



# Who wants the contrat de travail unique ? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France

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## Who wants the *contrat de travail unique* ? Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France

Bruno AMABLE

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# Who wants the *contrat de travail unique*?

## Social support for labour market flexibilisation in France

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### Abstract:

A policy proposal is to abolish the distinction between regular open-end employment contracts and fixed-term contracts and substitute a unique labour contract with a degree of employment protection increasing with tenure. A question on the desirability of the "*contrat unique*" was included in the 2012 post-electoral survey. Using the answers to this question, this paper proposes an empirical analysis of the possible social basis for the *contrat unique*. Insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of the estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. The bulk of the social support for the CTU is made of "insiders". The social support for the *contrat unique* resembles the traditional social base of the Right with the addition of some "outsiders".

**Keywords:** *contrat de travail unique*/ single labour contract, insider/outsider, political economy

**JEL classification:** J41, P16

### Qui veut le contrat de travail unique ?

#### La base sociale favorable à la flexibilisation du marché du travail en France

### Résumé:

Une proposition de réforme du marché du travail est de substituer un contrat de travail unique, dont la protection se renforcerait avec la durée dans l'emploi, aux contrats à durées déterminées et indéterminées. Une question de l'enquête post-électorale 2012 porte sur ce contrat. Cet article utilise les réponses pour tenter de cerner la base sociale susceptible de soutenir une réforme majeure de flexibilisation du marché du travail. Les théories insiders/outsiders prédisent que les insiders devraient s'opposer à cette réforme alors que les outsiders y seraient favorables. Les résultats obtenus ne vont pas dans ce sens. Le cœur de la base sociale du contrat unique est composé d'insiders. Cette base sociale ressemble à la base électorale de la droite avec l'addition de certains groupes d'outsiders.

**Mots clés:** contrat de travail unique, *insider/outsider*, économie politique

**Classification JEL:** J41, P16

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## 1. Introduction

Since at least the beginning of the 1990s, it has become increasingly commonplace in the economic policy debate to blame high and persistent unemployment in Europe on the “rigidity” of labour market institutions (Bean, 1994; Siebert, 1997). Although contested (Baker et al., 2005; Howell et al. 2007; Amable et al. 2011; Howell, 2011; Amable and Mayhew, 2011), this view has become prominent in the recommendations made by international organisations: the OECD in its original jobs strategy (1994), the European Employment Strategy (European Commission, 1997), the IMF (2003) or again the OECD (2006) with a reassessment of the 1994 jobs strategy. Strong employment protection legislation is taken to be an impediment to hiring and is considered as a priority area for labour market reform (OECD, 1999, 2007, 2012).

Employment protection legislation (EPL) is also blamed for fuelling dualism on the labour market (Boeri, 2010). A high level of protection would insure labour market “insiders” from macroeconomic shocks, and the employment cost of the necessary adjustment to the business cycle would be borne by “outsiders”, in particular younger workers.<sup>1</sup> This would explain the rise of nonstandard forms of employment (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003a), temporary employment (fixed-term contracts, agency work...) or part time work, as well as the high level of unemployment among young people.<sup>2</sup> The existence of two parallel labour markets,<sup>3</sup> one where workers enjoy the protections of standard employment with “permanent contracts”, and another one where workers have contracts that leave them exposed to all business cycle-related risks, is also considered to be at the root of several economic inefficiencies: an inefficient labour turnover because firms are reluctant to transform temporary contracts into open-end contracts, an inefficient allocation of human resources because opportunities offered to outsiders are limited by the positions held by insiders, or a suboptimal level of training because of the lack of commitment from both employers and temporary workers.

These views have gained prominence in the public policy debate in France, a country that the OECD ranks among those with the highest level of employment protection<sup>4</sup> and where the unemployment rate never went under 7% over the past three decades. The ineffectiveness of economic policy to bring back full employment once led a disillusioned President Mitterrand to claim that everything had been tried out in vain in the fight against unemployment. This lack of success has spurred the partisans of a yet untried answer to the unemployment question: a significant liberalisation of the labour market.

The idea that labour market dualism and rigidities should be strongly diminished has led to the proposition to abolish the legal conditions for the existence of a dual labour market and substitute a single labour contract to the existing permanent and temporary contracts (Blanchard and Tirole 2003b, Camdessus, 2004). The idea was exposed more precisely in a report written by two economists, P. Cahuc and F. Kramarz (2004),<sup>5</sup> who proposed the abolition of the distinction between open-end and fixed-term contracts and the substitution of a *contrat de travail unique* (hereafter CTU), i.e. a single employment contract that would have workers’ rights in terms of benefits and entitlements as well as firms’ firing costs increasing with tenure. Formally, the new contract would be open-end, but firms would be relieved of some of their obligations in case of employment termination: no obligation to propose an alternative employment plan in case of collective dismissal and no obligation to give an economic motive for the termination of the contract and therefore no possibility for a judge to check whether such a motive is valid. The proposed rationale for such a

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<sup>1</sup> On the insider-outsider theory, see Lindbeck and Snower (1988).

<sup>2</sup> For a recent assessment of youth unemployment, see Bell and Blanchflower (2011).

<sup>3</sup> A pioneering work on labour market dualism is Doeringer and Piore (1971).

<sup>4</sup> With a value of 3 for an indicator of employment protection that scales from 0 (least stringent EPL) to 6 (most restrictive EPL). For comparison, the US has an EPL indicator value less than 1 (data are for 2008/2009).

<sup>5</sup> Similar propositions have been made for Italy (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2009).

contract was that the flexibility of the CTU at the beginning of the employment relationship would encourage job creation, whereas the level of protection increasing with tenure would be an incentive to invest in co-specific assets such as training and skills.<sup>6</sup>

One cannot address the issue of labour market flexibility without raising the question of the political economy of labour market reforms (Saint-Paul, 2000). The increasing degree of employment protection associated with the CTU could be an improvement for workers formerly having fixed-term contracts, although they would lose the security attached to the fixed duration of the contract; but the situation of workers formerly holding permanent contracts could be worsened. For these reasons, the proposed implementation of such contracts is generally thought of as a “two-tier” reform, applying to new hires only.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, “insiders” would be concerned too, should they losing their jobs or simply change jobs. Therefore one may expect that the suppression of permanent contracts would be met with the opposition of insiders and the organisations that defend them. The terms of such an opposition between insiders and outsiders are well-known (Saint-Paul, 2000), but the consideration of the public debate on the issue of the CTU as well as the difficulties met by the project point to the existence of other cleavages.

The implementation of the CTU was one of the reforms promised by Nicolas Sarkozy’s during the 2007 Presidential campaign,<sup>8</sup> along with the promise of a ‘*sécurité sociale professionnelle*’. The former would increase labour market flexibility and the latter would represent the security part of what was supposed to represent a French version of flexicurity. Neither the former nor the latter was implemented during Nicolas Sarkozy’s term for lack of a clear social support for the CTU. Proposed by the Prime Minister François Fillon to the social partners shortly after Nicolas Sarkozy’s election, both firms’ and workers’ unions rejected the CTU (Fabre, 2008; Gaudu, 2008). Trade unions considered that implementing it would threaten the security attached to permanent contracts, which still represent over 85% of all wage contracts,<sup>9</sup> and generalise job insecurity. Firms had in 2007 other priorities than the CTU. Labour market flexibility was and still is high on their agenda, but the end of the 35-hour week and the implementation of the so-called “conventional termination” of the labour contract were priority targets in 2007, not the CTU.<sup>10</sup> Besides, neither the MEDEF (the organisation representing large firms) nor the CGPME (representing small and medium-sized firms) wants a single contract to replace interim and short-term contracts, which both organisations find a cheaper alternative. The existence of several contracts satisfies large and small firms alike, and their main objective is to increase flexibility on each type of contract. As a consequence, making the CTU as part of a deal on flexicurity between unions and firms was not possible in 2007. According to an “insider” of the bargaining, the MEDEF’s only preoccupation then was to give ‘as little as possible’ (Verhaeghe, 2011). It is therefore no wonder that nothing came of it.

The issue of the single contract cropped up again shortly before the 2012 Presidential election when the national association of human resources managers (ANDRH) expressed its support for the implementation of the CTU, within a framework of collective bargaining involving competitiveness and employment issues.<sup>11</sup> The reaction of the then Minister of labour and

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<sup>6</sup> However, in 2006, the *Conseil d’Orientation de l’Emploi*, which depends from the Prime Minister and provides expertise on all employment-related topics, pointed out the legal difficulties that the implementation of the CTU could meet. It was likely to be incompatible with the obligation stated in the fourth article of the ILO Convention 158 (Termination of Employment Convention, 1982) to provide a valid reason for the termination of an employment contract.

<sup>7</sup> This would “mechanically” increase dualism (Boeri, 2010).

<sup>8</sup> Sarkozy (2007).

<sup>9</sup> 86.5% in 2011. Source : Insee, enquête Emploi 2011.

<sup>10</sup> The “conventional termination”, which was introduced in the labour law in 2008, is a drastic simplification of employment termination when both employer and employee agree (Fabre, 2008). Between 2008 and 2012, one million of such terminations have taken place.

<sup>11</sup> Assises nationales de l’Association Nationale des DRH, 17 June 2011

employment, Xavier Bertrand, was cautious. The option could be taken into consideration, but only when this could represent a “win-win” solution for both firms and wage-earners. The Centrist candidate to the Presidential election, François Bayrou, included the CTU in his program and promised that fixed-term contracts would be limited to special cases (maternity leave replacements, seasonal jobs...). The single contract is still considered as an objective, at least on paper, by the main party on the Right, the UMP. Both candidates<sup>12</sup> to the presidency of the party of former President Nicolas Sarkozy, in 2012 have expressed their support to the CTU. Besides, the issue came back in the public debate at the beginning of 2013 when the socialist-led government took the initiative of launching a bargaining on employment between trade unions and firms’ organisations, with the objective of finding a “win-win” agreement which could involve trading off labour flexibility for security. Various business personalities more or less loosely linked with the government (e.g. Louis Gallois, former CEO of EADS and SNCF) expressed their support for schemes resembling the CTU.<sup>13</sup>

To sum up, the CTU holds an ambiguous position in the public policy debate: officially taken to be a solution to France’s unemployment problem by political parties of the Right and Centre-Right and promoted by neoliberal think-tanks<sup>14</sup> and numerous mainstream economists, cautiously considered as a possibility in the context of a flexicurity deal by some fractions of the socialist party, but considered with varying degrees of hostility or indifference by the majority of the Left, trade unions and firms’ organisations. The question of the social support to the CTU remains open.

The aim of this article is to check the existence of a social base for a labour market reform such as the CTU. A question on the implementation of the CTU was included in the 2012 French post-electoral survey. In the following, the determinants of the answers to this question will be investigated. The article is organised as follows. Next section reviews the theoretical elements that could explain why some individuals could be more likely to be supportive of a labour market reform such as the CTU than others. The issues of the insider/outsider divide and its empirical implementation are reviewed. Section 3 exposes the empirical strategy adopted. Section 4 discusses the first series of results which check for correlations between different dimensions of social stratification and the support for the CTU. Section 5 considers extended models that incorporate different dimensions. Section 6 concludes.

## **2. Attitudes towards labour contract protection and social characteristics of the individual**

One may consider several hypotheses regarding the possible support for a labour market reform such as the CTU. Individuals finding it difficult to enter the labour market or holding atypical contracts could in principle be favourable to a measure which would not harm their current situation and could improve it in the long run. The insider/outsider divide should therefore be found as a significant explanation for diverging opinions about the desirability of the CTU. Similar arguments can be found in economics (e.g. Saint-Paul, 2000, 2002) as well as political science (Rueda, 2005, 2006). Employment protection is held to protect insiders and individuals as well as organisations (trade unions) and political (social democratic) parties that represent them should be opposed to its dismantling whereas outsiders and employers should support it.

Some theoretical objections to these predictions have been raised. One line of argument is that individuals’ preferences with respect to labour market regulation may not result from a strictly economic rationality (Emmenegger, 2009). Other, social or political, determinants, would explain preferences regarding labour contract regulation. Thus, outsiders may express the same preferences

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<sup>12</sup> Former Prime Minister François Fillon and Jean-François Copé.

<sup>13</sup> Louis Gallois : «Il y a trop d’emplois précaires». Interview in *Le Parisien*, 11 January 2013.

<sup>14</sup> E.g. the Institut Montaigne founded by former CEO of AXA, Claude Bébéar.

as insiders out of working class solidarity for instance.<sup>15</sup> Another possibility is that outsiders may doubt that labour market flexibilisation should lead to an improvement of their career prospects. As mentioned above, the positive employment effect of lower employment protection is a controversial topic among economists, why should there be unanimity on its benefits among outsiders? Other elements may explain why outsiders could express preferences similar to those of insiders: they may have their income partly depend on that of an insider, when living with one in the same household for instance (Pierson, 2001), or they may hope to become insiders themselves, when they have a high skill level for instance, and thus identify with insiders rather outsiders. In short, insider/outsider theory may explain why insiders should oppose labour market deregulation and self-employed or employees in a privileged position on the labour market favour it, but it may be less relevant to explain the preferences of outsiders (Emmenegger, 2009).

These theoretical objections explain also the empirical difficulty to identify outsiders. The most obvious definition of an outsider considers the employment status of the individual (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988). Following this, individuals who are unemployed or are employed with an atypical contract, i.e. not an open-end contract or a voluntarily chosen fixed-term contract, could be considered as outsiders. The characterisation of the outsider status in reference to the employment status has been criticised (Häusermann and Schwander, 2012). What could be labelled “ontological” outsiders may experience periods of typical employment whereas ontological insiders may occasionally be employed with an atypical contract or even be unemployed. The employment status at a given time would therefore be an imperfect signal of the insider/outsider divide. Häusermann and Schwander (2009a,b) propose a definition of socio-structural outsider groups based on occupation and class partly inspired by Oesch (2006). Five ‘post-industrial class groups’ are distinguished: capital accumulators (CA: large employers and self-employed professionals), socio-cultural professionals (SCP: teachers, nurses, librarians...), blue-collar workers (BC), low service functionaries (LSF), and mixed service functionaries (MSF: a residual category). These groups are interacted with gender and age since these dimensions are commonly taken to be strong indicators of the actual or potential outsider status (Esping-Andersen, 1999). The age variable leads to a classification between young (under-40) and old (over-40). Häusermann and Schwander (2009b) distinguish three degrees of “outsiderness”: strong, medium and low potential. The different categories are given in Table 1. The groups with high outsider potential are young and female low service functionaries and socio-cultural professionals. The classification is made using the ISCO88 classification of activities and the Table of correspondence given in Appendix 1 of Häusermann and Schwander (2009b). Häusermann and Schwander (2009b) distinguish several definitions of insiders and outsiders according to the welfare regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990): Liberal, Nordic, Continental (and Southern).

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<sup>15</sup> These aspects are partly taken into account by economists (e.g. Saint-Paul, 2004) who contend that “ideology” explains individual preferences or that outsiders are “manipulated” by unions. Plugging these elements into an individual rationality-based argument has a strong *ad hoc* flavour though.

Table 1. Insider/outsider classifications according to Häusermann and Schwander (2009a,b)

		Häusermann and Schwander (2009a)		Häusermann and Schwander (2009b)
		Continental regime	Southern regime	
Insiders	Low outsider potential	Male low service functionaries; male socio-cultural professionals; male Blue-collar; mixed service functionaries; capital accumulators	Old male low service functionaries; old socio-cultural professionals; male Blue-collar; mixed service functionaries; capital accumulators	Blue-collar workers; capital accumulators; mixed service functionaries
	Medium outsider potential			Male low service functionaries; old low service functionaries; male socio-cultural professionals; old socio-cultural professionals
outsiders	Strong outsider potential	Female low service functionaries; female Blue-collar; female socio-cultural professionals	Young low service functionaries; old female low service functionaries; young socio-cultural professionals; female Blue-collar	Female low service functionaries; young low service functionaries; female socio-cultural professionals; young socio-cultural professionals

These classifications are questionable. For instance, it is far from certain that the outsider potential of an old male low-skilled blue collar worker is systematically lower than that of a young female worker or that male blue collar workers should be systematically classified in the same category as managers and lawyers. But criticisms of this type could be addressed to the bulk of the literature based on the insider/outsider divide. Häusermann and Schwander (2009a) make further distinctions according to the level of skills according to the ISCO-88 classification and the level of education (the high-skilled have completed a higher secondary education, the low-skilled have completed a below higher secondary education).



### 3. Empirical strategy

Tests will be performed on the influence of individual characteristics on the answers to the question concerning the CTU included in the 2012 post-electoral survey: *'Would you be in favour or against the implementation of a single employment contract replacing the fixed-term and open-end contracts? Dismissal would be easier than with an open-end contract but dismissal indemnities would increase with tenure'*. Four possibilities to answer were given, excluding the possibility to be neither in favour nor against: very much in favour; rather in favour; rather against; very much against. Results of the survey for that question are given in Table 2. 38% of the respondents are broadly in favour of such a measure whereas almost half the respondents are opposed to it. For comparison, poll results published in January 2013 indicated that 72% of the population were opposed to the end of the open-end contract<sup>16</sup> against 26% in favour of it. Another poll (*Harris Interactive pour la CGT*, September 2012) asked for opinion about various possible measures to fight unemployment and gave the following figures: 61% of the respondents were opposed to labour market flexibilisation through easier hire and fire whereas 37% were favourable to it.

In the post-electoral survey used hereafter, 12.8% of the respondents express no opinion on the CTU, almost all of them giving a 'do not know' answer to the question. This not negligible percentage may have to do with the absence of a neutral answer (neither in favour nor against) but may also reflect that some respondents may not feel concerned by the CTU because they are no longer part of the active population for instance. For these reasons, the "no response" will be analysed separately.

Table 2. Distribution of answers to the question on the CTU.

Answer	Percentage of respondents		
very much in favour	8.3%	}	38.0%
somewhat in favour	29.7%		
somewhat against	27.9%	}	49.2%
very much against	21.3%		
No response	12.8%		12.8%

Tests will be performed according to the following sequence. A first step will be to see what types of individuals do not express an opinion on the CTU. A dichotomous variable is considered, taking the value 1 when the individual has given a "no response" and zero otherwise. Specific estimations will be performed on this variable. A second step will take all the ordered choice answers to the CTU question, i.e. taking out the "no response", and make an ordered probit estimation. For robustness purposes, answers to the CTU question are then dichotomised in two directions: first gathering the very favourable and somewhat favourable answers in a pro-CTU dummy variable and second gathering the very unfavourable and somewhat unfavourable answers in a contra-CTU variable. Probit estimations will be performed with both variables as dependent variables. Since these last estimations are made on the whole sample, another robustness check will be performed by restricting the sample to individuals that have expressed an opinion on the CTU, i.e. by removing the "no response". Last, a Heckman two-step estimation will be made on the dichotomised variable expressing the support to the CTU in order to check whether the "no response" alter the conclusions

<sup>16</sup> Poll made by BVA: Baromètre de l'économie, janvier 2013. The question was less precise than that of the *enquête post-électorale* and did not mention explicitly the CTU but the transformation of the open-end contract in order to facilitate hiring.

drawn from the previous estimations taking as selection variables significant variables explaining the “no response” pattern identified in the first-step estimations.

The empirical strategy is not uniquely focused on the issue of the insider/outsider divide but addresses the more general question of how social differentiation affects preferences towards the CTU. In this respect, several dimensions can be taken into account.

*Gender and age.* Employment opportunities are likely to differ according to the gender and the age of the individual. Most contributions to the insider/outsider literature emphasise that young or female individuals are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged by barriers to hiring. A gender variable will be considered (for women) and different age brackets will be included as dummy variables: 18 to 24, 25 to 34, 35 to 44, 45 to 54, 55 to 64, over 65, as well as 25 to 54 (prime age) and over 55.

*Type of activity.* The relevance of the CTU may differ according to the activity of the individual. The answers to the question regarding the activity of the respondent will be used to distinguish: paid full-time job; paid part-time job; school; unemployed; retired; home duties; ill or disabled.

*Sources of household's income.* This is different from the type of activity of the individual but influences the relevance of the CTU too. The following sources of income are considered: wages; self-employment's income; pensions; capital income.

Income and wealth levels as well as education and skills are also potentially important determinants of the attitude towards labour market liberalisation:

*Level of income.* The level of household income is individualised by dividing it by the squared root of the size of the household in order to account for possible intra-household economies of scale. Deciles of this individualised income are then taken into account as explanatory variables.

*Level of wealth of the household.* Five categories are distinguished: over 300000 Euros (corresponding to the 87<sup>th</sup> percentile of the wealth distribution in France), between 150000 (70<sup>th</sup> percentile) and 300000 Euros, between 75000 (46<sup>th</sup> percentile) and 150000 Euros, between 7500 (30<sup>th</sup> percentile) and 75000 Euros and less than 7500 Euros.

*Education level.* The following levels are distinguished, based on the highest level of education attained by the respondent: primary education, secondary (general) education, first level professional education,<sup>17</sup> secondary professional education,<sup>18</sup> higher professional education,<sup>19</sup> first (L) level general higher education, university degree (M or D).

*Insider/outsider.* A central question is how the insider/outsider divide can be taken into account. As mentioned above, one may rely on the employment status of the individual or on some other definition of the outsider potential of the respondent.

Starting with the status-based definition, the typical employment contract will be defined here as an open-end contract for full-time employment or a part-time job because of the individual's own decision. On the other hand, if the individual is unemployed, or works part-time but not because

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<sup>17</sup> Corresponding to the *Certificat d'aptitude professionnelle* (CAP) or *Brevet d'études professionnelles* (BEP).

<sup>18</sup> Corresponding to professional or technical baccalaureates

<sup>19</sup> Corresponding to the University Diploma in Technology and a professional bachelor degree.

of her/his own decision, or has a fixed term contract and earns less than 2000 Euros per month,<sup>20</sup> it will be defined as an outsider and a dummy variable for this status will be entered in the regressions. Defining what an insider is beyond a negative definition (i.e. not an outsider) could be useful too. An insider will be defined as an individual who is civil servant or has an open-end contract in the public or the private sector, or a fixed term contract with a monthly income over 4000 Euros (91th percentile of the French income distribution).<sup>21</sup> The “insider” and “outsider” dichotomous variables thus defined will be considered as explanatory variables. In the sample, 63.4% of the respondents are therefore “insiders”, and 14.4% “outsiders”, 22.2% being neither.

The identification of the insider/outsider definition may be extended in order to take into account the situation of the individual’s partner when there is one. Variables indicating the insider or the outsider status of the partner will therefore be considered.

The other definitions of insider/outsider are based on Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b). Since it is never very clear whether France belongs to the Continental or the Southern welfare state regime, both definitions of insiders and outsiders for respectively the Continental and Southern regime will be considered, in addition to the “post-industrial class groups”.

To complete this analysis, the definition of occupations according to the INSEE PCS 2003 level-2 classification is also considered. For our purpose, the following occupations are distinguished: managers and high-skill (mostly self-employed) professionals; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers; high-skill public sector employees; high-skill private sector employees; medium-skill public sector employees; medium-skill private sector employees; technicians and associate professionals; public sector clerk; private sector clerk; personal services employees; skilled workers; unskilled workers. The distinction between private and public sector employment as well as the differences in skill level and responsibility are important for defining the individual’s assessment of the potential risks and opportunities attached to the CTU.

Additional characteristics worthy of interest are the following. The attitude towards labour market liberalisation is likely to be influenced by the individual’s perception of his or her own labour market risk. This can be directly assessed since a question of the survey asks: *should you lose your current job, how difficult would it be to find another one within the next 12 months?* Possible answers are: very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, and very difficult. These answers will be entered in the estimations as dummy variables for each choice of answer. Other risks could be considered through other questions of the survey. Since the CTU was intended as part of a deal on flexibility, trading off security for flexibility, the stability of the social protection system should be a crucial element in deciding whether the CTU is an acceptable option for wage-earners incurring unemployment risks. A question asks whether the respondent is worried that European integration should lead to less social protection in France. The binary answer (worried/not worried) will be used to construct a dummy variable.

Since the proposition of a single labour contract has a strong partisan character (no Left party ever officially expressed any support for it), it may also be relevant to introduce variables reflecting opinions and votes. Regarding opinions, the questions concerning employment/unemployment may be relevant. A question asks about the degree of approval (four possibilities) of the following proposition: *the unemployed could find work if they really wanted to*. Four dummy variables for the four possible answers will be considered. Another question concerns what the most and second most

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<sup>20</sup> Since no question was asked about the reason for having a fixed-term contract, it is not possible to assess whether the individual has chosen not to have a permanent job. A monthly income of 2000 Euros corresponds to the 61<sup>st</sup> percentile of the French income distribution. The median income is 1660 Euros.

<sup>21</sup> This leaves, among others, individuals with a fixed-term contract and a monthly income between 2000 Euros and 4000 Euros being neither insiders nor outsiders.

important problems facing France are. Dummies for answers corresponding respectively to employment and youth unemployment will be considered. Votes in the first round of the presidential election will give as many dummy variables as candidates. Finally, using the self-positioning of the individual on the Left/Right axis, five dummy variables corresponding to far Left, Left, Centre, Right, and far Right are constructed.

All estimations follow the same procedure, which is adopted in order to obtain parsimonious specifications and limit the risk of spurious regressions. Variables are entered in a model when they are statistically significant and removed when their significance falls below the 10% level.

#### **4. Estimation results**

Estimations were made by considering each type of social and individual differentiation at a time. Results of the estimations are summed up in Table 3, which indicates which variables have obtained significant coefficients. Details of the regression results are given in Appendix. The Table's results must be read as follows. The estimations taking into account the age and gender variable have been made by defining the individuals aged between 18 and 24 as the excluded category. Regarding the estimation for the "no response", individuals aged over 65 and women have a significantly higher probability to give a "no response" to the CTU question than the other respondents; individuals aged between 25 and 44 have a significantly lower probability to give a "no response" to the CTU question than the other respondents. Restricting the sample to respondents who have expressed an opinion on the CTU, the ordered probit estimation indicates that individuals aged over 55 tend to give answers more significantly in favour of the CTU (choices are ordered from very favourable to very unfavourable). The probit estimation on the dichotomous pro-CTU variable confirms that this age group is significantly more in favour of the CTU than the other respondents. Finally the estimation for the contra-CTU variable indicates that individuals aged 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 (but at the 10% significance level) express more than the other respondents a negative opinion on the CTU whereas individuals aged over 55 and women (at the 10% significance level) express such negative opinions less than the other respondents. When one removes the "no response" for the probit estimations concerning the pro- or anti-CTU opinion, only individuals aged 55 and above express a significant difference of opinion with respect to the other respondents (this is indicated in bold characters). The Heckman two-step estimation gives results close to the previous ones and the comparison test leads to reject the independence of the probit and selection equations.

	estimation	Dependent variable	Significant positive influence	Significant negative influence
Age and gender (excluded category: 18-24)	probit	No response	Over 65; women	25-34 and 35-44
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Over 65 and 55-64
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Over 65 and 55-64</b>	
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	25-34; 35-44*	<b>Over 65 and 55-64; women*</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Over 65 and 55-64</b>	
Source of household's income (excluded category: welfare benefits)	probit	No response		wages
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Pensions; property income
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>pensions</b>	
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>wages</b>	<b>Pensions; property income</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Pensions; property income</b>	
Type of activity (excluded category: paid full-time job)	probit	No response	Retired; home duties; students	
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Retired; home duties
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Unemployed; retired</b>	
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU		<b>Unemployed; retired; home duties</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>retired</b>	
Wealth	probit	No response	Wealth unknown; refuse to answer	

(excluded category: less than 7K Euros)	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Wealth over 300K Euros; refuse to answer
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Wealth over 300K Euros</b>	<b>Wealth between 150K and 300K Euros</b>
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Wealth between 150K and 300K Euros</b>	<b>Wealth over 300K Euros; Wealth unknown; refuse to answer</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Wealth over 300K Euros</b>	
Household income  (excluded category: 1 <sup>st</sup> decile)	probit	No response		8 <sup>th</sup> * and 10 <sup>th</sup> deciles
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	3 <sup>rd</sup> decile	5 <sup>th</sup> and 10 <sup>th</sup> deciles
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> deciles</b>	2 <sup>nd</sup> decile*
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	3 <sup>rd</sup> , 8 <sup>th</sup> * and 9 <sup>th</sup> deciles	<b>5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> deciles</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>5<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> deciles</b>	3 <sup>rd</sup> decile
Education level  (excluded category: education unknown)	probit	No response	Primary education; secondary education	higher professional education; professional education
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Primary education; secondary education; tertiary education M and D
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Secondary education; tertiary education M and D</b>	
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU		<b>Primary education; secondary education; first level professional; tertiary education M and D;</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Secondary education; tertiary education M and D</b>	

Education level and age (excluded category: education unknown )	probit	No response	Primary, first level professional and secondary education over 65	Prime age (25-54) professional education, higher professional education and tertiary education L
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	Prime age first level professional, professional and higher professional education; prime age tertiary L; higher professional education 18-24	Tertiary M and D over 55
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		<b>Prime age first level professional, professional and higher professional education; prime age tertiary L; higher professional education 18-24;</b> primary education over 65
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Prime age first level professional, professional and higher professional education; prime age tertiary L; tertiary D under 55;</b> professional education 18-24	primary and secondary education over 65; <b>tertiary D over 55</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	Tertiary M and D over 55	Primary education over 65; prime age first level professional and education; young and prime age professional and higher professional education; young and prime age tertiary M and D; young tertiary L

Table 3. Estimation results summary: statistically significant variables.

It seems therefore that individuals that would not be that much affected by the CTU (most individuals over 65 and a certain fraction of those over 55 are pensioners)<sup>22</sup> are less likely to express a precise opinion on that matter, and when they do, they are generally favourable to the implementation of the CTU. On the other hand, those that would be more likely affected (prime age wage-earners) are less likely to give a “no response”, and when they do, they are not particularly favourable to the CTU.

Regressions made on the main source of household’s income confirm the previous pattern. Individuals living on pension and property income are more prone to supporting the CTU than other individuals, in particular wage earners.

This is followed by the regressions on the levels of wealth and income. Estimations with wealth variables indicate that individuals in wealthy households are on average more favourable to the CTU than others. The pattern is less clear regarding income levels. High incomes are less likely to give a “no response” but they are not the only category favourable to the CTU since middle-income earners (5<sup>th</sup> decile) also express favourable opinions.

The differentiation according to education level gives only basic results: respondents with low levels of general education are less likely to have an opinion and highly educated individuals are on average more favourable to the CTU. It is interesting to take the age variable in consideration too because of the specificity of the responses of pensioners/seniors and the fact that the level of education varies substantially with age: seniors are over-represented in the primary education category.<sup>23</sup> The education variables are interacted with four age categories: young (18 to 24), prime age (25-54), 54-65 and over 65. When the categories obtained concern too few individuals, two age categories are grouped together: tertiary education level M or D for instance. The results for these interacted variables are much more informative than when education is taken alone. Prime age individuals, particularly with a professional education, are opposed to the CTU. The only category to be significantly in favour of the CTU is that of highly educated individuals over 55. These respondents have indeed significantly higher income and wealth levels than the other respondents.<sup>24</sup> One may infer from their social position in terms of age, skills and wealth that these individuals may not feel threatened by the implementation of the CTU.

The preliminary conclusions from this first set of results is that the support to the CTU seems to come from individuals who are either not threatened or not concerned by its implementation, which does not speak in favour of the importance of an insider/outsider divide on this matter. To investigate this question in more details, we now turn to the results from estimations using the various definitions of the insider/outsider distinction.

Starting with the employment status-based definition, one sees that both insiders and outsiders (in the restricted or even extended sense) are less likely to give a “no response”. The seemingly more robust result concerns individuals having an insider partner: they are less likely to support the CTU than others. This is a partial confirmation that the insider/outsider status influences the attitude towards the CTU, but the status of the partner seems to matter more and outsiders, either in the extended or the restricted sense), do not express a clear support for the CTU.

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<sup>22</sup> 46% of the 55-64 in the sample.

<sup>23</sup> 40% of the over 65 are in this education category vs. 15% for the sample average.

<sup>24</sup> Conclusions from ordered probit regressions taking respectively the income and wealth levels as dependent variables and the variable indicating the highly educated category as an explanatory variable.



Table 4. The insider/outsider divide.

	estimation	Dependent variable	Significant positive influence	Significant negative influence
Insider/outsider (excluded category: neither insider nor insider)	probit	No response		Insider, insider partner, former unemployed, outsider
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	<b>Insider partner</b>	
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		Insider partner
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	Insider, <b>insider partner</b> , former unemployed, poor, 18 to 24	
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		Insider partner
Continental insider/outsider (excluded category: neither insider nor insider)	probit	No response		Insider; outsider
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		Insider*
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU		
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	Insider; outsider	
Southern insider/outsider (excluded category: neither insider nor insider)	probit	No response		
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response		insider
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Insider; outsider</b>	
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU		
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	Insider	
“post-industrial class groups” (Excluded category: capital accumulators)	probit	No response		MSF; young SCP*
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	<i>Young SCP</i>	
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		<b>Young SCP</b>
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Young SCP; MSF</b>	
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		<b>Young SCP</b>

We turn now to the definitions proposed by Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b). Results are summed up in Table 4. When one adopts the Continental welfare state characterisation, it turns out that both insiders and outsiders support the CTU more than other individuals. With the Southern welfare state characterisation, only insiders are distinguished, but again because they tend to support the CTU more than others. Regarding the definition according to the post-industrial class groups, the most robust result is that young (i.e. under 40) socio-cultural professionals (SCP) are opposed to the implementation of the CTU. This category has, according to Häusermann and Schwander's (2009) classification, a strong outsider potential in Southern welfare states, but not in Continental ones.

Häusermann and Schwander's categories can be crossed with education and skills. The results of the regressions in Appendix Tables 12 to 15 can be summed up as follows. For both the Southern welfare state- and the continental welfare state-based definition, low education (i.e. under the baccalaureate level) outsiders as well as both low and high education insiders are more favourable to the CTU than other individuals. Taking the distinction in three degrees (strong, medium, low) of the outsider potential (see Table 2) in interaction with education, one obtains that low education strong outsider potential individuals and, more significantly, high education medium outsider potential individuals support the CTU more than others. Taking skills into account, one obtains that the categories the more favourable to the CTU are low-skill outsiders and both high- and low-skill insiders according to the Southern welfare state-based definition.<sup>25</sup>

The conclusions one can draw from these results are: (i) some insiders tend to be favourable to the CTU, which contradicts most predictions taken from the insider/outsider literature; (ii) low education or low skill outsiders tend to support the CTU, which is what most insider/outsider theories would predict; (iii) high skill or education outsiders do not particularly support the CTU, which is not what could have expected on the basis of the insider/outsider literature. The outcome is therefore a *partial* confirmation of the insider/outsider predictions. The differentiation of outsiders' attitudes according to skills or education is somewhat surprising. The mechanism on which the CTU is based is to progressively grant protection to employees with job tenure. One could have expected that this progressive entry into a "pseudo-insider" status could have been perceived as beneficial by skilled outsiders, who could be confident in their ability to stay employed once they can get a job. On the other hand, the risk of staying in precarious jobs is certainly higher among low-skill outsiders, and the CTU would not enable them to eventually reach the pseudo-insider status. Therefore, one could have expected high-skill/education outsiders to be more favourable to the CTU than low-skill/education outsiders, which is not what comes out of the estimations.

A more precise characterisation of the socio-professional groups supporting the CTU may be obtained with the help of the INSEE-PCS 2003 classification. The support to the CTU comes from some high-skill categories (managers and high-skill employees of the private sector) and one low-skill group (personal services). The opposition to the CTU is mainly that of unskilled workers and, less significantly, skilled workers. As mentioned before, the age variable plays a role in the attitude towards the CTU. The previous estimations suggest that the age of 55 is a dividing line between pro- and anti-CTU. The INSEE categories are therefore interacted with age (under or over 55). Results with the categories interacted with age show a relatively clear pattern. For almost any skill level and many occupations in the public or the private sector, the categories favourable or not hostile to the CTU are populated with individuals over 55. Besides, the higher the skill level, the higher support to the CTU: managers and high-skill employees are markedly more in favour of the CTU than medium-skill

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<sup>25</sup> Results with the Continental welfare state-based definition are not significant.

workers. The exception is personal service workers,<sup>26</sup> where the adhesion to the CTU can be observed both over and under 55. This group cannot be characterised as a strictly outsider group according to the definition based on employment status: there is no predominance of atypical contracts. According to our status-based definition, 32.5% of this group has the outsider status and 54% the insider status. On the other hand, it would be defined as an outsider group when one adopts the definitions based on the type of welfare state (either continental or southern)<sup>27</sup> and have predominantly a strong outsider potential according to the definition of Häusermann and Schwander (2009b).<sup>28</sup> But the CTU is the only issue where personal service workers have the same policy expectations as the other pro-CTU groups. Otherwise, they have the same pattern of expectation as most other workers: for instance, they are mostly favourable to giving the priority to wages over competitiveness as an economic policy objective. One may note however that they tend to agree with the opinion that the unemployed could find a job if they wanted too, along with other workers as well as shopkeepers. They have also the same difficulties on the labour market as other low/mid-skill private sector wage-earners: a higher propensity to have experienced unemployment.

The consideration of the labour market risk variables (Appendix Table 18) reveals that the more an individual is confident about his or her possibility to find a new job after redundancy, the more he or she supports the CTU, which confirms that the employability of an individual makes her or him more supportive of labour market deregulation.

Finally, results with the opinions and vote (Table 6) variable confirm the Right bias of the individuals in favour of the CTU. Individuals that do not think that the unemployed could easily find a job if they wanted to or who are worried about the consequences of European integration for the stability of the social protection system are opposed to the CTU whereas those who think that employment is a problem tend to support it. Last, opponents to the CTU are found among Left voters (i.e. respondents who voted for the main Left candidates at the first round of the 2012 presidential election: François Hollande and Jean-Luc Mélenchon) and respondents who consider themselves as Left or far Left. Including the Left-Right partisan variable itself (11 modalities) confirms that the more Right an individual considers himself or herself, the more supportive of the CTU he or she is (Appendix 21).

To sum up, the first investigations reveal a series of cleavages relative to the CTU: age, income and wealth, skills or education or socio-professional categories which partly overlap with various definitions of the insider/outsider distinction, and political leanings or opinions. These cleavages are not independent from one another, individuals over 55 are more likely to lean towards the Right than other individuals, the same applies for the relatively skilled occupations of the private sector. As mentioned before, the various insider/outsider definitions do not lead to very clear conclusions. If anything, insiders, whatever the definition, or at least some of them, tend to support the CTU whereas the preferences of outsiders are more difficult to assess. The most informative differentiation of individuals is the one that crosses age with INSEE categories. Therefore, it will be the basis of the extended models which are presented in the next section.

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<sup>26</sup> This group is characterized as follows with respect to the ISCO88 classification: 3.5% group 4 (Office clerks); 60.5% group 5 (protective and personal services workers); 36% group 9 (Sales and services elementary occupations).

<sup>27</sup> Close to 90% of that group have outsider statuses thus defined.

<sup>28</sup> It is also a predominantly female group (over 90%).

Table 5. Occupations

	estimation	Dependent variable	Significant positive influence	Significant negative influence
Occupation (Excluded category: not classified)	probit	No response	Low-skill workers	Technicians; med. Skill private sector*
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	Skilled and low-skill workers; medium-skill public sector employees	Managers and professionals; personal service employees
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Managers and professionals; personal service employees; high-skill public* and private sector</b>	Low-skill workers*
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Skilled workers; medium-skill public sector employees*</b>	<b>Managers and professionals; personal service employees</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	Managers and professionals; high-skill private sector employees; personal service employees	Skilled and unskilled workers
Occupation interacted with age (Excluded category: not classified)	probit	No response	Low-skill workers over 55; craftsmen and shopkeepers over 55; public sector clerks over 55; private sector clerks over 55	Skilled worker under 55; private sector clerks under 55; technicians and associate professionals under 55
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	medium-skill public sector employees under 55; skilled workers under 55	managers and high-skill professionals over 55; high-skill private sector employees over 55; high-skill public sector employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers over 55; personal services employees over 55; technicians and associate professionals over 55; personal services employees under 55
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>managers and high-skill professionals over 55; high-skill private sector employees over 55; high-skill public sector employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers over 55; personal services employees over 55; technicians and associate professionals over 55; personal services employees under 55; private sector clerks over 55; medium-skill private</b>	

		<b>sector employees over 55; medium-skill public sector employees over 55; public sector clerks over 55</b>	
probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	skilled workers under 55; medium-skill public sector employees under 55; technicians and associate professionals under 55	<b>high-skill private sector employees over 55; high-skill public sector employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers over 55; managers and high-skill professionals over 55; private sector clerks over 55; public sector clerks over 55; personal services employees over 55; technicians and associate professionals over 55; personal services employees under 55; medium-skill private sector employees over 55; medium-skill public sector employees over 55;</b>
Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	high-skill private sector employees over 55; high-skill public sector employees over 55; farmers, craftsmen and shopkeepers over 55; managers and high-skill professionals over 55; private sector clerks over 55; public sector clerks over 55; personal services employees over 55; technicians and associate professionals over 55; personal services employees under 55; medium-skill private sector employees over 55; medium-skill public sector employees over 55;	

	estimation	Dependent variable	Significant positive influence	Significant negative influence
Opinions (excluded category: no answer)	probit	No response		Priority competitiveness; priority wages; important problem: French state vs. EU
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; worried about European integration; favourable to an increase in the number of civil servants	Youth employment is an important problem; satisfaction level with Sarkozy's action for youth employment
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Youth employment is an important problem</b>	<b>Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; worried about European integration; favourable to an increase in the number of civil servants</b>
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; worried about European integration; favourable to an increase in the number of civil servants;</b> important problem: number of civil servants; important problem: French state vs. EU	<b>Employment is an important problem</b>
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	<b>Employment is an important problem</b>	<b>Disagree and strongly disagree to lazy unemployed; worried about European integration</b>
Vote (excluded category: no vote)	probit	No response	Refusal to answer	Mélenchon; Bayrou*
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no response	J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande; P. Poutou*; refusal to answer*	F. Bayrou; N. Sarkozy
	Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	F. Bayrou; <b>N. Sarkozy</b> ; M. Le Pen	Refusal to answer; <b>J.L. Mélenchon*</b>
	probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande</b> ; P. Poutou	
	Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		J.L. Mélenchon; F. Hollande
Self- positioning left/right	probit	No response		Far Left; left
	Ordered probit	Ordered choice excluding no		Significant negative coefficient with the ordered choice variable: the more (Right-) Left-wing the

(excluded category : no answer)	response		individual, the more (favourable) unfavourable to the CTU
Probit	Binary choice: pro CTU	Far right; right; centre	
probit	Binary choice: contra CTU	<b>Far Left; left;</b> centre; right*	
Heckman two-step probit	Binary choice: pro CTU		Far Left; left

Table 6. Opinions and votes

## 5. Extended models

To simplify matters, the extended models will focus on the dichotomised variable expressing support for the CTU. The estimation procedure is similar to the one adopted so far: only significant variables are introduced and kept in the models presented.<sup>29</sup>

The model based on the interaction between age and socio-professional categories is extended to take into account the characteristics of individuals that have other types of activity: school, unemployed, retired, home duties. The possibility of a gender-specific influence is also considered by potentially reintroducing the corresponding variable. Also, since the presence of an insider partner was seen to be correlated with the opposition to the CTU, this variable is introduced too. Other variables possibly entering the model are those characterising some aspects of the insider/outsider divide: a dummy when the respondent says that he or she is having difficulties to make ends meet, dummies for the type of employment contract (open-end or fixed term) and whether it is an involuntary part-time job.

A further extension considers the variables characterising labour market risk, i.e. whether it would be easy or difficult to find a new job in case of redundancy, and the appreciation of the role of European integration for the stability of the social protection system. Then, a third series of estimations will consider the possibility of introducing variables characterising the political leaning of the respondent and whether he or she is a trade union member. A fourth series adds the variables reflecting the opinion on the unemployed, i.e. whether the respondent think they could find a job easily if they really wanted to (four possibilities). The fifth series modifies how these latter variables are considered and reduces the number of variables to two (easy/difficult to find a job for an unemployed).

Results are presented in Tables 7 to 11. Each table has three columns for, respectively, the estimation results with the whole sample, the restricted sample (respondents who expressed a positive or negative opinion on the CTU) and finally for the Heckman two-step estimation.

Table 7 confirms the results previously obtained with the occupation and age variables, i.e. the support for the CTU among many social categories over 55. The importance of the insider partner as a support-decreasing factor can be noted. No importance of a specific gender effect not already incorporated in socio-professional differentiation is found.

Table 7. Extended models

	Probit	probit	Heckman
retired	0.176*** (0.068)	0.267*** (0.078)	0.155* (0.080)
managers over 55	1.360*** (0.344)	1.177*** (0.348)	1.095*** (0.325)
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	0.623*** (0.166)	0.702*** (0.184)	0.711*** (0.174)
high skill public over 55	0.496*** (0.164)	0.584*** (0.183)	0.587*** (0.173)
unskilled workers under 55	-0.355** (0.168)		
personal services under 55	0.349** (0.163)	0.426** (0.174)	0.388** (0.167)
personal services over 55	0.433** (0.197)	0.491** (0.215)	0.407** (0.205)

<sup>29</sup> We also check that the correlation between explanatory variables does not exceed 0.3.



technicians over 55	0.410** (0.188)	0.390** (0.195)	0.402** (0.185)
insider partner		-0.182** (0.085)	-0.168** (0.083)
home duties		0.385** (0.169)	
farmers over 55		0.423** (0.191)	0.347* (0.182)
constant	-0.430*** (0.040)	-0.321*** (0.050)	-0.379*** (0.050)
<b>selection equation</b>			
primary education over 65			-0.819*** (0.110)
secondary education over 65			-0.527*** (0.148)
prime age first level prof. Educ.			-0.361** (0.157)
prime age prof. Educ.			0.518** (0.212)
prime age tertiary educ. L			0.551** (0.218)
prime age higher prof. Educ.			0.395** (0.193)
woman			-0.177** (0.082)
former unemployed			0.154* (0.088)
insider			0.161* (0.087)
home duties			-0.409** (0.180)
constant			1.240*** (0.107)
athrho constant			0.637** (0.258)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014
Number of censored observations			257
rho			0.563
p-value for comparison test			0.013

Note : Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

The inclusion of opinion variables enriches the model. Individual not worried about the consequences of European integration for the social protection system are more favourable to the CTU than others. In contrast, respondents who are worried about that issue are opposed to the CTU.

Table 8. Extended model

	probit	probit	Heckman
not worried about Europe and social protection	0.258*** (0.068)		
retired	0.143** (0.071)	0.237*** (0.081)	0.163* (0.089)
managers over 55	1.252*** (0.349)	1.091*** (0.351)	1.045*** (0.339)
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	0.552*** (0.167)	0.655*** (0.186)	0.671*** (0.180)
high skill public over 55	0.455*** (0.165)	0.572*** (0.186)	0.583*** (0.179)
unskilled workers over 55	-0.348** (0.169)		
personal services under 55	0.357** (0.164)	0.447** (0.175)	0.429** (0.171)
personal services over 55	0.421** (0.199)	0.529** (0.218)	0.471** (0.214)
technicians over 55	0.412** (0.187)	0.421** (0.195)	0.434** (0.188)
insider partner	-0.159* (0.082)	-0.186** (0.085)	-0.168** (0.085)
worried about Europe and social protection		-0.279*** (0.071)	-0.272*** (0.070)
home duties		0.428** (0.171)	0.335* (0.174)
farmers over 55		0.430** (0.185)	0.378** (0.180)
clerk private sector Over 55		0.291* (0.155)	0.267* (0.149)
constant	-0.460*** (0.050)	-0.134* (0.069)	-0.202*** (0.074)
<b>selection equation</b>			
primary education over 65			-0.834*** (0.110)
secondary education over 65			-0.518*** (0.150)
prime age first level prof. Educ.			-0.353** (0.160)
prime age prof. Educ.			0.514** (0.213)
prime age tertiary educ. L			0.545** (0.221)
prime age higher prof. Educ.			0.389** (0.195)
woman			-0.176**

			(0.084)
former unemployed			0.157*
			(0.089)
insider			0.163*
			(0.087)
home duties			-0.340*
			(0.184)
constant			1.237***
			(0.107)
athrho			0.482*
Constant			(0.278)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014
Number of censored observations			257
rho			0.448
p-value for comparison test			0.083

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

The following estimations do not change the previous results but add a political dimension to the attitude towards the CTU (Table 9). The more left the individual, the more opposed to the CTU, as was found previously. One may note that the unemployed seem to be favourable to the CTU with this specification.

Table 9. Extended models

	probit	probit	Heckman
not worried about Europe and social protection	0.257***		
	(0.068)		
retired	0.129*	0.302***	0.242***
	(0.072)	(0.080)	(0.085)
managers over 55	1.244***	1.044***	0.970***
	(0.345)	(0.349)	(0.334)
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	0.568***	0.587***	0.581***
	(0.167)	(0.188)	(0.180)
high skill public over 55	0.454***	0.599***	0.589***
	(0.166)	(0.184)	(0.177)
unskilled workers over 55	-0.333**		
	(0.168)		
far Right	0.220**		
	(0.091)		
personal services under 55	0.370**	0.421**	0.397**
	(0.164)	(0.177)	(0.173)
insider partner	-0.170**	-0.178**	-0.161*
	(0.081)	(0.086)	(0.085)
technicians over 55	0.423**	0.428**	0.418**
	(0.187)	(0.196)	(0.189)
personal services over 55	0.404**	0.519**	0.439**
	(0.200)	(0.219)	(0.213)

worried about Europe and social protection	-0.249*** (0.071)	-0.245*** (0.069)
far Left	-0.316*** (0.088)	-0.310*** (0.086)
Left	-0.224*** (0.082)	-0.220*** (0.079)
home duties	0.437** (0.171)	0.334* (0.172)
unemployed	0.260** (0.130)	0.254** (0.127)
farmers over 55	0.360* (0.186)	
constant	-0.483*** (0.052)	-0.125 (0.079)
<b>selection equation</b>		
primary education over 65		-0.829*** (0.110)
secondary education over 65		-0.527*** (0.149)
prime age first level prof. Educ.		-0.350** (0.160)
prime age prof. Educ.		0.520** (0.213)
prime age tertiary educ. L		0.544** (0.220)
prime age higher prof. Educ.		0.395** (0.194)
woman		-0.173** (0.083)
former unemployed		0.160* (0.088)
insider		0.167* (0.087)
home duties		-0.339* (0.183)
constant		1.231*** (0.107)
athrho		0.508**
constant		(0.242)
Number of Obs	2014	1757
Number of censored observations		257
rho		0.468
p-value for comparison test		0.036

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

As can be seen in Table 10, the opinion about the unemployed is also correlated with the attitude towards the CTU, in a rather unsurprising way: individuals who disagree with the statement that the

unemployed could find a job if they really wanted to are not favourable to the CTU. One may note that the variables representing the personal service workers become less significant when the variables expressing the opinion about the unemployed are introduced.

Table 10. Extended models

	probit	probit	Heckman
not worried about Europe and social protection	0.250*** (0.068)		
retired	0.166** (0.070)	0.322*** (0.079)	0.209** (0.087)
lazy unemployed: strongly disagree	-	0.413*** (0.086)	-0.456*** (0.094)
managers over 55	0.413*** (0.086)	-0.456*** (0.094)	-0.433*** (0.093)
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	1.296*** (0.358)	1.004*** (0.367)	1.015*** (0.354)
high skill public over 55	0.545*** (0.169)	0.541*** (0.188)	0.605*** (0.182)
lazy unemployed: disagree	0.547*** (0.165)	0.577*** (0.186)	0.628*** (0.180)
unskilled workers over 55	-	0.228*** (0.070)	-0.261*** (0.075)
unemployed	0.228*** (0.070)	-0.261*** (0.075)	-0.247*** (0.074)
technicians over 55	-0.382** (0.172)		
personal services over 55	0.263** (0.122)	0.296** (0.130)	0.289** (0.128)
worried about Europe and social protection	0.424** (0.190)		0.391** (0.192)
insider partner	0.395** (0.198)		0.372* (0.215)
skilled worker under 55		-0.263*** (0.072)	-0.258*** (0.070)
home duties		-0.199** (0.085)	-0.181** (0.085)
far Left		-0.309** (0.140)	-0.284** (0.138)
personal services under 55		0.407** (0.169)	0.330* (0.173)
constant		-0.169* (0.086)	-0.170** (0.084)
selection equation		0.332* (0.173)	0.327* (0.170)
primary education over 65	-	0.360*** (0.057)	0.001 (0.089)
		0.084 (0.082)	
			-0.865*** (0.111)

secondary education over 65				-0.550*** (0.150)
prime age first level prof. Educ.				-0.371** (0.160)
prime age prof. Educ.				0.556*** (0.213)
prime age tertiary educ. L				0.543** (0.221)
prime age higher prof. Educ.				0.417** (0.197)
woman				-0.160* (0.083)
insider				0.149* (0.085)
home duties				-0.342* (0.185)
constant				1.295*** (0.098)
athrho				0.443* (0.244)
constant				
Number of Obs	2014	1757		2014
Number of censored observations				257
rho				0.416
p-value for comparison test				0.069
Note: Standard errors in parentheses				
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01				

This finding is confirmed in Table 11 where the opinion about the unemployed is dichotomised by regrouping the strongly disagree (agree) and disagree (agree) together.<sup>30</sup>

Table 11. Extended models

	probit	probit	Heckman
unemployed: lazy	0.314*** (0.063)		
not worried about Europe and social protection	0.244*** (0.068)		
retired	0.169** (0.070)	0.276*** (0.081)	0.166** (0.083)
managers over 55	1.335*** (0.354)	1.044*** (0.362)	0.993*** (0.342)
high skill public over 55	0.557*** (0.165)	0.645*** (0.185)	0.650*** (0.177)
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	0.560*** (0.170)	0.579*** (0.190)	0.601*** (0.181)

<sup>30</sup> To avoid including variables with a joint correlation coefficient over 0.3.

unskilled workers over 55	-0.383** (0.172)		
technicians over 55	0.425** (0.189)	0.406** (0.196)	0.422** (0.189)
unemployed	0.260** (0.122)	0.296** (0.130)	0.268** (0.126)
personal services over 55	0.391** (0.198)	0.445** (0.217)	0.367* (0.210)
unemployed: not lazy		-0.297*** (0.069)	-0.278*** (0.068)
worried about Europe and social protection		-0.246*** (0.072)	-0.232*** (0.069)
home duties		0.405** (0.169)	
insider partner		-0.187** (0.086)	-0.175** (0.084)
personal services under 55		0.338* (0.175)	0.305* (0.169)
far Left		-0.257*** (0.089)	-0.249*** (0.086)
skilled worker under 55		-0.300** (0.140)	-0.296** (0.136)
Left		-0.168** (0.083)	-0.160** (0.080)
constant	-0.655*** (0.053)	0.104 (0.084)	0.029 (0.087)

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#### selection equation

primary education over 65	-0.852*** (0.112)
secondary education over 65	-0.550*** (0.148)
prime age first level prof. Educ.	-0.369** (0.158)
prime age prof. Educ.	0.558*** (0.212)
prime age tertiary educ. L	0.548** (0.220)
prime age higher prof. Educ.	0.420** (0.194)
woman	-0.159* (0.082)
insider	0.147* (0.085)
home duties	-0.408** (0.182)
constant	1.296*** (0.097)

athrho			0.569**
constant			(0.242)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014
Number of censored observations			257
rho			0.515
p-value for comparison test			0.019
Note: Standard errors in parentheses			
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***			
p<0.01			

## 6. Conclusion

This article has analysed the determinants of individual attitudes towards a significant labour market reform: the substitution of the CTU, a unique labour contract with limited protection increasing with tenure, to both open-end and fixed-term contracts. The insider/outsider theories would predict that insiders would oppose such a reform whereas outsiders would welcome it. Beyond the theoretical and empirical problems associated with the definition and identification of insiders and outsiders, the results of the various estimations do not bring an overwhelming support for the insider/outsider theories. Positive attitudes towards the CTU come mostly from individuals that would broadly be defined as insiders: they are wealthy, senior, have medium or high education/skill levels or responsibility positions in the public or the private sector, they are confident about their employability or are not likely to be affected themselves by any labour market reform (they are retired for instance). These characteristics identify groups close to the Right electorate. Indeed, Left voters express a dislike of the CTU and more generally, the differentiation of pro- and anti-CTU can be analysed in relation with a certain number of opinions that define a broad Left/Right cleavage: the danger that European integration could represent for the welfare state, the willingness to work of the unemployed, etc. These findings are compatible with the fact that the proposition of a CTU has been carried by Right or Centre-Right parties so far.

Some elements of the insider/outsider theories receive some support in the data. For instance, individuals that have an insider partner tend to have negative opinions of the CTU. Also, some groups that can be defined as outsiders do support the CTU: possibly the unemployed but above all the personal services workers. This group cannot be considered as an outsider group according to the employment status, but other definitions of the outsider status such as those of Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b) would have that group classified among the outsiders. However, characterisations in terms of insiders or outsiders, whether based on the employment status or defined such as in Häusermann and Schwander (2009a, b) are not precise enough to identify the groups favourable to a labour market liberalisation reform such as the CTU.

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## Appendix. Regression results

### 1. Age and gender

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
over 65	0.591*** (0.089)	-0.428*** (0.065)	0.272*** (0.069)	-0.582*** (0.085)	0.547*** (0.077)	-0.547*** (0.077)	0.324*** (0.101)
woman	0.200** (0.082)			-0.115* (0.061)			
35-44	-0.293** (0.125)			0.167* (0.095)			
25-34	-0.298** (0.147)			0.249** (0.108)			
55-64		-0.346*** (0.073)	0.383*** (0.079)	-0.304*** (0.091)	0.430*** (0.082)	-0.430*** (0.082)	0.379*** (0.080)
constant	-1.392*** (0.085)		-0.445*** (0.043)	0.186*** (0.071)	-0.369*** (0.044)	0.369*** (0.044)	-0.441*** (0.043)
cut1 constant		-1.500*** (0.054)					
cut2 constant		-0.328*** (0.040)					
cut3 constant		0.568*** (0.040)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
woman							-0.198** (0.080)
25-34							0.324** (0.144)
35-44							0.304** (0.123)
over 65							-0.581*** (0.089)
constant							1.381*** (0.085)
athrho constant							0.895** (0.409)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.714
p-value for comparison test							0.029

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## 2. Source of household income

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
wages	-0.606*** (0.079)	0.203* (0.105)		0.315*** (0.111)	-0.213* (0.117)	0.213* (0.117)	
pensions		-0.209* (0.110)	0.293*** (0.061)	-0.325*** (0.114)	0.317*** (0.121)	-0.317*** (0.121)	0.327*** (0.071)
property income		-0.803* (0.470)		-1.235** (0.549)	1.198* (0.611)	-1.198* (0.611)	1.031** (0.491)
constant	-0.884*** (0.050)		-0.408*** (0.039)	-0.067 (0.103)	-0.150 (0.109)	0.150 (0.109)	-0.416*** (0.039)
cut1							
constant		-1.295*** (0.107)					
cut2							
constant		-0.120 (0.101)					
cut3							
constant		0.774*** (0.101)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
Wages as main source of income							0.613*** (0.079)
woman							-0.160** (0.078)
constant							0.968*** (0.072)
athrho							1.126** (0.460)
constant							
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.810
p-value for comparison test							0.014

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## 3. Type of activity

	no answer	ordered logit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckmann
retired	0.581*** (0.081)	-0.321*** (0.059)	0.293*** (0.063)	-0.587*** (0.065)	0.497*** (0.070)	-0.497*** (0.070)	0.375*** (0.078)

home duties	0.709*** (0.175)	-0.286** (0.146)		-0.542*** (0.154)	0.388** (0.169)	-0.388** (0.169)	
school	0.408** (0.196)						
unemployed			0.220* (0.120)	-0.229* (0.119)	0.249** (0.126)	-0.249** (0.126)	
constant	-1.444*** (0.059)		-0.418*** (0.041)	0.218*** (0.041)	-0.350*** (0.044)	0.350*** (0.044)	-0.375*** (0.043)
cut1							
constant		-1.440*** (0.052)					
cut2							
constant		-0.279*** (0.038)					
cut3							
constant		0.611*** (0.039)					
<b>Selection equation</b>							
primary education over 65							-0.806*** (0.123)
secondary education over 65							-0.570*** (0.156)
prime age first level prof. Educ.							-0.364** (0.166)
prime age prof. Educ.							0.450** (0.213)
prime age tertiary educ. L							0.488** (0.223)
prime age higher prof. Educ.							0.340* (0.196)
woman							-0.167* (0.086)
former unemployed insider							0.154* (0.092)
home duties							0.133 (0.093)
constant							-0.398** (0.192)
athrho							1.311*** (0.117)
constant							0.556** (0.267)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	1916
Number of censored observations							223
rho							0.505

p-value for comparison test 0.038

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

#### 4. Wealth

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
refuse to answer	0.711*** (0.119)	-0.239** (0.108)		-0.424*** (0.124)			
unknown wealth	0.541*** (0.101)			-0.258*** (0.093)			
wealth over 300K		-0.314*** (0.070)	0.308*** (0.082)	-0.262*** (0.088)	0.249*** (0.088)	-0.249*** (0.088)	0.302*** (0.077)
wealth 150-300K				0.147* (0.080)	-0.173** (0.079)	0.173** (0.079)	
wealth 75-150K							
constant	-1.357*** (0.046)		-0.363*** (0.033)	0.094** (0.047)	-0.187*** (0.041)	0.187*** (0.041)	-0.362*** (0.033)
cut1							
constant		-1.403*** (0.048)					
cut2							
constant		-0.250*** (0.036)					
cut3							
constant		0.638*** (0.037)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
refuse to answer							-0.583*** (0.111)
unknown wealth							-0.462*** (0.099)
woman							-0.162** (0.077)
over 65							-0.718*** (0.075)
constant							1.623*** (0.071)
athrho							2.216*** (0.777)
constant							
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.977
p-value for comparison test							0.004

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### 5. Income

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
decile 9	-0.520*** (0.161)			0.233** (0.106)			
decile 8	-0.326** (0.140)			0.179* (0.100)			
decile 3	-0.334* (0.177)	0.268*** (0.103)		0.340*** (0.124)	-0.255* (0.131)	0.255* (0.131)	
decile 7	-0.322* (0.186)						
decile 10		-0.342*** (0.092)	0.376*** (0.111)	-0.276** (0.114)	0.369*** (0.118)	-0.369*** (0.118)	0.320*** (0.100)
decile 5		-0.266** (0.118)	0.321** (0.134)	-0.247* (0.136)	0.323** (0.142)	-0.323** (0.142)	0.292** (0.122)
decile 2			0.168* (0.092)				
constant	-1.125*** (0.049)		-0.401*** (0.038)	0.016 (0.042)	-0.238*** (0.038)	0.238*** (0.038)	-0.372*** (0.034)
cut1 constant		-1.373*** (0.051)					
cut2 constant		-0.232*** (0.037)					
cut3 constant		0.678*** (0.039)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
decile 3							0.219 (0.175)
decile 7							0.312* (0.187)
decile 8							0.320** (0.140)
decile 9							0.470*** (0.166)
woman							-0.187** (0.085)
over 65							-0.715*** (0.082)
constant							1.434*** (0.086)
athrho							

constant							1.852*** (0.347)
Number of Obs	1842	1633	1842	1842	1633	1633	1842
Number of censored observations							209
rho							0.952
p-value for comparison test							0.000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## 6. Education

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
primary	0.789*** (0.098)	-0.241*** (0.091)		-0.684*** (0.093)	0.353*** (0.097)	-0.353*** (0.097)	
secondary	0.261** (0.106)	-0.206*** (0.072)	0.215*** (0.078)	-0.470*** (0.088)	0.332*** (0.086)	-0.332*** (0.086)	0.216*** (0.078)
professional	-0.350** (0.165)						
higher professional	-0.328** (0.160)	0.156* (0.084)					
tertiary M & D		-0.195** (0.086)	0.285*** (0.093)	-0.447*** (0.103)	0.358*** (0.101)	-0.358*** (0.101)	0.321*** (0.091)
first level professional				-0.183** (0.083)			
constant	-1.326*** (0.063)		-0.390*** (0.037)	0.284*** (0.056)	-0.325*** (0.043)	0.325*** (0.043)	-0.394*** (0.037)
cut1 constant		-1.408*** (0.059)					
cut2 constant		-0.250*** (0.045)					
cut3 constant		0.638*** (0.045)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
Primary ed.							-0.514*** (0.102)
Secondary ed.							-0.242** (0.106)



Professional ed.							0.261 (0.164)
woman							-0.162** (0.077)
over 65							-0.553*** (0.085)
constant							1.553*** (0.081)
athrho							1.819 (1.575)
constant							
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.949
p-value for comparison test							0.248

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### 7. Education and age

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
primary over 65	0.902*** (0.103)		-0.264*** (0.096)	-0.332*** (0.101)			-0.263** (0.110)
secondary over 65	0.530*** (0.150)			-0.302** (0.139)			
first level professional over 65	0.355** (0.161)						
prime age professional	-0.520** (0.212)	0.324** (0.137)	-0.304** (0.137)	0.524*** (0.135)	-0.459*** (0.139)	0.459*** (0.139)	-0.390*** (0.134)
prime age tertiary L	-0.487** (0.215)	0.500*** (0.123)	-0.483*** (0.140)	0.687*** (0.138)	-0.640*** (0.143)	0.640*** (0.143)	-0.564*** (0.138)
prime age higher professional	-0.384** (0.190)	0.443*** (0.095)	-0.427*** (0.136)	0.607*** (0.133)	-0.573*** (0.139)	0.573*** (0.139)	-0.496*** (0.135)
prime age first level professional		0.365*** (0.080)	-0.361*** (0.094)	0.478*** (0.099)	-0.482*** (0.097)	0.482*** (0.097)	-0.407*** (0.095)
young higher professional		0.664*** (0.221)	-0.623** (0.303)	0.820*** (0.293)	-0.783** (0.308)	0.783** (0.308)	-0.692** (0.299)
young tertiary level M & D		0.791*** (0.178)		0.794*** (0.231)	-0.913*** (0.239)	0.913*** (0.239)	-0.659*** (0.226)
tertiary M & D over 55		-0.514*** (0.163)		-0.564*** (0.211)	0.667*** (0.219)	-0.667*** (0.219)	0.478** (0.199)
young professional				0.624** (0.299)	-0.593* (0.309)	0.593* (0.309)	-0.511* (0.298)
constant	-1.281*** (0.054)		-0.154*** (0.039)	-0.164*** (0.046)	0.034 (0.043)	-0.034 (0.043)	-0.111** (0.046)

cut1								
constant								
cut2								
constant								
cut3								
constant								
<b>selection equation</b>								
woman								-0.146*
								(0.079)
primary education								-0.472***
								(0.092)
home duties								-0.494***
								(0.166)
over 65								-0.536***
								(0.081)
constant								1.533***
								(0.074)
athrho								
constant								1.200*
								(0.649)
Number of								
Obs	1991	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014	
Number of censored observations								257
rho								0.834
p-value for comparison test								0.064
Note: Standard errors in parentheses								
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01								

## 8. Insider/outsider

	no answer	ordered logit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckmann
former unemployed	-0.287*** (0.084)			0.119* (0.065)			
insider partner	-0.316*** (0.110)	0.240*** (0.062)	-0.224*** (0.077)	0.376*** (0.076)	-0.311*** (0.080)	0.311*** (0.080)	-0.239*** (0.076)
insider	-0.238*** (0.084)			0.162** (0.067)			
outsider	-0.207* (0.119)						
poor				0.119* (0.067)			
18 to 24				0.249**			

				(0.122)			
constant	-0.859***		-0.270***	-0.278***	-0.117***	0.117***	-0.259***
	(0.077)		(0.034)	(0.067)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.036)
cut1							
constant	-1.285***						
	(0.046)						
cut2							
constant	-0.130***						
	(0.035)						
cut3							
constant	0.753***						
	(0.038)						
<b>Selection equation</b>							
former unemployed insider							0.163*
							(0.086)
primary education							0.194**
							(0.085)
home duties woman							-0.370***
							(0.105)
over 65							-0.366**
							(0.173)
constant							-0.146*
							(0.079)
athrho							-0.587***
constant							(0.087)
							1.349***
							(0.106)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.808
p-value for comparison test							0.000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### 9. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: continental welfare state

	no answer	ordered logit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckmann
continental insider	-0.294***	-0.104*					0.199**
	(0.113)	(0.055)					(0.097)
continental outsider	-0.245**						0.187*
	(0.121)						(0.103)
constant	-0.947***		-0.315***	0.012	-0.184***	0.184***	-0.485***
	(0.101)		(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.089)
cut1							
constant		-1.392***					

		(0.056)					
cut2							
constant		-0.245***					
		(0.046)					
cut3							
constant		0.636***					
		(0.048)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
woman							-0.143*
							(0.079)
over 65							-0.798***
							(0.074)
home duties							-0.456***
							(0.159)
constant							1.511***
							(0.073)
athrho							
constant							1.821***
							(0.390)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.949
p-value for comparison test							0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

#### 10. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: Southern welfare state

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
southern insider	-0.145** (0.058)	0.274*** (0.098)			0.143** (0.068)	-0.143** (0.068)	0.125** (0.062)
southern outsider		0.191* (0.112)					
constant		-0.534*** (0.091)	0.012 (0.030)	-1.181*** (0.038)	-0.276*** (0.056)	0.276*** (0.056)	-0.396*** (0.052)
cut1							
constant	-1.426*** (0.061)						
cut2							
constant	-0.278*** (0.050)						
cut3							
constant	0.604*** (0.051)						
<b>selection</b>							

<b>equation</b>							
woman							-0.155** (0.078)
over 65							-0.791*** (0.074)
home duties							-0.445*** (0.159)
constant							1.516*** (0.072)
athrho							
constant							1.807*** (0.386)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.948
p-value for comparison test							0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

### 11. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: post-industrial class groups

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
MSF	-0.220** (0.109)			0.159* (0.085)			
young SCP	-0.377* (0.196)	0.337*** (0.111)	-0.284** (0.143)	0.433*** (0.138)	-0.364** (0.147)	0.364** (0.147)	-0.302** (0.140)
constant	-1.134*** (0.042)		-0.298*** (0.031)	-0.037 (0.033)	-0.160*** (0.033)	0.160*** (0.033)	-0.296*** (0.031)
cut1							
constant		-1.312*** (0.045)					
cut2							
constant		-0.161*** (0.033)					
cut3							
constant		0.722*** (0.035)					
<b>selection equation</b>							
MSF							0.224** (0.106)
woman							-0.157** (0.077)
over 65							-0.784*** (0.074)
home duties							-0.433*** (0.160)

constant							1.489*** (0.074)
athrho							
constant							1.737*** (0.477)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.940
p-value for comparison test							0.000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## 12. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: continental welfare state and education

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
outsider high educ.	0.215** (0.084)			-0.301** (0.125)			
outsider low educ.		0.131* (0.075)	-0.224*** (0.081)		0.310*** (0.099)	-0.310*** (0.099)	0.240*** (0.090)
insider low education			-0.135** (0.067)		0.215** (0.085)	-0.215** (0.085)	0.179** (0.078)
insider high education				-0.339*** (0.106)	0.189* (0.099)	-0.189* (0.099)	0.221** (0.093)
constant		-0.338*** (0.034)	0.100** (0.046)	-1.091*** (0.044)	-0.356*** (0.068)	0.356*** (0.068)	-0.468*** (0.064)
cut1							
constant	-1.309*** (0.045)						
cut2							
constant	-0.160*** (0.033)						
cut3							
constant	0.722*** (0.036)						
selection equation							
primary education over 65							-0.804*** (0.101)
secondary education over 65							-0.589*** (0.140)
prime age first level prof. Educ.							-0.433*** (0.154)
prime age prof. Educ.							0.553*** (0.208)
prime age tertiary educ. L							0.589*** (0.212)

prime age higher prof. Educ.							0.439** (0.187)
woman							-0.168** (0.080)
former unemployed							0.154* (0.085)
insider							0.156* (0.083)
home duties							-0.370** (0.167)
constant							1.228*** (0.102)
athrho							
constant							1.388*** (0.516)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.883
p-value for comparison test							0.007
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

### 13. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: southern welfare state and education

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
outsider high educ.	0.384*** (0.111)	-0.274* (0.142)	0.448*** (0.137)	-0.561*** (0.205)	-0.370** (0.144)	0.370** (0.144)	
insider high educ.				-0.276*** (0.092)			0.319*** (0.095)
outsider low educ.							0.285*** (0.101)
insider low educ.							0.268*** (0.085)
constant		-0.298*** (0.031)	-0.017 (0.031)	-1.091*** (0.044)	-0.159*** (0.033)	0.159*** (0.033)	-0.544*** (0.074)
cut1							
constant	-1.309*** (0.045)						
cut2							
constant	-0.157*** (0.033)						
cut3							
constant	0.726***						

	(0.035)						
selection equation							
primary education over 65							-0.814*** (0.099)
secondary education over 65							-0.598*** (0.139)
prime age first level prof. Educ.							-0.438*** (0.154)
prime age prof. Educ.							0.548*** (0.209)
prime age tertiary educ. L							0.597*** (0.212)
prime age higher prof. Educ.							0.435** (0.187)
woman							-0.167** (0.079)
former unemployed insider							0.151* (0.084)
home duties							0.158* (0.082)
constant							-0.357** (0.167)
athrho							1.229*** (0.101)
constant							1.520*** (0.583)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.909
p-value for comparison test							0.009
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

#### 14. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: outsider potential and education

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
strong outsider high educ.	0.202*** (0.076)		0.212** (0.089)	-0.346*** (0.120)			
medium outsider high educ.		0.297** (0.141)			0.356** (0.152)	-0.356** (0.152)	0.337** (0.139)
strong outsider low educ.		0.152** (0.075)			0.226*** (0.086)	-0.226*** (0.086)	0.128* (0.073)
low outsider				-0.332***			



high educ.			(0.123)				
low outsider				0.150**	-0.150**		
low educ.				(0.075)	(0.075)		
constant	-0.356***	-0.015	-1.102***	-0.286***	0.286***	-0.351***	
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.035)	
cut1							
constant	-1.306***						
	(0.046)						
cut2							
constant	-0.156***						
	(0.034)						
cut3							
constant	0.726***						
	(0.036)						
selection							
equation							
primary							-0.799***
education over							(0.102)
65							
secondary							-0.604***
education over							(0.140)
65							
prime age first							-0.444***
level prof.							(0.155)
Educ.							
prime age prof.							0.552***
Educ.							(0.209)
prime age							0.598***
tertiary educ. L							(0.211)
prime age							0.435**
higher prof.							(0.187)
Educ.							
woman							-0.163**
							(0.080)
former							0.157*
unemployed							(0.085)
insider							0.163**
							(0.083)
home duties							-0.400**
							(0.168)
constant							1.221***
							(0.102)
athrho							
constant							1.330***
							(0.378)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.869
p-value for comparison test							0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

### 15. Insider/outsider according to Häusermann and Schwander: southern welfare state and skills

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
southern outsider low skill	0.337*** (0.111)		0.410*** (0.138)	-0.349* (0.196)	-0.253* (0.154)	0.253* (0.154)	
southern insider low skill		0.315*** (0.088)			0.172** (0.074)	-0.172** (0.074)	0.300*** (0.086)
southern outsider high skill		0.298*** (0.106)			0.167* (0.096)	-0.167* (0.096)	0.268*** (0.102)
southern insider high skill		0.227** (0.101)					0.191** (0.097)
constant		-0.549*** (0.076)	-0.014 (0.031)	-1.162*** (0.038)	-0.271*** (0.057)	0.271*** (0.057)	-0.529*** (0.075)
cut1							
constant	-1.312*** (0.045)						
cut2							
constant	-0.161*** (0.033)						
cut3							
constant	0.722*** (0.035)						
selection equation							
primary education over 65							-0.821*** (0.098)
secondary education over 65							-0.595*** (0.139)
prime age first level prof. Educ.							-0.445*** (0.154)
prime age prof. Educ.							0.542*** (0.209)
prime age tertiary educ. L							0.596*** (0.211)
prime age higher prof. Educ.							0.434** (0.186)
woman							-0.162** (0.079)
former unemployed insider							0.146* (0.085) 0.154* (0.082)

home duties							-0.345**
constant							(0.168)
							1.232***
							(0.101)
athrho							
constant							1.466***
							(0.514)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.899
p-value for comparison test							0.004
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

### 16. Occupations: INSEE PCS 2003 classification

	no answer	ordered probit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckman
unskilled workers	0.300** (0.127)	0.270** (0.107)	-0.235* (0.120)				-0.292** (0.121)
technicians	-0.411** (0.192)						
medium-skill private sector	-0.388* (0.211)						
personal services employees		-0.288** (0.114)	0.350*** (0.127)	-0.262** (0.129)	0.396*** (0.135)	-0.396*** (0.135)	0.279** (0.119)
medium-skill public sector		0.277*** (0.090)		0.192* (0.107)			
skilled workers		0.209** (0.084)		0.221** (0.091)			-0.165* (0.091)
managers		-0.419** (0.208)	0.952*** (0.269)	-0.736*** (0.277)	0.958*** (0.280)	-0.958*** (0.280)	0.640*** (0.211)
high-skill private sector			0.310** (0.122)		0.302** (0.128)	-0.302** (0.128)	0.220* (0.113)
high-skill public sector			0.209* (0.115)		0.243** (0.123)	-0.243** (0.123)	
constant	-1.173*** (0.042)		-0.362*** (0.036)	-0.009 (0.035)	-0.251*** (0.036)	0.251*** (0.036)	-0.314*** (0.037)
cut1							
constant		-1.296*** (0.050)					
cut2							
constant		-0.137*** (0.038)					
cut3							
constant		0.752*** (0.040)					

selection equation							
MSF							0.206*
							(0.107)
woman							-0.145*
							(0.079)
over 65							-0.784***
							(0.074)
home duties							-0.481***
							(0.161)
unskilled worker							-0.311**
							(0.134)
constant							1.514***
							(0.077)
athrho							
constant							1.592***
							(0.289)
Number of Obs	2014	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations							257
rho							0.920
p-value for comparison test							0.000
Note: Standard errors in parentheses							
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01							

### 17. Occupations: INSEE PCS 2003 classification and age

	ordered logit	pro	contra	pro	contra	Heckmann
high skill priv. Sect. Over 55	-0.624*** (0.155)	0.795*** (0.163)	-0.747*** (0.172)	0.946*** (0.180)	-0.946*** (0.180)	0.897*** (0.172)
managers over 55	-0.781*** (0.203)	1.536*** (0.341)	-1.146*** (0.341)	1.450*** (0.341)	-1.450*** (0.341)	1.303*** (0.321)
farmers over 55	-0.641*** (0.169)	0.307** (0.155)	-0.607*** (0.168)	0.620*** (0.189)	-0.620*** (0.189)	0.512*** (0.182)
high skill public over 55	-0.527*** (0.139)	0.649*** (0.160)	-0.631*** (0.168)	0.804*** (0.178)	-0.804*** (0.178)	0.769*** (0.171)
personal services over 55	-0.548*** (0.163)	0.570*** (0.198)	-0.522** (0.204)	0.693*** (0.216)	-0.693*** (0.216)	0.573*** (0.207)
medium skill public under 55	0.350*** (0.128)		0.355** (0.160)			
clerk priv. Sect. Over 55	-0.331** (0.129)	0.352*** (0.135)	-0.404*** (0.138)	0.506*** (0.149)	-0.506*** (0.149)	0.422*** (0.141)
technicians over 55	-0.433** (0.174)	0.587*** (0.186)	-0.419** (0.189)	0.633*** (0.196)	-0.633*** (0.196)	0.592*** (0.183)
personal services under 55	-0.295* (0.151)	0.381** (0.163)		0.432** (0.173)	-0.432** (0.173)	0.405** (0.167)
skilled workers under 55	0.225**		0.410***			

	(0.110)		(0.131)		
	0.231*				
unskilled workers under 55	(0.136)				
	0.506**		0.532**	-0.532**	0.488**
med. Skill private over 55	(0.216)		(0.228)	(0.228)	(0.211)
	0.251*	-0.362***	0.423***	-0.423***	0.350**
public clerk over 55	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.150)	(0.150)	(0.146)
	0.262*		0.346**	-0.346**	0.317**
med. Skill pulic over 55	(0.143)		(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.148)
		0.352**			
technicians under 55		(0.167)			
			0.231*	-0.231*	
skilled workers over 55			(0.135)	(0.135)	
constant	-0.463***	0.073*	-0.376***	0.376***	-0.486***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)
cut1					
constant	-1.432***				
	(0.053)				
cut2					
constant	-0.242***				
	(0.039)				
cut3					
constant	0.664***				
	(0.041)				
<b>Selection equation</b>					
over 65					
home duties					-0.346*
					(0.183)
					-0.831***
primary education over 65					(0.107)
					-0.511***
secondary education over 65					(0.148)
prime age first level prof. Educ.					-0.372**
					(0.156)
prime age prof. Educ.					0.516**
					(0.212)
prime age tertiary educ. L					0.551**
					(0.217)
prime age higher prof. Educ.					0.397**
					(0.191)
woman					-0.166**
					(0.082)
					0.163*
former unemployed					(0.087)
insider					0.167*
					(0.086)
constant					1.226***

athrho						(0.106)
constant						0.705*** (0.253)
Number of Obs	1757	2014	2014	1757	1757	2014
Number of censored observations						257
rho						0.607
p-value for comparison test						0.005
Note: Standard errors in parentheses						
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01						

### 18. Easyness to find a new job in case of redundancy

	Heckman
finding a new job:	
somewhat easy	-0.196** (0.095)
somewhat difficult	-0.269*** (0.088)
very difficult	-0.298*** (0.111)
constant	-0.192*** (0.050)
<b>selection equation</b>	
primary education over 65	-0.801*** (0.110)
secondary education over 65	-0.562*** (0.143)
prime age first level prof. Educ.	-0.392** (0.155)
prime age prof. Educ.	0.537** (0.211)
prime age tertiary educ. L	0.587*** (0.215)
prime age higher prof. Educ.	0.428** (0.189)
woman	-0.170** (0.081)
former unemployed	0.155* (0.086)
insider	0.147* (0.085)
home duties	-0.361** (0.173)
constant	1.237*** (0.104)

athrho	
constant	0.842*** (0.281)
Number of Obs	2014
Number of censored observations	257
rho	0.687
p-value for comparison test	0.003
Note: Standard errors in parentheses	
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01	

## 19. Opinions

	Heckman
Europe and social protection: afraid	-0.290*** (0.064)
unemployed could find a job: strongly disagree	-0.414*** (0.084)
unemployed could find a job: disagree	-0.217*** (0.068)
Employment: important problem	0.280** (0.126)
constant	0.022 (0.064)
<b>selection equation</b>	
primary education over 65	-0.788*** (0.109)
secondary education over 65	-0.576*** (0.141)
prime age first level prof. Educ.	-0.406*** (0.152)
prime age prof. Educ.	0.557*** (0.209)
prime age tertiary educ. L	0.587*** (0.213)
prime age higher prof. Educ.	0.447** (0.187)
woman	-0.177** (0.080)
former unemployed	0.145* (0.086)
insider	0.162* (0.084)
home duties	-0.392** (0.171)
constant	1.231*** (0.103)
athrho	

constant	1.026*** (0.245)
Number of Obs	2014
Number of censored observations	257
rho	0.772
p-value for comparison test	0.000

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

## 20. Vote at the first round of the 2012 presidential election

	Heckman
Vote first round	
Jean-Luc Mélenchon	-0.419*** (0.098)
François Hollande	-0.236*** (0.067)
constant	-0.196*** (0.041)
<b>selection equation</b>	
primary education over 65	-0.792*** (0.107)
secondary education over 65	-0.618*** (0.142)
prime age first level prof. Educ.	-0.441*** (0.155)
prime age prof. Educ.	0.541*** (0.209)
prime age tertiary educ. L	0.580*** (0.213)
prime age higher prof. Educ.	0.441** (0.186)
woman	-0.157** (0.079)
former unemployed	0.148* (0.085)
insider	0.154* (0.083)
home duties	-0.394** (0.166)
constant	1.229*** (0.102)
athrho	
constant	1.318** (0.551)
Number of Obs	2014
Number of censored observations	257
rho	0.866



p-value for comparison test 0.017

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

## 21. Left-Right differentiation

	Heckman	Heckman
Far Left	-0.299*** (0.079)	
Left	-0.206*** (0.072)	
Left-Right scale		0.055*** (0.012)
constant	-0.203*** (0.041)	-0.560*** (0.065)
<b>selection equation</b>		
primary education over 65	-0.793*** (0.105)	-0.806*** (0.109)
secondary education over 65	-0.613*** (0.141)	-0.653*** (0.147)
prime age first level prof. Educ.	-0.425*** (0.154)	-0.434*** (0.162)
prime age prof. Educ.	0.552*** (0.209)	0.475** (0.209)
prime age tertiary educ. L	0.594*** (0.212)	0.519** (0.214)
prime age higher prof. Educ.	0.446** (0.186)	0.374** (0.187)
woman	-0.164** (0.079)	-0.157* (0.084)
former unemployed	0.150* (0.085)	0.141 (0.090)
insider	0.157* (0.083)	0.113 (0.090)
home duties	-0.388** (0.167)	-0.396** (0.179)
constant	1.227*** (0.102)	1.318*** (0.111)
athrho		
constant	1.213*** (0.341)	1.288*** (0.420)
Number of Obs	2014	1916
Number of censored observations	257	223
rho	0.837	0.859
p-value for comparison test	0.000	0.002

Note: Standard errors in parentheses

\* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01