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From a State to a City-Centered Perspective on
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Cultural Policies in Europe. From a State to a City-Centered Perspective on Cultural Generativity¹

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Abstract

Cultural policy in Europe is deeply rooted in the Welfare State doctrine that has been prevailing during the last half century. Its implementation has gone along with the invention and rise of educational policy, social policy and health policy. This paper sketches its evolution as a four phase move towards what has been emerging as the central dual content of the current public cultural policy: preserving and promoting heritage, and bringing the creative industries at the core of the so-called knowledge society. The general evolutionary trend shows four distinct phases: 1) the creation of a systematic cultural supply policy based on a limited definition of culture suitable for public financing and based on a vertical concept of democratization by conversion; 2) the gradual decentralization of public action, which leads to an increasing disparity in its aims and functions, and which challenges the initial universalist, top-down egalitarian model; 3) a revision of the legitimate scope of public action, which declares symbolically obsolete the founding hierarchy of cultural politics, that which would oppose high culture, protected from market forces and entertainment culture and governed by the laws of the industrial economy; 4) an increasing tendency to justify cultural policy on the basis of its contribution to economic growth and to the balance of national social diversity, which legitimises the regulatory power of public action as well encouraging the expansion of the creative industries and the demands for the evaluation of procedures and results. The last section of this paper moves away from the state centered perspective and focuses on the city as the incubator of cultural generativity, in order to suggest how a city-centered approach to cultural development challenges the state-centered doctrine of cultural policy.

Key Words: *policy; culture; creativity; welfarism; global city; sociology; urban economics.*

Cultural policy has undergone major changes over the last half century. What I aim to do is first to review the evolution of the European model of cultural policy. Yet before investigating evolution, one should ask: does such a model exist? My claim is that such a model does exist, even if we should not overlook significant differences between the various European countries. My suggestion is that these differences have been far greater before the communist system in Eastern Europe collapsed, and before dictatorships in Spain and Portugal were overthrown

in the seventies.

I shall take as a fundamental premise of my argumentation that the European model of cultural policy is deeply rooted in the Welfare State doctrine that has been prevailing during the last half century. In fact, cultural policy may be regarded as one of the pillars of this doctrine and its implementation, together with educational policy, social policy and health policy.

I'll sketch its evolution as a four phase move towards what has been emerging as the central dual

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content of the current public cultural policy: preserving and promoting heritage on one hand, and bringing the creative industries at the core of the so-called knowledge society, on the other hand.

The general evolutionary trend which I will expound upon shows four distinct phases³:

1) the creation of a systematic cultural supply policy based on a limited definition of culture suitable for public financing and based on a vertical concept of democratization by conversion.

2) the gradual decentralization of public action, which leads to an increasing disparity in its aims and functions, and which challenges the initial universalist, top-down egalitarian model;

3) a revision of the legitimate scope of public action, which declares symbolically obsolete the founding hierarchy of cultural politics, that which would oppose high culture, protected from market forces and entertainment culture and governed by the laws of the industrial economy;

4) an increasing tendency to justify cultural policy on the basis of its contribution to economic growth and to the balance of national social diversity, which legitimises the regulatory power of public action as well encouraging the expansion of the “creative industries” and the demands for the evaluation of procedures and results.

Having investigated the European cultural policy state model and its evolution, I’ll move away from the state centered perspective and focus, in the last part of my talk, on the city as the incubator of cultural generativity, in order to suggest how a city-centered approach to cultural development challenges the state-centered doctrine of cultural policy.

1. The Initial Model: Excellence in the Arts – the Virtues of Democratization

When culture entered the welfare states’ agenda in the 1950s, a simple doctrine quickly formed the basis of public action. It consisted of two objectives: pro-

³ In viewing the phases of public cultural action as a series of phases in the various European countries, a meticulous historical and comparative approach is required to avoid lapsing into caricature. Yet it would go well beyond the bounds of this study. I can only refer to the details of the documentation and works which I have consulted for this talk. See Greffe, Pflieger (2009), McGuigan (2004), Poirier, (2000), Rigaud (2001), Ross (2009), Saint-Pulgent (2009), Schnapper (2002), Throsby (2001), Urfalino (2004), *The Economy of Culture in Europe* (2006), *Compendium. Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe* (2009). I may also refer to the final chapter of my book *Le Travail créateur*, Paris, Seuil/Gallimard, 2009.

tecting and developing cultural activity, and providing citizens with equal access to it. Definition of culture was homogenous, associated with high culture, with its hierarchies and classifications and its selective renewal and settling principles. Culture symbolized a national identity while also claiming to embody universal values.

The arena of public cultural action was defined in opposition to the arena of cultural industries and the entertainment culture, dominated by market forces. However, a history of the arts might also show that the market had moved artistic innovation away from the academic arena and its state protection and into the visual arts. Literature and cinema are mainly market-based: innovation finds its ways and its niche within that market framework.

Fundamental public action was overall more certain of its values than its procedures. Neither Keynes, the founder and first Chairman of the Arts Council of England, nor French Minister Malraux doubted that the guiding principles of public action should be excellence and the widest possible democratic participation in frequenting works of the greatest artistic ingenuity. The situation was the same in the German Länder and Northern European democracies when, thanks to economic growth, cultural politics began to figure as a priority for welfare states.

The expected effects of a supply policy

How did the policy of supply affect demand behaviour? In Northern Europe, there was no doubt about the aim: the social stratification of tastes and preferences, which creates huge class divisions, could be limited. This is the ‘escalator’ model of slow ascent: the various social groups stand on higher or lower steps, depending on their budgetary and educational means, but when growth is strong and its fruits efficiently distributed, the stairway elevates everyone. Once basic needs are covered (food, housing, transport, health) a disproportionately higher amount of expenditure is then directed towards higher requirements such as leisure and culture, spatial mobility, personal care, domestic services, etc. The machinery of the welfare state promotes culture as a fundamental right and an essential part of personal and collective growth, ranking it alongside other rights such as education, health and social security.

France and Great Britain’s philosophy relied more on the ripple effect of territorial dissemination on demand.

How effective has public cultural action been ?

What do we know about how effective public

cultural action has been in lowering cultural consumption inequalities?

Drawing on existing European research literature on public cultural policies and available data, it is possible to summarize the issue of efficiency in three points:

- there are winning sectors, which attest to the success of public action: when looking at cultural outings, heritage-related activities rank highest. The culture-consuming public is now greater, and comes from more socially and geographically diverse backgrounds. Without heritage, there would be no cultural tourism, something which has considerable economic importance. This seems particularly to be the case for Southern European countries, whose cultural heritage is considerable;

- there are trends within practices, with some starting off positively then recently falling off: for instance, reading practices and literacy levels have long distinguished the Northern European countries, where adult education and the network of public libraries have historically been the key to local and central cultural policy. The recent change in reading practice (is a result of the growing competition from the growing range of digital technologies;

- finally, there are sectors in which supply has far outstripped demand: this is the case for theatre and other such live performing arts. These sectors embody one of the historical origins of public cultural policy throughout Europe, and remain central to them. However, these sectors have continued to remain restricted, both in terms of the size and social diversity of their public. The realm of classical concerts and opera remains particularly symbolic of the voluntarism which is always necessary, always reasserted and always disappointed. To some extent this typifies all public action-related dilemmas.

2. Decentralization and Decentering

Everywhere in Europe, the supply-centred policy I have described increasingly involved local authorities: in Northern Europe and in federally governed countries earlier than in Southern Europe.

My point is the following: by taking into account issues of territorial balance and spatial equity, the primary definition of public cultural policy action, as rooted in a hierarchical and universalistic set of tenets, have gradually been undermined. The involvement of local players fairly quickly prompted the

question of the definition of culture to be supported.

The welfare state and its central cultural administration aimed at persuading and helping local authorities to provide their populations with a coherent range of cultural facilities and amenities such as libraries, museums, live performing arts venues, art and music schools, theatre companies, symphony orchestras, opera houses, etc. Yet as this process unfolded, local authorities increasingly broadened the definition of culture they were willing to supply, leading it towards a more anthropological definition of cultural identity and diversity, and increasingly linking cultural policy to education, urban and social policy.

In the face of the hierarchical classification of arts legitimately deserving of public support and the glacial pace of changing individual cultural tastes and raising attendance for high culture events and institutions, radical proponents of a cultural policy counter-model proposed instead a re-evaluation of popular culture.

See the Danish case. Denmark created a Ministry of Culture in 1961. Here, support for the arts, in the limited definition of culture, was at once grounds for opposing the populism of those parties hostile to public support. Towards the late 1960s, a public report recommended adopting a pluralist view of culture, working in harmony with local authority involvement. In reality, pluralism was closer to a default egalitarianism rule than anything else, since funding structures are far less flexible than model shifts would suggest, due the sunk costs and path-dependency of public support schemes.

The British 'arm's length' model is a completely different way of organising public action, but with just the same conflicting objectives.

The lesson to be drawn from that period is the following. As public cultural action expands, it feeds its differentiation and contestability: the question quickly arises as to whether there can only be one single, immutable definition of culture governing cultural action in the regions or whether, at grass roots level, the 'top down' public action model ought not to be changed for a 'bottom up' policy.

3. Open borders: Cultural Policy, the Free Market, the Economy and the End of Monopolies

In the mid-70s, the first oil crisis led to an economic downturn which restricted the welfare state model to low levels of economic growth. Culture, seen as a civilising force, could no longer remain

anti-utilitarian and outside the boundaries of market forces. This is both the result of an exogenous shock and the consequence of the policy's internal differentiation and territorial expansion.

Externally, the development of the cultural welfare state in Northern Europe was abruptly curtailed, owing to the sharp increase in welfare payments during a time of rising unemployment.

Internally, social and welfare democracy had created an opening for the deconstruction of hierarchies within the arts. The cultural industries had undergone a formidable development since the 1960's, around the time when the first large-scale systematic programmes of public finance for culture were implemented. These industries had given rise to numerous musical innovations (the birth of pop and rock music) since the end of the 1950s, and these effervescent adolescent sub-cultures were epitomized by values of cultural, critical, hedonistic and anti-establishment liberalism, in stark contrast to what was denounced as high brow culture, transmitted in a quasi-hereditary manner. How could it be that consumption of culture was so strong in the commercial sector and yet so clearly socially unbalanced in the subsidized sector? As popular culture began to be reassessed, rigid hierarchization of the cultural sphere seemed no longer legitimate..

The utility of culture and of public action took on a new form. The economic and industrial valuation of cultural production, the impact on local development and urban regeneration, the development of corporate sponsorship and the diversification of resources were the guiding tenets that Thatcher's government imposed on the Keynesian philosophy of the Arts Council in the UK.

In France, the coming together of cultural policy and economic rationality took on an opposite profile. The aim of growing interventions to support traditional arts and heritage was maintained, to the extent that there was increasingly centralized expenditure by the Ministry of Culture on Paris and its surrounding area, with unprecedented support of large scale architectural and heritage works. At the same time, the Ministry of Culture's scope grew beyond and in an opposite direction to its original domain, into the production of the cultural industries and the deployment of artistic forms into markets of mass consumption which would maintain their success and pace of innovation. Public action, accused of failing to become more democratic, understood that its context was changing.

Note however that nowhere has public action been prone to massive redirections of spending towards the domains of organised cultural production in ac-

cordance with free-market competition. It is symbolic, but also and above all regulatory. The example which is valid across the whole of Europe is the political and economic fate of the audiovisual industry. The monopoly of public control over television came to an end in the different countries at various dates between the mid-1970s to the end of the 1990s. Public action has indeed shown itself to be effective when it developed a regulatory mechanism of contracting and control by independent authorities, which set a framework for the expansion of the audiovisual industry through maintaining or promoting political, religious, cultural and linguistic diversity. Public action also induced the television industry to finance the film industry, whose production and heritage it could exploit, by setting quotas to protect national production in a market dominated by the American industry.

Regulatory action is one in a set of three principles building the new rationale for cultural policies.

The second one was call for the social and economic benefits of culture, which have been visible since the 1970s in the behaviour of large as well as small cities.

Thirdly, it was essentially in the 1980s that the first means of assessing cultural policy were devised. Evaluating and measuring the effects of cultural policy is too big a subject for me to explore here. I will merely state that the efforts to do so have taken differing approaches: analysis of the economic impact of culture and the support to its provision, study of the spillovers of local spending, the application of tools for public policy evaluation and expenditure rationalisation to culture, and the international evaluation of national public policies.

4. Cultural Policy, Industrial Policy and the Knowledge Society: from the Cultural Industries to the Creative Industries

At this point, let me restate a key argument which can be seen as the leading thread of my presentation.

As the social and economic justification for public cultural action has been through a series of adjustments, the very definition of culture itself has changed. We are familiar with the distinction between a narrow definition of culture, based initially on the high arts, then incorporating all of the high arts and their popular forms (in music, literature, dance, etc.), and an anthropological, relativistic definition. On the other hand, bringing the cultural industries into the sphere of public policy moves it in

another direction entirely, leading to a more far-reaching political revision.

The situation evolved rapidly when the flag was flown for the creative industries. Cultural policies in most European countries have adopted this requalification of one part or even, as in the United Kingdom, the entirety of their field of intervention. The movement started in Australia which promoted the idea of a 'creative nation' in the early 1990s. This revamped cultural policy had two main objectives:

- 1) to work towards the complete recognition of multiculturalism, and
- 2) to promote the creative industries, whilst moving towards the information and communication technologies sector's industrial policy.

In Europe, this doctrine was revised and implemented by Tony Blair's government from 1997 onwards. The policy implemented in the UK distinguishes between two areas of intervention, namely heritage and the creative industries. The latter include architecture, music, live performance, publishing, the art and antiques market, music, arts and crafts professions, television and radio, film and video, advertising, design, fashion, video games, software and IT services.

The argument is simple: culture as covered by policy materialises as goods, services, performances and practices. Under this definition, culture is an end product and its consumption should be as geographically and socially equitable as possible, in order that individual satisfactions coincide with social benefits.

In redefining it to place greater emphasis on creativity, culture, in the sense used here, becomes a sector in which qualities which are also a resource for the economy as a whole are sought and implemented. For this reason, activities which can be defined as both utilitarian and functional forms of production are associated with the arts: advertising, fashion, industrial and software design being good cases in point.

And creativity should be seen as a generic part of the inventiveness common to all economic activities which constantly require knowledge, its unceasing renewal and a technical approach to the production process to ensure innovation.

Cultural policy thus becomes an "industrial" policy. This new sectoral identity of public action has been adopted in Denmark and in Sweden (the strategy was entitled *Culture and experience economy*, 2003) in the Netherlands (*Our creative potential*, 2005), the German Länder, in Lithuania and in Pol-

and.

I'll underline the main shifts this reshuffling of cultural policy is the product of.

- 1) Equating culture with creativity occurs in societies growth model is based on technological innovation and on raising the country's knowledge capital.
- 2) The public management of culture and the arts should no longer be an evidence-free zone shielded from measurement of its contribution to economic and social development.

What can be found in this statistical mapping which might provide the economic value of the cultural sector resides in its contribution to GDP, in added value, in growth rates, in the proportion of jobs directly or indirectly related to the sector and in the quality of these jobs, in the characteristics of businesses and micro-businesses and in their competitiveness (productivity and profitability) and in the volume and structure of cultural consumption expenditure in household budgets. However, the argument that culture is also an intermediate good also leads to the attempt to pinpoint all of culture's indirect contributions to the economic growth and social cohesion of countries, territories and towns.

One simple measure of this indirect contribution is that cited by local authorities since the 1970s: the leveraging effect of available cultural goods and services on the development of local tourism and on urban regeneration. Valuing the exact knock-on effect of tourism has long been the subject of controversy, when the exact returns on cultural investments were being examined and compared with alternative investments.

It is also significant that one of the main outcomes of action supportive of the so-called creative industries was the proliferation of urban regeneration schemes and the redevelopment of industrial sites within major urban areas. Examples abound: Helsinki, Amsterdam, Manchester, Lille, Marseille, Lodz, Barcelona, Dublin, London and Milan to name but a few. Similarly, for medium-sized cities the emergence of 'creative clusters' has provided a possible response to the competing draw of large urban areas for artists and cultural enterprises.

Another indirect contribution lies in the fact that the cultural industries are industries of content. Their work has sustained the development of information and communication technologies. the supply of musical, audiovisual and information content constituted the best loss-leading product strategy to speed up the household adoption of technological

goods and to quickly change consumption patterns.

The most elusive indirect contribution is that of “cultural vibrancy” as celebrated by the British cultural policy. Vibrancy means a power of attraction over multiple sectors of the economy and at various social levels. The thinking behind this is not new. What is new is the attempt to calibrate it, and comes from economic thinking on endogenous growth and on self-sustainment through creative and innovative impulses. Creative indices are offered to public and private bodies to encourage the emergence of a new social ecology. Academic works offer to enrich nations’ accounting tools by constructing a gauge of the cultural value of all social and economic realities, and to contribute to the definition of sustainable development policies.

3) The third evolution concerns employment in the cultural sector.

One of the arguments of the creative industries’ policy is the consecration of key values associated with creativity: a flexible and compliant personal approach, an appetite for risk, the ability to cope with the unexpected, lateral and intuitive thinking, the championing of diversity within teams. What do the jobs and employment markets which promote such qualities look like? Numerous studies have been done, and all of them highlight the disparity between the vigorous growth of this employment sector, which is far higher than that of the service industry, and the individual situation of those in the job market. Educational qualifications are above average but there are huge inequalities in earnings, as shown by the Paretian profile of their distribution (four fifths of earnings and amounts of work are enjoyed by less than one fifth of professionals), and individuals, however qualified, more frequently than elsewhere cycle between short-term employment, unemployment and side jobs.

Ironically enough, cultural policies have had a spectacularly successful effect on cultural availability and encouraged the rapid growth of professionals working in the cultural sector, but essentially have been able to offer stable employment only to administrative and technical employees of artistic organisations and bureaucratic central and local cultural institutions and those various professions built around the artistic supply side (those involved in teaching, organisation, intervention, conservation, dissemination of art and culture).

5. Creative Undertakings in their Urban

Context: Growth, Inequality and Globalization

Cultural policy models, however different they may be, always deal with the question of hegemony of one or a few leading cultural centers at the national level.

One actual dilemma is the balance between the ideal of cultural democratization, which advocates a more egalitarian distribution of high culture, both at the societal and at the spatial level, and the efficiency rule, which tends to favor - with higher rates of public cultural investment - the cities that bring prestige to the country and give it a top rank in international cultural life.

At a nation level, a usual social welfare function implies that inequality in income and in various kinds of resources should be reduced. In essence, this implies a more egalitarian distribution of human capital. Human capital development (mainly through a rise in average educational level) translates into rising cultural consumption and rising demand for cultural amenities, leveraging therefore increasing supply of culture.

However, things go different at a local level. Spatial inequality, with a few urban metropolitan areas and cities dominating the economic and demographic scene, has proven itself as a means to drive the connection between human capital and growth. In a nutshell, the ‘agglomeration economy’ or ‘demand for urban density’ argument claims that returns to skills (productivity) and to creative undertakings (innovativeness) correlate highly with the size of the city workers and consumers live in.

Why this is so has been investigated extensively for about three decades, especially by economists and economic geographers like Edward Glaeser in his numerous publications issued since the 1990’s⁴.

Large cities serve as forges of human capital and incubators of innovation, due to human capital spillovers: individual productivity appears to depend on the density of smart and well educated people, due to higher inventiveness generated by higher and faster exchanges of ideas, and due to the concentration of workers in those industries requiring high levels of human capital and high demand for innovation. Accordingly, dominant cities specialize in business services - law, finance, accounting and consulting - but also in creative industries’ production of goods and services (arts, entertainment, media, fashion, design, advertising). Occupational breakdown of workforce composition according to the size of the

⁴ See in particular Glaeser, Kolko, Saiz (2001).

Table1. Selected occupational group specialization by metro size class, 2000 (quoted from Markusen and Schrock, 2006, p. 1308)

Occupational group	All MSAs	Metropolitan total employment range (000s)				
		>3500	1000–3500	500–1000	250–500	<250
Computer and mathematical	1.17	1.05	1.56	1.06	0.84	0.75
Legal	1.15	1.47	1.26	1.06	1.02	0.84
Business and financial operations	1.12	1.26	1.23	1.10	0.98	0.85
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, media	1.09	1.87	1.05	0.97	0.95	0.83
Architecture and engineering	1.09	0.79	1.36	0.96	0.98	0.96
Life, physical and social science	1.05	0.96	1.26	0.95	0.89	0.92
Office and administrative support	1.04	1.14	1.04	1.06	1.01	0.95
Management	1.04	1.09	1.11	0.97	0.97	0.95
Protective service	1.02	1.30	0.97	1.06	0.93	0.91
Healthcare practitioners and technical	1.01	0.98	0.95	0.99	1.11	1.10
Personal care and service	1.00	1.13	0.99	0.98	0.97	1.00
Community and social services	0.98	1.20	0.87	0.94	1.05	1.06

Notes: Occupations shown exhibit relatively high rates of skewness across US metros. Specialisation index of 1 indicates equal share of occupation in size class as in overall economy.

Source: Authors' calculations based on data from US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statistics, 2000.

Table2. Occupational specialisations, by group, US world cities and all metros, 2000 (quoted from Markusen and Schrock, 2006, p. 1309)

Occupational group	Los Angeles	New York	Chicago	World Cities
Arts, design, entertainment, sports, media	2.20	2.37	1.04	1.87
Legal	1.26	2.03	1.11	1.47
Protective service	1.29	1.72	0.88	1.30
Business and financial operations	1.08	1.40	1.30	1.26
Community and social services	1.09	1.57	0.94	1.20
Office and administrative support	1.15	1.20	1.07	1.14
Personal care and service	0.82	1.64	0.94	1.13
Management	1.00	0.99	1.26	1.09
Computer and mathematical	0.91	1.08	1.14	1.05
Education, training and library	0.94	1.27	0.84	1.01
Healthcare support	0.80	1.49	0.70	1.00
Healthcare Practitioners	0.97	1.01	0.96	0.98
Craft and assembly production	1.19	0.53	1.15	0.95
Transportation and material moving	1.16	0.60	1.08	0.95

Source: see Table 1

metropolitan area and to the dominance of world cities, as shown in Tables 1 and 2 taken from Markusen and Schrock's 2006 paper provides a glimpse of this urban specialization and generativity process.

The increasing trend towards spatial concentration of cultural workers within major urban areas or urban districts is well documented as well the agglomeration economy pattern that fits especially well with the production and work process in the arts, with its entrepreneurial base of micro-businesses, flexible and interdependent resource-sharing networks and with its working population whose

structural surplus makes it possible to organise a system which work on a project-by-project basis.

Less easy to measure are the returns to density on the cultural demand side. Cultural consumption correlates with income and educational level. Once controlling for those factors, there seems to be a net cultural amenities supply effect.

Taken together, the several factors of an agglomeration-driven cultural growth lead to a conclusion that hurts the basic philosophy of a nation-level defined cultural policy. Major centers concentrate the best jobs, high levels of innovation and high-stants

Table3. The 20 most connected cities in the WCN in 2000 and 2008 (quoted from Derudder *et al.*, 2010, p. 1868)

2000			2008		
1	London	100.00	1	New York	100.00
2	New York	97.10	2	London	99.32
3	Hong Kong	73.08	3	Hong Kong	83.41
4	Tokyo	70.64	4	Paris	79.68
5	Paris	69.72	5	Singapore	76.15
6	Singapore	66.61	6	Tokyo	73.62
7	Chicago	61.18	7	Sydney	70.93
8	Milan	60.44	8	Shanghai	69.06
9	Madrid	59.23	9	Milan	69.05
10	Los Angeles	58.75	10	Beijing	67.65
11	Sydney	58.06	11	Madrid	65.95
12	Frankfurt	57.53	12	Moscow	64.85
13	Amsterdam	57.10	13	Brussels	63.63
14	Toronto	56.92	14	Seoul	62.74
15	Brussels	56.51	15	Toronto	62.38
16	São Paulo	54.26	16	Buenos Aires	60.62
17	San Francisco	50.43	17	Mumbai	59.48
18	Zurich	48.42	18	Kuala Lumpur	58.44
19	Taipei	48.22	19	Chicago	57.57
20	Jakarta	47.92	20	Taipei	56.07
22	Buenos Aires	46.81	21	São Paulo	55.96
23	Mumbai	46.81	22	Zurich	55.51
27	Shanghai	43.95	25	Amsterdam	54.60
28	Kuala Lumpur	43.53	28	Jakarta	53.29
29	Beijing	43.43	31	Frankfurt	51.58
30	Seoul	42.32	40	Los Angeles	45.18
37	Moscow	40.76	46	San Francisco	41.35

consumption, but do also generate spatial and social class polarization, with large numbers of migrants attracted and housing prices distribution even more skewed than wage distribution of the population of residents. Moreover, major centers are likely to be more densely connected to each other across the world, and to build a tight network of world cities, as shown in numerous recent studies⁵ (Alderson and Beckfield, 2004; Derudder, Taylor *et al.*, 2010). Table 3 above, quoted from Derudder *et al.*'s paper, lists the 20 most connected cities in the World city network defined by Derudder, Taylor and their research team. That network structure is a most distinctive way to secure and improve urban economic and social dominance in the era of globalization.

⁵ See in particular Alderson, Beckfield (2004) ; Derudder, Taylor, Ni, De Vos, Hanssens, Bassens, Huang, Witlox, Shen, Yang (2010).

Conclusion

What has notably emerged from my investigation is that local, regional and national cultural policy schemes are likely to increasingly differ with respect to how they set their respective priorities. A state-centered policy has mainly an egalitarian concern. Yet inequality may boost creativity and cultural generativity up to the point where it generates increasing social costs. A major city's artistic prestige and cultural development may benefit the whole country's prestige, yet at the expense of cities competing with it to develop. Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism may be key ingredients of a diversity-driven creativity, yet at the price of potentially increasing social segregation and polarization.

These are major dilemmas cultural policies have to address when it comes to the net contribution that creative undertakings and, in a less trendy phrasing, human capital accumulation provide to enhance economic growth and social welfare, as well as to

ensure dominance in the globalization process. In a sense, the emphasis on creativity and creative industries has gained ground in the public cultural discourse and agenda as a way to narrow the gap between the top-down approach of the state-centered, rather egalitarian cultural policy doctrine, and the bottom-up approach of spatial agglomeration-driven generation and exchange of ideas and increasing returns to skills in the knowledge economy.

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