangements and inconveniences, neo-radicalism did not prompt economic development and growth in the "developing nation." Instead, the neo-liberal monetary hypothesis "flopped significantly" in all developing nations where it was forced (Payne &Phillips 2010: 96), totally not able to address destitution, underdevelopment and social rejection and inequalities (Mac Ginty & Williams 2009: 13; Murshed 2011: 174).

Stiglitz (2002: 84) argues that the Washington Consensus strategies wrecked occupations and made financial, social and political insecurity on a vast scale in numerous nations; much of the time, the rich got wealthier, and the poor get poorer and the middle class just vanished.

Paris (2004: 166) takes note of that following quite a while of neo-liberal advocates saying that they are not ready to "exhibit convincingly" that their methodologies and strategies can prompt economic development and advance growth but rather, the

mind-boggling proof focuses to a conclusion that neo-liberal approaches and projects just declined financial conditions in affected nations. Notwithstanding the absence of economic development in the developing nations, through marginalisation of the state and advancement of government within the developing world, the Washington Consensus has constrained, and limits developing nation governments and establishments and added to decay of their legitimacy (Boege et al. 2008: 6).

On paper, the neo-liberal approach advances free markets, facilitated commerce and monetary progression. However, Western forces do not work by free market and unhindered commerce rules. McEwan (2009: 99) feels that unhindered commerce has dependably been a myth. For long time, with a specific end goal to ensure and develop their economies, Western economies have straightforwardly utilised tariffs, endowments and levies, which are in opposition to the unhindered commerce idea and their open sermons about the significance of facilitated commerce. This has led to the conclusion by majority of authors that neo-liberalism is a major obstruction to financial improvement, stability and flourishing in many developing nations (Brainard, Chollet & Lafleur 2007: 20; Ghani & Lockhart 2008: 154; Maathai 2010: 101).

Although post Washington consensus came to address the failure of neo-liberalism, this approach was expected to address the disappointments of past neo-liberal methodologies and medicines. The primary aim of this approach was economic and institutional change, democracy advancement good governance, economical and impartial development, capacity building, investment in local activities, and common

society advancement (Payne & Phillips 2010: 148). As the segment on liberal peace will appear, the liberal peace system utilised for remotely operations is very nearly a correct reproduction of the Post-Washington Consensus.

Faultfinders of the Post-Washington Consensus contend that, a more conscious way to deal with improvement than its neo-liberal precursors and receiving the idea of practical development, for example, local capacity building, Post- Washington Consensus does not vary essentially from the Washington Consensus and other neo-liberal thoughts and standards said above.

Most fundamentally, Post-Washington Consensus it has neglected the "inquiries of worldwide structures and political setting within development practices" (Payne & Phillips 2010: 151). The emphasis on effective governance and institutional change in the developing world appear to accept that disappointments of forced neo-liberal prescriptions have been mostly because of the absence and ability of local government and citizens to execute external driven approaches to development.

Tadjbakhsh (2011a: 31) stresses that the flow of worldwide economic emergency crisis has uncovered "blame lines within the philosophy of capitalism" and neo-radicalism advanced by the West, adding this may prompt a genuine look for optional economic methodologies. Notwithstanding, regardless of its weaknesses and disappointments, neo-liberalism is still effective, with defenders in most Western governments. Mac Ginty and Williams (2009: 14) compose that "structures of the contemporary global political economy have been caught by neo-liberal powers" fit

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for taking out any option for public discourse. The study uses this theory for analyses because its support externally driven PCRD and has resulted in lots of small arms in South Sudan because of the market biases.

4.2.2. State building approach

Rothstein has highlighted that peace-building is slighting the introduction of a "peace structure" (a structure that gathers peace) and related systems for doing it (Rothstein, 1999: 18). State-building is a procedure of re-building and remaking real foundations of governance equipped for furnishing residents with the physical and financial security and fundamental service delivery to its citizens (Chandler 2006:1; Belloni 2007: 100; Newman 2009: 30).

State building is a fundamental component for stabilisation and a change of early recovery practices as an account for South Sudan into long- term change. The reclamation of state capacity should consolidate the establishment of instruments for oversight, responsibility and economic related controls and the formation of professional open organization, good governance and redesigning of representation and helpful political institutions (Aden 2010: 90-91).

Violent clashes annihilate and disturb the movement of administrations conveyance (for example, Health, Education, sanitation et cetera) and discourage the regular routine related with improving livelihood of people. The feebleness of the failed state to give basic services has unimaginable impact on nationals' basic needs and

restarting prosperous welfare practices and long-term prospect for ensuring welfare, diminishing desperation and empowering enhancement and development.

Failed state like South Sudan show the reverse; dreadful methodologies that bolster serious elites, few spending controls and uncontrolled dishonour and corruption and bolster strategy that limit opportunity and preferred advantages for all exist. Benefit conveyance and economic progression relate to legitimacy in that natives tend to pull back their support from governments that cannot give proper administrations and services delivery. South Sudan state weakness to provide basic delivery can be a basic contributing factor to citizen's disappointment and emission of violent clashes within the ethnic tribes.

Building up of working, comprehensive, compelling and true state institution is viewed as a noteworthy essential for long-term stability, peace, democratisation and economic recuperation and development (Bellin 2005: 598). A working state must have the capacity to administer its domain, keep up lawfulness, have political authenticity and specialist, raises duties and incomes, give essential administrations and be straightforward and accountable to the population (Hanlon 2006:6a).

Along these lines, the establishment of instruments for political support and far reaching approaches, the suitable course of action of basic regulatory administrations, engaging defilement, empowering fame-based culture (democratic system), allowing free and reasonable majority rules system by government of South Sudan will ensure long-term stability.

As noted above, a lack or acknowledgment of developing proper institutions or a crack in institution makes it difficult for peace-building to take place and brings a disregard of the state. Multiplication of new states emerged after the cold war (for instance, South Sudan), some of which have stayed fragile and precarious.

A large portion of these states are attempting to establish frameworks for peace, reconstruction and development, and there is a rising worldwide accord that peace framework is impossible without reinforcing the institutional systems of the state. Wyeth and Sisk (2009) states that the idea of state-building rose practically as an exit technique for peace builders about war to peace because of the apparent pathologies of "liberal peace-building".

Fragile states are creating undesirable flow and issues at local level, as well as regarding overflow impacts related with conflict, political instability, and fear-based oppression, trafficking among others. Along these lines, viable and developed states have become basic "saviours" to advance development and peace and to counteract security obstacles. However, with peacebuilding, state-building has also progressed broadly. From a thin diversion with building/sustaining formal institutions and state organisations, there has been an indispensable move within the global development world perceiving that the state cannot be managed in confinement and that relations of state-society are vital to state-building frameworks.

Hence, in governance, the responsibility of nation is directed towards issues of democracy, constitutional rights, peace-building engagement and fortifying the nation

by fulfilling their centre capacities as organ of change to decrease poverty and the public has a say in requesting good governance and a better administration conveyance.

Along these lines therefore, nation-building is not solely about "top-down" methodologies of institutional restorative (i.e., concentrating on nation performing) but additionally "bottom-up" methodologies connecting nation and the public for the betterment of the nation (Chandler 2006). The study analyses and use this theory as it supports nation building and building of local capacity of the people and ensures better administration conveyance of a country.

4.2.3. Sustainable development approach

The sustainable development approach is viewed as an alternative way to deal with development that challenges neo-liberalism and different approaches. There are different meanings of sustainable development. According to Brundtland (1987: 41), sustainable development is characterised as "advancement that addresses the issues of the present without trading off the capacity of future to address their own issues."

Payne and Phillips (2010: 119) states that this methodology centres around prosperity of people, enhancing vocations, attending to fundamental human needs and opportunities, securing nature and advancing sustainable economic development. They argue that many protagonists of sustainable development do not

argue for economic growth promoted by neo-liberals but call for benefits to be shared by all (Payne & Philips 2010:137).

However, the problem with sustainable development approach is its broadness and vagueness. Notwithstanding this, the idea of practical improvement and sustainable development on prosperity of people has impacted development thinking for the last two decades (Payne & Philips 2010:144).

The impact of sustainable development and development hypothesis will continue to grow because of the expanding concern about environmental changes and global warming (Haines & Hurst 2011: 16). On a fundamental level, sustainable development is one of the key highlights of post-conflict recovery thinking and planning. Subsequently, sustainable development objective is devoted to advancing peaceful and comprehensive social orders, provision of access to justice for all, and building compelling and responsible institutions at all level of government and society.

Moreover, in conflict settings, acquiring a quality education is the foundation for enhancing individuals' lives and for economic development. Critical progress must be made towards expanding access to training and education at all levels and expanding enrolment rates in schools, especially for women and, lessen disparities by lifting individuals out of destitution. In addition, there is a need to invest in infrastructure – transport, water system, communication technology which are significant to accomplishing sustainable development and empowering communities.

According to neoclassical market analysts, the objective of sustainable development should reflect the requirement for social orders to keep up the capacity to deliver economic prosperity over time and to guarantee, at least, that future generations will have access to similar level of prosperity as present generations. Its proponents contended that genuine development enhancements in the "third world" need to start at the local level and livelihoods improvements and conveyance of basic needs to all, thus, from safe house, food, clean water and sanitation to medicinal services and education (Haynes 2008: 28).

4.2.4. Cosmopolitan conflict transformation theory (Resolution)

Rambostham et al., (2009:23) mentions that in analysing the attitudes of all parties involved in a conflict, Cosmopolitan Conflict Transformation Theory (CCTT/R) are a comprehensive structure and systematic approach in PCRD. CCTR is a framework that aims to put together all parties to the conflict in South Sudan identifying a lasting peace to the current conflict: non-combatants, civilians, conflicting parties, displacement of people using both bottom-up and top-bottom mechanism (Rambostham, Woodhouse & Curl 2011).

Peoples fundamental needs must be met (culture of peace, peace and reconciliation through the transformation of leadership and structural institutions and this is what CCTT advocates through collaboration of all actors involved in the post-conflict community to bring a lasting peace and development. Wellerstein (2007) states that peacebuilding intervention must be centred on following three approaches: conflict dynamics, fundamental-based conflict roots and coherent strategic calculations. By

putting into practice, the above preceding CCTT allows actors to transform structural dimensions of the community, displaced people, under bondage society and ensure that there is a free and fair democratic society that support social justice and peace-building (Canolly, 2012). It is important for CCTT interventions to address the complex socio-economic issues, environmental and communal challenges by maximising the common advantages to all gatherings that identify themselves with the conflict in South Sudan (2004:35).

Woff and Yakinthou (2011) states that, CCTT is a long- term view of peace that looks to move away from unmanageable clashes, changing extended clashes into well-mannered ones. CCTT is a conjecture that underscores the importance of "addressing the structural roots of conflict by changing the existing patterns of behaviours and creating a culture of non-violent approaches that proposes an integrated approach to peace-building aimed at bringing about long-term changes in relational, structural, personal and cultural dimensions" (USIP 20011: 15-16).

The research advocates a CCTT centred on reconstruction and long-term development of peace and security in a separated society of South Sudan. By quest of a lasting peace, CCTT is a process of re-building peace, which, as indicated by CARE universal (2010:7) perceives and bolster the main local community and all partners and procedures that are esteemed important in ending viciousness and promptly addressing the reasons for violent strife (Shulika 2013:89).

The primary aim of CCTT is to stop clashes/conflict and try to change the gatherings perspective within which clashes/conflict happened and find amicable solutions to the conflict (Whetho 2014:123). Lederach and Miese (2003) posits that four central modes CCTT targets in any conflicts; personal transformation, thus changes in perspective, changes of mind and changes in will and gestures of conciliation; relational transformation, thus changing issues, transcendence of contested issues; structural transformation, thus changes from deviated to symmetric relations, control structures and underlying drivers of viciousness and changes cultural transformation, thus changing local, national, regional and international environment and changes of leadership, goals and intra-party politics (Lederach & Miese (2003).

The study stands on peace-building initiative in South Sudan using CCTT, the researcher has gathered innovative information and added to the accessible discourse of peace-building in post-conflict reconstruction and development and conflict transformation.

It is important to say that, numerous interveners, mediators and peacemakers intercede in clashes by offering interventions between key clashing elites while side-lining the minority gatherings (Boates 2009). MacGinty and Richmond (2016), mention that this act set in new groups for future conflicts. Hence, within the framework of this research, the verdict of numerous interveners to manage basic leadership elites and compelling figures in a nation, subverts the part of the local people as an evenly vital party to the on-going conflict (Richmond &Tellidis 2014).

The research uses CCTR to demonstrate the perspective and knowledge of South Sudanese on peace-building can provide as alternative contribution to efficient intervention in South Sudan conflict. Putting into perspective, authors like Rambostham, Woodhouse and Curle 2011; Ledarach (2015) have used and analyse CCTR approach to understand the dynamics external actors play in on-going conflicts. Nevertheless, they have not used this approach in analysing PCRD intervention and peace-building in South Sudan. Hence, the study is aimed at potentially new contribution to the existing literature in PCRD, particularly in ending the bloodshed and destruction of the little remains of South Sudan through proper shared peace-building intervention, national dialogue and a capacity to open up effective structure of good governance in South Sudan. The "two horses" must step aside with their personal greed and allow reconciliation and development for the newest nation in the world to take its place on the global village.

4.2.5 Conclusion

The chapter examined concepts and provided a critical analysis and constructive criticism of the main issues; arguments and concerns related to externally driven PCRD and highlight the gap in the literature that the study explores. It explains the importance of post-conflict reconstruction and development and examined market biases by external actors using neo-liberal mechanism as a means for good governance. One weakness of neo-liberalism is that, it creates loophole for small arms trafficking as in the case of South Sudan where small arms, are littering in the streets of South Sudan as people easily walk with firearms in the streets as a means

of protection and creates multiple openings for conflict. The researcher uses cosmopolitan conflict transformative theory (CCTT) to demonstrate perspective and knowledge of South Sudanese on peace-building and provides an alternative contribution to efficient intervention in South Sudan conflict as a contribution to the study to ensure that lasting peace and development can prevail in South Sudan.

CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

5.1. Introduction

This chapter is about research plan and procedure, test, information gathering and investigation, legitimacy and dependability of the examination, ethical contemplations and constraints of the research methodology. The study uses qualitative methodology approach to PCRD using explorative and interpretative approach to put together people opinions on the current civil conflict in South Sudan. It explains the statement problem of the research. The aims of this study are to assess the strengths, shortcomings and potential of both externally and internally driven PCRD and explore the nature of an alternative/improved approach. It also highlights how data collection was accomplished and analysed in the study and how legitimacy and validity was achieved through the research.

5.2 Qualitative Methodology

Social realities can be studied in three major approaches. They are quantitative approach, mixed method and qualitative approaches. This study is an exploratory research; therefore, the study adopted the qualitative approach in its inquiry of post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD). Qualitative research is a systematic approach used to describe life experiences and give them meaning. The aim of using qualitative methodology is to gain insight, explore the depth and complexity inherent in the phenomenon of South Sudan.

Because of the naturalistic approach to its subject matter; Denzin and Lincoln (2005) states that subjective research includes an interpretive approach as it tries to understand or decipher the significance individuals conveys to them.

The primary aim of interpretive research is to learn about processes and individuals explore and to discover and uncover issues about a problem (Tsang 2013). When the examination of PCRD was done in this study, there were no official refreshed profiles and insights about the breakthrough of the peace building intervention in South Sudan. From this perspective, the idea of the examination requested that the analyst utilises exploratory investigation. Therefore, through the gathering of qualitative data from observation, fieldwork, interviews, reviews of documents and complex phenomenon the study was put together.

The great tool of qualitative study stress on the processes of disclosure, the researcher used face-to face interview with the participant at their discrete locations. This methodology is the most appropriate for an exploratory study about PCRD. For an in-depth understanding of various PCRD approaches and practices, analytical study approach was used. To analyse data, the study used the qualitative approach, one of the principle systematic instruments in subjective research.

5.3 Interpretive Research

The point of interpretive research is to find out about procedures and people and their perspectives, viewpoints, elucidations and encounters (Neuman 2006: 88) as well as to understand and interpret actions and behaviour of individuals (Sarantakos

2005: 12). Researchers who use interpretive style argue that social specialists need to pull together, break down and mull over individuals' perspectives, qualities and sentiments. Thus, they see individuals and their connections, sentiments and convictions as key influencers of reality; interpretive specialists don't believe that esteem free science is conceivable (Neuman 2006: 93-94). Social research is a piece of ordinary reality and cannot be considered esteem free (Struwig & Stead 2001: 16).

The intention of the researchers is to explore the comportments, experiences and valued perceptions of the people and what shapes their thought and real-life experience in the on-going conflict in South Sudan. Due to differing ways by which social realities can be approached, the motive of the researchers was to find a possible way to understand and explore the participants of the on-going conflict. Mouton (2008: 49) posits that keeping in mind the end goal to productively address exploration inquiries, targets and issue articulated. The examination of PCRD in South Sudan was made to outline the impact and weakness of externally driven PCRD and show how lasting peace can be restore through internally driven PCRD approach.

Struwig and Stead (2001: 5) states that "methods such as surveys, experiments and interpretation of statistical data" are great features of quantitative research are normally used by positivist research in their quest for clear-cut measures and predictions about human behaviour. However, Interpretive researchers, on the other hand, use qualitative methods, keeping in mind the end goal to lead an "orderly

investigations of socially important activities" and see how people identify with each other and how they "make and keep up their social universes" (Neuman 2006: 88). Yin (2013) writes that the purpose of investigating qualitatively is on the intelligent and precise structure of the proposed phenomenon. Hence, the perspective of the researcher on the hypothesis of PCRD is that the principal researcher asks the necessary and up-to-date questions to derive the right answers.

Data collection through qualitative means is designed to produce data that "provides accounts of respondents own words" (Henn, Weinstein & Foard 2006: 14). Hence the proponents of qualitative research put emphasis on certainties and rely upon a network of individuals and occasions in the setting (Neuman 2006: 92-93). The data on PCRD of South Sudan was collected through face-to face interviews from the people in Juba, the capital city of South Sudan.

Therefore, qualitative researchers argue that there are numerous unquantifiable actualities about people and the world in which they live, and it must be comprehended through interpretive and subjective research strategies (Babbie and Mouton 2001: 53; Sarantakos 2005: 50; Welman, Kruger & Mitchell 2005: 9). Along these lines, interpretive analysts utilise subjective information to accumulation strategies: for example, perception, semi-organised, top to bottom, open-ended interviews and contextual investigations to gather information about individuals and processes.

5.4 The Qualitative Approach for PCRD Research

This research advocates for a position that tries to recognise the inclinations, reactions and limits of the general population in post-strife condition and how they are communicating because of their everyday connection regarding peace-building procedure on the ground. Consequently, it rejects the standard stand that argues perspectives on conflict and social disorders are just questions of mediation. It subsequently takes an examination approach that does not regard participants as objects of the exploration, but rather as subjects who are involved in the on-going conflicts and have experience explanation of their views. It enables research participants to have some direct encounters of the exploration members in a setting that enables them to represent themselves and it helps to set up peacebuilding activities that are more pertinent to the people in South Sudan.

Over the century, the main methodology used in development research was quantitative research methodology. One of the main reasons for this was the pressure from economics and positivist paradigm to quantify development work and its impact. However, this has significantly changed over time and qualitative research methods have become important pillars of development research, especially when the aim of researchers is to holistically understand complex phenomena (Mayoux 2006: 116-18).

In terms of PCRD, while quantitative research methods are often used to numerically and statistically show the benefits of external actors' involvement, the use of quantitative research to study post-conflict recovery efforts often masks the reality

and "erases the particularity of places and experiences through inevitable generalisations" (Richmond 2009: 557; Newman2009: 28-9).

According to Denskus (2007: 660), to better understand in-conflict and post-conflict societies and their needs, there is a need for "more qualitative insight into the social dynamics of war and peace." Similarly, Richmond (2011: 49) argues that qualitative and contextual research is necessary if we want to understand post-war operations and developments and improve current practices.

The use of qualitative approach empowers the researcher to acquire a top to bottom and a bottom-up data of local community involvement, discernments, convictions, perspectives, qualities and sentiments about PCRD in South Sudan and inquiries identifying with these cannot be replied by quantitative research since it puts accentuation on evaluation in the gathering and investigation of the information (Bryman, 2004: 19). Bryman (2004: 20) asserts that qualitative research is recognised from quantitative research in the following: (a) it "predominantly emphasises an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research, in which the emphasis is placed on the generation of theories"; (b) it "has rejected the practices and norms of the natural scientific model of positivism in particular preferences for an emphasis on the ways in which individuals interpret their social world"; (c) it "epitomises a perspective of social reality as a continual movement of people (Bryman 2004: 20), hence it offers a relativist epistemology (Rathbum 2008). From this point of view, learning is said to be subjective, relevant, research setting

and the researcher "must engage in reflexive and self-critical dialogue" (Gray 2009:168).

5.5 Objective of the study

Main objectives of this study are to present key findings about externally and internally driven PCRD based on the extensive review of literature and field research in South Sudan and offer recommendations to improve current practices.

5.6 Population of the Study

The population of the study is the people of South Sudan. The study was conducted in Juba, the capital of South Sudan. The total population for the study was 38. It comprises of government officials, opposition government officials, Non-governmental organisations, traditional leaders, women movement and the youth of South Sudan. This population was purposively chosen for their involvement in the on-going civil war in South Sudan. The categories of the population and their position have been tabulated below in the population sample.

5.7 Population Sample

Sampling in connection to proper research strategy decides the nature of any investigation. Subsequently the specialist must pick a very much composed ascertained testing paradigm and be driven by rule, with the goal that his investigation test does not speak to the "undifferentiated" or a more extensive populace (Cohen et al., 2007). The study sampling depended on purposive and hypothetical examining techniques. Purposive sampling drives analysts to pick

respondents considering their ownership of specific information identified with the examination theme (Rule and John 2011:64; Birks and Mills 2011: 11). When theoretical and purposive strategies are used for sampling, sample size depends on the type of research and the aims of the study (Ibid: 270).

The sample population is represented by 6 categories of respondents. The categories are government officials, officials from the opposition party, NGOs, traditional leaders, Youth soldiers, women and UN agencies (UNMISS). The current government comprises of the two factions namely; the Dinka tribe represented by the president Salva Kier and opposition Nuer tribe represented by Riek Machar the vice president. Below is the sampled population for the study in South Sudan.

Table 2. Sample population

CATEGORIES	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	POSITION/ TRIBE
Government officials of South Sudan	5	Dinka tribe in Juba
Opposition government officials	5	Nuer tribe in Juba
NGO	8	UNMISS, UNDP, International Alert
Traditional leaders	5	Community traditional leaders
Women movement	5	Both market and women movement in South Sudan
Youth	10	Youth soldiers or ex-youth soldiers
Total population sampled	38	

The study sampled both side of the government; 5 governmental officials from Dinka tribe; 5 governmental officials from the opposition Nuer tribe, 3 NGOs officials were sampled; 5 traditional leaders were interviewed; 5 women who are working in the market of Juba, the capital of South Sudan were interviewed as they became vulnerable during and after conflict and 10 youth soldiers with the average age above 15 – 25 years were interviewed as the majority of them were directly involved as child soldiers in the conflict. Furthermore, 5 officials from the UN agencies (UNMISS) were interviewed on the current conflict in South Sudan. It is important to mention that because of the volatility of the situation in South Sudan, it was not feasible to have large numbers of participants for the sample.

In the context of the study, the researcher obtained 38 views from the people of South Sudan who were directly involved in the conflict and most interviews lasted for over an hour, providing over thirty-eight hours of audio taped interview material. Instead of aiming to interview many respondents who would provide similar feedback, the focus was on key informants. All respondents were purposely chosen since they had broad learning as well as experience identified with the issues, concerns and ideas that are contemplated.

Although 38 participants may be viewed as a small sample and cannot obviously represent the entire population of South Sudan, the sample yielded the required empirical data on the role for a peaceful settlement on the on-going conflict for reconstruction and development in South Sudan.

The key criteria for selection of respondents was that they have been/are personally involved in or have experienced PCRD processes and operations in South Sudan.

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Babbie and Mourton (2012) posit that qualitative research is not to base its analysis of data on statistical suggestion as those demanded by quantitative inquiry. Coupled with this, "the tradition of qualitative research tends to look on meaning and motivation that underlie the understanding of processes in the social world" (Kalof et al 2008:79).

Creswell (2012:206) states that the standard of picking as example using purposive examining is whether the informant and information are "data rich" and purposive testing is a deliberate decision of a witness because of the characteristics the source has. Thus, this investigation, the obvious quality that was used was the members' direct involvement and awareness of conflict in the country and the peace-building intervention from externally driven processes.

5.8 Data Collection

Data collection involves obtaining intricate details on a particular phenomenon and this includes observing emotions and feelings, thought processes of the participant (Creswell 2012). To achieve the aim of the study, data was collected from multiple sources. Semi-organised and open-ended top to bottom interviews were led with chosen people, authorities, and some policy-makers working in South Sudan. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in South Sudan. In addition, interviews with some respondents were conducted using Skype audio conferencing via the internet and review of relevant documents.

5.9 Personal Interviews

Kumar (2005: 127) specifies that the selection of meetings is dictated by no less than three criteria: the "nature of the examination" (That is, the delicate idea of issues included); the geological appropriation of the investigation populace"; and the "sort of the investigation populace".

Open-ended in-depth interviews allowed the collection of detailed and elaborative responses from 15 respondents. Data collection through semi-organised interviews in common settings, where respondents are encountering the issues that are contemplated, was picked because it permitted the gathering of direct subjective information and expanding of the comprehension of the considered phenomenon (Creswell 2009: 175).

Walsh (2001: 66) states that the advantage of semi-organised meetings is that respondents are frequently more open to discuss their perspectives and encounters when given a chance to add to the discussion, in this way, helping analysts "find sudden and unanticipated information." According to May (2001: 123), semi-organised meetings allow respondents "to answer more alone terms than institutionalised interviews".

During the personal interview process, the focus was on the qualitative dimensions of PCRD and processes, attitudes, patterns and opinions. Standing on personal interviews, the specialist could relieve the "problems arising out of limited administrative/ application and limited opportunity to clarify issues that the questionnaires could have accorded this study" (Kumar 2005: 114). In most cases, additional questions emerged during the conversation with respondents.

Furthermore, since semi structured in-depth interviews allow for extra testing past the interview guides, respondents had an opportunity to raise issues they thought were vital, however were not secured by arranged inquiries and it gave the participants in the sample a privilege to narrate their views in their own words about South Sudan and the urgent need for reconstruction and development through enhanced peace-building.

Data collection was based on the informed consent. Informed consent forms were given to respondents before interviews, which they read and signed. The right to privacy and anonymity of respondents were respected. Interviews were led on an intentional premise and respondents could leave the procedure whenever if they wished to do so. All interviews in South Sudan were conducted in English. Furthermore, all interviews were recorded using a digital audio recorder. This was done with the permission of respondents. The recording of the interviews ensured that taking notes was not necessary and the focus was on the interview process.

5.10 Review of documents and journal articles

Apart from the semi-structured interviews, the study garnered an extensive variety of significant sources, for example, books, scholarly diaries, news articles and meetings notes, productions, policy briefs, journals, speeches from various actors who work on or write about post-war reconstruction and development were consulted.

This was done to understand contentions, debates, issues and developments linked to PCRD and the broader post-conflict context studied. The review of literature provided the theoretical background and insight into PCRD practices, approaches

and experiences around the world and informed interview guides. Daily paper articles and radio meeting interpretations were additionally investigated especially from "Aljazeera" government legislation of South Sudan, UN reports and the internet. Journal articles were of great help as it assisted the researcher to obtain and understand the dynamics of the current PCRD practices and the current situation in South Sudan.

The web gave invaluable asset/coordinate data for the exploration given the current idea of the topic and critically the dramatic way the events unfolded in the conflict in South Sudan. Secondary sources gave broad bibliographic and logical information that supplemented the essential wellspring of information, in this manner, lighting up the investigation. References to the information presented in the literature review and contextual background chapters is made in the data analysis chapter with a specific end goal to upgrade the legitimacy of the research procedure and discoveries as well as to ensure data triangulation.

5.11 General participant's observation

Participant perception (observation) as a methodological approach bears important and generally direct data. It fills in as an information gathering tool and an approach to research inquiry. This study has also been enriched by the occasional visits that the researcher undertook to South Sudan in the years prior to the field work. During the period between (2013-2018), the researcher has visited and resided in South Sudan to be specific Juba on more than five occasions: 1month per visit, the researcher was able to observe the behaviour of the participants and the people of

South Sudan during the time of peaceful settlement to the time the conflict broke out in December 2013 as they interacted. This participant observation really enabled the researcher to understand the behaviour pattern of South Sudanese and how they interact with each other.

5.12 Data analysis

Through data analysis, the researcher brings structure, cohesion and importance in the information gathered. Related subjects and examples are distinguished and gathered within the information accumulation (Ngulube2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Krippendorff (2004:9) state that any method for making derivations is equitably and deliberately recognising indicated characteristic within a context. Hence content analysis and narratives investigation were the principle forms that bring order, structure and significance to the information collected.

According to Lasswell (1949:120) content analysis thrives to find out "who says what, to whom, why, to what extent and with what effect?". In any substance examination, the errand is to make surmising from the information to specific parts of the setting to legitimise these derivations as far as the learning about the consistent reason for the study (Weitzman 1999:95). The analysis of content in this research connote that data was deciphered and introduced under rising topics. Therefore, the primary investigator had the capacity to arrange information in the setting and convey the analysis of in different forms.

Riessman (2005:3) posits that the substance of a content "what" is said to be more than "how" it is stated, the "told" as opposed to "telling" as a narrative analysis

method gives more emphasis and to locate a topical component over research members as they describe and react to inquiries questions. Along these lines the, researcher was able to and understand clearly what the people of South Sudan narrated during the interview.

For the interview and questionnaire data, the method of triangulation was used. As referred to earlier in this write-up, if interview information is seen as a genuine delineation of the emotions and experience of the general population, the exactness of the data can be checked through triangulations (Silverman 2005: 156). The technique for triangulation as expressed empowers to check the credibility and precision of interview information by essentially alluding to various wellsprings of information. This is fundamentally done by references to different sources, for example, literatures on the issues under investigation, legal documents, treaties/agreements, official reports, other research findings, and other relevant documents.

Creswell (2009: 13), states that as a system of inquiry the researcher determines a general unique hypothesis of a procedure, activity, opinions and views of respondents. This helped to the use of bottom-up analysis to generate findings and possibly theories (Rule and John 2011: 91). Denscombe (2007: 92) contends that this approach is especially valuable when social scientists need to explore and comprehend respondents' perspectives.

In the wake of leading and translating the interviews, the discoveries were coded. In subjective research, codes are clear issues, thoughts, ideas and contentions raised by respondents. Efficient coding helped with arranging of the information under

various sub topics, ideas and contentions. For this investigation, introductory information was gathered, translated, evaluated and the discoveries were coded.

After observing of deficiencies and gaps in the gathered information, another cycle of information accumulation led to address these gaps. Within the research, codes were included, altered or taken out as more interviews were directed, translated and deciphered. Toward the end of this procedure, the codes were assembled into related clusters/areas of the information.

The findings gathered are presented in italic and followed with the information that led to each finding. Some information is quoted directly to present descriptions and interviews are summarised. It is important to mention that this chapter only presents findings, however, the next chapter analyse the findings through the contextualisation and in comparison, with other data from the literature review and background chapters interpretation and explanation.

For the study, an all-embracing re-examination of literature was conducted keeping in mind the end goal of building up a superior comprehension of the approaches, practices and concepts that relate to post conflict reconstruction and development in order to select appropriate actions for the research as well as to understand post-conflict contexts in South Sudan.

5.13 Using the triangulation approach

Triangulation enabled the researcher to contrast information acquired from different sources, and fieldwork to check the authenticity of the information gathered during the fieldwork (Silverman 2006:290). A meeting/survey information was thoroughly

analysed against the information gathered from individual perception on the researched topic and data in scholastic journals on PCRD, was analysed.

This researched thesis therefore examined relative to what has been said by other researchers and documents that have been written on the topic/s under investigation in attaining the degree of validity and credibility. However, we should also bear in mind that it is impossible at best to achieve an absolute accuracy in relations to validity and credibility. The threat against validity and reliability cannot be controlled absolutely. This is particularly valid because of qualitative research where the level of subjectivity is substantially superior to quantitative research. Hence the possibility generally is to diminish the risk of in favour of maximising validity and reliability and the researcher was able accurately to the best of my ability gathered and recorded data from the participants correctly.

This process assisted the researcher to categorise the data into thematic concepts and sections (Gibbs 2007: 38). Finding relationships and connections among concepts and sections lead to of key research findings or formation of theories. Amid the data examination process, the researcher searched for topics, ideas, contentions and depictions of procedures that are much of the time specified by respondents or found in the information that feature the issues of significance or enthusiasm to the investigation.

Recognising these expressions and contentions is called coding. Gibbs (2007: 40) composes that codes "shape a concentration for contemplating the information and its elucidation." According to Babbie (2007: 296), when the approach is utilised to dissect the information, "precise coding is critical for accomplishing legitimacy and

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unwavering quality in the information investigation." This procedure prompted the development of ideas that inevitably turn into the premise of a hypothetical model for the study to obtained validity.

5.14 Validity and reliability of the study

Denscombe (2007) states that before anyone undertakes a data collection, it is very important for the researcher to ask some pertinent question before embarking on research especially regarding obtaining accurate data: "will the research produce true and honest findings? Will the data be precise and detailed? Are respondents likely to give full and honest answers? Will the investigation manage to focus on the most vital issues"? He said that once these questions can be answered in the optimistic, then the study is likely to stand scrutiny in terms of its precision/accuracy. Silverman (2005:6) states that reliability and validity are an imperative component of every credible research. Qualitative research alludes to how much finding of an investigation is free of unintentional conditions of their creation in qualitative research. Reliability concerns the self-reliance people assert to the techniques we utilise for the compilation of data.

To ensure reliability, the strategies, and hypotheses utilised as a part of the exploration was evidently explained in line and it is in relations to the rationale of the research. It is imperative to mention that during the data collection, accidental factors such as unstructured interviews, taking photographs, breaking confidentiality particularly those that can influence the nature of the information were limited. Because of vulnerability and some factors, it is very important that research ethics,

was adhered to; the consent of the respondents was sought and secured ahead of time before embarking on the data collection. Confidentiality in the whole process was assured to bring about confidence from the part of the respondents and lastly the research sought to build and establish good rapport with the respondents while the interviews happened in a clearly convenient setting and environment. Hence, the method and technique employed for this research ensured its relative accuracy and reliability.

During the research work, legitimacy and reliability were accomplished utilising four aspects of the development model of Lincoln and Guba (2000); validity, trustworthiness, transferability, and conformability. Validity in this study refers to the accuracy or correctness of the findings. Trustworthiness is how confident the qualitative researcher is in truth of the study findings. It demonstrates that the evidence of the results reported is sound. Transferability is the degree to which the results can be generalised or transfer to other context or settings. Conformability is description of changes that occur during the course of the research and an understanding of how such changes can affect the study. Validity was achieved through the introduction of the full record of the examination in a precise way. In keeping up an unmistakable record of the information examination procedure of the investigation, the research achieved dependability.

Peace-building intervention involves rigorous processes. Therefore, the researcher was aware that inquiries (questions) put to respondents could have been addressed in different way if they were asked by different investigator. By the purposive nature of the sample participants selected, the study achieved its validity because the

research participants selected were directly involved in the on-going conflict which need reconstruction therefore the participants were considered enlightened about the subject under investigation.

Furthermore, Transferability implies the degree to which the results can be transfer to another context. To achieve transferability in a context of peace-building, actors/interveners can draw knowledge for solving conflicts in other parts of the world, the findings in this study are relevant to conflict-prone countries such as Syria, CAR and GCC crisis.

Reliability is a measure of consistency and exactness of the examination. While qualitative specialists offer thoughtfulness regarding unwavering quality, they utilise terms such as consistency and trustworthiness (Sarantakos 2005: 89). To come up with reliable, consistent and dependable data, the researcher consulted various sources of data and employed multiple measurement methods.

For this study, in-depth semi-structured interviews and existing literature survey were utilised keeping in mind the end goal to get various and assorted points of view about various ways to deal with PCRD and affirm credibility of the investigation and discoveries. Participants provided detailed information for data collection and analysis. The research was intended and conducted in an all-inclusive, truthful, ethical and proficient approach to guarantee its legitimacy, unwavering quality, validity and trustworthiness which aided the study to address its objectives on the triggers of conflict in South Sudan and why it is necessary for PCRD processes to be set in immediately.

5.15 Ethical considerations

Social specialists have a "good and expert commitment to be "moral" and are required to basically take after moral guidelines in their work (Neuman 2006: 129). Recorded underneath are moral models in view of Sarandakos (2005: 18) and Denscombe (2007: 141) to which this investigation has clung to:

- ➢ Respect for the rights of respondents;
- ➢ Honesty, integrity demonstrable skill of investigator;
- ➢ Provision of clear and honest data about research points and techniques to respondents;
- ➢ Avoidance of any physical or mental mischief to respondents;
- ➢ Explanation of conceivable dangers and results the respondents may experience because of their support in an examination;
- ➢ To security and namelessness of respondents;
- ➢ Confidentiality of the information gathered in an examination;
- ➢ Research should be founded on educated assent.

The researcher respected the rights of the participant in their choice of location for the interview and they were allowed freely to express their opinion concerning the on-going conflict. It is vital to state that to shield respondents from being powerless and far from any damage, the researcher requested respondents not to reveal their identities in the examination. Anonymity guarantees that respondents are unidentifiable with a specific end goal to ensure their safety after the examination is finished and made open to the public. The researcher employed a social worker from South Sudan who accompanied and assist in explaining the importance of the research to the research participants especially the vulnerable youth soldiers as

necessary precaution was taken to ensure that no harm occur to them whilst participating and assisting the researcher to find information from them without being forced to do so.

Hence all effort in the research was made not to elicit negative emotions and to allow them to freely choose to participate willingly without being coerce into participating in the ongoing research. It is important to mention that precaution was taken to make certain that children do not, and are not perceived to, divulge information that may compromise their security or that of their families, friends, communities or the researchers themselves. Hence the issue of Confidentiality was critically observed in the following ways to ensure that the 10 vulnerable children are not in any way exposed to harm.

Public confidentiality: The researcher in conjunction with the social worker, ensure that the 10 vulnerable children were not identified in public places and in publications that will be circulated to the public.

Social network confidentiality: The researcher ensured that no information was given to family members, friends or others known to the child for their participation.

Third party break of security: where a gathering or family unit part uncovers something individual about another. The researcher ensured that information remain confidential and will not be exposed to the public and will remain only property of the researcher and the department of development studies, University of Fort Hare.

Respondents willingly participated in the investigation, completely understanding conceivable dangers and outcomes included. They were informed of their entitlement to avoid answering any inquiries they felt uncomfortable with. Moreover,

respondents were prompted not to uncover any politically sensitive data that could open their life to risk.

5.16 Delimitations of the study

This study examination has various constraints. Recorded below are some constraints and inadequacies and clarifications on how their effect on the examination was limited:

A major constraint the researcher experienced was the limited time spent in South Sudan as the geographical setting of the states were wide apart, as such, the researcher did not have the capacity to cover an expansive number of respondents and travel around the whole country.

Also, because of the on-going conflict in South Sudan, some states were still not safe to travel to for research purposes. As such, the researcher limited findings and interviews to Juba the capital town of South Sudan where currently almost state within South Sudan have residents there because of better security as compare to other state. As such the study did locate views from respondents from different state. The study focuses on medium-to-long-term socio-economic recovery, institutions (state building) and stability in South Sudan. The study did not focus on some aspects of PCRD. For instance, humanitarian aspect was not the focus of the study as its purpose is not to promote medium-to- long term reconstruction and development but only offers immediate short-term relief to displaced people (Shurke & Buckmaster 2005:738).

Peace-keeping as concept was not the focus of the study as it forms an integral part of post-conflict recovery efforts because it targets fighting, monitors cease fire in the aftermath of conflict through the deployment of foreign soldiers. The study looks beyond peacekeeping and shift focus on medium-to-long term recovery through restoring responsible law and order and building legitimate governance and state structures in South Sudan.

Lack of non-Western primary and secondary sources on PCRD: The dominant part of essential and optional sources on post-conflict reconstruction and development are composed by Western specialists and scholars. In any case, all through the exploration procedure, some non-Western sources were found and consolidated in the writing and contextual background chapters;

Subjectivity – During the broad review of the writing, the researcher went over overpowering proof that externally determined PCRD is not working and brining stability in nations rising out of conflict. This has significantly impacted my reasoning and readiness for field research and meetings. However, to constrain subjectivity and predisposition, the author has kept a receptive outlook all through the exploration procedure and construct the discoveries exclusively considering the information gathered through writing survey and field research;

This study has concentrated on PCRD in South Sudan. It would be useful if the examination included broad backgrounds about conflict in every nation currently engulfed, for example, reasons for conflicts, parties included, pre-war and wartime financial and political flow and methodologies that prompted end of each war. Notwithstanding, doing this would make the examination excessively broad and

unfocused. The approach taken in this investigation, emphasis is on the period after the formal end of conflict, is in accordance with different examinations and productions about PCRD;

Focus on just South Sudan – Since the inception of the nation through to autonomy in 2013, the nations have encountered rough clash and resulting in post-conflict reconstruction tasks. However, because of the space, time and financial restrictions, and additionally the need to keep the examination centred, it was impractical to centre around different nations;

Urban predisposition – Field work for this investigation was directed predominantly in the capitals of South Sudan (Juba) meeting respondents about PCRD. Even though this is a critical impediment, the author was not able to travel widely in South Sudan because of budgetary, on-going conflict and security imperatives.

5.1.16 Conclusion

The chapter discussed research design, methodology, methods, data analysis and presented the ongoing conflict in South Sudan in different themes. The chapter justified the use of qualitative methodology for this study. Purposive sampling was used to select the participants of the study. Through purposive sampling, the researcher was able to select an information rich sample: South Sudanese that are part of the on-going civil conflict in South Sudan.

General participant observation, personal interviews and document reviews were used to gather data. Data collected was analysed and presented using different

themes; positions of government officials, age, women and different political ideologies from NGOs. In summary data gathered was taken from both primary and secondary.

Poor methodologies and intervention strategies in solving conflicts has fuelled the prolonged conflict in South Sudan. Peoples basic needs must be met (Culture of peace and peace education. Peace resolutions should be set in place by interveners and they should necessitate conditions for transforming attitudes and relationships between the leaders in the conflict through national dialogue. The next chapter introduces the findings gathered from the research

CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH FINDINGS

6.1. Introduction

The chapter identifies possibilities for common ground for reconciliation and restoring lasting peace through internally driven PCRD for local participation and state-building. The findings were sampled through open-ended and semi-structured in-depth interviews with the selected respondent and some individuals who have knowledge on PCRD and working in South Sudan. The objectives were to examine the factors that led to the resumption of conflict in South Sudan; analyse strength and weakness of externally driven PCRD mechanism; identify opportunities for building strong and responsive state institutions and provide alternative views that assist internally driven PCRD capacity and how sustainable development and peace can be sustained in South Sudan.

6.2 Using qualitative descriptions

Denscombe (2010:133) mentions that qualitative analysts present their findings as a "description" to enable a researcher to gain a delicate insight into specific circumstances and the description must be comprehensive in order to ascertain all parts of the study phenomenon. Hennik, Hutter and Bailey (2011:239) posit that the presentation of "solid descriptions are basic understanding of the meaning of peoples actions and attitudes in the data and provide a foundation for future conceptualising and explaining".

Data presentation and qualitative explanation includes the development of a "chronicle" from the data collected and categorised. This chronicle is a "strategic and systematic presentation of the respondent's experiences that reflect the insight and difficulties of the study phenomenon" (Hennik, Hutter & Biley 2011:205). The study of the post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) chronicle of South Sudan is presented in descriptions. The explanations of issues, ideas, concepts and various opinions raised by the research participants is the cornerstone of the qualitative analysis thus helping the various readers to understand the perspectives of the respondents.

Hence, the findings were grouped under various subheadings to ensure clarity of the data collected from the respondents. They are grouped under general conditions of South Sudan environment; general conditions of security environment; reconciliation and peacebuilding; governance and nation-building; short-term and long-term recovery; economic recovery and development; development infrastructure and reconstruction; the fruit of peace in South Sudan; local capacity and skills; external community involvement; external support; dependency syndrome; lack of communication; local ownership; obstacles facing South Sudan; awareness of peace-building; the role of Ugandan intervention in South Sudan; IGAD intervention and conclusion.

6.3 General condition of South Sudan environment

What is the general feeling after independence and the current environment?

A view from one respondent was that South Sudan has a history of prolonged conflicts since the early formation of the country around the 1950s, coupled with the neglect of development of infrastructure and these circumstances pose a great threat to the citizens; no better schools, lack of good hospitals and few industries to take care of the massive population coupled with complete lack of basic services as proper drinking water is processed through artificial means mentioned by one respondent (Juba 3 January 2018).

Some respondents said that after independence the country started to gain confidence in development until the midnight announcement and massacre between the two rival tribes in the house of the presidency in December 2013, which has up to date paralysed the country socially and economically. Many people are fleeing the country and people are not able to provide necessities on their own and must depend on outside assistance for their survival.

The protracted civil conflict that started from December 2013 has ensured that a majority of the people has to depend on international organisations for food, healthcare and education as it is not safe to even go to the farm to cultivate or even harvest whatever one has planted as the conflicting parties are using our villages as a home for the contention (Juba, 3 January 2018).

6.4 General security situation in South Sudan

South Sudan has a seen a momentous enhancement in security after independence in 2011; combined security by both tribes in contention, local initiatives were a major factor that led to the improved security.

Two of the respondents who were former members of the current government and held high positions such as Director-General for Customs, mentioned that South Sudan has seen a dramatic improvement after independence in 2011. However, they said that, for instance during the days of 2005 and 2006, it was very dangerous to journey anywhere in South Sudan without a heavy security backup because of the existence of gang militias, but since that time till 2013, the government tried to deactivate the gang militias and it was safe to travel anywhere in South Sudan until the devastating civil conflict which has made it even worse than the days of post Sudan 2005/2006 (Juba 3 January 2018).

One respondent said that one of the main participants of ensuring security during those days was the government of South Sudan whilst the UN peacekeeping mission were also the external drivers that have been present since that time and they played a big role especially in Juba the capital and ensured that peace prevailed.

However, one respondent said that the government who is supposed to protect the civilians are the ones now killing us because of ethnic differences and when your identity is known by one faction, it is very easy to be eliminated by one of the tribes

simply because of your ethnic background. He said, "We have all flee our home to Juba because of the civil war and have lost so many relatives because of greed and selfishness from the two most powerful men on the land for what......., he paused" (Juba 3 January 2018).

Although the security situation has improved only in Juba after ongoing negotiations between the two factions when compared to wartime fighting, many communities in South Sudan continue to experience outbreaks of hostility and insecurity caused by ethnic animosity, cattle rustling, fighting over resources, and power and rebel activity because of the ongoing civil war.

It is important to mention that not all respondents even agree to improved security during the time of independence from 2011 to 2013. One respondent who is a member of parliament in Juba said that one of the problems since independence has been the inadequate security in many areas and even where they are, they lacked proper control mechanism to exercise their duties and security positions within the country are ethnocentric about what tribe you belong to. Due to the insecurity across the country, local and multinational organisations were not able to consolidate the peace dividends of independence and any actors that tried to reconstruct and create development were either prevented or were captured by one of the conflicting parties (Juba 4 January 2018).

Ethnic violence has been localised across the country and bloodshed is easily seen in the broad daylight of South Sudan.

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Several of the respondents pointed out that currently across the country, there is localised violence and massive insecurity due to the ethnic fighting for position and it's very unsafe to travel from one destination to another because all the roads are being ambushed by conflicting parties who crave for blood against their opponents as a means of gaining control of power. They retorted "Our little left-over family cattle and other farm land resources have been taken over by rebel activities" and one respondent emphasised saying... "there is zero safety or no zone to stay in any village in South Sudan currently" (Koyonkonyo market, Juba 5 January 2018).

Another respondent mentioned that in any case, the security forces were never rehabilitated and improved even after independence and they were nowhere near a good security force because they never received any up-to-date training on security measures and "majority of them were either having a basic education up to primary level or no education at all" because some of them had their position through patriotism of the SPLM/SPLA. He noted that a very problematic issue over the years since independence has been the deployment of the army to prevent ethnic fighting or disarmament attempts which was normally based on a tribal basis. Hence not being trained for local or international invention, the army often creates problems instead of solving them especially when the case involves the opposite tribe to which the problem has to be resolved (Juba 5 January 2018).

Was reintegration, demilitarisation and demobilisation (DDR) a success in the country and did the influence of external agencies help in achieving that aim?

A key piece of security sector reform should be demilitarisation, grounding and reintegration of previous warriors. A local counsellor who is working with the government of South Sudan service (GOSS) contended that external agencies, for example UNMISS, who should lead this procedure according to the CPA, have neglected to do their duty of DDR, as the DDR and its constrained accomplishments have been crafted by neighbourhood performers or local people according to how they see fit.

A respondent mention that the DDR process started years ago as per arrangement on the grounds that the multinational group was not able to work together. The GOSS at that point chose to step up and attempt to position different equipped gatherings and groups. Various outfitted gatherings have been reintegrated into the armed forces and other security structures. DDR, in any case, is a long way from being done and the current conflict sparks the revival of those ex-combatants to fight back on the grounds of being either rejected or sidelined on ethnic bases (Juba 28 December 2017).

In opposition to the above feeling, another respondent said that the DDR procedure had never had genuine help from the South Sudanese armed force and government. There are numerous people within the legislature and armed forces who don't feel that the nation is prepared for DDR as the administration cannot ensure well-being and security of the general population and groups, according to a respondent from the parliament of South Sudan. As far as grounding of fighters, the key contention of the administration is "what would happen if the armed force expels countless

troopers, whose exclusive pay is the armed force pay. They figure according to two respondents said that, this would even just make much greater instability", all this discrepancy was hovering in the face of the government until the civil war started in 2013 because they were not able to properly reintegrate the ex-combatants into the community (Juba 3 January 2018).

6.5 Reconciliation and Peacebuilding

The current negotiations led by IGAD for peaceful settlement, peace, justice and accountability for the crimes committed during the war were ignored by both sides and the international community. Since the current government and opposition party are guilty of civil crimes, this was seen as the only way forward and it's not solving the problem at hand.

One respondent clarified that there is no stipulation of any transitional equity components in the peace understanding as all gatherings know they would need to respond in due order regarding atrocities and manhandling of human rights. Along these lines, "equity and justice has been overlooked and have been ignored especially justice for the people". She included that "South Sudanese appear to have proceeded onward without equity … compromise and peacebuilding have occurred without transitional justice" that is why any meetings and agreement for peace are ignored only few days after sitting and wasting the state resources for their personal gain.

Another respondent said that the meetings in Ethiopia are just a means of getting money or enriching themselves because any sitting attracts a certain percentage of money per person per day. All parties involved in the ongoing conflict are not genuinely prepared to stop the relapse of the conflict because they are gaining massively from external donations. He mentioned that the external actors who are supposed to bring solid peace are rather using the conflict to amass wealth from the oil generation. He said the United Nations mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) was once caught by the former Director General and custom officials for carrying guns in their truck which was supposed to deliver food aids to the needy. "The ones who were supposed to be the protector of our state by ensuring peace are using their truck to give guns to opposition parties, so tell me, how can peace be restored, and reconciliation happen so that justice will be served to the perpetrator of our country" (Juba 5 January 2018).

South Sudan needs a national reconciliation and peace-building process that would involve ordinary people and communities. Reconciliation and peacebuilding between leaders were important for internal stability and peace in the aftermath of civil conflict.

A respondent who works for an NGO in South Sudan called attention to the fact that the procedure of conciliation and peacebuilding has not yet been finished. The Juba Declaration and other peacebuilding and compromise endeavours have happened primarily "to finish everything" between pioneer leaders. He included that South Sudan needs a national reconciliation and peacebuilding process that would include

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standard individuals and groups and not just pioneer leaders. Simply after such process happens, "we could rise as a tranquil nation and have a decent opportunity to create and flourish" (Juba 5 January 2018).

6.6 Governance and Nation-building

Regardless of the absence of capacity, South Sudan has set up fundamental administration structures and organisations since 2011 after independence. Notwithstanding, endeavouring to oblige potential "spoilers" prompted formation of a huge, costly and insufficient organisation.

As far as nation-building and administrative governance goes, South Sudan needed to "begin starting with no outside help" in 2005. Because of the times of war, "regular citizen structures did not exist and there were very few individuals in the whole district who had non-military personnel administrative experience" to steer the nation forward after post Sudan through the days of national referendum.

A respondent clarified that, because of the idea of the peace understanding, which demanded control imparting to Khartoum on the national level, we invested a considerable measure of energy setting up national government. This included a considerable measure of bartering and trading off finished positions and we needed to name our best qualified authorities to the national government in Khartoum keeping in mind the end goal to ensure our interests. Likewise, because of countless spoilers in the South, we regularly needed to offer positions to individuals who were not qualified but rather were obliged to bring in the running of the administration. This

made an organisation too huge, hence, we did not have a choice because it was necessary (Juba 28 Dec 2018).

One government official said that during the provisional period, South Sudan's government just put in place basic institutions that were not properly managed and forced themselves to hold a multiparty election for the president, state governors and local county administrators in 2010. This was the time that ethnic divisions set in by appointing only tribal mates even if they did not qualify to occupy political position and those loyal to them were made head of government institutions and according to him, the election was rigged and that started the armed rebellion from tribes that felt that they were neglected within the country.

Majority of the people who won the state positions were mainly people from the president's tribe – "the Dinka" and from the then Vice President Reik's "Nuer tribe". This created an ethnic tension in the running of the government institutions because political favouritism was the order of the day until the fateful night when the vicious violent conflict break-up started in South Sudan (Juba 6 January 2018).

During the period 2011 to 2103, there was minimal political competition in South Sudan due to the need to present a unified front in the international world. The country could face serious political competition, sanctions and instability after independence and specifically during the first post-independence elections.

Legislative issues and administration amid the between time period after independence were more centred around exhibiting togetherness on the world front holding the 2011 autonomy as opposed to on political rivalry (Juba 10 October 2014). However, the genuine internal political and administration test that South Sudan was going to face was at the point at which the following election was going to be held as the president (Salva Kiir) fired the Vice President because of maladministration and corruption charges for stealing billions of monies meant for development. Coupled with these accusations and developments, tension ensued in South Sudan as political rivalry became intense that later led to the civil conflict (Juba 22 September 2014).

After independence, South Sudan has been moderately triumphant in setting up fundamental governance structures across state levels: authorities and institutions still do not reach many people in rural areas across the country.

Despite the fact that there was huge accomplishment as far as setting up administration structures on the national and state levels, South Sudanese organisations still do not contact, or services do not reach numerous individuals in provincial zones within South Sudan. While the essential structures of the state have been worked, there is as yet far to go until there is a steady state, ready to represent viably and convey efficient administrations to the population according to two respondents (Juba 28 December 2017).

Many rural areas are still in a devastated conditions; no infrastructure, no basic schools, no proper healthcare facilities and no proper roads to mention just a few and even when it rains, it is very difficult to travel from one destination to another and yet our governors and county official members are driving the latest vehicles that come to the market without a sense of national duty to the civilians. People struggle to survive on food as poverty across the country can be seen in every household and sounds like a national anthem. Two respondents said that our government is a disgrace to us because they only think about themselves without serving the purpose to which they were called to duty for in the national government. They paused for a while and said... "Anyway, how can you blame them when they do not have any qualifications in the positions to which they have been enshrined to govern?" (Juba 5 January 2018).

6.7 Short-term vs. Long-term recovery plans

Because of a troublesome association with Sudan and the need to safeguard stability and hold a national referendum in 2011, the administration of South Sudan organised and created short-term post-war recuperation over the medium- to long-term remaking and development.

As indicated by one respondent from the opposition South Sudanese government, troublesome political relationships and the absence of trust between Juba and Khartoum implied that the GOSS needed to continually maintain its attention on security issues and the moves made by Khartoum and not on other consuming issues (Juba 6 January 2018). Various respondents contended that in view of the

six years of the break time frame (2005–2010) prompting the referendum in 2011, the GOSS could not consider long-term post-conflict recuperation. It needed to centre on quick short-term designs which organised security, political steadiness and holding of the conveyance of essential administrations and economic recreation and development (Juba 6 January 2018).

The emphasis on security and sidelining of different needs was additionally because of the way that "nearly everybody in the legislature has a security or armed force foundation and this was seen as the key issue" (Juba 6 January 2018). More than half of the government budget goes to the armed forces as there were always fears that war could break out and the only way to keep them happy was to use the leadership and channel all resources for security against Sudan.

Between 2011 and 2013, multinational international donors and agencies working in South Sudan focused only on short-term humanitarian and emergency issues, disregarding medium-to long term reconstruction and development.

Similarly the GOSS concentrated on short-term needs, universal benefactors and associations working in South Sudan have wavered to start dealing with reconstruction and development in that period, concentrating rather for the most of the time on compassionate and crisis issues through donations of food parcels to the refugee camps, giving medicinal kit to some communities and all of these international organisations positioned themselves in Juba, the capital of South Sudan without going down to the rural communities to establish themselves and start initiating long-term developmental goals like education and uplifting the community

from the war-time garrison mind set. All their members were lavishing themselves in hotels in Juba where security is intact rather than planning on reconstruction and development for the whole country. Some of the respondents blamed the international organisation for lack of vision and uniting the people towards a common goal but rather sowing a seed of division among the people of South Sudan (Juba 5 January 2018).

Notwithstanding till the present time, contributors and worldwide associations working in South Sudan have not thought of a long-term recuperation and development procedure. The fundamental purpose behind this was the six-year period between 2005 till 2011, prompting the choice of a referendum, which created a circumstance where nobody was certain what might happen and if the South would stay in Sudan or turn into a free nation. The time frame kept vital choices and long-term arrangements in limbo even after independence and the same routine continues which shows a face of political favours for government official negotiating for ownership and power and amassing support from international donors with their own political ambitions and power greed according to some of the research participants (Juba 7 January 2018).

6.8 Economic recovery and Development

Due to the lack of capacity and focus on security, very little was done to build small-to-medium scale production facilities and industries since independence. Apart from the oil industry which is a bone of contention for control between the government and

the rebel factions, South Sudan currently does not have any other industries to enhance growth.

Since independence, the GOSS got billions of US dollars from oil income. Notwithstanding, most of these assets were utilised for security and operation of government organisations. A respondent said that while oil incomes are South Sudan's key source of money, "we should downsize the overdependence on oil and expand the economy" sooner rather than later (Juba 6 January 2018). One of the fundamental issues is that the area does not have any huge nearby generation production facilities so essentially everything must be transported in from neighbouring and different nations. The absence of facilities implied that very little was done to begin small- to medium-scale creation industries and businesses between the time period of independence until all gains was brought down by the civil conflict in 2013 (Koyonkoyon, Juba 6 January 2018).

Due to the political rivalry the two leaders of South Sudan and period of uncertainty, foreign investors were reluctant to invest in South Sudan. During this time, the country only saw small-scale investments, mainly from neighbouring countries.

Similarly, the government, benefactors and global associations were dubious about the future and did not concentrate on long-term issues, reconstruction and development. Foreign financial investors likewise withheld action to check whether the peace would hold and if South Sudan would turn into a genuine democratic and autonomous nation. As one respondent called attention to, South Sudan did not

perceive any genuine ventures in the area between 2005 and 2010. Also, after independence, the only thing you see around is building of hotels and it is only concentrated in Juba, the capital of South Sudan to the neglect of other states, and even state governors are staying in Juba to legislate their state (Juba 7 January 2018).

While the worldwide business groups wavered to put resources into South Sudan, neighbouring nations, for example, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia have benefited extraordinarily from exchange and interests in restaurants, lodgings and other convenience offices. A huge number of gifted and semi-talented specialists from these nations have been working in South Sudan since 2011 and the skilled personnel increase even after independence. Moreover, because of the absence of local capacity, numerous organisations from surrounding countries and area have been given huge contracts to assemble infrastructure in South Sudan.

South Sudan needs to explore post-conflict recovery and economic reconstruction and development experiences of other countries but should not allow others to dictate country's economic choices and policies. Furthermore, the government needs to be involved in development and diversification of the economy instead of leaving this to the markets.

Two South Sudanese market women said "we have to take a good look at what different nations have done regarding economic improvement and pick their accepted procedures, yet we cannot enable others to reveal to us what is best for us.

We should have the capacity to pick our financial framework and arrangements". One respondent noticed that apart from oil, agribusiness ought to be the most imperative industry to be upheld and created by the legislature, including that "we should begin delivering our own nourishment. This will limit sustenance uncertainty and reduce our dependency on imported goods". She additionally pointed out that the state needs to mediate and encourage expansive scale rural tasks in South Sudan. This would create jobs for the youth especially those who were involved in fighting as youth soldiers; and some of them are back home and confused and do not know the way forward. Guaranteed local production generation and food security could even procure us foreign cash" (Koyonkoyon market, Juba 6 January 2018).

Other respondents mentioned that we cannot leave this to the business sectors to deal with. We plant products and do not even have the means to bring it to the market; no security, no transportation and no access to facilities and this is creating a big problem for development to kick-start at full length. The government must use its capacity quickly for peaceful settlement to reconstruct the economy again rather than using their energy to fight a worthless fight to the neglect of the entire population. "We are suffering, and we need reconstruction and development to take place as soon as possible". The doctrine of leaving everything to the business sectors has bombed all over the place and we should move away from that concept. The respondents said in the conversation as they mention the names of their leaders in the ensuing conflict... "Salva Kiir and Reik Marcha, listen to the voice of the people

and those innocent blood killed are crying for freedom and reconstruction of our dear nation, save South Sudan for the people" (Juba 7 January 2018).

6.9 Development infrastructure and Reconstruction

Before the civil conflict, most urban centres in South Sudan especially the regional cities have seen momentous infrastructure reconstruction and development since independence.

With regards to fundamental reconstruction and development remaking and improvement, a respondent for the government office contended that "South Sudan has come far since 2005. The district has gained impressive ground, although there has never been much advancement in the South before". He included that in the initial years after the war, very little was done for the most part because of the absence of capacity and financing, terrible administration and debasement, however things have enhanced since independence and the legislature could build streets and other fundamental framework across the nation. The GOSS should be given due credit for reconstruction within the periods before the conflict broke out, especially in the capital cities of South Sudan, there are basic hospitals, basic education foundations and the country experience a great improvement in all social amenities, even our children could go out in the night to play and come back home safely in the period of independence.

However, he mentioned that the rural areas which forms the majority have seen little or no development of infrastructure since the country gained autonomy in 2011. The

fight for ethnic supremacy and occupation of the country's top positions has divided the nation and bloodbath all over, people are quietly being terminated at their homes, rape, murder, and all evil vices are the order of the day in South Sudan and all the gains the country made since independence have been destroyed by the political ethnic rivalry between the two most powerful tribes in South Sudan (Juba 7 January 2018).

6.10 The fruit of Peace

Since independence, key peace dividends experienced by most people in South Sudan have been basic security and freedom of movement. At the same time, many people have not yet seen dividends such as livelihood improvements and basic services.

One respondent who is a security guard in the office of the department of justice in Juba mentioned that in a post-conflict condition, for example, in our country South Sudan, the cooling down of savage clash is not enough for long-term stability. He added that society, individuals need to see the fruits of peace profits, for example, physical recreation and development, essential administrations and openings for work and proper freedom of movement. People's homes have been destroyed by the ongoing conflict and some even do not know how to restart their lives, do not have freedom to go back to their villages from which they escaped and look for the little left to begin a meaningful livelihood and reconstruct their homes and communities

because of the likelihood of relapse into armed conflict again (Juba, 7 January 2018).

More than half of the respondents argued that since post-referendum through to independence, South Sudan has really never experienced peace dividends because the whole country was always surrounded with armed security forces and only Juba the capital of South Sudan has seen some improvement and infrastructure development although majority of infrastructure development was on hotels and the tourism industry because the world wanted to see the new creation of how they have crafted their way into independence whilst most parts of the country and rural areas are sidelined. Till today, the majority of the people of South Sudan are still waiting for basic services, such as schools, water, sanitation, proper roads, healthcare and vocational schools for our children (Juba 7 January 2018).

Two ex-youth soldiers said that, the over flooding of the capital city Juba is as a result of lack of services and development because they have not seen such facilities and believe that they might find opportunity and enjoy good life the rural areas does not offer to them. The greatest dividend many of the South Sudanese has experienced in the area of employment is in the government and army. Both the army and the government are overcrowded with influxes of people more than it can sustain; especially the army as majority are coming from the break-up of Sudan and ex-combatants supporting the movement for independence and it is the duty of the government to provide ex-combatants and potential spoilers in order to maintain stability (Juba 7 January 2018).

Clustering of service delivery, development and employment opportunities only in the capital and a few other metropolitan centres at the expense of rural areas was also a factor that led to instability and unrest in the country.

Many of the respondents emphasised that the lack of infrastructure development and basic services outside the capital was one reason for the violent conflict. Improvement that was started by the GOSS after the conflict/war was centred just in Juba and a couple of other metropolitan cities. When you visit Juba, you can plainly observe the advantages of peace. In any case, a respondent said that if you go to any provincial territories, there are still no enhancements and development. This should be adjusted soon as we cannot bear to commit a similar error the administrations in Khartoum had made since the 1956 autonomy, with power and improvement brought together around Khartoum, while the peripheries were underestimated. This prompted uprisings and the same has happened in our country in 2013, as the people mind has been thwarted towards a better future and good governance, so they think the only way to establish that is through war and fighting for what they believed in, therefore, the government should recreate avenues for service delivery for the people (Juba 6 January 2018).

6.11 Local Capacity and Skills

Inadequate capacity for governance and economic reconstruction and development are key challenges facing South Sudan today.

Because of the history of prolonged wars, most South Sudanese never had an opportunity to get education. After these prolonged wars, the GOSS had barely anybody working for the administration with past authoritative and administrative experience. The administration needed to get South Sudanese who during the war had lived and worked in different nations to help set up government organisations.

While gainful, this made issues as there was a considerable measure of pressure between the individuals who had stayed in Sudan during the war and the individuals who left as outcasts and are presently returning to get high positions within the government.

Another respondent added a comparable perspective, bringing up that one of the immense troubles that South Sudan has looked since 2005 was coordination and settlement of different groups – from former soldiers, internally dislodged, to exiles and individual returnees throughout the world. "Each of the individuals had desires and is frequently seeking similar positions and occupations" (Juba, 6 January 2018).

Since the casual end of the conflicts, South Sudan has confronted a monstrous lack of capacity as the greater number of positions in the administration were not given to qualified people but rather to the individuals who had partaken in the freedom battle or to the individuals from different agitator groups or friends of the government.

Absence of capacity with regards to administration and economic reconstruction and development are viewed as a portion of the fundamental difficulties confronting free South Sudan. After the peace assertions in 2005 and the South started framing its

independent government, the greater part of positions in government establishments were not given to individuals in view of their capabilities and fitness, as there were very few qualified individuals accessible, yet they were given based on their past contribution in the freedom battle. Furthermore, positions also had to be given to the members of various rebel groups who were threats to stability and peace. All this meant that there was a "massive capacity shortage" since the end of the war (Juba 7 January 2018).

Due to the decades of war coupled with underdevelopment and absence of educational opportunities, are not the only problems that the government is facing, but skills and capacity development does not exist in all other sectors of the economy as he pointed out that currently the majority of skilled and semi-skilled workers are coming from neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Uganda and surroundings and that creates a lot of competition over jobs.

Notwithstanding, a local chief in one of South Sudan's states who is residing in Juba brought up that, the enormous issue in South Sudan is the absence of training and aptitudes among locals. Local people experience serious difficulties discovering business even in territories where there is a considerable measure of financial action, for example, oil rich states, simply because they do not have abilities. We should enhance our education framework and continue preparing and giving training to the general population so that they can help later improvement of the nation (Juba 7 January 2018).

A UNMISS official said that in South Sudan, regardless of the considerable number of issues identified with the absence of capacity and abilities, there is eagerness among the general population and specialists to buckle down and reconstruct the nation. He included that, unlike other nations rising up out of conflict, South Sudanese people appear to understand the inadequacies and are approaching the international groups for intervention, help and support (Juba 9 January 2018).

6.12 External Community Involvement

Since independence, international community's efforts and pressures ensured that the referendum on self-determination was held. In terms of other efforts, most of the work by international donors and organisations has channelled energy primarily on provision of emergency assistance to vulnerable communities within South Sudan.

One respondent said that in that Juba since independence, South Sudan has been a "prime post-conflict recuperation experiment where global givers and associations are applying their methodologies, practices and systems they got from past encounters". He further said that, "the best effect made by the international group was of a political nature – from impacting Khartoum government to consent to the peace agreement by forcing it to enable the independence to materialise without regard to the outcomes" (Juba, 3 January 2018).

Apart from humanitarian and emergency aid, the duty of international donors and organisations in South Sudan has been disillusionment. This was mainly due to lack

of medium- to long-term strategy for reconstruction and development and lack of harmonisation among external actors.

As specified above, within the period 2005 through to independence in 2011, contributors and worldwide associations have not had a long-term recuperation and development methodology but have been concentrating exclusively on crisis and short-term prescriptions. A respondent who is an education specialist in South Sudan said that, apart from the compassionate and crisis assistance, crafted by most external actors has been a mistake. They have drastically failed to live up to expectations and their work is a disgrace because they chipped away at enhancing coordination among themselves and their managerial techniques, while investing little energy in required projects and activities they were brought in the country to do (Juba, 6 January 2010).

A few respondents said that one of the issues confronting neighbourhood groups and experts were the guarantees by givers and global associations that were not conveyed. One of the huge issues we face in our country today were the fake promises global associations give about assistance, guarantee ventures, and financial support and after that nothing could ever be executed. They consolidate themselves within the population and yet nothing is executed and even emergency assistance was short of what they promised to the country (Juba 7 January 2018).

Despite the needs for infrastructure reconstruction and development, the international community has done little in terms of providing funding and assistance for physical reconstruction in post-conflict South Sudan.

One respondent contended that since independence and our country joining the UN and multinational organisations, little as far as physical reconstruction has been done in South Sudan. The donor countries have done little in providing any financial support to the government, no physical reconstruction is taking place, because even the capital city of South Sudan roads are an eyesore simply because when it rains the roads in the capital city is completely inaccessible. All gutters in the city are blocked with sewage and dust and the government has done little in initiating a proper reconstruction and development let alone in the city. Hence, all roads leading to the rural areas are completely inaccessible and the products from small farms are difficult to be transported to other areas for sale. The only physical development done by the international organisation is sending troops down for security purposes and fairly giving assistance to the poverty-stricken villages within the country (Juba 6 January 2018).

All international donors and organisations working in South Sudan have their own interests and agendas which are contrary to the local needs and priorities.

A South Sudanese representative in the traditional leaders noticed that every international donor and contributor associated with South Sudan has their own financial, security, territorial and geopolitical plans and interests. For them, "needs

and interests of South Sudanese come simply after their own advantages and motivations" (Juba, 3 January 2018).

Some universal associations, as indicated by an authority from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), go much further, "carrying on like deliverers and accepting they are on the landmass to spare poor Africans who do not know how to deal with themselves. From multiple points of view, they act simply like numerous colonialists did during the provincial periods". He included that numerous international associations are acting like this in South Sudan. Another respondent said that "it is vague if most global associations are here to help South Sudanese or for their own particular advantage, progression and development" (Juba 3 January 2018).

Majority of international agencies arrived in the country from other post-war or in-conflict countries, often trying to replicate the work they had done elsewhere. Also, throughout the days of post-self-determination in 2005 to independence in 2011, majority of personnel and officials working for international organisations in South Sudan have lacked basic knowledge about the country, its history, people, problems and needs.

Three respondents called attention to numerous individuals working for the UN and other universal associations based in South Sudan who have no information about the nation; their exclusive capability is that they already worked in nations, for example, Burundi, Rwanda, Congo, Iraq or Afghanistan. "As a general rule, they

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simply attempt to reproduce things that they have done in these different nations" (Juba 6 January 2018). Another respondent included that it is ridiculous that "the internationals" originated from Afghanistan, Iraq and different places and take a step at doing similar things in South Sudan that they have done somewhere else. "Aside from every one of these spots being in a general sense extraordinary, the issue is that whatever was done in Afghanistan, Iraq and different nations has not delivered positive outcomes there" (Juba 6 January 2018).

For the vast majority of the time frame, high-positioned international authorities who settled after freedom were supposed to ensure that their tasks and projects that should have been actualised in South Sudan were not situated in the South but rather in different nations. They would visit the district occasionally and settle down without delivery in light of these shortcomings in South Sudan as majority of their driven activities were overseen by "parachute guests" (Juba 7 January 2018).

Notwithstanding the absence of leaders and knowledge about South Sudan among international agencies, incessant staff changes within the associations, and particularly within the UN and its organisations, are reducing the odds of any meaningful development. Staff shortages and short-term development relate not only to UN offices but rather are occurring in most international associations working in South Sudan. One respondent said that out of a huge number of "internationals," there are a few individuals who remain in South Sudan for over a year and connect with neighbourhood individuals and endeavour to find out about the nation. "Most internationals are here on the grounds that it is great to have South Sudan

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experience and build on their portfolios for future international development vocations" (Juba, 6 January 2018).

6.13 External Support

While numerous external capacity building efforts have been taking place in South Sudan since independence, most of them were either short-term or conducted by inexperienced foreign advisors and officials.

External capacity building endeavours in South Sudan have been occurring on two fronts. On one hand, non-natives are functioning as guides to neighbourhood services and high-positioned authorities. On the other hand, various international associations are sorting out short workshops and programmes about peace-building, compromise, reconciliation, venture agreements and usage and numerous different resources. However, the issue with the programmes is that, they are short, once-off occasions without development (Juba, 7 January 2018).

As indicated by a previous GOSS respondent, since independence, youth from Europe or United States, with no past experience of working for government organisations, were named as counsellors to different GOSS services as a component of external capacity programs financed by the European Union and United States. "Their absence of experience could be seen from the way that some of them would go to their workplaces in the services in shorts and shoes" (Juba 28 December 2017).

Another respondent said that in South Sudan, we can see the most unmitigated egotism of the international group, where they want to send individuals in their twenties to advise the administration on how to improve… these are individuals who barely have any experience separated from school training and maybe a few temporary jobs and section level employments are sent to us (Juba 28 December 2017). "South Sudan needs vocational and institutional mentorship programs where experienced heads from the continent and around the globe should work with neighbourhood authorities on all department of government over a more extended time frame. External heads would not settle on choices but rather just exhort local people and offer with them their encounters" (Juba 28 December 2017).

A few associations are now looking at such mentorship programs. This is not a transient warning post, but a long-term contribution going on for various years and attempting to solve the conflicting issues at hand and restructure the economy again and this what I called hands-on capacity building work (Juba 3 January 2018).

6.14 Dependency Syndrome

South Sudan suffers from a dependency syndrome created over the decades of war. Extensive post-conflict emergency and humanitarian efforts by the international community, while necessary, are only prolonging this dependency on foreign aid and assistance.

One respondent said that a significant issue in South Sudan is the reliance disorder made during the conflict. Today, individuals do not consider the legislature

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responsible for the absence of conveyance of fundamental services since they have become accustomed to being given these services by international NGOs and humanitarian assistance. She included that "there is a need to direly change these dynamics, where neighbourhood groups and specialists expect that "the internationals" will keep on feeding them. This reasoning is perilous as 'the internationals' do not stay perpetually" (Juba, 7 January 2017).

Broad contribution by external performing actors has become a problem for growth. A respondent from one of South Sudan's states said that, despite the fact that we are extremely thankful for the assistance and support we are getting from the international organisations, particularly alleviation of poverty support and human services, the issue is that this help is proceeding to make our country subjecting to only external assistance (Juba 7 January 2018).

Many years of reliance on universal associations, NGOs and emergency relief have totally changed the attitude of the general population in South Sudan. When they require something today, they do not consider their own drives or local experts and offices yet go straight to global associations and request assistance. This has been the test confronting the legislature and local experts, whose validity and administrative efficiency is in question (Juba 7 January 2018).

Combined local authorities and international donors and organisations need to work together on a strategy for changing the dependency on foreign assistance to that of

self-reliance. However, this may take time as many vulnerable communities still fully depend on international NGOs and aid agencies for survival and basic services.

A respondent contended that a considerable effort should be made to change the reliance attitude in South Sudan: We should work with our kin to change their mind set from expecting free services and sustenance from worldwide NGOs and help organisations to work to accommodate themselves and their families. This will be a long procedure and we should cooperate with the universal group on this in order to turn the country from complete collapse (Juba 2 January 2018).

In any case, as one respondent noticed, the truth is that without external support, numerous local people would battle to survive. She underscored that "there are numerous rustic groups where, if global NGOs and offices do not convey fundamental services, nobody would step in to assist the people and they would be left to dry out and die of starvation and strife (Juba 6 January 2018).

6.15 Lack of Communication

Many international donors and organisations working in South Sudan design and implement projects and programmes with little or no communication and consultation with local authorities and organisations. This often leads to projects that are not necessary or appropriate for local conditions.

One of the difficulties confronting local experts is the absence of correspondence and communication between external performing actors and local communities, associations and individuals; numerous international associations working in South

Sudan are outlining and executing ventures with next to zero consultation with local people and associations. They regularly cover each other's work or execute ventures that are not required or important. This should change as we have to recognise what every one of these associations is doing in our groups. Rather than everybody looking at their own activities and projects, we need to work towards objectives that are characterised by South Sudanese which we trust and have faith in that it will enable us as community to work towards a common ground and a common goal of national reconstruction and development and not foreigners (Juba 7 January 2018).

An UNDP official contended that external performing actors need to convey and communicate more with the local community and allow communal participation. "We have to discuss more with South Sudanese as they are the beneficiaries of our assistance and help and find out about their nation, issues and needs than any international organisation".

An exceptionally intriguing similarity that connects well to everything external agencies are endeavouring to do in South Sudan and other war-torn nations is development of benefactor subsidised structures in provincial territories. Rather than building mud cottages that have been being used in the district for a considerable length of time, Western benefactors demand building Western-style structures with blocks or concrete and metal rooftop. While mud cottages are suitable for South Sudanese ecological conditions and do not get extremely hot, Western-style structures are essentially unusable in an area or facility that one does not have cooling, which individuals in rural regions do not have. Rather than demanding the

building of Western-style structures, they should possibly help the local people enhance their mud cottages, the respondent stated.

6.16 Local Ownership

South Sudanese are proud people toughened during decades of war and suffering. They often reject ready-made "solutions" imposed or recommended by foreigners without prior consultation.

Various respondents called attention that, notwithstanding the staggering closeness of worldwide benefactors and organisations in South Sudan, local experts and nationals have not abandoned having a critical say in post-conflict recuperation and state-building reforms. A former GOSS official said that the military attitude and individuals toughened during the war are key reasons why South Sudanese experts do not consider Westerners to be the "knowing all" individuals and why they regularly decline to actualise what international organisations instruct them to do (Juba, 7 January 2018).

One of the traditional leaders mentioned that socially, South Sudanese are pleasant and proud individuals. They occasionally acknowledge instant arrangements suggested by foreigners. This frequently baffles the local communities' leaders and contributors who are accustomed to forcing arrangements in Africa" (Juba 7 January 2018).

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Many projects and programmes designed by international donors and organisations were not implemented by local authorities because locals were not part of the design and development process.

Throughout the years, numerous tasks and projects arranged by international contributors and organisations were not executed on the grounds that South Sudanese specialists do not acknowledge burdens by non-natives. Frequently, dreams and thoughts of "the internationals" were not the same as those of the local experts yet South Sudanese acknowledged their financing as they required aid support. Be that as it may, the issue was where local experts would not endeavour to actualise what was concurred already as they were not associated with the outline of the activities (Juba 2 January 2018).

To keep these issues from happening once more, a local NGO official said that "we have to help local structures as opposed to forcing our own particular "Western" structures and thoughts or getting things done alone while sidelining local people". He included that, while some global characters are attempting to help local structures, "numerous people are as yet forcing their thoughts or getting things done individually without consulting local people" (Juba 2 January 2017).

While South Sudan needs extensive support and assistance from the international community, external actors need to ensure genuine local ownership so that South Sudanese authorities, organisations and citizens are part of the design, development and implementation of all projects and programmes.

A respondent said that South Sudan needs a considerable measure of help from the international group, yet this "dependably should be support and not inconvenience local ways and thoughts. South Sudanese need to drive state-building, peacebuilding and advancement" (Juba 6 January 2018). Another respondent included that the main way South Sudan can turn into a stable nation is "if local individuals and elites take control of their own fate. If we enable non-natives to set needs and force arrangements they believe are required, we will never be free, stable or prosperous" (Juba 6 January 2010). Another respondent emphasised on the above sentiments; we have an opportunity to fabricate a nation after so many years of anguish and conflict. We must build a nation that will necessitate our requirements and desires. To accomplish this, state-building, country building and development procedures and projects must be outlined and actualised by South Sudanese, not international organisation that need to learn about our history, issues, difficulties and necessities (Juba, 7 January 2017).

6.17 Obstacle Facing South Sudan

Stability and peace in South Sudan will depend on the government's ability to provide basic services to the population.

A respondent said that, regardless of mammoth recreation, peacebuilding and state-building work and changes since 2005, "despite everything we have a long journey to go to make a stable state" (Juba, 5 January 2018). A respondent who is an NGO official pointed that his involvement in rural areas has shown him that in numerous regions "individuals do not seem to have any connection to the legislature,

regardless of whether it is central, state or local government" nor do they get any services from the government (Juba, 6 January 2018).

A larger number of individuals in South Sudan live in rural areas and face many difficulties. A dire need in the country is access to water and grazing lands for cattle, absence of which is causing strife and viciousness among various groups (Juba 7 January 2018). A local NGO official said that the desires of individuals after the freedom and autonomy will be incredible and the "legislature should deliver on the guarantees keeping in mind the end goal to prevent outrage and potentially extensive scale viciousness and resistance" (Juba 6 January 2018).

For South Sudanese to accomplish enduring peace, individuals require development. Cities still do not have streets, hospital facilities, schools, job openings for work and essential services. Conveyance of fundamental governance was echoed by another respondent as key for peace and stability. They expect asphalt streets, schools, healing centres and participatory services and the legislature should deliver these needs to the people as we cannot afford going back all the time to reconstruct and more importantly proper mutual security arrangements should be reached between the conflicting parties to allow us to go back to our home and begin to put the pieces together. He echoed "it is enough of the blood, we need peace and proper nation-building and the government must ensure that it happens to enable us enjoy the peace dividends we dearly fought for" (Juba 6 January 2018).

Being a diverse country, South Sudan needs to embrace all its communities and peoples. The authorities need to deliver services and share resources equitably among regions and communities, without favouritism based on ethnicity, tribe, in a political party or geography.

Two respondents said that it is of outmost significance that assets are shared evenly among districts and groups in South Sudan, without bias in view of ethnicity, clan, in a political gathering or topography (Juba 7 January 2018). Another respondent contended that decentralisation of administration and adjusted advancement all throughout South Sudan will be the key for stability. A major issue so far has been the way that huge amounts of cash that came to South Sudan stayed in the capital, Juba. If this continues, it will become problematic later as individuals from different parts of the nation rise up against this centralisation. He said that "remember that centralisation of energy (oil) and assets in Khartoum" was one of the primary drivers of North-South wars that lasted for many years and even until today we are still fighting and negotiating for complete ownership of our oil as North Sudan thinks that some parts of the regions belong to them and they must also have a market share of the oil revenues (Juba 6 January 2018).

One respondent reminded that in the 1990s, "South Sudanese battled each other roughly. The circumstance is generally quiet today as there are constantly ongoing negotiations for ownership, however there are concerns over security, for instance when Southerners hold next election, old divisions would arise and currently within the country there are similar old blame lines". In any case, South Sudanese are still a

long way from defeating tribalism in legislative government. "This is one of the considerable difficulties in the South and should be overseen precisely if there is to be peace and stability over the long term".

However, he believes that South Sudan can come out of the ongoing conflict and re-establish a better and stable government as we have a very energetic youth now who want to come back home and help to reshape our country again with the knowledge they gain from outside (Juba 5 January 2018).

South Sudan will need to go through a social transformation in order to catch up with other regions and the world after decades of war, suffering, marginalisation and isolation.

A local respondent said that South Sudanese should experience a critical social change to make up for lost time with the district and the rest of the world. He pointed that "numerous individuals who stayed in the South amid the times of war have put some distance between the cutting-edge world and we should get up to speed rapidly" (Juba 6 January 2018). Another respondent contended that South Sudanese need to change their reasoning and conduct and stop taking up weapons each time they have a grievance, for example, absence of essential services. He is confident that later, individuals will embrace lawful systems and utilise tranquil means to challenge rather than disobedience and savagery (Juba 6 January 2018).

In post-conflict South Sudan, everything is a priority. One of the main challenges facing authorities is to decide what to focus on first during the ongoing destabilisation.

One respondent noticed that education stands out amongst the most vital needs that need earnest consideration as this is the key for the eventual fate of South Sudan. Notwithstanding, he concluded that there are additionally other pressing needs, for example, clean water, sustainable farming methods, human services and security that need critical consideration as well and that this must be in some way adjusted because ignorance is what is keeping us fighting each other, so when proper education is established, our people will embrace and understand each other better (Juba 6 January 2018).

One of the greatest difficulties is choosing what is a priority; security, fundamental governance, employment creation or frameworks of all institutional departments. "Everything is critical and essential however not all things can be delivered without a moment's delay; therefore, the administration needs to choose what are the key priorities for the country and deliver them" (Juba 6 January 2018). Discussing the service needs in the autonomous South Sudan, a local negotiator said that in the medium term, the best need will be security, nation-building and support of solidarity in the nation (Juba 7 January 2018).

6.18 Awareness of Peace-building

Do you think that an externally driven liberal peace framework is the only option for post-conflict countries in the quest for recovery, stability and peace?

The primary significant concern of the respondents was to build up whether all the citizens are aware of Africa Union (AU) peacebuilding intercessions in the South Sudan. During the investigation, all the respondents, were insightful (in wide terms) of AU progressing peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan. A note on the profiles of respondents on the consciousness of AU peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan is enlightening. It is important that most of the respondents knew about AU peacebuilding mediation in the South Sudan for the accompanying key reasons: To begin with, it merits specifying that most members in this examination were scholars, Women activists and Youth soldiers and agitators as exhibited in the procedure section of this investigation. Hence their level of familiarity with Africa Union peace-building intercessions in the South Sudan was moderately high. The academics (especially social researchers), Women activists and Youth soldiers and radicals - albeit living in Juba – have been worried about issues that identify with administration, brutality and destitution in the South Sudan.

Furthermore, youth soldiers and dissidents contended awareness of Africa Union sending its troops to the South Sudan for peacekeeping. This gave them the mindfulness that AU was mediating in the country. Most members in the examination were occupied with seeing a more stable, tranquil and a superior South Sudan. As

contended by one respondent, women activists have been vocal on the part of AU peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan since 2005 (Juba 26 December 2017).

Although this investigation purposively focused on the informed class among the South Sudanese people group in Juba (scholars, ex-military and activists), it seemed that the subject of understanding of their consciousness of AU peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan is a mind boggling one. There were distinctive levels of attention to AU peacebuilding intercessions in the country among scholars and women activists.

For example, most ex-military and rebels of the opposition government contended that they knew that AU was utilising SANDF from South Africa and ECOWAS from West Africa to fight revolts as a method for building peace. One extremist contended that AU was building peace in the South Sudan by financing frameworks, for example, streets, air terminals as a method for enhancing business in South Sudan. "By developing our streets, air terminal, AU is tending to joblessness and neediness in the country". There were equally views that AU was associated with electioneering and political occasions of the South Sudan in order to figure out who will succeed or ensure peaceful transitions of government. From the shifting perspectives of the informed classification, it can be contended that attention to the South Sudanese evacuees of AU peacebuilding intercessions relies upon the conceptualisation of what can bring enduring peace to South Sudan.

6.19 The Role of Ugandan Intervention in South Sudan

While the finding uncovers that most members are against the current government, it is under the administration of Salva Kiir that South Sudan relations have prospered. As indicated by the two respondents, Uganda has turned into the greatest provider of products and ventures to the South Sudan, giving over 40 percent of the nation's imports. Notwithstanding, it is under the administration of President Salva that IGAD's peacebuilding mediation in South Sudan has expanded. The members against Salva's administrations assumptions and his association with Uganda supported another investigation's journey of discovering the help of Uganda peacebuilding mediation in the South Sudan as described by the Sudanese displaced people. In this investigation, a large portion of the members of this examination were worried about observing a superior and tranquil South Sudan.

Most members interviewed upheld the endeavours that Uganda was looking for enduring peace in the South Sudan. One respondent contended that since Uganda is the main exchanging accomplice with the South Sudan, it has no choice but to end clashes in the South Sudan.

Two respondents against Uganda's peacebuilding interventions in the South Sudan contended that Uganda was supporting the degenerate administration of President Salva Kiir. "Why should I support a government that brings defilement and poor administration in South Sudan?" Some members scrutinised the thought process of Uganda of expanding its imports to South Sudan while in the meantime doing its peacebuilding interventions (Juba 7 January 2018).

In any case, from the discoveries, most members concurred that Uganda had a part to play in resolving conflict in the South Sudan. Subsequent to discovering that the vast majority of the examination's members bolstered Uganda's peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan because currently they have taken majority of our displaced people and offered them a safe place to settle and start afresh and portions of land are given to them to start farming activities so that they the citizens of South Sudan can overcome the challenge of poverty, hunger and starvation (Juba 7 January 2018).

However, there were various perspectives where respondents described the part of Uganda's peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan as contentious. Most of the respondents' views of Uganda's peacebuilding mediation were that Uganda should address the underlying drivers of war in the South Sudan. Respondents" perspectives differed on the underlying driver of conflict. For example, all ex-military and youth revolutionaries that the examination met contended that media externally depicted the reasons for war in the South Sudan. He contended that, "on TV, I see short-sighted revealing of conflict in the South Sudan. A few media announced that radicals were causing conflict in order to advance themselves. What is not known is that radicals/rebels were working in a joint effort with government officers with whom they share plunder". Ex-military worker included that by working with the South Sudanese armed force in its peacebuilding mediations, Uganda is unconscious that the administration could not lead a hostile against rebels or opposition government (Juba 7 January 2018).

Most perspectives of respondents on the part of Uganda's peacebuilding intercession in the South Sudan depended on their attention to the progression of what breeds war in South Sudan. To get more knowledge, the examination guaranteed that respondents distinguished peacebuilding parts that they thought Uganda was playing in the South Sudan. Every respondent to the best of their insight could recognise the part of Uganda's peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan especially through the visibility of soldiers in the country to help instil stability.

Some respondents contended that the Uganda peacebuilding intervention has found a few dissidents in the country. One member contended "the most substantial accomplishment of the Ugandans intervention in the South Sudan is the disbandment of the revolt aggregate in opposition or grieving party". By debilitating the exercises of opposition especially in the capital Juba, Uganda was making space for positive peace in South Sudan.

Peace in South Sudan must be acknowledged if revolutionary groups were wiped out or were contained. Essentially, Sandole (2010) contends that the disposal of furnished dissident groups and state armies (savage groups) requires negative peace which is a beginning stage of positive peace. Sandole's (2010) justification was re-sounded by a few respondents of this examination. For example, a traditional leader contended, "the disposal of agitator groups by Ugandan army residents and other external intervention would make peaceful conditions in the South Sudan. This will permit peace projects to be actualised by both local communities and universal peace-builders.

As a method for securing its enthusiasm for the South Sudanese, this investigation set up two interlaced parts of Uganda's peace-building mediations as described by the respondents. On one part of the respondents, there were members who portrayed that Uganda was utilising peacebuilding intercessions to extend its exchanging enthusiasm for the South Sudan. This was by ensuring Uganda claimed business in the South Sudan. Furthermore, another classification of members portrayed that since it started its peacebuilding intercessions in South Sudan, Uganda has expanded its respective exchange with South Sudan.

The connection between Uganda peacebuilding interventions and organisations in the South Sudan provoked one respondent to contend that the activities of Uganda and external actors were giving a formula to calamity. The previous perspectives of respondent drove the analyst to see some injurious associations between Uganda peacebuilding intercession, business and struggle in the South Sudan. From the perspective of most respondents, it can be contended that Uganda and the influence of external actors is giving grounds to (re)occurrence of contentions.

A respondent said that Uganda was meddling with the interests of the government and their open support for the current government under President Salva Kiir through financing radicalism to destabilise the opposition government for their benefit maximisation" Then again, "Uganda peace-building intervention in the South Sudan jeopardises supporting dissidents' source of occupation which the present government cannot offer". As an outcome, "Uganda peacebuilding mediations were

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evoking more revolutionary activities other than peace as echoed by the respondent"
(Juba 7 January 2018).

6.20 Peace-Building Intervention by Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)

How are the ongoing peace intervention by IGAD and other organisations working for peaceful resolutions significant?

In the wake of investigating distinctive perspectives of the respondents on the part of peacebuilding, the examination saw it as beneficial to discover how members of this examination appraised IGADs peacebuilding intervention in South Sudan. During the examination, some members contended that IGAD peacebuilding interventions in South Sudan were extremely significant. Some respondents maintained that IGAD peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan were of no significance.

Many respondents contended that there was an incentive in IGAD peacebuilding mediation as it was venturing forward in tending to the extended South Sudan conflict. It is their duty to ensure that peace remains in the region and they must ensure that human rights abuses were stopped by the conflicting parties. However, any time they meet for peaceful settlement, a few days after, conflict breaks out in one of the villages in South Sudan, this tells me that both the government and the opposition parties do not want to settle for peace and enable our people begin life again (Juba 6 January 2018).

Also, there are respondents who felt that the IGAD peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan were of no significance essentially because, they are not

comprehensive. For example, a dissident youth soldier contended that IGAD peacebuilding interventions favoured one gathering to the contention to the detriment of other displeased actors. By sidelining different performing actors to the Sudanese conflict, "the IGAD peace-building mediations were delaying, muddling and sustaining the South Sudan contention further". Notwithstanding muddling and drawing out clashes, as an ex-revolt you contended that "IGAD Africa's peace-building mediations were uneven, they were delivering different harmful complications".

Hence, by disregarding rebel and other displeased gatherings in its peace-building intervention in the South Sudan, IGAD was setting new justification for future clashes in the South Sudan. As indicated by the perspectives of the ex-revolt, IGAD peace-building interventions in the South Sudan were undermining the impact of the radical gatherings in the country (Juba 7 January 2018).

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Curle (2011) state that by ignoring different groups to the contention, endangers intensifying conflict. This is on the grounds that, when conflict emerges, no group perceives alternate as having honest to goodness claims (Lambourne 2014:41). In these unique circumstances, a Sudanese educator at the University of Juba contended that "contentions in the South Sudan are expected absence of acknowledgment of political administrations since 2005. In this way, by perceiving and consulting with the government (which is viewed as ill-conceived), IGAD was cultivating warlords in the South Sudan". He stated further that by favouring any side of the conflict, IGAD peacebuilding activity was turning a blind eye

to the part being played by Uganda in the South Sudan conflict. Sadiki (2014) posits that global peace builders for furnishing and financing diverse radical gatherings in the South Sudan have blamed the government of Uganda. Hence, from the perspectives of a few respondents, by only supporting the legislature of President Salva Kiir, IGAD peacebuilding intervention can be contended to revive the impacts of Uganda in the South Sudan contention.

6.21 Conclusion

In accordance with this current study's speculation, this chapter underscored the possibility that IGAD, Uganda, ECOWAS and international organisations' intervention in the DRC may not be illuminated on a suspicion that peacebuilding is a method for tending to the high flood of south Sudanese displaced people. In doing as such, this chapter contends that there is a great deal for all stakeholders to contribute towards peacebuilding intervention in the South Sudan. All parties involved in the current conflict must rethink about the future of the country, stop the conflict and design methods that will bring a lasting solution to South Sudan. From the respondent's perspectives, it is their desire that irrespective of the ethnic divisions among them, peace must be restored, and the only way is through local intervention and national dialogue from all of the people of South Sudan.

CHAPTER SEVEN

REFLECTION OF KEY FINDINGS

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter discoveries obtained from in-depth meetings and interviews in South Sudan are dissected and analysed with the information, ideas, and contentions from the written literature and relevant contextual background sections. The first section of this chapter gives an examination and discussion about PCRD in South Sudan; in Section two, key discoveries about externally and internally driven PCRD that arose out of the data gathered in the investigation are analysed; Section Three examines the prospects for an enhanced/different approach to deal with post-strife reconstruction and development.

Birks and Mills (2011:66) argue that, when analysts utilise their hypothesis for information investigation, data analysis comes in numerous structures – from interview transcripts to writing, reports and arrangement policy documents. This information can be considered and utilised during the data examination process. They suggest that researchers should regard the literature as information and allude to it during data examination (Birks & Mills 2011:22).

While applying a hypothesis into practice, this section contextualises the evident contending values of hypothesis posited in the study and subjective information displayed in part six - an examination of perspectives and states of mind of the South Sudanese towards peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan. Initially, while the theory chapters of this study helped in seeing academic contentions, the subjective

information fragment tested the genuine perspectives of the South Sudanese living in Juba regarding the matter under scrutiny. As posited in Chapter five, insightful contentions were tested by the perspectives of ongoing peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan. Discoveries and other information were thoroughly cross-examined and translated, clarifying their importance and implications. The chapter therefore posits that issues, ideas, contentions and points of view were recognised and connected through analysing the data (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011:205).

Also, by connecting theory and practice in this section, this examination elucidates why scholars regard peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan as broad yet myopic in excluding the real voices of numerous South Sudanese. Hence, the chapter contends that it is because of limitation of academic work in not increasing key knowledge and points of view of dispositions and perspectives of South Sudanese that has limited from casting a more "grounded look" on the inspirations for multinational peace-building endeavours in South Sudan.

Subsequently, this chapter analyses the dispositions and the view of the South Sudanese towards a multipurpose African peacebuilding intervention in the South Sudan on one hand, and then again, it explains the capacity and the premiums of international peacebuilding missions in South Sudan. By drawing on the encounters, experiences and contentions of the empirical realities of South Sudanese towards Africa's peacebuilding mediations and external determined mediations in South Sudan, this chapter contributes new information on peacebuilding in South Sudan.

Utilising the inductive information investigation strategy, "patterns, classifications and themes" will be built "from the bottom-up" (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011: 175). Conceptualisation of the data is the last procedure of data investigation where it will be considered how the discoveries and contentions introduced in the past chapters and the material in Chapters two, three and four identify with each other. This is done keeping in mind the end goal to build up a calculated comprehension of the issues, contentions and practices identified with both internally and externally driven PCRD. This procedure will eventually prompt advancement of key discoveries from the findings. Conceptualisation is a more theoretical level of examination than coding and categorisation of the information that was done in Chapter five. It requires taking a perspective at the overall information, looking at the connections and clarifying what is going on in the data and with the contemplated phenomenon (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011:247-248).

This chapter will initially examine and conceptualise the information and after that take a general view of the broad perspective. Analysis will be exhibited under various sub-headings; the discoveries from South Sudan and the investigations will be directed, trailed by the introduction of key discoveries derived from the examination. The next chapter will offer some suggestions for conceivable enhancements to PCRD.

Before moving into examination and discourse, the exploration inquiries, points and targets of this investigation are summarised. This will help centre this chapter with a specific end goal to accomplish the objectives and targets. This examination

investigates and surveys qualities; shortcomings and capabilities of both internally and externally driven PCRD and the ways post-conflict practices and methodologies can be enhanced to bring lasting peace and financial dependability in nations rising up out of conflict. It also intends to investigate the nature and an optional/enhanced way to deal with PCRD in South Sudan and the rest of the world in general.

Furthermore, by drawing on the encounters, insights and contentions of the empirical realities of the general population of South Sudan towards peace-building intercessions in South Sudan, this chapter is useful in testing some insightful suppositions on peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan: in the event that it is to merge situation among the global forces maintaining hegemony (as upheld inside the fundamentals of external impositions or prescription) or for positive peace in South Sudan or (as upheld inside cosmopolitan conflict transformation). Hence based upon these investigations or examination the analyst fills in the deficiencies in literature on the element of displaced South Sudanese individuals estranged across the borders of Uganda and abroad and their commitment to peacebuilding intervention in their nation of origin. All protocols considered, this chapter moves this investigation from being just expressive to a more dynamic one.

7.2 Section One: Discussion and analysis

This section discusses and analyses the discoveries and data from the literature. While there might be some overlap in this area from past chapters, it is fundamental to merge, examine and break down an extensive variety of previous information and discoveries with a specific goal to build up merits, shortcomings and capability of

different PCRD methodologies and practices utilised as a part of the South Sudan case. Moreover, looking into various sources of data upgrades the legitimacy and quality of the exploration procedure and discoveries and guarantees better triangulation.

7.2.1 South Sudan civil conflict

As specified in the literature survey, research on conflict transformation has limited effort on the endeavours of peacebuilding by concentrating on the most proficient method to "utilise short-, medium- and long-term procedures of either turning away or revamping war-influenced groups in order to lessen the probability of a repeat of conflict or potential brutality" (Ramsbotham et al. 2011:199). Lambourne (2004) recommends that if one is to achieve the coveted objective of contention change, then the focal point should be on the reconstruction of the political, safety measures, constitutional reform, social and financial institutions for the general public in conflict or those emerging up out of contention.

Other peace researchers propose that the main driver of contention should be tended to by advancing social and economic equity and also setting up institutions of administration and law systems which will fill in as an establishment for peacebuilding, compromise and advancement (Nkhulu 2005; Botes 2001:43). Hence, cosmopolitan conflict transformation hypothesis contends with the aim of inclusive mediation methodology in warring/post-conflict nations to genuinely change attitudes of conflicting parties to the conflict.

Therefore, interveners should consolidate all groups to the contention: conflicting groups, non-warriors, the citizens, exiles and IDPs in peacebuilding by utilisation of bottom-up and top-down techniques. However, as indicated by legitimacy, by mediating strategically in a nation where there is contention, an intercessor, regardless of being an external actor or a local body, does so for its goals and approaches which may incorporate external, monetary and safekeeping.

Smith & Rugunanan (2014) argue that in most contentions, there are insights by researchers and international intermediaries into displaced people from nations consumed by conflict as being incapable of adding to the structural reconstruction of peace in their nations. With regards to this examination various researchers have added to the knowledge of different bodies of peacebuilding mediations in South Sudan (Gordon 2014; Lakika et al. 2015; Tonheim & Swart 2015).

Therefore, researchers' works delineate how the external actors are as yet gauging capacity with respect to peace-building intervention in the South Sudan. Combined with various labels and confusions that are related with them, external peacebuilding mediations in the South Sudan are an essential part of contention of conflict transformation on the African continent. Notwithstanding this, there is a dearth of empirical studies that examine the mentalities, observations and perspectives that South Sudanese (dwelling in Juba) have towards worldwide peacebuilding intervention in the South Sudan.

This sub-segment features and explains the insightful overview of the internally driven peace-building mediations in the South Sudan by concentrating on the

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perspectives, states of mind and contentions of the South Sudanese people living in Juba as communicated in various chapters. All things considered, this chapter views another sort of empirically based research that is required in understanding various organisations' role in post-conflict reconstruction and development in Africa

7.2.2 Fragile Institutions and Fraud

Le Billon (2001:562) states that the shortcoming of organisations inside a state will most likely fuel struggle conflicts. States with weak institutions will probably endure never-ending intra and intra-nation conflict while those with solid institutions and good administration are less inclined to battle. Hence, when a nation has ineffective, weak institutions and frameworks, it triggers the development of societal classes in the general public. Societal classes formed, normally become a hindrance to development: a weak institution leads to distinctive types of shameful acts (political, social and economic).

This deprives the South Sudanese of access to equity and justice within the nation. While numerous endeavours have been set up to stop the relapse of South Sudan into civil conflict, they have been left at negative peacekeeping and peace deals – without trying to change or transform the weak institutions that keep on breeding treacheries as drivers of the civil war. This is a re-assertion of Sandole (2010:9) who contends that "negative peace may be a vital condition for positive peace … yet falls short concerning changing established causes and states of contention". Some respondents argued that the endeavours of worldwide bodies to end war in South

Sudan always resulted in negotiations and tending to opposition's needs and between top conflicting parties in the contention.

The unremitting South Sudan civil war is credited to bad organisations and feeble administration. This is in opposition to countries like United Arab Emirates (UAE) which, like South Sudan, are rich in oil yet have strong infrastructure that propels great managerial administration and dissemination of advantages for all (Fearon 2004). The presence of good organisations and administration in the UAE repudiates a well-known academic contention that abundance of natural resources triggers struggle (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Stewart 2011).

Prospectively, the occurrence of great administration in the oil wealthy UAE indicates how wealth in precious stones or oil, should decrease the occurrence of conflict if those assets and resources remunerate all the citizens (Le Billion 2001). With regards to South Sudan, Le Billion's (2001) contention is inapplicable. It does not offer a clarification concerning why the wealth of oil in South Sudan has advanced weak and unfair institutions that do not promote good governance.

Within the context of South Sudan, abundance of oil reserves has advanced communal conflict in the nation. One respondent contended "if South Sudan's government can set up enterprises and structures to process its oil resources, it can create work for larger part of the population who are grieving in poverty due to unemployment". Lacking and feeble institutions, the absence of good administration and poor foundations opens doors to allow unjustifiable administrations, people and

associations to amass riches corruptly. One respondent said that, because of the absence of institutions that hold individuals who carried out wrongdoings in South Sudan responsible, both government and opposition rebel groups have utilised common South Sudanese as instruments of their advancement (Nazli & North, 1993).

However, most respondents agreed that the best peacebuilding intercession in South Sudan should be to reinforce weak institutions, administration and infrastructure framework in order to enhance the delivery of benefits to the citizens in South Sudan. Hence, the most valuable peacebuilding intervention in South Sudan should be directed towards tending to structural treacheries to stop continuation of violence in the nation.

7.2.3 Politic-Identity and Communal Deprivation

Mills (1997:89) states that, tribalism, race and ethnicity are types of personality acts that are conferred when a 'prevalent' race or group stamps an agreement with itself, permitting no contribution from different races or groups. Comprehending through the perspectives of South Sudanese in Juba, Millis's argument can clarify the role of communal deprivation in South Sudan. The real politic of the South Sudan is described by a shifting (re)alignment of groups around a collective political leader or ethnic tribe. In doing so, politics of identity –whereby specific ethnic gatherings of individuals/groups adjust and re-adjust with the help of a specific leader has advocated the rejection of different groups from taking an interest in the South Sudan political procedure. "Within South Sudan," as mentioned by a respondent,

"politics of compensating a particular ethnic group has advocated the demonstrations of building ethnic support.

As previously indicated by respondents "most of the previously mentioned elites and people utilise their influence to make riches for themselves and their groups and not to equitably serve a large portion of the population, for instance people from other tribes are neglected when it comes to giving top positions in government". Leaders in South Sudan are sufficiently capable of meddling with the working of institutions that are intended to hold them responsible. Therefore, when faced with criticism looking for feedback from different ethnic groups most leaders may enrol individuals from their ethnic group to shield them and most of the time, they instigate their supporters or groups to utilise viciousness as a strategy of keeping them in control, mentioned by one respondent.

Hence, for such people, conflict is the only method for continuing to hold power. "War is politically expedient for the elites to encourage ethnic and communal disunity in order to retain power". "Poverty and ethnic inequality have given a hole in which political leaders pay off youth from their groups to cause savagery in South Sudan". As such, groups that help or support a faction to the leadership should construct superior government authorities to cling to key positions in government organisation. However, "groups perceived to be against the established organisation are subjected to joblessness or low-ranking positions within the establishments".

Another respondent contended that ethnic exclusionary methodologies of the current government in solving destitution in South Sudan has resulted in marginalisation and

denial of the fundamental needs and privileges of the dominant population. As indicated by the respondents, "Since the dawn of autonomy in 2011, the administration has proceeded with divisionary legislative issues that were practised by provincial bosses in Khartoum (Sudan); encouraging tribal dominance and mediocrity politics". Notwithstanding this, "politics of exclusion have neglected to satisfactorily address the issue of destitution, security, unemployment and development". As a reason for civil conflict in South Sudan, break-up legislative issues have produced imbalances and reinforced ideas of mediocrity amongst the clans deprived of admission to the political procedures. Therefore, the marginalised and excluded people from the hierarchical procedures in South Sudan have become one and built up personality objection to battle control ethnic tribes that are viewed as "superior to the others within South Sudan".

From the perspectives and experiences of this current investigation's members, the study derived that the triggers of war in the South Sudan are entangled: one directs and sustains the other. For example, by summoning the effect of lopsidedness, common hardship and divisions, poverty, feeble and unfair organisation, from the respondent's viewpoint, it is important that South Sudan 'violence and politic' is essentially affected by people with great influence, both in the neighbourhood and universally. Subsequently from cross examination of CCTT, perspectives of respondents of this investigation on the reasons for South Sudan conflict point to gaps in the distant past and current peacebuilding mediations were being done in South Sudan during the days when it was a joint nation as Sudan. A few perspectives of the members agree with some authors' contention regarding

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mediators and peace builders do not go further than the enthusiasm of top elites disagreeing communities in their investigation of a continuous or precedent conflict (Lambourne 2010:34).

Through the principles of CCTR hypothesis, the vast majority of perspectives of the South Sudanese people in this subsection point to the way the main drivers of the contention are more genuine than the political avarice that peacebuilding interveners focus on. As found in the literature, the perspectives and the insights of the examination's members bring the view that peacebuilding intervention has been limited to ideological misconception of the top clashing elites in South Sudan. With regards to the civil conflict, the members' perspectives show a requirement for all stakeholders of peacebuilding interventions to focus on the acts of political rejected ethnic imbalance and social structures made by broad systems of support and nepotism. Therefore, from the perspectives and experiences of members, this examination makes a supposition that numerous techniques utilised by peacebuilding interventions give less consideration to main drivers of war in the South Sudan.

7.2.4 Challenging Post-Civil Conflict Environment

An essential issue raised by respondents and featured in the writing is the testing condition in post-civil conflict South Sudan. For centuries, the nation was minimised politically, socially, economically and deficient with regards to any development. Accordingly, when the war finished in 2005, South Sudan needed to 'begin from zero' regarding monetary, infrastructural and institutional development and the

foundation of suppliers of fundamental services; for example, human healthcare services and training, which for a considerable length of time were either non-existent or given by universal NGOs and aid organisations. This implied post-conflict recuperation in South Sudan would be seemingly the most difficult since the end of the Cold War.

7.2.5 Perspective of Post-conflict Period

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that completed the North-South Sudan civil war in 2005 was a result of long arrangements and troublesome bargains by warring groups and strategic pressure from the West. One of the key parts of the CPA was the condition that enabled South Sudan to withdraw from Sudan following six years of the provisional (pro tem) period. This period was intended to give the administration in Khartoum time to make solidarity appealing' to Southerners through great administration, advancement help and peacebuilding. Notwithstanding, during the pro tem frame, none of this happened and the two sides stayed suspicious of each other. Not just that the break period did not fill its unique need, it also prompted the loss of six years in South Sudan regarding medium- to long-term reconstruction and advancement in any sector of the economy.

During the preceding six-year pro tem period, the global cluster held up any assistance to perceive what might occur during the completed six-year time frame. Global contributors and associations working in the South faltered to start taking a shot at reconstruction and development, because they were uncertain if South Sudan would remain a portion of Sudan or turn into an autonomous nation. Rather,

external agencies concentrated basically on short-term compassionate and crisis issues. For similar reasons, external financial specialists like the United Nations and the IMF declined to put resources into South Sudan. In order to remain secure, the administration of South Sudan utilised the greater part of its assets and capability to guarantee internal security and stability and that the self-assurance referendum was held on time in 2011, investing little energy in reconstruction, improvement and conveyance of fundamental services to the population.

7.2.6 Post-Conflict Security Enhancements

As indicated by the field research and literature, local endeavours have been the key factor for post-conflict security enhancements in South Sudan. The main consideration that prompted this was the Juba Declaration, an assertion signed in January 2006 by the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) and various Southern outfitted armed groups that battled in favour of Khartoum amid the war. The Juba Declaration shocked the worldwide group as external performers were not engaged with the arrangement procedure. Toward the end of this procedure, most South Sudanese equipped groups that aligned with Sudan amid the war joined the GOSS. This prompted noteworthy security enhancements in South Sudan.

Despite the security enhancements in the fallout over the Juba Declaration, numerous territories in South Sudan kept on encountering instability and outbreaks of confined battling between different ethnic factions over assets. This frequently occurred in remote zones where the nearness and presence of government establishments and police are insignificant and where residents do not have access

to fundamental administration and basic services, proposing that fighting was by and large caused by genuine grievances and distress from the residents.

While the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMISS) should offer extensive help to local experts in South Sudan for security changes and DDR, little help appeared during the time period. The UN frequently advocated its inaction with its constrained command, which excluded security of civilians influenced by fighting. Moreover, while UNMISS order included help for the DDR and SSR, the UNMISS neglected to genuinely help the GOSS and its security forces. The fundamental explanation behind this was UN's powerlessness to facilitate and design the DDR and SSR with other global contributors and accomplices. Important to note was that, if successful assistance from the UN and other external characters was available to South Sudan at that time, more could have been done as far as the DDR and SSR was concerned and maybe, the country would not have found itself in the civil conflict right now.

Local authorities additionally lingered behind regarding the DDR. The primary explanation behind this was the way that South Sudan's political and armed force authority did not feel that the nation was prepared for demilitarisation and deactivation of soldiers and previous revolutionaries during and between the time periods. This was certainly because of the administration's powerlessness to ensure well-being and security of the general population and groups. As far as demobilisation was concerned, the administration expected that expulsion of a huge number of armies, whose only pay was derived from the armed forces, would make unrest, social turmoil and possibly prompt disobedience.

7.2.7 Peacebuilding and Reconciliation Within the Top Level

Negotiations between different outfitted groups and external actors prompted the signing of the Juba Declaration in 2006, which was a key point of reference in post-conflict peacebuilding and compromise within South Sudan. This guaranteed the solidarity of Southerners and maintained the submission on self-assurance in a serene situation. However, this procedure included just administration and wartime revolt leaders, totally barring groups and normal individuals and communities, a considerable number of whom survived on account of kindred South Sudanese during the war. While critical, arrangements and reconciliation between the elites are insufficient for long-term peace and security. Since South Sudan became an autonomous nation, there is a requirement for a wide-based national reconciliation and peacebuilding process to manage the past and build South Sudan based on strong establishments and complete development.

7.2.8 Post-Conflict Recuperation Efforts at Local Level

At the point when the war ended in 2005, South Sudan started accepting a portion of the oil income from the oil delivered in the district. During the pro tem time frame, this added up to over US$7 billion. This noteworthy measure of that money was to be utilised for post-conflict recuperation, infrastructure improvement and institution of government organisations. However, there were few enhancements from the oil income because of defilement, corruption and broad spending on security. Worthy of note also was the absence of skills and capacity in the legislature and other government establishments and in addition the public institutions implied that there

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were insufficient qualified individuals who could plan and actualise locally determined post-conflict recuperation undertakings and projects and work on financial advancement and complete economic development.

Since South Sudan is a free nation, the national government and experts on state and local levels have an opportunity to start enhancing vocations for the residents. As noted in Chapter six, the desires among the subjects and citizens are enormous. They were guaranteed a better life in an autonomous South Sudan. If this does not appear, there is potential for social turmoil, instability and strife. If the administration does not currently put aside their political and leadership differences and soon start to deliver fundamental administration, provide basic services and actualise comprehensive reconstruction and development ventures and projects, there will be minimal possibility of long-term security and peace.

This, notwithstanding, will be hard to accomplish given the limited imperatives and overpowering spotlight on security within only the factions conflicting. Furthermore, debate with Sudan over charges for oil trades through the Northern offices drove South Sudan to stop its oil generation during 2012 and currently each of the conflicting parties is trying to control the oil-rich regions in order to amass capital to keep on fighting for their political correctness. Since oil incomes are the principle source of income for the nation, the shutdown of oil generation and the world market price of oil not being consistent and the little that the country generates are not enough to set up proper development implied that all locally determined reconstruction and development endeavours are at a standstill or stopped. The

nation struggles during these trying times of conflict; however, the residents remained to a great extent persistent, with desires for vocation changes and a better life once the oil production resumes and complete peace is restored through an efficient negotiation technique by both the local actors and the multinational organisations.

7.2.9 Local politics, Nation-building and Governance

Looking back to before 2005, South Sudan did not have working non-military personnel government structures. The nation has gained huge ground since the end of the war regarding the establishment of essential administration structures and organisations on national, state and local levels. Notwithstanding, while the foundation of institutions on national and state levels was generally effective, authorities and established institutions still do not reach people in rural zones across the nation. Hence, this regularly prompts outrage and fighting between frantic groups who do not have access to establishments and essential services within the country.

One factor that undermined state-building and institution of successful establishments was the need to suit potential local "spoilers". The GOSS needed to oblige different equipped groups that used to fight in favour of Sudan, offering them positions in the organisation as a token of loyalty for devotion to the country. While this may have been fundamental, keeping in mind the end goal was to set up stability and prevent relapse of battling within the area, it prompted the formation of huge, costly and ineffectual institutions and governance structures. Another factor that undermined compelling administration and conveyance of government basic

services to the populace was the absence of skills and capacity within the legislative government. Hence, most of the individuals who work for the administration originate from the armed forces and other security powers. For them, the key need is security, not reconstruction, economic development, good governance and conveyance of fundamental administration.

As far as local legislative issues are concerned, South Sudan was in limbo during the time period. During the time of pro term 2005 to independence in 2011, there was almost no political rivalry because of the need to display a united front against Khartoum and hold on to self-assurance with determination. This, in any case, does not imply that the nation will be politically steady in the medium to long run. As noted in various chapters of this study, the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is a 'marriage of comfort' between different ethnic and territorial factions. Numerous present leaderships of the SPLM battled against each other during the conflict and wartime divisions within South Sudan have never been overlooked and came back to undermine the nation's security in 2013 when the civil conflict broke out. The genuine test for South Sudan will be the main post-autonomy election among the conflicting parties in the ongoing civil conflict, when the nation could confront genuine political rivalry and instability.

It is important to mention that, because of the protracted times of war, destruction and marginalisation, South Sudan never created a local skills capacity or the establishment of viable governance. The nation still needs to set up steady and functioning state institutions that organise prosperity for the populace, good and

viable administration and responsibility and must be accountable. Moreover, it is of outmost significance that the legislative issues, politics and freedom of choice stay open and comprehensive and should not be founded on ethnicity as well as embracing minority ethnic groups within South Sudan to allow the nation to take its rightful place among the world economy.

7.2.10 Eco-Development and Reconstruction

With only the oil business, which was created by Sudan and its global partners during the war and profited just the North until 2005 when the pro tem agreement was struck, South Sudan at present does not have other huge ventures (apart from an SABMiller lager producing facility). The reason for this is the absence of capacity and the overpowering spotlight on security. Almost nothing was done to create small-to medium-scale generation offices and ventures following the end of the war. Also, the principal explanation behind this was the vulnerability during the break time frame between 2005 till autonomy in 2011, which solely prevented both the local and external financial specialists from putting resources into economic recreation and development.

South Sudan as the research was being done, depends completely on oil revenues. In the medium to long run, notwithstanding, economic diversification will be an absolute need as oil is a finite asset/resource. The nation has perfect climatic conditions and enough land to become one of the primary producers, distributors and an economic hub for agricultural products on the African continent. To accomplish this, the South should build framework and create capacity and abilities

of its workforce. This should be the principle aim of the GOSS and its associates since without proper framework, training, skills and capacity, the nation would not have the capacity to create and enhance ways of life of its subjects in the future.

Furthermore, being a new nation with unpractised and inexperienced leadership authority, the nation's political elite should be mindful so as not to be misused and misguided by capable nations which are not keen on the prosperity of South Sudan but only interested in its natural reserves and resources. Discoveries from the respondents proposes that South Sudan needs to oppose the burden of standard improvement methodologies from the West, for example, neo-liberalism but plan and design its own development model that is appropriate for the nation's specific circumstances, conditions and needs.

Moreover, a few respondents contended that South Sudan first needs to build its institutions and create infrastructure frameworks, enterprises and cooperative businesses and afterwards they can think about regional, continental and worldwide economic integration. This is a substantial prerequisite as the nation at present does not have much to offer apart from its oil industry and if they do not quickly settle their differences and put the country first, they risk sinking the country deep down and the future generation will be cursed forever without any resources to count on. Without local capacity, proper institutions and enterprises, South Sudan will remain reliant on merchandise and ventures from different nations.

Respondents additionally recommended that the administration should be engaged with economic recreation, development and infrastructure and bolstering local

ventures as opposed to leaving this to the business sectors or the markets to determine its own fate. Given the disappointments of neo-liberalism especially in the developing Third World countries, this is the most sensible approach that can be taken. Since the nation does not completely rely upon assistance and aid from the West and IFIs for its future presence and development yet has its own assets and furthermore gets bolster from China, this could end up being a superior decision for Africa's and the world's newest nation.

7.2.11 Pro-services, Development and Uneven Reconstruction

Since the prolonged war that concluded with the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement (CPA), major urban cities in South Sudan saw noteworthy basic infrastructure reconstruction improvement and development before the civil-conflict in 2013. In any case, while the nation's capital and a couple of other urban cities have seen upgrades, provincial and rural zones, which are the huge dominant part of the nation, have seen practically no recreation and advancement of infrastructure framework, for example, properly constructed roads, streets, healthcare facilities and schools since 2005.

Centralisation of reconstruction, development and arrangement of essential basic services just in a couple of cities to the detriment of whatever remains of the nation is unsafe and could prompt further instability in the distant future of South Sudan especially since there is an influx of returnees – youth who went into diaspora to study and for safety and security reasons. The current administration needs to change this pattern, particularly since it was the current political elites from South

Sudan who went to war with the North to end centralisation of power, assets, government control and development in Khartoum, while whatever is left of the nation was marginalised.

Another risk of pro-service development in an ethnically diverse nation is that groups and communities that do not agree and see development and essential administration of basic services may see this to be because of not belonging to specific ethnic gathering. Being a diverse nation, South Sudan needs to grasp and embrace every one of its people regardless of ethnic background. Those in power and given responsibilities need to convey administrations, provide basic services and offer assets or the worth of the nation equally among the areas and communities, without partiality based on ethnicity, clan, enrolment in a political group or geographical space to which a community belongs. Hence anything or whatever is short of will prompt insecurity and strife.

7.2.12 Involvement of International Communities in South Sudan

Since 2005, according to literature, South Sudan has been a proving ground for worldwide groups' post-conflict recuperation endeavours. Some of these endeavours were certain while others were not viable. Respondents emphasised that the best effects made by the global group were strategic endeavours and extensive pressure which guaranteed the promotion of self-determination progressively towards independence in 2011. Other positive endeavours by worldwide contributors and associations were the arrangement of emergency assistance and fundamental administrations to powerless groups within South Sudan.

Notwithstanding, different viewpoints suggested that, universal contributors and associations have not been exceptionally powerful and helpful to the citizens of South Sudan. Most worldwide donors and associations did not endeavour to work or channelled their attention on at medium- to long-term reconstruction and development during of 2005 and 2011 and even after independence they were still not able to put the different tribes together.

They additionally neglected to help physical rebuilding in South Sudan, regardless of the tremendous needs for recovery and proper stability. They can be faulted for the vulnerability amid the interval time frame and even after independence, formality from international communities, and procedures for releasing funds especially by IMF and the absence of coordination among global actors. It is important to mention that, as some respondents confirmed, that after independence, the international donors guaranteed to give South Sudan over US$6 billion for reconstruction and development; however, they neglected to perform on their guarantees, contributing just a little part of this sum.

Another explanation behind the inefficient involvement by the universal group was the way that most of the authorities working for global organisations in South Sudan or as consultants to the GOSS before the civil conflict did not have the most essential information about the nation, its history, individuals, issues and basic needs. Most of them touched base in the South from other post-war or in-strife nations, regularly attempting to repeat the work they had done somewhere else while remaining in the nation for just a year or less.

Most universal contributors and associations working in South Sudan have planned and actualised ventures and projects with little or no correspondence with local communities and associations. This regularly prompted ventures that were unsuitable for local conditions. Besides, some respondents contended that since the South Sudanese are proud individuals, toughened through many years of war, communal conflict and massive suffering, they frequently dismissed instant 'arrangements' or ready-made solutions forced or suggested by international communities without prior consultation and agreements, prompting misuse of financial resources, time and endeavours within the country. Inadequate universal help was not just crafted by benefactors and associations from the West. As noted in a previous chapter, the African Union (AU) selected the administration within the Africa continent to lead AU's post-conflict nation-building and advancement endeavours in South Sudan.

Notwithstanding that the AU has constantly been assigning troops and basic security forces to South Sudan who basically marshalled and control mostly Juba the capital city and some remote villages within the country. The AU has done little to help the nation. Behind the reasons put forward by the AU are the absence of financing and capacity within the AU to contribute seriously to post-war recuperation. It remains a mirage to see whether the international group's inclusion and work during the on-going negotiation between the conflicting parties will change now that South Sudan is in civil war.

While the South needs broad help and assistance from the international group in the years to come, the researcher proposes that international performing actors need to change their approach and guarantee certified local proprietorship and support with the goal that South Sudanese authorities, various associations and natives can have a basic influence in the outline, development and execution of all tasks and projects in their country. This is the best way to guarantee that post-conflict reconstruction endeavours decidedly benefit the nation and lead towards long-lasting, long-term peace and stability in South Sudan.

7.2.13 Dependence Syndrome by South Sudanese

South Sudan is experiencing a dependence disorder which developed throughout the times of war. South Sudan lacked mostly basic institutions and basic services such healthcare and education facilities and essential administrations. Although South Sudan has attained independence, the main administration services that most of the residents can get to are the ones now given by worldwide NGOs and emergency relief organisations. Broad post-conflict emergency endeavours and arrangement of essential services by the international group, while important, are just dragging and prolonging the reliance on outside guidance and assistance.

This field research investigation recommends that as opposed to extending this reliance within South Sudan, local authorities and universal benefactors and associations need to think of a system for building neighbourhood capacity, passing on administration obligations to local specialists. This will lead to changing the reliance attitude among South Sudanese populace to the rest of the world through

proper training institutions especially among the security forces. It will create amenities for social welfare and begin to develop systematic reconstruction and development structures that will put them on the road to recovery and it is the duty of the government to design and implement structures that will ensure that the citizens are well protected against violence and injustices.

Notwithstanding the ongoing conflict negotiations among the faction groups by IGAD, the international community, the AU and many multifaceted agencies, this may take quite a while as a number of defenceless groups still completely rely upon universal NGOs and aid assistance for essential administration of basic services since the GOSS and local authorities currently do not have ability to provide these basic services and infrastructural development to the citizens. A critical comment was advanced by all respondents, who believe that in the long term, stability, peace, nation-building, good governance and effective security in South Sudan will depend to a great extent on the administration's capacity to give essential administrative services to the population.

7.2.14 Externally driven PCRD

Most nations recuperating from war/conflict need capacity and subsidies to recoup and reconstruct and stand on their own as a nation. This shows that external performing actors and their contribution and endeavours in post-conflict settings are critical. At same time, different respective and multilateral external performing actors have assets and ability to give help in terms of peacekeeping, philanthropic help,

state-building and physical and economic reconstruction for countries coming out of conflict (Newman, Paris and Richmond 2009:4)

However, various specialised and auxiliary inadequacies have undermined externally driven PCRD over the most recent two decades. The absence of coordination, correspondence and collaboration among external performing actors is one of the real specialised imperfections confronting externally driven activities. Much of the time, every benefactor and association work on and executes their specific designs and plans, frequently copying endeavours and wasting funds given for that purpose. There is an earnest requirement for viable coordination of PCRD endeavours to give most extreme help to post-conflict nations and their population (Tadjbakhsh and Richmond 2011: 221; Chesterman 2003:7)

Furthermore, if external performing actors need to really enable post-war nations to recuperate and build a lasting peace, they must end the act of sending staff that lack fundamental learning and knowledge about nations and are qualified simply because they earlier worked in some other war-torn nation. Ghani and Lockhart (2008:120) mentions that organisations such as the USAID often send consultants to the "third World" countries without consulting the local government which are to receive assistance. Rather, they must enrol, prepare and convey staffs who can comprehend local settings, societies, customs and requirements. Authorities who work for global benefactors and associations should be prepared to remain in post-conflict nations for longer time frames – no less than two years – with a specific end goal to have the

capacity to make a significant commitment to PCRD by developing the capacity and skills of the local people (Wolpe and McDonald 2008:141).

All the above, be that as it may, would not be anything but difficult to accomplish given the complexities, logical inconsistencies and interests of the universal development industry and external actors who work on PCRD. Because of the due dates forced by benefactors and other international performers intrigued by "handy solutions" in complex post-conflict situations, externally determined activities need tolerance to see nations build up their local capacity, assemble agreement among different gatherings and recuperate. PCRD is a moderate and troublesome process, with numerous difficulties en route. Rather than "convenient solutions", there is a need for long-term support and help – of no less than 10 years for reconstruction, development, peacebuilding and nation-building keeping in mind the end goal to realise significant change and avert future episodes of fighting. During this time, the essential aim of external actors should be to build local capacity and exchange obligations to local authorities as quickly as time permits.

Although the significance of local proprietorship and continuous consultation with local actors is featured, much of this has been only fruitless talk. Keen on 'quick fix solutions', external agencies frequently overlook the principle of local ownership possession and impose their thoughts, visions and 'quick fix solutions' on local actors (Bredal 2009:19-20). Hence, these imposed solutions are not helping war-torn nations and these practices are undermining the way toward lasting post-conflict recuperation and development for nations coming out of conflict (Nathan 2007:7)

It is important to mention that it is very ineffective to force ideologies onto nations; therefore, what external actors can do is to create significant and long-lasting financial and political changes to ensure that those countries are able to achieve the aim of lasting peace and stability and support economic recovery for the nation. Externally driven actors can energize, encourage and bolster these procedures; however, it is the obligation of local performers to put this to work and flourish in post-conflict nations. Eventually, post-conflict projects, strategies and policies that are designed and executed without contribution from local communities would not be properly managed and sustained over the long term as they will be met with discontent from the local population (Nathan 2007: 7)

As far as basic deficiencies are concerned about externally driven PCRD, the generally acknowledged contention among universal contributors, establishments, associations and specialists that work on PCRD is that exclusive external actors originating from intense Western nations have the ability to help war-torn nations recoup and become stable and prosperous. For instance in Bosnia, external actors have attempted to recreate the social-political culture and relations according to their ready-made blueprints (Hancok 2009:19).

Notwithstanding this achievement, the record of externally determined PCRD in the repercussions of the Cold War proposes that externals are not superior to local people with regards to building peace and recreating conflict-desolated states and economies. A positive example of this from within the African continent is Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Liberia, after the genocide where massive numbers of the

population were massacred were able to slowly infuse the local population in building one of the finest countries in the world now. To this end therefore using Rwanda as an example suggests that eternally determined PCRD endeavours have not prompted 'positive peace' and lasting political, social, financial and security upgrades and viable improvement in post-conflict nations.

Advancing this perspective on external actors, one reason for this has been the way that key needs of external actors and universal contributors have not been expansive based on advancement, vocation upgrades, welfare and conveyance of fundamental administrations or provision of basic services in post-conflict nations. However, they set regulation of violent conflicts with a goal to advance and defend national security, geopolitical or potentially financial interests of effective nations. Emergency assistance and relief are given to post-conflict nations with imposed conditions, intending to impact strategies and changes in the beneficiary nations, and propel interests of givers as global relations depend on authenticity, and this would not change soon.

However, if external organisations really want to help war-torn nations recuperate and rebuild, their fundamental objective should be the foundation of lasting peace and stability and work enhancements for the tormented population. The progression of geopolitical, socio-economic, security and different interests of the givers should be optional needs of international organisations in conflict-torn nations.

International performers can keep on using their diplomatic, political, and military and money-related influence on enforcing arrangements and changes in powerless post-war nations. This, notwithstanding, would not prompt recuperation, viable administration and stability but rather worsen the situation as in the case of South Sudan. External impositions undermine local organisations, possession, institutions, responsibility and accountability and create reliance on foreign organs for development. It also damages local political relations and creates conditions for external agencies and relief agencies to extort the underprivileged nation because of conflict. Besides, meddling, and sometimes illiberal and undemocratic strategies utilised by external performers to probably build vote-based (democratic system) and strengthen stability in some post-conflict nations can just prompt tyranny and instability when external agencies complete their missions and leave the affected country.

Mirroring economic reconstruction and development, local citizens should have the capacity to choose what sort of economic reconstruction framework they need to set up in their nations. Besides this, local communities and specialists need to partake in arranging, planning and execution of economic recreation and development projects and approaches as opposed to having to only take after the directions of donors' prescriptions. Rather than coordinated obstruction into domestic issues of post-conflict nations and imposition of 'one measure fits all' improvement hypotheses and methodologies Elhawary, Foresti and Pantuliano 2010:18). External actors need to encourage and bolster economic recreation and advancement that are informed by

prioritised local needs, they must give an all-inclusive and comprehensive opening and engage all gatherings and people in post-conflict societies. To this end the most ideal approach might be to impact change and enable nations to recoup after war/conflict (Chandler 2011:87; Woodward 2011:88).

Moreover, instead of forcing external financial and political philosophies, visions and ideas in such cases like South Sudan, Somalia, international organisations should attempt and make these appealing to local performers and communities. There is a more prominent step of progress if there is honest local acceptance rather than economic models, institutional frameworks and establishments from foreign impositions and inconveniences. The objective of external organisations and multinational corporations should be to set up peace and effective institutions that are established in local values and standards and should above all be economically sustainable in the long term.

Since the end of Cold war, from Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia, East Timor, to Iraq, Afghanistan to South Sudan, external driven state-building efforts has been disappointing (Paris and Sick 2007:1, Waton 2009:717). It is imperative to mention that, the failure of external characters to assemble 'positive peace' has been because of the inadequacies at both the technical (that is in the designing, development and implementation) and basic structural levels through policies, procedure and processes. Regardless of whether specialized weaknesses are attended to and upgrades are made in arranging and usage of externally determined tasks, the urgent change needs to happen at the basic structural level. Rather than

proceeding with the same externally imposed and driven methodologies and practices and just enhancing the implementation and giving more universal specialists funds, there is a need for basic structural change, presumptions and power relations in post-conflict tasks. It is important to allow local voices and ideas to contribute meaningful to post-conflict recovery and development in their own societies as complete mobilisation of locally driven support participation is probably going to prompt policy change and bring lasting solution to PCRD.

7.2.15 Prospect of internally driven PCRD

It is critical not to romanticise everything local, given the way that in numerous post-conflict settings, political elites are not keen on livelihood changes, extensive development and great administrative governance (Linde, Mac Ginty and Richmond 2009:594). Notwithstanding this allegation, it is not also right to expect that if external characters do not mediate to "spare" nations desolated by conflict and design and drive post-conflict recuperation tasks, these nations will never find balance and reconstruct, build peace, and develop. The instance of Rwanda shows that when given a possibility, local community-driven initiatives can prompt peace, stability, nation-building, foundation functioning of working institutions and solidification of a multiparty vote-based system (Menocal 2009:4), the instance of South Sudan additionally demonstrates that local activities can prompt security upgrades and reconciliation among previous enemies.

Regarding the shortcomings of internally driven PCRD, the instance of Rwanda demonstrates that internally driven PCRD happens when external characters are not

inspired by mediating and getting engaged with nation's post-conflict recuperation. Lacking global monetary and specialised help, such nations confront various troubles, most outstandingly absence of subsidising and capacity with respect to expansive based and far reaching reconstruction and development. Furthermore, while local customary structures can have a beneficial outcome in the repercussions of violent conflict and contribute to compromise, peace-constructing and nation-building, the problem in numerous war-torn nations and communities is that traditional structures are regularly powerless and undermined by wartime elites.

It is necessary to mention that, while international help and emergency assistance are frequently vital for post-conflict recuperation, long-term reconstruction and development and stability rely upon local ability to govern, outline and execute activities and projects (Egnell 2010:475; Harris and Foresti 2011:20). Lasting stability, security, peace, destitution abolition, advancement of institutions in post-conflict nations necessitate extensive local capabilities' initiative to cut across levels of the legislative management and general institutions of conveyance for fundamental administrations, tactical execution, and financial improvement.

It can be accomplished through broad and long-term local competence building, education for instrumental training of management authorities and youth within the nations that are recovering from the conflict rather than coercing and imposing their own dreams and 'arrangement solutions'; to this external organisational characters need support and facilitate local capacity building to ensure that what they wish to achieve in the long run becomes a reality (Richmond 2009a:73).

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7.2.16 Democratisation and PCRD Nation-building

A working state should have the capacity to represent its domain, keep up and maintain law and order, have political authenticity and authority, raise tariffs, duties, embargoes, prevent dumping of products within the country and raise revenues, give fundamental administration of basic services and be accountable to the citizens. While the underpinning establishment of working state organisations can be upheld by the worldwide group, the nation-building process should be privately and locally determined and claimed for it to work (Samuels 2005:733-7340. Feasible states and institutions can only rise or emerge over a long period of time that involves local control over power, troublesome bargains and establishment of structures and instruments established in the language and understanding of the local values and standards. Similarly, nation building is a procedure of development of a typical national character and solidarity among individuals who live in the same nation. This can be accomplished through the endeavours of local individuals and political elites.

Regarding post-conflict democratisation, good governance and democratisation are vital for lasting peace and stability; they require a long-term time allotment, local acceptance and complete local responsibility and ownership for democratisation process. International organisations and donors need to see the advantages of this framework and find a way to adjust it to local conditions if necessary and drive the procedure with the goal to enable sustainability. Democratisation frameworks and institutions should be 'home-developed' and reflect local conventions, social relations and history. Objectively, household political procedures and collaborations are key to

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long-term financial and socio-political change. Important to note also is that democratisation in the aftermath of conflict should not be hurried as extreme political rivalry over power can additionally worsen divisions and enmities in war-torn nations. Rather than 'quick fix solutions', democratisation should be the ultimate objective of PCRD tasks, presented after the establishment of sound security, stable political condition, working administrations and organisations, job creation and monetary reconstruction and during the transitional period, nations can be run or governed through local control of power sharing (Sorbo 2004:16; Richmond 2009:580).

7.2.17 Viability of liberal Peace Principles

The prevailing world view of liberal logic, global actors accentuate the essential liberal standards of law-based government, regard for human rights, flexibility of articulation and uniformity are liberal peace standards suitable for post-conflict settings. A solid contention can be made that vote-based system (democracy) is the most suitable type of government for the foundation and shielding of peace and stability and prevention of future vicious conflict (Richmond 2011: 43). Nonetheless, as noted, for majority rule government to work, it must be built by local performing communities and nationals of post-conflict nations, not forced by outsiders. Furthermore, rather than imitating Western administration models, democratic and government models should be changed in accordance with local conditions, traditions, conventions and requirements if necessary (Richmond 2009:578).

The second section of the liberal peace structure – neo-liberal economics – is not the best answer for post-conflict nations. For decades, neo-liberalism has been the

predominant world view in the development discourse and was regularly forced on "Third World" nations by Western forces and IFIs. Rather than annihilation of poverty, livelihood changes, financial advancement and development, neo-liberal policies has declined effectively creating troublesome financial conditions in the developing world and prompted an increment in poverty, disparity and underdevelopment. Besides, marginalisation of the state in the financial world and open market circles and advancement of small government has in most cases restricted the capacity of developing nations' governments and institutions to address financial issues and added to decrease of their legitimacy.

After the conclusion of the Cold War, post-conflict nations which experienced externally determined PCRD have confronted the same previously mentioned formative difficulties. As a component of the externally determined liberal peace system, economic reconstruction and development endeavours by the global group have been founded on the neo-liberal ideas and prescriptions improvement of free market economies, decrease of the state's part in the economy and social spending cuts. In post-conflict nations encountering externally determined PCRD, residents and political elites have not been permitted to unreservedly choose economic and administration frameworks that were set up and created in the aftermath of war/conflict, rather, the decisions were affected and frequently forced by effective Western nations and IFIs (Linden 2011:67).

In most recent decades, there has been a huge contrast between different universal development actors and ways to deal with development that they advance. For

instance, human and individual-centred development is advanced by associations, for example, the UN and a large number of its agencies, while IFIs and real Western powers essentially advance neoliberal economic and development. Nonetheless, even though various worldwide institutions advance alternative development approaches, the development discourse has been and keeps on being overwhelmed and directed by the IFIs and capable Western nations. They keep on primarily promoting neo-liberalism as the cure for all developmental ills in developing, fragile and post-conflict nations (Moore 2000: 15; Busumtwi-Sam 2002:257).

Moreover, even though the neo-liberal approach has advanced throughout the years and embraced the thought of sustainable development and popular expressions, for example, local capacity building, cooperation and ownership, regardless it does not vary significantly from the Washington Consensus and past neo-liberal methodologies, systems, ideas and standards. Most importantly, neo-liberalism has neglected to address power disparities and basic factors that determine advancement systems and methodologies in the developing world.

Nation-building and peacebuilding after conflict requires broad spending on short- to medium-term social projects to give significant peace profits as business enhancements and fundamental administrations and solidify and support peace and security. In view of the South Sudan contextual analysis and validated by encounters of numerous different nations, it is apparent that the externally determined PCRD and liberal peace system forced on nations recuperating from conflict have consistently neglected to contribute unequivocally to peacebuilding endeavours,

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manage poverty and power disparity, enhance jobs and economic conditions and prompt improvement and development. Much of the time, imbalances, poverty and reliance on external guidance were expanded while welfare and fundamental administration services were lessened. Moreover, while post-conflict settings require solid states ready to provide administrations and welfare and enhance jobs of battling populaces, the neo-liberal economic model has undermined and restricted the state and its powers in post-conflict nations.

Rather than neo-liberal plans, prescriptions and inconveniences, short- to medium-term needs in present conflict nations require livelihood enhancements, arrangement of essential services and welfare and promotion of business openings in the medium-to long run, rather than following outside guidelines and impositions, nations should be permitted to locate their own specific projects to create, based on local capacity potential and necessities.

Local communities should be permitted to decide their own improvement needs and assume a key role in the planning and execution of recreation and development projects and activities. This, in any case, will be hard to accomplish since post-conflict nations like South Sudan fundamentally rely upon outside guidance and emergency assistance and cannot escape external impact in socio-economic and political undertakings within the country.

7.2.18 Mirrors of PCRD supported

Most nations rising out of years of battling, war and annihilation cannot rebuild and develop without outside help and assistance. Hence, rather than externally determined PCRD or local communities working on their own, there is a requirement for more incorporated methodologies and practices. Local characters have more knowledge about issues and needs in their nations and (frequently) think more about the eventual fate of their societies than external people and at the same time, outsiders frequently have capacity and funding to subsidise or assist.

Many people are of the opinion among universal experts and associations that external actors are fundamental to peace, stability and economic reconstruction and development in post-conflict nations, but this is not supported and upheld by proof. Rather than proceeding with the same externally planned and driven methodologies and practices and executing tasks that are significantly more meddling and interventionist than the past ones, there is a need to generally change the structure of post-conflict activities. Local community voices and ideas should be permitted to go to the fore and genuinely add to the rebuilding and reconstruction of their communities (Menocal 2009:4).

Local people need to lead the pack with regards to outlining and driving of PCRD procedures and mediations and choosing what sorts of economic and political frameworks are built in their nations in the aftermath of conflict. Rather than forcing their designed visions, ideas and outlines, outside agencies need to work with local

people and complement their endeavours (Busumtwi-Sam 2004:347; David 2001:13).

This proposition for internally driven and externally supported PCRD is in accordance with various advancement and post-conflict recuperation methodologies and structures examined in research chapters. Like internally driven PCRD, people-focused development is development from beneath or from within where local communities and individuals go about as operators in charge of development and livelihood upgrades. This approach takes after an understanding that diverse individuals and social orders have distinctive recorded and social encounters, settings, vision and needs and might need to develop in unmistakable routes informed by their local knowledge, values and their utmost requirements. People-centred development requires a "more noteworthy local control, responsibility, activity, and independence… the general population are urged to activate and deal with their own neighbourhood assets, with government and other improvement actors in an empowering role" (Korten 1987:145–6).

Also, the internally driven and externally supported PCRD calls for bona fide local investment and empowerment. In the development setting. This alludes to the local commitment, strengthening and empowerment during development endeavours and activities, including giving communities and individuals a basic leadership role and enabling them to start activities, they see suitable for their settings (Doornbos 2003:60).

This proposition is additionally in accordance with the emancipatory model of liberal peace, which stresses local ownership and bottom-up PCRD. The fundamental point of the emancipatory model is arrangement of essential necessities to the populace, advancement of social equity and establishment of an administration framework based on the liberal and democratic standards or a cross-breed framework that blends liberal and democratic principles with local traditional structures. Similarly, the light impression way to deal with PCRD alludes to a minimal contribution in decision and policymaking in post-conflict nations by international agencies and rather permits local activities, initiatives and ownership. Importantly, post-liberal peace aims to offer an alternative to externally composed and driven plans and impositions, combining outer aptitude and funds with local office, ideas and activities in an agreeable and non-hegemonic way (Haynes 2008: 201).

Even though internally driven and externally determined PCRD has hypothetical support in the development and post-nation recovery literature, its implementation and usage will remain a test. The general population community-centred approach, while sound, requested in numerous developing nations and supported by associations, for example, the UN, has attempted to come to notice because of the strength of neo-liberalism. Similarly, while the emancipatory model of liberal peace exists in principle, theory and policy documents of some international organisations and associations, they are yet to be utilised constructively in PCRD operations.

It is essential to remain sensible and recall that neo-liberalism remains the overwhelming issue that shapes development thinking and planning

comprehensively. This implies the both local advancement and internally driven PCRD "will remain restricted by more extensive basic variables" sooner rather than later (Willis 2011:233). Notwithstanding this, scholars, development specialists and professionals need to keep endeavouring to influence development and post-conflict reconstruction methodologies and practices to be more comprehensive, incorporated and locally determined.

An essential inquiry from the researcher is whether it is realistic to expect that bilateral and multilateral universal benefactors will give financing and enable local people to plan and drive post-conflict reconstruction processes given that there are various traditional leadership capacities among nations. It might be hopeful to expect that givers – a large portion of whom provide funding to help to post-conflict nations since they have geopolitical, key strategic, security, monetary and different interests to do this – will give financial related assistance and specialised help to post-conflict nations yet not demand that they drive PCRD processes themselves. Given the way that global relations depend on legitimacy, which drives governments to act not as indicated by the good and legitimate standards but rather by contemplations of power and advancement of national interests, it might be excessively optimistic, without a doubt, to expect outer performers, especially those from the West, to give support to enable local people to plan and drive PCRD operations (Harris and Foresti 2011:20).

Hence, critical worldwide movements have been occurring in the course of the last decade and this may impact post-conflict reconstruction endeavours in numerous

nations in the coming years. It is far-fetched that the Western authority in worldwide organisations can stay as compelling as it has been throughout the decades because of the ascent of nations, for example, China, India and Brazil. China is now one of the primary donors of outside assistance to developing nations and to numerous post-conflict nations. War-torn nations rich in natural assets do not depend exclusively on Western guidance and help when they can get the same from China. Dissimilar to the Western guide, Chinese guidance and help come without political conditions attached as the beneficiaries do not need to comply with the Chinese policy solutions and reforms. This implies that in asset-rich nations, internally driven and externally determined PCRD could become a reality.

7.2.19 Conclusion

External actors can offer advice, support, assistance and incentives to local people but ultimately, those within a society must define their own future. Peace-building and nation-building and recovery after conflict need to be internal matters where local people lead the process and are supported by external actors.

The Chapter also add that international community can play a vital role in facilitating this process and supporting local actors but should needs to refrain from imposing its preferred vision of a peaceful society. The international community should focus more on medium-to-long term recovery and there is a need to shift from externally driven to internally driven and externally supported PCRD, ensuring local ownership and sustainable recovery of peace and development.

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. Introduction

The chapter reflects on cosmopolitan conflict transformation resolutions of the investigation and realign theoretical underpinnings of authors. It advocates the promotion of internally driven PCRD operations, promotion of democracy, delivery of peace dividends and new trusteeship system to enable lasting peace and stability in war-torn nations on the road to recovery using cosmopolitan transformation resolutions to solve the conflict in South Sudan. The chapter offers practical recommendations for improvement in future PCRD processes and operations in South Sudan as a point of reference. The recommendations include national dialogue and reconciliation; prioritisation of security; nation building; community promotion; ending atrocities; acceleration of modernisation through traditional institutions; solidify national unity; social service expansion, followed by a conclusion.

This examination concentrated on post-conflict reconstruction activities and procedures. Taking a glimpse at South Sudan, the investigation explores and surveyed strengths, shortcomings and capability of externally and internally driven PCRD and the ways post-conflict practices and methodologies can be enhanced with a specific goal to bring enduring peace and financial stability in nations rising out of conflict.

Post-conflict recovery and development is a moderately new conjecture, developing in its present shape just after the fallout of the Cold War. In the course of the past two decades, post-conflict reconstruction–including financial reconstruction, improvement, peacebuilding, state-building and security sector reform (SSR) – came to be viewed as key operations for the international group and different global associations, intending to advance political and financial recuperation and improvement in war-torn nations. The expressed point of PCRD procedures and activities is to make security, set up long-term peace, establishment of functional economy institutions and enhance employment and welfare of the populace and prevent relapse into vicious clashes in the future.

Notwithstanding this, since the mid-1990s, externally determined tasks have not prompted enduring peace and security, functioning of working establishments, annihilation of poverty, employment enhancements and economic recreation and development. Very regularly, projects, strategies and 'solutions' were outlined and forced by outside performers either because they had worked somewhere else or on the grounds that they were impacted by geopolitical, economical or potentially security interests of effective nations. Besides, externally determined actors have tended to expect that non-exclusive methodologies considering the liberal peace system can work in all places, while overlooking local communities, settings and knowledge. At the same time, internally driven endeavours were either disregarded or stifled by universal investigators, specialists, and associations dealing with PCRD.

The key guideline driving post-conflict reconstruction and stabilisation endeavours should be to engage subjects and elites in post-war nations to choose their own financial, political and administration frameworks and structures that are proper for their unique circumstance. International organisations can and should offer help and impetus, yet neighbourhood individuals should have the capacity to characterise their own future. Rather than forcing externally planned "arrangements" and strategy prescriptions, global donors and associations need to help dynamic powers in post-conflict nations and restrict help to support changes yet enable local-members to outline and drive PCRD forms.

As far as economic recovery and development are concerned, rather than forcing "one size fits all" financial hypotheses and methodologies created by outsiders, external organisations need to help local communities to build up their own advancement needs and think of locally outlined approaches to reconstruct and build in accordance with the general population approach to development.

8.1.1 Promotion of Democracy in Conflict-Torn Nations

While this study is incredulous of the neo-liberal economic way to deal with post-war reconstruction and development, it does not contend against the fundamental standards of liberalism and vote-based system. It, notwithstanding, contends against the inconvenience of imposition and "one-size" standards and blueprints on post-conflict social orders by universal actors. To work and be economical, post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building should be locally determined and ideas from locals, vision, voices, needs and aspirations should be conveyed to the fore.

Universal agencies can and should bolster these procedures; however, they should not force or potentially drive them.

This conclusion is shared by a few academic writers who point out that the dominant part of commentators of externally determined PCRD and liberal peace do not have an issue with democracy, human rights, opportunity for economic articulation, economic development and flourishing but with the way that outsiders are endeavouring to force these standards, thoughts and beliefs on post-conflict nations (Tadjbakhsh 2011:5; Tadjbakhsh & Richmond 2011:233).

Samuels (2005:733) states that democracy is the most suitable type of administration for the institution of stability and peace after conflict and counteractive action of future vicious clash. A contention regularly used to legitimise government advancement around the globe is the "democratic peace postulation," also called "liberal peace thesis," which stipulates that democracy systems do not conflict with different democracies (von Hippel 2000:96; Mac Ginty 2010:394). As per liberal peace structure, the most ideal approach to end wars and live in peace and flourishing is to have a consistently democratic world. This, advocates of externally determined liberal peace contend, would have a "progressive effect on global politics, making conflict obsolete" (Inayatullah & Blaney 2004:116).

Moreover, on collective worldwide security, as indicated by Alfred Zimmern (cited in Osiander 1998:426), can be set up between democratic states shaping the core of an "expansive and imperative political constellation". Gray feels that "liberal morality

is not an equation to conjunction within administrations that consist of assorted variety lifestyles. Inasmuch as the world contains different administrations, it is a remedy for struggle". Thus, numerous defenders of Western-style radicalism means to end the decent variety in the realm of legislative issues, administration and financial matters, compels all nations to acknowledge the liberal peace structure and Western-style equitable administration keeping in mind the end goal to spare the world from brutal clash, precariousness, neediness and suffering.

The reality of this matter is that since the conclusion of the Cold War, democratic governments did not fight wars against different popular governments. However, this does not imply that equitable states are peaceful promoters of peace and stability (Navari 2008:36-7; Luckham 2011:90). Galtung (1996:50) posits that since 1945, nations that have fought most wars have been Western vote-based systems. Hence, Tadjbakhsh (2011a:24) states that the way democratic systems frequently go to war as command systems is a proof that they are "true inclined to war".

Since the end of the Cold War, democratic advancement has turned into a key instrument utilised by the global group to advance political and economic improvement modelled after the American and Western European communities (Ake 1993:240; Ali & Matthews 2004a:408; Lacher 2007:241).

Various interventions and operations in "fragile or fail state" and post-conflict nations have advanced and still advance "free and fair elections, development of law based political organisations, regard for common freedoms and market-oriented monetary

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reforms – the essential components of Western style liberal market majority rule government" (Moore 2000:15). Taylor (2007:556) contends that liberal peace completely "relies upon outer intervention, hoisting outside performers to an inescapable (if not all-powerful) position". This is obvious from the way that in 14 externally determined PCRD tasks between 1989 and 1999, outside organisations composed national Constitutions, drafted laws, sorted out races, defined financial approaches and even totally assumed control over the organisation of nations (Paris 2004:3-4).

"Free and fair elections in the aftermath of violent clash are viewed as the key show-stopper of the liberal peace structure. Notwithstanding the discussion about colossal changes and advancement of equitable values, human rights and open-market economy, numerous Western givers and associations frequently principally centre around holding multi-party elections while giving less consideration to different parts of liberal peace" (Englebert &Tull 2008:117; Borges & Jose Santos 2009:76). Hence, Chesterman (2001:8) contends that elections in post-conflict settings give "moment satisfaction" for Western governments, policy designers and different advocates of externally determined PCRD. Because of this, Collier (2010:6) writes that numerous strategy producers and policy makers in the West see quick post-conflict elections as a "recuperating healing for post-struggle tensions and abhorrence".

Notwithstanding, holding untimely elections in a profoundly separated nation or communities that only recently experienced horrible civil wars can intensify the circumstance and prompt further divisions and insecurity (Ali & Matthews 2004a:413;

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Zoellick 2008:73). Elections can exacerbate the situation and create divisions when political gatherings conform to and battle along ethnic, religious lines (Abiew & Keating 1999/2000:102; Samuels 2005:732).

A working multiparty democratic system and freedoms and openings that accompany it are superior to tyranny, totalitarianism and autocracy. Matlosa (2006:9) mentioned that democracy is a "principal tool for advancement and stability" and that local community focused improvement requires a democratic setting.

It is imperative to mention that in principle, a democratic framework "gives a straightforward structure to the progression and circulation of political power to the public" and energises tolerant and peaceful open deliberation, diversity tolerance opinions, political rivalry and accountability (Höglund & Söderberg Kovacs 2010:387–8). Also, a working majority-rule government can give balanced governance amongst subjects and government, ensure human and political rights, secure the self-governance of community, property rights and flexibility of the press, all of which can fundamentally encourage economic development and advance stability and peaceful determination of contention (Annan 1998:23; Samuels 2005:733; Calderisi 2006:130; Siegle 2009:53).

All things considered, one of the key lessons of history is that democratic government "cannot be composed easily, especially not by international organisations" (Sørbø 2004:16) or be introduced by coercion (Schmitz 2008:95). Democracy is not easily and simply a basic and direct specialised exercise but a

complicated social and political process (Richmond & Franks 2007:11). As Omaar (2004:92) states, "there are no outlines for vote-based system". To be sustainable, a vote-based system must be characterised and set up by local communities not international organisations.

Mostly, a democracy framework supports exceptional political rivalry over power. In steady and peaceful social orders, this can create issues or prompt savagery. In nations rising out of war, nonetheless, "antagonistic governmental issues by majority rule government" can without much of a stretch fuel unhealed divisions and hostilities, drawing out insecurity, hatred and struggle (Paris 1997:76)

Democratic framework and governance can undoubtedly be controlled and mishandled by solid elites, particularly in delicate post-conflict settings (El-Bushra 2006:229). Besides, when developing nations and fragile nations who are recouping from brutal clash are endeavouring to quicken economic development and growth, democratic system can be a hindrance instead of giving assistance as "democratic administrations think that it is hard to push through monetarily enactment in the midst of opponent groups interests" (Moyo 2010:42). Hence, Hanlon (2006a:82) reminds us that in Europe, democratisation came last, following a century of consolidation and state-building. Today, scholars and policy think tanks assume that state-building and democratisation are required to occur at the same time and can be done in a couple of years.

Notwithstanding these reasons, the record of democratic government in the 'Third World' and post-conflict nations has not been especially great in the last two decades. Hence, Cilliers (2008:95) noticed that, "however appealing democracy is, political progression does not guarantee financial recovery or accepted social welfare". She takes note that African democratic systems are not playing out any better monetarily compared with non-democracy. What's more, in many nations around the globe that have embraced an equitable governance of administration since the mid-1990s, political and different types of viciousness and abuse have proceeded with (Luckham 2011:97). Collier (2010:8) states that the explanation behind this is that the West has predominantly advanced the "exterior instead of the basic foundation" of majority rule government. He focuses that majority rules system should not be just about elections, but rather about governments serving their residents. Luckham (2011:92) includes that a working democratic government should likewise enable residents to impact choices and policies. Shockingly, since the end of the Cold War, many "Third World" and post-conflict nations have seen the spread of externally determined elections rather than the spread of democratisation (Collier 2010:15). Therefore, authors like Salih (2009:137; Vorrath (2010:1) assert that even though democratisation has been a key part of contemporary externally determined PCRD endeavours, external actor's still cannot seem to make steady and viable democratic systems in societies and local communities emerging out of war.

The mentioned negative record of democracy in the developing nations makes critical issues for external actors who chip away at popular government advancement. Hence, individuals in numerous nations do not see Western-style democratic government as their key system (Misra 2002:16). Richmond (2009:580) correspondingly takes note that Western-style liberal thoughts and standards are frequently forced on societies rising out of fierce clashes regardless of the way that the larger part of individuals and groups want to experience their lives in freedom and flourishing, "most do not want Western-created types of liberalism". Mac Ginty and Williams (2009:163) contend that in numerous nations assaulted by years of battling, instability and poverty are key issues confronting the populace are not the absence of democratic system but rather "monetary and social hardship and imbalance".

Furthermore, forcing a Western-style democratic system and liberal peace structure in numerous African nations regularly prompts a "conflict of societies". One of the key aspects of conservative liberal peace is the "person as the essential unit of society", which might be in opposition to the shared and customary lifestyles in numerous non-Western societies (Mac Ginty &Williams 2009:50). As Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011:223) clarify, "cosmopolitan insistence on the supremacy of the individual" is not generally as local interest, indigenous values and qualities, neighbourhood legislative issues and informal institutions. Instead of guaranteed stability and prosperity, this conflict of societies, traditions, values and perspectives

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can make issues between local elites intending to build up a Western-style society and most of the populace aiming to protect their customary lifestyle.

8.1.2 Delivery of Peace Dividends and Liberalisation

Many poor and conflict-stricken nations rely upon international guidance and help and cannot escape external interference in local undertakings. Since the end of the Cold War, help and support from Western nations and IFIs have been connected to changes in view of neo-liberal economic model (Kaldor 2007:182; Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2009:207). The beneficiary nations as a rule do not have a decision but to acknowledge conditions with a specific goal to get financing. This prompts a circumstance where contributors and IFIs can "conclusively impact the state and monetary system being built" after conflict (Barbara 2008:309–10). Krasner & Pascual (2005:153) state that externally determined reconstruction and advancement in the aftermath of brutal clash involve "affecting decisions" that post-conflict nations make about their institutional and administration setup and economy. Natives and political elites in these nations are scarcely at any point not permitted to pick financial and administration frameworks that are set up and developed. The choices, as Krasner & Pascual note, are influenced or frequently forced by Western nations and IFIs. Local people are expected to welcome, endure or inactively acknowledge radical trials with their economic condition (Pugh 2009:83). Concentrating on African post-war nations, Salih (2009:155) clarifies how they must choose the option to acknowledge external interference into internal issues and policy making:

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African post-conflict states cannot resist the economic conditionality of global financial institutions… with their weak competitive advantage in the global market, they can hardly own the political agenda, let alone control the economic and public policies essential for consolidating peace

The neo-liberal monetary approach and impositions externally determined post-conflict financial rebuilding and development endeavours expect to grow "free market economies by disposing of hindrances to the free movement of capital and products within and across a nation's periphery… and fortify the development of private ventures while lessening the state's role in the economy" (Paris 2004:19). Projects outlined and advanced by benefactors and IFIs incorporate large scale monetary stability, trade liberalisation, monetary imperative, deficit reduction, reduction in government expenditure, consolation of export drive development and privatisation of state-owned institutions (Newman 2009:41; Pugh 2011:149–50).

Notwithstanding this, as the neo-liberal remedies and impositions failed to completely eliminate poverty and convey development and flourishing to the developing nations, the "prevailing political economy of the liberal peace has neglected to address major formative issues, for example, neediness, exclusion, social equity deficiency" and access to essential administrations (Salih 2009:134) in post-conflict nations. Rather, the neo-liberal economic approach – the key section of liberal peace system – has "exacerbated financial marginalisation among poor people, expanded destitution and incited grievance and social unfairness" (Ibid:137). Barbara (2008:310) contends that by forcing neo-liberal financial matters on war-torn

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nations and "by subjecting rashly modified states to the changes of the market", the liberal peace structure and neo-liberal economic approach are not making feasible states, ready to contend economically in the globalised world. Much of the time, consequences of neo-liberal impositions and changes in the outcome of conflict are "social separation and expanded imbalance in ways that suggest the (re)creation of social discontinuity as opposed to cohesion" (Pugh 2009:82). Further, the emphasis on snappy privatisation of state-owned enterprises frequently creates circumstances where wartime elites assume control over the state structures and beneficial businesses (Salih 2009:135) whilst the rest of the citizens let to suffer and stagnate.

Tadjbakhsh (2011a:31), mentions that the economic aspect of the liberal peace structure does not permit locals and elites in present conflict nations to "choose their financial needs… and shield neighbourhood financial exercises from the negative impacts of globalisation". Instead, they are compelled to take after external prescriptions even though there is no sureness or confirmation that neo-liberal policies and projects would create financial growth and development in post-conflict nations, just a perspective that there is a "probability of economic change over the long term" (Paris 2004:200).

After end of civil conflicts, desires of individuals living in conflict-torn societies are high. Individuals envision significant benefits, for example, peace, security and soundness and in addition access to essential necessities, for example, food, water, protection, business, training and medicinal services. These advantages are called

"peace profits" and should be exhibited and give "advantages of peace over conflict" (Rolandsen 2006:1).

Many authors about PCRD argue that outer policy prescriptions that accompany the liberal peace system are not the best choices for war-torn nations looking for immediate peace profits. They contend that peace which comes about because of externally determined endeavours has a "low quality", set apart by the absence of peace profits and welfare, proceeding with uncertainty, political flimsiness and moderate financial recovery (Mac Ginty & Richmond 2007:496; Pugh 2011:158).

Notwithstanding this, Sørbø (2004:6) posits that full-scale economic measures forced by Western benefactors and universal financial institutions as an aspect of the liberal peace structure frequently conflict with "political rationale of peacebuilding", which expects to fund short- to medium-term social projects aimed at maintaining peace. Pugh (2011:150) perceives that large-scale monetary stability and lessening deficit of the developing nations are not the best short- to medium-term policy alternatives for conveyance of peace profits, for example, poverty alleviation, community improvement and work opportunities. He stated that there is no doubt that macroeconomic stability is critical to avert hyperinflation and help with debt adjusting, and currency stability as in the case of South Sudan. Notwithstanding, in post-conflict nations, the fundamental needs should be employment enhancements, rebuilding and social prosperity and not only about monetarism (Pugh 2011:158).

Stiglitz (2002:77) feels that financial recuperation and development after war are vital; however, they should not be done in a way that can undermine social soundness, stability and peace. Authors like (Murithi 2006:19–20; Schellhaas & Seegers 2009:5) contend that financial models, strategies and changes advanced and forced by the IFIs can destabilise and contrarily influence post-conflict recuperation, peacebuilding and provision of peace profits. Salih (2009:153) contends that the "fixation of liberal peace advocates with economic freedom as privatisation and encouraging the standards and practices of the free market is a main consideration in consigning squeezing social issues to lack of clarity". Various authors point out that the neo-liberal economic model does not accommodate standardised savings or support the populace living beneath the destitution line; rather, it demands significant social spending cuts which significantly influence poor people and further raises poverty and disparity (Chang & Grabel 2004:18; Richmond & Franks 2007:19; Tadjbakhsh 2011a:27). For instance, the IMF's emphasis on slicing spending deficiencies through open spending cuts frequently "conflicts with the point of building peace" and conveying quick and obvious peace profits in post-conflict countries (Boyce 2008:6).

Hence, Barbara (2008:311) posits that neo-liberalism is an "untimely and not well considered reaction to prompt and corrective" peacebuilding and formative needs and difficulties confronting war-torn nations. "In their endeavours to drastically change significant parts of the state, society and economy" in a brief time frame, externally determined post-conflict reconstruction activities are "subjecting delicate

social orders to colossal pressure's (Barnett & Zurcher 2009:23). Expounding on fundamental exchange offs in the result of war, Collier et al. (2003:166) compose that advancement and upkeep of peace and stability should get the most noteworthy thumbs-up, notwithstanding when this includes sidelining monetary development and large-scale financial stability.

Then again, Boyce (2011: 118) reminds one that there is a need to adjust peace-building endeavours and large-scale macroeconomic stability as post-conflict nations cannot simply continue asking for financial help or printing cash, in this manner risking abnormal amounts of debts and hyperinflation. Notwithstanding when post-conflict nations intently take after neo-liberal directions and outlines and see no advantages, Western contributors and IFIs barely ever acknowledge any obligation regarding financial disappointments and unsteadiness. Or maybe, they accuse post-conflict nations and their legislatures, their absence of capacity, defilement (corruptions) or the powerlessness to contend in the "free market" environment. As Barbara (2008:317) brings up, neo-radicalism is a helpful apparatus utilised by the worldwide group to "deny obligation regarding monetary advancement, which is advantageously left for the unhampered market to decide".

However, authors like Moore, Paris, Barnett and Zurcher explain that the fundamental issue identified with financial recuperation in post-conflict nations is that numerous outer specialists and professionals who plan and drive PCRD tasks and projects "compare development with neo-radicalism consequently", not permitting local communities any space for elective discourse. Neo-liberalism and capitalism

"empower conflict and rivalry" and may not be the best quick decisions for nations that are endeavouring to move away from strife and build up stability and peace. Therefore demanding "instant" financial and political advancement, external agencies, through their 'one size fits all' outlines, frequently sow "the seeds of contention, urging opponents to wage their battle for supremacy through the markets (Moore 2000:15; Paris 1997:74; Barnett and Zurcher 2009:24).

Given this, a few authors believe that external imposition of administration and economic models and policies might be the principal obstructions to formation of long-term stability, peace, working establishments and economic re-building and development after conflict clashes (Höglund & Söderberg 2010:390). Newman, Paris and Richmond (2009:12) contend that democratic system and market financial matters are "ostensibly ill-disposed" and are not really appropriate for delicate post-conflict communities.

As indicated by Tadjbakhsh (2011a:29), Western benefactors and IFIs demands advancing the "traditionalist and constraining adaptation of neo-liberal economic models" in post-conflict nations and not socialist oriented models utilised by some European nations. She believes that socialist economic models, with their emphasis on social security, universal healthcare and welfare, would be far more beneficial and can help deliver a more substantial peace dividends after war.

8.1.3 A New Trusteeship System

Stiglitz (2002:24) argues that mind set of leaders, which accepts that white Westerners know how to "save" and the backward "Third World", has persevered long after the formal end of colonialism and imperialism. He includes that this attitude has been practised for a considerable length of time through Western-controlled associations, for example, the IMF and World Bank. Willis (2011:20) clarifies that this is what numerous people allude to as neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism – the financial, political and strategic predominance of effective nations and constraint of self-sufficiency of the 'Third World' to decide their own future. The possibility of a formal global trusteeship framework has arisen among Western policy approach and specialists after the end of the Cold War (Duffield 2007:7).

As indicated by Mohamed (2005:811), the old trusteeship framework that existed under the League of Nations was utilised to administer domains and nations "possessed by people groups not yet ready to remain without anyone else's input under the strenuous states of the cutting-edge world". She proposes another UN trusteeship chamber, which should "accept the accountability for overseeing nations recover from conflict and failed states" (Mohamed 2005:812).

Advocates of a trusteeship framework contend that there is a requirement for formal instrument that would legitimise and direct remotely determined tasks since the old UN trusteeship framework "does not make a difference to regions which have moved toward becoming individuals from the UN" (Mohamed 2005:9).

Søbjerg (2007:480) contends that there are no shrouded plans behind the proposed new trusteeship framework, however just a desire to "quicken the development of post-conflict communities" and advance establishment of value and institutions that empower the people of war-torn regions to achieve their most elevated self. Ellis (2005:2) mentions that the universal trusteeship framework should be brought back and used to settle issues in numerous nations around the globe. He contends that the new trusteeship framework would not need to take away full power from states, however it should "involve new upgraded system of universal responsibility". Krasner (2004:89) goes further and contends that there is a requirement for a system that would consider the cancellation of sovereignty of failed states for an inconclusive time frame to enable international agencies to have the capacity to administer, run and "fix" these nations. Forge and Oppenheim (2008:59) surmise that transitional organisations that take away sovereignty of the states and take full control of the administration would be better for nations rising out of fierce clashes than universal activities that offer power and cooperate with local officials. They point out that power-sharing and joint decision-making require accord building, which can mystify the global expert's endeavour to successfully actualise administration and re-building activities. Interestingly, agreement working, rather than being viewed as a positive exercise that can enable post-conflict nations revamp socio-political institutions and relations, is seen by Ford and Oppenheim (Forge & Oppenheim 2008:59) as hazardous and inefficient.

However, some authors contend that achievement of global trusteeships and universal administration of a nation relies upon full acceptance by the local community. Hence, Helman & Ratner (1993:11) feel that states and individuals subject to a trusteeship framework should "turn over power to outside actors and follow their commands".

According to Søbjerg (2007:482), only when residents in a post-conflict nation comprehend and acknowledge that "expert and authority rests with an external organisation will the trusteeship win". However, Søbjerg does not offer one case of a trusteeship framework or worldwide organisation working by and effectively helping individuals in war-torn nations accomplish financial advancement, lasting peace and stability.

Krasner (2004: 107) contends that formalisation of a new trusteeship framework "would smell if not look excessively like colonialism" according to governments and subjects in the "Third World". Bain (2003:75) includes that any new type of trusteeship, "regardless of how edified and well meaning, cannot get away from its supreme past in light of the fact that it has a place with a method of measurement that is magnificent by its temperament". Therefore, Mohamed (2005:839) states that the connections to the pilgrim and imperial past and bad behaviours can be deleted by calling the new trusteeship framework something more suitable and politically right, for example, "international administration'.

8.1.4 Traditional Structures and Local Norms

Mac Ginty (2008:139) contends that most externally determined endeavours to revamp nations after war have been "completely contradictory to indigenous and traditional works, seeing them as unaccountable, conflicting to the 'illuminated' aims of liberal peace". Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011:225) write that as opposed to using neighbourhood culture, custom, information, values, structures and institutions, outer performing actors working in post-conflict conditions regularly observe these as "irregularities" and plan to change them to reflect current, Western-style standards, establishments and structures.

Boege et al. (2008:11) argue that contemporary externally determined PCRD methodologies and endeavours frequently and in most cases totally disregard neighbourhood traditional administration structures, practices, values and societies which have been managing welfare, order and peace-making in the developing nations for a considerable length of time which still assume a vital role in the lives of customary individuals.

Hence, Elges (2005:185) states that there is a need to perceive the significance of customary and local social structures and work with them rather than just forcing new, external structures. Lambourne and Herro (2008:276) contend that outer performing actors working in conflict prone nations tasks need to "abstain from making social cacophony by forcing unseemly components and procedures" that do not identify with local standards, needs and aspirations. Murithi (2008:28) conceives that internally determined procedures can possibly realise a more manageable

peace as they are for the most part "drawn upon neighbourhood social thinking, traditions and values and also customary and grassroots thoughts of equity and group based political discourse". According to Yannis (2003:77), the contribution by the worldwide group should plan to supplement local structures and PCRD endeavours and initiatives. International organisation should create initiates that will assist conflict countries to re-develop and grow their economy.

It is imperative to set up strong political, monetary, and social institutions in an incorporated customary framework of compromise peacebuilding, all participatory mechanism to deal with building state organisations. The current legislative government and partners need to help with the establishment of local based conflict mitigation and relief aid and that should include women's association leaders, youth and the citizens to create capabilities to address struggle without savagery.

Projects should be set up with a reasonable political system that tries to end ethnic clashes and paves access for financial development and fundamentally farming, as it is the primary occupation of most South Sudanese and try to embrace forward-looking approaches for good governance.

8.1.5 Internally driven development recovery

Trejos (2009:130) characterises improvement as a long-term process aimed at building a general public ready to "take care of its own needs and intensely and effectively connect with the rest of the world through exchange, venture, and human connections, exchange of information and provision of administrations". Thomas

(2006:193–4) contends that developing nations and war-torn nations require local advancement, where nations can create as they see fit and do what they believe is ideal for them. Along these lines, nations and community people would have the capacity to develop in a "different, socially and culturally progressive way," rather than tailing 'one size fits all' vision of development advanced by the West and IFIs. He focuses on that this type of development should be founded on standards, for example, strengthening, empowerment, equity, participation and supportability.

Moreover, the focal point of local advancement is on individuals and their prosperity as opposed to fundamentally on development, full scale financial aspects, markets and economic balance (Nayyar & Chang 2005:3). From multiple points of view, this takes after the idea of the peace profits talked about previously, where the essential point of PCRD is to enhance jobs and give fundamental necessities, for example, nourishment, water, protection, business, training and social insurance to the populace keeping in mind the end goal to convey "advantages of peace over war" (Rolandsen 2006:1).

Dowden (2009:164) composes that sustainable socio-financial advancement of any general public – whether a nation recouping from war or a developing nation cannot be driven by pariahs; however, by the nations being referred to and their administrations and subjects. Maathai (2010:134) imagines that to guarantee maintainability of development activities, individuals in a developing nation and nations rising up out of brutal conflict need to decide improvement needs and

assume key roles in plan and execution of rebuilding improvement projects and undertakings.

Thus, Galtung (1996:135) and Calderisi (2006:162) stretch that to be manageable and effective over the long term, economic improvement must be driven from within; international actors should just help this procedure, not force and drive it. Hence, Easterly (2006:318) adds that improvement "originates from independent, exploratory endeavours and the acquiring of thoughts, establishment institutions and innovation" from developing nations when it suits the developing nations to do so. A worthy note to mention is that while above writers expound on economic advancement, their contentions are suitable for post-conflict nations' recovery in the aftermath of fierce clashes.

Regarding economic recovery and advancement, imposition of external visions, ideas and systems by outside performing actors is "probably not going to be effective if they disregard neighbourhood conditions and stifle the procedures of experimentation" that have been the key for fruitful monetary and institutional improvement in numerous developing nations in the past decade (Kozul-Wright & Rayment 2011:189). Barbara (2008:308) believes that global benefactors, associations and specialists engaged with post-conflict recuperation tasks do not know how to 'motivate' economic advancement in nations rising up out of vicious clashes; the lion's share of analyses led by outside characters since the end of the Cold War have deserted monetarily fragile and help-dependent states, unable to work without anyone else and give essential administrations to their citizens. The

explanation behind this, contends Busumtwi-Sam (2004:345), was the imposition of the neo-liberal financial model which is not helpful for peacebuilding and economic recuperation. He proposes an option for developmental approach for recovery and peacebuilding in the aftermath of conflict:

"Development for the purpose of building and sustaining peace differs from mainstream development in that it is designed to institutionalise peace as a condition or outcome by facilitating the emergence of more stable, non-violent and responsive forms of political, economic and social relations".

Therefore, Barbara (2008:311) highlights on Busumtwi-Sam's contention and mentions that post-conflict nations require "an alternative developmental concession of a state that is equipped for advancing financial development as a reason for state consolidation". This would incorporate monetary and developmental approaches and policies aimed at consolidating the economy, job upgrades, work creation and livelihood improvements while building local capability to contend in the globalised world (Barbara 2008:313).

8.1.6 Free-Will Political and Economic Systems

James Busumtwi-Sam (2004:344) states that, for peace-building, state-building and monetary recuperation to be altogether fruitful, nations recouping from conflict should be helped by the worldwide associations without accepting any ideological or political feelings and frameworks: Peacebuilding is not, or should not be, tied in with

embellishment nations in a specific image (i.e. Western market majority rule governments) in view of ideological feelings.

Global help for peacebuilding is and should be about helping neighbourhood communities set up conditions that will empower them to settle on choices that are moderately free of vast scale savagery, dread, hardship and predation. Schwarz (2005:433) believes that the key issue with externally determined PCRD is the ideological push to manufacture "liberal, improved states and not stable, compelling and welfare states". Schaller (2009:19) adds that locals and elites in post-conflict conditions must be allowed to pick political and financial frameworks that best suit their nations, traditions, customs and cultures. Socio-economic approaches and policies should be received with the nation's traditional, economic, provincial and geopolitical interests as a top priority instead of those of Western forces and IFIs. This is in accordance with the general population focused way to deal with development, which calls for local control of developmental decisions and improvement of home-developed activities that aim to enhance occupations and individuals' welfare (Korten 1987:145–6; Thomas 2006:193).

Hence, if the above is to materialise, it might be important to first rebuild and change effective universal associations working in developing and post-conflict nations. Ghani and Lockhart (2008:111) posit that the worldwide advancement and help framework and institutions that run it should be in a general sense transformed with a specific end goal to give significant help to the developing world and nations rising

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up out of savage conflict, enabling local people to drive these procedures rather than just forcing impositions and 'solutions'.

Easterly (2006:105) contends that a feasible democracy "relies upon the moderate and bottom-up development of principles of reasonable fair play". Democracy is not a 'transplant' that can be forced by 'untouchable Westerners' but It can just 'develop' out of the general public after some time (Korhonen 2001:525). Sørensen (2007:371) composes that fundamentally, "democratization is a vocation for insiders. They should make the proper conditions for majority rule government in their own particular nations, since they are the general population and vote-based system implies run by the general population" (unique accentuation). Ake (1993:241) includes that if the majority rules system in Africa and whatever is left of the developing world is to be "applicable and feasible," it cannot just take after the Western liberal popular government model but needs to change in accordance with neighbourhood conditions, traditions, customs and necessities.

For majority rules systems to work in any nation, and particularly in nations recouping from brutal conflict, considerably more is required than pluralism, multiparty elections and political rivalry. Working and supportable majority rules system needs a typical national vision and clear and regarded tenets of political conduct. Furthermore, a vote-based system requires collaboration among government officials and policymakers, not just rivalry over power, workplaces and assets basic leadership (Luckham 2011:94). As such for democracy to rise after war, external actors can give help and support but it is up to the local community to build

up the "principles of reasonable fair play" and guarantee that all gatherings regard these guidelines in the long run (Easterly 2006:105).

Therefore, it is vital to remember that globalisation, geopolitics, wealthy nations and worldwide associations have a critical impact on social, political and economic life in each nation in the developing world (Putzel 2001:4). Additionally, reliance on external guidance and help is inescapable for some current conflict nations due to devastation and absence of funds and capacity with respect to reconstruction and development (Kang & Meernik 2005:98). This, in any case, should not give externally determined actors the privilege to force their frameworks, practices and philosophies without consulting local communities and political elites, keeping in mind their aspirations and desires and enabling them to choose in what sort of a nation they need to live in (Wolpe & McDonald 2008:139). Nathan (2007:7–8) mentions that the fundamental hypothesis is not that neighbourhood communities will essentially develop great policy approaches, rather, the notion is that a procedure-oriented approach that regards and engages local communities will probably yield great outcomes in the long run rather than an approach that undermines local communities' leaders.

8.1.7 Post-Liberal Peace

Richmond (2011:43) contends that as opposed to compelling an externally determined liberal peace structure on nations recuperating from conflict, there is a requirement for choices that can work and leave positive outcomes and stability. He proposes a "post-liberal peace" to deal with PCRD and juxtaposes it as an approach

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that would permit "pluralism of peace to be exercised as a method for rebuilding communities and reconstructing states". He takes note that this approach should not romanticise everything local and reject everything foreign except guarantee that outer performing actors really engage local individuals and elites "in a non-hegemonic way" (Richmond 2011:47) and in addition completely comprehend local settings, customs, traditions and needs in war-torn nations.

Richmond (2009:578) contends that outer performing actors can assume an essential role as far as "support and direction on specialized role of administration and institution building" however should not do it in an obtrusive and meddling way, regarding local people as negligible subjects and making conditions on outside help. Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011:234–5) surmise that post-liberal peace should look to put external performing actors "in a situation to help, assist and aid but not recreate the ideological hegemony of a specific type of liberalism". They further add that the reason for post-liberal peace should not be to plan and create blueprints, uniform systems and well-ordered blueprints for post-conflict recovery but do what is best for every nation.

Liden (2011:69) argues that the ideas for post-liberal peace approach can be derived from post-colonial hypothesis. As indicated by him, post-colonialism is a "critique of neo-colonial highlights of worldwide politics where outside performing actors disregard universal standards and traditions for the sake of peace and development".

Therefore, rather than promoting the separation of outside actors the same way that a number of post-colonial scholars would do, present liberal peace needs to be built around "non-hegemonic engagement" and outer help for local initiatives in post-conflict nations. Richmond (2011:45) notes that post-liberal peace needs to lead to a "liberal-local hybrid form of peace" and post-war recovery. This means that the current externally designed and driven approaches and practices would need to be modified in order to bring to the fore local voices, needs, demands, ideas and visions. Outside actors would need to work with local people as opposed to regarding them as simple subjects.

Tadjbakhsh and Richmond (2011:234-5) explain that post-liberal peace would enable peace to "rise up out of the ordinary setting" rather than institutional outlines for neo-liberal economic advancement and state-building. They state that local individuals should be viewed as "specialists" who are equipped for adding to post-conflict recuperation and formation of stability (Ibid:237). Richmond (2011:45) stresses that both local and global performing actors are vital for the accomplishment of post-liberal peace – local people since they know the unique circumstances and needs and should be the ones to choose in what sort of society they need to live in; and worldwide actors since they have abilities, capacity and subsidies to help nations desolated by conflict. Liden (2011:67) contends that instead of modifying local standards and norms to Western principles, peacebuilding in conflict-prone nations should be an "exercise in careful control between outer regulating mediation and local office established in the standards and ideas of the agents themselves".

Richmond (2011:51) argues that the idea regarding post-liberal peace is not expecting to undermine fundamental standards of liberalism and democracy system. Rather, it is a critique of the conservative liberal peace system that has been forced on numerous post-conflict nations since the end of the Cold War. He imagines that liberal and democratic methodologies should not be discarded, but rather endeavours should be made to enhance the liberal peace system to draw in local characters in a non-paternalistic manner.

It is important to mention that while the idea of post-liberal peace is still at the beginning stages of improvement, it is consistent with the ideas of internally driven and externally determined PCRD which is investigated and explored in this study. This idea tries to discover a path where, rather than forcing instant solutions and outlines, externally performing actors would work with local people on post-conflict reconstruction in a collective and useful way, with an objective of deep rooting peace and established institutions in local communities, standards and norms even after the eternal actors leave those nations ravaged by conflict.

8.1.8. National dialogue, transitional justice and reconciliation

Transitional justice and reconciliation systems can help peacebuilding and repair of broken connections among previous foes. This can be as remedial justice, (for example, truth and reconciliation commissions) or retributive justice (indictment in local courts or international courts) or a mixture of both. In the focal point of this study, transitional justice components are currently centred exclusively on retributive

justice without focusing how reconciliation and peace building are overlooked. This is probably going to contrarily influence long-term reconciliation and peacebuilding prospects in South Sudan; circumstances are to some degree distinctive in South Sudan, as the split from within the government and inward peacebuilding and reconciliation enabled individuals to proceed onward without transitional justice. Above all, transitional justice systems should be arranged and organised to amplify the possibilities of reconciliation and peace as opposed to contributing further to relapse and divisions.

Once a political resolution is achieved, the government should set out on a national discourse and reconciliation process. The procedures should open conversation among the communities and should include mapping out of a considerable number of items, building up a system of caring to the concerns distinguished from the conflict. The parliament of South Sudan should back the procedure of opening up for national dialogue to enable people to freely express themselves about the issues creating tension within the nation. They must allow traditional chiefs and local leaders to set up community dialogue that allows all tribes to discuss ways forward, ask for forgiveness, solidarity and national unity.

8.1.9 Prioritisation of Security

While security after war is one of the primary goal to avert future episodes of fighting and savagery and set up the ground for rebuilding, advancement, peacebuilding and state-building, shining an unbalanced spotlight on security while different parts of PCRD are sidelined would not create lasting peace and stability. Eventually, peace

profits as livelihood changes, fundamental administrations and job openings are of central significance for creating a course for recuperation and security in the aftermath of conflict. In the short run, peace and stability can be ensured by peacekeepers or through broad spending on security powers; however, for a long-term arrangement, better ways of life, conveyance of essential administrations and occupational creation are the key. Good governance, basic amenities and job creation will reduce insurgents of security breach in the country.

8.1.10 Nation-building

An arrangement for nation-building should incorporate societal change programmes. This procedure must look to change the nationals through proper structured education systems, creating vocational skills avenues for the youth to get empowered, and arrangement of technical opportunities for residents to understand their potential and feel the need to work for self-fulfilment and empowerment.

8.1.11 Community Promotion

Formation of a solid and free society is imperative in the repercussions of conflict. Local society can add to peacebuilding, compromise, advancement of human rights, good governance and poverty mitigation. However, rather than being voices of the populace and real campaigners for better life for all, community NGO and associations should frequently settle fundamentally problems of lack of facilities and execute benefactor motivation. In most cases, local community associations need to execute what the community need, not what they believe is required to enable the communities to develop.

8.1.12 Solidify National Unity

South Sudan should bring together ethnic leaders to assemble their supporters to work together in managed and sustained inter-ethnic collaboration. South Sudan's ethnic diversity is an asset that should be promoted to enable the nation to vanquish its present difficulties. The profits of free South Sudan should stream down to the whole population; this will, therefore, develop trust and a sense of belonging in the emerging state's national character and propagate coordinated effort among the people.

The feeling of belonging should be created within the country to ensure that citizens will not be constrained to ethnic leaders but saturate the whole society. It would create a feeling of commitment and responsibility for the government to coordinate and corporate with the traditional leaders, and a self-perpetuating cycle of confidence and trust will fortify the country. With the extended regulation of this approach in principle and practice (which is hoped to be the situation for a prosperous South Sudan), a strong feeling of connection to the nation that rises above ethnic divisions and loyalties will win in South Sudan.

8.1.13 Social services expansion

Improving fundamental social administration is one of the successful ways for the current administrative government to encourage a more grounded feeling of national identity. Existing social services should be dispersed to extended remote groups. Development that reaches out to the outskirts, as opposed to focusing on Juba, the capital city, could demonstrate a reviving point for national solidarity.

8.1.14 Peaceful and designed resolution with Sudan

The conflict disagreement with Sudan over the extraordinary issues in the CPA agreement are vital because South Sudan's oil income was lost when oil production was stopped. It is imperative to continue generation to manage the juvenile economy. The problem is that South Sudan has no control at all of how quick or moderate the resolution of the dispute will be, and hence, the nation should not depend on the brisk return of the South Sudan–Sudan relationship to normalcy.

Notwithstanding this, settling the dispute with Sudan is a legitimate concern for South Sudan and the Sudan. In that capacity South Sudan should miss no chance to peacefully settle the remarkable dispute based on the structural framework of the two nations, with the dynamic help and intervention of AU/IGAD. As the dispute and insurgency within the SPLM/A are delayed, the future uncertainty would inconvenient both the Sudan and South Sudan, and the latter should apply endeavours to end the dispute at the earliest opportunity with the goal that the nation can refocus its strategies on peacebuilding and reconstruction of the nation and provide basic needs for its citizens.

8.1.15 Ending atrocities

Even though negotiations to end rough clashes are not the focal point of this investigation, they are pivotal for the achievement of PCRD. Transactions should be about local parties coming to an understanding, with or without international mediators to deal with their disputes and set up a future for the nation. Local groups have a great deal in contention and they should be the ones to choose their future.

External agencies can help in this procedure through intercession and even political threats of authorisations, yet they should not force arrangements or draft agreements and force them on local communities. The channel through which local parties will execute an understanding is whether they draft and compose it and own it. This will create a sense of belonging that can bring lasting peace.

8.1.16 Contribution of AU to PCRD

As noted in the writing review, while the AU has sound policy reports for post-conflict reconstruction on the landmass. For example, NEPAD's "African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework", the AU and NEPAD lack assets ability to actualise the framework and enable African nations to recoup after conflict. Hence, if the AU needs to stay valid and offer solid help to African nations, it would need to move from rhetoric and composing of policy frameworks and start to execute them practically. Also, African nations need to begin contributing funds to the AU so that the continent's body does not remain completely reliant on Western contributors for every activity it exercises.

8.1.17 Framework for liberal peace in post-conflict nations

The field work in a nation recovering from conflict and meetings with key witnesses who have been/are associated with or have encountered post-conflict reconstruction procedures and operations in South Sudan have created a fascinating perception about the liberal peace structure. Even though this framework has formed all externally determined PCRD tasks and mediations since the end of the Cold War and has affected scholarly and strategy writing about PCRD, it remains an obscure

idea in post-conflict nations. Just a few of the respondents the researcher met for this study knew about the idea of liberal peace (every single universal authority in South Sudan). Notwithstanding that this idea is utilised to decide the eventual fate of post-conflict nations, it should be displayed to people in general in these nations affected by conflict and discussed, rather than just being encircled and reframed by a few group of externally determined specialists and policy creators.

8.2 Conclusion

In nations recouping from conflict, reconstruction and development should run alongside peacebuilding and state-building. They are interconnected and urgent for post-conflict reconstruction, stability and counteractive action of future fierce clashes. Without post-conflict peace, security and stability, noteworthy financial development, reconciliation or regard for human rights are far-fetched. At the same time, without physical, social and political recreation, economic advancement and fair distribution of essential basic services, it is hard to build and consolidate a stable and peaceful society after conflict. Moreover, post-conflict peacebuilding and nation-building frequently go as one and cannot be isolated in either research or practice.

State organisations would not be viewed as genuinely legitimate to the population if they cannot give peace, security, stability and fundamental welfare. The truth in nations endeavouring to reconstruct from conflict requires consolidation of every one of these viewpoints and fields if mediations and activities are to be fruitful. Hence, specialists, scholars and experts want to help nations rising out of conflict, they cannot restrain research and exploration to their various fields only. They need to

reach over various fields if that can conceivably enhance their comprehension of essential peace and lead ideas, discoveries and proposals that can have a genuine effect on the African continent.

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APPENDIX I: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Note: In this study, broad interview guides were used for field research. The guides provided a list of themes and issues to be covered in the interviews. Different guides were prepared – a general guide about PCRD and specific guides about South Sudan – based on the extensive literature review. In most cases, additional questions emerged during the conversation with respondents. Furthermore, respondents had a chance to bring up issues they thought were important but were not covered by the questions below.

Interview Questions

➢ How much did local authorities do in terms of livelihood improvements and post-conflict recovery since 2005?

➢ How far is South Sudan in terms of peace-building and reconciliation?

➢ In South Sudan, the international community focused primarily on humanitarian assistance and not on reconstruction and development between 2005 and 2013. Would the situation be better today if there were more reconstruction and development efforts by external actors?

➢ Local capacity building is lauded by external actors as the key for long-term PCRD success. Yet, in South Sudan, the region that has started from scratch in almost every sense of the term after the peace agreement was signed in 2005, why is it being ignored in practice?

➢ How did you become involved as a youth soldier in the on-going conflict and why did you find yourself in the youth camp for recovery?

➤ What are major challenges facing South Sudan on the road to lasting peace, stability and development?

General questions

➤ How do you define a successful post-conflict reconstruction and development operation?

➤ How do you explain the fact that since the end of the Cold War, out of many externally driven attempts to reconstruct and develop societies emerging from violent conflict around the world, there seem to be only a few relative success stories and many failures?

➤ Externally driven state-building and democracy promotion imply compressing processes. Can this realistically work in South Sudan?

➤ In many cases, local actors often have limited or no say on matters related to the future of their country. Do local communities and traditional leaders have a say in stopping the on-going crisis?

➤ Do you think externally imposed socio-economic and political "solutions" can work in the long-run?

➤ It is argued that Western experts, often lacking basic knowledge of what is happening or what the real needs are in post-conflict societies, are making major decisions. How can we expect any improvements in these societies when those who make decisions do not know much about post-conflict countries like South Sudan?

- The importance of the involvement of internal actors and local ownership of PCRD processes are often highlighted by Western government officials and international donors and organisations and can be found in all policy documents. In practice, however, post-conflict reconstruction and development interventions around the world are externally driven. Is this contributing to the high rate of failures and lack of sustainability of post-conflict operations and processes? Should this be changed?

- There is no question that a functioning democracy is better than authoritarianism, totalitarianism and dictatorship. However, is externally driven imposition of liberal market democracy in war-ravaged countries and expectation that this can take hold in a few years reasonable and sustainable?

- Do you think that externally driven liberal peace framework is the only option for post-conflict countries in the quest for recovery, stability and peace?

- Some authors argue that for a state to be legitimate by the citizens, state-building process must be designed, owned and implemented by local actors, not outsiders. Do you agree with the above statement? Please explain your answer.

- What are some of the current pertinent issues that cause political internal violence and conflicts in South Sudan?

- Have government policies in South Sudan been unresponsive and impossible to spur and bring about Economic recovery and development since independence? If so, did this play a role in the current conflict and instability?

- South Sudan is littered with small arms and light weapons, with remnants of violence and conflicts that causes destabilization. How can the country be stabilized to bring it to bring peace and harmony?

- Most of the army members of South Sudan have barely been exposed to the culture of peace, civilian protection, human rights and principles of the rule of law. In your opinion, what must be done to improve this situation in the future?

- The SPLA is currently an amalgamation of revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries (union with different militia groups). Why is it difficult to achieve central command of the SPLA to bring about political stability?

- South Sudan prior to and from the onset of independence has been confronted with multiple development challenges. How can the government overturn these challenges?

- Currently there are no government policies for development and economic growth especially those that harness its potential in agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry, etc. To what extent in your opinion can the government accelerate these policies for development?

- How can the problematic issues on the ground such as leadership, power, fighting, ethnic violence and conflicts, cattle rustling and urban crimes be addressed to bring stability to the economy?

APPENDIX II: INFORMED CONSENT FORM

Ethics Research Confidentiality and Informed Consent Form

This form is to be completed by the researcher(s) as well as by the interviewee before the commencement of the research. Copies of the signed form must be filed and kept on record David Annan, a (PhD student) from the department of development studies, university of Fort Hare, South Africa.

Our University of Fort Hare / Department of development studies is asking people from your South Sudan (Juba) community to answer some questions, which we hope will benefit South Sudan and possibly other communities in the future on post-conflict reconstruction and development

The University of Fort Hare / Department of development studies is conducting research regarding post-conflict reconstruction and development in South Sudan. We are interested in finding out more about the impact of conflict on development and ways to reconstruct economies after conflict. We are carrying out this research to help create a platform on reconstruction and development after conflicts.

Please understand that you are not being forced to take part in this study and the choice whether to participate or not is yours alone. However, we would really appreciate it if you do share your thoughts with us. If you choose not take part in answering these questions, you will not be affected in any way. If you agree to participate, you may stop me at any time and tell me that you don't want to go on with the interview. If you do this there will also be no penalties and you will NOT be prejudiced in ANY way. Confidentiality will be observed professionally. I will not be recording your name anywhere on the questionnaire and no one will be able to link you to the answers you give. Only the researchers will have access to the unlinked information. The information will remain confidential and there will be no "come-backs" from the answers you give.

The interview will last around (30-60) minutes. I will be asking you a question and ask that you are as open and honest as possible in answering these questions. Some questions may be of a personal and/or sensitive nature. I will be asking some questions that you may not have thought about before, and which also involve thinking about the past or the future. We know that you cannot be certain about the answers to these questions, but we ask that you try to think about these questions.

When it comes to answering questions there are no right and wrong answers. When we ask questions about the future, we are not interested in what you think the best thing would be to do, but what you think would happen. If possible, our department would like to come back to this area once we have completed our study to inform you and your community of what the results are and discuss our findings and proposals around the research and what this means for people in this area.

INFORMED CONSENT

I hereby agree to participate in research regarding post-conflict reconstruction and development in South Sudan.

I understand that I am participating freely and without being forced in any way to do so. I also understand that I can stop this interview at any point should I not want to continue and that this decision will not in any way affect me negatively.

I understand that this is a research project whose purpose is not necessarily to benefit me personally. I have received the telephone number of a person to contact should I need to speak about any issues which may arise in this interview.

I understand that this consent form will not be linked to the questionnaire, and that my answers will remain confidential. I understand that if at all possible, feedback will be given to my community on the results of the completed research.

………………………………………………………………

Full name and title of participant   **Date………………..**

I hereby agree to the tape recording of my participation in the study

……………………………..

Signature of participant   **Date**………………..

Thank you.

University of Fort Hare
Together in Excellence

ETHICAL CLEARANCE CERTIFICATE
REC-270710-028-RA Level 01

Certificate Reference Number: MON321SANN01

Project title: **Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in South Sudan.**

Nature of Project   PhD in Development Studies

Principal Researcher: David Annan

Supervisor: Dr P.B Monyai
Co-supervisor: N/A

On behalf of the University of Fort Hare's Research Ethics Committee (UREC) I hereby give ethical approval in respect of the undertakings contained in the above-mentioned project and research instrument(s). Should any other instruments be used, these require separate authorization. The Researcher may therefore commence with the research as from the date of this certificate, using the reference number indicated above.

Please note that the UREC must be informed immediately of

- Any material change in the conditions or undertakings mentioned in the document
- Any material breaches of ethical undertakings or events that impact upon the ethical conduct of the research

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

The Principal Researcher must report to the UREC in the prescribed format, where applicable, annually, and at the end of the project, in respect of ethical compliance.

Special conditions: Research that includes children as per the official regulations of the act must take the following into account:

Note: The UREC is aware of the provisions of s71 of the National Health Act 61 of 2003 and that matters pertaining to obtaining the Minister's consent are under discussion and remain unresolved. Nonetheless, as was decided at a meeting between the National Health Research Ethics Committee and stakeholders on 6 June 2013, university ethics committees may continue to grant ethical clearance for research involving children without the Minister's consent, provided that the prescripts of the previous rules have been met. This certificate is granted in terms of this agreement.

The UREC retains the right to

- Withdraw or amend this Ethical Clearance Certificate if
  - Any unethical principal or practices are revealed or suspected
  - Relevant information has been withheld or misrepresented
  - Regulatory changes of whatsoever nature so require
  - The conditions contained in the Certificate have not been adhered to

- Request access to any information or data at any time during the course or after completion of the project.

- In addition to the need to comply with the highest level of ethical conduct principle investigators must report back annually as an evaluation and monitoring mechanism on the progress being made by the research. Such a report must be sent to the Dean of Research's office

The Ethics Committee wished you well in your research.

Yours sincerely

Professor Lindelwa Majova-Songca
Acting Dean of Research

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10 November 2017

APPENDIX III: LIST OF INTERVIEWS

➢ Former South Sudanese educationalist. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 3 January 2018.

➢ Former South Sudanese government official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 3 January 2018.

➢ International official working for an NGO agency. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 9 January 2018.

➢ A member of the traditional leader's council in South Sudan. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 6 January 2018.

➢ Conflict management lecturer at the University of Juba. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 28 December 2017.

➢ Local NGO official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 7 January 2018.

➢ Officials from the opposition party in South Sudan. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 28 December 2017.

➢ High-ranking UNMISS official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 6 January 2018.

➢ A former custom official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 2 January 2018

➢ Officials from the GOSS. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 6 January 2018

➢ Official from the UNDP. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 7 January 2018.

- Women activists from the Market. Interview conducted in Koyonkoyon, Juba, South Sudan on 26 December 2017.

- A peace-mediator on the on-going settlement. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 6 January 2018.

- Youth Soldiers. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 26 December 2017.

- A retired former member of the SPLM/A. Interview conducted in Juba, on 6 January 2018.

- Officials of current government. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 7 January 2018.

- A member of parliament. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 3 January 2018.

- A south Sudanese economist and government official. Interview conducted in Juba, South Sudan, on 7 January 2018.

APPENDIX IV – BASIC STATISTICS FOR SOUTH SUDAN

Note: some statistics for South Sudan are not available. In addition, many of the statistics that are available are only estimates.

|	
POPULATION	**12,854,137 (est.)**
POVERTY LEVEL	**50.6% (Est.)**
UNEMPLOYMENT	**18.5% (Est.)**
LITERACY	**32.0 (%) in 2015**
GDP	**9.015 billion USD (2015)**
GDP PER CAPITAL	**$ 1,500 (Est.)**
NUMBER OF DISPLACED PEOPLE	**39,806** Refugees and IDPs received non-food items assistance from UNHCR across South Sudan in January 2018. **2,223** New arrivals registered in South Sudan in January 2018. **40,502** Refugees living in Ajuong Thok refugee camp as of 31 January 2018
LIFE EXPECTANCY	**56.11 years (2015)**

APPENDIX V – PICTURE

This picture was taken just outside Juba, the capital of South Sudan. This shows the effect of the ongoing civil conflict.

APPENDIX VI – MAPS OF SUDAN

MAP 1 – SUDAN & SOUTH SUDAN

Source: http://www.polgeonow.com/2012/05/feature-sudansouth-   sudan

border26.html.

MAP 2 – SOUTH SUDAN

Source: https://www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/africa/lgcolor/sscolor.htm