A HAZY REDEMPTION: CAN DERADICALISATION WORK IN INDONESIA?

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information that have been used in the thesis.

This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously.

____________________________________

Lendra Putra Nurezki

1 May 2014
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof Bilveer Singh, for his passionate and endeavouring guidance during the production of this thesis. This thesis reflects the continuation of my academic interests on Indonesia since working on my undergraduate research papers. The modules that I took under Prof Singh over the years on Indonesian politics inspired the idea for the research topic.

Writing the thesis would not be possible without the precious support from my parents, *Almarhum* Abdul Rahman Jasman and Faulena Masdjid, my wife Asnur Mursalin Aspar and my brother, Imis Iskandar. They supported me morally and financially throughout the years. My family persistently persuaded me to advance my academic career even though I wanted to concentrate on my career in the civil service. I would also like to thank my in-laws, Aspar Anwar and Asiah Jais for their kind understanding when I had to spend most of my personal time toiling on the master’s programme, and for supporting my wife in times of needs. Not to forget *keluarga besar* Hj Jasman and *keluarga besar* Hj Masdjid for the love.

My greatest gratitude to my supervisors at the Ministry of Home Affairs for their kind understanding at work; approving my leave to conduct my fieldwork in Indonesia and allowing time-offs to meet my supervisor. Not forgetting my colleagues who showered me with encouraging words and covered my duties while I was away for studies. I admit that it is not easy embarking on the programme as a part-time candidate.

Finally yet importantly, I would like to thank the following individuals for their humble and critical assistance: Mr Ansyaad Mbai (Head, BNPT), Dr Sri Yunanto (BNPT), Mr Narendra Jatna (Head of Cibadak District Attorney General Office), Mr Bayu Adinugroho (Public Prosecutor), Ms Mistqola (Sugeng Sarjadi Syndicate), Mr Tito Karnavian (Head of Police, Papua) and Prof Salito Wirawan Sarwono (Universitas Indonesia).
PREFACE

This thesis is a requirement for the Master’s in Social Science, awarded by the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. I share the view held by many that terrorism posed by extremist radicals, is one of the most dangerous security threat today, especially post 9-11. The subject of deradicalisation is relatively new in the field of terrorism research. The research is timely because Indonesia had recently formalised its deradicalisation programmes for Islamists terrorists in 2010. It is also a useful read for policy makers and deradicalisation specialists. The methodology used in this research is based on literature reviews and field research with informants, academics, and practitioners in Indonesia. Fieldwork is the best means to capture experiences and the ground realities to appreciate the challenges of deradicalisation in Indonesia.

The use of the Indonesian language in this thesis is extensive and requires the readers to refer to the terminologies provided. However, English translations are provided within the thesis for quick reference.

Readers are to note that some assertions made in the thesis are adapted from confidential reports and documents, and citations are provided where possible. Some of the interviewees I met were reluctant to reveal their identities, thus, the identities of the many villagers and informants whom I met cannot be verified.

I chose the title A Hazy Redemption: Can Deradicalisation work in Indonesia? because it illuminates the main concern of this thesis; the worrying rate of terrorist recidivism in Indonesia despite going through the deradicalisation programme. Indonesia has thus far been successful in its counter-terrorism efforts through the hard approach, but the effectiveness of its deradicalisation programme remains shrouded in uncertainty.
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ABSTRACT

Indonesia’s war on terrorism has been successful, shown by the ability of its elite terrorism task force - Densus 88 and the police - to gather intelligence, conduct successful arrests and to cripple the terrorist network. With a recidivism rate lingering above 10%, Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts do not share the same success. Mainstream literature on deradicalisation has sought to focus on ideological factors through disputing the radical’s religious doctrines and religious interpretations. Upon reviewing several literatures, there seems to be a detachment between the focus on ideological approach and the motivating reasons for the terrorists’ entry and exit from terrorist organisations. Several literatures assume that it is achievable to deradicalise any form of extremism through the same framework, with some modifications to specific conditions. Can deradicalisation work in Indonesia? Using Indonesia as a case study, this thesis will argue that disengagement is the best strategy to prevent future violence committed by Islamist terrorists and cultural contextualisation is the most critical factor in Indonesia’s deradicalisation strategy. The main concern of this paper is the worrying rate of recidivism among released terrorist convicts and the management of the deradicalisation programme. The radical ideology should be aptly contextualised in tandem with the cultural environment in which the terrorist is operating. Several policy recommendations are offered in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

Keywords: Deradicalisation, disengagement, radical ideology, cultural context, terrorism, Indonesia

(33,000 words)
TERMINOLOGIES

abangan  Refers to the population of Javanese Muslims who practice a more syncretic version of Islam

adzan  prayer call

amok  A Malay word meaning "mad with uncontrollable rage". It is a term for a killing spree perpetrated by an individual out of rage or resentment over perceived mistreatment

aliran  -ism, faith, beliefs

aksi massa  mass actions

aurat  body

aqidah  a branch of Islamic studies describing the beliefs of the Islamic faith

bai‘a  pledge of allegiance

Bshineka Tunggal Ika  Official national motto of Indonesia. The phrase is Old Javanese translated as "Unity in Diversity"

bid‘ah  Innovations in religious matters

Cultuurstelsel  Dutch for "Cultivation System" or less accurately, the Culture System

da‘wah  "issuing a summons" or "making an invitation", usually denotes preaching of Islam

dhuha  The time of dhuha begins when the sun is about a spear’s length above the horizon and it continues until the sun reaches its meridian

Dewan Revolusi  Revolutionary Islamic Council of Indonesia

Islam Indonesia
**fardhu**  mandatory

**fardhu ain**  Muslim's personal obligation

**gamis**  a long shirt, Pakistan-styled

**gerakan**  movement

**Gerakan Pemuda Ka'bah**  Ka'bah Youth Movement

**hadith**  Religious use is often translated as 'tradition', meaning a report of the deeds and sayings of Muhammad

**halal**  An act permitted (legal) by Islamic law

**haram**  An act forbidden by Islamic law. It also means "sinful" in Arabic

**istiqomah**  consistent and firm (in obedience)

**fa‘i**  a concept used in Islam to legitimise wealth accumulation taken from enemies of Islam without waging a war

**kifayah**  obligations the fulfilment of which is not mandatory on every individual Muslim. Instead, if some fulfil it, that will be good enough

**i‘dad**  preparation for jihad

**ikhwan**  brother / brotherhood

**jihad**  holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty, or, a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving spiritual discipline

**Katir**  “Unbeliever” or “infidel”. The term refers to a person who rejects God or who hides, denies, or covers the "truth"

**Khilafah Islamiyah**  Islamic caliphate
khurafat Distorted beliefs or superstitions based on actions and nature.

Laskar Jihad Warriors of Jihad

mansuhkan delete

Masyumi It was a major Islamic political party in Indonesia during the Liberal Democracy era in Indonesia. It was banned in 1960 by President Sukarno for supporting a rebellion.

mati syahid Martyrdom. Muslims who die during a fight or struggle to defend Islam. It is the highest ideals of Islam.

mubaligh A group of religious experts who are sent out (abroad) to spread their religion through education, education, social work

mudir head of a school (director)

Muhammadiyah “followers of Muhammad”. It is an Islamic organisation in Indonesia. The organisation was founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in the city of Yogyakarta as a reformist socio-religious movement, advocating individual interpretation of Quran and sunnah.

mujaheedin “Strugglers” or “people doing jihad”. Muslims who believe they struggle in the path of God. The word is from the same Arabic word as jihad (“struggle”).

negara kesatuan Unitarism

Padri priest

Pancasila The Five Principles. It is the Indonesian state philosophy, formulated by the Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno

pesantren Islamic boarding school

perajurit soldier/army
puasa  fasting

priyayi  In traditional Javanese society, a class that comprised the elite in contrast to the masses, or “little people” (wong cilik). Until the 18th century the priyayi, under the royal families, were the rulers of the Javanese states

Quran  The book composed of sacred writings accepted by Muslims as revelations made to Muhammad by Allah through the angel, Jibril

qiymulail  prayers done in the evening between one hour after dusk until dawn.

Reformasi  Reformation

sabilililah  In the cause of Allah

santri  a cultural 'stream' of people within the population of Javanese who practice a more orthodox version of Islam, in contrast to the abangan classes

syariah  the moral code and religious law of Islam

syahadat  to bear witness

solat  prayers

sunnah  the way of life prescribed as normative for Muslims based on the teachings and practices of Islamic Prophet Muhammad

takeyya  An Islamic concept allowing Muslims to deny or hide their faith when forced to do so to avoid harm

tafsiran  interpretation

takfir  In Islamic law, takfir refers to the practice of one Muslim declaring another Muslim an unbeliever or kafir
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>takhayul</td>
<td>beliefs in something which exists and is considered sacred/magical, but in actual fact it does not exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>taklim</td>
<td>to study, seeking knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tarekat</td>
<td>way, path or method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tauhid</td>
<td>the concept of monotheism in Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>tukang adzan</td>
<td>someone performing the prayer call</td>
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<tr>
<td>ulama</td>
<td>Islamic scholar</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ummah</td>
<td>nation or community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volksraads</td>
<td>People’s Council. It was an advisory body created by the Dutch for the East Indies in 1917</td>
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<tr>
<td>wajib</td>
<td>mandatory (obligation)</td>
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# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIN</td>
<td>Angkatan Mujaheddin Islam, Islamic Jihad Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKABRI</td>
<td>Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces Academy Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNPT</td>
<td>Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, National Agency for Combating Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>BU</td>
<td>Budi Utomo, Noble Endeavor. It was the first native political society in the Dutch East Indies</td>
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<tr>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Darul Islam, House of Islam. It is an Islamist group in Indonesia that aims for the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. A group of Muslim militias, coordinated by a charismatic radical Muslim politician, Sekarmadji Mariyjan Kartosuwirjo, started it in 1942, proclaimed it in 1949.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Densus-88</td>
<td>Detasemen Khusus 88, Special Detachment 88</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAPERMIGAS</td>
<td>Gabungan Perusahaan-perusahaan Minyak dan Gas, Joint Oil and Gas Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOLKAR</td>
<td>Golongan Karyawan, Worker’s Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>FKAWJ</td>
<td>Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah. People of the Prophet’s Path and Congregation</td>
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<td>FPI</td>
<td>Front Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Front</td>
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<td>IP</td>
<td>Indische Partij, Indies Party. One of the very first political organisations pioneering Indonesian nationalism in the colonial Dutch East Indies</td>
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<td>IPAC</td>
<td>Institute for Policy Analysis for Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>KOMPAK</td>
<td>Komitee Penanggulan Krisis, Crisis Management Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPI</td>
<td>Laskar Pembela Islam, Islamic Defenders Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMI</td>
<td>Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia, Indonesian Council of Jihad Warriors</td>
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<td>MUI</td>
<td>Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Council of Islamic Scholars Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>NII</td>
<td>Negara Islam Indonesia, The Islamic state of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>NKRI</td>
<td>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia. United States of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NU</td>
<td>Nadhatul Ulama, Awakening of Islamic scholars. It is a traditionalist Sunni Islam group in Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polri</td>
<td>Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, The Indonesian National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>PKI</td>
<td>Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNI</td>
<td>Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRI</td>
<td>Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDI</td>
<td>Sarekat Dagang Islam (Union of Islamic Traders). Haji Samanhudi, a businessman in Surakarta, founded it in 1905 or 1912. His business was trading in batik. It had as its goal the empowerment of local merchants, especially in the batik industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union). One of the first mass political organisations in Indonesia. Sarekat Islam was formed in 1912</td>
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as a result of the reorganisation of SDI, an organisation that reflected the interests of the nascent Indonesian commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the struggle against foreign (mainly Dutch) capital.

TKR  *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat*, Army for the Independence of Indonesia

UUD  *Undang-undang Dasar*

TII  *Tentara Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Army
CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION

“Jihad must come first (even if one’s parents are sick). Unless jihad is in (the state of) fardhu kifayah (a collective duty, for the nation). If jihad is in (the state of) fardhu ain (in the sense of an absolute, individual duty), jihad takes priority. There is no obligation to ask permission from one’s parents. But even if jihad is still in the fardhu kifayah state, such as jihad to spy on infidel countries, Muslims do not require their parent’s permission.”


Indonesia boasts some of the most perturbing trends associated with violence committed by Islamist terrorists, who endorse violence in the name of religion. Against the backdrop of the post-9/11 security landscape, the recent violence mainly involves bomb attacks, ranging from the deadly twin Bali bombings in 2002, the Australian Embassy bombing at the Kuningan District in 2004, the JW Marriott and Ritz Carlton bombing in 2009 and the bombing of a mosque in a police compound in 2011. Deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia have been formalised since 2003 under a new government regulation, to alter radical beliefs and to bring back convicted terrorists into the mainstream society. Although these terrorists had participated in the country’s “deradicalisation programme” which was praised by many security observers, including Sidney Jones, the rate of recidivism is still worrying. Indonesia’s war on terrorism has thus far been rather successful, shown by the ability of its elite terrorism task force, Densus 88, and the police to gather

1 Interview with Abu Bakar Baasyir, alleged Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah, on 13 August 2005 and 15 August 2005 from Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. Questions were formulated by Scott Atran and translated for him in Bahasa Indonesia by Taufiq Andrie, accessed on 1 November 2013. [http://jeannicod.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/05/36/63/PDF/ijn_00000631_00.pdf]
intelligence, conduct successful arrests and re-arrests of recidivists, as well as to disrupt the terrorist network.\(^4\) However, to what extent has Indonesia been successful in rehabilitating these Islamist terrorists and stop them from re-committing the violence since the programme’s inauguration in 2003?

The idea of running the deradicalisation programme became exigent after the 2002 twin bombings in Bali. From 2000 to 2010, around 600 convicted terrorists were held in Indonesia’s prisons, and about 100 of them were involved in the Aceh military training camp, either to participate in the military training or to be trainers themselves.\(^5\) Those who participated in the Aceh training camp were believed to be mostly recidivists in \textit{jihadist} terrorism, including the case studies discussed in this thesis. From 2002 to April 2013, approximately 800 arrests were made and 63 were killed in various shootouts with security forces during the arrests.\(^6\) Up until August 2013, Indonesian authorities discovered at least 28 terrorist recidivists out of around 300-350 convicts released, or about 10% recidivism.\(^7\) The rate is higher than that of Saudi Arabia and Singapore – which will be mentioned in the next paragraph- , and it


Certainly raises concerns on the quality of deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia. Moreover, many of these released convicts have not been receiving proper post-release monitoring. Indonesia should be concerned because, upon the release, most of these terrorists re-engaged in violent activities that destroy lives and properties.\(^8\)

Can deradicalisation work? Several countries have implemented robust deradicalisation programmes. Singapore has released about two thirds of terrorist detainees, out of 64 detainees since 2002.\(^9\) Figures show that since the inception of rehabilitation and deradicalisation programs in Singapore, on record, only one re-arrest has been made (in 2012).\(^10\) While there is no confirmed data on the rate of terrorist recidivism, Abuza concluded that deterrence and coercion are significant for the low rates of recidivism in Malaysia.\(^11\) Malaysia’s Home Minister, Datuk Seri Hishamuddin asserted in a media statement that Malaysia’s prison recidivism rate is much lower than many other countries with 7.97% in 2012.\(^12\) For example, latest figures reported that Saudi Arabia posts its recidivism rates to fall within the range of

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\(^8\) Refer to Chapter 5 of this thesis on the case studies. Also refer to Table 1 of Chapter 4 for a list of notable recidivists in Indonesia.


\(^10\) Abdul Basheer, who was drawn to terrorism through the Internet - hence he was labelled self-radicalised or more commonly known as a do-it-yourself terrorist - was detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 2007 in Singapore, after he made plans for militant jihad in Afghanistan. After his release in February 2010, he made some headway in re-integrating into society. However, he was caught again in 2012 for wanting to revert to undertaking militant jihad abroad. This excludes the re-arrest of JI member, Mas Selamat Kastari who was re-arrested in 2010 after he had escaped from the Whitley Road detention centre in 2008.


2-3%.

Hence, as compared to Singapore and Malaysia within the same region, and Saudi Arabia, - with Malaysia and Saudi Arabia having a Muslim majority population - the success and reliability of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme remain hazy. Others, including journalists and the Indonesian government, still claim that it is in fact promising. To what extent is Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme promising and how is success measured? Many have also argued that the war on terrorism cannot stop at conducting an offensive against the terrorists and putting them behind bars. While counter-terrorism efforts should be formidable enough to stop the violent acts of terrorism from besieging the country, the deradicalisation programme epitomise a critical step in the post-arrest phase to rehabilitate these terrorists. Ideally, the prisons serve as Indonesia’s fortress to keep away terrorists from causing further damage to lives and properties. This thesis also discusses the management of Indonesia’s prison system, a key institution in managing the deradicalisation programme. Through fieldwork in Indonesia, I will highlight why

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14 I will not engage in a comparative analysis with Singapore and Malaysia in this thesis, because of there are already available literature which describes the programmes and partly also because of restricted access of information.


16 There is no available information during the research of this thesis on how Indonesia measures its recidivism rates and its method of calculation. I briefly discuss this issue in Chapter 4 in “Comments on Recidivism.”

Indonesia’s prisons are a vulnerable place for terrorists to deradicalise and thus implementation of the programme becomes ineffective. It is ironic how prison serves as an important environment to play a role as a rehabilitation centre to induce positive change, yet it incubates further radicalisation and recruitment of new members, making it a vulnerable place for terrorists to deradicalise.

I. AIMS OF RESEARCH

This paper will examine Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme for Islamists terrorists and address some of the issues associated with the management of that programme. The main concern of this paper is the fairly worrying rate of recidivism among released terrorist convicts, as well as the way the programme is managed. It is presumed in this paper that religious intervention is important, but it may not necessarily be an effective strategy in the design of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme. Thus, what would be the best way to conduct deradicalisation programmes to ensure that the programme participant does not return to violence?

This thesis will argue that disengagement is the best strategy to prevent future violence committed by Islamist terrorists and cultural contextualisation should be the most critical factor in Indonesia’s deradicalisation strategy. John Horgan asserts that the aim of the deradicalisation programme is to reverse the process of radicalisation as well as to ensure that participants of the programmes do not return to terrorism.\textsuperscript{18} Has the Indonesian government done enough to eradicate the violence committed by these terrorists through its deradicalisation programme?

Although there have been prominent successful cases, the report card does not look hopeful for Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme upon scrutinising the reported statistics and the ground reality. These include: 1) convicted terrorists’ participation in the deradicalisation programme for pragmatic reasons instead of renouncing their extremist views, 2) the preservation of the *jihadist* culture – be it intended or unintended - through the daily activities in prison, 3) luxurious privileges enjoyed by the terrorists in prison, 4) inadequate training for prison wardens and 4) an absence of a coordinated effort for the post-release phase of the deradicalisation programme.

II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study seeks to answer several important questions, which include the following:

Firstly, how do individuals get radicalised in Indonesia?

Secondly, why despite going through deradicalisation programme, some participants return to terrorism?

Thirdly, what should be deradicalised?

III. ROADMAP

Chapter two highlights the literature review of the concepts on radicalisation, the deradicalisation programme and disengagement. The chapter also seeks to identify gaps in research on radicalisation and deradicalisation. The problems faced by every country in trying to implement the deradicalisation programme are unique and hence, no “one-size-fits-all” solution can be applied across all deradicalisation designs and methods. Cultural contextualisation will serve to strengthen the
effectiveness of the deradicalisation programme. The chapter will also provide the reader with some background knowledge and offer a concise response to the first research question on some of the “pathways” to radicalisation. It will also attempt to conceptualise “deradicalisation” in the context of Indonesia. Various literatures have expounded various definitions. While most incorporate religious rehabilitation to induce cognitive shifts, the current state of Indonesia’s prisons makes religious rehabilitation counterproductive. It is probably more practical to strengthen the spirit of nationalism and reinforce the values of “pancasila” – the Indonesian state philosophy - in a deliberate manner through job attachments, social integration and constant engagement of these former terrorists in public debates to draw them into an intellectual discussion, while dissuading them from violence.19

Chapter three seeks to illustrate the rise of radicalism in the context of Indonesia’s social and political history. It provides background to research question one as it outlines some of the key organisations and events that bred radicalism among the various extremist groups that existed throughout Indonesia’s colonial period, President Sukarno’s era, the New Order and the Reformasi era. While most groups are politically motivated, some are just plain religious extremists who want to establish a state based on the Islamic syariah laws. Other forms of religious extremism shown by these groups include the perversion of several Islamic concepts such as jihad, fardhu ain, mujaheedin, fa’i, wajib, halal, haram and i’dad.

Chapter four will examine several mechanisms of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme and problems plaguing the prison system. The chapter seeks to answer research questions one and two. There are several issues associated with the operationalisation of deradicalisation programmes despite claims of promising

19 Examples of former rehabilitated terrorists include Ali Imron, Nasir Abbas and Noor Huda Ismail.
results that demand immediate attention and action from the government. These include a) freedom of communication access by the terrorist convicts, b) the abuse of pesantren At-Tawwabin by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members, c) overcrowding in prison and d) unrestrained interaction among inmates. The chapter will also attempt to outline the evolution of Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts throughout its history starting with the programme implemented for Komando Jihad during the New Order period (1965 – 1998). The recurring pattern, which is frequently expressed in Indonesia’s deradicalisation attempts, is the constant need to stop the spread of violent terrorists’ activities and to reintegrate the terrorists back into mainstream society. This requires the process termed as “disengagement”, which will be explained in chapter two.

Chapter five will examine five individuals who are all recidivists. It seeks to identify several recurring patterns that could provide an insight as to why cultural contextualisation is important. Chapter five also attempts to provide a reply to research question three through a deeper appreciation of the terrorists’ culture and mindsets. The case studies include Imron Baihaqi alias Abu Tholut, Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, Abdullah Sunata, Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan and Luthfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid. These convicted terrorist had participated in some form of deradicalisation programme with the exception of Abdullah Sunata, who cooperated well with the police. However, all of them re-engaged in terrorism and the terrorist networks upon release from prison. I chose these case studies among the others due to availability of information at the time of research.

The concluding chapter six will provide a comprehensive analysis of why, after dissecting Indonesia’s prison conditions, examining its deradicalisation programme and after viewing Indonesia’s social conditions from a bird’s eye view,
disengagement may seem a more practical and pressing solution. Moderating the 
jenadist views may seem to be an arduous and resource intensive task. This is 
especially so in a plural society where a myriad of Islamic orientations coexist with 
other religions and cultures, bound by the values of Indonesia’s state philosophy of 
Pancasila, which will be which is set against the historical context of radicalism.20 
One of the key solutions to disengaging the terrorist from violence is to recognise the 
importance of cultural contextualisation and, as such, it requires an effort from the 
government to enforce reforms and change in the way the programme is managed. 
Violent jihadism is indeed a deliberate strategy, and success for the jihadists is 
ensured as long as the terrorist group’s political and strategic will remains strong.21 
Weak inter-agency cooperation and follow-up programme signals a weak political will 
– which is among many other factors - in combating jihadism and recidivism.

IV. LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH

This thesis employs field research to gather data as a qualitative approach 
based on a short period of fieldwork from 2011 to 2013. Through interviews with 
security agency officers and several former terrorists, data is collected. Chapter five 
employs a concise narrative study as a qualitative approach through oral history 
interviews and transcripts of prison interviews. However, the author did not have the 
luxury of spending long periods with the detainees to amass as much field texts as

20 Pancasila encompasses five principles, which stresses five elements supposed to be common among 
Indonesian ethnic groups. The five principles are: 1. Believe in one God, 2. Indonesia unity, 3. Humanism, 4. 
Social justice and 5. Democracy.
21 Robert Pape argues that terrorism is successful at a strategic level when there is political coercion and a 
persistent desire at an individual and group level. Pape asserts that Al-Qaeda’s will fulfill its objectives, such as 
to rid the Ummah from all forms of oppression, if they successfully expel U.S troops from the Persian Gulf 
region through any means, including sustained efforts to exert violence. See Robert Pape, in Dying To Win: The 
possible. Due to lack of data and inaccessible information, quantitative analysis was not attempted. Further research should be engaged to combine the qualitative approach with quantitative analysis to measure the success and failures of the deradicalisation programme and uncover deep-seated problems of the deradicalisation programmes. However, the thesis will provide some cursory statistics such as number of arrests and recidivism rates taken from media sources as well as primary data.

Secondly, the case studies are limited to the five subjects chosen in this thesis due to the limited availability and access of data. Exclusion of several prominent recidivists is due to lack of access and confidential information. Other interesting figures such as Abu Bakar Baasyir and Nasir Abbas were not examined in detail due to their extensive coverage and the abundant materials available. The author will not be able to add any new value to the vast existing literature on these individuals. However, it may be interesting to examine these individuals at a later period to see, for example, if deradicalisation works for Nassir Abbas and Ali Imron, or can it work for Abu Bakar Baasyir.

Lastly, data and statistics in this thesis are gathered from various sources, mainly through interviews with practitioners, academics, informants, online news portals and academic papers. The government has not released any official annual statistics thus far. This may be due to the lack of coordination among the state prisons or perhaps for political reasons. This thesis provides citations for the statistics and interview excerpts where possible.

22 Clandinin and Connelly refer to the individual’s life stories and experiences as “field texts.” See Jean D. Clandinin and Michael F. Connelly, in Narrative inquiry: Experience and story in qualitative research, Jossey-Bass San Francisco, 2000.

23 Primary data refers to statistics released by the government agencies during briefings and conferences.
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW

I. UNDERSTANDING RADICALISATION: REASONS AND PATHWAYS

Before I examine the concept of deradicalisation, it is important that an understanding of radicalisation be established. Radicalisation and extremism are complex and multi-faceted phenomena that have been successfully exploited by terrorist groups in spreading their ideology, even among the most disenfranchised segments of the population throughout the world. This exploitation is further shown by the strategic use of a variety of media, including the internet, which provides them with the ability to disseminate a broad-ranging corpus of indoctrination and propaganda, fostering the ideal environment for a virtual ummah where all are connected regardless of their geographical location.

How do we define radicalisation? Several definitions presented in the vast array of literatures on the term “radicalisation” highlight the frequent use of it to describe the process of change in an individual’s attitude, behaviour and cognition. Greg Hannah et al describe it as a process whereby “individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that society tends to consider to be normal, into a range that society consider extreme.” In some cases, these individuals may then take a further step and involve themselves in acts of violence. Jenkins asserts that radicalisation comprises “internalising a set of beliefs; a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction.” In other words, radicalisation requires that the individual enter a mental process that is transformative, with a personality change that conditions him or her to violent

behaviour. The United Nation’s (UN) working definition does an elegant job at defining the key concepts clearly. The UN defined radicalisation as the process of “adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change.”\textsuperscript{26} The preceding definitions highlight the involvement of cognitive and psychological transformations. Thus, being a cognitive process, it induces a change in the individual’s reasoning and understanding of violent ideologies.\textsuperscript{27} John Horgan makes an important distinction between the terms “radicalisation” and “violent radicalisation” and he describes them in the context of a social process. For Horgan, radicalisation is “the social and psychological process on incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology.”\textsuperscript{28} Conversely, violent radicalisation is “the social and psychological process of increased and focused radicalisation through involvement with a violent non-state movement.”\textsuperscript{29} Hence, the definitions are useful for our understanding on the concept of deradicalisation, particularly in comprehending the third research question of this paper, what should be deradicalised?

How does on becomes radicalised and join terrorist groups? Several general theories deserve some attention. Firstly, the “social exchange” theory as put forth by Peter Blau sees that the formation of human relationships can be analysed using cost-benefit analysis.\textsuperscript{30} Similarly, the reason for someone to be affiliated with a group is strongly influenced by exchange of benefits due to his membership in the group.

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\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
Blau’s theory holds that individuals take part in a relationship based on a sense of practicality and not mutual coercion. As a result, they expect returns that are proportionate with their involvement and contribution through the group’s activities. According to Blau, these individual begin interacting in the social setting and they gradually become attracted to the group upon realising the benefits, such as higher status in society, economic incentives as well as fulfilling their *jihadist* aspirations.\(^{31}\)

Secondly, using “rational choice” theory in explaining radicalisation assumes that getting involved in terrorist activities is derived from rational considerations and cost-benefit calculations.\(^{32}\) The decisions made by social and political actors constitute an optimal strategy to meet their objectives. The “rational choice” theory also asserts that joining terrorism may not characterise a pathological or illogical behaviour, but an ideal way to satisfy personal needs under certain circumstances. According to Sandler and Arce, suicide bombings are carried out merely to maximise the group’s goals.\(^{33}\) However, Crenshaw argues that some terrorists’ behaviour contradicts the assumption that that acts of terrorism is an optimum effort to meet the socio-political objectives.\(^{34}\) For example, extreme violence by terrorists groups will only beget fierce offensive from security agencies, such as retaliation by Indonesia’s Densus 88, and this will hamper the former’s overall objectives. Rational choice

\(^{31}\) *Ibid*, p. 36.


theory does not seem to accommodate the effects of brash action, intellectual
defects, or emotional experiences. Extreme feelings of hatred, strong sense of
loyalty to a leader could skew rationality, as in the case of strong support for JI
leaders, Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abu Rusydan, as well as over-ambition. If the
terrorists are rational and strategic in their thinking, they should be more likely to
disengage upon realising their objective. Evidence, however, suggests that
terrorists often sabotage their own success, even before achieving an agreement.
Instead, they want to preserve the group and maintain a purpose and meaning, to
sustain their sense of belonging as well as their need to engage in jihad. Violent
behaviour supersedes strategic objectives and thus, fulfilling individuals’ needs other
than the group’s objective.

Thirdly, Robert Gurr points out the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis as the
primary source of the human capacity for violence. Joseph Margolin echoes Gurr’s
views that terrorists’ behaviour is a response to frustration arising from political,
social and personal needs. However, this argument assumes simple causal
mechanism in which aggression is always the consequence of frustration. A better
approach would be to examine subcultural theories, which takes into account that
terrorists are living according to their own subculture and value system. The
transmission of values and attitudes of one’s subculture – such as fanatism - will

35 See David W. Brannan et al, “Talking to Terrorists: Toward an Independent Analytical Framework for the
36 Jeff Victoroff, “The mind of a terrorist: A review and critique of psychological approaches,” in Journal of
Conflict Resolution, op. cit.
37 Jerrold Post, “Terrorist psycho-logic: terrorist behavior as a product of psychological forces,” in Origins of
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, edited by W. Reich, Woodrow Centre Press,
38 Ibid.
40 Joseph Margolin, “Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism,” in Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,
41 Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, in The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in
Criminology, Routledge, New York, 2001, chap. 3. See also Franco Ferracuti and Marvin E. Wolfgang, in The
undoubtedly drive aggressive behavior. Some scholars also argue that the frustration-aggression hypothesis is misleading because the hypothesis says very little about social psychology of prejudice and loathing. The hypothesis also focuses too much on extremism that “acts of terrorism only play a role as the main motivator for encouraging extreme violence.” Paul Wilkinson refines this further and asserts that “politically-motivated terrorism” cannot be understood outside the context of the terrorists and their development, such things that include ideology, beliefs, and culture.

Lastly, Erikson’s theory of “identity formation” states that terrorists will be inclined to assume a negative identity. An example would be the members of Komando Jihad, who view themselves as members of an oppressed Islamic group during the New Order era who were disappointed by the failure to crush communism and form the Revolutionary Islamic Council of Indonesia. As a result, they take on the negative identity of being a terrorist group. Knuston believes that individuals get involved in terrorism to express feelings of anger and helplessness due to the absence of alternatives. Numerous studies have highlighted evidence that individuals who become terrorists often stem from the population that consist of individuals who are unemployed, with no job security, socially alienated, and society dropouts. Therefore, these individuals become motivated to engage in terrorism.

43 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
when their grievances and shortcomings are not addressed. Models of personal paths sometimes show that when the group selects terrorists, these terrorists often originate from high-risk communities and they suffered from low self-esteem in the earlier period of their lives. While in society, they failed to obtain the desired place and status, and this swells their frustration that encourages them to pursue for a new identity. According to Erikson, their underlying need for being part of a terrorist group is a symptom of psychosocial identity, either incomplete or fragmented.46 Interestingly, indulging in violent social, cultural, and political activities improves their personal relationships with other terrorists and this leads to membership with other violent groups.47

In addition to the above approaches, John Horgan notes that “psychodynamic” theory is statistically the most popular psychological explanation for terrorism.48 Many studies posit that terrorist behaviour is dependent on the individual psyche in attempts to link personality traits to violent behaviour. In addition, many studies examining identity formation and its relationship to terrorist behaviour also view an individual’s psyche as the source of needs-driven motivation that leads an individual to take action. As a result, the influence of cultural factors tends to be minimised because they generally fall outside the research paradigm of general psychology.

46 Kohut echoes this argument by Erikson. See Heinz Kohut, in The Analysis of the Self, International Universities Press, New York, 1971, pp. 120-124. Kohut further proposes that the psychologist should empathically experience the world from the patient’s point of view (temporary indwelling) so that the patient feels understood. This is relevant when we talk about handling counselling sessions in deradicalisation strategies.

47 For Erikson, personal identity represents one’s set of goals, values and beliefs, which include relationships with family and friends. See Waterman S. Alan, “Identity, the identity statuses, and identity status development: A contemporary statement,” in Developmental Review, no. 19, pp. 591–621.

48 Horgan finds that psychodynamic accounts for political violence continue to be employed, based on the assumption that violence is the result of latent desires going back to early childhood experiences. See John Horgan, in The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, New York, 2003, pp. 50-53.
While the theories and hypothesis on “radicalisation” offered by aforementioned scholars in general are apt, practitioners in the security agencies, law enforcement and the judiciary easily blame religion as the root cause of radicalisation among Islamists terrorists. Does Islam cause radicalisation? Among Western scholars, there is a visible reticence to specify directly that Islam is the central culprit in the radicalisation of Islamist groups, although others are more careful on assigning the blame. It is fair to say that perverted ideals of Islam can contribute to the development of the radicals, and thus, deradicalisation targeting at ideological rehabilitation should be the solution. However, there have been calls to focus on non-ideological factors such as the depletion of all other means of political dialogue to achieve their objectives, poverty, oppression and desire for autonomy.49 For example, an individual can appear radicalised as an excuse to commit violence while gaining sympathy from Muslims. In other words, “terrorists” can make use of “radicalisation” to mask his criminal intentions so that the court will try him as a terrorist in court.50

In the context of post-9/11 security landscape, some argue against the claim that religion is at the heart of most conflicts. Robert Pape argues in Dying to Win that an ardent desire to defend a territory motivated suicide bombings. Even in Indonesia - one of the top five countries with the largest influence of salafism (26 million followers) - extreme religious groups are not truly seeking to spread Islam or any


50 This is a crucial fact to note, because terrorist convicts enjoy certain privileges in Indonesian prison as compared to other non-terrorist inmates, such as special prison programmes, employment and more attention given.
other ideology to non-Islamic population.  

For Pape, religion matters, but one must look at the context of national resistance against the enemy, which can be the government or a particular nationality. Political motivations and economic incentives are far more influential than religious extremism in the case of suicide bombings. He argues that most suicide bombers are not uneducated, immature religious zealots or social losers. They collectively believe that their territory and culture are invaded and the invader cannot be overthrown.  

Bilveer Singh discusses socio-political motivations for radicalisation of Islamists terrorists and characterises the state of religious extremism vis-à-vis the current state of military and state affairs. He calls for rigorous commitment and communication with local Muslims and breaking the terrorists’ regional network rather than addressing their religious dissatisfaction. 

Thus, scholars have stressed for the history of Islam to be understood in the context of its wider political history. The abovementioned views do not necessarily argue for religion as the cause of radicalisation, but among other causes, religion is indeed problematic. Religion becomes a medium to endorse violence and the dilemma of assigning blame to religion as the main cause of radicalisation sets in when we try to find absolute differences in motivations for radicalisation.

While some scholars choose not to focus on religion as the main cause of radicalisation, Rohan Gunaratna et al argue that individuals are usually ideologically

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52 Pape draws his study from a demographic profile of over 460 men and women attackers.
driven and not operationally driven. Hence, they argue for the dismantling of the terrorists’ ideological beliefs as an effective way to stem the current global wave of terrorism. Here, we see nuances of ideological blame on radicalisation. As will be discussed later, ideology on its own may not be adequate enough to drive radicalisation. Some may be drawn to terrorism due to friendship or just out of anger and vengeance. The excerpt below is taken from an account written by Roki Aprisdianto, a former Klaten-based terrorist who was arrested in 2011.

“Ah, Polda. Rasanya masih terasa kebersamaan bersama beberapa ikhwan. Disana kami biasa saling bercanda. Terutama dengan ikhwan-ikhwan bom buku dan kelompok senjata Abu Umar. Tiada hari yang terlewatkan kecuali selalu ada canda disana. Aku sangat sedih berpisah dengan mereka tapi jalan ini lebih wajib untuk ku tempuhi. (Ah, the Regional Police. I still feel a sense of camaraderie with a few of my brothers, especially with my friends from the book bombs and Abu Umar’s group. Not a day passed that we did not chat there. I was very sorry to leave them but I had to move on (for my wives and kids))

On 10 December 2012, Roki was recaptured. After his first arrest, he had managed to get a small group together to build a simple bomb that two members planted in front of the police station in Pasar Kliwon, Solo on 20 November 2012. However, a passer-by saw it, and it was quickly dismantled by a bomb squad. He

was tried again and sentenced to nine years in August 2013, which he will presumably have to serve on top of the time remaining from his first sentence. While the interview excerpt highlights that Roki might be ideologically driven, Polri believes that Roki is just a plain hardcore and mischievous criminal who had planned to bomb police stations and even mosques.\(^57\)

Hence, it is not possible to narrow down a single cause of radicalisation as individual and environmental factors contribute in the same magnitude to the development of this issue. Frameworks have been established by various scholars in trying to understand the development of terrorism, although most of these theories are banked on the environmental cause of the terrorist and not the individual’s motivations towards engaging in these activities.\(^58\)

II. DERADICALISATION AND DISENGAGEMENT

Since the concept of deradicalisation is fairly new, there seems to be a lack of academic debate over theories of deradicalisation. However, the concept of disengagement has been around for some time. The question of determining why individuals move away from terrorism has garnered little interest, hence, suffering from a general apathy from analysts in the field. The practice of deradicalisation initiatives has nevertheless enjoyed considerable attention from counter-terrorism initiatives worldwide for their alleged outcomes and successes.

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Equally gaining attention is the concept of “disengagement.” Disengagement occurs when an individual or a group no longer engages in violence or the individual no longer participates in the violent activities of the group. Conversely, deradicalisation occurs when a group or an individual no longer believes in a violent ideology. The two processes are important in theorising the perpetrators of the violence, such as the extent of the terrorists’ radicalisation, why and how people participate in acts of terror and violence, as well as how to stop these actions. The end result of the deradicalisation programme does not necessarily lead to complete deradicalisation. Deradicalisation is an outcome that very few violent terrorists can achieve. Often, most will go into relapse upon release from prison without post-release monitoring efforts.

III. DERADICALISATION

Several authors have described deradicalisation as a process involving a cognitive shift, including Omar Ashour, Khan and Altaf, Gunaratna et al and Chowdhury and Hearne. Ashour, together with Chowdhury and Hearne, argue for a change in the fundamental beliefs of the terrorists. Thus, religious rehabilitation is a key strategy, but Chowdhury and Hearne assert that deradicalisation will work vis-à-vis a successful disengagement. While Gunaratna et al concur with Chowdhury and Hearne, the former call on the programme implementers to foster a strong rapport with the terrorists. Rabasa et al on the other hand argue for the need to delegitimise the terrorist groups and erode the confidence of programme participants on their former group as a more appropriate deradicalisation strategy spurred by the disengagement process. This is essential to steer the programme participants away from the terrorist network. Several literatures reviewed in this thesis urge for the
building of an effective deradicalisation strategy that promotes sustained disengagement.

Omar Ashour, a political scientist and author of *The De-Radicalisation of Jihadists*, defines the concept of deradicalisation as “a process of relative change within radical movements, one in which a radical group reverses its ideology and delegitimises the use of violent methods to achieve political goals, while also moving toward an acceptance of gradual, social, political and economic changes within a pluralist context.”\(^59\) He goes on to say that while deradicalisation requires the abandonment of violence, it can go without delegitimising the ideological reasons that permit society’s norms to be violated and the use of violence. In other words, deradicalisation can take place at either a behavioural level or ideological level. For Ashour, successful deradicalisation should ideally occur on all three levels: behavioural, ideological and organisational.\(^60\) Due to the shortcomings on the management and implementation of the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia that will be explained in chapter four, I feel that such a benchmark would be far-fetched for Indonesia at this moment.

Khan and Altaf define deradicalisation as “a fundamental transformation in understanding and a reorientation in outlook, often due to some personal traumatic experience of the violent ideologies, engendering post-traumatic growth in the form of rehabilitation.”\(^61\) From this definition, it is clear that deradicalisation is a thought


\(^{60}\) Ibid.

changing process. This definition also suggests that deradicalisation is a process that takes place after an individual has already been exposed to violent ideologies and is willing to change thought patterns because of the effect that the ideologies have had on him.62 Hence, to some extent, this is true given the fact that deradicalisation programmes are much easier to implement when involving individuals who have had first-hand experience engaging in these ideologies and are willing to change.63

Alternatively, Gunaratna et al view deradicalisation as a process on a continuum.64 They are of the opinion that an ideal type of rehabilitation includes capturing the “hearts and minds” of the terrorists and successfully reintegrating them into society through religious re-education, psychological counselling, social engagement and vocational training.65 The authors seem to get this understanding from the aims of these programmes, they are more interested in the process that is part of the concept, and their understanding is based on what is altered in the process of deradicalisation.66 Thus, the deradicalisation programmes are built on the assumption that “terrorism is a terrorism-justifying ideology.”67 It is thus difficult to use force in combating of terrorism because in the end, these ideologies will still be reinvented and reinvigorated, posing even greater challenges. Deradicalisation programmes aimed at dismantling and delegitimising the terrorism ideologies, according to the authors, are perhaps most effective methods of combating the issue.

65 Also see Rohan Gunaratna and Lawrence Rubin, in Terrorist Rehabilitation and Counter-Radicalisation: New Approaches to Counter-terrorism, Taylor & Francis, 2011, chap. 1.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
Chowdhury and Hearne view deradicalisation as involving a cognitive shift, and that the process should involve a fundamental change in understanding.\(^68\) The explanation on deradicalisation is contrasted with disengagement that the latter is defined as a behavioural change that may involve leaving the group and not engaging in terrorist activities.\(^69\) However, the authors argue that disengagement does not usually involve a change in ideals or values. Therefore, the authors link the two by saying that deradicalisation only occurs with a change in behaviour (disengagement) and involves delegitimising the radicals’ rhetoric and tactics in the eyes of the public. These sentiments are also echoed by other scholars as already discussed above.\(^70\)

Rabasa \textit{et al} define deradicalisation by first seeing it as a process of de-legitimisation in which individuals lose confidence in a given system and slowly retreat from their own group, because he or she no longer feels part of the group. Hence, the programme participants doubt the group’s values and its members. The terrorist groups are progressively dehumanised and regarded as possible adversaries to the programme participants. Thereafter, all deradicalisation efforts for the programme participants are now focused towards providing the participants with a new environment and belief system, in the hope of moderating the participants’ views towards moral values, global issues, religion and society. The authors also define deradicalisation as the opposite of radicalisation.\(^71\) They view it as a process of becoming less radical through a change in behaviour and beliefs. The behavioural

\(^{69}\) Ibid.
\(^{70}\) Ibid.
change involves a cessation of the violent activities performed by the individual and the belief change primarily involves an increase in confidence in the new system and a desire to be in the system.\textsuperscript{72}

Most researchers would distinguish the term “deradicalisation” from “counter-radicalisation.” The latter refers broadly to policies and programs that attempt to dissuade individuals at risk of radicalisation from becoming radicalised or “crossing the line and becoming terrorists”, which is part of the "counter-terrorism" strategy. Thus, counter-terrorism strategy involves “a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected - and possibly already radicalised - individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists.”\textsuperscript{73} In other words, counter-radicalisation works upstream to prevent radicalisation by reducing vulnerability and increasing resilience.

\textbf{IV. DISENGAGEMENT}

John Horgan describes disengagement as a process in which the individual’s role within an organisation changes from violent participation to a less active role.\textsuperscript{74} Horgan also asserts that disengagement alone does not necessarily bring about deradicalisation nor is deradicalisation a “necessary accompaniment to disengagement.”\textsuperscript{75} Hence, the process of disengagement would be different for each

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{72} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{74} John Horgan, in \textit{Walking Away from Terrorism}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 152. \\
The factors that encourage the disengagement process may provide the tools to build a strategy towards an efficient deradicalisation programme and the process involves both physical and psychological factors. Psychological factors may entail a change of priorities in the individual's mind towards the group, including developing negative sentiments or disillusionment with the political aims and actions of the organisation. Physical disengagement entails moving away from opportunities to engage in violent behaviour. Arrest, imprisonment and death are characteristic of the typical kinds of disengagement. Abundant research on disengagement processes involving different types of groups has been carried out, the most prominent being the deprogramming of individuals belonging to cults.

Concerning disengagement of individuals from cults, a number of best practices have been identified that are broadly applicable to other groups. Firstly, the exposure of a cult member to outside society was more likely to influence his behaviour and lead him to leave the organisation. Secondly, the intimate relationship with a person outside of the cult lessens an individual's obligation to his cult group and augments the likelihood of the latter to defect. Third, if the cult member did not consider the demands of the cult to be vital to the mission, the likelihood of defection from the cult increased. Fourth, if the cult failed to satisfy the emotional needs of the individual.


member, or failed to create strong group cohesion, defection was likely imminent. Fifth, family disapproval was an important factor in the decision to desert the group.\textsuperscript{79}

Many of the factors encountered in the disengagement processes from cult groups are similar to those of extremist and terrorist groups. Undoubtedly, the disengaged extremist may not necessarily be repentant or ‘deradicalised’ at all. Tore Bjorgo, author of \textit{Leaving Terrorism Behind}, identifies two essential factors in the decision of the terrorist to leave the group: the “push” and “pull” factors.” The “push” factors are essentially negative circumstances, such as a lack of commitment towards the organisation. Either the individual is no longer enticed with the ideological motivations that initially had radicalised him, or he has received parental or social disapproval. The “pull” factors are opportunities with promising potential, such as a job. Educational prospects could also be jeopardised if an individual’s group membership were known and a desire to establish a family was also identified as some of the strongest motives for leaving a militant group.

Bjorgo identifies several factors in support of the disengagement process, including a public rupture from the organisation even when the ideology remains strong, and a gradual retreat from the group. Conversely, Bjorgo also found that individuals might be adamant to leave a group for fear of lacking social ties outside of the group or lack of employment opportunities, given that many join terrorist groups for opportunistic or economic reasons. The individual may also fear

\textsuperscript{79}Several authors have argued that family closeness and parental disapproval of cult membership seemed to be significantly more effective in encouraging defection. See for example, James A. Beckford, in \textit{Cult Controversies: The Societal Response to New Religious Movements}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 139.
retaliation and lack of protection, which often causes him to delay his decision to leave the group.\textsuperscript{80}

Changing the perception of terrorist is another approach Mark Woodward \textit{et al} put forth.\textsuperscript{81} The authors assert that changing the individual's perceptions is an approach more realistic and pragmatic than changing the latter's identity and worldviews regarding terrorists and perpetrators of violence in Indonesia. They also concluded that disengagement should not be so dramatic, but the impact of altering the terrorists' perceptions is very important in order to reduce incidents of violence and terrorism.\textsuperscript{82}

V. CONCEPTUALISING ‘DERADICALISATION’ IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIA

Indonesia has designed many variants of deradicalisation programmes including community outreach programs to inoculate vulnerable groups against extremist ideology through travelling “road shows” of popular Islamic scholars who reject violence; innovative use of the Internet and other media to counter jihadist narratives; and youth activity programs directed at young men in their late teens and early twenties who might otherwise be subject to recruitment. Taken a step further, deradicalisation programmes in general can be aimed at strengthening “moderate” institutions – an approach full of pitfalls – or addressing social and economic grievances in those areas where marginalisation and discrimination have fostered

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extremism. However, in Indonesia, most deradicalisation programmes start with the prisons.

While the definitions of deradicalisation are fair and reasonable, scrutinising the context in which deradicalisation programme takes place in Indonesia and a redefinition of the term “deradicalisation” is necessary to illuminate the fact that the process should target the individual as well as the community where the individual is nested. Secondly, the primary aim of deradicalisation programme in Indonesia should be disengagement from acts of violence and the terrorist networks.

For the purpose of this paper, I shall employ a more pragmatic working definition of deradicalisation that is more appropriate for Indonesia. Therefore, “deradicalisation” is a managed process targeted at an individual as well as the community in which he is nested to refrain from engaging in terrorism for religion’s sake, while embracing national values that encourages tolerance and multiculturalism.

From this definition, cultural contextualisation is an important factor in this strategy, the programme should also encourage the rejection of violence, and acceptance of values as reflected in the philosophy of “pancasila,” which I will explain in the next section. I chose this definition because it begs for a more personalised and contextualised approach in designing the deradicalisation programme. The problem with accepting the general views of deradicalisation as presented in the preceding chapters lies in the difficulty or almost impossible task of persuading the detainees to moderate their religious views. However, John Horgan notes that it is possible for a person to deradicalise successfully at the ideological
level, but he does not disengage from committing violence and this is counter-productive for a successful deradicalisation. Horgan argues that,

“The disengaged terrorist may not be “deradicalised” or repentant at all. Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in ideological support”

This is because, once released, the individual will re-engage his old networks for: 1) social support, 2) because he feels indebted for past assistance rendered to him by the old network and 3) he fears retaliation by the group if they suspect he revealed secret information during police interrogation. It is more difficult to ensure that terrorists do not return to their old friends in the absence of post-programme efforts and nonchalant treatment of these terrorists by society. I will discuss in the later chapters how addressing the ‘cultural context’ will ease some of the problems associated with the implementation and management of the deradicalisation programme.

Hence, the working definition does not necessarily require that deradicalisation would eventually persuade the programme participants to abandon their extremist views on religion. As for success cases such as Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron, it is unclear to what extent they are deradicalised, given the enormous assistance and resources they acquired from the police. Based on my observation on several case studies, as well as the fairly high rate of recidivism of 10% for Indonesia, it is clear that programme participants will disengage from violence, but will not be easily persuaded to abandon their jihadist interpretation of Islam and aspirations for an Islamic state, hence, the title of my thesis, “a hazy redemption”.

83 John Horgan, in Walking Away from Terrorism, op. cit., p. 27.
Released detainees often made known their rejection on the use of violence and killing of civilians. However, some like Abu Rusydan openly display fervent anti-establishment sentiments and harbour aspirations to establish an Islamic state based on syariah laws in Indonesia.

VI. PANCASILA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DERADICALISATION

Pancasila was formulated in 1945 partly through the contributions of renowned Islamic scholars in Indonesia. The Quran and hadith were used as inspirations to pen down their philosophical contributions because they contain timeless values that are appropriate for the people of Indonesia. Therefore, in countering radicalism and terrorism, it is apt to employ Pancasila as an instrument of deradicalisation by the government and the community. Although radical Muslim groups have ardently rejected the philosophy of Pancasila, it would be useful for the government to revive the spirit of Pancasila through national education.

Therefore, sensitising radicals with the values of Pancasila can be an effective way to encourage disengagement or even deradicalisation. A Muslim who upholds Pancasila will have guided principles to instil a mindset that rejects extremist ideologies through his aqidah (faith), ibadah (obligations), muamallah (civil transactions), adab (manners) and akhlak (morals). How so? I will use some of the principles of Pancasila to explain.

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84 The second draft of Pancasila was formulated in the Jakarta Charter by the Committee of Nine (Panitia Sembilan) which include Islamic figures such as, Ki Hadikusumo (an ulama and head of Muhammadiyah), Wahid Hashim (Head of Nadhatul Ulama) and Abi Kusno (a key figure in Masyumi). See Pandji Setijo, in Pend Pancasila – Persep Sej PB (CB), Grasindo, 2011. See also, Jajat Burhanudin and Kees van Dijk, in Islam in Indonesia: Contrasting Images and Interpretations, Amsterdam University Press, 2013, chap. 2.

85 See Azyumardi Azra, “The Use and Abuse of Quranic verses in contemporary Indonesian politics,” in Approaches to the Quran in Contemporary Indonesia, edited by Abdullah Saeed, chap. 10.

The first principle of Pancasila - believe in the one and only God - encourages an individual to recognise that his or her conception of God may be different from the conception of God to others. This difference will not cause conflict, because there is no compulsion in the conception of God. A Muslim who comprehends Pancasila will understand that people belong to different religions. Hence, any religious devotee will adhere to similar principles, such as duty to God, fellow human beings and the environment in general. The second principle – just and civilised humanity – allows an individual to balance fundamental human rights and freedom with the individual’s obligation toward society and state. This principle highlights the idea that relationships within society and state should be based upon a just and civilised morality.87 As for the third principle – unity of Indonesia – the people and the government should join hands to ensure the success of the deradicalisation programme manifested through the Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (National Agency for Combating Terrorism, BNPT). The government should therefore play the facilitator role by bringing together renowned religious leaders, motivators and social workers to contribute their expertise in the various stages of the deradicalisation programme. The reformation of the national education system should entail, which imbues the “pancasila” mindset, rather than just giving away formal information about the five principles in the classroom. Hence, reinforcing the “Pancasila” mindset in the education system would reduce the chances of radicalisation in communities. Many political leaders and top civil servants have spoken publicly for the need to inculcate these values among Islamic radicals via

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deradicalisation programmes. As such, reviving patriotism is an important strategy as a counter-narrative to the jihadist culture.

Can the exploit of “Pancasila” narratives facilitate deradicalisation? The working definition of deradicalisation thus attempts to answer an important question, “what are we deradicalising?” Ideally, the result of the deradicalisation programme should be the abandonment of extremist religious views. However, bearing in mind the difficulties faced by the government to control the proliferation of radical ideas in mosques, pesantren and the internet, the most exigent outcome is to discourage political and social violence. One way is to permeate the values of Pancasila in prison, as well as the community to counter jihadists’ narratives. This could discourage recidivism and impede the process of re-radicalisation and recruitment. Therefore, the Indonesian government should infuse a sustained outreach effort with the values of Pancasila through the state’s national education programme and public seminars. Islamic radicals are accepted and tolerated in some Indonesian village mosques, and these mosques are gaining participation from Muslims with diverse orientations, even from neighbouring villages. Hence, deradicalisation programmes in prisons should be adopted and extend its target at a national level, particularly in rural and small town communities where the released terrorist are usually nested.

VII. CAN RADICALISM BE REVERSED?

Can radicalism be reversed? Some have argued that the process can actually be reversed while others claim otherwise due to a number of systemic influences. The question begs us to appreciate the motivations of individuals to engage in terrorist activities.\(^89\) Barrett and Bokhari assert that any discussion of reversing the process of radicalisation should first examine what processes the radical individual went through to become sufficiently radicalised to take up violent means.\(^90\) Alternatively, reversing the process of terrorism is possible base on their arguments that individuals are not born terrorists but they become terrorists through indoctrination over time. Hence, there is a possibility of a process reversal for individuals to go back to the initial state.\(^91\) Those who maintain that the process cannot be changed argue on the basis that individuals go through a cycle of learning where there they are exposed to new information, ideas, behaviours and attitudes.\(^92\) Although the process does not lead to a permanent change in behaviour and perceptions, it is entirely difficult to reverse the process as it is already entrenched in the mind and relapse could be inevitable.

Existing studies on terrorism seem to discover a set of universal principles that could shed light on the essential nature of radicalisation, but the process has revealed that their methodologies may be inappropriate to understand behavioural


\[^91\] Ibid.

experience within a particular cultural context. In reviewing a study on *jihadi* extremism, terrorism scholar Andrew Silke, on one hand, lauds Sageman for being able to build profiles of *jihadi* extremists, while at the same time charging that the publically available sources of information used by Sageman were not always reliable.\(^93\) Silke faulted Sageman for failing to make comparisons with individuals who were not members of extremist groups.\(^94\) Within the context of this particular research design, Silke is essentially alleging Sageman with committing the methodological error known as “selection on the dependent variable” in which Sageman chose his cases based on the particular value they may have in helping to establish patterns. Raymond Bakker replicated part of Sageman's study of *jihadists* in Europe and the former acknowledged Sageman’s contribution of underscoring the important role of radicalisation and social networks in providing potential entrée into terrorist organisations.\(^95\) He notes, however, that Sageman's characterisation of *jihadi* extremism as being linked to global *Salafi* networks does not fit well with current European realities in which successful attacks, such as those in Madrid, Amsterdam and London, as well as failed attacks and plots, were “home-grown”. Moreover, the attacks were carried out without the central control of any organisation in the global *jihadist* movement. Sageman updates his views in a later work where he characterises the current version of the global Islamist threat as “leaderless”, falling more in line with Bakker on the nature of the European *jihadist* movement.\(^96\) Sageman’s updated account recognises that the *jihadist* movement has evolved over time and, thus, the study is indeed noteworthy.

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\(^93\) Marc Sageman, in *Understanding Terror Networks*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

\(^94\) Richard R. Barrett and Laila Bokhari, "De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world. An overview," *op. cit.*


Consequently, Sageman’s methodology can only offer a snapshot in time. While the movement itself continues to morph and change, this approach does not account for time and the fluidity of events that Sageman refers.\textsuperscript{97} It is also representative of many studies that seek to use a correlational approach to support rebuttable assumptions. For example, Sageman equates attending university and obtaining a degree as a measure of educational level without contextualising the educational experience of the individual in terms of: 1) quality of education, 2) experience in school, 3) the availability of resources and 4) the potential discriminatory practices within the school system that the individual would face as a member of a particular religious or ethnic minority.\textsuperscript{98}

This data-driven approach highlights another unfortunate feature of many current efforts to study radicalisation. As Veldhuis and Staun rightly point out, most research on radicalisation, particularly after 9/11, has basically utilised a post hoc approach in which terrorist attacks have often been the starting point towards investigating the radicalisation process.\textsuperscript{99}

Research has shown that there is a possibility of reversing the process through a comprehensive deradicalisation programme that should encompass both soft and hard measures that Densus 88 and the National Agency for Combating

\textsuperscript{97} Besides \textit{Understanding Terror Networks}, see other works by Marc Sageman, in “Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in Afghanistan and Beyond,” a testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, presented on 7 October 2009. In the testimony, he talked about the danger of global neo-jihadi terrorism. See pp. 13-15 of the transcript.

\textsuperscript{98} See Marc Sageman, in \textit{Understanding Terror Networks}, \textit{op. cit.}

Terrorism (BNPT) in Indonesia have been trying to achieve.\textsuperscript{100} Horgan is of the opinion some “push” and “pull” factors can actually lead to the reversal of the process. However, support is needed for the personalised approach to reduce the chances of recidivism. Some of the factors that would lead to a possibility of leaving terrorism include, disillusionment with the group’s objectives, the behaviour and conduct of the group’s leader, loss of status or rank within the group, inability to withstand being a fugitive and loyalty issues between the family and the group that cause tension.\textsuperscript{101} These factors actually “push” or encourage the individual to leave terrorist activities. Other pull factors include the opportunity to leave a violent life, amnesty, reduced jail terms, financial and social support, re-education, longing for peace, ordinary living and starting a family.\textsuperscript{102}

Despite these pull and push factors that encourage reverting from terrorism, the use of a multi-pronged approach has been touted as being more useful. Scholars propose a DDR (disengagement, deradicalisation, and rehabilitation) approach that is seen as effective in reversing terrorist ideals. This approach should involve four important issues: (1) go-betweens must be used to encourage terrorist to abandon the their actions, to be done in prisons and through counselling; (2) there must be religious re-education teaching the mainstream understandings about the Quran\textsuperscript{103} and eliminating false theo-political interpretations\textsuperscript{104} (3) mobilising ex-terrorists,

\textsuperscript{100} Dearstyne and Bruce W, “Fighting terrorism with Information: Issues and Opportunities,” in Information Outlook, vol. 6, no. 3, 2002, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{101} John Horgan, in The Psychology of Terrorism, Routledge, New York, p. 121.
\textsuperscript{103} Here, I am referring to mainstream understanding and interpretation of the Quran in accordance to the \textit{ahlul-sunnah wal-jamaah}.
\textsuperscript{104} See Bilveer Singh, “Terrorism Abandonment [DDR] as a key to counter-Terrorism Strategy in Future,” op. cit. The concept of theopolitics are the two sciences of theology and politics. See Reventlow H.G. et al, in Politics and theopolitics in the Bible and postbiblical literature, 1994, Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield.
especially those who were in top ranks to encourage individuals to disengage from violence, and (4) mobilising family members and peers to provide social support during rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{105} The objective of this approach is to soften the hearts and minds of the terrorists to revert from their beliefs and ideologies. In practice, it is very difficult to reverse the process of terrorism as this involves a clear understanding of the psychological motivations and environmental motivations. A root cause analysis is thus needed for an effective employment for the approach.\textsuperscript{106} Root cause analysis provides a method to research and systematically plot the range of root causes underlying the terrorist’s origins, grievances and demands. Ideally, mapping the root causes will produce the information to articulate appropriate responses from the government, hence, providing the aptitude to calibrate its strategies and tactics for the particular threat of terrorism effectively.

Reflecting the frustration in the current state of radicalisation and terrorism research, Horgan asserts that a legacy of the reductionist approaches to understanding terrorist behaviour is not only confusion about what a psychology of terrorism implies, but also the realisation that even some of the simplest analyses of terrorists produce inconsistent and confusing uses of psychological findings.\textsuperscript{107} Horgan argues for an interdisciplinary approach that will provide a more sophisticated understanding of the psychological processes involved in terrorism. He suggests that researchers should begin to think in terms of “pathways” instead of

\textsuperscript{105} John Horgan, in The Psychology of Terrorism, op. cit., p. 125.
\textsuperscript{107} A reductionist approach tends to mute or even ignore the multifaceted and cross-disciplinary character of the problem. On the other hand, the interdisciplinary approach accepts the fact that the problem is complex and beyond the ability of any single discipline to understand comprehensively. See Allen F. Repko, in Interdisciplinary Research: Precess and Theory, SAGE Publications, 2011, chap. 5.
“profiles” and “root causes” when seeking to understand terrorist behaviour.\textsuperscript{108} This is where Kumar Ramakrishna, in his book, brings together an understanding of both societal influences and individual level factors to make sense of the motivations guiding the actions of the members of JI.\textsuperscript{109} Hence, examining “pathways” would presumably include an understanding of the radicalisation process and provide a way to understand how an individual moves towards radicalised beliefs over time in a fluid and constantly changing social environment.

VIII. CULTURAL CONTEXT

Most research to date on radicalisation and militant extremism have neglected the interaction between the cultural context and the individual’s cognitive development which combine to constantly shape and reshape the individual’s worldview that eventually determine the individual’s life trajectory. As Valsiner notes, “all human beings are said to belong to society or societies. Yet they do so in different ways...”\textsuperscript{110} An individual is not only embedded in society but society is also embedded in the individual in a way that is personalised and unique.

When culture is referred to in everyday parlance, we recognise that people make different assumptions about the world. Culture is categorised in different ways and adhere to different values and beliefs, all of which significantly shape behaviours...

\textsuperscript{108} For looking at pathways to radicalism, see Kumar Ramakrishna, in Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalisation in Indonesia, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2009. In developing the Radical Pathways framework, the book extensively reviews the studies on social psychology and culture. Ramakrishna does a commendable job in referencing and discussing these concepts and demonstrating their applicability in Indonesia and for the JI.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

and ways of thinking.\textsuperscript{111} Thus, cultural contextualisation should apply to groups insofar as participants often hold values, attitudes, beliefs and ideological orientations that are often quite distinct from the broader culture and those shifts cause social change. There is an extensive body of research in sociology and political science that is based upon this view.\textsuperscript{112} The use and application of the term has also been contested and appropriated because culture in today’s academic discourse is often more complex and fluid.\textsuperscript{113}

What then constitutes culture in the context of deradicalisation? This thesis assumes that there is a deeply entrenched \textit{jihadist} culture among Islamists terrorists. Hence, as with the discussion that will follow, \textit{jihadists’} culture consists of a) social and personal networks, b) personal and group beliefs, c) attitudes towards \textit{jihad}, d) attitudes of society towards terrorists as well as e) prison conditions. In chapter four, the prison conditions in Indonesia will be described in greater details. While these components of culture are important, tackling the attitude of society towards terrorism and disengaging the personal networks of terrorists are some of the key strategies. The government must be able to discourage or stop released terrorists from returning to their old terrorist network. Sulastri Osman argues that radicalisation is influenced by a number of factors that can be seen to be culturally linked. Thus, the understanding of this concept is important to ensure the programme’s


success.\textsuperscript{114} Osman pertinently points out that individual and religious radicalisation are actually tied to traditional or cultural aspects, influenced by two factors: blood relations and marriage. This is in the context of JI, which is marked by blood relations, marriages and brotherhood that facilitate terrorism.\textsuperscript{115} A cultural approach is paramount to understand how these relationships have formed over time and how deradicalisation can be applied in specific situations.

However, how can we measure and assess culture in the context of deradicalisation? There are several approaches: the “survey-research” approach, the “analytical descriptive” approach and the “ethnographic” approach. The “survey-research” approach measures culture through individual questionnaires. Thus, this quantification of culture will lead to the de facto definition of culture.\textsuperscript{116} While this method starts with deep conceptual definitions of culture as “mental models” or “underlying assumptions,” their subsequent attempts to measure it by questionnaires and the forcing of the data into dimensions derived a priori or by factor analysis implies that culture is definable at the surface attitude level.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, if one starts with a definition of culture as an aspect of the “deep structure” of an organisation or some of its parts, it is unlikely that a pre-determined dimension that leads to questionnaire construction adequately cover the conceptual terrain that culture deals with in main issue in this thesis. The “analytical descriptive” approach requires culture to be described and measure. Thus, culture is broken down

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} See Geert Hofstede, in Organisational Cultures, Beyond the Fad: A Qualitative/quantitative Study Across Twenty Cases, University of Lumburg Press, 1988. See also, Geert Hofstede & Michael Bond, in The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to Economic Growth, 1988.
analytically into components that are empirically more manageable and settles for studies of those components. Thus, the core concept becomes undefined and implicit but its manifestations occupy centre stage and become the de facto definition of culture. These manifestations, which I will discuss in later chapters, include Islamic practices, rituals, social networks, principles, mindset and attitudes. This is useful as a research strategy. Nevertheless, as a conceptual strategy, it imposes a possibly undesirable bias and makes assumptions that may not be valid from other points of view. The validity in the true meaning of the symbolic or behavioural manifestations may not be decipherable without the fathoming of a deeper set of phenomena that tie those manifestations together.

While the ethnographic method is the ideal approach to gather data for this thesis as a cultural interpretation, the short span of time spent with the informants and interviewees does not allow the author to gather in-depth experience and thorough observation. The thesis also lacks the essential elements of an ethnographic work. Hence, this thesis does not constitute ethnography, and anthropologists do share a core of common expectations about ethnographic presentations. However, while this thesis is descriptive and gathered from a few interviews, it may contain a handful critical feature of ethnographic works. In other words, a descriptive focus is a necessary element, but is only part of what constitutes ethnography. Nevertheless, taken from anthropology and sociology, the approach begins with an assumption that there are deeper structures that cannot be unravelled or understood without intensive and extensive observation supplemented

118 See articles by Harris and Sutton, “Functions of parting ceremonies in dying organisations,” in *Academy of Management Journal*, vol. 29, 1986, pp. 5-30. See also, Martin and Siehl, “Organisational culture and counterculture: An uneasy symbiosis,” in *Organisational Dynamics*, vol 12, no.2, pp. 52-64.
by interview data from cultural insiders or the terrorists themselves. Geertz calls this “thick description” and this approach brings out the uniqueness and complexity of the cultural imperatives.\textsuperscript{119} Paradoxically, the approach leaves unexamined, the conceptual and definitional problems of the cultural concept as applied to deradicalisation and radicalisation. A central assumption of this approach is that culture can ultimately only be deciphered as it is enacted. Therefore, it implies that the terrorists’ culture does not exist conceptually except in the observable behavioural manifestations enacted by the group members, in this case the terrorist convicts, the non-terrorists convicts and the community in which the terrorist is nested. However, this may also lead to vague conceptualisation of culture like “the way we do things” or “common systems of meaning” that belies the “depth” of the observational methods. Also, this approach forces us to limit our observations to some limited aspect of the group’s behaviour and explain that aspect in great detail without necessarily tying that entire behavioural set into other phenomena that may exist among the terrorists.

Therefore, from an analytical standpoint, culture matters and must be taken into account if we are to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of the deradicalisation process and the pathways that may lead individuals towards extremist behaviour that may culminate in violence. The International Peace Institute (IPI) notes that it is particularly important to pay close attention to the context of the deradicalisation programme in order to ensure success. The context in this case means the cultural environment, social, political, and global climate. Shallow

understanding of the individual culture of the terrorist is what defines the success of one programme and the failure of another programme.\textsuperscript{120}

Understanding the culture is indeed imperative for any policy makers or academics who are conducting research in Indonesia, which is an amalgamation of multi-cultural societies. Thus, many considerations and sensitivities have to be made when implementing deradicalisation programmes. The Indonesian programme is actually built on the ability of the deradicalisation officer to adapt to the personal experiences of the detainee in order to understand how the detainee feels.\textsuperscript{121} Culture remains an important concept in the deradicalisation of terrorists because a deep appreciation of the cultural context would equip the officers running the programmes in being able to understand the motivations better as well as other drives that push these terrorists to engage in violent activities. The proceeding chapter shall deal with the historical account on the rise of radical groups in Indonesia. It sets the stage for readers to understand the evolution of terrorism and terrorist groups’ motivations in Indonesia.

IX. CONCLUSION

Several aspects of the aforementioned concepts can be researched and are relevant for the implementation of the deradicalisation programme and to encourage disengagement: firstly, the significance of the change in perceptions of actors and perpetrators of violence and terror. Secondly, there is a need to trace the


\textsuperscript{121} John Horgan, in The Psychology of Terrorism, op. cit., p. 126.
background, the ideological and sociological paths, the people who join terrorist networks and the understanding of variations in their motives.\textsuperscript{122}

There are a number of issues that deserves attention from the literature on deradicalisation. Most of the above-mentioned studies believe that deradicalisation should involve a cognitive shift, a change in beliefs about terrorism ideals.\textsuperscript{123} It was also identified that deradicalisation is a process that flows from disengagement.\textsuperscript{124} Deradicalisation begins when the radicals are bombarded with pull and push factors in prison that allows them to experience a “cognitive opening,” making them receptive to new ideas. The cognitive opening is the result of a traumatic experience that challenges the coherence of the individual’s worldview. Thus, deradicalisation programmes pick up from this point in order to foster a change in ideals and a fundamental shift in understanding.\textsuperscript{125}

Most of the literature and its understanding on the concept of deradicalisation have led to a process-based approach to deradicalisation where the implementers of these programmes are focused on change in ideals and a return to normalcy.\textsuperscript{126} Many authors, therefore, believe that a shift in ideals is essential for any deradicalisation programme to succeed. This is a rather skewed approach to the deradicalisation programmes, given the fact that most of these programmes take place in the Islamic world. The ideals of the Islam are some of the contributory factors to the development of the radicals. Thus, by focusing on these ideals, it could

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{122} Thomas Hegghammer, "Global Jihadism after the Iraq War," in \textit{The Middle East Journal}, vol. 60, no. 1, 2006, p. 32.
\item\textsuperscript{123} Richard R. Barrett and Laila Bokhari, "De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world. An overview," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 170-180.
\item\textsuperscript{124} Chowdhury, Naureen and Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism: De-radicalisation and Disengagement from Violent Extremism,” \textit{op. cit.}
\item\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\item\textsuperscript{126} See John Horgan, “De-radicalisation or Disengagement? A Process in Need of Clarity and a Counterterrorism Initiative in Need of Evaluation,” \textit{op. cit.}
\end{itemize}
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be difficult to change the minds of the individuals or groups engaged in terrorism.\textsuperscript{127} Other scholars have argued for a system wide approach to deradicalisation programmes by including a change in ideals, in behaviour and in beliefs. This would mean that the process of disengagement must precede deradicalisation.\textsuperscript{128} A complete focus on ideologies is not the most effective way to handle deradicalisation programmes because of group influence as well as the strong presence of Islamic religious beliefs.\textsuperscript{129}

Terrorism literature has been exhaustive with many of the studies focusing on change in ideals and beliefs. Community involvement in these programmes is important as well. Individual motivations should also be understood in order to create programmes that actually address the needs of the group or the individual, making it difficult for them to retreat and go back to their ideals and behaviour.\textsuperscript{130} However, as what this thesis and other scholars would suggest, there are no one-size-fit all deradicalisation models that can be applied across all systems.

\textsuperscript{130} Richard R. Barrett and Laila Bokhari, "De-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world. An overview," \textit{op. cit}, p. 175.
CHAPTER 3: RADICALISM REVISITED IN THE CONTEXT OF INDONESIA’S HISTORY

Many countries today experience the menace of radicalism sweeping their society. Radicalism in Indonesia is a long-standing phenomenon. It is a part of Indonesia’s political history and has been active since the colonial era. Along with Muslim sentiments, coinciding with the feelings against Western domination over the Muslims, radicalism in Indonesia grew and evolved in various intensity and nature throughout its course of history. The next sections trace the development of radicalism by various groups – especially Islamic groups - throughout the relevant period in Indonesia’s history: the Dutch colonial era, the Sukarno era (Old Order era), the New Order era and the Reformasi era. It is also important to note that Indonesian radical movements have their origin in reform movements in the Middle East, such as Wahhabism.

I. RADICALISM DURING THE DUTCH COLONIAL PERIOD

During the Dutch colonial period, radicalisation among the farmers developed due to the widespread economic exploitation through cultuurstelsel. This policy gave the Dutch and their Indonesian allies’ enormous wealth through export growth.

While the Dutch introduced modernised industries in Indonesia, colonial exploitation

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131 The Cultivation System (cultuurstelsel), or less accurately the Culture System, was a Dutch government policy in the mid-nineteenth century for its Dutch East Indies colony, requiring a portion of agricultural production to be devoted to export crops, Indonesian historians refers to it as Tanam Paksa (Enforcement Planting). The Dutch forced the cultivation of sugar under the infamous cultuurstelsel. Elson indeed notes, and perhaps as much as four-fifths of such income was returned to the Netherlands East Indies Government in the form of taxes. See Robert E. Elson, in The Cultivation system and "agricultural revolution, Southeast Asian Studies Department, Monash University, Melbourne. 1978. See also, Merle C. Ricklefs, in A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200, Stamford University Press, 2001, p. 159.
took place. Profits from the system were ploughed back to the Netherland’s state revenue. This not only impacted the economic well-being of the Indonesians but also their culture. Many of the villages’ institutions were destroyed and cultural practices that the natives had adhered to for many years slowly withered. Thus, the tension of economic pressure grew among the peasants that led to an insurgency.  

Sartono Kartodirdjo, a prominent Indonesian historian, classifies the various insurgencies during the Dutch colonial period into four main categories, 1) the anti-racketeering movement, 2) revivalist group, 3) chiliastic movement, 4) the local Sarekat Islam (SI) movement. The four groups used religion as their basis such as holy war or “sabillilah,” including the use of orders or “tarekat” in their recruitment or during the rebellions, such as the Banten Rebellion in 1750 and the Lombok rebellion in 1891. For example, the farmers who rebelled on a privately owned farm in Ciomas in 1886 - which was categorised as anti-racketeering – were accused by the colonial government of being fanatics and using religion as its fuel. Similarly, the revolt led by Achmad Ngisa in 1871, who declared himself as the defender of fairness (Ratu Adil), was waged in the name of holy war and the use of tarekat.

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132 Iskandar N, In Aspek demografi dan sejarah perekonomian yang relevan bagi pembangunan dalam jangka panjang di Indonesia, Faculty of Economics, Universitas Indonesia, 1978.
136 Ibid.
Among the various types of insurgents, movements that were sectarian in nature posed a major problem for the Dutch. An example of a sectarian movement was the *Padri* War, an armed conflict in Minangkabau, Sumatra. It was a confrontation between reformist Muslims (known as *Padris*) and the local chieftains who received assistance from the Dutch. The pioneers of *Kaum Padri* were greatly influenced by *Wahabiism* upon their return from performing the *Haj* in Mecca. A similar *Padri* movement existed in Minagkabau and the movement declared the *tarekat Syattariyah* as a perverted Islamic group because they practised *takhayul, bid’ah and khurafat*. The war, which occurred from 1803 to 1839, was initially ignited due to disagreements in Islamic matters before it turned into a battle against the Dutch occupation. The war began with the arrival of the *Padri* movement that strongly opposed un-Islamic acts in the Pagaruyung district (Sumatra) such as gambling, opium and liquor consumption, matriarchy, and the erosion of Islamic obligations. The turmoil triggered a split between the *Kaum Padri* and the *Kaum Adat* during the reign of Sultan Muning Alamsyah and later on involving the Dutch. The *Kaum Adat* sought help from the Dutch and the latter arrived in Padang, Sumatra in full battle gear. Realising their battle inferiority against the Dutch, the *Kaum Padris* resorted to guerrilla warfare.

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137 *Wahabism* is a branch of Sunni Islam, (though some people dispute that a *Wahabi* is a *Sunni*). It is a religious movement among fundamentalist Islamic believers, with an aspiration to return to the earliest fundamental Islamic sources of the *Quran* and *Hadith*, with inspiration from the teachings of medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyyah and early jurist Ahmad Ibn Hanbal.

Besides confronting the Dutch, the Kaum Padri employed violence against those who detracted from the true teachings of Islam, in accordance to the former’s practice. According to Abdurrahman Wahid, the Kaum Padri championed several Islamic laws which were foreign to the locals such as: a) keeping long beards and penalty for those who shaved, b) punishments for female who did not cover their aurat except for their eyes and hands and for males who exposed their knees, and c) death penalty for those who repeatedly miss their solat fardhu. In addition, the Kaum Padri permitted slavery. Imam Bonjol, one of their famous leaders who was regarded as a national hero for fighting against colonialism, legalised slavery. These slaves were acquired during the wars against fellow Muslims whom they regarded as infidels.

The radicalism of the Kaum Padri was further underlined in 1815 during the assassination of members of the royal family who had embraced Islam. Tuanku Nan Renceh, a padri, punished his own aunt to death for consuming betel that was ruled as haram. According to Wahid, the Padrises mirrored the Wahabis during its formative period and the latter’s followers such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The ideology and actions of the ulamas at that time can be considered radical, as they attempted to promote social change in a hasty and extensive manner. The ulamas chose to engage in conflicts using arms even though during that time, the Kaum Adat was less able. The involvement of the Dutch made the conflict even more complex and it intensified anti-colonial sentiments even among the non-Padrises.

139 Merle C. Ricklefs, in A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200, op. cit, p. 183.
140 See Gerry Van Klinken, “Return of the Sultans: the communitarian turn in local politics,” in The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics: The Deployment of Adat from Colonialism to Indigenism, edited by Jamie S. Davidson and David Henley, op. cit., chap. 7. See also, Renske Biezeveld, “The many roles of adat in West Sumatra,” op. cit., chap. 9.
Using the concept of nationalism in a broad manner, the first organisational expression of nationalist aspirations was championed by *Budi Utomo* (BU), or the “Noble Endeavor,” formed in Java in 1908.¹⁴¹ Rather than having an explicitly political programme, BU functioned primarily as a government pressure group, and was particularly interested in getting the government to establish more schools and to ensure that more natives received modern education.¹⁴² The group members initially came from the Western-educated student population in the major cities. However, they group swiftly expanded to include members from the lower rungs of the Javanese society, especially the lower level of the *priyayi*. BU was short-lived as an organisation, due to internal tensions among the *priyayi* and its uneasy relationship with the Dutch authorities. While the formation of BU was perceived as the beginning of organised nationalism, some of its former members, such as Tjipto Mangunkusomo and Suwardi Suryaningrat went on to form the more radical Indische Party which was an influential political organisation founded in 1912.

II. **RADICALISM DURING SUKARNO’S ERA (OLD ORDER)**

Before the Japanese occupation, radical groups directed their dissention towards the Dutch. In the 1920s, the PKI coordinated an increasingly radical movement, voicing defiance against the Dutch. However, the movement waned after

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¹⁴¹ See Akira Nagazumi, in *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918*, Institute of Developing Economies, 1972, pp. 85-120. See also Steven Drakeley, in *The History of Indonesia*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 2005, chap 3. Heryanto points to a “more populist and egalitarian” Muslim association (*Sarekat Dagang Islamiyah*), born a few years prior, as a more genuinely nationalist organization: one, which was banned by the Dutch. See Ariel Heryanto & Sumit K. Mandal, in *Challenging Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia*, Routledge, New York, 2012, chap. 1.

the Dutch banned the PKI and imprisoned its leaders.\footnote{Gerindo was an Indonesian political organisation founded by a group of leftist nationalists and communists in 1937 during the national liberation struggle of the Indonesian people. See Kahin, R. Audrey, in Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity from Diversity, University of Hawaii Press, 1985, p. 117.} The 1930s saw the formation of a new radical organisation, Gerindo (Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia or Indonesian People’s Movement), which was revolutionary in nature. Its leaders had been associated with the PKI, PNI, Partindo (Partai Indonesia or Indonesian Party) and the Islamic-modernist, Sumatra Thawalib.\footnote{The establishment of Partindo was the result of a decision made by Sartono when he was the chairperson of the PNI-Lama replacing Sukarno who was captured by the Dutch government in 1929. Sartono dissolved PNI and established Partindo. The goal of Partindo was the same as that of with PNI-Lama that is to fight for Indonesia’s independence by running a non-cooperation politics against the Dutch government. Ibid.} As Gerindo was anti-colonial and anti-European, it called for national independence and land reform, which was welcomed by the Javanese communities. However, the organisation was short-lived due to internal tensions.

After the struggle to secure Indonesia’s independence, divisions in Indonesia’s society began to seep in. During Sukarno’s era of Liberal Democracy (1950-1957) and Guided Democracy (1957-1965), radicalism was characterised by the mushrooming of separatist movements that aimed to establish a state independent from the Republic of Indonesia. Sukarno’s secular government gave no room for an Islamic state. These movements could not accommodate the terms of the establishment of the Republic and responded with violent opposition. These included societal differences on religion, customs, fears of Javanese political domination and the impact of Christianity and Marxism. As a newly formed independent state, Indonesia was facing a fundamental problem in which all the parties involved in the struggle to establish it were in disagreement with regards to its constitution and state ideology.
One such group that opposed the Indonesian constitution during Sukarno’s era was the *Darul Islam* (DI). Muslim militias originally established the DI’s predecessor, *Hizbullah* and *Sabillilah* towards the end of the Japanese occupation in 1942.\(^{145}\) Since the proclamation of the DI by Kartosuwirjo in 1949, it was influential over large areas in West Java with the aim of proclaiming an Islamic state. The DI positioned itself as an alternative to Sukarno’s government and its leaders met in 1953 to form a united front to proclaim the Islamic state of Indonesia, with Kartosuwirjo as its first imam. The DI / *Tentara Islam Indonesia* (TII) led by Kartosuwirjo appeared five years after Indonesia proclaimed its independence and the DI/TII was formed to advocate the ideology of Kartosuwirjo with regards to institutionalising the *syariah* laws and to form the Islamic state of Indonesia. The rebellion of the DI/TII led by Kartosuwirjo is considered the onset of terrorism fuelled by religious grounds in Indonesia. Such ideology is still used as a primary objective of terrorists today. Although the DI / TII Kartosuwirjo was not listed as a terrorist organisation, it was given the spotlight whenever the issue of radicalism in Indonesia was discussed.\(^{146}\) *The Darul Islam* went on to produce several violent splinter groups, notably *Jemaah Islamiyah*, which will be discussed later.

Another DI / TII group, which was led by Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, operated in South Sulawesi and was part of the DI / TII Kartosuwirjo.\(^{147}\) Muzakkar, a former

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\(^{147}\) Darul Islam fighters sought to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia and rebellions were carried out in Aceh, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi. West Java was the worst hit. See Jamie S. Davidson, in *From Rebellions to Riots: Collective Violence on Indonesian Borneo* by, *Indonesia: Towards Democracy*, op. cit., chap. 2.
Lieutenant Colonel in the TNI, accepted Kartosuwirjo’s offer to become the chief of the TII’s fourth division in Sulawesi. The division was then named *Divisi Hasanuddin*, as Muzakkar did not want to use the name “TII” for his regiment. He preferred to employ the name, *Tentara Kemerdekaan Rakyat* (TKR), or the *People’s Freedom Army*. On 7 August 1953, Muzakkar declared that Sulawesi and the eastern region of Indonesia were willing to join the NII, and Muzakkar was made Deputy Minister of Defence NII.\(^\text{148}\) During his leadership in DI Sulawesi, he carried out some offensive activities against the government such as attacking the Indonesian army (TNI), the destruction of bridges and kidnapping Christian doctors and priests. The government of Indonesia countered the group by launching Operation ‘Tumpas’ and ‘Lighting’ to quell the rebellion of Muzakkar’s group. On 2 February 1965, Muzakkar was shot dead in an operation launched by the TNI.\(^\text{149}\)

In 1953, Daud Beureu’eh formed the DI/TII movement and Daud was very influential in Aceh. He supported the *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM) and declared that the province and adjacent areas of Aceh as part of the NII. The group almost managed to control Aceh except for big cities such as Banda Aceh, Sigil, Langsa and Meulaboh, which remained under the firm grip of the Indonesian government. Part of the reason for the NII Aceh movement’s formation was Daud’s disappointment towards the Sukarno’s government for not fulfilling its promises to institutionalise the *syariah* law in Aceh after the war for independence. The insurgency in Aceh was resolved after special autonomy status was granted to Aceh on 26 May 1959 in the areas of religion, customs and education.

\(^\text{148}\) One of the best comprehensive accounts of the *Darul Islam* is by Nazaruddin. See Nazaruddin Sjamsuddin, in *The Republican Revolt: a study of the Acehnese Rebellion*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1985, chap. 1-3 and 6.

\(^\text{149}\) Merle C. Ricklefs, in *A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200*, op. cit., p. 326.
III. PKI’S RADICALISM: THE RISE OF ODER BARU (NEW ORDER)

Radical movements that openly engaged in armed rebellion and terrorism tactics were prominent in the course of Indonesia’s history. They aimed at forming a separate state from the Republic of Indonesia. Slightly different from Sukarno’s era, the banishment of the *Parti Komunis Indonesia* (PKI) and the outlawing of the communist ideology, radical movements based on Islam started to appear.

While the focus of this thesis is on Islamic radicalism, it is useful to examine the PKI against the backdrop of rising radicalism among Islamic organisations. All Islamic organisations viewed the PKI and communism as the common enemy of Islam and saw President Sukarno as the party’s main protector at the expense of other groups, Islam in particular.\(^{150}\) The PKI’s approach hinged on the dynamics of radical nationalism and it was an ideological party. The party was able to extend its appeal beyond a simple *aliran* context through its concerns for popular social and economic interests, especially to the Javanese *abangan*.\(^ {151}\) Against the context of worsening economic situation in 1965, the PKI launched a campaign against the traditional elite and labelled them “corruptors and bureaucratic capitalists.”\(^ {152}\) Sukarno’s political concept of NASAKOM (acronym based on Nationalism, Religion, and Communism) was withering with the weakening support for communism. The PKI mounted several aggressive and violent protests in towns and villages with slogans and caricatures calling for the “crushing of the peoples’ enemies” and death


to the traditional elites. The elites quickly recognised that the PKI’s radicalism was more genuine than they had thought. In a bid for power, the PKI’s offensive against the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) culminated into a Coup d’état on 1 October 1965 through the Gerakan 30 September (30th September Movement or G30S). During the attempted coup, seven kidnapping teams formed by G30S abducted six military generals from their homes in the early hours, and momentarily laid claim to the country’s political centre. They were finally purged by General Suharto – who was not targeted during the coup - after assuming command of the Indonesian army in the absence of General Yani. According to Roosa, Suharto used the movement as a pretext for delegitimising Sukarno in what can be called a creeping Coup d’état, that was disguised as an effort to prevent a coup. Muslim groups joined the fight against the communists, claiming it was their duty to cleanse Indonesia of atheism. Muslim organisations such as the NU had long been working with anti-PKI army officers were mobilised by Suharto’s men to accuse the PKI of being responsible for the G30S.

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154 While no concrete evidence had been established on the direct involvement of PKI in the coup, Suharto had claimed in his memoir that he knew PKI was the masterminded. The radio announcer during that morning was Lt. Col. Untung, whom Suharto knew was very close with PKI leaders. See Robert E. Elson, in Suharto: A Political Biography, Cambridge University Press, 2001, chap. 5.
156 Ibid.
157 Vittachi Tarzie, in Fall of Sukarno, Praeger, 1967, pp. 135-139.
IV. VIOLENCE BY ISLAMISTS GROUPS DURING THE NEW ORDER

Hard-line Islamists groups started to form in the early 1970s and 1980s. They continued to campaign their aspirations to establish an Islamic state and institutionalising the syariah laws. The New Order government prohibited such groups and saw them as a threat. On the other hand, moderate Islamic groups were able solve the problems of pluralism in Indonesia and they supported and accommodated well to a society which is multicultural.

One such extremist Islamic group during the New Order was the Komando Jihad. Komando Jihad’s existence lasted from the 1960s right up to the mid-1980s when the Indonesian intelligence unit clamped them down.¹⁵⁹ Asep Warman and Imran Muhammad Zein led some of the famous cells of the Komando Jihad. The violence committed by the group include the bombing of Masjid Nurul Iman in 1976, and the hijacking of a Garuda Indonesia airplane in 1981 with 57 passengers on board, in which they demanded the release of 20 political prisoners and the expulsion of the Yahudi (Jews) and the Israeli military from Indonesia.¹⁶⁰

The short-term objective of the Komando Jihad group led by Warman was to crush communism and to form the Dewan Revolusi Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Revolution). They protested fervently against the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution of Indonesia. During group’s active years, JI was formed out of a loose confederation of several Islamic groups. However, the group’s leaders, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir were arrested during a crackdown on Komando Jihad. In 1979, the group led by Warman assassinated the Rector of

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 22.
Universitas Sebelas Maret in Solo for exposing the existence of JI. Warman had also plotted to kill the judges and prosecutors who were handling the Haji Ismail Pranoto case.\textsuperscript{161} Warman's group was also responsible for several robbery attempts including on a car carrying salaries of Sunan Kalijaga University in Jogjakarta and the Teachers’ Training College in Malang. Warman defended his robberies as fa’i, a concept used in Islam to legitimise wealth accumulation taken from enemies of Islam without waging a war.

\textit{On the other hand, the Komando Jihad} group led by Imran was a fundamentalist Islamic group that was trained in Libya, Iran and Saudi Arabia in terrorism crafts and bomb making. Their terrorist acts included the attacks on police posts in Jakarta, Banding and Malang. It was formed in 1980 when the followers of Imran, who was an imam at the Istiqamah Mosque, pledged their bai’a to him. Imran was executed by the government when he was found guilty of masterminding the hijack of the Garuda Indonesia airplane in 1981.\textsuperscript{162}

The \textit{Tanjong Priok} massacre in September 1984 was another watershed incident in which the local Muslims clashed with the government. The incident was triggered by unhappiness over the actions of a local Christian military staff whose actions were deemed as disrespectful towards Islam.\textsuperscript{163} Two days after the incident, an Islamic cleric, Abdul Qadir Jaelani gave a sermon against Pancasila at the As-

\textsuperscript{161} Haji Ismail Pranoto was a prominent figure in \textit{Darul Islam}. He was responsible for the recruitment of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir in 1974.


Saadah mosque. 164 Thousands joined the protests led by Amir Biki, attacking the North Jakarta military command post and police headquarters. 165

It is also worth mentioning that some Muslim parties and organisations have created or revived their youth wings that have the potential to transform themselves into a radical organisation. One such group was the Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, which was formed under the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP). Although the Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah was never categorised as an Islamic group, they committed several radical acts, such as raids on what they deemed immoral activities. 166 They were also responsible for the bombing of Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta in 1984, as retaliation for the Tanjong Priok massacre.

Currently still declared as active by the International Crisis Group, Angkatan Mujahed in Islam Nusantara (AMIN) – a Darul Islam splinter group - was also vigorous in carrying out radical activities in the 1990s. 167 The group was responsible for the bombing of Plaza Hayam Wuruk in Jakarta. The motive of the bombing was not religious in nature but it was deemed as a criminal act by the government. 168 They were also accused of bombing the Istiqlal Mosque in Jakarta in 1999. Although AMIN have been enthusiastic by more open-ended religious sentiments, they

164 Ibid.
defined their agendas in the context of Islamisation of Indonesia. According to the 
group, it is Jakarta’s secular orientation and willingness to embrace Western-led 
globalisation and capitalism actively, which is at the root of the country’s problems 
and, hence, the principal deviation needs to be “corrected.”

V. EXTREMIST ISLAMIC GROUPS DURING THE REFORMASI ERA

The proliferation of hard-line, militant, radical and fundamental Islamic groups 
was augmented by the wave of democratisation during the fall of the New Order. 
Several radical Muslims who had fled the country started to return home because 
they were no longer a political threat under the New Order government. The 
reformasi era also gave rise to extremist groups who championed issues along the 
lines of racial, political, human rights, democratisation, freedom of speech and press. 
It was perceived as a reaction towards several state policies that some Muslims saw as alienating. The decade saw the rise of non-Muslim officers 
serving in both the civilian and military branches of the government. This 
affected the career progression and scholarship opportunities of some Muslim officers. 
Other policies were also detested such as prohibition of wearing the tudung or jilbab (headscarf) in public schools. Probably, the 
most controversial policy was the sole foundation (asas tunggal) 
requirement. Under this policy, every social and political organisation in the country should acknowledge Pancasila as its only foundation. Many Muslims viewed this as a ruse of the government to decimate the chance in elections for opposition political parties, especially the Muslim-based United

170 See Irman G. Lanti, “Is Islamic Extremism on the rise in Indonesia?” a commentary paper produced for Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2002.
Development Party (PPP), which at that point saw a steady rise of votes during the previous two elections.\(^{172}\)

Other groups, which gained traction, include Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ), Laskar Jihad, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Majlis Mujaheddin Indonesia (MMI). They demanded the recognition of an Islamic state through Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution – on the belief in the One and Supreme God\(^{173}\) - and for the reinstatement of the famous seven words in the original Jakarta Charter, which was “the obligation to carry out Islamic law for its followers.”\(^{174}\)

Forum Komunikasi Ahlu Sunnah Wal-Jama’ah (FKAWJ) and Laskar Jihad led by Jaafar Umar Thalib were formed in 1998 before the fall of the Suharto regime. The group’s dominant orientation of Islam was salafism and they adhered to the literal translation of the Quran and hadiths and out rightly rejected independent translation and traditional practices of Islam, which are culturally biased. FKAWJ runs a number of branches in Indonesia and its members ranged from college graduates to school dropouts.\(^{175}\) Laskar Jihad is FKAWJ’s military arm and Thalib himself managed it. The popularity of Laskar Jihad supersedes that of FKAWJ due to

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173 Article 29(1) of the original 1945 Indonesian Constitution. At the same time, it never explicitly mentioned the name of any established religion in the world. The word “Allah,” which connotes with the Islamic term for “God,” appears once on Article 9, which regulates the formal oath for elected President. The word Allah also appeared in the Preamble of the Constitution, which stated that Indonesian independence could only occurred by the grace of Allah Almighty.


its widespread media attention it had gotten. Some of its extremist activities include, sending its members to Maluku to participate in the sectarian conflicts between the Christians and Muslims. It also published a website to highlight the atrocities committed by the Christians in Maluku.\footnote{176}

Another hard-line group formed in 1998 by Muhammad Rizieq Shihab in Jakarta a few months after Suharto stepped down was Front Pembela Islam (FPI).\footnote{177} FPI was mooted by several ulamas, habibs, mubalighs and Muslim activists at Pondok Pesantren Al Um in Jakarta with the aim of upholding Islamic laws in a secular state. FPI’s ulamas and jemaahs used the group as a platform to work together, upholding the amar ma’ruf and nahi munkar (doing what has been told and staying away from what is forbidden) in their daily lives. Notoriously known for several radical acts since 1998, FPI positioned itself as a moral police and a pressure group working to eradicate immoral behaviours in society, which are against the syariah law. FPI targeted nightclubs, brothels, liberal Muslims, churches and embassies of countries that were considered by FPI as hostile towards Islam. One of FPI’s most significant actions was their presentation on the aspirations of the Indonesian people during Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR) special assembly in November 1998 after the fall of Suharto.\footnote{178} Some of FPI’s demands include: 1) the revocation of pancasila, 2) the removal of Indonesian military officers from the legislative and executive branch of the government, 3) accountability of former


\footnote{178} Noorhaidi Hasan, in Laskar Jihad, Southeast Asia Programme, Cornell, New York, pp. 13-29.
president Suharto and an apology from GOLKAR (Golongan Karyawan, Party of Functional Groups) - the ruling political party during 1966-1998 under Suharto’s New Order regime - for the atrocities during the New Order, such as the occupation of East Timor. Most recently, FPI organised protests against the Miss World Contest 2013 held in Bali, Indonesia.

*Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI)*, the paramilitary wing of FPI, was considered controversial due to its hard-line approach in warning Muslims who broke the Islamic laws. This was especially so during the fasting month of *Ramadhan* when they often resort to violence against Muslim who indulged in forbidden activities. The most prominent act of violence was the attack during the birthday celebration of *Pancasila* at the Monas (National Monument) in June 2008. They viciously beat up the participants of the event, including women and children with hard and blunt objects, destroying cars and public properties in the process.179

*Majelis Mujahedeen Indonesia (MMI)* was a social Islamic organisation formed as a result of the Kongres Mujahedeen 1 Indonesia to uphold the *syariah* in Yogyakarta in August 2000. The congress produced the Yogyakarta Charter, which stated that the majority of Indonesians who are Muslims has the right and responsibility to uphold the *syariah*. According to MMI, the *syariah* was the solution to the political, social and humanitarian crisis in Indonesia. Thus, the MMI members have agreed on several initiatives such as, 1) rejecting ideologies that were deemed un-Islamic, 2) creating a strong camaraderie among *mujahedins* domestically and internationally, and 3) to urge all Muslims to be active in *da’wah* and *jihad* in every

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corner of the world. MMI also urge all Muslims to support the implementation of Islamic law and reject the concept of a secular state.\footnote{Kumar Ramakrishna \textit{et al}, in \textit{After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia}, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2003, p. 322. See also, Bilveer Singh, in \textit{The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist}, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2007, pp. 89-95.}

\section*{VI. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH}

Perhaps the most prominent and dangerous terrorist group today is Jemaah Islamiyah; the group forms the bulk of the terrorist inmate population in Indonesia. It is a militant organisation aimed at establishing an Islamic state within Southeast Asia and it is perceived to be a political-religiously driven terrorist group.\footnote{Numerous accounts have been written on \textit{Jemaah Islamiyah}. See Kumar Ramakrishna \textit{et al}, in \textit{After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 51. See also, Diya Rashwan, in \textit{The Spectrum of Islamist Movements, Volume 1}, Verlag Han Schiler, Berlin, 2007, p. 81.} The United States has declared JI a “forbidden corporation” according to intelligence sources; JI is a confederation of several Islamic groups.\footnote{Bruce Vaughn, in \textit{Terrorism in Southeast Asia}, Diane Publishing, 2010, p. 11.} It has links with the notorious Al-Qaeda organisation, and some JI members are Afghanistan alumni. Being an offshoot of the \textit{Darul Islam}, JI is a conservative Islamic group, and the organisation’s pioneers were Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir. They were accused of masterminding the bombing of JW Marriot Hotel Jakarta in 2003. According to intelligence sources, it was believed that JI was sponsored and supported by other terrorist organisations such as the \textit{Abu Sayyaf} group – a Philippines-based militant Islamist separatist group - and \textit{Al-Qaeda}.\footnote{Dona Z. Pazzibugan, “Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf now merged, says anti-terror expert,” in Inquirer.net, 29 September 2011, accessed on 1 Mar 2014. [http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/67043/jemaah-islamiyah-abu-sayyaf-now-merged-says-antiterror-expert]} Some of JI’s famous acts include the attack on several churches in major Indonesian cities in 2000, the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in 2004 and the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, and
even the planned bombing of Yishun MRT station in Singapore in 2001, which was foiled.

Similar to the previous groups mentioned, JI was active and systematic in the quest to establish *Khilafah Islamiyah*. Influenced heavily by *salafism* coupled with military skills, JI permitted the act of violence in *jihad* that was seen as a holy act. JI was silent, however, on allegations that they committed acts of terrorism and violence in the name of religion.\(^\text{184}\) Non-Muslims were regarded as second-class citizens without rights to hold office in government. JI also do not recognise gender equality; women were allowed to neither exercise any rights nor hold any office. Poor government administration and weak legislation during the early years of the *Reformasi* era has encouraged Islamic groups to pressure the government to enforce the *syariah* as the solution.\(^\text{185}\)

In summary, the rise of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia was influenced by a) the global radical Islamic movements based in the Middle East, which emerged as a reaction to the downfall of political Islam in the Middle East, b) the ideology of Western society which was secular and materialistic and other factors such as injustices suffered by Muslims in other countries. JI saw violent *jihad* as an effective method to mount an attack against the West and the former perceived the latter as their number one enemy. As a result, violence committed by radical Islamist groups such as JI, a stigma was developed among non-Muslims – especially in the West - to assimilate the Muslim identity to that of a terrorist or a militant. However, the development of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia needs to be viewed against the


\(^{185}\) Many scholars assert this. See for example, Arief Budiman *et al*, in *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1999. See also, Kevin O’Rourke, in *Reformasi: The Struggle for Power in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2002.
backdrop of the socio-historical reality in a diverse country, so as not to pose a threat to the future of pluralism in Indonesia. Therefore, it is necessary to identify, map and evaluate the problems associated radicalisation and deradicalisation.
CHAPTER 4: INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME

I. INDONESIA’S DERADICALISATION EXPERIENCE

As was mentioned earlier, the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia should generally be directed for radicals with the aim of reintegrating them into society and dissuading them from violence. The following paragraphs will illuminate the fact that deradicalisation in the form of religious counselling and re-education will not be as successful as other forms of tangible aids.

The concept of deradicalisation is not new to Indonesia. In the context of radical Islamic movements, deradicalisation of the former NII, Komando Jihad, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah Tarbiyah, and movements in Poso, highlights some examples and learning points of how deradicalisation can be operationalised in the future. Indonesia’s deradicalisation initiatives over the years had experienced successes and failures. Successes are shown by abandonment of violence by the members of the radical groups. There are no known sources to show how many participants of Indonesia’s past deradicalisation programmes – such as those initiated for Komando Jihad and in Poso – had abandoned extremism. However, from the many articles and books researched in this thesis, substantial number of participants had exploited the deradicalisation programme to consolidate their strengths, take advantage of its economic incentives or to escape rough treatment from the police. There are no specific data stating that there was any formal deradicalisation programme in Indonesia until 2003. The government had not declared any such programme at the national level before that. Since 2010, BNPT was appointed the coordinating agency

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for a more systematic deradicalisation programme targeting terrorists. This includes the security apparatus, military, intelligence unit, other related ministries, religious leaders, and members of the public to implement a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. BNPT took over from Densus 88 that ran the deradicalisation programme since 2003. What entails a “deradicalisation programme” for Indonesia? Does providing monetary awards and job training constitute deradicalisation or is religious counselling also part of the programme? Can family visits or providing free school fees for the inmates’ children alter their mindset to accept moderate views of Islam? The following few paragraphs present a cursory illustration of how deradicalisation programme has evolved in Indonesia.

II. **KOMANDO JIHAD: ECONOMIC INITIATIVES**

As a country that was subjected to terrorism and other violence in the course of its history, Indonesia had experience running the deradicalisation programmes that are approximately similar to Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Singapore. Indonesia started its programme as early as the 1960s. Rehabilitating members of the Komando Jihad was one such example of how deradicalisation was initiated in Indonesia. The programme, which ran from 1962 to 1977, applied the economic empowerment approach. The New Order government offered a number of economic incentives to leaders and activists of DI / NII who pledged their allegiance

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188 Angel Damayanti, “Is Terrorism in Indonesia a Triumph?” op. cit.


to the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). For example, for government provided transmigration incentives for its foot soldiers. The commanders were given jobs and start-up capital. A battalion commander, Ules Sudjadi, was employed as a Kodam Siliwangi (*Komando Daerah Militer*, or the Commando Territorial Command) staff and Ateng Djaelani and Adah Djaelani were commissioned as kerosene dealers in Bandung and Jakarta.¹⁹¹

The deradicalisation programme was a success as it improved the economic well-being of its participants. Many ex-combatants abandoned their violent *jihadi* aspiration and ran their own businesses. Several former DI/NII activists benefited from the deradicalisation programme’s economic approach, such as providing employment. In 1968, Ateng Djaelani successfully became chairperson of Gapermigas PT (Joint Oil and Gas Company). The former activists took advantage of their strategic position and flexed their economic muscle to consolidate power among the rest of the DI/NII members. This was evident from various meetings organised such as Situ Aksan in 1971, which brought together thousands of DI/NII supporters.¹⁹² They also organised the meeting at Sigil in 1974 where they successfully rekindled the spirit of DI/NII to fight an open war against the Indonesian government.¹⁹³ Thus, these deradicalisation efforts backlashed the government. From this failure, *Komando Jihad* was formed. The ideology of the DI/NII activists did not wither with the poverty and hardship that they experienced and the economic revitalisation of its members allowed them to reconsolidate their strengths.

¹⁹¹ See *Tempo*, vol. 7, no. 3, 2007, p. 73.
¹⁹³ Ibid.
III. **LASKAR JIHAD: SELF-DERADICALISATION**

Indonesia’s deradicalisation efforts became “self-initiated” when the deradicalisation programme was actually carried out by the radical movements without them realising it. This happened to the radical group, *Laskar Jihad*, whose Islamic orientation was strictly *salafism*. The group waged a *jihad* in Maluku upon receiving a *fatwa* that it was *wajib* for them to fight in Maluku. The *salafi ulamas* who authorised the *fatwa* include Shaikh Muqbil bin Hâdi al-Wadîi from Yemen, Shaikh Râbi bin Hadi a-Madkhâlî from Mecca and Shaikh Abdul Mukhsin al-‘Abbad from Madinah.¹⁹⁴ However, in a twist of events, the group halted their violence in Maluku in 2002 after Sheikh Robi’ bin Hadial-Madkhâlî, an *ulama* from Madinah, issued a *fatwa* for *Laskar Jihad* to be disbanded. Sheikh Robi’s *fatwa* was supported by three other *salafi ulamas* in Saudi Arabia. In the *fatwa*, he said, “I have come to know that the Indonesian government has devoted its attention to *jihadism* and defended its country well. As such, do not allow yourselves to continue *jihad* and plant this flag.”¹⁹⁵ While Greg Fealy asserts that, the decline in funding had forced many *Laskar Jihad’s* members to leave the battlefields of Maluku and Poso and return to civilian life, John Sidel argued that an aggressive crackdown against armed Islamists groups had affected the morale of its members.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the *Laskar Jihad* had attracted national and international controversy over the stoning to death of one of its members who admitted to an adulterous relationship with an Ambonese woman. Thus, disengagement of its members developed due to lack of financial and logistical

support to engage governmental security forces, as well as a stained image of the organisation. Little is known if former Laskar Jihad’s members are ideologically deradicalised.\textsuperscript{197}

IV. DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME IN POSO

The deradicalisation programme initiated in Poso by the Indonesian government in 2007 was implemented after the armed conflict between JI activists and the police in Tanah Runtuh, Poso that claimed the lives of one policeman and 14 jihadists in Poso.\textsuperscript{198} Badrodin Haiti, district chief of Suteng in Jakarta headed the deradicalisation programme. The programme focused on providing economic assistance to the combatants as well as vocational skills training. A successful case was Sofyan Djumpai alias Pian, an active member of the Mujaheddin Kayamanya convicted of firearms possession. Pian helped to recruit his former jihadist mates to take part in the programme. In July 2007, 16 former terrorists participated in automotive vocational training and furniture making.\textsuperscript{199} Upon completion, they were given monetary incentives and equipment for them to start their own business. The female ex-combatants as well as the wives of former terrorists programme also participated in the deradicalisation programme. They received training in baking and sewing. In 2008, 160 former terrorists participated in the programme and they successfully avoided acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{197} The government crackdown on Jemaah Islamiyah waned Laskar Jihad’s influence after in the wake of the Bali bombing. So did that of its allies in Maluku. See Harold A. Crouch, in Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2010, chap. 7.


\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid.
Besides the police programme, the Pemuda Poso had its own deradicalisation programme, including an initiative to provide capital assistance for ex-combatants to start businesses. About 125 people received cash amounting to 10 million Rupiah (S $1100.00 [$1 = 9000 IDR]).\(^{201}\) The ex-combatants were able to work on various development projects with the local government. For example, Pian received construction projects such as road improvements and building maintenance from the government.

In addition, the Indonesian government initiated a deradicalisation programme that includes building a religious boarding school in the Tokorondo district in Poso. Touted as a “mega” pesantren project, the programme aims at keeping out teachings of radical Islam by implanting curricular subjects such as religious studies, Arabic and English.\(^{202}\) A prominent Muslim activist and local JI member, Ustaz Adnan Arsal, played a significant role in developing the pesantren. While he had disengaged from violence, he now remains a vocal speaker against the BNPT.\(^{203}\) One of his contentions with BNPT was his disagreement that Poso – where Adnan comes from - was branded as a haven for terrorists.\(^{204}\) Although Adnan is disengaged from committing violence, he is influential and charismatic enough to earn the support from his followers. Hence, BNPT may be waging a losing battle in its deradicalisation efforts in Poso if Adnan continues to discredit the government deradicalisation efforts.


V. CURRENT DERADICALISATION PROGRAMMES IN INDONESIA

As mentioned earlier, conceptually, the Indonesian government does not own any official deradicalisation programme. However, based on media reports and field research, the Indonesian police have initiated deradicalisation programmes by various “soft approaches” such as, communication and visits by family members, unconditional financial aid and soft loan for starting a business and prison facilities for terrorist inmates, such as those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The conduct of the soft approach relied on the mutual trust between prison wardens and inmates.

The Indonesian government issued a regulation in 2010 formalising the establishment of a new National Anti-Terrorism Agency. The law tasks established the new agency with formulating policies and national programs, coordinating government offices concerned about its implementation and implementing policies in the field of anti-terrorism by setting up task forces with members from government offices in line with their respective tasks, functions, authorities. Hence, under the new regulation, the deradicalisation programme in Indonesia involves an array of government agencies at various levels and stages of the programme, but mainly operationalised by the prison wardens. The prison (pemasyarakatan) functions under the mandate of the Directorate General of Corrections (Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan). BNPT, which was known as the Coordination Desk for Eradication of Terrorism (Desk Koordinasi Pemberantasan Terorisme) in 2010,

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206 The Presidential Regulation Number 46 of 2010 was made under the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law (Law Number 15). Also see BNPT Chief, Ansyad Mbaï’s statement in “Analysis: Deradicalisation – Is Indonesia’s approach working?” in Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) News (a service of the UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), 15 October 2012, accessed on 15 November 2012.
introduced a blueprint and implemented a deradicalisation programme. Under the leadership of Brigadier General Suryadharma Salim, the programme includes an initiative to embrace terrorist inmates in a personal mentoring program. The programme is also part of another initiative by the National Police Bomb Task Force (Persatuan Tugas Bom Mabes Polri), which is the forerunner of Densus 88. Since 2010, BNPT oversee and coordinate deradicalisation programme in Indonesia between government agencies.

The programme is designed for the prison wardens (petugas pemasyarakatan) as the main implementers, and operationally supported by Densus 88, BNPT officers, psychologists and the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). Densus 88 and the police carry out the investigations, arrests and interrogations. The wardens implement and monitor the terrorists’ daily activities and offer any assistance whenever the latter need it while in prison. The terrorists are supported financially in situations that require monetary assistance as long as their intentions to use the money are genuine and benign. MUI officers are supposed to play the role of counsellors and facilitators to alter the terrorists’ mindset concerning two fundamental issues: (a) killing of civilians and (b) the need of building and sustaining an Islamic state. However, it is pertinent to note that, most prisons have started to cease the use of state appointed ulamas, as the terrorists have more respect for former JI members because the state ulamas are regarded as failures who did not

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207 The initiative was spearheaded by the Inspector General of Police, Surya Dharma Salim, former head of the Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror, by getting convicted terrorists involved in lectures and discussions, providing support to families and their children, held a religious lecture and, in some cases provide limited financial assistance to start a business / small business.


establish the syariah in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{210} Former terrorists, such as Ali Imron and Nasir Abbas, are roped in to act as mentors or “interlocutors,” as they are considered success cases in the deradicalisation and disengagement process.\textsuperscript{211} Some terrorist inmates pay more attention to people like Abbas and Imron, and the former denounced violence after a series of counselling session with the latter. The former terrorists are also valuable because they provide information on strategies as well as tactics used by the terrorist groups.

The programme developed from providing financial and capital assistance, organising thematic discussions, routine study and rapport building between inmates and wardens. Thus, technically, the main features of the programmes are not about religious counselling or re-education. Any form of ideological intervention has been less than successful and there is widespread resistance from the inmates, because in reality, inmates generally refuse to participate in any form of deradicalisation programme. However, there is also an effort to carry out a series of special discussion sessions aimed to deconstruct the extremists’ understanding of \textit{jihad}. Critics, including community leaders, Muslim organisations and practitioners have argued that the mechanism of embracing these terrorists did not work well partly because the programme is regarded by most of the terrorist negatively and sceptically.\textsuperscript{212} The terrorists view it as a strategy to weaken and destroy their ideology. This partly explains why the percentage of successful deradicalisation program against terrorist prisoners is low.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{210} Interview with Ansyaad Mbai, Jakarta, July 2013.
\textsuperscript{211} The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, “Prisons and Terrorism Radicalization and De-Radicalization in 15 Countries,” a policy report published for ICSR on 2010.
\textsuperscript{212} Those who rejected the programme include Subur Sugianto, Aman Abdurrahman, Ustaz Andung and many others.
\textsuperscript{213} Cited from various sources.
Another contributing factor to the effectiveness of the deradicalisation programme is the continued interaction by the police with the families of the prisoners and the communities within which the latter originate. The programme encourages the prisoners to move away from the terrorist violent ideologies by reminding them of the struggles and embarrassment faced by their family members. Families are encouraged frequent visits to the prison. Many have argued against these efforts because terrorists exploit such initiative to transfer the care of their family to the police. This makes it a community programme rather than individualised efforts to deradicalisation.214 “What the police are doing today is just cutting the tip of the iceberg. We need to find out why this guy is going back to the network. There must be a problem and a weakness,” asserted Tito Karnavian.215

Therefore, in the framework of Indonesia’s past deradicalisation initiatives and the historical context that drove radicalisation, it is important to understand and identify the gaps and constraints that the government faces when running the programmes. This is important because, we are trying to understand why despite being incarcerated and involved in deradicalisation programmes and showing promising response, terrorist inmates returned to their old ways. The next section gives a brief illustration of prison life as well as the dynamics of the programme.

VI. PRISON SYSTEMS IN INDONESIA

Indonesia’s first few convicted JI members were Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani, a member of JI Johor Baru, and Edi Setiono alias Usman, an alumni of Afghanistan.\(^{216}\) That was also Indonesia’s first experience in dealing with JI terrorists in prison and handling a court case classified as “an act of terrorism.”\(^{217}\) They were sentenced to twenty years in prison for their roles in the bomb attack in August 2001, Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta and were sent to Cipinang Prison. Although there were previous bombing incidents during the post-Suharto period, such as the bombing of the Philippines embassy in Jakarta in 2000, the Christmas bombings in 2000 and the bombing of Jakarta churches in May and June 2001, no arrests were made. However, accused terrorists were arrested during Suharto’s rule for incidents such as: 1) the hijack of Garuda Indonesia flight 206 by Komando Jihad in 1981, 2) bombing of Bank Central Asia in 1984 by Gerakan Pemuda Ka’bah, and 3) the bombing of Borobudur temple by a blind Islamic preacher in 1985. No known deradicalisation programme was carried out for the aforementioned perpetrators. It is also pertinent to note that no jurisdiction clause was provisioned for terrorism cases in 2001. Indonesia adopted its Anti-terrorism Law in 2002, which was approved by former president Megawati, six days after the Bali bombings took place.\(^{218}\)

When Cipinang prison received the first convicted Islamists terrorist inmates, Dani and Usman, it did not have any specific rules and regulation concerning the treatment of these terrorists. They were housed in the same cells with the rest of the

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\(^{217}\) Ibid.

\(^{218}\) See article by Simon Butt, “Anti-Terrorism Law and Criminal Process in Indonesia,” a background paper produced for the ARC Federation Fellowship at University of Melbourne, 2008.
prisoners and there were no limits imposed on their interaction with the rest of the inmates as well as the outside world. They were allowed visits two to three times a month and there was no restriction during the visits. Family members were allowed to bring any necessities for the inmates.\textsuperscript{219}

The absence of special regulations in dealing with convicted terrorist accentuates the inexperience of Indonesian prisons with regards to curbing radicalisation and imposing deradicalisation programmes.\textsuperscript{220} Bayu and several BNPT officials recounted to me that convicted terrorists are highly respected in prisons, as they were regarded as a brave, religious warrior and dangerous because they were knowledgeable and have demonstrated their ability to carry out bombings.

Following the Bali bombing in 2002, dozens of suspects were arrested and jailed, including Imam Samudra alias Abdul Aziz, Amrozy, Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas and Ali Imron alias Alik. They were placed in Kerobokan prison in Denpasar, Bali. The captivity of the Bali bombers marked the beginning of confusion and disorientated approach of handling convicted terrorists. Although the Bali bombers were placed in isolated cells, communication was possible by shouting to one another.\textsuperscript{221} The enforcement of restricted communication was short-lived and in 2003, a special prison block was provisioned for terrorists and slowly, the terrorists begun to have more flexibility to communicate and interact.

\textsuperscript{219} Interview with Bayu Adinugroho and Ansyaad Mbai in Jakarta, July 2012.
\textsuperscript{220} An interview with Taufik bin Abdul Halim alias Dani and Edi Setiono alias Abbas found that they deny receiving any forms of deradicalisation programme from 2002-2004.
\textsuperscript{221} Interview with Ansyaad Mbai in Jakarta, July 2012.
a. COMMUNICATION ACCESS

The pivotal point occurred was when Imam Samudra began to communicate with the JI network using the internet inside the Denpasar prison.\textsuperscript{222} This was widely reported in the media and was dubbed as an outstanding failure of the Indonesian government in managing terrorist inmates. Agung Setyadi, a university lecturer from Semarang, sent a laptop to Beni Irawan, a prison worker assigned to the terrorist inmates’ cellblock and Beni gave the laptop to Samudra.\textsuperscript{223} Beni’s acquaintance with Samudra started through socialising with the latter and both often held discussions on religious matters. Beni was even requested by the terrorists to perform the \textit{adzan} in the terrorists’ cellblock during the mandatory prayer sessions termed as \textit{solat fardhu}.\textsuperscript{224} Interaction between inmates and wardens became more frequent and were unregulated. Thus, the social interaction between wardens and the terrorists backfired and, moreover, wardens at that time were not trained to manage terrorist inmates professionally.

There was also an abuse of communication access committed by Mukhlas when he was discovered giving sermons and lectures through teleconferencing to an audience outside of prison. There was a congregation of Muslims in a mosque in Solo, listening attentively to Mukhlas when he was broadcasting his lectures using a laptop from prison.\textsuperscript{225} In 2005, the inmates were given limited communication access


\textsuperscript{224} A fact confirmed by several BNPT officers I interviewed.

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
after an officer discovered Mukhlas’s use of teleconferencing to spread JI’s ideology and to disseminate instructions.

The main concerns of the prison authorities in the early 2000s with regards to terrorists inmates was the lack of prison space and the free interaction between terrorists and non-terrorists inmates. This is especially so in Cipinang prison, which housed JI heavyweights such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abu Rusydan, Abu Tholut and Urwah. Since 2010, a separate cellblock was created to house convicted terrorists. In addition, prior to 2008, inmates were allowed frequent visits by family members and friends. This concession allowed them to obtain basic necessities, handphones, *jihadist*-themed books and scriptures from visitors. Such privilege enjoyed by the inmates was seen as jeopardizing efforts to implement any deradicalisation programme in prisons.

b. **PESANTREN AT-TAWWABIN**

Perhaps the most glaring mistake made by prison authorities that hampered deradicalisation efforts was the provision given to set up an informal “*pesantren*” *At-Tawwabin* in Cipinang.226 The inmates carried out activities such as religious classes, Quran reading and *tafsiran*. Abu Tholout once served as the *mudir* or school principal at the *pesantren* from 2005 to 2006. It was estimated that the *pesantren* was attended by some 300 non-terrorists inmates.227 After the mandatory Friday congregational prayers, terrorist inmates had the freedom to converge and have a meal together. It was discovered in 2007 that some JI inmates exploited this privilege to carry out proselytisation among non-terrorists inmates as well as to reinforce their

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227 Ibid.
violent *jihadist* ideology. While *At-Tawwabin* (which means, ‘those who repent’) was originally set-up as a religious facility, the misuse made by JI members to imbibe the general inmate population with jihadists aspirations prompted the government to shut it down in 2007. Activities among terrorist inmates were more restricted since then and the authorities managed to curb several JI members from infiltrating *pesantren At-Tawwabin*. However, from frequent attendance at *At-Tawwabin*, some non-terrorists inmates had begun to assimilate the *jihadist* culture from charismatic JI individuals who embody the ideology of JI in the form of violent *jihadism*. They are attracted to the latter’s interpretation of Islam, behavioural norms and their anti-western and anti-establishment perspective.\(^{228}\) Such phenomenon had certainly forced the government to revamp their ideological strategy, and even more so, when it was discovered that many “normal” inmates including youths and the elderly had volunteered themselves to serve as *santri*, be it as *imams*, befriender or *tukang adzan* at *At-Tawwabin*.

BNPT had revealed that the establishment of *pesantren At Tawwabin* was actually part of the design for the “deradicalisation” programme. The *pesantren* was to be closely monitored by the prison authorities to propagate moderate Muslim views and to encourage positive religious activities among inmates. BNPT was surprised why the JI members were active in the *pesantren* as some of the informal classes and *da’wah* there did not fit their ideology. Yunanto gave several possible reasons. Firstly, JI members had arranged to exploit *At-Tawwabin* as a platform to springboard their ideology, to recruit new members and to gain sympathy from the general inmate population. Secondly, they wanted to score points for good behaviour to gain attention from prison authorities, hoping that they will note the former’s

\(^{228}\) Ibid.
positive religious activities in the pesantren, to be included in the consideration for remission and early release.\(^{229}\)

**c. JIHADIST WAY OF LIFE**

Terrorist inmates such as Sunata and Abu Tholut, who are more appealing, were able to radiate their jihadist culture and attract other inmates. What constitutes these “jihadist way of life”? Some of the mandatory religious duties such as praying five times a day, fasting and Quran recital were consistently observed. Besides the fardhu praying times, the terrorists also performed the solat sunnah which includes solat dhuha, tahajud and qiyanulail.\(^{230}\) These prayers are actively performed in a congregation. In addition to the mandatory fasting during the month of Ramadhan, they also fasted on Mondays and Thursdays, a common practice among Muslims. The terrorist inmates also actively perform the puasa Daud, which is fasting during alternate days, emulating the practice of Prophet Daud.\(^{231}\) These religious habits are commonly observed among Muslims of all backgrounds; none is “extreme” in nature.

However, indoctrination occurs subtly during religious classes or taklim sessions. When these sessions are attended by non-terrorists inmates, the sessions will be based on general Islamic concepts such as fardhu ain, tauhid and aqidah. These discussions will progress to topics relating to jihad, especially, when most of

the participants in attendance are terrorist inmates.\textsuperscript{232} Being able to perform these religious duties, especially in a \textit{jemaah}, allows the terrorists inmates to be in a constant state of \textit{istiqomah}, and to reinforce their desire to perform \textit{jihad} even under restricted conditions in detention. Hence, an image of a pious Muslim will crystallise in the mind of the audience and becomes attractive among hardcore criminals, drug addicts and youths. They turn to the more influential JI members in prison to register their remorse and become more active in performing their Islamic duties. Inadvertently, some JI members assume the role of counsellors and this result in other non-terrorists inmates to become susceptible to recruitment into the terrorist network. Some of the more chilling ideas shared by the terrorists are as follows:

“\textit{Jika ahli keluraga kita mati di dalam pengeboman terhadap para musuh Islam, maka mereka akan masuk syurga} (Even if our family members died in the bombings, heaven is promised for them)”

Interview with Urwah by prison wardens.

“\textit{Walaupun negara melarang, kalau syariat Islam mengizinkan, ya tidak masalah … Kalau tindakan kekerasan sebagai hukuman atas kesalahan dilakukan Nabi, bisa diterapkan sekarang} (Even if state law forbids it, violence in the name of Islam is allowed … If the prophet allows it, we can apply it today.)”

Son Hadi, spokesperson for \textit{Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid} (JAT), September 2012.

In addition to religious practices, the terrorists used other daily recreational activities in prison to buttress their \textit{jihadist} commitments. While these activities are usually left unmonitored, they became an avenue for the terrorists to spread extremist ideologies. For example, simple recreational activities like watching

\textsuperscript{232} Interview with Abdullah Sunata by Bayu Adinugroho, Jakarta, 2009.
television, DVDs, films, interaction during sports activities and reading books are abused, as the terrorists are constantly looking for ways to find loopholes in the system. They watch videos and read books that cast violent jihad in a positive light, such as those made by Anwar Al-Awlaki and Abu Bakar Baasyir.233 These materials are obtained from visitors and are also widely available in the internet through websites such as YouTube or sent to them via email. The jihadi-themed materials became widely consumed, especially among the younger inmates, and they are made even more attractive by the JI members, such as by making a rap video to spread the positive message of armed jihad.234

d. MINI BUSINESS

The provision to allow inmates to run a mini trade in prison allows unrestrained interaction among the general inmate population, as well as opportunity for the terrorists to fuel their desire for jihad. Even in prison, terrorists were able to strengthen their camaraderie by providing monetary support to their fellow terrorists who were held in Batu, Nusakambungan prison in Central Java.235 In order to enable them to support their family back home and to provide meaningful activities to inmates, Cipinang prison allowed inmates to run a mini trade in prison. This allowed terrorist inmates to accumulate wealth from selling handphone prepaid cards, food, and basic necessities to other inmates.


234 Many rap-themed videos are available in YouTube to make them appear “cool” and attractive to youngsters, such as, [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pWZd08S8e2Lg].

A popular item which is sold includes the *gamis* (a Pakistani long-sleeved dress or a shirt), and wearing it symbolises a form of identity for the *santri*. Other inmates called terrorists who indulged in these businesses as *para ikhwan* as a sign of respect.\(^{236}\) Some of these businesses became profitable and thus, the terrorists were able to send money to their family as well as other comrades to aid their mission to perform the *jihad*.

While the preceding section highlights the problems associated with the Indonesian prisons in managing the inmates, the following two sections describe some of the shortcomings in the post-release phase that hamper the deradicalisation effort.

### e. WEAK INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION

There is a lack of synchronisation among the various security agencies in handling and managing terrorist inmates from the time of arrests and release from prison. The lack of training received by prison wardens amplifies the problem. There have been calls for a better integration among BNPT, the Directorate of Corrections and the police to share vital information and to implement aftercare programmes. This weak coordination among agencies prompts Sidney Jones to call for a strengthening of capacity of relevant agencies.\(^{237}\) While Singh describes Indonesia as a classic case of a weak state and society, he acknowledges the commendable effort by Indonesia’s security agencies in dealing and eradicating the menace of

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terrorism. However, the on-going rivalry for resources among government agencies negatively impacts counter-terrorism efforts and thus, delaying any responses. Furthermore, Indonesia’s Directorate of Corrections has not made any significant commitments to get directly involved in the deradicalisation efforts. This is unfortunate because the deradicalisation process breaks down when terrorists are released from prison. Moreover, interaction with the authorities in prison and police often ends up with an interrogation session to extract information from the convicted terrorists. Weak coordination among agencies also disrupts the effort to develop a personalised relationship. Trust and rapport built during interrogation is lost to the police until the terrorist goes to prison and the prison wardens take over. Due to an absence of continuity to build a relationship with the terrorist, prison officials bear the burden of trying to continue building rapport, only to discover that they will not be able to sustain the rapport once the terrorists are released back into the community.

f. WEAK FOLLOW-UPS

To date, there are no formal post-prison programmes run by the government. The weak follow-up actions by The Ministry of Social Affairs do not facilitate nor monitor the reintegration of terrorist back into society. The police or BNPT are assumed to shoulder the responsibility. Therefore, opportunity is lost for an active effort to reintegrate terrorist back into society. As a result, former terrorists will turn to their old network for social, emotional and economic support.

Furthermore, individuals or organisations that run their own deradicalisation programmes lack of support and recognition. One such individual is Sarlito Wirawan,
who advocates moderate Islamic teachings. In his efforts, he tries to weave in deradicalisation with his academic research and applies it to the released terrorist. The programme attempts to connect religious leaders with terrorists in prison and those recently released, in an effort to instil moderate understanding of *jihad*, using the definition put forth by the Centre for Islamic Studies\(^{239}\) – *jihad* is defined as “struggle” or striving, taking place at two levels: “inner” and “outer”. While outer *jihad* refers to the defence of the Muslim community under attack, inner *jihad* refers to all the struggles that a Muslim may go through, in adhering to the religion - as his main materials.\(^{240}\)

**VII. THE ROLE OF ISLAMIC CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS**

BNPT has called for the cooperation between authorities and civil society in ensuring the success of post-release deradicalisation programme. BNPT maintained that it can only facilitate, falling short of being the enforcers of deradicalisation programmes. *Muhammadiyah* and *Nadhatul Ulama* have not been formally involved in the state’s deradicalisation programme, although some *Muhammadiyah* members used to be involved in Indonesia counter-terrorism efforts. Indonesia's two largest Islamic social organisations have also shied away from directly participating in or pledging support for the BNPT’s deradicalisation efforts.\(^ {241}\) The leaders of the organisations have maintained that they would work with former terrorists if that work


were a part of their normal activities. Hence, further efforts must be made by the state to work with these key Muslim organisations on deradicalisation in an effort to reintegrate the terrorists into mainstream Muslim communities. However, the role of civil society should not be one that involves religious rehabilitation, but one that takes a humanitarian approach. Besides providing moral and psychological support, civil society organisation such as *Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian* (Institute for International Peace Building) could open up new social networks for former terrorists, encourage economic independence or at the very least, provide their clients with a bit of respect and dignity.\(^{242}\) This will not only encourage disengagement, but it will minimise the resistance of the former terrorists to accept changes in their lifestyle.

### VIII. **INDONESIAN DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME: A TRIUMPH?**

Indonesia has not released any concrete data to measure the success of the deradicalisation programme in prison and an accurate prediction is not possible.\(^{243}\) Since the 1990s, JI, an offshoot of *Darul Islam*, took the lead in almost all terrorist related incidents and they form the bulk of the terrorist inmate population.

From 2000 to 2010, approximately 600 convicted terrorists were held in prison and about 100 of these individuals were involved in the Aceh military training camp, as either trainers or participants.\(^{244}\) From 2002 to April 2013, approximately 800

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\(^{244}\) Refer to footnote No. 4.
arrests were made and 63 of these were shot dead in shootouts with Densus 88.\textsuperscript{245} As of 2013, Indonesia has at least 28 known recidivists terrorists out of around 300-350 convicts released, or about 10% rate of recidivism.\textsuperscript{246} While the figures seem low, the rate of recidivism could be slightly higher with undiscovered recidivists and suspected terrorists who were acquitted without charge and later went on to commit terrorist acts. This would include Qomarudin alias Mustaqim and Rachmat Puji Prabowo who were both ex-JI members arrested in 2004 for sheltering Noordin Top. Upon the acquittal of Qomarudin and Rachmat, they went on to join the Aceh camp.\textsuperscript{247} It also excludes men who re-engaged in terrorism after their release but in a way that did not violate any law; several of the Poso combatants who were arrested in 2007 and then joined the local JAT would fall in this category.

In one article, BNPT asserted that 13% of those released in 2010 returned to terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{248} According to Ansyaad Mbai, BNPT chief, these terrorists had taken part in some form of deradicalisation programme in prison. In the same year, 170 terrorists were arrested and 22 of them were recidivists.\textsuperscript{249} However, Carl Ungerer from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimated that as many as 30% of those who were convicted are vulnerable and not susceptible to the deradicalisation programme.\textsuperscript{250} IPAC estimated that over 80 terrorists will be due for release in 2013 and 2014, and these terrorists will bear the testament on the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{245} Refer to footnote No. 5.
\item\textsuperscript{247} See Sidney Jones, “Canberra Paper – Indonesian Terrorism,” a paper delivered at conference entitled, Indonesian Terrorism in a Global Context, on 5 December 2011, Australian National University, Canberra.
\item\textsuperscript{249} Ibid.
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effectiveness of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme. It is difficult to ascertain whether a former detainee is fully rehabilitated, or is simply practicing the jihadi principle of takeyya in which disinformation and deception are justified if their well-being or Islam is threatened. The effectiveness of the programme remains an open question.

Table 1 shows a partial list of recidivist terrorists, compiled from various sources such academic literature, online articles and fieldwork. The information below serves to highlight that not only the terrorist returned to their old networks, but they also resumed acts of violence. Moreover, most of these convicts had participated in the deradicalisation programme and it begs the question whether the government had done enough to evaluate their potential for release. The next section shall explore five of these case studies. Selection of these cases is due to the information available at the time of research and lack of information on the rest of the recidivists. However, the analysis will not explore prominent cases such as Abu Bakar Baasyir and Aman Abdurrahman as extensive coverage in the media on them are available.

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251 A report by BNPT, Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakatan, “Daftar Narapidana Teroris Yg Masih Menjalani Pidana/Tahanan di Lapas/Rutan Seluruh Indonesia Yang Akan Bebas Pada Tahun 2013-2014,” February 2013. The report was provided by IPAC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Previous offences</th>
<th>Involvement in Deradicalisation programme</th>
<th>Post-release activities</th>
<th>Current status</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>In May 2006, the District Court in South Jakarta sentenced Sunata to seven years imprisonment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Abu Bakar Baasyir</td>
<td><em>Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah.</em> Masterminded several key bombings such as Bali Bomb 1. In 2003, sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Released in 2006 for cooperating with police.</td>
<td>Rejected deradicalisation programme</td>
<td>Financer and ran a training camp in Aceh.</td>
<td>In 2011, sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.</td>
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252 Compiled from various sources online including Jawapost.com, Detiknews.com and Jakarta Post, as well interview sessions during fieldwork.
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Luthfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid</td>
<td>Collaborated with Noordin Top. Sentenced to 4 years imprisonment. Released in 2007.</td>
<td>Put through deradicalisation programme</td>
<td>Trainer for a military camp in Aceh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Mustofa alias Abu</td>
<td>Took part in the bombing of the Atrium</td>
<td>Put through a deradicalisation programme</td>
<td>Alleged member of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Alias</td>
<td>Action/Activity</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
<td>Outcome/Result</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tholut</td>
<td>Shopping mall in Central Jakarta in 2001 and was found guilty of possessing illegal ammunition and explosives in 2003. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison in 2004 but received a reduced sentence in 2007.</td>
<td>“Tanzim Al Qaeda” in Depok, West Java.</td>
<td>8 years imprisonment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sri Puji Mulyo Siswanto alias</td>
<td>Withheld information from police regarding the group led by Subur Sugianto. In 2006, sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.</td>
<td>Put through a post-release rehabilitation program by Noor Huda. Re-radicalised due to old networks.</td>
<td>In 2011, sentenced to 8 years jail.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IX. COMMENTS ON RECIDIVISM

BNPT and the Indonesian government have used the term “recidivists” loosely. It is clear that recidivist refers to repeat offenders or those who returned to commit terrorism acts. However, it is unclear whether these recidivists participated in any deradicalisation programme. For example, the Indonesian police have labelled the convicted terrorists in Table 1 as recidivists. Must a repeat offender go through the deradicalisation programme to be labelled as recidivist, or is imprisonment enough as criteria? A check on the U.S. Justice Department on the definition of “recidivism” yields the following:

“Recidivism is measured by criminal acts that resulted in re-arrest, re-conviction, or return to prison with or without new sentence during a three-year period following the prisoner’s release.”

The abovementioned definition uses previous convictions rather than arrest for calculation, the recidivism rate for Indonesia would be hovering at just below 10%, including those who were shot dead at the time of arrests. At the time of research for this thesis, no data was available to ascertain the “window period” used by the Indonesian government in order to categorise terrorists as recidivists. However, if the definition holds, statistics might be skewed as the calculation excludes other terrorist, which falls outside the range. These include those who were caught beyond the three-year window, those who radicalised or support terrorist acts

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254 The figure “below 10%” is just a rough estimate provided by BNPT officials through interviews. It excludes terrorists who are re-arrested after the “three-year” window period.
but did not commit anything against the law and those who were caught but released without sentence.

While the definition should not apply to Islamist terrorists because the aim of deradicalisation should be to prevent released terrorists from re-engaging in terrorism and violence, the rehabilitation of these terrorists should be permanent. Ideally, the process should encourage terrorists to embrace moderate Islamic worldview while upholding the Indonesian nationalism, manifested through the tenets of *pancasila*. 
CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDIES

I. IMRON BAIHAQI ALIAS ABU THOLUT

Imron Baihaqi alias Abu Tholut is labelled as “Indonesia’s top terrorist” by the various local media. He was accused of taking part in the bombing of the Atrium Shopping Mall in central Jakarta in 2001 as well as possessing ammunition and explosives. In 2004, he was sentenced to seven years imprisonment but was released in 2007 as he displayed positive response during the deradicalisation programme in Depok prison. In 2011, he was re-arrested on terrorism charges and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. He was believed to have reconnected with the terrorist network and became a member of the Tanzim Al-Qaedah in Aceh where he participated in the training and supplied weapons. Tholut was also previously trained in Afghanistan and participated in a militant camp in Mindanao in the Philippines.

Abu Tholout is known to be a “good person” and friendly among his neighbours in the village Desa Bae, Kudus. Although the name Abu Tholut had become synonymous with terrorist activities before his arrival, the villagers at Bae accepted him as a warm and friendly person. Tholut did not portray himself as an extremist. Some villagers even believed that he was not really a terrorist, although they knew he had just been released from prison. Tholut is affectionately called “Om Yon”, a short form for Uncle Imron. His family is also very sociable with the

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258 Ibid.
259 Calling a person with the title “om” is a sign of respect, usually referring to someone who is older.
villagers and his wife, Fachatun, is active in community activities. When interviewed, the villagers admitted that they did not know of Tholut’s activities outside the village, even though he and his family interacted well in the village. He was also known as Pak Ustaz as he was active in giving sermons and carrying out religious classes outside the village. Bayu and Narendra believed that Tholut earned some income by conducting religious classes and syarahan outside the village. Tholut rarely preached in the village as his religious orientation of Islam differed from that of the villagers.

Tholut was once among several convicted terrorists enrolled in the police’s deradicalisation program while in prison, but he is a confirmed recidivist by the intelligence branch. Bayu and Ansyaad believed that the sentence was inadequate for someone with Tholut’s proficiency unless the government managed to pierce through Tholut’s network deeper and deradicalise his followers. Tholut could potentially build a new network of terrorist cells if the government is not responsive as he was regarded as a pious and brave man among the other inmates. While in prison, he headed pesantren At Tawwabin. While reports have emerged that he is shunned by Abu Rusydan’s factions, he is well liked by supporters of Noordin Top and other splinter groups.

In an interview with BNPT in 2010, Abu Bakar Baasyir revealed that Abu Tholut was a respected teacher in Pondok Pesantren Ngruki (Baasyir’s boarding

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260 Bayu Adinugroho and Narendra Jatna during interviews conducted on October 2012, Jakarta asserted this.
262 Interview with Ansyaad Mbai and Bayu Adinugroho in Jakarta, November 2012.
school) and he taught Asyakari. Baasyir admitted that he was emotionally linked to Tholut as a fellow ustaz. In the interview, Baasyir vividly mentioned:

“Saya dan Tholut sepakat untuk berjihad melalui jalur pendidikan dan berda’wah tanpa kekerasan. Kami akan melawan jika diserang. Saya yakin Tholut tidak akan menyetujui cara jihad yang dilakukan mereka-mereka yang di Aceh. (We pledge to jihad in with the path of education and da’wah without violence. We will retaliate only if we are attacked. Tholut would never agree with how jihad is conducted by those in Aceh.)

The interview highlights the deep-seated affinity among JI members, which cannot be easily broken.

II. BAGUS BUDI PRANOTO ALIAS URWAH

In 2004, Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah was arrested for sheltering Azahari and Noordin Top, the masterminds of the JW Marriot bombing in Jakarta in 2003. The following year, the South Jakarta District court sentenced Urwah to prison for three and half years. He was jailed in the Cipinang prison, a top-security prison in Jakarta. While he initially refused participation, he eventually gave in for practical reasons. Ansyaad Mbai noted that Urwah, like other terrorists who were desperate to be released, showed remorse and made convincing promises to the police relating to abandoning violence. He cooperated with the police and gave valuable information about several key figures in JI. Urwah was released from prison in late 2007 and was later shot dead during an arrest in 2009. While in prison, he interacted a lot with the

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264 Asyakari is the science of war.
265 Excerpts provided by BNPT.
“JI Putih” (white JI) and regularly visited them in their cells every week.266 This “white” group persistently reject any form of deradicalisation programme and they refuse any assistance from the wardens.

Urwah was exposed to radicalism while attending a local public school and he had good connections in the terrorist network. Born in 1978, Urwah came from the village of Mijen in the district of Kaliwungu, Kudus regency and his family members were mostly basket weavers. Although the villagers were aware of Urwah’s terrorist activities, they were still friendly towards Urwah’s family and Urwah himself was known to the villagers as a polite young man who was diligent in his religious duties. Bayu also mentioned that villagers had no problem attending Friday congregational prayers with Urwah after his release from prison. Urwah graduated from Pesantren Al-Muttaqein in Jepara. He then continued his education in Ma’had Aly An-Nur in Solo.267 It was in An-Nur that Urwah started to participate in terrorist activities upon meeting with Islamic radicals. One of his teachers in An-Nur was Syaifuddin Umar, alias Abu Fida, who was also arrested and considered a key link to senior JI members, most importantly Azahari.268 Abu Fida introduced Urwah and another of his classmate, Ubeid, to Noordin Top. Upon his release from prison, Urwah maintained good relationships with his former classmates such as Ubeid and other known radicals.

Urwah resided in Surakarta, in the village of Padokan, Sukoharjo after his release. His routine work included downloading jihadī documentaries and films from YouTube and copied them onto storage media for mass dissemination under the

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266 “White JI” is a term used to describe inmates who stay committed to the jihadist cause of JI. Interview with Sri Yunanto, Jakarta, October 2012.
267 According to Bayu, Ma’had Aly An-Nur had since moved to Sukoharjo.
268 Interview with Tito Karnavian and Bayu Adinugroho, Jakarta, October 2012.
name of Muqowama Publications. He produced several *jihad* documentaries such as *Para Peminang Bidadari* (The Fairy Proposals), *Daulah Islamiyah Iraq* (The Islamic State of Iraq) and *The United States of Losers*.\(^{269}\) Urwah regularly received invitations to give lectures in Surakarta and Yogyakarta, and he was a regular *imam* who led the *fardhu* prayers in mosques. His ardent followers included housewives, young adults and teenagers.\(^{270}\) One of Urwah’s teachings in these mosques reiterated the fact that *jihad* is *fardhu ain*, and therefore it is legitimate for anyone to execute it based on whatever initiatives and methods. Urwah, like other JI members, argued that performing *jihad* does not require the permission of an *imam*.\(^{271}\)

My interview with BNPT officials and Noor Huda revealed some disturbing facts; villagers who patronise mosques utilised by JI members especially in Central Java, regarded convicted terrorists as defenders of Islam, to the extent that they visited these terrorists in prison as a form of solidarity among Muslims.\(^{272}\) One of the visitors in prison told Noor Huda that, “We have to remain united as *mujahid* to fight against the enemies of Islam.” These kinds of support enable detainees to maintain their spirit of *jihad*. Furthermore, it reinforces a mentality that they are still living within *mujahid* groups even when they are in prison. Urwah mentioned to Huda that

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\(^{269}\) As of March 2012, these videos were still available in YouTube.com. The original uploaded videos have been deleted. They were re-uploaded by one user, ‘uno iguane’ earlier in 2013 and garnered less than 50 views up until June 2013.

\(^{270}\) Interview with Bayu Adinugroho, Jakarta, October 2013.

\(^{271}\) This is a radical understanding of *jihad* in the modern context. A famous quote often used (or misused) was by Ibnu Rusyid, “Obedience to the *imam* is mandatory even though the he is unfair - even though he is *fasiq* - unless he gives orders to commit adultery, which include preventing one from performing *jihad*, which is *fardhu ain*.” He said it in the context of Muslims being attacked in physical sense (war). See books by Rohimin, in *Jihad: Makna dan Hikmah*, Erlangga, 2006, pp. 6-13. Also, Mohd Liki Hamid, in *Pengajian Tamadun Islam*, PTS Professional, pp. 130-140.

\(^{272}\) Some examples of these mosque which are often used as a place for gatherings and sermons of JI members include, *Ramadhan Mosque in Bekasi*, *Al-Muttaqien Mosque in Kartopuran*, *Al-Islam Gumuk Mosque in Solo*, *Al-Maghfirah Mosque in Cimanggis* and *Pesantren Jamsaren Mosque* in Surakarta. This information was quoted from an operation conducted by Densus 88 in intelligence gathering to find out the extent of the spread of radicalism in mosques in 2010.
as *mujahids*, they always have to protect their image and their principles on their views on *jihad*.

### III. ABDULLAH SUNATA

While Abdullah Sunata was touted as a success case in Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme, he became a prominent recidivist when he was accused of masterminding a terrorist training camp in Aceh and planned to attack the Presidential Palace on 17 August 2010. During the programme, he claimed to renounce the use of violence in *Jihad*. According to Nasir Abbas, as a member of NII, he reignited his radical aspirations and joined forces with Kompak (Crisis Management Committee) which operated during the crisis in Ambon. Sunata also played a critical role within the JI network after the death of Noordin Top. After the Bali bombings, he opened a training camp in Mindanao and was believed to receive funds from the Middle East. Within the military leadership structure of JI, Sunata was known to be in the ranks of Dulmatin and Umar Patek. Sunata was arrested on 2 July 2005 for possession of firearms and for sheltering Noordin, the late bomb-making expert who orchestrated all of the major suicide bombings targeting Westerners in Indonesia, including the Bali nightclub blasts. In May 2006, the District Court in south Jakarta sentenced Sunata to seven years imprisonment. He was released from prison almost three years later in 2009 for cooperating with the police, displaying good behaviour as well as changing his perception towards violence. He was re-arrested in June 2010 for his alleged involvement in a plot to carry out a

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273 Sunata denied his involvement to attack the presidential palace on 17 August 2010, although the police had claimed they have strong evidence to prove his guilt.


275 Interview with Bayu Adinugroho, October 2010, Jakarta.

276 Ibid.
Mumbai-style attack targeting foreigners in luxury hotels and several high-profile assassinations.

Sunata was born in *Bambu Apus* in eastern Jakarta on 4 October 1978. Bearing his real name, Abu Ikrimah Al Bassam Al Mathlub, he became famous when he commanded the *Laskar Mujaheddin Kompak* in Ambon. According to Ansyaad, Sunata was deemed as an exemplary subject in the deradicalisation programme. He proved that even hardened criminals could change.\(^{277}\)

Noor Huda Ismail, who is the Executive Director of *Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian*, claimed that Sunata was a nice and accommodative person while in prison. He was receptive towards the rehabilitation programme and cooperated well with the police. During one of the routine dialogue session with his case officers, Bayu asserted that Sunata was remorseful for his deeds and rejected the act of martyrdom and suicide bombing.\(^{278}\) He did not support any attack in Jakarta or Bali because they were not deemed as conflict zones. He even claimed that he once refused Noordin Top’s request to collaborate in a bombing mission because he did not endorse the use of bombs.\(^{279}\) Hence, Sunata’s road to rehabilitation looked promising and he was released in 2009. However, a year later, he returned to his radical ways and hooked up with his old network of friends. Ansyaad believes that just like Urwah, he participated in the deradicalisation programme for pragmatic reasons and personal benefits.

\(^{277}\) Interview with Ansyaad Mbai, August 2012, Jakarta.


Sunata was a charismatic leader and he had little problem in finding new recruits to join his cause, especially in East Java, which according to police sources, was a worrying fact. A former webmaster for JI, Abdul Aziz, said that the new recruits did not necessarily agree with the idea of using bombs but they share the same aspiration with Noordin and company, which was utmost hatred for the U.S. and its allies. Neighbours of Sunata described the latter as a polite man as he did not display any negative characteristics.

While Sunata rejects the idea of terrorist attacks in Jakarta and Bali, intelligence analyst, Dino Chressbon, believes that Sunata had regarded Poso, Ambon and Aceh as legitimate battlegrounds for Muslims to launch attacks. Moreover, he had similar views with his JI comrade that killing the leader of the region they were fighting in was legitimate.

IV. THORIQUIDIN ALIAS ABU RUSYDAN

It is worthwhile to examine Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan’s case, although he did not participate in the deradicalisation programme. An appreciation of his worldview and the environment he operates in could give us a better understanding on how the deradicalisation programme ought to be carried out. Former Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah, Rusydan took over as the day-to-day caretaker of JI from Abu Bakar Baasyir in 2000 and formally assumed the position in April 2002. He led JI

280 Ibid.
281 This information was shared by Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Daerah Riau Kota Barelang, extracted from case file of Abdul Aziz bin Sihabudin.
283 This is a well-documented fact, although there are conflicting accounts. Abu Rusydan asserted in several interviews that there never was a replacement Amir or “emergency Amir” for Abdullah Sungkar, See for
Mantiqi 2, which oversaw Java, Sumatra and other Indonesian islands. Rusydan was arrested in 2003 on charges of sheltering one of the Bali bombers, Mukhlas, and was sentenced to three and half years in prison. He was released early in 2005 for good behaviour and declared that he rejected all forms of bombings that target innocent civilians, including the bombings in December 2000. While Rusydan refused to condemn the Bali bombers, he pleaded with all militant groups to reconsider their violent strategies.\textsuperscript{284} He detested participating in the police deradicalisation programme in Cipinang prison. After his release in 2005, Rusydan resumed supporting JI activities regardless of the conditions attached to his release. Most of the Afghan veterans respect and consider him as a suitable leader for JI.\textsuperscript{285}

Rusydan is the son of Haji Mohammad Faleh, who was the leader of \textit{Darul Islam}. Being the son of former leader of an extremist group, Rusydan is well connected in the terrorist networks. Abu Rusydan was born in Kudus, Central Java and the region has been notoriously known to harbour numerous terrorist activities. It is home to several of the most-wanted terrorists including Abu Tholut alias Mustofa and Bagus Budi Pranoto. Faleh was arrested for his alleged involvement in \textit{Komando Jihad} warfare in the 1980s. Rusydan graduated from Surakarta University in the School of Social and Political Sciences in 1983. While Rusydan opposed democracy and advocates Islamic law adamantly, he is very much against example, James C. Whitmire, “\textit{Jemaah Islamiyah Remains Active and Deadly},” in \textit{The World’s Most Threatening Terrorist Networks and Criminal Gangs}, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 200. See also, Manullang A.C, “\textit{Terrorisme dan Perang Intellijen},” in \textit{Terrorism}, 2006, p. 84.\textsuperscript{284} Interview with Ansyaad Mbai, Anugerah, Narendra Jatna in Jakarta, September 2012.\textsuperscript{285} Noor H. Ismail and Carl Ungerer, “\textit{Jemaah Islamiyah: A renewed Struggle}?” \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2.
indiscriminate violence. He was rejected from the Armed Forces Academy (AKABRI) in 1984 because he was related to a DI leader.

During one of his counselling sessions in prison, he mentioned that his departure to Afghanistan to participate in the war against the USSR in the 1980s was not opposed by any of his family members and relatives. He once told BNPT officials, “Alhamdullilah, they supported my decision to be a Mujaheddin.” When asked if Rusydan knew what a terrorist is, he answered as follows,

“Yang disebut teroris adalah orang-orang yang melakukan dua jenis kejahatan, yaitu, kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan dan kejahatan luar biasa. Kedua sifat ini tidak ada dalam seorang Muslim karena umat Islam memiliki fitrah (kecenderungan alami) yang berarti bahwa umat Islam tidak mungkin mau berperang dengan insan yang lain. Yang kafir adalah mereka yang luar biasa, seperti George W. Bush dan pasukannya. Mereka adalah orang-orang yang kejam dan memberi kemanusiaan dengan masalah. (The so-called terrorists are people who commit two types of crimes, namely, crimes against humanity and extraordinary crime. Both of these traits do not exist in a Muslim because Muslims have fitrah (natural tendencies) which means that Muslims are not likely to fight humanity. The non-believers are those who are extraordinary, like George W. Bush and his troops. They are the ones who are cruel and infuse humanity with problems.)”

287 Discussion with Abu Rusydan in a forum entitled, “Isu Terorisme dan Islamophobia,” held in Masjid Salman ITB, Bandung, 8 December 2012. The author translates Rusydan’s quote.
288 Ibid. Translated by the author.
Rusydan then went on to explain his definition of a *mujahid* to the prison officer. During one of the “Q&A” session held with students, Isna, an upper secondary school student from *SMA Negeri 1 Kudus*, mentioned that she agreed with Ustaz Rusydan on who is a *mujahid*. She mentioned that she sometimes attends Ustaz Rusydan’s lectures at his home or in the mosque. When asked what a *mujahid* is, she said,

“The person is considered a mujahid if he is willing to fight for the glory of Islam with a sincere heart. His character is always steadfast towards the religion no matter how daunting the challenges are. He is willing to invite others to join his cause and is always ready to carry out the actions instructed to him.”

A comparison between Rusydan’s definition of a *mujahid* and a terrorist reveals a chilling distinction. It can be inferred that anyone who wages a war in the name of Islam, even if it is fighting against a government or people belonging to groups which are deemed as oppressor of Islam, can be considered a *mujahid*. Furthermore, those who regard *mujahids* as terrorists have been influenced by people who hate Islam. Rusydan even called the Indonesian government as *thogut* (an infidel who crossed the line) because firstly, they had robbed God’s prerogative

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289 Isna was not willing to reveal any other information about herself besides her school. Translated by the author.
of regulating order in this world, and secondly, they gave rise to a new order which promises a better life.\footnote{Abu Rusydan has been known to reiterate this fact in the various forums and discussions he participated. See “Ustadz Abu Rusydan: Pemerintah Indonesia adalah Pemerintahan Thaghut,” in Voice of Al-Islam online, 20 February 2013, accessed on 20 September 2013. [http://www.voa-islam.com/news/indonesiana/2013/02/20/23361/ustadz-abu-rusydan-pemerintah-indonesia-adalah-pemerintahan-thaghut/]}

V. LUTHFI HAEDAROH ALIAS UBEID

Luthfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid is one of the better-known recidivist terrorists. He was a member of JI and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and was first convicted in 2004 for collaborating with Noordin Top and Azahari. Following positive response during the prison’s deradicalisation programme, he was released in 2007. After his discharge, Ubeid became active in JAT and was a regular speaker in forums as well as a facilitator in many of JAT’s taklim sessions. Soon after leaving JAT, he joined the Tanzim Al-Qaeda training camp in Aceh as an instructor. His daily activities include translating Arabic jihadi themed books into Bahasa Indonesia and distributing them among members of the terrorist network. His relapse has been widely regarded as the failure of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme by the media.

Ubeid hailed from Magetan, East Java and was very firm in his quest for jihad. His persuasive personality enabled him to gain public support and sympathy. After a brief stint in Poso, he was involved in the military training camp in Aceh as a trainer. In 2011, during a district court trial in Jakarta, Ubeid claimed that the people of Aceh supported the group’s military training and other activities.\footnote{The group in Aceh military training camp was branded as ‘terrorists’ by the Indonesian government. See Al-Ikhwah Al-Mujahidin, “Struggle In Indonesia: Ubeid Denies The Conclusion By Expert Witness,” January 2011, accessed on 30 October 2012. [http://esinislam.com/MediaEnglish/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=181]} The support came in the form of food aid and organising the training sessions. During the trial, he blamed security forces for starting an armed clash in Aceh. He rallied support and sympathy...
from the local Acehnese by telling them that the security forces had initiated the tension and the training camp participants were raided and chased into the mountains. This allowed Ubeid to cast a negative light on the security forces and influenced the villagers in Aceh to think that the armed clashes are caused by the police. In a statement by Son Hadi, spokesperson for JAT, he mentioned that Ubeid left JAT due to some differences in opinion.\textsuperscript{292} Ubeid persuaded JAT to join his cause to perform \textit{idad Jihad} in Aceh.\textsuperscript{293} However, upon Son Hadi’s refusal to collaborate with Ubeid in Aceh, the latter parted with JAT and pursued his ambition in Aceh. He was made treasurer in Aceh and was responsible for ensuring adequate funding to support its operations.

Ubeid’s religious knowledge, coupled with his fluency in Arabic, commands respect from other prison inmates. After his re-arrest in 2009, Ubeid was sentenced to 10 years in jail and was placed in Cipinang prison. As a young cleric, Ubeid advocated the need for consolidation among \textit{jihadi} elements to strengthen the lines in anticipation of the call for global \textit{jihad} initiated by \textit{Al-Qaeda}.\textsuperscript{294} While in prison, he was active translating religious books to \textit{Bahasa Indonesia}. These books were widely read in prison by inmates and were made available outside prison as well.\textsuperscript{295} Besides Sunata and Abu Rusydan, Ubeid was also admired among younger inmates.


\textsuperscript{293} \textit{idad Jihad} means “preparation for \textit{jihad}.” Rusydan made the argument of using \textit{idad} for Muslims to attack bigger and powerful enemies.


\textsuperscript{295} It was not known how the materials Ubeid wrote could end up outside the prison walls at the time of the field research.
VI. PATTERNS

The foregoing case studies highlight several important issues, including how the jihadists employed “culture.” Cultural manifestations ought to be scrutinised in designing the deradicalisation programme for Islamist terrorists in Indonesia. It can be concluded that the motivations for recidivism is not solely based on religious reasons. While each case study is unique, a host of factors come into play to stimulate their re-engagement to terrorism such as income, family support and feelings of anti-establishment. However, there could be current and future developments that this thesis may have omitted, thus, accounts of the individuals’ developments are incomplete. For example, other significant factors involved may have played significant roles in the recidivism of the case studies that have not been discussed such as, the involvement and instigation of foreign organisations. Their involvement may come in the form of funding or logistical support.

Studies including larger samples of cases should be conducted in order to gain insight into the factors that play a dominant role in radicalisation processes. The combinations of factors that cause radicalisation are indeed abundant, diverse and unique for each individual. This implies that no radicalisation processes are the same and naturally, the same holds for the cases discussed above. While there are some recurring patterns between them, the extent to which causes or catalysts contributed to the radicalisation processes vary. These comments notwithstanding, a few apparent similarities are worth mentioning in the next few sections.
a. SOCIAL AND PERSONAL NETWORKS

Network dynamics appear to have been important factors in all the case studies. Personal networks seem to extend beyond their own cell group and it is hard or almost impossible to abandon their terrorist group. Peer pressure, groupthink and the tendency to conform appear to have exerted substantial influence on these individuals. For example, while all of them are associated with JI, they are also well known among other extremist groups such as Laskar Jihad, JAT and FPI. In other words, when they have altercation with one group, they can join another group. Consequently, most seem to have been embedded in close and relatively homogeneous networks. While their interconnectedness is complex, they are linked together with the same aspiration and mission. In addition, as Osman has argued, terrorists are also interconnected through blood and kinship. Robust network dynamics is also shown towards their fellow comrades such as the number of terrorists who provided shelter for Urwah, Noordin Top and Abu Tholut despite knowing that their actions will beget jail time. They were also able to build new networks by attracting new followers and recruiting more youths into the cause. Breaking and uncovering this network dynamics would perhaps contribute to the success of deradicalisation strategy.

Marc Sageman has argued that understanding the dynamics of terrorism requires a deeper understanding of networks and cohort groups.296 The value of plotting relationships to unearth sources of influence and behavioural patterns is highly important. However, paying too much attention to terrorist networks and links has been criticised by scholars such as Natasha Hamilton Hart who asserts that

researchers will end up in a pointless hunt for terrorists’ links and they will look like amateur detectives.\textsuperscript{297} While Hamilton’s argument is valid, it is still important to break the network as far as possible to prevent recidivism.\textsuperscript{298}

\textbf{b. PERSONAL AND GROUP BELIEFS}

Unrestricted interaction among inmates had led to the spread of extremist teachings of Islam and \textit{jihadist} values and beliefs. These values and beliefs are entrenched in anti-Western, anti-modern and anti-democratic attitude, in combination with their belief in Zionist conspiracies and \textit{salafist jihad} ideology.\textsuperscript{299} Distinctive to these terrorists groups is also the rejection of participation in the political process.\textsuperscript{300} Other beliefs include skewed definition of a \textit{Mujaheedin}, and classification of legitimate places to wage a \textit{jihadist} war. Hamilton aptly cautioned against pathologising terrorism by taking their ideology more seriously than their grievances.\textsuperscript{301} She divides the terrorists’ motivations into political grievances and religious grievances. An emphasis on the later will derail researchers from uncovering the true motivations of terrorists.

The Cipinang prison that houses notorious names in the \textit{jihad} world such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, Abu Tholut, \textit{ustaz} Qital, Luthfi Haedaroh alias Ubeid and \textit{Ustaz} Fahim allows frequent interaction among inmates.


\textsuperscript{298} Greg Barton has argued for the importance of breaking the terrorists’ network. See Greg Barton, “Ten Years On: Indonesia’s anti-terrorism advances,” in ABC news online, 12 October 2012, accessed on 1 February 2014. [http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/4308906.html] Indonesia’s key security leaders have also stress the importance of disrupting these networks, including Tito Karnavian (Head of Papua Regional Police) and Allan Nairn (Indonesia’s Special Security Forces, Kopassus).


\textsuperscript{300} Many literature talks about this. See for example, Diya Rashwan, in \textit{The Spectrum of Islamist Movements}, \textit{Volume 1}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{301} Natasha Hamilton-Hart, “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: expert analysis, myopia and fantasy,” \textit{op. cit.}
When inmates are allowed to perform the obligatory Friday congregational prayers together, charismatic individuals such as Abdullah Sunata and Abu Rasydan are able to take advantage of such gatherings to extend their influence and rally support from other inmates. The interaction that augmented the terrorists’ resilience and some of them were even revered as the “bombers who are pious and brave.”

Most prisons such as Palu in Sulawesi, Nania in Ambon and Gunungsari in Makasar do not limit the interaction among inmates as well as between inmates and external visitors.

Interactions among inmates and at times, prison wardens are influenced by the ideology propagated by the terrorists. Yunanto recounted how prison officers would sometimes join in the congregational prayers where Abu Bakar Baasyir or Abu Tholult is the imam. The officers may even attend religious classes and talks organised by the inmates themselves. Urwah or Sunata would sometimes invite the prison officers themselves to debate on religious matters. Such interaction provides a poor setting for a controlled environment in a deradicalisation programme. Charismatic terrorists are capable to weakening the aqidah of other inmates, enabling the infusion of the jihadist ideology to sip into the latter’s religious beliefs. It provides a platform for recruitment as well as radicalised individuals to become more radicalised.

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302 In Bahasa Indonesia, they were referred to as “tukang ngebom – orang-orang soleh dan pemberani,” Interview with Ali Imron September 2010, obtained from BNPT in January 2013.

303 Interview with Dr. Sri Yunanto, Jakarta, September 2012.

304 To the Muslims, aqidah means accepting firmly without reservation, from the absolute facts of Islamic teachings.
c. ATTITUDE TOWARDS JIHAD

Groups such as JI and JAT interprets jihad in the salafist mujahedin sense, which is beyond the moderate sense of personal spiritual improvement and defence of the Muslim community. This includes the moral duty of overthowing Muslim governments and societies considered as apostates. Incarceration reinforces a mindset that prison is part of the jihadi journey and this mindset spreads across inmates. They also endorse the idea that jihad is fardhu ain (mandatory). It also gives rise to the unified realisation among detainees that the obstacle to achieving an Islamic state is the apostate government and the U.S. policies supporting them. This is infused with a peculiar attitude of the Javanese; they believe in the philosophy of three “nga”s; ngalah (relent), ngalih (break away), ngamuk (run amok). As Javanese, these terrorists will relent to favourable long-term goals; however, if their opponents act tough on them, most Javanese would ngalih, or break away in search of a strategy to win. However, if the enemy continue to their hostility, the Javanese will run amok.

Nazarudin Mochtar alias Harun, a detainee in Porong Surabaya, mentioned a disturbing credo shared among terrorists detainees to Densus 88 officers, which is, “Going to jail is like taking a holiday from jihad, when we are released from prison,

306 Ibid.
307 M. Bambang Pranowo, in Orang Jawa jadi Teroris, edited by Syaefudin Simon, Pustaka Alvabet, Jakarta, 2011, p. 18. The book is in Bahasa Indonesia and it attempts to reveal why many Javanese are dragged into terrorism. In fact, the Javanese, as a society that upholds tolerance, religion and not easily influenced by others shows the contrary.
308 While Bambang Pranowo asserted this in his book, a chat with some confidential informants who were once acquainted with JI members revealed that this is true to some extent.
we Mujaheddins should be ready for jihad." Moreover, for the terrorists, serving prison time is a special moment for them to berkhalwat (to be alone and self-reflect), as well as to maximise their devotion time to God. This is worrying because, firstly, incarceration does not break their spirit to defend the group’s cause. Moreover, it heightens their spirit to jihad because they see imprisonment as a form of provocation. Secondly, responding positively to deradicalisation programme may just be a façade to attain early release; this seems to be a common pattern among all the recidivist cases. This observation points to a concern with the environment where the deradicalisation programmes take place. The terrorists feel that being in prison will not halt their desire to pursue jihad. In fact, the current state of prison environment allows an amalgamation of terrorists groups and sharing of resources among themselves while in prison. While it is costly for the government to isolate prisoners due to the large number of detainees, it is useful to limit the communication among detainees and their communal activities in prison. It is only in 2010 that the Cipinang Prison set aside dedicated prisons block for terrorists detainees. Akbar Hadi, the Dirjen Pemasyarakatan Kemenkumham (Director General of Correctional Facilities, Law and Human Rights) stressed in a media interview that the move to set aside a dedicated prison block had garnered considerable success. This include: 1) better management of prison capacity, 2) tighter control of inmates and 3) a more structured programme for terrorists.311

309 Excerpts from interview with Nazarudin Mochtar alias Abu Gar. Obtained from BNPT in January 2013.
310 Excerpts from interview with Abdurrahman Aman. Obtained from BNPT in January 2013.
d. ATTITUDE OF THE COMMUNITY

There appears to be a nonchalant and casual treatment from the community towards these terrorists when they are released and relocated to a particular village. Even though the villagers know the background of their new neighbours, the former chose to tolerate the latter’s presence. The villagers also attend religious classes organised by Abu Rusydan and Abdullah Sunata. Moreover, the terrorists’ family members support these individuals to follow the path of violent jihad. The existence of radical individuals in the villagers had allowed the jihadist ideas – such as establishing an Islamic state through jihad - to be accepted and delivered through sermons, syarahan, taklims and casual interaction. This proliferation is made more intense with the government failing to deliver several promises made to the people such as the inability of the government to curb corruption and rising cost of living. This led the radicalised individuals to join extremist groups to realise their aspirations and to voice their anger as described in chapter three.

Examples of indifferent attitudes shown by villagers can be shown in the excerpts of their statements interviewed in Kudus and Sidoarjo:

“Terorisme itu pekara biasa. Yang teroris itu adalah pemerintah. (Terrorism is normal. The government is the real terrorist)”

Pak Man, 74 years old, a trishaw rider.

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313 Interviews were made between June 2013 – August 2013 at Surabaya, Kudus and Sidoarjo, Indonesia.
“Justeru mau di apain? Asalkan yang jadi target itu bukan kita. Nilai nyawa di sini itu kecil. Satu teroris ketembak, sepuluh lagi akan muncul. (What can we do about it? As long as we are not the target. The value of lives is low. With one dead terrorist, ten more will appear.)”

Mba Sulastri, 50 years old, bakso peddler.

“Saya tidak bermasalah mereka jadi tetangga. Kami capek diinjak-injak, mas. Biar mereka sadar dan dengar suara rakyat. (I have no qualms if they (terrorists) are my neighbour. We are tired of being oppressed. Let them (government) realise their mistake and hear the peoples’ voice”

Pak Deni, 62 years old, security guard.

The interviewees above were individuals I met living in areas where terrorist were found to be hiding. Two basic questions were asked: 1) how would you feel about terrorists living in your village? and, 2) are you worried about terrorism in Indonesia? The questions were asked in Bahasa Indonesia and in some instances, I had to ask in Javanese, which they were more fluent. Most of those interviewed were not worried about terrorism; they were aware that some of their fellow villagers subscribed to jihadist ideas.

From my several engagements with security agency officials, the communities in which these terrorists are nested reject any form of violence, but they harbour anti-
establishment and anti-Western sentiments. Narendra Jatna mentioned that, although there is frequent occurrence of protest and violence, even in mosques, many of these villagers feel that the threat of terrorism is not their topmost concern. Rather, they are more anxious with bread and butter issues. The villagers know that the terrorists have specific targets, and the villagers are not among their targets.

Hence, Ansyaad admitted that the fight against terrorism is still one-sided. The government had failed to rally support from society to combat terrorism and this is certainly counter-productive for any deradicalisation efforts. As such, breeding ground for radicalisation is no longer at pesantren or mosques but can happen in any place including public schools, shopping malls, cafés and most potently, in cyberspace. The government must work towards addressing the attitudes and mindset of society towards terrorism. At its current state, the Indonesian government lacks the capacity to do so, due to inadequate coordination among security agencies and poor management of the prison system, which have been discussed in chapter 4.

e. DISENGAGEMENT PATTERNS

None of the case studies showed successful deradicalisation; however, temporary disengagement experienced in all the case studies is highlighted in this thesis. Disengagement from extremist ideology and violent tendencies was evident during incarceration and during the deradicalisation programme. Disengagement was thus acted out as a means to secure early release or remission. In other words, the imprisoned terrorists disengaged as a desperate measure. As was mentioned by

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315 Interview with Narendra Jatna, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta, 12 October 2012.
BNPT chief, Ansyaad Mbai, during one interview session, these terrorist convicts will put up a show and try to convince prison wardens that they no longer harbour jihadist ambitions.\textsuperscript{317} Abdullah Sunata was almost a shining example of how deradicalisation programme can succeed - just like Nasir Abbas and Ali Imron - but his positive response to the programme turned out to be deceiving.

Disengagement from their personal or social network becomes bleak, hampered by freedom of interaction in prison. The terrorists were able to reinforce their brotherhood and form new bonds during daily activities in prison. The areas in which the released terrorists are being placed are also vulnerable. The villagers in these areas do not know what to look out for and who to approach with information regarding any suspicious activities by their new “ex-terrorist” neighbour. In a number of cases of arrested terrorists, villagers often recounted that while the terrorists appeared friendly, they rarely got involved in community activities, sometimes showed unusual behaviour, radical in their sermons and often travel outside of their village. This allowed the terrorists to consolidate their relationships with terrorists’ networks and re-engage in terrorism without being under constant surveillance.

Disengagement cannot be sustained in the community due to the presence of radical elements. Many of the terrorists are released back into the community, which either contains their former networks or religious extremists. Old networks and interaction with radicalised individuals re-fuel their need to perform jihad and get involved in terrorists activities once again. In most instances, these terrorists often find it hard to survive on their own and end up turning to their old networks for economical and emotional support. Disengaging from old networks begets criticism from other terrorists, being labelled as thogut or infidels. As such, deradicalisation, or

\textsuperscript{317} Interview with Ansyaad Mbai, Jakarta, 12 October 2012.
even disengagement, becomes unpleasant for them. Furthermore, society is incapable of altering the terrorists' positive image of *jihadism*, which had initially influenced their recruitment to the terrorist group. This is what Horgan terms as psychological disengagement, whereby shattering the romantic *jihadist* dream is critical to sever their positive image of violent *jihad*.\(^{318}\)

While Rusydan appears to be disengaged and has rejected indiscriminate violence, it remains unclear to what extent is he disengaged; was he disengaged from his ideology, terrorist network, or just violence? Almost all the case studies discussed in this thesis recommence their terrorist activities upon release with the exception of Abu Rusydan, who continues to rally his anti-establishment sentiments in his religious classes and sermons. Rusydan’s post-prison antics and his hard-line remarks against the government make his disengagement appear hazier.

### f. *I‘DAD* AND MILITARY PREPARATION

A significant number of released terrorists joined the Aceh training camp either as trainers or administrators to prepare future *jihadists* for a larger war. This emphasises the allure of *i‘dad* or military preparation in which the *Quranic* chapter of *At-Taubah*, verses 5-6 are commonly cited to endorse engaging in a war for *jihad*.\(^{319}\) Despite the discovery of the Aceh camp and its demolition in 2010, many released terrorists were still willing to risk joining camps set up by Santoso in Poso and the Abu Umar network in Sulawesi. Among those who took part in Aceh were also well-known and charismatic leaders of the *jihadi* movements such as JI, JAT and FPI. Their recidivism may be driven by the desire to assert command and assure their

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\(^{319}\) For literature that traces the perspective of radicals on *i‘dad* and *jihad*, which includes the perspectives of Abu Rusydan and family members of Imam Samudra, see Bilveer Singh and Munir Mulkhan, in *Teror dan Demokrasi dalam I‘dad dan Jihad: Sudut Pandangn Kaum Radikal*, Metro Epistema Publishing, 2013.
supporters that they are still in authority even after prison release. Thus, their recidivism has less to do with the camp per se. Abdullah Azzam, also known as “Father of Global Jihad”, asserts one of the more controversial views on *i’dad*. He points out that *i’dad* through *irhab* (terror) and scare tactics are more important than obligations of the pillars of Islam other than the Muslims’ *syahadat*. This includes the killing of children and women, and those who support the democratic system.320

**g. REASONS FOR JOINING THE JIHADIST CAUSE**

Reasons for individuals to join the *jihadist* cause may not necessarily entail religious ideology. A serving prison warden shared that non-terrorist inmates have various intentions for joining the *jihadist* cause. Some are fascinated with the idea of increased or higher status in society as a *perajurit Islam* (Islamic warrior). Others are attracted to economic incentives such as the possibility of earning extra income, enjoying certain privileges and gaining some extra benefits in the form of tangible items or jobs. Interestingly there are those who want to hop into the bandwagon to wash away their past sins. Reasons that cause radicalisation or for joining terrorists groups have been discussed in the literature review. However, for the case of Indonesia, motivations for recruitment should receive particular concern, because, any system that is in use currently to assess high-risk detainees should be able to detect these individuals. While the Indonesian authorities face an arduous task of monitoring freed terrorists whose backgrounds and whereabouts are well known, a petty thief or drug dealer who had just join the *jihadist* network is unlikely to receive

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320 According to Abdullah Azzam, all notion of jihad have been replaced by At-Tawbah verse 5 and 36 and it supersedes *mansuhkan* more than 120 verses of the Quran before it, both in Mecca and Medina. See Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, in *Al-Qaeda in its own words*, Harvard University Press, 2008 and see Bilveer Singh and Munir Mulkhan, in *Teror dan Demokrasi dalam i’dad dan Jihad: Sudut Pandangn Kaum Radikal*, op. cit.
special monitoring. Thus, the real problem of violent terrorist acts may not lie with the released terrorists, but those who were recruited in prison.
CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS REVISITED

Thus far, the first research question – how individuals get radicalised? - had been dealt with in chapters three, four and five. While historical circumstances have given rise to the formation of politically-motivated religious extremist groups, readers must understand that every individual traverses through different pathways, thus, the need for contextualisation and personalisation of a rehabilitation programme. In addition, the role of charismatic religious leaders in the process of radicalisation to attract new followers and encourage current ones, as in the case of Abu Rusydan, Abdullah Sunata and Abu Bakar Baasyir, should be re-examined for further research. In the context of injustices faced by Muslim communities during the New Order era and against the backdrop of the post 9-11 security landscape, JI members are able to rally support and evoke sympathy towards their jihadist cause successfully, partly because their followers may have already embraced anti-Western or anti-establishment sentiments. Exposure to terrorist networks has also augmented the process of radicalisation among prison inmates as well as the terrorists featured in the case studies. However, as pointed out in the literature review, Horgan distinguishes between “radicalisation” and “violent radicalisation”. As such, it is perhaps useful to reframe the first research question as “what causes these radicalised individuals to engage in violence?” This is in view of the fact that, radicalised individuals may adhere to extremists’ conception of religion but may not necessarily engage in violence.

The main concern of this thesis is reflected in the second research question - why despite going through deradicalisation programme, participants still return to
their old networks and resume terrorist activities? In other words, Indonesia should be concerned at reducing the rate of recidivism and trace the processes that could impede the success of the deradicalisation programme. Chapter four addressed the second research question, whereby, as Ashour argued, poor prison management and lack of coordinated efforts will not achieve an ideal deradicalisation objective. An ideal deradicalisation objective occurs on all three levels: behavioural, ideological and organisational. Chapter five also discussed the attitude of the community towards radicalism and terrorism, which is nonchalant while some are even supportive of the terrorists group. The support garnered provided ample room for released terrorists to re-engage in terrorists activities without being scrutinised, and at the same time preach their *jihadist* rhetoric to the villagers. A deficient post-prison programme without strict legal restrictions will leave released terrorists unmonitored and give them the opportunity to re-engage with the terrorists’ network.

The last research question – what should be deradicalised? – is indeed an issue which most government should pay attention. Chapter two shows that individuals radicalised in various ways and often, the blame will always be on religion and ideology. Only a tailored approach that focuses to individual needs and, to what extent they are radicalised, will allow the authorities to decode their cognitive and behavioural conditions. Furthermore, it is also important for the Indonesian government to sensitise the society on the needs to manage and eradicate all forms of radicalism. Thus, while Indonesia may not have the capacity to do so now, it is important that it start gearing towards a new approach for the deradicalisation programme. The approach should be a complete and self-sustaining with the capability to address individual motivations to terrorism and also societal influences upon the individual which makes them likely to return to radical ideologies in the
event of release.\textsuperscript{321} The case studies show that the deradicalisation programme should not focus on just the programme participants. There is inadequate effort to ensure that the community itself is conducive to be the supporting agency for the deradicalisation programme during the post-release phase. The revamped deradicalisation programme should incorporate community leaders in educating members of the community to be tolerant, even between the different orientations of Islam. There is also a need to persuade the community to refrain from using violent means to champion their extremist beliefs. Cultivating and developing national education imbued with the tenets of \textit{pancasila} is one way to produce a moderate community, one which will offer a favorable environment to facilitate the deradicalisation of released terrorists.

\textbf{II. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS}

Culture is an intricate subject to accurately define and conceptualise due to the complex environment that the terrorist operate in against the backdrop of political and social history, majority Muslim population, and intricate network dynamics of the terrorist groups. It is difficult to determine a cause and effect relationship between the experiences of social and prison life and the negative effects, and how such experiences may affect the individual terrorist.

This thesis hinges upon the self-reported data of Indonesia and independent verification to deny or confirm the data is partly not possible. Considerations must also be given to the difference in the definitions of relevant terms used in various literatures and various countries such as “radicalisation” or “deradicalisation.” Readers must acknowledge that what may be considered radical activity in

\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
Singapore or other parts of the world could be considered normal social behaviour in Indonesia. For example, it is typical in Indonesia to hear imams talking about jihad and professing anti-western and anti-establishment sentiments during sermons and religious classes. Understanding Islam in Indonesia also requires basic, if not extensive understanding of the Javanese culture – a dominant culture in Indonesia – which has been written extensively in scholarly writings.\textsuperscript{322} The author acknowledges the fact that this issue was not dealt with extensively, partly because of the limited time available to examine the rich literature on this subject. However, it is not enough to understand the terrorists’ religious view without this cultural background knowledge. Walking along “Arab Street” in Surabaya, one might discover Muslims worshipping the grave of the wali songo,\textsuperscript{323} whereas in certain parts of Jogjakarta and Kudus, Muslims practice Islam marinated with Javanese psycho-cultural values with a tinge of Hinduism and Buddhism. No attempt was made for a comparative analysis of Singapore, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia – which run some of the most successful rehabilitation programme for radicalised individuals – to offer externally valid data to measure success. This is because the deradicalisation programmes are implemented under fundamentally different government structures, cultural context and legal environment. Indonesia, unlike Singapore, has a majority Muslim population and it does not have emergency laws such as the Internal Security Act. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Indonesia does not have a solid government control over its


\textsuperscript{323}The Wali Songo (Nine Saints) were revered saints of Islam in Indonesia, especially on the island of Java, because of their historic role in the spread of Islam in Indonesia. The word wali is Arabic for “trusted one” or “saint,” while the word songo is Javanese for the number nine. Thus, the term is often translated as “nine saints.”
deradicalisation programme. The programme in Saudi Arabia is under the direct purview of the Minister of Interior, who makes critical decisions on how to run deradicalisation programmes. However, rigorous comparative analyses of Indonesia’s programme with other programmes are widely available electronically and in journals.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Can deradicalisation work in Indonesia? Innovative approaches - such as economic incentives, religious programme in prison to encourage moderate religious views and job schemes - employed by the Indonesian authorities, deradicalisation programmes in Indonesia are still useful in the strategy but the programme in its entirety still has a long way to go. In terms of counter-radicalisation efforts, Indonesia has been highly effective in conducting offensive operations, making successful arrests and tracking down recidivist terrorists. Several recommendations are presented below to provide an insight to achieve the best strategy.

a. RECOMMENDATIONS 1 – RELIGION MAY NOT ALWAYS BE THE PROBLEM

Promoting disengagement needs to be carefully implemented within the context of the particular culture or socio-political issues experienced by the terrorist because every terrorist went through different pathways. A deradicalisation strategy that focuses on religious rehabilitation must be implemented in tandem with addressing certain cultural imperatives of individual inmate, as well as personalised

325 See Kumar Ramakrishna, in Radical Pathways: Understanding Muslim Radicalisation in Indonesia, op. cit. and John Horgan, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalisation into Terrorism,” op. cit.
attention. Several inherent problems such as poor prison management, lack of coordination among agencies and poor public support stands in the way of an effective deradicalisation programme. While disengagement from the terrorist’s network and disengagement from violent tendencies are more pragmatic approaches to curb recidivism, the key to ensure successful disengagement is cultural contextualisation. Ideological deradicalisation on its own may seem ineffective because, terrorists have no regards for state appointed ulamas. Moreover, religion may not be the main driver for jihadist aspirations. The latter emanates from peer pressure, kinship, economic needs, identity formation and anti-establishment sentiments. As seen from chapter three, terrorism evolves from politically motivated groups which are religiously affiliated. Radicalism rose during the various phases of Indonesia’s history due to economic exploitation, demands for separation, curbing of religious movements by the government as well demands to reinstate the original Jakarta Charter which allows for the mandatory establishment of the syariah laws.

However, this does not mean that ideology and religion should be played down. Religious concepts of jihad, i‘dad, fardhu ain and wajib should still be deliberated and debated openly or with the radicals to debunk their interpretation which promotes violence. This poses several consequences for Indonesia and the region. Firstly, the mushrooming of violent radical groups in Indonesia will continue. Secondly, a lot of time and resources will be wasted in re-capturing terrorists who go into relapse. Thirdly, the threat of Islamic extremism in the region can never be eliminated as long as charismatic jihadi leaders such as Abu Bakar Baasyir are still influential in Indonesia.
b. RECOMMENDATIONS 2 – EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOFT APPROACH

The Indonesian model has proven that traditional ‘hard’ methods of coercion and “long-term” imprisonment are important to stop the violence but may work against achieving the ideal objective of the deradicalisation programme. On the other hand, the soft approach of treating terrorists can be viewed both positively and negatively. Indonesia has taken a soft stance to the treatment of terrorists with many of them receiving better treatment than their counterparts in other correctional facilities do. The rationale is that the convicted criminals will be more inclined to cooperate with the authorities and they are also less likely to resume their radical behaviour once they are released back into the society.\textsuperscript{326} This assumption is true to some extent because of a number of reasons; (1) such an approach is in line with international norms of basic human decency, (2) some detainees have actually been able to change their radical beliefs through this approach and many scholars believe that de-humanising the terrorists only serves to justify their violence and make them behave in ways that are morally repugnant.\textsuperscript{327} The terrorist detainees in the prisons receive the best treatment in terms of freedom, access to family members, financial service support and access to food and proper sanitation. This is contrary to the kind of treatment and attention other inmates receive. The deradicalisation programme is divided into several stages and upon serving one third of their prison sentence, they are given more freedom and privileges. It is this stage that is actually critical to the

\textsuperscript{326} Milda Istiqomah, "Deradicalisation programme in Indonesian prisons: Reformation on the correctional institution," Conference paper presented at the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Australian Counter Terrorism Conference, December 2011, accessed on 2 September 2012. [www.academia.edu/1288509/deradicalization_program_in_indonesian_prisons_reformation_on_the_correctional_institution]

deradicalisation programme and one that could spur a relapse. The privileges and freedom given to the detainees allow them to communicate with the outside world, initiate contact with former terrorist groups and radicalised society members through the broadcasting of their messages, lectures and sermons.328

c. RECOMMENDATIONS 3 – REFORMING THE PRISON SYSTEM

Poor prison management such as overcrowding and lack of resources will not allow any personalised approach during the deradicalisation programme. It is essential to note that terrorists only trust each other with information and thus, terrorists will not trust others, such as the prison warden, who is termed as an intruder. This means that the officer in charge of the detainee must first aim at cultivating a long lasting relationship built on trust and mutual consent.329 Once the detainee is able to trust the officer, something that happens over time, then the officer can use this to appeal to his intellect as well as his emotions to let go the rational beliefs and change his violent behaviour. Such a personalised approach will require considerable resources even after the terrorists are released from prison. It is also important that they be monitored by the same officer who was in charge of them to ensure that there is continuity and better understanding of the monitored target. Also of great importance is the period immediately after the arrest, when a thorough background on the individual should be conducted in order to establish motivations

328 Refer to chapter four of this thesis on the case of prison warden, Beni Irawan passing a laptop to Imam Samudra.
for his extremist behaviour. This should be the starting point, and by addressing these problems early, it is possible for them to change their radical beliefs.\textsuperscript{330}

That religious extremism has been allowed to flourish in prisons is one of the key contributory factors to the failure of the programme. While \textit{pesantren At-Tawwabin} was set up in prison to instill moderate religious teachings, it became a fertile ground to breed radicalisation. An environment which allows the cultivation of religious extremism makes it difficult for any deradicalisation strategies to succeed.\textsuperscript{331} Furthermore, many of these terrorists misinterpret the \textit{Quran} and receive guidance from radicalised religious leaders in the prison.\textsuperscript{332} On the other hand, the approach used by the prisons is to carry out religious preaching and using the \textit{Quran} to educate terrorist inmates on the ideal way of Islamic life – which demands the highest moral standards and unconditional commitment to God - and reinforce the fact that terrorist activities are not the obligation of a Muslim. The problem however, is that the terrorists do not accept counseling by state appointed \textit{ulamas} and feel that they are being brain-washed by those \textit{MUI} officials in the prisons who try to change their internalised beliefs about Islam using state propaganda. The detainees are thus influenced by those views and reversing their perception is challenging. Nevertheless, engaging these terrorists with moderate Islamic teachings should be reframed \textit{vis-a-vis} addressing their personal motivations.

From the description of deradicalisation programmes in prisons, it is possible to identify a high level of division on the approach taken to run the deradicalisation programmes. Many scholars and the media have spoken against the use of the soft approach through the police, Densus 88 and Islamic religious leaders. Some also strongly opposed to the idea of involving former terrorists in the programme.\textsuperscript{333} Thus, without a solid and concerted blueprint for deradicalisation programmes across all prisons, the Indonesian government ends up implementing a variety of approaches and employing different standards. Literature has shown that tactical strategies like those in Indonesia that use force and coercion have been successful to some extent in trying to stop the Muslim extremists from advancing their causes.\textsuperscript{334} However, fragmentation within the government agencies makes the implementation process becomes less coordinated among the prisons. Police involvement in the whole process of deradicalisation is loathed by the terrorists because of the tactics used which are similar in other correctional facilities and one that is embedded in the law. In so doing, the goal of the programme is derailed in totality. The programme is supposed to change beliefs and attitudes of the individuals and not subject themselves to another system similar to the other detainees in correctional facilities.

d. RECOMMENDATIONS 4 – ADDRESSING ECONOMIC NECESSITIES

Terrorists may commit acts of violence in exchange for economic rewards. For example, some of the terrorists highlighted in this thesis, and many other recidivists not highlighted, find it hard to reintegrate with the larger society and thus,

\textsuperscript{333} Richard Barrett and Laila Bokhari, “Deradicalization and rehabilitation programmes targeting religious terrorists and extremists in the Muslim world: An overview,” \textit{op. cit}.

difficulty in finding a stable job and income. Involving in terrorist networks has become a culture because, to some extent, it provides terrorists with economic and emotional support. Thus, authorities have to work towards delinking the programme participants from any form of terrorists’ network. Effective methods include using counter-narratives and providing economic incentives to dissuade programme participants from going back to their network. While performing *jihad* is the chief priority, terrorists such as Urwah and Abu Tholut perhaps view economic survival just as important for themselves and their family. They will turn to the terrorist groups not only because they want to uphold the group’s aspirations, but beyond the ideological struggle, the terrorists will receive economic assistance from the terrorist group. Thus, terrorist networks become a professional association to address all the necessities of life and not just an ideological bond.

**e. RECOMMENDATIONS 5 – ADDRESSING THE JIHADIST VALUE SYSTEM**

From earlier discussions, I have assumed that changes in values precede changes in behaviour, and therefore that is a need to address these values before we can influence the terrorists’ behaviours. For example, interacting with JI members may lead to assimilation to the individual values and beliefs, and this will lead to radicalisation, which often ends up in violent behaviour. Therefore, there is a need to instill nationalism or the spirit of *pancasila* to moderate their views. Horgan might find this assumption problematic and simplistic, because the link between views and behaviour is far more complex.\(^{335}\) However, in the case of Indonesia, where radicalisation is more rampant than it seems, and has become a norm in some

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\(^{335}\) Omar Ashour, in *The Deradicalization of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamists Movements*, op. cit., p. 6.
villages, a deliberate attempt to re-calibrate the value system of terrorist is perhaps necessary.

f. RECOMMENDATIONS 6 – THE INEFFECTIVE USE OF EX-TEERRORIST

The Indonesian government and the police have resorted to the use of ex-terrorists which can either produce a positive result, or vice versa. The rationale for the use of the former terrorist is to show other terrorists that their actions are wrong.\textsuperscript{336} It is also a good strategy to get the ex-terrorists to be counselors because they are the same people who carried out the recruitment. Thus, their changed views to abandon violence can encourage the convicted terrorists. This strategy also enables the police to gather information to aid a better understanding of the terrorists’ strategies and hideouts. However, using ex-terrorists would mean that these individuals have been turned around by the government and made as instruments to help hunt down their comrades. Many terrorist groups will automatically view these individuals as traitors in the sense that they failed to complete the mission.\textsuperscript{337} As much as the police may obtain information on the terrorists’ plans and any other relevant information, the later view these former terrorists as a threat to their mission and interacting with them may cause a drawback. The detainees would end up leaking information which may actually lead to further arrests and revealing the details of their operations. However, the strategy can also backfire as these former terrorists view the government as using them


against their will. Deradicalisation is about the individuals and their motivations, and the use of former terrorists may not be a good plan in unearthing the motivations of individuals towards terrorist activities.\textsuperscript{338} A personalised approach to the whole issue of deradicalisation is necessary because it is not viable to assume similar drives to terrorism as individuals are different and environmental forces influencing them are also different.

\textbf{g. RECOMMENDATIONS 7 – DERADICALISING THE COMMUNITY}

The deradicalisation programme conducted mainly in prison has excluded other radicals in the society and thus, society is still engulfed in the problem of reducing the chances of success upon release from prison. The Indonesian government implements the prison deradicalisation programme for detainees through the use of the police, prison wardens and religious leaders. The problem lies with the authorities neglecting former terrorists and other members of the community who may bear grievances towards the government as shown in chapter three, for past atrocities, unequal treatment or poor government administration. The most appropriate strategy for the government is to address these grievances and win the hearts of the general public. This includes cleaning up the negative image – perceived by the general public - of the government and the security agencies such as the armed forces, police and Densus 88. Secondly, a plan should be drawn up involving multiple government agencies to educate the society on how best Islam should be practiced and how to eradicate terrorism in Indonesia.

The root of the problem stems from the community where the radicals originate and where the detainees return to. When these communities are not

\textsuperscript{338} Rabasa \textit{et al}, in Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, \textit{op. cit.}
harnessed in the deradicalisation programmes, the “deradicalisation” process is halted upon their release from prison. The already-radicalised villages may in turn become the catalysts to motivate ex-convicts to re-engage in the acts of terrorism.\textsuperscript{339} Society’s attitude towards terrorism is an important determinant to achieve an overall successful deradicalisation programme because, it can potentially re-cultivate the norms and behaviours of the ex-convicts, be it terrorists or non-terrorists. More often than not, deradicalisation programmes are centered on the terrorists. While considerable resources are spent on integrating programme participants back into the community, little efforts are being made to ensure that the community itself is conducive to achieve success for the deradicalisation programme. The environment should consist of a community in which the majority subscribes to more peaceful and tolerant view of the religion. If there is an overwhelming population or the existence of groups which support radical religious ideas and the desire to set up an Islamic state through violent means, releasing a terrorist into that community will greatly decrease the chance of deradicalisation.\textsuperscript{340} Terrorists have begun to employ newer methods to recruit and these include online radicalisation. Therefore, the ex-convicts released into society could still pose a problem because most citizens have not been educated on the need to support them psychologically, emotionally and even religiously. Moreover, it is a concern that the community may be adhering to radical

\textsuperscript{340} Tyson Adam, "Deradicalisation in Indonesia: Discourses and Strategies," a featured article in \textit{Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism} online, accessed on 20 October 2013. [http://www.searcct.gov.my/featured-articles/50-de-radicalisation-in-indonesia-discourses-and-strategies]
ideologies and this could hamper the rehabilitation process of the released terrorist during the post release phase.\textsuperscript{341}

The deradicalisation programme should not rely on the prison’s programme and the prisoners alone but should be able to integrate and bring together a system wide approach to include the community.\textsuperscript{342} This approach should involve a great deal of institutions as well as community members in helping change radical beliefs in the society. Society involvement is thus an important step in ensuring that new recruitment is eliminated and released terrorists do not go back to committing violent acts.

h. RECOMMENDATIONS 8 – PROPER TRAINING FOR PRISON WARDENS

It is also essential that the prison wardens in charge of the deradicalisation programmes be properly trained on both the physical and psychological aspects of the process in order to better understand terrorists’ behaviours and actions. This will facilitate their understanding on the terrorists’ needs and also be able to genuinely recognise change in behaviours. It is impossible to expect non-trained police and prison officers to be effective on the job. This assumption is quite dangerous to the process and the officers themselves. If the detainees harbor feelings of suspicions while undergoing the deradicalisation programme, they will slip into a position to justify their radical and violent behaviours towards the security personnel. Culminating into violent behaviour is possible when they are exposed to de-


humanising situations such as during arrests or interrogation. All trained officers ought to ensure a thorough evaluation of the terrorist is carried out to aid their understanding of the latter’s motivations towards terrorism. A background check of the detainee is useful to seek the most effective way to help them change their beliefs and attitudes.

IV. CONCLUSION – DISENGAGEMENT AS THE BEST STRATEGY

Overall, there is a need to understand that deradicalisation per se may work in theory but the ground realities show that it is challenging to operationalise it. Many scholars have voiced their concerns on this and many have argued for approaches that combine both disengagement and deradicalisation.\textsuperscript{343} The rationale behind this is that the process of disengagement involves a change in behaviour, refraining from violence and ceasing involvement with the terrorist organisations and does not necessarily involve a change in beliefs. Deradicalisation on the other hand is aimed at changing the individual’s belief system and to encourage them to abandon extremist ideologies and embrace mainstream values. However, disengagement for now may be the best option for Indonesia to reduce the rate of recidivism and lower the chances of violent incidents. The difficulty in changing the mindset of the terrorists lies in their entrenched beliefs and ideologies. Moreover, the principles of \textit{jihad} in the extremist ideology are viewed as religious obligations by the terrorist groups.

Disengagement should be the first course of action and, more importantly, must always be voluntary. If disengagement is made under false promises, it means that when they are released, the terrorists are best placed to relapse and return to

\textsuperscript{343} Rabasa \textit{et al}, in \textit{Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists}, \textit{op. cit.}
committing violent acts. Only after a successful disengagement can the government work towards diffusing the threat of terrorism by encouraging the terrorists to deradicalise. These would include embracing *pancasila*, which would encourage the former terrorists to appreciate multiculturalism, practicing tolerance, respecting Indonesia’s constitution and, at the same time, ensuring their family well-being. Nevertheless, as shown by the literature review, some scholars are of the opinion that the goal of the rehabilitation programmes should be focused on cognitive shifts, which is rather more challenging. Challenging the Islamic views of charismatic leaders such as Abu Rusydan, Abu Bakar Baasyir, Abdullah Sunata and Son Hadi is not an easy task. They are very critical of counter-narratives to the *jihadist* ideologies by the state and their ability to defend the *jihadists’* ideology attracts a substantial number of supporters from the Muslim population. Combined with public sympathy towards jailed *jihadists* and weak government policies, deradicalisation faces a bleak prospect. The fact that terrorist groups are able to provide individuals with an alternative avenue for support – be it economic or social – security agencies should not neglect these networks. In the eyes of the public and the world, only statistics on number of terrorist-related incidents, arrests and bombings can truly be accountable for the triumph of Indonesia’s deradicalisation programme.

V. FUTURE RESEARCH

There is a considerable amount of literature on the aspect of deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes; however, ‘disengagement’ receives relatively lesser attention. A number of scholars have tried to explain the concept of disengagement,

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345 Recent developments have seen vocal ulamas and JI leaders labelling deradicalisation programmes as "*haram.*"
but an in-depth analysis may actually be required in order to effectively understand this concept.\textsuperscript{346} Moreover, further research to understand the link between radical beliefs and disengagement should be explored to understand how a change in behaviour is possible through the process of disengagement.\textsuperscript{347} Although scholars have tried to explain the push and pull factors of terrorism and motivations to leave terrorism, a great deal of research is paramount to identify the positive aspects that can be used to influence disengagement and hence, ensuring its success. To achieve a successful disengagement model, more emphasis should be placed on the individual offender rather than dealing with terrorism as a whole problem. Applying ‘cultural contextualisation’ allows the prison officer to understand the immediate needs of the terrorist and address those needs to achieve disengagement in the most reliable way.

Speaking of rehabilitation of terrorists and the violent means towards achieving of religious obligations or personal goals, it is possible to see a great deal of efforts being placed on deradicalisation. Most researchers have explored this concept to great depth. It is possible to see that much of it actually focuses on places where radicalisation takes place and how deradicalisation efforts can be applied to these places in order to change ideological beliefs of individuals.\textsuperscript{348} There are other parts of the literature that essentially focus on the motivations to radicalisation with most of them identifying discrimination, foreign occupation and counter-terrorist overreaction as triggers of radical beliefs.\textsuperscript{349} Therefore, in essence, deradicalisation programmes are built upon the identification of radical beliefs and their triggers and

\textsuperscript{347} Frank Bovenkerk, in "On Leaving Criminal Organizations," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{348} Tyson, Adam, "Deradicalisation in Indonesia: Discourses and Strategies," \textit{op. cit.}
\textsuperscript{349} John Horgan, "From Profiles To Pathways And Roots To Routes: Perspectives From Psychology On Radicalisation Into Terrorism," \textit{op. cit.}
how these could be eliminated. Many literatures have identified a number of approaches to doing this. Nevertheless, there are few studies that have attempted to link between culture and radicalisation. Therefore, it is perhaps relevant for future research to accord importance on the impact of culture on implementing deradicalisation programme.

Advancement in technology and communications could also impede deradicalisation programme. I have provided a cursory account on how terrorists utilise technology to maintain an open communication channel with their networks in chapter four and five. It is increasingly becoming difficult for terrorists to operate given the increased pressure on them to cede ground and join the mainstream views. Under these pressures, radical groups have come up with better ways to recruit new followers and spread their ideologies and beliefs. The internet and the advancements in technology have enabled this to materialise. Most literatures ignore the rise of technology and its impacts on terrorist groups as well as its influence on the ability of the radicals to spread messages with ease and recruit new members with ease. Few researches have been carried out on internet radicalisation, which is presumably becoming one of the most sought after method of spreading radical beliefs. The ubiquity of the internet allows one message to be transmitted across the world to a large number of readers and this allows the sender to gather immediate followers. Radicalisation is not limited to radical camps in the 21st century but is propelled by the rise in the use of the internet and the realisation that the internet can do a better job in terms of broadcasting those beliefs and recruiting followers not only

at home but also on the international front. Therefore, research needs to identify what forms of technology are easily available to terrorists and how do they make use of the technology to spread radical ideologies. It should also focus on the ways that programmes can be structured through the use of technology to limit access to radical messages and to also prevent young techno-savvy youths from accessing such materials. Technology can cut both ways and the internet as a matter of fact, can be very effective in recruiting followers and acting as a communication tool to help advance their radical beliefs across time and space.

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351 David L. Paletz and Alex Peter Schmidt, in *Terrorism and The Media*, op. cit., pp. 30-50.
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