LEIBNIZ, BERKELEY AND MONADS:
DISSOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF DIVINE AND HUMAN
MORAL CULPABILITY

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2012
DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information which have been used in the thesis.

This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university previously.

________________________
Charlene K.L. Koh
16 September 2012
Acknowledgments

I have always been enthralled and captivated by the works of the great system builders of 17th and 18th Century Western philosophy. It is my honour to be able to pen some of my thoughts and hopefully, in a small way, participate in this centuries-old discussion.

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Yours Truly,
Charlene K.L. Koh
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Summary

The project of this thesis is to examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom might work in the absence of a material world and to bring forth the issue of moral culpability in light of Leibniz and Berkeley’s neo-theistic God. Issues of the free will of man and God’s role in acts of moral evil particularly concerned these philosophers since they directly impact issues of moral responsibility. Man’s agency and the problem of moral evil are conceived as potentially devastating to their neo-theistic metaphysics since they undermine God’s divine attributes in their phenomenalist worlds.

In this thesis, working from an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I shall argue that his theory of monads cannot be consistently held with human agency. It seems that in Leibniz’s case, individuals who perform evil acts are not morally responsible for them, what I shall refer to as the problem of human moral culpability. With regards to Berkeley, I put forth that God concurs and is as a result, responsible for actualizing evil acts, something inconsistent with His divine attributes. Thus, it appears that while human beings are responsible for willing morally evil acts, God is also to be held culpable because of the nature of Berkeleyan concurrentism. I shall refer to this as the problem of divine moral culpability.

I suggest that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he seeks and Berkeley cannot consistently retain the notion of God, in their respective metaphysical pictures as they stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to maintain the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they commit. I shall attempt to dissolve these problems for Leibniz and Berkeley by putting forth the tweaked theory of monads.
Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been employed throughout the text:

**Leibnizian texts**

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<td>PW</td>
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<td>Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil</td>
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**Berkeleyan texts**

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<tr>
<td>A</td>
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References to the Discourse, the Monadology, Theodicy, the Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, Philosophical Writings and the Principles are made by section number; References to Three Dialogues and Alciphron by page number.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

The monotheistic God plays a crucial role in many 18th century Western philosophies, George Berkeley’s and Wilhelm Gottfried Leibniz’s included. Issues of the free will of man and God’s role in acts of moral evil particularly concerned these philosophers since they directly impact issues of moral responsibility. These two phenomenalist philosophies are not always compared to each other in this context. The project of this thesis is to examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom might work in the absence of a material world and to bring forth the issue of moral culpability in light of Leibniz and Berkeley’s neo-theistic God.

1.1 The God of Berkeley and Leibniz

According to traditional, Western theism, God is a distinct being, the creator of the universe, independent of it, eternal and possessed of divine attributes. The prevailing consensus among theologians concerning the divine attributes of the theistic God is that they include at least the following: omnipotence (God is all-powerful), omniscience (God is all-knowing) and omnibenevolence (God is wholly good).
For Leibniz, “God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom, acts in the most perfect manner, not only metaphysically, but also morally speaking”. Being all good and supremely wise, the “author of nature”, has created the best possible world, of the “highest perfection”, “the most perfect order”, of which could not have been done better. Berkeley has a similar conception, putting forth that the “Author of Nature” is a “Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness”, who is omnipresent, just and “who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of beings”.

In their various works, Leibniz and Berkeley support the concept of an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God. In this manner, their conceptions of God have these traditional features in common with the providential God of traditional theism. Both systems are phenomenalist and have God at the core of their metaphysics. Notably, however, the God of orthodoxy is predominantly associated with the existence of a material world. Given that both Berkeley and Leibniz’s worlds are non-material ones, their respective metaphysics give rise to a God that shares the traditional pan-omni properties, but performs distinct functions in light of their respective phenomenalisms. Indeed, God is a crucial component of both Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s philosophical systems but their God is to be distinguished from the God of orthodoxy for this reason.

1 D1
2 D22
3 D7
4 D3
5 P147
6 P151
7 P155
8 P151
As such, in this thesis, I refer to the neo-theistic God of Berkeley and Leibniz’s phenomenalisms and not the traditional, theistic God.⁹

1.2 The problem of moral culpability and the problem of moral evil

Leibniz and Berkeley were very much concerned about the free-will of man and the problem of moral evil. The opening passage in Leibniz’s *Theodicy*, puts forth that “freedom is deemed necessary, in order that man be deemed guilty and open to punishment”.¹⁰ In *Three Dialogues of Hylas and Philonous*, Berkeley puts forth that in order for beings to be held morally responsible, individuals must be genuine agents that possess “the use of limited powers…immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.¹¹ Both assert that morally evil acts should not be attributed to God since humans freely will these evil or imperfect events, and this places the entire burden of culpability upon their shoulders. Further, both argue that the actions human persons sees as evil are to be considered good in the grander scheme of things which we cannot comprehend due to our limitations.¹² Leibniz also attempts to avert the problem of evil by arguing that God merely permits, but does not will evil.¹³ Man’s agency and the problem of moral evil are conceived as potentially devastating to their neo-theistic metaphysics since they undermine God’s divine attributes.

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⁹ Such a distinction addresses the second examiner’s concerns regarding the thesis’ preserving of the traditional providential God of Christianity in the face of potential debits by highlighting that this is not the God of Berkeley and Leibniz.
¹⁰ T1
¹¹ HP, p. 237
¹² P153; A, p. 113; D4; D5
¹³ D7
It is imperative for both Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s philosophies that God not bear any moral responsibility for the acts of moral evil that individuals commit, and that they themselves solely bear responsibility for their actions. In this thesis, working from an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I shall argue that his theory of monads cannot be consistently held with human agency. It seems that in Leibniz’s case, individuals who perform evil acts are not morally responsible for them. But Leibniz desires to place the burden of moral responsibility on human individuals – I shall refer to this here as the problem of human moral culpability. With regards to Berkeley, I put forth that God concurs and is as a result, responsible for actualizing evil acts, something inconsistent with His divine attributes. Thus, it appears that while human beings are responsible for willing morally evil acts, God is also to be held culpable because of the nature of Berkeleyan concurrentism. I shall refer to this as the problem of divine moral culpability.

I suggest that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he seeks and Berkeley cannot consistently retain the notion of God, in their respective metaphysical pictures as they stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to maintain the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they commit. Human individuals possess free activity of their wills, rendering them morally responsible for the acts they perform. I shall attempt to provide solutions to these aforementioned critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley with my goal being to propose reformulations of their views that keep these metaphysical tenets in tact.
1.3 Summary of the thesis

Following Chapter 1, I begin the thesis proper with Chapter 2, where I introduce Leibniz’s metaphysical system. For my purposes here, I shall outline key components of Leibniz’s mature metaphysics and their workings. I give a detailed account of the Leibnizian monad, the building blocks of the Leibnizian world, discussing their characteristics and features such as the hierarchical ranking of created monads, the nature of phenomena in the Leibnizian world and the nature of the body. Due to monads being windowless, Leibniz also posits a special principle, the Principle of Pre-established Harmony, to govern the ‘interaction’ between monads. The Leibnizian world is perhaps best described as a sea of monads, where there is no direct causal link between these immaterial entities – what there is instead is an orchestrated series of corresponding changes. In this chapter, I shall also examine the role of God in Leibniz’s metaphysics.

Turning my attention then to George Berkeley in Chapter 3, I introduce Berkeley’s world view and outline a possible problem with it. I begin by briefly considering Berkeley’s arguments against the existence of matter and examine the components of his immaterial world. Berkeley’s world is an idealist one, purely constituted by two kinds of immaterial entities – minds or spirits and ideas. God plays a crucial and intimate role in Berkeley’s metaphysical system. God is a divine mind that coordinates and sustains the world as we know it. He is ever-present, sustaining and coordinating the ideas of sense in all individuals and providing consistency their experiences. It is against this distinct role that God has in Berkeley’s world to which I
raise an objection. It appears that if God coordinates and sustains ideas for all individuals and between all individuals, then He does the same in acts of moral evil as well. As such, an inconsistency arises since an omnibenevolent being actualizes acts of moral evil.

In Chapter 4, I present an examination of human agency in both Leibniz and Berkeley’s works. I shall begin with an inquiry into the subject of the free activity of the will within Leibniz, particularly in light of deterministic elements in his philosophy. In particular, I shall briefly look at arguments for compatibilist and incompatibilist readings of Leibniz. I proceed to cast doubt on the compatibilist reading of Leibniz and propose that for purposes of this thesis, we adopt an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz. Following this, I shall examine the activity of the human will in light of the distinct role God has in Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture. Here, God does more than merely agree with and allow the actions of individuals to occur. Rather, God participates and brings the willed action into actuality, synchronizing the experiences of all individuals involved. My purpose here is to locate human agency in a concurrentist world. I also argue further that Berkeley was an incompatibilist about freedom.

Next, I turn my attention to seeing both their metaphysical worlds in a comparative light. In Chapter 5, I briefly raise some points as discussed in the comparisons made by J.J. MacIntosh, Margaret D. Wilson and Laurence Carlin. I also highlight textual similarities with regards to Leibniz and Berkeley’s respective metaphysics. Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies do share similarities and have differences. Whilst acknowledging the differences in their metaphysical pictures
however, I continue to find that their phenomenalist similarities as well as the commonality of the basic idealist entities constituting their respective worlds provide grounds for my attempts to borrow from the Leibnizian world in order to aid Berkeley against the problem of divine moral culpability.

In Chapter 6, I put forth my critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley. Specifically bringing into question the theory of monads, I shall argue that the manner in which Leibniz has characterized and described the workings of monads (particularly, human souls) as an unfolding of monadic perceptions within an entity, is problematic. In essence, if all the monadic perceptions are preprogrammed for every monad, including human souls, then it seems that the source of action is not within an agent. Hence, it appears that there is no room for free will, and without agency, Leibniz cannot assign human individuals moral responsibility. With regards to Berkeley, I put forth that in such a concurrentist world, God brings into actuality morally evil acts – something inconsistent with his divine attribute of omnibenevolence. A being who is wholly good cannot bring into fruition and thereby be culpable for morally evil acts.

In response to the aforementioned critiques I shall attempt to reinstate human agency and dissolve the problems of divine and human moral culpability in Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s world in Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 7, I put forth an altered version of the theory of monads. On what I term the tweaked theory of monads, humans possess agency since they no longer simply experience the mere unfolding of monadic perceptions, but may actually make internal choices and truly be said to act as a result. I shall also address
issues regarding the Principle of Sufficient Reason, Predicate-in-notion Principle and their place in the tweaked metaphysical system. As a consequence of attempting to preserve free will by tweaking the theory of monads and ensuring the contingency condition, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle lose their fit in the scheme of things. The Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle may be tweaked and adapted to suit the new metaphysical system, but they fit poorly as they originally stand. To do so however, is an undertaking beyond the scope of this thesis.

In Chapter 8, I argue that the problem of divine moral culpability for Berkeley may be dissolved and his immaterialism maintained if one were to adopt the theory of monads. I put forth that Berkeley and Leibniz share very similar immaterial foundational entities. As such, I suggest that instead of minds and ideas, one employs monads and monadic perceptions instead. Here, my attempts are not to render Berkeley’s philosophy indistinguishable from Leibniz’s but rather to maintain Berkeley’s phenomenalism in the face of the problem. I find my adoption of the theory of monads is compatible with Berkeleyan metaphysics and resolves the problem of divine moral culpability since God no longer actualizes acts of moral evil. Finally, I conclude this thesis in Chapter 9, where I briefly recount my arguments and propose some closing remarks.
Chapter 2: Leibniz’s Metaphysical Picture

2.1 What is a Monad?

The Leibnizian world is fundamentally constituted by a simple substance Leibniz calls a monad. “Monads are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements of things”. A monad is “nothing but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. By ‘simple’ what is meant is ‘without parts.’” The utter simplicity of a Monad renders it to be created or extinguished only by a divine miracle. “To say that Monads are simple is to say that they are without parts, and thus immaterial; for Leibniz, anything material consists of parts. The simplicity of Monads is also the foundation for their indestructibility.” In other words, since “it cannot be formed by a combination of parts”,

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14 In my overview of Leibniz’s metaphysical world, I shall begin by focusing on the fundamental building block – the monad. I shall work from the assumption that the Leibnizian monads and principles relevant to them may be consistently held with Leibniz’s other principles and laws, such as the principle of sufficient reason. Admittedly, Leibniz did not introduce the term ‘monad’ till relatively late in his career. However, I note that there is widespread consensus in the scholarship that suggest that monads just are basic constituents of Leibniz’s world, a world in which principles such as the principle of sufficient reason apply (Rescher, p. 23; Ross, p. 73; Mates, p. 154). In support of this, Leibniz made reference to monad-like entities in works that pre-date the Monadology. He refers to these entities as “individual substances” in the Discourse on Metaphysics and entelechy, soul or spirit in other letters or works (Rescher, p. 18). As such, I shall assume in this thesis that Leibniz sees all his formulated principles and laws, including the theory of monads, as working harmoniously together. My discussion of Leibniz’s world shall thus be focused on the theory of monads in this chapter.

15 M3

16 M1

17 Jolley, p. 67. “According to an old tradition which Leibniz accepts, destruction consists in the dissolution of a thing into its component parts; thus when there are no parts to begin with, there can be no dissolution.”
“there is no conceivable way in which a simple substance can come into being [or be
destroyed] by natural means.”\footnote{18}

According to Leibniz, monads are windowless, they “have no windows, through
which anything could come in or go out.”\footnote{19} A corollary of their being windowless is
“[thus that] neither substance nor accident can come into a Monad from outside.”\footnote{20} A
Monad cannot be changed in quality or altered internally by any other created thing\footnote{21},
“the natural changes of the Monads come from an internal principle, since an external
cause can have no influence upon their inner being”\footnote{22} by generating any changes in it,
since that would involve a transference of quality from one to another. All monads
possess qualities and it is imperative that they do so since “otherwise they would not even
be existing”.\footnote{23} Also, if simple substances did not differ in quality, there would be
absolutely no means of perceiving any change in things”.\footnote{24} In addition to possessing
qualities, Leibniz also puts forth that no two individual Monads share exactly the same
properties. As he outlined in the theory of the Identity of Indiscernibles, “each Monad
must be different from every other… [for] in nature there are never two beings which are
perfectly alike and in which it is not possible to find an internal difference, or at least a
difference founded upon an intrinsic quality”.\footnote{25}
2.1.1 Entelechies, perception and appetition

Each Monad is endowed with perception and appetition. Monads are endowed
with perception, which according to Jolley, Leibniz defines as “the expression of the
many in the one”. All monads perceive the universe, however they are able to do so to
varying degrees of distinctness depending on their hierarchical standing and degree of
perfection. According to Leibniz, appetition is to be defined as “[the] activity of the
internal principle which produces change or passage from one perception to another”. Otherwise put, appetition refers to the internal desire or tendency by which a monad
shifts from one state to the next. It may also be conceived of as a “dynamic principle by
means of which a monad moves from one perceptual state to its successor”. Each and
every monad is in constant flux, changing from state to state. Change is a constant
process though instances of it may not always be apparent to us since “[what] appears to
us as absence of change is really a very small degree of change”.

2.1.2 Hierarchy of created monads

All monads possess some degree of appetite and perception, but not all of them
possess the same degree of consciousness. One may outline three broad categories of
monads – namely, unconscious, conscious and self-conscious monads. In essence, the

26 Jolley, p. 67
27 M15
28 Jolley, p. 68
29 M10. Every “created Monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each.”
30 M10. This is an application of the Law of Continuity, according to this law, “[everything] is continually
changing, and in every part of this change there is both a permanent and a varying element.”
difference between the self-conscious monad and other monads is that the self-conscious monad experiences a greater clearness and distinctness of its perceptions and ideas. Monads without conscious sensations or feelings and devoid of any memory are unconscious monads. Such substances with confused perceptions may be referred to with the broader term of entelechies. In contrast, the highest created monads are ones that possess memory, conscious and unconscious perception, reason and thought, as well as self-consciousness. For these monads, “perception is more distinct”. These monads may be termed ‘rational souls’ and are the category of which humans belong. The intermediate category of conscious monads or souls are reserved for beings (for example, animals) that are conscious, but not self-conscious.

2.2 Each monad represents the whole universe

Each individual monad has perception and consequently a particular viewpoint of the world. And so, the number of Monads must be infinite: “for otherwise, it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe.” As Leibniz put it,

"And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many

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31 M19
32 M65
different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad.”

In this manner, the Leibnizian metaphysical world is constituted of a system of monads forming an infinite and continuous gradation of perception and appetite, and thus the universe is “not only infinitely divisible…but is also actually subdivided without end”.

A “perpetual living mirror of the universe”, all individual monads have enfolded within themselves, the relations of all other substances – a representation of the entire universe. “In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions”. Yet “although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special way”.

While a being with infinite wisdom could from each and every individual monad gain a detailed understanding of all events, past, present or future, in the universe, a created being cannot do so. This is the case since a created soul can only read in itself.

33 M57  
34 M65  
35 M56  
36 M60  
37 M62  
38 D9
those perceptions which are represented distinctly, it cannot unroll those complexities which are enfolded within itself, as an all-powerful being could.\textsuperscript{39} “An omniscient Being could see the reality and history of the whole universe within the lowest Monad”, a limited, created monad is hardly privy to any of such knowledge.\textsuperscript{40}

2.3 God in the Leibnizian System

God plays a pivotal role in the Leibnizian metaphysical system. For Leibniz, God is not only an “eternally necessary Being whose very idea (or essence) involves existence and who is in that way the ground of existence to all other things”, “He is also the greatest of beings, the highest of Monads (\textit{Monas monadum}), whose own existence is one among many necessary and eternal truths”.\textsuperscript{41} According to Leibniz’s formulation for the ontological proof of the existence of God, “God alone (or the necessary Being) has this prerogative that He must necessarily exist, if He is possible”.\textsuperscript{42} Thus “God alone is the primary unity or original simple substance, of which all created or derivative Monads are products and have their birth, so to speak, through continual fulgurations of the Divinity from moment to moment”.\textsuperscript{43}

Just as all created beings are monads, God is a monad as well – only that He is an uncreated, perfect, self-existent monad, from which all other entities derive their

\textsuperscript{39} M61
\textsuperscript{40} Latta, p. 50
\textsuperscript{41} Latta, p. 57
\textsuperscript{42} M43
\textsuperscript{43} M47
existence. If Monads are simple, immaterial, and indestructible, then it is clear that Leibniz has arrived at an ontology in which the building blocks of the universe share certain properties with God. Leibniz reinforces the thesis that monads, the basic entities, are mirrors of God when he tells De Volder that they are all endowed with perception and appetite, or appetition." God possesses infinite and supreme power and wisdom, both morally and metaphysically. While He has absolute perfection, created beings may only be said to share fractions of that perfection. Created beings derive their perfection from God, but are imperfect due to their own nature. As Leibniz put it, “created beings derive their perfections from the influence of God, but that their imperfections come from their own nature, which is incapable of being without limits”. Incapable in the sense that it is part of the essence of a created being to be limited. And so “what is limited in us is in Him without limits” since in all created monads, there are only “imitations” (the grade and confusion of which depend on the degree of perfection of the particular monad) of the attributes of perception and appetition which God possesses perfectly and infinitely.

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44 If this is the case, one might then ask if God (a monad) can be considered ‘windowless’. Monads, according to Leibniz cannot influence each other’s inner beings since qualities cannot be transferred in or out of a monad (M7). While Leibniz does think that God is a monad, and Leibniz also says that all monads are windowless, I find that Leibniz positions God on a different plane being that He is the Divine where descriptions of created monads do not always apply to Him. God is supposed to be the omnipotent Creator and as such, He must affect other entities and bring them into being. Perhaps then, this feature of the divine supercedes and trumps the feature that nothing can ‘go out’ of a monad. This matter may be further discussed, but for the purposes of this thesis and since it will not affect my arguments, let us assume that God is a monad with some special characteristics (for example, his ‘windowlessness’ and the perfection of His perceptions) and that the strict windowlessness criteria that Leibniz outlined best describes the interaction between created monads.

45 Jolley, p. 67
46 D1
47 M42
48 M30
49 M48
As such in Leibniz’s view, the divine omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent entity chose to bring into actuality this world which is the best possible.\textsuperscript{50} The “actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it”.\textsuperscript{51} Hence, this metaphysical universe is the result not of an indifferent all powerful will, but of an all-powerful will that has created a world of the “highest perfection and could not have done better”.\textsuperscript{52}

2.4 Monads and phenomena

In the Leibnizian world, a ‘material’ body is essentially a compound and compounds are “nothing but a collection or \textit{aggregatum} of simple things”.\textsuperscript{53} What appears to human persons as a finite, continuous, ‘material’ body is actually a set of monads, endowed with perception with each having a distinct point of view that falls within a certain limit. This set of monads then appears to us phenomenally as a finite body with a defined spatial boundary. Every possible point of view within this said limit is taken up by or belongs to a monad in that set. Consequently it is due to the perceptions of these monads “[constituting] a continuous manifold like the various possible shades of colour, e.g., that the set is perceived as a continuously extended and endlessly divisible object”.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{50} D7  
\textsuperscript{51} M55  
\textsuperscript{52} D3  
\textsuperscript{53} M2  
\textsuperscript{54} Broad, p. 104
Hence, “[body], for Leibniz, is nothing but a collection of Monads (or phenomena of Monads)”.\footnote{Latta, p. 46} For Leibniz, there are only “independent substances or collections of substances which human beings misperceive as bodies.”\footnote{Broad, p. 91; emphasis mine} “[Bodies] are only phenomena, though they are phenomena bene fundata.”\footnote{Broad, p. 91} So, what the materialist perceives as a body is actually a collection of very confused minds or monads.\footnote{Broad, p. 111} More specifically, the “living being or animal consists of the dominant monad together with the subordinate monads which together constitute the organic machine”\footnote{Broad, p. 89}, the dominant monad then being the soul of that particular living being.\footnote{“Now each Monad implied in any such aggregate perceives or represents all the phenomena constituting its group, since it perceives the whole universe, of which they are parts. But as each Monad differs from all the others in the degree of distinctness of its perceptions there must in each group be one Monad which represents the group more distinctly than does any other Monad implied in it. This Monad of the most distinct perception in each compound substance Leibniz calls the dominant Monad of the substance.” (Latta, p. 109)}

2.5 Connections between monads – the Principle of Pre-Established Harmony

Given Leibniz’s description of a monad, particularly their being windowless entities, one might wonder how souls and bodies relate. But this question is misplaced. Metaphysically, all ‘material’ bodies are merely ordered phenomena brought about due to the existence of monads. Hence, the question of the connection between the body and the soul is more accurately speaking, a question regarding the relation between monads. Monads are windowless so a further account or hypothesis of how they interact with each
other is required to facilitate the monadic theory. This theory, so conceived by Leibniz, is the law of pre-established harmony.

Let us imagine the following scenario: one sighting a white swan in a lake. Given that one adopts a theory that includes the human soul perceiving and acting in a world by means of a physical body which is animated by the soul, the case is as follows: light from the sun bounces off the white swan, travels to the human being, enters its eye, is translated by the eye, sent via the optic nerve to the brain and finally, this results in or produces the particular visual sensation experienced by the individual.

However, according to Leibniz’s theories, there is no actuality in this. For Leibniz, there is no interaction between the set of monads that one perceives as the swan, and the set of monads one perceives as one’s body. But neither is there any interaction between the set of monads one perceives as one’s body and the dominant monad that is one’s soul. “The facts underlying these phenomenally true, but metaphysically misleading statements are facts about the correlation of contemporary states of monads in accordance with the Pre-Established Harmony.”

What actually occurs in one’s ‘sighting’ of the swan, according to Leibniz, is the relevant sets of monads perceiving, changing through an inner pre-established synchronization that is ideal and not material. Since substances are immaterial for Leibniz, these substances or monads cannot effect change on each other as a result of material causation. One must discard conventional notions of cause and effect which

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61 Broad, pp. 113-114
entail physicality. While it seems like they do, monads cannot effect any real change in each other. Yet it appears that they do since all changes in monads are prearranged in such a way that changes in one are accompanied by corresponding changes in other monads.

According to Leibniz, one arrives at the theory of pre-established harmony via reason, and not imagination or sense perception. Monads are indeed combinations of activity and passivity, but these are strictly confined to the internal, implying an absence of physical influence of one monad on another. In his letter to Arnauld, Leibniz likens the pre-established harmony of monads to bands of musicians playing perfectly in tune with one another. Here, Leibniz says that the concomitance between monads may be likened to several different bands of musicians, each playing their parts separately such that they do not see or hear one another. They do this while still maintaining a perfect harmony which is all the more surprising since they did not have any direct connection to each other.⁶²

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⁶² Latta, p. 47
Chapter 3: Introducing Berkeley’s World View

3.1 Introducing Berkeley’s world view

3.1.1 Arguments against the existence of matter

The central aim of the *Principles of Human Knowledge* and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* was to advance a novel view of the world in direct opposition to the more prevalent one at the time, ‘materialism’. “The view that Berkeley rejects is a sort of composite of the views of Locke, of Descartes, of Malebranche, of Newton, and of others who collectively were sometimes referred to as ‘the new philosophers’.”63 The materialism that Berkeley refers to is the view that there is a real material world that exists independently of the mind. On this view, there are actual material entities, cars, trees and rocks for example, that exist independent of whether an individual is perceiving them.

At this juncture, it is crucial to note that I am not using the term ‘materialism’ in the manner it is commonly used today in the philosophy of mind. Also known as ‘physicalism’ and specifically used in relation to the mind-body problem, this usage of ‘materialism	extsubscript{1}’ refers to the view that only the physical exists. Rather, the ‘materialism	extsubscript{2}’

63 Dancy, 1998, p. 11
Berkeley has in mind makes no such conclusion. Berkeley’s ‘materialism\textsubscript{2}’ maintains that both the physical as well as the mental exist. Henceforth in this thesis, when reference is made to ‘materialism’ let us refer to ‘materialism\textsubscript{2}’.

Non-material entities are not absent from the materialist’s world, the materialist does not deny the existence of non-material entities but rather affirms the co-existence of both. John Locke provides us with a materialist world view, a particular conception that Berkeley was aware of and to which his criticisms were directed. For example, in the Lockean physical world, distinctions between primary and secondary qualities are made based on Locke’s adoption of Boyle’s corpuscularian hypothesis. For Locke, primary qualities of objects are features of actual physical objects that give rise to ideas resembling themselves. This is brought about due to the innumerable corpuscles which compose the world. Each individual corpuscle has its own size, shape and motion, and brings about certain phenomena that an individual experiences. Primary qualities include solidity, motion and extension. Secondary qualities on the other hand, are qualities that are not a feature of the physical world but are results of the powers of objects to produce certain ideas in us. They are qualities that arise when these corpuscles come into contact with a perceiver and react in certain manners with that perceiver. Examples of secondary qualities include, taste, smell, sound and colour. Hence, unlike primary qualities that resemble the corresponding object that produce them, secondary qualities do not resemble the powers that produced them.
Crucially, in this view of the physical world, there is an actual material realm, although the Lockean conception of the physical world does not correspond exactly to the manner in which we experience it phenomenally. Berkeley however, refutes the materialist claim and argues that there is no material world. 64

In *The Principles of Human Knowledge* and *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, Berkeley targets these said materialists’ conceptions by bringing to light the inconsistencies of their beliefs. Like the materialists, Berkeley agrees that the manner in which the world is present to us is through various sense perceptions. However, Berkeley argues that that is all there is to their existence – there is no need to posit matter or a material substratum which holds groups of properties together. As Philonous, Berkeley’s mouth-piece in the *Three Dialogues* put it:

“I see this cherry, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind, because they are observed to attend each other.” 65

64 In line with his phenomenalist world view, Berkeley criticizes the primary-secondary quality distinction by arguing that the individuals can only know for sure the sensations that they experience. As the qualities of colour and smell (what Locke refers to as secondary qualities) are experienced in the same manner as the qualities of figure and extension, it appears problematic to distinguish between primary and secondary qualities (HP, pp. 35-38). Ultimately, Berkeley’s rejection of the primary-secondary quality distinction is a result of his phenomenalist metaphysics.

65 HP, p. 95
The competing world view Berkeley then advances is a simple and elegant one, a view in which the world is composed of only spirits and ideas. “He called himself an ‘immaterialist’, by which he meant that he (a) denied that what the philosophers and scientists were calling ‘matter’ exists at all, (b) affirmed that spirit or mind is the sole support of bodily things, and the only cause of their changes.”66 Existence of so-called ‘material objects’ for Berkeley, as his famous dictum ‘esse is percipi’ conveys, rests in the very act of being perceived.

3.1.2 A world of minds and ideas

Berkeley maintained that there are only two sorts of things in the world, minds or spirits and their ideas. What are physical objects to Locke for example, Berkeley finds are only ideas which do not themselves have an independent existence and can only exist in minds. “Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them.”67 Further, there are also subdivisions amongst these two categories. There are two kinds of minds – the Divine mind and the finite minds of individuals. There are also two distinct types of ideas – sensory ideas and ideas of the imagination.

Berkeley finds that, of some of his ideas, he can suppose that his own mind is the cause. But he cannot do the same for others – namely, ideas of sense. In other words, I may find that I have a great amount of control over ideas of my own imagination. For example, I may imagine a Ferrari in my front yard. But when I actually look out of my

66 Jessop, p. 24
67 HP, p. 76
window, I find that I cannot decide what I see. Ideas of sense are not “creatures of my will” as ideas of the imagination are for while we can control and will our imaginations, “what you and I see, etc., is not determined by any willing, wishing or imagining of ours – it is stubbornly there before us; and it is constant in the sense that under certain conditions we can perceive it again and again, like the table in one’s room or the road outside one’s house”.68 And since “no idea can be the cause of anything, for ideas are wholly passive and a cause is necessarily something that acts…the ideas which we don’t cause must therefore be caused by some other mind”.69 Or As Berkeley put it in *The Principles*, “Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must be in another mind”.70 From this Berkeley concludes that “[there] is therefore some other will or spirit that produces them”.71

In essence, this aforementioned argument which is premised on the idea that God is the sustaining force of our world is referred to by Berkeley scholars as the continuity argument. “The simplest version starts from the premise that the things we see continue to exist when we cease to see them. But the things we see are ideas, and ideas cannot exist except in some mind. There must therefore be some other mind wherein they exist during the gaps in our awareness of them.”72

The continuity argument is widely accepted by scholars as being an argument for the existence of God put forth by Berkeley, and one inextricably tied to the particular

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68 Jessop, p. 30
69 Dancy, 1987, p. 43; HP, p. 58
70 P90
71 Warnock, p. 89
72 Dancy, 1987, p. 44
immaterialist metaphysical picture he argues for. Berkeley also achieves this in the independence argument. Fundamentally, the independence argument begins from observations of certain ‘features’ of the sensible world (or ideas of sense) as well as from the fact that neither ideas nor finite minds may be said to have caused such features to come about. The argument concludes, based on “the nature of the ideas of sense” that the world of sensory ideas exists only because “there is a unique, omnipotent and benevolent mind causing those ideas in us”.  

For Berkeley, one is aware of the existence of God by reflection. As Philonous puts it, “[for], all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in myself some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflexion and reasoning”.  

The picture of God painted by Berkeley and conveyed by the aforementioned arguments for the existence of God is one where God’s role is not only as Creator and Author of Nature, but also of grand coordinator and sustainer. God plays the vital role

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73 Bennett, p. 207. Jesseph, p. 182. Berkeley has also proposed a version of the cosmological argument to argue for the existence of God. But his cosmological argument is unconnected with immaterialism. Hence, it is not germane to our purposes here.

74 Dancy, 1987, p. 44

75 HP, p. 76

76 Apart from the view that God coordinates and sustains the world, one should note that one is not suggesting that this is the only account of God’s role. There are alternative accounts of God’s role, for example, one might take the stance that the world we live in and the ideas we have are actually ideas that belong to God. This archetype theory is suggested by Mark Hight (Hight, pp. 177-217). However, this view is not the predominant view concerning what Berkeley took to be the role of God. The view that God’s role is that of sustaining and coordinating the world is the predominant view in the Berkeleyan literature. As such, let us assume that this is Berkeley’s stance on the role of God for the purposes of this thesis.
of coordinating and sustaining the world as we know it, “[affecting] me every moment
with all the sensible impressions I perceive”. In examining our sensory experience,
sense perceptions do seem to occur in certain patterns which make it largely predictable –
such events then appear to operate under certain laws of nature. Berkeley observes that in
the world, there is “regularity, order and concatenation of natural things… [each part
works] with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole”. Berkeley puts forth
that nature occurs in such uniform and constant a manner due to God. The “omnipresent
eternal Mind, which knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to out view in
such a manner, and according to such rules… [which are then] by us termed the laws of
nature”. He sustains ideas of sense in us and provides an experience of consistency,
being the “cause of those regular sequences of ideas that are called reality”.

In Berkeley’s phenomenalist world, when one ‘eats’ a cherry for example, God
ensures that one has a cherry-flavoured taste sensation. And ceteris paribus, the next time
one ‘consumes’ a cherry, a similar experience would be enjoyed. One would not have for
example, experience the flavour sensations of a pizza instead. “God… is intimately
present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which
continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, ‘in
whom we live, and move, and have our being’.” And “He alone it is who ‘upholding all
things by the word of his power’, maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby

77 HP, p. 58
78 P146
79 HP, p. 75
80 Urmson, p. 63
81 P149
they are able to perceive the existence of each other.”\textsuperscript{82} The presence of God, for Berkeley, permeates all of human experience – even interactions between human minds are facilitated by God, guaranteeing regularity and consistency.

In essence, God ensures our phenomenal experience continues as we know it, and sustains the external world, albeit one of ideas. What the materialists think of as matter is in essence an immaterial idea. They mistakenly think of an object as a material one because it is possessed of properties which one thinks must belong to mind-independent entities. But such is not the case, and the ‘material entities’ accepted in materialism are in fact immaterial ideas sustained by God\textsuperscript{83}. Indeed, “matter, though it not be perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds.”\textsuperscript{84} Crucially, Berkeley found his account advantageous because of its relative simplicity. It need not postulate this additional “inert, extended, unperceiving substance, which they call matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the eternal mind of the Creator”.\textsuperscript{85} Berkeley’s metaphysical picture consists of immaterial ideas and spirits only – a metaphysical picture that accounts for everything the materialist’s theory does and which need not postulate the superfluous entity called ‘matter’.

\textsuperscript{82} P147
\textsuperscript{83} Here, for my purposes I adopt the widely accepted reading of Berkeleyan metaphysics regarding God’s role as being one where he places the relevant ideas in our minds and not the view that the ideas we perceive are ideas in the mind of God.
\textsuperscript{84} P70
\textsuperscript{85} P91
4.1 Human agency in Leibniz

Like most of his important doctrines, Leibniz’s views on freedom are developed over a host of marginal notes, letters, and published works. In the *Theodicy*, Leibniz lists three conditions that must obtain for there to be human freedom. “According to the formula of his maturity, freedom consists in intelligence, spontaneity, and contingency”. In Leibniz’s own works, these conditions are to be found in T288:

“I have shown that freedom, according to the definition required in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, whereby we determine ourselves, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without necessitating it: and all the conditions of freedom are compromised in these few words.”

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86 Davidson, p. 395
87 Adams, p. 11
Human beings may be said to possess agency if they fulfill these three criteria or conditions in their actions. In this thesis, I shall only refer to individuals who possess understanding of the objects in question as agents. That is, I shall assume the first condition. By virtue of his metaphysical picture and the role of God, the question of human freedom for Leibniz involves reconciling human agency with divine foreknowledge and providence. In essence, does Leibniz’s God leave any room for free activity of the human will – do we fulfill the conditions of spontaneity and are we able to do otherwise?

4.1.1 Conditional Future Contingents – the Dominican-Jesuit Debate

“In the discussion concerning divine providence there were two widely endorsed Scholastic views on the truthmakers for such propositions called conditional future contingents (CFCs), in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.”\textsuperscript{88} These “two lines of response to this problem…were instrumental in shaping Leibniz’s own stance.”\textsuperscript{89} On one hand, the Dominicans put forth that God’s foreknowledge obtains from Him being causally involved in the myriad of human actions, what they termed technically as ‘concurrence’.\textsuperscript{90} For them, conditional future contingents were determined ‘postvolitionally’, meaning that CFCs have “as their truthmaker a divine decree”.\textsuperscript{91} On the other hand, the Jesuits put forth that such involvement as that which the Dominicans held would eliminate free will. Thus, the Jesuits held that in order for God to “not be the

\textsuperscript{88} Murray, p. 209
\textsuperscript{89} Begby, p. 48
\textsuperscript{90} Begby, p.84
\textsuperscript{91} Murray, p. 209
author of sin, his foreknowledge would have to be ‘prevolitional’. They therefore looked to define some form of scientia media – middle knowledge – a divine knowledge of pure possibles, quite independent of any volitional contribution of God’s own”.

Leibniz agreed with the Jesuits’ critique of the Dominican view that their concept of divine concurrence would rule out free-will and spontaneity and render God culpable for human sin since His concurrence (or causal involvement) brings into actuality acts of moral evil. However, Begby notes that the “the libertarian model proposed by the Jesuits – often paraphrased in terms of a freedom of indifference – fails, on his view, even to constitute a coherent view of free will. In particular, it jeopardizes one of the pillars of Leibniz’s philosophical system, namely the principle of sufficient reason”. The principle of sufficient reason states that for every contingent fact there is a reason why the fact is as it is and not otherwise.

For Leibniz then, both the Dominicans and the Jesuits fall short of providing a plausible account of free human action. The Dominican view is incompatible with freedom since it violates the spontaneity condition. It also accordingly leaves God open to problems of evil, since if the particular nature of every event is determined by God’s causal contribution, it appears difficult to avoid the conclusion that God is himself a

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92 Begby, p. 84
93 Begby, p. 84
94 D13
95 Murray, 1995, p. 79
direct and willing accomplice in every evil act that occurs.\textsuperscript{96} The Jesuit view also fails to satisfy Leibniz since it denies his crucial principle of sufficient reason.\textsuperscript{97}

According to Murray, “Leibniz remedied these deficiencies by arguing that God knows subjunctive conditionals of freedom in virtue of knowing what dispositions the agent had immediately prior to any free choice, dispositions which suffice to ‘determine’ the choice ‘infallibly’ while leaving the agent free. In doing so, Leibniz keeps the human free act separate from external determining influences while preserving the Principle of Sufficient Reason.”\textsuperscript{98}

\textbf{4.1.2 Leibniz’s compatibilist view of freedom}

Predominantly in Leibnizian scholarship, commentators hold that Leibniz subscribed to a compatibilist view of human freedom – more precisely, that Leibniz thought that every event is determined but people still possess free will.\textsuperscript{99} Most prominently, Robert M. Adams asserted that Leibniz was a compatibilist and that he maintained this to the end of his life.\textsuperscript{100} A compatibilist interpretation of Leibniz might point to the following to support his reading. One might cite Leibniz in the \textit{Theodicy}, where Leibniz seems to put forth that God’s possession of complete foreknowledge is indeed consistent with human beings possessing free will. As he put it, “I am of opinion

\textsuperscript{96} Murray, 1995, p. 81
\textsuperscript{97} Murray, 1995, p. 91
\textsuperscript{98} Murray, 1995, p. 91; T361
\textsuperscript{99} Begby, p. 84; Davidson, p. 402; Paull, p. 218; Adams, p. 5
\textsuperscript{100} Adams, p. 5
that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from necessity.”\textsuperscript{101} The Leibnizian world seems a deterministic one, where “[the] foreknowledge of God renders all the future certain and determined”.\textsuperscript{102} And yet, Leibniz simultaneously holds that man is not compelled to act the way he does.\textsuperscript{103}

While “[the] whole future is doubtless determined”\textsuperscript{104}, it is only the case that “[the] will is always more inclined towards the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by necessity to adopt it. That it will adopt this course is certain, but it is not necessary.”\textsuperscript{105} While there is “a certain inevitability about the operations of the laws of nature”, Leibniz did not find that this was metaphysically necessary as his interlocutor suggests.\textsuperscript{106} The laws of nature, according to Leibniz, merely ‘incline without necessitating’. In essence, while logical necessitation is incompatible with free will, determination (hypothetical necessitation) or ‘determinateness’ is compatible.\textsuperscript{107} By highlighting the distinction between hypothetical necessity and metaphysical or absolute necessity, Leibniz seeks to illustrate that determinism need not impinge on human freedom. As Leibniz put it, “that which is contingent and free remains no less so under the decrees of God than under his prevision”, “neither futurition in itself, certain as it is, not the infallible prevision of God, nor the predetermination either of causes or of God’s decrees destroys this contingency and this freedom.”\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{101} T34
\textsuperscript{102} T2
\textsuperscript{103} T3
\textsuperscript{104} T58
\textsuperscript{105} T43
\textsuperscript{106} Ross, p. 110
\textsuperscript{107} Begby, p. 98
\textsuperscript{108} T52
4.1.3 Reading Leibniz as an incompatibilist

The predominant opinion of Leibniz scholarship subscribes to the idea that Leibniz believes that human freedom is compatible with causal necessity. However, more recently, scholars such as Michael J. Murray, have suggested an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz. Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are not logically compatible. In his article, “Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom”, Murray draws attention to the distinction between physical and mental compatibilism, arguing that while Leibniz might be a physical compatibilist, he denied mental compatibilism. Murray does not deny that Leibniz may be read to be a physical compatibilism or hold that we are free and have causally necessitated physical bodies simultaneously. The compatibilism Murray claims Leibniz rejects is mental compatibilism or the view that “the faculties of the human soul involved in the free human choice, viz., intellect, will and passions, with their attending dispositions, behave in such as way that they causally necessitated our choices”. According to Murray, mental compatibilism is inconsistent with spontaneity since the faculties of choice are causally necessitated, hence undermining free will. As such, when it comes to the question of human agency and free will, Murray takes Leibniz to be an incompatibilist with regards to freedom.

109 Murray, 1995, p. 91
110 Murray, 1995, p. 92
111 Murray, 1995, p. 92
112 Murray, 1995, p. 91
113 Murray, 1995, p. 91
Murray adds support to his claim that Leibniz was not a compatibilist in the contemporary understanding of the term, by citing a passage from Leibniz’s *Necessary and Contingent Truths* (NCT)\(^{114}\):

> “But indeed Free or intelligent Substances have something greater and more remarkable, in a certain imitation of God; that they are not bound to any certain subordinate Laws of the universe, but act spontaneously from their own power alone, as if by a sort of private miracle….And this is true inasmuch as no creature is a knower of hearts that can predict with certainty what some Mind is going to choose in accordance with the laws of nature.”\(^{115}\)

It seems here that Leibniz suggests that human freedom is not deterministic but that acts of free-will consist in free agents “[interrupting] the connection and course of efficient causes operating on their will”\(^{116}\). As his third condition of freedom, Leibniz desires to put forth the idea that individuals possess the ability to do otherwise – this may be referred to as the contingency condition. In the *Discourse on Metaphysics*, he puts

\(^{114}\) Admittedly, this is a contentious passage in Leibniz scholarship, with scholars like Murray at one end of the spectrum, scholars such as Jack Davidson and Endre Begby at the other extreme arguing that an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz cannot be gleaned from the NCT, as well as intermediaries such Paull Cranston. Jack Davidson argues in the article “Imitators of God: Leibniz on Human Freedom” that while the NCT text does draw attention to some central elements of Leibniz’s views on freedom, namely that human freedom is grounded on a kind of imitation of God’s nature, it does not provide grounds for thinking that Leibniz was an incompatibilist. Endre Begby in “Leibniz on Determinism and Divine Foreknowledge” argues that the conceptions as laid out in the NCT cannot be consistently held within Leibniz’s system as it underwrites the doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. Paull Cranston in “Leibniz and the Miracle of Freedom”, on the other hand, sees the theory of miraculous freedom presented in the NCT as a reasonable one which the mature Leibniz might have held. Although Cranston does not think that Leibniz is a full fledged incompatibilist, he holds that Leibniz was not consistently a physical compatibilist.

\(^{115}\) PW100

\(^{116}\) C93
forth that “absolutely speaking, the will is in a state of indifference, as opposed to one of necessity, and it has the power to do otherwise or even to suspend its action completely; these two alternatives are possible and remain so.”¹¹⁷ One might be lead to believe that individuals do interrupt certain courses that their will is inclined to, and may readily choose to do otherwise.

### 4.1.4 “The ability to do otherwise”

For Leibniz, a free act is one where the agent exercises reason in choosing the best option (this is the first condition of freedom – namely, intelligence). He held that the human agent is always determined to will a particular outcome, though such determination may not always be by the intellect.¹¹⁸ In “Descartes and Leibniz on Human Free-Will and the Ability to Do Otherwise”, Wee examines this third condition of freedom for Leibniz and finds that a key difficulty for the Leibnizian account of human free-will is that it is unclear how the agent could fulfill the contingency requirement for freedom. Briefly put, Wee finds that Leibniz’s contingency requirement for free-will comes into sharp conflict with Leibniz’s other philosophical commitments such as his views concerning God’s nature as well as his spontaneity condition of freedom. Crucially for our purposes here, Wee also puts forth that Leibniz’s contingency condition of free-will comes into conflict with his determinist thesis. Since a free act for Leibniz is one in which the agent’s will is determined by what reason suggests is the best choice, it is unclear how this act could simultaneously satisfy the requirement that the agent ‘could

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¹¹⁷ D30
¹¹⁸ Wee, p. 390
have done otherwise."\textsuperscript{119} "The Leibnizian agent who acts freely certainly would not have been ‘able to do otherwise’ in the sense required by the medieval voluntarist, who holds that this ability precisely requires that the act is \textit{undetermined}. In what sense could Leibniz then have accorded the human agent an ‘ability to do otherwise’?"\textsuperscript{120}

Leibniz parallels his account of the will and determinism to that of the famous saying, \textit{“Astra inclinant, non necessitant”}. He says that whereas “the event towards which the stars tend (to speak with the common herd, as if there was some foundation for astrology) does not always come to pass… the course towards which the will is more inclined never fails to be adopted.”\textsuperscript{121} It is one thing to say that the will is inclined towards a certain course, but another to say that the will will never fail to adopt that particular course to which it is inclined. In the latter, one does not seem to have been able to do otherwise.

The ability to do otherwise that Leibniz claims individuals possess does not appear to be a genuine, workable avenue for individuals. While on the surface, Leibniz’s addressing of the ability to do otherwise does appear to support a compatibilist reading of him, a deeper look at it in context however reveals it to be more problematic than helpful. And as such, its addition serves to cast doubt on the compatibilist reading.

Wee’s case for Leibniz’s contingency condition of free-will comes as coming into conflict with his determinist thesis provides us with a sufficient case for reading Leibniz

\textsuperscript{119} Wee, p. 391
\textsuperscript{120} Wee, p. 391
\textsuperscript{121} T43
as an incompatibilist. Murray’s arguments also lend further support to former. It is however, not my purpose in this thesis to examine the actual outcome of this and I shall defer discussion on the larger argument. While the incompatibilist reading of Leibniz does not dominate the scholarship, interesting points and inconsistencies in Leibniz’s work have been raised that provide good reason to re-examine Leibniz’s view of determinism and free will. In light of this, I shall adopt an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz in this thesis for my purposes.

4.2 Human Agency in Berkeley

4.2.1 Divine concurrentism and the human agent

In “Berkeley, Human Agency and Divine Concurrentism”, Jeffrey K. McDonough presents an examination of Berkeley’s view of human agency and argues that he subscribed to divine concurrentism. “[Concurrentists] maintain that although creatures are endowed with genuine causal powers, no creaturely causal power could be efficacious in bringing about its appropriate effects without God’s active general assistance, or concurrence.”122 God does much more than merely allow the willed actions of human persons – He Himself brings about every effect individuals will. When referring to divine concurrence with respect to Berkeley, I mean not only that God agrees with a particular action and allows for it, but that He is causally involved in bringing it about. Given Berkeley’s metaphysics and God’s particular role, one is licensed in referring to divine concurrentism in this particular way. Such a treatment is in line with

122 McDonough, p. 4
writers such as McDonough.\textsuperscript{123} Henceforth, when referring to divine concurrentism in Berkeley’s world, I shall be referring to this specific brand of concurrentism where God is causally involved.

According to McDonough, Berkeley’s writings point to the conclusion that he himself held what was a default position for many in the early modern and medieval periods.\textsuperscript{124} Most notably and explicitly, McDonough cites P145, where Berkeley finds that “I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents like my self, which accompany them, \textit{and concur in their production}”. The concurrentist interpretation of Berkeley, I put forth, is consistent with my exposition of Berkeley’s world as outlined in Chapter 3.

Berkeley’s account of moral responsibility and agency is tied to his concurrentist views.\textsuperscript{125} On such a reading, Berkeley is able to maintain the distinct role he assigns to God in his world, as well as allow for an individual to bear responsibility for his ‘actions’ since he willed it freely. For Berkeley, genuine human agency is essential to moral responsibility. As stated rather explicitly in \textit{Alciphron}:

\begin{quote}
“\textit{It should seem, therefore, that, in the ordinary commerce of mankind, any person is esteemed accountable simply as he is an agent. And, though you should tell me that man is inactive, and that the sensible objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act},
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{123} McDonough, p. 4
\textsuperscript{124} McDonough, p. 4
\textsuperscript{125} McDonough, p. 21
and what I act I am accountable for. And, if this be true, the foundation of religion and morality remains unshaken.”\footnote{126}

Here, with Euphranor as his mouth piece, Berkeley argues in favour of human agency and accordingly, man’s accountability which forms the very foundation of religion and morality. God is a central entity in Berkeley’s enterprise – hence, he requires a robust view of human freedom. In \textit{Dialogues}, Berkeley puts forth that in order for beings to be held morally responsible, individuals must be genuine agents that possess “the use of limited powers . . . immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.\footnote{127} Berkeley maintains that some of the imperfections we experience in the world cannot be morally attributed to God. As humans freely will these evil or imperfect events, they instead are to be held morally accountable.

For Berkeley, human beings are spirits or active beings, beings that can think, will and perceive.\footnote{128} Berkeley seems to put forth that one’s ability to will things is evident through intuition and personal experience. In the \textit{Principles}, Berkeley describes the experiences of willing in the imagination:

\begin{quote}
“I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy: and by the same power it is obliterated,
\end{quote}
and makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded on experience. ”129

He also describes this same feeling of immediacy in willing when it comes to actions:

“The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its perceptions, so far forth as volition is included in them. . . .In plucking this flower, I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose....I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise, is the effect of my volition. ”130

And

“I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is . . . an effect immediately depending on the will . . . ;”131

129 P28
130 HP, p. 36
131 HP, p. 62
Further, in *Alciphron*, Berkeley insists that

“though you should tell me that man is inactive, and that the sensible objects act upon him, yet my own experience assures me of the contrary. I know I act . . . and what I act I am accountable for”.132

At this juncture, one might inquire further and ask if individuals are free to will what they will? Berkeley’s response to this would be an unequivocal yes. In *Alciphron*, the character Alciphron asks Euphranor if the prescience of God nullifies man’s freedom since “[that] which is certainly foreknown will certainly be. And what is certain is necessary. And necessary actions cannot be the effect of free-will.”133 Euphranor responds this question and broadly to other arguments concerning “such terms as…determination, indifference, freedom, necessity, and the like” when it pertains to the freedom of man, referring to them as “perplexities and errors” of the doctrine of abstraction.134 Euphranor or Berkeley’s proposed course of action is to employ a more commonsensical approach:

“But, if I take things as they are, and ask any plain untutored man, whether he acts or is free in this or that particular action, he readily assents, and I as readily believe him from what I find within... I shall

132 A, p. 147; emphasis mine
133 A, p. 144
134 A, p. 146
make bold to depart from your metaphysical abstracted sense, and appeal to the common sense of mankind.”\textsuperscript{135}

Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture allows for a robust account of human agency as well as God’s ever-present involvement in our actions, without diminishing human responsibility. It “allows Berkeley to treat created spirits—including ourselves—as genuine, active, secondary causes, rather than as the mere occasional causes of God’s lone activity”, thereby making room for human agency.\textsuperscript{136}

4.2.2 Free will and determinism in Berkeley

Compared to Leibniz, Berkeley offers us relatively less discussion on the topic of free will. However, while he did not explicitly describe himself as such, I put forth that Berkeley’s concurrentism is in support of incompatibilism. Berkeley places much emphasis on human agency and free will. The concurrentist God concurs with the choices that human beings themselves freely will. Berkeley spills much ink attempting to establish that “man is accountable, that he acts, and is self-determined” in order to render man morally accountable for his own actions.\textsuperscript{137} As such, in light of his attempts to argue for the agency and free will of man, as well as the conspicuous absence of any determinist talk, one is inclined to think that Berkeley’s view is an incompatibilist one and that he did not think that freedom compatible with determinism.

\textsuperscript{135} A, p. 147
\textsuperscript{136} McDonough, p. 19
\textsuperscript{137} A, p. 148
Chapter 5: Comparing Leibniz and Berkeley

5.1 Introduction and historical timeline

On the last page of his copy of Berkeley’s Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Leibniz penned the following comments:

“Much here that’s right and agrees with my views. But too paradoxically expressed. For we have no need to say that matter is nothing; but it suffices to say that it is a phenomenon like the rainbow; and that it is not a substance, but a result of substances...The true substances are Monads, or Perceivers. But the author ought to have gone on further, namely to infinite Monads, constituting all things, and to their preestablished harmony. He wrongly, or at least pointlessly, rejects abstract ideas, restricts ideas to imaginations, despises the subtleties of arithmetic and geometry. He most wrongly rejects the infinite division of the extended, even if he is right to reject infinitesimal quantities.”

138 Mates, p. 224, emphasis by Mates
In part fuelled by Leibniz’s own words, a number of scholars have held that Leibniz and Berkeley put forth strikingly similar philosophical views.\textsuperscript{139} Beginning “as early as 1716, commentators have associated Leibniz and Berkeley especially because they both emphasize the role of perceivers in defining reality and provide seemingly phenomenalist descriptions of physical bodies”.\textsuperscript{140}

Their views are similar because both of them endorsed forms of phenomenalism, typically understood in the early modern context as a metaphysical view concerning the nature of physical objects and characterized by phrases such as “bodies are reducible to sets of perceptions” or “\textit{esse est percipi}”.\textsuperscript{141} Since it is more relevant to the early modern context and as such to my purposes in this work, I shall refer to phenomenalism as the view “that nothing exists apart from perceivers and their perceptions (or ‘phenomena’)… [as opposed to a] realist, in this context, means someone who believes that there also exists a real world underlying our perceptions”.\textsuperscript{142} In what follows, I shall attempt to highlight the points of comparison in Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies. My aim is not an in-depth comparison itself, but to highlight specific similarities that these “phenomenalist companions” share.\textsuperscript{143}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{139} Carlin, p. 151  \\
\textsuperscript{140} Daniel, p. 163  \\
\textsuperscript{141} Carlin, p. 151  \\
\textsuperscript{142} Ross, p. 88  \\
\textsuperscript{143} Carlin, p. 151
\end{flushleft}
5.2 Similarities

Leibniz writes in 1672, “I seem to myself to have discovered that to Exist is nothing other than to be Sensed [Sentiri] – to be sensed, however, if not by us, then at least by the Author of things, to be sensed by whom is nothing other than to please him, or to be Harmonious”.144 One is reminded of Berkeley when one encounters such a comment.

In “Leibniz and Berkeley”, J.J. MacIntosh aims to justify the claim that there are significant commonalities between the views of the two philosophers in question. He notes that “even the most cursory examination shows Berkeley and Leibniz to have held strikingly similar philosophical views: they had many of the same motives, they asked the same kind of questions, and they came up with very similar answers.”145 A pivotal commonality that Leibniz and Berkeley share, one that MacIntosh wishes to draw attention to, is that they are both phenomenalists or immaterialists. For MacIntosh, “[the] importance of the perceiver and his perceptions, the running together of primary and secondary qualities and the denial of their objectivity, and the agreement that God is the cause of the perceptions in question without the intervention of matter” are amongst those central similarities in the works of Berkeley and Leibniz.146 Both Leibniz and Berkeley “provide a phenomenalist account of bodies that not only spells out what it means for

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144 Daniel, p. 169
145 MacIntosh, p. 147
146 MacIntosh, p. 157
something to exist but also highlights the need for a doctrine that explains how the perceptions of individual perceivers are co-ordinated”.

According to “both Leibniz and Berkeley, all of creation is orderly, and all things are in ‘exact harmony’ and in correspondence with everything else”. For the phenomenalist then, the following becomes an important question to be answered: How might one explain our phenomenal experiences? With a material world and the presence of a mechanical system, one would appeal to mechanical causation to explain the consistency of our experiences and coherence of events. But if one were to depart from the materialist’s conception of the world, this alternative metaphysical picture must be able to fill in the explanatory gaps left behind since the materialist’s theories can no longer be used to account for certain experiences such as causation, consistency and coherence in our phenomenal experiences. How might such crucial features of our phenomenal experiences be explained by an immaterialist?

For both Leibniz and Berkeley, the answer is God. And their respective treatments of God and the pivotal role He plays in their metaphysics seem quite similar. Leibniz writes in the Discourse on Metaphysics, “And God alone (from whom all individuals emanate continually and who sees the universe not only as they see it but also entirely different from all of them) is the cause of this correspondence of their phenomena and makes that which is particular to one of them public to all of them; otherwise, there

147 Daniel, p. 171
148 Daniel, p. 178
would be no interconnection.”\textsuperscript{149} This seems to bear much resemblance to Berkeley’s “He alone it is who ‘upholding all things by the word of his power’, maintains that intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other.”\textsuperscript{150}

Further, Leibniz also refers to God’s role as that of concurring with our actions and being a producer of ideas or sensation in us. He writes as follows:

\textit{“In concurring with our actions, God ordinarily does no more than follow the laws he has established, that is, he continually conserves and produces our being in such a way that thoughts come to us spontaneously or freely in the order that the notion pertaining to our individual substance contains them, a notion in which they could be foreseen from all eternity.”}\textsuperscript{151}

One is again reminded of the following from Berkeley:

\textit{“It is therefore plain, that nothing can be more evident to anyone that is capable of at least reflection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas}

\textsuperscript{149} D14; Leibniz reiterates this point in D32: “Hence God alone brings about the connection and communication among substances, and it is through him that the phenomena of any substance meet and agree with those of others and consequently, that there is reality in our perceptions.”

\textsuperscript{150} P147; Berkeley also mentions this point in HP32: “God alone produces the connection or communication between substances: it is through him that the phenomena of one coincide or agree with those of another, and as a result that there is reality in our perceptions”.

\textsuperscript{151} D30
or sensations, which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short, ‘in whom we live, and move and have our being’.  

Crucially, the common trait of immaterialism that runs through both Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s philosophies is inextricably tied to the crucial role that God assumes in both metaphysics. For Berkeley, the eternal, omnipresent Mind sustains ideas of sense in us and provides an experience of consistency, being the “cause of those regular sequences of ideas that are called reality”.  

“According to Leibniz, the divinely pre-established harmony of perceivers not only constitutes their identities relative to one another but also guarantees the order of the things they perceive. For Berkeley, the co-ordination of bodies described by laws of nature reveals the same kind of harmony as Leibniz’s postulation of an infinity of monads.”

Both Berkeley and Leibniz wish to establish regularity in nature in their metaphysical systems. But the respective ways in which they go about doing this is a point of difference. In Berkeley’s metaphysical system, God guarantees and coordinates all features of our phenomenal experience, ensuring “that things may go on in a constant uniform manner”.

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152 P149
153 Urmson, p. 63
154 Daniel, p. 171
155 P70
Notably, the manner in which Leibniz goes about establishing this in his metaphysical system leads to an important difference between the two philosophies. This “important difference, results from Leibniz’s decision to opt for the notion of pre-established harmony as a justifiable explanatory tool”.\textsuperscript{156} MacIntosh highlights Leibniz’s awareness that a problem arises for any phenomenalist who has God in his metaphysical system as a direct causal agent. Leibniz was wary of occasionalism and having God at our “beck and call”.\textsuperscript{157} Leibniz has in place in his system then, what he terms “pre-established harmony”, this is something Berkeley’s system does not possess. This is a discrepancy between the two systems that MacIntosh sees as a “disagreement about a point of detail rather than about a substantial issue… since it is not at all clear that Berkeley was aware of the problem”.\textsuperscript{158}

5.3 Differences

As a direct criticism of MacIntosh’s paper, Margaret D. Wilson, in “The Phenomenalisms of Leibniz and Berkeley”, argues that one should reject MacIntosh’s “attempts to assimilate Leibniz’s position to Berkeley’s, on the grounds that they both think that reality may be fully explicated in terms of perceivers, their wills or appetites, and their perceptions or perceptual contents”.\textsuperscript{159} While not denying that both Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s metaphysical views have had some commonalities including both holding “in some sense that the physical world is ‘mind-independent’”, she argues that “attempts

\textsuperscript{156} MacIntosh, p. 156
\textsuperscript{157} MacIntosh, p. 156
\textsuperscript{158} Latta, p. 157
\textsuperscript{159} Wilson, p. 6
to assimilate Berkeley’s phenomenalism... to Leibniz’s [would] give insufficient weight to certain fundamental and unique features of Berkeley’s philosophical doctrines and objectives – features which in fact place him in opposition to [Leibniz].\textsuperscript{160} In other words, Wilson argues that MacIntosh only appears to succeed in his endeavour by overlooking crucial characteristics of Berkeley’s view which are incompatible with Leibniz.

Wilson puts forth that merely because they may both be considered phenomenalists in some way, it does not mean that their phenomenalisms are the same.\textsuperscript{161} Wilson points out that MacIntosh appears to almost presume a kind of homogeneity with regards to the view “phenomenalism” and hence, in doing so ignores pivotal characteristics of Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalism which set it in opposition to Leibniz’s. Wilson thus sets about re-visiting and highlighting the differences between Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalism and Leibniz’s – essentially what MacIntosh has failed to do.

According to Wilson, “Berkeley...was centrally concerned to vindicate the reality of the world as presented in ordinary sense experience, against the abstractions of the philosophers and scientists of his time. Leibniz, on the contrary, agreed to the superior reality or objectivity of the physicist’s conception of the world”.\textsuperscript{162} Essentially for Berkeley, esse ist percipii and all that exists is what is perceived or presented in ordinary sense perception and that “that perceptions of secondary and of primary qualities equally

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{160} Wilson, p. 4 
\textsuperscript{161} Wilson, p. 6 
\textsuperscript{162} Wilson, p. 12}
and adequately present to us the real qualities of bodies (bodies themselves being only congeries of sensations)”. While sense perceptions are all that constitute the experiential world for Berkeley, Leibniz instead “holds that qualities construed by physics as ‘real’ are themselves mere phenomena, relative to their monadic ‘foundations’.” “Berkeley was a phenomenalist in the straightforward sense that he construed the appearances of ordinary sense experience... He was deeply concerned to deny – in the early works, at any rate – that either science or metaphysics reveals truths about reality which provide a corrective to ordinary sense experience.” Leibniz and Berkeley utilize terminology with reference to their respective phenomenalisms differently. When Berkeley speaks of perception he means, more specifically, conscious awareness of ideas of sense. On the other hand, as is well known, Leibniz defines the term rather mysteriously as “the expression of many things in one” or “that all cases of expression in monads are perceptions”.

In “Leibniz and Berkeley on Teleological Intelligibility”, Laurence Carlin highlights this same point, arguing that there are important differences between the “phenomenalisms” of Leibniz and Berkeley. Carlin argues that “[viewing] Leibniz and Berkeley through the lens of final causes, or more specifically through their views about intelligible explanation, brings out the basic point that they have had radically different conceptions of nature”. Their differing phenomenalisms lead also to other substantial

163 Wilson, p.11  
164 Wilson, p. 12  
165 Wilson, p. 4  
166 Wilson, p. 7  
167 Wilson, p. 9  
168 Carlin, p. 153  
169 Carlin, p. 164
differences in their views – for example their regard of nature and its complexity, their views on science, their views of infinite divisibility as well as unsensed realities.

“Leibniz emphatically rejects Berkeley’s sensationalism and its accompanying view of science, and it is this rejection that lies behind his criticism of Berkeley’s “restriction of ideas to imaginations… Berkeley had underestimated nature’s complexity.”\textsuperscript{170} Further, Leibniz subscribed to infinite divisibility while Berkeley did not on the basis that “[things] that do not appear to ordinary sensory images do not exist; infinite parts do not appear to ordinary sense experience; hence, matter is not infinitely divisible since it must be part of a finite mind”\textsuperscript{171}

5.4 Conclusion

Whilst MacIntosh hopes to establish the crucial commonality of both being phenomenalists, he does not deny that there are differences between the two as well. One large difference concerns infinity and infinite divisibility\textsuperscript{172}. Another notable difference is the workings of their respective phenomenalist metaphysics. However, despite the aforementioned two differences in their metaphysical views, MacIntosh still finds that the similarities outnumber and outweigh in importance, those differences – especially because when they did arrive at differing conclusions, “it was, in one important case at least, merely because Leibniz recognized a logical possibility which Berkeley had

\textsuperscript{170} Carlin, p. 152
\textsuperscript{171} Carlin, p. 153; P 124
\textsuperscript{172} MacIntosh, p. 156
overlooked”. Acknowledging that their views are not carbon copies of each other and that “they did not have views which were identical beneath the terminology”, MacIntosh puts forth that that the two views are compatible and that Leibniz’s views are logical extensions of Berkeley’s.174

Here, neither J.J. MacIntosh nor I suggest that Leibniz and Berkeley’s brands of phenomenalism are identical. In fact, as aforementioned, MacIntosh does explicitly point out that the exact workings of both brands of phenomenalism do constitute an important point of difference that should not be overlooked. What is crucial to note here however, is that the metaphysical systems of both Leibniz and Berkeley share the overarching commonalities of being phenomenalist and having God play a pivotal role in that phenomenalism. “Admittedly, there are differences in the ways that Leibniz and Berkeley present their ideas. But that does not mean that they differ substantially regarding their fundamental insights.”175 The building blocks or fundamentals of Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s metaphysical systems share common characteristics. As such, I find that Leibniz and Berkeley are “phenomenalist companions” and we may, as I shall soon put forth, look into bringing to bear some portions of their theories to solve difficulties of the other whilst retaining the phenomenalist and neo-theistic spirit of the respective philosophies.176

173 Latta, p. 147
174 Latta, p. 155
175 Daniel, p. 163
176 Carlin, p. 151
Chapter 6: Confronting Leibniz and Berkeley with the Problems of Moral Culpability

In this chapter, I shall put forth critiques of Leibniz and Berkeley. Firstly, I shall argue that the theory of monads is incompatible with free will in the case of Leibniz leaving him faced with the problem of human moral culpability since one can no longer hold individuals morally blameworthy. Secondly, I shall argue that Berkeleyan concurrentism is confronted with the problem of divine moral culpability, where God is responsible for acts of moral evil.

6.1 Critique of Leibniz

6.1.1 Bringing in the theory of monads – where is free will?

The theory of monads is arguably a foundational cornerstone for Leibniz’s mature metaphysical picture. The question then is whether there is room for free-will (of the incompatibilist sort) given the theory of monads. I put forth that the Leibnizian theory of monads leaves no room for the free-will Leibniz so fervently argued for.
Leibniz did not introduce the term “monad” until much later in his career. In the *Discourse on Metaphysics* published in 1685, the first systematic presentation of his metaphysics, he referred to entities called “individual substances”. He continued to use this term, sometimes using the term *substantial form* and *entelechy* in its stead, or even *soul* or *spirit* in suitable contexts. Leibniz first began generally using the term monad in 1769. The *Monadology* of 1714 was the first consolidated presentation of his theory of monads.

As aforementioned, Leibniz outlines free-will as consisting of intelligence, spontaneity and contingency. Here, it is the contingency condition of free-will that is being called into question. Since all the monadic perceptions are pre-programmed and cannot be altered or changed in quality by any created thing\textsuperscript{178}, then it seems that the source of action is not within the agent. Such determinism of the will is incompatible with freedom. It is unclear how the human soul might go about making a free choice or action (even one that is foreknown by God) if all its changing monadic perceptions are a pre-planned, unchangeable series where God has pre-programmed all monads internally to unfold. As such, it appears that free-will is inconsistent with the theory of monads.

\textsuperscript{177} Rescher, p. 18  
\textsuperscript{178} M7; emphasis mine
6.1.2 “The problem should be viewed in light of the Predicate-in-notion Principle, not the theory of monads”

At this juncture, one might ask if the issue of free-will should be examined in light of the Predicate-in-notion Principle and not the theory of monads. The predicate-in-notion principle is of fundamental importance to Leibniz’s metaphysical system. “Every substance has a notion so complete that anyone who fully understood it could infer from it all the predicates, down to the minutest detail, which will ever belong to that substance.”

Hence, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and it is part of his essence to do so. If Caesar did not cross the Rubicon, then he would not be Caesar. “Every substance has a complete notion, and the complete notion of it in some sense contains every fact about it down to the very minutest detail of its remotest future history.” The only entity that can achieve this is God. “Just by glancing at Socrates’ individual concept, God already knows exactly how and when Socrates will die…. [He] never needs to infer anything.” But even beyond this, God has already used his “infinite intellect to construct individual concepts of all possible individual substances”. Given the predicate-in-notion principle, one might question why the free-will problem I have raised is directed towards monads and not towards the predicate-in-notion principle. This opponent might say that in a world view where both the theory of monads and the predicate-in-notion principle apply, monads could be operating under the principle and hence unfold in accordance with it. So, Caesar crossed the Rubicon in year X at time X – this is part of his concept.

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179 Broad, p. 11
180 Broad, p. 6
181 Broad, p. 331
182 Broad, p. 331
And as such, in year X, the monad that is Caesar’s soul experiences Rubicon-crossing monadic perceptions.

Both the theory of monads and the predicate-in-notion principle are closely related in Leibniz’s world, but one may examine them separately. Viewing the two theories as distinct entities will allow us to more adequately approach and address the question of why my critique is directed towards the theory of monads and not at the predicate-in-notion principle. My response to this, to borrow a phrase from Leibniz, is that the predicate-in-notion principle merely inclines but does not necessitate. When God created the best possible world, it included having Caesar cross the Rubicon. But it does not follow from the fact that Caesar will choose to cross the Rubicon (since God foreknows this), that he does not choose to do so freely. However, when one considers the theory of monads and my aforementioned critique of the theory of monads, the issue in this case is that there is no room for Caesar to make choices since his experiences are a series of unfolding, pre-planned monadic perceptions. As such, I shall focus my efforts on the theory of monads instead of the predicate-in-notion principle since I find that it presents a greater challenge for freedom of the will.

An inconsistency arises for our incompatibilist Leibniz – his account of free-will is inconsistent with his theory of monads. It appears that with the theory of monads, there will be no free will and as such, humans bear no moral responsibility for the acts they commit. Both monads and free-will are crucial conceptual components in the Leibnizian
system that I believe Leibniz would not so easily dispense with. It is my challenge then to attempt to preserve as much of both for Leibniz in the chapters to come.

6.1.3 The problem of human moral culpability

Apart from aiding Leibniz in avoiding the free-will problem, I further put forth that Leibniz is also faced with the problem of holding human individuals morally accountable for their actions. If humans do not possess free will, they do not commit morally evil acts freely and hence, are not to be held morally accountable and blameworthy for acts of moral evil that they commit. If this is the case then “it appears that man is compelled to do the good and evil that he does, and in consequence that he deserves therefore neither recompense nor chastisement: thus is the morality of actions destroyed and all justice, divine and human, shaken”. Leibniz wants to maintain the moral culpability of human beings but seems unable to do so in the face of the free-will problem. This, I term the problem of human moral culpability for Leibniz.

6.2 Refuting Berkeley’s metaphysical picture

6.2.1 The argument from the problem of moral evil and divine moral culpability

For our purposes here, let us imagine the following scenario. Let us suppose that Janice desires to murder a random stranger. The idea that murder is an act of moral evil is a rather intuitive one. Legally defined, murder is “[the] crime of unlawful killing...with
malice afterthought”\textsuperscript{184} or the “intention to cause death or grievous bodily harm.”\textsuperscript{185}

Janice walks around her neighbourhood and with a pistol and shoots the first person she sees, Tim, in the back. Tim yells in immense pain and collapses, bleeding. How would Berkeley explain this occurrence metaphysically?

Berkeley’s concurrentist metaphysical picture relies on God to bring about not only the sensory experience of performing the act an individual wills, but also the corresponding resultant consequences on the rest of the world, including the giving of the relevant sensory experience to other individuals who are involved in the act. Otherwise put, our willing something is brought into actuality in the world when God concurs with our will. In Berkeley’s world, when Janice wills to pick up the pistol and shoots Tim, Janice receives ‘pistol-picking’, ‘trigger-pulling’, ‘gun-recoiling’ sensory ideas. Tim receives ‘shot-being-fired’ sound sensation and ‘bullet-piercing-into-back’ sensory ideas as well as sensory ideas involving pain and the cessation of all future sensory ideas. Berkeley has no recourse to a materialist explanation of events, where a physical human entity named Janice wills for a bullet to pierce into Tim’s back by her firing of a pistol, and her will to shoot Tim is actualized by her physically taking a real, material pistol, pulling the trigger and engaging a series of mechanical processes within the pistol that results in the release of a projectile that then plunges it into the back of a real Jack. This willing of Janice’s directly results in Tim experiencing real physical pain and possibly extinction. Berkeley, however, cannot make reference to such a series of causal events since for him there is no actual material world. Without God’s coordination of sensory

\textsuperscript{184} Bone, p. 258
\textsuperscript{185} Bone, p. 258
perceptions and effects between individuals, there is no effectual link between the two individuals. In short, without God, Janice would not be able to cause suffering to Tim.

What I put forth is that a problem arises because of God’s unique role in Berkeley’s metaphysics. God is supposed to be omnibenevolent and hence cannot partake in an evil act. Here one adopts the implicit premise that if an entity is wholly good, this entity cannot partake or bring about an evil act. And if this entity does bring about an evil act, then it ceases to be wholly good. Berkeley’s concurrentist world view allows for individuals to be morally responsible for the ‘actions’ they will since they freely will them. However, God also bears responsibility since He directly brings about these acts by concurring in them. Otherwise put, God causally brings these acts about. If God’s concurring in X, where X is a morally evil act, is the sole reason it is actualized, then it seems that God must bear some responsibility for bringing suffering upon an individual. Certainly, one is not suggesting that the individual who willed the evil act be absolved of moral culpability, but rather one is arguing that in addition to this, God is also morally responsible for those evil acts since He actualized it. As such, Berkeley is faced with the problem of divine moral culpability.
Chapter 7: The Tweaked Theory of Monads

A key feature of all Leibnizian monads, including human souls, is the pre-arrangement of their perceptions – the “internal programming… built into their complete individual notion… the basis for the state-to-state transition”. The criticism against the monads that I have previously raised in Chapter 6 arises due to the manner in which the monads that are human souls unfold. The problem arises precisely because monadic perceptions seem to be pre-planned and that monads have specific monadic perceptions invoked at designated points in time. As such, I find that Leibniz’s theory of monads leaves no room for the free activity of the human will. I attempt to retain as much of both as Leibniz originally outlined, by proposing a simple tweak to the theory of monads. I put forth that the following changes to the theory of monads, the overall formulation of which I shall call the tweaked theory of monads, furnishes Leibniz with exactly the ability to maintain the monads as well as human free-will. Further, I put forth that the proposed change to his theory of monads also allows him to hold human beings morally accountable.

186 Rescher, p. 69
7.1 Tweaking the theory of monads

Essentially, one of the conditions for human freedom as outlined by Leibniz, namely ‘contingency’, is not met. If one wishes to preserve free-will in the Leibnizian system then one must fulfill all three conditions for human freedom, including the contingency condition. What I put forth here is a rejection of Leibniz’s notion that monadic perceptions merely unfold in human souls. At the outset, allow me to first make a clarification – the amendments to Leibniz’s original theory of monads that I shall propose are restricted only to monads that are human souls.

In order to re-establish the individual’s agency, the monadic picture requires the inclusion of a mechanism or outlet in which choice may be exercised. Instead of the soul experiencing the unfolding of a series of pre-planned perceptions, I put forth that the soul be a free monad able to unfold in a number of different ways depending on the individual’s choice, fulfilling the contingency condition or the condition that the agent is able to do otherwise. By rejecting the idea that all monads including human souls merely experience timed monadic perceptions, the source of action will thus be placed back in the agent.

Let us say for example that Bill walks in to a supermarket. Let us then assume we know that when Bill walks into the supermarket he will desire to steal a loaf of bread. This man, Bill, is in reality a conglomerate of monads loosely organized around a higher-order monad or soul. According to Leibniz’s original theory of monads, what occurs for
the human soul is an unfolding of perceptions for that particular monad. As such, the scenario above may be described to have transpired in the following manner: the relevant soul has the monadic perception of walking into a supermarket, it has perceptions of desiring to steal a loaf of bread, then perceptions of taking the bread and leaving the supermarket without paying for it. These events or series of monadic perceptions may be represented as follows:

![Diagram of monadic perceptions](image)

**Figure 1. Example of a Series of Monadic Perceptions in the Theory of Monads**

What I put forth in the tweaked theory of monads is a rejection of a mere unfolding of monadic perceptions in the case of human souls. On this view, Bill, continues to be a conglomerate of monads loosely organized around a higher-order monad. But what differs is that the human soul is a microcosm of choice – meaning that at time $t_1$, Bill’s soul may choose to walk into the supermarket or not to walk into the supermarket. Let us say that he does walk into the store – this is represented by $a$ at time $t_1$. At time $t_2$, Bill’s soul may choose to take a loaf of bread ($b_1$) or not to take the loaf of bread ($b_2$). He chooses to take a loaf of bread and has the corresponding monadic perception $b_1$. At time $t_3$, he may choose to pay for the loaf of bread at the cashier ($c_1$) or not to pay for the loaf of bread at the cashier ($c_2$). He chooses to hide it and has monadic perception $c_2$. At time $t_4$, Bill may choose to remain in the supermarket ($d_1$) or leave the
supermarket (d₂). Bill chooses to leave with the bread he has not paid for and has corresponding monadic perception d₂.¹⁸⁷ This series may be represented by the following diagram:

![Diagram of a series of monadic perceptions]

Figure 2. Example of a Series of Monadic Perceptions in the Tweaked Theory of Monads

Instead of the mere unfolding of monadic perceptions, as in the case of the theory of monads, in the tweaked theory of monads, the human soul makes choices and thus fulfills the contingency requirement for freedom (or the ability to do otherwise) that Leibniz outlined. While in the original theory, souls do not seem able to do otherwise than they are programmed to do, what one suggests here instead is that each human soul may do so and hence be said to freely will.

¹⁸⁷ This series of monadic perceptions is a simplified example. A complete account of these events would include a vast number of monadic perceptions, since the transition from one monadic perception to another is almost indistinguishable due to the minute nature of individual changes. Here, I am merely highlighting some crucial moments and individual monadic perceptions for the purposes of this discussion.
I propose that each human soul is a ‘microcosm of choice’, where such choices the monads make have no direct, physical effect on other monads. Rather, as the law of pre-established harmony dictates, other monads merely unfold in a manner compatible and synchronized with the choices the human soul makes – mirroring an effect in the ‘physical’ understanding of the term. Crucially, laws that govern the interaction between monads continue to apply in the tweaked theory. Other characteristics regarding monads also continue to be maintained in the tweaked theory of monads. All monads continue to be windowless, immaterial and indestructible. Also, the monadic hierarchy is also maintained, with the additional feature than the highest form of monads, the soul, not only has the clearest perceptions but in addition is also capable of choice.

Let us assume that all of Bill’s choices, to walk into the supermarket, to take a loaf of bread and then to leave without paying are choice not made under duress. Let us say for example, that Bill notices that this supermarket has poor security measures and that it will be more advantageous to him to simply take the bread without paying for it than it will be to pay. In other words, Bill was not for example, unable to pay and in need of feeding his three starving children and thus driven by passion. Bill reasons that in this case he can easily, in a manner of speaking, have his bread and eat it too.

As such, the human soul is endowed with the ability to exercise its agency. One might ask then, how this tweaked conception of the human soul may cohere with the other characteristics of the monads and laws governing their interaction that Leibniz has outlined. Certainly, if the change I have proposed requires subsequent changes to other
facets of the system of monads then one has to outline new features, such as laws that
govern interactions between monads. However, I put forth that proposing this additional
feature in human souls does not require any further tweaks in the relevant laws governing
or features of any other monad. All corresponding changes in the world arise in a
synchronized manner due to the law of pre-established harmony.

In the alternative theory of monads, when bringing the best possible world into
being, God has already foreknown all the choices of all individuals ever in existence will
make. Grounded in God’s foreknowledge, the law of pre-established harmony continues
to perform its function in the tweaked theory. The law of pre-established harmony
performs the function of coordinating windowless, immaterial monads, and dictates that
all changes in a monad are synchronized with relevant changes in all other monads. Since
God foreknows all the individuals, relevant choices and events to be found in the best
possible world, all monads including souls could then be accordingly coordinated. With
regards to the workings of the metaphysical system, for example the interactions between
monads, one need not amend these to cohere with the amended concept of the human
soul. The addition of human souls making choices instead of having monadic perceptions
merely being unfolded for them has deep implications for the ability to do otherwise but
does not undermine the principles according to which monads interact.

Therefore, with the tweaked theory of monads, one arrives at a situation where
God may possess foreknowledge of all events that will occur and yet there is the ability to
do otherwise and hence, there is free will and choice. Human souls do indeed make real choices at each moment, choices that God has foreknown and has decided to bring into being in this best possible world. Human freedom as well as the theory of monads (to a very large extent) has both been preserved. Further, I also propose that the adoption of the tweaked theory of monads, since it safeguards human freedom, would also aid Leibniz in avoiding the problem of human moral culpability.

The proposed tweaked theory of monads does not compromise Leibniz’s vision of a neo-theistic, immaterial, monadic world. However, as a consequence of attempting to preserve free will by tweaking the theory of monads and ensuring the contingency condition, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle as originally formulated, lose their fit.\textsuperscript{188} With respect to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, “if the choice of the will is not determined or brought about by antecedent conditions prior to the act of willing, then the requirement that that choice must have occurred for a sufficient reason would be violated”\textsuperscript{189}. Pertaining to the Predicate-in-notion Principle, since acts of will are undetermined, substances do not have complete notions from which one can infer all its predicates. The contingency condition (or ability to do otherwise) is logically incompatible with these principles, giving rise to what Wee terms a “genuine

\textsuperscript{188} Given this resultant need to reformulate the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle, one might raise the objection that one accepts a compatibilist reading of Leibniz instead. To such an opponent, I highlight again the grounds for pursuing an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz and the inability of the individual to fulfill the contingency condition of freedom (or the ability to do otherwise) which Leibniz himself sets out in T288. Further, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle seem to be inherently compatibilist in nature, since they depend on a necessitarian metaphysics. While I am not suggesting that these aforementioned principles are unimportant to Leibniz, I put forth that human free-will is a crucial component of his metaphysics as well, one that Leibniz might not be so willing to dispense with for the purposes of maintaining the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle given the potentially problematic nature of such a move for his neo-theistic God.

\textsuperscript{189} Wee, p. 390
irreconcilability”.\textsuperscript{190} According to Wee, Leibniz does not have recourse to claim that such logical incompatibilities arise due to our finite minds being unable to grasp the relevant metaphysical aspects, unlike Descartes has for example.\textsuperscript{191} These principles thus come into direct conflict with “any robust ascription of the ability to do otherwise”.\textsuperscript{192} In light of this, the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Predicate-in-notion Principle may be tweaked and adapted to suit the new metaphysical system, but they fit poorly as they originally stand. I shall defer on such an undertaking however, since it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

7.2 Sin and circumventing the problem of human moral culpability

With the tweaked theory of monads however, one has argued that human beings do indeed have free-will and exercise their agency by making choices. If there is no free will, then human persons cannot be held responsible for acts of moral evil, as Leibniz desires. By allowing for human souls to make choices, the tweaked theory of monads and the changes proposed aid Leibniz in resolving the problem of human culpability since “[vice] and crime… arise there through the free inward operation of the creature”.\textsuperscript{193} Leibniz may then hold the human person morally accountable for his or her actions.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{190} Wee, p. 413
\item \textsuperscript{191} Wee, p. 413
\item \textsuperscript{192} Wee, p. 413
\item \textsuperscript{193} T388
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
At this juncture, one might ask us to turn our attention to Leibniz’s account of sin.\textsuperscript{194} For Leibniz, human beings commit sin because they are created creatures with limitations.\textsuperscript{195} The human being and any other created monad are entities whose “essence it is to have limits”.\textsuperscript{196} Given Leibniz’s account of moral evil as arising from a limitation in the essence of the human soul, can human beings still bear moral responsibility for moral evil since it appears that Man is created in a manner that he is “liable to fall”?\textsuperscript{197} In light of this, it seems that God is to bear at least some moral responsibility. Can the problem of human moral culpability still be avoided by a change in the theory of monads? I find that despite Leibniz’s account of sin, the problem of human moral culpability may still be circumvented.

According to Leibniz, the human soul, though it is the highest entity in the monadic hierarchy and thus has the clearest monadic perceptions as well as the ability to choose, is not without limitations. On Leibniz’s view, God possesses “absolutely infinite or perfect” attributes, whereas in “the created Monads or the Entelechies there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the Monad.”\textsuperscript{198} “[What] is limited in us [then,] is in Him without limits”.\textsuperscript{199} Indeed, “[were] the soul completely without limitations, it would be God”.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{194} Let us take that committing an act of moral evil is an instance of sin.
\textsuperscript{195} “We must consider that there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence” (T135).
\textsuperscript{196} M47
\textsuperscript{197} T28
\textsuperscript{198} M48
\textsuperscript{199} M30
\textsuperscript{200} Carlson, p. 633
For every decision or choice a soul makes, whether to commit any act including those of moral evil, the soul may select between possible scenarios and chooses a particular one using its intelligence or reasoning. “[The] soul spontaneously strives to realize a particular state of affairs from among several it presents as abstract possibilities, having used its advanced powers of reasoning to judge this course of action to be in its best interest.”

Though no individual will ever freely will evil for itself, it is because it has limitations in its reasoning that it is sometimes directed towards what is only apparently good. But “the apparent good it aims for does not always coincide with [the] true good” “consequently “it can deceive itself and commit other errors,” with the results often being “detrimental to itself”.

Given this limitation of human souls, are individuals still to be held morally responsible – should the burden of responsibility not fall on God? “When the sinful soul complains that limitations in its original nature cause it fall into sin, it must be remembered that, while the human soul is limited in many ways, it still has the freedom to make choices and pursue its own good.” Otherwise put, when the human soul acts or makes a choice that is morally evil, it does so fulfilling the spontaneity, contingency and intelligence criteria set out by Leibniz. Since they are free, human individuals are morally responsible for their actions.

201 Carlson, p. 635
202 Carlson, p. 632
203 Carlson, p. 633
204 Carlson, p. 635
Chapter 8: The Tweaked Theory of Monads and Berkeley

8.1 Berkeley’s problem

Berkeley casts aside the material worlds of Descartes and Locke in favour of one where God is intimately present. For Berkeley, God sustains and coordinates all sensory ideas in each and every instance of natural occurrence or human action. God also performs this same function even in cases of moral and natural evil. God is thus causally responsible for acts of moral evil. But God is supposed to be omnibenevolent and as such, having a part to play in an evil act is inconsistent with His divine attribute. One assumes here the implicit premise that if an entity is wholly good, it cannot bring about or partake in an evil act. And if this entity does bring about or partake in an evil act, then it ceases to be wholly good. Therefore, I put forth that an inconsistency arises for Berkeley – the role Berkeley assigns God puts Him in a position where He brings about morally evil acts and is thus morally responsible for them, a violation of one of His divine attributes. Berkeley’s metaphysical picture depends on the neo-theistic conception of God, where God is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent, but bringing into fruition morally evil acts seems antithetical to His very being.
In light of the problem of divine moral culpability, I find that Berkeley’s metaphysical picture beckons to be altered at the very least if it is to be retained. In order to retain world view, Berkeley has two alternatives to choose from. Firstly, Berkeley could maintain his brand of immaterialism wholesale and put forth that God is not wholly good. Secondly, Berkeley could maintain the conception of God with the three pan-omni qualities and alter his immaterialist picture such that God does not coordinate or sustain acts of moral evil. Here, I propose to undertake the latter.

8.2 Looking to a fellow phenomenalist

In his own copy of *the Principles of Human Knowledge*, Leibniz penned that Berkeley should have gone further to the infinity of monads. As put forth in Chapter 4, Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s metaphysics share crucial similarities. They both expound phenomenalist philosophies and have the neo-theistic God holding prominent positions in their metaphysics. Berkeley’s metaphysical picture sees God as an intimately present sustainer and coordinator. Leibniz’s world view on the other hand, sees God as the divine architect and law giver who is ever-present though not involved in moment to moment concurrentism as Berkeley’s God is. It is this difference that could provide the basis for allowing Berkeley to alter his brand of immaterialism, thereby avoiding the problem of moral culpability and retaining both his phenomenalist stance as well as the intimate and crucial role that God plays in his metaphysical picture. I put forth that one bring to bear the tweaked theory of monads in Berkeley’s philosophy because it coheres well with Berkeleyan metaphysics.
Further, I also put forth that they share in the fundamental constituent entities of their respective metaphysical worlds and it is this commonality which I would like to explore and exploit in order to aid Berkeley in avoiding the problem of divine moral culpability. My aim here is not to argue that Berkeley should have arrived at all the same conclusions as Leibniz. Rather, I aim to preserve as much of Berkeley’s original theory as possible to render it distinct from Leibniz. I shall attempt to do this by the tweaked theory of monads when bringing it to bear on Berkeley’s so one is still able to maintain that the resultant world view is Berkeleyan, not Leibnizian.

Berkeley’s world is populated by only two entities – minds or spirits and ideas. “This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul or my self”.205 “A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being: as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called the will.”206 And “the will is termed the motion of the soul”.207 Like a monad which is a human soul for Leibniz, Berkeley’s spirit or mind is an active, dynamic entity with “power or agency” and will.208 Further, like Leibniz, Berkeley regards “the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and… consequently incorruptible” .209 As he put it, “[nothing] can be plainer, than that the motions, changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect an active,

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205 P2
206 P27
207 P144
208 P25
209 P141
simple, uncompounded substance: such a being therefore is indissoluble by the force of nature, that is to say, the soul of the man is naturally immortal.”

In this manner, there are marked similarities between Berkeley’s and Leibniz’s account of the human soul. Given these similarities, I put forth that one is warranted in adopting the Leibnizian conception of a monad and bringing it to bear in Berkeley’s world. In speaking of monads and monadic perceptions, rather than spirits and ideas, one is not adding anything additional to Berkeley’s discourse. These basic constituents of the immaterial worlds are similar and provide us with a common denominator. The account of interaction between monads or spirits then will be the point of difference and the contributing factor to the problem of divine moral culpability. In other words, I propose that the account of how interactions between human souls take place or how morally evil acts are actualized requires alteration. For this purpose, I will borrow the term monads and the law of pre-established harmony (which I will modify for Berkeley’s purposes) from Leibniz – what is to a large part, the tweaked theory of monads.

For Leibniz, the world is a sea of monads. Even what is perceived as the ‘human body’ is a loosely grouped set of monads. This is a notion that conflicts with Berkeley’s view that the world is populated only by minds and ideas and that the ‘body’ is nothing but a series of ideas to a specific mind. As such, I shall leave out this component of Leibniz’s philosophy when adapting the theory of monads for Berkeley’s metaphysical picture since I desire to keep Berkeley’s philosophy as Berkelean as possible. My aim here is to borrow from Leibniz to aid Berkeley, not render Berkeley’s view completely

\[210\] P141
Leibnizian. Hence, the addition of this would be detrimental since it is a notion that is contradictory to one of Berkeley’s fundamental notions.

Borrowing from the theory of monads, I put forth that one replaces minds and ideas with monads (human souls) and monadic perceptions. Here, one is not only borrowing the terminology from Leibniz, but also incorporating the concepts of monads and monadic perceptions are the distinct manner in which they operate. What one attempts to do here is shift God’s role from a sustainer and coordinator, to a lawgiver or architect. If God does not sustain acts of moral evil as per the original Berkeleyan formulation, then He is not to be held morally responsible for them and hence, the problem of moral evil outlined is dissolved. Human agents are to be held solely accountable for the evil that they do.

The alternative account one proposes then, borrowing from the theory of monads is this: In the case of Janice shooting Tim, Janice, what is essentially a monad or human soul, wills to shoot Tim, another monad or human soul. Her willing such an act is followed by her experiencing the monadic perception of pulling the trigger. The monad Tim, then experiences the monadic perceptions including bullet-piercing sensations, sensations of pain, and extinction. But how does Janice’s willing to shoot Tim, her receiving all the relevant monadic perceptions of sensations, and Tim’s receiving of all his relevant monadic perceptions of being shot all occur as if in a cause and effect series if God does not directly coordinate them? For monads are windowless, and hence cannot

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Here, when we refer to individuals, such as Janice, we actually specifically refer to a human soul or monad. The name Janice, for example, is thus a ‘convenient designator’ for a specific human soul that is a dominant monad.
be affected by any created thing. Here, as Leibniz has, one looks to the law of pre-established harmony.

At this juncture, one might question whether the law of pre-established harmony is compatible with Berkeley’s metaphysics. Indeed, Leibniz’s metaphysical system is one of tight-knit, interdependent concepts – so, borrowing of the concept of monads and the law of pre-established harmony might necessitate one in adopting other arguments Leibniz has made. More specifically, it might require one to agree with Leibniz regarding God’s foreknowledge when He created the world and further that this world is the best possible one that God could have created.

For Berkeley, even what we consider ills in this world – things such as miseries endemic to human life – are “indispensably necessary to our well-being”. These so-called evils, Berkeley finds, only appear to be evil since they actually have to nature of good, when one considers them in the grander scale of the system of beings. Given that God is omnibenevolent, it is hard to imagine that Berkeley would disagree that this is the best possible world. A wholly good being cannot consistently bring into being a world that is not the best possible one – doing so would only leave Berkeley with the problem of evil and problem of divine moral culpability, the very problem one is trying to avoid on his behalf.

\[^{212}\] P153
\[^{213}\] P153
That this is the best possible world might not be measured through individual experiences but by taking stock of all individuals ever in existence and this is something only known by God. Berkeley does put forth this notion himself, saying that it is “the nature of [the] infinite not to be comprehended by that which is finite”. The question of whether God considered all the possible worlds He could have brought into being prior to creation might also be raised. For Berkeley, “God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation”. I find that this is not problematic for Berkeley since it is part of divine foreknowledge and of God’s omniscience that He should be able to see all future happenings in a manner that we cannot. This world is created by God, who is a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. It seems then that God could not bring about a world that was not the best possible one. As such, Berkeley would not have much problem accepting that God possess foreknowledge as part of his omniscience and that He chose to create the best possible world since it coheres very much with the conception of God he outlines.

8.3 Addressing the problem of divine moral culpability

At this juncture, one might ask how altering Berkeley’s brand of phenomenalist metaphysics allows one to avoid the problem of divine moral culpability. If it is the case that Leibniz’s God should be morally culpable in the same manner as Berkeley’s then one

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214 Introduction, P2
215 HP, p. 101
216 P151
does not have an argument for proposing the tweaked theory of monads be adapted for Berkeley’s purposes. To address this, let us consider the act of Peter stabbing Jodie in three metaphysically different worlds. Let us say that Peter decides to stab Jodie in the back with a knife. I shall first describe this event in terms of the original Berkeleyan metaphysics, then I shall do the same in terms of the materialist understanding and then lastly in the modified Berkeleyan world view that I have advanced, one which integrates the tweaked theory of monads.

In Berkeley’s original formulation of a phenomenalist world, the stabbing might be explained in the following manner: Peter, wills to stab Jodie, God, the grand coordinator and sustainer, brings this action into actuality by providing Peter with knife-picking, knife-stabbing-into-Jodie’s-back sensations, while at the mean time providing Jodie with stabbing and pain perceptions. While God did not will the act of stabbing Jodie, He did sustain and coordinate all relevant perceptions that amount to Jodie’s stabbing. Without God, this stabbing would not occur. God’s solely actualizing the stabbing is tantamount to God committing the stabbing. Here, I do not put forth that Peter is absolved of moral responsibility since he did not commit the act itself in the Berkeleyan world. Rather, I am further arguing that God does bear moral responsibility for the act as well, on the grounds that He essentially committed the morally evil act by bringing it into fruition in this particularly Berkeleyan manner.
In a non-phenomenalist, material world, the stabbing is to be explained in a different manner.\textsuperscript{217} Peter, who wills to stab Jodie, picks up a physical knife with his material hands and plunges it into the back of the real, material body of Jodie, who feels immense pain as a result of physical processes. Perhaps one might ask where God is in all this and whether He is morally accountable for this evil act that befalls Jodie. Indeed, God has chosen to create a world where amongst the many events that occur, the event of Jodie getting stabbed occurs as well. But God did not will to stab Jodie, as Peter did. And neither did He commit what is essentially the morally evil act, as the Berkeleyan God did.

In the revised Berkeleyan world I have proposed, what occurs in the same events is this: the monad ‘Peter’ wills freely to ‘stab’ Jodie. The law of pre-established harmony then sees the relevant perceptions experienced by each monad – perceptions of stabbing for the monad ‘Peter’ and perceptions of pain are experienced by the monad ‘Jodie’. Here, in this phenomenalist world, one manages to avoid the problems of the original Berkeleyan metaphysics, one where God is morally accountable for the stabbing because of His direct involvement. Here, God did not will the act, and He did not commit or causally bring it into actuality. As such, one is no longer faced with the problem of divine moral culpability.

When entity Y commits an act of moral evil X, I put forth that moral culpability may be ascribed if either or both of the following criteria is fulfilled: firstly, that Y wills for X to occur, and secondly, that there is Y’s direct involvement or action to bring about

\textsuperscript{217} For the purposes of comparison, let us assume that this materialistic world is a theistic one, and one where God chose to create this world because it was the best possible. In other words, I shall hold all other facets of the world constant with Berkeley’s, save for the phenomenalist aspect of his metaphysics.
X. Indeed, Peter wills that Jodie be stabbed, but does God do the same? Does God will X in the same way that a murderer desires to kills his victim? The answer is no. As it is in the case of the original Berkeleyan world, God does not will the stabbing of Jodie in this way. According to Berkeley, such a direction of will belongs entirely to Peter and may not be attributed to God.\textsuperscript{218} One might attempt to argue that God does in fact will the stabbing, albeit indirectly, by willing and bringing this world into actuality, a world where Jodie will be stabbed. However, foreknowledge of all events and bringing such a world into being cannot be equated with willing any particular act in that series.

Indeed, it appears problematic that God chose a world where the stabbing would happen. Yet, it is a world where human individuals are possessed of free will and choose to act in certain ways. When choosing which world to bring into being, God foreknew all events that would occur if He brought this particular world into being, but He did not direct Peter’s will, Peter did this freely and hence, God did not will that Peter stab Jodie. Though God allowed for such a stabbing to occur, He still did not will it.

Essentially, what one should be concerned with here is the second condition of divine moral culpability – namely, God’s direct involvement in bringing about a morally evil act. And it is with this that the original Berkeleyan metaphysics is confronted, a problem that the materialist conception manages to avoid. The new formulation of Berkeley’s metaphysics is advantageous because it avoids the problem of divine moral culpability by not having God involved in such a problematic manner, while also

\textsuperscript{218} HP, p. 82; all actions are produced “immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.
avoiding the materialist conclusion. The modified Berkeleyan metaphysics that integrates Leibniz’s tweaked theory of monads allows Berkeley to retain the phenomenalist nature of his metaphysics.

8.4 Objections and counter-arguments

Let us now consider two criticisms an opponent might potentially raise.

8.4.1 Does Berkeley cease to be a phenomenalist?

One might raise the point of whether Berkeley continues to be a phenomenalist given my proposed changes to his metaphysics.\(^{219}\)

Counter-argument

What I have proposed to in light of the problem of divine moral culpability is to replace Berkeley’s particular method of God actualizing particular acts with an adapted version of the tweaked theory of monads. In order to tailor the theory to suit Berkeleyan metaphysics, I have left out the notion of the body as a loosely grouped set of monads. While there is room for a ‘body’ in Leibniz’s metaphysics, Berkeley’s world only consists of ideas and minds or souls. Bodies again, are mere perceptions in one’s mind or of a monad and not a loosely grouped set of monads.

\(^{219}\) This is a critique proposed by the second examiner in response to an earlier incarnation of this thesis.
Phenomenalism may be defined as the view that physical objects are to be reduced to sets of sensory perceptions.\textsuperscript{220} In direct contrast with this is the view termed materialism, which asserts the opposite – namely that there is a real material world independent of the mind. With the proposed changes to Berkeleyan metaphysics, although the manner in which perceptions are coordinated is altered, the basic constituents of the Berkeleyan world remain the same – they continue to be populated by minds and ideas only. The basic tenet of phenomenalism, the idea that physical objects are to be reducible to sensory perceptions, is still maintained. The Berkeleyan world has not been turned into a materialist world for example. Admittedly, the brand of phenomenalism may not be strictly that which Berkeley originally conceived, but nonetheless the altered Berkeleyan metaphysics that I have put forth continues to be a phenomenalist one.

8.4.2 The objection from moral evil

One might ask if my proposed treatment truly resolves the problem of moral evil and absolves God of moral culpability since even in this proposed world God continues to allow moral evil to befall individuals, even if He does not concur with evil acts directly. Otherwise put, since we are replacing Berkeley’s direct interventionist God, with one where God’s activity in the world is not directly interventionist, is the former superior to the latter in its ability to absolve God from moral responsibility?

\textsuperscript{220} Carlin, p. 151
Counter-argument

In his works, Berkeley has responded to the wider problem of evil – the question of how we are to reconcile God with the evils evident in this world or how God can allow evil acts to occur. For example in the *Principles*, Berkeley puts forth that if we “enlarge our view… we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things, which considered in themselves to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.” Further, Berkeley also argues that individuals possess free will and may choose to use these limited powers “immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions”.

What I find is particularly pressing for Berkeley is that God directly participates in and actualizes acts of moral evil – a direct result of Berkeley’s brand of concurrentist metaphysics. And this is a critique to which Berkeley does not respond, despite it being a crucial problem arising from his concurrentist phenomenalism. It is this issue that I have attempted to address and propose a rejoinder on Berkeley’s behalf. It is not my purpose in this thesis to weigh Berkeley’s responses to the general problem of evil, attempts I deem sufficient and acceptable here. Thus, as a response to the aforementioned critique, a God that does not directly concur with human actions avoids the problem of divine moral culpability and as such, is morally superior to one that does.

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221 P153
222 HP, p. 82
Chapter 9: Conclusion

The project of this thesis has been to bring forth the issue of moral culpability and examine how an incompatibilist account of freedom might work within Leibniz and Berkeley’s neo-theistic phenomenalisms. I have confronted Leibniz’s and Berkeley’s metaphysical pictures with the problems of human and divine moral culpability and propose manners in which their phenomenalist metaphysical systems may be reworked or tweaked in order to avoid these critiques. In my opinion, the free-will problem and problems of moral culpability pose serious threats to Leibniz and Berkeley’s philosophies since they address the very workings of the respective metaphysical systems and seek to undermine key components such as God and free-will.

Working from an incompatibilist reading of Leibniz, I have argued that his theory of monads leaves no room for human agency since it does not allow one to fulfill the contingency requirement for freedom that Leibniz himself sets out. As such, I suggest that individuals who perform morally evil acts do not do so freely and as such, are not morally responsible for them. With regards to Berkeley, I have put forth that God concurs and is solely responsible for actualizing evil acts, something inconsistent with His divine attributes. And on this basis, while human beings are responsible for willing morally evil acts, God is also culpable because of the nature of Berkeleyan concurrentism.
I have suggested that Leibniz cannot have human agency which he desired, and Berkeley cannot consistently retain God in his metaphysical picture as these respective systems stand. Apart from a consistent, workable metaphysic, both would desire to maintain the idea that people alone are to be held morally accountable for the acts they commit. Human individuals possess free activity of their wills and they are thus responsible for the acts they perform. I have thus sought to dissolve these problems on behalf of these two philosophers.

Human free-will, the theory of monads as well as his neo-theistic conception of God are both components of his metaphysical system that I find, Leibniz desires greatly to retain. In order to address the problem of free-will and human moral culpability, I have put forth the tweaked theory of monads. This alternative to Leibniz’s original theory of monads allows Leibniz to maintain the aforementioned tenets of his metaphysical system. However, such a move does require a re-formulation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason and Predicate-in-notion Principle.

In the case of Berkeley, I have put forth that the workings of the Berkeleyan world make it such that God actualizes or brings about acts of moral evil. To dissolve this critique and save his immaterialist world view, I argued that Berkeley should borrow from the immaterialist world view of Leibniz. The modified Berkeleyan metaphysical picture that I propose would essentially have God take on a different role from Berkeley’s original formulation. God would be present, but less intimately so. He would take on the
role of a grand architect and law giver, relinquishing that of a moment to moment coordinator. It is this intimate presence that gives rise to the problem of divine moral culpability. As such, I find that the modified Berkeleyan metaphysical picture, one augmented with Leibniz’s theory of monads, sees his idealist world view just sufficiently altered that his overarching philosophy is not unrecognizable and yet have it avoid the aforementioned critique. Since God does not actualize or bring into fruition any acts including morally evil acts, then God is not morally culpable for moral evil. The spirit of Berkeley’s project, I find, is largely maintained.
Bibliography


