

NEW TENDENCIES IN THE TURKISH CENTER - RIGHT: WITH  
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE "NEW" DEMOCRAT PARTY

A Master's Thesis  
Submitted to the Department of Political Science  
and  
Public Administration  
of  
BILKENT UNIVERSITY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
by  
Yılmaz ÇOLAK

ANKARA

September, 1994

JQ  
1809  
-A8  
D4  
1994

NEW TENDENCIES IN THE TURKISH CENTER-RIGHT: WITH  
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE "NEW" DEMOCRAT PARTY

A Master's Thesis  
Submitted to the Department of Political Science  
and  
Public Administration  
of  
BILKENT UNIVERSITY

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  
Master of Arts  
by  
Yılmaz ÇOLAK


ANKARA  
September, 1994

Yılmaz ÇOLAK  
*tarafından onaylanmıştır*


JA  
1809  
A8  
04  
1994

B026460


I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

  
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu


I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science and Public Administration.

  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler

Approved by the Institute of Economic and Social Science



## ABSTRACT

### NEW TENDENCIES IN THE TURKISH CENTER-RIGHT: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE "NEW" DEMOCRAT PARTY

ÇOLAK, Yılmaz

M. S. in Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu

September, 1994, 123 pages

The objective of the present study is to understand the general characteristics of new tendencies in the Turkish centre-right. To accomplish this task, the "new" Democrat Party (DP), which is one of the new political formations in Turkey, is analyzed through a comparison with two major centre-right parties - the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP). By touching upon the some basic concepts of the centre-right politics such as economic and political liberalism, conservatism, liberal democratic system, this comparison refers to the question of how the Turkish centre-right realizes their political ideology and practice. It seems that the "new" DP which defends the necessity of liberal-pluralist values at the level of both state and society is much closer to the ideology of the centre-right politics than the MP and the TPP. Main conclusion drawn from this study is that the traditional structure of Turkish politics has been pushed toward a liberal democratic

iii

system by evolving political sentiment within socio-economic and political development. In such orientation, the newly emerging political movements in the centre-right appear as one of significant, determinant factors.

**Key Words:** Turkish Centre-Right, New Right, Political Liberalism, Economic Liberalism, Conservatism, Neo Conservatism, Atatürkism.

## ÖZET

### TÜRK MERKEZ SAĞINDA YENİ EĞİLİMLER: "YENİ" DEMOKRAT PARTİ ÖRNEĞİ

ÇOLAK, Yılmaz

Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doc. Ahmet İçduygu

. Eylül, 1994, 124 sayfa

Bu çalışma ile amaçlanan, Türk merkez sağında ortaya çıkan yeni eğilimleri ve onların genel özelliklerini anlayabilmektir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, yeni eğilimlerden biri olan Aydın Menderes liderliğinde Büyük Değişim Partisinde başlayıp Demokrat Partide devam eden siyasal hareket iki büyük merkez sağ parti (Anavatan Partisi ve Doğru Yol Partisi) ile karşılaştırılmalı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır. Merkez sağ ideolojisinin dayandığı siyasal ve ekonomik liberalizm, muhafazakarlık, yeni muhafazakarlık, liberal-çoğulcu demokratik sistem gibi temel kavramlar baz alınarak, üç parti arasındaki karşılaştırma yapılmaya çalışılmıştır. Hem devlet hem de toplum seviyesinde ekonomik ve siyasal anlamda liberal değerlerin hakimiyetini savunan "yeni" Demokrat Parti, merkez sağ ideolojisine ve değerlerine ANAP ve DYP den daha yakın olduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışmadan çıkarılabilecek temel sonuç, 1990 larda ortaya çıkan yerel ve küresel değişikliklerin etkisi altında kalan Türk siyasal sisteminin geleneksel yapısı liberal demokratik bir sisteme

dođru kaymaya zorlanmaktadır. Merkez sađda ortaya ıkan yeni siyasal oluřumlar Trk siyasal sisteminin iinde bulunduđu bu sreci etkileyen nedenlerden birisi olarak belirlemekte.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Trk Merkez Sađı, Yeni Sađ, Ekonomik Liberalizm, Siyasi Liberalizm, Muhafazakarlık, Yeni Muhafazakarlık, Atatrklk.



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am particularly grateful to my supervisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Ahmet İçduygu for his helpful comments throughout the preparation of the thesis and devoting valuable days for reading the drafts of the thesis. I would also like to express my thanks to other members of the examining committee, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıođlu and Assist. Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler.

I also owe special dept of gratitude to Prof. Dr. Metin Heper for his valuable encouragements at the start of the process and Prof. Dr. J. M. Salt for his stimulations at the initial stage.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	III
ÖZET	V
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	VII
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER I: DEFINING THE CENTRE-RIGHT: A THEORATICAL FRAMEWORK	12
1.1 Democracy and Pluralist-liberal Democratic System	13
1.2 Centre-Right-Wing Politics	16
1.2.1 Conservatism and Neo-Conservatism	17
1.2.2 Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism	22
1.2.3 The New Right	26
CHAPTER II: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH CENTRE-RIGHT	35
1.1 The Turkish Centre-Right: From 1923 to 1980	37
1.1.1 The Progressive Republican Party	37
1.1.2 The Free Party	39
1.1.3 The Democrat Party	41

	PAGE
1.1.4 The Justice Party	43
1.2 The Centre-Right in Turkey: From 1983 to 1994	46
1.2.1 The Motherland Party	46
1.2.1.1 The MP under Özal Leadership	46
1.2.1.2 Post-Özal Era	51
1.2.1.3 Policies and Ideologies of the MP	53
1.2.2 The True Path Party	56
1.2.2.1 The TPP in Opposition	56
1.2.2.2 The TPP in Government	63
CHAPTER III: THE "NEW" DEMOCRATIC PARTY	70
1.1 The Grand Transformation Party and the "new" DP	70
1.2 Ideological Background of the "new" DP	72
1.3 The Reasons of the Necessity for a New Program	79
1.4 The Program of the "new" DP	81
1.4.1 Democratization	82
1.4.2 Economic Transformation	87
1.5 The "new" DP's Views on the State and the Society	90
1.6 The Views of the "new" DP on Religion and Secularism	93
1.7 The "new" DP's Views on Nationalism	95
1.8 The "new" DP and Other New Centre-Right Parties	97
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION: A COMPARISON	103
BIBLIOGRAPHY	115

## INTRODUCTION

Changes in the international system imply several consequences for the nations' political and socio-economic structures. Developments in the last decade, such as the collapse of communism and the East Block, the rise of globalisation and the emergence of "new world order", have paved the way to the rapid and rising process of transformation across the world. This process gives us a new declaration: all viable alternatives to liberal democracy has now been quite discredited. A consistent theme of such newly emerging context is that liberal democracy, which is still gaining ground all over the world, is the only plausible form of governance in the modern world, but, in accordance with the changing situation, it needs to be redefined and restructured. Parallel to that, the roles and functions of political parties started to be questioned and discussed because their ideologies and views do not clearly interact with the newly reshaping social process and structure which compel political parties to search new identities and ideologies.

It may be seen that this global transformation has an important and effective impact upon the Turkish political and social structure. Nowadays, Turkish politics suffers from the presence of so many political parties, and their failure in providing possible solutions to the problems faced by the people and alternative policies, as a result of serious ideological straits. Changes in global and local environment might be regarded as one of the significant process behind the rise in the number of political parties in Turkey.

Furthermore, fragmentation and polarization in Turkish politics are strongly linked with the 1980 military intervention by which the Turkish political system have been reshaped, especially in regulating party formation and activities. By the late 1980s, the Turkish politics was appeared to be moving into a fragmentation reminiscent of the 1970s faced with the emergence of old leaders and parties. Such fragmentation, the result of the 1980 coup, gained speed in the early 1990s, as the global and local conditions were transformed.

In the same context, personalistic conflicts or intra-elite conflicts seem to be other reason that brings about some new political parties come to exist. Most of these political parties may be called as "splinter parties"<sup>1</sup>; yet, splinter parties which did not reflect any kind of cleavage in the electorate have always had a rather brief life. In fact, political parties in Turkey have usually emerged and developed as a means of elite conflict. For this reason, for a long time the basic cleavage in Turkish politics has been a cultural rather than socio-economic in nature.

As one of these newly emerging parties, the Democrat Party (DP), *Demokrat Parti*,<sup>2</sup> was first established by a group of people under the leadership of Adnan Menderes who was the leader of the DP until it was banned by the military following the 1960 coup d'etat. Later, the DP was re-established in May 1993. The "new" DP was joined with the Grand Transformation Party (GTP), *Büyük Değişim Partisi*, led by Aydın Menderes, the son of Adnan Menderes, in February 1994. The "new" DP, which entirely accepted the program of the GTP, differs to a certain extent from the "old" DP in terms of the views on democracy, state, social organisation, etc. Two elements, that are globalization of liberal democratic ideas and views and the post-1980 devel-

opments, on the one hand, and personal factors, on the other hand, seem to have an effect on the re-emergence of the "new" DP with a new program and principles emphasizing pluralist-liberal version of democracy which distinguishes the "new" DP from the other present political parties in Turkey. Globally and locally changing context may be the most potent reason bringing about a new program which compelled the leaders of the "new" DP to renew themselves so as to restructure and restore Turkish democracy. At the same time, personalistic aspect that one leader steers some people towards forming a new political party or shaping a new program for the party is much more crucial in the emergence of the "new" DP as an apart political party. Aydın Menderes, the leader of the "new" DP, played a determinant role in forming new principles and ideology within a new cadre. However, as opposite to the other small political parties, the "new" DP does not seem a splinter party from a big political party as a result of personalistic and communalistic conflict over party or government policy.

Because of its right-wing roots and heritage, the "new" DP can be considered as a political party in "center-right" of Turkish politics. Similarly, in this study I use the term "center-right" to label two major political parties - the Motherland Party (MP), *Anavatan Partisi*, and the True Path Party (TPP), *Doğru Yol Partisi*.

Nevertheless, some students of the Turkish politics talk about the limited role of the concepts of "left-wing" and "right-wing" in determining the Turkish politics. Mango<sup>3</sup> claims that progressives *versus* religious reactionaries and the western distinction between right-wing and left-wing are inappropriate for studying Turkish politics where basic cleavage was cultural rather

than functional. Thus, Turkish politics can be best understood in terms of a cleavage among populist or democrats and bureaucrats. This is clearly expressed through the theoretical construct of "center-periphery cleavage" with which change and continuity in Turkish political party life may be conveniently explained.<sup>4</sup> In this respect, always at issue was the bureaucratized version of Atatürkist thought. Populist or democrats, heavily representing the periphery, have continuously attacked on the Kemalist ideas which were transformed into an ideology by the bureaucratic elite. At the present day, some scholars<sup>5</sup> stress that we can not sufficiently understand Turkish political structure, especially in the post-1980 era, by looking at the chief cultural cleavage between the center and periphery, between traditionalist and modernist. As to them, this insufficiency can be explained with socio-economic factors in stead of political factors. It is because that once periphery came to center, it became one of the basic actors in determining politics. They also argue that the rise of the power of civil society and shifting class structure are other important aspects causing the insufficiency of old cleavages in understanding Turkish politics. However, it can not be denied the fact that such dichotomy has still been to a large extent dominant in Turkish politics, where the center-right emerged as the representative of periphery, paving the way for a new cleavage such as "laik" (secularist) and "müslüman" (Moslem), "Türk" (Turk) and "Kürt" (Kurd), and so on.

The distinction among right-wing and left-wing in Turkish politics came into picture as the leaders of the Republican People's Party (RPP), *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*, declared their position in the left of center in 1965. By this distinction, during the 1970s, the political parties, and even party factions, had been regularly formed and reformed around certain ideologies

and counter ideologies. After the left and right distinction was began to be used, the line of the DP, the Justice Party (JP), *Adalet Partisi*, the MP and the TPP were classified as the center-right parties. They defined their position in accordance with their opposition to their counterpart parties; the RPP, and later, in the post-1980, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), *Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti*, led by Erdal İnönü and now by Murat Karayalçın, the Democratic Left Party (DLP), *Demokratik Sol Parti*, led by Ecevit, and the RPP of Deniz Baykal. Beside these centrist political parties, there are also some other political parties both in the right-wing and the left-wing. In the right-wing there are Erbakan's Welfare Party (WP), *Refah Partisi*, pro-Islamist centrist party, and Turkeş' Nationalist Action Party (NAP), *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*. Moreover, there are some minor parties: Yusuf Ozal's the New Party (NP), *Yeni Parti*, which is splinter party from the MP; the Grand Unity Party (GUP), *Büyük Birlik Partisi*, which separated from the NAP; the Anew Birth Party (ABP), *Yeniden Doğuş Partisi*, of H. Celal Güzel who was the minister of National Education in the governments of Turgut Ozal who was the prime-minister from 1983 to 1989 and later he became the President; Besim Tibuk's Liberal Party (LP), *Liberal Parti*; and the Nation Party (NP), *Millet Partisi*. In the left-wing there are some radical parties: the Socialist Unity Party (SUP), *Sosyalist Birlik Partisi*, the Labour Party (LP), *İşçi Partisi*, and the Socialist Party (SP), *Sosyalist Parti*.

In a convenient context, in order to designate their position in Turkish political and party system, the MP, the TPP and the "new" DP, which do not completely share the peculiarities of the center-right in the political literature, are labeled as the centre-right parties. However, at the level of general principles, Turkish centre-right, in some sense, has similarities with the "centre-



right politics", which is closely linked with liberal and conservative views, and their new versions: neo-liberalism , neo-conservatism and the new right. For that reason, it is necessary to answer the question of how the center-right is viewed in the literature of politics that is the subject of the first chapter in the present study.

Turkish center-right parties (the DP, the JP, the MP and the TPP) that follow liberal and democratic tradition based on the views of Prince Sebahattin, the Progressive Republican Party (PRP), *Terrakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, and the Free Party (FP), *Serbest Fırka*, played mainly crucial role in shaping Turkish politics and in leading democracy to take roots among people and in the consolidation of democracy. Following the transition to a multi-party system, the "old" DP dominated Turkish politics until the military intervention in 1960. It could be seen as a protest movement against the hegemony of the bureaucratic elites who perceived democracy as the liberation of the intellectual-bureaucratic elite from the absolutism of the majority. Under the leadership of the "old" DP's political elites, periphery came to center, and, in this way, strong ties among the state and people were established, which hindered the potential conflict among them. In the multi-party era, the "old" DP and other center-right parties have challenged the elitist perspective of the centralist bureaucratic elite that produced tensions in the political system and remained dysfunctional for the development of democratic government. Thus, their ultimate aim was to put an end to the domination of the bureaucratic elites over the state and the society.

On the contrary, it is not the "old" DP's objective to remove Atatürkism, the official ideology, which has remained as the dominant politi-

cal ideology in the Republican era, but it opposed the bureaucratic elite's interpretation of Atatürkism. The center-right parties interpreted Atatürkism in favorable to their views and to suit their purpose. By such interpretation, they tried to legitimate their orientation. Furthermore, they did not intend to turn away from Atatürkist secularism and westernization; in this sense, the center-right parties, especially the "old" DP in the 1950s, one may assert, played a significant part in increasing the legitimacy of Atatürkism in the eyes of people. On the other, unlike the Kemalist ideas, they defended the evolutionary transformation of the society rather than revolutionary one, liberal economic policies rather than estatist policies, and liberal democracy rather than rationalist democracy. Unlike these contradictions, by the changing international context, all political parties and groups believe the necessity of the free market economy which has been the main economic principle of the center-right.

As a result of such consensus on the basic principles of Atatürkism, the TPP and the MP, major center-right parties, are acting together and sharing same views with the bureaucratic elites and with the left-wing political parties. This agreement is made for preventing threats, originating from social and cultural groups basing on certain cultural identities, to the official ideology, Atatürkism. The rise of these social and cultural groups and identities might be explained with the idea that during the 1980s and 1990s civil societal elements started to gain ground and significance. Although both the TPP and the MP are largely sterilizing themselves from these groups, the "new" DP puts the view that each group in the society has a freedom of assembly and association, and a freedom to express and publish their opinions. Here, it can be said that the "new" DP depends on the principles of political liberal-

ism, and also it puts forward the idea of "hakem devlet" (the referee-state)<sup>6</sup>. This idea of "hakem devlet" depends upon a form of state which should not impose any sort of ideologies or views on people through education or any way and it should equally treat all groups. Implicitly, by this claims, the "new" DP challenges the nation-state, the Republican regime, lounging around on the Atatürkist principles.

Such views of the "new" DP makes possible to distinguish it from two major center-right parties: the MP and the TPP. The MP under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, however, paved the way for the erosion of Kemalist principles throughout struggling by the bureaucratic and centralized structure of the state, while it regarded the Atatürkist principles as a necessary phenomena for reaching democratic and modern Turkey. In the post-Ozal period, the coalition among four inclinations - liberals, conservatives, nationalists and centralists - with which the MP was able to reintegrate the anti-systemic tendencies, was ended almost with excluding some groups from the party. Like the MP, the JP in the early 1970s and the SDPP in 1992 excluded some anti-systemic groups that run counter to the central-official ideology. In the same way, the TPP, the continuation of the JP, existed in a position of legitimizing civilian politics and maintaining the issue of democracy in the political agenda from 1983 to 1992; yet, it is in government, its challenge to the "bureaucratic will" and its wish of civilian politics have not yet been put into a practice. Consequently, the problem in the center-right politics appears to be whether or not accepting and implementing the requirements of political liberalism. At the same time, there are some political parties and movements, emerging mostly in the right-wing of Turkish politics, depending upon liberal discourse and rhetoric.

The aim of the present study is to compare and contrast the characteristics of the "new" DP, on the one hand, and those of the MP and the TPP, on the other hand, by focusing on their perceptions of pluralist-liberal democracy, economic and political liberalism, and the state. What the differences and similarities among these three center-right parties are and so what degree their ideologies fit into the center-right politics in the literature of political science are the fundamental questions of this study. With the help of this comparison, I want to arrive in an understanding of the general characteristics of new political movements in Turkish center-right.

In the first chapter, as I noted earlier, a general theoretical framework that the western center-right put up will be explained. It includes an elaboration of the concepts of the pluralist-liberal democracy, conservatism, liberalism and the new right, particularly in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom. These concepts are applied to clarify the ideology of the center-right parties across the world and Turkey.

The second chapter aims to analyse the historical development of the Turkish center-right under two subtitles; from 1923 to 1980 in which the PRP, the FP, the DP and the JP will be discussed, and from 1980 to now where the elaboration of two major center-right - the MP and the TPP - will take place. This helps us to understand whether or not there is a center-right tradition in Turkey. The third chapter deals with the ideology and party program of the "new" DP under the leadership of Aydın Menderes. Throughout this chapter, the "new" DP's connection with the GTP, and its views on the state, society, democracy, religion, secularism and nationalism will be brought up. The

fourth chapter, which includes some concluding remarks, is about the comparison among the "new" DP and two major center-right parties, the MP and the TPP, in terms of their main political ideology.

---

---

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>See, Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey*, (Washington: Eoten Press, 1985), p. 5.

<sup>2</sup>In the present study, in order to prevent any possible confusion the DP of Adnan Menderes from 1945 to 1960 is labeled as the "old" DP and Aydın Menderes' DP from 1993 up to now is called as the "new" DP.

<sup>3</sup>Andrew Mango "Turkey: The Emergence of a Modern Problem", in *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, ed. by W. Hale, (London: Bowker, 1976), p. 10.

<sup>4</sup>On the center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, see Serif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*, 102 (1973), pp. 169-190.

<sup>5</sup>See, Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980", in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. by Ahmet Evin and Metin Heper (New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 201-211, and Nilüfer Göle, "İslami Dokunulmazlar, Laikler ve Radikal Demokratlar", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 27 (1994), pp. 13-18.

<sup>6</sup>This notion of the state is found in the pluralist-liberal democratic theories in which the state is a neutral arena. State must treat all its members as equal. For further details, see Stephen L. Elkin, "Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy", in *The Democratic State*, ed. by Roger Benjamin and S. L. Elkin (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 179-213, and Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political*, (London and New York: Verso, 1993), p. 125.

## CHAPTER ONE

### DEFINING THE CENTER-RIGHT: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Turkish center-right has used some basic concepts and terms, such as pluralist democracy, free will, conservatism, economic and political liberalism, center-right, etc., in order to define and determine their position and ideologies . It is usually argued that these concepts and terms applied by Turkish center-right do not reflect social and political reality as it is the case for highly industrialized democratic societies. As it is indicated in the Introduction part, this may be made clear with an explanation that Turkish social structure and cleavage are substantially different from such societies; in general, basic cleavage in Turkey has been cultural, basing upon the center-periphery drift, rather than socio-economic or class structure. On the contrary, one can not reject the fact that Turkish center-right shows in some sense similarities with western center-right politics, in terms of accepting the parliamentary system, political democratic regime, liberal economic policies, some conservative and nationalist views, and so on. In this chapter, a general theoretical framework of center-right politics through clarifying the terms and concepts used in the political literature will be given. This helps us to understand the meaning of the terms applied by Turkish center-right and to compare Turkish center-right by western one.

In recent years, the rising of the right-wing politics in the world, especially in the United States and the Great Britain, has been witnessed. This may include the center-right movements based on the liberal and conservative aspects committed to the parliamentary system, and also the extreme right movements glorifying nationalism and opposing doctrines espousing internationalism. There is also certain right which has traditionally derided the parliamentary system, even when it has insisted on the parliament. Here, a description about general characteristics of center-right-wing politics and emerging new trends in this politics will be given through briefly focusing on the United States and the Great Britain, in most cases. It is now generally agreed upon that the center-right politics, all over the world, is profoundly connected with pluralist-liberal democracy and its parliamentary institutions, contrary to all right-wing movements violating these institutions. It is therefore necessarily needed to describe pluralist-liberal democratic system and of its requirements, which seems to be an inevitable political and socio-economic system by the center-right politicians.

### **1. Democracy and Pluralist-liberal Democratic System**

Democracy is still far from being the most common form of political system, but it is gaining ground across the world. Firstly, it is suitable to start with the definition of democracy. Its dictionary definition is simply that democracy means the rule of the people. It is obvious that only a small minority of individuals can be rulers in modern societies. So ruling must be taken, to a large extent, in terms of choosing the rulers and influencing their deci-



sions.<sup>1</sup> This dictionary definition clearly reflects most common view that ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders. To this effect, it is generally assumed that, in a democratic society, there is equality of opportunity for all citizens. We can find two forms of democracy<sup>2</sup> in its dictionary definition; one is direct democracy in which the people rule by making decisions themselves, and the other form is representative democracy in which the people elect a number of representatives to make decisions for them. In spite of some exception, like in Switzerland where a kind of direct democracy is relatively predominant, representative form of democracy can be distinctively regarded basic form of democracy accepted throughout the most of societies.

Pluralist-liberal democratic system, which exists as a unique form of political system, may be dependent on some required principles and characteristics, in general. First one is the ideology of participation in decision-making that necessitates regular elections, free speech, free association of political parties, etc. Other is that, under such circumstances, power should be diffused across a wide range of national or local institutions and organisation, thus no one group can systematically organize power in own interests. Third principle is related with the function of government which should act as umpire or referee in order to arbitrate upon the complex demand of heterogeneous society, and also there should be ensuring sovereignty of parliament over government. It is for this reason that, in the pluralist democratic system, the state is seen as a neutral arena in which actors may be able to use in attempting to serve their interests. It may thus be seized for use by particular interests, possible in a society where the state is largely free from any social classes and groups. Finally, political culture of this sort of pluralist demo-

cratic societies must be linked with norms guiding action, including belief of the idea of freedom apart from state bureaucratic control, while the state or government should be responsible for providing some services provision of health, education and welfare facilities according to need.<sup>3</sup> Political democracy resulted from such liberal-pluralist democratic system and logically embraced by pluralism<sup>4</sup> quarantines the civil liberties of all citizens, political pluralism, the system of contracts and the principle of representation. It also requires a complex set of social institutions or a civil society, which is relatively independent of the state, though never completely.<sup>5</sup>

The essence of democracy still consists of securing the competition of interests and the rules which make their representation possible. As a unitary agent of intervention and action, the state has dissolved. At this point, it is indispensable needed to define the term civil society, at a some extent, in order to understand the position of the center-right politics in the West and in Turkey. Most common definition of civil society found in the literature stresses the existence of a relatively wide range of social sectors ( family, groups, voluntary associations and so on) which are autonomous from the state. "The activities of such sectors are regulated by various associations existing within them; they are not embedded in closed, ascriptive settings; they are open ended and overlapping" <sup>6</sup>.

A state limited in its power emerges , by and large, as certain main condition for political democracy. This situation takes us to the thought that democracy is heavily related with a free market system and a limited state. Within an economy of which the state controls the larger portion, someone who hold power can easily and deliberately frustrate opposition and retain

power.<sup>7</sup> Public spaces which are independent of the institution of government, the party system and state structures are inevitable condition for a kind of democracy in which there exist some peculiar "rights to make one's voice heard by means of representation or by modifying the conditions of listening, as well as the right to belong or to withdraw from belonging in order to produce new meanings".<sup>8</sup>

## 2. Center-Right-Wing Politics

Throughout this part, I will mainly concentrate on the position of the center-right after the mid-1970s, starting point of the rising of the right-wing politics. This does not, however, mean that the progress of the center-right in the preceding period, afterwards of the Second World War, will not be clarified. At the first hand, it is useful to begin with the definition of the concept of the Right politically by giving its broader explanation generally agreed on. In fact, the term has not absolutely fixed the meaning and it can be used relatively. The Right as a concept, used to characterize the conservative end of the political spectrum in modern polities, may be defined in part by its opposition to its political counterpart, namely the left. While it would be a mistake to see the right only as a synonym for conservatives, it may refer to political movements, and also may refer to ideas sharing a commitment to the advancement of conservative social, political and economic ideas. Advocates of the right, under the effect of the conservative views, believe tradition and custom as guides to behavior. In addition, unlike liberals and those on the left, its conservative principles comprise the veneration of religion, loyalty, and a system of social hierarchy.<sup>9</sup>

The modern advocates of the right-wing consent the capitalist system, although some of its proponents look askance at changes associated with capitalist development. One of the political scientists clarifies this situation in the following way;

*All members of the Right share a belief in the importance of private property (together with a legal system) as the foundation and enabling condition for political and economic liberty. They also share an antipathy to collectivist or political, preferring those based in individualism.<sup>10</sup>*

All these definitions until now clear that the center-right should be considered together with conservatism and liberalism, in political and socio-economic sense, after the Second World War. The rise of the right in the late 1970s and the 1980s was highly related to a large extent with rising new political movements in the right-wing politics; such as, the new right, neo-conservatism, neo-liberalism, and so on. Still, democratic parties by advancing arguments of the right are dominant in Western democracies, and they have been indicated in eastern and central Europe with the collapse of collectivist polities. The conception of the center-right, predominantly used in this thesis, may be related in general with conservative and liberal views, and their new versions: neo-conservative and neo-liberal movements.

## **2.1. Conservatism and Neo-Conservatism**

It is not so easy to describe conservatism and its new form. It is because of the fact that its meaning and usage can be changed and can be used

for different purposes and for pointing out distinct ideological preferences in accordance with many countries and societies. With regard to the United States and the Great Britain, which are the symbols of liberal democratic system, conservatism will be systematically analyzed. Conservatism as a concept may refer either to a political and social attitude, or to a more or less well-defined set of political policies designed to preserve best of what has been inherited in the light of changing and unanticipated circumstances. That is, it seeks the preservation of the literature, institutions, and characteristic ways of thinking and doing which have grown up in a nation or culture, and offers no prescription for change.<sup>11</sup>

In classical notion, the conservatives generally emphasized hierarchy and negative consequences of economic activity. The conservative, moreover, desire to maintain social order and authority, require strong central governmental authority, and justified the state's provision of basic health care and education in terms of precedent.

In order to understand American conservatism one requires to start with the historical context in which it emerged in the 1950s. The constellation of economic, social and national security themes, defining recent American conservatism as a world view, is clear enough. In economics, conservatives have stressed freeing the market from the constraints of government; that is, less government with more freedom and greater prosperity: cutting taxes, domestic spending, and regulation. On social issues, conservatives have condemned the secular, humanistic bent of American culture and its crucial effects on the traditional family, gender roles, religion, and morality. On the issue of national security, they drive greater spending on the American mili-

tary to counter the Soviet military and power. These three elements of conservatism can be respectively called economic libertarianism, social traditionalism and militant anti communism.<sup>12</sup> By the late 1950s, "conservatives generally agreed that conservative was their proper name, not individualist, true liberal, or libertarian".<sup>13</sup>

In the 1950s and early 1960s, conservatives moved dramatically from an isolationist to an interventionist anti communism, and also they tried to revise their arguments against the growing domestic states and their defense of laissez-faire capitalism. For this reason, they attempted to make a moral case for capitalism to go along with the utilitarian one. They concerned with the philosophical discussion about how to bring together two very different kinds of conservative language: a libertarianism emphasizing individualism and freedom, and a traditionalism expressing moral order and community.

Conservatives turned to traditionalist themes to help construct a moral defense of capitalism to supplement the utilitarian one which usually emerged from libertarianism. In the words of Himmelstein;

*By trying to join traditionalism and libertarianism, conservative fusionists were above all saying that the decline of freedom and pristine capitalism went hand in hand with the decay in God and absolute truth. Freedom and fusionist sought to articulate, in short, was a religious defense of pristine capitalism required a religious, moral, spiritual justification... what the capitalism.<sup>14</sup>*

In sum, the union of traditionalism and libertarianism come into the picture with its traditionalist emphasis on objective moral order and its libertarian stress on private property. Most conservatives accepted to bring together somehow these two different language criticize domestic collectivism. As a result of reconstructive conservative ideology, conservatives "recast their defense of pristine capitalism by making a more explicitly moral, rather than an economic, case for it. The result was a complicated combination of libertarian and traditionalist themes that remained a hallmark of conservatism into the 1980s".<sup>15</sup>

The progress of American conservatism can be divided into two phases: from the late 1950s to the early 1970s the conservative movement became an effective political movement but failed to make its mark on American politics; from the mid 1970s to the early 1980s the movement, in the form of new right reached full maturity and became for a time a dominant force in the United States politics. The most striking characteristics of the new right was its continuity with older conservative movement in leadership and ideology as well as to a large extent in strategy and rhetoric. Differences between both were usually superficial. Like the older conservative movement, new one combined a militant anti communism with a libertarian defense of pristine capitalism and a traditionalist concern with moral and social order.<sup>16</sup>

In the case of the United States, one must mention the neo-conservative movement which left its mark on American politics since the mid 1970s. It is the fact that it was not independent from the new right movement. Neo-conservatives are a group of former left liberal intellectuals who became more conservative as a response to the new left of the 1960s and emphasize the

necessity of the capitalist free market. They became risingly skeptical about the ability of government to solve the problems that it addressed. They also fear that the combination of excessive expectations and government failure could threaten liberal democratic societies. They advocate the creation of moral and political values, the use of a corrected market for the promotion of social goals, and the restoration of a pluralist political system.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, British conservatism, which is based on the writings of Hume and Oakeshott, Burke, Disraeli and Salisbury, Churchill and Thatcher, regard the limited character of government the most fundamental tenet of the conservative politics. For a conservative in the British tradition, political life is not a project of world improvement, or the constitution of human institutions on the pattern of any ideal model, but it is something much humbler. Any government, which is animated by a conservative outlook, takes for granted the imperfection of human affairs acknowledged by conservatives as a result of ordinary experience and common observation, not any metaphysical speculation.<sup>18</sup> For over decade, British conservatism has been relevant with social and moral conservatism, that Reagan's policies based on, through the frequent references to Victorian values in Thatcher's rhetoric.

The policy agenda of British conservatism has been dominated by the freeing up the market from the state's regulation. This is strongly related with the liberal conservatism of Thatcher. There can be no return to the collusive corporatism of the 1960s and 70s, forced by the interventionism of post war conservatism - interventionist conservatism. Extending market institutions, reducing taxation, inflation and government expenditure, and privatizing public industries and services have emerged basic target of this conservatism.



In the Great Britain neo-conservatism has been used to describe the revival of traditionalist conservatism which distinguishes itself from the both interventionist conservatism and the liberal conservatism of Thatcher. The British neo-conservatives emphasize that order is the main concern of conservatism; the reason behind their rejection of both type of conservatism is that;

*interventionist conservatism because of its tendency to comprise with the left rather than oppose it, and liberal conservatism because of its excessive concern with liberty at the expense of order. There must be a common moral order if men are to live peacefully together and it is the role of government to promote and enforce that moral order.*<sup>19</sup>

## 2.2. Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism

As it is defined in a classical sense, the classical political and economic liberalism is dependent on a belief in competitive individualism, a reduced and controlled role for the state, and a maximization of the market. The economy and social order will be largely self-regulating, no particular need for the state intervention. And so, while liberalism accords a minimum role to the state in the operation of the economy and social order, it plays down moral order and tradition. Classical liberal conceptions of the role of the state are spit out in terms of a principle of "laissez-faire".<sup>20</sup>

The classical liberalism of Adam Smith, sharing the rationalist and individualist beliefs of the eighteenth century, argued that each individual is

capable of judging his or her own actions. In the economy individual pursuit of wealth and self-interest generates a collective prosperity. The great novelty of Smith lies in his preference for wealth over virtue. Also, he endorsed as a means of his ultimate value-control of arbitrary rule, a limit to the fear which governments could impose on their citizens. In Adam Smith's views, the role of the state are only to provide very limited public goods, to provide justice and defense, and to engage in educational activities.

Here, the liberal polity is briefly characterized as a community possessing to a high degree the following features: popular constitutional government; a diverse society with a wide range of individual opportunities and choices; a predominantly market economy; and a substantial strongly protected sphere of privacy and individual rights. Classical liberalism went into decline at around the end of the nineteenth century, and the term liberal became frequently used to describe an interventionist or social liberalism, particularly in the US and the UK, because of the rise of social liberal and socialist ideas; of cultural, economic and technological changes; and of deficiencies in classical liberal thought.<sup>21</sup>

It can be claimed that, at the end of the twentieth century, liberalism is now triumphant. It spreads in the heart of the advanced world because the Anglo-Saxon power became successful in the two world wars. Since the late 1970s much debate has taken place as to whether the class compromise - an acceptance by the conservatives of welfare and an acceptance by socialists of the market - has come unstuck. As Hall indicates, "more particularly, ideologists of the radical right such as Hayek and Friedman have been proclaimed as the "true" liberals by politicians such as Reagan and Thatcher in an attempt to

discredit social democracy".<sup>22</sup> However, many scholars see both ideologists deriving force behind the revival of neo-liberal ideas after the Second World War.<sup>23</sup>

Like the classical meaning of liberalism, neo-liberalism can be summarized as the belief that government intervention does not usually work and that markets usually do<sup>24</sup>. The market - the voluntary exchange of goods and services - will usually satisfy the wants of individuals more effectively than government, or the state. Neo-liberalism differs from classical liberalism;

*an individualist order is not free-standing, but depends on forms of common for its worth and its very existence...One of the basic needs of human beings is membership in a community. Such membership will be stable if the community is seen to be meeting basic human needs through the institutions of the market and others. The morality of the market, prizing and rewarding integrity and responsibility, is the only morality consistent with the reproduction of a liberal civilization.*<sup>25</sup>

There are three main views in modern liberal thinking. First one is Public Choice School explains government failure as a result of the preserve effect of the normal pursuit of self-interest in the political realm in contrast to the invisible hand in the economic realm. They consider liberty and individualism as fundamental values, and public institutions should be designed to maximize individual freedom for libertarian reason.<sup>26</sup> Second one, libertarianism, consisting of the work of Nozick and Rothbard, which represents a more extreme form of liberalism shares the liberal commitment to individual

property-based rights but lobby for a radically reduced state. That is why, individuals should have maximum autonomy and freedom.<sup>27</sup> While most libertarians want a minimum state and some seek its complete abolition, new right liberals reject such a view that arguing the need for a state to enforce indispensable laws. Finally, the work of F. A. Hayek, one of the important representative of neo-liberal school, will be touched upon.. In much of his writing, Hayek does make the conceptual link between economic and personal liberty. He does articulate possibly the economic and political assumptions of liberalism, attacks the post-war trend toward the state intervention whether in economic and welfare activities and opposes the extension of the citizenship rights through the society.<sup>28</sup> For him progress of a society, limited by the structure of rules and practices of that society itself, occurs toward an evolutionary process of natural selection of rules and institutions. It is by this criterion, "the identifications of moral rules with necessary restraints on human conduct, restraints which make ordered liberty possible, is essential to Hayek's dissociation of morality".<sup>29</sup>

Neo-liberalism has been used in the US to refer to a group of politicians and intellectuals associated with the Democrat Party. They are part of left-liberalism rather than the revival of classical liberalism, but are less hostile to the market than most left-liberals. their ideas are "vigorous economic growth achieved through an industrial policy the co-operation of government, business, and labour; support for innovation and technology; investment in education and training; national service...".<sup>30</sup>

Consequently, liberalism, within its new versions, requires a context where market forces creates the ideal conditions for individual and political

liberty. The extent of the state provision of services must be carefully specified and deliberately minimized. While the post-war Keynesian welfare consensus requires an interventionist state, liberalism implies a minimal state.

### 2.3. The New Right

The term New Right that refers to the entire collection of conservative and neo-conservative movement, and liberal and neo-liberal movements has gained usage since the mid-1970s in a number of advanced industrial democracies, especially in the US and the UK. In both countries, advocates of new right arguments had been active since the early 1960s; yet it was in the wake of the 1973-74 economic crisis, and the electoral success of Thatcher (1979) and Reagan (1980). Then, this term became commonplace. The various components of the new right, first appearing in Western Europe and North America, were both a response to the growing intellectual crisis of socialism and a reformation of other ideologies, notably classical liberalism. In the new right movements, there are two broad groups - neo-liberal and neo-conservative - each containing many particular groups.

King explains the meaning of the term new right in <sup>the</sup> a following way;

*The term New Right refers to a range of conservative and liberal ideals including principally a commitment to individual freedom and the primacy of the free market in preference to state policy. These fundamentals become the basis for policies such as privatizing the public sector, deregulation, reducing the welfare*

*state, monetarist macroeconomics measures, and, in some cases, a conservative moralism.*<sup>31</sup>

Furthermore, the ideas of the new right necessitates the abrogation of social citizenship and its implication through promoting property rights as the most valid form of citizenship right. The new right advocates thus believe that inequality is a prerequisite for societal development and progress.

These principles gave rise to two different approaches in politics. The first includes those who defend traditional liberal values of personal freedom, market process and minimal government. These liberal new right theorists believe that political and economic freedoms are most important values that can be realized in the polity. That is, liberal political and economic tenet as the core of the new right is the superiority of market mechanisms as a promoter both of economic prosperity, and of the maximization of individual freedom through limiting of the state intervention. The second new right promotes the conservative values of inequality, social hierarchy, and traditional moralism. According to this approach, many aspects of the welfare state have encouraged a breakdown of traditional values such as commitment to the family and religion.<sup>32</sup>

The origins of the ideas of new right theorists and activists are not especially new, enjoying a lineage with pre-industrial conservative belief and nineteenth-century liberalism whereas such ideas were displaced from the political agenda of western democracies during the first three decades following the Second World War since social democrats captured the political initiative. Later, since the mid-1970s, the new right has had considerable sig-

nificance in Western democracies and in displacing social democracy. To solve the problems resulted from economic crisis, the political thought of the new right contained a powerful analysis of government failure in the western democracies.

In both British and American societies, the term new right directly relates with the desire to reduce the role of state and to maximize market processes which lead to public policies, such as privatization. Moreover, it effectively locates a constellation of committees, centers and institutes committed to opposition to the expanded state of the post-war period and restoration of individualism. The American New Right contributed to the victory of Reagan and influenced his administration's policy decisions subsequently. Similarly, the British New Right played major role in shaping the direction of the Thatcher leadership and government.<sup>33</sup> Both leaders - Reagan and Thatcher - had significant effect on Ozal's policies, especially primacy of free market economy, privatization, giving priority to individuals, and other, in the 1980s.

What are differences and similarities between the British New Right and the American New Right, in terms of their policies and implementations? British usage of the term New Right is considerably based upon liberalism which is the source of the New Right economic and political theories and policy objectives. However, conservatism only provides a set of residual claims to cover the consequences of pursuing the liberal policies; for example, liberal objective of reducing public welfare provision implies a traditional role for women and the family; conservatism provides an ideology justifying such outcomes from public policy.<sup>34</sup> In British conservative doctrine of the New

Right, unlike American one, the social and moral conservatism has been less powerful and played minimal role in the decision-making process. The New Right is largely synonymous with Thatcherism that combines Toryism - nation, family, authority, traditionalism - with liberal political economy- self-interest, competitive individualism and anti-statism. This seems to be identical with the act of American conservative combining traditionalism and libertarianism in the 1950s and 60s, and after the mid-1970s.

In the United States, the main characteristics of the New Right was its continuity with the older conservative movement in leadership and ideology as well as in strategy and rhetoric. Difference between the two is usually superficial. Still, it combined a militant anti-communism with a libertarian defense of pristine capitalism and a traditionalist concern with moral and social order. Unique features of the ideology of the New Right, however, were the emphasis on social issues, and the adoption of supply-side of economics that was a substantive departure from conservative ideology. Corporate Conservatism, that remained an important political force as the Reagan years ended, and the New Religious Right, remained limited in scope of its influence in both Reagan and Bush era, are other significant right movements. New Right, intellectual conservatives and religious activists together - the New Religious Right - provided an important part of the groundwork for Ronald Reagan's successful presidential candidacy in 1980.

In the United States, the "New Paradigm" as a guiding theory of the New Right is regarded as the brain of the policies of Reagan, pickled in the brine of an approach to social policy. What is the New Paradigm? It includes: free market and free enterprise; *decentralization*; *choice* of consumers; *em-*



*powerment*, and *pragmatism* that public service provision should be guided by what works, not by ideological dogma.<sup>35</sup> The American New Right, or American neo-conservatives, have an agenda that is currently being associated with the rise of the moral majority and some former liberal and leftist disenchanted intellectuals, as contradictory to the British one.

Both the Thatcher and Reagen governments sought to push their respective political economies toward increased reliance upon the market sector; it is for this reason that they sought to shift public spending away from public welfare services. An obvious example of this is the Thatcher Government's vigorous pursuit of the privatization of many areas of public ownership. It seems to be logical implication of New Right economic principles to reverse the post-war trend through increased state-based activity in place of market-based activity. Both the Labour Party in Britain and the Democrats in the United States have been placed on the defensive by the spread of the arguments of New Right and have been forced to revised their own programs.

In short, New Right ideas , it can be said, have had considerable influence on public policy in western democracies. The policy of reducing public sector through privatization and deregulation has become a general one. Many western democracies have engaged in extensive privatization programs, and this strategy has extended to the new democracies of Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, the New Right ideas have in important ways achieved dominance in the intellectual arguments informing public policy in western democracies.

---

---

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>For details, see Antony H. Birch, *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy* (1986), pp. 17-18.

<sup>2</sup>See, Keith Graham, *The Battle of Democracy: Conflict, Consensus and the Individual*, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986), p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>See, Mike Riley, *Power, Politics and Voting Behaviour* (New York and London: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1988), p. 8, and Stephen L. Elkin, "Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy", in *The Democratic State*, ed by R. Benjamin and Stephen L. Elkin (Lawrence, Kansas: the University Press of Kansas, 1985), pp. 179-213.

<sup>4</sup>For the definition of pluralism made by Dahl, see Birch, p. 165.

<sup>5</sup>John Keane, *Civil Society and the State*, (London and New York: Verso, 1988), p. 26.

<sup>6</sup>S. N. Eisenstadt, "Introduction", in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. xi.

<sup>7</sup>Seymour Martin Lipset, "Conditions of the Democratic Order and Social Change: A Comparative Discourse", in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 13-14.

<sup>8</sup>Alberto Melucci, "Social Movements and the Democratisation of Everyday Life", in *Civil Society and the State*, ed. by John Keane (London and New York: Verso, 1988), p. 258.

---

<sup>9</sup>On definitions, see Desmond King, "Right", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. by Joel Krieger, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 790-91; and David Robertson, "The Right", in *A Dictionary of Modern Politics*, Second Edition, ed. by Nigel Ashford and Stephen Davis, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 45.

<sup>10</sup>King, p. 791.

<sup>11</sup>Norman Barry, "Conservatism", in *A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought*, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 45.

<sup>12</sup>Jeremy L. Himmelstein, *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 13-14.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid, p. 26.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid, p. 59.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, p. 61.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, pp. 63,85,86.

<sup>17</sup>See, N. Ashford, "Neo-conservatism", in *A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought*, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 185. Also, see Tomislav Sunic, *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right*, (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 15.

---

<sup>18</sup>John Gray, *Beyond the New Right*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 46-47.

<sup>19</sup>N. Ashford, pp. 184-5.

<sup>20</sup>On the definition of the classical liberal understanding, see King, p. 10; Himmelstein, p. 56; Gray, p. 6; and John A. Hall, "Liberalism", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. by Joel Kriger, (New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 539.

<sup>21</sup>William A. Galston, "Liberal Virtues", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 82, no. 4, December 1988, p. 1281.

<sup>22</sup>Hall, p. 541.

<sup>23</sup>N. Ashford, "Neo-liberalism", in *A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought*, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis, (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 185.

<sup>24</sup>Gray, p. 120.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid, pp. 122-23.

<sup>26</sup>King, p. 12; and Ashford, p. 186.

<sup>27</sup>King, p. 13.

---

<sup>28</sup>Norman P. Barry, "The Road to Freedom: Haiku's Social and Economic Philosophy", in *Hayek'te Serbest Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Özgür Toplum*, Anap Bilimsel Yayınlar Dizisi-3, (Ankara, 1993), p. 75.

<sup>29</sup>Barry, p. 72.

<sup>30</sup>Ashford, p. 186.

<sup>31</sup>Desmond King, "New Right", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. by J. Kriger, ( New York and Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), p. 631.

<sup>32</sup>King (1993), p. 631.

<sup>33</sup>See, Martin Durham, "The New Right, Moral Crusades and the Politics of the Family", *Economy and Society*, vol. 22, no. 2, May 1993, p. 254.

<sup>34</sup>King (1985), p. 25.

<sup>35</sup>See, Max Sawicky, "What's NEWP? A Guiding Theory of the New Right", *Social Policy*, Winter 1992, pp. 7-9.

## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TURKISH CENTER- RIGHT

In this chapter, development of the Turkish center-right will be analyzed from historical perspective. I already mentioned the general characteristics of the center-right politics. Here, brief history of Turkish center-right and their ideas will be given.

The fundamental political cleavage in the late Ottoman and early Republican era can be described as a center-periphery drift. Until the 19th century, in the Ottoman empire this center-periphery drift had been among the incumbents of the Ottoman institutions and people who excluded from the state. During the 19th century this cleavage was complicated with another one which resulted from the efforts of westernization which ended the old intra-elite unity and produced a new conflict. Under such circumstances, the Young Ottomans who played crucial role in the reforms of Tanzimat ending in the first constitutionalist period were the constitutionalist and autocratic. The democratic experiment of the second constitutionalist period (1908-1918) was dominated by the Society for Union and Progress, *Ittihat ve Terrakki Partisi*. The Unionists were simply called nationalist, authoritarian, modernist, centralist and statist. Because of these characteristics of the Unionist, they

were against three types of political groups. First one was the liberals who favored parliamentary democracy, administrative decentralization, more reliance upon the private initiative, and more Ottomanist policy (a policy aimed at creating an "Ottoman" identity around the common fatherland and dynasty). Second was the religious traditionalists who were opposed to the secularist aspects of the Unionist policies. Last one was the non-Turkish minorities.<sup>1</sup> For our study, the opposition of the liberals is much more significant than other opposition groups because this opposition was seen again in the early years of the Republic as the Progressive Republican Party which opposed the statist, centralist, revolutionist attitude of the People's Party. In other words, the People's Party maintained the tradition of the Society for Union and Progress. In the early years of the Republic, the Free Party was another political party which partially defended the views of the liberals.

With the transition to a multi-party system the Democratic Party tried to carry out the values of liberal-democratic tradition connected with the views of Prince Sebahattin, the PRP and the FP. In fact, the DP was not able to free from the legacy of the single party period; for example, its perception of the state was not different from the RPP. That is, it was not successful to implement liberal policies. Like the DP, the Justice Party did not apply the liberal economic and political policies, despite existing some liberal ideas in its initial program in the early 1960s. One may express that Turgut Ozal's Motherland Party was the first center-right party which tried to apply the liberal economic policies. Consequently, Turkish politics in the late Ottoman period and in the Republican era has obviously experienced a sort of dualistic character: statist, centralist and positivist values, on the one hand; and liberal,

pluralist and conservative-traditionalist values, on the other hand. However, the political parties that asserted to base on the liberal and conservative aspects have not fully escaped from the centralist and positivist characteristics of the Ottoman-Turkish legacy.

## 1. The Turkish Center-Right: From 1923 to 1980

### 1.1. The Progressive Republican Party

The Progressive Republican Party (PRP), *Terrakıpperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, had a very important place in the formation of a center-right tradition in Turkey, as the first organized political party, center-right party. The PRP that was the short-lived party was founded in November 1924 by a number of leaders of the War of Independence - Rauf Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, Refet Bele, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Cafer Tayyar, Adnan Adıvar - aftermath of some reforms such as the declaration of Republic, the abolition of Caliphate, and so on. In the years after 1923 the nationalist movement evolved into a movement with a far reaching goal of radically transforming Turkish society and culture. At the same time, plural political structure of such movement paved the way gradually to a monolithic power structure which was dominated by the radical wing of the movement under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. This change involved the elimination of rival power centers within the nationalist movement and, in several cases, these showed some resistance . The most serious resistance, potentially dangerous to M. Kemal's position, was the formation of the PRP, earnestly challenging to the Kemalists until it was



closed under the *Takrir-i Sukun Kanunu* (Law on the Maintenance of Order) in June 1925.

Erik Jan Zürcher, in his study of the *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic*, proves that the main reason for the PRP's opposition was that its founders and leaders were fully convinced that they had as much right and legitimacy to govern Turkey as M. Kemal and his "new" men. For prominent nationalist leaders, the heritage of the movement "was being monopolized illegitimately by one guardian of the true traditions of the movement".<sup>2</sup> Also, they declared that they opposed to personal rule (*Şahsi Salтанat*), an obvious reference to M. Kemal's personal ascendancy, and attacked the anti democratic and authoritarian tendencies of the government.

However, the clash of personalities is not itself enough to explain the emergence of the PRP's opposition. It was also much more: it was a fundamental clash of world views. The men who formed the PRP preferred continuity in contrast to the revolutionary approach of the Kemalists; that is, the PRP wanted *Islahat* (reform) rather than *Inkilap* (revolution). Furthermore, they were against to the centralization of power envisaged in the Kemalist program and proposed local initiative involving the people in their own affairs as the vital step towards democracy.<sup>3</sup>

Both in the PRP's manifesto and program, the party advertised itself as liberal. In its manifesto, it emphasized economic and, particularly, political liberalism by which the will of people had to be expressed continuously. Although this could be done partially through public opinion and the press, this was not effective enough. The real solution is the formation of competing political parties. In this way the manifesto stated its opposition to despotism,

and stressed individual rights, judicial independence, and administrative decentralization. In the general principles of its program, Turkish state is a Republic based on the sovereignty of the people. In short, liberalism and democracy form the basis of its actions, supporting general and individual liberties, promising a reduction in the role of the state, and establishing clear separation of powers. In the chapter of its program on social policies which is a good example of its decentralization, welfare is the responsibility of the municipality and city districts, but that the fulfillment of this responsibility to be found in supporting and encouraging private initiative. The emphasis is clearly on solidarity through charitable and mutual help organizations, not state interference.<sup>4</sup> It is on all these points that there is a clear difference of emphasis among the PRP's program and manifesto, on the one hand, and the RPP's policies, on the other hand.

The label "post-independence conservative" is quite adequate for the PRP. Frey has argued that there lay "conservative aim of making the new Turkey conform as far as possible to the customs and traditions of the old change was to be gradual and evolutionary, not swift and revolutionary in the Kemalist mode".<sup>5</sup> They were conservative only in the sense of being the conservative wing of the same Young Turk/nationalist movement, of which Kemalists formed radical wing.

## 1.2. The Free Party

The Free Party (FP), *Serbest Firka*, was the second important opposition party of the Republic. The experiment with the FP came about, as a result

of several reasons and conditions emerging in the late 1920s. The reforms that took place during the period of 1922-30 brought about some sort of antagonism to the government and the regime. Moreover, bad economic conditions, substantially affected by the world economic crisis in 1929, and continuing rebellions in Eastern Anatolia greatly added to the discontent which threatened to an important degree the Republic and its reforms. Under such circumstances, the FP was established by Fethi Okyar with the encouragement of M. Kemal who urged others to join it, including his sister. The choice of Fethi Okyar and the selection of other FP leaders were possible because they were not challengers to M. Kemal. It is generally accepted that the purpose of establishing this party was to air the accumulated discontent and to control existing social opposition.<sup>6</sup>

M. Kemal did not only determine the people who founded the FP, but also the nature of the FP's program. Its program consisted of several points, such as republicanism, secularism and liberalism; direct elections; abolition of monopolies, tax reductions and a free exchange; and importation of foreign capital. The main objective of the FP was to oppose the RPP and to criticize its failure in the economic field. This attracted to it immediately a large group of enthusiastic followers who courageously supported the party. Growing popularity of the FP and its criticism of the government were interpreted by the Republicans not only as a threat to their own rule, but to that of the regime itself. In the eyes of government, this support came chiefly from reactionaries. M. Kemal and the RPP justified abolition of the FP, which was dissolved by its leader in November 1930, by alleging that it had become the vehicle for counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, the objective of founding the FP, one may argue, was not to pass to democratic system through compromising the

single party system. The FP which had some similarities by the PRP, especially in terms of economic policies, prepared the ground for the Democratic Party, established in 1945 and dominating Turkish politics in the 1950s.

### 1.3. The Democrat Party

The transition to multi-party politics started in 1946 when the RPP regime allowed the formation of opposition parties. The reasons that stood behind the decision of passing to multi-party system were the favorable international environment following the victory of the democratic regimes in the Second World War, the long tradition of westernization that implied democratization, and the social unrest due to wartime shortages and profiteering.

The Democrat Party (DP), *Demokrat Parti*, which was the most significant and influential opposition party was founded on 7 January 1946 by four prominent parliamentarians of the RPP - Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan. Only four years after its establishment, the DP came to power with an overwhelming electoral victory on 14 May 1950, and also it won the 1954 and 1957 elections. After remaining in power for ten years, it was ousted by the military on 27 May 1960.

The DP as a coalition of various types of oppositions to the RPP brought together urban liberals and religious conservatives, commercial middle class and the urban poor, etc. Such heterogeneity of the DP coalition

claimed that "the dominant social cleavage of the era was cultural rather than socio-economic in nature. The common denominator of the DP supporters was their opposition to the state officials".<sup>7</sup> In this sense, it shares some similar characteristics with the PRP which emerged because of the cultural cleavage and the world view differences, and both share the views on liberal economic and democratic policies. Unlike the PRP, the DP was permitted to be established with a limitation that it would respect Atatürkist principles.<sup>8</sup>

The specific issues put forward by the DP in general involved the high cost of living, lack of freedom, the existence of anti-democratic laws, and some abuses by the government. It is because that the Democrats saw the concept of democracy as a panacea for almost any problem, from tax inequality to gendarmerie pressure. For them it would take root in the daily life of the people. In its four years in power, the DP aimed at advancing democracy with preventing government interference and with rising individual freedoms. However, in the later years, because of the failure of economy, a number of freedoms were limited - some measures against to opposition taken - in order to achieve peace and stability. Beside the economic failure, the DP's perception on the state which was not so different from the RPP is another factor responsible for the failure of democracy. Like the RPP, it considered all institutions to be at the service of the party in power; here, it did not oppose to the transcendentalist state. They differed greatly from each other in their perspectives to the role of the state, bureaucracy, private enterprises, and local initiative. The lack of political culture conducive to a democratic government was third factor. It may be seen that the legacy of the single-party period continued to influence the DP's attitude, such as intolerance towards political opposition.<sup>9</sup>

As it has been noted above, political conflict between the RPP and the DP emerged as difference of attitude in terms of values and norms. In this respect, Islam was seen as the most potent issue. The DP government, which itself became associated by the resurgence of Islam, permitted wider grounds for religious practice and education, without compromising Atatürkist's reforms.<sup>10</sup> Throughout much appealing towards religion and other symbols, it emerged to be such a party that fought to hinder the domination of the bureaucratic state over civil society. The conflict among the DP and the bureaucracy, which retained its RPP loyalties under multi-party politics and resisted the DP's efforts to consolidate its political power, was the perhaps most significant factor leading to the breakdown of the democratic regime.

#### 1. 4. The Justice Party

After the 1960 military intervention, Ragıp Gümüşpala, Şinasi Osmalı, Tahsin Demiray, Mehmet Yorgancıoğlu, Cevdet Perin participated in the establishment of a new party which would be a continuation of the Democrat Party. Only four of the eleven founders of the party had any relations with the DP. The Justice party (JP), *Adalet Partisi*, was set up in 1960, and Gümüşpala became its chairman. As one of the three political parties - the Justice Party, the Nation Party (NP), *Millet Partisi*, and the New Turkey Party (NTP), *Yeni Türkiye Partisi* - competing to the successors to the Democrats, the Justice Party won only 35 percent of the votes in the 1961 elections. Following a period of unstable coalition governments, the JP gradually established itself as the principle heir to the DP. In the elections of 1965, it gained an absolute

majority and formed a government under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel. In spite of the decline of its votes, in 1969, it retained its absolute majority in the Assembly and continued to be in power until the military forced JP government to resign in March 1971. While its votes decreased by fully one-third in the 1973 elections, the JP remained the dominant party of the center-right; then, it returned to power as a series of Demirel-led coalitions, after the short-lived RPP-NSP (National Salvation Party) coalition of 1973-4.

The support received from a number of influential groups seemed to be major factor in the success of the JP in its formative years. A body of former officers and DP members became actively involved in its foundation. In turn, for Demirel, the JP was a mass party which represent the interests of all class-city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers. For example, the JP aimed at representing the interest of both industrial workers and businessmen: it was able to do this successfully.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore in the 1960s it took some supports among persons not wholly committed to the secularism and westernisation principles of Atatürkism. The coalition on the right based on the periphery, that was forged first by the DP and followed by the JP, showed signs of breaking down during the late 60s and early 70s, and so the situation to the right of the JP was more fragmented. Emerging religious and nationalist movement in addition to the personalistic type of leadership aided by such fragmentation.<sup>12</sup>

The JP and its Democrats predecessor were identified in the 1950s and 1960s more with liberal and pro-private enterprise policies, while the RPP leaned toward estatism, emphasizing the leading role of the state in economic

development. The JP always accorded an important role to the private sector, and also its liberal anti-statism was stronger than that of the DP. In its programmatic theme, the private sectors and free-market economy were regarded as necessary for a democratic regime; the public sector may start when the private sector end. However, as it came to power, the share of the governmental sector in economy was not limited and the state economic enterprises continued to powerfully exist.<sup>13</sup> At that point, it may be regarded to be a pragmatic party. Following years of its government, the JP thus gradually arrived at the idea of mixed economy. Furthermore, the JP as a center-right platform was identified mainly with business and modernized agrarian interest. Like the DP in the 1950s, the JP in the 1960s and 70s continued to represent peripheral discontent with the policies of modernizing bureaucratic-intellectual elite during the single-party period. Because it was a party based on political will, the JP was anathema to the bureaucracy which had already received quite a big share of power, thanks to the 1961 constitution. As the opposite of the DP, it was very cautious in its relations with the military. For instance, in order to show the good will to military, the JP-dominated parliament elected Cevdet Sunay the President of the Republic and Demirel turned the National Security Council (NSC) into an active tool in everyday politics. At the same time, the JP skillfully used patronage and clientelistic ties in its grassroots organisation inherited from the strong DP organisation. During the 1970s, it was a ideologically pivotal party, while it was weaker than before. Ideological differences between the JP and the RPP were so great, creating hostility among two parties, and among electorates.



## 2. The Center-Right of Turkey in the Post-1980

### 2. 1. The Motherland Party

The Motherland Party (MP), *Anavatan Partisi*, one of the major center-right parties, unexpectedly came to power after 1980, having achieved impressive results in the parliamentary elections of 1983. In the present part, an attempt will be made to explain the position and ideology of the MP in the center-right context under three subtitle: (1) The MP under Ozal Leadership, (2) Post-Ozal Era, and (3) Party policies and Ideology.

#### 2. 1. 1. The MP under Ozal Leadership

The MP under the leadership of Turgut Ozal was formed by a group of founders who primarily came from the private enterprises and took part in the lower echelons of the pre-1980 centrist and extremist political parties. Throughout cutting across the old cleavage of the right and perhaps extending into the center-left, it brought about the development of a new cleavage in Turkish politics. Therefore, it has been mostly come on the scene as the coalition of the four inclinations: liberals, conservatives, nationalists and centrists. Various groups coming from different social strata may be added to these inclinations. To a large extent this coalition of Ozal's MP was similar with the coalition led by the DP which was especially successful in molding a coalition of different economic, cultural and social interests existing in the periphery. Such structure of the MP assisted in neutralizing and reintegrating the anti-systemic tendencies on the right and the periphery, including so many members of the National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Nationalist Action

Party (NAP). The synthesis of four inclination provided by the MP closely related with a sort of consensus on some targets and opinions such as free market economy, protecting the traditional values, free will, and so on.<sup>14</sup>

Turgut Ozal, the leader of the MP from 1983 to 1989, was close to the Justice Party and its leader, Demirel. Ozal himself served under Demirel - the prime minister of JP governments - with his capacity on several occasions, in 1969 as the Director of the State Planning Organisation and in 1979 as the economic adviser of Prime Minister. In addition, because his brother was one of the influential member of the NSP, he was related to the NSP in a way that he was contested in 1977 on its Izmir list. It is for the reason that Ergüder defines Ozal's position in Turkish politics, before 1980, somewhere between the moderate and more secular right of the JP, and the religious right of the NSP.<sup>15</sup>

There are so many reasons behind unexpected victory of the MP in the 1983 elections. At the first hand, the success of the MP appears to be associated with the tendency of masses' commitment to free elections linked with better living standards and the dramatic socio-economic development in the eyes of the people. The Turkish electorate had already searched for a new centrist solution to the diseases of the party system in order to achieve regime stability. However, instead of ideological polarization of the electorate, the Turkish electorate preferred the stable government and efficient delivery of services and solution of the problems. The MP seemed to have sensed this centrist and pragmatic leaning of the Turkish electorate. The MP leadership responded this characteristics of the electorate with its conciliatory and moderate style of politics. As Ergüder put it,

*The MP may have emerged as a new , taking advantage of the vacuum created by the absence of the old parties and the yearning of the electorate for a democratic and relatively grassroots center-right alternative, given the choice they had in 1983. By steering clear of ideological and partisan conflict and by addressing new sets of issues in a changing and urbanizing Turkey, the MP seemed to have become a major party of the right, despite the strong opposition from the old guard of Turkish politics.<sup>16</sup>*

Moreover, Ozal projected himself as a qualified technician turned to politics, who knows the rational formulas of Turkey's problems and is ready to implement them without any political considerations. Explaining its position through using modern channels of communication (TV, press, advertising) is another basic factor paving the way to its success in the elections of 1983. In TV it cast an image of an economically developing country.

The MP had significance in providing "softening of political conflict" and in creating "policy-oriented dialogue"<sup>17</sup> in the post-1980 political life. It thus emphasized on a tolerance, conciliatory style of politics and moderation rather than polarized and non-conciliatory politics of the pre-1980. This new type of politics caused the conflict and criticism over policies rather than ideological conflict or systemic and anti-systemic conflict. Other major attempt at the reform by the MP was to give more autonomy and power to local government and especially to municipalities, through which it tried to reduce the burden of bureaucracy on the people. This attempt to localization has been one of the most potent aim of the center-right from the beginning; for example, the idea of localization tended to be a dominant in the initial

program and manifesto of the PRP, the first organized center-right party. It is because that localization has been considered to be the first step for reaching liberal democracy. Its emphasis on delivery of services to the citizen made the well-conducted campaign to show the relationship between taxes and service delivery. This was other reason which open up the place for the MP at the center-right of Turkish politics.

The economic policy of the MP combined with an economic rationality, communicating with the masses to explain the rationality behind policy decision, a commitment to reduce inflation to reasonable levels, strengthening economically the "main pillar" (orta direk), securing economic growth and prosperity. Economic policy of the MP responded market signals through an emphasis on exports and internationalization of Turkish economy, in contrast to the unquestioning preference of the earlier periods for import substitution. This means that, unlike former center-right parties, the MP made possible shifting a state-dominated economy to an export-oriented free market economy where the state would be cut down in size. Also, this represents an effort to divorce economic policy from decisions and priorities depended upon the patron-client relations which was associated by the politics of the DP and the JP. The privatization policy of the MP was a crucial try for cutting down the size of the state in economy within which it was aimed to safeguard the State Economic Enterprises against political patronage.<sup>18</sup> In practice, the governments of the MP heavily invested in infrastructural development and tourism, realized with the help of borrowing abroad that gave headache to its government after the mid-1980s.

In the constitutional referendum, held on the issue of lifting the ban on the political activities of the pre-1980 political leadership in 6 September 1987, Prime Minister Turgut Ozal and the MP actively campaigned against lifting the ban. In short term, it was useful for the MP, but, in long term, it would indicate that its support of conciliatory politics and its commitment to democratic values was eroding, and also, it signaled that the MP leadership was going away from the conciliatory and moderate style of politics on a basic political rights.<sup>19</sup>

In the 1987 elections, the MP won a majority of the seats and remained in power because it was successfully adopted the winning formula of the DP-JP, based on an effective policy performance. After this elections, the TPP of Demirel became to be major obstacle for the MP regaining the dominant position on the right of the political spectrum. Beside that the challenge of increasing rates of inflation, that coupled by the declining growth rate, appeared to be other reason behind the decline of the electoral support for the MP government.

By the end of 1986 and early 1987, Turkey witnessed the rise of party competition and fragmentation in the right because of the emergence of old parties and leaders of the right. To maintain its position the MP therefore resorted to the same economic policy measures popular at election time, as in the 1970s: higher agricultural support prices and heavy spending in constituencies, which led to the rise of economic deficiencies and problems. Here, it might be asserted that this policies caused the re-emergence of the patron-client relations, excessive expenditures at election time to win, and a less conciliatory attitude toward the press and the opposition.

The local elections on 6 March, 1989, was seen as the most important sign of trouble for the MP which was able to capture a mere 21.8 percent of the votes whereas the TPP strengthened its position and manifested to be an alternative of the MP. As a result of such failure, the issue of searching new image and a return to the spirit of 1983 started to be openly discussed, so that cracks in the coalition of four inclinations began to emerge.

In 1989 Ozal era in the MP was ended by his election as the President of the Republic. Sometimes described as "Moslem technocrat", Ozal seemed to appeal to traditional values without giving them ideological pre-eminence over the need to bring Turkey into the international competitive market place. In this respect, a comparison to R. Reagan and M. Thatcher is not out of place. Reagan's appeal to Christian values, anti-abortion interests, etc., enables him to absorb traditional elements of the electorate without sacrificing his prime emphasis on modern issues which are the market over the state, investment and growth over income maintenance, and so on. Likewise, Thatcher's strong emphasis on the Victorian age, right along with liberal economic policies, is similar with Reagan's. Neo-conservative and neo-liberal movements both in the US and the UK affected these behaviors of Reagan and Thatcher. Ozal's public stance on traditional morality had been notably more muted than that of his American and England counterpart.

### 2. 1. 2. Post-Ozal Era

After Ozal was elected as the President, struggle between four inclinations within the MP risingly continued to gain power. At the end, Yıldırım

Akbulut, one of the leaders of the conservative slant, was appointed as Prime Minister by President Ozal, and then was elected as the Chairman of the MP. Although Ozal was not able to, as President, officially have ties with the MP, during the period of Prime Minister Akbulut, he indirectly interfered in the decisions and policies of the MP government and directed the internal power relations within the MP. In spite of relative hegemony of nationalists and conservatives over others, the MP under the leadership of Akbulut who was in power for two years, 1989-1991, did not represent substantially any different features from Ozal period in terms of implementing economic and political policies, and of basic ideology or outlooks. During the term of Akbulut, discussions about the issue of a new image for the MP and the search for a new identity were increasingly maintained in order to able to grasp the spirit of 1983. This search for a new image in the post-Ozal period may find its clear expression in terms of the struggle among the conservative-nationalist side and liberal-centrist one.

In June 1991, Mesut Yılmaz, labeled as a leader of liberals and centrists, was elected as the chairman of the MP and Prime Minister, replacing Akbulut. To begin with, Yılmaz dismissed most of staff of the government and the administrators of Akbulut's time and set up his new cadre in the MP administration and government. In this way he attempted to break the indirect control of Ozal over the party. The purpose of this attitude of Yılmaz was to dominate and direct the party by removing old cadre with his new men, and so the MP became the party of Yılmaz.<sup>20</sup> Because of exclusion of some groups from the party, the MP was not the same with the MP under the leadership of Ozal which depended on the coalition of four inclinations.

What is the new within the chairmanship of Yılmaz in the MP is that the MP enters into a search in order to rely on a kind of intellectual base because the center-rightist political parties have suffered the lack of ideological and intellectual support from the beginning. In this search of a new ideological identity, in these days, there is a significant tendency for accepting liberalism as a basic philosophy.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, neo-conservatism, firstly used by Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Reagan in the United States, is another important concept, which was clearly seen in the policies of Ozal's governments, in defining new ideological identity. After 1983, both liberalism, especially in economic sense, and conservatism started to be used for the first time in Turkish political life by the MP.<sup>22</sup> Yet, unlike Ozal, Yılmaz attempts to effectively use both concepts as a kind of intellectual-ideological base. Mesut Yılmaz defines the MP's position in Turkish politics from 1983 until now in the following way:

*After 1983, Turkey entered into a process of transformation through implementing new policies and carried out new reforms by the MP. In the late 1980s, Turkey however faced with a sort of fatigue of the reforms: high rate of inflation and foreign debt. We are now trying to make up a new program by which second step of transformation will be realized.<sup>23</sup>*

### **2. 1. 3. Policies and Ideology of the MP**

The MP as a center-right and moderate political party undertook to implement the liberal economic and democratic policies once it was in power.



As I indicated in the previous sections, it cut across former cleavages of the right and the left by its position as conciliatory politics and commitment to democracy. In this sense, one might claim that economic and political liberalism were two designating factors in describing the MP's policies after 1983.

One of the high-level official in the MP, in a personal interview on November 10th 1993 in Ankara, noticed:

*The MP has struggled with the bureaucratic and centralized structure of the state. While some success has been gained, the strong state structure that comes from the era of the single-party system could not unfortunately be removed. That's why, democracy does work with its all institutions. Still, the parliament and government do not have the enough power to control the bureaucracy.*

The challenge of the MP to the bureaucratic and corporatist state structure through applying the liberal policies paved the way for causing such bureaucratic structure to decline in quality. One of the student of Turkish politics mentioned that "during the 1980s, the erosion of Atatürkism as the official ideology could be seen a development that provided far greater scope or politics. The political will rather than the bureaucratic now had the upper hand, particularly in those areas that were not preserved as the sphere of the state".<sup>24</sup> However, in spite of the MP's challenge to bureaucratic structure and the relative liberalization of the state, this does not mean that the MP fully

reduces the Atatürkist principles, seen as necessary for reaching democratic and modern Turkey by the MP leaders.

One of the most important contribution of the MP to Turkish politics is to precede individual rather than the state by reducing huge burden of bureaucracy on the citizens; during its government, the term individual gained importance, and its priority *vis-à-vis* the state was wholly acceded by Turkish intellectuals. Therefore, individual seems to be regarded at the first attempt in all activities of government and opposition.<sup>25</sup> Other contribution of the MP is that it brought about cause that Turkish intellectuals began to see economy as a sphere of technical field rather than a sphere of political economy whereas it unnecessarily insisted on and pronounced the economy far too much, which led to the emergence of destructive effect in the moral structure of the society, with little attention to political liberalism.

The MP's view on the state is directly related with liberalism in the economic and political sense. It requires a small state which is only responsible for the defense, social security and infrastructure, not a state which controls and interferes into political life and economics. However, this small state should be active, which means that when it makes its original function, it becomes more strong.<sup>26</sup> For the MP, the Turkish state is able to designate and impose its official ideology, represented by Atatürkism, which is main criteria in shaping Turkish politics and society. It may be here mentioned that there exists a dichotomy among its views on the state and its liberal philosophy.<sup>27</sup>

The MP principally depends on three freedoms shaping its understanding of democracy: (1) freedom of thought, (2) freedom of conscience

and religion, and (3) freedom of enterprise. According to Yılmaz, this system of three freedoms in which there is no place of statist thought and policy will make its mark on the political, social and economic life in the late 20th and 21st century. The creative power of individuals takes place of the statism and this system of three freedoms provides a democratic environment where each group and individuals realize their projects reflecting their interest. In fact, the leader of the MP, in spite of these views, talks about some limitation on democracy not seen as a basically necessary and prior thing in every case. For instance, the MP chairman Yılmaz does not see democratic policies as a solution of the South Eastern question at the first hand. Indeed, in spite of the tendency accepting liberalism as a general ideology, the requirements of political liberalism may not be reflected on the MP's views, especially its view on the position of the state and society. It does not have a clear cut ideology and views resting on liberal or conservative aspects. During the 1980s, the MP with its emphasis on economic rationality, service delivery and decreasing bureaucracy seemed to open up a place for itself at the center right of Turkish politics.

## **2. 2. The True Path Party**

### **2. 2. 1. The TPP in Opposition**

The True Path Party (TPP), *Doğru Yol Partisi*, basically a direct continuation of the Justice Party, was founded in 1983 by a group of people oriented by Süleyman Demirel, former leader of the JP. Ahmet Nusret Tuna became its first chairman and later, in stead of him, Yıldırım Avcı became its

chairman. The TPP was essentially led by Demirel who was elected the chairman of the party in 1987. Its basic characteristics have been the articulation of its exclusive association with the JP and carries out the claims of inheritance from the Democrat Party of the 1950s.

The leader in the TPP has been very crucial because it is a party primarily identified with its leader, Demirel . It is clearly claimed that it is Demirel's party. Following the military coups, the Justice Party with all pre-1980 political parties was closed down, and so Demirel and his followers were banned from political activity, because of the reason that the military held Demirel and other pre-1980 political leaders morally responsible for the civil-war like situation of the 1970s. Once the military decided to turn to a multi-party politics, Demirel and his followers set up the Grand Turkey Party (GTP), *Büyük Türkiye Partisi*, despite the fact that he was banned from political activity before the 1983 elections. Yet, the military abolished the GTP and sent Demirel and some of his followers to the Zincirbozan military facilities in Çanakkale. Other followers of him, directed by Demirel to set up a political party through remote control from the activity, established "The TPP which was soon to become the symbol of democracy, liberty and freedom and basic rights".<sup>28</sup>After he returned to Ankara, he continuously steered the TPP through his faithful followers like Yıldırım Avcı, Gökberk Ergenekon, Mehmet Dülger, Husamettin Cindoruk, etc.

The TPP had received clear and strong opposition from the military. Beside that, much of DP-JP voters that made up Demirel's traditional support base was also captured by Turgut Ozal's MP. Feride Acar has noted:

*Despite all negative situations, Demirel managed to stay in the politics. After September 1980, he followed a deliberate strategy of keeping his contacts, very close and even daily, alive supporters all over Turkey. His personality and leadership style, and the predominantly patron-client type of relationship between the TPP and the party's supporters facilitated such a personal touch possible.<sup>29</sup>*

In such successful contacts, Demirel's image of "people's man" (halk adamı) had a fundamental place. He has also been the only leader of major political party in Turkish political life who speaks with a rural, Central Anatolian accent. From the beginning, he has always had a kind of a message that provided a commitment to the masses in a best possible way about presence of the true representatives of people in parliament.

The image of Demirel as the people's man, his commitment to distributive governmental policies and his personal style of easy access caused the clientilistic JP of the 1960s and 70s. On the contrary, with the changing conditions, in the 1980s, this clientilistic policies became unfavorable because of opposition status. Indeed, Demirel's life and personal style were not appropriate for the conditions in the late 1980s. The populist policies have not accorded well in the 1980s with a different ambitions and values of second and third generation urbanites, young technocrats, professional elites, particularly in the presence of an alternative rightist discourse, i. e. that of the MP.<sup>30</sup> Thus, Demirel needed to change his general old image and also the image of the TPP. His new image seemed to be identical with democracy, struggling against the anti-democratic policies and the military. On the other

hand, the fragments of old patronage and clientilistic relations are still main determining factors in the TPP's policies and organisation.

With a national referendum in September 1987, the bans against all former political leaders of the pre-1980 era was lifted. After that, Demirel was elected as the fourth chairman of the TPP at an extra-ordinary convention. At the late 1980s and early 1990s, Demirel was forced to make a "face lift" in the party in order to attract the electorates. It is by this criterion, at the TPP's convention in 1991, the TPP recruited "new faces" and was now striving to gain its aims with the help of the modern outlook. By this time, Professor Tansu Çiller joined the TPP. New executives of the party including Çiller were elected to rejuvenate the TPP. In October 1991 elections, the TPP won the highest number of votes in the parliamentary elections but failed to obtain an outright majority, resulting the coalition set by Demirel with Erdal İnönü's Social Democratic Populist Party.

In its election platform, the TPP had set clear targets such as ousting President Ozal, introducing sweeping democratic reforms, improving Turkey's human rights image, reducing inflation in a reasonable period of time and combating terrorism within the guidelines of democratic norms. The most of these targets remained intact under the coalition protocol.<sup>31</sup>

What are the TPP's ideology and views during opposition? The main ideology of the TPP depended upon three basic aspects: democracy, nationalism and conservatism, which are particularly important in defining its identity and describing its location in the post-1980 political spectrum. Beside the JP's ideas, stands and terminology, the TPP developed a new and distinct discourse, but it suffered the lack of sophistication in its ideological discourse,

because of insufficient intellectual and media support and the party's existing intellectual cadre tending to be over shadowed by Demirel.<sup>32</sup> Such position of the TPP directly relates with traditional weakness of Turkish center-right political parties being deprived of an intellectual basis and academic support.

The conception of "democracy", for the TPP, means unquestionable superiority and unhindered exercise of the "national will" (milli irade). Moreover, the ideology of the TPP bases upon the assumption that the "bureaucratic will" is particularly against the "national will". As a result of such view, during opposition, it had a dichotomy among civil and military bureaucracy, and ordinary people of Turkey. Such perception might be explained with the traditional center-periphery rift in Turkish politics. Acar sees the TPP's position in the following way:

*It is hardly tolerant other political groups and parties of their claims to represent civil societal elements. Thus, it perceives "free democracy" both as simple majoritarianism relying exclusively on the forces of periphery which are assumed to be the incarnation of the national will and as coming to the fore only when the DP, the JP, or the TPP true representatives of the masses, are in government.<sup>33</sup>*

This sort of perception of democracy naturally has negative implications in terms of the minority rights, legitimacy of opposition, peaceful transfer of power and desirability of a governmental system characterized by checks and balances. It is by this criterion, equating the TPP's conception of democracy with a pluralistic understanding of democracy appears problematic. Such TPP's understanding of populist and majoritarian con-

ception of democracy is similar with the DP's perception in the 1950s. One may therefore argue that Turkish democracy represented populist characteristics, especially in the 1950s, and the 1960s and 70s. This means that there was a strong orientation to unmediated mass political participation but not democracy in terms of rights of the minorities, toleration for opposition, and so on. To a large extent, The center-right of Turkish politics - the DP, the JP, the MP, and the TPP - has represented features of such understanding of democracy.

The theme of "democracy" and "national will", which has constituted the public face of the party's ideology, let the TPP displaying strong anti-militarism. Its leadership had put a significant fight against post-coup attempts to depoliticize society, and also this had maintained the basis of the TPP's major challenge to the MP and its leader Ozal.

The TPP's challenge to the bureaucratic will does not have the same meaning with which the TPP especially opposes the basic aspects of the official ideology basing on the secularism-laicisim- and Atatürkist principles. In the views of the TPP, both secularism and Atatürkist principles that are the basis of the democratic and unitary state structure, and freedom of religious belief and freedom of thought and freedom of speech can not be restricted.<sup>34</sup> It is concluded that the TPP's understanding of the state and democracy has bounded to central official ideology, Atatürkism.

Another meaningful ideological theme of the TPP is Turkish nationalism defined as social cohesiveness, territorial integrity, altruism and promotion of a higher national consciousness among the citizens. Its nationalism



is devoid of extreme rightist formulation of the concept: anti-communist and anti-leftist. In this sense, its views on the nationalism is separated from other major center-right party, the MP, which legalized the extremist tendency in Turkey by removing the code of 141, 142 and 163 in the Constitution.

Conservatism that has been perceived as the protection of national tradition and culture is one of the basic aspects of the TPP's ideology. Its perception of conservatism included a sensitivity to Muslim values and practices of the population; it was different from the connotative meaning of conservatism, as in the National Salvation Party and the Welfare Party. The TPP's version was basically secular.<sup>35</sup> Sometimes the leaders of the TPP used religious-conservatism rather than secular conservatism as a kind of rhetoric. In fact, the TPP strictly oppose any sort of religious political parties which run counter the secular ideology of the state.<sup>36</sup>

The TPP was not able to free from the views of mixed economy whereas, at the early 1990s, it seemed to accept liberal economic policies as its basic economic targets. In its party program and government protocol, it is claimed that, instead of setting prices by monopolistic and administrative decisions, flexible pricing will be adopted with a view to invigorating the market. It is for this reason that the role of the state was reformulated by the TPP in a way that the role of the state should be to co-ordinate and stabilize the economy rather than rigid planning and setting inflexible goals while creating an environment which will stimulate the potential of the private sector. Privatization is a basic tenet of this policy. For the TPP, it is a means of consolidating the financial structure of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). The TPP's leaders defended smaller state's hegemony in the econ-

omy, and so they require the privatization of the SEEs. These economic policies are same with the new right policies in the west. Patron-client relationship among the leaders and their men or followers might, however, prevent to manifest indefinite attitude on the privatization issue. These economic policies of the TPP resulted that the challenge that came from the TPP in opposition was not on issues concerning economic policy because "January 24th, 1980 Economic Measures" adopted by a government under Demirel formed the basis of Ozal's economic policies, and also formed the TPP's views on economic issue.

In short, in the post-1980 period, the TPP played a far more significant role in the legitimating of civilian politics and in maintaining the issue of democracy on the political agenda through the symbolism of the continuity of its leadership and its anti-militarism. The nature of its rather simplistic conception of democracy leads to a kind of fairly negative role in the development and consolidation of pluralist democracy in Turkey.

### **2. 2. 2. The TPP in Government**

After setting up the coalition among the TPP and the SDPP, this government tried to realize its targets which included the reducing high rate of inflation, introducing democratic reforms, etc. However, it failed in reaching the most of its targets, so the masses that expected too much from the TPP and the coalition started losing confidence in government and the TPP. Although the leaders of the TPP made several promises during opposition, they failed to keep any of them. The TPP, which insisted so much on de-

mocracy among 1983 and 1991, started turning into a party of the *status quo* and started to abandon the superior values and norms it had striven for in the past decade.<sup>37</sup> There were also accusations that a party which suffered so much intimidation in the hands of a military administration had forgotten the past and was attempting to facilitate the military.

Its challenge to the "bureaucratic will" of the state and its wish of civil politics which were stressed during in opposition have not been put into practice. Unlike its challenge to the MP, in terms of the relationship with the military and bureaucracy, there has not yet existed any different policies of the TPP from the MP. As we know, the TPP's anti-militaristic view had constituted the basis of the TPP's main challenge to the MP.

The TPP, like the DP and the JP, has primarily based on the clientilistic relations and on the party patronage. This understanding of democracy as a system of bargaining was, of course, less convenient in opposition than in government. This sort of relationship has therefore become dominant in the TPP in government.

When Ozal died in April 1993, the deputies decided to elect Demirel as President that meant the end of the active party politics for Demirel. Once Demirel became the President, Tansu Çiller who was former minister of the state in the TPP-SDPP coalition government was elected as chairperson in June 1993. First of all, Çiller attempted to eliminate the most of the pro-Demirel elements in the party executive and failed. This created a new friction in the TPP. She also managed to weed out all the pro-Demirel men in the Cabinet and in the most state officers. Demirel is not the father of the

party anymore but it became the party of Tansu Çiller, like Mesut Yılmaz.<sup>38</sup> With the last Convention of the TPP, Çiller got her leadership accepted by members of the TPP. In this way, the tradition of the leader-based party and politics in the center-right, which has been major factor in seeing leader as identical with party, is maintained by the examples of Çiller and Yılmaz.

Çiller relies on her ambitious privatization program in her economic policies and solving economic problems. She is fairly radical enough to take decision toward the greatest privatization operations in Turkish history. In this sense, she seems determined to follow Ozal's privatization philosophy. Furthermore, Ozal's princes are making comebacks one after another to work for Çiller with whom they share ideas and principles of economic management.<sup>39</sup> It might be seen in a way that Çiller follows the path of Ozal, but not that of Demirel. In addition to that, the TPP, the "voice of the people of Anatolia", turned to pay attention to the people of big cities and thus attempts to compete against the MP to win urban center-right votes. This attempt of Çiller might be evaluated as a sort of aim to change the traditional image of the TPP, basing on the rural population.

As in government, the TPP clearly began to depart from being party of the suffering masses and turned into the party of the opportunists. Democratic slogans, support for human rights and a derive for reforms were completely left in order to reach some short term gains.

---

---

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Ergün Ozbudun, "The Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, interruptions and reequilibrations", in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by E. Ozbudun (Ankara: Turkish Pol. Ass. Publ., 1988), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup>Erik Jan Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), p. 111.

<sup>3</sup>Feroz Ahmad, "Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 66.

<sup>4</sup>Zürcher, p. 97-102.

<sup>5</sup>Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, (Cambridge, Mass: M. I. T. Press, 1965), p. 326.

<sup>6</sup>On the establishment of the FP and this period, see Tevfik Çavdar, "Serbest Fırka", in *C. D. Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yay., 1983), p. 2053, Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to A Multi-Party System*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 64-65.

<sup>7</sup>Ergün Ozbudun, "The Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, interruptions and reequilibrations", in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by E. Ozbudun (Ankara: Turkish Pol. Ass. Publ., 1988), p. 16.

<sup>8</sup>Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*, (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1990), p. 12.

---

<sup>9</sup>For further elaboration, see Ali Yaşar Sarıbay, "The Democratic Party, 1945-1960", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 125-27.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid, p. 129.

<sup>11</sup>For details, see Avner Levi, "The Justice Party, 1960-1980", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 139.

<sup>12</sup>Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey", in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Ass., 1988), pp. 117-122.

<sup>13</sup>See, Levi, pp. 141 and Walter F. Waiker, *The Modernisation of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day*, (New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publ., 1981), p. 131-32.

<sup>14</sup>See, Üstün Ergüder, "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 153.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid, p. 155.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid, p. 160.

<sup>17</sup>These two aspects were seen by Nilüfer Göle as two determinant factor in Turkish political life after 1980. Nilüfer Göle, "80 Sonrası Politik Kültür", *Türkiye Günü*, 21 (Kış), p. 50.

---

<sup>18</sup>Ergüder, pp. 164-165.

<sup>19</sup>Jacob M. Landau, "Conclusion", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 205.

<sup>20</sup>Taha Akyol, "Çiller'in Partisi", *Milliyet* (Istanbul daily), 21 November 1993, p. 15.

<sup>21</sup>Statement made by the one of major MP leaders, during an personal interview , 10 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>22</sup>See, Şenol Durgun, "Sağdaki Yeni Gelişmeler ve Sağın Yeniden Yükselişi", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, Kış 1991, p. 78.

<sup>23</sup>Yılmaz's Opening Speech in the 4th Grand Meeting of the MP, 28 August 1993, Ankara.

<sup>24</sup>Metin Heper, "Introduction", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 1-2.

<sup>25</sup>Taha Akyol, "Sağın Tabanı Tavanını Değişmeye Zorluyor", in *Vatan Millet Pragmatism*, ed. by H. Göktaş and R. Çakır (Istanbul: Metis Yay., 1991), p. 211.

<sup>26</sup>Yılmaz's Opening Speech, 28 August 1993, Ankara.

<sup>27</sup>For the further elaboration on the liberal democratic state and the MP perception of the state, see Yılmaz Karakoyunlu, *Türkiye'de Liberalizmin Seyir Defteri (1938-1991)*, (Ankara: Anap Bilimsel Yay. Dizisi-4, 1993).

---

<sup>28</sup>Ilnur Çevik, "DYP-A Party Which Had a Mission", *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara daily), 20 November 1993, p. 1b.

<sup>29</sup>Feride Acar, "The True Path Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 189.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid, p. 191.

<sup>31</sup>Ilnur Çevik, p. B1.

<sup>32</sup>Acar, p. 193.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid, p. 196.

<sup>34</sup>For further details, see *Government Program of the TPP-SDPP Coalition*, p. 8 and Süleyman Demirel, *VX. Basın Toplantısı*, 28 February 1993, Ankara: DYP.

<sup>35</sup>Acar, p. 197.

<sup>36</sup>Personal interview with a high-level official in the TPP, 17 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>37</sup>Ilnur Çevik, p. B1.

<sup>38</sup>Taha Akyol, "Çillerin Partisi", p. 15.

<sup>39</sup>*Turkish Daily News* (Ankara Daily), 30 August 1993, p. 3.



## CHAPTER THREE

### THE "NEW" DEMOCRATIC PARTY

#### 1. The Grand Transformation Party and the "new" Democratic Party

In the present chapter I will investigate the "new" Democratic Party looking from within; how they perceive Turkish state, society and history, and how they understand the concept of democracy, economy, secularism and nationalism. But later, in conclusion, you will find further elaboration on the "new" DP. In such a way, the views and ideology of the "new" Democratic Party (DP), *Demokrat Parti*, will be clarified. But, first of all, it is necessary to mention about the Grand Transformation Party (GTP), *Büyük Değişim Partisi*, closely relating the "new" DP because of its leader and of its program and principles.

The Grand Transformation Party was founded by a group of people, led by Aydın Menderes who is the son of late Prime Minister Adnan Menderes executed by the military following 1960 coup. Aydın Menderes was a major person leading to the emergence of the GTP as a political party. The GTP was composed of people having distinct social and cultural background and origin. The GTP with its distinguishable program and principles showed distinctive characteristics from other existing political parties. For instance, the GTP's perception of democracy, which based upon the

pluralistic-liberal sense of democracy without recognizing any restriction in front of the representation of each group and interest at the social and political level, reflects one aspect of these distinctive characteristics. Moreover, it proposed a new definition and reinterpretation of the state, that was called as a "referee-state" (hakem devlet). Within this respect, once it emerged, it was labeled a "unlimited democracy party".<sup>1</sup> Such perspective had not yet been seen in the program of any political party in the period of the Republic.

In 1993 prohibitions on former political parties were removed, and then most of these political parties were re-established. For instance, Türkiye's National Work Party (NWP), *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*, got its previous name: the Nationalist Action Party, and the Republican People's Party was re-established by a group of deputies splitting from the SDPP. Simultaneously, the DP dissolved in 1960 by the military coup came on the scene, led by Hayrettin Erkmen, on May 1993. Following the days of the re-emergence of the DP, the attempts to unite the GTP and the DP found ground in both political parties. Finally, in 16 January 1994, in the Grand Meeting of the DP, Aydın Menderes was elected as the chairman of the DP; later, by joining the GTP to the DP, Aydın Menderes and his new men controlled the party. This "new" DP entirely accepted the GTP's program as its new program.

Why did the GTP join to the DP? The answer of such question may be found in the views of Aydın Menderes. For him, after the transition to a multi-party system, the DP in the 1950s played much more significant role in fulfilling the most potent transformation in the Republican era, by starting the democratization of the society and the state. For this reason, "when we founded the GTP, the spirit of 1946 was our reference point. We were not too

much different from the DP of the 50s; we believe in similar values: democracy, free and national will, property rights, and the state for people. Because of these factors, we joined the DP, and our aim is now to interpret such basic principles with the new and changing context of Turkey and to maintain the transformation and democratization process started by the DP in 1950".<sup>2</sup> Menderes stressed that the "new" DP's views on the state, redefined as the "referee-state", linked with the attempts of the "old" DP to democratize the state structure. In order to make real great transformation by the program of the "new" DP in the 1990s, the "old" DP by its name forms some sort of ideological infrastructure. As to the leader of the "new" DP, globally and locally changing context and the rise of the grassroots movements indicate that Turkey needs much more democracy and the democracy Turkey needs has already been included in the program<sup>3</sup> of the "new" DP.

## **2. Ideological Background of the "new" DP**

In order to clearly understand the "new" DP's ideological background, we must look at the political development of Turkey and relationship between state and society from the perspective of the "new" DP. In the early Republican period, there was the environment where there existed two different ways of life: people accepting western values and life style, on the one hand, and people living with the traditional and Islamic values, on the other hand. This can be best expressed in terms of the center-periphery cleavage, in which the center was made up by the bureaucratic state elites and intellectuals with their distinct culture, a different type of language and style of wear, and the periphery was composed of the rest of the people who did

not belong to this type of life style.<sup>4</sup> The growing conflict between the center and the periphery occurred especially around two basic issues which were the religion - Islam - and Kurdish crises which are still dominant. For the "new" DP, such conflict resulted on a large scale from the shift of the regime (passing from the Empire to a nation-state) and so radical-anachronic nationalism. Beside both reasons, the strong-profound state, characterized with the single-party system in the early period of the Republic, restricted the participation of opposing groups and masses within power.<sup>5</sup>

As a result of pressures coming from below and of changing international context, in 1945, the bureaucratic and civil elites directed by "Milli Şef" decided to pass from the single-party system to a multi-party system. It is for this reason that, after 1950, during the government of the Democratic Party Turkey entered into a speedy process of socio-economic transformation. As to the leaders of the "new DP, the "old" DP led Turkey to face the conception of democracy, the welfare and freedom. Because of the discontent and hate to the single-party, the Republican People's Party, masses identified themselves with the "old" DP. Its success was not only resulted from such dissatisfaction, but also from its program that is given in the Second Chapter. With the accession of the "old" DP to power center and periphery were attempted to be linked up by each other.<sup>6</sup> Serif Mardin SEEs the success of the "old" DP in a way that, after the 1950 elections, periphery identified itself with the DP showing a challenge to the center whose interest was represented by the RPP. And so, in 1960 military intervention supported by bureaucratic elites came and dissolved the DP.<sup>7</sup>

As to Aydın Menderes, socio-economic and political transformation started by the "old" DP picked up speed in the 1980s. Thus, Turkey started to become major and powerful country in its region and in the world. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the 1990s, a kind of "political decay" (siyasal çürüme), which could be seen in the indecision and instability in the field of internal politics, foreign policies, economic and social life, etc., became dominant in Turkish politics.<sup>8</sup>

The high-level officials of the "new" DP claims that Turkish society is still carrying the potentiality of the transformation, stimulated in the 1980s. This transformation requires economic and political development, or economic and political liberalism. Democratization of the state and the society seems as a basic and necessary unit of such transformation. Main objective of the "new" DP led by Aydın Menderes is to complete the transformation of the state and the society started by the "old" DP and accelerated by Ozal's MP.<sup>9</sup>

Aydın Menderes, during personal interview on 27 November 1993, stated;

*From the beginning of the Republic, the society has contradicted with the state or bureaucratic side, as its will for change and transformation was restricted by politico-military elites. For this reason, the society desires to carry out a progress much more than them. As a result of such existing consciousness of the progress, the society is gradually appearing as a discontent; that is, in terms of the political and economic conditions, the requirements of autonomy by the sphere of civil society clashes with the political*

*interpretation of the bureaucratic and civil elites who do not accept to change the traditional bureaucratic structure.*

Up to this point, the main purpose of the "new" DP emerges as to break the control of central bureaucratic structure over the society, more radical than other centre-right parties. The "old" DP, as the first political party seriously challenging the bureaucratic structure propped by the Kemalist principles, has very important place in Turkish politics. In this respect, the "new" DP is closely linked to the "old" DP with strong ties so it aspires to finish the hegemony of the state over the society and to open the way of the society, and, in this way, its desire for transformation can be easily realized.

It is clearly seen that ideological roots of the "new" DP base basically on the "old" DP. At the same time, other right-wing parties - the JP, the MP and the TPP - have strong ties with "old" DP. Aydın Menderes, leader of the "new" DP, had intimate relationship with the JP and Demirel before and after 1980; in the period between 1970-80, he was the deputy of the JP and in a remained high position in the JP. After 1980, Aydın Menderes and Demirel acted together for removing the political prohibition. Following removal of prohibition, Demirel became the leader of the TPP whereas Menderes declared to leave the politics. He stressed that the reason of leaving the politics is the need for observing the events happening in Turkey and in the world from outside of active politics. Demirel, during this time, criticized the shadow of the military over democracy, and so, for Menderes, people expected from him to end up the domination of the military and bureaucracy over the society and democracy, but this expectation was not realized.<sup>10</sup>

Menderes mentions that the JP and the TPP, under the leadership of Demirel, did not contribute anything to the "old" DP's cause. However, he evaluates Ozal's era differently in which socio-economic and political transformation initiated by the "old" DP was tried to be risingly kept on. Ozal tried to democratize Turkey, for instance, by removing the 141, 142 and 163 articles of the constitution which were the barriers for freedom of thought and organisation, and he firstly opened some significant issues to public discussion, such as Kurdish question.<sup>11</sup> Menderes criticizes everyone who assert to be continuation of the DP because they did nothing for democratization and economic transformation of Turkey, initiated by the "old" DP. In an interview made by author of the present study with Menderes, he said that "today, we are much closer by the national will in the path of democratization emerged in 1946 than the MP and the TPP era. Because they can not defend full democratization of the society, they are prohibitive. It is not important for a party to be continuation of the "old" DP, but having in relation with the "old" DP is important. In Turkey democratization started in 1946, but it has not yet come to its last halt. For him, other centre-right and -left parties say that we stay in the present level of democratization. This is the evidence of which the single party tradition is being kept on these political parties. Nevertheless, Turkey needs much more democratization ever before. The 1946's spirit is the expression of the "national will" and the wish of people. Some of the objectives of the "old" DP have been done until now, and we will finish the rest of them". These words of Aydın Menderes clearly displays the ideological roots and targets of the "new" DP.

Aydın Menderes rejects the concepts of the right and the left for the definition of his position and the classifying his party. Recently, the concepts

of right and left lost their importance in determining the position of political parties in Turkey and in the world. He claims, in an interview with Menderes made by author, that they can not fit into a political context arranged according to the separation of the right and the left but they are attempting to squeeze in this type of political fan into their body for a new Turkey. "Both concepts are not the products of our society so they do not manifest our political structure. It is not clear that what concept of right and left mean in Turkey. Also, it is not useful to describe Turkish political structure by these concepts. They may give some general approximation, but can not reflect Turkish political life. One party may have some characteristics of rightist or leftist party at the same time".<sup>12</sup>

Two types of political party or political movement, Menderes claims, are starting to be dominant in Turkish politics: "tutucu" (conservative) party and "yenilikçi" (renovative) party. They will take the place of the term right and left. He sees his party, the "new" DP, as a kind of "yenilikçi" party aiming to transform the society with the help of its democratization program.<sup>13</sup>

What policies should be followed by the "new" DP to realize this transformation? For the "new" DP, in the sense of the transformation of the society and the state there are two political movements; first one is "değiştiriciler" who try to primarily apply or keep on an abstract model on society. In the Turkish case, from the Tanzimat era up to now, the efforts of transformation have been made or directed from up to down. One of the high officials of the "new" DP indicates that such transformation of the society is closely associated the rule from above. The second is "değişimciler" who defend the



necessity of spontaneous transformation and try to take away the obstacles, which hinder the social transformation, in front of the society, but they do not offer an abstract model. Menderes put his party, the "new" DP, in the second group. In such a way, implicitly, the "new" DP challenges to the official ideology of the state, Atatürkism, which have tried to transform the society from above.

This sort of understanding and perception shape the reasons of the formation of a new political party - the GTP - and a new party program. This new party with its program and its cadre joined by the "new" DP under Menderes leadership. The leader of the "new" DP criticizes, in Turkey, thirty or forty people come together and easily form a political party, and , at that moment, program and views of party are determined. Such formation of a political party emerges as the personal preferences rather than the social preference. He indicates that, for forming a new party and program, some views should be discussed, and then, people who agree with these views form a community before setting up a political party. They tried to pass into this process and gave shape to a new political cadre who constitutes the nucleus of the GTP and, now, of the "new" DP.

Until here, one can not fairly separate the party - the "new" DP - and its leader - Aydın Menderes - from each other. Although Menderes criticizes other party formation, personalistic aspects appears to be one of the significant determinant factor in the emergence of the "new" DP within its new program. The name of Menderes could not be taken separately from the "new" DP. However, he says, "I do not think politics myself in personalistic basis. If being the leader of the "new" DP leads to be source of authority for

me over the party, I am going to prevent such tendency. I never force the party for anything not wished. Our party will exist as "fikir platformu" (a platform of idea). In this respect, we purpose to form a kind of party, its members can easily oppose a draft of proposed law about tax submitted by the "new" DP when it is in power".<sup>14</sup>

In sum, the "new" DP's attitudes toward Turkish political and social life places it in a different position from other centre-right parties, but the "new" DP and the centre-right parties, especially the MP and the TPP, ideologically have some similar features in terms of sharing the heritage of the "old" DP. It is obviously seen that Adnan Menderes and Turgut Ozal are two major leaders who substantially influence Aydın Menderes' views and the path of the "new" DP.

### **3. The Reasons of the Necessity for a New Program**

There are several reasons which led Menderes and his new cadre to provide a new program. Firstly, for them, changing socio-political and socio-economic context of the world and of Turkey seems a basic reason that required a new program in order to catch the direction of change and to steer it into a useful manner. Menderes summarizes the reason for why a new program is needed in the following way; "The governments have changed, the prime ministers have changed but the misfortune of the nation has not changed. The reason of the existence of the "new" DP with its program is to change the misfortune of Turkey"<sup>15</sup>. What is the meaning of the term "misfortune of the nation"? At the first hand, it comprises the practical social

and economic problems, such as inflation, terrorism, bribe, unemployment, foreign debt, and so on. Other is too general, that is the problems aroused from ideological and cultural differences among governor and governed, or among political and bureaucratic elites and masses.

As it was indicated in the first part, according to the "new" DP, in the early 1990s Turkish politics faced with a kind of "political corruption", illustrated as inability of the government for solving economic and social problems and for providing new reforms. There has been existing dynamics of transformation and progress in the society, and been requirements of people resulting from such directions. This paved the way for the conflict among elites or governors, who want to be identical with the bureaucratic tradition, and the dynamic social forces. That is, the desire of the autonomy by the sphere of civil society has clashed with the political interpretation represented by the state and politico-military elites. As to Menderes, this duality has existed as a different type in respect of the conditions of each period, and the "new" DP with its program is a retranslating of such duality in the sphere of politics. Minimising the negative effects of such dichotomy is a fundamental "mission" of the "new" DP.<sup>16</sup>

Because of these reasons, for Menderes, the party needed a new program. Forming a new program with a new party should be different from other existing political parties. For him, as different from other political parties, his political movement is rising from down to up by extending the political discussions over large segments of society. Thereby, the "new" DP will be successful to provide a social consensus and a reconciliation among governor and governed.<sup>17</sup>

The "new" DP is composed of various groups and people having distinctive origins and opinions but, at a certain level, they come to a consensus on some chief principles which are democratic values and demands of transformations of the society. It aims therefore to be a "melting-pot".

Why do they need a "new" party, small party, in stead of realizing their aims in one of the big party of the centre-right? Menderes, in an interview made by the author of this study with him in November 1993, stressed that "we have a sort of program, and in order to implement such a program, a new party and a new cadre are a must. In this way, this party would be registered as an owner of the views in the program that is accepted as a mission of the party. It is for the reason that there is no suitable condition in other parties to implement their program, and so they joined to the "new" DP to give a ingenious message and to become a united whole with its program. It is rumoured that, when the election for the chairman of the MP was made in 1991, Ozal offered Menderes to become the chairman of the MP, but he did not accept it because he could not realized his targets in the MP.

#### **4. The Program of the "new" DP**

In 1946, Turkey entered into the process of democratization, but, until now, it has not achieved a stable development. This is because of three military interventions which interrupted such process and of the bureaucratic and military elites who produced tensions in the political system and remained dysfunctional for the development of democracy. One can thus claim that Turkey has not yet had all of the democratic institutions and

structures. For the "new" DP, after 1946 the first stage of democratization began in Turkey, and by new changes all over the world in 1989, the second stage of democratization started to widespread, which has effectively felt in Turkey. In order to complete the process of democratization and to grasp the level of pluralist-liberal democracy, at this second stage, both democratization and economic transformation of Turkey are unavoidable and inevitable aspects.

#### 4. 1. Democratization

In this part the question of how the "new" DP sees the concept of democracy and the process of democratization are going to be answered. The "new" DP evaluates democracy as a phenomenon which ought to be applied in all spheres of life, and at the level of the state, of economy, of education, of military, of mass-media, etc. Due to this reason, democracy is not only a thing which is remembered at the elections time and it does not only mean giving vote. Democratization requires two fundamental features. First one is that each individual has a right to choose his/her life style and to belong to an identity and to develop his/her cultural values or norms in an unrestricted fashion. Thus, it is necessary for democracy that each group, ideology and individual can freely express their views and , if they wish, can set up their association or their political parties in order to defend their interest in the social and political arena legally. The state or any other institution can not designate their ways of life, in place of individual or group. State is, however, only responsible for protecting democracy and providing the security of the citizens and creating a democratic environment with the quarantine of freedom of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish

their opinions. According to the program of the "new" DP, available cultural and traditional differences acquired by several social units in Turkey are national richness so they should be accepted in terms of a free and pluralistic context without any social and legal restriction. Here, it can be claimed that the "new" DP requires a kind of cultural and political pluralism which necessitates that other ways of life would allow in a pluralist society. In Turkey, for example, religious or ethnic oriented political party can be freely set up.<sup>18</sup>

Second important characteristic of the "new" DP's program is that the position of the state should be redefined in such a way that it should not be an instrument of imposing views, ideology or belief on people. It should act as umpire or referee in order to arbitrate on the complex demands of heterogeneous society. That is, it should be a "referee-state" (hakem devlet), being a referee among different groups or ideologies. And so, such sort of the state can not hinder socio-economic and socio-political transformation, formed by the society itself, towards more pluralistic society.<sup>19</sup> Responsibility of such state is restricted only with providing the security of individuals and groups, and removing external factors which threaten their private life, and also, according to need, the state should be responsible for providing some services in a limited manner, but it should not interfere in their private life.

To realize the process of democratization, for Menderes, depends upon the desire of society. A political party is, however, needed to turn this desire of society into a "political consciousness". The "new" DP attempts to perform this responsibility; that is why, its principal objective is to transform the

political consciousness into a "national will". At the last instance, the society will make a decision about its situation and determine how it evolves.<sup>20</sup>

Another significant factor relating with the position of the "new" DP is that democracy within the party itself is the first step in the fulfilment of the democratization process. It is by this criteria, the "new" DP aims to become a "fikir platformu" ( a platform of ideas). Menderes mentions that they do not look for the unity of belief in their party. For this reason, the "new" DP is a party which depends on the consensus on some concrete targets. It is the reflection of this assertion that the "new" DP is composed of people who do not have the same world view and one's general philosophy of life. He, also, claims that they intended to create a political party in which members are able to criticize each other and, if it is necessary, one of them can freely give a vote against draft of a proposed law by the "new" DP in the parliament, but not a political party which is purely linked with its leaders. Simply, they try to be a "mass party" in that everything is freely discussed and each social unit participates or is represented. Menderes says that, in today's context of Turkey, there is no real mass party. In Turkish political parties which are called "mass parties", masses are not represented. Indeed, there are some groups in these parties, but, for instance, there is no one worker deputy in the parliament.<sup>21</sup> In the words of Menderes,

*In the politics, the hegemony of the status and the money should be ended. Unfortunately, both, which are especially seen in the parties called as the mass party, have dominated Turkish political life. If we want the hegemony of democratic institutions and structures*

*in all sphere of life, there needs a political party which does not depend on the domination of the status and the money.*<sup>22</sup>

The predominately patron-client type of relationship between political parties and their supporters is thus regarded as a chief obstacle in front of Turkish democratization process. For the "new" DP, because of the patron-client relations, it is necessarily needed to develop the internal democracy within political parties. In the centre-right tradition, such a party patronage and clientelistic relationship have been dominantly resulted from their pragmatism and strong grassroots organisation.

For the "new" DP, following three basic aspects is a must in the process of democratization, in respect of the "new" DP; (1) everyone has a free life as s/he wishes, (2) no one can disturb other, and (3) everything can be discussed publicly. Under such circumstances, as to Menderes, human beings can easily reach truth and consensus through discussion and dialogue. Democratization also seems inevitable in order to join different groups and to minimize the existing tension among them by creating a system of contracts and consensus.<sup>23</sup>

In the views of the "new" DP, localization - strengthening the local governments - or decentralization, which means the transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative authority from central government to local governmental organisation is regarded as a major step in the process of democratization. Power should be diffused across a wide range of local institutions and organizations as well as national one. The rising participation and representation of people within local governmental organisation in the



program of the "new" DP is aimed. Hence, the assembly of municipalities or local administration will be composed of the citizens elected from each "mahalle" (quarter) by its dwellers.

In addition to these, the "new" DP's perception of democracy is strongly connected with occupational groups and associations which are one of civil societal elements. To this effect, Menderes asks why there is only one body of lawyers, or why there is only one society for architects. These legally restricted and centrally determined association prevent democratization of the society by creating a political and social monopoly. For him, these are the corporatist habits coming from the single-party era. In the government of the "new" DP, as to its leader, the political prohibition over the managers of unions, occupational groups, professors, and those like that, will be abolished.<sup>24</sup> Menderes says,

*We will be staunch supporters of a democracy in which everyone will have the right to express and publish his/her opinions and freedom of assembly and association. We want a democracy for a "demokrat Türkiye" where everyone, without any restriction, is free.*<sup>25</sup>

Democracy, for the "new" DP, which quarantines the system of contracts, is tightly linked with a consensus among different segments of the society, and so insisting democracy from above is inappropriate for the nature of democracy. The limits of freedom as proposed by the "new" DP do not allow individuals to violate common rights of each other and are determined by their common values.

## 4. 2. Economic Transformation

The second fundamental item in the program of the "new" GTP which is economic transformation directly relates with the principles of economic liberalism. To strengthen the private sector, to provide suitable condition where free market is fully settled down, and to remove the state intervention over the market and economy appear as the principal characteristics of the "new" DP's economic goals. In these days, the economic liberalism, or free market economy, is unique case approximately accepted by all nations in the world. While some specific differences exist, in Turkey, the policies of the liberalisation of economy are existed in the program of each political party.

What are the views of the "new" DP on the economic liberalism? The role of the state, which is very important in terms of designating the direction of economy, is minimized in a liberal economy. Menderes evaluates the role of Turkish state in the way that the proportion of the state in the Gross National Product and in the budget is increasing, on the one hand; public investment is decreasing, on the other hand. Such huge proportion of the state in the GNP has hindered the political and economic liberalism. He argues that the existence of democratization is impossible with a state that owns the half of the National Profit and continuously interferes to the market and economy. Under such case, economic liberalism itself can not bring democratization and liberal democracy, or *vice-versa*. Economic liberalism and democratization, for Menderes, should come together. It is because that the state and the bureaucracy are able to significantly influence and steer political and economic decisions, if they take in the charge of the economy. Because of this, privatization that seems to be one of the most fundamental ways for

making the state smaller emerges as a main part of the process of democratization.<sup>26</sup>

The "new" DP's view on the privatization of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) is internally linked with its understanding of democratization which may be realized throughout the relationships among distinct societal and political units. It risingly gains importance for breaking the hegemony of the state over society and economy. How is the privatization of the SEEs realized, in the program of the "new" DP? There are two types of the SEEs in Turkey: first type which is profitable, and second one, which loses money. First of all, the SEEs having positive cost will be sold, and then obtained revenues from the sale may be used to improve the condition of the SEEs which are not profitable. Besides, they may be used to encourage the private sectors ardently which are willing to buy the SEEs. As the state provides credits, it may lay down a condition that workers are not sent out.

To this effect, the "new" DP's principal critics to all governments, which have caused higher public expenditures, especially, resulting from the populist policies and patron-client relations, comes into the picture. Both the public expenditures and the SEEs are two fundamental causes of the public finance gap (kamu finansman açığı). The "new" DP therefore offers the restriction of the public expenditure which leads to increase internal dept.

The privatization of the SEEs, the restriction of the public expenditure and the control of the internal dept are anticipated in the program of the "new" DP as main principles paving the way for the decline of the public finance gap. Within the successful implementation of these policies, inflation may

decline. Menderes stresses that, such process takes long time; for instance, the decline of inflation to 10 per cent in a period of 6 or 8 years. Furthermore, a new reform of expenditure is inevitably needed for the improvement of the present situation of the economy, of the politics and of the state. As the "new" DP comes to power, there will be new regulations in the tax law to reach its goals.

The role of the state in economy should be limited only to improve economic conditions by assuring stability, while creating an environment that will stimulate the potential of the private sector. Menderes, in his opening speech in the Convention of the "new" DP on February 1994, said that " it should not be forgotten that a state which can affect one's daily fond (rızk) can easily influence the individual's preference and belief". It is for this reason that economy should be largely independent from the control of the state. Within the larger proportion of the economy controlled by the state, someone holding power can easily and deliberately the frustrate opposition and other social groups. Furthermore, for the "new" DP's economic program, finance sector will be determined as to the free market conditions without any intervention, which necessitates the autonomy of the Central Bank. Not like the centre-right and centre-left political parties, the "new" DP opposes the full membership to the European Community which will lead to restrict the regional and international preferences and benefits of Turkey. In this case, Turkey should pay attention to the regional economic co-operation and try to benefit from the competition between great economic blocks. Its views on the custom union with EC, which will come about in 1995, is also very different from other parties.

## 5. The "new" DP's Views on the State and the Society

State as a fundamental determinant factor in political life and an organized body, has been significant in all societies throughout history. Strong and centralized state has predominantly existed as a unique power in Turkish politics. The "new" DP sees such state structure as a handicap which has created difficulties for the process of democratization and of economic transformation of the society. That's why, the state ought to be reformed and transformed into a new type designated by the society.

In the following pages, the question of what the state defined by the "new" DP ought to do and what it ought not to do will be attempted to be discussed. Basic roles of the state are to get the security and happiness of the citizen and the society which may be called as the civil liberties of all citizens, to protect the independence and the national unity of the country, to regulate the justice service, to remove the obstacle before the social peace, to make some infrastructural facilities which can not be done by the private sector, and those like that. What is new on the position of the state is that the state should not be an instrument of getting any ideology, belief or view accepted by the society and individuals. That is, the state should not have whatsoever ideological identity leaned on its individuals, and also should not interfere to the political process and to the political requirement for the name of a ideological identity. This state is called as a "referee-state".<sup>27</sup>

The "new" DP's slogan relating with this new reformulating and definition of the state is that "Güle Güle Yasakçı Devlet, Merhaba Hakem-Devlet" ( Good-bye the Prohibitor State, Hello the Referee-state). This pro-

hibitor state is a heritage of the single-party era clarified at the outset. It is a chief responsibility of the state to procure an environment where the preference of individual can freely emerge and organize. Within this respect, Menderes expresses that each individual can freely decide what they learn, what they consume and produce, what they wear, what degree they believe something, but not the state.<sup>28</sup> As a result, all ideologies, views, etc., can express themselves unlimitedly, and, if they wish, they can found their political parties which can not be closed. But, with one exception is that they can be closed by the state, if they apply to use force. This sort of freedoms guaranteed by the state may give a chance to all different sub-cultural groups expressing themselves; thus, they can freely speak their language, broadcast with their language and choose any belief without any restriction.

Reformulating of the position of the state, the "new" DP frankly challenges to the state based on the Atatürkist principles, the basis of the official ideology of the Republic. It reflects that the "new" DP sides with the society in dichotomy among the state and society. In the words of Menderes,

*State is not a secret thing whereas it is an entity made up of individuals so it should be in the hand of people. If we learn to look at the problems, resulting from the dichotomy between the state and the society, from the perspective of people, we can easily solve the problems.*<sup>29</sup>

Why does people require such sort of state? because they, as for Menderes, do not want a state that is interventionist and determinist, and looks down on. In order to turn this desire of people into a political con-

sciousness, there needs a political party aiming to realize it. The "new" DP tries to carry this mission towards intending to transform the existing tendency into a political consciousness and later into a national will.

As it is indicated at the outset of this part, principal challenge of the "new" DP is directed to the traditional bureaucratic structure, and bureaucratic and political elites who have attempted to plug the participation and representation of the people. Menderes says, "the main reason of these elites' behavior is the fear of losing their situation in the state and losing of the economic and social profit".<sup>30</sup> These views of the "new" DP about the Republican ideology substantially differentiate it from other centre-right parties.

In order to reformulate the role of the state, the rearrangement of the constitution comes the most crucial task in the "new" DP's program. A new constitution that gives priority to the freedom and right of individual. In the program of the "new" DP, the state control over the health, education and social security services which are not responsibilities of the social state are not included as social policies. The social security system will, therefore, be prepared in a way that a society that can procure its social security itself will try to be formed through supporting and encouraging civil organizations. To this effect, the emphasis is clearly on solidarity by mutual help organizations or civil associations. It is one way of freeing from the guardianship of the state. Moreover, the encouragement of private sectors for education and health services are located in its program.<sup>31</sup> Besides, the role of the state in providing cultural activities is to some extent restricted. Menderes stated, in a personal interview on July 1994 in Ankara, "in the government of the "new"

DP there is not going to be the Ministry of Culture. Cultural services will be transferred to the civil societal elements and voluntary associations".

The Turkish military in the Republic era has had strong links with the regime and has played a much more crucial role, in various important historical tasks, with three interventions shaping political and party system. Therefore, the "new" DP's outlook to the military automatically becomes a challenge to its present position. As being a soldier of the Kemalist regime, Turkish military in the Republican period has manifested the interventionist character. Thus, the first duty of Turkish military has been to suppress some internal political, social and cultural elements which potentially seem as a threat for the regime; it means that it has existed as the regime's military. Turkish military, as for the "new" DP, should be reorganized to get rid of external threats, but not be a watchman of whatsoever ideology.<sup>32</sup>

The "new" DP's understanding of the position of the state seems to be influenced by the liberal tendency all over the world as well as the loss of credibility of the welfare state. Hence, one can infer from the "new" DP's views on the state that the notions of the pluralist and liberal theories of the state appear the core-sources of its views. It is obviously seen that it sides with the society rather than the tradition of centralized and strong state, and rejects this state with its all bureaucratic structures.

## **6. The Views of the "new" DP on Religion and Secularism**

The "new" DP's view on Islam represents so many peculiar characteristics, different from those of other Turkish political parties. Islam as a



basic cultural unit has existed the historical phenomenon shaping Turkish culture and social structure. One can thus evaluate it as an element that has attached different ethnic and cultural groups. The "new" DP opposes the state hegemony and control over religion. Menderes notices,

*The state should not control the religion. Religion, Islam, ought to be ideologically autonomous so that the civil societal organizations and associations which are desirous may perform religious affairs in place of the state. On the other hand, certain religious services are inevitably made by public services, if some services can not be performed by the civil societal elements, such as funeral services, providing "imam", etc. In this sense, there will be the public religious service largely restricted.<sup>33</sup>*

In the program of the "new" DP, there are the themes to privatize religious services gradually. This privatization depends on the emphasis that members of universities, representatives of the "Diyanet İşleri" and agents of voluntary associations should come together for a negotiation and attempt to reach certain general consensus about how religious affairs and services are performed, and how religious organizations are organized and which functions they perform. For Menderes, voluntary associations, intending to perform the religious services, are the components of a pluralist society; yet, in terms of designation their responsibilities, they have to reach an agreement. The leaders of the "new" DP are against the thought that there can not be civil religious associations and organizations.<sup>34</sup>

Menderes mentions that like other units in the society, Islamic elements have freedom of association and assembly in the democratic conditions; that is, there may be political party advocating the religious law and order. Furthermore, the compulsory lecture of religion in the primary and secondary education will be removed when the "new" DP is in government. Instead, there might be elective courses, such as Arabic, Religion, etc.<sup>35</sup>

The "new" DP's views about the secularist understanding and policies of the Kemalist ideology are not too much different from its perception of the bureaucratic structure and the official ideology of the regime. In general, in the context of today, the regime does not maintain its sensitivity about the official ideology anymore. Therefore, a sort of democratic framework in which secularism can be discussed and criticized, and anti-secularist views can freely organize as a association or political party and participate, should be completely formed.<sup>36</sup> As to Menderes, in such democratic context, if an anti-secularist movement becomes the majority, it may make certain changes in secularism.<sup>37</sup>

## **7. The Views of the "new" DP on Nationalism**

Another critique of the "new" DP about the official ideology is the Kemalist nationalism which is the one of chief principles of Atatürkism. As to the "new" DP, the Kemalist nationalism has not been successful because it could not have obtained a needed harmony among various sub-cultural and ethnic groups, and so it has brought the country to face with the threshold of division. Because of such failure, Turkish state has to make peace by its past

and Muslim identity. Now, Muslim identity and Kurdish identity are two fundamental reasons which are compelling Turkey towards this reconciliation with its past, its history. If Turkey wants to be a major regional power and obtains the internal integration, it should make peace with Islam, which is a name of living together in Anatolia and of imperial vision.<sup>38</sup> The origins of Kurdish issues are interconnected with the implementation of anachronistic Turkish nationalism policies, which led to many problems in Turkey having the imperial heritage, by the governors.

Such outlook shapes the "new" DP's nationalistic approach that is not based upon the racist understanding. It is essential for its approach that the role of Islam is very significant in attaching Anatolian people each other for a long time. It is clear from its approach that its ideas on nationalism find its fair expression in the concept of "Anadolucu Milliyetçilik" (Anatolian Nationalism).<sup>39</sup>

Spiritual and mystic views which may procure the internal integration of Turkey have substantial place in the views of the DP on nationalism. Menderes, in his speech in Eskişehir in 1993, claims that "the solution of the South Eastern problem lies hidden in the united and integrated thoughts of Yunus Emre", and he goes on, "we try to be like dervishes or gazhi, we will be in the service of our nation by the power taken from their spirituality".<sup>40</sup> Its approach on nationalism does not rest on pure Turkish nationalism in that race seems to be chief determining factor. Hence, the conception of Turkish identity can not be used in defining its views on nationalism, not found in the speech of Menderes and party program.

## 8. The "new" DP and Other New Centre-Right Parties and Political Movements

By the early 1990s, Turkish politics was characterized by fragmentation and polarization, and lack of decisive authority on the part of the government and opposition. Such fragmentation and polarization are much more severe on the right-wing of Turkish politics faced with getting strong minor parties including the WP and the NAP, and the emergence of new political parties. The "new" DP under the leadership of Aydın Menderes, the New Party of Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal - the brother of Turgut Ozal - Cem Boyner's the New Democracy Movement, the Grand Unity Party under Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu and Besim Tibuk's Liberal Party, which are in the margin of the political system are the most important of these new political parties and movements. They are striving to search for forming a new approach and consensus by resting on the society and the civil societal elements, as opposite to being the *status quo* in the centre including the major centre-right parties: the TPP and the MP.

One may see the "new" DP as the candidate for establishing a "liberal conservative" movement; Yusuf Ozal's New Party (NP), *Yeni Parti*, as the candidate for forming a "liberal technocrat" movement; Besim Tibuk's Liberal Party (LP), *Liberal Parti*, as "liberal democrat"; the New Democracy Movement as "liberal democrat" movement, and Yazıcıoğlu's Grand Unity Party (GUP), *Büyük Birlik Partisi*, as "liberal nationalist" movement.<sup>41</sup> Their principal similarity is to defend political liberalism *vis-à-vis* the central authority of the Republic of Turkey. These political parties and movements

usually use the terms of "yeni" (new), "değişim" (transformation or change) and "demokrasi" (democracy), but most of them are uncommitted the label of "liberal". Quite to the contrary, their importance stems from using different version of liberalism.

---

---

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>For this labelling, see *Nokta* (Weekly Periodical Istanbul), 16-22 May 1993.

<sup>2</sup>Statement made by Aydın Menderes, during a personal interview, 5 July 1994, Ankara.

<sup>3</sup>The "new" DP's program includes two principal aspects; (1) Democratization in that, without any restriction, every individual has the right to express his/her opinion in a free condition and state ought to give up to impose any view or ideology forcefully, and (2) Economic transformation that relates with liberal economic policies. See, *Demokrat Parti Program Taslağı*, (Ankara: DP, 1994), pp. 4-5.

<sup>4</sup>On the centre-periphery cleavage, see Şerif Mardin, "Centre-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*. 102 (1973), pp. 169-90.

<sup>5</sup>*Büyük Yürüyüş* (Official Bulletin of the GTP), 21 May 1993, p. 2.

<sup>6</sup>Aydın Menderes, *Ve Siyasette Yeni Yönelişler*, (Istanbul: Dergah Yay., 1992), Pp. 246-247.

<sup>7</sup>Şerif Mardin, 1973, p. 186.

<sup>8</sup>*Büyük Yürürüş*, p. 2.

<sup>9</sup>Personal interview with Aydın Menderes, 27 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>10</sup>Aydın Menderes, *Ve Siyasette Yeni Yönelişler*, pp. 164-165.

---

<sup>11</sup>Personal interview with Aydın Menderes, 27 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>Taken from the lecture of Aydın Menderes in METU, 4 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>14</sup>Statement made by Menderes, during a personal interview, 27 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>15</sup>A personal interview with Aydın Menderes, 27 November 1993, Ankara.

<sup>16</sup>*Büyük Yürüyüş*, 7 June 1993, p. 2.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid, p. 2.

<sup>18</sup>*Demokrat Parti Program Taslağı*, pp. 20-21.

<sup>19</sup>Statement made by Aydın Menderes during a personal interview, 5 June 1994, Ankara.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

---

<sup>23</sup>Aydın Menderes, "Yeter! Söz Milletindir", *Genç Demokrat*, no. 2, 1994.

<sup>24</sup>Aydın Menderes, The Opening Speech in the Grand Convention of the DP, 5 February 1994, Ankara.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>*Yeni Zemin* (Monthly Review, Istanbul), 12 July 1993, pp. 13-15.

<sup>27</sup>Statement made by Aydın Menderes during a personal interview, 5 June 1994, Ankara.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>*Demokrat Parti Parti Program Taslağı*, pp. 15-16.

<sup>32</sup>*Büyük Yürüyüş*, p. 2.

<sup>33</sup>A Personal Interview, 5 July 1994, Ankara.

<sup>34</sup>Aydın Menderes, *Ve Siyasette Yeni Yönelişler*, p. 254.

<sup>35</sup>A Personal Interview with Menderes, 5 July 1994, Ankara.



---

<sup>36</sup> "Laiklik", *Genç Demokrat*, 2 (1994), p. 9.

<sup>37</sup> *Büyük Yürüyüş*, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>39</sup>In "Anadolucu Milliyetçilik", race odes not determine the national identity itself so the radical unity is not necessarily seen as a basis of Turkish nation or Turkish national identity. This nationalism rests upon the unity which is defined with the historical fatalism. Anatolian nationalism perceive the national history from the religious and spiritual perspective. It is an attempt of melting Islam and nationalism into same pot. Islam has played most potent role in terms of designating the unity of historical fatalism. For further details, see Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, *Türkiye'de Cemaatçi Milliyetçilik ve Nurettin Topçu*, (Istanbul: Dergah Yay., 1992), pp. 23-27.

<sup>40</sup>A Speech delivered by Aydın Menderes in Eskişehir on May 1993.

<sup>41</sup>For these calling, see Nilüfer Göle, "Liberal Yanılgı", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 24 (1993), pp. 12-18. Deniz Gürsel and C. Hakan Arslan see the New Democracy Movement identical by universalise liberalism. They assert that there may be traditionalist or local liberalism, and they emphasize the consciousness of living in one culture, not on this culture, see Deniz Gürsel and C. Hakan Arslan, "Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi Bildirgesi'nin Eleştirisi ve Kapsayıcıbir Alternative", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 23 (1993), pp. 108-110. To this effect, the liberalism of Aydın Menderes' "new" DP may represent such local or traditionalist liberalism.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### CONCLUSION

In the present study, I have reviewed some main theoretical formulations concerning the center-right politics and then have analyzed the development of Turkish center-right parties by emphasizing their political and socio-economic views. In addition, the ideology and perspectives of the "new" DP has been elaborated looking at the question of what the new tendencies are in the center-right of Turkish politics .

It is generally agreed that the center-right politics across the world is profoundly connected with liberal-pluralist democracy and its parliamentary institutions. And also, it is bound up with liberal and conservative values. Such liberal-pluralist democratic system guaranties the civil liberties of all individuals, political and cultural pluralism, the system of contracts and the principle of representation. It also requires a complex set of social institutions or a civil society relatively independent from the state. Before looking at both the modern perception of concepts of conservatism and liberalism in the center-right politics, it is necessary to point out their classical usage and meaning. The conservatism implies a desire to maintain order and authority requiring the strong central governmental control. However, classical political and economic liberalism bases on a belief in a competitive individualism, a reduced and minimized role for the state, and a maximization of the market.

Modern usage of both concepts are not also free from the term new right. The new right which became very popular with Reagenism and Thatcherism is the entire collection of neo-conservative and neo-liberal movements. A range of liberal and conservative ideals, that the new right refers, includes principally a commitment to individual freedom and the primacy of the free market over the state, privatization of the public sectors, deregulation, reducing the welfare state, limited role to the state, and a conservative and traditional moralism.

If we consider above mentioned characteristics as basis of the center-right politics, one may say that none of the Turkish center-right parties in the pre-1980 including the PRP, the FP, the "old" DP and the JP did not really manifest the features of the center-right politics observed in the western democracies. In the post-1980 the center-right parties including the MP and the TPP was influenced from the center-right movements emerging in the west. In fact they have not yet got along with the characteristics of the center-right politics. As we said at the outset, Turkish politics can be best understood in terms of center-periphery cleavage in general, drift among populists or democrats and bureaucrats in particular. For a long time, the center-right of Turkish politics which represented the peripheral interests has successfully challenged the embodiment of the ruling bureaucratic elite - by the DP in the 1950s, by the JP in the 60s and 70s, and by the MP in the 80s - in the name of commercial, agrarian, provincial and private enterprises' interests. Until the 1980s, Turkish center-right had deeply connected by the simple majoritarianism, mixed economic policies based on populist pragmatic policies, and reflecting private interests, in place of pluralist notion of democracy and liberal-

pluralist social system and liberal economic policies which are the grounds of the center-right politics.

In the 1980s the MP, emerging as a democratic and relatively grass-roots alternative, dominated Turkish politics. Unlike previous center-right parties, it emphasized on the liberalization of economy - defending the free market economy, privatization, less state intervention, economic rationality - and, in some cases, the liberalization of politics - giving preference to individual rather than the state, cross cutting prior ideological cleavage by procuring a coalitions of four inclinations: nationalists, conservatives, liberals and social democrats. Besides, during the 80s, it could be elaborated as a synthesis of conservative and liberal values. Such synthesis was also the basis of Reagan's and Thatcher's policies tied with the new right movement. In addition to his liberal views and policies, one of the unique features of Ozal which was identical to Reagen and Thatcher was the emphasis on traditional and conservative moralism coming together with the liberal economic policies. By challenging to bureaucratic structure of the state, the MP gained a relative and limited liberalization of the state in economic and liberal sense. Quite to the contrary, after 1987 turning to the populist policies, which had been applied by the center-right parties resulted from their patronage and clientelistic relations, substantially injured its liberal economic and political policies. In the 1990s, it starts to come close more and more to central official ideology and centrist values. The MP's perception of democracy is concerned with three freedoms; of speech, of religion and belief, and of enterprise, which are the reflection of the liberal-pluralist notion of democracy, but, in reality, its views and policies are not completely depended upon such values. Today, in spite of a tendency accepting liberalism as a general philosophy and ideology

of the party, requirements of political liberalism may not be seen in the views of the MP, especially on the position of the state, and the rights of sub-cultural groups and minorities.

The TPP as a successor of the JP is another political party dominating Turkish center-right in the 1980s and 1990s. Once it was in opposition, the TPP defended the civil politics resting on "democracy" and "national will" *vis-à-vis* the military and anti-democratic policies, as its counter-part, the JP. The TPP perceives democracy as simple majoritarianism relying exclusively on the forces of periphery, and unhindered exercise of the national will. Because of this, such populist and majoritarian sense of democracy shows harshly tolerance to other political parties and politico-social groups, and it is the cause of negative implications in terms of minority rights, legitimacy of opposition and peaceful transformation of power. Therefore, we can not easily equate the TPP's conception of "democracy" with a pluralistic-liberal understanding of the term. There is simplicity in its ideological discourse, as a result of receiving less support from intellectuals and media. In its program we find some liberal economic policies: privatization, less state, not rigid planning, etc. Once it came to power, the TPP was not successful to realize its aims, especially in getting civil politics and liberal economic policies. Like the "old" DP and the JP, fragments of old party patronage and clientelistic relations are largely tied with the TPP. Such understanding of democracy as a system of bargaining seems being one of the so many reasons preventing to achieve its economic and democratic targets.

In the early 1990s high fragmentation and polarization, and the lack of ideological certainty of the government and the opposition started to dominate

Turkish political life. Because two minor political parties - the Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party - started to gain strength, and new political parties and movements started to come on the scene, such fragmentation and polarization are seriously felt on the right-wing of Turkish politics. These newly emerging political parties and movements which are the consequence of ideological differences are seeking to search new ideology and consensus. In this search they attempt to rest on the civil societal elements through criticizing the sterilization of the center comprising the major center-right parties (the MP and the TPP) and the center-left parties, and through criticizing the centralist *status quo*. As one of these new small parties, the "new" DP, led by Aydın Menderes, is based upon an emphasis of liberal-pluralist democratic system which means that each group and individual can freely express and publish their opinions and can freely set up their association or political parties. Such system wants a society which is organized around popular sovereignty and a concern for individual rights. The "new" DP aims to completely put an end to the control of the center-bureaucratic elite over the state and society. Furthermore, in doing so, it aims to reach a social consensus and reconciliation among governor and governed. It is all clear from the "new" DP's views that it challenges the bureaucratic structure shaped with Kemalist principles. Economic transformation, second significant target of the "new" DP, includes chiefly a commitment to the primacy of the free market rather than state policies, privatization of the public sector and deregulation. For the "new" DP, this liberal economic policies will bring the state control on economy, which has hindered the development of democracy, to an end. These views of the "new" DP about economy are to a large extent similar with both the MP's and the TPP's ideas. All these views of the "new" DP lead us to face a notion that its perception of democracy and democratic system appears

familiar with liberal-pluralist democracy and with the approaches and ideas of the new right that the center-right politics in democratic societies depends upon. In addition to these, the "new" DP puts forward a new idea on the state that it has not already existed in Turkish politics. The state can not be an instrument of imposing any ideology on by people. This state is called as "referee-state" (hakem devlet). One may claim that its view on the state is tightly connected with the pluralist and liberal theory of the state which requires a state acting as umpire or referee in order to arbitrate on the complex demand of heterogeneous society. In short, the "new" DP's views of politics - by an emphasis of the freedom of speech and of belonging to an identity, principles of representation, the system of contract, and political and cultural pluralism - is very much a part of liberal political theory.

What are the differences and similarities among the "new" DP, and the MP and the TPP? First main difference is their different perception of democracy. The "new" DP, newly emerging minor center-right party, entails a democracy necessitating a sort of liberal-pluralist democratic system and democratic society. As the opposite of the "new" DP, the MP and the TPP, in general, maintain some kind of populist and majoritarian sense of democracy which could be seen on a large scale in the views and policies of the "old" DP and the JP. In such understanding of democracy linked by majoritarianism and pragmatism there was a powerful orientation to unmediated mass political participation, but not tolerance to sub-cultural and social groups, and to opposition. Unlike both center-right parties, the "new" DP sees political democracy as liberal-pluralist democratic system. Such basic difference, for example, can be seen in their outlooks on sub-cultural and opposing groups, and socio-cultural minorities. Unlike the MP and the TPP, the "new" DP defends a

societal system which rests on cultural pluralism by which each ways of life should be allowed as it is the case in any particular pluralist society. This freedom guaranteed by the state will give a chance to all different sub-cultural groups to express themselves, to use their own language in education, training and broadcasting, and to choose whatsoever belief without encumbrance. By such opinions, it can be claimed, the "new" DP is profoundly differed from the TPP and the MP both of which, in most cases, put these groups under the care of guardian of the Republican official ideology basing on nationalism, laicism, statism, republicanism, and populism. Because of believing the necessity of official ideology, the MP and the TPP sometimes set an obstacle to what people learn, what they believe and which identity they belong to, which are designated by the central bureaucratic organizations, in the name of Atatürkism.

Other significant difference emerges in defining the position and functions of the state; the "new" DP reformulates the state's position and functions by conceptualizing it as "referee-state" described in the previous parts. However, the TPP's and the MP's opinions on the state is not independent from the official ideology determined in accordance with Kemalist principles, while the MP and the TPP sometimes propose liberal policies contradicted with such Republican state ideology and its bureaucratic structure; for example, their attempts for privatization are restricted by the bureaucratic elites. This state has emerged as an autonomous agent setting ideological parameters. For "new" DP the state should not dominate education which has been basic tool for imposing the official ideology, and not control the religion, Islam, which should be ideologically autonomous. Civil societal organizations and voluntary association may perform the religious affairs, as in the western



democracy. The "new" DP's understanding of religion also shapes its opinions on the secularism, which is possible at the level of the state, not necessarily needed at the level of individual. In opposing to the "new" DP, the MP and the TPP defend the idea of that the state is able to control religion and should perform religious affairs. Although the TPP and the MP believe the need of the state procuring welfare and social security policies; the "new" DP claims that the society can itself make the best for ensuring social security within "third sectors": civil organizations. This self-securing system, as for the "new" DP, is one of the significantly basic aspect to free the society from the guardianship of the state.

Main resemblance of the "new" DP with the TPP and the MP is their claim to be the owner of the heritage of the "old" DP. The views and path of the "new" DP is affected to a large extent by Adnan Menderes whose name has been mentioned with the multi-party system and by Ozal who brought forth liberal discourse starting to take up speed throughout emphasizing the primacy of individual to the state, refusing the state domination, etc. Besides, the "new" DP shares similar opinions with both parties (the MP and the TPP) in accepting conservative views basing on Islamic values in some sense, and in accepting liberal economic policies - in the sense of free enterprise and free market conditions, privatization, and reducing largely the role of the state in economy. Three political parties insist on desire and decision of people, or "national will", that is most fundamental determining factor in the works of parliament, and the policies of government and political parties. The "new" DP, like both the MP and the TPP, may be seen as a leader-based party, not alike cadre-party. Aydin Menderes is major leading figure in the emergence of the "new" DP as a different political party.

In fact, the "new" DP's conservative and nationalistic views, on a large scale, put it in a different position from the TPP and the MP. For a long time, in the views of the "new" DP, Islam has had importance in integrating Anatolian people, and has made possible a harmony between them. According to its program, it is also important in attaining its goal of pluralist society. Yet, the "new" DP uses and applies most of the aspects and concepts of the western center-right politics concerning socio-economic functional pluralism, but we can say that such pluralism is very difficult to come about in Turkey where basic cleavage has been cultural rather than functional. It may be inferred from the program of the "new" DP that, with reference to Islam, aiming pluralist society will base on Islamic-religious cultural pluralism rather than socio-economic pluralism existing in the class-structured western societies. As Reagan's and Thatcher's governments were the emphasis on traditional and moral conservatism for regulating broken social ties and relationships, Menderes puts forward the combination of Islam and nationalism which may provide needed socio-cultural harmony and consensus, through reference to the role of Islam in Anatolia in the past. This view of Menderes seem to be influenced from Ozal.

We can easily say that the "new" DP seems to be to fit into most of the features of the center-right politics. On the other hand, the MP and the TPP, not fully accepting liberal-pluralist democratic values, can not respond the characteristics of a center-right political party, but their perception on democracy bases on majoritarianism. This is due to the lack of sophistication in their ideological discourse caused by receiving less intellectual and academic support. This is the traditional weakness of Turkish right-wing politics; that is, Turkish center-right parties have not had a clear-cut ideology on the state

and societal system. As opposite to them, the "new" DP has the approaches based on the complex set of ideological and theoretical framework. But, its approaches on the state and society supported with this ideological and theoretical framework do not reflect the reality of Turkey where there has been an extremely strong state tradition. This seems to be one of its weak side hindering its growth. Unlike its political views, the other weak side of the "new" DP is that it seems as a leader-based party, as it is the case of other center-right parties.

Until the 1980s, Turkish center-right had provided alternative policies to the views of RPP which was commonly represented by the central bureaucratic elite. The center-right alternative was also a challenge to bureaucracy without injuring the basic theme of the Republican ideology. In the 1980s and early 1990s, within changing context of Turkey the growing power of the civil societal elements and different socio-cultural identities started being influential in Turkish politics. All political parties are forced to reregulate and redefine their ideologies in accordance with newly shaping political and social context. Although the political conjecture was suitable for further democratization, the center-right parties did not take further steps toward democratizing the parliamentary and majority level keeping their position which was quite conservative toward the issue. These political parties started to lose the legitimacy and power for taking radical decision and realizing reforms, and there existed a contradiction among their views and the demands of the society. For this reason, the center-right and-left parties and bureaucracy seem to agree on resisting some pro-systemic alternatives; for instance, the center parties make coalitions against the Welfare Party and they oppose some revival of cultural identities.

Under such circumstances, especially in the center-right, new tendencies and search, aiming at forming a new movement or political party, began to emerge. Basic familiar feature of these movements and political parties is their being depended on liberalism which is one of the four enemies that is considered a challenge to national unity and the Republican ideology; others are communism, Islam and Kurdism. The threat of communism has been disappeared, but other three are still rampart. It may be argued that, today, liberalism exists as most fundamental challenge to the goals and rules of the Republican nation-state. It is because that central bureaucracy tutelage may be abolished within democratization of all spheres of life through liberal and pluralist values. New minor political parties and movements with their emphasis on liberal democracy which necessitates to a freedom to all groups and identities in the society through legitimizing them may be said as a threat to the bureaucratic structure and ideology of the Republican regime.

To this effect, we can say that, in Turkish political system, there are now clash and conflict between pluralist, liberal and conciliatory values, on the one hand, and centralist, bureaucratic and elitist values, on the other hand. This seems a new version of center-periphery drift, or conflict among populist or democrats and bureaucracy. As one of such new political parties, the "new" DP could be viewed as the one which manifests pluralist and liberal values since its leaders try to formulate a new political understanding particularly basing on political and cultural pluralism. But, I think that the possibility of spreading the views of the "new" DP needs a political culture resting on some aspects: participation, tolerance, political and cultural pluralism, and consensus, that they have not completely existed until now in Turkish politics and society. Lack of such political and social system that the "new" DP relies

on can be seen as a fundamental obstacle to its development. And also, one can say that its ideology does not reflect the social and cultural structure of Turkish society in reality. In the near future, therefore, the "new" DP will not be able to be successful in gaining considerable popular support and in getting located in the Turkish politics as a major political party.

In the early 1990s, Turkey is experiencing the orientation toward pluralism, liberalism and decentralization, that can be seen as being congruent with evolving political sentiment within socio-economic and political development. This orientation might gradually give rise to emerge race of a political context necessitating democratic understanding, linking with the social contracts among different identities. Within the context of such new trends, the Turkish politics and Turkish society need some political parties defending liberal-pluralistic notion of democracy.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acar, F. (1991) "The True Path Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I.B. Tauris), pp. 188-121.
- Ahmad, F. (1991) "The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 65-82.
- Akyol, T. (1993) "Çiller'in Partisi", *Milliyet* (Istanbul Daily), 21 November 1993, pp. 15.
- Akyol, T. (1991) "Seçim Göstergeleri Açısından Türkiye'de Sağın Sorunları", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 17 (Winter), pp. 4-11.
- Ashford, N. (1991) "Neo-Conservatism", in *A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought*, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 184-185.
- Barry, N. P. (1993) "The Road to Freedom: Hayek's Social and Economic Philosophy", in *Hayek'te Serbest Piyasa Ekonomisi ve Özgür Toplum*, Anap Bilimsel Yayınlar Dizisi-3 (Ankara: Anap), pp. 63-103.

Barry, N. (1991) "Conservatism" in *A Dictionary of Conservative and Libertarian Thought*, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 48-49.

Birch, A. H. (1993) *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*. London and New York: Routledge.

*Büyük Yürüyüş*, The Official Bulletin of the GTP, 21 May 1993.

*Büyük Yürüyüş*, The Official Bulletin of the GTP, 5 July 1993.

Çavdar, T. (1983) "Serbest Fırka", in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları), pp. 2052-2059.

Çevik, I. (1993) "DYP-A Party Which Had a Mission", *Turkish Daily News* (Ankara Daily), 20 November 1993, pp. 16.

Çiller, T. (1994) *Başbakan Tansu Çiller'in Konuşmaları*, Ankara: Başkanlık Basım Merkezi.

Demirel, S. (1993) *XV. Basın Toplantısı*, 28 February, Ankara: DYP.

Demirel, S. (1993) *Siyasi Partiler ve Demokrasi*, Başbakan S. Demirel'in 12. 1. 1993 ve 16.1. 1993 Tarihli Konuşmaları, Ankara: DYP.

*Demokrat Parti Program Taslağı*, 1994, Ankara: DP.

Durgun, Ş. (1991) "Sağdaki Yeni Gelişmeler ve Sağın Yeniden Yükselişi", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 17 (Winter), pp. 70-79.

Durham, M. (1993) "The New Right, Moral Crusades and the Politics of the Family", *Economy and Society*, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, pp. 253-256.

*DYP 1991 Erken Genel Seçim Bildirgesi*, Ankara: DYP.

Eisenstadt, S. N. (1992) "Introduction", in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. by ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: E. J. Brill), pp. vii-xiii.

Elkin, S. L. (1985) "Pluralism in Its Place: State and Regime in Liberal Democracy", *The Democratic State*, ed. by R. Benjamin and S. L. Elkin (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas), pp. 179-211.

Ergüder, Ü. (1991) "The Motherland Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 152-201.

Ergüder, Ü. (1988) "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey", in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by E. Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association), pp. 113-147.

Eroğul, C. (1990) *Demokratik Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi*. Ankara: Imge Kitabevi.



- Evin, A. (1988) "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and After 1980", in *State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s*, ed. by A. Evin and M. Heper (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter), pp. 201-211.
- Frey, F. W. (1965) *The Turkish Political Elite*. Cambridge, Mass: M. I. T. Press.
- Galston, W. A. (1988) "Liberal Virtues", *American Political Science Review*, 82 (December), pp. 1277-1289.
- Government Program of the TPP and the ADPP Coalition*, 25 November 1991, Ankara: DYP.
- Göktaş, H. and Çakır, R. (1991) *Vatan Millet Pragmatizm*. Istanbul: Metis Yayınları.
- Göle, N. (1994) "İslami Dokunulmazlar, Laikler ve Radikal Demokratlar", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 27 (Mart-Nisan), pp. 13-19.
- Göle, N. (1993) "Liberal Yanılgı", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 24 (Güz), pp. 12-18.
- Göle, N. (1992) "80 Sonrası Politik Kültür", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 21 (Kış), pp. 49-55.
- Graham, K. (1986) *The Battle of Democracy: Conflict, Consensus and the Individual*. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books.

- Gray, J. (1993) *Beyond the New Right*, London and New York: Routledge.
- Hall, J. A. (1993) "Liberalism", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. by Joel Kriger (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 539-541.
- Heper, M. (1991) "Introduction", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 1-9.
- Heper, M. (1985) *State Tradition in Turkey*. Walkington: Eothen Press.
- Himmelstein, J. L. (1990) *To the Right: The Transformation of American Conservatism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Karakoyunlu, Y. (1993) *Türkiye'de Liberalizmin Seyir Defteri (1938-1991)*. Ankara: Anap Bilimsel Yayınları Dizisi-4.
- Karpat, K. (1966) *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to A Multi-Party System*. Second Edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keane, J. (1988) *Civil Society and the State*, London and New York: Verso.
- King, D. (1993) "Right", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed. by J. Krieger (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 790-791.

- King, D. (1993) "New Right", in *The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World*, ed by J. Krieger (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 631-632.
- King, D. (1987) *The New Right: Politics Markets and Citizenship*, Chicago, Ill.: The Dorsey Pr.
- Landau, J. M. (1991) "Conclusion", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 202-207.
- Levi, A. (1991) "The Justice Party, 1983-1989", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau ( London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 134-151.
- Lipset, S. M. (1992) "Conditions of the Democratic Order and Social Change: A Comparative Discourse", in *Democracy and Modernity*, ed. by S. N. Eisenstadt (Leiden: E. J. Brill), pp. 1-14.
- Mango, A. (1976) "Turkey: The Emergence of a Modern Problem", in *Aspects of Modern Turkey*, ed. by W. Hale (London: Bowker).
- Mardin, Ş. (1973) "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics", *Daedalus*, 102, pp. 169-190.
- Meluci, A. (1988) "Social Movements and the Democratisation of Everyday Life", in *Civil Society and the State* (London and New York: Verso), pp.

- Menderes, Aydın (1994) "Yeter! Söz Milletindir", *Genç Demirkırat*, no. 2.
- Menderes, Aydın (1993) *A Speech Delivered by Aydın Menderes*. Ankara: BDP.
- Menderes, Aydın. (1992) *Ve Siyasette Yeni Yönelişler*. İstanbul: Dergah Yay.
- Mill, J. S. (1984) "Representative Government", in *Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy*, ed. by D. Held, (Oxford: Polity Pr.), pp. 97-100.
- Nokta*, İstanbul Weekly Periodical, 16-22 Mayıs 1993.
- Öğün, S. S. (1992) *Türkiye'de Cemaatçi Milliyetçilik ve Nurettin Topçu*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları.
- Özbudun, E. (1988) "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequibrations", in *Perspectives and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by E. Özbudun (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association), pp. 1-59.
- Riley, M. (1988) *Power, Politics and Voting Behaviour*. New York and London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Robertson, D. (1991) "The Right", in *A Dictionary of Modern Politics*, Second Edition, ed. by N. Ashford and S. Davis (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 240.

- Sarıbay, A. Y. (1991) "The Democratic Party, 1946-1960", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by M. Heper and J. M. Landau (London: I. B. Tauris), pp. 119-133.
- Sawicky, M. (1992) "What's NEWP? A Guiding Theory of the New Right", *Social Policy*, Winter, pp. 7-19.
- Sunic, T. (1990) *Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right*. New York: Peter Lang.
- Tökin, F. (1965) *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler ve Siyasi Düşüncenin Gelişimi: 1839-1965*. Istanbul: Ert Yayınları.
- Tunçay, M. (1992) *T. C.'nde TEK PARTİ YÖNETİMİ'nin Kurulması, (1923-1931)*. Third Edition, Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi.
- Turkish Daily News* (Ankara Daily), 30 August 1993.
- Weiker, W. F. (1981) *The Modernization of Turkey: From Atatürk to the Present Day*. New York and London: Holmes and Meier Publishing Inc.
- Weiker, W. F. (1973) *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Yeni Zemin*, Istanbul Monthly Review, 12 July 1993.
- Yılmaz, M. (1993) A Speech Delievered by Mesut Yılmaz in the Convention on August 28th and 29th, Ankara: ANAP.

Yılmaz, M. (1993) *Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkanı Mesut Yılmaz'ın ANAP TBMM Grubunda Yaptığı Konuşma, 12 Ekim 1993*, Ankara: ANAP.

Zürcher, E. J. (1991) *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924-1925*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.