

Remembering the Pacific War

**Edited by
Geoffrey M. White**

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Preface

This Occasional Paper presents discussions from the conference on Cultural Encounters in the Pacific War held at the East-West Center over four days, 18-21 May 1988, and sponsored by the East-West Center, the University of Hawaii's Center for Pacific Islands Studies, and the Hawaii Committee for the Humanities. The conference provided an occasion for Islanders, scholars, and others interested in the Pacific region to discuss the meanings and impacts of the Pacific War from local points of view. Like the conference, this collection combines scholarly papers with the testimonies of Islanders from diverse regions. The aim is to review wartime experiences in terms of their significance for the social and political history of island societies. Pacific historians have long noted the importance of the war as a moment of transition, whether toward independence or some new form of relationship with metropolitan powers. The papers and narratives that follow pursue these local significances by assessing the meanings of the war in a range of societies. Taken together they provide a wide-angle lens through which to assess the war's impact on the region as a whole. Given that World War II continues to be invoked in statements about current events, these papers also shed light on the relevance of that war to contemporary identity and political relations.

The conference consisted of nineteen presentations, combining both written papers and oral testimony. These included a mix of seven Pacific Island "veterans" with scholars of various nationalities (five Americans, three Pacific Islanders, two Japanese, one Australian, and one New Zealander). Most of these presentations focus on Pacific Islanders' experiences and recollections of the war, although three papers focus on American and Japanese perceptions as well. These latter add important complementary information to our understanding of the war's cross-cultural encounters. The participation by two Japanese researchers, Hisafumi Saito and Wakako Higuchi, was especially helpful in balancing the inevitable American or European bias in conference discussions. The reader should be aware that, even though our focus is on Islanders' recollections of the war, the American context of the conference probably leads participants to focus somewhat selectively on topics and events seen from an American or European vantage point.

The papers encompass a wide geographic scope. Although certainly not exhaustive or comprehensive, they are grouped to reflect the broad sweep of

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the war across the entire region. Following the order of presentations at the conference, the papers are organized by traditional culture areas--Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia. The ordering parallels roughly the chronology of the Allied offensive, beginning in the Southwest Pacific and moving northward and westward toward Japan. The first section focuses on Melanesian societies, followed by discussions of the war in Micronesia. The only Polynesian case included here is that of American Samoa, which, like Hawai'i, figured importantly in the war as the site of a rear-area American base. The collection concludes with papers on American and Japanese perceptions of Melanesian Islanders. The most noticeable omission from this inventory of island war history is the absence of any accounts from New Caledonia or French Polynesia.

Two major themes emerge from this collection's review of Islanders' experience of the war. The first, and one that is often minimized in military histories, is the suffering, disruption, and destruction wrought by the war in island communities. The second theme pertains to the war's impact on social relations, particularly the manner in which the war led to a rethinking of relations with colonial powers. In some areas, such as the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, this rethinking led to moves for greater autonomy, while in other areas it accelerated a process of integration, as in the case of American Samoans or Hawaiian Japanese.

The war's toll on island communities will never be known adequately or tallied. In part this is because of the "invisible" nature of native populations, which were little known to most combatants. The numerous cases related, in which planes from both sides bombed and strafed villages where little or no evidence of enemy presence existed, testify to the casual military attitudes toward the safety and well-being of Islanders. One example is the bombing of the artificial island of Laulasi offshore from Malaita in the Solomon Islands. The residents of Laulasi, other Solomon Islanders, and even the British resident commissioner were baffled about why an American squadron of seven torpedo planes bombed Laulasi in an area far from any Japanese troop concentrations, resulting in the deaths of twenty-two men, women, and children (more than half children). Flight reports recently uncovered by Hugh Laracy with the assistance of John Lundstrom show that this bombing was nothing more than a matter of poor navigation, mistaken identity, and a lack of adequate cautions about the presence of local villagers. The tragic result at Laulasi was repeated many times over in Papua New Guinea where saturation bombings of Japanese-held areas accounted for a large proportion of the estimated fifteen thousand Papua New Guineans killed in the war.

Because Islanders were relatively powerless and lacked access to forums where they might voice their suffering, they often endured death, disease, and

destruction in obscurity. On the larger islands whole coastal communities could quietly disappear as they sought refuge in forested interior regions. Although this may have gotten villagers out of the way of battles and bombings, it often left them, unable to obtain adequate food supplies or medical care, to face starvation and disease. The residents of small atolls that were the site of massive invasions may have experienced the most horrific calamities of war. Unable to leave their tiny habitats, residents of places such as Tarawa or Kwajalein recall cowering in bunkers as the earth shook around them for hours, only to emerge (if they were lucky enough to have survived) and see nothing but shattered palm trees, with every bit of vegetation stripped from the coral surface. Even other Pacific Islanders accustomed to the more robust and lush environment of high volcanic islands have difficulty imagining the completeness with which an atoll may be devastated. These differences emerged in the conference when Jonathan Fifi'i, from the large island of Malaita in the Solomons, asked quizzically why Sam Highland dwelt at length on the loss of plants and trees from Betio islet in Tarawa, saying "The same thing happened in my home, but I don't worry about it in the bad times of war." However, unlike Malaita where people could always find and grow food in the interior, tiny Betio was stripped clean of vegetation by the Japanese occupiers intent on fortifying the place. The result was complete dependency on external food sources, with years of work required to regenerate taro pits and the like. Because atoll populations could not hide, they were also more vulnerable to victimization as forced labor. In one of the worst cases of suffering under forced labor, nearly half of the population of Nauru was taken by the Japanese to work in Truk and Kosrae. Of the eight hundred on this journey, more than half perished before returning.

For the colonial powers, relations with "native" peoples during the war were often framed in terms of "loyalty," epitomized in images such as that of the Papua New Guinean "fuzzy wuzzy angel" who carried Australian supplies and wounded soldiers through rugged terrain. Although the issue of loyalty may crystallize the problem of native relations for colonial and military regimes, the concept may have little or no relevance in rural island communities. Whereas loyalty was often presented by the warring powers as a clear-cut matter of alignment with one side or the other, Islanders whose relations with colonial "masters" were ambivalent at best prior to the war often did not regard the conflict as their war. While Jonathan Fifi'i's comment at the conference that "the British were worse than the Japanese" may be somewhat extreme for many areas, his observation underlines the sentiments of many Islanders who suffered invasion and counterinvasion under conditions of immense confusion and uncertainty. For many who witnessed the collapse of prewar colonial regimes, approaching new military outsiders from Japan,

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America, and elsewhere was fraught with danger. Many people adopted a kind of humane pragmatism that only translated into alignment with one side or the other once new or renewed colonial arrangements began to take shape. Those who misjudged often paid for their mistake with their lives or careers. One such person was the Solomon Islander George Bogese discussed here by Hugh Laracy.

From one island group to another the local meanings of the war frequently depended upon the prior history of colonial experience. The papers show the range of variation in local responses to the war, with some communities such as Palauans or indigenous Fijians seeking greater involvement and advancement in the colonial apparatus, and others building on wartime experiences to assert local autonomy and disengagement, as in the postwar Maasina Rule movement in the Solomons. In Japanese Micronesia, where the war was preceded by a growing militarization of the region, the outbreak of hostilities resulted in the recruitment of Micronesians into labor groups and quasi-military units under a rhetoric of coparticipation in the Japanese national cause. Whereas this sort of recruitment was undertaken as an expansion of opportunity and trust in many islands, it was just the opposite in those areas of Micronesia such as Guam, Kiribati, and Nauru that had been under American or British control. The indigenous populations of these places were subjected to harsh and regimented conditions aimed at putting them to work for the Japanese war effort and at preventing any possibility of sabotage or betrayal. As several of the papers in this collection show, these policies resulted in starvation, sickness, or death for many so affected.

The formation of labor and military units in Japanese Micronesia was paralleled in Allied Melanesia and Polynesia. In Papua New Guinea, where the Japanese occupation was longest, and the fight to expel them the most extensive, the need for local labor resulted in coercive recruitment strategies that saw nearly fifty thousand people of Papua New Guinea volunteering or being pressed into service under dangerous and difficult conditions. Many of those who worked as carriers not only suffered extreme hardships on mountain trails, but also left wives and families behind who found themselves struggling to survive without able-bodied men to assist with the requirements of subsistence. For the most part, Allied labor corps formed in the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and elsewhere met their needs with volunteers who signed on for the opportunity to acquire new experiences, dollars, and surplus materiel from American troops generous with government-issue property. As several of the Melanesian papers in this collection show, the impressions created by these American "exchange partners" had similar effects throughout the South Pacific. Specifically, unregulated contacts and interactions with military personnel who had no interest in maintaining the guise of European

superiority tended to rupture the prewar status quo, which was based on a code of racial separation and superiority. Encounters with black American servicemen, often perceived as beneficiaries of Western education and economy, also served to challenge color-coded systems of colonial rule.

The first section of this volume consists of six Melanesian presentations that deal with the war in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Papua New Guinea is discussed in a paper by historian John Waiko based on the keynote speech he gave at the conference. Waiko summarizes the findings of his own and others' studies of New Guineans' experiences of the war, while also considering the problems of incorporating information from oral traditions in history writing. Given the size of Papua New Guinea, and the fact that many areas experienced long occupations by the Japanese, it is regrettable that more material on that country could not be included in this volume. Another Papua New Guinean, Maclaren Hiari, was invited to the conference to present his work on the oral history of the Kokoda trail campaign, but was unable to attend at the last minute. Waiko's piece is followed by Brij Lal's discussion of the effects of the war in Fiji, particularly its relevance for this history of relations between indigenous and Indian Fijians.

Of the remaining four Melanesian presentations, three deal with the Solomon Islands and one with Vanuatu. Anthropologist Lamont Lindstrom discusses Vanuatu, focusing on ni-Vanuatu labor corps experiences. Involvement in local labor corps and contact with military base personnel is perhaps the central issue for many areas, such as New Caledonia or Tonga, which did not become the site of open combat but rather experienced another sort of invasion--that of construction battalions and support units that turned quiet south sea isles into citylike military bases. The Solomon Islands, lying between Bougainville and Vanuatu, experienced the effects of both kinds of invasion: the disruption of prolonged military struggle as well as the novel opportunities offered those working on rear-area bases. The war in the Solomons is discussed in three presentations--two by Solomon Islanders David Gegeo and Jonathan Fifi'i, and one by historian Hugh Laracy. Gegeo, a doctoral candidate in political science, gives an overall discussion of the cultural meanings and impacts of the war in the Solomons, and Fifi'i presents a firsthand account of his experiences as a leader of a section of labor corps recruits from Malaita working on Guadalcanal.

The war in Micronesia is discussed in eight presentations, four by Micronesians who experienced the war themselves, and four by researchers (three anthropologists and an oral historian). Lin Poyer opens the section on Micronesia with an overview of the course of the war and its historical significance for the region. This is followed by discussions of the impacts of the war in

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Nauru, Kiribati (Tarawa), Marshall Islands, Pohnpei, Guam, and Palau. This collection has benefited from a paper by Nancy Pollock on Nauru not given at the conference, but incorporated subsequently in order to detail some of the little-known history of Nauruans during the war. Like the people of Pohnpei discussed by Suzanne Falgout, Nauruans suffered extreme deprivations because of occupation and isolation, even though their island was never the site of a counterinvasion. The experiences of Micronesians whose islands were the site of major battles are graphically portrayed by Sam Highland for Tarawa, by John Heine for the Marshalls, by Tony Palomo for Guam, and by Ubal Tellei and Wakako Higuchi for Palau. Although contrasts in experience (eg, between those of American-oriented Guam and Japanese Palau) are dramatic, the dangers of alignment with one or the other of the metropolitan powers are brought home in all of these presentations.

Following the section on Micronesia, wartime experiences in the American territories of Hawai'i and Samoa are discussed. Ted Tsukiyama, an American of Japanese ancestry (AJA), discusses the significance of his own recruitment and that of other Hawaiian nisei into the American war effort. As anyone familiar with modern Hawai'i knows, the heroic service of American Japanese in both the European and Pacific theaters of World War II did more than any single event to validate the American identity of people of Japanese ancestry living in the islands. Ted Tsukiyama's presentation at the conference was but one instance of many occasions in which AJAs' World War II service has been cited as a symbol of national identity and loyalty. The contrast here with the situation of Fiji Indians described by Brij Lal could hardly be greater. Both Hawaiian Japanese and Fiji Indians descend from groups brought to the Pacific to work on plantations as immigrant labor. Both now represent major segments of the states in which they reside and have moved into the full range of professional and business occupations. However, whereas the AJAs of Hawai'i have achieved substantial political power through elected government, Fiji's Indian population has not--a fact underscored dramatically by the 1987 military coups in that country. The different histories of these two groups' involvements in World War II can be read as an ominous precursor of their different fortunes in the modern Pacific. Whereas the wartime experiences of AJAs in Hawai'i helped them overcome skepticism about their loyalty and ability to serve, the relegation of Fiji's Indian population to continued plantation labor during the war added yet another factor that differentiates their history from that of indigenous Fijians, who compiled an impressive record of wartime sacrifice and heroism.

The involvement of American Samoans in the war is reviewed in a paper by anthropologist Robert Franco and an oral presentation by Tuala Sevaetasi, a veteran of the Samoan Fitafita Guard. As in the case of the

Hawaiian Japanese, World War II opened up avenues of recruitment into the regular US military that marked a significant deepening of participation in mainstream US society. Franco's paper, based on documentary and interview data, is complemented nicely by Sevaaetasi's personal narrative of activities beginning during the war that gained him a military career and eventually brought him to Hawai'i.

The final section contains three papers that step back and consider the war's cultural encounters from the point of view of American and Japanese military personnel. By considering the ways the combatants in the Pacific conflict perceived Islanders, these papers add an important complement to this volume's main focus on Islanders' experiences. Hisafumi Saito and Marty Zelenietz, both anthropologists who have worked on the island of New Britain in Papua New Guinea, use published materials to examine the ways Japanese and Americans regarded Melanesians. Their discussions suggest that, for both groups, "natives" were less significant for military personnel than military personnel were for many Islanders. However, whereas Zelenietz writes that Melanesians were "invisible" to many Americans, Saito cites Japanese comments about their friendship and good relations with local people. Note, however, that these attitudes were evident in the propaganda-driven publicity of both sides that emphasized the "liberating" effects of freeing Islanders from oppressive occupation by the enemy. It is apparent that military perceptions of Islanders, as reported in journals and newspapers of the day, were extensively molded by wartime needs to find "loyal natives" and "brave allies."

The conference on which this volume is based was supported by the East-West Center's Institute of Culture and Communication, the University of Hawaii's Center for Pacific Islands Studies, and the Hawaii Committee for the Humanities. In addition the conference and this volume have benefited from support of the editor's research on island histories of the war by a grant from the Interpretive Research Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities. The assistance of all these organizations is gratefully acknowledged.

For the Center for Pacific Islands Studies, the conference was the thirteenth annual Pacific Islands Studies conference. The organizational efforts of Director Robert Kiste and Outreach Coordinator Tisha Hickson made possible an event that reached a great many people in Hawai'i, continuing a tradition of annual conferences that brings significant Pacific Islands issues to the attention of the community. Donald Rubinstein, formerly executive director of the School of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies, played a central role in conceptualizing, conducting, and evaluating the

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conference from the time of its inception. The quality of discussions owes much to his knowledge and understanding of island cultures.

Conference discussions benefited greatly from the participation of several scholars from the University of Hawaii who acted as discussants and facilitators. In addition to Donald Rubinstein, others who contributed their considerable knowledge and skill to the deliberations were Murray Chapman, David Hanlon, Leonard Mason, and Karen Watson-Gegeo. The discussions also benefited from comments by Roger Keesing, anthropologist at McGill University and long-time associate of the late Jonathan Fifi'i.

For the East-West Center the conference was an important part of a larger project on Pacific recollections of the war that involved a previous conference held in the Solomon Islands in 1987, research in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, and several publications based on collaboration with colleagues in the region. Several people at the center worked tirelessly to see the conference run smoothly, especially Nancy Taylor and Edith Yashiki. We would also like to thank Edith Yashiki and Joy Teraoka for their help with the preparation of this Occasional Paper.

The East-West Center project on recollections of World War II in the Pacific Islands has already produced several publications. These include *The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II* (University of the South Pacific, 1988); *Taem Blong Faet: World War II in Melanesia* (Solomon Islands USP Centre, 1988); *The Pacific Theater: Island Representations of World War II* (University of Hawaii Press, 1989); and the photo-essay *Island Encounters: Black and White Memories of the Pacific War* (Smithsonian Press, 1990). The current volume complements these other publications in several respects. First, its cultural and geographic sweep is broader than most of the books, the first two of which focus solely on Melanesia. Second, our primary focus on indigenous recollections is here expanded with information on American and Japanese perceptions of Islanders, thus adding greater depth to the portrayal of the war as "cultural encounter." Finally, and perhaps most significantly, this volume combines both research-based papers and firsthand accounts by Islanders telling about their own experiences. As the reader will find, this somewhat unusual mixture of voices adds to the immediacy and texture of the volume's portrait of wartime experiences. The contributors hope that these narratives and discussions will inspire further oral historical work with those Islanders who know and speak a different history from that which circulates most widely in the books and films of the metropolitan powers.

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MELANESIA

Oral History and the War: The View from Papua New Guinea

John Waiko

In this paper, prepared as the keynote address to the conference Cultural Encounters in the Pacific War, I wish to comment on some of the events of World War II in my country, Papua New Guinea, and to use that commentary to address more general questions pertaining to the uses of oral and documentary history in the representation of the past. I begin by drawing a parallel between the study of colonial history in Papua New Guinea and the place of peasant history in European historiography. The paper then reviews a range of Papua New Guinean experiences during the war, as seen through the lens of oral history, before concluding with further remarks about problems of historical method.

Colonial History and Oral Traditions

The attitude taken to history, especially colonial history, by Europeans stems from some of the same ideological positions taken in regard to documents of the European literate classes and the oral traditions of the peasants in continental Europe. The development of European historiography in the study of folklore makes it plain that many European historians, with very few exceptions, had built up a considerable indifference toward the oral traditions of the peasants. During the nineteenth century in particular, professional historians concentrated on documents, while folklorists studied contemporary oral testimonies. Both concluded that oral traditions were not of much use for historical purposes. These scholars were members of the ruling class, which included politicians, lawyers, and doctors. According to them history meant what happened in the activities and events that had to do with the people in power whose views and ideas were recorded in documents. Unlike the upper class the peasants did not have power and they could not make decisions. The masses did not affect the flow of history because they had no control over what happened. They could not make history. Only the elite made decisions and thereby contributed to history. For this reason many professional historians were more concerned with the records left behind by the leaders and the institutions they had created than with the oral histories of the peasants.

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The folkloric study of peasant oral traditions did not locate events that appeared in documents researched by professional historians. These professionals concluded that oral traditions were useless. Amateur historians did not challenge this conclusion because they took oral testimony at face value, diminishing it because their work was not taken seriously. Historians, both professional and amateur, and folklorists were asking the wrong questions. Even though oral traditions could not be related to events as described in the documents, oral histories at least indicated peasant attitudes toward events and the actions of the elite.

The general intellectual climate among highly respected scholars in continental Europe questioned the validity of oral traditions as historical sources. And this indifference toward and bias against the oral cultures of the Western peasantry was to have a profound impact on European historians and anthropologists who went out from their respective countries to study cultures other than their own. Why should they trust oral narratives of non-Western peoples?

In Papua New Guinea the damage to oral history has not been as great as elsewhere; but what of the future? We may have escaped the work of amateur historians because professionals have taken the lead in studying Melanesian oral traditions seriously. I am a participant in events while wanting to record them as accurately as I can. This includes recording people's knowledge of the recent past, including the events of World War II. Indeed, my interest in recording it grows stronger as changes among the Binandere erode knowledge of their past in many parts of the community. In this way, my research and writing is making me a major custodian of my people's traditions.

Of course, in the role of custodian lies a real danger of augmenting live oral tradition with one person's viewpoint, however loyal and careful that one person may be. Live testimony depends in part on a lack of literacy for its continued existence. Literate historians often play at keeping their written documents alive but immutable by insuring that they are not easily acquired by informants, frequently people who have only recently become literate and who have too much respect for the written word. The ability or the right to criticize the written word is not established easily in oral societies once they come into contact with literate foreigners. It takes a long time for these societies to realize that the written word is no stronger than its spoken counterpart and can be just as wrong.

The essence of live oral tradition is, I think, that there is no one "carrier" above all others. In most Melanesian societies, there are no specialists designated as carriers of traditions and directly responsible to the chief or king, to members of a higher class, or even to the state. The transmission forms and contents of another kind of oral tradition are supervised, guarded,

and controlled by someone higher than the carriers themselves. That is why formal oral traditions in highly structured or graded societies, such as found in Polynesia, are not necessarily alive but bend toward the yoke of a ruler so that a specialist is the custodian of the chief's, king's, or state's tradition. Similar situations existed in continental Europe where historians and folklorists were under the influence of the state. There was not a living oral tradition because once a ruler succeeds to the throne or chieftainship, his order of generations becomes established as the live one.

In my view, the live spoken word in most parts of the Pacific and in Papua New Guinea is not controlled by one person or one carrier above all others. However, once the tradition is contained and shaped by one vessel, it is open to corruption. In short, being an active member of a community and at the same time an objective recorder of tradition is a very difficult dual role. I try to look carefully and honestly at the relations between myself and the society I am writing about and serve. I believe that any person who enters a community and writes about it must meet this double role seriously. The conflict is between writing for the people and writing for the university establishment. I have tried to ensure in my own case that the two are balanced as evenly as possible.

World War II Encounters

I wish now to deal directly with the Papua New Guinea encounter with the Japanese, Australians, and Americans during World War II. In order to appreciate the encounters in Papua New Guinea we look at three groups of people: ordinary villagers; laborers and carriers; and soldiers and police.

In 1939, when the war broke out in Europe, it was too remote for Papua New Guinea. Sir John Guise wrote:

I still remember the night of September 3, 1939, when there were a large group of Papuans including myself sitting beside a radio set belonging to another Papuan at Samarai. We listened with wonder, silence, and fear as Mr. Chamberlain declared war on Germany from London. We tried to make ourselves believe that the broadcast would not affect us at all in Papua but the feeling we had at the time was one of uneasiness. We were brought to the point where we had to recognize and accommodate our thoughts to the implications of this international broadcast from London. There was no other way. (1969, 562)

By August 1941, the European residents' propaganda against the Japanese had become widespread. The *Papuan Villager*, a monthly paper for Europeans and the few Papuans who could read English, had indicated dislike

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of the Japanese. By October the prejudice spilled over, as this quotation shows:

The Japanese are not white men. Their skins have a rather yellow color, sometimes pale brown. They are often small men, but well-made and strong. One strange thing about them is the way their eyes slant upwards at, slant upwards on the outer corners.

In the early days, the Japanese soldiers were bow and arrow men like so many Papuans. But now they have warships, and cannons, and tanks, and airplanes. Perhaps this is a mistake as I do not think their warships and other fighting things are really as good as those of Europeans. And if they ever go to war against the Europeans they will soon find this out.

(Inglis 1969, 508)

At the beginning of 1942 Papua and New Guinea remained a quiet colonial backwater. Despite war in Europe and the determined southward expansion of the Japanese, Europeans continued to live in Port Moresby, Rabaul, and on their plantations as if nothing was happening in the outside world. Most Papua New Guineans were not aware of the great war raging to their north. Some slight fortification and preparation for war had been made in Papua, but the League of Nations mandate forbade the construction of fortification in New Guinea.

On 4 January 1942 peace ended when the Japanese bombed Rabaul. This was their first attack on the Australian territory. Until 1945 the islands of Papua New Guinea became a battlefield over which 1 million Americans, 300,000 Japanese, and nearly 500,000 Australians fought. At the time this was almost one foreigner for every Papua New Guinean. Between 3 and 5 February 1942 the Japanese dropped two bombs on Port Moresby in the early hours of the morning. Numerous stores were hit. The Australian troops and the local people alike began to loot the stores. One eyewitness noted, "Looted Moresby was a blood-chilling example of how thin the veneer of white civilization is in times of great stress and danger." Chaos reigned in Moresby, Samarai, and Misima where the civil administration lost control. The Commonwealth of Australia suspended civilian authority and declared military control in both Papua and New Guinea. The whites suddenly deserted Papua New Guineans. The desertion damaged beyond repair the white prestige that had been established and jealously guarded by the European residents before January 1942. Peter Ryan (1969) put it aptly: "The pre-war relationships of white master and black servants were shaken. A different sort of white man was seen for the first time in the Australian soldiers whose humanity, informality, and willingness to labor in the sun and in the mud were in contrast to the rigid allowances of many of the pre-war residents."

What about the villagers? An obvious effect of the war was the great damage done in areas where the fighting was heaviest. Practically everything Europeans had built before the war was destroyed. Almost all the solid buildings erected by the Germans disappeared. Government and mission stations were destroyed and valuable government and mission records dealing with the period before 1942 were lost. Allied bombing, ground fighting, the Japanese search for food, and, to a lesser extent, some looting by Allied and Japanese soldiers caused most of this destruction. Much Papua New Guinea property was also destroyed. Villages were burned and the people evacuated. Gardens were pillaged and left to the jungle. In the Madang area Allied bombing destroyed the great sea-going canoes of the people of the coast; and, because the old people with the skills to build them also died during the war, the destroyed canoes could not be replaced.

People also suffered from the recruitment of the young men to work for the Japanese or the Allies. As a result gardens in the village were neglected. In some areas Papua New Guineans were shot by the Japanese, or the Allies, for disloyalty. Toward the end of the war hungry Japanese soldiers sometimes shot villagers and enemy prisoners for food. The ordinary people in the villages were deprived and lost their homes. First, the news and the terror of the fight made them move into their hunting grounds, caves, and swamps in the nearby forests. The people left their villages in fear of both the Japanese and the European soldiers. A villager near Finschhafen had this to say: "How could we settle down to clear the bush and make gardens? We were always running away from the Japanese. When we were hiding, the Japanese caught up with us so we had to move on. We collected wild yams and fruits of all kinds in the bush and ate them to keep ourselves alive." Temporary absences from villages for hunting wild animals and collecting sago were a customary practice; the difference now was the length of the absence. Before the war it was a matter of days and weeks; during the war it was longer--in fact, one to three years. Second, in areas which the Allies and the Japanese soldiers used as battlefields, people were forced to evacuate their villages and flee to temporary camps. After the fighting ceased these people were allowed to return to their villages.

One of the bloodiest battles fought during World War II was on the Kokoda trail. The Japanese attempt to capture Australia was diverted in May 1942, after the battle of the Coral Sea. In July the Japanese aimed to occupy Port Moresby by first landing their forces between Gona and Buna in the northern province. Arthur Duna was an ordinary villager who witnessed the invasion and described it:

The firing of the guns and the explosions of bombs brought all the clouds of the skies down and touched the earth and all the living things seemed to be

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crushed to dust. All the clansmen who were brave, courageous, and strong in the previous day appeared to become like babies in their first day out of their mother's womb at the arrival of the Japanese. It was as if the landing, gun noises, and the actual terrifying sight of the ships that covered the wide horizon of the bay had removed the bones of the people. They could not run even if they tried to, for it was a unique disaster beyond anyone's memory.

(In Waiko 1988, 46)

Arthur Duna, a young and daring man, would have been the first person to brandish a stone club or a steel axe in the air if a neighboring clan had invaded his village. But a Japanese invasion was physically and technologically beyond comparison. Clubs and axes were obviously inferior. Guns, bombs, ships, and planes were so superior that the landing, with its thunder of bombing, was like the lightning that strikes the tops of coconut trees. Arthur Duna describes vividly how women, men, and children felt the impact of the nerve-racking attack and the suddenness of the sweeping thrust of the Japanese invasion:

As if you had a dreamlike spirit chasing you and you want to run, [but] you cannot run and the spirit catches you. It went just like that. There was a great panic. That afternoon, you could not run away from where you were at the time of the invasion. There was not time to go to your village to gather your family or collect your valuable belongings. Wife ran naked without her husband and children. Husband ran naked without his wife and children. A child ran without his parents. And even if he or she who was with his small ones, he or she deserted them. All ran in different directions into the bush. Some ran for cover like rats and bandicoots in the kunai grass. The night fell and each individual slept either in the grass or under the trees. The damp soil was your bed and the rotten logs your pillow. You went to sleep wherever you happened to run that night. (In Waiko 1988, 45)

These quotations hardly exaggerate. And in the districts where the war was fought, the Japanese did not try to establish a system of native administration at all. They only moved along like army worms and ravaged the countryside about two miles on either side of the tracks. In one area of Morobe province, a man said of the Japanese behavior, "The Japanese finished the food in the gardens. They finished all our cattle. Defecating and urinating, they spoiled the church. Calling out, '*buta, buta*', or 'pig, pig', they killed and ate our pigs."

How about the Melanesian laborers? By May 1942, as part of the war effort, a standing order was issued that not more than 25 percent of the adult male population of a village could be recruited for laborers and carriers, and that the laborers were to be employed in their home districts (Ryan 1969). On

paper the conditions of indentured laborers were as follows. A minimum wage of 5 shillings per month, and 6 shillings per month for those who rendered a three-year contract of service. The maximum monthly wage was 10 shillings, and 8 shillings was paid to the three-year contract laborers who carried out heavy duties. The plantation laborers were paid only 6 shillings a month as the work was relatively lighter.

In reality, however, the carriers' ability to endure hardships was pushed to the limit. A so-called line of communication between Gona and Buna on the coast through Kokoda across the Owen Stanley Range to Port Moresby on the other side of Papua New Guinea consisted of a series of camps. Each camp had a store, a rest house, and a guard house. The role of carriers was fivefold: to establish a camp and erect buildings, to construct traps or a road between one camp and another, to build a supply base at each camp, to carry packs and rations for troops, and, last but not least, to carry the wounded soldiers on stretchers from the front line to the base camps.

I have said that an order was issued to recruit one quarter of the total adult male population as laborers, carriers, policemen, and soldiers. In order to appreciate the overall problem of recruitment in Papua New Guinea, I would like to look at the details of a small community, the Binandere people, with whose history and culture I am familiar. They were a population of about 2500 adults and children, occupying twenty-one villages in the Oro province. The total adult male population was 354 of whom 21, or 6 percent, were recruited as soldiers in the Papuan Infantry Battalion. Of these, 35 men, 10 percent, joined the Royal Papuan Constabulary as policemen, and 110 men, 31 percent, were recruited as general laborers and carriers. This meant that 188 males, 53 percent, were too old or too young to render any service to the war effort. These percentages are true for about two-thirds of the people of Papua New Guinea. One-third had little contact with the war. In fact, in the highlands of New Guinea, the people rarely saw even a plane.

The exact total labor strength between 1942 and 1945 is difficult to obtain. Yet Peter Ryan (1969) provides the following figures, which increased rapidly during the Japanese occupation of Papua New Guinea. According to Ryan, by 31 October 1942 about 7000 laborers were recruited. By September 1943, 30,000 had been recruited. By July 1945, 55,000 laborers were recruited. These figures do not include many people who served short engagements near their homes. However, many populous districts were Japanese held, so that less than half the population of the controlled areas was supplying the entire levy. According to Peter Ryan's calculation,

recruitment in some villages was 100% of fit male adults. I myself knew villages where, in 1944, recruitment exceeded 100%, since partly unfit men were impressed for lighter duties. The village suffered severely without men

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to clear gardens, hunt, maintain houses and canoes, etc. Diet was deficient, disease mounted, the women were strained from overwork, there was in some places near starvation and very high infant mortality, there was all the grief of separation and bereavement and that frightening apathy and loss of will to live. (1969, 540-541)

In 1943 Peter Ryan, walking up the Lakekamu River in the Papuan Gulf, crossed the Bulldog track to Wau in the Morobe province within seven days. There he observed the carrier's conditions:

The carriers each had a load of about fifty pounds. Their daily ration was one meal of boiled rice which they cooked for themselves each night. They had each a packet of army biscuits in the mornings, usually eaten on the march, and they set out from Bulldog with a small tin of meat, a piece which they ate the first day so as not to have to carry it. Apart from his loincloth or G-string, each carrier had one 'trade' blanket [S]imple scientific measurement shows that this ration lacks protein, fats and vitamins, and even for ordinary work could be deficient in crude calories. For arduous labor in cold mountains it was quite inadequate. Sickness rates sometimes rose higher than 25%, 14% was accepted as reasonable. Beri-beri, New Guinea mouth, and tropical ulcer--all diet deficiency signs--were common. (1969, 542)

What about the soldiers? As the war progressed, police and other Papua New Guineans were taken into the army and trained as special fighting units--first, the Papuan Infantry Battalion and then the two New Guinean Infantry Battalions, which were later all joined together as the Pacific Islands Regiment (Barrett 1969). Because of their knowledge of the environment, and their skills with local terrain, this small unit achieved much and produced some distinguished war heroes, some of whom are depicted in the film *Angels of War*. In the battlefields, soldiers--Australians, Americans, and Papua New Guineans--had to face a common enemy, the Japanese Army. Abraham Pap of Wadokai said how all the soldiers faced the formidable enemy: "We saw the *masta* soldier dying and the Japanese dying, and we were very frightened. Blood was like water and we were completely soaked in it. We just laid on the ground and moved along on our stomachs. If we raised our heads, bullets would have got us in no time." Sir John Guise echoes the same sentiment of the bond between and among the soldiers who had to face the enemy at close range--on many occasions only a rifle-shot away. "The friendship was bound on the battlefield of blood. This is exactly what happened when Australians and Papua New Guineans fought together, suffered together, and no force in the world can smash the friendship" (in Nelson 1980, 172).

This quotation reflects the bond in hindsight, as there was distinct discrimination between European soldiers and Melanesians in the battlefields, and each was segregated in separate camps. For example, an anthropologist reported the following incident after the war at Madang:

Two tanks were installed near the wharf for drinking. Both full of the same chlorinated water but labelled respectively "European personnel" and "Natives only." As I pass one morning, I heard the ANGAU officer in charge of the natives wrongly abusing a private who had gone to the wrong tap. "Have you no pride or grace?" he asked. "Don't you realize that this water is for coons?" (Inglis 1969, 514)

The private may have been an innocent person who probably did not think of Papua New Guineans as coons. In spite of the segregation there were very close bonds between the soldiers of different races. Don Barrett reports of a toothless Australian being fed by a Melanesian private when a huge flood chased the soldiers up into the trees:

After an uncomfortable and wet night there was a little cheer in the morning when a small wild pig was captured. Miraculously a fire was made and soon the tempting smell of cooking pork was causing mouths to water. Watering freely was the mouth of Lieutenant Harry Read who was also bemoaning the loss in the flurry of the previous day of his denture. Pig cooked, and Read's batman, Pte. Lalun produced a tasty meal assuring Read that the pork was tender enough to eat without teeth. It was. "How was it done?" queried Read. "Simple," said Lalun, "I chewed it first." (1969, 501)

The film *Angels of War* reveals glimpses of the dramatic theater of the war, and the traumatic, emotional impact it had in Papua New Guinea. The film shows the suffering and losses, as well as the recent and continuing demands for compensation, especially by the carriers, laborers, policemen, and soldiers. It is not possible to include a narration of every man and woman interviewed in the film, but I wish to highlight a few individuals, in order to put you in a position to appreciate their statements.

The first person is Arthur Duna, whom I alluded to earlier. Duna was at Buna government station when the Japanese bombed it and describes how he and his relative escaped from the station:

As the plane came very low, it started to fire its machine gun and went ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, ta, like coconuts falling from the trees, and everything was totally smashed. Wilfred and I were near a house with an iron roof and we felt that the machine gun was going to destroy the roof of the house and bring the house down to the ground. So Wilfred and I hid under some planks of timber that were laid on top of one another nearby. We were

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hiding there when the plane came and fired its guns and then passed by. Then it returned and fired at the station again. I came out from under the planks first and pulled at Wilfred's legs saying, "Look, if we stay here the bombs will come and kill all of us, so let's run away." So I pulled him out and ran to the sea. Wilfred and I left all our loincloths and our waistbands, armbands, everything under the planks. We just ran naked into the sea and dived under the water. All other parts of our bodies were under the water with mouths shut, though the noses to breathe and eyes to watch the planes were in air. It was like lying in a grave, except we still breathed. Each time the plane came over, we dived under the water. And each time it went away, we came out of the sea and ran along the beach. Just ran, ran, and ran.

(Waiko 1988, 46)

In the film, Duna tells the story of how the Japanese captured him, of his escape, of his recruitment to work as a laborer for the US military forces, and of the time he was innocently beaten as a result of his fellow villagers' desire to have sexual intercourse with the white female nurses.

The second person is Raphael Oimbari from a village between Buna and Gona. He is an ordinary villager who meets a wounded soldier by the name of George Washington in a helpless situation:

George Washington received a mortal wound and I helped him to a nearby camp where a doctor treated him. After the bridge crossing, he asked for water and I fetched some for him. He had hardly finished drinking, drinking it, when a Japanese Bren gun burst out like thunder at us and we dived under the Kunai grass. George on one side and I on the other side of the track. I crawled out first and picked him up slowly. We were walking again when he said, "I am hungry." I gave him one hard biscuit, but he said, "Break it in half and let us share it." So I broke it and gave him one half and I ate the other half. After sharing the biscuit, he began to limp instead of walking. The pain was too much and he was dizzy. I embraced the man and tried to carry him but he was too heavy, so I half-carried him to our camp.

The third person is Japhet Jigede, who rose to the rank of sergeant major but was stripped of his rank just before the war ended. He explains that the war ended because Pacific Islanders used their age-old customary magical powers and not because of superior weapons, particularly the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945. Jigede believes the ashes from the burning of a piece of bark, a leaf, a piece of animal or fish, and a portion of his father's hair saved the Melanesians under his command. He describes the process and the effective use of the magical power:

I told all the members of the Papuan Infantry Battalion under my control to sit around the fire that I made to burn these things. They had to be there

when the power in these things evaporated into smoke so that they could inhale it. After the things were burned to ashes, I filled their tins with ashes. I ordered each soldier to come one by one and take a tin of ashes and my instructions followed. "This is not our war but we have entered into it and you may die at any moment. This staff is your protection, derived from our deep rooted customs established by our ancestors who used it against their enemies. Do not play with it. If you play with girls or lie with women, do not hide these deeds." [Say], "I am sick, my head is aching and my body's heavy," or any kind of excuse that you can produce. The officers will allow you to return to the rear camps, away from the enemy front line, then you must boil some water with some traditional plant munitions and wash away the sexual odor before you can be allowed to return to the front line again. If you do not follow this, your sexual contact with women will spread from one man to the others among us. This would make us vulnerable and easy targets for the Japanese bullets which would shoot through our bodies. The bathing and cleansing in hot water with medicines will wash away the vulnerability and the enemy bullets will miss us." To avoid bullets, I ordered the men to abstain from sexual intercourse if they wanted to return to see their families in the villages. I showed them how to use the ash.

"Every morning, dip your middle finger and smear it over your eyebrow, rub it over your rifle barrel and the remainder of it, keep inside the pouches where pistols or cartridges are kept. If you follow these instructions, your bullets will enter the bodies of the enemy, but the enemy bullets will not touch you. They will miss you. This is because the power embodied in the bones of my father will protect us all. We are going to war with him and he will guide our way and save us." This power came down from my ancestors and it was passed on to me. I gave this power to soldiers under my command. We have defeated the enemy through these customs and no other. This was an overwhelming power which I never, ever, exposed to my white superiors. Not aware that our customs had provided the power to win, the final outcome of World War II, whitemen thought they had succeeded in defeating the Japanese through man and weapons alone.

Conclusion

Allow me to conclude with some remarks on historical method. Karl Popper, in his book *Objective Knowledge*, argues that the difference between metaphysical and scientific theories is that the scientific ones can, in principle, be disproved. Nobody ever proves that a theory is true, but someone can prove that a theory is false. The theory that has stood up to several attempts to disprove it is better than one that has not been tested. The real problem

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with social science is that a theory that is in principle falsifiable may be one very hard to test in practice.

This is especially true of history because it deals with surviving evidence. The European historians do not ordinarily ask what is the nature of historical explanation any more than a Melanesian sorcerer asks what is the nature of spiritual power. But both are continuing a tradition in which they are likely to receive and accept, often without questioning, somewhat vaguely formulated (even incoherent and contradictory) accounts of what history or sorcery is from those who trained them. The questions they are likely to ask are those of technique rather than of philosophical foundations. For instance, will it be useful to conduct a particular numerical analysis or will that type of sago palm produce more sago than the others?

What then is the characteristic difference between the documents and the oral traditions on which history is based? It is not, I believe, that the document is possibly true while the oral narratives are not true. The difference is, I suggest, that the written and oral sources are embedded in different cultural traditions. They are meant to be judged by quite different traditional standards in literate and oral cultures. The problem arises when literate historians try to fit oral testimony into the method, model, and time scale that accommodate history based on documentary sources. The reverse is also true in a situation where oral narrators attempt to fix the written word into the complex ethos that is history derived from oral traditions. Yet the similarities of the approaches are striking and a good historical method is equally important for both.

World War II was not of the Papua New Guineans' making and was beyond their understanding. The villagers experienced the terror of the explosive might of warplanes and battleships, of mortar and machine-gun fire. They watched as their homes and gardens were destroyed. They were conscripted by both sides and sometimes they were refugees in their own land. Ethel May Pushon, an Australian, is said to have turned 105 years in April this year (1988). She has seen two world depressions and two world wars. According to her, when World War I broke out, "Women had a degree of independence never seen before because the menfolk were away." In Papua New Guinea, the independence of women, perhaps, went a bit too far. One observer put it this way: "If the sexual problems of the boys away at war are serious, so also are those of the sweethearts and wives they leave behind. Deprived of their lawful sexual partners, the women indulged in random love affairs with the men who remained in the village."

An extreme example of this type of maladjustment came to my attention on the lower Sepik River. A group of women of a village from which almost three-fourths of the able-bodied men had been recruited appeared before the assistant district officer at Angoram to make court. They accused the *tutul* of

neglecting his duties by refusing to have intercourse with them. They argued that since the government had sanctioned the recruitment of their men, it was up to this village official appointed by the government to keep them sexually satisfied. The *tultul*, speaking in his own behalf, wailed that he had done his best but that he had reached his limit. "*Mi les long puspus*," he cried, "*baebae skin blong mi bae pinis*" 'I am tired of intercourse, soon my skin will become completely loose and I will be completely wrecked as a result of too much orgasm.'

The following is a cry from one of the women whose son was taken away. I'll translate the song poem in this manner:

War has come
The young men are leaving
To defend alien land.
The foreigners will be saved.

What has called
The young man away
To become enemy victims?
The conquerors will be happy.

The mother is deserted
Lonely without her son
A barren beggar
Abandoned to heartache.

The mother who lost blood
Has become a barren beggar.
The one who bore him
I am a lonely beggar.

(Waiko 1986, 31)

Here, this woman is telling in subtle points about the flow of war. She sees her son going to fight and laments that this will only be to the advantage of the foreigners: those who see him as a savior and those who will count him as a victim. The verses are strong statements of the grieving mother who feels deserted and impoverished. The poem is a clear indication that while the villagers knew little of the broad strategic flow of the war or the reasons that either side gave for their violence, they made perceptive statements about their own actions and attitudes.

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**For King and Country:
A Talk on the Pacific War in Fiji**

Brij V. Lal

On 1 July 1939 a very curious poem appeared in the pages of the Fiji Times, arguably the most loyal newspaper in the most loyal, dutiful colony in the British Empire. Titled "To Whom It May Concern," it went like this:

Please be kind to Britain,
She isn't very strong,
Her Navy is inefficient,
Her Army's all gone wrong.
Her ARP * is useless,
Her Airforce is far too small,
Her people so degenerate,
She has no morale at all!
She doesn't want to fight you,
She's so convinced you'd win,
She'll let you take her Empire,
If it will save her skin.
She's old, decayed and senile,
And you have strength and youth,
So please be kind to Britain,
Don't keep abusing Britain,
Be nice to poor old Britain,
Or, you may learn the truth.

The truth about Great Britain was quite simple. It emerged from the war a devastated nation, diminished in international stature. Its once mighty, far-flung empire began to crumble and creak around it. Soon, with India leading the way, the sun would set forever on waves that Britannia had ruled for well over a century. But the truth about the Pacific War in Fiji is not quite so

* ARP: air raid precaution

simple. Except for a few brief months during the entire period of the Pacific War, Fiji was never in danger of invasion from any quarter. Not a single shot was fired, not a single life lost on Fijian soil itself for the defense of those islands. And yet the war became a powerful symbolic event in Fijian history, bequeathing a legacy of suspicion, division, distrust, and hostility among the different communities in Fiji.

The Fiji war in its various aspects is too large a topic for me to cover in this paper so I'll be brief and confine myself to one or possibly two related questions.¹ The first is: How did the different ethnic groups in Fiji, the Fijians, the Indians, and the Europeans, respond to the government-inspired war effort, and how did they perceive the war, its importance and significance for their own communities and for the colony as a whole? Let us take the indigenous Fijian response first. Their response was quick, warm, and extremely generous. In 1943, the peak period, there were 8513 men in uniform in Fiji, half of whom were in the labor corps. Of these 6371 were indigenous Fijians. Local and expatriate Europeans, particularly from New Zealand, contributed 1870, and Indians numbered a paltry 264. The Fijians justifiably emerged from the war as heroes, praised for their bravery and cunning in jungle warfare, their steadiness under fire, and their loyalty and dedication to the cause of the British Empire. Their record of accomplishment, as measured by the number of awards they won, is impressive. Altogether they received 29 decorations, including a posthumous Victoria Cross, and 25 mentions in dispatches.

The question is: Why did the Fijian community respond so enthusiastically? It seems to me that there are at least four or five reasons which help us understand the quick Fijian response. First, culture had a role to play. Fijians were no strangers to war, which was a constant and important part of their life in precolonial times. Fighting was, as Charles Wilks described in the 1840s, "a noble employment of man and a path to honor and status for young men" (Ravuvu 1974, 1). This was also the case in many other Pacific Island societies. Courage and valor, prowess in war--these were values upon which Fijian culture placed a very high premium. Another important reason for the prompt Fijian response, I think, was the fact that the people who did the recruiting were high chiefs, in some cases paramount chiefs. Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, only a couple of rungs below God in most Fijian eyes according to his biographer Deryck Scarr (1980), led the recruiting effort. He was Oxford educated, a member of the bar, and a distinguished high chief in the employ of the colonial civil service. He toured the villages, talked and advised, and enlisted young men with great success. Several other very high Fijian chiefs enlisted as officers in various platoons, and their presence was inspiring to young men willing to prove their loyalty to the Crown. "Fijians will never be

recognized unless our blood is shed first," said Sukuna, to great effect. And coming from him, these words carried great weight. So, at one level, the active enlisting was seen as fulfilling a traditional obligation to the *turaga* 'chief', and to the *vanua* 'land' (see Ravuvu 1974). The principle of reciprocity was clearly at work here.

Whatever we may think of the effects of colonialism in the Pacific or Fiji, most Fijian chiefs did not actively dislike the British or their policies. They saw the coming of the British to Fiji in a positive light. Gordon's policy of indirect rule had preserved Fijian traditions, institutions, and values, albeit in a significantly modified form (see France 1969). The Great Council of Chiefs was the body that was directly responsible for much of the government of indigenous Fijian society. The colonial government had acted to prevent land alienation with a result that 83 percent of all land in Fiji today remains in Fijian hands. The Fijian chiefs saw the government of Fiji not as a one-way street but as a partnership involving themselves and the colonial government. And in things that mattered to them, the welfare of their own society, they had complete control. Given this situation it is not surprising to find that when one partner was under attack, the other felt obliged to come to its assistance. There were of course throughout Fijian history many Fijian voices of dissent. In the early part of this century there was Apolosi Nawai, and in the 1920s Fijians in southern Viti Levu youth organizations, such as the Viti Cauravou, at times advocated refusal to pay tax because they complained of neglect and isolation, of being treated like children. But they were suppressed by the combined power of chiefs and colonial officialdom.

For the most part, though, trust characterized the relationship between chiefs and the government. Ratu Sukuna, the first Fijian to be knighted, had a certain undoubted love for British culture and British institutions. Opposing an Indian push for complete adult franchise in 1934, he said in the Legislative Council: "Fijians desire a form of government in which British culture, a sense of fair play and justice are going to preponderate. That, sir," he said to the speaker, "is a desire we hold very strongly" (Scarr 1980). A year before, in 1933, opposing Indian calls for political equality with Europeans, Sukuna had said in the Legislative Council: "The question of equality has been raised and I should like to say publicly that so far as the Fijians are concerned, we think we are very well treated, and for the next two, three, four generations we will look to European leadership and expect the Europeans to lead us until such times as we are able to guide ourselves" (Scarr 1980). Similar sentiments were expressed in 1961, 1965, 1969, and indeed today, right now as I speak, the paramount chiefs of Fiji are beseeching the Queen to keep the title of Tui Viti, despite unceremoniously severing links with the Crown. The fact was that many chiefs were educated in Britain; "going up" to Oxford, even for a

minor administrative course for a couple of months, was a source of great prestige and status in a community and colony that placed high premium on rituals, ceremonies, and protocol. And the fact that they shared the same religion and played "rugger" and cricket together helped to reinforce bonds of solidarity between the Fijians and the Europeans. So it was only natural for chiefs to come to the assistance of their mentors and protectors in a time of need.

But while sentiment played a part in determining the quality and magnitude of Fijian response, political calculations were not far below the surface. These were clearly understood if not always publicly articulated. Changes that displeased Fijian chiefs were in the offing. Indians demanded full democracy, elected government, and equality with Europeans. And as we might guess, these were things that chiefs opposed because such things as democracy and elections posed direct and very real threats to their status and the basis of their power. Then there were the demands from the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR), the monopoly sugar company in Fiji, which could not be ignored. The company led an attempt in the 1930s to get the Fijian landlords to open up land and to give more secure leases to Indian tenants. And that, too, threatened the Fijian hold on power. Ratu Sukuna saw very clearly indeed that if he was going to stop the tide of change threatening to undermine Fijian chiefly power (as he saw it), he needed to get the British government on his side. A strong show of loyalty would do the trick, and the war provided that opportunity. He was not disappointed. Changes after the war gave an expanded role for Fijian chiefs in a revitalized Fijian administration. It was reformed and revitalized in 1946. The government reaffirmed its pledge to uphold the promises of the Deed of Cession to maintain the paramountcy of Fijian interests in Fiji. The chiefs, thus, were able to kill two birds with one stone. They got what they wanted and, on the other hand, demonstrated their loyalty to the empire.

The Indian response, in contrast, was, as I have said, paltry and indirect. They raised money through carnivals, games, and direct contributions--enough, surprisingly, to buy a bomber, which was named the Fiji Indian, for the Royal Air Force. Some who couldn't put up with petty acts of racial discrimination in Fiji went to New Zealand and joined the Narrow Neck and Maori camps. Others with some European blood joined the part-European platoon in Fiji. Hundreds joined the Labour Corps and served in Fiji for the entire duration of the war. But as far as actual soldiering went, their response was unenthusiastic. They were labeled disloyal and seditious, and their descendants have been tainted with the supposed cowardly sins of their fathers and forefathers.

Why this paltry response? Were Indians actually actively disloyal? Let us consider several things. In the first place, what is not often realized is that the government did not want Indians to enroll as soldiers in the armed forces. An Indian platoon was created in 1934 but disbanded in 1941. Instead, the government wanted Indians as laborers and as workers. That was the way, the governor told the Indians, that they could make their valuable contributions to the war effort. Listen to the governor in a radio broadcast in 1941. He urged the Indians "To remember always that the best way to win a war is in the first place to increase the general level of production by working with increased effort in whatever may be the normal employment. And in the second, to fit themselves with any special responsibility for which they may be selected." The second part was a half-hearted afterthought. No serious and sustained effort was ever made to recruit Indians to fight in the Fiji Defence Forces.

The second reason for Indian reluctance was European insistence on maintaining double standards in the matter of pay. European soldiers received 3 shillings a day, wife separation allowance of 3 shillings per week, and child allowance of 1 shilling and 6 pence. Non-European soldiers received 2 shillings per day, half the European rate of wife separation allowance, and one-third the child allowance. The Indians simply, and quite understandably, insisted on equal pay, equal work, equal value, equal risk. The government refused. It refused because it knew that Fiji was never really under any imminent threat of attack. And Indians refused to concede that, on the battlefield, a white soldier's life was worth more than a non-white soldier's life. Today no one would seriously question the principle of equal pay for equal work. But in colonial Fiji it was seditious to even think of equality with Europeans.

The third reason for the Indians' lukewarm response was that unlike the Fijians, the Indians did not have a warm recollection of their colonial experience in Fiji. Whereas the Fijians remembered protection and various safeguards, Indians remembered servitude, cultural deracination, violence, and an unaided, lonely struggle for survival after the end of indenture in 1920. The colonial government was rightly perceived as uncaring, unsympathetic, and working in collusion with the CSR. Indeed, in every dispute that farmers had with the company from the 1920s to the 1960s, the government always sided with the company, using on all occasions strong tactics to break up industrial strikes. The company was also a major landholder in Fiji. Those tenants who lived on its estates were bound by a contract that minutely regulated every aspect of the tenant's life. You couldn't even plant vegetables for your own use on CSR estate land without the company's permission. You couldn't keep a milk cow, a goat, poultry, or anything else without the

company's authorization. And CSR made it very clear that it didn't want Indians to enlist for overseas service because that would mean loss of income and loss of labor for its own operation. Thus, when the time came for Indians to decide who to listen to, they knew what to do. They called the CSR a tyrannical mother-in-law and the government a dutiful daughter-in-law. I've seen no record anywhere of the government ever leaning on the CSR to make it less painful for its tenants to leave for service in the Labour Corps or on the battlefield.

Membership in the British Empire was not the badge of honor for the Indians that it obviously was for the Europeans and Fijian chiefs. As one official noted, the possibility of the decline of the British Empire aroused in the Indian "no emotion stronger than incredulity that the British should have allowed themselves to be reduced to this humiliating plight." He continued: "To the Indians we live among here, the Empire is no national heritage, no proud monument to the distinguished history of their race. It is something extraneous to their culture and they could face with equanimity the prospect of it being shaken to pieces by the convulsions of this war."

Two other things need to be mentioned. One is that the Indians did not share the dark view that the British painted of Japanese as monstrous human beings whose brutality knew no bounds. They listened to Radio Azad, broadcast from Tokyo at the crack of dawn every day, and heard Japan talk about a new order, freedom for the Asiatic races, and the end of British colonialism in Asia and the Pacific. The colonial government, of course, scoffed at these promises, but one Indian asked, "How can we know it is false when we haven't even given it a try? After all, there might be something in it!" When one prominent Fiji Indian leader was asked how he might respond if the Japanese came, he said: "Well, now that you (the Japanese) have come to live among us, you must do your very best for our social welfare." The British thought that seditious.

The second thing that should be borne in mind is that for many Indians at that time (1930s and 1940s) India was still the emotional and spiritual homeland. Emerging from the shadows of indenture they were trying to forge an identity for themselves in this period. Naturally, inevitably, they turned to India. It is only to be expected that Indian political thought and political developments in this period would influence the attitude of people in Fiji. If the colonial government in Fiji had been more caring and more sympathetic to the needs of Indian farmers and workers, the Indians might have been less inclined to look for help outside the colony. But that was not the case. For all these reasons then--culture, history, sentiment, and ideology--the Indian response remained lukewarm. Fiji Indians were not actively disloyal or seditious; Fijian exuberance only made it seem so.

What about Europeans? Well, it was their war and, as was to be expected, they rallied behind the war effort with total dedication. They knew that without the British Empire, they would be reduced to nothing, without the jobs and status they enjoyed in the colony. Men joined the different regiments and went abroad, and women formed such societies as the Patriotic Knitting and Sewing Society to talk about the war and raise money. They put up with the inconvenience of rations, curfews, and other restrictions. But as they listened to Australian radio and heard terrible news about heavy casualties, especially among colonial regiments from Australia and New Zealand, anti-English sentiment began to emerge slowly among the local Europeans. One example: "John Bull is sitting tight and secure in his little island, accepting heroic sacrifices in blood and treasure from his children overseas but unwilling to take any risks on their behalf in return." They accused "the British lion of deserting its cubs and leaving them to be devoured by the Japanese tiger."

But it was the Americans, who came in large numbers, who caught the full brunt of Australasian and local European bitterness and frustration. One reason was the circulation of wild rumors. Noted one official, "The periodic flare-up of anti-American sentiment among Kiwi troops appears to have its origins in an emotional reaction to stories about American soldiers in New Zealand. Tales of desertion of wives and sweethearts for Americans do circulate freely and each man feels his girl is being stolen or seduced." And the Americans did not make it easy for themselves either. For example, they did not comport themselves to the prescribed norms of Anglo-Australasian social behavior in Fiji. They drank heavily in public, they womanized, talked freely, and generally "had a good time."

The Americans posed another kind of threat to the established order as well. In their dealings with non-Europeans they were often generous, open, and congenial, which was quite a contrast to the ritualized and closely regulated conduct between local Europeans and non-whites. For example, Americans didn't mind too much if Indian drivers went into the camps and walked or drove away with a few gallons of petrol for their trucks. And they didn't mind paying a few shillings to Fijians for horses stolen from the Sabeto Indian settlement. They shared their cigarettes and on occasion their whisky in return for a few favors. The colonial government called Americans "Strangers with novel viewpoints and unfamiliar ways causing a silent but far from painless upheaval in the lives of all the communities." It feared that American friendliness toward the local population might put the government into a "thoroughly uncomfortable fire."

But that was not to be. The Americans left, leaving behind memories of a different kind of sahib: efficient, impatient with rituals, and generous. And it

didn't take too long for old colonial ways of doing things to reassert themselves. Still, in many ways Fiji of 1945 was very different from Fiji of 1939. Demobilized Fijian men went back to the villages, many broken by all kinds of diseases, such as tuberculosis, malaria, and smallpox. They went with strange and wonderful stories. One of my favorites is recounted by Asesela Ravuvu in his book *Fijians at War*. It is about Fijian soldiers not wanting to train when they had a hangover, or when it was wet and miserable outside. They would eat hot chillies, raise their body temperature, sweat, and then tell the doctors, "Look, I have a fever, I can't go out today." Ravuvu also tells the story about the valiant Viliame Lomasalate of Platoon No. 5 who, prevented from keeping his promise to eat the first enemy he killed in the Solomons, nevertheless managed to eat the eyeballs of a dead Japanese soldier which he had scooped out with his pocket knife. Such fierce patriotism and loyalty to the cause of the war earned for the Fijian soldiers a glorious reputation as among the best jungle fighters in the world.

At the end of the war the colonial government gave about five thousand sets of agricultural equipment to the demobilized Fijian soldiers to take back to their villages to replant their neglected gardens and reinvigorate the subsistence economy. A money economy entered the village after the war, and in the Fijian villages on the periphery of towns tinned goods (fish, mutton) began to replace some of the traditional items of exchange. Before the war European and Fijian leaders had, in their own ways, opposed Indian demands for political change and social equality. Their experiences during the war--the camaraderie of the battlefield and their common dedication to the cause of the empire--augmented their shared hostility toward Indians and forged a bond of friendship, which has endured ever since, between the two groups. The war also transformed the character and the role of the Fijian military: the Fiji Defence Forces, created solely for the defense of Fiji itself, were given a new role as the Fiji military forces, which could be sent out to any part of the British Empire needing soldiers. By design as well as default, then, the Fiji military force was necessarily Fijian dominated. An accident of history had given the Fijians a power more important, as we now know, than the ballot box. They jealously guarded the Fijian domination of the armed forces with what results I need not say. The truth about the Pacific War in Fiji, then, is not simple.

Note

1 This paper is an edited transcription of my talk given at the 1988 conference. A fully documented study is in preparation.

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World War II in the Solomons: Its Impact on Society, Politics, and World View

David Welchman Gegeo

The war . . . was very intense. Evenings, mornings and nights we were dumbfounded by everything that was happening. Guns and bombs were constantly exploding. . . . We lived in constant fear.

Isaac Gafu

[You] would see blue flames from the bombs dropped and shells fired. Day and night was just like that. And our ships at sea would also fire bullets like rain. Hey, I really don't know how to describe it.

George Maelalo

These two quotations--one from Isaac Gafu, who served in the Solomon Islands Labour Corps on Guadalcanal, and the other from George Maelalo, who was one of the first Solomon Islanders to be trained in the defense force--dramatize the impact of World War II experiences on the Islanders who were directly involved in it.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of the war on Solomon Islands society, politics, and world view. First, I will introduce the Solomon Islands and briefly outline major events in the war there. Next, I will examine how the war affected Islanders, both those who were directly involved as soldiers, scouts, and members of the Labour Corps and those left behind in villages. Then I will discuss the influence of the war on political and social changes that occurred in the Solomons in the late 1940s. Finally, I will examine recent events in the Solomons to show the kind of long-term impact that the war had on Islanders' views of Americans.

DAVID WELCHMAN GEGEO

The information I am presenting comes from in-depth interviews with twenty-seven World War II veterans from Kwara'ae on the island of Malaita, whose oral histories I recorded in 1984 and 1987. Their stories are supplemented by several years' fieldwork carried out by myself and Karen Watson-Gegeo, as well as my own recollections as a Kwara'ae man who grew up listening to World War II stories told by veterans living in my community.

The Solomon Islands and World War II

Other than the plantation experience, most Solomon Islanders knew little about the outside world prior to World War II, and their experiences with Europeans were largely limited to the British, Australians, and New Zealanders who were coconut plantation owners, missionaries, teachers, or colonial officers. Given the colonial situation, relationships between Islanders and these Europeans in general were distant and demarked by clear lines of authority.

Many Islanders heard rumors about World War II when it began in Europe in 1939, but they paid little attention to it because it seemed remote and unlikely to affect them. Even when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawai'i in 1941, Islanders regarded the conflict as the white people's war, just as in their own traditional warfare system two tribes could war with each other without affecting other tribes. Moreover, at the time, little information about the war actually got to most Islanders because there was as yet little access to radio broadcasts.

Solomon Islanders were therefore very surprised when rumors about the Japanese advance on the Solomons were confirmed by the Japanese bombing of Gavutu, Nggela, on 22 January 1942. They saw their British rulers retreat as the Japanese rapidly took Nggela and then occupied Guadalcanal in May. During the ensuing months, before the Americans landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and gradually retook the island, most of the 800 Solomon Islanders involved in the Solomon Islands Defence Force worked as policemen, scouts and coastwatchers. A few were also trained as soldiers and later fought in the Solomons and in Bougainville.

After the American invasion of Guadalcanal the British established the Solomon Islands Labour Corps in November 1942 and began recruiting Islanders to build airfields and roads, load and unload supplies and materiel from ships, and clear fields to set up camps. The majority of Islanders involved in the war actually served in the Labour Corps, on one-year contracts. (See recollections by Jonathan Fifi'i in chapter 4 about his experiences as the leader of a Labour Corps section from Kwaio, and Lamont Lindstrom's discussion of the Vanuatu Labour Corps.)

The Labour Corps was essential to the Allied war effort because it freed American soldiers to concentrate on fighting and therefore played a major role in victory over the Japanese. At its peak membership in 1944 the Solomon Islands Labour Corps had over 3700 recruits. Recruiting was especially high from Malaita, where British officials actually argued over how many men they could extract without devastating the local subsistence economy.

Immediate Impact of War Experiences on Islanders

The immediate impact of the war on Solomon Islanders included the shock of what was involved in modern warfare between nation states; a sudden, new perception of relationships with outsiders, especially with regard to "race"; and the social dislocation of communities when men went off to participate in the war in large numbers.

Isaac Gafu and George Maelalo's descriptions of their fear and shock are typical of recollections by those who experienced the war firsthand as scouts, soldiers, or members of the Labour Corps. They had signed up with little knowledge of what they were getting into. They associated signing up for the war with signing up to go to the plantations--a chance for travel, adventure, and to make a little money. They did not realize that their own cultural conception of war was very different from the reality of war as fought by modern nation-states, which involves masses of soldiers; complex technology, equipment, and supplies; ships, airplanes, bombs, and machine guns; mass killing; and fighting over long distances and large land areas.

Not only did all of these characteristics of a world war shock Solomon Islanders, but they were amazed also that contending armies appeared to want to completely destroy each other. For the Kwara'ae, who were overwhelmed by seeing battlefields covered with dead bodies (too many even to bury), the high casualty rate of modern warfare left the deepest impression. This impression is reflected in the Kwara'ae name for World War II, *mae doe* 'big death'.

A second important experience during the war had to do with Islanders' relationships with white Europeans. For the first time Solomon Islanders began to distinguish among kinds of white people. Whereas the British continued the strict lines separating Islanders from their colonial masters, Americans treated Solomon Islanders with warmth and generosity. (See chapter 6, in which Hugh Laracy talks about a notorious case of animosity between a Solomon Islander and a British officer.) Islanders were struck by the huge amount of food and other supplies Americans brought with them. They were also struck by the willingness of Americans to share with Islanders,

even to the extent of passing around a single cigarette. As Gafu recalled, "they came with their cargo and you ate until you could not eat anymore so you threw the food away. . . . [The] Americans said, 'Let's eat while we're all still alive and together. Because when the Japanese come, some of us may be killed. And then, even if we get together to eat again, it won't be the same' " (paraphrased). The unity Solomon Islanders felt with Americans is reflected in this statement. Together with its emphasis on sharing food, these relations could seem almost sacred to the Kwara'ae, for they represented a sharing even to the grave--"blood sharing," as it would be expressed among Kwara'ae warriors (Fox 1962, 125).

The sense Islanders had that Americans treated them as equals was reinforced by the seeming equality that black American soldiers enjoyed with white soldiers--they wore the same clothes, ate the same food, received the same pay, and lived in the same tents. In fact, out of these experiences, Islanders developed a "mythic schema" about Americans in which Americans were depicted as enjoying unlimited wealth and racial equality. Americans were seen as proud, courageous, and strong. Moreover, the idea that the Solomon Islands could become independent was introduced to many Islanders by Americans during the war. In particular, Islanders felt a kinship with Americans because America, too, had been a colony of the British and had won its independence through a revolutionary war.

Meanwhile back home in the villages on Malaita the people who had been left behind when large numbers of men were recruited into the defense force and Labour Corps struggled with major social dislocation. In traditional times, before men went off to fight a tribal war, everyone would meet to discuss who would fill leadership roles and what other arrangements needed to be made to ensure the safety and continuity of village life. Such preplanning was possible because tribal animosities built up over years, and people could anticipate when hostilities were likely to break out. But recruitment for World War II happened suddenly and unexpectedly, and people were confused about what was really happening or what the implications were for village life.

In the early months of 1942, the British began ordering all coastal villages on Malaita to be abandoned and Islanders to flee into the interior as the Japanese advanced. People still talk about how women pulled their sleeping children from bed and fled into the forest with them, and how the men spent the rest of the night laboring to erect shelters in mosquito-infested swampy areas, using the dim light from burning dried bamboo and coconut leaves. For many months people were forced to live in the bush without fires at night because of the fear that the Japanese would locate their settlements.

The Japanese did destroy some buildings on Malaita, but they never launched an invasion or occupied the island. Yet Malaita people experienced the terror of war, even if from a distance. They saw planes being shot down at night in the channel between Guadalcanal and Malaita, they heard the pounding of guns during the invasion of Guadalcanal by the Americans, and lived in fear of invasion themselves.

In terms of local social organization, status relationships in the villages were disrupted, families were separated, people worried about their villages being looted, and domestic animals broke out of their pens and ran wild. With so many men absent, women became more active in village leadership, taking on new roles (see chapter 11 by Suzanne Falgout for similar effects on Pohnpei). In fact a group of women from villages in West Kwara'ae marched to the government headquarters to demand that the Kwara'ae men who had been recruited for war service be returned to Malaita.

The overall immediate impact of the war on Solomon Islanders was a shattering of old beliefs about cosmology, that is, how the world works. The outside world--previously far away and little known--suddenly was seen to be connected to them in a drastic way. Two gigantic, technologically sophisticated armies had appeared from nowhere to fight a war not on their own home grounds, but in the Solomons where Islanders were not even a party to the dispute (Zoleveke 1988). Moreover, Islanders came to a much more profound understanding that there are different kinds of people in the world, but especially, different kinds of white people.

Impact of World War II: The Postwar Period

One of the primary social and political outcomes of World War II was the rise of Maasina Rule, a Malaita movement to restructure traditional society and gain political independence from England (see Laracy 1983). *Maasina*, a word from the 'Are'Are language of Malaita, means "brotherhood." Jonathan Fifi'i, who was a Maasina Rule head chief for Kwaio district, talks about the movement in chapter 4. He also discusses his experiences in his chapter in the book *The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II* (White et al. 1988).

To briefly summarize the movement, Maasina Rule was both a revitalization movement and an independence movement. The revitalization aspects involved the restructuring of traditional cosmology and the reestablishment of a Solomon Islands worldview, updated to incorporate Islanders' experiences with the outside world, through education, and during the war. It reestablished a traditional chiefdom system for Malaita, rebuilt

fortifications destroyed by the missionaries, and developed religious ideas that synthesized Christianity with traditional beliefs.

As an independence movement Maasina Rule was concerned with getting rid of the foreign colonial government and establishing self-rule. Some commentators have seen Maasina Rule as a cargo cult because as the movement progressed, a segment of members came to believe that if movement rules were followed the Americans would return and give Islanders masses of material goods. Salana Ga'a, one of the movement leaders for Kwara'ae, believes that the cargo idea was used by the British to undermine the legitimate aims of the movement.

Hugh Laracy argues that "although Maasina Rule was sparked by World War II its roots can be traced far into the past. . . . There is no reason to suppose that Solomon Islanders have ever been less conscious of their worth than have any other people. Indeed . . . the historical record clearly attests their abundant readiness to defend both themselves and that which they considered to be theirs" (1983, 7). What Islanders' World War II experiences did was to intensify and legitimate their sense of identity, and their right to take charge of their own political destiny. They no longer saw the British as infallible, they were more conscious than ever of the capricious nature of colonial rule, and the Americans had legitimized their feelings that they should be independent and in control of their own country.

An important result of World War II was that many island men returned home more experienced in dealing with outsiders, more fluent in English, and with more insight about how to oppose British rule. Many of the men who served in various capacities in the war, such as Jonathan Fifi'i, became leaders of, or active participants in, Maasina Rule. The British were able to suppress the Maasina Rule movement by force, arresting and imprisoning the leaders. Eventually, with continuing pressure from Islanders and continuing economic problems of their own, the British agreed to the islands becoming independent, which was realized in 1978.

Long-term Effects of the War on Islanders' Attitudes Toward Americans

Among Islanders who experienced the war directly, some viewed their experiences negatively and others positively. For some the war was a traumatic experience, but for others war brought new ideas and, through movements like Maasina Rule, helped forge the beginnings of a national identity.

Much could be said about the long-term effects of the war, but I will focus on Islanders' attitudes toward Americans. Islanders who served in the war returned home to their villages to tell and retell their experiences to their

children and grandchildren. A major theme in the stories they told and in the oral histories we collected was the mythic schema they had formed about Americans as generous, egalitarian, wealthy, audacious, and rescuers of the Solomon Islands.

What has happened to this mythic schema since the war? Solomon Islanders like myself, who were born and grew up after the war, learned through the older generation's World War II stories to respect and admire Americans. The first doubt cast on this view occurred in 1968 when the Americans were successful in landing men on the moon as part of their space exploration program. The general feeling among rural Solomon Islanders about this exploit was that Americans were tampering with nature. Although Solomon Islanders saw the moon flight as further evidence of American audacity and technological superiority--similar to what they had witnessed in World War II--they couldn't understand what America had to gain from it, and they feared the moon and the atmosphere might be polluted or damaged by it.

The second incident casting doubt on the mythic schema was the Vietnam War. Solomon Island villagers questioned why such a large power like the United States would invade such a small, poor country. People equated Vietnam with the Solomons and talked of how if a superpower invaded the Solomon Islands to take it over, the outcome was certainly obvious. Again they asked, what has America to gain from this?

The third issue casting doubt on the mythic schema of Americans has been the growing consciousness among all Solomon Islanders of the dangers of nuclear testing and nuclear war. Older Islanders who remember the bombs of World War II talk of how, if nuclear bombs are bigger and more destructive, then whole islands would be blown out of the sea in a nuclear war. Islanders find it amazing that Americans, who they had previously seen as saviors and as protective of Islanders' rights, would be promoting nuclear development. As one villager commented to me, "You don't even have to be educated to see the stupidity in it."

Nevertheless, the landing on the moon, the Vietnam War, and the possibility of nuclear war seem remote to most villagers. But in 1984 an event occurred in the seas just offshore that brought the reality of contemporary American interests into conflict with the mythic schema developed about Americans in World War II. This event happened in 1984 when the American tuna fishing vessel, the *Jeanette Diana*, was caught fishing within the two-hundred-mile zone of the Solomons, a violation of international law. The Solomon Islands' only small patrol boat chased the *Jeanette Diana*, fired over its bow, and brought it back to port a prisoner.

In court the ship's captain denied violating international law, but the court ordered heavy fines levied against the captain and also ordered the ship seized and sold. The Reagan administration threatened to boycott all tuna from the Solomon Islands and to take other measures. Eventually the dispute was resolved when the United States repurchased the ship at a price lower than its market value, and the Solomons government reduced fines.

The *Jeanette Diana* episode came as a shock to Solomon Islanders. First, they were dismayed that Americans would willfully violate international law and fish in Solomons waters, given that tuna is one of the country's few natural resources. Second, they were elated by the audacity of the Solomons patrol boat crew, which took on and arrested a very large and technologically sophisticated ship. The deceptive testimony of the captain in court and the reaction of the Reagan administration--all of which was detailed in the local media--shocked Islanders and puzzled them. Again, what had America, with all its wealth and power, to gain by taking advantage of a small country like the Solomons? Were Americans no longer friends to Solomon Islanders?

For the younger generation these events and a growing consciousness of world politics have weakened greatly the mythic schema about Americans passed on to them by World War II veterans. Even in the villages people over the past ten years have begun to reassess the long-held image of Americans as people to look up to, realizing that, like everyone else, Americans have strengths and weaknesses.

In contrast with the *Jeanette Diana* incident, the events following the devastation of Cyclone Namu in 1986 renewed villagers' faith in Americans, at least on Malaita and Guadalcanal. Immediately after the cyclone devastated many areas on these two islands, the US Navy sent construction battalion units (Seabees) to deliver food and supplies, repair roads and rebuild bridges, dig ditches to drain flood waters, and reconstruct buildings leveled by floods and wind. Their activities and their behavior received wide coverage in the newspapers and on the radio. Once again Americans were seen as coming to rescue Solomon Islanders, this time from a natural disaster. Many elements of what the Seabees did and how they behaved fit the mythic schema developed in World War II, including displaying physical strength and speed in work; treating Islanders in an egalitarian way; sharing food, clothing, and tobacco; and criticizing their officers behind their back. Story after story told to me and my wife in 1987 about the Seabees' involvement reflect these elements. As for the older men who had served in World War II, they said "That's just the way those Joes behaved in the war."

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Remembering the War in the Solomons

Jonathan Fifi'i

The Coming of the War

The white people told us that a war would eventually come. But even though we listened, we didn't believe them. We couldn't think of any reason that fighting would come to the Solomons. Other people advised us that if fighting did come, we shouldn't be afraid. They said that even if a bomb fell, it would be five minutes before it exploded. All we had to do was pick it up and throw it to where it would explode away from us!¹

In 1942 I was still at school at Kwailabesi, in northeast Malaita. One day we saw the Seventh Day Adventist ship *Melanesia* arrive. But there were no Solomon Islanders aboard, only missionaries. They warned all of the students that fighting was coming soon. They said "We will be leaving tonight. We can't say if we will ever see you again. But though we are leaving, the Americans may come to evacuate you. You must not worry, because there are Seventh Day Adventists among the Americans too."

Some of the other students and I prepared to see our teachers off. At dusk we boarded a small postal boat, and we and the *Melanesia* traveled along in the dark, without any lights. By daybreak we had reached Siota, on Nggela, and at Taroaniara we camouflaged the two boats with branches. We went in two dinghies to Tulagi, the capital at that time, to see what was happening there. Very few people remained in town. A Chinese child had been left behind in the evacuation so the police took him to Auki.

We heard two warplanes approach and at first they flew over us, but then they turned back, and one flew off toward Savo Island. The second plane returned to Tulagi and bombed the wireless station. A second bomb hit the resident commissioner's house, and a third was dropped on the prison. That night all of the missionaries fled, and we ran away too. By the next morning we were back on Malaita again. When we arrived we spread the word that we wouldn't be able to pick up any bombs to throw them away!

The same day that we arrived back on Malaita the fighting grew stronger. Bombs were bursting all day long. The next day, and the next, no Americans had arrived. We were all alone at Kwailabesi. We ate all the ducks and chickens and the goat too. The missionaries had told us we should.

Days later we saw the first American airplanes above. There were lots of small ones, and perhaps thirty big ones. The next day we saw a Japanese plane go over us flying very low. It came back past us and went down toward Ata'a. After it ditched the four Japanese aboard got their things, including a machine gun, and went to the Ata'a tax house, where they slept. People passed the news to Auki and the government sent six policemen, headed by Corporal Ben Ramo'alafa, to pick them up. When the police got to the head of the trail they took off their uniform sashes and guns and hid them. They tied up *kabilato* (loincloths) for themselves, and mussed up their hair so they would look like villagers when they went down to visit the Japanese. Then they went down to the tax house and greeted those four Japanese there, and rested with them, and got into a friendly conversation. Then they suddenly jumped up and wrestled the Japanese to the ground.

The name of the fourth Japanese was Kawaiama and he had worked at Tulagi before, repairing ships. He recognized Ben Ramo'alafa. "It's Corporal Ben. You kill us. We have come here to die," he said.

But Ramo'alafa said, "No. We have not been given orders to kill you. We were ordered to take you with us. We are to take you to Auki if possible." The Japanese agreed to go along with them. When they reached Feranagona they were being given food when one of the Japanese tried to commit suicide by pressing one hand down on top of his head and pressing the other one up under his chin, and biting down on his tongue. They had to tie his hands so he couldn't try that again.

Meanwhile some Kwaio men had come to Kwailabesi to escort me and the other Kwaio students back home. They told us that on the way they had seen the Japanese and that the plane had crashed near the river at Ata'a.² The next morning we were all walking along the trail when we came upon those four Japanese and those six soldiers. We continued along the trail with them until we got to the big river at Fokanakafo, and the man who had tried to commit suicide before leaped into the water, with one of the others tied to him. Some of the soldiers jumped in after them and pulled them back to shore. When we parted with them there, they were still asking to be killed. But the soldiers didn't want to kill them, since there was no reason for it.

To Guadalcanal

When we arrived back in Kwaio the two government headmen, my relatives Sirifa and Brown Kwarialaena, announced that the government had sent a paper saying they needed people. One of the headmen was my uncle. he said to me, "My boy, I want you to go to fight." He told me, "I want you to go because you've been to school, you speak some English and I want you to lead the group because the Americans don't speak Pijin English." I was only about twenty-one years old at the time, but they instructed me on how to look after the men, and I was willing. I said, "Oh, I would like that." I was made sergeant of our section on the spot. There were twenty-five of us, including myself. Altogether there were one hundred of us in four sections of twenty-five people each. Some just joined because they were interested and curious about war.

When we left for the fighting at Lungga the older people sacrificed pigs in the shrines to the spirits of our ancestors so they would guard us from injury. They asked them to make the Solomon Islanders strong so they could protect the islands from being spoiled. They sacrificed to the spirits to make the fighting be finished in one place and not spread to other areas. They were afraid that the war might spread to Malaita and spoil the ancestral shrines there. The spirits were asked to make the enemy dizzy and slow and to cause them to make mistakes, and for their rifles to misfire and miss their targets. Pigs were sacrificed for our minds to be strong and clear for whatever we had to do.

You and I may not believe such sacrifices could work, but those people did. And it seems as if they did work for them. Notice that even though the enemy was strong, the fighting didn't spread to Malaita. And the war was finished quickly on Guadalcanal. The heavy fighting only lasted a few months.

So only two days after I had arrived back home, a large group of us set out across the island. That night we slept in the bush at Duukwasi, and the next day we arrived in Auki where we were given food. The government officer Mr Trench said that after we had eaten, we should be brought back to him for inspection, and we would be leaving that night on the *Mendana*. We would arrive at Lungga the next morning. Trench told us, "If any of you are afraid to go to war, if you care too much about your family, care about your life, don't go."

We said, "No, we're going to go. We don't mind. What's the difference? If we stay on Malaita we will probably be killed, too, by the Japanese. And if we go we'll be killed, so what's the difference?"

Lungga

When we approached Guadalcanal we saw miles and miles of tents, masses of people, and trucks of all kinds going back and forth. The sea was full of ships, there were planes above us, and we could hear gunshots in the bush. But there were no Solomon Islanders there, the people were mostly American Marines. And there were no black Americans, or Australians, or New Zealanders there yet. There were not even any Guadalcanal people. The Fijians had just arrived. When we got there the place was just starting to fill up with people.

Four more sections of Kwaio and other Malaitans went to Tulagi. While they were there a store of ammunition blew up and six men were killed. One Kwaio man, Takaaba'e, was badly injured in that explosion and he was in such chronic pain that he eventually hung himself. Another Kwaio man, Suda, was blinded in one eye. At Tenaru there must have been three thousand of us. With us were several plantation managers [Labour Corps officers]. They were supposed to look after us.

They organized us into groups. "This group over here. You go with that leader there. This group over here go with that leader over there." I was the interpreter at that time. Some people were left there to put up our tents. There were four tents [one for each section of twenty-five], and also one where our meals were prepared.

During a war there's no time to waste. You just can't play around. We had just arrived but right away we were put to work. The water that we drank was polluted by dead bodies. But where else could you get water from? We just drank it. The Americans had brought along tablets that they put in the water to purify it. And so we got down to work.

At Lungga we unloaded and stacked the American cargo, and chopped wood for building storehouses to put it all into. We served as porters carrying goods, guns, and ammunition for the soldiers patrolling in the bush. We also aided the wounded and carried and buried the dead. Americans were always well buried in the ground, but the Japanese bodies were just covered enough to stop the stench. You could see their legs sticking up out of the earth.

It didn't appear then that the war would be over as soon as 1945. The fighting seemed too strong. During the daytime it was usually quiet because the American airplanes were flying around overhead, but one time Japanese airplanes attacked the Lungga airfield and dropped four bombs on it. Another time we were working at Lungga beach and a Japanese plane dropped two bombs in the middle of us there on the beach. The next day it bombed us again. There must have been fifty men killed during bombings. What would happen is that new recruits who had just arrived wouldn't obey

orders. If the air raid sounded then we would all jump into the fox holes, but the new arrivals would try to run away from the bombing instead. That's why so many died.

One time [26 January 1943] we were camped there with those Labour Corps officers, and about four in the morning the air raid sounded, and we all dived into our foxholes. Then they told us it was all clear, to come out. When we had all climbed out of our foxholes, the enemy attacked again. Some people became confused and they panicked and dashed off in all directions, and many were killed by the bombs. We were angry about that and we asked to be taken back home to Malaita. Mr Widdy [Labour Corps commanding officer] tried to calm us down, but we wouldn't listen to what he said. Then two American officers came and talked to us: "If you all go back, then this fighting will go on for a long time. What if we soldiers have to stop fighting in order to do the labor too? Because you are here to do the work, this fighting will be finished quickly."

And we answered: "We want you to tell those British officers you are going to put some Americans in our camps. Second, we want an American officer to be with them. And another thing, tell them they can't forbid us from visiting the Joes [Americans]."

They told us: "We will go talk with them, and will tell you tomorrow if they agree or not."

Then we added, "There is something else we want. We want them to give us our pay. They have not paid us yet."

The next day they came back and said it was all right. Then we were happy, and two hundred fifty of us went back to Lungga beach, and others went to Aribé'u, and some to Mataniko.

We didn't get any days off from our work, not on Saturdays, Sundays, or even Christmas or the New Year. Some of our men complained and said, "Why didn't we celebrate these holidays?" And I said to them, "There's no time to celebrate anything. Get down to work." We did the same kind of work as the Americans and the British, but we weren't allowed to wear the same uniforms. We wore lavalavas, yardage. It was forbidden for us to wear trousers or shirts. We sergeants were given a piece of khaki that had three stripes painted on it. They tied strings onto the cloth, and each of us were to tie the cloth onto our arms. The white officers all wore their stripes sewn onto their shirts, but all we got were those pieces of khaki. I was ashamed to wear it like that, so I would just carry it around in my hand.

We worked all day long until dark. Laborers were paid just \$2 per month, and sergeants eight dollars. We thought that was a lot of money at that time. Before the war wages had been only 10 shillings per month, or £1 [US\$2] if you had worked someplace for a long time. So we were very happy. There was

always enough food because the Americans fed us when we worked on their cargo. They told us to take anything that we wanted for ourselves. We took extra, thinking that, if we could find a way, we would send some of it back to our relatives on Malaita. When we were working with the Americans, we were never hungry, but no one grew fat either. That's because we never slept at night with the enemy planes always coming.

We requested clothing for the women back home. There on Malaita clothing was in such short supply that women were having to tear their pieces of cloth in half so there would be enough to go around. They couldn't cover their breasts; they only had enough to wrap a skirt around their waists. The Christians, that is. The bush women were all right, because they didn't mind going naked. I asked the Americans for cloth, and they told me that they hadn't brought any with them, only things for the fighting. But they did say they would look for old mattress covers, and if we washed them we could have them. So the Marines found some mattress covers and they brought them to us and said, "Here, send these to your women back on your island. This is the best we can do. It's not peacetime. We understand your need. Take these mattress covers for the time being and let the women use them." But there was a problem because our British officers were usually watching when our trucks arrived in the evening, bringing us back from work. I asked the advice of the Americans supervising us, and they told us that when we were carrying gifts we should jump down off the trucks before they reached the camp, and then we could slip in later.

Our officers tried to forbid us from visiting Americans, but when we told the Americans of this they told us not to worry about it, so we kept going. When an American had finished eating he would wash his plate and give it to me and tell me to go stand in the line for food. One time a Labour Corps officer saw this and told me I couldn't eat that food. A man named Kirsh told him "Go fuck yourself!"

While at Lungga we would collect things from the military dumps, wash them and store them in our tents. Whenever a Labour Corps section was ready to return to Malaita, the British officers would search through their possessions and confiscate forbidden things, like trousers. They gave out word that we were not supposed to take military items back home. But the Americans said that was a lie. They said the things we were taking were only rubbish, and anyone could just pick them up. Some of the American soldiers even scavenged at the dumps themselves.

The Americans gave us lots and lots of sheets, shirts, trousers. They even gave guns away. Some men got pistols, others carbines. One time they gave one man a machine gun. We wanted to take all our cargo back home with us, but it was difficult. They said each man could take home only one box about

thirty inches long. Some men made special boxes. A relative of mine, Gwauni, made our boxes for us. These boxes had a false bottom, and when Officer Widdy would inspect them he would reach into the box and touch the wood and think that was the bottom. Some men hid cartridges, while others disassembled rifles to conceal inside. My, but those boxes were heavy!

But one day, when all the sections had gone off to work, the Labour Corps officers summoned together some police and they searched through all of our tents. They confiscated all of the things that the army had given to us. They put the clean clothes into a separate pile by themselves, and then they poured kerosene over all the old clothes and set them on fire. They took those good things to their own quarters and later sold them in their store. When we arrived back at our camp we objected, but they said those things were not for us boys but were only for white men. We saved this episode in our memories.

On the night of 15 January 1943 Ru'uboo, Te'efu, 'Ui'aniaria, Tome Niuboo, and maybe fifty Kwaio and other people met. These men said they were going to kill the British Labour Corps officers. But I forbade it. "You cannot kill them, because we are in the midst of a war. It will be bad for all of us." They said "We can claim a bomb killed them."

I told them, "But those of you who do the murders will still have to adhere to the strict religious taboos that a man must follow after killing someone, and people will see from that what is going on." I ordered them not to do it.

I'm talking about these things because we were an oppressed people in the Solomon Islands. We had been oppressed for some time up to that point. Not only a single moment, it's something that happened each day all the time. And then when we would complain the American Marines would listen to us. They didn't mind. They would listen to us complain about the situation in the Solomon Islands. And when we worked and the British people would come and say, "Get cracking. What are you waiting for?" the American Marines would come and say, "Shut up, get out of here," in our defense. And they would tell us, "You have to struggle, you have to do something. If you just obey, obey all the time, nothing's going to be done for you." And then we got the idea from that time. They would encourage us and say, "Struggle. They may kill you, they may torture you, they may do all kinds of things to you but don't give up. Keep going." That was the beginning of Maasina Rule.

After the war, when I went back to Malaita, I wanted to do what they had said. I wanted to start Maasina Rule, but my uncle who was the headman wouldn't allow it. He said, "Let other people start it and then you can join them, but don't start it yourself." That was because my uncle was a government headman. That was an important position in the British colonial system. He told me, "Let other people start it and then you can join them."

JONATHAN FIFT'I

After the war we had courage, whereas prior to the war we would always just give in.

The War Back Home on Malaita

Americans bombed Laulasi, Gamuo, Uru Island [East Kwaio], and Fousaari'i, South Malaita. The Americans were just playing around, but it was bad for those places they bombed.

I heard two explanations for why Laulasi was bombed. The first is that when the airplane was going over, men were putting thatch on the houses and they waved at the planes. The second is that when Japanese came to Auki in [July] 1942 a man named Sale 'Abakomu met them at the wharf, and he and some other Laulasi people led them to the government office. Also, a false rumor went around that they were hiding Japanese at Laulasi Island. At that time Mr Bengough, the district officer at Auki, had fled. Later, Sale 'Abakomu and others who had assisted those Japanese were jailed for six weeks.

Of the bombing of Gamuo they say a man had gone outside and was staring at that American plane and it just started bombing. Near Uru Island people had gotten into a big canoe and were paddling hard to flee to the shore when they were bombed. At Fousaari'i, near Maramasike, they just attacked a rock out by the reef in deep water. They dropped four bombs, but they were just messing around practicing and didn't get close to any houses.

One American plane went down near the mouth of Sinalagu Harbour, in Kwaio. The pilot's name was Allen. His plane sank in the sea but he had a rubber raft, which he paddled along with his hands. The waves carried him to the edge of the reef at Ririsiana, and a man named Gi'u saw him and thought someone must have capsized their canoe. But then he noticed it must be something different because the man's skin was white. And that rubber raft was red, and too short to be a canoe. Pilot Allen saw Gi'u too and thought he was an enemy scout. So Allen jumped in the sea away from his raft and sunk into the water with just his face and nose showing. A wave carried him up to the shore. He moved to a place to land on the beach and tried to hide there, but he was ready to swim back out to sea if he spied trouble. Gi'u went to the point of the reef and saw that he was a white man and beckoned to him to come to him. Pilot Allen had also just realized that Gi'u was a black man and he swam over to him on shore. Gi'u asked him "Where are you from?"

Pilot Allen told him, "I am an American, they shot my airplane's fuel tank and when I reached here it was empty and so I fell down here, the plane sank, and the waves carried me and my rubber raft to shore. Are there any Japanese here?"

Gi'u told him "No, there are no Japanese here on Malaita." Gi'u said they should go to the place where I, Fifi'i, am from, and he told him "You musn't be afraid, I won't trick you." Pilot Allen said that first they should carry his raft onto shore, and then they let the air out of it. Gi'u and he took the raft and moved to the place Farisioa, a Seventh Day Adventist village. The only clothes Allen had left were his trousers.

Many airplanes were searching for him afterward over on the Guadalcanal side, as they thought that he must have gone down near where his plane had been hit. But instead, he had taken a route that took him across land.

They dried out his pants for him, and gave him a dry shirt, and he stayed there for five days. The Auki police came to escort him to Auki from which he would be sent back to Lungga. Pilot Allen was a young man. Maybe he is still alive, or perhaps he died in the fighting. People asked him and he said that if he survived the war he would come back to visit the place where he had been rescued.

Guadalcanal Chapels

During the war there must have been three thousand Malaitans working on Guadalcanal. There were also people from Makira, Ulawa, and Ugi Island. These were the only people I saw working with the Americans at Lungga. We built a large chapel at the cemetery for the war dead. The people from Ulawa decorated the inside. When it was finished people from all the different Christian denominations gathered there every Sunday, or whenever their sabbath was, to pray. Only the Kwaio hill people didn't go there to pray. Where would they get pigs to sacrifice? And their people were already performing sacrifices for them back on Malaita for the fighting to be calm. Their chapels were their foxholes, because when the fighting began, they would pray to the spirits of their ancestors while inside them. That was the Melanesian way.

JONATHAN FIFI'I

Notes

1 Most of the paper was written in the Kwaio language by Jonathan Fifi'i in May 1988, during his stay in Honolulu, and translated into English and edited by David Akin. In some places additional material has been added, as requested by Mr Fifi'i, from his 1988 conference talk and from a series of interviews taped by Akin in 1982, 1987, and 1988. The editor would like to thank Geoffrey White for help in the editing and production of this paper.

2 The exact crash location was Manua, near Suanaga'i (Ben Burt, personal communication to editor, 1984).

The Vanuatu Labor Corps Experience

Lamont Lindstrom

It has been nearly fifty years since American forces occupied what was then the Franco-British colony of the New Hebrides. US military personnel first came ashore on Efate in March 1942. They stayed less than four years. The New Hebrides bases were rolled up by the end of 1945. Since the war Islanders have experienced the gamut of economic and political forces that have given shape to contemporary Pacific nations. The most important event of the postwar era was the achievement of national independence in 1980, celebrated by the renaming of the archipelago. James Cook's "New Hebrides" is now the Republic of Vanuatu. Still, fifty years beyond the outbreak of the Pacific War it remains impossible to overlook the decisive effects of those few years in the lives of the people who witnessed and took part in wartime events. And it is impossible to understand what has happened during the past half century in the Pacific without taking into account the transforming effects of the war upon island political and economic structures.

This paper explores the residues of wartime encounters in the lives of men who live on Tanna, an island of southern Vanuatu. Nearly every man and boy who was able to work traveled north to Efate to join American military labor corps. In addition to the impact this experience had on individual lives, the war also gave shape and impetus to a postwar, anticolonialist movement on Tanna: the John Frum movement. This, in altered form, is still active on the island today. It is an important organization in the contemporary political arena. Many of the movement's rituals, symbols, and ideological goals were borrowed from the labor corps experience. To document the continuing effects of wartime encounters, I have been collecting war histories, stories, and songs from labor corps veterans on Tanna since 1982.¹

The War in the New Hebrides

In early 1942 the American military command decided to occupy a number of South Pacific islands, including Efate, in order to forestall the Japanese

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advance southward, and to protect sea-lanes to Australia. A task force from New Caledonia landed on Efate in May 1942 to supplement units that had arrived earlier to begin construction of a major airfield. Military information about the New Hebrides and about Japanese movements in the region was sketchy. Servicemen landed at Port Vila in full battle dress, unsure whether the Japanese had already occupied the town. In Port Vila, also, residents were guessing which side would occupy Efate first. Islanders who observed the fleet approaching from over the horizon report that people said, "In an hour we'll know if we'll live or die." European colonials, at least, were relieved to see the occupation fleet displaying the Stars and Stripes, rather than the Rising Sun.

On Efate the Americans developed installations at Port Vila and also at Port Havannah. Several months later they established a second advance base on Espiritu Santo, a hundred and forty miles closer to the fighting that developed on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. During the Solomon Islands campaign most of the men and materiel on the American side passed through these two advance bases. Many of the wounded were evacuated to Efate or Santo for medical treatment. During the first years of the war Santo was the largest American installation west of Pearl Harbor. Efate, at its peak, housed 15,000 service personnel. Santo was home for over 40,000. Hundreds of thousands more passed through the New Hebrides on the way to and from the front lines to the north. (Information about the American presence on Efate and Santo is provided by Garrison 1983; Geslin 1956; Heintz 1944; Kralovec n.d.; and Wallin 1967.)

By 1943 the Americans had turned back the Japanese advance at Guadalcanal and had begun to push northward up through the Solomon Islands. The advance bases in the New Hebrides were transformed into rear-line support facilities for the remainder of the war. Efate was rolled up in late 1944; Santo a year later. In 1942 the Japanese managed several times to bomb and shell (from submarines) these bases. Attacks ceased as the war turned against the Japanese in 1943. The war experience in Vanuatu, thus, was not one of battle. Rather, people experienced a brief but intense period in which their lands were overrun with thousands of new sorts of people, and heaped with tons of military cargo and materiel. At the height of the battle for Guadalcanal, for example, three cargo ships a day arrived at Second Canal on Santo, with men and cargo to unload.

These wartime population and supply movements must be put into local context. In 1941 the entire population of the New Hebrides numbered only 40,000. Port Vila and Santo were small, sleepy port towns serving an under-developed plantation economy located on the fringes of the colonialist world. There were few roads, no airfields, and no municipal water supply or

telephone systems. Although some Islanders were engaged in plantation labor and in coconut cash cropping, subsistence agriculture remained the economic mainstay of village life, which retained, in general, its traditional character. Within a few months of the American occupation, however, Seabees and army construction units had built fighter and bomber airfields, port facilities, water supply systems, large encampments, acres of Quonset and Dallas huts for storage, movie theaters, new roads, restaurants, clubs, and bars--the whole apparatus of a large military base.

Wartime Encounters

Islanders first observed and then were drawn into this military activity and development. On the books, at least, a number of antifraternization orders existed to restrict contact between military personnel and the local populace. A curfew on Santo restricted Islanders and a community of Vietnamese plantation workers to their villages and quarters from 7:00 PM to 7:00 AM. Restrictions existed also on visits by Islanders to military camps and on attendance at outdoor cinemas. Servicemen were restricted from visiting villages. Military Civil Affairs records, however, report that these regulations were widely ignored (see Kralovec n.d.). Islanders and servicemen encountered one another in various sorts of activities and contexts.

These contexts included a lively trade in carvings, bows and arrows, pigs' tusks, and grass skirts. (Even men took up grass skirt manufacture--traditionally a female occupation.) In addition to artifact and food marketing, some Islanders went into the laundry business. The Americans established, at one point, eight coastwatching stations scattered throughout the northern New Hebrides and the Santa Cruz Islands. Personnel at these camps recruited local assistance. The colonial government also created the New Hebrides Defence Force. Two hundred men, mostly from Malakula, joined this unit that coordinated its activities with the American military.

Other Islanders encountered Americans in more informal activities. Pig hunting on Malakula, for example, was especially popular among American officers. The war's photographic record documents some of these expeditions in which Americans encountered inhabitants of remote mountain villages. Other encounters occurred at church services, at cinemas (Santo possessed forty-three indoor and outdoor movie screens), and at dances wherein local performers entertained American troops.² Undoubtedly the most intensive kind of encounter between Islanders and Americans was the labor corps experience. Here, men left their homes, went to live on the US bases, and worked long and difficult days under direct American supervision.

The Labor Corps

Both the Japanese and the Allied militaries recruited civilian labor to support their war efforts. In the New Hebrides the Americans almost immediately rounded up Islanders to help build the first airfield on Efate. Men from Efate and from the Shepherd Islands just to the north worked to build Bauer Field, named after a flyer shot down in the Solomons. This local labor pool was soon exhausted. More hands were required, and the military turned south to the island of Tanna, which had a relatively large population of 6000. By the end of 1942, 1000 Tannese men were working on Efate--essentially the entire male able-bodied work force of the island. Recruits signed on for three-month tours of duty; many stayed longer.

In most of the Pacific the American military recruited labor through colonial middlemen, such as the British-officered Solomon Islands Labour Corps or the Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit (ANGAU). This permitted prewar colonial powers to maintain some semblance of authority over local peoples. It also buffered the potential dangers of direct contacts between American servicemen and Islanders. In Vanuatu, however, although the British and French at first assumed responsibility for labor recruitment and supervision, this did not last long. The American military, in part spurred by workers' complaints about terrible food, soon took over both labor recruitment and supervision. In part this abrogation of colonial authority followed from the locally peculiar situation in which the British and French jointly governed the "Condominium." The US military was annoyed by frequent disputes between the two colonial powers that disrupted American plans. Also, the bases in the New Hebrides were among the first the United States established in the Pacific. Policy regarding civilian labor recruitment had not yet hardened into the form it would later assume, wherein the Americans were more concerned to respect colonial sensibilities. Later in the paper I will remark again the importance of this direct, unmediated contact between American supervisors and island workers.

Workers on Efate were split into monolingual gangs of twenty-five or so men and divided between the army and the navy. The principal American supervisor on the army side was Major George Riser. On the navy side, a Seabee named Thomas Beatty was in charge. These two men are still renowned today on Tanna as "Tom Army" and "Tom Navy."

Work gangs built their own coconut-thatched housing in camps set aside for them. The military provided food, clothing (surplus army or navy issue), cots, blankets, cigarettes, and so on. A couple of men in each gang were appointed "boss boys" (selected primarily because of their knowledge of Bislama, the local Pidgin English). Other men were appointed company

cooks. The men received some medical care from both American and colonial doctors. A weekly dose of atabrine was a notable part of this care. The military was concerned to protect its troops by shrinking the island's malarial pool. Each man was also issued a numbered dogtag. Workers were paid around US\$0.25 a day (or about US\$7.50 a month). Men today state that these wages were purposely kept low at the insistence of the British and the French. It is certainly true that both colonial powers feared postwar wage inflation. Many workers augmented their salaries by performing various sorts of casual services for the troops.

Men today recount the difficulty of the work they performed. Ten-hour days were common with only one day off every two weeks. War work was in several ways similar to the sorts of prewar plantation labor some of these men had experienced. For example, workers were organized into all-male gangs, set joint tasks to perform, and housed in barracklike quarters. But the organization of labor during the war was in other ways very different from prewar plantation work.

First, new sorts of tasks were assigned. One of the most common of these was stevedoring. Labor corps veterans tell stories of their ignorance when first boarding a military cargo ship. They did not know how to find the holds, how to move between the densely packed cargo, or how to struggle with bulky and heavy material. Other unfamiliar wartime tasks included working in mosquito abatement crews spraying diesel oil on standing water; working in military hospitals and having to burn up amputated American limbs; working on trucks delivering supplies to the various encampments; and so on.

A second difference between the war's organization of work and prewar forms of labor was the American reliance on machinery and technology. Workers report the wonderful powers of tractors on the large vegetable farms the military established on Efate. They were impressed with the efficiency of bulldozers and graders in the construction of airfields and new roads. In addition the machines of battle itself were both impressive and fearsome: warplanes, artillery, bombs, jeeps, trucks, and radar (which the Tannese call by the Pidgin English word *stil* 'steel'). Prewar employers relied almost solely on cheap labor. As many of these labor corps recruits had themselves *been* that cheap labor, they were deeply impressed with the efficiency of American technology.

A third difference between wartime and plantation labor was the military's utilization of shift work. The fact that one team of laborers worked all day and then was replaced with a second team that worked all night under lights is a key point in many people's recollections of the labor corps experience. Never before, and never again, had Islanders worked nights.

A fourth difference that characterized war work was the prevalence of danger and death. Although there were only a few Japanese attacks on American installations in the New Hebrides, warning sirens howled frequently to signal suspected sightings of Japanese planes or submarines, or to signal drills. Workers tell of the clutching fear they experienced when the sirens sounded. Although no workers died from military action, many became ill from disease, from injury, and from overwork. A significant number of Tannese men died on Efate and remain buried there today. Workers also pitied the American dead and wounded they observed return from the Solomon Islands. They tell of walking along the road to the airfield and seeing trails of blood that had dripped from passing ambulances. And they tell of hearing the moans of wounded servicemen as these ambulances passed by on the way from airfield to hospital.

Finally, during the war the Tannese worked alongside a different kind of people from those of the prewar period. They worked for Americans, many of whom were black Americans. The segregated, black American 24th Infantry was a part of the main landing force on Efate. The army component of the task force from New Caledonia that landed on 4 May 1942 consisted of 4612 men. Of these, approximately 3400 were black (Garrison 1983). Most of these black troops were in service units. Some, however, such as the 198th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, were combat troops. The fact that blacks were isolated in quartermaster and transportation units reflected American racism of the times and military reluctance to use black troops in battle. From the Tannese perspective, however, *these* were the troops in control of American stores and supplies. In charge of the cargo, black Americans' lowly position within military society, ironically, was at least partly revalued by Tannese observers.³

The two most salient features of the labor corps experience that are recalled and that continue to have an effect today are first, the war's cargo and the establishment of new sorts of exchange relations; and second, a new style of interpersonal relations between Islanders and Europeans. The bases in the New Hebrides were, for much of the war, supply bases. They were hoards of stores and military materiel. Islanders received food, clothing, cigarettes, and many other kinds of goods from American benefactors and employers. Islanders' war stories incorporate long lists of the things people enjoyed during those years. But these stories also stress that these goods were obtained within relations of exchange. People recall the many sorts of things they received from the Americans. They also point out, however, that they reciprocated with their labor and assistance with the American war effort. They stress the hardships they endured in return for the gifts they received. Wartime exchange, in peoples' accounts, thus recapitulates traditional

reciprocal exchange patterns, the goal of which is to ensure an essential equality and appreciation of each side. People also tell of more spiritual sorts of assistance rendered to the American effort. A number of local sorcerers, particularly from the island of Ambrym, loosed their magic powers to ensure that the Americans won Guadalcanal.

The second enduring memory from the war concerns a new style of interpersonal relation with amiable outsiders. The colonialist prewar era in much of the Pacific was characterized by rigid sumptuary codes that maintained clear boundaries between Europeans and Islanders.⁴ These codes in particular regulated eating habits. Islanders, generally, ate certain kinds of food, while Europeans ate other kinds. The code prevented the two peoples from eating together. Dress was also regulated. Only Europeans could wear shoes, long trousers and, in some parts of the Pacific, shirts as well.

Many Americans, whose interests in the Southwest Pacific were short-term, were unconcerned to uphold these codes of interpersonal behavior, even if they realized they existed. War era photographs depict American troops dining with Pacific Islanders, sharing and lighting cigarettes for island "friends," giving away shirts, trousers, boots, hats, and so on. No doubt the tenor of interaction between American servicemen and Islanders was often paternalistic, but it was different in important ways from the quality of relationships Islanders had experienced with colonials before the war. Americans and Islanders also occasionally made common cause against Europeans. More than one worker from Tanna recalls being supported by American servicemen in disputes with French or British colonialists. More than anything, what people recall from the war is this new kind of interpersonal style, and the richness of wartime relations of exchange.

The War and the John Frum Movement

Besides recollections and war stories, not much was left behind when the Americans rolled up their bases and went home. There were, of course, the airfields, new roads, and a few Quonset huts and jeeps. Most of the supplies and stores the Americans did not want to ship back home were simply bulldozed into the sea.⁵ The labor corps experience itself, though, has continued to have important effects on Tanna--first in Islanders' relations with the British and French and, more recently, in their relations with the independent government of Vanuatu. These war experiences have provided a new way to phrase Tannese opposition to alien control of island life. The war offered a new language of symbols to demonstrate this opposition. The most organized form of this opposition has been the John Frum movement.

Postwar "cargo cults" are well known, and among these is Tanna's John Frum movement. (For more detailed accounts of this movement, see Guiart 1956; Worsley 1968; Lindstrom 1981.) Briefly, around 1939 a mysterious figure calling himself John Frum appeared in southwest Tanna. Unclear is exactly who or what this figure was. At the time some suspected a Japanese spy who was preparing the way for invasion by fomenting unrest. The condominium administration eventually concluded that a conspiracy of Tannese men had dressed themselves up as John Frum in order to con their fellows. The administration made a number of arrests and, in fact, continued to arrest and deport movement leaders until 1956. Whatever he might have been, John Frum fits easily within Tannese notions of the supernatural order. Apparitions of ancestral and other spirits who give advice to the living are still common on the island.

Among his various pronouncements John Frum predicted the arrival of Americans who would help the Tannese in their struggle against the British and the French. The colonial administration, in fact, intercepted letters to this effect in 1941, several months before Pearl Harbor. And sure enough an American fleet soon landed in force at Port Vila. Tannese labor corps veterans explain that they were pleased, but not surprised, by the American occupation. Advised by John Frum, they were ready to recruit in large numbers to the American labor corps. This Tannese willingness to sign up contrasts with what occurred in other parts of the Pacific theater. In Papua New Guinea, for example, Islanders were understandably reluctant to volunteer for dangerous work at poor wages. ANGAU experienced significant difficulties in meeting its labor needs. In Vanuatu, however, where people expected Americans to arrive at any moment, men report that they were happy for the opportunity to help the war effort by joining the labor corps.

When the Tannese went home from Efate they carried along memories of their encounters with Americans that fed into John Frum prophecy. John Frum supporters organized a number of anticolonialist actions against European control of their island. Some of these, such as a boycott on copra production and on trade-store purchases, made sense to condominium officials. Others, such as the construction of an airfield for American planes in north Tanna, were perceived to be mystical and irrational. The colonial administration attempted to suppress the movement until 1956. Since that time the John Frum organization has gradually been institutionalized into a combination political party and church.

Movement leaders, in this institutionalization process, have revised John Frum goals and ideology. They have also devised a set of movement symbols and rituals, borrowed to a large extent from their war experiences. Followers have constructed various John Frum ritual sites, decorated by symbolic

dogtags, model soldiers and airplanes, and red crosses (adopted from the doors of military ambulances and medic jackets). Every 15 February, the major movement holy day, a drill team of young men marches back and forth. They carry bamboo rifles and are commanded by a "sergeant" who barks out commands such as "to the right!" and "about face!" Each marcher has "USA" painted in red on his naked chest and back. John Frum leaders, on ritual occasions, dress themselves in American military uniforms. They have preserved bits and pieces of these uniforms from the 1940s; they also obtain new supplies from occasional tourists and yachtsmen. In 1978 people raised the American flag at cult headquarters. They continued to raise US flags until 1982, when the independent national government confiscated some of the movement's ritual paraphernalia, including its American flags. Recently they have raised the Stars and Stripes again.

Conclusion

The war experience in this way has continued into the present in the form of the sacred objects, ritual forms, and messages of the John Frum movement. The core of John Frum's message has been a demand for island autonomy and for unmediated relations with the outside world. The labor corps experience of seemingly unlimited cargo, obtained through reciprocal relations of exchange, and of new kinds of direct, interpersonal relations with outsiders provided a new code in which to phrase the message. During the war Tannese relations with a powerful outside force--with America--were unmediated by meddlesome third parties. Also during the war Tannese relations of exchange were vastly enriched, yet, from an island point of view, still retained a traditionally important reciprocal character.

Many John Frum prophecies speak of the return of the Americans. People hint darkly of hidden ammunition and supply dumps dug into the earth, awaiting a new American army. Yet, Islanders do not wish to go back to war, nor do they really want Americans of the 1980s actually to come to Tanna. Rather, the plea for an American return bespeaks a desire to reconstitute the kinds of exchange relations and the unmediated contact with the outside world that people enjoyed during the war. The war's experiences, in sum, matched traditional Tannese expectations of autonomy, of sociability, and of exchange.

Island demands for autonomy, for richer relations of exchange, and for unmediated "roads" to outside powers, phrased in John Frum's wartime images, were a constant irritant to the colonial administration. John Frum continues to trouble the independent national government in Port Vila. Recollections of wartime relations of exchange, and of direct contacts with

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world powers that bypass centralized national authorities, for many Tannese, have shaped an image and an expectation of what "true" independence and autonomy should be like. Although a half-century old, war recollections and images continue to have powerful effects in the present.

Notes

1 These texts are analyzed in Lindstrom (1989).

2 Workers at the end of a day, or after successfully emptying out a cargo ship, would sometimes perform a traditional dance on deck. Traditional Tannese dance utilizes no instruments. Rather, dancers clap their hands and stomp their feet to accompany their songs. Tanna's soil is volcanic in nature and booms when stomped. No doubt workers appreciated the similar accoustical properties of the decks of cargo ships. Kralovec (n.d.) reports that an American, unfamiliar with this practice, shot and wounded a worker on Santo. The sight of a work crew beginning a dance apparently evoked common American images of South Seas cannibals.

3 The Tannese reading of black Americans is ambiguous. On the one hand blacks appeared to have many of the rights of white servicemen. They drove trucks, controlled cargo, wore uniforms, and so on. On the other hand the Tannese also perceived blacks to be dangerous, terse, and under white control. They undoubtedly picked up some of the more obvious features of American racism and the subordinate position of blacks in the US military.

4 The situation in Vanuatu is made complex by the presence of French as well as British colonialists. My impression is that relations between French settlers and Islanders were often less rigidly structured.

5 Million Dollar Point, where the Americans dumped most of their excess supplies on Santo, is now a popular scuba diving site.

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George Bogese: "Just a Bloody Traitor"?

Hugh Laracy

Although World War II, especially the battle for Guadalcanal, brought the Solomon Islands to international prominence, few of the Islanders emerged from the war with significantly enhanced reputations. Of those who did, probably only three became well known outside the group. Of these, two, Jacob Vouza and Bill Bennett, have been honored as heroes for their service on the side of the victorious Allies: Vouza for an act of bravery in refusing to tell his Japanese captors about American defense positions and then providing useful information to the US Marines; Bennett for sustained bravery while serving behind Japanese lines with the coastwatcher and guerrilla leader Donald Kennedy.¹ Other Solomon Islanders who also served the Allies faithfully, though less dramatically, were left in obscurity.² But it is in the nature of things for honors to be acquired selectively and sparingly--and somewhat fortuitously. George Bogese, the third of the trio, discovered that those who do not find favor with the victors are distinctly vulnerable. Not all Solomon Islanders, especially in the areas that were longest under Japanese occupation, as in parts of Choiseul and Australian-ruled Bougainville, were immovably staunch supporters of the Allies. Indeed, some of them were subjected to summary punishment for "disloyalty." But only two individuals, John McDonald from the Shortland Islands and George Bogese from Santa Isabel, were subjected to the indignity of a trial and the ignominy of a conviction.³ And of these two it was the fate of Bogese, partly because of a close, if hostile, involvement with the well-publicized heroics of Kennedy and Bennett, to become the more notorious.

In Bill Bennett's crisply stated opinion, Bogese was "just a bloody traitor," and as such deserved nothing but reprobation and lasting ill repute. Bennett had some not unreasonable grounds for his view.⁴ Unlike Vouza, Bogese had chosen not to risk his life by resisting the Japanese after he, too, had been captured by them. Moreover he was involved in an incident in which Bennett received severe burns from exploding petrol. Besides, in 1946 a court found him guilty on a charge of assisting the enemy and sentenced him to four years

imprisonment. From a position more detached than Bennett's, however, and at a remove of almost half a century, during which Solomon Islanders have outgrown their subordination to foreign rule, Bogese's actions seem more understandable, and possibly less reprehensible, than they were to his contemporary critics.

Most of the Solomons group had been a British protectorate since the 1890s, but the government had brought few benefits to the Islanders, as many people from Bogese's home island of Isabel complained during the Chair and Rule movement of the 1930s, and as others from the southern islands were to complain during the Maasina Rule movement of the 1940s.⁵ Solomon Islanders, then, in their own estimation owed the colonial government little. As an institution it was remote yet threatening and was represented among them only by a few sparsely scattered officials with extensive powers whose primary tasks were to collect the annual head tax and to discourage breaches of the peace. If the Islanders in 1940 had feelings of gratitude and affection for Europeans, they were for missionaries rather than for the government. Even so they generally remained very loyal during the war, although this is easily explained. Whatever their grievances against their colonial "masters," the Islanders did not find in the Japanese an appealing alternative to the existing regime ("better the devil you know!"). And the Japanese, given that they were on the defensive during most of their occupation of the Solomons, had little chance to make themselves particularly agreeable. Besides, the missionaries backed the officials in urging the Islanders to support Britain and its Allies. In Bogese's case, however, there were additional and acutely personal strains on his loyalty: he was captured at a time when it seemed as if the British had abandoned the protectorate to the Japanese, and at a time when, although he was in government employment, there was ill-feeling between him and his superior, Donald Gilbert Kennedy. Vouza, in contrast, was captured after the American forces had arrived to challenge the Japanese and was, moreover, encouraged to resist by the memory that years before, as a policeman, he had once failed notably in his duty. In being captured he accepted a chance to make reparation for that embarrassing lapse.⁶ Bogese had no such spur to heroism.

Bogese's problems began in May 1942 on the island of Savo. He was there, on Kennedy's orders, in his capacity as native medical practitioner conducting a medical survey. On 5 May he encountered two Japanese survivors from the destroyer *Kitsutsuki* that had been sunk the day before, during the Japanese occupation of the protectorate headquarters at Tulagi. They were suffering from wounds and burns. After getting approval from Leif Schroeder, a former trader working as an Allied coastwatcher who sent some food down from his bush hideaway for the Japanese, Bogese dressed their

wounds. Three days later a Catholic missionary, Desmond Scanlon from Visale on Guadalcanal, visited Savo and gave food and clothing to the pair. He also advised Bogese and others to look after them properly, "otherwise there will be a row with the Japanese authorities," and before leaving wrote his name and address on a piece of paper, which he gave to the Japanese. For his part Bogese--as he later recounted in an affidavit--attempted to conceal his occupation and identity from the Japanese, but the deception was soon revealed. On 9 May two barges carrying fifty soldiers and guided by a man named Tolia arrived at Savo, near Panuel village where Bogese was living, to collect their compatriots. When they had landed one of the soldiers addressed the watching villagers in English: "The rule of Great Britain is finished. You are now under the Japanese military rule. Anybody who disobeys Japanese orders must be shot. We now proclaim martial law. All natives must cooperate with the Japanese." The party then proceeded to the village where Tolia identified Bogese: "This is Dr George we talk along you before." The Japanese who had spoken on the beach then said to Bogese: "My name is Sima. I was in Fiji for nine years. I know the names of all the Native Medical Practitioners who were trained in Suva. You must be one of them. You must tell me the truth, and you must cooperate with the Japanese, or you will be shot You must come with us to Tulagi. . . . All Native Medical Practitioners must work for the Japanese government."

"I was," admitted Bogese, "frightened to disobey," and he proceeded to work for a new "master" as an interpreter. On 11 May, Sima (who was probably the man more commonly known as Ishimoto) had him write a notice in the Nggela language urging the people of that island to return to their homes and not to hide in the bush.⁷ On 12 May, Bogese went with Sima to the village of Voloa on Nggela to recruit men to help unload a ship at Tulagi. On 13 May, he and one of those men, Kuini Gee, were directed by Sima to translate from English to Nggela another notice "To all the Island People," informing them: "The Japanese Army came to protect the Natives. You must return to your villages and do your work in peace and remain calm. You must give information to the Japanese Military Authorities."⁸

On 15 May he had to translate a similar message into the Bugotu language of southern Isabel for distribution among his own people: "Will you return to your respective villages and perform your ordinary occupations and be safe. The Japanese army respect all people in these islands, they didn't come to [do] you any harm or to burn your houses and destroy your property, they came to protect all your people in these islands."⁹ The Bugotu version, however, as Bennett later pointed out, contained an instruction not included in the English original: "If any natives know of any Europeans hidden around

the Islands, who possess rifles, ammunition, etc, they are to report them immediately to the Japanese authorities in Tulagi."¹⁰

Meanwhile Bogese had also been told that he was to go to Rabaul, where the chief medical officer of the Japanese wished to ask him about tropical diseases. Before leaving he was taken with two barge loads of Japanese, about fifty soldiers, to Kolare on Isabel to visit his wife and children, whom he had not seen since 27 February, when he was sent to Savo.¹¹

From that point events took a more dramatic turn, although the truth about Bogese's activities becomes more difficult to ascertain. On the afternoon of 17 May, with Bogese and his wife and family aboard, the Japanese set off in search of Kennedy's vessel, the *Wai-ai*, which was hidden with camouflage not far away at Sigana. According to Bogese he had not told the Japanese where the vessel was. Rather he claimed it had already been spotted by a Japanese aircraft. Nor, he said, had he told them where Kennedy was hiding. According to a Kolare man named Jasper Rutu, however, Bogese had asked him where the *Wai-ai* was hidden; and Rutu, for fear of the Japanese, had told him. Rutu also said that Bogese had instructed him to lead the Japanese to Kennedy's base at Mahaga, in an attack planned for 4 PM on 17 May; and had further advised him that a vessel, the *Joan*, hidden in the mangroves by a departed trader, should be found and handed over to the Japanese. According to another witness, Joseph Supa, Bogese's wife's cousin, who went with them on the barge and who had helped hide the *Wai-ai*, "from the time we left Kolare, Bogese stood with the Japanese on the stern, at the place where they steered." Bogese's father-in-law, Maaki Hathavu, meanwhile, on his own initiative had sent a message to Kennedy, warning him of the intended attack. The unfortunate Bennett, however, received no such warning.¹² According to him he was on the *Wai-ai* when he saw the barges approaching, "and I saw George Bogese talking to the Japanese and pointing to the *Wai-ai*." Then, to prevent the ship falling into Japanese hands, Bennett ordered his crew to pour petrol about, but the Japanese saved him the bother of igniting it: "After Bogese pointed out the *Wai-ai*, somebody on board the Barge shouted, but receiving no reply from the *Wai-ai*, the Barge immediately opened fire, the second shot hitting a store of benzine aboard and setting fire to the *Wai-ai*. I dived overboard when the vessel caught fire and managed to swim ashore, but was badly burned."¹³

In the light of these testimonies it is clear that Bogese was working closely with the Japanese on 17 May. In his defense, however, Bogese denied that he had been a willing participant and, while not denying the facts reported by prosecution witnesses, offered explanations calculated to minimize his responsibility. Thus, regarding the proposed attack on Kennedy's post, Bogese claimed that it was only after the Japanese told him they had already

detected it by radio direction finding and threatened to shoot him if he did not help them locate it that he told Rutu to lead them to Mahaga. Besides, he said, he did not think Kennedy was there at the time. As for the attack on the *Wai-ai*, he said that

an aircraft had already spotted the vessel. . . . The Japs told me that they had found a ship. I said I knew nothing of any ship. The Japs then said I should ask somebody to say exactly where the ship was, that the aeroplane had spotted one. I asked Rutu. I admit this. I asked Rutu and Rutu said at Sigana [On the way there] I was sitting on the stern of the ship. Supa and Gee were forward. As soon as we arrived at Sigana, I pointed out and we came to the harbour. We could not find the ship. I asked Supa where the ship was, and he said it was somewhere here. Then we heard a bang, saw the ship burning and the crew diving overboard.

With that the Japanese turned for Tulagi. The attack on Mahaga had been called off shortly before they left Kolare, in response to a message that there was a ship waiting at Tulagi to take Bogese and Kuini Gee to Rabaul. The pair left in it on 18 May, arrived in Rabaul two days later, and for the next two months worked in the native hospital there. In that time Bogese had one brief discussion with Japanese doctors, about tropical diseases.

Then on 1 August, after repeated requests, he and Kuini were returned to Tulagi. He was immediately given leave briefly to visit his family at Voloa on Nggela where they were staying. Although tempted to stay there with them he did not dare, he said, for fear "of Mr. Kennedy, from the Japanese having captured me at Savo and the burning of the ship *Wai-ai*. And the fear of the Japanese coming round and looking for me!" On 5 August, therefore, accompanied by his wife and children, he returned to Tulagi. He was there when the Americans invaded two days later. Although he told them what he knew about the Japanese forces on the island, he was shortly afterward sent to Australia for internment at the insistence of British officials. There he and his family remained, at Taturu in Victoria, until October 1945, when he was returned to the Solomons to face charges of having collaborated with the enemy.¹⁴

It was a sad prospect for a man who, in his educational attainments, in his high competence in the English language, and through widespread recognition of his professional abilities, was one of the outstanding Solomon Islanders of his generation--and probably the best known. He was forty-one years old at the time. He had known and enjoyed success. But he had also felt the hurt of rejection, commonly experienced by educated Islanders in colonial society, and that well before the events in which, as he put it "I lost my profession and my reputation . . . and everything that was important to me."¹⁵

Although concern for his personal survival prompted the actions for which Bogese was to be tried, his behavior between May and August 1942--and his sense of injustice at what it cost him--cannot properly be understood in isolation from his prewar history.

George Bogese was born at Vulavu in Isabel in 1904, the son of Margaret Semo and Philip U'U, and was baptized into the Church of England by the missionary doctor Henry Welchman. He attended a village school until the age of ten, then went to the Melanesian Mission School at Norfolk Island from 1914 to 1917. After that he returned to Isabel where he became a teacher. In 1922 he joined the government service. He worked first as a clerk, one of the first Solomon Islanders to do so, for five years. Then in 1928, on the recommendation of J. C. Barley, district officer at Gizo, he became the first Solomon Islander to be sent to study medicine at the Central Medical School in Fiji.

He completed the course in 1930, winning the Barker Gold Medal for attainment, and returned to the Solomons in 1931 as a native medical practitioner.¹⁶ In this capacity--visiting villages, inspecting laborers on plantations, holding clinics at government stations--"Dr George," as he was called, traveled widely throughout the Solomons, becoming well known to brown and white residents alike. Well known, but not always well liked, and persistently suspected of misbehavior.

Bogese's professional competence seems never to have been questioned. In 1934 his district officer said he was "keen and efficient, and takes a thorough interest in his work," an opinion endorsed by the senior medical officer.¹⁷ But objections against his character, especially rumors reported by missionaries of sexual misconduct with his female patients, flourished. They were not totally unfounded, although they were taken more seriously by the authorities than they would have been if he were a white man. Thus in 1934 he was found guilty on a charge of adultery and fined £4. On more serious charges, however, he was acquitted. In 1936, on Malaita, a preliminary investigation cleared him of a charge of rape, but did commit him for trial on a charge of incest with his daughter by Anna Kovaga, the first of his three wives. On that charge, too, he was acquitted (but only after the girl had been medically examined), as he also was acquitted on a lesser charge of indecent assault against the same girl.¹⁸ It was a decision that must surely have brought acute relief to a man who already had another daughter by his second wife, a Fijian named Anna Seini, and who was to have ten children by his third and current wife, Susanna Riko, daughter of Maaki Hathevu of Kolare.¹⁹

Regardless of alleged sexual delinquencies, Bogese was guilty of another "failing" which was even more reprehensible in colonial society. He did not regard himself as being inferior to Europeans. One official wrote that "Owing

to his unfortunate manner he is not liked by the white residents of the District, with whom he is in frequent contact through their labour." Another identified the "fault" succinctly, "he is very self-confident."²⁰ Evidence of this, although as a trait rather than a fault, was given in 1939 when Bogese complained to his superiors about what he saw as "the unfair treatment accorded to us, whether native officers or ordinary natives, by some European Officers on many matters," and had the temerity to ask "is this treatment due to the rules [being] set aside for the natives . . . or due to carelessness?"²¹ Many other Solomon Islanders were, in fact, concerned about the matter yet few of the European residents would have disagreed with Kennedy's opinion about the kind of person who would openly ask such a question, or how he ought to be treated:

Bogese is a person of a type well known to all who have had to deal with the educated native at loose, without adequate social control, in a primitive community. The type is characterised by limitless presumption combined with that kind of humility which has been aptly described as arrogant. In the course of some 24 years service in the Pacific Islands I have had more than a little experience of this sort of native. I strongly deprecate any suspicion of harshness or impatient treatment of unsophisticated natives in any environment, and have found that the less one raises one's voice the more co-operation one receives from them. But I have found, to the contrary, that abruptness and direct speech is the only method of achieving satisfactory official relations with those of the Bogese type.²²

Given the clarity of Kennedy's views and the vigor with which he customarily acted, it is hardly surprising that in late 1941, amid the stress of encroaching war, when Bogese and Kennedy were both appointed to Isabel, the two should fall out badly. Unfortunately for the historian, their mutual hostility means that neither is to be fully relied on as a witness concerning the other. The trouble began in January over food stocks, when, contrary to Kennedy's orders, Bogese gave rice from government stores to patients at the local hospital. He said he did so because they needed it; Kennedy maintained that the patients were young women who were not ill but whom Bogese was merely encouraging to stay at the hospital. Another dispute occurred later that month, after Bogese supervised the carrying of supplies from the government post at Tataba inland to Mahaga. Kennedy accused him of stealing some of the supplies; Bogese claimed that far from stealing, he had given some of his own food to the carriers, and that Kennedy had rebuked him for this, saying "You think you are a big chief, to share the food. You are only trying to show off." Whatever the truth of these matters, one thing at least is clear. Kennedy distrusted Bogese. Moreover, he cites alleged

difficulties in recruiting carriers for the shift from Tataba to Mahaga as leading him to suspect that Bogese was influencing the people of southern Isabel not to cooperate with the government.

To test this theory Kennedy sent Bogese on a tour of the island in February to do medical work and to advise the people to avoid the Japanese when they came, and then sent a patrol after him to check on the instructions he was issuing. Predictably Bogese claims to have done as he was told, but Kennedy remained unconvinced of his loyalty. After three weeks he recalled Bogese from his tour and, without offering any explanation, took him to Savo. There he left him in the charge of the headman Johnson Soro, with orders not to leave the island and with the warning "be very careful, or you will be shot, or whipped, the same as the others." It was the last time the two met.²³ Kennedy went on to become a hero, while just over two months later Bogese was in Japanese hands. By September 1942, through another sudden change of fate, if not of fortune, he was interned in Australia with his wife and three children.

It was not a fate he accepted easily. Over the next three years Bogese wrote a number of letters--consistently fluent, logically resourceful, and occasionally disingenuous--urging his innocence. He blamed Kennedy for his woes, stating that his appointment to Savo was due to "persecution and ill treatment" of him by Kennedy "for purely personal reasons," and arguing that had he not been sent there he would not have fallen in with the Japanese, and so could not have been forced to cooperate with them. He also compared his case with that of others and pleaded unfair treatment: there had been rumors about him, but there had also been rumors--and even complaints--about Kennedy in regard to brutality and improper dealings with women, and Kennedy had never been punished. Then there was the case of the Catholic missionaries of Visale: Father Scanlon had introduced himself to the Japanese, and Father Aloysius Brugmans had accompanied a Japanese patrol to Lungga for two days in July, yet they had not been treated as collaborators. And, he asked with plaintive rhetoric, though not unreasonably, how could he, "a poor defenseless native," be expected not to cooperate.²⁴ As he put it to John Curtin, the Australian prime minister:

It is well known all over the world how the Japanese committed atrocities in the Solomons, New Guinea, the Philippines, or Netherlands East Indies. Civilians were murdered in masses, captured soldier, both European or natives were ill treated, murdered or forced to do this and that, air pilots were executed as in the case of nine pilots at Rabaul. Filipino citizens were burned to death for disobeying them, etc. etc. How could I, being a

defenseless native, resist such a horde of Japanese who proclaimed martial law and death sentences in the Solomons?²⁵

Unbeknown to Bogese, he was not alone in pleading his case. In October 1945 the Anglican bishop, although admitting to a personal dislike of Bogese, wrote to the resident commissioner expounding excuses for his actions and asking that no charges be laid against him:

Bogese is a Solomon Islander who perhaps prematurely was "educated above his station." . . . But it is unreasonable to think that Bogese may well have thought that through a Japanese regime here, the Solomon Islander might get a better crack of the whip. After all there has been a British Administration in these islands for 50 years now . . . are you proud, or even satisfied with what has been done for the peoples here by the British Raj? Your two predecessors have told me that the great contribution of the British . . . has been . . . "security of tenure" and . . . the "Pax Britannica." Neither of these has been very apparent since December 1941. Is it treason for a native of these islands to think that the progress of his people is bound up with an Asiatic race rather than with the British regime of which after all, he is only a "protected" subject.

I have no doubt that Bogese will plead that he acted "under constraint." If he so pleaded and I were an Assessor on the Bench . . . he would get my vote for "acquittal." There were absolutely blood-curdling stories going the rounds in the Solomons in the first half of '42 as to what the Japanese had done on Bougainville to extract information. If Bogese had heard these stories . . . I am not surprised if he gave such information as was asked.²⁶

The administration, however, was unmoved. There was wide public interest in the affair, not least because of the crucial role played by the coastwatchers in the Solomons campaign and because of their dependence on the "cooperation of the natives" in operating behind enemy lines. Possibly to have threatened their security was, therefore, seen as a particularly serious matter, and one that required nothing less than a formal court hearing.²⁷ Accordingly, after a preliminary enquiry, five charges were laid against Bogese; to wit, that he did "with intent to assist the enemy:"

- 1 try to induce Rutu to lead the Japanese to the coastwatch base at Mahaga;
- 2 induce Nicholas Gee to go with the Japanese to Rabaul;
- 3 induce Rutu to tell him the whereabouts of the *Wai-ai*;
- 4 assist the Japanese to locate the *Wai-ai*; and
- 5 "voluntarily join himself with the enemy Japanese" between 1 May and 8 August 1942.²⁸

Unfortunately for Bogese the bishop was not on the bench when the case was heard. In May 1946 he appeared before the Chief Justice of Fiji, Sir Claude Seton, sitting in Honiara as a judicial commissioner, with two former planters as assessors, J. M. Clift and H. A. Markham. On the first four charges, which related to specific acts and which called for factually precise evidence to prove that he had freely and materially assisted the Japanese, he was acquitted. But on the fifth, which was a more general charge and one where the prosecution was relying on its own perception and not on the testimony of indigenous witnesses who had been intimately involved in the events, it was a different matter. It was held against Bogese that "after he returned from Rabaul, he brought his wife and family in from a country place and they lived with him in Tulagi in apparently close association with the Japanese." On this charge he was found guilty and sentenced to four years imprisonment, of which he served three. Released from Rove Prison in 1949 he returned to the obscurity of village life.²⁹ Not for him would there be an obituary in the *BSIP Newssheet*.

Bogese paid dearly for his association with the Japanese. He lost his job and spent seven years in custody. Moreover, the colonial administration, unforgiving and ever distrustful--as its records abundantly show--would never risk allowing him an opportunity to regain a position of any standing or influence in the Solomon Islands, or to live down the reputation of traitor that he had acquired, if not earned. He had not been represented by a lawyer at his trial, he was refused leave to appeal against his sentence, and from prison he was prevented from contributing to a political discussion then flourishing among his compatriots.³⁰ In December 1946 he wrote an open letter to the people of southern Isabel, urging them to cooperate with the government if they wished to prosper and not to join the Maasina Rule nationalist movement. That in his exhortation he also touched on Solomon Islanders' entitlement to the "Freedoms" listed in the Atlantic Charter of 1940 and to the conditions of life prescribed by the UN Charter was unlikely to make the letter any more acceptable in the eyes of authorities who were already prejudiced against its author, because such claims were also being made by Maasina Rule.³¹ If anything, the letter was likely to strengthen rather than dilute the distrust they had for him. Contemplating Bogese's eventual release from prison, one official even saw risks in encouraging him "to do a certain amount of anthropological work. . . . Bogese as an Assistant Medical Practitioner was always apt to use his position to his own advantage, and might magnify his association with the University [of Sydney] to suit his own ends in some way."³²

In a similar vein, following his release, the high commissioner ordered that "[Bogese] should not be given any form of public employment,"³³ while in

June 1951 the resident commissioner, after meeting Bogese briefly and for the first time during a visit to Isabel, denounced him as "one of the nastiest bits of native composition I have met."³⁴ Presumably this was still his belief the following month when H. E. Maude, a former colonial official then living in Sydney, informed him that two Australian professors, A. P. Elkin of Sydney and S. F. Nadel of Canberra, were planning to bring Bogese ("who gave us so many headaches during the war") to Australia to assist them with their anthropological research.³⁵ The resident commissioner declared himself to be "very apprehensive about the idea" and needed no persuading to accept a recommendation that "Under no circumstances [should] Bogese be allowed to go to Australia for a year. He is a potential nuisance of the first order, and after a year in Australia he could wreck Isabel in no time."³⁶ Instead Bogese spent 1952 working in the less corrupting atmosphere of Lever's plantation at Yandina.³⁷ He then returned to Isabel where, without profit to himself or danger to the government, he found some diversion in completing a Bugotu-English dictionary.³⁸ He died on Isabel, after a brief illness, on 18 June 1959, unlamented and unnoticed beyond his own district.³⁹

Both as the first Solomon Islands native medical practitioner, and as a reputed traitor, George Bogese has a firm claim to a place in Solomon Islands history. But he also has other grounds for that claim. He was the first Solomon Islander to have his writings published in a recognized academic journal. Already in 1940 he had published a brief article, "Notes on the Santa Cruz Group," in *The Native Medical Practitioner*, a journal published in Fiji, but during his internment he completed another and more ambitious project. This was an account of the traditional culture of Bugotu.⁴⁰ In May 1945 Bogese wrote to A. P. Elkin, professor of anthropology at Sydney University and editor of the journal *Oceania*, introducing himself and describing the project. He had probably become aware of Elkin through the latter's involvement with the Society for the Protection of Native Races. In July he was to write to him again, enclosing a long affidavit about the events of 1942 and requesting the society's help in obtaining "an official enquiry into the unfair treatment I received from Mr D. G. Kennedy, and my subsequent deportation and internment."⁴¹

Despite his reputation in official circles for self-seeking, there is, however, no reason to suspect Bogese of any duplicity in contacting Elkin. His first letter, and it was followed by seven others before his request for assistance, was one such as any editor of an anthropological journal would welcome, and does not suggest that he was seeking to ingratiate himself for personal advantage:

HUGH LARACY

I am a native of the Solomon Islands and a Native Medical Practitioner by profession. I understand that you have some interest in natives' welfare and all that I wish to inform you [is] that at present I am writing, in very simple English, Anthropological work about my own District, BUGOTU, Santa Isabel, S.I. The subjects dealt with are: short history, clan totemism, sacrifices in altar, fables, tales, dances and songs, feasts and marriages, diseases and treatment of herbs and their methods, fishing house and canoe building, children's play and a tale of Mogo tribe (now extinct), Bugotu vocabulary in English, etc. If you think that this will be any use in your dept., please kindly inform me. After the war you may publish it if possible.⁴²

The work was eventually published in two parts in *Oceania* in 1948. With its appearance Bogese, the "educated native" rejected by the colonial regime for his lack of docility toward his "masters," and punished for being reluctant to risk his life for them, at last earned himself a measure of notability unsullied by scandal. At the same time he provided a legacy of knowledge for his people and set a precedent that other Solomon Islanders could honorably follow. And as time has passed and more information on the war has come to light even his unfortunate involvement with the Japanese can be seen in a more honorable light. At a conference in Honiara in 1987 numerous Solomon Islands war veterans publicly expressed misgivings at the readiness with which they had given their youthful loyalty to the Allies, and admitted to some bitterness at how little it had benefited them. Could he have been there Bogese would surely have smiled knowingly. He too had learned not to expect generosity from colonial rule, but well before they had. The most ironic and surprising revelation of the conference, however, came from Bill Bennett who admitted that while serving with Donald Kennedy he, like Bogese, had come to hate him. So much so that during a skirmish with the Japanese in September 1943 he had taken advantage of the confusion to try to kill Kennedy although only succeeded in wounding him. Yet Bennett finished the war a hero.⁴³

Such admissions indicate the complexity and subjectivity of the notion of loyalty, and of how it is to be assessed. Loyalty to whom? To what? Why? At what cost? They also contribute to the rehabilitation of Bogese's reputation. He was no hero but he was more than "just a bloody traitor." Indeed, without stretching ingenuity too far it may be suggested that latter day Solomon Islanders might usefully find in Bogese a source of national pride. He was intelligent, self-assured, and pragmatic. And it was for displaying such qualities that he, more than other Solomon Islanders, attracted an opprobrium that reflected above all else the unwholesome fears, insecurities,

and pretensions inherent in the colonial regime--as in all colonial regimes--from which the Solomon Islands became independent in 1978.

Notes

1 Boutillier 1989; Cooper 1946, 15-16, 28-29, 47-53; Feldt 1946, 110-111, 150; *Government Monthly*, March 1984 (1:27); Horton 1970, 49-50, 72, 94-96, 149; Macquarrie 1946; *PIM*, May 1984, 73; *Solomon Star*, 23 March 1984, 21 January 1988; *Toktok*, 22 March 1984.

2 In response to a request by Bill Bennett at the Pacific Recollections of World War II Conference, Honiara 1987, a list of all Solomon Islanders recorded as serving in the war was published in Laracy and White (1988, 117-237).

3 Unfortunately the court records for the trials of Bogese and McDonald appear to have been lost. The trials were held in Honiara in 1947 before Sir Claude Seton, the chief justice of Fiji, sitting as a judicial commissioner of the Western Pacific High Commission. The records are not in Honiara, neither in the High Court archives (the court was not set up until later in 1947), nor in the National Archives; nor are they in the Fiji National Archives, where Fiji judicial records for that period have been deposited. Evidence given at the preliminary inquiries for both hearings is in the Solomon Islands National Archives, BSIP CJ 1945.

4 This is a comment Bennett commonly made whenever the subject of Bogese was raised in conversation.

5 Bennett 1987, 259-263, 286-299; Hilliard 1978, 282-285; Laracy 1983.

6 Bennett 1974, 174; Cooper 1946, 29; Laracy 1980, 140; Moorhouse 1928, 6-8.

7 In a tape recorded interview Bogese's daughter Margaret pronounced the name as Shima (Kolotevo 1971). But he seems to be the same man known to Bishop Aubin and most others who have occasion to mention the English-speaking Japanese familiar with the Solomons as Ishimoto (Aubin 1942, 3 July). Feldt describes him as "A Japanese who had lived in the Solomons, and had also been a barber in Fiji, [and] was the head of the Native Department" (Feldt 1946, 111). He was also known as Yoshimoto.

8 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bogese, affidavit 5 July 1954. In this document Bogese presents an account of his life up to 1944.

9 BSIP 4 FS 66: Yoshimoto, notice, 15 May 1942.

10 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bennett, statement, 4 May 1945.

11 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bogese, affidavit, 5 July 1945.

12 BSIP CJ 1945: Statements collected at preliminary inquiry.

13 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bennett, statement, 4 December 1945.

14 BSIP CJ 1945: statement of Bogese. Other accounts of these events, but consistent with Bogese's statement, are in Bogese's affidavit and in various letters filed in BSIP FS 66.

15 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bogese to Western Pacific High Commission (WPHC), 4 August 1944.

16 BSIP 4 FS 66: Bogese, affidavit, 5 July 1945; Guthrie 1979, 28.

17 BSIP I/III, F 58/3: Miller to SMO, 8 October 1934; Crichlow to Secretary to Government, 25 October 1934.

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- 18 BSIP I/III, F 12/7/11: Acting Resident Commissioner to WPHC, 11 August 1936; BSIP I/III, F 58/3: Bengough to SMO, 31 July 1936; BSIP 4, FS 66: Bogese, affidavit, 5 July 1945.
- 19 Nelson Basily, personal communication.
- 20 BSIP I/III, F 58/3: Miller to SMO, 8 October 1934; Crichlow to Secretary to Government, 25 October 1834.
- 21 BSIP I/III, F 58/3: Bogese to acting SMO, 23 May 1939.
- 22 BSIP 4, FS 66: Kennedy, note on Bogese, 20 January 1945.
- 23 BSIP 4, C 5: Kennedy, report on coastwatching, 20 November 1943; BSIP 4, FS 66: Bogese to WPHC, 8 August 1943, 4 August 1944; Kennedy, note on Bogese, 20 January 1945; Bogese, affidavit, 5 July 1945.
- 24 BSIP 4, FS 66: Bogese to WPHC, 8 August 1943, 15 November 1943.
- 25 BSIP 4, FS 66: Bogese to Curtin, 22 March 1945. Other Australians learned about Bogese through *PIM*, April 1945:25; May 1945:34.
- 26 BSIP 4, FS 66: Baddeley to Noel, 5 October 1945.
- 27 BSIP 4, FS 66: Resident Commissioner to WPHC, 22 October 1945.
- 28 BSIP CJ 1945: order for removal of trial, 11 February 1946.
- 29 *PIM*, August 1946:2.
- 30 Elkin Papers P 130, 4/12/135: Bogese to Elkin, 22 July 1946; BSIP 4, FS 66: Bogese, request to appeal, August 1946.
- 31 BSIP 4, C 91: Bogese to Secretary to Government, 16 December 1946, enclosing "Open Letter." The United Nations, noted Bogese, aimed to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all "without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." *Charter of the United Nations*, Article I, para 3.
- 32 BSIP I/III, 58/3: Trench to Elkin, 26 November 1948.
- 33 BSIP I/III, 58/3: WPHC to Gregory-Smith, 7 July 1949.
- 34 BSIP I/III, F 14/3, III: Gregory-Smith, Ysabel, 9-18 June 1951.
- 35 BSIP I/III, 58/3: Maude to Gregory-Smith, 18 July 1951.
- 36 BSIP I/III, 58/3: Gregory-Smith to Davies, 24 July 1951; Davies to Gregory-Smith, 25 July 1951.
- 37 Elkin Papers, p. 130, 4/2/122: Bogese to Capell, 19 January 1952.
- 38 Cited in Capell 1962, 179-180, but apparently lost subsequently.
- 39 Nelson Basily, personal communication, 16 October 1987.
- 40 Jee Bogese (1941, 1948).
- 41 Elkin Papers P 130, 4/2/122: Bogese to Elkin, 22 July 1946; Wise 1985.
- 42 Elkin Papers P 130, 4/2/122: Bogese to Elkin, 20 March 1946.
- 43 This discussion is based on a large body of evidence in Laracy and White (1988), and in White et al. (1988).

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MICRONESIA

Micronesian Experiences of the War in the Pacific

Lin Poyer

Since the initial encounters of Micronesians and Europeans in the sixteenth century Micronesia has undergone colonial rule by four world powers: Spain (mid-1500s to 1899), Germany (1899-1914), Japan (1914-1944), and the United States (1944 to the current termination of United Nations trusteeship). The first three changes of control between colonial rulers were accomplished with little impact on Islanders. When the United States wrested control of the area from Japan, however, it was by some of the most destructive and bloodiest fighting of World War II.

World War II was global warfare and Micronesians were caught in the middle of the Japanese and Allied contest for the central Pacific. Under Japanese military control Micronesians were subjected to harsh discipline, forced labor, relocation, and the confiscation of farm products. Some men were drafted into the military and took part in the fighting. Other men, women, and children worked on military construction and picked up the load of extra labor to provide food, clothing, and shelter for themselves and the Japanese soldiers and civilians living with them. Micronesians also suffered the danger and destruction of Allied military attack, and the material shortages and psychological pressures of the war years.

As Allied forces achieved victory in the Pacific, wartime hardships were dramatically replaced by a massive influx of American goods and personnel, and Micronesians came under United States administration, which espoused democratic ideals and tolerance of native tradition, but had its own agenda for the islands' future. The brief, intense period of change during and after the war years provided Islanders with novel experiences and understandings of themselves and their relationships with foreigners. The results of the impact continue to shape Micronesian society.

Background

In order to understand the impact of the war on Micronesia we must begin by outlining recent Micronesian history. Spanish colonial control had little direct impact on the islands (except for the Marianas); but during the nineteenth century traditional life was transformed by contact with European traders and missionaries. Most Micronesians became Christians, and mission schools operated on the larger islands. Cash was scarce, but people sold copra, crafts, and labor to buy cloth, iron tools, and a few other European goods. Still, when Germany purchased control of the islands from Spain in 1899 the lifestyle of most Micronesians centered on fishing, cultivating taro, breadfruit, and other crops, and raising domestic animals. During the German era (1899-1914) the government encouraged the development of trade and reorganized land tenure on the European model. Health care, child education, and local government were for the most part handled by local people themselves, although the Germans enforced a legal code. But neither Spain nor Germany was a Pacific power, and these governments were not interested in extensive change or development of the islands (again, excepting the Spanish in the Marianas).

When Japan allied itself with Britain in World War I, the Japanese navy moved to take the islands from Germany in 1914. Micronesia was officially sanctioned as a League of Nations mandate under Japan in 1921. Unlike the German and Spanish governments Japan was vitally interested in its Pacific empire; as a result the era of Japanese control saw enormous changes in Micronesian life. Japan's interest in the islands was primarily economic and, as time went by, strategic. It added the mandated islands to its "inner empire" (which included Taiwan, Korea, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the southern part of Sakhalin Island). Japan governed its colonial possessions closely, using tight bureaucratic control, an efficient police force, and manipulation of local cultural institutions (such as traditional leaders) to manage the local populations (Peattie 1988). And there was always strong military support, if the colonial administrators needed it.

The Japanese government expended enormous attention, energy, money, and personnel on their island empire, even before the war years (Yanaihara 1940). The first decades of Japanese control saw the establishment of public schools, health services, public works, and an elaborate administrative bureaucracy. In the mid-1930s, however, Japanese national interests began to supersede concern with the welfare of Islanders as the empire began to expand by military action.

The nature of Japanese impact on Micronesia varied geographically. Major factors in social change were immigration by Japanese settlers,

economic development, and government control over local life. All of these increased throughout the period of Japanese colonial control. The greatest changes, significantly transforming local conditions, occurred in the Western Pacific, especially on Saipan and the Marianas, the largest islands, where tens of thousands of Japanese immigrants came to work on sugar plantations owned and run by Japanese. Palau also was much changed by Japan's influence. In the Caroline Islands, the high islands saw immigration, industrial development, urbanization, and extensive government control. Life on smaller atolls in the Caroline and Marshall islands was transformed least by the Japanese colonial presence, though even the smallest had a police detachment and a school, and were visited by Japanese traders, medical personnel, census-takers, and other administrators.

Japanese traders had operated on a small scale throughout Micronesia even during the latter part of the German era. After Japanese takeover both trade and industry developed quickly. By 1920 the Japanese South Seas Trading Company had a monopoly of the ocean trade, and the South Seas Development Company was organizing sugar, marine products, copra production, and phosphate extraction throughout the islands. The expansion of industry, especially sugar production, increased immigration from Japan to the islands--first to Saipan and the Marianas, then to Palau, and eastward through Chuuk and the Central Carolines, to Pohnpei. By the mid-1930s Islanders were outnumbered by Japanese everywhere except in the Eastern Carolines and the Marshall Islands--in 1940, on the eve of the war, 81,000 Japanese lived in the mandated islands compared with about 50,000 Micronesians.

The large-scale immigration of Japanese into the islands coincided with a change in Japan's colonial policy. Until the mid-1920s Japan managed its colonies based on simple segregation of local people and Japanese. Education, for example, consisted of a lower track for colonial people (Taiwanese, Koreans, or Micronesians), and a higher track for Japanese. But as the Japanese home government increasingly came to be influenced by military interests, colonial policy changed. By the late 1920s a theory of "Japanization" was introduced, which aimed to spread Japanese language and customs to local people, encouraging loyalty to Japan. Despite this policy of "assimilation," colonial administrators did not allow local people to expect equal rights with Japanese, or opportunities for self-government or Japanese citizenship. Promotion of "assimilation" was really a form of social control. By the 1930s--as waves of Japanese settlers were pouring into Micronesia--the colonial policy of assimilation was intensified in order to strengthen the empire. The policy increased in strength from then until the end of the war: civil and military administration were constantly emphasizing to Islanders

(and other Japanese colonial peoples) that they should be loyal Japanese citizens, that they had obligation to the Emperor, and that they should sacrifice and bear the burden of the needs of Japan.

The result of this thirty-year-long educational effort in Micronesia was to build up a store of loyalty toward Japanese. Islanders were aware of the benefits Japan introduced--including opportunities for wage labor, trade, and travel (including travel to Japan), sanitation and health facilities, widespread education, and so on. At the same time Islanders recognized the unequal treatment they received from Japanese; the colonial educational and police system made it clear that Islanders did not have full legal, political, or economic equality with Japanese. For example, Japanese men on Pohnpei could marry island women, but not vice versa. The colonial bureaucracy was strict in its administration of law and control of local life. Gradually, as the war increased pressure on the Japanese military government, the military's harshness toward Micronesians reduced Micronesian goodwill and caused most Islanders to welcome the American invasion.

When the war in the Pacific began, the Japanese government in Micronesia was prepared psychologically and materially to support the advance of Japanese armies in Asia and to defend the empire if necessary. Historians disagree about how extensively the islands were fortified before war was declared. Mark Peattie, reviewing the question recently, argues that there is no good evidence that Japan was preparing for an island war far in advance (1988, 247-251). Instead, he says military construction of harbors, airstrips, and oil storage facilities began in Micronesia two years before Pearl Harbor, and the Fourth Fleet headquartered at Chuuk was only established late in 1939. The construction of military bases was not yet completed at the time of the first victorious Allied invasion in 1944. But Micronesians were affected by the international tension well before the first shots were fired. They lost land, jobs, and a sense of being in control of their islands as ever greater numbers of Japanese immigrants moved to Saipan, the Marianas, and Palau. The military took an increasing interest in colonial administration. German and American Christian missionaries were replaced with Japanese counterparts. Young men worked in prewar construction projects, and everyone was subject to propaganda, economic pressure to help the empire, and the shutdown of contact with the rest of the world.

On the eve of the war, then, we see the Japanese actively preparing for conflict and demanding additional efforts and loyalty from Micronesians. On their part, Islanders were ambivalent: they acknowledged the power and authority of the Japanese and recognized the improvements and opportunities of Japanese rule; but they also saw that they were losing control

of their own lands to Japanese immigrants, and they increasingly resented the harsh discipline and demands of the military presence on the islands.

Prewar history is critical in comparing Micronesian and Melanesian wartime experiences. Of course, the two areas are geographically different, with peoples quite distinct in culture and political organization. Colonial histories also differ, though both populations were largely Christian, and were involved in trade, wage labor, and exposure to foreign ideas in the years before the war. Most notably, though, Micronesia was an integral part of the Japanese empire, and for thirty years Micronesians had been governed, educated, propagandized, and given orders by Japanese. This colonial experience was both positive and negative for Micronesians. Both feelings were expressed during the war.

The War

For most Micronesians the war began with small-scale, local increases in the military presence. Transportation and supply facilities were upgraded; construction of military bases began; the Japanese navy joined small trading ships on the ocean horizons; and Japanese soldiers were billeted on nearly every island. Aside from a few American attacks on the Marshall Islands in early 1942, Micronesia did not experience warfare directly during the first years of the war--until the American invasion came with a vengeance at the beginning of 1944.

From Pearl Harbor in 1941 until 1944 Micronesia played the role of the rest of the "inner empire" surrounding Japan itself: as a support system for the fighting in Asia and in the Southwest Pacific. Chuuk became increasingly important as a base to support the Japanese navy in the Solomon Islands battles, even though the Japanese Navy's great battleships spent much of the war sitting in Chuuk Lagoon, waiting for the "decisive encounter" with the US Pacific Fleet that never came. This waiting period was important in building the American myth of Chuuk as an impregnable fortress, and the idea that Micronesia was fortified to the hilt and would be extremely difficult to attack.

Many books have been written about Japanese and Allied strategy in the Pacific War. To state Micronesia's place in high-level military plans briefly is not simple. From the Japanese viewpoint the empire was a series of concentric circles, with the home islands of Japan at its center. As the war progressed, and the Japanese military shifted from an offensive to a defensive posture, high command continually redrew a "defensive perimeter" that all loyal subjects were commanded to defend. This perimeter was repeatedly narrowed, as Allied forces penetrated closer to the home islands from the east and the south. The Japanese military followed a deliberate policy of

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"letting go" of outer perimeters as it became unfeasible to supply and support them. Japan hoarded its strength for the anticipated final defensive battles; the fighting became more intense as it drew nearer to Japan itself.

On the Allied side, strategy was aimed at reaching Japan as swiftly as possible. By the spring of 1943 Allied resources were sufficient to open a fighting front in the Central Pacific, while continuing the Southwest Pacific offensive. A compromise between army and navy, and among the Allies, provided a plan to open a second "road to Tokyo" by a westward sweep through Micronesia, eventually to link up with Allied forces moving north through the Solomons and New Guinea for the final assault on the Philippines and, if need be, on Japan itself. It remained unclear for several months which Micronesian islands would be attacked, and in what order. Allied high command had little information about the extent and distribution of Japanese strength in the area, and little experience, at first, with amphibious warfare (Morison 1947-1962).

By late 1943 the Japanese navy was short of supplies. Their losses in the defense of the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago meant that they could not effectively counter any large-scale central Pacific attack. The commander of the Japanese Fourth Fleet drew a new defensive perimeter, leaving the Gilberts and Marshalls outside of it. They would not be seriously defended, though troops already there were expected to fight to their deaths. Meanwhile Allied naval strategists were choosing their first point of attack on the new Pacific front. The Japanese fleet was based at Chuuk, which seemed well protected by its screen of islands; therefore, the Americans decided to attack the Marshall Islands first. To do that they needed an air base within bombing distance. The Gilbert Islands (now part of Kiribati) were chosen as their first Micronesian target.

Chronology

The first Allied landings in Micronesia took place in the Gilberts in November 1943, with a massively destructive bombardment and land invasion of Tarawa. The fighting war had come to Micronesia, and from this day on it increased in intensity without pause. After Tarawa, air and surface bombardment of the Marshall Islands began, and continued for two months. Kwajalein was invaded on 31 January 1944; the attack on critical Eniwetok was planned for February. In support of these attacks Pohnpei, Kosrae, Wake, and other Marshall Islands were repeatedly shelled and bombed.

In February 1944 the major American strike on Chuuk destroyed 200,000 tons of Japanese shipping. But Admiral Koga had ordered his major warships out of Chuuk two weeks before, pulling them back to Palau, assuming that

eastern Micronesia was lost and intending to hold a new line of defense between the Marianas and the western Carolines. The attack on Chuuk blew up one of the Allies great myths of Japanese power in Micronesia; the Enewetak invasion on the same day cleared the way for the US takeover of the Marshalls.

At that point the Allies decided to "bypass" Pohnpei and Chuuk--that is, to hit them by air and sea attack and "neutralize" them as military bases, but not to make a land invasion. See chapters 8 and 11 for what this meant to people on the islands that were "bypassed" or "neutralized." It did not mean they were out of the war. It did mean that they were cut off from supplies and support from the remaining parts of the empire. Except for a few submarines, which could carry very little, the "bypassed" islands had no access to outside supplies; they were effectively incapable of either offensive or defensive military action; they were subject to air and surface bombardment; and, as the months went by, the people--Japanese and Micronesian--were increasingly concerned simply with staying alive. The military on some islands, it seems, simply abandoned Japanese and Micronesian civilians, leading to a general scramble to avoid starvation.

By the end of February 1944 the United States had taken control of 800,000 square miles of ocean, and forced the effective Japanese resistance back to the extreme western Pacific. Former Japanese bases in the Gilberts and Marshalls were turned into American bases; Japanese were killed or taken prisoner; Islanders were experiencing their first lengthy encounters with Americans (discussed elsewhere in this volume). The US Navy, prepared with civil affairs officers and plans for handling conquered populations, began to organize the next phase of Micronesia's history: the American era (Richard 1957).

Although the central Micronesian islands were not invaded by Americans after the conquest of the Marshalls, they were still in the war. Chuuk, Satawal, Pohnpei, and other islands were repeatedly attacked, and Japanese repeatedly tried to use them as air and submarine bases. Island men were conscripted as labor for the Japanese, sometimes working while bombs were falling. Men and women worked overtime to produce badly needed food and tried to maintain community life under wartime stress. While these central Caroline Islands were "bypassed," the bulk of American military might in the central Pacific was converging on the Marianas, where Saipan had become the chief Japanese headquarters for the central Pacific. The desperate fighting on Saipan and the Marianas is well known to military history; it began on 15 June 1945 with the first attack on Saipan; the battle for Saipan lasted twenty-four days. Guam was invaded on 21 July; Tinian on 24 July. Fighting on all these islands was long and bloody, with great devastation and death for

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people on all sides. Islanders were vastly outnumbered on most of these islands, which had larger civilian Japanese populations. The final days of the war in the western Pacific were marked by horror for civilians, culminating in the mass suicides of Japanese civilians on Saipan. But the Allied conquest of the Marianas meant that American planes could now reach the Japanese mainland with their bombs, and the end of the war was in sight.

The end of the war in the Micronesian islands came on 30 August 1945 when Japan's South Sea Island forces made their official surrender in Chuuk. During the next months Japanese were repatriated, leaving Islanders with their new administrators, the American navy. The war in the Pacific was over. But for Micronesians the meaning and the memory of the war would never end.

The Impacts of the War

Although American, European, and Japanese historians have produced voluminous documentation of Western and Asian experiences of the Pacific theater of World War II, they seldom include information about the effects of wartime operations on local people. Most Micronesian memories of the war are preserved in songs and stories, which are only now being collected to give us detailed knowledge of daily life during the war, and the impact of Japanese colonial and military activity, large-scale conflict, and initial American occupation on Islanders. I can only outline some of the most significant and lasting impacts of the wartime era, and briefly compare Micronesian experiences with those of Melanesia.

Wartime experiences varied considerably among the island groups of Micronesia. The Marshall Islands lay at the eastern periphery of the Japanese empire; they were the springboards for Japan's early attacks on the United States and were the site of the first American attacks on the Japanese. Marshall Islanders were also the first Micronesians to experience the new American colonial policies. Pohnpei, in the Eastern Carolines, held an important seaplane base and a large Japanese urban area. After Pohnpei was cut off from the Japanese empire by American forces, people there had to intensify local agricultural production, and they suffered shortages of imported manufactured goods such as cloth. On nearby Kosrae numerous Japanese and Islanders were relocated to a labor camp, where they had to remain when communication with the empire was cut off. The populations far exceeded Kosrae's agricultural capacity, so that starvation and sickness set in. Chuuk and Yap, which shared similar economic and social wartime stresses, were more prominent in Japanese military plans. Yap held a seaplane base; Chuuk Lagoon was a major naval base, home to the Japanese combined fleet

until the American conquest of the Marshall Islands. Japanese air and submarine attacks were launched from Chuuk and Yap as late as the US invasion of Saipan (June 1944). The central and eastern Caroline Islands were subject to American attack throughout this period. After the Japanese gave up the defense of the eastern islands, Palau, the Marianas, and Saipan were reinforced heavily with army and navy forces, making them the eye of the war hurricane: on these islands physical destruction and human suffering were most intense.

Physically the war changed the face of all the islands. Japanese and Islanders had invested much effort and money in the construction of harbors, airports, cities, electricity-generating plants, and local industries--all were destroyed. Under the administration of the US Navy new systems of employment and trade had to be established. Medical care, education, and government services had to be built up again.

Other aspects of life also changed as a result of the war. Women had a greater role in work and in leadership while men were away from home; they brought these wartime experiences back to their families and peacetime lives. Young men had traveled more widely than their fathers; they had met people from other parts of the Pacific; and they came home with new ideas and aspirations. The great material wealth displayed by both sides, especially by Americans, suggested to Islanders a new standard of economic and industrial potential. Unlike Melanesians, for whom encounters with American troops were a brief interlude, Micronesians were about to begin a lengthy relationship with the United States.

Comparisons with Melanesia

Many of the impacts of the war affected Micronesians and Melanesians similarly. Both suffered the danger and destruction of bombardment from Allies (Micronesians were less subject to Japanese attack). Some Micronesian men, like Melanesians, served in combat, including volunteers who served in the Japanese Army far from home in Southeast Asia and New Guinea. Most adult men worked as conscripted labor for the Japanese, and some moved from island to island as they were ordered. Other men, women, and young people carried on at home, laboring overtime to produce food and other necessities not only for themselves, but also for Japanese. For all Pacific Islanders the major stresses of the war were danger, starvation, absence from or loss of family, social dislocation, and population movement.

But though both Micronesia and Melanesia were key strategic areas in the Pacific War, people in the two regions experienced the war in very different ways. These differences are due to traditional cultural and social

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distinctions, the degree of direct involvement with occupying forces, the nationality of occupying forces, and even differences between army and navy approaches to civilian populations. Micronesians had lived under Japanese rule for thirty years when the navy-led American invasion changed their world in a matter of months. Melanesians, who had been living under various European colonial governments, were caught in intense back-and-forth fighting between Japanese and Allied forces. After the war, control of many Micronesian islands was demanded and achieved by the US military for security reasons, with many islands placed under navy control. Melanesia, again divided among the colonial powers (who had economic, as well as strategic, uses for the region), experienced a diversity of postwar policy impacts. Micronesians saw the end of the war as a change to a new era; American administration changed almost every aspect of political and economic life. Melanesians found that the British, French, and Australians who returned to their colonies after the war wanted to return to "life as usual." These returning colonialists were met by Melanesians who had seen a wider world and developed new ideas, which they wanted to translate into new ways of life. Postwar political activity, then, was quite different in the two regions, although populations in both regions have achieved political independence.

Conclusion

With the end of the war in the Pacific came the end of Japanese colonial administration in Micronesia. It was hard to predict what the future would hold. Americans had mixed feelings about their new island possessions. On the one hand they wanted firm control of military bases in Micronesia, and they wanted the loyalty of Micronesian people. On the other hand the United States believed in self-government and did not want to be seen as a colonial power. The administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands developed within this double set of American intentions. The modern outcome of the American military conquest of Micronesia, as we see today, is Micronesian independence, with a variety of special relationships with the United States.

I have provided a very broad outline of the context of Micronesian experiences of the war years. Following chapters take up specifics of what life was like for people who lived through that time--people who have given us their memories, so that we too can learn about it.

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Nauruans during World War II

Nancy J. Pollock

Nauru was a small island of great interest to European powers during World War II. Phosphate had been mined there since 1906 by a consortium among Britain, Australia, and New Zealand to maintain agriculture in South Pacific colonies. But Japan was also eyeing it for its own agriculture. The central position of the island meant that it had strategic value for those nations as well as for the United States. With an airstrip the island provided a good base from which to make strikes against islands in the southwest Pacific. It thus became the center of an ongoing struggle that ultimately involved bombing and the relocation of two thirds of the Nauruan population. Following Japanese takeover of the island, 1200 Nauruans moved to Chuuk where more than 400 died. Of those who stayed on Nauru a significant number either died of medical complications or were beaten to death or executed for minor misdemeanors by the Japanese. And the Chinese on Nauru suffered even worse treatment than the Nauruans.

In this paper I examine the main events of the war for Nauruans beginning with the Japanese takeover in December 1941 and continuing through the final return of Nauruans to their island in February 1946. I then consider some of the long-term effects of these involvements, particularly the consequences of evacuation and starvation.

Nauru is mentioned only briefly in many accounts of the war in the Pacific. Dorothy Richard (1957) and Samuel Morison (1951) have provided some of the most complete documentation, which is supplemented by Wesley Craven and Frank Cate's formal history of the United States army and air forces in World War II (1950). But the focus of these accounts is winning the war, not its effects on the lives of Pacific Islanders. Sir Albert Ellis (1946) provides a good description of both the island and the disruption to Nauruan life from the vantage point of his longtime knowledge of the island as an administrator of the British Phosphate Commission. He was in the official party that arrived on Nauru in August 1945 to accept Japanese surrender. Patrick Cook (n.d.) has left a manuscript that he began as an eighteen-year-

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old Nauruan and maintained throughout the war. The exercise book with its pencil entries in English is preserved in the Australian War Museum, Canberra. A Chinese resident of Nauru, Nai Fai Ma (n.d.), also recorded the events of the war on Nauru in a diary, noting particularly the effects on the Chinese population. In addition to these written sources I draw on my own interviews with Patrick Cook and three other Nauruans who still hold vivid memories of World War II. I have pieced together the following from these oral and written accounts.

Background

The British Phosphate Commission was the main administrative body on Nauru from 1919 when Britain, Australia, and New Zealand replaced Germany under a League of Nations mandate agreement. The Japanese seized the island from Australia in December 1941, just after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and proceeded to build airstrips and bring in a large military force. The US military command responded by bombing Nauru in an attempt to destroy the airstrips. Caught in the middle of this conflict were some 1800 Nauruans and about 200 Chinese, as well as some Gilbertese who had been employed to work in the phosphate mine. Twelve hundred of the Nauruans were evacuated by the Japanese to Chuuk, while the others stayed home to suffer through the American bombing and the rigors of the Japanese regime. This paper examines the effects of this evacuation and bombing on the people of Nauru.

Nauru is a small island with a circumference of 19 kilometers and is situated in the mid-Pacific 42 kilometers south of the equator. The land area consists of a narrow coastal rim and a raised interior plateau, which was found in 1902 to contain a rich source of the mineral phosphate. This has been mined since 1906 and sold as superphosphate to fertilize the farms of Australia and New Zealand. Money from the sale of phosphate provided some income to a few Nauruan landholders, but they were paid below the international market price. The Japanese, who also needed to buy phosphate for their rice fields, had to rely on lower quality phosphate from Angaur, Makatea, and sources outside the Pacific. Part of their motive for seizing Nauru was to gain access to a cheap high quality source of phosphate.

A second Japanese motive for seizing Nauru was to expand the large military bases they had established in the eastern Carolines and Marshalls during the 1930s--an activity about which the United States knew very little. These bases had been established while Japan was administering Micronesia under a League of Nations mandate after World War I, even though the mandate had an explicit clause forbidding the use of mandated territories for

military activity (Miwa 1988). Japanese expansion during 1940 and 1941 necessitated the use of these bases as a supply line into islands such as Nauru and Tarawa in the Gilberts, which the Japanese took in 1942.

The Japanese expansion southward resulted in fierce battles at Tarawa in the Gilberts, in the Solomon Islands, and in New Guinea. Nauru was an important transit point in their push to control the islands of the southwest Pacific. It gave them a base for air sorties and for maintaining a military force. Even though there is no harbor on Nauru, a system of anchor buoys established for phosphate shipments was used by the Japanese to moor troop ships. They built three airstrips during their first six months on Nauru to provide air protection for shipping.

Japanese Seizure of Nauru

In December 1941 the Japanese seized Nauru from the Australians, and evacuated their citizens and 570 Chinese on 23 February 1942. The Japanese formally took possession of the island on 26 August 1942, raised their flag in place of the Union Jack, began to build military installations, and attempted to reopen the phosphate mine. They brought in over 4000 Japanese, some of them marines, some laborers, and a small group of NTK (South Seas Development Company) personnel to run the phosphate mine.

The population buildup on Nauru was accelerated further when the Japanese moved the Banabans from Ocean Island, which they had also seized. Several shipments of Banabans, amounting to about 900 people, arrived on Nauru during 1943. Most of these were relocated on Kosrae, Pohnpei, and Chuuk, but some remained on Nauru for the duration of the war (see Cook n.d.).

This sudden increase of the population on Nauru brought over 6000 people to an island where only 1800 Nauruans had existed previously (Richard 1957, 49). The raised reef had only a narrow band of fertile land around the coastal rim, while the rich vegetation in the interior was being ripped out to mine the phosphate between the coral pinnacles. Such a large population relied totally on outside supplies. In mid-1943 the Japanese administration made the decision to move some of the Nauruans off their island.

Evacuation to Chuuk

To reduce the size of this population two forms of evacuation were imposed. In June and August 1943 two groups of 600 Nauruans each were moved a thousand miles north to the island of Chuuk where there was already a

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considerable Japanese military force. The 600 Nauruans who remained on Nauru were evacuated from their homes and forced to live in designated areas of the island, away from their ancestral lands.

Cook recorded in his diary that 29 June 1943 was "another historical moment" when the Nauruan leaders were called in by the Japanese administration and told that 600 of their people were to go to Chuuk that day in a troop carrier that had arrived on Nauru bringing in more Japanese marines and laborers. "It was approved that a party of 600 natives under the supervision of Kaicho Detudamo and N.M.P. Joseph Harris will be the first." On 16 August 1943, "another order of the second Nauru evacuees was issued." This party was headed by Albert Harris. A total of 1200 Nauruans was evacuated to Chuuk (6).

The Nauruans were told to organize their people to leave. They did not understand why they were being evacuated, nor where they were going. They could see the overcrowding problem but had little appreciation of the war and why the Japanese were there. Desire for their phosphate was obvious, but the military buildup made little sense. Nai Fai Ma suggests the Nauruan leaders were told that families with relatives in the leprosy asylum were to be sent away. Apparently Japanese had a fundamental fear of leprosy and thought that, confined on a small island, they too would catch the disease.

On Chuuk the Nauruan evacuees were placed on the islands of Tol and Fefan, where they were expected to work on building airstrips and producing sweet potatoes and fishing to feed the Japanese garrison. Sweet potato cultivation, and indeed agriculture in general, were not familiar practices to Nauruans, as no root or grain crops grew on Nauru. They were expected to work alongside Chuukese who were used to growing root crops, although they had not cultivated sweet potato in earlier times. This workforce of Nauruans and Chuukese was supervised by strict Japanese overseers who used brutal practices to keep up production. The aim was to provide food for the large military force garrisoned there, and to construct airstrips for their progressive conquest of the South Pacific.

Little has been written about this part of the war and its effects on the lives of the Chuukese, the Nauruans, and other Micronesians. The Reverend Amram of Nauru still holds vivid memories of the privations of the two years he spent on Chuuk with his family. He described that period to me as the "turning point" in his life. Not only was the work in the fields unfamiliar and Japanese discipline extremely strict, but the Americans also bombed the area. The Japanese were liberal with their beatings. On one occasion, after a group of Nauruans had been beaten, they decided to swim to another island where their families were held. They went despite the threat of sharks. Reverend Amram recalls

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swimming, swimming, swimming, until about 4 or 5 AM, I reached the island exhausted. I went to find my family. I saw them huddled together. Near them some Nauruan houses were all destroyed by bombs. Some were dead. There were bodies everywhere. I asked "Are you alright?" They said "Take us away in case the planes come back." It was about 7 or 8 o'clock, so I took them away some distance. Then I prayed to God "Thank you for saving my family." I promised to devote my life to God.

He became a pastor of the Nauruan church, a position he still holds.

When the Japanese questioned him about this episode, they wanted to know the whereabouts of the Australian submarine that had taken him from one island to another. When he denied there had been an Australian submarine, the Japanese interrogators tied his hands and beat him until he was unconscious. He had no broken bones, but other Nauruans took care of him and tended his wounds until he became strong enough to work again. After that he worked extremely hard to avoid the displeasure of the Japanese.

Another Nauruan taken to Chuuk was Detudamo, an outstanding Nauruan leader who had been lobbying the British Phosphate Commission since 1927 for a greater share of phosphate profits for the Nauruan landowners. Before leaving Nauru he had been appointed governor of the Nauruans by the Japanese and had endeavored to plead the Nauruan cause with the military administrators. He did his best to keep morale high amongst the Nauruans on Chuuk and appealed to the Chuukese for food when supplies ran short in 1944 (but with little success, according to Amram). The Nauruans on Chuuk became despondent as they watched many of their family and friends die, with no way to find food or medicine to help them.

One episode that illustrates Detudamo's shrewd perception of their situation on Chuuk was recorded by Reverend Amram. Just before the Americans arrived to liberate Chuuk, the Japanese offered Detudamo some Camel cigarettes, but he refused. They then offered him Sakura (Japanese) cigarettes. He took one and lit it and smoked. ("He must have used his head," Amram commented.) As a result of this wise choice the Japanese brought an American and a Japanese medicine kit. He refused the American kit, saying he preferred the Japanese one. Then they asked, "Suppose the war finished. What ship would you like to take you home--American, Australian or Japanese?" Detudamo replied "Nippon ship." They were all smiles. "We were very happy that we were spared. So many Nauruans had died," concluded Amram.

By October 1945, well after the American occupation, 410 of the expatriate Nauruans had died and most of the remaining 793 Nauruans were still working on a Japanese potato plantation on Tol Island. Apparently they

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despaired of being discovered by the American inspection force because Detudamo, their chief, wrote a letter to the commander of the occupational force, delivered on 1 November 1945. The letter begged for food because they were subsisting on "only green leaves and toddy . . . and if help is still delayed we shall all be perished. . . . We would be very grateful if you would be so kind as to send us foodstuffs such as rice, navy bread, etc., with your bill. On reaching home (Nauru) arrangements would be made through our government for payment" (Richard 1957, 49). Those remaining Nauruans were returned to Nauru in February 1946 aboard an Australian ship. Amram recalls both happiness and sorrow as the story of the hardships of life on Chuuk were shared with the much depleted families.

Living on Nauru 1942-1946

The 600 Nauruans who were left on Nauru after August 1943 were also subject to privations, including evacuation from their home districts (for details of Nauruan social arrangements in districts, see Pollock 1987). They were told to move out of their homes in the various districts around the island and to relocate to Nibok and Boe districts in the less frequented northwest corner of the island. Their houses were either pulled down to make room for the barracks of Japanese marines, or were commandeered by the Japanese, particularly those in the Menen district, for their officers. Also in Menen district, on the site of the tuberculosis sanitarium, large separate encampments were built for the Japanese military and the 700 laborers who were brought in to build the airstrips.

Another group of Nauruans who suffered at the hands of the Japanese were the leper patients who had been confined in the leper asylum in Menen district. All forty-nine of them were told that they would be taken to a place where they would be cared for. Instead they were crowded into three leaky boats, towed out to sea, and then fired on from the shore. The Japanese fear of leprosy is given as justification for this inhuman act (Ma n.d.).

Between September 1943 and January 1944 the main activity on Nauru was building three airstrips, which the Japanese needed for their forays into the Solomons and Papua New Guinea. They also needed these as a backup for their position on Tarawa, Gilbert Islands, and for the defense of the Marshalls and Chuuk. In addition to the Japanese laborers 275 Nauruans were also required to work on the airstrips for the Japanese (Ellis 1946, 27). They were expected to work from dawn to dusk and were beaten or denied food if they slacked at all. For people who had never had to do much physical work this was exacting enough, but the discipline and privations were additionally traumatic.

The total Japanese force on Nauru in May 1944 was 4178 (Ma n.d., 23). It consisted of 2867 marines and 1311 laborers. Another 1463 "natives" were listed, as well as 179 Chinese. The "natives" included Nauruans as well as Gilbertese, Ellice Islanders, and one or two Marshallese. Thus the total population on Nauru at that time amounted to 5820 (Ellis 1946, 27). This was the largest population by far ever to occupy this small island.

During the occupation from August 1942 to September 1945, when the Japanese surrendered the island, those 5820 people lived under very crowded conditions. Even under normal circumstances resources would have been stretched. But with the island effectively blockaded by American air attacks, Japanese supply vessels were unable to bring in either provisions or ammunition. In September 1943 a 1000-ton Japanese vessel and a 6000-ton cargo vessel were sunk by American bombs or torpedoes. Despite the daily American bombing raids two Japanese cruisers and two transport submarines managed to get through bringing provisions and ammunition to Nauru during 1944. The arrival of 75 tons of rice and 50 tons of ammunition in September 1944 in the two Japanese submarines was extremely welcome (Ellis 1946). But that provided only a temporary respite from the starvation facing the Japanese as well as the Nauruans and Chinese. That was the last shipment of provisions to reach the island until the war ended in August 1945. Nai Fai Ma describes the deaths of the Chinese from starvation in bleak entries in his diary.

In addition to the blockade against Japanese supply ships, the weather had added its own constrictions to the food supply. A severe drought set in during early 1943 and lasted into 1944, thereby reducing the productivity of the few pandanus and breadfruit trees that remained on the narrow coastal belt. The coconut trees produced fewer and smaller nuts. But their production was already reduced by the practice of tapping the inflorescences to make sweet toddy--a practice used extensively when all other food sources were exhausted. The Japanese allotted coconut trees thus: "Three trees for a Japanese, two for a native, and one for a Chinaman" (Ellis 1946, 29).

The calcareous soil of Nauru produced little besides the pandanus and coconuts on which Nauruans had based their traditional diet. But to keep such a large population alive the Japanese administration ordered the growing of pumpkins. When the group of Australian and New Zealand representatives of the British Phosphate Commission arrived on Nauru to accept Japanese surrender, they found pumpkins everywhere, both growing profusely and stored in sheds ready for use. The reason that Nauru had been turned so successfully into a pumpkin patch was the use of 40-gallon petrol drums full of sewage and excreta as the "soil" in which the pumpkins flourished. Ellis described the smell and the flies as "the Japanese's

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unprecedented legacy" (1946:85). Dysentery was rife. The Australian occupation forces poured oil on the drums to burn them in order to restore Nauru "to its usual sanitary and healthy atmosphere" (Ellis 1946, 83).

Fish was more readily available. During the last two years of the occupation Cook's diary entries consisted only of the number of fish he caught each day, and of the bombing raids. He still recalls this as the time when he learned to fish. He also noted, with some irony, that the bombing raids sometimes yielded a good supply of fish if the Americans missed their target and a bomb exploded close to shore killing many fish. Fishing became the work of many Nauruans for their Japanese captors, and all the fish they landed had to be handed over, except for one for their families. The Japanese kept a close watch as each fisher came ashore; several Nauruans and Chinese and Gilbertese were beaten for concealing a fish to feed their families.

The result of these lean times, however, was not as severe as one might expect. Although some Nauruans (and more Chinese) died from starvation and complications, the Australian occupation party that arrived in September 1945 remarked that they had expected to find the inhabitants emaciated and in poor health, but instead they all looked "fairly well," though suffering from dysentery and other diseases (Ellis 1946, 83).

The physical conditions for Nauruans who remained on Nauru differed little from those that Nauruans suffered on Chuuk. Both groups had to work hard, were subject to harsh Japanese authority, and were close to starvation. The only consolation for those who stayed on Nauru was that they were on their home island, and so suffered a different form of psychological trauma than those who were physically separated from it. They developed a mistrust of anyone who was not Nauruan. The fight for survival set Nauruans in opposition to Chuukese on Chuuk, and against Gilbertese and Chinese, as well as their Japanese captors on Nauru. Nai Fai Ma worked closely with the Japanese authorities during the occupation of Nauru, but the day the Japanese were evacuated after Victory in the Pacific Day, August 1945, he attacked a Japanese with an iron bar and nearly killed him. His reason was that this was one way of retaliating for the hardships inflicted on himself and his fellow Chinese (25). No doubt ancient antagonisms between Japan and China surfaced at this emotional moment.

Bombing of Nauru

Bombing occurred daily on Nauru throughout 1943 and 1944 so the Nauruans became very used to the raids. But when the island was first attacked on 27 December 1940 to cripple the phosphate installations, Cook described the event as "a thing which I'll say most thrilling in History" (1). Two years later

he was still excited by the sight and sound of warfare: "It was a beautiful site [sic] to see the defense guns flashing upwards in fine groups of red balls, yet considerable damage was done to the airfields" (5). These are the words of a young man describing an exciting event. Later in his diary the entries are more prosaic and repetitious: "Three of them [American bombers] visited us early at 8 AM dropping bombs for which we retaliated without effect" (31 July 1944). The excitement was gone. During 1943 and 1944 Nauru was bombed by American planes almost every day.

Americans began bombing the new airstrips and installations on 25 March 1943 as part of their campaign to stop Japanese military expansion into the southwest Pacific. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff decided by the summer of 1943 that the Gilberts should be taken by Allied forces in an action code-named Operation Galvanic. This was to be a quick thrust as the first step toward capturing Pohnpei and Chuuk in the Carolines. The newly constructed airbase on Nauru, which was finished in January 1943, was seen as a threat to the success of Operation Galvanic as the Japanese could use that island to cover an area between the Solomons and the Gilberts (Craven and Cate 1950, 300). On 19 November 1943 the US warships *Saratoga* and *Princeton* attacked Nauru and "neutralized" it, so that it was no longer able to support the Japanese campaign in the Gilberts (Morison 1951, 136). For some six weeks the island continued to be bombarded. On 8 December alone US bombers dropped 51 tons of bombs on Nauru and "tried to sink it" (Cant 1945, 163).

These repeated attacks on Nauru's airstrips contributed to the success of the American attack on Tarawa by drawing off Japanese attacks on the American Marine landing force. The American aim was to overpower the 3000-strong Japanese garrison on Betio, Tarawa, which was not quite ready for the American onslaught on D-day, 20 November 1943. As Cant commented: "The persistence of Japanese on Nauru was irritating during the Gilbertese campaign. The island was repeatedly bombed but the air base was regularly and repeatedly repaired by the enemy. Nauru did not sink, but never fully recovered from this onslaught" (Cant 1945, 163). The success of this campaign for American forces, albeit with losses of over 3000 men, was the beginning of a long period of isolation for the Japanese and Nauruans on Nauru.

Following the success of Operation Galvanic in the Gilberts, American bombing of Nauru continued, but this time the aim was to divert Japanese energies away from defending the bases they had established in the southern Marshalls, such as the airstrips on Mille and Jaluit, and the significant bases on Kwajalein, Pohnpei, and Chuuk. From December 1943 through January 1945 bombing of Nauru continued on most days. As Cook recorded for

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9 December 1943, "Another memorable date; a formation of American fighter planes raided us early at 5:35 AM and destroyed most of the military objects, and warships were firing on the island." This raid resulted in four Nauruans killed and twelve Nauruans injured, as well as many more Gilbertese killed and wounded. The church (newly built in 1940) and several British Phosphate Commission buildings were destroyed.

Effects of Bombing

Cook made little direct record of his or other Nauruan reactions to the events of the war. From the few comments he does make we can infer some of his emotional reaction. For example he refers to 25 December 1941 as "Our Black Day" when enemy planes returned "and smashed our old wireless station by diving very low using machine guns and bombs. From then a constant visitation of enemy bombers has taken place." And beside 22 August 1942 he wrote, "We all went mad with fear when we saw them (American bombers) tearing the air like wild Indians on the war path."

He also records that some of those bombing attacks resulted in fatalities or injuries either to Nauruans or Gilbertese. In his personal recollections to me he commented on his feelings when, as a young man, he watched his sister and cousins die as a result of a bombing that blew apart the house in which they were living. He and a friend had been off fishing when the bombing occurred. In his diary he also recorded raids that damaged buildings such as the government office and store.

Nai Fai Ma's record is also very factual, though less detailed than Cook's diary. Ma comments on the brutality of the Japanese and on the drastic shortage of food for the Chinese. We know that they were assigned only one coconut tree and can infer that their rations of rice were less than was needed to sustain them. The Chinese who had been left behind on Nauru at the time of the evacuation of the Australians in February 1941 were recorded then as being sickly (Ellis 1946, 28). So it is less surprising that the number of Chinese who died during the Japanese occupation was high.

The reaction of Nauruans to the Japanese occupation of their island is hard to judge, except in hindsight. For example Cook's comment on 25 August 1942, the day when the Japanese occupation was established was: "Another warship arrived and officially announced the occupation of the island. Therefore we submittedly approved that day to be recorded as a very romantic conclusion to the Nauruan history. The Hinomaru (Japanese flag) instead of the Union Jack was not respected by every native on the island of Nauru. Detudamo was appointed Governor." This acceptance of a fait accompli was only slightly elaborated during our discussions of the war; Cook

recalls that as a young man he accepted what happened without too much resentment of the Japanese. The conflict of loyalties emerged with hindsight.

Cook's account shows a gradual change of loyalties, which I judge as only natural given the close proximity with which he and other Nauruans were living with the Japanese. He uses the terms enemy and raiders throughout the diary; in the first entries up to August 1942 those terms refer to the Germans and the Japanese, but gradually thereafter he records the bombing attacks by "American Boings [sic]" and American raids, and a "daily visitation of enemy planes" on 12 March 1944, which was clearly an American bombing raid.

Not only were Cook and the other Nauruans under very strict military rule by the Japanese, and fearful of repercussions if they stepped out of line, but they also were suffering losses of relatives at the hands of American bombers. In 1987, as a result of hindsight, they felt no particular affection for the Japanese but judged that their only way of staying alive was to do what the Japanese commanded. Nauruans were in the minority and were easily picked off if they committed offenses. They also told me that they did not understand why the Americans kept up their bombing raids for so long (two years) after the island was rendered ineffective militarily. They of course were living with the dispirited and disarmed Japanese force and knew how short all supplies including ammunition were on the island, but the American forces had only indirect knowledge of their condition. As American raids shifted from the airstrips to the tuberculosis settlement where Japanese forces were housed and to the gasoline drums, they became a daily threat to the lives of the Nauruans.

The ambivalence of one young Nauruan is recorded by Cook. On 15 February 1943 he wrote:

The 10-year-old son of Detudamo (the Nauruan chief and Governor) was imprisoned today by his father's command. It's because an air officer asked him how he enjoyed the trip (on one of the Japanese planes) the other day the boy then said "I enjoyed it very much." Then the officer said now which country did you like most the English or the Japanese, the boy said "I like both the English and Japanese." The officer was very sorry as he expected the lad to praise Japan so he talked it over with Detudamo advising him to teach the boy to learn the good manner. So his father imprisoned him. (5)

The total number of Nauruans killed during these bombing raids was about forty, but no accurate record of their deaths was kept apart from Cook's diary entries. Many more were injured, as were Gilbertese and Chinese. For 4 May 1944 Cook wrote: "Nine or more dive bombers inflicted heavy casualties on soldiers and us and ruined many houses." A similar entry occurs for 8 May. But with the shortage of supplies, including medicines and

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equipment for the hospitals, it is likely that many of those who suffered from what would normally have been minor injuries succumbed for lack of treatment. The rate of death was enhanced also by the poor physical condition of those who were wounded.

The shortage of food is barely mentioned by Cook, but Nai Fai Ma made more entries in his diary about the Chinese dying of starvation. On Saturday 25 February 1944 Cook recorded that "Casual labourers ceased duty owing to lack of rice. . . . The Allied Blockage forced the soldiers to eat creepers and its kind, while we natives eat (DOBOIY) weeds DENENO, DOMO DURU. Later the Copra were ceased owing to that Copras were nowhere to be found" (8). On 10 April 1944 he noted "Soldiers demanding toddies from us," referring to the coconut toddy made by catching the sap from a cut inflorescence on a coconut tree. On 21 April 1944 "Two hundred native men were called up to collect toddies for the soldiers. Rice rationing among them was greatly reduced--they eat rice soup only for their morning breakfast. Some of the already collected toddy tree will be taken from us on the 26th." Among the strict orders issued to Nauruans were: "Don't give your toddy (to Japanese soldiers)--give it as a present [and] Don't take coconut fruits. The punishment was - Nipon - Do - Kiro One soldier was shot while stealing native toddy. See list of names of others doing same. Eade (Giurour) and Deirog left home for Secretar's Hombu (Jap Collies; Hd Qrts) offering themselves for food-stuffs. Soldiers and native constables were sent out to search for them" (Cook n.d., 11).

Nai Fai Ma on the other hand has left us some graphic details of the increasing shortage of food from March 1944 to the end of the war. On 17 March he recorded, "Food problem becoming serious. Coconut trees suitable for collecting 'toddy' numbered." On 20 March he wrote: "Coconut trees distributed among the people: Japanese 3 trees each; Native 2 trees each; Chinese 1 tree." And on 1 July, he noted "Rice gradually getting scarce. Pumpkins, sweet corns and sweet potatoes take the place of weed and wild grass growing in uncultivated tracts." On 13 September: "Ocean Gilbertese LUKA 'toddy' collector of Japanese after severely beaten and tied up for three days executed for defrauding by supplying Japanese with 'toddy' mixed with water." On 14 September a Japanese transport submarine surfaced and landed 75 tons of rice, 50 tons of ammunition and several tons of cargo (23). Ironically, Ma recorded the death of four Chinese from starvation between September and December 1944, and two Chinese who were working for the Japanese were beaten to death on separate occasions for stealing a pumpkin. The record for 6 July 1945 states: "CB 284 SEEK KOW suffering from paralysis and his body swollen up in all parts owing to malnutrition, passed away." One report gives a total of 22 Chinese deaths during the war out of the 190 who

remained on Nauru (Anonymous 1946, 17). These records indicate that the Chinese probably suffered more physically from the shortage of food than the Nauruans themselves, though there were fewer of them.

The physical destruction of Nauru was described in detail by an anonymous visitor in February 1946. Temporary houses lined the foreshore but did not distract from the vast destruction of the settlement by American bombing and shelling. In addition the Japanese had constructed an elaborate and strong system of defenses against a marine landing, leading the author "to the obvious conclusion that the Japanese in their own way hoped to conclude a sort of compromise peace with the Allies, and on terms favorable to both sides (some say saving face) would retain Nauru for its vast deposits of phosphate. 'What I have I hold' would doubtless have applied in this case." These defense works, which consisted of deep pits as tank traps, concrete pill boxes, and underground dugouts and radio stations, were all protected by many gun emplacements. A Japanese cemetery near Buada Lagoon contained more than five hundred Japanese burials (Anonymous 1946).

Effects of the War on Nauruans

The war brought total disruption to the lives of all Nauruans, whether they were evacuated to Chuuk or stayed on Nauru. In 1946 they had to begin to build a new society, based on new family structures and new status considerations. One persistent cultural phenomenon was Head Chief Detudamo, who had not only survived but had provided moral support during the trying times on Chuuk.

Physical destruction of the island from eighteen months of almost daily bombing raids by the Americans, and from the Japanese installations, meant that houses had to be built in home districts, using whatever finance could be found. The British Phosphate Commissioners provided sixpence per ton export duty on phosphate and advanced £200,000 for a fund for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the island. The Australian administration, however, was slow to act, so that in 1948 Nauruans were still living in huts built from scrap materials salvaged from the war, and their schools and hospitals were inadequate. Phosphate mining resumed in July 1946. Ellis (1946) was very concerned about the damage to equipment, but the plant was repaired and set running again with seventy-six Europeans to direct its progress.

The enforced work that the Japanese imposed on the Nauruans during the war also had a long-term effect. Nauruans had never worked so hard before, and the work they were expected to do was completely foreign to them, whether building airstrips on Nauru and Chuuk, planting sweet

potatoes, or digging Japanese defenses. After the war the attitude to work continued, and all able-bodied Nauruans were employed.

One political outcome of these five traumatic years was that Nauruans decided upon a more democratic system of government. Today they speak of abolition of the Temonibe class--a process which began in 1927 when a new political body replaced the former Council of Chiefs, but which was hastened by the events of the war. In 1951 governing power over affairs of the island was placed in the hands of a newly created body, the Nauru Local Government Council. The council was a major step toward self government and the declaration of independence in 1968. Detudamo and Hammer de Roburt emerged from the war period as the primary leaders, not only as chiefs, but also in the broader more democratic postwar political structure (see Viviani 1971 for discussion of the setting up of the Nauru Local Government Council).

Social relationships also changed. Nauruans had never been very keen to travel on whaling ships or to become indentured labor in Queensland, as had other Pacific Islands people. But after World War II bonds between Nauruans became even tighter as a result of their shared losses of family members, and their decrease in overall numbers. The harsh life that each group had suffered left its mark as a determination to build a strong society based on their own model, independent of outside influences. The Americans had bombed them, the Australians had apparently abandoned them, and the Japanese had beaten and starved them, so who could they trust but their fellow Nauruans.

Their loyalties also became more clear. Control of their island by outsiders was not providing Nauruans with the kind of life they wanted. Their wartime associations of the label "enemy" first with the Japanese and then with the Americans, was later broadened, at least in Cook's diary, to include all Allies--that is the British, Australians, and New Zealanders who had been working their island for phosphate for forty years.

The Banabans (from Ocean Island), who had been evacuated to Nauru, had no island to return to after the war, so accepted the island of Rabi off the northeast coast of Fiji as their future home. The Nauruans knew that they might also have to face such a possibility, though not as drastic as that faced by the Banabans. Watching the Banaban episode enabled Nauruans to consider this possibility in their own future; they rejected an Australian offer for resettlement on an island off the north coast of Australia.

The population of Nauruans had been severely reduced. In 1946 there were only 1369 Nauruans, as well as 21 Gilbertese and Ocean Islanders, and 778 Chinese, some of them newly arrived. Thus the Nauruan population was reduced by 439 over the three years of evacuation and occupation. Their

health also remained poor, with leprosy and tuberculosis as the most prevalent diseases, and yaws, venereal disease and beriberi also widespread.

What interests me most in this whole wartime episode on Nauru is the effect of drastic food shortages on the current status of health. Nauruans have been described in the 1970s as having one of the highest incidences in the world of diabetes, with 40 percent of the population in 1981 diagnosed with noninsulin dependent diabetes mellitus. An important question that needs closer examination is the link between this wartime period on Nauruans' physical status and the recently documented high incidence of diabetes.

Conclusion

Older Nauruans remember clearly the drastic interventions in their lives brought about by Japanese evacuations to Chuuk, and by the bombings they suffered both on Nauru and on Chuuk. The three-year period from 1942 through 1945 is imprinted indelibly into their memories. These memories have led to two long-term effects.

First, determined to control their own lives after having been pawns in a major war, they rejected the British Phosphate Commission's offer to relocate them. Nauruans wanted to maintain ties to their island. After the war the fight for phosphate royalties continued with renewed vigor, ending only when the Nauruans bought the phosphate industry from the commission for A\$20 million, a transaction entwined intimately with Nauru's declaration of independence in 1968.

Second, their land became even more precious to them. Most Nauruans continue to live on Nauru. Those who do migrate do so either to seek education, to take positions in Nauruan diplomatic missions, or, in a few cases, to take jobs in Australia. But the bulk of the Nauruan population can be found living on the island of Nauru. In this they differ markedly from other Pacific Island nations where a growing proportion of the population is to be found in metropolitan countries (for further details see Pollock n.d.).

Both short-term and long-term effects of the war resulted on Nauru. When we have drawn together war accounts from other islands in the Pacific we may see some similarities. We need to do this before people such as Patrick Cook and Reverend Amram can no longer share their memories with us.

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World War II in Kiribati

Sam Highland

The Republic of Kiribati consists of three groups of islands, namely the Gilbert Group, the Line Group, and the Phoenix Group, all scattered across the central part of the Pacific Ocean. The total land area of the country is about 719 square kilometers, most of which is about one meter above sea level. Because the soil is very poor, the planting of coconut trees is the only industry on land. On the other hand the vast waters surrounding the country are good fishing grounds. The national capital is located in Tarawa in the northern Gilberts, and the population of the country during the 1985 census was 64,000.

World War II in Kiribati was confined mainly to the important government bases in Banaba, Tarawa, Abemama, and Butaritari. This paper is about the Tarawa campaign, one of the bloodiest battlegrounds in the entire war, and its impact on the Kiribati people, particularly the inhabitants of Betio village, which was the stage of the main conflict between the Japanese and the Americans.

Betio village is an islet located at the southern extremity of Tarawa atoll. Until the ravages of the war, the Betio people engaged in a subsistence lifestyle with some affluence. The land abounded with tropical fruits and crops, mainly coconuts, breadfruit, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, pandanus, papaya, and traditional root crops. The surrounding sea teemed with marine life, fish and molluscs, readily available all year round. Life was easy, luxurious, and enjoyable before the threat of war came in the first week of December 1941. The population of Betio in 1941 was about four hundred, including a few expatriates.

The Japanese Invasion of Tarawa Atoll

The Japanese landed on the ocean side of the southwestern part of Betio at about 3 AM when the village was asleep. All the expatriates were captured, interrogated, and threatened unless they responded accurately to the

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demands of the Japanese. Everybody was rounded up near the post office, and some of the captives were tied up with ropes to coconut trees. The only food store on Betio, that of Burns Philp, was taken over by the Japanese and later destroyed. The Betio villagers had depended on the Burns Philp store for their basic needs other than traditional food. Curfews were set, and most movements were restricted. At about 4 PM that same day, when everyone had been gathered at the post office, the Japanese flag was hoisted and the Japanese commander declared Tarawa to be under Japanese jurisdiction. The Japanese left Tarawa that same day, leaving behind the Betio people, who were scared and worried about their lands and lives. They could do nothing to escape a war they had nothing to do with. They were confused, distressed, and totally lost.

Early in 1942 the Japanese returned to Tarawa. When they landed again on Betio, the villagers expected more calamity. This came true when the Japanese destroyed all sailing and fishing canoes to prevent the people from escaping. Crops such as *babai*, taro (a prestigious root crop), and coconut trees were cut down and buried. Local houses and government staff quarters were destroyed. The whole islet was cleared of trees and houses in the first few weeks to make way for Japanese fortifications. People were forced to provide free labor and at times their personal belongings, such as clothing, were taken by the Japanese for their own use. Following several weeks of hard labor the local people were forced to leave their home village and find shelter in North Tarawa where the majority had no lands to stay on. As war refugees they had to depend on the goodwill and generosity of others for their maintenance. The move to North Tarawa was made more difficult because of the destruction of canoes. The Betio villagers had to walk and navigate the 25-mile stretch of reefs and tidal passages, laden with whatever personal belongings they could carry. They believed it was the end of the world for them.

Once the Betio people were evacuated, the Japanese recruited the men for hard labor to complete the fortification of the tiny islet--the construction of war bunkers, the laying of concrete structures crowned with sharpened metal on the reef around the islet, the construction of the airstrip, which covered almost a quarter of Betio, and the Japanese quarters. As most of the traditional crops had been destroyed, the laborers had to find extra food for themselves.

A popular punishment for failure to carry out orders was to tie up a worker with ropes and place a stick of dynamite between his legs. Another was flogging. Two locals, both mental patients, were shot and killed by the Japanese for refusing to carry out orders. With these cruel and inhuman treatments the Japanese exploited the gentle character of the Tarawa people.

During those days of hard labor American bombers used to raid the islet of Betio. Usually occurring during the full moon when visibility was better, the raids caused great suffering. Where could the people hide from the shelling? The usual place became the hollows of the taro pits! Two I-Kiribati lost their lives during these raids.

The Arrival of the Americans

The Americans finally landed on 20 November 1943. After seventy-seven hours of bitter fighting the Americans recaptured Tarawa from the Japanese. The British and American flags replaced the "flag of Nippon."

A day after the Japanese surrendered, the Americans recruited over one hundred I-Kiribati to clear dead bodies and war debris on Tarawa. This time the local people experienced better working conditions. Heavy equipment was used, rations were issued in abundance, and those who were selected to work even earned wages. Free clothing was provided, and each laborer was paid about US\$2 per day. The Americans established good relationships with the I-Kiribati, providing almost everything for their personal needs. Forced labor as experienced with the Japanese had ended. The Betio people's experience during the American occupation was the opposite of what was experienced under the Japanese.

During the American and British joint administration a Labour Corps was set up. People were recruited not only from Tarawa but from the rest of the islands as well. The main tasks of this Labour Corps were to clear the island of Tarawa and to reestablish the administration of this group of islands. Two companies from the Labour Corps were sent to the Solomon Islands to do similar work. Betio's traditional way of life was gradually restored, but with great difficulty because of the extensive war damage. When the Betio villagers returned to their islet they were unable to enjoy again the prewar subsistence lifestyle they had known because the islet had been ruined by the war. More corpses and war debris were evident than crops and trees on the tiny atoll, which was about three miles long and a quarter mile wide. The rehabilitation process was not easy. Lands Commissioner Harry Maude estimated that about 17,000 coconut trees had been destroyed on Betio to make way for the airstrip, and that about 14,000 square feet of taro pits were buried on Betio alone. Maude calculated that the financial compensation due the Betio landowners for their loss of traditional crops was £42,600. Note that these figures relate to the Betio damage alone and do not include the cost of damage to Butaritari, Abemama, Banaba, and other parts of Tarawa (Bairiki and North Tarawa). The rich inshore fisheries of Betio were destroyed and contaminated by the war. Local fish traps were destroyed and fishing activities

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were disrupted for several decades. The lagoon and ocean areas were full of wreckage. Unexploded bombs and war debris of various descriptions made the marine life inedible. Instead, the Betio people had to depend on expensive, imported tinned foodstuffs for their survival.

The Effects of World War II on Tarawa

The war made a tremendous impact on the life and culture of the Betio people. It became clear to them that their splendid and serene isolation could not escape the ripples of international conflicts such as World War II. The Betio people never regained their traditional subsistence lifestyle. The ecological damage on the fragile atoll was so extensive and lasting that both land and marine productivity were affected severely. The people had to start life all over again. Taro pits took three years to develop before a crop could be harvested. Building materials had to be brought in across the lagoon from North Tarawa for the villagers to build their local dwellings. Countless material and psychological losses were sustained by the people of Betio. The restoration of the past is impossible, of course, but the development of their future appears also to have been set back by the impact of the war. The Betio people have struggled to remain a viable community against history and time. The lack of war reparations from the colonial administration and the urbanization process since the war have exacerbated the economic and social situation of the once happy and cohesive community of Betio.

Marshall Islanders' Experiences in World War II

John Heine

I recall the war vividly, although I was very young, a small child of barely nine years. One day stands out most in my mind. That was when I first saw and believed that the war would be a danger to all of us. All I knew about war was what I had learned from Japanese comics about how they were killing Chinese in Manchuria. But this time I was under the guns of American planes. It was early morning of 4 February. I was sitting outside my parents' house under a coconut tree trying to remember the beatitudes from the Bible in preparation for my Sunday school class when suddenly I heard the guns overhead. I saw two planes diving straight at the end of our island, Jabwot. That was the beginning of World War II in the Marshalls. About one hundred Marshallese people died in that bombing. One Japanese was killed, not from a bullet, but when he bumped into a coconut tree while running away.

After that we didn't see any more war for some time. We heard of it, but there was quiet as long as the Americans stopped coming to the island. We did know that the war started with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. As small children in the Japanese school, we had been asked to walk around the island with tiny flags and do some banzais. We didn't know why. All we knew was that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. Why it happened, we didn't know. And then, suddenly, we heard that Tarawa had fallen and we began to see American planes all over the place, dropping bombs everywhere.

One afternoon as I was working with my father, we saw Japanese coming out of the bush. There were about ten of them, and they ordered my father to go with them, and I followed. We went to our house and there the Japanese started going through my father's belongings. In his old chest they found a typewriter and a red fishing line. So they started fumbling around with the typewriter. They were curious, wondering what it was, because these soldiers were not high rank and probably had never seen a typewriter before. After they did all this examination with my father's typewriter and his fishing line, they said, "Come with us," and they took my father. That was the last I saw of him for three months.

A few weeks later I saw the Japanese barge approaching our island again. This time the Japanese were accompanied by a Marshallese man who was their interpreter. They came straight to our house and ordered my mother to follow them. That was the last I saw of my mother for a month or so. Then one night, near dawn, I was awakened by the touch of a sharp object on my head. They took me to the barge and dumped me in. I landed on some guys underneath. They were elderly men who were captured by Japanese to be used at forced labor. I imagined I was one of them when they took us. Where we were going we didn't know because it was dark. Then the barge stopped. When I came out of the hole I saw an island like a picture I'd never seen before of a lot of coconut trees without fronds, their stumps sticking out of the ground and big concrete buildings crumbling down. I saw some airplanes broken on the field. This was going to be our home for the next two months.

I was one of the laborers. There were twenty-nine of us. With these four men I had to stay in a place spending fourteen hours a day after ten-hour shifts, but I had the pleasure of visiting my parents. Another thing I remember is when I found myself able to run away. I guess I had to run because the Japanese were thinking of killing me. I got out of this hole and this air-raid shelter where they were keeping us imprisoned, and I ran as far and as fast as I could. I found myself standing by the edge of the water. The only thing that got into my mind was to jump and start swimming because I heard bullets going over my head. I swam for about four miles. When I arrived at another island, I saw three other Marshallese. They were my companions in the prison. They had escaped a couple of hours ahead of me. So will you join us, they asked. We stole a Japanese canoe and we paddled to the next island. We had to cross three different channels. Now, if you know what *channel* means in the islands, it means you had to swim against about a five-to-ten-miles-per-hour speed of water. So two guys were on this canoe paddling, and two were swimming alongside, because the canoe was not big enough to take all of us. But we made it anyway and then we split up. I didn't want to accompany them because I was afraid if they caught one of us, he might report the other. I knew if they caught me I might report on them. So we split up, we broke up our canoe and let it drift away, and then I went my way.

Whatever happened to those three guys I didn't know until the end of the war. I found two of them still alive. But anyway, that was the beginning of my life for eleven months. For these eleven months I was hiding in the bush. And of course, being on flat land, not a beautiful mountain island where you have big trees, big boulders, caves to hide, it was very difficult to hide. But for some reason the Japanese were not smart enough, they didn't catch me.

I was hiding for eleven months until one day I saw an American LCI [landing craft, infantry] coming back to one of my islands where I was staying alone. I decided to swim to this ship, and sure enough I found five Marshallese scouts on board along with two Marines and navy people. They gladly picked me up and transported me to another island. I couldn't believe when I heard Marshallese being spoken on board. Because to me the war was not yet over. Where in the world was this Marshallese language coming from? It was quite strange. I didn't know that Kwajalein had already been secured, and that Majuro was secured. All I knew was that we were still at war in Jabwot. I did not even know that my brother, Dwight Heine, was on the other ship trying to pick up any Marshallese that they could repatriate from among the Japanese, or at least evacuate to the American side.

To make the story short, I got to Arno and spent ten days there. I volunteered to join the Scout Force. They took me to Majuro and trained me in some very strange ways. And did I enjoy it. Indeed I enjoyed it because I thought I was going back to do something about the Japanese in Jabwot. Well, the training hadn't lasted long before I was asked to go back to Jabwot. This time I was going back with hand grenades and Tommy guns, ready to shoot. Instead, we found twenty-seven Marshallese on our way, right by the island next to where I had been hiding. So we picked them up and waited for night so we could go shore. That was our order, "You catch the commanding officer." But late in the evening we didn't see the message to proceed to Mili Island where about twenty Japanese had surrendered, showing a white flag over the island. So we proceeded that evening and we picked up the Japanese officer and turned back to Majuro. Later, after my second trip, my brother, who thought I was quite radical in using the guns, dumped me from that program.

At the end of the war I was too old to get into school. The school system couldn't accept anyone of my age, so I went to see the principal of our school on Ebon. I asked him, "Can you please set up a program for old juveniles like us?" This man was good enough to set up a small program and put us in the back of the classroom. Because we were not young enough to be called fifth grade, he called us the "back table" because our table was in the back.

We studied. Two years later I went to Majuro looking for a job but ended up in another school system where they were teaching us how to teach young kids. So I spent six months in that school, but then they pulled me out and made me a storekeeper for the school. After two years they made me graduate and gave me a diploma, which qualified me as a teacher.

I thought I was ready to teach, but discovered that I wasn't. So I went to Kwajalein and got a job with the US Navy and learned to speak English. When I had been picked up while I was swimming I could not answer any of

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the English words spoken to me. I didn't speak one word of English. So I worked for the US Navy on Kwajalein for five years and then from there I proceeded to the Philippines on my own and was fortunate enough to get into a school there, a place called Solomon University. Without passes from high school it was not an easy task. In 1959 my brother became the first Marshallese graduate of the University of Hawaii. In 1957 I became the first Marshallese graduate from Solomon University in the Philippines.

Maybe I will add a word about my brother, why he did not graduate in 1957 or before me. Perhaps you remember the testing of the atomic bomb in Bikini. Well, he spoke out, not really against the testing of the bomb, but he spoke and asked the United States to guarantee our life, the safety of our lives before any such test could be conducted. For that reason, and perhaps other reasons that I don't know, his scholarship just disappeared. He did not get back to school again until I had graduated from Solomon University in the Philippines.

It's not easy to pick out the experiences that are most important in one's life. I can't speak for the entire population of the Marshall Islands, but at least many of my age are by-products of the Pacific War--a conflict that we were not part of. We had no business in it; but we were drawn into it. As a result it is not easy for any of us in the islands to predict our futures. We started out with the German government. They trained a bunch of us, giving us enough tools to learn what to do, what they expect of us, and how to build our country. Then out went the Germans, and in came the Japanese. Those who were qualified to lead our country were no longer available, a new bunch had to be trained under the Japanese. And then when we were about to get on our feet and begin to think for ourselves, out go the Japanese. Then here come the Americans. And those leaders of the Japanese era were out, and a new bunch had to be trained.

The question someone raised here yesterday is, "Who's next?" Well, perhaps that question is too late for the Marshall Islands, because we have our own government now. We have what we call the Republic of the Marshall Islands. But then when you examine that republic, and you think about how that republic was led into being what it is through the training of three different administrations, is that a republic, a product of our own desires, of our own making? Well, I will not pretend to have the answer to that question. All I'm saying is that our government today is spending gifts from the United States of \$1.5 million dollars through our Compact of Free Association. Much of that money is designated into what we call CIP, capital improvement projects. But once that money is turned into nails and cement, airfields, and trucks, and none of it is invested by the time the fifteen years are up, what then? Again, I don't think I'm qualified to answer that question. But when

you try to separate our future and what we are today from what we were then, when other people were doing our thinking for us, you begin to wonder if that is exactly the type of government that we want. Perhaps it is, I don't know the answer.

I remember not too long ago when I was in the Philippines and also when I was in the United States traveling, people always introduced me as Mr Heine from the Marshall Islands. And then after the end of our talk people would ask, "Where?" And I would say, "Marshall Islands." "Where is that?" And I answered, "Micronesia." "What's that?" I had a difficult time trying to tell them where I am from, unless I said, "You know Bikini?" Then they would say, "You mean, you are talking about that little thing?" I said, "No, I'm talking about that bigger thing." Then I said, "You remember the atomic bomb test?" "Oh, so you are from there? You mean you still have people living there?" I said, "Look at me, I'm alive."

Now if people are trying to govern someone far away and trying to build the future of people far away not knowing where we are (I'm talking about the Germans and about the Americans), would they know where they want to take us to? I think it is a very important question to be answered from our own inner soul.

I have a cousin who wrote a book, *Micronesia at the Crossroads*. His name is Carl Heine. He also went through this school (University of Hawaii). In that book he was talking about the crossroads. He became our first author. Whatever he said in that book, being the first author in my family, I'm really happy that he produced something that somebody can read.

There is another thing that people don't quite understand. I was invited in Baltimore, Maryland, to speak in a Methodist church. My name was plastered all over the church bulletin that Mr Heine from the Marshall Islands, the missionary, is coming to talk to us. And of course the church was filled because they misunderstood my name. They thought Heine was someone from Germany and they wanted to come to hear the report on the money they had been spending on our small church. But they were kind of disappointed when they discovered that I was a native from a tiny island. So let me explain to you why I'm Heine and why my parents suffered during the war. If I was Heine from Germany, then why should the Japanese go after my parents? Well, actually, Heine is the name from Germany and we were from there sometime way back. But the Japanese were more concerned about my middle name, Russell, it's from England. My great-great-grandfather migrated to England, married a Britisher, and then went to Australia and married an Australian. Then two generations later my grandfather came to the island and married a native. So here I am, a mixed-up *halohalo*. Again, a by-product of foreign countries.

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I can go on and name you numbers of experiences from numbers of people who were actually shot, who were actually killed, who were actually beheaded in front of my eyes. War is a horrible thing to happen to anyone. It's even more horrible when you don't understand the meaning of it. I don't believe any nine-year-old kid can interpret the meanings of war. To the Marshallese, when we compare our age to the age of the United States and other countries, we are just infants, and it's very difficult for us to interpret the meaning of that war and relate it to our present experience. But we do know that we were tangled by it, that we were hit by it.

Stories are being told over and over and over about what the war was. I repeatedly told my family. Perhaps now I am beginning to regret that I've been telling them that kind of story about the war, because I have a son who is in the US Marine Corps. I have a cousin, Carl Heine's brother, who has been out of the army serving in Vietnam. I have a nephew, here in Honolulu, in the army, and I have two grandchildren that have just been qualified last month to be in the army and the navy. So I don't know, I must have planted some kind of seed for revenge. That's why I feel kind of sorry about my stories. Maybe I shouldn't have talked to you and told you these kinds of stories. Because whoever we are, whether we believe in God or not, or a Supreme Being, there is always that little voice of danger in one's mind. Thank you.

Appendix: Audience Questions and Answers

JH John Heine
RF Robert Franco

LM Leonard Mason
AP Antonio Palomo

LM The Marshall Islands is an area that I have worked with for over forty years. I know very much what John Heine has been talking about because I heard stories like that in 1946 when I was first out there. But I think there's something that John referred to only briefly that needs some emphasis, because it's part of the war story and yet it's not. In 1946 the US military began the atomic tests at Bikini and later at Enewetak. The communities that were relocated from those areas to other islands in the Marshalls had hardships of various kinds in making adjustments. Then in 1954 the first hydrogen bomb was exploded at Bikini. I'm sure you've all heard of the radioactive cloud that blew over Rongelap to the east and that exposed those

people. At least one has died and many have been in the hospital because of some of the effects of that. There are those kinds of difficulties that people are still experiencing in the Marshalls that come out of the war. If the Americans had not gone into the Marshalls as they did, they probably would not have selected Bikini and Enewetak for tests as soon as the war was over.

There is still another side effect of this that is disturbing the culture greatly. It concerns the payment of money to these disturbed populations. We've introduced a kind of money economy to some of the populations to the point where they are really almost welfare people, like Bikini, Enewetak, and Rongelap. Then we took over Kwajalein and developed a missile-testing site which is now intended to be part of the Star Wars program. The United States is paying some \$8 to \$10 million a year to the Kwajalein landowners for the lease of that land. Distribution of that money has created untold problems because land is very important to the Marshallese, and when you get money for your land, how do you divide it up? By the traditional system? It's into the courts. And I just say now that John Heine, as a trial attorney in the Marshalls, is right in the middle of that kind of result from World War II, and we shouldn't lose sight of that. What the future holds is even more complicated because of some of these events that arose out of the war. Thank you.

AP I'd like to pose this question to John. You've mentioned two things. One was that you decided to attend college in the Philippines and the other had to do with your brother Dwight who had a scholarship to go to college, yet for some reason it was denied him. Do you know why? Why did you decide to go to the Philippines? You could have come here, you could have gone to the states, you could have gone to other places.

JH I guess my brother was fortunate enough to receive a scholarship from the United States Navy. That's why he came to this school. I was working for the United States Navy as well, but I did not receive any scholarship. But I did receive free transportation to the Philippines. . . . Because my brother appeared in the United Nations and spoke against the tests of the bomb the scholarship was withdrawn. Then later on he continued his education through the John Hay Whitney Foundation of New York.

LM I can add just a footnote to that, which might clarify things from my understanding. I know Dwight quite well. Dwight was one of the first Marshallese to become a public figure in the Marshalls under the American administration. At one point, after he'd been to college here for a couple of years and then had gone back and was working in the education program there, he was invited to New York to the Trusteeship Council meeting. At

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that time they were considering a motion (this was before 1958) to terminate tests in the Marshalls. And he spoke in favor of that motion. He had not gotten authority from the high commissioner of the Trust Territory to make that trip. He also made speeches on the mainland on his way back, under private sponsorship. When he got back to the Marshalls his job was taken away from him and the scholarship which he had been promised lapsed. There were several people here in Hawai'i, in the education department, who knew him quite well, who spoke in his favor in high places in Washington, and Dwight Heine's name was finally cleared. Another high commissioner had come in and made another decision. But I think that's partly what explains the retraction of his scholarship.

RF Has Marshallese enlistment in the US military increased a great deal in recent years or has it been steady since the war?

JH I thought two years ago Marshallese would get out of the Marshall Islands, find the opportunity outside the Marshalls to enlist. They did enlist outside, but right now there is an active program of recruiting inside the Marshall Islands itself. Since the signing of the Compact of Free Association there are few benefits that have been afforded to us in the Marshalls, and serving in the United States armed forces is one of the benefits made available to our young people. A lot of kids are taking the test, and it amazes me that over 60 percent are passing. Somehow we thought that it would not be that high. We all made a mistake, we thought maybe under 50 percent would pass. But it's over 50 percent of the kids passing, including girls. That's another thing that amazes me because women in our history have always been in the background, although they are the backbone of our country because we inherit our rights to the land through our mothers, through the female line. The women were expected to stay in the background, but today we are having numbers of girls signing up, taking the test, and passing the test. So something is going on, maybe that's another result of the war.

RF The Marshallese and the other Compact states in Micronesia can voluntarily enlist but may not be drafted. Is that correct?

JH Yes, they are not drafted. They are voluntarily enlisted. We have regular visits by army recruiters.

Q There are economic benefits regarding military establishments, and Marshallese are finding opportunities through the American military for some advancement as well. But do you find that at all ambiguous? Do you

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find that being inside the American military has an advantage? It gives you a leverage, perhaps, on the future of the Marshall Islands? Or is it also a danger? Or both? Because, of course, the Kwajalein military testing range will be a nuclear target.

JH I think you are quite right that there is danger in what we are doing right now. But I guess the dangerous part of what's happening now is not that strong in our minds because we are economically so poor. We have no economic base besides our coconuts, which is only about eight cents a pound, nine cents a pound, sometimes it's down to two cents a pound. So, in the absence of an economic base, we see that because of the Kwajalein testing ground we cannot really say no to the United States. While the taking is good, we are using it. And, speaking of leverage, yes, there is that leverage. I attended one of the prenegotiation meetings before the signing of the Compact when one of our delegates told some big man from the Department of Defense, "Well, if you cannot accept our price in Kwajalein, there are others who want to pay." This man quickly pounded the table and got up and said, "Let's have a break for a while." So we had a coffee break for about five minutes. Whatever took place after that, I don't know whether there was a telephone call somewhere, but then we found the (payment) clause in our compact was a little bit jacked up. So, I mean, we can sense that we have some chips in our hand right now. But for how long, we don't know. If new places are selected, or if the atomic bomb becomes obsolete, then what? We have that question in our mind too. And believe me, our islands are not growing any bigger. Our population has grown from barely ten thousand after the war to forty-two thousand and we're still on the go. So I don't know when that will stop, the spiraling of our needs with the rising of our population, but something is bound to happen somewhere.

Lessons of War from Pohnpei

Suzanne Falgout

What exactly happened to the island of Pohnpei and its people during World War II? As Lin Poyer (chapter 7) has pointed out, written sources of the period are based primarily on Allied military documents, and the information they provide is limited to strategic plans, dates, and targets of attack plus some intelligence data on Japanese activities (Crowl 1960; Morison 1975; Richard 1957; Sherrod 1952). The limited nature of this information combined with the use of such seemingly innocuous labels as "neutralized" and "bypassed" tends to downplay wartime activities on the island. Furthermore, the reader is left to wonder if there were any native inhabitants on the island or how they were involved.

Yet it is clear to all but the most casual visitor to the island that the people of Pohnpei were significantly involved in the war and that they consider World War II to be an important part of their own history. In 1980-1981 I lived in the Wene area of the Kitti chiefdom located in the southern part of Pohnpei. During my stay World War II was a topic that was still discussed by older men and women in daily conversations around the household and at informal kava gatherings of neighbors and friends in the evenings, and warsongs continued to be broadcast over the local radio station.

I returned in the summer of 1985 to ask women and men of Pohnpei to share their memories of the war with me. They recounted their wartime experiences vividly in songs, anecdotes, and personal narratives. These accounts provided detailed descriptions of the variety of wartime activities in which they participated and also revealed how they themselves understood, felt about, and coped with the war (see Falgout 1989). These accounts at times were filled with emotion. I was impressed that World War II was really a watershed event, a turning point in their lives and in Pohnpei history. I believe that the enormous scale of this foreign war, fought with advanced technology, and the rapid, dramatic social changes that accompanied it continue to shape the lives of those who experienced it. Let us look then at

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what happened to the people of Pohnpei in World War II and at the important lessons these wartime experiences have held for them.

Wartime Experiences in Pohnpei

When Pearl Harbor was attacked on 7 December 1941 Pohnpei had been under Japanese colonial rule for twenty-seven years. Fertile Pohnpei had been well suited for Japan's initial goals of resettlement of its burgeoning population and for economic production for the homeland (Fischer 1957). Shortly before the war broke out, economic production on the island was stepped up, with a goal of furnishing supplies for war efforts on other islands (Bascom 1965). Military construction projects (such as land communication and radar installations, defensive gun emplacements, blockhouses, shelters, a seaplane base, and two small airstrips) were also begun (Ashby 1983; Denfield 1979). The people of Pohnpei were among those hired to work on various wartime projects. At first their participation was on a voluntary, wage labor basis. Men went to work on construction projects and on agricultural plantations. Some young women also went to work in the fields, hoping to earn a little money and to have a bit of adventure.

No major battle would actually be fought on Pohnpei soil. However, some men were drafted into the Japanese military and were transported to other islands. In July 1942, 20 men from Pohnpei (5 from each of the four chiefdoms existing at that time) were drafted and sent to Rabaul to join the fighting (Higuchi 1984). Once they reached Rabaul these men were assigned to different units. In July 1943 another 179 Pohnpei men were drafted and sent to Kosrae. For reasons widely speculated about, but ultimately unknown, all of these men came from the chiefdom of Kittu and represented all remaining able-bodied men from that area. Kittu women had been left behind to care for their families, farmsteads, and community.

Events in 1944 would change Pohnpei's role once again. Allied forces had decided to "neutralize" and then "bypass" Pohnpei before proceeding with the attack on Enewetak. This process of "neutralizing and bypassing" an island, however, was not as innocent an action as it sounded. The people of Pohnpei recalled seeing several Allied planes flying reconnaissance missions over the island in early February. A few days later the bombing began. According to Allied reports 42 B-24 Liberator bombers of the 7th Air Force based on Tarawa struck Pohnpei. Within two weeks 5 Allied raids dropped a total of 118 tons of high explosives and over 6000 incendiary bombs. Then on 1 May, six US battleships (*Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Alabama, North Carolina, South Carolina*) shelled the northern portion of the island, including the port town and Japanese colonial headquarters of Kolonia. The

attack was halted after 70 minutes when it was determined that no worthwhile targets remained. Indeed, all air bases had been destroyed and of the 940 buildings in Kolonia, an estimated 75 percent were leveled (Denfield 1979; Hanlon 1981). Furthermore, shipping was effectively blockaded. The new Japanese goal in Pohnpei necessarily became one of self-sufficiency. The people of Pohnpei were pressed into forced labor units, and the level and harshness of the Japanese demands increased.

In Kitti all able-bodied women were now conscripted to work on various agricultural projects around the island. Young mothers were forced to leave their children in care of the aged or infirm now left behind. Those women who joined the workforce put in long hours from sunrise to sunset. Days off were reduced to alternate Sundays, then completely canceled. Toward the end of the war some workers were even locked in compounds and forbidden any visitors, not even their own children. Those who had been left behind had to fend for themselves. Farmsteads suffered from neglect, and consumption of farm products was carefully monitored by the Japanese.

Many Kitti women went to work initially in the tapioca and rice fields in Sokehs chiefdom located in the drier, flatter northern end of the island; later some toiled in the tobacco fields established in the southern Madolenihmw chiefdom. Living conditions in agricultural compounds were poor, and the work was backbreaking.

Allied forces repeatedly bombed the island in order to prevent the rapid rebuilding efforts of the Japanese. (Denfield [1979] estimates 250 airstrikes were mounted from February 1944 to August 1945.) One Kitti woman who worked in the rice fields of Sokehs remembered being able to set a clock by the arrival of the planes. The crew began work at 5 AM. When the planes arrived at 8 AM workers hid in bunkers and ate their breakfast. When the alarm sounded again they went back to work. But sometimes the planes arrived unexpectedly. This woman vividly recalled shaking with fear as she tried to run for cover. She is a large and somewhat awkward woman. She stated that she started to give up trying to escape and would just lie down in the open field to accept her fate. After several near misses a kindly Japanese supervisor assigned her to kitchen detail. But even here, she pointed out, she was not safe. One morning a bullet struck the chair in which she had just been sitting.

These extreme efforts on the parts of the Japanese and the people of Pohnpei were apparently effective. There was a severe shortage of cloth. Some people were forced to fashion clothing out of old handkerchiefs, stockings, or even hospital gauze; others stayed indoors, only venturing out under cover of darkness. However, they do not recall any serious lack of food during the war.

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Those men who had been drafted and relocated to other Pacific arenas were not so fortunate, however. Of the twenty men sent to Rabaul, where fighting was intense, only three were returned (Watakabe 1972). Kitti men who had been relocated to work on construction projects in Kosrae (along with Japanese, Okinawan, and Korean soldiers, plus natives of Kiribati) also suffered extreme hardships after the bombing began in 1944. In February 1944 four American planes sunk the Japanese ship *Sun Sang Maru* and destroyed the warehouse, airstrip, and other military buildings. After this incident three large ships carrying numerous Japanese reinforcements from Chuuk were dispatched to Kosrae. Allied bombing of Chuuk shortly after disrupted further transportation and effectively stranded these soldiers and cut off needed goods. Food was in very short supply, and an emphasis was now placed on establishing agricultural plantations. But the number of people on the island was too great; strict rationing was begun and starvation soon set in. Other defensive military construction projects were initiated, with work continuing night and day with little rest. No one remained idle. Even the sick and dying were assigned tasks according to their remaining abilities.

The Japanese assigned different foodstuffs to each of the different cultural groups on Kosrae according to a hierarchical ranking. The best foods, including all large fish and most other sources of protein, went to the Japanese themselves. Kiribati men, because they were former British subjects and considered prisoners of war by the Japanese, were given last priority in obtaining food. The people of Pohnpei fell in between. At first Pohnpei men were given breadfruit and coconuts to eat, both important items in their traditional diet. Natives of Kiribati were given only less desirable swamp taro. As times got tougher the people of Pohnpei were given the Kiribati foods. Kiribati natives then subsisted on the few tiny potatoes that still grew and finally on just potato leaves cooked in a "soup." Anxiety over food ran high fed by rumors of widespread cannibalism in Tarawa and one suspected case in Kosrae. One informant reported his delight in finding a single coconut one morning; he believed this would insure his survival until evening. Many of the Kiribati reportedly died from malnutrition. Japanese soldiers unaccustomed to the island foods and environment, did not fare well either. Kitti men describe in vivid detail Japanese soldiers who had degenerated into walking "stick men." It is a sight they cannot forget.

Wartime Lessons for the People of Pohnpei

"War is the greatest hardship," is the phrase Pohnpei men and women use over and over again to sum up their experiences in World War II. To the outsider wartime conditions in Pohnpei were certainly not as bad as in some

other locations in the Pacific theater, and miraculously few people of Pohnpei died in the crossfire. Nevertheless, the nature and scale of the hardships they suffered exceeded anything previously known to them. Common themes running throughout the war accounts I collected concern the miserable conditions, the poor treatment by Japanese and Allies alike, and the general question of why Pohnpei had been caught in the middle of this foreign war. Some people stated that they still find it difficult to discuss this period in their lives. At times a person would shudder at the memory of an event, ask for a break, or even halt the interview. I believe these World War II experiences have caused the people of Pohnpei to reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of their traditions and to reconsider their relationships with outsiders. Here I will limit my remarks to just two examples.

First, I believe that as a result of their wartime experiences traditional Pohnpei gender distinctions became blurred and in need of revision. Pohnpei men, proud of their traditional roles as hard workers and fierce warriors, came to sense their limitations in this foreign war fought with advanced technology. For example Kitti men who had been relocated on Kosrae reported experiences of acute loneliness, fear, and nervousness after the bombing began. One young Kitti man observed the bombing of Kosrae as he lay flattened out among the roots of a breadfruit tree--the only shelter he could find. He recalled how hard the ground shook during the bombing and the scenes of death and destruction after the smoke cleared. Later he sat alone, his body still trembling violently with fear, trying to regain his composure. Some Kitti men were diagnosed as having a dread Pohnpei disease, "sickness of unhappiness," a debilitating disease affecting both body and mind (Ward 1979). Reportedly, several died from it. People living near the airstrips and agricultural plantations in Sokehs that were bombed repeatedly were afraid to go outside; some chose to forego eating for several days at a time rather than venture out into the fields.

The impact of the war on Pohnpei women was no less profound. For example, Kitti women who had traditionally been unaccustomed to heavy work and scenes of combat, reported severe hemorrhaging toward the end of the war. Some women blamed their subsequent infertility on the wartime hardships they endured. Yet, the wartime experiences of these women helped them to realize they could overcome traditional limitations on their activities. After the war Kitti women did not completely revert to their traditional roles. These women also began to accompany men at their tasks. This generation of Kitti women, I am told, is renowned for overstepping traditional gender boundaries in both work and politics, and for helping to open the way for further changes in women's roles brought by the subsequent American administration of the island.

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Under American policies of universal education and affirmative action, Pohnpei women have been encouraged to pursue advanced education and to work in the modern sector (see Falgout 1988). While Pohnpei women remain statistically underrepresented in the workforce and rarely hold high level positions, the people of Pohnpei do recognize a number of benefits in having educated and working women as members of their households. These women bring cash incomes to their own natal families and to that of their husbands. An education is now considered an additional asset in women and has become a consideration in marriage choice. Some Pohnpei employers prefer to hire women as workers in positions such as secretaries, teachers, nurses, and storekeepers. They believe that women are more open by nature and thus are less prone to shame others or become shamed themselves in business transactions. Some families may even prefer that the women in the family are the ones to work in the modern sector. This will free the men to engage in traditionally important activities, such as agriculture or community service. In this way a family can get ahead in both worlds.

Second, and more significantly, I believe World War II experiences have played a major role in Pohnpei's reassessment of its relations with foreigners and the nature and significance of its role in the world context. For the more than one hundred fifty years since contact, various foreigners have had their own agenda for the island of Pohnpei and its people. Early in the days of contact with whalers, traders, missionaries, and the like, foreigners were relatively few in number, often disorganized, and at times competed with each other in their efforts (Falgout 1987; Fischer 1957; Hanlon 1988). Under these circumstances the people of Pohnpei were able to bend foreign desires to fit traditional Pohnpei goals--to acquire new forms of wealth and to gain allies with technologically superior weapon systems, and by these means to enhance their prestige within the traditional chiefdom. But, increasingly over colonial times, the people of Pohnpei became dominated by and dependent on the foreign presence, a situation reinforced by threat of military force. Although Pohnpei people were able to retain many of their traditions to a remarkable degree, these were relegated to an evershrinking sphere of activities. Looking at the island context as a whole, the people of Pohnpei were becoming marginal figures in their own land.

Foreign domination and dependency was clearly the case in Japanese colonial times. Japan ruled its Micronesian possessions with a firm hand and had achieved a good measure of success in ensuring Pohnpei loyalties. When the war broke out, the people of Pohnpei recalled, they were initially a bit excited to begin preparations. Warfare in traditional Pohnpei was the "custom of men," and many believed Japan was powerful enough to win the war. Furthermore, Japanese propaganda led the people of Pohnpei to believe that

the bumbling, stupid Americans would never pose a serious threat. The American inability to effectively use their sophisticated wartime technology was the butt of Pohnpei jokes. Indeed, when American planes initially reached the island, their gunfire was usually wide of the presumed target, often landing in the jungle or the ocean. When the bombing began, however, the people of Pohnpei began to sense the huge scale of the war and the possibility that Japan might lose. One man who worked as a native assistant and interpreter for the Japanese talked about the bombing of Kolonia: "It was only then that I realized Americans would actually fight in Pohnpei. The Japanese had given us instructions on how to protect ourselves if we were bombed. They told us to put our thumbs in our ears and our fingers over our eyes. Before this (the bombing of Pohnpei), we used to joke about it. We used it to tease our friends. Now we realized what could happen--we could lose our eyes, even our lives."

Now the people of Pohnpei began to fear Japanese reprisals for their role in losing the war. Some Japanese soldiers, sympathetic to the plight of the people, warned them that the Japanese would allow no natives to be taken as prisoners. Should invasion occur, rumor had it, the Japanese planned to annihilate the natives as they huddled in their bomb shelters. While the men continued to build bomb shelters according to Japanese specifications, they secretly made plans to escape both sides. These plans were codified in song and transmitted through the gossip network.

In the end, Japanese surrender of the island to the Allies was accomplished without incident (Momm 1945). However, according to Jack Fischer, who served as naval administrator of the island from 1950 to 1953, the people of Pohnpei considered the Americans to be just the latest in a series of conquerors. He wrote, "Moreover, some of our behavior (e.g., treatment of government land, caste and social barriers between Americans and natives) appears to the Ponapeans to confirm this view. We are considered as better conquerors than the Japanese mainly because we order people around less, do not slap them, and leave them to pursue their own ambitions" (Fischer 1949-1954).

Clearly then, the women and men of Pohnpei did play a significant role in World War II, and (at least at first) many did so willingly. But I believe that the people of Pohnpei became increasingly aware that their fate ultimately rested in the hands of Japanese and Allied forces. The wartime hardships endured by them, I believe, serve as the extreme example of the high price of foreign domination and dependency. And I believe wartime experiences have been a significant factor in their recent decisions to take a more direct and active role in defining their relations with their Pacific rim neighbors and in charting a new role for themselves in the modern world. Pohnpei involvement

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in World War II has also heightened their awareness of the strategic geographic position they hold in the world context. Some Pohnpei leaders now see this strategic position as a significant bargaining chip to be used in charting Pohnpei's future. Clearly the people of Pohnpei are no longer willing to place their fate so firmly in the hands of foreigners.

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Island in Agony: The War in Guam

Tony Palomo

When one reads the popular anthologies about World War II in the Pacific one is invariably impressed by the drama of the stealthy Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the rape of Nanking, the humiliation of the French in Indochina, and the blustery cry of "I shall return!" from General Douglas MacArthur just before the fall of Bataan in the Philippines. As one leafs through the ultimate chapter of these chronologies one senses the heroics at Midway and the Coral Sea, the deathly battles at Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima, and finally, the Japanese surrender aboard the battleship *Missouri* on Tokyo Bay. These are, of course, all factual and quite appropriate in any recounting of the Pacific War. Invariably missing in all these anthologies are the roles played by the unwitting victims of the war and the effects the three-year conflict had on these people.

Let me speak about Guam because I was there from beginning to end, although I was a bit too young to fight and a bit too old to forget.

Guam is the southernmost island in the Mariana archipelago, a little over 200 square miles at about 14 degrees north of the equator. During 1941 there were some 20,000 people living in Guam; no less than 90 percent were of Chamorro ancestry. The other 10 percent were Americans, mostly military personnel and their dependents, Filipinos, Japanese, Chinese, some Micronesians, and a few persons of Spanish, German, and English ancestry. About half of the population was then living in the city of Agana. A good number were living in the seaport town of Sumay, and the villages of Agat, Umatac, Merizo, and Inarajan. Most people, including those in Agana, derived their livelihood from the farms, which were strewn throughout the 30-mile long island.

In 1941 Guam had been under American naval administration for four decades, or since 1898 when naval Captain Henry Glass seized the Spanish-owned island while en route to Manila to assist Admiral Dewey to subdue the Spaniards--and later the Filipinos--during the Spanish-American War. Believe it or not, not a drop of blood was spilled during the American take-

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over. In fact, the Spanish garrison of some fifty soldiers thought the booming sound coming from the USS *Charleston's* cannon was a salute rather than an act of war. Needless to say, the Spaniards surrendered meekly in the face of some two thousand armed troops aboard the American naval fleet close to the reef and bound for the Philippines.

Several things must be understood before we dwell on the Pacific War itself. First of all, although they were mere wards of the United States, the Guamanians were very loyal to America. For more than thirty years, they sought US citizenship status, but they were consistently turned down. They remained loyal nonetheless. The Guamanians strongly believed in the greatness of America, both as a freedom-loving country and as a military power. Second, the neighboring islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, the latter being only 45 miles north of Guam, were Japanese-mandated islands and were virtually closed ports during the late 1930s and early 1940s. Native inhabitants of these islands were also Chamorros, all related to the Chamorros in Guam. Their loyalty, however, was to Japan.

Preparations for the possibility of war were taking place. Military barracks and fuel tanks were under construction. Young local men were being recruited into the US Navy as mess attendants and as Insular Guards. Other local men were being recruited by Pan American World Airways for work at Midway, Wake, Canton, and other points in the Pacific. Late in November 1941 the navy evacuated all its dependents to Hawai'i--except five nurses and a dependent awaiting the birth of a child.

Then, early in December 1941, two Japanese envoys stopped in Guam while en route to Washington, DC, to talk peace. And while the Japanese emissaries were talking peace in Secretary of State Cordell Hull's office that fateful day on 7 December 1941 (8 December in Guam), the Japanese naval fleet and air armada struck Pearl Harbor. According to my clock, the Japanese struck Guam four hours later, blasting the Marine Barracks and the Pan American Hotel in Sumay, and peppering other selected targets throughout the island.

Two days later, in the early morning of Wednesday, 10 December 1941, some five thousand fully armed Japanese soldiers invaded Guam or, as the Japanese historian preferred, "advanced" into the island. The only resistance took place at the historic Plaza de Espana in Agana where about one hundred local defenders, mostly Insular Guardsmen, navymen and a few Marines fought the invaders for perhaps thirty minutes before accepting the inevitable. No one has ever established the number of people killed during the Japanese invasion. I would say one hundred, more or less. My father helped bury about thirty bodies in a mass grave along the beach in east Agana. And there were, of course, dead soldiers and sailors at the Plaza de Espana. No

one seems to know how many Japanese soldiers were killed during the brief encounter. My guess is few, if any.

Guam thus became the first and only American territory conquered by a foreign power. Some people may argue that the Philippines also fell to the enemy, but it must be remembered that the US Congress passed legislation in 1934 granting independence to the Philippines, and it was during a transitional period that war broke out. Philippine independence was slated for 1944.

In surrendering Guam to the Japanese, Naval Governor George McMillin poignantly said:

Captain George J. McMillin, United States Navy, Governor of Guam and Commandant, United States Naval Station, Guam, by authority of my commission from the President of the United States, do, as a result of superior military forces landed in Guam this date, as an act of war, surrender this post to you (Captain Hayashi) as the representative of the Imperial Japanese Government.

The responsibility of the civil government of Guam becomes yours as of the time of signing of this document.

I have been assured by you that the civil rights of the population of Guam will be respected and that the military forces surrendered to you will be accorded all the rights stipulated by international law and the laws of humanity. (Palomo 1984, 31)

Shortly afterward the Japanese commandant issued the following proclamation:

We proclaim herewith that our Japanese Army has occupied this island of Guam by the order of the Great Emperor of Japan. It is for the purpose of restoring liberty and rescuing the whole Asiatic people and creating the permanent peace in Asia. Thus our intention is to establish the New Order of the World.

You all good citizens need not worry anything under the regulations of our Japanese authorities and my [sic] enjoy your daily life as we guarantee your lives and never distress nor plunder your property. In case, however, when use demand you [sic] accommodations necessary for our quarters and lodgings, you shall meet promptly with our requirements. In that case our Army shall not fail to pay you in our currency.

Those who conduct any defiance and who act spy [sic] against our enterprise, shall be court-martialled and the Army shall take strict care to execute said criminals by shooting!

Dated this 10th day of December 2601 in Japanese calendar or by this 10th

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day of December, 1941. By order of the Japanese Commander-in-Chief.

(Palomo 1984, 31)

Thus began thirty months of Japanese occupation.

Everyone was required to report and register with the Japanese authorities. The Japanese issued orders banning possession of firearms, radios, and cameras. Those found to possess any of these instruments were subject to stiff penalties, including death. To impress the local citizenry of their seriousness about criminal or treasonable behavior, the Japanese executed two young Chamorro men by firing squad early in 1942. Shot to death--before a captive audience of Chamorros near the Catholic cemetery--were Francisco Won Pat for allegedly stealing goods at a warehouse owned by an American company, and Alfred Flores for sneaking a message to an American friend being interned. The message allegedly sought the American's advice on what to do with a stack of dynamite at a worksite.

All American personnel--except six navy men--were later shipped to prisoner of war camps in Japan. The six sailors fled into the jungles of Guam to await the return of American forces, which they confidently estimated would take no more than three months at the most. Only one--George Tweed--survived the war, thanks to the courageous and surreptitious assistance of dozens of Guamanians, including Antonio Artero and his family who fed and kept him in hiding for eighteen months. The others were eventually tracked down and executed by Japanese search teams. None was given a chance to surrender.

Agana became a virtual ghost town during the occupation period. Most of its residents left the city and eked out their living in the farming areas in the outlying districts. For hundreds of years Guam's economy had been agricultural. So the people had no difficulty making the adjustment, including my father who was a carpenter by vocation and a part-time storekeeper. When our family moved to my maternal grandparents' ranch in Mogfog, some ten miles east of Agana, my father simply swapped the many cans of groceries and other goods in our small store for hogs, chickens, and a couple of heads of cattle, and we all became full-time farmers. We even purchased our first and only horse, Peggy by name. The soil and the farm animals became our salvation, as they did for hundreds of other city folk.

Although there were no underground saboteurs as we see depicted in European cities and towns, we had some pretty brave and daring souls on our little island. During the first year of the war there were at least six radio receivers operating on the island, and information on the changing tides of war was passed on, secretly of course, to key island residents--sometimes right under the noses of the Japanese. Those in-the-know learned of the fall of

Bataan, Singapore, and Malaysia. They later learned of the victories at Midway, the Coral Sea, and Guadalcanal. So by the time the last of the radio receivers burned itself out the outcome of the war was a certainty.

There were many heroes during the war, but I shall name only two because they were giants in their hearts and convictions--one was a man of God, the other a true earthly patriot.

Father Jesus Baza Duenas was a constant thorn to the Japanese, including the military and civil authorities as well as the Japanese Catholic prelates who were brought to Guam to help sell the goodness of the Japanese Empire. Stubborn as a mule, Father Duenas refused to accept temporal orders and insisted that he was answerable only to God. "And the Japanese are not God," he asserted many times. At a meeting called by the Japanese, Father Duenas sat at the back of the meeting room and was heard to sing--quietly--"God Bless America." It is said that at one time a frustrated Japanese leader threatened to have the padre exiled to nearby Rota but decided not to do so for fear of an uprising by the natives. As is the destiny of most heroes, Father Duenas was executed nine days before American forces returned to Guam.

The other hero was Joaquin Limtiaco, an unassuming man who operated a fleet of taxicabs prior to the war. Limty, as all persons by that name are called, was recruited by Japanese intelligence to track down the American fugitives. Limtiaco did such an excellent job that he pretty much knew where the Americans were most of the time and was able to forewarn them whenever the Japanese searchers planned a stake out at any of their many hiding places. Because of their frustrations the Japanese took it out on Limtiaco, torturing him on eight different occasions, and not once did Limty give away the Americans.

The Japanese were, of course, aware of the need to convert the Chamorros, recognizing that they had been under the spell of the Americans for four decades. By the middle of 1942 elementary schools were reestablished throughout the island, manned by Japanese teachers brought in from Japan. Established also was a special school geared toward training local young men and women to become interpreters and teaching assistants. In other efforts to Japanize the island, the names of Guam as well as the various municipalities were changed. Guam became "Omiya Jima," which means "the Great Shrine Island." The city of Agana became "Akashi" or "Red City." The various villages were similarly renamed.

Propagandists were also utilized. Among arguments used were the potential benefits that could be derived by the Chamorros as partners in the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, which, in effect, would be the Japanese Empire comprising Japan, a big chunk of China, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and the Marianas. The empire would

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then be the greatest in the world, possessing everything needed to prevail, and would need nothing from outside these perimeters.

In conversations with prominent Chamorros astute Japanese propagandists would offer any or all of the following arguments in attempts to convert the natives:

1 It is understandable for the Chamorros to prefer the Americans. After all, the Americans had been in Guam for forty years and sentimental feelings were bound to develop. However, if the Chamorros would give the Japanese the same length of time, forty years, the Chamorros would prefer Japanese to the Americans.

2 Unfortunate though it may have been historical facts indicated that Guam was the only known inhabited island to regress in population during the past three centuries. When the Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan docked in Guam in 1521 the estimated population of the Marianas was placed at anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000. When the Japanese arrived in 1941 there were less than 20,000. All other areas in the world showed substantial increases in population. Something must have been wrong in Guam.

3 Ever since Western colonizers stepped on the shores of Guam in the seventeenth century, the Chamorros never controlled their own destiny. "When the Spaniards came, they controlled you, didn't they? When the Americans came, they ruled the island, didn't they? Now that we're here, we control you, don't we? And should the Americans return, they'll control you again, won't they?"

To some extent, such propaganda worked. A story is told of a woman who, prior to the war, lived with an American navy man, and not long after the Japanese came, she commenced living with a Japanese officer. Some of her girlfriends began berating her for catering to the Japanese. Her friends, you see, had been either married to or living with Americans. The woman became so mad at her so-called friends that she lambasted them thus:

Why is it that when I have an affair with a Chamorro, it's perfectly all right. If I have an affair with an American, it's also all right. But now that I'm having an affair with a Japanese, you people look down on me. I have read the Ten Commandments, and the Sixth Commandment said: "Thou shall not commit adultery." Period. It did not say "Thou shall not commit adultery with a Japanese!" They are winning the war. So they must be okay. Anyway, should the Americans return, I will have an affair with an American. (Palomo 1984, 88)

One of the most difficult things for the Chamorros to accept was the edict that the Japanese Emperor was both the temporal and spiritual leader of the empire. This was contrary to their religious upbringing because at least 95 percent of the people of Guam were Christians, the great majority Catholics.

During the initial occupation period the Japanese held several victory parades throughout the streets in Agana, especially after the fall of the Philippines and Singapore. Attendance by the residents of Agana was obligatory. Most elderly Chamorros who witnessed these events remembered the galloping stallions, the weapons of war on display, and the inevitable float showing a young nisei boy wearing a Japanese military uniform and pointing a rifle at another boy dressed in American navy attire, with the nisei youngster stepping on an American flag.

By the middle of 1942 parades ceased to be held. The tides of war had changed and Japanese authorities were then more concerned about the American fugitives who were hiding out in the jungles of Guam. Search parties comprising Japanese military personnel, Japanese-speaking Saipanese interpreters and investigators, and locally recruited police officers were constantly on the prowl looking for the fugitives.

The Chamorros, however, were determined not to help the Japanese in their pursuit. The Chamorros looked to the American fugitives as symbols of America and were willing to suffer any indignities to prevent their capture. As a consequence dozens of Chamorros--and perhaps hundreds--were beaten and generally brutalized by Japanese (and in some instances, Saipanese investigators) for refusing to divulge the whereabouts of the Americans. Unfortunately, even those Chamorros who knew nothing about the Americans' hiding places were jailed and brutalized.

At about dawn on 12 September 1942, three of the fugitives were tracked down and executed on the spot in the jungle of Togcha in south-central Guam. They were L. L. Krump, A. Yablonski, and L. W. Jones. Six weeks later, on 22 October 1942, two others--Al Tyson and C. B. Jones--were found and executed at their hiding place in Machananao in northern Guam.

George Tweed, the lone survivor, was at about this time hiding out near a ranch belonging to Juan (Male) Pangelinan, a retired navy man and veteran of World War I. Tweed subsequently moved to Urunao at the northwestern tip of the island and remained there for the rest of the war. Pangelinan was executed by the Japanese shortly before the end of the war.

From late 1942 to early 1944 a semblance of peace reigned in Guam, if that is possible. Most of the Japanese soldiers were gone in pursuit of other island conquests, and only a handful of Japanese administrators were on the island. The young Chamorros were busy learning kanji and the mysteries of the oriental world. The adults were busy trying to survive and make do

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without Dodge and Plymouth sedans, Lucky Strikes, Camels and Chesterfields, the Lone Ranger and Tonto, Nelson Eddie and Jeanette MacDonald, Coca Cola and Van Camp's Pork and Beans. They had to make do with Japanese cigarettes, soy sauce on rice, tea, zories, and a lot of locally grown farm products. My dad grew his own tobacco and fermented his own liquor, *aguardiente*, which beats Mexican tequila and Russian gin.

If Guam was ever self-sufficient it was during the occupation period. Not only were we able to feed ourselves with natural food, but by late 1943 Guam began feeding thousands of Japanese troops who were returning from the war zones in the central Pacific--the Marshalls, the Solomons, Gilbert and Ellice, Papua New Guinea, and other exotic places.

By middle and late 1943 the Japanese demanded--and got--two things: laborers forced to help construct airstrips at several parts of the island, and more laborers forced to work at rice and vegetable plantations in various parts of the island. Thousands of people, from youngsters in their early teens to elders in their sixties and seventies, were required to toil under the hot sun at the airstrips and at the plantations. Compensation was nil.

I remember one man who loved smoking cigarettes and didn't mind working at one of the airstrips, because at the end of the day the workers would be given a pack of cigarettes. Usually, however, the men would form a line and before each received his pack from the Japanese leader, each worker had to bow to the Japanese and say *arigato* (thank you). To impress the Japanese, this worker made a fanciful and elaborate bow but in his nervousness forgot the Japanese word for "thank you." For showing off and for being forgetful the Japanese slapped him and denied him his pack of cigarettes.

It was about this time that the animalistic nature of the Japanese soldiers began to emerge. The American forces were closing in, having taken the Marshalls, Gilbert and Ellice, the New Hebrides, the Solomons, and the eastern Caroline Islands. Reports from afar were all bad. Nazi Germany was on the verge of collapse. El Duce, Benito Mussolini, was hanged by his own people. The war in China was turning from bad to worse, and the mighty Japanese Pacific fleet was in disarray.

To the Japanese, life became meaningless and worthless in Guam, particularly when the American armada began bombarding the island early in June 1944. People were killed without reason. A forty-year-old man found in a ranch in Agat was forced to kneel and slashed on the neck with a sword and left for dead. A group of young people found in Agana during the height of the bombardment were forced to dig their own grave, beaten and stabbed, and buried alive. Rapes were frequent. Beheadings at Tai and Fonte and other places more so.

By then the Chamorros were taking it from both sides. While the Japanese were brutalizing the people on land, the American bombardment was taking its toll from the sea. Bombardment commenced as early as 8 June but was sporadic. However, beginning on 8 July and continuing day and night for thirteen consecutive days, hundreds of ships blasted Guam. And on 20 July 1944, the day preceding the landings, American carrier planes pummeled the island with 627 tons of bombs and 147 rocket shells, the most shattering weight of explosives expended in prelanding operations in the Pacific war up to that point. Of 3826 buildings throughout the island, 2631 were destroyed. And of 665 dwellings that escaped destruction, the great majority were located in the southern and south-central part of the island.

Among bombardment casualties were Tomas DeGracia Santos, struck by shrapnel on 12 July, died; Rosalia Cruz Roberto, fatally struck by an American missile on 19 June (she was six months pregnant and hiding in a cave near Sumay); Magdalena Nora L. G. Shimizu, a girl who died when her head was struck by shrapnel; Frank Brown, killed during bombardment on 11 July.

Among casualties at the hands of the Japanese during the bombardment were Jose (Papa) Cruz, executed for attempting to save a downed American pilot; Gaily Camacho and Vicente Munoz Borja, among thirty victims of a massacre at Fena on 23 July; Asuncion and Maria Rabago Castro, sisters shot to death on 22 July; Diana and Josefina Sablan Leon Guerero, sisters, bayoneted to death on 18 July; Hannah Chance Torres, beaten to death on 15 July.

By late 1945 Guam was a veritable armed camp. More than 160 military installations, both large and small, were strewn throughout the 22-square-mile island. As of 31 August 1945 there were 65,095 army troops, 77,911 navy men, and 58,712 Marines, or a total of 201,718 military personnel. There were 21,838 Chamorros. More than 19,000 Guamanians were made homeless by the bombardment, and the dire situation was further aggravated by the need for land and accommodations by the troops being readied for the invasion of Iwo Jima, Chi Chi Jima, and eventually the Japanese homeland. In the farming district of Yona alone, about 33,000 Marines of the 3rd Division were in training for the conquest of Japan.

In its report to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, the Hopkins Committee, comprising three prominent Americans (Ernest M. Hopkins, retired president of Dartmouth College, Maurice G. Tobin, former governor of Massachusetts, and Knowles A. Ryerson, dean of agriculture at the University of California), described the situation then existing in Guam:

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There was constantly evidence (of) an undercurrent of uncertainty and insecurity caused by the fact that great numbers of families had lost their homes and did not know what the future had in store for them.

Agana, the capital and metropolis of the island with a prewar population of over 12,000, was laid completely waste by the war so that scarcely a house was left standing. Many smaller municipalities were severely damaged. In addition, with the reoccupation by American forces and the development of the island as a major base for the onslaught of Japan, thousands of others were forced to move from their homes and their sites taken for airfields, supply centers, ammunition dumps, housing areas, recreation spots and the like.

None of the municipalities which have been projected to take the place of those destroyed or preempted is yet ready for settlement or resettlement, and there is no clear indication when they will be. Also, many Guamanians find themselves still unable to go back to their small farms or ranches to live or even to farm in an effort to raise fresh foodstuffs to supplement that which is on sale in local stores. (Palomo 1984, 234)

The Hopkins Report went on to say:

In our opinion, citizenship is long overdue and should be granted forthwith. Indeed, an apology is due the Guamanians for the long delay and they are also entitled to the nation's thanks and recognition for their heroic services rendered during the recent war. The people are in all respects worthy of being welcomed into the full brotherhood of the United States, with all rights and privileges, and the nation will be the gainer for it. (Palomo 1984, 235-36)

Looking back at the tumultuous period, and based on the knowledge of what has happened since then, I ask myself questions which perhaps only astrologers can answer. Could the war in the Pacific have been avoided? I believe not. Although a relatively weak nation, Japan was suffering from lack of vital resources and needed to expand, particularly into China and Indonesia to provide the goods necessary for its people's survival. Japan, then as now, had very limited natural resources. On the other hand the Western countries, particularly the United States, would not permit the Japanese to "advance" into China or any other country in the Far and Near East, and would not furnish needed goods, such as oil, steel, and the like. Japan's biggest mistake, of course, was her militaristic leaders' decision to strike at Pearl Harbor. In doing so, she awoke a sleeping giant.

Could Guam have been spared had it been armed to the teeth, as some American leaders wanted? The answer is no. Guam was too far from the

continental United States and too isolated in the midst of the Japanese mandated islands to survive for any length of time.

Was Guam important? Yes, but only as part of a frontline of defense and as a way station to the Orient and to the continental United States.

Why were the Chamorros so patriotic to the United States? They were not United States citizens, and the government then in place was not democratic. For more than two centuries, Guam was under a Spanish regime that was dying a slow death. As a consequence its overseas possessions were either revolting or moving into stoic stagnancy. Times were miserable in Guam when Captain Henry Glass entered Apra Harbor in 1898. The Spanish garrison did not even have the means to return the captain's salute! The American naval administration was not outstanding by any means, but it offered high hopes of better things to come, in spite of itself. At least one naval governor, Willis Winter Bradley, proposed a "bill of rights" for the people of Guam. Unfortunately, such altruistic behavior did not endear Bradley to his superiors in the Navy Department. It never came to be.

I had wondered why the most popular song during the occupation was "Uncle Sam, Please Come Back to Guam." The little ditty went this way: "O Mr Sam, Sam, my dear Uncle Sam, won't you please come back to Guam. . . . Eighth of December, 1941, the people went crazy, right here in Guam. O Mr Sam, Sam, my dear Uncle Sam, won't you please come back to Guam." It was sung, indeed, but not within earshot of a Japanese. To me it meant deep love for the values that America was known to espouse. I sometimes felt it was unrequited love, but love nonetheless.

Did the war do us any good? No and yes.

No, for several reasons: First of all, we became pawns in an international conflict. We became victims of a war we had no part in causing. Second, we lost friends and relations dear to us, losses that can never be compensated. And finally, our life-styles have been changed completely--from a tranquil, parochial, and family-oriented existence to a fast-track, multicultural, and oftentimes cynical existence.

But also, yes, the war did us some good: The abiding loyalty that the Chamorros displayed during the war gave America the only rationale it needed to grant the Guamanians US citizenship and a civil government. Unfortunately, the American Congress did not grant full rights of congressional representation and voting participation in presidential elections. These latter rights would have completed the circle. America has yet to do so. And the war also made us aware of our own vulnerability in any Pacific conflict, then, now, and in the future.

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War in Palau: Morikawa and the Palauans

Wakako Higuchi

The Pacific War was one of the most significant events in modern history. For most Micronesians, especially the Palauans, it provided a transition from rule by an Asian colonial power to rule by a Western colonial power. The story of "Morikawa" presented here illustrates this transition. The story traces the changes in the Palauans' views of the Japanese that accompanied the increasing severity of wartime conditions. First, however, I briefly describe the Japanese presence in Micronesia both before and during the war.

Japan's Micronesia

During its thirty-year administration of Micronesia (1914-1945), Japan's main center in Palau was a thriving Japanese town in Koror. The Nan'yocho (South Sea Bureau) settling in Koror in 1922 caused the town to become the center of commerce and administration for the whole of Micronesia. Evidence of this was the fact that the Japanese population in Koror in 1941 was 9408, out of a total island population of 9873.

The Palauans had only a few roles to play in the Japanese political, social, and economic arenas, and they seldom had contact with the Japanese during their daily lives. Despite their talent or ability, job opportunities were limited for individual Palauans after graduation from *kogakko* (Islanders' public school). After three to five years of public schooling, some of them attended Mokko Totei Yoseijo (Carpentry Apprenticeship Training Center), later known as the Industrial Apprenticeship Training Center. Some also attended the Seinen Koshukai (Young Men's Night Classes). Despite this almost all of them, if hired, became "tea" boys in government offices, or workers for private companies in the Angaur phosphate mines. The only gateway to success for a young Palauan was to become a *junki* (Islander policeman) or *hojo kyoin* (assistant teacher). It was very desirable for Palauans to establish an economic niche in Japanese society because the cash income they received enabled them to experience the modern world. Simon Ramarui of Palau

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remembered that the Palauans were very curious about what the Japanese had and what they did. At the same time the Islanders were reminded by their Japanese teachers to "learn from the Japanese behavior." That is, they were encouraged to emulate the cultural standards of Japan.

Rapidly changing internal and external events, such as the political conditions on the Chinese continent, especially the "Manchurian incident" of 1931, also had a great effect on the islands. Japan's policy of slow Islander advancement, characterized by segregation of Islanders from Japanese, had to be altered to a rapid policy for the realization of *komin* (nation of the Emperor of Japan). This change resulted from national expansionism and the policy of the new Nan'yocho director, Hisao Hayashi, from the bureau of Kanto, China.

In 1933 Japan gave notice of its intention to withdraw from the League of Nations and did so formally in 1935. This event provided just the impetus Director Hayashi needed to announce the "Ten Year Development Plan for the South Sea Islands." According to the plan, based on the National Mobilization Law, the whole nation was to reform its mode of living in both matter and mind and would support government policy in the matter of conquest; in other words, a crusade. As a result Nan'yocho examined the concept of conferring Japanese nationality on Islanders because of the unification of the two peoples implied in the ten year plan. This plan, however, was not carried out because of the unexpected and continuous events of the Pacific War. Nevertheless, during the war between Japan and the United States Palauans inevitably came to fulfill their duties as *komin*. With the opening of hostilities on the Chinese mainland, both the Islanders and the Japanese in Micronesia were completely mobilized. The slogan "All Japanese nationals shall unite tightly" was propagated to persuade both the Japanese and the Islanders to form a single body for achieving the government's wartime goals. This change was dictated by the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement of 1938 which spread throughout Micronesia. Thus the earlier policy of comparative separatism for the two groups was reversed.

In December 1940 Nan'yo Gunto Taisei Yokusan-kai (Imperial Rule Assistance Association in the South Sea Islands) organized. With direction from the Tokyo headquarters, fifty-eight branches of the association established themselves throughout the small islands in Micronesia. This association sponsored the following daily activities for the purpose of raising the nationalistic consciousness of both the Japanese and the Islanders:

1 Emperor Day (anniversary of Emperor Jinmu's accession)--worship of the Emperor's photo, ceremony of worshipping from afar, and festival of supplication for winning the war.

2 Day of Worship at the Shrine--to deepen people's respect for the gods and ancestors.

3 Day of Upsurge of the Japanese Spirit and Clarification of the Fundamental Concept of Nation Policy--pamphlets and posters were distributed.

4 Day of Knowledge of the War Situation--lecture and movies.

5 Day of Conservation of Resources--gathering of both useless and discarded articles for recycling and the protection of materials.

6 Day to Reform the Nation's Life--stop smoking, stop drinking, eat simple foods, and donate extra money to the national defense fund.

7 Day to Restrain National Enjoyment--restraining of play, leisure, and so on.

8 Day of Physical and Mental Discipline and for Promotion of Health.

9 Day of Emergency Precautions--giving military training to preschool children and civilian adults, training maneuvers for air defense, fire defense, and searchlight use.

10 Day of Economy for the Coming Emergency--stop drinking, dispense with unnecessary luxuries, and donate savings to the war relief fund.

11 Day for Encouragement of Thrift and Diligence--abolish idleness with all one's might according to one's own occupation, the promotion of efficiency, good use of energy, curtailing of unnecessary expenses and saving money.

12 Day of Patriotism--conduct marches and flag processions to inspire patriotism.

13 Day for the Home Front to Support the Fighting Forces--house to house visiting, gathering donations for the soldiers.

14 Day to Wake Up Early--waking up early, worshipping at the shrines, mountaineering, worshipping the Emperor's Palace from a distance.

15 Day for Appreciation of the Imperial Favor--regularly paying silent tribute to the great Imperial favor with appreciation.

Palauan knowledge of the national situation deepened through these spiritual days and common activities with the Japanese. Tomin Fujin Kinro Hoshi-kai (Island Women's Volunteer Group) led by the Japanese Women's Patriotic Society; Tomin Seinen-dan (Young Islanders' Association) which joined with the Japanese Shobo-dan (Fire Fighting Association); and Keibo-dan (voluntary guards for the purpose of making preparations for US air

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attacks) were typical examples of how the Islanders and Japanese mobilized themselves under the same purpose to win the war.

As the war moved closer to Palau the Islanders themselves came to understand the war situation and made contributions to the various saving funds. In their support of the war effort the Islanders contributed 14,129 times for a total of 131,815 yen. This generous amount was contributed during the period from April to December 1943. These amounts show clearly that the Palauans on a per person basis banked and contributed large sums of money according to the Japanese national policy for building the Greater East-Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some Islanders, especially those in Saipan, asked the Nan'yocho to give them Japanese nationality. With this change in status the Islanders could be sent to the war front. The request was not approved. However, several small groups of Islanders were sent to New Guinea as civilian helpers assigned to the military (see chapter 14 by Ubal Tellei).

The Japanese naval office in Palau started constructing fortifications in Micronesia in 1937. From the advent of the Pacific War to about mid-1943 the Japanese military viewed Palau mainly as a rear base and supply depot between Japan, New Guinea, and Dutch Indonesia. Although personnel in military units passing through Palau were drafted to assist in the construction of airports, roads, bomb shelters, and the movement of war supplies, labor was still very much in short supply. All residents of the Palau Islands, including both Palauan and Japanese women, and children in elementary schools, were made to work on the construction of military facilities. War supplies were stocked all over Koror town, and huge amounts were scattered throughout southern Babeldaob. During this time the Islanders labored with patriotic vigor. Their unflinching dedication surprised the Japanese who, in turn, reevaluated their conception that Palauans were lazy and did not realize the need for hard work.

The first US attack on the island took place on 29 March 1944, when US carrier-based planes raided Palau. After these raids most residents in populated areas, including the military, evacuated to jungle sanctuaries on Babeldaob. On 6 July 1944 the Japanese military garrison on Saipan was captured. American troops landed on Guam on 21 July and on Tinian on 23 July 1944. The situation for Japan's military forces in the Pacific War became serious, especially after the US invasion of Peleliu on 15 September and Angaur on 17 September 1944. The Japanese military, cut off from all communication with the outside world, announced the "Principle of Self-Support" to all field troops on 3 November 1944. Furthermore, all navy, army, and civilian personnel not engaged in fighting became members of agricultural groups. Nan'yocho Director Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya called for all

general residents in the Palau Islands to "fight the war successfully through rearguard action."

From late 1944 on, the "fight" for the Japanese became one of obtaining food rather than preventing an American invasion of Babeldaob and Koror. The Japanese commander in Palau, Lieutenant General Inoue, decided to hold Babeldaob no matter what the sacrifice, and to inflict maximum damage on the enemy. This "fight" continued until the end of the war even though US troops did not invade Koror or Babeldaob.

On 15 August 1945 the war between Japan and the United States in Palau ended. The Japanese military in Palau and Yap signed the instrument of surrender aboard a US destroyer on 2 September 1945. Representing the two sides were Lieutenant General Inoue and Brigadier General Marshall. Approximately forty-five thousand people formally surrendered that day. This included the Japanese military and all civilian personnel. After the war groups of Korean and Taiwanese laborers rioted against the Japanese, but a friendly relationship between the Japanese and the Palauans remained.

Kanpei Taisha Nan'yo Jinja, the highest ranking Shinto shrine in Koror, was built in 1940 by the Japanese government to celebrate the 2600th year of the Imperial reign. It was considered one of the greatest symbols of Japan's expansionism overseas. This important shrine was set on fire by the Japanese military just before the US landing, because they believed it would have been desecrated by the Americans. In retrospect this act was symbolic of the end of the Japanese administration of the islands.

Morikawa and the Palauans

"Morikawa" is a fascinating story filled with both fact and fiction. It is a mixture of both the horrors of war and the unique human ability to psychologically explain the seemingly unexplainable. It is not known whether the Morikawa legend, which developed over a number of years, was started during or after the war.

Even today nearly all older Palauans recognize the name "Morikawa-san" or "Morikawa Taii" (Captain Morikawa). According to Palauan oral history Morikawa suddenly appeared in Palau. He would walk about resolutely without hiding in the jungles, even when US airplanes started strafing. These planes, local tradition holds, did not and could not attack Morikawa. Palauans who met Morikawa during the war period believe he was connected with the US military. There are many common Palauan beliefs about Morikawa that, taken together, form a powerful wartime legend. One story said that Morikawa had a wireless for communicating with the United States, and he sent his messenger, a Yapese, to Peleliu, which the United States had taken

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from the Japanese in a fierce battle. The Palauans believed that Morikawa was an American spy who had succeeded in contacting the Americans in order to help thwart the Japanese. Some Palauans heard rumors that the Japanese planned to kill them all; others predicted this plan would be canceled because of the influence of Morikawa.

The strength of these wartime legends probably prompted Timothy Ngtil of Ngeremengui to report on 7 January 1975 that

Morikawa arrived in Palau without informing anybody as to which airport or seaport he would use. He urged Palauans to concentrate on enlarging their farms and growing many plants such as taro, tapioca, rice, and other foods. The increased production would help alleviate the food shortage and improve Palauan morale. Because the Japanese military in Palau suffered from a scarcity of food, they had decided to kill all the Palauans. The Japanese were quite positive that this genocidal plan was the panacea that would end their suffering. Upon learning about the plan, Morikawa attempted to find a solution whereby Palauans could escape mass death and, at the same time, solve the Japanese food shortage problem. He suggested to the Japanese military officials in Palau that they postpone their extermination plans and use the natives to grow more food plants.

Another Palauan, Yoshiko Ashio, echoes Ngtil's story. She remembers that Morikawa was a very handsome, likeable young man, probably a nisei from Hawai'i. She maintains that as the commanding officer responsible for Palauans he was, at the same time, a US spy. Japanese soldiers, according to Ashio, had prepared a huge bomb shelter and planned to kill the Palauans by herding them in and then detonating a bomb. As ordered by headquarters, Morikawa visited Ashio's village in Ngiwal. He told the villagers there that he would inform them in about a week of the date they should prepare food, clothes, and mats and come to Ngatpang. After Morikawa left Ngiwal he was not seen for a while. Palauans believed that during this time Morikawa climbed Todai-yama in Ollei, located in northern Babeldaob, and sent signals to US ships located between Kayangel and Ngarchelong. The signals, they believed, probably meant he had finished visiting Palauan villages on the east coast of Babeldaob and was going to visit the west coast villages. The Islanders also believe military officials on the US ships already knew of the Japanese plans for genocide. After this work Morikawa returned to Ngatpang and asked Lieutenant General Inoue, the commander, "Please wait one more week before ordering the Palauans to assemble here." Within this same week Japan's surrender ended the Pacific War. Ashio maintains that the Palauans "commonly believe that Morikawa saved them from genocide." Moreover, because no one could find him after the war, Palauans believed that

Morikawa returned to Hawai'i or was killed in Palau by the Japanese on suspicion of being a spy.

Other oral traditions in Palau support this testimony. They maintain that Morikawa knew the war would soon end and suggested to the Japanese military officials in Palau that young, athletic Palauans could be mobilized to form a new military group. The idea was accepted by the Japanese authorities, and a training program was established. This was yet another way Morikawa found to save the Islanders from execution. Ngitil concluded, "Maybe our God in heaven did not agree with Japanese military plans, so he sent this powerful and intelligent man to us. Many Palauans thank him for the great job he performed in saving the entire population of Palau."

The following Palauan chant song, titled "Meringel a Mekemedil Rubak" (Merciless War of the Rubak), composed by Buikispis, typifies the Palauan regard for Morikawa:

So reckless was the way Isoroku [Admiral Yamamoto] handled the war that
he irritated Roosevelt who sent out *kidobutai* [mobile troops].

He sent our *kidobutai* to fill the whole Pacific.

It filled the whole Pacific and turned its weapons on us.

Wow--there are *okabes*, flying *kusentei* [submarine chaser] shooting at our
lands.

Wow--*kusentei* shooting. Hiding in the woods we were unaware that they
[the Japanese] were preparing a *bokugo* [air raid shelter] at Ngatbang
in an attempt to exterminate us all.

Were it not for our rescue by Morikawa, [President] Roosevelt's spy, we
should have all perished at Ngatbang.

Today Yoshiyasu Morikawa lives in Japan. Documents state that he was educated in the Japanese Army Officers School during the prewar period. Morikawa was trained as a field artillery man at the Tokyo Field Artillery Training School and after graduation was assigned to the 20th Regiment in Utsunomiya, Tochigi-ken, Japan. He served in the border guards along the Russian-Manchurian border in Chichiharu (Qiqihar). He received further training for six months in academic artillery study at the Science School in Tokyo, graduating in April 1944. His corps had been ordered to move from Manchuria to Palau while he underwent his training in Tokyo. Upon his graduation he was appointed to serve at the headquarters in Palau in early May. Currently, he is retired from Japan's Ground Self-Defense Force. Morikawa claims that the Palauan contention that he was a US spy is erroneous and is amazed at the myth. He also denies that the Japanese military planned to kill all of the Palauans. In reference to his arrival, Morikawa states he was the only passenger on a military flight destined for

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the islands. He served directly under Lieutenant General Inoue, commander of the headquarters in Ngatpang. His duties involved studying strategic military topography; surveying times, places, and strategies of possible US landings on Babeldaob; and drafting plans to counter subversive activity on the part of the Islanders.

According to Morikawa one great anxiety the Japanese military had during the war was the civilian unrest that prevailed throughout Babeldaob. The meaninglessness of the fight against the United States, food shortages, and the US strategy of surrounding Babeldaob with warships but not landing after the Peleliu and Angaur invasions, tempted not only Chamorros, but also Palauans to escape to American warships regularly anchored off Ngarchelong. In fact most of the two hundred Chamorros living there had escaped to US naval ships between late 1944 and early 1945. A Palauan named Oikawasang (Joseph Tellei) was tempted by these Chamorros to escape to an American ship in Kossaol Channel. In mid-December 1944 he fled with his wife, Josefa, to Peleliu via Angaur. The news of his escape gave Japanese headquarters a great shock because he was a former *junki-cho* (head native policeman). This was the highest position an Islander could obtain in those days, and for many years he had enjoyed the confidence of the Japanese. Morikawa said Japanese headquarters regarded such escapes as a serious problem, and they feared strategic information would be leaked to the Americans. Therefore, the need to organize the Palauan society for united Japanese-Palauan action became pressing.

Headquarters ordered Yoshiyasu Morikawa, then a twenty-four-year-old captain and intelligence officer, to organize all the Palauans in Babeldaob. Morikawa's assignments were to iron out the differences between the Palauans and the Japanese soldiers, to encourage the Palauans to cooperate with the military, and to prevent Palauan involvement in any acts serving the interests of the enemy. Lieutenant General Inoue ordered all military officials to support Morikawa. The group of Palauans Morikawa organized came to be known as the Morikawa Butai (Morikawa Corps). The corps was comprised of a group of civilian, administrative, and military persons. In addition Japanese *shidokan* (leaders) who were former school teachers or policemen were stationed in some *hinanba* (places of refuge). Palauan chiefs and elders were to cooperate with the Morikawa Butai and the *shidokan* under the single authority of the Japanese military headquarters.

Before the beginning of hostilities with the United States, the relationship between the Palauans and the Japanese was considered satisfactory, and the nan'yocho administration of Palauan affairs was benevolent. The Palauans began to understand the intricacies of a more sophisticated social order and gained the amenities of a modern society. The Japanese, for their part,

harvested the resources of the islands. The outbreak of war and the continual failures of the Japanese Imperial Forces caused a serious breakdown in this harmony. The cultured group that once flourished in Palau was supplanted by an increasingly haggard military, one forced to scavenge, often abusively, without regard to the Palauans' needs.

Attempting to make amends, Captain Morikawa began survey trips twice a month to the twelve to thirteen Palauan *hinanba*. He investigated Palauan living conditions and learned that the Palauans resented Japanese soldiers stealing coconuts and potatoes, so he asked the leaders of the Japanese soldiers to stop such behavior. Morikawa urged the Palauans not to disturb military maneuvers and to obey orders. In order to help alleviate the food shortages the Morikawa Butai taught the Palauans how to enlarge their farms and especially how to cultivate tapioca and sweet potatoes. He also ordered troops to be stationed near the Palauan *hinanba* for its protection. He recalls that the Palauans had morning assemblies in each *hinanba*. The *shidokan*, the leader of the *hinanba*, delivered a patriotic speech and assigned the Palauans their daily work. The Japanese national anthem was sung and Palauans faced respectfully in the direction of the Emperor's palace in Tokyo. If the Palauans had any complaints to make, the military officials and *kyoiku-shigaku* (school inspector) would hear them.

The role of the Morikawa Butai helped reduce the friction between the Palauans and the Japanese soldiers. These activities are remembered by older Palauans who have great respect for Morikawa, even now, some forty years after the war.

Contradicting the Palauans' belief that Morikawa was an enemy spy, he said, "I was never a spy. I recommended to headquarters the idea of Giyu-Kirikomi-tai (Patriotic Shock Corps) as a means of spiritual control of young, male Palauans." The Islanders confirmed that this name greatly encouraged young Palauan men because it was the name used for a special Japanese corps that counterattacked US forces in Peleliu in late September 1944. The name took on the aura of heroic suicide troops facing the enemy.

Second Lieutenant Ichiro Hachisu recalled that he was ordered by Teru Shudan (Teru Group, veteran troops from Manchuria) at headquarters to be one of the trainers. A total of eighty Palauan men were enlisted on two separate occasions. The men were between eighteen and twenty-seven years old, physically strong, and of good character. They received six months of spiritual and technical combat training.

Recent interviews with all the surviving Palauan members of the Kirikomi-tai reveal that they believe, even today, that their mission was to counterattack US troops on Peleliu. However, this was not the case. Hachisu said that the military training that Palauans received from the Japanese was

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for the purpose of teaching rigid discipline, Japanese manner, and genuine courage culled from experience. He thought the Islanders would believe their duty would be equivalent to that of the Japanese. Both Morikawa and Hachisu contend that the Japanese high command in Palau did not envision Palauans as an actual fighting force.

Corresponding to Morikawa's idea to create the group, Hachisu remembers that his efforts were admired by former Nan'yocho officials, who since the beginning of civilian rule felt there had not been a greater fruit in the education of Islanders than this training, even though Nan'yocho had made large budgetary outlays for over twenty years pursuing this type of policy. Morikawa said "the meaning of education in this case was to provide Palauans the ability to work with the Japanese, and to achieve capability on the Japanese level with which Islanders could fulfill their responsibilities." These words reflect Morikawa's national patriotism in those days as a man trained by the Japanese Military Officer School.

According to Palauans, Japanese witnesses, and Morikawa's own statement, there are no substantiated facts to confirm he was an American spy. Morikawa stated the reality behind the Palauans' "Morikawa" fable. First, he was a military officer born in Ehime prefecture, Shikoku, Japan. He was not a nisei from Hawai'i. His father, who was a principal of a Japanese elementary school, always taught him that he must be benevolent to everybody. Morikawa also explained that he had studied but does not speak English. He insists he never contacted anyone from the US military during the war. Although Palauans said he suddenly disappeared after Japan's surrender and was either killed by the Japanese military or returned to Hawai'i, he was in fact repatriated to Japan with his troops in January 1946 after he received treatment for amoebic dysentery. Further verification of this is the registry of his name on the list of Japanese military pensioners in the Welfare Ministry of the Japanese government. Lieutenant Hachisu, Morikawa's subordinate, stated, "It was completely impossible for any military officer who worked for headquarters to conduct activities as an enemy spy." Morikawa acknowledged that he had attempted to send signals to US warships off northern Babeldaob in order to judge what the Islanders' signals to these ships had meant. He said, "I was ordered by Lieutenant General Inoue to investigate the meaning of light signals which the Islanders occasionally used to communicate with the U.S. warships." This was one of his missions as an intelligence officer. Morikawa also said he had never visited Peleliu during his one-and-a-half-year tour of duty in Palau.

Morikawa and other former Japanese military officers and soldiers denied the existence of any plan to kill the Palauans. "The result of the American-Japanese fight was readily obvious even for us when both Peleliu and Angaur

fell. US ships surrounding Babeldaob Island didn't attack us except on a few occasions, and it was completely unnecessary for us to kill the Islanders that late in the war. The Islanders didn't affect us," said Morikawa. He recalls that escapes to the US ships did not continue after early 1945 when the Morikawa corps established itself. Jiro Nakamura, a former Nan'yo military policeman who was sentenced to prison for his involvement in the 1944 shooting of an American pilot prisoner, stated, "While a few rebellious Korean laborers were captured by the military police, the simple and honest Palauans, who were below the standards set by the general Japanese population, were to be regarded as not dangerous. Genocide of the Islanders would have been planned if it took place on an island such as Saipan or Guam. But in the case of Babeldaob, it was not seriously attacked by the Americans in the post-Peleliu and Angaur days. Therefore, the idea that the Japanese military would have tried to kill the Islanders does not correspond with the facts. I personally never heard of the plan which was supposed to be our duty."

Reflecting on his wartime experiences in Palau, Morikawa said, "That I was a military officer might be a reason why the Islanders paid special attention to me. Because of my officer education and training, I was naturally different from the non-professional soldiers with respect to behavior and language." These words remind us of Ashio's statement: "Morikawa always wore white clothes and walked dauntlessly in the jungle even while American airplanes attacked."

Morikawa's story, or that of the "man" that was named Morikawa, was created piece-by-piece by the Islanders' fear, dissatisfaction, frustration, uneasiness, and anger associated with the extreme conditions of war experienced for the first time. The complex events of the story become understandable given the unique sociological and psychological pressures of wartime.

One of the references that helps explain the Palauan view toward the Japanese in the prewar period was the Japanese educational policy stated in *Nan'yo Gunto Kyoiku-shi* (History of Education in the South Sea Islands, 1938). It said that "education for the Islanders will be given importance, especially educability of their spirit building, and they will be taught moral principles in accordance with the Imperial Wish of its Rescript." This historical document also stated that the Japanese on the islands were instructed to make supreme efforts to maintain and improve the dignity of being a Japanese and were encouraged to be models for the benefit of the Islanders. However, as recognition of the worsening war situation increased, the Japanese (mainly the military) began demonstrating their *honne* (instinctive reaction to a situation). Although all soldiers were taught *tatemae* (character, as it exists in principle), the instinctive side of them became

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prevalent. This behavioral change was caused mainly by food shortages and the unbelievable hardships of jungle life. Contrary to the norm, Morikawa, who served as a mediator between the Japanese and the Islanders, acted with fortitude and kindness. His attitude and behavior sparked the Islanders' imagination of the other power--"strong America." Morikawa drew a sharp distinction between himself and the other Japanese. Ashio, the Islander, was very disappointed in the troops' behavior. She related her experience by explaining, the people had been repeatedly told of Japan's immortality, but when they saw the soldiers' animalistic behavior they began to hope that the Japanese would be defeated by the Americans. The contrasting concepts of Japanese vs American, and the reality of the general Japanese soldier's behavior, as opposed to Morikawa's, mingled in the Islanders' mind. Born from within this paradox, was a light of hope--the mythical "Morikawa."

A fitting conclusion to Morikawa's story comes from Morikawa himself: "It may be interesting to know whether I was a spy or not. However, the more important fact of the story is that this is how the Palauans psychologically interpreted their wartime history. They created a 'story of a man' and have been believing it for over forty years."

NOTE: This paper is based on two previous papers of mine: "Micronesians and the Pacific War: The Palauans," Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1986; and "Micronesia Under the Japanese Administration: Interviews with Former South Sea Bureau and Military Officials," Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, 1987.

Palauans and the Japanese Military Experience

Ubal Tellei

Translated by Patrick Tellei

I am grateful for the opportunity to share my experiences and the experiences of the twenty-eight other young Palauans who went to work with the Japanese during World War II.

I will begin by going back to the early days in grade school when we began in the morning by facing Japan and bowing down to the emperor. We were prepared to do that because we were told by the Japanese that Japan would be the dominant power in the Pacific. We were prepared to accept that. We were able to read and we listened to the news, too, but the literature and the news were all Japanese oriented, so we only heard things about Japan. While going to school we heard that Japan had won in Beijing and Nanking, and this reinforced our belief that Japan was strong. In fact, they held celebrations to mark the victories. Then, of course, after that we heard about the victory at Pearl Harbor and nothing else. This further strengthened our belief that Japan was the power to follow. We came to believe Japan because everyday in the news we heard not only about the victory at Pearl Harbor but also in other places like Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries in the Pacific that fell to the Japanese. When the time came to recruit our people into the Japanese Navy and Army bound for Dutch New Guinea (Irian Jaya), we were prepared to go because we were told that they were going to build a second Japan. The military administration in Koror sent word to all the chiefs from Palau to recruit the strongest and most able-bodied men. The opportunity was there, so they decided to go with it.

When we twenty-nine arrived in New Guinea we heard that the Americans had landed in Wewak and in Guadalcanal. We were charged with the task of unloading fuel and bombs from the ship and transporting them to the airport. Some of the men that went with us got sick; and some decided to

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stay behind with the indigenous people of Irian Jaya. The rest of us got on a ship and went to different places.

I and some of the other Palauan men got on a Japanese ship on its way to Celebes (Sulawesi). Unfortunately, the bombs that we helped unload were seized by the Allied forces who captured the place and later were the same bombs that were used against the Japanese. In Celebes, the place we stayed in was bombed out; everything on the ground was just wiped out. So we moved to Borneo. Immediately after we left Borneo the American Air Force bombed our previous base. From there we moved to Singapore. There all the transport ships were lost and only the military ships were left. Then we came under the jurisdiction of the military ships.

Japanese ships equivalent to American cruisers, along with four destroyers, came to Singapore and transported all the people recruited from the islands to Japan. At Singapore our task had been to load thirty thousand bars of silver to be brought to Japan. When we left Singapore, American planes were already all over the place, but fortunately a typhoon developed and the task force decided to ride out the storm for three days to prevent the planes from attacking the ships. It was successful and avoided the planes, so we reached Taiwan. We then went to the port of Kure in Japan. Our task then as workers on the ship was to unload all the silver bars, to throw them into the bay. From Kure we went to Hiroshima and stayed for ten days. We were in Hiroshima on 2 August 1945. [The A-bomb was dropped on 6 August 1945.]

From Hiroshima we left with a task force of seven ships for Taiwan in order to defend it. Taiwan was the westernmost stepping-stone for the invasion of the motherland. On our way to Korea at night, American submarine forces found us; that night we saw two of the seven ships, the one immediately in front and the one right behind, cut in half. Each of the ships that was lost carried at least three thousand military personnel and civilians on their way to Taiwan. The trip normally takes three days, but it took us a week because at night we had to watch for Japanese submarines and during the day for American submarines and airplanes.

There were many people aboard the ship and we ran out of food. They were not prepared to accommodate everybody. At that point we made up our minds we were ready to die. When we reached Taiwan the bombardment started, so we had to leave port again. When we finally made it to land we had to be transported by trains.

From there we moved to Kaohsiung, one of the places in Taiwan. Then we moved to where the Japanese were. The day we arrived we put in machine-gun emplacements in preparation for the invasion. While we were defending the place we were told they were going to use the most

sophisticated anti-aircraft guns. Again it was "proven" to us that the Japanese were very advanced, because the first two planes that approached were shot down. The next day an American plane flew beyond the range of the anti-aircraft guns and then dropped either leaflets or some sort of metals that affected the guns. The guns couldn't work anymore. Right after the first plane came and dropped some of those things to block the guns, at least twenty planes came and bombed the place that we had worked so hard to put together.

At that point, we, the people who were recruited to work, started doubting the Japanese, because their best weapons were no match against the Americans. We stayed there. The Chinese forces came in and then the US 6th or 7th Fleet came in. That was the end of the war for us. All the Japanese soldiers were returned to their homeland. We stayed and were the last group to leave with the Japanese officers to go back.

After they took over the place the American forces asked us where we wanted to go. We told them we wanted to go back to Japan. When we got to Japan, they asked us where we wanted to go. We told them that we wanted to go back to Palau because that's where we were from. From Tokyo we went to three other cities and then to Saipan. Some of those who stayed behind went straight from there to Morotai and then to Palau, but we came later and then had to stop in Saipan. From Saipan we went to Guam for a while, and from Guam down to Peleliu; and from Peleliu we went to Koror, where we were from.

Appendix: Audience Questions and Answers

Q What kinds of contacts did you have with the indigenous people in that section of Irian Jaya?

UT There were about five hundred labor corps members from Bia Island or state who worked side by side with the Japanese.

Q Did the Japanese give you a special role as a supervisor, as somebody who knew the Japanese language, or did your group work the same as the Papuans?

UT We were assigned special roles to supervise the workers from those places: (1) because we spoke the language; (2) because we were recruited to work there; and (3) because we learned the indigenous language in those six months.

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Q What about the wages of this group from Palau? How did they compare with prewar wages and working conditions?

UT In Palau, when we were working building the communication station in Palau, we were paid 70 cents a day. But when we were recruited to work in the South Pacific we were paid the equivalent of \$1.50 a day.

Q I'd be interested in your impression of the Americans prior to having any contact with them, and then after. Being in a Japanese environment, what were your impressions of the Americans harming the soldiers?

UT Originally we were told that the Americans were not very good and that they would do two things. Either they would beat us, or those who committed serious crimes would be tied to horses and the horses would split them. We believed that before we met them. But after the Americans came in, and after the surrender, we learned that they were different people. When we were in Taiwan two navy officers walked up while I was sitting with a Japanese and asked me if I was Filipino. I said no, I was Micronesian. They told me that I belonged to Americans, and then took me to their ship and gave me American clothes.

Q After the war did the Japanese reward your group with any compensation?

UT No compensation. The money used was the money we were paid while in Taiwan. But after the war we didn't receive any compensation.

Q Your account just now sounds as if it wasn't until you got to Taiwan and the American planes were bombing that you began to have doubts. It seems as if you and your friends worked willingly, voluntarily, that you were fairly devoted to the image you had of Japan. Was there any time before Taiwan that you began to question or began to regret leaving Palau?

UT When we were still in Irian Jaya, that's when we started having doubts. But you couldn't make it show that you were having doubts. But from our contacts with the indigenous people there, some of whom had contact with the Allied forces, they told us that we were going to lose the war. And we started having doubts, but we wouldn't show it.

HAWAI'I AND SAMOA

Nisei Military Experience during World War II

Ted T. Tsukiyama

That fateful moment in history, 7:55 AM, 7 December 1941, when the first Japanese bombs rained on Pearl Harbor, drastically transformed the lives of everyone in Hawai'i, particularly those of Japanese ancestry.

I was awakened that morning by the constant rumbling of thunder. The sky toward Pearl Harbor was black with smoke, punctuated by puffs of white aerial bursts. "They're sure making this maneuver look real," I thought. Turning on the radio, I heard the announcer screaming, "Take cover, get off the streets! We are being attacked by Japanese enemy planes. This is the real McCoy! Take cover!" Those words pierced me like a piece of shrapnel. I was numb and uncomprehending. Then I heard the radio announcer say, "All members of the University ROTC, report to the campus immediately." I jumped into my ROTC uniform and rushed up to the ROTC barracks at the university campus. This was the first of three times that I was to volunteer my services during the first thirteen months of World War II.

Why did those of Japanese ancestry like myself volunteer for wartime service, one, two, and even three times during the war? To really understand why, you have to go back a hundred years to the beginning of Japanese immigration to Hawai'i.

History of Japanese Immigration

In 1885 the first boatload of Japanese immigrants landed in Hawai'i in response to the sugar industry's need for field labor. Successful sugar cultivation required cheap labor, and the Hawaiian planters found the Japanese worker productive and industrious. Boatloads of imported immigrants from Japan followed, and by 1900 there were 60,000 Japanese in Hawai'i.

Although their numbers grew, their wages were low and discriminatory. Portuguese and Puerto Rican workers got \$22 per month, while the Japanese were paid only \$18. A strike in 1909 was beaten down by force. Conditions were slow to improve.

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Again in 1920 the Japanese sugar workers went out on a general strike that erupted into bitter racial hostility. The whole community was marshalled against the strikers. The strike for better labor conditions was pictured, not as an economic struggle, but as a conspiracy by Japan to take over Hawai'i. The sugar industry's dependence on Japanese labor notwithstanding, by sheer numbers--almost 40 percent of the population--the Japanese in Hawai'i had become an economic, political, and military threat to the community.

Here's how Gavan Daws described the situation after 1900:

The Japanese had a high birthrate, and a high birthrate meant more and more American citizens of Japanese ancestry. That prospect was enough to frighten a good many men who had a vested interest in keeping things as they were. Alien Japanese were manageable--they could be prevented from taking out homesteads; they could be prohibited from working on territorial and federal construction projects; they could be barred from traveling to the American mainland; their language schools and their newspapers could be harassed; and their laborers' organizations could be beaten in any long strike. But what about the nisei, who might be on the verge of taking the advice of the Americanizers, and who would have the law behind them if they did? In 1920 only three voters in every hundred in the islands were Japanese; in 1926 it was eight in every hundred, and in 1936 it was one in every four.

Was there any way to head off this apparently inexorable movement?

The important thing was to prevent the Japanese from "taking over," whatever that might mean. The situation was variously described, but all the descriptions seemed to threaten evil. In 1920 the Japanese had to be controlled on the plantations; by the nineteen thirties they were loose in society at large, and that was a more formidable problem. If Americanization did not take hold among the nisei the islands might become an extension of the Japanese political system in the Pacific, and that was unthinkable. But if Americanization through education was successful, the Japanese--once Hawaii became a state--might vote together and elect a governor of their race, and that would be insupportable. (1974, 315).

That was a description of Hawai'i only fifty years ago. That's well within my lifetime!

In the 1930s talk of statehood for Hawai'i grew, because the future of Hawai'i's agricultural economy depended on gaining voting representation in Congress. Yet Hawai'i was gripped in the schizophrenia of a Catch 22 situation because the biggest threat and obstacle to statehood was "the Japanese question in Hawaii": Would the Japanese in Hawai'i make good Americans?

The voice of opposition to statehood is well reflected by the testimony of one John Stokes before a Congressional joint committee in opposition to statehood for Hawai'i. He said:

Of the original Japanese arrivals, 40,000 still remain and 110,000 of their descendants are American citizens, capable even now of dominating the local electorate. In view of their parents' training, characteristics, and background, *how far may they be trusted?*

To one who has studied Japanese and local backgrounds, it seems that statehood for Hawaii at the present time might become dangerous to the United States in the near future. At best it would be risky, so why place Hawaiian control in the hands of an unproven group, especially one descended from subjects of an aggressive and ambitious nation which *at any moment* may become an active enemy? (Ogawa 1980, 262)

That "moment" arrived most unexpectedly when the first Japanese bomb dropped on Pearl Harbor. That dreadful, too horrible-to-even-dream-about nightmare had come true. We were at war with Japan!

That in brief is the picture of pre-Pearl Harbor Hawai'i. Now, the heretofore unknown, unproven, and highly doubted loyalty of the Japanese in Hawai'i became the BIG QUESTION MARK. Let me describe the question in words you can understand. In his prelude to *Ambassadors in Arms* (1954), a story of the 100th Battalion, Professor Thomas Murphy described two American soldiers sitting in a machine-gun pit on the north shore of O'ahu, one was Hawaiian and one was of Japanese ancestry. After a long silence the Hawaiian finally blurted out the question almost every other non-Japanese in Hawai'i had been burdened with. He asked: "Eh, if they come, who you going shoot? Dem or me?" To which the nisei soldier indignantly replied, "Who you think, stupid? Me just as good American as you!" This was the big question mark: Could those of Japanese ancestry be good loyal Americans? Professor Murphy wrote: "To answer and prove the question, deeds would be necessary, not mere words."

The Hawai'i Territorial Guard

On that morning of 7 December 1941, when we reported to our ROTC unit, there was no registration or signup, no swearing in, nor any formalities. No one questioned us; there were no doubts, hesitancy, or distrust. We were ROTC cadets responding to the call in defense of our country, just like any other American soldiers or sailors reporting to their battle stations. Rifles and real bullets were issued. Our first mission was to deploy across Manoa Stream and repel Japanese paratroopers who had reportedly landed on St

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Louis Heights. The enemy never came. This was just one of many groundless rumors that spread across Honolulu that day.

That afternoon we were converted into the Hawaii Territorial Guard (HTG) and trucked to the National Guard Armory, where our state capitol building now stands. We were issued those round pie-shaped tin helmets and gas masks and were assigned immediately to guard the palace, the courthouse, the electric and telephone companies, Board of Water Supply stations and reservoirs, and other utility installations around the city. Our Company B was stationed in the Dole cannery warehouse, where we guarded the industrial factories, gasoline tanks, and Honolulu harbor, armed only with puny Springfield .03 rifles. Fortunately no bombs dropped on the Iwilei area. The enemy never landed. The important thing was that we had responded to our country's call to arms, we were accepted, we were proud to be in uniform, we were serving our country in its hour of need.

Of the 500 of us in the HTG, 80 percent were of Japanese ancestry. Six weeks after the Pearl Harbor attack, the War Department discovered to its horror that O'ahu was being guarded by "hundreds of Japanese" in American uniforms. Everyone of Japanese ancestry was discharged from the HTG on the morning of 19 January 1942. That discharge order was more devastating than if a bomb had exploded in our midst. This blow was worse than Pearl Harbor. To have our own country, in its danger and time of need, reject and repudiate our services was more than we could take. No words could ever adequately describe the feelings of complete rejection and repudiation we experienced when we were dismissed from the service of our own country, just because our faces and names resembled those of the enemy. The very bottom had dropped out of our lives.

But that was not all. More humiliation followed. Hawai'i was gripped by a fear of a Japanese invasion. Other Japanese Americans already in uniform had their rifles taken away, and they were transferred to noncombat engineer units. The Draft Board reclassified all Japanese Americans from 1-A draft status to 4-C (enemy alien) so that we were precluded from military service. John Balch, president of the Hawaiian Telephone Company, wrote a pamphlet, "Shall the Japanese Be Allowed to Dominate Hawaii?" and proposed all Japanese be moved to the island of Moloka'i. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox pleaded with President Roosevelt for the wholesale evacuation of all Japanese from Hawai'i because "the military defense of Hawaii is now being carried out in the presence of a population predominantly with enemy sympathies and affiliation." On 19 February 1942 President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, which called for the evacuation of 110,000 men, women, and children of Japanese ancestry from the west coast and their confinement to

barbed-wired detention centers in inland United States. This was the situation facing Japanese Americans in February 1942.

We had nothing to do but go back to the university. But education became meaningless. Nothing made sense. Our nation was crying for workers and servicemen, and yet we were deemed useless and unwanted.

The Varsity Victory Volunteers

One day in late January 1942, Hung Wai Ching, secretary of the university YMCA, talked to a group of HTG discharges and persuaded them that there were other ways besides shooting a gun to serve their country and they ought to petition the military governor and offer themselves as a noncombat labor battalion. One hundred sixty-nine university boys signed a petition that was accepted by General Emmons. I was among those volunteers. This group was given the name Varsity Victory Volunteers (VVV), and we were assigned to the 34th Army Engineers at Schofield Barracks. We were armed, not with rifles, but with picks and shovels, hammers and saws, crowbars and sledgehammers and performed much needed defense work on O'ahu for the next eleven months.

Hung Wai Ching was very proud of his VVV boys. He bragged about how these boys gave up their education and other lucrative defense jobs to serve as common laborers. One day in late December, the quarry gang breaking rocks up at the Kolekole Pass quarry saw Hung Wai Ching with some important looking brass. The visitor was Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Was it mere coincidence that just a few weeks later, in January 1943, the War Department announced the formation of an all-nisei combat team, changed the nisei draft status from 4-C back to 1-A, and called for volunteers?

The Triple V boys voted to disband so they could volunteer for the 442nd Combat Team. The Triple V had served its purpose. It had stemmed the rising tide of hysteria, panic, and prejudice against Hawai'i's Japanese at a most strategic time, and had answered the big question mark with bold, dramatic, and positive action, not mere words.

The 442nd Combat Team

The 442nd carried on where the Triple V left off. A call for 1500 volunteers from Hawai'i was made. Ten thousand Japanese Americans in Hawai'i responded. On the mainland more nisei volunteered from behind the barbed wire of detention camps. For the third time in the war I volunteered and was accepted to serve in the 442nd. The 100th Battalion had already been sent to the mainland and had finished training with a distinguished record.

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The story of the 100th and 442nd has been told and retold many times. It will not be retold here. The 100th and 442nd became the most decorated and probably the best publicized American fighting unit in World War II. Personnel of this single battle unit were awarded one Congressional Medal of Honor, 52 Distinguished Service Crosses, 560 Silver Stars, 5200 Bronze Stars, and 9486 Purple Hearts, and earned 7 Distinguished Unit citations.

The most renowned feat of the 100th and 442nd was the heroic rescue of the 211 men of "The Lost Battalion," which happened in the hills of Bellefontaine, France, in late October 1944, at a terrible cost of 161 dead, 43 missing, and 2000 wounded. After the battle, on 12 November 1944, General John Dahlquist, commander of the 36th Division, who had ordered the rescue mission, called an assembly to honor the 100th and 442nd for their achievements. Seeing only a few hundred men assembled of a regiment which normally numbered over 4000, General Dahlquist asked Colonel Virgil Miller with some irritation, "I thought I ordered the whole regiment to assemble. Where are the rest of the men?" To which Colonel Miller, with tears streaming down his cheeks, replied, "You're looking at the entire regiment, Sir. That's all that's left" (Stein 1985, 32; Duus 1987, 217).

The incomparable combat record of the 100th and 442nd, underscored by over 800 headstones for fallen comrades scattered from Italy to France, gave dramatic and irrefutable response to the big question mark and established for all time the truth of President Roosevelt's statement to the 442nd: "Americanism is not a matter of race or ancestry. Americanism is a matter of mind and the heart."

The Military Intelligence Service

A larger question still remained to be answered: "Would Americans of Japanese ancestry be willing to fight against the Japanese, to fight *against those of their own race and blood?*"

Early in the war the American military forces discovered the need for effective military intelligence against the Japanese. The Japanese Americans provided the best source of trained intelligence language specialists in the numbers that were needed. A military intelligence school for teaching military Japanese was established at Camp Savage, Minnesota, in 1942, and nisei with some Japanese language background were recruited from the detention centers, Hawai'i, the 100th Battalion, and the 442nd Combat Team. I was included in a group of one hundred men recruited from the 442nd in training at Camp Shelby.

After completing a six-month crash course in military Japanese, my unit was assigned to the 10th Air Force in the India-Burma theater to perform

radio intelligence work intercepting radio transmissions of the Japanese Air Force in Burma. Other military intelligence graduates were assigned to the US Infantry, Mars Task Force, the Air Force, Marines, Navy, Paratroopers, OSS, and OWI, and to the British, Australian, New Zealand, and Chinese forces operating in the Aleutian Islands, Guadalcanal, Buna, New Georgia, Tarawa, Leyte, the Burma Road, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima, over the entire Asian-Pacific theater. They translated captured documents, intercepted and deciphered coded messages, deciphered and translated maps, battle plans, military orders, diaries, and letters, and interrogated captured Japanese prisoners. They were the eyes and ears of Allied forces fighting the Japanese in the Pacific War. After the peace they served with the Japan Occupation Forces and the War Crimes Tribunals.

In 1944 nisei interpreters translated the captured Operation Z, a Japanese Navy plan for the defense of the Marianas and the Philippines. When the American fleet steamed into the Marianas, Admiral Spruance already knew the exact number and location of Japanese ships and planes, resulting in a decisive American victory in the battle of the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. Nisei interpreters were instrumental in determining the location of Admiral Yamamoto's whereabouts, which led to the ambush of his airplane and his resulting death. Back in the Pentagon, Kazuo Yamane was leafing through some captured Japanese documents that Navy Intelligence had classified as "routine" (of no military value). He discovered a thick book that turned out to be the Imperial Army Ordinance Inventory listing the numbers of every type of Japanese weapon. This discovery led to new targets for B-29 raids over Japan.

The Japanese-American military intelligence linguist faced an added danger--being mistaken for the enemy and being shot at by their own troops. Most of them had Caucasian bodyguards. Yet some were killed by mistake. Sergeant Frank Hachiya of Hood River, Oregon, volunteered to parachute behind enemy lines in the Philippines, but as he made his way back to American lines, he was mistakenly shot by Americans as an enemy infiltrator. On his body they found maps of the complete Japanese defenses for Leyte. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross posthumously. Yet his name was one of the fourteen Japanese-American names removed from the War Memorial Honor Roll by "patriots" of the Hood River American Legion Post. Following a nationwide outcry the names were restored. A memorial to Frank Hachiya now reads:

The life of Sgt. Hachiya symbolizes well the story of the Japanese-American soldiers of WW II. Unwanted by the Army, he could not be drafted. Suspected by his own Government, he was confined in a relocation camp. Given

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the most trying of assignments, to fight against those of his own ancestry and culture, he was mistakenly shot and killed by his own comrades. Though he died, his courage resulted in the saving of lives of thousands of his countrymen.

During the War, over six thousand nisei served in the US Military Intelligence Service against the Japanese enemy, but little is known of their identity and exploits because their services were confidential and kept secret until their recent declassification. The nisei of the Military Intelligence Service were the Allies' "secret weapon" in the war against Japan. General Douglas MacArthur stated that "Never in military history did any Army know so much about the enemy prior to actual engagement." General Willoughby, head of US Army Intelligence in the Pacific theater stated: "The nisei saved a million lives and shortened the war by two years." Theirs was a ringing and undeniable response to the question: "Who you going shoot, me or them?"

Conclusion

When the 100th Battalion and 442nd Combat Team returned from the European battlefields they were awarded a special Presidential Unit Citation on the White House lawn, the only American military unit to be so honored. Speaking for the whole nation President Harry Truman rendered the final verdict on the loyalty of Americans of Japanese ancestry when he said: "I can't tell you how much I appreciate the privilege of being able to show you how much the United States thinks of what you have done [Y]ou fought for the free nations of the world [Y]ou fought not only the enemy, but you fought prejudice, and you won!"

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Samoans, World War II, and Military Work

Robert W. Franco

When Commander Benjamin F. Tilley arrived at Tutuila in August 1899 he marvelled at Pago Pago harbor, "a perfect fortress . . . stronger for defense than Gibraltar." Eight months later eastern Samoa was ceded to the United States, and Tilley set out to establish a naval administration for the territory. He created a government that included only two new institutions, a judicial system and the Fitafta Guard, who were to enforce court decisions and generally maintain order. Tilley formed the Fitafta in order to attract "the elite young men and thus bring them under the influence of the government" (quoted in Olsen 1976, 9-10, 21). During the 1920s and 1930s, employment with the naval administration brought a great deal of prestige to the Fitafta guardsmen. Darden states that the Fitafta were an important source of cash for their extended families (*aiga*), and that guardsmen were "accruing prestige vastly out of proportion to their traditional status" (1952, 13).

In the early 1940s World War II came to American and Western Samoa. When Samoans speak of this period they talk of the abundant wage labor opportunities and the continuities of their military service to the United States. In the 1940s large numbers of Samoans, not just Fitafta guardsmen, gained access to wage labor opportunities, military enlistment opportunities, and a chance to redefine their status in relation to their traditional chief's *matai*. Hundreds of American and Western Samoans developed transportation, communication, and supply skills, and with the end of the war they were eager to succeed in overseas labor markets. In this way World War II provided a major stimulus to international Samoan migration, a migration that now encompasses a wide geographic expanse from New Zealand through Samoa to Hawai'i and the US mainland. For Samoans, as for other Islanders discussed in this conference, the aftereffects of World War II have been as disruptive as the war itself.

During World War II in Samoa, for the first time hundreds of Samoans were allowed to volunteer for the US military, either as Fitafta guardsmen or as members of the US Navy or Marine Corps Reserve. When the naval

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station at Tutuila was closed in 1951, these recruits and their dependents, nearly a thousand people in all, were relocated to Hawai'i. From the 1940s to the present Samoans have been volunteering to serve in the US armed forces, and as they have traveled to military bases in Hawai'i, California, and Washington they have found kin who have preceded them and established Samoan enclaves near these military bases. From World War II to the present military enlistment has been a significant catalyst to migration, and a major strategy for adapting to American urban environments.

In 1940 Pago Pago was only a minor naval station lacking "the facilities necessary to handle wartime logistical problems" (Olsen 1976, 175-176). In the spring of 1940 Captain A. R. Pefley went to American Samoa to draw up plans for the development of defense capabilities on Tutuila. Pefley's development plan included the following points:

- 1 Additional quarters for officers and enlisted men must be constructed;
- 2 Expand commissary, storage, and refrigeration;
- 3 A new dispensary and additional generators needed;
- 4 Increase light and heavy machinery and equipment;
- 5 Purchase additional land at Fagotogo and Utulei;
- 6 Build garage, machine shop, and recreation facilities;
- 7 Improve sanitation in Pago Pago and other areas;
- 8 Develop a thorough agricultural program to feed the men.

In November 1940 expansion of the naval station began. Later this expansion program was part of a contract, The Pacific Air Bases Program, which included construction work at Pearl Harbor (Burke 1972b, 25).

Much of this initial expansion on Tutuila was conducted under the administration of G. K. Brodie, director of the Public Works Department. From the naval records there appears to have been a great urgency to this expansion. For example, the records refer to "war clouds brewing," and "the clouds of war descending." Brodie felt that the necessary speed of the work was unfortunate and that there would be problems going from a "decrepit, minor Naval Station" to a "Pacific Air Base" in a short period of time (Burke 1972b). Brodie, in a memorandum to Lieutenant Commander W. L. Richards, wrote:

The labor situation is most unique. . . . In general, the native labor will be sufficient and satisfactory. However, there are several points that require special mention: a) Native Food supplies have to be maintained. The natives have one great fault; they have little foresight. As long as they have sufficient food in the ground for their needs, they are satisfied. They do not

entirely grasp the fact that when we take most of their men for labor they will have to rely on the women, old men, and children for plantation work. We are making every attempt to encourage or force them to keep planting in excess so that there will always be adequate food to supply the men working. If their food supply fails, we will have to take over the task of feeding the island by the importation of rice and by fishing with dynamite. At regular intervals, native Public Works employees who have high standing with the natives are being sent out to check the plantation and put pressure on the chiefs to keep the planting going. This is an odd and perhaps illegal expenditure, but it is almost mandatory under the circumstances; b) The natives can do a good 8 or 10 hours work a day, but when worked beyond that, they cannot keep up the pace. They desire to work as much as possible to get the money, but trials have proved that they cannot physically stand up under long working hours. (Burke 1972b, 25)

By October, 1942 the US military was preparing for a possible attack on Tutuila and for a protracted engagement. The role of the Fitafta Guard in any defensive action was clearly specified:

Fitafta section 1 -- Take the enemy forces under fire approaching within the east sector of the Naval facility. Control the spread of fire during lulls in the battle.

Fitafta section 3 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within the *malae* area. Control fire . . . safeguard essential material and records as directed. Be prepared to carry out Naval Station Logistic Plan One on order.

Fitafta section 4 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within the west sector . . . control fire during lulls in the battle.

Fitafta section 5 -- Take enemy forces under fire approaching within the *malae* area. Be prepared to man fire truck on order. Power house detail control damage to Naval Station power supply. (Burke 1972a)

Samoans were also active within the Supply Division at Pago Pago. This division was viewed as one of the most important because it was necessary to "keep the logistics train functioning smoothly" (Burke 1972b, 129). The Supply Division consisted of 2500 civilian employees, and it is assumed that most or all of these were Samoans.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor many ships were directed to Pago Pago. According to Burke, "Ship arrivals jumped from three in December, 1941 to fifty-six in December, 1942. Shipping activity was intensive throughout 1943. In March, 1943, 121 vessels passed through Pago Pago harbor. Shipping arrivals declined after February, 1944, from fifty per month to less than twenty" (1972b, 135).

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A great deal of military activity occurred in Samoa between January 1942 and March 1944. In October 1942 there were 14,371 American servicemen on Tutuila and Upolu. During the following twelve months this military force decreased to 9491, and by February of 1944 only 2080 American servicemen remained in Samoa (Burke 1972a, 75). The "Marine Era" on Tutuila ended on 1 March 1944, when the base reverted to a naval station. The naval commandant was then responsible for the "roll up" of the base, that is, he made available supplies and building materials to be sent to the forward bases in the Northern and Central Pacific. The naval station was given a new, less urgent "mission" (Burke 1972a, 7). The station then provided:

- 1 Limited anchorage facility
- 2 Permanent fueling facilities
- 3 Minor naval repair depot
- 4 Supply facilities
- 5 Communication facilities
- 6 Weather observation station
- 7 Limited aviation facilities
- 8 Hospital facilities
- 9 Internal security using any personnel available

Even into 1945 more than seven hundred Samoans were working as stevedoring personnel using cargo handling equipment, cranes, trucks, and trailers, and reports from Tutuila remark: "Ships are promptly discharged to full limit of labor and equipment available" (Burke 1972a, 13).

In general the US military presented positive assessments of the Samoan labor force, especially during the period of intense military activity, 1942-1944. Burke states: "Throughout the entire war period Samoan personnel were used wherever possible releasing the Navy personnel for more vital jobs. The Samoans performed very satisfactorily. Although the Samoan did not have the stamina of a Caucasian, he could work for about ten hours a day without losing efficiency" (1972b, 131).

The US military was also present on Upolu and Savai'i after 27 March 1942. The greatest concentration of American troops was on Upolu, as Savai'i was considered too rough and mountainous for airfields, and there were no anchorages for larger ships. Through negotiations with A. C. Turnbull, acting administrator in Western Samoa, and with other representatives of the New Zealand government, the United States was able to secure tenure over 5000 acres of land for the period of the war. The land was to be developed into an airstrip using US military personnel and Samoan workers. The Samoans were paid 5 shillings per eight-hour day if they were laborers and 8 to 16 shillings

per eight-hour day if they were foremen or specialists. It appears that the Western Samoans were also eager to work, as one report states that "sufficient labor is available at all times" (Burke 1972b, 46). In addition to assisting military personnel with the construction of an airstrip, Western Samoans also worked in roadbuilding. As the war moved westward beyond Samoa, Western Samoans worked to maintain the airstrip as an emergency facility.

Olsen, (1976, 177-179), in his fine history of the American naval administration in Samoa, summarizes some of the beneficial and disruptive effects of Samoan participation in World War II:

One of the most important benefits that Samoans would derive . . . was the experience and training Samoan mechanics and craftsmen gained working alongside American civilian contract employees and the Seabees. As a result after the war, Samoans were competent to construct, maintain and operate the Island Government facilities. With the exception of the Public Works officer and his assistant . . . all the employees of the Public Works Department were Samoan, including draftsmen, surveyors, foremen, machinists, heavy equipment operators, plumbers, electricians, refrigeration mechanics, welders, and clerks. Also, during and after the war, Samoans working for the naval station learned valuable trades that allowed them to open their own small businesses, such as small auto repair shops, paint shops, and carpentry services. Other Samoans who had enlisted received veteran's benefits allowing them to further their education. (1976, 177-179)

However, Olsen goes on to argue:

On the whole the impact of World War II was disruptive despite the benefits Samoa gained as a result of the war. The very foundation of Samoan society --the *matai* system--was threatened . . . The replacement of Samoa's plantation economy by a wage economy gave the young men . . . a feeling of independence gained from having money in their pockets rather than being dependent on their *matai* who controlled the family's lands. (1976, 179)

In 1945 Governor Hauser addressed the American Samoa Fono in these words: "We have much to do, as native industry, agriculture, education, and the like suffered greatly when you made your all-out effort for the U.S. and our allies" (quoted in Olsen 1979, 186). Governor Hauser warned the Fono that the wartime prosperity would soon be over. This prosperity is probably best reflected in the growth of the assets of the Bank of American Samoa during the period. Between 30 June 1941 and 30 June 1945 this bank's assets grew from \$309,768 to \$1,804,281 (Olsen 1976, 178).

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In the period 1945 to 1950, the American Samoa Fono addressed three major issues to the naval administration. First, a request was made to give all Fitafta guardsmen and Samoan Marines American citizenship. This request was withdrawn when questions about citizenship and land ownership were raised. Second, Chief Tuiaosopo complained from his position within the Fono that during the war years the military administration had inappropriately selected lower ranking chiefs for government positions. Third, in the discussion over a constitution for American Samoa, it was decided to remove a clause prohibiting "involuntary servitude" because the Fono was afraid that such a clause might restrict the authority of *matai*. These issues show quite clearly that American Samoa political leaders, even after the disruptions of World War II, still placed great value in their *matai* system and its prerogatives in economic decision making. Further, the citizenship issue foreshadowed an ongoing concern over citizenship status and land tenure questions.

The period 1940 to 1950 was a decade of rapid population growth in American Samoa, no doubt partly due to the presence of the US military (see Keesing 1973). By 1951 the wartime prosperity was ending, and Samoans were finding it difficult to readjust to a lowered standard of living. Lewthwaite, Mainzer, and Holland vividly describe the diaspora that accompanied the closing of the US Naval base in American Samoa in 1951:

The *General R. L. Howze*, the last scheduled naval transport sailed on 25 June, 1951. It carried many members of the disbanded Fitafta Guard north to Hawaii . . . and when, in 1952, the *President Jackson* called on short notice to pick up dependents, the authorities were faced with something of a rush. For many claimed relatives in Hawaii and seized the opportunity for free or low cost naval transportation, and though the hastiness of the medical and financial screening was to provoke protest--almost 1,000 Samoans embarked for Honolulu. (1973, 135)

Conclusion

During the 1940s a rapid increase in the number of wage-labor opportunities stimulated large-scale rural-urban migration to Pago Pago. Job skills acquired during World War II gave Samoans the confidence to begin moving internationally--American Samoans to Hawai'i and the US mainland, Western Samoans to New Zealand--in the early 1950s. These early international movers were probably more highly skilled than any later wave of Samoan migrants. The initial migrants to Hawai'i and the US mainland established

Samoan communities around military bases, and these "ethnic enclaves" have provided, and continue to provide, points of entry for new Samoan migrants.

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The Fitafta Guard and Samoan Military Experience

Tuala Sevaaetasi

Dr Franco has mentioned most of the things that happened in Samoa during World War II, but I was there. I was in the service, in this outfit he mentioned, called the Fitafta Guard. I believe there are a lot of you who have heard of that name, and maybe have even been in Samoa during that time to see what those people did. But there are some who do not understand what the word *fitafta* means. The word *fitafta* is a Samoan word for "soldier," the people who are ready to fight for their country, who are ready to render their service when their country needs it the most.

I was surprised when World War II came to Samoa. Fitafta is a unit of the regular navy. They received the same salary that regular navy received. Only in those days there was not much money, but the value of the money was there. The private or the seaman drew \$21 a month. So did the Fitafta. In 1900 President McKinley gave the authority to Commander Tilley to establish the navy authority in Samoa. That lasted until 30 June 1951, when by executive order the administration of the island was transferred to the Department of Interior. Franco also said that during that time, those people, the Fitafta Guard, were relocated here in Hawai'i, stationed at Barbers Point. That was the beginning of the big migration from Samoa, because of those people.

Let me speak about what the Fitafta did for their country and for the military. After Commander Tilley first formed the Fitafta Guard in 1900 some people were assigned to sea duty. At that time there was only one navy ship in Samoa. It was not a destroyer, it was not a cruiser, but a tug boat. Some Samoans from the Fitafta Guard were assigned sea duty on that ship.

Now, what did they do for their country? The navy at that time was not too strict about the Fitafta purchasing things from the commissary and PXs, the post exchanges. So in that way most of the Islanders depended on the Fitafta. The Fitafta bought things from the navy commissary. So most of these people depended greatly on the Fitafta Guard. And because these guards are Samoans, the native people of American Samoa respected them. In Samoa during World War II, there were changes everywhere the war came.

TUALA SEVAAETASI

One of the big changes in Samoa was population. Everywhere you went after the war, you saw some *haole* (Caucasian) kids, most of them *haole*. That increased the population of Samoa.

Bob Franco also mentioned the work. I've seen those things. Some of the reports Franco gets from these other Samoans--if they were here, I would tell them--they just didn't know what they were talking about. Some guys said that the Samoans were forced to work. No, it was not that way. I go along with somebody who says that when Samoa heard that the US government was at war with Japan, the call came around and they offered their hands to help.

I was enlisted in the navy through the Fitafta Guard in 1932. One of the reasons I wanted to go there was that I love music. In 1902 the navy sent to Samoa two navy musicians to teach the Fitafta Guard so they could organize a band. That band helped to bring up the name of the Fitafta Guard. So I love music and I thought I'd better join the navy, not only for the pay--the pay was there; the Fitafta Guard was about the best paid job in Samoa at that time--but I went there to be a musician, a better musician.

After I joined I found out that there was no vacancy; all the band positions were filled. So they used me as the governor's orderly. In 1933 I accompanied the governor of American Samoa and the assistant administrator from Western Samoa on a trip to Suva for a visit to the Rockefeller Foundation. When we came back, I had a chance. All this time I wanted to come out, to attend a music school to improve my music knowledge. But during that time the war started in Europe and then the navy stopped the transfer. They told me that I'd better stay in Samoa. So I did until 1948 when I left the Fitafta Guard and band. I was proud to serve in the outfit, not only for the US government, but also for my people.

I came here and reenlisted in the army band at Fort Shafter. What happened? When I came to that band there were nothing but local boys, just Filipino. And then their allocation was filled too. There were only two sergeant first class and five second class, and then I reenlisted in the second class. I had no chance to move out, and then all of a sudden the Korean War broke out. Then I saw the memo from the commanding general, "People who have experience in the infantry, we are going to put up an infantry training center at Schofield." So I thought, this is my chance. This is what I learned from Samoa in the Fitafta Guard and band.

When they started that outfit, I was surprised. We were trained like soldiers. Instead of Commander Tilley to bring the Marines to guard the navy installation, Commander Tilley suggested that it would be better to use the Samoan people for the job. Then he found out that the Samoan people are very trustworthy. They served faithfully, and there was no problem with them. The reason for that is the culture. We people know such things as courtesy

and discipline. A child in Samoa is disciplined from a very young age. Now when I accepted, or was accepted for the training center at Schofield, I was one of the teachers to teach discipline and courtesy. Then I found out that was the most hated subject in the army.

If only the good Lord would make me young again, I would reenlist again to serve in the army.

Appendix: Audience Questions and Answers

TS Tuala Sevaaetasi
JF Jonathan Fifi'i

JC John Charlot

JC One of the things I heard about the army presence or navy presence during the war was that the navy men would disrupt the Samoan ceremonies because they'd be sort of flirting with the girls or trying to get girls away from the ceremony. I was wondering if you'd run across this?

TS I have never heard of anything like that. The people of Samoa during the navy administration served with full heart. We even welcomed them to come. Some of the navy personnel even came and slept in our homes, but nothing happened. I have never heard of one rape case during all the fifty years the navy was in Samoa. The people respect the navy, and their personnel respect the Samoan culture, too. I didn't hear anything about that.

JC I was wondering, were there a number of navy officers who were offered Samoan titles? Was there any mixing of those?

TS Yes, there were some Samoans, even our Senator Inouye. Inouye, when he came to Samoa, the Samoans asked him to be their spokesman in Congress. So Inouye accepted that, even now he has been helping the Samoans. So the Samoans named him the Fofoga o Samoa. In other words, the one who represents Samoa. His word is above all the chiefs' words of Samoa. He speaks for all the chiefs of Samoa. There are other people who came back, and I heard that they were given titles in Samoa.

JF I've got another question, my friend. You've been talking a lot about Samoa, but here we talk about World War II and you didn't touch anything about how World War II affected Samoa, Pago Pago.

TS Well, there were not any encounters during World War II in Samoa, but I heard someone earlier mention propaganda or rumors. After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor there were rumors in Samoa that the Japanese said, "Well, we missed you this time, but we'll see you New Years." You know that thing came true. In January 1942 the Japanese shelled American Samoa, Tutuila. This harbor, even though it's small, it's deep enough for big ships, and it's well surrounded by mountains. So it is very hard, there is no place for a plane to land. When the Japanese shelled the place, there were already fortifications put up on the other side of the island by the 7th Marine who first came there to fortify the place. But the trouble was they put up four six-inch guns, two on one side of the mouth of the harbor, and two on the other side, all facing the entrance. And they also mounted the antiaircraft batteries. During the war that was another part of the Fitafta Guard's duty. Like myself, I was assigned to those antiaircraft batteries. My duty, I was one of the gunmen with the Marines, with the 7th Defense. So that was part of the Fitafta Guard's duty.

As I said, nobody knew how in the world Commander Tilley and the old Samoans called this unit, this regular navy unit, the Fitafta, the soldiers. But when they organized that outfit we were trained to be ready for actions like this. I've been in the Fitafta rifle team. Every once in a while the British would come and then ask permission to use the rifle range. We competed with all the teams that passed through Samoa, and none of them could beat us. When they gave me the chance to be an instructor up at Schofield for individual weapons, they asked me, "Have you given any classes before?" I told them, "No." "And what are you going to teach the trainees?" I told them, "You give me any individual weapon and I'll fire against the best you have. And if I can shoot that good, then I know how to teach these people how to shoot." And I've been a competitive shooter for the army all this time, even during my time in the band. I have traveled to Camp Perry, Ohio, where the national competition is held every year. I usually shot rifles, but then age crept in, so I turned to the pistol. My permanent classification is master. I shoot against the best. I am not the best, but so far as training goes, I once started teaching a kid in the band here in Honolulu to shoot the pistol. We started from the arms rule. The pistol is not too accurate; they're not made for competition. But when I left for three years and came back, that boy had won the championship of this island. He was the best. And then from here, the army called him for the army team stationed at Fort Benning. He held the national record for more years than anyone who has won the national record. Those are some of the things we did during World War II.

CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS

**Villages without People: A Preliminary Analysis of
American Views of Melanesians during World War II
as Seen through Popular Histories**

Marty Zelenietz

When I visited my parents in April 1988, my father showed me the travel supplement of a local paper, thinking that I'd enjoy the feature article on Papua New Guinea. From the title alone, "Welcome to the Stone Age," I could imagine the contents, the usual stereotyped images of Papua New Guinea: jungles, headhunters, cannibals. The author fulfilled my expectations, conjuring up the image par excellence of Melanesia: "The natives are friendly, despite their well-deserved reputation as headhunters, a practice that is only a few generations in the past" (Handley 1988, 1).

Can we escape this image, this myth? I doubt it. Myths give particular meaning to events, "transforming complex affairs into simple but crystal-clear 'realities' that explain and justify how things are now" (Horne 1986, 57). They guide our vision and fix our perspective. Probably, two centuries hence, travel writers will still write of "friendly New Guinea natives, only a couple of hundred years removed from headhunting and cannibalism." Myths and images, having frozen our vision, possess a self-perpetuating ability to live on long after reality changes. Ghosts of the past influence our perceptions of the present as the travel supplement stereotype of Papua New Guinea demonstrates.

In this paper I talk about myths, images of the past, shadows of a war that ended more than four decades ago. The ghosts of the World War II live on, as the *National Geographic* knows (Benchley 1988). Images of the war still command our attention: witness the number of new books about the war (eg, Toland 1982; Terkel 1984; Spector 1985; Dower 1986), and the reprinting of old books (Smith and Finch 1987 [originally 1948]; MacDonald 1978 [originally 1947]). This flood of printed pages reflects the continuing importance of the war in American thought, history, and mythology.

History and Images

With rare exception the expanding literature replicates and perpetuates a stereotype of indigenous Melanesians that is as inaccurate as the stereotype of Americans that many Melanesians hold (see eg, Gegeo, chapter 3). The people of Melanesia found themselves caught in the crossfire of a foreign war, a war that generated for them images and myths of powerful, generous, and egalitarian Americans. With my colleague, Hisafumi Saito, I've described the images held by one group of people, the Kilenge of West New Britain (Zelenietz and Saito 1986). The Kilenge experienced the war firsthand; they provided labor to build an airstrip, first for the Australians and later for the Japanese; they hid from the bombs and shells as the First Marine Division invaded Cape Gloucester on 24 December 1943; and they served as carriers for MacArthur's forces on Bougainville and New Guinea. From such experiences the Kilenge fabricated indelible images of the combatants. To this day the images provide local stereotypes to guide Kilenge interactions with foreigners.

In trying to put the Kilenge view into a broader context, to ground the Kilenge images and memories in the larger events of the Pacific, and to see how the combatants felt about the indigenous peoples of the region, I thumbed through several readily available popular histories of the war. What I did not find in them struck me as being far more revealing than what I did.

What was missing? Two lacunae captured my attention. First, I discovered, historians almost totally ignore the battle for Cape Gloucester. Although the War Department released a film in 1944 called *Attack: The Battle for Cape Gloucester*, that battle never captured the public's imagination, never spawned the images and press copy generated by battles like Guadalcanal (eg, Tregaskis 1943; Kent 1972; Hoyt 1983) or Buna (Mayo 1974).¹ At best, Gloucester rates a few paragraphs (Spector 1985, 247) or pages (Davis 1962, 168-188; Berry 1982, 64-65, 84-85, 102-105) in books that deal mainly with other events and campaigns.

The second thing I couldn't find was *local people*. The Americans were important to the Kilenge; the Kilenge, as far as I could see, *did not exist* for the Americans. The more I read about the Pacific War, the more it struck me: references to the indigenous peoples of Melanesia were few and far between. When mentioned at all, Melanesians usually fit a particular Western stereotypical image of "the native." Soldiers and historians recalled the mud, the malaria, the mountains, and the monsoons, but not the Melanesians. Writers make abundant reference to places and villages, but rarely to the inhabitants. In my search for Melanesians, I was chasing images of invisible people, shadows of nonentities.

The invisible Melanesian contrasts sharply with the flesh-and-blood civilian in the European theater of the war (see eg, Mauldin 1945; MacDonald 1978). Americans came out of the war with a clear image of a Europe brought to its knees by the war's devastation, a land teeming with dispossessed, destitute refugees. Ultimately America responded to this image with the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction. No such plan benefited the war-ravaged people of Melanesia. Why, I asked myself, should one group leave such a visible and memorable image, and the other group fade into oblivion like a photograph left in the sun?

That question forms the basis of this presentation. Although I deal with matters of what we call history here, I am not a historian. Rather I am an anthropologist. As such, I'm accustomed to gathering my information by living with people, participating in their lives, talking with them, and learning from them. Their views, after all, reflect their culture. This is how I learned the meaning of World War II for the Kilenge. For this paper, however, I have had neither the resources nor the time to travel and interview survivors of the war, to explore the images they hold of the people of Melanesia. But these images are not inaccessible: literate people generate and record their myths in writing. Trade paperback books, written primarily by Americans for an American audience, became my informants. These books represent American myth-making, and because they sell successfully and continually in the popular market, I presume they reflect, at least in part, the American worldview. Undoubtedly there is something of a dialectical process at work here. These books not only mirror the values of the culture that spawns them, they also shape the images that culture holds. I want to show how they feed our stereotypes of Melanesians. I make no claim to have examined the popular and scholarly literature thoroughly and exhaustively. My research, really in its infancy, has only scratched the surface of a wealth of written material. My aim is to examine how American fighting forces, and those who record their deeds, their mythmakers, saw or failed to see the indigenous people of Melanesia during World War II, to explore American images of the Melanesians, and in contrasting those images with images held of Europeans, to account for why those images exist.

But before I talk of the people of Melanesia, I must first talk of the land itself, because before they saw the people, the Americans saw the land, and the land etched indelible images on the American psyche. American perceptions of, and experiences with, the Melanesian landscape profoundly influenced what and how they later saw the people.

Images of Melanesia

American forces went into the Southwest Pacific not knowing what to expect, or for that matter where they were going. For the most part they never understood the geography of that vast oceanic area. "To this day, few GIs and Marines have the remotest idea of where they fought" (Manchester 1980, 94). We may understand civilian and enlisted personnel's bewilderment over the North and South Pacific (Manchester 1980, 94; Terkel 1984, 527), but MacArthur's apparent confusion between New Guinea and Papua (1964, 164), and Spector's inappropriate description of Lae as a "village" and Buna a "town" (1985, 216) reveal the underlying and persistent depth of American ignorance of Melanesia.

Unlike the Philippines, or Guam, or Hawai'i, Melanesia did not form part of the American colonial experience in the Pacific. Here was a world most Americans had never before seen, never before experienced. A landscape totally alien, its awesome beauty overwhelmed their senses; its hidden dangers could cost them their lives. Their first long look at this land impregnated their senses with ambivalent and contradictory responses:

O, lost tropic beauty of sea and cocopalm and sand.

It is scarcely believable that I can remember it with pleasure, and affection, and a sense of beauty. . . . The pervasive mud, and jungle gloom and tropical sun, when they are not all around you smothering you, can have a haunting beauty at a far remove

But, God help me, it was beautiful. I remember exactly the way it looked the day we came up on deck to go ashore: the delicious sparkling tropic sea, the long beautiful beach, the minute palms of the copra plantation waving in the sea breeze, the dark green band of jungle, and the dun mass and power of the mountains rising behind it to rocky peaks. . . . The jungle stillnesses and slimes in the gloom inside the rain forest could make you catch your breath with awe. From the mountain slopes in mid-afternoon with the sun at your back you could look back down to the beach and off across the straits to Florida Island and one of the most beautiful views of tropic scenery on the planet. None of it looked like the pestilential hellhole that it was.

(Jones 1975, 37-38)

In 1976, as a neophyte fieldworker in Kilenge, I went on a tour of local "war sites" (mainly bomb craters and shell holes) with a friend. We scrambled up and down slippery slopes, following a track barely six inches wide. Hemmed in by dense green foliage, I couldn't see eighteen inches beyond my nose. As the sweat poured off me, my soaking shirt clinging to my back, I knew I couldn't get any wetter than this. I was wrong, as a cloudburst soon

taught me. Gasping for breath, wrapped in the bosom of the jungle, I thought "How the hell could anyone fight a war here?"

It isn't the action that stands out the most to me about Cape Gloucester though, it is the awful weather. Rain, rain, rain, every day and night . . .²

You'd be trying to move through the jungle when you'd find yourself up to your knees, or deeper, in a mudpit. There was a joke floating around that went like this:

This captain is looking at one of those mud pies when a helmet appears moving through the mud. Then it comes up a little higher and the captain sees a head.

"Jeez," the captain says, "you must be in real deep."

"Real deep," the Marine replies. "Wait 'till you see the bulldozer I'm driving!"

Then there was jungle rot. You couldn't possibly keep your socks dry, much less your boondockers. This knocked the devil out of your feet. By the time we left New Britain many of our men could hardly walk.

Another menace was those big trees. They were rotten. The shelling and the lightning were always knocking them over. Our division actually had several men killed from either lightning or falling trees. (Berry 1982, 64-65)

Melanesia surprised the Americans; they were ill-prepared for the landscape, climate, and conditions. At Buna the camouflage dye in their uniforms reacted with the tropical heat and sweat, causing great discomfort and skin rashes, and the infantry never seemed to have the right weapons at the right time (Mayo 1974). Guadalcanal was a "vision of beauty, but of evil beauty" (Manchester 1980, 192), a "loathsome, lethal island where the malarial mosquito became as great a danger as the machine gun and the mortar" (Winton 1978, 71). In this first tropical battlefront, "[while] battle casualties [by September 1942] had not yet reached 1000, twice that number were suffering from malnutrition, the aftereffects of dysentery, virulent fungal infections, and exhaustion. Malaria, shortly to strike down so many, was just beginning to appear" (Griffith 1963, 159). And at Cape Gloucester, "the damn diseases ran rampant. Malaria came back, and so did dysentery--just think what happened to your bowels in weather like that. Even our ponchos began to disintegrate" (Berry 1982, 54-55).

Melanesia, for the Americans fighting there, was a world full of contradictions. A fecund, verdant land teeming with lush growth and abundant life, it was also a shadowy world with the stench of ever present death and rot. What Mayo said for Buna applies to Melanesia as a whole: "The battleground had been a vast, primitive, almost unknown wilderness of towering mountains and steaming coastal jungles, burned by the equatorial sun and drenched by

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tropical downpours" (1974, 171). As the land was alien, primitive, and unknown, so too were its people.

Images of Melanesians

What kind of people did the hundreds of thousands of American troops who served in Melanesia expect to find there? Understandably, but regrettably, few authors delve into the troops' expectations: men going into combat would hardly spend their last hours of peace philosophically discussing the nature of the inhabitants of their battleground. Most likely they hit the beaches in blissful ignorance, as unknowing about the people as about the land. Manchester wrote: "In the view of World War II GIs and Marines, most of what they had heard about the South Seas was applesauce. They had expected an exotic world where hustlers like Sadie Thompson seduced missionaries . . . and wild men pranced on Borneo . . . and lovely native girls dived for pearls wearing fitted sarongs, like Dorothy Lamour" (1980, 101).

At best, their expectations were parodies of reality. Tregaskis recorded this story: "In the hours before the first wave landed on Guadalcanal, Dr Malcolm V. Pratt, the senior medical officer aboard, who won distinction in the First World War, told me an amusing story this afternoon. 'I went below to look around last night,' he said 'expecting to find the kids praying, and instead I found 'em doing a native war dance. One of them had a towel for a loin cloth and a blacked face, and he was doing a cancan while another beat a tomtom'" (1943, 32). At worst, their ignorance was absolute. "Nobody had ever heard of it [Guadalcanal] . . . the guys had a thousand queries for their officers. What was the target island like? Any bars? Any tail?" (Manchester 1980, 204).

The few images of Islanders readily available to the Americans came mainly from two sources, both cut from the same cloth. Missionary tales and explorer exploits formed the raw material, the basic myth, for American preconceptions of Melanesians. Book titles such as *Cannibal Land* (Johnson 1929), *Cannibal Caravan* (Miller 1939), *The Heart of Black Papua* (Taylor 1926), *John G. Paton, Hero of the South Seas* (Byrum 1924), *Erromanga, the Martyr Isle* (Robertson 1902), *The Savage Solomons . . .* (Knibbs 1929), and *The Isle of Vanishing Men* (Alder 1922) indicate the ready-made stereotype of Islanders as savage, headhunting cannibals that pervaded the thoughts of those in the know. Thus an American correspondent commented that he flew "over Malaita Island, home of cannibals and of a few hardy missionaries" (Lee 1943, 350), and a popular historian records the tribulations of a downed flier who feared his would-be rescuers would put him in a cannibal pot (Lord 1977, 192). Griffith, who fought on Guadalcanal as a Marine officer, found this use

for the quintessential stereotype: "Henderson-based aircraft had their own troubles. They were kept operable by maintenance crews who cannibalized a badly shot-up plane with the same loving care the Solomon Islanders had a century previously bestowed on dismembering a plump missionary" (1963, 123-124).

Many Melanesian societies *did* practice headhunting and cannibalism in the past, but most societies had abandoned those practices long before World War II. Read's (1986) recent reflective study of Susuroka shows us the possible speed, depth, and impact of cultural and social change: what people did a generation before may not relate in the slightest to their contemporary actions. We cannot impute behavior to a people based solely on what their ancestors did. But myths live on.

Perhaps, from a historical and relativistic position, we can understand the use, during the war, of the cannibal image. Cannibals are, after all, everything that civilization is not, and the war was (among other things) a war for civilization. What becomes hard to excuse is the historical perpetuation of the cannibal image, the almost pornographic and voyeuristic fascination with the savage. Do we really benefit from Mayo's passing description of the Orokaiva? "They were only fifty years removed from cannibalism, and that in a peculiarly revolting form--the practice of 'living meat', in which they tied their prisoners to a tree and as meat was needed cut slices from buttocks or legs, plaster pandanus leaves over the wounds . . ." (1974, 15). But the prurient interest in cannibalism lingers: Horton (a former district officer and coast-watcher in the Solomons) captions one of his photos "Former cannibals train hard to defend their island against the invading Japanese" (1971, 16) and notes that "exploits such as these [coastwatcher Kennedy's] soon stirred up the warlike spirit of the local people which was never far below the surface. They had been famed in the not so distant past as headhunters" (Kennedy 1971, 39). Kent meanwhile reminds readers that the vicious fighting on Guadalcanal "made the headhunting exploits of the old days seem tame by comparison" (1972, 9). Ultimately the savage image carries into the present and we encounter the inexcusable remark, "Stealthy cannibals still flourish in Papua" (Manchester 1980, 115).

Within this context, what kinds of images and myths emerged from American wartime contact with Melanesians? How did the Americans see and describe the Islanders?

Some accounts suggest that the Americans did not even see Melanesians as being distinct peoples, different from other Pacific Islanders. American servicemen appeared uninformed about or indifferent to distinctions between various Pacific peoples (cf Saito, chapter 19). Americans, by labeling various island people "gooks" (Terkel 1984, 60; Berry 1982, 36; Manchester 1980,

101) imposed a generic nativehood on the people of the Pacific.³ Cultural distinctions mattered little: natives were natives.

Americans rarely saw Melanesians as whole human beings, people with houses, families, beliefs, and day-to-day concerns. Detailed American depictions of Melanesians are few and far between. Fahey's firsthand account uses relatively neutral language in a bare-bones description of people and a village in the Solomons, and of Islanders on Efate and New Caledonia (1963, 86, 23, 32). Manchester comes close to depicting Melanesians as Rousseauian "noble savages," innocents of the jungle (1980, 101-102). Tregaskis supplies a lengthy passage about Savo Islanders, their appearance, their villages and churches (1943, 191-194). He describes his scouting party's guide as "typical native pattern: stumpy, dirty teeth, red hair, childish manners" (192). Later writers, if they even describe the "natives" at all, evoke similar images of short, childlike people. Melanesians were "wiry little men" (Hoyt 1980, 113), "small, black natives . . . afflicted with malaria, dengue fever and fungus infections," "stocky, muscular black men with six-inch shocks of dirty red hair" (Davis 1962, 109, 129) who could barely count past ten (Hoyt 1983, 105). Some authors use more neutral terms, such as "local inhabitants" (Hess 1974, 88) or "tribesmen" (Cortesi 1985, 45). For the most part, though, information on the island people and their way of life is sadly lacking, with only a few writers providing even minimal historical and anthropological background (see Horton 1971, 8-11; Kent 1972, 9-10; Manchester 1980, 110-111).

American writers, if they acknowledge the Melanesians at all, tend to see them primarily in terms of how they helped or hindered the war effort. MacArthur cited "friendly co-operation from the New Guinea natives" as an important contributing factor in his Southwest Pacific campaign (1964, 165). From the first day Americans landed on Guadalcanal and recruited Melanesian guides, Melanesians made substantial contributions to the Allied cause (Manchester 1980, 206). They served as carriers and bearers on the Kokoda trail (Mayo 1974), in New Britain (Davis 1962, 129, 180), and in many other combat areas. As part of the Australian coastwatching service, they were scouts and guerrillas, gathering vital intelligence, harassing and misleading the Japanese (see eg, Lord 1977; Horton 1971; Kent 1972; Tregaskis 1943). They guided American patrols into enemy controlled territory and safely extricated them (eg, Griffith 1963; Hoyt 1980, 73, 98; Horton 1971, 47, 51). Villagers flocked to join the coastwatchers and aid the war effort (Lord 1977, 245; Horton 1971, 39). Manchester even reports that tribesmen in Papua walked 200 miles to Port Moresby to aid that town's Australian defenders (1980, 103). Whether as part of the organized coastwatching service or simply as villagers, they rescued dozens of downed American airmen (eg, Hoyt 1983, 125; Horton 1971, 52; Hess 1974, 56, 88). Even in the New Guinea Highlands,

far removed from battlefield action, Melanesians "did their bit" for Allied success: Cortesi relates Chimbu contributions in locating a site for, and then constructing, an advanced aircraft base at Tsili Tsili (1985).

The saga of Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza epitomizes American respect for Melanesian aid and loyalty during the war. Vouza, who was tortured, stabbed, and left for dead by the Japanese as punishment for carrying an American flag, dragged himself back to American lines on Guadalcanal and insisted on giving his report before being hospitalized. His courage, bravery, and devotion earned him an undying place in American war lore (see Berry 1982, 132-133; Griffith 1963, 107-111; Horton 1971, 19; Hoyt 1983, 96; Kent 1972, 61; Lord 1977, 69-73; Manchester 1980, 221ff; Tregaskis 1943, 149-50). Vouza, for the Americans, symbolizes the best of their stalwart Melanesian allies, sorely mistreated by the Japanese. The exploits of Vouza and his island compatriots, their indomitable will and loyalty in the face of Japanese oppression, earned high praise. Those exploits also served as a moral tale, a legend demonstrating the "rightness" of the American way (Horne 1986, 59). The emergent image and myth shows people who were "loyal soldiers for the allies" (Hoyt 1980, 113). "The natives avoided them [the Japanese] as they would men stricken with the plague"; "[t]he natives, all of them, were loyal to the Allied cause" (Griffith 1963, 41, 127). "There was no love lost between the natives of the Solomons and the Japanese" (Berry 1982, 119). "The Allied forces could count on the complete co-operation of the Solomon Islanders whereas the Japanese were detested" (Horton 1971, 17).⁴

Despite these testimonials to their fortitude, and despite the obvious role they played in the war, Melanesians are often overlooked by those commenting on the war. Spector slights both the war's impact on Islanders and their participation in the hostilities. Although he examines the effect of American servicemen on states and colonies of the Pacific rim, he chooses to concentrate on Australia and India, dismissing Melanesia in a single sentence: "In remote parts of New Guinea and the New Hebrides, they [GIs] inspired bizarre "cargo cults" among the local inhabitants, some of which have continued to the present day" (1985, 400). He mentions a number of campaigns, such as Kokoda-Buna (189), the fighting on Guadalcanal (192), and the construction of the Tsili Tsili air base (240), all without acknowledging the presence let alone contribution of the Melanesians involved (in contrast, see Mayo 1974 for Buna; Griffith 1963 for Guadalcanal; and Cortesi 1985 for Tsili Tsili). Spector is not unique: a pattern emerges from the literature, a pattern of villages without people, natives without substance. Americans portray unidimensional Melanesians--allies in war, but nothing else. If the Islanders were not actively assisting the Americans, they were not "there."

Two oral histories of American recollections of the war are nearly devoid of mention of Pacific Islanders. Berry's book (1982) on the Marines contains infrequent references to indigenous peoples, while Melanesians are totally absent from Terkel (1984). Winton's book (1978) has *one* photograph of an Islander as its sole Melanesian content. Numerous other accounts of the war cite many village names, but usually fail to mention the inhabitants of those places (eg, Mayo 1984; Hoyt 1980; Hoyt 1983; Griffith 1963; Lee 1943; Jones 1975). Melanesian villages were targets, objectives, or landmarks but not places where people lived. Accounts of the air war also ignore Islanders. Morrison's book (1986) contains *one* mention of Melanesians, and Hess (1974), in his history of Pacific aerial combat, only twice mentions them, both times in connection with rescuing downed airmen. Apart from that, Melanesians seem absent. Where were they?

Many, no doubt, fled the conflict and hid in the bush. In the Solomons district officers ordered the villagers to leave the coast and make their homes and gardens in the mountainous island interiors (Horton 1971, 34; Kent 1972, 29). Mayo describes Papuans fleeing as the Japanese came ashore at Buna (1974, 16), and Lord takes us into a village deserted after American shelling (1977, 139). In Europe too people fled at the first sign of battle, but returned shortly after (MacDonald 1978). The Kilenge I studied remembered going back down to the coast to meet the Americans after the shooting stopped, and the legendary Marine, "Chesty" Puller, returned "1700 natives" to their villages on New Britain (Davis 1962, 182). Somehow, though, the return of Melanesians never made the impression on Americans that the return of Europeans did: it did not leave an image, it did not contribute to a myth.

Careful reading of the various accounts shows that, in truth, the Melanesians were there, on the spot, seeing and being seen by Americans. We already know from Manchester that Islanders met the Americans the first day the latter were on Guadalcanal. Tregaskis' firsthand account of Guadalcanal is notable for its lack of reference to Melanesians, excluding his description of Savo Islanders. Why, then, does he relate the incident of a patrol that found the raped and mutilated body of a young girl by the side of a trail (1943, 172), and then pass on without further remarks? Were Melanesian women *that* common a sight that only a hacked torso called for comment?⁵ Again, if Melanesians weren't there, why does Tregaskis, on his way back to civilization, rejoice at seeing "dusky maidens swimming in the surf," a welcome relief "after looking at marines, Japs and betel-chewing Melanesian men" (1943, 262), unless, of course, he'd seen (but never mentioned) his fill of Melanesian men on Guadalcanal?

Were American servicemen barred from contacting Melanesians? Non-fraternization rules were certainly in place (eg, Fahey 1963, 57, 86), but the

Kilenge fondly remember many American visitors to their villages, and the nonfraternization rules did not pose any barrier to soldier-civilian interaction in Europe (eg, MacDonald 1978, 347).

From the air it seems Melanesians were as invisible as they were at ground level. Thus Cortesi (1985), who praises Chimbu contributions to the Tsili Tsili air base, never even suggests that Melanesians could have been the victims of American bombing attacks at Wewak. Jablonski (1971) too never mentions the possibility of Melanesian casualties of the air war. This starkly contrasts with his frequent mention of European civilian casualties of American and British bombing attacks.⁶

Perhaps we don't hear more of Melanesians because the Islanders interacted more with garrison and service troops than with actual combat troops. As soon as the combat units secured their objectives, garrison units and service outfits relieved and replaced them. The overwhelming trend in popular histories of the war favors either command personalities or combat units and conflict situations. Life in garrison or service units paled in comparison, and similarly would probably make for dull reading. Books on noncombatant units, in other words, wouldn't sell; hence, they aren't published. The same situation holds true, of course, for Europe. Yet civilians on that continent figure prominently in the war literature.

American servicemen viscerally understood the differences between the European theater of operations and the Pacific theater. "In the Pacific, there were none of the European diversions. What you tended to see were miserable natives and piles of dead Japanese and dead Americans" (Terkel 1984, 64). "Our jungle rot was the equivalent of their trench foot. But we didn't have much in the way of female civilian population, or wine cellars" (Jones 1975, 121). Americans "liberated" European towns and cities (eg, Mauldin 1945; MacDonald 1978; Terkel 1984), but only once did I encounter the term "liberated" used in connection with Melanesian communities (Davis 1962, 182).

For the GI, the Pacific had "natives," while Europe had "civilians." The images of Melanesians that Americans carried into the islands, and the images they subsequently formed there, differ sharply from their images of Europe and Europeans. The wild, savage land and its wild, savage people stood a world apart from the cathedrals and civilians of Europe. The GI could barely understand or comprehend the land and people of Melanesia: they were a foreign, alien enigma. But the GI could empathize with the plight of the Europeans caught in a war-torn continent. With very little difficulty American soldiers could see themselves mirrored in the wretched, miserable, displaced continental civilians.

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It would take a pretty tough guy not to feel his heart go out to a shivering, little six-year-old squeaker who stands barefoot in the mud, holding a big tin bucket so the dogface can empty his mess kit into it

It chills a man to see a young girl, with a haunted hopeless expression in her eyes and a squalling baby which must go on squalling because she is hungry and has no milk for it. Not only does he pity her, but he thinks that this could possibly have happened to his own sister or his wife.

(Mauldin 1945, 66, 69; see also MacDonald 1978, 220-221)

The GI ability to empathize with Europeans, to insert himself into the role of the civilian other, and the inability to similarly empathize with or absorb the role of Melanesian villager, is not terribly hard to comprehend. In part the explanation lies in the American orientation toward Europe, an orientation based in bonds of blood and culture. "Virtually all Americans were descended from European immigrants. They had studied Continental geography in school. When commentators told them that the Nazi spearheads were knifing here and there, they needed no maps: they all had maps in their minds" (Manchester 1980, 49). Their cognitive maps of the world, in which the "Old Country" loomed large, told many Americans as they crossed the Atlantic that they were headed "home." "I was in Fulda [Germany], where my namesake, Saint Winfrid, converted the tree-worshipping Germans to Christianity. My family came from this area" (Terkel 1984, 158). The roots of American cultural values stretched across the ocean to Europe. Americans identified strongly with their Old World origins, but felt no such affinity toward Melanesians, whose land, cultures, and customs were totally alien.

Understanding the American ties to Europe, and the lack of similar feelings toward Melanesia, helps us to explain the different images of those parts of the world conveyed in and by the war literature. This understanding, however, provides us with only a partial explanation of the differences. If we look into mainstream American society itself, into then-prevalent American beliefs and attitudes, we can more fully account for why Americans saw Europeans one way, and Melanesians another way. I contend that Americans failed to identify with Melanesians, failed to see them as whole human beings, because Melanesians have black skin. The issue is a matter of race.

Images of Black and White

Racial discrimination, racial segregation, and white supremacist attitudes were all well-entrenched in society in general, and the military in particular, as America entered World War II. A nation supposedly united to win the war systematically excluded black citizens from participating in a labor force crying out for workers: only one black worked at the General Motors plant in

La Grange, Illinois, and only nine blacks worked for Lockheed in Los Angeles, all as sweepers. Eventually, under threat of a march on Washington led by A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, the Roosevelt government issued Executive Order 8802, authorizing the Fair Employment Practices Commission (Terkel 1984, 9, 33-38).

The military, a microcosm of American life, reflected general social feelings. Racist attitudes dictated that blacks could only make mediocre soldiers (Spector 1985, 386), that "blacks were not to be trusted in combat" (Terkel 1984, 9; see also MacDonald 1978, 200, 333, 337). Thus on the eve of the war only four thousand blacks served in the US military, less than in 1900 (Spector 1985, 386). Racist belief so pervaded society that, even in the face of a growing need for troops and a nondiscrimination clause in the Selective Service Act, local draft boards chose married whites and white fathers over eligible single blacks (Spector 1985, 387).

Once in the military, blacks confronted a system little changed from the prewar Jim Crow days. For all intents and purposes they lived in a world separate from their white brothers-in-arms. "I think of two armies, one black, one white. I saw German prisoners free to move around the camp, unlike black soldiers, who were restricted" (Terkel 1984, 149). Black servicemen rode in separate railway cars and were excluded from white PXs and servicemen's clubs without having their own comparable facilities (Terkel 1984, 150). They formed separate units, mainly labor battalions "with dressed-up names like engineer, quartermaster, what have you" (Terkel 1984, 365), and their camps were strictly segregated on military bases, out of sight to most base visitors and personnel (Terkel 1984, 263; Williams 1983). The Red Cross even segregated blood from black and white donors (Terkel 1984, 566). Segregation ran so deep that one black air unit, the 332nd Fighter Group, isolated on their air base, had to take off in the wrong direction down the runway. When blacks did form combat units their training was often so prolonged and so intense that they ended up being elite units (Terkel 1984, 344). Williams' fascinating book, *Hit Hard* (1983), documents the trials and tribulations faced by one black tank outfit. The 761st Tank Battalion faced racism and discrimination at home, abroad, and after the war; it took them thirty-five years to get a Presidential Unit Citation (Terkel 1984, 231; Williams 1983).

Just as blacks fought to join the civilian war effort, so too did they fight the discrimination and racism in the military. A race riot broke out at Camp Shenango, Pennsylvania, over separate but unequal facilities. Only after the deaths of soldiers did the situation improve (Terkel 1984, 150). Similar riots were barely avoided at Camp Claiborne, Louisiana (Williams 1983, 80-83) and Camp Lucky Strike, France (Terkel 1984, 369), but naval personnel did

riot in Guam (Spector 1985, 391-393). Naval stevedores at Port Chicago, California, mutinied after two hundred black ammunition loaders died in an explosion (Terkel 1984, 392-401). In most of these incidents inquiries white-washed the military, concluding that the blacks were too sensitive. They consistently failed to recognize the racism inherent in the structure of the services (Spector 1985, 393).

Blacks recognized the irony of their situation. They were fighting a "race war" (Dower 1986, 4) against America's enemies, while America still systematically exploited and discriminated against its own black citizens. "The struggle against both the Germans and the Japanese was accompanied by attacks on master-race theories in general, and thus cut at the roots of white supremacism and discriminatory laws and institutions in the United States" (Dower 1986, 175). Dower, in his provocative book, argues that the Pacific War was, for both sides, a race war. He maintains that Americans judged their German and Japanese enemies by different standards. While authorities incarcerated Japanese Americans, they were far less systematic in incarcerating German and Italian Americans. The "bad guys" in Europe were not the German people as a whole, but rather just the Nazis. The entire Japanese nation, in contrast, served as the villain in the Pacific. The press played up the difference between the war against Germany ("a family fight . . . between white nations"), and the war against Japan (a war of Occidental and Oriental ideals and civilizations) (Dower 1986, 165).

America had long feared the "yellow horde" across the Pacific Ocean, and American colonial policy in the Pacific contained more than a tinge of racism (see eg, Lee 1943, 24; Dower 1986, 148ff). Colonized peoples, like domestic Blacks, lived under the burden of such labels as *primitive*, *monkey*, *savage*, and *wild*, terms meant to dehumanize them (Dower 1986, 149). Propagandists revived these terms for the war against Japan. The rhetoric of the Pacific War "called for 'the almost total elimination of the Japanese as a race', on the grounds that this 'was a question of which race was to survive, and white civilization was at stake' " (Dower 1986, 55). The American propaganda machine depicted the Japanese as either superhuman or subhuman, but *not* as *human*.

Here lies the final clue to understanding American attitudes toward Melanesians. Domestic racism not only pervaded American society and the US military establishment; a virulent, xenophobic, and patriotic racism dominated the Pacific battlegrounds. Many Americans saw themselves fighting a race war, a "war without mercy," against a savage, primitive foe. They fought their first land engagements in the islands of Melanesia, a land already stereotyped in myth as wild, savage, alien. Fighting and horrendous conditions

of heat, mud, rain, and insects, as well as a merciless foe, reinforced the image of Melanesia as a savage land.

In this latter-day version of hell, the Americans encountered people with alien and savage customs, strange cultures, and black skins. Not all, perhaps not even most, Americans held strongly racist views: many individual Americans came to know and respect Melanesians as whole people. But insofar as the American mythmakers, those who recorded the war and generated our images of the war, saw those Melanesian people at all, they identified the indigenous inhabitants with the land, saw them through the lens of racial prejudice, and connected them with the death and destruction of a racial war. Rightly or wrongly, Americans associated the Melanesians with the Japanese enemy. Although the two differed from one another, both were foreign people: strange, alien, primitive, and savage. American commentators did not see Melanesians as whole people, as human beings. At best, Melanesians became curious, primitive, and cannibalistic allies. At worst, being not quite human and not the enemy, Melanesians were not even there. Innocent victims of a foreign war, Melanesians became caught in the trap of historical oblivion.

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Notes

1 As a rule of thumb, the early ground battles in Melanesia drew more attention than the later battles. Progress in the Central Pacific, North Africa, and Europe tended to overshadow the Southwest Pacific campaign.

2 The First Marine Division invaded Cape Gloucester during the height of the monsoon season. "Sixteen inches of rain fell in a single day" (Manchester 1980, 98).

3 This phenomenon is similar to that of European settlers creating the category of "Indian" when they lumped together the various indigenous peoples of North and South America.

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4 Reality in Melanesia, of course, differed from the preceding hyperbolic rhetoric, which serves as myth-reinforcing legend. Local people in the Buna-Gona region turned over Australian and American civilians and soldiers to the Japanese (Mayo 1974, 25-26). Some Solomon Islanders displayed active hostility to Australians hiding from the Japanese, "betraying" their former colonial masters, and the Japanese made some headway in winning Islander loyalty (Lord 1977, eg, 223-224).

5 Perhaps they were, perhaps they weren't. By the time Manchester arrived at Guadalcanal, he could record the parenthetical comment: "(The only native woman I saw on Guadalcanal had a figure like a seabag. She was suffering from an advanced case of elephantiasis. Hubba Hubba.)" (1980, 22).

6 There are just two references to Melanesians in his entire volume on the Pacific air war, while the first fifty pages of the companion volume on the European air war contain no less than six references to civilians and civilian casualties.

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**Barefoot Benefactors:
A Study of Japanese Views of Melanesians**

Hisafumi Saito

This paper discusses the experiences of Japanese soldiers in Melanesia with special reference to their relationship with and their views of Melanesians. Contrary to my original expectations, Japanese were very interested in Melanesians. This is reflected in the considerable number of documents I have collected that refer to Melanesians during the war. In this paper I draw from twenty-three of those documents. These materials are listed in chronological order in appendix A. Each particular source in the list is then designated by letters from *a* to *w* in the tables in appendix B.

Inhabitants Referred to by Materials

Records pertaining to the people living in the Wewak area of Papua New Guinea, including Kairiru and Mushu islands off Wewak, Prince Alexander Range, and the basin of the middle and lower Sepik River, are the most abundant (Table 1). This is because many Japanese, after failing to attack Aitape in July 1944, survived the war by depending on food supplied by villagers, mainly in the southern slopes of the Prince Alexander Range. Though Japanese troops survived the war in Rabaul (at the eastern tip of New Britain) and in Bougainville (in the northern Solomons chain), only five sources refer to the people in and around Rabaul, and just four to those in the Solomon Islands. There do not seem to be as many Japanese who had close contact with inhabitants in both of those areas. In Rabaul the Japanese had established a "self-supporting system," which made it possible for them to survive without commandeering villagers' harvests. In Bougainville, Japanese could find few friendly inhabitants (except on Buka), largely because of the successful campaigns by the Allied forces.

Terms Referring to Melanesians

Although village names often appear in the materials the proper names of ethnic groups are never referred to. Tanaka (1975), who records the names of some ethnic groups in Western New Guinea (Irian Jaya), is the only exception. Tables 2-4 display the various terms that are used to refer to Melanesians. Those terms are classified into three categories: terms used to refer to Melanesians in general (Table 2), terms meaning a specific category of Melanesians (Table 3), and terms for Melanesian soldiers (Table 4). A word marked with + is that used in a particular source, and that marked by ++ is that used most frequently. The symbol - means that the term is used just to indicate the inappropriateness of its usage.

Terms Referring to Melanesians in General

Many words are used to refer to Melanesians in general (Table 2). This is because the Japanese language did not and does not have any appropriate terms to designate the inhabitants of developing areas such as Melanesia. Among these terms, *gen-ju-min*, *do-jin*, and *do-min* are most frequently used. Each of these terms means "native" in English. Haneda (1985) used *do-jin* just once to tell that it was a discriminatory word. I think that the word *do-min* carried the same connotation. These words are rarely used by Japanese born after the war.

The materials offer sufficient evidence that Japanese soldiers usually called Melanesians *do-jin* or *do-min*, but these terms could not be used officially, for example in news items, even during the Pacific War.

Specific Category Terms for Melanesians

These words are also many in number (Table 3). Among these, *kanaka*, *kanaka-zoku*, and *papua-zoku* are used frequently. As Yamamoto points out, *kanaka* is a discriminatory term today, and it is not always clear how Japanese soldiers classified Melanesians by the terms *kanaka* and *papua* (cf Yamamoto 1985, 254-255).

Terms for Melanesian Soldiers

These terms are comparatively few (Table 4). Predominantly, they are used to designate Melanesians hostile to Japanese troops. Only two materials, Watanabe (1982, 142) and Kitamoto (1970, 54, 59-62, 64), use them to refer to Melanesians fighting for the Japanese.

Manners and Customs

There is abundant information concerning the manners and customs of people living in the Wewak area of Papua New Guinea (Table 5). Of all the materials with substantial descriptions on this theme, only Haneda (1985) mentions the customs in another area--Rabaul. Table 5 shows what kinds of manners and customs are described in the materials, giving the relevant pages in which each topic is mentioned.

The materials depict various kinds of customs. Generally speaking, however, their descriptions are too superficial to have ethnographic value. Nor do they pay much attention to the differences in customs between ethnic groups.

Japanese soldiers were sent to the battlefields without any knowledge of Melanesians (cf Yamanaka 1982, 177-178), and obviously did not stay in Melanesia for the purposes of research. Therefore they should not be criticized for the low ethnographic value of their records. Although a few descriptions include apparently improper conjectures, the materials laudably report the customs of Melanesians without a taste for the bizarre and racial prejudice.

Estimation

The materials assess Melanesians in terms of their personality, appearance, intelligence, mode of life, physical prowess and sense, laziness, and timidity (Table 6). In their estimation, "primitiveness" is often emphasized: primitive appearance, primitive lifestyles, laziness and timidity as traits of primitive people, and so on. Melanesian personalities are admired as honest and obedient. Even in this respect, however, the image of primitive Melanesians is expressed. For example, in a chapter introducing their "primitive" culture, Yamamoto writes, "Though they are said to be savage, Papuans understand affection, debt, and obligation" (Yamamoto 1985, 244).

Cooperation

The row in Table 7 labeled "cooperator" shows the page number where the personal name of a particular cooperative Melanesian appears first in a material. Fifteen names of Melanesians who worked for the Japanese troops are recorded in total. All of them were "chiefs." Among them, "Manga" appears in three materials.

The other rows are the same in character as those in Tables 5 and 6. For each way of cooperation, the sources are listed. "Food offering" includes some accidental gifts made by the Melanesians who happened on Japanese soldiers.

It also tells about serious relations between Melanesians and Japanese. For example some materials point out that it was very hard for inhabitants to deliver an allocated amount of their harvest. Among others Melanesians worked as carriers, laborers for constructing roads and buildings, orderlies for mail delivery and other services, guides, and rescuers. The row "canoe" refers to cases where Melanesians offered their canoes for transporting goods and soldiers. Then it is similar to "carrier" and "guide" in the way of cooperation. Including "hospitality," the reception of soldiers who called at villages, all kinds of cooperation mentioned above are activities to support Japanese soldiers from the rear. Table 7 shows that an overwhelming majority of cooperative activities is included in this category. In contrast, the records of activities directly relating to military operations, "battle" and "watch" are small in number. The only incident in "testimony" is that a Melanesian gave favorable testimony for an accused Japanese after the war.

Intimacy

In the materials there are a number of episodes which speak of the intimate terms between Melanesians and Japanese soldiers. The authors are proud that they were good friends of Melanesians, and think that Japanese soldiers were fundamentally different from white men in this respect. "While white men discriminated against Melanesians and exploited them, Japanese were kind to and worked together with Melanesians." This is the view repeatedly written in the materials, sometimes as the words of Melanesians (cf Izumi 1943, 190-192, 194, 206-207; Suzuki 1982, 61; Ochi 1983, 121; Mitsukawa 1984, 331-332; Murosaki 1984, 177; Yamada 1985, 165-166; Yamamoto 1985, 252-253). Some of the materials insist that because the islands in the South Pacific are the birthplace of remote Japanese ancestors, the Melanesians are physically similar to the Japanese, and the Japanese have sympathy with the Melanesians (cf Izumi 1943, 193; Ochi 1983, 223; Yamamoto 1985, 252).

On the other hand, Japanese thought, "We should not spoil Melanesians. We have to cure their characters stained by laziness, and raise them up to the point where they willingly obey Japanese. This is one of the aims of this war" (cf Izumi 1943, 193-197). The efforts for enlightenment and their positive results are recorded in some of the materials (cf eg, Kitamoto 1970, 60; Arao 1975, 208; Watanabe 1982, 163; Yamanaka 1982, 190). However, I have found no evidence that the Japanese army made enthusiastic and systematic efforts to make Melanesians "the Emperor's loyal subjects." For example there are some episodes in which Japanese soldiers persuaded inhabitants to cooperate with them, but they appear only to have made irresponsible remarks to suit the occasion (cf Izumi 1943, 200-201; Kitamoto 1970, 32, 41,

45; Mitsukawa 1984, 330-332, 356-357). The only feature common to most of their remarks is the desire to stimulate Melanesians' rebellious attitudes toward white men.

Hostility

The Japanese troops gave Melanesians many things, such as rice, tinned food, sugar, cloth, and so on, to win their favor. But these goods were rapidly drained and never resupplied. Starving Japanese soldiers gave inhabitants everything and did anything to get food.

Out of their small community the Japanese troops were relatively free from their own conscience and the military discipline that did not directly concern action and class system (cf Kawamura 1988, 26-27). Contrary to military orders soldiers frequently used their arms for hunting (cf eg, Yamada 1953, 63-64, 87, 126, 192; Kitamoto 1970, 30; Hirao 1980, 70; Hoshino 1982, 114). It was also frequent to expropriate Melanesian villagers' crops (cf eg, Yamada 1953, 72, 86, 122; Kitamoto 1970, 88; Fukuyama 1980, 155). Even some conscientious soldiers thought that hunger was an adequate excuse for pillage (cf Hoshino 1982, 139-140). Although the headquarters in Wewak, in order to regulate food supply, prohibited barter with individual Melanesians (cf Suzuki 1982, 266-267; Murosaki 1984, 167), starving soldiers continued adding bandages, watch chains, razor blades, tweezers, and grenades to their list of merchandise (cf Ueki 1982, 180; Mitsukawa 1984, 248, 290; Murosaki 1984, 147).

Plunder caused dispute in every corner of Melanesia under Japanese occupation (cf Kitamoto 1970, 70; Fukuyama 1980, 145; Kitamoto 1984, 158-159; Haneda 1985, 205). Some Melanesians defended their gardens with arms (Ueki 1982, 202; Murosaki 1984, 52; Matsutani 1985, 240) and many ultimately revolted against the Japanese (cf Fukuyama 1980, 179-180; Fuke 1982, 16; Hoshino 1982, 156-157, 168, 170; Suzuki 1982, 271). For example at the close of the war it was too dangerous for Japanese troops to approach Melanesian villages in the Wewak area (cf Hoshino 1982, 138, 177; Yamanaka 1982, 221).

Conclusion

All the materials used in this paper were written by the Japanese who experienced the Pacific War in Melanesia. As a result the information offered by them is biased. For example they do not mention the facts that some starving soldiers ate Melanesians as well as soldiers of the Allied forces (cf Hara 1987, 151-152, 157-158; Miyakawa 1985, 55-66; Nakazono 1986, 43-46,

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51-72; Tuzin 1983), though some cases where Japanese soldiers ate Japanese soldiers are recorded (cf Kitamoto 1970, 71; Suzuki 1982, 242; Watanabe 1982, 177, 192; Ochi 1983, 160-131).

However, I think these materials represent their views of Melanesians well. Though Japanese soldiers used discriminatory terms to refer to Melanesians, and thought Melanesians primitive and lazy, they had not always despised Melanesians. They found many good characteristics in Melanesians and thought Melanesians similar to Japanese in some respects. I think that for the Japanese soldiers who believed the ideology of the Japanese Empire, Melanesians had to be worth saving from "evil" white men and enlightening by Japanese.

Japanese were urged to the war by the dogma, "You should expel white men, and enlighten the people in Asia and Oceania." Contrary to their intention the soldiers in Melanesia ended up relying on local inhabitants for food. In the materials they repeatedly expressed their regret and thanks to Melanesians (cf Kitamoto 1970, 46, 70, 102, 104; Fuke 1982, 17; Watanabe 1982, 196; Mitsukawa 1984, 308, 369, 394, 400, 433; Yamada 1985, 172). Melanesians were generous benefactors as well as barefoot primitives for Japanese soldiers.

Appendix A: List of Materials

- a Fuke, Takashi
1943 Letter from the South Seas. Unpublished letter, 12 pp.
- b Izumi, Kiichi
1943 *Battles in Solomon*. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Sha.
- c Yamada, Eizo
1953 *Solomon Landing Force*. Tokyo: Nihon Shuppan Kyodo Co.
- d Kitamoto, Masamichi
1970(1969) *Kitamoto Reconnoitering Party*. Tokyo: Konnichi No Wadai Sha.
- e Arao, Tatsuo
1975 Rabaul. In *History of the Pacific War I: Pacific Islands*. Tokyo: Fuji Shoen.
- f Tanaka, Magohei
1975 Battles in New Guinea. In *History of the Pacific War I: Pacific Islands*. Tokyo: Fuji Shoen.
- g Yamazaki, Hidesuke
1975 Mole War. In *History of the Pacific War I: Pacific Islands*. Tokyo: Fuji Shoen.
- h Fukuyama, Takayuki
1980 *Battles in Solomons*. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha.
- i Hirao, Masaharu
1980 *Record of a Naval Doctor*. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha.
- j Fuke, Takashi
1982 Throwing a Beneficent Chief Over. *Kaiko Shi* (August).
- k Hoshino, Kazuo
1982 *Memory of the New Guinea War*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- l Suzuki, Masami
1982 *East New Guinea Front*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- m Ueki, Toshimasa
1982 *New Guinea*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- n Watanabe, Tetsuo
1982 *Landing Forces Disappearing in the Jungle*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.

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- o Yamanaka, Hideaki
1982 *A Reed from Naniwa*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- p Ochi, Harumi
1983 *Record of New Guinea War*. Tokyo: Tosho Shuppan Sha.
- q Kitamoto, Masamichi (main interviewee)
1984 *Marathon Troops in New Guinea*. In *My Experience During the Showa Era 4*. Tokyo: Ohbun Sha.
- r Mitsukawa, Motoyuki
1984 *Salt*. Tokyo: Sensi Kanko Kai.
- s Murosaki, Naonori
1984 *Recollection of an Anti-Aircraft Artillery Unit*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- t Haneda, Masami
1985 *The Southern Cross Seen Dimly in the War Fire*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.
- u Matsutani, Miyoko, editor
1985 *Folktales, Today II: Troops*. Tokyo: Rippu Shobo.
- v Yamada, Tasuku
1985 *New Guinea War*. Tokyo: Ohshi Sha.
- w Yamamoto, Katsue
1985 *A Duncce of Mountain Artillery Units*. Tokyo: Senshi Kanko Kai.

Japanese Views of Melanesians

Appendix B: Tables

Table 1 Inhabitants Referred to by Materials

area index

1. Solomon Is. 2. Rabaul, New Britain I. 3. Northeastern Part of New Guinea 4. In and around
Wovak, New Guinea 5. Western New Guinea 6. Umbol I.

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
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6				+																			

Table 2 Terms Referring to Melanesians in General

Index

1. 住民<ju-min, inhabitants> 2. 部落民<buraku-min, villagers> 3. 部落住民<buraku ju-min, village inhabitants> 4. 新民<shin-min, new people> 5. 村民<son-min, villagers> 6. 島民<to-min, islanders> 7. 土着人<do-chaku-jin, natives> 8. 土着民<do-chaku-min, natives> 9. 蛮人<ban-jin, savages> 10. 原住民<gen-ju-min, natives> 11. 原住民族<gen-ju minzoku, native race> 12. 現地人<gen-ti-jin, natives> 13. 現地住民<gen-ti ju-min, local people> 14. 現住民<gen ju-min, present inhabitants> 15. 土人<do-jin, natives> 16. 土民<do-min, natives> 17. 黑人<koku-jin, black people>

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
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17																				+			

Table 3 Specific Category Terms for Melanesians

Index

1. カナカ<kanaka, kanaka> 2. カナカ人<kanaka-jin, kanaka people> 3. カナカ土民<kanaka do-min, kanaka natives> 4. カナカ土人<kanaka do-jin, kanaka natives> 5. カナカ族<kanaka-zoku, kanaka tribe> 6. カナカボーイ<kanaka boi, male kanaka> 7. カナカメリー<kanaka meri, female kanaka> 8. パプア<papua, Papuans> 9. パプア人<papua-jin, Papuans> 10. パプア族<papua-zoku, Papua tribe> 11. パプア現住民<papua gen ju-min, present inhabitants in Papua> 12. メラネシア族<meranesia-zoku, Melanesian tribe> 13. メラネシア現住民<meranesia gen ju-min, present inhabitants in Melanesia> 14. 部族<bu-zoku, tribe> 15. 種族<shu-zoku, race> 16. 食人種<shoku-jin-shu, cannibals> 17. 人喰い人種<hito-kui jin-shu, cannibals>

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Table 4 Terms for Melanesian Soldiers

Index

1. グラック (黒人兵) <gerakku(koku-jin-hei), gerakku(black soldiers)> 2. 黒人兵<koku-jin-hei, black soldiers> 3. 黒人軍<koku-jin-gun, black troops> 4. 土民兵<do-min-hei, native soldiers> 5. 土民軍<do-min-gun, native troops> 6. 土人兵<do-jin-hei, native soldiers> 7. 土人軍<do-jin-gun, native troops> 8. 土人憲兵<do-jin ken-pel, native MP> 9. 原住民憲兵<gen-ju-min ken-pel, native MP>

	a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h	i	j	k	l	m	n	o	p	q	r	s	t	u	v	w
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Japanese Views of Melanesians

Table 5 Manners and Customs

clothing	(a)(b:188-9)(d:45-6)(f:278,283)(g:318)(l:259,273)(m:132)(n:97)(s:49,52) (t:89-91,122)(v:159)(w:243-4)
language	(c:137)(g:318-9)(i:68)(k:147-8)(l:298)(o:180)(r:285-7)(t:90-1)(v:158)(w:247)
music & dancing	(a)(d:44)(f:278)(k:150)(l:280)(p:223)(s:165,172,174-5)(v:167-8)(w:251)
food	(f:278)(k:163-4)(l:280)(m:180)(n:148-9)(t:93-4)(v:160-4)(w:133,248-9)
village & building	(d:48,61)(f:278,283)(k:150-1)(l:272)(t:93-4,122)(v:160)(w:247-8)
office	(a)(h:179)(p:212,246)(s:164,173)(t:94)(v:166)(w:244-6)
betel chewing	(d:32)(k:151)(m:132)(s:49)(t:90)(v:164)(w:249)
marriage & sex	(d:61)(p:223)(s:173,178)(t:91-2,95)(v:168)(w:134,246,249-50)
hunting & fishing	(k:163)(s:175-7)(t:88,122)(v:163)(w:249)
slit gong	(d:32-3)(k:148-9)(r:347)(v:158)(w:248)
pig	(a)(l:259)(s:178)(v:162-3)
horticulture	(r:319)(v:160)(w:251-2)
status of women	(s:173)(w:246)
money	(t:92-3)
education	(t:94-5)
sing-out	(k:149-50)
bush knife	(v:159)
art	(w:245)
cure	(w:245-6)
fire	(w:248)
religion	(t:91)
trade	(k:160)

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Table 6 Estimation

personality	(a)(c:153)(d:98)(n:97)(o:190)(p:224)(r:291,337,383-4) (s:172,179)(u:158)(v:183)(w:244)
appearance	(a)(b:186-9)(c:127-8)(d:33,45)(e:208)(l:20)(r:247)(w:130)
intelligence	(b:189-90)(e:208)(o:190)(r:286-7)(t:91)(u:172)(w:247)
mode of life	(a)(c:113)(l:61)(s:40-1,173)(w:250)
physical prowess & sense	(n:194)(p:223)(r:291,308,310)(s:52-3,165,178)
laziness	(a)(b:193-4)(n:312)(r:337)
timidness	(a)(s:52)(u:172)

Japanese Views of Melanesians

Table 7 Cooperation

food offering	(d:59-80)(h:165,179)(j:17)(k:130,144,162-3)(l:248,275)(n:92,147,149-50,175) (o:188-91,225-6)(p:250)(r:78,247,304,315,317-9,335-6,343,362) (s:52,120,162-3,166,169-71)(v:172)(w:130-2,134,170-1,173)
carrier	(b:217)(d:33-4,36,39-49,52-3,60,63,72-3)(e:208)(f:278,281)(k:144,165-6) (l:57,277)(n:142)(p:211,247-8)(r:305,316,359,385)(s:172)(t:124)(v:177)
laborer	(d:60)(e:208)(f:278,280)(h:179)(n:142,194,310-2,326)(o:180)(r:243,312,316) (s:52)(w:134)
guide	(b:217)(d:47)(k:144,184)(l:255,277-80)(n:183-5)(s:120,164-5,167-8,173,178)
hospitality	(d:33)(l:259-60,266,273)(n:261,315-6)(r:291,333)(s:169-70)(v:165-8)
orderly	(d:39,56)(e:208)(k:154)(l:277)(r:316,318,337)(s:165)
canoe	(b:206,268)(k:165)(l:275,278)(n:172-4)(w:130)
rescuer	(e:227)(h:128)(m:169)(u:157)
battle	(d:57,60-2,76-7,84-5,92-5,97-8,100)(l:110-4)(n:142-3)
watch	(b:200)(d:34)
testimony	(v:182)
cooperator	(d:33)(k:162)(l:110,254,258,260)(r:284,290-1,311)(s:174,176)(t:94)(w:134,244)

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Yukio Shibata and Michael Somare: Lives in Contact

Basil Shaw


The Japanese invasion of New Guinea in 1942 brought unprecedented change to the lives of the local people of Papua New Guinea. Besides the havoc and destruction associated with the fighting, there were also cultural encounters by local people with massive numbers of Japanese, American, and Australian service personnel. Some of these encounters proved disastrous and destructive for one or both of the parties; others provided inspiration and long-lasting relationships. The paper explores the relationship between Michael Somare, former prime minister of Papua New Guinea, and Yukio Shibata, a commissioned officer in the Japanese occupation forces in New Guinea during the period 1943 to 1945. It is tentatively proposed that Shibata was an inspiration to Somare, providing him with a role model that enriched and informed Somare's later behavior as a politician and statesman.

The Japanese Occupation of Northern New Guinea

Japanese armed forces occupied parts of both the Mandated Territory of New Guinea and the Territory of Papua during the period January 1942 until August 1945 when all Japanese forces in both territories were called on to surrender by the emperor. The surrender was formally effected on 6 September 1945. Because the Japanese influence on Michael Somare is the issue to be investigated in this paper, it is necessary to know the details of the Japanese occupation of the Wewak-Lower Sepik River areas, which include the villages of the Murik Lakes to which the Somare family returned from Rabaul in January 1942.

The facts are drawn from the following sources: volumes of the official Australian war history by Wigmore (1957), McCarthy (1959), and Long (1963); from the volume by Miller (1959) in the official military history of the United States Armed Forces in the Pacific Ocean; and from an English-language account of the occupation of New Guinea by Tanaka (1980). Two Japanese-language memoirs by officers who were in the Wewak area provide

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Sepik River Mouth, Murik Lakes, Wewak Coastline

personal observations about relations between villagers and Japanese soldiers. These works are by Yoshiwara (1955) and Ishizuka (1981). This information has been supplemented by personal interviews with exservicemen who served in this part of New Guinea: Y. Goto, S. Shozawa, and K. Yoshizawa (1983) and Y. Shibata and K. Kajizuka (1986).

Although population centers such as Lae and Salamaua were bombed by Japanese aircraft operating from Rabaul in January 1942, it was not until 8 March that year that these towns were occupied by the Japanese as part of a two-pronged attack on Port Moresby. Later Aitape, Wewak, Madang, and surrounding coastal areas were also occupied. In 1944 Wewak became a major Japanese defensive position as it became the headquarters of the 18th Army. The Japanese 6th Air Division occupied airstrips in and around Wewak as well, and there were naval installations on the islands off the coast of Wewak. These positions became the targets for both US and Australian bomber raids. Miller cites one raid on Wewak on 17 August 1943 in which over one hundred American planes attacked Japanese installations and then flew eastward along the coast attacking secondary targets as opportunities presented themselves (Miller 1959, 198). The coastline from Wewak to Madang became a major air lane during 1944-1945 and natural features such as the Sepik River mouth were used as navigational landmarks. Somare describes the destruction of the village of Karau during one of these raids, which he attributes to the Australians (1957, 3).

As far as can be established from the war records, the Murik Lakes villages were never bombed by the Japanese after the initial capture of Wewak in June 1942. No Australian military or administration targets existed there as they did in Wewak. The fact that all bombing of the Murik villages was by American and Australian planes provided the Japanese with a propaganda opportunity which they exploited and which has stayed in Somare's mind. The sight of the Japanese (thought to be the ancestors of the Murik people) defending themselves and the villagers from air attacks established a bond between Japanese and Murik people that still exists. Somare refers to visits to Wewak of Japanese veterans during 1969 and 1970 (1975, 76-77). Y. Goto, a participant in those visits and president of the Japan-PNG Goodwill Society, confirms the visits and refers to the warmth of the reunions.¹ Filmed scenes of the visits occur in the film *Angels of War*.

Miller concludes that General McArthur's decision to bypass Wewak and to make large-scale landings at Aitape and Hollandia on 27 April 1944 meant that Wewak was never the site of a major military confrontation, and the local people were fortunate that such battles never occurred there. The coastal lowlands of the Sepik River area, including Somare's home village in the Murik Lakes, were therefore the scene of spasmodic fighting as the Japanese forces gradually retreated to the diminishing perimeter around Wewak that the Australian 6th Division entered from the west on 11 May 1945. The Murik Lakes villagers were spared the worst of the destruction and interruption caused by the war, but they did have significant contact with the Japanese during the war as will be shown.

Wewak in 1942 was the administrative center for the Sepik District, which was peopled by villagers whom McCarthy described as follows: "The sago-eating people who lived along the river were of a smouldering temperament and oppressed with witchcraft and superstitious fears. Traditionally they were headhunters" (1959, 48). Contact with the people of the Lower Sepik swamps had not been on a great scale by the forties, and the Murik people were practically inaccessible in those days except by boat or canoe along the coast, usually from Wewak. The most frequent visitors were missionaries from the Society of the Divine Word at Wewak or Marienburg, one of whom, Joseph Schmidt, spent most of his working life in this part of New Guinea. His descriptions of the Murik people indicate that they were friendly and considerably acculturated to Western ways (Schmidt 1923-1924). McCarthy's description, which conflicts with Schmidt's, may be explained by the fact that it was obtained from Australian military sources who were not generally welcomed by the Murik at the end of the war.

In describing the European evacuation of the Sepik area McCarthy indicates that in March 1942 there were only thirty or forty Europeans in the

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Wewak area, and that in Angoram, to cite one instance, local people including native police rebelled against administration officers. As late as April 1942 the district officer, later Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Jones of ANGAU, was involved "in bringing the renegade police to book and restoring order among the natives² who had become disaffected" (McCarthy 1959, 49). Some of these district officers in their capacity as NGVR/ANGAU officers at the time of the occupation took to the bush where their local knowledge, particularly of individual villagers, was used in monitoring Japanese military activities. Of particular interest were acts of collaboration with the Japanese by villagers who seemed sympathetic or actively aiding the Japanese military effort.

It is, however, not difficult to see the local people's point of view and to understand friendships formed with individual Japanese, such as that between Somare and the Japanese officer Shibata, whom Somare remembers as Sivata (1975, 3ff). Tanaka (1980, 99ff) devotes a lengthy section of his history of the war to describing relations with the local people whom he claims the Japanese were not out to colonize or subdue. Tanaka's view is that it was policy to deal with the locals firmly so that they would eventually be able to share in the achievements and rewards of the "co-prosperity sphere" which was to be established in the Southwest Pacific. The Japanese had appealed to the peoples of the far-eastern British colonies such as India, Burma, and Malaya as well as their Netherlands and French counterparts to join in an anticolonial revolt against their patronizing and exploitative white rulers. While this antiadministration feeling lacked any sort of unified base or political identity in New Guinea, local groups at the village level did support the Japanese. Details of what from an Australian point of view was "betrayal" can be found in McCarthy (1959, index 649). The Japanese viewpoint is summarized by Tanaka:

Papua New Guinea people also gave a very good impression to the Japanese soldiers and sailors. . . . [T]he contacts with the local residents were mainly aiming at asking them for their cooperation concerning the supply of provisions and some labour. . . . [T]hey were good-natured, cooperative people. In some places, many great favours were granted to the Japanese. . . . [L]ocal residents kindly supplied the Japanese soldiers with all the food they required. They did this by going without their own food under the orders of the Great Chieftains around Wewak. (1980, 100)

The official Australian attitude to this collaboration was that it was somewhere between disloyalty and treason. The punishment was summary, because the native ordinances did not canvass such "crimes," and was carried out publicly. To be fair, however, McCarthy is evenhanded in his description

of the quandary the locals found themselves in. McCarthy's judgment of circumstances in 1942 was:

It must have been difficult for the natives to decide whom they should help. . . . [T]he Japanese did not merely ask but demanded cooperation from the villages and the consequences of refusal were harsh, the burning, or air bombing and strafing of a reluctant village being routine procedures. . . . Many natives indeed went beyond an attitude of sympathy and friendliness and passed on information at considerable risk to themselves, or patrolled deep into Japanese territory as guides or on other missions. Some, however, were prepared to aid the Japanese whether from feelings of resentment dating from pre-war times, from hope of gain or for personal reasons of various kinds it is hard to say. (1959, 88)

The foregoing descriptions, both Japanese and Australian, demonstrate that history is mostly self-serving, and that in war histories winners usually get to write the authorized version. In general terms it can be said that the local people suffered at the hands of both Japanese and Australian-American forces and paradoxically benefited from both groups in individual and different ways. The contention in this paper is that Michael Somare was one of the Papua New Guineans who benefited from contact with the Japanese, and while this is implicit in his autobiography (1975), it needs to be shown explicitly how the Japanese occupation challenged prevailing local attitudes to the white authorities and to record some of the advances and improvements they brought to village life.

The Murik Lakes villages were occupied by soldiers from the Maritime and Engineering Transport Division of the Akazuki Regiment, part of General Adachi's 18th Army, during the period from late 1942 until the end of the war (Jehne 1983, personal communication). When not actually involved in hostilities the life of the individual soldier under such circumstances is inclined to boredom unless garrison duty is supplemented by creative and productive undertakings. What follows is drawn from Jehne's interview with Goto; the accounts of Tanaka (1980), Yoshiwara (1981), and Ishizuka (1985); and my interview with Shibata and Kajizuka in 1986.

Tanaka explains that during the latter part of 1944, when supplies of rice were no longer available from Southeast Asia, this staple food would have to be grown locally in paddy fields as is customary in Southeast Asia and Japan. The Japanese introduced the flooded rice-field to villagers living in the wetlands, and Japanese and locals worked side by side both in the establishment of the paddies and in the husbandry of the crop. They also grew a wide variety of vegetable and fruit crops alienating village land, thus (according to Australian historians) adding to the hardships of the local people (Long 1963,

292). In some situations, however, the locals were compensated for their land at the time by the Japanese who also readily adapted to the age-old processes of bartering and trading. Illustrations both from Yoshiwara (1981) and Ishizuka (1955) confirm these shared activities, which challenge the commonly held local view of villagers working *for* foreigners, but not *with* them. There were other value systems concerning personal relationships that the Japanese held and that presented a contrast to those held by Europeans or Australians in 1942. Mrs M. Jehne, the interviewer and interpreter for the conversation with ex-servicemen recorded in 1983, asked the Japanese group a question about the identity of the Japanese as perceived by the locals when they arrived at Murik in 1942.

JEHNE Please comment on the statement that the local people thought the Japanese were "our dead forefathers coming to rescue us" (Somare 1985, 5).

YOSHIZAWA When the "white" men gave things to the natives they threw the things down in front of the natives, but the Japanese handed these small gifts (cigarettes etc) over to them quite formally with their hands. The natives appreciated this treatment very much.

GOTO There are other reasons why the natives felt closer to the Japanese than to the Europeans. The Japanese, whether winning or losing, generally adopted an attitude of "equality" to the natives and would live and eat together with them. There was none of the master-servant relationship with them--that characterised European-Papua New Guinean interaction. For example, such as eating separately and punishing natives if they should observe white women changing their clothes. Also we do not have any reports that Japanese troops seduced the native women whereas it is reported that many were seduced by the Allied forces. The Japanese maintained a strict code of behaviour and the natives respected the Japanese for this.

To understand the significance of Goto's remark it is necessary to recreate briefly the relationships between master and servant in both territories prior to the war and to refer to analysis and commentary available on colonial racial relationships. At the time he left Rabaul in 1942 the young Somare was five, six in April, old enough to be forming his first values and attitudes toward white men and women.

Prewar Rabaul was still the Mandated Territory's administration center--a town whose expatriate population was dominated by government and church officials. (Following disruption caused by the eruption of the volcano, Matupi, in 1937, plans were proceeding to transfer the government administrative functions to Lae.) Many of these officials were the class- and race-conscious

employers described by Nelson, who never seemed to work for the money they obviously had and certainly never worked in a fraternal sense with their Tolai laborers or servants (1982, 165ff). Underpinning this behavior was the belief, generally held by white people, that Papua New Guineans were inferior, less intelligent, and, with any encouragement, given to arrogance.

The status of local people was determined by the native ordinances of both territories that proscribed the behavior and dress of villagers when mixing with white people, particularly women. Oliver in his personal reflections on life in Bougainville summed up the expatriate view of local people: "In so far as the area's indigenous peoples figured in their objectives, they were looked upon mainly as private producers of raw materials, as labourers in European enterprises, as consumers of European manufactures and as accessories in the civilisation and development of the colony" (Oliver 1973, 78).

The young Somare, who spent his first five years growing up in the married native police quarters at Vunamami in Rabaul, would have been in awe, perhaps fear, of white officials and would have been in the process of establishing a servant mentality. As far as white women were concerned, he may have been aware of their helping and caring roles in hospital, missionary, and charity work, and perhaps conscious of the isolation they also endured at the wishes of the white male population. If he had not developed these attitudes in Rabaul prior to the war, he would certainly have learned them in Wewak five years later when the war was over. The ambiguities white women faced in their relationships with male indigenous workers, including their personal servants, are explored by Inglis (1974) in an examination of the White Women's Protection Ordinance (1926) of the Territory of Papua. Inglis' argument is that the white male perception was that Melanesian men were sexually overactive (that is, more active than whites) and unrestrained in their sexual behavior, which matured in their early teens. This perception by white men led to fear and resentment of black men and boys and eventually to prejudice and discrimination against them. For Inglis this piece of legislation is the extreme of Papuan caste legislation (Inglis 1973, ix). The legislation was male instigated, and charges heard under it were sensation-alized by the expatriate press. There is no reason to believe that these attitudes were any different in Rabaul than in Port Moresby. Inglis cites reports in the *Rabaul Times* similar to those in the *Papuan Courier*, the principal expatriate newspapers in New Guinea and Papua prior to the war.

According to Goto's claim, the Japanese behaved in markedly different ways from the Australian or European norm, exhibiting behavior that would have challenged the assumptions forming in young Somare's mind about equality and the master-servant relationship. For example, some private Japanese soldiers used to labor alongside the Papua New Guineans, demon-

strating ways of planting crops. In doing so they would also rest, share food, and eat together. That a brotherhood of shared purpose was established between villagers and the Japanese is demonstrated by the strenuous ANGAU efforts to rehabilitate locals after the Australian troops reoccupied areas of Japanese influence (Gash and Whittaker 1975, plate 665). Goto also claims that Japanese soldiers respected village women and made no sexual demands on them, a point confirmed by Somare (1975, 5). Although officially frowned on, there is no doubt that the Australian or European male population sexually exploited local women in the tradition of the double standard in sexual behavior found widely in British and Australian colonial possessions.

Somare and Shibata

Yukio Shibata was born in Kamogawa, Chiba Prefecture, in 1920. After completing his middle schooling he went to a military engineering college where he studied among other subjects metallurgy and ethnology. He was working in the nickel mines and the associated refinery in Chiba Prefecture when the war commenced, and he was commissioned as a lieutenant after attending officer training school. He was sent to New Guinea in 1943 where he was attached to the 9th Boat Engineering Regiment, a logistics unit responsible for the transport of supplies along the north coast of New Guinea. Shibata was the judicial affairs officer or administrator of a part of this unit. After service in Lae and Finschhafen he was assigned on 12 March 1943 to the Murik Lakes, a major location for Japanese small ships and landing craft.

Small ships transported all sorts of goods from major harbors along the coast to Japanese troops. As the war closed in on the Japanese, supplies of food from Southeast Asia diminished, and the Japanese were forced to grow increased amounts of vegetables and to trade for fresh and dried fish, pork, and sago with the local people. The Murik Lakes were chosen as the site to produce salt for the 18th Army, and it was Shibata's job to manufacture the salt by boiling and evaporating sea water. The salt was then distributed by boats, one of which was commanded by Shibata. To the local people he was the boat captain or "Kepten" (Pidgin), and this is why Somare remembers him as Captain Sivata. Shibata's headquarters were in the village of Karau, Somare's home village.

The Karau children were intrigued by the boats the Japanese used, which were different from the canoes they were accustomed to, and Shibata remembers this as the common interest that brought him and the children together. In addition, Shibata shows a natural fondness for young people. The need to communicate with both children and elders forced Shibata to learn New

Guinea Pidgin (Tok Pisin) in which he soon became fluent. (He had some knowledge of English from his schooling in Japan.) He says he learned Pidgin from a Bible which he found in a deserted church. Shibata remembers how lonely he and his fellow soldiers were, and how the children played with them and "brought some joy into their lives." Children and soldiers taught each other games and dances, stories and songs. Shibata was concerned that the war had interrupted the mission schooling provided by the SVD and sought the permission of his superiors to set up a village school in Karau early in 1944. Somare was one of about twenty children who attended the school. At that time he was eight years old. Shibata does not specifically remember Somare as Somare remembers Shibata, but he does remember one boy as very intelligent, quick, and outgoing--a boy who produced a clever piece of writing called "Kaup is Japan." Kaup is one of the Murik villages, and Shibata has speculated that Somare might have been this clever boy.

The village big men agreed to build a school, which Shibata sketched. In his spare time Shibata started an ethnography of the Murik villages and produced genealogies of the families which were complemented by sketches and descriptions recording different aspects of village life. Shibata managed to retain this ethnographic material, returned to him by Australian prisoner-of-war authorities when he was repatriated to Japan in early 1946. He worked on his ethnography during the six months he spent recovering from malaria in a hospital, and presented some of the material to General MacArthur, whose military history staff were collecting primary documents from the Pacific campaign.

Shibata still has this material, a copy of which he gave to me. His recollection of what was taught in the school is therefore based upon written record. School started early in the morning and with an assembly in which ritual recognition was made of the sun, the winds, and other natural phenomena. Respect for elders, particularly the village big men, was also a feature of this ritual, which included traditional Japanese greetings and obeisances. Shibata, who is not a Christian, was establishing his school curriculum in the Shinto tradition which, at that time, lent support to Japanese militarism and enforced ideas, such as order and respect for the emperor or for those who had his delegated authority.


Rote learning of factual material, where students repeat information written on a blackboard or spoken by a teacher, establishes the authority of the teacher and the political system represented by the teacher because the recitation of memorized facts reduces the need to think. This method of instruction was, and for younger children in Japan still is, the traditional way of learning. Shibata used the ground as his blackboard, inscribing ideograms from the kanji syllabary that Somare and the other children were asked to



Murik salt processing. *Sketch by Yukio Shibata*

recognize and recite, finishing off with names and honorifics to show respect for the teacher. Shozawa, who ran a similar school in the next village, remembers being disconcerted at the Murik way of counting, which he remembers as "one, two, many," although this view is wrong, according to Schmidt, who identified several different numbering systems using base four and base five, depending on the purpose of the counting (1923-1924, 725ff). Shibata and Shozawa decided that they would teach the Murik children the Japanese number system so that when they wanted four boys, for example, to run an errand, that would be the number who responded. Number sequence naturally led to simple calculation made concrete by using natural materials such as pebbles and shells. Games also were used to reinforce number concepts, and there are drawings among Shibata's ethnography of children in lines and groups exchanging places or obeying instructions that would allow them to conceptualize abstract numbers and facts.

Shibata taught the children Japanese classic stories such as "Momotaro" and songs such as "Akatombo." When they met again in Tokyo in 1985 and in Wewak in 1986 both Shibata and Somare showed that neither had forgotten the words of these traditional songs, even though the meanings had been lost over the forty-year period. Shibata believed that Kendo, one of the Japanese martial arts, disciplined the body, so he added formal exercises to each day.



The Shibata school in Kaup village, Murik Lakes. *Sketch by Yukio Shibata*

Shibata, Shozawa, and the other officers who taught the children of the Murik villages believed that the daily regimen they imposed on the children's lives would bring about a more purposeful existence that would fit them to share in the prosperous coexistence the Japanese envisioned in Papua New Guinea. Older men and women were also subjected to a certain amount of learning, and the Japanese used the children to communicate with the elders. Women were urged to cook food for recuperating servicemen and were encouraged to visit the makeshift hospitals and to perform simple tasks. Cigarettes, tinned goods, articles of clothing, implements, and other artifacts were bartered for both children's and adults' services.

As Allied control of the north coast of New Guinea increased, Shibata said, the Murik villages were subjected to increased aerial bombardment, particularly because the smoke from the fires of the salt works pinpointed their positions. Shibata and the local big men decided in July 1945 to move the women and children into the mangrove swamps, and the school closed down. Shibata came out of hiding in September 1945 when the war ended and was repatriated in January 1946.

Both Shibata and Somare have testified to the inspirational nature of their shared experience (Somare 1970, 1975; Shibata 1986; Minakami 1986), and proof of this mutual regard is to be found in the reunions of Somare and Shibata in 1985 and 1986. Because both men have recorded their versions of

this period it is possible to draw attention to some minor discrepancies in the accounts. Somare believes the Japanese were not only educating young people but also training them as future soldiers. The Japanese interviewees dismiss this idea, but there is evidence in the Australian war histories that New Guineans fought both with Australian and Japanese military forces. Somare also wrote that Shibata was a Japanese-American who made his way to Japan at the outbreak of war and enlisted in the Japanese army. This is incorrect. Shibata did not visit the United States before the war. Somare was also misinformed about the "Kempeitai," which he believed was Japanese for "captain" (1970, 31), while actually it refers to the Japanese military police. These small differences aside, Somare has acknowledged it was the Japanese who provided him with his first formal education, and that he appreciated the experiences he had with Shibata and the Japanese, who were favorably different from the white men he had seen in Rabaul.

Implicit in Somare's recollections of this time is the inference that he was excited at the prospect of learning something from another culture. Because Shibata was sensitive about acculturation and wanted to build on Somare's own culture, the experience for Somare was a happy one, and one which was to encourage him when the opportunity arose in 1947 to enroll at Boram Primary School, part of the government school system in Wewak. Shibata therefore must be recognized as providing the first major nonindigenous influence on Somare's life, during the period between his eighth and ninth birthdays.

When Shibata was asked what he hoped the outcome of his village school would be, he said that he hoped it would help young people, particularly those with leadership abilities, develop attitudes that would suit them for self-determination. Perhaps Shibata is being idealistic after the event, because it is difficult to assume that the Japanese would not have replaced one form of colonial administration with another. But it is worth noting that Somare in later years was motivated by a desire for self-determination, which would lead eventually to the realization of self-government and independence achieved through political means.

Notes

1 A Japanese-speaking friend of the author, Claus Jehne, arranged to interview the ex-officers on a trip to Japan in 1982-1983. Through the help of the Japan-Papua New Guinea Goodwill Society, Jehne made contact with the Japanese New Guinean veterans and audiotaped an interview.

2 The term *native* is not used in this paper unless it occurs in direct quotation or in the context of the prewar period. The term was used by anthropologists and administrators prior to the war to designate indigenous Papua New Guineans and occurs in the titles of regulations and ordinances. For example, offences under the Native Administration Regulations (1924) of the Mandated Territory were heard in the Courts for Native Affairs (Mair 1970:67). Not all prewar anthropologists were satisfied with the term *native*, however, and Ian Hogbin as early as 1934 at Wogeo referred to "the Wogeo people" or the "islanders" or "villagers" or used a similar synonym, rather than the word *native*.

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Contributors

SUZANNE FALGOUT
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
Colby College
Waterville, Maine 04901

JONATHAN FIFT'I
East Kwaio, Malaita
Solomon Islands
(Deceased)

ROBERT FRANCO
Social Science Department
Kapiolani Community College
4303 Diamond Head Road
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96816

DAVID GEGEO
Department of Political Science
University of Hawai'i
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96822

JOHN R. HEINE
C/- Alele Museum
PO Box 629
Majuro
Republic of the Marshall Islands 96960

SAM HIGHLAND
C/- University of the South Pacific Centre
Bairiki, Tarawa
Republic of Kiribati

WAKAKO HIGUCHI
PO Box 5205
Mangilao, Guam 96923

Contributors

BRIJ V. LAL

Department of Pacific & Asian History
Research School of Pacific Studies
Australian National University
GPO Box 4
Canberra, ACT 2601
Australia

HUGH LARACY

Department of History
University of Auckland
Auckland
New Zealand

LAMONT LINDSTROM

Department of Anthropology
University of Tulsa
Tulsa, Oklahoma 74104

ANTONIO PALOMO

US Department of Interior
Room 908, PDN Building
Agaña, Guam 96910

NANCY J. POLLOCK

Department of Anthropology
Victoria University
Private Bag
Wellington
New Zealand

LIN POYER

Department of Anthropology
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, Ohio 45221

HISAFUMI SAITO

Faculty of Sociology
Chukyo University
101 Tokodachi, Kaizu-cho
Toyota 470-03
Japan

Contributors

TUALA SEVAAETASI
94350 Hiau Street
Waipahu, Hawai'i 96797

BASIL SHAW
42 Highview Terrace
St Lucia, Queensland 4067
Australia

UBAL TELLEI
PO Box 1087
Koror, Palau 96940

TED TSUKIYAMA
2536 Sonoma Place
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96822

JOHN WAIKO
Department of History
University of Papua New Guinea
PO Box 320, University
Papua New Guinea

GEOFFREY WHITE
Institute of Culture and Communication
East-West Center
Honolulu, Hawai'i 96848

MARTY ZELENIEZ
33 Beech Street
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