The Aim of the War for Japan and ‘the National Liberation of Asia’ in the Greater East Asian War

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Introduction

Looking closely at the tracks followed by the Japanese leaders during the Greater East Asian War, they were far from what was expressed as their war purpose in the Greater East Asian Declaration (November, 1943). Since it was absolutely impossible to turn the military situation for the better, the Japanese leaders of the time should have made the second best choice: ‘to gain a victory in terms of philosophy or ideology in spite of the defeat on the battlefield’, which is definitely required in war as the last resort of diplomacy. However, Japan could not make its war slogan a firm spiritual basis, ‘the national liberation of Asia from the colonial oppression by the Western powers’, which had been advocated before the war. (1)

Diplomatic relations during a war correspond to the tide of the war. Most of the Japanese leaders recognized their disability to continue the war, because they had already lost the command of the air and the sea, and major cities including Tokyo had been severely damaged by heavy and almost indiscriminate bombings. According to TOGO Shigenori’s memoirs, he claimed that Japan’s defeat would be a matter of time soon after the American troops landed on the mainland, the only option available for the Japanese army being ‘guerrilla activity’, and ANAMI, the Minister of the Army, did not raise an objection to the remarks. (2)

This study first showed the aim of the war at its outbreak, and overlooked the war-time diplomacy after 1943 when the Axis Powers were to be defeated, especially what the then Japanese leaders thought of ‘the liberation of Asia’ as a national policy in the Greater East Asian
Joint Declaration. Next, we discerned the truth that the greatest concern of both the government and the army converged on ‘upholding the national polity’ at the last moment, while the army advocated decisive battles in the mainland, and we demonstrated a clear distinction between the aim at the outbreak of the war and that at its termination. Last, we investigated the principle of Japanese foreign policy by focusing on the peace initiative to the Soviet Union as a means of movement to the end of the war.

1. The aim of the war at its outbreak and ‘the national liberation of Asia’ in the Greater East Asian Joint Declaration.

The design of the termination of the Greater East Asian War had been discussed just before the outbreak of the war. It was aimed at expanding Japanese territory by winning a victory. The first policy in ‘the Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide of the War’\(^{(3)}\) determined at the Imperial Council on July 2, 1941, claimed that the Empire of Japan should establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere irrespective of the change of the external situation. The second policy showed that the Empire of Japan would deal with the China Incident, advance toward the south to build the basis of self-sufficiency and self-defense, and resolve Northern Territorial Dispute depending on the change of the situation. In ‘the Guideline of the Execution of Imperial Policy’ \(^{(4)}\) determined at the Imperial Council on November 6, 1941, it was explicitly confirmed; that the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain should not thwart the design of resolving the China Incident (the Sino-Japanese War) by the Empire of Japan in accordance with the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and China, and with the Japan-Machukoku-China Joint Declaration; that the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain should neither close Burma public roads nor support the government led by Chiang Kai-shek politically and economically; that the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain should not set up any military rights
in the areas of Thailand, Dutch East Indies, China, and the Far East in the Soviet Union; that the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain should not promote war preparations in the Far East. Furthermore, this official document stated that both countries should resume the trade with the Empire of Japan and supply enough materials to meet the needs of the self-sufficiency of the Empire from their territories in the southwest Pacific area. It also showed that only when these demands were met, the Empire of Japan would not perform any military advance into the neighboring areas except for China, and would withdraw the troops from French Indochina after establishing peace, and secure the neutrality of the Philippines. Thus, the design of realizing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere through the emancipation of Asia corresponded to the political, economic, and territorial expansion of Japan, but not to an extent that the nation could avoid occasional conflicts with the Western colonial rulers. In other words, the Japanese leaders of the time stubbornly clung to the old tactics of 'maintaining the balance among great powers'.

At the outbreak of the war in December, 1941, Japanese military supreme commanders cried for joy by having the upper hand in the beginning and were completely absorbed in the success. They sought to determine the belongings of the southern areas in terms of military policy, and in 1942 they planned to supervise most of the local institutions in the Greater East Asian region as well as political, economic and cultural affairs there by establishing the Ministry of the Greater East Asia. It was aimed not only to deprive the Foreign Ministry of its most important role but also to mobilize all human and material resources in the occupied territories to make them contribute to the war. It rested on the idea of keeping the balance between the Anglo-American powers and the Empire of Japan.\(^\text{5}\) When the issue, 'the belongings and authority of the occupied territories', was placed on the agenda on March 14, 1942, the Prime Minister, TOJO, asked the Navy what areas to occupy completely to secure necessary military bases. ITO, the Vice Chief of the Naval General Staff Office, answered
that there would be nothing to be desired if they could occupy all the southern areas. Malay and Sumatra, blessed with natural resources, were determined to belong to the Empire, although the Philippines and Burma were given recognition to independence. Moreover, Singapore was not given independence even in name only, because of the geopolitical importance the area had in terms of military policy. These were good examples. 

However, most of the Japanese military supreme commanders, blinded by the success in the beginning, forgot their grand political design. They could not obtain support from the people in the occupied areas while the tide of the war was better for them, and they suffered crushing defeats in the Battles of Midway and Gadacanal.

The Greater East Asian Council was held in Tokyo in November, 1943, when the U.S. Navy was anticipated to launch earnest counterattacks in the Pacific. Japan’s main objective at the council was to mobilize all human and natural resources in the occupied territories to fulfill the war. It was SHIGEMITSU Mamoru that in the conference sought to demonstrate the universality of Japan’s war purpose not just to Asian nations, but to the Allied Powers in the joint declaration of the council (the Greater East Asian Joint Declaration), and also attempted to perform a new diplomatic initiative in terms of the postwar conception. Shigemitsu became the Foreign Minister in the Tojo Cabinet in April, 1943, and tried to give some substantiality to the Japanese declaration on the emancipation of Asia and to show Japan’s postwar conception to take a stand to the Atlantic Charter by the Allied Powers. The preamble of the declaration showed that ‘the nations in the Greater East Asia should cooperate to fulfill the Greater East Asian War, to liberate the Greater East Asian peoples from the fetters of the West, and to establish the self-sufficiency and self-defense’. However, it is clear that the aim was to wage the war by getting resources when looking at the process of the planning of the declaration within the Japanese government and the correspondence by its leaders at the council.

To cite an example, Indonesia, one of the most important areas to
get resources, was not invited, and neither was it given any word of independence at the council. In this way, although the purpose of the war was explicitly announced as the universal idea at the conference, ‘the national liberation of Asia’ advocated in the Joint Declaration was just ‘a diplomatic offensive’, in which ‘the roundabout foundation work for peace’ was included as a hidden intention. (8)

In conclusion, the idea of liberation for the Japanese leaders, especially for those of the military authorities, was merely the tactics to wage the war by obtaining the territories and resources. On the other hand, that idea for officials of the Foreign Ministry like Shigemitsu was to present Japan’s strong case for taking a postwar stand against the U.S. and the U.K., while they reconciled themselves to accepting the continuance of the existing colonial system in the midst of the war situation getting worse for them. To put it differently, their conception for the postwar world at the outbreak of the war, which had been pictured in the light of winning a victory, changed mentally into another conception to prepare for the defeat. This means that the idea of liberation was not the supreme end of the war but just a means to keep the balance among the leading nations. As a result, the Greater East Asian Declaration only revealed Japanese growing impatience with the tide of the war to Asian nations as well as the U.S., which had been getting concerned about the returning of European colonial rulers to Asia. (9)

2. The balance of power and the conservation of the ruling class as the postwar conception

The U.S.–U.K.—China trilateral summit was held in Cairo in November, 1943. The Allied Powers expressed there for the first time the fundamental design about dealing with Japan after the war. They also confirmed the removal of all the islands and territories in the Pacific Japan had gained after the First World War, the returning of Manchukoku, Taiwan, and Shoko Island to China, and the freedom and independence of the Korean Peninsula. In the meantime, however,
postwar Asian nations were on the point of changing dramatically at this time. First, the defeat of the Japanese Army was going to bring about national revolution in Asia. Second, the Yan’an Government had been gradually awakening the peoples in the colonies in Asia. Not merely the U.S. and the U.K. whose priority was to defeat the Axis Powers, but also Japan, which was seeking its postwar foreign policy on the assumption of bringing peace based on the defeat, could not respond to this Asian stream. Both parties were much the same in this point of view.

The Prime Minister, Tojo, disputed in his speech on the radio that ‘we, 100 million brotherhood, would advance closely together with one billion people in the Greater East Asia to fulfill the war’, and that ‘the enemy was seeking to disturb the Greater East Asia from the inside at the cost of Japan, while gaining complete control over the Chongqing Government, and dangling an enticing carrot of replacing Japan with Chiang Kai-shek.’

Here we found that the Japanese leaders of the time had had the postwar conception based on the balance of power with the West, though they had advocated the emancipation of Asia as their war purpose. It can be pointed out here that the statement of ‘replacing Japan with Chiang Kai-shek’ was produced from the intention to secure the distribution of the rights and interests in Asia to the benefit of Japan. It did not go a single step out of the postwar conception at the outbreak of the war. In fact, Japan could not develop any positive foreign policy to Asian countries or the Allied Powers in terms of the substantial emancipation.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Togo, who made a speech at the House of Peers on January 21, 1942, claimed that ‘Japan had a noble mission of bringing liberation and prosperity to East Asia in the light of world history, and had been fighting for the just cause.’ In 1943, however, he advised senior statesmen that ‘he had concluded their defeat would be unavoidable if this disadvantageous tide of the war went on,’ adding that ‘the defeat of the war would be inevitable without carrying out
resolutely a huge revolution.’ (13) ‘A huge revolution’ in Togo’s speech meant regaining the political and diplomatic leadership from the Army, and taking the domestic initiative toward the termination of the war. (14) In fact, however, his aim was to prevent the ruin of the conservatives by communist revolution and to protect the Emperor system of Japan as their symbol. This idea can be found in his speech that political, or rather communist revolution would occur if they took a wrong course in the process toward the termination of the war, and that they had to do whatever it might take to protect the Emperor system. (15)

In conclusion, the idea of ‘the liberation of Asia from the colonial system’ inevitably disappeared from the postwar conception when the state of the war had become desperate, because the war purpose for the Japanese leaders rested on the intention of maintaining the balance among the great powers externally, and of conserving the ruling class domestically.

3. The liberation of Asia in the policy toward the Soviet Union

In 1944, Japan was defeated in the Solomons and the Marianas, followed by the loss of Saipan in July. The war situation was totally desperate for Japan. Diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union were quite delicate and important affairs for the Japanese foreign policy until the end of the war. The Soviet Union was at war with Germany, while maintaining neutrality with Japan. This gave birth to the national policy which both the Foreign Ministry and the Army could cooperate to deal with, because the communist power was considered Japan’s last trump card to make peace with the Allied Powers. Here, we aimed to demonstrate how the Japanese leaders of the time had dealt with the relations with the Soviet Union in their war purpose.

When the Russo-German War broke out, some leaders in the Japanese Army advocated opening hostilities against the Soviet Union. However, KONOE, the Prime Minister, and the Navy, who had been anxious about the war situation in the Pacific, were against the new battle. The third
guideline in ‘the Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide of the War’ (16) confirmed that ‘the war between Germany and the Soviet Union should not be intervened for a while. When the tide of the war took a turn for the better for the Empire of Japan, weapons should be used to resolve the Northern China Dispute.’ (17) The fourth guideline stated that ‘whether to open hostilities against the Soviet Union should not change the Empire’s fundamental policy on the war in the Pacific.’ To put it differently, the policy toward the Soviets was considered less important than that of advancing toward the south to prepare for the war against America and Britain, and ‘the liberation of Asia’ was not directly referred to as the war purpose.

By the year of 1943, however, the Russo-Japanese balance began to change as the Pacific and the Russo-German Fronts began to progress. Togo planned to maintain neutrality with the Soviet Union. He advocated not only bringing peace to the Russo-Germany War by putting political pressure on Germany if necessary, but also achieving a Japanese-Soviet alliance, which had been seen as the last card for Japan. This conception of the peace of the Russo-German War through the intermediation of Japan was based on Togo’s belief that the peace between the two powers would exert an immeasurable influence on the war in the Pacific. (18) However, the Army and some officials in the Foreign Ministry insisted on straddling on the fence, being afraid that Japan’s alliance with the Soviet Union would give rise to Germany’s peace with America and Britain, and as a result, Japan would be left alone on the battlefield against them after the Japanese-German relations turned for the worse. (19)

Even in such a situation, most of the Japanese leaders sought to gain the inside track in the postwar order in which America, Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union would be the leading players. This reveals that they did not consider the policy toward the Soviets in terms of the emancipation of Asia. In other words, Togo was strongly concerned about the defeat of Germany in the Russo-German Front triggering that of the Axis Powers, while the Army hoped that
Germany would win a victory with the collapse of the Soviets, which would unavoidably lead to the increase in their rights and interests in the Far East. As the complete victory over America and Britain had been becoming desperate, the last resort for the Japanese leaders was to propose a truce and bring peace to their greatest advantage on the assumption that they would confront the Anglo-American powers after the war. Both the Russo-German War and the policy toward the communist power were recognized as the key tools for surviving as one of the leading players in the postwar world.

Shigemitsu, who assumed office as the Foreign Minister in April, 1943, promoted the policy toward the Soviets more positively than Togo. On September 30, 1943, Shigemitsu claimed at the conference in the presence of the Emperor that Soviet’s entry on the Allied side in the current situation would be a crushing blow for Japan, and that they should avoid stimulating the Soviet dictator so that they would not provide a pretext for his reneging on the Neutrality Pact. The Minister went on to advocate as concrete measures that it would not be impossible to end the Russo-German War if Japan could help the Soviet Union to advance toward the Mediterranean Sea and Asia Minor, because the communist state was planning to make Europe turn red and to Stalin the Anglo-American powers were ‘bitter enemies in the same boat’. The diplomatic approach to the Soviets by Shigemitsu was virtually the same as the previous one in terms of pursuing the balance of power. Here it can be pointed out that his conception also rested on ‘the benefit-sharing’ among great nations by seeing the postwar order as an arena of power politics, lacking the view of making substantial emancipation of Asia.

In the latter half of 1944, Shigemitsu attempted to take back the helm of diplomacy which the Army had grasped, and to promote external policy toward the end of the war by ‘sheer force of diplomacy’. The Foreign Minister was firmly convinced that the domestic ruling by the Army and the defeat in the war were inseparably linked. He believed that the diplomatic offensive superior to that of the Allied
Powers would resolve these two factors at the same time. To the Minister, the Greater East Asian Declaration and the planning for the alliance with the communist power meant a possibility of making up for the defeat on the battlefield as well as providing a strategy for ‘winning a diplomatic victory’ to carry out the drastic reforms of the domestic structure. Specifically, he advocated as follows: ‘The aim of the war for the Empire of Japan is fair and it should be made clearer externally’; ‘Definitely necessary for the Empire now is to promote the understanding of the Soviets about our every endeavor as an East Asian nation to bring about the construction and stability of East Asia’; ‘Our policy to aim at the liberation and independence of the East Asian peoples is consistent with that of the Soviet Union.’ He was seeking to form cooperative relations with Stalin through the use of the phrases, ‘the aim of the war’, ‘East Asian nations’, or ‘liberation and independence’, and through the pro-communist policy in China. (23)

This idea of developing some alliance between Japan and the Soviet Union and among Japan, the Soviets, and China was based on his belief in the postwar world ruled by power politics. In fact, supposing that it would be possible for Japan and the Soviets to join hands when the protection of the rights and interests for the latter in East Asia was achieved not by America and Britain but by the Japan-Soviet compromise, and that the antagonism between the Anglo-American powers and the communist state would be inevitable in accordance with the progress of the war situation, Shigemitsu sought diplomacy by sheer force of power politics, and stated that their Empire should ask Stalin whether he could make a compromise with Germany when Moscow could obtain security in the western area to advance toward the Mediterranean Sea. (24) Put another way, his idea aimed at building the postwar order in the confrontation between the two camps, the camp of the Anglo-American powers and that of Japan, the Soviets, and China. It did not rise above the previous conception of the balance of power.

The Soviet Government, however, refused several offers from Japan to send an envoy to make the Russo-German peace and to reinforce the
Japan-Soviet cooperation, resulting in the negotiation between the two governments hitting a snag. Thus, Japan only revealed itself to be a disgraceful loser to the Soviet Union, which was going to be a winner in the war against Germany, and was gaining a victory over Japan through the Yan’an Government.

Reading telegrams from the Foreign Minister, SATO Naotake, ambassador to the Soviet Union, concluded that it was extremely shameful as a great nation to try to make a disgraceful concession to survive after involving the Southeast Asians in the ravages of war, and that he could not possibly stand the disappointment and contempt from Thailand or Burma. \(^{(25)}\)

Thus, as ‘the national liberation of Asia’ was not the supreme ideal but a means of diplomacy, the last card left with the loser was ‘struggling for survival’ after getting Asian peoples in the disasters, namely, ‘the renunciation of responsibility for the liberation’.

4. From the liberation of Asia to upholding the national polity

As the tide of the war was getting worse than ever before for Japan after the crushing defeat in the battle of the Philippines, by October of the year 1944, the Imperial Japanese Army had secretly begun to investigate how they should take on the Allied landing troops based on ‘the Program on the Mainland Decisive Battle’. \(^{(26)}\) The most noteworthy point here is that the Japanese Army thought an out-and-out resistance to the bitter end in Asia would lead to preventing the Soviets from entering the war against Japan. Heading off the Soviet entry was considered an absolute requirement to prevent the Army from being broken up associated with the defeat in the war, and a do-or-die resistance to the Allied Forces a prerequisite for the avoidance of the Soviet entry. In early April, 1945, the General Staff Office of the Imperial Japanese Army analyzed the state of affairs in ‘the Comment by the Vice Chief on the War Guidelines for Chiefs of Staff of the Imperial Army (draft)’, presenting the view that definitely fundamental was to
avoid commencing hostilities against the Soviet Union. (27) According to
the comment, the Soviet entry would have an immeasurable influence
on the termination of the Greater East Asian War, and if the U.S. should
begin to take control of the continent of China, the Soviet Union would
advance toward the south to use weapons. (28) This view reveals that
the Japanese Army considered the decisive battle in the mainland not
as the national policy to liberate Asia but as a clever piece of tactics to
survive in the postwar order ruled by the two camps, while foreseeing
factors on the Cold War after the Axis Powers lost the war.

As they lost the battles and aerial attacks were becoming increasingly
serious, the diplomacy toward the end of the war was more actively
promoted. As shown before, the Greater East Asian Council was held
in 1943, the purpose of which was to confront the Atlantic Charter with
the war purpose of Japan and to incorporate Asian nations into the war
footing. And the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu, sought the
strategies of bringing peace to the Russo-German War and some alliance
between Japan and the Soviets to prevent the Axis Powers from being
shattered. Tokyo kept on attempting to form a political alliance with
the communist power, because both the Foreign Ministry and the Army
agreed that absolutely necessary was the prevention of the Soviet entry
into the war to avoid the total collapse of Japan.

Unfortunately, this Japanese judgement was over-optimistic and lacked
foresight. Stalin condemned Japan as ‘an evil aggressor’ in his speech
made at the 27th Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution in November,
1944, before giving notice not to extend the period of the Soviet-
Japanese Neutrality Pact on April 5, 1945. (29) Even after that, however,
Tokyo still continued to seek ‘a phantom love’ from the country which
had secretly determined to enter the war. At the Supreme War
Leadership Conference held on April 30, 1945, the Government and the
Army, expressing the words of praise to the strenuous efforts of the
German Government and people, confirmed that they should take care
not to stimulate the national sentiment of the Soviet Union. They still
hoped to make peace overtures to the U.S. through the intermediation of
In the midst of these attempts, Konoe made a direct appeal to the Emperor, saying “Regrettably, our defeat in the war could not be possibly avoided. Communism that is sure to emerge and spread associated with the defeat is now the most truly-alarming factor of all from the viewpoint of upholding the national polity. It is a party in the Army indoctrinated with an idea of communism that stands in the way to the termination of the war. To carry out the reforms of the Army is the indispensable prerequisite to save Japan from communism.”

This appeal to the throne is not simply worthy of attention as an appeal to the Emperor associated with the moves to end the war, but also of great interest in that Konoe and the ruling class feared that communist revolution in the Army which would occur by continuing the war could give rise to the ruin of the Emperor system. However, what is more important and noteworthy is that Konoe’s purpose did not go a single step out of upholding the national polity. At the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War, Konoe presented a thesis the theme of which was ‘Overcoming Self-Centered Pacifism by the Anglo-American Powers’. And he stated that what they had pursued since the Manchurian Incident was inevitable for Japan, and that the aim of the Greater East Asian War was the emancipation of Asian peoples oppressed by western colonial powers. But in his advice to the Emperor, he condemned a party in the Army for the war, attempting to uphold the national polity by ending the war and stirring up the fear of communism.

The Konoes being the head family of regents and advisors, it can be easily imagined that he wished to conserve the Imperial Household and its supporting class after the war by protecting the Emperor from the war crime affairs which could be raised after the war. However, it was the fear of communism that made him hesitate at an alliance with the Soviet Union and made him plan to bring peace through the direct negotiation with America. Anticipating the postwar antagonism between the two camps, Konoe sought as the fundamental foreign policy to develop cooperative relations with the capitalistic party in terms of
power politics. Here, we found that no sense of responsibility for the liberation of Asia could be seen in this conception of his at the last minute.

When the KOISO Cabinet was replaced with that led by SUZUKI Kantaro in April, 1945, Togo appeared as the Foreign Minister again. He still wished to make peace through the Soviet intermediation until the end of the war. But the talks between HIROTA and Malik did not make any substantial progress. In July, Konoe was appointed to the special envoy to the Soviet Union at the Supreme War Leadership Conference. However, Stalin rejected the sending from Japan on the grounds that the mission of the envoy was not clear. Japan made an offer to send the envoy again, but the Soviets did not respond to it. In the middle of these desperate attempts the Potsdam Declaration was issued by the Allied Powers on July 26. Faced with the ultimatum before the complete destruction, Togo still insisted on promoting the peace negotiation with America and Britain through the Soviet intermediation after investigating the relations between the declaration and the Soviets. It was, as it were, ‘a phantom diplomacy’.

After that, the Japanese leaders traced the tracks to accepting the Potsdam Declaration by converging on ‘upholding the national polity’ and ‘the decisive battle in the mainland’. Since ‘the liberation of Asia’ was not the absolute purpose of the war, they sought to develop external policy toward the end of the war in terms of the balance of power among the leading countries, aiming to protect the dominant class including themselves. No unawareness of responsibility for the liberation can be found here.

Conclusion

The war in the Pacific and Asia became the great momentum for the independence of Asian nations. Southeast Asians do not have large foreign forces stationed in the beginning of the 21st century. They are blessed with more freedom and independence than ever before. In this
point of view, the Greater East Asian War led to the national liberation of the oppressed. However, until the end of the war the Japanese leaders clung to the conception of upholding the national polity, which corresponded to conserving the traditional ruling system internally, and clung to power politics among the leading countries externally. What they sought was not 'the liberation of Asia. The meaning of the war and the responsibility for it should be conveyed to the next generation all the more clearly for the calamitous defeat. However, Japan did not even make any endeavor to carve its case and proof in history. Japanese diplomacy was a complete loser in this respect. According to Shigemitsu, 'the supreme aim of the war and its limitation should be fundamental to recover peace. To find out the optimal substance for a human being as well as a nation brings great power and holy work. Whatever the result of the war may be, the future for the nation and the human being can be found in this effort.' (36) Here we can find a great difference between this comment of Shigemitsu’s and who the Japanese leaders, including him, really were at the last moment of the war.

(Notes)

(1) As for an assertion of this kind, for example, see HAYASHI Fusao, Positive View on the Greater East Asian War, Bancho Shobo, 1970.
(3) The General Staff Office, the 20th Squad, the 15th Division, the Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide of the War, the Records on the Imperial Councils, (July 2, 1941)
(4) The General Staff Office, the 20th Squad, the 15th Division, the Basic Outline of Imperial Policy, the Records on the Imperial Councils, (September 6, 1941)
(5) SHIGEMITSU Mamoru, Strife-torn Showa (Last Volume),
Chuokoronsha, 1952, p.179.


(7) As for the drafting process of the Greater East Asian Declaration, see HATANO Sumio, the Pacific War and Asian Diplomacy, University of Tokyo Press, 1996, pp.161-173.

(8) Ibid., p.185.

(9) Ibid., p.185.

(10) NAGAI Yonosuke, the Origin of the Cold War, Chuokoronsha, 1978, pp.145.


(13) Togo, op.cit., p.314.

(14) Ibid., p.314.

(15) Ibid., p.315.

(16) The General Staff Office, the 20th Squad, the 15th Division, the Basic Outline of Imperial Policy Depending on the Tide of the War, op.cit.

(17) HATA Hikosaburo, the Vice Chief of the General Staff Office, answered Togo’s question at the Imperial Headquarters Liaison Conference on March 7, 1942, “Only when the tide of the Russo-German War changes, our policy should be changed. The intervention by the Empire should not be done under the current circumstances.” The General Staff Office, the Notes by Sugiyama (Last Volume), Harashobo, 1967, p.53.

(18) Togo, op.cit., p.300.

(19) Edited by the Institute of 100 Years’ History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 100 Years of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Harashobo, 1969, p.642.
(20) The General Staff Office, the 20th Squad, the 15th Division, *the Presentation by the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Council, the Outline on the Current War Leadership, the Records on the Imperial Councils*, (September 30, 1943)

(21) Ibid.

(22) Edited by Kajima Institute of International Peace, op.cit., p.54.

(23) Shigemitsu sent a telegram to SATO Naotake, ambassador to the Soviet Union, saying “Communists led by the party are currently rampant in China. I regret to say the Empire of Japan cannot avoid conniving it. However, this situation can be utilized for compromise at the same time.” (edited by the Institute of 100 Years’ History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., pp.655-656.)

(24) A telegram to SATO Naotake, ambassador to the Soviet Union, from the Foreign Minister of Japan, Shigemitsu, on November 24, 1944, (edited by Kajima Institute of International Peace, op.cit., p.70.)

The General Staff Office mainly insisted that they could attract Moscow on the grounds that the fall of Japan’s national power would be against the future interests of the Soviet Union in terms of power politics between the Anglo-American countries and the Soviets, encouraging both Shigemitsu and Sato to make more effective efforts diplomatically. It seems that what Shigemitsu stated in this telegram reflected the above-mentioned idea of the General Staff Office. (edited by the Institute of 100 Years’ History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.647.)

(25) A telegram to SATO Naotake, ambassador to the Soviet Union, from the Foreign Minister of Japan, Shigemitsu, on November 13, 1944, (edited by the Institute of 100 Years’ History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.653.)


(27) Ibid., pp.191.
(28) Ibid., pp.191.

(29) As for this, according to the secret diary dated April 8, 1945, “our policy toward the Soviet Union was thwarted here again.” (edited by the Military History Society of Japan, the *Army of Imperial Headquarters War Leadership Division, the Secret Diary of the War last volume*, Kinseisha, 1998, p.699.)

(30) The Supreme War Leadership Council, the *Records of the Supreme War Leadership Councils*, August, 1944 to June, 1945.


(33) “Most of the advocates insisting on the complete destruction of the Anglo-American powers are converts from the left. Little can we know what they have in mind,” said Konoe, expressing deep concerns about cooperative relations with the communist country and calling for the returning to a pro-American line. (edited by Kyodo News Service, *Konoe Diary*, Kyodo News Service, 1968, pp.36-37.)

IRIE Akira argues that Konoe had wishful thinking about the basic policy of the U.S. on the Imperial Household by looking at his advice to the Emperor, “Public opinion in America and Britain has never called for the change of the national polity. There are some hard-liners on this matter in both countries, of course, and no one can tell what will happen in the future. However, there is no need to worry about upholding the national polity.” “The main objective of the U.S., the U.K., and Chongqing is the total destruction of the Japanese Army.” (IRIE Akira, *Japan-the U.S. War*, Chuokoronsha, 1978, pp.271-272.)

(34) Ibid., pp.271-272.

Irie argues that Konoe’s advice to the Empire has great
implications in that he advocated the return to the Japan-the U.S. relations in the 1920s as well as the abandonment of the pro-Soviet and anti-American line of the Japanese government.

(35) Edited by the Institute of 100 Years’ History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, op.cit., p.672.