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Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska

Adam Mickiewicz University, Poland

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DIALOGUE--A NEW UTOPIA?
by Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska

Dr. Krystyna Gorniak-Kocikowska is a professor of philosophy at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. She belongs to the younger generation of philosophers. She has attended a number of conferences abroad and is interested in dialogue on many levels.

One of the most important features of the contemporary world is that that world is partly self-created by the people who live in it, and yet appears alien to these same people. Is this the first occasion of this sort in human history, or have there been previous periods when people felt content—and even happy—with the world in which they lived? Not in the culture of the Western world.¹ People have always said that happiness was a feature of some distant, former Golden Age, or else that it would be realized only in the future. In reality, however, people have necessarily had to concentrate on the future since it is impossible to return to the past. In each age people constructed an ideal picture of the world, which they subsequently tried to realize in their present. However, it has never been possible to accomplish this. These dreams have remained mere utopias.

Dissatisfaction with a given situation does not seem to be peculiar to humans. According to Karl Popper: "Life looks for a better world. Each living individual thing tries to find a better world, at least in order to survive or to swim a bit easier there. This is characteristic of all life, from the amoeba up to man. It is ever our wish, our hope, and our utopia to find an ideal world" (Popper/Lorenz, 1985, p. 17). This ideal world was portrayed in the Christian religion as the Kingdom of God. People had to try to achieve it. But what the Christians were trying to reach in early Christian times, as well as in the Middle Ages, has different interpretations today. On the one hand, one sees in these people an existential need for inner perfection and for spiritual unity with God. Nikolai Berdyaev was one philosopher who understood in this way the tenacity of the people of the Middle Ages. For Czeslaw Milosz, similarly to Berdyaev, the Middle Ages was the period of true Christianity. As Jaroslaw Anders has written: "The medieval mind was rooted, according to Milosz, not only in theological doctrine but in the religious images that organized outer and inner life so as to give special significance to human
existence. Perhaps the most important of these, Milosz suggests, was the Christian image of God-as-Man, or divinity in human shape, which conveyed a message that the world of being had one inherent goal: a realization of some kind of perfect, absolute humanity" (Anders, 1986). On the other hand, the aspiration to unity with God in God's Kingdom on earth can be seen as the basis for human conquest of the earth for humankind. For example, Reinhart Maurer (1983) maintains that the whole Western civilization developed because people united their efforts in attempting to establish this Kingdom of heaven on earth. Maurer thinks that chiliasm resulted from man's being homo agens, and yet wishing to find a better world. This chiliasm transformed the human being into a goal-directed being. Moreover, because it was one goal, i.e., the Kingdom of God on earth, the people who sought it were united in a community of purpose. In accordance with this goal, an entire hierarchy of values was constructed which was subordinated to this goal. Likewise, the social order was also subordinated to the goal. According to Andrija Krešić, the belief in a kingdom of heaven, which would arise only "at the end" of history, brought the first Christian communities together. In their isolation they became concentrated on building principles of social life which would best serve their dream (Krešić, 1978, p. 32).

Belief in God and belief in the possibility of achieving their aim were the premises which led to the clergy achieving their position at the very top of the social order. The clergy, however, were seen as those who know how people must act if they wish to achieve this sacred goal. Emile Durkheim sees one of the most important social functions of religion as being that people who believe can act more effectively and become more successful in their actions than those who are nonbelievers (Durkheim, 1984, p. 558). Likewise Europeans, with their belief and their united action, worked under the leadership of clerics (who both owned the mysterium of faith and at the same time possessed the greatest knowledge of people and the world) in the hope of building a better future for humanity—a future which they realized they would never live to see.

This was the first great utopia of Western culture.

II

In contrast to Maurer, Jan Szczepanski sees other reasons for the economic, political, and cultural dominance of Europe in the world for the past 2500 years. But in reality one can reduce these to two key factors: faith or religion (also recognized by Maurer) and rationalistic thinking, i.e., science, which began in ancient Greece (Szczepanski, 1985, pp. 97-99). However, we might also consider that one of the best known and, according to Bertrand Russell (Russell, 1946, p.
129), one of the oldest utopias arose during an ancient period of rationalistic thinking. Plato's vision of a perfect society may be considered rationalistic insofar as his ideal society was to be governed by the wisest men, i.e., philosophers. As Czesław Milosz writes: "Reason guided by Eros establishes universal ideas which, by the very fact of their existence, contradict what is in the name of what should be" (Milosz, 1982, p. 185).

One can then always take as the basis of all later utopias the two human features of faith and thinking. These differ, but at the same time are both attributes of each human being. Yet they are constantly in conflict. In European history one can see different periods where one or the other was clearly dominant. Despite this conflict, they formed the ground of people's activity in attempting to build a better world.

Until the Middle Ages it seemed that human beings' main motivating force was religious faith in the kingdom of God on earth. However, the different forms of people's activity resulted in the development of science and technology. The invention of the printing press shortened the time necessary for popularization of the newest inventions and discoveries. As a result science and technology's development was even more accelerated. At the same time, Gutenberg's invention increased the possible independence of people from the clergy. As the dissemination of texts greatly widened, the clergy's control over people's thought became more and more tenuous. Up to that time the only effective form of education had been through personal contact with one's teacher, which allowed the teacher greater control over students' reactions and development. The results of research also became subjects of more open debate rather than being monopolized and controlled by the clergy. The printed texts made individual study possible. The author of a printed text had no extratextual influence upon the reception of his work, unlike a teacher, with his greater interpretive control over his students' thought. Before the invention of printing, wisdom and knowledge were effectively seen as almost a variety of mystical learning. The possessors of knowledge greatly increased with the advent of printed texts. At the same time the period necessary for the popularization of ideas of a given book became ever shorter. The "Divine Comedy" needed 400 years to become known throughout the whole of Europe, "Don Quixote" needed 20 years for the same, and "Werther" by Goethe only 5 years (see Escarpit, 1969, p. 21). People could communicate then not only on the basis of their own experiences, which could not always be compared, but also on the basis of what they had read, i.e., what they "experienced" in their minds, what was both individual and at the same time common. A new faith arose: the faith that each human being could possess
complete knowledge of the world and effectively act towards his aims. The new religions of Protestantism postulated even a clergy composed of all believers, i.e., all Protestants were obliged to study the Bible themselves rather than leave the Holy Word to the clergy alone.  

For the first time in the history of the New Age in European culture the kingdom of God on earth was seen as possibly realizable in the near future. There arose the hope that people are able to build this kingdom hic et nunc, and that each person, using his/her own mental apparatus, could perceive the path to the goal and achieve this goal. In the eighteenth century, for the first time in the New Age, Western culture not only called into doubt the omnipotence of God, but also the deity's very existence. The common goal was to be realized through the individual creativity and intelligence of people themselves. Faith in the omnipotence of people's reason was the "spiritus movens" of humankind. As previously, people wanted to build a happy future. And as before, they believed in the possibility of realizing this dreamed world. The road and the means to the goal had changed. Now not only faith in God, but faith in each human being would bring human happiness. This was the second great Western utopia.

III

The idea that all people by using their own reason have the same possibilities of learning the truth, knowing about the world, and effectively acting, gave birth to another idea, or, rather, caused people to remember a long forgotten idea, i.e., that people should have the same rights. Long sought happiness in the future should be accessible in the same degree to all, as should also be the new desire of realizing happiness in the present. People should not only have the same rights in their striving for a better world, but also in their access to what already exists.

From this idea arose a new utopia: the socialistic utopia. This utopia also featured faith in a better future for humankind. This was often understood as the fulfillment of the Christian belief in Christ's Second Coming. In socialistic ideology "priests" or, rather, the men of wisdom, again gained the leadership position in society. There was the faith that people through their own activity would build their own future, a new world better than the present one. Those people who possessed the "power of transcendence" (Krešić, 1978, p. 33) should show others how this dreamed goal could be realized. "Because of this work of transcending 'this world,' it is quite logical for the Marxist Ernst Bloch to point out in his non-conformist philosophy of hope and 'dialectical-concrete utopia' the possibility of reading the Bible 'with the eyes of the Communist Manifesto,' and the possibility that Christianity should again form an alliance with
the revolution (after the alliance of the period of peasant wars)" (Krešić, 1978, pp. 33f.).

The gigantic mental work of Karl Marx opposed such an understanding of socialism. Marx was as optimistic and had as much faith in individual human reason as did the philosophers of the Enlightenment. But contrary to many other socialist ideologists, Marx wanted to build social egalitarianism on scientific and rationalist grounds. In his opinion, the working class would build their emancipation through their own work, struggle, and wisdom. "Workers of the World Unite!" rather than "Workers of the World, Follow Me!" This statement, however, made it possible to see Marx also as a utopian, a man who saw the working class as a Messiah, like Czeslaw Milosz did (Milosz, 1982, p. 191).

But on the other hand, Marx stated that philosophy is the head of the revolution, while the proletariat is its heart. If we connect this with the statement that the most important division of labor is the division between mental and physical work (Marx, Engels, 1979, I, p. 222), it is clear that the essential situation up to Marx's time had not changed at all. A nonantagonistic society would remain a utopia as long as this division of work endured. Socialistic ideology would retain the division between those people who know and those who trust these knowledgable ones and who would follow the former—which might easily become reducible to mere obedience to them. As in Plato's utopia, we have at the top of society the "philosophers," who might easily be understood as "people of wisdom," the possessors of the secret of how to lead people to the Promised Land. The conviction that only scientists can truly know and describe reality was created, and that only afterwards could "ordinary" people be enlightened and taught this goal. It was accepted that the proletariat are not able to perform independent mental work. "It can be read in each sociology textbook that authority is necessary for the existence and concentration of groups and that no group can be stable without it" (Szczepanski, 1984, p. 104). In today's world we can see many examples of people looking for a leader, or a prophet, who they are willing to follow and whose authority they willingly accept. (In Poland, for example, this tendency was manifested as the "cult of experts" of the early 1980s.)

What are the bases for this desire for a leader? Is it, as Nietzsche wrote, characteristic of people dominated by the herd instinct, an instinct reinforced by the Christian tradition, in which obedience is regarded as one of the most important virtues? Or should we agree with the bitter remark of Karl Jaspers that people don't want to think? Or with Sartre that people wish to flee their responsibilities? John Naisbitt claims that the revival of religious practice in
contemporary America arises because people "need something to hang on to [my emphasis], not something to debate" (Naisbitt, 1984, p. 240). Whatever it be, faith in the readiness or possibility of people's independent use of their reason should be seen as too optimistic.

IV

The end of the nineteenth century was marked by despair in the omnipotence of human wisdom. This despair is seen today as a strong antirationalist stream in the social sciences, as well as in everyday life, and even in the natural sciences. This tendency is the result, on the one hand, of disappointment with the natural sciences and technology, which did not fulfill the promises of their enthusiasts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, not only failing to increase human happiness, but increasing the threat of total destruction. On the other hand, it is also an expression of the helplessness of the majority of people, even the educated, in the face of ever burgeoning knowledge which they can neither possess in its totality nor truly understand. "True" knowledge, the highest achievement of the sciences, is accessible only to elites. Individual talents and abilities are not as important today as fifty years ago. Again there arises the division of people into those who "really know" and those who trust and believe the former. It seems there is no possibility of effective social control of the development and application of the sciences. Many people feel cheated by modern science. Even if the crisis of Western culture is a result of the creation of a consumer society in which people are given their individuality, their will, and their happiness, this problem remains intact. The consumer society is a result of the development of technology, based on rationalist philosophy and on the natural sciences. In this case as well, rationalism may be regarded as "guilty" of leading humanity down a blind alley.

The world of technology in which we now live was created by people themselves. The human being is the creator of this world, even though he/she no longer understands it. He/she also no longer comprehends nature, i.e., the world apart from people. This is the fundamental problem of contemporary humanity. In their search for a happy world people have fallen into a trap. Their self-created world is for most of them as dangerous and unknown as their former world, and "ordinary" people are as helpless and as baffled as before. The difference is that these "ordinary" people have an additional feeling of menace. Their insecurity is reinforced because of the perception of the possibility of total destruction. This destruction threatens humankind first of all from the devices of people themselves, rather than from "blind" nature's forces. But despite the human source of this danger, people cannot escape their feeling of helplessness. This
feeling of being threatened gives birth to different reactions: from a position of acceptance, through various kinds and shades of resignation, to eventual hope and an active fight against this threat, even if it manifests itself in the search for a leader who will know how to end the threat. All these attitudes are more or less utopian. Their utopian character is manifested in the fact that people's perceptions of the world haven't essentially changed: now as before, the subject-object distinction remains, whereby the object is reduced to the status of a poor tool to be utilized in human actions. Even action, as previously understood in this text, can no longer be talked about: "The possibility of producing something, which is contained in technology, has developed—not least as a result of its success—into a crucial form of action: even in human relationships, production replaces action" (Kampits, 1981, pp. 329f.). Since the sciences treat human beings more and more as physical beings and have shown that human beings don't have any special position in the universe, they have rendered people as mere objects, with all the consequences which result from this.

Functionally speaking, mankind is not that different from a virus or a bacteria. He is a speck in the vast universe. Such a view corresponds to the kind of mass killing we've seen in this century. To kill a million or two million, or ten, what does it matter? Hitler, after all, was brought up on the vulgarized brochures of nineteenth-century science. This is something completely different from a vision of the world before Copernicus, where man was of central importance. Probably the transformation I sense will restore in some way the anthropocentric vision of the universe (Milosz, 1986).

The question is: is it really possible to change this situation?

The latter's critique cannot stop the development of technology and science. Experiments in "returning to nature," understood as resignation from all that technology has given people, are the purest form of utopianism. Today no escape from the world is possible. (After all, how can one draw a line between what is acceptable and what is not acceptable from technology?) Those who wish to turn their backs on the present world will feel the negative effects of technological civilization just as much as will others, and total destruction threatens them just as it does all people.

We need a new mode of thinking: thinking not in categories of subject-object, but in terms of subject-subject. But this new thinking needs a new world-picture or, better, a new stance towards the
world. To create a picture of the world means that the world is seen as an object of which I as a subject am not a part.

In his book "The Problem of Man," Martin Buber comments on Kant's statement that the question "What is man?" is the basic question of all philosophy. At the same time, Buber says this question was answered neither by Kant nor by any other philosopher. Buber himself writes:

This means that we are at the same time and in one with the finiteness of human beings obliged to know man's participation in Nonfinality, not as two separate features, but as the doubling of processes in which human existence can finally be cognized. Both Finality and Nonfinality influence him; he participates in both Finality and Nonfinality (Buber, 1971, p. 14).

People and the world share a relation of oneness. That people are regarded as something different from the world is an arbitrary act of human beings themselves. We have made ourselves different from the world. We have placed ourselves in a position different from the world, and have tried to be superior to it. The new task of people is to feel and to be conscious of the oneness of the world. "Nature must change from an object which we can manage into something opposite from us, but in which we participate. This doesn't mean a romantic return to nature in which nature is again seen as an object for aesthetic purposes. . . . Nature should again be the home of human beings, and not just the source of energy, food, and materials" (Kampits, 1981, p. 330). "Man participates in both Finality and Nonfinality." This statement of Buber at the same time indicates that the fulfillment of man's being can be seen neither from a single-sided orientation of Nonfinality understood as the aim of oneness with God nor as a one-sided identification with Finality. Both of these when taken separately lead to the degradation of one or the other of these relations, i.e., the relation between man/woman and Finality or the relation between man/woman and Nonfinality into a mere subject-object relation. The result of which is that the human himself/herself becomes an object.

Man/woman, who participates in Finality and in Nonfinality, has a position, so to speak, at the center of the universe, but not in the sense of classical anthropocentrism. At the same time we should consider Kant's view that the role of man/woman in his/her relation to the external world is to order that world. If we are united with the world, our situation is much more complicated than philosophers previously thought it to be. We are no longer spectators looking at the
world as if it were a mere picture. We are also no longer the creators of order in the world who change the world without themselves being changed by the world. Nor are we architects who rebuilt the world according to their own design. We are partners of all other elements of the world. We change the world and are changed by it. At the same time, our role in this world is, or rather should be, mediation. Mediation is also a kind of dialogue. The mediator should be able to dialogue with both sides. If then "man participates in both Finality and Nonfinality" his nature should be dialogical. As a result, the dialogical principle should be the principle of human existence at all its levels.

VI

Humankind today faces a qualitatively new situation. It no longer has to answer questions regarding what it can or should will or what is or should be its goal. These questions were answered when people decided that their goal is happiness. Through their different actions in pursuit of this goal, human beings built still new utopias, as well as constructing a new world. In this new "human world" we not only have the problem of the relationship of humans and nature, or of humans and God. Much more important now are the relations between humans and the results of their actions: in the past, in the present, and in the future. Today even nature cannot survive, or be revived, without human assistance. This means that all these relations become forms of relations between people themselves. The oneness of the world find its expression in human existence, and now the existence of the Earth is dependent on people. As long as humankind has no other home but this planet, its most important goal must be to ensure the security of life on Earth.

This goal is quite different from the goal of the utopias, which was until now the propelling force of human activity. The goal of each utopia was an "ideal"; the contemporary goal is a necessity. Through their actions people are now able to destroy the earth; so the survival of our planet depends on people's will, even if it is mainly the will of "leaders." Upon this depends the fate of the Earth, as the abode of humankind.

People have acted busily in trying to realize utopias, both mentioned here, as well as a number of others. None of these utopias belongs merely to the "dead past." Each of them has its sworn adherents and defenders who believe that only the realization of their utopia can fulfill humanity's goal: happiness. The examples mentioned here show how different utopias are from each other. Philosophers have often shown that the dialogue between faith (which is
often identified with religion and which may also be often understood as human participation in Nonfinality) and rational thinking, i.e., science, which represents human participation in Finality, has been very difficult, if not impossible. Kinhide Mushakoji sees the possibility of solving this problem. He writes:

A dialogue about social praxis between those who believe in God and those who do not can be fruitful only when both parties reach a point where the question of theism or atheism becomes not merely a logical question about the affirmation or negation of the concept of God but rather an existential problem of the motivation both parties have in their social praxis. Both parties can reach a point where they see the futility of quarrelling on a formal logical level and see that any social praxis must recognize the historical role of both those who believe in God and those who do not. This realization is not an eclecticism nor a syncretism; it is the affirmation of two contradictory positions not on the level of formal logic but on the existential level of social praxis (Mushakoji, 1985, p. 255).

The difficulties shown here could be much smaller if faith and thinking were seen as factors in a totality and not simply as two different factors belonging to opposing totalities between which one must try to build a dialogical bridge. We should then speak as well of both the dialogue occurring within each group of people and the dialogue of each individual with herself/himself. These forms of 'internal' dialogue should never be seen as mere monologue, even though a quasi-dialogue may consist of only monologues. Assuredly such internal dialogue may, for many reasons, in practice prove obstructive. Such reasons have a mainly strategic character: in "external" dialogue between two groups it often seems better to present one's own group as a monolith. But then is external dialogue right from the start a mere distortion? Should such a situation be seen as a disguised conflict rather than as a dialogue? In this context, the following statement by Josef Simon may be very important:

To the culture of dialogue belongs some degree of skepticism from both sides in knowing that their own conviction is "greater" because it is noninterchangeable, although this does not mean it is truer. To this culture belongs the acceptance of the other's conviction as also someone's "own." This reciprocal acceptance is at the same time a practical truth. Not truth, but the opposition between faith in authority and one's own conviction will be relativized in such a way that to the other will also be given the right to possess a conviction, and thereby authority (Simon, 1985, p. 57).
The hope of contemporary people is dialogue. One tries to make a dialogue between representatives of different tendencies, positions, viewpoints, doctrines, etc., and to conduct this dialogue on different levels. But is this really a dialogue? Isn't it really mainly seeking at cross purposes and at different times from each other; and even if people speak to each other, is it really a case of listening and responding to each other? There are many doubts as to the possibility of dialogues which arise from theoretical premises; but there are also very many practical obstacles which are mainly due to psychological reasons and which can make dialogue impossible. As a good example, there is the history of efforts at dialogue between Christians and Marxists. Paul Mojzes shows not only this history; he has also made a list—though incomplete, as he himself claims—of 28 premises which are necessary for dialogue. Just reading this list makes it clear how great the difficulties of dialogue are. Yet, according to Mushakoji (1985, p. 235), the dialogue between Christians and Marxists, as well as the dialogue between East and West, can serve as relatively fruitful dialogues!

Andras Szennay says that the dialogue between Christians and Marxists is future-oriented (see: Mojzes, 1981, p. 203). All utopias are also future-oriented, as I showed at the beginning of this text. Should we draw from this parallel the conclusion that dialogue is also utopian? No, since dialogue is not a goal of human activity. Dialogue is a position, a method which should help people to act for their different utopias, the differences of which are accepted by everyone. To strive for a single goal is no longer possible since God's kingdom is seen as capable of being achieved either "at the end of days" or hic et nunc. Contrary to the past, acceptance of a plurality of utopias is a necessity, if humankind does not want to commit suicide. This is a paradox: as long as people were not able to destroy totally their own kind as a result of their power over nature, the feeling of their oneness with Finality and Nonfinality was unnecessary for them. It was enough to identify themselves with only one of these modes of the universe's being. In accordance with this condition, human method was confrontation rather than dialogue. To traverse this former path is far too dangerous today. So perhaps it will be this danger which will lead people to the perception that "We simultaneously and together with the acceptance of the Finality of man have to know man's participation in Nonfinality, not as two separate features, but as the doubling of processes in which human existence can finally be cognized" (Buber, 1971, p. 14). This doubling of processes can be manifested in dialogue.
Differences are not to be removed, but are to serve as mutual enrichment. Both partners must be open to insight gained in the joint endeavor. Tension, dissent, and even conflict are seen as part of the process. No attempt should be made to camouflage differences for the sake of the appearance of a superficial agreement. Partners in dialogue must seek to know one another directly by listening, by speaking, by working together (Mojzes, 1981, p. 213).

Evidently the statement of the necessity of dialogue is only the beginning of a long journey. Even when this necessity is eventually generally accepted, there will remain an immense number of problems making dialogue difficult. One of the most important of these is the immanent character of each human being. According to Karl Popper, "Man is first of all language. What is it which makes the development of culture possible? Critique. Through language and through critique we have developed culture" (Popper in Popper-Lorenz, 1985, p. 39). At the same time one can see here great difficulty since language is still a very imperfect tool; but people must use this tool as up till now no better one has been found. Simon maintains that the one who speaks discloses herself/himself. She/he transmits to others the possibility of their understanding her/him. Even if one tries to frame the understanding of his/her words in a particular way, e.g., by giving sets of definitions, one can never be certain that his/her words will be understood by others in the way he/she intended. He/she can never fully communicate himself/herself in his/her words. Speaking remains a translation to others, having no guarantee of complete translation. This deceptiveness of language makes dialogue very difficult even if one has the best intentions, because one can never be sure if she/he has been correctly understood. That is why it is even more important to possess a willingness to listen and to try to understand. To understand the utopias of my partners who desire as much as I do to build a better world of the future.

Czeslaw Milosz has said (Milosz, 1986) that all problems of contemporary society result from the fact that humankind in the eighteenth century took a "wrong train." One should rather say that we travel today on many different trains travelling along numerous separate tracks. Yet nevertheless, we all wish finally to reach the same final station. Perhaps because the trains do not travel the same tracks a collision will not be possible?

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1986, Austria) on which I based this paper. I would also like to thank Mr. John Thomas, who corrected my English.

ENDNOTES

1 In the Orient, e.g., in the case of Maharashi Mahesh Yogi, whose teaching is intended to be more accessible to Western audiences, happiness is connected with meditation. However, the Western concept of human happiness as necessarily connected with human activity is thereby devalued or even jettisoned. (See, for example, Heino's [1982] treatment of the subject.)

2 The word "action" is understood in Zelger's sense (1984). How important action is for the Christian religion is shown by, for example, Harri Heino, who is the director of the Research Institute of the Lutheran Church of Finland. He writes: "... the Lutheran church cannot interpret the deep meditation so that the meditation experience would be an immediate path to unity with God" (Heino, 1982, p. 21).

3 The supremacy of the clergy as the only "owner" of the mystery of faith and of knowledge endured much longer in the Roman Catholic Church. This is sometimes seen (e.g., Hooykaas, 1972) as an explanation for the fact that in the last two hundred years relatively fewer scientists in the USA have come from a Catholic background than from a Protestant background.

4 Krešić quotes Ernst Bloch, Atheismus im Christentum (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag 1968), p. 67.

5 How optimistic and at the same time utopian the situation of the working class of that time was seen is shown, for example, by Engels' paper "The European Worker in 1877" (Marx-Engels, 1979, vol. 4).

6 Bertrand Russell thinks that in each form of society up till now one still sees the same division that was developed by Plato (Russell, 1946, pp. 129-40).

7 Surely this was not only the result of socialistic ideology, but first of all a result of the cult of science, which was developed as a result of the second utopia. From this example, one can well see that utopias are based on rationalism as well as nonrationalism.

For further development of this point, see Gorniak-Kocikowska, 1984.

One should think of Durkheim's considerations (1984).

At the 1983 Seminar of the Swiss Association of Human Sciences, the theme of which was the "Mood of the End of Days, and the Crisis of Orientation," Professor Kurt Stalder (Bern, Switzerland) postulated a positive inner attitude towards the possible end of the world, which contains the possibility of crossing into a better world. See: Mensch-Natur-Gesellschaft, II/1984.

When Konrad Lorenz says: "Animals are also people" (Popper-Lorenz, 1985, p. 14), and: "The human sense of values corresponds to the process of evolution insofar as in our brain the game of all against all is also in progress, just like in the external world" (Popper-Lorenz, 1985, p. 20), then we can understand that in this way also the human being is united with the external world. The applied sciences are now trying to utilize such a viewpoint, which can be seen, for instance, in medicine. At the Twelfth German Philosophical Congress in Innsbruck (Austria) Nelly Tsouyopoulos presented a paper entitled "The Picture of Man in Modern Medicine" in which she spoke about an ecological model of medical anthropology.

"In the great religions, the universe is not the partner of religious communication but at the most a means of communication, the partner being inside or beyond the universe" (Keller, 1985, p. 121).

The tendency to regard the human being and the world as a unit can now be seen in many areas as, for example, in ecology. At the Tenth International Wittgenstein Symposium in Austria, Professor Zemanek in his paper "Will the Computer Rehumanize the Natural Sciences?" [in German] pointed out that computer technology at its present level of development needs new thinking and a new philosophy. The world cannot and should not be seen anymore as a particular order of individual objects. It should be seen as a whole, or a system. Another point considered by Professor Zemanek was that there is reciprocity between the human being and the world of technology which people created. To my mind, this relation can also be seen as a
specific kind of dialogue.


19 See: Simon, 1985, p. 58.

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