CHANGE AND STABILITY
IN
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST

A THESIS PRESENTED BY H. PINAR BİLGİN
TO
THE INSTITUTE OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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*tarafından beğlenmiştir.*

BİLKENT UNIVERSITY
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I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of International Relations.

Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss
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Asst. Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler

III

Abstract

This thesis is a study on change and stability in
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Kjell
Goldmann's theory on change and stability in foreign
policy is applied to Turkish foreign policy towards the
Middle East. It is argued that since the mid-1960s,
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been
stabilized; there have been no changes in the policy
except for adjustment changes. In this study, the
stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle
East is explained with the help of thirteen foreign policy
stabilizers presented within the framework of Kjell
Goldmann's theory.

Özet

Bu tez, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikasında değişim ve durağanlık üzerine yapılmış bir çalışmadır. Kjell Goldmann'ın dış politikada değişim ve durağanlık teorisi, Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikasına uygulanmıştır. Bu tezin temel savı 1960'ların ortalarından beri Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikasının sabitlendiği; birkaç ayarlama dışında üzerinde hiçbir değişiklik yapılmadığıdır. Bu çalışmada Türkiye'nin Orta Doğu'ya yönelik dış politikasındaki durağanlık, Kjell Goldmann'ın teorisinde sunduğu onüç dış politika sabitleyicisinin yardımı ile açıklanmıştır.

Acknowledgements

The title "Acknowledgements" implies that one has more than one person to thank for their help in writing his/her thesis. If this is the rule, this study is an exception. Although a large number of people have contributed to me at various stages of my life and my studies -and I am grateful to them all-, my thanks go to Dr. Bilge Criss without whose excellent guidance I could not have started, let alone finished, this thesis. She encouraged this study from its inception and gave me the benefit of her excellent advice. Nobody else would have put up with me and my 211 pages-long thesis.

Dr. Müftüler and Dr. Borovalı were also extemely understanding in this regard that they read this rather long thesis and gave me expert critiques of it. My thanks go to all three of them.

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Chapter I: Introduction

1.1 The Need for an Analysis of Change and Stability in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East

The entire world was affected when the Cold War began. It was one of those profound changes which every single actor felt itself forced to react one way or another. The end of the Cold War also brought about a major change in the international system though not of the same caliber. Notwithstanding the fact that the rules of the game were reversed, the way the game ended, i.e., the disintegration of first, the Soviet Bloc, and then the Soviet Union itself, despite all the shock it caused, was not that unexpected. On the contrary, many regarded its end to be near while many others considered this to be wishful thinking.

Leaving aside the degree to which the end of the Cold War was expected, one has to concentrate on the impact it made on international relations. The end of the Cold War, though it came gradually, produced, in the end, a snowball effect on people's conception of international phenomena in that a world not divided by an iron curtain seemed to present new opportunities as well as challenges.

Given such profound a change in the international arena, states were expected to adopt to changing circumstances as required by the definition of change in foreign policy, which implies that change is a response of the government to its perception of some change in its external environment. In this sense, the response one government gives to foreign stimuli, i.e., change in the external environment, is a matter of perception. That is why most foreign stimuli are missed, misinterpreted, ignored, or treated routinely by governments. It is assumed that it is only when foreign stimuli are repeatedly reinforced by other events that it becomes "inescapable" for governments to respond to them.

Although change in the environment, in this case, the end of the Cold War, is not the only stimulus that initiates change in foreign policy, and despite the fact that external stimuli may not always bring about foreign policy change, it is still regarded to be the major source of change in foreign policy analysis. This largely results from a deterministic understanding of international interaction which gives little power to actors, but tends to explain state action as responses to international stimuli, in contrast to the voluntarist understanding which concentrates on states' own initiatives as the major source of change. The "truth," if it exists, is somewhere in between. Accordingly, foreign policy change is the response of the actor, i.e., the government, to

the external environment which it perceives to have changed. Three alternative combinations may emerge in line with this thinking: either the environment may change, but the actor may not perceive it to have changed; or the environment may stay the same, but the actor may perceive it to have changed; or the environment may change and the actor may perceive this change. In any case, it still depends on the actor whether to respond or not, regardless of whether it perceives a change in the environment or not.

However, it is still assumed, seemingly in contrast to the previous argument, that the end of the Cold War was very profound a development, which would, in one way or another, cause some change in the foreign policies of states. Indeed, the end of the Cold War was one of those foreign stimuli that caused the unfolding of events and made it nearly impossible for governments to ignore the change. Accordingly, by 1989, foreign policy change was on the agenda of many states. However, the extent to which change in policy was to take place remained vague for most states. Some confined to minor adjustments while others went as far as changing their orientation.

Turkey was among those states that were rather hesitant to adapt their policies in the face of profound change in the external environment. The Turks preferred to wait until late 1989 when there came such a moment with the coming down of the

Berlin Wall it became clear that the developments were irreversible. Even after 1989, Turkey refrained from making any changes in its foreign policy although the Soviet Union, whose posed threat has been one of the major determinants of Turkish foreign policy, has completely changed its policies. One explanation that can be put forward is that by then, Turkey shared with the United States a strong interest in the preservation of existing structures and relationships. One author describes this as Turkey's "secret hope" that, despite everything, Turkey wished to see NATO preserved.[1] Thus the Turks refrained from taking the initiative for a foreign policy change, and preferred to wait. This attitude might also have stemmed from Turkey's being a "small power, which by definition implies that she is in the position of responding to what happens in the external environment rather than shaping that environment."[2] The Turks, to go one step further, are even hesitant to respond to what happens in the external environment if it seems to require any change in the traditional policy, a salient issue in Turkish domestic politics. In fact, Turkish foreign policy has been characterized by its consistency and continuity, in comparison to other young states. This is partly because nearly every foreign policy action that the governments undertook since the mid-1960s have been considered within the broad framework of the so-called "traditional Turkish foreign policy" regardless

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of changes in the external environment, as experienced in the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf (1990-91). When there has been any change it has been "slow, deliberate, carefully elaborated, and gradually developed by succeeding governments."[3]

It is this nature of Turkish foreign policy that leads the analysts of Turkish foreign policy to conclude that forces of continuity/stability prevailed over the forces of change. The small number of analyses that make up the literature on Turkish foreign policy have usually concentrated on the continuity of Turkish foreign policy. This not only stemmed from the fact that the policy itself has been very consistent and proved to be a continuation of the past policies, but also from the negative meaning attached to the word "change," which has usually been identified with the foreign policy of the Menderes era. In this sense, the words "change" and "deviation" have usually been attributed similar meanings in that change is not perceived to be something good, while continuity is praised.

However, the term "continuity" can also easily be equated with the term "stability," which has a rather negative connotation, especially in the eyes of those who vie for "dynamism" in foreign policy. It is argued here that both continuity and change are neither good nor bad in themselves. The meaning one attributes to these terms usually depends on

whether s/he is for or against change in foreign policy. To give an example, continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is the main concern of this study, has endowed Turkish policy with a degree of predictability and also consistency, both of which are praised. The very same continuity in policy, however, caused drawbacks for Turkey when changes took place in the external environment to which Turkey failed to react swiftly, or adopt to changing circumstances.

A similar argument may be put forward on those very few analyses on Turkish foreign policy that they presented a continuity in arguing for the continuity in Turkish foreign policy. The reason why such analyses usually concentrated on continuity rather than change is probably that the word "change" has been given a negative connotation, i.e., deviation from Kemalist foreign policy principles. However, when it became clear by 1989 that lack of change can be as bad as change itself, the need for a better analysis of the forces of continuity in Turkish foreign policy made itself felt. The Gulf Crisis erupted at a time when Turkey was beginning to reconsider its policies and has decided to reassert itself as an important factor for European security. Although Turkish foreign policy towards the Gulf Crisis was intended, by President Özal, to be a "deviation from the stagnant policies of the past" through the "pro-active" stance he took during

the crisis, the result did not disturb the pattern of continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

What should be remembered is that the argument, here, is not that Turkey should have adopted a more active policy during the crisis, and that it should have enforced its strategic importance to the West and the Middle East alike. On the contrary, it is argued that there seems to be a limit in rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, as Turkey's past experience of relations with the region also proves.[4] However, the stable nature of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East still strikes the analyst because although there has been a profound change in the external environment in which the policy is shaped, the policy remains stable, contrary to expectations and also statements by some. This is what inspired this analysis: the urge to learn about the factors that sustain the continuity of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

As argued before, change is neither good nor bad in itself. So is stability in foreign policy. However, a student of foreign policy analysis cannot remain content with arguing that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has always been stable. An analyst has to become able to account for change and the lack of change, not only for the sake of building theory per se, but in order to become able to account for the future, to the degree that is possible. It is

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in this sense necessary to become able to account for the lack of change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's theory on change and stability in foreign policy will be utilized.[5]

1.2 Scope and Objective

As indicated above, the objective of this study, i.e., an analysis of change and stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, is to become able to account for the lack of change in the policy with the ultimate aim of becoming able to account for the future. It is assumed that knowledge of stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, i.e., phenomena, the presence of which tend to inhibit change in policy, may help the analyst to become able to predict, to some degree, what may happen in the future, though this is not the ultimate purpose.

Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's theory of change and stability in foreign policy will be utilized. The "theoretical sketch" he provides about the stabilizers of foreign policy, an inventory he puts forward in this analysis, will be applied to the Turkish case, i.e., Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The aim of choosing relations with the Middle East as a test case in an analysis of stability of Turkish foreign policy is twofold: The first one is that the recent change in the external environment, i.e.,

the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were profound changes, when the Soviet Union's importance in Turkey's security calculations is considered. Not only a major threat to regional security has dissolved, but also its advocates like Syria, which came to threaten Turkey's security, lost their major ally. Since this fits the definition of profound change, one expects to see some change in Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. It is, in this sense, interesting to analyze the stability of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The second reason stems from the peculiarity of the experiences of the recent crisis in the Gulf and the aura it caused in Turkish domestic politics. The discussion as to whether Turkey's policy in the Gulf Crisis constituted a deviation from traditional Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East or not drew the analyst's attention to the matter that made an analysis of the stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East more than interesting.

Thus, it is extremely interesting and also a challenging task to become able to account for the stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. However, what is meant by the term, the "Middle East" also needs clarification. This need stems both from the problematic nature of the term and also from its usage within the context of Turkish foreign policy. The

problematic nature of the term largely depends on different meanings attributed to it. Since September 1902 when the term was first used, the "Middle East" meant different things to different people. Still, it was always the outsiders, i.e., the West, who defined the Middle East. Roderic Davison sumps up the history of the term: "For, as the term 'Middle East' has developed a history to its present condition, the unifying principle has always been the political and strategic interests of outside powers."[6]

In addition to the problem arising from the nature of the term "Middle East", its usage within the context of Turkish foreign policy is also not problem-free. In the literature on Turkish foreign policy, the policy towards the Middle East, the policy towards the Arab World, and the policy towards the Muslim world are often used interchangeably. It is this ambiguity inherent in the term, and also its usage within the Turkish context that leads one author to argue that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has always been "undetermined".[7]

Within the bounds of this analysis, the term Middle East will be referred to as the sub-system including all the countries of the Mashrek (Near East), the Maghreb (North Africa), and the Gulf Region. This is because references to states from all three subregions is made

when referring to Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Thus, although it is only a small group of Middle Eastern states with which Turkey enjoys full bilateral relations and lays down specific policies (these states include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel), the fact that the term Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East includes, at least theoretically, all three subregions, leads the analyst to delimit the boundaries of the region accordingly.

However, although all three subregions, the Mashrek, the Maghreb, and the Gulf region, are included in the analysis on change and stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, bilateral relations with each state will not be considered within the bounds of this study. This is not only because the Middle East will be treated as a sub-system with a dynamic of its own,[8] but also because Turkey formulates its policies on a regional basis, i.e., Turkish foreign policy has a broad framework called the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in accordance with which bilateral relations with each regional state are shaped. It is in this sense that the Middle East will be treated as a sub-system and the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will be analyzed accordingly.

To do this, Kjell Goldmann's inventory called the stabilizers of foreign policy and his theoretical sketch on foreign policy stabilizers will be utilized. His theoretical sketch will be treated as a systematic checklist of various phenomena that tend to block, delay, or reduce the scope of change. The objective would be to check to what extent these phenomena were active in the Turkish case. Although contributing to further refinement of the inventory would not be the purpose, an empirical application will inevitably make a contribution, however modest.

1.3 Outline of the study

Goldmann's theoretical sketch of thirteen types of stabilizers will be checked against the Turkish case, in order to see which ones and to what extent were active in reducing the sensitivity of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East to pressure for change that may come from the external environment. Although the bulk of this study covers an analysis of the stabilizing impact of various stabilizers on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, established in the mid-1960s, pre-1960 developments will also be considered to present an idea as to the forces of continuity and change that work in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The second chapter is an analysis of foreign policy theories and theories of foreign policy change in particular.

Goldmann's theoretical sketch on foreign policy stabilizers will also be analyzed, in detail, in this chapter. The third chapter, as indicated above, includes a brief historical appraisal of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The so called new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East of the 1960s, which later came to be called the traditional policy will be analyzed in depth to prepare the groundwork for an analysis of change and continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Chapters four to seven comprise analyses of policy. Chapter four is on international stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The stabilizing impact of normative regulation, dependence, and third party, as stabilizers of foreign policy, will be analyzed in this chapter. Chapter five analyses the cognitive stabilization of the policy through studying the stabilizing impact made by consistency, centrality and testability of the policy in question. The sixth chapter is on political stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The impact of institutionalization, support and salience of foreign policy stabilization will be considered. In the seventh chapter, administrative stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will be analyzed. Four stabilizers, the presence or absence of which will be checked against the Turkish case are fragmentation, critical variables, response

repertory, and decision structure. The conclusion chapter will include an analysis of the total stabilizing impact of Goldmann's thirteen stabilizers on the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Chapter II: Theories on Foreign Policy and Applications

2.1 Theories on Foreign Policy

There is little agreement, in the field of International Relations, over the use of terms such as International Politics, Foreign Policy, and International Relations.[1] Lack of consensus on the definition of foreign policy, i.e., the dependent variable of International Relations, is a persisting problem of the field. Although most studies on international relations have been foreign policy studies, lack of consensus on key definitions impeded the emergence of an overall paradigm which would, if ever could, organize theoretical components to further our understanding of the behavior of nations.[2] Two problems of foreign policy studies, lack of an overall paradigm and the lack of agreement on key definitions, tend to reinforce each other which leaves the sub-field of foreign policy analysis with a plurality of foreign policy theories. According to Holsti, this stems from the paradox as to "[h]ow one defines these terms is largely influenced by what one wants to investigate, and what one investigates is largely a function of a particular approach, model or theory."[3] Since it is not easy to break away from this paradox, it would be safer to resort to a rough definition of

foreign policy that is easier to agree upon. In this sense, foreign policy can roughly be defined as the relationship of units to the international system, i.e., to other states.[4] Foreign policy analysis, as a sub-field of International Relations, is the study of this relationship.

Since many international and domestic factors play upon the behaviors of states, foreign policy studies require a combination of different perspectives of the family of social sciences. Political Science, Economics, Psychology and International Politics all provide insight into foreign policy studies. It is because foreign policy analysis requires inter- and/or multi-disciplinary approaches to state behaviors that a plurality of foreign policy theories exist. The lack of an overall paradigm to play within and the insufficiency of existing theories to account for the relationship of states to other states results in criticisms of the field, which tend to question the competence and/or relevance of foreign policy analysis as a sub-field of International Relations. However, foreign policy analysis, despite its deficiencies, serves an important purpose in furthering our understanding of international relations by the help of its main deficiency, the plurality of foreign policy theories. Although still far from accounting for state behaviors, foreign policy theories provide valuable insights into relations among nations.

Two main criticisms directed against foreign policy analysis, -that it is no different from Diplomatic History or that it is too much Political Science oriented- in this sense, may become the main strength of the field. Accordingly, foreign policy analysis is not simply Diplomatic History, as is usually argued by theorists in search for grand theories to explain the entirety of the international system. Neither is it simply Political Science, as claimed by diplomatic historians and International Relations traditionalists alike, that it concentrates on political process at the expense of policy outcome.[5] Foreign policy analysis is rather the study of "transactions [between states], the domestic circumstances that produce them, the effect on them of the system and its structures and their influence on the system."[6]

The criticisms directed against foreign policy analysis, in a sense, take root from this eclectic nature of the field that it combines perspectives, which, otherwise, fall into different paradigms of international relations studies. James N. Rosenau, one of the forerunners of the field, defines foreign policy studies as a "bridging discipline." Margot Light, building upon this definition, underlines the significance of foreign policy analysis, which, in Rosenau's words again, is "a discipline with limitless boundaries" regarding the number of independent variables that have to be dealt with:[7]

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> As a subject of study, FPA [foreign policy
> analysis] is invaluable both because it is a
> 'bridging discipline', connecting together the
> diverse issues that students deal with under
> separate headings in other subjects, and because
> it translates abstract theory into concrete
> problems. Furthermore, by concentrating on the
> interface between the state and the state system,
> FPA links the micro level of politics with the
> macro level of the international system.[8]

Foreign policy analysis, as "a discipline with limitless

boundaries" is undertaken not only by foreign policy scholars,

but also by others who study international relations. Among

these, Steve Smith discerns five main ways of studying foreign

policy: through a domestic politics perspective; International

Relations theory; comparative foreign policy theory; case

studies; and middle-range theory.[9] The domestic politics

perspective treats the state as a self-contained unit and sees

foreign policy as its external activity. International

Relations theory, as opposed to this, stresses the systemic

causes of state behavior. Comparative foreign policy theory

can be considered as an attempt to find a mid-way between the

two- an attempt to combine external and internal causes into a

generally applicable theory of foreign policy. Case studies

and middle-range theory, in comparison to comparative foreign

policy theories, are less ambitious approaches. Case studies

still dominate the field although under attack for not being

scientific enough. Middle-range theory, on the other hand, is

an attempt to inject theory into historical analysis.[10]

The plurality of foreign policy theories, as mentioned before, impede the development of a general theory of foreign policy. But, they still contribute immensely to our understanding of the international phenomena.

2.2 Theories of Change in Foreign Policy

If and when an analyst attempts to inject the concept of change into foreign policy analysis, s/he has to face the greatest handicap of the lack of a general theory in foreign policy analysis which results, according to Rosenau, in the non-cumulative character of foreign policy studies.[11] This prevents the analyst from coping with the extraordinary rapidity of change in world affairs. Given this state of the field, two traditions of foreign policy analysis coexist: that of viewing foreign policy in terms of traditions, as the pursuit of formerly defined policies, and that of viewing it in terms of situations, as variable responses to changing conditions. Although this cannot be termed as peaceful coexistence, given the inherent tension between viewing foreign policy in terms of traditions and in terms of situations, the main tendency in the field of foreign policy analysis, surprisingly, has been to do both at the same time.[12] This stems from the inclination in the field to undertake vertical analysis, tracing trends down through history. According to Rosenau, there is "a compelling

simplicity" about this type of analysis that foreign policy actions of states are seen as the continuation of some previous pattern.[13] In this sense, foreign policy becomes embedded in the history of the nation. Accordingly, Rosenau argues that:

> The residue of the past can thus be seen as differentiating the behavior patterns and attitudinal tendencies of any society from those of every other society. Moreover, since the norms that sustain a nation's culture are not entirely consistent with each other, contradictions among the external policy that a society may pursue can be easily explained as reflecting the diversity inherent in the society's culture. If, for example, a society avoids involvement in one situation abroad and becomes deeply involved in another, a perusal of its past would probably yield enough evidence of flexible orientations to permit one to posit the contradictory behavior as expressive of a pragmatic style.[14]

On the other hand, the analysis of foreign policy in terms of situations concentrate on changing demands emanating from the international system or from the decision maker's own society. However, current stimuli is injected into foreign policy analysis only in crisis situations that "[o]ther than the studies bearing on crisis behavior foreign policy analysts have not made environmental variables the focus of theoretical inquiry." As a consequence, the literature lacks propositions or data concerning interaction and relative strength of the demands arising out of past experiences on the one hand and out of present circumstances on the other.[15]

In line with this tendency to combine two opposing traditions, and also due to the lack of any other comprehensive theory, foreign policy of a state is usually analyzed in terms of its traditions. And when, for some reason or another, any change occurs in a state's foreign policy, this is explained by referring to the dynamics of international politics or the imposing/erratic nature of leaders. The important point which is usually ignored is the inherent inconsistency in the assumptions of these two traditions. According to Goldmann, "such explanations undermine the very assumption that foreign policy is patterned– unless it can be explained why this particular policy was vulnerable to that particular disturbance." Goldmann, then, puts forth the question "if both [change and stability] were to be expected, how can either be explained, and how could either have been predicted? What factors determine whether, when, and to what extent pressure for change in a policy will in fact produce change?"[16] This failure largely results from the tendency in the field of International Relations to explain events after they take place. The problem is not that events are being explained after they take place; it is not possible to do otherwise. It is that analysts tend to adapt their theories of foreign policy making to explain the change in policy which resulted in that specific event in the aftermath of the event within

the environment that has been changed by the unfolding of that
event without even being aware of it. This is not to claim
that dynamics of change in foreign policy is totally ignored,
but that our existing theories are not able to account for
it.[17]

The domestic politics perspective, one of the five sub-
fields of foreign policy analysis, deals, among other things,
with the dynamics of change in foreign policy. However, while
studies on theories of foreign policy decision-making have yet
failed to produce a single, definitive policy-making model,
they have contributed to the field by putting forward new
insights into the way decisions are made.[18] As such, foreign
policy analysts have been unable to understand and explain
change which adds a new complexity to already complex models
of foreign policy making.

According to Rosenau, one of the forerunners of
comparative foreign policy studies, the study of foreign
policy "cries out for developmental theory," i.e., a theory of
foreign policy that can account for how major determinants of
a state's foreign policy behavior interact across time.[19] He
argues that this is because

> both area specialists and comparative foreign
> policy analysts tend to reject the very idea of a
> developmental sub-field that is committed to
> specific methods and that aspires to building
> visible and testable theory. Committed to
> accounting for the unique details and cultural
> nuances that differentiate their region or
> country of concern, area specialists do not see

themselves as engaged in a specific enterprise...
Comparativists, on the other hand, resist the
idea of a developmental sub-field because they do
not regard their endeavor as scientific and fear
that a focus on development across time will
confine them, perforce, to a single case and
accounting for the impact of specific events,
foci they see as the very antithesis of science
with its stress on identifying and explaining
central tendencies among many cases.[20]

Drawing attention to this gap, Rosenau, back in the

1970s, had called for constructing developmental theories of

foreign policy without foregoing the basic committments of

science. In this sense, the aim of constructing a

developmental theory of foreign policy would be to "explain"

and to "anticipate" developments that are likely to occur at

those moments "when emergent structures clash with persistent

patterns, when continuities seem increasingly

counterproductive relative to the possibilities of change,

when domestic needs and foreign policy changes are in

conflict."[21]

Although years have passed since Rosenau called for

developmental theories of foreign policy making, students of

foreign policy analysis have not yet been able to construct a

developmental theory that would "explain" the past and the

present and "anticipate" the likely developments of the future

of a state's foreign policy.[22] Nevertheless, there have been

attempts in recent years to integrate the concept of change in

foreign policy analysis; an effort that seems to have prompted

by large-scale historical change: The end of the Cold War,

which led International Relations specialists to recognize their static conception of the international system that, until now, prevented them from accommodating processes causing/precipitating change.[23] Since then, there have been attempts to explain the evolution of the international system[24] an example of which is K.J. Holsti's Change in the International System.[25] In this collection of essays Holsti analyzes change in the international system and foreign policy making as well as change in the analysis of International Relations. According to him, foreign policy analysis has been predominantly static and thus, most studies concentrated on particular countries' foreign policy decisions at the expense of foreign policy change.[26] One of these essays "Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy Theory," is a study of change in foreign policy.[27] But the type of change Holsti is interested in is "dramatic change," namely foreign policy restructuring and re-orientation, which he finds out to be more relevant for analyzing foreign policies of the Third World states, since they are the ones who are not content with their foreign policies. Since he distinguishes between "normal" foreign policy change and foreign policy restructuring, and takes up the latter as his understanding of change at the expense of the former, his framework appears to be suitable for analyzing foreign policy

re-orientation, which seems to be the exception, rather than "normal" foreign policy change, which emerges to be the rule.

The attempt to incorporate "normal" change in foreign policy studies produced two inspiring works by Charles F. Hermann and Kjell Goldmann. Hermann, in his study titled "Changing course: When governments choose to re-direct foreign policy,"[28] suggests a framework to conduct analyses of change in foreign policy. Goldmann's study, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy[29] on the other hand, provides a very complex theory of how foreign policy is stabilized. Both authors' understanding of change, as opposed to Holsti's, admit "normal" foreign policy change in their definition of change in foreign policy. Hermann's concept of "major foreign policy re-direction" involves any change in foreign policy other than adjustments changes, i.e., those changes that occur on the level of effort only.[30] Goldmann, on the other hand, has a wider definition of change. According to him, change in policy is assumed to have taken place when "either a new act in a given type of situation or a given act in a type of situation previously associated with a different act" is observed.[31]

Kjell Goldmann, whose theory of change and stability in foreign policy will be utilized within the bounds of this study, is interested in the factors that determine whether, when, and to what extent pressure for change in a government's

foreign policy will in fact produce change.[32] In an attempt to

find an answer to this question he puts forward an inventory

called "stabilizers" of foreign policy defined as the

phenomena that tend to inhibit change in foreign policy even

when there is pressure for change. According to him, foreign

policy theories have to become able to account for change and

lack of change, called stability, not only for the sake of

building a theory per se, but in order to become able to

account for the future. He argues that

> [t]he question of change and stability in foreign
> policy is vital for peace and security. In order
> to   improve   relations   between   long-standing
> adversaries it is necessary to destabilize their
> mutual policies of enmity. Once this has been
> achieved, the task is to stabilize their emerging
> policies of amity- that is, to make it possible
> for an initially fragile détente to survive the
> stresses and strains that are bound to occur.[33]

Goldmann's theory of change and stability in foreign

policy is not a theory per se but, as he defines it, a

"theoretical sketch", or a weak theory in the sense that "its

concepts are imprecise, its propositions are weak, and it has

not been exposed to a systematic empirical test."[34] Still, his

theoretical sketch serves the purpose not only because a

sketch is better than nothing at all, but also because it is a

necessary intermediary step towards producing theory proper.

The disadvantages of using a weak theory are also valid

for this study. However, as Goldmann indicates, "those who

need to consume theory cannot always produce themselves." It

is even impossible for a "student" of International Relations to undertake such a huge task. But, "if a theoretical sketch exists, there is no need to choose between being arbitrary and beginning from scratch" which are two alternatives open to a student in the absence of a proper theory.[35]

In this study, Goldmann's theoretical sketch will be utilized in analyzing change and stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. His theoretical sketch, in the absence of a proper theory will serve as "a tool for asking better questions -as a systematic checklist for the analysis of specific problems."[36]

2.3 The "Theoretical Sketch": Change and Stability in Foreign Policy

Since the task here is to identify the factors that make Turkish foreign policy more or less sensitive to pressure from any of the sources of change, stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy will be identified. Goldmann defines stabilizers as those factors that "determine whether an input into the system from one of the sources of change will set a process of change in motion." The argument here is that "in the absence of stabilizers, policies are highly sensitive to new conditions, to negative feedback and to residual factors." Stabilizers are assumed to reduce this sensitivity in mainly three ways: (1)by blocking policy change unless removed, (2)by reducing the scope of policy change, (3)by delaying policy change.[37]

This study will be an attempt to answer the question how to account for change and stability in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Towards this end, Kjell Goldmann's conception of stabilizers will be utilized and his systematic checklist of foreign policy stabilizers will be checked against the Turkish case. Goldmann classifies stabilizers into four categories: administrative, political, cognitive, and international.

> 'Administrative' stabilizers are identified by examining the structure and the mode of operation of the bureaucracy. 'Political' stabilizers are identified by studying the domestic politics of foreign policy. 'Cognitive' stabilizers may be found in the beliefs on which the policy is based. 'International' stabilizers concern the state's external relations.[38]

Under these four categories there are a sum of thirteen stabilizers which will be considered below. The main pattern will be from most to the least common and obvious; from foreign policy stabilization by international agreement to foreign policy stabilization by administrative structures.

According to Goldmann's theory, **international stabilizers** are those factors that reduce the sensitivity of a foreign policy to change through means external to the state. There are mainly three ways for international stabilization: Normative regulation, dependence, and third party effect. Normative regulation may stabilize a policy through creating expectations on the part of other parties regarding the agreements/treaties that cannot be violated

without incurring a cost to the actor. Dependence, mainly understood as economic dependence, may be created by the pursuit of a policy of the actor towards its subject that the actor becomes dependent upon this relationship. It is through the creation of such a relationship between the actor and its subject that dependence functions as a stabilizer of foreign policy. Third party may function as a stabilizer through the creation of a stable structure of relations between the actor, its subject and a particular third party where the actor's relations with the third party determines its relations with the subject.[39]

Cognitive stabilizers, on the other hand, are those factors that operate at the individual level. A policy is considered to be cognitively stable if the actor's belief in the policy is consistent, central and untestable. Consistency, centrality, and stability function as stabilizers by their impact on the psychological costs of policy change. It is assumed that consistency of a policy increases the cost of change by increasing the actor's belief in the system and making change less likely. Centrality functions in a similar fashion that when a policy is central, thus positively linked to other policies, it will be harder to change the policy without incurring costs in the form of negative impact on other policies. Testability, on the other hand, functions as a stabilizer in its absence. When a policy is untestable it

does not run the risk of being challenged by consequences incompatible with the intentions, thus becoming less amenable to change.[40]

The third group of stabilizers are **political stabilizers** which operate at the domestic level through causing a foreign policy to be "embedded" in domestic politics which reduces its sensitivity to change. There are three dimensions to this process: Institutionalization, support, and salience. The degree of institutionalization or the extent to which the government has become committed to pursue a policy may operate as a stabilizer through increasing the political cost of deviating from that policy and also through decreasing the alternatives to be considered or "the likelihood of contingency planning". Support functions as a stabilizer by increasing the costs of deviating from a policy. However, the impact of lack of support or opposition to a policy is not easy to measure since it depends on the type of Political party system and leadership structure. Salience, on the other hand, functions through its impact on the degree of institutionalization and support of the policy. If an issue is regarded to be salient, "it matters more the extent to which a policy has become institutionalized as well as whether it is consensual or controversial."[41]

Fourthly, **administrative stabilizers** are assumed to function when administrative tasks of intelligence, planning

and decision-making are carried out in a way that inhibits change.[42] There are four types of administrative stabilizers that are assumed to function. Two of these, fragmentation and decision structure are structural stabilizers, while critical variables and response repertory are substantive in the sense that they concern the substance of what the apparatus is doing. Fragmentation in the administrative structure may function as a stabilizer by hindering the discovery of new patterns and impeding the organization's ability to adopt and to learn. Critical variables are those rules of what to take into account and what not when monitoring the environment. There are usually rules about tolerable ranges, that is, about the changes in the values of the critical variables that would justify a reconsideration of the current policies by the administration. The fewer the number of critical variables, the more stable the policy. And secondly, the larger the tolerable ranges, the more stable the policy. The third type of administrative stabilizer, response repertory of a country is composed of those contingency plans worked out by the bureaucracy. Its impact on the stability of a policy depends on its existence as well as its nature, i.e., whether it is moderate or not. Fourthly, decision structure may help stabilize a policy depending on its nature. Leader autonomous groups are assumed to be more open for changes while decision

structures requiring bargaining among delegates may be more stable.[43]

As Goldmann also indicates, his theory or "theoretical sketch" of foreign policy stabilization is rather complex and has its limitations. He lists four main limitations: (1)a number of conceptual deficiencies; (2)the weakness of its causal claims; (3)the limited extent to which these claims have a basis in research; (4)its static nature. Nevertheless, since conceptual improvement is likely to come primarily from attempts at empirical application, the objective of this study will be to utilize his "theoretical sketch" while being aware of its limitations. Goldmann's theoretical sketch, in this sense, will be treated as a systematic checklist of various phenomena that tend to block, delay, or reduce the scope of change. The purpose would be to check to what extent these phenomena were active in the Turkish case. Although contributing to further refinement of the inventory would not be the purpose, an empirical application will inevitably make a contribution, however modest. In this sense, the systematic checklist of these four types of stabilizers will be checked against the Turkish case, i.e., Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, in order to see which ones were active in reducing its sensitivity to pressure for change. Keeping in mind the limitations of the theory and also problems of finding data that are relevant, the attempt, here, would be to make generalizations based on data. In

cases where it is not possible to find relevant data, the researcher will rest content with impressions while trying to be as scientific as possible.

Chapter III: Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East

3.1 Basic Concepts

Foreign policy can roughly be defined as the relationship of units to the international system -other states.[1] It has four components ranging in scope from general to specific: foreign policy orientation, national role, foreign policy objective, and action.[2] In any analysis of foreign policy, it is usually the government actions that are taken as the main indicators of a state's foreign policy. Outside observers most of the time equate foreign-policy making with day-to-day problem solving. According to Paul Seabury:

> All too often policy is the product of random, haphazard, or even irrational forces and events. Equally often it is the result of dead-locked judgments, an uneasy compromise formula. Often what happens on the surface as a nation's settled course of action may be due to indecision, unwillingness or inability to act. It may be no policy at all but simply a drift with events. Sometimes foreign policies are the product of statesmen's passive compliance with strong domestic political pressure - and thus products of contending political forces within the nation itself. Finally, policy may be due to statesmen's abdication of choice and rational judgment in the face of ruthless and strong external pressures.[3]

Although every action governments take cannot be understood to constitute a step towards the achievement of an ultimate goal as assumed by the rational actor model, nevertheless, there is usually an ultimate goal or set of goals known as foreign policy objectives that governments attempt to achieve through ordering of various actions. This should not be taken to mean that the approach here is a teleological one and that "purposefulness" is being injected into foreign-policy making.[4] The aim rather is to present foreign policy as a puzzle, pieces of which have to be studied separately in order to "solve" the whole.[5]

There are, as indicated above, four components of this puzzle: orientations, roles, objectives and actions. Orientations and roles are broader components of foreign policy which reflect basic national needs as well as external conditions.[6] What one means by orientation is "a state's general attitudes and committments towards the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and for coping with persisting threats."[7] National roles, on the other hand, are about how governments conceive themselves and what committments they undertake in line with these conceptions. They "provide guidelines for actions when specific situations arise in the environment."[8] The third component of foreign policy, foreign policy objective, is "an image of future state

of affairs and future set of conditions that governments, through individual policy-makers, aspire to bring about."[9] Foreign policy action, within this framework can be defined as what "governments do to others in order to effect certain orientations, fulfill roles, or achieve and defend objectives."[10],[11]

It is against this conceptual framework that any analysis of Turkish foreign policy must be tested. There are two basic reasons for this: The first one arises from the parallel drawn between puzzle and foreign policy. It is not possible to grasp the reason behind a foreign policy action without prior knowledge about other components of the puzzle, i.e. orientation, national roles, and objectives. The second reason stems from the nature of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and its origin as an "extension" of Turkey's pro-Western policy.[12] It would be too simplistic an approach to try to explain Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East as a policy on its own for what one ends up with after an analysis may seem to be a self-destructive policy which is far behind Turkey's policy as understood here. Thus it becomes essential to explore the nature of Turkish foreign policy from the very beginning.

3.2 Kemalist Foundations of Turkish Foreign Policy (1923-1938)

Turkish foreign policy stands on well established principles driven from the Kemalist legacy. The most

prominent of these "Peace at home and peace abroad" is considered to be the "keystone" of Turkish foreign policy. Atatürk had said, in his State of the Nation speech of November 1, 1928: "It is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and tranquillity both at home and in the world."[13] Realistic as it was, Kemalist foreign policy did not leave any room for idealism other than its mostly sought after ideal of becoming an equal member of the Western world of nations. Therefore, argues one author:

> Atatürk qualified his desire for peace by saying: 'In the formulation of our foreign policy we pay particular attention to the safety and security of our country and to our capability to protect the rights of the citizenry against any aggression.' This meant that while Turkey's wish was to live in peace with all nations and maintain friendly relations with great and small powers alike, she was nevertheless prepared to prevent the infringement of her territorial sovereignty and political independence and she would not hesitate to take up arms against would-be aggressors.[14]

According to Aptülahat Akşin, the first Turkish Ambassador to Syria, it was one peculiarity of Atatürk's foreign policy that it stayed away from military alliances and pacts. This stemmed from, argues Akşin, his conviction that every alliance would provoke a counter-alliance due to suspicion and insecurity it will cause, which will be against

Turkey's foreign policy principles that necessitate friendly relations to be established with all nations.[15]

During the Atatürk era, Turkey's international orientation was non-alignment which seemed to be the one best fit to serve its objectives in the immediate post-WW1 period. Turkey was a war-torn country in need of internal reconstruction which made it a must to seek peace in both domestic and international environments. Accordingly, Turkey assumed the role of "independent" during this period, which can roughly be defined as "the pursuance by the governments its own best interests."[16] Turkey, as a young republic facing internal problems and undergoing rapid modernization, had to be realistic and modest in its external objectives. Most of the effort, during this era was spent on establishing friendly relations with all nations and cultivating new bases of friendship with old enemies. This was enabled by the unique nature of the Republican foreign policy which was not contaminated by any ideology, not even by Kemalism which was not an ideology per se.[17] Turkish policy makers appeared to be operating in the "gray area" avoiding extreme alternatives.[18]

A second role which Turkey assumed during this era was "internal development" which, like, "independent," has little or no reference to a particular task or function within the international system. Governments assuming this role direct their efforts towards problems of internal development.

Holsti argues that "[t]here is a suggestion of wishing to remain uninvolved in international political matters," regarding this role conception.[19] Nevertheless, international cooperation particularly in economic and technical matters is not ruled out.

Political pragmatism as well as realism guided Turkish policy makers during this era. Two basic foreign policy objectives were sought throughout the period: "to create a strong and modern state which without external assistance could defend its territorial integrity and political independence against external aggression; and to make Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western European community of nations on an equal basis."[20]

Turkey's Middle East policy the main principle of which was avoidance of interference with Middle-Eastern affairs was formulated within this general framework. Although bilateral relations with regional states were established, the main thrust of Atatürk's Middle East policy remained one of "ignorance" or "leaving the Arabs on their own."[21] The Sadabad Pact (8.7.1937) concluded with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan was a good example of how Kemalist foreign policy distanced itself from the Middle East. Rather than being an example of regional cooperation and collaboration, as it is claimed to be, the Sadabad Pact outlined the principles according to which member states would not interfere in each others'

affairs. The Turkish policy makers were also aware of the "simplicity" of this pact for they only emphasized its psychological impact.[22]

During this early era, Westernization, or to make Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western European community of nations on an equal basis, together with other core objectives of maintaining security, territorial integrity, and political independence remained Turkish policy makers' core objective, i.e., the objective fundamental to the existence of the political unit without which the state cannot pursue other types of objectives.[23] Other possible objectives such as propagating the Kemalist ideology, supporting anti-imperialist movements elsewhere or regional leadership, which the new Republic was expected to pursue were either ignored or subordinated to these core objectives.[24] Turkey's Middle Eastern policy, as indicated above, was shaped as an "extension" of its pro-Western policy with the ultimate aim of minimizing the dangers to its core objectives. To quote one observer of Turkish foreign policy, the primary objective of Turkey's Middle East policy during this era was "to avoid a waste of resources in the area rather than to derive benefits from it."[25]

However, in accounting for Kemalist foreign policy, one should not be misled by the common perception that it was a

policy of total avoidance of Middle Eastern affairs. As Robinson puts it

> the policy probably operate[d] so long as it enforce[d] Turkish interests....During the early years, republican Turkey refrained from making overtures against anyone. In her weakness, she wished to give no cause for complaint. Other *than the Hatay plum, which ripened and fell into the Turkish lap,* the Turks pursued a non-committal policy, even up to the closing months of the World War II [emphasis mine].[26]

In fact, it was Atatürk himself who patiently waited until "the Hatay plum" ripened. Between March 15, 1923, when in a speech he gave in Adana he mentioned Hatay as being a "Turkish land for 4000 years,"[27] and mid-1936, when the Montreux convention was signed, Atatürk cautiously waited and helped the Turks of Hatay (Sancak- the Sandjak of Alexandreatta) to pave the way for the incorporation of Hatay to Turkey.[28] Finally in October 1936 Atatürk, noticing that the international environment was favorable for such a move - because Europe was getting closer to war-, took the initiative and by suddenly leaving for Adana to inspect the troops, he made sure that the French would understand his readiness to use military means if the Hatay problem was not solved in favor of the Turks. In fact, it was Atatürk's decisiveness, tactfullness and his non-hesitance when it was in Turkey's interests, which in the end, enabled the incorporation of Hatay to Turkey (1939).

Another indication of secondary status given to relations with the Middle East was seen in 1924-25 during the upheavals in Rif, Morocco headed by Abd al Kerim.[29] The Turkish attitude towards this proto-nationalist independence movement showed that even Turkey's ignorance of Third World independence movements, for which the Democratic Party government was harshly criticized during the 1950s was not without precedent in the history of the Republican foreign policy. At first, the Turkish press and public opinion took interest in the Rif rebellion and parallels were drawn between the Turkish War of Independence and the struggle of the Moroccans. However, from 1925 on, the government press and the state elite together started to voice their concern that it might be harmful to Turkey's interest to draw the wrath of the French and the Spanish at a time when Turkey needed their support in the League of Nations to secure a favorable solution of the Mosul dispute. After July 1925, the Turkish press changed tune and the Rif rebellion was not mentioned again. Accordingly, it was during the same days when a Turkish member of parliament suggested the government should issue a newspaper in French with the twofold aim of responding to the allegations that Turkey was causing unrest in Morocco and the Caucasus, and also showing everybody that Turkey's foreign policy had nothing to do with Islam but was open and sincere to Europe.[30]

3.3 The Change in Turkey's Orientation and NATO Membership (1939-1960)

In the post-WWII era, Turkey changed its orientation and became allied. The tripartite treaty signed with Britain and France in 1939 had already allied Turkey with the West. However Turkey did not live up to its committments during the War, due to reasons of its own, and it adopted an attitude of buying time. Although it was allied to the West in terms of its national orientation, Turkey still did not regard itself as a faithful ally in terms of national role conception and it gave utmost priority to remain non-belliggerent.[31]

The decisive break came in February 1952 when Turkey became a member of NATO. The change in the orientation to alignment with NATO concurrently changed Turkey's conception of its national role. Turkish policy makers largely began to conceive Turkey's role as a "faithful ally"[32] of NATO, i.e. the West, and a "bridge"[33] between the West and the Middle East. These two national role conceptions reinforced each other in a rather peculiar fashion. It was through proposing itself as a bridge between the West and the Middle East that Turkey reinforced its position vis-à-vis the West, especially the U.S., which by February 1952 led to NATO membership.[34]

During the period between 1947, the declaration of the Truman Doctrine and February 1952, the declaration of NATO's acceptance of Turkey and Greece to membership, the Republican People's Party (RPP) and Democratic Party (DP) governments

alike worked hard to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis the West by proposing Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, thus agreeing to act in line with the British proposal for a Middle Eastern Defense Organization.[35] In fact, Turkish policy makers even during Atatürk's presidency conceived Turkey as a potential bridge between the West and the Middle East,[36] an argument that largely emanated from the peculiarity of the Turkish Revolution that made Turkey the first Muslim state to adopt a Western-style democracy. Turkey's Republican rulers also adopted this line of thinking during the late 1940s. Although initially they were reluctant to assume a role in the Middle East, they became more eager to get involved in a Middle Eastern Defense Organization in which Turkey was planned to serve as the link between the West, i.e. Britain, and the Middle East after they realized that this was a step they had to take in their march towards NATO membership.[37]

During the Second World War, there did not seem to be any direct contact between Turkey and the Middle East. Following the signing of the tripartite treaty with the French and British (October 19, 1939), the treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Germany (June 18, 1941), Turkey turned its eyes toward the West. Relations with the Middle East, together with concerns other than remaining out of the war, were frozen during the course of the war. Things did not

change much after the end of the War in that the RPP governments did not seem enthusiastic to change Turkish policy towards the Middle East although the region had changed drastically. Turkish foreign policy makers' attitudes towards the newly independent Middle Eastern states seemed to be one of accepting the developments as they were, or like a "fait accomplis" that had to be lived with, but nothing more.[38] However, what Turkey did not do as well as what it did during the war, in a way, shaped its post-war policies.

Accordingly, although the maintenance of Turkish non-involvement even under immense pressure from the Allies is regarded to be a story of success, it was not without ramifications for Turkey's post-war relations. To give an example, active Turkish involvement in the Korean war can be considered as "the price Turkey had to pay to shake off the stigma of unreliability that still hung over her as a result of her wartime policy."[39] Selim Deringil notes that there was "considerable suspicion particularly in the U.S. and British military circles that in the event of a Soviet move into Iran and the Arab world, Turkey would allow the Soviets safe passage."[40] The fact that the RPP also did not object -in essence-[41] to the decision to send 4,500 troops to Korea can be taken as an indication of its agreement with the Democratic Party regarding the necessity of reassuring the West of its willingness for cooperation.[42]

Turkey's efforts to prove itself to be open and sincere to the West did not seem to have ended with its active involvement in the Korean war, though it became a member of NATO on February 17, 1952. Active Turkish involvement in Middle Eastern affairs and over enthusiasm of the Turks to cooperate with the U.S. forces during the DP administration can also be regarded as a part of the same effort. Thus it can be argued that "it was a question of seeking to maintain Turkey's credibility as a reliable partner of the West which caused it to pursue a pro-Western policy."[43] Besides, as argued before, Turkish membership in NATO came only after a promise made to the British, who until then held reservation to Turkey's membership, that Turkey would assume the responsibility for the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization.

In the following years these measures were furthered by the DP governments which accused the RPP governments for their aloofness during World War II.[44] The Middle East became the focus of the DP governments in the attempt to prove their loyalty and cooperativeness to Turkey's Western allies. Although Turkish policy makers did not know the Middle East well, for they simply had no experience of involvement in regional affairs, they, on the contrary, argued that "only the Turks really understood the Arabs and therefore in a position to approach the Arab states" for the proposed defense

organization.[45]   Given Turkey's lack of experience in the

region, Turkey seems to have undertaken such a task with the

ultimate goal of securing its Eastern and Southeastern borders

against direct or indirect Communist threat.

Adoption of this policy by the Turkish policy makers

gradually evolved.   As the Communist threat to the region

grew, the Turks became less hesitant to ally themselves with

the West although they came to realize the difficulties in

developing better cooperation and understanding with the

Middle Eastern states.   According to the U.S. Ambassador to

Ankara, George McGhee (1951-1953),

> Köprülü...felt that Turkey was in an extremely
> difficult situation.   Earlier, when it was still
> seeking admission to NATO, Turkey had felt *obliged*
> [emphasis mine] to demonstrate its solidarity
> with the West.   Subsequently, the Turks felt they
> must be loyal to their new allies.   Since the
> interests of the West so frequently clashed with
> those of the Middle Eastern states, it was
> impossible for Turkey to satisfy everyone, and
> thus it had decided that the West must be given
> top priority."[46]

It was in this sense that Turkey's Middle East policy,

in the post-WWII era too, became an extension of its pro-

Western policy.   During this era not only its Middle East

policy, but literally everything other than Turkey's core

objectives of maintaining security, political independence and

territorial integrity were subordinated to the goal of

Westernization and becoming a full-fledged member of the

Western European community of nations.[47]

It was during the 1950s when Turkey's economy also became dependent upon the West, further reinforcing Turkey's pro-Western policy. From the late 1930s on, the futility of non-alignment had become known to Turkish policy makers not only due to security considerations, but also because of increasing economic difficulties at home. By the end of the 1920s, the policy of 'private initiation' had begun to falter. Coupled with the 1929 economic depression, Turkish policy makers decided to tilt towards etatism understood as state interventionism in the economy and Western financement of Turkish economy which required establishment of better relations with the West.[48] Towards this end Turkey took a few actions, one of which was Turkish agreement at Nyon on September 10-11, 1937 to participate in the British hunt for German submarines in the Mediterranean.[49]

Thus, from the 1930s on, external financing of Turkish economy became one of the factors shaping Turkish foreign policy.[50] Karpat underlines Turkish foreign policy objectives in the Middle East from 1940s on as "achieving first, national security, second, economic aid, and third, at expanding influence in the area."[51] It is in this sense that Turkish policy towards the Middle East became an extension of Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy, for none of these objectives were adopted for the sake of strengthening relations with regional states, but rather as a result of Turkish attempts to prove

itself to the West as a cooperative partner in regional affairs. The explanation was that the latter in return would give it a hand in coping with its internal problems. The DP government, by 1955 had already concluded that Middle East Defense Organization was doomed to fail without Arab participation which it failed to obtain. On the other hand, Turkey was in vital need of cooperating with the West through the formation of such an organization not only because of security considerations or as a step towards proving itself as a part of the West, but particularly because it needed to continue and strengthen its relationship with the West for domestic political and economic reasons. By the end of 1955, inflationary policies and foreign trade deficits had brought Turkish economy face to face with bankruptcy. The Menderes government, more than any other time, needed Western and especially U.S. aid:

> Menderes and his colleagues apparently expected
> that the U.S. government would boil them out of
> their economic difficulties. The DP leadership
> believed that Turkey's political importance to
> the West would induce its allies to provide
> extensive economic assistance even if the Turks
> refused to follow the course recommended by their
> partners. Such a calculation was by no means
> farfetched. While the U.S. aid mission
> continually pressed the Turkish government to
> retrench and follow a more rational economic
> policy, in the end the U.S. always came forward
> to provide essential assistance to keep the
> Turkish economy afloat. Indeed, American aid
> nearly doubled over its previous rate during
> these crucial years -averaging about $96 million
> annually for the period 1953-1959.[52]

One factor on which both the previous RPP and the ruling DP governments agreed was that "Turkey stood to benefit more from a comprehensive association than from a bare formal security guarantee. To bring the somewhat refractory U.S. to this conclusion, the Turks were willing to take as a wide range of obligations," which included Turkey's assuming a new role in the Middle East.[53]

What differed in the DP governments' understanding of the use of NATO membership and intimate relations with the United States was a political worry that troubled Menderes and his colleagues. NATO membership, which was considered by the Democrats as a security tap against any plot that may be undertaken by the Republicans to topple them,[54] by the mid-1960s became a security tap against a potential military coup, because they thought being a member of the Democrats' Club would ensure the continuation of democracy in Turkey. The Menderes government's overreaction to the Iraqi military coup (1958) can be analyzed in line with this reasoning that Menderes, by trying to convince the United States with the help of Jordan to intervene in Iraq,[55] wanted to show a lesson to potential coup makers in Turkey. Menderes was reported to have accused the opposition in a speech he gave in Balıkesir in the aftermath of the Iraqi coup in September 6, 1958 of adopting the Iraqi example by trying to topple the government through use of force. This was reported as Menderes' first

mentioning of the word of a coup[56] which he feared would become a "contagious disease."[57]

Thus, from the second half of the 1950s, strengthening the relationship with the United States began to serve a domestic political purpose as well. This objective of the government was crystallized with the "Cooperation Agreement," concluded between Turkey and the United States on March 5, 1959. In the preamble of the agreement, the determination of the parties "to resist aggression direct or indirect" was mentioned which provoked audible reactions within the Republican ranks who asked for a clarification of the term "indirect" and sought assurance that Menderes did not intend to ask for American assistance in stifling the opposition.[58]

The Menderes government, on the other hand, took the Cooperation Agreement as a guarantee of U.S. committment to Turkey, the Turkish democracy and the elected government of the Democratic Party. Given the fact that Soviet pressure on Turkey was decreasing (relations were being re-strengthened with the Soviet Union and Menderes was expected to visit Moscow in June 1960) and relations with Egypt, which were strained following the Turkish recognition of Syria's break with Egypt in 1958, normalizing (Egypt sent an Ambassador to Turkey in June 1959 after a few years' interval),[59] the Menderes government's demand for U.S. guarantee to help Turkey

in resisting indirect agression seems to be made more on domestic grounds rather than external.

Thus, during the years 1939-60, Turkey's core foreign policy objectives remained the same except for dropping of the phrase "without external assistance": 'To create a strong and modern state which could defend its territorial integrity and plitical independence against external agression; and to make Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western European community of nations on an equal basis.' The fact that Turkey's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East were defined within this framework led the Turks to disregard the political structure and objectives of their Middle Eastern neighbors.[60] Lack of experience in the region and Kemalist foreign policy's avoidance of the Middle Eastern affairs during the initial years of the Republic probably made it easier for successive Turkish governments to pursue this course. The fact that Turkey, despite its initial hesitation, went forward with the idea of first a Middle Eastern Defense Organization, then the Baghdad Pact is indicative of Turkey's willingness to be subservient to the will of its allies and especially its major ally, the United States -into whose "sphere of responsibility and influence" Turkey entered.[61] Relations with the Middle East were perceived by the Turkish policy makers as a means to be utilized to further its core objectives. Securing and strengthening ties with the U.S. was seen by the Democrats

élan vital to further these objectives. That Turkey did not have a structured set of relationship with the Middle East to stabilize its relations made it easier for the Menderes administration to agree with the wishes of its allies. For there was no precedent from which to deviate.[62]

During these years, Turkey took a few, then undisputed, actions that later came under immense criticism. Turkey's voting record in the United Nations was one of those problematic issues. In 1955, Turkey voted against the Algerian case in the United Nations General Assembly. In 1957, Turkey abstained from voting on an Afro-Asian proposal for Algerian self-determination. In this sense Turkey seemed to be acting as royalist as the king if not more. These actions were to come under immense criticism during the 1960s.

Turkish recognition and maintenance of relations with Israel was another problem area. Turkey's initial approach to the Arab-Israeli dispute tilted toward the Arabs. This was not only because anti-imperialism was a foreign policy objective of Turkey's, which indeed was, but rather because Turkey perceived the creation of a Jewish state in the region as a threat to its security due to the latter's links with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It was largely as a result of this second factor that Turkey in November 1947 voted against the partition resolution that divided Palestine into two states, a Jewish state and an Arab state. It took the

Israelis a lot of time and effort to convince the Turks, who believed Israel's neutrality to serve as "camouflage for deep-rooted communism,"[63] that Israel would not constitute a Soviet bridgehead in the Middle East. It was particularly Western support for the new Jewish state that "shook the resoluteness of Turkey,"[64] that in March 28, 1949, it finally recognized Israel, becoming the first Muslim state to do so. In December 1949, two states forwarded for this action, the most fashionable of which is to argue that Turkey sought to pursue the "fashion prevalent in the West"[65] by recognizing Israel. There is some truth in this argument to the degree that the Turks thought maintaining links with Israel will be a symbol of its ties with the Western world -something of which they were proud. Another reason may be that Turkey perceived benefits in acquiring Israel's friendship which they thought could act as an advocate of Turkey's interests in Washington.[66] Besides, the decision to recognize Israel did not seem to be controversial at home, which enabled the Turkish policy makers to freely pursue their line of foreign policy which was free of any religious considerations.

However, contrary to what is generally thought and despite the conclusion of a trade agreement between Turkey and Israel on July 4, 1950,[67] Turkish-Israeli relations were not that good even during the times when the Arabs perceived them to be flourishing. During the early 1950s, the Menderes

government tried to put some pressure on Israel regarding its domestic affairs, and demanded for a public stance of opposition to communist states.[68] It may well be concluded, as Israel's Ambassador Maurice Fisher did, that the Turks failed to distinguish between socialism and communism let alone shades of socialism. In his reports to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fisher wrote that by 1956, Ankara was still expressing concern over the political balance in Knesset which they believed tilted towards the communists.[69]

Turkey's relations with Israel were no more than cordial until the late 1950s. This was not because Turkey refrained from alienating Middle Eastern states. Turkey's relations with Israel from the very beginning were very volatile.[70] Although Israel desired to foster links with Turkey, for it believed this would allow Israel to "strengthen its ties with the West while not formally abandoning its non-alignment,"[71] this was not reciprocated by Turkish policy makers. It was only after Turkey's Middle Eastern security environment began to change in the late 1950s that Turkish policy makers decided to play the Israeli card. Following the 1958 coup in Iraq, the Turks, who until then had been trying to slow down negotiations going on with their Israeli counterparts on cooperation for security, became eager to talk.

> 'A, our envoy, was invited to Zorlu in İstanbul,'
> wrote Ben-Gurion excitedly in his diary, five
> days after the coup, and (Zorlu) told him that
> they are acting parallel to our actions, and that

he will be pleased to see full cooperation between our political activities and theirs.[72]

On August 29-30 1958, Turkey and Israel signed an agreement for cooperation in the diplomatic, military and intelligence spheres, as well as in commerce and scientific exchanges.[73] However, this agreement, rather than functioning as a stabilizer of relations between the two countries, became an "illustration of the unpredictable nature of Turkish-Israeli relations."[74] Though two countries shared many things in common, the dynamics of Middle East politics became the main determinant of two countries' relations. Turkey's main objective regarding relations with Israel remained that of "maintaining" them. Turkey's role conceptions also reinforced this objective. Being a faithful ally of the West required Turkey to be friends with Israel, which was itself a Middle Eastern state aspiring to become a member of the West. The bridge role, too, necessitated good relations with Israel for it was the major party in the region who had a "gap" to be bridged.

The formation of the Baghdad Pact, initiated by Britain, was another foreign policy action taken by the DP administration which was harshly criticized during the 1960s for its alienation of the Arabs and causing Turkey's isolation in the international arena. The conditions that initiated such action have been mentioned before. Iraq, Iran and Pakistan were three other "Northern Tier" states that shared

Turkey's concerns and joined Turkey, the "backbone," in the Baghdad Pact in 1955 to constitute the "flesh surrounding the backbone."[75]

The 1956 Suez Crisis was a test case for Turkey's Middle East policy which took its concrete form in the formation of the Baghdad Pact. During the crisis, although member states denounced Israel and Turkey withdrew its ambassador from Israel on November 20, 1956, Turkey, nevertheless, informed the Israelis that it would remain friendly; afterwards, diplomatic relations were continued at a lower level with exchange of charge d'affaires. Since the Suez Crisis caused alienation of the Arab states and a rift was formed between the Baghdad Pact members and non-members, the Baghdad Pact, largely due to its divisive nature, came to be regarded as a "failure"; it was blamed for the rise of radicalism in the Middle East. However, the success or failure of a policy has to be considered with regard to its objectives, not side effects. What Turkey was trying to achieve through its Middle East policy during the 1950s, as argued before, was not the acquisition of the friendship of regional states, for whom it did not seem to have cared until then. It may even be argued that the Turks were not yet conscious of the importance of the role that was beginning to be played by the Third World, and particularly the Middle Eastern states in the world fora. Thus, alienation of the Middle Eastern states was a side

effect of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy, which, during the 1960s, made rapprochement with the Middle East its foreign policy objective- again not for the sake of its own, but in order to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis the West.

3.4 The New Turkish Foreign Policy (1960-   )

3.4.1 Prelude to change, 1960-1964

The 1960 coup did not bring about any significant change in Turkey's foreign policy. The National Unity Committee (NUC -composed of 38 officers who carried out the coup), on the contrary, took care to make it known that Turkey would remain a faithful ally of the West. The fact that Selim Sarper, who was a career diplomat and Turkey's former ambassador to the U.N., was appointed to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs was an indication of the NUC's effort not to disrupt the continuity in Turkey's foreign policy.

During these years, Turkey's Middle East policy also remained unaltered; it was still an extension of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy. The lack of cautiousness and the urge to act with the West, which were attitudes identified with DP governments, were still visible in Turkish actions. To give an example, on September 29, 1961, when Syria decided to break away from the United Arab Republic (UAR -founded by Syria and Egypt in 1958), Turkey became the second state after

Jordan to recognize the new regime. Such early a declaration, which was probably prompted by Turkey's happiness to see the rift between two most anti-Western states in the region, drew the wrath of the Egyptian leadership and they decided to cut all diplomatic relations with Turkey.[76] Another example of continuity in Turkey's policy was seen in Turkey's voting record during 1961 when it served as a member of the United Nations Security Council. The records show that Turkey voted in favor of colonial powers in all proposals concerning disputes between the colonial powers and their colonies in search for independence. Turkey supported France and Britain in their problems with Tunisia and Kuwait respectively, thus further alienating the Middle Eastern states.[77]

3.4.2 Change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East

During the early 1960s, although the Soviets gave indications of their eagerness to normalize relations, Turkish policy makers remained cautious and made it known their desire that Turkish-Soviet relations remain within the boundaries drawn by East-West relations.[78] The change in East-West relations, which became more visible after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis when it became clear that both the United States and the Soviet Union were determined not to be drawn into war with each other, gradually convinced the Turkish policy makers for the need of a multilateral foreign policy. The transition from the strategy of massive retaliation to

flexible response was also decisive in defining Turkey's role because the defense of Turkey, especially Eastern Turkey came under dispute. The removal of the Jupiter missiles in 1963, which were placed in Turkey as part of massive retaliation strategy, that was dropped by the United States by the 1960s, was an indication of this change in U.S. policy which came as a blow to Turkish policy makers.[79]

Nevertheless, it was only after 1964 that events such as the U.S. landing on Lebanon (1957), when İncirlik air base was used on notification rather than consultation with the Turkish authorities, came under consideration and contributed to a review of U.S.-Turkish and Turkish-Middle East relations. The review of Turkish-Middle East relations was largely caused by the Turkish displeasure with the attitude of its allies who failed to support Turkey on the Cyprus issue, a case in which Turkey considered itself to be "absolutely" right. The Middle Eastern countries' support of the Greek Cypriots caused the Turks to come to terms with their cultural and historical bonds. Thus, the Cyprus case became a catalyst for a large-scale review in Turkish foreign policy as a result of which the so called new Turkish foreign policy was formulated. Displeasure, feeling of betrayal, anger and failure of hope in this case led to and also enabled a review of Turkish foreign policy in general and relations with the Middle East in particular during the 1960s.[80] It was also at this critical

juncture that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature largely as a result of the effective role that came to be played by Turkish public opinion.

The so called new Turkish foreign policy, which emerged in the mid-1960s as a result of these discussions and considerations was planned to stand in opposition to the mistakes committed during the 1950s that were blamed for the deterioration of relations with the Middle East which, in return, caused Turkey's isolation in the region and alienation at the United Nations concerning Cyprus. In this sense, Turkey's pre-1960 policies toward the Middle East produced a negative feedback that led to cognitive inconsistency and increased opposition. However, although, as a result of these, Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature, adoption of a multi-faceted foreign policy and the formulation of a new Turkish foreign policy remained as issues on which all parties -except for the extreme right and left- agreed.

The most prominent feature of the new Turkish foreign policy was its emphasis on multi-faceted policy making. Turkey's foreign policy orientation, although subject to criticism by radical rightist and leftist circles alike, remained unquestioned at the policy-making level. Turkey's national role conceptions also did not change although the role of "faithful ally" came to be less emphasized. Turkish national role conception of a faithful ally of NATO remained

unaltered even during years of internal turbulence, but the idea of being a faithful ally of the United States came under immense criticism. Turkish policy makers, indeed, took great care to minimize criticisms to their Western allies since they knew it well that Turkey could not do without NATO which served Turkey's core foreign policy objectives of maintaining security, territorial integrity and political independence and making Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western community of nations. The "dual effort" of trying to maintain a low-profile in alliance relations with the West while trying to keep other channels of communication open, and, if possible, aid was undertaken with these considerations in mind.[81] Turkey, without weakening its ties with the West, changed its attitudes towards the Soviet Bloc and the Third World alike, which came to be called the multi-faceted foreign policy.

When applied to the Middle Eastern context, this policy required less cooperation with the United States, and a more balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. Nevertheless, Turkey refrained from overruling cooperation with the United States and preferred to make its decisions ad hoc.[82] Decrease of tension in the region enabled by the end of Turkish-Western efforts to direct the regional course of politics and the resurgence of inter-Arab rivalries allowed the Turks to distance themselves from U.S. policies without incurring any costs. A good example of this effort was seen

in 1964 when Turkey, together with other CENTO (Central Treaty Organization -the name Baghdad Pact took after Iraq's withdrawal in 1958) members, Iran and Pakistan, concluded an agreement to create the organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Although RCD seemed to be "duplicating" non-military functions of CENTO, since, it, by no means, advocated anything new, it served an important political and psychological purpose in stressing the "independent" nature of the new organization, i.e., that it was being planned and worked out by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan alone, and that it sought no military purposes.[83] Through initiating the formation of RCD, Turkey intended to give a signal of its independent foreign policy. The Middle Eastern states were not the only audience of this gesture. Turkey, at the same time, wished to show the Soviets that cooperation between the three RCD members was not tainted by cold war concerns as it had been during the 1950s. Rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states was also initiated with the Soviets in mind, who continually tried to enlist the Turks on the anti-Israeli front. Nevertheless, the Turks were able to maintain a balanced attitude and did not go so far as the Soviets demanded.[84]

In sum, Turkey's role conception during these years remained being a faithful ally of NATO. In its relations with the United States, Turkey emphasized its independence though

it still remains questionable to what extent this was anything other than rhetoric. It is true that U.S. involvement in Turkey's domestic affairs was decreased to and kept at a minimum, and a new Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed on July 3, 1969 to limit and regulate U.S. presence in Turkey. However, regarding the use of NATO bases for non-NATO purposes, Turkish policy makes preferred to preserve a degree of "ambiguity" which they believed to have "a deterrent value of its own."[85] Although Turkey maintained that it would not allow the use of its bases during 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, it would still be premature to argue that this was an indication of a complete reversal in Turkish foreign policy simply because Turkey refused to cooperate with the U.S. while adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality that tilted towards the Arabs. It would be more accurate to argue that Turkey adopted a policy of caution in its attitudes towards the Middle East crises in line with which it carefully weighed the pluses and minuses of each action to be taken and decided accordingly. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy carefully stuck with one of the main principles of Kemalist foreign policy: that of pragmatism. As seen in Turkish policy makers' declarations during the 1980s' crises in the Middle East, Turkey did not completely rule out cooperation with the U.S. for non-NATO purposes. It rather put forward principles to be fulfilled before becoming part of a Western intervention to

the Middle East. In sum, Turkey acted "decisively and cautiously at the same time; without abandoning its multifaceted foreign policy."[86]

As indicated before, when defining a state's foreign policy, verbalized policy as well as non-verbalized policy, in other words declared programs, as well as behavior patterns will be taken into consideration. Although the two may not be identical, they nevertheless have a correlation that is unlikely to be zero. Besides, in foreign policy making, declarations as well as actions are important; statement by a policy maker about his/her country's intention to change a policy is as important as the real change in attitudes and actions. In this sense, various statements made by Turkish policy makers during this era to the effect that Turkey will adopt a multi-faceted foreign policy and that Turkey will leave its previous pro-Western policies made an impact as strong as the impact of actions Turkey took to this effect. During the late 1960s and early 1970s moderate actions Turkey's policy makers undertook in an attempt to balance Turkey's ties with the West and the Middle East seems to have convinced the latter. During these years the relative calm that came to the region also enabled the Turks to pursue this policy. It was primarily so because the Turks felt themselves relatively secure that they could overrule U.S. use of NATO bases in Turkey in Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973.

However, it was also because the Arab-Israeli dispute was the main focus of regional states during this period that Turkey did not face any real dilemma in trying to balance its committments to the West with its policy of rapprochement with the Middle East. By the end of the 1970s, however, as increasing Soviet activities in peripheral areas of the world gave way to a second cold war, Turkey's threat perceptions began to intensify. The twin crises of 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian Revolution led the Turkish policy makers to reconsider Turkey's ties with the West. The Turks, although still refusing to make any formal strategic committment outside the NATO framework, became more eager for consultations about cooperation for security in the Middle East. To quote one analyst of Turkish foreign policy, these developments brought back "the traditional images of international politics held by the Turkish policy makers."[87] To give an example, in November 1983, the Ulusu government concluded an accord with the United States whereby American troops in the Multinational force in Lebanon (which were deployed in Beirut at the request of the Lebanese government, following the 1982 Israeli attack on the PLO forces in Beirut, with the task of assisting the Lebanese Army in restoring the authority of the central government) were awarded the right to use the NATO base at İncirlik.[88] The permission Turkey granted the Multinational force to use the İncirlik base during the

Gulf crisis (1990-91) was another example of how Turkey cooperated with the West whenever it deemed necessary, and also felt conditions to be ripe for such cooperation. It is in this sense that one should not go too far in claiming that Turkey's relations with the United States were weakened in the post-Menderes era or that Turkey adopted it as a principle to overrule any U.S. request for the use of NATO bases in Turkey for non-NATO purposes. On the contrary, it may be argued that Turkey's national role conceptions remained to be that of a faithful ally of both NATO and the U.S. although the latter was less pronounced. It was in this sense that Turkey's new foreign policy can be considered to have become successful. Without changing the basic tenets of Turkish foreign policy, Turkish policy makers were able to pull the Middle Eastern states to their side -to the extent that was possible.

The main change was in the rhetoric employed by the Turkish policy makers that they emphasized Turkey's adoption of a multi-faceted foreign policy which made establishment of good relations with the Middle Eastern states one of its goals. To this end, diplomacy rather than coalition building was to be the main foreign policy tool.

Regarding Turkey's role conception as a "bridge" between the West and the Middle East, the new Turkish foreign policy can be considered to have given substance to this role. In fact, the drafters of new Turkish foreign policy argued that

the role of a bridge was "designated" for Turkey by "history and geography" alike.[89] Still, the bridge role remained largely a rhetoric and was not conceptualized on the policy making level so that it could have presented an operational significance.[90] Nevertheless, rapprochement with the Middle East, undertaken as a part of the multifaceted foreign policy, was presented as an implementation of Turkey's bridge role. According to the formulators of the new Turkish foreign policy, Turkey, in order to fulfill the bridge role, had to maintain friendly relations with regional states. To do this, Turkey had to adopt a "sound" policy refraining from entertaining any goals of leadership, keeping in mind the fact that its position in the eyes of the Middle Eastern states could only be based on respect. Ambassador Hamit Batu, one of the drafters of new Turkish foreign policy, argued that "if Turkey properly grasped and adopted this historically designated role with all its obligations, its position in the Western world would be strengthened."[91] What was significant in this argument was that strengthening of Turkey's role in the Western world was presented as the final aim of strengthening ties with the Middle East. In this sense, Turkey's Middle East policy still remained a means to an end, an extension of Turkey's Western-oriented foreign policy.

If one looks at Turkey's behavior pattern during this era, an indication of the adoption of a multifaceted policy

was seen in Turkey's participation in the preparatory meetings for and the Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Djakarta in 1964 and in Algeria in March 1965, respectively. To compensate for its absence in the non-aligned conference, Turkey sent two ambassadors to inform the participants of its position.[92] This was different from Turkey's pre-1960 policies, when Turkey refused to attend Afro-Asian conferences and was reported to have participated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 on U.S. prompting to present the case against non-alignment. Nevertheless, Turkey, in an attempt to balance its participation in the Conference, sent its Minister of Rural Affairs to Tel Aviv in 1964 to reassure Israel of its friendly intentions.[93]

As part of its effort to enlist Middle Eastern states, which they saw as "potential natural allies," Turkish foreign policy makers sent representatives and goodwill missions to present Turkey's case on the Cyprus issue. Another aspect of this policy of rapprochement with the Middle East, which led Turkey to activate its role of a bridge between the West and the Middle East necessitated careful balancing of its attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. During the period under consideration, Turkey undertook this policy with success. To give a few examples, following the 1967 war, Turkey, although refraining from condemning Israel as the "aggressor," nevertheless advocated its withdrawal to its pre-

1967 borders.[94] But still, Turkey refrained from openly favoring Palestinian independence during the 1960s and the strongest resolution backed by Turkey, U.N. Security Council resolution 242, did not even mention the Palestinian people by name but referred to the "refugee problem".[95]

During the 1970s, Turkey's policy tilted more towards the Arabs as did the U.N. General Assembly. However, by the mid-1970s Turkey's policy gradually became pro-Arab to the extent that it even came to contradict its previous declarations and actions.[96] Nevertheless, Turkey's relations with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) remained cool. When in 1979, PLO was given the permission to open an office in Ankara (three years after it was announced that the permission would be given) it was declared that the rank of the head of PLO office will be the same as the Israeli representative.[97]

During the 1980s, as Turkey's ties with its allies restrengthened, Turkey began to retreat towards its more carefully balanced policy. In 1982, Turkey abstained from the U.N. voting on a resolution, which condemned Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. The resolution further declared that Israel was not a peace-loving state, and deplored the negative U.S. vote that prevented the U.N. Security Council from adopting "appropriate measures against Israel and calling on U.N. agencies and international

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institutions to tailor their relations with Israel to its punitive terms."[98] During the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) Turkey adopted a policy of neutrality in line with its new foreign policy principles. According to one observer, this strict attitude of neutrality adopted by the Turks "further strengthened a sense of confidence in Turkey's credibility as a non-interfering, friendly, and reliable neighbor."[99]

From the mid-1980s on, parallel to its rapprochement with the West, the Turks began developing their ties with Israel. By 1986, diplomatic representation between the two countries, downgraded to the level of second secretary following Israel's declaration of Jerusalem as its capital, was restored to pre-1980 level, i.e. that of charge d'affaires. In December 1991, the Turkish government undertook another balancing act and upgraded Turkey's diplomatic relations with both Israel and the PLO to the ambassadorial level.

Turkey's return to the balancing game renewed interest in the bridge role. In 1986, Prime Minister Özal , in an attempt to justify Turkey's continuing relations with Israel, was saying that he regarded Israel "as a window...on future events." For Turkey "to play a role in solving the problem of the Middle East...;that window must remain open," argued Özal.[100]

Ayhan Kamel, back in 1977 had outlined the new Turkish foreign policy towards "the Middle East, i.e., towards the Arab countries"[101] which were summarized by Seyfi Taşhan in a rather recent study. According to these two experts, Turkey's policy towards the Middle East can be summarized in six principles;

- non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle East countries,

- non-interference in inter-country relations,

- equality,

- maintenance of both diplomatic relations with Israel and of political support for the Arab cause,

- maintenance of links with the West, with due regard for their impact on Turkey's relations with the Middle East and vice versa,

- development of bilateral relations.[102]

This outline of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can, more or less, be regarded as the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East not only because other experts on Turkish foreign policy seem to agree upon it,[103] but also because Turkey's verbalized as well as non-verbalized policy seems to converge upon these principles as seen in the preceding analysis. The principles outlined as the new Turkish foreign policy still continue to guide Turkish foreign policy makers during the 1990s. Hamit Batu, the drafter of

the new Turkish foreign policy, argues that even the Turkish

policy during the Gulf crisis (1990-91), regarded by many to

constitute a deviation from the "traditional Turkish foreign

policy" [104] (the term used to define what was the new Turkish

foreign policy of the 1960s), cannot be considered to

constitute a change in policy, for "[d]evelopments have been

too rapid for any government to chart a new course amid

unpredictable events."[105]   Batu prefers to define Turkey's

policy towards the Gulf Crisis as constituting a deviance from

some of the practices of its traditional policies.   Andrew

Mango agrees with him on this point that he regards "[t]he

imperceptible rate of change of Turkish foreign policy [as]

the base of journalists in search of copy, and even of

academics in search of theses to prove."[106]   Nevertheless, he

agrees that the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) brought about a degree

of change to Turkish foreign policy that Turkey got involved

in an inter-Arab dispute, which was something it tried to

avoid since the Baghdad Pact.

However, it is disputable whether Turkey's involvement

in the anti-Iraqi camp, in the case of the latter's invasion

of Kuwait, as a change in Turkey's foreign policy towards the

Middle East.   As mentioned before, change, within the bounds

of this study, will be defined as "a new act in a given type

of situation or a given act in a type of situation previously

associated with a different act."[107]   Building upon this

definition, for Turkey's involvement in an inter-Arab dispute and the permission it granted the multinational force to use the NATO base at İncirlik to constitute a deviation from the traditional Turkish foreign policy, the traditional policy should have overruled such an action. However, as indicated before, Turkish foreign policy makers, even when following a multi-faceted foreign policy, which aimed at rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, did not completely rule out cooperation with the United States, preferring to make their decisions ad hoc.[108] On the contrary, several statements made by the Turkish policy makers during the 1980s, when the tension in the region seemed to escalate, pointed to a number of conditions to be fulfilled before Turkey could get involved in an inter-Arab dispute or allow its bases to be used for non-NATO purposes. Although they were never declared as a "set of principles," the hints that pointed to them were present in Turkish policy makers' statements as to why Turkey did not get involved in this or that dispute. These were as follows: The crisis in the Middle East had to pose a direct threat to Turkey's interests; the United States had to have a clear-cut policy laying down its objectives, principles, and action plans; there had to be some kind of a cooperation among the NATO allies, which necessitated overlapping of U.S. and European views; Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors had to agree with the U.S. regarding the presence of this threat and should

not object to Turkish involvement in an inter-Arab dispute. If all of these conditions were to be fulfilled, which only did during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91), Turkey could not think about getting involved in an inter-Arab dispute.

Thus, it can be argued that Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East showed a continuity since the 1960s when it was first formulated. Although there have been minor adjustments, the main tenets of the policy remained the same. The definition of change adopted within the bounds of this study does not involve adjustments as change in foreign policy, for a government's foreign policy constantly changes with minor adjustments just like in Heracletius' observation that one cannot step in the same stream twice.[109]

Chapter IV: International stabilizers

International stabilization of a foreign policy is assumed to be the first step towards foreign policy stabilization. According to Goldmann, the typical process of policy stabilization begins at the international level. In the model presented by Goldmann, the international stabilization of a foreign policy is a process by which "the actor's international relations are colored by his pursuit of this policy."[1] There are three ways to international stabilization of a foreign policy: The policy may be stabilized by international agreements, by economic depdendency, and by relations with third parties.

4.1 Normative Regulation

Normative regulation is considered to be "the traditional method for policy stabilization in international relations."[2] According to Goldmann, "[r]egulation may take the form of treaties or agreements but also of custom. Norms, whether formal or informal, create expectations that cannot be violated without incurring a cost."[3] Problems related to lack of enforcement in international law are known to all.

However, the concern here is not whether/to what degree governments take norms into consideration when formulating policies and taking actions. It is assumed a priori that governments, although in varying degrees, do take norms into consideration either before, during or after policy making processes.

The problem regarding the measurement of the influence of norms in policy making process is that it is not merely a problem of observance or non-observance of clearly defined rules and regulations -when they exist. It is that governments do take action which they believe to be consistent with international law. According to Holsti, "[g]overnments normally characterize conflicts in the legal and diplomatic terms that are most advantageous to their interests and objectives. This practice is not necessarily a capricious twisting of legal principle to fit facts; it arises out of different perceptions of reality."[4] Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean that governments foster a Machiavellian approach in cases of conflict between national interest and international law by choosing to abide by the law as long as it fits their interests. Although it is a perennial problem of international law that there is no institution in the international arena to assume the functions of a domestic government in law enforcement, the fact that states, nevertheless, observe international norms, enables one

to make the assumption that governments do take norms into consideration either before, during or after policy making process.

Besides, given the problem of lack of enforcement in international law, the fact that the state in question has priorly accepted to abide by the rules and regulations of international law makes it costly for a government to violate them. The problem is not that a government can violate these norms but that it becomes costly to do this. According to Holsti, "[t]hrough treaties, declarations and traditional methods of dealing with other states, most governments create abroad certain expectations that future actions will conform with past patterns of behavior."[5] This is how customary norms act as stabilizers in foreign policy-making; the pursuit of a policy, by definition, implies that there occurred a minimum degree of regulation in the form of customary norms. Goldmann considers such regulation which emerges in the form of unilateral international regulation "difficult to distinguish from the stabilizer...called institutionalization"[6] and underlines the need for regulation of the relationship by explicit agreements for normative regulation to act as a stabilizer on foreign policy.[7] However, the mere presence of agreements between the parties is not enough; they should be analyzed with regard to their regulatory performance with the following criteria in mind: "the legal status of the rules,

the occurrence of contradictory regulation, and the problem of application associated with the rules."[8]

Before going into an analysis of the existing agreements between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, one peculiarity of the Turkish case should be emphasized. States' desire for stability and predictability is often quoted as one of the reasons for states' acting in conformity with international law. Care taken by revolutionary regimes to conform to international law is usually shown as an example of this desire. Yet, non-revolutionary states with modest foreign policy objectives, which, according to this argument, find it easier to conform to international law, for their ultimate aim is to create a routine to make their policies more stable and predictable. According to Holsti, governments that are formed after great wars or periods of instability also fit this rule. Accordingly, such governments conform to international norms because of their desire for stability and predictability in order to "make permanent the changes that have been achieved through political and military actions. The peace treaty creates a new order out of chaos, stability out of rapid change, and predictability out of uncertainty."[9]

The over-enthusiasm to conform to international law that was observed in Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war era can be explained with the help of this understanding. Turkey of the 1920s was a war-ridden state with a ruined economy

which had to start from scratch in establishing a republican regime. In the inter-war era, Turkey underwent a period of revolutionary change by undertaking a rapid and comprehensive modernization program which made it a must for successive Turkish governments to opt for stability and predictability in its international relations. Peace and stability in the world was necessary to be able to sustain revolutionary change at home. It was this desire for stability that made Turkish foreign policy makers over-enthusiastic to conform to international law.

An analysis of Turkish foreign policy during this period shows that Turkey followed a policy that was strictly in conformity with principles of equality, respect for agreements and peaceful resolution of disputes. During Atatürk's presidency, five international disputes to which Turkey was a party were settled through pacific means either before the Permanent Court of International Justice or the Council of the League of Nations. In March 1936, Turkey asked for a revision of the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty concerning the demilitarized status of the Turkish Straits basing its claim on the principle of rebus sic stantibus (which was found justifiable by other parties that revisions were agreed upon in the Montreux Convention [1936]).[10]

In case of the Mosul dispute, Turkey agreed to the decision of the League of Nations which awarded Mosul to Iraq

on the conditions that the British mandate over Iraq should continue for twenty-five years. Turkey at first questioned the legality of the award but on June 5, 1926 concluded a treaty with Britain to settle the Mosul question according to which Turkey agreed to relinquish its claims to Mosul in return for the promise that 10% of the revenues of the Turkish Petroleum Company (which was the name of the British oil company that drilled Mosul oil) would be paid to Turkey for twenty-five years.[11] Turkey preferred to agree with the decision of the League of Nations not only for the reason that it was incapable of doing anything else, but because Turkey was in need of peace and stability.[12] This was an indication that Turkey chose to abide by the rule of the Permanent Court of International Justice or the Council of the League of Nations even when they were not fully in congruence with or even contrary to Turkish national interest. One should not exaggerate this attitude and argue that Turkish foreign policy during the era has been characterized by complete adherence to International Law whatever its costs were. The fact was that Turkey chose to abide by International Law even in cases when it was contrary to its national interests (such as the decision to give up Mosul) not only because of its belief in the ethical value of law observance, but also because of its desire to create stability and predictability in its foreign

policy which was vital for the national reconstruction and development of Turkey.[13]

Turkey's foreign policy in the post-World War II era can also be explained within the context of Holsti's characterization of states with modest foreign policy objectives. Turkey, a state with no external ambitions, preferred to adhere by international law to make its policies more stable. According to Holsti, "[f]or states with more modest external objectives, law observance for many types of transactions becomes so routine that policy makers would consider other alternatives only in great conflicts or emergencies."[14] The same can be argued with regard to the normative regulation of Turkey's Middle East policy, perhaps with the exception of the 1950s, which led, in the 1960s to the formulation of the so-called new Turkish foreign policy that included more modest objectives compared to those of the 1950s. In fact, most of the principles of the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were embodied in the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Accordingly, Turkey's Middle East policy stands on well established principles three of which are: non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Middle Eastern countries; non-interference in inter-country relations; and mutual respect for sovereignty. These are universal principles every state is expected to abide by when laying down policies. Depending upon these principles, it may

be argued that Turkey at least creates the impression of a conformist state, over-enthusiastic to act in accordance with the rule of law to justify its inaction most of the times.

Turkey's relations with the Middle East cannot be claimed to have become extensively regulated to the degree that it will be stabilized through normative regulation. For normative regulation to exist, there should be treaties or agreements between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, stipulations of which would regulate relations. In the Turkish case, there exists no such agreement apart from bilateral treaties. Among these, five are still in force.[15] However, since these treaties are limited in scope they do not regulate Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern states, at least not extensively. An analysis of these treaties show that they usually cover economic, technical or cultural matters; or as in the case of agreements with Iraq, Syria and Iran they cover cooperation in security matters which usually means border insurgencies. The experience of the ill-fated Baghdad Pact made Turkey rather hesitant to initiate or join multilateral regional organizations. Instead, Turkey preferred to sign bilateral treaties of limited scope. It is as a result of this hesitance on Turkey's part that it is not a member of any Middle Eastern regional organization other than the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference).

The OIC, of which each regional state (with the exception of Israel) is a member, is considered to be a "loose" organization with limited regulatory power. It is true that the Organization is limited to a consultation forum where Islamic states come together and exchange views. However, although the OIC does not have the power to make binding decisions on its members the fact that those states regularly come together and exchange views on issues and that a resolution is agreed upon at the end of each meeting can be considered to have regulatory effect. Member states at least learn about the views of others and also their own position compared to theirs. Thus, although they have only psychological and moral implications, the decisions of the OIC have an effect on member states. Besides, the suspension of Egypt's membership following its recognition of Israel and the Camp David accords, which was sanctioned in the third Summit Conference in Taif, Mecca in 1981, shows that the OIC does not tolerate deviation. Even though the imposition of such a sanction has no legal basis in the Charter, unanimous decision by member states was considered to be enough to suspend Egypt's membership in 1981. The legal basis of the decision was built upon the assertion that the action constituted a "material breach" of a treaty (i.e. the objectives of the OIC Charter).[16]

Turkey, a de facto member of the OIC, has not yet ratified its Charter; nor has it participated in the formation and activities of the Islamic Court of Justice or the Islamic Jurisprudence Academy. The fact that Turkey detained from these actions on the grounds that they would not conform to its secular constitution, precludes any sanction to be imposed on Turkey thus hindering the effectiveness of normative regulation. Nevertheless, the fact that Turkey did not ratify the OIC Charter and that it puts reservations on the resolutions on decisions that are not in accordance with U.N. resolutions, Turkey had approved or supported, its secular constitution, and basic foreign policy, does not prevent the psychological effect, mentioned before, from functioning. The declaration made by the Turkish government during the seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in İstanbul in May 1976 that Turkey has decided to approve the Charter of the OIC[17], which is still subject to the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly,[18] can be considered as an example of this psychological factor. Another incident in which Turkey seems to have acted in line with the expectations of OIC states was Turkey's decision in December 1980 to reduce the level of Turkish representation in Israel from the level of chargé d'affaires to that of second secretary[19] Following Israeli government's announcement of its decision to shift its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in July 1980, diplomatic

representatives of fifteen Muslim countries with the PLO representative as their spokesman came to visit the Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to reiterate their governments' wish that Turkish government break of all its relations with Israel. The representatives were reported to have reminded Demirel that this would also be in conformity with Islamic Conference resolutions. Although refusing to cut off its relations with Israel, the Demirel government decided to close down its consulate in Jerusalem and summon the Turkish chargé d'affaires in Tel Aviv to Ankara for "consultations" to "reevaluate the matter."[20] It was in December 1980, after the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey that the new government decided to reduce Turkey's level of representation in Tel Aviv. Although it is argued that Turkey did this "because it felt, as a member of the OIC, it had to show its support for the Arabs on this sensitive issue involving the legal status of Jerusalem as it had always done...since the 1960s," it was also reported that according to a "secret" decision reached by the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, in September 1980 in Morocco, the General Secretary of the OIC was authorized to prepare a special report concerning Turkey's relations with Israel which was to be discussed during the OIC summit to be held in Mecca in January 1981.[21]

Although existing agreements do not meet the criteria set above for normative regulation to function as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy, Turkey's relations with the Middle East can still be regarded to be regulated, at least to an extent. First, by participating in the conferences since 1969 Turkey created international expectations on the part of Muslim states, which makes it harder for Turkey to deviate. Second, the psychological effect does function that Turkey sometimes finds it hard to act alone. Thus, although existing agreements did not constitute a stabilizing effect on Turkey's Middle East policies, depending on the fact that they did not extensively regulate these relations, the psychological effects arising from Turkey's membership to the OIC cannot be disregarded.

4.2 Dependence

The word dependence has a variety of meanings. The one used by Goldmann is rather a narrow one. According to him, an actor's dependence on its relationship with the environment is defined to be "a function of the cost of goal attainment if the relationship were broken in comparison with the cost of goal attainment if it had never been established."[22] For "it is more costly to interact first and then stop than it would have been not to interact in the first place."[23] In this sense dependence is understood to be a condition that follows

the process of adaptation rather than one arising out of need. If we follow his line of thinking, "the pursuit of a policy creates a particular relationship between actor and environment; the actor increasingly depends on continuing this relationship; this dependence helps to stabilize the policy."[24] This type of dependence, defined by Goldmann as structural dependence, acts as a stabilizer of policy when the actor adopts to continuing interaction, considers unacceptable not to interact, and adheres to the present policy.

The concern here is to determine whether Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East helped to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the region. To do this, first, the evolution of Turkey's economic relations with the region will be analyzed to see whether and to what extent the two parties became structurally adopted to this interaction. For dependence to act as a stabilizer the economies of both parties must become structurally adopted to each other. Dependence in the sense of one economy's need for another is treated as a source, but not a stabilizer of foreign policy. Thus, it is of extreme importance regarding the purposes of this study to see whether increasing economic relations with the Middle East was a source or an outcome of Turkish foreign policy towards the region. If it is assumed that Turkey in mid-1960s changed its policy towards the Middle East to adopt the so-called new Turkish foreign policy, which emphasized

multi-faceted policy making, a balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute as well as non-interference in inter-Arab disputes, with economic goals in mind due to increasing economic influence of the Middle Eastern states, then Turkey's economic dependence to the Middle East emerges to be the source of the change in Turkey's policy towards the Middle East. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that Turkey adopted this new policy with political goals in mind, which in time led to economic interaction and later dependence, then, dependence may emerge to be a stabilizer of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. This depends on one's point of view as well as his/her reading of history.

Within the bounds of this analysis after determining the extent to which the two parties have become structurally adopted to this interaction, an attempt will be made to analyze its impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The hypothesis, here, is that economic interdependence helps to stabilize a country's foreign policy, since it becomes costly for the country in question to stop interacting due to political reasons after its economy becomes structurally adopted to this interaction. When this hypothesis is tested against the Turkish case, it is expected to inquire into the degree of adoption of Turkish economy in that whether continuing interaction with the Middle East stabilized Turkish foreign policy towards the region to the

extent that it became more costly for Turkey to disrupt these relations, or not.[25]

Turkey's policy of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern countries began to take shape during the second half of the 1960s as a part of its desire to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy. The so called new Turkish foreign policy emphasized diplomacy as an instrument in trying to strengthen the relations with the Middle East. What initiated new Turkish foreign policy was the isolation in which Turkey found itself concerning the Cyprus dispute and its attempt to enlist Middle Eastern states in strengthening its position. During the initial phase, Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East were kept at a minimum, although Turkey was an oil importing country thus dependent on Middle Eastern oil. However, it was not this dependency on oil that helped Turkey to decide to reaffirm its economic ties with the Middle East.[26] On the contrary, the drafters of the new Turkish foreign policy emphasized the political aspect of relations with the Middle East. It may well be the case that Turkish policy-makers refrained from putting economic relations to the forefront for fear of appearing opportunistic. Although Turkey expected to derive benefits from strengthening relations with the Middle Eastern states, it did not want this to appear as the reason for the adoption of the new Turkish foreign policy. This largely stemmed from the care Turkish

policy makers took to maximize the positive impact adoption of the new Turkish foreign policy was expected to make on the Middle Eastern states. For, Turkey wanted to differentiate itself from the Western European states, which following the OPEC oil embargo, changed their attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli dispute and became more benevolent toward the Arab cause. Turkey also wanted to prove the Middle Eastern states that it sincerely wanted to strengthen its relations. To this end, Turkish policy makers downplayed the role of economic interdependence in regional relations. Another reason for the downplay of economic factors in regional relations may be the general inclination in Turkish foreign policy to downplay the role of the economy. According to H.E. Yılmaz İkizer (Ret. Ambassador), the main failure of Turkish foreign policy is this inclination that it does not pay much attention to the practice of exchange/give-and-take in international relations.[27]

During 1969-1973, the Middle Eastern share in total Turkish exports was "negligible," amounting to 3.3% at its highest. The average of the period was 1.8%.[28] It was the same with Turkey's imports that Middle Eastern share was 6.1% in 1973, the highest during the period. The period average was 3.4%.[29] Following the OPEC oil embargo in 1973, many of the European countries reviewed their Middle East policies and tried to show more understanding toward the Arab cause

regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict thus disassociating themselves from the policies of U.S. and Israel. Turkey, too, adopted similar approaches on the political plane, but it was on the economic plane that it was hesitant. Although it was among those countries whose economies were most severely hit by the embargo Turkey, did not react immediately to remedy its already precarious economy. This hesitance stemmed not only from Turkey's desire not be regarded as opportunistic by the Middle Eastern countries but also from Turkish economic structure. According to one expert, during this period, Turkey neither had much to offer to the regional countries as its industrial products were not up to the desired standard, nor was it able to produce enough of them to be exported.[30] It was mainly as a result of the introduction of the January 24, 1980 stabilization program and its strict application by the Bülent Ulusu government (1980-83) that the structure of Turkish economy began to change.[31] Opening the economy to the rest of the world was one of the aims of this program. During the 1980-85 period, Turkey' exports to the Middle East increased very rapidly. This was enabled both by the rise in oil prices in 1980 and also the export promotion policies undertaken in line with the January 24, 1980 stabilization measures.

It was the changes that took place in the Turkish economy after 1980 that made it more complementary with the

economies of Middle East which enabled the export boom to the region. Turkey's main exports to the Middle East have traditionally been base metals, agricultural goods and live animals.[32] Turkey of the 1980s had an outward-looking economy with competitive manufactured goods such as textiles to export.[33] Second, Turkish entrepreneurs and state officials became better versed in the business culture of the Middle East, making it easier to commence new ventures in the region.[34]

Turkey's proximity to and affinity with the Middle Eastern countries can also be considered to have helped stimulate exports. However although the same factors were in force during the 1970s Turkey's economic relations with those very countries were not good at all. In the 1973-77 period, when other countries, for example Korea, was able to increase its exports to the Middle East Turkish exports to the region grew very slowly.[35] Following the oil embargo in 1973, economic relations with the Middle East became the focus of government attention. The objectives of the Turkish government, in approaching the Middle Eastern countries, according to one observer, were "to secure oil, if possible on easy payment terms, to attract some of the new petrodollars for investment in Turkey and to increase exports to oil-producing Arab countries."[36] Although it is true that the number of states to which Turkey exported amounted to 8 in

1973, began to increase steadily beginning with 1974 and stabilized around 14 partners from 1978 onwards and that the number of states from which Turkey imported which were only 6 in 1973 climbed to 14 in 1981, its economy was still far from being structurally adopted to this trade relationship.[37] Until the 1980s, oil remained to be the crucial factor in Turkish-Arab economic relations. Thus it can be argued that Turkey became structurally adopted to growing economic relations with the region only during the 1980s. The adaptation of Turkish and Middle Eastern economies to one another was enabled by and an outcome of political rapprochement and internal economic restructuring and not vice versa. It was only by the late 1980s that improvement in economic relations became a factor on its own and began to press for even closer cooperation.[38]

In the first half of the 1980s, the first signs of an adaptation began to surface. During the period 1980-85, Turkey's exports to the Middle East increased very rapidly. The rise in oil prices and Turkey's new trade regime were together responsible for this increase. Besides, the "regional composition effect" was at work during this period, which meant Turkey's trading partners were growing more rapidly than the world trade as a whole.[39] The collapse in oil prices in 1986 resulted in a shakedown in Turkish-Middle East economic relations causing Turkish exports to fall by

$944 million, or by over a quarter.[40] But the Turkish economy was still able to post a surplus of $421,2 million. In 1987, after the partial recovery of oil prices, Turkey still managed to post a surplus of $45,1 million.[41] During the 1980s the volume of trade between Turkey and the Middle East, largely unaffected by the rise in oil prices, continued to increase. The volume of trade that was 17,14% in 1978, rose to its highest in 1982 by 34,13%. By the end of the 1980s it was stabilized around 19%.[42] In the second half of the 1980s, Turkish-Middle Eastern economic relations consolidated around these figures, creating a more equitable basis for future relations.

The question that needs to be answered here is whether at the end of the 1980s the two interacting parties have become structurally adopted to the extent that they would deem it unacceptable to cede this interaction. Since dependence is measured by the "additional cost incurred from first attempting interaction and then retreating to autarky,"[43] what Turkey gained from this interaction can help one to understand the cost of ceding it. According to one expert, the advantages of Turkey's economic cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries can be studied in two categories: positive impact on balance of payments; positive impact on other parts of the economy. It is further argued that the global increase

in total Turkish exports was also related to the increase in exports to Middle Eastern countries.[44]

The expansion of exports to the Middle East could contribute two important factors to Turkey's industrialization process:

a) to lower the geographic concentration of Turkey's exports, and hence, the structure of export products

b) while alleviating the balance of payments problems.

The first can modify the structure of industrialization response to changing economic relations. The extra foreign exchange resulting assists the second.[45]

Furthermore, increasing trade with the region decreased both the geographical and commodity concentration of Turkey's exports.[46] Turkey began to export to the Middle East what it could not sell to the European Community (EC) because of the community's protectionist measures. Thus a significant and complementary economic relationship was consolidated between the two parties. Turkey imports energy from and exports food and manufactured goods to oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries which are net importers of food and manufactured goods. However, one should not emphasize too much the virtues of complementary economies. Although there is "a good amount of complemetarity among the economies of the Islamic bloc",

thus creating a potential for economic cooperation, it remained as excess capacity up to this day. According to one expert,

> to come up to the level of intra-trade of the developing countries, the Islamic countries have to close a gap of up to 20% in exports; to come up to the level of the industrialized countries intra-trade, the gap is of 60%; and to come up to the level of developing non-oil exporting countries intra-trade the gap is of 35%.[47]

Turkish economic interaction with the Middle East is not limited to trade relations although it is the one that is most advanced among all. Turkish contracting firms operate in the Middle East. Worker's remittances also constitute a contribution to the Turkish economy. It was after 1974, when the migration of Turkish workers to Europe had almost ceased that Turkey began to supply manpower to the Middle East. Besides, Middle Eastern countries have financial investments in Turkey. Nevertheless, trade relations constitute the most significant and structured aspect of economic interaction.

The history of Turkey's economic relations with Israel, although showing a trend completely different from that of with the oil-producing countries of the Middle East, also reveal the problematic economic relations within the region. The fact that the two countries' economies are not complementary also contributes to the low level in economic relations between the two countries. However, the situation was completely different until the 1950s. During the period

of the British mandate over Palestine, the bilateral trade, which tilted towards Turkey's favor, was very large to the extent that during years 1946-1949 Palestine was Turkey's third largest export market.[48] During early 1950s, a degree of equilibrium was achieved in the trade balance especially due to Turkey's increasing imports from Israel. At the same time, Turkey's exports to the region began to decline as the two countries' economies began to become less complementary. Having itself become an agricultural exporter, Israel began to cut down its imports from Turkey while Turkey continued to purchase Israeli industrial products. In 1954 the trade balance between Turkey and Israel -for the first time- began to tilt towards the latter's favor, as a response to which the Turks made it known that "the present state of affairs should be seen as nothing more than a brief transitional period."[49] According to an expert on Israel's foreign relations, it was the Turks' "overweening national pride which [did] not tolerate slights" that prevented the relations between two countries from increasing.[50] While the Israelis tried to convince the Turks that the two countries' economies were complementary -Turkey an agricultural one, Israel an industrial one- Turkey's Democratic rulers, who were not that happy about Israel's achievements -which was a smaller and younger state than Turkey was- preferred to keep relations at a low level. Coupled with the intensifying Arab-Israeli

dispute which made it harder for the Turks to foster their ties with Israel, during the 1960s and 1970s, economic relations were kept at a a minimum. During the 1980s, as Turkey's economic relations with oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries gained pace, those with Israel were stabilized around 0,35% of Turkey's total trade volume- which was the lowest among all.[51] The fact that the trade relations continued to tilt towards Israel, made the establishment of a structurally balanced relationship less likely. The high tariff rates Israel puts on Turkish exports prevents the trade between two countries from increasing due to the Turks' sensitivity not to increase the negative balance between Turkey's imports from and exports to Israel. Although trade relations between the two countries increased after the Israeli-Palestinian accord was signed, they are still far from contributing to Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East act as a stabilizer on Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East.

In the literature on Turkish foreign policy, it is argued that economic relationship between Turkey and the Middle East has begun to "stabilize."[52] According to Robins, "what the last years of the 1980s showed is that there is a significant and complementary economic relationship to be had between the parties."[53] Given the low level of trade between Islamic countries, Turkey's achievement emerges as an

"outstanding trade success."[54]   In line with this thinking, one can safely conclude that Turkish economy became structurally adopted to continuing interaction with the Middle East, creating a stabilizing effect on Turkish foreign policy.

On the other hand, experts on Turkish foreign policy usually argue that it is a "liberal prejudice" to think that growing economic relations between Turkey and the Middle East will become structured to the extent that this will lead to a similar development in political relations.   It was Turgut Özal, Turkey's prime minister from 1983 to 1989, who argued in line with the mood of the 1970s détente policies, that "economic relations..ease political tensions and pave the way for political agreements."[55]   Özal's argument was probably based on his functionalist understanding of international relations and his rather naive -especially when viewed against the background of Turkey's failing record in the Middle East-assumption that economic relations can continue and increase without being affected by but positively affecting political relations.   The history of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was full of examples of the weakness of this approach.   Then Minister of Foreign Affairs İlter Türkmen admitted in the early 1980s that economic relations with the Middle East could "continue to increase if [emphasis mine] political circumstances permit."[56]   What the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s taught to Turkish policy-makers was that

rapprochement with the Middle East, which was a political end,
could be achieved only through political means. According to
Aykan,

> [a]s Türkmen then implied, political
> circumstances could relate either to political
> tensions between the regional states (such as the
> negative impact the tensions between Iraq and
> Syria was expected to have in 1982 on Turkey's
> export to Iraq) or to the attitude of an
> unpredictable economic partner like Libya, which
> could cut economic relations with Turkey or
> prevent them from developing for political
> reasons.[57]

To use Goldmann's terminology, until the late 1980s,
Turkey's economy was not structurally adopted to economic
relations with the Middle East, which, if resulted in
dependence, would have enabled one to test the hypothesis that
economic dependence helps to stabilize a country's foreign
policy. This is why establishing economic relations with the
Middle East was neither the source of newly adopted Turkish
foreign policy which foresaw showing more understanding
towards Middle Eastern states nor the means towards
establishing closer political relations with them. Economic
relations with the countries of the region emerged to be a
"side-effect" of Turkish foreign policy towards the region
which evolved through time. And it was only after both
parties structurally adapted to the relationship that it began
to act as a stabilizer on the foreign policies of actors. It
is beyond both the aims and the scope of this study to analyze
the stabilizing effects of Turkish-Middle Eastern economic

relations on the foreign policies of the latter. However, depending on the experience driven from the Gulf crisis, it can safely be argued that both sides showed a degree of restraint in their actions towards the other. This was especially visible in Iraqi attitudes towards Turkey. Despite the opposition's prophecies that Turkish-Iraqi relations will never be good anymore, Iraq began to make overtures to Turkey immediately after the end of the war. According to the Turkish daily Hürriyet , Iraqi Ambassador to Turkey, Rafi' Dahan Mujavvil al-Takriti informed the Turkish Minister of Finance, Adnan Kahveci, in early February 1991 that Baghdad had abandoned its "inflexible" policy towards Turkey. He said: "Our ministers who are responsible for irrigation and trade are ready to hold talks with you whenever you wish to do so. We want to resolve the problems in the two fields."[58]

Turkey, although it did not refrain from closing down the pipeline, freezing Iraqi assets, and participating in the economic embargo against Iraq, is now among those countries who are trying to ease the embargo. The recent visit by Turkish businessmen to Iraq can be taken as a step towards reestablishing the economic links between two countries. Iraq also gives signals of its willingness to reestablish these relations.

In the past, Turkey's economic relations with the Middle East have never been problem-free. For example, when trade

with Iran began to decline in 1986, there seemed to be two distinct reasons which triggered the decline. The reason behind the decrease in Iranian imports was the fall in Iranian oil revenues. For Turkey it was the new policy adopted by the Iranian government to require oil importing countries to import an additional $500 million worth of non-oil product.[59] One other event which showed the instability of economic relations with Iran was the duplicity of Iran regarding a natural gas pipeline that was to pass through Turkey. In 1991, Turkey and Iran signed an agreement stipulating that if a natural gas pipeline from Iran to Europe was to be constructed thorough Turkey, Turkey was to purchase 4.5 million m^3 of gas annually.[60] Following this agreement, the Iranian authorities informed BOTAŞ, a Turkish firm responsible for the handling of the agreement, that a pipeline from Iran through Turkey to Europe was out of the question thereby limiting the project to the management of Turkey's purchase of Iranian natural gas and once more frustrating Turkish dreams to act as a bridge between the Middle East and Europe. Later Iran announced its project to build a pipeline through the Ukraine to transport its natural gas.[61]

Nevertheless, Turkey continues to consolidate its economic relations with the Middle East. Turkey has signed trade agreements with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan. It has Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreements

with Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Turkish representatives hold annual meetings with the representatives of these countries (except for Qatar with which there has been no meeting yet) to further economic relations.[62] Turkey has signed agreements to arrange relations in the banking sector with Iran and Iraq .

The state of trade relations between Turkey and the Middle East gives the first indications of a structural adaptation of their respective economies. The Gulf war experience also helps one to consolidate this view. However, although there is every indication to be optimistic about the future of economic relations there are still steps that need to be taken for this structural adaptation to consolidate and stabilize the foreign policies of the two parties. There is reason to be optimistic on the export side that not only Turkey's exports to the region has increased, but its products have become diversified and trading partners have increased in number. However, the same cannot be said about Turkey's imports. Although Turkey's imports from the region have increased, thus increasing the general volume of trade between the two parties, they still remain concentrated on oil.[63] Given the fluctuation in oil prices this creates a factor of vulnerability for Turkey's relations with the region. To overcome this vulnerability, Turkey's "relations with the oil producing countries should be directed towards other sectors

and activities, while at the same time opening up to the non-oil Arab countries."[64]

In sum, it can be argued that economic dependence, an international stabilizer, which is assumed, according top Goldmann's theory of stability in foreign policy, to emerge in the initial periods of policy stabilization, emerged rather later in the Turkish-Middle Eastern case. It was only during the late 1980s that the two parties' economies began to became structurally adapted to each other. Until then, economic dependence cannot be claimed to have acted as a stabilizer of Turkey's policy towards the Middle East.

4.3 Third Party

In International Politics, third parties are assumed to have a stabilizing effect on foreign policies of states through the process of coalition formation. The demands generated by coalition policy may stabilize a state's foreign policy through the following process: When a relationship is established between two states, their respective relations with third parties show a tendency to change. If the trilateral relationship between the three parties, the actor, its object, and the third party evolves in the direction of forming a structure called a coalition, that is thought to be in "structural balance," (which tends to be stable) thus creating a stabilizing effect on actor's foreign policy.[65]

The understanding that third parties have an impact on relations between states stems from traditional power politics reasoning, which assumes relations with an "other" state to have an impact on the relations between two interacting states. The other state is not an ordinary one but a significant other that has "weight."[66] It is not necessary for the "other" state, which is called the "third party" to be a great power with an inherent weight of its own. Considering the problematic nature of the concept of weight, it has to have the capability to influence the relations between the two interacting parties: the "actor" and its "object".

The nature of the relationship between the parties (amicable, inimical) and the specific issue at stake (core, peripheral) are also important in determining the extent to which the third party can influence their acts and actions.[67] According to Rubinstein, a "state adopts to the preferences of the other when the issue is of marginal importance to it. Minimal adaptations are part of the overall influence relationship; they are the 'payoffs' for services rendered and are usually made since the costs are negligible."[68] This is how "influence" is exercised when the relationship between the actor and the third party is amicable. If there is enmity between the two, the latter usually uses coercion or force to impose its will. Thus, the type of tactic used by the third party and the degree of success it will achieve depends on the

"past tradition of friendship or hostility between their objectives and interests."[69]   While relations of consensus and/or overt manipulation are typical between states with a past tradition of friendly relations with few disagreements, relations of coercion and force seem to be more typical for the latter.[70]   According to Goldmann,

> the extent to which the stabilizer here called 'third parties' exist may be taken to depend not only on (1) the nature of the relation between actor and third party and on (2) the nature of the relation between third party and object, but also on (3) the weight of the third party."[71]

However, as mentioned before, not all third party relationships have a stabilizing impact on foreign policies of states, unless the established relationship is in a "structural balance."   The theory of structural balance classifies such relations as to their being stable or unstable.   Goldmann identifies four such sets of structures that are assumed to be inherently stable according to the theory of structural balance:

I. My enemy's enemy is my friend.

II.   My enemy's friend is my enemy.

III. My friend's enemy is my enemy.

IV.   My friend's friend is my friend.[72]

These structures are thought to be in structural balance and are therefore assumed to be inherently stable.   "In cases I and II, the actor's policy toward an object is stabilized by

concern with an enemy third party. In cases II and IV, his
policy toward an object is stabilized by concern with an
allied third party. All other structures are inherently
unstable..."[73]

Since there are usually more than one third party that
are somehow associated with the actor and its object, the
study will content itself with an analysis of the most obvious
ones. An analysis of the third parties involved in Turkey's
relations with the Middle East shows that United States and
the Soviet Union come forth as the most obvious ones.
However, one factor that needs to be kept under consideration
when trying to determine whether a third party tends to
stabilize a policy or not, is whether the relationship between
the actor and the third party was a condition of or response
to the relationship between the actor and its object. Since
third party reasoning is concerned with the role of coalition
formation,[74] one needs to differentiate between the two, i.e.
the conditions of and responses to a specific relationship.
What is relevant for this study is the relationship
established afterwards. States need not begin interacting
after the relationship between the actor and its object has
been established, but the trilateral relationship must have
evolved towards forming a new structure. Thus, before going
into the details of the relationship between Turkey and the
aforementioned third parties, one has to determine whether or

not these relations constitute a coalition formed/reformed after the establishment of the relationship between Turkey and the Middle East. If this condition is not met, no matter whether structural balance is established between the three or not, the third party effect would not be functioning as a stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, but will be a mere condition for its formulation. The role played by the United States and the Soviet Union will be analyzed separately to see whether they functioned as third party stabilizers on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East or not.

When tested against this latter criterion, i.e., whether relations with the third party was a condition of or a response to actor's relations with its subject, the stabilizing role of the United States as a third party to Turkey's relationship with the Middle East becomes questionable. Although Turkey's relations with the Middle East have a history that is older than its relations with the United States, it was after the end of the Second World War that relations with both gained significance in the eyes of Turkish policy makers. Concurrently the Soviet Union entered the picture. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was shaped during the Cold War. Although there is truth in the assessment that Turkish foreign policy in general and Turkish policy towards the Middle East in particular exhibit a

continuity, and that they both have been shaped by Kemal Atatürk during the early years of the Republican era, the fact that most of the Middle Eastern states were not yet independent at the time makes it harder to test its validity. Thus, it would not be too wrong to claim that Turkey's policy towards the Middle East was shaped in the post-World War II era. It was during the heyday of the Cold War that the third party effect was stronger as far as both the United States and the Soviet Union were concerned. Until 1964, Turkish policy makers assumed that the geopolitical and regional interests of Turkey and the United States were identical. Although what Turkish policy makers understood from alliance relationship was similar to those structures of positive relations, "my friend's friend is my friend" and "my friend's enemy is my enemy," it would still be premature to claim Turkish-U.S.-Middle Eastern relations during the 1950s to have become stabilized through this relationship. As the 1960s' adjustments in Turkish foreign policy that led to the formulation of the new Turkish foreign policy also prove, Turkey did not hesitate to deviate from policy suggestions of its ally when an issue it deemed to be important was at stake.

During the late 1940s and 1950s because Turkey did not attach utmost importance to its relations with the Middle East it did not refrain from being identified with United States policies.[75] According to Bölükbaşı,

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both İnönü and Menderes, considered Turkey's
alliance with the United States essential for
security and hence, tried to cooperate with the
U.S., even in areas thought unimportant to
Turkish national security interests. Turkey was
eager, for instance, to associate itself with
American Middle East policies during the 1950s.[76]

Turkey's Middle East policy until the 1960s had one

basic aim, containment of the Communist threat in its Eastern

and Southeastern borders. It was regarding this aim that

Turkey and United States' Middle East policies converged.

However, this convergence in policies occurred not after but

at the same time when Turkey's Middle East policy was being

shaped; Turkish-U.S.-Middle Eastern trilateral relationship

was neither a condition for nor a result of Turkish-Middle

Eastern relations.

According to the theoretical sketch provided by

Goldmann, Turkey's Middle East policy, in order to check

whether it has become stabilized through third party effect,

has to be tested as function of (1)the state of U.S.-Middle

East relations, (2)the state of U.S.-Turkish relations,

(3)United States' weight. An analysis of the trilateral

relationship shows that only the second aspect was stable

enough to fit the argument. Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations

remained friendly until the 1990s. U.S.-Middle Eastern

relationship, on the other hand, was too complex and volatile

and did not lend itself to be categorized as amicable or

inimical. Although the Arab-Israeli dispute continued to

strain the relations between the U.S. and the Arab Middle East, there was always change and uncertainty about future relations. Only U.S.-Israeli relations remained as an island of stability. However, as the 1956 war showed, even the U.S. policy towards Israel was not stable enough to be taken for granted. Hence, one condition for United States' functioning as a stabilizer of Turkey's Middle East policy did not come true.

Regarding the third aspect, although the weight of the third party was not questionable, for United States was Turkey's major ally and a super power, the history of Turkish-U.S. relations does not provide enough evidence to support the theory. The 1950s are considered to be a decade during when Turkey associated itself with U.S. policies in the Middle East to the degree that under U.S. influence it assumed the task of establishing the Baghdad Pact (1954). What is often forgotten is that Turkey did not attach any significance to the Middle East during the 1950s. Relations with the Middle East were seen within the context of East-West tension, containment of the Soviet Union, and the role Turkey assumed in this process.[77],[78] As argued before, relations with the Middle Eastern states, apart from the rhetoric did not carry much weight.

However, to measure an influence relationship between two states, there must be certain parameters to be measured.

To quote Bölükbaşı, "Turkey's support of American diplomacy in Latin America is certainly not indicative of the influence relationship between the U.S. and Turkey because the issue is irrelevant to Turkey's security."[79] Although it is true that the Middle East and Latin America do not carry the same weight in Turkey's calculations, the analogy still holds.[80] Since Turkey was not interested in Latin American affairs and had nothing at stake regarding its relations with the Latin American states, it could act in line with the wishes of the United States, for it might have calculated that it could derive benefits without incurring any costs at all. Although Middle East was not as insignificant as Latin America was to Turkey, nevertheless Turkish policy makers did not attach great significance to relations with the Middle East that they could subordinate them to the wishes of its great power ally. Besides, even when the so called new Turkish foreign policy was formulated during mid-1960s with the utmost aim of strengthening Turkey's relations with the Middle East, it was done not for its own sake, but for the purpose of attaining Arab support for the Cyprus dispute. Thus, strengthening relations with the Middle East did not become a goal of its own until the late 1970s. Since then the relations between the three can be described as being structurally imbalanced, for from the 1960s on and particularly after the U.S. arms embargo on Turkey in 1974, Turkish-U.S. relations lost a lot

of its predictability, especially within the Middle Eastern

context. The multilateral approach introduced by the new

Turkish foreign policy together with the détente in East-West

tension caused Turkish-United States relations to become less

structured and more volatile. This change was also a result

of Turkish resentment towards U.S. policy which was far from

being structured in itself. According to Rubin,

> In their dealings with the United States, the
> Turks learned that Washington can be reliable
> when it wants to be, but often lacks staying
> power and consistency in following thorough on a
> policy. As time goes on, the change in
> administration or even of personnel or moods
> within and administration has led to a tremendous
> instability in American policy-making. The Turks
> are wary of taking risks on behalf of the U.S.
> position only to find that it has been changed,
> or even reversed leaving them with a stance that
> is risky, or even opposed to a new American one.[81]

Recent findings regarding the Baghdad Pact also prove

that even during the 1950s, when U.S.-Turkish bilateral

relations were relatively stable, Turkey suffered from lack of

predictability in U.S. actions. In the case of the Baghdad

Pact, although it was the United States that initiated the

formation of the Pact, it later preferred to stay away and

refrained from becoming a member, for it became aware of its

divisive effects in the region, which the U.S. policy makers

feared, would play into the Soviets' hands.[82]

Thus, although the U.S. had weight in the eyes of both

the Turks and the Middle Eastern states, thus fulfilling the

first condition for the establishment of a structural balance

in trilateral relations between U.S., Turkey and the Middle Eastern states, neither U.S.-Middle Eastern nor U.S.-Turkish relations were stable and predictable enough for structural balance to be established. It is in this sense that the United States, although remaining as a significant other to both actors, did not emerge to be a third party to stabilize Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle Eastern states.

Similar but even stronger arguments can be put forward regarding the influence of the Soviet Union as a third party to Turkish-Middle Eastern relations. Although there was a general understanding that the Soviet Union was the greatest threat to Turkey's security and that the support it provided to Turkey's neighbors put Turkey's security at stake, a negative structural balance ('my enemy's enemy is my friend,' and 'my enemy's friend is my enemy') was never established. Although the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were inimical and that the Soviet Union was a super power holding great weight (thud fulfilling the third condition for structural balance to be established), the complexity of trilateral relationships prevented such a structural relationship from being established. Although the nature of the relationship between the actor and the third party was quite clear, the complexity of the relations between the third party and the subject, and the fact that the weight of the third party was quite irrelevant in terms of these relations

prevented the Turkish- Soviet-Middle Eastern trilateral relationship from becoming stabilized through third party effect.[83]

From mid-1960s on, changes in the international environment and demands from the domestic environment both enabled and also led Turkey to adopt a multilateral approach in its foreign relations. As Turkey began to attach more and more importance to relations with the Middle East, the third party effect both in terms of the United States and the Soviet Union decreased. Turkey, beginning from mid-1960s began to refrain from being identified with United States policies in the region. The 1973 war is especially indicative of the Turkish effort that while Turkey refused to grant the U.S. refueling and reconnaissance facilities for airlift to Israel,[84] it permitted the Soviet Union to use its air space to help the Syrian the latter's struggle against Israel. This caused resentment on the side of the Americans and deteriorated U.S.-Turkish relations. Following the 1974 Cyprus affair, Turkish landing on the island and the ensuing arms embargo, together with the détente in East-West relations, enabled and led Turkey to further this multilateral policy which moved it further away from the stabilizing effect of third party relations. For example, during the Hostage crisis, U.S. request in April 1980 for sanctions to be imposed on Iran was met with Turkey's urge for "further patience."[85]

Besides, right after the revolution, when the U.S. requested the placement of six helicopters in the NATO base at İncirlik as part of a plan for the deportation of American personnel and their families from Iran, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit "accepted" the request on the conditions that Iranian officials would agree to them to enter into Iran, nobody other than the flight personnel would be present in the helicopters, and no military equipment would be transported from or to Iran.[86] In the face of Turkish reply, U.S. Marines which were reported to have arrived at İncirlik, were sent back to the Azors. It was later declared that the U.S. administration has accepted this "permission" with "gratitude".[87]

By the late 1970s and 1980s although Soviet power and influence began to grow in the Middle East, bringing back "traditional images of international politics" held by the Turkish policy makers, Turkey "continued to link its security to the West while eschewing the unidimensional policies of the 1950s. The changing conditions have instead induced Ankara to act decisively and cautiously at the same time; without abandoning its multifaceted foreign policy."[88] In 1981, Turkey refused the idea advanced by the U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig of forming an anti-Soviet coalition in the Middle East, which was to be based on the concept of "strategic consensus." Turkish government's declared position was that no strategic consensus could be reached in the Middle

East unless the Arab Israeli conflict was settled.[89] Regarding the Arab-Israeli dispute, Turkey seemed to have covered a long way since 1950s that the Turks took care not to be identified with U.S. policies in the Middle East; instead they adopted a balanced attitude.

Following the end of the Cold War, strengthening Turkish-U.S. relations, ambiguously called "strategic cooperation" by President Turgut Özal,[90] again became an issue in Turkish politics. Close cooperation between Turkey and the United States during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) substantiated the argument that Turkish-U.S. relations may gain "additional significance" with the end of the Cold War.[91] However, the Süleyman Demirel government that took office in late 1991 and the successive Tansu Çiller governments took care to distance themselves from the style of Motherland Party governments, which they considered to be acting too cooperative. An action they took in line with this attitude was the Turkish abstention- despite a personal appeal from President Bush to Prime Minister Demirel to vote in favor-, in the U.N. General Assembly vote of 16 December 1991 on U.N. General Assembly resolution of 10 November 1975 which described Zionism as "a form of racism and racial discrimination."[92]

Thus, it can well be argued that Turkey's relations with the United States, even when they were closest, were far from being stable and predictable enough to enable the formation of a trilateral relationship between U.S., Turkey, and the Middle

East to stabilize Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East. In the case of the Soviet Union, the trilateral relationship was even less predictable (especially beginning from mid-1960s), although there were times when the impression was created that Soviet-Turkish Middle Eastern relations fit the pattern 'my enemy's friend is my enemy' -especially concerning Turkey's relations with Syria.

Chapter V: Cognitive stabilizers

According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, a policy is more likely to be stable if beliefs of the policy makers about the policy are consistent rather than inconsistent, if the policy is cognitively central rather than peripheral, and if their beliefs about the policy are untestable rather than testable. Consistency, centrality and testability are cognitive stabilizers that operate at the individual level. If the individual policy makers' beliefs regarding the policy in question are consistent, central and untestable, i.e., cannot be convincingly proven wrong, the policy can be claimed to be psychologically stable.

Although individual policy makers' beliefs may be different than officially adopted beliefs, the two, nevertheless are not inherently opposed. Goldmann argues to the interdependence of the two, but admits that the degree of correspondence between them may never be known.[1] If the analyst is able to draw inferences from individual policy makers' official statements regarding his unofficial beliefs about the policy, s/he may draw conclusions as to the consistency, centrality and testability of his/her belief about the policies with the ultimate purpose of understanding

whether it will help stabilize his/her country's foreign policy through its impact on the costs of policy change. In other words, if his/her beliefs about the policy are consistent, central and untestable, then, his/her perception of the costs of changing that policy will be higher compared to inconsistent and peripheral beliefs which can rather easily and convincingly be proven wrong.[2]

5.1. Consistency

Psychological reasoning suggests that if the policy maker's belief in a policy is consistent, s/he will perceive the costs of changing that policy to be greater and will not easily opt for change. According to Goldmann, "[a] fully consistent, policy-related set of beliefs has two features: according to this set of beliefs, the policy is certain to produce the intended result, and it *is not thought to have any counter-productive side-effects* [emphasis mine]."[3] Then, in analyzing the consistency of Turkish policy makers' beliefs on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, two factors have to be considered at the same time: Whether or not the pursuit of the policy is believed to have a uniformly favorable impact in terms of the objective the policy is intended to serve, and whether there exists any side effects that are counter-productive. It is assumed that if both conditions are met, the Turkish policy makers' beliefs about

the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can be considered to be cognitively consistent thus having a stabilizing effect on the policy.

As argued before, Turkey's pre-1960 policy towards the Middle East, which ended up with Turkey's alienation in the international fora, provided a negative feedback which helped destabilize Turkish foreign policy during the early 1960s and contributed to change. Cognitive inconsistency in the beliefs of the Turkish policy makers was one of the factors that helped produce negative feedback as a source of change in foreign policy. In this sense, Turkish policy makers' beliefs about Turkey's pre-1960 policy towards the Middle East were cognitively inconsistent since they thought it not only failed to produce the intended result but also produced many counter-productive side-effects.

However, one point that should be kept in mind is that perception of the results of a policy by the policy makers as unintended or producing counter-productive side-effects also depends on how one defines policy objectives. If Turkey's foreign policy objective regarding the Middle East is defined as the attainment of Western and especially U.S. support in defense and economic matters alike in return for Turkish cooperativeness in Middle Eastern security, Turkish policy makers' beliefs may be claimed to have been consistent, since what was intended was achieved through NATO membership and

increasing U.S. defensive and economic assistance. Turkish
policy makers' statements also point to this cognitive
consistency in their beliefs about Turkey's Middle East
policy. The Democrat Party's Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Fuad Köprülü's words is an example to this. Köprülü, in
response to the U.S. Ambassador George McGhee's criticisms
regarding Turkey's pro-Western policies that alienated the
Arabs, was reported to have said that earlier, when Turkey was
seeking admission to NATO, the Turks felt they must be loyal to
their new allies. Since the interests of the West frequently
clashed with those of the Middle Eastern states, the Turks,
feeling the near-impossibility of satisfying everyone, had
decided that they should give top priority to their
commitments to NATO and the West.[4] In this sense, the Turkish
policy makers may be claimed to have been certain that the
policy they pursued was going to produce the intended result.

Still, Köprülü's statement also hints that the counter-
productive side-effects of the very same policy were known to
Turkish policy makers. Alienation of the Middle Eastern
states can be considered to have been one of these counter-
productive side-effects which the Turkish policy makers
ignored until mid-1960s when, coupled with other side-effects,
it contributed to destabilize Turkish foreign policy towards
the Middle East. In fact, Turkey's near-ignorance of Middle
Eastern countries' responses to its own policies continued

until the West failed it in the Cyprus matter. The withdrawal of the Jupiter Missiles from Turkey, and the U.S. failure to support the Turks against the Greeks, coupled with the infamous Johnson letter (1964) -which contributed to public opinion's becoming a factor of its own regarding foreign policy matters-, all helped convince the Turks that their foreign policy towards the Middle East, which they pursued in spite of its counter-productive side-effects, was not that certain to produce the intended result. Until then, the Turks believed that their allies and especially the United States would support them in the face of such a problem. Turkish displeasement with the attitudes of its allies who failed to support Turkey on Cyprus, a dispute in which the Turks considered themselves to be absolutely right, led to inconsistency in their beliefs about the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. From mid-1960s on, the policy's counter-productive side-effects such as the alienation of the Middle Eastern states, which were ignored until then, became more visible since the Turks came to need their support in the U.N. voting on Cyprus. The destabilization of Turkish foreign policy during early 1960s, in return, produced a new formulation called the new Turkish foreign policy.

An analysis on the consistency of the beliefs of Turkish policy makers about Turkey's new policy towards the Middle

East shows that they were consistent -something, which, in the end, helped to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the region. As argued before, the new Turkish foreign policy, which emerged in the mid-1960s, was planned to stand in opposition to the mistakes committed during the 1950s that were blamed for the deterioration of relations with the Middle East which, in return, caused Turkey's alienation in the international fora concerning the Cyprus problem. Thus, the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, aimed at giving an end to Turkey's isolation in the U.N. through strengthening the relations with the Middle East. Secondly, Turkey, through the adoption of this new Turkish foreign policy, intended to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy, which Harris describes as the "dual effort" of trying to maintain a low-profile in alliance relations with the West while trying to keep other channels of communication open.[5] The pursuance of this multi-faceted foreign policy, when applied to the Middle Eastern context, required less cooperation with the United States regarding regional crises and a balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute with the ultimate purpose of rapprochement between Turkey and the regional states.

The new Turkish foreign policy, which was designed not to repeat the mistakes of the 1950s, can be regarded to have become cognitively consistent in the belief system of Turkish

policy makers -to the extent that their statements hinted at their beliefs. One of the drafters of the new Turkish foreign policy, Hamit Batu (Ret. Ambassador), writing in 1991, after the Gulf War (1990-91) argued that Turkey has been able to convince the Middle Eastern states of its good will and friendly intentions, which was the main objective of this policy when formulated during mid-1960s. He further argued that the friendly and understanding attitude of the Turks, who refrained from cooperating with the West or taking sides in regional disputes, introduced an important element of stability in the region, which, according to Batu, was "appreciated" by the Middle Eastern states.[6] Thus, as can be deduced from Batu's words, Turkish policy makers believed that the new Turkish foreign policy, which came to be called the traditional policy during the 1980s, produced the intended result, which was rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, i.e., being able to convince the Middle Eastern states of Turkey's goodwill and friendly intentions -to the extent that was possible.

Regarding the counter-productive side-effects of the policy that was being pursued, Turkish policy makers did not seem to have faced grave problems. In fact, Turkish policy makers' main efforts were directed towards minimizing the counter-productive side-effects of the policy they have been pursuing. For example Turkish policy makers seem to have

feared that rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states might restrain Turkey's relations with the West and United States in particular since this policy necessitated low-key attitudes in relations with the United States and minimum cooperation with the West in Middle Eastern crises. In attempt to overcome this effect, Turkey tried to maintain a balance in its relations with the West and the Middle East, and Israel and the Muslim states of the Middle East, which in turn, caused the Turkish policy makers to live through hard times. However, in the last instance, they, through minor adjustments, were able to maintain this balance; or so they believed which is still enough for the purposes of this analysis since what is important is what the policy makers believed in. Government programs of Turkish governments since the 1960s are also indicative of the Turkish policy makers' belief to this effect.[7]

Turkish policy makers also seem to have belief in Turkey's success in maintaining a link with Israel as part of the policy of maintaining a balance in its relations with Israel and the Arab Middle East. Thus, another possible counter-productive side-effect, that of restrainment in relations with Israel, seems to have been minimized in their minds.

The only counter-productive side-effect of the policy of rapprochement with the Middle East seems to be an indirect

domestic effect, i.e., the increasing role of Islam in Turkish
domestic life and the question it brings forth: Whether this
policy will run counter to Turkey's secularism. Although
successive Turkish governments took a more "flexible" stand
regarding the application of the principle of secularism when
they agreed to join the OIC , even on a de facto basis,[9] they
nevertheless refrained from taking too flexible a stand that
they, to this day, put reservations to the final declarations
of the OIC meetings and also did not become a de jure member
of the organization. In this sense they have been trying hard
to minimize the role religion played in the making of Turkish
foreign policy. However, they have not been that successful
in minimizing the threats posed by Islamic ideological
subversion attempts of Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors. For
example, the restraint Turkish policy makers try to show
towards radical Middle Eastern regimes such as Iran with the
ultimate purpose of reassuring them of Turkey's goodwill and
friendship, from time to time, seems to backfire. Since the
1979 revolution in Iran, Turkey has been trying to show much
restraint in its relations with Iran despite the inherent
inconsistency between the ideologies of the two regimes, and
Iranian attacks against Atatürk and his ideology which do not
seem to come to an end. But, what Turkey seem to end up with
as a result of this policy of restrainment is increasing
number of threats emanating from Iran[9] such as efforts

undertaken towards exporting the Islamic revolutionary ideology and Iranian leaders' attacks against Atatürk and Turkey's secularism through which they intend to threaten the ideological basis of Turkish democracy and suggest an Islamic one instead. Through pursuing such a policy the Iranians not only threaten Turkey's internal security but also serve an important domestic purpose by weakening the only strong alternative to their own Islamic ideology in the Middle East region, that of secular Turkish democracy.

To give another example, Turkey shows a similar restraint in its relations with Saudi Arabia, while the latter explicitly supports Islamist activities and activists in Turkey. It is in this sense that Turkey, from time to time, finds it hard to maintain friendly relations with the Muslim states of the Middle East while the latter continues to engage in subversive activities directed against the secular regime in Turkey. Still Turkish policy makers seem to be able to overcome these cognitive inconsistencies through methods of their own. For example Kenan Evren (former Chief of Staff, Head of State and President), in an interview he gave to Turkish daily Milliyet, stated that he had "good intentions" in establishing ties with the Arab states, for these countries provided much financial assistance to Turkey. He added that he did not, at the time, foresee any danger in establishing such a relationship. When Saudi Arabia's continuous

denunciations of the secular Turkish republic and its characterization of Atatürk as an enemy of Islam are considered, a former commander's seeing no harm in strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia seems "remarkable."[10]

However, the threat rapprochement with the Muslim states may pose to Turkey's secular regime seems to be the only counter-productive side-effect troubling the minds of Turkish policy makers when laying down their policies. They take utmost care to minimize this effect at the cognitive level through maintaining and even strengthening relations with Israel thus proving to themselves and to the world alike that they do emphasize secularism in foreign policy making.

The Turkish policy makers try to minimize the threat of ideological subversion by radical Muslim states of the Middle East usually through diplomatic means, i.e., warning, from time to time, the heads of their diplomatic missions in Ankara and making declarations to the effect that 'Turkey will not let anyone threaten neither the ideological basis of the regime nor its territorial integrity or political independence.' Even then they take utmost care to minimize the possible harm it may cause on Turkey's relations with the Middle East. An example of this artitude on the part of Turkish policy makers was seen in February 1993 when a police operation in İstanbul revealed that a group of Islamic militants had been trained and sheltered in Iran before

carrying out bloody activities in Turkey one of which was the assasination of journalist Uğur Mumcu. In this case, the Turkish policy makers preferred to play "deaf and dumb"[11] and fell short of directly accusing the Iranian administration but maintained that "an Iranian connection does exist," and that necessary action will be taken if it is proved. It seemed that against all the evidence pointing to Iran, Turkish policy makers preferred to leave the door open so that the Iranian administration could make its escape. However, public reaction to Mumcu's assasination was so great that the Turkish government, which failed the nation by not even summoning the Iranian Ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, felt compelled to do something. Documents revealed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, İsmet Sezgin were given to Hikmet Çetin, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, in turn, handed them over to his Iranan counterpart; an action out of which came nothing since Iran denied all suggestions that it was behind such an act of terror in Turkey.[12]

The only exception to Turkey's low-key attitudes in reacting against Iranian submissive activities was seen in 1989 when Turkey recalled its Ambassador to Ankara for consultations, implying Iran to do the same; an action prompted by Iranian Ambassador Mottaki's participatipon to various WP(Welfare Party) rallies in Konya organized in support of student protests about the the ban on scarf in the

universities.[13]   Relations between the two countries were restored only in 1992 and Prime Minister Demirel made his postponed trip to Iran.[14]

To what degree this counter-productive side-effect of continuing the policy of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states affects the belief system of the Turkish policy makers and whether or to what extent it may lead, in the long-run, to cognitive inconsistency may not be known. What can be said after an analysis of the consistency of the beliefs of Turkish policy makers about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is that they, to this day, remained consistent. In other words, Turkish policy makers continue to believe that the policy they have been pursuing is certain to produce the intended result of rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states, and that they also believe nearly all side-effects to be favorable. In sum, Turkish policy makers' beliefs about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can be claimed to have been consistent thus acting as a stabilizer on Turkish policies. To what extent they will continue to be consistent will depend on the magnitude of this effect on the thinking of Turkish policy makers and whether or to what extent they will be able to minimize it.

5.2 Centrality

A policy is regarded to be cognitively central, according to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, to the extent that it is believed to be linked positively to other policies.[15] In Goldmann's words:

> If the pursuit of policy P1 is thought to facilitate the successful pursuit of another policy P2, then this link between P1 and P2 helps to stabilize P1. The more such links and the stronger they are, the more central and hence the more stable P1.[16]

Then, an analysis on cognitive centrality of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East within the beliefs systems of Turkish policy makers necessitates the analyst to determine whether or not it is linked with other policies and if it is, whether these links are strong.

As argued before, during the early years of the Republic, Turkish policy makers did not adhere much weight to Turkey's relations with the Middle East. In the immediate post-War period, this attitude began to change that by the 1950s, the Middle East became "the center of gravity" of Turkish foreign policy.[17] However, relations with the Middle East did not become the central focus in the minds of Turkish policy makers for the sake of strengthening relations with regional states or for regional leadership purposes. What Turkish policy makers aimed at through taking an active stance in Middle Eastern affairs was to strengthen Turkey's position vis-à-vis the West and present Turkey as a valuable and

faithful ally thus seeking to facilitate Turkey's becoming a part of the West. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, during the 1960s, was central to the thinking of Turkish policy makers in the sense that it was thought to serve Turkey's both core objectives of 'making Turkey a full-fledged member of the Western European community of nations on an equal basis' and 'maintaining the security, territorial integrity and political independence of the state'. It was in this sense that Turkey's Middle Eastern policy became and remained until mid-1960s an extension of Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy.

The new Turkish foreign policy of the 1960s, which was planned to stand in opposition to the mistakes committed during the 1950s, emphasized multi-faceted foreign policy making. When applied to the Middle Eastern context, this policy required less cooperation with the United States and a more balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute. In fact, Turkey's Middle East policy played the central role in precipitating change in Turkish foreign policy that it remained the only aspect of Turkish foreign policy, other than the policy towards the Soviet Union, undergoing restructuring while other policies either remained the same or underwent minor changes. Turkey's distancing itself from the West concerning Middle Eastern affairs facilitated its maintaining a low profile in its relations with the West in general and

the United States in particular. In fact, it was only by keeping itself aloof from Middle Eastern affairs and trying to remain neutral in regional crises that Turkey could do without close cooperation with its Western allies. Although the relative calm that came to the region from the 1960s on was also a factor that enabled the Turks to underplay their alliance ties, it was also because they stopped interfering with the affairs of the regional states that they could distance Turkey from the West while without putting its security or territorial integrity at stake. Thus, the new policy of remaining neutral in Middle Eastern crises served to facilitate the application of Turkey's multi-faceted foreign policy.

Secondly, the new policy of rapprochement with the Middle East necessitated a balanced attitude towards the Arab-Israeli dispute, i.e., a balance to be established in its relations with Israel and the Arab Middle East. This policy of balancing Turkey's relations with Israel and the Arab Middle East not only reinforced Turkey's neutrality vis-à-vis regional disputes but also the secular character of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey remained, until the Camp David Accord of 1979, when Egypt recognized Israel, the only Muslim state to have diplomatic ties with Israel. Besides, maintaining ties with Israel, which was, and still is, necessitated by this policy of balance, served an important purpose through

showing Turkey's Western identity and even strengthened its position vis-à-vis the Western European countries. Moreover, Turkey hoped of and succeeded in gaining the support of the Jewish lobby in the United States through maintaining links and even cooperating with Israel. At the same time, the policy of balancing the relations with Israel and the Muslim Middle East provided a link with Turkey's other objectives such as maintaining the secular character of Turkish foreign policy, showing Turkey as a part of the West and strengthening its position in the United States Congress thus providing support for other foreign policy objectives and actions alike.

Thirdly, the maintenance of this balance also facilitated Turkey's policy vis-à-vis the Third World states in general since this balanced policy showed that Turkey was interested in their concerns such as territorial self-determination and independence. Besides, this helped Turkey to establish more stable bilateral relations with Middle Eastern countries that helped increase economic interdependence. Though not a source of Turkey's new policy towards the Middle East, economic concerns, by mid-1970s, became an important aspect of Turkey's relations with the region. Rapprochement with the Middle East also helped Turkey out of some of its economic problems, especially through securing oil shipments, providing work for Turkish migrant workers and credits and business opportunities for Turkish

firms. Prime Minister Turgut Özal, in his opening speech to the Third International Girne Conference in 1985 on Turkey-EC-Middle East Relations, said that

> [e]conomic relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries are growing rapidly to the benefit of both sides. This development simultaneously has a special importance for our relations with Europe because of the mutual benefit it offers.[18]

It is in this sense that fourthly, and maybe most important of all, the policy of rapprochement with the Middle East helped Turkey reactivate its role of a bridge between the West and the Middle East. The bridge role is, by definition, a vague one, for it necessitates more than the will of the actor to be implemented. In other words, if state A is going to act as a bridge between states C and D, not only state A has to have the will and necessary capability to enforce its will, but also states C and D should need state A to act as a bridge in between themselves and ask state A to act accordingly. During the 1950s, Turkish policy makers' main problem when implementing this role was Middle Eastern states' lack of trust in Turkey. It was only after Turkey adopted the policy of rapprochement during mid-1960s that it slowly began to gain the trust of Middle Eastern states. Though this never became a friendship that Turkey could take for granted, the mistrust of the 1950s was largely overcome during this era. Thus, the rapprochement policy adopted during mid-1960s provided an impetus for the implementation of the bridge role,

which enforced, in Turkish policy makers' eyes, Turkey's European identity. Turkish policy makers, through presenting Turkey as a natural bridge between the West and the Middle East wanted to reinforce Turkey's value to the Europeans thus strengthening its place in Europe. Hamit Batu, one of the drafters of the new Turkish foreign policy, writing in 1965, argued that it was only if Turkey properly "grasped" and "adopted" the "historically designated role" of bridge with all its "obligations," that its position in the Western world could be strengthened.[19] This argument alone is enough to display the central position held by Turkey's Middle East policy and the national role of a bridge between the West and the Middle East.

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's (1993-) statement below also shows that the belief system of the Turkish policy makers still remain the same.

> Applied by some to Turkey in the past, the terms such as 'buffer' or 'periphery' were at best questionable metaphors. But in virtually every sense, including the geopolitical, they were flawed then and are deeply misleading now. Although Turkey is situated in an area of physical transition on the Eurasian land mass, the geographic and political fact is that *Turkey is a European country* [emphasis mine]. And, the specter of chaos -and too often its terrible reality- in areas of Europe and of Asia adjacent to it must now command the attention that once was focused on what was, but is no longer, the Alliance's central front.
>
> Turkey's demonstrated record of moderation, responsibility and commitment to international order in the midst of the turbulence reveals the

best of the characteristics one wants to associate with a European 'mindset' and European outlook. Consider the dilemma for Alliance security were Turkey absent from the centre of this sea of turmoil and a nation of different character were in its place.[20]

Two conclusions can be derived from Çiller's words. One is that Turkish policy makers of the 1990s are more certain as to the European identity of their country compared to those of the 1960s who believed that Turkey, "due to its social structure.. cannot be regarded as a Western country in the real sense of the term."[21] Batu, in 1965, argued that Turkey was "admitted" into the EC because of its geopolitical and strategic situation. According to him, being the only Muslim "member" of the community, Turkey position was not "strong." This was why history and geography "designated" for Turkey the role of a bridge between the East and the West, which, if fully implemented, would "strengthen" Turkey's position in the Western world.[22] This central position given to Turkey's rapprochement with the Middle Eastern states and the implementation of its role of a bridge between the West and the Middle East, which the rapprochement policy was hoped to facilitate, was believed to help reinforce Turkey's position in the Western world.

As to the second conclusion derived from Çiller's words, the strengthening of belief in Turkey's European identity seems to be the only change that seems to have emerged in the belief system of the Turkish policy makers of the 1990s. This

even reinforces the central position held by Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East by enabling Turkey to become more active in implementing the bridge role. In other words, Turks' feeling more secure about their European identity may be expected to give a freer hand to Turkish policy makers in rapprochement with the Middle East which would, if it could, have further facilitated the implementation of the bridge role only if the question as to the operational significance of this role did not still remain open. Nevertheless, at the cognitive level, Turkish policy makers seem to have solved the problem as to Turkey's identity. In this sense, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is thought to facilitate Turkey's integration into the European mechanisms through proposing itself as a bridge between the West and the Middle East or as "the open window" to Israel of the Muslim Middle East. Paradoxical it may seem, this policy remains cognitively consistent in and central to Turkish policy makers' beliefs thus serving as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

5.3 Testability

Testability as a stabilizer of foreign policy is assumed to function is its absence. In other words, policy makers' beliefs which are untestable are assumed to be more stable,

for they do not run the risk of being easily and convincingly proven wrong by discrepant information. The assumption behind this reasoning, one Goldmann borrows from Robert Jervis, is that beliefs tend to be stable, or to quote Jervis, there is a "universal source of inertia" in human affairs.[23] Robert Jervis, in his well-known study Perception and Misperception in International Politics,[24] analyzed the mechanisms that brought about the stability of beliefs, i.e., the various ways in which cognitive processes tend to confirm and enforce existing beliefs.[25,26] However, as Goldmann also indicates, "[b]eliefs may change under the impact of discrepant information...and there is a need for a theory about the kinds of beliefs that are particularly likely, and particularly unlikely, to be stable."[27]

Robert Jervis lists a number of ways in which a belief may be untestable. According to him,

> [t]he most vulnerable beliefs are those predicting definite, observable, short-term consequences. If, on the other hand, anything can be taken to be compatible with a belief, this belief is invulnerable....In an intermediate category can be found beliefs that, even though testable in principle, can be checked only against evidence that is rarely accessible or against events that rarely occur.[28]

Basing his argument on Jervis' findings, Goldmann proposes the testability of a belief to be a function of "(1) the extent to which it can be falsified in principle, and

(2)the extent to which relevant evidence is available in practice."[29]

However, in analyzing the testability of a policy-maker's belief about foreign policy, there is one main problem that has to be coped with, which is, the near-impossibility of being objective. Testability is "a genuinely subjective [emphasis mine] matter of how large an impact empirical evidence would have on the believer."[30] But, although it is a difficult concept, for it cannot be observed objectively, it nevertheless serves an important purpose in understanding policy change and stability. That is why Goldmann's theoretical sketch suggests that "it be put on the agenda of the analyst concerned with a problem of foreign policy stability, even though judgments about the testability of the beliefs on which a policy is based cannot be but relatively speculative."[31]

In analyzing the testability of foreign policy beliefs, Goldmann, in parallel lines with Jervis, differentiates between beliefs about long-term goal attainment which are inherently untestable and beliefs about short-term goal attainment which can be quite testable.[32] Then, in analyzing the testability of policy makers' beliefs about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, one has to differentiate between beliefs about long-term goal attainment, and those about short-term goal attainment.

When laid down during mid-1960s, the so-called new Turkish foreign policy was planned to serve one important purpose: the establishment of a multi-faceted foreign policy which could serve Turkey's twin core objectives of 'maintaining Turkey's security, territorial integrity, and political independence,' and 'making Turkey a full-fledged member of the European Community of Nations' while underplaying ties with the West, especially the United States. The Turkish foreign policy makers believed that if they adopted this multi-faceted foreign policy they could foster ties with the Second and Third world states without incurring any costs security-wise. They also believed that this would help solve some of Turkey's economic problems through reducing its dependency. Apart from this general belief about the goals of the new Turkish foreign policy, the newly formulated Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East had some, more specific, goals which, the Turkish policy makers believed, would further Turkey's core objectives. Three specific beliefs on the part of Turkish policy makers can be singled out. These are (ranging from short- to long-term):

1. The belief that the policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises will give an end to Turkey's alienation in the international fora and will enlist Middle Eastern countries' support in the U.N. voting on Cyprus.

2. The belief that the policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises will bring about rapprochement with regional states.

3. The belief that -unless the conditions put forward earlier regarding Turkish involvement in a Middle Eastern crisis were fulfilled- Turkey may remain neutral in a Middle Eastern crisis situation without incurring any costs, while at the same time emphasizing the independent and neutral aspect of policy making in Turkey.

The first one, Turkish policy makers' belief that the policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises will give an end to Turkey's alienation in the international fora and will enlist Middle Eastern countries' support in the U.N. voting on Cyprus can be considered to be testable since it was about a short-run expectation.

Shortly after the Cyprus crisis started in late 1963, both Turkey and Greece brought the case to the international fora. The alienation of the Turks caused by the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey as part of a deal between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis, coupled with the infamous Johnson letter (June 1964) in which the U.S. president warned the Turks that if any Turkish action in Cyprus provoked Soviet intervention, Washington might not come to Turkey's help, convinced the Turks that they should

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become more independent in foreign policy making, which they hoped, would enable them to enlist international support for the Turkish-Cypriot cause. Accordingly, Turkish policy makers decided to set Turkish foreign policy on a multi-faceted course, an important aspect of which was rapprochement with the Third World and especially Middle Eastern countries, which Turkish policy makers regarded as potential natural allies. Turkey's participation to preparatory meetings for and the Conference of Afro-Asian states held in Djakarta in 1964 and in Algeria in March 1965 respectively was a part of this effort. As mentioned before, to compensate for its absence in the non-aligned conference, Turkey sent two Ambassadors to inform the participants of the Turkish Cypriot cause.[33] Turkey also sent representatives and good-will missions to Third World states with the same purpose. In return, Turkey expected to enlist Middle Eastern support, which it did. Turkish policy makers' belief about goal attainment, in this case, was quite testable, not only because there was a short-term expectation to be fulfilled, on the part of the Turkish policy makers, i.e., Middle Eastern support in the U.N. voting, but also because what was expected was something concrete that the Middle Eastern states would either vote in favor or not. In this sense, Turkish policy makers' beliefs were quite testable. However, given the testability of this belief about the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle

East, there still does not seem to be agreement as to whether the policy succeeded or failed to achieve what it intended to.

> Resolution 2077, adopted at the end of the United Nations debate on Cyprus on December 1965, tested the success of this new Turkish foreign policy. Although the resolution threw the Turkish right of intervention granted by the Zurich-London agreements in 1960 into limbo, the fact that three Arab states supported it was interpreted by the Turkish leaders as a sign that mutual support between Turkey and the Arab world was "becoming a reality." However justified this optimism, it showed that Turkish leaders were encouraged by the vote.[34]

In fact, there are two different arguments regarding the success of this policy. According to Turkish policy makers, this vote in which six states voted with Turkey, proved the success of Turkish foreign policy that Turkey was no longer alone in the international arena. Those who argued to the contrary claimed that only six countries supported Turkey and this was not much of an achievement. Although there does not seem to be an agreement regarding what the "real" achievement of the policy was, the fact that the Turkish policy makers regarded it to be a success and that they carried through this policy can be taken as an indication of the untestability of their belief. In other words, although this belief about short-term goal attainment and what was expected seemed to be rather concrete, the extent to which it could be falsified in principle turned out to be rather low. It is in this sense that Turkish policy makers' this first belief about Turkish

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foreign policy towards the Middle East emerged to be untestable thus contributing to its stability.

The second belief of Turkish policy makers, that the policy of neutrality adopted towards the Middle East crises will lead to rapprochement with regional states, was about "long-term" goal attainment as indicated by its drafter Hamit Batu.[35] According to Batu, this new policy was not to be pursued only on a temporary basis to gain support for certain political causes but on a permanent basis to gain the "friendship" and "intimate concern" of those countries.[36] He added that the issue was not simply "whether or not certain Arab countries would feel sympathy to Turkey or love Turkey."[37] The issue for Turkey in the Middle East, argued Batu, should be "to represent [its]...spiritual and physical presence" in the region and "obtain the respect" of regional states.[38]

Keeping in mind the factors that Goldmann proposes to be sought in analyzing any policy's testability (i.e., the extent to which is can be falsified in principle, and the extent to which relevant evidence is available in practice), an analysis of the testability of this second belief shows that it proved to be untestable thus invulnerable. In trying to determine the extent to which this belief could be falsified in principle, it turned out that the belief that Turkish neutrality in Middle East crises will bring about rapprochement with regional states was too vague to be falsified since many

things ranging from cordial diplomatic relations to strong friendship ties can be understood as rapprochement. Besides, in terms of expectations, Turkish policy makers did not include anything definite or observable. What was expected in Batu's words, was to "represent" Turkey's "spiritual and physical presence" in the region and "obtain the respect" of the countries of the region.[39] It is in this sense that Turkish policy makers' this second belief about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was untestable.

The third belief of Turkish policy makers that -unless the conditions put forward earlier regarding Turkish involvement in a Middle Eastern crisis were fulfilled- Turkey may remain neutral in a Middle Eastern crisis without incurring any costs, while at the same time emphasizing the independent and neutral aspect of policy making in Turkey, is rather untestable both because it is about long-term goal attainment, thus harder to test, but also because the kind of event against which it can be checked would rarely occur.

As argued before, the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East implicitly included conditions to be fulfilled before Turkey could get involved in a Middle Eastern crisis. Turkish policy makers believed that unless these conditions were fulfilled, the fulfillment of which either meant that there was a grave danger against Turkey's security in the face of which Turkey cannot do anything but to react, or that

Turkish involvement would not do any harm to Turkey's policy goals regarding the Middle East. However, the fact that those conditions were rather too complex to be fulfilled in any crisis situation since they necessitated cooperation among the West and also Middle Eastern states' approval of Turkish action, it can safely be argued that this belief was untestable. Although the belief about policy was testable in principle, since Turkish policy makers believed that Turkey's neutrality in a Middle Eastern crisis would serve its interests only when these conditions were fulfilled which meant it could be tested in any situation which met the criteria, the fact that the situation that was being defined by the Turkish policy makers was rare to occur, the policy turned out to be untestable, thus invulnerable.

In sum, Turkish policy makers' all three beliefs about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East turned out to be untestable. In this sense they may be regarded to have contributed in policy stabilization. In general, their beliefs were usually invulnerable not only because anything seemed to be compatible with their expectations but also because the conditions that they laid down were too complex that could have rarely occurred. Surprisingly all conditions were fulfilled in the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East once again proved its stability by remaining more or less within the boundaries of the new, i.e., traditional, Turkish foreign policy.

Chapter VI: Political Stabilizers

The political stabilizers, the third group of stabilizers in Goldmann's theoretical sketch, operate at the domestic political level. The existence of political stabilizers point to the possibility that foreign policy may be protected against pressures for change by becoming embedded in domestic politics thus increasing the costs of change.[1] According to Goldmann, two extreme cases may emerge due to the presence or absence of political stabilizers. At one extreme, a foreign policy may develop into a national dogma in case of which heresy would be a heavy burden in the competition for leadership and power and would therefore be unlikely to occur. In the face of a policy against which dissent is not approved, the voices that vie for change would not be heard. At the other extreme, a policy may have just been adopted over major opposition thus vulnerable to pressures for change. In this case, every sign of negative feedback may be exploited by the opposition as a weapon in the power struggle.[2] What happens usually is something in between the two extremes that any policy by definition is stabilized to some extent. What differs is the degree of this stability which changes depending on the degree of the effectiveness of political

stabilizers in addition to others like international, cognitive, and administrative stabilizers.

According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, the functioning of political stabilizers may inhibit change and stabilize a foreign policy through causing it to become embedded in the country's domestic politics. In other words, it may become too costly for the political actor to opt for foreign policy change if the policy is embedded in domestic politics. There are three dimensions to this embedment:

1.The degree of institutionalization, or roughly the extent to which the government has become committed to pursue the policy.

2.The degree of support, or roughly the extent to which the various actors in domestic politics support, are indifferent to, or oppose the policy.

3.The degree of salience or roughly the significance of the issue in the domestic political struggle.[3]

According to Goldmann, "[i]f a foreign policy has become an institution, if there is national consensus over it, and if the issue is highly significant in domestic politics, than the pressure for change needs to be substantial in order to bring about a deviation from previous policy."[4] However, the relationship between these three political stabilizers is usually not this simple but rather too complex. The three rarely exist at the same time. Besides, they do not always reinforce each other although they seem to be doing so. To give an example, it is possible for an institutionalized

policy to be controversial or for consensus to exist over a policy that has not yet become institutionalized. It is in this sense that each one of the three political stabilizers have to be studied separately in order to assess the overall impact they may make on foreign policy stabilization.

6.1. Institutionalization

The mere existence of a policy on an issue may act as a stabilizer on a foreign policy through generating expectations on the part of the public opinion and external environment alike that the government will not act ad hoc but pursue this line of action unless there are good reasons to do otherwise.

> The more institutionalized the policy is, the better the reasons for deviation have to be. In other words, the more widespread and the stronger the expectation that a policy will continue to be pursued, the more institutionalized this policy.[5]

According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, at one extreme there is the minimum degree of institutionalization which is necessary for a line of action to be defined as policy. At the other extreme, there is the unshakable institution to which the government would be' expected to adhere, come what may. The task of the analyst is to determine where exactly does its foreign policy stand in between these two extremes.[6]

Institutionalization is expected to affect policy stability in two ways; one direct and the other indirect:

> The direct effect is to increase the political cost of deviating from previous policy.

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Obviously, the larger the cost, the more pressure
needed to bring about a deviation, other things
being equal. The indirect effect is to reduce
the likelihood that alternative policies are
considered in advance, that is, the likelihood of
contingency planning. The higher the political
cost, the more likely the presumption that
contingency planning is a waste of time.[7]

It is argued the indirect effect was more dominant in

stabilizing the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East

that the degree of institutionalization of the policy simply

overrode the need and search for other alternatives. The

direct effect has also functioned in stabilizing the Turkish

foreign policy towards the Middle East that the "new Turkish

foreign policy" of the 1960s became the "traditional Turkish

foreign policy" of the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, the

Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was made a

tradition thus an institution when it was, practically

speaking, still too early for it to become one. By the end of

the 1960s, there were references to this traditional Turkish

foreign policy in government programs and newspaper columns

alike. Even parallels were drawn with Atatürk's foreign

policy to strengthen the argument for the traditional nature

of the policy. As argued before, Atatürk's foreign policy

towards the Middle East was one of non-involvement as dictated

by the political circumstances. Drawing parallels with his

policy helped the Turkish policy makers institutionalize the

new policy. It was through this way that a 5-6 year old

policy became the traditional Turkish foreign policy.

In this sense, it is necessary to remember how policies may become institutionalized in order to see how the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East became an institution and was thus stabilized. According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, a policy may be institutionalized in mainly three ways: By policy declarations, by custom, and by investment.[8] An analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that the policy has become institutionalized first by policy declarations and in time by custom.

Policy institutionalization through declaration usually emerges in the initial stages of the life of a policy when it is too early to establish a custom or to make investments. Policy declarations are simply commitments by the policy makers as to what actions they would take in the future. Policy institutionalization reduces imperatives for change when commitment to a policy reduces the alternatives for future governments through generating expectations at home and abroad alike that may not be failed without incurring domestic political costs. The degree of institutionalization of a policy may change depending on three variables: The authority of the official making the declaration, the frequency of such declarations, and the context in which the declaration is made.

An analysis of policy declarations about the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that the policy,

even by mid-1960s when it was newly introduced, met the criteria mentioned before for the institutionalization of a policy through policy declarations. To give an example, government programs of the Suat Hayri Ürgüplü government (February 1965-October 1965) and the following Süleyman Demirel government (November 1965-November 1969) pointed to the change in the Turkish foreign policy. Both governments in their respective programs underlined their determination to stand against the "zümreci" (factional) understanding of international relations when describing their policy towards the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[9] In other words, they reiterated their determination not to be drawn into regional conflicts based on the East-West struggle, which meant, within the Middle Eastern context, that Turkey would remain neutral towards Middle Eastern affairs. The government program of the Demirel government was more explicit on this matter when it stated the government's belief that being a member to a regional organization, i.e. NATO, was not an obstacle to flourishing relations with non-aligned countries, i.e. the Middle Eastern states.[10]

The inclusion of these phrases in the government programs of the two governments that were in office when the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was being introduced during mid-1960s is important regarding the purposes of this study, for they signify the degree of

commitment of the two governments to the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The authority factor which affects the degree of commitment of the government to a policy was found effective that the authority making the declaration was the highest one : The prime minister. Besides, the third factor, the context in which the declaration was made was also significant that it was included in the government program. Regarding the second factor, the frequency of such declarations, the analysis shows that declarations as to this effect were made frequently. From mid-1960s on whenever there was a crisis situation in the Middle East the Turkish government in office maintained its determination to remain neutral and not to cooperate with the West against the interests of the regional states. In this sense, the policy declarations of the Turkish governments maintained enough commitment to the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East -to the degree that the policy could be regarded to have become institutionalized through this factor.

From mid-1960s on, policy stabilization through the establishment of a custom or practice in policy making became a factor of its own that institutionalized the policy further. What is meant by the establishment of a custom in policy making here is the creation of behavior patterns that tend to create expectations of consistency and continuity on the part of the domestic and foreign public opinion alike. Policy

makers usually tend not to contradict a well-established custom for the simple reason that it would be too costly. Institutionalization by custom, in this sense, makes policies self-reinforcing, for "the mere fact that a policy is being pursued increases the likelihood that it will continue to be pursued."[11]

The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, from mid-1960s on became institutionalized through the establishment of a custom not only due to the continuous pursuance of the policy, but also due to continuous references by successive Turkish governments as to their determination to continue to pursue this policy. As indicated before, various government leaders indicated the government's commitment to the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in crisis and non-crisis situations alike.

However, as indicated before, the continuity in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was an important factor in itself that helped institutionalize the policy. In this sense there was not only verbal commitment by the Turkish policy makers as seen in their policy declarations but there was also an established custom as their behavior pattern also proved. According to Goldmann, a shift in the government usually puts the stabilizers of a foreign policy to the test. The continuous pursuance of the new policy towards the Middle East by successive Turkish governments that were formed by

different parties of the ideological spectrum, can thus be regarded as an indication of the degree of institutionalization of the policy. Then, policy stabilization through institutionalization of the foreign policy was a factor in the Turkish case, as seen in the former analysis, that helped stabilize the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

In sum, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was stabilized through institutionalization first by policy declarations, then through the establishment of a custom that made a "traditional policy" out of the "new policy" in a rather limited time.

6.2 Support

The degree of support for a foreign policy or the extent to which the various actors in domestic politics support, are indifferent to, or oppose the policy has direct effect on its stability. In other words, if the policy is supported by various domestic political actors the pressure for change on the policy has to be substantial in order to bring about a deviation. According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch,

> the amount of support for a foreign policy is a
> function of the amount of positive support and
> opposition from each of the political forces in
> society, the contribution of each being weighted
> in terms of both political importance and
> substantive distance.[12]

Since no quantitative index can be developed based on this definition, the analyst has to rely on his/her impressions of the policies advocated by the chief political actors and also the public opinion.

According to Goldmann, the extent of positive support and opposition may affect the stability of a foreign policy in more than one way. The one most relevant for the Turkish foreign policy is this: "The more positive support for a policy, the greater the political cost of not pursuing it and, consequently, the more stable the policy." On the other hand, "[i]f opposition to a policy exists, there likely exists at least one preplanned alternative, and this, other things being equal, helps to reduce policy stability." Thirdly, the existence of opposition to a policy implies that there are some who have an interest in taking note of, and spreading information about changes in the conditions for the policy as well as negative feedback. In other words, "[t]he stability inherent in very selective perception of the environment is less likely to obtain if there is no opposition than if everybody supports the policy or is indifferent."[13]

In order to assess the degree to which support may act as a stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, one has to determine the extent of positive support or opposition to the policy. After doing this, the next step should be to understand how it affects the stability of

foreign policy. However, it is not an easy task to determine the amount of opposition to a policy and the extent to which it may affect policy stability. Both positive support and opposition to government's policies may come from various segments of the society. Although different in terms of political importance and substantive distance, each political force in the society has something to say for or against the policies of the government. Since it is not possible within the limits of this analysis to study the views of all political forces in the society, the best research strategy seems to be to study the views of the political parties. It is assumed that in a parliamentary democracy like Turkey, the differences and similarities between the policies of political parties will reflect prevailing trends in the country at large. This approach seems to be more relevant also if one sticks to the view that the role of Turkish public opinion on foreign policy making is visible only when drawing the boundaries within which the policy must be shaped. It is further suggested that public opinion does not have any positive or negative effect on policy making in Turkey; nor has it the capacity to pave the way for radical changes.[14] Then, a study on the prevailing trends in foreign policy views of Turkish political parties will give an idea as to the degree of support for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and to what extent this mat stabilize the policy.

Turkey's policy towards the Middle East was established in mid-9160s at a time when Turkish foreign policy in general was under attack by various segments of the society. It was by early 1960s that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature. Thanks to the liberal constitution of 1961, dissent became tolerable. However, this should not be taken to mean that criticisms on foreign policy matters were not tolerated until the 1960s. It was rather that there was a general consensus among the government and opposition alike that foreign policy was a matter above party politics if not a "taboo."[15] This not only stemmed from the nature of the single party rule lasted until 1946, which did not tolerate deviations that would alter party discipline but also from the general belief among Turkish policy makers and members of opposition alike that the policy that was being pursued was the "right" one. According to Deringil, This was also due to the historical conditioning of Turkish policy makers.

> In the early Republican era, the Ottoman political conditioning of the governing elite led them to suppose that the natural form of rule was by diktat. Their socialization as military men or bureaucrats had not provided them with any instinct for democracy.[16]

Following the Second World War, with the introduction of multi-party regime, this political atmosphere which equated criticism with dissent and even treason came to an end. However, foreign policy continued to remain a matter above party politics after 1946 and "resisted the general process

which was leading towards democratization of political decision-making, and the change in the character of the state elite that went with it."[17] Although the development of the multi-party system in the post-1946 era led to "the first crack in the unity of the Turkish elite,"[18] the crack was not wide or deep enough to cause foreign policy to lose its bipartisan nature. Besides, both the RPP and DP agreed that foreign policy remain above party politics. Even after the May 27, 1960 coup, which left nothing untouched in the domestic political arena, foreign policy remained an exception. It was not only the politicians but also the elite that argued against a change in foreign policy or simply did not discuss about Turkish foreign policy. Thus, although both the domestic political environment and the external environment were favorable for a discussion to be started about Turkish foreign policy, neither the politicians, nor the elite seem to have taken this chance.[19] It was only by mid-1960s that Turkish foreign policy lost its bipartisan nature and became a matter of party-politics.

Within this environment, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East became the focus of criticisms. Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which was blamed for Turkey's alienation in the United Nations voting on Cyprus came under immense criticisms from the rightist and leftist circles alike. Surprisingly, however, what came out

of these discussions, the new Turkish foreign policy towards

the Middle East, again became a matter above party-politics

once it was adopted. According to Kürkçüoğlu,

> [During the 1960s] a pro-Arab policy in the Middle
> East was probably the only foreign political
> issue on which all political forces in Turkey,
> from the extreme right to the extreme left, all
> agreed albeit due to different, and sometimes
> even conflicting reasons.[20]

Thus, even during times when it came under immense

criticism there was some kind of agreement on Turkish foreign

policy towards the Middle East that even when it changed, a

consensus emerged afterwards that still remains unaltered.

Since the 1960s, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle

East can be claimed to have been stabilized. Goldmann argues

that "[t]he more positive support for a policy, the greater the

political cost of not pursuing it."[21] On the other hand, if

there is opposition to a policy this means there likely exists

at least one preplanned alternative or, if not, there are

people who have an interest in taking note of and spreading

information about the changes in the environment and negative

feedback thus causing the policy to become less and less

stable.[22]

As argued before, the first reasoning fits the Turkish

case that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East may

be argued to have become stabilized since the amount of

support for the policy increased, in time, the political cost

of not pursuing it. This is especially true for the mid-1960s when the policy was first introduced, and early 1970s when political support was even greater. However, by mid-1970s criticisms to Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East as well as Turkish foreign policy in general increased from far right and left alike. Goldmann argues that "if opposition exists from both the left and the right to a center policy, the two may cancel each other out."[23] It is in this sense that the criticism of the extreme left and right which took harsh stance against the Turkish foreign policy during the 1960s may be understood to have canceled each other out. What is interesting to note is that both the left and the right voiced nearly the same criticisms against the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Both seemed to want Turkey to be more pro-Arab in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and to refrain from cooperating with the West in Middle Eastern crises. Maybe it is because both the extreme right and the left agreed upon these criticisms that they were not strong enough to destabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Besides, the opposition never proposed alternative policies to be pursued other than Turkey's leaving NATO, disassociating itself from the West and Israel and becoming the "natural" leader of the Middle East. Furthermore, since "a modest amount of opposition" is considered to be "more stabilizing than perfect consensus," Turkish foreign policy towards the

Middle East can be considered to have become stabilized through this process.

With regard to the parties closer to the center of the political spectrum, their opposition to the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East never became so great to pose an alternative to the existing policy. On the contrary opposition parties usually argued for more strict adherence to already agreed upon principles of Turkish foreign policy that led one foreign observer to argues that:

> [O]n most foreign policy issues there is normally a broad consensus of opinion across most of the Turkish political spectrum. Naturally, there are differences of emphasis....In general, however, policy has been oriented towards the protection of accepted national interests and has thus helped to maintain the consensus. In other words, when talking of Turkish foreign policy one can, in most cases, talk of "Turkey" or "the Turks" without having to say which section of public opinion one is referring to.[24]

Although some argue to the contrary, this nature of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East did not change with the end of the Cold War or after the end of the Gulf Crisis (1990-91). It is true that stronger opposition to government's foreign policy was voiced both during and after the crisis. It is also true that this was the first time foreign policy became an issue for public discussion. Although this may be regarded as "a contribution the Gulf Crisis made to the Turkish democracy,"[25] the extent of this contribution should not be exaggerated since what was being

discussed was not about the policy itself, as would be expected, but rather about the way through which this policy was pursued. It became such that after all the aura that was caused after the Gulf War, the substance of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was left untouched. Two reasons may be discerned for this lack of real discussion about the substance of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The first one results from the nature of public opinion in Turkey. Although people have their own views about government's policies, the fact that they lack even basic knowledge about foreign affairs prevents public opinion from becoming a force of its own.[26] Secondly, the politicians also lack the necessary background to keep up with the unfolding events in the international arena and to put forward alternative policies the presence of which could have destabilized the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This is true for both the past, and unfortunately, the present. During the Gulf Crisis, the criticisms of the opposition largely concentrated on the personality of the President and the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the way he conducted foreign policy. Lack of enough knowledge about the ongoing of events should not be an obstacle for the members of the opposition when trying to decide about their own positions, argues Soysal in his book titled Parliament and Foreign Policy.[27] According to him, opposition parties usually

use this as an escape for their inability to produce alternatives for government policies. What Soysal pinpoints to in criticizing the RPP opposition to DP governments's policies is a deficiency of Turkish political parties that they have not been able to overcome even today.[28]

Apart from the extreme right Welfare Party (WP), no other party seems to have alternatives to the existing Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The fact that the WP's plan foresees Turkey to become a leading power in establishing "the Union of World Muslims" towards creating a "just order" in the world, is indicative of the inability of the Turkish opposition to produce alternative policies.[29]

Thus, although there does not seem to be an enthusiastic support voiced for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the fact that there does not exist a strong opposition with preplanned alternatives or with the capacity to monitor the environment leads one to the conclusion that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been and still likely to be stabilized with the help of the functioning of support as a stabilizer of foreign policy.

6.3 Salience

The salience of an issue can be shortly defined as its significance in the domestic power struggle. The salience of

a policy signifies "the extent to which the patterns of domestic coalitions and cleavages would be affected by an actor's changing his position on it."[30] Accordingly, if a policy is considered to be salient in the domestic political arena, this means that more will be at stake if the actor tries to make any changes on it.

According to Goldmann's theoretical sketch, political salience as a stabilizer of foreign policy has an indirect effect on the stability of the policy. It is assumed to act as a stabilizer of foreign policy through reinforcing the stabilizing impact of institutionalization and support.

> On this assumption, even a highly institutionalized and consensual policy vulnerable to disturbances if the actors in domestic politics deem the issue to be politically trivial. If they consider the issue to be politically salient, it matters more the extent to which a policy has become institutionalized as well as whether it is consensual or controversial.[31]

It is in this sense crucial to assess the salience of a policy in the domestic political arena to see whether it is salient enough for significantly reinforcing the impact of institutionalization and support. Since salience is not a concept easy to operationalize, Goldmann proposes two methods for its measurement. One method is to measure the attention the policy receives in the political arena. The other method is to examine the changes in conditions and cleavages that have occurred or of debates about their eventuality.[32] Still,

if a policy is found to be politically salient, it does not necessarily mean that the policy will likely be stabilized. It only means that, if the actors consider the issue to be politically salient, it matters more the extent to which a policy has become institutionalized as well as whether it is consensual or controversial. Accordingly, even a highly institutionalized and consensual policy may be vulnerable to disturbances if the actors in domestic politics deem the issue to be politically trivial.[33]

An analysis of the salience of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that the issue, i.e., Turkey's relations with the Middle East is considered by the actors in Turkish political arena to be politically salient. Although there is usually little political controversy about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the fact that there is usually little political controversy about Turkish foreign policy in general is indicative of Turkish political actors' tendency to view foreign policy matters to be above party-politics as well as their lack of enough background about foreign policy matters, which reinforces the first tendency. It is this nature of Turkish political parties, mentioned before, which leads one analyst to argue that

> the question of which one of the...[political parties] will rule singly or in coalition through the next decade is likely to be an *insignificant* [emphasis mine] factor with respect to the basic

values, objectives, calculations and instruments
of Turkish foreign policy.[34]

This is not because foreign policy is not an issue of little political salience in Turkish domestic politics, but because there is usually little controversy about foreign policy matters in general. The same can be argued for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that there is little or nor controversy, as argued before, about it.

Although salience in the sense of amount of controversy is not what one looks for when analyzing the degree of salience of a foreign policy, the fact that the other two methods proposed by Goldmann do not seem to produce any results, leads one to the conclusion that one can also resort to measure the amount of controversy during the course of his/her analysis, as can be seen here.

The two methods proposed by Goldmann, as mentioned before, were the measurement of the attention the policy receives, and an examination of the changes in coalitions and cleavages that have occurred or of debates about their eventuality.[35] Given the fact that foreign policy matters have not, as a tradition, been made a matter of debate in the Turkish political arena and that even when they are debated it is usually about the style through which the policy is conducted rather than its substance, it would be futile an effort to search for clues as to the salience of foreign policy issues, and about relations with the Middle East in

particular, when forming coalitions and cleavages or holding debates.

Regarding the amount of attention Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East receives, an examination of government programs shows that the issue is not paid much attention in comparison to other more controversial issue like relations with the United States. References to the policy towards the Middle East, which cover three paragraphs at the most, usually evolve around the same phrases -no matter what political party comes to power- like 'Turkey's commitment to a just and stable peace in the Middle East,' or like 'Turkey's wish that the Arab-Israeli dispute would be given an end.'[36]

However, although both methods Goldmann proposes to be used when analyzing the degree of salience of a foreign policy point to "insignificance" of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in domestic power struggle, this should not be taken to mean that it is not salient. One is tempted here to repeat one peculiarity of Turkish foreign policy which is that it is considered to be a matter above party politics. This is not only because, as argued before, that foreign policy is considered to be a taboo -usually due to security reasons which stems from the tendency of the Turkish policy makers to equate foreign policy with the national security policy-, but also because the political actors do not have the necessary background to follow the ongoing international events, let

alone proposing alternatives to the existing policy. This peculiarity, or rather deficiency of Turkish political actors give rise to a situation that seems to be unforeseen by Goldmann, in case of which the policy is politically salient but this is not reflected in policy statements or government programs.

The salience of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was seen during the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) when the Motherland Party government and President Özal's policies were criticized with the claim that they constituted a deviation from traditional policies.[37] This controversy was caused not only because of the significance of the issue, for Turkey's security for even participation in the war was considered to be one of the alternatives, but also because of the belief among the opposition parties in the "correctness" of the traditional policy that they did not tolerate a deviation even in style. Besides, since the traditional Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was equated with Atatürk's foreign policy, any deviation was presented as a deviation from the Kemalist legacy, which is, in itself enough to make an issue politically salient in the Turkish context.

Thus, although unable to be detected through Goldmann's methods, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East emerges to be politically salient in the Turkish political arena, though not in the power struggle, except for crisis situations which do not seem to alter the rule. It can be

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argued, building upon these findings, that the salience of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East increases the stabilizing effects of institutionalization and support with the help of the peculiar nature of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish political actors.

Chapter VII: Administrative Stabilizers

Goldmann's suggestion that administrative phenomena may function as stabilizers of foreign policy rests on the assumption that the administrative tasks of intelligence, planning, decision-making and implementation may be carried out in such a way that inhibits change.[1] In the absence of administrative stabilizers, i.e. bureaucratic inertia, the following may take place:

1. Changes in policy conditions and negative feedback are discovered immediately.

2. Alternatives have already been prepared, or are promptly invented.

3. A decision to change policy can easily be made.

4. This decision is fully implemented without delay.[2]

Leaving implementation aside, which is not included within the bounds of Goldmann's theoretical framework (for the simple reason that it is assumed to be less problematic in the foreign policy process in the implementation of decisions, for once the decision to change has been made, it is unlikely to be seriously distorted by foreign ministry officials), only intelligence, planning and decision-making processes will be

taken into consideration when looking for stabilizers of foreign policy.

Goldmann, in his theoretical framework discerns four administrative stabilizers of foreign policy. Two of them, fragmentation and decision structure, are structural in the sense that they concern the structure of the administrative apparatus. The other two, critical variables and response repertory are substantive in the case that they concern the substance of what the apparatus is doing.

The administrative stabilization of a foreign policy is assumed to take considerable time and to be contingent on its previous international, cognitive and political stabilization. Until now, it has been argued that most of the stabilizers included in Goldmann's theoretical sketch seemed to be functioning on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The fact that the policy has not been changed, i.e., stabilized, since the mid-1960s hint that the administrative stabilizers have also been effective throughout this process. The administrative stabilizers are assumed to be less effective during the initial stages of a policy since policy makers usually have incentives to maintain their sensitivity to the environment as well as the availability of other alternatives.[3] In the later stages of a policy, where the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is now, administrative stabilizers emerge and usually take hold of the

ongoing of events. To what degree they may inhibit change in foreign policy depends on their strength to detect which they have to be studied separately.

It is in this sense that the distinction made between the structural and substantive administrative stabilization of a foreign policy becomes meaningful. According to Goldmann, whose study includes an analysis the stability of détente, since parties (the Soviet Union, United States, and West Germany) had interest in avoiding the administrative stabilization of détente, the number of variables in the critical range was high and the tolerable ranges tended to be small. In other words, the respective governments of the Soviet Union, United States, and West Germany were very receptive to developments in their external environment that a large number of variables remained critical. "[O]ur antennas are big and constantly operating," said one German observer when described Germany's détente policy. The same was true for the U.S. and Soviet policy makers. It is in this sense that substantive stabilization of détente seemed a low probability.

This condition, which Goldmann terms as "the existence of a stabilization bias to the detriment of détente", can be claimed to have been absent in the Turkish case. The Turkish bureaucratic elite, on the contrary, were in favor of the stabilization of new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle

East, just like the Turkish politicians were. However, since the task here is not to identify the intentions of Turkish foreign policy bureaucrats, leaving the ontological impossibility of such a task aside, one should retain with pointing out that substantive stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were active from the very beginning. For the definition of the policy and its laying down of strict principles, however undeclared, indicated Turkish policy makers' willingness to utilize substantive stabilizers in stabilizing the policy. The rest was left to the making of bureaucratic inertia and time.

7.1 Fragmentation:

Fragmentation falls into the category of administrative stabilizers which means that administrative growth may stabilize a policy through hindering the discovery of new patterns. Although growth may increase the capability for data collection thus contribute to policy process, "the correlation between the amount of available 'data and the visibility of important features may be negative."[4] Besides, organizational compartmentalization, which follows, may inhibit communication and coordination, and may render planning cumbersome. Furthermore, standard operating procedures, which may be created to cope with administrative growth can inhibit the discovery of the unexpected as well as

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innovation and improvisation.[5] The only remedy for policy
stabilization through fragmentation seems to be the
establishment of an effective coordination mechanism to
connect separate parts of the organization. According to
Goldmann, this is very important to overcome the loss of
perspective inherent in compartmentalization and also to be
able to benefit from the investment made in increased
capacity.[6]

The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is neither very
large nor fragmented. It has 740 officials working in 13
different departments specializing on different regions and
issue areas.[7] The department responsible for bilateral
relations with the Middle East and Africa is one of these 13
departments. Until the 1980s there was no separate department
working on relations with the Middle Eastern states that all
fell under the responsibility of the department of bilateral
relations. Thus the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot be
considered to be too large or fragmented. However, although
this is the case, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not
large or fragmented enough to impede any change, fragmentation
still functions as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy
towards the Middle East albeit in a different way.

The problem of fragmentation in Turkish foreign policy
towards the Middle East emerges as a result of the
multiplicity of governmental institutions involved in the

foreign policy process, and the problem of lack of coordination that ensues. In Turkey, foreign policy bureaucracy comprises the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministries of Defense and Finance (regarding issues that deal with their respective subjects), the Councillory of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT), the National Security Council (MGK), the Councillory of Treasury and Foreign Trade, and also the Military. These governmental institutions are all involved in different stages of foreign policy planning and decision making concerning matter which fall under their jurisdiction. Although it seems quite natural that these institutions participate in the foreign policy process, the fact that their participation is usually uncoordinated complicates Turkish foreign policy structure and results in a problem of lack of coordination.

The origins of this problem of lack of coordination in the making of Turkish foreign policy go back to the 1960s. The experience of the 1950s, especially the unchecked nature of Turkish-U.S. relations had led the coup makers of May 27, 1960 to blame the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this state of relations and to curtail the powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which until then was able to remain quite independent of other governmental institutions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which until 1960 had the authority to coordinate policies in political, economic and military issues

alike, was left nearly powerless by the 1960 coup. The Ministries of Defense and Finance and the Military took over the powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding their areas of interest, and began to participate in the foreign policy process in a rather active manner.[8] After the establishment of the National Security Council with the 1961 constitution, foreign policy making in Turkey became utterly complicated which resulted in the problem of lack of coordination.[9] Although the National Security Council is supposed not to participate in foreign policy making but to make recommendations to the executive on national security matters, the fact that foreign policy is usually equated with national security policy, especially by the military circles, resulted in the military's gaining an upper hand in the Turkish foreign policy process.[10] The primary reason for this has been the nature of the Middle East as an unstable region and the fact that Turkey's three Middle Eastern neighbors constitute, in one way or another, threats to Turkey's security. Moreover, the lack of initiatives in Turkish foreign policy towards the region also reinforced the convergence of security policy and foreign policy.

A legacy of the 1960 coup, the problem of lack of coordination in foreign policy making was further reinforced by the 1971 and 1980 coups which tended to reinforce the role of the military. The powers of the National Security Council

were increased by a decree dated 1983. The Motherland Party governments, which tended to curtail the economic powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the creation of the Councillory of Treasury and Foreign Trade, also contributed to the weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It is as a result of this fragmentation in foreign policy process that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can also be claimed to have been administratively stabilized. In fact the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is a perfect example of how fragmentation impeded change in Turkish foreign policy. This is especially because regarding the Middle East, foreign policy and security policy easily converges in the minds of the military and civilian bureaucracy alike for the simple reason that three of the Middle Eastern countries as Turkey's neighbors constitute a threat to Turkish security. Thus, the military more easily and directly got involved in foreign policy making when the issue is Middle Eastern affairs. When ministries of Defense and Finance are added to this, fragmentation emerges to be a policy stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

As mentioned before, stabilization through administrative fragmentation can be remedied. In fact, to find the optimum balance between fragmentation and coordination has been a continuing concern for most states

facing this problem. However, in the Turkish case, no government institution seems to be capable of pulling the strings together, something which impedes change in foreign policy. To sum up, three factors can be claimed to have been contributed to administrative fragmentation function as a stabilizer on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The first one is the continuing fragmentation of Turkish bureaucracy regarding the policy towards the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Intelligence Organization, the National Security Council, ministries of Defense and Finance and the Military are all included to some extent in the foreign policy process. The second factor is the inability of the Turkish bureaucracy to remedy the problem of coordination. In fact, there is no clue as to this problem's being recognized as a problem by the Turkish policy makers. Although outside observers of Turkish foreign policy point to this problem of lack of coordination in foreign policy making,[11] no remedy seems to have been found. Nor is there any sign that it is being searched for by the Turkish policy makers. The third factor is the dominant role played by the Military in foreign policy process. The role of the military is especially strong in the decision-making stage which causes Turkish foreign policy to be dominated by national security concerns. The view of the military that security policy is too important to be left in the hands of politicians or their

"irresponsible wrangling with each other"[12] is also indicative of their inclination to dominate the foreign policy process.

The domination of the military also results in the weakening of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-à-vis the other government institutions, which contributes to the conservatism in the Ministry. Unable to conduct policies on its own, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to stick with the existing ones. Another result of this domination is the politicization of many foreign policy issues, especially economic ones, which would otherwise be considered technical.[13] As a result of the functioning of these three factors, administrative fragmentation emerges and remains to be an irredeemable problem of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East alike. It is throughout this process that fragmentation acts as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East to further stabilize an already stable policy.

8.2. Critical Variables:

In Goldmann's theoretical framework, critical variables are assumed to be important in assessing the stability of a foreign policy for they determine the degree of receptivity of the administration to developments in the external environment. The size of tolerable ranges, in a similar fashion, have an impact on the responsiveness of the

administration to external developments. In other words, the critical variables and tolerable ranges determine what and what not to take into account when monitoring the environment.

The rules as to the number of critical variables and the size of the tolerable ranges are called standard operating procedures. In Goldmann's theoretical sketch, it is taken for granted that administrations generate standard operating procedures through time. It is not only administrative growth that necessitates the establishment of standard operating procedures but also the pursuance of a policy in itself may automatically generate them regardless of whether the administration has grown or not. Thus, it is assumed that written or unwritten rules may emerge in the course of a foreign policy as to what are the critical variables, i.e., rules as to what to take into account when monitoring the environment. Accordingly, it is further assumed that rules will also be likely to emerge about tolerable ranges, i.e., rules as to the degree up to which changes in the values of the critical variables would justify reconsidering current policies.[14]

Goldmann puts forward three suggestions regarding foreign policy stabilization through the functioning of critical variables:

> First, the fewer the number of critical
> variables, the more stable the policy, other
> things being equal....

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> Second, the larger the tolerable ranges, the more
> stable the policy....
> The main utility of knowledge about critical
> variables and tolerable ranges, however, lies in
> their telling us about the kind of stress to
> which the policy is vulnerable. The more we know
> about critical variables, the more we know about
> the factors that may trigger a change in the
> policy as well as about the factors unlikely to
> do it. The more we know about tolerable ranges,
> the more precise these conclusions.[15]

Since it is not easy a task to learn about the critical

variables of a foreign policy, for the foreign policy

bureaucrats themselves usually do not know about or cannot

explain them, one has to retain with impressions in his/her

analysis of foreign policy declarations and actions.

As argued before, Turkish foreign policy towards the

Middle East, from the very beginning, was intended to be a

stable policy. This not only stemmed from the Turkish Foreign

Ministry officials' well-known "conservatism" and

"cautiousness",[16] which are personality traits that lead them

to minimize the number of critical variables. The general

understanding among the Turkish foreign policy bureaucrats

alike that foreign policy and security policy converged on

matters regarding the Middle East also reinforced the

stability that they tended to minimize the number of variables

by restricting them to only those variables about Turkey's

security. Although foreign policy is a concept that embraces

security policy, in the rather peculiar Turkish case, the two

are understood to be convergent largely due to the domination

of the military, the conservatism of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, and also the civilian governments' curbing down of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'. To put in other words, it is as a result of the domination of security concerns when laying down foreign policy that the number of the critical variables are low.

The domination of security concerns in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can easily be deduced from an analysis of the earlier mentioned principles of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. As argued before, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East operates largely on an action-response framework[17] in which initiatives towards changing the environment are kept at a minimum or they simply do not exist at all. Although "Turkey needs to develop a favorable milieu in which threats are minimized and economic interdependence maximized",[18] the series of principles, which Turkey adopted during the 1960s and strictly followed well until today, dwell on the security aspect of Turkey's relations with the region. The creation of economic interdependence emerged as a foreign policy principle of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East only during the mid-1980s as a result of Prime Minister Özal's initiatives.

A response-oriented policy should not be expected to have many critical variables to monitor the environment for. An analysis of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle

East shows that the numbers of critical variables are very few. Turkish policy makers usually concentrate on the security aspect of the developments when monitoring the environment. This is what Kâmuran İnan terms as the "defensive diplomacy" in his analysis titled Foreign Policy. According to İnan, Turkish foreign policy lacks initiatives but concentrates on defense- in both strategic and diplomatic meanings of the term.[19]

Those developments in the region that do not constitute a direct threat to Turkey's security are readily ignored by the bureaucracy, who, as argued before, tend to continue the existing policy. Thus, Turkish bureaucrats may be claimed to have a tendency to restrict the number of critical variables that may lead Turkey to get involved in a Middle Eastern crisis. It is in this sense that they, when monitoring the environment, concentrate on security threats rather than opportunities for the enhancement of bilateral relations or for strengthening Turkey's bid for the bridge function between the West and the Middle East. Thus, any development in the Middle Eastern environment is expected to constitute a threat for Turkish security for it to be considered by the Turkish bureaucracy. This is all the more true for the military which dominate the foreign policy process for the time being that it is them who tend to emphasize the security aspects of developments.

However, critical variables, although few in number, cannot be claimed to have a strong stabilizing effect on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, for the tolerable ranges do not seem to be as small as they have to be. Although Turkish bureaucrats' definition of a 'threat to Turkey's security' is not large or complicated enough to include threats other than military threat, the same cannot be argued for the size of tolerable ranges. According to Goldmann, the larger the tolerable ranges, the more stable the policy. In other words, the tolerable range, for the small number of critical variables that are considered when monitoring the environment, are not very large. The tolerable ranges tend to be even smaller when it is a matter of increase rather than a decrease in threat to Turkey's security. This, in a way, stems from the low number of critical variables that those very few which are included in the bureaucrats' list are only about Turkey's direct security interests. That's why Turkish bureaucrats do not tolerate any increase in the threat posed to Turkey's security. If it was not a matter of security but a less salient issue like the Peace Process in the Middle East, Turkish bureaucrats may be expected to be, and are, more tolerant to the ups and downs of the negotiations. It was the same when the Camp David Peace Accord between Egypt and Israel was being worked out during the late 1970s that Turkey did not show more than minimum

interest in the negotiations. In sum, although the tolerable ranges tend to be small, for Turkey does not tolerate even the smallest threat to its security, which is the single most important issue around which the critical variables concentrate, the fact that there are very few number of critical variables to concentrate on when monitoring the environment contributes to the stabilization of the foreign policy towards the Middle East.

8.3 Response Repertory

Planned alternatives to the existing policy may be available in the form of opposition policy as well as bureaucratic programs. The former has already been considered when discussing the stabilizer called support, and it has been concluded that in the Turkish political context the opposition parties do not present planned alternatives to the policy in force, i.e., the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. What Goldmann proposes to be considered as another stabilizer of foreign policy, called the response repertory, is of the second type of planned alternatives. In this sense, response repertory is those contingency plans prepared by the foreign policy bureaucracy. Goldmann argues that "[h]ypothetically, a shift to a new policy is facilitated [emphasis mine] by the preexistence of this option in the repertory of responses." Thus, the presence of contingency

plans may have a destabilizing effect on foreign policy especially in crisis situations. However, the opposite situation, the complete absence of contingency plans is also not that stabilizing, for "[i]f no contingency plans exist, a policy may break down completely under stress rather than be modified." [20] It is in this sense, argues Goldmann, that the stability of a foreign policy may benefit from the existence of planned moderate alternatives.

However, it is more than hard a task to know about the presence and the contents of contingency plans. Although knowledge of the response repertory could have been useful, if at all possible, in forecasting the likelihood of change that may occur in the foreign policy of the state concerned, since it is unlikely to be accessible, the analyst has to retain with his/her knowledge about the impact of other stabilizers.

Although it is true that some hints as to the content of some contingency plans may be achieved, but they may also be gravely misleading, for "[o]ccasional insights will not suffice, since the absence of plans is as significant as their presence [emphasis mine]." It is in this sense that Goldmann proposes response repertory not to be included in an analysis of foreign policy stability. According to him, it is, in itself, very useful to know "what one would need to know but cannot know." [21] This is why response repertory as a stabilizer

of foreign policy retains its place in the theoretical framework.

In line with Goldmann's argument, response repertory as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will not be analyzed within the bounds of this analysis. However, although one may never be sure of their presence or absence, it will be kept in mind that "the existence of planned moderate alternatives" may have stabilizing effect on the policy.

8.4 Decision structure

In the literature on foreign policy decision making, the rational actor model is usually contrasted with the bureaucratic politics model. According to the rational actor model, the leader selects the best alternative proposed by the "leader-autonomous groups" who engage in an uninhibited search for alternatives. This proposition implies that this kind of decision making facilitates change, for the best alternative may not always be the continuation of the existing policy. If, on the other hand, decision making involves bargaining among various parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy, as implied by the bureaucratic politics model, it will be more difficult to vie for change; the policy will more likely be stable.[22]

Therefore, knowledge of the way in which foreign policy decisions are made, about whether to deviate from the policy, will help the analyst to understand better what would happen to the policy if there is a pressure for change.

> If such a decision is likely to be made in a leader-autonomous group formation, this helps to make the policy unstable; if it will probably be made by means of bargaining among delegates, this helps to make it stable. Thus, to associate a decision structure with a policy means to predict the process by which decisions about the policy will be made.[23]

It is common, in the literature on Turkish foreign policy, to associate the bureaucratic politics model with the Turkish foreign policy. Furthermore, the lack of change in Turkish foreign policy is usually explained with reference to the decision structure -and the impact of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy in particular. According to Gönlübol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy has a stabilizing impact on the Turkish foreign policy through the traits of over-cautiousness and dignity it imposes on the decision making process.[24]

However, as argued before, it is not only the Ministry of Foreign Affairs bureaucracy that is involved in the foreign policy process. As indicated before, the Ministries of Defense and Finance, the National Security Council, the Councillories of National Intelligence Organization, and Treasury and Foreign trade, and also the Military are all involved in this process. Since foreign policy decisions are

made as a result of the bargaining among various parts of this huge bureaucracy, each having veto power concerning veto powers over matter related to themselves, the foreign policy decision structure of Turkish foreign policy can be regarded to have stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy in general, and Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in particular.

As argues in previous sections before, it is not only the fragmentation of the foreign policy bureaucracy that has stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East; it is that no remedy such as coordination among several parts of the bureaucracy has been found. The lack of any hint as to any search that has been going on to find a remedy for this problem, it is argued, stems from the peculiar decision structure of Turkish foreign policy. It is because each part in the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy wants to dominate the foreign policy process that no mechanism for decision making has been found. Thus, what is going on within the Turkish bureaucracy is something more than "bargaining among various parts of a bureaucracy". The "rivalry"[25] among various parts of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy usually makes itself felt as a continuous struggle for domination in the foreign policy process. This makes two, both stabilizing, impact on Turkish foreign policy in general, and the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in

particular. The first impact is on the fruition of Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy. As a result of the relentless struggle going on for domination in daily political matters, Turkish foreign policy comes to lack long-term plans towards the achievement of its foreign policy goals.

The lack of planning is Turkish foreign policy is known to all.[26] According to an observer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the policy did never include long-term action plans, but usually emerged to be a policy of adopting low-key attitudes toward developments in the region.[27] Since the rivalry in the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy is not for better long-term planning but for daily gains, it lacks information and task forces relevant for long-term planning. It is as a result of these deficiencies that various parts of the foreign policy bureaucracy do not come up with anything but continue to dwell on the very same matters in an attempt to keep up with the daily challenges. One should not expect such a decision structure not to have stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy in general and the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in particular.

As mentioned before, the continuous struggle among various parts of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy has a second impact on the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is further reinforced by its

first impact. It is argued here that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been stabilized not only by the decision structure but also because the rivalry among various parts of the bureaucracy is not for change but for continuity. An analysis of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and the Turkish foreign policy towards the recent Gulf Crisis (1990-91) shows that the tendency in the bureaucracy was for restraining the President; what was being argued was whether to restrain him less or more. During the Gulf Crisis, it was President Özal, as the head of the executive, who vied for some change in the policy while the bureaucracy tried to pull him back. The resignations of Head of General Staff Necip Torumtay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Bozer and the Minister of Defense Sefa Giray can be regarded as attempts to restrain President Özal's enthusiasm to get involved, in one way or another, in the Gulf War, by people who were under stress because of their inability to find a mid-way -other than resignation- between the conservatism of their respective bureaucracies and the pro-active attitudes of the President.

It is in this sense that the decision structure of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy is regarded to have a two-fold stabilizing impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The policy is stabilized not only as a result of the struggle among various actors of the bureaucracy that try to outbid each others' policies, but also due to the nature of

this struggle that it is usually for continuing the existing
policy when in the face of demands for change.

Chapter VIII: Conclusion

Goldmann's theoretical framework suggests the following when describing what a highly institutionalized Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would be like:

- There would be binding treaties prescribing the relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states in a precise and noncontradictory fashion.

- Turkey would have become highly dependent on continuing interaction.

- The relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states would be supported by strong common enmities and friendships.

- The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would be based on consistent ideas.

- The Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would occupy a central position in the belief systems of Turkish policy makers.

- Foreign policy-related beliefs of the Turkish policy makers would be untestable.

- Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would be highly institutionalized.

- There would be strong support for Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, and little or no opposition against it.

- The issue of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would be highly salient in domestic politics.

- The administration would be fragmented without remedies.

- The critical variables would be few, and the tolerable ranges would be large.

• There would be no alternative in the response repertory, or the existing alternatives would be moderate ones.

• Decisions about whether and how to modify the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East would have to be made by a decisionmaking process of the delegate type, i.e., by foreign policy bureaucrats who do not have the authority to make any changes at all.

What needs to be considered is whether and to what extent these propositions were fulfilled, i.e., whether the thirteen stabilizers outlined above were functioning to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

It was expected in the beginning that several of these stabilizers would be found to have contributed to the stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. This reasoning stemmed largely from the analyst's observation that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been a stable policy which proved to be able to resist pressures for change. Thus, it was assumed that the stabilizers proposed by Goldmann in his theoretical framework would be found to have been effective in stabilizing Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Separate analyses of the impact of these stabilizers on the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East have been made the preceding parts of the study. And it has been found that nearly all of these

stabilizers have contributed to the stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which to some extent explains the continuity in the policy.

However, what is crucial regarding the purposes of this study is to see the overall impact made by these stabilizers. The need to consider all stabilizers of a foreign policy stems from the reasoning that all have to be kept under consideration when analyzing its stability and the likelihood for change. If only one stabilizer is taken into consideration, one may be able to account for one action. For example it can easily be claimed that Turkey did not join the embargo imposed by the United States on Iran for the simple reason being that it has good economic relations with Iran, something which it does not want to lose. But this reasoning does not enable one to account for Turkey's cutting down the Kerkük-Yumurtalık pipeline to join the anti-Iraqi camp during the recent crisis in the Persian Gulf (1990-91). But if one can explain the overall impact they make on policy stability one can also become able to account for the future. It is in this sense that an overall analysis of the overall impact made by Goldmann's thirteen stabilizers have to be made.

It was stated earlier that the typical process of foreign policy stabilization starts at the international

level, whereas administrative stabilization takes place toward the end of the process. "From international agreements and third party relations via dependence, cognition, and domestic politics to "bureaucratic inertia" -this is the essence of foreign policy stabilization according to the model."[1] However, as an analysis on the stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East showed, the policy was first stabilized not through international stabilizers but through cognitive and political stabilizers of foreign policy. This largely resulted from the nature of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that it was the endresult of Turkish policy makers' attempt to outdo the policies of the past and also because it was a consensual policy that the cognitive and political stabilizers of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were there and functioning when the policy was first established. However paradoxical it may seem, when contrasted with Goldmann's theoretical sketch, the international stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East emerged in the later stages of the policy.

In fact, the overall stabilizing impact of **international stabilizers** was found to be low in the case of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Normative regulation cannot be claimed to have stabilizing

effect on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East for the simple reason being that there is no extensive regulation of the relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern states. The fact that both Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries are members of the OIC does not create a strong normative regulation of Turkey's policies, for OIC is not strong an organization to make its decisions binding; besides Turkey is not a de jure member of the OIC. However, the fact that Turkey's participation as a de facto member to the meetings of the OIC has created expectations on the part of the Muslims states and that Turkey finds it increasingly hard to fail these expectations and to act alone, creates a psychological impact that has stabilizing impact on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Thus normative regulation did not and still does not have any stabilizing effect on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East with the exception of the psychological impact its membership to the OIC creates.

Regarding the impact of dependence as a stabilizer of foreign policy, it can be argued that economic dependence, which is assumed to emerge in the initial periods of policy stabilization, emerged rather late in the Turkish-Middle Eastern case. It was only during late 1980s that the two parties' economies became structurally

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adopted to each other, though not a great extent. Until then economic dependence cannot be claimed to have acted as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The stabilizing impact made by third party as a stabilizer of foreign policy is even less, if not non-existent. Turkey's relations with the United States, even when they were closest, were far from being stable and predictable enough to enable the formation of a trilateral relationship between the U.S., Turkey and the Middle Eastern states to stabilize Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. In the case of the Soviet Union, the trilateral relationship was even less predictable although there were times when the impression was created that Soviet-Turkish-Middle Eastern relations fit the pattern 'my enemy's friend is my enemy' -especially concerning Turkey's relations with Syria.

The overall impact made by international stabilizers on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East seems to be rather low contrary, to the premises of Goldmann's theoretical framework as argued before. When dependence and normative regulation, albeit of a limited degree, began to function as stabilizers of the policy, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has already become stabilized to some extent through the impact of

cognitive and political and later administrative stabilizers. This seems to support the argument made before that the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, from the beginning was intended to be a stable and consistent policy, as indicated by the name 'traditional Turkish foreign policy' it was given when it was only a few years old.

Such an argument necessitates a more detailed explanation of the **cognitive stabilization** of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. In the analysis, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was found to be consistent in the sense that the Turkish policy makers believe that the policy they pursue is certain to produce the intended result. They also believe nearly all side-effects to be favorable, except for a counter-productive side-effect of the growing impact of Islam in Turkey and the Middle Eastern states' support for this phenomenon. Although the beliefs of Turkish policy makers on the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were found to be consistent, thus stabilizing the policy, it should be indicated here that the stabilizing impact of consistency, in the future, will depend on the degree to which Turkish policy makers will be able to overcome this counter-productive side effect.

Centrality as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East can also be claimed to be effective since the policy is central to the thinking of Turkish politicians not only because it serves Turkey's core objectives, or reinforces its secular character and its role as a bridge between the West and the Middle East, but also because it reinforces Turkey's European identity through enabling Turkey to present itself as a valuable ally of the West. The strengthening of Turkey's European identity also contributes to Turkey's relations with the Middle East; the two processes tend to reinforce each other. Though this is not a problem-free process, the fact that, it is central to the thinking of Turkish policy makers, however paradoxical it may seem, reinforces the stabilizing impact of centrality on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

Of all the three cognitive stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, testability emerges to be the strongest one since it fits fully the criterion Goldmann puts forward, i.e., that Turkish policy makers' beliefs on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East are untestable. The untestability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, together with other two cognitive stabilizers contribute to the further stabilization of the policy.

Interestingly, the cognitive stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was the first to evolve through the overall process of policy stabilization. This largely stemmed from the fact that it was a well-elaborated policy, a product of the Turkish policy makers' decisiveness to formulate a policy that would not repeat the mistakes of the previous years. This is why it was consistent in and central to the minds of the Turkish policy makers.

Political stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East also came early, contrary to Goldmann's propositions. This also stemmed from the peculiar character of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that, from the beginning, it was intended to be a consensual policy. As argued before, when it was first introduced it was the single issue on which political parties from the extreme left to right alike agreed on. In the following years Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was to become further stabilized through the functioning of political stabilizers albeit for different reasons. Firstly, the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East met all the criteria for Institutionalization, to function as a foreign policy stabilizer that it was institutionalized first by declarations and then by custom. As a result,

institutionalization made a direct and an indirect effect towards the stabilization of the policy. The direct effect, as argued before, was that institutionalization of the policy increased the political costs of deviation from the existing policy. The indirect effect was to eliminate the need for contingency plans that the absence of alternatives helped stabilize the policy. In sum, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East was stabilized through institutionalization first by policy declarations, then through the establishment of a custom that made a 'traditional policy' out of the 'new policy' in a rather limited time.

Regarding the impact of support as a foreign policy stabilizer, it can be claimed that although there does not seem to be an enthusiastic support voiced for the Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, the fact that there does not exist a strong opposition with preplanned alternatives or with the capacity to monitor the external environment in search for signs of negative feedback, leads one to the conclusion that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has been and is still likely to be stabilized with the help of the functioning of support as a stablizer of foreign policy.

The third form of political stabilizer salience does not have a direct impact on the stability of foreign

policy but tends to strengthen or weaken the stabilizing impact of institutionalization and support. In the case of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, it is found that the policy is salient to the degree that it reinforces the stabilizing impact of institutionalization and support, in line with Goldmann's proposition.

As argued before, institutionalization, support and salience as stabilizers Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, did not emerge in the later stages of the stabilization of the policy that these three were effective from the very beginning. One can even argue as to the "mutual reinforcement between cognitive consistency on the one hand, and institutionalization and support on the other."[2] Goldmann argues that development in thinking and of domestic politics may go hand in hand, something which seems to be the case in the stabilization of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that cognitive and political stabilization of the policy seems to have went hand in hand.

Regarding the **administrative stabilization** of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, which is assumed to come later in the process of policy stabilization, the willingness of Turkish bureaucrats for stabilization of the policy, once it has been agreed upon, may be claimed to have sped this process, which otherwise

might have taken some longer time. In this sense, cognitive and political stabilization, as Goldmann has foreseen, enforced the administrative stabilization Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Fragmentation as a stabilizer of foreign policy was effective from the very beginning and since no remedy has been found to the problem of lack of coordination it caused, it continues to function as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The number of critical variables, the second type of administrative stabilizer, was found to be low. The fact that tolerable ranges for these critical variables are not large, as necessitated by Goldmann's theoretical framework, did not prevent critical variables from acting as a stabilizer of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that those variables were all about security matters for which small tolerable ranges can be tolerated.

Response repertory is not included in the analysis as proposed by Goldmann who argues that it is useful to know what one would need to know but cannot know. What should be kept in mind regarding the response repertory is that its presence as well as absence has destabilizing impact on foreign policy, and that the presence of a moderate alternative may be the most stabilizing one.

Regarding decision structure as a stabilizer of foreign policy, one can argue that the bureaucratic nature of the decision-structure contributed to the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The bargaining, or the rivalry between various parts of the Turkish foreign policy bureaucracy, over the years contributed to the stability of policy through impeding the production of long term plans and averting the politicians' demand for change.

In sum, Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, as seen in the summary analysis above was stabilized through the overall impact of the thirteen stabilizers of foreign policy. The fact that the steps through which they were expected to function were disordered is indicative of the peculiar characteristic of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East that it was intended by its drafters, from the very beginning, to be a stable and consistent policy. Since a shift in the government is usually assumed to put the stabilizers of foreign policy to the test, the continuous pursuance of the new Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East by successive Turkish government formed by different parties of the ideological spectrum can be regarded as an indication of the degree of the institutionalization of

the policy, i.e., that the stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East were very effective.

In this sense, Goldmann's hypothesis that "the variety of phenomena included in the sketch help to stabilize foreign policies",[3] was also confirmed, in that they were found to be effective in stabilizing Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. The fact that their order was found to be reversed in the Turkish case may point to the significance of cognitive stabilizers on the stability of foreign policies as seen in the Turkish example. In this sense it can be proposed that cognitive stabilizers may reinforce the stabilizing effects of other stabilizers if they emerge in the early stages of the process of policy stabilization.

Regarding the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East and its future implications, the analysis of the stabilizers of the policy showed that the policy is stabilized by more than ten stabilizers, which not only explains why it remained unchanged to this day, but also implies that they will continue to stabilize the policy in the near future. As argued before, the only problem regarding the functioning of the stabilizers of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East remains to be the counter-productive side-effect of the growing impact of political Islam in Turkey. The argument here is

that, the future stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East will depend on to what degree policy makers will be able to cope with this side-effect (both the domestic and also the external aspects of the matter) and the potential destabilizing impact it presents to the stability of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. Turkish public opinion and policy makers alike are very sensitive about the secular characteristic of Turkish foreign policy that a deviation on this matter will not be tolerated. That is why Turkish policy makers have to become able to cope with this inconsistency and the impact of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East on this matter.

Notes

Chapter I:

[1] Duygu Sezer, "Turkish foreign policy in the Year 2000," in Turkey in the Year 2000 (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989), 114.

[2] Duygu Sezer, "Turkey and the Western Alliance in the 1980s," in The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, ed. Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada (Westport, Conneticut: Praeger, 1993),216-7.

[3] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts," in Turkey's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges,ed. John Chipman (London: Routledge, 1988), 346.

[4] See Oral Sander, "Yeni bir bölgesel güç olarak Türkiye'nin dış politika hedefleri," in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi, (ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu [İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994], 424,) where the author argues that Turkey's relations with the Middle East should be developed "as necessary."

[5] Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[6] Roderic H. Davison, "Where is the Middle East?" in The Modern Middle East, ed. Richard Nolte (New York: Altherton Press, 1963), 20; quoted in Bassam Tibi, Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91 (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1993), 45-6.

[7] See Oral Sander's views in Dünya Nereye Gidiyor? Atatürk İlkeleri Işığında Türkiye ne Yapmalı? (?: Hava Harp Okulu Yayınları, 1994), 45.

[8] See Tibi, Conflict and War, 22-60, for a discussion on the Middle East as a sub-system.

Chapter II:

[1] K.J.Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 15.

[2] See K.J.Holsti, "Restructuring Foreign Policy: A Neglected Phenomenon in Foreign Policy," chap. in Change in the International System (Great Britain: Edward Elgar, 1991) for a discussion of this problem.

[3] Holsti, International Politics, 17.

[4] Holsti, International Politics, 115.

[5]Margot Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis," in <u>Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory</u>, eds. A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 94.

[6]Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis," 94.

[7]James N. Rosenau, "Introduction: New Directions and Recurrent Questions in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy," in <u>New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy</u> eds. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 2.

[8]Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis," 94.

[9]Steve Smith, "Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations," in <u>The Study of International Relations</u>, eds. Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasairan (London: Macmillan, 1989): 376.

[10]Smith, "Foreign Policy Anlaysis and IR," 376-80.

[11]Rosenau, "Puzzlement in Foreign Policy," chap. in <u>The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy</u> (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 232.

[12]Kjell Goldmann, <u>Change and Stability in Foreign Policy</u> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 3.

[13]James N. Rosenau, "The External Environment as a Variable in Foreign Policy Analysis," in <u>The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy</u> (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 320.

[14]Rosenau, "The External Environment," 321.

[15]Rosenau, "The External Environment," 320.

[16]Goldmann, <u>Change and Stability</u>, 3.

[17]Richard Ned Lebow, in "The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism," <u>International Organization</u> 47 (Spring 1994): 249-277, stresses upon the same tendency with regard to the failure of neo-realism in explaining the end of the Cold War. Little, within a similar context argues that neo-realism is ahistorical in its disregard of the evolution of the international system. See Richard Little, "International Relations and large-scale historical change," in <u>Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory</u>, eds. A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994): 9-26.

[18]Light, "Foreign Policy Analysis," 95. Allison's well-known and praised study <u>The Essence of Decision</u> (Glenview, Illinois: Scotts, Foresman and Company, 1971) is a good example for this.

[19]Rosenau, "Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy: the Case of the USSR, in <u>New Directions in the Study of</u>

Foreign Policy eds. Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr. and James N. Rosenau (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 53.

[20]Rosenau, "Single-Country Theories," 53.

[21]Rosenau, "Single-Country Theories," 72.

[22]Steve Smith in "Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations" argues that our aim need not be to develop a general theory of foreign policy. According to him, foreign policy analyst, instead of assuming such a task, which is not realistic at all, has to concentrate on less ambitious middle-range theories or case studies.

[23]Little, "IR and large-scale historical change," 9.

[24]See Little, "IR and large-scale historical change" for a critical review of these studies.

[25]K.J. Holsti, *Change in the International System* (England: Edward Elgar, 1991).

[26]K.J. Holsti, "Farming, Ranching, and Accounting: Perspectives on Change in International Relations," in *Change in the International System*, 10.

[27]chap. in *Change in the International System* (England: Edward Elgar, 1991): 83-100.

[28]Charles F. Hermann, "Changing Course: When governments choose to redirect foreign policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 3-21.

[29]Kjell Goldmann, *Change and Stability in Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[30]Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.

[31]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 10.

[32]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 3.

[33]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, xv.

[34]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 4.

[35]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 5.

[36]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 4.

[37]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 15-16.

[38]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 26.

[39]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 30-34

[40]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 35-7.

[41]Goldmann, *Change and Stability*, 46-54.

[42]Bureaucratic inertia is the term used to define this type of policy stabilization. However, Goldmann prefers not to use

it with the purpose of avoiding the pejorative overtones the term may suggest (Goldmann, Change and Stability, 54).

[43]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 56-62.

Chapter III:

[1]K. J. Holsti, International Politics- A Framework for Analysis, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1988), 115.

[2]Holsti, International Politics, 92.

[3]Paul Seabury, Power, Freedom and Diplomacy (New York: Random House, 1963), 5 quoted in Holsti, International Politics, 120.

[4]It should be noted here that the term 'purpose' does not indicate rationality or that actions governments take are all part of an ultimate plan. What is meant by being purposeful is the assumption that governments usually have an objective, however irrational, in mind and they do not act randomly.

[5]Rosenau argues that neither the lack of an overall paradigm, nor the insufficiency of existing theories or the limitations of data singly or together can explain the non-cumulative character of foreign policy studies. What is missing, according to him, is a motivational component -what he calls "the feeling of puzzlement about both continuities and the changes that mark world politics." What he means by puzzlement is the formulation of our curiosity as to the interplay of international phenomena into genuine puzzles comparable to Newton's bewilderment as to why apples fall. However, as Rosenau also emphasizes, genuine puzzles are not simply matters of bewilderment. "[They] derive from general 'what' and 'why' questions, but they are more focused. They identify processes with specified outcomes, as well as expressing curiosity about sources" (234). A question, only if it is "provocative" in this way and "precise" in the outcomes it specifies, can be called a genuine puzzle (235). According to Rosenau, "our efforts, unlikely to converge around common problems, much less achieve the substantive clarity and methodological precision needed to trace and comprehend the changing world scene, until we allow ourselves to be puzzled -genuinely intrigued- as to why the underlying patterns and discontinuities we discern unfold as they do" (233). See James N. Rosenau, "Puzzlement in Foreign Policy," in The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 233-35.

[6]Holsti, International Politics, 115.

[7] Holsti, _International Politics_, 93.

[8] Holsti, _International Politics_, 115.

[9] Holsti, _International Politics_, 119. The assumption, here, that states have an image of future state of affairs and future set of conditions that they aspire to bring about should not be taken to mean that state is assumed to be a rational actor. Foreign policy analysts leave aside this assumption and propose to define foreign policy behavior as purposeful behavior. Being purposeful means that actors do not act randomly but with some goal in mind which may not always be rational. They might be highly unrealistic yet they always serve some purpose. To go one step further, it is in this sense that the structure of the international system may be understood as the "unintended consequences of actions taken by agents of the state." See Richard Little, "International Relations and large-scale historical change," in _Contemporary International Relations: A Guide to Theory_, eds. A.J.R. Groom and Margot Light (London: Pinter Publishers, 1994), 20.

[10] Holsti, _International Politics_, 140.

[11] In laying down Turkey's foreign policy there does not seem to be a need for differentiation between non-verbalized policy, i.e., the line of action followed by the government, and the verbalized policy, i.e., the program government declares its intention to follow. The tendency in the field to present verbalized policy as _the_ foreign policy should not obscure the immense contribution a study on non-verbalized policy will make to one's understanding of a country's foreign policy. Since the aim is _not_ to ascribe intentions to actors in order to find out their 'real' intentions, an analysis of change and stability in foreign policy may retain with understanding government's foreign policy through making generalizations about past behavior _and_ analyzing government programs and declarations. See Kjell Goldmann, _Change and Stability in Foreign Policy_ (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 9-10, for a discussion of this problem.

[12] Kemal Karpat, et al. _Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition_ (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 114.

[13] Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1961), 356 quoted in Metin Tamkoç, _The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of National Security and Modernization of Turkey_ (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976), 299.

[14] Tamkoç, _The Warrior Diplomats_, 299-300. An example of this attitude was seen in 1937 when Atatürk agreed to join an international effort led by the British to hunt down unidentified submarines discovered in the Mediterranean.

Harris considers this as an attempt on the part of the Turks to "solidify Turkey's relationship with Britain so that Ankara might succeed in consummating its long-hoped-for Anglo-Turkish alliance." See George Harris, Turkey: Coping With Crisis (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), 182.

[15]Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), 123.

[16]See Holsti, International Politics, 133.

[17]Metin Tamkoç defines Kemalism as "the ideas and ideals of Kemal Atatürk about the past, the present and future of the Turkish polity" (111)Accordingly, Richard D. Robinson (The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965],) argues that Atatürk's avoidance of a well-defined ideology has been of enormous help to Turkey, for in its absence the Turks could shift gears without an emotional political crisis...Otherwise it might not have been that easy for Turkey to change its international orientation from non-alignment to membership to NATO.(163-4) George Harris also has a parallel view of Kemalism. According to him, although Atatürk's example remained "a major source of inspiration in setting Turkey's course," since he was "a pragmatist and an experimenter, he did not seek to bind Turkey to an ideology or to set foreign policy in a rigid mold. Moreover, Atatürk's legacy on foreign affairs was not specific enough to answer all of the questions and needs of its successors." See George Harris, Troubled Alliance (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 180.

[18]Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats, 303.

[19]Holsti, "National role," 26.

[20]Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats, 73-4.

[21]See Mahmut Dikerdem, Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları (İstanbul: Cem, 1990), 10. Various historical and also psychological reasons are put forward to justify this policy: Ayhan Kamel ("Turkey's Relations with the Arab World," Foreign Policy [Ankara] 4, no.4. [1977], 91-2), puts forth three reasons for cool relations between the Turks and the Middle East during this era. Firstly, "[t]he Turkish people had fought against the colonial powers for years at heavy cost in order to maintain their centuries-old special ties with the Arab people, and when this feeling of special attachment was not however reciprocated by the latter, this created a sense of disillusion and bitterness on the part of the Turkish people, the effects of which continued for a few generations. Secondly, up to the time of WW2, there were only four Arab countries which had achieved their independence, namely,

Saudi Arabia (1926), Iraq (1932), North Yemen(1934), and Egypt (1936). As for the others, colonial powers were acting on their behalf in foreign affairs. Thirdly, the secularism which had been adopted in Turkey...was misinterpreted by the Arab people. In fact, the Arab world got the impression that the Turkish people under the new leadership wanted to break away from this world." Also see Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, 203-210 for a similar evaluation.

[22]See Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, 199 for Turkish Foreign Minister Dr. Tevfik Rüşdü Aras' views about the Sadabad Pact and pp. 198-201 for a general evaluation of its significance. Also see p.45 for Akşin's personal evaluation of the Pact. According to him, it was because Atatürk knew the futility of going beyond consultation that he opted for the Sadabad Pact.

[23]See Holsti, International Politics, 123. There is an implicit time criterion regarding the classification of different types of objectives. Core objectives are regarded as those short-range ones which have to be pursued at once and all times. Middle- and long-range objectives, on the other hand are not that fundamental and are hoped to be achieved in the future. Within the Turkish context, although Westernization can be considered to be a middle- or even long-range objective if one is using the criterion of time, in terms of the value Turkish policy makers placed on its achievement, it was, and still is, a core objective.

[24]Karpat, Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, 115. These expectations were not groundless. During the National War of Independence, Turkish leaders were known to have initiated an active propaganda campaign among Arab nationalists in Syria in order that they would cooperate with the Turks against the French and the British occupation. The Arab masses, during the 1920s, were also known to be recipient of Turkish and Arab elite's propaganda on the achievements of Turkish revolution. See Tamkoç, The Warrior Diplomats, 182.

[25]See Andrew Mango, "Turkish Policy in the Middle East: Turning Danger into Profit," in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, ed. C.H. Dodd (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 58.

[26]Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development (Cambridge: Mass.: Harward University Press, 1965), 174.

[27]Stefanos Yerasimos, Milliyetler ve Sınırlar- Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), 187.

[28]See Nuri Konuralp, Hatay- Kurtuluş ve Kurtarılış Mücadeles Tarihi (İskenderun: Hatay Postası Gazete ve Basımevi, 1970?).

[29]Abd al Kerim is regarded as "the first Moroccan political leader to have justified his cause in terms that lay outside the dynastic system," since his movement, although regional and tribal in character, was one which bridged the gap between traditional tribal rebellions and ideologically motivated modern revolutions. Abd al Kerim founded the Rif Republic in 1922 which became "the first central government that much of the region had known for centuries," and administered Northern Morocco which was until Spanish control for more than three years. His republican government was such a "success" that became a "source of his defeat." The French, who tolerated Abd al Kerim until then, agreed to cooperate with the Spanish when it became clear that the Rif Republic was more than a tribal rebellion and posed a good example of a "successful indigenous state" that was seen as a threat to French dominion in North Africa." The French and Spanish troops, which together amounted to more than 400,000, compelled Abd al Kerim to surrender in 1926. See Robert Rinehart, "Historical Setting," In Morocco: A Country Study, Harold D. Nelson, ed. (Washington D.C.: G.P.O., 1985): 19-50.

[30]François Georgeon, "Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası (1919-1938): Bazı İşaret Taşları," in Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası, eds. İskender Gökalp and Francois Georgeon, trans. Cüneyt Akalın (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1990), 38-39.

[31]It was only during the last phases of the War that Turkey decided to change its policy. Following the Cairo Conference, where Turkey for the last time refused to fulfill its obligations under the tripartite treaty, the Turks had to face a reversal in Anglo-American policy which resulted in a diplomatic "freeze" and the termination of aid. Improving military position of the Allies against the Axis powers also exerted "irresistible" pressure on Ankara. Russia's advance into Eastern Europe which came when the new Anglo-American position threatened to isolate the Turks was the last straw. Bruce Kuniholm in The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980) relates a joke about blackout regulations in Istanbul during the WW2, which reflected the Turkish anxiety in the face of the growing Soviet influence in the Balkans: "The story was that the Russian Ambassador had called on the Turkish Foreign Minister to say: 'I am instructed by my government to assure you that there is no need for you to inconvenience your people by this blackout. When we attack; it will be in the day-time'" (Kuniholm, 63). By 1944, Ankara decided to take a series of initiatives to signal its new attitude. In April 1944, trade with the Axis powers came to an end. Later Menemencioğlu was removed from office on grounds that he was pro-German. On August 12, 1944 Ankara broke relations with

Germany. And lastly, in February 23, 1945 Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan.

[32]A government is assumed to adopt the role of a "faithful ally" when it makes a specific commitment to support the policies of another government. See Holsti, "National Role," 24-25 for a discussion of the definition of this role.

[33]The role of "bridge" is rather vague compared to other national role conceptions. The government usually assumes a communication function and it acts as a conveyor of messages between peoples of different cultures. See Holsti, "National Role," 24. Within the Turkish context the role of "bridge" remained vague since Turkish policy-makers failed to conceptualize this role on the policy-planning level in order to present an operational significance. See Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's discreet foreign policy between Western Europe and the Middle East," in Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, eds. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 94.

[34]Menderes said, in an interview he gave to Birmingham Post that Europe could not feel itself safe until Middle East was safe and stated that it was Turkey's "duty" to secure cooperation between the West and the Middle East for purposes of Middle Eastern defense and development. Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı Politikası (1945-1970) (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 71-2.

[35]Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Necmeddin Sadak, immediately after the declaration of Truman Doctrine was reported to have announced his government's eagerness for Arab participation in an organization of the Eastern Mediterranean states. Syria was reported to have responded favorably to this declaration but the rapprochement that followed did not last for long for there occurred a coup in Syria by the end of 1948. See Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956)," Middle East Journal, 10, no.10 (Autumn 1956), 385.

[36]Georgeon, "Kemalizm ve İslam Dünyası," 40.

[37]Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı Politikası, 41.

[38]Dikerdem, Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları, 11-12. Although the declaration of Syrian independence was made on September 28, 1941, Turkey refused to recognize Syria until 1946 on the grounds that Syria did not renounce its rights on Hatay. Turkey was represented in Syria through its Consulate in Damascus. The impasse was resolved only on March 6, 1946 through Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said's mediation, Turkey agreed not to insist on formal Syrian recognition of Hatay's

incorporation to Turkey as a precondition for recognizing Syria. In return, Syria agreed not to present formal demands on Hatay. See Sanjian, 383. Aptülahat Akşin, who became the first Turkish Ambassador to Syria, blames Turkey's policy during this era which he regards to be "volatile" due to the alienation of Middle Eastern states, and Syria in particular. See Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, 212.

[39]Selim Deringil, "Introduction: Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk," in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 3.

[40]Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk," 3.

[41]The RPP's only objection was regarding the form of this decision that it was not presented to the vote of the Assembly. Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971) (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1976), 73.

[42]This action was also justified on the grounds that "the sense of global interdependence and responsibility" that was founded on the "geopolitical realities of the 19th century" led the Turkish policy makers to go to the aid of South Korea as seen in the case of Ethiopian War of 1935 when Turkey supported the sanctions against Italy. Ret. Ambassador Nuri Eren, writing in 1963, argued that "the Turkish people as a whole take their international responsibilities seriously, and politicians are not asked to explain committments to go to war if far of Norway or distant Pakistan are attacked...Similarly, the nation can easily associate her objectives with America and British goals. Turkish statesman, when they refer to peace being indivisible, address themselves to the world. They have no need to convince their fellow citizens. This deed sense of global interdependence governs every Turkish act and thought on international affairs." See Nuri Eren, Turkey Today -And Tomorrow (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), 226-228. However naive it may sound, since it was the view of at least some policy makers, it is worthy of consideration.

[43]Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Atatürk," 4.

[44]An example of this attitude can be seen Altemur Kılıç's Turkey and the World (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959). According to Kılıç, İnönü governments by emphasizing Turkey's Westernness and "perhaps neglecting the geographic and strategic realities, made no effort to prepare the ground culturally and psychologically for a better understanding and cooperation with the Arabs and the Iranians" (189).

[45]George Crews McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 130. The

Menderes administration, for example, does not seem to have understood the fact that the Middle Eastern states did not perceive the Soviet threat as the Turks did. They also underrated the role Arab nationalism played in regional affairs. Fuad Köprülü, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Menderes Governments between 1950-1956 (except for a brief period in 1955 when he served as Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister), considered the Arab League as a "misleading concept" that was "created" by the British "for their own purposes," and thought that it was "not representative of the Arabs." McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, 130. The opposition was no better informed of the regional dynamics; nor did they seem to care. Faik Ahmet Barutçu (Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister between 1947-1949 and the RPP deputy group leader between 1950-1954), relates in his memoirs titled Siyasi Anılar 1939-1954 (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977) his meeting with Prime Minister Menderes, when he said, in reply to Menderes' criticism that the RPP governments alienated the Arabs, and the English should not be alienated for the sake of the Arabs, who were, "of no use." He argued that since alliance with Britain was central to Turkey's foreign policy, it was always within this context that Turkey's relations with the Arab countries had to be designed (507).

[46]McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection, 140

[47]For example in 1946 when the U.N. advised its member states to withdraw their representatives in Spain, Turkey was the "first" to abide by. When, on November 5, 1950 the U.N. overruled this decision, Turkish Ambassador the very same day departed for Madrid. This was more as a result of the Turkish urge to act in line with the West than a reaction to the Franco government in Spain. See A. Haluk Ülman and Oral Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler: (1923-1968) II," A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi (1972), 5.

[48]Ülman and Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler," 16. It was also as a result of the etatist policies that Turkish economy became dependent also on German economy through external financing and strong trade links which became one of the factors that caused Turkish neutrality during the Second World War.

[49]Mehmet Gönlübol et al., Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (Ankara: Alkım Kitabevi, 1990?), 114. In 1935 Turkey participated on sanctions against Italy after the latter's attack on Ethiopia although such action caused disruption in its trade relations (112). This action was prompted by a decision to this effect by the League of Nations of which Turkey was not a member at the time.

[50]Ülman and Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler," 14-24.

[51]Karpat, Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, 115.

[52]Harris, Troubled Alliance, 73.

[53]Harris, Troubled Alliance, 44.

[54]Ülman and Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler," 6-7.

[55]Dikerdem, Ortadoğu'da Devrim Yılları, 183-7.

[56]Ahmad and Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 184.

[57]Harris, Troubled Alliance, 65.

[58]Harris, Troubled Alliance, 169.

[59]Ahmad and Ahmad, Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi, 197.

[60]Karpat, Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, 115.

[61]Nur Bilge Criss, "U.S. Forces in Turkey," In U.S. Military Forces in Europe- The Early Years, 1945-1970, Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, eds. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993): 331.

[62]Recent studies on the Baghdad Pact show that United States' policy towards the Middle East also changed after seeing the reactions against the Pact when it became more inclined to play down its role in fear of alienating Arab states under Egypt's leadership which did not seem to be willing to join the Pact. If this was the case, the Baghdad Pact as a project seems to have been taken up by the British after then. The period between 1955-57 can also be viewed, in this regard, as a period of clash between two great powers' opposing views of the Middle East. Although it is not easy to say which view the Turkish policy makers adopted, the best that can be put forward is that they remained hesitant. Although the Turkish government took the side of the U.S. in the event of the joint British-Israeli-French raid on Suez (1956), they, nevertheless, continued to press for a more active U.S. role in the Baghdad Pact, something which the U.S. policy makers wanted to avoid. Thus what can be derived from these new studies on the Baghdad Pact is the reasoning that the Turkish policy makers, under U.S. prompting, became committed to a policy vis-à-vis the Middle East states and did not want to give up this policy. This was not only because Turkey feared losing its strategic importance vis-à-vis the West but also because it did not want to be left alone with the Middle Eastern states supported by the Soviet Union which now became antagonistic towards the Turks because

of the very policies Turkey took in line with the wishes of the West. See Nigel John Ashton, "The Hijacking of a Pact: the Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tension in the Middle East, 1955-1958," Review of International Studies 19 (1993): 123-137.

[63]Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece- Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean (London: Frank Caas, 1987), 7.

[64]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 45.

[65]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 50. However, this should not be taken to mean that Turkey's recognition of Israel was prompted by the West. Not that Turkey would not be happy to act in line with the wishes of it was in vital need of their support but the fact was that this was perceived to be in line with Turkey's foreign policy goals. For "İnönü knew well how to resist [foreign promoting] when it suited his book. See Mango, "Turkish Policy in the Middle East," 60.

[66]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 50. It seems that the Israelis helped the Turks to believe in this link. According to Nachmani, the Israelis, who were having a hard time strengthening their ties with the Turks, were advised by the Americans to "seek the proximity of the Americans in Turkey" for "ties with the Americans will exert considerable influence upon the Turks." This made Israeli consulate to conclude that "[i]t would be a good thing if the Turks think that [Israel] had influence with the Americans (52). Although they failed to achieve most of what the Turks requested, (52-54), nevertheless the cooperation between the two continued to the degree that they concluded voting pacts in the United Nations (52-7).

[67]According to Nachmani, the conclusion of this treaty was expedited by Israel's declaration of support for the U.N. Security Council's policy on Korea. The Arabs, on the other hand, remained neutral. The Turkish response was to impose restrictions on Egyptian air crew in transit through Turkey. See Nachmani 51-2.

[68]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 7.

[69]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 49.

[70]See "Maurice Fisher to the Foreign Ministry, 16 Aug. 1953, Israel State Department Archives 2536/12/b." quoted in Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 43.

[71]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 7.

[72]Michael Bar-Zohar, "Ben-Gurion and the policy of the periphery," in Israel in the Middle East, eds. Hamar

Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 169.

[73] Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 74.

[74] Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 74.

[75] In his memoirs George McGhee (153-4) relates the meeting between Menderes and Dulles in which the formation of a new defense organization in the Middle East was discussed. According to McGhee, Menderes indicated Turkey's willingness to serve as the "backbone" of a regional defense organization, in reply to which Dulles said that he agreed with Menderes that Turkey would ahve to be the backbone of any Middle Eastern defense arrangement, but, that there must be "flesh surrounding the backbone."

[76] Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı Politikası, 137.

[77] Oral Sander, Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri, 1947-1964 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979), 204.

[78] Duygu Sezer, Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 126.

[79] In fact, the Kennedy administration even before the Cuban Missile Crisis had asked its diplomats to explore the possibility of removing those missiles be withdrawn due to their obsolete status both in terms of technology and also strategy, for they were placed on Turkish soil as part of massive retaliation strategy in 1959 which was dropped by 1961. However, due to negative response from the Turks who perceived the presence of missiles as an indication of U.S. alias NATO commitment to Turkey, and of Kennedy's concern about looking weak in the eyes of the Soviets, especially after he was browbeaten by Khurschev in Berlin in 1961, the idea was dropped until 1962.

[80] Sezer, Kamu Oyu ve Dış Politika, 182.

[81] Harris, Troubled Alliance, 127.

[82] Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," in Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance ed. Douglas T. Stuart (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 168.

[83] George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 160.

[84] Aykan notes that President Cevdet Sunay (1966-1973) turned down Soviet suggestions to the effect that the Turkish-Soviet joint communiqué should include the phrase that both states supported th Arab people "in their just struggle and eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression..."

Instead, the communiqué read: "the establishment of a fair and lasting peace in the area." NYT, November 23, 1969, p.14, quoted in Mahmut Bali Aykan, Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Towards the Muslim World: 1960-1987 (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1988), 156.

[85]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change,", 168.

[86]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," 165.

[87]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," 165.

[88]Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Development of Turkish-Arab Relations: An Appraisal," in Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, eds. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 23.

[89]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 112.

[90]Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Discreet Foreign Policy Between Western Europe and the Middle East, in Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 94.

[91]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 112-3.

[92]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 106.

[93]Karpat, Turkish Foreign Policy in Transition, 125.

[94]Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Quesiton in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993), 95.

[95]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 96.

[96]Turkey's approval of a Turkish-Libyan communiqué issued in January 1975 expressed both countries' support for the "Palestinian liberation struggle" and for "the right of the Arab countries to regain their occupied lands by any means," was in contradiction with its previous stand of not going beyond resolution 242 (Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 97). Although Turkey did not regard the Palestinian refugee problem as merely a humanitarian problem but also a political one, until the 1970s, one could not tell this by reading the texts of the speeches given by the Turkish representatives in the United Nations. Aykan notes that they "never" mentioned the right of Palestinian people to "self-determination and statehood in their own territory." The official line remained content with indicating Turkey's sympathy "with the refugees of Palestine" and voiced its demand that "their plight be alleviated in accordance with law and justice."

However, by mid-1970s, the effort on the part of the Turkish policy makers to conform as strictly as possible to the U.N. resolutions left its place for a policy that tilted more towards the Arabs. Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 122-23.

[97]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 100.

[98]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 102.

[99]Hamit Batu, "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World," Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations 6 (1991), 86.

[100]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 103.

[101]Ayhan Kamel, "Turkey's Relations with the Arab World, " Foreign Policy (Ankara) 4, no.4. (1977), 91-107.

[102]Seyfi Taşhan, " Contemporary Turkish Policies in the Middle East: Prospects and Constraints," Foreign Policy 12: 1-2 (1985), 8-13.

[103]See Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," 166-7; Ferenc A. Váli, Bridge Across the Bosporus - The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), 310-2; Philip Turkey and the Middle EastTurkey and the Middle East (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 65-7; Batu, "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World," 86.

[104]See Philip Robins, "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adevnturist or Dynamic?," in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects, ed. C.H.Dodd (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 70-87.

[105]Batu, "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World," 85.

[106]Mango, "Turkish Policy in the Middle East," 67.

[107]Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy, 10.

[108]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," 168.

[109]Hermann, "Changing Course," 5.

Chapter IV:

[1]Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy-The Problems and Possibilities of Détente (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 72

[2]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 30.

[3]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 30.

[4]K.J. Holsti, International Politics- A Framework for Analysis, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988), 369.

[5]Holsti, International Politics, 375.

[6]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 31.

[7]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 91.

[8]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 91.

[9]Holsti, International Politics, 374.

[10]Yılmaz Altuğ, "Turkish involvement in some international disputes," TTK Belleten, III, no.206, (1989): 259-360.

[11]See George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, 4th ed. (Ithaca: Cornall University Press, 1980), 123; Also see Aptülahat Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1991), 126-31 for Turkish policy makers' feeling of entrapment regarding this decision.

[12]Akşin, Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi, 126-131.

[13]According to Oral Sander, "[a] closer examination of Atatürk's motto 'peace at home and peace abroad' reveals a firm interdependence between the two parts. His endeavor to establish 'peace at home' by initiating necessary socio-economic reforms and by elevating Turkish society to the level of contemporary civilization directly affected his policy of 'peace abroad,' which was free from adventurism, ideological differences among states, and past feuds and based on the realization of such concepts of 'friendship,' 'peace' and 'cooperation.' His policy of 'peace abroad,' in turn, secured a "breathing space for the new Republic allowing it to dwell on internal reconstruction and reforms which laid the foundation upon which internal peace and stability was based." See Oral Sander, "Nationalism and peace: the significance of Atatürk's movement," The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations: 1980-81 XX (1986), 258-259.

[14]Holsti, International Politics, 374.

[15]These treaties are:

Iran: (1932)	Treaty on Security, Neutrality and Cooperation
	Agreement on the security of borders (1937)
Iraq:	Treaty on good neighborliness (1946)
Syria:	Protocol on security and cooperation (1987)
Jordan:	Treaty of Friendship (1947)

[16]The legal basis of this sanction is justified as such: Although the oic charter does not contain any provisions on the imposition of sanctions, it embodies the legal constitution and foundation of the Organization signed and ratified by sovereign states. By its nature, it is a multilateral treaty laying down both rights and obligations which the member states are bound to carry out in good faith. "By acting alone and in complete disharmony with the general policy of the oic member states, Egypt has failed to fulfill its obligations under Art. II (A) 5 of the Charter which stipulates that the member states will "co-ordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, and help them to regain their rights and liberate their land." According to an expert, since this article contains one basic objective of the oic Charter, Egypt's violation constitutes a 'material breach' of the treaty thus justifying the suspension of its membership. Hasan Mounuddin, The Charter of the Islamic Conference- The Legal and Economic Framework (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1987), 100-104, for an analysis of the legality of this sanction.

[17]According to Aykan, a reservation was added to the declaration of May 1976 that "Turkish approval of the Charter would extend only to those points that remained in conformity with the secular Turkish constitution. Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s, International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993), 99.

[18]Mahmut Bali Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference: 1960-1992 - The Nature of Deviation From the Kemalist Heritage (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), 78.

[19]Aykan, Turkey's Role in the OIC, 100.

[20]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 101.

[21]Aykan, Turkey's Role in the OIC, 101.

[22]Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy- The Problems and Possibilities of Détente (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 32-33.

[23]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 32.

[24]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 31.

[25]Structural adaptation is not easy to measure, since, according to Goldmann, the measure would have to consist in a comparison between hypothetical situations. However, it is still important for an analyst to see whether there has developed a degree of structural dependence between the two parties in order to make a sounder analysis of stability in foreign policy. Thus, here, an attempt will be made to

measure structural adaptation of Turkey's economy to flourishing relations with the Middle Eastern countries.

[26]Writing in 1981, Duygu Sezer argued that Turkey has discovered the fact that it had to stress the political factors instead of concentrating on economic ties since religious and cultural affinities failed to provide a steady basis for economic cooperation. Duygu Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," Adelphi Papers, no.164 (1981), 37.

[27]M. Yılmaz İkizer, Şu Bizim Garip Hariciye ve Dış Politika (İstanbul?: Sucuoğlu Matbaası, 1992?), 98.

[28]Abdelrahman Zeinelabidin, "The present and future perspective of Arab-Turkish economic relations," Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations 2 (1987), 105.

[29]Zeinelabidin, "Arab-Turkish economic relations," 105.

[30]Ali İhsan Bağış, "The beginning and the development of economic relations between Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries," Dış Politika, XII, nos.1-2 (June 1989),85.

[31]The goals of this program were to curb galloping inflation, to improve the balance of payments, to increase the national products and employment and to open the economy to the rest of the world. Erdoğan Alkin, "Economic Factors Influencing Turkey's Relations With Middle East and Western Countries," in Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 193.

[32]Sübidey Togan, Hasan Olgun and Halis Akder, Report on Developments in External Economic Relations of Turkey (Ankara: Foreign Trade Association, 1987), 103.

[33]Philip Robins, Turkey and the Middle East (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991), 108.

[34]Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 108.

[35]Anne O. Krueger and Okan H. Aktan, Swimming against the tide: Turkish trade reform in the 1980s (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), 158-9.

[36]Sezer, "Turkey's Security Policies," 37.

[37]Zeinelabidin, "Arab-Turkish economic relations," 106.

[38]Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Arab and Turkish public opinion attitudes towards questions of the two nations," Dış Politika, XII, nos.1-2, (June 1985), 41.

[39]Krueger and Aktan, Swimming Against the Tide, 159.

[40]Taner Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri ile Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkilerinin Son On Yılı," in Türk Ekonomisi ve Dış Ticaretindeki Son Gelişmeler, ed. Erkut Onursal (Ankara:

T.C. Başbakanlık ve Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı Ekonomik Araştırmalar ve Değerlendirme Genel Müdürlüğü, 1990), 221.

[41]Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İle,"221.

[42]Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İle,"195.

[43]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 32.

[44]Alkin, "Economic Factors Influencing," 196.

[45]Alkin, "Economic Factors Influencing," 197.

[46]Togan, Olgun and Akder, Report on Developments, 103.

[47]Masudul Alam Choudury, Islamic Economic Cooperation (London: The Macmillan Press, 1989), p.152. Note that the figures are of 1984.

[48]Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece -Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean (London: Frank Caas, 1987), 61.

[49]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 61.

[50]Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece, 61.

[51]Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İle,"213.

[52]Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 111.

[53]Robins, Turkey and the Middle East, 111.

[54]Nevzat Yalçıntaş, "Economic Relations between Turkey and the Islamic countries," Studies in Turkish-Arab Relations, I (1986),319.

[55]Mahmut Bali Aykan, Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Muslim World: 1960-1987 (unpubl. Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1988), 265.

[56]Interview with Türkmen in Ankara, date not given, Hürriyet, April 25, 1982, 1, in JPRS, May 10, 1982, 40, quoted in Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, p.266.

[57]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 266.

[58]FBIS-Western Europe, February 15, 1991, 27.

[59]Süha Bölükbaşı, Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Ortadoğu (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1992?), 25.

[60]Nur Bilge Criss, "Arduous Diplomacy: Turkish-Iranian Relations in the Aftermath of the Islamic Revolution," International Journal of Turkish Studies, forthcoming, 22.

[61]"İran'ın Doğalgaz aldatmacası", Sabah, April 28, 1992, quoted in Criss, "Arduous Diplomacy."

[62]Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İle,"190-1.

[63]Other than oil Turkey's imports from the Middle East include sulphur, phosphate, ammonia, mineral ore, and leather

manufactures. Güven, "Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu Ülkeleri İle," 224.

[64]Zeinelabidin, "Arab-Turkish economic relations," 139.

[65]Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy - The Problems and Possibilities of Détente (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 111.

[66]The concept of weight is similar to power both in its meaning and also regarding its problematic nature. According to Goldmann, weight "denotes the significance to the actor of the third party's relationship to himself and the object." Although it is nearly impossible to measure precisely the significance of one state to another, the author nevertheless, claims that "meaningful judgments can often be made" which may prove to be enough for the purposes of this study. Goldmann, Change and Stability, 35.

[67]Influence can be defined as the means a state uses to change or sustain the behavior of another state. Power, in this sense, becomes the "general capacity of a state to control the behavior of others."(141) The act of influencing is a relationship and a process. States use resources to influence other states. Power comprises all. It is a means; it is based on resources; it is a relationship and a process; and it is a quantity that can be measured, at least crudely. Although power is an integral part of all political relationships, in international politics, it yields itself through the act of influencing. K.J. Holsti, International Politics - A Framework for Analysis, 5th ed. (Englewood Cliff, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988), 140-156.

[68]Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile: the Soviet Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p.XI, quoted in Süha Bölükbaşı, Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 8-9.

[69]Holsti, International Politics, 154.

[70]Holsti, International Politics, 154-155.

[71]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 35.

[72]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 34.

[73]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 34.

[74]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 110.

[75]Kemal Karpat defines Turkish policy during the era as a policy of "almost passive acquiescence" to the decisions of the NATO and the U.S. Kemal H. Karpat, "Introduction," in

Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974, comp. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 4.

[76]Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Ortadoğu*, 2.

[77]According to Aykan, the Arab-Israeli dispute was considered by the Democratic Party government "as distracting the Arabs from the Soviet menace" that they "urged them to recognize Israel and negotiate a peace treaty that would free them to begin dealing with the Soviet threat (Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 1950s to the 1990s," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25 (1993), 92). Menderes' view of the 1957 crisis with Syria was similar that he considered the Syrian crisis not to be a matter between Turkey and Syria but "a phase and reflection of a great struggle between the two blocs." Kemal Girgin, *T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız -70 Yılın Panoraması : 1923-1993* (Ankara: ?, 1993), 32.

[78]Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External Contexts," in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, ed. John Chipman (London: Routledge, 1988), 297.

[79]Bölükbaşı, *Türkiye ve Yakınındaki Ortadoğu*, 8.

[80]Turkish Minister of State Fatin Rüştü Zorlu's speech at the Bandung Conference (April 1955) and the estrangement this caused in Turkey's relations with the Third World is often quoted as a proof of how alliance with the United states harmed Turkey's relations with the Middle East. It is true that Turkey attended the Conference Under U.S. influence, Turkey's earlier "refusal" of invitations to attend the second Asian Conference assembled in New Delhi in January 1949 (Peter Calvocoressi, *International Politics Since 1945* [New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968], 259) and the First International Islamic Conference assembled in Karachi in January 1955 (Richard D. Robinson," Developments Respecting Turkey," *A.U.F.S. Reports*, vol.I, 83, quoted in Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri: 1947-1964*, (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1979), 121.) are indicative of its indifference to Third World affairs. Furthermore, Zorlu's "performance" at Bandung was praised in the U.S. Congress and was used to justify an increase in aid to Turkey. Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri*, 121-122.

[81]Barry Rubin, "U.S. Middle East Policy in the Turkish Context," in *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, ed. George S. Harris (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985), 79.

[82]Nigel John Ashton, "The Hijacking of a Pact: the Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American tensions in the Middle

East, 1955-58," Review of International Studies 19 (1993), 123-137.

[83]Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Orta Doğusu'na Karşı Politikası: 1945-1970 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 11-12.

[84]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey and the Southern Flank," 300.

[85]James W. Spain, American Diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (New York: Praeger, 1984), 57. See pp.49-68 for author's analysis of "third party factor" in U.S. relations with Turkey.

[86]Milliyet, 13 February 1979, 8.

[87]Milliyet, 16 February 1979, 5.

[88]Ali Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change," in Politics and Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Douglas T. Stuart (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), 165.

[89]Anatolia, 1050 GMT, October 7, 1981, in FBIS, October 9, 1981, T1, quoted in Mahmut Bali Aykan, Ideology and National Interest in Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Muslim World: 1960-1987 (unpubl. Ph.d. diss., University of Virginia, 1988), 232.

[90]Cumhuriyet, March 26, 1991, 10, quoted in Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 105.

[91]Ian O. Lesser, Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), 42.

[92]Aykan, "The Palestinian Question," 106.

Chapter V:

[1]The problem with studying the consistency, centrality or testability of policies is that the main source, which is the official statements by the policy makers may be misleading. Since policy makers design their statements to minimize the cognitive problems of pursuing the policies they advocate, the researcher may have to use his/her imagination to read between the lines. The approach that is adopted here, the intuitive approach, should be designed so as to minimize the risk of the analyst's reading too imaginatively between the lines. Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 117-8.

[2]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 36.

[3]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 36.

[4]George McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection (New York: St Martin's Press, 1990), 140.

[5]George S. Harris, Troubled Alliance (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1972), 127.

[6]Hamit Batu, "Turkish Foreign Policy in a Changing World," Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations 6 (1991), 86.

[7]Kemal Girgin, comp. T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politika (70 Yılın Panoraması) 1923-1993 (Ankara: ? , 1993); also see then deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Murat Karayalçın's article in Yeni Türkiye ("Yeni Ufuklar ve Türkiye," Yeni Türkiye 1 [Mart-Nisan 1995], 45-7).

[8]Mahmut B. Aykan, Turkey's Role in the Organization of Islamic Conference: 1960-1992 -The Nature of Deviation from the Kemalist Heritage (New York: Vantage Press, 1994), 200.

[9]Nur Bilge Criss, "Arduous Diplomacy: Turkish-Iranian Relations in the Aftermath of the Islamic Revolution," International Journal of Turkish Studies, forthcoming,25.

[10]Birol Yeşilada, "Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East," The political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, eds. Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tünay, Birol Yeşilada (Westport, Conneticut: Praege, 1993), 176.

[11] İsmet G. İmset, "Playing Deaf and Dumb with Iran," Turkish Probe,March 9, 1993, 5-7.

[12]"Islamic Terrorism: Turks see through Iranian Veil," Turkish Probe, February 9, 1993, 2-4.

[13]See Under-Secretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nüzhet Kandemir's statement in April 3, 1989 about the government decision ("Document II," Turkish Review of Quarterly Digest 4 (1989), 161-4.

[14]Semih İdiz, "An Unholy Alliance," Turkish Probe, February, 16, 1993, 3-4.

[15]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 37.

[16]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 37.

[17]Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğu'suna Karşı Politikası (1945-1970), (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 36-7.

[18]"Prime Minister Özal's Statement to the Seminar," Turkey: An Active Partner in Western-Middle Eastern Economic Relations: Seminar Papers, Erol Manisalı, ed. (İstanbul: ?, 1985), 9.

[19]Mahmut B. Aykan, Ideology and National Interest in Turkish foreign policy Towards the Muslim World: 1960-1987 (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1988), 112.

[20]Tansu Çiller, "Turkey and NATO: Stability in the vortex of change," NATO Review (April 1994), 6.

[21]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 111.

[22]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 111.

[23]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 23.

[24]Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.

[25]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 23.

[26]Jervis resembles this mechanism that brings about the stability of beliefs to the functioning of what Thomas Kuhn calls "normal science," or "puzzle-solving science." According to Kuhn, the process through which the existing theory, or what he calls a paradigm is able to be account for a mass of incoming data simply by ignoring discrepant information is how normal science, i.e., science within the accepted paradigm, functions. As Kuhn puts it "Lifelong resistance, particularly from those whose productive careers have committed them to an older tradition of normal science is not a violation of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research itself. The source of resistance is the assurance that the older paradigm will ultimately solve all its problems, that nature can be shoved into the box the paradigm provides. Inevitably, at times of revolution, that assurance seems stubborn and pig-headed as indeed sometimes it becomes. But it is also something more. That assurance is what makes normal science or puzzle-soling science possible" (Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, 150-1, quoted in Robert Jervis, "Hypothesis on Misperception," International Politics, 2nd ed., eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis [U.S.A.: Harper Collins Publishers, 1985], 511-2). This is why stability of one's beliefs or the capacity of his/her beliefs to cope with discrepant information should not be labeled as 'cognitive distortion' (Art & Jervis, 512). That is how policy is made and protected against unnecessary alterations which may occur because of wrong or misleading data. And this is also what testability, as a stabilizer of foreign policy, is about.

[27]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 23.

[28]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 38.

[29]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 38.

[30]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 38.

[31]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 39.

[32]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 122.

[33]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 106.

[34]Mahmut B. Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish foreign policy from the 1950s to the 1990s," International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (1993), 94.

[35]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 114.

[36]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 112.

[37]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 114.

[38]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 114.

[39]Aykan, Ideology and National Interest, 114.

Chapter VI:

[1]Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 43.

[2]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 39.

[3]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 44.

[4]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 44.

[5]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 45.

[6]One point which should be underlined here is that what is meant by institutionalization is the evolution of a practice and custom in foreign policy making, not the establishment of government institutions.

[7]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 46.

[8]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 46.

[9]See the two mentioned government programs in Kemal Girgin, T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız (70 Yılın Panoraması (Ankara: ?, 1993), 48&52.

[10]Girgin, T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız, 52.

[11]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 47.

[12]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 49.

[13]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 49-50.

[14]Haluk Ülman and Oral Sander, "Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler: (1923-1968) II," A.Ü.S.B.F. Dergisi, (1972), 12.

[15]Mahmut Dikerdem, Direnenler-Barışın Savunmasıdır, (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1990), 75-77; İsmail Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz, (İstanbul: SİSAV, 1993), 37.

[16]Selim Deringil, "Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk," in Turkish foreign policy- New Prospects, ed. C.H. Dodd (Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, 1992), 7.

[17]Deringil, "Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk," 5.

[18]Deringil, "Turkish foreign policy since Atatürk," 7-8.

[19]Duygu Sezer, Kamuoyu ve Dış Politika (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 153.

[20]Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Development of Turkish-Arab relations: A historical appraisal," in Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 17.

[21]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 49.

[22]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 50.

[23]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 51.

[24]William Hale, "Turkey, NATO and the Middle East, in Foreign Policy issues in the Middle East, ed. Richard Lawless (Durham: Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1985), 44-5.

[25]Nebil İlseven, "Körfez Bunalımı ve Türkiye," in Ortadoğu Sarunları ve Türkiye (Ankara: SESAV, 1991, 72.

[26]The results of a survey conducted in August 1990, immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, is indicative of Turkish public's views about Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East. According to the results of this survey, the majority of the Turkish people (61.4%) were against Turkish involvement in the war, but supported Turkey's policies such as cutting the pipeline. An even greater majority of the people (67.0%) considered Turkey as a European country but/and wanted the strengthening of relations with the Muslim world (59.3%) (111-113). Thus, although it seems that the Turkish people have an opinion about foreign policy matters the fact that 56.5% of the people surveyed did not know what NATO is, is indicative of the weak role Turkish public opinion may, if ever, play in shaping Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East.

[27]Mümtaz Soysal, Dış Politika ve Parlamento (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1964).

[28]See Soysal (Dış Politika ve Parlamento, 220-3) for an account of how İnönü made use of government's hesitance to inform the opposition about foreign policy matters in justifying why his party has been unable to come up with any alternatives.

[29]See WP leader Necmettin Erbakan's article in Yeni Türkiye ("Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası Nasıl Olmalı?" Yeni Türkiye 1

[Mart-Nisan 1995], 58-61. See also the articles by the leaders of other Turkish political parties in the same issue.

[30]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 134.

[31]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 52-3.

[32]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 135.

[33]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 52-3.

[34]Duygu Sezer, "Turkish foreign policy in the year 2000," in Turkey in the Year 2000 (Ankara: Turkish Political Science Association, 1989) 69.

[35]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 135.

[36]Girgin, T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız.

[37]See Şerif Mardin, .("Turkey and the Gulf Crisis," in The Gulf Crisis: Background and Consequences, ed. İbrahim İbrahim [Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992]) for a review of the views voiced against government policies.

Chapter VII:

[1]Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Preinceton University Press, 1988), 54.

[2]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 55.

[3]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 173.

[4]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 56.

[5]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 56-7.

[6]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 57.

[7]Kemal Girgin, Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz (Teşkilat ve Protokol) (Ankara: T.T.K. Basımevi, 1992).

[8]See Kâmuran Gürün's memoirs (Akıntıya Kürek: Bir Büyükelçinin Anıları... [İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994]) for his account of how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' powers on economic matters were curtailed and how this affected Turkey's economic relations at a critical stage when Turkey was trying to enter the European Economic Community.

[9]See Gencer Özcan, "Türk Dış Politikasında Eşgüdüm Sorunu Üzerine Düşünceler," Toplum ve Ekonomi 6 (May 1994), for an analysis of the problem of lack of coordination in Turkish foreign policy.

[10]Mehmet Gönlübol,"Türkiye'nin 1980'li yıllardaki dış politikasının bir değerlendirmesi," in Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Mehmet Gönlübol, et al. (Ankara: Alkım Kitabevi, 1990), 626; İsmail Soysal, Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz,(İstanbul: SİSAV, 1993), 37.

[11]Özcan; Murat Yetkin, Ateş Hattında Aktif Politika (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1992), 244-5; Kâmuran İnan, Dış Politika, 2nded.(İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat, 1994), 24, 65, 85, 103, 116. İnan in his analysis on Turkish foreign policy, points to the competition rather than coordination among the various segments of the bureaucracy.

[12]Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu, "Officers: Westernization and Democracy", in Turkey and the West- Changing Political and Cultural Identities, ed. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü, and Heinz Kramer (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), 24.

[13]Mehmet Gönlübol, "Türkiye'nin 1980'li yıllardaki dış politikasının bir değerlendirmesi, in Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, Mehmet Gönlübol et al. (Ankara: Alkım Kitabevi, 1990), 628.

[14]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 59.

[15]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 59

[16]Gönlübol, "Türkiye'nin 1980'li yıllardaki," 632.

[17]Gönlübol, "Türkiye'nin 1980'li yıllardaki," 627; Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı Politikası (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1972), 185. See also Oral Sander's views in Dünya Nereye Gidiyor? Atatürk İlkeleri Işığında Türkiye ne Yapmalı? (?: Hava Harp Okulu Yayınları, 1994), 45, where the author argues that Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, to this day, remained undetermined, which substantiates the views of the first two authors.

[18]Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Security Policy: Continuity and Change,"in Politics and Security in the Suthern Region of the Atlantic Alliance, ed. Doglas T. Stuart (London: Macmillan Pres, 1988), 166.

[19]İnan, Dış Politika, 90-91.

[20]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 60.

[21]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 60.

[22]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 60-1.

[23]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 61.

[24]Gönlübol, "Türkiye'nin 1980'li yıllardaki," 626.

[25]İnan, Dış Politika, 103.

[26]İnan, Dış Politika, 86.

[27]Kürkçüoğlu, Türkiye'nin Arap Ortadoğusu'na Karşı,105.

Chapter VIII:

[1]Kjell Goldmann, Change and Stability in Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 70-1.

[2]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 75.

[3]Goldmann, Change and Stability, 194.

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