

TRANSNATIONALISM AND EARLY EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE NOUVELLES EQUIPES INTERNATIONALES AND THE GENEVA CIRCLE 1947–1957*

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ABSTRACT. *Based on the analysis of primary sources from party archives and the private papers of politicians in six countries, this article evaluates the influence of Christian Democrat transnationalism on European integration in the crucial formative period from 1947 to 1957. It shows how the Christian Democrats' co-operation in the Nouvelles Equipes Internationales and the Geneva Circle shaped and re-enforced their historical orientations, ideological preferences, and common party interests and played an important role in structuring the concept and the reality of a 'core Europe' of continental countries. It is crucial to include 'soft' factors such as the growing transnational political networks in the analysis of European integration history to avoid a monocausal explanation that focuses exclusively on inter-state relations and sees the integration process solely as the product of a multilateral bargaining process driven by national (economic) interests.*

In an attempt to give a comprehensive explanation of the integration process in post-war (Western) Europe, Andrew Moravcsik has recently argued that it is and always has been basically driven by national preferences which are negotiated by the governments of the member states.¹ Moravcsik assumes that

* This article draws upon primary sources from party archives and the private papers of politicians in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Luxemburg has no relevant archival sources. What remains of the archives of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC) after its dissolution in the early 1990s has been transferred to the Istituto Sturzo in Rome, but so far, it is not accessible for research. This does not matter very much, however, as DC politicians played no prominent role in transnational party co-operation until the 1960s, which is partly due to their preoccupation with party politics in Italy as well as the intra-party conflicts between the different wings of the DC and the frequent government crises and changes.

¹ Andrew Moravcsik, *The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht* (London, 1999); idem, 'De Gaulle between grain and grandeur: the political economy of French EC policy, 1958–1970 (Part 1)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2/2 (2000), pp. 3–43; idem, 'De Gaulle between grain and grandeur: the political economy of French EC policy 1958–1970 (Part 2)', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 2 (2000), pp. 4–68. For various criticisms of the selective and partly manipulative use of sources and existing historical literature in Moravcsik's theory-driven works see also in volume 2/3 (2000) of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Jeffrey Vanke, 'Reconstructing de

such national preferences are almost exclusively determined by economic considerations of the costs and benefits of membership or further integration. Such liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of the integration process as one of the most influential phenomena in post-war Europe are a reaction to neo-functionalism which has perhaps tended to over-emphasize the autonomy of 'Europe' and to underestimate the persistence of nation-states and their continued importance for collective identities, political legitimacy, and policy-making. Intergovernmentalism also seems more in line with the contemporary experience of the strength of nationalism in post-1989 (Eastern) Europe and with the pronounced 'national interest' rhetoric of governments, especially those of the larger European Union (EU) states.

Moravcsik's and other similar analyses of European integration suffer from conceptual and empirical weaknesses that are to some extent typical of the social sciences. Most of all, they are theory-driven and tend to ignore contradictory empirical evidence. Contemporary historical research into European integration after 1945 has shown, however, that the forces behind and motives for the integration process varied substantially from country to country and in different periods. The historical reality was much more complex than social science studies often lead one to believe, especially those that pretend to explain integration history as well as current trends, but really want to prove a particular theory. Also, 'national interest' is a rather weak analytical tool. Very often it turns out to be a rhetorical construct which politicians use to conceal their personal ideological preferences or particular group or party interests. Moreover, liberal intergovernmentalism also tends to underestimate the relative autonomy of the political process – especially in the early post-war period – from the influence of pressure groups as well as the role of non-economic factors in the decision-making process.

Contemporary historical research has also re-evaluated the role of national governments and of economic considerations in the integration process.² It has thus corrected the misconception of earlier contemporary historical studies, which were still informed by the cruder versions of functionalist theory, that European integration was largely driven after 1945 by the political ideas of small elites which had formed in the resistance, as well as by European

Gaulle', pp. 87–100, and Mark Trachtenberg, 'De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and Europe', pp. 101–16. Despite being sympathetic to Moravcsik's general approach, Alan S. Milward, 'A comment on the article by Andrew Moravcsik', pp. 77–80, also hints at the unsound use of source material and argues that he goes too far in reducing de Gaulle's motives to commercial ones, especially in relation to the president's policy on British EEC entry. For a theoretical criticism of Moravcsik's approach see, for example, Wolfgang Merkel, 'Die Europäische Integration und das Elend der Theorie', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 25 (1999), pp. 302–38, at p. 313.

² Instigated largely by the in many ways pathbreaking research and publications of Alan S. Milward, *The European rescue of the nation-state* (London, 1992); (with Frances M. B. Lynch, Ruggero Ranieri, Federico Romero, and Vibeke Sørensen), *The frontier of national sovereignty: history and theory, 1945–1992* (London, 1993); *The reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–1951* (London, 1984).

pressure groups.³ However, the new and sometimes extreme emphasis on governments and national (economic) interests also seems to be informed by the almost exclusive reliance of many contemporary historical studies on newly released national government records. These of course tend to magnify the role of national politicians and bureaucrats and to exaggerate the importance of even quite minor economic interests and technical issues. Whether, ultimately, they determined the outcome of negotiations is a different matter.

One other factor that clearly *also* influenced the integration process is the transnational co-operation of interest groups and political parties. When the role of such cross-border societal networks operating below the governmental level is fully taken into consideration – not at the expense of, but in addition to intergovernmental co-operation – it also becomes clearer how important non-economic motives such as historical orientations, ideological preferences, and party political interests were for European integration in the early post-war period.

Transnational co-operation of continental European Christian Democrats after 1945 is the most significant explanatory factor which can help to avoid excessive emphasis on intergovernmental relations and economic interests in the analysis of European integration history. With the partial exception of France, where the electoral support for the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) began to decline quite steeply already in 1951, the Christian Democrats were the dominant political force in all six member states of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), founded in 1951–2, and the European Economic Community (EEC), founded in 1957–8.⁴ Equally dominant was their concept of a non-socialist welfare state in a mixed economy in a (West) European institutionalized framework for economic reconstruction and integration, and political co-operation. With this concept they aimed to overcome Europe's history of nationalist conflicts, and especially Franco-German antagonism. To a very large extent, the European Christian Democrats managed to determine the institutional structures and the economic and political content of the ECSC, the European Defence Community (EDC), which failed in the French National Assembly in 1954, and of the EEC in the first decade of post-war European integration.

³ See especially Walter Lippens, *A history of European integration, 1945–1947* (Oxford, 1982; German edn, 1977).

⁴ On Christian Democrat parties in Western Europe after 1945 see the contributions to Michael Gehler, Wolfram Kaiser, and Helmut Wahnout, eds., *Christdemokratie in Europa im 20. Jahrhundert/Christian Democracy in twentieth century Europe* (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar, 2001); Emiel Lamberts, ed., *Christian Democracy in the European Union [1945/1995]: proceedings of the Leuven colloquium, 15–18 November 1995* (Katholiek Documentatie- en Onderzoekscentrum Leuven (KADOC) – Studies 21) (Leuven, 1997); Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, eds., *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1965* (Oxford, 1996).

I

In 1945, it seemed that the natural conclusion from the experience of national socialism and the Second World War was to treat Europe as a common political space. There was a general consensus among European Christian Democrats that transnational co-operation and the co-ordination of their policies would be crucial for European reconstruction. Compared with the interwar period and exile, when transnational party contacts had been weak and politically ineffective,⁵ four main incentives for better organized and more intensive transnational co-operation can be identified. First, as Joseph Escher, president of the Swiss Conservative People's Party, emphasized at the first multilateral meeting of Christian politicians in Lucerne in early 1947, it was necessary to re-activate the personal and institutional links interrupted by the war.⁶ Secondly, the evolution of the Cold War strengthened the common perception of the danger of communism and of the need to counteract international communist activity and propaganda at a European rather than a national level. After all, as Paolo Emilio Taviani of the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC) put it in June 1950, the Christian Democrats would all fight 'on the same side of the barricade' in the case of a European civil war.⁷ Thirdly, the Socialist and Liberal parties in Europe also wanted to reorganize their transnational co-operation, and both political tendencies, due to their international ideologies, seemed per se better prepared for the expected Europeanization of national politics. Finally, the Christian Democrats wanted a unified Europe, but a Europe that was Christian and *abendländisch* (occidental) in its cultural and political orientation, not socialist. Transnational co-operation also seemed crucial to define the intellectual foundation and the programmatic content of the new Europe they wished to create.

Transnationalism in European Christian Democracy after 1945 took two forms: the formal, institutionalized collaboration took place in the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI), founded in 1947, which were transformed into

⁵ On transnational contacts of Catholic politicians after the First World War see Guido Müller, 'Das "Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne", 1925–1939 – ein vorweggenommenes Exil katholischer Demokraten in der Zwischenkriegszeit', in Gehler, Kaiser, and Wohnout, eds., *Christdemokratie in Europa*, pp. 559–73; Roberto Papini, *Il coraggio della democrazia: Sturzo e l'internazionale popolare tra le due guerre* (Rome, 1995); Alwin Hanschmidt, 'Eine christlich-demokratische "Internationale" zwischen den Weltkriegen: Das "Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d'Inspiration Chrétienne" in Paris', in Winfried Becker and Rudolf Morsey, eds., *Christliche Demokratie in Europa: Grundlagen und Entwicklungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert* (Cologne and Vienna, 1988), pp. 153–88. On Catholic contacts in exile see Wolfram Kaiser, 'Co-operation of European Catholic politicians in exile in Britain and the United States during world war II', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35 (2000), pp. 439–65. For a general overview see also Peter M. R. Stirk, 'Crisis and continuity in interwar Europe', in idem, ed., *European unity in context: the interwar period* (London and New York, 1989), pp. 1–22.

⁶ Procès-verbal de la conférence politique internationale de Lucerne 27 février – 2 mars 1947, Bundesarchiv Bern (BAR), JII.181 1987/52, 2372.

⁷ Geneva Circle, 12 June 1950, French protocol, KADOC, Archief CEPSS, 3.1.11.

the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) in 1965; in addition, Victor Koutzine, born in Charkov in the Ukraine in 1910 as the son of an employee in the French diplomatic mission in Tsarist Russia, organized informal secret talks between Christian Democrats from 1947 to 1955 together with Johann-Jakob Kindt-Kiefer, a former German emigrant in Switzerland and close wartime collaborator of the former Reich chancellor Joseph Wirth.⁸ These meetings were attended by Georges Bidault, Konrad Adenauer, and other leading European politicians in the period 1948–9. Thereafter they continued to provide a focal point for free political discussion, especially concerning the Franco-German relationship and West European integration.

The NEI were not constituted by parties, but by national *equipes*.⁹ These were de facto identical with the national parties, with the notable exception of France and Belgium where they were formed by individual politicians of the MRP and the Parti Social Chrétien (PSC/CVP). The main decision-making body was the executive committee, headed by the president: the French MRP politician Robert Bichet from 1947 to 1949 and the Belgian PSC/CVP politicians August de Schryver (1949–59) and Théo Lefèvre (1960–5). The secretary general directed the small secretariat in Paris. The other members of the executive committee were the deputy presidents who came from four and, from 1957 onwards, from all six other West European national *equipes*. The NEI organized annual congresses on specific themes, passed and published resolutions on current political issues, and the secretary generals of the national parties met from 1954 onwards to co-ordinate their electoral strategies and their political propaganda. Party representatives also held meetings for the first time in 1957, initiated by de Schryver, to guarantee the greatest possible representation in the new EEC and EURATOM institutions of Christian Democrats from all six member states at the political and official levels.¹⁰

The NEI's relatively weak institutional structure and its very general French name are explained by the main fault-line of post-war West European Christian Democracy between the MRP and the PSC/CVP on one side and most other parties on the other. The MRP in particular did not want to compromise its new non-confessional, secular image in French politics. As a result, the MRP representative Robert Wirth argued at the first meeting in

⁸ Concerning Koutzine see Pierre Turrettini to Direction Générale des Camps de Travail, 21 Aug. 1943, Curriculum Vitae Koutzine and 'Signalementsblatt', 23 Sept. 1943, BAR, E.4264 1985/196. Concerning Kindt-Kiefer see Nachrichtendienst Zürich/Polizeikorps Kanton Zürich, 12 Nov. 1943, BAR, E.4320 (13) 1973/17. See also Heinrich Küppers, *Joseph Wirth: Parlamentarier, Minister und Kanzler der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1997), pp. 301–28, at pp. 303, 316 (fn 1144).

⁹ See also Jürgen Hollstein, 'Zur Geschichte christlich-demokratischer Zusammenarbeit in Europa: Die "Nouvelles Equipes Internationales" [NEI]', *Libertas*, 3–4 (1989), pp. 82–117.

¹⁰ August de Schryver to Bruno Heck, 5 Aug. 1957, with Aide Mémoire – Réunion Préparatoire de Bruxelles, 29 July 1957; Procès-verbal de la reunion de représentants democrates-chrétiens et de représentants du Mouvement syndical-chrétien qui a eu lieu le 18 octobre 1957 ... à Strasbourg; Aide Memoire de la Conférence des délégués des partis democrates chrétiens et des représentants des organisations syndicales et patronales D. C. qui s'est tenue à Bruxelles, le 14 décembre 1957, all in KADOC, Archief de Schryver, 7.4.1.4.

Lucerne that the new organization should under no circumstances look like a 'black international'. The papal encyclicals, Wirth insisted, 'can inspire a doctrine, but one should not forget that they do not apply to politics'.¹¹ As Barbara Barclay Carter, the British representative in Lucerne, concluded after this first international meeting, the MRP politicians feared the use of the term 'Christian Democrat' which 'would lay them open to a charge of clericalism and took no account of the number of non-believers and even, in North Africa, of Moslems among their adherents'.¹² The PSC/CVP, too, did not want to be associated too closely with the Church. The first PSC/CVP representatives in the NEI were quite left-wing, and they also wished to be as closely associated with the MRP as possible. Transnational co-operation in Europe, the Belgian Jules Soyeur, the first NEI secretary general, argued in a note on its creation, should assist Christian Democrat 'emancipation from certain outdated political and social concepts of the Church'¹³ – thus the ideologically meaningless name of the new organization which some other representatives, especially from Italy and Austria, had wanted to turn straight away into a union of parties with a common framework programme.

The issue of party membership of the PSC/CVP and the MRP was only resolved when they joined the NEI in 1959 and 1964 respectively. However, this was not the only difficulty the Christian Democrats encountered in their attempt to intensify their collaboration after 1945. The relationship between the West European parties and the exile groups from East-Central Europe was also not easy, especially when the division of Europe seemed increasingly more permanent and the NEI began to concentrate more exclusively on West European integration. Another difficult relationship was that between the Austrian and Swiss parties, which were initially very active in the NEI, and the parties of the ECSC/EEC which intensified their co-operation in the Christian Democrat parliamentary party in the Common Assembly of the ECSC from 1952 and later in the European parliament of the EEC from 1958.

It was precisely these difficulties that the Christian Democrat parties experienced after the war in agreeing on the degree of institutionalization and formal programmatic commitment which led to their informal contacts within the Geneva Circle temporarily becoming very important. The idea of periodic secret meetings of leading Christian Democrat politicians was the result of a German–French initiative instigated by Kindt-Kiefer and Koutzine.¹⁴ Kindt-

¹¹ Procès-verbal de la conférence politique internationale de Lucerne 27 février – 2 mars 1947, BAR, JII.181 1987/52, 2372.

¹² NEI, Secrétariat Général [Jules Soyeur], Notes préliminaires, no date [March 1947], KADOC, Archief A. E. de Schryver, 7.2.1.

¹³ Jules Soyeur, 'Christian Democrats and industrial democracy: a new international body', *People & Freedom*, 94 (1947), pp. 1–2.

¹⁴ See also the recollections of Bruno Dörpinghaus, 'Die Genfer Sitzungen – Erste Zusammenkünfte führender christlich-demokratischer Politiker im Nachkriegseuropa', in Dieter Blumenwitz, Klaus Gotto, Hans Maier, Konrad Repgen, and Hans-Peter Schwarz, eds., *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit: Politik und Persönlichkeit des ersten Bundeskanzlers: Beiträge von Weg- und Zeitgenossen* (Stuttgart, 1976), pp. 538–65, at p. 538.

Kiefer had good contacts with Adenauer in the late 1940s¹⁵ and acted as chairman of the Geneva Circle until the beginning of 1952.¹⁶ Koutzine, who was a naturalized French citizen and close to Bidault, was the interpreter of the Circle and directed its secretariat, which was established in 1950.¹⁷ According to an Austrian participant in the Geneva Circle, Koutzine enjoyed the ‘full trust’ of West European Christian Democrats.¹⁸

The meetings took place from 1947 to 1955. In contrast to the NEI, the exiles from East-Central Europe were excluded from them, as they focused primarily on concrete Franco-German and West European issues. It is possible to identify several key motives to explain why the German and French Christian Democrats in particular sought to engage in secret talks in addition to the NEI. The Germans, especially Adenauer, were keen to put the bilateral relationship on a completely new basis after three wars in three generations. Moreover, the consultations were for them one step on the road towards the re-integration of (West) Germany into the community of democratic European nations on the basis of equality. They could also help to ensure constructive collaboration over the reconstruction of West Germany and Western Europe.¹⁹ At the same time, the French desire to avoid too close official contacts with the Germans played a role at a time when French public opinion was still largely hostile to reconciliation.²⁰ The Geneva meetings provided an opportunity for MRP politicians to strengthen the Western orientation of the German Christian Democrats. Closer co-operation with (the western part of) the former ‘arch enemy’ was also increasingly seen as a *conditio sine qua non* for a successful defence against the Soviet threat. In this way, the creation of the Geneva Circle also reflected the onset of the Cold War which made the co-operative inclusion of West Germans into West European consultations imperative.²¹

From the summer of 1949 onwards, Adenauer and Bidault no longer

¹⁵ See, for example, Adenauer to Kindt-Kiefer, 27 Mar. 1948, in Konrad Adenauer, *Briefe über Deutschland, 1945–1955*, selected and introduced by Hans Peter Mensing (Berlin, 1999), pp. 75–6.

¹⁶ For Kindt-Kiefer’s wartime activities in Switzerland see Nachrichtendienst Zürich, 31 July 1942, BAR, E.4320 (13) 1973/17. See also Ulrike Hörster-Philipp, *Joseph Wirth, 1879–1956: Eine politische Biographie* (Paderborn, 1998), pp. 628–9, 650–60.

¹⁷ On Koutzine’s background see also the letter by Barbara Roth, Archiviste d’Etat adjointe, to Michael Gehler, 22 May 1998, quoting from Dossier Victor Koutzine (224 443), Département de l’intérieur, de l’environnement et des affaires régionales, Archives d’Etat, République et Canton de Genève, Archives de la Police des Etrangers. The authors would like to thank Barbara Roth for her informative reply.

¹⁸ Cf. Bericht über die Sitzung des Büros der NEI am 18.9.1950 in Paris, Institut für Zeitgeschichte Wien (IfZg), NL 48 (Hurdes), DO 367.

¹⁹ Dörpinghaus, ‘Die Genfer Sitzungen’, pp. 539–40, 542. See also, as general introductions, Josef Foschepoth, ed., *Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte, 1945–1952* (Göttingen and Zurich, 1985), and Ludolf Herbst, *Westdeutschland, 1945–1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration* (Munich, 1986).

²⁰ Roberto Papini, *L’internationale démocrate-chrétienne: La coopération internationale entre les partis démocrates-chrétiens de 1925 à 1986* (Paris, 1988), p. 73. Papini’s work is mostly not based on original sources.

²¹ Koutzine to Dörpinghaus, 5 Nov. 1949, Archiv für christlich-demokratische Politik St. Augustin (ACDP), I-009-017.

attended the meetings. After Adenauer's election as West German chancellor, governmental contacts were possible, and Koutzine and Kindt-Kiefer frequently visited Bonn, and Koutzine delivered confidential messages from Adenauer in Paris.²² The Geneva meetings now took place at a lower level, but the regular briefing of Adenauer, Bidault, and others was guaranteed. In the German case, for example, Herbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer's foreign affairs adviser, and Otto Lenz, state secretary in the federal chancellery during 1951–3, took part and strictly advocated the chancellor's line.²³ The Circle now mainly served to demonstrate and reinforce the loyalty between the German and French representatives and parties. In spite of Koutzine's efforts to sustain it, the decline of the MRP in France and the differences within the MRP between Bidault and Robert Schuman contributed to a further diminution of its political relevance. Moreover, the Benelux parties began to have doubts about the value of the meetings which were turning more and more into a bilateral Franco-German discussion forum and were no longer directly relevant to their interests.²⁴ One meeting took place in Baarn in the Netherlands in 1953, but the change of location could not arrest the continuing decline in significance of the Geneva Circle until its demise in 1955.

During the first decade after the War, the transnational co-operation of European Christian Democrats was most important with respect to the idea of a new, institutionalized Europe as a break with past national conflicts in Europe which, among other aspects, would provide a solution to the German question through (Western) integration. More concretely, their contacts contributed significantly to early Franco-German rapprochement and to the creation of the Council of Europe in 1949 and of the ECSC in 1951–2, as well as to the EDC project and the creation of the EEC in the mid-1950s.

II

One of the NEI's crucial functions was to serve as a forum for the ideological rationalization of concrete Christian Democrat policies. In particular, their transnational co-operation allowed the Christian Democrats to develop their own peculiar notion of 'Europe' both in their transnational consultation and in their public discourse at the NEI congresses. Their contacts facilitated a mutual understanding concerning the guiding principles of their post-war

²² Dörpinghaus to Adenauer, 5 Nov. 1949; Koutzine to Adenauer, 23 July 1950, 3 Aug. 1950, Stiftung Bundeskanzler Adenauer Haus Rhöndorf (SBKA), Bestand 10 01–25, 10.01 CD/10.03 K; Dörpinghaus to Adenauer, 21 Jan. 1950, ACDP, I-009–13/1; Koutzine to Dörpinghaus, 11 Mar. 1951, ACDP, I-009–017. See also Henning Köhler, *Adenauer: Eine politische Biographie* (Berlin and Frankfurt/Main, 1994), pp. 588, 590. In 1955 Kindt-Kiefer also attempted to mediate for Adenauer in the Saar question, but without success. Cf. Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Staatsmann, 1952–1967*, vol. II (Stuttgart, 1991), pp. 229–31.

²³ Geneva Circle, 13 Feb. 1950, Tagung des Kontaktausschusses in Genf, Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang-Instituts Wien (AKVI), BPL, Konvolut BMfUnterricht 1946–50, Mapped NEI.

²⁴ Geneva Circle, 2 Mar. 1952, Protokoll über die Sitzung in Genf, ACDP I-172–31.

European policies and helped them, despite the continuing differences in national preferences and policies, to achieve a basic ideological consensus. This consensus, which they projected successfully at their congresses, encompassed the strongly anti-communist foundation of their European ideology and policies. To a large extent it continued the Catholic anti-bolshevism of the interwar period under the new and ideologically rather favourable circumstances of the Cold War. The Christian Democrats, however, now opposed communism with an unambiguously democratic non-socialist alternative to laissez-faire capitalism which required a European framework for economic and social reform. Their consensus also included a typically Catholic interpretation of the roots of nationalism and the genesis of the two European 'civil wars' of the twentieth century. This consensus essentially blamed liberalism, but was no longer accompanied to the same extent with anti-modern rhetoric. Finally, the NEI also provided a forum, less than three years after the war, for the public affirmation of a common Christian Democrat interpretation of the German and European causes of national socialism and the conditions for the re-integration of Germany into the *Abendland*, or civilized Christian Europe. The Christian Democrat discourse on the genesis of the European 'civil wars' and on the German question were of course closely intertwined, and they were crucial for post-war reconstruction.²⁵

The German question was already the theme of the second NEI congress in January 1948. It was also the first international political congress with German participation. As representatives of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU) and of the Bavarian Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU), Adenauer, Jakob Kaiser, and Josef Müller were in Luxemburg only as observers, but Adenauer was asked to make an improvised speech. This congress not only paved the way for the early integration of the German Christian Democrats in transnational party co-operation; it also created a political climate in which the rehabilitation of the West Germans and their integration in the community of democratic states became imaginable and realistic, even for the French MRP.

The introductory speech by the Swiss national councillor Karl Wick²⁶ and the reports by the Luxemburger Pierre Frieden on the 'spiritual and cultural aspect' of the German question²⁷ and by the Dutchman P. J. S. Serrarens, who headed the international Christian trade union movement, on the 'political

²⁵ The transnational party discourse was of course embedded in a wider Catholic discourse in post-war Western Europe, emanating from Pope Pius XII downwards, about the role of liberalism and socialism in bringing about the horrors of the twentieth century. For the broader intellectual context see, for example, Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et les Traités de Rome* (Brussels, 1990). On the ideology and politics of collaboration of Pope Pius XII see the critical biography by John Cornwell, *Hitler's pope* (London, 1999).

²⁶ Karl Wick, Die deutsche Frage, Exposé zuhänden der Konferenz christlicher Politiker, Luxemburg, 30-1 Jan., 1 Feb. 1948, BAR, JIL.181 1987/52, 2662.

²⁷ Pierre Frieden, Le problème allemand, son aspect spirituel et culturel, NEI, Le problème allemand, Session de Luxemburg, 30-1 Jan., 1 Feb. 1948, BAR, JIL.181 1987/52, 2350.

aspect',²⁸ indicate the extent to which the European Christian Democrats were prepared to reject the idea of a 'collective guilt' of all Germans for national socialism, the war, and the holocaust, and instead to differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' Germans. Their idea of 'two Germanies' was based on a specifically Catholic interpretation of German history. According to this interpretation, Germany west of the ancient Limes and partly west of the river Elbe was first Roman, then Carolingian, and later democratically influenced. In any case, it was 'non-Prussian'. In contrast, the Lutheran Germany east of the river Elbe had been alienated from the (Catholic) Christian civilization of Western Europe for a long time and had already been responsible, as Serrarens put it, for destroying, in the Reformation, 'the unity of Europe'. According to Serrarens, there was 'a direct line from Frederick the Great to Bismarck and Hitler'.²⁹ Thus, West Germany, which incidentally was the area occupied by the Western Allies, seemed suited for rehabilitation and capable of integration. In contrast, the Lutheran East Germany was under the control of communist atheists and, for the time being, lost for the *Abendland*.³⁰ Despite their strong sympathies for the Catholic part of Central Europe, especially for Poland, this interpretation clearly facilitated the acceptance of a temporary division not only of Germany, but also of Europe. It thus helps to explain Christian Democrat support for the formation of a Western bloc under American leadership and their extreme caution with respect to Soviet détente initiatives in the 1950s.

Adenauer essentially shared this interpretation, allowing him quickly to emerge as the preferred partner in European politics among the West German Christian Democrats. Others appeared less reliable, especially the leader of the East German CDU, Kaiser, who wanted to give priority to German unification, although only under democratic auspices. In his improvised speech,³¹ Adenauer, in referring to the Christian resistance in Germany, resolutely rejected the idea of a collective guilt of all Germans. This was no longer really an issue in Luxemburg, however. Following upon Churchill's proposal in his speech in Zurich in 1946, he also made a far-reaching offer for close Franco-German partnership.

Another key condition for the rehabilitation of the Germans, and for the quick inclusion of the German Christian Democrats in the NEI and of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany in European integration, was to

²⁸ P. J. S. Serrarens, *Le problème allemand, son aspect politique, NEI, Le problème allemand, Session de Luxembourg*, 30–1 Jan., 1 Feb. 1948, BAR, JII.181 1987/52. ²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ On the role of the term *Abendland* for the European debate in Germany after 1945 see Walter Lipgens, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik, 1945–1950: Erster Teil, 1945–1947* (Stuttgart, 1977), pp. 233–5. For a modern intellectual history of the term, albeit only in a German and not in a comparative European context, see Axel Schildt, *Zwischen Abendland und Amerika: Studien zur westdeutschen Ideenlandschaft der 50er Jahre* (Munich, 1999).

³¹ A summary of the key elements of Adenauer's speech is to be found in 'Christlich-demokratische Internationale?', *Rheinischer Merkur*, 7 Feb. 1948. Concerning Adenauer's early European policy and the NEI meeting in Luxemburg see also Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Aufstieg, 1876–1952*, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1986), pp. 557–8.

rid the West Germans of their moral debt through the Europeanization of the historical responsibility for national socialism and for the crimes committed by Germans in its name. In his report, Frieden admitted that there was a specifically German contribution to the rise of fascism and national socialism in Europe. He saw this in a romantic and unrealistic disposition of German elites, dating back to the nineteenth century. As a result of this disposition they had been more open towards the quasi-religious ideological messages of national socialism. On the other hand, Frieden argued, fascism was a phenomenon that ‘had developed not only in Germany, but in Europe as a whole’,³² and it is here that the Christian Democrat discourses on Germany and Europe were obviously linked.

According to Wick, national socialism was, if anything, rather ‘the reflection of an international *Zeitgeist* than of a national *Volksgeist*’. It was really only ‘the teutonic expression of a more general crisis’, just as ‘bolshevism is the Russian-Asiatic expression of this crisis’. In the end, both ideologies, fascism and bolshevism, could only succeed in an unfair and morally corrupt world. It was laissez-faire capitalism and free trade and thus, in the last resort, liberalism that the Christian Democrats held responsible for the decline of Christian civilization. Wick even spoke dramatically of a ‘European collective guilt’, as national socialism and bolshevism were ‘really just a recapitulation of European history of the last 150 years’.³³ Being a Swiss, Wick was perhaps more inclined to share a portion of this European collective guilt than some others, due to his country’s far-reaching co-operation with Nazi Germany during the war.³⁴ However, his exposition reflected a more widespread longing of Christian Democrats for a *moral* reorientation towards past, apparently better, times to accompany the process of economic and social modernization. The key, clearly, was for Germany to ‘re-enter into the Christian mainstream’, as Frieden put it, and to ‘detach itself from the purely biological and positivist view of life’,³⁵ in other words, the Germans needed to be ‘re-Christianized’. How better could they prove their moral recovery, one might add, than by being as aggressively anti-communist as possible.

Crucially, the idea of two Germanies and the Europeanization of the guilt question also allowed the Christian Democrats to look more pragmatically at

³² Frieden, *Le problème allemand*.

³³ Wick, *Die deutsche Frage*. In relation to the West German Christian Democrats and their view of the ‘guilt’ question see the interesting article by Maria Mitchell, ‘Materialism and secularism: CDU politicians and national socialism, 1945–1949’, *Journal of Modern History*, 67 (1995), pp. 278–308, at p. 297. For general context see Mary Heimann, ‘Christianity in Western Europe from the Enlightenment’, in Adrian Hastings, ed., *A world history of Christianity* (London, 1999), pp. 458–507.

³⁴ For a very good synopsis of the controversial debate about Switzerland and the Second World War see Georg Kreis, ‘Vier Debatten und wenig Dissens’, in idem and Bertrand Müller, eds., *Die Schweiz und der Zweite Weltkrieg/La Suisse et la Seconde Guerre mondiale* (special issue of vol. 47, no. 4 (1997) of *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte*) (Basel, 1997), pp. 451–76. See also Erwin Bucher, *Zwischen Bundesrat und General: Schweizer Politik und Armee im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Zurich, 1993).

³⁵ Frieden, *Le problème allemand*.

the negative consequences for Europe as a whole of the desolate economic situation in the western zones of Germany and to realize the dangers of a permanently enforced control of Germany. In his report on the economic aspects, the Belgian Désiré Lamalle recommended a substantial increase in German coal production and exports in the short term and German economic reconstruction within a new European framework in the longer term. Germany simply could not be left in its current distress which would leave a 'source of infection in the heart of Europe from which our civilization might well die'.³⁶ As a solution to the German question and to avoid such an infection, the Christian Democrats foresaw the formation of a European Germany after the ruthless attempt by the national socialists to create a German Europe by force.³⁷ In principle, their transnational exchanges in Luxemburg already foreshadowed the solution of the German question through the (self-) control of (West) Germany by integration within a new, institutionalized European order. Their ideological disposition after 1945, as it was developed and reaffirmed in their transnational party co-operation, naturally made the Christian Democrats the strongest proponents of this concept. Their support for the re-integration of West Germany was of course greatly facilitated by the fact that they had partners there in the CDU/CSU and Adenauer who stood for their vision of a morally renewed, 'European' Germany. Moreover, the CDU/CSU and Adenauer were prepared to give Franco-German reconciliation and Western integration absolute political preference.

Adenauer also used the Geneva Circle to demonstrate his willingness and that of his party to co-operate closely with the West European Christian Democrats and to create an atmosphere of mutual trust. Of course he was also pursuing his aim of achieving internal sovereignty as quickly as possible, as well as external emancipation from the occupying powers. At a meeting in June 1948, Adenauer criticized the London agreements concerning the Ruhr statute which he argued provided not only for the control of West German production, but its de facto elimination from world markets. He expressed the hope that the statute would be a temporary solution only and urged the French Christian Democrats to modify their position on the control of German coal and steel production soon. Adenauer referred to the recommendations of the three power conference of 4 June 1948 in London which had also demanded a new French policy, a change which Bidault had already initiated unofficially.³⁸ Adenauer also made it clear that in view of the currency reform in the western zones, he regarded the partition of Germany as a fact of life which could not be

³⁶ Désiré Lamalle, *Le problème allemand, son aspect économique*, NEI, *Le problème allemand*, Session de Luxembourg, 30–1 January, 1 Feb. 1948, BAR, JII.181 1987/52, 2350.

³⁷ In this context, see also Resolution, adoptée par la conférence de NEI tenue à Luxembourg du 29 janvier au 2 février 1948, ACDP, IX-002-011/2.

³⁸ On French policy towards Germany in this period see also in greater detail Raymond Poidevin, 'Die Neuorientierung der französischen Deutschlandpolitik 1948/49', in Foschepoth, ed., *Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage*, pp. 129–44, at p. 129; Reinhard Schreiner, *Bidault, der MRP und die französische Deutschlandpolitik, 1944–1948* (Frankfurt, Berne, and New York, 1985), pp. 154–61.

changed in the foreseeable future. He saw a new German nationalism, which might be supported by the Soviet Union, as the greatest danger. To counter such a tendency, he advocated a strict policy of economic integration of West Germany into the emerging West European and Atlantic system.³⁹

Adenauer's comments fell on fertile ground. In October 1948, Adenauer, Bidault, and several other Christian Democrats discussed the political fate of the continent. Bidault remarked that Europe used to extend to the Urals. Now it was only 'a small isthmus'.⁴⁰ Russia did not want war. On the other hand, Bidault added, he had spent 600 hours negotiating with Molotov and 30 hours with Stalin, but without any success. It was clear that it was impossible to convince the Soviet leader to change course. Reflecting the dominant Christian Democrat interpretation of Stalinism, Bidault insisted: 'We are confronted with a new Islam, which will never retreat, and from which we have to expect everything.'⁴¹

Against this international background, the American-sponsored European Recovery Programme was an economic necessity for the reconstruction of Western Europe, Bidault argued. But it would not provide 'a definite solution'. The key to the future organization of Western Europe was the Franco-German relationship. The 'eternal, useless duel' between these two nations had to stop to allow a European solution. Otherwise, there would be no solution at all. Bidault also urged caution, however, concerning the institutional set-up of the new Europe. With respect to a European parliament, which was debated at that time, one should not 'go too far'. It was necessary to be 'very progressive in the economic field, but very cautious in the political field'.⁴² Adenauer concurred with Bidault's statement. In particular, he also advocated the creation of a European confederation, rather than a federation. He clearly did not wish to burden the beginnings of Franco-German reconciliation with too far-reaching institutional demands concerning the future organization of Western Europe.

III

The issues of European economic integration and security policy dominated the Geneva Circle in the early 1950s. Both questions were of course closely linked to the 'German question', particularly in the context of the Schuman Plan of May 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community and the Pleven Plan of October 1950 for what became the EDC.

Plans for some form of European co-operation in coal and steel went back to

³⁹ Geneva Circle, 29 June 1948, *Compte rendu d'une rencontre à Genève*, Archives Nationales Paris (AN), 457 AP 59.

⁴⁰ Hurdes to Gruber, 2 Nov. 1948, with a photocopy of notes Hurdes had prepared on the Geneva Circle meeting of 21 Oct. 1948, Institut für Zeitgeschichte Innsbruck, Karl Gruber Archiv (KGA), Karton 4.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid. See also Jean-Claude Demory, *Georges Bidault, 1899–1983: Biographie* (Paris, 1995), pp. 178–89, 251–60, 268–70; see also Gérard Bossuat, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944–1954* (Etudes générales, Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France, Ministère des Finances, Editions), vol. 1 (2 vols., Paris, 1992), pp. 295–352, 353–409.

the interwar period and the 1926 international steel cartel.⁴³ When the Christian Democrats met in Geneva in March 1948, Jean Morin, at that time a member of Bidault's cabinet and one of his most influential collaborators,⁴⁴ mentioned that the French government had commissioned a group of industrialists to examine the possibility of some form of interweaving of the French and West German coal and steel industries. Adenauer reacted immediately. He wanted to avoid a 'unilateral consideration' of this question by the French alone and asked Kindt-Kiefer to check whether it might not be possible to arrange consultations with Germans. He suggested the Cologne banker Robert Pferdmenges 'who has been familiar with the conditions in the Ruhr for years'.⁴⁵ At that stage, Pferdmenges had already been in consultations with French steel producers and had offered them no less than a 50 per cent stake in the Ruhr steel works. Private discussions about this issue continued, and in March 1950, the French government sent a delegation to the Ruhr to achieve a consensus concerning steel exports from the Saar to southern Germany, which was seen as a prelude to more far-reaching agreements.⁴⁶

At about the same time, around 20 March 1950, Adenauer met Koutzine and proposed the full integration of the French and German coal and steel industries, as well as the chemical industries. Koutzine immediately forwarded this proposal to Bidault on 22 March 1950.⁴⁷ Adenauer suggested meetings of officials to study the situation in the three sectors from a comparative perspective. It would then be possible in a second round of talks to agree to a mutual entente to avoid 'a Franco-German fight in the markets'. According to Adenauer, this would be a first concrete and realistic step towards a Franco-German rapprochement and also towards realizing the economic and political unity of Western Europe.

Bidault let Adenauer know through Kindt-Kiefer that he was well disposed towards the proposal. It was in fact fully compatible with the interests of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. They devised a plan for integration in coal and steel in the second half of April, a plan Schuman made public on 9 May 1950.⁴⁸

⁴³ On the question of continuity and discontinuity concerning co-operation in coal and steel see especially John Gillingham, 'Zur Vorgeschichte der Montan-Union Westeuropas: Kohle und Stahl in Depression und Krieg', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 34 (1986), pp. 381–405.

⁴⁴ Demory, *Georges Bidault*, pp. 278–9.

⁴⁵ Adenauer to Kindt-Kiefer, 30 Mar. 1948, document 796, in Hans Peter Mensing, ed., *Adenauer Briefe, 1947–1949* (Berlin, 1984), p. 195.

⁴⁶ Cf. Gillingham, 'Vorgeschichte', p. 404.

⁴⁷ Proposition of Chancellor Adenauer, Koutzine to Bidault, 22 Mar. 1950, AN, 457 AP 59. The date of the meeting with Adenauer is not given, but it must have been shortly before Koutzine wrote the letter to Bidault. It is also unclear when *exactly* Adenauer conceived his proposal, but it was definitely a personal initiative to be transmitted through the existing party channels. It had not at that point been discussed by the Bonn government. See also fn 22 in Ulrich Lappenküper, 'Der Schuman-Plan', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 42 (1994), pp. 403–45, at pp. 407–8.

⁴⁸ On French–US contacts over the Schuman Plan see A. W. Lovett, 'The United States and the Schuman Plan: a study in French diplomacy, 1950–1952', *Historical Journal*, 39 (1996), pp. 425–55. On the relations between Adenauer, Schuman, and Bidault see also Demory, *Georges Bidault*, pp. 295–8.

The intergovernmental negotiations then dragged on into 1951.⁴⁹ The Geneva Circle continued to discuss related questions and played a supportive role. It turned out, however, that the question of West German rearmament became very urgent soon after the publication of the Schuman Plan, on the outbreak of the Korean War.⁵⁰ It was this issue that took up most time in the Geneva Circle until the final demise of the EDC in the French parliament in August 1954.

In the Geneva meetings, as well as in Western Europe more generally, what was seen as the desired or at least inevitable inclusion of the Federal Republic in the evolving Western defence system led to an early rejection of a 'Europe as a third [world] power', that is, as a 'bridge between East and West'.⁵¹ For Adenauer, the Geneva meetings provided an ideal opportunity to launch the idea of West German rearmament in secret talks with the French Christian Democrats long before the creation of the Federal Republic and before he, like Churchill, began to air this possibility in public in November and December 1949.⁵² In the Geneva meetings, Adenauer advocated a West German contribution to European defence as early as December 1948⁵³ and again in March 1949 – that is, almost two years before the publication of the Pleven Plan. He insisted in the Geneva talks that an understanding with the Soviet Union over the future of Germany and Europe was impossible. He then raised the question of whether Europe was able to withstand a possible Russian attack from the east. Half of Germany was already occupied by Russia, Adenauer argued, and the other half lay 'defenceless before the Russians'. If Britain did not recognize the danger, France had the enormous task to be the 'protector of Europe'.⁵⁴

The theme of French political leadership in the reconstruction of Western Europe ran through all of Adenauer's contributions to the Geneva meetings. As well as reflecting his deeply held conviction that Britain was and would remain

⁴⁹ On the origins of the Schuman Plan and the evolution of the ECSC see, in particular, Raymond Poidevin and D. Spierenburg, *The history of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community* (London, 1994; French edn, 1993) and the relevant chapters in the multilingual volume by Klaus Schwabe, ed., *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/1951* (Brussels, 1988).

⁵⁰ Cf. Rolf Steininger, *Wiederbewaffnung: Die Entscheidung für einen westdeutschen Verteidigungsbeitrag: Adenauer und die Westmächte, 1950* (Erlangen, Bonn, and Vienna, 1989), pp. 43–169.

⁵¹ Dörpinghaus, 'Die Genfer Sitzungen', p. 540. See also Wilfried Loth, 'Von der "Dritten Kraft" zur Westintegration: Deutsche Europa-Projekte in der Nachkriegszeit', in Franz Knipping and Klaus-Jürgen Müller, eds., *Aus der Ohnmacht zur Bündnismacht: Das Machtproblem in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1945–1960* (Paderborn, 1995), pp. 57–83.

⁵² Steininger, *Wiederbewaffnung*, pp. 15–17.

⁵³ Geneva Circle, 22 Dec. 1948, protocol Koutzine, AN 519 AP 10. See also Philippe Chenaux, 'Les démocrates-chrétiens et la construction de l'Europe (1947–1957)', *Revue politique*, 1 (1991), pp. 87–101, at p. 96; Wolfram Kaiser, 'Begegnungen christdemokratischer Politiker in der Nachkriegszeit', in Martin Greschat and Wilfried Loth, eds., *Die Christen und die Entstehung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft* (Stuttgart, 1995), pp. 139–57, at p. 150.

⁵⁴ Geneva Circle, 8 Mar. 1949, Bericht Hurdes von der Tagung des Koordinations-Komitees der christlich-demokratischen Parteien in Genf, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Wien (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), BKA/AA II-pol 1949, Zl. 82.250-pol/49 (80.161-pol/49), Int. 14; see also the protocol in ACDP, I-009-017.

semi-detached from the European continent and that his crucial task was to work for Franco-German reconciliation, it was also a crude tactical move to ally French fears of Germany, to strengthen French self-confidence, and to induce the French government, which was led at that time by the MRP, to take bold initiatives over Europe. ‘Third way’ and ‘bridge’ concepts were out of the question for the German chancellor in foreign policy, and there should be no doubts about this in the minds of his French partners. In one of his reports to Bidault, which was based on his frequent talks with Adenauer and Blankenhorn, Koutzine described Adenauer’s foreign policy concept: ‘Adenauer has set everything on the card of European federation. Essentially, his entire foreign policy is constructed around that objective because he believes that the Franco-German entente, the key idea behind his plans, can only be realized in a wider West European context. Adenauer is thus deliberately sacrificing German unification.’⁵⁵

The German representatives also stuck to their clear preference for Western integration over German unification in the context of the Stalin notes of 1952 which envisaged the unification of a neutral Germany with its own national army. In the Geneva talks, Otto Lenz referred to the Soviet offer as ‘a new problem’. He declared that ‘Adenauer is determined, as before, to integrate to the utmost. Russia ought first to prove its honest intentions by receiving the United Nations and by holding free elections [in East Germany].’⁵⁶ The German Christian Democrats in the Geneva Circle did everything in order to make clear that the West should not get involved with Stalin’s proposal. In June 1952, Lenz rejected the question put forth in Geneva as to whether the West should negotiate with the Soviet Union before the ratification of the Western treaties. He argued that the Soviets would only agree to German unity ‘if they have the upper hand’. Stalin’s notes ‘thus are only aimed against the West forming a bloc’. Soviet policy was merely a stalling tactic. The West German government intended ‘to ratify the [European] treaties swiftly’.⁵⁷

In the period 1953–4, the German representatives became increasingly dissatisfied with the hesitant French policy towards European integration, and especially with the dragging out of the domestic debate about the ratification

⁵⁵ La Tactique du Chancelier Adenauer [Victor Koutzine to Georges Bidault 1951], AN, 457 AP 59. This document is printed in French in Michael Gehler, ‘“Missverständnisse” niedriger hängen? Adenauer opferte bewußt die Einheit für die Westintegration’, *Informationen für den Geschichts- und Gemeinschaftskundelehrer*, 45 (1993), pp. 22–8, fn 9. On this highly controversial question see the excellent literature review by Klaus Kellmann, ‘Deutsche Geschichte nach 1945: Neuerscheinungen vor, während und nach der Auflösung der DDR und der Vereinigung beider deutscher Staaten’, *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 44 (1993), pp. 243–69, at pp. 247–53.

⁵⁶ Geneva Circle, 24 Mar. 1952, protocol von Sprei, ACDP, I-172–31.

⁵⁷ Geneva Circle, 16 June 1952, protocol Grubhofer, AKVI, Karton NEI c) e). For a well-balanced approach see Wilfried Loth, *Die Teilung der Welt: Geschichte des Kalten Krieges, 1941–1955* (Munich, 2000), pp. 291–304. For an older English edition, see idem, *The division of the world: a history of the Cold War, 1941–1955* (London, 1988). See also Torsten Ripper, ‘Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952: Die Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Debatte’, *Zeitgeschichte*, 26 (1999), pp. 372–96.

of the EDC Treaty. They increasingly doubted the usefulness of the Geneva Circle, as one MRP assessment of the prospects of ratification after another proved to be overly optimistic, generating doubts about the reliability and the political influence of Bidault and his advisers in the MRP and in French politics.⁵⁸ Of course, the Geneva discussions of the security issue were successful in so far as the MRP members of the French parliament voted eighty to two with four abstentions in favour of the EDC in the crucial vote on 30 August 1954. The French-inspired treaty failed, however, and the Western Allies had to fall back on the alternative, initially favoured by Adenauer in 1950, of German (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) NATO membership, now combined with the creation of the intergovernmental Western European Union (WEU) with Britain. This came into force in May 1955. Koutzine, who had foreseen the failure of the EDC in the French parliament, became an ardent supporter of a renewed emphasis in European integration on economics. The Geneva Circle did not really recover from the failure of the EDC, however. Instead, the NEI became the focal point in transnational party co-operation not only for the formation and development of the integration ideology, but also for European policy-making.

IV

During the EDC crisis, and after it finally ended with the ratification of the Paris Treaties, the ECSC states could draw upon their previous consultations concerning economic integration. These had in fact begun with the discussions about a European customs union in 1947–8. Only the ECSC had been set up prior to 1954. Proposals for projects in other sectors, like agriculture, transport, and nuclear energy, had been mooted, however, and debated on and off. Throughout the early 1950s, moreover, the Benelux countries in particular had pushed the idea of Europe-wide tariff reductions with the ultimate goal of a customs union inside the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). Alan Milward has thus pointed out that to describe the Messina conference at the beginning of June 1955 as a *relance européenne*, as if the ECSC ‘core Europe’ had suddenly and miraculously emerged like a phoenix from the ashes to reach out for new horizons, is cultivating a European myth.⁵⁹ In fact, these horizons were well known for a long time and many inside the ECSC had continued to aim for them even during the EDC crisis which temporarily dominated West European politics during 1952–4.

Nor should the failure of the EDC be interpreted as a fundamental break in the integration process in institutional respects. The negative vote of the French National Assembly was of course a setback for the constitutionalists who wanted to build a European constitutional state. But the institutional

⁵⁸ Koutzine to Lenz, 14 Sept. 1953, ACDP, I-172–74.

⁵⁹ Milward, *The European rescue*, pp. 195–6.

purists were only a small minority even in the ECSC states. During the EDC negotiations the supranationality of the original Pleven Plan had already been watered down significantly. Just like the EEC, it combined supranational and intergovernmental elements in an international organization of a new type. The institutional issue should also not be overemphasized for a second reason. Research into the history of the integration process has shown the extent to which different institutional concepts have always also reflected concrete policy goals linked to them.⁶⁰ Institutional concepts could be adapted to changing external conditions and for new fields of integration, such as economics. Indeed, an analysis of the NEI discussions of institutional questions up to the mid-1950s shows very clearly that the European Christian Democrats were not only very flexible with respect to the institutional design of European institutions, as long as they fulfilled certain functions, such as to foster Franco-German reconciliation. It also becomes clear that they were often unaware of the exact differences between supranational and inter-state institutional concepts.⁶¹

Christian Democrat transnationalism in the formative period of the EEC in the period 1954–7 underlines the relative continuity in the integration process from the signing of the EDC Treaty and through the EDC crisis to the signing of the Rome Treaties on 25 March 1957. Just two weeks after the negative vote in the French National Assembly, the Christian Democrats used their annual congress in Bruges in Belgium from 10 to 12 September 1954 to demonstrate their belief in the vitality of the European idea. They expressed it symbolically with several speeches and a torchlight procession in honour of the Italian prime minister Alcide De Gasperi who had died just three weeks previously on 19 August 1954. Unlike Adenauer and Bidault, for example, De Gasperi had never himself participated in any activities of the NEI or the Geneva Circle, but he was regarded as one of the key Christian Democrat figures in the integration process because of his successful domestic fight against communism in Italy and his prominent role in intergovernmental relations in continental Europe. In one sense, De Gasperi's death seemed timely. It could be associated with the slow death of the EDC and of the plan for a European Political Community (EPC) as a constitutional roof over it, which he had initiated. The NEI parties managed to use their Bruges congress to develop the political cult of the European 'founding fathers', especially De Gasperi, Schuman, and Adenauer,

⁶⁰ In relation to the Christian Democrat 'founding fathers' Adenauer and Schuman see Schwarz, *Adenauer, 1952–1967*, p. 147; Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman, homme d'Etat, 1886–1963* (Paris, 1986), p. 377.

⁶¹ For Christian Democrat party co-operation and institutional issues of European integration see also Wolfram Kaiser, 'Institutionelle Ordnung und strategische Interessen: Die Christdemokraten und "Europa" nach 1945', in Wilfried Loth, ed., *Das europäische Projekt zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts* (Opladen, 2001), pp. 81–98; idem, "'L'ennemi héréditaire, c'est l'Angleterre": Les démocrates-chrétiens français et allemands face aux questions institutionnelles (1947–1963)', in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, ed., *France et Allemagne face aux institutions européennes* (Brussels, 2001) – forthcoming.

which helped them to project the image of themselves as the ‘European’ – and thus modern – parties.⁶²

The Christian Democrats also publicly made clear that they saw the NATO/WEU solution as necessary after the failure of the EDC, but not at all as promising for further integration in the future. Schuman, for example, in a speech at a meeting of the West German Europa Union in Hanover in October 1954, called the WEU ‘a London façade in the English style, decorated in the Parisian way’. If one was content with the NATO/WEU solution, he declared, ‘it would be the definite abandonment of a European solution to which we remain attached over and above all other preoccupations’.⁶³ In a Geneva Circle meeting on 31 January 1955, the MRP politician Pierre-Henri Teitgen insisted: ‘If the headquarters of European politics are re-located to London, we know that we cannot expect anything from England but sabotage.’⁶⁴ The German CDU MP Karl Count von Spreti agreed and added: ‘I am in favour of a Europe of the six [ECSC] powers ... It will be just as in the case of the ECSC: when they [the British] realize that they are marginalized, they will cooperate.’⁶⁵

The European Christian Democrats not only retained their concept of a ‘core Europe’ of continental countries; they were also resolved to continue the integration process in the field of economics. Many months before the failure of the EDC, the NEI had made economic integration the theme of their Bruges congress which strongly supports the continuity thesis about the integration process in the mid-1950s. At the end of their congress, the Christian Democrats passed the ‘Manifesto of Bruges’ in which they outlined the project of a common market in Europe: ‘Through creating a common economic space, the united Europe will open a vast field for expansion to national production in harmony with the modern technological possibilities and the growing needs of the people.’⁶⁶ Such a common economic space would have to include ‘the complete liberty of exchange and circulation of people and ideas [... and] the liberation of the exchanges of goods, services and capital’; in other words, the so-called four basic freedoms of the later EEC Treaty. In addition, the NEI demanded the direct election of a European parliament. Only such an ambitious integration programme would allow (West) Germany and France to overcome their historical antagonism and prevent a possible neutralization or ‘sovietization’ of Germany.⁶⁷

⁶² Rouwhulde aan President De Gasperi, NEI congress, Bruges, 10 Sept. 1951, KADOC, Archief A. E. de Schryver, 7.2.4.8.; John Biggs-Davison, ‘Christian Democrats meet the “Nouvelles Equipes” at Bruges’, *The Tablet*, 18 Sept. 1954.

⁶³ Quoted in Poidevin, *Robert Schuman*, p. 381.

⁶⁴ Geneva Circle, 31 Jan. 1955, protocol von Spreti, ADCP I-172-31. ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ Manifesto of Bruges, 10–12 Sept. 1954, KADOC, Archief R. Houben 246.2/3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* On Western neutralization ideas after the war see Axel Frohn, *Neutralisierung als Alternative zur Westintegration: Die Deutschlandpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 1945–1949* (Frankfurt, 1985); Andreas Hillgruber, *Alliierte Pläne für eine “Neutralisierung” Deutschlands, 1945–1955* (Opladen, 1987), pp. 5–31.

The significance of this manifesto does not lie in its public impact. This was in fact limited. The annual congress was reported widely in those newspapers and journals in continental European countries that were affiliated to the Catholic Church and the Christian Democrat parties, but not very much beyond them. The real meaning of the congress and the declaration lay in its meticulous preparation. This shows very clearly how far advanced planning for economic integration in continental Europe already was in 1954. In the spring of 1954, the Belgian Christian Social politician and director of the PSC/CVP research centre, Robert Houben, the so-called *rapporteur* for the Bruges congress, had developed a detailed questionnaire on issues of European economic integration which he sent to the national *equipes*. Their answers, and especially those of the German CDU/CSU and the French MRP, reflected certain integration concepts and preferences which largely prefigured the later negotiating positions of those countries' governments in the EEC negotiations in the period 1956–7.⁶⁸ It is true, of course, that the French Christian Democrats could only influence and support the pro-European line of the Socialist-led Mollet government from outside from January 1956 onwards. Moreover, differences of opinion also existed within the Christian Democrat parties, as the clashes during 1955–6 between Adenauer and the German economics minister Ludwig Erhard, who preferred global trade liberalization to regional integration, exemplify.⁶⁹ It is exactly because of this need for intra- and inter-party co-ordination and compromise in the national context that it is astonishing how well developed the different positions already were by the time of the Bruges congress.

Summarizing the answers to his questionnaire, Houben stated in his report the general agreement among all parties to move towards horizontal economic integration in the form of a customs union. Although the experiences with the ECSC were seen as broadly positive, integration in other sectors was regarded as too un-ambitious and limited in its economic and political effects. They were also agreed that economic integration should not be confined to market integration, but would have to have a strong political component; and that the European Economic Community which they were hoping to build should pursue a generally liberal foreign trade policy compatible with the aims of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).⁷⁰ The answers to the

⁶⁸ Questionnaire by Houben, responses of the CDU/CSU and the French *equipe* (MRP), July 1954, KADOC, Archief R. Houben, 246.2./3.

⁶⁹ Concerning the different European concepts of Adenauer and Erhard, which continued to shape the debate over European integration in the Federal Republic until the early 1960s, see also Daniel Koerfer, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt: Erhard und Adenauer* (Stuttgart, 1987), and Hanns Jürgen Küsters, 'Zollunion oder Freihandelszone? Zur Kontroverse über die Handelspolitik Westeuropas in den fünfziger Jahren', in Helmut Berding, ed., *Wirtschaftliche und politische Integration in Europa im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1984), pp. 295–308, at pp. 298–302.

⁷⁰ Robert Houben, *Gemeinsame Elemente einer christlichen politischen Doktrin auf dem Gebiet der Wirtschaft und des Sozialwesens*, NEI congress, Bruges, 10–12 Sept. 1954, ACDP, IX-002–016.

questionnaire showed, however, that differences continued to exist between the parties mainly with respect to economic and social policy within a customs union. The more left-wing French Christian Democrats wanted quite far-reaching harmonization of social and fiscal legislation which especially the Germans and the Dutch disliked. The MRP also wanted the common organization and financing of development aid to European colonies, or 'overseas territories'. The CDU/CSU accepted economic co-operation with European colonies as 'a special task' of the future Community, but clearly did not want to finance colonialism, the more so as the Federal Republic as well as Italy and Luxemburg did not of course have colonies. Other faultlines concerned currency convertibility, which the CDU/CSU wanted to achieve as quickly as possible, and the free movement of people. Fearing massive immigration from Italy, the MRP wanted long transition periods. It was already clear in the Federal Republic, however, that its industry would shortly suffer from labour shortage, so that free labour migration seemed to make great economic sense. The answers to Houben's questionnaire helped clarify such continuing conceptual differences over economic integration. At the same time, it no longer seemed impossible that they could be overcome.

Already in February 1955, the NEI had decided to use their next annual congress to debate economic and social integration in Europe.⁷¹ In Salzburg in Austria in September 1955, the Italian DC secretary general Amintore Fanfani presented the more general political report and the Dutch economics minister Jelle Zijlstra the economic report. By coincidence, the congress this time took place just one week after the meeting of the ECSC foreign ministers in Nordwijk in the Netherlands on 6 September and while the expert committee under the chairmanship of the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak was still discussing the technical problems of establishing a European customs union, a first step agreed by the ECSC states in Messina three months previously. The selection of the *rapporteurs* proved significant. It was not the more left-wing Catholic social reformer Fanfani, but the more liberal economics professor Zijlstra who outlined the economic issues. He roundly rejected all demands for far-reaching harmonization of social and fiscal legislation as a precondition for the establishment of a common market.⁷² According to Zijlstra, economic integration was perfectly possible without the transfer of many competences for policy-making to a supranational authority, an approach that in the eyes of many Christian Democrats appeared somewhat discredited as a result of the failure of the EDC. Zijlstra emphasized that this was also in line with the experience of the more limited Benelux customs union of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. The issue of harmonization was irrelevant before the start of the new project. Rather, it would become relevant during the integration process, but only in the sense that the customs union

⁷¹ NEI Comité Directeur, Paris, 19 Feb. 1955, ACDP, IX-002-003.

⁷² Jelle Zijlstra, Die politische und wirtschaftliche Integration Westeuropas, NEI congress, Salzburg, 14-16 Sept. 1955, BAR JII.181 1987/52, 2383.

would harmonize the conditions for competition. In the ensuing debate, Zijlstra once more rejected the idea of harmonization and recommended that its supporters read the free trade theory of comparative costs by the British economist David Ricardo first published in 1817. From this perspective, Zijlstra said, the demand for harmonization was simply based on an economic ‘misunderstanding’.⁷³

The harmonization issue did not seem nearly as clear-cut to everyone in Salzburg. The argument about the harmonization of social and fiscal legislation reflected continuing differences also among European Christian Democrats over how *dirigiste* they conceived economic policy and about what now tends to be called the ‘social dimension’ of European integration. Within the Netherlands, the Protestant Zijlstra was operating in the corporative system of economic and social policy-making that had been introduced after the war. He did not, however, wish to transfer decision-making in most questions other than foreign trade policy to the Community level. Like most Christian Democrats from the conservative and liberal wings of their respective parties, Zijlstra feared an over-regulated Community that would tend to be economically and socially inflexible and not least – under the influence of the French economic tradition – might end up as a protectionist bloc. The dominant role of these widespread fears in the NEI deliberations as well as in the negotiation of the EEC Treaty reflects the more general shift in post-war Christian Democracy from the more ambitious and interventionist concepts for social reform of the immediate post-war period towards a more liberal, market-oriented approach, also at the European level.⁷⁴

It is also indicative of how widespread anti-British feeling was among the European Christian Democrats, after the failure of ‘their’ EDC Treaty and in view of Britain’s reluctant observation of the Spaak Committee deliberations,⁷⁵ that it was Zijlstra, coming from the most Atlantic-oriented ECSC member state, who insisted, in reference to Britain: ‘We cannot wait. We will continue to work [on the Messina proposals]. We might see each other one day in some combination, maybe even unification.’⁷⁶

As the third annual NEI congress in a row, that of 1956 also dealt with economic integration. It took place in conjunction with the conference in Venice on 29–30 May 1956 where the ECSC foreign ministers decided to start official negotiations over the creation of a customs union and an atomic energy authority on the basis of the Spaak Report, which had finally been submitted

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ See also Martin Conway, ‘Introduction’, in Buchanan and Conway, eds., *Political Catholicism*, pp. 1–33, at p. 31.

⁷⁵ On British policy towards the Messina process and continental reactions to British policy see Wolfram Kaiser, *Using Europe, abusing the Europeans: Britain and European integration, 1945–1963* (London, 1999), chapter 2; James R. V. Ellison, ‘Accepting the inevitable: Britain and European integration’, in Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck, eds., *British foreign policy, 1955–1964: contracting options* (London, 2000), pp. 171–89.

⁷⁶ Debate, NEI congress, Salzburg, 14–16 Sept. 1955, ACDP, IX-002–003.

by the Belgian foreign minister in April 1956.⁷⁷ That the European Christian Democrats concentrated so exclusively in their transnational party co-operation on economic integration during 1954–6 underlines how stable their aims and motives for integration were. At the same time, it shows that they were prepared to be flexible and to adapt to the changed external circumstances after the failure of the EDC through switching to another sector, economics, and through moderating their previously more supranational institutional demands. The deliberations inside the NEI stabilized their long-term ideological orientation, strengthened their resolve to succeed this time, and facilitated their transnational co-ordination and the search for acceptable compromise solutions during the tedious EEC negotiations. The NEI discussions also reflected their *ex post* interpretation of the failure of the EDC, which was also widely shared by other pro-European political groups in the ECSC states and which Schuman had expressed in his Hanover speech in October 1954: ‘We have lost a battle, but we can still win the war.’⁷⁸

V

If one wanted to judge Christian Democrat party co-operation during the first decade after 1945 against the far-reaching ambitions of politicians like the Austrian Felix Hurdes in the post-war euphoria of the 1947 Lucerne meeting, the balance sheet would be negative. The NEI did not develop into a European political party with a cohesive common programme for the construction of a United States of Europe. Although the Christian Democrats increasingly operated in a common political space and had to arrive at decisions on common policies, national, cultural, and linguistic barriers prevented the evolution of a European political public which would have provided a sufficient incentive for the creation of a European party. Even by the year 2001, the European People’s Party has not become a party in the narrow sense of the word, but is still largely an association of national parties.⁷⁹

None the less, Christian Democrat transnationalism after 1945 fulfilled a number of distinct functions that clearly facilitated and shaped early European integration. The first of these functions was the repeated debate about, and collective affirmation of, common historical orientations. As forums of collective self-reassurance, the NEI congresses and the Geneva meetings obviously did not have a direct and immediate influence on inter-state negotiations. But they

⁷⁷ See, by way of introduction, Wilfried Loth, *Der Weg nach Europa: Geschichte der europäischen Integration, 1939–1957* (2nd edn, Göttingen, 1991), pp. 113–26; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours* (Paris, 1996), pp. 101–13.

⁷⁸ Quoted in Poidevin, *Schuman*, p. 381.

⁷⁹ On the development of the European People’s Party see also the book written by its former secretary general, Thomas Jansen, *The European People’s Party: origins and development* (London, 1998; German edn, Bonn, 1996) and – from a German party perspective – Günter Rische and Ingo Friedrich, eds., *Europa als Auftrag: Die Politik deutscher Christdemokraten im Europäischen Parlament, 1957–1997: Von den Römischen Verträgen zur Politischen Union* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna, 1997), pp. 9–84.

manifested and helped sustain a common belief system which in turn facilitated inter-cultural communication and the bridging of diverging economic and political interests among West European Christian Democrats. In particular, the Carolingian myth of a united, pre-Reformation Europe and the essentially anti-liberal and anti-socialist explanations of the roots of twentieth-century totalitarianism and the holocaust were widely shared among the Christian Democrats *and* instrumentalized by them in the conflict over the future of Europe, as well as in the domestic political context, especially in West Germany and Italy. Whatever other historical, economic, and political motivations for national foreign policy, the *Abendland* myth clearly facilitated the acceptance of the division of Germany and of Europe and the exclusive concentration on a continental *West* European programme of integration.

Linked to the impact of common historical orientations, the NEI and the Geneva Circle also helped to clarify, to develop, and to sustain broad ideological preferences among West European Christian Democrats. These included the strong anti-bolshevism which had its roots in the interwar period, but was re-invigorated in the Cold War and proved one key factor in the dominance of Christian Democrat parties in continental Western Europe in the first two decades after 1945. Anti-bolshevism never became as marked in the MRP as it was, for example, in the CDU/CSU or the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP).⁸⁰ Yet it did form a strong common bond holding the Christian Democrats together in crises in the integration process, for example in the aftermath of the EDC failure, when a détente between East and West appeared possible *at the expense of* the ‘core Europe’ concept of the ECSC, the EDC and the EEC. Some West European Christian Democrats like Paul Van Zeeland were tempted during the 1950s by détente and demilitarization concepts,⁸¹ but such ideas were completely marginalized in the NEI, in the Geneva meetings, and also within an ad hoc NEI commission set up in early 1956 to discuss such concepts.⁸²

A third function of Christian Democrat transnationalism was to initiate and later to sustain the integration process in order to gain a distinct party political advantage in West European politics. The Christian Democrats collectively occupied the policy field of integration where the Socialists hesitated because of their opposition to the exclusion of Britain and the Scandinavian countries and their suspicion that an integrated ‘core Europe’ would be too Catholic,

⁸⁰ For the ÖVP see also Michael Gehler, “‘Politisch unabhängig’, aber “ideologisch eindeutig europäisch”: Die ÖVP, die Vereinigung christlicher Volksparteien (NEI) und die Anfänge der europäischen Integration, 1947–1960”, in idem and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die europäische Integration, 1945–1993* (Vienna, Cologne, and Weimar, 1993), pp. 291–326, at pp. 303–4.

⁸¹ On Paul Van Zeeland’s détente initiatives see in greater detail Vincent Dujardin and Michel Dumoulin, *Paul Van Zeeland, 1893–1973* (Brussels, 1997), pp. 213–31.

⁸² Comité ad hoc I, Paris, 11 Feb. 1956, BAR, JIL.181 1987/52, 2362; see also the meeting of the committee, now renamed East–West Commission, on 1 May 1958 which led to the adoption of a ‘conservative’ resolution concerning détente for the 1958 NEI congress in Scheveningen in the Netherlands: Commission Est–Ouest, Paris, 1 May 1958, BAR, JIL.181 1987/52, 2362.

conservative, and capitalist, without sufficient nationalization and economic planning. Unlike in some EU countries in the 1990s, 'Europe' was a term increasingly associated from the early 1950s with modernity and progress, and their strong support for the integration process and their collective public cultivation of the myth of the Christian Democrat 'founding fathers' clearly provided a distinct party advantage for the Christian Democrats in addition to their anti-bolshevism. That they re-invigorated previous ideas for horizontal economic integration immediately after the failure of the EDC project *also* reflected their common party interest to sustain their political dominance in Western Europe.

Christian Democrat transnationalism in Western Europe after 1945 also had important side effects that were not initially intended, but none the less fundamental to the way in which the integration process evolved. As has been shown, the concept of a Carolingian 'core Europe' was at least partly historically motivated. It was, however, strengthened further by the absence of non-continental centre-right parties from Christian Democrat transnationalism. Although Christian Democracy was largely non-confessional or inter-confessional in Western Europe after 1945, it had developed out of political Catholicism and Catholic social teaching.⁸³ Its primary electoral support still came from Catholic communities, even where the parties were formally non-confessional, like the centre-left MRP, or inter-confessional, like the centre-right CDU/CSU. Neither Britain nor the Scandinavian countries had comparable traditions, and the Conservative parties there initially showed little interest in co-operation with continental Christian Democrats. The NEI had a small British *equipe*, but at first it also included Labour politicians and some Liberals. After all, Christian democratic thought had first developed in Britain inside the Labour party which traditionally represented Irish Catholic immigrants, who formed the largest Catholic group.⁸⁴

Quite apart from specific economic and political interests, British and Scandinavian Conservatives' distinct ideological roots and (self-) exclusion from transnational party contacts meant that they could not and would not link up with the continental Christian Democrat European ideology.⁸⁵ When they finally did become interested in transnational contacts in the context of

⁸³ See also, as a general introduction with further literature, Adrian Hastings, 'Catholic history from Vatican I to John Paul II', in idem, ed., *Modern Catholicism: Vatican II and after* (London and New York, 1991), pp. 1–13.

⁸⁴ On British traditions of Christian Democracy see Tom Buchanan, 'Great Britain', in Buchanan and Conway, eds., *Political Catholicism*, pp. 248–74; Joan Keating, 'The British experience: Christian Democrats without a party', in David Hanley, ed., *Christian Democracy in Europe: a comparative perspective* (London, 1994), pp. 168–81.

⁸⁵ The dominance of Social Democracy, their strong anti-Catholicism and Socialist 'third way' ideology also made closer co-operation between Scandinavian Conservatives and continental Christian Democrats more difficult. See also Wolfram Kaiser, 'A better Europe? EFTA, the EFTA secretariat, and the European identities of the "outer seven", 1958–1972', in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, and Raymond Poidevin, eds., *Institutions européennes et identités européennes* (Brussels, 1998), pp. 165–84.

the British, Danish, and Norwegian applications for EEC membership and the Swedish application for association of 1961–2,⁸⁶ the institutional and ideological foundations of ‘Europe’ had long been laid. It also became clear that the more progressive, left-wing Christian Democrats from Italy and France were categorically opposed to the membership of those parties in the NEI and its successor organization from 1965, the EUCD.⁸⁷ Christian Democrat transnationalism thus strongly reinforced the ‘core Europe’ concept of six ‘Carolingian’ countries determined to forge ahead with economic and political integration, with significant repercussions for the integration debate about core and periphery, and a Europe of different speeds, even after successive EU enlargements at the turn of the century. It is also indicative of the strength of the transnational ideological and institutional bonds in the NEI and its successor organizations that, despite the external limitations of the Cold War in the case of Austria and a well-established neutrality policy in the case of Switzerland, the Austrian and Swiss Christian Democrat parties were and still are by far the most ‘European’ parties in their countries in relation to questions of further integration or EU membership.

The analysis of Christian Democrat transnationalism thus shows how insufficient an explanation of European integration history would be that focuses *exclusively* on inter-state relations and sees the integration process *solely* as the product of a multilateral bargaining process driven by clear-cut national (economic) interests. If European integration history research wishes to advance beyond monocausal explanations that are sometimes theory-driven, then it is clearly crucial to include other factors in the analysis, such as the growing transnational political networks after 1945. Europe was not made by governments alone.

⁸⁶ For these applications and the ensuing negotiations see the relevant chapters in Anne Deighton and Alan S. Milward, eds., *Widening, deepening and acceleration: the European Economic Community, 1957–1963* (Baden-Baden and Brussels, 1999).

⁸⁷ See, for example, the analysis in Karl Josef Hahn, *Die Haltung der christdemokratischen Parteien zu einer eventuellen Zusammenarbeit mit den Konservativen Parteien*, 12 Feb. 1964, Katholiek Documentatie Centrum Nijmegen, Archief KVP, 1271; Franz Horner, *Konservative und christdemokratische Parteien in Europa: Geschichte, Programmatik, Strukturen* (Vienna and Munich, 1981), pp. 68–71.