

**METAPHORIZING THE PHILIPPINE PRESIDENCY:
SCHEMAS OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP IN
THE POST-MARCOS STATE OF THE NATION
ADDRESSES (1987-2009)**

By

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Thesis Summary

This research is a socio-political discourse analysis of Philippine presidential rhetoric after the country's re-democratization in 1987. The period under investigation—1987 to 2009—is significant in that it departs from 14 years of authoritarianism under Ferdinand Marcos. It is a period characterized by democratic restoration as well as the challenge to sustain basic freedoms, civil liberties, and democratic institutions amid the changing socio-political and economic landscape both in the national and global fronts. Covering the four post-dictatorship presidencies of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, this thesis examines how specific conceptualizations of key themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the four presidencies. The thesis also accounts for the similarities and differences of the presidential schemas. The State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs) delivered annually by these presidents are used as primary data.

Theoretically, the thesis assumes that mediating mental structures such as schema account for the relationship between text and context. In my analytical framework, a schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-making processes, is constituted by frames that at the same time organize these experiences. These frames may be represented through conceptual statements—macro-level conceptualizations—that are likewise constituted by a cluster of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2007) that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions found in political texts and talk. Through repeated use and deployment, these metaphors that function as and work in conjunction with rhetorical strategies

such as logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, strategies of self-representation and othering (Van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997), and political myths (Charteris-Black 2005) can set off, prompt, trigger or disrupt (shared) schemas responsible for our sense making processes.

I suggest that the schemas that emerge from the analysis of the national addresses may be used to compare similarities and differences among the four post-dictatorship presidencies and to account for continuities and discontinuities in Philippine presidential leadership within the last two decades.

From the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs, I deduce a couple of insights. First, the themes are metaphorized and framed (Lakoff 2006, 2008) in relation to the key themes emphasized by a president and this is accounted for by the evolving socio-political contexts and the agency of the president. Second, metaphorizations and frames serve to justify and work towards hastening the public acceptance of government policies. Third, schemas of state of the nation and the presidential leadership in the post-Marcos SONAs take on a path structure—a movement from one point to a desired destination. What distinguishes a presidential schema from the rest is the way specific elements (or themes) in the path structure are conceptualized. Finally, certain conceptualizations of the focal themes in the post-Marcos presidencies reinforce or adhere to social discourses that tend to perpetuate or reproduce relations of dominance and control. The final point provides impetus for multiple audiences of presidential speeches to engage in the critical examination of how themes commonly invoked in these addresses are metaphorized and strategically expressed before they get transformed into public policies.

Chapter 1

Political Discourse and the Philippine Presidency

1.1 Introduction

To read the word, says educator Paulo Freire, is to read the previous reading of the world (Freire 1997). What Freire means is that words that make up our texts and talk reflect and recreate human reality. It is through the reading of texts or by understanding the language used to describe human experience that we are able to make sense or even ‘uncover’ other people’s understanding of their own experience and their conceptions of the world at large. Freire’s thesis on reading the world/word can serve as a guiding principle for discourse analysts who are engaged in the study of language used in various domains of human endeavor. Understanding the use of language enables humans to understand perspectives or world views that motivate people into action. In the domain of politics, where language plays a significant role in influencing people’s beliefs about the past and present state of affairs and their opinions about public policies, the study of political discourse becomes compelling. The need for the study of political discourse is affirmed by Gronbeck (1996) when he said:

Politics understood as a symbolic action demands that we analyze systematically the discourses of political ideology and valuation, of political visions and places citizens occupy in such visions; of the means by which self-interests are converted into public interests—into public policies’ (47-48).

What this implies is that whatever the politician communicates warrants careful analysis and reflection. What the politician expresses as significant, what she¹ sets as

¹ For the generic pronoun, I use the terms ‘he’ and ‘she’, ‘her’ and ‘him’ interchangeably in this thesis.

the national or public agenda, how she casts her constituents' role in making such agenda happen, and the strategies she uses to ensure that what she deems important becomes publicly acceptable—all these require systematic study that will help us understand the complex domain of politics.

A number of scholars in the field of language studies have addressed such demand by demonstrating that a systematic study of language and other semiotic resources not only leads to a productive reading of political texts and talk, but can also illuminate our understanding of how politics work. For instance, Sauer (1997) has shown that an analysis of political speeches can contribute to 'a clearer interpretation and explanation of complications regarding the orator's constraints, functions, and dilemmas.' He says that discourse and discourse elements which include text structures, text passages, and form-and-meaning units are manifestations of actions to perform specific functions such as persuasion and the accomplishment of political success (54). Moreover, the politicians' use of these discourse elements reflects what choices are open to them and what constraints they face in the public communication setting. Wodak's (2009), in her study of political talk and texts in the European parliament, argues that doing politics is very much dependent on context that is influenced by a host of factors including but not limited to national traditions and political systems as well as subjectivities of political actors.² Discourse analysts like Fairclough (1989, 2001, 2003), van Dijk (1998, 2006), Wodak et al (1999), Chilton (2004), and Charteris-Black (2004, 2005, 2007), among others, have offered frameworks in the analysis of political discourse. Their significant contributions to

² In her study, Wodak points out that personal histories, national identities, and political loyalties can actually serve as resources of the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in their discourses especially in building their arguments, whether these are communicated in the public arena or behind closed doors (57-112).

the study of political discourse have generated a tradition of scholarship that both deepens and explores ways of understanding how language is used in the domain of institutional politics and its implications in society at large.

The present study builds on this scholarship of political discourse, and like these studies, it aims to undertake a systematic analysis of the language used in the domain of politics. It focuses on a set of speeches of the same genre delivered by various political actors within a country-specific context and who had served as democratically elected national leaders after a period of dictatorship. The country-specific context under study is the Philippines where political texts and talk prove to be a rich source of data for discourse analysts interested in studying democracies in the Southeast Asian region. The various political actors in question refer to the four Philippine presidents who had served as the country's head of state following fourteen years of authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos. The speeches under examination are the State of the Nation Addresses (or the SONAs as they will be referred to in this thesis). A SONA is a constitutionally mandated report to the nation delivered by the Philippine president annually before members of the Congress during its opening session. Covering the period from 1987 to 2009, this study undertakes a socio-political discourse analysis of twenty-three SONAs delivered by four post-Marcos presidents: Corazon C. Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph E. Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Informed by studies in cognitive linguistics, critical discourse analysis, and rhetorical theory and criticism, the thesis develops an analytical framework that recognizes the layers of mental structure that mediate between text and context. In this framework, the schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-making processes (Strauss and Quinn 1997; Quinn 2005), is constituted by

frames that at the same time organize these experiences. These frames are represented through conceptual statements—macro-level conceptualizations—that are likewise constituted by a cluster of conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2007) that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions found in political talk and texts. Through repeated deployment, these metaphors that function as or work in conjunction with logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, rhetorical strategies of self-representation and othering (Van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997), and political myths (Charteris-Black 2005) can set induce or disrupt (shared) schemas responsible for our sense-making processes.

In analyzing the SONAs, I examine how specific conceptualizations of key themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the four presidencies. I also account for the similarities and differences of the presidential schemas. I argue that these similarities and differences reflect the continuities and discontinuities in presidential leadership and reveal what discourses are emphasized or deemphasized over a period of time. It must be noted that a critical position is taken in the study and this is vital in showing that the key themes that are most common, and more often than not reified in Philippine political discourse, prove to be problematic especially when their conceptualizations by political actors are closely examined. For instance, the theme of democracy, which is almost always taken for granted in Philippine political discourse, proves to be a malleable concept that has been defined or redefined in ways that favor certain political, and sometimes personal, interests. The study then encourages the readers and listeners of political messages not to take these political themes for granted and to constantly engage them

in critical analysis before they get transformed into ‘non-negotiable materialities’ or ‘more authoritative contexts’ (Blackledge 2005).

In the succeeding sections, I provide a brief background of the Philippine political system and the presidency, an explanation on the nature of the SONA and the rationale for its selection as an object of inquiry, the aims and objectives of the study, and its significance to scholarship in the fields of political discourse in general and of Philippine political rhetoric, in particular. An overview of the thesis chapters is provided in the final section.

1.2 The Philippine political system and the presidency

The Philippines, as inscribed in its 1987 Constitution, is ‘a democratic and republican State’ where the power of the national government is exercised by three co-equal branches—the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. The president, who is elected every six years under the current Philippine constitution, heads the executive branch; the legislative is headed by Congress which is constituted by the Senate and the House of Representatives, while the judiciary is led by the Supreme Court.

The current Philippine presidential system of government can be traced back to the 1935 Constitution which set in place a commonwealth government during the period of American colonization. The constitution, which was patterned after the US Constitution, defined the duties and powers of the Philippine president. In the current Philippine charter, the president acts as chief executive, serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and has the power to appoint, with consent from the Commission of Appointments, members of the Constitutional Commission, ambassadors, officers of the armed forces, and members of the Supreme Court, among others. The practice of delivering the annual report to the nation, commonly

referred to as the SONA, by the Philippine President is inscribed in the 1935 Constitution as well as in succeeding national charters that replaced it.

The 1935 Constitution was replaced by the 1973 Constitution when then Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos placed the country under martial law. The 1973 charter consolidated the powers of the president thereby legitimizing Marcos' authoritarian rule. In 1986, when Marcos was ousted from power, the 1973 Constitution was replaced by the Freedom Constitution that gave the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino vast powers. Aquino used her vast powers to create a constitutional commission that drafted a new constitution that was eventually ratified in 1987. Those who drafted of the 1987 Constitution drew inspiration from the earlier national charters, but had done away with some of the presidential powers inscribed in the 1973 Constitution (see Chapter 4 for details). The 1987 Constitution particularly mandates the president to deliver a report to the nation during the opening of the congressional session for the year which falls on the third Monday of the month of July.

1.3 The State of the Nation Address

The SONA is a constitutionally mandated speech that contains the president's assessment of the national situation, the government's performance during the previous year, and her recommendations for the succeeding year. The SONA is one of the many ways the executive department exercises accountability to the nation.

The practice of delivering a SONA is inscribed in section 20 of Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which states, 'The President shall address the Congress at the opening of the regular session. He may also appear before it at any other time.' This provision is quite similar to that of the US Constitution, which states that the president 'shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,

and recommend to their consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.’ The main difference is the explicitness of the Philippine provision on how the President should give his report on the state of the nation to Congress. That method is public address. America’s first president, George Washington, initiated the practice of presenting the constitutionally mandated report on the state of the union in person.³ Apparently, the Washington tradition was the inspiration of the writers of the Philippine Constitution.

Rigoberto Tiglao, former presidential management chief of staff, asserts that the ‘SONA is the podium for the Chief Executive—as the leader of the nation—to explain where she wants to bring the country towards, and to provide Filipinos her analysis of the basic strengths and weaknesses of the nation. It is the leader’s role to point to the nation’s strengths and gains so as to inspire them to unite and move forward’ (cited in Navera 2006, 30-31). A SONA has the following features: an articulation of accomplishments during the term, an analysis of the national situation including problems and challenges faced during the previous year, agenda or direction setting, and appeals for support and unity, and recommendations to Congress and to the Filipino people at large (31). It serves as an avenue to reaffirm national values.⁴ Moreover, the SONA provides accounting for presidential actions and decisions done during the term and which may be met with disapproval from some sectors of society.

³ Thomas Jefferson, the third US president broke this Washington tradition by sending his report in written form. The Jeffersonian act would continue until Woodrow Wilson assumed the presidency in 1913 (Metcalf 2004, 8).

⁴ The SONA was patterned after the United States’ State of the Union Address (SOUA). Campbell and Jamieson (2008) have noted that the SOUA is generically characterized by three processes: (1) public meditation on values, (2) assessments of information and issues, and (3) policy recommendations. These characteristics can also be gleaned from the Philippine version of the State of the Union.

This accounting is realized by the president in her presentation of her leadership's accomplishments and her assessment of the national situation.

Until recently when the incumbent president chose to deliver his SONA 2010 largely in Filipino,⁵ Philippine presidents delivered their SONAs largely in English. It was not, however, unusual to hear them intersperse their speeches with Filipino passages. While this aspect of the SONAs is not fully accounted for in this study, I wish to point out that such rhetorical choice appears to have been pursued by the national leaders for at least two reasons: one, to translate a point delivered in English earlier in the speech (a strategy of repetition or restatement) and two, to highlight that which the president considered important for the knowledge of the Filipino audience at large. For instance, Aquino used Filipino in communicating the nature and relevance of people-initiated and people-driven 'Kabisig' movement (see extract 27 of 5.3.4) while Estrada underscored the significance of his 'war on poverty' agenda by communicating his statements on the topic first in English then in Filipino (see extract 12 of 7.4.4).

My choice in using the SONA as a focal text for analysis is due to several reasons. First, the nature of the SONA warrants the study of the discursive construction of presidential leadership. Apart from its usual features, the SONA also articulates the vision of the president and how this vision is made operational in the execution of his duties and responsibilities as a national leader.⁶ Second, it is a well-

⁵ President-elect Benigno Simeon Aquino departed from the earlier tradition by delivering his first SONA largely in Filipino. Notably, the only time he spoke English was when he mentioned ideas having to do with his foreign policy.

⁶ The significance of the speech may be gleaned from the fact that speech becomes part of the public record as it is published in the *Congressional Journal* and more recently, the presidential website (www.op.gov.ph) and Philippine news websites (e.g., www.inquirer.net).

publicized speech. It is perhaps the only type of presidential speech, apart from the inaugural address, that has the most publicity in a president's term of office. It is the public address most identified with the president and most talked about before, during, and after the event. It is broadcast via television, radio, and more recently, the Internet (through the government channel and the government website). Its full text is also made available in the national dailies and the government websites as reference for researchers and the public at large. Third, the SONA is a site of contestation. As in any form of political discourse, the SONA is embedded with assumptions and presuppositions that are dialogic in character as they reaffirm certain interested perspectives or respond to competing or opposing ones.

1.4 Aims and objectives

How have the post-Marcos presidencies conceptualized the state of the nation and the national leadership after the restoration of Philippine democracy? How have these presidencies through their conceptualizations of the national situation and national leadership departed from and/or sustained the rhetoric of Marcos' authoritarian rule? As a corollary to this, how have the post-Marcos presidential presidencies fared since the 'restoration of democracy' in 1986? These are the major questions that this study seeks to address.

To address these questions, the study examines the schemas of Philippine presidential leadership in the SONAs delivered during the post-Marcos period (from 1987 to 2009) and accounts for similarities and differences of the presidential schemas of the four presidencies covered in the study. It also examines how these schemas reaffirm or subvert, reflect or appropriate social discourses that dominate both the national and global spheres. An example of a social discourse that has dominated the national and global spheres, for instance, is the discourse of

neoliberalism (discussed in Lakoff 2008, 51-60) or the ‘globalist discourse’ (discussed in Fairclough 2006). I see this discourse coming into fruition in the Philippines when the government ratified the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) in the 1990s and adhered to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank’s (IMF-WB) prescription to follow structural adjustment plans which include policies on trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. It should be noted, however, that the structural adjustments had been adopted even during the time of Marcos’ authoritarian regime when he set to open up the Philippine economy by doing away with what were deemed as protectionist or nationalist policies (This will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis). How the discourse of neoliberalism has been sustained and reaffirmed despite the change of leadership, and more importantly, the shift from dictatorship to democracy, is a point that stirs curiosity and therefore, warrants critical examination.

In examining the schemas of presidential leadership, I focus on four key themes that run across the SONAs of the four presidencies covered in this study: democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. The identification of these four themes will be discussed in Chapter 3 (Theoretical and Analytical Frameworks).

The following then are the specific objectives of the study:

1. spell out the metaphorizations and rhetorical strategies used to express the four themes in the SONAs of each president;
2. examine how the conceptualizations of the key themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the four presidencies;
3. discuss the similarities and differences of the presidential schemas; and

4. examine how these similarities and differences in schemas relate to dominant social discourses that pervade both the national and global contexts.

1.5 Rationale for the Study

The study enriches the scholarship on political discourse by examining Philippine presidential speeches using an analytical framework that is informed by concepts from cognitive linguistics, critical discourse analysis, and rhetorical theory and criticism studies. By focusing on political texts in the Philippines, the study increases awareness of and interest in non-Western and ‘Third World’ discourses, which can later lead to comparative studies of political talk and texts in various socio-political contexts. In employing the said analytical framework in the study of Philippine speeches, it offers a way of reading political discourse productively by demonstrating how conceptual metaphors function as and work in conjunction with rhetorical strategies such as the piteis, positive self-representation and othering, and political myths—all of which will be discussed substantively in Chapter 3.

This study complements existing studies on the intersections of language and the (institutional) political sphere in the Philippine context (e.g., Sugbo 1987; Pelagio 1990; Fernandez 1990; Pinzon 1997; Navera 2003; Cuba 2005; Pelagio 2005; Gonong 2007). But unlike earlier studies which focus on specific political-historical personalities (e.g., Pinzon 1997; Cuba 2005; and Pelagio 2005) and specific cases in Philippine political history (e.g., Pelagio 1990; Fernandez 1990; Navera 2003) using approaches from rhetorical theory and criticism—which focus on the persuasive

aspects of discourse, this study covers a longer period of Philippine history,⁷ is not focused solely on a political-historical figure, and more importantly employs a framework for analysis that is informed by concepts from both language studies as well as rhetorical theory and criticism studies. For instance, the present framework proposes to show how conceptual metaphors, a cognitive linguistic concept, can function as logical, motivational, and ethical proofs that not only establish the credibility of the political leader but can also be used to advance political beliefs and policies. This study therefore hopes to demonstrate the possibility of integrating two distinct but not necessarily disparate traditions of language-based scholarship by constituting a viable framework for a productive reading of political discourse in the Philippines.

This study is also important in that it problematizes the themes commonly talked about and invoked in Philippine presidential rhetoric after the authoritarian regime of Marcos. Themes like democracy, national economy, peace and order, and the presidency are staple themes in Philippine presidential rhetoric because they represent issues that almost always confront the nation (Malaya and Malaya 2004; Cortes 1999); these themes are often reified and taken for granted. This study shows that by examining their conceptualizations (framing and metaphorizations) working in combination with other rhetorical strategies in the speeches, structural relationships that privilege one sector of society at the expense of another, which are often

⁷ I believe that the study's focus on a period of Philippine history is an important development from earlier studies in that it provides a more diachronic account of how linguistic resources have been deployed in Philippine political discourse. Earlier studies have also taken into account the historical milieu to show how discourse is implicated in its historical context; however, there is the tendency to regard the milieu as a mere background to the rhetorical analysis, which somehow defeats the purpose of demonstrating the impact of political discourse in history. The potential contribution of the critical discourse analytical perspective to historiography is mentioned in Flowerdew (2008).

obfuscated in presidential discourse, can be made apparent. For instance, in examining the conceptualizations of democracy, one might ask: How has democracy been framed in the post-Marcos presidencies? Why has it been framed as such? What do such frames highlight? What do they hide? How do they configure with the framing of other themes in order to constitute a schema of presidential leadership? What does this configuration of frames or schema privilege? What does it marginalize? These are specific questions that the analysis of the SONAs attempts to address. A study of the discourse of post-Marcos presidential leadership can therefore serve as a critical assessment of how the four presidencies have fared since the ‘restoration of democracy’ in 1986.

That the study engages in a critical assessment of how post-Marcos presidencies have fared since the fall of the dictatorship also implies that the study partakes in the assessment of recent Philippine political or presidential history. This thesis is written at a time when more than a quarter of a century since the toppling of the Marcos regime through ‘people power’ and since ‘the restoration of democracy in the Philippines’⁸ has passed. More than two decades after the famed uprising that sent the dictator into exile, the Philippines is still faced with issues of corruption,⁹ communist insurgency (and secessionism in Southern Philippines), and recurring crises in leadership. These long standing challenges are complicated by the fact that

⁸ The terms ‘people power’ and ‘the restoration of democracy’ became resonant in the Philippine political discourse after the fall of Ferdinand Marcos in February 1986. Corazon Aquino, the first post-Marcos president and who was the symbolic leader of the anti-Marcos struggle, would constantly invoke such terms in her presidential speeches.

⁹ The Philippines has recently received a very low score compared to its most ASEAN neighbors in the 2008 corruption perception index (CPI) in a study conducted by Transparency International. The CPI measures degree of corruption as seen by business people and analysts. A grade of 10 means a country is very clean while 0 means it is very corrupt. Philippines got a score of 2.3 and ranked 141 among 180 countries rated in the study (See article on TI report at http://newsbreak.com.ph/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5373&Itemid=88889051)

the Philippines has gradually embraced neo-liberal policies by following the structural adjustment plans (SAP's) recommended by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (IMF-WB).¹⁰ Scholars from various fields of the social sciences—political science, history, sociology, and Philippine studies—have made attempts to account for the current state of Philippine politics and society. This research participates in the assessment of what has gone on in the past two decades that has made the Philippines what it is now (and will probably be in the future) from the perspectives of discourse and rhetorical studies. The thesis works to show how post-Marcos presidential discourses have contributed to the complex past and present political environment of the Philippines.

1.6 Overview of the chapters

This thesis consists of ten chapters. In Chapter 1, I spelt out the aims and objectives of the research and established why the study is worth pursuing.

Chapter 2 reviews literature in the areas of rhetoric, discourse, and Philippine presidential leadership upon which this study builds. In this chapter, I show how the studies in these areas are relevant to the present study by identifying what concepts and ideas are adopted in the current project. I also discuss how the present study partakes in the ongoing conversations in these different areas by articulating how it addresses area-specific concerns and theoretical issues.

Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical concepts that constitute my conceptual guide for the study and explains the analytical framework I shall use to examine the data.

¹⁰ The Philippine government under the Ramos presidency signed the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trades-World Trade Organization (GATT-WTO) that espouses trade liberalization, deregulation and privatization of government-owned companies and corporations.

Specifically, I offer the possibility of a schema-theoretic framework¹¹ in the analysis of presidential speeches. The framework, as mentioned earlier, recognizes that texts and contexts are mediated by layers of mental structures. Expressions in the texts are motivated by conceptual metaphors that function as and work in tandem with other rhetorical strategies. Clusters of related conceptual metaphors make up a conceptual frame. A constitution of frames leads up to the schema which reflects and influences any particular president's discourse. By studying schemas sustained or reproduced by political orators or rhetors over time, the analyst can identify continuities and discontinuities in terms of political views and policies across administrations. It can also reveal what social discourses (e.g., neoliberalism or globalism) are sustained and privileged by the rhetors.

Chapter 4 provides a historical context to the analytical chapters on the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric. It puts together secondary literature on the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972, during which time he imposed martial law in the Philippines, to his ouster from public office through a popular mass demonstration in 1986. It also provides a metaphorical analysis of Marcos' rhetoric during his authoritarian rule, with the intention of articulating the salient conceptualizations that the post-Marcos presidencies address in various ways.

Chapters 5 to 9 are the five analytical chapters that address the first two specific objectives of this research. Each of the five analytical chapters is divided into seven sections which comprise an introduction (i); a recounting of the historical milieu of the presidential period under study (ii); separate analytical sections on the

¹¹ The term 'schema-theoretic' is used to label the framework that establishes the relationship of schemas or schemata to conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors and these terms are explained in Chapter 3 of this study. It is to be distinguished from the way the term is used in a strictly formal sense in mathematical and computational studies.

themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency (iii-vi); and a chapter summary (vii).

Chapter 5 covers the SONAs of Corazon C. Aquino from 1987 to 1991, a period of transition from the authoritarian rule of Ferdinand Marcos to re-democratization. I argue that throughout Aquino's SONAs, the schema of the state of the nation was constructed via a multi-layered configuration of frames, conceptual metaphors and their entailments that tend to revolve around the theme of democracy and/or the process of democratization. Aquino, through her speeches, cast herself as a primary agent of democracy and a complete anti-thesis of the Marcos dictatorship.

Chapter 6 focuses on the six SONAs of Aquino's successor, Fidel V. Ramos, while Chapter 7 covers the three SONAs delivered during the unexpired term of Joseph Ejercito Estrada who was unseated from the Philippine presidency in 2001. In Chapter 6, I argue that the frame of competition took a privileged position in the Ramos presidential rhetoric in that the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency were framed and metaphorized based on the notion of global competitiveness. Ramos also cast his presidency as an exercise in effective management—a conceptualization consistent with his neoliberal orientation and his vision of the Philippines as a newly industrialized country. In Chapter 7, I argue that in Estrada's SONAs delivered during his unexpired term as president, he emphasized his movie personality-oriented political brand (Fairclough 2006), that is, his tough persona or his macho image which was consistent with his cinematic characters that had made him a popular moviestar in earlier years. This tough image of Estrada was reinforced by the way he conceptualized the four focal themes. I note, however, that in spite of the tough and aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, he merely sustained the neoliberal policies started by his predecessor.

Two chapters—Chapters 8 and 9—are devoted on the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the longest standing Philippine president since Ferdinand Marcos. Chapter 8 covers Arroyo’s three speeches delivered during her successor term and her inaugural SONA after she was elected for a full term in 2004. The chapter centers on Arroyo’s recontextualization of the US government-led ‘global war on terror.’ In this chapter, I argue that through the SONAs, the Arroyo administration was able to work towards sustaining its hold of power on the one hand, and showing its commitment to the Bush administration-led global war on terror, on the other.

Chapter 9 covers five SONAs delivered after what may be regarded as the most damaging political crisis faced by the Arroyo presidency in 2005. The chapter focuses on Arroyo’s assertion of presidential legitimacy. I argue that Arroyo asserts her presidential legitimacy through conceptualizations that substantiate the following propositions: (1) The national economy is a strong player in the global arena under the Arroyo administration; (2) The existing political system is a roadblock to the country’s full development; and (3) The Arroyo presidency is a working presidency and has succeeded.

Chapter 10 synthesizes insights from the five analytical chapters. It compares and contrasts schemas of the four post-Marcos presidencies by examining continuities and discontinuities in the conceptualizations of the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. It consists of two discussion sections: the first focuses on the key emphases in the four post-Marcos presidencies while the second offers a theme-based analysis of the conceptual frames and metaphors across the four presidencies.

Chapter 11 is the conclusion which recaps the aims and objectives of the study, provides a summary of insights from the preceding chapters, and offers

possibilities for future study. It also provides the researcher's reflections on the shortcomings and potential contributions of the study.

Chapter 2
**Studies on Rhetoric, Discourse, and Philippine Presidential Leadership: A
 Review of Related Literature**

The study builds on and extends scholarship in areas such as rhetorical theory and criticism of public address, critical discourse studies, metaphor studies within cognitive linguistics, political linguistics or political discourse analysis, and Philippine presidential history. Below, I review some of these works that inform my research.

2.1 Rhetorical theory and criticism of public address

In his landmark essay *Public Address: A Study in Social and Intellectual History* (1947), Wraga argued that the study of speeches or public address is also the study of ideas in transmission within a historical context. Wraga substantiated this when he said,

A speech is an agency of its time, one whose surviving record provides a repository of themes and their elaborations from which we may gain insight into the life of an era as well as into the mind of a man [sic]. *From the study of speeches given by men [sic], then it is possible to observe the reflections of prevailing social ideas and attitudes.* (Wraga 1947, 33; emphasis mine)

While recognizing the idea that speeches reflect social ideas and attitudes within a period of time, Parrish (1954, 36) offered to enlarge the scope of public address scholarship by also acknowledging the instrumentality of speeches ‘in shaping the course of history, in defining and strengthening a people’s ideals, and in determining its culture.’ In theorizing about the rhetoric of public address, he suggested that critics should consider the following when evaluating a speech: impressions made by the speaker’s character or personality, content of the speech including the order of his thoughts, and appeals for motivation. These correspond to

Aristotle's concept of the means of persuasion—the *pisteis* or artistic proofs, namely, *ethos* or authoritative appeals, the *logos* or logical appeals, and *pathos* or motivational appeals. In my study, I regard the *pisteis* as rhetorical strategies which are useful to the analysis of political discourse (see Chapter 3.5.1).

Black (1965/1978, 50-51) extended the scope of rhetoric by suggesting that discourse makes rhetorical and ideological commitments for the speaker and constrains the audience 'to expect certain ways of arguing and certain kinds of justifications in later discourses that they encounter, even on different subjects.' His point that a speech shapes our perceptions and brings to light aspects of national experience with which people are most concerned is useful in establishing the potential impact of rhetoric in society.

Black's intimation on the relationship of rhetoric and society is characteristic of rhetorical studies in the latter half of the twentieth century. At this time, scholars like Black had begun to rethink or re-conceptualize the idea of rhetoric. The intellectual ferment in the latter half of the twentieth century had redefined and expanded what it means to be rhetorical: 'Rhetoric [is] not merely the art of teaching public speaking but rather to be rhetorical [is] a central and substantial dimension of many facets of the human social experience' (Lucaites, Condit, & Caudill 1999, 11). A dominant concern in contemporary rhetorical theory is rhetoric's role in social change processes (Lucaites et al 1999). Contemporary rhetorical theorists like Del Gando (2008, 14), who defines rhetoric as 'the creation of reality,' presuppose that reality is a product of intersubjective articulation and is therefore subject to sustenance, alteration, dissolution, recreation, and transformation. In other words, reality is rhetorically constructed and shifts in our rhetorical constructions—say, through neologisms, redefinition or reclamation (Allen and Faigley, 1995)—may then

potentially bring about changes in ‘power arrangements to benefit those previously lacking in either formal or informal prerogatives or influence’ (143). Rhetoric’s role in bringing about change runs parallel to the major concerns of critical discourse analysis in the broad field of language studies.

2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)

Interest in the social role of public address in society is also shared by linguists who have done considerable theorizing on the relationship of texts—used in a much broader sense to include language and other forms of semiosis—and their social, political, and cultural contexts. Scholars using the critical discourse analytical perspective are in the forefront of this research undertaking.

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is ‘a theoretical perspective on language and more generally semiosis as an element or ‘moment’ of material social process, which gives rise to ways of analyzing language or semiosis within broader analyses of social processes’ (Fairclough 2001, 121; also in Fairclough 2003, 2006).¹² It investigates the dialectical relationship between discourse and the social contexts, particularly how the use of language reflects, manifests, constitutes, reproduces, and circulates conditions of inequality, dominance or control and how dominant social processes and structures in turn shape and influence the use of language (Fairclough 2006; Martin and Wodak 2003; Weiss and Wodak 2003). Adopting critical reflexivity in research, critical discourse analysts view their academic work as dialectically related to social conditions of domination (Billig 2003). This study adopts this critical stance in that it

¹² Fairclough (in Schaffner 1997, 86) points that in the analysis of discourse, there needs to be a double orientation: ‘to (a) the specificity of the particular discursive event, to what is particularly being done here and now; and to (b) the relationship between the particular discursive event and the order of discourse.’

problematizes the commonly talked about themes in Philippine presidential rhetoric such as democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. It examines how the conceptualizations of these themes make up schemas that sustain or reproduce asymmetrical power relations in the Philippine socio-political reality. It aims to show how presidential schemas encourage the use of state power even if it means sacrificing basic freedoms and civil liberties, undermine nationalist interests in favor of globalist ones, vilify the insurgency without addressing its root causes, and lionize the national leadership at the expense of public accountability.

An important contribution of the CDA perspective to the study of discourse in the humanities and social sciences is its emphasis on textual analysis. Fairclough (2003, 3) argues that '[t]extual analysis is not only linguistic analysis; it includes 'interdiscursive analysis,' that is, seeing texts in terms of different discourses, genres, styles they draw upon and articulate together. Text-oriented discourse analysis (TODA) (Fairclough 1992, 2003) views texts as elements of social events that have causal effects in that they bring about changes in their immediate and remote contexts. Changes brought about by texts are not mechanical; their effects are mediated by meaning-making (2003, 8). These theoretical assumptions are important for critical discourse analysts. That texts, Fairclough points out, have social, political, cognitive, moral and material consequences and effects necessitates an understanding of these consequences and effects especially if critical discourse analysts are to raise moral and political questions about contemporary societies (14).

Common analytical frameworks that have been used in CDA studies have included, among others, socio-semiotic, discourse-historical, and socio-cognitive approaches. These three are the common approaches referred to by some discourse

analysts as constituting the ‘mainstream CDA’ (Billig 2003; Blommaert 2005; Chilton 2005).

Fairclough’s socio-semiotic framework offers an analytic framework that is problem-centered and ‘combines relational and dialectical elements—negative critique in the sense of diagnosis of the problem, positive critique in the sense of identification of hitherto unrealized possibilities in the way things are for tackling the problem’ (2001, 125). More specifically, Fairclough offers the following stages in his framework for analysis: *identification* of the lexico-grammatical choices in language use, *description* of the production and possible interpretation of these choices, and *explanation* where the analyst relates the text features with the socio-cultural context using among other things, the notion of discourse formation.¹³ His framework also includes a critical reflection on the analysis (2001, 125).¹⁴

The discourse-historical approach examines different discourse strategies realized through various linguistic forms and relates them with contents of discourse which include thematic concerns of the texts for analysis, the historical and political contexts of the production of the texts, as well as social and cultural settings which may be of relevance to the analysis (Wodak, De Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart 1999; Blackledge 2005).

Employing the discourse-historical framework in their studies, Martin and Wodak (2003, 9) argue that ‘CDA approaches the issues of ‘history’ and ‘narratives on the past’ from an inter/transdisciplinary perspective. The ‘context’ has to be

¹³ Discourse formation pertains to the rules that govern sets of statements that circulate and are perpetuated in certain institutional and social contexts (Foucault, 1972).

¹⁴ A specific example of the application of this framework is the study of the mediatization of politics associated with a ‘professionalization of communications within government and political parties and the management of the mediation of political messages, and the emergence of spin doctoring, seeking to put a positive spin on political messages’ (Fairclough 2006, 01).

investigated; the dialectics between ‘text and context,’ between certain historical events, certain historical images and narratives as well as certain institutional conditions—all are involved in forming certain histories.’ The relationship of CDA and history has also been noted by Flowerdew (2008, 197) who stated that CDA ‘can be historiographic, that is to say, it can play a part in the writing of history.’

Van Dijk’s (1998) socio-cognitive approach, a framework for ideological discourse analysis, examines ideologies associated with social positions of language users in communities, groups, organizations or the society at large. Ideologies, notes van Dijk, are ‘systems that are the basis of socio-political cognition of groups... [They] organize social group attitudes consisting of schematically organized general opinions about relevant social issues.’ They also ‘feature relevant, self-serving selection of fundamental socio-cultural values. Since group relations and interests are involved, we may assume that ideologies show a polarizing structure of US and THEM’ (1998, 139).

In van Dijk’s approach to ideological discourse analysis, socio-cognitive interface is made possible through context models. In his essay on political cognition (2002), he reiterated this by explaining how our personal beliefs, actions and utterances on the one hand, and shared social representations—knowledge and attitudes organized and underlain by a set of statements or ideology—on the other hand, are mediated by these context models (mental models). These models, he explained, are influenced by both our episodic memory (short-term memory) that contains our quotidian experiences, and long-term memory that contains values, beliefs, and opinions we more or less share with other people in a social place and time.

More recently, van Dijk (2006) offered a systematic theory of the structures and processes in manipulative communication within a triangulation framework that involves the following approaches: discourse analytical, cognitive, and social approaches. In my analysis of Philippine presidential discourse, I consider all three orientations (linguistic, pragmatic, and cognitive) as equally important. However, for the benefit of clarity, I suggest the following interrelationship of the three orientations: As far as presidential discourse is concerned – which is a discourse from an interested perspective – the metaphors are strategically used to influence (pragmatic) how people make sense of abstract domains of experience (cognitive) and they are manifested in varying degrees through text and talk (linguistic).

I broadly adopt aspects of the said frameworks in developing my analytical framework for the present study. Like Fairclough and Wodak, I recognize the dialectical relationship of text and context by relating textual features of the SONAs with broad themes that tend to dominate the Philippine socio-political context and with the historical milieu where the speeches are situated. Like van Dijk, I recognize the role of cognition in mediating between texts and contexts by showing that a multilayered mental structure enables readers and consumers to make sense of political texts and talk in relation to the socio-political and historical contexts. My notion of a multi-layered mental structure is further informed by perspectives from cultural anthropology (Strauss and Quinn 1997, Quinn 2005) and cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 2004, 2006, 2008; Charteris-Black 2004, 2005, 2007). Moreover, I adopt van Dijk's notion of the polarizing structure of positive self-representation and negative other representation (or othering) and regard them as rhetorical strategies consciously used by politicians in their discourses to boost their credibility or advance their respective political agendas (see Chapter 3.5.2).

It should be noted that while the critical perspective to discourse analysis has generated much scholarship, it has also been subject to criticism from within and outside the area. I mention here a couple of some criticisms that the present study attempts to address.

Billig (2003, 44) wrote that ‘mainstream CDA’ has the tendency to move towards ‘academic marketization’ and the ‘danger of critical orthodoxy.’ He suggested that critical analysts should then engage in a ‘continual intellectual revolution’ by being ‘open to new forms of writing and [aware] of its linguistic orthodoxies’ (44). The point of Billig is not to discredit the CDA project, but to encourage analysts to be reflexively self-critical and to be receptive to modalities of analyzing discourse other than those well defined and established practices. In this way, certain practices of critical analysis are not privileged at the expense of others that may offer alternative ways of reading or examining texts and talk. The thesis addresses this concern by offering an alternative way of reading political speeches—one that adopts aspects of well-established frameworks but is also informed by scholarship from other areas like rhetorical studies. Since both fields—discourse studies and rhetoric studies—mirror similar concerns like the role of language in social change processes,¹⁵ it would be useful to draw upon each other’s insights and expand, as it were, the repertoire of critical analysis of political discourse.¹⁶

¹⁵ McGee (in Lucaites et al 1999, 383) argues that ‘public discourse is not simply a conveyor belt that brings ‘ideas’ to the public; rather it is a material entity in its own right. To characterize rhetoric or discourse as material is to recognize the substantive effect that it has on an audience at a moment of its impact. That impact is a direct result of the unique and complex configurations of language—not merely the ideas supposedly ‘carried’ out by such language—employed by rhetors at a particular moment in time.’

¹⁶ This also responds to van Dijk’s statement that there is the need for a ‘much more explicit integration of rhetoric into the study of discourse, instead of the separate, more traditional formulation of ‘figures of speech’’ (2007, xxxv).

Other perceived weaknesses of CDA identified by Blommaert (2005, 34-37) are (1) the restricted analysis of historical developments where discourse is implicated or the lack of diachronic analysis, a history of becoming; (2) the geographic restriction to First World, late modern, post-industrial societies; and (3) the tendency of CDA to be text- and linguistic-based as well as to focus on available/manifest discourses with little or no consideration of 'absent' discourses.

The study addresses the first point by situating the SONAs not only in their immediate socio-political and historical context of production, but showing them to be implicated in a broader historical and socio-political context and by demonstrating that they are interrelated and intertextually coherent (Fairclough 2006), that is, a speech draws upon elements from previous speeches and becomes the basis for the formulation of succeeding ones. The study establishes that the discourses of the presidents during their respective terms of office are rooted in the discourses of the past and may be seen as a form of continuity or reaction to previous discourses. It specifically establishes that the discourses of the period under study (from 1987 to 2009) had been significantly influenced and shaped by the discourses of the preceding authoritarian regime. This is the rationale for Chapter 4 which provides an account of the Marcos authoritarian presidency and its discourses that the four presidencies were posed to address. Moreover, the study also establishes the connection between the local and the global by relating the conceptualizations of the key themes of the SONAs to some of the broad concerns that circulate in the international or world context.

The second concern is addressed by focusing on presidential speeches in the Philippine context. Such a focus as mentioned in the preceding chapter contributes to the increased awareness and interest in non-Western and 'Third World' discourses.

This present study augments research on the political discourse of the so-called small players in global affairs (e.g., Erjavec and Volcic 2007; Tyner 2005) and societies within the Asian context.

A limitation of the study is that it is, as Blommaert's criticism of CDA goes, text-oriented and that it focuses on manifest or available discourse. A more extensive research would have included the so-called counter-SONAs and undocumented stories on the national situations expressed by members of the opposition, militant groups, and ordinary folks. This would have given way to the juxtaposition of the official and non-institutional perspectives, government narratives and counter-narratives, debate and discussion on where the country has been, where it is at present, and where it is headed. The thesis's limitation notwithstanding, I contend that it is still possible to consider 'absent' or 'muted' discourses even when focusing on the manifest ones. This may be partly achieved by viewing the SONA as a site of contestation—as part of a dialogue where the presuppositions and assumptions that it holds may be regarded as a response to competing or opposing ones and where its expressions become indicative of what it privileges and what it silences. By deriving conceptualizations from the textual and semiotic cues of the SONAs, the critic becomes aware of the speaker's presuppositions and assumptions. By examining accounts of both the immediate and broad historical and socio-political milieus where they are situated, the analyst is able to infer which interpretations get reaffirmed and which ones get subverted or relegated to the sidelines.

I wish to emphasize that CDA remains an open-ended research undertaking that is subject to debates and rethinking (Wodak and Meyer 2001). By being conscious of this, critical analysts constantly explore new ways of making sense of texts and talk and therefore veer away from the tendency to move towards 'the danger

of critical orthodoxy.’ An awareness of its limitations enables analysts to engage in what Billig terms as ‘continual intellectual revolution’ in the research area.

2.3 Metaphor studies in cognitive linguistics

Like van Dijk, Chilton (2005) argued that CDA cannot neglect the cognitive aspect of communication. Studies on metaphors, especially conceptual metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1992a, 1992b, 1996, 1999, 2004, 2006, 2008), address this concern.

In a 1975 article published in *Educational Theory*, Ortony argued that

Metaphors are necessary as a communicative device because they allow the transfer of coherent chunks of characteristics—perceptual, cognitive, emotional and experiential—from a vehicle which is known to a topic which is less so. In doing so, they circumvent the problem of specifying one by one each of the often unnameable and innumerable characteristics; they avoid discretizing the perceived continuity of experience and are thus closer to experience and consequently more vivid and memorable. (1975, 20)

The view by Ortony that metaphors are ‘necessary not just nice,’ communicative rather than ornamental is extended and fully developed in the book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) written by linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson argue ‘[m]etaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system.’ This is an important shift in perspective towards metaphor which has been traditionally viewed as ‘a matter of mere language’ (1980, 5).

Lakoff and Johnson noted that the classical and most widely held theory of metaphor is the comparison theory which regards metaphor as a matter of language and not as a matter of thought or action. In this theory, ‘a metaphor can only describe preexisting similarities and not create similarities.’ This means that the role of a metaphor is to merely establish similar attributes between the topic or tenor and the

vehicle—a point from which Lakoff and Johnson differed. In presenting their alternative theory, they assert that ‘metaphor is primarily a matter of thought and action and only derivatively a matter of language’ and that ‘the primary function of metaphor is to provide partial understanding of one kind of experience in terms of another kind of experience’ that may involve preexisting isolated similarities, the creation of new similarities, and more (1980, 154). Metaphor then can serve as a mode of reasoning and functions to introduce alternative ways of viewing the world.

Allbitron (1995, 33) extends the conceptual theory of metaphor by suggesting that ‘an important function of metaphor is the creation of schemas for understanding abstract domains of experience.’ He argues that conceptual metaphors ‘are responsible for the existence of schematic knowledge structures that can influence the way information about a metaphor’s topic domain is processed and represented in memory’ (38).¹⁷ The author suggests that by providing a means for tying together ideas in the text, metaphors ‘may play an important role in the comprehension not only of figurative language, but of discourse in general’ (41, 43).

Later works of Lakoff (1999, 2004, 2006, 2008) demonstrate the application of the contemporary metaphor theory (CTM)—or what would later be known as ‘neural-based theory of metaphor’ (due to its links with the developments in neuroscience)—to American politics. To Lakoff, American political life is underlain by the Nation-as-Family metaphor. In accounting for American politics, Lakoff identified two competing dominant models that induce the use of metaphors for morality. These are ‘the strict father’ model—whose basic conservative morality

¹⁷ Allbitron expounds that the schemas formed by the entailments of conceptual metaphors functions to filter information that is consistent with it, ordering information in a systematic way based on the schema’s internal structure, and connects pieces of information in memory.

prioritizes the complex of strength metaphors over that of the nurturance metaphors—and ‘the nurturing parent’ model—whose basic liberal morality prioritizes the opposite.

Another important contribution of Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis is the notion that metaphors construct social realities. The authors proposed that, ‘[m]uch of cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old ones’ (1980, 45). This constructivist notion is in fact due to the shift in perspective mentioned earlier. As Lakoff and Johnson noted:

The idea that metaphors can create realities goes against most traditional views of metaphor. The reason is that metaphor has traditionally been viewed as a matter of mere language rather than primarily as a means of structuring our conceptual system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform. It is reasonable enough to assume that words alone don’t change reality. But changes in our conceptual system do change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions (1980, 146).

It is no wonder then that political leaders’ choice of metaphors can reproduce, reaffirm or challenge the way we conceive our socio-political reality. Lakoff and Johnson further cautioned:

Political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms. Like all other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality. But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because they constrain our lives. A metaphor in political or economic system, by virtue of what it hides, can lead to human degradation. (1980, 236)

Beer and de Landtsheer (2004) have also noted the constructedness of socio-political realities and the vital role played by metaphors in the process of social construction. They point out that ‘[the] power of metaphor is to understand and impose forms of political order. Metaphors reflect, interpret, and construct politics’ (30).

Meanwhile, the integration of contemporary metaphor theory in CDA has been demonstrated in studies of cognitive linguistics. In his *Corpus Approaches to Critical Metaphor Analysis* (2004), Charteris-Black proposed to integrate Lakoff and Johnson's contemporary theory of metaphor with critical discourse analysis. He thus came up with a framework of critical metaphor analysis which involves the identification of metaphors, description, and evaluation, which follow Fairclough's stages of CDA.

Charteris-Black's framework of critical metaphor analysis identifies a metaphorical expression from words or phrases that cause semantic tension through personification, depersonification, and reification (2004, 20). Charteris-Black suggested the use of corpus linguistics for a more 'accurate' identification of metaphors and goes on to argue that by doing so, the analyst would find it easy to establish the context within which metaphors are used.¹⁸

According to Charteris-Black, the description stage makes it possible for the analyst to derive from metaphorical expressions the underlying conceptual metaphors or conceptual keys which are useful for the explanation stage. In the explanation stage, the analyst is able to relate the use of conceptual metaphors to the socio-cultural situation, especially how these metaphors appeal to the prevailing socio-cultural beliefs and attitudes or how they can potentially create or privilege certain understandings of reality that maintain or challenge the status quo.

¹⁸ This, however, poses a problem to analysts of texts where there is inter-sentential and/or intra-sentential use of English and another language. This is the case with regard to the texts under investigation in this study. In the SONAs, statements spoken in Filipino languages (e.g., Tagalog, Ilocano, Bisaya) are interspersed with the statements communicated in the English language.

2.4 Political discourse analysis

The concepts from rhetorical theory, the contemporary (neural-based) theory of metaphor, and CDA are useful and relevant to political discourse analysis.

Sauer (1997) argued that rhetorical analysis can play a role in the description stage of the critical discourse analysis of political speeches. He explained:

The basis of both rhetoric and discourse analysis is functional pragmatic. Discourse and discursive elements, such as text passages, text structures, form-and-meaning units, and the like are regarded as manifestations of actions to perform specific functions... Incorporating rhetoric within the methodological set of tools of discourse analysis will thus contribute to a clearer interpretation and explanation of complications regarding the orator's constraints, functions and dilemmas (Sauer 1997, 54).

Incorporating (classical) rhetorical analysis to critical discourse analysis would also mean taking into consideration the nature of public speeches in terms of the dimensions of time, context, orator, addressee, medium, type of speech, and aim or purpose. This becomes the basis for describing the nature of public speeches in contemporary society (in Sauer's case, the modern Dutch society).

That analytical categories of classical rhetoric have remained useful to the study of public discourse is underscored in Remer (2008). Remer points out that some of the principles of oratory or classical rhetoric are still relevant in that they address important issues like the complexity of human nature (an understanding of which would require the rhetor to employ passion or appeal to emotion in order to make people act on political decisions or proposed courses of action), the (non)existence of equality of opportunity and of fact in participation, and the recognition of other forms of participation that do not necessarily conform to the notion of 'rational-critical' discourse (2008, 191-94).

Wodak (2009, 23-24) reaffirms Sauer and Remer's points by arguing 'that 'doing politics' is highly context-dependent, influenced by national traditions and political systems, by the habitus of politicians, the modes of performance, the many embodied personality features, organizational structures, and antagonistic political interests.' Wodak based her central claim on various findings from her ethnographic studies of the European parliament. Sauer, Remer, and Wodak reaffirm the need for political discourse analysts to provide an adequate description of the specific as well as broad historical, social, political, and cultural contexts of the speeches under examination in order to have a context-sensitive analysis—something that the present study attempts to achieve.

In theorizing about political discourse, Chilton (2004) and Charteris-Black (2005, 2007) both extend Lakoff and Johnson's notion of metaphor as a mode of reasoning. Chilton (2004, 203) explains that '[c]ross-domain metaphorical mappings make it possible to draw inferences that could not be drawn on the basis of direct evidence or the basis of direct experience. In political discourse, metaphors are often not just embellishments of literal propositions, but modes of reasoning about, for example, the future and about policies.'

Charteris-Black (2005) applied the critical metaphor analytical framework in examining the rhetoric of politicians. In explaining this framework, he demonstrated how concepts from classical rhetorical theory can be merged into the contemporary theory of metaphor. He specifically showed how conceptual metaphors mediate between ideology (associated with the *logos* or logical proofs) and myth (associated with *pathos* and cultural values) to legitimize policies advanced by politicians and delegitimize policies of their opponents. This study adopts Charteris-Black's theorization on the function of metaphor in mediating between myth and ideology and

demonstrates other potential ways on how rhetorical theory can inform the use of conceptual metaphors in political discourse analysis.

In a more recent work, Charteris-Black (2007) extended the critical metaphor analytical framework further by considering other semiotic resources apart from verbal or linguistic communication. He suggested that ‘leaders – like actors – use metaphors and symbols to satisfy followers’ psychological and symbolic needs and that leadership is communicated through impression management, metaphor and media choices.’

Charteris-Black (2007, 215) explained that physical appearance, dress and body language, use of artefacts and symbols and symbolic action comprise the non-verbal modes while use of metaphor, use of stylistic features (myths, slogans, epigrams, humor), communication of vision and values, and communication of legitimacy comprise the verbal strategies. These verbal and nonverbal modes of communication are then integrated in the choice of media that constitutes the performance of leadership (216). It should be noted, however, that the two studies conducted by Charteris-Black on political rhetoric (2005 and 2007) are limited to ‘charismatic’ and ‘highly successful’ leaders. By focusing on these cases, Charteris-Black’s work on political rhetoric tends to create idealized models of political leadership that can potentially serve as good models of leadership for societies dealt with in his study, but not for those others with different historical and cultural contexts.

2.5 Philippine presidential leadership

Cortes (1999), Martinez (1999), Malaya and Malaya (2004), and Abinales and Amoroso (2005) have produced works on Philippine presidential leadership that are particularly relevant to the present study.

Cortes (1999) provides an account of one hundred years of Philippine presidential history. Written by members of the Philippine Historical Association (PHA), the book is at best a useful resource for researchers whose goal is to get a picture of the circumstances, highlights, accomplishments, and challenges faced in each of the presidential terms from Emilio Aguinaldo's revolutionary government to the early years of the Estrada presidency.

Martinez (1999) focuses on Philippine political history in the presidencies of Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada by examining their SONAs. The author expresses his *raison d'être* for using the SONAs to study presidential leadership early on in the book:

The President's policy is communicated in words and statements before the national constituency and official gatherings in speeches or in written declarations, orders and messages... [I]n a presidency, the expression of a policy is a matter of skilled rhetorical elaboration and not just of substantive decision or rumination. (Martinez 1999, viii)

Martinez's book highlights the 'expressive function' of the President, one of those he claims as unwritten in the Constitution. It is a function 'by which he expresses the sentiments and aspirations of his people, an unwritten but recognized responsibility that also obtains in the orthodox case of those representative legislators, Senate or House, when they debate in the halls of Congress, and justices when they pen decisions' (11). Farther on, the author explains that his main task in the book is 'to show what [the presidents] said, or how they viewed their challenges and dangers, how they assessed themselves and their administrations in their own light, not actually how they performed...[T]he lessons, the ideas, the policy frameworks, the claims, values and ideals contained in the SONAs which addressed particular times and circumstances, are always interesting' (127). The book may be considered one of the

first serious works on the role of SONAs in the post-Marcos era. The author, however, appears to repudiate his early pronouncements about the importance of the president's expressive function when he states that 'our interest in this book is in content or substance, not in style' (163)—a position that represents the contentious notion that dichotomizes content and form, substance and style or that ideas can be seen as separate from how they are communicated through language. The book therefore falls short in understanding the complexities of the expressive function of Philippine presidential leadership by focusing solely on 'ideas' disregarding that their very nature and character during transmission is 'dependent upon configurations of language' (Wrage 1947 in Burghardt 2000, 32). The proposed work amends this shortcoming by acknowledging that an analysis of linguistic expression is vital to understanding how leadership is viewed or framed in presidential communication within its social, political, and historical contexts.

Malaya and Malaya (2004) provide a useful introduction to the collection of inaugural addresses of Philippine Presidents from Emilio Aguinaldo to Gloria Macapagal Arroyo by discussing the most common themes found in the presidential speeches. These themes have been useful for the identification of the analytical themes in the present study. The authors also mention a number of the most enduring sound bites heard from the presidential podium, and discuss some issues involved in the process of speech writing (e.g. ghostwriting). The brief introductions about the presidents before their inaugural addresses are presented to the reader provide guideposts on how the presidents fared in realizing visions and goals they had earlier enunciated in their inaugural speeches. They also provide the reader a glimpse into the major accomplishments and challenges faced by each president.

Abinales and Amoroso (2005) provide a nuanced account of the dynamics of state and society relations from the early communities in the Philippine archipelago to twenty-first century Philippine politics. Its last three chapters on the Marcos presidency, the democratization from 1986 to 1998, and the twenty-first century politics under the term of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo are particularly instructive for this study. A significant point that the authors convey on the post-Marcos politics is that while pre-martial law traditional politics appeared to be reinstated after democratic institutions were restored under the Aquino presidency, a political climate giving civil society represented by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) unprecedented influence in Philippine government emerged (237). On the other hand, there also emerged—as a 'political legacy' of the Aquino presidency—the seemingly enduring challenge of maintaining a 'delicate balance between strengthening state capacities and the need to assure a rightly skeptical public of the state's commitment to democracy' (242).

The works of Cortes (1999), Martinez (1999), Malaya and Malaya (2004), and Abinales and Amoroso (2005) provide useful guideposts on the significant developments of Philippine presidential history. Assessments and semi-biographical accounts of the presidential terms of Aquino, Ramos, Estrada and Arroyo also provide relevant information on the socio-political and historical context of the post-Marcos presidential leadership. This include, among others, works and/or edited volumes of Rajaretnam (1986); Mamot (1987); Aquino (1990); Caoili (1991); Abueva and Roman (1993); Cacho-Olivares (1998); Landicho (1999); Coronel (2000); Doronila (2001); Hutchinson and Tordesillas (2001); Lacquian and Lacquian (2001); Abueva, Alfiler, Domingo and Nicholas (2006); Thompson and Macaranas (2006); and Rice (2010). On the other hand, accounts of people's organizations (such as the

Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace), independent national think tanks (like the IBON Foundation), and independent media organizations (like the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism) provide useful alternative perspectives. These groups have published or released papers or statements that focus on specific issues that have confronted presidents and their administrations. I find them particularly helpful as they enable researchers working on Philippine presidential discourse to (re)consider the nuances and intricacies of historical contexts that constrain political texts and talk which in turn are constitutive of such contexts. For the present study, these perspectives have been useful in providing alternative assessments of the state of the nation which serve as counternarratives as it were to the SONAs or official rhetoric of the presidents.

2.6 Presidential rhetoric studies

Theorization on Philippine presidential rhetoric has not been as vibrant as that in the West. In fact, many of the studies pursued in the area have borrowed frameworks and conceptual guides from American as well as European scholars.

Particularly useful in the theorization on presidential rhetoric or political communication in the Philippines are presidential studies in Medhurst (1996) which focuses on the ‘rhetorical presidency,’ Medhurst and Ritter (2003) who examine the relationship of speechwriting and presidential leadership, Hart (1987) and Gronbeck (1997) who investigate (American) presidential communication in the ‘modern age’ or ‘age of secondary orality.’¹⁹

¹⁹ The term ‘age of secondary orality,’ which refers to the pervasiveness of the use of electronic media and new communications technology beginning in the twentieth century to the present, was introduced by Walter J. Ong in his works on orality and literacy (see for example, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, [London: Routledge, 1982]).

Also relevant are the works of Sauer (1997) on political communication in modern Dutch society; Fairclough (2000, 2006) on the mediatization of politics through branding; and other fairly recent studies that examine the rhetoric of othering in George Bush's presidential discourse after the 9/11 attacks (e.g., Erjavec and Volcic 2007; Lazar and Lazar 2007; Leudar, Marsland, & Nekvapil 2004). Sauer's (1997) notion of 'modern political communication' is useful in that it articulates features of contemporary public communication that I find apparent in the conduct of the SONAs: public speeches as justification for public decisions made earlier, the simultaneous addressing of multiple audiences (e.g., Congress, the Filipino people at large, the international community, so-called enemies of the state), the aim to achieve both persuasive and political success (that is, the consolidation as well as assertion of power), and the propensity to express sound bites that will be picked up by media, among others. On the other hand, Fairclough's (2000, 2006) notion of political 'branding' is helpful in explaining the inclination of some political leaders to engage in image-building and image-restoring strategies (Benoit 1995) or why they tend to highlight certain features of their personalities when communicating their policies.

Needless to say, most of the studies I mention in this section are based on American-European experience and traditions; hence, generalizations, insights, and theories derived from them do not fully apply to the complexities of Philippine political reality.

2.7 Summary

This chapter reviewed some of the relevant literature that informs this research. It highlighted works in the areas of rhetorical theory and criticism of public address, critical discourse studies, metaphor studies within cognitive linguistics, political linguistics or discourse analysis, Philippine presidential leadership, and

presidential rhetoric studies. In reviewing these works, I showed how they are relevant to the present study by identifying what concepts are adopted in the current project. I also discuss how the present study partakes in the ongoing conversations in these different areas by articulating how it addresses area-specific concerns and theoretical issues. In the next chapter, I draw on some of the ideas discussed in this chapter and present an outline of the theoretical perspectives that constitute the conceptual guide for the critical analysis of the speeches under examination.

Chapter 3

Towards a Schema Theoretic Framework for the Analysis of Philippine Political Speeches

In this chapter, I outline the theoretical perspectives—ideas and principles—that constitute my conceptual guide for the critical analysis of SONAs. In presenting the outline, I also affirm some of the ideas discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, I establish the inextricable relationship between text and context and use this theoretical assumption to argue that the configurations of certain features of the texts (metaphorical expressions and other rhetorical features) construct schemas of presidential leadership that either reinforce/reaffirm or disrupt/subvert social discourses that dominate the national and global spheres. Towards the end of this chapter, I shall explain the analytical framework employed in the five analytical chapters of this research.

3.1 The dialectics of text and context

Like Fairclough (2001, 2003, 2006), I consider the text as ‘an element or ‘moment’ of material social process, which gives rise to ways of analyzing language or semiosis within broader analyses of social processes’ (2001, 121). Texts, according to Fairclough, are elements of social events and have causal effects in that they bring about changes. Changes brought about by texts are not mechanical; their effects are mediated by meaning-making (2003, 8). In other words, it is through interpretation or the process of making sense of texts or semiotic resources that people are able to sustain, reproduce, alter or modify social processes which in turn influence the production of future texts. The following summarize the relationship of text and context:

The relationship of text and context is complex. The features of context are sometimes thought of as determining or influencing certain elements in the linguistic structure of text. However, the relationship is circular, or, rather, reflexive, since texts themselves contribute to the constitution of context. (Chilton and Schaffner 2002, 16)

The impact or consequences of texts in social processes may be accounted for through the concepts of *recontextualization* and *intertextuality*. Recontextualization, according to Blackledge (2005), involves the transformation of discourse. It entails the use of an argument in another context—whether through repetition or a summary of it with modifications, additions, and deletions.

The repetition, verbatim, of the same argument in a new context involves a transformation as discourse almost always attracts new meaning in new settings. But argument is rarely repeated verbatim. Instead it is often summarized, with new parts added, and others deleted, so that while it bears many features of the original, it is transformed in ways which comment on, legitimate or otherwise evaluate it' (Blackledge 2005, 12).

Blackledge cites Fairclough's observation that 'in the process of recontextualization events may be represented in ways which foreground or background particular elements, events may be rearranged, so that new elements become salient features, events may be abstracted or generalized, and events may be explained, criticized or legitimated' (12). Recontextualization is also considered a powerful feature of the discourse of politicians as the modifications in an argument emphasize which parts of it are favored at the expense of others. The privileging of certain parts of an argument is crucial especially when the argument moves into 'increasingly powerful contexts,' 'new and perhaps more authoritative contexts' or 'non-negotiable materialities' such as public policies, laws, and statutes (13). These 'non-negotiable materialities,' because they are often imbued with power, become the basis for people's ways of acting, interacting, and representing themselves, others,

and their environment. Recontextualized arguments in presidential decrees, legislation or public policy, for instance, may lead to further marginalization of religious and cultural minorities or sanction acts that violate basic human rights (e.g., the aggressive militarist counter-insurgency strategies of the post-Marcos presidencies—see for instance, sections 5.5.3, 7.5, and 8.5) and repression of civil liberties deemed vital to a society’s democratic way of life (e.g., Arroyo’s calibrated preemptive response which requires protesters to have permits when mounting rallies or demonstrations—see Chapter 9.3.2).

Recontextualization may be seen as a form of intertextuality. Blackledge (2005, 17) notes that the term intertextuality, in its broadest sense, pertains to the ‘relationships between texts. This may mean, as it often does, the relationship between text and an embedded quotation, or explicitly reference to another text, or an allusion to a specific text.’²⁰

Intertextuality is a major research issue for those involved in ‘social discourse analysis,’ another term used to refer to social theory-informed discourse analysis such as that of Fairclough. Citing Julia Kristeva’s argument about the intertextual nature of social discourse analysis, Strauss (2005) explains:

Social discourse analysis is by necessity intertextual (Kristeva 1986), that is, it is concerned with the way other texts are incorporated into the text under analysis. This requires familiarity with prior verbal and written expressions of the ideologies in question, so you can recognize when a given text incorporates established ways of expressing certain sets of ideas. This may sound hard, but if the topic is one that you have been studying, this will not be difficult. (Strauss 2005, 222)

²⁰ Recontextualization (or importation, to use Sauer’s term) is often used to refer to the process by which a dominant text assimilates, for some strategic purpose, elements of another genre (17).

Another way to understand the concept of recontextualization is through Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of 'voice.' Blackledge (2005, 14) notes that '[i]n Bakhtin's theory of language as responsive to the social world, discourse is dialogic, shaped and influenced by the discourse of others. An utterance is a link in a complex chain of other utterances, and is informed and shaped by other utterances in the chain.'

Recontextualization provides what Bakhtin (1984) calls a 'dialogising background' to another person's speech or utterance. He says, 'The speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is – no matter how accurately transmitted – always subject to certain semantic changes. The context embracing another's word is responsible for its dialogising background, whose influence can be very great. Given the appropriate methods for framing, one may bring about fundamental changes even in another's utterance accurately quoted' (in Blackledge 2005, 14).

In political discourse, it is the authoritative voice that usually provides a dialogising background to the voices of others. The contact between the authoritative voice and other voices is pivotal to the movement or transformation of discourses into more powerful contexts or into non-negotiable materialities.²¹

3.2 Schemas as mediating mental structures

The impact of texts in society may be gleaned from evidence of recontextualization, intertextuality, and the concept of voice, but the dynamics of the relationship between text and context, language and society, may be further explained through the concept of mediating mental structures, which are referred to as mental models (van Dijk 1998, 2002, 2006) or schema (Strauss and Quinn 1997; Quinn 2005).

²¹ In the words of Blackledge, it is 'the authoritative voice [that] senses and responds to voices of others, is influenced by them, transforms and is transformed by them' (2005, 16).

Schemas, according to cognitive cultural anthropologists Strauss and Quinn (1997), are mediating mental structures that enable people to make sense of objects and situations. They are a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-making processes.²² Quinn (2005) provides the following explanation on the nature of schema:

A schema is a generic version of (some part of) the world built up from experience and stored in memory. The schema is generic...because it is the cumulative outcome of just those features of successive experiences that are alike. Although schemas can change, those built on repeated experiences of a similar sort become relatively stable, influencing our interpretations of subsequent experiences more than they are altered by them. To the degree that people share experiences, they will end up sharing the same schemas – having, we would say, the same culture (subculture). The social world is constructed in just such a way that many of our experiences – the language we speak, for example, or the way we are brought up as children, or the built environment we inhabit – are indeed shared. Hence, many, many of our schemas are cultural ones. (Quinn 2005, 38)

I would like to elaborate some of the points raised by Quinn with regard to the concept of schema, relate them to the subject of my study, and think of possible ways of extending them for a productive reading of political discourse, particularly of Philippine presidential rhetoric. The first point that I wish to elaborate is that schema is ‘built up from experience.’ Quinn explains that schemas include experience of all kinds—

²² The stability of schemas is relative to how deeply they have been internalized by individuals and the public in general. Strauss and Quinn discuss both centripetal and centrifugal tendencies that work toward or against certain properties of culture.

It would seem that the schema theory advanced by cognitive cultural anthropologists like Quinn and Strauss complements the textual oriented critical discourse analysis that acknowledges the power of texts in the (re)production of social processes (see Fairclough 1992, 2003, 2006 for text-oriented discourse analysis or TODA). While the first tends to emphasize the ‘centripetal’ tendencies that sustain social realities, the latter tends to highlight ‘centrifugal’ tendencies that tend to disrupt the status quo. Both are complementary in this respect in that they help explain the complex nature of social reality.

...unlabeled as well as labeled, inarticulate as well as theorized, felt as well as cognized. Schemas, in short, can be as various and complex as the experience from which they are derived. The same is true, of course, for cultural schemas, which do not differ from other schemas except that they are built up from experience that has been shared. (Quinn 2005, 38)

This is an important point to consider also when dealing with political discourse. Political actors and the intended audience of their political acts bring with them their backgrounds and experiences when producing and consuming political texts and talk; it is then necessary for critical analysts to take into account these backgrounds and experiences (i.e., history, social attitudes, social beliefs, ideologies, and so forth) in order to show what potentially accounts for the stability or the changes especially in shared schemas.

The second point has to do with the existence of long standing schemas. Quinn says that schemas built on 'repeated experiences of a similar sort become relatively stable.' This is significant especially when examining any of the following research scenarios: different political texts communicated by the same political actor throughout a period of time; different political texts but categorized under the same speech genre; or different political texts of the same genre communicated by different actors in different temporal and historical contexts but tackling the same national issues or areas of concern. It is important to ask how these similarities and differences figure in the persistence of the schemas over time.

Relevant to such a concern is the idea that schemas can, or in fact, do change. Quinn and Strauss point to centrifugal forces as reasons for changes. It would be interesting to find out what it takes for these forces to subvert existing shared mental models and create new ones. Using Quinn's argument, I suggest that texts and performances that are enacted with relative regularity—such as ritualized instances of

political speaking (e.g., inaugural addresses, annual ceremonial speeches, State of Nation Addresses)—contribute to the (re)affirmation and (re)production of schemas, which according to Quinn ‘influence our interpretations of subsequent experiences more than they are altered by them.’ Yet, it may also be possible to think that texts and performances enacted with relative regularity are potentially open to disruptions that can lead to changes in the way political actors and their intended audience view social reality. I suggest that the occurrence of these disruptions may be due to several reasons which include, among others, shifts in socio-political and historical contexts, changes in leadership (that is, who lead and how they lead), and variations in ways of representing, acting, and interacting. This study hopes to account for both re-affirmative and disruptive elements or factors and how they have contributed to the shaping of the social and political realities particularly in the Philippine context.

Certain features of the text—those that are salient and recurring in discourse—can prompt or possibly, disrupt cultural schemas, which are responsible for our sense-making process. This study focuses on metaphorical expressions in political text and talk, but it also takes into account how metaphors configure with other rhetorical strategies employed in the political speeches under investigation to reinforce or reconstitute shared schemas. These other rhetorical strategies include, among others, the *pisteis* or artistic proofs, strategies of self-representation and othering, and political myths—all of which will be discussed in section 3.5 in relation to metaphor.

3.3 Metaphors and the construction of political reality

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) argue that metaphors play ‘a central role in the construction of social and political reality’ as they are capable of creating new meanings, creating similarities, and thereby defining a new reality. Having established that metaphors are ‘primarily a means of structuring our conceptual

system and the kinds of everyday activities we perform,' Lakoff and Johnson suggest that metaphors can actually 'change what is real for us and affect how we perceive the world and act upon those perceptions' (1980, 146). Also, Allbitron (1995) has suggested that metaphors create schematic knowledge structures that can influence the way we make sense of abstract domains of experience. It is then possible to think that political leaders' choice of metaphors can reproduce, reaffirm or challenge the way we conceive our socio-political reality. This has tremendous implications on the ways our public policies are crafted. It is interesting to consider what metaphors political actors use to persuade the public into accepting ideas that it would otherwise give a second thought or dismiss outright. As Lakoff and Johnson have cautioned us:

Political and economic ideologies are framed in metaphorical terms. Like all other metaphors, political and economic metaphors can hide aspects of reality. But in the area of politics and economics, metaphors matter more, because they constrain our lives. A metaphor in political or economic system, by virtue of what it hides, can lead to human degradation. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 236)

Charteris-Black (2004, 2005, 2007) builds on Lakoff and Johnson's theory and argues that metaphor in persuasive discourse should be seen from cognitive-linguistic and pragmatic perspectives. He also brings to the fore the notion that metaphor is 'a relative rather than an absolute concept' (2004, 20). He states:

Given that there is unlikely to be full consensus either on what is, or is not, a metaphor, or on how much the use of a particular word or phrase is metaphorical, it may be that definitions of metaphor need to incorporate a linguistic, a pragmatic and a cognitive orientation. The term 'metaphor' may refer to a bundle of linguistic, cognitive and pragmatic characteristics all or any of which are present in varying degrees. Metaphor is not, then, an

exclusively linguistic, pragmatic or cognitive phenomenon. (Charteris-Black 2005, 20)²³

Linguistically, a metaphor is a word or a phrase that causes semantic tension by reification, personification or depersonification; pragmatically, it is an ‘incongruous linguistic representation that has the purpose of influencing opinions and judgments through persuasion’; and cognitively, it is ‘caused by (and may cause) a shift in the conceptual system’ (20).

By integrating the pragmatic view in the cognitive linguistic perspective advanced by the Lakoff and Johnson, Charteris-Black recuperates the contribution of classical rhetoric to metaphor theory. The pragmatic view recognizes the role of metaphor in persuasion. From this perspective, ‘metaphor is effective in realizing the speaker’s underlying goal of persuading the hearer because of its potential of moving us’ (11). This, Charteris-Black suggests, highlights the emotional impact of metaphors because its use ‘taps into an accepted communal system of values’ (12).

Chilton (1996) acknowledges the work of 18th century philosopher and rhetorician Giambattista Vico as the most significant early contribution to the study of language and politics, especially the place of metaphor in this imbrication. Vico views metaphor not just as a strategy for persuasion but as ‘an important ingredient in the historical evolution of societies and political cultures’ (Chilton 1996, 39).

For Vico, metaphor is both a process of understanding and a process whereby individuals and groups interact with one another in civil society and in the production of that society. Metaphor is thus not a rhetorical ornament, but a constitutive part of thought and society (Chilton 1996, 39).

²³ I see this as somewhat parallel to van Dijk’s (2006) triangulation framework which he uses to come up with a systematic theory of the structures and processes in manipulative communication. Van Dijk’s framework uses the following approaches: discourse analytical, cognitive, and social approaches.

Vico's perspective resonates in Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1992, 1996, 2008) and Chilton (1996) who share the theoretical assumption that metaphor is 'one important mode of concept formation and argument construction.'

Metaphor is a conceptual process, and is reflected in the evolution and structure of languages and discourses. Its presence in text and in talk is not confined to the ornamental or the persuasive; indeed, these are rather minor aspects of metaphor. Rather, metaphor can be seen to play a major role in argumentation (Chilton 1996, 43).

The constitutive role of metaphors helps explain the relationship between metaphors and policy making. As Chilton (1996, 68) suggests, 'I assume policies result from perceived interests, are expressed in verbal formulations and declarations, and result in actions corresponding to a greater or lesser degree with those formulations and declarations.' He says that at the state of articulation, metaphor plays cognitive and interactive roles.

In its cognitive role, metaphor acts as a conceptual instrument that enables people to think about situations that are new, complex, or remote. In its interactive role, metaphor acts as a means of, for instance, avoiding direct reference, of creating common ground, or of maintaining contextual continuity and cohesion. (Chilton 1996, 68)

Chilton notes that in discourses elaborated by powerful and influential groups, the conceptual and metaphorical resources are constantly exploited and reorganized to achieve the purposes of persuasion, legitimation, group solidarity as well as the production of new conceptualizations for problematic situations. He, however, points out that metaphors can be contested and reformulated, but also stresses that 'their linguistic embedding in discourse can contribute to a situation where they privilege one understanding of reality over others. They will be a contributing factor, though

not the sole factor, in the production, reproduction and contestation of political realities' (Chilton 1996, 74).

Given the significant role of metaphors in political discourse, it would then be crucial to understand its relationship with other 'contributing factors' in the construction of political realities. But before I discuss the relationship of metaphors with the other contributing factors—which I take here to mean the other rhetorical strategies employed in political texts and talk, I would like to introduce the notions of conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors (Lakoff 2004, 2008). I believe an understanding of these concepts helps establish how metaphorical realizations or expressions in political texts and talk relate to the concept of schema.

3.4 Conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors

I argue that the notions of frame and conceptual metaphor are useful in understanding how metaphorical expressions and realizations in the political texts can sustain or potentially subvert existing schemas shared by politicians and their publics. They help articulate the relationship between metaphors as realized in texts and talk and the broad mental structure we call schemas.

3.4.1 Conceptual metaphors

Conceptual metaphors are statements that underlie a number of metaphorical expressions (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Charteris-Black 2004). This understanding of conceptual metaphors is based on the cognitive semantic approach towards metaphor that originated from the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and which Charteris-Black (2004, 2005) and other cognitive linguists (e.g., Semino 2008; Koller 2004) broadly adopted in their works on metaphors in discourse. The approach claims that 'metaphorical expressions are systematically motivated by underlying (or conceptual) metaphors' and that motivation implies that there is a single idea that explains those

expressions (Charteris-Black 2004, 9). A conceptual metaphor, which takes the form of *A is B* (e.g., DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON; LIFE IS A JOURNEY), ‘represents the conceptual basis, idea or image that underlies a set of metaphors’ (ibid.). Identifying the conceptual metaphors is particularly useful in finding commonalities and variations in the way an issue of national concern is represented across political speeches delivered by a single rhetor or across speeches of the same genre delivered by different rhetors.

Conceptual metaphors may also be seen as the major premises or warrants on which political arguments are built. They serve as justifications for policy decisions and actions and their identification becomes necessary in reconstructing the arguments of a political speech.

3.4.2 Conceptual frames

In his best-selling book *Don't Think of An Elephant* (2004), Lakoff explains that ‘[f]rames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world. As a result, they shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions. In politics, our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing *is* social change’ (2004, xv). Lakoff cites as an example the framing of the war on Iraq in 2003. He explains that the George W. Bush administration justified the war using the nation as a person metaphor, more specifically ‘the rational actor model’ used by the international relations community (70, 73). The metaphor conceptualizes nations as naturally seeking self-interest, and when necessary they use military force in order to serve their self-interests (ibid.). Lakoff suggests that progressives must make use of alternative articulations based on the values of empathy and responsibility in order to reframe the American foreign

policy. He argues for a conceptualization of the nation as one driven by nurturant morality which makes possible actions based on ‘fairness, an ethic of care, protection of those needing it, a recognition of interdependence, cooperation for the common good, the building of community, mutual respect, and so on’ (Lakoff 2004, 64).

Frames are part of the ‘cognitive unconscious’; they are ‘structures in our brains that we cannot consciously access, but know by their consequences: the way we reason and what counts as common sense’ (Lakoff 2004, xv). Lakoff argues that frames are known through language in that ‘[a]ll words are defined relative to their conceptual frames. When you hear a word, its frame (or collection of frames) is activated in your brain’ (2004, xv).²⁴

In my study, I view conceptual frame as a collection or cluster of conceptual metaphors that relate or substantiate a particular theme or issue of national concern (e.g., democracy). I argue that the frame mediates between the schema which is a broad conceptual category and metaphors that find expression through texts and talk. It is through the frame that the relationship between metaphors and a schema is established. On the one hand, frames are macro-conceptualizations that underlie clusters of related conceptual metaphors. On the other, frames make up the schema in that they give shape or organize what is otherwise an inchoate collection of experiences. As will be shown in the analytical chapters, the conceptual frames of the four focal themes in a set of presidential speeches delivered over a period of time constitute a president’s schema of the state of the nation and consequently, of presidential leadership.

²⁴ The terms ‘frame’ and ‘conceptual frame’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis.

3.5 Metaphors and political speeches

Political speeches, especially those given by presidents and national leaders, are replete with metaphors and other rhetorical strategies (to be spelled out and described in 3.5.1 to 3.5.4)—resources that help circulate and perpetuate the beliefs and values needed to rally public support for newly crafted policies or courses of action. Moreover, these resources help sustain political capital (i.e., credibility and public support) vital during times of crises.

Political speeches arguably contribute significantly to presidential image making. They ‘sell’ the president to various interest groups, to powerbrokers who are crucial to her success or political survival. It is through speeches that political leaders like the president wield power in that they usually are privileged to have information first and to say it in the best way they can (Hart 1987). In the ‘age of secondary orality’ where spontaneity of public utterances made by political leaders especially the president is programmed to project favorable public images, political speeches have become media spectacles.²⁵ Pronouncements made by the president on television are carefully planned.²⁶

²⁵ ‘Media spectacle,’ on the other hand, is an analytical framework developed by Douglas Kellner. Kellner (2003, 2) explains that ‘media spectacles are those phenomena of media culture that embody contemporary society’s basic values, serve to initiate individuals into its way of life, and dramatize its controversies and struggles, as well as its modes of conflict resolution. They include media extravaganzas, sporting events, political happenings, and those attention-grabbing occurrences that we call news – a phenomenon that itself has been subjected to the logic of spectacle and tabloidization in the era of media sensationalism, political scandal and contestations, seemingly unending cultural war, and the new phenomenon of Terror War.’

²⁶ Hart (1987, 117) suggests that the mediation of speeches through television, radio and print (and, now, the ‘new media’) has actually been concerned with ‘melodramatic imperative needed to make the news interesting, the various strategies used to render news anchorpersons credible and the tonal features required to make televised news suitably memorable.’ He views this exercise from a rhetorical perspective that ‘regards the president as a muse, (her) speeches as a plot to be exploited, and the reporters who cover the president as playwrights.’

Gronbeck (1996, 41-45) identifies the following characteristics to describe the presidency in the ‘age of secondary orality’:²⁷ the employment of multi-mediated rhetoric (i.e., verbal, visual and acoustic) and the ‘continuous, complicated and compelling process of building and maintaining a political ethos’ central to presidential success. To account for the ‘refashioning of presidential rhetoric’ and ‘the refabrication of the presidency itself’ in the electronic age, he makes the following recommendation:

Politics understood as a symbolic action demands that we analyze systematically the discourses of political ideology and valuation, of political visions and the places citizens occupy in such visions; of the means by which self-interests are converted into communal interests – into public policies (Gronbeck 1996, 47-48).

This thesis is an attempt to respond to this challenge by focusing on how metaphors configure in political discourse to sustain or challenge existing schemas that influence the way political actors deal with issues of national or global significance. While metaphors serve as the central focus of this work, it is important to recognize that such expressions work in tandem with other rhetorical resources that political actors like the president (and his communications advisers) draw upon in speech-making. As Charteris-Black (2005, 7) argues, ‘What is important, though, about discursive modes and figures of speech is that they act in combination with one another rather than in isolation; indeed we often isolate them solely for the purpose of analyzing effective communication strategies.’

²⁷ Although Gronbeck talks of the American presidency in his essay, his descriptions can be made applicable to the Philippine presidency. Considering that the American presidential system has been the model of the Philippine government for over seven decades, the Philippine presidency can be seen as analogous to that of the United States.

There is a range of linguistic and rhetorical resources from which the speakers or rhetors draw upon in order to craft their messages. Condit and Lucaites (1993, xii) talk of a ‘rhetorical culture’ in order ‘to draw attention to the range of linguistic usages available to those who would address a historically particular audience as public, that is, a group of potentially disparate individuals and subgroups who share a common interest in their collective life.’ They further explain:

In this rhetorical culture, we find the full complement of commonly used allusions, aphorisms, characterizations, ideographs, images, metaphors, myths, narratives and topoi for common argumentative forms that demarcate the symbolic boundaries within which public advocates find themselves constrained to operate (Condit and Lucaites 1993, xii).

How metaphors in combination with other available rhetorical resources are used by the rhetors (i.e, Philippine presidents) in their public addresses is dealt with in the analytical chapters of this work. Below, I discuss how metaphors interact with such rhetorical resources as the *pisteis* also called in classical rhetorical tradition as proofs (logos, pathos, ethos), strategies of self-representation and othering, political myths, and ideographs.

3.5.1 Metaphors and the *pisteis*—logos, pathos, and ethos

The study of political speeches necessarily involves the study of ‘means of persuasion.’ How do metaphors figure in this system rooted in classical rhetoric is an analytical point that scholars have attempted to address. The means of persuasion include the *logos*, *pathos*, and *ethos*—also known as *pisteis* or the ‘artistic proofs’ in classical rhetorical theory.

Logos pertain to the reasoned arguments or logical proofs that rhetors employ to advance a claim. Pathos, on the other hand, refers to the motivational appeals or proofs that the rhetor employs in order to capture the interest of the audience and

make them embrace his point. Ethos pertains to the speaker's authoritative appeal or credibility.²⁸

In this study of Philippine political speeches, I adopt some of the suggestions posed by Charteris-Black (2005, 202-209) on how metaphors interact with the three artistic proofs—logos, pathos, and ethos. Charteris-Black suggests that metaphors help communicate political arguments (logos), heighten emotional impact (pathos) of political messages, and establish the ethical integrity (ethos) of political communicators.

Metaphors provide proofs to support an argument by 'drawing on ways of thinking by analogy' (Charteris-Black 2005, 204). By explaining a political policy using certain source domains or vehicles that are cognitively accessible to the audience, speakers are able to offer their audience reasons to accept the policy. For instance, by conceptualizing the democracy as the country's comparative advantage in the global economic order, Fidel Ramos, as will be shown in Chapter 6, was able to show that democratic system can work towards achieving the 'tiger status' in a region where it is apparent that authoritarian leaders run successful economies. Metaphors also express or articulate the warrants or basic premises through which political arguments are justified. These warrants or basic premises come in the form of conceptual metaphors implied by metaphorical expressions in political texts and talk.

Metaphors, as suggested by Charteris-Black, increase the emotional impact of political messages by sustaining the morale during times of national crisis,

²⁸ Considered the elements that make up a speaker's credibility are *phronesis* (good sense), *eunoia* (good will), and *arête* (good moral character). It should be interesting to note that the speaker's effective use of logical and emotional proofs may contribute to his competence (good sense) and trustworthiness (good will); thus, enhancing or boosting the speaker's credibility. This demonstrates what may be regarded as the interrelatedness of the three artistic proofs—logos, pathos, and ethos.

communicating the emotional investment that politicians have in their ideas, and communicating politicians' empathy with groups who are regarded as weak and needing support (203). Metaphors enable politicians to create heroes, villains, and victims, all of which arouse emotions. This arousal of emotion is particularly evident when nations, political parties, particular systems of political beliefs or particular abstract nouns are personified because they are thought of as bad or good persons (204). This is, for instance, shown in the Aquino speeches (in Chapter 5), where democracy was rendered as a living entity that sustained the national life while dictatorship—particularly the Marcos dictatorship—was a national destroyer and an aggravator of the already miserable state of the national economy.

As metaphors fortify arguments and heighten emotional impacts of messages, they also work towards establishing the ethical integrity or the credibility of the politicians. Metaphors establish the ethos of politicians through representations of them or their leadership roles as moral agents (cf. Charteris-Black 2005, 203). This is evident in the analytical chapters where it is shown that post-Marcos presidents regarded themselves in a position of expertise or as standing on a high moral ground when articulating highly contested government policies. Heightening the ethos of political leaders is also made possible when the metaphors used to express or articulate political claims or policies imply certain ethical qualities that are especially highly regarded by their target audience. Charteris-Black notes that 'metaphors integrate an evaluation of policies with an evaluation of the politician and it is this mirror-like quality that makes them persuasive—the ethical ideals of the audience are reflected in the image of the politicians' (202).

3.5.2 Metaphors and rhetorical strategies of self-representation and othering

As shown earlier, metaphors have a central role in enabling rhetors or political communicators to make effective use of logical, emotional and ethical proofs. Other rhetorical strategies that may interact or work in conjunction with metaphors in political text and talk are the strategies of positive self-representation and othering. Strategies of positive self-representation include self-identity descriptions, activity descriptions, norm and value descriptions, position and goal descriptions while othering may be in a form of negative lexicalization, negative comparison, norm and value violation (van Dijk 1998; Riggins 1997). These two strategies are parallel to Chilton's notions of legitimization and delegitimization (2004, 47). The first, as noted by Charteris-Black (2005, 17) aims to imbue utterances with evidence, authority, and truth, while the latter employs such specific strategies as acts of negative other representation, acts of blaming, scapegoating, marginalizing, excluding, attacking the moral character of some individual or group, attacking the communicative cooperation of the other, attacking the rationality or sanity of the other, and in extreme cases, deny the humanness of the other. Metaphors, being linguistic representations of reality, assist in the acts of legitimization and delegitimization.

3.5.3 Metaphors and political myths

An important contribution of Charteris-Black's work on metaphor analysis of political discourse is how an analysis of metaphors occurring in political speeches reveals the myths on which ideology is based. In other words, Charteris-Black established the interrelationship of the three concepts important to the study of political discourse—metaphors, ideology, and myth.

Charteris-Black (2005, 21) argues that metaphors mediate between myth and ideology. Ideology, he describes, is ‘a consciously formulated set of ideas that comprise an organized and systematic representation of the world and therefore forms the basis for acting in the world.’ In this study, ideology is defined as a representation of the state of affairs of a nation or society from an interested perspective. Myth, on the other hand, ‘is a common way of communicating ideology’ (21). Charteris-Black explains that a myth

... is a story that provides an explanation of all the things for which explanations are felt to be necessary. Myth engages the hearer by providing a narrative that embodies a set of beliefs expressing aspects of the unconscious. It provides a narrative-based representation of intangible experiences that are evocative because they are unconsciously linked to emotions such as sadness, happiness or fear. Its function in discourse is to explain with a view either to entertain or gain power. Myth is therefore a two-sided weapon that can be used for evaluation with a positive or a negative purpose’ (22-23).

Metaphors are used to legitimize an ideology through the creation of myths. In using the expression ‘tough love’, for instance, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo conjured a story where in her government acted with parental care. Such role justified Arroyo’s rather unpopular economic policies like the expanded value added tax. Another example would be her use of the expression ‘working president’ to represent her role as national leader. The expression suggests a story of a hardworking female president that is the opposite of her predecessor (Estrada). The expression, of course, boosted her waning popularity and lent legitimacy to her perennially challenged presidency (see Chapters 8 and 9). Metaphors, in other words, trigger or activate myths or narrative representations that enable the audience to attach positive (or negative) evaluations to a politician’s beliefs and policies which, needless to say, are ideologically rooted. As Charteris-Black articulates clearly, ‘metaphor provides the

crucial link between semi-conscious cultural knowledge of myths and conscious political ideologies. By drawing on deeply rooted cultural schemata politicians are able to represent their beliefs and their policies as heroic tasks and themselves as epic heroes' (208).

3.5.4 Metaphors and ideographs

Another rhetorical resource that works in combination with metaphors is the ideograph (an analytical concept particularly used in Chapter 8). Ideographs are slogan-like terms (e.g., 'freedom of speech,' 'rule of law,' 'clash of civilizations') that functions as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief' (McGee 1980/2000, 459).²⁹ I suggest that there are at least two ways by which we can think about the relationship of metaphors and ideographs in political discourse. First, metaphors may be viewed as a means to recontextualize³⁰ ideographs. Second, metaphors may be seen as rhetorical resources working in conjunction with ideographs as well as other rhetorical strategies.

Such recontextualization may be further divided into at least two possible strategies: re-semanticization and re-lexicalization. Metaphors, because they view terms conventionally understood in one domain or context through another domain or context, may be seen as a means of recontextualization. Metaphors have the capacity then to refashion, redefine or re-semanticize ideographic terms which are pervasive in

²⁹ An explanation of ideograph is offered by McGee (1980/2000, 467): 'An ideograph is an ordinary-language term found in political discourse. It is a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable. Ideographs are culture-bound, though some terms are used in different signification across cultures. Each member of the community is socialized, conditioned, to the vocabulary of ideographs as a prerequisite for 'belonging' to the society.'

³⁰ For more discussion on recontextualization, see Fairclough (2003, 2006) and Erjavec and Volčič (2007).

the rhetoric of political speeches. Needless to say, they add new meaning to popular slogans. Re-lexicalization is somewhat the reverse of re-semanticization. In this case, the value of the ideograph remains, but its linguistic form changes. It is re-worded or rephrased. Using the terms of Saussurean linguistics, I view re-lexicalization as a case where the signified or usage and meaning persist, but the signifier changes. Both re-semanticization and re-lexicalization may be interpreted as attempts to localize or make more relevant issues or areas of concern to the existing public ideologies and attitudes. It may also be a means to boost public acceptance or goad disapproval of policies and public personalities. An example of a re-semanticized ideograph would be the term 'war on terror' which was conceptualized as 'war on poverty' and a curative in Arroyo's SONAs to make the term relevant to the national context (see Chapter 8). Relexicalization is apparent in the use of the term 'people empowered economy' as a rewording of the term liberal economy (see Chapter 5). The term 'people empowered economy' draws upon the positive valuation associated with the 'people power' phenomenon which ended more than a decade of dictatorial rule.

I suggest that ideographs working in conjunction with metaphors and other rhetorical strategies contribute to the persuasiveness or 'persuasive power' of political discourse. I cite as an example the interaction of the ideographic expression 'war on terror' with the term 'strong republic' metaphorized as an effective instrument in nation-building in Arroyo's earlier SONAs (see Chapter 8). Realized in the texts, the expressions sent off the message that Arroyo was keen on having a strong and effective state under her watch. As suggested in the example, the combination of ideographs and metaphors in political discourse is usually strategic in that it pursues certain political agenda. These agenda include among others the representation of leadership from an interested perspective as well as the legitimization of it. As

indicated earlier, the interaction between metaphors and ideographs is shown in Chapter 8 which focuses on how the ‘war on terror’ discourse was recontextualized by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in her political speeches.

3.6 Analytical framework and method

The theoretical perspectives and concepts mentioned above inform what I suggest is a schema-theoretic framework for the critical analysis of Philippine presidential discourse. In this section, I explain how this analytical framework is employed in the reading of the SONAs. First, I define the analytical categories that I employ in the analysis of the texts. Along with the definitions, I also provide clarification with regard to my use of certain terms like ‘metaphorize’/ ‘metaphorization’, ‘metaphorical conceptualization’, and ‘conceptualization’. Second, I recount how I delimited the scope of the study through the identification of the focal themes. Finally, I explain the method of analysis by illustrating the levels of my analysis (Figure 3.1). A diagram of the schema theoretic framework (Figure 3.2) is also provided to illustrate how the analytical categories relate to each other.

3.6.1 Analytical categories and some terminological clarifications

As discussed in the previous sections, I employ the following terms in my analysis of the SONAs: themes, metaphors, conceptual metaphors, conceptual frames/ frames, and schemas. In the course of my analysis, I also employ the concepts of self-representation and othering, ideographs, political myths, and the rhetorical proofs—all of which I consider as rhetorical strategies and whose theoretical underpinnings have been explicated in 3.5. As I define the terms, I shall also clarify my use of such terms as ‘metaphorize’, ‘metaphorical conceptualization’, ‘conceptualization.’ All these key terms will be presented in bold fonts in this section for the benefit of the reader.

By **themes**, I refer to the major topics or target domains that are dealt with in the analysis of the SONAs. They are abstract domains constantly discussed in the SONAs and may therefore be considered staple topics in Philippine presidential rhetoric. The focal themes in the analysis of the presidential speeches are (1) democracy, (2) national economy, (3) peace and security, and (4) the presidency.

In my framework, I adopt Charteris-Black's (2005) definition of **linguistic metaphors** as lexico-grammatical expressions that suggest personification, depersonification or reification of topics/ target domains/ abstract terms. These expressions are underlain by **conceptual metaphors**, which are statements that resolve the semantic tension among a set of related linguistic metaphors (Charteris-Black 2005; Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

I regard **conceptual metaphors** as **conceptualizations** that suggest a perspective or way of looking at a specific target domain or topic or abstract term. **Conceptualizations** necessarily recontextualize the target domain in that they imply a certain representation of such domain. *However, not all conceptualizations are metaphorical.* They may be literal statements that also suggest a perspective or representation of a domain or topic or abstract term. What differentiates a **metaphorical conceptualization** from a non-metaphorical conceptualization (literal statement) is that the former suggests a semantic tension between the target domain (topic) and the source domain (vehicle/ suggested perspective or representation), a domain that is usually more concrete or culturally familiar (Kovecses 2005).

Related to the above-mentioned terms is the notion of **metaphorization**. I use the term **metaphorization** to refer to the metaphoric process of conceptualizing a domain of experience using another domain. To **metaphorize** is therefore to personify, depersonify or to render a domain of experience or a topic as an object. It

involves recontextualization, that is, the representation of a topic or domain of experience using another context. It necessitates that a particular domain of experience be viewed from another lens. **Metaphorizing** therefore entails the dislocation from one context or position and a relocation to another.

I use the term **frame** or **conceptual frame** to refer to a statement that subsumes a set of related conceptualizations including conceptual metaphors. It is a macro-conceptualization that encompasses conceptualizations that underlie lexicogrammatical expressions in texts and talk. It is a general statement that subsumes other conceptualizations including conceptual metaphors. The term is particularly useful in the analysis in that it deals with multiple themes in the speeches of four presidents. How each of the themes is framed by each of the presidents is therefore a point for comparative and contrastive analysis.

The term **schema** as used in the analytical framework is a configuration of conceptual frames. A complex of frames, the schema may be represented by a series of interrelated frames. In discourse, it may be realized as a story or a set of interrelated propositions or premises that establish a claim. Like the conceptual frames, the schemas (their verbalizations are shown in Table 11 in Chapter 10.4 of this thesis) serve as points for comparative as well as contrastive analysis. They are particularly useful in showing commonalities and variations in the ways the four presidencies under study cognitively structured the national situation and national leadership.

By **rhetorical strategies**, I refer to the **rhetorical proofs**, **self-representation and othering**, **political myths**, and **ideographs**. Their theoretical underpinnings and some relevant examples of how they are used in this work are provided in the earlier sections of this chapter (see 3.5.1, 3.5.2, 3.5.3, and 3.5.4). What I wish to reiterate

here is that the metaphors generated from the speeches actually function as and/or work in conjunction with these rhetorical strategies. The pertinent sections mentioned show some specific instances of how these rhetorical strategies figure in the analysis of the SONAs.

The analytical categories constitute a four-level analytical framework which is illustrated in Figure 3.2 under section 3.6.3. I wish to note here that the seemingly complex and multi-layered framework of analysis is motivated by the scope and complexity of the data set. In this study, I am dealing with conceptualizations of 4 themes across 23 presidential speeches delivered by 4 presidencies. Each level of analysis requires a category that would enable the analyst to make systematic detailed explications as well as a comparative and contrastive study. At the level of text, metaphorical expressions (working as or in conjunction with other rhetorical strategies) provide evidentiary basis for the conceptual metaphors that underlie expositions of a particular theme, say, democracy.

The category of conceptual frame is especially useful when the multiple themes examined in this study are taken into account. As there are multiple conceptual metaphors that underlie expressions having to do with a particular theme, the conceptual frame allows the analyst to make a general statement that subsumes related conceptual metaphors on the specific theme. The general statements provided by conceptual frames allow for easy references when the configuration of conceptualizations of various themes (in the case of this study, there are four themes) in the speeches made by a particular president is discussed. For example, in his latter SONAs, Ramos' framed democracy as precursor to economic development as shown by two conceptual metaphors that he used: DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE and DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE. Such conceptual frame ran

consistent with how he framed the national economy in most of his presidential rhetoric: a competitor in the global economic arena. This frame is constituted by conceptual metaphors that view the global economic order as BASED ON SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST, A SPORTS ARENA and AN ADVENTURE. This goes to show that as far as Ramos was concerned, democracy functions as an aid towards economic competitiveness; it must be used to survive in the global economic order (For further analysis, see Chapter 6 and Chapter 10.2.2.). Also, the use of the category of conceptual frame facilitates the comparative analysis of conceptualizations of the same theme across four presidencies.³¹

The schema is a category most useful in the comparative analysis of the four presidencies. Each presidency constitute a schema—a ‘super story’ to borrow a phrase from Freidman (2002) or an overall framework that contains and establishes the relationship of conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors of the themes under study. This analytical category is also useful in comparing and contrasting each of the four presidencies against that of Marcos, that is, how they might have sustained and/or deviated from the rhetorical choices made by the dictator.

3.6.2 Identification of themes

To delimit the scope of the study and facilitate the reading of all 23 speeches included in the research, I chose to focus on what I considered as major themes across the post-Marcos SONAs. A survey of the SONAs gathered from the published collections of presidential speeches, the Philippine president’s webpage, and the

³¹ If a work focuses solely on conceptualization of one theme or idea—and this is evident in the works of Lakoff (2006b) which explains how ‘freedom’ is framed by the conservatives and progressives and of Condit and Lucaites (1993) which examines the use of the word ‘equality’ in American rhetoric—then the distinction between frame and conceptual metaphor may not be necessary. It may then be possible to just use the category of conceptual metaphor or the broader term conceptualization in the comparative analysis of how different presidencies have conceptualized the theme.

archives and library collection of the House of Representatives in Quezon City, Philippines was conducted to identify the common themes and issues salient across all 23 of them. I also examined published historical accounts and documents on the Marcos authoritarian regime (from 1972 to 1986) and the presidencies of Corazon C. Aquino, Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to get a good grasp of the socio-political and historical milieu within which the public addresses were situated. The collection and examination of these historical accounts and documents was made possible by a three-month library research in a number of libraries and research centers in the Philippines: the library and archival sections of the Philippine House of Representatives; the University of the Philippines Main Library's Filipiniana section; the library of the UP National College of Public Administration and Governance; the library of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ); and the library of IBON Foundation, an independent think tank that regularly publishes analyses on the socio-economic and political situation in the Philippines. Crucial for my identification of the focal themes was an account of the socio-political situation in the Philippines during the final year of the Marcos presidency (see Chapter 4) and the Aquino administration's assessment of its presidential term (see Abueva and Roman, 1993). The former was significant in that it highlighted the issues and concerns to which the post-Marcos presidential leadership was positioned to respond while the latter showed what the immediate post-Marcos presidency (i.e., the presidency of Corazon C. Aquino) considered as vital national concerns that succeeding presidencies were posed to address or build on. I had also taken into consideration the common visions and themes identified by

Malaya and Malaya (2004) in Philippine presidential inaugural addresses from the time of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1899 to that of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2004.³²

Given my initial engagement with the primary texts, my knowledge and understanding of the socio-political milieu of the period under investigation as well as previous accounts of the major issues and concerns that confronted the four post-Marcos presidencies under question (Malaya and Malaya 2004, Cortes 1999, Martinez 1999), I had identified the following focal themes: democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. I found these focal themes useful for the analysis in that they were broad enough to subsume the more specific issues and concerns common across the post-Marcos SONAs. For instance, discussions on the issue of poverty and economic relations with other countries necessarily fell under the theme of national economy. The more specific concern on insurgency was logically subsumed under the theme of peace and security while issues on graft and corruption were placed under the theme of the presidency which covered issues on governance and public service.

3.6.3 Method of analysis

With the focal themes identified, I pursued the analysis of data based on how each presidency developed each theme. In analyzing the SONAs of each president, I focused on portions of the speeches that explicate or discuss a focal theme. From these extracts, I identified the metaphorical expressions relevant to the focal theme.

³²The themes identified by Malaya and Malaya are ‘the call for unity,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘citizenship,’ ‘economic growth and development,’ ‘poverty,’ ‘peace and order’ (especially during the post-war era), ‘Philippine-American relations,’ ‘graft and corruption,’ ‘heroism,’ ‘Divine Providence,’ ‘the silent majority,’ and ‘the people’ (2004, 1-12).

It should be noted that inaugural addresses are inextricably linked to the SONAs in that the visions and general statements in the former are substantiated and mapped in the latter discourses (Campbell and Jamieson 2008). However, since SONAs are situated within the context of the presidential term and not on day one of the presidential term, their concerns are more specific than general; they are more experience-based than abstract.

Since metaphorical expressions having to do with the focal theme were varied (that is, various source domains or vehicles were used to express a focal theme), several clusters of related metaphorical expressions were generated. From these clusters of metaphorical expressions, I derived the underlying conceptual metaphors, which are represented in the analysis as A is B (e.g., DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS). To illustrate this point, I present the following extracts from the SONAs of Corazon C. Aquino:


1. I believe that *nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of our country*—such as the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, the betrayal of public interest—*than in the blessings of democracy: freedom; rights; transparent dealings; and a government of the people by the people themselves.* (1988)
2. The failed adventurism has underscored the fact that *our restored democracy has gone past its fledgling stage.* (1990)
3. Democracy, once a word, *is now alive: this is our legacy.* (1991)

The extracts above, taken from SONAs delivered in 1988, 1990 and 1991, all deal with the theme of democracy. Metaphorical expressions are indicated using italics. The first extract metaphorizes democracy as a ‘cure for the ills of the country’ suggesting the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS; the last two express democracy as a living (‘alive’) and evolving (‘has gone past its fledgling state’) organism, thus, the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY. Further examination of the Aquino SONAs would show various metaphorical expressions that suggest other conceptual metaphors such as DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACITOR OF THE PEOPLE, DEMOCRACY IS RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER, and DEMOCRACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH (see Chapter 5.3.4). These conceptual metaphors relate to the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A

CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS suggested by extract 1. They are related in that the domains suggested by the terms ‘CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS’, ‘BENEFACTOR’, ‘RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER’, ‘FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH’ yield the broader conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM. In addition to the conceptual metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM and DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY cued by extracts 2 and 3, several other conceptualizations relevant to the theme of democracy have been generated in the analysis of the Aquino SONAs (see Chapter 5.3). These conceptual metaphors include DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT and DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT.

Now, the conceptual metaphors generated from the various clusters of related metaphorical expressions on democracy are considered in the analysis as constitutive of a macro-conceptualization on democracy, which is referred to in the analytical chapters as the conceptual frame. The conceptual frame is an overarching or general statement that shows the relationship of these various conceptual metaphors on a focal theme and is represented in the analysis in bold caps, that is, **A is B**. In the illustration I have just demonstrated, the two conceptual metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY and DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM combined with other conceptual metaphors posited from other extracts on democracy (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT, DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT) would yield the following frame: **DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE**. Figure 3.1 provides a simple illustration of how the analysis works.

Figure 3.1 An illustration of the levels of metaphorical analysis



The above illustration suggests how the conceptual frame on the theme of democracy in the Aquino SONAs is generated. As there are three other themes examined in this thesis (i.e, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency), at least three other frames are generated in the analysis of the Aquino speeches. The group of conceptual frames of the four focal themes present across a set of SONAs is regarded in this study as that which would constitute a schema of the 'state of the nation' and of presidential leadership. In my analytical framework, I view the schema as an overarching analytical category—a broad mental structure that is constituted by the conceptual frames. The schema is multilayered and complex as its constituent units are, but its general or overall structure may be based on the patterns suggested by the frames that constitute it. How conceptual frames make up or configure the schema would then form the basis for comparing and contrasting one presidential schema to another or for checking out commonalities and variations

across the post-Marcos presidencies. Specifically, they show how stable or fluid the conceptualizations of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency are over a period of time. The stability in conceptualization or framing would of course show continuities in terms of ideologies or perspectives in leadership; while fluidities would reflect changes in the way the four themes are talked about across the four presidencies. Moreover, a comparative analysis of the presidential schemas, which is offered in Chapter 10, would show whether the four post-Marcos presidencies had moved centripetally towards or centrifugally against how the state of the nation and Philippine presidential leadership had been conceptualized in the rhetoric of Marcos' authoritarian rule.


When using the analytical framework, I suggest two general functions of schemas: schemas either reflect current socio-political realities or they reconstitute the way we view or experience these socio-political realities. The first engages in reproduction or reaffirmation of ideologies, taken-for-granted notions or existing dominant discourses while the second engages in recontextualizing and recreating these ideologies, notions or discourses, making it possible for alteration, subversion or change to happen.

When schemas reproduce the status quo, it means that the frames and metaphorizations used in political texts that constitute them sustain existing realities. They re-express what is and in the process reinforce, continue or perpetuate what dominates or what is taken for granted. On the other hand, when schemas reconstitute, that is, alter the form of existing realities, it implies that their constituent frames and their metaphorizations in political texts deviate from, subvert or replace the old ones. They destabilize and discontinue notions that are almost always taken for granted and offer new ways of experiencing or dealing with socio-political

realities. This may bring about change in the way a government manages constraints of a given situation and may most likely define the kind of policies that it decides to pursue.

In the analysis of the SONAs, I also take note of the intertextualities and recontextualizations exploited by the post-Marcos presidencies. As the SONAs are considered intertexts, the analysis of the presidential speeches establishes reference or allusions to previous ones delivered by preceding national leaders. The SONAs are also viewed in relation to Marcos' authoritarian rhetoric; thus, how such rhetoric had been sustained or challenged in the post-Marcos SONAs are likewise taken into account. Moreover, the SONAs of each of the four presidents are seen as discourses that draw upon personal histories (including personal brands used in political campaigns such as the image of Estrada as tough guy with a heart of gold), accounts of national history as well as the existing socio-political structure. In other words, the political texts are treated as recontextualizations of the constraints of the past and the present state of affairs.

Figure 3.2 on the next page shows a diagrammatic representation of the schema theoretic framework used in the analysis of the SONAs.



Chapter 4

Ferdinand Marcos, Martial Law, and His 'Democratic Revolution'

This chapter provides an historical context to the succeeding analytical chapters on the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric. It puts together secondary literature on the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972, during which time he imposed martial law in the Philippines, to his ouster from public office through a popular mass demonstration in 1986.

Specifically, it aims to outline the justifications or lines of reasoning employed by President Ferdinand Marcos for the imposition of martial law in September 1972. It also aims to account for the social, economic, and political situation from the time martial law was imposed to the end of his presidency. As a corollary to this, the chapter also recounts the events that led to the peaceful overthrow of the Marcos regime. Moreover, the chapter discusses issues and concerns that were considered crucial to the administration that would eventually replace that of Marcos. Finally, it provides a metaphorical analysis of Marcos' rhetoric from the time he imposed martial law to his final year in power, with the intention of articulating the salient conceptualizations that the presidencies after Marcos were positioned to address.

4.1 The Marcos presidency before martial law

Ferdinand Edralin Marcos became the 10th president of the Republic of the Philippines in December 1965. In his first term of office (1965-1969), Marcos set out to realize his grand pronouncement during his inaugural that 'This nation will be great again.' He pursued 'an unprecedented national development agenda in response to the sociopolitical, cultural, and economic problems besetting the young nation'

(Meimban 1999, 215). His programs included effective tax collection, enactment of new tax legislation, and securing foreign loan through the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). He also launched the ‘green revolution’ aimed at increasing rice productivity and ‘an ambitious and visionary infrastructure program which covered the construction of networks of roads and bridges throughout the length and breadth of the more than 7,100 islands composing the country’ (216). In October 1966, he hosted the Manila Summit Conference attended by six heads of states including that of the United States. The summit gave birth to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was ‘intended to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia’ (ibid.).

While Marcos, in his first term of office, as described by one historian, ‘made strides in the fields of education, agriculture, industry, and technology’ (Meimban, 216), political scientist Maria Lourdes Rebullida pointed out that such was only one side of the picture. ‘The other side of the picture appeared to be the dark, cloak-and-dagger scenes involving Ferdinand Marcos’s political manipulation, financial schemes and sex scandals that eventually leaked out to the media and came to public knowledge, to some extent. (First Lady) Imelda Marcos’s political style and predispositions to power also evoked antagonism’ (2006, 157).

In fact, from 1966 to 1968, the deteriorating peace and order situation in the country became the most pressing problem Marcos faced in his first term of office (Meimban, 216). The period witnessed the massacre of seven farmers suspected of being Huk³³ sympathizers in Central Luzon, the killing of thirty-two bolo-wielding

³³ The term ‘Huk’ pertained to any of armed communist rebels who waged war against what it perceived as pro-US leaders of the Philippine Republic installed after Independence from the US colonial government in 1946. The term was derived from ‘Hukbalahap’ (an acronym for Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon or People’s Army against the Japanese), a group of Filipino rebels who fought

members of ‘Lapiang Malaya’ in Metro Manila, and the Jabidah massacre and cover-up in Corregidor Island, which involved the killing of para-military troops being trained for what was purported to be a planned invasion of Sabah over which the Philippines had territorial claims (ibid.). Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., a staunch critic of Marcos, exposed before members of the Philippine Senate the Jabidah cover-up in a 1968 privileged speech titled ‘A Garrison State in the Make.’

Presidential historian Adriel Obar Meimban noted that the late 1960s, during which time the Marcos presidency encountered socio-political disturbances, was a period when two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—were engaged in a cold war, an ideological conflict that pitted America’s concept of democracy against Soviet Union’s brand of communism.

In the meantime, the People’s Republic of China was experiencing ‘revolutionary activities’ through the leadership of Mao Tse Tung, whose socialist beliefs attracted students and peasant masses in the Philippines. A divided Vietnam was engaged in civil warfare with Southern part aided by the United States (ibid.). The Philippines, which had maintained strong ties with the US since its independence and which was then considered a model of liberal democracy in Asia, was positioned to help contain the spread of the communist ideology in the region.

In 1969, Ferdinand Marcos ran for reelection and became the first Philippine president to win a second term. His election as second term president was marred by accusations of massive cheating³⁴ and the use of what is touted in Philippine politics

the Japanese colonial forces during the Second World War. The group eventually became the military arm of the Partido ng Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP).

³⁴ Alex Bello Brillantes in his book ‘Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972’ (Quezon City: Great Books Publishers, 1987) wrote that ‘[the] Presidential elections on November 1969 between incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos and challenger Sergio Osmena

as ‘guns, goons, and gold’ (Rebullida, 2006; Meimban, 1999; IBON Foundation, 1985). This and the deepening socio-economic and political crisis of the period generated ‘general social discontent’ in the country (Rebullida, 157).

4.2 The martial law of 1972: Rhetoric and reason

The conditions of general social discontent during the second term of Marcos were articulated through student demonstrations, radical activism, labor unrest, agrarian conflict, and domestic insurgency (Meimban, 217; Rebullida, 157). Noting that by the time Marcos assumed his second term, ‘Philippine politics had become intense,’ Rebullida writes:

Student activism was on the rise and the demonstrations at the Malacañang³⁵ on January 30, 1970, and at Congress on February 3, 1970, caused the Senate to create an investigating committee. The core issues identified by the Senate committee and decried by mobilized groups of peasants, workers, teachers and jeepney drivers, among others included the economic crisis, unemployment, devaluation, government extravagance, and high prices of commodities. There was opposition to Marcos’s government policies, to graft and corruption in government. There was ideological ferment evidenced by the rise of left-leaning groups and communist insurgency that called attention to feudalism, imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism. There were reported killings, bombings, breakdown of law and order, and warlordism of politicians in different parts of the country. The August 21, 1971, bombing at the Liberal Party proclamation rally held in Plaza Miranda causing death and injury had shaken the nation; the victory of the opposition candidates in the 1971 (congressional) elections signaled the challenge to Marcos. (ibid.)

marked one of the most bitter, expensive, and violent elections in Philippine history. It was also one of the dirtiest national elections. Newspapers, radio and television broadcasts carried reports of numerous elections irregularities, including massive vote-buying, ballot box stuffing, and cheating. Thus were the conditions when President Marcos assumed his second and last four-year term of office. His opponent, alleging massive fraud and cheating, never conceded’ (128).

³⁵ Malacanang Palace is the official residence of the Philippine president.

In 1972, a year before the end of his second term as president, Marcos declared martial law, citing that it was a constitutional means necessary for ‘the preservation of the Republic’ and the ‘reconstruction of society.’

4.2.1 The theory of democratic revolution

In justifying the imposition of martial law in the Philippines, Marcos invoked his theory of ‘democratic revolution,’ which he also referred to as the ‘revolution from the center’ or ‘constitutional revolution.’ He would also later justify the consolidated powers of his executive leadership seen during the period of martial law by stating that it was a form of ‘constitutional authoritarianism.’

Presidential Proclamation 1081 (‘Proclaiming the State of Martial Law in the Philippines’) was signed on 21 September 1972 with the following aims: to protect the Republic from subversive elements purportedly ‘conspiring to seize political and state power by means of anarchy, rebellion and secession’ and ‘to remove the causes of popular grievance which had accumulated through decades of neglect and oppression and given rise to discontent, chaos and violence, and thereby reestablish democracy, restore individual rights, and promote the welfare of the Filipino people.’³⁶ The presidential proclamation was anchored on the 1935 Philippine Constitution, particularly Article 7, Section 10, paragraph 2 which allowed the president to declare martial law in case of imminent threat or danger to the Republic. PP 1081 was later sustained by another proclamation which declared the continuation of martial law and whose validity was affirmed by the Supreme Court. Rebullida puts this Marcosian agenda quite succinctly: ‘In ideological rhetoric, Marcos promised to save the republic, restore peace, and order by military means, and establish a New

³⁶ These reasons were reiterated in Presidential Proclamation 2045 signed in 1981 terminating the state of martial law throughout the Philippines.

Society anchored on social transformation, equality, and democratic participation to prevent rebellion from the poor' (159).

Two publications by Ferdinand Marcos articulate his rationale for implementing martial law: *Today's Revolution: Democracy* published in 1971 during which time Marcos suspended the writ of habeas corpus³⁷ and *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines* (1973) published a year after he declared martial law (Rebullida 2006, 158). In 1974, he published 'The Democratic Revolution in the Philippines' which put together the two earlier publications.

In *Today's Revolution: Democracy* (1971), Marcos talked of a 'revolution from the center' which he explained is 'an act of direct non-violent confrontation against the oligarchy of the Philippines.' It is supposed to mediate 'between the majority of the poor masses and the minority of the landed, industrial, business and commercial elites' (Rebullida 2006, 158). The 'revolution from the center' warns and rejects totalitarianism of both rightist and leftist extremists. It is a 'democratic revolution'—a supposed peaceful means of addressing the socio-political problems of the Philippines and 'engaging in deep and far-ranging changes in the country' (ibid.).

Marcos reasoned that his call for 'democratic revolution' was sanctioned by the 1935 Constitution. Moreover, the 'democratic revolution' was intended to bring about the 'New Society' which was to replace the old one that according to Marcos had 'reached such a condition that a powerful few, the nation's oligarchy, held in their hands the lives and fates of millions of other citizens' (1974/1977, 320). This condition of extreme inequity purportedly fueled the rising social activism and leftist

³⁷ The writ of habeas corpus was suspended immediately after grenades exploded at a rally in Plaza Miranda killing and injuring senatorial candidates of the opposition. The suspension was lifted after six months. Brillantes noted that the suspension of the writ was seen as 'the prelude to martial law' (p. 129).

rebellion in the late 1960s and early 1970s—during the second presidential term of Marcos—that the ‘revolution from the center’ aimed to quell.

Notes on the New Society of the Philippines (1973) is somewhat a follow up to the earlier publication. It takes account of the rise of communist rebellion against the Philippine republic. In this book, Marcos disclosed documents that revealed activities of the extremists from the left and right of the political spectrum, ‘plots to assassinate him, shipment of firearms and ammunition, infiltration by subversives of government programs, and bombings in different areas’ (Rebullida, 158).

Marcos rationalized martial law by warning the people of the dangers of the communism and the rightist conspiracy. Rebullida notes that, ‘In [Marcos’] rhetoric, martial law and the New Society would target the major threats to the republic, namely, communist revolutionaries, rightist conspiracy, Muslim secession, private armies and political warlords, rampant corruption, criminal elements, oligarchy, social injustice, foreign interventions’ (159). These ‘threats’ to the republic, it must be noted, both included existing and long standing problems (i.e., private armies and political warlords, rampant corruption, criminal elements, oligarchy, social injustice, foreign interventions) as well as imminent ones (i.e., communist revolutionaries, rightist conspiracy, Muslim secession).

In his preface to the book *The Democratic Revolution of the Philippines* (1974/1977), which combines his two earlier publications, Marcos expounded what the New Society entailed:

The New Society in which Filipinos live today maybe described as their emancipation from an old society whose hallmark was injustice, the supreme injustice in which equality of opportunity was withheld from them by an oligarchy that appropriated for itself all power and bounty. The New Society is in fact a revolution of the poor. By means of it, Filipinos today are attempting, through disciplined vision, to make the rewards of their labors and the fruits of

their resources available to all. By means of it, they are walking out of a stupor filled with Walter Mitty fantasies, the opium of the oppressed and underprivileged. To share together in real life is the heart of democracy. Accordingly, the New Society is democratizing the wealth of the nation, striving to move democracy from cloud to hovel. (8)

Marcos found an ally in Carlos P. Romulo, diplomat and one-time chairman of the United Nations Security Council. Romulo, who provided the foreword to the third edition of *The Democratic Revolution*, wrote:

For all the radical rhetoric reverberating in the political forums, he (Marcos) knew that the noisiest voices were those who were actually against social change: radical rhetoric was employed merely to catapult the power-seekers to power. This sort of thing could, perhaps, be tolerated in a stable developed society. But in Philippine society this rhetoric could only foster a revolution that was bloody and catastrophic—in Marcos's words, a Jacobin not a liberal revolution. (20)

In his book, Marcos asserted that the rightists and leftists were one in targeting his central authority as President. He said:

Both the reactionary Right and the radical Left found a common focal point and symbol for their plans: Ferdinand E. Marcos. By concentrating on the singular person of the president, the conspirators on the one hand, and the revolutionaries on the other, were able to concretize for their propaganda purposes the complexities of social unrest and the justification of their aims. This is the standard technique of propaganda warfare; the creation of a scapegoat, a sacrificial lamb. (139)

Brillantes (1987), however, noted several fundamental inconsistencies between Marcos' official explanation of martial law and PP 1081, a legal document. One inconsistency worth mentioning in this chapter is the fact that while Marcos claimed that the imposition of martial law was in response to the purported conspiracies of the rightists and leftists to overthrow the government, he made no mention of the rightist plot to overthrow the government in the legal document. Brillantes pointed out that

‘everything is attributed to the left’ (131). If one reexamines PP 1081,³⁸ it would be quite easy to infer that it is a well documented account of the activities of the radical left—the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed group, the New People’s Army (NPA)—at the time. It most certainly takes note of the increase in the number of armed rebels as shown, for instance, by one of the following ‘facts’ cited to establish the difficulty in containing ‘the present rebellion and lawlessness in the country’:

The New People’s Army, the most active and the most violent and ruthless military arm of the radical left, has increased its total strength from an estimated 6,500 (composed of 560 regulars, 1,500 combat support and 4,400 service support) as of January 1, 1972 to about 7,900 (composed of 1,028 regulars, 1,800 combat support and 5,025 service support) as of July 31, 1972, showing a marked increase in its regular troops of over 100% in such a short period of six months. (Presidential Proclamation 1081, 1972)

The same document also asserted that ‘the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force have assumed the magnitude of an actual state of war against our people and the Republic of the Philippines’ (ibid.).

One of the Philippine’s foremost essayists, Conrado de Quiros, observed that the practice of ‘bloating the size of communists’ dated back to the first post-World War II Philippine presidential administration, the early years of Independence. In his book, *Dead Aim: How Marcos Ambushed Philippine Democracy* (1997), de Quiros wrote:

³⁸ PP 1081 may be read online at http://www.lawphil.net/executive/proc/proc_1081_1972.html (Retrieved on 31 July 2009)

Marcos did not start the practice of bloating the size of the communists. The practice dated all the way back to (Manuel) Roxas's time and the early years of Independence. Each time government submitted its budget to Congress, it grossly inflated the strength of the communists and imminence of its threat. The size of the Huks grew in direct proportion to the size of the budget: The bigger the budget, the bigger the Huks. Eventually, the communists being used in this way got to be called the 'Budgetary Huks.'

This was so especially from the second half of the 1950s when the Huks rapidly disappeared from the scene. What prevented their complete disappearance was less the cunning of their leaders than the shrewdness of their enemy. The trick, as the *Free Press* wrote in an editorial on September 18, 1971, was to show not only that the communist remained strong, or even menacing, but that the government was also mightily pushing them back. 'On the one hand, the military authorities must exaggerate the Huk threat to the government, and on the other, they must claim, to justify the money they have been getting, that they are winning, if they have not already won, the war against the Huks.' (281)

Indeed, Marcos was merely recontextualizing a practice carried over from his predecessors only that when he was the one in power he had a rather elaborate theory and the necessary legal weapons, as it were, to warrant his claims.

4.2.2 Legal imperatives

The 1973 Constitution and its amendments in 1976 and 1981 fortified Marcos' rationale for martial law and the New Society. Clearly, the argument for martial law and the New Society as shown in the Marcos publications in 1971 and 1973 as well as his presidential proclamations was transformed into more 'authoritative contexts' or 'non-negotiable materialities' such as the 1973 charter that replaced the 1935 Constitution and the Marcos decrees and letters of instructions which were sanctioned by the new charter and its amendments to 'form part of the laws of the land.' These authoritative contexts or non-negotiable materialities served to consolidate the executive powers of Ferdinand Marcos (see Rebullida, 2006, 161 and 163). His

presidential speeches including his Reports to the Nation or State of the Nation Addresses contributed to the circulation of the New Society ideology.³⁹

The amendments made in 1976 and 1981 sustained the executive powers of Marcos (Rebullida, 163-164). These constitutional amendments enabled him to issue decrees, orders, and letters of instructions, that ‘shall form part of the laws of the land,’ whenever in his judgment as a president, ‘there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence’ (ibid.).

4.2.3 Marcos’ agency

Marcos’ human agency was instrumental in the realization of martial rule in the Philippines (Rebullida, 60). Specifically, others saw martial law as part of Marcos’ plan to perpetuate himself in power. Brillantes (1987) called this ‘ruler’s imperative’ and noted that the Marcos government in fact intervened in the arenas of the student and labor demonstrations, the constitutional convention formed in 1971 to examine the 1935 Constitution, and the Supreme Court. He established that the administration of Marcos had exerted undue influence in these arenas to set the necessary backdrop for martial law, to ‘constitutionalize’ the extension of his term in office, and to legitimize his authoritarian regime (132).

³⁹ In the last section of this chapter, I shall look into the metaphorical constructions in following documents deployed during the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos: (a) ‘The Democratic Revolution of the Philippines’ (1974/1977) which consolidates the two earlier publications that provided the rationale for Marcos’s imposition of martial law and whose ideas about the Philippine society were channeled through his presidential addresses during the martial law years (1972-1981), (b) his televised address proclaiming martial law in 1972, (c) his SONA in 1975 as representative of a national address during the time martial law was imposed, (d) his speech titled ‘Encounter with Destiny’ delivered after martial law was lifted in 1981, and (e) his last two national addresses in 1985 before he was ousted from the presidency via ‘people power.’ I shall also from time to time allude to speeches delivered from 1981 to 1985, which Marcos considered a period of ‘normalization’ after the lifting of martial law.

De Quiros (1997) noted that to Marcos, the greatest role of his life was saving the Republic from the communist threat. He quoted the following entry written on 9 March 1970 in Marcos' diary:

'I feel my greatest contribution to the country will be saving it from communism. It would be easy to adopt palliatives and delay the confrontation with the deadly peril. But this would be the easy way out.

'After my term and within the decade of the next, the nation would have to confront it anyway. And I would have been guilty of dereliction of duty, if not cowardice, for not facing up to it and rooting it out while I had the opportunity and the power.

'So I have decided that I must risk even the future of my family so as to save our freedoms and individual dignity. The issue has become this simple and brutal. It is a matter of survival. It is a matter of daring or not – on my part.

'And I decide to dare.' (292)

On the one hand, the excerpt from Marcos's diary shows him to be a responsible and accountable leader; on the other, it betrays his sense of self-importance. Critics of the Marcos presidency believe that this sense of self-importance coupled with his desire 'to cure the ills of society' reveals Marcos' ambition to perpetuate himself in power. Jovito Salonga, an opposition senator during the Marcos presidency and Senate President during the first post-Marcos presidency, commented the following about the declaration of martial law in 1972, as quoted by de Quiros:

'When [Marcos] came out, he began reading a prepared speech. He was declaring martial law all over the country, he said, and gave the secessionist movement in the South, there was the assassination and coup plot by Opposition figures. That was nothing new. He had been saying those things for months.

'But then he said something that floored me. He said he was declaring martial law not just to curb the insurgency and the secessionist movement but also to cure the ills of society. Martial law, he said, had given him the historic opportunity and mandate to build a New Society.

'Normally, you would be happy to hear something like that. A president wants to reform society – that is well and good. But it was not so in this context. I immediately thought: Martial law is an instrument to restore peace and order in society. Once peace and order comes back, martial law is

lifted. It is a temporary measure, it is an emergency measure. It has a definite – and short – timetable.

‘But reforming society, creating a new society, that is another thing. That is not temporary, that has no limits. That could go on and on. You do not reform the society or build a new society in a few years. You do it in one lifetime – maybe more.’ (319-320)

4.2.4 The U.S. connection and class conflict

Also important in understanding Marcos’ decision to pursue an authoritarian presidency in 1972 is the idea that constitutional authoritarianism was a means ‘to deal with social unrest that had a bearing on the US-Philippines relations’ (Rebullida 2006, 161). It is possible to think that the ideology of the ‘democratic revolution’ or the ‘revolution from the center’ was necessary to hasten the accommodation and spread of a larger ideology—the neoliberal ideology pursued by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund upon which the United States exerts great influence.

Such line of thinking concerning the imposition of martial law is actually well discussed in Brillantes’ book on Philippine authoritarianism in 1972 (1987). Brillantes presented several explanations for the imposition of martial law and categorized them into two: official perspectives and alternative ones. He argued that the martial law imposition in 1972 was ‘a result of the interplay of the following major factors or imperatives: (1) President Marcos’ desire to perpetuate himself in power; (2) Pressures emanating from both the world state and world capitalist systems to preserve (mostly) American security and economic interests in the Philippines; (3) Rivalry for political and economic dominance among certain factions of the ruling class; and (4) Efforts of the ruling elite to depoliticize certain segments of the

population who were threatening their dominant political and economic position in society' (128).

While Brillantes acknowledged the validity of the 'ruler's imperative' or Marcos' desire to perpetuate himself in power, he emphasized that 'the explanation of martial law must be put in a broader historically specific context, located in the world systems, without, however, neglecting analysis of the classes internal to these systems' (139). Explicating further, he said: 'Indeed focus must be made on the impact of pressures from the world systems upon the Philippine political economy. After all, the Philippines is highly integrated into the world state system and world capitalist system. Equal emphasis must be given to internal class dynamics operating within the social system' (ibid.).

The validity of the class conflict explanation may be seen in how Marcos' administration, at the onset of martial law, disenfranchised some members of the ruling elite, whom he considered in his 'democratic revolution' treatises as the 'oligarchy' only to replace them with cronies of his administration.

The pressure to conform to the demands of the world capitalist system—specifically, the opening of the Philippine economy to foreign investments—is evident in the following extracts taken from Marcos' *The Democratic Revolution*:

Looking back at the record, we may say that September 21, 1972, marked the turning point for the Philippine economy. This is not to say that a miracle occurred overnight. The record shows that martial law was the catalyst that brought into fruition all our efforts at revitalizing the economy. This began earnestly in February 1970 when I approved adoption by the government and the Central Bank of a rigid stabilization program that featured the unpopular 'floating rate' system of exchange administration. Attention was concentrated on strengthening the country's monetary and fiscal structure. Incentives for growth and expansion of exports and promoting foreign investments, both loans and equity, were set in motion. The need for strengthening these areas had long been recognized. Corrective legislation and policy measures, however, suffered from constraints inherent in the old order of anarchy,

violence, vested interests, and political orientation. *Both foreign and domestic investments faltered for want of faith in the capacity of the government to assure them of security, stability and freedom from undue restraints in capital movement. Martial law and the New Society provided the key to performance.* (1977, 234)

Brillantes noted that it was after the imposition of martial law that Supreme Court decisions that were detrimental to the economic interests of the foreigners, especially those from the United States, were reversed by a provision in the Marcos-sponsored 1973 Constitution (137). This evidence makes valid the assertion that martial law was good for the security and economic interests of the United States in the Philippines (ibid.).

4.3 The socio-economic and political situation at the time of authoritarianism (1972-1985)

What transpired in the next ten years or so following the imposition of martial law in the Philippines is summarized by Rebullida in the following:

Having proclaimed martial law on September 21, 1972, Ferdinand Marcos proceeded to issue General Order 1 on September 22, 1972. In brief, he suspended the legislature, banned political parties, stopped elections, seized and controlled the media; and caused the arrest of the opposition leaders and dissidents, suspected subversives, even criminals (sic); and prohibited unlicensed and unauthorized use of guns. He ruled the country by executive decrees, proclamations and general orders; and exercised all the powers and prerogatives as commander in chief of the armed forces of the Philippines. The 1973 Constitution and amendments in 1976 and 1981 were drafted and ratified in unprecedented ways, resulting in the consolidated powers vested on the incumbent, Ferdinand Marcos. (165)

Specifically, the 1973 Constitution gave Marcos power to be both president and prime minister until such time that the interim assembly meets and the new interim president and prime minister had been designated. However, before such

could happen, amendments made three years after the new constitution had been ratified replaced the initial provision on the interim National Assembly and made Marcos simultaneously the president and prime minister and member of the new Batasang Pambansa (National Parliament) (166).

In January 1981, Marcos lifted martial law. Meimban (1999) noted that the announced lifting was timed a month before the first visit of Pope John Paul II to the Philippines (236). This, he said, ‘served to neutralize the noisy minority within the Catholic hierarchy critical of the Marcos dictatorship’ (ibid.). Interestingly, it was also timed with the swearing in of Ronald Reagan as the fortieth president of the United States. This was seen as a ‘political gesture...intended to assure President Reagan (a personal friend of the Marcoses) that Marcos would not be an embarrassment to the new American President’ (ibid.).

To legitimize his hold on power even after the lifting of martial law, Marcos then called for a presidential election, where he was eventually proclaimed winner (Meimban, 238). The shift from martial rule to a new term of office for Marcos was signaled by replacing the ‘New Society’—in place for almost ten years under martial law—with the term ‘New Republic.’⁴⁰ Notwithstanding the lifting of martial law, Marcos maintained his power by making further amendments to the 1973 constitution. Rebullida (2006) noted that in that year, Marcos finally ‘established and defined the supremacy of the president as the real executive over that of the prime minister as the administrative executive’ (166). She argued that, ‘From the constitutional and institutional perspective, the structure of government and executive powers stipulated

⁴⁰ This is also referred to as the ‘Fourth Republic’ (see Cortes, 1999).

in the 1976 and 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution had convoluted the parliamentary form of government' (173).

The Philippines under martial law and the ensuing authoritarian regime after it was lifted experienced what could be regarded as the erosion or 'perversion' of democratic institutions: interference in constitution making, sham elections, a dominated legislature, a politicized judiciary, a politicized military, and what Rebullida termed as the 'contravention of the ethos of public service' as well as the 'cooptation or sublation of the bureaucracy to the executive' (167-69). In other words, the democratic institutions experienced undue influence from the executive leadership of Marcos.

On 21 August 1983, former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., staunch anti-Marcos opposition leader, was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airport upon his arrival from a three-year exile overseas. His death was pivotal in heightening the anti-Marcos struggle that culminated in what is now known as the '1986 EDSA people power revolution.'⁴¹

The critical issues that fueled discontent towards Marcos' presidential leadership are categorized by Rebullida into three: (1) political issues concerning Marcos's victory in the elections of 1981 and snap elections of 1986, the authoritarian regime's legitimacy or illegitimacy, the dictatorship disguised as democracy, the unresolved assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., and political repression of the media, public opinion, and the opposition; (2) development fiasco, cronyism, corruption in government, economic crisis, and the country's foreign debt; and (3) Marcos's wealth

⁴¹ EDSA stands for Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, the strip of highway in the National Capital Region where about two million people converged to call for the ouster of Ferdinand Marcos from presidential power in February 1986.

and plunder of the Philippine economy (Ferdinand and Imelda jointly and separately), Imelda's extravagance and power play (170). It should be noted that categorizing these issues remains difficult as they were all interlocking or interrelated concerns at that time of the Marcos presidency.

In two of his last public addresses before the National Assembly (Batasang Pambansa) in 1985, Marcos reenacted his commitment to strengthen the country's 'democratic dialogue' and institutions. On 14 January 1985, he reminded the members of the Assembly that 'whatever the party may belong to, however we may differ in our political beliefs, we have a common ground to uphold and defend together...the democratic system that sustains our nation and through which we have all been elected into public office' (16). Six months later, he underscored the need to tap the democratic ideology and tradition in order to 'struggle' against communism and socialism. This, Marcos argued, could be pursued by 'insisting that we must develop and nurture our own democratic ideology, one rooted in our experience and needs' (22 July 1985, 19). In spite of these pronouncements on his renewed commitment to democracy, Marcos was unsuccessful in countering the mounting opposition against his authoritarian rule, which was channeled through various modes of protests by various groups including the civil society. As Rebullida remarked, 'In the context of liberal democracy, the constitutional and political set up of the New Republic and the exercise of power, including political repression, human rights violation, and corruption were all construed as dictatorship—a conjugal dictatorship⁴²—but rationalized as constitutional authoritarianism. The interlocking

⁴² The conjugal dictatorship refers to Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. While Mr. Marcos was in power, his wife, Imelda, wielded immense political influence by having been entrusted by her husband vital government positions (While she was governor of Metro Manila, she concurrently headed the Ministry

issues of cronyism, foreign debt, failure of development programs and worsening socio-economic conditions fueled the rejection of Marcos by many sectors, including the youth, business, and the church' (170).

In April 1985, IBON Foundation through its publication *IBON Facts and Figures* released, in popular form, a comprehensive report on the Marcos presidency titled 'The Republic after 20 Years.' The report took into consideration eleven points 'basic to any assessment of contemporary Philippine society.' These points include quality of life, prices of basic goods, employment, economic realignment, industrialization, foreign debt, the agricultural scene, the role of the state in the economy, graft and corruption, the human rights violation, and insurgency.

IBON noted that after twenty years of Marcos presidency, the quality of life among Filipinos had not improved: communicable diseases had spread and caused death, poverty and degradation had persisted, and Filipinos had been eating food 'of less quantity and inferior quality' (2). It also made note of the increase in inflation and the fact that nominal wage workers could hardly keep up with the inflation as well as the rise of unemployment and export of labor.

A significant feature of the Marcos presidency pointed out by the IBON report was the economic realignment that had a bearing on the agriculture and industry sectors as well as the country's accumulation of foreign debt. This economic realignment—which was skewed towards protecting foreign, mostly US, interests—is, as cited earlier, considered one impetus for Marcos' pursuit of constitutional authoritarianism.

of Human Settlements and Ecology.). The positions enabled Imelda Marcos to exercise functions in the bureaucracy (see Meimban, 1999, 227).

IBON's report noted that Marcos' economic policies when he was reelected for a second term in 1969 'set the stage for the reversal of previous policies that placed restrictions on imports as well as on outward flow of foreign exchange.' Economists observed that Marcos' policies pushed for 'opening the economy wider to foreign goods and foreign investments—principally those of the US.' The declaration of martial law, in fact, hastened the Philippines' entry into free trade (4). The report proceeded:

Thereafter, 'export-led industrialization' became the economic catchword. Investment incentives and preferential credit were given exporters. Rules on foreign investments were relaxed. Export processing zones were set up. Schedules to lower import tariffs were drawn up and wages maintained at low levels not only through wage legislation but also through bans on strikes.

Foreign markets took precedence over the domestic market. Bananas and shrimps went to the Japanese. Sugar had to be rationed at times among local consumers. Even rice was exported. Zone employees were forced to work overtime, turning out Barbie dolls, tennis balls, beaded handbags, Levi's jeans, assembled watches and cars, semiconductors and the like—for foreign companies and foreign buyers (5).⁴³

The export-led industrialization, however, did not lower the import dependence of the country. In fact, export promotion boosted it (*ibid.*). Unfortunately for the Philippines, the export-led industrialization had not pushed the economy towards genuine industrialization as the raw materials for the supposedly flourishing export industries such as garments and electronics were almost 100 percent imported, while the country's export industries were confined to 'processing, assembling, and

⁴³ This account is especially important in demonstrating how Philippine socio-political realities are tied to the global/ world realities. On the other hand, the description proves significant to the analysis of the presidential discourses after Marcos, especially when we compare and contrast the shifts in economic policies in the Marcos and post-Marcos presidencies and how they have been metaphorically expressed in the presidential speeches.

packaging.’ Moreover, foreign companies had to be relied upon in spearheading the export activities (6).

Meanwhile, emphasis on commercial crop production enabled big foreign and local corporate farms to gain control over large tracts of agricultural lands ‘displacing small, self-sufficient farmers and transforming them into plantation and contract growers’ (7).

This import-dependent export-orientation of the Philippine economy plus the ‘unrestricted outflow of profits and capital by foreign investors—and eventually, the drain in dollars caused by servicing foreign debts’ triggered a foreign exchange crisis in the late 1970s (5). It was further noted in the report that the rapid growth of foreign debts in the 70s was ‘the deliberate result of an ambitious investment program based on an export-led industrialization strategy. Moreover, it had the blessings of the IMF and the World Bank, and later, that of private international commercial banks. The World Bank itself had projected that the country would need US\$15 billion from 1976 to 1985. Thus, [the Philippines’] foreign debt grew, with both the government convinced that, or at least hopeful, that these debts would be settled as soon as the export program got under way’ (7).

The highly import-dependent export promotion, however, failed to take off as the prices of traditional export commodities suffered downward trend while the traditional markets of Philippine exports started to set up protectionist barriers that limited the entry of goods (*ibid.*).

Perhaps, better known than Marcos’ adoption of free trade policies was the way his government exerted undue influence in the country’s economic affairs. The Marcos presidency saw the expanding role of the government in the financial market, the creation of government monopolies, and the granting of economic privileges to

friends. Instead of eradicating oligarchy, the New Republic paved the way for Marcos and his cronies to replace the oligarchs. The Anti-Marcos forces called this ‘crony capitalism’ where the decree-making powers of the president were employed ‘[to facilitate] the transfer of big business from rival clans to favored ones’ (7-8).

Also cited in the IBON report were the ‘unparalleled rapacity’ of the corrupt and the human rights violations incurred during the Marcos regime. Basic freedoms such as freedoms of speech, the press, organization and public assembly were curtailed while arrests, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings of those considered critically opposed to the Marcos government became widespread (8-9).

Constitutional authoritarianism proved to be ineffective in quelling the insurgency. It should be noted that Marcos used the ‘growing rebellion’ led by the communist New People’s Army and the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines to justify the declaration of martial law. Accounts having to do with the insurgency in the late 1960s and early 1970s regarded the military threat of the NPA negligible (10). However, the repressive military regime boosted the membership of communist rebels. The same thing happened to the Moro rebels. As the IBON report noted, ‘Martial law declaration on 21 September 1972 did not weaken the Muslim resistance a bit. Rather it pushed the Moro counter-offensive towards taking on a more serious character’ (ibid.).

4.4 The leadership after Marcos: Issues and concerns

In the book *The Philippines After Marcos* edited by R. J. May and Francisco Nemenzo and published in 1985 when Marcos was still occupying the presidency, opposition senator Jose W. Diokno, who was incarcerated during Marcos’ martial rule, wrote a chapter on the crisis confronting the Philippines at the time: ‘The post-

Marcos era has in fact already begun. It began on 21 August 1983 when an assassin's bullet shattered the skull of Senator Benigno Aquino. That bullet, we now know, did more than kill the leader of the opposition; it also shattered the regime of Ferdinand E. Marcos. What we witnessed today are its death throes. True, Marcos still occupies the presidential palace, but his control over men and events had dwindled' (Diokno in May and Nemenzo, 1985, 1). In that same chapter, he identified issues and concerns that would confront the country when Marcos' rule as the nation's most powerful man ends.

Diokno articulated in his essay various scenarios that might lead to the end of the Marcos regime. He raised the possibility of Marcos' death due to his failing health, in which case potential successors of Marcos from his own party or opposition would 'jostle each other for political advantage or even for survival; they would form cliques and alliances and seek the support within the military; some might even seek the support of the U.S. government' (3). The possibilities of military or US intervention, to Diokno, did not bode well for the country as it might produce what he termed as 'unstable stability.' He explained that such intervention 'would not help solve the national problems, but only aggravate them, for it would lead to more militarization and less dialogue, greater repression and fewer chances of peacefully redressing the just grievances that spawned the Muslim and NPA rebellions, more poverty and exploitation of labour and less equality and justice, increased dependence on the US government and foreign capital, and diminished Filipino control over our economy, our future, even our very survival' (ibid.).

In the event of Marcos resignation—caused by pressure from the opposition—Diokno mentioned a need for transitional government that would essentially 'de-Marcosify' the country and facilitate the restoration of democracy. Diokno specified

the tasks at hand for the transitional leadership: 'Its first commitment is to call for free and honest elections within a period of not more than four months from the date that the transitional government takes power. In addition to calling and supervising those elections, the major tasks of the transitional government would be to restore the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus throughout the country; to grant a general and unconditional amnesty to all persons charged, arrested or convicted of political offences, wherever they may be (inside or outside of the Philippines); to scrap all decrees that grant special privileges to the cronies and relatives of Mr. and Mrs. Marcos; to restore full freedom of the press; to restore the independence and integrity of the judiciary; to conduct an impartial probe into the assassination of Senator Aquino; to redress the more immediate problems of our Muslim and highland brothers; and to seek a restructuring of and better terms for existing foreign loans' (4).

Diokno also underscored the vital role of the US in the Philippines, stating that even before the Second World War, the US policy had always been 'to see to it that the Philippines "remain in hands we can control or rely on", "to permit to the Philippine government a continued independence in all internal affairs, but to preserve it as a bulwark of US security" (these quotes are from a memorandum of George Kennan in 1948); and that it provides a base from which to project US power and gain access to the riches of Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East.' Diokno explained that the policy rests on the premise that 'so long as American security interests in the Philippines do not feel themselves threatened, the US could be expected to act with a certain forbearance, with a certain subtlety, a certain amount of quiet diplomacy, both with the government and opposition figures, to try and secure its ends' (ibid.).

He further argued that however Marcos might leave the political scene, his successor—the technocrats' and the military's roles in the transition notwithstanding—could not ignore the basic problems of the Philippines: 'the inequity of its social system and the maldevelopment of its economy, which together have bred poverty, injustice, and the rebellions of the Muslims and the dispossessed' (5). It should be noted that these 'basic problems' Diokno mentioned were not necessarily a result of the Marcos administration. In fact, the 'inequity in [the Philippines'] social system and the maldevelopment of its economy' are considered long-standing problems of the country. It may be assumed that the Marcos presidency, in spite of its great pronouncement of transforming the nation ('This nation will be great again'), failed to address these problems because it merely disenfranchised a faction of the ruling elite while empowering its cronies and the Marcos family (cf. Brillantes, 1987).

A freedom fighter and a staunch nationalist, Diokno stressed that neither military solution nor following 'the same prescriptions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that Marcos, [Cesar] Virata and other technocrats have been pursuing' would address the national problems. Emphasizing the need for the transition leadership to find its own way in solving these problems, he wrote: 'There is no pattern it can follow, no model it can copy. If experience has taught Filipinos anything, it is that every country is unique and must forge its own future in its own way. But the primordial condition for doing this is that we free ourselves of the control of the US government. We could restore freedom to the Philippines. We could re-establish democracy. But unless the successor government can transform our society and change the structure of our economy, freedom and democracy would count for very little' (6).

Less than a year after the release of *The Philippines After Marcos*, Ferdinand E. Marcos' theory and practice of 'democratic revolution' would end in what is now touted as EDSA People Power Revolution of 1986. The exercise of people power in February 1986 was considered by many as a culmination of the series of protests against Marcos' political and economic control of the Philippines. Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, widow of the slain opposition leader Benigno Aquino and the symbol of anti-Marcos protests, would be propelled into presidential power on the 25th of February that year. Thus, began the complex transition from dictatorship to democracy—that would include efforts at 'de-Marcosification' and the still ongoing project of transforming the Philippine society as well as attempts at changing the problematic national economic structure.

This thesis as stated in the earlier chapters examines the rhetoric of the executive leadership after Ferdinand Marcos. For a focused study on the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric—the evolving conceptualizations and metaphorizations of the 'state of the nation,' I have limited the scope of this research by examining four topics of major national concern which may also be considered as significant domains in post-Marcos presidential leadership. These are: democracy; the national economy; peace and security; and the institution of the presidency or the executive leadership. These domains cover, and in fact, interlock with some of the major national concerns confronting the Philippines after Ferdinand Marcos' rule ended via the People Power Revolution in February 1986. Their selection should not, however, be construed as a

preclusion of other significant domains or administration-specific concerns that the leadership after Marcos needed to address.⁴⁴

4.5 Metaphors in the Marcos rhetoric (1972-1985)

At this point, it would be helpful to discuss the metaphorical constructions in the official documents deployed by Marcos and his administration in public. This section will specifically discuss the metaphorical conceptualizations found in Marcos' national addresses from the time he imposed martial law in 1972 to his last year in public office. These conceptualizations constituted some of the issues and concerns that the national leadership after Marcos was positioned to address.

It is interesting to note that when the official rhetoric on martial law⁴⁵ is analyzed, two seemingly contradictory, but purportedly complementary metaphorical constructions of martial law emerge: On the one hand, there is the conceptualization **MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY**; on the other, there is the conceptual metaphor, **MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE**. Both conceptualizations appear to constitute the frame: **MARTIAL LAW IS DEMOCRATIC**.

In Marcos' official rationalization of the martial law declaration, he established that '[all] indications that the country was fast slipping into irretrievable

⁴⁴ The Philippines relations with the international community (including regional groups like the ASEAN, the United Nations, and the European Union) and with the economic superpower (US) / emerging superpowers (like China) are not fully treated and discussed in this work, but are also worthy of investigation. Moreover, there are specific issues—like the dispute over Spratlys Islands, the debate on the retention of the US military bases, the debate on population control, the Philippine Centennial Celebrations in the latter half of the 1990's during the term of Fidel Ramos, and debates on amendments to the 1987 Constitution—that may serve as significant points of departure for the analysis of Philippine presidential discourse in the post-Marcos era.

⁴⁵ I refer to the publication 'The Democratic Revolution of the Philippines' (1974/1977) as constituting the official rhetoric on martial law.

chaos were present, so large and persistent' (1977, 260) making Presidential Proclamation 1081 all the more necessary. He would repeatedly cite the seven sources of 'imminent danger' to the nation: leftist revolutionaries; rightists; Moro secessionists; private armies and political warlords; criminal elements; oligarchs; and foreign interventionists (see 156-57, 260). He referred to them as 'perils, [which, when] allowed to go unchecked, would in time have been sufficient by itself to endanger the peace and stability of society' (260). The conceptualization that MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY was therefore realized by expressing that the nation was in grave danger, that the government was constitutionally sanctioned to use martial law to save the nation, and that the restoration of civil order through martial law was necessary for the country's constitutional survival. Martial law was metaphorically expressed as a 'preservation of society' (189) and as 'an instrument of defense for democratic government' (317). The following extract from Marcos' treatise on 'democratic revolution' further reveals this conceptualization:

1. We had to restore civil order as the bedrock of any constitutional survival. Civil order is merely the rationale of all societies: enforcement of and obedience to the law. When I placed the entire country under martial law, my first concern was to secure the Republic against any uprising, politically motivated or otherwise, and to secure the entire citizenry from the criminal elements, private armies bred by local politics, and the outlaw bands in the countryside, who might either take advantage of the temporary panic or undermine our efforts to assert the authority of our police forces. It was imperative that we dismantle the apparatus of the insurgency movement and the whole system of violence and criminality that had virtually imprisoned our society in fear and anarchy (221-22).

In the extract, Marcos begins with a general statement on the necessity to restore 'civil order as a bedrock of any constitutional survival.' That civil order is

metaphorically expressed as a ‘bedrock’ of constitutional survival suggests its primary significance to the Philippine polity. This is followed by substantiation of such metaphorization, that is, civil order is the rationale of all societies. These statements prefigure the need for martial law, which in the succeeding statements is positioned as a preconditioning object of the state (‘When I placed the entire country under martial law’)—an instrument as it were—in order for the president to ‘secure the Republic against any uprising’ and ‘secure the entire citizenry from the criminal elements.’ The final statement of the extract is a re-expression of the preceding statements where Marcos talks of the urgency to ‘dismantle the apparatus of the insurgency movement and the whole system of violence and criminality that had virtually imprisoned our society in fear and anarchy.’ That the acts of dismantling an apparatus and a system and of securing of the Republic and the citizenry should follow after martial law was put in place by Marcos in 1972 renders martial law as an instrument, a counter-apparatus or a counter-system that is supposed to restore civil order in the embattled Philippine society.

As a DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE, martial law was expressed as revolutionizing. Marcos metaphorized it as an instrument of ‘reconstruction’, a producer of ‘radical reforms’ and a ‘catalyst,’ suggesting even its transformative capacity as shown by the following extracts:

2. In what way can the rebellion of the poor achieve the goal of equality by destroying society which perpetuates mass poverty? Governments can offer a constitutional and orderly alternative because of their power, which they can use oppressively, on the side of the status quo, or redemptively, on the side of equality. On the basis of necessary choice I understood the declaration of martial law to mean not only the preservation of the Republic but *also the thorough reconstruction of society*. (189)
3. Our martial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military and on complete submission to the

decision of the Supreme Court and, most important of all, the will of the people. It is unique in that *it does not seek to maintain the status quo but has instead brought about radical reforms.* (212-213)

4. The record shows that martial law was *the catalyst that brought into fruition all our efforts at revitalizing the economy.* (234)

I shall now show how these conceptualizations were realized and sustained in the speeches of Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 to 1985. For this purpose, I have selected the following texts as bases for my analysis: (1) his televised address proclaiming martial law in 1972, (2) his SONA in 1975 as representative of a national address during the time martial law was imposed, (3) his speech titled ‘Encounter with Destiny’ delivered after martial law was lifted in 1981, and (4) his last two national addresses in 1985 before he was ousted from the presidency via ‘people power.’ I shall also from time to time allude to and use extracts from speeches delivered from 1981 to 1985, which Marcos considered a period of ‘normalization’ after the lifting of martial law.

In his first address to the nation under martial law delivered on 23 September on radio and television, Marcos emphasized the two conceptualizations:

5. I assure you that I am utilizing this power for the proclamation of martial law vested in me by the Constitution for one purpose alone, and that is, *to save the Republic and reform our society.* I wish to emphasize these two objectives. We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic, but at the same time, we must now reform the social, economic and political institutions in our country. The plans, the order for reforms and removal of inequities of our society, the clean-up of government of its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of criminal syndicates, the systematic development of our economy, the general program for a new and better Philippines will be explained to you. But we must start out with the elimination of anarchy and the maintenance of peace and order.

I have had to use this constitutional power in order that we may not completely lose the civil rights and freedom we cherish. (1972)

In the extract, 'to save the Republic' and 'reform our society' are both rendered as objectives, but they also indicate the two major conceptualizations of martial law.

That MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY is realized in expressions such as 'We will eliminate the threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic,' 'we must start with the elimination of anarchy and maintenance of peace and order,' and 'I have to use this constitutional power in order that we may not completely lose the civil rights and freedom we cherish.' In these expressions, preservation of society is articulated as the elimination of what is considered undesirable ('threat of a violent overthrow of our Republic' or 'anarchy'), maintenance of what is deemed desirable ('peace and order'), and ensuring that the constitutional rights ('civil rights and freedom') are not completely lost. The last expression is especially curious in that it presupposes that constitutional rights such as 'civil rights and freedom' are compromised but 'not completely' lost with the employment of martial law or 'use of this constitutional power.' On the other hand, it justifies the use of martial law by implying that it is a guarantee for the continuous enjoyment of the constitutional rights and that without it, there is the possibility that the people might lose them 'completely.' In other words, the expression positions the Marcos government's decision to impose martial law not only as a constitutionally sanctioned act, but one that is also pro-democratic, pro-people.

That MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE is indicated by the imperative to 'reform social, economic, and political institutions of our country.' That this imperative for reform is highlighted as an 'objective' of the imposition of martial law articulates the conceptualization. Martial law as a democratic agency is signaled by expressions that foreground the proclamation of martial law as a power that is 'constitutional' or 'vested by the Constitution.' The conceptualization is also

cued by the expression ‘general program for a new and better Philippines’ which prefigures the ‘New Society’ that Marcos would later substantiate in his official rhetoric including his presidential speeches. Note that Marcos’s proposition of change or ‘reform’ to ‘a new and better Philippines’ also entailed ‘removal of the inequities of our society, the clean-up of government of its corrupt and sterile elements, the liquidation of criminal syndicates, the systematic development of our economy.’ The expressions suggest radical measures of decontaminating society (*‘removal of the inequities of our society’, ‘the liquidation of criminal syndicates’, ‘clean-up of government and its corrupt and sterile elements’*) and their organization in the clause in the above extract (4) indicate that the ‘systematic development’ of the national economy logically follows after these radical measures get implemented.

Success of the constitutional authoritarianism or the imposition of martial law was articulated in Marcos’s national addresses in the following years. In his rhetoric, he would show evidence of how his twin objectives of preserving and reforming society through the intervention of constitutional authoritarianism had been achieved. For instance, the President’s Report to the Nation delivered at the Quirino Grandstand on 19 September 1975, three years after Marcos imposed martial law, show realizations and expressions of the two central conceptualizations in the Marcos presidential rhetoric.

In sustaining the conceptualizations of martial law, Marcos employed more specific metaphorizations. These metaphorizations provide a multi-level or multi-layered conceptualization of martial law or constitutional authoritarianism. To maintain the conceptualization **MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY**, Marcos metaphorized martial law as a **CURATIVE** and **AN EFFECTIVE MEASURE TOWARDS ORDER AND SECURITY**.

MARTIAL LAW IS A CURATIVE

6. We are no longer the paralyzed nation, of course, which we were at the start of our program in September 1972, but still, if we ask ourselves frankly, have we become the nation we wanted to be, after breaking with our past? (1975)

MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF ORDER AND SECURITY

7. There is order where there used to be none; anarchy is only a memory of the past; and growth and changes seem to be everywhere around us.
And when we look at the individual citizen, there is reason to feel that his rights and liberties are on the whole much better secured today than they were before the *intervention* of constitutional authoritarianism. (1975)

In extract 5, the nation prior to September 1972, during which time martial law was imposed, is metaphorized as a body in a state of paralysis ('the paralyzed nation'). That it was 'no longer' the case in 1975 suggests that 'the program' or martial law served as a curative to the national condition. In extract 6, the past is set in contrast with the present to establish that martial law is an agency of order and security ('There is order where there used to be none; anarchy is only the memory of the past'). Martial law as an agency of order and security is cued by the expression 'intervention of constitutional authoritarianism,' which in the same extract, is rendered as instrumental in ensuring better security for individual rights and liberties.

On the other hand, martial law as a DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE is substantiated by metaphorizing martial law as an ECONOMIC BOOSTER, A LIBERATING FORCE, and AN AGENCY OF INTERNAL REVOLUTION. The following extracts show these metaphorizations:

ECONOMIC BOOSTER

8. The national economy, for many years a deficit spender of resources, exhibits both vigor and resiliency in the face of crisis. Economic activity of all kinds is never more pronounced than at any other time in our history. International investors, and no less than the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, continue to manifest their faith in the economy. (1975)

9. Central to our economic policies is the sharing of increments of growth. We cannot speak of growth unless we can distribute such growth to the people and we cannot speak of growth unless we first manage an entire spectrum of issues and problems that bedevil the economies of the industrialized as well as the non-industrialized world.

The experience of the past three years provides statistical evidence that our economy has fared creditably well. Whoever takes the measure of the level of economic effort, whether for, or against, or neutral to the New Society or constitutional authoritarianism, cannot fail to admit that government intervention is the most significant factor in the acceleration of economic activity. (1975)

10. But even foreign investments have grown at dramatic rates during the three-year period of martial law in the New Society. From January 1973 to the end of FY 1975, foreign investments now total P2.25 billion. From the total amount of investment applications for the first semester of 1975, the Board of Investments has approved foreign investments totaling P50 million. (1975)

LIBERATING FORCE

11. Today, we find unprecedented prosperity in the rural areas an obvious upsurge in the purchasing power of the Filipino farmer, and a general air of confidence and optimism in the countryside. Paradoxically, martial law, the instrument of the colonizer to preserve the status quo, has brought true freedom to the countryside for the first time in centuries.

In the first 1,000 days of the New Society, therefore, we have succeeded—through deliberate policy and action—in helping the Filipino farmer rediscover himself, attain a new dignity, and secure true freedom. (1975)

AGENCY OF INTERNAL REVOLUTION

12. Now underneath these surface impressions of vitality and stability, there are profound problems that embattle our New Society. The general signs of national strength and progress somehow do not yet completely translate into realities sufficiently relevant to the ordinary individual. We must translate into realities sufficiently relevant to the ordinary individual. We

must translate our growth into a state of high morale among people. Growth is rendered in statistics and changes in the landscape, changes in the cities, in the roads, in the infrastructures. But more than this, we need a new vigorous climate of confidence and hope, a passionate renewal of faith and devotion, which sustains armies and populations even in the midst of siege.

And while our policies decree sweeping changes in our institutions and programs, we have lagged behind in the fundamental change on which the New Society is truly to be forged. This is the change within us, in our hearts, in our minds, in our souls—the internal revolution, which our nation from the time of our forebears has passionately craved for. (1975)

As an ECONOMIC BOOSTER, constitutional authoritarianism is rendered as responsible for the vigor and resiliency of the economy (7), as ‘the most significant factor in the acceleration of the economy’ (8), and for shoring up foreign investments (9). These metaphorizations were significant in establishing that the national economy was functioning satisfactorily in the world economic order. In extract 10, martial law as practiced in Marcos’ presidency is differentiated from how it had been employed by the colonizers. No longer meant as an oppressive tool, it is metaphorized as an instrument in securing freedom for the farmers—A LIBERATING FORCE. Extract 11 is especially interesting in that in that it articulates martial law as AN AGENCY OF INTERNAL REVOLUTION. Using lofty rhetoric, Marcos suggested that internal revolution might be forged through ‘change within us’ or ‘change in our hearts, in our minds, and in our souls.’ This may be associated with the goal of changing mindsets or inculcating an ideology that would not only embrace the necessity of martial law but would render as acceptable the broader context that warrants the imposition of such law.

The twin conceptualizations of martial law as A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY and as A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE are also further conceptualized in the following formulation: MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED

CRIMINALS IS A DE-CONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC. On the one hand, DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC is seen as way to purge the society of its diseases, thus, implying the restoration of the national health or preservation of society; on the other, it suggests the necessity for further reform or change in the way the body politic works three years after martial law had been implemented. How this formulation is achieved is demonstrated in the following extracts which I shall discuss further below:

13. The establishment of constitutional authoritarianism, which enabled this government to seize the reins of national directions, has resulted in the growth of bureaucracy as a massive machinery that affects every aspect of our national life. But along with this, there have also risen massive opportunities for graft, corruption and the misuse of influence, opportunities which are now being exploited within the government service. (1975/1979)

14. For the last three years I have been watching the conduct of officers and employees in the national as well as the local government. It is my duty as President of the Republic of the Philippines to reward what is proper, dedicated and devoted service by a public servant, and by the same token, to punish for violation of the sacred trust of a public official. (1975/1979)

15. We are not limiting ourselves in this general cleanup to the ranks of the government. There are lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals who, because of certain claims of blood kinship, affinity, personal closeness, friendship to, or business affiliation with, supposedly high-ranking officials of the government, arrogantly utilize or wield influence not only in corrupting public officials or in coercing them, but also in securing for themselves or their associates personal advantages denied to others, and in obtaining favors, privileges and preferential treatment in derogation of fairness and justice.

All of them shall be purged from the ranks of those who would participate in the fruits of the New Society.

At the same time, I have ordered the Secretary of National Defense to arrest persons in the list of those against whom there is evidence of commission of crime. He shall be supported of course by the military organization.

Why have we done this at this time? This is the day of celebration. Why this attempt to clean up? Because I have warned, I have scolded, I have cajoled, I have reprimanded. We have given enough time to reform. But the contagion continues.

Now, it is time to cut off the infected parts of the society from active public life before they endanger the entire body politic. (1975/1979)

While Marcos recognized constitutional authoritarianism as an ENHANCER OF THE BUREAUCRACY (Extract 12), which provides another layer to the conceptualization of martial law as A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE, he also pointed out the ‘rise’ in ‘massive opportunities for graft, corruption and the misuse of influence.’ This context provided impetus for Marcos to cast himself as a keen observer of the developments in the bureaucracy and to conceptualize the president as A JUDGE and DISCIPLINARIAN (In extract 13, he said: ‘It is my duty as President of the Republic of the Philippines to reward what is proper, dedicated and devoted service by a public servant, and by the same token, to punish for violation of the sacred trust of a public official’). Marcos then used the purported rise in massive opportunities for graft, corruption and the misuse of influence in order to justify the use of military power in ‘purging’ the body politic of crime and corruption which he metaphorized in his speech as DISEASES as evidenced by the expressions ‘contagion’ and ‘infected parts’ (Extract 14). This decontamination of society expressed in terms such as ‘general clean up to the ranks of government,’ ‘purged from the ranks of those who would participate in the fruits of the New Society,’ and ‘to cut off the infected parts of society from active public life before they endanger the entire body politic’ became a legitimating discourse for the arrest of suspected ‘criminals’ which included members of the political opposition, critics of the Marcos administration, and activists who steadfastly opposed martial law.

Even in the speech that declared the lifting of martial law in 1981,⁴⁶ Marcos maintained his justification of constitutional authoritarianism by rendering the eight-year period under martial law as a crisis government necessary before normalization could take place. Marcos asserted that martial law ‘had succeeded in the attainment of its objectives’ and expressed both the restorative/preservationist and transformative character of martial law.

16. We can say today with utmost confidence that the nation has surmounted the challenges to survival, the paralysis of will, and the decay of community that in 1972 had required the declaration of martial law; that the lifting of martial law is an accolade not only to the military and defense establishment of our country but also to the entire citizenry of the Republic.

After eight years of crisis government, we have lifted ourselves from the abyss of crisis onto a high ground of national stability and dynamism, such as we have never known in our history as a people. (1981)

In the extract, martial law is metaphorized as a necessary MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL, RESTORATION, and REVITALIZATION (‘the nation has surmounted the challenges to survival, the paralysis of will, and the decay of community that in 1972 had required the declaration of martial law’) which can all be subsumed under the broader conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY. This conceptualization was also expressed when Marcos talked about national security and peace and order (‘Order has returned to public life’ as in extract 17) and the preservation of ‘supreme authority of government’ (extract 16). In

⁴⁶Interestingly, Marcos’ explanation for the lifting of martial law in 1981 was due to his belief that the beginning of the decade of the 1980s ‘propitious’ time for the country to embark in a new phase of governance:

As early as 1976, all the way to early last year, I had decided that the last year for martial law was to be 1980, and that the beginning of the decade of the 1980s was most propitious for our people and country for the termination of martial law. (1981)

extract 17, the conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE is also realized and Marcos especially underscored ‘a change in the heart and the spirit and the soul of the Filipino people’—a goal he articulated in his speeches during the period martial law was in place.

17. Order has returned to public life, and security has been ensured for the Republic, not just in one climactic show of the power of government, but in sustained, even routinary demonstration of discipline and vigilance. We are now confident that there is no challenge to public order and national security today that the national government and our people cannot meet. (1981)
18. The supreme authority of government has not only been preserved; it has been strengthened and enhanced by pervasive reforms in the process of decision-making and program implementation, and in the very soul of the bureaucracy. But in addition to all this there has been a change in the heart and the spirit and the soul of the Filipino people. For to reform a nation, one must reform each individual man. And I can safely say that every Filipino has changed for the better. (1981)

Also realized in the 1981 speech of Ferdinand Marcos was the conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A BOOSTER OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY subsumed under the broader conceptualization MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE. In the following extract, Marcos implied that the outcome of the implementation of martial law had been favorable to the national economy. He characterized the national economy as ‘sound and full of vigor,’ ‘resilient before crisis,’ and one that ‘will continue to grow.’ He also implied that martial law had led to the ‘rise in the welfare’ of the poor and had ushered ‘a beginning in tapping the social conscience of free enterprise’:

19. The national economy is sound and full of vigor. In eight years we have wrought fears of productivity and economic expansion that have brought us to the threshold of full economic modernization. The reality and the prognosis of continued international economic instabilities do not diminish this verdict of economic health. Therein lies the strength of the Republic

of the Philippines and its people. We have been and we are resilient before crisis, and the economy will continue to grow.

The benefits of economic development and political stability have been translated into the rise in the welfare of many sectors especially the lower sectors of our society. With land reform and programs for the democratization of wealth and economic development, we have raised the very poor among us to a new life, not at the cost of strangling the position of the more prosperous members of our society but in regulating wealth. Indeed, we have made a beginning in tapping the social conscience of free enterprise for the task of promoting the welfare of the many. (1981)

Marcos expressed confidence in the new period of normalization and liberalization because amendments in the Constitution as well as laws on national security and public order were passed. These amendments and laws consolidated the power of the President and ensured the legitimacy of his actions against those elements which in his judgment 'imperil' the life of the nation.

During the supposed period of normalization (1981-1985), Marcos relied on his constitutional powers to issue decrees and letters of instructions to pursue his presidential agenda. As he allayed fears of a return to martial law in the face of mounting threats from insurgents, he asserted that 'even if situation should deteriorate, we have adequate checks and responses in our system of government to cope with this, without having to repair to martial law' (1984).

The year 1983, however, proved crucial to this period of normalization. On August 21 of that year, Benigno Aquino Jr., a former Senator and one of Marcos' staunch critics, was assassinated on the tarmac of the Manila International Airport upon arrival from a three year exile in the United States. Aquino's death galvanized protests against Marcos from various groups including members of the militant left.

Although he no longer had martial law powers at his disposal, Marcos had had consolidated powers through the revised constitution and had full control in the use of military forces to respond to the activities mounted by protesters and activists. On the

other hand, he advocated the process of dialogue within the National Assembly—a move that can be seen as a way to delegitimize the critical opposition beyond the parliament.

Even in the absence of martial law, Marcos justified the use of military power to address challenges posed by the mounting insurgency in the countryside, disruptive dissension in the labor sector, and street protests. The use of military power was justified through the conceptualization **PEACE AND SECURITY ARE PRECURSORS TO NATIONAL SUCCESS**, which took a significant place in Marcos' rhetoric during the post-martial law period. In the following extracts from Marcos' 1984 and 1985 national addresses, peace and security are conceptualized as a necessary and 'imperative' element to 'spur' socio-economic growth:

20. As we take purposive action *to spur the economy to recovery and growth, we need to ensure peace in our society and security of our Republic.* (1984)

21. *In pursuing these initiatives for the economy and society, peace and security are imperative to success.* This administration has shown how much can be done to strengthen law and order in our social life, and to secure the Republic from every threat to overthrow it. (1985)

As in his justification of the imposition of martial law in 1972, Marcos employed the narrative of imminent threat from the communist insurgents in establishing that 'uncompromising' utilization of military power was what was needed to ensure peace and security. In the extracts below, the communist insurgents are characterized as having taken advantage of the national crisis ('willfully infiltrated and manipulated by subversives and provocateurs' as in extract 21) and who posed 'threats' to the communities (extract 22). They are described as sources of disruption,

‘provocateurs,’ ‘infiltrators,’ and opportunists that had to be met with ‘proper response by the government and military forces.’

22. This is a period of uncertainty and stress in national life has also been a time of intensive buildup of subversion and insurgency.

The peaceful pursuit of reforms including demonstrations and protests is a necessary part, I presume, of our democratic life. But it is a very grave and disturbing trend when these are willfully infiltrated and manipulated by subversives and provocateurs.

Likewise, the efforts of labor to secure workers’ rights and welfare have been marred often by subversive infiltration of their ranks. And these have led sometimes to violence at the picket lines.

The dangers on this end would not be disturbing but for the heightened activities of insurgent terrorists in recent months. For a combination of both—intensified urban activity and countryside insurgency—suggests an expansion of aims and buildup of strength.

The gravity of these threats has therefore been met with proper response by our government and military forces. And you may be sure that we shall be vigilant and resolute in our campaign to ensure the peace and security of the nation. (1984)

23. As economic difficulties have beset us during the last three years, however, those seeking to the overthrow of government by force found the time opportune to expand and intensify their activities. And today the peace and security situation is of priority concern.

Although stability has been attained with respect to the secessionist movement in the South, other elements now pose grave threats to our communities, the most critical of these being the Communist New People’s Army.

There has been a tendency, particularly on the part of the foreign media and foreign observers, to exaggerate the extent of the Communist threat, so much so that we are not the subject of all kinds of scenarios on when and how the Communists will take over. This kind of ‘overreacting’ on the part of those who do not know the situation first hand merely serves to confuse the issues and do not help us any in dealing with the realities of the problem.

While the CPP/NPA has managed, since 1969, to increase its strength, improve its firepower, and expand its political influence, it is still far from being an immediate threat to government and overall national stability. But it does pose a serious threat to peace and order and in some of our communities, and to life and welfare for several thousands of our people. Intelligence estimates today place NPA membership at between 10,000 to 12,000 men, and this armed force is potent enough to affect peace and order conditions in four percent of our 41,615 barangays, where it has political and military organizations, and in the additional nine percent which it occasionally visits.

Likewise, it is significant that 70 percent of violent incidents perpetrated in the countryside and in some urban areas in recent years have been initiated by the NPA. Political bias should never cloud our perceptions of these acts of violence and terrorism. From January 1985 to June this year, the NPA mounted attacks on 27 municipal buildings and 29 integrated national INP stations, causing an estimated damage of P92 million. In the period from 1981 to 1984, damage caused by the NPA attacks amounted to P330 million. In terms of lives lost, NPA violence and terrorism have taken the lives of 600 civilians, including 46 government officials.

Our response to the insurgency has been a dual strategy. In the short term, this strategy consists of the uncompromising utilization of military power and the application of national security laws against insurgents. For the long term, however, our strategy seeks to achieve social, economic and political development as the lasting guarantee for social peace. (1985)

It is important to note that the conceptualization that **PEACE AND SECURITY ARE PRECURSORS TO NATIONAL SUCCESS** remained consistent with the twin conceptualizations of martial law as **A DEMOCRATIC INSTRUMENT TO PRESERVE SOCIETY** and **A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE**. Peace and security—goals which are associated with the preservation of society—were largely pursued by employing military power which Marcos continued to harness even after the lifting of martial law. By doing so, Marcos reenacted the formulation that militarist intervention was a necessary factor in bringing about social change.

During the period of normalization, Marcos also rehearsed the conceptualization that **DEMOCRACY IS AN ALTERNATIVE IDEOLOGY TO COMMUNISM THAT MUST BE NOURISHED AND DEFENDED**. This was of course rooted in his concept of ‘democratic revolution’ which in the early 1970s he offered as an alternative to the revolution waged by the communist insurgents. This was also a reaffirmation of the Cold War rhetoric where competing ideologies of the world’s superpowers were pitted against each other.

In the following extract, Marcos cast democracy as an ideology caught in a struggle against competing ideologies like communism and socialism. He suggested that victory in the struggle is realized by nurturing democracy ('renewing ourselves many times by an act of faith,' 'by tapping anew the great resources of democratic ideology and tradition'), defending it against competing ideologies ('carry the struggle to the citadels of the enemy'), and discrediting these competing ideologies ('underscore the sour fruit of communist and socialist experience').

24. We need have no fear as we engaged in this struggle of ideas, in this test between our rival faiths and ideologies. But it is no longer enough to simply trust to the worn saw that our people will never be won over by communism or socialism, because of ideals and beliefs they were born to.

Tradition is indeed on the side of democracy. But it is vain and illusory to imagine that this struggle can be won without renewing ourselves many times by an act of faith. It cannot be won without tapping anew the great resources of democratic ideology and tradition. It cannot be won if we do not carry the struggle also to the citadels of the enemy, and underscore the sour fruit of communist and socialist experience.

This is the reason why I have not stopped insisting that we must develop and nurture our democratic ideology, one rooted in our experience and needs.

This is why I believe it is not enough that we parrot the beliefs of others in democratic processes and institutions. We must understand their practical import in society, and why they must be defended. (1985)

It is interesting to note that the specific expressions of nurturance and defense are themselves realizations of conceptual metaphors that make up the broader conceptualization of democracy as an ideology. These conceptual metaphors are: DEMOCRACY IS A RELIGION ('renewing ourselves many times by an act of faith'), DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY IS A RESOURCE ('by tapping anew the great resources of democratic ideology and tradition'), and COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM ARE THE ANTI-THESIS OF DEMOCRACY ('carry the struggle to the citadels of *the enemy*,' 'underscore *the sour fruit* of communist and socialist experience'). These articulations on

democracy and other competing ideas like communism and socialism undergird a broader conceptualization, that is, **IDEOLOGY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT REQUIRES NURTURANCE AND PROTECTION IN ORDER TO SURVIVE AGAINST OTHER COMPETING ENTITIES.**

It must be said that Marcos' insistence on democratic ideology against the communist or socialist ideology should be understood within a broader context or broader discourse. During the Cold War era, the Philippines under Marcos was regarded as the fortress or 'citadel' of democracy in Asia which enabled the United States to maintain at that time the second largest military bases outside its shores. This meant that the Philippines was strategically positioned to counter the spread of communism in Southeast Asia which could very well have been influenced by neighboring China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It also meant that the Philippines served to protect both the military and economic interests of the United States (cf. Diokno 1985; Brilliantes 1987). The democratic ideology that Marcos espoused was supposedly favorable to the implementation of liberalization policies and structural adjustment plans that Marcos had in his list of economic reform measures (IBON 1985). It was therefore imperative to constrain forms of dissent that challenge these reform measures and the presence of the US military within Philippine territory and to discredit ideologies that repudiate such measures and interventionist foreign policies.

At this point, I wish to summarize the conceptualizations that underlay the rhetoric of Marcos' authoritarian rule. Marcos' authoritarian presidency may be divided into two periods—the period during which martial law was imposed or the 'crisis government' as Marcos would have it and the period of normalization and democratization. It should be noted that the latter part of the second period was,

however, characterized by mounting protests against the Marcos regime which eventually led to his ouster in February 1986. Two sets of conceptualizations correspond to these periods of Marcos’ authoritarian rule.

The first set (Table 4.1) is centered on conceptualizations of martial law or constitutional authoritarianism. The following lists down the two frames of martial law and the conceptual metaphors that substantiate these frames:

Table 4.1 Frames and Conceptual Metaphors during Martial Rule (1972-1981)

Frames	Conceptual Metaphors
MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC MEANS TO PRESERVE SOCIETY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MARTIAL LAW IS A CURATIVE • MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF ORDER AND SECURITY • MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC • MARTIAL LAW IS A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL, RESTORATION, AND REVITALIZATION
MARTIAL LAW IS A DEMOCRATIC AGENCY OF CHANGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MARTIAL LAW IS AN ECONOMIC BOOSTER • MARTIAL LAW IS A LIBERATING FORCE • MARTIAL LAW IS AN AGENCY OF INTERNAL REVOLUTION • MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC • CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM IS AN ENHANCER OF THE BUREAUCRACY

As explained in the analysis, the conceptual metaphor MILITARY ARREST OF SUSPECTED CRIMINALS IS A DECONTAMINATION OF THE BODY POLITIC substantiates both of the frames.

The second set includes two conceptualizations that remain consistent with the twin conceptualizations of martial law. These conceptualizations have something to do with peace and security and the democratic ideology. Both conceptualizations

may be regarded as frames in that they subsume metaphorizations that substantiate the proposition that they offer:

Table 4.2 Frames and Conceptual Metaphors after Martial Rule (1981-1985)

Frames	Conceptual Metaphors
<p>PEACE AND SECURITY ARE PRECURSORS TO NATIONAL SUCCESS</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • COMMUNIST INSURGENTS ARE SOURCES OF NATIONAL DISRUPTION AND DISTURBANCE • COMMUNIST INSURGENTS ARE DANGEROUS ELEMENTS IN THE COMMUNITIES • UTILIZATION OF MILITARY POWER IS PEACEMAKING
<p>IDEOLOGY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT REQUIRES NURTURANCE AND PROTECTION IN ORDER TO SURVIVE AGAINST OTHER COMPETING ENTITIES</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN IDEOLOGY THAT MUST BE NOURISHED AND DEFENDED AGAINST COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM • • DEMOCRACY IS RELIGION • DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGY IS A RESOURCE • COMMUNISM AND SOCIALISM ARE THE ANTI-THESIS OF DEMOCRACY

By examining the conceptualizations—frames and conceptual metaphors—of martial law, military power, and the democratic ideology as realized and expressed in the presidential rhetoric over the period of Marcos’ authoritarian rule (1972-1985), it is possible to infer or derive how Marcos throughout his authoritarian presidency conceptualized the themes of democracy, the national economy, peace and order, and the presidency—the four themes that are closely examined in the succeeding analytical chapters on post-Marcos administrations. Based on the analysis above, the following conceptualizations may thus be derived⁴⁷:

⁴⁷ This is done to establish points for comparison with the post-Marcos presidential rhetoric; however, it should be noted that the treatment in the analytical chapters which focus on the primary data (i.e., SONAs from 1987 to 2009) for this study is much more detailed in terms of textual analysis in that conceptual metaphors were posited or generated from the lexical and grammatical expressions having to do with each of the four themes (i.e., democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency). Also, in the case of the analytical chapters, the conceptual frames were posited from the

Table 4.3 Conceptualizations of Focal Themes as Derived from Marcos' Rhetoric during the Period of His Authoritarian Rule

Themes	Conceptualizations (Frames and Conceptual Metaphors)
Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF COMMUNIST THREAT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITARIANISM AND CONSOLIDATED PRESIDENTIAL POWERS ARE A VIABLE MEANS TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY
National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY WHOSE DEVELOPMENT IS DEPENDENT ON NATIONAL STABILITY, PEACE AND SECURITY • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN ENTITY THAT IS SUBJECT TO UNFOLDING EVENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER
Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PEACE AND SECURITY ARE PREREQUISITES TO SYSTEMIC NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • INSURGENTS ARE SOURCES OF DISRUPTION AND DISORDER IN THE COUNTRY • UTILIZATION OF MILITARY POWER IS A VIABLE MEANS TO ENSURE PEACE AND SECURITY
The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE PRESIDENT IS AN AGENT IN THE PRESERVATION OF SOCIETY • THE PRESIDENT IS A AN AGENT OF SOCIAL REFORM • THE PRESIDENT IS AN AGENT OF DEMOCRACY

The schema that emerges from these conceptualizations is one that acknowledges the centrality of constitutional authoritarianism in the national life. It is regarded as a way to protect a democratic society from the threats of communism and socialism. When exercised by the president, it becomes a means to protect and reform society. Such schema might have served as Marcos' way of managing the exigencies of the

interrelated conceptual metaphors of each theme as expounded by each president in order to show in Chapter 10 similarities and variations in the framing of a specific theme across the four post-Marcos presidencies covered in this research.

times which included among others the Cold War discourse and the external pressure to accommodate the neoliberal paradigm.

As indicated in the historical account of Marcos's authoritarian rule, the official rhetoric on martial law and the use of military power had not gone unchallenged during the period of Marcos' presidency from 1972 until his ouster in 1986. As some of the earlier cited publications have demonstrated, Marcos' justification for martial law and the use of military power was countered by evidence that his authoritarian regime contravened democratic values and institutions, committed human rights violations, and abused presidential power.

In the next four chapters, I examine not only how the major themes mentioned earlier had been conceptualized and metaphorically expressed in the post-Marcos presidencies. I also discuss how the metaphors in the martial law rhetoric have been variously recontextualized, that is, subverted, reaffirmed, exploited or redeployed in the presidential speeches after Marcos.

Chapter 5

Cory Aquino and the Framing of Philippine Democracy

5.1 Introduction

Corazon C. Aquino – popularly known the world over as Cory Aquino – rose to presidential leadership at the crest of a series of non-violent mass demonstrations involving approximately two million Filipino civilians along with well-known political, military and religious figures. The demonstrations, which were sparked by earlier protests against massive cheating in the Snap Philippine Presidential Election in February 1986, unfolded in a highway known as the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). It is also considered a culmination of the long-standing protest movement that sought to end the more than 13-year old iron-hand rule of Ferdinand Marcos. The movement aimed at restoring a democratic government that was, in the word of Filipino essayist Conrado de Quiros, ‘ambushed,’ when martial law was imposed by President Marcos in September 1972.

Understandably, the restoration of democracy through people power and how it should translate into something that would transform the nation in general and people’s lives in particular became an important point in the presidential discourses of Cory Aquino (see Cortes, 1999, 260-261; Malaya and Malaya, 2004, 248-251).

In this chapter, I argue that throughout Aquino’s State of the Nation Addresses from 1987 to 1991,⁴⁸ the schema of the state of the nation is constructed via a multi-layered configuration of frames, conceptual metaphors and their entailments that tend to revolve/ play around the theme of democracy and/or the process of

⁴⁸ Included in the texts used for the analysis are the five State of the Nation Addresses of Ms Aquino (1987 to 1991) as well as the written document (Report to the Filipino People) that accompanied the valedictory congressional speech of Ms Aquino in 1991.

democratization. I specifically wish to demonstrate how the concept of democracy is conceptualized across her national addresses and how such conceptualization configures with the conceptualizations of other themes such as national economy, peace and order/ national security, and the presidency. More specifically, what is examined is how the conceptualizations of these themes work in conjunction with, complement, support, reinforce or fortify Aquino's framing of democracy.

As in the Marcos regime as well as in past Philippine presidencies, the Aquino presidency viewed the Filipino nation⁴⁹ as a living entity or structure – something that is capable of expression, is constantly threatened by illnesses brought about by internal complications or the environment, is susceptible to further destruction but is also capable of restoration and recovery. Interestingly, Aquino's five SONAs variously suggest this in such expressions as 'the nation has spoken' (1987), 'the national will' (1987), 'our country is threatened' (1987), 'the ills of our country' (1988), 'the trauma of a wounded nation' (1988), 'building a stronger nation' (1989), 'our nation bustled with productive energy' (1990), 'our life as a nation' (1990), and 'the country was at a standstill' (1991). Moreover, the speeches conceptualize the nation as the Filipinos' collective self. This is, for instance, demonstrated in the use of the personal pronoun 'we' as in the expression '*we* will endure as a free nation' (1991 Written Report) and the possessive personal pronoun 'our' as in the line 'It drained the last drop of confidence in *our* future from all but the hardest spirits, and shattered *our* image abroad' (1991).

While Marcos believed that military rule was crucial to the national survival, the Aquino presidency saw its predecessor's imposition of martial law as destructive

⁴⁹ The term 'nation' is used interchangeably with the term 'country' in the national addresses.

and detrimental to national life. In the rhetoric of Aquino's SONAs, only in a democratic system sustained by what her administration deemed as the 'ways of democracy' and 'people empowerment' can the nation thrive, achieve maturity, and develop to its fullest.

The discussion that follows is organized based on the four themes I have chosen to focus on in this study: democracy/ democratization, national economy, national security (including peace and order), and the presidency (also referred to as the 'government' or 'executive leadership'). Each theme corresponds to one discussion section where I present the conceptual frame/s on the theme, spell out the conceptual metaphors that constitute the frame/s, and show how these conceptual metaphors are realized through metaphorical expressions across the speeches. In Table 5.1, I outline these conceptual frames generated from the conceptual metaphors derived from the textual analyses of the Aquino SONAs. The frames, categorized based on the four themes, are explicated in the discussion sections. The major points from each discussion section are then summarized in a concluding section where the overarching schema of the state of the nation under the Aquino administration is taken into account.

Table 5.1 Conceptual Frames in Corazon C. Aquino's SONAs

Section	Theme	Conceptual Frames
5.3	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE
5.4	National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE
5.5	Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE • THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY • THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS PEACEMAKING
5.6	The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT⁵⁰ IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY

Before I present the analytical sections, I shall first provide a historical milieu of the Aquino presidency to put into context the conceptual frames and metaphors that emerge from the textual analyses. The historical milieu can be found in section 5.2 which accounts for the significant events that transpired during the presidential term of Aquino and the exigencies her administration was positioned to respond. Sections 5.3 to 5.6 are the four analytical sections and section 5.7 is the chapter's summary.

5.2 Historical milieu of the Corazon Aquino presidency (1986-1992)

After the assassination of opposition leader and former Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. in August 1983, his wife Corazon 'Cory' Cojuangco Aquino became the

⁵⁰ In this study, terms such as 'government', 'executive leadership', 'the executive', and 'presidential leadership' are considered lexical equivalents of the term 'presidency' which is a one of the four focal themes.

symbolic leader of the anti-Marcos struggle. She subsequently rose to power after the peaceful overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos through a famed 'people power' uprising in February 1986.

Aquino's presidential term is noted for reestablishing democratic institutions and processes undermined during more than thirteen years of Marcos authoritarianism. Upon her assumption to presidential power, she restored political freedom curtailed under the militaristic rule of Marcos by issuing presidential proclamations lifting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and granting amnesty to political prisoners. Among those political prisoners granted amnesty was Jose Maria 'Joma' Sison, who was the founding chair of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) when it was reorganized in 1968. He later went into exile in the Netherlands after his release was vehemently protested by those in the military.

One of the problems Aquino inherited from the Marcos regime was a fragmented Philippine society which included the problem of communist insurgency. Anti-Marcos activists had noted that the dictator had been the 'number one recruiter' of communist rebels. Aquino in her well known speech before the US Congress noted that communist insurgency that numbered less than 500 before Marcos's imposition of martial law in 1972 swelled to more than 16,000 by the time the dictator fled. Aquino pursued peace talks with the CPP but the latter broke off the talks after a leftist trade union leader was murdered by a death squad allegedly connected to the Philippine Army (Pomeroy 1992, 320). The CPP resumed the armed struggle of its New People's Army (NPA) after the failure of negotiations. In 1988, Aquino declared an 'all-out war' against the rebels.

Aside from the challenge of communist insurgency, the Aquino government also faced seven military coup attempts, two of which were most devastating—those

that transpired in August 1987 and December 1989. Her eventual successor, then Defense Secretary and former Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Fidel Ramos, is credited for having stood by President Aquino and for quelling military attempts to grab power. There was also restlessness in Southern Philippines as Moro rebel forces waged for a Bangsamoro or an independent Muslim Mindanao. Also during Aquino's term, the country experienced some of the worst calamities in modern history: the July 1990 earthquake and the Mount Pinatubo eruption in 1991. In the same year that Pinatubo erupted, the Philippine Senate voted 'no' to the proposal that would have extended Philippine-United States Military Bases Agreement, ending the decades old presence of US military in the Philippines.

Noted for her emphasis on 'people empowerment,' Aquino used 'development diplomacy' as a thrust in foreign relations—a policy that focused on the political and economic reconstruction of the Philippines through international cooperation.

Aquino pursued economic reforms including economic liberalization and privatization of government-owned and/or government-controlled corporations. The perennial problem of graft and corruption in the bureaucracy was addressed through the creation of the Office of Ombudsman to investigate complaints of illegal acts by government officials.

Aquino considered as the centerpiece of her administration the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which was meant to redistribute land to tenant-farmers. However, the non-distribution of the Cojuangco family-owned Hacienda Luisita to its

own tenant-farmers became a major source of criticism against the first post-Marcos leadership.⁵¹

In 1992, Aquino finished her term successfully with a peaceful transfer of power. Throughout her presidency, her leadership style was noted to have been operating in a politico-spiritual plane and ‘to have been defined by the virtues of sincerity, integrity, religiosity, and humility.’

5.3 Democracy

Central to the rhetoric of the Aquino presidency is the following conceptualization or framing of Philippine democracy: **DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL LIFE.** This conceptualization is achieved through the following statements that are variously expressed across the five SONAs of Ms. Aquino:

- (5.3.1) DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN RENDERED WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP
- (5.3.2) THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT
- (5.3.3) DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT
- (5.3.4) DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM
 - (a) DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE NATION
 - (b) DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER
 - (c) DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER
 - (d) DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS
 - (e) DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCTIVE TO GROWTH

The conceptual metaphors and their entailments suggest a narrative or story of democracy: democracy as a living system had been rendered weak – in other accounts, ‘ambushed’ (see De Quiros 1997) – by the Marcos dictatorship. People struggled to fight the dictatorship and their struggle culminated in the people power

⁵¹ In November 2011, during the presidential term of Aquino’s son Benigno Aquino III, the Supreme Court ruled for the distribution of land of the Hacienda Luisita to the farm workers.

revolution that installed Aquino to power. The revolutionary government of Aquino worked to restore democracy that remains evolving and can be nurtured by ‘ways of democracy.’ This story of democracy when combined with the story of the nation and the national economy make up a complex combination of frames that constitute a broader frame or the schema of the state of the nation. This would be accounted for at the end of the chapter. Meanwhile, I shall explicate how each of the conceptual metaphors that lead up to the narrative of democracy is realized in the texts.

5.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE

That DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE is expressed in the SONAs in a variety of ways, a number of which generally point to democracy as having been weakened under the Marcos regime but restored by the Aquino government that replaced it.

Two metaphorizations express such conceptual metaphor in the speeches: DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ STRUCTURE (as suggested by the phrases ‘democratic restoration’ and ‘enlargement of democratic space’) and DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY (e.g., ‘planted the freest democracy’, ‘our restored democracy has gone past its fledgling stage’). Both metaphorizations suggest an evolving or changing system—a building or structure can be ‘enlarged’ and ‘strengthened’ (in the same way that it can be destroyed and weakened) while an organism can develop and ‘mature’ (or experience regression). Clearly, what these metaphorizations try to achieve is to render democracy as a system that is dynamic or one that is subject to alterations or modifications and is never closed or fixed. The following extracts exemplify the two metaphorizations:

DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ STRUCTURE

1. Incredibly, despite the significant reduction in the country risk effected by *the democratic restoration*, we were not accorded the terms given other countries which got longer periods, better rates and greater latitude for growth. (1987)
2. Despite the great losses sustained, I felt no regret that we had completely *restored democracy*. (1988)
3. But in one thing we grew from strength to strength – *in the enlargement of our democratic space and the strengthening of our democracy*. (1991)

DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY

4. Fifteen years ago, in this season of the year, my husband stood in the Senate and delivered what turned out to be *the valedictory of Philippine democracy*. He exposed the conspiracy to place the country under martial law, dissolve Congress and set the stage for unremitting plunder of our patrimony, and the degradation of our great name and honor.

The *dictator's last mockery of democracy* was committed in this hall, where the loser was proclaimed winner of the snap election. Today, I join you in *rededicating this hall to true democracy*. (1987)
5. Yet nothing generated greater admiration than our political achievements. In little over a year, *we uprooted a dictatorship and planted the freest democracy in the world – with all its good and bad features*. (1989)
6. This failed adventurism has underscored the fact that *our restored democracy has gone past its fledgling stage*. It has proceeded to *mature* and is now ready for *a more profound expression in our life as a nation* (1990)
7. Every calamity tested *the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, find relief, and meet the absolute necessities of the people* without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights. (1991)
8. Democracy, once a word, *is now alive*: this is our legacy. (1991 WR)

9. The increasing number of registered voters and a national voter turnout averaging 80% in all four political exercises demonstrated both *the vitality and viability of our newly restored democracy*. (1991 WR)

The phrases ‘democratic restoration’ and ‘restored democracy’ in extracts 1 and 2 easily bring to mind the metaphorization that DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/STRUCTURE. The phrases presuppose a prior destruction of ‘democracy,’ an indirect allusion to the actions of the Marcos regime. They also presuppose that democracy can be lost, weakened, enervated, made static so as to render useless, and dissipated. The metaphorization of democracy as a structure is also shown in extract 3 with the use of the phrase ‘enlargement of democratic space and the strengthening of our democracy.’

Also worth noting is that extracts 1 and 3 suggest that democracy—the restored structure—can significantly affect the state of the nation or country. In extract 1, it is established as the cause (‘effected by’) of significant reduction in country risk while extract 3 suggests a correspondence between national growth (‘we grew from strength to strength’) and the ‘enlargement of democratic space.’

However, in extracts 6 and 9, the phrase ‘restored democracy’ is given a living element. Descriptions of the ‘restored democracy’ as having ‘gone beyond its fledgling stage,’ as having ‘proceeded to mature,’ as being deemed ‘ready for a more profound expression in our life as a nation’ (extract 6), and as having ‘vitality and viability’ (extract 9) are realizations of the metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY.

The organic metaphorization of democracy is also evident in extracts 5, 7 and 8. Extract 5 from Aquino’s third SONA offers a direct expression of democracy as

organism by stating that it is ‘planted’ in place of an ‘uprooted’ dictatorship, while extract 8 is most explicit about the vitality of democracy through the expression ‘democracy... is now alive.’ In extract 7, democracy is depicted as having the ‘capacity to absorb distress,’ ‘find relief’ and ‘meet the absolute necessities of the people without the curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.’ Needless to say, the description accords an agentive element to democracy.

Extract 4 taken from the inaugural State of the Nation Address of Aquino in 1987 highlights her husband’s, then Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., speech in 1968 which forewarned of an impending ‘garrison state in the making’ (Aquino 1985). The recollection of that incident in the national address implies how ‘democracy’ ended with the declaration of martial law, the dissolution of Congress – a democratic institution Aquino referred to as ‘the hall of democracy,’ and the rise of Ferdinand Marcos’s dictatorial regime. To Aquino, a direct consequence of the end of democracy was the degradation of the nation’s (‘our’) ‘great name and honor’, implying that the life of the nation – including its credibility or reputation – is anchored on the viability of democracy. The third statement of the same extract provides a recounting of a depraved action in the past (‘mockery of democracy *was* committed in this hall, where the loser *was* proclaimed winner of the snap election’) in the Congressional hall – the same place where her speech was delivered. Notably, the expression ‘the dictator’s last mockery of democracy’ in the statement implies further the role of Marcos in the national degradation. Such recounting of an unfavorable past is followed by a statement on the present (‘*Today*, I join you...’) which highlights how the new government’s role contrasts with that of Marcos: the Aquino administration’s participation in ‘rededicating this hall to true democracy’ against the ‘dictator’s mockery of democracy.’

5.3.2 RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS AN ACHIEVEMENT

The restoration of democracy from the destruction caused by the Marcos dictatorship is considered a national achievement in the Aquino SONAs. That such restoration is A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT underscores the importance of this evolving system to the Philippine national life. This can be gleaned from the following extracts:

10. *Our extraordinary achievements* in fulfilling the first requirement of renegotiation [of foreign debt payment], *the establishment of free and responsible government*, gained us applause but no substantial accommodation from our foreign creditors. (1987)
11. This day completes the circle of *our democratic achievements*. Now Philippine democracy rests solidly upon the three pillars of freedom: the President, the Supreme Court and Congress. (1987)
12. Mr. Senate President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, join me now in expressing our congratulations and deepest gratitude to those who have this day by God's grace given to the nation *the fully ripened fruit of freedom* – ang ating mga kababayan, ang mamamayang Pilipino (our countrymen, the Filipino citizens). (1987)
13. That pride and that confidence rest, however, on the continuing faith in the *one solid and undeniable achievement of the great moral exertion of our people: the establishment of a democratic government* under an honest and dedicated leadership. (1987)
14. This is the real national emergency, for what is involved here is not underutilized manufacturing capacity or insufficient incentives for the rich, but the very quality of the Filipino who symbolizes *the great Asian miracle: a revolution without blood, democratic restoration without tears*. (1988)
15. We held *elections that were the freest and most participative in the history of this – perhaps of any – republic in the world*. (1989)
16. I therefore ask you, Honorable Senators and Representatives of this [...] our people's Congress, and the rest of our leaders, to renew with me *our commitment to the dream that bound us together in 1986*:

Democracy, freedom, sovereignty, economic growth, social justice.
(1990)

17. Against our economic gains that are ever hostages to fortune, stands *one steadfast, unalloyed achievement: our democracy*. Destined, I believe, to outlive our problems and deck with the graces of liberty the material progress of our future. *That achievement* is better seen from the disinterested distance of foreign admirers, than from the myopic view of those at home who wish to destroy it. (1991)
18. *The legacy of a restored democracy* not only has made Juan de la Cruz confident to speak his mind and walk our streets safely. *It has made him proud to proclaim anywhere in the world that he is Filipino.* (1991 WR)

As an achievement, the restoration of democracy or the democratization of the country after the people power revolution is variously described as ‘extraordinary’ (10), ‘complete’ (11), ‘solid and undeniable’ (13), ‘steadfast’ and ‘unalloyed’ (17).

In 12, the achievement is a harvest – ‘the fully ripened fruit of freedom’ given to the nation by the Filipino people (‘ang mamamayang Pilipino’). It is also considered ‘the great Asian miracle’ (14), a phrase which underlies the religious dimension of the people power revolution and the democratic restoration that followed.

In extract 15, the use of superlatives ‘freest’ and ‘most participative’ in the context of ‘the history of this –perhaps of any – republic in the world’ to refer to the congressional, provincial, municipal, and *barangay* (village) elections – considered then and now as the most concrete forms of democratic exercise in the Philippines – emphasizes the significance of democratization as a national achievement. It is a dream that has been achieved, one that has bound the national leaders together (16); it is admired by the international community (17) and a source of pride for the Filipino (18).

On the other hand, it is important to note in extract 10 the caveat to celebrating the establishment of a democratic government as an achievement seeing that ‘no substantial accommodation from foreign creditors’ was achieved in the renegotiation for foreign debt. In other words, the president was quick to remind her audience of the reality that the nation would face in spite of the significant accomplishment of democratization.

5.3.3 DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT

One of the most important conceptualizations of democracy introduced by the Aquino administration is the idea that DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT. This may be considered an important legacy of the Aquino presidency having been installed through a ‘people power’ uprising in 1986.

To the Aquino presidency, democracy, a system which had been ‘mocked’ under martial rule imposed by the Marcos presidency, but ‘restored’ to its ‘true’ form and substance when Aquino was put into power, and tested by threats emanating from leftist insurgents and military rebels, needs to be nurtured if it has to thrive and sustain national life. The following extracts illustrate the said conceptualization:

19. Our swift democratization was done against the advice that I reserve emergency powers in the face of rising military adventurism and communist terrorism. But I believe then – and time has proved me right – that this nation shall find no greater *source of strength to defend democracy* than *in the enjoyment of all its rights and liberties*. Democracy is *our faith* and *the root of our strength* to defend it. (1989)
20. But there is *a way to strengthen democracy that is within the country’s reach*. That is through *the empowerment of the people*. (1991)
21. But *empowering the people* means more than just giving them elections every three years. It means enlarging their contact with government beyond elections to its daily workings – so that the vast

resources of one support the initiatives of the other, and the policies of government are refined by the insights of the people. By this means the lives of the people shall be constantly improved and *the people themselves empowered by the habit of directing their own government. People empowerment*, through people's organizations, NGO's, foundations and cooperatives, is the surest means we know to make government mirror the aspirations of the people. We want elections to be just one of the other more *effective means to bring the people into government and government to the people*, to make it truly a *participatory democracy*. (1991)

22. The *organized participation of the people in daily government* may provide the *stabilizing element* that government has always lacked. The active participation of the people in government *will lend proper direction and continuity to policy*. (1991)
23. Where once we almost lost our voice as a nation, today we speak with many voices, but it is a responsible and committed noise. If we push for *empowerment*, it is because we know it is *our guarantee* that we will endure as a free nation. (1991 WR)
24. Peaceful, honest and orderly elections through which the will and the wisdom of our people would be expressed shall enable us to bequeath *our legacy of democracy strengthened by our responsible and mature citizenry*. (1991 WR)

In the above-mentioned extracts, reinforcement of democracy is expressed through defense (19) and strengthening (20, 24) of it; and the means to reinforce (defend or strengthen) democracy would be through people empowerment and/or democratic practices (e.g., 'enjoyment of [democratic] rights and liberties' (19), 'peaceful, honest and orderly elections' (24)). Democratic practices and people empowerment are variously characterized as 'a way to strengthen democracy' (20), 'enlarging people's contact with government' (21), 'a stabilizing element' (22), and 'our guarantee that we will endure as a free nation' (23). People empowerment is also made synonymous with the terms 'participatory democracy' (21) and 'organized/ active participation of

the people' (22). Moreover, it is conceptualized as crucial to the process of policymaking (21 and 22).

5.3.4 DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM

The relationship between democracy and the national life is substantiated by the characterization of democracy as A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM. As earlier mentioned, this conceptualization is accomplished using the following more specific conceptual metaphors that underlie the texts:

- (a) DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE,
- (b) DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER,
- (c) DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS,
- (d) DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER, and
- (e) DEMOCRACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH.

Democracy's role as a BENEFACTOR OF THE PEOPLE is realized in the following extracts:

- 25. Many *have benefited* from the example of our previous struggles. Many more *stand to profit* from what we shall make out of *our democracy and freedom*. (1990)
- 26. *Participatory democracy will end the practice of punishing provinces and municipalities for the wrong vote in the last poll. It will separate elections, where the people vote for their favorites, from the provision of public service which every Filipino has a right to expect from the government, regardless how he voted.* (1991)

Extract 25 underscores the assurance of benefits (or profits) people will get from democracy while extract 26 suggests how a particular form of democracy, that is, participatory democracy, can ensure provision of public service to the Filipino voters in spite of how they actually voted. Extract 27, below, is another evidence of the said conceptualization (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR), but it uses a

concrete example of democracy—what is referred to as mga Kabisig (Partners)⁵²—to express such conceptualization. The Kabisig may be considered personifications of democracy as conceived by President Aquino. They are ‘katulong’ (helpers) and ‘kasama sa pagtulong’ (fellow helpers) in all aspects of national life.

27. *Ang mga Kabisig nating ito ang nagbigay buhay sa diwa ng EDSA. Sa lahat ng dako ng ating bansa ay taglay pa rin nila ang diwa ng rebolusyon ng 1986. Patuloy silang kumikilos, laban sa kahirapan, kaguluhan, sakit at kamangmangan. Katulong natin sila sa pagpapabilis at pagpapalaganap ng ating mga programa: sa repormang pansakahan; sa kapayapaan at kaayusan: sa pangangalaga ng ating kalikasan at likas na yaman; sa pagpapatupad ng desentralisasyon; at sa paghango natin sa kapos-palad nating kababayan mula sa kahirapan. Kasama natin sila sa pagtulong sa mga biktima ng nagdaan lindol sa Cabanatuan, Dagupan, Baguio at iba pang pook. Binigyang buhay ng mga Kabisig nating ito ang diwa ng ating Saligang Batas; binigyang halimbawa nila ang tunay na kahulugan ng demokrasya.*

(Trans. *Our Kabisig (Partners) give life to the spirit of EDSA*. In all parts of the country, they still possess the spirit of the revolution of 1986. *They continue to act against poverty, disorder, disease, and ignorance. They help us* in accelerating and disseminating our programs: in agrarian reform; in peace and order; in caring for our environment and natural resources; in implementing decentralization; and in saving our less-fortunate countrymen from poverty. *They are with us* in helping the victims of the recent earthquake in Cabanatuan, Dagupan, Baguio and other places. *Our Kabisig give life to the spirit of the Constitution; they exemplify the true meaning of democracy.*) (1990)

In the same extract, the Kabisig movement is also depicted ‘to give life’ to the spirit of EDSA people power revolution (‘diwa ng EDSA’, ‘diwa ng rebolusyon ng 1986’), which spawned the process of democratization of national life in the first place, and to the spirit of the Constitution (‘ang diwa ng Saligang Batas’) which is an

⁵² The Kabisig movement includes nongovernment and peoples’ organizations.

important hallmark of the restoration of Philippine democracy. The extract therefore lends itself to the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER. This can also be inferred from the following extracts where the democratization led by the Aquino presidency is credited for the ‘emergence of a healthy multiparty system’ that is touted to pave way to ‘the more ideological, cause-oriented and platform-guided interests and legitimate concerns of key sectors of our population’ (28) and where the initiative in participatory culture of *kabisig* is regarded to engender productivity (i.e., ‘yield more fruits in the years ahead’) (29).

28. More than these, we have seen *the emergence of a healthy multiparty system*, spanning the entire range of the political spectrum, with the more traditional personality-based political parties being effectively challenged by and gradually yielding to *the more ideological, cause-oriented and platform-guided interests and legitimate concerns of key sectors of our population*. (1991 WR)
29. Certainly, the initiatives in foreign policy, economic policy and *participatory culture of kabisig*, as a strategy for getting the right things done right away, will continue to *yield more fruits in the years ahead*. (1991 WR)

Complementing the conceptualization of democracy as life-giving and life-sustaining is the statement that DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS. This is made explicit in extract 30 and suggested in 31:

30. I believe that *nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of our country* – such as the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, the betrayal of public interest – *than in the blessings of democracy*: freedom; rights; transparent dealings; and a government of the people by the people themselves (1988)
31. Every calamity tested *the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, find relief, and meet the absolute necessities of the people without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights* (1991)

Extract 30 expresses that the ‘nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of our country...than in the blessings of democracy.’ The expression runs parallel to Marcos’ conceptualization of martial law as a curative (see Chapter 4). Marcos would himself insist that the imposition of martial law was within the bounds of democracy as he even called it ‘constitutional authoritarianism.’ Aquino would, however, trounce that Marcosian assertion in her speech by specifically spelling out what she meant by ‘blessings of democracy’ as source of national cure. In the extract, she showed that the ‘blessings of democracy’ which include ‘freedom; rights; transparent dealings; and a government of the people by the people themselves’ can remedy ‘the ills of our country’ which include ‘the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, betrayal of public interest,’ all of which the Marcos administration was accused of perpetrating. In extract 31, the curative dimension of democracy is expressed in these terms: ‘the capacity of democracy to absorb distress, find relief, and meet the absolute necessities of the people without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.’ That democracy can ‘absorb distress,’ ‘find relief,’ and ‘meet the necessities of the people’ in times of calamity underscores that democracy is a resource for comfort (‘relief,’ ‘meet the necessities’) and adjustment (‘absorb’). Again, Aquino struck a contrast with Marcos by emphasizing that comfort and adjustment can be achieved ‘without the least curtailment of freedom or compromise of rights.’

That DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT/ PEOPLE POWER is realized in extracts 32, 33, and 34.

32. *To give the people greater power over their lives is the essence of democracy that we must strive to bring out completely. (1991)*

33. *Democracy is the only way for us.* We must therefore find the ways by which the pitfalls that go with its blessings are reduced, while its inherent strengths are brought to the fore. Of those strengths the most promising is *people power, a reserve for nation building* we tapped only once in our history with such marvelous result. (1991)
34. *The bottom line of the CARP is to empower our people* so that they could more actively shape their economic destinies. After barely three years of implementation, *the lives of thousands of farmer-beneficiaries have been transformed.* (1991 WR)

In extract 32, democracy ‘[gives] people greater power over their lives’ while in 33, it is ‘the only way for us’ and has ‘people power’ as one of its ‘strengths,’ having been ‘a reserve for nation building’ tapped during the mass demonstrations in 1986. In 34, the CARP or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program – considered by Aquino as the ‘centerpiece of democracy’ (1991) – is described as empowering and transformative. It is important to note that in Aquino’s presidential discourse, the metaphorization of democracy as A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER appears to complement the earlier conceptualization of people power as a MEANS TO NURTURE DEMOCRACY (see 5.3.3). This goes to prove that as far as the Aquino congressional speeches are concerned, democracy and people power are mutually sustaining and that one is rendered weak without the other.

Also subsumed under the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM is the metaphorization of democracy as a crucial element in bringing about a kind of economic system conducive to growth (DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCTIVE TO GROWTH). This metaphorization is realized in statements that express an indirect causal relationship between democratization and economic security and/or development. In the following extracts, economic development, expressed in such terms as ‘recovery,’ ‘growth’ and

‘economic security,’ is ‘accounted for,’ ‘powered by,’ ‘engendered,’ and ‘guaranteed’ by a ‘people powered capitalism’ and/or ‘market-oriented economy,’ which, the Aquino government claimed, have been made possible with the restoration of democracy or democratization. In the next nine extracts, I highlight the expressions of development (e.g., economic growth, recovery, etc.) by putting the lexicogrammatical choices in bold italicized fonts. I also highlight expressions of how such development is achieved by italicizing the terms or phrases used. Linguistic expressions of democracy/ democratization or democratic restoration are underlined.

35. We have tracked ***this growth*** and found *it accounted for mainly by small and medium businesses and by Filipino-Chinese entrepreneurs*, sectors that made few demands on the public sector, other than to be left alone to work in the democratic space we created. We are seeing *people-powered capitalism in action*. (1988)
36. On economic front, we must provide long delayed incentives to *the sectors that have powered **our recovery** particularly the small and medium term enterprises*. (1988)
37. First, we *have to strengthen the foundations of **a vigorous market-oriented economy***. This would involve *continued adherence to prudent fiscal and monetary policies and reliance on market forces in the functioning of the economy*. *These policies have engendered **robust growth of private investment, output, employment and consumption***. These have also kept inflation at acceptable levels and helped protect the real incomes of wage earners. *We must steer away from the siren songs of quick fixes, easy spending, unwarranted subsidies, and irrational price controls*, which elsewhere have contributed to bloated deficits, tailspin hyperinflation, and social instability. (1989)
38. All these now could help us see how we have contributed to ***a climate of economic security**: a market-oriented economy was restored, crony capitalism and economic cartels in sugar and coconut industries were dismantled*. We are a democracy that protects rather than persecutes, sequesters if necessary, rather than confiscates, guarantees rather than

steals the fair and fitting share of the entrepreneurs' and workers' fruits of labor. (1991 WR)

The patterns of causality implied in the above-mentioned extracts can be illustrated thus:

Democratic space/ democratization → people-powered capitalism → growth (35)

Democracy → people powered economy → economic recovery (36)

Democratization → adherence to prudent and fiscal monetary policies and reliance on market forces → vigorous market oriented economy/ robust economic growth (37)

Democracy → restoration of market-oriented economy → climate of economic security (38).

The role of democracy – particularly of the democratic government of Aquino – in launching national economic recovery is communicated directly in extracts 35 to 38. It is expressed quite explicitly in extract 35 which mentions ‘the small and medium business/enterprises’ (also cited in extract 36 of the same speech) as instrumental to the nation’s economic recovery and growth. In extract 36, these small and medium term enterprises are explicitly described as having actually made possible (‘powered’) the country’s economic ‘recovery’ from its supposedly ailing condition in the Marcos regime.

In extract 37, the line ‘continued adherence to prudent fiscal and monetary policies and reliance on market forces in the functioning of the economy’ is supposed to suggest a contrast to some of the economic policies during the Marcos years⁵³;

⁵³ It is noted for instance that ‘the proliferation of inefficient and unprofitable public sector enterprises and bad loans held by the Philippine National Bank, the Development Bank of the Philippines (two major financial institutions of the Philippine government), and other government entities, was a heavy

hence, it is reasonable to assume that, in this extract, democratization, with the Aquino government at its helm, paved way to the purportedly more sound economic policies. These policies are rendered as some sort of a reinforcement (‘strengthen the foundation’) and stimulus (‘engendered’) of the economy. They are also represented as vehicles to keep the economy on the right track. This is especially suggested in the expression, ‘We must steer away from the siren songs of quick fixes, easy spending, unwarranted subsidies, and irrational price controls, which elsewhere have contributed to bloated deficits, tailspin hyperinflation, and social instability,’ where the phrase ‘steer away’ implies some sort of a redirection. More specifically for Aquino, it should be a redirection from the practices of the past (‘quick fixes, easy spending, unwarranted subsidies, irrational price controls’)—the practices supposedly prevalent during the Marcos regime. She cast these practices as easily tempting (‘siren songs’), but was quick to add that they had actually put the economy in an unfavorable state: they caused excesses (‘bloated deficits’) and put inflation out of control (‘tailspin hyperinflation’). The adoption of more ‘prudent’ policies as well as the ‘reliance on market forces’—made possible with the onset of re-democratization—would then be the best alternative in order to do away with the excesses, to stabilize inflation, and to ensure economic growth in general.

A similar line of reasoning can be found in extract 38 where democracy characterized as conducive to a free and fair market economy and a system that ‘protects,’ ‘sequesters if necessary,’ and ‘guarantees...fair and fitting share of entrepreneurs’ and workers’ fruits of labor’ as opposed to the previous system of

legacy of the Marcos years’ (‘Economy of the Philippines’, The US Library of Congress, Available at <http://countrystudies.us/philippines/59.htm>). However, it should also be noted that both Marcos and Aquino pursued structural adjustments plans—trade liberalization, deregulation, privatization—as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund-World Bank.

crony capitalism (a system that ‘persecutes,’ ‘confiscates’ and ‘steals the fair and fitting share of the entrepreneurs’ and workers’ fruits of labor’).

Indirect causality is also evident in the president’s presentation of her recommended solution to alleviate poverty in the country. This is evident in extracts 39 and 40 below.

39. Our principal focus must be on *rural development – the liberation of the economic, social and political energies of the countryside...We need to decentralize political structures to widen the people’s participation in national life.*

A people-powered revolution must aim for a people-empowered democracy and economy. *Rural development will best realize this aim. **The alleviation of poverty** will come with the upliftment of the rural poor.*

Unless we draw our rural areas into the dynamics of the national economy, turning hinterlands of decay into frontiers of progress, our growth and equity goals will not be attained, neither in the short nor the long term. (1989)⁵⁴

40. *A key link in breaking the bondage of poverty and what has been called the curse of underdevelopment is a liberal economic environment* that encourages and supports the pursuit of a prosperous life with dignity. (1991 WR)

In extract 39, rural development is rendered as a booster (‘upliftment’) of the rural poor. The ‘upliftment’ is supposed to bring about the empowerment of the people and consequently a ‘people powered economy’ vital to the ‘alleviation of poverty.’ Interesting here is how an upward movement (‘upliftment’) for the rural poor is established to have direct link to the decrease or downward movement (‘alleviation’)

⁵⁴ It is important to note that in this extract, the analyst interprets the use of the term ‘(rural) development’ as a process (that is, ‘the liberation of the economic, social, political energies of the countryside’ and ‘[drawing out] our rural areas into the dynamics of the national economy, turning hinterlands of decay into frontiers of progress’). The goal is ‘alleviation of poverty’ which is an expression of ‘economic development’ (growth, recovery) which is used earlier to denote an outcome/consequence of certain processes.

of poverty. This suggests that rural development is an agency of change (upward movement for the poor on the one hand, and downward movement of poverty on the other). That it is transformative is made explicit in the expression ‘turning hinterlands of decay into frontiers of progress’, where hinterlands and frontiers are set in contrast by associating them with the terms ‘decay’ and ‘progress’, respectively. In extract 40, poverty is not just something to be made less serious or to be alleviated; it is metaphorized as a ‘bondage’ which a ‘liberal economic environment’ is supposedly capable of ‘breaking.’ By rendering poverty as bondage and the liberal economic environment as a key link in breaking the bondage, Aquino underscored the importance of adopting free market economic policies in the post-Marcos leadership. An indirect causal pattern similar to the earlier ones can be gleaned from the two extracts just mentioned:

Democratization → rural development → people powered economy → alleviation of poverty (39)

Democratization → liberal economic environment → breaking of bondage from poverty (40)

Such pattern is also manifested in several instances such as the representation of the state of labor industrial relations (i.e., Democratization → liberated labor sector → reduction in strikes and full utilization of industrial capacity), which is seen in contrast with the conditions ‘under the dictatorship’;

41. ***Industrial capacity***, idle for lack of capital, markets, and confidence under the dictatorship, ***has been fully utilized.***

The ***economic upturn*** is reflected in ***the reduction of industrial actions.*** ***The exuberance of a suddenly liberated labor sector has made room for a deeper appreciation of the need for all sectors to work together – rather than against each other – for the general improvement.***

Let us not, however, use the reduction in strikes by itself as an invitation to more investments, but rather as *a barometer of the more equitable distribution of the progress we are making*. (1989)

the Aquino government's policy with regard to the private sector (Democratization → privatization → strengthening of the private sector);

42. Related to our government efforts for decentralization and devolution of functions of our central office to the local units, the surge of NGO-GO project collaboration, and the support for local autonomy and the autonomous regions, *we also continue to push for privatization to challenge further and strengthen our private sector*. (1991 WR)

and the state of the Philippine environmental movement (Democratization → participative process and Kabisig spirit/ Spirit of partnership → flowering of the environmental movement):

43. Doubtless, the Philippine environmental movement, long muzzled by the dictatorial past, is *experiencing its flowering in the highly participative processes and Kabisig spirit of this administration*, with peace as its foundation. (1991 WR)

Let me make a more detailed analysis of the last three examples. Extract 41 expresses development in a rather elaborate formulation. In expressing this formulation, Aquino first presented a proposition that not only affirms the achievement of her government in the labor sector ('Industrial capacity...has been fully utilized'), but contrasts it with the achievement under Marcos ('Industrial capacity, idle for lack of capital, markets, and confidence under the dictatorship'). Then, Aquino proceeded by equating 'economic upturn' with 'the reduction of industrial actions.' This 'reduction of industrial actions' or 'reduction in strikes' was attributed by Aquino to what she terms as 'the exuberance of a suddenly liberated labor sector' that 'made room for a deeper

appreciation of the need for all sectors to work together...for the general improvement.' Moreover, Aquino explained that the reduction in strikes was 'a barometer of the more equitable distribution of the progress we are making.' From these assertions, it is implied that the 'suddenly liberated labor sector' was made possible by the departure from the Marcos' dictatorship and the country's efforts at re-democratization under the Aquino administration. This then brings us the general causal formulation: democratization → liberated labor sector → reduction in strikes and full utilization of industrial capacity.

Extract 42 expresses that the 'push for privatization,' which was part of the Aquino government's economic policies to achieve national development, is 'related' to other democratization-related efforts such as 'decentralization and devolution of functions of our central office to local units, the surge of NGO-GO project collaboration, and the support for local autonomy and the autonomous regions.' It should be noted that these democratization-related efforts were also efforts at de-Marcosification in that they deviated from the highly centralized and 'sultanistic' (Thompson 1995) not to mention 'paternalistic' (as opposed to collaboration-oriented) Marcos regime. That development is expressed in terms of 'strengthen(ing) our private sector' is, however, indicative of the Aquino administration's subscription to the structural adjustment plans prescribed by world financial institutions to Third World societies like the Philippines.

Extract 43 deals with the Philippine environmental movement, which may be seen as part of a larger umbrella of creative movements including those of non-governmental organizations and people's organizations (NGOs-Pos) that fully developed under the Aquino watch. In the extract, Aquino expressed that the participative processes and collaboration-oriented ethos ('Kabisig spirit') encouraged

by her administration had led to the ‘flowering’ of the Philippine environmental movement. Again she struck a contrast between the ‘flowering’ of the movement experienced under her administration with its having been ‘long muzzled by the dictatorial past.’ The expression ‘flowering’ metaphorizes the movement as having achieved the height of its development while the expression ‘long muzzled’ gives off images of restriction and control that make development almost impossible. The contrast suggests that democratization not to mention de-Marcosification was conducive to the full development of creative movements such as the Philippine environmental movement.

The following table summarizes the similar patterns of causality evident in the last nine extracts cited:

Table 5.2 Patterns of Causality between Democracy and Economic Development

Extract	Patterns of causality (the root cause in bold letters)
35	Democracy → people powered capitalism → growth
36	Democracy → people powered economy → economic recovery
37	Democratization → adherence to prudent and fiscal monetary policies and reliance on market forces → vigorous market oriented economy/robust economic growth
38	Democracy → restoration of market-oriented economy → climate of economic security
39	Democratization → rural development → people powered economy → alleviation of poverty
40	Democratization → liberal economic environment → breaking of bondage from poverty
41	Democratization → liberated labor sector → reduction in strikes and full utilization of industrial capacity
42	Democratization → privatization → strengthening of the private sector
43	Democratization → participative process and Kabisig spirit/ spirit of Partnership → flowering of the environmental movement

To summarize this discussion on democracy vis-à-vis the national life, I would like to point out that the framing of democracy in relation to President Aquino's concept of 'the nation' in her State of the Nation Addresses from 1987 to 1991 may be described as an elaborate one in that it entails a multi-layered conceptualization. It makes use of conceptual metaphors that build towards broader, more inclusive conceptual metaphors subsumed under the frame. But this framing of democracy is further complexified when seen in relation to how other themes such as national economy, national security/ peace and order, and the presidency are conceptualized in the Aquino presidential rhetoric. As will be suggested towards the end of this chapter, the confluence of these conceptualizations and the elaborate framing of the democracy make up the broader frame or schema of the state of the nation during the years of the Aquino presidency.

5.4 National economy

In Aquino's SONAs, the constant reference to the national economy as something capable of 'growth' and 'recovery' makes it a synecdoche for national life; thus, the conceptualization **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE**.

There are several ways by which the conceptualization of the national economy is achieved in the addresses. The following conceptual metaphors derived from the addresses establish the conceptual frame **NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE**:

(5.4.1) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON

(5.4.2) POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE
NATIONALECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE

- (5.4.3) THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.
- (5.4.4) THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
- (5.4.5) THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE (AILING) NATIONAL ECONOMY.

The combination of these conceptual metaphors and their entailments already constitute a rescue narrative, a story that positions the new government of Aquino as a hero/ heroine or protagonist poised to deliver the nation or the national economy from a miserable state brought about by the destructive force of poverty, compounded by years of struggle under the Marcos dictatorship, and deeply affected by the changing conditions of the world economy.

5.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON

In the national addresses, the national economy is portrayed as fragile, ‘severely distressed’ and ‘has contracted considerably’—that is, THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON—when the Ms. Aquino first came to power (44, 45).

44. When I took power 17 months ago, I was immediately called upon to deal with the dangerous combination of *a severely distressed economy* and a growing insurgency – threats which fed on each other and on the hopelessness and confusion which prevailed. (1987)
45. By 1985, *the economy has contracted considerably*; its rate of growth had been negative for two consecutive years. The country was at a standstill, as if waiting only for the last rites to be performed. By 1986, we had turned the economy around – in less than a year. We improved on that performance the year after. (1991)

Note the juxtaposition of the economy and the country in extract 45: economic conditions stand for country’s conditions; and what happens to the economic situation is reflective of what happens to the country.

5.4.2 POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE

A major indicator of the national economy's fragility is the incidence of (massive) poverty conceptualized as A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE. This is suggested in the extracts below:

46. *Poverty blighted the land.* Five million families (or 59 percent of the total) live below the poverty line, as compared to 45 percent in 1971. Dictatorship had done nothing but make more of our people poorer.
It also made us sicker. The prevalence of malnutrition among our young and the incidence of birth fatalities had risen at alarming rates. In short, *an economy in shambles* and a polity with no institutions save my presidency to serve as the cornerstone of the new democracy that we set out to build. (1987)
47. Memory will bring more vividly to mind than a recitation of statistics the devastation of our country then, *the deep and sweeping poverty* of the great mass of the people, the trauma of a wounded nation. (1988)
48. *Yet poverty remains prevalent.* The lowest 30% of our population remains *mired in unchanging misery*. (1989)

Particularly noticeable in extract 46 is how 'poverty' is linked to the state of the national economy ('an economy in shambles'). This link, mentioned in the inaugural SONA of Aquino, establishes the already obvious notion that the incidence of poverty betrays the national economic conditions. In reading extracts 47 and 48, therefore, it is presupposed that 'the deep and sweeping' as well as 'prevalent' incidence of poverty that had 'mired' a significant population of people 'in unchanging misery' is indicative of the state of national economy.

5.4.3 THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

The Aquino administration also blamed the massive poverty on the previous administration – the Marcos dictatorship – which Aquino claimed to have aggravated the already impoverished condition of the country (see example 46, ‘Dictatorship had done nothing but make more of our people poorer.’).

In the Aquino addresses, the Marcos dictatorship is particularly held responsible for the impoverished state of the nation. In the following extracts from Aquino’s first (1987) and final (1991) State of Nation Addresses, Marcos, referred to as ‘the dictator’ (or his regime, ‘the dictatorship’), is exposed as manipulative and corrupt, dispositions that, as expressed in the addresses, had further compounded that dire national state (THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.)

49. *The dictatorship gave special privileges to government corporations and select individuals. In their various forms, these enterprises enriched the few at the cost of impoverishing the many. They distorted markets and factors of production. And they bore the aspect of legitimacy that made challenge and change impossible. (1987)*
50. I mention this (re: economic recovery in 1986), not to offset the shortcomings of the present with the achievements of the past. I mention it to show what can be done in such a short time, and how much improvement was made from *conditions far worse than what we have today the dictator’s apologists notwithstanding, that the country was worse off now than when he and his wife were stealing the country blind. (1991)*

In extract 49, the dictatorship is established as the sanctioning agent of crony capitalism where government corporations and select individuals are given ‘special privileges.’ These corporations are consequently blamed for enriching a few at ‘the

cost of impoverishing the many’ and for distorting ‘markets and other factors of production.’ On the other hand, extract 50 refers to Marcos as a ‘dictator’ whose presidency is described in the very telling clause ‘when he (Marcos) and his wife were stealing the country blind.’ This can be read as a strategic move to emphasize that the conditions during the Aquino administration, in spite of its shortcomings, were better compared to the state of the national economy when Marcos was in power.

5.4.4 LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

But while the Aquino administration blamed the Marcos dictatorship for the sorry state of the national economy, it also recognized how national economic conditions were interrelated with constraints imposed by the international economic conditions and the global context at large. Aquino conceptualized this reality in two ways THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATION and THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE BENEFACTORS/ PATRONS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE NATION.

THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE SOURCES OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

51. Recession hit the international economy in the early ‘80’s. Every economy suffered, but the heaviest toll was taken on *the fragile economies of the developing nations*. (1987)
52. *We must grow; yet maintain access to the international financial system*. We must find ways of funding our growth without being held hostage to debt. If we are to meet our commitments to our creditors, the bankers must first meet our financing needs. (1987)
53. *The world economy is held back by the debt that countries such as ours carry*. In 1987 there was a negative outflow of \$2.2 billion to our foreign creditors. *It was blood from the veins of our economy*, and took

a heavy toll in missed output and lost employment. *We need a transfusion to maintain our growth.*

The international initiative for a consortium of donor countries to support Philippine development plans could give us that transfusion. I welcome the support of world leaders for the economic development assistance program for the Philippines. We see innovative and far-reaching debt reduction as *a vital component of this international initiative.* (1987)

...ARE BENEFACTORS/ PATRONS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

54. Our maturity is anchored on our ability *to earn and maintain a place of honor and respect in the community of nations.* This place of honor also rests on *our credibility before our international creditors.* Today, we still suffer from the burdensome legacy of the past. Our foreign debt continues to stare us in the face; and so does the responsibility of servicing all these debts. (1990)
55. I could have repudiated the foreign debt, won the passing praise of a greatly relieved people, and the lasting contempt of a devastated country. *I could have opted for outright hostility towards the international banking system and invited its retaliation. But the only result would have been to weaken the present democracy against the conspiracies of the former government,* which contracted the miserable debt in the first place. I would have taken the chance, if I were the only one at risk, but I had a country to take care of. (1991)

Clearly in the extracts 51, 52 and 53, the life of the national economy is linked to the global context, that is, the status of the world economy ('recession in the 1980's'), the international financial system, and foreign development assistance. Particularly in extract 53, payment of the foreign debt is seen as a threat to the economic life, as the negative outflow that resulted in the debt service is likened to loss of blood ('blood flowing from the veins of our economy'). Furthermore, the initiative of foreign countries to extend economic assistance to the Philippines is seen as a necessary transfusion to propel it to development. Such economic assistance involved debt reduction which is viewed as 'vital' or life-saving/ life-sustaining.

On the other hand, extracts 54 and 55 present justifications for the Aquino government's policy of servicing foreign debt, a considerable part of which was 'contracted' during the presidency of Marcos. In these extracts from Aquino last two SONAs, justifications for debt service include the need to 'earn and maintain a place of honor and respect in the community of nations,' to maintain 'credibility before our international creditors,' and to respect the international banking system in order to ensure support for the newly restored but fragile democracy that was susceptible to threats and attacks. Again, the vital link between the national economy and global financial system, between the country or nation-state (also referred to as 'we', 'us' in extract 54) and the community of nations is established in the utterances. That the supposedly re-democratized Philippines was obligated a huge amount of debt incurred under the Marcos dictatorship in order to 'earn and maintain a place of honor and respect in the community of nations,' 'maintain credibility before international creditors' and to ensure support for democracy, however, underscored the seeming over-dependency or over-reliance of the national economy on the world financial institutions. Needless to say, it communicated that the country was under the patronage system controlled by these financial institutions.

5.4.5 GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE ECONOMY

As expected of SONAs, Aquino's speeches reported on what her government had done to address the dire conditions of the economy as well as outlined recommendations on how 'recovery' and 'growth' could be achieved and sustained. In this light, the national economy was conceptualized as something that can be revived or revitalized. Aquino underscored that economic recovery and sustained growth are only possible in the post-Marcos government founded on democratic ideals.

Throughout Aquino's national addresses, the new government had been portrayed to offer new hope for the nation in general and the national economy in particular to recover and regain its momentum for progress. The addresses underlay the conceptualization that THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE (AILING) NATIONAL ECONOMY. Extracts 56 to 59 below further illustrate the conceptualization of the national economy as a living system – one that can show signs of health, can be propelled and sustained to achieve growth, and can be pushed upward (upward mobility being a primary conceptual metaphor for growth):

56. I am pleased to report certain *healthy signs in the economy*. GNP posted a modest growth at 1.5 percent. Exports posted volume growth of 21.7 percent, (1987)
57. We have reaffirmed our faith in private initiative *to propel and sustain our economy* (1987)
58. Let me return to the measures taken *to spur the growth of the economy*. (1988)
59. We have *pushed the economy upward* by creating new jobs and sources of livelihood and moving millions of Filipinos out of the danger zone of poverty into the safety net of self-sufficiency with dignity (1991 WR)

Also, national economic recovery, revival or revitalization is especially evident in the following extracts with the living system conceptualization very much in the fore:

60. [It] is not world market but *a reinvigorated domestic economy that is paving the way to recovery*. (1987)
61. *We revived a dead economy* and in three years *had it well on the road to recovery*. The figures are well-known and unimpeachable, yet some bear repeating. (1989)

62. The *economic upturn* is reflected in the reduction of industrial actions. (1989)
63. Last year, our nation *bustled with productive energy*. (1990)
64. A total of 17 billion 480 million pesos in foreign investments poured into our country, 75 percent more than the previous year, evidence of the continuing confidence of the international community in *our economic recovery*. (1990)
65. *In all of our efforts to sustain the forces in our economy*, we have emphasized the use of science and technology. At present we are transferring technology from those who generate them to the end-users, especially in our rural areas. (1990)

It is interesting to note that the ‘recovery’ of the national economy is likened to a destination (‘way to recovery,’ ‘road to recovery’) and upward trajectory (‘economic upturn’), which is consistent with the conceptual metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY and MORE IS UP, examples well discussed in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). It may be inferred that the movement suggested by such expressions was instigated by the incumbent presidency which recommended specific measures in order to achieve the desired national economic goal or destination. Extracts 64 and 65 particularly demonstrate examples of these specific measures (i.e., encouraging foreign investment and the use science and technology) to build confidence as well as sustain the forces in the economy.

5.5 Peace and security

Considered the ‘enemies’ or anti-theses of democracy are ‘dictatorship,’ the ‘communist insurgency’ or ‘the Left,’ the ‘military adventurists/ rebels’ or ‘the Right,’ and criminality. With Aquino at the helm of the nation, however, ‘dictatorship’ from the presidential podium was no longer regarded as a major

national threat. Allusions to dictatorship in Aquino's congressional speeches only signified what the nation lost and how the nation suffered before the democratic restoration. They also served to allay fears of reverting to an authoritarian form of government that remained prevalent among a number of the Philippines' neighbors in the Southeast Asian region. This sentiment was validated by Aquino in her valedictory SONA when she said:

66. The formula for success is said to be *dictatorial government*. But we tried that already, with *worse results* than the most irresponsible democracy can produce. Besides, *the spirit of our race will not accept a dictatorship*; and memories, fresh as the *scars* it left, will not let us consider that option again. (1991)

In the extract, 'dictatorship' is set in stark contrast to 'democracy' by conceptualizing the former as 'worse' than 'the most irresponsible democracy' and as a non-option or non-choice for a people who have borne scars from the experience of dictatorial rule.

As if to emphasize that the period of Marcos dictatorship was an unpleasant time of the struggle for democracy in the Philippines, Aquino likened it to darkness in her accompanying 1991 Report to the Filipino People. The conceptualization DICTATORSHIP IS DARKNESS is rendered in the following extract:

67. The *dark night* is over. It ended in 1986. Our long day's passage to the brightest hour of our democracy continues. (1991 WR)

5.5.1 REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO THE DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE

The fresh 'scars' of Marcos dictatorship notwithstanding, what concerned the Aquino administration more was the persistence of the communist armed rebellion and the military coup that constantly challenged the leadership of Aquino. Together

with criminality, the communist rebellion and military coup attempts were considered as threats to the restored democratic society; thus, the conceptualization **REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE**.

In this sub-section, I shall discuss separately how the ‘major national threats’ (communist rebels, military adventurists, and criminals) are represented in the SONAs.

As a threat, the communist insurgency is vilified in the speeches (see extracts 68 to 71 below) as feeding on ‘hopelessness and confusion,’ brutal, self-destructive, immoral, cruel, opportunistic, and manipulative of the democratic system the Aquino leadership set in place.

68. When I took power 17 months ago, I was immediately called upon to deal with the dangerous combination of a severely distressed economy and *a growing insurgency – threats* which fed on each other and on the hopelessness and confusion which prevailed. (1987)
69. There will be no progress in our communities without order, without *securing the lives and properties of our citizens against criminality and insurgency*. (1989)
70. A better indicator is *the brutality* with which the *Communist leadership* has treated the common people and even their own ranks. This *self-destructive course* reveals *a movement whose organizational and moral center has ceased to hold*. This *picture of disarray* is both good and bad. For we must brace ourselves for *greater cruelties* from *a cause that is now indistinguishable from a common crime*. (1989)
71. Of course, the push for NGO partnership has not been without problems. In recent years, we have monitored the rise of almost 100 NGOs that have served as front organizations of *major threat groups like the CPP/NPA*, who systematically channel funding obtained from abroad to subversive activities which distort the efforts and priorities of this government. (1991 WR)

In the above mentioned extracts, items 69 and 70 are particularly interesting as the communist insurgency is collocated with ‘criminality’ and ‘common crime.’ This strategy suggests that the insurgency might no longer be treated as a movement with legitimate social and ideological concerns, but as ‘a cause indistinguishable from a common crime’ and bereft of a ‘moral center.’ This strategy justifies the use of military force in dealing with the insurgents, which will be discussed later in the chapter.

In a subtle way, the communist threat is also depicted as a parasite to the host villages or communities—a depiction which underlies the conceptual metaphor COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE. This implies that any measure proposed by the government to address the situation, especially measures involving the military, is curative:

72. We have reduced the fighting strength of the CPP/NPA by 19 percent by the end of 1989. And we brought down the number of *communist-affected barangays*⁵⁵ by nearly two-thousand, or 25 percent of the total number in 1988. (1990)
73. Our Armed Forces has been working closely with our civilian bureaucracy: constructing roads in *insurgency-infested areas*, actively participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts after natural disasters, as well as quelling attempts at seizing state power. (1991)
74. Development underscores the role of our civilian agencies in making a difference in responding to our people’s needs and expediting the delivery of services, especially in isolated and *insurgency-vulnerable communities*. (1991 WR)

⁵⁵ A barangay refers to a village or community that serves as the basic political unit of Philippine society.

The extracts through phrases such as ‘communist-affected barangays’, ‘insurgency-infested areas’, and ‘insurgency-vulnerable communities’ clearly establish that the host communities are held hostage to the insurgency that thrives in these areas and takes advantage of their vulnerability. But the severity of the communist threat is underscored by the conceptualization that THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS TERRORISM:

75. Every measure must be taken to protect the people’s security against *communist terrorism* while the CVO and CAFGU systems are put in place. (1988)
76. For *the armed Left*, it has been a year of defeats and retreats; a year of *propaganda by terror* rather than the strategic initiative of which I had boasted. The rejection of our peace efforts restored to Government the moral basis of war. (1989)
77. *Attempts to subvert the government under the deceptive cloak of winning the hearts and minds of our people* continue. As the CPP/NPA has realized that it has failed to reach its strategic stalemate stage this year, there are clearly signs of desperation, indicated by *attempts to increase terroristic acts* like bombings, a possible shift to the protracted people’s war, and monitored plans to forge ideological leanings. (1991 WR)

Using the domain of terrorism to conceptualize the communist insurgency is also carried out to represent the military rebels or the extreme right as in the conceptualization THE MILITARY REBELS ARE TERRORISTS. This is evident in the following extracts:

78. Our country is threatened by totalitarian slavery on the left and *reversion to fascist terror and corruption on the right*. (1987)
79. For a few days, these misguided elements *waged war against our people, employing a terrifying fear strategy* that unmasked all their

pretensions to ideological inclinations. Before our people, *they attempted to display brute force*, hoping to create an aura of armed victory. (1990)

80. *Terroristic activities of the ultra-rightist groups*, particularly the August bombings, like the Welgang Bayan, repelled rather than won the sympathies of the people. Already, some 841 *ultrarightist elements* have been neutralized. (1991 WR)

How the acts of terrorism by the military rebels affected democracy and the national life is exemplified in the following extracts:

81. One month after I stood here and sounded a call for unity, *the Right made its boldest and bloodiest move against the new democracy*. With *characteristic treachery*, it lunged in the middle of the night at the heart of the Republic. While the attack was repulsed, *the August 28 coup attempt almost wiped out the hard-won gains of the whole year and revived the nagging doubt that this country could have any future other than turmoil*. (1988)
82. As we, however, were making real headway in our socio-economic thrusts, *the enemies of our democracy, who comprised some two percent of the military, struck on December 1, 1989 in a futile bid to blunt the impact of the gains of our democracy*. (1990)
83. While there are still *a few within the AFP who continue to hang the sword of Damocles over our people*, I am proud to say that, on the whole, the Armed Forces of the Philippines continues to be the protector of our democratic gains. (1990)
84. By 1986, we had turned the economy around – in less than a year. We improved on that performance the year after. *This progress was cut off by the August '87 coup attempt*. (1991)
85. We were on the verge of a second take-off when *the December 1989 coup* broke out. *It drained the last drop of confidence in our future from all but the hardiest spirits, and shattered our image abroad* (1991)

86. But those natural calamities were preceded by another entirely the work of human hands: *the massive December 1989 military revolt that cut short a second economic recovery, after the dislocation caused by the earlier August 1987 coup attempt. That one strangled the powerful rebound of the Philippine economy after the EDSA Revolution.* (1991 WR)

These extracts recount how the military coup attempts especially in August 1987 and December 1989 worked as agents of destruction. They are rendered as damaging ('wiped out hard won gains'), destabilizing ('revived nagging doubt' of instability), anti-democratic (made 'a futile bid to blunt the impact of the gains of our democracy'), economically disruptive ('cut off'/'cut short' economic progress/recovery), predatorial ('drained the last drop of confidence in our future'), a destroyer of the country's international reputation ('shattered our image abroad'), and an economic obstruction ('strangled the powerful rebound of the Philippine economy'). The expressions vilify the military coups attempts and the rebels that waged these attempts, but they hardly addressed issues raised by the rebels, some of them legitimate ones. Extract 83 especially uses the expression 'continue to hang the sword of Damocles over our people' to suggest the persistence of adventurism in the military that to the President veered away from the military's constitutional role as protector of the nation's democratic gains. The expressions, which underlie the conceptual metaphor MILITARY REBELS ARE DESTROYERS, characterize the military rebels as destructive forces meant to stunt – i.e., cut off, cut short, strangle – (economic) growth or progress as well as to diminish – i.e., wipe out, blunt, shatter – the restored democratic government. In extract 81, the image of the military rebels as destroyers becomes more vivid with its portrayal as a treacherous, murderous plotter, who 'lunged in the middle of the night at the heart of the Republic.'

Another way of characterizing the military rebels in the SONA is through the demonization, which underlie suggesting the conceptual metaphor THE MILITARY COUP PLOTTERS ARE EVIL. In extract 87, the use of the term ‘evil design’ brings to the fore Aquino’s religious inclination. A devout Catholic, she must have conceived of her government in ‘a politico-spiritual plane’ where enemies of the state and of the democratic institutions which she helped put in place are considered ‘evil’ and bereft of moral basis (cf. Mamot, 1987). This is shown in the following example:

87. Once more, our people, and 98 percent of our armed forces who remained loyal to our Constitution, thwarted *the evil design of this band of military adventurists and their civilian supporters*. (1990)

It is important to note the use of the terms ‘misguided elements’ and ‘adventurists’ (extracts 79 and 87 above and 88 below). Like the Aquino government’s characterization of the communist insurgency, these terms portray the military rebels as thoughtless and lacking in morality (‘misguided’). This may be seen as a strategy to undermine whatever legitimate claims or concerns the military rebels had had to justify their actions:

88. While we have yet to fully recover from the consequences of the imprudence of these *misguided elements*, our resolve to move forward has not been diminished. This *failed adventurism* has underscored the fact that our restored democracy has gone past its fledgling stage. (1990)

5.5.2 THE MILITARY IS A DEFENDER OF DEMOCRACY

Given the threats posed by the communist and the military rebels, it was important for Aquino to define the role of the military in the post-Marcos government.

In her SONAs, particularly the last two ones, she emphasized the specific role of the military in her administration: **THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY.** An important strategic reformulation of the role of the military, this conceptualization is illustrated in the following extracts:

89. Our maturity is anchored, too, on *the commitment of our soldiers to our Constitutional democracy.* (1990)
90. While there are still a few within the AFP who continue to hang the sword of Damocles over our people, I am proud to say that, on the whole, *the Armed Forces of the Philippines continues to be the protector of our democratic gains.* Even as they perform their mandate of keeping peace and order in our land, they are also our partners in our development goals. (1990)
91. In the previous regime, the military establishment was viewed as part of the oppressive state machinery, instead of being the defender of the people. Not anymore. *Our Armed Forces has been working closely with our civilian bureaucracy: constructing roads in insurgency-infested areas, actively participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts after natural disasters, as well as quelling attempts at seizing state power.* (1991)

The second and third extracts above also emphasize that THE ARMED FORCES ARE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS and that they are PARTNERS OF THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY, respectively. These conceptualizations complement their role as defenders of the people and of constitutional democracy (extract 89 and 90). That the military forces are DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS is explicitly expressed in the line ‘they are also partners in our development goals’ (90). On the other hand, their conceptualization as PARTNERS OF CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY is expressed and further substantiated in extract 91. In the extract, Aquino regarded the following as examples of the military’s partnership with the civil bureaucracy: ‘constructing roads in

insurgency-infested areas, actively participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts after natural disasters, as well as quelling attempts at seizing state power.’ These expressions render the military as builders, rescuers, and protectors of the state—roles that manifest support for the civilian bureaucracy.

Such civilian-military partnership is also explicated in the following:

92. I am pleased to note that even in our peace and order efforts, *the partnership is applied*. The civilian sector continues to play a vital role in our integrated strategy towards the attainment of these goals. *This partnership is evident in our various inter-agency councils, such as the peace and order, the regional development, and the national reconciliation and development councils.* (1990)

In the extract, what is conveyed is that the partnership generated under the Aquino administration involved reciprocity between the two sectors. While, on the one hand, the military had been involved in civilian or non-military activities like ‘constructing roads’ and ‘participating in relief and rehabilitation efforts’ (91) the civilian sector, on the other, had been engaged in ‘peace and order efforts’ as purportedly evidenced by ‘various inter-agency councils’ created towards this end (92). The engagement of the civilian sector is underscored by pointing out that it ‘continues to play a vital role’ the ‘integrated strategy.’ The expression plays up the supposed strong partnership between the two parties—the military and the civilians. It however tends to keep under wraps the military abuses in the countryside most prevalent after the Aquino administration took a more conservative position, one that is veered towards the right, as well as the recurring tension between the military and left-leaning members of the country’s civil society.

5.5.3 MILITARY FORCE IS PEACE-MAKING

On the other hand, the characterization of the military as a development partner bolsters the conceptual frame that **THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST AND MILITARY REBELS IS PEACE-MAKING**. This is established with the following more specific conceptualizations that also serve as reasons or supporting statements.

- (a) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY
- (b) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY
- (c) THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION IS MORAL ACT

The following extract expresses statement (a) where the use of military force is recontextualized as 'security operations,' a lexical choice that lends legitimacy to its adoption by a democratic government. It is established as a component of a broader counter-insurgency strategy that includes 'development' and 'reconciliation':

93. The Government strategy to quell the insurgency consists of three simultaneous approaches: (1) Development; (2) Reconciliation; and (3) *Security Operations*. Development underscores the role of our civilian agencies in making a difference in responding to our people's needs and expediting the delivery of services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable communities. Reconciliation provides options for rebel returnees to merge quietly back into the mainstream of our society. *Security operations* become necessary only when there are monitored hostile activities of armed groups, posing peace and order problems and a threat to the lives of our innocent citizens. Successful security operations led to the neutralization of at least 50 CPP/NPA leaders, eight of whom are Central Committee members and the rest being leaders of various functional and territorial commissions. The combined development and reconciliation efforts have also led to a reduction of barangays affected by the armed communist insurgency.

Today, it is estimated that only 4,841 or 12% of the 40,848 barangays nationwide are affected. (1991 WR)

In the extract, the pursuit of ‘security operations’ is conditional: ‘only when there are monitored hostile activities of armed groups, posing peace and order problems and a threat to the lives of our innocent civilians’ will it become necessary. What the extract aims to do is to equate ‘security operations’ with the ‘neutralization’ of the communist rebels. Further examples of the act of neutralizing the insurgents are cited below. What is interesting to note in the extracts is how the objects of neutralization are expressed. That ‘sixty three ranking communist leaders,’ twelve of whom were ‘top ranking national leaders of the CPP/NPA’ were ‘neutralized’ highlights an achievement of the Aquino government in the area of national peace and security. On the other hand, that ‘threats posed by extremist elements will continue to be neutralized and minimized’ underscore the government’s aversion to extremism. Furthermore, in both extracts, neutralization of the communist rebels is expressed in passive form (‘were neutralized’; ‘will continue to be neutralized and minimized’); however, while extract 94 appears to downplay the role of government in the act of neutralization, extract 95 foregrounds the significance of citizens’ participation in the act of neutralization (‘Through determined citizen vigilance and active cooperation with government’).

94. Sixty three ranking communist leaders were *neutralized*. Of this, 12 were top ranking national leaders of the CPP/NPA. (1990)
95. Through determined citizen vigilance and active cooperation with government, we are confident that the threats posed by extremist elements will continue to be *neutralized* and minimized. (1991 WR)

It is interesting to note that the harsh connotation of security operations is mitigated by highlighting that counter-insurgency involves development and reconciliation as shown in extracts 96, 97, and 98.

96. *Development* underscores the role of our civilian agencies in making a difference in responding to our people's needs and expediting the delivery of services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable communities. (1991 WR)
97. *We won back to the stream of society* thousands more of armed insurgents. (1991 WR)
98. *Reconciliation* provides options for rebel returnees to *merge quietly back into the mainstream of our society*. (1991 WR)

Extract 96 again highlights the civilian-military partnership by explaining that 'development' in the government's counter-insurgency program emphasizes the role of civilian agencies 'in responding to people's needs and expediting the delivery of services, especially in isolated and insurgency-vulnerable communities.' This implies that within the counter-insurgency framework, 'security operations' waged by the military and development work pursued by the civilian agencies are complementary tasks in helping alleviate the conditions of the communities affected by insurgency. On the other hand, extracts 97 and 98, which express winning back thousands of armed insurgents 'to the stream of society' or 'merging quietly back into the mainstream society,' suggest that within the framework of the government's counter-insurgency, the rebels are offered the option to be integrated back, as it were, into lawful Philippine social system. In both extracts, the conceptual metaphor SOCIETY IS A RIVER is realized by such expressions as 'the stream of society' (97) and 'the mainstream society' (98). The image of a stream or watercourse is particularly useful

in suggesting a desired flow or course towards a specific direction. To say that rebels or dissidents should join or merge back into the '(main)stream of society' most certainly privileges the direction or flow as defined or determined by those in power or those who assume the dominant position in society. It denies potential differences or counterflows as they are considered inimical to the status quo.

The belligerent tone is underplayed when the fight against insurgency is seen within the framework of democracy. This brings to the fore two related conceptualizations: DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON AGAINST INSURGENCY and THE USE OF THE MILITARY FORCE IS DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY. The first evidently runs across the four extracts below while the second is suggested in extracts 100 and 101.

99. To all of you in this chamber today who are here because you won at the ballot box, *democracy is beating back the challenge of the totalitarian Left*. We are winning because we have given back to the people control of their lives and faith in the future. To that renewed hope we add *the fresh vigor of a new army of democracy*. Above all, we now have a future. (1988)
100. My assessment of the peace and order situation is mixed. With regard to the insurgency, the tide has turned – I believe permanently. *The main weapons were democracy, a greater concern by government for rural needs, the economic recovery, a heightened respect for political and human rights, and a deeper commitment to their proper mission on the part of the Armed Forces*. (1989)
101. In summary, *we have beaten the insurgents less by fighting than by the example of our humanity, our concern, and the impact of our economic progress*. (1989)
102. But I believe then – and time has proved me right – that this nation shall find no greater source of strength to defend democracy than in the enjoyment of all its rights and liberties. *Democracy is our faith and the root of our strength to defend it*. (1989)

Democracy as A WEAPON AGAINST INSURGENCY is realized in such expressions as ‘democracy is beating back the challenge of the totalitarian left,’ ‘the fresh vigor of a new army of democracy’ (99); ‘[t]he main weapons were democracy...’ (100); ‘we have beaten the insurgents...by the example of our humanity, our concern, and impact of our economic progress’ (101); and ‘[d]emocracy is...the root of our strength to defend it’ (102). While the expression in extract 101 does not directly point to democracy as a weapon or an instrument of defense, the values that Aquino articulated—‘example of our humanity, our concern, and impact of our economic progress’—in her speech communicated the democratic ideals that she advanced (see section 5.2), thus, making it possible to suggest that they were Aquino’s democratic instruments with which she had ‘beaten the insurgents.’

Meanwhile, the conceptual metaphor THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY is subtly suggested in extracts 100 and 101. In both extracts, the application of military force or the pursuit of ‘security operations’ (by the Philippine Armed Forces) gets hidden or obscured when articulations of non-military efforts such as ‘democracy’ (100), ‘a great concern by the government for rural needs’ (100), ‘a heightened respect for political and human rights’ (100), ‘humanity’ (101), and ‘economic recovery/ progress’ (100 and 101) are pointed out as ‘the main weapon’ against the insurgents. In 100, the use of the military force is implied in the expression ‘a deeper commitment to their proper mission on the part of the Armed Forces,’ one that appears to couch the militarist component of the counter-insurgency framework in soaring rhetoric. Moreover, the phrase ‘a deeper commitment to their proper mission’ suggests that the armed forces’ engagement with the communist rebels was sanctioned by Aquino’s democratic government as long as

the mission of fighting the communists was clearly and correctly understood ('proper') by the military men and that commitment to such mission was intensified (made 'deeper'). In 101, the conceptual metaphor is expressed in the line 'we have beaten the insurgents less by fighting' which seems to downplay the role of the military in the government's counter-insurgency efforts. Notwithstanding such suggestion, the expression still indicates that Aquino's democratic government recognized the armed forces (the 'fighting') as having contributed to the purported defeat of the insurgents.

Another way of justifying the use of military force is to establish that it is a moral act. This line of reasoning is pursued in the following extracts:

103. *The application of force will be as effective as it is judicious.* The operational thrust of our armed forces is predicated on deterrence, preemption and destruction. (1987)
104. Some will say that force does not address the roots of insurgency. I will answer: Indeed, for such roots are addressed by measures of economic improvement and equitable distribution. *But such measures also need time to bear fruit, time that only feats of arms and negotiating from strength can buy us.* (1987)
105. We have chosen to improve our capability to effectively manage force not so that we who desire peace could wage war but rather, *so that those who would war upon us will realize, by the deadlines of our riposte, the virtues of peace.* (1987)
106. Thus, *'we shall bear arms for the intent of bearing them is just,'* and, if necessary, we shall mourn our dead by celebrating the birth of generations whose legacy shall be one nation, free, upright and prosperous. (1990)

'The application of force' is seen as a well-thought out decision ('judicious'), a necessity ('But such measures also need time to bear fruit, time that only feats of arms

and negotiating from strength can buy us'), peace-oriented, and 'just.' Interestingly, in extract 106, Aquino paraphrased lines from Shakespeare's *King Henry IV* to establish the justness of the government's intention to apply force or 'bear arms.'

It is important to note that Aquino was emphatic in pursuing and exhausting peaceful dialogues and negotiations in spite of the application of military force to address the problem of insurgency:

107. ... we shall continue to *exhaust measures and avenues that will involve all our people in the task of moral and material reconstruction and national unity*. (1987)

108. Meanwhile, we have kept the door open for *peaceful negotiations*. The Cabinet Cluster on Security and Political Development continues to conduct *peace dialogues and negotiations* with the Multisectoral Peace Advocates. In the simplicity of our lives, we are relearning *peaceful means of approaching and resolving conflicts* and articulating needs and fears as a key strategy of democracy. National unity, after all, must be forged amidst the diversity of opinions, cultures, and ideologies in our pluralistic society. *The power of massive peace*, which our people had shown at EDSA, *serves as a beacon light in our continuing efforts to rebuild a just society*. (1991 WR)

In all these configurations, it is important to consider that the SONAs are not just a mere recounting of and accounting for the plight of the nation but a national assessment pursued by the incumbent leadership. It is then necessarily a means by the president to represent her leadership or her government. In the next section, I discuss what representations of the Aquino government emerge from and are necessarily privileged in her five SONAs.

5.6 The presidency

Given earlier conceptualizations of the nation as a living entity sustained by an evolving democratic system, of communist and military rebellion as threats to the democratic way of life, and of the militarist solution as an act sanctioned by the government in defending democracy and fighting against communist and ‘ultra-rightist’ threats, it is not difficult to derive the following conceptualization of the Aquino government’s place in the national schema: **THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY.**

As a sanctioning agent of the use of military force against the communist and military rebels, the government under the Aquino watch established itself as A MORAL COMBATANT. In the following extracts, Aquino positioned her administration as having the ‘moral basis,’ the ‘moral edge,’ the ‘moral ascendancy’ in the conflict with the insurgents:

109. The rejection of our peace efforts restored to Government *the moral basis of war*. (1988)
110. Yet, they must do this (civilians defending their communities) with the same respect for human lives and disciplined restraint we expect of our soldiers in dealing with non-combatants. Let us not lose *the moral edge to this conflict*. (1988)
111. I have already noted the progress that has been made against the insurgency. The increasing isolation of the rebels has allowed military operations to succeed as never before. But such operations must take greater care to avoid collateral damage to the civilian population. For *our moral ascendancy* has accounted for the greater part of *our superiority in this conflict*. The protection of human rights even under conditions of conflict must be a key consideration in military operations and missions. (1989)

The government's 'moral' position established by the above-mentioned utterances complements the justification that militarist solution, packaged as 'security operations' in the counter-insurgency strategy, is a democratic solution to communist rebellion. Working in conjunction with such positioning is the government's characterization as an AGENT OF PEACE through 'respect and protection of human rights' evident in extracts 110 and 111 above and explicated in extract 112 below:

112. *One of the underpinnings of our government is peace through respect and protection of human rights.* Human rights may well be the heart of our democracy. Thus, immediately upon assumption to office, we restored the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, repealed the decrees on Preventive Detention Action (PD 1877 and 1877-A) and released political prisoners. We also created the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. Our 1987 Constitution then provided for an independent Commission on Human Rights to investigate all forms of human rights violations and to recommend measures that would further promote human rights. *We have also directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the police to comply strictly with the required legal processes in all cases of arrests and detentions,* and approved the designation of all city and provincial state prosecutors as human rights coordinators. (1991 WR)

But while it espoused 'peace,' Aquino's government saw the inevitability of using force in order to be the PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE from the armed rebels. Such is reflected in the following:

113. I wish we could still pursue the path of peace. Yet until the NPA and their friends come to trust their doctrines to the ballot box rather than the armalite, *Government has no choice except to defend our people with the gun.* (1988)

Ultimately, the Aquino presidency projected and presented itself publicly as THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY through out its SONAs. This intimation is evident in the following extracts:

114. *My mandate was not just to make a country rich, but to make democracy work: To make it work as a system of genuine popular participation. To make it meaningful to the lives of the common people by giving them jobs and justice, work with dignity, health and education, and reason to hope that the future will be better for themselves and their children. (1988)*

115. *When the two Houses of our Congress, therefore, meet in this Fourth Regular Session, there are two things I shall ask of you. First, I ask you to consider and appreciate the significance of this time in our history. I ask you to consider the options for a giant step forward that are arrayed before us. And second, I ask you to address a legislative agenda that will push our democracy further into that level of maturity – a higher level of maturity necessary to the rebuilding of our nation. (1990)*

116. *On June 30, 1992, the traditional ceremony of political succession will unfold at the Luneta. The last time it was done that way was in 1965. I shall be there with you to proudly witness the event. This is the glory of democracy, that its most solemn moment should be the peaceful transfer of power. (1991)*

In 114, Aquino categorically asserted that her mandate ‘was not just to make the country rich, but to make democracy work.’ The assertion itself articulates the conceptualization that THE AQUINO PRESIDENCY IS THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY. That Aquino openly expressed in her national address her mandate—to make democracy work as ‘a system of popular genuine participation’ and to make it ‘meaningful to the lives of the common people’—communicates that she acknowledged her responsibility in the democratization process and that she had a stake in the direction the process had taken.

The sense of responsibility and ownership in the democratization process expressed in 114 is further realized in extract 115, where Aquino, whose constitutional mandate was to annually report on the state of the nation before members of the Philippine Congress, asked congressional representatives and senators ‘to address a legislative agenda that will push our democracy further into that level of maturity – a higher level of maturity necessary to the rebuilding of our nation.’ What is important to note here is how the evolution of democracy into ‘a higher level of maturity necessary to the rebuilding of the nation’ is going to be instigated or induced, as it were, by a legislative agenda that Aquino recommended to Congress. The extract makes a case for the configuration of two conceptualizations or frames mentioned in this chapter: **DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE** and **THE AQUINO PRESIDENCY IS THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY**. What may be surmised from this configuration is the presupposition that in Aquino’s presidential rhetoric, it was the Aquino presidency—who led the transition from the Marcos dictatorship to democracy—that sustained Philippine national life during that period.

The configuration is also evident in 116 where Aquino, during her valedictory SONA in 1991, declared that the ‘traditional ceremony of political succession’ would take place on the constitutionally authorized date. This was of course meant to dispel rumors that she would run for president in the 1992 elections.⁵⁶ By declaring so and promising that ‘I shall be there with you to proudly witness the event,’ Aquino sealed her fate as the primary agent of democracy. Although she was not constrained by the

⁵⁶ Aquino, who was brought to power through ‘people power’ uprising or extra-constitutional means, was not covered by the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the incumbent president to run for a second term. At the time of her presidency, there were talks of making her consider getting a fresh full term as president under the new charter.

1987 Charter to run for six-year presidential term in the 1992 presidential election, Aquino thought it best to follow the constitution to the letter. And by describing ‘the peaceful transfer of power’ as ‘the glory of democracy’ and ‘its most solemn moment,’ she established a striking difference between her and Marcos. While Marcos sought to perpetuate himself in power, she was willing to relinquish power to another leader. Thus, as Aquino proved her presidency to be THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY through her rhetoric, she likewise drew a distinction between her presidency and that of Marcos, suggesting that it was the Marcos dictatorship that weakened Philippine democracy (q.v. section 5.2.1).

Before I conclude this chapter, I wish to note the observation that Aquino’s presidential discourse is laced with allusions to spiritual activity or guidance, as demonstrated in the following:

117. Mr. Senate President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress, join me now in expressing our congratulations and deepest gratitude to those who have this day *by God’s grace* given to the nation the fully ripened fruit of freedom – ang ating kababayan, ang mamamayang Pilipino. (1987)
118. ...the Filipino who symbolizes *the great Asian miracle*: a revolution without blood, a democratic restoration without tears. (1988)
119. Let me make myself especially clear on this point: I shall complete *the work that God gave us to do* – to make a new nation, strong, and free and prosperous. (1989)
120. *By the grace of God and the unshakeable faith of the Filipino people*, I am confident we will pull through. (1990)
121. I hope that history will judge me favorably as our people still regard me, because, *as God is my witness*, I honestly did the best I could. No more can be asked of any man. (1991)

Such carefully laced references to spiritual guidance reinforce the point mentioned earlier that Aquino's presidency operated within 'a politico-spiritual plane.'

5.7 Summary

The configuration of all the above-mentioned conceptualizations—conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors constituted the overall schema of the state of the nation during the incumbency of President Corazon Aquino in so far as her annual congressional speeches were concerned. It is a schema that regards democratic restoration as vital to national life in that it enables the full development of the national economy and ensures the country's peace and security.

The analysis and discussion in this chapter show a multi-level conceptualization of the life of the nation and the evolving but fragile democratic system within which such national life was circumscribed. They establish that the schema of the state of the nation was constructed via a multi-layered configuration of frames, conceptual metaphors and their entailments across the five national addresses that tended to revolve or play around the key theme of democracy and/or the process of democratization.

Emphasis on democracy and democratization—its emergence as a key theme—in the Aquino congressional speeches may be explained by the socio-political context of the Aquino presidency, Cory Aquino's persona as a heroine of democracy and the anti-thesis of Marcos, and the conscious effort of the Aquino administration to 'de-Marcosify' the Philippine government and society especially by contrasting Marcos's dictatorial rule with that of the Aquino presidency. The Aquino presidency was a period of transition from dictatorship to democracy and it was through the

Aquino leadership that democratic institutions, basic freedoms, and liberties were restored. Aquino was of course the emergent leader who vowed to repudiate the dictatorial style of Marcos leadership by being the very anti-thesis of Marcos (Thompson 1995) and by enacting in her public addresses a contrast between the ‘dark’ period of martial rule and the ‘democratized’ state of the nation after 1986. These actions were consistent with the persona or the kind of image or characterization Aquino had cast for herself throughout her political career.

In the Aquino SONAs, the framing of democracy as **AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE** is multi-faceted and multi-layered as evidenced by the various conceptual metaphors underlying the metaphorical expressions on democracy in the texts.

Democracy’s evolution is particularly made evident by conceptual metaphors that suggest a trajectory from one stage/ level to a higher one: **DEMOCRACY IS A BUILDING/ STRUCTURE** and **DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY**. The first conceptual metaphor is realized through expressions that suggest movement from destruction to restoration while the second is realized through metaphorizations suggesting recovery from illness, development from a fledgling stage to maturity or revitalization. It is this movement from one less desired state to a desired one that the Aquino government considered worth celebrating, thus the conceptualization **DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT**.

The celebratory take on democracy is further sustained by discourses that talk about what kind of achievement democracy is, why it is a cause for celebration, what it offers, how it works for or sustains the life of the nation, and how it can be nurtured. These discourses underlie two complementary conceptual metaphors that add layers to Aquino’s framing of Philippine democracy. On the one hand, there is the

conceptualization of democracy as a national possession that needs to be protected and defended from threats or as an object of nurture that draws sustenance from ‘people power.’ On the other hand, democracy is conceptualized as an agent that is life-sustaining. This agentic representation of democracy is realized in metaphorical expressions that render democracy as a benefactor of the people, a resource for people power, cure to national ills, and as the key to a ‘people powered economy’ or ‘people powered capitalism’ conducive for growth.

That democracy and people power are mutually sustaining elements generates the notion that DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER, which is not at all surprising given the fact that the 1987 Constitution—one of the products of the revolutionary government of Cory Aquino—has institutionalized the concept of people power.⁵⁷ Curiously, however, the conceptualization of democracy as THE KEY TO PEOPLE POWERED CAPITALISM appears to be a mere departure from how neoliberal policies were communicated to the public during the Marcos presidency. Recall that in the martial law rhetoric of President Marcos, ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ was necessary to facilitate the ‘export-led industrialization’ and the ‘opening of the economy,’ including the pursuit of the structural adjustment plans prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Since the martial law rhetoric no longer functioned as a convenient justification for the pursuit of neoliberal policies, the use of ‘people power’ rhetoric or the rhetoric of democracy was a logical choice. In other words, the same adherence to economic liberalization adopted by Marcos was pursued under the

⁵⁷ Former Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban suggests that ‘People Power’ is embodied in the 1987 Constitution. This he asserts in his column at the *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, ‘With Due Respect’ (http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/columns/view/20100515-270223/Thunderous_triumph_of_People_Power (Available 17 May 2010)). This view is also shared by Eugenia Apostol, founding chair of the Foundation for Worldwide People Power (see <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100222-254614/How-to-live-the-way-of-People-Power> (Retrieved on 17 May 2010)).

Aquino administration, only that in the latter, such policy was veiled under the rhetoric of people power.

The multi-layered framing of democracy was well entrenched in the Aquino rhetoric in that it figured quite prominently in the conceptualization of other significant themes such as national economy, national security, and the presidency. For example, democratization was seen as instrumental to the recovery and growth of the national economy conceptualized in the Aquino speeches as a manifestation of national life. Democracy was also used to justify policies that have to do with the insurgency and peace and order (e.g., THE USE OF FORCE IS A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY). Finally, the Aquino government or presidency, which was ushered into power through a mass movement to restore democracy and which had carried the agenda of democratization, presented and projected itself in the speeches as the PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY. That the Aquino government cast itself as such is significant in the overall framing of Philippine democracy and in the schema of the state of the nation at large. It is significant in that such conceptualization/ characterization has become an important measure for evaluating the actions and public policies of the Aquino presidency and the presidencies that came after.

The framing of Philippine democracy in the national addresses of Cory Aquino most certainly had implications on the public policies pursued under her term as president. It was under this framing that economic liberalization policies, the militarist solution to communist insurgency, and government partnership with non-governmental and people's organizations were realized. The framing launched the creation of realities that were bound to be recontextualized and adopted by the succeeding post-Marcos presidencies. The multi-layered framing of democracy and its

configuration with the framing of other themes manifest that the national addresses were implicated in an evolving contextual matrix, that is, social, political, cultural, national, and global. This accounts for a schema of the state of nation that is discursively complex and that would set the tone for the construction of schemas in succeeding presidencies.

Chapter 6

Fidel V. Ramos and the Construction of 'Global Competitiveness'

6.1 Introduction

The presidency of Fidel V. Ramos, former defense chief and successor of Corazon Aquino has been associated with the slogan 'Philippines 2000'—a term which encapsulates Ramos' vision for the Philippines as a newly industrialized country (NIC). Considered a challenge for Ramos was how to steer the country towards NIC-hood within the context of a democratic system that had just been restored by the previous administration after years of authoritarian leadership under Marcos (Thompson and Macaranas 2006). Ramos articulates this vision of NIC-hood through his State of the Nation Addresses. These addresses I argue underlie a schema of national development that puts premium on 'global competitiveness.' This schema, constituted by a complex of conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors realized in Ramos' SONAs, may be expressed, thus:

The new world economic order is a survival of the fittest socio-economic order. It is an inevitable state of affairs where economies compete with one another. The Philippines, in order to survive in the new order, needs to transform itself into a newly industrialized country and be globally competitive. To be a competitive player in the global socio-economic order, the Philippines has to pole vault towards its development goals. Pole vaulting towards development can be done by using democracy as a comparative advantage and a competitive edge, by ensuring political stability through peace and order and the defense of national security, and by pursuing economic reforms that will ensure economic growth and sustainable development.

In this chapter, I discuss how such schema is realized or expressed metaphorically in the SONAs of Ramos throughout his six-year term. As in the

previous chapter on Aquino’s SONAs, the discussion below looks into four themes or concerns that are likewise examined in the rest of the analytical chapters. These four themes are democracy, national economy, national security/ peace and order, and the presidency. The following table shows the theme/ topic-specific conceptual metaphors derived from the SONAs of Ramos.

Table 6.1 Conceptual Frames in Fidel V. Ramos’ SONAs

Section	Theme	Conceptual Frames
6.3	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE • DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS
6.4	National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS • POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR
6.5	Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS • PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE • GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED WAR
6.6	The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT • THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER

A historical milieu of the Ramos administration (1992-1998) is provided in section 6.2 of this chapter to help contextualize the conceptual frames and metaphors that are discussed in the analytical sections that follow.

6.2 Historical milieu of the Ramos presidency (1992-1998)

Fidel V. Ramos, note Malaya and Malaya (2004), came to power with three handicaps. First, he was elected as a minority president, having won the elections among seven candidates with less than a quarter of popular votes. Second, he was a Protestant in a predominantly Catholic nation. And third, his background as former Chief of the Philippine Constabulary (PC) under Marcos and Armed Forces Chief under Aquino 'evoked fears of militarization' (260).

Having graduated from the United States West Point, Ramos had a sterling military career in the Philippines. When he was appointed Chief of Staff of the constabulary by Marcos, he was considered 'a moderating influence in the Marcos-controlled military' (ibid.).

Ramos is considered an EDSA people power hero for breaking with the Marcos regime on 22 February 1986. He was joined by then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile. Their defection was backed by the influential Catholic archbishop, Jaime Cardinal Sin, who called on Filipinos to assemble at the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) to protect Ramos and his fellow defectors. Hundreds of thousands of people responded to the Cardinal's call leading to what is now touted as the EDSA people power revolt that sent the Marcoses into exile.

Ramos' rallying principles in his 6-year term were 'people empowerment' and 'global competitiveness.' His vision for the Philippines as a newly industrialized country was encapsulated in the slogan 'Philippines 2000.' His presidency has been noted to have sustained the economic liberalization pursued by Aquino and her team particularly in telecommunications, insurance, transportation, and energy sectors (261). He took the 'unpopular, yet necessary, move of deregulating the oil industry, ending decades of subsidized oil prices' (ibid.).

Economic growth and a relatively significant decline in poverty during the Ramos administration earned for the Philippines the label ‘emerging tiger’ economy.

Worth noting during his administration is the signing of peace agreements with the rightist Rebolusyong Alyansang Makabayan (RAM) and the separatist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which was created to materialize his accord with the MNLF, won for him the 1997 UNESCO Peace Prize.

Despite the modest economic gains and the historic peace accord with military rebels and Moro separatists, the Ramos presidency was marred by a number of challenges and controversies. These include: the Delia Maga-Flor Contemplacion case in Singapore ‘which exposed the vulnerability of millions of Filipino overseas workers,’ allegations of corruption in a land deal with a private company, the inconclusive peace talks with the communist movement, the proposed Charter change initiative that was purportedly meant to prolong Ramos’ stay in power, the El Nino drought, and the 1997 Asian financial crisis (262).

6.3 Democracy

Ramos employed two conceptual frames when he dealt with the theme of democracy in his SONAs. The first, expressed through his earlier speeches, reaffirmed the frame set off by his predecessor while the second was more attuned to the idea of global competitiveness which undergirded his presidential schema.

6.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE

Having participated in the people power revolution that toppled the Marcos dictatorship and having been at the helm of defending the newly restored democratic government against challenges from the military and the Philippine Left, Ramos was inevitably disposed to invoke democracy—the much valued term in the immediate post-Marcos presidency—in his major presidential speeches. In fact his first three congressional speeches delivered from 1992 to 1994 talked of democracy as a SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH (1992), A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (1993), A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY, and FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE OF INITIATING CHANGE (1994). In other words, Ramos reaffirmed, at least rhetorically, the democratic values carried over from the previous administration. The extracts below demonstrate what I mean:

1. Certainly, we are today *a nation confirmed in our constitutional democracy*: strengthened by the trials we have weathered. (1992)
2. *Development is impossible if it is not people-powered and people-centered*. Whenever foreign observers look at our country, their principal wonder is how we have managed to languish in underdevelopment in spite of our tremendous human resources – specially our labor force – their literacy, their competence, their resourcefulness, their high sense of moral values. (1993)
3. Perhaps, it is because the kind of democracy we have known – for the better part of the century – has emphasized the individual over the community; private gain over the public good; civic rights over civic duties. But, in truth, *the concept of civic duty is the core of the historic tradition of democracy everywhere*. (1994)
4. We Filipinos have already won our democratic revolution. History has made our culture of freedom proof against tyranny. Of course, freedom by itself does not bring about progress. But it provides *the most enduring foundation stone for the good society* we are trying to build – for ourselves and for those who will come after us. (1994)

5. Our democracy is far from perfect – but *it works well enough for us to be able to move it away from the politics of patronage, guns, goons, and gold.* (1994)

Extract 1 underlies the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL STRENGTH ('a nation is confirmed in our constitutional democracy'). The term 'confirmed' specifically brings to the fore the notion that the nation is well entrenched—therefore, strengthened—in the 'constitutional democracy' restored by the Aquino government. A restatement of Aquino's conceptualization of democracy as instrumental to economic growth is evident in extract 2 which establishes that 'people power' is imperative to development (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT). Both extracts 3 and 4 point to the conceptualization of democracy as A STRUCTURE, one that has a 'core' and that serves as 'foundation stone' while extract 5 suggests that democracy can effect change—A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM CAPABLE OF INITIATING CHANGE—in a political culture mired in patronage and the tradition of 'guns, goons, and gold.' These conceptualizations derived from the extracts run consistent with Aquino's framing of democracy as **AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE.**

6.3.2 DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS

Interestingly, it was in his latter speeches, particularly in his 1995 and 1997 addresses, that Ramos articulated a significant shift in the way democracy should be viewed in the post-Marcos Philippine society. While he admitted that 'once upon a time, democracy was a millstone around our neck'—an apparent concession to Singapore's former Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew's cutting remark on democracy in the Philippines during the latter's state visit, Ramos emphasized that the 'Philippine-style democracy' (see extract 6 to 9 below) can be seen as the country's 'competitive

edge’ (1995) or ‘unique comparative advantage’ (1997) in the new global economic order. These conceptualizations, it should be noted, appear to relate to the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT (as shown in extract 2 above) which is similar to Aquino’s conceptualization of democracy as A KEY TO A PEOPLE POWERED ECONOMY CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH (see Section 5.3.4 of Chapter 5). However, the metaphorizations of democracy as a ‘competitive edge’ and ‘unique comparative advantage’ suggest that the national goal is not just development or economic growth, but global competitiveness, which is necessary for national survival. Democracy is conceptualized in these metaphoric expressions as that which would distinguish the Philippines from its economic competitors. Needless to say, these metaphorizations are consistent with the Ramos schema of national development mentioned earlier.

Specifically, Ramos’ conceptualization of Philippine style democracy as ‘our competitive edge’ afforded him the opportunity to discuss its potential—what it does best in consonance with the demands of the times (re: new economic order) (6), what it demands from the Filipinos (7), and what needs to be done with it in order to adapt to the demands of the future (8).

6. *Philippine-style democracy is our competitive edge—because democracy—by awakening and mobilizing ordinary people to the possibilities of their lives—enlarges tremendously our talent pool of enterprise, knowledge and productivity.* (1995)
7. *But let us not forget that the democratic way – by enlarging the latitude for debate and dissension – also demands harder work, greater cohesiveness – and social responsibility – from every one of us.* (1995)
8. *If our democracy is to adapt to the dynamism – of society, culture and politics – which is the wave of the future, then it must become more pervasive, more participatory.* (1995)

Note that in extract 6, it is conceptualized as a kind of booster that ‘awakens’ and ‘mobilizes’ ordinary people to the possibilities of their lives and that ‘enlarges’ the ‘talent pool of enterprise, knowledge and productivity.’ The word group ‘talent pool of enterprise, knowledge and productivity’ is particularly in consonance with the globalist discourse (Fairclough 2006) and neoliberalism (Bourdieu 1998).

While building on the agentic quality accorded to democracy in extract 6, extracts 7 and 8 present certain conditions that Ramos deemed necessary to maintain democracy’s role as a competitive edge in the global economic order. These conditions ‘demanded’ by the ‘democratic way’ and impelled by the need to ‘adapt to the dynamism’ are couched in terms that tend to communicate the values of free competition: ‘harder work’, ‘greater cohesiveness’, ‘social responsibility’, ‘pervasive’ and ‘participatory.’ ‘Harder work’ connotes discipline which is highly valued in the frame of competition (Lakoff 2008, 79-80). ‘Greater cohesiveness’ and ‘social responsibility’ are terms that easily counteract ideas of individual freedom and dissent. ‘Pervasive’ and ‘participatory,’ while very much suggestive of freedom and democracy, may also mean lack of regulation or de-control, which are consistent with the free market ideology or ‘conservative worldview’ (62-63). Interestingly, these terms are emphasized as they are situated in independent clauses that convey imperativeness (‘demands’ and ‘must’).

Ramos’ final SONA (1997) reinforced this notion of democracy as a **PRECURSOR/ PRECONDITION FOR GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS**. In his remark, he emphasized the inevitability of democracy in a market-oriented global economic landscape.

9. And we cannot allow our democracy to wither – because *Philippine democracy is our unique comparative advantage in the new global order.*

(Applause) *Only democracy can release the spirit of enterprise and creativity among our people. And without freedom, economic growth is meaningless.* (1997)

In extract 9, democracy is again conceptualized as an organic entity ('wither'), but it is cast more directly as a significant factor that is supposed to put the Philippines on the lead ('our unique comparative advantage') in the context of 'the new global order.' The vitality of democracy, which can be inferred from the metaphorization of it as an organic entity (another realization of the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY), is then seen as instrumental in the Philippines' survival and fortitude in the competitive world context. The extract also appears to reverberate Aquino's conceptualization of democracy as KEY TO PEOPLE POWERED ECONOMY CONDUCIVE TO GROWTH ('Our democracy *can release the spirit of enterprise and creativity among our people*'). Seen within the frame of global competition, however, such conceptualization in Aquino's rhetoric appears limited in scope. In Aquino's terms, economic growth and development are the end goals of re-democratization while in Ramos', the economic growth and development propelled by the restored democracy are just means to an end.

In summary, while he echoed some of the democratic values affirmed Aquino during her term, Ramos was obviously inclined to make use of 'democracy' along the lines of the 'free market' or 'market-driven economy' which was essentially the thrust of new global economic order.

6.4 The national economy

'Global competitiveness' may be regarded as the key term in Ramos' congressional speeches. Such emphasis on 'global competitiveness' may be seen as a

response to the shift in the global economic order and the challenge to show that democracy and development are reconcilable (Thompson and Macaranas, 2006).

By 'global competitiveness,' Ramos was of course referring to the ideal, the characteristic trait or the quality that the national economy in particular and the nation in general should aspire for in the changing world context.

In his 1997 SONA, for instance, he talked of the need to 'find our competitive niche' in a 'survival-of-the-fittest economic order' where 'great opportunities await the intelligent, the self-disciplined, the innovative, the daring, the young bulls, and the tiger cubs' and which 'imposes several penalties on the inefficient, the unskilled, the non-productive, the timid, the disunited, and the lame ducks.' The image triggered by the phrase 'survival-of-the-fittest economic order' as well as the deeply polarized representations (e.g., 'the self-disciplined' as opposed to 'the unskilled', 'the daring' as opposed to 'the timid', 'the young bulls' as opposed to 'the lame ducks') in Ramos' utterances showed a kind of social Darwinism present in his interpretation of the globalist discourse.

Ramos' emphasis on 'global competitiveness' was clearly linked to the discourse of the 'new world order,' sanctioned by such international agreement as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades (GATT) and the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). It should be noted that it was during Ramos' presidency that the Philippines ratified the GATT-WTO. It was also during his time that the adoption of structural adjustments which involved economic liberalization, privatization, and deregulation came into full swing.

6.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA

Ramos’ conceptualization of the Philippine economy vis-à-vis the global economic order may be subsumed under the conceptual frame of competition where the Philippine economy is conceptualized as the competitor while the global economic order the competitive arena. This conceptual frame is constituted by a number of conceptual metaphors that underlie the metaphorical expressions found in the Ramos SONAs.

With regard to the national economy, metaphorical expressions having to do with overcoming global challenges, meeting international benchmarks, fighting for survival, and engaging in competitive sports are evident in the Ramos presidential speeches. The following table outlines Ramos’ conceptualization of the Philippine economy in the context of the global economic order, which Ramos also described as ‘a brutally competitive economic order’:

Table 6.2 Ramos’ Framing of the National Economy in the Global Economic Order

TARGET DOMAIN	SOURCE DOMAINS
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER/ “NEW WORLD ORDER”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SURVIVAL-OF-THE-FITTEST SITUATION • SPORTS ARENA • ADVENTURE
THE PHILIPPINES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FIGHTER FOR SURVIVAL • PLAYER • GLOBAL/ REGIONAL COMPETITOR

The following extracts from the Ramos’ speeches show how the various conceptualizations of the global economic order (as shown in Table 6.2) are realized in the texts:

THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST:

10. We must prepare our economy for the new trading order ordained by the Uruguay round of the general agreement on tariffs and trade. Our *survival* in the evolving world trade organization will depend on how competitive our export industries can become. (1994)
11. Let us not delude ourselves: It is *a brutally competitive* economic order emerging out there. (1995)
12. This '*survival-of-the-fittest*' *socio-economic order and political order* imposes several penalties on the inefficient, the unskilled, the non-productive, the timid, the disunited, and the lame ducks. But great opportunities await the intelligent, the self-disciplined, the innovative, the daring, the young bulls, and the tiger cubs. (1997)

...IS A SPORTS ARENA:

13. The power crisis is on its way to resolution because of the United Actions of Congress and the Executive Branch. This is where our strength lies, in unity of purpose and harmony of actions. But these alone will not be sufficient for the economy *to be strong and resilient for global competition*. We therefore have also introduced reforms to restructure the system in favor of inefficiency away from protecting the inefficient. (1993)
14. If we fail to adapt to new economic realities, we will *lag even farther behind*. Worse, we may fritter away *the gains we have already won*. How then do we face this *challenge*? How do we *stay on track* and *accelerate our advance*? (1995)
15. We must now move aggressively *to bring our people up to speed* with the global economy. To create high-wage jobs in the future, human-capital investments are the key. (1997)

...IS AN ADVENTURE:

16. Thus, both self-interest and International commitments compel us to turn our economy outward – toward participation in *humankind's shared adventure of development*. We signed the Uruguay round of agreements to improve our market access to the rich countries and to qualify for special treatment in World trade. (1994)

It is clear from the above extracts that competition is deeply entrenched in Ramos' representations of the world economy. It then becomes an important backdrop and a rationale for national economies to be viewed as COMPETING PARTICIPANTS in dynamics of the global economy. It is no wonder then that in Ramos' SONAs, the Philippines had been conceptualized either as a PLAYER or GLOBAL/REGIONAL COMPETITOR. These conceptualizations may be seen in the following extracts:

THE PHILIPPINES IS A PLAYER:

17. But surely, my beloved countrymen, our greatest achievement has been to restore our faith in ourselves, and in what we can do together as *a national team*. (1994)
18. If we fail to adapt to new economic realities, we will *lag even farther behind*. Worse, we may fritter away *the gains we have already won*. How then do we face this *challenge*? How do we *stay on track* and *accelerate our advance*? (1995)
19. If our country is to become *a significant player* in the Asia Pacific, then we must now prepare the place we want to have in this future world. We must find *our competitive niche* – and nurture it. (1997)
20. We must work hard *to win our place* in the world – because the world will not stop for those who stand idly by on the roadside of development. (1997)
21. The plain truth is that we can no longer make do with economic *leapfrogging* – because other countries are leapfrogging, too. Our aim should rather be to *pole-vault* into the twenty-first century. (1997)
22. And under our *pole-vaulting strategy*, we aim to turn the Philippines into an Asian hub for software development and training. (1997)

... A GLOBAL/ REGIONAL COMPETITOR:

23. We now have a real opportunity *to secure a fair share of the investments flowing into the ASEAN Region*. What is important is that we continue to improve our country's attractiveness for investments—by emphasizing our competitive advantage. (1993)

24. With this further economic liberalization, Metro Manila can now *compete* to become a financial and trading center in Southeast Asia and our archipelago can *aspire to become a landmark* in the borderless world of the future. (1995)
25. Resolution of our home-grown conflicts will free us to focus on *sharpening our competitiveness* in the Asia Pacific and world markets as well as deliver social services more effectively to our people. (1996)
26. We must make not just our business enterprises – but the whole of national society – *competitive* in the world by expanding research and development (R&D) in the emerging technologies and in education, especially in science and technology at all levels. (1996)
27. And how do we assure for ourselves the place we want to have in the future world? How can we find *our competitive niche* – and defend it? (1997)

It is interesting to note that Ramos' use of sports metaphors help heighten or intensify his rhetoric's emphasis on competitiveness. This is especially evident in his final address (1997) where he proposed a shift in economic strategy, that is, from 'economic leapfrogging' to one that is highly elaborate, not to mention competitive strategy: 'the pole-vaulting strategy' (see extracts 21 and 22). The term 'leapfrogging' suggests a movement, a trajectory from one place to another. In the context of development theory, it happens when a developing country skips the supposedly harmful phases or stages gone through by industrialized countries. These harmful stages of development include the polluting development trajectory that is deemed inimical to the environment (Goldemberg 1998). That the term 'leapfrogging' is replaced by a highly competitive and elaborate sport, 'pole-vaulting,' shows a more competitive drive towards achieving national development goals.

Ramos described 'the pole-vaulting strategy' as '[his] administration's legacy to future administrations.' It is a strategy which would supposedly 'complete the

transformation of [the Philippine] economy from an inward to an outward orientation' and would enable the government 'to move aggressively to bring our people up to speed with the global economy.'⁵⁸

The impetus for global competitiveness and competition as manifested in the above extracts is further realized in expressions that render them imperative for the country. The following extracts demonstrate this:

28. *Global competitiveness must begin at home.* (1993)

29. The first modernization is that of the economy – to make it more productive; *to make it competitive in the world*; and to make room for the small and middle-sized industries which are the building blocks of economic democracy. (1993)

30. We also need to recast our laws on trusts, monopolies, oligopolies, cartels and combinations injurious to public welfare – *to restore competition* where it has disappeared, and *to preserve it where it still exists*. In a word, *we need to perpetuate competition as a system to regulate the economy and achieve global product quality.* (1993)

31. We now have a real opportunity to secure a fair share of the investments flowing into the ASEAN Region. What is important is that we continue *to improve our country's attractiveness for investments – by emphasizing our competitive advantage.* (1993)

32. *Competition* is particularly fierce for trade and investments. *And the countries most likely to capture these investments are those that set out the appropriate policies.* (1995)

In these extracts, competitiveness and competition are seen as a reality that economies like that of the Philippines cannot do without (as in extracts 28 and 32) on the one

⁵⁸ The use of such sporting events to describe the government strategy lends itself to the journey metaphor invoked in explaining the national development aspirations (e.g., 'roadside of development' in extract 20). On the other hand, it might not have been as effective or as memorable as the use of sports events like basketball or boxing, which are popular to the Filipinos, economic class notwithstanding.

hand, and as the sure and only means to adapt to that reality (as in extracts 29, 30, and 31), on the other.

6.4.2 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS

Along with advocating global competitiveness in the new world economic order, Ramos saw the need to advance the idea of economic liberalization both as a national and global imperative. On the national scale, economic liberalization is that which would propel the country towards global competitiveness. It is set in contrast with protectionist policies which are viewed as barriers to economic growth. On the global scale, it is the principle that undergirds the new world economic order.

Specifically, Ramos' speeches conceptualized economic liberalization (and its more specific renderings like tariff reduction, privatization, deregulation, export-orientedness and outward orientation) using the following metaphorizations—**A BOOSTER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH and AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS:**

LIBERALIZATION IS A BOOSTER/ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

33. We must *press on* with deregulation and liberalization and bring down the last of our self-imposed barriers to economic growth left over from the age of protectionism. (1994)
34. The other day, I issued Executive Order No. 264 promulgating a tariff reduction program that *accelerates* our economy's outward-orientation. (1995)
35. First, growth today is being *boosted by exports and investments* and not by consumer spending or government pump priming. (1996)
36. Second, growth is being *accompanied by some increase in private savings* and not necessarily by increasing external debt or foreign loans. (1996)
37. *Deregulation* and *privatization* have worked particularly well in transportation and communications, and energy. These policies have *encouraged a rapid growth* in demand enabling the private sector to offer

more and varied transport services like the Supercat Ferries in the Visayas, the new airlines and even big-ticket items like Edsa's MRT 3, the Metro Manila Skyway, the expressways extending to Clark, Subic and Batangas Port, Terminals II and III at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport or NAIA. (1997)

38. We are also working on the privatization of the National Power Corporation and the Philippine Postal Corporation as *key elements in our effort to pole-vault into the information age*. (1997)

...IS AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS

39. With this further economic liberalization, Metro Manila can now *compete to become a financial and trading center in Southeast Asia* and our archipelago can aspire to become a landmark in the borderless world of the future. (1995)

40. Competitiveness goes beyond GDP and other macro-economic measures. It encompasses the entire spectrum of the political, social, cultural, scientific and value systems of a country. And the lesson from East Asia is clear. *Competitiveness comes from an open economy* – from a stable political system and from a united, hard-working people. Competitiveness comes from modern infrastructure, and from work-people trained in cutting-edge technology. (1996)

41. *Privatization* will allow an enlarged provident fund system to *widen* its coverage; *increase* management flexibility in investing its portfolio; *increase* statutory minimum contributions; and *decentralize* its operations. (1996)

42. ...we must complete the reforms – like *the liberalization of retail trade* and the Anti-trust/Anti-monopoly Act – because this will *make the market system work more effectively*. (1997)

43. We must also nurture a stable capital market – one that will *encourage long-term investor confidence; mobilize efficiently domestic savings and foreign investments* for our social and physical infrastructure; *work in conformity with international standards*. (1997)

In extracts 33 to 38, deregulation, liberalization, privatization, and export-orientedness or tariff reduction—all of which are part of structural adjustment plans (SAPs) prescribed by global financial institutions like the IMF-WB—are

conceptualized as pivotal elements—boosters or accelerators—in achieving national economic growth. As boosters or accelerators, these SAPs are expressed in such a way that their implementation necessitates urgency (‘press on’) and brings about a positive spin for the economy (‘accelerates our economy’s outward orientation,’ ‘growth is being boosted by exports and investment,’ ‘growth is being accompanied by some increase in private savings,’ ‘deregulation and privatization...have encouraged a rapid growth,’ ‘privatization...as key [element] in our effort to pole-vault in the information age’).

A similar conceptualization is evident in extracts 39 to 43, although in these extracts, liberalization is specifically conceptualized as an incentive for competitiveness. This conceptualization is evident in expressions that suggest that economic liberalization or an open economy translates to becoming a regional economic hub (39), competitiveness in the various systems of the country (40), better management of government owned and controlled corporations (41), effectiveness of the market system (42), and conformity with the demands of the global economic order (43).

Viewed as antithetical to economic liberalization are protectionist policies which are conceptualized as impediments or barriers towards economic growth and therefore inimical to the country’s realization of its competitive potential. The conceptual metaphor PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN OBSTRUCTION TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS is realized in the following extracts:

44. To improve government’s capability to provide adequate services and infrastructure for the economy, we seek an amendment to the public transport service law – last revised in 1952 – *to rid it of its restrictive regulatory framework and to foster a new competitiveness in our land, water, and air transport industries*. Efficient transport must complement

our breakthroughs in the telecom industry which has served to link our archipelago more closely by high-tech means. (1994)

45. Five other laws that should have been repealed or amended long ago include the Investment Company Act of 1960, which contains a provision requiring all directors of investment companies to be citizens (although, strangely enough, the same law does not restrict foreign equity in these companies). *With the lifting of foreign exchange controls, the Uniform Currency Act of 1950 should now be repealed to allow a free market in international financial and trading transactions.* (1995)
46. I also ask Congress to repeal the minimum capital requirements for foreign investors in wholesale and export enterprises under negative list 'B', and to delete entirely negative list 'C' of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991. I further ask the Congress to amend the Financing Company Act of 1969 and the Investment Houses Act of 1973 *to allow unrestricted foreign investment in finance companies and investment houses.* Moreover, we must take the necessary steps now to ensure the rapid development and expansion of our domestic capital market. (1995)
47. To complete our liberalization of the economy, *let us repeal the remaining laws – some enacted over 40 years ago that still limit economic growth and deny consumer access, the Filipino consumer to quality goods at lower prices.* (1996)
48. Let us be clear about what we should not do. *We must reject all calls for a return to the closed, stagnant and inward-looking economics of the last 40-45 years.* (1997)
49. *We cannot remake this country without tearing open the old blinders and throwing away the old formulas.* (1997)

The protectionist policies are variously referred to in the above extracts as 'restrictive regulatory framework' (44), 'foreign exchange controls' (45), specific laws like the Financing Company Act of 1969 and the Investment Houses Act of 1973 (46), 'the closed, stagnant and inward-looking economics of the last 40-45 years' (48), and 'the old blinders...and old formulas' (49). They are 'laws—some enacted over 40 years ago that still limit economic growth and deny consumer access...to quality goods at lower prices'—that, to Ramos, needed to be repealed in order for his administration to pursue its economic agenda (47).

The proposed policy change, that is, the repeal, amendment and replacement of existing ‘restrictive’ laws, is seen as that which would propel the economy towards competitiveness as well as its national development goals. This is particularly evident in extracts 46 and 47 where the explicit recommendation to repeal and amend the existing laws is conceptualized as significant steps towards ‘rapid development,’ ‘expansion of our domestic capital market,’ and ‘liberalization of the economy’—considered prescriptions for competitiveness. The proposed economic policy is also metaphorized as an act of removal realized in such terms as ‘to rid of,’ ‘lifting of,’ ‘tearing open’ and ‘throwing away’ (as shown in extracts 44, 45, and 49) and as an act of repudiating the existing policy which Ramos strongly described as ‘closed, stagnant, inward looking economics of the last 40-45 years.’ This obvious othering of the existing policy can be read as a repudiation of the protectionist, in fact, nationalist economic policy, that for decades had denied the foreign, especially American, capitalists to fully exploit and take advantage of the natural resources of the country.

6.4.3 POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR

Precisely because the Philippines in the post-Marcos era remained as a Third World or developing country with a significant number of the population living below the poverty line, poverty alleviation became a major concern. At this juncture, I shall focus on the conceptualizations of poverty, the poor, and the poverty alleviation program of the Ramos administration and examine them vis-à-vis the executive leadership’s conceptualization of the Philippine economy as a global player in the new world economic order.

Ramos framed poverty alleviation using war metaphors. This is somewhat similar to conceptualizations in the Anglo-American political discourse (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Semino 2008). Semino notes that ‘WAR metaphors are often used in

relation to particularly serious and intractable problems, and to the initiatives and strategies that are developed in order to solve them. This leads to expressions such as ‘war against crime,’ ‘war against inflation,’ ‘war against drugs,’ ‘combating unemployment,’ ‘combating the drug trade’ and so on. Metaphors such as these emphasize the gravity and urgency of the problem in question, and the seriousness of the effort that is being made to solve it’ (100).

By using the expression ‘the war on poverty’ to indicate his plans for poverty alleviation in his 1992 speech, Ramos had made clear his conceptualizations of poverty and the government initiatives and strategies that would be employed to address it. The following extracts are reflective of the war frame in that poverty is seen as an ‘enemy’ and government initiatives are conceptualized as ‘interventions’ against poverty or as war strategy:

GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS/ WAR STRATEGY

50. *THE WAR ON POVERTY*. These measures will in time move the economy back to growth. But let us not imagine growth by itself will suffice to bring the poor majority of our countrymen and communities into the mainstream of development. (1992)
51. We shall undertake three main types of *intervention against poverty*:
 The first is to ensure the delivery of basic social services to the poorest communities and to make sure that every poor family has a decent minimum of health, nutrition, housing and education.
 The second is to see to it that the poor gain access to agrarian reform, skills training and extension services that will open up livelihood opportunities and jobs to them.
 And the third is to help poor communities organize cooperatively – to empower them to play a greater role in their own development, (Applause) and to make their voices heard in the making of public policy. (1992)
52. The central thrust of all our programs is Poverty Alleviation. We must *fight poverty* in ways that will not merely wait for the economy to develop. (1993)

53. But because the poor cannot wait – because, in Gabriela Mistral’s phrase, the child’s name is today – we have *intervened* to put poverty alleviation at the center of government’s concerns. (1995)
54. Our *war against poverty* must be *fought by a strong army of citizens*. We must *mobilize* not only government but the entire citizenry on the *rallying cry* of self-help and self-reliance. All hands – not just government’s – are needed *to win this war*. (1995)
55. The *impetus* for *any winning strategy* should come from below – by harnessing the energies of the poor themselves. (1995)

POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY

56. Right now, our more realistic goal is *to prevent poverty from perpetuating itself*. (1995)
57. Yes, there is still great poverty among us, but every time we touch one family with our livelihood and social service programs; every time a quality job gives one worker a higher sense of dignity; every time we transform a Smokey Mountain into a decent place for human beings, then we loosen *the grip, the iron grip of poverty* on our people. (1996)

The government’s interventionist role in poverty alleviation generates a significant insight on how Ramos viewed the poor during his presidency. Interestingly, the Ramos speeches conceptualized the poor in two ways: one, as victims who need to be rescued not to mention benefit from government interventions (as in extract 51) and two, as an active agent in the ‘war against poverty’ (as exemplified in extracts 54 and 55). These conceptualizations can also be surmised in the following:

THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE GOVERNMENT

58. We must, in sum, depart from the ‘trickle down’ policies of the past, which had only left our poor farmer and other poor communities behind – and move into *the policy of ‘positive discrimination’ to lift them up and equip them with the humanities of life*. (1992)
59. Fourth, Social Reform. In Poverty Alleviation, we have moved away from the old ‘trickle down’ policies to *‘positive bias’ for our poorest provinces*

and the numerous pockets of poverty that are to be found even in our richest cities. (1994)

60. One – we need *to build up the absorptive capacity of the poor* by enhancing the capability of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people's organizations (POs) – such as cooperatives, livelihood associations and self-help groupings – that are dedicated to them...

Two – we need *to improve our mobilization of financial resources* – raised both here at home and from official development assistance – that are meant for the exclusive use of the poorest sectors.

Three – we need *to synergize, consolidate and streamline all of government's strategies, programs and agencies that address poverty alleviation* into a more focused and better coordinated collective effort that reaches down to the barangay level. (1995)

61. We do, however, realize that *the ultimate solution to poverty is providing enough productive and remunerative jobs and livelihood to our people.* (1995)

THE POOR ARE AGENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT BENEFICIARIES

62. After consultations with all these sectors, we have determined the need for three basic types of *interventions*.

The first is *to give the poor* access to quality basic services – the very imperatives of survival for people living on the margin. The 'flagship' programs under this agenda include socialized housing for the urban poor.

The second is *to give the poor* better means to earn their own living. Priority programs under this agenda include intensified implementation of agrarian reform and a sustained 'credit for the poor' effort.

The third major item on our Social Reform Agenda is *a package of programs that will enable ordinary Filipinos to take part effectively in decision making processes that directly affect their interests and welfare.* (1994)

63. And we have gone some way *in placing the common tao at the center of our development efforts – both as agent and as beneficiary.* (1995)

Curiously, while Ramos recognized the capacity of the poor to help themselves and to become agents of development, he nevertheless emphasized in his speeches that the empowerment of the poor and their communities comes from the government. This complexifies the concept of 'people power' that emerged when Aquino rose to power.

Not only is the government an enabler of the people's capacity for self-help and self-reliance. More importantly, it is a government that can distribute resources to groups (nongovernmental organizations, people's organizations, etc.) that it deems qualified 'to build the absorptive capacity of the poor' (60), that crafts '*a package of programs* that will enable ordinary Filipinos to take part in decision making processes (62), and that has 'gone some way in *placing* the common tao⁵⁹ at the center of development' (63). It is the government as an institution which, through its policy initiatives and strategies for poverty alleviation, decides ultimately which is enabling and which is disabling, which is empowering and which is not empowering—a tendency that relegates the poor to the role of mere beneficiary and not really an active agent of change.

6.5 Peace and security

In the area of peace and order and national security, the following interrelated conceptual frames emerge from the Ramos SONAs: (1) **NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**; (2) **PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE**; and (3) **GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED WAR**. The first articulates the imperative for national stability in achieving national development goals. The last two enunciate what the Ramos administration considered as necessary measures to achieve national stability. Specifically, the second conceptual frame explains measures pursued by the Ramos administration in order to resolve conflict with the rebels—communist, Moro,

⁵⁹ The term 'common tao' is used in Philippines—whether in the spheres of political discourse or otherwise—to refer to the people, the masses or ordinary folks.

and military. The last one provides justification for the government's policy to address the problem of criminality.

6.5.1 NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In Ramos' congressional speeches, national stability is a prerequisite or a precondition to economic development. This, for instance, is evident in his assertions that conceptualize stability as a 'platform' for economic takeoff, one that is built on the 'foundation' or 'rock' of 'peace, civil order and social harmony' (67). It is that which would 'release the full energies of the nation' (65). These and other related conceptualizations of national stability are shown in the following:

64. Examples from East Asia teach us that *the first – and foremost – requirement of economic development is stability*, which is the long-term predictability of the political system. (1993)
65. If we are to release the full energies of the nation, people who live, work and produce must be *secure* in their persons, in their property and in their homes. (1993)
66. Political stability *underpins* our turnaround. We held two successful elections these past three years – proving Philippine democracy is no longer fragile as it once was. (1995)
67. Ultimately, the pace of growth will depend on *how solidly we build our platform for takeoff*.
That platform will be stable only if it is built on the rock of peace, civil order and social harmony. (1995)
68. Within two years, I am confident we shall leave our country and people a legacy of social cohesion and political unity – *on which future governments can build greater national capacity, stability and prosperity for all Filipinos.* (1996)

Extracts 64, 65, and 66 suggest that stability and security are imperatives to national (economic) development, also expressed as the 'release' of 'the full energies of the nation' or 'turnaround.' This is evident in the expressions 'first and foremost

requirement' (64), 'must be secure' (65), and 'underpins' (66). Extract 67 shows a more elaborate expression of the conceptual metaphor by conceptualizing 'stability' as a platform 'built on the rock of peace, civil order and social harmony.' In extract 68, 'stability' is positioned alongside expressions such as 'greater national capacity' and 'prosperity,' both suggesting development goals. Moreover, the terms 'social cohesion' and 'political unity'—terms which characterize national stability—are expressed as the basis for the development goals.

6.5.2 REBELS ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL PROGRESS

It is important to note that when Ramos was elected president, he inherited a country encumbered by rebellion from forces on both ends of the Philippine political spectrum. On the one hand, there were the military rebels who attempted several coup d'états against the Aquino government under which Ramos served as defense chief. On the other, there was the long standing armed struggle by the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA). In Mindanao, there was the Muslim secessionist movement by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). These forces were a major concern for Ramos who wanted to make sure the country was conducive for the free market enterprise. It is interesting then how his political rhetoric, particularly the rhetoric of his SONAs, (re)constructed the reality of these forces vis-à-vis his vision of a newly industrialized Philippines.

So how were these forces constructed in the SONAs? As far as Ramos's SONAs were concerned, the communist, Muslim, and military rebels were viewed as obstacles or impediments to national progress. In his inaugural SONA (1992), Ramos established that the instability and uncertainty posed by the conflict with the rebel groups are stumbling blocks to progress. He said:

69. Peace and security are the first urgent problem. *For as long as instability and uncertainty characterize our common life, we shall not make any headway.* (1992)

70. Peace is a process. And we must all join hands to bind and heal the *conflicts that have so long divided and held us back.* (1992)

Variously, the (military, Muslim and communist) rebels had been metaphorized as misfits or wayward members of society, as a dangerous conflagration, as diseases—generally, as threats—that need to be dealt with if stability is to be achieved:

THE REBELS ARE MISFITS/ WAYWARD MEMBERS OF SOCIETY

71. This is why in my inaugural address, I immediately raised the issue of amnesty to enable all rebels *to re-enter civil society as law-abiding citizens.* (1992)

72. Erstwhile military rebels have been *reintegrated into civil society* – even as the process of dealing with their grievances continues, many of the reforms they suggest – in our electoral practices, for example – have been incorporated into our proposals to Congress. (1996)

...ARE A CONFLAGRATION

73. Radical Insurgency should never *flare up* all over again: These last 18 years, it has already cost us 40,000 dead. (1993)

...ARE DISEASES

74. Again and again, this spirit of rebellion has *broken out* – in leftist insurgencies, military mutinies, and separatist movements. (1993)

75. We cannot keep using force and violence to suppress these *outbreaks*. We must try to recognize their root causes – so that we can apply lasting remedies. (1993)

It is important to note that Ramos identified poverty as the root cause of rebellion and this is then tied to his discourse on poverty alleviation (see discussion in 6.3.3).

6.5.3 PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE

Dealing with the rebels is another important aspect of the Ramos administration and the rhetoric that accompanied it. On the one hand, Ramos pursued peace talks with the rebels and offered ‘the olive branch of peace’ through an amnesty program. Both the peace talks and the amnesty were viewed as steps towards ‘lasting peace’ that would consequently ensure political stability in the country. This is evident in the following extracts:

76. This grant of amnesty is *the initial step in a comprehensive peace and unification process that shall address the problem of bringing back all other rebels to the fold of the law*, I, therefore, invite both chambers of Congress to join the Executive in constituting a National Unification Commission, that will include representatives of the private sector. This commission will undertake extensive consultations with concerned sectors of society including rebel groups, in order to formulate a viable amnesty program and the process that will lead to a just, comprehensive and lasting peace. (1992)
77. Finally, I ask Congress to repeal Republic Act No. 1700, as amended, so that the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar organizations will no longer be outlawed but *allowed to compete freely, openly and peacefully in the political, economic and social arena instead of their following the path of the armed struggle*. (1992)
78. With the dissident National Democratic Front (NDF), our peace talks have finally *moved on to substantive issues*, but we are no more than cautiously optimistic – because of the ideological issues involved and the hard-liner positions the NDF has taken. (1996)
79. Fortunately, that 60-year old conflict has substantially declined in its intensity – partly because our amnesty program has enabled individual rebels to return to *the ways of peace*. (1996)
80. The Davao City consensus of last month with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which envisioned our 14 Southern Provinces and the cities therein being brought into a special zone of peace and development (ZOPAD), with the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) to promote it, *moves us closer towards the resolution of the conflict* that has cost more than 120,000 lives, with so many more dislocated from their homes these past 27 years. (1996)

It was during Ramos' term that the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law had been passed. The statement allowing the Communist Party and similar organizations to 'compete freely, openly, and peacefully in the political, economic and social arena instead of their following the path of the armed struggle' (see extract 77) suggests that the government offers an alternative, a more viable route so to speak, to the one pursued by the communist rebels in the country. It goes without saying that this route where Communist Party and similar organizations 'compete freely, openly, and peacefully' is in line with the discourse of competitiveness, where supposedly superior ideas out-credit the weak ones.

The instrumentality of peace in bringing about national goals can be seen from the following utterances in Ramos's 1996 congressional speech:

81. Ladies and gentlemen of Congress, peace as we well know is *a process and it must be carefully nurtured and so is development. Peace and development always go together. Together, both are best weapons to alleviate the poverty in Mindanao and everywhere else, because the lack of either one breeds deprivation and foments tension and armed conflict. Mindanao – as well as the rest of the Philippines, needs peace if it is to achieve the sustained broad-based development its people deserve.* (1996)

In the extract, peace is conceptualized as something interconnected with development, indicating that one is without the other. It is also rendered as a 'weapon' to alleviate poverty, one whose absence 'breeds deprivation and foments tension and armed conflict.' In other words, it is a necessary factor in achieving 'sustained broad-based development.' Such representations of peace (first, as 'weapon'—an instrument in the 'war on poverty'—and second, as a significant variable in the resolution of armed conflict and 'sustained broad-based development') remain consistent with the notion of global competitiveness that undergirds the rhetoric of Ramos during his presidency.

6.5.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED WAR

On the other hand, Ramos, being the former chief of the country's armed forces, pushed for the modernization of the both the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. His administration also adopted a tough stance against criminality by sponsoring the re-imposition of death penalty and by regarding the government policy against criminals as a display of strength and a 'moral,' not to mention 'civilized,' war (1997). In the following extracts, the death penalty is metaphorized as an effective deterrent to criminality (82) and the proposal to restore death penalty a civilizing instrument (83), while the overall government effort to curb criminality is seen as WAR, where the government role is intensified by rendering it as a tough crime buster (84), an 'unrelenting' combatant (85), a self-correcting fighter (86), a crusader (87), law enforcer and moral warrior (88).

DEATH PENALTY IS AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO CRIME

82. First, I ask the Congress to restore the death penalty to cover heinous crimes, (Applause) which of late have enjoyed resurgence – encouraged no doubt, by *the weakness of our deterrents*. (1992)

PROPOSAL TO RESTORE DEATH PENALTY IS A CIVILIZING INSTRUMENT

83. Last year, I proposed that we restore the death penalty. We must show *determination to prevent any reversions to barbarism*. (1993)

ANTI-CRIME EFFORT IS WAR; GOVERNMENT IS A COMBATANT/ WARRIOR

84. *All-out war we reserve for criminals, terrorists and plunderers*. We have broken the back of the biggest crime syndicates, dismantled the most notorious armed groups, and effected changes in the leadership and chain of command of our police force to improve its credibility and efficiency (1994)

85. On still another front – in *our war on criminality* – we will be just as unrelenting (1995)
86. We will pursue our *fight against heinous crimes* with greater vigor – even as we continue *to cleanse our government of the scalawags and grafters within its ranks* – whether in the executive, the legislative or judicial branch (1997)
87. And I ask all of you to join me in *a crusade against dangerous drugs* (Applause) – which threaten particularly our young people. And for this crusade we need to amend the Dangerous Drugs Law and the passage of the Anti-Racketeering Bill (1997)
88. And we will *employ the full force of government against criminals, the outlaws*, especially their masterminds, the drug lords and the financiers who persist (Applause) in *challenging the rule of law and undermining the moral fabric of our society*. We will hit them hard again and again. (1997)

Ramos' adoption of various measures against rebellion and criminality manifested a presidency that made sure no stone was left unturned when it came to ensuring peace and order in particular, and national stability at large. What was important to him was that the preconditions for the country's 'economic take off' were met.

What clearly emerges from Ramos' discourse on national stability is a government that is a steadfast peace maker—one that embodies patience, forbearance, courage, and steadfastness: qualities that are also associated with participants in a competitive sports or undertaking. This is clearly articulated in the following extract from his national address in 1995:

89. If the peace process is to be the test of *government's patience and forbearance* – then I assure you we have patience and forbearance enough – and above all, *the will to forge a just settlement that will endure*.
And if it is to be a test of *our courage and steadfastness*, why then, *we have that courage and steadfastness*, also! (1995)

This conceptualization of government or executive or presidential leadership as a person—specifically as an agent of competitiveness—will be discussed in the next section.

6.6 The presidency

In discussing Ramos' conceptualizations of the presidency, I take into account how he viewed his role in government in his congressional speeches. I argue that this significantly renders how the presidency as a form of institutional leadership had been represented during his administration.

6.5.1 GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

It may be argued that the conceptualization of the government as an ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT provides a clear proof of the Ramos presidency's proclivity towards the discourse of global competitiveness. Ramos offered in his SONAs several measures paving the way to such a conceptualization.

To Ramos, the government as an enabler of economic growth is realized in two ways: one, by 'putting the house in order' and two, by 'liberalizing the economy' (1994). These measures are supposed to create 'conditions for self-sustaining growth.'

The expression 'putting the house into order' implies a parental aspect in governance and management of governmental affairs. It suggests disciplining (often associated with a strict father) and imposing cleanliness and orderliness in the house space (associated with the role of the homemaker, usually the mother, in the traditional concept of the family). 'Putting the house into order' uses a domestic metaphor that puts the Philippine government particularly the Philippine president in the role of the parent, that is, THE GOVERNMENT IS A PARENT. Thus, as a parent that

puts the house in order, the government guarantees an environment characterized by political stability (discipline) and social cohesion (harmony). Such conceptualization of the government is realized in the following extracts:

90. Because of this experience, we now know development cannot take place in our country unless *we put our house in order*.

And this – to me – means accomplishing three things:

One, restoring political and civic stability.

Two, opening the economy: dismantling monopolies and cartels injurious to the public interest, and leveling the playing field.

Three, addressing the problem of corruption and criminality.

These three tasks – once completed – shall secure the environment for self-sustaining growth – and enable the government to act positively and consistently in the national interest.

Our strategic framework to establish effective government – *of putting our house in order* – so that our drive for development can begin – we call Philippines 2000. (1993)

91. The first year *we devoted to putting our house in order* – to restoring political stability, enhancing national unity, and strengthening social cohesion – *as requisites for economic recovery*. (1994)

As one that is responsible for liberalizing the economy, the government promotes opening the economy and ensuring a level playing field of enterprise. The conceptualization THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION is realized in the following passages:

92. We shall also *tap private resources* under the Build-Operate-and-Transfer and similar schemes. *To liberalize the private sector's entry into the transport industry*, it will be necessary to amend the 50-year old Public Service law. (1992)

93. We should then be able *to mobilize development financing for both agriculture and industry* – not just through Government financial institutions but primarily through the private banking system, whose business that ought to be. (1992)

94. In trade, we expect *a rise in export demand as our major markets return to growth*. You can count on the Executive to do all we can *to make our industries worldwide competitive*. (1992)
95. This means gradually *abolishing all remaining quantitative restrictions on trade, liberalizing the foreign exchange market and adopting a more realistic foreign exchange rate*. (1992)
96. The second (year) we devoted to *liberalizing the economy – opening it to competition, and leveling the playing field of enterprise*. (1994)
97. We have taken the following initial steps *to improve our export competitiveness...* (1994)
98. To improve government's capability to provide adequate services and infrastructure for the economy, we seek an amendment to the public transport service law – last revised in 1952 – *to rid it of its restrictive regulatory framework and to foster a new competitiveness in our land, water, and air transport industries*. Efficient transport must complement our breakthroughs in the telecom industry which has served to link our archipelago more closely by high-tech means. (1994)

In extracts 92 to 98, the Ramos government is positioned as a primary agent of economic liberalization. The pronoun 'we' consistently appears in these extracts to refer to the executive and is then followed by expressions that suggest any of the following actions: legislate or formulate policies that liberalize the economy (92, 95, 96, 98), tap private resources to fund social infrastructure (92, 93), and initiate steps to improve export competitiveness (94, 97).

The conceptualization of the government as a GROWTH ENABLER evident in the above-mentioned extracts from Ramos's 1992 to 1994 SONAs is consistent with the notion of global competitiveness. Notably, this indicates intertextual coherence in Ramos congressional speeches.

6.5.2 THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER

When Ramos talked about effective government as a way of restating the imperative of 'putting the house into order' (extract 90), he was also suggesting that

presidential leadership is all about effective management, or that THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER. This other conceptualization of the executive leadership is again in consonance with the schema of competitiveness prevalent in his presidential discourse. Take for instance the following extracts from Ramos's 1994, 1995, and 1997 SONAs:

99. How did we accomplish all these things?

We were able to do what we did – not by emphasizing ideology, but *by seeking consensus and taking actions.*

Not by setting people apart – but *by bringing them together.*

Not by charisma – but *by quiet competence and patience, patience and patience.*

The lesson is clear: *without hard work, there are no miracles. We must perform as we pray, and pray as we perform (1994)*

100. *I cannot overemphasize the need to improve government's capacity and effectiveness. Our ultimate objective is to assert the rule of law – to replace privilege with effectiveness, and establish the social cohesion and legal equality that characterize a working democracy.*

Management teachers remind us that there is a difference between efficiency and effectiveness.

The public agency and public servant can be efficient for as long as they fulfill their mandate within the law – even if that law is already outdated.

Effectiveness, on the other hand, has to do with meeting objectives at the appointed hour. Effectiveness is doing the right thing at the right time.

In the present condition, our bureaucracy is saddled with structures and systems fit only for a bygone age.

An old bureaucratic joke asks the simple question: 'If it takes two ditch-diggers two days to dig a ditch, how long would it take four-ditch diggers.'

The logical answer should be one day. But – real, bureaucratic life – the correct answer is probably 'four days' – or perhaps forever.

Indeed, we have made government the employer of the last resort. (1995)

101. For my part (applause), let me assure you the work of government will never slacken during this final year of my watch (applause). I will not be a lame-duck President for two reasons: First, because that is not my nature and you know that very well (applause). And second, the times call for vigorous tigers and not enfeebled fowls (applause). I will be working and governing. You will all feel and hear and see me working and

governing as your President until I turn over the presidency to the 13th President of the Republic at high noon on 30 June 1998. (1997)

Extract 99 from the 1994 SONA establishes the difference between leadership rooted in ideology and charisma and one that is action-oriented, unifying and performance-oriented. To Ramos, the latter option was what ascertained his administration's accomplishments in the past year. It was his version of an effective management or administration; it defined his leadership style. The version of leadership and management distinguished him from his predecessors and even from those sectors that challenged or were highly critical of Ramos presidency. It may be surmised that the expression 'perform as we pray, pray as we perform' is both an allusion and a critical commentary on the previous administration of Corazon Aquino, who made no secret about her reliance on prayer in her exercise of presidential leadership. The expression can be seen as intertextually coherent with the rhetoric of Aquino that laced the domain of politics and governance with references to religion and spirituality.

On the other hand, the use of a triad and antithesis found in the following lines—'not by emphasizing ideology, *but by seeking consensus and taking actions*. Not by setting people apart – *but by bringing them together*. Not by charisma – *but by quiet competence and patience, patience and patience*'—may be interpreted as a jab against Ramos' critics from the mainstream opposition and the Philippine Left. It must be noted that some of his chief political rivals including his Vice President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and fellow 1992 presidential aspirant Miriam Defensor Santiago had been publicly acknowledged as charismatic leaders. Also other organized opposition groups like the Communist Party and other left-leaning organizations had been normally portrayed in the mainstream Philippine politics as

highly steeped in ideological debates. In fact, these debates had caused deep divisions and splintered groups in the Philippine Left (see for instance, Garcia 2001). To Ramos, a presidential leadership that therefore de-emphasizes ideology and is not dependent on charisma, one that is instead action-oriented and has the competitive qualities of ‘quiet competence’ and ‘patience’ is the way to go.

Extract 100 from the 1995 SONA perhaps best captures what Ramos meant by effective management. In this speech, he made reference to management theory and how bureaucratic process in the Philippines had failed in achieving optimum results. He first established ‘the need to improve the government’s capacity and effectiveness.’ Effectiveness was then associated with the terms ‘rule of law’ and ‘legal equality’ suggesting that the former can only be achieved when the law is made applicable to all and does not exempt the privileged few. Ramos then proceeded to talk about the difference between efficiency and effectiveness as taught in management classes, but related this to the Philippine case, which because of ‘structures and systems fit only for the bygone age’ could not manage to achieve optimum results in the bureaucracy. This commentary on the limitations and constraints confronting the ‘bureaucratic life’ was a move to re-emphasize the need to establish changes in the system of governance, which Ramos earlier in his speech acknowledged as ‘the foundation of sustained development.’ Embedded in this entire discourse on the necessity to pursue efficacy in the bureaucracy is the metaphorization of the government as an employer. By describing the bureaucracy as ‘saddled with structures and systems fit only for the bygone era,’ Ramos was implying that the government would remain ineffective and inefficient (‘the employer of the last resort’) until the constraining ‘structures and systems’ are replaced with ones that are appropriate for the current or contemporary conditions.

In extract 101 from his valedictory SONA in 1997, Ramos sealed his representation of the president as AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER by assuring his audience that ‘the work of the government will never slacken during the final year of my watch.’ He indirectly likened himself to a ‘vigorous tiger’ which was mentioned in the speech to counter accusations that presidents in the tail end of their term of office end up as ‘lame duck’ also referred to in the address as ‘enfeebled fowls.’ This was underscored by the repetition of the phrase ‘working and governing’ to signal that the Ramos brand of leadership would continue until his last day in office. The choice of the image of a vigorous tiger in rendering Ramos’ presidency or presidential leadership was most likely deliberate as the image appeared logically consistent with his vision of the Philippines as a newly industrialized economy, also metaphorized as a ‘tiger’ status or economy among trading partners in the ASEAN and East Asian regions (see for instance Thompson and Macaranas 2006, 92).

Emphasis on such terms as ‘quiet competence and patience,’ ‘effectiveness,’ ‘performance,’ ‘vigorous tigers’ in the above-mentioned extracts demonstrates various realizations of the value of competitiveness in the exercise of Ramos’ presidential leadership. Ultimately, to Ramos, an effective manager aims for competitiveness. Such virtues as patience and hard work as well as the characteristics of quiet competence and vigor contribute to that end.

The conceptualization of a president as AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER may be further seen from the extracts that run below:

102. One of my first moves was to issue Memorandum Order No. 27, ordering all departments and agencies to eliminate duplication of functions, achieve greater cost-effectiveness, and rechannel resources to priority projects. It is time we addressed this issue together. Give me the authority to reorganize the bureaucracy – and I assure you that we shall

achieve the kind of organization required for *efficient, effective and quality administration* (1993)

103. And – six – we must raise the quality and integrity of our governance – because only *the competent and responsible exercise of authority can bring about our country's modernization* (1995)

104. *To accelerate such reforms*, we need above all *to improve dramatically the effectiveness of public institutions*. We must *simplify the systems of regulations, licenses and permits* accumulated over generations of big government that have often become opportunities for corruption (1995)

105. The entire public sector we must *transform from a regulatory into a promotional and developmental paradigm serving and urging the private sector to become globally competitive* similar to those that led to East Asia's amazing transformation these past 30 years (1995)

106. And as practiced during the past five SONAs, I shall today – 30 days ahead of schedule – also submit the President's budget for 1998 – all *in the interest of sound financial management and the cost-effective utilization* of public funds (1997)

Like those earlier cited before them, these extracts express the necessity for effective management, which is realized in such expressions as 'efficient, effective and quality administration,' 'competent and responsible exercise of authority,' '[simplifying] systems of regulations,' '[transforming] the public sector into a promotional and developmental paradigm,' 'sound financial management [and] cost-effective utilization.' Interestingly, the extracts especially those delivered in 1995 (i.e., extracts 103 to 105) express that such management measures are critical to modernization, the acceleration of reforms or global competitiveness. These expressions work in coherence with the idea of global competitiveness that runs throughout Ramos' speeches.

6.7 Summary

In this chapter, I have established that the notion of ‘global competitiveness’ is key in understanding the schema of Fidel V. Ramos, the second Philippine president in the post-Marcos era. I argued that the frame of competition took a privileged position in the Ramos presidential rhetoric in that the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency were framed and metaphorized based on the notion of global competitiveness.

The pervasiveness of the idea of competition is evidenced by a shift in the way democracy was conceptualized in the Ramos presidential speeches. His earlier SONAs reaffirmed the conceptual frame employed by his predecessor but his latter congressional speeches viewed democracy as a comparative advantage. In Ramos’ SONAs from 1995 to 1997, democracy had been regarded as a necessity for the nation to survive in the global economic order.

The global economic order being a highly competitive arena where the race for survival is given premium, Ramos conceptualized the Philippine national economy as a competitive participant who needs to develop his/her full potentials and competitive advantage to ensure his/her survival. This conceptualization was realized in the speeches through the metaphorization of the national economy as a player or global/ regional competitor.

In making the national economy competitive, Ramos underscored the need to adopt measures on economic liberalization. The analysis of the speeches reveals that economic liberalization had been considered a vital step towards national growth and development, and consequently global competitiveness. Metaphors that suggest movement and trajectory, especially competitive sports, had been deployed to ensure

that the presidential discussions on the Philippine economy remain anchored on the frame of global competitiveness.

In the area of poverty alleviation which the researcher subsumed under the topic of national economy, war metaphors had been employed. This use of the war frame ran consistent with the frame of competition in that the kinds of ‘intervention’ presented by Ramos to alleviate poverty were aligned with measures deemed necessary to achieve competitiveness in the economic front.

National stability was viewed by Ramos as the foundation or platform towards economic take off. Ensuring peace and order which included resolving conflicts with communist, military and Muslims rebels was deemed vital in ‘releasing the full energies of the nation.’ The elimination of rebellion and criminality was therefore linked to the competitiveness aspired for by the Ramos presidency.

The Ramos presidency regarded itself as an important agent in achieving the country’s global competitiveness. In doing so, Ramos rendered presidential leadership as an exercise in effective management, thus the conceptual metaphor THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER. It goes without saying that this conceptualization put emphasis on certain managerial characteristics and values that reinforce the notion of global competitiveness that undergirded Ramos’s presidential schema.

While the Ramos SONAs underlie a rather distinct schema based on the president’s agenda to transform the Philippines into a globally competitive and newly industrialized country, they still somehow channeled conceptualizations that constituted the schema of Ramos’ immediate predecessor, Aquino, and even that of Marcos. Such conceptualizations include the rendering of economic liberalization or ‘opening of the economy’ as well as of peace and security as precursors to national development. Also Ramos, like his predecessors, engaged in positive self-

representation by rendering the executive or the presidency as the powerful agent that could make national development happen. This channeling of previous conceptualizations provides evidence of the continuities of political beliefs and policies even after regime change.

Chapter 7

Joseph ‘Erap’ Estrada and the Rhetoric of Toughness

7.1 Introduction

Joseph ‘Erap’ Ejercito Estrada⁶⁰ won with a wide margin of votes when he ran for the presidency in 1998. His presidential campaign was based on a pro-poor agenda with ‘Erap para sa Mahirap’ (Erap for the Poor) as slogan. It is widely acknowledged that his populist campaign rhetoric coupled with his image as a tough guy with a heart of gold for the poor—an image carved from his archetypal movie characters—was instrumental in making him the third post-Marcos President.

Estrada’s SONAs during his unexpired term from 1998 to 2000 were woven around his persona or character as a tough leader armed to fight poverty. This character—which was a confluence of his archetypal role in Philippine cinema as a tough guy with a heart of gold, his success story as a town mayor, his nationalist stance while in Senate, his tough image as a crime buster which he carved out while serving as vice president to Fidel Ramos, and his general appeal to the masses—was an important focal point in his speeches in that it was supposed to propel the kind of development he had envisioned for the Philippines.

Considering the evolving Philippine socio-political and cultural context, it is to be expected that each of the four themes considered as foci of this research had been dealt with differently in the Estrada national addresses.

Democracy did not figure prominently in his speeches except in 1999 when Estrada had to address ‘fears’ that the democracy regained in 1986 was being ‘threatened.’ National economy, being an important topic of concern in Estrada’s

⁶⁰ Estrada’s nickname ‘Erap’ is the reverse of the Filipino word ‘pare’ which means ‘buddy.’ It is a nickname he has assumed since his active years in the Philippine movie industry.

populist campaign rhetoric, took an important place in Estrada's presidential speeches. Noticeable is how poverty alleviation, a 'centerpiece' of the Estrada administration, was conceptualized by employing the militarist metaphoric expression 'war on poverty.' Though not necessarily original as it had been deployed in the speeches of Marcos and Ramos, this militarist expression tied in well with the tough character that Estrada projected.

National security and peace and order remained a major concern in Estrada's short-lived presidency. Special attention was given to the secessionist movement in Mindanao especially in his 1999 and 2000 speeches. He variously conceptualized the armed rebellion including the secessionist movement as obstacles to progress, a threat to constitutional democracy, and as a disease that needs to be crushed. His presidential rhetoric conflated armed rebellion with criminality, where crime was dealt with using justice of the punitive instead of the restorative kind. Estrada also conceptualized war as a necessary instrument to ensure peace, thereby warranting the determined use of military action when dealing with the problem of insurgency in the countryside and Moro secessionism in Southern Philippines. Of course, the topic of presidential leadership had lent itself to interesting metaphorizations especially because of Estrada's rather colorful image as a national leader.

In this chapter, I discuss how each of these themes—democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency or presidential leadership—had been variously conceptualized in the Estrada SONAs and how such conceptualizations channeled Estrada's largely macho rhetoric. Also, I shall show how such conceptualizations differ or remain in consonance with their conceptualizations in earlier post-Marcos presidential rhetoric. The following table shows the conceptual framing of each theme in Estrada's SONAs during his unexpired presidential term:

Table 7.1 Conceptual Frames in Joseph Estrada’s SONAs

Section	Theme	Conceptual Frames
7.3	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY
7.4	National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PATIENT IN NEED OF MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM • RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A MEANS TOWARDS COMPETITIVENESS • WAR ON POVERTY IS A PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR RECOVERY AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
7.5	Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMED REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED TO BE CRUSHED • ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME • WAR IS PEACE
7.6	The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH GUIDE, A VISIONARY, AND A LEARNER

A historical milieu of the Estrada presidency is provided in section 7.2 to contextualize the conceptual frames and metaphors discussed in the analytical sections.

7.2 Historical milieu of the Joseph Estrada presidency (1998-2001)

Known as a top-rated and highly acclaimed popular actor in Philippine cinema, Joseph Estrada had a vast experience in Philippine politics and governance before he won a landslide presidential victory in 1998. He was a long time mayor of the city of San Juan in Manila during the time of Ferdinand Marcos; he was elected senator during the Aquino presidency; and he was vice president to Fidel Ramos from

1992 to 1998. His electoral campaign slogan ‘Erap para sa Mahirap’ (Erap for the Poor) proved to be effective when he earned 39 percent of the total number of votes—the highest number of votes in Philippine electoral history at that time. Interestingly, while his program of government declared a pro-poor theme that emphasized food security, mass housing, and public health as top priorities, tough stance and rhetoric seemed to be what characterized the short-lived Estrada presidency.

Estrada’s tough stance was particularly evident when he dealt with the problem of insurgency. In 1999, he endorsed the Philippine-US Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which the Philippine Senate eventually ratified. Although the accord only allowed joint military exercises between the Philippine and US troops, it is seen to have reestablished American military presence in the Philippines particularly in the South which faced rebellion and secessionism from Moro groups.

In 2000, Estrada declared an all-out war with Moro rebels. This provided a go-signal for the armed forces to overrun and reclaim ‘base sanctuaries’ in Mindanao that were occupied by the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a breakaway group of the Nur Misuari-led Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which had made a peace accord with the Philippine government under the Ramos administration in 1996. Estrada’s counter-insurgency programs included Oplan Makabayan in 1998 and Oplan Balangai in 2000, which employed ‘the strategy of concentrating heavy troop deployments and conducting intensive and relentless military operations in priority areas the AFP considered as strongholds of the NPA, MILF, and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)’ (Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace 2006, 6).

Criticized by the mainstream Philippine media for his laidback management style, Estrada faced a debilitating political crisis due to allegations of corruption. In October 2000, his erstwhile friend Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson made an exposé on

Estrada's involvement in an illegal numbers game that led to his impeachment trial before the Philippine Senate.

In January 2001, barely two and a half years after his ascent to presidential power through a huge popular vote, Estrada was ousted through what is touted as EDSA Dos or People Power 2.

7.3 Democracy

As mentioned earlier, the theme of democracy did not figure prominently in Estrada's SONAs except in 1999 when he had to allay 'fears' that the democracy was under threat. In his 1999 State of the Nation Address, Estrada had to reaffirm his 'unwavering commitment to democracy' to dispel the growing perception that the president had resorted to authoritarian rule and tyranny when dealing with his critics. This was the time when Estrada was highly criticized for his 'high handed efforts in crushing and attacking opposition such as the pressure and closure of critical media outlets and the red baiting of militant oppositionists' (Tujan 2000, 25).

Specifically, Estrada addressed two issues before he started with his assessment of the national situation. The first was on the state of democracy during his presidential term, and the second was on the issue of cronyism. The following extract focuses on the state of democracy:

1. (a) I, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, President of the Republic of the Philippines, with the nation, the world, and God as my witness, do hereby reaffirm my unwavering commitment to democracy.
 - (b) I stand by my solemn oath to defend the Constitution as president. I will always uphold freedom in all its various forms; including the freedom of speech, of the press, of worship, of assembly, and of choice. None of these freedoms are under threat.
 - (c) Those who fear the loss of freedom do not share my faith in the strength of our constitution, in the sturdiness of our institutions, in the passion of our people to preserve their freedom, and in their determination

and power to defend it. Freedom may have been lost before. It will never be lost again. Our people will see to that. I as president will stake my own life on it.

(d) Yet may I remind our people that liberty without responsibility is license, that freedom does not confer the right to violate the law or the rights of others, that freedom without responsibility is the formula for chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness.

(e) The paranoid will take that last statement as a hidden threat. The rest will see it as a self-evident principle, accepted throughout the ages, and needing neither apology nor defense. Yet, given a choice between freedom and restraint, I will choose to err on the side of freedom.

(f) To paraphrase Voltaire: I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. But that does not mean I waive the right to argue with you! That is as much my constitutional right as it is yours.

(g) Let all doubts be erased. Democracy, freedom and the constitution are alive and well in this country. (1999)

Democracy⁶¹ is conceptualized in the extract as **AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION**. This is realized in such expressions that suggest commitment to its defense ('I, Joseph Ejercito Estrada,...do hereby *reaffirm* my unwavering commitment to democracy'; 'I stand by my solid oath to *defend* the Constitution as president'; 'I will always *uphold* freedom in all its various forms'), its protection by institutions and established practices ('Those who fear the loss of freedom do not share my faith in the *strength of our constitution*, in the *sturdiness of our institutions*, in the *passion of our people to preserve their freedom*, and in *their determination and power to defend it*'), and assurances of vigilance and sacrifice ('[Freedom] will never be lost again. *Our people will see to it. I as president will stake my own life on it.*').

⁶¹ Notably, the term is associated and made synonymous with such terms as 'freedom' and the 'constitution.' As implied in paragraph (b) of the extract, the three terms—democracy, freedom and the constitution—are interlinked. It may be surmised based on the earlier rhetoric of the post-Marcos presidencies, especially that of Aquino, that the 1987 Constitution is the material expression of the abstraction of democracy and that 'freedom and all its various forms' are the concrete manifestations of democracy at work.

That the commitment to its defense was pursued by no less than Estrada, the highest leader of the land, suggests that democracy is no ordinary object of defense. It is also a PRIZED/ TREASURED IDEAL. Democracy's protection from potential loss is ensured by political institutions including the charter which are metaphorized as stable structures that are strong and sturdy (as shown in the phrases 'strength of our constitution' and 'sturdiness of our institutions') and established practices like 'people power' as suggested by the phrases 'the passion of our people to preserve their freedom' and 'their determination and power to defend it.' It is interesting to note that Estrada's vow to 'defend' and 'uphold' A PRIZED IDEAL that is subject to threat and potential loss channelled earlier conceptualizations of the Philippine president as the primary agent of democracy (see sections 4.5 and 5.6).

The expressions 'strength of our constitution' and 'sturdiness of our institutions' may also be read as realizations of the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A STRUCTURE which was also employed in the speeches of Aquino and Ramos. Interestingly, democracy and its manifestations are also conceptualized as LIVING ENTITY (as shown in the line 'Democracy, freedom and the constitution are alive and well in this country'). Recall that both conceptualizations—STRUCTURE and LIVING ENTITY—are evident in Aquino's rhetoric and make up a larger conceptualization: **DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY**. It may be said then that Estrada's brief discussion on democracy is not just a reaffirmation of his constitutional duty as president to protect it, but also partly a reaffirmation of Aquino's framing of Philippine democracy.

In paragraph (d), Estrada assumes a strict father image (Lakoff 1996) where he insisted that freedom should be coupled with 'responsibility' in order to veer away from 'chaos, anarchy, and lawlessness.' This formulation can be seen as Estrada's

way to warrant his public stance against the critical media as he had earlier filed a libel case against some members of the critical press. Invoking ‘responsibility’ seemed to be his way to assert the need for discipline in a democracy, an absence of which would bring about disorder and contravention of the rule of law.

In paragraph (e), he cast those who are critical of the coupling of ‘freedom’ and ‘responsibility’ as ‘paranoid’ and justified the coupling as a matter of fact—‘a self-evident principle, accepted throughout the ages, and needing neither apology nor defense.’ But as if to allay fears that he would opt for a regimented political system, he added that ‘freedom’ is an OPTION (‘a choice’) he would prefer to ‘restraint.’

In paragraph (f) he paraphrases the French philosopher Voltaire by saying, ‘I may not agree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.’ This statement casts him as the heroic DEFENDER while it casts democracy or freedom, especially the freedom of speech, as the DEFENDED. He then used this as a premise for insisting on his ‘right to argue’ and asserted that it is ‘as much constitutional right as it is yours.’ These assertions cast him then not only as a DEFENDER of the freedom of speech, but also a chief ENFORCER of it.

7.4 National economy

Though popularly elected in 1998, Estrada’s foray into the Philippine presidency faced the challenge of a national economy mired in the Asian financial crisis. His first national address in congress, however, reveals that the situation created an opportunity for Estrada to render the national situation in metaphorical terms, and at the same time criticize how the previous administration had handled the situation.

In conceptualizing the state of the Philippine economy, Estrada employed health and disaster metaphors. Two conceptual frames enabled Estrada to articulate and explain the state of the Philippine economy vis-à-vis the Asian financial crisis: **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT** and **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM**. Both of these conceptualizations are expressed in the following extract from Estrada's first SONA delivered in 1998:

2. Hindi na ako magpapaligoy-ligoy pa. Nasa harap tayo ngayon ng matinding krisis na gumugulo sa buong Asya. (I am not going to beat around the bush. We are faced with a severe crisis that has caused disarray in the whole of Asia.)

Ayon sa mga eksperto, wala pa tayo sa *pinakamalubhang yugto ng krisis*. (According to experts, we have not yet reached *the worst part of the crisis*.)

Kung babalewalain natin ang kinalalagyan nating ngayon, tiyak na lulubog ang ating bansa sa bigat ng ganap na recession. (If we are going to take our current state for granted, I am sure that our nation will sink because of the weight of complete recession.)

Kaya ba nating iwasan ito? O hihintayin na lang ba nating tamaan tayo ng lalong matinding dagok sa ating kabuhayan? (Are we capable of preventing this? Or are we just going to wait for the worst hit on our livelihood?)

Malubha ang lagay ng ating ekonomiya, at namimilagro ang kabangyaman ng bansa. (*The economy is in grave condition*, and the national treasury is in danger.)

Hindi kayang punuan ng pamahalaan ang kakulangan ng ekonomiya. Sa madaling salita, bangkarote and gobyerno. (Our government is not capable of filling up what our economy lacks. In other words, the government is bankrupt.)

Sawa na ang taumbayan sa mga walang-kabuluhang pangako't palabas. Sa harap ng *matinding krisis* na ating pinagdaanan nitong nakaraang taon, *ang kailangan nati'y mga mabilis at mabisang lunas*. Ito ang matinding hamon na dapat nating tugunan—tayong lahat: ang panguluhan, ang kongreso, ang pribadong sektor, ang mamamayan. Mabigat na hamon ito—subalit buo ang tiwala kong mas matimbang ang pinagsama nating talino, sipag, kakayahan. (The people are fed up with senseless promises and show. *In the face of the severe crisis that we have gone through this past year, what we need is a quick and effective cure*. This is the challenge that we have to address—all of us: the presidency, the congress, the private sector, the people. The challenge is great—but I have full confidence that our combined intelligence, diligence, and competence are greater.) (1998)

I shall explain in separate sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.2) how the two conceptualizations are realized in the above-mentioned extract and were actually sustained in the Estrada SONAs. In doing so, I argue that both conceptualizations of the national economy as A MEDICAL PATIENT and A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM strategically positioned Estrada and his administration as THE MEDICAL HERO/ RESCUER of the purportedly ailing and fragile economy—a rendering that was in line with Estrada’s tough rhetoric.

7.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT

To Estrada, the Philippines, especially its economy, was gravely ill when he assumed power and it was his duty as the elected leader to find an effective cure for the ailing national economy. In extract 2, he described the economic condition using such expressions as ‘wala pa tayo sa pinakamalubhang yugto ng krisis’ (we have not yet reached the worst part of the crisis), ‘malubha ang lagay ng ating ekonomiya’ (the economy is in grave condition), ‘matinding krisis’ (serious crisis) that require ‘lunas’ (cure) that is both ‘mabilis’ (quick) and ‘mabisa’ (effective). These expressions underlie the conceptual metaphors ECONOMIC CONDITION IS HEALTH, THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY SUBJECT TO ILLNESS, and THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION. These conceptualizations are akin to Aquino’s framing of the national economy as a MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE (the nation being a LIVING ENTITY who suffered and died under Marcos dictatorship and was restored back to life during the period of re-democratization); however, they point to a more specific frame: **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MEDICAL PATIENT**.

Estrada’s use of health metaphors to explain the national economic state was sustained in his 1999 and 2000 SONAs.

In 1999, Estrada provided a listing of his administration's accomplishments, capping an account of each accomplishment with the phrase 'We did it.' This rhetorical device may be seen as a form of diacope—a repetition of a word or phrase after an intervening discourse—to add emphasis to the accomplishments of his administration. He repeated the phrase five times until he introduced the policy on pump priming in which case he admitted that in reducing the government deficit—something he promised to do in 1998—'we did not do it.' This admission was not an admission of failure, but a means to present an alternative course. At this point, it was necessary for Estrada to return to the use of health metaphors when describing this apparent shift in economic policy. In the following extract, Estrada repudiated the policy of the Ramos administration ('a 25% across-the-board forced savings on the expenditures of the government') by likening it to an inappropriate prescription ('administering the medicine for high blood pressure to a patient with low blood pressure') which he claimed could have worsened the national economic condition:

3. At a time when the economy was threatened by recession, the previous administration had decided on a 25% across-the-board forced savings on the expenditures of the government. This was like administering the medicine for high blood pressure to a patient with low blood pressure. *Lalong lulubha ang pasyente, at baka mamatay pa ng hindi oras.* (Trans. The condition of the patient got worse, and he might even die so suddenly) (My favorite doctor, The First Lady, always makes sure that my blood pressure is normal. Especially when I'm reading the newspapers.) (1999)

The extract underlies the conceptual metaphor THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA/POLICY IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION, where the Estrada economic agenda/policy was supposedly a better prescription than that of Ramos. It props up the framing of the national economy as A MEDICAL PATIENT in need of medical intervention from the Estrada administration. Estrada played up this use of health

metaphors by making a parenthetical statement about his wife-doctor—referred to in the extract as ‘The First Lady’—making sure always that his blood pressure is normal ‘[e]specially when I’m reading the newspapers.’ This statement appears to have been made as a verbal jab against the critical press, which purportedly caused abnormal health conditions for Estrada himself. Interestingly, this representation of the critical press works parallel to the representation of the recession which had supposedly put the national economy in high risk.

In his 2000 State of the Nation Address, Estrada described that the economy was in ‘healthy’ condition in that ‘as a whole [it] has experienced moderate growth, low inflation, low interest rates, strong exports, a healthy balance of payments, and record-high international reserves.’ He insisted that the weaknesses in the foreign exchange of the peso, the national currency, ‘cannot be attributed to the country’s macro-economic fundamentals’ but ‘a result largely of a new Asian currency contagion: Other currencies in the region have been weakening due to political factors and the strength of the US economy and the US dollar.’ He furthered that ‘If the peso had not adjusted accordingly, our exports would have become less competitive. Obviously, the nervousness about the potential implications of the Mindanao conflict on the economy also contributed to the depreciation of the peso.’

In the preceding presidential pronouncements, health metaphors were employed to conceptualize the state of the national currency, that is, its condition was a result of the ‘Asian currency *contagion*.’ This metaphorization made it easy for the speaker to suggest that the performance of the Philippine peso was affected by the state of other regional currencies as influenced by political factors as well as that of the US economy and the US dollar. Also, the performance of the national currency was linked to the competitiveness of the Philippines in the world market—a desired

state. Moreover, internal conflicts such as the ones waged in Mindanao were seen as forces that contributed to the depreciation of the national currency.

As in 1998, health and weather metaphors were mixed in Estrada's 2000 SONA to articulate the conditions besetting the national economy. The following extract shows this:

4. We were thus witness to a paradox: strong exports, large external trade and payment surpluses, and record levels of international reserves side by side with a depreciating peso.

That paradox, in fact, might be *harbinger of some dark clouds* coming back. After *a brief period of recovery* from the financial crisis, the Asian region is *suffering from a mild relapse*. As mentioned, the currency exchange rates are depreciating. Oil prices have gone up substantially. Unemployment is rising. And investments are nervously staying away from the East Asian region as a whole. (2000)

In the extract, what is regarded as the paradox—the co-occurrence of strong macroeconomic fundamentals with the peso depreciation—is realized as a possible ‘harbinger of some dark clouds,’ an expression which underlies the conceptual metaphor ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER CONDITIONS. On the other hand, it is expressed as a condition of ‘suffering from a mild relapse’ which implies a different conceptual metaphor, that is, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS.

In the next section, I focus on the use of weather metaphors.

7.4.2 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM

Extract 2 (see page 228) from Estrada's 1998 SONA is also interlaced with expressions using metaphors that suggest potential disaster and danger. This is evident in the following expressions: ‘tiyak na *lulubog* ang ating bansa sa bigat ng ganap ng recession’ (I am sure that our nation will *sink* because of the weight of complete recession) and ‘O hihintayin na lang ba nating tamaan tayo ng lalong *matinding dagok* sa ating kabuhayan?’ (Or are we just going to wait for the *worst hit* on our

livelihood?). These expressions conceptualize the economy as A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM in need of a rescue, with the regional economic recession as the impending danger or disaster.

In his 1999 SONA, Estrada conceptualized the Philippines as a survivor of the regional economic crisis. Expectedly, he was wont to provide a sterling account of what his administration had done in the previous year and how his year-old presidency had managed to steer the country away from the crisis. This time, he employed weather and journey metaphors to describe the economic recession and the recovery of the Philippine economy from that recession, respectively. In the following extract, Estrada conceptualized the Asian crisis as a violent weather, a storm that the Philippines, metaphorized as a sea vessel, had survived with the President, the captain, at the helm, together with a ‘team’ of experts in various fields who, indirectly metaphorized as his crew, assisted him in steering the vessel in the right course:

5. Sa aking inagurasyon sa Luneta noong ika-30 ng Hunyo 1998, mahigpit kong iginiit na "Huwag n'yo akong subukan!" Nguni't ang sumubok sa akin ay hindi ang taong-bayan kundi *ang matinding bagyo na tumama sa ating ekonomiya*. (In my inauguration at Luneta on the 30th of June 1998, I firmly asserted "Don't try me!" But what tried me was not the people but *the heavy storm that hit our economy*.)

Nang ako'y hinirang na maging *kapitan ng barko ng ating sambayanan*, ito ay *kasalukuyang palubog na sa maalong dagat ng "Asian crisis"*. Sabi ko sa aking sarili: ang ganda naman ng "timing" ng aking *pagsakay*. *Hinahampas ng hangin at alon ang barko*. At lalong masama, kakaunti na lang *ang gasolina sa kanyang tangke*. *Paano natin ngayon dadalhin ang barkong ito sa ligtas na lugar hanggang makalipas ang malupit na panahon?* (When I was elected to be the *captain of the national ship*, the economy was *sinking in restless seas of the Asian crisis*. I said to myself: What a wonderful timing in *taking the ride*. *The air and the waves kept on rushing against the vessel*. Worse, I have limited *gasoline in my tank*. *How are we going to bring this vessel/ ship to a safe place until the violent weather is over?*)

Mabuti na lang, ang aming "team" ng mga kilalang dalubhasa sa kanya-kanyang linya ay nagkaisa sa pagpapasya kung paano lulutasin ang

mga problemang ating hinaharap noon. Sa pamamagitan ng aming pagtutulungan, pagsisikap at mga tamang pamamalakad, napaayos namin ang paggalaw ng barko. *Nang sumikat ang araw, ang karamihan ng mga ibang barko ay nakalubog pa rin at nagsisikap pang umahon, nguni't ang barko ng Pilipinas ay nakalutang na sa liwanag ng araw.* (Good thing, our team of experts in different fields is united in their decision on how to solve the problems that we are facing. Through teamwork, patience and good management, we were able to steer the ship in the right course. *When the sun rose, most of the ships are still submerged in the waters and struggling to rise above it; but the Philippine ship is afloat in broad daylight*) (1999)

Notably in the following extracts, he further established the extent of the crisis by likening it to A NATURAL DISASTER or TURBULENCE and by articulating the kind of help the Philippines received from its people, its government and outside forces to weather the storm.

6. In 1998, most of our Asian neighbors *sank* into recession. In contrast, our country managed a modest but positive growth of one-tenth of one percent (0.1%) in our Gross National Product. However, our Gross Domestic Product dipped by one-half of one percent (0.5%) during the year. In the first quarter of this year, our GNP abruptly surged upward by 2% and our GDP by 1.2%. Last year, we were *struggling to keep ourselves from sinking*. Today, *we are sailing towards the high seas again*.

It is time once more to pay tribute to a special class of Filipinos: our overseas workers. They as a group kept our GNP growth at positive rates even during the worst of times. They continue to be *our economic saviors*. (1999)

7. So when the global market gobbles up \$1.2 billion worth of Republic of the Philippines Global Bonds for budget support, from the first country to float such an issue after the Asian crisis; and when the market buys up the \$400 million of Bangko Sentral bonds issued for reserve management purposes; and when the Eurobond flotation of the national government raises \$383 million: -- obviously, the world believes that in the Philippines, *it has stopped raining*. We are getting a shower of umbrellas! (1999)
8. Only last Thursday, the IMF Executive Board completed the fourth review under our standby arrangement. This will now allow us to draw about \$214 million, which will further increase our gross international reserves. The IMF executive directors also praised the Bangko Sentral, headed by Governor Gabriel Singson for the last six years, for the successful

implementation of monetary policy through the *turbulence* of the past two years. (1999)

In the extracts, ‘sinking’ (6), ‘raining’ (7), and ‘turbulence’ (8) are expressions used to suggest the gravity of the Asian crisis. They are metaphorical expressions that relate to the existence of a disconcerting meteorological phenomenon—a storm—which the national economy, metaphorized as a ship, had to withstand. Rendered as saviors of the economy are the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) (6), national government (7), and its monetary policy sanctioned by global financial institutions such as the IMF (8).

7.4.3 RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A MEANS TOWARDS COMPETITIVENESS

In the course of articulating his economic agenda, Estrada offered a shift in the rhetoric used to articulate desired changes in the Philippine economy: he suggested a shift from ‘reform’—a ‘faddish word’ which he regarded as ‘too weak and wimpish’—to ‘radical restructuring’ which was in consonance with his tough, not to mention macho, image. He said:

9. I must confess, however, that I find the faddish word ‘reform’ as too weak and wimpish. What I believe the Philippine economy needs is not just reforms but radical restructuring, from the ground up.

The extract conjures such conceptual metaphors as REFORM IS WIMPISH while RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A SHOW OF STRENGTH. Both may be interpreted as gendered as being ‘wimpish’ may be regarded as characteristic of emasculation while ‘radical restructuring’ suggests aggressiveness, courage and physical strength that are associated with stereotypical masculinity. And to Estrada, ‘radical restructuring’ was what the country needed for his economic policies to flourish.

In the following extracts, Estrada explained that the economic structure of the Philippines had been impeded by protectionist policies—a position that echoes one of Ramos’ conceptualizations in his SONAs: PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN OBSTRUCTION TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (see Chapter 6.3.2). He proposed ‘radical restructuring’ as the means ‘to make the economy productive, efficient, and globally competitive’:

10. Many are asking why is it that other Asian countries, which went through a worse crisis than we did, actually grew faster on the rebound. One reason is that we recovered from a higher base, they from a lower one. *A more fundamental reason is that the very structure of the Philippine economy today was inherited from past decades of import-substitution and protective policies, aggravated by economic mismanagement and corruption.* Our industrial base is thin. Due to decades of neglect, our agricultural productivity is low. Our population growth rate is high. And our technology is on a catch-up mode. Rectifying these decades of historical errors and lapses will take much more than two years of any presidency.

Radical restructuring entails the modernization of the economy, both physically and electronically, to make it more productive, efficient, and globally competitive. And modernization must touch not just agriculture and industry but the brains and hands of our people, to put the country squarely on the path of the information superhighway, which in turn links the world's knowledge-based economies into one vast global network.

Curiously though, the ‘radical restructuring’ did not seem to depart from what had been implemented and advocated in the past administrations. In fact, it had been used to justify free trade agreements and structural adjustments inherited from the previous governments of Aquino and Ramos.

In the following extract, Estrada’s ‘radical restructuring’ appeared to be consistent with Ramos’ schema of national development that put premium on the notion of ‘global competitiveness’:

11. All these institutional reforms and *radical restructurings*, plus additional measures I will mention later, *should restore and increase the country's ability to compete for investments in the future.*

As we build our infrastructure, so shall we build our information superhighway. In fact, instead of just retracting the history of other faster-growing countries, *we have decided to leapfrog from the so-called old economy to the new economy: using information technology, including e-commerce, to fast-track our output, our productivity and our competitiveness.* (2000)

In the preceding extract, ‘radical restructuring’ together with ‘institutional reforms’ are conceptualized as the means to increase ‘the country’s ability to compete for investments.’ Estrada also obviously discounted his predecessor’s word choices by re-employing the concept of economic leapfrogging (‘leapfrog’) instead of Ramos’ ‘pole vaulting’ strategy used by the latter in his final SONA. Though both terms had been employed to mean accelerating the country’s level of competitiveness, Estrada’s less original choice appeared to be in keeping with the rhetoric of development and at the same time a rejection of Ramos’ rhetorical strategy. On the other hand, the use of ‘leapfrog’ instead of the sophisticated sport ‘pole vaulting’ appears to reduce Estrada’s aggressive and macho rhetoric.

It may be said that the shift in rhetoric, that is from ‘reform’ to ‘radical restructuring,’ was a move that was in consonance with the presidential image projected by Estrada—the image of toughness and machismo. The use of ‘radical restructuring’ was merely a deployment of a relatively novel buzzword to impact the message of the president. Substantially, Estrada’s ‘radical restructuring’ did not differ from the previous programs of the past administrations. In fact, it merely echoed the neoliberal policies adopted by the governments of Aquino and Ramos.

7.4.4 WAR ON POVERTY/ POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR

An outstanding feature of the rhetoric of Estrada's national addresses with regard to the national economy is the 'war on poverty.' Clearly, this was borne out of the populist (pro-poor) rhetoric that the president used in his political campaign. The phrase is of course not unique to Estrada since the same one was employed by Fidel Ramos in his presidential speeches. However, the use of this phrase worked consistently with Estrada's tough image and the highly militarist rhetoric which he employed to address national security as well as peace and order concerns (see 7.5)

The extract below illustrates Estrada's use of the phrase 'war on poverty' which he described as 'not just a policy but a passion':

12. I consider poverty an intolerable social shame. It cries out not for marginal attention but for a total approach. For me, *the war on poverty is not just a policy but a passion*. I deplore the fact that the past economic programs of this country were mostly upside-down. Baligtad (Reversed). They aimed at developing the apex and neglected the base.

My own belief is the opposite. Uplifting the rich leaves the poor behind. But uplifting the poor lifts everyone, including the rich.

Let me make this clear. My vision is not just the alleviation of poverty but its ultimate eradication. Alleviation is temporary. Eradication is permanent. Alleviation is limited. Eradication is total. The proper response to the problem of poverty is not superficial treatment but total structural change. Hindi maaring puksain ang kahirapan sa pamamagitan ng patapal-tapal at papahid-pahid lamang. Kailangan ay baguhin ang buong sistema. (Poverty cannot be eradicated by merely applying something on surface. It requires a change of the entire system.)

I realize that "eradication" is unattainable in real life. But getting as close to it as possible is worth the effort. It is true that Jesus Christ said: "the poor you will always have with you," but he did not say they had to be the majority. My vision is to drive poverty away from the center and into the periphery of our concerns, to make it a marginal rather than a mainstream problem.

Hence, our war on poverty is not just one program of government. It is the overriding business of the government itself. It is built into and embedded in our total economic and social programs. It defines and drives the substance, the content, and the heart and soul of our entire strategy of government.

Ang ating kampanya laban sa kahirapan ay hindi isang programa lamang ng pamahalaan. Ito ang sentro ng patakaran at pagkilos ng

pamahalaan. Nakatatak ito sa kabuuan ng bawa't programang pangkabuhayan at pang-lipunan. Ito ang magbibigay-buhay at lakas sa diwa at puso ng pagkilos at pamamalakad ng pamahalaan. (NB: A restatement in Filipino of the preceding paragraph)

It is essential for our war on poverty that the economy develops in general, but this is not enough. It is also important that development efforts be re-directed towards the poor, towards the base of our society. In my thirty years of public service, I have always decided for the greater good of the greatest number. With this conviction, I can never go wrong. (1999)

In the extract, Estrada conceptualized 'war on poverty' as a FORMULA or a PRESCRIPTION that is 'built into and embedded in our total economic and social programs.' It is a life-inducing formula in that it 'defines and drives the substance, the content, heart and soul of our entire strategy of government.'

Estrada's 'war on poverty' is supposed to be different from the economic programs of the past that purportedly 'uplift the rich' but leave the poor behind. It conceptualizes poverty as taking up a substantive part of the social structure by alluding to poor as the 'base' of the social pyramid and by describing poverty as a central or 'mainstream' problem that need to be driven to the 'periphery' or made 'marginal.' Estrada's assertions that he was for the 'ultimate eradication' of poverty and not just for its 'alleviation', that the 'proper response to the problem of poverty' is 'total structural change' and not 'superficial treatment' betray his aggressive stance. They are consistent with his assertions on 'radical restructuring' where he showed his characteristic male audacity.

Underlying the 'war on poverty' concerns articulated in the Estrada presidential rhetoric was the continuation of globalist neoliberal policies started out in the previous administrations, especially that of Ramos, Estrada's predecessor. This is seen in the following extract:

13. All these shifts will take place in a free market environment. All investments in industries, whether large or small, upstream or downstream, capital- or labor-intensive, will be welcome. But *special attention will be placed on "unblocking" investments in small and medium-scale industries, especially in the rural areas. There are many obstacles in our laws and in our landscape that impede the spontaneous flow of investments and technology into these industries. These obstacles will be removed by programs that will open up and make markets more efficient: whether by legislation, by policy and regulation revamps, by focused infrastructure construction, or by other means.*

Investments create jobs. And jobs provide both income and dignity. They are the decisive eliminators of poverty.

Our war on poverty is in our programs to enable our industries to achieve global competitiveness. We will transform the power sector to a market-based, competitive industry in order to lower the costs of power. The Omnibus Power Bill is necessary to achieve this. We will exploit our competitive advantage in high-tech industries. Our science and technology policies are being re-oriented towards satisfying the needs of the underprivileged. (1999)

The extract, which talks about encouraging a ‘free market environment’ to achieve global competitiveness, metaphorizes the government-facilitated entry of investments in small and medium-scale industries, especially in the rural areas, as a form ‘unblocking’ the (rural) economy. Such metaphorization presupposes that the status quo had not been conducive to investments. This is explicated in the metaphorization of existing laws as ‘obstacles’ that serve to ‘impede the spontaneous flow of investments and technologies’—a metaphorization that underlies the conceptual metaphor PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS. The removal of these ‘obstacles’ is supposed to ‘open up and make markets more efficient,’ which serves as a metaphorical expression for a liberalized economy. Several ways are offered to go about the ‘unblocking’ and ‘opening up’ of the national economy: ‘by legislation, by policy and regulation revamps, by focused infrastructure construction, or by other means.’ They are conceptualized as MECHANISMS FOR REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES/IMPEDIMENTS.

The extract also shows a justification for the Estrada-sponsored proposal to amend the constitution, especially what was purported as ‘protectionist policies’ that bar foreigners from owning land. In this regard, the war frame became a significant means to cast those who oppose the policies pushed by the Estrada administration as ‘enemies’ against which the people and recipients of the government economic agenda should fight and resist. This will be further explored in the next section on national security and peace and order—domains where Estrada appeared to favor ‘the military sword to provide swift solution over rising criminality as well as rising popular unrest and rebellion’ (Tujan 2000, 23).

7.5 Peace and security

In Estrada’s 1999 national address, rebellion or insurgency was characterized as irrelevant.⁶² Estrada went on to discredit its founding leaders in exile by referring to them as leaders who have abandoned their followers ‘para magpasarap sa ibang bansa’ (in order to enjoy themselves abroad) and to pursue an ‘insurgency by remote control.’ While he was open to negotiations with the communist rebels in the ‘community level,’ he made it clear that such was possible only on the administration’s terms. In his characteristic street-smart rhetoric, Estrada used the vernacular to communicate his message to the rebels:

14. Nguni’t mabuti na ring maliwanag ang usapan. Kuwenta klaras. Kakaunti na lang ang panahon at pasiyensiya na nalalabi sa pag-dadada. Isuko na ninyo ang inyong armas. Bumalik na kayo sa buklod ng batas at ng ating lipunan, At dito tayo mag-usap ng masinsinan, bilang magkakapatid, walang sandata sa kamay, walang tutukan ng baril. (*But it is good when things between us are clear. Cuentas claras. Time and patience left for*

⁶² Interestingly, this line of argument had been repeated by the Arroyo government in dealing with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

talk is getting shorter. Surrender your arms. Return to the fold of the law and our society. And this is where we should talk seriously, as brothers and sisters, without arms or weapons, not at gunpoint.) (1999)

Estrada employed several metaphorizations in order to negatively represent the insurgency in his speech: insurgency as an obstacle to national progress, as a manipulated act or operation, as a threat to constitutional democracy, and as a disease or pest that needs to be crushed.⁶³

INSURGENCY/REBELLION IS AN OBSTACLE TO SOCIAL PROGRESS

15. Ang isa pang *balakid* sa *digmaan laban sa karalitaan*, at sa *kaunlaran ng buong bayan*, ay ang *rebelyon* ng ilan sa ating mga kababayan. (Another obstacle in war against poverty, and to national progress is the rebellion waged by several of our compatriots.)

LEADERS OF THE INSURGENTS ARE MANIPULATORS

16. Sila’y matagal nang iniwan ng kanilang mga lider upang magpasarap sa ibang bansa, at doon nila tinutulak ang ‘*insurgency by remote control*’. (They have long been abandoned by their leaders to spend good time in other countries where they pursue insurgency by remote control.)

INSURGENCY IS A THREAT TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

17. Our people overwhelmingly support our constitutional system and our functioning democracy. *No insurgency of any color has the legal, political, or moral right to seek to bring it down.*

This government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. Your rebellion does not. And this government was not elected to compromise the sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, not ever.

If you wish to run the government, seek the people’s mandate. If you have any grievances against the government or against society, seek your redress within the law. You have a right to your beliefs, but *you cannot justify your belligerence.*

⁶³ The last one is an allusion to a popular advertisement where a popular film and television actress endorses the use of a certain detergent to kill bacteria or germs.

INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE/PEST THAT NEEDS TO BE CRUSHED

18. *Hindi binebeybi ang rebelyon. Pinipisa. Kaya, huwag n'yo kaming hamunin! (Rebellion is not to be treated like a baby. It is squashed. So don't you dare challenge us!)*

Notably, the final conceptual metaphor was likened to how the government dealt with crime, and Estrada was explicit about this in his SONA:

19. *Hindi binebeybi ang rebelyon. Pinipisa. Kaya, huwag n'yo kaming hamunin! Gayon din ang masasabi ko tungkol sa krimen at mga salarin. Hindi nilalambing ang krimen. Dinudurog. Hindi kinukupkup ang kriminal. Pinaparusahan. Lalong-lalo na iyong mga nagtutulak ng bawal na gamot sa ating mga kababayan. Setenta por sienta ng krimen ay nagmumula sa pag-gamit ng droga. (Rebellion is not to be treated like a baby. It is squashed. So don't you dare challenge us! The same applies to crime and its perpetrators. A crime is not something to be coddled. It is crushed. A criminal is not somebody to be harbored. He is punished. Especially those who are pushing/selling drugs to our compatriots. Seventy percent of crimes committed are due to drug-use.)*

The juxtaposition of contrasting images in the statements – a nurturing image ('binebeybi' (to baby), 'nilalambing' (to coddle or pamper)) and a punitive one ('pinipisa' (to squash), 'dinudurog' (to crush), 'pinaparusahan' (punish)) – is worth noting. They serve as rhetorical strategies of othering as they vividly visualize the kind of negative treatment that both the rebels and criminals deserve. That rebellion and crime (target domains) are rendered as diseases also suggest that the two may be conflated making possible the formulation that ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME, where crime is to be dealt with either punitive measure or retributive justice.⁶⁴ Such a

⁶⁴ Lazar and Lazar (2007) discuss the use of police work in American presidential discourse. In their work, they note that the use of police discourse does curious referencing to liability and punishment which points to retributive kind of justice and tends to ignore the restorative kind.

presupposition was consistent with Estrada's persona as a crime buster – an image he had held long before he assumed presidential power.⁶⁵

It is interesting to note, however, that in spite of Estrada's belligerent rhetoric against the rebels, he was rather conciliatory in his 1999 congressional speech by referring to them earlier as 'kababayan' (compatriots). This seemingly sympathetic stance towards the communists may be due to the fact that several of those who supported Estrada's bid to the presidency were intellectuals, university professors, and community organizers associated with factions of the Philippine Left (some of whom later became members of his cabinet).

In 2000, Estrada claimed success in his 'all out war' policy against the secessionist groups in Mindanao such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). He then proposed a four-point strategy in approaching the Mindanao question, which included forging peace talks with MILF 'within the framework of the [1987] Constitution.' In inviting MILF 'into a brotherly embrace of peace,' Estrada took the opportunity to discuss why the rebel groups should drop their secessionist goals.

Estrada conceptualized secessionism or the separatist movement as a threat that aimed to amputate Mindanao from the organic body that is the Philippines. He went on to give 'some unsolicited advice' to MILF, stating that secessionism 'is an

⁶⁵ This image constitutes part of the 'Erap myth,' which in itself is a confluence of various forces. It is a product of discourses from Joseph Estrada's four-decade stint in the Philippine movie industry; from authorized and unauthorized biographers' depiction of his personal life; from the media portrayal of him through radio, television, print or the Internet; from his public utterances; and from everyday face-to-face talks about his many images – as politician, husband, father, grandfather, lover, gambler, womanizer, actor, the Filipino Robin Hood, intellectual lightweight, leader, protector of film workers, Chinese Filipino businessmen supporter, anti-elite, perennial bida, nationalist, anti-US bases senator, the carabao lawmaker, the impulsive speaker, Tagalog-speaking President, Clinton counterpart, centennial president, ama ng masa – that have endeared him to most members of the lower classes of society and some members of the elite. To put it succinctly, powerful signifiers have contributed to Erap's rise as a shining political star (Navera 2003).

impossible dream' with which the majority in Mindanao and international community do not sympathize:

20. May I give the MILF some unsolicited advice. *Secession in the Philippines is an impossible dream.* There simply is no space in our geography, in our demographics, and in *our national psyche* for forcibly carving another state out of the present Philippine territory. For that reason, the foreign models you invoke, like East Timor, will not work for you.

Please bear in mind that you are neither the sole occupants nor even the majority in the lands you wish to carve out to convert into your own state. There are whole Filipino populations in Mindanao--Muslims, Christians, and Lumad--who do not want their territories and their residencies disturbed. Not even the majority of the Muslim population share your separatist views nor the violent means you employ to attain them. The overriding passion of the people of Mindanao is for peace.

Our people will simply not stand for the *dismemberment of the country. All of the Philippines belongs to all Filipinos. No part of it belongs to any particular group.*

And the international community as a whole will neither support nor sympathize with secession. In fact, we deeply appreciate the statement of his excellency, Dr. Azeddine Laraki, secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), encouraging Muslim minorities in non-member states [and I quote] "To contribute effectively to the progress of the countries they live in and to respect their sovereignty and laws." [Unquote.]

Secession as a dream is also out of tune with history. If there is one lesson that historical evolution has taught us, it is this: That diversity is a cause for celebration, not segregation; that cultural cross-breeding leads to strength while in-breeding leads to weakness; and that cultural identities are enriched by interaction and impoverished by isolation. Some of the most glorious creations and achievements of civilization are the products of the historical confluences between Islam and Christianity.

What we should strive for is not just peaceful coexistence but interactive harmony and constructive interdependence. (2000)

In the extract, Estrada not only conceptualized secessionism as an act of dismembering the country (body), but also as an impossible dream 'that has no space in [the] national psyche,' and a dream that is 'out of tune with history'—one that deviates from 'the lesson of historical evolution has taught us.' These conceptualizations portrayed the Moro secessionists as a radical minority offering a

proposition that was not only disagreeable to the people of Mindanao and the international community, but also dangerous to the national life. They made it appear as if the quest for self-determination by the Moros would make the proposed Bangsamoro land inimical to interaction with other cultural communities beyond its shores. Also, they portrayed the secessionist movement as irrelevant in the contemporary world that is supposed to regard ‘diversity as a cause of celebration.’ This portrayal curiously deemphasized the ‘historical and systemic marginalization of the Moros’ in Southern Philippines (Santos 2008) and how the previous governments including post-Marcos administrations had themselves been complicit in the marginalization of the Moros in the countryside through state policies and programs that tend to under-privilege Muslim communities in the Philippines.⁶⁶ In a way, the conceptualizations succeed in othering groups like the MILF, making the militarist solution pursued by the Estrada administration justifiable.

Justification for the militarist solution may be seen in the following extract:

21. We cannot negotiate over secession. The sovereignty and the integrity of the republic are not available for compromise or trade--not even for the sake of peace. Any peace won by bartering any portion of our sovereignty is an immoral peace.

Moreover, the sovereignty and integrity of the republic are unconquerable. No guns will ever terrorize the Filipinos to surrender any piece of their sovereignty to anybody: not--as our history shows--to any colonial power, not to any foreign invader, and certainly not to any internal rebel.

We cannot talk about secession. But we can talk about a new beginning for Mindanao.

In fact, if you are bold enough for it, we can talk about a different war, a bigger war that needs to be fought. I do not mean the guerrilla warfare that you appear to have shifted to. I hope you stop--for the sake of the

⁶⁶ In Marites Vitug and Glenda Gloria’s ‘Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao’ (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public Affairs and the Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), it is noted that ‘what figure as an important reason for joining the Moro rebellion such as the one waged by MILF are the military abuses and the need for land and livelihood’ (p.116).

people, especially the poor, who will suffer the most from continued hostilities. But if you decide to engage us further, we are ready for you. If you can shift strategies and tactics, so can we.

When I talk of another war, I mean the war to correct historical wrongs, which left a sad legacy of poverty and social injustice to Mindanao. This is the war that all of us, including ex-rebels, should fight together.

Fighting the rebellion is one thing. It takes the military to do it. But fighting the root causes of rebellion is another. It will take the whole society to do it. (2000)

The extract reveals a rhetoric that easily reverts to the ‘war’ frame—that even the resolution of the problems in Southern Philippines could be conceptualized as a battle. In the extract, Estrada initially lays out the non-negotiables (‘We cannot negotiate over secession. The sovereignty and integrity of the republic are not available for compromise or trade...’). He then repudiates the use of arms to challenge sovereignty (‘No guns will ever terrorize the Filipinos to surrender any piece of their sovereignty to anybody’). Moving on, he introduces the possibility of talking ‘about a new beginning for Mindanao.’ But just when the recipient of the message is about to think that Estrada is taking a conciliatory stance or, at the very least, is calling for a dialogue, he suddenly frames his talk in the domain of war (‘we can talk about a different war, a bigger war that needs to be fought’) and renders the rebels in ways that elicit negative evaluation of their resolve (‘the guerilla warfare that you appear to have shifted to’; ‘continued hostilities’). And then he turns into a combative and defensive mode (‘But if you decide to engage us further, we are ready for you. If you can shift strategies and tactics, so can we’), suggesting that the government is not about to back out from the fight pursued by the rebels. In the final paragraph of the above extract, war against rebellion per se (‘fighting rebellion’) is distinguished from war against ‘the root causes of rebellion’ (‘fighting the root causes of rebellion’). While this makes the militarist solution one of several approaches to address the

problem of Moro insurgency, the use of the war frame (as evidenced by the use of the term ‘fighting’ or the expressions ‘a different war, a bigger war that needs to be fought,’ ‘a war to correct the historical wrongs’ in the last three paragraphs of the extract) naturalizes the use of military force; the frame renders the use of force inevitable.

In the extract below, the MILF rebels are metaphorically expressed as wielders of violence (‘they built up an army and used their firepower to force their separatist aims against an unwilling people’), plotters (‘the rebels simply used the peace talks as an opportunity for arms buildup, for troop recruitment and training, for deployment, for territorial consolidation, and for enlarging their threat to the republic’), destroyers of the country’s image (‘they inflicted severe damage on the country’s image abroad’), traitors to the country (‘The military camps they maintained...were not under the command and control of the government of the Philippines. They owed their allegiance elsewhere’). This portrayal of the Moro rebels made it appear that pursuing negotiations with them had become impossible and unnecessary.

22. The MILF could not be talked out of their position, whether territorial or ideological. They said that their goal of secession was non-negotiable. Well, neither is the sovereignty and integrity of the republic. No one can challenge that proposition by force of arms and get away with it.

It would have been quieter if the conflict could be resolved by an exchange of words rather than by an exchange of fire. *But whenever words were tried in the past, in the name of so-called peace but which in reality was appeasement, the rebels simply used the peace talks as an opportunity for arms buildup, for troop recruitment and training, for deployment, for territorial consolidation, and for enlarging their threat to the republic.*

There would have been a larger space for tolerance if they had pushed their cause in the open marketplace for ideas. But instead, *they built up an army and used their firepower to force their separatist aims on an unwilling people.*

True to form, the MILF took advantage of the 1997 ceasefire to commit at least 227 violations. These include the kidnapping of Father Luciano Benedetti in September 1998; the occupying and setting on fire of

the municipal hall of Talayan, Maguindanao; the takeover of the Kauswagan Municipal Hall; the bombing of the Lady of Mediatrix boat at Ozamiz City; and the takeover of the Narciso Ramos Highway. By doing so, *they inflicted severe damage on the country's image abroad, and scared much-needed investments away*. The numerous camps they maintained were not Boy Scout camps. They were staging areas and launching pads for expanding the MILF rebellion further. These military camps were not under the command and control of the government of the Philippines. They owed their allegiance elsewhere. (2000)

As mentioned earlier, such conceptualization of the Moro rebel groups served as a convenient excuse to pursue the militarist solution towards Moro rebellion in Mindanao. And to Estrada, forging war was necessary to achieve peace (**WAR IS PEACE**). This is evident in the following extract where the military option is metaphorized as an inevitable response to rebel's use of force ('armed rebellion demanded an armed response'; 'In effect, we did not choose the military option. It was forced upon us') and a mechanism to ensure peace ('In order to ensure permanent peace in the future, we had to demolish the rebels' apparatus for making war'):

23. Given all these, plus the unabated murders, terrorism, ambushes, extortion, bombings, illegal control of buildings and public highways, and other atrocities committed by the rebels in the pursuit of their secessionist aims, the government was faced with two choices. One was to play the sucker, keep tailing and let the problems grow until the republic was in real mortal danger. *The other was to meet force with force. An armed rebellion demanded an armed response. The sitting-duck strategy has never been known to work well...for the duck.*

In order to ensure permanent peace in the future, we had to demolish the rebels' apparatus for making war. Moreover, abstention from military action would have been tantamount to political abdication.

In effect, we did not choose the military option. It was forced upon us. But we used it. And we succeeded. (2000)

In the extract, Estrada made it appear that the government had no better choice than 'to meet force with force' as the rebels were involved in extremist and anarchic activities ('unabated murders, terrorism, extortion, bombings, illegal control of

buildings and public highways and other atrocities’). The other choice that Estrada foisted was actually rendered a non-option. The abstention from the military action—the complete opposite of that which he proposed to do—had been labeled the ‘sitting duck strategy,’ a supposedly counter-intuitive choice as the government was ‘to play the sucker, keep tailing, and let the problems grow until the republic was in real mortal danger.’ Estrada also considered it ‘tantamount to political abdication.’ This rather simplistic reduction of the alternative solutions to the insurgency in Southern Philippines to two options (‘to meet force with force’ versus ‘to play the sucker’; ‘armed response’ versus ‘the sitting duck strategy’; ‘military option’ versus ‘abstention from military action’; ‘to demolish the rebels’ apparatus for making war’ versus ‘political abdication’) and the obvious mockery of the less favored option was a clear case of false dilemma or either-or fallacy that worked as a strategy to diminish the value of solutions other than military action. This might have been necessary as the endorsement of the military action as well as the indictment of any option that refuses or contradicts such action both worked to bolster Estrada’s image as a tough leader.

7.6 The presidency

Estrada conceptualized his role as president in terms of journey metaphors. In his inaugural SONA in 1998 (see 24), he regarded himself as a guide (see 25), a rescuer of the embattled nation, and a pilot that was tasked to lead the country’s take off (see 25). These metaphorizations are evident in the introductory part of his speech where he said:

24. Today, I stand before you with an accounting of the present with *a road map for our future*.

Paano ba tayo *itatawid* sa krisis na bumabalot sa ating ekonomiya?
 (How are we *to overcome* the crisis that envelopes our economy?)
Nasaan na ba tayo ngayon? (*Where are we now?*)
Saan ba tayo nanggaling? (*Where have we been?*)
Saan ba tayo patutungo? (*Where are we headed?*) (1998)

25. To conclude, my aim is *to help our country escape the recession*.

My solutions are obvious, my proposals may be common place, but they were never adopted before.

In sum, they are to spend wisely and less. And by austerity and hardwork generate the means to cover the shortfalls of the past, so we can have *a smooth runway for final take off*.

Perhaps by then, six years will have passed, and *someone else will take over as pilot*. (1998)

That the president is regarded as guide in the national journey is not distinctive to Estrada's presidency. The same conceptualization was latent in the addresses of the previous post-Marcos presidents. What might have distinguished him from his predecessors was how he specifically characterized himself as a guide or national pilot. And this characterization can be seen in his succeeding addresses.

Throughout his short-lived presidency, Estrada was sensitive to the criticisms leveled against his office. He characterized his presidency as an object of attack from the opposition and the critics 'who have no insight' (1999). Estrada had to bolster his image in his address by proving that he was an effective leader or guide with a respectable position in the international stage. In the following extracts, he attributes the 'improvement in the country's economic performance' to 'effective governance' (see 26)⁶⁷ and by asserting that 'the current leadership of the Philippines enjoys a high level of respect' in the regional and international forums (see 27):

⁶⁷ Though not the focus of the study, the codeswitching in extract 26 is worth examining. It appears to have been strategically employed to establish identification with the audience. Unlike in other SONAs where codeswitching is used to translate what has been previously said in English in rather formal Filipino, Estrada used the colloquial language as evidenced by common expressions as 'tsamba' (chance or luck) and 'Mali naman yan' ('That's rather wrong'). The shift in language rendered Estrada

26. I narrate all these "inside stories" to make a point. Those who make a career and a business out of hitting me are saying that the improvement in the country's economic performance was due to pure luck, to good weather, or to anything but Erap. Tsamba lang daw. Kung gumanda ang takbo ng ekonomiya, walang kinalaman si Erap. Nguni't kung bumagsak ang ekonomiya, kasalanan ni Erap. Mali naman iyan. (Trans. It was pure luck according to some. If the economy runs well, Erap has nothing to do with it. But if the economy falters, it's the fault of Erap. That's rather wrong.) Our recovery was due to the innovative way we analyzed situations and made bold decisions.

Our success was the result of effective governance. It was a matter of having the right policies, being supported by competent and dedicated cabinet members, respecting the freedom of the market, managing and budgeting our resources right, and acting quickly before the danger grew or the opportunity disappeared. (1999)

27. *With all these developments, it is no wonder that in the space of only one year, the other Asian countries and, indeed, much of the world, have come to recognize the presidency of the Philippines as among the leaders of the region.* This is indeed a long way from the skepticism that greeted this presidency when it began. *In APEC, in ASEAN, and in other regional and international forums, the current leadership of the Philippines enjoys a high level of respect.* Our international prestige is on the ascendant. The dramatic rebound in the stock market is a strong indication of confidence. And the people, according to the latest surveys, give the president a 77.6% approval rating.

The heads of the IMF and the World Bank also have had good words to say. Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, said: -- and I quote -- "What is clear is the Philippine situation is vastly different from Korea, Thailand and Indonesia... I think you all know you are weakened far less than anyone else in the region with the exception of Singapore." (End of quote.) and Mr. Michel Camdessus, managing director of the IMF, said he considered the Philippines as a model for countries in the ASEAN region. (1999)

From the way he framed the centerpiece of his presidency, that is, 'war on poverty,' and the militaristic stance he had towards the problem of insurgency especially of the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines, it may be inferred that Estrada characterized himself as one tough guide. His tough rhetoric was of course consistent

as someone more relatable to his audience. The expressions make the passage sound conversational and highlight the apparent irrationality of his critics.

with his tough image carved from his cinematic characters during his active years in the movie industry and his years of experience as a politician. Curiously, this same rhetoric enabled Estrada to undermine the capability of what he regarded as the nation's as well as his presidency's adversaries (i.e., rebels and critics of the administration) while bolstering or reinforcing his image:

28. There are those, in fact, who say that we have no vision. They claim, for example, that we have no programs to fight poverty: the central pledge of my campaign. They are wrong. *It is not the government that is lacking in programs. It is our critics who are lacking in perception. It is not I who has no vision. It is they who have no insight.* (1999)

29. *This government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. Your rebellion does not. And this government was not elected to compromise the sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, not ever.*

If you wish to run the government, seek the people's mandate. If you have any grievances against the government or against society, seek your redress within the law. You have a right to your beliefs, but you cannot justify your belligerence.

Peace we offer you, but appeasement, never. It is the weak that offers appeasement to the strong, not vice versa. Do not doubt our resolve. We will welcome you back at any time. But we will give your rebellion no air to breathe, no space to move, no time to prosper. If you accept peace, you will have it. If you do not, we will enforce it anyway. (1999)

30. *Our vision is coherent and clear. I wonder why some observers fail to perceive it.* Please don't get shocked if I quote from the scriptures; I believe the answer is there – and I quote: "They look but do not see, and hear but do not listen." (End of quote.) By the way, that was from Matthew.

The English author, George Moore, was right when he said: -- and I quote -- "The lot of critics is to be remembered by what they failed to understand." (End of quote) (1999)

31. *As to those who continue to distract me from pursuing my vision, I take my cue from Abraham Lincoln, who said, -- and I quote -- "If I were to try to read, much less answer, all the attacks made on me, this shop might as well be closed for any other business. I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end. If the end brings me out all right, what's said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong, ten angels swearing I was right would make no difference."* (End of quote).

According to the surveys, millions of Filipinos are saying I am right. Between Lincoln's ten angels and the millions of my own countrymen, I choose to believe my countrymen. (1999)

The four extracts show the polarized relationship between the Estrada government and its critics and between his government and the rebels. In extract 28, the self and other representations are apparent in the way Estrada denied the criticism leveled against his administration ('There are those, in fact, who say that we have no vision') while attacking or discrediting his critics by suggesting that they were themselves guilty of what they accuse him ('It is not the government that is lacking in programs. It is our critics who are lacking in perception. It is I who has no vision. It is they who have no insight'). The use of the expressions such as 'perception', 'vision', 'insight' and the 'lack' of them appears to indicate a common frame that undergirds the conceptualization of criticism as PERCEPTION and government plans and programs as A VISION. That frame could be that SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT (which includes but is not limited to government planning or programming and social criticism) IS A VISUAL/SENSORY EVENT where actors or participants may envision, perceive, draw insights or falter in doing so. By using the strategy of denial ('They are wrong'), attacking his accuser ('It is our critics who are lacking in perception'; 'It is they who have no insight'), and strategically positioning that what appears to be opposing sides in the same conceptual frame (Estrada government versus critics), Estrada was able to portray the differences between the two entities and to spell out what was 'wrong' with his critics' claim.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ It could have been an option for the speaker (or accused) to just deny any assertion from his accuser and attack the accuser by attributing negative descriptions to him in which case the specific frame of accusation and attack may not necessarily be the same.

The same strategy is apparent in extract 30 where he describes his government's vision to be 'coherent and clear' while taunting 'some observers [who] fail to perceive it.' Even his scriptural allusions from Matthew 13 of the New Testament and his quote from English author George Moore are indicative of the conceptual frame SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT IS A SENSORY EVENT. The quotes, in fact, extend the polarized representation further by showing that the differences are in terms of levels of perception (Matthew: 'They *look* but do not *see*, and *hear* but do not *listen*'; George Moore: 'The lot of critics is to be remembered by *what they failed to understand*'). The scriptural and literary allusions portray the critics as inadequate in their level of social engagement thereby rendering their criticism of the government flimsy or insubstantial.

In extract 31, Estrada had reduced his critics to being a mere distraction ('As those who continue to *distract* me from pursuing my vision, I take my cue from Abraham Lincoln...'). While this expression indicated his impatience when dealing with the opposition and the critical press (Tujan 2000), his use of an appeal to authority (re: Lincoln quote and the 'surveys') position him as a leader who would be unperturbed by attacks ('I do the very best I know how, the very best I can, and I mean to keep doing so until the end') and who still enjoyed popular support.

In extract 29, the Estrada government is pitted against the rebels: 'The government was elected by the people. It enjoys their support. Your rebellion does not. And this government was elected not to compromise sovereignty of this Republic, not in substance, not in symbol, not ever.' The uncompromising stance of the Estrada government in this particular extract suggests formidability which tied well with for the tough rhetoric of Estrada. This is particularly intensified in the third paragraph where Estrada distinguished the 'weak' from the 'strong': 'Peace we offer

you, but appeasement, never. It is the weak that offers appeasement to the strong, not vice versa.’ True to his tough persona, he expressed his policy towards rebellion in a way that suggests the conceptual metaphor ANTI-REBELLION IS CONTAINMENT (‘But we will give your rebellion no air to breathe, no space to move, no time to prosper’).

Interestingly, Estrada conceptualized ‘peace’ as an object that can be had when it is accepted by the rebels and ‘enforced’ on them if they do not do so. That peace can be ‘enforced’ suggests that military action is necessary when dealing with armed rebellion or that the government takes the armed response WAR IS PEACE. Adopting such conceptualization undoubtedly contributed to the tough rhetoric that Estrada was keen on projecting.

In his 2000 SONA, he explained that his presidency was a ‘learning presidency’—one that ‘struggled through the challenges of coping with the learning curve.’ His metaphorization of the president as a learner who had gone through and survived the difficulties brought about by situational factors such as the regional economic crisis and ‘attacks’ from his critics and detractors worked to reaffirm his resolve that his was indeed a tough, that is, enduring, leadership. Notwithstanding the attacks on his presidency, which he viewed as inimical to the prospects for the national economy, his presidency was ‘poised for new beginnings.’ This is shown in the following extract:

32. Admittedly, over the past two years, *the presidency itself has struggled through the challenges of coping with the learning curve*. Made all the more difficult by the long-lasting effects on the corporate sector of the Asian financial crisis and by the vicious attempts of my detractors to discredit me and my family. These attacks started way back during my campaign and never let up. Now, it has intensified in a more vicious way after the SWS reported a recovery in my approval rating. Unfortunately, by discrediting me, the head of state and of government, they also undermine the confidence of the international community in the country, and thereby damage the prospects for our economy.

Sa halip na tayo ay magsiraan, kailangang magkaisa at magtulungan tayo sa darating na apat na taon upang mapabilis ang ating pag-unlad. Habang tayo ay nag-aaway-away, nagpapalakpakan naman ang ating karatig-bansa dahil sa kanila pumupunta ang mga dayuhang kapital at turista. (Instead of mudslinging, we need to unite and help each other for the next four years so that we can hasten our development. While we squabble, our neighbors rejoice because foreign capital and tourists go to them.)

Nonetheless, *the presidency has learned its lessons well at this point, the presidency itself is poised for its own new beginnings.*

Unfortunately for Estrada, his new beginnings did not experience its full realization. Almost three months after he delivered what would be his last SONA, Estrada was accused of being involved in an illegal numbers game and of receiving huge sum from tobacco excise taxes. The accusations would lead to an aborted 24-day impeachment trial which culminated in an extrajudicial exercise of ‘people power.’ On January 20, 2001, six months before Estrada was to deliver his fourth congressional speech, he was ousted from the Philippine presidency and was replaced by his constitutional successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

7.7 Summary

In summary, Joseph Estrada’s State of the Nation Addresses from 1998 to 2000 manifested and expressed tough rhetoric that reflected and reaffirmed Estrada’s image as the quintessential Filipino macho—strong, audacious, uncompromising, and a hero ready to rescue persons or institutions in distress.

Democracy as a topic of major concern figured prominently only in his 1999 speech where he had to allay fears that his administration had resorted to authoritarian rule. In his national address, he reaffirmed his commitment to democracy by conceptualizing it as an OBJECT OF PROTECTION AND DEFENSE and implicitly as a

TREASURED ENTITY/PRIZED POSSESSION, thereby reverberating earlier conceptualizations of democracy by his predecessors.

Understandably, the topic of national economy figured significantly in Estrada's presidential speeches. The state of the national economy was conceptualized using health, weather, and journey metaphors, suggesting that the Philippine economy was suffering from the disease that was the Asian financial crisis, which at the same time posed as an impediment for its full 'take off.' Also, the crisis was seen as a meteorological obstacle in the country's sail towards its desired destination.

Estrada viewed his presidency as one that was tasked to find cure to the NATIONAL ILLNESS. He offered a pro-poor oriented economic agenda which he framed using a militarist metaphor: 'war on poverty.' By using the militarist metaphor, not only was his role as champion of the poor underscored in his discussion. He also fortified the tough image that he had assumed long before he was elevated to the Philippine presidency. Such fortification was not only evident in the use of militarist metaphor but also in the deployment of a more aggressive language in place of what Estrada regarded as 'weak and wimpish.'

In spite of the tougher and more aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, his policies curiously remained consistent with the global neoliberal policies started out in the previous administration. This tends to imply that the shift in rhetoric in the case of Estrada's State of the Nation Addresses were more in consonance with the presidential image he wanted to project in public than with the policies he introduced during his term. In fact, his tough sounding 'radical restructuring' did not differ from the supposedly more 'wimpish' economic 'reform' agenda of his predecessors. In other words, Estrada's administration merely sustained the neoliberal policy agenda pursued by the Aquino and Ramos governments. This should not however imply that

rhetoric merely conceals what is regarded as desired reality or 'truth.' In so far as the projection of neoliberal economic policy in the Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada national addresses is concerned, rhetoric, in fact, appears to clothe, accentuate, build up what is presented as truth (re: the inevitability of adopting neoliberal economic policy/policies) so that what is initially thought of as unfamiliar becomes familiar, what is regarded as unpalatable becomes palatable, or what is deemed disagreeable, agreeable.

The tough image of Estrada fortified through militaristic metaphors and tough rhetoric proved useful when he dealt with the topic on national security and peace and order. It came in handy when discrediting the insurgents, who, like criminals, he metaphorized as a disease or a pest that needed to be crushed. The common 'othering' of these two distinct forces in society may be seen as an attempt at conflating rebellion and criminality, thus making possible the conceptual metaphor, ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME. As noted earlier, such conceptualization was consistent with Estrada's crime buster persona. More than that, however, it warranted the privileging of the retributive kind of justice over the restorative kind.

The tough image was also particularly necessary when Estrada declared an 'all out war' with the Moro rebels in 2000. Noticeable in Estrada's final SONA was his preference for a militarist solution to the Moro rebellion in Mindanao. While he seemed to have had an expanded concept of war when he talked about 'fighting the root cause of rebellion,' his very use of the frame privileged the use of military force and in fact, rendered it inevitable.

What could have been a colorful Estrada presidency conceptualized as a tough guide ready to lead the Philippines to its full take off was cut short when Estrada became the first Filipino and Asian president to be impeached. The impeachment trial

lasted for 24 days and culminated in what is now touted as People Power 2. Joseph Ejercito Estrada was replaced by his Vice President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who was to be president of the Philippines in the next 10 years.

Chapter 8
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Recontextualization
of ‘War on Terror’⁶⁹

8.1 Introduction

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, being the Vice President of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, became the constitutional successor after the latter was ousted from power through a second EDSA people power uprising in January 2001. The manner through which she was catapulted to power—that is, through extra-constitutional means—had put her successor presidency under the cloud of doubt. A decision of the Philippine Supreme Court stating that Estrada had voluntarily relinquished his position during the height of the mass demonstrations at EDSA sanctioned Arroyo’s assumption into the Philippines’ highest office.⁷⁰ Arroyo would eventually hold the Philippine presidency for more than nine years—the longest serving president since Ferdinand Marcos. Her presidency spanned more than three years of successor term (January 2001 to June 2004) and six years of full term (July 2004 to June 2010).

As explained in the introduction, the discussion on the Arroyo presidency is divided into two analytical chapters. The first Arroyo chapter covers SONAs delivered during her successor term and her first SONA less than a month after she

⁶⁹ This chapter draws from the information and discussion found in two earlier papers written by the student researcher. The first one titled ‘The Rhetoric of Accountability in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s State of the Nation Addresses (2001-2005)’ (in *Public Policy X*, July to December 2006, pp. 27-57) and the second ‘‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE: Recontextualization and Political Myth-making in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s 2002-2004 State of the Nation Addresses’ (in *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*, Volume 8, Number 4, pp. 313-343). Some portions in the text that appear in the second article are reprinted by permission of Taylor and Francis, Ltd (<http://www.tandfonline.com>).

⁷⁰ This decision is, however, contested by legal scholars in the Philippines. See for instance Querubin, S. M., A. R. T. Muhi and C. F. Gonzales-Olalia, ‘Legitimizing the Illegitimate: Disregarding the Rule of Law in Estrada v. Desierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo,’ *Public Policy VII*, No. 1, January to June 2003, pp. 63-131.

was elected for a full six-year term in 2004. The chapter focuses on Arroyo's engagement with the U.S. government-led 'global war on terror,' which she actively invoked during the period under study. The second Arroyo chapter, Chapter 9, covers the rest of the Arroyo SONAs, that is, from 2005 to 2009, and focuses on Arroyo's assertion of legitimacy after a damaging political crisis hit her presidency in mid-2005.

In this chapter, I argue that as Arroyo tried to respond to global concerns such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, she had worked to recontextualize through her presidential addresses the discourse on 'global war on terror' in order to make it relevant and integral to the national agenda that she had set when she assumed power in January 2001. At the same time, I examine how this recontextualization worked to legitimize her hold of power especially during her successor term.

The SONAs especially from 2002 to 2004 were delivered during the time when Arroyo invoked the country's engagement in the U.S. government-led global war on terror. The term 'war on terror' can be seen as both metaphorical and ideographic.⁷¹ The idea of waging a battle against something that is abstract (terror or terrorism) is metaphorical in that it indicates the conceptual metaphor TERROR IS AN

⁷¹ It must be noted that some of the examples of ideographs mentioned by McGee (1980/2000) and other scholars who have adopted McGee's framework (e.g., Cloud 2004, Condit and Lucaites 1993) are themselves metaphorical. These include 'freedom of speech,' 'rule of law,' (McGee 1980; Condit and Lucaites 1993) and 'clash of civilizations' (Cloud 2004). These examples show that notions such as 'speech,' 'law,' and 'civilization' go through the process of reification or personification (i.e., SPEECH IS AN OBJECT; LAW IS A GOVERNING POWER; CIVILIZATION IS A COMBATANT) which causes semantic tension (Charteris-Black 2005, 20). On the other hand, the constant use or deployment of such terms as 'freedom of speech,' 'rule of law,' and 'clash of civilizations' in public discourse by those who wield it (i.e., politicians, judges, the media, the academia) naturalizes their reproduction, circulation, and consumption. This contributes in making them ideographic.

ENEMY IN COMBAT⁷² or more broadly TERROR IS A PERSON where the abstract term ‘terror’ is understood through another domain of experience or through personification. But the recurring use of the term ‘war on terror’ in political rhetoric has made it ‘ordinary’ but at the same time significantly associated with a ‘collective commitment’ to normative goals such as ‘peace,’ ‘political stability’ or ‘protection and defense of freedom’; hence, I consider it ideographic.⁷³

The ideograph ‘war on terror’ has been recontextualized in so many ways.⁷⁴ Metaphors can be a means to recontextualize ideographs like ‘war on terror.’ They create, extend or revise meanings that are associated with such terms. For instance, when former U.S. President George W. Bush declared ‘war on terror’ after the September 11 attacks, he associated the phrase with a ‘crusade.’ Arroyo in one of her SONAs regarded the ‘domestic war against terrorism’ as an enhancer of ‘international visibility.’ These vehicles or source domains help recontextualize the phrase ‘war on

⁷² In this paper, I adopt Charteris-Black’s (2004) definition of conceptual metaphor as ‘a statement that resolves the tension of a set of metaphors by showing them to be related’ (p. 21). By employing this category, the analyst makes explicit the target and source domains (A is B) that underlie a set of metaphorical expressions spread within or across texts.

The conceptual metaphor TERROR IS AN ENEMY IN COMBAT which I argue underlies the metaphorical expression ‘war on terror’ is also realized in expressions as ‘our republic’s efforts to fight terror and enforce peace’, ‘by breaking the back of terrorism and criminality’ (Arroyo 2002) and ‘we have hit hard on terrorism’ (Arroyo, 2003)

⁷³ The catchphrase ‘war on terror’ which has been widely circulated after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States (mostly through statements by the administration of United States President George W. Bush as well as through major global media networks) has undeniably contributed to the refashioning of political communication in the new century.

The ‘war on terror’ discourse asserts the U.S. responsibility in spreading the values of freedom, liberty, and democracy, which puts it on a high moral plane capable of imposing itself on other sovereign states (see for instance articles of Lazar and Lazar, 2007; Cloud, 2004; Erjavec and Volčič, 2007).

⁷⁴ Erjavec and Volčič (2007) provide an interesting addition to the discourse on ‘war on terror’ when they assert that the discourse is actually appropriated and recontextualized in local settings. Specifically, they analyze how young Serbian intellectuals ‘employ, borrow and appropriate’ G.W. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ to understand the impact of G.W. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ discourse on the construction of identities in the Balkans, especially on a reconfiguration of Serbian nationalistic discourse (124).

terror’ to justify policies like military attacks against Afghanistan and Iraq or the Oplan Bantay Laya, the Arroyo government’s counter-terrorism program in the Philippines. Needless to say, they are also attempts to influence how their respective publics should view their government policies. Political speeches like the SONAs then are sites where such recontextualization can take place.

Recontextualized ideographs, that is, ideographs re-fashioned through metaphors, inevitably influence any attempt at legitimizing and de-legitimizing political leadership. They contribute to political mythmaking—the creation of a narrative unfolded by the rhetor or speaker which may be a continuation and reaffirmation of an already existing, powerful myth or a subversion of it.⁷⁵ In other words, the configurations of ideographs and metaphors in political texts and talk work toward the creation of myths necessary in asserting, legitimizing or fostering public support for political leadership. In the case of Arroyo, whose rise to the Philippine presidency had been hounded by questions of legitimacy, and who succeeded a presidency built on populist rhetoric, it had been a struggle to present an alternative myth that would legitimize her political leadership.

As in the previous analytical chapters, Chapter 8 looks at how the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency/ executive leadership are conceptualized across the four Arroyo SONAs and how these conceptualizations are realized in metaphorical and/or lexico-grammatical

⁷⁵ Myth is used here in the sense that Charteris-Black employed it in his book (2004). He adopts Cassirer’s (1946) concept of the mythmaking in modern societies. He notes that ‘mythmaking – accompanied by the use of incantations, slogans, neologisms and semantic distortions – has become an extremely sophisticated, self-conscious activity which makes use of the most advanced techniques available to manufacture and circulate the product’ (Charteris-Black, 2004, 209). It may be construed then that mythmaking in our times is a form of commodification in the realm of politics, something that is consistent with the idea of a ‘rhetorical presidency.’

expressions. These conceptualizations together with other rhetorical strategies in the texts are examined based on how they substantiate Arroyo's recontextualization of the 'war on terror' discourse. The following table outlines the conceptual frames generated from the textual analyses of the Arroyo SONAs from 2001 to 2004:

Table 8.1 Conceptual Frames in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's SONAs (2001-2004)

Section	Theme	Conceptual Frames
8.3	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT • DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINOS HAVE FOUGHT FOR
8.4	National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE
8.5	Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES • CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS • REBELS ARE CRIMINALS • 'WAR ON TERROR' IS A CURATIVE TO REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY • STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES
8.6	The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN NATION BUILDING • THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER

A historical milieu of the Arroyo presidency from 2001 to 2004 is provided below in order to situate the speeches in their historical context and to contextualize the conceptual frames and metaphors discussed in the analytical sections.

8.2 Historical milieu of the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo presidency (2001-2004)

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was catapulted to power after the ouster of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada through a peaceful people's uprising now known as the EDSA People Power 2. She was sworn in to office as the country's 14th president on January 20, 2001, the day when the Supreme Court declared the presidency vacant. Her early months as president were hounded by questions on the legitimacy of her assumption to power. On May 1, 2001, several days after Philippine prosecutors arrested former President Estrada for charges of plunder, the Arroyo administration faced one of its toughest challenges. As they marched to Malacañang, thousands of supporters of ousted President Estrada demanded his release and reinstatement. What was regarded as a violent protest of Estrada supporters was quelled when Arroyo declared a state of rebellion that led to the arrest of a number of protesters and leaders of the opposition. The state of rebellion was lifted a few days later. The results of the midterm elections conducted in the same month proved favorable to the Arroyo administration. In her first State of the Nation Address, she called for an end to political bickering and presented her agenda to win the war against poverty. To win this 'war,' Arroyo offered the following: 'economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate for the 21st century,' 'a modernized agriculture sector founded on social equity,' 'social bias towards the disadvantaged,' and improved 'moral standards of government and society.'

Before the end of 2001, Arroyo was one of the first heads of state to support the U.S. policy of 'war against terror.' She would later claim to be the first national leader to establish the connection between 'war against terror' and 'war against poverty.' The policy of war against international terrorism would be reinforced by

U.S.-Philippine military joint exercises in Southern Philippines, near the stronghold of the Abu Sayyaf group, which is said to have links to Al Qaeda. Her adherence to the global war against terror would be underscored in her second SONA in 2002. She incorporated such commitment in her vision to build a 'strong republic' during her term. Despite exerting her best efforts to steer the country towards economic development, Arroyo sincerity remained in question. Pundits observed and criticized her 'weather vane' character and her apparent 'over-eagerness to be elected in 2004.'

On December 30, 2002, Arroyo announced in a speech at the Rizal Shrine in Baguio City that she would no longer run for the 2004 presidential elections: 'I have decided not to run for President during the election of 2004. If I were to run, it will require a major political effort on my part. But since I'm among the principal figures in the divisive national events for the last two or three years, my political efforts can only result in never-ending divisiveness.' Her plummeting popularity in the surveys went up after her famed declaration.

On July 27, 2003, a day before she delivered her third SONA, Arroyo faced another rebellion. This time, more than three hundred renegade junior officers and soldiers of the armed forces staged a mutiny and seized a hotel and a shopping mall in the business district of Makati City. After twenty-two hours of negotiation, which included a televised warning from the President, the soldiers surrendered peacefully to government forces. The President later formed a commission to investigate the mutiny.⁷⁶

In the same year, she changed her earlier decision not to run for the 2004 presidential election. She explained that her supporters had clamored that she run for

⁷⁶ The following link provides details of the mutiny:
http://images.gmanews.tv/html/research/2007/11/oakwood_mutiny_timeline.html
http://images.gmanews.tv/html/research/2007/11/oakwood_mutiny_timeline.html

a second term. The highly contested election of 2004 was viewed as an opportunity for Arroyo to gain a fresh mandate that would dissipate questions on the legitimacy of her first term.

On June 24, 2004, Congress declared Arroyo as winner of the May 2004 presidential elections, beating her closest rival, popular actor Fernando Poe, Jr., with a margin of one million votes. Her victory was, however, marred by accusations that she cheated her way to the presidency. The strong accusations would temporarily take back seat when the Iraq hostage crisis involving Filipino driver Angelo dela Cruz ensued less than a month later. Dela Cruz's was taken hostage by a terrorist group in Iraq, who demanded the Philippine government to withdraw its small Filipino contingent from the Arab country in exchange for the life and freedom of the Filipino driver. The contingent was scheduled to withdraw in August of the same year. This situation was viewed as a test of Arroyo's adherence to the global war against terror. At the same time, she was torn between having to please her countrymen at home and the members of the international coalition fighting against international terrorism. In the end, she ordered the withdrawal of the Filipino troops from Iraq amid criticism from the United States, Australia and other members of the coalition. In her 2004 SONA, she found the opportunity to justify her decision.

8.3 Democracy

In a span of four SONAs, Arroyo made mention of the term 'democracy' only a few times—six times to be exact. In her inaugural SONA in 2001, Arroyo alluded to 'democracy' as part of the historical recounting in the introduction of her speech. The recounting rehearsed the conceptualization that DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT (q.v. Chapter 5.3.2) by expressing that 'Filipinos peacefully reclaimed

their civil liberties in the people power revolution’ and that they ‘reaffirmed [their] commitment to freedom and democracy...with hardly a drop of blood shed or a shot fired in anger’ (1). The expressions may be seen as re-articulations of Corazon Aquino’s discourse on democracy and freedom.

1. In 1986 Filipinos peacefully reclaimed their civil liberties in the people power revolution. Under the leadership of Corazon Aquino, we reaffirmed our commitment to freedom and democracy on a mere stretch of highway—with hardly a drop of blood shed or a shot fired in anger. (2001)

A similar re-articulation of Aquino’s discourse is evidenced in Arroyo’s speech in 2004—her inaugural SONA after she was elected for a full presidential term. In Filipino, she re-expressed the conceptualization that PEOPLE POWER IS A MEANS TO REINFORCE DEMOCRACY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.3). Arroyo used the metaphor ‘puso’ (heart) to conceptualize people power, suggesting that it is the latter that sustains or reinforces democracy (2). The corporeal metaphorization of people power and democracy also implies a related conceptualization, that is, DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM, which was very much developed in the Aquino rhetoric (q.v. Chapter 5.3.4). This is also articulated in (3), which suggests that democracy serves as a benefactor of the nation in that it is supposed to provide blessings (‘ang biyaya ng demokrasya’) to the people. It should be noted that, in extracts 2 and 3 below, the Filipino language is employed to express the metaphorizations of democracy. Such may have been the case in order to highlight democracy’s significance to the ordinary Filipino people—the ‘taong bayan’ or ‘mamamayan.’ In Arroyo’s words, they make democracy work by being the ‘puso ng demokrasya’ and they ought to benefit from the ‘biyaya ng demokrasya.’ The Filipino metaphorizations somehow

make the abstraction of democracy more relevant and perhaps, comprehensible to the masses.

2. Ang kapangyarihan ng taong bayan ay puso ng demokrasya. Dapat kasama sila sa paghugis ng kanilang kapalaran. (Trans. The power of the people is the heart of democracy. They should be part in shaping their destiny.) (2004)
3. Ipinapangako ko ang isang bagong direksyon: mamamayan muna. Ang taong bayan ang pinakamalaki nating yaman. Ngunit madalas, kaunti lang ang atensyon na binibigay sa kanilang pag-unlad. Di tuloy matawid ang agwat ng mayaman at mahirap. Di tuloy mapa-abot sa lahat ang biyaya ng demokrasya. (Trans. I promise a new direction: the people first. The people are our biggest resource. But most of the time, little attention is given to their development. This is the reason the gap between the rich and the poor is not bridged. This is the reason the blessings of democracy is not given to everyone.) (2004)

What emerges as relevant to the central argument of this chapter, though, are the other expressions on democracy found in Arroyo's SONAs from 2002 to 2004. They may not appear very salient in the presidential speeches, but they fortify Arroyo's recontextualization of the 'war on terror' discourse. In these extracts Arroyo employed interrelated conceptualizations vital to her recontextualization of 'the global war on terror': **DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON, DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT**, and **DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS FOUGHT FOR**. The first two conceptualizations are expressed in Arroyo's SONA delivered in 2002. She said:

4. Criminal syndicates will be treated as what they are, direct threats to national security. Criminals are criminals, whether of the common kind or the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies. They will feel the brunt of the arsenal of democracy. Freedom, too, is entitled to self-defense. (2002)

In extract 4, which would be further discussed in the peace and security section, Arroyo used the phrase ‘arsenal of democracy’ to suggest how criminals—‘whether of the common kind or the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies’—would be dealt with in her administration. The phrase ‘arsenal of democracy’ implies that democracy can be used as a weapon—and Arroyo might have been referring to existing programs and policies as well as future laws that she was insistent on passing (e.g. Human Securities Act of 2007) that sanctioned the use of hard power or the militarist solution to deal not only with ordinary crime (‘of the common kind’) but also of ideologically driven rebellion (‘the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies’). The last line, ‘Freedom, too, is entitled to self-defense’ implies that **DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT**, which justifies the use of weaponry (‘arsenal’) and protective mechanism (‘self-defense’) to combat the perceived threat (‘criminals’) against ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’

That democracy is **AN OBJECT OF THREAT** is also underscored in the following extract where it serves as a conjunct of the term ‘security.’ In the extract, both ‘democracy’ and ‘security’ are expressed as regional concerns. It should be noted that in the U.S.-led discourse on war on terror, both ‘democracy’ and ‘security’ had been used to justify the United States’ preemptive strikes and its exertion of military power in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks. Securitization of national as well as regional territories from terrorist activities as well as the spread of democracy had been used by the United States government to rationalize the employment of arms to combat groups identified by the U.S. State Department as terrorist organizations and the building of U.S. arsenals in strategic locations around the globe. This appears to be recontextualized by Arroyo in the following extract, where ‘global’ concerns become regional ones:

5. We have reached out to good friends and neighbors—such as Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, and President Megawati of Indonesia—with the message that we must work together especially where democracy and security are concerned. (2003)

The defense of freedom is also expressed in the following extract where Arroyo declared the Philippines' commitment to 'democracy' after the Philippine troops were pulled out from Iraq in order to save the life of kidnapped Filipino driver Angelo dela Cruz. The extract underlies the conceptualization that **DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS FOUGHT FOR**. That democracy is a national faith is expressed in the clause 'we are strong and principled believers of democracy' and that this faith has been fought for by the Filipino can be seen in the statement that follows. In the same extract, terms such as 'totalitarians' and 'terrorists' are used to name the object against which the 'fight' or the 'struggle' is pursued. These terms refer to the 'threats' in the discourse of global war on terror and their use in Arroyo's speech establishes that in spite of the highly contested pull-out of the Philippine contingent from Iraq, the Philippines would continue to pursue the anti-terrorism track, especially because it had the historical record to back up this claim.

6. As the leader of the nation, I say in behalf of the Filipino people to the world: we are strong and principled believers in democracy. Four generations of fighting Filipinos have ceaselessly struggled against totalitarians and terrorists, for our freedom, for the freedom of our people and the people of the world. (2004)

By metaphorizing democracy as an object of threat and 'a national faith' that defends itself against threat through the state-sanctioned use of hard power, Arroyo appeared to be pursuing a track similar to that of then U.S. President George W. Bush who in

his first speech after the 9/11 attacks declared with forthrightness that the ‘war against terrorism’ was a ‘crusade’ to be waged.

8.4 National economy

The way Arroyo framed the national economy was similar to how Aquino framed it more than fifteen years earlier. Like Aquino, Arroyo employed the conceptual frame **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE** (q.v. Chapter 5.4). While similarities may be found in the way Arroyo and Aquino developed this frame in their respective national addresses, there are also noticeable differences. This may be due to the differences in global as well as national contexts of the two presidencies. The following conceptualizations constitute Arroyo’s use of the frame:

- (8.4.1) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT
- (8.4.2) THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
- (8.4.3) (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY
- (8.4.4) TOUGH LOVE IS A CURATIVE TO CHRONIC DEFICITS

8.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT

Arroyo conceptualized the Philippine society in general and the national economy in particular as a living entity confronted with a very serious problem on the one hand, and afflicted with a ‘chronic illness’ on the other. In Arroyo’s frame, both problematic situations necessitate interventions from the government—one that is communicated in militarist terms and another that communicated as a corrective or curative measure.

Arroyo's conceptualization of the national economy as a living entity confronted by a serious problem that requires initiative and strategies is evidenced by her use of the catchphrase 'war against poverty,' similar to that which her predecessors used to communicate their anti-poverty agenda (q.v. Chapter 6.2.3 and Chapter 7.2.1). The seriousness and gravity of poverty as a national problem is expressed in the extracts below. In extract (7), poverty is metaphorized as a state of confinement ('imprisoned by poverty') and a plague ('salot ng kahirapan'), terms which suggest how constricting and widespread it is as a national concern. Extract (8) instantiates the use of the phrase 'war on poverty' which suggests that initiatives and strategies have been developed in order to address the serious problem of poverty. These initiatives and strategies signaled by the term 'war' are discussed in Section 8.4.2.

7. Last May One, the poor raised their voices in anger and their fists in fury. Imprisoned in poverty, shackled to shame, denied justice in society, they personally delivered the message that, 100 years after they revolted to establish this nation, they had yet to partake in the national dream.
 Dinig na dinig ko ang pahayag nila at napakumbaba ako. Hindi ba't nasa balikat ko ang tungkuling mamuno sa *pakikibaka laban sa salot ng kahirapan?* Ako na siyang anak ng tinawag na 'poor boy from Lubao'? (Trans. I could clearly hear what they are saying, and I was humbled. Isn't it that I carry on my shoulders the responsibility to lead *the struggle against the plague of poverty?* I, the daughter of the man called 'the poor boy from Lubao'?) (2001)
8. We cannot afford to lose. Even a stalemate will be defeat. For what is at stake is our country as a viable proposition in the world economy. And we must be viable if we are to win the most fundamental war, the *war against poverty*. (2002)

On the other hand, Arroyo's conceptualization of the nation as a living entity with health concerns is evidenced in the following extracts:

9. For a country to be as good as it can get, many of the right decisions are tough decisions. I have made some of the toughest. And I will make even more tough decisions in the year to come. Because the easy way out may be to postpone the *pain* but only prolong the problem (2002).
10. Iyon ang aking sinabi nang naluklok ako bilang pangulo noong 2001. Sinabi ko noon na panahon na ng *paghilom* sa ating lipunan (Trans. That was what I said, when I became president in 2001. I said then that it is time to *heal* our society.) (2003).
11. We must bear the *pain* and share the *pain* to enjoy the *gain* together (2004).

In the extracts, Arroyo talked of ‘pain’ (7, 9) and healing (‘paghilom’)⁷⁷ (8) of the society, words that point to the metaphorical view of the national society as a living entity suffering from a poor health condition. These lexical choices establish that THE NATION IS AN ILL PERSON, a conceptual metaphor that makes use of a source domain (A PERSON’S STATE OF HEALTH) also employed by Arroyo when discussing the national economy. For instance, she would describe the nation’s economic problems like the budget deficit as ‘chronic,’ and refer to economic progress as ‘growth’ which can ‘slow down.’⁷⁸ Hence, the conceptual metaphor THE NATION IS AN ILL PERSON can also be translated as THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN ILL PERSON, which is notably similar to Aquino’s conceptualizations of the same target domains.

The ill-stricken national economy is illustrated in the following extract from Arroyo’s 2004 SONA. In the extract, Arroyo described the budget deficit as the ‘most urgent problem’ of the country. She established its urgency by metaphorizing the budget deficit as a debilitating and fatal disease—‘chronic,’ ‘can slow down

⁷⁷ The word ‘paghilom’ is especially noteworthy as it often collocates with the word ‘sugat’ (wound) when used in discourses in Filipino. Its use therefore suggests a recuperation of the national body in order for it to function normally and properly.

⁷⁸ This is most evident in the President’s SONA in 2004, which marked the beginning of her term as the newly elected head of state.

growth [if vigorously stamped out],’ ‘can kill the economy’ if ignored, and ‘drastically reduce[s] government’s ability to make [investments needed for growth and job creation].’ It can also prove detrimental to the nation at large (‘a surefire formula for national failure’).

12. Our most urgent problem is the budget deficit. Sometimes it’s unavoidable; but *chronic deficits* are always bad.

Sometimes *stamping deficits too vigorously can slow down growth, but ignoring them can kill the economy*. It sends the wrong signal that we don’t understand our fiscal predicament and will not help ourselves. This will drive away investments, exacerbate the deficit and hurt job growth.

Chronic deficits drastically reduce government’s ability to make those infrastructure investments that business needs to grow and create jobs.

Chronic deficits mean undertaking less social services that private charity will never provide but without which social war is inevitable. This is a *sure fire formula for national failure*. (2004)

To Arroyo, the corrective and curative intervention for the budget deficit experienced by the national economy is the ‘tough love’ formula which is discussed in section 8.4.3.

8.4.2 THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In her first SONA, Arroyo spelled out the ‘tasks’ in ‘winning the war against poverty within the decade.’ In the following extracts, she outlined the four elements in the struggle against poverty (‘apat na element ng pakikibaka sa kahirapan’) which she also described as ‘mga sandata natin sa digmaang-bayan laban sa kahirapan’ (Trans. ‘our weapons in our national war against poverty’). Clearly, these militarist metaphorical expressions (‘pakikibaka’ or struggle, ‘sandata’ or weapons, ‘digmaang-bayan’ or national war) were meant to communicate the seriousness of the government’s resolve to address long-standing problem of poverty in the country.

13. When I became President last January, I told the people about my vision of winning the war against poverty within a decade.

To succeed, the template of our national agenda must revolve around four components—*apat na elemento ng pakikilaban sa kahirapan* (trans. four elements in the struggle against poverty).

The first is an economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate to the 21st century. *Pagnenegosyo upang dumami ang trabaho* (trans. Free enterprise in order to increase jobs). Not a pitiless free-for-all but free enterprise with social conscience.

The second component is a modernized agricultural sector founded on social equity. *Palalaguin ang kita at ani ng maralitang tagabukid* (trans. Increasing the income and harvest of the poor farmers.)

The third component is a social bias toward the disadvantaged to balance our economic development plan. *Pagkalinga sa mga bahagi ng lipunan na naiwanan ng kaunlaran* (trans. Caring for those sectors of society who have been left out by development.).

And the fourth component is to raise the moral standards of government and society. *Moralidad sa gobyerno at lipunan bilang saligan ng tunay na kaunlaran* (trans. Morality in government and society as the pillar of genuine development.).

Pagnenegosyo, pagpapaunlad ng agrikultura, kalinga sa nagigipit na sector, at moralidad sa gobyerno at lipunan—ito ang mga sandata natin sa digmaang-bayan laban sa kahirapan. (Trans. Free enterprise, modern agriculture, social bias towards the disadvantaged sector, and morality in government and society—these are our weapons in our national war against poverty.)

Arroyo went on to say that she had organized her ‘interpretation of the state of the nation along these four components of our national anti-poverty ideology.’ In her discussion, she provided details on how her government intended to pursue each component, what her targets were for the year, and her legislative agenda.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ For instance, in describing the first component which is the economic philosophy for the 21st century, Arroyo sets the following formula: ‘Under this philosophy, the way to fight poverty is to create jobs, not destroy them. To create jobs, we will attract investments. To attract investments, we will attend to macro-measures and concerns.’ In addressing the macro-measures and concerns, Arroyo focused on long-term structural issues: reforming the power sector, infrastructure, productivity, and savings rate. For each structural issue, Arroyo provided more details. In focusing on infrastructure, for example, Arroyo stated that her government will ‘harness the private sector via the built-operate transfer law.’ On the issue of productivity, Arroyo declared that her government would minimize bottlenecks such as high cost of power, deterrents to investments in agriculture, overly confrontational labor-management relations, and corruption and red tape at the national and local government levels. On these bottlenecks, she declared the implementation of the Power Sector Reform Law to reduce the cost of power, enact a law making farm land acceptable as loan collateral, work with labor and business to retrain workers for

Interestingly, in explicating the details of her ‘economic philosophy for the 21st century,’ Arroyo explicitly acknowledged the United State’s ‘economic and military power’ as an important factor in the economic affairs of the Philippines. Stated less than two months before the September 11 attacks in the United States and before the launching of the ‘global war on terror,’ the declaration below reaffirmed that Arroyo’s economic policies were tied to the global economic affairs implying the conceptualization THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AT LARGE IS THE LIFE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.4).

14. The strength of the financial and fiscal sectors partly lies in how we use the realities in the global and regional environment to our benefit. Thus, we will enhance our relations with the United States, whose economic and military power continues to make it important as a factor in the affairs of the region and in the nation. We will also strengthen bilateral economic and political relations with Japan, our biggest source of development assistance and a major trading partner. And more and more, we will design foreign policy and foreign trade policy in the context of ASEAN.

Expressions such as ‘how we use the realities in the global and regional environment to our benefit’ and ‘our relations with the United States, whose economic and military power makes it important as a factor in the affairs of the region and in the nation’ suggest that the international environment and relations are resources for national strength, thereby realizing said conceptualization.

8.4.3 (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY

In July 2002, months after the September 11 attacks and after the George W. Bush administration launched the ‘global war on terror,’ Arroyo declared in her

the fast-changing technologies of the new economy, strengthening the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, full-computerization of the elections, cut in half the number of signatures required for service in government agencies, streamline operations and slash red tape in local governments, etc. The detailed substantiation of Arroyo’s agenda indicates that her government was bent on setting doable targets.

second SONA that she was ‘the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection between war against terrorism and the war against poverty.’ The full declaration on the ‘interconnection’ runs, thus:

15. As a result of our decisive action after September 11, the Philippines is now a recognized player in world affairs. The President of the Philippines was the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection between the war against terrorism and the war against poverty. Now, nations large and small embrace this interconnection.

We have gained powerful allies in our domestic war against terrorism. I am certain that our increased international visibility will continue generating capital inflows for the Philippines. (2002)

The declaration ran parallel to Arroyo’s pre-9/11 statement (extract 14) on the link (‘interconnection’) between the national economy and the global economic affairs including the assertion of United States economic and military interests. Two related conceptualizations can be generated, thus, from this Arroyo formulation—one specific and the other broad: THE (GLOBAL) WAR AGAINST TERRORISM IS THE (PHILIPPINE) WAR AGAINST POVERTY and GLOBAL IS LOCAL. The first appears to have been used to pitch the need to engage in the Bush administration-led global war on terror while the second rehearses the conceptualization having to do with the link between world and national economies. In the extract above, Arroyo expressed the first conceptualization by saying that the Philippine engagement in war against terrorism (‘our domestic war against terrorism’) had led to ‘increased international visibility.’ It appears that in Arroyo’s national economic frame, ‘international visibility’ is supposedly good for national economy as it generates ‘capital inflows for the Philippines.’ If we refer back to Arroyo’s 2001 SONA, she considered generating ‘capital inflows’ necessary for job creation, which falls under her ‘economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate for the 21st century,’ the first component of

her anti-poverty ideology or ‘war against poverty.’ Curiously, however, the conceptualization also makes a more explicit pitch in adopting the militarist approach in the pursuit of national economic development. By suggesting that the war on terrorism translates to war on poverty, Arroyo not only justified the country’s engagement in the global war on terror, she also suggested that the use of hard power or the military element was necessary in making her national economic agenda work. That THE WAR ON TERROR IS THE WAR ON POVERTY may also be seen as anchored on the broader conceptualization THE GLOBAL IS LOCAL, a restatement of the conceptualization THE WORLD ECONOMY IS A LIFE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY mentioned earlier. This broad conceptualization—GLOBAL IS LOCAL—suggests that international engagements can be seen in local terms (e.g., the global war terror in terms of the ‘domestic war on terrorism’) so that they remain relevant and relatable to the national audience.

The related conceptualizations are also evident in the following extract that shows how vital winning the ‘war against terrorism’ is to the Philippines as ‘viable proposition’ in the world economy and its ‘war against poverty.’

16. We cannot afford to lose. Even a stalemate will be defeat. For what is at stake is our country as a viable proposition in the world economy. And we must be viable if we are to win the most fundamental war, the war against poverty. (2002)

The statement was made in the context of the Arroyo government’s accomplishments in its domestic war against terrorism (i.e., the capture of the mastermind in the bombings in Southern Philippines, also considered ‘the number one expert terrorist bomber’). In the extract, Arroyo established that national accomplishments in the war on terrorism contribute to the Philippines’ position as an important participant in the

global affairs ('a viable proposition in the world economy'). The expression 'viable proposition' brings to mind the earlier expressions such as 'international visibility' and 'a recognized player in world affairs' which, to Arroyo, were necessary in order for the Philippines to compete for investments in the free market global economy and consequently work towards reducing, or 'fighting,' the incidence of poverty in the country.

8.4.4 TOUGH LOVE IS A CORRECTIVE/ CURATIVE ACTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF CHRONIC DEFICITS

In her 2004 SONA, Arroyo employed the phrase 'tough love'—a phrase that suggests parental concern or maternal love—to refer to measures that her government deemed necessary to address the chronic budget deficit. The 'tough love' formula involved a combination of alternatives such as an increase in revenue collection, expansion of government services and cost-cutting measures to cure the 'chronic' economic illness posed by the budget deficit. Also proposed were measures expressed in lexical terms that connote physical change:

17. We have to *tear away layers* of inefficiency piled by decades of political accommodation: redundancy in the national service, waste in local governments, and pointless procedures for getting done what isn't needed anyway to secure the public welfare (2004).
18. We will *downsize* the government, motivate excess employees to become entrepreneurs, and increase the pay of a *lean and mean* bureaucracy (2004).

These proposed measures are summed up in the following statement that expresses the formula's asymmetrical relationship between the 'tough' government and other constituents of the national body, who are expected to exhibit 'patience,' to

‘cooperate,’ and to actively ‘support’ the government decisions and proposed courses of action:

19. All the solutions require: *toughness* on the part of the government, *cooperation* on the part of business, *patience* on the part of our people, and *active support* on the part of Congress (2004).

8.5 Peace and security

Expectedly, the ‘war on terror’ discourse was heavily employed when Arroyo discussed peace and security. In her 2002 SONA, Arroyo declared that the ‘global anti-terrorist coalition is a historical watershed,’ which had helped the government ‘immensely in finally breaking the cycle of terrorism and criminality.’ To the Arroyo administration, the global anti-terrorist coalition had helped enhance crime fighting and advance capabilities for national defense.⁸⁰ Enhanced crime fighting and advanced capabilities for national defense were seen as prerequisites to making the country ‘a viable proposition’ in the world economy, which would consequently lead to winning the ‘war against poverty.’

8.5.1 CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES

In Arroyo’s SONAs, criminality and terrorism were portrayed as undesirable or parasitical elements that needed to be removed or expunged from the (national) body by means of ‘elimination,’ ‘cleansing,’ ‘breaking the cycle,’ and ‘a comprehensive reform that cure[s].’ To Arroyo, their destruction is supposed to lead to a kind of stability conducive to economic growth.

⁸⁰ The global anti-terror movement has also given the Arroyo government a reason to ‘enhance our strategic relationship with the United States through continuing training exercises to sharpen our soldiers’ capabilities to move and communicate, to fix and finish off their targets.’

20. We will start with the two biggest syndicates, the Bucala and Fajardo gangs. I have challenged the Philippine National Police to *eliminate* them within a year. (2002)
21. I have told you the PNP that they must start with the *cleansing* of their own ranks. (2002)
22. This new global consensus helps us immensely in finally *breaking the cycle* of terrorism and criminality. (2002)
23. I thank the national police for their solid support in yesterday's crisis, and I am sure they themselves welcome *a comprehensive reform that will cure* the organization not only of the failures of the scale of the Al-Ghozi escape, but also the daily devils that are the kotong cops. (2003)

Arroyo applied a similar treatment when describing the pervasiveness of the drug problem in the Philippine society. In her 2003 speech, Arroyo used such Filipino terms as 'malalim ang lagos' and 'bumabagtas' – roughly translated as 'run deeply' and 'traverse' – which suggest a fluidal and creeping movement usually associated with a growing disease in the human body.

24. Ang katiwaliang nilikha ng kalakal sa droga ay *malalim ang lagos* at *bumabagtas* sa lahat ng sector. Dapat nating kapootan ang walang pakundangang pagsira sa buhay ng ating mga mamamayan na maaaring humantong sa *pagkawasak* ng ating mga institusyong demokratiko (Trans. The irregularities brought about by the drug trade *run deeply* and *traverse* all sectors. We should be infuriated by this senseless devastation of the lives of our citizens which may lead to the *destruction* of our democratic institutions.) (2003).

The drug trade, like other forms of criminality, is clearly treated then as an illness that runs through the national body.

8.5.2 CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS

Arroyo declared in her 2002 address that criminal syndicates will be treated as 'direct threats to national security.' The declaration implied that criminal syndicates

would be treated as terrorists, thus, the conceptualization **CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS**. This conceptualization warranted a more militarist approach to crime, especially what Arroyo identified as ‘criminal syndicates.’ The following extracts show a more militarist approach to criminality and terrorism. ‘Breaking the back’ (25) and ‘breaking up’ (28) conjure systematic destruction while expressions such as ‘hunting down’ (26), ‘watched, tracked and infiltrated’ (27), ‘mopping up’ (28) suggest a capture and kill approach associated with military operations.

25. I am determined to build a strong republic by *breaking the back* of terrorism and criminality (2002).

26. I have given very clear orders to spare nothing in *hunting down* kidnapers (2002).

27. We are getting a clearer picture of the leadership, membership and area of operations of these syndicates. I now want their linkages and modus operandi. I am overseeing how they are being *watched, tracked* and *infiltrated* (2002).

28. We beat down crime, we are *breaking up* the drug and kidnapping syndicates, we are *mopping up* the stragglers. The people are safer in the streets, in their homes, and in their places of work (2004).

8.5.3 **REBELS ARE CRIMINALS**

In the same speech, Arroyo also did not make a distinction between what she called criminals ‘of the common kind’ and rebel groups that have been fighting against the government for decades. She said, ‘Criminals are criminals, whether of the common kind or *the kind that kills in the name of political advocacies*. They will feel the full brunt of the arsenal of democracy.’ The statement underlies the conceptualization **REBELS ARE CRIMINALS**. It is also clearly a justification of the

counter-insurgency program that the Arroyo government launched in January 2002.⁸¹ What human rights groups have found questionable about this program is that it indiscriminately targets legal organizations suspected by the military as ‘front organizations’ for armed groups.

The indiscriminate targeting of legal organizations by Arroyo’s counter-insurgency program is also reflected in the indiscriminate use of the term ‘enemies of the republic.’ In 2002, Arroyo declared, ‘As commander in chief, I am taking a direct hand in the war against the enemies of the republic.’ The use of the term ‘enemies of the republic’ appears too broad and encompassing that it is possible to include anybody who was strongly against Arroyo’s policies. The term would necessarily then include those in the left of the political spectrum whose critical stance against the administration’s policies and programs was widely known.

8.5.4 WAR ON TERROR IS A CURATIVE

As suggested in Section 8.5.1, Arroyo did not only adopt the militarist metaphors when she employed the war on terror discourse to fight criminality and rebellion. She also recontextualized ‘war on terror’ as a curative to the national ills. In 2002, for instance, Arroyo declared,

29. At stake in this war is the very life of society, the very possibility of basic rights and liberties, which have been under attack for a long time (2002).

⁸¹ The counter-insurgency plan is called ‘Oplan Bantay Laya’ (Operation Freedom Watch). Its strategic goal is to ‘decisively defeat insurgents (and) armed groups in order to attain and maintain peace and security for national development’ (Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace, 2006, p. 6).

The primer by EMJP states that the program was ‘framed after the US ‘war on terror.’ The Arroyo administration received \$4.6 billion in US military assistance for AFP. Added to this is the \$30 million allotted for ‘counter-terrorism’ trainings’ (p. 7). It also added that the program was ‘patterned after US military strategy. This included the utilization of propaganda to demonize as ‘terrorists’ those it considers as enemies; the conduct of intensive military operations using heavy weaponry to ‘shock and awe’ its enemies as well as suspected supporters from the civilian populace; the conduct of preemptive strikes and rendition or the abduction, torture, and/or killings of suspected ‘terrorists.’ Groups and individuals proscribed as terrorists are deprived of all their rights’ (Ibid.).

That the national life depended on the ‘war on terror’ (referred to in the extract as ‘this war’) suggest that the war has some health-giving value. More so if we consider that the ‘attack’ alluded to emanated from those that keep the nation ill. Earlier in the speech, the president characterized ‘criminal gangs and homegrown terrorists’ as spreading ‘*poisons*’ in the nation. She said: ‘Indeed, criminal gangs and homegrown terrorists have exploited the poisoned political atmosphere to spread poisons of their own: kidnapping, gambling, drug-dealing and rampant smuggling.’ Hence, pursuing the war on terror was like purging the ‘poisons’ from the national body; hence, the conceptualization **WAR ON TERROR IS A CURATIVE**.

In 2003, Arroyo was particularly explicit about the curative or rehabilitative effects of invoking the help of the United States government – the major proponent of the ‘global war on terror’ – especially in resolving insurgency and rebellion in Southern Philippines. She said:

30. We will avail of the good offices of Malaysia in the search of a political solution to the conflict with the MILF, while looking to the help of the United States in the *rehabilitation* of conflict areas and the *eradication of the roots* of war. (2003)

That the United States should help in the ‘rehabilitation’ of conflict areas and in the ‘eradication of the roots of war’ signaled the Arroyo administration’s support for the joint military exercises between the Philippine and US governments in Southern Philippines, which after the September 11 attacks on US soil, came to be regarded as part of the framework of the global war on terror.

8.5.5 STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES

It may be inferred that the strategic recontextualization of the discourse on ‘war on terror’ (both as a means to combat criminality and as a cure to the national ills) worked to fortify the Arroyo administration’s policies with regard to peace and national security. These state policies may be seen as the concrete means by which the global war on terror might be adopted in the national scale. They are the **INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES.**

In her 2002 SONA, for instance, Arroyo cited the ‘the reallocation of resources in [the] year’s budget to enhance the republic’s crime fighting capabilities.’ She justified this by providing statements that bolster the significant role of the police and the military and the government’s ‘tough’ resolve in ‘waging war against the enemies of the republic.’ Below are some of the statements praising the military and the police:

31. This year, what used to be Camp Abubakar became an authentic community of new hopes and dreams where our flag flies and our soldiers protect those who have returned to their homes. (2002)
32. We achieved all of these backed by the valor, professionalism, and restraint of our soldiers and police. I salute our men and women in uniform, at the forefront of our republic’s efforts to fight terror and enforce peace. (2002)
33. I salute the men and women of the police who scorned to be bribed and confiscated 500 kilograms of shabu in Quezon province last year, and caught the biggest fish so far in the drug trade. (2002)
34. I salute the men and women who raided the shabu factories in Batangas, Zambales, San Juan, Varsity Hills, and other places, seizing a total of 5 billion peso worth of illegal drugs and lab equipment in the largest drug busts ever in our history of crime fighting. (2002)

By highlighting the effectiveness and competence of the military and the police personnel in fighting crime and terrorism, Arroyo showed how the reallocation of budget for the military and the police could potentially make crime fighting and the fighting against acts of terrorism more effective—a case of an a fortiori argument. In this regard, the government policy of enhancing military and police resources was rendered as a significant instrument in making ‘war on terror’ work in the domestic front.

Arroyo also endorsed the anti-terrorism bill (which was eventually ratified as the Human Securities Act of 2007). The bill was described as that which would ‘strengthen our legal armory’ and ‘plug the loopholes by which crimes spread and democracy is undermined.’⁸²

Both the reallocation of budget for enhanced crime fighting capabilities and the eventual passage of the anti-terrorism bill may be seen as instrumental in the Philippine version of ‘war on terror.’ They also serve as evidence of how discourses are transformed into ‘more authoritative contexts’ or ‘non-negotiable materialities’ (Blackledge 2005). They are the concrete manifestations, if not outcomes, of abstractions like the catchphrase ‘war on terror’ and serve as proof or evidence that discourses circulated and perpetrated by those in positions of power have impact on our socio-political reality.

⁸² The Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) comments that the law’s definition of terrorism is ‘vague, ambiguous and highly susceptible to abuse.’ Words and phrases as ‘widespread and extraordinary fear and panic’, ‘populace’, and ‘unlawful demand’ remain unclear. The FLAG asserts that, ‘With no objective standards to guide our law enforcers, the Human Security Act in effect bestows on our law enforcers the unfettered discretion to decide if a person is engaged in terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism. And that is very dangerous indeed’ (Diokno, 2007).

8.6 The presidency

In 2002, Arroyo introduced the concept of the ‘strong republic’ which became a recurring theme in her succeeding addresses.

The ‘strong republic’ is a spin off from a trope used by national hero Jose Rizal in one of his writings and echoed by President Diosdado Macapagal, Arroyo’s father, in his inaugural speech in 1961.⁸³ It represents what Arroyo’s deems as the ‘great ideal’ for the country, her vision for the future of the Philippines.

8.6.1 THE STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN NATION BUILDING

In the 2002 SONA, the ‘strong republic’ easily clusters with such terms as ‘edifice,’ ‘enduring structure,’ ‘fine stone,’ and ‘bedrock.’ Arroyo considers it her fitting contribution to nation-building, ‘the fine stone (she) should like to add to the edifice of our nation.’ In her own words, it is ‘the finest stone within (her) ability to shape’ and the ‘bedrock of victory from poverty.’

The image of a sturdy, structure is accentuated and complicated by descriptions associating the strong republic with a living entity. When Arroyo described it as having ‘*independence* from class and sectoral interests’ and having ‘a *capacity*, represented through strong institutions and a strong bureaucracy, to *execute* good policy and deliver essential services,’ it is given an agentive character. More so, when the President said, ‘[a] strong republic *does* what it says. It *takes* care of the people and *takes* care of their future.’ On the one hand, the strong republic – enduring and resilient – may be Arroyo’s concept of a healthy nation-state. On the other hand,

⁸³ In his 1961 inaugural address, President Diosdado Macapagal said, ‘Nation-building is an exacting and endless endeavor. No president can build the whole edifice of a nation. All that he is called upon to do, is to add a fine stone to that edifice, so that those who shall come after him may add other fine stones that will go for a strong and enduring structure’ (Malaya and Malaya 2004, 210). The last two lines were quoted in the 2002 SONA of Arroyo.

it may be regarded as something instrumental in addressing the ills of the nation and in restoring its health. These may be inferred from the following extracts:

35. And a prosperous republic does not exist by mere fact of declaring itself to be so. *A republic must be so in fact, in reality, and especially in the difference it makes for the better in the lives of its citizens.* (2002)
36. *Ang malakas na republika ay para sa mahihina, para sa nagugutom, para sa nanganganib, para sa agrabyado, para sa mga api! Yan ang malakas na republika para sa kanila* (Trans. A strong republic is for the weak, for the poor, for the jobless, for the hungry, for those in danger, for the disadvantaged, for the oppressed. That is the strong republic. For all of them.). (2002)
37. Ang ating pangarap ay walang kabawas-bawas – *isang matatag na republikang hindi matitinag ng makasariling interes, yumayabong sa mga gumaganang institusyon ng pamamahala, naglilingkod sa isang masipag na lipi saanman ito kailangan upang maibigay sa kanila ang karapat-dapat nilang tanggapin* (Trans. Our dream has remained the same – a strong republic that is not shaken by personal interests, that grows through government institutions that work, and that serves hardworking people wherever it is needed in order to give them what they deserve.). (2003)

That the strong republic is explicitly characterized as making a ‘difference’ in the lives of its citizens’ by serving the weak, the poor, the jobless, the hungry, the disadvantaged, the oppressed—all victims of the nation’s ills—accords well with the conceptualization ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE.

8.6.2 THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC

To Arroyo, a strong republic is ‘a shield that needs a *strong arm* to hold it up’ (2002). In her 2003 SONA, she explicitly expressed who should stand for this strong arm:

38. For the practical purposes of most people, government exists to provide jobs, homes, education, peace, food on every table. And to do that adequately and dependably, government must possess the capacity to execute good policy and deliver basic services through strong and responsive institutions staffed by a competent and dedicated bureaucracy.

In short, *government must be the arm of a strong republic* (2003). (Emphasis added)

The government as the arm of a strong republic is perhaps best represented in the 2004 government publication titled *Vision and Performance Record of President Gloria*. The document establishes the centrality of ‘a strong, effective state’ in propelling ‘economic growth.’ It says:

There has been nearly a consensus among economists—of even contrasting political ideologies—that *a strong, effective state* has been the crucial factor in the economic growth of the advanced countries and more recently, of the East Asian tigers. One of the major conclusions of the 1997 World Bank Development Report was: “Development—economic, social and sustainable—without *an effective state* is impossible. It is increasingly recognized that *an effective state*—not a minimal one—is *central* to economic and social development...” (18) (Emphasis added)

The vision’s emphasis on ‘a strong, effective state’ as a determiner of ‘economic growth’ brings to mind notions of ‘political stability’ and ‘national security.’ These notions help justify the Arroyo government’s actions and policies couched in such terms as ‘a new bill that will strengthen our legal armory,’ ‘the full force of law,’ and ‘the full brunt of the arsenal of democracy.’ They were regarded as elements needed ‘to strengthen (the) investment climate’ and to present the country ‘as a viable proposition to the world economy.’

8.6.3 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER

It should be noted that questions of legitimacy had been raised against Arroyo from the time she assumed power in 2001 to her election as president in 2004.⁸⁴ The

⁸⁴ The year 2005 may be considered the height of the political crisis involving questions on the legitimacy of Arroyo’s presidency. This is due to the controversial wiretapped conversations allegedly between the President and an election commissioner during the 2004 elections. This is covered in Chapter 9.

recontextualization of ‘war on terror’ as war against serious national problems (i.e., drugs, criminality, corruption, poverty) heightens Arroyo’s presidential persona as a tough, serious, and engaged leader—a working president and a micro-manager ready to visit villages, check progress in government offices, exercise political will to punish erring men in uniform, and recommend what would strengthen the nation’s ‘legal armory.’⁸⁵ By recontextualizing the war on terror discourse and associating it with spurring economic growth and protecting the people’s ‘right to live in peace’ and ‘right to liberty,’ Arroyo is able to project herself more prominently in different roles that play up the myth of ‘the working president.’

Her SONAs from 2002 to 2004 showed various favorable self-representations of the president.⁸⁶ These representations include, among others: the president as a micro-manager, an achiever and deliverer of good news, an advocate of the U.S.-led war on terror, and a committed and serious national leader. Below, I show textual evidence of these self-representations.

Casting herself as a micro-manager, Arroyo made references to specific actions she pursued while in office: telling and reminding her cabinet what to do (39),

⁸⁵ The representation of Arroyo as a micro-manager came even before she invoked the need to support the global war on terror. I would like to argue, however, that the recontextualization of the war on terror as war against national ills has been used to *intensify* this image.

⁸⁶ The various representations of the president I argue contribute to the conceptual key of THE PRESIDENCY IS THE PRESIDENT which has several permutations (e.g., GOVERNMENT IS PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION IS PRESIDENT). In such conceptualization, the presidency (institution) is embodied by the personality of the president or head of state.

It should be clarified that *the president is not necessarily the presidency*, which pertains to the institution or a large collective of people who constitute the administration or executive branch of government; however, the person who occupies the position of the president has the power to define what the institution stands for. The conceptual key may also come to mean that the presidency is image-making. This is quite related to what a former Philippine press secretary once asserted - ‘politics is theater’ (‘The presidency,’ 1990). Of course, he refers to theater in the mimetic sense (that is, acting as role-playing) in that whoever assumes political leadership has to know how to project roles and images befitting a leader. These roles and images reenact and/or redefine the institution of presidency.

making surprise visits in government offices (40), and giving executive orders such as abolishing offices that purportedly contribute to bureaucratic red tape (41). The expressions ('sinabi ko,' 'pinapaalala ko,' 'nagsagawa ako,' 'I have abolished') are significant in that they render Arroyo as directly involved in the affairs of the state.

39. Kaya noong isang taon, *sinabi ko* na ang kabinete ko ay kailangan gumawa ng *konkretong resulta* sa paglaban sa katiwalian. *Pinapaalala ko* sa kanila ngayon na sa sumunod na araw, magbigay ng kanilang ulat sa naturang mga resulta (Trans. So last year, *I told* my cabinet that they should come up with *concrete results* with regard to the fight against corruption. *I am reminding* them now that in the coming days, they should submit their report on the said results.) (2002).

40. Kaya *nagsagawa ako* ng *sorpresang pagbisita* sa tanggapan ng gobyerno, upang pasiglahin ang talagang nagsisikap at gisingin kung sino ang natutulog sa trabaho (So *I made surprise visits* in government offices in order to encourage those who are perseverant and to rouse those who sleep at work.) (2003).

41. *I have abolished* eighty offices under the office of the president. *I will abolish* thirty more (2004).⁸⁷

In the following extracts, Arroyo cast herself as an achiever and deliverer of good news. In achieving this, she made comparison between what had been the case in the past—before she assumed the presidency (42) or during the early part of her presidency (43, 44)—and what was the case at the moment of speaking. As evident in the extract 42, the past situation was rendered undesirable ('we had the second most expensive power rates in Asia') while the present was represented as an improvement from the past ('Now, we have gone down to number 6'). In 43, Arroyo implied that targets set early on in her presidency ('a million new jobs in agriculture and fisheries') were being reached ('We have provided more than half of that number two thirds into

⁸⁷ Given emphasis in the extracts are the processes (material, verbal, behavioral), the doer of the processes, and lexical choices like 'konkretong resulta' (concrete results) and 'sorpresang pagbisita' (surprise visits) that indicate the kind of role the doer projects in her utterance.

my term') while in 44, she emphasized positive consequences of her legislative agenda passed by Congress.

42. Before I became president, we had the second most expensive power rates in Asia. *Now, we have gone down to number 6* (2002).

43. I said that there could a million new jobs in agriculture and fisheries. *We have provided more than half of that number two-thirds into my term* (2003).

44. In fact, *we will now be able to bring clean water to the entire country* because during my previous term, you, Congress finally passed the clean water act; because in my first days as president in 2001 I signed the solid waste act (2004).⁸⁸

In 45 to 47, she represented herself as an advocate of the U.S.-led war on terror by proclaiming that she 'was the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection between war against terrorism and war against poverty' (45), she was 'taking a direct hand in the war against the enemies of the republic' (46), and reaffirming relations with the United States (47). Extract 46 is particularly interesting in that her 'war against the enemies of the republic' was anchored on the U.S.-led 'war on terrorism' (see 8.5.4). References to herself as 'the first head of government' (45) and 'their only state visitor for the year' underscored Arroyo's self-perceived importance in the global anti-terrorism movement that had spawned after the events of 9/11 in the U.S.

45. The President of the Philippines was *the first head of government to emphasize the interconnection between the war against terrorism and the*

⁸⁸ Notice the emphasis on the achievements of the incumbency. This is achieved through various ways: by contrasting the state of the nation in the past and present, showing how targets set by the incumbent in the previous year are gradually and successfully achieved, and showing positive outcomes of previous actions set by the present administration.

war against poverty. Now, nations large and small embrace this interconnection (2002).

46. As commander-in-chief, *I am taking a direct hand in the war against the enemies of the republic* (2002).

47. It was also fitting that *I put in a new perspective on our relations with the United States*, where three million Filipinos live and where I made a visit as *their only state visitor for the year* (2003).

In 48 and 49, Arroyo constructed herself as a committed and serious national leader by promising to ‘work even harder’ and ‘do even better’ (48) and by demonstrating that she fit a defining characteristic of a modern leader (49). Needless to say, the expressions lent themselves to Arroyo’s propagandized persona as a ‘working president.’

48. In any event, *I promise to work even harder* if that is possible, and *do even better* because I believe that there is always room for improvement (2002).

49. (A modern leader) *must stick to priorities* that were carefully chosen, rather than dump them at every first issue that is recklessly raised. *I have stuck to my priorities: jobs, food on every table, homes, education, peace* (2002).

In several ways, Arroyo tried to identify herself with the great majority of the Filipino people by projecting herself as the champion of the farmers and the working class (50), the poor (51), and the overseas Filipino workers (52).

50. To the countless incentives that Congress has granted to business, *I’ve matched similar programs to give a similar break to the worker in the factory and in the farm* (2003).

51. Bilang pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga pinakamahirap ng ating bansa hinggil sa pinakamalubhang mga problema natin, *dinalaw ko ang mga di-kilalang barangay* (Trans. As a way of consulting the poorest of our country with regard to our most pressing problems, *I visited less-known villages.*) (2003).

52. And I cannot apologize for *being a protector of my people* (2004).

More obvious ways of legitimizing her leadership can be seen from her self-representation as a product of people power,

53. *At dahil ako ay naluklok sa pagkapangulo dala ng malawakang galit sa anomaliya, alam kong kailangan wakasan ang katiwalian* (Trans. Because I was thrust into the presidency due to a wide protest against anomalies, I am aware that we need to end corruption.). (2002)

54. I know that *it is to me that those many Filipinos are looking for the vindication of their decision to go to EDSA*. I shall not disappoint them. (2002)

and as a duly-elected and well-supported leader of the 2004 presidential elections,

55. Thanks to many of you, *I emerged from the last election with more votes than any previous president*. (2004)

56. As a further sign of the people's overwhelming support, *they gave me a huge majority in Congress, and among the local governments*. (2004)

These various roles and representations heighten the political spectacle that is the Philippine presidency. They specifically established the political ethos of Arroyo as a leader worthy of support because what was projected rhetorically was a president who seriously worked and fought against long standing national problems. Her persona as a working president was especially significant in that it provided a contrast to her predecessor, Joseph Estrada, whose populist, pro-poor image has been eroded and subverted by accounts that portray him as a 'chronic violator of the law,' 'a sanctioning agent of criminal activities,' and a self-aggrandizing public official (Navera 2003, 147-151). The persona worked to de-mystify Estrada and established Arroyo as the (new) heroine ready to find a cure to the ailing nation or solutions to serious and intractable national problems by sheer observance of work ethics

apparently wanting in the previous administration. That recontextualized ‘war on terror’ as a means to combat domestic terrorism as well as a national curative heightens her role as a serious, no-nonsense leader geared up to fight obstacles that get in the way of ‘economic growth.’

8.7 Summary

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s ascendance to the Philippine presidency marked the beginning of the longest presidency since Ferdinand Marcos. Arroyo’s presidency spanned more than three years of successor term and a full six-year presidential term. This chapter focuses on the first four of Arroyo SONAs, three of which were delivered during her successor term and the other less than a month after she began her full presidential term in 2004. The schema that emerged from the said SONAs is one that equates the global war on terror with the war on poverty in the national level. In her schema, a strong republic is complemented by such formulation.

Thrust to the Philippine presidency at the crest of a peaceful mass demonstration against massive corruption involving her predecessor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Arroyo sought to pursue an anti-poverty ideology—strategically termed ‘war on poverty’—during her presidential term. In her first SONA, she outlined the four components of her ‘war on poverty’ agenda and provided a detailed accounting of how she sought to realize them. The four components are: an economic philosophy of free enterprise appropriate for the 21st century, modern agriculture, social bias for the disadvantaged sector, and morality in government and society.

After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, however, Arroyo adopted the framework of the US government-led ‘global war on terror.’ This marked

a realignment of her ‘war on poverty’ discourse with the discourse of the ‘global war on terror.’

This chapter specifically focused on how the Arroyo SONAs from her successor term to 2004 recontextualized the war on terror discourse to make it relevant and relatable in the socio-political context of the Philippines and also to legitimize her presidency which she assumed through extra-constitutional (i.e., people power) means. The discussion was developed by examining the various conceptual frames and metaphors employed in the speech to substantiate the themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency.

After Arroyo’s declaration of her government’s engagement with the global war on terror, Arroyo framed democracy using three interrelated conceptualizations: **DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON**, **DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT**, and **DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINO HAS FOUGHT FOR**. The first conceptualization treated democracy as an instrument that sanctioned the use of hard power or militarist solution to deal with criminality and rebellion. The second sought to justify the first by positioning democracy as an object of threat ‘entitled to self-defense.’ The third conceptualization extends the second conceptualization by showing that democracy as an object of threat is historically rooted as the Filipino people had fought for it over time. It also lends value to democracy by regarding it as a national faith. The combination of these three conceptualizations—that democracy is a national faith that has been an object of threat but is capable of defending itself against threat through a state-sanctioned use of hard power—ran parallel to the George W. Bush declaration that the ‘war on terror,’ intended to ensure security and to spread democracy, was a ‘crusade.’

In terms of the national economy, Arroyo recontextualized war on terror by linking it to her administration's war on poverty agenda. Like Aquino, Arroyo employed the conceptual frame **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE**, but Arroyo substantiated this frame using conceptual metaphors that reflected the socio-political and historical context of the period. In her speeches, Arroyo established that the NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT. As Arroyo adopted the framework of the global war on terror, she made it a point that her conceptualization that the WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS A FORMULA TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (a conceptualization spelled out in her first SONA in 2001) would find interconnection with the war on terror discourse. Arroyo accomplished this by adopting the conceptualization that THE (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR AGAINST POVERTY, which is related to a broader conceptualization, GLOBAL IS LOCAL. In Arroyo's formulation, the global war on terror could be understood in terms of the 'war on poverty' agenda. In her speeches, Arroyo explicated that the engagement in global war on terror would lead to the country's international visibility, which would bring foreign investment and 'capital flows' necessary to pursue a major element of the war on poverty agenda. This also meant that global engagement translates to national development.

While a militarist or combative frame was used to deal with poverty, Arroyo adopted curative and corrective metaphors to deal with the budget deficit, which, in her first SONA after her election for a full presidential term, she conceptualized as an economic illness.

In the area of peace and order and national security, Arroyo employed both militarist and curative domains in dealing with criminality and rebellion. Criminality

and rebellion were conceptualized as diseases and parasites that needed to be expunged from the national body. In this regard, Arroyo recontextualized the war on terror as a curative to the national ills (i.e., criminality and rebellion). Arroyo's conceptualization of criminality and rebellion reveal a conflated formulation. On the one hand, criminality was conceptualized in terms of terrorism in that criminal syndicates were regarded as 'direct threats to national security' making it necessary to use military power in dealing with criminals. On the other, Arroyo did not make distinctions between rebels and criminals. She adopted the conceptualization **REBELS ARE CRIMINALS** making it possible to target rebels in the same fashion that criminals were treated in the Philippine domestic war on terrorism. The conflated formulations appeared to justify the indiscriminate targeting of those critically opposed to the Arroyo administration. This could have possibly accounted for the high number of cases of political executions and extrajudicial killings during the Arroyo administration.

To pursue the war on terror in the national scale, Arroyo endorsed the ratification of anti-terrorism bill and declared a reallocation of resources in order to 'enhance the republic's crime fighting capabilities.' Both policies served as apparatuses of the war on terror in the Philippines. Moreover, they prove that transformation of discourse in more authoritative contexts and the impact they have on the socio-political reality.

The recontextualization of the war on terror as war against poverty, as a means to combat threats to national security, and as a curative to the national ills complemented Arroyo's vision of a 'strong republic' that put premium on 'national security' and 'political stability' which her administration deemed vital in spurring 'economic growth.' The recontextualization contributed to the legitimization of her

presidency that had been challenged with questions of legitimacy. By recontextualizing ‘war on terror’ as war against a serious and intractable national problem like poverty, against threats to national security, and against the national ills at large, Arroyo heightened her presidential persona as a tough, serious, and engaged leader—a working president and a micro-manager geared up to rid the nation of its social, economic and political ills.

Through the SONAs, the Arroyo administration was able to work towards sustaining its hold of power on the one hand, and showing its commitment to the Bush administration-led global war on terror, on the other. In other words, the public speeches were instrumental in juggling the President’s acts of justifying the Philippines’s involvement in the global war on terror and of ascertaining its tenuous hold of power.

Chapter 9

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and the Assertion of Presidential Legitimacy

9.1 Introduction

Before Gloria Macapagal Arroyo could deliver her 2005 State of the Nation Address, her government faced arguably its worst political crisis since she assumed public office in 2001. In June 2005, a tape recording of a telephone conversation that transpired a few weeks after the 2004 national polls allegedly between the president and an election official circulated in public. In the conversation, the president was allegedly making sure that she got a margin of one million votes against her closest rival, popular actor Fernando Poe, Jr. The phone conversation became a media spectacle and was so highly publicized that the president had to apologize for her ‘lapse in judgment’ on national television. Following her televised apologia, ten members of her cabinet resigned from their posts and called on Arroyo to step down from office. Her staunch political backers including former President Corazon Aquino and supporters in Congress expressed the same call. Resigned members of her cabinet warned that the crisis would mark a shift in Arroyo’s presidential policy: ‘political survival at all cost.’⁸⁹

⁸⁹ The resigned Arroyo cabinet members explained that the reason for their resignation on 8 July 2005 was that the Arroyo government ‘had lost its credibility and capability to govern with the confidence and trust of the people.’ They warned that ‘the President instead of governance would be preoccupied with ensuring her political survival at all cost.’ This was reiterated in a statement condemning ‘Arroyo’s betrayal of people power’ on 24 February 2006 (see Avigail Olarte, <http://www.pcij.org/blog/?p=634>, Available: 2 September 2010). In the same statement, the ten resigned cabinet members, also called the ‘Hyatt 10,’ contended that Arroyo’s policy of ensuring her political survival at all cost was demonstrated by the quashing of the impeachment case against Arroyo ‘by technicality and generous dole-outs of patronage and political favor’ and suppression of ‘legitimate efforts to ferret out the truth... at every turn, with the cover-up on the Garci tapes, the imposition of the Calibrated Preemptive Response, and its issuance of EO 464, among others.’

This chapter covers five of Arroyo's SONAs from 2005 to 2009—during which time President Arroyo had to constantly address the issue of the legitimacy of her full presidential term. I argue that Arroyo's SONAs offer three propositions that worked towards legitimizing her hold of power. They are as follows:

1. The national economy is a strong player in the global arena under the Arroyo administration.
2. The existing political system is a roadblock to the country's full development.
3. The Arroyo presidency is a working presidency and has succeeded.

Let me give an overview of these propositions. The first proposition had been used by the Arroyo government to undermine challenges against its political leadership. In 2005, Arroyo argued that the national economy was on the verge of take-off primarily due to fiscal reforms that she pushed as a legislative agenda and which saw passage through the help of her supporters in Congress. She would consistently mention in her succeeding SONAs that the fiscal reforms accounted for the strong macro-economic fundamentals that had shielded the Philippines from the damaging impact of the global economic crisis that confronted her term. She contended that it was these fiscal reforms that had made her an unpopular leader, but that she pursued them nonetheless because they were the 'right' economic policies. Her valedictory SONA in 2009 communicated that the state of the nation was 'a strong economy.'

The second proposition put forth the idea that the existing political system, that is, the Philippine presidential system of government, serves as an impediment to the country's full development. Arroyo explained in her 2005 SONA that 'Over the years, our political system has degenerated to the extent that it is difficult for anyone to make any headway yet keep his hands clean.' Specifically, Arroyo had blamed the political system for the 'political noise' that has made it impossible for the executive

and legislative branches of the government to work together towards a common legislative agenda. She had since then pushed for a constitutional change that aimed at ‘empowering’ the countryside whose development, Arroyo contended, had been constrained by the center or ‘Imperial Manila.’

The third proposition established that in spite of the ‘roadblock’ to development, the Arroyo government had remained committed to its duties and responsibilities. The proposition put forth the notion that throughout its term, the Arroyo government had been ‘working and working well’ (2006). This was supposedly evidenced by Arroyo’s purportedly impeccable ‘work ethic,’ by her propensity towards ‘micro-management,’ and through the creation of ‘super regions’ in her administration’s blueprint of the medium-term public investment plan.

Consistent with the preceding analytical chapters, Chapter 9 also looks into how the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency/ executive leadership are conceptualized across the five congressional speeches and how these conceptualizations are realized in metaphorical and/or lexicogrammatical expressions. These conceptualizations together with other rhetorical strategies in the texts are examined based on how they substantiate Arroyo’s assertion of presidential legitimacy. The following table outlines the conceptual frames generated from the textual analyses of the Arroyo SONAs from 2005 to 2009:

Table 9.1 Conceptual Frames in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's SONAs (2005-2009)

Section	Theme	Conceptual Frames
9.3	Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT
9.4	National economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN AN UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS
9.5	Peace and security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION IS TERRORISM • INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT • PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO • PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS
9.6	The presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY'S FULL DEVELOPMENT • CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A CAREGIVER • ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES

An account of the historical milieu from 2005 to 2009 is provided in the following section to contextualize the conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors discussed in the analytical sections.

9.2 Historical milieu of the Arroyo presidency (2005-2009)

Touted as the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal,⁹⁰ the political crisis of 2005 also marked the beginning of more scandals and challenges to the Arroyo presidency.

The ‘Hello Garci’ scandal spawned after a former deputy director of the National Bureau of Investigation claimed to have audio tapes of wiretapped telephone conversations between the president and Election Commissioner Virgilio ‘Garci’ Garcillano from May to June 2004. The conversations purportedly proved the allegation of election cheating leveled against Arroyo since she assumed her full term in 2004. In the taped conversations, she was purportedly asking Garcillano to ensure her victory against her closest rival by one million votes. The scandal would so captivate the public mind that on June 27, Arroyo appeared on television to apologize for a ‘lapse in judgment’ in deciding to make phone calls with an election commissioner. Without naming the commissioner, she also denied that she influenced the results of the elections. Few days later, ten members of her cabinet resigned from their posts and called for her resignation as well. They claimed that President Arroyo had lost the credibility to govern because the legitimacy of her election had remained under the cloud of doubt. They contended that because of this problem of credibility, the president, instead of working on governance, would be preoccupied with her political survival at all cost. Political allies of the president like then Senate President Franklin Drilon and former President Corazon Aquino had also asked her to do the ‘supreme self sacrifice.’ As the calls for her resignation intensified, Arroyo immediately responded through a speech that blamed the political system of the country for the instability experienced by her government. A few

⁹⁰ ‘Garci’ pertains to the nickname of the purported election commissioner called by the president to ensure her victory in the 2004 election.

weeks later, she delivered her fifth State of the Nation Address carrying the same premise and declaring that, ‘it is time to start the great debate on Charter change.’

Public condemnation of the scandal resulted in congressional hearings and mass protests and the state responded with a series of controversial executive orders and proclamations. After two members of the military appeared on a Senate hearing having to do with the ‘Hello Garci’ scandal, Arroyo released Executive Order 464 which prohibited government officials under the executive branch to attend congressional hearings unless permitted by the Office of the President. This was also seen as a response to congressional inquiry on a curious agreement supposedly executed by her National Security Adviser with the US-based Venable law firm ‘to secure grants or congressional earmarks for support of the Charter Change initiative of the President of the Philippines which would reshape the form of government in the Philippines’ (Magallona 2007). Professor Merlin Magallona, former dean of the University of the Philippines College of Law, explained that this provision in the contract simply meant that the Philippine Government would solicit or procure US government funding to finance amendments or revisions of the Philippine Constitution.

Arroyo also issued the Calibrated Preemptive Response, which disallowed street protests without permit.

On 24 February 2006, a day before the anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, a purported military plot to take over the government was uncovered by authorities. This propelled Arroyo to issue Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) which sanctioned the declaration of state of emergency throughout the country. Meant as a response to the ‘series of actions...hurting the Philippine State—by obstructing governance including hindering growth of the economy and sabotaging people’s

confidence in the government and their faith in the future of [the] country'⁹¹, PP 1017 gave the Arroyo government the authority to implement warrantless arrests and to take over private enterprises. The presidential proclamation was lifted after about a week, but concerned citizens together with members of the opposition and private lawyers challenged its constitutionality before the Supreme Court. The court decided that it was constitutional but ruled that the government's enforcement of warrantless arrests and taking over of private institutions and companies violated the law.⁹²

The 'Hello Garci' scandal sparked a series of impeachment complaints leveled against Arroyo since 2005. The first impeachment complaint, which was based on the telephone controversy, failed. A supposedly stronger impeachment complaint based on the same controversy and other scandals was filed a year later, but was dismissed at the House of Representatives. In 2007, another impeachment complaint was filed in connection with the issues on bribery. Based on the revelation of priest-turned-governor Eduardo Panlilio that a number of governors received half a million pesos from Malacanang (the Presidential Palace), the complaint, however, did not prosper.

Arroyo's annual addresses continued to declare support for the war on terror policy and pushed for the ratification of the Human Securities Act of 2007. Highly contested, the law was meant to address the issue of terrorism that had become an important concern in the Arroyo watch. Set off against this backdrop was the rise in the cases of extrajudicial killings with unarmed activists, human rights workers, and journalists as victims. The 2007 report on the extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in the Philippines by United Nations Special Rapporteur Philip Alston

⁹¹ For the full text of PP 1107, please see <http://pcij.org/blog/2006/02/24/text-of-proclamation-no-1017> posted at the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) Blog on 24 February 2006.

⁹² See <http://pcij.org/blog/2006/05/03/supreme-court-pp-1017-partly-unconstitutional><http://pcij.org/blog/2006/05/03/supreme-court-pp-1017-partly-unconstitutional>

cited the indiscriminate use of language to vilify most groups in the Philippine political left. In Alston's preliminary note on his visit to the Philippines, which was submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council, he identified 'two of the most important underlying causes of a great many of the killings':

The first cause has been variously described as 'vilification,' 'labeling,' or guilt by association. It involves the *characterization* of most groups on the left of the political spectrum as 'front organizations' for armed groups, whose aim is to destroy democracy. The result is a wide range of groups – including human rights advocates, labor union organizers, journalists, teachers' unions, women's groups, indigenous organizations, religious groups, student groups, agrarian reform advocates, and others – are *classified* as 'fronts' and as 'enemies of the State' that are accordingly considered to be legitimate targets. The second cause is the extent to which aspects of the Government's counter-insurgency strategy encourage or facilitate the extrajudicial killings of activists and other 'enemies' in certain circumstances (3-4). (Emphasis added)

Notably, the unabated killings and their non-resolution under the Arroyo presidency led others to consider that a 'culture of impunity' had seeped throughout the country.

While President Arroyo struggled to eclipse what may be regarded as a sordid socio-political landscape with marvelous tales of economic growth as shown through her SONAs, controversies involving the president and her spouse surfaced. One of the most controversial that had gripped the Arroyo presidency since the political crisis in 2005 was the national broadband network (NBN) deal with China's ZTE Corporation. The deal was allegedly overpriced by 130 million US dollars to cover kickbacks.⁹³ It allegedly involved the president's husband and some government officials including the chair of the elections commission. Based on the testimony of the director of the National Economic Development Authority at a Senate hearing on the NBN-ZTE deal, the elections chair who was a close ally of the president offered him 200 million

⁹³ See <http://www.inquirer.net/specialreports/nbndeal/view.php?db=1&article=20100717-281589> for story.

pesos as bribe in exchange of approval. The director said he informed the president of the bribe and that she told him not to accept it. Pressed to give out details of his conversation with the president, the government official invoked 'executive privilege' making it difficult for the opposition to implicate Arroyo in the scandal.

Arroyo's espousal of Charter Change especially the shift to a federal parliamentary form of government worked to consolidate her support from local government units and members of the Congress who supported the idea of a decentralized government. Arroyo used this to create the perception that Manila was the isolated seat of protests against her presidency while the rest of the nation supported her to stay in power.

Despite Arroyo's constant declaration of a strong economy in her presidential speeches, leading polls such as the Social Weather Station and Pulse Asia showed marked decline in her public trust ratings. These ratings caused some news reports, political pundits, and media commentators⁹⁴ to declare that Arroyo is the most unpopular president since Marcos.

In the succeeding sections I present the analysis of the texts. I discuss how specific conceptualizations underlying metaphorical expressions work with certain rhetorical strategies to legitimize Arroyo's hold of power until the end of her term.

⁹⁴ See for instance, this news from the Associated Free Press, <http://www.asia-pacific-action.org/node/101>, available at the Action in Solidarity with Asia and the Pacific website on 2 September 2010. This is also communicated in this 18 July 2008 report available at the gmanews.tv website: <http://www.gmanews.tv/story/107780/Survey-shows-Arroyo-most-unpopular-RP-president-since-1986> (Available: 2 September 2010).

9.3 Democracy

‘Democracy’ figured in the post-2005 crisis SONAs to indicate two things: one, the government’s reaffirmation of democratic institutions and practices; and two, the government’s position in the midst of speculations that democracy had eroded under the Arroyo watch. In conceptual terms, these are: **DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES** and **DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT**.

9.3.1 DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES

The first point was variously expressed in the SONAs delivered in 2005, 2007, and 2009. These expressions underlie the conceptualization that **DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES**. In 2005, Arroyo declared in her introduction that the purpose of the opening session of congress where the president gives her national address is ‘to celebrate democracy.’ The phrase implicitly reaffirms the unique partnership between the executive and legislative branches of government as expressed in the 1987 Constitution.

In 2007, she expressed that spending more on human capital formation under her administration was to ensure that democracy was a ‘government for the people.’ She said:

1. We have spent more on human capital formation than ever in the past. Why? Because if the government of the people and by the people is not for them as well, it is a mockery of democracy. (2007)

In the passage, Arroyo justified her government’s investment in ‘human capital formation’ as a realization of the Lincolnian concept of the democracy—a

‘government of the people, by the people, and for the people.’ The use of the term ‘human capital formation’ is itself curious in that it regards people as capital that can be ‘formed’ or accumulated for the purpose of investment. It is a dehumanizing concept that is part of the global capitalist discourse which privileges quantifiable economic growth instead of holistic human development (Bourdieu 1998).

That the Lincolnian articulation of democracy should be used to justify a global capitalist notion such as ‘human capital formation’ is interesting when seen in the larger context of the Arroyo discourse. The passage is preceded by an articulation of the government’s initiatives and investments in education. Mentioned are investments such as ‘3 billion pesos in science and engineering research and development technology’ as well as Filipino students’ sterling achievements in international math and science competitions. These details are anchored on the premise that ‘in today’s global economy, knowledge is the greatest creator of wealth’—a statement that Arroyo foregrounds to jumpstart her discussion on ‘safety net and education’ in her SONA. This specific formulation of democracy—‘human capital formation’ as an exercise in democracy—is linked to Arroyo’s grand vision of the Philippines as a First World Country and actually adds another layer to the conceptualization of democracy as a value expressed in national institutions and practices, that is, DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR FIRST WORLD STATUS (cf. Chapter 6.3.2).

In 2009, Arroyo declared, ‘let us address the highest exercise of democracy, voting!’ She followed this up by saying that a fully automated elections was approved by Congress, implying that the 2010 elections would push through (‘In 2001, I said we would finance fully automated elections. We got it, thanks to Congress.’). The declaration served the purpose of allaying fears that she would perpetuate herself in

power after her term ends in 2010; it also re-articulated an important post-Marcos conceptualization that PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IS A MEANS TO REINFORCE DEMOCRACY (q.v. Chapter 5.3.3). It should be noted that in Aquino's final report to the nation, she articulated that democratic practices like elections—which may also be very well considered expressions of 'people empowerment' or 'people power'—'strengthen' democracy. This was channeled in Arroyo's declaration.

9.3.2 DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT

In articulating the government's position in the midst of speculations that democracy had eroded under the Arroyo watch, her SONAs proved to be useful. Arroyo specifically addressed the growing public perception that her government's response to her critics—members of the opposition, activists, the press and other media personalities, and some members of the military—had been heavy handed and anti-democratic. In doing so, she employed the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT to justify her actions.

In her valedictory SONA in 2009, she concurred that democracy was potentially under threat during her watch, but at the same time justified that her government's actions (e.g., PP 1017, calibrated preemptive response, military solution to rebellion and insurgency) should not be perceived as threat but an act of defending and protecting democracy from threat. She said:

2. In the face of attempted coups, I issued emergency proclamations just in case. But I was able to resolve these military crises with the ordinary powers of my office. My critics call it dictatorship. I call it determination. We know it as a strong government.

But I never declared martial law, though they are running scared as if I did. In truth, what they are really afraid of is their weakness in the face of this self-imagined threat.

I say to them: do not tell us what we all know, that democracy can be threatened. Tell us what you will do when it is attacked.

I know what to do:

As I have shown, I will defend democracy when it is threatened by violence; with firmness when it is weakened by division; with law and order when it is subverted by anarchy; and always, I will sustain it by economic progress, so that a democracy means not just an empty liberty but a full life for all. (2009)

The extract shows how discourse worked to legitimize the Arroyo government's actions towards attempted military coups. Arroyo used the strategies of differentiation and transcendence to justify her emergency proclamations ('My critics call it dictatorship. I call it determination. We know it as a strong government.'). Her assertion that hers was a 'strong government' recontextualized her use of emergency powers, which was perceived by her critics as Arroyo's prelude to declaring martial law in order to perpetuate her stay in power. She also employed denial ('I never declared martial law...') and combined it with counter-accusation or an attack on her accusers ('...though they are running scared as if I did. In truth what they are really afraid of is their weakness in the face of this self-imagined threat.'). Finally, she asserted the position of the government as the actual 'defender' against threat to democracy, dismissing notions that the government was the source of threat. This she achieved by naming the threat—'violence', 'division', 'anarchy'—names that had been used in previous presidential rhetoric to ascribe to armed resistance, mass protests, subversion, and (attempted) military coups (q.v. section 4.5 of Chapter 4). In doing so, Arroyo worked to establish her government's legitimacy in enacting state response to what it perceived as actions perpetrated by 'enemies of the state'—a term that in the Arroyo's highly contested counter-insurgency program had been used to include even unarmed activists and civil society workers (see discussion on the employment of 'war on terror' rhetoric in Chapter 8).

By doing all this, however, Arroyo was also channeling Marcos' rhetoric on constitutional authoritarianism in that she had used protection and defense of democracy in order to warrant contested state policies that were perceived anti-democratic.

9.4 National economy

Having faced its worst political crisis in 2005, Arroyo used the argument of a strong Philippine economy to establish that she and her government was what the country needed to stir it towards progress. She also asserted that her economic policies were what shielded the Philippines from the damaging effects of the global economic crisis. Her SONAs from 2005 to 2009 communicated that as far as setting the direction of the national economy was concerned, she was at the helm. This contributed to the legitimization of her hold of power.

From 2005 to 2009, Arroyo framed the national economy in two ways, a move which may be attributed to the changing socio-economic and political context of the period. On the one hand, Arroyo employed the conceptualization **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS** to assert that the Philippine economy was doing well under her watch. On the other, she employed the conceptualization **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS** to respond to the developments in the global context. Each of these frames is constituted by conceptualizations derived from the expressions found in the speeches:

(9.4.1) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS

(9.4.1.1) FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES, RESOURCE GENERATORS AND ECONOMIC BOOSTERS

(9.4.1.2) THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR FOREIGN TOURISTS AND INVESTORS

(9.4.2) THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

(9.4.2.1) THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY

(9.4.2.2) FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL

9.4.1 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE PHILIPPINES' UNFOLDING STORY OF PROGRESS

In her 2005 SONA delivered a few weeks after the 'Hello Garci' controversy, Arroyo characterized the country as divided—'the story of the nation is a tale of two Philippines.' She went on,

3. One is the Philippines whose economy, after long years of cumulative national endeavor, is now poised to take off. The other is the Philippines whose political system, after equally long years of degeneration, has become a hindrance to progress. (2005)

Here, Arroyo characterized the national economy as a VOYAGER/ TRAVELER 'poised to take off' and the political system as a BARRIER TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 'a hindrance to progress.' This section will focus on the national economy while discussion on Arroyo's characterization of the political system would be done in the section on the presidency or executive leadership.

Arroyo's metaphorization of the national economy as a VOYAGER/ TRAVELER ready to take flight or to engage in a journey is an articulation of the broader conceptualization THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS. This is demonstrated by descriptions of the economy as robust ('an economy that grew more than 6% last year'), productive ('continued to work...while generating 4 million jobs in the last four years') (4),

‘resilient and full of potential’ (5) within the context of a developing ‘story’ or ‘storyline.’

4. As a country on the verge of take off, our storyline would surprise many at home and abroad. The story includes an economy that grew more than 6% last year and that has continued to work in the teeth of the biggest oil price hikes in history, while generating 4 million jobs in the last four years. (2005)
5. This story should work itself as one about an economy as resilient and full of potential as its people are patient and hardworking, guided by a government—with the executive and the legislative hand-in-hand—that is able to pass a no-nonsense budget and make the tough decisions to put our fiscal house in order. (2005)

Interestingly, in Arroyo’s triumphalist narrative, it is not only the economy that is bolstered through descriptions of its strength and resilience; the ‘people’ are characterized as uncomplaining (‘patient and hardworking’) and more importantly, the government is strategically positioned as a paternalistic guide (‘able to...make tough decisions to put our fiscal house in order’) that makes possible the highly favored development of the story.

9.4.1.1 FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES, RESOURCE GENERATORS, AND ECONOMIC BOOSTERS

The unfolding story of national economic progress, Arroyo argued, was largely due to the fiscal reforms—‘the tough decisions’—that her administration pursued and its allies in congress supported through legislation. In what may be deemed as a strategy to dramatize and bolster the image of her administration, she employed heightened descriptions of the reform package:

6. I specially refer to our recent titanic struggle to enact the three laws that comprised the biggest fiscal package in our history, the biggest revenue increase in a generation that will break the vicious cycle of financing development by borrowing and having to borrow again just to service

those loans. This is the one reform that will snap the chain that has bound our future to a profligate past and debt-burdened present. (2005)

The use of the expressions ‘our recent titanic struggle’, ‘the three laws that comprised the biggest fiscal package in our history’, ‘the biggest revenue increase in a generation’ underscore the importance of the fiscal reform measures Arroyo was referring to in her speech. This gets extended when the reform is conceptualized as A LIBERATING FORCE as seen in the expressions ‘break the vicious cycle’ and ‘snap the chain.’ Arroyo was, in a way, presenting herself as an indispensable leader—the messiah as it were (Nadal 2010)—since her fiscal reforms were expected to perform acts of deliverance from a ‘vicious cycle’ or a ‘chain’ to a desirable future.

In 2006, Arroyo sustained her explication of the fiscal reforms by conceptualizing them as a RESOURCE GENERATOR that strengthens the economy and enables the government to pursue its reform agenda. Specifically, Arroyo talked of her economic and fiscal reforms—including reforms in revenue collection—as the reason her government had funds for the ‘war on poverty,’ ‘stamping terrorism,’ ‘fighting corruption,’ and ‘pursuing constitutional and electoral changes.’ Moreover, Arroyo declared that there were now ‘funds’ to realize the Medium Term Public Investment Plan (MTPIP), which consisted of a grand project aimed at enhancing the country’s comparative advantage.

In the following extract, Arroyo conceptualized fiscal reform expressed through such terms as ‘more vigorous tax collection’ and ‘fiscal discipline’ as effective mechanisms for generating profit (‘we have achieved record revenue collections’; ‘billions of pesos in annual interest savings’) needed for ‘public investments.’ Moreover, fiscal reform was rendered as a means towards ‘turning a

weakening economy to a strong republic’—an expression that underlies the conceptualization FISCAL REFORM IS AN ECONOMIC BOOSTER.

7. To the civil servants who rose to the challenge of turning a weakening economy to a strong republic, through more vigorous tax collection and more vigilant action against corruption, maraming salamat. We have achieved record revenue collections. We are lining up corrupt officials to face the consequences of their misdeeds. And finally earned the respect of the international community as a serious and viable state for our fiscal discipline and billions of pesos in annual interest savings that are now going into necessary public investments. (2006)

9.4.1.2 THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR FOREIGN TOURISTS AND INVESTORS

In explaining MTPIP, Arroyo highlighted the creation of ‘Super Regions’ and the infrastructure development aimed at making the Philippines a ‘First World Country’ in twenty years. In her SONAs delivered in 2006 and 2007, Arroyo articulated that the Super Regions are ‘the blueprint for building the future’ and are envisioned to constitute the modern Philippines. Their creation is meant to enable the government to ‘enhance the comparative advantage’ of the different geographical sections of the Philippines and at the same time brand the country as a comparatively unique destination for foreign tourists and investors.

Worth noting is the way the Super Regions are packaged or branded in the Arroyo SONAs: North Luzon as ‘an agribusiness quadrangle’ (2006 and 2007); Metro Luzon Urban Beltway as the ‘globally competitive urban, industrial, and service center’ (2006) or ‘the top magnet for industry and investment’ (2007); Central Philippines as ‘a tourism hub’ (2006) or ‘tourism super region’ (2007); and Mindanao as the ‘priority for agribusiness investment in the south’ (2006) or as ‘the country’s

food basket' (2007). Also included among the 'Super Regions' is the 'Cyber Corridor,' conceived as the 'center of technology and learning' that 'runs the length of all the super regions, from Baguio to Cebu to Davao.' It is an electronic environment created 'to boost telecommunications, technology and education' (2006). Arroyo explained in her 2006 SONA that the Cyber Corridor is where 'the English and information and communication technology skills of the youth give them a competitive edge in call centers and other business process outsourcing.' It is supposedly that which would position the Philippines as 'a top off-shoring hub in the world' (2007).

The branding of these Super Regions and their corresponding descriptions manifest Arroyo's proclivity for marketing the Philippines as an attractive spot for foreign investment and foreign tourists and paint an ultra-optimistic picture of the country's potential to become among the 'First World Countries.' Their expression in the texts made it appear that governing the Philippine archipelago with an already complex past and an increasingly complex present is manageable—in fact, in Arroyo's term, micro-manageable. This is particularly evident in how Arroyo substantiated what her government had done and intended to do further with the Super Regions.

In the following extract, for instance, Arroyo presents a point-by-point account of what the strategic goal is for the region (in this case, Central Philippines), what accomplishments have been made, the specific projects that are under way, the local executives and international partners involved in the projects, the budget allocation, and legislators or congressmen spearheading the project.

8. Let's now go to Central Philippines, our tourism super region:
- *We protect its natural wonders and provide the means to travel to those wonders
 - *For Boracay, the leading overall destination, the Kalibo Airport is now international with an instrument landing system as we said last year. Next is an P80 million terminal on request of Joben Miraflores.
 - *The Aklan-Libertad-Pandan Road, waiting for Japan to approve the contractors, will connect Boracay to the nature park we declared in Northwest Panay Peninsula. We are improving other Panay roads and building the road from the Iloilo Airport which we inaugurated in Santa Barbara to Iloilo and the Metro Radial Road that Mayor Jerry Trenas asked for when we inaugurated the airport, Art Defensor conceived the airport when he was governor, Governor Neil Tupaz midwived its delivery when we inaugurated the airport, I said...
 - *Iloilo connects Guimaras via Jordan Wharf. We thank Congress for the P900 million oil spill calamity fund to save the environment of Guimaras. I thank once again the previous Congress. It is back on its feet. The other side of the island will connect to Bacolod soon because we started building the Sibunag RORO Port last May on recommendation of Governor, now Congressman, Rahman Nava.

The extract comprises just a section of a rather lengthy point-by-point account of the Super Regions in the 2007 SONA. The detailed accounting cast Arroyo as a hands-on president—someone engaged in development activities of the regions and privy to what was going on beyond the confines of the presidential residence in Manila. In other words, the Super Regions also served to help Arroyo substantiate her claims at micro-management—something she would regularly boast about her administration. Their articulation in the speech represented a leader that was willing to work for the often neglected countryside by decentralizing and redistributing power and resources from the center ('Imperial Manila') to the regions. It positioned the Arroyo presidency's vision as far-reaching, its development program wide-ranging, and its potential impact broad and inclusive, that is, not confined to Metro-Manila—the traditional seat of protests against the Arroyo leadership. In other words, the articulation of the 'Super Regions' in the SONAs functioned to legitimize the Arroyo

presidency. Moreover, it worked strategically in consolidating support for the president from different sections of the archipelago.

9.4.2 THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS

Faced by the global economic crisis in 2008, Arroyo saw an opportunity to further the characterization of the Philippine economy within the global context—and that is by conceptualizing it as **A SURVIVOR**. To establish this, Arroyo employed two conceptual metaphors—one that describes the context of strife and survival and another that tackles the means for survival. These conceptualizations are: **THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY** and **FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL**.

9.4.2.1 THE GLOBAL CRISIS IS A CALAMITY

It should be interesting to note that Arroyo conceptualized the global economic crisis as an unexpected but inevitable turn of events—a natural calamity that economies like the Philippines had to survive. In the following extract, Arroyo did not exactly pinpoint what she thought was the root cause of the crisis; instead, she considered it as a condition—in fact, a meteorological phenomenon—to which the Philippines just had to adjust:

9. Bigla-bigla, nabaligtad ang ekonomiya ng mundo. Ang pagtalon ng presyo ng langis at pagkain ay nagbunsod ng pandaigdigang krisis, the worst since the Great Depression and the end of World War II (Trans. All of a sudden, the world economy has turned around. The hike in oil and food prices triggered the world crisis, the worst since the Great Depression and the end of World War II.). Some blame speculators moving billions of dollars from subprime mortgages to commodities like fuel and food. Others point of the very real surge in demand as millions of Chinese and Indians move up to the middle level.

Whatever the reasons, we are on a roller coaster ride of oil price hikes, high food prices and looming economic recession in the US and

other markets. Uncertainty has moved like a terrible tsunami around the globe, wiping away gains, erasing progress. (2008)

In the extract, Arroyo mentioned reasons cited by analysts and pundits for the onset of the world economic crisis—oil and food price hikes, speculators, and the surge in the demands in China and India—but as to the root cause or causes of the crisis, Arroyo did not seem interested in explaining in her speech. Instead, she considered the uncertainty brought about by the crisis as a given. This was established through the use of paratactic clauses where the crisis is conceptualized as an ensuing phenomenon (‘roller coaster ride’, ‘a terrible tsunami’) that her government had no control. Another example of this is shown below:

10. While we can take some comfort that our situation is better than many other nations, there is no substitute for solving the problem of rice and fuel here at home. In doing so, let us be honest and clear eyed—*there has been a fundamental shift in global economics*. The price of food and fuel will likely remain high. Nothing will be easy; the government cannot solve these problems over night. But we can work to ease the near-term pain while investing in long term solutions. (2008)

The extract shows a paratactic clause expressing the ‘fundamental shift in global economics.’ The shift is represented as something existent—‘there’—without identifying who is responsible for the shift. The paratactic expression suggests that the so-called ‘shift’ is a truism whose social agency is effaced (see Fairclough 2003).

The conceptualization GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY then establishes the gravity of the situation. It enables the audience to identify with a problem through a familiar domain—the domain of natural calamity which based on Philippine experience is as common occurrence that has had devastating effects on the life and property of the people. Moreover, the metaphorization puts the burden of finding relief or spearheading relief operations on the government which is often the

case when the country is hit by the worst typhoons, earthquakes or other natural calamities. It positions the government as the chief rescue operator.

9.4.2.2 FISCAL REFORMS ARE MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL

Arroyo attributed the country's survival to the 'tough choices' her administration had made—the fiscal reforms she introduced—and cast her government as the indispensable element in the country's survival from the 'worst effects of the global crisis.' In the following extract, Arroyo communicated that her administration's fiscal reforms created the 'shield' around the country and served to protect it from the impact of the crisis; they were the country's MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL amid the devastating 'storm' of the global financial crunch:

11. Because tough choices were made, the global crisis did not catch us helpless and unprepared. Through foresight, grit and political will, we built a shield around our country that has slowed down and somewhat softened the worst effects of the global crisis. We have the money to care for our people and pay for food when there are shortages; for fuel despite price spikes.

Neither we nor anyone else in the world expected this day to come so soon but we prepared for it. For the guts not to flinch in the face of tough choices, I thank God. For the wisdom to recognize how needed you are, I thank, you Congress. For footing the bill, I thank the taxpayers.

The result has been, on the one hand, ito ang nakasalba sa bayan (this is what saved the nation); and on the other, more unpopularity for myself in the opinion polls. Yet, even unfriendly polls show self-rated poverty down to its 20-year low in 2007. (2008)

In the extract, Arroyo implied that her fiscal reform measures ('tough choices') not only prepared the nation for the global crisis; it also saved the nation ('nakasalba ang bayan') from the unfavorable effects of the crisis. The extract also shows a government that is competent in planning ('foresight'), decisive ('grit and political will', 'guts not to flinch in the face of tough choices'), and a caring one,

rendering the Arroyo government central to the country's purported survival. This shall be further explicated in the section on the presidency.

A similar rendering of the national economy is evident in Arroyo's final SONA delivered in July 2009. In her introduction, she described the devastation caused by the 'financial meltdown' over the past twelve months, but was quick to mention that the country '*weathered* a succession of global crises in fuel, in food, then in finance and finally, economy in a global recession, never losing focus and with economic fundamentals intact.'

Arroyo attributed the country's capacity to 'weather' the global crises to her 'key reforms,' her 'economic policies,' and 'revenue measures.' In the following extract, Arroyo conceptualized these 'reforms' as MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL as they served as the country's protection from the 'worst of shocks' of the crises. She said:

12. Our reforms gave us the resources to protect our people, our financial system and our economy from the worst shocks that the best in the west failed to anticipate.

They gave us the resources to extend welfare support and enhance spending power. (2009)

13. The strong, bitter and unpopular revenue measures of the past few years have spared our country the worst of the global financial shocks. They gave us the resources to stimulate the economy. (2009)

Arroyo's rather optimistic portrayal of the national economy's success in surviving the challenges brought about by the global crises and her administration's significant role in that regard may very well be seen in the following summative account of the state of the national economy in her valedictory SONA—an account that can be described as self-congratulatory, bullish and forward-looking:

14. In sum:

- (1) We have a strong economy and strong fiscal position to withstand global shocks.
- (2) We built new modern infrastructure and completed unfinished ones.
- (3) The economy is more fair to the poor than ever before.
- (4) We are building a sound base for the next generation.
- (5) International authorities have taken notice that we are safer from environmental degradation and man-made disasters.

Apart from expressing the conceptualization of the national economy against the backdrop of the global economic crises, this summative account of the state of the national economy render the country ready for Arroyo's envisioned future—the Philippines as a First World Country complete with 'modern infrastructure,' characterized by an economy supposedly 'more fair to the poor than ever before,' and whose safe environment has taken the notice of 'international authorities.' The account is also reflective of Arroyo's argumentative strategies to legitimize her position of leadership: that the economy was in a position of strength under her watch, that concrete manifestations of her government's resolve to push the country's development towards full swing are the completed infrastructure projects in the 'Super Regions,' that her government pursued the right economic policies despite a hostile popular opinion, that the policies were proven effective during the crises, and that the international authorities acknowledge the accomplishments of her leadership.

To sum up this section on the national economy, Arroyo argued from 2005 until her final SONA that under her watch the national economy was poised to become a strong voyager, a character of strength in the unfolding story of national progress, a survivor during the global financial crisis, and a strong and resilient entity towards the end of her term. Arroyo considered her economic policies including the value added tax (VAT) as instrumental in sustaining the economy and in ensuring its strength and resilience amid challenges posed by the changing global economic order.

9.5 Peace and security

In the aspect of national security and peace and order, Arroyo's speeches from 2005 to 2009 focused on the passage of antiterrorism law and on engaging in peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

On the anti-terrorism law, Arroyo said:

In the area of national security, I urge the swift passage of an anti-terrorism law that will protect rather than subvert, enhance rather than weaken, the rights and liberties that terrorism precisely threatens with extinction. (2005)

By persisting on the passage of the Human Rights Act, Arroyo sustained her recontextualized discourse on 'war on terror.'

9.5.1 REBELLION IS TERRORISM

What the Arroyo government considered as terrorism especially in the congressional speeches delivered from 2005 to 2006 remained contentious as it subscribed to the United States government's list of terrorist groups that included the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA). Thus, in Arroyo's framing of national security around this time, the following conceptualizations were evident: COMMUNIST REBELLION IS TERRORISM and the MILITARY SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY IS A MEANS TOWARD JUSTICE AND FREEDOM.

These are particularly evident in her 2006 SONA:

15. And we will end the long oppression of barangays by rebel terrorists who kill without qualms, even their own. Sa mga lalawigang sakop ng 7th Division, nakikibaka sa kalaban si Jovito Palparan. Hindi siya aatras hanggang makawala sa gabi ng kilabot ang mga pamayanan at maka-ahon sa bukas ng liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan. (For those provinces covered by the 7th Division, Jovito Palparan is fighting against the enemy.

He will not stop until you are freed from the dark night of fear and reach the dawn of justice and freedom.) (2006)⁹⁵

In the extract, Arroyo's use of the expression 'the long oppression of barangays by rebel terrorists who kill without qualms, even their own' alluded to the communist rebels who in the early 1990s were engaged in massive self-purging activities within the communist movement due to ideological conflicts as well as suspected military infiltrators within their ranks. The collocation of the terms 'rebel' and 'terrorists' in the noun phrase 'rebel terrorists' emphasized not only the fact that rebels are engaged in what the Arroyo government deemed as terrorist activities, but actually suggested that REBELS ARE TERRORISTS. This conceptualization, which vilifies the communist rebellion, was further heightened by such phrases as 'long oppression' and 'who kill without qualms, even their own.' These cast the rebels as the chief perpetrators of political and extrajudicial executions instead of the military which operated based on the state policies of the Arroyo administration. This strategy to vilify the rebels was further reinforced by statements that compliment General Jovito Palparan, a high-ranking military officer regarded by the militant left as the 'mastermind' behind extrajudicial killings of activists under the Arroyo watch. In fact, Arroyo characterized Palparan as one who fights the enemy ('nakikibaka sa kalaban') and as the complete opposite of what his critics have said about him ('Hindi siya aatras hanggang makawala sa gabi ng kilabot ang mga pamayanan at maka-ahon sa bukas ng liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan'). In the preceding expression, Arroyo cast him as

⁹⁵ Jovito Palparan was a high-ranking military official under the Arroyo administration regarded by the militant leftist groups as responsible for the extra-judicial killings during the Arroyo administration. It should be interesting to note that this was mentioned prior to Arroyo's condemnation of political killings and vow to stop extrajudicial execution. This was considered by some as Arroyo's way of vindicating Palparan and the military involved in counter-insurgency. Her statements differentiated the Arroyo-sanctioned use of force or military solution from her concept of 'terrorism.'

a protector of the community—a man who would fight relentlessly for the community’s justice and freedom—and employed the images of darkness (‘gabi ng kilabot’) and light (‘liwayway ng hustisiya at kalayaan’) to show what Palparan had been fighting against and what he was fighting for.⁹⁶ By and large, Arroyo’s conceptualization of communist rebellion until 2006 tended to reduce the complex problem of insurgency in the Philippines to an act of terrorism within communities, thereby justifying the use of military force in the countryside. Her seemingly ambivalent take on terrorism sent off the impression that her administration sanctioned the extrajudicial executions when perpetrated by government troops against ‘enemies of the state’ and rejected them only when communist rebels perpetrated the political killings.

In 2007, however, Arroyo declared a less ambivalent position on political killings. Criticized the year earlier for praising Palparan and for justifying the use of state violence against what the government considered as terrorists or state enemies, Arroyo stated:

We fight terrorism. It threatens our sovereign, democratic, compassionate and decent way of life.

Therefore, in the fight against lawless violence, we must uphold these values. It is never right and always wrong to fight terror with terror.

I ask Congress...I urge you to enact laws to transform state response to political violence: First, laws to protect witnesses from lawbreakers and law enforcers. Second, laws to guarantee swift justice from more empowered special courts. Third, laws to impose harsher penalties for political killings. Fourth, laws reserving the harshest penalties for the rogue elements in the uniformed services who betray public trust and bring shame to the greater number of their colleagues who are patriotic.

We must wipe this stain from our democratic record. (2007)

⁹⁶ Interestingly, ‘kilabot’—a Filipino term for ‘source of fear’—had also been used by the militant left when referring to Palparan.

International pressure to address political killings due the damaging report by the United Nations' Rapporteur Phillip Alston on extrajudicial executions in the Philippines as well as demands from Philippine human rights groups to stop the killings made the Arroyo government reconsider its policies against rebellion.

9.5.2 INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

Interestingly, while Arroyo employed tough rhetoric when dealing with the communists, she talked about peace in Mindanao and forging an agreement with the Moro rebels as shown in the following:

We've worked with the Organization of the Islamic Conference to forge peace with our Muslim brothers. Eight percent of our peace talks with them have been completed. Permanent peace in Mindanao is within reach. (2005)

How peace in Mindanao would be achieved in Arroyo's frame is what is interesting. Eager to achieve a First World Philippines through the creation of 'Super Regions' which would be the target of investors both local and foreign, Arroyo emphasized that it is the investments in agribusiness in Mindanao that would hasten the peace process and build a modern Southern Philippines. In this regard, Arroyo employed the conceptualization **INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT**. This is evident in the following extracts taken from the 2006 and 2007 SONAs:

16. Susi sa anumang pag-ibayo ang malakas na suporta at ma-abilidad na liderato ng pamahalaang local. Halimbawa, iyong 'from arms to farms' ni Governor Ben Loong ng Sulu, with his caravan of tractors literally invading former rebel camps in his province. Congratulations. (Trans. Key to any endeavor is the strong support and skillful leadership of the local government. For example, the 'from arms to farms' program of Governor Ben Loong of Sulu, with his caravan of tractors literally invading former rebel camps in his province. Congratulations.)

Mahigit isang linggong nakaraan, dumating sa 'Eleven Islands' ang daan-daang rebelde at kanilang pamilya, sa pamumuno ng dating MNLF

Commander na si Aribari Samson. Dito sa mga pulo na kilalang ‘no man’s island,’ dati nagtatago ang mga rebelde at criminal. Ngayon sa tulong ng isang programa ng United Nations, nagtayo tayo ng dalawang daang tahanan at panibagong buhay para sa pangkat ni Samson. Thank you for giving peace a chance. Congratulations, Commander Samson. (Trans. More than a week ago, hundreds of rebels and their families headed by former Moro National Liberation Front Aribari Samson arrived at ‘Eleven Islands.’ These islands known as ‘no man’s island’ used to be the hiding place of rebels and criminals. With the help of a United Nations program, we were able to build two thousand houses and a new life for the group of Samson. Thank you for giving peace a chance. Congratulations, Commander Samson.)

I take this occasion to express our gratitude to the donor community from the US, the Organization of Islamic Conference and the European Union, Australia, Japan, our ASEAN neighbors, the multilaterals and the rest of the world. Thank you for helping our peace process.

If we can harness the forces of good in our nation, the positive force at work here at home and those from abroad such as the US, Malaysia, the OIC and others, we shall prevail in Mindanao with a peace agreement that brings freedom and hope to all Filipinos. With this peace, we would reap dividends in resources invested in agribusiness, not aggression, to build up, not tear down, the Philippine South. (2006)

17. We have created a Philippine model for reconciliation built on inter-faith dialogue, expanded public works and more responsive social services. These investments show both sides in the Mindanao conflict that they have more at stake in common; and a greater reason to be together than hang apart, including being together isolating the terrorists.

Imprastruktura ang haliging nagtitindig hindi lamang ng kapayapaan kundi ng ating buong makabagong ekonomiya: mga kalsada, tulay, paliparan, public parks and power plants (Trans. Infrastructure is the pillar that establishes not only peace but an entirely modern economy: roads, bridges, airports, public parks and power plants.) (2007)

In extract 17, the ‘caravan of tractors’ and foreign donations and investment from world organizations like the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Conference, countries like the United States, Japan, and Australia, regional groupings like the ASEAN and the European Union are conceptualized as having transformative capacity in that they can change rebel camps into farms and productive residential areas for former rebels. They constitute the ‘forces of good’ that can hasten the peace process necessary to realize the transcendental values of ‘freedom’ and ‘hope.’ Peace,

on the other hand, is conceptualized as that which would enable the country ‘to reap dividends in resources invested in agribusiness’ necessary to build a modern Mindanao. This last point develops the conceptualization **INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT** by suggesting that **PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO**.

In extract 18, investment in infrastructure is conceptualized as ‘the pillar’ that establishes peace and a modern society in general (‘ang haligi na nagtitindig hindi lamang ng kapayapaan kundi ng ating buong makabagong ekonomiya’). Along with the ‘inter-faith dialogue’ and ‘more responsive social services,’ ‘expanded public works’ are thought of as constitutive of ‘the Philippine model for reconciliation.’ Emphasis on infrastructure or public works reveals a proclivity for details and for something concrete which is actually in consonance with Arroyo’s image as a micro-manager.

The urgency for dialogue was emphasized in the 2008 SONA. In the following extract, Arroyo privileged ‘talk’ over ‘fight’ and advocated sorting out political dynamics in Mindanao through ‘utmost sobriety, patience, and restraint.’

18. A comprehensive peace has eluded us for half a century. But last night, differences on the tough issue of ancestral domain were resolved. Yes, there are political dynamics among the people of Mindanao. Let us sort them out with utmost sobriety, patience and restraint. I ask Congress to act on the legislative and political reforms that will lead to a just and lasting peace during our term of office.

The demands of decency and compassion urge dialogue. Better talk than fight, if nothing sovereign value is anyway lost. Dialogue has achieved more than confrontation in many parts of the world. This was the message of the recent World Conference in Madrid organized by the King of Saudi Arabia, and the universal message of Pope in Sydney.

Pope Benedict’s encyclical *Deus Caritas Est* reminds us: ‘There will always be situations of material need where help in the form of concrete love for neighbor is indispensable. (2008)

The word choices such as ‘utmost sobriety, patience, and restraint,’ ‘demands of decency and compassion,’ and ‘dialogue’ as well as allusions to the World Conference in Madrid, which appealed to the transcendental value of peace, were important in selling a controversial Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) on ancestral domains signed by the Arroyo government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front which was later rendered unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, they were important in establishing Arroyo’s adherence to peaceful modes of resolving conflict in order to downplay accusations of state terror, state repression, and political killings. Privileging talk over war positioned the Arroyo government on a high moral ground. It communicated that peace took precedence in the Arroyo schema.

9.5.3 PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS

The adherence to peaceful and democratic means to resolve conflict was sustained in Arroyo’s valedictory SONA in 2009. In fact, she not only talked about the prospect of peace talks with MILF but also with the Communist Party of the Philippines. The statements below underlie the conceptualization **PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS**. This was important in establishing the value of what Arroyo had done to resolve ‘inherited’ and ‘age-old’ conflicts with the Moro and communist rebels. On the other hand, it worked to differentiate Arroyo’s peace-oriented policy from that of her predecessor’s (‘a politically popular but near-sighted policy of massive retaliation’), thereby asserting the importance of her rise as president and her hold of power.

19. Namana natin ang pinakamatagal na rebelyon ng Komunista sa buong mundo. (We inherited the longest communist rebellion in the world.)

Si Leah de la Cruz, isa sa labindalawang libong rebel returnee. Sixteen pa lang siya nang sumali sa NPA. Naging kasapi sa regional White Area Committee, na-promote sa Leyte Party Committee Secretary. Nahuli noong 2006. (Trans. Leah de la Cruz is one of the 12 thousand rebel returnees. She was only sixteen when she joined the NPA. She became a member of the White Area Committee and was then promoted at as Leyte Party Committee Secretary.) She is now involved in an LGU-supported handicraft livelihood training of former rebels. We love you, Leah!

There is now a good prospect for peace talks with both the Communist Party of the Philippines and the MILF, with whom we are now on ceasefire.

We inherited an age-old conflict in Mindanao, exacerbated by a politically popular but near-sighted policy of massive retaliation. This only provoked the other side to continue the war.

In these two internal conflicts, ang tanong ay hindi, ‘Sino ang mananalo?’ kundi, bakit pa ba kailangang mag-laban ang kapwa Pilipino tungkol sa isyu na alam naman nating lahat na di malulutas sa dahas, at mareresolba lang sa paraang demokratiko? (Trans. In these two internal conflicts, the question is not ‘Who is going to win?’ but, why should there be a need to fight fellow Filipinos on an issue that we all know cannot be resolved through force, but only through democratic means?)

There is nothing more that I wish for than peace in Mindanao. It would be a blessing for all its people, Muslim, Christian and lumads. It will show other religiously divided communities that there can be common ground on which to live together in peace, harmony and cooperation that respects each other’s religious beliefs. (2008)

Arroyo’s use of ‘peace talks’ and ‘democratic means’ to resolve conflict with the communist and Moro rebels should not, however, be taken as a mere rejection of earlier policies on using force to ‘defend democracy.’ Their use can be seen as strategic in sending the message that it was Arroyo’s policy to adhere to peaceful methods of resolving the age-old conflicts, but that it invoked the use of force when threat became imminent. In fact, in the same speech, Arroyo justified what may be considered militaristic solution to conflict:

As I have shown, I will defend democracy with arms when it is threatened by violence; with firmness when it is weakened by division; with law and order when it is subverted by anarchy; and always, I will try to sustain it by wise policies of economic progress, so that a democracy means not just empty liberty but full of life for all. (2009)

9.6 The presidency

In Arroyo's SONAs from 2005 to 2009, interrelated conceptual frames with regard to the presidency emerge as crucial to her assertion of presidential legitimacy.

Each of these conceptualizations will be substantiated in separate sub-sections:

- (9.5.1) **THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**
- (9.5.2) **THE CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE**
- (9.5.3) **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A CAREGIVER**
- (9.5.4) **ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES**

9.6.1 THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The damaging political crisis in 2005 also propelled Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to set a new agenda for public debate and discussion. In her 2005 SONA, Arroyo declared: 'It is time to start the great debate on Charter change.' She was of course referring to changes in the 1987 Constitution and recommended a shift from the presidential form of government to a federal parliamentary form similar to some of the Philippines' neighbors in the ASEAN region. The pursuit of charter change put forth two related conceptualizations that had to do with Arroyo's framing of presidential leadership after the 2005 crisis: **THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT** and **THE CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE**.

Arroyo blamed the current political system for the difficulties that her administration had been facing—especially the difficulty to push her legislative agenda because of the often tenuous relationship between the executive and the

legislative branches of government. Such sentiment underlay the conceptualization **THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO FULL NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.**

Arroyo characterized the political system as a ‘burden’ on the anticipated economic ‘take off,’ a ‘hindrance’ to national progress, an impediment to development, and a system that ‘has degenerated’ and ‘betrayed its promise to the new generation of Filipinos.’ These are expressed in the following extract:

20. The other message to send is that we will address the burden that the other Philippine story imposes on our anticipated take off. I refer to the story of how our political system has now become a hindrance to our national progress.

Over the years, our political system has degenerated to the extent that it is difficult for anyone to make any headway yet keep his hands clean. To be sure, the system is still capable of achieving great reforms. But, by and large, our political system has betrayed its promise to each new generation of Filipinos, not a few of whom are voting with their feet, going abroad and leaving that system behind. (2005)

9.6.2 CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE

In proposing charter change, Arroyo pitched the following reasons: (1) that the Charter change would bring people closer to the government through federalism; (2) that the new form of government would work at every level and would ‘not end before the closed door of a bureaucrat in Metro Manila’; and (3) that the sooner the fundamental change is done the better for the country. These reasons underlie the conceptualization that **CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL CHANGE.** On the other hand, Arroyo also conceptualized the proposed constitutional change as **A MECHANISM FOR ADJUSTMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY** as seen in the following declaration:

21. I shall work with Congress, civil society groups and local government executives who are convinced that charter changes are needed to enable the country to surmount the unprecedented challenges of the 21st century. (2005)

When she talked about new challenges or ‘the challenges of the 21st century,’ Arroyo necessarily referred to the demands of the global economic order. The charter change then as a mechanism for surmounting ‘unprecedented challenges’ can also be articulated as **A MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE**, that is, a mechanism for realigning the fundamental law of the Philippines to the rules of the a world economic order that espoused the liberalization of national economies. This is indicated in the following where Arroyo talked of a major concern that the charter change should address:

We must address such questions as how much more government is needed for the greater safety and economic security of our people, and how much less government is more conducive to free enterprise and economic progress. (2005)

By proposing a change in the fundamental law of the country, Arroyo was therefore not only asserting her leadership in setting a new agenda or in changing the course of public debate and discussion, but also in launching the Philippines’ position in the global arena.

Arroyo did not conceal her preference for the Constituent Assembly mode in amending the charter. The Constituent Assembly would allow the two congressional bodies—the House of Representatives and the Senate—to sit down as one body in pursuing constitutional amendments. Arroyo knew that she had a control of the majority in the House of Representatives which clearly outnumbered the Senators whose majority were critical of her administration. This and her preference for

federalism in her proposed charter change can be seen as Arroyo's strategic move to consolidate support from the regions. In her SONA, she acknowledged the local government executives that were present in the hall and bolstered the position of the regions and provinces by citing their accomplishments vis-à-vis national development. It is interesting to note that from here on, she would constantly use the issue of decentralization to rally her supporters from the regions behind her while situating Manila as the IMPERIAL CAPITAL ('Imperial Manila' in 24) that benefits at the expense of the regions ('from the center to the countryside that feeds it,' 'an inequitable concentration from Manila' in 23 and 25).

22. The economic progress and social stability of the provinces, along with the increasing self-reliance and efficiency of political developments and public services there, make a compelling case for federalism.

Perhaps, *it's time to take the power from the center to the countryside that feeds it.* (2005)

23. We now have the funds for constitutional and electoral changes. Sa kasalukuyang sistema, napakabagal ng proseso, at bukas sa labis na pagtutunggali, at sikil ang lalawigan at mamamayan sa paghahari ng *Imperial Manila*. Panahon nang ibalik ang kapangyarin sa taumbayan at lalawigan (In the current system, the process is slow and open to too much fighting, and the provinces and the people are constrained by the dominance of Imperial Manila.). (2006)

24. Last year I unveiled the Super Regions—Mindanao, Central Philippines, North Luzon Agribusiness Quadrangle, Luzon Urban Beltway and the Cyber Corridor—to *spread development away from an inequitable concentration in Metro Manila*. Hindi lamang Maynila ang Pilipinas (Trans. The Philippines is only Manila).(2007)

9.6.3 THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A CAREGIVER

The barrier posed by the political system notwithstanding, Arroyo was also out to prove that **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER**. From 2005 to 2009, she intensified this persona in her congressional speeches by spelling

out what had been done, what was being done, and what would be pursued further during the rest of her term.

Arroyo put great emphasis on the said persona through expressions that indicate her government's focus on work as well as calls for unity while suggesting that criticisms leveled against her office by the opposition posed unnecessary restraint. The following extracts show this:

25. Now is not the time for divisiveness, and while there's no avoiding partisan politics, there can be a determined effort by all sides to limit the collateral damage on a country poised for take off. (2005)

26. Bickering in politics may delay, but not derail the initiatives that need to be taken on our pro-poor, pro-growth, and pro-peace agenda. (2006)

27. For those who want to pick old fights, we're game but what a waste of time. Why not join hands instead? Join hands in biggest challenge of all, where we all win or we all lose: battle for the survival and progress of our one and only country. (2006)

28. I stand in the way of no one's ambition. I only ask that one stand in the way of the people's well being and the nation's progress.

The time for facing off is over. The time is here for facing forward to a better future our people so desperately want and richly deserve. (2007)

29. There isn't a day I do not work at my job or a waking moment when I do not think through a work-related problem. Even my critics cannot begrudge the long hours I put in. Our people deserve a government that works just as hard as they do.

A President must be on the job 24/7, ready for any contingency, any crisis, anywhere, anytime.

Everything right can be undone by a single wrong. Every step forward must be taken in the teeth of political pressures and economic constraints that could push you two steps back if you flinch and falter. I have not flinched, I have not faltered. Hindi ako umaatras sa hamon (Trans. I do not retreat from a challenge.). (2009)

Extracts 24 to 28 show how Arroyo regarded criticisms against her office as an unnecessary and useless suggesting that CRITICISM FROM THE OPPOSITION IS A DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY. By using expressions such as 'divisiveness', 'bickering in

politics’, ‘those who want to pick up old fights’, and ‘facing off’, Arroyo trivialized the position of her political enemies. In extract 28, she cast herself as one with an impeccable work ethic—a ‘President on the job 24/7’—and one who does not surrender to challenges posed by political pressure and economic constraints. The strategy worked to legitimize her position as a national leader while delegitimizing that of her critics.

To counter claims that she was unpopular among her constituents, Arroyo asserted that she would rather be ‘right than popular’ (30) and that her role as president and as a national leader was to do ‘what is necessary’ (31), ‘to work, to lead, to preserve and protect our country, our people’ (32). These assertions worked to dismiss what she termed as ‘unfriendly’ popularity polls which showed her to be the most unpopular president since Ferdinand Marcos and to prove wrong her critics from the business sector—‘those cocooned in corporate privilege [who] refuse to recognize [that the administration is doing something right]’ (33). The following extracts express how Arroyo dealt with the issue on her unpopularity:

30. We were able to strengthen our economy because of the fiscal reforms that we adopted at such great cost to me in public disapproval. *But I would rather be right than popular.* (2007)

31. We have come too far and made too many sacrifices to turn back now on fiscal reforms. *Leadership is not about doing the first easy thing that comes to mind; it is about doing what is necessary, however hard.*

The government has persevered, without flip flops, in its much criticized but irreplaceable policies, including oil and power VAT and oil deregulation. (2008)

32. *I did not become President to be popular. To work, to lead, to protect and preserve our country, our people, that is why I became President.* When my father left the Presidency, we were second to Japan. I want our Republic to be ready for the first world in 20 years. (2009)

33. *Our administration*, with the highest average of rate of growth, recording multiple increases in investments, with the largest job creation in history,

and which gets a credit upgrade at the height of a world recession, *must be doing something right, even if some of those cocooned in corporate privilege refuse to recognize it.* (2009)

Note that in extract 30, Arroyo indicated her awareness of the unpopularity of her fiscal reforms, especially the VAT (value-added tax). She, however, saw this as an important opportunity for her to assert the strength of her leadership. By asserting her leadership against the backdrop of an unpopular policy, Arroyo was giving off the message that her low popularity ratings were due to ‘tough policy choices’ and not because of corruption scandals and misuse of presidential powers as her critics would claim. On the other hand, her affirmation of VAT was also a reaffirmation of the neo-liberal policy that she inherited and continued from the previous administrations. VAT and other fiscal reforms then also served as her tools for legitimizing her tenuous hold of presidential leadership while they allowed Arroyo to remain anchored on the neoliberal agenda of the world economic order.

Accentuating her working president rhetoric was her rhetoric of care. In the following extracts, Arroyo projected herself as a protector of the people in the face of the global crisis (33), a leader whose concern is a ‘responsive and accountable’ government (34), as a champion of the people’s wellbeing (35), and as a selfless caretaker of the people (36). These characterizations manifest the conceptualization that **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CAREGIVER.**

34. Many more have nothing to protect them from the immediate blunt force trauma of the global crisis. Tulad ninyo, nag-aalala ako para sa kanila. Ito ang mga taong bayan na dapat samahan natin (Trans. Like you, I worry for them. They are the people that we need to attend to.). Not only because of their sacrifices for our country but because they are our countrymen. (2008)

35. I call on all our government workers at the national and local levels to be more responsive and accountable to the people. Panahon ito ng pagsubok.

Kung saan kayang tumulong at dapat tumulong ang pamahalaan, we must be there with a helping hand. Where government can contribute nothing useful, stay away. Let's be more helpful, more courageous, more quick.

Kaakibat ng ating adhikain ang tuloy na pagkalinga sa kapakanan ng bawat Pilipino. Iisa ang ating pangarap—maunlad at mapayapang lipunan, kung saan ang magandang kinabukasan ay hindi pangarap lamang, bagkus natutupad. (Trans. Part of our aspiration is the continuous care for the welfare of each Filipino. We have one dream—a progressive and peaceful society where a bright future is not just a dream but a reality.) (2008)

36. As your President, I care too much about this nation to let anyone stand in the way of our people's well-being. Hindi ko papayagang humadlang ang sinuman sa pag-unlad at pagsagana ng taong bayan. I will let no one—and no one's political plans—threaten our nation's survival. (2009)

37. Governance, however, is not about looking back and getting even. It is about looking forward and giving more—to the people who gave us the greatest, hardest gift of all: the care of the country. (2009)

Thus, in Arroyo's presidential schema, working president is also a caring one especially towards 'the people.'

9.6.4 ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES

Complementing the conceptualization **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A WORKING AND CARING PRESIDENCY** is the conceptualization that **ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES**.

In her valedictory SONA, Arroyo gave out the specific results of her economic policies and especially underscored how her administration had addressed problems inherited from her predecessors. This was again an opportunity to legitimize her hold of power. In the following extract, for instance, she asserted that her government did the heroic act of 'exorcising' the 'demon of foreign debt' while the past administrations merely 'conjured' it:

38. The next generation will also benefit from our lower public debt to GDP ratio. It declined from 78% in 2000 to 55% in 2008. We cut in half the debt of government corporations from 15% to 7%. Likewise foreign debt

from 73% to 32%. Kung meron man tayong malaking kaaway na tinalo, walang iba kundi ang utang (If there is one big enemy that we defeated, it is our foreign debt.) Those in the past administrations conjured the demon of foreign debt. We exorcised it.

The metaphorization of debt as an enemy and its reduction as a dramatic form of defeating or ‘exorcising’ the enemy portrayed Arroyo as some sort of an economic redeemer—a ‘messiah’ to borrow the term from Nadal (2010)—that the Philippines needed all this time.

The conceptualization of Arroyo as THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES further personalizes the Philippine presidency. It downplays the historical context of the problem of foreign debt by obviating the circumstances faced and efforts exerted by the previous administrations in addressing the problem of foreign debt. Moreover, it casts the Arroyo presidency as the necessary heroine who accomplished what her predecessors failed to do.

9.7 Summary

This chapter sought to spell out the frames and conceptualizations that make up the schema of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s presidency after it faced a major political crisis in 2005—a crisis that put the legitimacy of her election as a full term President into question. As in the previous chapters, it examined the conceptualizations relating to democracy, national economy, national security/peace and order, and the presidency as expressed and realized in the SONAs delivered from 2005 to 2009.

In Arroyo’s speeches, democracy is conceptualized as **A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES**. This conceptualization was important in affirming democratic institutions and practices

which Arroyo invoked as her hold of power became tenuous due to questions on her presidential legitimacy. Due to attempted military coups and challenges posed by communist and Moro rebels, Arroyo had to express through her speeches the conceptualization that **DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT** and that her government had always been ready and prepared to protect it. Both conceptualizations of democracy were important building blocks of Arroyo's strategy to legitimize her hold of power. The first was used to undermine attempts at using extra-constitutional and extra-legal acts to remove her from power while the second cast herself as the country's much-needed leader in the face of threat from the military and communist and Moro rebels.

In 2005, Arroyo conceptualized the national economy as a **STRONG AND COMPETITIVE VOYAGER** and broadly as **A PROTAGONIST IN THE UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS**. She attributed the protagonist's strength to her fiscal reforms and economic policies which she conceptualized as **RESOURCE GENERATORS** and **LIBERATING FORCES**. To Arroyo, these fiscal reforms were needed to fund a grand public investment project that sought to create 'Super Regions' meant to brand the Philippines as **A UNIQUE DESTINATION OF FOREIGN TOURISTS AND INVESTORS** and accelerate its transformation into a First World Country. Later, these fiscal reforms were also considered as the economy's **MECHANISMS FOR SURVIVAL** amid the global economic crisis which Arroyo conceptualized as **A NATURAL CALAMITY**. To underscore the importance of her administration's role and its fiscal reform policies in the midst of the crisis, Arroyo expressed through her speeches that **THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR**.

In the aspect of national security and peace and order, Arroyo carried on with her tough stance against the communist rebels. She employed the conceptualization

REBELLION IS TERRORISM in consonance with the United States watch list of ‘terrorist groups’ that included the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. This was a continuation of her recontextualization of the US-led ‘war on terror’ (2002-2004). However, she later abandoned this after her administration was heavily criticized for the rise of extra-judicial killings. A United Nations report which implicated the military in the political killings made Arroyo reconsider her stance towards the rebels. Arroyo explicitly expressed her administration’s adherence to the peaceful resolution of the ‘age-old’ conflicts with the communist rebels and the Moros. The conceptualization of the communist and Moro rebellions as long-standing conflicts inherited from the previous administrations was a strategic move to contrast the Arroyo government’s policy with that of the previous presidency which declared an all-out war against the Moro rebels in Southern Philippines. Arroyo had taken a conciliatory stance towards the Moro rebels and insisted that **INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT** and that **PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO**. These conceptualizations were important in Arroyo’s vision to transform Mindanao into a ‘Super Region’—one of five needed to accelerate the Philippines’ voyage into a First World status.

In the political front, Arroyo conceptualized the current political system as a **BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY’S FULL DEVELOPMENT**. She used this to account for the challenges faced by her executive leadership after the 2005 political crisis. To set a new agenda for public debate and discussion, Arroyo proposed charter change which she conceptualized not only as a **MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL CHANGE** but also as a **MECHANISM FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE** especially in the context of the global economic order. This did not only show Arroyo’s capacity to set the national agenda,

but also her capacity to initiate moves to realign the fundamental law of the land with the world economic order's demands for economic liberalization.

Arroyo's strategies to assert the legitimacy of her presidency included showing that she was serious about her work as president and that hers was a caring government. These put forth the conceptualizations that **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER** and **A CAREGIVER** which were expressed in various ways across her speeches from 2005 to 2009. Complementing these frames is the conceptualization **ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES** which further personalizes the role of the presidency in effecting change.

The conceptualizations employed by Arroyo may be seen as continuations of her rhetoric before the 2005 crisis and are reminiscent of the conceptualizations used by her predecessors. For instance, her characterization of the economy as a strong character in the unfolding story of national progress and as a survivor in the global economic crisis was reminiscent of Ramos' conceptualization of the Philippine economy as a participant in the survival-of-the-fittest economic order—and this shows continuity in terms of economic policy. What might have differentiated Arroyo's schema from her previous schema prior to the 2005 crisis and from that of her predecessors was the fact that her employment of frames and conceptualizations were anchored on the need to assert her presidential legitimacy. The context within which Arroyo communicated her leadership and the state of the nation constrained as well as defined how these conceptualizations worked rhetorically. In a way, it was convenient for Arroyo to invoke earlier conceptualizations of democracy in order to fortify her position as president. It was also necessary for her to highlight the strength and resilience of the Philippine economy to show that her fiscal reforms worked and that she knew what she was doing. She had to assert her tough position with regard to

the communist and Moro rebellion and military adventurists to show who was in control. Later, she had to soften her stance in the dealing with these groups to show that her government was pro-peace, was not guilty of state terrorism, and was responsive to the calls to end the rising extra-judicial killings during her watch. Meanwhile, she had to cast her presidency as a working presidency to differentiate herself from her predecessor and to show that in spite of criticisms and challenges leveled against her office—including several attempts at impeachment—she remained focused, strong, and determined to lead the country towards a ‘modernized economy’ and to finish her full term. Her presidency from 2005 to 2009 then can be defined as an assertion of presidential legitimacy.

Chapter 10

Schemas of the State of the Nation: Continuities and Discontinuities in the Post-Marcos Presidential Rhetoric

10.1 Introduction

This chapter compares and contrasts schemas of the four post-Marcos presidencies by examining similarities and differences in the framing and conceptualizations of the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. Specifically, the chapter looks at what conceptualizations were sustained across the four presidencies, what were replaced, subverted or recontextualized, and what accounts for the conceptualizations' constancy or variation. I address this concern in two discussion sections. In both sections, I not only make comparisons among the four presidencies under question, but also show how they compare with the rhetoric of Marcos established in Chapter 4.

The first section discusses the key emphases in the four post-Marcos presidencies while the second is a theme-based analysis of the conceptual frames and metaphors across the four presidencies. The first section is meant to establish differences and similarities in terms of what themes were given prominence in the post-Marcos presidencies. In the section, I shall also discuss why certain themes were given emphasis over others, how these emphasized themes configure with other themes to form schemas of the state of the nation and presidential leadership, and how they figure in relation to the rhetoric of Marcos during his authoritarian rule.

The purpose of the second discussion section is to show the commonalities and variations in the way the focal themes are talked about and conceptualized across the four presidencies. In this section I establish that these commonalities and

differences reflect continuities and discontinuities in terms of political beliefs and policies among the four presidencies, as well as in relation to Marcos' rhetoric during his authoritarian regime. I also show how these continuities and discontinuities work towards or against social discourses that dominate the national and global contexts.

A summary is found at the end of the chapter.

10.2 Key emphases in the post-Marcos presidencies

In this section, I discuss, based on the analytical chapters, the theme or themes that were prioritized or given significant emphasis in each of the four presidencies. To show this, I present a table of conceptual frames and metaphors that constitute each presidential schema. I also explain why such theme or themes were given emphasis by each presidency.

10.2.1 Corazon Aquino's SONAs (1987-1991)

Democracy was the key emphasis in the presidential rhetoric of Corazon Aquino. This is demonstrated in the following table which shows the conceptual frames and metaphors that constitute Aquino's schema expressed in her five SONAs.

Table 10.1 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Corazon C. Aquino's SONAs (1987-1991)

Theme	Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors)
DEMOCRACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN RENDERED WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP ▪ THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT ▪ DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER ▪ DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACITOR OF THE NATION • DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER • DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER • DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS • DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCTIVE TO GROWTH
NATIONAL ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON ▪ POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE ▪ THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. ▪ THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ▪ THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE (AILING) NATIONAL ECONOMY.
PEACE AND ORDER/ NATIONAL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS A DISEASE ▪ THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IS TERRORISM ▪ THE MILITARY REBELS ARE TERRORISTS ▪ THE MILITARY REBELS ARE DESTROYERS ▪ THE MILITARY COUP PLOTTERS ARE EVIL • THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE ARMED FORCES ARE A PARTNER OF THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY ▪ THE ARMED FORCES ARE DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS • THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS PEACEMAKING <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY ▪ THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS A DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION TO INSURGENCY ▪ THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE TO DEFEND DEMOCRACY AND THE NATION IS A MORAL ACT
THE PRESIDENCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY

The table shows a multilevel conceptualization of democracy across Aquino's presidential addresses. It is arguably the most well developed theme in the Aquino addresses. Also, the conceptualizations of democracy were significant to Aquino's conceptualization of other themes. This is evident in the way Aquino linked certain metaphorizations of democracy with the national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the multi-layered framing of democracy was well entrenched in the Cory Aquino rhetoric that it figured quite prominently in the conceptualizations of other themes. For instance, democracy or democratization was seen as key to the recovery and growth of the national economy which was conceptualized in Aquino's speeches as a manifestation of the national life. Democracy was also used as a reason for justifying militaristic policies against rebellion and criminality. It was rendered as the object of defense while both the rebels from the ranks of the communists and the military were metaphorized as terrorist threats to the newly restored democracy. Through the SONAs, the Aquino government also cast itself as the primary agent of democracy which was significant in her overall framing of Philippine democracy and in her schema of the state of the nation. Such conceptualization acts as an important measure for evaluating the actions and public policies of post-authoritarian presidencies including that of Aquino. The Aquino presidency being the leadership that replaced the Marcos authoritarian regime and the one that launched the restoration of democracy, its conceptualization of Philippine presidential leadership has consequently become the basis for how its successors have worked towards balancing their use of state powers on the one hand and their commitment to democratic ideals on the other.

It can be inferred that the emphasis on democracy and democratization in Aquino's SONAs was due to the socio-political context of the Aquino presidency,

Aquino's persona as a heroine of democracy and the anti-thesis of Marcos, and the conscious and persistent effort of the Aquino administration to 'de-Marcosify' the Philippine government and society. The Aquino presidency was a period of transition from dictatorship to democracy and it was during this time that the democratic institutions, basic freedoms, and civil liberties which were sacrificed during Marcos' authoritarian rule were restored. During this transition, Aquino consciously performed her role as the anti-thesis of Marcos, thus repudiating the dictatorial style of his leadership. A distinct rhetorical strategy that Aquino employed to perform this role was to render a contrast between the 'dark' period of martial rule and the 'democratized' state of the nation after the 1986 'people power' revolution. This reinforced the persona or image that Aquino had had cast for herself throughout, and even beyond, her presidency.

10.2.2 Fidel V. Ramos' SONAs (1992-1997)

While Aquino emphasized the theme of democracy and democratization in her SONAs, Fidel Ramos put premium on the idea of global competitiveness. Clearly, the key emphasis in Ramos' presidential rhetoric was the national economy and how it can be a competitive player in the arena of the world economic order. This is apparent in the following table which shows the conceptual frames and metaphors that constitute Fidel Ramos' schema as expressed in his six SONAs.

Table 10.2 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Fidel V. Ramos' SONAs (1992-1997)

Theme	Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors)
DEMOCRACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT CAN SUSTAIN NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE OF INITIATING CHANGE • DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
NATIONAL ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A COMPETITIVE ARENA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A SPORTS ARENA • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS AN ADVENTURE • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS • POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY • GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS OR WAR STRATEGIES AGAINST POVERTY • THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS • THE POOR ARE AGENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT BENEFICIARIES
PEACE AND ORDER/ NATIONAL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS • REBELS ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO NATIONAL PROGRESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ REBELS ARE MISFITS/ WAYWARD MEMBERS OF SOCIETY ▪ REBELS ARE A CONFLAGRATION ▪ REBELS ARE DISEASES • PEACE TALKS AND AMNESTY ARE STEPS TOWARDS LASTING PEACE • GOVERNMENT POLICY AGAINST CRIMINALS IS A MORAL AND CIVILIZED WAR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEATH PENALTY IS A DETERRENT TO CRIME ▪ PROPOSAL TO RESTORE DEATH PENALTY IS A CIVILIZING INSTRUMENT ▪ ANTI-CRIME EFFORT IS WAR
THE PRESIDENCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE GOVERNMENT IS A PARENT ▪ THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION • THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER

In his SONAs, Ramos emphasized the notion of global competitiveness especially with regard to the Philippine economy. This was in line with his government's adoption of structural adjustment plans, which were part of its policy of economic liberalization.

That the notion of 'global competitiveness' pervaded the Ramos presidential rhetoric is evidenced by the way through which the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency were framed and metaphorized in Ramos' presidential addresses. This was clearly a response to the global economic order that espoused the reduction of tariffs and trade liberalization.

While Ramos reaffirmed Aquino's framing of democracy in his earlier SONAs, he adopted a different frame in his latter speeches when he conceptualized democracy as a 'comparative advantage' or a 'competitive edge' in the global economic order. This comparative advantage or competitive edge was seen as significant to the Philippines, particularly to the national economy, which Ramos conceptualized as a competitive participant in the 'survival-of-the-fittest' world economic order.

In Ramos' discourse of global competitiveness, economic liberalization was framed as a booster or accelerator of economic growth as well as an incentive for competitiveness. This justified the Ramos administration's economic policies that included tariff reduction, deregulation, and privatization, among others. It also enabled the administration to render protectionist or nationalist economic policies as barriers or impediments to economic growth.

With regard to the serious and almost intractable national problem of poverty, Ramos employed the war frame which conceptualized government initiatives and programs as 'interventions' to alleviate poverty. Ramos' war frame complemented

the competitive frame by highlighting the government's primary role in empowering the poor. Although Ramos recognized the capacity of the poor to become agents of development, he nevertheless underscored that it is the government that ultimately decides which courses of action are enabling and disabling, which are empowering and disempowering. This may have ensured that 'interventions' for poverty alleviation were not inconsistent with or inimical to the liberalization policies of the Ramos administration.

In the peace and security front, Ramos framed national stability as the precondition for economic development and global competitiveness. This necessitated that conflicts with military, communist, and Moro rebels, who were conceptualized as impediments to national progress, found resolution. Ramos offered peace talks and granting of amnesty as solutions to the long-standing conflict with the rebels. Meanwhile, he conceptualized the government policy on criminality as a moral and civilized war. This worked to justify the government's resolve to restore the law on death penalty which was repealed under the Aquino watch.

In a presidential schema undergirded by the notion of competitiveness, Ramos conceptualized his presidency as an exercise in effective management—a conceptualization that emphasized managerial characteristics and values consistent with his government's neoliberal orientation and his vision of the Philippines as a newly industrialized country—an economy with a 'tiger' status.

10.2.3 Joseph E. Estrada's SONAs (1998-2000)

The following table shows the conceptual frames and metaphors that constitute the Estrada schema as expressed in his SONAs delivered during his unexpired term of office:

Table 10.3 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Joseph E. Estrada’s SONAs (1998-2000)

Theme	Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors)
DEMOCRACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A STRUCTURE ▪ DEMOCRACY IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY
NATIONAL ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PATIENT IN NEED OF MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE HEALTH CONDITIONS ▪ FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER CONDITIONS • RADICAL RESTRUCTURING IS A MEANS TOWARDS COMPETITIVENESS • WAR ON POVERTY IS A PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR RECOVERY AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
PEACE AND ORDER/ NATIONAL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMED REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED TO BE CRUSHED • ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME • WAR IS PEACE
THE PRESIDENCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH GUIDE, A VISIONARY, AND A LEARNER

In his speeches, Estrada emphasized his tough persona, his macho image which ran consistent with his cinematic characters that made him a movie star in earlier years. His tough rhetoric was manifested in the way he conceptualized the four focal themes in his three SONAs. He conceptualized democracy as an object of protection and defense, which justified his rather antagonistic policies towards critics of the administration. While using a combination of health, weather and journey metaphors to communicate the state of the national economy, he also positioned his administration as the necessary agent in finding cure for the economy afflicted with the disease brought about by the Asian financial crisis and as the ship captain that the nation needed to endure the stormy seas. Like his predecessor, Estrada employed the

militarist metaphor of ‘war on poverty’ and recontextualized it as a prescription or formula for recovery and global competitiveness. This coupled with his use of words that suggest aggressiveness (e.g., ‘radical restructuring’ in favor of what he regarded as a ‘wimpish’ term, ‘reform’) contributed to his tough or macho rhetoric.

The tough image of Estrada proved useful when he dealt with peace and security concerns. It afforded him the opportunity to discredit the insurgents and criminals by metaphorizing them as diseases or pests that needed to be ‘crushed.’ This common negative representation of rebellion and criminality—a representation that denies the humanness of both rebels and criminals—underlies the formulation ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME, one that conflates the two forces. Such formulation was not only consistent with Estrada’s crime buster persona; it also privileged a retributive kind of justice over the restorative kind (cf. Lazar and Lazar 2007). Furthermore, the ‘all out war’ declared by Estrada against Moro rebels may also be seen as part of his projection as a tough leader.

In spite of the tough and aggressive rhetoric of Estrada, his policies remained consistent with the neoliberal policies adopted by the previous administrations. This implies that the shift in rhetoric in the case of Estrada’s SONAs were more in consonance with the presidential image he wanted to project in public than with the supposed change in the way Philippine government was run. Estrada merely sustained the neoliberal policy agenda pursued by the Aquino and Ramos governments.

10.2.4 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2001-2009)

Below, I present two tables that show the conceptual frames and metaphors constituting the schemas of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo before and after the political crisis in 2005 (See Chapter 9.2).

Table 10.4 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's SONAs (2001-04)

Theme	Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors)
DEMOCRACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT • DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINOS HAVE FOUGHT FOR
NATIONAL ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT ▪ THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ▪ (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY ▪ TOUGH LOVE IS A CURATIVE TO CHRONIC DEFICITS
PEACE AND ORDER/ NATIONAL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES • CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS • REBELS ARE CRIMINALS • 'WAR ON TERROR' IS A CURATIVE TO REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY • STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES
THE PRESIDENCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN NATION BUILDING • THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER

Table 10.5 Conceptual frames and metaphors in Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s SONAs (2005-09)

Theme	Conceptualizations (frames and conceptual metaphors)
DEMOCRACY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT
NATIONAL ECONOMY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN AN UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES AND RESOURCE GENERATORS ▪ THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR TOURISM AND INVESTMENTS • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY ▪ FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL
PEACE AND ORDER/ NATIONAL SECURITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION IS TERRORISM • INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT • PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO • PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS
THE PRESIDENCY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A BARRIER TO THE COUNTRY’S FULL DEVELOPMENT • CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A CAREGIVER • ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES

Commonalities and variations in the conceptualizations of the focal themes are evident in Tables 10.4 and 10.5 and they indicate the continuities and discontinuities in terms of beliefs and policies throughout Arroyo’s nine-year presidency. Let me start with the commonalities.

In both schemas, Arroyo had notably conceptualized democracy as an object of threat. This conceptualization, I argue, justified Arroyo’s use of hard power when dealing with perceived national threats. In Arroyo’s earlier schema, the framing worked to justify the use of weaponry (‘arsenal’) and protective mechanism (‘self-defense’) to combat the perceived national threat (‘criminality’ which was conflated with ‘rebellion’) to ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy.’ This complemented with two other conceptualizations—DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON and DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL

FAITH THAT FILIPINOS HAVE FOUGHT FOR—bringing forth a formulation which ran parallel to the George W. Bush declaration that the ‘war on terror’ was a ‘crusade.’ In Arroyo’s second schema, the conceptualization of democracy as an object of threat justified her contested policies which included her Presidential Proclamation 1017, the calibrated preemptive response, and her counter-insurgency program Oplan Bantay Laya. At the same time, it cast her as the country’s much needed leader in the face of threat from the rebels—military, communist, and Moro.

Conflation of rebellion and terrorism also ran consistent in the Arroyo SONAs from the early years of her presidency to her final year in office. In recontextualizing the ‘war on terror’ discourse, Arroyo made the terms ‘rebellion’ and ‘criminality’ synonymous while establishing early on that criminality is a form of ‘terrorism.’ The conflation of these terms was strategic in that it allowed the government to target rebels in the same way that criminals were treated in the Philippine domestic war on terrorism. It justified indiscriminate targeting of those critically opposed to the Arroyo administration, which could have possibly accounted for the rise in the cases of political executions during Arroyo’s presidency. The tough stance against the rebels and the conflation of the terms ‘rebellion’ and ‘terrorism’ was sustained even in the SONAs delivered after the 2005 political crisis, although this was apparently abandoned when the Arroyo government was heavily criticized for the rise of extra-judicial killings. This criticism was backed up with a report prepared by Philip Alston, a United Nations rapporteur, whose findings indicated that the counter-insurgency run by the military under the Arroyo watch was partly to blame for the rise in political executions of activists and those considered critical of the administration.

Also, throughout her more than nine years as president, Arroyo emphasized her persona as a working president. While this was originally meant to distinguish

herself from her predecessor whose work ethic was much criticized, the conceptualization **THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER** functioned towards legitimizing her hold of power. It conveyed that despite the criticisms leveled against her office—including several attempts at impeachment—she remained true to her constitutional duties as a national leader and was focused and serious in leading the country towards a ‘modern economy.’

Several variations or differences are also evident in the two schemas. First, there is the difference in the way the national economy had been rendered in the pre- and post-2005 SONAs. In Arroyo’s earlier schema, the national economy was conceptualized as a living entity confronted by poverty and afflicted by chronic deficit. Such conceptualization rendered the economy as an object of challenges (that is, poverty and chronic deficit) which can only be overcome by government interventions that included the ‘war on poverty’ ideology. ‘War on poverty’ was linked to the ‘global war on terror.’ Arroyo established through her SONAs that the country’s engagement in the global war on terror would translate to national development in that it would contribute to the country’s international visibility, which would bring in foreign investment and ‘capital flows.’ Arroyo argued that these were necessary to pursue her war on poverty agenda. After the 2005 crisis, Arroyo emphasized the role of the economy as a strong and competitive subject—a voyager, a protagonist in the unfolding narrative of national progress, and a survivor in the global economic crisis rendered both as a critical health condition and a weather problem. Arroyo attributed the strength and resilience of the economy to her fiscal reforms and economic policies, casting her leadership role as a redeemer in the face of the global crisis. The re-conceptualization of the national economy from being an object of challenges to being a subject emerging as strong and resilient from a global crisis

shows that the shifts in conceptual frames are not just motivated by changes in socio-political contexts, but also by changes in political agenda—in Arroyo’s case, the need to assert her legitimacy after the 2005 political crisis.

Another variation or difference in conceptualization is evident in terms of peace and security. In her earlier schema, Arroyo emphasized the ‘war on terror’ discourse by applying the framework of the US-led global war on terror in dealing with the insurgents. This, however, changed after the Alston Report was released. From an emphasis on ‘war on terror’ that was even linked to the ‘war on poverty,’ Arroyo shifted her emphasis to ‘peace.’ She conceptualized peace talks as the means to resolve age-old conflicts and even went on to conceptualize infrastructure as an instrument of peace and development. This emphasis on ‘peace talks’ or ‘peaceful resolution’ to long-standing conflicts communicated that peace took precedence in the Arroyo schema, thereby downplaying accusations of state terror, state repression, and political killings. While the shift in policy may have been due to the flak the US-led global war on terror was getting both in the international and local contexts, the need to save face after the release of a critical report on extra-judicial killings may have also accounted for the shift.

Finally, there was a noticeable shift in the way the executive leadership was rendered in the Arroyo speeches. In Arroyo’s earlier SONAs, she presented what was thought of as a sustained discourse on the ‘strong republic.’ After the crisis in 2005, Arroyo blamed the existing political system as a barrier to the country’s full development. De-emphasizing on the ‘strong republic’ while putting the blame on the political system served—to borrow the words of Abinales and Amoroso (2005, 280)—‘to highlight the real limitations of state capacity.’ Arroyo could not assert her ‘strong republic’ so she had to resort to blaming the political system in order to

explain the 2005 political crisis that almost cut her full term short. She then offered charter change or constitutional amendments as an agenda and conceptualized this proposed policy as a mechanism for political and economic change within the context of the global economic order. This demonstrated not only Arroyo's capacity to set the national agenda, but also her capacity to initiate moves to realign the fundamental law of the land with the global financial institutions prescription for economic liberalization.

The two Arroyo's schemas are quite similar to those of the earlier presidencies in a number of ways. Her conceptualization of democracy as an object of threat resembles those of Marcos, Estrada, and even Aquino, all of whom had to justify the use of military action to quell the insurgency. During her full presidential term, Arroyo's use of the same conceptualization to justify policies that were perceived anti-democratic as they curtailed civil liberties was reminiscent of Marcos' conceptualization of martial law, making Arroyo appear as the most Marcosian of the four presidencies under study. This is also evident in her conceptualization of the political system as a barrier to progress and of constitutional change as a means to advance the system. However, unlike Marcos who succeeded in launching the 1973 Constitution, Arroyo failed to push through with the charter amendments she openly advocated after the 2005 crisis.

Like her predecessors, Arroyo conceptualized the national economy as a living entity confronted by challenges such as poverty and chronic deficits. Her post-2005 conceptualization of the economy as a strong, resilient subject was also very much like those of her predecessors, especially Estrada, who rendered the economy as a survivor of the global crisis. Interestingly, Arroyo shared with her predecessors

including Marcos the idea that economic liberalization as prescribed by global financial institutions is what the national economy needs in order to fully develop.

The shifts in emphasis and differences in conceptual frames in the two schemas of the Arroyo presidency show that national leaders give due consideration to changes in socio-political contexts when they address the nation. Leaders like the president (and her presidential advisers) are likely to manage these changing or shifting domestic and global concerns in their discourses in order to make relevant their beliefs and policies as well as to legitimize their positions of power when challenged. This point is further substantiated in the next section.

10.3 Conceptualization of themes: Commonalities and variations

In this section, I show the multiple conceptual frames and metaphors employed to communicate the themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency across the post-Marcos SONAs.

In my discussion on each theme, I identify which conceptualizations had been consistently employed across the four presidencies and account for their consistent use. I also account for the differences in the way each theme had been framed and metaphorized among the four administrations. I then examine how the conceptual frames and metaphors employed to develop the theme depart from and recontextualize Marcos' conceptualizations of the said theme. I also show how they reinforce or deviate from discourses that dominate the national and global contexts.

Two points that were partly discussed in the earlier section are reinforced in the analysis. One: the recurrence of conceptualizations of the focal themes across the four presidencies indicates continuities in terms of political beliefs and policies over time and such continuities become even more pronounced when the four presidencies

are examined vis-à-vis Marcos’ regime. Two: variations or differences in the conceptualizations of the focal themes show the fluidity in the framing of national concerns and this fluidity may be due to the unique contingencies faced by the one in power, the changing socio-political context, and the agency and persona of the political actor (or actors) involved.

10.3.1 Democracy

Table 10.6 Framing of Philippine democracy in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009)

President	Conceptual frames
Aquino (1987-1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM THAT HAD BEEN RENDERED WEAK UNDER MARCOS DICTATORSHIP ▪ THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT ▪ DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE POWER ▪ DEMOCRACY IS LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFACTOR OF THE NATION • DEMOCRACY IS A NURTURER • DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER • DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS • DEMOCRACY IS A KEY TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY/ CAPITALISM CONDUCTIVE TO GROWTH
Ramos (1992-1997)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT SUSTAINS NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A SOURCE OF NATIONAL STRENGTH ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A RESOURCE FOR DEVELOPMENT ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM THAT IS CAPABLE OF INITIATING CHANGE • DEMOCRACY IS A PRECURSOR FOR COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A COMPETITIVE EDGE ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Estrada (1998-2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF DEFENSE AND PROTECTION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL • DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ DEMOCRACY IS A STRUCTURE ▪ DEMOCRACY IS AN ORGANIC ENTITY
Arroyo (2001-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A WEAPON • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT • DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL FAITH THAT THE FILIPINOS HAVE FOUGHT FOR
Arroyo (2005-2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES • DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT

The data shows a multilayered conceptualization of the concept of democracy especially apparent in the Aquino presidency. Aquino, being the first president since the end of Marcos' authoritarian rule and under the 1987 Constitution, necessarily set off the scope and boundaries of post-dictatorship Philippine democracy. Her multilayered conceptualization was bound to be adopted and recontextualized by her successors.

A conceptualization that had been sustained in the post-Marcos presidencies is the conceptualization of democracy as an evolving entity (see sections on Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada in Table 10.6). This frame had been substantiated through the use of metaphors that suggest democracy either as a structure that goes through alterations or as an organic entity. The frame takes into consideration that several factors affect or influence the way democracy moves from one phase to another. The influence of these factors—people power being a prominent one—suggests the specific and unique process of democratization in the Philippines whose understanding may possibly lead to the articulation of the Philippines' contribution to the theory and practice of democracy at large.

Common to all of the four presidencies covered in this study is the framing of democracy as a national value. This is suggested in the following conceptualizations of democracy from each of the four presidents: RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT (Aquino); DEMOCRACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Ramos); DEMOCRACY IS A PRIZED IDEAL (Estrada); and DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS EXPRESSION IN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES (Arroyo). The high importance given to democracy across the four presidencies suggests the presidents' commitment to the national ideals embedded in the 1987 Constitution. It also implies that public addresses of national importance like the

SONA serve as opportunity for national leaders to engage in what Campbell and Jamieson (2008) term as ‘a public meditation of values.’

In the latter presidencies—specifically that of Estrada and Arroyo—emphasis given to the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF THREAT is evident. It should be noted that both presidencies had been criticized for being anti-democratic or harboring dictatorial tendencies (See Chapters 7.3 and 9.3.2) and both responded by asserting that democracy was threatened under their watch. This common response channels that of Marcos. Marcos conceptualized democracy as an object of communist threat in order to justify his imposition of martial law. This rendering of democracy can be seen as a common feature of Philippine presidential rhetoric that had been fully utilized during the Marcos presidency and re-deployed even in post-dictatorship presidencies. That democracy is used to justify the use of state power to respond to the opposition and critical sectors of Philippine society makes democracy a problematic notion. It somehow rekindles the discourse of constitutional authoritarianism which Marcos used to justify his imposition of martial law and consequently his abuse of presidential power.

While commonalities are evident among the conceptualizations across the four post-Marcos presidencies, the fluidity by which democracy had been conceptualized in the 23 SONAs cannot be denied. The fluidity may be explained by various factors. These include differences in key emphasis (as shown in 10.2), shifts in domestic and global concerns, shifts or changes in presidential agenda, and the agency of the political actor. For instance, because Ramos emphasized the need to be ‘globally competitive’ in order to reach the state of national industrialized country-hood (NIC-hood), there was a shift in the way he conceptualized democracy in his addresses. From channeling and paying homage as it were to the conceptualizations rendered by

his predecessor, Ramos adopted and made more salient the conceptualizations of democracy as a competitive edge or a unique comparative advantage. These conceptualizations were more attuned to his presidential agenda and the domestic and global concerns of his presidency which included the ratification of the GATT-WTO. The Philippine government's active involvement in the GATT-WTO marked the country's participation in the new global economic order which was primarily anchored on the discourse of neo-liberalization. In other words, each President conceptualized democracy in terms of how her/his administration could respond to existing domestic and global issues.

There also appears to be less articulation on democracy as a concept in the latter presidencies compared to those of Aquino and Ramos. If at all, the invocation of democracy in the SONAs of Arroyo and Estrada was merely a reaffirmation of a national ideal—a 'public meditation of values' as expressed earlier. This shows that other issues of national significance had through time taken the place of what was considered a primary concern in the early post-Marcos years. It, however, takes a salient position in presidential discourse when the incumbent president is accused of resorting to authoritarian measures as in the case of Estrada in 1999 and Arroyo after the 2005 political crisis. That democracy is reaffirmed in the SONAs or any important presidential speech to dispel public perception of a return to martial law indicates the Filipino people's tendency to be skeptical towards a strong state and its propensity for abuse (see Abinales and Amoroso 2005, 242).

10.3.2 National economy

Table 10.7 Framing of the national economy in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009)

President	Conceptual frames
Aquino (1987-1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS AN AILING PERSON ▪ POVERTY IS A DESTRUCTIVE FORCE THAT HAS KEPT THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IN A MISERABLE STATE ▪ THE MARCOS DICTATORSHIP WAS AN AGGRAVATOR OF THE ALREADY MISERABLE STATE OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. ▪ THE WORLD ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE LIFE-SOURCES AND BENEFACTORS OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY ▪ THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT IS AN INVIGORATOR OF THE (ILL- STRICKEN) NATIONAL ECONOMY.
Ramos (1992-1997)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A COMPETITOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ARENA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A COMPETITIVE ARENA <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS BASED ON THE SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS A SPORTS ARENA • THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDER IS AN ADVENTURE • ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION IS AN ACCELERATOR OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND IS AN INCENTIVE FOR COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE AN IMPEDIMENT TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS • POVERTY ALLEVIATION IS WAR <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • POVERTY IS A SELF-PERPETUATING, OPPRESSIVE ENEMY • GOVERNMENT INITIATIVES ARE INTERVENTIONS OR WAR STRATEGIES AGAINST POVERTY • THE POOR ARE VICTIMS AND BENEFICIARIES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS • THE POOR ARE AGENTS OF DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNMENT BENEFICIARIES
Estrada (1998-2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PATIENT IN NEED OF MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE HEALTH CONDITIONS ▪ FINANCIAL CRISIS IS A HEALTH PROBLEM/ ILLNESS ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC AGENDA IS A MEDICAL PRESCRIPTION • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A POTENTIAL DISASTER VICTIM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GLOBAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE WEATHER CONDITIONS • WAR ON POVERTY IS A PRESCRIPTION/ FORMULA FOR RECOVERY AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PROTECTIONIST POLICIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TOWARDS ACHIEVING GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS

Arroyo (2001-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF NATIONAL LIFE <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A LIVING ENTITY CONFRONTED BY POVERTY AND AFFLICTED BY CHRONIC DEFICIT ▪ THE WAR AGAINST POVERTY IDEOLOGY IS THE FORMULA TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ▪ (GLOBAL) WAR ON TERROR IS (THE PHILIPPINE) WAR ON POVERTY ▪ TOUGH LOVE IS A CURATIVE TO CHRONIC DEFICITS
Arroyo (2005-2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A PROTAGONIST/ CHARACTER IN AN UNFOLDING STORY OF NATIONAL PROGRESS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ FISCAL REFORMS ARE LIBERATING FORCES AND RESOURCE GENERATORS ▪ THE PHILIPPINES IS A UNIQUE DESTINATION FOR TOURISM AND INVESTMENTS • THE NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A SURVIVOR IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A CALAMITY ▪ FISCAL REFORMS ARE A MECHANISM FOR SURVIVAL

The national economy had often been conceptualized as a person and served as the synecdoche for the nation; thus, the conceptualization **NATIONAL ECONOMY IS A MANIFESTATION OF THE NATIONAL LIFE** was fairly common in the post-Marcos presidencies. The conceptualization of the national economy as a person across the post-Marcos presidencies varied based on the contingencies faced by those in power. This also manifests the fluidity with which the theme of the national economy had been conceptualized over time.

As was often the case in the post-Marcos presidencies covered in this study, the national economy was rendered as an ill person when it was set against long-standing, serious, and almost intractable problems such as poverty or the global economic crisis. This was very much evident in the Aquino, Estrada, and Arroyo presidential rhetoric.

The economy was rendered potentially strong and resilient when the government talked about accomplishments in the economic front. In Ramos'

addresses specifically, the national economy's potential to compete had to be highlighted in order to justify the adoption of liberalization policies. In the latter SONAs of Gloria Arroyo, where the need to assert the incumbent's legitimacy became a political objective, a rendering of the economy similar to that of Ramos was also evident. That the economy was conceptualized as a resilient character—a protagonist—in the unfolding Philippine story as well as a survivor in the global economic crisis showed that the Arroyo leadership was on the right track when it introduced 'fiscal reforms' and pushed for what it purported as 'sound macro-economic policies.' Arroyo even went on farther by characterizing the Philippines as a unique tourism and investment hub, thereby justifying its grand infrastructural plan also dubbed as the 'Super Regions.'

Poverty had been conceptualized in the post-Marcos presidencies as an enemy or oppressor as suggested by the phrase 'war on poverty.' That war metaphor was often employed in dealing with poverty meant that poverty had always been considered a serious and intractable problem (cf. Semino 2008).

Across the presidential schemas, government initiatives and economic policies were considered either as interventions in the war against poverty or as necessary medical prescriptions or formula to cure the country of poverty when it was rendered as an illness. This conceptualization positioned the incumbent government as a vital agent in the resolution of the national problem.

The link between the global and the national spheres had been a common feature of all presidential schemas especially with regard to the theme of the national economy. Differences lay in the way the relationship had been conceptualized. The world economy and the international community were conceptualized as life sources in the Aquino addresses. In the Ramos speeches, the global economy became the

inevitable arena within which competition among national economies including the Philippines was bound to happen. In the case of Estrada, developments in the global context, especially the Asian financial crisis, were rendered as influential to the condition or state of the national economy. The crisis was rendered either as a disease or a natural disaster from which the national economy had to suffer, endure and recover. A similar rendering of the global economic crisis can be seen in the addresses of Arroyo during her full term. The link between the global and the national or between the global and the local had been expressed quite explicitly when Arroyo argued for the interconnection between the global ‘war on terror’ and the national ‘war on poverty.’ The presidential expression underlay the conceptualization that GLOBAL IS LOCAL in that international engagements were considered directly relevant to the national context especially in the realization of the national economic agenda.

In playing up the link between the global and the national, it was inevitable for post-Marcos presidencies to underscore the importance of economic liberalization. In the neoliberal agenda, economic liberalization—which entailed following the IMF-WB prescribed structural adjustment plans such as privatization, deregulation, and tariff reductions in trade—is considered necessary to achieve national development. In this regard policies that were considered ‘protectionist’ or nationalist were considered impediments to global competitiveness and national economic development. The conceptualization of the link between the global and the national then highlights the seemingly perpetual and inexorable dependence of the nation on the global economic order. It is a case of the global economic order imposing its will on a national economy. Chen (2010) points out that this proclivity towards treating the global economic order as inexorable tends to dissolve ‘structural differences

between oppressor and oppressed, first and third world, capital and labor, and state and social subject’ (21-22). In this case, any assertion of nationalist orientation with regard to the economy is seen as a repudiation of what should be.

10.3.3 Peace and security

Table 10.8 Framing of peace and security in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009)

President	Conceptual frames
Aquino (1987-1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE THREATS TO DEMOCRACY AND THE NATIONAL LIFE • THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT IS A DEFENDER OF THE PEOPLE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY • THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS PEACEMAKING
Ramos (1992-1997)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NATIONAL STABILITY IS A PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
Estrada (1998-2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARMED REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY ARE OBSTACLES TO SOCIAL PROGRESS, THREATS TO CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY, AND DISEASES/PESTS THAT NEED TO BE CRUSHED • ARMED REBELLION IS A CRIME • WAR IS PEACE
Arroyo (2001-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CRIMINALITY AND TERRORISM ARE PARASITES/ DISEASES • CRIMINALS ARE TERRORISTS • REBELS ARE CRIMINALS • ‘WAR ON TERROR’ IS A CURATIVE TO REBELLION AND CRIMINALITY • STATE POLICIES ARE INSTRUMENTS OF WAR ON TERROR IN THE PHILIPPINES
Arroyo (2005-2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • REBELLION IS TERRORISM • INFRASTRUCTURE IS AN INSTRUMENT FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT • PEACE IS KEY TO RESOURCE GENERATION NEEDED FOR A MODERN MINDANAO • PEACE TALKS ARE THE MEANS TO RESOLVE AGE-OLD INTERNAL CONFLICTS

Rebellion and criminality were common problems identified in the post-Marcos administration’s rendering of the state of peace and security in the country. How they were conceptualized varied from one president to the next.

Aquino considered them threats to democracy and the national life. To her both rebels from the communist front and the military were anti-democratic forces whose goal was to impede the process of re-democratization.

Ramos, whose administration tried to be conciliatory with the rebels by repealing the anti-subversion law, was more implicit compared to the other three in conceptualizing rebellion. It would seem though that to Ramos any cause of national instability would pose as an impediment to the nation's global competitiveness. Peace and security then were important elements in the Ramos schema. The peace process and amnesty for the rebels were vital in ensuring national stability.

Estrada was more explicit in his conceptualizations of rebellion and criminality. He considered them obstacles to national progress, a threat to constitutional democracy, and pests that need to be crushed. The last one was particularly in consonance with his tough rhetoric. He was also outright in expressing that the armed rebellion is a crime, something that would appear to be implicit in Ramos' national addresses but adopted and extended further by his successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Arroyo not only conflated rebellion with criminality; she also conflated criminality with terrorism making possible the formulation that **REBELLION IS TERRORISM**. The formulation was in consonance with the US-led global war on terror.

Common to post-Marcos presidencies is the conceptualization of the militarist solution to rebellion as a justifiable course of action. The use of hard power or the military force to address the problem of insurgency appeared as a common recourse for post-Marcos presidencies especially when peace talks would fail. Only when there were strong accusations of privileging the military at the expense of human rights would the government shift its rhetoric to one that advocated dialogue and the peace process. This was also the same strategy that Marcos employed so well especially during the period of 'normalization' in the early 1980s.

The vilification of the insurgents—their metaphorization as ‘terrorists’ (especially pronounced during the presidency of Arroyo) or ‘pests’ that need to be crushed—tends to hide or obscure the root cause of insurgency which is socio-economic poverty and lack of social justice—problems which have existed even prior to Marcos’s authoritarian rule. By vilifying the rebels, the government not only justifies its pursuit of the militarist solution; it also evades its responsibility of examining the conditions that breed insurgency and rebellion—its policies that may actually turn out to be anti-poor or those that actually perpetuate the culture of poverty and social injustice.

10.3.4 The presidency

Table 10.9 Framing of the presidency in the post-Marcos presidential SONAs (1987-2009)

President	Conceptual frames
Aquino (1987-1991)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT IS A MORAL COMBATANT, A PROTECTOR OF THE PEOPLE AND THE PRIMARY AGENT OF DEMOCRACY
Ramos (1992-1997)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE GOVERNMENT IS AN ENABLER OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT • THE PRESIDENT IS AN EFFECTIVE MANAGER
Estrada (1998-2000)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE PRESIDENT IS A TOUGH GUIDE, A VISIONARY, AND A LEARNER
Arroyo (2001-2004)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A STRONG REPUBLIC IS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT IN NATION BUILDING • THE GOVERNMENT IS THE ARM OF A STRONG REPUBLIC • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER
Arroyo (2005-2009)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • THE POLITICAL SYSTEM IS A ROADBLOCK TO THE COUNTRY’S FULL DEVELOPMENT • CHARTER CHANGE IS A MECHANISM FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM • THE ARROYO PRESIDENCY IS A CONSCIENTIOUS WORKER AND A CAREGIVER • ARROYO IS THE ECONOMIC REDEEMER OF THE PHILIPPINES

Various conceptualizations of the presidency or executive leadership or the government are evident across the post-Marcos SONAs. I argue that the way the government or executive leadership was cast in the SONAs depended on the persona projected by the incumbent president and his or her presidential agenda or political objective.

Aquino projected that her government was the primary agent of democracy not only to distinguish herself from the dictatorial leadership of her predecessor but to assert her position as a transition leader whose legacy is the restoration of democratic institutions. Ramos had to cast himself as an effective manager and the government as an enabler of economic growth in order to communicate that his administration was in the center of transforming the Philippines into a newly industrialized country by the end of the 20th century. Estrada's projection of himself as a tough guide, a visionary and a learner in his SONAs was partly motivated by the macho image he projected in the movies in earlier years. Estrada's recourse to his prior image which had become a significant part of his political brand as a tough guy with a heart of gold can be seen as a strategy of intertextuality which lent itself well to the tough rhetoric of his SONAs. Arroyo's persona as a working president was necessary to distinguish herself from her predecessor and to legitimize her perennially challenged presidency. By communicating that her work ethic was impeccable and that she was a hardworking micromanager, she reduced criticisms leveled against her office to being trivial and unnecessary. She considered the criticisms as emanating from partisan politics which did not help in getting things done.

The overarching conceptualization appears to be that **THE GOVERNMENT/ THE PRESIDENCY IS THE PRESIDENT**. This validates the long-standing notion that the Philippine presidency as a national institution is largely defined by the one who occupies the presidential position. On the one hand, it belabors an obvious point—that there can never be a stable schema as far as the Philippine presidency is concerned; on the other, it proves the personalistic nature of the presidential system of government in the Philippines. The Philippine presidency, as noted by such political analysts as Rocamora (1998) and Quimpo (2010), is a powerful position—'much too

powerful, in fact, that it has become vulnerable to being manipulated and abused by holders who have authoritarian or predatory inclinations, or who want to remain in power beyond their terms' (Quimpo, 59). Such observation suggests that the Philippine presidency is significantly defined by the president's agency—or by how the person occupying the public office makes use of his or her powers, duties, and responsibilities enshrined in the Constitution.

The various conceptualizations—'moral combatant', 'protector of the people', 'agent of democracy', 'enabler of economic growth', 'effective manager', 'tough guide', 'arm of a strong republic', 'working presidency', 'economic redeemer', among others—all present positive representations of executive leadership which makes the SONA an instrument of propaganda, particularly of fostering a favorable evaluation of the incumbent leadership. The SONA, as far as the post-Marcos presidencies are concerned, has proven to be a powerful tool for the president to assert her dominance in representing the state of the nation and the quality of presidential leadership.

10.4 Summary

In this chapter, I compared and contrasted schemas of the four post-Marcos presidencies. The presidential schemas including that of Marcos can be summarized in the table below:

Table 11 Summary of the presidential schemas from Marcos to Arroyo (1972-2009)

Presidency	Schema⁹⁷
Marcos	Constitutional authoritarianism is the way to protect society from the threats of communism. Exercised by the president, it becomes a means to protect and reform society.
Aquino	Democratic restoration is vital to national life in that it enables the full development of the national economy and ensures the country's peace and security.
Ramos	Global competitiveness is what will ensure the country's survival and its development in the global economic order.
Estrada	Tough leadership is the way to fight poverty and long standing insurgencies that get in the way of national development.
Arroyo (2001-2004)	War on terror can be equated with the war on poverty. A strong republic is complemented by such formulation.
Arroyo (2005-2009)	Economic resiliency due to sound economic policies is proof of presidential legitimacy. This is a reality that unfolds while a parallel one reveals that the existing political system is a roadblock to national development. Constitutional change should address the roadblock.

In my comparative analysis of the presidential schemas, I examined the continuities and discontinuities in the framing and conceptualizations of the four themes of democracy, national economy, peace and security, and the presidency. I addressed this concern in two discussion sections.

In the first section, I established differences and similarities in terms of what themes were given prominence in the post-Marcos presidencies. I argue that certain themes were given emphasis over others due to the socio-political context that circumscribed and constrained a presidency, the unique persona assumed by the president, and his or her political agenda, among others. These emphasized themes configure with other themes to form schemas of the state of the nation and presidential leadership that were more or less unique to each presidency.

⁹⁷ In this table, the schema is verbalized as a statement or statements that put together or encapsulate the conceptual frames and metaphors expressed in the SONAs.

In the second section, I showed the commonalities and variations in the way the themes are talked about and conceptualized across the four presidencies. I suggested that these commonalities and variations reflect continuities and discontinuities in terms of political beliefs and policies. I also showed how the conceptualizations of the focal themes reinforce or adhere to social discourses that perpetuate relations of dominance and power.

Chapter 11

Conclusion: Insights, Reflections, and Possibilities for Future Research

11.1 Review of the present study

This research is a socio-political discourse analysis of Philippine presidential rhetoric after the country's re-democratization in 1987. Covering the four post-dictatorship presidencies of Corazon Aquino, Fidel Ramos, Joseph Estrada, and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, this thesis examines how specific conceptualizations of key themes and their configurations in presidential speeches constitute the schema of each of the four presidencies. The thesis also accounts for the similarities and differences of the presidential schemas. The State of the Nation Addresses (SONAs) delivered annually by these presidents are used as primary data.

Theoretically, the thesis assumes that mediating mental structures such as schema account for the relationship between text and context. In my analytical framework, a schema, which is a collection of experiences that mediate our sense-making processes, is constituted by frames that at the same time organize these experiences. These frames may be represented through conceptual statements—macro-level conceptualizations—that are likewise constituted by a cluster of conceptual metaphors that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions found in political texts and talk. Through repeated use and deployment, these metaphors that function as and work in conjunction with rhetorical resources such as logical, emotional, and ethical proofs, strategies of self-representation and othering, and political myths, among others, can set off, prompt, trigger or disrupt schemas responsible for our sense making processes.

I suggest that the schemas that emerge from the analysis of the national addresses may be used to compare similarities and differences among the four post-dictatorship presidencies and to account for continuities and discontinuities in Philippine presidential leadership within the last two decades.

I argue that as schemas of the state of the nation and presidential leadership are constituted and reconstituted through the speeches. Variations in schemas cast the Philippine presidency as an evolving national institution. These variations reflect the changing socio-political and cultural contexts, shifts in presidential agenda, and the different choices that the political actors make during their respective terms of office. Moreover, presidential personae contribute to the fluidity in the framing and conceptualization of the themes that ran across national addresses delivered within a period of time.

11.2 Insights on the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs

From the analyses of the post-Marcos SONAs, I have deduced a couple of insights. First, themes are framed and metaphorized in relation to the key themes emphasized by a president and this is accounted for by the evolving socio-political contexts and the agency of the president. Second, metaphorizations and conceptualizations serve to justify and work towards hastening the public acceptance of government policies. Third, schemas of state of the nation and the presidential leadership in the post-Marcos SONAs take on a path structure; what distinguishes a presidential schema from the rest is the way specific elements (or themes) in the path structure are conceptualized. Finally, certain conceptualizations of the focal themes in the post-Marcos presidencies reinforce or adhere to social discourses that tend to perpetuate or reproduce relations of dominance and control; this provides impetus for

multiple audiences of presidential speeches to engage in the critical examination of how themes commonly invoked in these addresses are metaphorized and strategically expressed before they get transformed into public policies.

Firstly, while the SONAs delivered over a presidential term or a period of time are multi-thematic, certain theme or themes tend to be given emphasis and emerge as the most salient. The salience of these key themes is manifested in their centrality to the arguments in the political speeches. Various themes are framed and metaphorized in relation to these key themes. This may be accounted for by the evolving socio-political context within which these speeches were uttered and by the rhetorical choices made by the speaker—choices which necessarily contribute to the reinforcement of his or her public persona. The key themes or emphases (e.g., democracy for Aquino, global competitiveness for Ramos) are indicative of the varying emphases of the post-Marcos administrations which were implicated in varying contexts, that is, socio-political, national and global. It is also important to note that recontextualization of themes across the national addresses delivered over a period of time is fairly common because of the said changes in the sociopolitical context as well as the assertion of presidential agency.

In the analyses, these varying emphases and conceptualizations are revealed through conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors which are expressed linguistically through metaphorical expressions working in conjunction with other rhetorical strategies. The conceptual frames and the conceptual metaphors that constitute them reveal how common and recurring themes across the speeches are publicly circulated or communicated. By deriving the conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors—conceptualizations—that underlie national addresses within a specified term or period of time, it is possible to reconstruct schemas of presidential

leadership. These schemas of political or presidential leadership reveal how those who were and have been in power project themselves and their administration when they communicate to their audience or the public.

Secondly, the use of metaphorizations and conceptual frames in the SONAs are motivated by the need to communicate in concrete and tangible terms the evolving and often complex socio-political situation that the nation faces and how the incumbent government intends to address it. Specific metaphorizations and conceptualizations serve to justify and work towards hastening, as it were, the public acceptance of (contested) government policies as shown by the institutionalization of 'people power' or the integration of nongovernmental organizations and people's organizations in governance and decision-making processes during the Aquino administration, the adoption of neoliberal policies under the Ramos watch, the all-out war against the Moro rebellion during the unexpired term of Estrada, or the passage of the anti-terrorism law or the Human Securities Act during the Arroyo presidency. These conceptualizations help define as well as substantiate the policies of the incumbent administration.

Thirdly, the analyses show that the post-Marcos presidential schemas generally take on a path structure. This is evident in the way the focal themes are conceptualized in the speeches. The path structure is realized in the speeches through a movement from one point to another—from a less favorable state to a more favorable one. The movement may also be in a form of evolution, that is, from a fledgling stage to a stage of maturity (as in the case of democracy), from a sorry state to one of recovery and competitiveness (as in the case of the national economy). The path structure is also laden with obstacles and impediments (like insurgency and criminality) and overcoming them would require meeting the prerequisites (i.e., peace

and security; national stability). The defeat of long standing enemies (like poverty) also allow for the transition from the current state of affairs to a more favored national situation (e.g., newly industrialized economy, tiger status, economic progress). In this path structure, the president is seen as a vital agent—one that causes movement or change. Presidential leadership serves as the impetus in the national trajectory—from dictatorship to democracy, from economic stagnation to global competitiveness, from a conflict-infested national state to national stability. The president, who embodies the executive leadership, is positioned as a hero or heroine—one that is in the forefront of preserving national values but at the same time propels national change.

Charteris-Black (2005) offers an explanation of this tendency to employ the path structure, often linguistically realized through journey metaphors, in political discourse. He says that journeys are

...a highly expressive source domain for political metaphor because they integrate basic cognitive schematic knowledge of daily experience of movement with other rich and varied knowledge of experiences that only sometimes occur when we go on journeys. I would suggest that their expressive potency for leaders is because they integrate underlying positive experiences of successful arrival at destinations with the knowledge of what can go wrong. However, unlike, say, health and sickness metaphors, or life and death metaphors where the evaluation is fairly overt because we know health and life are good and that sickness and death are bad, journey metaphors are rhetorically successful because they rely on rich underlying cognitive patterns and on subliminal associations. (Charteris-Black, 207)

He takes on the idea farther by looking at the experience of journeys ‘from the point of view of myth and what we might call cultural, historical experience.’ He says:

In many myths going on long journeys toward some predetermined goal is an established means of taking on the stature of a hero. A very common theme from folktales around the world is quest; this is a journey in which the hero encounters various tasks that entail danger and require courage to overcome. The journey is either self-chosen or imposed on a particular individual. Tasks

may be finding treasure of some kind (usually guarded by a dragon or other dangerous beast); finding the solution to a riddle (e.g., Rumpelstiltskin); or realizing a series of tasks as part of a voyage or adventure. (Charteris-Black, 207)

Charteris-Black then speculates on the reason politicians employ journey metaphors:

Is it too improbable to believe that the major reason why politicians draw on journey metaphors is because they wish to inherit the heroic qualities associated with epic heroes? If this were the case then it would explain why journey metaphors occur very frequently in their speeches and they normally convey highly positive evaluations of the traveler/ politician. What is important, then, about journey metaphors is that they provide support for the claim that metaphors provide a link between semi-conscious knowledge or myths and conscious political ideologies. By drawing on deeply rooted cultural schemata politicians are able to represent their policies as heroic tasks and themselves epic heroes. (Charteris-Black, 208)

The explanation on the use of journey metaphors in political discourse may also possibly explain why Philippine presidential schema seems to conveniently take the path structure. A path structure particularly lends itself well to administrations with a fixed term, which helps articulate accountability and achievement in the given time period. That Philippine presidencies take on the path structure when they communicate presidential leadership establishes a commonality with the way some of their foreign counterparts do political discourse.

I wish to point out, however, that what would distinguish one presidency from another, or Philippine presidency from its counterparts abroad for that matter, would be the way specific elements (or themes) in the path structure are conceptualized along the national trajectory or in the movement from one point to another. I would also like to suggest that regardless of one's political ideology or party affiliation, politicians will tend to employ the path structure in order to show continuities or discontinuities in leadership. The path structure is a convenient way to demonstrate

what previous programs the incumbent regards as worthy of follow through and extension, and what detours in terms of policies and beliefs the current leadership would take.

Finally, the analyses of the SONAs reveal that certain conceptualizations of the focal themes in the post-Marcos presidencies reinforce or adhere to social discourses that tend to perpetuate or reproduce relations of dominance and control. These include, among others, the conceptualization of democracy as an object of threat in order to justify the assertion of state power, rendering the link between the global and the national as perpetual and inexorable so that the global agenda supersedes that of the nation's, vilifying the insurgency to the extent of obscuring its root cause, and the constant positive conceptualizations of the incumbent leadership or government that transforms a national leader's constitutional duty to report on the state of the nation into a powerful instrument that privileges representations not inimical to the president's agenda.

The rendering of democracy as an object of threat in order to justify the assertion of state power is specifically reminiscent of Marcos' rhetoric on constitutional authoritarianism. It shows that even after a regime change or a transition from dictatorship to democracy, the Philippine presidential leadership has remained prone towards such tendency to use democracy in order to meet authoritarian ends. Furthermore, democracy, being a concept that is almost always positively evaluated in the Philippines and easy to seek agreement on, yet easily malleable, gets invoked in order to regain, sustain or build on the president's political capital. The notion of democracy in Philippine political rhetoric therefore becomes problematic and warrants incisive critical investigation in public communication settings.

The established link between the global and the national in the SONAs is another feature of post-Marcos presidential rhetoric that is worth critically examining. In the economic front, the link is one that puts ‘globalist’ concerns above ‘nationalist’ ones in that certain national economic policies that are rendered ‘protectionist’ are considered obstacles to global competitiveness and the realization of economic liberalization advanced by global financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. This tendency to thwart the so-called ‘protectionist’ national economic policies in order to give way to structural adjustments such as privatization, deregulation, and tariff reductions in trade is also reminiscent of the Marcos’ policy of opening up the Philippine economy, which, as mentioned in Chapter 4, was actually facilitated by the imposition of martial law. It may be said then that the shift from dictatorship to democracy did not really totally change the national economic agenda. Embracing the neo-liberal economic policies was, in fact, apparent in the Aquino, Ramos, Estrada, and Arroyo’s SONAs in much the same way as it was in Marcos’. What seems to have changed over the years is the way these neo-liberal policies have been conceptualized or communicated. They were framed and metaphorized in ways that the presidents have envisioned or imagined not just the national economy but their role in the movement towards their desired national goals.

The vilification of the insurgents is of course a strategy of othering and downplays perpetration of state terrorism in the post-Marcos presidencies. Such strategy also justifies the use of military action or hard power which could translate to human rights abuses by the government’s armed forces. Vilification frames military abuses within the bounds of a government-sponsored counter-insurgency—variously conceptualized in the SONAs as a defense of democracy, anti-criminality, anti-terrorism, and curative to national illness—thereby breeding a culture of impunity,

one that regularizes the practice of abuse by armed authorities. Again, this tendency in the post-Marcos presidencies rehearses the Marcos authoritarian rule during which time the military became the very symbol of oppression.

By privileging representations of the presidency not inimical to the president's agenda, the SONA becomes an instrument of propaganda. For instance, by portraying the presidency as the primary agent of democracy, it obfuscates the national leadership's role in sanctioning the use of state power to curtail basic freedoms and civil liberties. The SONA becomes a tool for the incumbent president to assert her power in representing the state of the nation and the quality of her presidential leadership.

The above-mentioned instances of conceptualizations that tend to perpetuate relations of dominance and control make it imperative for the multiple audiences of political speeches like the SONA to engage in the critical examination of how commonly used themes are metaphorized and expressed strategically in these addresses, to render them as problematic concepts, and to discuss about them in various public communication settings before they get transformed into public policies or non-negotiable materialities. What the president says and how she says them especially in important events like the annual SONA translate to the administration's legislative agenda, which a supportive Congress eager to make concessions with the executive for various political reasons can easily pass into law. Laws can mean a better life for the people; but it could also mean the death of freedom as what the Marcos example showed us. In this light, Lakoff's (1992, 2004) point that metaphors can or do kill is well taken.

11.3 Reflections on the limitations and challenges of the study

In doing the present study, I encountered challenges and limitations which I would like to discuss in terms of how I tried to address them while I was doing my research and how they can inform future analysts of presidential discourse. I would like to focus on three sets of challenges or limitations that may be regarded as significant concerns in this type of research: (1) the challenges that arise from using the schema-theoretic framework; (2) problems that have to do with taking the critical perspective in research; and (3) the limitations of academic writing vis-à-vis critical scholarship in the humanities and social sciences.

What I would consider a major challenge that arose from using the schema-theoretic framework for the analysis of the SONAs was the apparent subjectivity by which conceptual frames and conceptual metaphors are generated from linguistic metaphorical expressions—a challenge also recognized by other metaphor scholars (e.g., Kovecses 2005, 2010; Semino 2008). The challenge of resolving the ‘semantic tension’ (Charteris-Black 2004) from related metaphorical expressions through general declarative statements was most certainly not an easy task. It required reading and re-reading the texts to identify lexico-grammatical cues as well as a working knowledge of the personal histories of the speakers, the changing socio-political contexts of the speeches under investigation including prevailing concerns and public sentiments at the time the speeches were delivered, and the apparent as well as potential cultural resources upon which Filipino presidents or political speakers draw their conceptualizations. Analysts of political discourse in specific socio-cultural contexts may do well to heed what Julia Kristeva (noted by Strauss 2005) had to say about social discourse analysis: ‘Social discourse analysis is by necessity intertextual...requires familiarity with prior verbal and written expressions of the

ideologies in question, so you can recognize when a given text incorporates established ways of expressing certain ideas' (22).

The challenge of reconstructing the conceptual metaphors from the text is perhaps best demonstrated by the need to reword some of them in the process of revising earlier drafts of this work (e.g., PEOPLE POWER IS A MEANS TO REINFORCE DEMOCRACY is restated as DEMOCRACY IS EMPOWERMENT; MILITARY FORCE IS A JUSTIFIABLE COURSE OF ACTION is restated as MILITARY FORCE IS PEACEMAKING). Conceptual metaphors, as mentioned earlier, are not necessarily spelled out or expressed explicitly in texts; the analyst has to rely on linguistic cues. Needless to say, phrasing the conceptual metaphor after positing the target and source domains from linguistic cues is not an easy task especially if the ultimate goal of the analysis is not just to identify these conceptualizations but to show how these conceptualizations configure to form the broader categories including presidential schemas. The conceptual metaphors as well as the conceptual frames may very well be regarded as the underlying assumptions of the rhetoric of presidencies under study. These conceptualizations, after all, represent the presuppositions and taken-for-granted notions that motivate how the presidents cognitively structure the national situation and leadership. I have to admit that this excitement or yearning to see the bigger picture (i.e., the presidential schemas) apart from my closeness or familiarity with the material had sometimes led me to be less cognizant of the accuracy of the phrasing of the conceptual metaphors which should not have been the case. At times, when I would posit the conceptual metaphors from the text, my primary goal would be to point out the underlying assumptions that work toward the broader categories. It took the necessary distance from the material and from my draft for me to be able to realize this. It was largely because of the 'fresh eyes' of the readers of my work that the

problems having to do with expressing conceptual metaphors in my draft became apparent.⁹⁸

In re-wording my conceptual metaphors, I had to re-read and reexamine the data especially the extracts that I used to substantiate my analytical points. Moreover, I had to recall the socio-political and historical context that constrained the speaker in crafting and presenting her presidential speech before the public. I was guided by a couple of criteria in my rewording of the conceptual metaphors: the semantic tension between the target and source domains and the need for economy of expression. For instance, the statement THE GOVERNMENT IS A PROPONENT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION which one of my examiners correctly pointed out as a literal statement has been reworded as THE GOVERNMENT IS AN AGENT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION. The term ‘agent’ personifies the government and casts it as an instigator of an activity (i.e., economic liberalization) which is what is suggested by the linguistic cues of the extracts from Ramos’ speech and not just an advocate which it literally does anyway with its programs and policies. An example of economy in expression is demonstrated in the rewording of the conceptualization THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE REBELS IS A JUSTIFIABLE COURSE OF ACTION (another literal statement) to WAR IS PEACE. The latter is not only succinct in expression; it also better captures the assumption that underlies Estrada’s rhetoric against the insurgency or armed rebellion.

One of the things that this research has therefore taught me is to develop that balance between working towards (re)creating that big picture or the story of my

⁹⁸ It also helped that while waiting for the examiners’ reports, I did not read my draft. The waiting period which was spent doing non-thesis related activities like applying for work in a way helped me establish distance from my thesis. It afforded me the chance to incubate ideas that had not fully developed when writing the early drafts of this thesis and most importantly, to develop fresh eyes that I needed to revisit my data and to review how represented them in this work.

research—so that one ‘does not mistake the wood for the trees’—and making sure that the details of the analysis are accurately presented to substantiate my story—so that there is clear evidentiary basis for my claims.

Another limitation of the analytical framework used in this study is its dependence on classical rhetorical categories like the *pisteis* in demonstrating how concepts in discourse and rhetorical studies can be meshed. While I had considered how other rhetorical concepts such as ideographs (McGee 1980) configure with conceptual frames and metaphors in my analysis, I would suggest that analysts also consider more non-traditional rhetorical strategies such as the ‘strategies for change’ identified and explained by Allen and Faigley (1995, 144-168). Allen and Faigley discussed a host of persuasive uses of language that do not necessarily match the analytical categories of classical rhetoric. Although the authors refer to them as ‘discursive strategies for change,’ they can also be used to achieve the opposite. Some of these strategies that are also quite apparent in the analyzed presidential speeches are the ‘juxtaposition of languages’ which can be used for stylization and image-bolstering (157) and narratives which can ‘supply the basis of stereotypes and become a strong conservative force by justifying inequality’ (167).

Taking a critical perspective also posed a challenge in doing this research. Since critical discourse analysis is a conscious social and political engagement on the part of analysts, they then tend to be seen as above the ordinary reader as they examine texts with systematicity and through a disciplined lens. This should not be the case, as pointed out by Chilton, Tian and Wodak (2010) and Billig (2003). While analysts employ an informed analytical framework in studying texts, their readings should not be considered above or superior to those who do not employ the same lens. Chilton, Tian, and Wodak argue that the analysts’ knowledge about potential

meanings that readers will arrive at in processing the texts under investigation does not guarantee that the analysts will be able to spot all potential meanings. The analysts must be conscious of their limitations and recognize that there may be other ways of reading the texts under question. It is incumbent, however, on the analysts to make explicit and accessible their readings of the political texts under question because 'there is in fact no other route than to produce analyses and allow open critical discussion about alternative analyses and readings' (Chilton et al, 494). To accommodate open critical discussion about alternative ways of reading the texts is to realize that the analysts' readings are not definitive, but are part of the larger and ongoing conversations about language and politics and are therefore subject to challenge and further investigations.

The final point that I wish to discuss is the limitation of academic writing especially when one takes the position of critical scholarship. One of the criticisms leveled against critical language studies in recent years is the tendency to employ a language that is inaccessible to the larger audience (see Billig 2003; Chilton, Tian, and Wodak 2010). Academic research like this present study is made in such a way that technical language and the use of jargon almost always becomes a rule. Given the current academic culture that encourages scholars to be knowledgeable of the recent scholarship in their fields of study, this becomes inevitable. It is a fact that studies such as this one are written for a specialized audience. But then, one should also recognize that this becomes accessible to students of other fields who may be interested in similar problems but are working on them using different lenses or analytical frameworks. I myself have tried to be conscious of this. In the process of writing and re-writing my study, I have learned that much is expected of critical analysts, especially those who study language in use, in making sure that they are

explicit in what they mean by their assertions and that they avoid obfuscation of ideas in their prose so as not to alienate their larger audience.

11.4 Possibilities for future research

The SONAs of the four Philippine presidencies covered in this study prove to be a rich source of data for analysis of political discourse in the Philippines. As one scholar suggests, ‘The highly rhetorical world of Philippine politics, where a small Philippine elite continues to rule the country, is most certainly a minefield of data which can help firm up the (largely West-based) work in discourse and rhetorical studies.’⁹⁹ I believe much can still be done though to generate insights on the presidential addresses.

Other research topics that emerge from the doctoral thesis that are worthy of further investigation are: (1) the language choice of Philippine presidents in delivering their SONAs; (2) the gender factor in the development of presidential rhetoric; and (3) metaphorizations of the presidency as style.¹⁰⁰ It is interesting to examine, for instance, why Philippine presidents like Estrada, Arroyo and even the incumbent president Benigno Aquino III chose to deliver their national addresses largely in Filipino or using intra-sentential mixtures of English and the national language(s). I have noted that there are at least two reasons for this: (1) to provide a translation of passages delivered in English especially, if the passages warrant emphasis (this is apparent in the speeches of the four post-Marcos presidents); and (2) to identify with the audience (this is demonstrated quite clearly by Estrada, Arroyo, and most recently, the current Philippine president as of this writing). The translation of English

⁹⁹ Comment from a referee of the journal *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*.

¹⁰⁰ This is an idea based on a suggestion by one of the examiners.

passages into Filipino in the speech is a strategy of repetition and appears to be an attempt to make an important point more comprehensible to the larger Filipino audience. Two things may be said in relation to this point of making an important passage comprehensible. One, the SONA may be regarded as a highly elitist piece of discourse; this is so because only specific portions of the text largely delivered in English are made relatable to the larger Filipino audience.¹⁰¹ Two, it would appear that not everything that the president says is of importance to the larger public because not everything warrants repetition or translation into a more comprehensible language. This then begs the question: Who is to say what is important or more important to the Filipino audience when it comes to the SONA—an exercise in public accountability? That the president or her speech consultants should decide which ideas are important to the Filipino public negates the very idea of accountability and suggests a condescending attitude of the presidential leadership towards the public which it is mandated to serve.

Identification is, of course, a strategy of the politician to gain or sustain public support for his agenda, thus, ensuring his political capital. The way Estrada and Arroyo went about employing this strategy is instructive and worth further investigation. Estrada, because of his prior image as a tough guy with a compassion for the masses, had to use tough street-smart Filipino language to identify himself with his audience and to remain faithful to his image. Arroyo, on the other hand, made use of the intrasentential mixtures of English and the national language (also called ‘Taglish’ in the Philippine vernacular) in her latter SONAs to make herself relatable to her audience in an attempt to reverse her dwindling popularity.

¹⁰¹ The incumbent Philippine president, Benigno Simeon Aquino III who who has chosen to deliver his SONAs largely in Filipino subverts this rule, but whether this will go on in the future remains to be seen.

With regard to the relationship of gender and presidential rhetoric, it would be interesting to find out how the rhetorics of the two women presidents (Aquino and Arroyo) differ from those of the men (Ramos and Estrada). Are the differences gendered? If so, how do both women presidents enact or perform femininity through their addresses? How do the male presidents reinforce their masculinities through their speeches? One of the things that I find quite noticeable with regard to gender and the SONAs is the interesting use of metaphors by the female and male presidents. While both female and male presidents employ 'tough' rhetoric when dealing with concerns like the national economy and peace and security typically through military metaphors, the marked difference appears to be in the specific metaphors used. For instance, absent in Estrada and Ramos, but present in Arroyo is the use of the expression 'tough love' which suggests parental discipline. Arroyo's use of parental metaphors coincides with Aquino's expressions that suggest nurturing and caring a (fledgling) democracy, something not quite apparent in the expressions of Ramos and Estrada. So, does gender influence the use of parental and nurturing metaphors in presidential rhetoric? That may well be an interesting question for future research.

On a more theoretical level, it might be interesting to relate metaphorizations of the presidency with the sociolinguistic notion of style. The treatment of Estrada's rhetoric of toughness may lend itself to the notion of stylization (Coupland, 2001). Estrada in making use of his macho rhetoric in his speeches (by employing the language of his cinematic characters and his persona as a crime-buster) enacts the presidency as macho (sometimes hyper-masculine). This is extended to his choice of policies with regard for instance to democracy and national security (e.g., democracy as an object of defense, 'all-out-war' against the MILF). Estrada's example somehow rehearses Coupland's notion of stylization as a 'creative selection from a pre-existing

repertoire' to project a social personas or stances (347). In this case, the presidency may possibly be viewed as a 'style'—an evolving style that has been shaped and reshaped by those who have assumed its role. In the course of shaping the presidency, some of the resources from the pre-existing repertoire are used, others are dismissed, and new ones are added up to form innovative ways of enacting what it is to be a president or a national leader.

In terms of future research, it would also be worth conducting an ethnographic study of the production and reception of the SONAs. A limitation of the present study is that it has been solely text-oriented. It would be interesting to find out what goes on in the production phase or the preparations for the SONA and reception of its multiple audiences. How is the speech recontextualized by media, distilled by the members of the Congress, appropriated by ordinary Filipino folks, rejected and resisted by the opposition or the militant groups? How are the SONA sound bites redeployed towards non-negotiable contexts—that is, legislation and public policies? Moreover, what activities are mounted by the public in relation to the SONA beyond the congressional hall where the president delivers his speech? What counter-discourses are being made? How do these counter-discourses work in relation to the official discourses of the president?

The possibilities for future research in Philippine political discourse are many. And reading the word in order to read previous readings of the world will prove to be important in the future as it is now.

Appendix A
List of Ferdinand E. Marcos' State of the Nation Addresses and
Presidential Proclamations

- Marcos, F. E. Mandate for greatness. First inaugural address, 30 December 1965.
- Marcos, F. E. The State of the Nation Message, 1966. State of the Nation Message to Congress, 24 January 1966.
- Marcos, F. E. The Epic of Nation Building. State of the Nation Message, 23 January 1967.
- Marcos, F. E. A nation of achievers. Message to Congress on the State of the Nation, 22 January 1968.
- Marcos, F. E. New Filipinism: The turning point. Address to Congress on the State of the Nation, 27 January 1969.
- Marcos, F. E. To transform the nation – transform ourselves. Second inaugural address, Rizal Park, 30 December 1969.
- Marcos, F. E. National discipline: The key to our future. State of the Nation Message. 26 January 1970.
- Marcos, F. E. The democratic revolution. State of the Nation Message, 25 January 1971.
- Marcos, F. E. Strength through crisis, growth in freedom. State of the nation message, 24 January 1972.
- Marcos, F. E. First address to the nation under martial law. Radio-TV address, Malacanang, 23 September 1972. In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. Second address to the nation under martial law. Radio-TV address, Malacanang, 21 October 1972, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. Martial law and congress. Remarks during a conference with Congressmen, Malacanang, 29 November 1972, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. The New Society is in peril. Radio-TV address, Malacanang, 7 January 1973, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. Ratification of the new constitution. Address at the presentation of the results of the referendum on the new charter, Malacanang, 17 January 1973, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.

- Marcos, F. E. Report to the Nation after one year of Martial Law. Radio-TV address to the nation, Malacanang, 21 September 1973, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. Martial law and constitutionalism. Remarks on observance of the first year of the new Constitution, Marhalika Hall, 17 January 1974, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 4, December 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. The barangay and the imperative of national unity. Address on the second anniversary of Martial Law, at Maharlika Hall, Malacanang, 21 September 1974, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 5, January 1979.
- Marcos, F. E. The president's report to the nation. Address delivered at the Quirino Grandstand on the occasion of the third anniversary of the proclamation of martial law, 19 September 1975, In Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential speeches, Volume 5, January 1979.
- Marcos, F. E. Inaugural address. Opening Session of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly). 12 June 1978.
- Marcos, F. E. Encounter with destiny. Speech delivered by President Ferdinand E. Marcos proclaiming the termination of the state of martial law. Heroes Hall, Malacanang, 17 January 1981.
- Marcos, F. E. A turning point for the nation. The president's message to the Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly), opening of the second regular session, 22 July 1985.
- Proclamation Number 1081 (Marcos administration). Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines, 21 September 1972.
- Proclamation Number 1104 (Marcos administration). Declaring the Continuation of Martial Law in the Philippines, 17 January 1973.
- Proclamation Number 1836 (Marcos administration). Defining the conditions under which the President may issue orders of arrest or commitment orders during martial law or when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, 16 January 1981.
- Proclamation Number 2045 (Marcos administration). Proclaiming the termination of the State of Martial Law throughout the Philippines, 17 January 1981.
- Proclamation Number 2045-A (Marcos administration). Amending portions of Proclamation Number 2045 proclaiming the termination of the State of Martial Law in the Philippines, 23 July 1983.

APPENDIX B
List of Post-Marcos State of the Nation Addresses (1987-2009)

A. Corazon C. Aquino SONAs (1987-1991)

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the Eighth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 27 July 1987.

State of the Nation Address during the Second Regular Session of the Eighth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 25 July 1988.

State of the Nation Address during the Third Regular Session of the Eighth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 24 July 1989.

State of the Nation Address during the Fourth Regular Session of the Eighth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 23 July 1990.

State of the Nation Address during the Fifth Regular Session of the Eighth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 22 July 1991.

B. Fidel V. Ramos SONAs (1992-1997)

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the Ninth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 27 July 1992.

State of the Nation Address during the Second Regular Session of the Ninth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 26 July 1993.

State of the Nation Address during the Third Regular Session of the Ninth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 25 July 1994.

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 24 July 1995.

State of the Nation Address during the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 22 July 1996.

State of the Nation Address during the Third Regular Session of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 28 July 1997.

C. Joseph Ejercito Estrada SONAs (1998-2000)

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the 11th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 25 July 1998.

State of the Nation Address during the 2nd Regular Session of the 11th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 26 July 1999.

State of the Nation Address during the 3rd Regular Session of the 11th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 24 July 2000.

D. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo SONAs (2001-2009)

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the 12th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 23 July 2001.

State of the Nation Address during the 2nd Regular Session of the 12th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 22 July 2002.

State of the Nation Address during the 3rd Regular Session of the 12th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 28 July 2003.

State of the Nation Address during the First Regular Session of the 13th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 26 July 2004.

State of the Nation Address during the 2nd Regular Session of the 13th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. House of Representatives, Batasang Pambansa, Quezon City. 25 July 2005.

State of the Nation Address during the 3rd Regular Session of the 13th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. 24 July 2006.

State of the Nation Address during the 1st Regular Session of the 14th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. 23 July 2007.

State of the Nation Address during the 2nd Regular Session of the 14th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. 28 July 2008.

State of the Nation Address during the 3rd Regular Session of the 14th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. 27 July 2009.

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