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STEPHEN DORRIL

A Critical Review:

MI6: FIFTY YEARS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Presented December 2010
I would like to thank Professor Keith Laybourn for his welcome comments and generous support during the writing of this review.

- Stephen Dorril
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THE REVIEW: MI6: FIFTY YEARS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Stephen Dorril's post-war history of SIS will be the definitive work for years to come.
- Harry Ferguson (former MI6 officer)

INTRODUCTION

In 1999, Professor Christopher Andrew, the leading historian on intelligence studies, warned against creating a divide between popular and academic intelligence history. There was a necessity, he argued, to reach a mass audience as well as the more specialised community of intelligence scholars. (1) In many ways, MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations, which was published by a major commercial company, Fourth Estate, in May 2000, did manage to bridge the divide. It was reviewed in all the major newspapers, magazines and in many journals. In the journal Cold War History, Richard J. Aldrich, Professor of International Relations at Warwick University and a highly acclaimed author and authority on the intelligence world, labelled MI6 "a landmark volume". (2) It sold 20,000 copies in the UK and under the title, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, 40,000 in the United States where the all-important trade publication, Publishers Weekly (June 2000), gave it a starred rating for its "in-depth research for the serious student and entertainment for the well-informed spy buff".

The book's prime focus is the post-Second World War European continent and the Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS – more commonly known as MI6) intelligence-gathering and special operations, principally in the Middle East. South-East Asia and Africa were not dealt with in any
great depth; it was, and is intended, that they would be covered in another volume dealing with the
Service's and MI5's involvement in counter-insurgency during the period of the rundown of the
British Empire. A study of MI6's worldwide stay-behind networks, popularly known as 'Gladio',
was almost complete and had been part of the original text, but the book's already considerable
length led to it being cut. *Gladio: MI6, the SAS and the Stay-Behind Networks* is to be published in
2011/12. Similarly, material dealing with the Service's involvement in the Irish "Troubles" and its
relationship with journalists during the Cold War is earmarked for other books (*The Dogs in the
Street: British Intelligence and the Troubles* to be published in 2012/13 and *Agents of Influence:
Journalists, Writers and MI6* at a later date).

A major concern of the publisher was to have a full history that brought MI6 up to the present day.
This was achieved but the section on the later period (1966-2000) is not extensive and is covered in
one hundred pages. The main focus, therefore, is the period 1944 to 1966, which covers the change
from the Second World War 'hot war' to the emerging 'Cold War' and the development of the Service
into the modern SIS, a process which began in the 1960s. It is also a demarcation line in terms of
the documentary record; the archive and secondary material becomes much thinner when dealing
with the post-seventies period. Noting that the book's main focus of study is on the two decades up
to 1966, Aldrich acknowledged this as "a strength, not a weakness, and will please Cold War
Historians. Dorril has focused his considerable investigative powers to give us the most detailed
picture of postwar MI6 yet to emerge." (3)

In terms of structure there were potentially a number of ways with dealing with the vast amount of
material (800 pages with nearly 400,000 words and another 61 pages of notes and 30,000 additional
words) that is contained in the book. The decision was made to split the book into a number of
defined sections, each dealing with different areas and aspects of the Service's activities. Within
each section, the chapters run chronologically across a specific time-frame. The structure was influenced by the experience of working on a joint book on the Profumo Affair (*Honeytrap: The Secret Worlds of Stephen Ward*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987) with the investigative writer, Anthony Summers, who stressed the importance of chronology. Indeed, as a central strand of the methodology, the mantra became – chronology is everything. Even well-respected academic books often fail to pay heed to that and can be cavalier with chronology or drift confusingly from subject to subject. My standard technique is to take the research material and once it is typed up, to put into a strict chronology – by year, month and by day. This is a long drawn out process but it pays dividends by helping to illuminate how and why certain operations and decisions were undertaken or made. (4)

Problems over editing copy frequently arise for an author when published by a major commercial publisher. The editor at Fourth Estate, however, was very supportive and made few changes and little editing to the completed text. Inevitably, there were discussions/arguments about the amount of space available for notes and bibliography, and, equally inevitably, compromises had to be made by the author. The notes for *MI6* are not perfect by the standard of some academic publishers but are far superior to almost all commercial publications, containing sixty-two pages of quite detailed notes. Unable to give space to a full bibliography and all sources, a compromise was made by giving a note to each paragraph, rather than each quote/source/fact. Within these paragraph notes, the sources run top to bottom and contain, in the first instance, full bibliographic details. Sometimes if the same source is used for a paragraph then, in order to save space, it was decided that the note numbers would be combined. There are 61 pages of notes which compares favourably with the recent (September 2010) publication of the "authorised" history of MI6 by Professor Keith Jeffrey of Queen's University, Belfast, (5) which contains 25 pages of rather thin notes that fail to make even a rudimentary reference to documents within the Service's archive. Former MI6 officer and
renowned historian, Hugh Trevor-Roper, wrote that "When a historian relies mainly on primary sources, which we cannot easily check, he challenges our confidence and forces us to ask critical questions. How reliable is the historical method? How sound is his judgement?". (6) There is very little in MI6 that cannot be checked.

Research for the book was constructed from material collected over many years, a process that accelerated in the early 1990s and was completed in 1999. This was a period when I was self-employed undertaking free-lance writing and journalism, and was generally regarded as an investigative journalist. No grants were available for research for the book, though I did towards the end receive two small grants (K. Blundell Trust and the Royal Literary Fund) to help me with the editing of the book when I became seriously ill. Therefore, I was reliant on the advance, which had long been exhausted, and my own meagre financial resources. In many ways, necessity became the mother of invention. I had to undertake research in ways that were not normally used. It was also undertaken before the Internet was generally available as a research tool.

In reviewing MI6, Richard Aldrich claimed that "Dorril belongs to the Premier League of investigative researchers. These individuals distinguish themselves by tackling seemingly difficult subjects and displaying research that is often ingenious." In asking what dividends does Dorril's approach deliver?, he added: "First and foremost this is an extraordinary compendium, bringing together almost all that is currently available on the subject" using a "diverse range of research materials". It was based on "careful and comprehensive combing of a vast range of secondary material, much of it well researched". And even where it was controversial, "the more interesting assertions rest on several sources". (7)

Indeed, MI6 was the first detailed, heavily researched and systematic study of the Secret
Intelligence Service in the post-war period. It was also the first to centre on the Service's Special Operations (more commonly known as covert operations) in that period and place them in the broader context of Britain's foreign policy concerns. It was followed a year later by Richard Aldrich's *The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence* (8), an impressive work begun when he was Fulbright Fellow at Georgetown University in Washington DC and based on extensive research in the American files. It is, however, a study of the American and British intelligence services' impact on the Cold War and covers other agencies besides the Secret Intelligence Service. Though we differ in interpretation on some areas (exile operations against the Soviet Union - 9), we agree on the importance of some previously neglected subjects such as deception (10). Despite the extensive archival research, Aldrich's book – which I greatly admire, knowing how difficult this subject area is to research - contains little that specifically contradicts or challenges the research of *MI6*, which, in many ways, is unique. Whilst there have been many books in the United States covering the same area and time-frame with regard to the activities of the CIA, in Britain *MI6* is, to date, the only book to specifically do so for the Secret Intelligence Service.
I indirectly created for myself major obstacles by dealing (almost) exclusively with post-Second World War intelligence affairs and, in particular, British ones, and, even more so, specifically MI6 operations. Few writers, researchers or academics had ventured down this route, partly because they believed there were no files on which to base their research. In an interview for Radio Four News on 26 September 2010 (11) MI6's "authorised historian", Professor Keith Jeffrey, said he was thankful that he had to stop his own research at the beginning of the Cold War. "I fell down on my knees and thanked the Lord I was stopping at 1949." He had, he admitted, signed a "Faustian Pact" in which he saw everything up to 1949 but had no wish to go further. "Yes, there's lots more exciting stuff to be done in the future but that's for my successor – if there is one." In reporting Jeffrey's comments, The Times (18 September 2010) said the secrets of the post-1949 period "may not be known for years, if ever". This betrays a certain unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of MI6, which like other recent books on the subject he fails to list in his bibliography.

Until the publication of Jeffrey's book, the Secret Intelligence Service had always claimed it was an ultra-secret agency that would not release any files since it had no wish to compromise its guarantee to agents it had recruited that it would never reveal their names or details of operations. When the Service went through the process of "avowal" in 1988, which for the first time put MI6 on a constitutional basis – up until that point it had not officially existed even within the British unwritten constitution – there was little change in official policy and the Service remained closed to any form of scrutiny. (12) In contrast, the Security Service (MI5) undertook a major clean up of its public image following the release of Peter Wright's controversial book, Spycatcher (1986), and the
damaging revelations about alleged plotting against Prime Minister Harold Wilson, which had an
effect on recruitment to the Service. A policy decision was made to employ a PR consultancy firm,
with the result that MI5 began to make it self known to the public in a controlled manner. (13) The
John Major government (1992-97) helped the process with the introduction of the "Open
Government" initiative (too late for MI6), which led to a less draconian attitude with regard to the
release of files on the part of the "weeders". This included a clever drip feed of files released to the
National Archives (then the Public Records Office) at Kew - mostly dealing with pre-Second World
War and wartime exploits, which led to number of popular books detailing in a largely sympathetic
manner some of the MI5's more successful operations. This would eventually lead to the publication
of the Security Service's official history by Professor Christopher Andrew. (14)

These initiatives, however, barely registered with MI6 whose primary concern, as articulated by its
successive chiefs, was to retain the aura of secrecy that surrounded the Service. (15) A few books
were sanctioned by former MI6 officers or "insiders" (officers "Alan Judd" aka Alan Petty and
Harry Ferguson, and journalist Gordon Shepherd) who were given some access to the files but they
only dealt with operations going back to 1909-1920. (16) Their publication did not result in the
transfer of the few files actually still existing to Kew (17) and in the intervening years, no post-war
files have been released except by default through releases in other departments such as,
occasionally, the Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office (FCO) or via discussion through bodies such
as the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and, in one case, a Court appearance.*

A major traditional academic work on MI6 did not arrive until 2004 with the publication of Philip
H. J. Davies's well-researched book, MI6 and the Machinery of Spying. Even so it was almost

*The strange release of SIS documents to the Court in the case in 2000 of arms dealer, go-between
and MI6 agent, Stefan Kock, is the only example of that I am aware of original contact reports and
not post-fact specially compiled reports being released in the public domain. (18)
entirely devoid of official documents for the post-war period (no more than a dozen from different
departments in a long dense chapter) and relied heavily on interviews with former officers. (19)

"Dorril," noted Aldrich in his review of MI6, "makes the compelling observation that secret services
do not always leave a fully documented trail to be archived. Even when they do, these archives may
not make it to the [National Archives] at Kew to be perused by historians." (20) Even though
Professor Jeffrey, who was allowed access to the Registry for his "authorised" history, told the BBC
that the MI6 archive is "the holy grail of British archives" and that it was "a cornucopia, an
extraordinary Aladdin's cave of historical materials", even he found it very patchy. "Quite a lot of
stuff has been destroyed over the years. It hasn't all survived." (21) It is estimated that only ten per
cent of SOE/MI6 files have been kept. (22) Each time the Service moved office, masses of files
were, apparently, simply incinerated. However, as Aldrich has noted, the processing by the
authorities of documents in other departments is uneven and 'weeders' make mistakes when
releasing them. Some Foreign Office files do contain discussion of MI6 operations for the period
immediately after the Second World War but following the defection in 1951 of the traitors, Guy
Burgess and Donald Maclean, silence descended on the Foreign Office and references to the SIS
(our "Friends" as they were known) were largely suppressed or weeded out. (23)

With enough time to search thoroughly and to work laterally though unlikely files, some persistent
academic archival researchers might claim that, "with enough coffee and cigarettes, most subjects
can be examined. The motto of these dedicated denizens of the archives is that there are no secrets,
only, lazy researchers." (24) That initially appears an attractive claim, and it is true that a
considerable volume of material has been declassified and released, but in the last decade few
substantial bodies of Cold War secret service records have been released compared to other areas of
the period, and in the case of MI6, very little indeed. Aldrich has also warned those studying
intelligence against viewing official archives at the National Archives as an "analogue of reality". In
addition to the problem of a lack of files, there is another one with regard to the few files that do make it to the archives – are they to be trusted? Some researchers insist that, "however thorough the research, investigations conducted within the [NA] are ultimately trapped in a domain governed by the authorities ... Ultimately, to locate most of one's research in the [NA] is to accept that the broad nature of things on the historic menu is controlled by the authorities." (25) There is the danger of being entranced by the National Archive's "efficient history supermarket" and "pre-selected menu" of intelligence material. In general, British academics dealing with the intelligence services research too narrowly and miss out on important material that simply cannot be found in the traditional archives. (26)

Contrast their approach with that of John Newman in the United States and his detailed analysis of the hundreds of thousands of CIA documents released over the past two decades concerning the relationship between the agency and Lee Harvey Oswald, the alleged assassin of President Kennedy*, in his book, *Oswald and the CIA* (27). Based on his twenty years experience as a Military Intelligence officer in the US intelligence community, Newman produced a unique study of CIA files which detailed how an intelligence agency actually works in practice rather than in theory. It bears little resemblance to the accounts that we have to date. It illustrated how the imposition of ultra secrecy to protect the agency from outside scrutiny, but also the internal divisions within it, mean that files rarely contain the whole story and that summaries of files (what we usually see in the archives) are written with an awareness to their eventual viewing by outsiders and are therefore not entirely trustworthy. By the very nature of being "intelligence" files, less trust can be placed in them than, for example, diplomatic files which, although also concerned with secrecy, simply do not

* Many academics in Britain (but no longer in the United States) are simply not willing to study the material in this area, even though, following President Clinton's sanctioned JFK Records Act of 1992, the Archives now contain more files on the day-to-day operations of an intelligence agency than any other archive. (28)
have the same degree of need to conceal, not only from external monitoring but also from colleagues (and future scrutiny by historians).

In considering these restrictions – both involuntary and voluntary – on the use of traditional archives and files, and acknowledging that MI6 is "a substantial piece of research", Aldrich notes that "it also represents a methodological challenge. It confronts historians of the clandestine Cold War, and especially what Donald Cameron Watt has called the 'British School' of Intelligence Studies (29), with an awkward question. How far can this subject be examined convincingly by moving through archives that have been 'dry-cleaned' by the authorities? A reader's ticket and a sharp pencil may be the right toolkit for a study of British reactions to the Marshall Plan, but is it the right one for researching secret service history?" (30)

Coverage of intelligence matters in the post-war period had been mostly left to journalists and pro-Service propagandists such as the Daily Express's Chapman Pincher (31), and investigative writers such as Tom Bower and Philip Knightley (32). Many of the books covering this area were obsessed with security and intelligence service "moles" such as Kim Philby and George Blake, and were reliant on anonymous sources and were generally poorly sourced and referenced. The phenomenon of "molemania" disfigured so much historical writing on the British secret services and the Cold War with the result that the over concentration on this area led to large areas of British intelligence "remaining unknown to us". Aldrich notes that MI6 does not deal with that "over-familiar stereotype, obsessive 'molemania'" but "instead tries to investigate more of the real work-a-day world of British secret service". (33)

Until recently, few writers dealt with the Service's Special Operations. Nicholas Bethel's book on the 1949 Albanian operation and Tom Bower's investigative books on the Baltics and his
"biography" of the Chief of MI6 during the late 50s and early 60s, Sir Dick White, were exceptions. (34) These were good books but lacked sufficient sourcing to be taken seriously by academics as they tended to be over-reliant on anonymous sources and interviews. Similarly, Nigel West's low-key, and rather thin post-war history of MI6, *The Friends* (1988), which also crossed over into the work of the Security Service (MI5), had few sources, references and notes. (35)

Over the past twenty-five years, "Nigel West", whose real name is Rupert Allason, has been the most successful writer on the security and intelligence world, and is the author of 20 books on the subject. Between 1987 and 1997 he served as a Conservative MP; his father had been Parliamentary Secretary to the disgraced War Minister, John Profumo. (36) Beginning as a researcher for the popular intelligence writer, "Richard Deacon" (aka Donald McCormick) (37), he used his family background and contacts to interview a number of retired former officers of the security and intelligence services, and in the early eighties produced the two books that made his name (*MI5* – 1982 and *MI6* – 1983). (38) West's technique was to amass as many books as possible on the intelligence world and supplement their stories with details of the officers involved. They were surprisingly successful given that they were often densely packed with names and detailed structure maps of the services. His books helped fulfil the appetite of the newspapers for stories of traitors inside the services and were available in a period (1980s) when there was generally a paucity of reliable material on the intelligence world. West was clever at repackaging old material and refreshing it by injecting it with new research. Most journalists seemed unaware that some of the material had been published before. They were in many ways "potboilers", lacking references to sources, which made it hard to verify the material disclosed. However, by publishing so many new names West did, by default, help create a base from which to investigate the intelligence services on a more structured basis. *Friends* was a step forward in terms of investigating MI6 in that it dealt with, for the first time, the post-war period. West described it as a "nuts-and-bolts" affair on how
"the country's overseas, clandestine intelligence-gathering arm made the transformation from Empire to membership of the EEC". (39)

More interesting and serious was Anthony Verrier's *Through the Looking-Glass: British Foreign Policy in the Age of Illusions*, published in 1983; a book that particularly influenced me with its informed view of the role of the intelligence services in post-war Britain. A former *Observer* journalist, Verrier (now dead) was the Defence Correspondent of the *News Statesman* in the 1960s and later became a Research Fellow at St Anthony's College, Oxford, which has often referred to as the "Spook's College" because of the number of former intelligence personnel attached to it. Verrier was the ultimate "insider" which is easily established by the number of people listed in the introduction to his book who had helped him. At the time, only those in the know would recognise their names but they are a veritable Who's Who of the intelligence world. (40) Research into their backgrounds revealed that they included former senior MI6 officers.

Verrier was an elegant writer with a beautiful turn of phrase who made telling comments about British foreign policy. (41) His central argument was that following the Second World War, in the absence of a strong economy and large defence forces, Britain had increasingly relied on the substitute influence and capabilities of the intelligence services to pursue a foreign policy that presented Britain as a still great power. This is summed up in the oft-repeated phrase used by Foreign Office officials and ministers such as Douglas Hurd (42), as "punching above our weight" (a view recently aired – October 2010 - during the debate on the economic "cuts" by the Prime Minister, David Cameron, and his Minister of Defence, Dr. Liam Fox). (43) Verrier saw strong links between the servants of the Victorian Empire who worked in far outposts of the Empire and the officers of the post-war MI6. He had strong sympathies with a Service which, he believed, contained some of the brightest and best, and who were well aware that it (British foreign policy)
was all an illusion.

Verrier's stimulating book illuminated some previously unknown areas of MI6's operations (such as Ireland and in the Middle East - 44) and was very good at illustrating the place of the Service in Britain's foreign-policy domain as part of what he termed the "Permanent Government" and that, whilst its officials were keenly aware of economic or political realities, politicians invariably paid little heed to them. (45) In a sense, its starting point is Dean Acheson's infamous and still relevant remark at West Point on 5 December 1962 that Britain "has lost an empire and has not yet found a role". The book is a view of the world as told through MI6 eyes, principally those of former Chief, Sir Dick White. With its air of authority on the subject, Verrier's text was semi-academic in tone but lacked, in some areas, enough documentation, references or sources to place complete trust in his account. However, it was possible to identify some of the MI6 sources (such as Frank Steele on Ireland - 46) and follow them up.

Much current literature on intelligence, notes Aldrich, "presents a picture of the British secret services as broadly focused upon obvious foreign enemies in hot and cold wars. In reality, their targets were far more diverse." It is partly from admiration of Verrier and his general overview of the Service that, as Aldrich further acknowledges, "Commendably, Dorril avoids this and other stereotypes that have dogged the history of the British secret service. We do not get 'enemy-led' history but a balanced picture in which intelligence is gathered on neutrals, even on allies." (47) Faced with the problem of the lack of Service files, until recently, academic research and writing on intelligence largely avoided the problems of dealing with the post-war and cold war period. However, the lack of transparency in the intelligence world and the deficiency in information do not invalidate areas of study such as secret intelligence. In considering researching the Irish "Troubles" – and here is a valid analogy with researching MI6 – M. L. R. Smith suggests that "the barrier to
scholarly interpretation is purely a mental hurdle that has grown up in the minds of academics, fortified by three decades of established methods of thinking". (48) That there is an absence of perceived reliable information is often an excuse used to rationalise the lack of the study of particular areas and to avoid, in the case of the Irish conflict but valid in terms of special operations, its "more unsavory aspects". Smith believes that the researcher "who ploughs his or her way through the literature trying to constuct a coherent picture ... is facing no more and no less difficulty than the Kreminologists or China-watchers of times past. They could not write as if they had a direct line into the Soviet and Chinese politburos. Instead, they relied on very careful analysis of the outpourings of the state propaganda machines to discern what was happening behind the iron and bamboo curtains." (49) The available evidence can be used in a way compatible with academic research standards. Indeed, Smith argues that because evidence is never complete or all-revealing there is a need for academics in the first place to assess and interpret available information. (50)

Aldrich makes the point that my work involves research into areas that have been "wilfully resistant" and that he has, more importantly, adopted an approach that "challenges current mainstream practice". It requires us to consider "how might we best go about rolling back the frontiers of a no less stubborn opponent, the secrecy that still blocks the road to a fuller understanding of the clandestine Cold War". (51) Breaking with most intelligence history conducted in Britain over the last two decades, Dorril, notes Aldrich, "has not spent long in the [National Archives]". (52) This partly because of his shared view with historian Alex Danchev that "Conversations occuring in corridors or over telephone, or at cocktail parties can shape events ever more decisively than whole stacks of official memoranda that find their way into the archives". In order to unravel the activities of MI6, "one has to dig deep and sift carefully, in the manner of the archaeologist, but also acculturate, like some intrepid anthropologist, to a strange and secretive society whose intricate social and professional networks are familiar to their members but quite
baffling to the outsider, whose currency is the informal understanding, and whose transactions consist chiefly of unwritten and sometimes unspoken agreements." (53)

In order to break into that secretive network, notes Aldrich, "Dorril has conducted a remorseless trawl of the secondary literature, including the most obscure theses and privately published memoirs. This has been combined with press material, correspondence and interviews with witnesses, to provide a detailed institutionalist survey of a subject that many still regard as impenetrable." In doing so, Dorril (along with Scott Lucas*) "shine a light into some dark corners, especially the vexed issue of British and American attitudes to liberation and the prospect of rolling back the frontiers of Stalin's Soviet empire in eastern Europe". Partly as a result of their efforts, mainstream writers on international affairs, on both sides of the Atlantic, now realise that "Liberation" was a more important issue for policy makers than hitherto realised. (54)

Whilst it is true that there has been in recent years a growing interest in British clandestine activities in the Third World after 1945, Aldrich notes that an overtly revisionist tone has been less evident. "Perhaps this reflects a tendency to see these matters through a colonial rather than a Cold War prism, or perhaps Cold War interest in Britain has simply focused upon attempting to claim a British 'share of the Cold War action', rather than assessing the nature of British responsibility. There is, nevertheless, a distinctly new revisionist tone to the work of Stephen Dorril" (55), who is part of a discernible group of critical writers** on intelligence in Britain. Even so, Dorril concedes that "MI6 is a vital, essential arm of the state and lurking beneath his indignant text is a deep admiration for 'half a century of intriguing, spying and thuggery'." (58)

* Scott Lucas is Professor of American Studies at the University of Birmingham. (56)
** In particular, Aldrich is making reference here to the work of Mark Curtis. (57)
A central plank of the research for MI6 and guiding philosophy is the idea that there is more on the secret world in the public domain and open sources than anyone (including academics and the security and intelligence services) realised. (59) This view was primarily derived from Peter Dale Scott, the main influence on my methodology, whose work I first came across in the late 1970s when he was a Professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Born in 1929, Scott was a former Canadian diplomat who, having seen the diplomatic cables on Vietnam, became an early critic of the war. (60) His book *The War Conspiracy* (1972) was immensely impressive being very different in structure, format and content to almost everything else that I read on the Vietnam War. Scott was a footnote connoisseur; notes that often seemed to be the basis of books in themselves. Scott's central methodological viewpoint was that Modern society is "open with a rich source of materials". (61) For his book on Vietnam, he relied on "traditional sources" – memoirs, newspaper articles from many countries (by experienced Asian observers), congressional committee hearings, annual reports of corporations and basic reference works. In turn, he often attacked these self-same sources for being willing intelligence service conduits for disinformation.

In a later book, *Drugs, Oil and War* (2003), Scott questioned the "archival bias" (62) that the "truth about policy should be studied chiefly from recorded bureaucratic discussions, statements and rationalizations". He argued that, although there are many such excellent studies, "we risk losing sight of the possibility that a significant part of the process lies elsewhere". Scott makes the case for "archival scepticism" as much of the intelligence record is unreliable. (63) Some historians take note of that but many do not and accept the archive record with little scepticism or recognition that the very nature of how such records are compiled and collated creates problems. Unsurprisingly, Scott was supportive of John Newman's work (see above) and the pair exchanged research.

It was, for a long period, not accepted that immediately following the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, US policy on Vietnam changed (this does not imply cause and affect). It is still a highly controversial area but many historians now accept as a "historical fact" that on 24 November 1963 - two days after the assassination - there was an initiation of a policy reversal and instead of a planned withdraw of American combat troops, the "central objective" changed to assisting South Vietnam "to win" the conflict*. (64) Scott asserted that a ultra-secret National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 273) amended on the 24th had authorised the reversal. He attempted to reconstruct NSAM 273 from references in the press and public documents. (65) His analysis was partially vindicated by the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1972 (just has his book was being published) but was only recognised as being accurate in the 1980s when the Memorandum was finally declassified and published. (66)

From studying Scott's work flowed a number of theories; principally that secret agencies are not as secret as they believe themselves to be. My psychology degree and, in particular, study of Freud was a useful guide. According to psychoanalytic theory total secrecy is rarely possible as there is always a degree of "leakage" whether directly or indirectly or consciously and subconsciously. (67) For instance, in retrospect it is clear that the writer and former Naval Intelligence officer, Ian Fleming, revealed the existence of the Enigma secret as early as 1953 with his reference to the "Lector" machine in his book From Russia with Love. (68) Part of this Freudian analysis is that the operations of the secret world are rather like an iceberg – 9/10ths remain hidden but we do see part of it. That may seem small but given that it is estimated that only a small proportion of the MI6 files are still in existence (see above), it is not an impossible hinderance to finding out more.

Often that part of the secret world becomes visible through the press – secret agencies have to

* Scott's friend, the activist writer, Noam Chomsky, still refuses to accept this revision, blinded, perhaps, by his strong anti-Kennedy stance. (69)
engage with the press in a number of ways – through defections, unusual incidents, operations that
go wrong and the follow up enquiries. Christopher Andrew criticised one of my books in a review (70) for using press sources but he misinterpreted their value. The press is useful for some simple factual material (such as the identity of new chiefs) but the main use is for appreciating the way that intelligence agencies manipulate the press. This has been one of my main contributions to understanding the role of intelligence agencies. Through my close involvement in the case of the Northern Ireland information officer and "psychological" warfare operative, Colin Wallace, (see Paul Foot 71) I have learnt a great deal about the techniques employed; in particular, the way that material is deliberately "surfaced" and placed in publications. (72)

As M. R. L. Smith argues in the context of writing on the Irish "Troubles" but relevant to other areas where there are no or few archive files, there is no reason why journalist accounts cannot be used - as long as they are reliable - to achieve academic ends. This requires "the assiduous accumulation of data. The process often relies on the piecing together of journalistic 'real-time' reports, matching them with other commentaries to build up a bigger, longer-term picture." (73)

As part of the research for MI6, books were systematically "gutted" with the resultant material typed up and put back into chronological order. The sources, such as interviews, articles and books, were tracked down and the same process undertaken with them. This was an extremely useful excercise in that it soon became apparent from where material originated. This was particularly the case with Nicholas Bethel's account of the Albanian operation and Tom Bower's book on the Baltic operations (74) where it was clear that the sources were generally limited. Once the original Albanian/Baltic texts were tracked, this then led to other tracts, including a source rarely used by British historians dealing with the intelligence services - Soviet and East European publications. The propaganda nature of these publications meant that they were often regarded as being too
unreliable for quoting. However, more recent research, such as that into the publications of East German propagandist Julius Mader (75), has indicated that they were often remarkably accurate. The reality was that the Soviets were in receipt of so much original intelligence material from agents in the West that they had little need to fabricate it. Thousands of MI6 documents were copied and handed over to their Soviet handlers by Kim Philby and George Blake. (76) When Blake was safely behind the Iron Curtain, the KGB and its satellite agencies began to release documents which formed the basis of numerous pamphlets detailing these anti-Soviet operations. They revealed that almost all the MI6 sponsored emigre groups were infiltrated and that all their networks in the Baltics, Poland and Ukraine during the early part of the Cold War had been "rolled-up" by the Soviet Bloc security services*. (77)

The research involved employing investigative journalism techniques, which included building a bedrock of purely factual structural information obtained from the public domain – i.e. the identity of MI6 officers, their rank within the Diplomatic Corps and their specific postings at "stations" abroad. Some of the techniques were derived from the CIA "defector", Philip Agee, (78) who showed how it was possible to identify CIA officers through public records (principally the pension records in the State Department diplomatic record). In this country in the 1980s, Jonathan Block built on Agee's work through the trail of previously identified MI6 officers in official reports, such as expulsions from countries and newspaper accounts. (79) I took this further by an obsessive trawl through open sources in the public domain.

No one in connection with researching MI6 before read the Foreign Office (FO) Diplomatic Lists or even Who's Who and Who Was Who. The Diplomatic Lists up until the mid-sixties gave detailed information about FO officers stationed abroad, among whom were MI6 officers stationed under

*These operations are detailed in "Part Three: The Soviet Empire" (pp. 161-300).
'light cover' in local embassies - a cover that is, and was, easily exposed by the local security agencies. Some specific intelligence postings were not well hidden – for instance, in the 1940s/1950s Passport Control Officers, attached Foreign Office and attached British Forces HQ Hong Kong (a full list of identifiers is given in the author's Lobster Special) gave away the identity of intelligence officers. (80) By reading the entire entries for 1945 to 1965 and by matching their postings with already identified officers, I was able to identify numerous other officers. Some of these were self-identifying because they could be checked against officer's names in the public domain which had been published in previous publications such as the books of "Nigel West"; and those identified in Who's Who (I read all the entries from 1945-80). I found that a good source (and neglected one) of purely factual information were the obituaries in The Times and, more importantly, the Daily Telegraph. By the 1980s, a number of senior MI6 officers with wartime experience and service in the Cold War were beginning to die off and the obituaries were being written by a retired former officer who provided details of their postings and background. (81)

Other neglected sources for Service names included official Soviet publications that dealt with Kim Philby and George Blake. The two agents identified to their Soviet handlers virtually all of the MI6 officers (something like 400 names) who had served abroad during the period 1945 to 1963. The KGB controlled the release of these names in a series of propaganda exercises, including the publication of books and the strategic use of articles in the Soviet press. (82) Much of this material was confirmed by retired MI6 officers, such as Anthony Cavendish. (83)

The perceived problem of officers being identified (which potentially fell within the remit of the Official Secrets Act) was recognised by the Foreign Office whose Security Department (the deputy of which was an MI5 officer) launched an investigation into my research. This was followed up with a letter from the Foreign Office Security Department to retired officials (84) which
acknowledged that there were up to twelve official publications in the public domain which could be used to identify MI6 officers. A decision was made not to pursue the matter further (I had a lawyer waiting on call in the event of any attempt to prosecute me) probably because of the embarrassment and the logical, and entirely reasonable, idea that it might be more effective just to ignore this possible breach of the Official Secrets Act. However, the authorities did subsequently "clean up" the Diplomatic List and removed indicators that might identify intelligence officers under "light" cover. Unfortunately, the process only served to highlight the fast-track promotions that characterise the careers of MI6 officers against the slower career climb of standard diplomats.

Once the identities of officers were known, it was then a simple, but time-consuming, matter of building up a picture of the MI6 stations abroad and their strength in officers through the Diplomatic List. Research then followed into what, if any, publications these officers had written, a process which uncovered a number of previously unknown works, memories and diaries. An example were the books and pamphlets of South-East Asia specialist, Donald Lancaster. (85) The research was also used to identify intelligence sources quoted in previous books and journals, particularly on the Middle East. An example was the Arabist specialist, John Christie, an anonymous source of information for a book by Mustafa M. Alani, *Operation Vantage: British Military intervention in Kuwait, 1961*. When Mr Christie personally complained to me that he had never ever given an interview, I was able to point out that, although his name had been redacted in the main text, someone had failed to notice that his name was still in a note on page 267. In another book, someone had removed an officer's name from the text but not the index. (86)

Despite the qualms of some historians in this area, interviews are a necessary part of research. As Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis suggests, human relations, particularly in and between secret

*For details of the Kuwait operation in *MI6* see page 671 onwards.
agencies, cannot always be reconstructed from documents. (87) Carefully used, interviews are the most telling source for insight into how such agencies work in practice. Interviews were carried out by me with officials and agents involved with the intelligence services and, in a small number of cases, with MI6 officers. Some interviewees, such as Montague Woodhouse, were extremely generous with their time. Most were largely anonymous and their evidence was largely used to verify or not existing material. The general understanding was that they would not be quoted directly. I also had two long unpublished interviews of senior MI6 officers, primarily about the Middle East, on a similar understanding. I was also given a long "last testament" by George Kennedy Young, the most and important senior officer in the Middle East and former Vice-Chief of the Service, which included a personal statement on the role of an intelligence officer. This was supplemented by material from his five published books of which no one had previously made use. (88) Whilst not directly about the Service, they did make reference to his intelligence activities and included informed comments about British foreign policy directly relevant to his career and MI6.
MI6 broke new ground in terms of research and understanding in a number of key areas including providing new material on the organisation of the Service during different transition points in response to changes in the Cold War (seen through the book); the background – in terms of recruitment, training, organisation and philosophy - to the Service's "special operations" (again throughout the book); the role of academic specialists in forming the Service's "World View" (see Chapter Five); the increasingly importance role of technical intelligence (see Chapter 25: "The Technical Fix") and its murky relationship with former fascists and Nazis as intelligence assets (see Chapter 8: "Germany and the 5 x 5s" in particular). However, a central theme of MI6 is that Secret Intelligence Service placed a strong reliance during the Cold War on personal and insider networks based around "old-boy"-style links to politicians and outside interests. These are identified by MI6 as "factions" within the Service which during particular sensitive operations were in "collusion" with key politicians and ministers, and foreign policy officials in a way which largely circumvented normal democratic control or oversight. The background to this was often the dispute over the nature of the "special relationship" with the United States which reflected the rather desperate need of official foreign policy circles for Britain to be seen to "punch above her weight". This led to an increasing use of the Service as a substitute for real power as intelligence-gathering, deception activities and special operations took the place of military intervention. "What dividends does Dorril's approach deliver?", asks Richard Aldrich.

"First and foremost," acknowledges Aldrich, "this is an extraordinary compendium, bringing together almost all that is currently available on the subject." (89) In using a rich vein of sources previously not used in traditional academic accounts of the intelligence world, MI6 uncovered a
number of Service links to "state-private" intelligence funded or supported networks; a field of study that has since become a fashionable preoccupation of researchers on intelligence. (90) Based on neglected European Movement (EM) and National Union of Students (NUS) archive sources, MI6 detailed the depth of this officially/unofficial co-operation in the section on the EM by outlining the role played by former resistance workers who became MI6 "assets", and the way these connections were used to run operations among students, writers and journalists. This also led into discussion of the "notorious" Bilderberg group and the undercutting of numerous conspiracy theories that surround this organisation by revealing for the first time the central role played by an MI6 agent, Josef Retinger, and the use of it as a "talking-shop" to ease tension between elite British and American groups over Cold War disputes; an area since pursued by Professor of International Relations at Nottingham, John W. Young, who acknowledges the MI6 reference to Retinger. (91)

By using such a diverse range of research materials, Aldrich writes that this "allows this book to capture some of the texture of the work of ordinary MI6 officers going about their business in the familiar hotspots of the Cold War and during Britain's troubled retreat from empire. Matters of agent recruitment and tradecraft are fully explored and give this book a texture that archive-based work is less likely to achieve. The book is also good at identifying the personal networks." (92) MI6 details and uncovers the personal relationships and private "insider" networks which, it argued, are a central component of the way the Service works but are largely absent from traditional, narrow archive-based academic works. Such networks involved government ministers (former MI6 officer Julian Amery in particular - 93), MPs (such as ex-SOE officer Neil McLean - 94), the banking sector (such as former SOE senior figure Charles Hambro - 95) and the special forces (SAS founder David Stirling - 96). These, it is argued, were an essential and necessary addition to the Service, which by the late 1950s and early 1960s was increasingly under Foreign Office supervision and Treasury monitoring, in order to circumvent increasing political control. But also necessary to take
the place of costly and potentially dangerous official operations, in order to support unofficial or
deniable operations for which there were no official sanction. The former involved "the
Musketeers" (Amery and McLean) in Albania (97) and the latter in the Yemen (98).

This is a grey area which academics approaching the subject in a traditional manner often find
difficult to deal with. In its approach to dealing with MI6 as a distinct intelligence agency, *MI6* is
different to most conventional accounts. Often the writing on intelligence agencies, British ones in
particular, takes no account of bureaucratic structures – though the academic Philip Davies is a
notable exception to this general line (99). Even so, when it does, it tends to be functionalist and
bears little witness to the testimony of those that actually worked inside them. In terms of
organisation, MI6 is seen as an "ideal type" with flow charts of the organisation as a cohesive
system constructed rationally, rather than a particular type of bureaucracy that is skewed by the
needs of ultra secrecy. Too often not enough account is taken of the external or often hidden internal
pressures that are exerted on it from other state bodies (the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the
Military) and outside interests (oil would be one) or of the political context. This approach tends to
create a consensual view of the intelligence world that generally only sees positives or, in a rather
British indifferent way, such as Christopher Andrew's official history of MI5, disposes of the
negatives in a jokey/off-hand manner. (100) In this way, much academic writing on secret agencies,
generally ignores or underplays people's self-interest, manoeuvrings, manipulation and competition.
Writing on these areas is too easily dismissed as "conspiracy thinking", though psychoanalysts
would see this as the natural state of human beings in an unnatural social enviroment.

Intelligence agencies are mostly treated as self-contained units which have a benign world-view
with straight lines of communication to or from policy-makers. Peter Dale Scott's great insight
(101), which partly came from the way he did his research, was to see (and confirmed by Newman's
research of the files) that factions often reside inside these bureaucracies. (102) These factions often had extensive links to outside interests (Banks would be one). In addition, key individuals (the CIA’s James Angleton in the US and a large presence in MI6, George Kennedy Young) exerted a disproportionate influence on their organisations and their operations. In contrast, most British researchers champion the pre-eminence of the social world over its constituent actors or human subjects. (103) The tendency is to either ignore these characters or to dismiss them as "mavericks", instead of acknowledging that, as former MI6 officer Malcolm Muggeridge wrote, secrecy corrupts and influences in a negative way human behaviour. (104)

Scott viewed – as does MI6 - the area where the general intelligence world intersected with the political world as one of "covert politics", and as such, the conduct of public affairs is often not undertaken "by rational debate and responsible decision-making but by indirection, collusion and deceit". (105) But this also works in reverse with the "political exploitation of irresponsible or para-structures, such as intelligence agencies". A prime example would be Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and "collusion" with Israel and France over Suez (and latterly New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Iraq war). These ideas are central to MI6 and its exploration the Suez special operations in 1956. This is described at length in the book in Chapter 29 ("Suez: Assassins and Thuggery") which details the unique relationship between the Prime Minister and the Controller Middle East, George Kennedy Young, the conduit for the Service's Yellow Book intelligence (known as Luck Break) on Nasser and the Egyptian regime.

MI6 notes that special operations and much of the intelligence collection on Egypt and the Middle East was run by a faction (the "Robber Barons") that went in for what the senior Foreign Office official responsible for the intelligence side, Geoffrey McDermott, noted as "extreme right-wing politics". (106) Interestingly, Peter Hennessy in his latest edition of Secret State (2010)
acknowledges the presence of a number of extreme right-wingers in the Service (not named but named in *MI6*) during the 1950s and early 1960s but makes no comment or explores that fact. (107)

*MI6* argues that for most of the 1950s the Service evaded or escaped proper democratic control or oversight and that a small group or cabal of right-wing officers was able to forge an alliance with similarly-inclined ministers (and Prime Minister Eden) in order to carry out a series of special operations. (108) Again, traditional academics find this a difficult area, particularly when there is clear evidence of collusion. Generally, they dismiss ideas of a "rogue elephant" or of an agency out of control. In practice, the British lack of a formal constitution allowed this to happen and without effective parliamentary oversight, there was no mechanism to stop it, since the Foreign Office (and at times the Foreign Secretary) did not have full control of the Service. Since MI6 (or more particularly key officers) controlled the intelligence on Suez (known as Lucky Break - 109) it is not clear who was controlling or manipulating who - the PM or MI6. (A question that still lacks a clear answer with regard to Iraq and the WMDs in 2010.)

In its detailed analysis of the role played by the Service during the Suez crisis (rather than the full accounts of the role of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Office - 110) *MI6* argues that there was a significant gap between what was said and recorded in the official record of meetings and what officers recall of those same meetings and decisions. For instance, the denial of "thuggery" (i.e. assassinations) during the Suez operations by the military and the Foreign Office is met with incredulity by officers. However, their involvement in such operations is used to illustrate the point that a faction within the Service simply ignored the Chief's own statement that the Service did not engage in such activity. (111) Similar disjoints would occur in the Lebanon and in South-East Asia where local controllers carried out operations without full authorisation – to the dismay of the Chief. The concept of "deniability" thus makes a mockery of the idea of a documentary record that
academics can follow through traditional means. In pursuing the trail as MI6 did, the book also helped explode the myths that operations against Nasser ended with the resignation of Eden. The new Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was just "as obsessed with the idea of getting rid of Nasser". (112)

Other operations and actions considered which had previously been immune to any serious investigation include those in Vietnam (113), Oman and the Yemen (114). The small section dealing with South East Asia is one of the most interesting in the book in that it provides a more detailed biography of the senior officer and future chief, Maurice Oldfield, than that portrayed in previous accounts of his life (115). It overturns some of the myths about this alleged "Smiley"-like figure (he wasn't as liberal as some believe) - and reveals the importance of the debate within the intelligence community on the reality or not of the Sino-Soviet split in the early sixties. (116) This section is a positive view of MI6 and recognises that within its ranks were some extremely intelligent individuals who had a realistic and insightful view of the so-called "communist menace" in S.E. Asia in contrast to the "domino-theory" held by the American analysts.

In covering these operations, MI6 deals with an area that had not been previously mentioned in any post-war study of British Intelligence, namely "Deception". (117) It had appeared that the use of deception techniques had been confined to the War years but MI6 argued (and this was later confirmed by the release of files and partially by the Service's own official history) that deception operations in what were known as "disruptive actions" - involving deceiving particular groups, such as terrorists, and hostile intelligence agencies with planted disinformation in the press - were planned and carried out during the Cold War. Richard Aldrich did deal with the subject in The Hidden Hand in the following year, though we continue to differ as to its significance at the beginning of the Cold War (Aldrich gives it greater significance). (118)
In considering operations behind Iron Curtain, MI6 argued that the Service was burdened with an old-fashioned pre-Second World War anti-Bolshevik outlook that meant that some officers could be regarded as "premature" cold-warriors who went into battle against the Soviet Union before the embers of the War had been extinguished or had time to cool. This ensured that a potential window for an unofficial agreement with the Soviet Union before the Cold War began in earnest was closed prematurely. That Labour Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, had initially taken a much more sensible view of what could be done, particularly about the Middle East, and that Stalin was probably willing to come to some kind of accommodation with the West (119), remains controversial but has been recognised by some historians. However, it still invites heated disagreement in the context of the intelligence services and MI6, as is shown by the response to the book on the Right in the United States. (120)

In considering the development of the operations against the Soviets, MI6 claimed that the British contribution was fairly limited after the election of Winston Churchill in 1951 - though it took a considerable amount of time to actually put an end to them. (121) As Prime Minister and in temporary charge of the Foreign Office when Eden was ill, Churchill had little faith in the liberation policy and was at loggerheads with the US administration (and the CIA) which continued to plan and put in place operations behind the Iron Curtain when it was clear that they had failed, and that the risks to the world were potentially severe. MI6 provides a more complicated version of the special relationship with the United States which suggests that it was for much of the 1950s largely presentational and that, whilst relations with individual officers was general good on the ground, between the services there was a degree of mutual distrust – and bitterness in the case of MI6 at the lack of American support - and this required continuing, and considerable, efforts to repair the damage (this can be seen with the establishment of the Bilderberg group, which – with its substantial imput from MI6 "assets" – was designed to bridge the widening views of Atlanticist elites on the
Cold War). This was, *MI6* argues, a pivotal moment as Eden and George Kennedy Young considered the option of joining the European Community to maintain a degree of independence of action in the Middle East free of US interference. (122)

However, MI6 knew how to play the game by pandering to American anti-communist prejudices. This is most clearly outlined in the only, to date, detailed account of MI6's role (as against several ones on the CIA's contribution - 123) in the important coup against the Iranian democratically elected government in 1953; an event that led to the Service's eager involvement in several other similar exercises during that decade in the Middle East. The extensive research in the chapter is backed up and confirmed by a long interview with the key officer planning the coup, Norman Derbyshire. It is likely to remain the most complete account for some time as there appears to be no Service history and the Foreign Office consolidated history written for the files remains secret. (124) *MI6* argued that the coup was a disaster in that, by bringing down the Mossadeq regime, the operation effectively undercut "a number of legitimate interests that were essential to the country's viability". (125) The coup achieved the stability that the West craved but at a steep and destructive price. By putting fear of communism at the centre of its operation and thus denying the possibility of a democratic regime under Mossadeq's leadership, the Service's actions effectively helped destroy the middle ground in Iranian politics and thus laid the ground for the Shah's authoritarian regime that followed, and the inevitable eruption of the 1979 revolution.

The "coup" is central to Iranian views of the West and *MI6*’s contribution has been welcomed in Iran and by Iranian exiles as a necessary corrective to the versions peddled by the CIA. It led to involvement in two documentaries made by Iranian documentary film-makers and extensive interviews for a major American documentary on the coup, broadcast on the ABC television network on the 50th anniversary in 2003. (126)
What *MI6* also exposed was the Foreign Office delusion that once Britain had managed to rebuild its economy, it would be able to stand alone and undertake independent action in foreign policy and intelligence matters. Whilst *MI6* shows that (after the Iranian coup) the special relationship was often a cynical exercise with the CIA and MI6 at loggerheads in key areas, Britain could never undertake truly independent action because it simply lacked the means to do so and was always, ultimately, subservient to the vastly greater resources of its American "cousins". A number of misconceptions about the relationship which find their way into books on the intelligence world are overturned (127) particularly the apparent "four lessons" learnt from the success of the Iran coup.

In "punching above our weight" - as Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd put it during the Major years - the British government's deployment of MI6 as a substitute for the absence of real economic or military power was (and remains), *MI6* argues, delusional, and only served to help preserve the fantasy that Britain retained a deserved place on the world stage as a major power, when, in practice, it hid the nation's inevitable decline and thus frustrated attempts at modernisation in the 1960s, and continues to do so to this day. This is the backdrop, the book also argues, for the failure of successive governments to properly enquire into the functioning and funding of MI6. As Hurd put it: "The past is a different country." One former officer admitted, the Service had deliberately and successfully cultivated "an air of mystique and importance" to its work. *MI6* was part of a process of demystifying its activities.(128)

*MI6* undermined some of that mystique with its portrayal of the Service, notes Aldrich, "as expensive, wasteful and involved in operations which are either morally questionable or else involve 'low farce'." The former includes the Service's cynical campaign against the Soviet Bloc which deceived a number of exile groups into believing that MI6 was interested in the liberation of their countries behind the Iron Curtain, whereas the Service in reality used them or exploited them
to gather intelligence. In the process thousands lost their lives or were imprisoned in an hopeless campaign which, as the book argues, never had a serious chance of succeeding. The intelligence take from this disastrous policy was mediocre at best and almost certainly worthless. As noted above, the Soviet security forces and intelligence services simply rolled up the networks which had been penetrated from the beginning. (129)

Aldrich concluded his review of *MI6* with the remark that "Such trenchantly revisionist writing on British overseas policy is rare, and revisionist accounts that are based on a close, if skewed, reading of detailed scholarship and documentation are even rarer ... whether you agree with this critical perspective or not, the work wears it colours on its sleeve and makes for refreshing and provocative reading." (130)

*MI6* opened up a whole area of intelligence activities - operations, bureaucratic relations and individual stories - that had previously been deemed secret or largely impossible to investigate. It did so in a critical way, exposing the many myths that had grown up around a Service that even its own practitioners acknowledge had performed badly during the early years of the Cold War.
IMPACT

*Mi6* was heavily reviewed and the subject of a numerous newspaper and magazine articles when it was published. In the subsequent decade it has retained its importance through its use on radio and television documentaries, and from being regularly quoted in other books and in academic journals. An example of how its research method bore fruit and how the Service tried to counter *Mi6*'s impact is shown by comparing it with the Service's own official history.

In 2004, a decision was made by the then Chief of Mi6, Sir John Scarlett, to produce an "authorised" history of the Secret Intelligence Service. Its publication by historian Professor Keith Jeffrey was publicised in *The Times* (18 September 2010) with according to its author, exclusive extracts of "one of the extraordinary revelations of the book". Operation Embarrass was Mi6's covert operation to sabotage attempts by Jewish Holocaust survivors to send ship of refugees to their potential new home in Palestine (131). Jeffrey told *The Times* that when he stumbled across the documents in the Mi6 Registry he realised that he had "unearthed an explosive story in every sense". Having worried that documents might be deliberately destroyed, here, he concluded, "was evidence that Mi6 was not hiding the truth from him. This rather assured me that I could see everything." He added that, "If I had been systematically destroying documents to cover up all the bad stuff I would have bloody well destroyed those [Operation Embarrass]." (132) This is, for reasons outlined below, incredibly naive.

According to Jeffrey, "there were hours of debate within Mi6 over whether the story could be revealed". He argued that it had to be included to make the book credible. (133) The only problem, is that *Mi6* had covered the subject in more detail and had actually named the officers and agents
involved in the operation*. Jeffrey appears to have succumbed to what the historian E. H. Carr in *What is history?* referred to as the "fetish of documents". (134) Research for *MI6's* version had been culled from open sources and interviews. Comparison of the two versions reveals that *MI6* was accurate, only being wrong or having a distinctly different interpretation in one aspect, namely the deception activities** running parallel to the sabotage operation. In truth, the Service was not revealing anything in the authorised version; Jeffrey's book merely confirmed officially the existence of one of its more unsavory operations in the mid to late 1940s. Further evidence that the "hours of debate" had more to do with fear of confirming an already existing account rather than any idea of unearthing "an explosive story" is the fact that *MI6's* account of Operation Embarrass was central to an international awarding-winning Canadian documentary in 2005. (135)

The originality of the research and content, led *MI6* to be being used in a number of other documentaries and books. Much to my surprise, given the paucity of information on the subject, in 2005, Scottish BBC Radio producer, Douglas Macleod, managed to publish an entire book on the activities of the British and Scottish Leagues for European Freedom (BLEF/SLEF). It soon became apparent that this was overwhelmingly based on Chapter 21 of *MI6*, "The British and Scottish Leagues for European Freedom" (136), a unique look at previously neglected areas which had involved research in the Scottish National Library and its archive of SLEF material, and interviews with two leading figures in these particular groups who died soon after the publication of the book. The publisher and author later agreed to write a letter of apology acknowledging that the book, *Morningside Mata Haris: How MI6 Decieved Scotland's Great and Good*, was based substantially on the *MI6* chapter. (137)

The breadth and depth of the material in *MI6* led to the book playing a crucial role in breaking

* See *MI6* Chapter 26, "Palestine", pp. 542-549.
** Though this did serve to confirm the author's view that deception played an important part in the Service's special operations.
through the British "conspiracy of silence" on intelligence matters and the often cosy relationships that exist between writers - seduced by the secrecy - and the intelligence and security services. The son of a senior MI6 officer, Frank Stallwood, involved in the attempted overthrow and assassination of President Gemal Nasser post-Suez (138), contacted me - in one of many such instances - to find out more about his father as he wanted to write a biography of him, having previously not known that he was an intelligence officer until I provided details in *MI6*. Stallwood had been originally identified by the BBC investigative journalist, Tom Mangold, but was unable to broadcast his name on a Panorama documentary on MI6 because of restrictions "imposed" by the D-Notice Committee "guidelines". (139) As a result of the publication of *MI6*, the author was invited to be a consultant to a subsequent Panorama programme on the Secret Intelligence Service.

Few writers – and fewer publishers – have been willing to ignore the desire of the authorities to appraise their books in a shameful example of "voluntary" pre-publication censorship. Part of the reason for the book's success was that, by deliberately ignoring requests from the Secretary of the D-Notice Committee (as it was then called) to see and "vet" – though they call it "advice" - the book before publication, it broke through the gentlemanly world of non-disclosure. Much to the embarrassment of a senior *Guardian* journalist, *MI6* identified one of his open sources on Iran, Desmond Harney, as a former MI6 officer. Harney had written about Iran during the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (140) and his material was used by the newspaper but no one until *MI6* had identified him as a senior officer stationed in Tehran. This was part of a general unstated agreement in the media that it was not the done thing to identify officers; though the American media has long been willing to quote on the record CIA officers and does not regard this as a problem. Although pressure was put on the publishers and there was an extensive "legalling" process by leading barrister, David Hooper, for fears of breaching the Official Secrets Act, they did not buckle like many publishers have in the past. Nor did they when, in the week of publication, the Attorney
General threatened to issue a writ for breaching reporting restrictions on specific operations and there was a fear that the book might have to be withdrawn and possibly pulped. (141)

A consequence of the publication of *MI6* is that, on average, I receive every month a serious request for information from an author/researcher or someone seeking background on their relative. Simon Fraser recently (142) wrote to me in furtherance of his research into the escape in 1947 of the Polish prime minister, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, from Warsaw in an operation organised by MI6. His grandfather, Rupert Walley, captained the ship, the Baltavia, on which Mikolajczyk had been, to use the technical term, "exfiltrated" out of the country. He had come across the story in *MI6* (143), which Mr Fraser found contained the most detailed account of this episode despite, he discovered, deep interest in the story in Poland. In August 2010 author Hannah Stoneham, currently writing a biography of the English novelist Barbara Comyns Carr, wanted to find out more about the novelist's husband, Richard Comyns Carr, who been employed in MI6's Section V with Kim Philby during the Second World War. She was using *MI6* as the basis for her research into Richard's intelligence career having found little available information elsewhere. (144)

*MI6* has also been a major research tool for serious writers of espionage fiction. The most recent being Jeremy Dunn's highly acclaimed *Free Agent* (145) which William Boyd described as "a wholly engrossing and sophisticated spy novel set against a forgotten corner of 20th century history". The forgotten corner was partly based on Mr Dunn's reading of *MI6*, which he acknowledged in his "Author's note" (146) as "an excellent history of the British Secret Intelligence Service, which led me to many other works".

The ripples out from *MI6* have been and remain very strong on both to a wide public and on an academic level, where, whether they agree or not with the conclusions, researchers and writers have
had to consider its coverage of a range of topics and operations from Iran (147), the Yemen (148) to Vietnam (149). The ramifications have been extensive, including being a consultant to, or being heavily involved with through extensive interviews, and, in many cases, the sole or major source on the intelligence side, in a number of television, radio and film documentaries not only nationally but also internationally in Hungary, France, Canada and the United States. (150) I have also had in-depth interviews concerning MI6's activities with newspapers and magazines from around the world, including Japan, Germany, the United States, France, Portugal and South Africa. The intensive research displayed on such areas as the 1953 Iran coup, has meant that MI6 has continuing importance as a form of knowledge transfer to the public, which is undertaken through dozens of public and conference talks, and led to his deployment by the BBC as an "expert" on the Service and intelligence operations. (151) Mark Curtis, former Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in his wide-ranging look at British Foreign policy, Web of Deceit (2003) - which includes twenty-five references to MI6 as a source on the Middle East - called Dorril, "Britain's leading expert on MI6". (152)
CONCLUSION

In the context of academic scholarship on intelligence, even with its highly critical stance on its subject, *MI6* has gained acceptance within a research area that is often conservative in its stance and sometimes cosily aligned with or sympathetic to the intelligence and security agencies. Such a revivionist account will always be controversial, but the fact that it has such strong support from one of the subject area's leading academics, Richard Aldrich, is evidence that this is a major work that has helped point the way forward to further research in a highly contested area, and has opened up possible ways of undertaking research for academics who are only now tentatively dealing with some of the controversial intelligence areas of the Cold War.

There has been in the decade since *MI6* was published an increasing academic interest in intelligence studies with a new generation of researchers investigating the area which has led to a welcome flood of new books, papers and studies on the subject. However, as evidenced by the bibliography of journals such as *Intelligence and National Security* (153) the areas and operations covered by *MI6* and the Secret Intelligence Service itself have only generated a relatively small number of studies and fewer books. Whilst there have been plenty of UK studies based on recently released archive material covering security and, to a lesser extent, intelligence operations up to the end of the Second World War, the archives, and in particular British ones, remain largely closed for those studying post-war intelligence and special operations. What little direct intelligence material has been disclosed has mostly been part of a controlled exercise. Such is the fate of Keith Jeffrey and his authorised history of MI6 whose notes for the final chapters covering some of the same subjects as MI6 in the period of 1945 to 1949 manage to contain not a single reference to any internal MI6 files. (154) It is partly for this reason that former MI6 officer, Harry Ferguson, stated in 2010 that "Stephen Dorril's post-war history of SIS will be the definitive work for years to
By using innovative research techniques to uncover the story of an organisation that had been deemed impervious to serious investigation due to the absence of traditional archives, MI6 forged a new trail in researching secret agencies. In doing so it presented a challenge to previous scholarship and ideas of what could and could not be researched. With its highly critical interpretation of the Service's role – based on substantial gathered evidence - and its tying in of the Service to strands within British foreign policy, it opened up the debate on the role and significance of intelligence agencies within British society during the Cold War and after. It did so in a particular manner and style so that what might previously have been an obscure debate among a few practitioners, writers, commentators and academics was brought to a much wider public than is generally the case for an academic study.

MI6 overturned the official and sanitised view of intelligence activities and the role of the Secret Intelligence Service during the Cold War that, up until that point, had largely been unchallenged by academics. That the Service's own "authorised" history is so slim on the early part of the Cold War and ends at 1949 illustrates the extreme nervousness about documenting the period covered by MI6 and confirms the book's achievement – and continuing relevance - in researching and investigating a controversial and highly secretive area that had previously been deemed impossible. Revealing, as it were, the unrevealable.
STEPHEN DORRIL

Published books:


(2000) *MI6: Fifty Years of Special Operations*, London; Fourth Estate


Dorril, S. and Ramsay, R.

Dorril, S. and Summers, A.

* Research for my books depends on the material available and in what form. Besides many interviews, *Blackshirt* was heavily based on archive material and included successful Freedom of Information requests to archives in Germany, the United States, France, Ireland, Japan and Australia. It also included a substantial number of files obtained from the UK National Archives at Kew, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Ireland, the United States, France and Australia. Numerous private archives were also consulted and the Special Collections material on Fascism at Sheffield University and the Mosley archive at Birmingham University.

The research material has been donated to the Special Collections at Sheffield University under the title, “Blackshirt”.

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- *What are Europeans?* London: (Conway Papers) South Place Ethical Society, 1972

NOTES


4. See, for instance, the detailed chronology for the Albanian operation in *MI6*, pp. 380-90.


9. Aldrich tends to see them as being less serious than I do; however, he has more recently suggested that perhaps they have been underestimated. See Aldrich’s *Cold War History* article.


15. It was only in November 2010 that a Chief of the Service made an on the record public statement about the Service.

17. Communication (10 October 2010) from former MI6 officer, Harry Ferguson, who said that there were few pre-war files in the archive.


22. Aldrich, 'Liberation', 133.


25. *Ibid*.


28. On the released JFK records, See Peter Dale Scott, *Deep Politics II*, Dallas: The Mary Farrell Foundation, 2007. The most interesting example of a British close study of intelligence files is Phil Tomaselli's *Tracing your Secret Service ancestors* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2009) which does provide evidence of the way files are constructed to hide operational details, though there is little study of post-Second World War files.

29. Donald Cameron Watt, 'Intelligence Studies: the Emergence of a British School', *Intelligence*


Jackson, 1978; Their Trade is Treachery, London: New English Library, 1982; Too Secret Too Long,
London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984. Pincher's best book happens to be his latest and last,

Phillip Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist and


34. See Nicholas Bethell, The Great Betrayal: The Untold Story of Philby's Biggest Coup, London:

35. Nigel West, The Friends: Britain's Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations, London:

36. See James Allason, Ringside Seat: The Political and Wartime Memoirs of James Allason,

Donald McCormick (with Nigel West), Spy, London: BBC, 1980.


40. See "Acknowledgements" page in Anthony Verrier, Through the Looking-Glass: British Foreign

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41. See the "Introduction" (pp. i-ix) to *Through the Looking-Glass*, for overview of Verrier take on British foreign policy.

42. See *MI6*, p. 780 - Hurd's son is a senior MI6 officer.

43. The Spending Review on Defence in 2010 still used the term to justify the retention of, or lack of cuts in key areas such as nuclear weapons.

44. See Verrier chapters on Northern Ireland and Iran in *Through the Looking Glass*.

45. Verrier introduced the term "permanent government" in reference to those who guided and decided upon Britain's foreign policy i.e. those Foreign Office and Cabinet Office officials who controlled the main committees and generally set policy on intelligence affairs.

46. He played a key role in terms of "Conflict Resolution" in Ireland in the early 1970s.

47. Aldrich, 'Liberation', 134.


49. *Ibid*.

50. *Ibid*.

51. Aldrich, 'Liberation', 133.

52. *Ibid*.


58. Aldrich, 'Liberation', 137.
59. See Dorril, MI6, Preface, p. xiv.


65. Scott, “The Death of Kennedy”.


67. The reference to Freud has been made previously by me in the Preface to *The Silent Conspiracy*, p. ix.


72. "Surfacing" involves planting stories in foreign publications which can then be imported into a British newspaper through the use of MI6 journalist "assets", and then confirmed by a reliable source (usually the journalist's MI6 handler). Examples of such surfacing by MI6 and others in the


75. Paul Maddrell, 'What we have discovered about the Cold War is what we already knew: Julius Mader and the Western secret services during the Cold War', Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 2, (May 2005) 235-258.

76. See the books on Philby by Phillip Knightley, such as The Philby Tapes: The Secret Life of a Master Spy, London: 1999.

77. See Dorril, MI6, Chapter 14 on Ukraine, pp. 223-248. Local documents from Albania and Yugoslavia (with their security agencies independent of the KGB) also revealed that MI6 networks in these countries had also been rolled-up.


81. Identity unknown.

82. Nikolai Yakovleve, CIA, Target – The USSR, Moscow: Progress, 1984. A series of "Blue Books" were published during the Cold War in Hungary which detailed Western intelligence operations against the country. Much of the material was the result of agent penetration of the numerous exile groups.


84. See Lobster, No. 26.


89. Aldrich, 'Liberation', 133.

90. Hugh Wilford, *The Mighty Wurdlitzer: How the CIA played America*, London: Harvard University Press, 2008, is a very good book on this area. However, it is striking is that such books do little more than confirm the attacks made on the CIA in the 60s/70s by radical groups, such as *Solidarity* in the UK, whose publications on the subject were often dismissed by academics as "conspiracy thinking" but are now confirmed by the research.

91. See Dorril, *MI6*, Chapter 22, "The European Movement and the Battle for Picasso's Mind".


93. Amery: see Dorril, *MI6*, in particular, the Chapters "The Musketeers in Albania", "Suez: Assassins and Thuggery" and "The Musketeers in Yemen".

94. McLean: see Dorril, *MI6*, in particular, the Chapters, "The Musketeers in Albania" and "The Musketeers in Yemen".

95. Hambro: see Dorril, *MI6*, in particular, pp. 138-152.

96. Stirling, see Dorril, *MI6*, in particular, the Chapter, "The Musketeers in Yemen".

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100. Christopher Andrew, *The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, London: Allen Lane, 2009. In particular, the references to the alleged plotting against Prime Minister Harold Wilson, see Section E, Chapter 4, 'The “Wilson Plot”', pp. 627-643, which concludes with the lines: “Old conspiracy theories never die. This one has not even begun to fade.”


102. On Young, see Dorril, *MI6*, in particular, the Chapters, "Iran: 'Unequal Dreams'", pp. 558-599, and "Suez: Assassins and Thuggery", pp. 600-651.


104. In considering his work for MI6, Malcolm Muggeridge wrote that secrecy was “as essential … as vestments and incense to a mass.” He belied that secrecy was a corrupting influence. Quoted in *Lobster*, No. 9, 1985.


118. *Ibid.*, deals with the highly contentious "Operation Splinter-Factor" whose existence is disputed.


120. See reviews of *MI6* on the Amazon website for the book for examples of outrage that the British and Americans might have had some responsibility for initially igniting the beginning of the Cold War.

121. See Dorril, *MI6*, pp. 495 & 505.


124. Private Information.


128. See Dorril, *MI6*, pp. 780 & 800.


133. *Ibid*.


137. Telephone communications and letters, summer 2005.


141. The Attorney General was about to start proceedings but we were able to show that the disputed material was available in the public domain in foreign newspapers in Germany and Israel.

142. Email, Simon Fraser, 30 August 2010.


144. Email, Hannah Stoneham, 20 July 2010.


151. A full list of talks, papers and contributions to BBC programmes is available on the author's University of Huddersfield website.


153. *Intelligence and National Security* (published by Routledge) has been going for 26 years and is the leading academic journal for intelligence and particularly British intelligence studies.


155. Email communication, Harry Ferguson, 11 October 2010.