ABSTRACT

While there is broad scholarly agreement that policy-making in the European Union (EU) involves a multitude of public and private actors at different levels of government, there is less agreement whether the EU should be conceptualized as a form of governance by networks or governance in networks. This article first examines different concepts of networks. It then sets out multiple functions of networks within the EU policy process. Particular attention is paid to the extent to which networks may provide added value to European integration and improve the quality of governance by effectively solving common problems and helping to address the democratic deficit or whether, by acting as mechanisms of exclusion rather than inclusion, they actually contribute to the EU’s legitimacy deficit. Since networks can enhance governance quality as well as undermine its democratic credentials, a balance sheet shows both positive and negative consequences.

Key words: Policy networks, governance, European Union/Commission, efficiency, legitimacy

Most students of European governance would agree that policy-making in the European Union involves a multitude of public and private actors at different levels of government (Bache and Flinders 2004; Peterson 2004; Hooghe and Marks 2003). Some authors have argued that the European Union (EU) is most adequately conceptualized as a form of governance by networks (Kohler-Koch 1996), in which the authoritative allocation of values is negotiated between state and societal actors (cf. Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Ansell 2000; Schout and Jordan 2005). Others contend that the EU is a system of governance in networks (cf. Peterson and Bomberg 1999), dominated by governmental actors.

To elucidate this debate, the first part of the paper explores different concepts of networks. Given a proliferation of theoretical and empirical network studies raising the question of the added value of their
functions within the EU policy process, the article’s second part explores their multiple functions and normative implications. Some scholars have argued that one of the key added values of networks may lie in their potential to improve the quality of governance by effectively solving common problems. At the same time, others have stipulated that the EU as a transnational polity suffers from inadequate democratic credentials, and that networks may help address the democratic deficit. A third group contends that networks are mechanisms of exclusion rather than inclusion and, are therefore, part of the problem. The differing views may be attributed to the finding that ‘there is no clear evidence that policy networks contribute to [either] effective problem-solving (i.e. provide added-value) . . . [or] democratic legitimation’ (Skogstad 2003: 326). This implies that the impact of networks on the performance of public policy-making is ambivalent (cf. Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999a; Börzel and Panke 2006).

Networks and European Union Governance

The multiple meanings of networks

The Babylonian variety of understandings in the governance literature reflects distinctions along two dimensions. This first distinction is about methods. Networks can serve as an analytical tool. Quantitative approaches consider network analysis as a method of social structure analysis. The relations between actors are analyzed in terms of their cohesion, structural equivalence and spatial representation using such quantitative methods as ascendant hierarchical classification, density tables, and block models. In his contribution to this issue, Henning applies such a network approach to the study of European agricultural policy. The qualitative approach is more process-oriented. It focuses less on the structure of interaction between actors and more on the content of these interactions, using such qualitative methods as in depth interviews and content and discourse analysis. The contributions here by Quaglia and Christopoulos and by Dakowska illustrate this approach. The quantitative and qualitative methodological approaches can be complementary (Pappi 1993; Sciarini 1996). Our discussion therefore focuses on the distinction between networks as a typology of interest intermediation and networks as a specific form of governance.

This second distinction is about ontology. Networks connote specific types of interest intermediation entailing different forms of institutionalized exchange relations between the state, business and civil society. They thus provide an alternative to the traditional pluralism-(neo)corporatism dichotomy, allowing a more fine grain analysis by
taking into account sectoral and sub-sectoral differences, the role played by private and public actors, and formal as well as informal relationships between them (Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Jordan and Schubert 1992). The basic assumption is that the existence of networks, which reflect the relative status or power of particular interests in a policy area, influence policy outcomes.

Some authors have further developed the network concept using it as an analytical concept to connote a particular type of interest intermediation characterized by ‘structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamics between actors in politics and policy-making’ (Schneider 1988, p. 2). In this use, networks provide a perspective from which to analyze situations in which a given policy cannot be explained by centrally concerted policy action. Rather, the network concept draws attention to the interaction of many separate but interdependent organizations which co-ordinate their actions through interdependencies of resources and interests. Actors who take an interest in the making of a certain policy and who dispose of material and non-material resources required for the formulation, decision or implementation of the policy form linkages to exchange these resources. The linkages, which differ in their degree of intensity, normalization, standardization and frequency of interaction, constitute the structures of a network. These governance structures in turn determine the exchange of resources between the actors and form points of references for their calculations of costs and benefits of particular strategies (see Henning).

Networks can be conceived as a particular form of governance, defined as institutionalized modes of coordination through which collectively binding decisions are adopted and implemented (Mayntz 1993; Scharpf 1997). They involve non-hierarchical modes of coordination constituted by mutual resource dependencies and/or informal norms of equality among the actors involved. Given their non-hierarchical nature, networks may be considered as superior to hierarchy and markets with regard to both effectiveness and legitimacy in modern societies characterized by societal differentiation, sectoralization and policy growth that lead to political overload and ‘governance under pressure’ (Jordan and Richardson 1983). Modern governance is characterized by decision systems in which territorial and functional differentiation disaggregate effective problem-solving capacity into a collection of sub-systems of actors with specialized tasks and limited competence and resources’ (Hanf and O’Toole 1992: 166). The result is the functional interdependence of public and private actors in policy-making as governments have become increasingly dependent upon the co-operation and joint resource mobilization of policy actors.
outside their hierarchical control. Networks have emerged as a new form of governance – different from the two conventional forms of governance, hierarchy and market – which allow governments to mobilize political resources in situations where these resources are widely dispersed between public and private actors (Kenis and Schneider 1991; Kooiman 1993; Le Galès 1995). The involvement of many relevant stakeholders in the policy process also increases the acceptance of the decisions taken and their likely effectiveness.

To consider networks as a form of governance, they have to fulfil the following criteria. Firstly, public and private actors form an informal negotiation system in which they enjoy equal status due to mutual resource dependencies and/or informal norms of equality and coordinate their actions through negotiating voluntary agreements. Secondly, the voluntary agreements are collectively binding and are complied with by all the actors involved (cf. Mayntz 1998). This is particularly important, since it puts private actors, who cannot resort to hierarchical coordination, on a more equal footing with public actors, giving them a real say in the adoption and implementation of political decisions. Accordingly, the role of public actors changes from authoritative decision-makers to partners of and mediators between private actors (Kohler-Koch 1996; Ansell 2000; Schout and Jordan 2005).

The European Union: Governance in rather than by networks

The European Union is widely considered as a unique system of multilevel governance (Puchala 1972; Wallace 1983; Caparaso 1996). Political scientists have shown a remarkable creativity in developing new concepts to capture the *sui generis* nature of the EU, describing it as a ‘new, post-Hobbesian order’ (Schmitter 1991), ‘a post-modern state’ (Ruggie 1993; Caparaso 1996) or ‘a network of pooling and sharing sovereignty’ (Keohane and Hoffmann 1991). Governance is particularly attractive for studying the policy processes of the EU; it is seen as an alternative to hierarchical government, which is largely absent in the EU’s system of multilevel governance. At the same time, research on governance offers concepts that can be equally applied to international institutions and national states, facilitating the comparison within and beyond the nation-state. Due to its multi-level structure, the EU has been widely conceptualized as a system of network governance in which the authoritative allocation of values is negotiated between state and societal actors. The ‘governance turn’ in EU studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006) has been fuelled by the White Paper on Governance published by the European Commission in 2001 to...
address the declining effectiveness of EU policy-making and its persistent lack of democratic legitimacy (Joerges, Mény and Weiler 2001; Olsen forthcoming). The White Paper reflects a search for more ‘modern forms of governance’ based on networks, which are considered as the most appropriate way to deal with the challenges the EU is facing in the twenty-first century (Schout and Jordan 2005: 1–8).

The ‘nature of the EU beast’ (Risse-Kappen 1996) cannot be captured by one particular type of governance. Like its member states, the EU features a combination of different forms of governance that cover the entire range between market and hierarchy. It can use hierarchy in making policies insofar as its supranational institutions allow the adoption and enforcement of legally binding decision without the consent of (individual) member states. ‘Modern’ (Kooiman 1993), ‘cooperative’ (Mayntz 1998) or ‘network’ (Rhodes 1997) governance, by contrast, which systematically involves private actors in the policy process, is hard to find. EU policies are largely formulated and implemented by governmental actors.

Member state governments share power with the European Commission, the European Parliament and other supranational and transgovernmental actors such as regulatory authorities. Yet public actors at various levels of government remain the central decision-makers and especially the implementers of EU policies. This even applies to structural policy, where the EU Treaties explicitly prescribe the involvement of the social partners and civil society organizations in the policy process. Private interest government is equally rare. The dominance of public actors is in stark contrast to the national level, where public-private co-regulation and private self-regulation have become constitutive for the modern state (Scharpf 1993; Mayntz 1993). They equally abound in international politics in the absence of any state hierarchy (cf. Cutler, Haufler and Porter 1999; Cutler 2003; Hall and Bierstecker 2002). This does not necessarily support an intergovernmentalist approach to the EU and European integration. From the very inception of European integration, networks have played an important role in EU policy-making, particularly in the formulation and implementation stages. Private actors seek to use these networks to influence the Commission, the European Parliament and the member state by offering their expertise and their political support.

Yet these informal relations are asymmetrical and do not satisfy the criteria of governance by networks. Describing the EU as such an archetype misses the reality of EU governance. It ignores the importance of supranational hierarchy, which casts its shadow widely; it also overestimates the role of private actors in EU policy-making (Börzel forthcoming). However, these forms of informal politics are
better described as governance in networks rather than governance by networks. Instances of network governance are rare compared to forms of governance entailing combinations of supranational hierarchy, intergovernmental negotiations and market competition.

Governance in networks abounds in EU policy-making. The dispersion of competencies and resources necessary to make effective EU policies has given rise to informal relations that connect public and, to a lesser extent private actors at different levels of government (cf. Christiansen and Piattoni 2003; Kaiser, Gehler and Leucht 2009). The network governance literature has argued that public and private actors seek to pool their resources to solve common problems (Kohler-Koch 1999: 25; Scharpf 1997: 137–138). This functionalist perspective is challenged by empirical studies that have shown that supranational actors, the Commission in particular, have made strategic use of networks to strengthen their position in EU policy-making. Networks lend significant power to the European Commission, which often acts as a broker drawing on the resources provided by private actors (expertise, acceptance) to shape the formulation and implementation of EU policies according to its interests. While it takes advantage of private actor resources to increase its action capacity, the Commission seeks to preserve its autonomy and has little interest in extending the involvement of private actors beyond consultations (Obradovic and Alonso Vizcaino 2007).

A more political approach to networks also points to their potentially exclusive nature. While networks may provide multiple access points to EU policy-making (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Peterson and Bomberg 1999), their informal character seriously compromises their participatory potential due to a lack of transparency and accountability. Moreover, less resourceful actors are unlikely to be admitted to the multi-level networks of the EU.

**Governance in networks: effective and legitimate?**

**Effectiveness**

Effective governance encompasses a substantive and a procedural aspect (cf. Héritier 2003, Neyer 2004). Firstly, effective governance produces policies that solve problems and satisfy the demands they were designed to cope with. Secondly, effective governance requires efficiency, the production of sufficient policy output without delays or deadlocks at reasonable cost. Like legitimacy, effectiveness contributes to the maintenance of political systems. In system-theoretical perspective, political systems exist in order to produce collectively binding
outcomes, suited to solve problems and satisfy demands. An ineffective political system that produces either predominantly inadequate outcomes or too few solutions to cope with the environments or other sub-system’s problem-pressures or demands cannot maintain itself in the long run (Parsons 1960; Easton 1957; Easton 1965).

The emergence of networks has been closely related to the declining effectiveness of hierarchy (state failure) in domestic politics and the absence of hierarchy (anarchy) in international politics. Under conditions of environmental uncertainty and increasing international, sectoral and functional overlap of societal sub-systems, networks have a crucial advantage over hierarchy and market (Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Mayntz 1993; Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997). While deregulated markets are unable to control the production of negative externalities (problems of market failure), government hierarchies no longer control all the resources necessary to produce polices capable of addressing societal problems. The EU combines the functional differentiation of modern societies with the absence of a central authority in the international system. Thus, networks allow EU policy-makers to mobilize resources widely dispersed among public and private actors at different levels of government. Business and civil society actors offer the Commission, the European Parliament and the member state governments information, expertise, financial means, or political support, which the latter need to make and enforce EU law. In exchange, private actors can influence the contents of EU norms and rules, with which they have to comply (Peterson and Bomberg 1999; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Ansell 2000; Schout and Jordan 2005).

Networks can enhance the quality of the policy and decision making process through five major mechanisms. Firstly, networks possess a highly flexible nature, adjusting to complex contemporary policy problems that cannot be tackled at all or as well by existing formal institutional arrangements (Kenis and Schneider 1991).

Secondly, policy networks provide avenues of access to decision-makers (Mazey and Richardson 1993; Peterson and Bomberg 1999), thus allowing interested and affected actors to be involved in proactive governance decisions that impinge upon their activities. They can contribute to the identification of policy problems and new opportunities to solve them at an early stage of the agenda-setting and policy formulation stages of the policy process (Joerges and Neyer 1997).

A third element of added value is the capacity of networks to provide multiple resources. Given the complexity of modern policy problems, no state agency or public actor has the wherewithal to address issues single-handedly. The result is an increasing reliance upon the co-operation and resources of private actors who can bring
information, empirical knowledge, specific technical expertise, financial means and political clout and support. This latter is especially true where such network actors are major organisations with a wide membership base. Public actors, whether at the national or supranational level, require all of these elements to produce and enforce collectively binding rules and norms (Sorensen and Torfing 2005; Schout and Jordan 2005).

Fourthly, networks are aggregative institutions that can exchange and negotiate with public officials attempting to broker compromises required to resolve policy problems (Börzel 1998; Eising and Kohler-Koch 1999b; Skogstad 2003: 326). Networks have the capacity to broker agreement, resolve conflict and help in the transfer of ideas. Such a function is only possible to the extent that networks and network-based negotiations are founded on communication and trust. Iterative interaction between multiple strategic actors can boost trust levels between actors. Unconstrained by strict and prescribed rules, networks of informal relationships serve as settings conducive to interaction and communication, and provide a framework for consensus building and tempering conflicts among stakeholders (March and Olsen 1995: 27; Mayntz 1993).

Networks fifthly have a socialization function, which is specially important for the political and cultural diversity arising from enlargements. Networks facilitate the development of shared meanings and values which evolve via the use of common language to deliberate on particular problems or issue areas (Fligstein and McNichol 1998: 61–62). This function can be described as the human dimension of policy networks: direct personal contacts may facilitate the de-politicization of issues and the creation of particular understandings of policy issues and measures to resolve them. The socialization of individuals in network-like contexts at the supranational level is an important mechanism for deepening the European integration process (Hanny and Wessels 1998; Verdun 2000).

Networks equally augment the quality of policy outputs, firstly by generating decisions appropriate to and accepted by their target groups. Network actors often possess detailed knowledge relevant for political decision-making requiring a credible basis for making difficult policy choices (Kooiman 1993; Scharpf 1999). Networks act as information and knowledge gathering instruments where these resources are both widely dispersed among disparate actors and within multiple governance levels. Networks also pool these resources for their injection into the policy process. Secondly, and as a consequence of networks’ ability to stimulate deliberation among multiple stakeholders, networks also enhance the quality of output, insofar as a more feasible
policy results from this process (Klijn and Koppenjan 2000; Kooiman 2000).

Thirdly, networks tackle major problems associated with horizontal co-ordination between multiple and differentiated actors, such as facilitating the reconciliation of diverging interests. This can achieve collective outputs and outcomes, insofar as participating actors go beyond the lowest common denominator of their individual interests. If this happens, interests develop a sense of joint responsibility and ownership for decisions. In sum, networks possess a real capacity to engender increased compliance and reduced resistance to policy implementation (Sørensen and Torfing 2003: 614).

The extent to which networks have contributed to the problem-solving capacity of the EU is contested. The evidence presented by the literature is mixed (cf. Héritier 2003). The multiplicity of actors and a diversity of interests generate costs, such as longer decision-making processes and difficulties in achieving consensus. The solutions produced in network contexts may be based on the lowest common denominator rather than upgrading benefits. Furthermore, based on the assumption that heterogeneous groups experience greater difficulty in reaching decisions than homogeneous groups, deadlock may occur due to the variety of goals and outcomes being pursued by multiple actors (Héritier 2003; Börzel 1997). Where such deadlock occurs, networks can veto players (Tsebelis 2002), which is an obstacle to further European integration.

The higher the complexity and functional pressure due to policy overload and government failure, the more likely networks are to emerge. In order to increase the problem-solving capacity of the EU, actors need to recognize their interdependence and develop sufficient trust to forgo their self-interests in favour of ‘upgrading the common interest’, if network actors share common values (Ostrom 1990). In short, if networks involve actors that possess relevant resources and that have developed sufficient trust in their exchange relationship, they are likely to increase the effectiveness of (EU) policy-making. Given the increasing diversity of the EU and its 27 member states, these conditions cannot be taken for granted.

Legitimacy

Even if networks are accepted as prominent structures in multi-level governance, their legitimacy constitutes an issue of concern. Legitimate governance occurs when any political power exercised by a governance structure is acknowledged as rightful and there is a general disposition to accept and obey unknown future decisions even where these may
not correspond to an individual’s self-interest. Networks are theoretically based on the voluntary cooperation of public and private actors and affected actors to have ‘a say’, so that political decisions correspond at least in part to the totality of interests present in the network. Networks can enhance participation by posing as intermediaries between levels of governance and can help improve the correspondence between ‘rulers’ and ‘the ruled’. As with effectiveness, the extent to which networks can enhance legitimacy depends on certain scope conditions.

Governance in networks can contribute to the legitimacy gains of both the process and output of decision making. Firstly, networks provide an integrative forum for a plurality of contending positions to be articulated and given a hearing (Skogstad 2003: 326). Consequently, they are a means of meeting demands for a participatory role in the policy process (Fung and Wright 2003; Sørensen 2002). They enable social actors to participate directly in making and implementing the services that affect them, a fundamental requirement of democracy (Peters 2007).

Secondly, by including affected actors at the input stage, networks may produce more widely accepted outcomes. Policy-takers are integrated and act as co-producers of collectively binding decisions that affect them. Wide inclusion is also likely to mobilise greater support and help to win acceptance for policy by ‘selling’ policy to their membership. Network actors can provide feedback so that government actors can adjust their policy and in so doing generally smooth the way for implementation (Kohler-Koch 2000: 525). Networks also contribute to the establishment of an intermediate level of sub-elites possessing the capacity to challenge the prevailing set of established influential groups and thus enhance competition between them (Etzioni-Halevy 1993).

Thirdly, networks constructed of multiple civil society groups can enhance the engagement of the wider citizenry, useful given the decline in more traditional expressions of political activity. Dakowska’s article shows how the activity of transnational network-building among national political party foundations is a means to attain both legitimacy and access to the European institutions. Commission officials have been increasingly more open to innovative solutions which could help them to answer the public demand for more dialogue with the citizens (cf. Heard-Lauréote forthcoming).

Scholars and practitioners alike have started to scrutinize the perceived ‘undemocratic’ forms of network influence in the informal politics of the EU. Here the discussion focuses on five major costs presented by networks and network negotiations. Firstly, governance in networks challenges organising principles of representative democracy
Networks can, for example, undermine the position of elected politicians because the delegation of decision-making competences to networks lessens these individuals’ ability to scrutinise and influence political processes and outcomes. If they are completely uncoupled from the parliamentary arena, networks cause representative democracy’s hollowing out (Papadopoulos 2003: 479–80).

Secondly, networks are usually not subject to democratic control (Benz 1995; Scharpf 1999; Börzel 1997: 8; Thompson and Pfarr 2005: 4). Networks often have informal and opaque decisional procedures and highly integrated networks may lack transparency, be difficult to monitor and make it impossible to hold any individual(s) responsible. ‘Policy community’ networks have a particularly closed nature, whereby actors’ access is restricted; some are completely excluded and other powerful ones dominate. Christopoulos and Quaglia question the legitimacy of the banking regulation network, which does not include consumer protection organizations. Even when consumer organizations are consulted and temporarily included in the network, their input and influence is limited by their lack of economic expertise and personnel resources. Such closed conditions are often fostered because they facilitate the achievement of compromise. Within the network where there are unequal patterns of political inclusion and influence, this can increase the susceptibility of networks to parochialism (O’Toole 1997) and even corruption (Thompson and Pfarr 2005: 4; Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 2).

Thirdly, the way in which groups and interests are selected, or are perceived to be selected, for participation is not through popular election (Schneider 2000: 260). Where there is evidence of ‘advantaged groups populating the policy-making regime’ (O’Toole 1997), there is a risk that networks form a private interest government that puts sovereign decision-making in the hands of strong pressure groups (Sørensen and Torfing 2005: 202). By definition policy networks represent only interests involved with the specific policy sphere (Atkinson and Coleman 1992). Rather than allowing for the participation of all affected interests, networks tend to facilitate the participation of the most active and resourceful of affected interests. Consequently networks possess an elitist quality.

Fourthly, horizontal coordination and negotiation within policy networks is prone to shifting responsibility (Thompson and Pfarr 2005: 4) and accountability (Papadopoulos 2006; see also Mayntz 1998: 15-16). Indeed, a risk here is to internal accountability whereby network participants may be considered to be non-legitimate because they are unrepresentative, untrusted or unaccountable. The absence of direct
accountability is enhanced by the relative marginalization of elected politicians and the low capacity of parliaments to exert control over networks. This is particularly likely to happen if politicians can lack expert technical knowledge, given the increasing complexity of the social and economic issues they are faced with.

The top-level bureaucrats, policy experts and interest representatives who tend to predominate in networks only enjoy indirect accountability. They are not constrained by electoral pledges or subject to electoral sanctions; they are accountable to their principals, ministers, members of professions. Citizens are not the direct principal. What is lacking is external accountability. NGOs are accountable to those who entrust them with power and to donors but not accountable to the general public or the populations affected by their actions. Similarly, private firms are accountable primarily to their managers and shareholders, workers and consumers via the market.

The legitimacy of networks in EU policy-making depends on scope conditions. The more inclusive they are and the more transparent their membership and their contributions to the policy process, the more likely networks will foster the acceptability and acceptance of EU policies.

Conclusion

All the major EU institutions and the European Commission in particular, find themselves embedded within a complex web of relations and informal policy interactions. The informal relationships that exist between public and private actors in policy-making are more appropriately conceived of as governance in networks than governance by networks. Networks have the potential to support all the forms of governance in the EU, ranging from supranational hierarchy, intergovernmental negotiations to market competition and rare forms of genuine network governance. The informal relations between public and private actors have potential added value – but only if the actors possess relevant resources and sufficiently trust each other. If such networks are sufficiently inclusive and transparent, they also contribute to legitimising EU policy-making.

The European Commission has promoted the creation of networks to increase the problem-solving capacity of EU policy-making to develop elements of substitute democratic legitimacy (Héritier 1999). The White Paper on European Governance and particularly the Report of Working Group Networking People for a Good Governance in Europe, which was prepared in collaboration with leading European...
scholars, are two major manifestations of this focus on networks. Throughout that report, the Commission itself emphasizes the two key concerns explored in this paper: effectiveness and democratic legitimacy.

The European Commission has paid less attention to the vices of networks. However, it has recently made attempts to deal with the democratic deficit by increasing their inclusiveness and transparency. In early 2006 for example, it launched a Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative to encourage debate on lobbying activities, feedback on the Commission’s minimum standards for consultation, and the publication of beneficiaries of EU funds. As a follow up, the Commission has adopted a voluntary register for interest representatives, held a series of stakeholders discussions on a Code of Conduct linked to the register, reinforced the application of the Commission’s consultation standards, and implemented a policy on the publication of the beneficiaries of EU funds. New provisions in the Lisbon Treaty recognise the importance of consultation and dialogue with, for example, associations, civil society, workers, employers and churches. The Commission thus appears to be more sensitive to the conditions we have identified for networks to enhance rather than undermine the legitimacy of EU policy-making.

NOTES
1. The literature discusses other characteristics of networks, including actor constellations that equally involve public and private actors (Mayntz, 1993) or relations based on trust, which favour problem-solving over bargaining as the dominant action orientation (Scharpf, 1997: 137-138). However, such a narrow concept of network governance is flawed both in theoretical and empirical terms (cf. Börzel, 1998).

REFERENCES


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