THE “SPANISH COLONIAL PAST” IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN PHILIPPINE HISTORY: A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE (MIS)USE OF SPANISH SOURCES

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SUMMARY

The 1880’s witnessed the birth of a new Spanish colonial model which the government tried to apply to their remaining colonies. If we could summarize in a single word the last years of Spanish rule in the Philippines, this would be “reformism.” Conventional accounts, however, insist on characterizing this period as a form of “medievalism.”

The reformist convulsion was reflected in a frantic publication of books and newspapers in the late-nineteenth century. The Philippines was one of the central preoccupations of these writings, which reflected the different political trends in Spain.

These books were read and acquired by Americans when they decided to occupy the archipelago. They needed to know everything about its new possession in order to govern it. After these books were read, most of them were systematically suppressed in American historiography. This was part of the colonial administration’s strategy in its construction of a Philippine history to suit its goals.

The American construction of Philippine history systematically denied the reformism and modernity of the late Spanish regime, instead shaping the notion of a Dark Age of Spanish rule, described as anachronistic, despotic, tyrannical, medieval and halting. The notion of a Dark Age perfectly suited the American occupiers since self-government could then be denied to the Filipinos who had just emerged from Spanish domination.

The American construction of Philippine history started in 1898 with the conquest of the Philippines and continued until independence in 1946.
Its impressive lineage of contributing scholars included important figures such as Dean C. Worcester, Jacob Schurman, William H. Taft, James A. LeRoy, Edward Ayer, James A. Robertson, David P. Barrows, William C. Forbes, Francis B. Harrison, Leonard Wood, and Joseph Ralston Hayden. Although these figures played different roles as officials, scholars, journalists, and private collectors, all of them held the clear and firm conviction that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government.

To support this argument, these writers developed a stereotyped image of Spanish rule. They de-contextualized Spanish terms that, during the nineteenth century, were imbued with positive meanings, and transformed them into something negative. They invented purported evils such as caciquism, suppressed documents and books, censored part of the press and prohibited associations. Finally, they gave a unique shape to the Philippines, encapsulating it within Latin America instead of Southeast Asia.

The early twentieth century produced a colonial discourse in which all the pieces seemed to fit together perfectly. The above authors have left us an important legacy—their books. By reading these carefully, one can begin to appreciate the magnitude of the colonial enterprise. These books were part of a sophisticated strategy to woo an apathetic American public that was not interested at all in the Philippines. They ultimately succeeded in making Americans embrace the ideas of empire, and above all convinced them of the necessity to conquer, occupy, and hold on to the archipelago.
What was originally a production of texts to justify the U.S. conquest has become a still-potent discourse in the academe. This thesis not only probes into the construction of colonial discourse, but also furnishes an alternative by introducing suppressed works, questioning officially-sanctioned writings, and demystifying some purported evils such as caciquism.
Introduction

In September 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the United States had decided to undertake a crusade against international terrorism. This war was to be called the “Global War on Terror” and was to be waged with legitimate and legal arms—that is, by spreading the sacred principles of American democracy. Bush launched his war of choice in Iraq, in 2003. The American-led invasion of Iraq was called “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a label that signaled the benevolent purposes of the United States.

The United States had decided once more to become the saviors of the oppressed. The occupation of Iraq was ostensibly to liberate the Iraqi people from a tyrannical and decrepit dictator, Saddam Hussein. This new crusade against the evils of despotism is rarely called the “Iraq War.” Instead we hear terms such as “insurgents” and “insurgency,” referring to the Iraqis. The United States has had a tough time implementing true democracy in Iraq. It claims it cannot escape the responsibilities of government, however, and so they must remain in Iraq. If they withdrew prematurely the government of Iraq would lapse into a “bloodbath” or civil war.

Many people might think that these contemporary events are new and terrorism has become the evil in the twenty first century, just as “communism” was one of the curses of the second half of the previous century. These arguments prevalent in the present American policy are part of an old discourse which started as early as 1898, when the US
decided to embark upon its imperialist adventure following a specific pattern:

In the realm of ideas and ideals, American policy is guided by three conceptions. One is the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to help other people solve their problems. A second is the principle of self-determination applied at the international level, which asserts the right of every society to establish its own goals and objectives, and to realize them internally through the means it decides are appropriate... The third idea is one which insists that other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States.  

In 1896, the Filipinos rose against the Spaniards after demanding more reforms. In 1897, Spaniards and Filipinos signed the treaty of Biac-na-bató. It seems that in the fall of 1897, Theodore Roosevelt and William McKinley embraced the idea of taking and retaining the Philippines. Obviously, the Americans disguised their real intentions, and instead they presented themselves to some Filipinos insurgents as fired with a humanitarian “impulse” to help the Filipinos to expel the Spaniards in order to gain their independence. Thus the Spanish-American war was represented by the Americans as a crusade to liberate the Filipinos from Spanish tyranny.

Once the Americans liberated the Filipinos from the Spanish medieval yoke, they found themselves with international obligations to carry out in the Philippines. The natives were deemed incompetent for self-government. An 1899 Commission concluded that “the machinery of Filipino government served only for plundering the people… crime of all

2 Appleman Williams, W. The Tragedy of American diplomacy, p. 43.
The Filipinos, said the report, were not a nation, but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and people, and their loyalty was still of the tribal type. The Americans, thus, realized that the power of self-government could not be assumed without a considerable prior training and experience under the guidance and tutelage of an enlightened and liberal sovereign power.

That liberal and sovereign power would be the United States, which imposed the government they considered convenient for themselves as well as the Filipinos. Jacob Schurman constructed or gave shape to a discourse that emphasized the “black legend” of the Filipino Republic and outlined the “dark age” of the Spanish regime. Schurman, to justify the American occupation and to demonstrate the incapacity of the Filipinos for governing themselves, “examined a great number of witnesses” and “studied carefully Spanish governmental institutions.” The witnesses were deliberately co-opted and Schurman concluded that most of the Filipinos did not want independence. The witnesses who were favorable to the American occupation happened to be the educated class; the other witnesses were the most ignorant. These two extreme poles became the vox populi of the Philippines.

Careful examination made the Schurman Commission conclude: “Should our power by any fatality be withdrawn, the Commission believes that the Government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy.” The Americans, thus, could not escape the responsibilities of government which their sovereignty entailed. From 1900 onwards, their

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altruistic ends became a tautology. They started to construct, at the opening of the twentieth century, a perfect structure where all the pieces fitted perfectly. The U.S. colonial administration sought to involve academics, publishers, universities, collectors, and private enterprises that faithfully served American interests in the Philippines. The books produced during this period became an effective propaganda tool with which to practically indoctrinate their readers about the necessity to occupy and hold the Philippines, and above all to silence antagonistic, anti-imperialist voices. This policy was a success. Many books produced and promoted during the early colonial period continue to be cited today, which books that were neglected or suppressed during this same period continue to be omitted from bibliographies today. Universities were the institutions that spread the ideas contained in these colonial books, serving to indoctrinate future scholars. Newspapers became another powerful medium in the service of the state to promote certain kinds of knowledge while silencing dissident voices.

This thesis treats the above topics taking as its axis the 1899 Schurman Commission, since Schurman lays the foundations of the notion of a “dark age” of Spanish rule, the “black legend” of the Filipino republic, and the construction of American discourse of Philippine history. What Schurman concluded in his commission’s report was further developed by the new commission led by Taft in 1900. The difference between the Schurman and Taft Commissions was that the latter was vested with the absolute power to reestablish civil order in the Islands. The whole machinery of government rested in the hands of the
Commission. In fact, the Taft Commission had a sort of “esprit de corps, everything was passed unanimously.” Bellairs (pseudonym of Charles Ballentine) and Henry Parker Willis claimed that the all-embracing power and the unanimity of the commission built up an arbitrary and despotic government in the Islands, which was disguised as “benevolence.” However, Taft and his supporters rejected criticism by repeatedly making references to “the good we are doing,” and “the good we are doing” was the motto which triumphed in the United States since Taft relied on James Alfred LeRoy to spread this idea.

James A. LeRoy is the other axis of this thesis since what the Schurman Commission inaugurated in 1900 was built upon by him. LeRoy probably was the most important player in Philippine politics and history from 1902 to 1909. He gave shape to the Spanish “dark age” by displaying a vast knowledge of Spanish history and sources. His books, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* and, above all, *The Americans in the Philippines*, immediately became references for scholars. LeRoy was the main architect of something called “caciquism,” a term I will discuss extensively in later chapters. LeRoy constructed the discourse of caciquism as a cancer destroying the sacred principles of the democracy, a system inherited from the medieval Spanish system with which the Americans could not fight. Finally, LeRoy was the director of the

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5 Bellairs, Edgar G. *As it is in the Philippines*. New York: Lewis, Scribner & Co., 1902. Bellairs was the first one to state that Taft Commission had an omnipotent and arbitrary power. His book was silenced and at present a few scholars have used it. Parker Willis, Henry. *Our Philippine Problem. A study of American colonial policy*. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Parker Willis stated the same as Bellairs two years later. See for instance, p. 20.

6 Parker Willis, H. *Our Philippine Problem*, p. 41.

Schurman and LeRoy presented to American public opinion a distorted history of the Spanish regime. They concluded that the Spanish system was anachronistic, faltering, tyrannical, decrepit, despotic and above all “medieval.” Both of them based their conclusions on a study of Spanish administration. LeRoy furnished in *The Americans in the Philippines* and *The Philippines 1860-1898. Some comments and bibliographical notes*, an important Spanish historiography on the Philippines by suppressed those parts which questioned the “negative” portrayal of Spanish rule and instead presented it as progressive, dynamic and modern. Schurman and LeRoy were building up the dichotomies “bad Spanish” versus “good Americans,” medieval Spanish regime versus liberal and progressive American administration, and so forth. In sum, they shaped what would become the stereotypical images of Spanish administration in the Philippines.

After LeRoy presented to the academe and to the American public his knowledge of Spanish bibliography and history, scholars have not used his work again although in 2005 they are furnishing us with the same stereotypic images, such as the following:

> Whether liberal or conservative, pro-church or antichurch, pro- or anti-monarchy, Spain became a “backwater,” incapable of sustaining any policy that could win consensus, while its economy fell further behind the flourishing industrial centers of Europe.

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The crucial word in this categorical statement is “backwater” since this term implies the same ideas LeRoy fostered in his books “Spain was only a democracy in form” and “despite the liberal and progressive people in Spain, the reforms were a dead letter.” Norman Owen, in 2005, perpetuates a discourse that started as early as 1905—that is, a hundred years ago. However, Owen’s statement is based, not on Spanish bibliography, but on the books that came out during the period of American colonial rule.

This thesis aims to provide an alternative to the traditional picture above. I provide a more useful framework for understanding the Spanish colonial system in the Philippines from 1868 to 1898. The Spanish regime was a modern system able to modify the old structures. If we could summarize those last thirty years of Spanish rule in the Philippines in a single word, it would be “reformism”—certainly not “medievalism” as the conventional accounts would put it. Spain decided to implement a policy of reforms in order to restructure the whole system. This reformist convulsion of the last thirty years of the Spanish colonial system was reflected on a frantic publication of books and newspapers. More than two thousand books came out having as a main concern the Philippine Islands, and more than a hundred newspapers were published in the Philippines.

The Philippines—the Pearl of the Pacific for Spain—became the protagonist in the books and papers which mirrored the different political trends predominant in Spain. These books were read by Americans scholars and officials such as Dean C. Worcester, whose collection in the University of Michigan is a faithful reflection of his knowledge of Spanish
history; James A. LeRoy who provided information of Spanish books and newspapers; William H. Taft and Edward Gaylord Bourne who left a legacy of Spanish books at Yale University; and, finally, Schurman who brought 19th century Spanish books to Cornell University. All of them needed to know everything about the archipelago. The books were acquired by them when the Americans decided to conquer and occupy the archipelago. Afterwards, however, these books were systematically neglected by American historiography and have since lain idle in libraries.

The first and second chapters of this thesis show how the Americans in 1898 started to build up the Spanish black legend by co-opting Spanish terms as *caudillo, dictador* and *aniquilar*, giving them “negative” connotations. Their standard uses and meanings in the Spanish nineteenth century have become charged with a negative portrayal of Filipinos imputing them with despotic behavior and justifying *de facto* the American occupation of the archipelago. The second chapter pays attention to the Schurman Commission and the outlining of a Spanish “dark age.” Schurman based his conclusions about Spanish administration in the Philippines on the Maura law, which gave the natives the power over the municipalities. Schurman relied on official Spanish documents translated in English. However, he was to deny the Spanish reforms by concluding that “it failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government.”

The argument outlined by Schurman was further developed by LeRoy. The main body of this thesis is devoted to LeRoy since he made

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the most important statement that helps us to understand how the Americans justified until 1946, first, the occupation; secondly, colonization, and, finally, their administration. LeRoy told James A. Robertson, in 1904, that the reform programs of liberal and revolutionary government in Spain had to be relegated to a secondary place. It was a paradigmatic statement since as we have seen in 2005 the reform programs are still relegated to a “backwater” or simply ignored.

LeRoy followed *ad literam* this pronouncement. *The Americans in the Philippines* and *The Philippines 1860-1898: some comments and bibliographical notes* invite the readers and scholars to use the Schurman report to know about the last years of Spanish administration. He warned that “the reader is, however, in danger of being misled if he does not understand the organization, showing the governmental scheme as modified by recent laws, some of them which had not at all, or had but lately, taken effect.”

With this sentence, LeRoy clarified the possible ambiguities of the Schurman report and he categorically stated that the Maura reform remained a “promise.” Americans scholars from then onwards have conceived in this way the Spanish reforms as a “promise” or a “dead letter.” No one has used the huge bibliography which is pointed out in this thesis about Maura law.

The third chapter introduces LeRoy as Taft’s brain. In fact, LeRoy elaborated a political strategy which was followed until the Americans managed to “Americanize” the archipelago. He attracted some distinguish

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Filipinos by introducing himself as sympathetic to the Filipino cause. As a matter of fact, LeRoy’s correspondence provides us with a better understanding of how American policy was engendered in the Philippines. This correspondence contradicts stereotypes such as “collaborationism” and caciquism. Instead it casts light on the birth of the system of patronage introduced by the Americans in 1902 and how Taft and LeRoy created an evil called “caciquism” to negate more self-government for the natives. Curiously there was not caciquism in the central government. Caciquism, as it is explained in the seven chapter, was endemic in some provinces and in all the municipalities ruled by Filipinos.

The fourth chapter analyzes the significance of LeRoy’s *The Americans in the Philippines*, specially the chapter devoted to the Spanish regime. LeRoy wrote this chapter with knowledge drawn from first-hand acquaintance with the leaders of the Filipinos; he studied Spanish colonial history and he furnished an important bibliography based on personal and official records. These factors brought a semblance of rigor to this book. No other writer on the Philippines had exhibited such wide acquaintance with Spanish and English sources of information. As a matter of fact, LeRoy covered all the important literature of the Philippines, casting him as the leading American authority on Philippine affairs. *The Americans in the Philippines* is the most valuable source in order to understand the notion of “Spanish medievalism,” a word which LeRoy uses frequently in his narrative. His chapter on Spanish colonial regime is partial and distorted since he suppressed important Spanish sources, which questioned *de facto* his arguments.
The chapters fifth and sixth furnish an alternative to LeRoy’s argument about a Spanish “dark age” by introducing part of the bibliography he suppressed. Moreover, this chapter introduces Wenceslao Retana, who could be considered as the Spanish *alter ego* of LeRoy. Retana became the most cited Filipinologist by Spanish, American and Filipino historians. He was a valuable reference for the Americans, as historian and bibliographer. He was very prolific, writing many books and collaborating in several newspapers and he was director of the most important journal published at the turn of the nineteenth century, *La Política de España en Filipinas*. His books are a faithful reflection of the Spanish colonial dynamism.

Retana’s *La Política de España en Filipinas* shows us that reforms were implemented in the Philippines. However, LeRoy succeeded in damning Retana since the latter questioned the American construction of Philippine history. Most of Retana’s works have thus been suppressed by scholars. Instead, Retana is well-known especially for three works: *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Aparato Bibliográfico* and *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal*. Besides, he was famous for new editions, with unpublished writings, of *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas, Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas o mis viajes por este país* and *Historia de Mindanao y Joló*. These works are scholarly but they do not question the American discourse, and thus are well-known today. But the reformism advocated by Retana has fallen into oblivion together with his more controversial works.

The seventh chapter is the catalyst of this thesis since the topic inaugurated by LeRoy in 1905 with the publication of *Our Spanish*
inheritance in the Philippines has shown a vigorous continuity in the American academe. The “dark age” of Spanish rule pictured in The Americans in the Philippines was to be complemented with the image of a deep-rooted feudal institution called “caciquism.” LeRoy defined this system as a syncretic form of past traditions that had persisted during the Spanish regime and that was challenging and distorting the modernity of American institutions. LeRoy essentialized the evils of Spanish centralization with its dramatic effects in local politics. Caciquism surfaces as an institution that paralyzes the process of native government in the Philippines. LeRoy gave to a complex system, non-existent in the Philippines until the arrival of the Americans, a surrealist meaning.

Caciquism is a Spanish word that emerged for first time in 1884. It was a strictly Spanish phenomenon inextricably interconnected with an incipient democracy. The Spaniards never used the term cacique in the Philippines and let alone did they implant the system. LeRoy co-opted a term in vogue at the turn of the nineteenth century and extrapolated it to the archipelago to infer that the Americans inherited this system. From 1905 to 1946, caciquism will become the curse and the burden of the Americans appearing with certain intensity in specific moments of the American colonial administration.

The phenomenon such as LeRoy inaugurated it in 1905 and as it has developed during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, lends uniqueness to the archipelago through establishing analogies with Latin American phenomena such as caciquism or ladronism. LeRoy succeeded
in investing a necessary and positive phenomenon, which in Spain had brought national stability, with an entirely negative meaning.

The eighth chapter pays special attention to the publication of Blair and Robertson’s multivolume *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, the massive collection of Spanish documents translated into English. *The Philippine Islands* was edited by Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson—two enigmatic persons who have never been properly studied. This enterprise was privately set up through the Arthur H. Clark Company of Cleveland, a new company set up to publish Spanish documents. The Company gave rigor to this work by selecting the most prestigious historian in 1902, Edward Gaylord Bourne, to conduct the work. Bourne was an Americanist and this fact gave a specific shape to this work by making the Philippines an appendage of Latin America.

What was initially a purely private enterprise became part of the American administration starting in 1904 when LeRoy intervened by selecting the contents of volumes 6 to 52. In fact, volume 52 was created entirely by LeRoy. *The Philippines Islands* hence became part of the colonial machinery built up by the American administration, a propagandistic work with a specific purpose: “Whoever views the Philippine question as one of great importance in our [American] national life cannot but regard this work as most necessary and valuable.”

LeRoy criticized this work in *The American Historical Review* by considering it of “small value.” However, once LeRoy became part and

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parcel of the multivolume work it was acclaimed in academic circles. More than a hundred later, *Blair & Robertson* continues to be a creed for Americans and Filipinos. It is hard to question a work, which on the surface evidences nothing surreptitious. But, as I will demonstrate later, the publication of this massive collection of primary sources had an agenda of *ad hoc* [mis]translation, [mis]interpretation and de-contextualization of the documents in order to impute backwardness upon the Spanish regime and necessity upon the American project to educate the natives.

The last chapter shows that the triumph of the Democrats did not at all hamper the development of American colonial discourse. On the contrary, 1914 proved to be a significant year for twisting the possible process of independence for the archipelago. Dean C. Worcester took over the legacy left by LeRoy, who died in 1909. Apparently, as history tells us, Worcester was forced to resign his charge in the Philippines because of his crusade against slavery and peonage. He spread the idea that slavery was still prevalent in the Philippines. To enforce his argument, he related slavery and peonage to caciquismo. The emergence of this topic has its *raison d'être*: Worcester was appealing for the continuing of U.S. rule in the archipelago. Otherwise, he said, anarchy would rule in the Philippines. Obviously, he provoked the anger of the Filipinos, and this is the reason, we are told, that Worcester had to resign. But we should note that he resigned in order to return to the U.S. for a specific purpose: to write *The

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Philippines Past and Present and to give lectures in different universities and clubs. His book, his articles in newspapers and his speeches would serve to convince the audience to hold the Philippines, and to counterattack and silence a dissident voice, James H. Blount, who published The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. Worcester, in the first edition of The Philippines Past and Present, discredits the arguments of Blount who had fiercely criticized the American occupation. Blount asserted that Filipinos, upon the arrival of the Americans, were fit for self-government. Worcester and the U.S. administration were denying this fact. Most important, what Blount termed the Filipino-American “war,” Worcester termed the “insurgency,” stating categorically: “I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper noun, to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States.”

The ambiguous terminology used from 1905 by Barrows in A History of the Philippines, who used “war” and then a few pages later the term “insurgency,” was clarified in 1914. The process of forgetting had started. Worcester triumphed over Blount. The edition of 1930, edited by Ralston Hayden, omitted any reference to Worcester’s criticism against Blount’s The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912. Hayden, using Worcester’s arguments was suppressing some books and above all omitting the term “war.”

There is an unknown aspect of Worcester: he was the architect of the Wood-Forbes report. If the Schurman Commission was the progenitor of the discourse, Wood’s report became the maturity of the American

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discourse. The report was categorical in pointing out the evils of the archipelago but above all the report signaled the continuity of Taft’s policy. To the question of independence, Wood would respond categorically, “never.” The “benevolent assimilation” policy implemented by Taft had been undermined by the incapacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves, asserted Wood. The archipelago was practically in a state of anarchy governed by a “cacique” oligarchy. This idea will be spread through a whole slew of books, such as Katherine Mayo’s *The Isles of Fear*, a book that indicts caciquismo as the evil of the Philippines and demonstrates that this system was inherent in the Filipino ethos. Mayo established a cacique hierarchy. Wood tried to eradicate this tyranny. These books served as an excuse to spread the idea in the United States of holding the Philippines, thus reversing the process of ultimate independence. Clearly, the end of these books was propagandistic.

Seemingly, imperialist ideas had won. The American construction of Philippine history had become completely shaped. The last contribution to the discourse, before independence, was apparently Ralston Hayden, who wrote the ultimate justification of the American experiment in the Philippines: “we tried but we could not.” Hayden would impose a model of colonial studies or imperialism at the University of Michigan. He indoctrinated many students on how to conceive of Philippine history and policy. Hayden’s work simply perpetuated the discourse.

13 See Bell Price Edward. ‘Future of the Philippines. Interviews with Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate; Sergio Osmeña, Senator and ex-Speaker of the Philippine Lower House, and Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, Governor General of the Philippines.’ *The Chicago Daily News*, 1925. Although this interview was published in *The Chicago Daily News*, the first time I came across it was among Ralston Hayden papers.
The American experiment was built upon broken promises, transgressions of the law, censorship, delusions, rumors, etc. The Americans tried to implement their democracy, but instead they created a dysfunctional system, by observing that the Filipinos were more capable than them to govern themselves. They fostered the centralization of the system, conferred power to the oligarchies and created a serious social imbalance. They succeeded in having Americans and Filipinos alike accept the discourse in which a war of resistance against the United States became an insurrection. Their propaganda succeeding in suppressing important Filipino works. Last but not least, they convinced the Filipinos that there was something evil inherent in themselves: caciquism.

We can establish analogies with the first part of this introduction since the Americans have created an Iraqi government in the same way they had created the “old cacique aristocracy” in the Philippines. The U.S. has underestimated the size of insurgency in Iraq as they did in the Philippines at the opening of the twentieth century. Last but not least, it is said that the Bush administration is manipulating the media. But did not Taft manipulate it in 1900 when he claimed peace when there was no peace? In sum, the U.S. continues to liberate “others” from tyranny by transplanting the sacred principles of its democracy to mask the violence of conquest and colonialism. This is the story to be developed in this thesis.
CHAPTER I: GENESIS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION
OF PHILIPPINE HISTORY

The general character and situation of a people must determine what sort of government is fitted for them. That nothing else can or ought to determine.

Edmund Burke

Not by our seeking, not by any greed of territory, but by circumstances over which we could exercise no control, we were forced into a relation with the Filipino people which imposed obligations on us we could not escape.

William Howard Taft

In 1898, Wenceslao Retana stated in La Política de España en Filipinas:

The Philippines should not have parties: conservatives, sagastinos (supporters of Sagasta), carlistas or republicans are not natural, the Spaniards are the only ones who should be admitted… The policy of party formation splits and separates people, fosters “caciquism” which gives shape to compadrazgos, gives rise to individualisms and personal factions… and produces dissensions and incalculable evils in the “patria.”

Retana was presenting a metaphor of what had happened in Spain since the advent of democracy by inferring that the creation of parties had fostered political ideas in Filipino minds and these people lacked enough intelligence to understand the political and administrative ideals of Western civilization. In fact, Retana was displaying the stereotypical imperialist discourse of the turn of the nineteenth century and the

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twentieth century. Moreover, Retana was claiming that caciquism—endemic to Spanish democracy—had played an important role in fostering the government of conservatives or liberals with the support of carlistas and republicans. This support is called by Retana *compadrazgo*, which connotes a clientelist system in which the cacique becomes the political intermediary. Finally, Retana was warning that the implementation of the reforms in the Philippines or the political participation of the Filipinos would generate the same kind of patronage system. By voicing the sentence *solo caben españoles* (Spaniards are the only one who should be admitted), Retana was denouncing the power acquired by natives thanks to the reforms—such as the new ranks of *capitanes*, *tenientes* or *jueces de paz* which would become the embryo of separatism. In addition, Retana was praying for the return of the conservatives and the friars, the true catalysts of *Spanish-ness*.

Retana was echoing *Spanish-ness* and the “evils of the patria.” This was a metaphysical feeling. Retana is not alluding with the use of this terminology to “caciquism” or “compadrazgos” as phenomena developed in the Philippines, since in the islands there were yet no political parties but only sympathizers of some Spanish ideas. Retana was not aware of how the use of his specific terminology was to be deliberately misused and misread by the Americans in order to justify and above all to legitimate their conquest in the Philippines. Retana and other “Filipinologist” used Spanish terminology in ways that were specific to, and typical of, the nineteenth century. Some of the terms used during the
last years of the Spanish regime were pejorative per se but they did not connote the derogatory meaning that the Americans later gave them.

It is not rare to find in the literature on the Philippines words such as “dictador” (dictator); “aniquilar or aniquilación” (annihilate as a synonymous of “to destroy” or “to humiliate); “latrofaccioso” (bandolero--bandit); “clase directora” (director class or ruling class); “filibustero,” “laborante (conspirator);” “caudillo” or “pronunciamiento.” The use of terms such as cacique and caciquism is, however, different since Filipinos identified Spain as the site of the emergence of caciquism and they never used caciquism to refer to something emergent or endemic in their country. The former terms had a standardized use and a specific meaning in 1899, while cacique and caciquism were not at all employed in Filipino literature.

As early as 1898, when the Spaniards lost the Philippines and the United States decided to occupy the archipelago, Retana and other conservative authors were co-opted by the Americans and these words started to be standardized in American books with a meaning completely disparaging. As a matter of fact, these words became part and parcel of the American construction of Philippine history –a construction which began to be engendered as early as 1899 and culminated in 1914: the year many books appeared that displayed a distinct view of history. It is important to point out, in contrast to the indiscriminate use of these words, that the American administration decided to suppress words like “colony” or “possession,” “war” and “independence.” The Americans neglected these terms in order to display their magnanimity to the
oppressed. Instead, they emphasized the negativity of terms as *caudillo*, *dictatorship*, *Generalissimo*, *annihilation* and *caciquism* to illustrate the evils of the “others” when they were faced with problems as a result of their own incapacity to impose their dictum.

This chapter deals with the U.S. conquest of the Philippines in two distinct sections. The first embraces the embryonic construction of the discourse, which started in 1898 by promising the Filipinos their independence. To deny this promise, the Americans needed to de-contextualize the abovementioned terminology, commonly use in Spanish, to demonstrate the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government and to justify their occupation. The second section explores the Schurman Commission--the catalyst of Taft Commission and above all the cornerstone of the creation of stereotypical images of Spanish rule in the Philippines. The report of the Schurman Commission must be viewed as the textual construction of a totally despotic and medieval Spanish system that “failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government…”

Schurman points out several defects, which were the catalyst for the emergence of the Spanish “dark age.” What Schurman sketched in the conclusion of the first report would be developed and elucidated upon by LeRoy in *The Americans in the Philippines*, which would become perceived as the only valuable and objective source through which one

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3 “Other” in this context means Filipinos and Spaniards, since as will be explained in this chapter the Americans, in order to justify their incapacity to subjugate the archipelago, would systematically blame Filipinos and Spaniards.
could “know” the Spanish administration in the archipelago. Therefore, this report would be cited as a reference in all the American books from 1903 to the present.

This perfect genealogy had important makers such as Dean C. Worcester, William H. Taft, James A. LeRoy, Edward Ayer, James A. Robertson, David P. Barrows, Francis B. Burton, Leonard Wood, Joseph Ralston Hayden, Cameron Forbes, Charles Elliott, Daniel Williams, and many others. Although these architects played different roles since some of them were officials in the Philippines, some were scholars and some private collectors, all them held the clear and firm conviction that Filipinos were unfit for self-government needing the benevolent assimilation offered by the United States. It was the latter that possessed the sense of justice and of humor and possibly even something more. To support this argument until the end, they needed to invent some evils, to omit documents and books, to censor part of the press, to prohibit associations and to build up an argument by which Spanish system was obsolete until the end. This legend, transformed into a perceived reality, gave shape to other myths, leading to the encapsulation of the Philippines in the context of Latin America instead of Southeast Asia. The Philippines becomes a mere appendage of Mexico.

No one can doubt that the Americans built up a perfect machinery where all the pieces seemingly fitted perfectly. All these authorities have left us an important legacy—their works. By reading carefully their books one can discern the magnitude of the American enterprise in the

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Philippines. These books were part of a sophisticated strategy to mobilize an apathetic American public that was not interested at all in the Philippines. However, all these in the end made most Americans embrace the imperialist ideal and above all convinced them of the necessity to conquer, occupy, and then hold on to the archipelago.

**After the War with Spain: the US “Acquisition” of the Philippines**

In 1898 Spain lost her last remaining colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. That empire where the sun never set had become a third-class empire. However, a young country was emerging as a new power in the world: the United States. 1898 was the starting point in their race to power. The U.S. decided to conquer and occupy the Philippines. Was this occupation legitimate?

This question is not rhetorical whatsoever. I think this question explains part of the American discourse of “benevolent assimilation.” Most of the books published from the beginning until 1946 justify *de facto* and *de iure* a licit, legal and even necessary occupation. This discourse was spread to other countries, and the British—despite some criticism of the American colonial system—accepted tacitly that the Philippine conquest was licit and legal. It was not difficult to convince other countries since the United States announced to the world and to the natives that the country would be managed solely in the interest of the natives with the deliberate purpose of preparing them for the

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6 See, for instance Alleyne Ireland. *The Far Eastern Tropics: Studies in the Administration of Tropical Dependencies Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlements, French Indo-China, Java, the Philippine Islands.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1905.
management of their own affairs. Under this premise, the United States were disguising a true colonization of the Philippines and a policy of subordination of the natives.

It is said that the modernity of the nineteenth century won over the medievalism of the fifteenth century. In this way were the Spanish government and its ill-fated fleet conceived. There is a deep-rooted story of the easy defeat of the Spanish in Manila bay. Curiously, neutral observers in the Philippines contemplated with skepticism the American prospects. For example, the German navy informed the Kaiser William II that a Spanish victory seemed probable. The story is more complex than the Americans have explained it from the beginning; other factors played an important role in the defeat of the Spaniards. Without going into detail, I would like to point out that the Spanish made many mistakes, indeed, but American victory could never have been achieved without the Filipinos’ support.

The American fleet was not as powerful as the textbooks and the witnesses have claimed, and Spanish warships were not made of wood. In fact, Worcester in a letter dated March 1899 said “we saw three of the Spanish war-ships which have been raised, floated to Hong Kong, and are now being repaired. None of them are badly injured [emphasis added] and all will probably be ready for service in five or six months.”

Moreover, the Americans were ignorant about practically everything concerning the Philippines. They could not even map the

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7 Elliott, Charles B. *The Philippines. To the End of Military Regime*...., p. 54.
archipelago. They needed to use the Filipinos for the success of their strategy. This part, obviously, is neglected in the textbooks since the potential eyewitness testimonies—Filipinos memoirs—fell into discredit thanks to a fruitful American campaign against them. Some of them simply fell into oblivion.

Emilio Aguinaldo, Galicano Apacible, Felipe Calderon, and some newspapers tell us that the Americans Consul Pratt, Consul Wildman, General Anderson, and Admiral Dewey promised Aguinaldo independence: “The United States, at least, would recognize “the Independence of the Philippines” under a naval protectorate.” Aguinaldo asked for a written agreement but Consul Pratt stated categorically it was not necessary to sign any agreement since “the American Government was very honest.”

Not only did Consul Pratt promise independence, but Admiral Dewey asserted also that “The United States have come to the Philippines to protect the natives and liberate them from Spanish yoke. America is rich in lands and money and does not need colonies.”

10 Up to a certain extend this campaign of discrediting has had certain continuity in American scholarship. Glenn May in 1997 wrote Inventing a hero. The posthumous re-creation of Andres Bonifacio. Quezon City: New Day Publishers. May dismisses Filipino sources of Bonifacio by considering most of them forgeries. There is some misleading data in this book. May, for instance, ignores the fact that Retana was a close friend of de los Santos. Retana and de los Santos shared documents and books. With the intention of discrediting de los Santos, May makes a mistake when he explains that de los Santos got information from an interview with Clemente J. Zulueta. Then May states that “Zulueta, so far as the documents indicate was not close to Bonifacio,” p. 32. Zulueta had in fact been an active part of the revolution. From 1895 he had worked for the Katipunan. He also shared his notes and writings with de los Santos. See Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy, Manila 20 September 1902. Robertson James Alexander: Annapolis Md. Manuscripts. Box 2 Letters, 1902-1906. North Carolina: Duke University.


12 Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica de la Revolución Filipina, p. 10.

13 Aguinaldo Emilio. Reseña Verídica..., p. 13
Finally, Aguinaldo concluded his meeting with Admiral Dewey by stating that this ensured the recognition of Philippine independence. To get this independence Aguinaldo had to attract the masses to revolt against the Spaniards. It is said that Admiral Dewey and Generals Merrit and Anderson treated the Filipinos as friends and allies, saying “sincerely” that the Filipinos were fit for independence. [emphasis added]. The Filipinos believed in those words and they helped the Americans to expel the Spanish oppressors and they hailed the stars and stripes as an emblem of freedom, as the token of liberty for the living.  

Independence was not the only promise made by the Americans. They promised, as well, freedom of press. This freedom was a fact for a few months and in this conjuncture the paper La Independencia emerged. It became the first separatist newspaper and was subsidized by the revolutionaries. The second separatist newspaper was called La Republica Filipina directed by Paterno. As La Independencia stated in 1898:

We will defend Filipino independence because it is the ambition of a country which has come on age, and when a people rise as one man to protest against a policy of oppression and injustice, they demonstrate enough vitality to live in freedom. The institutions of Administration and Justice were implemented in the brief period of three months…

La Independencia heralded the United States as “that great and strong country with which we are bonded by a sincere friendship.” These words imply that the Americans made promises to the Filipinos, and that

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14 Galicano Apacible. ‘To the American People,’ p. 4.
15 La República Filipina came out on September 15th 1898.
they presented themselves as the saviors, the champions of the freedom of the oppressed countries. But later the promise was denied and the newspapers were suppressed and destroyed.\textsuperscript{17} In fact, this first number of La Independencia fell into oblivion in American writings. Charles Elliot typically mentions that “the Insurgent newspaper, La Independencia” for November 22, 1899 acknowledges that “America has aided us indirectly by the blockade of Manila” but does not claim that the Filipinos had in any way assisted the United States.\textsuperscript{18} La Independencia had emerged with American consent, under their regime of a free press. However, the above excerpt subsumes the paper into the category “insurgent.” The sentence America has aided indirectly is, in fact, quite ambiguous and does not affirm or deny the assistance of the United States.

Fired by the verbal promise of independence, Aguinaldo arrived in Manila. According to him, Consul Wildman charged him to “as soon as he arrived in the Philippines, establish a Filipino government on a dictatorial basis.”\textsuperscript{19} It is hard to guess if Aguinaldo was charged to establish a dictatorship or he decided on it himself. Be that as it may, if Consul Wildman ordered Aguinaldo to implement a dictatorship that means that from the beginning the Americans had the clear aim of keeping the Philippines. By establishing a dictatorship Americans would have the perfect excuse to discredit Aguinaldo’s government. It is, therefore, not strange to discover William Howard Taft asserting some

\textsuperscript{17} La Independencia was dismantled by the Americans after February 4\textsuperscript{th} 1899. Zulueta owned the most complete collection of this newspaper. When he died this collection became part of the Philippine Library which was destroyed during the Second World War.

\textsuperscript{18} Elliott, Charles B. The Philippines. To the End of Military Regime…, p. 382.

\textsuperscript{19} Aguinaldo, Emilio. Reseña Verídica…, p. 12
years later that they could not abandon the islands to Filipino control because Aguinaldo’s government was “that of the military dictator.”

Taft had valid arguments to dismiss an Aguinaldo dictatorship. Aguinaldo had sent a document to Admiral Dewey laying out the foundations and basis of a dictatorship. This document would serve as perfect testimony to the alleged spread of tyranny and arbitrariness under Filipino rule. Moreover Admiral Dewey sent this document to foreigners who lived in Manila. This facilitated the international discrediting of Aguinaldo’s government. Americans could appeal to the world on behalf of their legitimate right to conquer the Philippines in order to save it from dictatorial rule.

The final outcome of Aguinaldo’s government would be swiftly represented by the Americans as oppressive, arbitrary and a disturbance greater than ever occurred in the time of Spain. This categorical judgment, which would be reiterated throughout the American term in the Philippines, demonstrated de facto Filipinos’ incapacity for independence, since for more than three hundred years Filipinos had been governed arbitrarily, and during the short term of the Filipino Republic Aguinaldo’s government was more tyrannical than at any time of Spanish rule or misrule such as the Americans started to define it.

There is the possibility, as well, that Consul Wildman never charged Aguinaldo to establish a dictatorship. Manuel Sastrón in Insurrección en Filipinas devotes a section to this topic and he infers that Aguinaldo proclaimed himself “dictator” advised by his assessor, the

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20 Storey, Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine Argument.’ [Sl., sn.], 1904?, p. 22
22 Storey Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine Argument.’ p. 22
lawyer A. Rianzares Bautista. The first decree proclaimed by Aguinaldo about his régimen dictatorial makes clear what was the meaning of this “dictatorship”:

_Vuelvo a asumir el mando de todas las huestes_ para el logro de _nuestras levantadas aspiraciones_ estableciendo un régimen dictatorial que se traducirá en decretos bajo mi sola responsabilidad, y mediante consejo de personas ilustradas, hasta que dominadas completamente estas islas puedan formar una Asamblea constituyente republicana y nombrar un presidente con su gabinete en cuyas manos resignará el mando de las mismas.

(I assume again the command of all _huestes_ [army] in order to achieve our raised aspirations establishing a _dictatorial regime_ which will be translated in decrees under my sole responsibility, and through the advice of _ilustrada_ (erudite) people until, once these Islands are reorganized completely, a Republican Constituent Assembly could be formed and a president with his cabinet could be appointed into whose hands the leadership will be transferred.)

This decree, enacted in Cavite on 24 May 1898, was published as well by Felipe Calderon in his “Época de la Revolución (primera serie).” Calderon uses some other terms which will be misused and de-contextualized by the Americans:

_De Nuevo me he esforzado en “acaudillar” las fuerzas que van a luchar para que consigamos nuestro glorioso deseo: por ésto se establece un Régimen dictatorial para ordenar las disposiciones, de acuerdo con el parecer de personas competentes si bien bajo mi única responsabilidad, hasta que pacificado todo este territorio, pueda establecerse una Asamblea que nombre un Presidente y Consejeros, a cuyas manos entregaré el gobierno del Archipiélago._

(I have toiled again in leading the forces which will fight in order to achieve our glorious wish: this is the reason a _dictatorial regime_ is established, to carry out programs upon the advice of competent persons although under my sole responsibility, until the whole territory is pacified, whereupon an Assembly might be established,

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which appoints a President and Councilors, to whom I shall transfer the government of the Archipelago.)

The content of both paragraphs is practically the same changing only the form which gives more emphasis to some expressions. I think that the original document is that published by Calderon in *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, judging from the use of some words such as “acaudillar,” expressions of hope such as “nuestro glorioso deseo” instead of “levantadas aspiraciones,” and the omission of Republic Constituent Assembly in the second document. That published by Sastrón was, according to Aguinaldo, provided by Pedro Paterno. Sastrón was emphasizing some terms or expressions in order to transmit the sense that the Filipinos had the ultimate “objective” of independence, endemic since the 1890’s. This nuance can be observed in the expression “nuestras levantadas aspiraciones” (our raised aspirations). The term “levantadas” used in this context connotes an impulse to something completely abstract while “aspiraciones” is synonymous with “pretensiones” in Spanish connoting purpose or objective instead of hope or wish. Sastrón, therefore, was paving the way for the construction of historical linearity prevailing in Spanish history and, above all, was subscribing to the idea that the Filipinos were unfit for the independence. This can be perceived in his use of the word “levantadas,” meaning something indeterminate, in contrast to a concrete or precise goal.

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Probably this is the reason Sastrón became an authority for Spanish and Americans, who co-opted some of his arguments.

However, it is more common to find Filipino written expressions such as “nuestro glorioso deseo” (our glorious wish), since this expression connotes not just “wish” but also “hope.” Moreover, this sentence had a more widespread understanding than that used by Sastrón. In sum, these paragraphs, despite their differing nuances, indicate that Aguinaldo appointed himself as “dictator.” If he did this by motu proprio no doubt he was using part of his Spanish knowledge and indoctrination in Roman history and laws and by being advised by Rianzares who demonstrated his knowledge in politics. The Régimen dictatorial and dictador in this context had a specific meaning. Aguinaldo was establishing a government under exceptional conditions. As for the term “dictador,” this was introduced in the dictionary of the Real Academia Española in 1732 with the meaning “Supreme magistrate among the old Romans who was appointed by the Consuls during dangerous times of the Republic in order to rule as Sovereign. By its institution, which only had to last six months, the law was observed with few alterations.”

When Aguinaldo used the term dictador in 1898 the RAE definition had changed a bit since 1732: “Supreme magistrate among the old Romans, who the consuls appointed after the Senate agreement

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26 Sastrón’s book is cited as practically the only source in LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines.

27 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces, su naturaleza y calidad, con las phrases y modos de hablar, los proverbios o refranes, y otras cosas convenientes al uso de la lengua. Dedicado al Rey Nuestro Señor Don Phelipe V (Que Dios Guarde) a cuyas reales expensas se hace esta obra. Compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Tomo Tercero. Que contiene las letras D.E.F. con privilegio. En Madrid: En la Imprenta de la Real Academia Española: por la Viuda de Francisco del Hierro. Año 1732, p. 268.
during *dangerous times* in the Republic in order to order as Sovereign.”

“In some modern republics, supreme magistrate with extraordinary faculties as that of Roman dictator.”

It is significant to note that the Spanish usage—which Aguinaldo and Rianzares had learned, emphasizes the exceptionality of the control of the dictator. Aguinaldo pointed out this fact when establishing a dictatorial regime until the country became pacified. Thus, this statement makes clear the temporariness of this regime. As for “dangerous times,” the Filipinos were fighting against the Spaniards.

Sastrón, apart from modifying the original document a little bit, did not make any comment—positive or negative—regarding the regime or the term dictator since he knew the Spanish definition. However, Americans, establishing an isomorphism, gave this “dictatorship” a modern meaning: “Government which in a country imposes its authority violating the old laws in force.” Dictator was interpreted as a “person who abuses his authority or treats arbitrarily the others.”

“Acaudillar” or by derivation “caudillo” were acquiring a specific shape in relation to the future discourse: abuse and corruption of Filipino leaders as inherent in Filipino ethos. Therefore, if ordered by Consul Wildman or established by Aguinaldo, the conquest was being delimited

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29 The literature from 1900 onwards emphasizes this idea. See for instance, *Report of the US. Philippine Commission to the President, 1900; Census of the Philippine Islands taken under the direction of the Philippine Commission in the year 1903; Storey Moorfield. ‘Taft’s Philippine Argument;’ Worcester, Dean C. The Philippines Past and Present*, etc.

30 *Acaudillar* means to lead an army. This is what Aguinaldo did during the revolution. As for its derivation, *Caudillo* in 1899 had two different meanings: “head and superior who leads and orders the people of war.” “head or director from some guild, community or body.” Aguinaldo was both. See *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana* por la Real Academia Española. Decimotercia edición, p. 211.
from the very beginning. Step by step, Americans were establishing their legitimacy for keeping the archipelago.

The Filipino government proclaimed independence on 12 June 1898. At that time a Congress was constituted in order to write regulations. The foundations of the regulations were those from the Spanish Congress. This congress appointed a committee to write the Constitution. Therefore, the Filipino Republic and independence were “legal” and “legitimate.”

This legality and legitimacy would soon be violated by Spain and the United States. The Americans started to reveal their real intentions by sending a big contingent of soldiers, and above all by keeping Aguinaldo’s forces out of Manila. The Americans once more had designed everything. They argued for a humanitarian reason –to prevent the Spaniards to be massacred by the Filipinos.

The sufficient justification for the restraint put upon the insurgents is the fact that had they been admitted to the city before the American authority was complete and arrangements for the protection of life and property perfected, they would beyond a shadow of a doubt, have sacked and looted the town.

According to American accounts, the Spaniards wanted all sorts of things to come under U.S. protection: “This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its

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31 Most of American scholars assume that the Filipino Constitution emerged from the French revolution and/or Latin American Constitutions. According to Felipe Calderon, Mabini wanted to take as model the Spanish Republican Constitution, but he adapted it after the Constitution of Costa Rica. The Filipino Constitution was a re-adaptation of the Spanish Constitution of 1869 via the Costa Rican Constitution.

32 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind or Some Features of the Anti-Imperialist Movement Attending the War with Spain...Boston: Lee and Shephard, 1903, p. 32. According to Chamberlin this story was told by Dewey, Merritt and Green.
private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.  

August 13th the capitulation of Manila was signed. Americans had decided to conquer Manila. Aguinaldo was not part of this negotiation. The Filipinos were not part of the victor, in fact, they became the victims since Americans were appealing “we were bound to take all steps in (our) power to re-establish and insure so far as possible, public order and safety.”

All these arguments—the sacred duties of America—had its raison d’être. They were claiming for international recognition to make their occupation legal, but in order to support these arguments—that is, to protect Spaniards and foreigners from the natives—Americans spread the story that Aguinaldo and his forces wanted to “annihilate” at that moment, Spaniards, and later on all “Whites.” LeRoy emphasized this point in several letters, above all in two he sent to El Renacimiento (one in 1904 and the other in 1907). Bourns, in confidence, told LeRoy that Antonio Luna had ordered the extermination of the Whites in 1899, but LeRoy—a master in research recalled Filipino testimonies that Bonifacio had preached a war of races and the assassination of Whites. LeRoy was really selective in his use of Spanish documents—specifically Retana and Sastrón—to justify the legitimacy of American occupation.

33 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind…, p. 34.
34 Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind…, p.39.
It is remarkable that Aguinaldo would have decreed “to annihilate the forces of Spanish Government.” Aguinaldo used quite often the term “aniquilar” or “aniquilación” (annihilate or annihilation). Aniquilar (annihilate) is etymologically and literally “to reduce to nothing.” Aniquilar means to destroy, to ruin, to wreck, to humiliate, to confuse, to discourage. “Aniquilar” is not synonymous with “exterminate”--to kill en masse. Americans, by translating ad literam this term [mis]interpreted what Aguinaldo implied, giving powerful reasons to fight against the Filipinos. Aguinaldo, when ordering his men to “annihilate Spanish forces,” was asking for combating and annihilating the Spanish forces while giving prisoners of war humanitarian treatment. In Spanish, for instance, the enemy is annihilated (destroyed) in combat. As a matter of fact, there is not a good translation of this term in English. No doubt, it was a good argument to legitimize the conquest. The same argument will be used later to justify the Filipino-American war, the further occupation of the archipelago and the “annihilation” or extermination of many Filipinos.

The last stage in giving full shape to the legitimacy of the conquest and occupation is the war –or I should say the “insurrection” since Americans considered this “uprising” as a mere “Tagalog insurrection.” By localizing the insurrection in Tagalog provinces, Americans were inferring that Aguinaldo did not have influence in other provinces. Therefore, independence would have meant anarchy since other

37 I give the terms “annihilation” and “extermination” their original meaning in English –“kill en masse,” since the Americans, in order to put down the Filipino forces, massacred some villages.
provinces would have never accepted Tagalog preeminence. This so-called insurrection was provoked by the Americans themselves. On 4 February 1899 American forces suddenly attacked all Filipino lines which were abandoned because it was Saturday and most of the Generals had gone to spend the week-end with their families. A letter from Worcester said that 1,900 insurgents had been killed. General Otis sent a cablegram to Washington explaining that the Filipinos sparked the hostilities. What General Otis said in that cablegram has become the dictum of the truth, since Americans immediately reacted by ratifying by a narrow margin the annexation of the Philippines. As for international opinion, it was believed as well that Aguinaldo’s forces attacked American soldiers or provoked American soldiers to attack the Filipinos. This provocation would justify the insurrection of the Filipinos: “The most ingenious devices were resorted to by the Filipinos to throw the responsibility of the first act of hostility on the shoulders of the Americans. As a matter of fact the war was commenced by the Filipinos…”

I have pointed out all these stages since they conform to the real intentions of the Americans: imperialism, conquest, occupation, and colonialism. It is quite clear that in the interval which elapsed between the battle of Manila Bay on 1 May 1898, and the signing of the Peace Protocol on 12 August, U.S. actions in the Philippines had assumed definite shape. The war would become a fait accompli by giving

38 Aguinaldo, Emilio. *Reseña Verídica*..., p. 36.
40 Ireland, Alleyne. *The Far Eastern Tropics*..., p. 194
legitimacy to the occupation. If some Americans, some of them Republicans and Democrats[^41] embraced some doubts as to whether the U.S. had to occupy the archipelago, the commencement of hostilities made them ratify the annexation. In short, the Americans conquered an independent country; they infringed the law by occupying a legitimate nation.[^42]

Soon the first dissident voices started to be heard: the occupation and conquest, they said, were contrary to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine and the Constitution of the United States did not provide a government for the colonies. The American administration reacted by counterattacking these voices. They started up their well-oiled propaganda machine by writing inflammatory articles discrediting Aguinaldo and the natives, arguing that “the retention of the Islands was completely necessary since if Americans withdrew anarchy would ensue.” These they published in newspapers and books.

The U.S. administration started to deny any promise of independence to Aguinaldo[^43] and if Consul General Pratt or Admiral Dewey made one, such promise was deemed to be beyond the authority

[^41]: Some Democrats such as Colonel Bryan had been a critic of subjugating the Philippines. However he came out in favor of supporting the treaty, advising the Democratic senators to vote for ratification. This decision, obviously, makes clear that Democrats and Republicans only differed on the form, not on the content. Leech, Margaret. *In the days of MacKinley*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959, p. 350. She illustrates the volubility of Colonel Bryan.
of these officers. General Dewey and Consul General Pratt systematically denied broaching any alliances. In fact, Admiral Dewey always grew indignant when the subject arose of any promise relative to the independence of the Philippines. He was quite categorical in stating:

I never directly or indirectly, promised the Filipinos independence. I never received Aguinaldo with military honors or recognized or saluted the so-called Filipino flag. I never considered him as an ally although I did make use of him and the natives to assist me in my operations against the Spaniards.

These words are quite eloquent and the indignation of Admiral Dewey infers that there was an agreement since at the same time, Dewey was admitting that without Filipino assistance they could not have defeated the Spaniards. Lamentably there is no testimony, since apparently the alliance was verbal –although John Foreman in 1899 mentioned a draft. Be that as it may, it is Aguinaldo’s word against the American officials’ word. However, it is surprising how Americans emphasized and systematically justified this fact in textbooks, speeches and newspapers. This reiteration implies there was a firm promise.

As early as 1899 Dean C. Worcester was invited to deliver a speech at the Hamilton Club of Chicago. This speech had a double purpose. On the one hand, Worcester needed to counterattack anti-imperialist accusations about “American crime in the Philippines.” On the other hand, he had to deny the promise of independence. Worcester could not categorically negate the fact of a promise, but he was very

skilled in de-contextualizing and discrediting Aguinaldo by stating that instead of independence, Consul Pratt had promised “protection.” Inviting suspicion is Worcester’s insistence on any direct or indirect promise of independence. His insistence, justification and de-contextualization of some texts makes us suspect quite strongly that a tacit agreement existed. Worcester fifteen years later continued to deny any promise of independence. By this time his justification has become a bit more sophisticated, doctrinaire and categorical than in 1899 by treating any hint of a promise as myth or fiction. He appeals to a lack of understanding because Aguinaldo could not speak English and Consul-General Pratt, Spanish. The conversation was translated by Bray

[…] Whatever was said during this conversation it is within the limits of the possibility that Pratt may have been made to say by his interpreter more than he intended and that his statements of what would probably be granted by the United States Government and his expression of good wishes for the cause of Filipino independence may have been translated as assurances and as promises…

It seems that Worcester bases this argument on Taylor’s Philippine Insurgent Records. However the idea of a possible misunderstanding between Consul Pratt and Aguinaldo was mooted by Manuel Sastrón in Insurrección en Filipinas in 1901. No doubt, Worcester appropriated this information for his book since he was fluent in Spanish and in fact he acquired this book and even translated chapters one and three into English in 1902. American scholars were very selective when they needed to use Spanish books. Sastrón stated,

Neither did American Consul speak Spanish, nor Aguinaldo English: the conference was made through an interpreter…without stating categorically that in such meeting there were from both parts statements which suffered a big alteration in meaning.

There is one other important fact until now ignored by all historians which invites more suspicion about the absence of a promise. John Foreman—a Britisher who lived in the Philippines—wrote *The Philippine Islands* in 1892. This book became a reference for the Americans when they needed to know everything of the archipelago. But this fact is secondary now. John Foreman re-wrote his book, including new chapters, in 1899. He devoted a chapter to the Filipino insurrection against Spain. He explains in great detail the arrival of Aguinaldo to Singapore and his meeting with Consul-General Pratt:

The result of this Singapore meeting was that a *draft Agreement* (emphasis added) between Consul-General Pratt and Emilio Aguinaldo was drawn up, subject to the approval of Commodore Dewey and subsequent confirmation from Washington. The essence of this provisional understanding was as follow, viz.: --

1. Philippine Independence to be proclaimed…

This information is significant in asserting categorically that there was an agreement—one that, according to Foreman, not only was verbal but also written. Foreman was promptly denounced by Pratt for publishing this and other allegations in his book. Pratt was successful in pressuring Foreman to remove the “offending page and insert an apology.”

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51 Worcester Dean C. “Some Aspects of the Philippine Question,” p.5.
Finally, I have found one more testimony that asserts categorically in 1924 and again in 1928 that the Americans and Aguinaldo made an agreement in Singapore and they promised “nationality” and “independence.” The Americans could not silence the voice of Franciscan priest Villajos since he wrote his manuscript in Spanish and this manuscript has never been published. Villajos states that

The country, specifically the Tagalog region, responded to the call to arms by Aguinaldo, who confided to them the promise of independence offered by the Americans … The Yanquis have not fulfilled to them what they promised in Singapore: “to concede the yearned independence.”

Americans had won another battle. Foreman, in the third edition published in 1906, removed or suppressed the parts about the meeting and the agreement between Aguinaldo and Consul-General Pratt. However, he insisted on Aguinaldo’s claim of “Philippine independence to be proclaimed.” Foreman stated in this edition that the claim of independence and other goals were revolutionary aspirations. What had been a draft Agreement between Aguinaldo and Pratt in Foreman’s 1899 edition, now was a text published by the Spanish newspaper, El Liberal. Foreman and the second edition of his book would be systematically discredited by James LeRoy.

Worcester was successful in his discourses and he opened the Pandora’s box for other “imperialists” to justify the war and further actions taken in the Philippines. A powerful propaganda campaign would

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52 Villajos, Juan de Dios. Apuntes del P. Juan de Dios Villajos ex-ministro provincial de la de San Gregorio. Manuscript. Archivo San Gregorio, 1924 p. 219. The friar Juan de Dios Villajos insisted on this promise in 1928, pp. 3-4. This manuscript belongs to Reynaldo Ileto who has shared it with me.

emerge to gain the sympathy of American public opinion and to counter the anti-imperialist arguments.

The anti-imperialist movement considered the occupation of the Philippines to have violated the sacred principles of the American Constitution, and above all questioned American values. Imperialists argued the necessity of occupying the territory since this had become hostile. But imperialists were confronted with the problem that the Federal government lacked the power to acquire territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies. Then Americans had no other choice but to resort to European laws:

The whole subject (of military authority over hostile territory) has been regulated by Section III of The Hague Second Convention, *On Military Authority over Hostile Territory*.

XX Art. XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

We can find another justification for this occupation in the argument that the Filipino Republic was to all intents a Tagalog oligarchy, engineered and dominated by a few persons: “The Philippine people, as such, had no representation, nor did the vast bulk of them have any knowledge of what was transpiring.” More will be said about this in later chapters.

Last but not least, all this illegitimacy, illegality and trail of broken promises led the American administration into some contradictions in the proclamation of the peace treaty on 21 December 1898. In this proclamation, the Secretary of War stated that Admiral Dewey effected

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54 Leech Margaret. *In the days of McKinley...*, p. 353.
55 Chamberlin Fred C. *The Blow from Behind...*, p. 8.
56 Williams, D. R. *The United States and the Philippines*, p. 94.
the “conquest” of the Philippines and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. He used the term “conquest” but later on, when he explained the main duties of the Americans, he claimed

> It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner, that we come not as invaders or “conquerors” but as friends to protect the natives...The mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation...

The term “benevolent assimilation” will appear again in this thesis.

It was a surreptitious message to demonstrate to other colonial masters the magnanimity of American colonial policy: “The Government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction, or for the expression of our theoretical views but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands.”

Almost every act of the U.S. in the Philippines was characterized by what may be called, from one standpoint, a certain peculiarity and originality, or, from another point of view, a blindness to local conditions. There was not any “benevolent assimilation” whatsoever, but this is the story which has prevailed, taking into consideration Americo Castro’s comment, “not everything that happens in the past of a country deserves to be remembered.” The Americans decided to furnish this face of Clio—their altruistic face—to other colonial powers and above all to the Filipinos while in the United States the newspapers fostered the cruelest face of colonial and imperialistic ideas, stating typically that “The Islands and their people belong to us because we have bought it and

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57 Williams D.R. *The United States and The Philippines*. p. 95.

58 Elliott, Charles: *The Philippines To the End of the Military Regime...*, p. 57.
we intend to possess it while any portion of our people wish it. This is our policy stripped of all pretension and hypocrisy.\footnote{I found this citation in the Villajos Manuscript. According to Father Villajos this statement was published in the \textit{Evening World}, P. 5.}

It is important to point out that these articles did not reach the archipelago. Therefore the Filipinos could ignore this imperialistic propaganda. Actually, this formed part of America’s “altruistic” aims—the denial to Filipinos of access to the American press. The policy of Benevolent Assimilation was further belied by the suppression and discrediting of most articles written by Filipinos or by the Anti-imperialist League. Therefore, another sacred principle—freedom of the press—was violated in the name of Benevolent Assimilation.

The first journals, \textit{La Independencia} and \textit{La Republica Filipina}, which had greeted the Americans as their saviors, were censored in 1899. Both of them disappeared not only as an effect of censorship, but also because the Americans succeeded in suppressing them from the collective imaginary. In 1899 \textit{Filipinas ante Europa} appeared, published in Madrid. This newspaper became an organ for the defense of the Filipino people. The Americans persecuted this journal more than the Spaniards had persecuted the Propagandist organ, \textit{La Solidaridad}, in Manila.

Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez contributed articles to \textit{Filipinas ante Europa}.\footnote{Isabelo de los Reyes, who was a laborante for the Spaniards, was now called “irreconciliable” (intransigent). Dominador Gomez contributed to this newspaper but he became more prominent in 1905 by collaborating in “Copy of the Memorial asking for the Independence of the Philippines.”} They displayed a nationalist-revolutionary outlook. The first number devotes an article to Mr. McKinley. This article is a fierce criticism of what they considered “imposition by brute
force” carried out by the Americans following the precepts of McKinley. Moreover they criticized the rationale of “benevolent assimilation”: “You also assert that without your protectorate, we would fall into fratricide anarchy, which is untrue…”

But even more eloquent and important was Galicano Apacible who wrote “To the American People.” By reading this essay we can infer that the promise of independence was real. Apacible put forward an extraordinary argument:

What reward did we get? Did the expected freedom come to us? No! As a requittal for our sacrifices and as a reward for our loyalty, subjugation is offered to us instead of freedom [emphasis added]. We may have a colonial government of the United States, administered in a foreign language, instead of the colonial government of Spain, which at least, was administered in a language already known to us and which we have made ours. We are to have a colonial government which will deny us the citizenship of its nation. In spite of their imperialistic tendencies, the Spanish government never went so far as to deny such citizenship! [emphasis added].

Such was the “benevolent assimilation” implemented by the United States. Galicano Apacible clamored for “independence or death.” But the voices of these Filipinos were being silenced by the so-called “Americanistas,” prominent Filipinos who had decided to cooperate with the Americans after having surrendering to them. These voices would be what the Americans would foster, while Apacible, Aguinaldo, Dominador Gomez, Isabelo de los Reyes and other “recalcitrants” would be gradually neglected, discredited and silenced until they fell into oblivion.

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62 Apacible, Galicano. ‘Please read and circulate. To the American People. An appeal,’ p. 5
One of the last claims of Los Filipinos was published in Manila, in November 1899: “La Política Actual en las Filipinas.” This short account of political affairs in 1899 is an indictment against American policy in the Philippines as one geared to implementing the policy of an oppressor. Once more, this account states the promise of independence and how the Filipinos believed in the Americans by considering them sincere and the redeemer of the oppressed.63

The examples cited above provide an alternative to the prevalent discourse of the academe—Spanish, American or Filipino. These works have been neglected systematically, some of them because they were written in Spanish, while others were deliberately omitted since they represented the other face of American benevolence: cruelty, oppression, tyranny. All these Filipino examples emphasize an important point: the failed task of the Schurman Commission. They are critics of the Commission since the latter co-opted some Filipinos—the so-called Americanistas—as the vox populi or representation of Filipino aspirations. As Reynaldo Ileto states, the Commission interviewed “dozens of Philippine-born witnesses of the ‘respectable and influential’” class and concluded that “the masses of the Filipino people, including practically all who are educated or who possess property, have no desire for an independent and sovereign Philippine state.”64 The Schurman Commission arrived in the Philippines with specific orders and this it

carried out faithfully—which was to represent the Filipinos as unfit for self-government.

Not only did Filipinos but also the anti-imperialists criticized American “benevolence” in the Philippines. If Worcester was invited by the imperialist and expansionists to deliver speeches, to the anti-imperialists George S. Boutwell was the other side of the coin. Boutwell presented an excellent address in September 1899 entitled “The War of Despotism in the Philippines Islands.” Boutwell complained of the suppression of opinions in the U.S. of those who differed with the imperialist project. The government, he said, was co-opting the press and other organs in order to pressure the people into silence—leading to the tacit acceptance of imperialism in America.65

One must recognize that the U.S. government’s mission of inculcating blind acceptance was a huge success. Despite Boutwell’s claims of the Filipino capacity for self-government, imperialist discourse succeeded in imposing its criteria. It succeeded in mounting a campaign of discrediting the anti-imperialists as anti-Americans and collaborators of the insurgents. The imperialists were little by little silencing these voices and imposing their dictum. While the critical works I mentioned earlier started to be suppressed, others were being fostered. An example, which would serve as a template for presenting the “true” Filipino aspirations is Isabelo Artacho’s “Declaración, Carta y Proclama.” Artacho, through personal questions addressed to Aguinaldo, mounted a

65 Boutwell, George S. The War of Despotism in the Philippine Islands. Liberty is Liberty as God is God. Published by the Anti-Imperialist League, 1899.
fierce criticism of the revolution, one which would be co-opted by the Americans as a dogma of faith. Artacho declared that the insurrection

only serves to satisfy political-personal ambitions, despicable and bastard passions, to execute with impunity in the dark of a political regime established with the name of Republic, eminently barbaric, treacherous and despotic acts and crimes ignored in the penal codes of the world…

Needless to say, this statement was adopted \textit{ad literam} by the Americans and it became the perfect excuse and pretext to keep the archipelago. It is important to note that Artacho, a Filipino previously involved in the revolution, now started to use the term “insurrection” instead of revolutionary war. The propaganda machinery of the U.S. can also be seen here working with effectiveness to transform “war” to “insurrection,” although at the beginning this machinery fell into contradiction and was mired in ambiguity.

The year 1905 saw the wide dissemination of what was originally asserted in the reports of the above Commissions. Fred Atkinson, the first general superintendent of education, was the first American author to tackle the Filipino insurrection of 1898 through his book, \textit{The Philippine Islands}. The term “war” appears timidly, to be overlapped by the term “insurrection.” LeRoy managed to disparage Atkinson’s book, which thus never saw wide acceptance. David P. Barrows, building on Atkinson, was much more influential. He reissued his \textit{History of the Philippines} in 1907, 1914, 1925 and 1926.\footnote{Barrows, David P. \textit{A History of the Philippines}. Yonkers-on-Hudson, New York: World Book Company.}

\footnote{Artacho Isabelo. \textit{Declaración, Carta y Proclama}, Hong Kong: 1899, p. 2. I have used Spanish version. I have a free translation in English which emphasizes deliberately some excerpts.}
The abovementioned works form only a small part of a wider discourse whose embryo was formed in 1899 and which became completely shaped in 1914. Artacho argues in this 1899 account that the insurrection was despotic and cruel and that Aguinaldo’s government was plagued with anarchy and familism. All these arguments would be used by the Americans to construct a distorted Philippine history ratified up to a certain extent by the Filipino Americanistas. Artacho praised the great nation of America as protector and liberator, motivated by the honest and generous purpose of “liberating the Filipinos from the new slavery.” It was better, he argued, to live under American tutelage rather than a Filipino government since Filipinos were not yet educated in politics.

Artacho’s manifesto contributed greatly to beginnings of American colonial discourse. As the years went by the discourse became more sophisticated and histrionic, but it also became a tautology. Americans broke their promises, violated international laws, conquered and subsequently occupied an independent country by starting a war. They censored newspapers and showed themselves cruel, irreverent and intransigent. America’s war was a war of despotism, such as Boutwell claimed. Some voices were silenced and suppressed forever, some were censored, other voices sang praises of the Americans—such as Artacho’s who would become a spokesman of the “honest intentions” of America. Artacho and other Americanistas would become the collaborators par excellence.

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68 Artacho Isabelo. Declaración, Carta y Proclama. p. 27.
I am more concerned here with articulating the voice of the losers—those who were clamoring for independence and would continue to do so during the decades of American rule. Filipinos were stigmatized with the epithet of “ignorant,” but they were not blind. They would not have collaborated with the Americans to expel the Spaniards unless they had received some promises. Despite the massive attempt by the Americans to deny or negate any sort of agreement between their representatives, Consul-General Pratt and Admiral Dewey, and General Aguinaldo, Foreman has fortunately left us with a document that tends to vindicate the claims of the revolutionaries: the draft Agreement between Consul Pratt and General Aguinaldo.
CHAPTER II: GENEALOGY OF THE DISCOURSE—THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION

We have freed the Filipinos from the abuses of Spanish rule. We cannot have them to drift alone on a dark aimless sea. We must save these less fortunate people from barbarism. This missionary Council does not support a grab for empire, but we support a paternal arrangement of our government toward the Philippines.

Josiah Strong

Background of the Commission

The starting point of the genealogy of American imperial discourse can be located in 1898 when the United States decided to protect or to become the guardians of the Filipinos. The U.S. administration involved itself in justifying such protection and guardianship through harnessing private enterprises, private collectors, newspapers and above all the academe. The universities would become the ideal forum to indoctrinate future students about the American project. The indoctrination acquired a specific character in which imperialist discourse prevailed. This discourse is characterized by the discrediting of Spanish rule.

Jacob Schurman, the president of Cornell University, had studied Spanish administration and decided univocally that the Spanish system was amorphous. Although important royal decrees were translated into English as early as 1899—for instance the Maura law—Schurman decided to suppress part of the archive and instead based his report on generalizations. He summarized more than three hundred years of Spanish rule in the Philippines as follows: “The Philippines was a colony
which remained a province of the Spanish missionary orders…” Thus he inaugurated the representation of Spanish rule as a “dark age” characterized by “three centuries of rule by medieval Spanish ecclesiastics.”

The Schurman Commission also initiated the suppression of terms such as “colony,” “war,” “independence” and “possession,” which henceforth became taboo. The U.S. administration would henceforth be able to disguise its imperialist policy through a discourse of Americanization of a backward country and the implementation of the sacred principles of democracy. The most important task, no doubt, was to fulfill the promise of a future self-government: “…when education shall have become general, then, in the language of a leading Filipino, his people will become more American than the Americans themselves.”

The Schurman Commission played the main role in the embryonic construction of a new history to underpin the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines. It laid the foundation for the Taft Commission to transform this into colonial policy. Some previously unknown people would gain unprecedented prominence as a result of their participation in this process. Dean C. Worcester, thanks to the publication of his book, *The Philippines and their People*, in 1898 became an immediate referent and an authority on the archipelago. This fact made him a valuable member

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2. *Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President.*, Vol. 1, p. 184. I think that, up to a certain extent, the Americans achieved their aim.
3. Dean C. Worcester played an important role during the Schurman and Taft Commission but I think that his most important task took place from 1914, with the publication of his book *The Philippines: Past and Present*, to 1924. He was to influence several generations. Therefore, his important task will be treated in another chapter.
of the Schurman Commission. Worcester would involve his alma mater, the University of Michigan, in the making of imperial policy.

More important, because of his anonymity, is Edward Ayer, a private collector who became *de facto* involved in the imperial project and took an active part in constructing the perfect colonial machine for producing knowledge.

Before analyzing the Schurman Commission as the catalyst of some stereotypical arguments in Philippine history, it is important to see how the U.S. administration got to involve private individuals such as Edward Ayer. Ayer played an important role since his task as Maecenas of the Philippines and his library as a tribal showcase generated three important topics: the encapsulation of the Philippines within the Latin American context, the suppression of books, and the Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government.

As soon as Edward Ayer knew that the Americans had decided to keep the Philippines he decided to buy all the books about Philippine history. He narrates his story as follows:

At the end of May, 1898, I happened to be in Venice, when the news came of the battle of Manila. At once I wrote to the principal book sellers of both Europe and America to send me a list of everything they had relating to the Philippine Islands, both manuscripts and printed, to my Chicago address, where I expected to be in about thirty days. Arriving there, I found a mass of material, catalogues, lists and letters from dealers all over the world, and in a few weeks the great Philippine Islands collection, now a part of the Edward E. Ayer Collection was well started. *I did not need to await the treaty of peace to realize that for many years to come these islands would be under the care of the US* [emphasis added] and that all this material about their native races would come well within the scope of my collection.

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Ayer’s paradigmatic statements throw light on the future pattern of colonial politics, education and scholarship. Ayer was right when he stated that he kept in touch with booksellers all over the world to acquire books. Americans were eager to know the history of a country they had acquired that was completely unknown for them. This eagerness for knowledge made Mr. Ayer, some publishers and above all the U.S. administration buy and collect documents regardless of the content or quality of the textbooks or manuscripts.

Ayer’s sentence, “I did not need to await the treaty of peace to realize that for many years to come these Islands would be under the care of the United States,” is important for several reasons. We can recognize the subtlety since there is not a single allusion to the term “colony” or “possession.” The Islands are merely “under the care of the United States.” Ayer was following the precepts of his government to identify the Americans as “protectors.” Moreover this statement is an interpolation where the past is origin of the present. Edward Ayer penned this story in 1926. At that moment, the American government was launching again, under Gen. Leonard Wood’s governorship, a campaign of propaganda to justify the U.S. refusal to grant the Filipinos independence nearly thirty years after the original “promise” in 1898.

It is important to follow Ayer’s career as the maecenas of Philippine history since his career reveals how he was implicated in the

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5 Edward Ayer kept in touch with the most and prestigious Filipinists from Spain –Wenceslao Retana, Pedro Vindel, Pablo Pastells and José Sánchez y Garrigós –librarian from the collection of La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas.

6 This precept from the days of McKinley was to consider the Philippines as a dependency belonging to the United States. There is an ad hoc omission of the term “colony.”
U.S. administration. Ayer bought many books, mostly dealing with the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. He went to Spain and acquired there an important collection, although some of the books he bought are completely useless—rubbish, even. Americans were in a hurry to know everything about the Philippines. Spanish booksellers took advantage of such American eagerness by emphasizing the possession of “rare books.”

As Retana explained in 1904—when he was working for Pedro Vindel—to José Sánchez, librarian from La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Ayer had been in Madrid visiting the collection of Pedro Vindel. He describes Ayer as follows:

“He came with the aspiration to buy old books. “I have a lot of money.” Vindel sold him algo de desecho impreso y manuscrito (rubbish - printed and manuscript)…”

Americans are madly acquiring three kinds of works: history, language and customs. They neglect legislation and newspapers… [emphasis added]

The last sentence is significant since the neglect of these documents was part of the campaign of suppression and discrediting aimed at Spaniards and the Spanish system. Ayer was interested in acquisitions from the first period of Spanish rule in the Philippines and above all from the accounts of the friars. This is the reason he said to Vindel that he wanted rare and old books. It was part of the machinery being constructed in order to illustrate the medievalism and the evangelization work at the heart of the Spanish system. Ayer bought books from the nineteenth century but only a few embrace the period

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7 Wenceslao Retana played an important role in this business. La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas Papers. Barcelona: Arxiu Nacional de Catalunya. Fons n. 138, Codi 030205
8 For instance, Edward Ayer bought to Pablo Pastells manuscripts from Spain in the United States and the Philippines, 170 volumes. He paid $10,000.
from 1868 to 1898, and these are imbued with a conservative trend. On the other hand, books related to legislation were acquired by officials such as Taft and Worcester. They made good use of them, implementing in the Philippines Spanish laws—this is the main reason these books had to be relegated to a secondary place. Ayer’s collection, then, was a pretext to foster, on the one hand, the notion that Spain was a despotic, tyrannical, anachronistic and medieval colonial master; and on the other hand, the state of backwardness of the Filipinos, who were pictured as an amalgam of tribes living in anarchy.

The second collaboration of Ayer with the construction of American discourse is connected with the first. With the purchase of these books—specifically from the sixteenth century—he was encapsulating the Philippines in the Latin American context. In fact, his main aim was to select documents of the acquisition of New Mexico and all parts of the United States which were once under the dominion of Spain. For this purpose, he contracted some students from the University of California who later became prestigious specialists on Latin American, such as Charles E. Chapman, Charles W. Hackett, William Lytle Schurz, and Charles H. Cunningham, who all contributed to the definition and contextualization of Philippine history within Latin America. All of them were in Seville collecting and transcribing documents from the Archivo

9 William Lytle Schurz wrote in 1930 *The Manila Galleon*. Lytle Schurz emphasizes the argument that the Philippines, during the Spanish rule, was a mere appendage of New Spain. This book became a reference for historians and at present continues to maintain its influence.

10 Charles H. Cunningham wrote in 1919 *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies. As Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila*. Cunningham’s book was a reference and continues to be so at present because of the uniqueness of the topic. The book is biased and wrong, but no-one has questioned him. Charles H. Cunningham, influenced by James A. Robertson, one of the editors of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, is a clear example of suppression in history with a specific effect, which is to show that the Spanish system was medieval.
General de Indias and later on, from 1928 onwards, they collaborated in the *Hispanic American Historical Review* with James A. Robertson, one of the editors of the multivolume compendium, *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*.

Finally, in 1904 Ayer visited the Philippines Islands, where he met Worcester, who at that time was the Secretary of Interior for the Islands. Worcester showed him a collection of about 8,000 photographs taken all over the archipelago. Ayer ordered copies of all these photographs and classified them by linguistic group. The photographs and the further classification became part of the Ayer collection in Chicago. The exhibition and the classification of these photographs had a specific objective: to demonstrate the incapacity of the Filipinos for self-government. One of the main points in the reports of the Schurman Commission and the Taft Commission was “racial and linguistic diversities disqualify them to undertake the task of governing the archipelago…” Ayer was providing a showcase for a big audience. The exhibition of these photographs demonstrated histrionically a barbaric civilization. This was part of American propaganda to spread the idea of Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government, and to justify the maintenance of the Philippines in American hands.

Ayer’s main contribution to American administration took place in 1921 during the preparation of the Special Wood-Forbes Mission to the Philippine Islands. His involvement in this special mission is an enigma.

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11 After this visit Ayer and Worcester continued to maintain a frantic correspondence. Worcester started to send him the official publications and recommend him some books which were included in his Philippine Collection.

12 The Schurman commission made special emphasis in that point and the volume 45 of Senate Documents is devoted entirely to illustrate the tribal diversity in the archipelago.
since he was quite careful in suppressing his personal correspondence. However, we know he made some suggestions to Leonard Wood since at Newberry Library we can find Wood’s letters. Besides his suggestions, Ayer presented as well some problems which Forbes and Wood were to confront: “P.S. The problems which you present are indeed difficult ones, and yet they are those which we must confront. Our Mission here is to make a thorough investigation on conditions and report to the President, so that he may have something definite on which to act.”

One can speculate what the “problems” were—that the Filipinos were vigorously claiming for an immediate independence as promised in 1914. In fact, as I shall explain in a later chapter, the Forbes-Wood mission had a specific task: to reverse the process of Filipinization and to argue and demonstrate that the Filipinos were still unfit for independence. These letters, thus, are a convincing demonstration of how the American administration was able to co-opt, in its laudable aims, different kinds of people—far removed from official positions but located in strategic institutions able to foster among scholars the construction of Philippine studies in the United States.

Dear Mr. Ayer:
Thank you for your good letter.
I shall be delighted to receive the suggestions which you speak of. Please write as frankly as you think…Ayer, Edward Papers. ‘Special Mission to the Philippine Islands.’ Box 2. Chicago: Newberry Library.
The Schurman Commission as Catalyst of the Taft Commission

The Schurman Commission is important for several reasons, probably the most important being that through it the United States and President McKinley made clear the policy to hold the Philippines. The Schurman Commission was in fact the catalyst of the Second Philippine Commission led by William H. Taft, as well as future commissions. However, the Schurman Commission has received less importance, being completely eclipsed by the Taft Commission. The reasons for this are rooted in three main factors. First of all, Schurman and his commissioners were not able to subordinate the Filipinos and to put an end to the war. Secondly, the Schurman Commission was characterized by the polarizations and disagreements among its members. And, finally, the exegetes of Schurman explain that as early as 1902, he stated openly that “the islands should be granted their independence as soon as possible.”

It is important to pay some attention to this Commission and its most important motto, “to retain the Philippines,” since in order to back up McKinley’s and the Republicans’ decision to keep the Philippines, the Commission constructed certain images of the Filipinos and their former colonial master, Spain, and put forward certain arguments that have prevailed, with some ramifications, up to the present. As a matter of fact, the Schurman Commission established a pattern that would be followed by the subsequent commissions. This was the practice of meeting only

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two classes of people. One was the very limited but thoroughly pro-
American type of natives who, more or less, could be the beneficiary of
American patronage; the co-optation of these ilustrados would pave the
way for an evolutionary argument, of “collaborationism” as synonymous
to “caciquism,” and “compadrazgo.” The other class was carefully
“culled” from the most ignorant and impoverished natives. American
Commissions considered from the beginning that the Filipinos could not
obtain independence since this class did not wish it, nor even a
protectorate. Besides, this poor and ignorant “rabble” would impose a
military oligarchy which would reign with terror. Therefore these two
classes became the *vox populi* of the Filipinos.

There is a second important issue brought up by the Schurman
Commission which has provided another stereotypical image. Schurman,
who had studied Spanish institutions, stated categorically that the
Philippines had been ruled for three hundred years by medieval
ecclesiastics. Schurman suppressed for this purpose important
documents. His summary of Spanish rule would be used by future
scholars as the dictum of the truth, giving form to a notion of the Spanish
“dark age.” Subsequent commissions would put forward a similar history
of Spanish colonial government.

Last but not the least, Schurman and his commissioners were
tasked with sorting out any doubts regarding the promises made to
Aguinaldo about independence under an American protectorate. The

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36 Peter Stanley and David Steinberg extrapolate the birth of clientelism back to the Spanish period, but
they emphasize that the Schurman Commission gave shape to the future patron-client relationships.
Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 56-57; Steinberg, David J. *The Philippines. A Singular and a
Commission explained in detail, although ambiguously, why the Philippines could not attain the category of protectorate. Schurman suppressed two important terms in order to demonstrate the magnanimity of American intentions regarding the Philippines: “colony” and “possession.”

When McKinley decided to retain the Philippines he needed to legitimate the American occupation by developing adequate means of administration besides easing the tension in relations with the Filipinos. For this purpose, McKinley named to the Commission Schurman (president of Cornell University), George Dewey, Charles Denby, Dean C. Worcester—considered by Fred Chamberlin as the encyclopedia of the committee—and Major General Otis. The Commissioners were representative of the two main American factions: Republicans and Democrats. This fact is significant in order to understand how, in a situation where public opinion was divided between retention of the Islands and anti-imperialism, “patriotic” American values were brought to the fore.

It is said that Schurman was an enemy of expansionism and that his attitude did not change when he was appointed President of the Commission. However according to his account of the interview with McKinley,

He reminded the president that he was an avowed opponent of annexation; however, McKinley countered by saying that he too opposed taking the Philippines but saw no way out, since he believed that to cast the islands adrift would cause “severe international complications and perhaps involve the United States in a world war.”

17 ‘President Schurman on the Philippine Situation.’ *Outlook*, (Nov. 4, 1899), p. 534.
It seems, judging by this paragraph, that Schurman decided to accept the expansionist policy out of patriotic duty. McKinley and Schurman were transgressing, by using patriotic ends, the legitimate aspirations of the Filipinos for independence and were showing to the world the benevolent ends of the United States:

> We were to aid in “the most humane, pacific and effective extension of authority throughout these islands, and to secure, with the least possible delay, the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants.”

This paragraph demonstrates us that the Americans presented themselves as liberators rather than conquerors. Not only did the Americans have to deal with the Filipinos but also the possibility of other Europeans powers intervening in favor of the Filipinos or the Spaniards. This is the reason McKinley was appealing to American patriotic values. The Americans twisted the argument around claiming that “an independent Philippine Republic would have been engulfed in the irresistible tides of rival imperialism…”

The Commission soon announced the benevolent purposes of the United States, which was anxious to establish in the Philippines an enlightened system of government under which the Filipino people might enjoy the largest measure of home rule and the amplest liberty. The Commission offered the Filipinos a government consisting of “a Governor-General appointed by the President; a cabinet appointed by the Governor-general and a general advisory council elected by the people.”

The Commission also promised Filipinos the largest measure of local

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19 Williams, Daniel R. *The United States and The Philippines*, p. 106.
self-government consistent with peace and good order.\textsuperscript{20} This announcement—a faithful reflection of the claims made by the Filipino reformists to Spain and, in fact, the reforms implemented by Moret in 1898—would attract the educated and propertied men who had separated from Aguinaldo and his Republic and joined their interests to those of the United States.

This will be the genesis for the future history of the collaborators.\textsuperscript{21} Avoiding the clichés or stigmas characteristic of the Philippine history devised by the Americans, we should understand that the so-called collaborators were an American creation in order to legitimize and establish a governmental system in the Philippines, rejecting the use of terms such as “colony” or “possession.” As Ileto explains, “The Americans found that, with a few exceptions, the Philippines had no sultans as in British colonies, no ‘hereditary chieftains or rulers,’ no ‘established sovereign to whom the people owed and recognized allegiance.’”\textsuperscript{22}

In fact, the Americans were faced with a typical colonial government implanted by the Spaniards in a transitional phase that was moving towards the British model. Those collaborators, as the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President, 1900-1901, 1:9.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Guerrero, Milagros. ‘The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-1902.’ In Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. de Jesus (ed.), \textit{Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations}, Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1981. Guerrero argues that there was not a disruption between the reforms implemented by the Spaniards in 1893 and the revolutionary government. Aguinaldo co-opted the propertied and ilustrado men in order to rule at the provincial and municipal level and he used the system established by the Spaniards. Guerrero assumes that those “caciques” who emerged during Spanish rule continued to have preponderance during the Filipino Republic and that later they collaborated with the Americans. Therefore, she is establishing an evolutionary emplotment related to two different approaches. On the one hand, the Marxist idea of class; and on the other, the American construction of “caciquism.” She misses an important issue in that the “ilustrados” were necessary as political intermediaries in an incipient government. In fact, they were the only ones with the needed political experience.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ileto, Reynaldo. ‘Knowledge and Pacification. The Philippine-American War,’ p. 21.
\end{itemize}
evolutionary history explains, are the same ones who collaborated with Spain. Not in vain were the Spaniards establishing a native autonomous government or self-government, but they had no time to develop this model.\footnote{Robles, Eliodoro. \textit{The Philippines in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century}. Quezon City: Malaya, books INC, 1969. Robles stated in 1969 that “Spain was not entirely averse to granting more powers to municipal and provincial governments at the proper time, as evinced by reforms in the last decades of the century when local capacity to rule began to emerge. Unfortunately, time ran out on her.” In spite of the bibliographical limitations because of American bibliographical suppression, this book is the best history of the nineteenth century. Robles recognized the reformist policy of the Spaniards. Lamentably he denies the Maura law by using LeRoy’s \textit{The Americans in the Philippines}, and the Schurman report.}

Therefore, the Commission needed to define, or to ascribe a category to, this new dependency, following upon its knowledge of the old government of the “ilustrados” and the “irreconciliables.” The United States was caught between Scylla and Charybdis since the “ilustrados” misunderstood, according to the commissioners (specifically, Worcester) the term “protectorate.” Thus, they had to explain why they could not implant a protectorate. Besides, they needed to reject categorically the term “colony,” which, on the one hand, meant continuity of the “tyrannical” government of the Spaniards; and on the other, reflected the Filipino insurgents’ violent opposition to any colonial form of government. The Commission was forced to suppress this term to attract the Filipinos.

The Filipinos were not mistaken, as the Americans claimed, in thinking that the United States promised independence under an American protectorate. Aguinaldo wrote in \textit{Reseña Verídica} that, “at least, the United States would recognize Philippine independence under a naval protectorate and there was no necessity to document this fact.”\footnote{Aguinaldo Emilio. \textit{Reseña Verídica}..., p. 10.}
Apparently, the idea of a protectorate was part of the promise made by Consul-General Pratt in Singapore. Moreover, as I stated previously, the 1899 edition of Foreman’s book supported this view. It states that “an American protectorate would be recognized on the same terms as those fixed for Cuba.” There is still another testimony by James Creelman in a letter of 20 November 1899: “General Aguinaldo has officially stated to the American representative his will and wish to accept a Protectorate from the United States.”

Worcester and Schurman denied any promise of the establishment of a protectorate. In negotiations Worcester established with some Filipinos, the latter illustrated clearly what they understood by “protectorate,” displaying a great knowledge in international laws. Schurman also rejected the promise, alleging “misunderstandings.” According to Schurman, the Filipinos misinterpreted American purposes. Finally, both had to make clear the real intentions of the United States vis à vis the Philippines—to establish de facto and de iure a colony.

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27 I have Worcester’s interview with Galicano Apacible. Worcester stated that “he was, like all his countrymen, perfectly childish.” According to Worcester, Apacible said that “the function of a protector was to protect.” Worcester was simplifying and discrediting the knowledge of Apacible. Worcester Dean C. Papers, 1899. Personal Correspondence. Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, University of Michigan.
28 Paterno, Pedro. *El Problema Político de Filipinas, solución dada por Pedro A. Paterno*. Paterno makes an excellent definition of Protectorate by which the Philippines would have sovereignty under American rule. He makes clear any possible misunderstanding by quoting international laws: “When a State, Le Moine says, is under the protection of another State, expressly reserving, in all cases the right to self-govern and to enact the laws that a country considers more convenient, it does not disappear as member of the society of nations…,” pp. 8-9.
It is hard to guess through the report of the Philippine Commission what the American purposes alluded to by Schurman were. Volume I of this report devotes fourteen pages (97-111) to explaining the plan of the government for the Philippines. These pages are full of ambiguity and confusion and disguise the real intentions of the Americans to colonize the archipelago. Predictably, the report starts by denying any Filipino aspiration toward a “protectorate.” The explanation is confused and, above all, contradictory. I wish to highlight two important reasons why the Americans could not consider the Philippines as a protectorate. First, the United States considered the Philippines as its new dependency. This is an important term—“dependency”—since it is part of the new American terminology and a priori conceals their real purposes. The second reason can be gleaned from the Commission’s comparison of British protectorates with the establishment of a possible protectorate in the Philippines. It concludes:

The United States possesses sovereignty over the Philippine Islands, and nowhere in the archipelago (excepting Mindanao, Palawan, and the Sulu group) are there sultans or chieftains. At the time of Spanish conquest the great majority of the natives were governed by chieftains or datus. But the Spanish system of government was uncongenial to the system of native rulership and by degrees the native potentates disappeared…

This paragraph is really very ambiguous since the commission was reversing the first promises made to the Filipinos, or more specifically, to Aguinaldo. As has been mentioned there was not, in the Philippines, an established sovereignty. In fact, when the Americans decided to hold the archipelago the government was in a phase of transformation in which

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the *principalía* began to self-govern their “municipios” (municipalities). The second phase of this project was to concede provincial self-government by extending the vote. The Spaniards did not have time, but Americans found an incipient political autonomy, which they needed to deny at this moment, but later the power of the *principalía* would be highlighted in order to demonstrate that *caciquism* was a structure of government implanted by the Spaniards and headed by the *principalía* who controlled the masses.32

The last sentence from the above excerpt disguises something deeper: the idea that the Spanish disrupted the native system in the Philippines as they had done before in Latin America. This is part of the black legend.33 The Spaniards did not destabilize the native system. On the contrary, for more than twenty years both systems coexisted with each other and when this changed, the *principalía* always had limited powers. In short, the United States was searching for some excuses to break the promise to Aguinaldo and to legitimate their conquest. But the Americans did not find a *tabula rasa*; on the contrary, they came across a political faction headed by “ilustrados and wealthy”—the so-called “autonomists” such as Pedro Paterno, Pardo de Tavera and Felipe Buencamino, among the others; and a leader, Emilio Aguinaldo, who was able to mobilize the masses in order to attain the independence of the

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33 The Black Legend started in England and France. This anti-Hispanism became an integral part of English thought. The writers highlighted examples of Spanish vileness and treachery and in Europe and the United States the idea spread widely that Spain was the cradle of ignorance and fanaticism, unable to compete with modern nations. The church was the main cause of the Spanish cultural “degradation.” It seems that this discourse is quite similar to that spread by the United States in the Philippines.
Philippines and to implement a Republic with the establishment of institutions that worked quite well.

The Commission put more emphasis on the negation of the Philippines as a probable colony. The Filipinos had revolted against the Spaniards in order to become a province, such as Cuba and Puerto Rico, instead of a colony. The Spanish government made clear in the articles of the constitution that the Philippines was a colony in the most modern sense—a territory ruled by a foreign country. But the Philippines was a colony from the sixteenth century as a territory out of the nation conquered and ordinarily ruled by “leyes especiales” (special laws.) The United States, therefore, had to nuance, in order to attract the Filipinos, a specific terminology. The term “colony” was completely suppressed:

The commission desires, on behalf of all the Filipinos, to protest against the suggestion of calling the archipelago colony…for in the experience of the Filipinos a “colony” is a dependent political community which the sovereign power exploits, oppresses and misgoverns.

The last sentence is a clear allusion to Spanish rule as oppressor, and it is a contradictio in terminis. The Americans by protesting against calling the archipelago “colony” were informing the Filipinos of their benevolent purposes. Therefore, they were to change the term colony to dependency—a more subtle word, which connoted subordination, subjection, subjugation or submissiveness. Dependency and colony are complementary terms and so the report states in the last sentence that “a colony is a dependent political community.” Obviously, the American necessity of suppressing any negative-ness to their “benevolent

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assimilation” made them fall into contradictions. They had already forgotten that they had stated categorically that the Philippines was a “dependency” of the United States. Filipinos would understand the American objectives as a new colonization since they were to implement the principle of Crown Colony Government by appointing officials instead of electing them. *A priori*, the report rejected the principle of Crown Colony since the American ends were to concede self-government to the Filipinos when these were prepared and this principle denies this right. The United States changed the form but not the content.

In sum, the Americans decided that the Philippines was not to be a colony or a protectorate but a *territorial government* – an ambiguous term that conceals the real purposes of the United States, which was the permanent annexation of the Philippines as with the case of Hawaii or Alaska. The Americans did not entertain the idea that independence would ultimately be granted and this point became one of the main principles of American discourse: “It is impossible, even approximately, to fix a time for the withdrawal of American sovereignty over the archipelago…”\(^3\) As I shall explain later in this thesis, this principle would become a dogma of faith.

The Schurman Commission, as has been mentioned, established the parameters for future commissions by keeping in touch with the pro-Americans, on the one hand, and on the other, the most ignorant and poor people specifically chosen in order to demonstrate that the Philippines was not prepared for self-government. This is the context in which we

\(^3\) *Report of the US. Philippine Commission*..., p. 103.
need to view the diplomatic negotiations of the Schurman Commission with representatives of Aguinaldo’s government. The Commissions attitude was framed by a budding construction of a “black legend” of the Filipino republic. Worcester defines the Filipino Republic as “a veritable reign of terror.” In fact he explained that

These leaders [of the Republic] never established a government which adequately protected life and property, or gave to their people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary inaugurated a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a government institution.36

The Schurman Commission thus exaggerated the facts to justify one of the conclusions of the report: unfitness for self-government. The report could thus only but conclude that “The United States cannot withdraw…we are there and duty binds us to remain. The Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence…there being no Philippine nation, but only a collection of different people.”37

This categorical statement of the Commission was to be supported by two main arguments. First was that the masses of the Filipinos did not really wish independence or even a protectorate.38 The second argument was to stigmatize the Filipino Republic and its leaders since the Republic was to be subsumed in the “dark ages” of Philippine history. Therefore this republic was to be as tyrannical and despotic as its predecessor, Mother Spain: “‘Philippine republic’ is the ideal of the Tagalog

36 Worcester Dean C. The Philippine Past and Present. New York: The McMillan Company, 1914 and 1930, p. 15. Modern historiography, for instance Peter Stanley, prefers to consult Filipino sources such as Felipe Calderon’s Memorias. Calderon defined the republic as a “military oligarchy.” See Stanley, Peter. A Nation in the making, p. 53. Stanley is being very subtle in selecting Calderon’s Memorias since he infers that American officials such as Worcester and Taft were right when they described Aguinaldo’s government as a military oligarchy.
37 “The Government of the Philippine Islands.” In Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission ..., 1900-1901. 1:4
insurgent leaders to whom the formation of that organization, at least on paper, offered a welcome means of escape from the despotic associations of the previous dictatorship, which, in fact, continued unchanged.  

Therefore the report and Worcester harped on the dictatorship and the republic being a “government of terror.” As a matter of fact, Worcester in a letter written on 26 May 1899 defined one of the leaders of the Republic, General Antonio Luna, as a military dictator. Schurman, in the meantime, set the precedents for the future commissions:

Military power released from civil authority always lapses into a selfish and remorseless tyranny. And nowhere is this law more tragically illustrated than in the Philippines. Such an unholy carnival of militarism, despotism, brigandage, cruelty and wholesome intimidation of peaceful and unoffending inhabitants as the disorganized insurgent bands have since enacted in different parts of the Philippine Islands is without parallel in occidental history…

This conclusion lays the foundation for the further development of the discourses of “caciquism,” and “caudillism,” besides supporting the idea of a perennial chaos, anarchy and incipient oligarchism in the islands.

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39 Report of the US. Philippine Commission..., p. 102. Benedict Anderson states that the Filipino Republic was fragile “with more than a few similarities to Bolivar’s abortive Gran Colombia…” “Had it not been for William McKinley, one might almost say, the Philippines in the early twentieth century could have fractured into three weak, caudillo-ridden states with the internal politics of the nineteenth century Venezuela or Ecuador.” Anderson, Benedict, ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines’ or ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,’ in Spectre of Comparisons. Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1998, p. 200. Anderson’s statement has been followed up by other scholars, such as for instance Paul Hutchcroft in Booty Capitalism. The politics of banking in the Philippines, who cites literally this excerpt in order to ponder the fact that Filipino Republic exhibited a pattern of “caudillismo.” (p. 25) We can see that there is continuity in the discourse from 1900. The Filipino Republic was an autocratic oligarchy. There is still a justification of American tutelage in the Philippines.


The Commission continued to argue why the Filipinos could not become independent at that moment, and again there was an insistence in the arbitrariness of the natives and if they were left alone, a patronage system would emerge in which would prevail despotism, misgovernment and corruption, since they had inherited these customs from the Spaniards. As I shall demonstrate in a later chapter, despite American tutelage the “patronage” or “cacique” system would be constantly referred to in the literature about the Philippines. We need to understand that was regularly deployed as the main argument when rejecting any idea of independence during certain phases of American colonial rule.

Another argument of the Schurman commission—inextricably related to the former—was that the diversity of tribes and language did not allow a pacific co-existence. This fact made at that moment an independent sovereignty Philippine state neither possible nor desirable.

In sum, when the first Philippine Commission finished its short trip to a few provinces, drawing on its interviews with a select elite and its biased knowledge of Spanish history and institutions, it concluded categorically that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. The arguments were apparently, and on paper, multiple but the report of the Commission is in fact unilinear and repetitious in its argumentation.

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42 This argument can be frequently found in American literature. Modern scholars have established a linkage between deep-rooted Filipino traditions and the development of systems of patronage which establish a dysfunctional democracy. Reynaldo Ileto develops this topic in ‘Orientalism and the Study of Philippine Politics’ in Knowing America’s Colony. A Hundred Years from the Philippine War.

43 The First Philippine Commission insisted on this point, probably at the request of Worcester. They considered it as one of the main obstacles for Philippine independence and they settled this matter in one volume devoted entirely to the different tribes. Volume III of the report is dedicated to this topic Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission to the President. ‘Senate Documents’. 56th Congress 1st Session, Vol. 45 1899-1900.
Obviously, the commissioners thought that the rebellion was not a national movement. It was only a “Tagalog insurrection” and

In general, such machinery of “government” as existed served only for *plundering* the people under the pretext of levying “war contributions” while many of the insurgent officials were rapidly accumulating wealth. The administration of justice was paralyzed and *crime of all sorts* was rampant...never in the worst days of Spanish *misrule* had the people been so overtaxed. In many provinces there was absolute anarchy and from all sides came petitions for protection and help. [italics mine]

This above excerpt deserves comment since it is the catalyst for the construction of a new Philippine history. This paragraph provides stereotyped images of Spanish colonial rule and the Filipino republic by suppressing Filipino and Spanish documents and newspapers such as *La Independencia*. Filipino institutions established by Aguinaldo worked quite well since they did not differ too much from those implemented by the Spaniards. Therefore there was not a radical disruption during the brief interregnum of the Republic. Felipe Calderon explains in his “Memorias” that the Congress inaugurated during the Republic accepted small changes to the Spanish regulations. Moreover, the project of the Constitution redacted by Mabini follows the articles of the Spanish republican constitution.

Paterno proposed a constitutional project following the Spanish Constitution of 1869. However, the father of the Constitution, Calderon, states that he took as model the Constitutions of Latin American republics, specifically that enacted by Costa Rica. In any case, the constitution finally implanted in the Philippines followed the model 1869

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45 Calderon Felipe G. *Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina. Segunda Etapa (1898 a 1901).* Manila: El Renacimiento, 1907, p. 235.
Spain, although most scholars follow Calderon’s argument. Some intentionally do so in order to support the idea the Republic could become a dictatorship as its “American forebears” or to deny that the Spanish Constitution of 1869 was the most modern of Europe.

The revolutionary government of Aguinaldo followed, as well, the Spanish reforms implementing a modern structure and function of provincial and municipal government from 1893. In other words, the Maura law was implemented by the Republic despite the systematic denial of the fact by American scholars from the Schurman Commission until the present. Aguinaldo, thus, was limiting the vote to a minority, as the Spaniards did before, from the propertied and educated class. This fact, however, should not be relevant per se since Aguinaldo was establishing a governmental structure familiar to his fellow Filipinos.

A problem arises when the Republican government’s policies are de-contextualized by scholars intent upon constructing an evolutionary emplotment and categorizing the government, therefore, as conservative when it should really be defined as the opposite—liberal. To state categorically that the conservative government ruled by Filipino oligarchies “perpetuated cacique society and government simply echoes the Schurman Commission, which for imperial purposes demonized the Filipino Republic, portraying it as more obscure than the Spanish “dark ages” since by perpetuating this oligarchy the Americans could not implant the sacred principles of democracy.

Apart from the establishment of these institutions, the Aguinaldo government founded a budding university and a great library with books confiscated from the Spanish religious. This data has been ignored by historiography because of the tendency to use a specific or official bibliography and omit important testimonies. Moreover, the brief interregnum of this “despotic” Republic—according to the Americans, of course—produced a series of stamps with a sun and a triangle. Such “despotism” is the histrionic portrayal of the Filipino Republic, part of the black legend, which unfortunately has maintained its efficacy up to today. The accumulation of wealth supposedly engendered the spread of oligarchism and the corruption of the Filipinos, a cancer which the Americans portrayed themselves as confronting and trying to eradicate, but could not.

Revisiting the “Dark Age” of the Spanish Regime

It is important to note that the use by the Schurman Commission of the terms “Spanish misrule” to define the old regime became the genesis of the construction of the “dark age” of the Spanish system. In fact, the Schurman report observed of the general government of the Islands at the end of the Spanish regime that

It failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government—the preservation of peace and order, and even the administration of justice; nor can there be any doubt that it proved an engine of oppression and exploitation of the Filipinos…

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Villajos, Juan de Dios. *Apuntes del P. Juan de Dios Villajos ex ministro Provincial de la de San Gregorio*, p. 205. Villajos was a friar who lived in the Philippines during the revolt. He wrote his memoirs—unpublished— in 1924.
The most prominent defects of the government were: (1) The boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general; (2) the “centralization” of all governmental functions in Manila; (3) the absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might make their needs and desires known; (4) a pernicious system of taxation; (5) a plethora of officials who lived on the contrary and by their very number obstructed, like a circumlocution office, the public business they professed to transact; (6) division of minor responsibilities though the establishment of rival boards and offices; (7) the costliness of the system and the corruption it bred; (8) confusion between the functions of the state and the functions of the church and of the religious orders.49

These conclusions regarding the Spanish regime were discrediting and tendentious, by displaying a decrepit, tyrannical and faltering Spanish rule. Schurman argued, then, that the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government is because Spain “failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government.” He showed how the Filipinos had lived for more than three hundred years under a state of anarchy and chaos. The isomorphism raised by Schurman created a mythogenesis which has survived up to the present.

It is important to analyze the defects as noted by the Schurman Commission since some of them are based on the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries instead of the end of the nineteenth. This assumption can be observed in the statement about “the boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general.” This defect, as pointed out by the commissioners, gave the governor-general supreme authority over the islands. This idea is immanent in the term “autocratic power.”

49 Report of the US. Philippine Commission..., Vol. 1, 1900, p.81. These conclusions about the old regime will be reproduced by Gaylord Bourne. ‘Historical Introduction.’ In Blair and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 vol. I; David P. Barrows, History of the Philippines; Charles H. Cunningham, The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila; James A. LeRoy, The Americans in the Philippines or Joseph Ralston Hayden, Philippines A Study in National development. In fact, these conclusions have become the stereotyped images of the Spanish regime.
However, the commissioners fell into a contradiction since this supposedly absolute power of the governor-general, linked to the Royal instructions to the governors during the early years of the conquest, clashes with the argument about the “confusion between the functions of the state and the functions of the church and the religious orders.” The word “confusion” infers that the function of the state was not as powerful as it seemed. On the contrary, Schurman seemed to be arguing that absolute power was really in the hands of the religious orders: “It will be noticed that there is scarcely any branch of the municipal government in which the reverend parochial priest does not play an important part.”

The report of the Commission in fact gives the friars an omnipotent power. However, as I have stated repeatedly, there are many ambiguities in the report. Schurman and his commissioners recognized tacitly that the Maura law was implanted in the archipelago. They knew that the power of the friars had been limited to inspections and giving advice. But the commissioners needed to dismiss this reality, offering instead the observation that “in practice [the priest] is said to make himself a power in the ‘pueblo’ by simply using these attributes effectively.”

Although the commissioners were conducting an inspection of the archipelago, they could not directly observe and verify the power of the friars and so they made reference to what they heard from their informants, e.g., “It is said that…” In sum, to illustrate the dichotomy between religious power and secular power, the commissioners were mobilizing an image anchored in the sixteenth century.

One can perceive that the defects pointed out by the report were written at the request of Worcester who had published, in 1898, *The Philippines and their people*. Worcester based his arguments regarding the Spanish regime on the first edition of John Foreman’s *The Philippine Islands*. Foreman experienced *in situ* important reforms in the Philippines and so he could state in his Preface that “within the last twenty years the colony [the Philippines] has made great strides on the path of social and material progress; its political and commercial development is rapidly increasing…”[emphasis added][52]

Worcester neglected this paragraph, emphasizing instead Foreman’s explanation of the first Spanish centuries. Foreman was echoing the vertiginous changes the Philippines was undergoing in the late nineteenth century. As a matter of fact, the decade of the eighties and the nineties of the nineteenth century saw the restructuring of Spanish colonial objectives in the Philippines, opening up two reformist avenues: the first was fiscal, the second and most important was institutional reform—i.e., judicial and municipal. This reform thus denies the claim of “the boundless and autocratic powers of the governor-general.” The “mission-military” paternalism pointed out by Schurman had already given way in the late nineteenth century to the authoritarianism of a modern colonialism based on the idea that the native races had to be raised to the category of subjects, economically useful and grateful receptors of modern colonial engineering.

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Under Spain’s reformist thrust, liberal governments would reorganize the whole administration. One of the first measures would be to strip the friars of their preeminence in the archipelago. The second and most important would be a readjustment of the institutions of the islands under the new concept of Spanish imperialism. This new concept anticipated giving minor positions to the natives in order to create a strong native bureaucracy similar to the British.

It was precisely the new colonial vision of the Spaniards that was reflected on the Philippines Exposition of Madrid in 1887. This exhibition showcased a tribal amalgam needing Spanish domination. The semi-savage native showed in the Exhibition had to be the receptors of the new Spanish colonial engineering. Victor Balaguer, Minister for the Colonies during the first liberal government, was the promoter of the Exhibition and the new colonialism. Although Balaguer furnished the new parameters of the colonial policy conceiving of the archipelago as an exploitative entrepôt, he defended as well the principle of gradual native assimilation. This idea was materialized with the publication of the Penal Code according to which the jueces de paz—justices of the peace—would be natives.

The new system of administration of justice was enacted in the Philippines, despite the defects noted by the Commission regarding the administration of justice. In fact, the Commission studied the Spanish administration and used official Spanish documents to elaborate on part IV of the report entitled, *The Government of the Philippine Islands*. The first chapter is devoted to the Spanish government in the Philippines.
Schurman ignored, precisely, the *Compilation of the Organic provisions of the Administration of Justice in the Spanish Colonial Provinces and Appendices relating thereto of 1891*, Tratado teórico práctico y colección de legislación para los juzgados de paz (Theoretical and Practical Treatise and Compilation of Laws for the Tribunals of Peace) (1893). This work contains the principles tying together the organization, attributions, civil, criminal and administrative procedures and above all the general rules for the justices of the peace—the Código Penal de Filipinas y Ley provisional para la aplicación de las disposiciones del mismo (1887), (Penal Code from the Philippines and Provisional Law to the application of its dispositions) and Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil de Filipinas (1888), (Civil Trial Law of the Philippines). The U.S. government used all these works to administer justice in the archipelago. However, it emphasized the idea of the “absence” of a true justice administration in order to demonstrate the tyranny and oppression characteristic of its Spanish predecessor.

Victor Balaguer implemented other revolutionary reforms dismissed by the Commission. These reforms were conceived as the product of the progress or exigencies of the nineteenth century. His

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53 These documents were translated during the Schurman Commission by the War Department, 1899. Washington: Government Printing Office.
54 José María Pérez Rubio compiled all these books which were published in Spain and the Philippines. Pérez Rubio founded in 1882 El Faro Jurídico in which are treated the issues related to laws. In 1889, he founded the journal El Consultor de los Jueces de Paz. He wrote all the legislation enacted for the archipelago. The books written by Rubio were acquired by Worcester, an active member of the Commission. These books can be found at the University of Michigan in the Dean C. Worcester Special Collection.
55 Victor Balaguer was the maker of the Consejo de Ultramar, an institution for the matters of the colonies. Moreover he encouraged public works, although the Commission stated categorically that “there were no public works.” He fostered agriculture and promoted the creation of a library in the Philippines. On August 12, 1887 the Museum-Library of Manila was inaugurated. The director of this museum was Pedro Paterno who started to publish in 1895 Boletín de Museo Biblioteca de Filipinas. This information is provided by W. E. Retana in Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas [3 vol.] vol. 3, entry 4556, p. 1773.
Memoria, Islas Filipinas is a faithful reflection of his idea of progress. “It is necessary,” he states, “to prepare those islands in order to respond to the expectations and promises of the future; it is necessary to foster the trade with the metropolis; to ‘hispanize’ the country.”

There is no doubt that the real intentions of Spain were the “re-colonization and Hispanization” of the archipelago--aims that were very different from what the Schurman Commission stated in its report.

Other liberal ministers paid special attention to reorganizing the administration of the Islands. Becerra during his term as Minister for the Colonies contributed to the development of public education and implanted the first reform of local administration on 12 November 1889. This was deemed as

the first step…taken in order that Spanish sons of the Archipelago, irrespective of race, because this does not exist in the law, learn about working in the councils, about the idea of municipio [municipal government] and how this work, preparing themselves at the same time for carrying out local matters.

This reform motion was concluded by Antonio Maura in 1893, thus the term “Maura law.” The Organic Royal Decree of 19 May 1893 which is published in Gaceta de Manila gives basically the form of the new municipal regime of the archipelago:

In the Philippine Islands, my government [liberal] will restore soon the destroyed communal institutions which have there the inestimable roots of tradition, restoring the faculties and means in order that they may meet by themselves the needs of every town.

These two excerpts contradict the defects presented by Schurman, i.e., “absence of representative institutions in which the Filipinos might

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57 Colección Legislativa, 2 semestre. ‘Exposición de motivos,’ pp. 1335-1351.
make their needs and desires known” and “centralization of all governmental functions.” Moreover the Maura law was enacted to decentralize the political system and foster the tribunales municipales (municipal tribunals) by representing the legal association of all the inhabitants of a municipality and administrating their own communal interests.69

The Maura law contained two crucial points. The first one is the election of officials which, although this was certainly restrictive, became a landmark achievement since the members of the municipal tribunal were to be elected by Filipinos instead of the governor. The second point is that the friars lost their power, becoming mere observers; “The municipal reform reduced the overwhelming influence the friars had had in all the matters of the town.”60

Schurman knew all these dispositions since the Department of War had translated the Maura law into English as Spain, translation of the General Instructions for drafting public documents subject to record in the Spanish Colonial Provinces of 1899. Moreover, the Commission possessed as well the Decretos creando y organizando el Cuerpo de Administración Civil de Filipinas (Decrees creating and organizing the Civil Administration in the Philippines) of 1870. These decrees were enacted by Moret. In fact, Schurman based his explication of Spanish government in the Philippines on the Maura law. Therefore, the reader

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69 The tribunal was to be constituted by five persons: a captain –before gobernadorcillo-- and four tenientes. These representative had to be elected by twelve persons belonging to the principalia (the most distinguished or noble Filipinos). These terms started to have a significant importance during this commission since the members of the principalia were the makers of the patronage system discovered by the Commission.

60 Retana, W. E. Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal, p. 306.
can conclude that the Schurman Commission in fact found this administrative system operating in the archipelago. Schurman, however, needed to deny that the law was in force. To this end, he used the categorical statement “absence of representative institutions.” The term “absence” was to play an important role in this context, since by using this word he could not deny the implantation of Maura law, but he might argue by “absence” that the representative institutions were only nominal. Thus, the term “absence” would develop into the notion of “dead letter.” Schurman would conclude that the Maura law had not educated the natives for self-government.

As for the de-centralization of the government, first Moret in 1870 and later Maura in 1893 started to de-centralize the system by giving power to the municipal tribunals. Schurman devotes a short paragraph to this so-called de-centralization, thus inaugurating an important topic for future scholars. He was to entitle this section “evils of Spanish centralization in government.” The evils which the Americans inherited were the omnipotent power of the cabezas de barangay (village headmen) who formed the vital core of the municipal economy. This omnipotence, says the Commission, shows the “malignancy of the disease by which [municipal government] had been corrupted.” The Americans could, therefore, be portrayed as confronting a centralized and corrupt system, which derived from a cacique-dominated system. In fact,

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in due time *Cabeza de barangay* would be assimilated into *Cacique* in colonial discourse.  

In spite of the defects pointed out by the commissioners, the Schurman and the Taft Commission did not disturb the previous structure. On the contrary, they resumed implementation of the Maura law and imposed the same bureaucratic and administrative system implanted by Moret. Taft used the same restricted franchise, reopened the schools that the Spaniards inaugurated and imposed the same system of taxation. However, Schurman and, later, Taft made the American people believe that these reforms were part of the process of “benevolent assimilation” by which the Filipinos were to achieve substantial self-government. Naturally, Spanish “misrule” had to be portrayed as medieval with a strong domination of the friars to the detriment of secular power. This idea fostered the defect pointed out by Schurman: the “confusion between the functions of the state and the functions of the church.” Flying in the face of facts, Schurman claimed that the Spanish administration had centralized structures and that it was a rudimentary and authoritarian system with a rudimentary policy of education.

In sum, Schurman furnished the genesis of the notion of a Spanish “dark age” which supplied “an engine of oppression and exploitation.” “The maintenance of law and order at the local level,” he asserted, “was the responsibility of the priest who dominated the municipal government in his parish and could call upon the provincial detachment of the

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62 Owen, Norman. ‘The Principalía in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898’; Cullinane, Michael. *Ilustrado Politics. Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*; McCoy, Alfred (ed.). *An Anarchy of Families*. Owen, McCoy and Cullinane, among the others, establish a parallelism between a centralized system and the dysfunctional power of the oligarchy. It seems that the discourse is alive a hundred years later.
This statement sums up the notion of three hundred years of ecclesiastical medievalism under an autocratic regime, which had remained imperturbable from 1565 to 1898. This sentence is thus the negation of the reformism of the last thirty years of Spanish rule in the Philippines. A specific terminology such as “absence” was to later develop into “dead letter,” referring to these reforms. The résumé of the whole governmental system of Spain in the Philippine Islands, as provided by the report of the 1900 Philippine Commission (volume I, part IV) became immediately the most valuable and “rigorous” source for future scholars. Although, as the years went by, the Americans knew of and acquired Spanish books on the Philippine Islands—books which could have put the Schurman report into question—these would be suppressed in order to promote the history first narrated by the Schurman Commission.

The notion of a Spanish “dark age” has enjoyed a certain continuity up to the present. For instance most American scholars, following upon the Report of the Philippine Commission, continue to deny that the Maura law was implemented in the archipelago. For instance, Glenn May in his widely cited essay, “Civic Ritual and Political Reality,” states that the Maura law was never implanted in the Philippines. All the elections, he says, “were conducted according to the regulations established by the Municipal Reform Decree of 1847, despite

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63 Golay, Frank H. *Face of Empire*, p. 60. Golay follows ad literam the summary and abstract written by Schurman in 1899. Schurman was successful and Golay’s book published in 1997, practically a hundred years later, follows the same pattern.

May’s statement could be supported in part with the secular argument, *obedezco pero no cumplo* (I obey but I do not enforce). This sentence lends some validity to his assumption since although we know a new electoral procedure was enacted, it might never have been enforced. Unfortunately, May sidesteps the issue empirically by drawing his examples from elections held prior to 1893.

As for the argument that the Spanish system was faltering, anachronistic and paternalistic until the end, we find it regurgitated in 2005 in the textbook edited by Norman Owen, *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia. A New History.* “Whether liberal or conservative, pro-church or antichurch, pro- or antimonarchy,” states Owen, “Spain became a backwater, incapable of sustaining any policy that could win consensus, while its economy fell further behind the flourishing industrial centers of Europe.”\footnote{Owen, Norman G. *The Emergence of Modern Southeast Asia. A New History. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005. p. 151.} This sentence is nothing short of a dogma of faith. The same idea can be expressed in different forms but the content has always been the same since the publication of the first Report of the Philippine Commission in 1900. Spanish misrule had to give way to the magnanimity of the Americans, who were called up to confront Spanish tyranny. As the Schurman report concludes:

> If the government is administered in the Philippines in the spirit in which it is administered in the United States, the people of that archipelago will, as already a few of them foresee, enjoy more
benefits than they dreamed of when they took up arms against the corrupt and oppressive domination of Spain.\footnote{Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission… Vol. I, part IV, p. 82.}

This statement clarifies all the ambiguities confronted by the Americans in deciding to hold on to the archipelago. The corrupt and oppressor Spanish system had not prepared the Filipinos for self-government. The Americans, transplanting their institutions, were to educate the poor and ignorant Filipinos. Progress triumphs over medievalism.

Any reader of the Report would have to conclude that, first of all, the Filipinos are unable to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. Diverse arguments are employed to support this categorical statement: the multiplicity of tribes, the diversity of languages which are mutually unintelligible and reflecting the multifarious stages of civilization. In sum the Filipinos are not a nation “but a variegated assemblage of different tribes and peoples, and their loyalty is still of the tribal type.” The Americans are inheriting from the Spaniards a geographically, ethnically, and linguistically fragmented colony.

Secondly, the reader would conclude that if the United States withdraws, the islands would lapse into anarchy and that would mean that the Great Powers would step in to protect their citizens and property there and would divide the islands among themselves. This argument is interwoven with the support that the U.S. receives from the Filipino Autonomists, who are identified as the representatives of the whole archipelago. Predictably the report states the indispensable need from the
Filipino point of view of maintaining American sovereignty over the archipelago, recognized by all intelligent Filipinos and even by those insurgents who desire an American protectorate; “They recognize the indubitable fact that the Filipinos cannot stand alone.”

Americans, therefore, cannot escape the responsibilities of government: “The commission is strongly persuaded that the performance of our national duty will prove the greatest blessing to the peoples of the Philippines.” This is the final conclusion of the Commission, presented on 2 November 1899.

The reaction of the press was mixed, ranging in comments from those of the Boston Journal and New York Press which termed the report of Schurman as “able” and “statesmanlike,” to those of the Washington Post which leveled a bitter attack upon both the report and its author. The detractors of the Schurman report would be silenced, however. The discourse had begun to take shape. The machinery had been engendered. The first Commission led by Schurman, through its contacts in some Philippine provinces with witnesses consisting of a few prominent men as well the most “ignorant,” wrote the report in order to pave the way for the second commission, which would rely on a strong military contingent to “conquer the peace.” The first Commission committed a serious blunder by assuring the American people that the insurrection was over and that the Filipinos generally welcomed U.S. rule. This optimistic report mobilized American public opinion to support the occupation. But the Commission was unable to silence the strong Filipino feelings for independence since, in spite of its conclusion that the insurrection came
from only a single Philippine “tribe”—the “Tagalos”—as distinguished from “the great mass of the Filipino people,” this insurrection would spread like wildfire to other islands.

The first Philippine Commission needed to twist the arguments to convince and mobilize public opinion of the necessity to keep the archipelago. From now on, a vertiginous publication of books with the same arguments and stereotyped images of the Filipinos and the Spaniards would invade the market. Yale and Michigan would become the cradle of democratization and imperialism, respectively collecting Spanish books and spreading the American discourse. The idea of saving “others” had germinated.

Worcester said of the Schurman Commission that “more than fourteen years’ experience in governmental work in the Philippines has profoundly impressed me with the fundamental soundness of these conclusions of the first Philippine Commission. Every statement then made still holds true.”\(^{67}\) As I shall show in the chapters to follow, every statement made then would hold “true” until independence, and maybe every statement has since become the dictum of truth until the present, using deceptively new terminologies, theoretical frameworks and discourses.

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CHAPTER III: JAMES ALFRED LEROY, MAKER OF

PHILIPPINE HISTORY

We have difficulty in Cavite with old ladrones Montalon and Felizardo, the difficulty in Albay, that arose really out of the oppression of some of the municipal caciques and has now developed into pure ladronism and a little mixture of religious fanaticism and ladronism…

William Howard Taft

Jacob Schurman and his commissioners came back to the United States with their categorical conclusions: the United States could not withdraw from the Philippines since the Filipinos were “wholly” unprepared for independence. The great mass of the people were ignorant, with a vague idea of what independence meant. And the educated class “is clearly desirous of peace here." The latter statement was one of the misrepresentations of the Schurman Commission, since the reports inferred that most of the Filipinos welcomed American rule and that the insurrection was over. This optimistic news was beneficial for McKinley, who was preparing for his re-election. He could then mobilize public opinion around the fact that he [as the representative of America] had won the “respect and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines.”

1 Report of the U.S. Philippine Commission (Schurman), II, 68, 352.
The conclusions of the Schurman Commission made McKinley undertake the task of establishing civil government in the new possession. Towards this end, he appointed a second Philippine Commission, designating William Howard Taft as its President. Other commissioners were Dean C. Worcester, Luke Wright, Henry Ide and Bernard Moses. This new Commission had a specific mission to continue and perfect the work of organizing and establishing civil government already commenced by the military authorities subject in all respects to any laws which Congress may enact.

The new Taft Commission brought with it a long Instruction promulgated by McKinley, which among other things stated:

In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which that are authorized to proscribe, the commission should bear in mind that government they are establishing is not designed for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views but for the happiness, peace and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands…At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and the people of the islands should be made plainly to understand, that there are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our governmental system which we deem essential to the rule of law and the maintenance of individual freedom…

Words such as “happiness,” “peace,” and “prosperity” disguised the real purposes of the United States: an indefinite retention of the Philippines. “The maintenance of individual freedom” became part of the democratic doctrine implanted in the Philippine islands in order to demonstrate that the Philippines had not prospered politically,

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4 President McKinley’s Instructions to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900. This Instruction can be found in W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands. Appendices VII*, p. 442.
economically and socially since the Spaniards did not believe in this principle.

Taft carried out, in part, McKinley’s instruction. In 1902 the peace was signed. Taft won many Filipinos over with his “policy of attraction” and his slogan “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” which was understood as the Filipinization of the archipelago. From 1902 to 1914 he would intervene in the archipelago—as Governor, Secretary of War and President of the United States. During these years he tried to “Americanize” and “democratize” the islands.

“Americanization” and the “democratization” would not be free of problems deemed to be inherited from the Spaniards or inherent in the Filipinos. Accompanying the positive terms such as happiness, peace, prosperity, and individual freedom stressed by Taft and the Republicans, we find a new terminology, which the Americans imbued with completely negative meanings. Taft and American rule would be faced with something that they called “caciquism.” This term started to appear in the textbooks in 1904, no doubt when the Americans were already familiar with the Spanish bibliography. This is the reason that this term cannot be found in the reports of the Commission.

Moreover, the Americans would start to misuse typical Spanish terms from the nineteenth century such as “clase directora” [ruling class] in order to infer “oligarchism and caciquism as a form of government.” Oligarchy was in Spain inextricably related to caciquism. However the Americans gave a different meaning to oligarchy; it would come to refer to a political class. Caciquism was assigned a different meaning as well:
landlordism. From the Spanish term *ladrón*, the Americans coined a new word to refer to the evils they had inherited: “ladronism” [corrupt brigandage]. And since they considered that the Filipinos were inherently bandits with insurgent trends, they resurrected a rare Spanish term from the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries: “latro-faccioso” (bandit). This word cannot be found in the *RAE*. The root “latro” comes from “latrocinio” or “latrocinar,” which means the act of theft; and the second word, “faccioso,” means “rebel.” Through this noun “latro-faccioso,” a species of Filipino “bandit-insurgents” came to be known.

Another term adopted from Spanish in order to justify the intensive military operations carried out by the Americans to “pacify” the Islands during the Taft Commission is “reconcentración.” This term should not be confused with “reconcentration camps,” such as the Americans inferred. Valeriano Weyler had imposed the “reconcentration policy,” which meant a separation of the rebels from civilians by putting the latter in safe havens protected by loyal Spanish troops. However the Americans decided to co-opt the negative term “concentration camp.” By doing so they were inferring that the Spaniards previously used these draconian measures. The Spaniards in fact never used such measures in the Philippines. Weyler only used it in Cuba. Last but not the least, the triumph of the nationalists in the Philippines gave rise to a new Spanish term, “peonage” (debt bondage), a system never used by the Spaniards in the Philippines. In sum, the Taft era was giving form to the binary opposition “bad Spain—good United States.”
This binary opposition, which started to be enunciated by the Schurman Commission, became fully established during the term of Taft’s Commission. Taft announced the “benevolent purposes” of the U.S. in different provinces in order to pacify the archipelago. “The Americans,” he declared, “in contrast to the Spaniards, had not come to enslave the people, but to promote an honest, liberal government which would secure to each Filipino his personal liberty.”

Sentences like the above were commonplace in American textbooks that were published from 1903. Many hagiographies of the Taft era came out from 1903 to 1946, but some books would be especially significant since they were published during difficult years for the policy of attraction implemented by Taft. In fact, the Taft era has not lost its influence in American scholarship, since from the 1970’s to the present many scholars have devoted books to this period. These books have a specific feature: the theme of the emergence of the Filipino collaborators who used Taft and his commissioners for their own benefit.

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6 See Chamberlin, Fred C. The Blow from Behind or some features of the Anti-Imperialist Movement attending the war in Spain. This book is completely propagandistic. In fact it is a hagiography of McKinley’s policy and the Schurman and Taft Commissions.
8 David J. Steinberg started to treat this topic during the 1970’s at the University of Michigan; and Peter Stanley, in A Nation in the Making, developed the same argument. At present many American scholars follow the pattern of Steinberg or Stanley. In fact, Stanley considered that the Taft’s era finished in 1914 when he lost the presidential elections. Michael Cullinane in Ilustrado Politics affirms
and became *de facto* and *de iure* the makers of the dysfunctional democracy prevalent in the Philippines. Underpinning this narrative is a surreptitious evolutionary emplotment.

No doubt, the decade of Taft’s policy is the most decisive for understanding the American construction of Philippine history. Above all, the year 1905 is significant, for three reasons. First is that by this year the Americans had become completely familiar with Spanish historiography on the Philippines. This knowledge bore fruit in the publication of many books. These were mainly textbooks that followed a specific pattern: a history of Spanish rule until the Spanish-American war in which there is a systemic discrediting of the Spanish regime. Here the books would take the cue from the report of the Schurman Commission. The implication of this narrative is that the Americans found a *tabula rasa* in the Philippines. Spanish rule had kept the subject population in a state of ignorance. Furthermore, all the textbooks included an ethnological study of the diverse tribes of the Philippines. This would justify the American occupation since the Philippines—an amalgam of islands and tribes—was seen to be inhabited by semi-savage tribes.

A second reason for the importance of 1905 is linked to the first: Accompanying the new familiarity with Spanish writings was a tendency to suppress certain books which would question the construction of the American discourse. Only those Spanish books which helped to foster the

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that Taft lost influence when the Federalistas or collaborators lost their pre-eminence. Taft lost his power for the brief interregnum of the democrats in the Philippines. Leonard Wood and Henry L. Stimson in 1928 were to follow the politics inaugurated by Taft. In fact, Henry L. Stimson had been Secretary of War in 1911, during Taft’s presidency.

9 See, the above note.
discourse were promoted. This policy of suppression was used as well against some American scholars who dissented against Taft’s policy, and above all against the Filipino ilustrados. Their voices continue to be silenced.

The third and most important fact is that in 1905 James A. LeRoy emerged as an authoritative voice—arguably, the only voice—of Philippine history. He became the expert in the history of Spain and its centuries of rule in the Philippines, portraying a distorted image which has prevailed up to the present.

LeRoy is notable for his grand overviews of the Spanish regime, although he himself admitted that “the general conclusions I have stated are not always brought out clearly.” Nevertheless, these “general conclusions” led him to confirm what the Schurman Commission had noted in its report. LeRoy gave full form to the notion of the “dark age” of Spanish rule—the view that for three hundred years the Spaniards ruled the Philippines under a medieval system dominated by the religious orders, a medievalism so deeply rooted that any reformism would become a dead letter. It is LeRoy’s work that underpins the discourse of the “immobilism” of Spanish rule.

LeRoy’s intimate knowledge of Spanish historiography on the Philippines allowed him to cleverly suppress important works related to the last thirty years of Spanish rule and to relegate Spanish reforms to a secondary place. In fact, in 1904 he wrote probably the most direct statement on how to marginalize the reformism of late Spanish rule: “Of

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10 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, August 24, 1904. James A. Robertson Special Correspondence. Box 5. Washington: The Manuscript division, Library of Congress. I ought this information to Professor Bernardita Churchill who kindly shared with me.
course, the various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary
governments in Spain must have attention, but these, and the 1872 revolt,
are really to be relegated to a secondary place…

LeRoy was to follow literally this statement in his book *The
Americans in the Philippines*, in which there is a systematical denial of
Spanish reformism. Instead, LeRoy invites us, for an understanding of
the Spanish regime, to use the report of the Schurman Commission.

In addition, LeRoy, as I will explore in the fourth chapter,
discredited all those who could question the American construction of
Philippine history. In this context, we have to include Spanish scholars
such as Wenceslao Retana; the Britishers John Foreman and Alleyne
Ireland, and fellow Americans such as Henry Parker Willis (*Our Spanish
Problem*), Charles Ballentine (*As it is in the Philippines*) and James H.
Blount (*Philippine Independence – Why*, and *Philippine Independence –
When*).

There are several other aspects of LeRoy’s career that make him
indispensable to understanding Philippine history from 1900 to 1909. He
witnessed the work of the Taft Commission as Worcester’s secretary. He
wrote a first hand testimony of the congressional trip in 1905. He was the
personal secretary and, above all, political adviser of Taft.

It is not well-known that LeRoy was as well the architect, from
1904 to 1907, of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, that massive

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31 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 18, 1904. James Alexander
32 Parker Willis, Charles Ballentine and James Blount were systematically discredited and suppressed
of the bibliographies. At present Parker Willis and Blount are known as –Democrats anti-Imperialists
and their important works have been forgotten by practically all the scholars. The case of Ballentine is
different he has been completely forgotten.
collection of Spanish documents translated into English and edited by James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair. This part of LeRoy’s career will be tackled in a later chapter in which the Blair & Robertson collection will be analyzed. As we shall see, this influential work gave shape to another myth—the encapsulation of the Philippines in a Latin American context—with which LeRoy was fully complicit.

LeRoy was important for his articles in newspapers and journals, for his books *Philippine Life in town and country* and *The Americans in the Philippines*—a posthumous work published in 1914. He left an important legacy in Michigan in the form of a travelogue of the Taft Commission and his notes of the Congressional trip of 1905. But his most important legacy is a file of his correspondence with Filipino ilustrados, American officials, James A. Robertson and above all with William H. Taft. Through these letters we can challenge the official discourse since they cast new light on the activities of the Americans in the Philippines during the first decade of their rule. These challenges to the official history will be presented in the chapters that follow.

**LeRoy: A sketch of a short life**

There are three official biographies of LeRoy. A short introduction written by Taft in 1913 is found in the posthumous work of LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines*. These biographical notes introduce the erudite scholar and politician LeRoy. The second biography included in the same work was written by LeRoy’s good friend Harry Coleman, editor of the Pontiac (Michigan) *Press Gazette.*
Finally a biography was written by his daughter Elizabeth L. Kallock.\(^\text{13}\)

The three biographic sketches are completely hagiographic, specially those written by Taft and Coleman. The latter pursued a specific objective: to mobilize LeRoy’s work in order to reverse the new policy of Filipinization ordered by President Wilson and implemented in the islands by Governor Francis B. Harrison. Therefore it is not rare to find some isomorphism between past and present in Coleman’s biography. The interpolation of past as origin of the present was aimed at mobilizing American public opinion through the voice of LeRoy, who had become known as the authority best able to make judgment on subjects connected with the Philippines. Coleman was speaking of the present when he said the following of the late LeRoy:

> It was his firm belief that until the great mass of Filipinos have been raised to a higher standard of citizens, both from an educational standpoint and with a knowledge of stable governmental discipline, any efforts toward independence would tend to the creation of factional difficulties of a disrupting and demoralizing nature. To promise the Islanders any particular time when independence would be granted seemed likewise to him inadvisable…\(^{14}\)

Of course, LeRoy subscribed to this belief. He was a convinced imperialist and a Republican conservative able to suppress any work which could damn the imperial machinery of the United States.

\(^{13}\) I do not know if this biography was published since I found a draft among James A. LeRoy papers. According to this draft, this biography was written in 1979. However, Lewis Gleeck affirms that the biographic sketch was written in 1970. Gleeck Lewis. *Nine Years to make a difference*, p 1.

James A. LeRoy was born in Pontiac, Michigan, on 9 December 1875 to a farming family. He graduated in the Classical, Latin and Scientific courses of his high school at the age of seventeen and had shown considerable athletic and scholastic ability, acquiring University attention by winning track events. In the three years during which he completed the full four-year course in the Literary College, he participated in track and football and won the admiration of President Angell and the faculty, as well as his many friends. His sports and other student activity articles, written while working in the Michigan Daily as Sports Editor and Managing Editor, were bought by the Associated Press, which appreciated the point of view of the participant who was also the writer. In this Senior Year he was a Director of the Athletic Association, to which he had belonged all three years; Captain of the track team, Managing Editor of the Daily, Senior Reception Committee, aside from being a top-ranking student. He was Ann Arbor correspondent for a number of papers throughout his these years, contributing to the Michigan Daily, Detroit News, Detroit Free Press, Pontiac Gazette and other metropolitan papers.

He graduated in 1896 from the University with the degree of Bachelor of Arts, his standing throughout his course entitling him to the highest honors. After his graduation he became Principal for one year at the Pontiac High School. He resigned his position to enter the ranks of journalism, being successfully connected with the Detroit Free Press and Evening News, and occupying a responsible position as political reporter.

\[15\] To write most of this brief biographic approach I follow Elizabeth L. Kallock’s biography and Harry Coleman’s. Some parts are my own arguments as a result of the reading of LeRoy’s correspondence.
He was in New York where he made extensive connection with the best publications. Later he became Sunday editor of the Baltimore Herald. It was while on this newspaper that he had an assignment in Washington which placed him in touch with the members of the Philippine Commission only recently chosen by President McKinley. He met in Washington his former professor and friend, Dean C. Worcester, who invited him to be his secretary and tag along with the Second Philippine Commission. He took Philippine history and Spanish classes en route. In fact, Worcester said of Le Roy:

Knowing his excellent university record I selected him unhesitatingly from a large number of applicants for this position…He has necessarily been entrusted with much information of a confidential character, and has always displayed the greatest discretion in the uses to which he has put the knowledge which he possesses…16

During his term as secretary of the Philippine Commission LeRoy became close to Taft, being his political analyst, his advisor and his “brain,” defending him until he died. LeRoy kept in touch with the Filipino elite –the members of the recently founded Partido Federal who provided him bibliographical information about the Spanish period and the Filipino revolution, and never lost touch with them until he died in 1909. LeRoy’s correspondence with this elite raises some questions as to whether the Americans made promise of definite independence to these so-called collaborators or Americanistas. What it is perceptible through the letters is that Taft and his Commissioners promised the “Filipinization” of the archipelago.

When LeRoy returned from this trip he had caught tuberculosis. The doctors advised him to live in dry climate. He went to Mexico and during his stay there he learnt about Spanish politics through Spanish magazine. He also began to discredit the emerging anti-Imperialist literature. LeRoy looked with grave concern upon any movement which had for its end the turning over of the Islands to complete native control. He plunged into magazine and newspaper writing, allowing no argument in favor of Philippine independence to go unchallenged. Of LeRoy’s vigorous journalistic campaign Coleman remarks:

> In none of these was there any attempt at controversy other than properly to inform the people of the United States of the duty resting upon them, to the end that the Filipinos should not be cast adrift while undergoing a sane and unselfish process of amelioration.\(^{17}\)

Contrary to Coleman’s hagiographic account, there was an attempt at controversy and what LeRoy tried to do was silence dissonant voices. Ballentine had questioned the arbitrariness of the Taft Commission in 1901. Henry Parker Willis and, later, James Blount started a crusade against U.S. policy in the Philippines. They were to affirm categorically that the Filipinos were prepared for independence. LeRoy, making use of his good literary connection with numerous publications, was eager to counterattack these arguments. He also wrote papers for prestigious journals such as the *Political Science Quarterly*, the *American Historical Review*, the *Independent* and the *Atlantic Monthly*.

After his stay in Mexico, LeRoy was appointed Consul at Durango in 1904. In 1905, he consolidated himself as an authority by publishing in

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\(^{17}\) Coleman, Harry. ‘James Alfred LeRoy’, p. xxi.
the *Atlantic Monthly* the essay, “Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.” This piece inaugurated publicly the notion that “caciquism” was the “chief obstacle to social and political progress in the Philippines.” No doubt, LeRoy learnt this term while reading Spanish works since he did not use it in his writings for the Taft Commission. This paper, I will explore in a separate chapter, had two objectives: The first one was to counter British criticism of the American colonial enterprise by Alleyne Ireland and others. LeRoy was to answer Ireland by arguing that the Americans inherited an evil from Spanish rule called “caciquism.”

The second and most important purpose was to demonstrate that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government and for independence. He was surreptitiously reversing Parker Willis’s arguments. Even the title *Our Spanish Inheritance* is the underside of *Our Philippine Problem*. He underpinned his argument about “caciquism” in his book *Philippine Life in Town and Country*. This book became a replica of Taft’s reports but disguised under the form of scholarship. *Philippine Life in Town and Country* provided a pattern for future books. It is important to analyze in some detail this book. Finally, in 1905 LeRoy would travel to the Philippines as personal secretary of Taft in the Congressional tour known as the Alice Roosevelt Longworth trip.

LeRoy spent his short life collecting information to write what he considered his magnum opus, *The Americans in the Philippines*. Reading his correspondence it seems he finished this book before he died but he

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had some problems publishing it—above all a fierce controversy on political issues with Dean C. Worcester. Worcester in 1906 told LeRoy that he could help him in publishing his book but he encouraged him to change some ideas which he considered big mistakes. We do not know if LeRoy could not publish the book for this reason. He complained to Taft that Philippine matters were undermining his health and his finances. Perhaps he did not finish it for this reason. The publication in 1914 invites suspicion since the book counters the new policy of Filipinization implanted by Harrison, and some parts seem written by Worcester more than by LeRoy.

LeRoy passed away in 1909 at the age of 34. Two months before his death, General Clarence Edwards asked him to review the two first volumes of Taylor’s manuscript, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introductions*. LeRoy, with his usual eloquence and articulation, managed to ensure that this manuscript would not be published. This was his last advice to Taft, who was about to be appointed president of the United States.

This has been a quick review of LeRoy’s life. His work and his task as scholar and politician are more important since he established some stereotypes that have survived to the present, and he managed to influence the scholarship of future generations, as we shall see.
LeRoy and his Filipino friends: Enter the “collaborators” and “caciques”

The autonomists, after a brief involvement with the revolutionary government, accepted U.S. sovereignty since the Americans promised justice, liberty and self-government. Pardo de Tavera, Luzuriaga and Legarda joined the Taft Commission. The Partido Federal was organized, becoming substantially the agent of the government. It is said that the members of the Partido Federal shaped Philippine conditions. Pardo de Tavera, Arellano, Legarda and others exerted considerable influence on American civil and military officials. Last but not least, they were among the main protagonists in the restoration of the peace. This linear emplotment has its raison d’être—to show how the influence of this elite on the country and on the American administration led to the build-up of a dysfunctional democracy ruled by prominent families who had been influential during the Spanish era. The Americans, finding themselves incapable of governing the islands, were looking to history in order to pin the blame on others.

I use this term since the ilustrados who promised alliance to the United States were close to some Spanish Republicans and “Autonomists” such as Emilio Junoy and Pi y Margall. These Spanish politicians clamored insistently to concede parliamentary representation to the Filipinos. In 1898, the prominent ilustrados expressed their love for Spain "porque queremos que las islas Filipinas sean españolas" (because we wish the Philippine Islands to belong to Spain). Spain denied the reforms and when they implemented them it was too late.

See, for instance, Cullinane, Michael. Ilustrado Politics..., pp. 57-58. Steinberg, David J. The Philippines A singular and a Plural Place.
Pardo de Tavera, Arellano, Legarda, Luzuriaga, Albert, Clemente J. Zulueta and others became an indispensable resource, at the beginning at least, for the Americans. They knew Spanish, Tagalog, Spanish history, Spanish documents, the history of the Philippines and so forth. The Americans were to show them how liberal they were by authorizing them to create a political party and to implement an “apparent decentralized system” in which Filipinos would have important positions in the government. Besides, the Americans were to promise independence for sure and above all, a time frame for the Filipinization of the archipelago, equivalent to total autonomy.

The members of the Partido Federal believed in the promises of the Americans and decided to accompany the commission on its journey through the provinces of Pampanga, Tarlac and Pangasinan. In this context Pardo de Tavera, Legarda, Arellano, Albert and Torres met LeRoy, who immediately showed his friendliness by telling them about his intention to write a history of the Philippines from a Filipino standpoint. We note, however, that in his private correspondence LeRoy revealed his true attitude toward these ilustrados by calling them Latinized, bastard half-Spaniards and, above all, “caciques.”

When LeRoy returned to the United States and above all when he was appointed Consul of Durango, he began to send letters to his friends as well as those who were not his friends such as, for example, Leon M. Guerrero and Isabelo de los Reyes. The excuse was to ask about Spanish bibliographical sources to write his book, paying special attention to the

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LeRoy needed to know everything about Spanish rule in order to build up his arguments about the immobilism and backwardness of America’s colonial predecessor. Moreover, the Spanish books would help him to elaborate upon some “evils” that the Americans had inherited from the Spaniards. This knowledge had a specific purpose: to demonstrate to the anti-Imperialist and Democrats the Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government and ultimate independence. LeRoy, then, by displaying in his dealings with the ilustrados a liberal acceptance of the goal of future independence for the Philippines, was able to know about the thoughts and feelings of his Filipino friends concerning American policy in the archipelago. This knowledge would then help him design an effective policy to would undermine any possible Filipinization and continuation of the Spanish imprint.

As early as 1902, LeRoy communicated with Clemente Zulueta through José Albert. Zulueta became a key person for LeRoy since he provided valuable information which LeRoy would use in his paper “The Philippines, 1860-1898; Some Comments and Bibliographical Notes” and in his book, *The Americans in the Philippines*, with some comments which Zulueta never affirmed. LeRoy introduced himself to Zulueta as follows: “I have committed myself to write a work about the American

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23 Clemente J. Zulueta is important for de-constructing the work of Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. Zulueta was born in Paco in 1876. He was a distinguished Filipino bibliographer. He studied law at the University of Santo Tomás. Although he realized different activities as journalist in *La Independencia* he has become well known as a historian. During Taft’s term as governor of the Philippines, Zulueta was named the collecting librarian traveling to Spain. He died in 1904.

24 This paper was published in Blair and Robertson (ed.), *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, vol. 52. I shall explain in the chapter devoted to Blair and Robertson how LeRoy was to use Zulueta’s knowledge of Spanish works such as Montero y Vidal, Sastrón, *Memoria del General Blanco*, Retana’s works and so forth.
LeRoy’s predisposition to read the works written by Filipinos and, above all, his claim that he wished to provide his fellow Americans with a true history of the revolution, captivated Zulueta and other ilustrados. This led Zulueta to admit to LeRoy that he possessed important documents of the revolution:

I see you have in mind to write a chronicle of the Philippine Revolution. I have enough unknown documents about the revolution. Some of these documents are so precious that I think that one cannot write accurately about the Philippine Revolution without previously consulting them.

Zulueta had important documents on the Katipunan, the treaty of Biac-na-bato, the revolution and the first phase of the newspaper *La Independencia*, to which he had been a contributor. He did not share these documents with LeRoy but his whole collection was sold to the American government in the Philippines. What Zulueta’s documents contained we cannot find out since they fell victim to the American suppression of sources.

Zulueta provided two important statements to LeRoy, which would be suppressed or ignored by him and by future scholars. In 1904 Zulueta wrote, “The only works I recommend to you are *La Política de España*

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en Filipinas and Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. These two works contain reports and excerpts of the trials, etc. all rigorously official.”

LeRoy did not make any reference to La Política de España en Filipinas despite Zulueta’s advice to him that the last issues of the journal were important since they presented the Spanish political debates about the archipelago and the new colonial restructuring. In fact, Retana, who is the underside of LeRoy, put the blame for the loss of the Philippines on those liberals who carried out the colonial transformation. LeRoy decided to ignore Zulueta’s recommendation since recognition of Spanish reformism would undermine the American construction of Spanish-Philippine history as an era of ecclesiastical medievalism until the very end. LeRoy instead decontextualized the journal: “When you come to read La Política de España en Filipinas you will find there sufficient internal evidence to damn Retana.” This journal was not to be used by American scholars anymore.

As for Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, another of Zulueta’s recommendations, LeRoy used the documents it contained relating to the Katipunan—that is, Volume 3—in order to infer that this movement was an excrescence of the poor and ignorant masses and that Bonifacio intended to “aniquilar” (exterminate) all the whites.

The other important statement Zulueta made LeRoy was related to the “Audiencia of Manila”: “The Audiencia of Manila did not depend on Mexico as some scholars believe; since its foundation it was autonomous

Zulueta was denying the traditional argument that the Philippines was a mere appendage of New Spain. Precisely, the role that the Audiencia played in the Philippines made the archipelago de facto and de iure independent, with its own legislative corpus. LeRoy ignored this statement since it could undermine the emerging argument of the encapsulation of the Philippines in Latin America. Instead, LeRoy decided to follow Pardo de Tavera’s argument that “The Philippine Islands had relations with Spain through the viceroyalty of Mexico and in many things the Philippines depended on the viceroy of New Spain, being also its Audiencia what decided many lawsuits from the Philippines.”

Pardo de Tavera’s argument suited perfectly the history that LeRoy was writing. This is the view which has come to prevail in the textbooks.

Zulueta died in 1904. He never got to know how LeRoy used his bibliographical knowledge. He was only useful to LeRoy in the scholarly sense. On the other hand, Pardo de Tavera, Florentino Torres, José Albert and others were both scholarly and politically useful.

It is important to note that LeRoy only absorbed the political perspective of the members of the Partido Federal since those whom he considered “irreconciliables” such as Isabelo de los Reyes and Dominador Gomez never answered his letters. LeRoy therefore based his arguments on the one-dimensional political trend he was familiar with.

This fact made him distort the events which took place in 1904 and 1905.

In 1903 Taft wrote LeRoy with a great concern:

We have difficulty in Cavite with those old ladrones Montalan and Felizardo, the difficulty in Albay, that arose really out of oppression of some of the municipal caciques and has now developed into pure ladronism and little mixture of religious fanaticism and ladronism in the corner of Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Pampanga…

This excerpt is important for several reasons. The first is that, while Taft was sending to the United States optimistic messages and information, he privately revealed his grave concerns about the situation in the Philippines. These worries give us an alternative view to the official story about the stability of the civil government established by the Taft Commission.

The organization of municipal governments was attempted in 1902 and 1903. Sometimes, however, upon the reports of disorder or “ladronism” the Commission would turn over a province to the military. In 1903 Taft reported that “it became perfectly evident that many of them were not able to maintain decent government.” Therefore, the governor decided to reduce the number of municipalities. The discontentment of some municipalities provoked serious disturbances in some provinces. Taft, LeRoy and other officials represented these disturbances as “ladronism”—as the work of a small, disorderly element. We can see from the words used by Taft that ladronism was more serious than the reports show. Besides, the letters written by Pardo de Tavera, Albert, Legarda and other “ilustrados” show us a generalized discontentment, although related more to their own political survival.

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Taft used terms derived from the Spanish words “ladrón” and “cacique.” In fact, this will be the first time that the terms appear, although privately. Taft was to define “caciquism” as a kind of bossism or a “tendency to exercise arbitrary powers which have not been conferred by law.” It is obvious that by 1903 the Americans were becoming familiar with Spanish historiography on the Philippines, although at this time “caciquism” was not yet the main evil confronting the implementation of American democracy. As for the term “ladronism,” this could be translated as “corrupt brigandage.” As an “-ism,” however, this term does not exist in Spanish. The Spanish word “ladrón” (thief), was turned into an “-ism,” a system. Actually, Filipinos themselves did not use the term “ladronism,” preferring instead the Spanish term “bandolerismo.” But the Americans decided to co-opt the word “ladron” in order to infer that they inherited this problem from Spain. The textbooks use synonymously the terms ladrones and tulisanes, a Tagalog word used by the Spaniards to refer to bandits.

When LeRoy received the abovementioned letter by Taft, he immediately communicated with his Filipino friends. In a letter to Florentino Torres in October 1903, LeRoy as usual first asked for bibliographical information for his book. Immediately afterwards, he said he wanted Torres’ opinion about the events that were taking place in the Philippines. Torres, subtly, complained about the ambiguities of American policy from the beginning. He said that “the Americans had to state clearly and put forward a concrete policy of the McKinley

33 Report, 1903, p. 84. Cited in Willis Henry P. Our Philippine Problem, p. 79.
government. Their concrete and defined aims had to be expressed without doubts or ambiguities, and with absolute clarity and frankness.\textsuperscript{34}

Torres was claiming for more self-government or autonomy and, above all, he was urging the American administration to clarify its policy for the future. The same claim would be expressed by Jose Albert, but Albert was more categorical than Torres. He stated that what was being discussed in Manila was a tacit finality of American policy in the Philippines. Manila had become a focus of anti-Americanism. Albert disagreed with Taft’s belief that a declaration of future independence would be disturbing for the Philippines. In fact, Albert was complaining about the ambiguity of Taft by voicing the phrase, “Philippines for the Filipinos.” “No reason exists to justify the silence of Congress, since this silence is translated into the practice that the United States wants to have the freedom to make of the Philippines what they wish.”\textsuperscript{35}

Albert was being categorical by identifying the turn of American policy towards a flagrant colonialism. He considered as offensive the argument that a future promise by Congress about independence would simply lead to the encouragement of the radicals:

The “Federales,” who have helped effectively in order for there to be peace in the Philippines, constitute the conservative opinion, which will always be the necessary counterweight to the radical opinion in the free Government of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{36}

Albert was probably the most radical within the Partido Federal and he would leave the party, becoming president in 1908 of the Partido

\textsuperscript{36} Jose Albert to James A. LeRoy, May 5, 1904.
Nacional Progresista by considering that the alternation and plurality of the parties would give stability and freedom to a government. He realized that everything in the Philippines was being paralyzed by the reduction being made in civil positions and municipalities. The race toward self-government had suffered an involution. Albert complained to LeRoy that the present administration had paralyzed the participation of the Filipinos in government:

In order to prove you we are now equal or even worse than two years ago, I invite you to read the collection of *La Democracia* and you can see the “appointments” that this government makes and you will be able to realize that there is a huge difference between American and Filipino wages.

…The gradual expansion of the government has remained paralyzed and the number of the Filipino judges has decreased. An additional proof that the gradual extension of the government is not being carried out is the appointment of Provincial Treasurers who continue to be Americans, in spite of the reiterated embezzlement…[37]

Albert provides important information about the real situation in the Philippines, and above all he demonstrates that the members of the *Partido Federal* were not as conformist as conventionally pictured in American historiography. It is important to illustrate from this excerpt three important issues in order to understand the further centralization of the administrative system under the U.S. and, above all, the policy of patronage (or “caciquism”) that the Americans would start to define and normalize. Albert mentions a policy of “appointment.” The government would engender the development of a system of patronage. The other two issues—prevalence of American officials to the detriment of the Filipinos, and the graft and corruption of these American officials—are

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inextricably interwoven with Taft’s policy of merits and appointments. Lamentably, these points have been suppressed or overlooked in the historiography, which follows a unilinear approach in which Americans are always posited as the ideal types. Thus the emergence of the corrupt system has become identified with something inherent in the Filipino societal make-up.

Albert continues his letter by criticizing the abusive fiscal system implemented by the Americans and above all the arbitrariness of the methods used by the constabulary. Albert views these two measures as having provoked a state of unrest among the Filipinos.

Another letter, this time from Pardo de Tavera, provides more or less the same perspective, but Tavera adds an important point. The Filipinos, he said, were starting to note that the U.S. had decided to remain in the archipelago: “. . .the concept of perpetual sovereignty of the U.S. in the Philippines is the genesis of the abuses which many Americans are making here, abuses which have substantiated an increasing hostile feeling…”

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38 The Constabulary was the rural police force in the Philippines organized in 1901. The officers of the constabulary were selected chiefly from American volunteers and from “honorably discharged soldiers” of the United States army. Some few Filipinos “whose loyalty was above suspicion,” were appointed to the lower grades. This is the first definition provided by Dean C. Worcester in *The Philippines Past and Present*, vol. 1, p. 381. However in p. 382 he says “The Philippine Constabulary may be defined as a body of armed men with a military organization, recruited from among the people of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos, and employed primarily for police duty in connection with the establishment and maintenance of public order.” This second definition has an explicit purpose to counterattack *The American occupation of the Philippines*. Worcester, Dean C. *The Philippines Past and Present*. New York: The Macmillan and Company. Vol. 1, pp. 381-382.

LeRoy reacted to the criticism of his friends by reversing the argument. He showed sympathy to a definite promise of independence, and he even a priori accepted a tacit declaration of independence:

If I believed that the majority of sensible Filipinos not only favor independence as the future destiny of their country (I do not doubt this is the case) but also that they think that a declaration or promise of future independence, granted now, would save the situation instead of making it worse, I assure you that I would not hesitate to vote for it if it was possible.

LeRoy was denying the idea that the United States wished to implement a policy of a permanent colonial system. Instead he insisted that the U.S. was protecting the Filipinos, doing the “best” for them “to hold the archipelago indefinitely.” The neutral words used by LeRoy made him seem favorable to the claims of the Filipinos. The first sentence of this excerpt—“the majority of sensible (Sp. sensato) Filipinos”—is significant since LeRoy implies that at that time only a few Filipinos wanted independence and precisely those who wished it were, far from being “sensible,” the “volatile Filipino agitators.” In fact, LeRoy was spreading the idea that most of the Filipinos had never had the slightest wish for independence and he was laying the groundwork for his most persuasive argument that the masses lacked the education to know what independence meant. Thus, the poor and ignorant masses were simply being led blindly by some leaders.

LeRoy continued his argument as to why a definite declaration of independence could not be feasible at that moment:

I cannot believe that a promise made in the present situation would not provoke an agitation by those less responsible and serious
Filipinos, those less capable to be the guides of a thousand of villagers who still live under the “yoke of ignorance.”

LeRoy underpinned this argument with two important facts. The first one was a despotic portrayal of the government of Malolos. He asserted that the Aguinaldo government encouraged the ignorant, peaceable, and non-vicious masses to commit the most heinous crimes. In the present situation, if the Americans made any promise of independence the situation could be repeated. This argument would become a tautology during the whole period of American rule in order to deny immediate independence to the Philippines.

As for education, LeRoy was supporting the cornerstone of American policy in the Philippines: the implementation of public instruction. LeRoy was approaching the question of education via the political development of the people. From now onwards, every problem in the control and development of the Islands would find its solution in the establishment of a complete system of public instruction.

LeRoy was to justify the systematic complaints of the *Federales* about abuses and economic advantages by Americans over Filipinos by arguing that the Americans worked more and better than the Filipinos. In short his articulate discourse was meant to convince his critical Filipino friends. But he was simply defending the policies implemented by Governor Taft.

Torres, Albert and Tavera offered LeRoy a sectarian perception of the real situation and their complaints were more related to their loss of preeminence. New political groups related to an incipient *Partido*

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41 James A. LeRoy to Benito Legarda, Durango, Mexico, 17 de Agosto de 1904.
Nacionalista and composed of both conservatives and radicals, were gaining ground. They were clamoring for national independence as soon as they could install a free government constituted by Filipinos. LeRoy was to play a most important role in silencing, in part, this new nationalist campaign. In the last five years, LeRoy had done a great deal of reading in Philippine history, especially on the political history of the last years of Spanish rule. This fact gave him authority to claim to know about Filipino politics. His knowledge of Spanish history and its Filipino policy would become materialized in his most important work, *The Americans in the Philippines*. This book would shape irreversibly the notion of a Spanish “dark age” and create a Filipino and Spanish curse called “caciquism.” The significance of both constructions—the “dark age” that denies Spanish reformism and the “caciquism” that would be harnessed to roll back incipient nationalism—will be explored in separate chapters of this thesis.

**LeRoy’s last years: A definite policy of historical reconstruction**

The articles published by LeRoy in various newspapers, the publication in 1905 of his *Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines* and *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, and his knowledge of Spanish and Filipino politics, were the main reasons why Taft required LeRoy to accompany him as his personal secretary during the Congressional visit to the Philippines. LeRoy’s perceptions of conditions in the archipelago and his relationship with members of the *Partido Federal* were to furnish the embryo of Taft’s future strategy for governing the Philippines.
LeRoy started to elaborate upon this new strategy in his meetings with editors and in speeches he gave that misrepresented and exaggerated conditions of the archipelago. He asserted, for example, that

The masses except in some of the more advanced districts and in particular the Tagalog provinces, are negligible and follow their leaders—ignorant and mere adventurous leaders that constituted the old cacique class, the men of property and education, speaking generally.42

LeRoy was justifying publicly why the United States had to hold the archipelago, since the Islands were just a conglomerate of different uneducated and wild tribes subordinated to a tyrannical oligarchy. LeRoy was explaining to the American public that the Philippines remained without a middle class and without gradations between top and bottom in the social scale. Therefore, the archipelago lacked the homogeneity necessary for political unity. For now, as LeRoy argued, the masses needed education in order to create or sustain a free government. The heterogeneity of the archipelago, the lack of a free government and the domination of caciquism or oligarchic government would become a tautology in newspapers, textbooks, journals and speeches.

This was the official image that the U.S. administration was to promote to the public and in the academe. However, we can glimpse a different view in LeRoy’s letters. His visit to the White House and his correspondence with Taft show us the underside of the story: how the U.S. administration built up a perfect strategy through which they could justify holding the Philippines. This strategy circles around the argument

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42 I have been unable to guess in which journal appeared this article written by LeRoy Secretary Taft’s Party in Manila Problems that demand solutions. I found it among his papers but the publication does not appear in any place, only the date, September 24, 1905. LeRoy James A. Papers 1875-1909. Box 2. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan.
favoring or encouraging “bossism.” As a matter of fact, it is argued by modern historiography that the so-called Filipino collaborators used the Americans for their own benefit. This assumption is behind the moves to justify caciquism, bossism or a patronage policy. However, LeRoy’s interview with President Roosevelt and his correspondence with Taft demonstrate how the Americans used precisely the so-called collaborators to install “bossism” as an institution.

**LeRoy as Taft’s brain**

When Taft and LeRoy returned from the Congressional trip to the Philippines, Taft urged LeRoy to come to Washington to bring some matters related to Filipino politics before the President. Taft thought that Roosevelt was to continue the Philippine policy he had implemented in 1901-1902. However Roosevelt had stated his purpose to transform an American government assisted by Filipinos into a Filipino government helped by Americans. Taft wanted LeRoy to dissuade Roosevelt from pursuing this idea.

On 14 October 1905, LeRoy met Roosevelt. He explained to the President how in 1901-1902 the members of the upper class were recognized by the U.S. in order to arrange the franchise. He stated categorically that the *Federal Party* is the party of caciques, but since these men are, in general, the commanders and leaders of their people, we must necessarily recognize them, in one way or another, while
creating as much as possible the conditions that will lead to social improvement and thus the lessening of their power. 43

LeRoy, by using the term “cacique,” was defining the members of the Federal party as the old cacique aristocracy. He was imputing something negative upon the old members of the party. He considered them as unfit for politics, at least for the Philippine politics of the present. In fact, he used the term cacique in order to demonstrate to Roosevelt that the old members of the Federal party had been educated under the Spanish regime. In this definition of cacique we find two very important words—“wealthy” and “educated”—that imply de facto the possession of Spanish education and methods. This excerpt is also significant for its tacit recognition of the implantation by the Taft Commission of a policy of patronage or appointment.

Roosevelt was not comfortable with the use of the term “cacique” and he replied to LeRoy that they had to recognize the constituted leaders in the Philippines in the same way they do in the United States. He was assuming the use of the policy of making appointments, as in the United States. LeRoy realized that Roosevelt avoided the use of the term cacique. When LeRoy elaborated upon what he regarded as the most suitable policy for the Philippines, he provided an alternative term, “bosses”:

We have to bring together a nucleus of pro-American sentiment, and build upon the necessity of our using the “bosses.” At the same time I said that I thought it should be the policy of the government to cultivate as far as possible the younger element—younger in the main—who have been the more radical, who have in the majority

43 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. Nine years to make a difference, p. 77.
of cases remained more suspicious towards us. With proper handling and a proper conduct of policy in the Philippines, we could attract the better sort of these young radicals, and that this is the important thing to be done in the Philippines.

This excerpt is relevant for understanding the future policy of the Philippines. The first sentence elucidates the implementation of “bossism” in the Philippines as a necessary evil to Americanize the archipelago. As for the strategy of attracting the younger radicals, this policy would start from 1907 onwards. To achieve this end, LeRoy and Taft dismembered the old Federal Party, suppressing key figures such as Tavera, Legarda and Albert—LeRoy’s Filipino friends. Furthermore, LeRoy succeeded in discrediting the members of the conservative nationalist party who were considered too “hispanized” such as Del Pan and Fernando M. Guerrero; the old radicals such as Lukban, Barretto and Dominador Gomez; and republicans such as Paterno and Isabelo de los Reyes.

LeRoy, always in the shadows, became an essential element for Taft’s functioning. In fact he was Taft’s brain. On 22 January 1906, Taft sent a confidential letter to LeRoy explaining his concern about Pardo de Tavera. He wanted Pardo de Tavera to retire from the government for when the popular assembly comes to be elected he could become a delegate. He wanted, instead, to promote a Filipino, Araneta, to head of one of the large executive departments: “Araneta in many respects is the ablest Filipino in the Islands; certainly he is the ablest for our purposes

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44 Gleek, Lewis Jr. *Nine Years to make a difference*, p. 80.
because of his knowledge of English and of American law. . .but Tavera is loath to give up the office."\textsuperscript{45}

Araneta was chosen to commence the Americanization of the archipelago. Tavera was considered too old. But this was simply an excuse. Actually, Taft wanted Tavera to retire because the commission was to be constituted by four Americans and four Filipinos; Araneta was to replace Tavera, not one of the Americans. The Americans were avoiding the Filipinization of the administration.\textsuperscript{46}

Tavera\textsuperscript{47} fell into the trap, deciding to retire from the commission even though he knew that Taft had deeper reasons to want him out. Tavera thought that he was forced to resign for his criticism against Governor Wright’s administration. Taft, in fact, considered him dangerous, able to mobilize public opinion to achieve his purpose.

LeRoy replied to Taft by discrediting Tavera. He distrusted the latter as politician and as Filipino, and called him one of “the most pronounced caciques.”\textsuperscript{48} Obviously, Tavera never knew that LeRoy had this opinion of him, since he continued to trust LeRoy. In spite of LeRoy’s assertion that Tavera was not to be considered as Filipino,


\textsuperscript{46} William H. Taft to James A. LeRoy, War Department, Washington, January 22, 1906.

\textsuperscript{47} Ruby Paredes has studied this period using Taft’s correspondence. She mentions the political game imposed by Taft—a tacit patronage system. However, she believes that the forced resignation of Pardo de Tavera was related to his strong criticisms towards Governor General Wright. Tavera thought that this was the main reason, but Taft considered him a political danger. Taft did not want to undermine the Federal Party. On the contrary, the idea was to attract the Americanized younger elements. Paredes Ruby R. ‘The Origins of National Politics: Taft and the Partido Federal.’ In Ruby R. Paredes (ed.), Philippine Colonial Democracy. Monograph Series Number 32. New Haven: Yale/University Southeast Asia Studies, 1988. She emphasizes the argument that in a colonial environment the patronage system is legitimate and even inherent in the policy of colonialism. Sometimes it seems that she establishes a clear dichotomy between good patronage system and bad caciquism by concluding that caciquism was endemic to Filipino traditions, customs and kinship.

Tavera made complaints about how some American officials had committed abuses with total impunity, while Filipinos were severely punished. Moreover, Tavera told LeRoy that Filipinos were just as prepared as the Americans to administer the various bureaus. These reasons, obviously, made the administration uncomfortable with Tavera.

LeRoy insisted with Taft on the need to change American political strategy by attracting the younger radicals instead of recognizing the “old cacique aristocracy”—meaning, the members of the Federal Party:

It seems to me that the time has now come when we should win over the best element among the radicals, the young men who have been led by the noose too often by Isabelo de los Reyes and others, but who are honest enough and well-intentioned. In order to do this, they must be divorced so far as may be, not only from men like Don Isabelo and his ilk, but also from some of the older men who are never going to like us and our ways, and who are at the same time too intellectually egotistical and too grounded in a preference for Latin ways and Latin ideas ever to accept, in their hearts, our ideas.49

This statement is essential to understand the further so-called “compadre colonialism”50—or policy of adjustment. LeRoy was trying to undermine any continuing Spanish imprint in the archipelago. Isabelo de los Reyes, since Spanish rule, was trying to attract the popular masses. He was one of the irreconciliables as far as the Americans were concerned—to too educated and too Spanish. He was able to attract those called by the Americans ignorant and young radicals. LeRoy was urging Taft to accelerate the process of self-government by conceding more

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50 Reynaldo Ileto defines “compadre colonialism” as a symbiotic relationship between the United States administration and Filipino nationalist leaders from the wealthy and educated class. Ileto, Reynaldo C. Filipinos and Their Revolution. Event, Discourse and Historiography. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, p. 271. Ileto gives an accurate definition to what some American scholars in the 70s started to call “compadre colonialism” with a pejorative meaning. Norman Owen, David Steinberg, and Michael Cullinane among the others, described “compadre colonialism” as a political farce by which some prominent Filipino politicians advocated independence in the Philippines but in the United States, they begged Washington not to concede the final independence. This has become the secular argument.
power to the Filipinos. This was the only way to attract those Filipinos who showed adverse sentiments toward the United States. The extension of self-government would convince the most radical of Filipinos of the Americans’ good-will. However, LeRoy warned about the need to hold back self-government when the Filipinos claimed for more privileges, by using arguments such as “caciquism” or “bossism.”

It is important to add that LeRoy when referring to Isabelo de los Reyes, Guerrero or Del Pan does not use the term cacique. In his arguments to Taft, he said that to combat the secret influence of these men the Americans had relied on the men of the old cacique class—those from the Federal party. It was time, according to LeRoy to get rid of the old caciques. However, since the Americans were to follow the policy, also endorsed by LeRoy, of making appointments and using patronage, the term “cacique” would reappear during periods of crisis, functioning as a discursive weapon in order to undermine the process of independence.

In spite of the statement made by LeRoy about not recognizing the so-called caciques, one of his letters to Taft furnishes a flagrant case of caciquism promoted by the American government. Juan Cailles, provincial governor of Laguna appointed by the Americans, was called upon to administer a vote on whether or not Laguna province would employ forced labor under the new law of the Commission permitting it. Cailles needed to secure the promises of a majority of municipal presidents in favor of this project. According to LeRoy, Dominador Gomez mounted agitation against such forced labor by appealing to the
proletariat. Cailles’ party accused Gomez of sedition, of inciting the masses to independence and revolt. The use of forced labor was voted down and Gomez arrested. Cailles telegraphed Manila that he had “irrevocably resigned.”

Governor Ide did not accept Cailles’ resignation and instead the use of forced labor was unilaterally approved. This law was bitterly opposed by the Filipino press when it was passed. LeRoy wrote with regret: “This is exactly the perpetuation of that caciquism, which we wish to have uprooted in Philippine local governments.”

Cailles was a typical case of the policy implemented by Taft in 1901-1902. It was not a matter of the perpetuation of caciquism since this did not exist before the American occupation. What Governor Ide did was to perpetuate the patronage policy, or policy of appointment, inaugurated by the Taft Commission. LeRoy did not put the blame on the Americans for authorizing Cailles to implement this coercive measure. On the contrary, LeRoy was to reverse the argument by considering its rejection a defect of the Filipinos: “Such things upset a whole year’s of preaching and talking about the ‘spirit of American government’ and the ‘caciquistic’ defects of the Filipinos which render self-government a failure among them as yet.”

This statement speaks for itself: self-government, particularly when it goes against American wishes, will always be rendered a failure because of “Filipino caciquism.” LeRoy reveals other worries in this letter which will have relevance for the future. He lamented that

Renacimiento had become a real political force which showed its hatred of everything American or Anglo-Saxon, and expressed itself in a rancorous way. The anti-imperialist Henry Parker Willis was in touch with some Filipinos such as Del Pan and Guerrero who criticized Taft of deceiving them, leading them to believe that statehood was possible. El Renacimiento, Parker Willis, Del Pan and Guerrero, among others, were to suffer a powerful campaign of discrediting by LeRoy.

LeRoy and his subtle indictment against El Renacimiento

LeRoy prepared a letter for publication in Manila in order to carry out his campaign of discrediting the Filipino nationalists. It was an attempt to undermine the Spanish imprint by emphasizing the medieval character of Spanish rule. LeRoy wrote a counter-argument to Felipe Calderon’s Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina published by El Renacimiento in 1907. Calderon had decided to publish this Memorias since he felt that Filipino students were forgetting their own history by learning a history of the Philippines from the American standpoint. LeRoy sought to neutralize Calderon and those who supported his views. Furthermore, this letter was part of the rising debate concerning Rizal versus Bonifacio as the hero to be remembered.

At the end of 1906 LeRoy sent that letter to El Renacimiento. According to him its main purpose was to reply to some ironic comments against Taft published in that newspaper. It was alleged that Taft showed himself in public to be a friend of the Filipinos, while in private he considered them “distinctly childish, whimsically, often unreasonably
childish, sometimes obstinately childish. LeRoy used his defense of Taft as an excuse to attack the enemies of American rule and above all the most Latinized segment of the Philippine population. He was to emphasize the “dark age” of Spanish misrule:

Those who supported that the alma Filipina (Filipino soul) is in danger in front of the Anglo-Saxon monster, are those who have been educated in Latin and Spanish molds, those who prefer Latin civilization, Latin literature and Latin customs. For this kind of Filipinos, all that involves a change in the traditional Spanish education, political organization and administrative procedures, is bad for the Philippines.

This excerpt is a subtle criticism of very influential Filipinos, those who, LeRoy thought, were “never going to like us and our ways.” He was directing his criticism, first of all, at Leon Maria Guerrero, editor of El Renacimiento, whom he considered egotistical and too grounded in a preference for Latin ways and Latin ideas. Guerrero had given recognition to those whom LeRoy called “demagogues, vicious liars and mental weaklings” such as Teodoro Sandiko and Isabelo de los Reyes.

More than Guerrero, however, LeRoy was targeting Del Pan, co-founder with Guerrero of a conservative nationalist party, who had been attacking Taft surreptitiously in the press. Del Pan’s family was Spanish, which made it all the more obvious that LeRoy was attacking the Spanish legacy itself. LeRoy’s second argument to discredit Del Pan and Guerrero concerned their clamor for independence. A third argument

54 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento. p. 3.
would be built around the fact that Del Pan and Guerrero were in touch with some important anti-imperialist such as Parker Willis. Let us examine these arguments in detail.

LeRoy’s letter was no less than a lesson in history. He always appealed to history in order to understand present conditions. However, this and other history lessons he gave were always just a means to support the idea that all of America’s problems were inherited from the old regime or were inherent in the Filipinos. LeRoy accused the Filipino newspapers of forgetting or ignoring its more recent history, such as, for example, the revolt of 1896. The selection of this revolt to focus on has its raison d’être. LeRoy wanted to make clear that this revolt was still reformist in character and that the Katipunan was “minor French Revolution” on the part of the poor and ignorant masses.

The nationalists and their newspapers such as *La Independencia* and *El Renacimiento* were claiming Bonifacio as the model of patriotism during the revolt of 1896. Bonifacio was starting to become an icon of “independence.” He and the Katipunan were to become potent signs to attract the masses in the future, but at this point in time, when *El Renacimiento* was advocating for Bonifacio as martyr and hero,\(^{56}\)

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56 Glenn May in 1997 published *Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous Re-creation of Andres Bonifacio*. He questioned the sources about Bonifacio used by some Filipino historians, beginning with Epifanio de los Santos and Manuel Artigas. He supports the argument that the writings of Artigas and de los Santos honoured the memory of an earlier, anticolonial struggle and transformed the life of the leader of that struggle into a classic heroic story “intended to build pride in things Filipino and keep alive the notion of an independent Philippines. By attempting to promote nationalist feeling in a colonial environment, they directly attacked the traditional order.” This argument is valid when May assumes that they tried to attack the traditional colonial order. However he is wrong in asserting that de los Santos and Artigas were promoting Bonifacio like a hero. Artigas’s biography is from 1911, that of Epifanio de los Santos from 1917. The claim for Bonifacio as hero and martyr came out as early as 1900 when Taft Commission did foster the worship of Rizal. According to LeRoy the adherents of Bonifacio resented this and considered that Bonifacio was being “neglected.” Bonifacio emerged again in 1906. LeRoy promoted a campaign for discrediting Bonifacio. His argument appealing to
Bonifacio was not part of the discourse of political rallies. In 1907, advocating Bonifacio and the Katipunan signified a tacit refusal of American institutions being imposed by the administration. The nationalist were complaining that the Americans had neglected Bonifacio from the beginning. They were right, since in their reports and in their official histories, the Americans considered Bonifacio and his adherents as the less educated men of the insurrection. LeRoy was to underpin his history lecture with the following argument:

As for the badly-considered exultations of Bonifacio, which are heard now from some Filipinos who despised him, I would remind them that what he preached was a war of races and the assassination (there is no other word for it) of the whites. And before claiming his work as glorious and before glorifying the revolt of 1896 as a legitimate phase, namely, the evolution to more social and political freedom, it must be remembered that no stable nation has ever been established upon assassination.\(^7\)

LeRoy bases his argument of the “war of races” in the documents published by Wenceslao Retana and Sastrón. These documents were written by friars and the more conservative sector. General Blanco, however, did not mention any war of races. LeRoy was furnishing an important argument for future scholars: Bonifacio as symbol of violence,

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Bonifacio’s alleged war of races was quite effective. It seems that Glenn May represents the continuity of the American discourse. This is not the place to fully counter May’s argument, but it is important to note that May mentions Retana and the publication of the documents of the Katipunan and above all the translation into Spanish of *Kalayaan*. He says that Retana did not allude to Bonifacio as author of any of the articles of *Kalayaan*. Moreover, he compares the translation of Retana and that made later by de los Santos. He takes for granted that Retana’s translation is reliable, while that from de los Santos is faulty. Retana did not translate *Kalayaan*; this was translated by Caro Mora, a completely Hispanized Filipino. May, basing his arguments on Retana’s *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, accuses de los Santos of “forgery” since the latter published documents not included in Retana’s. We cannot know if it is a forgery or not. Retana could not publish all the documents he had in 1897; Retana was a very good friend of Epifanio de los Santos. Maybe he gave him the other part of Bonifacio writings. We cannot respond fully to these questions here but Bonifacio certainly was not “as invented” as Glenn May assumes.

\(^{57}\) James A. LeRoy to *El Renacimiento*. p. 15.
armed insurrection and anger. LeRoy excuses Bonifacio’s behavior by saying that this man had been educated in a “medieval atmosphere.” This is the picture of the long dark age of Spanish regime. By giving Spanish rule a layer of medievalism, LeRoy was subtly insulting Del Pan, Guerrero, Sandiko, Gomez and others.

LeRoy continued his historical lesson for Filipinos by arguing that if Dewey had not helped them get rid of the Spanish yoke the most reactionary party of Spain would have denied them any reform:

If the United States had not interfered in 1898, what would the state of the Filipinos be now? The insurgent movement of 1898 would have continued, but what hopes were there to expel Spain? And as a result of the insurrections the Spanish reactionaries might have restricted more the freedom and cut the reforms already began under Spain.[59]

The good Americans had liberated them from the bad Spanish. The Filipinos could not complain. According to LeRoy it was impossible to have more freedom than they enjoyed under American regime. There is arguably a complete reversal of the historical record in this letter, but LeRoy was successful. The signifier of opposition to armed revolution became Rizal, who protested against the abuses of the Spanish government and oppression by the friars, he refused to join the revolt. Rizal had been promoted by the Taft Commission in 1900, now LeRoy was promoting him again. He was teaching the Filipinos how to use the past.

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In 1906, Guerrero, Pablo Ocampo and Pedro Paterno founded the Liberal Party. LeRoy constructed an interpolation of the past as origin of the present, designed to discredit Paterno, by writing a biased history of the Biak-na-bato treaty in which he accuses Paterno of making verbal promises of reforms assuring that he had the authority of General Primo de Rivera to make them. He claimed that there were documents in Washington that proved Primo de Rivera’s assertion that when the document of the insurgents concerning the reforms was presented to him, he [Primo de Rivera] squarely refused the proposals. They were not to talk anymore about reforms, but only of money.60

LeRoy had selected only a part of the story in order to accuse Paterno of keeping the money given by the Spaniards—the same claim that Primo de Rivera made in the Senate in order to justify his policy of repression. What LeRoy omitted from his account was that Primo de Rivera was replaced by Augustin who came to the Philippines with a specific mission: to concede the reforms claimed by Aguinaldo. Augustin did not shun Paterno or accuse him of being a “traitor.” LeRoy co-opted Primo de Rivera’s La Memoria and neglected to tell the underside of that history. He only stated what was useful in order to silence the voices of those who became uncomfortable for the American regime. LeRoy was not giving a lesson in history. He was constructing a new history and suppressing the voices of those Filipinos hostile to the Americans, who would eventually be forgotten by the younger radicals and the new generations of Filipinos.

60 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p.17.
The next target of LeRoy’s attack was the Malolos government. *El Renacimiento* and the different nationalist parties were claiming that the Malolos government had demonstrated its capacity for self-government and public order. Then, as now, they were ready for independence. This argument had already been put forward by *La Independencia* in 1898 and Felipe Calderon asserted it as well in his *Mis Memorias*. LeRoy could not entirely deny this fact. However, he argued that the insurrection was only based in the provinces around Manila and dominated by Tagalogs:

> The relatively good public order of 1898-1899 was not due to the government of Malolos, but the result of the Filipino nature, generally docile and pacific. This would not have demonstrated the capacity of the government of Malolos to rule the destiny of the whole archipelago with its several interests and languages.\(^{61}\)

Furthermore, LeRoy pursued the old argument that the Americans never promised independence to Aguinaldo during the meeting in Singapore. He was more definitive than Worcester and he discredited entirely Aguinaldo’s 1899 account in *Reseña Verídica*: “Dewey and Anderson have categorically denied having said to Mr. Aguinaldo the things that *Reseña Verídica* of Mr. Aguinaldo put in their mouths. I suppose that he did not write the said document and I prefer to believe so, because it contains several categorical lies.\(^{62}\)

This part of LeRoy’s letter attempted to rebut the arguments of *Reseña Verídica*. He alluded to the misinterpretation of terms by Aguinaldo. What Dewey and the consul conceded to him was merely a future recognition of independence. LeRoy again was making an isomorphism, reading back into the past Taft’s policy of a “future

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\(^{61}\) James A. LeRoy to *El Renacimiento*, p. 18.

independence.” This future was to remain uncertain, according to LeRoy: “I think independence will take attained after ‘generations,’ but it will not be soon.”

LeRoy doesn’t say how many generations it will take before Filipinos can expect to gain their independence. The term “generations” here is completely ambiguous, although the following sentences clarify that this will not be soon. LeRoy told Albert he did not know what could happen in ten or twenty years, but the Filipinos in 1906 were not in any condition to carry on a national life and to maintain a national government. LeRoy was not as frank in his piece for *El Renacimiento* as he was in his correspondence, but we can see that Taft and LeRoy thought of holding the archipelago forever.

LeRoy wrote in *El Renacimiento* of the Spanish “dark age” in the Philippines. This time, instead of inventing history, he criticized and discredited some important people. The first one was Wenceslao Retana. LeRoy had a special aversion for Retana since the latter represented a potential, serious challenge to the arguments he [LeRoy] had constructed about the medievalism of Spanish rule until 1898. He accused Retana of being anti-Filipino and above all anti-reformist. He said that those who tried to keep alive the “latinismo” tradition in the Philippines have resurrected Retana in their desire to resist the changes brought about by the Americans.

LeRoy was correct up to a certain extent. Retana was collaborating in the newspaper *El Renacimiento* and in 1907 published *Vida y Escritos*

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del Dr. José Rizal, the best biography of Rizal at that time and a vivid reflection of Spain in the 1890’s and her policy in the Philippines. This book challenged the American construction of Philippine history. Therefore, LeRoy needed to damn Retana.

Retana was to be only the excuse for attacking two important leaders in the Philippines in 1906, for different reasons. The first one was Del Pan. LeRoy accused Del Pan of being Spanish or Mexican instead of Filipino and to have been an anti-reformist in the Philippines. Del Pan had been making innuendos against Taft and the Federal party and calling for independence. The second was Dominador Gomez. It seems to me that Gomez had a more relevant role than Del Pan since he was one of the ciudadanos Filipinos who presented the memorial to Taft asking for immediate independence, and denying this thing called Filipino “caciquism.” Gomez was a natural born leader and in 1906 was involved in organizing labor unions. He campaigned against the use of forced labor in Laguna, pitting him against the governor, Juan Cailles. The U.S. administration was extremely uncomfortable with him. At precisely this moment LeRoy came along to lend his voice against Gomez:

Mr. Cailles, whom Mr. Gomez attacked as a “bad Filipino,” was in the battlefield fighting for the Filipino cause and winning the admiration of the American combatants. I am not saying anything about the question of forced labor in Laguna; for me it was “caciquism” not to allow the voters of Laguna to make their decision freely in favor of it, and the ridiculous protest of the Provincial Junta and the suggestions from above were certainly dictated by some other spirit than Americanism. 64

LeRoy justified Cailles’ position on the labor issue by recalling that he had been an insurgent fighting for the Filipino cause. Dominador

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64 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 24.
Gomez, on the other hand, had been in Cuba with the Spanish army. LeRoy was presenting a contrast between a good Filipino and a bad Filipino. Moreover he was representing “caciquism” as a Filipino institution diametrically opposite to the American spirit or “Americanism.”

Finally, LeRoy concluded this long letter by misrepresenting the Democratic Party and exalting the Republicans. The main purpose was to undermine the campaign of independence for the Philippines presented by Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan. He said that the Republicans had always supported the independence of the Philippines at “an indefinite future”: “The truth is that the Democratic Party does not exist as a great national party and is disorganized and split by personalities and diversities of criterion that they could not concede immediate independence.” LeRoy was discouraging Filipinos from thinking of immediate independence by misrepresenting the Democrats. Moreover, he distorted American public opinion saying that most Americans had accepted the ongoing policy, meaning Taft’s policy:

At the present moment, to give political independence to the islands would result in the immediate loss of civil rights, personal liberty and public order, as regards the mass of the Filipinos for the majority of the islanders have been given these great privileges by us, and only keep them because we vigilantly safeguard and guarantee them.

This was the apparent reason American public opinion supported Taft’s policy: that a Filipino government would only result in anarchy. American government was giving a chance for more self-government by

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65 James A. LeRoy to El Renacimiento, p. 27.
inaugurating in 1907 the Filipino Assembly. This Assembly would prove
the empathy of the American government with the Filipinos and would
become the culmination of the legislative program of Congress for the
Philippines.

LeRoy summed up this long letter by telling the young Filipinos
that this was the true history from 1897 on: An evolutionary narrative,
which presented a dichotomy between Spanish-Filipino and American
regimes and other binary oppositions such as “bad Spaniards” versus
“good Americans,” and “good Filipinos” versus “bad Filipinos.” Spanish
misrule was pictured as a long dark age, which certainly did not prepare
the Filipinos for independence. LeRoy was in fact fostering the “black
legend” of Spain and trying to undermine any Spanish traces in the
archipelago. The time had come to win over the best element among the
radicals, the young men who would foster the American construction of
Philippine history and Americanize the country.

LeRoy’s letter to El Renacimiento provoked a significant reaction
in the Philippines. For instance, Dominador Gomez was compelled to
defend his past before a crowd of his old-time constituents. Del Pan did
not respond to LeRoy directly. Instead he requested a list of such
questions as might prove of interest to American readers. To the question
of being “ready” for self-government, Del Pan said:

To my way of thinking the Filipinos themselves are more capable
of government and do it better than many nations who today are
ruling their own destinies, although they may not attain in the
beginning that degree of perfection which has been reached by
more advanced nations.67

67 ‘Means Tariff Solution. Candidate Del Pan, discussing reasons for granting Filipinos independence.’
La Independencia, 1907. I was unable to get the exact date. LeRoy James A. Papers, 1875-1909. Box 2.
He and his party therefore asked for independence. Del Pan had also to respond to the question of whether he was Spanish or Filipino. LeRoy even accused him of being Mexican. Del Pan’s reply was categorical: he was Filipino.68

LeRoy had proposed to “divorce” the young Filipino nationalists from the “old” hispanophiles. His letter, published by *El Renacimiento*, would be the beginning of the divorce, which would materialize in the decade of the twenties.

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CHAPTER IV: CONFIGURING THE “DARK AGE” OF SPANISH RULE—THE AMERICANS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Of course the various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention; but these and the 1872 revolt are really to be relegated to a secondary role.

James A. LeRoy

From 1902 to 1909 LeRoy wrote many articles in different newspapers and journals. He reviewed books, and he re-wrote David Barrows’s textbook, *A History of the Philippines*. However, he has become recognized by his two books: *Philippine Life in Town and Country* and *The Americans in the Philippines*. LeRoy never talked much in his letters about *Philippine Life in Town and Country* since this book came out with a specific purpose: to explain the present problems by interpolating the history of the old regime. This book outlines the Spanish “dark age” but it is *The Americans in the Philippines* that shapes and substantiates this image by [mis]using the Spanish sources. LeRoy had a definite judgment about the Spanish regime in 1904 when he wrote...

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1 For instance ‘Taft as Administrator. Traits and methods as revealed by his work in the Philippines.’ This paper was totally propagandistic in promoting Taft career for the presidency. Also see ‘The Philippines and the Filipinos’ written in 1906 for the *Political Science Quarterly*; and ‘The Philippine Assembly’ or ‘Philippine Problems after ten year’s experience.’ All these papers emerged with a definite purpose depending on the years they appeared. The most important is ‘The Philippines and the Filipinos’ since this is an indictment against Parker Willis’s book *Our Philippine Problem*. LeRoy is more radical here than in *Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines* in treating the topic of caciquism and bossism. This time he uses the term bossism as a corrupt system and fruit of an intellectual oligarchism. At the same time, this article was an excuse to foster some readings of the Philippines such as David Barrows’s book, *A History of the Philippines* and Gaylord Bourne ‘Historical Introduction’ in Blair and Robertson (ed.), *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. Vol. I. Instead, LeRoy discredited Parker Willis’s book by considering it misleading.
this book. However, *The Americans in the Philippines* was published in 1914. This is a posthumous work, published by Dean Worcester, whose intervention will be detailed in a later chapter.

In *The Americans in the Philippines* LeRoy wrote the chapter devoted to the Spanish regime with the knowledge drawn from his first-hand acquaintance with the leaders of the Filipino cause. Furthermore, he had studied Spanish colonial history and he furnished an important bibliography based on personal and official records. These factors served to confer rigor on this work. No other writer on the Philippines had exhibited such wide acquaintance with Spanish and English sources of information. In fact the author covers all the important literature on the Philippines, introducing himself as the leading American authority on Philippine affairs.

Bearing all the marks of rigorous scholarship, *The Americans in the Philippines* is thus the most valuable source in order to understand the American construction of “Spanish medievalism” by carefully examining the sources he used, or ignored. We can see how LeRoy provided a partial and distorted history by suppressing important books which would question *de facto* his arguments. This chapter will furnish an alternative to LeRoy’s idea of a Spanish “dark age” by introducing part of the bibliography he omitted.

It is important to examine first LeRoy’s *Philippine Life in Town and Country* since some of the arguments therein will be displayed again in *The Americans in the Philippines*, with bibliographical comments. *Philippine Life in Town and Country* is a propagandistic book that
follows a specific pattern: the report of Taft Commission transcribed in a scholarly way with a new contribution in the chapter entitled, *Caciquism and Local Self-Government.* LeRoy puts emphasis on several topics such as backwardness, fanaticism, caciquism and racialism—all of them inherited from the medievalism of the Spanish regime. Therefore he was *de facto* laying out the contours of a Spanish “dark age.” Obviously, the selection of the topic was meant to demonstrate *de facto* and *de iure* the Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government, and the necessity of a safeguard in the United States.

The first chapter shows the central argument of the book:

We do not need to condone the “backward” and “halting” policy which at last turned the Filipinos against Spanish rule. We must do full justice to her actual achievements, if not as ruler, at any rate as teacher and missionary to put the Filipinos of today in their proper category. Spain has never yet fully entered into the nineteenth century, politically nor intellectually, in the Peninsula itself.

LeRoy clearly portrays Spain as an anachronism, a perpetual medievalism. This assertion is corroborated by stating Spain that did not experience the changes of the nineteenth century. LeRoy promoted the idea of medievalism and theocratic rule by selecting terms such as “backward” and “halting.” This argument contrasts obviously with the liberalism and modernism implemented since the American occupation. The dichotomy modern America—backward Spain is quite clear. But the terms “backward” and “halting” bring forth a deeper idea: that the Filipinos were not educated for independence since they had remained in

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2 This chapter is a longer version of ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.’ *The Atlantic Monthly,* March 1905.

a state of ignorance. The argument first articulated fully by LeRoy became prevalent in the textbooks that followed.

The introduction provided the pattern that the book would follow. Present-day problems are explained by an interpolation of Spanish rule. Now the first problem the Americans had to confront was the conglomeration of different uneducated tribes in the islands. This chapter by LeRoy addressed the problem by criticizing Retana and Blumentritt as ethnologists. Instead, the work being done by the U.S. government’s Ethnological Survey, headed by David P. Barrows, was praised. LeRoy was recommending to present and future scholars which works had to be used in order to write a true history of the Philippines, and which ones to reject. The second issue identified by LeRoy was the dichotomy between the Christianized tribes--more or less educated and civilized--and the savage tribes. This dichotomy did not therefore allow the U.S. to concede more self-government to the Filipinos.

LeRoy inaugurated a topic which was to be revived in the 1960s and 1970s: the emergence of the Chinese mestizo and Spanish mestizo as economical and political forces in the second half of the nineteenth century. These mestizos held the greatest authority in Filipino communities. They became the leaders and bosses abusing their people. LeRoy set a precedent for future scholars to build on.

In the chapters that follow of *Philippine Life in Town and Country*, LeRoy paves the way for his most important topic: “caciquism.” In “A typical Filipino Community” he furnishes a picture of ruralism endemic

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in the Philippines thanks to the feudalistic Spanish regime, which connived with the *principales* to maintain social customs. This characteristic procedure of the Spaniards made the Philippines remain without a middle class “and hence without those gradations between top and bottom in the social scale which make for homogeneity of social sentiment and the corresponding political unity which alone can create or sustain a free government…”

The Americans tried to foster this middle class at least on paper by transplanting their social and political institutions. Only these institutions could sustain the full independence that was desired. In fact, however, the Americans undermined the incipient “colonial bureaucracy” implanted by Spain in 1893 following the British colonial model. And ironically, the transplantation of American institutions brought with it a system of relations called “bossism.”

In sum, *Philippine Life in Town and Country* is an interpolation of the past into the present in which LeRoy develops a dichotomy between past theocratic rule and present liberal democratic rule. The new regime was to give opportunity and progress for all; the old regime fostered the wealthy and educated who became the caciques whom the masses followed blindly. Moreover, Spanish connivance with the sustaining of native customs nourished the maintenance of a family feudalism, which degenerated into the predominance of a few families in the communities. Therefore, the Americans had a major duty: to eradicate these feudalistic

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trends and to educate the mind of the Filipinos as well as to teach the Filipinos something about the dignity of man and the dignity of labor:

Our work is to plant here the result of American democracy and to justify its ideals. We are here to promote a better understanding between the races and to bring about a thorough spiritual accord between the men of the East and the West, in which our own nation shall be the leader.6

These were the noble intentions of the Americans and so did LeRoy present them before American public opinion. His literary versatility and articulate prose concealed his conviction that the Filipinos were not yet prepared for independence. LeRoy’s ambiguities left a box open. The legacy from Spain was too deep-rooted for the Americans to grant the Filipinos independence. This would be relegated to the future—an indefinite future

The Americans in the Philippines: A gift for scholars

The Americans in the Philippines: A History of the conquest and first years of the American occupation with an introductory account of the Spanish rule, has to be LeRoy’s magnum opus since he spent years working on this book. He never finished it or if he did it, it was not published until 1914 as a posthumous work. In making this book LeRoy asked for bibliographical help from his friends such as Zulueta, Pardo de Tavera, Florentino Torres, Albert and even enemies such as Isabelo de los Reyes:

I would like to have a list or catalogue of all your works about the Philippines. Could I buy a collection of the newspaper Filipinas ante Europa? I want to buy the collections of La Solidaridad and La Independencia. I am American, sir (as you can see I am the

American consul here), but I do not have prejudices and I want to study the Philippine revolution not only from an American standpoint but also specially from the Filipino point of view.

This introduction “to write a history of the Philippines from a Filipino standpoint” attracted many Filipino intellectuals. He got those newspapers since they are cited in this book. However he discredited De los Reyes since he was a leader and defender of the perpetuation of Latin customs and ideas. In fact, De los Reyes showed himself to be anti-American.

It is difficult to guess if the publication was truly the book that LeRoy was working on from 1902, or whether it had suffered some censorship and or included some new contributions. We should not forget that *The Americans in the Philippines* was published in 1914 and it is not a coincidence that its publication followed after James Blount’s book *The American occupation in the Philippines 1898-1912*—an indictment against the implementation of Taft’s policy. We cannot even be sure if this was the title actually selected by LeRoy. What he says in his correspondence is simply that “…yo mismo, por ejemplo, tengo comprometida una obra sobre la Ocupación Americana en Filipinas (1898-1903) para el verano que viene (I have promised a work about the American Occupation in the Philippines [1898-1903] for next summer).”

According to these words LeRoy had entitled his book much as Blount’s and he had to finish it for publication in 1904. When he wrote

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7 LeRoy James A. to Isabela de los Reyes, Durango, Mexico October 13, 1903. Personal Letters of LeRoy James A. Box 1, Folder 1, October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan.

Zulueta he said he was to cover the American occupation until 1903 and when he explained the contents of his manuscript to Robertson in 1904, he said he planned to cover the entire period during which he actively served the U.S. government on the ground:

I shall devote the next chapter to summing up the civil government in the islands, giving both an abstract of the framework of government as it has been constituted from early 1901 onward and a discussion of the actual workings of government, municipal, provincial and insular, up to the present time (this covering many of the more significant events since 1902).

This was his intention. Gleeck says that he had to end his book prematurely owing to his failing health. LeRoy, as I shall show, was working until two months before he died in Fort Bayard. It was not very difficult for him to devote a chapter to the American civil government until 1904 since he already started to do this in his earlier books, among others Our Spanish Inheritance and Philippine Life in Town and Country. However, his analysis of the civil government from 1902 to 1905 was critical of Governors Wright and Ide and completely antagonistic to that of Dean Worcester. Worcester in fact wrote LeRoy a long letter in 1906 strongly criticizing his arguments. At the end of this letter, he asked LeRoy to send an outline of his book

So that I might be in a position to talk business to Ayer should he show any inclination to look favorably on backing its publication... If the general average of your work on your book is up to that which you did on the translation of Mabini’s memoirs I would do a good bit of hustling to get it published in the proper way because I should consider that it would be a contribution of great and permanent historic value. But if in covering the period during your absence from the Philippines you have fallen into serious errors of

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10 Gleeck Lewis, E. Jr. Nine Years to make a difference, p. 89.
fact and I were to help get the thing out I should kick myself for all time to come.\textsuperscript{11}

The first part of this paragraph indicates that Worcester was willing to help LeRoy publish his book if he ignored the years he was not in the Philippines. LeRoy replied to this letter telling Worcester that he read the Filipino press regularly, which gave him a good perspective on Philippine events:

I have done a good deal of reading, moreover, in Philippine history these five years past, especially in the political history of the last years of Spanish rule, and I am by that means in possession of a good deal of information of a general sort, sometimes also very particular and personal, which gives me some right to claim to know Filipino politics of today in a measure.\textsuperscript{12}

LeRoy was telling Worcester categorically that he was not about to change his mind, something Worcester knew. LeRoy preferred to leave his book unpublished rather than be forced to represent anything other than his own views. He offered his manuscript, “American occupation,” to the Macmillan publishers but they did not approve of a part of it. Therefore, it seems that LeRoy practically finished the whole book but could not publish it.

This story makes me wonder whether \textit{The Americans in the Philippines}, as published in 1914, is only a part of the whole book. Probably Worcester selected the chapters which could be used to effectively attack Blount and cast doubts on the Filipinization of the government. \textit{The Americans in the Philippines} and \textit{The Philippines Past and Present}, published the same year by Worcester, would together be


formidable in countering Blount’s arguments. Finally, LeRoy’s book, by covering the Spanish centuries backed by a large Spanish historiography on the Philippines, and the first years of occupation making extensive use of the Filipino press, would make a great contribution to the (re)writing of Philippine history.

*The Americans in the Philippines* is divided into two parts. The first chapter is devoted to the Spanish regime and contains a summary of “Spanish achievements.” One cannot doubt LeRoy’s imprint in presenting the mythogenesis of Spain. “The Spanish regime: a three-century prelude” relates and interprets the Spanish heritage of the country. LeRoy is ambiguous about the word “prelude” since it seems there is predestination in the American arrival to occupy the Philippines or a condemnation of the Spanish problems they inherited. However, some pages later he uses again the term “prelude” and makes clear that the Filipino revolts of the nineteenth century were the “prelude of Spanish crash.” LeRoy bases his argument on a de-contextualization of Feodor Jagor’s *Mis Viajes por Filipinas,* Sinibaldo de Mas’s *Informe de las Islas Filipinas,* and some decrees of the Cortes from 1810, concluding with a picture of “the undeveloped state of the Philippine archipelago and its inability to sustain this burden.”

LeRoy shows his ability to de-contextualize by bringing in some arguments from 1810 to 1898. The Spanish assumption of an “undeveloped state” in 1810 is brought forward by LeRoy to 1898,

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13 I use the Spanish version, since Jagor’s book was sent by Zulueta to LeRoy in Spanish. LeRoy translated and interpreted the excerpts cited in *The Americans in the Philippines.*
giving shape to his idea of a “halting” regime or as Schurman pointed out, an “absence of institutions.” As we will observe, he did the same with the reforms from 1868 to 1898 by harnessing the comments of Jagor and Sinibaldo de Mas, who wrote their books before the reform period. The use of these sources as a dictum of the truth leads LeRoy to conclude that the Spanish “reforms were a dead letter.” The chapter devoted to Spanish rule is the confirmation of what Schurman had pointed out in volume 1 of his Commission’s report— that Spanish rule was medieval, ecclesiastic, and theocratic. Therefore, this leads to the inevitable conclusion of a Spanish “dark age.” The difference between this chapter and the arguments of *Philippine Life in Town and Country* is in the use of sources. Scholars have ascribed historical value to this chapter since LeRoy displays his knowledge of a “tendentious” Spanish historiography. But the way he read or interpreted these Spanish books would only lead to the suppression and misinterpretation of these works.\(^\text{15}\)

LeRoy used a number of specific strategic narratives in writing this book. His account is diachronic although there are present interpolations that hook up to the past. The first chapter devoted to more than three years of Spanish regime is based on general conclusions, as the author

\(^{15}\) Leon Wolff in 1961 defines the Spanish regime as follows: “Whatever Spain gave the Philippines in the form of decent human relations and more institutions was incidental. Since the system was designed to nurture graft and racism, and to save souls for the Catholic Church, no attempt was made to develop economic factors or the free play of native culture. Occasional reformers who emanated from Madrid were murdered or otherwise rendered impotent. The country was really an enormous mission rather than a colony …Spanish law was paternal but autocratic; despite meaningless decrees slavery was perpetuated. The people were thrust into a medieval mold, their initiative paralyzed, their education throttled.” Wolff, Leon. *Little Brown Brother*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991, p.17. Wolff bases his history of the Spanish regime on *The Americans in the Philippines*. LeRoy has triumphed and his discourse has been perpetuated in the American academe.
himself admits: “I am well aware that the first two portions of my introductory chapter are general in their nature and that general conclusions I have there stated are not always brought out clearly by the anatomy my own text develops.\[16\]

LeRoy presents a review of general tendencies of the Spanish regime supported only by his deliberate co-optation and interpretation of the sources. His chapter is thus full of hiatuses and abrupt transitions brought on by his attempt to condense all the events of the three centuries of Spanish term. The final result reveals a tendency to make general conclusions that are not fully substantiated, such as the notion that the reforms in the Philippines were a dead letter because of the omnipotence of the friars. This argument has become prevalent in our textbooks.

LeRoy displays another important and strategic narrative, which is used in all his works:

The various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention, but these, and the “1872 revolt,” are really to be relegated to a secondary place. But in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms, conducted on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the foundation for the later more radical movements in the Islands themselves, though it was itself not separatist propaganda. It is more worthwhile to trace this propaganda in the writings of Rizal, Lopez Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar, Blumentritt and others than to devote special attention to the Katipunan.\[17\]

This scheme as elaborated by LeRoy can be found in *The Americans in the Philippines*. The reform programs and the revolt of 1872 are relegated by him to a secondary place, while he promotes *La
Solidaridad, the propagandist organ which featured the collaboration of Rizal, Lopez-Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar and Blumentritt. But this promotion of La Solidaridad is at the expense of other journals and newspapers which came out in the Philippines. LeRoy also deliberately neglects the underside of La Solidaridad: La Política de España en Filipinas. And last but not least, he does not pay much attention to the Katipunan, using only Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino and Sastrón’s Insurrección en Filipinas. Both sources have become a reference for American scholars.

The following excerpt sums up LeRoy’s tendencies to make general conclusions displayed at the very beginning of the chapter. It displays his main argument about Spanish rule—that it was a long dark age in which “ignorance” prevailed:

The people of the Philippines were on the 1st day of May in 1898, the product of mixed Asiatic ancestry, both of blood and of environment; of more than three centuries of rule of “medieval Spanish ecclesiastics;” of commercial and political contact for that length of time with Spaniards of a more progressive type, and for a half-century back with the world in general; and of a generation of strife and of revolution, on the part of their somewhat homogeneous civilized elements, toward a more independent existence and a dimly recognized ideal of nationality.18

This summary of three centuries of Spanish rule tries to clarify the problems that the Americans had faced since May 1898. LeRoy emphasizes the heterogeneity of the territory and its different races. The strongest argument is the medievalism conferred by the Spanish regime. However, his narrative construction falls into a contradiction in terms of the following assumption: “Spanish of a more progressive type.” What

did LeRoy mean? He knew perfectly about the progressive reforms in the archipelago in the last decade of the century such as he mentioned to Albert; he knew that the Spaniards had implemented reforms. However he would deny them all along in this chapter. Subsequently, he emphasized the opening of the Suez Canal, which led to liberal ideas coming to the archipelago. “The homogeneous civilized elements” learned of these ideas and they proceeded to fight against the tyrannical Spanish and friar caciquism. All the arguments laid out by LeRoy in the first paragraph of his book—heterogeneity, medievalism and a certain homogeneity—led to the conclusion that the United States needed to protect the archipelago.

LeRoy constructed the whole chapter with these generalizations. But if we had to select one portion of his story about the Spanish regime, we should have a look at the Spanish conquest. LeRoy assumes that the Spaniards consciously destroyed native institutions and customs. “I still believe,” he wrote, “that the Spaniards did consciously endeavor to destroy native institutions and customs, as they did in Mexico and as they did wherever else I have seen their work.” This is a sweeping statement that encapsulates the Philippines within the whole empire.

LeRoy based the above argument on Las Leyes Nuevas from 1542. The conquest of the Philippines had to follow ad literam the

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20 The orders and decrees enacted for the Philippines were ruled by these New Laws from 1542. In fact, these were the first Laws of the Indies. The Leyes Nuevas lost their preeminence referring to conquest and pacification when Ordenanzas sobre pacificaciones y poblaciones (Ordinances upon Pacification and Population) were enacted in 1573. Curiously these Ordenanzas were not enacted in the Philippines until 1599. Blair and Robertson published ad hoc the Memorial of Bishop Salazar in order to infer the abuses committed by the Spaniards in the Philippines. Bishop Salazar said that these Ordenanzas were not being obeyed, but the Ordenanzas had not been sent to the Philippines. Cano, Glòria. La Formación
corollary of these laws. LeRoy was fostering the black legend of Spanish rule and inferring that the laws were never enforced in the Philippines. Thus he was stressing the famous sentence, *obedezco pero no cumplo* (I obey but I do not enforce). LeRoy did not seem to realize that he was contradicting himself since in *Philippine Life in Town and Country* he blamed the Spaniards for conniving with and nourishing native customs. In sum, LeRoy provided an image of a corrupt, backward, halting, anachronistic, tyrannical Spanish rule in order to undermine all the Latin imprints in the archipelago and facilitate Americanization.

The Spanish regime until the nineteenth century, or specifically until the 1860s, is pictured by LeRoy as the “Golden Age” of Spanish ecclesiastical rule, which was never transcended:

Patriotic, sometimes also intelligent “efforts” were made to avert it [the final collapse], and the nineteenth century in particular was in Spain a drawn-out wrestling bout between the blind power of the “old giant of medievalism” and reaction and the spasmodic and nervous exertions of the young man of Spanish liberalism, re-aroused at intervals to the movement of scientific and political progress.21

I have highlighted the term “effort” since this neutral word is central to understanding the further conclusion of LeRoy that the reforms or promises made by the Spaniards were only “efforts,” never enforced. In addition, he establishes in this paragraph the axis of development from medievalism to liberalism, the former being so deep-rooted that liberalism failed to surmount it. Finally, for LeRoy the concessions made

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by the Spaniards were only generous and democratic in manner but Spain was unable to free herself from the iron hand which “bound her stationary to a past in whose glories she came more and more to live.”

LeRoy pointed the finger at Spain—the mother country—unable to implant modern ideas of government, education, politics, and religious tolerance in their full sense.

LeRoy recognized that some progress was made from 1863 onwards but he undermined his own argument by using Sinibaldo de Mas, who wrote his Informe in 1843 in order to support his thesis that Spain was unable to retain the Philippines. He also used José Montero y Vidal’s Historia General de Filipinas. Now Montero y Vidal was rabidly pro-friar, conservative and anti-reformist. Naturally this ideological orientation of LeRoy’s major source would cast a shadow on his treatment of this crucial period.

LeRoy devotes attention to a specific section entitled Municipal reorganization, which was meant to support Schurman’s argument about the “absence of native institutions.” He explains in detail the municipal reorganization from 1886 to 1893. He takes his information from the Schurman report and in doing so, advises the readers to use it as well. He starts with the timid reform implemented by Becerra which was to be a step towards giving the natives the right to exercise complete control in local affairs. This was, however, “only a decree conferring upon a few of

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22 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines., p. 15.
the larger towns the right to organize en ayuntamiento like those of the municipalities of Spain…”

Curiously, LeRoy explains in detail the reform implanted by Becerra, but he downplays and distorts the Maura law by stating that the priest was in the end the one who dictated the selection and election of local officials “by virtue of his personal authority, influence, and training, and by reason of his multifarious functions, by which he discharges the most potent functions in the government of the municipalities.”

LeRoy says of the Maura law that it remained, like too many other reforms of Spain, mostly a promise. At this point he tells the readers:

For a resumé of the whole system of Spain in the Philippine Islands, see Report of Philippine Commission, 1900, vol. 1, part IV. The reader is, however, in danger of being misled if he does not understand that the organization, showing the governmental scheme as modified by recent laws, some of which had not at all, or had but lately, taken effect.”

This advice is essential for LeRoy’s summary negation of the implantation of the Maura law. He informs the reader that the organization of the municipal and provincial government, such as was explained in the Schurman report, was modified or did not take effect.

Schurman, as we have seen in the second chapter, based his discussion of

25 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 44
26 LeRoy’s warning was categorical for future scholars since there has been a tacit agreement that the Maura law never took force in the Philippines. For instance Eliodoro Robles, who has written the best history of the nineteenth century in the Philippines, by following the Schurman report and The Americans in the Philippines states: “The measure had admirable qualities and was mainly a response to the demands of Filipino leaders. Coming, however, in the wake of the Philippine revolution, the law was really never carried out.” Robles, Eliodoro. The Philippine in the Nineteenth century, p. 218. Robles followed practically literally LeRoy’s argument. However, Robles is probably the only one who has admitted that Spain granted power to municipal and provincial governments “at the proper time, as evinced by reforms in the last decades of the century when local capacity to rule began to merge.” See, p. 295. Robles’s arguments have been silenced by the scholars since he dared to say that the Spaniards laid the foundations of the national unity. By 1969, American scholars were starting to bring out the evils of Filipino centralization which damaged the implantation of the sacred principles of American democracy.
the Spanish government on the decree of Maura. This is a tacit recognition that the Maura law, as with other decrees from the Spanish reform period, was indeed implanted in the Philippines. However, Schurman concluded that there were no representative native institutions since the Maura law was only nominal. Thus, LeRoy advises the readers to consult page 81 of the Schurman report, which demonstrates the corruption, autocracy and backwardness of the Spanish regime. What for Schurman was an “absence of representative institutions” would be rendered by LeRoy as a definite “dead letter” by emphasizing that the laws never took effect.

To render his conclusion more effective LeRoy recommends that for a fuller idea of the old Spanish system of internal administration, the reader could consult the appendix to volume XVII of The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898 which has translations of sections of Mas’s Informe of 1843 and Montero y Vidal’s Historia. But Mas and Montero y Vidal never wrote anything about the Maura law since this took effect long after their publications. LeRoy seems to have provided a neat picture or structure of the Spanish system by suppressing important books. He does not mention Wenceslao Retana, who was very prolific during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In fact, Retana had published a large bibliography about the Maura law. LeRoy, although knew some

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27 Retana said in 1907: Probably, Maura does not know all the bibliographical extension of his famous decree of 19th May 1893. It was published for first time in La Gaceta de Madrid and it was reproduced in La Gaceta de Manila and in all the newspapers published in the archipelago. It was also published by La Solidaridad; La Política de España en Filipinas. In addition this decree can be found in Royal Decree of 19th May 1893; Tribunales Municipales. Su organización, constitución y atribuciones, that is the new municipal regime, D. Miguel de Linán y Eguizábal. Manila 1893; Reforma Municipal de Filipinas by Camilo Millán; El Régimen Municipal en las Islas Filipinas by Pedro Paterno. This book is at Yale University and University of Michigan; El Municipio Filipino in El Faro Administrativo directed by Manuel Artigas; Diccionario de la Administración de Filipinas by Miguel Rodríguez.
of the books from Retana’s bibliography, decided to ignore them. He did the same with Retana, who was seen as a danger since he could question LeRoy’s arguments. As a matter of fact, Retana was the alternative to LeRoy. As we shall see, like LeRoy he became an authority on the Filipinos—those all-too-Latin Filipinos. This is one of the reasons LeRoy wanted to put him down.

LeRoy concludes this section with some very important statements. First of all he alludes to the censorship of the press during the Spanish regime. Secondly, he reiterates the idea that the Spanish were making progress although this progress was confronted with strong opposition from the religious orders, which tried to perpetuate the status quo. Censorship and the patronage of the religious sparked the discontentment of the natives who revolted in 1872 and in 1896. LeRoy establishes a linear emplotment between both revolts, although he prefers to overlook, as he stated to Robertson, the revolt of 1872—such as he defined it, anyway. His strategy in relegating this revolt to a non-event, is related to his denial of reformism and the creation of the image of an “amorphous Spain.” LeRoy tried to emphasize the idea that Spain was a grotesque deformation of European civilization. For this purpose he concealed the nature of Spanish democracy by considering it “a democracy only in manner.”

Berriz. Manila 1887-1895. This book is in the Special Collection Worcester at Michigan; Compilación legislativa del Gobierno y Administración civil de Ultramar by Manuel Fernández Martín; Diccionario Alcubilla. This decree was also commented in other works. LeRoy makes references along his chapter Filipinas: Estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad by Eduardo Navarro, however he does not mention there is a chapter in which Navarro complains the enforcement of Maura law. See Wenceslao E. Retana. Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1907, pp. 305-306.

The underside of this Dark Age: The 1872 prelude

The revolt of 1872 has to be contextualized in the Spanish construction of the democratic state and the importance the Philippines acquired as a colonial entrepôt. LeRoy portrayed the Spanish government as obsolete—as he put it, “medieval Spanish ecclesiastic.” However the Spanish revolution of 1868 witnessed the birth of a new Spain and a new generation—Europe-centered, culturalist, and democratic—that sparked a special dynamism in which ideas of freedom and progress were founded. For Vicens Vives, this generation carried an important intellectual baggage with doctrinal and pragmatic features. These features had immediate consequences in the colonies and above all in the Philippines, which became the “perla del pacífico” (pearl of Pacific). From now on, until the collapse of the empire, the archipelago would experience dramatic economic, political, juridical, legislative and cultural change in its structures. These transcendent reforms brought about the effective re-colonization of the archipelago in which the clergy would lose its pre-eminence, being pulled out from all civil matters.

The sudden importance of the archipelago was reflected in the books and newspapers of this period. More than two thousand books and more than a hundred newspapers and journals were published from 1868 to 1898. These show the constant struggle of two dynamics and

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30 The newspapers and journals were published in the Philippines. It is surprising how the papers and journals from 1868 to 1898 tackled all sort of topics--political, cultural, law, the economy and others. I have used for this information Retana, Wenceslao E. Aparato Bibliográfico Filipino. The newspapers and the journals were part of the collection of La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas.
trends, between those who advocated change and the defenders of a static order who demonized such changes. The press would become during this period the pulse of society, the catalyst of political debate. In fact, from the constitution of the provisional government to the coronation of Amadeo de Savoy in 1870, in Madrid alone there were more than three hundred newspapers embraced by all political factions. The press was completely free of censorship during these years. Most of the newspapers devoted a special and unusual attention to the Philippines, specially to the reformist policy emanating from the Ministry for the Colonies (Ministro de Ultramar). Finally, the importance of the archipelago can be seen in the changes made to the traditional juridical-political structures of the colony.

LeRoy reduces this story to the important contributions of two Ministers for the Colonies mentioned in his book: Manuel Becerra and Segismundo Moret. Becerra was the loyal defender of the revolutionary idea. He suggested the rectification of the political and administrative system. Although he resigned in 1870, Moret was to follow the same policy. Besides, he had made a study of an ambitious project of reformism similar to the French and Dutch models. It called for, firstly, the development of interior wealth by connecting the archipelago with the metropolis; second, the creation of a special administration, “as

31 There are many examples about how the clergy was forbidden to take part in civil matters. For instance, Giraudier, Baltasar. Los Frailes de Filipinas. Breves consideraciones de actualidad escritas por un español peninsular, 1888. Giraudier states that the revolution of 1869 paved the way for the separation of the clergy from civil matters, p. 16; another example is Navarro, Eduardo. Filipinas: estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad (1897). The works of Retana from the nineteenth century, etc. These works are a loyal testimony that the reforms were implemented in the Philippines.
33 Manuel Becerra became again Minister of Ultramar (Colonies) during the Restoration. Segismundo Moret was the last Minister for the Colonies and one of the most vilified.
intelligent and active as possible…to develop the civilization of that
territory and to foster Spanish interests”; and thirdly, the reform of the
economy.  

Moret was fully willing to implement this system and sent different
decrees to the islands. More important, it seems to me, were the decrees
of 16 August and 6 November 1870, which urged the reform of the
administration and educational system. Moret ordered the creation of a
new Body of Civil Administration in the Islands in order to cleanse the
Administration of a bureaucratic endogamy that was “depraved and
ignorant.” To implement this reform he encouraged qualified personnel
to be sent instead. 

As for the reform of secondary education, Moret wanted to
undermine the monopoly of the Church. He established a modern system
which tried to secularize secondary education and the university. This
reform provoked the reaction of the Church and finally it was
suspended. 

These reforms were to have a deep impact in the Philippines. The
news of the triumph of the Revolution in Spain arrived in Manila on 28
October 1868. The Governor General of the Philippines, José de la

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34 Memoria presentada a las Cortes constituyentes por el ministro de Ultramar, don Segismundo Moret y Prendergast, November 1 1870, Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1870. For instance, an example of this reform was implemented in the Philippines is Manuel Artigas who worked for the new administration.
35 For instance, the decree of July 7 authorized the correspondence via the Suez Canal –Barcelona-Manila. October 16 total liberalization of the trade; October 23 and 25 creation of a new Tribunal of Account and new Courts and the promotion of fiscal, etc. I think that these are enough data to
demonstrate that the archipelago was not as static as the image presented to us in textbooks.
36 The access of the Administration would be through a competitive exam for the position. The
candidate had to study Natural history, History of the Philippines and its legislation, sciences, arts,
37 The cruelest criticism of this reform came from Casimiro Herrera. Frutos que pueden dar las reformas en Filipinas. Madrid: Imprenta Universal, 1871.
Gandara, reacted by sending a telegram to Madrid, “swearing loyalty and unión to the Metropolis.” Gandara decided to ignore the news in order not to provoke disturbances. But the news could not be hidden for a long time. The first reaction in the Philippines was surprise and fright among the most conservative and reactionary sectors, and happiness among the liberals.

It was not necessary to wait too long for the explosion of the first reactions. On 1 February 1869 the newspaper _La Discusión_ announced that the Ministry for the Colonies had created a Commission of Reforms of “administration and government of the Islands.” One of the members of this committee was Vicente Barrantes, who was designated to execute agreements and internal resolutions.

The newspaper considered the appointment of this Committee and its members as a betrayal since Vicente Barrantes was a hireling of the religious orders and a reactionary. The expectations of a group of liberals who had lived in the archipelago, and some Filipinos in Spain, were frustrated. The most radical sector would systematically criticize this Committee. This criticism is part of the political debate generated during that period. Patricio de la Escosura and Vicente Barrantes were

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39 Vicente Barrantes had been quartermaster general of the Treasury in the Philippines. This data has always been relegated to a secondary place since Barrantes has become famous because of his writings. He was interested in theater and other entertainments, but his main contribution was the book _La Instrucción Primaria en Filipinas_, published in 1867. Barrantes shows the necessity to implement this reform in the archipelago, although he considers essential the role of the religious orders in the islands. He was a conservative.

40 Patricio de la Escosura wrote _Memoria sobre Filipinas y Joló redactada en 1863 y 1864_ published in 1882. Francisco de Cañamaque, member of the Parliament, wrote the prologue and was the one who urged the publishing of this _Memoria_. Cañamaque states categorically in the prologue that the
appointed members of this Commission because they were officials in the Philippines and therefore they knew first hand the dynamics and structures of the archipelago. Their conceptualization of the islands was wrong and biased since both of them considered the friars as a necessary evil but the new Spanish government needed to learn about the situation of the Philippines in order to implement the most suitable reforms.

LeRoy asserts categorically that the reforms of the administration were revoked. He ends his statement at this point. He is right. The reforms in 1872 were revoked by Madrid. But LeRoy’s simplistic explanation reflects his broader view about the triumph of the friars and the perpetuation of the status quo. This is the main reason he fostered hiatuses in his narrative. At the same time, though, it seems that LeRoy establishes a linearity between the revocation of the reforms and the Cavite revolt of 1872. Since he implies that the revolt was provoked by the friars and conservatives, he is underpinning to 1872 his idea of the perpetuation of conservatism in the archipelago. This is the reason the reforms and the 1872 revolt had to be relegated to a secondary place.

**The Cavite events: The birth of an evolutionary history**

The ambiguity provided by LeRoy in tackling this period has paved the way for the use of a specific terminology that magnifies the Cavite insurrection.\(^{41}\) The ambiguities are based on one source, Montero

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\(^{41}\) I prefer to use the term “insurrection” to define the events of Cavite since Spanish accounts written in the nineteenth century defined it as “La Insurrección de Cavite.” Retana always defines this event as “Los Sucesos de Cavite” (Cavite incidents).
y Vidal, who has become the authority *par excellence* to explain this period. Montero y Vidal mentioned one Casimiro Herrera, a friar defender of the *status quo*. Apart from Montero y Vidal, Spanish scholars also use as a valued source *Las Proscripciones de Sila*. In contrast, the *Manifiesto al país sobre los sucesos de Cavite, y Memoria sobre la Administración y Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas*, written by the liberal governor Carlos M. de la Torre, has been relegated to a secondary place.

LeRoy interpolates several terms to define the Cavite events. Sometimes he uses “revolt,” a term which strengthens his argument about the “prelude to the crash.” At other times he uses the term “affair,” which is a literal translation of the word “asunto.” LeRoy also uses a synonym of “asunto”—“caso”—which means *notorious affair, scandalous and even criminal*. Other words in his glossary are “disturbance” and “mutiny.”

The accounts from the nineteenth century use the term “insurrección” (insurrection). Or, like Retana, they define this movement as “los sucesos de Cavite” (Cavite incidents). No doubt, we can see that LeRoy took his terminology from Retana by translating by “sucesos” as “affairs.” However in twentieth century historiography—above all Anglo-American—this insurrection is designated as “the Cavite

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42 Montero y Vidal, José. *Historia General de Filipinas: desde el Descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta nuestros Días*. [3 vols]. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1887. 1894-95. Not only has Montero y Vidal become a creed for Spaniards but also for Americans, since Blair & Robertson (ed.) *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* –the American creed *par excellence*—translated some chapters into English.

43 Pedro Gutiérrez de Salazar acerbic enemy of Carlos M. de la Torre wrote in 1870 *Las Proscripciones de Sila (remedo de) en Filipinas, por el Exmo. Sr. D. Carlos M. de la Torre*. This source has been only used by Spanish Scholars. Most of them following Montero y Vidal who utilized this source to describe the impact of La Gloriosa in the Archipelago.


45 For instance, Montero y Vidal, Casimiro Herrero and Baltasar Giraudier.
mutiny.” Mutiny, according to the dictionary of La Real Academia Española means “chaotic movement of crowd, by and large against constituted authority.” It seems that this event a priori was not chaotic and even less against constituted authority—there was still a liberal government. Some Spanish scholars, instead, call this event “Asonada de Cavite.” There is not a good translation in English of this Spanish term. A synonym could be “mutiny.” “Asonada” gives to the event a sense of Spanish-ness, since it derives from the Latin asonare, while “motín” (mutiny) is a French term. Asonada means a tumultuous and violent meeting in order to achieve a political purpose. It does not seem that this was the real objective of this uprising. Other Spaniards use the term “sublevación” (uprising), “uprising in sedition.”

The use of this specific terminology—mutiny or asonada more than uprising—disguises the real nature of the rebellion. Mutiny, in English, has a narrower sense than in Spanish: “open rebellion against constituted authority (by seamen or soldiers against their officers.).” The purpose of the use of mutiny is related to the “constituted authority,” since it was a revolt to undermine Spanish “despotism.” Asonada is a more incisive term since the Spaniards categorize this insurrection as exclusively political. Therefore, mutiny, as used by LeRoy, and “asonada” as used by modern Spanish scholars, have been co-opted to construct an evolutionary history. The Cavite “mutiny” has been identified as the prelude to the revolts of 1896 and 1898 and as an incipient nationalist movement or, more precisely, proto-nationalist. By

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I have found this terminology in an unpublished manuscript written by a friar called Villajos. By defining the facts of Cavite as “sublevación” uprising he is implying it was not as grave as a rebellion.
establishing this linear sequence, scholars have constructed the stereotyped images of the Spanish system as anachronistic, despotic and tyrannical in accordance with the perspective of Anglo-American historiography. The insurgents, according to this historiography, revolted against the despotism of the government and against the friars. In sum the reforms implemented by de la Torre would become a dead letter. The Spaniards, instead, prefer the image of an obsolete and paternalistic system such as was displayed in the nineteenth century books. It seems that the Spaniards, through their arguments, reveal a surreptitious justification that “the loss of the Philippines would be imminent.”

More interesting, it seems to me, is the definition of the Cavite events in the nineteenth century. By using the term “insurrection” the conservative reactionaries and the friars—the defenders of maintaining the status quo—were inferring the idea of “separatism.” They were warning of the danger of implementing liberal reforms in a country where the people were childish, illiterate and unfit for assimilating dramatic changes. Retana is probably the most extremist by using “sucesos” and this is probably the reason LeRoy co-opted the term. Retana tried to play with the ambiguity since we do not know if he inferred by “sucesos” a criminal act or an event of transcendental importance. No doubt, for Retana this event had the two senses. Retana in the nineteenth century, defender of the political immobilism of the Spanish regime, considered this fact as a criminal act; however, Retana, in the twentieth century, observed Cavite as the catalyst of the newly-introduced liberal ideas, and therefore the cornerstone to the modernity of
the archipelago. This term “sucesos” became standardized and the Filipinos started to use it in 1898.47

In spite of the ambiguity showed by LeRoy and other scholars through the use of a vocabulary that implies “prelude or germ of separatism,” the Cavite insurrection was not necessarily considered as such by others. American scholars have portrayed this insurgency as the struggle of the nationalists against an oppressive Spanish system and against the omnipotence of the friars, selecting ad hoc for this purpose a small portion of the books written in the nineteenth century. LeRoy, who knew Spanish bibliography, used in illustrating this event the books of Montero y Vidal, Casimiro Herrera, and Francisco Vila.48 All of them support the American argument related to the Spanish system since they described the deplorable and chaotic state of the archipelago. But, probably the most important assertion is their argument concerning the “Cavite insurrection,” since this is a claim for the maintenance of the status quo and the danger of implementing reforms in a country ruled by “indolence.” They considered this insurrection as a separatist movement.49

Despite LeRoy’s conclusive argument that the Spanish system was obsolete, the years from 1868 to 1872 were not a failure, and the reforms were not a dead letter. The Spanish colonial system shifted dramatically towards an exploitative system. The most important testimonies of the

47 An example is the newspaper La Independencia which came out in 1898. An excellent newspaper, it became the first separatist one published in the archipelago. La Independencia, by using this term, was implying a criminal act of the friars.
49 See, for instance Vila, Francisco. Filipinas, p.15. This article is in the University of Michigan.
idea of re-colonization and exploitation are, on one hand, the 1887 Philippine Exposition in Madrid and, on the other, Retana’s legacy. They provide an alternative to the story narrated by LeRoy and the American scholars who came after him. The Exposition is absent in *The Americans in the Philippines*. As for, Retana, LeRoy made a sectarian selection of his legacy of writings.

**The versality of Retana: The reforms not a dead letter**

Wenceslao Emilio Retana is perhaps, since the nineteenth century, the most cited “Filipinologist” by Spanish, American and Filipino historians. Retana at the turn of the nineteenth century became the catalyst for the American construction of Philippine history beginning with its “Spanish dark age.” Retana was well known in the Philippines, in the United States after the American take-over, and obviously in Spain. He became immediately a reference for the Americans—as historian and bibliographer. In fact, he was in touch with prominent Filipinos and Americans such as Edward Ayer, James A. Robertson, David Barrows, Gaylord Bourne and the librarian Putnam from the Library of Congress.

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50 Emma H. Blair and James A. Robertson used some of the documents published in *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* and translated them into English for *The Philippines Islands 1493-1898*. In fact, they took from *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, vol. 3, the following documents: *Relación de las cosas de las Filipinas, hecha por Fr. Domingo de Salazar*. Manuscrito Inédito de 1583, pp. 1-45; *Carta de Relación de las cosas de la China y de los chinos del Parian de Manila*, a 24 de Junio de 1590, pp. 47-80. See *The Philippine Islands* vol. 5 *Affairs in the Philippine Islands* pp. 210-255; and vol. 7 *The Chinese and the Parian at Manila*. Domingo de Salazar, pp. 212-238.

51 See the first edition of David P. Barrows, *History of the Philippines*. When David Barrows wrote this book, *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* had not come out. To write part of the Spanish history he used some works of Retana. Barrows stated “Of modern historical writings mention must be made of the *Historia de Filipinas* three volumes, 1887, by Montero y Vidal, and the publications of W.E. Retana. To the scholarship and enthusiasm of this last author much is owed. His work has been the republication of rare and important sources. His edition of Combes... *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* –
As a reference, Retana’s books and articles he published have become stereotyped. The stereotypes were furnished by LeRoy, who cited and talked about Wenceslao Retana a lot. He had some kind of animadversion against Retana since this man represented Spanish-ness, a strong Spanish legacy in the Philippines and above all because Retana’s work reflected the fact that reforms in the Philippines were implemented—something LeRoy wanted to ignore or debunk.

LeRoy used some of Retana’s works in *The Americans in the Philippines*, but silenced the most important. In fact, he consulted only those which could not question his narrative. He does not make any single mention of Retana when he explains the Maura law, even ignoring *La Política de España en Filipinas*, newspaper which published the law among others and devoted many pages to Maura’s policy. LeRoy devotes a long footnote to Retana stating that he “was an industrious and fairly accurate Philippine bibliographer, but as a political writer he was a veritable calamity.”

This sentence speaks for itself. LeRoy does not give any credibility to Retana and above all to *La Política de España en Filipinas* which is summed up by LeRoy as “the organ of the ancient regime.” This is a tendentious definition, related to his narrative strategy of using “generalizations,” since *La Política* represented only the conservative...

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52 Edward Gaylord Bourne was an Americanist. The lack of American Filipinologists in 1902 forced Arthur Clark to contract Bourne to write a ‘Historical Introduction’ to *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898*. Bourne, in order to write this historical introduction, simply extrapolated Latin American institutions to the Philippines, basing his historical approach on Antonio Morga. *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* and Retana’s works such as his annotation of Zúñiga and *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.*

faction. But this was part of LeRoy’s campaign to discredit Retana. In fact, he started this campaign in 1904 when he accused Retana of being a "friar-eulogist" and hence biased.

LeRoy tried to dissuade James Robertson from using the advice of, or works from, Retana for his *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. He also cautioned him that "La Política de España en Filipinas was the organ subsidized for the purpose of combating the campaign of Spaniards and Filipinos for a liberal regime in the Philippines. It was widely believed that the friars supported it." LeRoy said of the pro-friar Retana, *I have very little respect for his reliability.*

LeRoy continued his personal crusade against Retana and in 1905 he sent off two important letters to discredit him. The first one, sent to Robertson, stated: "When you come to read La Política de España en Filipinas, you will find there internal evidence sufficient to damn Retana completely." LeRoy was encouraging Robertson to read *La Política* and to neglect and "damn" Retana and his work. He achieved his purpose since, as we will see, *La Política* is not consulted by most scholars. Robertson joined the fray. While he was director of the Philippine National Library he accused Retana of not contributing anything new. In a second letter to the director of *El Renacimiento*, Fernando M. Guerrero, LeRoy state:

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55 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 29, 1904.
56 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, January 20, 1904.
I cannot understand why you Filipinos again accept Mr. Retana. He is no better than a silly mercenary. Having lost by circumstance his market in Spain and in the convents of the religious orders who supported him, now he seeks to reconcile or reintegrate with the Filipinos in order to benefit from them as purchasers of his endless and always absurd “notes.”

(No puedo ver como ustedes, los filipinos toleran al Sr. Retana otra vez. Es un mentecato mercenario, ni más ni menos. Habiendo perdido por las circunstancias su mercado en España y en los conventos de las órdenes religiosas que le soportaban antes, ahora trata de rehabilitarse con los filipinos para ir aprovechándose de ellos como compradores de sus “notas” interminables y siempre disparatadas.)

This strong statement disguises something deeper than LeRoy’s discrediting of Retana. It is linked to the American strategy of undermining the Spanish imprint in the Philippines. LeRoy was right. Retana was collaborating in *El Renacimiento* and with most of the “ilustrado” Filipinos such as Epifanio de los Santos, Felipe Calderon, Isabelo de los Reyes, Dominador Gómez and Fernando Ma. Guerrero—those considered by LeRoy as too Latin and egotistic. Retana and his works enjoyed more influence among them than LeRoy and other Americans.

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59 LeRoy uses the Spanish verb “rehabilitarse,” making a wrong construction. The verb “rehabilitarse” does not exist in Spanish. We can only find the verb “rehabilitar” which means to restore something or someone to its old state.” There are two possibilities to translate this verb: to reconcile, since it is what Retana tried in the twentieth century or to re-integrate himself with the Filipino community.

CHAPTER V: LEROY, RETANA, AND THE SPECTRE OF SPANISH REFORMISM

When you come to read La Política de España en Filipinas, you will find there sufficient internal evidence to damn Retana completely. If I knew nothing else about him, that would be enough for me, either with regard to him as a man or to his position as a “Philippine authority.”

James A. LeRoy

In order to better understand the magnitude of the task faced by James LeRoy in rewriting the Spanish past in his book The Americans in the Philippines, we need to probe more deeply into the life and works of LeRoy’s Spanish “other”—Wenceslao Emilio Retana. Spanish scholars allude to Retana as “historiographer” and “historian” but in fact few things are known about Retana’s life. It is not easy to find any reference to his biographical details. I have found a personal anecdote narrated by Retana himself in La Política de España en Filipinas and a bio-bibliographical review written by Manuel Artigas y Cuerva, although John Schumacher mentions two more biographies.

According to Artigas, Retana was a public official appointed by royal decree on 4 December 1883, at the age of 21, to occupy a position of warehouse guard with the collector of public treasury in Batangas. Retana was transferred as official 4 to the Intendencia General de Hacienda; six months later becoming official 4 in Administración

Central de Impuestos directos where he remained until 1889. In July of that year he was promoted as official 3 of Contaduría Central. Artigas states that Retana got his position by influence and was a bureaucratic parasite. This is the only information we have about the official life of Retana in the Philippines.

As for Retana’s task as journalist and writer, his first work was El Indio Batangueño. As journalist he started to write articles in Batangas under the pseudonymous of “A. Nater.” He worked in La Oceánía Española, a newspaper directed by José Felipe del Pan from whom, according to Artigas, Retana learned much “although he did not partake of the standards upheld by this gentleman, since Retana was a retrograde.” Retana worked in other newspapers in the Philippines, such as La Opinión, but his outcries against the Spanish reforms and the Filipinos themselves provoked the antagonism of the latter.

It is said that he returned to Spain because the religious communities made him an offer to launch La Política de España en Filipinas in January 1891. In fact, we do not know by whom this newspaper was subsidized but its content links it to the Unión Católica (Catholic Union) and the friars.

Manuel Artigas does not provide more data. However, Retana explained in La Política de España en Filipinas that he had been official

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3 Manuel Artigas uses the term señorito who won the place through influence while he (Artigas) had to do “oposiciones,” an exam to get the place. Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quien es Retana…, p. 11. Artigas’s statement is important since when he mentions he did “oposiciones” this demonstrates that the reform of public administration urged by Segismundo Moret was implemented.

4 Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. Quien es Retana…, p. 20.

5 The Unión Católica —political party. One of the most important militants was Menéndez Pidal. Pidal defended Catholicism but disguised it under the term “Spain.” From 1881 onwards “patriotism” was inextricably interconnected with the religion and the Ancien Régime. See Alvarez Junco, José. Mater Dolorosa. La Idea de España en el siglo XIX. Madrid: Taurus Historia, 2001, p. 447.
of the Ministry of “Ultramar” (the Colonies) leading the press during Antonio Maura’s term as Minister for the Colonies. This fact is essential to give credibility to his writings. When Retana published the Maura law and his criticisms against the reforms, it was because these had been implanted in the archipelago. This editorial is interesting since Retana defines himself, in 1896, as “archiconservador” (ultraconservative), a fact that provides us with an insight into the origins of his discourse regarding the archipelago and that helps us to understand the hard criticisms he made against the liberal governments. Moreover, Retana at that moment was a member of the Cortes. This is all the information we have about Retana in the nineteenth century.

We have not paid attention to the difference between Retana in the nineteenth century and Retana in the twentieth century. This is crucial in order to counter the stereotyped, one-dimensional image of him provided by American scholars. In 1906, Retana stated, “I was never reactionary but a hothead Spanish and therefore a detractor of the writings of Filipinos...who longed for certain reforms and whose rise I thought was an indication that the loss of the colony for Spain was approaching.”

Retana was really a reactionary or, as he defined himself, an ultra-conservative, and this idea can be perceived in his works in which he defended the morality and dignity of the friars who could not be removed from the islands. He criticized republican ideas and the anticlericalism that prevailed in Spain and to some extent in the Philippines. He termed

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himself a “hothead Spaniard” (español exaltado) and this was true since he highlighted the Spanish-ness and the values of the mother country (patria) in his works. But Retana was merely echoing the ideas of the Unión Católica which considered the religious orders and Spanish-ness to be synonymous and could not forget the services that the religious had rendered to the country. “The conquest of the Philippines,” he stated, “was more religious and moral than warlike. The conservation of those Islands for Spain during three centuries is owed to the moral prestige of the friars.”

This statement, which sounds very familiar to us, was put forward in order to check the advent of liberal ideas, the reformist spirit, and above all to uphold the paternalistic policy led by the religious orders, which had in fact come to an end. The religious orders were being separated from administrative and political matters, as they had been from the sixteenth century onwards, although at an opportune moment during the seventeenth century the religious orders attained a great influence that prevailed until the first half of the nineteenth century.

8 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de M. Minuesa, 1898, p. 9. I found this book among Folleto de W.E. Retana, Frailes y Clérigos in the University of Michigan. However this book has been attributed to Baltasar Giraudier who wrote an article with a similar title—Los frailes de Filipinas: Breves Consideraciones de actualidad escritas por un Español Peninsular. Madrid: Imprenta de A. Pérez Dubrull, 1888. Los Frailes Filipinos por Un Español que ha residido en aquel país was written by Retana. In fact, this is the third edition of Frailes y Clérigos which he decided to keep anonymous. See Aparato Bibliográfico, Vol. 3, entry 4013, p. 1403.

9 Cano, Glòria. La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614. Universitat Pompeu Fabra. In this dissertation, the traditional idea that the Philippines was an evangelical mission is questioned. Philip II made us believe that this was the real purpose of Spain, at the beginning since the Philippines was just in the demarcation line of Portugal. Philip II kept the archipelago in a state of indefiniteness in order not to provoke the ire of Portugal until 1580 when this was annexed to Spain. From then onwards there was a clear separation of the powers—friars and governors. The Instruction to Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas is a clear example on this matter becoming the real cornerstone of the definiteness of the archipelago in which the bishop is advised not to interfere in political matters. During the seventeenth century—at that moment we do not know why, how and when—the religious orders attained a great influence in the archipelago. This influence would last until the middle of the nineteenth century.
new position of the friars in Retana’s time provoked a hard confrontation with the indigenous elite, the principalía, who were now carrying out many of the traditional tasks of the friars. Retana observed these developments, and one can find in his works expressions of concern that the friars had become vilified because of the imprudent reforms from 1870 onwards, that the lack of press censorship had allowed the importation of antireligious and political ideas. He vented his ire, as well, against the policy of attraction of some venal governors and last but not the least, the spread of masonry, which had become the locus of antifriar and separatist feelings—or filibusterismo.

This term “filibusterismo” at the turn of the nineteenth century acquired an unanticipated relevance. In fact, Retana contributed to the definition or de-contextualization of the term. To the definition of the RAE—party of the filibusteros in overseas (colonies) and parliamentary obstructionism—Retana added the meaning “independence and separatism,” encapsulating these term specifically in the Philippines. In fact, in the nineteenth century a filibustero was a pirate in the Antilles and a subversive anti-Spanish. Retana introduced a new concept: filibustero is one who wants as soon as possible, the emancipation of the “Philippine Archipelago.” Curiously, this new meaning—now fallen into disuse—was taken up by the RAE. The term filibusterismo took its definite form in 1891 when Rizal wrote El Filibusterismo and this novel

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10 This statement from Retana “lack of press censorship” contradicts the argument displayed by LeRoy’s “censorship of press.”

11 See, Retana W.E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país, 1898, p. 10.


was considered as the embryo of the independence struggle. In sum, Retana of the nineteenth century was, as Becerra defined him, a “clerical reactionary.”

However, after the loss of the Philippines, Retana changed dramatically. He became a champion of the Filipino cause and proclaimed himself politically as a socialist. As Zulueta said to LeRoy about Retana in 1904,

Retana is no longer “frailista” (pro-friar). He justified himself by saying that he [Retana] fought in favor of the friars because the latter subsidized him by buying his books and subscribing to his newspaper. He recognized that such behavior was a big mistake and that it damaged his career. Now he is distanced from the friars and has become a member of the most radical party of Spain. His last novel, “La tristeza errante,” follows a socialist trend. He has changed radically and seemingly his regret is sincere.

Zulueta was right; Retana had changed and this turn can be perceived in the book, *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal*. His exultation of the friars is transformed into a fierce criticism, even putting upon them the blame of the loss of the Philippines. In fact, not only Zulueta echoed this transformation in Retana but also Javier Gómez de la Serna, who said that “Retana had an overwhelming prejudice that without the friars

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the power of Spain would be pulled down. When he [Retana] could think by himself, he strongly attacked this false premise. . .

Retana continued his political life with minor positions such as civil governor of Huelva and Teruel. Later, he became head of the police force in Barcelona. He was member of important European cultural organizations and the Royal Spanish Academy of History. He worked for Pedro Vindel as librarian and bibliographer and in 1905 started to work for *La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas*. In sum, Wenceslao Retana was a very prolific and versatile man.

As for Retana’s impact on scholarship, we can say that he has become a reference and authority for scholars from the nineteenth century to the present. Retana wrote inflammatory articles with a viperish language, which did harm to both Filipinos and Spaniards of the liberal sort in the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, his articles and books have a precious, eloquent and convincing rhetoric, which permits us to glimpse the irony of the author. Lamentably, the double language he displayed has become translated in a unidirectional manner that is made to reflect the anachronism of the Spanish system and the power of the friars and the theocracy. In fact, only few of Retana’s articles and books have been used and these have been [mis]interpreted by scholars.

Retana is well-known to Spanish scholars especially for three works: *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, Aparato Bibliográfico, and *Vida*

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17 The fifth volume of *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* has been ignored by historiography. This fifth volume differs in form and content from the former fourth. First of all, we know who subsidized this volume –Victoriano Suárez; secondly, it came out in the twentieth century, that means after Spain lost
Besides these works, however, Retana is also known for the new editions, with unpublished texts and his comments, of Antonio de Morga’s *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* (1909), Joaquín Martínez de Zúñiga’s *Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas o mis viajes por este País* (1893), and P. Francisco Combes’ *Historia de Mindanao y Joló* (1897). Spanish historiography has, by and large, highlighted these works. 

Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, which we might consider a predecessor of Blair & Robertson’s *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, since it is a compilation of primary sources, permits us to glimpse Retana’s approach. The prefaces are as eloquent as the compilation of the documents, most of them friar accounts. However, the fifth volume, ignored by most Spanish scholars and practically unknown to American scholars, is different from the preceding ones, being a political history of the archipelago. This last volume was subsidized by the editor, Victoriano Suárez. Aparato Bibliográfico is said to be one of the best

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18 Retana published this book in 1907. While Retana was co-editor with Pablo and José Feced of *La Política de España en Filipinas* and director of the said paper, Rizal suffered a campaign of discrediting with racist comments. After Spain lost the Philippines, Retana started to exult Rizal by publishing *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal*. On December 30, 1907, Retana gave a conference in Barcelona, in the “Centre Nacionalista Republicà” (Nationalist Republican Centre). The conference resulted in a small book considered as a small tribute of admiration “al gran mártir de la Patria Filipina” (the great martyr of the Philippine Patria). This book, entitled *Rizal, Notícies Biogràfiques*, Barcelona, Tipografia l’Avenç, 1910, was written in Catalan. In fact, the members of this centre were those who supported the claims of the Filipinos at the turn of the nineteenth century.

19 I only allude to Spanish scholars since *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, *Aparato Bibliográfico* and *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal* and his annotations of Zúñiga, Combes and Morga are practically the only references cited by Spanish scholars. I cannot see these works being mentioned after American occupation. A case in point is Glenn May who has used above all the *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*. However, an exception which confirms my argument—these works are the most appreciated—is John Schumacher who states categorically: “The writings of Retana that seem to be permanent contributions to Philippine historiography fall into three groups…” John Schumacher subsumes in these three groups the works cited in this part of the section. See Schumacher, John N. S.J. *The Making of a Nation…*, pp. 153-154.
bibliographies for Philippine studies. It also contains valuable information about works which have disappeared or have been omitted by modern scholars.

_Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal_ is another book by which Retana is known. Spanish scholars have used this book to write defeatist, deterministic, developmental and unidirectional histories in which there is chain of cause and effect from 1872 to 1898. The facts from 1872—the Cavite event—are connected to the revolutions of 1896 and are all considered as “independentist and nationalistic” in essence. In sum, _Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal_ has been co-opted to underpin the idea of the overwhelming power of the religious orders, which are held responsible for the death of José Rizal and the onset of revolution.

Perhaps the repeated use of the abovementioned works of Retana, to the detriment of others, is related to a powerful belief among Spanish scholars that true history is written using primary sources. Furthermore, the U.S. administration bought most of the Spanish books in the market that were written in the nineteenth century—including all of Retana’s works—and thus made access to some of his other works difficult. A final explanation of the neglect of Retana’s other, more important, works is simply the lack of interest in the nineteenth century, which has still to be written properly. In sum, the omission of Retana’s works such as _La_

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20 It is important to note that Retana’s works from the nineteenth century such as _Reformas y otros excesos, La Política, etc_, considered the reforms as the germ of separatism. _La Política_ considered as cause-and-effect the revolts and the reformism. Therefore, he established, as most of the conservatives of the nineteenth century did, a historical linearity from 1872 to 1896 and 1898. Precisely, _Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal_ presents another standpoint. Retana assumes that the Spaniards made a blunder when they executed Rizal, but that neither 1896 nor even less 1872, were separatist revolts. However, modern Spanish scholars consider 1872 as the germ of nationalism and the prelude of 1896 and the collapse of 1898. See for instance Luis Togores, Antonio Caulín, Carmen Molina Gómez-Arnau etc. As we have seen, LeRoy subtly inferred the same deterministic history.
Política de España en Filipinas, Reformas y Otros Excesos, and above all Los Frailes Filipinos por un Español que ha residido en aquel país, have made scholars misread the real significance of the Spanish reforms, which certainly were not a “dead letter.” Our present knowledge of the nineteenth century does not permit us to appreciate the real impact of the reforms. For this purpose we should undertake local studies. Perhaps there is a clear message in Retana’s statement, which should make us meditate on the real impact of the reforms in the Philippines, that the country was really governed by the civil or secular powers.

**Deliberate misinterpretation of Retana’s works**

Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Aparato Bibliográfico and the later, Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal, immediately became references for American scholars such as Robertson, Barrows, Edward Gaylord Bourne, Austin Craig, and of course LeRoy himself. Craig, who in 1910 wrote Los errores de Retana. Crítica de su libro Vida y escritos del Dr. José Rizal. (The errors of Retana: Critique of his book, Life and Works of Dr. Jose Rizal) exemplifies the trend among American scholars to dismiss this book since Retana makes important statements therein about the

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21 As I have explained in introducing The Americans in the Philippines, LeRoy suppressed ad hoc La Política de España en Filipinas; and Reformas y otros excesos is not mentioned. Worcester had most of the books written by Retana, but he did not use any of them to write The Philippines Past and Present; Joseph Ralston Hayden did not make any allusion to Retana. We know that Barrows used Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino in the first edition of A History of the Philippines. In the following editions, that from 1925, Barrows did not use it anymore. All of them preferred to use The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. The trend has not changed in the present scholarly scene. All those authors who claim that the Spanish regime was medieval, unable to develop to modern states, have never consulted Retana. For instance, Alfred McCoy, Paul Hutchcroft, Norman Owen and John Sidel maintain categorically a Spanish anachronism, however they have not used any work written by Retana. Michael Cullinane uses Sinapismos and Aparato Bibliográfico and Glenn May use Archivo del Bibliófilo—in sum, those bibliographical or archival works. But I cannot see La Política or Reformas y Otros Excesos although these works are in American libraries. It seems that LeRoy won his crusade against Retana.
reforms implanted in the Philippines, and moreover furnishes a large bibliography on the Maura law. They needed to discredit the book in order to deny the modernization of the Spanish system. LeRoy’s influence is perceptible in Craig’s book. LeRoy had misused *La Política de España en Filipinas, Reformas y Otros Excesos, Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal* and other works, obviously with a specific purpose—to demonize the Spanish colonial system, to discredit Retana, and to deny that the reforms happened. Moreover, LeRoy and others did not use a most important book by Retana: *Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país* (The Friars in the Philippines by a Spaniard who has lived in that country). There is a reason for the deliberate suppression.

*Los Frailes Filipinos por un español* was acquired by Worcester, and can be found in the Worcester Special Collection in Michigan. It also exists in the libraries of Yale University, Cornell University, and the Library of Congress. Thus, it was not unknown to the Americans. Curiously, *Los Frailes Filipinos* has been attributed by the Americans to Baltasar Giraudier who wrote an article entitled *Los Frailes de Filipinas. Breves Consideraciones de actualidad escritas por un español peninsular* (The Friars in the Philippines. A brief account of the present by a peninsular Spaniard). We can see that the title is similar to what Retana wrote, but the work of Giraudier is only a leaflet of 16 pages. Both works have a common approach: a spirited defense of the friars as

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22 By writing in the catalogue Retana, Wenceslao, this title appears as one of his book. However when one goes into detail the book is catalogued under the name of Baltasar Giraudier.

23 Baltasar Giraudier wrote this leaflet in 1888 coinciding with the Filipino demonstration claiming the expulsion of the friars. Giraudier is a clear defender of the friars and above all the archbishop Pedro Payo.
the civilizing and governing agents in the Philippines, together with a fierce criticism of the advent of the reforms. Retana and Giraudier echo the loss of pre-eminence of the friars. Giraudier reiterated that “the prestige of Spain depends on the prudent intervention of the clergy in the economic and political administration of the towns.” He denounced the fact that “since a few years ago the friars are being pulled away from these town matters by fomenting antagonism between them and the Principales.”

It is not difficult to find this idea in Retana’s works of the nineteenth century. Retana’s defense of the friars has in fact become the basis for constructing the inveterate argument that “the Spanish system was anachronistic, underdeveloped, medieval and despotic until the end.” American scholars from the very beginning have echoed arguments such as “the Philippine conquest was more religious than warlike,” inferring that the archipelago was maintained for three hundred years without soldiers—a peaceful domination, religious and moral in essence. As emphasized by Giraudier, this argument supported the idea that the Philippines was ruled by the friars and subjected to a theocracy.

What conventional scholarship has ignored is the other side of the coin, such as when Retana argues, as did Giraudier in 1888, that “... the domination of the friars has disappeared. . . The government in general, whatever the political party in power, has applied many imprudent laws

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25 Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país. Madrid: Imprenta de Viuda M. de Minuesa, 1898, p. 9. Practically the same sentence used by Retana to describe the role of the friars in the archipelago was co-opted by Gaylord Bourne in the “Historical Introduction.” In Blair and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 “From the beginning the Spanish establishment in the Philippines was a mission...” Vol. 1. p. 48.
and has unthinkingly carried out reforms from 1870s onwards.\textsuperscript{26} American scholars and administrators have not been interested in developing this part of the story since it would demonstrate that the Spanish colonial system was similar to European colonialism and that, above all, it was not static and therefore in need of overhaul by the Americans. Besides, Retana was inferring that reform was implanted by liberal and conservative parties alike. The restructuring of the colonial system lasted until 1898.

Retana makes another important statement suppressed by historiography: “He who rules, who orders, who collects tributes, who has the public power, is the civil power of Spain through its representative. It is not true that the friars rule the country.”\textsuperscript{27} This statement demonstrates my argument about the new modern authoritarianism implanted by the Spanish government. It certainly contradicts the old argument about the medievalism of the Spanish colonial system. Retana here highlights the role of the friar clergy from the sixteenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries, and how from 1870 onwards the friars began to lose much of their prestige, privileges and preeminence to the rising principales. This statement could explain why Retana’s Los Frailes Filipinos is mistakenly attributed to Giraudier. But Baltasar Giraudier was not an authority in Philippine studies. In fact, he only became known because he was the co-owner of Diario de Manila with Manuel Ramírez and they both founded the printing works,

\textsuperscript{26} Retana, Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos..., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{27} Retana Wenceslao E. Los Frailes Filipinos..., p. 15.
“Ramírez y Giraudier.” Giraudier lacked scholarly authority, so therefore his work could be ignored and even be relegated to oblivion. Retana, on the other hand, was an authority from the 1880’s on. If Los Frailes Filipinos por un español que ha residido en aquel país had been attributed to him, the conventional argument of a mission-military paternalism would have been put in question.

The abovementioned suppression or misattribution of Retana’s work leads us to an even more crucial argument: that if the suppressed Retana is resurrected, we can challenge the myths that have been established about friar domination in the Philippines. Los Frailes Filipinos por un Español is a 1898 re-issue of Folletos Filipinos. I. Frailes y Clerigos. Retana was criticized by the friars, who did not subscribe to the manner in which he treated political matters. By consulting this work, we can put in question the argument made by LeRoy, Robertson, Barrows, Bourne and others that the Spanish reforms were a “dead letter.”

Retana the defender of the friars was an unequivocal defender as well of the qualities and values of the race and the patria—or what may be termed a “Spanish-ness.” This line of thinking can be identified in practically all his works, but specifically in Folletos Filipinos IV. Reformas y Otros excesos published in 1890. This book can be divided into two main parts: the first is what Retana called “reformas” and the second is what we can term “excesos.” Reformas y Otros excesos is a

clear indictment against the reforms implemented by Manuel Becerra—above all against his policy of education. Retana uses harsh language in order to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not yet fit for receiving the reforms the Spaniards wanted to implant. In fact, Retana’s expressions border on racism.

Retana is provocative and controversial in the prologue. He starts complaining that his books were being censored while those with liberal ideas were circulating freely in the Philippines: “They allow to enter El Globo, El Resumen, El País, and other newspapers where the friars are insulted. See, therefore, how censorship protects more those who abuse it instead of those like me who have always defended it."31

This statement is another illustration of how the alleged censorship of the press in the colony must be interpreted with nuance, depending upon the Spanish government and the governor sent to the Philippines at any particular time. The black legend about Spain fomented by the Americans in the early twentieth century was facilitated by misreading or omitting part of Retana’s statements or works. Instead of Spanish censorship suppressing liberal ideas, as LeRoy emphasized in The Americans in the Philippines, we have seen from one of Retana’s “suppressed” writings that in fact he was fuming against the censorship of conservative, pro-friar writings.

Reformas y Otros Excesos, as the title clearly denotes, demonstrates once more the effects that the implementation of reforms in the archipelago was having. In order to discredit the liberal reforms,

Retana uses harsh words in dismissing Manuel Becerra’s government. But the worst language is deployed against the Filipinos as Retana echoes the colonial discourse of the time about the superiority of the colonizers or the Whites.

It is important to illustrate the part of the book that I have identified as “Reformas” since Retana paved the way for the fostering of a stereotyped image of the Filipinos. The use of certain terms and the categorical statement that the Filipinos were unfit to do anything would become a truism for contemporary readers of Retana[32] and above all for the Americans. Becerra imposed a rigid system of education since he thought that Filipinos were not suited to be assimilated to Spain and needed “education” in order to come of age. This portrayal was distorted by Retana who referred to the “indios” histrionically and with ridicule. He makes assertions such as that “the indio’s brain is useless for elaborating anything grandiose” or, “most of the indios have no aptitude for anything, they are useless” or, “that is a country of big children, more or less skilful, more or less pacienzudos (patient), but most of them lazy.”[33]

These statements did harm to the Filipinos but I need to point out that the dismissive terminology used by Retana to portray the so-called “indios” does not differ from the global ideas about “natives” in a state of barbarism such as were portrayed within the European imperialist

[33] Retana, W.E. Reformas y otros Excesos, pp. 23-32. I have marked the term pacienzudo –it is a Spanish adjective known grammatically and morphologically as “aumentativo” (augmentative). The opposite to the augmentative is diminutive. The use of this type of adjective is always pejorative. Pacienzudo in fact means –person with many patience.
framework. It is common to find in French or British books the idea of the lassitude of natives or their unfitness to contribute to anything of value. Moreover, we can find a common terminology being used, such as “the apathy and helplessness in the people.” These similarities in colonial discourse should make us think about the traditional conception of the Spanish colonial system. There was in fact a common European discourse to denote the massive contrasts that existed between Western countries and the tropics, or the prevalence of whiteness over the indigenous. This should not be an excuse to justify Retana’s views. On the contrary, by observing the imperial tendency to dismiss the natives we can see that the Spanish colonial system had actually changed its policy in the late nineteenth century and had parted ways with totalitarian colonialism, above all of the British variety. Retana reflected these changes in his work.

We conclude our discussion of the “reformas” by examining a paragraph in which Retana summarizes his ideals of progress, reformism and Spanis-ness:

The Philippines—a country in which floats a sui generis environment, saturated with reformist microbes. They are worried by a wish of progress without taking into consideration the special conditions of the archipelago and the specificity of its autochthonous races. [This wish of progress] is giving us and will have to give us, lamentably, counterproductive results. It is sad that some of those who have influence in the Philippines want to be progressives: the worst thing is that the “microbes” from there have come here…

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35 Retana, W.E. *Reformas y otros Excesos. (Desengaños)*, p. 16.
This paragraph is really important for several reasons. First of all, Retana uses a distinctive terminology, playing with the reader and above all confusing him. I have emphasized the term “microbes,” which is used twice. In the first sentence, “reformist microbes” has a double interpretation. The key word is no doubt “reformist” since Retana is referring to those who execute the reforms and the defenders of such reforms. Here Retana shows his intransigence to the restructuring of Filipino institutions carried out by liberal governments. The term “microbe” here is synonymous with bacterium, meaning that reformism is an illness. “Defenders of the reforms” no doubt alludes to the Filipinos. Here the term “microbes” is completely pejorative, inferring that the Filipinos could not understand anything about reforms because of their being “dim-witted.” Thus, the first meaning points to the irresponsibility and incompetence of the Spanish government, which was following a policy of assimilation and attraction, while the second meaning is a new display of racialism, which denotes the unfitness of the Filipinos to become a Spanish province and Retana’s disdain for them.

Retana concludes this part of “reformas” with a grandiloquent statement, which denotes that the reorganization of the system in the Philippines was destroying the civilized and paternalistic work made by the friars. Retana was supporting his idea –already displayed in other works—of the loss of preeminence of the religious orders:

In the Philippines, we start to build up a sumptuous building at the turn of the sixteenth century. Until twenty years ago, we had only concentrated on laying the foundations which, by the way, are very
strong because the religion is the principal material. But tied to the fever of the progress, we want to finish rapidly this palace.  

Retana argues that the friars had conserved the Philippines for Spain. This was a prevalent argument during the last years of the Spanish colonial system. There was an ad hoc misinterpretation that the friars were the only Spanish element, and therefore the only representative of Spanish-ness. However to this wrong interpretation is related the first part of the paragraph: “the fever of progress” is a key phrase, which would sum up the restructuring of the institutions. The Spaniards did not have time to finish their new building.

The part I have identified as “excesos” shows the impact of what Retana calls the fever of progress or reformism. This excess is interpreted by Retana in two ways. The first type contains a new definition and dimension of the term “filibustero”: “I offer to the Royal academy: Filibustero-ra. Adjective. In the Philippines it is applied to those thirsty for the independence of the country. He uses all possible legal proceedings to reach the objectives which he pursues.

Significantly, Retana’s offer is registered by the dictionary and so we find filibustero being defined in 1899 as “man who works for the emancipation of ‘our’ overseas provinces.” This definition has fallen into disuse. But Retana provides a deeper dimension to the term filibusterismo and filibusterismo by inferring that the latter had been fostered by

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36 Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 34.
37 Robles states that Spain had not time to implement the reforms of the last decades of the century. “Unfortunately time ran out on her.” Robles, Eliodoro. The Philippines in the nineteenth century, p.295.
38 Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 47.
reformism and the assimilation of the Filipinos to Spain. At this point, Retana emphasizes another evil—the second type of “excesos”—widespread in the archipelago, promoted by the freedom of association which Spain had given to the Philippines. This evil was masonry, which, Retana says, “has contributed and contributes powerfully to the spread of ‘filibusterismo.’ The Spanish mason spends his life hunting mestizos and cuarterones thanks to the liberal and anti-monastic spirit.”

It seems difficult, after reading Reformas y otros excesos, to support the traditional idea that the reforms of the late nineteenth century were a dead letter, that “immobilism” or the perpetuation of status quo characterized the Spanish system until the end. Probably, its confirmation of the progress made in the Philippines has caused this book to be omitted or misinterpreted in most of the bibliographies. Analyzed carefully, this book confirms to us several aspects of the changing colonial system of the turn of the nineteenth century.

The first aspect is the “politics of attraction” followed by Manuel Becerra. I use this terminology in order to demonstrate that Taft was not the maker of that policy, since the Spaniards had implemented it before. Becerra legislated liberal reforms promising total assimilation to Spain when Filipinos came of age: diputados a Cortes (parliamentary representation) and libertad de prensa (freedom of the press). This argument is mentioned by Retana although he discredits and disagrees with these reforms by asserting that the Filipinos were not fit for such

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40 Cuarteron: mestizo born in Latin America from a Spanish and mestizo. For Retana the cuarterones did not spread the idea of independence since as mestizo they could not tolerate being ruled by pure indios. See, Retana, W.E. Las Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 61.
41 Retana, W.E., Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 62.
reforms. His dismissal of reformism is a tacit recognition that this was implanted.

A second important aspect is the mordant language used by Retana to define the so-called “indios.” His discourse is typically colonial by repeating stereotyped images of the natives in the tropics. Therefore this discourse must be encapsulated within the emergent imperial discourse characteristic of the European colonial powers in Southeast Asia—a modern European authoritarianism. It is significant to point out that some of the images displayed by Retana will continue to be systematically used during the American colonial period.

Last but not least is the regret of the loss of preeminence of the friars. This regret is again a tacit recognition that civil power had overwhelmed the religious: “El fraile de hoy tiene menos influjo que el de ayer” (The present friar has less influence than the past friar).[^1] This categorical assertion questions the traditional argument that “the Philippines was a mission more than a colony until the end.”

The topics introduced in Reformas y otros Excesos would become radicalized in La Política de España en Filipinas. It is said that Retana left the archipelago to write in this journal, which according to Manuel Artigas was subsidized by the friars. We do not know if the friars did so directly but it was certainly close to the Unión Católica and, therefore, ultra-conservative and religious, in essence. La Política de España en Filipinas commenced publication in January 1891 and lasted until 1898. The first and most radical phase of this journal was from 1891 to 1895.

[^1]: Retana, Wenceslao E. Reformas y otros Excesos, p. 80.
when it was directed by José Feced while Pablo Feced—known by the nickname Quioquiap—and Retana were the redactors. In January, 1896, the periodical entered a second phase when Retana became its sole director. It was somewhat transformed and became more moderate in its language (since its enemies had disappeared) and treatment of political issues (probably because a conservative government was in power).

*La Política de España en Filipinas* was essentially political: anti-liberal and racialist. During its first phase it became the adversary of the Filipino liberal periodical, *La Solidaridad*. *La Política* included many collaborators such as Ferdinand Blumentritt, Ventura Fernández López, Vicente Barrantes, Gonzalo Reparaz and others.

During the first period, its most radical, *La Política* carried a specific purpose as explained in the so-called *número prospecto*—prospectus number: “Some years ago, no one remembered here [in Spain] the Philippines and various governments made what they wanted with our colony. Today things have changed…the mobility of our policy has made us talk about the Philippines in gatherings, cafés, papers and associations.”

This statement reveals the relevance of the Philippines for the Spaniards as new colonial entrepôt. Moreover, there is a de facto recognition of the impact of reformism. To the old “statism” is opposed the “mobility” of the liberal governments. Therefore, one of the purposes

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43 The collaboration of Ferdinand Blumentritt in *La Política* demonstrates that the controversial Austrian was part of intellectual debates. In 1896, Blumentritt wrote in *La Política de España en Filipinas* “Filipinas y las ideas separatistas” (the Philippines and the separatist ideas). He was to state categorically that the separatism in the Philippines did not have any hope. “El interés vital de toda la Europa pide continue el dominio español en Filipinas.” (the vital interest of Europe prays the Spanish dominion in the Philippines to be continued). See, *La Política de España en Filipinas*. Segunda Época, Año VI, Núm. 143, 144, 145, 15 de Agosto de 1896.

of the journal was, precisely, to counterattack or to “combat” such reformism.

A second purpose is stated as well in this prospectus. The Feced brothers and Retana were willing to combat what they considered *anti-Spanish-ness* emanating from the Filipino colony in Spain and those who supported it. In fact, *La Política* became the main rival of *La Solidaridad* and its main goal was to undermine this publication through the discrediting of the Filipinos and the use of a racialist discourse:

Guerra, pues, sin tregua a todo lo que *solidario* se haga de aquellos crasos errores o propósitos aviesos que indicados quedan; guerra a toda *solidaridad* que algo español combata en nuestra colonia, y pretenda arrojar sobre ella, a título de progreso político, la túnica de Neso de reformas inoportunas, absurdas y perturbadoras.45

(War, then, without pause against all those crass mistakes or malicious purposes already mentioned that *solidario* shall commit; war against all *solidaridad* that challenges the Spanish-ness in our colony and intends to cast upon it, under the excuse of political progress, the tunic of Neso consisting of inappropriate, absurd and disruptive reforms.)

Feced and Retana, showing their wit with the language, play with the terminology, specifically with the terms *solidario* and *solidaridad*. Both terms have a double meaning in this paragraph. The term *solidario* with their crass blunders or malicious purposes alludes, on the one hand, to those sympathetic to reformism and specifically the liberal politicians. By using “*solidario*” to define Spanish government, Feced and Retana were inferring that the government was assimilating the natives—an inferior race—to Spain. Therefore, the journal was presenting itself as the champion of *Spanish-ness*. On the other hand, *solidario* surreptitiously means the collaborators with their political and racial enemy, *La

The use of *solidario* is extrapolated to all those who supported the Filipino colony in Spain and were sympathetic to their claims and their journal.46

As for the use of the term *solidaridad* the context seems less subtle than *solidario* since the Feced brothers and Retana were willing to fight against those who criticized Spain and *Spanish-ness*. By using the words *algo español*, they were identifying *Spanish-ness* with the ultra-conservative and the friars. We can interpret *solidaridad* as the Filipino journal and the political party that supports the journal and reformism.

It is quite clear that the main purpose of the Feceds and Retana was to antagonize *La Solidaridad*. This caused their journal to become the antithesis of *La Solidaridad*. The anticlericalism of *La Solidaridad* thus becomes pro-clericalism in *La Política*; the reformism advocated by Filipino ilustrados becomes anti-reformism and pro-conservative ideas for Retana and Feced. The collaborators of *La Solidaridad* considered themselves prepared to become a province of Spain; Retana considered the Philippines had not yet come of age. Filipino ilustrados manifested and claimed their *Spanish-ness*; Retana denied their *Spanish-ness* and instead denounced their hostility against Spain. *La Solidaridad* and *La Política* were a forum of debate in which their collaborators confronted each other through mordant editorials. They expressed antagonistic ideas about how to govern the Philippines from the colonized point of view and the colonizers with a specific idea of what a colonial exploitative system meant.

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46 Manuel Artigas y Cuerva infers that in this excerpt the *solidarios* alluded to the redactors of *La Solidaridad*. See Artigas y Cuerva, Manuel. *Quién es Retana. Su antaño y hogaño*, p. 43.
La Política was a loyal upholder of the “patria’s” interests and the superiority of their race and above all exuded a deep feeling of Spanish-ness. As the journal put it, “the colonization of superior races has always been the only redemption of backward people…We have to Hispanize those Islands and make of those “naturales” human beings, with the essential conditions which characterize our race and our nature.” This statement simply reflects the principal idea in the new colonial discourse. Retana and the Feced brothers were expressing what the politicians from La Restauración –conservative and liberal—considered they had to do in the Philippines. The old paternalism was changed to an effective colonization of the archipelago. This was a true policy of colonization in the modern sense with all that it meant about the appropriation of cultures. The above excerpt, therefore, reaffirms the triumph of Spanish-ness upon the “Other.”

Feced and Retana drew the ire of some Filipinos not only for discrediting them but also for defending the religious orders, which at the turn of the nineteenth century were identified as defenders of the status quo. These were the terms of the political confrontation between La Solidaridad and La Política and they relate to the antagonism between reformism and anti-reformism.

The second phase of La Política under Retana’s sole directorship no longer featured La Solidaridad as its adversary. Its procedures therefore changed, but not its basic standpoint. As Retana himself points out, those who know the background La Política “will understand that

the change in the direction of the journal cannot affect its program; only
the procedures or development will change since those [rival]
publications no longer exist… The initial impetuosity which was our
mark of distinction now must turn into prudence.

It is difficult to
discern the “prudence” Retana alludes to since in the journal’s second
phase we find the same racialist language used to define the natives and
the same systematic discredit of liberal governments and their idea of
progress.

_La Política de España en Filipinas_ is arguably the most important
work written by Retana since it plots the evolution of the Spanish
colonial structure from 1891 to 1898, and is probably its most accurate
portrayal. _La Política_ shows us the implementation of the most important
reforms but lamentably the journal is not widely available. The American
conquest of the Philippines made this journal difficult
to access, however. In Spain, it can be found in a small library, the
Museo-Biblioteca Victor Balaguer. For Filipino use, it is available in the
University of the Philippines library. American scholars have actually
enjoyed easier access to this journal since it is available in different
universities and in the Library of Congress. But few of them have used
Spanish sources in their accounts of the Philippines and therefore
LeRoy’s statements continue to be authoritative.

To end this chapter let us briefly return to Retana’s _Vida y Escritos
del Dr. José Rizal_. The campaign of discrediting Retana was begun by
LeRoy in 1904 and continued by James Robertson and Austin Craig in

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1910. Craig interrogated *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal* in his book, *Los Errores de Retana. Crítica de su libro “Vida y Escritos del Dr. José Rizal.”* This was written for domestic consumption in order to convince the Filipinos of the American commitment to their cause.

LeRoy’s influence is perceptible in Craig’s book since he is continuously cited. But Craig’s strategy is to co-opt some chapters of Retana’s *Vida y Escritos* and systematically ignore other important chapters. For example, I cannot see any comment, criticism or even mention of the chapter entitled *Quinta Época* (1892-1896), section three, in which Retana contextualized Rizal within the development of Spanish colonial policy in the Philippines. Craig does not mention anything related to colonial policy, most notably Maura’s intentions in the Philippines, his municipal reform law and the displacement of this law during Blanco’s term.\(^{49}\) Retana offers an excellent bibliography on the Maura law, which Craig ignores because alluding to it would have meant the tacit recognition of the re-organization of municipal institutions to facilitate control by the Filipinos. Absent from Craig’s book is Retana’s argument that the power of the provincial government was restricted and the friars “could speak, advice, explain, teach but not order anymore.”\(^{50}\) Craig instead says that voices like Retana’s were responsible for Spain’s loss of the Philippines. Retana had been damned!

\(^{49}\) See Retana W.E. *Vida y Escritos del Dr. José. Rizal.* Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1907, pp. 299-311.

CHAPTER VI: LEROY, THE FILIPINO REFORMISTS, AND

THE KATIPUNAN

The Taft Commission did foster the worship of Rizal. They were glad in 1900, to have one way of giving expression to their sympathies with the national ideals, without offending to favor revolt. Rizal, and a national holiday to him was just the chance. Doubtless, official recognition helped the matter along…

Some of the Bonifacio adherents, e.g. (the less well-educated men of the insurrection, the katipuneros in general) have sometimes resulted the “neglect” as they call it, of their idol…

James A. LeRoy

The chapter devoted to Spanish rule in LeRoy’s *The Americans in the Philippines* concludes by extolling the propaganda for reforms conducted by the members of *La Solidaridad*, especially José Rizal. LeRoy pursues two main objectives in that section. On the one hand, he attempts to show that the Filipinos in Spain did not spread separatist propaganda. They simply were clamoring for progress and liberalism in the archipelago. On the other hand, LeRoy attempts to dismiss Bonifacio and the Katipunan revolt of 1896 by depicting this as a revolution based on crime and assassination carried out by the worst elements of the poor and ignorant class of Filipinos.

LeRoy insists that there was no connection between the Propaganda movement, the Katipunan, and the events of 1898 and 1899. He reverses the argument prevalent in the Philippines, which showed that the revolt of 1896 was a legitimate stage to the true Philippine revolution—that is, an evolution to more social and political freedom. LeRoy explains that

the incidents of the so-called revolution of 1896, [was] actively participated in only by sections of the archipelago, and by certain
classes to the very considerable exclusion of others, inspired,
moreover, by various mixed motives, among which were not
wanting the baser ones of personal revenge and race hatred.

LeRoy establishes a dichotomy between progressivism and
independentism. He makes clear that the best proof of the rising Filipino
sentiment of nationality was the campaign carried on in the eighties and
nineties “by the more progressive element of young Filipinos.” This
campaign to LeRoy was two-sided: on the one hand, the Spanish
campaign for the extension to the Philippines of freer governmental
institutions, for an “honest” administration, and for the speedy
replacement of the friars; and on the other, the Filipino campaign for
improvement of educational facilities, a removal of the “espionage” on
the press and public opinion, and, above all, for an awakening of the
lethargic masses.

LeRoy was accurate in defining the program of the propaganda
movement. However, he infers that there was no progress in the
Philippines during the 1880’s and 1890’s. In fact, he stresses the
existence of “a medieval atmosphere of Spanish government.” In order to
support his argument, LeRoy co-opts the Filipino newspaper La
Solidaridad as the catalyst of assimilationist sentiments and the
mouthpiece of a Filipino campaign against the predominance of the
friars. “La Solidaridad,” he avers, “became an indignant protest against
the abuses of the Spanish government and the friars, and preached social
progress.”

1 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 63.
2 James A. Le Roy to El Renacimiento, Durango, Mexico, 1 November, 1906. Published in supplement
to El Renacimiento of January 17, 19, 22 and 24, 1907. Robertson, James Alexander. Annapolis, Md.
This statement was part of the American project of public education through a rewriting Philippine history. LeRoy was promoting some events and figures, including this reformist journal, while neglecting others. In order to foster the idea of Spanish tyranny and above all censorship of the press, some journals published in the Philippines at the same time as La Solidaridad were ignored. The recognition of these publications would have put in question the ideas of “espionage on the press” and “friar dictatorship” furnished by LeRoy and still widely embraced by American historiography.

In addition, the exaltation of La Solidaridad was a pretext to minimize the importance of the Katipunan newspaper Kalayaan and the revolt of 1896 which came, as LeRoy states, from the illiterate and poor classes of the population. By positing the revolt of 1896 as coming “from below,” he was implying that this rebellion lacked true principles, was premature and badly conceived. It was in fact LeRoy who inaugurated the “black legend” of the Filipino revolution with its leader Bonifacio fomenting “a race war.” “There are stray bits of evidence,” LeRoy says, “that extermination had by 1895 come to be the preaching of the more blood thirsty leaders like Bonifacio.”

LeRoy was also paving the way for his following chapter on the revolt of 1898 and the argument that General Luna wanted to exterminate all the whites. LeRoy was very selective with the Spanish terminology. Obviously, he bases his account of the revolt of 1896 on Spanish sources, mainly Sastrón, Retana, José M. del Castillo and Eduardo Navarro, who

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1 LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 83.
used the term “aniquilar.” As has been explained, “aniquilar” in Spanish is not synonymous with “exterminate” and even less so at the turn of the nineteenth century. LeRoy inferred that it meant “to kill en masse,” even though when one reads Kalayaan and other Katipunan publications there is no hint of this idea. Evidently, LeRoy was chalking up more “evidence” in order to represent the Americans as the ultimate saviors of the people: “It must be remembered that if the Americans had not interfered in 1898, the result of the aborted and badly conceived and premature revolt of 1896 would have been disastrous for ‘Filipino Reform’. The Americans, then, had liberated the Filipinos from the Spanish reactionaries as well as the oligarchism and autocracy of Aguinaldo’s republic.

At this point, we can clearly perceive the generalizations being put forward in LeRoy’s narrative. He presents a distorted history by concluding that the reforms wished by the Filipinos would have been postponed indefinitely were it not for American intervention. This is part of his strategy, implemented by ignoring some of the sources. Governor-General Augustin arrived with those reforms, but as we shall see, these reforms came too late. The Americans, meanwhile, had promised independence to Aguinaldo. They came and brought with them the desired liberalism. But the dark age would become a “golden age” only if Aguinaldo’s republic itself was destroyed.

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La Solidaridad and other Filipino publications

*La Solidaridad* was born in Barcelona in 1889. The collaborators of this journal were imbued with liberal and “autonomist” sentiments. Pablo Rianzares was the first owner of the journal and the first director Graciano Lopez Jaena, who was above all an orator, demagogue and a writer. Lopez Jaena was protected by acknowledged Spanish radicals such as Sol y Ortega, Emilio Junoy, who would defend the Filipinos and their reformism until the end, and other “Catalan politicians.” I have emphasized the term “autonomist” and “Catalan politicians” since both concepts played an important role in shaping the political ideas of the collaborators of *La Solidaridad*. The Filipinos in Spain were generally not assimilationist. What they were claiming was political representation and self-government. They learnt about this “autonomist” thesis in Catalonia, which was then experiencing an incipient nationalism. Catalonia was starting to construct its own political and administrative framework (a phenomenon which was disguised as a “discovery of its own identity”). Filipinos ilustrados were clamoring for a similar model to be implanted in the Philippines.

In 1890, *La Solidaridad* moved to Madrid since the *Asociación Hispano-Filipina* had been founded there and the collaborators of the journal felt that their political aspirations would find a wider audience in Madrid than in Barcelona. Lopez Jaena decided to remain in Barcelona, and Marcelo Hilario del Pilar became the new director of the periodical.
La Solidaridad was a journal written by Filipinos, but I am not all that sure if it was “for the Filipinos.” The cultural level of the journal, the high level of the language, the political issues it tackled, lead me to think that this journal was written for a Spanish audience. The collaborators of the journal wanted to be heard as Spaniards, and above all as a Filipino “ilustrado” elite. Its most important and regular collaborators were Graciano Lopez Jaena, Marcelo H. del Pilar, Mariano Ponce (whose nicknames were Naning and Kalipulako), José Rizal (who used the nickname of Laong Laan), Antonio Luna with the nickname of Taga-Ilog, José M. Panganiban (with the nickname of JOMAPA), and Ferdinand Blumentritt.

It seems to me that the reformist discourse of La Solidaridad was not as extraordinary as LeRoy tries to portray it. As a matter of fact, the journal is comparable with many other journals of the nineteenth century which became venues for political debate. It is not rare to find in the Spanish press satires, parodies and ironical treatments of the weaknesses of Spanish society—above all among the intellectuals and radicals. It was quite common to read satires against the clergy. The anticlericalism of La Solidaridad was in fact a prevalent discourse in Spain at the turn of the nineteenth century.

The real significance of La Solidaridad, it seems to me, lies in the fact that its history was co-opted for specific ends by American and Filipino intellectuals. The Americans argued that La Solidaridad advocated reform instead of independence. This idea was very important for the colonial construction of Philippine history, since the Americans
could then justify their occupation of the archipelago by inferring that the educated Filipinos, or ilustrados, only wanted more self-government, not independence. The argument follows that since the ilustrados knew that the Filipinos had not come of age, they therefore needed the tutelage of a progressive nation like America. Filipino intellectuals, in turn, could identify in *La Solidaridad* “the germ of Filipino consciousness” that would ultimately lead to the attainment of national independence.

As early as 1898 the Filipino revolutionary organ *La Independencia* praised the struggle of *La Solidaridad* to obtain Filipino self-government. The newspaper stated:

> Everybody knows our Filipino sons worked peacefully in the [Spanish] metropolis. Though their task was immense and the obstacles huge, these noble souls nonetheless, spurred on by the memory of the motherland, offered up their money and their lives. From their sacrifices emerged *La Solidaridad*, that Filipino humble journal, mouthpiece of our dreams. . .where our tears were deposited, with the expectation that Spanish hearts were touched.

This excerpt is important since it was distorted by LeRoy. *La Independencia* was the organ of the Filipino Republic. The collaborators of this paper observed that *La Solidaridad* was the catalyst of Filipino national consciousness, although the above paragraph does not state that *La Solidaridad* was the germ of separatism. However, LeRoy gives Filipinos a lesson in history, stating categorically that *La Solidaridad* was reformist and therefore should not be related in any way to the “Filipino revolution” that would follow later. Although he is technically right, he infers that the educated Filipinos wanted only more social and political

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5 *La Independencia* [Diario], Malabon 1898. *La Independencia* was the first separatist newspaper directed by Filipino intellectuals. Retana, Wenceslao E. *Aparato Bibliográfico*, vol. 3, entry 4575, pp. 1761-1771.

progress, never “independence.” He avoids the use of the term “independence” altogether.


As with *La Solidaridad* and other books, LeRoy de-contextualized Sancianco’s *El Progreso de Filipinas* in order to demonstrate the underdevelopment of Spain. When Sancianco wrote the book, the main reforms had not yet been implemented. LeRoy exploits this fact, deliberately focusing on topics discussed by Sancianco that would denigrate Spanish rule such as “lack of public improvement and defects of public services, especially education and in administration of justice; restriction of opportunities for Filipino laborers and evils of caciquism.”

Yet, anticipating Lopez Jaena, Del Pilar and Rizal, Sancianco would press for the assimilation of the islands to Spain; “Filipino matters,” he said, “must be sorted out as other Spanish provinces ruled by the same general laws...”

Most important among Sancianco’s writings is a rigorous article about the so-called “indolence” of the Filipinos. He argues that this inveterate assumption was a cliché. However, by reading his arguments

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denying indolence we can glean changes in Spanish colonial policy designed to make their Filipino subjects economically useful. Moreover, the so-called indolence of the Filipinos seems to be used as a justification to deny the Philippines status as a Spanish province. In fact, during these decades Spain was reaffirming the status of the Philippines as “colony.”

Sancianco’s ideas have been eclipsed by the writings in *La Solidaridad*. His arguments regarding Filipino indolence were co-opted by Rizal for his article *Sobre la indolencia de los Filipinos*. This is part of a supression which started as early as 1898. Moreover, *La Solidaridad* has eclipsed other journals which were founded and published in the Philippines. This omission is interwoven with the widespread argument concerning the censorship of the press. I am not denying there was censorship but we should take into consideration the fact that there was more or less censorship depending on the Spanish government and the governor of the Philippines in place at any particular time. In this context, we must observe that *La Solidaridad* was read in the archipelago.

Another predecessor of *La Solidaridad* that LeRoy fails to mention is *Diario Tagalog* published in Manila in 1882. This newspaper was written in Spanish and Tagalog and brought to the archipelago the new liberal atmosphere prevailing in the mother country. The director of *Diario Tagalog*, Francisco Calvo y Muñoz, went to the Philippines as an administrative official. *Diario Tagalog* defended the most liberal solutions for the country, such as that Filipinos could love the Philippines.
without despising Spain. As a matter of fact, *La Solidaridad* owed many of its ideas to *Diario Tagalog*. On 15 June 1890, it mentioned how, “under the direction of Francisco Bueno, *Diario Tagalog* defended the most liberal solutions for the country and with its doctrines was presenting liberal ideas to the Filipino people…”\(^{11}\) LeRoy, however, was not interested in mentioning *Diario Tagalog* since his portrayal of “espionage upon the press” might then come under fire.

*Diario Tagalog* had a brief life, but it was not the only one which spread liberalism in the archipelago. *La Opinión\(^ {12}\)* was founded in Manila in 1887. This newspaper was political and literary. It had a section called *El Mosaico* (The mosaic) imbued with antifriar sentiment and analogous to *A vuelo de Pluma* from *El Liberal* of Madrid. Julian del Pozo in a very subtle way demonized the friars. Its political section was managed by Benigno Quiroga, a left-winger from the Liberal party who immediately won the sympathies of the Filipinos and enjoyed the support of Governor Terreros. Quiroga mounted a fierce criticism of the friars. *La Opinión* was in fact the first eminently political newspaper in the Philippines that antagonized the religious orders\(^ {13}\). This feature of *La Opinión* has been deliberately ignored and instead this newspaper has become remembered as an ultra-conservative defender of the *status quo* and the religious orders under the direction of Retana and Camilo Millán.

\(^{11}\) *La Solidaridad*. June 15, 1890, número 33, p. 392


\(^{13}\) *La Opinión* disappeared in 1889 when Retana and Camilo Millán started to work in this newspaper. Retana was considered a reactionary anti-Filipino and Camilo Millán belonged to the “opportunistic trend” –a political trend—that was furiously anti-Filipino. Obviously, the Filipino progressive sector left the newspaper.
So what is new in *La Solidaridad?* *La Opinión* displayed its reformist ideas and its antifriar sentiment in Manila. It can be argued, however, that *La Opinión* was a Spanish journal published in the Philippines, directed by Spaniards. This would demonstrate that anticlerical feeling was prevalent in Liberal Spain. However, LeRoy and future scholars needed to show that Spain was only a “democracy in manner” but not in substance, and thereby build up the notion of a “dark age” of Spanish rule. It is quite clear that, by not mentioning this journal and its criticisms of the religious community in the Philippines, LeRoy could ascribe a certain preeminence and uniqueness to *La Solidaridad* and the idea of the predominance and power of the religious orders. Highlighting *La Opinión* would have demonstrated, on the contrary, that Liberal ideas and reformism had reached the archipelago.

There are more examples, but I would like to discuss just two more newspapers which were born at the same time as *La Solidaridad*. These newspapers are characterized by their popular nature. The first one, *El Ilocano*, appeared in Manila in 1889. Founded, directed and redacted by Isabelo de los Reyes, this was the first genuinely Filipino newspaper. It was also bilingual: Castellano-Ilocano. In a simple language designed to educate the public, De los Reyes discussed issues of political reform. LeRoy was never to use any work written by de los Reyes since he considered Isabelo de los Reyes a demagogue, plagiarist and just plain ridiculous. The fact is, incorporating the writings of De los Reyes, as in

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the case of Retana, would have put into question LeRoy’s extremely partisan history.

The second newspaper of a popular nature was *El Resumen*. Founded by Pascual H. Poblete and Baldomero Hazañas, this newspaper was imbued with a nationalist spirit. Poblete demonstrated his political astuteness by contracting peninsular writers, and therefore remained free from suspicion himself. For example, Governor Despujol’s policy of attraction was celebrated by *El Resumen*, which dared to announce that “. . .the Philippines and its sons wish the full hispanization of the territory, its progress and its equality, and its assimilation in rights and duties to the provinces of the metropolis.”\(^{16}\) No one previously had said anything similar in the Philippines.

The historical prominence of *La Solidaridad* was really built up in the twentieth century and for specific purposes such as the minimization of Spanish reformism, the construction of stereotyped images of the Spanish regime, and above all, the establishment of an evolutionist history that begins with the emergence of national consciousness in the pages of this newspaper.

*La Solidaridad* defined its program as follows:

Modest, very modest, are our aspirations. Our program, moreover, simply, very simply, is to combat all reaction, to impede all regression, to applaud, accept all liberal ideas, to defend all progress; in a word: one more propagandist of all the “ideals of democracy” aspiring to rule/prevail in all the peoples de aquende y allende the seas. [emphasis added]\(^{17}\)

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\(^{17}\) With these words started the first number of *La Solidaridad*. 1889.
This program of *La Solidaridad* was carried out. It combated the conservative reactions by making fierce criticism of an “apparent power of the frailocracia.” This topic was a cliché during the twentieth century when the Americans fostered this image. However, few scholars have noted the period when the collaborators of *La Solidaridad* applauding the liberal ideas and the reforms implemented in the archipelago. I have highlighted the phrase “ideals of democracy.” What *La Solidaridad* was claiming was not fictitious at all. Its writers lived in Spain during an incipient democracy, not “a democracy in manner” such as LeRoy stated in *The Americans in the Philippines*, and they wanted the Philippines to become a province of that democracy. Therefore, the traditional idea of an underdeveloped Spain should be revisited.

*La Solidaridad* was above all a political journal imbued with republican ideas. I have checked carefully the issues from 1889 and 1890 and have noticed that traditional historiography has focused on just the following three topics treated in the newspaper: the reiterative claim for parliamentary representation and Spanish intransigence toward it, antifriar feeling, and the defense against the “methodical denigrators of the race.”[^18] LeRoy, above all, gave form and authority to a certain image of *La Solidaridad* by picking up its accounts of a lack of public improvements, defects in the administration of justice, defects in public services (especially education), and above all the lack of progress provoked in part by the prevalence of the religious orders. What he and others failed to mention is that *La Solidaridad* also applauded the reforms

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[^18]: I take this sentence from John Schumacher. *The Making of a Nation*. I think this statement is quite exaggerated.
of Liberal governments, published the decree of Maura, and expressed commitment to *Spanish-ness* and to Spanish political dynamism.

Quite clearly, the major aim of *La Solidaridad* was to provide a picture of a retrograde and obsolete Spanish system under the domination of the friars. Its anticlerical articles were so repetitive that the newspaper *La Patria* had to respond with an article entitled *Verdades Viejas* (Old Truths). *La Patria* argued that the obsession against the friars was conveying the now-obsolete idea that the friars were the crux of Spanish rule, their presence vital for the maintenance of the colonial regime. *La Patria* was echoing the clear demarcation that the governments of the Restoration had drawn between the friars, who were henceforth separated from all political matters, and the authority of the civil government. However, the prevailing historiography prefers to highlight the power of the friars in order to underpin the image of a medieval and anachronistic Spanish system.

Professor Blumentritt, a regular contributor to *La Solidaridad*, became the champion of the Filipinos and his articles, full of erudition although with many inaccuracies, sometimes fostered the idea of the preeminence of the religious orders in the archipelago, and sometimes the opposite—that the friars did not have influence in the Philippines.

Maybe these swings of opinion were due to the fact that he was never in the Philippines. This data is relevant, nevertheless, to

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21 *La Solidaridad*, Ferdinand Blumentrit, May 31, 1889.
understanding Blumentritt’s notion of the “mission military” paternalism of the Spanish system, which had disappeared by the middle of the nineteenth century. According to him, Philippine history tells us that “the friar without the soldier could not, cannot and will not be able to conquer and conserve the country.”\footnote{Blumentrit, Ferdinand. ‘Desengaños el alabardero de los frailes.’ \textit{La Solidaridad}. Madrid, September 30, 1890, núm. 40 p. 646. Desengaños was Wenceslao E. Retana’s nickname.} For him and other collaborators of \textit{La Solidaridad} the friars were to be blamed for being fierce enemies of any progress, adverse to the propagation of Spanish, ignorant, enemies of any liberal government, and an anachronism.

As for the denigration of the race based on the new concept of modern authoritarianism, Blumentritt defended the Filipino race. His attack on Quiroquiap (José Feced) and Retana contributed to the emergence of \textit{La Política de España en Filipinas}, the alter ego of \textit{La Solidaridad}. What initially was a political and intellectual debate involving two antagonistic ideas soon came to overwhelm all other agendas, however. \textit{La Solidaridad} attacked the friars; Retana and Feced fought back, defending the friar cause. The exchange became nonsensical, degenerating into attacks on the Filipinos who were considered as childish and unfit to undertake anything serious.

This absurdity did harm to the Filipinos and to the new model of colonialism that Spain was trying to implement. It distorted the real purposes of Spanish government in the Philippines. The debates surrounding the friars and racial discourse lent themselves to co-optation by the American regime, which transformed polemics into a real portrayal of the Spanish system. It facilitated the construction and spread
of the legends about the underdevelopment and medievalism of the Spanish system.

**End of Spanish colonial restructuring, the triumph of “obscurantism”**

LeRoy is really careful in the last section of *The Americans in the Philippines* devoted to the Spanish regime to delimit clearly, by writing separate sections, the Filipino Propaganda and the Revolution of 1896 and 1898. What we can call the “reformist campaign” would become the basis of the American justification to hold the Philippines. This argument is emphasized in LeRoy’s treatment of José Rizal wherein he concludes:

Rizal’s novels epitomize the whole movement and give instantaneous photographs of the Filipino people, with their vices and defects all plainly delineated. Rizal was, despite his radical and bitter outburst against Spanish reaction, a preacher to his own people more than anything else; he wished to make them see that there must be self-reliance and individual independence before there could be a real national life of feeling, or the possibility of an independent Filipino government.\(^{23}\)

This excerpt demonstrates LeRoy’s use of Rizal to argue that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government and that the “ilustrados” were the *vox populi* of the archipelago, their wishes shared by everyone. Correspondingly, the revolt of 1896 would be for LeRoy “a sort of Filipino excrescence—a minor French Revolution on the part of the more ignorant leaders of the lower classes.”\(^{24}\) LeRoy here delineates the dichotomy between Rizal and Bonifacio, inaugurating what has become a linear emplotment of the history of the nineteenth century. As Reynaldo Ileto states:

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24 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904.
With *ilustrado* writing, then, Philippine history became intelligible, progressive, linear and to some extent, “purposive.” The people, or its vanguard intelligentsia, could help push history to its goal by education/reform or revolution. Subsequent histories, both of the liberal and radical varieties, have reproduced this nineteenth century emplotment.25

LeRoy considered it essential to inform his American audience about the events of 1896-1898. For this purpose he used, for the revolt of 1896, three sources: Sastrón’s *Insurrección en Filipinas*, Retana’s *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* and at times *La Política de España en Filipinas* for some irrelevant data. For 1897, he used Primo de Rivera’s memorial—extracting only a few notes—and his account of Biak-na-bato; Blanco’s memorial; and some books close to the conservative trend. However, he omitted those parts of the arguments of these books which concluded that the revolt of 1896 was the result of the implementation of reforms, which in turn furnished the germ of separatism.

The events of 1896 and 1897 are discussed in many publications, conservative as well as liberal. LeRoy was familiar with most of this huge historiography, and many of these books are in the United States, but he was extremely selective in using them. Unfortunately, ever since he published *The Americans in the Philippines* this rich bibliography has all but been forgotten. Instead, it is LeRoy’s account that subsequent scholars built on.

LeRoy’s story of 1896 is a compendium of facts found in the abovementioned books he depended upon.26 Although these sources

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26 Sastrón Manuel. *Insurrección en Filipinas*. Madrid [s.n.], 1901; Blanco, Ramón. *Memoria que al Senado dirige el general Blanco acerca de los últimos sucesos ocurridos en la Isla de Luzón*. Madrid
consider the writings of the Ilustrados as the catalyst of separatist ideas, LeRoy denies this argument. He makes clear the absence of any relationship between the writings of the ilustrados and the Katipunan newspaper Kalayaan, published by Retana in Archivo del Bibliófilo. Although even the sources used by LeRoy emphasize that masonry became el taller donde se fundió el odio a España (the foundry where hatred of Spain was cast.), LeRoy ignores all this. Instead he demonstrates that the Katipunan and the revolution only germinated among the masses, who followed blindly their fanatical leaders. He dismisses the idea of “true independence” inspiring the mass movement. Instead, the Filipinos are depicted as prone to mysticism, secret organizations and the like.

The Katipunan was in fact perceived by the Spanish government of the nineteenth century as an excrescence of masonry, which had co-opted and fanaticized the masses. According to Spanish sources—specifically documents published by Retana and Sastrón’s account—Marcelo del Pilar advised the creation of another association in 1892, which would serve to attract the peasants and the illiterate. This association would be the Katipunan.

27 According to Retana, this paper started to be published at the beginning of 1896. See, Retana, Wenceslao E. Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, vol 3. Ileto has cast light on this newspaper and on Bonifacio as indisputable leader of the revolt of 1896, ignored or misrepresented by Filipino historiography. The suppression of Bonifacio was fostered by the American educational system. See Ileto, Reynaldo C. Pasyon and Revolution. Popular Movements in the Philippines 1840-1910. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979.
29 Castillo y Jiménez, José M. El Katipunan o el Filibusterismo en Filipinas. Crónica ilustrada con documentos autógrafos y fotogravados. Madrid, 1897.
Retana, in *La Política de España en Filipinas*, published an article on 30 April 1896, and another on 15 May 1896, entitled *El Separatismo en Filipinas*. He echoed some letters sent to the newspaper *El Correo* by someone called Roque Rey, who explained the main reasons for the rise of separatism or *filibusterismo*, as it was called in the Philippines. These were as follows: the reformism which prevailed in the archipelago, assimilationist sentiments, masonry, republican ideas, hatred against the friars, and the policy of attraction followed by some governors. Retana was here denouncing the policy implemented by General Blanco.

It is important to note the last reason pointed out by Retana (who in fact fits the profile of “Roque Rey”): the implementation of the policy of attraction. LeRoy mentions the same sources in *The Americans in the Philippines*, but we cannot see the same arguments. General Blanco was considered responsible of the uprising of 1896 by governing with tolerance and ignoring the secret meetings and the rumors of the advent of a revolution. Blanco had to justify his acts before the Spanish senate. Among his many interesting statements was that many prestigious people in the Philippines were not separatist. Many liberals and above all the republicans in fact regarded the Filipino *ilustrados* as reformist and above all assimilationist more than separatist. And besides, they trusted the loyalty of the Filipinos. They saw separatism as something fostered by conservative and friar elements. Blanco affirmed that his policy of attraction was one of the dictums of Spanish government and that this

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31 Blanco, Ramón. *Memoria que al Senado dirige el general Blanco acerca de los últimos sucesos ocurridos en la Isla de Luzón.*
policy was preventing the implantation of separatist feelings. In a letter of 8 November 1894, Marcelo del Pilar wrote:

But lamentably, by judging what you deign to tell me in the letter of 23 July, insofar as this campaign runs, instead of our forces growing its dispersion is becoming evident. The shyness of some of them, the indifference of others (among the wealthiest, such is observed in the letter), are creating a huge emptiness around our cause…[32]

Blanco arrived in the archipelago with the Maura law, something LeRoy overlooks. In implementing this law he founded native institutions and gave the principalía more political autonomy by ruling the municipalities. He also allowed freedom of the press. This new liberal turn fostered, according to conservative sources, the revolt of 1896.

It seems, thus, that the reasons exposed by Roque Rey or Retana—assimilationism, masonry, republican ideas, hatred against the friars—were the reasonable consequences of the application of Blanco’s policy of attraction. As a matter of fact, Retana wrote inflammatory articles against Blanco ever since his arrival. But the most fruitful literature about the evils of reformism came out in 1897, and was reiterated and radicalized in 1898.

Eduardo Navarro, an Augustinian, wrote an interesting book explaining the implementation of reforms such as the new municipal regime, the enforcement of a civil and penal code and the appointment of justices of the peace. He complained that the friars had been stripped of their power and that the revolt was an intrinsic effect of reformism. In a short period of time, scarcely five years, he says, “all the reforms we have mentioned [i.e., the Maura law, penal and civil code, justices of the

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peace, etc.] were implemented; the way of life, customs and patriarchal laws were, in part, disrupted…”

This statement seems to contradict LeRoy’s argument regarding the perpetuation of medievalism. He used Navarro’s book but invited the reader to read only the last chapter, *La Masonería*, and then concluded that the book was irrelevant!

Camilo Millán, a recalcitrant journalist, explained the origins of the insurrection in the newspaper *El Español*. It was caused, he said, by the benevolence of the Spanish government, the municipal autonomy which gave shape to the formation of the “Catipunan.” In short, Spanish reformism encouraged the separatist movement. The Maura law, said Millán, “gave occasion to the enemies of the Patria to avail themselves of the autonomy given to the new municipios in order to complete their organization and precipitate the events which we all deplore.”

More mordant is Juan Caro y Mora in *La Voz Española*, a newspaper which was born under the banner of “The Philippines by Spain and for Spain.” Curiously, Caro y Mora was Filipino but completely *hispanized*. It is thought that he was under the influence of Fr. Evaristo F. Arias. He subscribed to the same causes of the insurrection as other authors, but introduced something new in his explanation that would prove very useful for LeRoy and others. “The peculiarity and

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novelty of this rebellion,” he said, “is the way in which it was prepared. The idea was essentially political—independence—and it germinated slowly. . .among the caciques and promoters in the lodges who gave it form and spread it among the fanatical masses.”

No doubt, the term “cacique” in this passage is owed to Spanish influence, although it is not clear whether Caro y Mora’s usage of it is due to the influence of *Las Leyes de Indias* (i.e., the assumption that cacique = principal) or whether he refers to the cacique which emerged in Spain during the Restoration as a political intermediary. Be that as it may, Caro y Mora was giving shape to the further American deformation of what cacique meant, as we shall see in the next chapter. From the ambiguous sentence one could easily infer that the caciques—such as LeRoy shows in his explanation of the revolt of 1896—undermined the will of the poor and ignorant masses.

Finally, we should note the statement of José M. Castillo y Jiménez in 1897 that masonry had been the workshop where hatred toward Spain had been forged and that municipal reform had fostered this *filibusterismo*.

The above books condemn Spanish reformism as the “evil” that precipitated the revolution. LeRoy knew about and used those books but he provided a sectarian reading of them, omitting the chapters devoted to the implantation of reforms. LeRoy based most of the history of the 1896 revolt on *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*. However, he selected carefully the documents of *Archivo* that seemed to demonstrate that the Katipunan

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37 Castillo y Jiménez, José M. *El Katipunan o el Filibusterismo en Filipinas*. Crónica Ilustrada con documentos autógrafos y fotogravados. Madrid.
was organized for the assassination of the whites. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that LeRoy co-opted as follows the prologue of Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino: “Monstrous revolution, in which, one has to say, we cannot see a plan, a definite aspiration or a directed intelligence, only cruelty produced by the mental insanity of a few ambitious men upon whose heads have already fallen the anathema of all civilized mankind.” Retana in the actual prologue does not accuse anyone in particular, but LeRoy points the finger at the masses, with Bonifacio as the main instigator.

Retana presented two kinds of documents: letters of the Guardia Civil (Constabulary), friars and civil governors, and documents related to Masonry, the Katipunan and its organ Kalayaan. The letters are important because they represent the views of the most conservative sectors and were the catalyst for the formation of American colonial discourse. They infer that Masonry had influenced all the inhabitants of the Philippines, including the masses, constituting “the bad seed that spread and the founding of another society called Katipunan –that is, reunión de notables in Spanish.”

This statement, made by an anonymous civil governor, was essential for the American construction of the Katipunan as an “abnormal association of the masses.” However, LeRoy and future scholars would ignore the words of the same civil governor when he related the revolt to

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40 Glenn May used Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino vol. 3 in Inventing a Hero: The Posthumous recreation of Andres Bonifacio. He considers Retana’s work as the most valuable and reliable source to know the story of the revolt of 1896 and the foundation of Katipunan. However, he is very selective with the documents since he infers that Spanish reformism such as the Maura law was never enforced in the Philippines. It seems that LeRoy is still very much alive in our textbooks.
the implantation of native institutions: “The capitanes, tenientes and jueces de paz [i.e., municipal officials] are the cabecillas of the revolution. They cannot continue unless a hard and energetic system is implemented in order to exhaust the bad seed that has spread…” The terminology used by this governor clearly alludes to the implementation of the Maura law and the implantation of justices of the peace and he puts the blame on them for the revolution.

As for Kalayaan, LeRoy overlooks the Katipunan newspaper, relegating it to a footnote. This is part of his narrative strategy since he wishes to avoid any controversy relating to “independence or separatism.” He mentions only one article of this newspaper—the “Manifiesto”—since this is attributed to Rizal. He refuses any idea of revolt:

Yet the manifesto of “Dimas-Alang” (Rizal), through presenting in allegory the awakening of his people by “liberty” preaches mainly the need for an “independence of spirit” and a self-reliance on the part of the people themselves, and must be distorted to find anything countenancing immediate revolt. [emphasis added]

There are some distortions and mistakes in this passage. LeRoy copied the name “Dimas-Alang” from Archivo del Bibliófilo which had made a mistake and used the pseudonym “Dimas-Alan.” But, Retana in La Política de España en Filipinas righted this wrong and attributed the article Pahayag to Dimas-Ilaw. LeRoy effects the distortion by attributing the manifesto to Rizal. In his aim to deny “immediate revolt,” he misleads the readers by claiming that Filipinos, as Rizal preached,

were not prepared for independence; this independence was only of the “spirit.” The “manifiesto” in fact was written by Emilio Jacinto who used the pen-name “Dimas-Ilaw.” It seems this excerpt shows how LeRoy made a tendentious use of the sources.

The abovementioned books about the 1896 revolt appeared during the signing of the pact of Biak-na-bato in mid-1897. All of them have a clear conservative trend and were useful for LeRoy. Conversely, he suppressed liberal narratives of the same event. Liberal politicians such as Moret, or republicans such as Junoy and Pi i Margall, did not doubt for a single moment the loyalty of the Filipinos. For instance Pi i Margall continued to support the Filipino cause during the impasse of the revolution. He wrote an editorial in the newspaper El País dated 22 December 1896, and re-issued in 1897, entitled “The work of the friars was falling into pieces,” wherein he concluded that this was for la salud del reino (the health of the kingdom.) Pi i Margall echoes the view that the loss of preeminence of the friars could only be healthy for Spain and the Philippines.

Moreover Morayta continued to be supportive to the Filipino cause, despite accusations of being a mason and a traitor to the “patria.” Morayta founded in 1897 a political journal called El Republicano. This journal offered news about the Philippines but above all Morayta remonstrated against those who saw the revolt as a consequence of masonry. La Voz de Ultramar was as well a liberal journal. Felipe Trigo

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provides facts that were quite different from those published by Sastrón. He defended the government of General Blanco.46

The selective co-optation by LeRoy of the abovementioned sources allowed him to delineate a dark age of Spanish rule that would eventually dominate historiography. The denial of reformism facilitated the spread of the idea that Spanish rule was backward and immobile. \textit{La Solidaridad} and the writings of the \textit{ilustrados} had earlier provided an image of the omnipotence of the friars until 1898. The image of oppression and tyranny under Spanish rule, built up by both the ilustrados and the leaders of the Katipunan, became the driving force of the separatist movement. Ironically, however, selective and decontextualized images of Spanish rule showing a quasi-medieval obscurantism nicely suited the American argument that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government. Therefore, the Filipinos needed American tutelage. LeRoy had constructed a history of Spanish Philippines to justify the U.S. occupation of the archipelago.

\textbf{What LeRoy never explained about 1897-1898}

Moret was appointed again Minister of the Colonies and Augustin, Governor of the Islands. Moret, who believed from the beginning in the loyalty of the Filipinos, together with Augustin attempted to implement the reforms demanded by the revolutionaries. Sagasta gave Augustin a “transcendental mission”: to allow the involvement of the Filipinos in all public matters. Augustin appointed some Filipinos to high military positions: Artemio Ricarte, Baldomero Aguinaldo, Mariano Trias,

\footnote{Trigo, Felipe. \textit{La Campaña Filipina. El General Blanco y la Insurrección}. Madrid: Fontanet, 1897.}
Licerio Geronimo, Enrique Flores, Felipe Buencamino and Pio del Pilar were among them. A Consultive Assembly was implemented headed by Pedro Paterno, and finally, there was the firm promise of representation in the Cortes.

Republicans and autonomists demanded that the government guarantee the continuity of the reforms in the archipelago. Emilio Junoy, who always supported Filipino claims, urged the Spanish government to implement the reforms immediately. He concluded: *no hagáis la reforma del Archipelago Filipino, tarde y mal.* (Don’t undertake the reform of the Archipelago late and badly.)

It seems that these reforms came too late since the Filipinos had received a firm promise of independence from American officials and this promise, no doubt, made the treaty of Biac-na-Bato in part a failure. The ilustrado Felipe Calderon, a veteran of the Malolos Congress of 1898, illustrated these facts first in 1905 with documents of the revolution until 1898 and in 1907 published an account of the second period from 1898 to 1901. These documents, systematically ignored by American scholars, throw some light on the birth and development of independence feelings in the Philippines, the last attempts at Spanish reforms, and above all they serve to demystify some traditional arguments that are in fact the product of an isomorphism between past and present.

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47 D.S.S., Ss. 28 de mayo p. 889.
48 Calderon Felipe G. *Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas. Época de la Revolución. (Primera serie.)* In Retana, Wenceslao E., *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino,* vol. 5, pp. 319-416. The same author published in 1907 *Mis Memorias sobre la Revolución Filipina. Segunda etapa* (1898-1901). Manila: El Renacimiento. If in 1905 Calderon wanted not to forget the formation of the Philippine nation, in 1907 he tried to explain a Philippine history from a Filipino standpoint since the textbooks only followed the American view.
Felipe Calderon narrates in great detail how Filipinos were waiting for the resumption of Spanish reforms from December 1897 to April 1898 and upon observing that these reforms were not forthcoming, hostilities were resumed. The war was intensified and Aguinaldo ordered his men to “aniquilar” (destroy) the Spanish army. This term has been [mis]translated by Americans as “exterminate.” In fact, however, the Spanish word “aniquilar”—in the context of Aguinaldo’s order—means to destroy, to ruin, not to exterminate, eliminate, or decimate. Besides, according Calderon’s documents, Spanish prisoners were well treated. This idea of “extermination” being systematically pursued by Aguinaldo’s army was fostered by the Americans to justify their occupation of the archipelago, after having broken their promise to be the “champion of the oppressed people.” The Filipinos involved in negotiations, especially the “Caudillo” or “Generalísimo” Aguinaldo, believed in the Americans. Calderon uses the term “caudillo”—a typical Spanish term which means “a head who leads and commands people at war” or “a man who leads a guild or community.” Aguinaldo was both since he had been head of his village or cabeza de barangay, during the Spanish term and later the leader of the Filipino people. American writers, however, have misused this term by making it connote

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49 Julia Cendrán Ruano, for instance assumes as the dictum of the truth the American assumption that the Filipino army wanted to kill the whites. Celdrán Ruano, Julia. Instituciones Hispanofilipinas del siglo XIX, p. 334.

50 Letter Felipe Calderon to Basilio Augustin, Kabite 9 junio 1898. “Emilio Aguinaldo treats very well the prisoners, above all the Spaniards..., p. 75. Joaquín Pellicena y López supports this argument although he was a recalcitrant reactionary. Pellicena y López, Joaquin. La Verdad sobre Filipinas. Folleto de actualidad. Manila: Tipografía Amigos del País, 1900.

51 General Merrit justified with these words their intervention in the Philippines. Calderon, Felipe. Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas, p. 7.
something pejorative. Aguinaldo later became stigmatized with this term “caudillo” denoting a boss or “cacique”.52

Calderon published in his compendium of documents an interesting letter of Felipe Buencamino, who declared himself Spanish and was with the Spanish government in the archipelago during the revolt. In fact he was the intermediary between Augustin and Aguinaldo. He became a prisoner of Aguinaldo who had come to distrust Spanish promises ever since the precedent set by Primo de Rivera and Paterno. Buencamino decided to join Aguinaldo’s army. He sent a letter to Augustin on 9 June 1898 in which he encouraged the Spanish governor to surrender since there was the real certainty of independence:

I think, my General, you must capitulate as soon as possible, instead of surrendering in war. I have heard that our “dictator” intends to transport free to Spain all those who want to return to Spain and to provide for the livelihood and material needs of those who wish to remain in the country.53

Buencamino’s long letter was deliberately manipulated by Manuel Sastrón in his account, *Insurrección en Filipinas*. Sastrón selected some parts in order to demonstrate to Spanish readers the arrogance and

52 Sidel, John T. *Capital, Coercion and Crime. Bossism in the Philippines*. Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1999. Sidel interpolates the past with the present in order to build up a linear emplotment, co-opting this term “caudillo” to endorse the idea that Aguinaldo was a strongman in the Philippines, besides implying de facto the connivance of Spanish system. Under the meaning of caudillo offered by Sidel there is a much more complex argument. See “Provincial Warlords of Cavite,” ‘Cavite’s Caudillo, 1901-35: General Emilio Aguinaldo.’ There is a deliberate [mis]use of the term, pp. 55-61. Benedict Anderson in ‘Cacique Democracy in the Philippines’ establishes a similar analogy. He emphasizes the term caudillo in order to define Aguinaldo: “The mestizo generals themselves (who included the grandfathers of Ferdinand Marcos and Benigno Aquino Jr.) began to follow the pattern of their American forebears, by setting themselves up as independent caudillos.” (p. 200) This statement is essential since Anderson follows two important arguments established as early as 1904. On the one hand, he infers that “caudillismo” as synonymous with the present “strongmen” is endemic in the Philippines. Therefore, this was an evil the Americans had to confront. There is continuity in the predominance of the families from 1898. On the other hand, by emphasizing the sentence “American forebears” Anderson is encapsulating the Philippines in the Latin American context, and subtly stating “caudillismo” shows the resilience of the Spanish colonial structure.

53 Calderon, Felipe. *Documentos para la Historia de Filipinas...* p. 78.
volatility of the Filipinos; he uses the term tagalo (Tagalog) in a pejorative way. As a matter of fact, Buencamino’s letter is not arrogant at all. On the contrary, it displays a special affection for the Spaniards, an affection that Buencamino would continue to demonstrate during the American era.

Augustin received Buencamino’s letter but had to return immediately to Spain anyway because they had surrendered to the Americans. The quick capitulation engendered a flood of opinions as to who or what was to be blamed for the defeat: the administrative immorality?, the predominance of militarism?, the implantation of the Penal Code?, the Maura law?, or the behavior of the religious orders? The answer/s depended on who was explaining the story. Whatever the root cause, the hard fact to be swallowed was that Spain had lost the Philippines in a war with the Americans.

The Philippines was lost and Moret took a huge portion of the blame. “More reforms! We have to take advantage of Moret as Minister for the Colonies! There is no other minister more filibustero than Moret!,” fumed Retana. He always referred to reformism and the freed press as catalysts of the insurrection and the subsequent revolution for independence. Pellicena, pointing the finger at Primo de Rivera and Augustin, alluded to different reasons: the Penal Code or the Maura law.

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54 Sastrón, Manuel. Insurrección en Filipinas, p. 460. It is interesting to note that Spanish scholars, influenced by this book as a loyal testimony of Philippine revolution, use the term Tagalog instead of Filipinos. Moreover, American scholars consider this book as “the most complete record of the insurrection and the war with the U.S. in the Philippines has yet been issued in Spain.” LeRoy, James A. The Americans in the Philippines, p. 97. This opinion about Sastrón’s continues to be prevalent among some American scholars.
56 Pellicena y López Joaquín. La Verdad sobre Filipinas. Folletos de Actualidad., p. 7.
The reformism blamed by Retana fell into oblivion, since the crisis of consciousness of 1898 imposed by authors such as Vital Fite, an antifriar defender of the Filipino cause, and Enrique Altamirano, confused the cause of the friars with the cause of Spain. The reasons stated by Pellicena suffered a selective co-optation, illustrating the predominance of administrative immorality and the omnipotence of the friars and suppressing the Maura law and the Penal Code.

The political debate in Spain did not end in 1898. The split opened up in 1898 between Liberals and Conservatives was inexorably deep. In 1904, Moret continued to insist that the Spanish had failed to adhere to the treaty or pact of Biac-na-Bato. Conservatives justified this by claiming that Aguinaldo had already signed an agreement with the Americans. At the end of the day, the political debates with their lack of recognition for Spanish reformism actually helped to shape and articulate the notion of a dark age of Spanish rule: the religious orders, the army, and an obsolete despotic and racialist administration, contrary to the assimilationist discourse of the Spanish administration, controlled the colonial structure until the bitter end.

**Epilogue: LeRoy’s account of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines**

If we can be assured that the first chapter of LeRoy’s book devoted to the Spanish regime was written by him, we cannot erase some doubts

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59 Maura, Antonio. *La Cuestión de Nozalda ante las Cortes. Discursos del Exmo. Sr. D. Antonio Maura*. Presidente del Consejo de Ministros. Madrid: Impresor Libertad, 1904. In this political debate, Moret, Junoy and Morayta were accused of supporting the Filipino cause. They were the *filibusteros* in Spain.
regarding the authorship of some chapters devoted to the revolution and the war. LeRoy supports some difficult arguments by quoting extracts from the *Compilation of insurgent documents* by Captain John R. M. Taylor. His handling of the issues of an alleged American promise of independence, the nepotism of the leaders of the Filipino revolt, and the “massacre” of whites, are based on Taylor’s work. Curiously, Worcester in *The Philippines Past and Present* used the same Compilation of Insurgent records. 60

Taylor’s work, then titled *Insurgent War Records*, was almost published in 1907 but certain problems intervened. In 1909, LeRoy, who was considered the most rigorous and objective scholar on Philippine history, was asked by General Clarence Edwards to review the two first volumes of Taylor’s manuscript, now titled *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States: A Compilation of Documents with Notes and Introductions*. LeRoy responded with an excellent critique and, with his habitual eloquence, warned Edwards not to publish the work under the Washington Bureau. “I very decidedly believe this work should not be published as it is,” argued LeRoy,61 since he considered it not a business of the government to furnish an official version of history and even less when a part of that history was still the subject of controversy. LeRoy suggested the publication of the insurgent documents without “colorful” comments, and through a private printing house rather than the government’s.

60 Worcester makes clear what insurgent means in that context: “I use the word “Insurgents” as a proper noun to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States.” He suppressed the term war. Worcester, Dean C. *The Philippines Past and Present*, 1914. Vol. 1, p. 16

LeRoy did not differ with Taylor over ideas since both believed in the “benevolence” of American policy. Actually, LeRoy and Taylor shared several manuscripts, books, and above all, comments. Both of them agreed on the main points of U.S. policy and both aimed to discredit the insurgents and their cause. But LeRoy felt that Taylor’s manuscripts lacked rigor and that there were mistranslations.

LeRoy saw to it that this manuscript was not published in 1909. It is said that he was trying to prevent damage to Taft’s career and perhaps this is true; Taft became president in 1909. Moreover, LeRoy argued that Taylor’s work was clearly insufficient because it lacked a “broad and liberal” viewpoint. Taylor tended to make “generalizations.” Well, it is striking to read LeRoy’s criticism knowing that his book, *The Americans in the Philippines*, is based on the same general conclusions but LeRoy was able to imbue his works with scholarly arguments and references from Spanish books and the Filipino press.

Some recent scholars such as John M. Gates infer that the censorship of Taylor’s work was due to his hard criticism of many of the leaders of the Philippine revolution, men who in many cases were then working for the American government in the islands. He notes that Taylor’s history also contained an implicit indictment of William Jennings Bryan and other anti-imperialist Democrats for their support of Philippine independence. It seems, according to these conclusions, that 1909 was not the year to publish this “official history.”

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62 Gates, John M. *James A. LeRoy’s Critique of John R. M. Taylor’s The Philippine Insurrection against the United States*. Edited with a brief introduction by John M. Gates. These essay can be found between Le Roy’s papers at Bentley Library, University of Michigan and Robertson’s papers, at Duke University.
Taylor learned about LeRoy’s review of his work leading him to complain to McIntyre in 1914 that any comments LeRoy may have made regarding the manuscript “should be ignored since he was a singularly prejudiced individual.” McIntyre replied that he believed Taylor’s work would be published. But in 1914, the bureau was not about to publish the work since the Democrats had won the elections and Taylor had made strong indictments against them. The only way to spread Taylor’s work was in form of an official report, which is how Worcester did it. LeRoy’s *The Americans in the Philippines*, when it appeared in 1914, used the documents compiled by Taylor. It is hard to say if these portions of the book were actually written by LeRoy or whether Taylor or Worcester had added some materials to LeRoy’s text in order to discredit the Democrat government.

Taylor’s *The Philippine Insurrection against the United States* was never published. It seems that in 1919 Washington again considered the idea of publishing it. With the Republicans back in power, Taylor’s book could be used in order to undermine the policy that had been implemented by the Democrats (under Governor Harrison) in the Philippines. Filipino claims of independence could be silenced by alluding to “the possibility of anarchy” (a pronounced theme in Taylor’s book) if they took over. The Library of Congress tried to locate the gallery-proofs of Taylor’s unpublished work. They sent a letter to LeRoy’s wife at Taft’s request inquiring about the whereabouts of the

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proofs, but “it does not appear from the correspondence whether they were retained by Mr. LeRoy or returned to the War Department.”

Before he died LeRoy had asked General Edwards not to file his notes. It was impossible thus to find in the War Department the proofs of Taylor’s work. I do not know if Mabel LeRoy had a copy but a person who did have one was LeRoy’s best friend, James Alexander Robertson, who had been influenced to take a negative view of Taylor. Maybe, this was the reason why Taylor’s documents could not be published in 1919. Taylor had been damned, as others were, by the pen of James A. LeRoy.

LeRoy died two months after sending his review of the Taylor manuscript to Edwards. This was the last time he would assist Taft, who would soon become president of the United States. In 1911 President Taft, traveling to Pontiac, reminded his audience of LeRoy’s imperishable work in the far-away Philippines:

Here near the school where he graduated, I wish to pay a debt of gratitude to his memory on behalf of the people of his nation. He went to the Philippine Islands, learned the people and their history, and he finally gave up his life on the field of battle, because he there became a victim of impaired health.

LeRoy had rendered a service to the Government of the United States. His work became a reference for the scholars and set a pattern for other books such as Charles B. Elliott’s *The Philippines*; Dean C. Worcester’s *The Philippines Past and Present*; Cameron Forbes’s *The Philippine Islands*, and a number of others. As time went by, LeRoy would be remembered as a rigorous and objective historian. No one questioned his role in the U.S. administration from 1900 to 1909.

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65 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. *Nine years to make a difference*, p. 115.
Ultimately, his history triumphed in the academe, never mind that it was a political exercise in remembering and suppressing. *The Americans in the Philippines* encapsulated nearly all the information that the historian needed at the time. David Barrows praised it as “indispensable to the serious student of history and of colonial government, superior to anything that has yet appeared and far above the recent works of Blount and Worcester, not only in the range of materials employed, but in judicial tone and convincing power.”

In 1963, Charles O. Houston, while researching in the Library of Congress about James A. Robertson, came across the figure of James A. LeRoy. He concluded that “efforts should be made to locate LeRoy’s papers. Enough is contained in his correspondence with JAR and Emma Blair to indicate that he was a person of great importance to the developing American policy in the Philippines in the early years of the century.” He was right. LeRoy was a person of great importance not only in the making of American policy but also as a scholar. His influence, although apparently attenuated, continues to the present day. He had written a “definitive” history in *The Americans in the Philippines*. Future scholars did not need henceforth to use Spanish sources to write a history of the Spanish regime. LeRoy gave shape to a “dark age” of Spanish rule, which clashed with American progressivism and liberalism. The modernism of American institutions would be seen to confront

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66 Barrows David P. Review of *The Americans in the Philippines*. I do not know where Barrows published this review since I found it among James A. LeRoy papers.

67 Houston Charles O. ‘Manuscripts and other material relating to the Philippines in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.’
deeply-rooted Filipino habits. The Americans had inherited the problems of “medieval Spain.”

LeRoy concluded his construction of the Spanish “dark age” with the seminal paper, *Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines*, and his crucial contributions to Blair and Roberson’s *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. From 1904 to 1907, this most important compilation of Spanish primary sources translated into English would be directed by him, as his correspondence with Blair and Robertson reveals. He was to give “uniqueness” to the Philippines by painting an evil called “caciquism,” which is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII: LEROY AND A CURSE CALLED
“CACIQUISM”

By 1901 Aguinaldo had surrendered with most other caciques following suit, though peasant resistance continued in some areas until 1910.

Benedict Anderson

The Schurman Commission was able to outline a “dark age” of Spanish rule by refusing to acknowledge the progressive restructuring that had taken place in the late nineteenth century and instead essentializing the Spanish regime as “medieval and oppressor” until the end. Schurman stressed the “evils of Spanish centralization in government.” According to the Commission’s report, such excessive centralization had disastrous results, among them a confused mess at the level of local institutions. The native chiefs, said Schurman, had become atrophied and useless, “if not indeed transformed into instruments of corruption.”

LeRoy built on what Schurman portrayed in the report, further shaping the notion of a Spanish “dark age” with the publication of *Philippine Life in Town and Country* and above all, *The Americans in the Philippines*. The dark age of the Spanish regime was to be complemented with a deep-rooted feudal institution called “caciquism.” LeRoy defined this system as a syncretic form of past traditions that had persisted during

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the Spanish era and was now challenging and distorting the modernity introduced by American institutions. LeRoy used the Commission’s criticism of the evils of Spanish centralization, with its dramatic effects on local politics, as the basis of an essentialized portrayal of such politics.

No doubt, LeRoy came across the terms “cacique” and “caciquism” when he went to a ranch in New Mexico in order to recover from his illness. There he learned Spanish history and started to acquire Spanish publications. It is not rare to find in these publications explanations about the evils of the “patria,” which suffered a cancer comprising “caciquism,” “political apathy,” “illiteracy,” and, as a result of all these ingredients, a certain “ruralism.” This language, in fact, reflects the literary trend prevalent at the opening of the twentieth century. Spain was experiencing a metaphysical crisis after the total collapse of the empire. The Regenerationist group started to define the Spanish incipient monarchy in terms of “oligarchy and caciquism.” This pejorative terminology became a moral denunciation of the political

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2 Regenerationism: With the term Regenerationism is known a group of writers such as Joaquín Costa, Macías Picavea, Lucas Mallada and Damián Isern whose main purpose was “to regenerate” the country—that is, to analyze “the evils of the patria” and to find them a solution or an option. These authors, belonging by their age to the generation of Galdós, are linked to the middle classes, especially unhappy and whose ideology is characterized by a petty bourgeois reformism. All of them agree in criticizing the political system of the Restoration by observing it as an exhausted and corrupted system. This movement was patronized by sectors of middle class and intellectuals worried by political mobilization. The regenerationist proposed reforms from above.

3 The term oligarchy has in Spanish two different acceptations. On the one hand, we come across the generic meaning—From the Greek oligoi, defines the forms of government in the power held by a “few” when these do not constitute an aristocracy. On the other hand, we find a second acceptation related to Spain and the nineteenth century. The oligarchy during the Restoration appeared as a system apparently of constitutional parliamentarism ruled by the growth of the political power of the middle classes. It was a personal regime of the politicians who, elevated to the most important posts of the government and the public administration, allied with an oligarchy of caciques, passes for public interest what really is party interest.
system of the Restoration. Costa, Gumersindo de Azcárate and other authors described the various forms of administrative and electoral corruption and went a step further by making judgments and complaints about “caciquism.” Among the facets of this system was the interference of the executive power in the electoral process in order “to make the elections”; caciquil interference in local, provincial and central administrations—as in the selection of positions; and the negotiation of “favors” claimed by clients.

Moreover, this literature gave form to the “cacique,” which was assimilated to terrateniente or hacendero (landowner), with feudalistic connotations. LeRoy did not bother to explore whether caciquism in Spain was anything deeper than what the Regenerationists explained. He considered the term and its definition at that time ideal for his own purpose, which was to reverse the Filipinization process and the increasing self-government of municipalities under American rule, by attributing the [mis]government of the towns to the local elite or principales who would in time be named “caciques.” Moreover, LeRoy was picking up other details about the “cacique” in Mexico, a very different context, where the term and the phenomenon were centuries-old. In Mexico, as Friedrich wrote “the cacique is a historically egregious

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4 Joaquín Costa was a liberal and republican. Probably the most important contribution to the literature was his sociological essay Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno de España. Moreover, Joaquín Costa was one of the leaders of the Regenerationism. Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y América I. Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 2004. Vol. 19, p. 438.

5 Gumersindo de Azcárate was a democrat, an intellectual precursor of the political sciences in Spain. Like Joaquín Costa, Azcárate was a republican. He contributed to the development of political modernity with works such as Self-Government and the Monarchical Doctrinaire and El Régimen Parlamentario en la práctica where he exposes his ideas about the democratic and parliamentary liberalism. Alvar, Jaime. Diccionario de Historia de España y América I, p. 155.

phenomenon and is widely regarded as a serious economic and legal problem.\[7\]

In Mexico, the cacique was the *representante del pueblo* (representative of the village), a *caudillo*, a *jefe* (chieftain) or a *hacendero*. Mexico had been one of the most important colonies of the Spanish empire, and the Philippines, according to Pardo de Tavera, had been a dependent of it. LeRoy, glancing at Mexico, found the perfect structure within which to subsume the Philippines, identifying there, as in Mexico, caciquism as an inheritance of the Spanish colonial structure. LeRoy also discovered the earliest use of the term “cacique” in *La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*, the Compilation of the Laws of the Indies, about which we shall have more to say later in this chapter.

The knowledge acquired by LeRoy led him to write *Our Spanish inheritance in the Philippines*, which would bring to a head the definition of a system, corrupt and tyrannical at the local level, as something called “caciquism.” The Commission report of 1903 had provided a timid definition of “caciquism” as “the tendency to exercise arbitrary powers which have not been conferred by law.”\[8\] The following year (1904) two ramifications of the term caciquism appeared. One was fostered by Taft for *The Census of the Philippine Islands*, in which caciquism is defined as a system led by wealthy and propertied men. The other ramification of the term appeared in *The American Historical Review*, written by LeRoy


\[8\] Report, 1903, p.84. Cited in Willis Henry P. *Our Philippine Problem*, p. 79.
himself, in which caciquism is assimilated to a form of slavery. Taft made caciquism an endemic tribal feature while LeRoy considered that it was a Spanish legacy or at least he blamed the Spanish regime for conniving with the locals in fostering this syncretic institution. Both definitions cast different meanings on caciquism, which would converge in 1905 in LeRoy’s *Our Spanish Inheritance*.

As a matter of fact, “caciquismo” as a system was a Spanish term referring to a unique and exclusively Spanish phenomenon. The definition of the term caciquism appears for the first time in the authoritative *Real Academia Espanola* dictionary in 1884. Therefore, it was a system which emerged during the Restoration. In 1898, when Retana wrote in *La Política de España en Filipinas* that the creation of political parties fostered caciquism and compadrazgo, he was not alluding to the Philippines, since there were no parties there. Caciquism was an offshoot of the embryonic democracy in nineteenth-century Spain and the alternation of the powers during the Spanish Restoration. However, at the turn of the nineteenth century those who were antagonistic towards the political parties of the Restoration started to coin a negative meaning of this system. This negative sense of “caciquismo” appears in the 1908 *Enciclopedia Universal*:

> Excessive influence of the caciques in the villages. A political system in which there is no law, only the will of the caciques.

> As a political system the caciquism is an evil of the parliamentary regime which consists of abusive influence and used with bastard purposes, which some persons exercise in some villages.

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9 In the index of *The Americans in the Philippines* the term caciquism becomes a synonym of “slavery.”

Both definitions were coined by the Regenerationists and came out in written form at the beginning of the twentieth century. The fact that it appeared in the *Enciclopedia Universal*, which became famous around the world, suggests to me that LeRoy had consulted it since the definitions he provides are quite close to the above. The *Enciclopedia* provides an extensive explanation of the phenomenon but there is not a single mention of the fact that this system was ever extrapolated to the Philippines.

Spanish historiography continues to take into consideration the above definition given by the Regenerationists. However, a recent reassessment by historians has rectified some previous misunderstandings about “caciquism” in Spain. Historians since the 1970s have developed the argument that the caciquil system was a “necessary evil” for the proper working of a democracy. Jaime Alvar states that

>caciquism] is a political system, a form of socialization of the constitutional mechanism in the Restoration (1875-1923). It involves an implicit group of rules of public behaviour in which there is an interchange of assets and services (favors, influences, position and privilege). The caciques as an essential vehicle would build up permanent clients. These clients acted in a foreseeable way by giving their votes to a pre-determined party, within the formal framework of liberalism. Therefore before the celebration of elections, the result was already known.

This above definition, related to the Functionalist school, is a generalization of the phenomenon, leaving many avenues unexplored.

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12 Functionalism: The concept of function applied to human societies is based on an analogy between the social and the organic life. The theory of functionalism defends the notion that the constituent elements from each society are explained by the functionality that these elements exert in it as a way to
However, if we consider caciquism as a clientelist system or a system of patronage, we can categorically state that this phenomenon, with its own nuances, could be found in the Philippines, or in any country for that matter (such as Filipinos would argue), although not during Spanish rule. The problem of caciquism arose when LeRoy turned a phenomenon that was positive—i.e., a system necessary for the development of democracies—into something completely negative and pejorative. He picked up the term caciquism from Spanish and Mexican literature and gave it a meaning akin to “bossism,” i.e., an evil that paralyzed the process of self-government and independence in the Philippines. The problems which Americans were confronting in the islands, such as discontentment, insurgency, political arbitrariness, and the emergence of the nationalists in politics, could then be identified and named as a phenomenon inherited from the Spaniards called “caciquism,” which made the Filipinos completely unfit for self-government. From now on, “caciquism” would appear in the literature as a cancer threatening the implementation of American democracy; it would appear in practically all the American reports and textbooks, taking different forms although the argument would always be the same: demonstrating the Filipinos’ incapacity for self-government and independence.

**Our Spanish inheritance in the Philippines**

It is not a coincidence that Taft and LeRoy were building up the terms cacique and caciquism in 1904. It seems from their correspondence guarantee the correct running of the community and its social reproduction. Alvar, Jaime. *Diccionario de Historia de España y América*. Vol. 19, p. 626.
that LeRoy introduced the term to Taft, and provided it as well to James Robertson for use in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. In 1904, LeRoy was quite fluent in Spanish and had studied the last years of Spanish rule in the Philippines. He was completely familiar with the terms cacique and caciquism through three different sources. Zulueta was his main source for Spanish documents and accounts from the sixteenth century to the nineteenth centuries, including the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*. LeRoy’s second source was *La Solidaridad*, issues of which Pardo de Tavera and Jose Albert had sent him, together with Rizal’s novels. Finally, we saw that LeRoy lived for eleven months in New Mexico and in 1904 moved to Durango, Mexico, to be the American Consul there. The Spaniards had used the term cacique from the conquest onward to define the native chieftains. Since LeRoy wanted so much to believe that the Philippines was an appendage of New Spain rather than a unique Spanish colony in Asia, he found the perfect framework through which he could infer that cacique and caciquism were implemented in the Philippines. Curiously, while *Las Leyes de Indias*, *La Solidaridad* and Rizal’s *Noli me Tangere* used the term cacique, this was never in reference to the Philippines. We shall discuss this at length later in this chapter.

It is important to pay some attention to this incipient use of the term caciquism in 1904 by LeRoy and Taft for the *Census of the Philippine Islands*\(^3\) since this first meaning is inextricably related to the negation of self-government at the provincial and above all municipal

\(^3\) *Census of the Philippine Islands taken under the direction of the Philippine Commission in the year 1903*. Comp. and published by the United States Bureau of the Census. Washington [Government Printing Office], 1905.
levels, since the latter was controlled by natives. The second Commission led by Taft had given relative autonomy or self-government to the municipalities that came under American control. However, the elective franchise was limited so as to concentrate voting power in the hands of the educated and wealthy residents of the towns. In reality, therefore, power was granted by the Americans to those classes of men who had a strong predisposition to accept their rule. The result was to devolve the control of the “pacified” towns into the hands of little oligarchies consisting of the most conservative men in each place. The elections were controlled by the American government which arbitrarily appointed its protégés. The term caciquism would start to be deployed but only in reference to the problems of the Filipino-controlled municipal governments. The deployment of the term cacique/caciquismo had a specific purpose: to deny any more self-government to the Filipinos and above all to defer the American promise of ultimate independence.

Taft and his commissioners had created the perfect framework for designing caciquism as something endemic to the Filipinos. This construction justified and underpinned American “tutelage.” Taft boasted about having conferred a measure of freedom and self-government to the inhabitants greater than they had ever enjoyed in the past. But at the same time, he was providing the elements by which this outpouring of freedom could be undercut. Caciquism was to be used as convincing evidence that a further measure of native self-government would be impossible.\footnote{Henry Parker Willis in his book \textit{Our Philippine Problem} cast light about the dysfunction of the local government. Not only did he use the government sources but also he was in the Philippines studying the cases and making some interviews. This book has been relegated by American scholars to a secondary place. See, Willis, Henry P. \textit{Our Philippine Problem}, pp. 71-89.}
Taft put it, “Our experience of giving self-government to these people has gone possibly a little bit fast and I find the governor general very much distressed occasionally at instances where native government is so bad that it is really an offense to the American government to permit it.”

In order to demonstrate the incapacity of the natives for self-government as evidenced by the misgovernment of municipalities, Taft would be the first one to elaborate the arguments establishing caciquism as an evil:

During the disturbed conditions in the Islands, when war prevailed during the years from 1898-1901, the most atrocious crimes were committed by taos, humble, ignorant but apparently peaceable and non vicious persons, simply because they were told by “rich and wealthy Filipinos, or “Filipinos of official position,” that they must do so. This is what is called caciquism.

This excerpt contains several important issues. The first one is the use of the word “war” instead of “insurrection.” Taft could not suppress or ignore this term in 1904 since the Census of that year was the fruit of American collaboration with the Filipinos in the Partido Federal who used the word “war” in their writings. But Taft used the term “war” deliberately in order to denote cruelty and despotism. In this context “war” is inextricably interwoven with his explanation of “caciquism.”

The second issue is that Taft delimited the word “cacique” to refer only to rich and wealthy Filipinos and those with official positions. He

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16 Census of the Philippine Islands, p. 531. I am sure the definition given by Taft in the Census was furnished by LeRoy. LeRoy in *The Americans in the Philippines* defined the caciques as “the masses of the Filipinos were at the beginning of 1898 ready to be led by the nose by their traditional “cacique” or, in the absence temporarily of these, by any self-constituted military leader with shoulder-strap and a revolver.” LeRoy, James A. *The Americans in the Philippines*, p. 143. Taft’s definition is practically a replica of this of LeRoy —the masses were blindly led by the caciques. Therefore they were emphasizing the ignorance of the masses which needed education.
was clearly alluding to the heads of local governments who had allegedly destroyed the will of the “poor and ignorant.” In fact, Taft confirms this argument by stating that caciquism was “the subjection of the ordinary uneducated Filipino to a boss or master who lives in his neighborhood and who, by reason or his wealth and education, is regarded as entitled to control by the ignorant tao.”

This definition is categorical since this subjection of the poor and ignorant people to their “patrons” precisely did not entitle the Filipinos to enjoy independence or more self-government since the uneducated who formed the bulk of the populace simply followed their “bosses” blindly—a symptom of political immaturity. The dichotomy being constructed between uneducated/subjugated and educated/boss renders it a necessity to implement the American educational system in the Philippines, which is the mainstay of Taft’s policy. This system of public instruction will be the cornerstone, argues Taft, for Filipinos to reach the stage of self-government.

Taft’s pronouncement is a key element in the development of the idea of Filipino caciquism because he assimilated caciquism to ruralism and moreover antedated this phenomenon to the Filipino-American war. The Americans could now argue that they were facing a problem already existing in the Philippines when they arrived in 1898. What Taft does not

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17 *Census of the Philippine Islands*, p. 531.

18 Caciquism as landlordism has survived until the present. In fact it is the logical explanation of this system: “American associates with the cities but caciques are landholding, rural-based feudal barons, with great power bind on land and personal favors to his constituents.” This definition provided by Lewis Gleeck in 1996 reflects the continuity of the discourse. See Gleeck Lewis, *Nine Years to make a difference. The tragically short career of James A. LeRoy in the Philippines*, p. 45.
elucidate in this definition is whether the Americans inherited this system from the Spaniards or whether it was inherent in the Filipino ethos.

There is something else which beckons the attention of the reader. If caciquism already existed during the Filipino-American war, as Taft asserts, it should have appeared in the reports of the Schurman and Taft Commissions. However, we cannot find the term or the definition of the system in these reports. Obviously, when the reports were redacted the commissioners were not familiar with Spanish sources; they only had in their disposal official documents in which the term cacique or caciquism never appeared in the Filipino context. The fact that those terms did not appear in the Commission reports should make us wonder if the system was really inherited from the Spaniards.

LeRoy’s definition of caciquism in 1904 is more elaborate than Taft’s. LeRoy was demonstrating for the first time his knowledge of Spanish bibliography. He established perfectly the features of the term and the system by stating categorically that caciquism was something inherited from the Spaniards. The context for this display of knowledge was LeRoy’s debut into the new category of “Filipinologist,” in recognition of which some journals asked him to review Blair and Robertson’s *The Philippines Islands 1493-1898*.

attention to slavery as a Tagalog or Filipino custom. At this point no relationship was being established between pre-Hispanic customs and the actual American administration. But LeRoy was opening a Pandora’s box of future arguments to be deployed by American scholars and administrators about slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage, as something inherent in Filipino behavior and how the Spaniards connived with it:

...Slavery was not finally and formally abolished for two and three-quarters centuries afterwards. As a matter of actual fact, however, we have to take into account that to the very close of Spanish rule the masses of the Philippine people were virtually held in serfdom by landed companies or by individuals, Spanish or half castes, and that the greatest obstacle to the implantation, in Philippine communities of today, of self-governing institutions is “caciquism.”

LeRoy looked at the past as origin of present since he is inferring that the Spaniards not only failed to abolish slavery but, worse, connived with it. He is also inferring that the Spaniards implanted caciquism at the turn of the nineteenth century, and that this coercive system had provoked political dysfunctions at the local level in which the wealthy and educated landowners had omnipotent power. This dysfunction was the main obstacle, argues LeRoy, for the implementation of self-government. LeRoy was constructing a dichotomy between “bad Spaniards” and “good Americans.” Dean Worcester would build upon LeRoy’s legacy and publish a book about how slavery was something

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19 LeRoy emphasized this ramification of caciquism as synonymous of slavery in *The Americans in the Philippines*. In fact, all the examples provided by LeRoy are interconnected with a sort of slavery. The first volume displays caciquism as an existent system upon the arrival of the Spaniards which had continuity at present. See, LeRoy, James A. *The Americans in the Philippines*. Vol. I, pp. 4, 45, 143.

endemic in the archipelago in 1909, forcing him as Interior Secretary to pass the “Anti-Slavery Act.” Worcester assimilated slavery to caciquism and paralyzed the process of Filipino independence by publishing *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands* in 1913.21

LeRoy subsequently defined the cacique system as follows: “Whereby in every village a few men of property and more or less education hold the rest of the population under an inherited despotism, imposed by ignorance and by slavery to the soil or to personal debt.”22 Through this definition we can see how LeRoy provided Taft with some basic ideas that Taft would enter into the Census. However, LeRoy is more explicit in elucidating the picture of “a few propertied and wealthy men,” i.e., the oligarchy that subjugates the uneducated mass. Self-government could not possibly be implemented under such conditions. The key word in this statement is “inherited,” with its categorical meaning that the Spaniards had implemented this despotic system related to ruralism. It is quite clear that the discursive association of caciquism and local politics was intended to paralyze any emergence of native politics.

LeRoy continued elaborating upon the system in order to associate “caciquism” and caciques with the Spanish colonial past. On 22 November 1904 he established the most surprising analogy:

The *Laws of the Indies* Book 6, Title 7, Law 16, gives caciques in the Philippines their former governing power under the new regime (interesting as bearing on the evil of caciquism today in the

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21 This topic is explained in more detail in Chapter IX.
Philippines and showing the desire to follow the analogy of Spanish-America, though conditions not always analogous).\textsuperscript{23}

This statement is highly significant for several reasons. First of all, we note LeRoy’s extrapolation of the word cacique to the whole empire, thereby encapsulating the Philippines within Latin America. Secondly, he de-contextualizes, misuses and misinterprets the Laws of the Indies. And finally, he interpolates the past into the present.

LeRoy correctly identifies the Laws of the Indies, Book 6, Title 7 and Laws 10, 11, 12 and others, as being devoted to the caciques, since this term was used to define the native chieftains in Latin America. Curiously, however, Law 16 he cites as specifically dedicated to the Philippines is entitled \textit{Que los Yndios Principales de Filipinas sean bien tratados, y se les encargue el govierno que solian tener en los otros} . . . (that the \textit{Yndios Principales} from the Philippines shall receive good treatment and be given the government that they used to have in the others. . . ). Note that there is not a single allusion to the term cacique here, the chieftains being called \textit{principales}. \textit{Principal} was a term used in Spain and in the colonies to designate distinguished people. \textit{Principal} in Spanish was synonymous with \textit{Ilustre} or someone of eminent, noble background.

The abovementioned Law was announced in a Royal decree of 11 June 1594 titled \textit{Zedula Real sobre que se ha entendido que algunos de los Yndios Principales de aquellas Yslas estan destituidos del señorío}.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, November 22, 1904. Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1. Folder 1 October 1903 to end of 1904. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, University of Michigan

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año de 1580 en Adelante de D. Francisco Antonio de Figueroa, escribano mayor de la Superior Gobernación de estas Yslas Philipinas, año 1751,}
LeRoy read this to mean that the Spaniards were conceding to the Filipino *principales* their former authority to rule their people. Therefore the Spaniards were devolving power to the local *principales*. LeRoy in referring to this law thus establishes a connection between 1594 and the present situation faced by the Americans. The *principales* had enjoyed power, which was exercised despotically since time immemorial. Therefore the American administration was clashing head-on with an endemic evil difficult to eradicate. Colonial policy could then be built upon this “fact.”

The misuse and de-contextualization of the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias* paved the way for a deliberate confusion about Filipino society which has survived to this day. This new construction built up by LeRoy established associations among the terms *principalía*, *ilustrados*, *cabezas de barangay*, *gobernadorcillos* and *caciques*. “Caciques” would assimilate all these terms.25 The guidelines for future scholars to build on

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25 Norman Owen wrote in 1974 ‘The Principalía in Philippine History: Kabikolan, 1790-1898.’ *Philippine Studies* 22 (1974): 297-324. He does not differ in his arguments from LeRoy’s in 1904 in which he associated *principalía* and cacique. Owen takes for granted that the term “cacique” was used in the Philippines and, besides, he defines it as “caciques enjoyed great wealth and manipulated the elections,” p. 302. Owen should accept that if cacique manipulated the elections during the Spanish term then the Maura law was implemented, something he denies a few pages later. In fact all the documents he uses are sources previous to 1893. This is a very subtle way to avoid dealing with the Maura law. He distinguishes “Ilustrados” as educated and caciques emphasizing local political power. This classification does not correspond with Spanish rule. Caciques as a Spanish element were quite far from this position. In the Philippines, such development had not taken place. The notion of caciques as having local political power took hold during the American rule. The problems of this paper start when Owen comes out with the term caciquism. He says that the sources do not provide glimmers of caciquism; however he invites us to view the incident involving *Gobernadorcillo Antonio Laurenciano* in 1806-07 as a flagrant case of caciquism. No doubt, Owen uses indiscriminately the term “caciquism” since in 1806-07 this had not even emerged in Spain and was not figured in the dictionary. Caciquism appears for first time in 1884. In order to emphasize a case of local dominance, Owen decides to use a
were being set. An evil was being constructed and brought to the notice of colonial officialdom.

**Our Spanish inheritance versus The United States in the Philippines**

LeRoy brought the dogmatization of the term cacique and the caciquil system to its final stage in 1905, taking as an excuse the need to answer criticisms made by Alleyne Ireland against the American administration. Ireland’s article “The United States in the Philippines” was published in *The Atlantic Monthly* in November 1904 and his book *The Far Eastern Tropics* saw print the following year.

It is difficult on the surface to see why LeRoy reacted so vehemently against Ireland since their discourses do not differ at all. In fact, Ireland regards the problems confronting the Americans as inherited from Spanish “misrule.” Therefore, there is no difference regarding the idea of “bad Spanish” although for Ireland the contrast really should be made with “good British.” Ireland reiterates stereotypical images of Spanish rule although he ignores Spanish writings. He emphasizes the fact that Filipinos were unfit for independence by stating that “The only kind of Government which Aguinaldo could have established would have been a military despotism masquerading under the guise of a Republic. . .

term in vogue from 1904 as “caciquism.” In sum, Owen, by making a case study of Filipino society in the nineteenth century, seems to support the argument that “caciquism” was something inherited, despite the fact that he had problems in finding the term and if he found it, this was associated with the Spanish phenomenon. This paper is a clear reflection of continuity in American scholarship.

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26 Ireland, Alleyne. *The Far Eastern Tropics. Studies in the Administration of Tropical Dependencies Hong Kong, British North Borneo, Sarawak, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlement, French Indochina, Java, the Philippine Islands*, p. 188. Ireland, in fact, makes strong criticisms of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial systems. These criticisms are related to the dichotomy of Latin world versus Nordic world. Ireland praises the colonial systems implemented by Dutch and above all British to the detriment of France, Portugal and Spain.
Such a Government would have been corrupt and inefficient. This assertion reflects the conventional colonial discourse of the early twentieth century that established “Orientals” as being inherently corrupt and in need of colonial tutelage for modern government. There are few differences, if any, between Ireland’s thinking and that expressed by Taft, for instance, in the Census.

Ireland, in fact, echoes LeRoy in making the following observation: “It has been assumed that the people of the Philippine Islands, as a whole, desired independence at the time of Aguinaldo’s insurrection and that they still desire it. . . [In fact] ninety-five per cent of the people have never had the smallest wish for independence.” Ireland here subscribes to the idea that the masses were led blindly by some leaders. In fact, he categorically affirms that the tropical native has an immemorial habit of despotic rule and the masses do what is told by his own native “bosses.” Le Roy jumped on this last statement, since it expressed perfectly his own argument that there was a cancer in Filipino society which Ireland had identified as bossism. LeRoy was to add that the Spaniards connived with this bossism, making it practically irreversible.

Despite some fundamental convergences between LeRoy and Ireland in their analysis of native society, the latter made three strong

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28 Ireland demonstrates a great knowledge of “colonialism” and no doubt he could be considered as a pioneer. However, his book is faulty and weak concerning the Philippines. His statement about the possible corruption of Aguinaldo’s Republic is based on the reports which did not provide any alternative to believe in the contrary. The government of Aguinaldo was able to maintain order throughout the archipelago and to secure the rights of property as well as respect for the laws. This would be the underside of history, disguised by colonial discourse.
30 Alleyne Ireland uses this term “bosses” inferring that the native was inherently despotic and autocratic. See Ireland, Alleyne. *The Far Eastern Tropics*, p. 256.
criticisms of the American administration that angered LeRoy. First, Ireland stressed the inexperience of the United States as a colonial master. He felt that there was a pernicious influence of American politics on Philippine legislation and that American officials in the colony suffered from a narrow vision:

There existed an ignorance of the broad established facts in relation to tropical administration, and an absence of information as to the work of the European nations in the neighboring Colonies, which could scarcely fail to impair most seriously the usefulness of the most conscientious and hard-working official.31

Overlooking the experience of the Europeans in colonial matters, Americans instead were implementing an experiment of converting the Filipinos into Americans based on their narrow observations at the expense of the Filipinos. Ireland, at this point, warns that the experiment could be a failure and “will plunge them into the most terrible political and social disorder.”32 Ireland was not mistaken in this assumption. The Americans and their experiment would create a political and social dysfunction which continues in the present.

Moreover, Ireland was critical of the demagogy of American colonial policy. For example, Americans protested against the suggestion that the archipelago be called their “colony.”33 The Schurman Commission refused the concept of Crown Colony as implanted by the British. It decided instead to subsume the new possession as a “territorial government.” Ireland regarded this definition of the Philippines as territorial government as a politically-motivated disguise of America’s real policy, which was in fact to implement the principle of Crown

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31 Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 201
32 The Outlook, December 22, 1904. Cited in Ireland, Alleyne. The Far Eastern Tropics, p. 278.
Colony Government. At first sight it seemed that the Americans afforded a larger measure of political participation to the people of the Islands. However, as Ireland observed, the local conditions under which the government operated remained completely inflexible since control of local affairs rested with appointed and not with elected officials. The de facto implementation of Crown Colony Government was more explicit at the provincial administrative level, which did not even pretend to reflect popular representation.

Ireland’s argument about the de facto establishment of the principle of Crown Colony Government did harm to the Americans since the word “colony” was completely taboo in U.S. politics. The Americans had, after all, liberated the Filipinos from their Spanish colonizers. They were now democratizing the Philippines by attempting to transplant in those islands their social and political institutions. Therefore the Philippines was not a colony but a territorial government which was acquiring self-government.

The fiercest criticism was of Ireland’s sentence, “The Americans believe that every race of man in every land and in every climate can become in time ‘a creature of schools, ballot–boxes and free political institutions’.” Ireland questioned the cornerstone of American policy in the Philippines—education—which was a sensitive issue since the Commission reports had boasted that the American administration, unlike the English and Dutch, was providing more popular self-government to its wards. As Taft put it, “The chief difference between English and

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Dutch policy and ours, in the treatment of tropical people, arises from the fact that we are seeking to prepare the people under our guidance and control for popular self-government.  

The motto of U.S. policy was to implement popular education to prepare the natives for self-government. Every problem in connection with the control and development of the Islands would find its solution in the establishment of a complete system of education. However, Ireland did not subscribe this point of view. He believed that the first and principal stage for self-government was to achieve political progress through industrial development.

Alleyne Ireland’s *The Far Eastern Tropics* should be regarded as the first comparative analyses of colonial policy in Southeast Asia. It is important to observe that in 1904, when Ireland was writing this book, the Philippines was considered a *de facto* and *de iure* country of Southeast Asia. In contrast, the trajectory of American colonial discourse, which developed from 1900 and became completely shaped in 1905, was to encapsulate the Philippines in the Latin American context. LeRoy would be the principal architect of this discourse.

Ireland’s criticisms of the U.S. in the Philippines triggered a vigorous and caustic reply from LeRoy. On 15 February 1905, LeRoy wrote to Barrows announcing that he had a contribution in the March issue of *The Atlantic Monthly*,

the real object of which, under the title “Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines,” is to show how our English critics, especially just now Ireland, seem to think there is no need of studying the history

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of the Philippines, with a view to ascertaining the real elements of the problem we have in mind.36

LeRoy was here de-contextualizing Ireland’s arguments since the latter was not arguing about the historical heritage of the Philippines; as a matter of fact Ireland and LeRoy, as we saw earlier, agreed on the dark heritage of Spain. What Ireland could not accept was the idea of transplanting to the Philippines the social and political institutions that had been nurtured on American soil. This he considered a colonial policy of blindness. This is what he perceived as the problem. But LeRoy responded to this criticism by twisting Ireland’s arguments around and presenting caciquism as the real curse plaguing the transplantation of American institutions.

LeRoy’s *Our Spanish inheritance in the Philippines* became a landmark in the dogmatization of caciquism as one of the principal obstacles to social and political progress—a cancer inherited from the Spaniards. Not having enough empirical foundations, LeRoy resorted to rhetoric, de-contextualizing the terms cacique and caciquism by intermingling them with *Ilustrados, ladrones*, slavery and other, mainly pejorative, terms. Sometimes caciquism is pictured as an evil in the cities, and sometimes in the towns. The caciques will be the political class as well as the landowners. Owing to LeRoy’s paramount need to develop an argument to frame colonial policy, his essay—“a hasty essay” as he admitted to Barrows—is quite ambiguous and problematic. Nevertheless, due to its seminal status, we need to examine it in detail.

LeRoy demonstrates in that essay his knowledge of Spanish and above all his reliance on definitions from Spanish dictionaries, although his definition of cacique was not extracted from the dictionary of *La Real Academia Española (RAE)* since he considered this dictionary “faulty.”

The word *cacique* (old Spanish spelling *cazique*) was the name for a chief or local magnate in Hayti when the Spaniards came there, and they carried the word elsewhere to describe petty local chieftains of the undeveloped communities in South and Central America, and in the Orient.

LeRoy distorts the term a little bit. The *RAE* defined the term for first time in 1729:

> **Señor de vasallos, o el Superior de una Provincia o pueblo de Indios:** y aunque en muchas partes de las Indias tienen otros nombres, según sus idiomas, los Españoles los llaman a todos Caciques, que parece lo tomaron de las Islas de Barlovento, que fueron las primeras que se conquistaron. Es voz Mexicana que significa señor.

(Chief of vassals or Superior of an Indian province or town: and although in many parts of the *Indies* they have other names, according to their languages, the Spaniards call all of them *caciques*, which it seems they took from the Isles of *Barlovento*, which were the first conquered. It is a Mexican appellation which means *señor*.) [emphasis added]

This first definition provided by the *RAE* is similar to that furnished by LeRoy. The *RAE* extracted the information from *La Real...

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37 On October 20, 1904 LeRoy told Miss Blair that “The Spanish dictionary you must have in the library; but that is faulty.” James A. LeRoy to Emma Blair, Durango, Mexico, 20 October 1904. Personal Letters of LeRoy James Alfred, 1875-1909. Box 1, Folder 1. Ann Arbor: Bentley Library, the University of Michigan.


39 *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces, su naturaleza y calidad, con las phrases o modos de hablar, los Proverbios o Refranes, y otras cosas convenientes, al uso de la lengua*. Al Rey Nuestro Señor, Don Phelipe V (Que Dios guarde) a cuyas Reales Expensas se hace esta obra compuesto por la Real Academia Española. Tomo Segundo que contiene la letra C. En Madrid: En la Imprenta de Francisco del Hierro, Impresor de la Real Academia Española, Año de 1729, p. 38.
Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. It is not enough to extract the phrase “the Spaniards call all of them caciques,” because the RAE specifically states that this was the case “in many parts of the Indies.” Now the Philippine archipelago was never called “Indias.” Royal decrees always made the distinction by referring to the “Yndias y las Yslas Philipinas”—the Indies and the Philippine Islands. So “cacique” was not necessarily found in las Yslas Philipinas. In 1780, the definition of cacique changed a bit:

Chief of vassals, or superior in some Indian provinces or towns. *Dynastes apud indos, vulgò cacique* (ruler among the Indians, commonly cacique). By resemblance, it is called [cacique] any of the *principales* of a town. *Primates populi.*40

This second definition made the term more specific by delimiting it to some “Indian provinces or towns.” This means that the term cacique was not used elsewhere. The second definition also assimilates cacique to “principal.” By 1780, some two hundred years after the conquest, the Spaniards were recognizing a “resemblance” between cacique and the chiefs of the Philippines who were called “principales” (not caciques) to render them the nobility they deserved. Finally, in the nineteenth century—1884 to be exact—the RAE included a new entry reflecting a phenomenon called “caciquism” in the nineteenth century as uniquely Spanish. In fact, the new entry coincides with the introduction for first time of caciquism as a “political system”:

Cacique. (word from Caribbean) m. Chief of vassals, or superior in some Indian provinces or towns. Figurative and familiar. Any principal person of a town who exercises excessive influence in political and administrative matters.

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40 *Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana compuesto por la Real Academia Española.* Reducido a un tomo para su más fácil uso. Madrid: Por D. Joaquín Ibarra, Impresor de Cámara de S. M. y de la Real Academia MDCCLXXX , p. 172.
Caciquismo  m. fam. Excessive influence of the caciques in the towns.41

These last definitions are connected with the emergence of the Regenerationists and some important novelists such as Galdós who delimited the caciques to the towns. They reflect, as well, the emergence of a political system that consisted of the oscillation of power between Liberal and Conservative parties. Be that as it may, the dictionary of La Real Academia Española does not specifically relate the term cacique to native chieftains from the Philippines.

Spanish historical dictionaries define the term “cacique” as “Natural chieftain of Latin American Indios converted into the local authority per excellence of the indigenous people. Not only did the conquerors recognize their noble condition and their power but also the inherited feature of the institution.”42 We should take particular notice of the first part of this definition, natural chieftain of Latin America, since this is the primitive and unique meaning from the discovery of America to the collapse of the empire. The Spaniards used this term when Columbus arrived in Hispaniola and discovered five caciques—as the indigenous people called them—ruling the country. This term was co-opted by the Spaniards and had a common usage throughout Latin America, as evidenced in the etymological and historical definitions. But the word “cacique” was not carried elsewhere as LeRoy assumes. As we have stated previously, the Spaniards did not call the chieftains found in the Philippines “caciques.” They used, instead, the terms Dato or Cabeza

de Barangay. Even the very first accounts used the term reyezuelo (petty ruler) or rajah.

LeRoy extrapolated the term cacique to the Orient by de-contextualizing La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. The Laws of the Indies only comprised those laws with general application. It is not surprising to find the term there. However, as I have explained before, LeRoy misinterpreted a specific law devoted strictly to the Philippines, which does not mention the term cacique whatsoever. In order to build up his main argument in “Our Spanish inheritance,” he decontextualized Law 16 so that the term cacique could seem to have been used in the Philippines, and that the Spaniards in 1594 conferred the power to govern to these Filipino chiefs. These “caciques” are described as exercising despotic power that was maintained through the centuries. As LeRoy stressed to Robertson, the co-optation of Law 16 was the origin of today’s evil called caciquism.

LeRoy was not completely wrong when he inferred that the term cacique was used in the Philippines. He had become an expert in Spanish history thanks to Zulueta, Pardo de Tavera and Albert. With their assistance he had used the books written by Foradada, Montero y Vidal, Martínez de Zuñiga, Paterno and Sancianco, among others, in order to write the essay included in volume 52 of Blair and Robertson’s opus.

43 Foradada, Francisco. La Soberanía de España en Filipinas: Opúsculo de actualidad destinado a popularizar el país las salvadoras ideas relativas a esta materia, 1897; Montero y Vidal, José. Historia General de las Islas Filipinas: desde el descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta nuestros días [3 Vol.], (1887, 1894-1895); Martínez de Zúñiga, Joaquín. Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas o mis viajes por este país [2 Vol.], 1893; Paterno, Pedro: La antigua civilización Tagalog, 1887; Sancianco, Gregorio. El Progreso de Filipinas: Estudios Económicos y Políticos, 1881…

and for his book, *The Americans in the Philippines*. Now Montero y Vidal, Martínez de Zúñiga, Foradada and Paterno did use the term “cacique.” It is important to note, however, that all these Spanish works were written in the nineteenth century. These writers co-opted the word “cacique” to define the chieftains from the Philippines at the time of the arrival of Magellan and Legazpi or, in Paterno’s case, to define the pre-Hispanic community. Paterno equated the term cacique with “datu.” No doubt, the use of the term cacique in these works is due to a misuse of the Laws of the Indies. Morga, for instance, who wrote *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas* at the beginning of the seventeenth century, never defined the chieftains as caciques. Therefore, the term cacique as applied to the Philippines is a product of the nineteenth century.

The case of Gregorio Sancianco is quite different. The writers mentioned above used the term “cacique” in order to define the native chieftain. They do not make any mention of a system called “caciquism.” Sancianco, in contrast, made reference for the first time to “caciquism” instead of simply the term “cacique.” Sancianco was a Filipino *Ilustrado* resident in Spain during the Restoration. He was in touch with Spanish

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45 Antonio de Morga was *oidor* of the Audiencia of Mexico, and later he went to the Philippines, becoming *oidor* of the Audiencia of Manila. Morga was familiar with the term cacique, since in Mexico was the common and official term to define the chieftains. He could have used it by analogy in the Philippines. However, when Morga, in the chapter VIII, defines the Filipino communities before the arrival of the Spaniards, he uses the terms dato, principal, jefe, rajah, regulo.

46 Michael Cullinane considers the term cacique a product of the nineteenth century. He does not use Spanish sources to define the term; however, he states categorically, “In the nineteenth century the Spanish state in the Philippines resurrected the sixteenth century term for a locally powerful strongman or chief to apply to a newly emerged category of Filipino society that had carved out a provincial or regional power base of wealth and influence that challenged the colonial state’s capacity to control it.” See *Ilustrado Politics. Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2003, p. 17. We can see that what LeRoy essentialized in *Our Spanish Inheritance* has been perpetuated in current American scholarship. No one resurrected a term of the sixteenth century to define strongmen in the Philippines since there wasn’t any democracy and the so-called “strongmen” could not exercise their influence in political and administrative matters. Michael Cullinane is using a definition from Spanish cacique used in Spanish policy.
intellectuals and above all lived through the period when the Restoration was the prevalent policy in Spain. Therefore, he knew first-hand about caciquism as a Spanish phenomenon related to an incipient democracy.

In his book *El Progreso de Filipinas* where he calls for the reform of rural landholdings, Sancianco states that under present conditions tracts of land were acquired by those covetous individuals who took advantage of the influences of the prevailing caciquism. We can see how statements like this would have fostered LeRoy’s argument that caciquism was something inherited from Spanish. But Sancianco’s sentence quite clearly refers to a “prevailing caciquism,” a system then in vogue in Spain, with which a Philippine parallel is made.

There is still another way in which the term cacique was used in reference to the Philippines. In 1878 Felipe del Pan wrote *Las Islas Filipinas. Progresos en 70 Años*. LeRoy knew about this book but did not cite it in his works. Del Pan states in a section on municipal government in the Philippines: “The *gobernadorcillo* is sometimes the local boss of a town. This name cannot be found in the official documents before the last century. Previously, they were called caciques.” He infers that the term cacique was used in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, disappearing in the eighteenth century to give way to the term *gobernadorcillo*. Del Pan is simply wrong in stating this. It is true that the term *gobernadorcillo* started to be used in the eighteenth

48 Del Pan uses the term jefe with no pejorative meaning. Jefe in this context is synonymous with ruler or governor.
century, although curiously it was not defined in the dictionary of Real Academia until 1869, the year that the Philippines became of utmost importance to Spain. Before the standardization of the term gobernadorcillo, official documents did not use the term cacique at all. We are confronted once again with a misuse of the Laws of the Indies. Be that as it may, LeRoy was not interested in utilizing the term “gobernadorcillo.” He needed to present before the American public and future students of the Philippines a term—cacique—that could be mobilized for the goals of American colonial policy.

Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines is an ambiguous and vague essay which leads us to wonder who are the caciques and what caciquism means since LeRoy provided multiple variables. It was precisely this vagueness that blinded the ilustrado members of the Partido Federal to LeRoy’s insinuation that the ilustrados themselves were a source of the curse called caciquism. LeRoy starts the essay by asserting that the chief obstacle to social and political progress in the Philippines Islands is “caciquism”—the term by which “bossism” is known in those regions. Although LeRoy considered “bossism” an inaccurate translation of “caciquism,” he regarded both terms are synonymous. He wanted to established analogies between bossism as an American phenomenon and caciquism as a Spanish-Filipino phenomenon. He described some common features of both such as the manipulation of the votes, or that bosses or caciques were political intermediaries much like the obliging friends in England.

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50 Le Roy James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines,’ p. 340. He considers bossism not a good translation of caciquism in the Philippines since the rural bosses do not fit the Philippine conditions.
Indeed, bossism and caciquism were phenomena of the nineteenth century. They were “necessary evils” for political development. LeRoy’s analogy between caciquism and bossism, however, gave the former a connotation completely pejorative which has prevailed until the present. Filipino caciquism is related to familism, a situation wherein a few families in a community would completely dominate the masses who depended on them in all senses. LeRoy’s picture of family/cacique politics mixed together usury, laziness and despotism. If we had to provide a suitable analogue for the term caciquism, it would have to be “a system of patronage.” Its multiple meanings would include granting favors, giving contracts or “making appointments” to office in return for political support. However, LeRoy much preferred to link caciquism with

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51 Lewis Gleck considers inadequate the translation of cacique as boss since the former connotes decrepitude and tyranny. Therefore an equivalent of cacique –according to Gleck, following LeRoy’s argument- must be found in the South before the civil war. See Nine Years to make a difference, p.45.

52 Michael Cullinane in 2003 defined the caciques as “individuals and families whose economic power and influence dominated certain municipalities and often extended to other parts of the province.” Ilustrado Politics, p. 16. Benedict Anderson has stigmatized, as LeRoy did in 1905, the analogy of caciquism and familism by taking as spur President Corazón Aquino’s term. Anderson makes a retrospective of the Aquino and Cojuano families which emerged in 1898. By establishing this evolutionary history he is perpetuating the discourse –the power of the cacique family is inherent in the Filipino ethos coming from immemorial times. Anderson has put in vogue again the term “cacique” with a derogatory meaning. See Cacique Democracy in the Philippines, p. 1998.

53 Paul Hutchcroft in “Colonial Masters, National Politicos, and Provincial Lords: Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the American Philippines, 1900-1913”, assumes that “when most of colonial powers were building powerful bureaucracies in the capital and relying on prefectural systems to centralize control over the countryside the American colonial government in Manila began the task of state formation with a pronounced emphasis on local autonomy and party patronage,” p. 288. This is the most important argument of this paper: the emphasis on Taft instituting a system of patronage. Hutchcroft considers this system clashed with caciquism and the feudal relations of dependence. Therefore he takes for granted that caciquism was a Spanish institution that the American inherited. In fact, he follows LeRoy’s pattern of argument by referring to Spanish rule as an anachronism. Hutchcroft does not assume that caciquism is a system of patronage. For him, the bad caciquism was instituted by the Spaniards while the good system of patronage was implanted by the Americans. Hutchcroft implies caciquism as something completely pejorative and negative; however, he has not studied Spanish caciquism.
bossism as a despotic, sometimes violent, mode of domination that was more useful for what the Americans were constructing.54

LeRoy’s essay establishes a cause-and-effect relationship that leads to caciquism becoming *de facto* related to local politics. Local leaders, he says, establish themselves in communities where only two, four, or twelve families out of a population of ten thousand or more live. These families “depend on those above them for employment or a piece of land to till or the money advances inevitably needed each year to till. This is the conception of what Philippine caciquism is in Philippine rural life.”55

The initial picture that LeRoy paints is in fact that of “rural caciquism.” It harks back to the following definition given by the Regenerationists: “Control, in a tacit way, by an individual of an evident influence and fortune of the reins of power and mass media in a community, generally in the rural environment.”56 This is the stereotyped image of Spanish caciquismo fostered by the literature of the nineteenth century which sought to depict caciquismo as a system fostered by the Spanish colonial rule.

54 Sidel John T. *Capital, Coercion and Crime. Bossism in the Philippines*. Sidel prefers to use the terms boss and bossism since they reflect a rejection of accounts stressing the putative socio-cultural legacies of Spanish colonial rule (caciquismo). By using the terms boss and bossism he emphasizes that Filipinos inherited American colonial era institutions. (See p. 6.) Sidel avoids the term caciquismo and tries to emphasize that the dysfunctional system existent in the Philippines is an American legacy from trying to transplant American social and political institutions. However, Sidel develops his argument by illustrating the Spanish nineteenth century as the time of the formation of the families or bosses. He infers that bossism was already prevalent when the Americans arrived in the Philippines. There is another contradiction in terms which recalls those of LeRoy, since Sidel resorts to the revolution – concretely, Cavite—to explain the formation of strongmen. Therefore, we come across an argument that bossism was a Spanish legacy, and at the same time inherent in Filipino societal behavior. Another example is an *Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines* by Alfred McCoy, which establishes continuity in familiar influences in policy from the time of Spanish rule. It seems that there is an attempt to escape the term cacique and caciquismo, since they connote something pejorative such as LeRoy built up in 1905. However, Americans scholars tend to emphasize the Spanish rule at the turn of the nineteenth century as the real producer of that phenomenon and none of them has studied caciquismo as a Spanish phenomenon and one necessary for the good development of a democracy.

55 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines’, p. 340. LeRoy was establishing a first feature of caciquismo as analogous to landlordism. This is the image which has prevailed at present. “Our cacique in those days was similar to the feudal barons of Europe or to our present-day hacendado,” Zaide, Gregorio F. *Philippine Political and Cultural History*, p. 82.

terratenientes (landowners) and the caciques as omnipotent individuals exerting tyrannical and despotic power. To Spaniards, it is the most familiar image of caciquism. It seems that LeRoy co-opted this cliché of Spanish caciquism assimilated to ruralism, and turned it into the official definition of Philippine caciquism until the end of American colonial rule. In fact, this definition is the embryo of future arguments about “familism” as a fundamental characteristic of Philippine politics.

After this first delimitation of caciquism as inherent in local government, LeRoy explains in great detail that caciquism was no new thing in the Philippines, and that it was the chief drawback to the effective working of the municipal code that was put into operation by Taft in 1901. Here LeRoy is surreptitiously pointing the finger at traditional Spanish institutions. By taking into consideration the fact that over many years caciquism was defined as a new feudalism this statement perfectly fitted LeRoy’s conception of the Spanish system in the Philippines as an inveterate and anachronistic system which clashed with a new and modern system over which the old hierarchy prevailed. The latter would be defined, at the beginning in private correspondence and later in the textbooks, as the “old cacique class or old cacique aristocracy.” In sum, LeRoy was justifying the arbitrary municipal policy implemented by the second Philippine Commission that was notorious for its limited suffrage and policy of “appointment from above.” At the

57 This definition was fostered by the Regenerationist at the turn of the nineteenth century and above all in the twentieth century. This idea caciquism as new feudalism could be found in many encyclopedias, above all in Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europea Americana which has become the icon of the Spanish language. This encyclopedia started to be prepared in 1905. In fact, Anderson in Cacique Democracy in the Philippines uses among other definitions of cacique, that of hacendado. He calls the hacendados in the nineteenth century “feudal.” See, Cacique Democracy, p. 197.
same time, he had found a platform from which to counter the criticism of Ireland and Parker Willis that the problems of U.S. administration in the Philippines were caused by the pernicious influence of American domestic politics on Philippine legislation.\footnote{Ireland Alleyne. *The Far Eastern Tropics*, p. 203.}

As the essay progresses, LeRoy develops other dimensions, mostly ambiguous, of this newfound “key” to understanding Philippine realities. “Caciquismo,” he says, “is the prime feature of the village life of the Filipino […] Indeed one may not unfairly say that the Spanish structure of local government was built upon it, and fostered not only its continuance, but its growth in new directions. But one may not blame the Spaniards for the existence of caciquism; it was a native institution before they came, and they merely accepted it…\footnote{LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines’, p. 341. It is important to note that this definition provided by LeRoy will have a huge influence and will become the official explanation in the textbooks for schools. An example is Benitez, Conrado. *History of the Philippines. Economic, Social, Political*. This book was published in 1926. In page 128, Conrado Benitez devotes a short point to “Caciquism or dato rule.” Benitez follows *ad literam* LeRoy’s definition.} LeRoy uses here the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias* in order to foster Caciquismo as something inherited from the seventeenth century.

LeRoy portrays caciquism as inherent in the Filipino ethos, a habitual feature of tropical societies or a component of tribalism. At times he argues that the Spanish merely accepted and connived with an existing institution; at other times he suggests that the Spanish furnished this institution. There are many contradictions in his essay since, on the one hand, there is the survival of the old social organization, while on the other hand the Spaniards are said to have crushed the tribal organization. There was a despotic tribal rule, which was more democratic than what
crystallized under Spain’s “inelastic ecclesiastical regime.” In sum, LeRoy could not build up a strong argument since he arbitrarily co-opted the term caciquismo in order to justify American blunders and above all their own despotism towards Filipinos.

The most surprising argument in the essay is when LeRoy claims that “the Filipino propaganda of 1868-98, culminating in the ill-planned revolt of 1896, was in large part a revolt against caciquism.” LeRoy makes clear that this revolt was ill-planed and that it was a revolt that “originated with the aristocracy.” The reference to an aristocracy seems to indicate the survival of the caciques, but this is not what LeRoy wishes to convey—not in this context, at least. Since the main purpose of the essay is to undermine the Spanish system, LeRoy squarely infers that Spain imposed and tolerated caciquismo as a corrupt, violent and coercive system. His seemingly contradictory assumption that the revolt against caciquismo originated with the “aristocracy” is connected to the new narrative of Philippine history that the Americans were helping to construct—one in which the Katipunan and Bonifacio as leader of the masses would be suppressed. The problem with Bonifacio, according to LeRoy, was that he preached a racial war, in contrast to the Propaganda movement, identified with Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and Graciano Lopez Jaena, which protested against administrative and economic caciquismo.

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60 LeRoy, James A. ‘Our Spanish Inheritance…’, p. 344.
61 At this point, I think it is important to compare the different stages LeRoy develops to define the caciques and Benedict Anderson’s Cacique Democracy. LeRoy starts by making an isomorphism of past and present. The present problems of the American administration in 1905 were provoked by an old feudal and patriarchal system called caciquismo. Then LeRoy starts his retrospective giving different layers of meaning to the term cacique—as a Spanish legacy, caciquismo assimilated to ruralism and the
LeRoy shows once more his knowledge of Philippine history, thanks to his Filipino friends. In mentioning Del Pilar and Lopez Jaena, we can conclude that he had read La Solidaridad. Needless to say, LeRoy knew about José Rizal and his masterpiece, Noli me Tangere. Rizal used the term cacique in Chapter XI of this novel, asking the question, quienes eran los caciques del pueblo? (who were the rulers of the town?) This was perfect for LeRoy’s argument. This sentence in the hero’s novel would become the key for those who wished to establish categorically that caciquismo and caciques were inherent in the Spanish system in the Philippines. LeRoy echoed this sentence but neglected to mention that Rizal was in touch with the group of the Regeneracionistas and was extremely influenced by Galdós, who had just finished his novel Miau, an indictment against caciquism. Moreover, Rizal together with Sancianco had lived in Madrid during the Restoration. They knew perfectly well the political debates in Spain and the development of caciquism as a distinct phenomenon of this period.

As for La Solidaridad and its use of the term cacique and caciquismo, neither Lopez Jaena nor Marcelo del Pilar defined it as a Filipino mode of behavior at all. Even less did they affirm that the Spaniards had implanted or fostered caciquism in the Philippines. Caciquism was something perceived to be endemic in Spain at that time. The use of cacique and caciquismo by the above Ilustrados resident in struggle of the “ilustrados” against caciquism although they were caciques. Benedict Anderson co-opts Corazón Aquino’s term to make a retrospective of the past. Anderson devotes a brief section to Spanish colonialism and the emergence of a mestizo elite. This would be the starting point of the growth of the caciques. Suddenly Anderson assumes exactly the same standpoint as LeRoy in 1905 in tackling the growth of National Sentiment: “the inevitable insurrection did not originate with the ilustrados.” Although there is ambiguity in the discourse it seems for Anderson these ilustrados were potential caciques, while Aguinaldo was a “caudillo.”
Spain reveal their familiarity with Spanish policy and literature. They understood that the cacique was a necessary evil, a political intermediary between the state and the people at a time of incipient democracy.

The longer the Filipino ilustrados were in Spain, the more familiar they became with the workings of caciquismo and the discussions of the phenomenon by Spanish intellectuals or ilustrados. Marcelo del Pilar was thus able to construct a simile by defining the friars “preeminence” in the Philippines as caciquismo monacal.\footnote{La Solidaridad, Madrid, October 15, 1890, Num. 41. Año 2. This argument would have great significance in 1905, during American colonial rule. General Attorney Wilfley would echo the notion of caciquismo related to the religious orders.} He appropriated “caciquismo” in order to denounce an oligarchy of friars that allegedly ruled the archipelago. These examples quite clearly indicate that Filipino ilustrados used the term “cacique” and the system “caciquismo” by analogy with the Spain they knew.

LeRoy’s argument that the revolt against Spain was planned to undermine caciquism became in turn a powerful argument for some educated Filipinos such as Albert, Pardo de Tavera and Florentino Torres, who really believed that they were dealing with something inherited from the Spanish past. What they failed to notice was that LeRoy was pointing the finger at them. LeRoy considered the principalía as bosses or caciques, and started to dogmatize the caciques as a social and political class. He identified the old cacique aristocracy class in the members of the Partido Federal. Not satisfied with that, he also identified the more radical members of the Partido Nacionalista as a new emergent class that he called the “younger men of the cacique class.”
To further stigmatize the Filipinos as caciques, LeRoy cites an
issue of the newspaper *El Renacimient o* as follows:

*El Renacimiento*, a daily newspaper published in Spanish and
Tagalog in Manila, is conducting a campaign primarily against
caciquism (and so, for that matter, is *La Democracia*, organ of the
Federal Party). But we find a collaborator of *El Renacimiento*,
saying in a recent issue: There are various forms of caciquism...

This anonymous collaborator of *El Renacimiento*, whose name
LeRoy does not mention, calls “caciques” the justices of peace, the
municipal presidents elected through manipulation of the franchise, the
chiefs of police, and so forth. In short, all of those positions occupied by
natives through appointment by American officials are now labelled
“cacique.”

*El Renacimiento* was the most nationalist and pro-independence
publication of that period. LeRoy once more displays his astuteness by
pointing out that even this most radical newspaper echoed the Filipino
evil called caciquismo. However, the quote invites suspicion since LeRoy
does not mention the name of the source. Curiously, David Barrows, an
American official, wrote a letter about caciquism entitled “Filipino self-
government.” Barrows said that the great curse of the islands was that
personal rights were not understood. Local justice, as administered by
Spanish-era justices of peace, was a “farce.” The article in *El
Renacimiento* cited by LeRoy—if it was ever written—is quite similar to
Barrow’s letter. I wonder if the anonymous collaborator of this article
was not Barrows himself. Barrows explained in a letter to LeRoy that he

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64 This letter had a definite purpose “to comment.” Barrows was very cryptic in this letter which is not
signed and was not addressed to anyone in special. It seems a pamphlet for propaganda. Robertson
had sent to the Filipino press some remarks about caciquism. Certainly, his remarks coincide with the article in *El Renacimiento*. Unfortunately I cannot verify this quote’s existence because this number of *El Renacimiento* is not among LeRoy papers, and he did not mention the date of its publication.

Finally, LeRoy offers a solution for eradicating caciquism as his counterattack on Ireland’s criticisms: “Popular education, the chief feature of the new regime is the greatest enemy to caciquism in the Philippines.” In short, caciquism would be abolished root and branch through the public school system. This would be the cornerstone of Taft’s policy.

LeRoy published in the same year, 1905, *Philippine Life in Town and Country*. He devoted Chapter VI to *Caciquism and Local Self-Government*. The content is the same as in the essay *Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines* but this chapter is longer because LeRoy added some long paragraphs from Rizal’s *Noli me Tangere*. The rhetorical question of Rizal, “Who are the caciques of the town?,” provided a key framework for LeRoy. Of course, he said, the caciques were the educated, the *principalía*, the justices of peace, local governors, and above all the half-Spaniards, wealthy and rich. He had established the discourse on Filipinos as caciques, and above all, had provided an answer to the problems being faced by the Americans in the Philippines.

_The myths of the Spanish Inheritance and the Spanish cacique_

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Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines and Caciquism and Local Self-Government are based in part on the emergence of the standard Spanish image of the cacique as terrateniente – a term which appeared for first time in 1803. In fact, we have seen that in 1884 the RAE figured cacique as “a person who in a village or region exerts influence in political matters.” This new acceptance of cacique paved the way for the emergence of a system called caciquism (sometimes also called cacicazgos). Caciquism was a new term that meant “excessive influence of the caciques in the towns.” This term fitted better the ethico-mythical image that the Regenerationists were building up. However, cacicazgo—an old term included in the Laws of the Indies that meant “dignity of the cacique.” Territory the cacique has”—was a more suitable term for capturing the feudal connotations in the prevailing literature.

This stereotypic image was fostered at the turn of the nineteenth century in the literature associated with Galdós, Varela and the Regenerationist that pictured caciquism as a new feudalism relegated to the rural sphere. This cliché has not been fully questioned. On the contrary, up to a certain extent, it has been supported by the functionalists and Tuñón de Lara who have inferred that the caciques were “aristocrat landowners” and the bloc dominant during the Restoration.

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66 Manuel Tuñón de Lara belonged to a republican family. He got his degree in Law in 1936, by starting the Civil War. He fought with the Republicans. He was imprisoned by the dictatorship of Franco. He had to flee to France where started his intellectual activity. He was teaching in the University of Pau initiating methodological renovation upon labor movement, Spanish culture and above all social history. Alvar, Jaime. *Diccionario de Historia de España y América.* Vol. II, p. 131.
The mythogenesis fostered by the Regenerationists started with Cánovas del Castillo and his *Restauration* gave full shape to the *caciquil* system. In order to govern the country, Cánovas fostered the grand cacique’s power, which was based on his general services to, and interest in, his “country.” Great oligarchs represented permanent party interests. During his term the party machines routinely falsified elections by maintaining social hierarchy and political oppression. Cánovas became the architect of the *caciquil* system and it is said that *caciquismo* was inextricably entwined with the Conservative party. This is the other side of the stereotypical image of this complex and difficult system. Cánovas was the maker, but Conservatives and Liberals made beneficial use of the system. This is the reason that the Restoration was a stable government.

Caciquismo played a key role in stabilizing Spanish politics. In literature, however, the caciques were portrayed as revolting beings. Cacique became a synonymous with *terrateniente*, a landowner with tyrannical and despotic power, a new feudal creature at the turn of the nineteenth century. The image of the bad cacique, equated with *terrateniente* and having feudalistic qualities, was promoted by the *Regenerationists* and the novelists. Not surprisingly, the Filipinos who

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67 Antonio Cánovas del Castillo was the main ideologue and politician from the Restoration, leader of the Conservative party. Cánovas was an intellectual and historian.

68 It has been assumed that the Restoration was the reestablishment of an old political regime substituted by other. However, the Restoration was the installation of a plural democracy or liberal monarchy –such as José Varela Ortega defines the Restoration—similar to British parliamentarianism.

69 The term “caciquí” emerged for first time in 1925, during the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera. It is important to note the appearance of this term since Primo de Rivera considered himself the “cirujano de hierro” (iron surgeon), the dictator advocated by Joaquín Costa. He tried to extirpate the caciquí system abolishing the democracy. In 1925, caciquí was defined by Galdós as “to establish here the hypocritical and “mansurrón” [excessive gentle] despotism which subjected the Spanish family to the absorbing and caciquí government of “patriciádo” (aristocracy).
came to Spain during the 1880s and 1890s, attuned as they were to literary trends, began to use the terms cacique and caciquism themselves, associate them with phenomena or modes of behavior found in the Archipelago.

These Filipinos were in touch with some professors from the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza, such as for example Giner de los Ríos, Joaquín Costa and Gumersindo de Azcárate, who considered themselves victims of caciquism and mounted fierce criticisms of the system by attacking the bases of the policies during that period. They asserted that there was no parliament, no parties, “only oligarchies.”

Costa, Picabea and Azcárate described caciquismo as a carry-over of the past, an “inorganic feudalism,” “a feudalism of a new genre, a hundred times more revolting than the warrior feudalism of the Middle Ages and by which the representative government conceals a mean creature, a hypocrite and bastard.” In this sentence, Azcárate tries to articulate his perceptions of his society and the weaknesses of its institutions. The Regenerationists constructed an ethico-mythical version of caciquismo,

70 The liberal policy of the Sexenio had developed the principle of free education as the academic freedom in the universities and freedom of initiative in the creation of schools. Cánovas del Castillo, during the first years of the Restoration, subjected the universities to a brutal purge, abolishing the academic freedom. This reform caused some professors to be expelled from the university. In this context, the Instituto Libre de Enseñanza was born in 1876. A group of krausist professors of the university founded this institution –Giner de los Ríos, Gumersindo de Azcárate, Nicolás Salmerón and Joaquín Costa. The Instituto Libre de Enseñanza understood education as the transmission of knowledge and human formation. This institution advocated above all tolerance and freedom of thought. Its influence in the Spanish cultural life at the turn of the nineteenth century and at the opening of twentieth century was substantial. Montero, Feliciano. Historia de España. Revolución y Restauración. Del Sexenio Revolucionario a la guerra de Cuba (1868-1898). Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2004, vol. 13, p. 415

71 This argument can be found for instance: in Costa, Joaquín. Oligarquía y caciquismo como forma actual de gobierno en España (1901); Macías Picavea, Ricardo. El Problema Nacional (1899); Mallada,Lucas. Los males de la patria del ingeniero or Isern, Damián. Del Desastre nacional y sus causas. They stated: “The present form of government in Spain is an absolute monarchy whose king is ‘His Majesty’ the Cacique.”

portrayed as the embryo of all the evils of the patria, and the cacique as
the perpetrator of a personalized policy and the capture of the law by
rural elements. Caciques undermined the will of the ignorant peasants. 
Caciquismo became a repressive, coercive and endogamous system in
which violence was inherent and implicit. This discourse was bound to
be absorbed by the Filipino ilustrados in Spain.

These epic developments culminated in 1898 with an explosion of
Spanish nationalism provoked, no doubt, by the loss of the three last
bastions: Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines. This burst of
nationalism led to the breaking up of Spain and the de facto emergence of
two Spains, one of which blamed caciquismo as a source of the country’s
backwardness, while the other Spain, generally identified with the
southern part of the country that was basically agrarian, nurtured the
mythical image of the cacique.

The legend tells us that the hacendero or terrateniente emerged
in Andalucia and Extremadura. “Cacique” denoted a despicable being,
a wealthy man who controlled the elections, the guardia civil, the priest,

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73 These Spanish terms have been used by Benedict Anderson, Lewis Gleek and John Larkin in the
context of the Philippines.
74 Andalucia and Extremadura became recurrent for many of the writers of the turn of the nineteenth
century and above all at the opening of the twentieth century because of a strong social polarization.
Javier Tussell opened the Pandora’s box in the 70s with a book entitled Oligarquía y Caciquismo en
Andalucia. Tussell has given an excessive importance to the electoral process in the study of
caciquism. He suggests a typology of the electoral districts established according to two variables,
especially in the case of rural districts: on the one hand, a socio-economic structure emphasizing the
property of the lands; and on the other, illiteracy. At that point, Tussell defines the caciques from these
provinces as terrateniente andaluz or extremeño while this terminology –terrateniente—is not used to
define the caciques from other provinces. Many local monographs have come out following these two
variables established by Tussell. The prevalent argument in these monographs is that caciquism was
endemic in Andalucia because of its backwardness which paved the way for an electoral apathy.
Jacques Maurice tries to question this argument by inferring that caciquism in Andalucia and
Extremadura cannot be stigmatized by common links and similar features. Maurice considers necessary
to analyze concrete cases in order to establish why Andalucia and Extremadura lived a democratic
deficit. See Maurice, Jacques, ‘Patronazgo y clientelismo en Andalucia. Una interpretación.’ In Robles
Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra. Patronazgo y Clientelismo Políticos en la España

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the peasants; in short the cacique was omnipotent. The myth of the emergence of local caciques was shaped at this point. The *caciquil* stories in Andalucia reveal several modes of the relationship between the cacique and his friends. This could have multiple forms in the south of Spain, from a deferential loyalty typical of a traditional *caciquismo* found in isolated peasant communities, to the purchase of this loyalty by a transactional *caciquismo*. This portrait of Andalucia or Extremadura is well-known in Spain and has always been related to the dichotomy between north and south, development versus underdevelopment, modernization versus backwardness, education versus illiteracy, and the like. It seems that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between underdevelopment or the so-called “third world,” and the emergence of tyrannies.75

*Caciquismo as a Spanish phenomenon: what American historiography has silenced*

The ethico-mythical image of caciquism described above does not differ much from how LeRoy portrayed it in *Our Spanish inheritance*. LeRoy was able to plant the seeds of a representation of the Filipino cacique as a revolting *hacendero* either fostered by the Spanish administration or endemic in a patriarchal Filipino society. The assumption, therefore, was that the Americans had inherited the problems of the Spanish regime. However, while American historiography does not

seem to have transcended the old discourse, Spanish scholars have revisited caciquism and have, up to a certain extent, gone beyond the image fostered by the Regenerationists.

For a long time, the critical historiography on the Canovist Restoration had resorted quasi ad literam to the regenerationist judgments and the complaints of Azcárate, Costa and others. However, in 1970, some scholars—Tusell, Romero Maura, Varela Ortega among them—started to revisit the meaning of caciquism during the Restoration. They put in question the stereotypic images by transcending the moral connotations attached to it by the Regenerationist. These scholars, associated with the theoretical development of functionalism, tended, however, to simplify the issue by attributing the presence of caciquism to the lack of “political culture” in the public life of the Restoration.

At present, a new generation of scholars has moved beyond the above explanations by emphasizing, among others, that caciquism was not monolithic at all. They are able to demonstrate that caciquism during the Restoration had multiple manifestations. It did not conform to a static system but was interwoven with an institutional structure susceptible to modification. Perhaps the most important of the new arguments is that caciquism was a necessary evil inherent in all democracies, “a political system and form of socialization of the constitutional mechanism during

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76 All of them are famous “Hispanistas” scholars.
the Restoration (1875-1923).\textsuperscript{78} The negative “new feudalism” connotation given by the Regenerationists has now been transcended.

In spite of the new conceptualization of caciques as an essential vehicle for building up permanent clients, and caciquism as a necessary constitutional mechanism, the new definitions still delimit the political game to two parties, conservative and liberal, considered without ideological base. The assumption still is that there were inherent “clientelist” relationships maintained through favors, influences, position and privilege.\textsuperscript{79} The clients acted in a foreseeable way. Causal connections are thus established between caciquism, political apathy and illiteracy.

This kind of argument reflects the contraposition of two concepts: “modern” and “backward.” The purpose of a caciquist mechanism seems to lie in organizing politics effectively so as to preserve its power.\textsuperscript{80} In fact, the factions which represented the caciques at a local level in the electoral districts had interests in the distribution of the seats. This distribution was made beforehand without confrontation. Thus, this “backward” behavior guaranteed the perpetuation of the system of power—the so-called \textit{turno pacífico}—and disguised the absence of programmatic differences among the parties.

The above explanation of caciquism ignores several important issues. For example, the historical definition emphasizes the existence of

\textsuperscript{78} Robles Egea, Antonio. ‘Sistemas Políticos, Mutaciones y Modelos de las Relaciones de Patronazgo y Clientelismo en la España del Siglo XX.’ In Robles Egea, Antonio (ed.), Política en Penumbra..., p. 232.

\textsuperscript{79} This thesis is defended by Javier Tusell or José Varela Ortega who consider that there is a cause-effect among this electoral behavior and the high indexes of abstentionism.

two parties devoid of ideology, which is true up to a certain extent. But the 1890’s saw the birth of ideology-driven political parties whose sympathizers came from the most unprotected classes. Also neglected is the most important function of caciquism: to facilitate the process of modernization of Spanish society. It can be argued that caciquism was a necessary accompaniment to the formation of the state in order for local politics to connect with the life of the nation as a whole. As Pino Artacho states, “caciquism, according to my point of view, was a transitory expedient, relatively useful.”

*Caciquismo* was a complex organization. Answers as to why and how it had become so prominent and strong were as diverse as the views expressed. Caciques were said by some to be wealthy men who abused their wealth, and by others to be politically powerful men abusing their political strength. Many said that *caciquismo* was engineered from the Ministry in the Interior and could be eliminated if its destruction were willed at the top; to others it was the local man who was at the root of the matter. Depending on the analyst, too much or too little bureaucracy was seen as its cause. Backwardness of the economy and deep-rooted traditions were also at times seen as the main culprits. *Caciquismo* was said to have a socially disintegrative function and there were some, even among those who loathed it, who affirmed on the contrary that, all other things being equal, *caciquismo* gave cohesion to the social body.

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Most of the above definitions of cacique and caciquism which allow for a certain syncretism were furnished by members of the so-called “Oxford School.” They started to identify 1840 as the genesis of the emergence of caciquism with the so-called *turno pacífico* (alternation of the dynastic parties) between Moderates and Progressives—the political structure implicit in Isabelline parliamentarianism. As pointed out earlier, in 1840 the term *caciquism* had not been registered in the dictionary of the *Real Academia*. It appeared for the first time in 1884. Besides this important observation, there is another important fact brought out by the Oxford School, which confounds the classic argument of the Functionalists: The caciques were a new elite, fundamentally political, whose power did not derive from their resources but from their connections. In the 1840s an anachronistic aristocracy was still prevalent. Caciques were definitely not aristocrats. They were not necessarily even wealthy men and landowners. Simply put, the caciques were the intermediaries between strategic political networks.

During the Restoration between 1875 and 1923, “clientelist” links acquired a decisive importance in empowering a mechanism of alternation in power inexorably interwoven with the emergence of patronage, which constituted a substantial part of the *caciquil* system.

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83 This Oxford School of Spanish historiography was constituted by Carr, Fusi, Varela Ortega, Romero Maura. They challenged the traditional assumptions about *Caciquismo*, prevalent from the emergence of *Regeneracionistas*.


85 John Sidel in order to emphasize the emergence of caciquism in Spain uses the old edition of the classical book written by Raymond Carr *Spain: 1808-1939*. Carr in 1966 had not transcended the secular image of cacique and caciquism furnished by the Regenerationists. It seems that Sidel wanted to perpetuate a notion of caciquism as a feudalistic institution. Carr later reissued this book, covering the history of Spain until 1975 and revisiting the argument of caciquism following the research done by his student Varela Ortega.
This system has been reduced to explain, on the one hand, behavior in elections and, on the other, the domination of local government, neglecting the fact that these elements were integrated into a global mechanism of the State and responded to a specific need to channel the access of citizens to property and common services.

The caciquil phenomenon has revealed itself in different forms and on many occasions. Traditionally it has been related to electoral fraud and corruption but it is, above all, the logical manifestation and expression of a social and political structure which is displayed in interpersonal, patron-client ties and in politico-administrative relationships. This relationship made the cacique above all the intermediary between the central administration and ordinary citizens.

Caciquism was not a Spanish exception, but a transitory adaptation of the rules of political liberalism and was inherent in an incipient democracy. It emerged with the implementation of liberalism and above all the suffrage, giving to the caciques a greater responsibility in government. It became an indispensable organ of national life, a necessary evil since as a political system it was the transition between the Ancien Regime and a modern state.

The Restoration gave shape to different and multiples layers of caciquismo; the system certainly was not static or monolithic.

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86 For instance, in England during the birth of the democracy emerged the “obliging friends,” analogous to the Spanish caciques.
87 José Varela Ortega argues that the implementation of the suffrage in the elections preserved the balance between administration and party organizations which characterized the system. The implantation of universal suffrage during the 1890s, the local party organizations, the caciques had more responsibility than the government did for the organization of the elections. He calls this phenomenon, elections from below since the caciques attracted the masses as clients. See Varela Ortega, José: Los Amigos políticos. Partidos, elecciones y caciquismo en la Restauración (1875-1900). Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia Estudios, 2001, p. 469.
Caciquismo with all its dysfunctions and anomalies created a national reality in Spain characterized by a clash between a local political culture and a new culture preoccupied with problems at the national level. In this context, the cacique was the intermediary who attracted the villagers to contribute or participate in the life of the nation. This attraction, obviously, was not always legitimate since it exploited a relationship of patronage—“clientelist” or paternalistic. But it was necessary in order to foster a national consciousness.

The image of caciquismo as a necessary evil in Spain is completely different from what was presented by LeRoy and built upon by American and Filipino scholars after him. They prefer definitions such as Costa’s, which was in fact a replica of the colonial perception in the Philippines. Costa believed that all the laws were passed if the caciques wanted, since the Civil Governors confided upon the caciques in order to get the necessary votes and to reach the majority in the Cortes. Costa asserted that the Spaniards “live subjected to the arbitrariness of a corrupted and corrupting minority, with no honor, Christianity, humanity. . .In Spain, caciquismo is a narrow system of government organized as masonry by regions, provinces and municipios.”

Franco and his historians co-opted this portrait of Spain and eradicated the cancer. Lamentably, Francoism rejected a democratic system by promoting the image fostered by the regenerationists. Franco became the “iron surgeon”—the enlightened dictator advocated by Joaquín Costa. Moreover, he was interested in exalting novelists,

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88 Costa, Joaquin. Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual de gobierno en España, p. 21.
thinkers, and critics such as Pereda, Galdós, Clarín and Blasco Ibáñez who wrote deep indictments against caciquismo as an evil which corrupted Spain. Ortega, Pérez de Ayala and Azaña would revive the same question in 1914, denouncing the immorality, injustice and personal benefit that the caciquil system gave to the oligarchies. This pessimistic view, prevalent until the recent past in Spain, neglected the fact that the Restoration gave way to the restructuring or reorganization of democratic institutions, which offered a new vision of how to rule Spain and above all how to build up a new colonialism similar to European systems.

The emergent caciques at the turn of the nineteenth century were uniquely and exclusively Spaniards. In fact we could define “cacique” as a representative of a new political class, and “caciquism” as a feature of the transitional period toward democratic institutions in Spain. Caciquism was never implemented by the Spaniards in the Philippines and if it had been, the Spaniards would have had to transform their colony into a democracy.

The Impact of Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines

Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines was a complete success. The paper was published with a specific mission: to paralyze the process of self-government and the voices of the independentistas during the Congressional trip which would take place in the summer of 1905. The response to the criticisms of Ireland was simply an excuse in order not to arouse the suspicions of the Filipinos. LeRoy had supplied a very

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89 James A. LeRoy would go on this trip as personal secretary of William H. Taft.
good argument to Taft: to silence the Filipino radical voices and above all to deviate attention away from the present conditions of the archipelago. Taft could claim that caciquism had betrayed the liberty bestowed by the Americans in the form of native-controlled local governments. LeRoy had inaugurated an important topic which was to appear again and again as a curse on Filipino aspirations toward self-government until 1946. LeRoy had stigmatized the Filipino political leadership as caciques, and had moreover demonstrated that the Spaniards were guilty of creating or connived with this system. The Spanish system was made out to be static and despotic until the very end.

LeRoy sent his paper to Barrows and to his Filipino friends in the Partido Federal. Although LeRoy considered the latter as part of the cacique aristocracy, they were to understand caciquism as a Spanish inheritance (as LeRoy depicted it) but in the context of its Spanish usage. LeRoy was to abuse and misuse this term until he died.

When Barrows read the article he sent a letter LeRoy in order to congratulate him. “I got the copy of the Atlantic Monthly with your article therein and read it with a great deal of interest,” he wrote, “The subject is one that has interested me of late and is, I think probably the most important social problem with which we have to deal here in the Philippines.” Barrows proposed to eradicate this curse through the establishment of publish schools. He viewed local justice as administered by justices of peace as an important source of the caciquism scourge. He also gave the term a new ramification already noted by LeRoy—

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caciquism as related to usury—another meaning that would be
expounded on by future scholars. However, Barrow’s explanation of
what caciquism meant posed some questions in his mind. He said to
LeRoy:

Many of them [justices of peace] are engaged in the business of
collecting debts: A man will approach them who has secured on
some poor wretch an obligation which has multiplied several times
in a relatively short time; the justice of peace agrees to collect it for
a contingent proportion and, like the man in the biblical parable, he
is hauled before the magistrate whence he is delivered into jail…

The caciques did not collect any debt in Spain, and caciquism was
not related to usury, as we have seen. The dimension of cacique behavior
given by Barrows fits perfectly with the role of the bosses in the United
States. This would imply that, in fact, caciquism was a system introduced
by the Americans. However, it is important to remember that the justices
of peace emerged during late Spanish rule with the implementation of the
new Civil and Penal Code. One of the tasks of the jueces de paz was
precisely to collect taxes and debts. Barrows de-contextualizes the task of
the jueces de paz and, at the same time, implies that this behavior was
inherited from the Spaniards.

LeRoy also sent his article to Florentino Torres and Jose Albert.
He justified the publication of the paper by claiming that he was refuting
the arguments of Alleyne Ireland, who doubted the capacity of the
Filipinos for self-government. LeRoy completely distorted Ireland’s
argument in order to gain the understanding and sympathy of some
Filipinos. For example, he wrote to Torres:

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91 David P. Barrows to James A. LeRoy, May 31, 1905.
You will receive my article “The Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.” I wrote this after reading the articles of our censor, Mr. Alleyne Ireland. He compares our procedures in the Philippines with those of what the English have made and are making in their colonies and always unfavorably for us. Our procedures are different; we want the development of the Filipinos instead of the territory.²

LeRoy stresses that the Americans are different from the English in wanting “development” for the Philippines rather than territorial occupation. Taft’s promise, “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” is reiterated here. In his letter to Jose Albert, LeRoy added another dimension to his critique of Ireland:

I sent my contribution about “The Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.” The idea I had in mind by writing it was to refute the findings of Professor Alleyne Ireland about the present government in the Philippines and about the capacity of the Filipinos for future improvement. I wanted to demonstrate with historical facts the defects of the previous social regime in the Philippines.³

LeRoy here is trying to convince his friend that caciquism was something inherited from Spain and so the Filipinos were not guilty of creating that situation. Privately, however, he called his ilustrado friends caciques and in fact considered them in his paper as instruments for perpetuating the old Spanish order. LeRoy was successful in disguising his criticism of his Filipino friends. They did not suspect that they had become the icons of oligarchism and a cacique aristocracy. Albert, for instance, congratulated LeRoy for the article; “The question that you raise concerning caciquism as the fruit of the old administration, is a

crucial one. My people like others cannot just strip themselves of this inheritance whenever they so wish. It requires time.  

The Filipino conservatives tacitly accepted that caciquism was endemic under the existing social conditions in the Philippines. They did not realize that LeRoy was misrepresenting some of them as bearers of evils that would justify continued American tutelage. This misrepresentation of the educated Filipinos as caciques was meant by LeRoy to convince American public opinion of the necessity to hold the Philippines. The newspapers, the academe, books, reports and speeches echoed the major points in LeRoy’s paper, ensuring that caciquism would henceforth become a recurrent issue. This work would consecrate LeRoy as an authority and the most accurate scholar on Philippine matters.

“If I am to single out one chapter which has given me the most new light,” wrote the President of the University of Michigan to LeRoy “I shall choose that on the caciques.” No doubt, the cacique argument was illuminating for the president of the University of Michigan. It offered the perfect platform from which to justify the shortcomings of the American government in the Philippines. LeRoy’s crusade against caciquism and the caciques was followed by other American scholar-officials who echoed the opinions prevalent in the United States.

In July 1905 the U.S. Attorney General Wilfley made a speech that the newspapers *El Mercantil* and the *Daily Bulletin* decided to publish.

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because of its relevance to “the Philippine problem.” Wilfley’s speech presented even more dramatic dimensions of the curse called caciquism:

The Attorney General Wilfley ascribes to Filipino bandits and caciques the main causes of the restlessness and public disorder observed in the provinces. The ladron is a figure quite well studied in order that the Americans become familiarized with internal conditions and get to know where his power and influence lie; in turn, caciquism is hardly known.\[emphasis added\]

This last sentence by Wilfley is paradigmatic since his definition of caciquism is a “galimatias”. If for LeRoy, caciquism, is something inherited and sometimes inherent in the Filipinos, for Wilfley, caciquism is an institution that is universal in the archipelago and inherent in the Filipino people. In fact, Wilfley assures his reader that “caciquism was an old Malay institution.”\[emphasis added\] He believes that it is the duty of the United States to eradicate the power of the caciques since this evil is contributing to the present discontent and disorder. Suddenly, caciquism has become synonymous with ladronism; both terms are co-opted from the Spanish language, with pejorative connotations. Caciquism is related to the aristocracy. It originates from the wealth, education, and religious and political conditions that fostered ladrones and latrofacciosos. Wilfley was simply articulating the same arguments that Taft had stated privately.

I have emphasized the terms ladrones and latrofacciosos. We can see that Wilfley was presenting an image of “bad Spanish rule” through

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\[97\] E.W. Kemmener, Professor at Princeton University, uses Wilfley’s argument of caciquism to explain the corruption in the elections and to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not still prepared for self-government, since the political bosses were a dominant factor in the archipelago. The ambiguities presented by LeRoy and Wilfley about caciquism are still prevalent since sometimes this is related to the rural areas and sometimes caciques are the political class. Kemmener’s paper is an accurate reflection of the triumph of the discourse by presenting Spain as a yoke of medievalism. His sources are Barrows, LeRoy, Blair and Robertson and American reports. LeRoy had been successful. Kemmener, E.W. ‘The Progress of the Filipino People toward Self-government.’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, 1908, p. 72.
the use of Spanish terms that implied that the Americans were dragging the yoke of Spanish medievalism. The Americans were successful in stereotyping these terms in the Philippines. Caciquism was a Spanish word for a Spanish phenomenon that was never implanted in the Philippines. However, after 1905 this cliché of the Spaniards as the makers of caciquism would become stereotyped in American books.

*Ladronism* is not really a Spanish word. It derives from the Spanish “ladrón” (thief). *Ladronism* was introduced by American writers with reference to Latin American corruption. As a matter of fact, *ladronism* was the equivalent of *caciquism* in some countries of Latin America. The use of the term shows us how the Americans encapsulated the Philippines in Latin American by using the same terminology there. More interesting is the use of the term *latrofaccioso*, a conjoining of *latrocinio* (action or habit of robbing) and *facción* (designates a group of those who rob). This term *latrofaccioso* was used in the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries as a synonym of *bandolerismo*. By deploying the terms *ladronism* and *latrofaccioso*, the Americans turned these phenomena into Spanish legacies in the Philippines.

Wilfley stresses that the most powerful caciques at present are the authorities in charge of municipal governments. Wilfley thus subscribed to the same argument as Taft’s, LeRoy’s, Worcester’s and others in the future. The evil existing in the municipalities was the direct result of the laws created by the U.S. commission. The Americans, however, could not admit that the real cause of the difficulties in the municipalities was the misguided implantation of their own institutions.
The inhabitants of the towns and above all the municipal governors could not adjust easily to the new system. Furthermore, there was a strict restriction of the franchise in local elections. All this would be turned into a powerful argument by the Americans against the alleged evil of indigenous government, necessitating the postponement of self-government and independence.

Wilfley’s argument about inept municipal officials leads him to conclude with a revealing statement: “Among the caciques, there are wealthy aristocrats and ilustrados. And from the enlightenment by the caciques another institution has been created—the “inahin,” a society dedicated to robbing carabaos.” Wilfley here suggests that the cacique aristocrats have such great control over the masses that they can be directed towards illegal activities.

Despite the inaccuracies in his speech, Wilfley was correct in some of his conclusions. He stated that caciquism had been furnished by the policy implemented by McKinley since he had given official positions to inept natives. However, Wilfley denies the fact that the laws and arbitrary policy of appointment implemented by McKinley was fostering a system of patronage.

*El Mercantil* fiercely criticized Wilfley’s argument about caciquism. Instead, this newspaper praised *Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines*, but not for LeRoy’s ambiguous arguments that made caciquism sometimes a Filipino, and sometimes a Spanish, coercive.

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98 The term is ambiguous since we can assume that Wilfley is alluding to the Filipino Ilustrados or those educated. However, in this context, it seems Wilfley means “educated.” The establishment of a relationship between cacique and ilustrado would not be new.

institution. On the contrary, *El Mercantil* astutely argued that LeRoy considered Filipino caciquism to be “not as oppressive as American bossism.” *El Mercantil’s* argument made sense: if the Filipinos were caciques, then the Americans were bosses, and therefore these kinds of systems were inherent in any society; in any case, the bosses were more violent and arbitrary than the caciques.

*El Mercantil* assumed that caciquism was a municipal mechanism, a “product of our country,” and an important catalyst of peace and order. Do we take this to mean that the Filipinos tacitly accepted caciquism as an indigenous institution? This assumption, however, conceals an important argument. Taft and his commissioners had started to accuse Aguinaldo and his Filipino Republic of being the catalyst of caciquism. Therefore, *El Mercantil* was providing a counterargument to such American criticism by inferring that the government of Aguinaldo was able to maintain order and to secure the rights of property as well as respect for the laws. Thus, if this indigenous government furnished a caciquil system, then caciquism provided order and peace—i.e., it was a necessary evil. This idea is quite different from that outlined by LeRoy, Wilfley and other American officials and scholars.

Knowing the trajectory of *El Mercantil*, one wouldn’t be surprised to read these positive arguments about caciquism. *El Mercantil* was a Spanish-Filipino newspaper to which the political and labor campaigner Dominador Gomez contributed. For this, in fact, he was awarded an extraordinary prize. Gomez was one of the voices clamoring for immediate independence. He emphasized that if caciquism ever existed,
it was a system inherent in any country. We must also understand that *El Mercantil* was the organ of the Spanish community in the Philippines. Its writers were completely familiar with the Spanish provenance of the term and the phenomenon. LeRoy, however, did not seem to notice the disguised criticisms in *El Mercantil*. He never commented on the argument that if caciquism were indeed a Filipino institution, then it certainly worked better than American institutions.

The most sweeping criticism of the notion of caciquism as a Filipino institution came from a group of prominent Filipinos who, on 28 August 1905 presented to a visiting U.S. delegation the *Copia del Memorial pidiendo La Independencia de Filipinas presentado ante la Comitiva Taft*. (Copy of the Memorial asking for The Independence of the Philippines presented to Taft’s Party). The list of signatories calling themselves *ciudadanos Filipinos* included Baldomero Aguinaldo, Galicano Apacible, Dominador Gomez, Vicente and Justo Lukban, Vicente Ilustre, Alberto Barreto and Teodoro Sandiko, all of whom were either veterans of the war or campaigners for independence. In fact, this memorial was suppressed by Taft for claiming for immediate independence, and was never published. The *ciudadanos Filipinos* can be considered as an incipient nationalist party, although they were criticized by later nationalists.

Ilustre and Barreto were the group’s spokesmen before the visiting U.S. congressional party. Ilustre advocated immediate independence,

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101 It is important to note this memorial was signed by Filipino educated and some peasants.
presenting this memorial to that effect. The message of the memorial, however, was quickly de-contextualized by the Americans, who rejected it categorically. Later on, some Filipino nationalists, taking the cue from the selective American reading and citation of the document, would reject it themselves. Since the document was never published, it could not be consulted directly except by a few with access to the original.

Let us examine carefully the arguments of the ciudadanos Filipinos. In asking for immediate independence, they offered as proof of the people’s capacity to rule themselves the existence in the islands of a “clase directora” (directing class) governing the “popular masses”: “It is undeniable that in the Philippines there exist what is called a clase directora, a small portion of individuals with positions in the present government, and a popular mass that is governable.” This depiction of society was de-contextualized by Taft who dismissed the memorial as part of an incipient “oligarchism.” LeRoy suspected that Barreto and Lukban were behind this plain declaration for aristocratic government as the only possible government in the Philippines. Taft and LeRoy together argued that this clase directora was, in the final analysis, the personification of caciquism.

These arguments by Taft and LeRoy had their raison d’être but were quite distant from reality. The ciudadanos Filipinos argued for a government run by a “clase directora” by making reference to the

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Filipino Republic of 1898 as *de facto* governed effectively by such a class or body of individuals. They described how the “political capacity” of Filipinos was demonstrated during the “ephemeral life” of the Filipino Republic, which “ruled with total tranquility, where the orders from above were executed and obeyed by the masses.” It’s true, they admitted, that economic welfare was lacking during the Republic, but that was because of the “abnormal state of affairs” then (i.e., the war against the Americans).\footnote{Copia del Memorial..., pp. 3-4.} Obviously, this argument was not acceptable for the new Philippine history that LeRoy and other Americans were constructing. Aguinaldo’s government and the Filipino Republic had to be depicted in terms of a despotic oligarchy ruling over the masses who obeyed blindly.

The criticisms by Taft and LeRoy gravitate around two important issues brought out by the *ciudadanos Filipinos* in their memorial. First was the assertion that the Americans were not carrying out their duties such as McKinley had promised—to tutor the Filipinos in establishing a stable government. On the contrary, said the *ciudadanos Filipinos*, the Americans were promoting instability by “implanting an inadaptable government into the Filipinos’ own environment. The understanding was that the government to be established had to have features that were fully Filipino.”\footnote{Copia del Memorial..., p. 4}

The second and the most important issue was about caciquismo. The *ciudadanos Filipinos* felt that the Americans were using the issue of caciquism to undermine the political capacity of the Filipinos. They disputed this argument with an important and provocative explanation:
Caciquismo could not have existed in this country, where the enslavement that characterizes it has found minimal expression. It has not existed as a unique tradition of the country. And if later it was found to exist here, precisely it was at the time when the country was about to be independent. This is commonly the case in other free countries.  

In other words, they were denying that caciquism was something endemic in the Philippines. They were arguing that caciquism was a typical system of patronage inherent in any country or society experiencing the transition from one stage to another, and that it appears in different ways in different societies.

In sum, the *ciudadanos Filipinos* considered it unfair for the Americans to reject their political capacity by blaming them for something called caciquism. Needless to say, Taft disliked this memorial and above all its negation of caciquism—a topic that the Americans usually trotted out whenever they had to reject Filipino demands for complete self-government. Besides, Taft was rather concerned about the last sentence that they wrote in capital letters: IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS WITH DECLARATION OF PERPETUAL NEUTRALITY.

The *ciudadanos Filipinos* were using a language in vogue at that time. By *clase directora* they meant a political ruling class. At the turn of the nineteenth century and in the early twentieth century the political ruling class in Spain distributed among the parties was defined as *clase directora*. This expression developed into *clase dirigente*. Now *dirigente* is the old Latin active participle and it means the same as *directora*. In fact, both words are synonymous but language usage over time has given

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106 *Copia del Memorial…*, p. 5.
them differing associations: the term *dirigente* is strictly related to politics while *director-ora* is interwoven with business and academe. In using the term *clase directora*, the *ciudadanos filipinos* were not referring at all to any form of oligarchism or caciquism. LeRoy, however, misrepresented them as a cacique class, probably following Joaquín Costa who stated in 1901: “Oligarcas y caciques constituyen lo que solemos denominar clase directora o gobernante, distribuida y encasillada en partidos.” (Oligarchs and caciques constitute what we usually define as a directing or governing class, distributed and pigeonholed in parties.)

The examples of *El Mercantil* and the *Ciudadanos Filipinos* show us that the Filipinos had a deep knowledge of politics. They had lived through the development of Spanish democracy and her system of patronage. They understood the important role that Spanish caciquism played in the consolidation of the state. This is the reason they advocated caciquism as necessary in the development of the state and congruent with national stability. However, LeRoy set a precedent and trend for the future through his observation that caciquism was an atavism evoking syncretic forms of past traditions that had persisted to challenge and distort the emerging American modernity. LeRoy succeeded in paralyzing the process of self-government, silencing voices such as Dominador Gomez’s and suppressing the Memorial. The topic would emerge again in 1914 in the move to halt the policy of Filipinization and in 1921 to deny the Filipinos independence. LeRoy had established the

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notions of Filipinos as caciques and Spain as the catalyst of cacique and caciquism.
CHAPTER VIII: ENCAPSULATING MEDIEVAL PHILIPPINES

IN LATIN AMERICA--THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, 1493-1898

I ordered “The Philippine Islands” for the Ethnological Survey and also for this bureau. We have received here about seven volumes. I have been somewhat disappointed in the series, taking it on the whole. It does not publish originals untranslated, and its resume of documents, as it calls it, is absurd.

David P. Barrows

The Philippine Islands 1493-1803 was the fruit of the most ambitious project by the Americans to rewrite the history of the Philippines after their occupation of the islands. It began in 1902 although at that moment it was confidential. It seems that the gestation in that year of a project to publish a multivolume compilation of Spanish primary sources translated into English was not a coincidence. In 1902 the archipelago, on paper, was pacified. It was opportune, since the Philippines was constantly in the headlines, to publish a work covering the three centuries of Spanish rule in order to understand some present troubles which the United States was facing. However, in 1902 there was not a single American scholar with expert knowledge of Philippine history. Therefore, the Arthur Clark Company, publishers of the compilation, had to rely on “Americanistas” to select the documents, to translate them and finally to provide a historical introduction to the work.

1 Emma Blair on June 25th, 1902 wrote to Edward Ayer announcing this project and asking for information. It is quite clear that Miss Blair was the brain of this project, despite all the honors going to Robertson. Ayer Edward Papers, folder 7. Chicago: Newberry Library.
The historian selected to tie together this multivolume compendium was Edward Gaylord Bourne of Yale University.

The selection of Bourne would give *The Philippine Islands 1493-1803* a specific shape. As an expert on Latin America in the sixteenth century, Bourne’s perspective enabled the Philippines to be encapsulated into Spanish America and considered as an evangelization mission. This is the reason the multivolume work starts in 1493. Bourne gave it the stamp of rigorous historical objectivity since he did the analyses, demonstrating how to test historical statements in a practical way.

The organization of the multivolume work reflects two important phases in its construction. The first five volumes were put together according to the criteria laid down by Bourne, which was to provide the American public with “trustworthy” documents. For accuracy’s sake, they even considered publishing the Spanish originals together with the English translations. The critical review of these initial volumes by James LeRoy, published in *The American Historical Review*, led to a complete change of the work’s format. LeRoy became the director of the project from volume 6 onwards. The sixth volume, in fact, contains an “editorial announcement” that the compilation would cover the whole span of Spanish administration. At that point, the history project became part of the American administrative machinery. LeRoy would dictate which documents to publish and which ones to ignore. At the same time, he was closely in touch, as we have seen, with the architects of U.S. colonial policy in the islands.

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2 Many are the books written by Bourne but maybe the most important work was a small book entitled “Spain in America,” published in 1905.
This chapter examines how *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* was constructed, and how the initial criticisms made by LeRoy were transformed into praises for the work and its authors. We shall show that from volume 6 onwards the prefaces and the documents selected have a specific purpose: to discredit the Spanish administration through the omission of certain works, the de-contextualization of others, and the use of certain epithets to define the Spanish bureaucracy and the natives. For this purpose, I shall then focus on two significant works that can be regarded as examples of suppression, de-contextualization and *ad hoc* mistranslation.

**The Philippines Islands, 1493-1898: its gestation and editors**

In the spring of 1902 a new company called *The Arthur H. Clark Company* of Cleveland Ohio was formed. Its objective was “to set upon a course of seeking out and encouraging talented historians, developing individual projects, and publishing a body of works on American history, biography and narrative.” Clark immediately arranged with Archer B. Hulbert to initiate a series of books entitled *Historic Highways of America*. He then met with James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair, with whom he had worked on a book project previously, and convinced them to undertake the publication of a second major series to be titled *The Philippines Islands, 1493-1803*. Because the Philippine islands were

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4 With Volume sixth, the dates for inclusion changed to “1493-1898.” To cover all the years under Spain.
constantly in the headlines as a result of the Spanish-American War, all parties felt that this project had a good chance of commercial success.5

The full title of the multivolume compendium was: *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and their Peoples, their History and Records of the Catholic Missions, as related in contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of those Islands from their earliest relations with European Nations to the beginning of the Nineteenth Century. Translated from the Original.*

One of the priorities of this work was to present Spanish documents and manuscripts to the public “with the intention and hope of casting light on the great problems which confront the American people in the Philippines; and of furnishing authentic and trustworthy material for a thorough and scholarly history of the islands.”6

To announce the publication of primary documentary materials for the public is rather ambiguous since a priori the main purpose of such works is to provide material for scholars. At least, this was the expressed purpose of putting together Spanish collections of primary sources such as *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.*7 Then the editors connect the documentary collection to “great problems” which confront the American people. What do they mean? The answer is provided by the editors in their prefaces. By reading them one is drawn to the conclusion

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7 *The Philippine Islands* is a replica of *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* edited by Wenceslao E. Retana. Blair and Robertson published some of the documents included in Retana’s work and they translated into English.
that the Americans had inherited the problems left by the oppressive, immoral and tyrannical Spaniards. These epithets can be found practically in all the prefaces. Moreover, the editors systematically furnish the idea that “slavery” was a pre-Hispanic institution maintained by the Spaniards. For instance, in introducing the documents in volume 8 the editors state that “a revolt of the Zambales and Negritos of Western Luzon is quelled and the surviving insurgents are dispersed or enslaved.” Blair and Robertson do not add any more comments. They do not explain under what circumstances the Spaniards enslaved the indios. This is one of the problems of *The Philippine Islands*. The prefaces are mere descriptions, mostly quite biased, of the documents without explaining the intricacies of Spanish administration. No wonder LeRoy considered the prefaces an unnecessary waste of space.

Blair and Robertson devote four volumes to the years 1493-1580. During these years Philip II did not send any Royal Decrees to the islands. However, the editors do not explain why there is this lack of official documents for this period. They assume that the Philippines was then a civilizing mission more than a colony, thus the absence of Royal Decrees.

This presumption disguises important arguments related to the 1580 annexation of Portugal by Philip II. This important event paved the way for the imperialism of the second half of Philip II’s sovereignty. It gave the Spanish administration the freedom to implement a true political

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base in the Philippines. Until that time, any movement could arouse the suspicion of Portugal which thought that the archipelago was within its demarcation line, and they were right. Therefore, in examining the first period of Spanish rule we must take into consideration the fact that 1580 to 1589 was a developmental phase leading to the consolidation of the Philippines as a colony from 1590 to 1602.

The lack of official (i.e., Royal) documents until 1580 led the editors Blair and Robertson to co-opt the black legend of the Spanish conquest. They assumed, through the documents sent by bishop Salazar, that there was a radical social and economical transformation in the native communities and that the native population was seriously decimated. On the contrary, careful analysis of the first twenty years from the arrival of Legazpi to Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas (1590), shows that this was a period of the coexistence of both societies.  

As for the incidence of slavery, the editors were making an isomorphism with the present in order to foster the notion that this institution was endemic in the archipelago. We will recall that the alleged slavery practiced by the caciques was regarded as a serious impediment to the implantation of the spirit of American institutions in preparation for self-government. Blair and Robertson provide many examples of slavery tolerated or connived in by the Spaniards. In the example given above, when they state that the Spaniards enslaved the insurgents, they

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11 Cano, Glòria. *La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614.*

12 As has been explained in a previous chapter, James A. LeRoy in *The Americans in the Philippines* considered caciquismo and slavery as synonymous. In 1913, Dean C. Worcester would furnish the same argument in *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands.*
do not explain to the readers that Spanish policy tolerated “slavery” in cases of “justa Guerra” (just war).

The thrust of the editorial selection of documents and events was to demonstrate that the problems of the present—i.e., pacifying and administering the islands—were inherited from the Spaniards. The examples provided are inextricably related to the matter of “trustworthy” and “authentic” material. As will be explained in detail later, the material was not new, since most of the documents had been published in other collections. Blair and Robertson provided many friar accounts and a few royal decrees, mostly extracted from La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. Obviously, the material was authentic but highly selective. Another problem was the mistranslation, decontextualization, and misinterpretation of the documents and the facts they contained, especially when LeRoy collaborated with the editors. Despite these serious problems, The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 became, and is still considered to be, the best and most comprehensive source of historical materials on the Philippines during the Spanish regime.13

Emma Helen Blair (1851-1911)

It is surprising that practically a hundred years after the completion of this work we hardly know anything about its editors. Emma Blair obtained her Bachelor of Arts probably at Ripon College. She had a mastery of French and Spanish, which paved the way for a scholarly

Teaching did not satisfy her, however, and so in 1877 she joined the staff of the *Christian Statesman*, a Milwaukee newspaper. She took up graduate studies at the University of Wisconsin in 1892, and later joined the library staff of the Wisconsin Historical Society as assistant librarian. In 1894 Blair resigned from the library staff to work as chief assistant to Dr. Twaites.\(^{33}\)

I know Miss Blair could understand French but I have not found any evidence that she could speak, read or even understand Spanish, although she is said to have translated many of the documents. Miss Blair was at the beginning the brain of the team and, in fact, in June 1902 she wrote to Ayer:

> I have just made arrangements with a publisher for the issue of a series (covering more than fifty volumes) to comprise documents relating to the early history of the Philippines. . . the period covered will be from 1493 to 1803. I have sent to Spain my associate editor [James A. Robertson].\(^{34}\)

Blair was the first one to complain when LeRoy criticized the initial volumes of this compendium, and she it was who also drew LeRoy, then Consul at Durango, into the project itself. It seems that in 1909 the University of Wisconsin awarded Blair an M.A. degree, *honoris causa*. This is practically all the information we have about her. E. Arsenio Manuel adds a bit more information which is mainly hagiographic, such as for instance that the motives which influenced Miss Blair to undertake this work were in great measure philanthropic.\(^{35}\)

This philanthropy had a clear aim: to provide the main reference source

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for Philippine history (the only one of any value at all in the English language) and to make the Philippine question one of great importance in American national life. She wanted to “assist in solving the problems of governing the Islands.” She died of cancer in September 1911, just days after having received an advance copy of volume one of her *Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley*—her last contribution to scholarship.

**James Alexander Robertson (1873-1939)**

Better known than Miss Blair, probably owing to his commitment to the American administration, James A. Robertson is identified as an American translator, scholar and bibliographer. In 1892 he entered Adelbert College, Western Reserve University in Cleveland, specializing in Romance languages and obtained his Ph.B. in 1896.

The heavier part of the burden of collecting materials for *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* fell upon Robertson’s shoulders. This took him in 1902-1907 to the archives and libraries of Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, England and the United States in search of original editions, rare prints, and manuscripts. He contacted historians, bibliophiles, and other such experts in the various countries he visited to seek help in evaluating, translating, and annotating the works he had selected, or in writing introductions to the various materials gathered. Robertson himself did a

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18 Editorial of the Wisconsin State Journal.
great deal of translating and annotating. Arsenio Manuel states that Robertson contacted historians and experts in several countries. Curiously, in the case of Spain, Robertson made contact with Wenceslao Retana, Eduardo Navarro, Pablo Pastells and Giner de los Ríos. Retana and Navarro could have helped him to understand the nineteenth century since both considered the revolt of 1896 as the result of the reformist policy implanted in the archipelago. However, LeRoy advised Robertson and even Arthur Clark against consulting Retana. The Jesuit Father Pastells was more useful for he could provide support for the idea of a Spanish regime that was more a mission than a colony. And as for Giner de los Ríos, this prominent educator and philosopher had nothing to do with the Philippines but he was one of the makers of the new educational system in Spain that eventually was transplanted in the archipelago. Following LeRoy’s advice, Giner de los Ríos would be ignored for the obvious reason that his education reforms would raise questions about the cornerstone of American rule: education.

Robertson’s work was considered significant and he became Doctor because of his achievements. He received praise from LeRoy, Manuel Artigas and above all A. Curtis Wilgus, who wrote *Hispanic American Essays. A Memorial to James Alexander Robertson*. While Miss Blair passed practically unnoticed, Robertson kept in touch with

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21 Francisco Giner de los Ríos suffered the university purge during the Restoration. He was one of the founders of *La Institución Libre de Enseñanza*. This institution introduced in Spain the most modern pedagogical and scientific theories which were developing around Europe.

LeRoy who from 1904 was practically dictating the shape of *The Philippine Islands* from volumes 6 to 52. Recommended by LeRoy to Taft and Superintendent of Education Barrows, Robertson reached the apex of his career with his appointment as chief librarian of The Philippine Library.

When Robertson became the head of the Philippine Library he wrote a history of the library and its holdings. This account is really interesting since it demonstrates *de facto* the political character of Robertson: imperialist. Through this history of the library he mounted a strong criticism of Spanish rule as having suffered from lassitude and decrepitude. As with the whole system of Spanish institutions, the library under the Spanish regime was criticized by Robertson as broken down and practically non-existent.

Robertson does not mention that the Filipino ilustrado, Pedro Paterno, was the librarian during Spanish rule. This brings us to the issue of misinformation or the suppression of information in his history of the library. It has been mentioned that during the short-lived existence of the Republic the first Filipino library was established with rich Spanish material acquired or confiscated from the Religious Orders. Robertson deliberately ignores this topic since there is another theme running through his account: a categorical definition of Filipinos as “ignorant and fanatics,” which demonstrates their unfitness for self-government.

Robertson becomes more explicit and proud when he explains how the Philippines Library was born. The library was founded in California as a private enterprise by an association called the *American Circulating*
Library Association of Manila. Lack of funds compelled the association in 1901 to seek government assistance. By Act No. 96 of the Philippine Commission enacted on 5 March 1901 the library was acquired by the government. The management and control of the library was by U.S. government appointment, as were all the positions in the Philippines despite the introduction of self-government during the Taft era. Needless to say, the library’s board was constituted by Americans with some token Filipino.23

No doubt, the most impressive accomplishment of Robertson was his editorship of The Philippine Islands. However, there is a second important feature of his career, which enhanced his prestige among scholars—his acquisition in 1913 of the Filipiniana Collection of La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, considered as the best such collection in the world. Robertson explains this process in great detail since he considers the purchase a personal achievement. According to him the collection had been offered as early as 1906 to the Library of Congress for the sum of 400,000 pesos. In 1913 the offer was renewed to the Government of the Philippines to which the Company finally sold the Collection for 200,000 pesos.

The story is a little bit different in actual fact. As has been mentioned in earlier chapters, the Americans were really keen to buy all the books and above all rare manuscripts related to their newly acquired archipelago. The condition of “rareness” became synonymous with prestige, no matter what the content was. La Compañía decided to take

vantage of this American buying spree. It started to foster and spread the idea they were really the *maecenas* of a valuable Filipiniana collection, and no doubt it was such. In 1904, José Sánchez y Garrigós, librarian of the *La Compañía* collection, insinuated to Wenceslao Retana, who was then working for bookseller Pedro Vindel, that the company was willing to sell its collection.

In response, Retana began to elaborate a clever strategy to attract the attention of the American government. “I really believe in the business,” he wrote, “but to make a great deal [of money], there are two specific things to do in advance: furnish it with ‘rareness’ and catalogue it with absolute magnificence.”24 This is precisely what *La Compañía* and Retana did from 1904 to 1906. In fact, during these years *La Compañía* increased its collection, buying Vindel’s collection, which included many rubbish manuscripts and quite useless papers, but they were “rare.” This purchase, predictably attracted the attention of American private collectors and above all, experts such as Robertson.

The strategy would take full shape in a scientific and erudite way. Retana put together an important catalogue which would be published in 1906—*Aparato Bibliográfico de la Historia General de Filipinas deducido de la colección que posee en Barcelona La Compañía General de Tabacos de dichas Islas*, in three volumes. He made an excellent job of cataloguing the collection of *La Compañía*, making references to many other works. He built up a bibliographical masterpiece which would be emulated in the two last volumes of *The Philippine Islands*, but

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unfortunately Blair and Robertson lacked the rigor and above all the knowledge that Wenceslao Retana possessed. His *Aparato Bibliográfico* was subtly spread in prestigious academic circles.

Edward Ayer of the Newberry Library and the Library of Congress itself became immediately interested in acquiring this collection but one of the most explicit wishes of *La Compañía* was to sell the collection to the Philippines. This is the reason that in 1906 *La Compañía* asked for 400,000 pesos from Washington. They knew beforehand that the Library of Congress would not pay that large sum. Then in May 1907 Retana and Sánchez devised a new strategy—a powerful campaign to mobilize opinion in Filipino newspapers. Finally, the Filipiniana collection of *La Compañía* was acquired by the Philippine Library as *La Compañía* had wished, expecting someday to witness the birth of *La Biblioteca Nacional de Filipinas.*

James Robertson never checked carefully the works included in Retana’s *Aparato Bibliográfico* and took for granted that he had acquired all the rare materials, which gave him prestige. But in fact many of the books listed—really important ones—were at Yale University from 1902. It was part of Retana’s “marketing” strategy to make references to many other works not actually in the *La Compañía* collection.

There is one last important feature of Robertson’s career not included in his biographies. During his term as librarian of the Philippine Library, Robertson became embroiled in a controversy regarding documents which he had acquired, translated and later published. These

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25 Letter of the history of the collection of *La Compañía* to Philippine Governor General. Companyia General de Tabacos de Filipinas Papers. ANC.
documents were purported to be pre-Hispanic, but were later proven to be fraudulent. This document is the pre-Hispanic Criminal Code of the Philippine Islands, published in *The Pacific Ocean in History* by H. Morse Stephens and Herbert E. Bolton under the MacMillan & Co. imprint. The publication of this book was the result of a big and important Congress called Panama-Pacific Historical Congress which took place in July 1915. Two important aspects of Robertson’s contribution need to be emphasized. On the one hand, the fake document enabled Robertson to put forward the persuasive argument, prevalent in *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, in support of the black legend of the Spaniards: that they consciously destroyed Philippine native institutions and customs such as in Latin America. This idea did not originate with him. He owed it to his friend James LeRoy who had told him, “I must still believe that the Spaniards, at least the friars, did consciously endeavor to destroy native institutions and customs, as they certainly did in Mexico, and as they did wherever else.” Robertson was paying tribute to the de facto architect (by 1904) of *The Philippine Islands*.

The second aspect of Robertson’s chapter worth mentioning is that the document he used ultimately got him stuck in contradictions. In explaining the constitution of the native institutions and mode of government he used the classical terminology found in the Spanish documents: chief (*dato* or *regulo/reyezuelo*) (petty king). But suddenly

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26 David P. Barrows participated as well in this Congress with a paper entitled “The Governor-General of the Philippines under Spain and the United States. Other participants were Charles H. Cunningham and William L. Schurz, old collaborators as James A. Robertson of Edward Ayer and contributors to the encapsulation of the Philippines in Latin America.

27 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico 24 August, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special Correspondence Box 5.
Robertson changed his argument, made an isomorphism between past and present, and began to infer that

Very early the Spaniards began to employ the American word cacique when speaking of the leaders, and this word has survived even to the present time and is in constant use. Indeed, the power of the leader among the ignorant people is still almost as great, if not actually as great, as at the time of Spanish colonization.

Since there was nothing in the documents that proved this, Robertson was simply spreading the discourse of caciquism built up by his friend LeRoy. His assumption that the term cacique was spread to the Philippines flew in the face of his own translations of Morga’s *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*, Plasencia, and other Spanish authors from the seventeenth and eighteenth century who, as I have pointed out before, never used the term cacique to define the native “leaders.” Even the term “leader” in this context is an anachronism. Robertson should have used the term “chieftain” since he was presenting a retrospective account of Spanish rule. The second part of Robertson’s paragraph above is a clear allusion to the de-contextualization of the Laws of the Indies that has enabled Philippine caciquism to have a deep lineage. LeRoy had told Robertson to use Law 16 by which the Spaniards gave “caciques in the Philippines their former governing status.” He was reading back into the past the notion of an evil caciquism that was being constructed and deployed by the American colonial administration.

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29 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, November 22, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special correspondence. Box 5. This argument has been explained in the chapter seventh.
Robertson concluded his argument about caciquism by asserting that this bad trait of the past was doomed before the advance of education. In sum, his contribution to the Stephens and Bolton book was designed to promote the emerging colonial discourse about Filipinos being unfit for self-government and therefore needing American tutelage.

Other more important facet of Robertson’s paper deserves our attention: his data related to caciquism as the consolidation of native despotism during the pre-Hispanic era. Robertson presented caciquism as a strong institution before the arrival of the Spaniards. Without any discussion of debt bondage or forms of dependency, he emphasized the common practice of “slavery” in Filipino communities or *barangays*. The context of this bold assertion was the new bill just passed by the U.S. Congress condemning peonage and slavery in the Philippine territory. Robertson at this point was mobilizing history to support the efforts of another American scholar-official, Dean C. Worcester, whose career we shall examine in a later chapter. Ultimately, Robertson’s historical contribution buttressed the notion that tyranny, despotism and corruption were endemic features of the ethos of the Filipinos since time immemorial.

Despite these distortions and even the use of a fraudulent document, Robertson kept his reputation intact. In fact, modern historiography lays the blame for this forged document on a Filipino, Jose E. Marco, curiously omitting the fact that Robertson had...
enthusiastically spread the contents of this document. Perhaps Marco had simply furnished the Americans with the kind of authentic past that they badly needed to bolster their policies. In any case, Robertson has escaped being tinged by this scandal. He continued a hectic life, teaching in North Carolina and becoming the editor of *The Hispanic American Historical Review*. He continued to contribute to the writing of a new Philippine history with some articles related to Spanish colonial rule.

**The First Criticism of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898**

In 1904, *The American Historical Review* published the first critical review of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1803*, which by that time had run to five volumes covering the years 1493 to 1583. As mentioned previously James LeRoy was the reviewer of this work. According to him,

Five volumes have now appeared of this, the most extensive undertaking ever made in Philippine history. Volume I...though entirely pertinent (the desire to reach spice islands by a western route led to Magellan’s famous voyage of discovery), one feels that

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30 Glenn May in 1997 talks about this code as a Filipino invention: “Jose E. Marco, a shadowy figure from Occidental Negros, revealed that he had uncovered a nineteenth-century manuscript written by a certain Father José M. Pavón that included translations of the code. Scott’s scrutiny of the sources revealed that no reliable evidence existed concerning the first code and that the manuscript by Pavón which was filled with anachronisms and absurdities, was a crudely executed forgery. In addition, Scott concluded that more than half a dozen other supposedly old documents uncovered by the same Jose E. Marco—all of which, like Pavón manuscript, were filled with data about the pre-hispanic Philippines—were likewise “deliberate and definite frauds.” Inventing a Hero, p. 8. Glenn May dismisses Jose E. Marco but the person who translated and spread this document was James A. Robertson. However, May does not mention the name of Robertson and even less that this translation is at Yale University under the title *The Robertson translation of the Pavon Manuscripts of 1938-1939*. The project to translate and provide these documents to the scholars was funded by the Newberry Library.

31 I mention *The American Historical Review* since this is the only journal I have found. However, LeRoy says to Barrows that he had written reviews of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1803* for *The Nation* and *The Evening Post*. James A. LeRoy to David P. Barrows, Durango, Mexico, November, 1903.
it was not strictly necessary to go so in detail into the documentary history of this never-settled controversy. LeRoy was right; it was unnecessary to be so detailed, but above all the documents presented by Blair and Robertson were not new. They were relatively easy to access since they had already been published in the previous century. An example is the Colección de Documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía or Colección de Documentos y Manuscritos compilados por Fernández de Navarrete.

The problem with LeRoy’s criticisms above is they seem more a justification than a true critique of the Blair and Robertson volumes. He says that “the editors of this series found themselves confronted at the very outset with a vast amount of such material which was all the more confusing in that it was so ill-assorted and undigested.” This assertion is untenable. As I have stated, the documents in those five initial volumes had already been published in different Spanish and Portuguese collections and anyone who has actually used these collections will immediately realize that LeRoy’s depiction of them as a “vast amount of ill-assorted and undigested material” is simply inaccurate.

The real problem with Blair and Robertson’s volumes 1 to 5 is the lack of royal decrees. These decrees were compiled by Spanish clerks in “cedulares” (collections of royal decrees), which dealt with matters of government, administration of justice, the treasury and war. These royal decrees are important in order to understand the nature of Spanish

33 LeRoy, James A. The American Historical Review, p. 150.
colonial rule until 1853. These “cedularios,” which have been largely overlooked by scholars, reveal to us the nature and extent of secular power in the Philippines. Blair and Robertson’s volumes do not contain any of these royal decrees, only the instructions to governors.

It would not have been very difficult for Blair and Robertson to access the cedularios. Why their neglect of such material? Was it more important, perhaps, for them to ignore the royal decrees and thus be able to conclude that the Philippines was more a mission than a colony? For this purpose, Blair and Robertson would have had to depend on the friar missionaries’ accounts, which they did. LeRoy even complained about the abuse of the friars’ accounts, even inferring that Blair and Robertson were being misled by someone who had been a “hireling of the friars.” At this point he was surreptitiously attacking Retana.

But LeRoy fell into a contradiction in terms since he accused Blair and Robertson of depending on these friar sources and then a few lines later he stated categorically that Philippine history had been written almost exclusively by friars. Therefore, it seems that the accusations made by LeRoy about the deficiency in the selection of the documents were more a criticism of those who were then advising Blair and Robertson—for instance, Wenceslao Retana and Edward Bourne—rather than the lack of skill on the part of the editors. One can sense, reading this mild rebuke, that LeRoy was offering himself as an alternative adviser for the project!

The other criticism made by LeRoy concerned the annotations, or lack of them: “Herein particularly are the volumes thus far issued weak (in addition to minor mistakes caused by a too servile following of Retana and other fallible authorities). This sentence is a clear discrediting of Retana. But let us pursue this matter of annotations further. In volume 5, Blair and Robertson published a document titled “Fray Salazar on Affairs in the Philippine Islands.” This was extracted from *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* in the preface to which the compiler, Retana, affirms that Bishop Salazar had become the Las Casas of the Philippines by protecting the natives. Blair and Robertson quote Retana’s words in their Preface, adding that the interference of Bishop Salazar in civil affairs provoked hostility between the ecclesiastical and secular powers. LeRoy co-opted this argument to infer that this hostility was prevalent from the time of conquest up to the very end of the Spanish regime. He suggested that the editors write this kind of annotation.

Blair and Robertson were correct in illustrating this controversy between the two powers, religious and secular. This hostility erupted because the religious orders during the decade of the 1580s had lost their initial dominance in the archipelago’s affairs. This was the historical view that the knowledgeable Retana was pushing, but LeRoy had to neglect or dismiss it since it was antagonistic to the American discourse about the perpetual reign of the bad friars.

LeRoy concluded his critique by justifying the deficiencies of *The Philippine Islands*:

That the editors of this work have launched it without time for sufficient preparation is the criticism to be made upon it, and a serious criticism it is. But it cannot fail to be a most valuable series, from every point of view, at this moment in our national history, and especially in view of the almost total lack of available publications on Philippine history in the English language.38

LeRoy was right and Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work has indeed become the most valuable reference of its type despite its inaccuracies. This was the only time that LeRoy would criticize *The Philippine Islands*, although he continued to review the work. That’s because LeRoy himself would become the most important architect of the documentary series after volume five.

LeRoy corresponded with David Barrows and Clemente Zulueta about his criticisms of the first five volumes. He told Barrows that the editors were trying to do things too much in a hurry:

This series will be of great value as the only fairly satisfactory means of reference in our libraries to the main already published data of Philippine history. But the editors have not had time to survey the field and form a fair judgment on the content and value of the material with which they have to work. The editorial sources on the subject are all poor and for the scholar, their work will be of small value.39

LeRoy confessed to Barrows that the work was pretentious that ten or twelve volumes would have been enough. It is interesting to encounter LeRoy’s statement that the work was poor and of small value, since after a hundred years of its existence, Blair and Robertson’s multivolume is still considered as the most valuable compendium of primary sources on

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the Spanish period. But LeRoy’s statement is based on the standpoint that Blair and Robertson did not have time to analyze their work and that they were translating sources already known.

Barrows, on his part, felt disappointed with the series “taking it on the whole.” “It does not publish the originals untranslated,” he complained, “and its resume of documents, as it calls it, is absurd.” The originals were not published for two reasons. The first is that most of the documents were already in published form, meaning to say they were not primary manuscript sources. The second reason is that Blair and Robertson had problems with the transcription of primary sources, misunderstanding and misinterpreting their content. Although Robertson said to Ayer, “our transcript is in many cases better than the original now,” the fact is that the transcriptions were poor and inaccurate.

An example of the editors’ problems is their handling of the Bando para que se manifieste el oro sacado de las sepulturas de los Indios. The transcription made by Robertson is deficient and the translation suffers because of the faulty transcription. Here is an excerpt:

El muy ilustre Miguel Lopez de Legazpi Gobernador y Capitan General por su Majestad de la gente armada del descubrimiento de las Yslas dixo que por quanto a su noticia ha venido que muchos soldados españoles y marineros han abierto en esta Ysla de “Cuba…”

(The most illustrious Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, his majesty’s governor and captain-general of the people and fleet of the

42 This Bando was translated by Robertson “Order to make declaration of the gold taken from the burial-places of the Indians.” Blair and Robertson (ed.), The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, Vol. 2, pp. 172-173.
43 Robertson, James A. Philippine Islands. Transcript miscellaneous, Newberry Library.
discovery of the Western Islands…many Spanish soldiers and sailors have opened many graves and burial-places of the native Indians in this island…

By comparing the above transcription and its translation we see that the Spanish document makes clear that Legazpi was both the governor and captain of those who traveled with him. However, Robertson translates Governor and Captain of the people and fleet by making a clear distinction between the two. We note also that Robertson’s transcription of the original document is confused by “Çubu” (such as in “Cebu”) and was rendered in the first documents as “Cuba.” It seems that Robertson doubted his transcription as well since he decided to omit the problematic name of the island and to render it instead as “this island.”

The bando (proclamation) concludes as follows: “…se hecho vando en forma de derecho por voz de ‘pito atambor’… (…the contents of this edict were proclaimed in the form prescribed by law, by the voice of Pito Atambor…) Robertson here confuses the ritual of the proclamation, or “obedecimiento,” with the name of a person. In fact the transcription should say “se hecho bando en forma de orden ‘a voz, a pito y atambor’” (the bando was proclaimed by voice, by whistle and by drum). This was the Spanish ritual in all the towns. However, Robertson thought that this expression was the name of the person who proclaimed

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46 Atambor was used in old Spanish meaning instrument and the person who played drums. Atambor and tambor mean the same but the former has disappeared from the language.
the order and he added in a reference “this name is given as ypolito atanbor.”

Probably the most valuable comment on *The Philippine Islands*, which has passed unnoticed, was made by the Filipino scholar Clemente Zulueta. In October 1903 Zulueta wrote to LeRoy: “I have read your criticism of the five volumes of the Philippine collection of Blair and Robertson and I find it mild. They cannot complain to you [about the review] and they are not justified to do it. The editors could have perfected it if they were not in such a hurry.”

Zulueta had met Robertson in Seville and offered him some important observations about the documentary collection. But Robertson did not want to listen to a Filipino. Zulueta considered the collection useless since most of the documents had been already published. He observed that there were important omissions in the work and mistakes in the selection of the documents. Zulueta in fact pointed out several mistakes such as the publication of Pigaffeta’s account. He told LeRoy that Blair and Robertson had taken Pigaffeta’s manuscript from the National Library of Paris. This manuscript was an inaccurate copy. “The original of Pigaffeta,” Zulueta clarified, “was published by C. Annoretti

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49 Colección de Documentos Inéditos relativos al descubrimiento. Madrid, 1864-1884. Six volumes of this collection contain documents on the Filipines; Colección de Documentos inéditos. Segunda Serie published by the Royal Academe of History in 1889. Two volumes exclusively contain documents on the Filipines; Colección de los viajes y descubrimientos que hicieron por mar los españoles desde el siglo xv. Fernández de Navarrete; Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile by F. Medina, 1888. The three first volumes exclusively contain documents of Magellan, Legazpi etc; Colleção de noticias para a histories e geografia dos naçoens ultramarinas. Lisboa, 1812; Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.
(Milan 1800). Walls and Merino translated into Spanish Anoretti’s edition. I gave notice of all these issues to Robertson.50

It seems that either Robertson or LeRoy eventually followed Zulueta’s advice and in volumes 33 and 34 reproduced the Italian edition of Pigaffeta in Italian and English.

Zulueta observed to LeRoy other mistakes in Blair and Robertson’s initial volumes which to him rendered the work inaccurate. LeRoy responded to this observations by Zulueta as follows:

What you tell me about The Philippine Islands of Blair and Robertson is extremely interesting. I am writing the reviews of this work for “The Nation” and “The Evening Post” and for “The American Historical Review.” The publisher Mr. Clark of Cleveland Ohio thinks that I have been a little bit hard with the collaborators; however he admits many things I have said are certain.51

Zulueta was willing to write down all his observations and publish them in the newspapers. But it seems that LeRoy intended to prevent Zulueta from carrying this out by justifying the alleged mistakes. He replied to Zulueta:

Miss Emma Blair, one of the collaborators, admitted my criticisms and explained to me some of the difficulties they have had. She confessed that they did not have time to check the documents of Philippine history nor to prepare a useful work for the students. She says that the idea hers.52

We do not know if Zulueta—somewhat of a purist scholar—ever accepted these excuses. He died unexpectedly in 1904. His command of Spanish bibliography is reflected in volume 52 of the compendium, where LeRoy uses Zulueta’s knowledge, shared through their

50 Clemente J. Zulueta to James A. LeRoy. 9 de Octubre de 1903.
correspondence, to write *The Philippines, 1860-1898. Some Comments and Bibliographical Notes*.

Arthur Clark and Emma Blair were offended by LeRoy’s criticisms. Blair wrote him a letter stating categorically that she and Robertson were not influenced by anyone in the selection of the documents and that the inaccuracies or mistakes were the fault of translators unable to give uniformity to the work. Be that as it may, being the object of LeRoy’s critical pen did not stop Blair and Robertson from inviting him to join the project. From November 1903 to 1907, LeRoy was the architect of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, turning it into a work of historical propaganda in the service of the U.S. colonial administration.

*LeRoy as collaborator in the penumbra*

Volume six changed completely the shape of the compilation. Suddenly, the editors announce that “So many and urgent requests have come to us, from subscribers and reviewers, for the extension of this series as shall cover the entire period of Spanish domination.” This announcement is a bit surprising after reading LeRoy’s criticisms. As far as I know, the only review of the series was written by LeRoy. Therefore, he must have been the one who requested coverage of the entire period of Spanish rule. The selection of the documents pertaining to the nineteenth century and the covering essay written by LeRoy were to provide crucial explanations of the problems that the Americans were facing in the

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Philippines. These are the “official documents” which will explain the Spanish nineteenth century. This sudden change is inextricably related to the collaboration of LeRoy himself in the making of the new *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*.

The influence of LeRoy is not immediately perceptible in the work. He collaborated, as did Edward Bourne, in writing an essay. The conclusive evidence about LeRoy’s involvement is found in the correspondence of James Robertson. These shed light on LeRoy’s role in the making of this work and above all in volume 52, which was entirely constructed by him.

Emma Blair was actually the first one to write to LeRoy in relation to the latter’s critique. LeRoy apologized for this and showed his predisposition to make suggestions relative to material for the nineteenth century. “You will understand,” he wrote, “how my experience in the islands helps me to visualize even early events in the Philippine history. I shall feel free to write you at any time when an idea occurs me.” Here he was introducing himself as an expert in Philippine matters. This aura of authoritativeness made Blair depend on LeRoy not only regarding the material to publish but also about translation issues.

There is a letter which *de facto* and *de iure* shows the incapacity of the editors to properly transcribe and translate the documents. Blair wrote LeRoy seeking his assistance in the translation of some documents.

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related to the instructions for the Manila Galleon and the *encomiendas*.

Blair sent him an inaccurate transcription and LeRoy predictably rendered a deficient translation.

Blair replied, “I should guess that the expression *tae* or *pesos muertos* meant something like a ‘gratuity’.” It appears that there was some difficulty in translating the term *pesos muertos*. LeRoy would not have found the expression “peso muerto” in the dictionaries since this acceptation appears for first time in the RAE in 1984, meaning *maximum goods freight expressed in metric ton which includes besides the weight of commercial freight that of food, water etc.*

Blair therefore could not have found this expression in any Royal Decree or document from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. LeRoy was probably guessing that the correct transcription was “pesos gruesos” a new coin which had a value of ten “reales” of silver. This expression appears in the RAE in 1737. That is why he associated it with another denomination of coinage, the *tae*. But this confused Blair even more.

I have found in royal decrees interconnected with *encomiendas* and *repartimientos* the expression *plazas muertas*, which means to occupy a position left by another soldier. This expression was quite usual in old documents. Be that as it may, LeRoy interpreted this expression in monetary terms and he even said that in the Academy’s dictionary, there was an entry for “muertas” as indicating that money comes without having earned it. This entry does not exist in the Academy dictionary.

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55 Volume XVII contains part of the Laws regarding to the commerce. The laws do not follow chronological issue and they are not the originals but a summary of the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*. Blair and

Nevertheless, LeRoy’s interpretation of the sentence inferred some corruption on the part of the Spanish bureaucracy.

“My guess at the expression limpios de coste y costa sobre el principal coste would be ‘charges or deductions’.”—here LeRoy continues with his politically-charged translations of apparently faulty transcriptions. Coste y costa is an adverbial locution which means price and expenditures without any benefit—nullo lucro sine lucro. LeRoy, instead, separates both terms as if they were different concepts. Coste y costa mean the same but together conform to a new meaning. Practically all the doubts presented by Blair related to the Manila Galleon and encomiendas were interpreted and translated by LeRoy according to some similar terms that appeared in La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias. Actually, most of the official documents used by Blair and Robertson belong to the Leyes de Indias. This fact led to LeRoy’s conclusion, as indicated to Blair: “It seems quite plain to me that Philippine revenue and expenditures were closely regulated from Mexico.”

LeRoy could not sort out all the problems and so used generalizations in order to respond some questions posed by Blair. Finally, he asked for Blair to look for the term “tepuzque” or tepusquez (copper). This term appeared in the first royal decree regulating trade on 11 January 1591. Blair and Robertson took this law from the Recopilación making a mistake in the date and assuming that this law was enacted on 11 January 1593. The sentence in Spanish was “he mandado, que de ninguna parte de las dichas Yndias vaya a la China
navio alguno…y que en ellos no puedan llevar mas de doscientos
cinquenta mill pesos de ‘tepusquez’…”57

Blair and Robertson omitted part of the royal decree and translated
this sentence as from New Spain not more than two hundred and fifty
thousand pesos de “tipusque” shall be taken in the vessels…58 The
editors do not make any reference to the word tepuzque which they
transcribed as “tipusque.” This term was Azteca and was a coin of scant
gold mixed with copper which disappeared in 1591. Then it is difficult to
find this term after that year.

After this initial exchange LeRoy did not write anymore to Blair.
She was to be relegated to a secondary role. LeRoy instead commenced a
frantic correspondence with Robertson advising and warning him about
the documents that should be published. This relationship started in
January 1904 when LeRoy wrote a significant letter to Robertson
advising him, the editor of the series, to publish certain documents and
warning him about certain unreliable scholars. This type of exchange
cumulatively turned The Philippine Islands into an isomorphic
compendium to provide historical explanations and excuses for the
present problems of the United States.

This “purpose” behind LeRoy’s involvement is illustrated in his
advice to Robertson about a royal cedula of 1751: “You will find this
mentioned more particularly in an article of mine on the friars in the
Political Science Quarterly for December 1903. My authority for it is

57 Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde 1580 en adelante…, p. 128.
simply *La Democracia*, the Federal Party organ of Manila. Robertson included this royal cedula in volume 48 entitled *Usurpation of Indian lands by friars* and the influence of LeRoy can be found in his reference to the fact that “. . . these abuses which occurred in the middle of the eighteenth century. . . have been repeated in our own time (up to 1897) with an outcome favorable to the friars.” Robertson was dwelling on the problems of 1897 in order to demonstrate that the revolt of 1896 was an insurrection against the power of the friars. This was a key argument of LeRoy’s, intended to bolster his construction of the dark Spanish past.

Among LeRoy’s most crucial pieces of “advice” to Robertson was that he should use the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias* as the Spanish creed. Also highly significant was his sending Robertson a copy of the proceedings of the first Cortes of 1810, stating:

> It would be of interest for your purposes to quote “part of the proceedings” of the first Cortes of 1810 showing three representatives of the Philippines present. The objection to this on the part of a Philippine delegate himself shows the undeveloped state of the Philippine archipelago.

This is an important excerpt since there is a deliberate co-optation of the documents. LeRoy encouraged Robertson to show only part of the proceedings which would display the sense of Spanish backwardness bringing thus into focus the notion of an “undeveloped state” until the end of the Spanish regime. Robertson dutifully included part of the

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61 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson January 27, 1904.  p. 3.
proceedings in a volume, giving it the title “Representatives of Filipinas in the Spanish Cortes.”

Not only did LeRoy advise about documents or books but he also judged the reliability of some authors. As has been noted, he felt an animosity towards Wenceslao Retana for several reasons. Retana had access to very valuable collections and documents and he had been the most important bibliographer and historian on Philippine matters. He was truly an “authority.” Robertson was in fact assisted in Spain by Retana and the first five volumes of The Philippine Islands contain some documents from Retana’s Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino. LeRoy tried to dissuade Robertson from using Retana’s works arguing that

Retana is charged with being a hireling of the friars…and his writings, so far as I have had occasion to use them, are vitiated almost on every page… He is, to my certain knowledge, many times absolutely untrustworthy as some of his works are for consultation. I hold everything obtained from him as suspicious.

What LeRoy was concerned about was that Retana’s views could be dangerous for the construction of an American discourse on the Philippine past. He was right in considering Retana as a hireling of the friars. Retana was a conservative. However, underneath his “frailismo” we can find a deep understanding of the nature of Spanish colonial policy in the Philippines. LeRoy specifically warned Robertson against using La Política de España en Filipinas because “the organ [is] subsidized for the purpose of combating the campaign of Spaniards and Filipinos for a liberal regime in the Philippines. In short, I have very little respect for his

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63 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 4.
LeRoy managed to convince the editors that Retana was unworthy of citation on all political or controversial matters, being “mentally despicable, a cheat, a turncoat, and hireling [of the friars].”

There are only two volumes of *The Philippine Islands* devoted to the nineteenth century. These are based on secondary sources and for the last thirty years of the Spanish rule, the Arthur Clark Company simply relied on LeRoy’s essay which was written to discredit *La Política de España en Filipinas*. For Retana’s anti-reformism campaign in the Philippines precisely shows us the underside of the story—that the reforms were actually implemented.

The alternative to Retana would be Barrows. LeRoy’s advised Robertson to “get in touch with Dr. David P. Barrows who started out as superintendent of schools for Manila, was for a time Chief of the Ethnological Bureau, and is now Superintendent of Public Instruction for the archipelago stationed at Manila. He has studied Philippine history.” Barrow’s imprint can be detected in several volumes of *The Philippine Islands*, but it is volume 46 that particularly reveals Barrow’s collaboration. Robertson devoted the appendix of that volume to education. We face again an interpolation of the past into the present since there is an exaltation of the American system under the title *Education since American occupation*. In reading and analyzing this appendix one can only conclude that it was written by LeRoy instead of Robertson. The reader gets to see clearly that *The Philippine Islands* had

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64 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 4.
66 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January, 1904, p. 5.
become a useful propaganda tool for the Americanization of the archipelago.

There are several signs that point to LeRoy’s intervention in the compilation. The first is praise of the cornerstone of American colonial policy. Passages such as the following are clearly his “voice”: “It is the chief glory of the American connection with the Philippines, that no sooner was their easy conquest an assured fact than attention was directed toward the education of the peoples who came under the control of the western democracy.”

This praise for America is also a denigration of the Spanish system of education whose methods LeRoy and Robertson considered antiquated. This backwardness is blamed for the poor condition of Spain. They must have known, however, that this was a simplistic view. In Robertson’s biography it is mentioned that he was assisted in Spain by Giner de los Ríos, the founder of Instituto Libre de Enseñanza. This Institute was from 1876 on the centre of gravity of a movement to reform Spanish culture and the channel for the introduction of the most advanced pedagogic and scientific theories. Rizal, Del Pilar and other Filipino ilustrados were in touch with the intellectuals in this institution.

The second piece of evidence that this short paper was not written by Robertson is its argument that the best work on education was done by the Jesuits. LeRoy explained this in detail to Robertson in one of his letters:

[The Jesuits] introduced chemical and physical laboratories for the first time to the islands; they conducted the new normal schools

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designed by the reform governments eventually to secularize at least primary education; they founded the Manila Observatory, probably the first of its sort in the Orient…

This account seems a contradiction since there is tacit recognition that Moret’s reforms in education were carried out in the islands—something that LeRoy denies.

The last piece of evidence LeRoy offers is surprising since there is an allusion to El Renacimiento and the attempt to maintain in the Philippines the Latin model. The short paragraph devoted to Leon Maria Guerrero coincides with the letter sent by LeRoy to El Renacimiento in 1907, in which he states that “The party which follows the intellectual leadership of Leon Guerrero (director of El Renacimiento) is quietly resisting what they call Anglo-Saxonization. . .”

LeRoy concluded his letter by explaining to Robertson who the caciques of the Philippines were. In his private correspondence the caciques were always the collaborators—the members of Federal Party—who supported from the very beginning the Americans.

In February LeRoy made an important suggestion that eventually became the cornerstone of The Philippine Islands and the historiography that followed upon it:

Referring again to your query as to the portions of the “Recopilación de Leyes de Indias” worth reproducing in the Philippines series, I suggest that the injunctions from Isabella the Catholic and Philip II as to the conversion of the natives being the primary object of Spain would be worthwhile.

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68 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, January 1904, p. 6.
70 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, February 18, 1904. James A. LeRoy papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5.
That this advice was followed can be gleaned in the multivolume work since the very beginning is that the Philippines was under the domination of the friars. LeRoy specifically suggested to Robertson that he draw upon only those portions of the Laws of the Indies that demonstrate that the Philippines, as with the other Spanish dominions, was more a mission than a colony. This is how Bourne had framed the initial volumes. But LeRoy suggested the use of *La Recopilación de Leyes de Indias* for another reason, which we have already pointed out: this valuable source could be used to present caciquism as something inherent in the archipelago. This argument can be traced in the volumes which treat of native customs in the archipelago.

Perhaps the most important suggestion made by LeRoy was to devote just half a volume or even less to the events of 1896-97, the revolt against Spain. In fact, he would ultimately be the author of the essay which covers these years. He considered that to really develop the history of this movement, one had to go back to about 1863 when the modern era began in the Philippines. It was in connection with this that he made a most paradigmatic statement, which has since become a dictum for most American and even Filipino scholars: “Of course, the various reform programs of liberal revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention; but these, and the 1872 revolt are really to be relegated to a secondary place.”

The Spanish regime was to be always a reference point for the Americans in establishing the significance of their occupation of the

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71 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson. Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5.
islands and in positing their intervention as a necessity in order to educate the Filipinos. This reference point would always therefore be distorted for the sake of the present and the reform period would have to be ignored, as it is in *The Philippine Islands* and in other textbooks. Furthermore, in order to achieve this purpose the work of Retana and other authors would be distorted or omitted.

The pattern of late nineteenth century past that LeRoy wanted Robertson to develop is contained in the following statement:

But in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms, conducted on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the foundation for the later more radical movements in the islands themselves, though it was itself not a separatist propaganda. I think you will find it more worth while to trace the propaganda in the writings of Rizal, Lopez Jaena, Marcelo del Pilar than to devote especial attention to the katipunan, a sort of Filipino excrescence – a minor French revolution on the part of the more ignorant leaders of the lower classes.72

Volume 52 is an actualization of this paragraph since the whole volume was in fact designed by LeRoy. He cast light on these years in *The Philippines 1860-1898 –Some comments and bibliographical notes.* He also presented a document which illustrated the reformist campaign of the ilustrados: *Constitution of the Liga Filipina.* LeRoy and *The Philippine Islands* were thus giving shape to a debate, ongoing up to the present, concerning Rizal versus Bonifacio. Their emphasis was on the notion that the educated class did not really want independence, since the Philippines was not prepared, and that those who wished for independence were the masses dragged along by some caciques. In sum,

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72 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904, p. 2.
The Philippine Islands was to relegate to oblivion the Spanish reforms, highlight the ilustrado movement, and dismiss the Katipunan.

LeRoy’s praise of the members of the Propaganda movement was selective. He was prejudiced against Pedro Paterno and Isabelo de los Reyes, judging their writings in the light of his political animadversion towards them. In his letter to Robertson, he describes De los Reyes as

the merest superficial and facile user of words, a plagiarist, pretender and fakir in politics; one will hardly expect scholarly work from him in writing of other sorts. He has just sense enough not to make such an ass of himself as Paterno, but he is a bad type of superficial Filipino.  

LeRoy was warning Robertson not to admit the works of Paterno and De los Reyes into the compendium. His prejudices extended to other important scholars of his time such as Foreman and Sawyer. Both of them had been critical of the American occupation. John Foreman’s edition of 1899, as we have seen, was the most controversial in affirming that there was a draft of an American promise of independence made to Aguinaldo. This edition was, of course, systematically discredited by American scholars.

The last suggestion of the year 1904 concerned the Informe (Report) of Sinibaldo de Mas. An excerpt from this Informe was included in volume 52, translated and abstracted by LeRoy. Mas was an Orientalist who was based in India for two years and observed closely the British colonial model in operation there. In his report, Mas was encouraging the re-structuring of the Spanish colonial regime in the Philippines along British lines. His projections of the transformation of

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73 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, August 10, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5.
the colonial model were followed by Victor Balaguer. LeRoy excerpted from the voluminous Informe only those parts that emphasized the backwardness of the archipelago (i.e., to illustrate the idea of a Spanish dark age). This is an example of the de-contextualization that often took place in selecting, excerpting, and translating documents for the Blair and Robertson compendium.

The hectic correspondence of 1904 continued during the following years until LeRoy’s early death. We can conclude that by 1904 LeRoy had worked out the shape of the further volumes of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. Even the last document published by the editors, The Friars Memorial of 1898, was included at the request of LeRoy. From 1905 onwards, apart from recommending to Robertson newspapers, reports and books which conformed to the bibliographical index, LeRoy involved himself in political affairs. Robertson could carry on with the completion of The Philippine Islands following LeRoy’s template. The multivolume work was no longer to be considered as something of “small value.” LeRoy’s henceforth positive reviews of the succeeding volumes are reflected in the following comment by Barrows:

I have noticed your reviews in “The Nation” and I think they are exceedingly wise and impartial statements of the value of these books. I think the volumes are of great value and should lead to an awakening of interest in the history of the Islands.74

Barrows was not praising the task of Blair and Robertson. He was referring to the new, hidden, role of LeRoy in the making of the

compendium. This acknowledgement is more pronounced in another letter Barrows sent to LeRoy:

I have been receiving the Blair and Robertson series very regularly. I think I now have fourteen volumes from your hands. I have been enjoying them very much. There are many letters and documents which they got in Seville which I had not seen and which are certainly of value.[3]

The sentence “I think I have fourteen volumes from your hands” is quite explicit. Barrows is not inferring that LeRoy had sent him the volumes, since he was a subscriber from the very beginning. What Barrows meant by this sentence was that LeRoy had become an indirect collaborator making the compendium a serious and rigorous work.

A surreptitious and subtle discourse

A deep analysis of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 could be by itself a thesis since the prefaces from the sixth volume onwards became a tool for anti-Spanish propaganda. We find epithets like “oppression,” “tyrannical,” and “backwardness” in reference to Spanish rule. The preface to volume 51, for example, dismisses the usefulness of Spanish accounts:

In 1828 was published at Calcutta an interesting book entitled Remarks on the Philippine Islands, 1819 to 1822, by an Englishman.[4] It throws much light on conditions in Manila at that time, and is of special value as coming from an enlightened foreigner, rather than a Spaniard.[5]

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[4] This Englishman from whom Blair and Robertson did not know the name was Henry Piddington. See Zaide, Gregorio F. Documentary Sources of Philippine History, two vols. National Book Store, INC, p. xi.
The prefaces demonstrate the evolution of the work towards enabling a full understanding of the problems that the Americans were facing in the Philippines. The thrust of the documents presented by Blair and Robertson was that these troubles were inherited from the Spaniards.

In order to analyze Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work properly I have selected two Spanish documents which illustrate the fragmentation of the work and the omission of important documents that would have made us understand better the first period of Spanish rule. The documents selected by Blair and Robertson show the Spanish administration as oppressive and antiquated. We find in the treatment of them a deliberate case of mistranslation, misinterpretation and de-contextualization.

The two documents I will analyze are Affairs in the Philippine Islands by Domingo de Salazar, Manila, 1583; and Foundation of the Audiencia. Some attention will be paid, moreover, to the Historical Introduction written by Edward Bourne, professor at Yale, and The Philippines 1860-1898. Some comments and bibliographical notes written by LeRoy. The collaboration between Bourne and LeRoy enabled The Philippine Islands to be represented as a rigorous and objective work, since both scholars were prestigious authorities on Spanish colonial administration.

Edward Gaylord Bourne

The fact that Edward Gaylord Bourne inaugurated this work is quite significant. It demonstrates de facto that in 1902, when the project
was conceived, there was no Filipinist in the United States of sufficient stature to write a history of the archipelago. For Gaylord Bourne was not an expert on the Philippines. He was a professor in the department of history at Yale University, and an Americanist—in fact, the first significant American scholar on sixteenth century Latin America. He designed his book *Spain in America* primarily to inform the American reading public of those features of Hispanic colonial history pertinent to the history of the United States. The emphasis of Gaylord Bourne’s work lay in Spanish north America, but he was additionally concerned with the transmission and modification of European institutions. He was well known because of the originality and acumen with which he interpreted sources, the objectivity of his observations, and the critical insights he applied to Spanish colonization prior to 1580. He went a long way towards escaping the Anglo-Protestant biases that plagued the histories of Spanish America, and this makes him seem the first scientific historian on that topic in the United States.

Despite the fact that Gaylord Bourne was a scientific historian initiating a scholarly reaction in the United States against the “black legend” of Spanish cruelty and fanaticism, his “Historical Introduction” does not pursue this topic in detail beyond the sixteenth century. Instead the thrust of Gaylord Bourne’s “Historical Introduction” was to encapsulate the Philippines within a Latin American framework by inferring that the same institutions and the same structure of Spanish rule were implemented in the Philippines.

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The influence of Gaylord Bourne can be readily perceived in the first five volumes of *The Philippine Islands* which at that time was designed to only embrace the period from 1493 to 1803. The first five volumes cover 1493-1583 and reproduce reiteratively documents that are related more to the conquest of Latin America than to the Philippines. Over the period of ninety years that are covered, only nineteen have an actual connection with the Philippines. These years are characterized by a deep organizational and legal emptiness, where some criteria of rule were imposed from far away and have little or no relation to effective control. Spain ruled the archipelago taking into consideration that the events which took place there were the result of political indefiniteness and indetermination about what to do with the islands. Gaylord Bourne did not understand the first years of Spanish rule in the Philippines in this way. Instead he set a precedent by giving shape to a discourse still alive in our textbooks—that the Philippines was an appendage of New Spain (Mexico): “The Philippine Islands in situation and inhabitants belong to the Asiatic world, but for the first three centuries of their recorded history, they were in a sense a dependency of America.”

In this paradigmatic statement, Gaylord Bourne was dogmatizing the history of the Philippines. As has been shown, Zulueta in 1904 wrote to LeRoy stating categorically that the Philippines did not depend—as some scholars were inferring—on Mexico or New Spain. But LeRoy ignored this view coming from a serious Filipino scholar, and so the traditional idea that the Philippines was a mere appendage of New Spain

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was born and remains alive today in Spanish, American and Filipino textbooks as a result of the continued use of _The Philippine Islands_ as a source in the United States and the Philippines (the case of Spain is due to other reasons).

By making an isomorphism between past and present and echoing the prevalent debates concerning the status of America’s new possession, Edward Gaylord Bourne tried to offer a scholarly explanation of the problems which the United States was confronting in the archipelago. He surreptitiously, through the selection and interpretation of the documents, stigmatized Filipino society as inherently despotic, stating outright, for example, that “the authority of the chief of the barangay was despotic.” Bourne based this statement on Morga’s _Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas_. But Morga in his chapter VIII describes the pre-Hispanic society without using the terms “despotic” or “tyrant” at all (p. 371). In fact he did not make any value judgment in describing the pre-Hispanic society. But Gaylord Bourne, as other American scholars later, was keen to portray the existence of an underdeveloped society, conveying thereby to American readers and scholars the idea that the Filipinos were unfit for self-government.

Scholars such as Benjamin Keen have argued that Gaylord Bourne initiated a scholarly reaction in the United States against the black legend of Spain. It is hard to perceive this “reaction” in his historical introduction to the Philippines. What it is noticeable, instead, is Gaylord Bourne’s perpetuation of the image of Spanish medievalism in

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the Philippines, the inveterate idea of “statism,” the decline and decrepitude of the Spanish regime which paved the way for the prevalence of bribery and corruption, and last but not the least, Gaylord Bourne abused some Spanish sources such as *La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*, misused other sources such as Antonio de Morga, and omitted some important Spanish works by asserting that there were hardly any works devoted to the Philippine Islands despite the fact that Yale in 1902 had acquired a very important collection of Spanish books from *La Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas*. This is the reason most of the bibliography used by Gaylord Bourne in this “Historical Introduction” are travelers’ accounts—works that can be quite inaccurate which should be used as sources of information and not as a dictum of the truth.

Gaylord Bourne’s arguments lead me to conclude that, contrary to Keen’s observation, there is in fact a perpetuation of the Spanish black legend in Gaylord Bourne’s treatment of the Philippines. He subscribed to the argument that nineteenth-century Spain had not experienced an evolution towards modernity in contrast to other European countries. Spanish conservatism at home “gave little opportunity for the development of a class of energetic and progressive colonial officials and financial corruption honeycombed the whole colonial civil service.”83

This argument becomes a tautology in subsequent pages. Terms such as corruption and bribery are applied in different contexts to define Spanish or Filipino behaviors. Gaylord Bourne was in fact shaping the discourse

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83 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 47.
that all the problems the Americans were confronting in the Philippines were inherited from the Spanish period.

Gaylord Bourne based his assumption of Spanish “decrepitude” on two important arguments that would have far-reaching effects. On the one hand, there is the argument that “from the beginning, the Spanish establishment in the Philippines was a mission and not in the proper sense of the term a colony.” Gaylord Bourne substantiates this idea of an “evangelizing mission” by inferring that the religious orders dominated the archipelago until the total collapse of the empire. He was shaping the notion of a static medievalism characterizing the whole Spanish period.

The other argument, up to a certain extent fostered by the notion of medievalism, is that the same structures of rule were maintained from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. By not recognizing that Spanish colonialism was also evolving, and that a re-structuring of the administration and civil service occurred in the nineteenth century, Gaylord Bourne was supporting the idea of a fixed, centralized, and corrupt civil service under Spanish rule. He probably based this argument on the Schurman report.

Gaylord Bourne makes some mistakes with the terminology. From the eighteenth century up to 1893, the towns were headed by a "gobernadorcillo." The implementation of Maura’s law changed this term to “capitán.” Gaylord Bourne does not distinguish these terms and states,

“the gobernadorcillo was commonly called “capitán.” The statement should be, on the contrary, “the capitán continued to be called “gobernadorcillo.” This mistake may look insignificant but it demonstrates that Gaylord Bourne was an expert on the sixteenth century and had quite a few things to learn about the nineteenth. Moreover it illustrates the persistent belief in the “immobilism” of Spanish rule, leading Gaylord Bourne to ignore or suppress the implementation of major changes like the Maura law. Gaylord Bourne could have done some research at Yale library since at that time the library already had, for instance, La Política de España en Filipinas and Filipinas: estudio de algunos asuntos de actualidad, not to mention Maura’s reform law published by Paterno and Artigas. Reading Spanish was not a problem for Gaylord Bourne. The problem was a refusal to treat the Spanish period with sympathy and objectivity.

I consider the conclusion of Gaylord Bourne’s “Historical Introduction” as the culmination of the historical anamorphosis which became the dictum of the truth and would dictate the pattern of Blair and Robertson’s opus. Gaylord Bourne categorically asserted that the Filipinos had been living in the middle ages and now were facing a new world with the Americans’ arrival. Having been maintained in a state of backwardness by Spain, they certainly could not be independent now.

In sum, Gaylord Bourne probably demystified the black legend of Spanish rule in Latin America but he laid the foundations for the stereotypic images of Spanish rule to be implanted in American writings.

85 Gaylord Bourne, E. ‘Historical Introduction,’ p. 57.
Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work supported these clichés with the choice and translation of the documents they published. We should not forget that they devoted 43 volumes in all to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

**Affairs in the Philippine Islands.**

In 1897, Retana published in his documentary compilation *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino* a manuscript titled *Relación de las cosas de las Filipinas hecha por Domingo de Salazar*. This document had not been published previously. Blair and Robertson were familiar with Retana’s compilation. After meeting Retana personally in Spain, Robertson became interested in this particular document since it pictured Salazar as the Las Casas of the Philippines—a religious who fought against the Spanish oppression of the natives. This document would lend support to the black legend of the Spanish conquest. The editors introduced the document as follows:

> The coming (in 1581) of the zealous and intrepid bishop, Domingo de Salazar, was a red-letter day for the natives of the islands. The Spanish conquerors are ruthlessly oppressing the Indians, caring but little for the opposition made by the friars; but Salazar exerts as far as possible his ecclesiastical authority, and besides urges the king to shield those unfortunate victims of Spanish rapacity.87

86 Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, a Spanish colonist, a priest founder of a Utopian Community was a scholar and historian. Las Casas was the first one in denouncing the *encomienda system* and he asked the abolition of the system paving the way for the promulgation of *Las Leyes Nuevas* which advocated for a good treatment of the indigenous. Las Casas has been considered as the first defender of human rights. He has been called the Father of anti-imperialism and anti-racism. The role of Las Casas has been magnified by modern scholarship. Las Casas as Vitoria were part of the new theories that emerged in the sixteenth century, related to Salamanca School. These theories were interwoven with the idea of governing an inferior race which needed the paternalism of a superior civilization. Cano, Glòria. *La Formación de una Colonia: Filipinas 1569-1614.*

This statement in the preface denotes the despotism of Spanish rule from the beginning. The editors, however, do not explain how this Memorial emerged and the important implications it would have for the future of the colony. Blair and Robertson were not wrong when they assumed that oppression and rapacity were rampant in 1581. Gonzalo Ronquillo had implanted a despotic government that allowed the enslavement of the natives. His policy of exploitation had provoked a serious economic dislocation and social discontentment. This was the situation Fray Domingo de Salazar encountered when he arrived in Manila. He wrote the Memorial in this context.

As Blair and Robertson state in the preface, this memorial talks about the abuses committed against the natives, the injustice in the collection of the tribute, tribute collected in pacified and heathen villages, the economic situation and the reasons for these conditions, and so forth. Fray Salazar made important allusions, with comments, to some chapters of Ordinances such as *Ordenanzas sobre Descubrimiento, Nuevas Poblaciones y Pacificaciones* (Ordinances about the discovery, new populations and pacification) signed in Bosque de Segovia on 13 July 1573. On page 19 of the Memorial, Salazar stated to the king that ordinances sent to the Philippines were not observed, and he started to cite the transgressed chapters of the ordinances: “Chapter 36 of the Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia says ‘And these shall be populated by *Indios and naturales* to whom the gospel can be preached; this is our

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primary aim in undertaking the new discoveries.” On the contrary, says Salazar, “the governors do little for the conversion of the Indians, but much for their own profit.”

The chapters cited by Salazar coincide *de facto* with the Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia. We should note, however, that these Ordinances were signed in 1573, whereas Salazar’s Memorial was penned in 1583. Spanish and American scholars echo the importance of this Memorial by considering Salazar as the main defender of the Indios. Curiously, what Blair and Robertson omitted is that when Salazar wrote his Memorial, the Ordinances of Bosque de Segovia *had not been enacted in the Philippines*. In fact, the Ordinances were enacted only in 1599; the year before, the king had threatened to punish all those who would transgress them. The Philippines, until this date, were ruled according to the *Leyes Nuevas* (the New Laws for the Indians).

Obviously, the question arises that if the Ordinances had not reached the Philippines, how could Salazar have mentioned them? Salazar had been in Mexico for a long time before moving to the Philippines and there had become familiar with these Ordinances. This question leads to another: why did the Spaniards implement these laws twenty-six years later. It is difficult to answer this question, but it seems that the non-promulgation of these laws was related to an ineffective settlement at the beginning. It was only much later, as problems in the

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metropolis and the formation of imperial policy were sorted out, that an
effective settlement could finally be established in the archipelago.

The promulgation in 1599 of these Ordinances is interconnected as
well with another important issue. Far from the traditional idea, stated by
Robertson and LeRoy, that the Spaniards had decimated or to all extents
and purposes destroyed the indigenous communities (the co-optation of
this Memorial, in fact, directs the reader to this conclusion) the Spaniards
actually co-existed with the old communities until 1589. There was no
total disruption. These ordinances of Nuevas Poblaciones were enacted
precisely to confer a new form to the traditional communities. The laws
were to reorganize the old communities into provinces, towns and
districts and soften the terms of conquest, now to be called “discovery,”
or submission, which would now become “pacification.”

To epitomize this point, Salazar, as has been noted, was compared
by Blair and Robertson to Las Casas and was even called Las Casas de
Filipinas. But Fray Salazar actually never challenged the encomienda
institution the way that Las Casas did in America; he never objected to
the imposition of the taxes that were implicit in the system. True, Salazar
was championing certain rights of the natives, but he drew a clear line
between natives who were Christians and those who were heathens and
therefore devoid of rights.91

91 A clear evidence Salazar never challenged the encomienda system is his arguments: No man could
demand tribute unless he had a right to do it; there must exist a true and legitimate right from which
this right depends; there are only two legitimate titles: political and temporal government and
supernatural and divine government; the tribute refers not only to the payments of a temporal man, but
also to the duty that the Christians have with the patria…This last statement demonstrates that Salazar
accepted the encomienda system and the taxation system inherent in the encomiendas. Thus, his
arguments about the rights of the indigenous were related to a definition of the indigenous between
Christians and heathen; subjected versus non subjected peoples. See Hanke, Lewis and Agustin,
The omission by Blair and Robertson of the real circumstances surrounding the promulgation of these ordinances was caused by their misuse of *La Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*. Salazar’s Memorial led them to conclude that the Laws of the Indies were never obeyed, that therefore these were a dead letter. Robertson needed to believe that the Spaniards had destroyed native institutions and customs. He could not regard the *Leyes de Indias* as evidence of a fair Spanish policy in the Philippines.

**The case of the Audiencia**

More important than Salazar’s memorial was the publication in volumes 5 and 6 of the Ordinances of the foundation of the Audiencia (High Court of Justice) of Manila in 1583.92 It has been taken for granted that this institution remained in force, with only minor modifications, until the collapse of the Spanish empire. The co-optation of the Ordinances from 1583 has concealed the fact that these Ordinances were replaced, not “renewed,”93 in 1595 with the reestablishment of the Audiencia.

Blair and Robertson introduce this topic as follows in the preface to volume 5: “In 1583 occurred two most notable events: one of these was the appointment for the Islands of a royal audiencia, or high court of justice, especially ordered by the king to watch over and shield the

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92 Blair and Robertson. 'Founding of Manila Audiencia.' *The Philippine Islands*, vols. 5 and 6.
93 Blair and Robertson mistranslated the term *renovar* by *renew* instead of “replace.” This mistranslation justified the assumption that the same ordinances were used again in 1595.
Blair and Robertson had collected the ordinances from the *Archivo de Indias* in Seville. The preamble of the establishment of the Audiencia supposedly states: “We have accorded the establishment, in the city of Manila of the island of Luzon, of one of our royal audiencias and chancillerias, in which there shall be a president, three *oidores* (auditors), a fiscal and the necessary officials.”

Bourne states in his *Historical Introduction* that the 1583 audiencia was composed of four *oidores* when in fact there were three. This mistake demonstrates the poor and unsynchronized research made by the editors. Blair and Robertson based their argument on the laws found in Seville; Bourne extracted his conclusions from *La Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*. The Audiencia from 1595 actually had four *oidores*.

The fact is, the 1583 Audiencia in Manila never existed. There were no specific ordinances to establish such an Audiencia in the Philippines at this time. The archipelago was still in its developmental phase. Philip II had not enacted any instruction to governors since the king and the *Consejo de Indias* were still studying carefully how the Philippines should be ruled. Therefore, the so-called ordinances of the Audiencia of 1583 were in fact taken from the Ordinances of 1563 *enacted for the Audiencias of Quito, Charcas and Panama* and called *generales* (general) for their generalized application. The same ordinances were dispatched in 1565 to Chile and Lima to establish audiencias there; in 1568 to Guatemala and Santa Fe; in 1572 to Nueva

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95 Blair and Robertson. ‘Foundation of the Audiencia of Manila,’ vol. 5, p. 274.
96 *Oidor* means attorney minister who in the Audiencias listened and sentenced cases and trials. Blair and Robertson translated it as “auditor.” The translation is incorrect since an auditor was an accountant. The best translation could be “judge,” with nuances.
Galicia and finally in 1583 to Manila to establish the Audiencia there.\textsuperscript{97}

The generalized nature of the ordinances ensured their non-implementation in the Philippines. The individual sections were so indefinite and ultimately deemed inapplicable to the realities found in the islands.

We know that the document on the establishment of the Audiencia was obtained by Robertson in Seville. Robertson was assisted in the archives by Pedro Torres y Lanzas. At that time, Torres y Lanzas was the archivist of \textit{Archivo de Indias}. He knew perfectly well that apart from these ordinances of 1583, there were new ordinances enacted in 1595 since he quoted them in \textit{Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla precedido de una Historia General de Filipinas} by Pablo Pastells.\textsuperscript{98} Robertson does not seem to have done anything to find these ordinances of 1595. He took for granted that the 313 sections of the establishment of the Audiencia of 1583 were used again for its reestablishment in 1595. This idea emerges upon reading the instruction to Pedro Tello. Section 53 of this Instruction (Blair and Robertson omitted the number of each section) is entitled “Real Audiencia.” The king ordered the establishment of the Audiencia and gave Pedro Tello new sections. Blair and Robertson overlooked this point. They assumed that Pedro Tello came with the same ordinances. However, they fell into a contradiction in the preface of the volume by presenting a document purportedly without historical value entitled \textit{Royal}

\textsuperscript{97} Muro, Romero Fernando. ‘Las Ordenanzas de 1596 para la Audiencia de Filipinas.’ \textit{Anuario de Estudios Americanos} XXX, Sevilla, 1973, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{98} Torres y Lanzas, Pedro. \textit{Catálogo de los documentos a las Islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla}. Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 1925. Vol. IV, doc. 4896, p. 49.
Audiencia established: “On November 26 following the king issues a decree re-establishing the Audiencia of Manila, and appointing as its president the new governor of the islands, Francisco Tello, sending him “detailed instructions. . .”

It seems according to this statement that Pedro Tello had “detailed instructions” for the reestablishment of the Audiencia, and apparently, Blair and Robertson knew this. But it was better to neglect this new Audiencia in order to confer an aura of “medievalism” upon the Spanish administration. Besides, Blair and Robertson could justify this neglect since the books or accounts they had used, from the seventeenth century onwards did not help to demystify their argument about the reuse of the same sections. On the contrary it seems that the books supported their argument. They are laconic and mention the Audiencia briefly. There is an allusion to the establishment in 1583 and its reestablishment in 1595. It is precisely this vagueness in the explanation which has led to the view that the same sections were reutilized since there is no mention of a new judicial corpus. For instance, Martínez de Zúñiga states

The Royal Audience was established for first time in the city of Manila in 1584 at the request of Fray Domingo de Salazar…it was abolished in 1591 by Alonso Sanchez’s informe and Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas…Salazar travelled to Spain in order to achieve the reestablishment of the Audiencia which was re-established in 1598

99 ‘Audiencia y sus ordenanzas’ (Audiencia and its ordinances) was issued in May 25th 1595. See Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año 1580 en adelante.
100 Blair and Robertson. ‘The Audiencia of Manila Established.’ The Philippine Islands, Vol. 9, p. 15.
101 Morga, Antonio. Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas; Martínez de Zúñiga, Joaquín. Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas; Mas, Sinibaldo de. Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842; Montero y Vidal, José. Historia General de Filipinas. Desde el descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta nuestros días etc.
This excerpt is full of mistakes since the audiencia was not abolished by Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas. The abolishment was the result of a tacit agreement between the ecclesiastic and secular powers. It was abolished in 1589 and re-established in 1595. The reestablishment is precisely related to the consolidation of secular power.

Sinibaldo de Mas quotes almost verbatim the same assumption, although he was more explicit, adding that the abolishment of the audiencia was connected to a problem of competition and mutual interferences between the audiencia and the governor.103 Montero y Vidal assumes the same.104 Therefore, these authors do not contradict the genealogy introduced by Blair and Robertson.

We can better understand the subtle process of mistranslation by examining in detail the Instruction to Governor Pedro Tello. On 27 May 1596 King Philip II dispatched the Instruction to Tello. The translation by Blair and Robertson of Section 53 of this instruction entitled Real Audiencia is as follows:

53- And inasmuch as I have exercised especial care in maintaining all the kingdoms and provinces subject to me in peace, tranquillity, and justice, for this same purpose and object I established an audiencia in that city and province, in order that everything might be governed by means of it, and justice administered with the universal equality, mildness and satisfaction that are desirable. After its establishment I ordered it to be suppressed, as experience proved it to be unnecessary in a land so new and unsettled. In its place I sent a governor and although his administration was excellent, yet inasmuch as that community has grown and, it is hoped, will continue to grow I have thought it advisable to found and establish the said audiencia again. Accordingly, after having appointed you in the place of Gomez Perez, your predecessor, I have determined to establish the said Audiencia again. It shall be

103 Mas y Sanz, Sinibaldo de. Informe sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas en 1842 Madrid [sn]: 1843, pp. 51-56.
104 Montero y Vidal, José. Historia General de Filipinas, desde el descubrimiento de dichas islas hasta nuestros días. Madrid: Imprenta y Fundición de Manuel Tello, 1887, p. 88 and p. 133.
located in these districts, in order that their government may be
similar to that of the other kingdoms under my dominion. I have
appointed for it persons as oidores, a fiscal and other officials. I
have renewed the former ordinances by which the said Audiencia
was founded.105

The key statement in this section is the sentence I have renewed
the former ordinances. At this point, Blair and Robertson added a
reference: “see the document here referred to, at the end of volume 5 and
completed in vol. 6.”106 The gist of this sentence, and probably the
catalyst for assuming the same ordinances were used again, is found in
the verb “renew” and the adjective “former.” The sentence in Spanish is
“Y para ello he proveído las personas de oydores, fiscal, y otros
oficiales, y renovado las ordenanzas pasadas.” The etymology of the
word “renovar” comes from the Latin renovare. There were exactly six
entries of the term in the RAE of 1737.107 By taking into consideration
that this sentence was written at the end of the sixteenth century, the
appropriate meaning is “novar” or “subrogar,” to replace, to appear in a
new form or to improve. And since the document links renovar with the
adjective [ordenanzas] pasadas (former), the implication is that the
former ordinances were replaced or improved, and not simply
reactivated.

The sentence in Spanish is clear and should be rendered as “I have
replaced or improved the previous ordinances.” Blair and Robertson

105. Instrucciones a Gobernadores’, Section 53, p. 221. Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas….; Blair
and Robertson. ‘Royal Instruction to Tello.’ The Philippine Islands, vol. 9 pp. 257-258. I have used
Blair and Robertson’s translation. I do not subscribe to this translation and it is part of the argument of
this section. This is the reason I have changed the term auditor and I have used the Spanish original
“Oidor.” I have highlighted the sentence which has provoked the mythogenesis of the use of the same
ordinances.
106. Blair and Robertson. ‘Royal Instruction to Tello,’ vol. 9, footnote, p. 257
107. Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana, en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces…., p. 574.
decided nevertheless to translate *renovar* as “to resume.” This reflects either a lack of skill or a deliberate political purpose—probably a combination of both. It is possible that Blair and Robertson or LeRoy did not consult the *RAE* on this since LeRoy considered this dictionary “faulty.” We can be sure that the three of them never consulted the first edition of the *RAE*. Whatever the precise reasons, the choice of “to resume” was more useful for their—or should I say LeRoy’s—strategic goal. As we have seen, Blair and Robertson regularly consulted LeRoy concerning their doubts.

The combination of mistranslation and misinterpretation that I have demonstrated above continues to pass unnoticed. The “Foundation of the Audiencia” and the “Instruction to Tello” are official royal decrees and therefore deemed important for the writing of Philippine history. Scholars have unfortunately taken for granted that these documents published by Blair and Robertson are reliable.

The Audiencia of 1595 was re-established with twenty-two new sections. This is the reason Philip II said, “I have replaced or improved the previous ordinances.” The Audiencia such as implemented in 1583 could not develop properly in the Philippines for several reasons. First of all, as I have mentioned, the sections of the audiencia of 1583 come from the Ordinances of 1563 of Quito, Charcas and Panama. These places had

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109 The most important example is Charles Cunningham who published in 1919, *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies. As Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila*. Godian Press, 1971. Cunningham has been the only one to explain the institution of the Audiencia. He was assisted by Robertson and he was influenced by the multivolume and the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*. Cunningham furnishes the argument the 313 sections were used again. This book has become a reference for scholars and has not been questioned. Cunningham was in Seville and knew perfectly the archives and the documents. He was working for Edward Ayer.
longer political and economical experiences as colonies than the Philippines. Not surprisingly, the articles did not fit realities in the archipelago. The Philippines had an intrinsic peculiarity. It was still a relatively new colony in a developmental process. This political indefiniteness is reflected in the royal decrees, ordinances and so forth.

During the decade of the 1580s the system was still too confused to establish in Manila an institution such as the Audiencia. The population concentration into villages had not taken place yet; the taxation of tributes had not been fixed; and above all the sections of the 1583 ordinances did not fit the specific functions of the officers. Most of these hindrances started to be solved between the abolishment of the audiencia and its reestablishment. From 1589 to 1595 the Philippines had become politically, economically and socially defined. This topic is extremely complex and should have been explained by Blair and Robertson but instead they furnished grounds for further speculations regarding the audiencia.

A paradigmatic case is the only work devoted to the audiencia of the Philippines, Charles Cunnigham’s *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies: as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila*. This book emphasizes what Blair and Robertson ignored although allowed us to glimpse through their sentence, “Although the audiencia was subsequently abolished for a few years, it was re-established in 1598 and the same articles were used again.”[110] There are two errors fostered here by Blair and Robertson. The first is a simple mistake—the date of the

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reestablishment as 1598 instead of 1595. The second, lamentably prevalent until the present, is the affirmation that “the same articles were used again.” Using volumes 5 and 6 of Blair and Robertson’s compendium, Cunningham naturally concluded that Philip II did not send new articles for the audiencia. The myth had been thoroughly shaped by 1919, when Cunningham published his book.

Blair and Robertson suppressed the Audiencia of 1595 since its recognition would have meant the acceptance of the view that by 1595 the archipelago had been consolidated as an effective colony more than a missionary enterprise. This would have clashed with what Gaylord Bourne had suggested in his Historical Introduction.

The ordinances of the Audiencia of 1595 were enacted in Toledo on 25 May 1595. The ordinances of 1583 had been replaced. Sánchez Bella asserts that the 1595 ordinances were general in character and could be applied elsewhere. So although designed with the Philippines in mind, the 1595 ordinances were transported, with modifications, to the reestablished audiencias in Chile in 1609 and Buenos Aires in 1661. Therefore, not only was an improved audiencia sent to the Philippines in 1595, with twenty-two new sections, but it also seems that this audiencia was so effective that it became the cornerstone for the foundation of others. Contrary to Blair and Robertson’s assumption, which fostered the idea of anachronism and medievalism, the Audiencia of Manila was the most modern of the empire.

By comparing the ordinances from 1595 with those from 1583 one can immediately see the differences. Those published by Blair and Robertson had 313 sections. In 1595 there were 335 sections. These twenty-two new sections were designed to address the specific problems of the Philippines. The first significant difference can be found in the preamble which introduces a new magistrate, thus creating four oidores. More interesting, however, is the following section devoted to Jurisdiction of the President and Magistrates in Civil and Criminal Cases. Seven new ordinances (3-10) were included in this section, all of them defining the roles and duties of the President, the Church and Magistracy. This was intended to eradicate the problem of the secular and religious authorities interfering with each other, a common problem in the past. The ordinances of 1583 had been too ambiguous on this matter. In contrast, section 9 of the 1595 Audiencia goes straight to the point: "...my Royal Jurisdiction shall not meddle in the ecclesiastical." Subtly, the king was preventing the church from interfering in civil power (and vice versa, of course). He was setting limits to the old preeminence of the friars.

The most substantial development over 1583 can be seen in Affairs of Government. These new ordinances demonstrate a tacit will to consolidate the Philippines and to implant an effective civil control over the archipelago. With this purpose in mind, the sections relating to Ecclesiastical cases were reduced to only one. The stress was now to be on effective civil government.

113 Copia Literal de las Reales Zedulas despachadas desde el año 1588 en adelante, p. 272.
Although 22 Philippines-specific sections were introduced in 1595, the rest of the ordinances, which had general application, were little changed from the 1583 version. By comparing these unmodified sections, however, we can get some idea of how Blair and Robertson translated the Spanish to suit their purpose. The most flagrant case is section 71 from 1583, equivalent to section 80 from 1595, belonging to the chapter *Indians and matters relating to them*. What Blair and Robertson translated as “that the said Indians shall be better treated,”¹¹¹ is in the Spanish original “*que los dichos Indios sean muy bien tratados*”—“that the said Indians shall be very well treated.” The meanings of these two sentences are not exactly the same. Blair and Robertson, by using the word “better” imply that the natives have been mistreated before. The sentence in Spanish, on the other hand, implies a heightened paternalism on the part of the Spaniards. Blair and Robertson’s perspective is supported by their translation of another sentence: “Item: Our said president and auditors shall always take care to be informed of the crimes and abuses.” The term “crime” exaggerates actual conditions since the Spanish word in the document is *excesos*, which should be translated as “abuses.” And what Blair and Robertson translate as “abuses” is, in the original, *malos tratamientos*, better translated as “mistreatment.” These do not seem to be innocent mistakes of translation.

The subtle biases in Blair and Robertson’s translation practices tend to pass unnoticed because they are set in the context of other documents that support similar meanings. Here we can see the logic of

their publication of friar accounts such as Bishop Salazar’s memorial, which dwelt on the abuses committed by the encomenderos, governors, alcaldes mayores and so forth. The mistreatment of the natives as even worse than slaves, is the central theme in such accounts. We can see how Blair and Robertson’s mistranslations were meant to augment the friar documents, altogether presenting a stark image of bad Spanish colonizers.

A pattern begins to surface as we examine Blair and Robertson’s choice of documents to include in their compendium, and even their choice of English words in the process of translation to convey the meanings they preferred. A past as origin of the present was being constructed. The message was that the despotism of the Spaniards would end with the arrival of the “saviors” who would redeem or liberate the Filipinos from tyrannical Spain through their policy of “benevolent assimilation.” Not to be forgotten is the fact that the publication of the Audiencia and related documents coincided with the new involvement of LeRoy in the Blair and Robertson documentary project. It was LeRoy who insisted to Robertson about the need to document the “Spanish evil.”

Finally, let us examine how “cacique” figures in the Audiencia documents and how Blair and Robertson handled this issue. Section 74 from the 1583 Audiencia (equivalent to section 83 from 1595) states: Ytten que ninguna Justicia ordinaria del distrito de la dicha Audiencia se entremeta a privar los caciques de sus cacicasgos. (“Itten that no ordinary Magistrate of the district of the said Audiencia shall meddle in
depriving the caciques of their dominion.”) Blair and Robertson translate this section as “Let not the judge of first instance in the district or our said Audiencia meddle with depriving the caciques of their caciquedoms. At this point, they cite the word cacique and in a footnote explain its etymology: “A word originating in Hayti, signifying ‘princes’ or ‘chiefs,’ quite naturally extended by a Spanish clerk or secretary to the chiefs of Filipino tribes.”

This maneuver is related to LeRoy’s intervention and his advice “to bear the evil to the present.” There is no evidence whatsoever of any Spanish clerk or secretary extrapolating the term cacique to the Philippines. Also surprising is the translation of cacicazgo as “caciquedoms” when it could be translated as territories, granjerías, haciendas, dominions and so forth. The term “caciquedoms” was more effective for the new discourse being shaped about the Filipino elite. Cacicazgo comes from the sixteenth century meaning “dignity of the cacique or noble among the Indians and also it is taken for territory or dominion which he has.” But Blair and Robertson decided to translate cacicazgo as “caciquedoms” in order to assimilate it to the term “caciquism” that had recently been coined by American officials in the Philippines. They were attempting to make these different terms synonymous so that “caciquism” could be regarded as an inheritance from the Spanish era.

315 Copia Literal de las Reales Cedulas...p. 291.
317 Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces..., 1729, p. 38.
In order to establish the cacique’s existence in the past Robertson, as we have seen, misrepresented the Audiencia and the *Leyes de las Indias*. The specific section on caciques in the Audiencia was one of the “general applications” for the whole empire that eventually became incorporated into the Laws of the Indies [Lib. 6, Tit. 7, L.4]. This is the only reason the term cacique appears. This was taken without modification from 1563 when these ordinances were first redacted. At that time, the Philippines had not even been conquered yet. Therefore the subject of caciques and cacicazgos was inapplicable to the Philippines.

Robertson seemed anxious to demonstrate that since the sixteenth century the Filipinos were virtually held in serfdom in encomiendas, the equivalent of landed estates. Curiously, this was regarded in Robertson’s time as the greatest obstacle to the implantation of self-governing institutions in the municipalities of America’s new possessions. In all likelihood the above translation was furnished by LeRoy.

The Audiencia and the mythology surrounding it are an example of the kind of knowledge generated by *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. In spite of being considered the single most voluminous collection of primary sources dealing with the Spanish period in the Philippines, it is a collection, basically, of secondary sources problematically translated.

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LeRoy on the Philippines, 1860-1898

The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 culminates with an essay written by LeRoy on the second half of the nineteenth century. Volume 6, which announced that the multivolume series was to cover up to the nineteenth century, informed readers that “For the history of the nineteenth century we will present various important decrees, reports and other official documents; and provide a clear, careful and impartial synopsis of some of the best historical matter.” As a matter of fact, Blair and Robertson did not publish important decrees, reports or official documents pertaining to the nineteenth century. The history of that period was to be explained through LeRoy’s long piece, “The Philippines 1860-1898: Some comments and bibliographical notes.”

LeRoy by that time was considered an authoritative scholar and bibliographer; in fact he had risen to become the leading American authority on Philippine affairs. His essay in the compendium’s final volume was to cover “all the important literature of the Philippines down to 1906.” It is practically the same bibliography as found in The Americans in the Philippines. As a matter of fact, this essay is a summary of his magnum opus. LeRoy selected part of the literature in order to stress the anachronism of the Spanish system (which all documentary series was all about) and sought in the essay to “bear some evils to the

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119 It is impossible to summarize in this section the bibliography presented by LeRoy. I am going to mention those books that Zulueta recommended to LeRoy. Le Roy used some of Zulueta’s recommendations and comments while those he discredited precisely became the alternative to his history of the Philippines and to the American bibliography.

120 Blair and Robertson, The Philippine Islands, Vol. 6, p. 8.

121 Gleeck, Lewis E. Jr. Nine years to make a difference, p. 67.
present.” He discredited important works that provided alternative perspectives, such as La Política de España en Filipinas, Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino, Foreman’s The Philippine Islands and others. From 1903 to early 1904 LeRoy had received from Clemente Zulueta a lot of information about Spanish books written at the turn of the nineteenth century. This provided him with an arsenal of bibliographical information, which he would use in this essay. Zulueta could not complain since he died in 1904.

LeRoy developed this essay carefully since he considered it essential “to have the events of 1896-1898, and to a great extent from 1860 to 1898, pretty well treated, for an American audience.”\footnote{James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico August 24, 1904. This letter can be found in James A. LeRoy papers and James A. Robertson papers. Special correspondence, Box 5.} He explained to Robertson that the great mistake of Americans was not to inform themselves as to what was going on in the Philippines. His strategy to solve this problem was deceptively modest:

My elaborate (comparatively so, at least) discussion of the closing years of Spanish rule is one dictated by the ignorance of the American public. For the period of Spanish rule, I have no right to tax my readers with more than general conclusions; if they choose to pursue it, I present them with bibliographical data.\footnote{James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, August 24, 1904. Special Correspondence, Box 5.}

LeRoy’s approach in The Americans in the Philippines was also pursued in this essay. He provides general conclusions for the reader and a select bibliography to back up the broad picture for those who wanted to read more.

LeRoy starts the essay with a conclusive affirmation: “The ‘modern era’ in the Philippine Islands—which indeed, in certain respects did not really begin until after the establishment of American rule—
coincides with the last half of the nineteenth century. Here he begins to apply his most effective strategy for writing the history of the last years of the Spanish colonial administration. The modernization of the country only took place when the Americans arrived. Yes, there was some kind of modernization during the “old regime” but this was undermined by a certain impulse to perpetuate the medieval conditions that had characterized the old order. This follows the outlines of what he had said to Robertson—“of course the various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention.” He would devote some attention to Spanish reformism. As a matter of fact, he assumes that there was very considerable progress during Spanish rule from 1860 onwards. But the reforms were only partial, often impractical, or in any case ill-adapted to Philippine conditions:

Abuses of administration continued under so-called liberal periods as well as in times of full clerical domination. . .The course of progress was so irregular and uncertain as to lend justification to the feeling of the Filipinos that they were being treated with insincerity.

LeRoy does not miss any opportunity to infer the existence of an intrinsic corruption during Spanish rule, which ensured that the reforms were a dead-letter or only a promise. By stressing the abuses of the Spanish administration he was explaining how the Filipinos had developed within this evil system, and how the resulting culture of abuse and corruption has become a hindrance to the implantation of American

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125 James A. LeRoy to James A. Robertson, Durango, Mexico, May 13, 1904. James A. Robertson papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5.
institutions. LeRoy in this essay presents a dichotomy between bad Spanish and good American.

As for LeRoy’s argument about irregular progress in the archipelago, he bases this on Filipino literature, specifically the newspaper *La Solidaridad* according to which the reforms implemented by liberal governments became paralyzed whenever the conservatives won the elections. LeRoy reiterates in this essay arguments that he had already put forward in his book and articles. Their singular conclusion is that the Philippines had been ruled by an ecclesiastical, medieval, and “halting” Spain—in practically every way the opposite of what the United States was.

The importance of this essay lies as much in LeRoy’s notes and comments about other sources of information about the Philippines. He warns the readers of errors by authors he dislikes, and gives special praise to American reports and books written by certain foreigners. He offers a guide to which bibliography to use (and which to reject) in order to write a “true and objective history.”

LeRoy, for example, highlights Feodor Jagor’s book as the dictum of the truth. Jagor was a German living in the Philippines in 1860 who published *Travels in the Philippines* in 1873. This book was indispensable, says LeRoy, since Jagor encouraged reforms in the Philippines and provided an illuminating account of the paternalism of Spanish rule.\(^{127}\) While the experience of Jagor is important, the fact is

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\(^{127}\) He sees Jagor as a prophet since he translated this book from Spanish and LeRoy interpreted some excerpts as showing that Jagor foresaw the clash of the Spanish regime. He devotes long paragraph to Jagor’s book in *The Americans in the Philippines.*
that from the time of his stay in the Philippines up to 1898 the country went through a modernization of its institutions.

LeRoy also recommends to his readers the 1842 *Informe sobre las Islas Filipinas* by Sinibaldo de Mas. He came across this *Informe* through Zulueta who in 1904 informed him that “Mr. Mas is the only Spanish who has judged with acceptable criterion the Philippine question.” What Zulueta probably meant was that Mas had made clear to the Spanish government that the parameters of the colonial system in the Philippines had better be reviewed and reformed or Spain would lose the archipelago. However, LeRoy de-contextualized Mas’s *Informe* by regarding the author’s conclusions as prophetic of the future of the Philippines. Mas’s advice was in fact heeded by the Spanish government, which tried to implant new colonial parameters but did not have time to see the reforms through.

LeRoy recommends Montero y Vidal’s work for a general understanding of Spanish Philippines history. In 1902 Zulueta had explained to him that “Montero y Vidal cannot be considered as a history. This is the work of a compiler and nothing else. However, Montero y Vidal’s work is, as a chronological account, the best. From this standpoint it is an excellent work.” LeRoy uses practically the same words to define Montero y Vidal’s *Historia General de Filipinas*:

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128 The same volume 52 of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* starts with *Internal Political Conditions of the Philippines 1842*. This is an abstract written and translated by LeRoy of *Informe sobre el estado de Filipinas en 1842* [3 vols] written by Sinibaldo de Mas.


“And though it is the best Philippine historical work for reference purposes, it is, after all, hardly more than a chronology of important events and compilation of official orders and projects.”

LeRoy does not provide any reference acknowledging his debt to Zulueta. He takes Zulueta’s knowledge as his own. In any case, LeRoy wanted to recommend this general history because it followed the conservative view. Montero y Vidal refused all liberal reforms in the Philippines. Instead he extolled the role of the friars.

LeRoy provides a very selective bibliography for the 1896-1897 revolt. He had asked Zulueta to furnish him official documents from 1896 to 1899. Since Zulueta did not find Spanish publications containing official documents he offered the following suggestion: “The Memoria of General Blanco is full of errors. The only works I recommend to you are ‘La Política de España en Filipinas’ and ‘Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino.’ These works contain the telegraphic dispatches, reports, etc., everything rigorously official.”

Zulueta never knew that LeRoy would use the information he provided to write an essay like this, and to include it in a series—*The Philippine Islands*—which Zulueta, it will be recalled, considered useless and full of errors. He thought that LeRoy wanted this information to write a book about the Philippine revolution sympathetic to the Filipinos, which is why he offered him to send LeRoy all the books he needed.

LeRoy affirms that the Spanish press such as *La Política de España en Filipinas* and *El Heraldo de Madrid* furnished original

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sources of information about the revolt. He again used the same words and information that Zulueta provided him.

Zulueta, as well, commented on Sastrón’s *Insurrección en Filipinas* as follows: “You can save yourself the trouble to read it. He has arranged and organized some news from the Manila newspapers.” LeRoy in his selective list of books about the insurrection includes Sastrón and adds, “Composed of accounts and documents drawn mainly from the press of Manila.”

LeRoy’s essay has become a reference for scholars wanting to know about the last four decades of Spanish rule. Owing partly to this work LeRoy was and continues to be recognized for his bibliographical knowledge. In contrast, the Filipino and indio Clemente J. Zulueta, who provided him with much of this knowledge, is almost totally unknown or is only mentioned as a Federalista. I am sure that Zulueta sent him other books together with his comments; I have only pointed out those I have direct evidence about.

LeRoy was a magician in de-contextualization. After presenting a long list of sources provided by Zulueta he focuses his attention on the 1897 Pact of Biak-na-bato. He emphasizes Primo de Rivera’s *Memoria* but only extracts a few notes from it, then provides a full synopsis, with quotations, of the history of the pact of Biac-na-bato. His main aim in this exercise is to discredit Pedro Paterno:

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That Paterno at least knew this, that if Aguinaldo did not he was
ticked by Paterno and others, that $200,000 disappeared
somewhere between Primo de Rivera, Paterno and a few other
possible beneficiaries; with this account and the documents in our
War Department, the history of affairs is pretty clear—necessary
reforms.136

LeRoy reinforces his argument by repeating the claim of former
Governor Primo de Rivera, whose declaration before the U.S. Senate was
translated by the War Department, that he never promised reforms for the
Philippines. Moreover, Rivera said that he had given money to Paterno,
which subsequently vanished. LeRoy supports this account since it
discredits both Paterno and Aguinaldo. As has been explained, Primo de
Rivera was replaced by Governor Augustin who in fact instituted the
stated reforms. But LeRoy conveniently omits this part of the story. He
dends his account abruptly with the claim of “necessary reforms.” The
reader can only conclude that Spanish reforms never reached the
Philippines.

LeRoy notably only comments about books which Zulueta had
expertly commented on to him previously. Moreover, he relegates to
footnotes other important books. Understandably some of these
marginalized books were those deemed not useful for, or even hostile to,
his construction of Philippine history. But the second reason for their
relegation to the footnotes is that Zulueta, who died in 1904, could no
longer provide him with comments thereafter.

LeRoy’s essay, needless to say, discredits authors who criticized
American occupation or who became serious opponents of the American

papers. Special Correspondence, Box 5.
construction of the Spanish colonial past. He managed, for example, to silence John Foreman who passed from being an authority for the Americans to an unreliable author. The problem emerged when Foreman re-issued his *The Philippine Islands* in 1899. Some information Foreman furnished displeased the Americans. LeRoy discredited Foreman in his correspondence with Robertson in 1904. He tried, as he had done before with Retana, to dissuade the editors to use or to recommend Foreman’s book. When LeRoy wrote this essay, Foreman had just reissued his book covering the American occupation until 1906. Foreman strongly criticized the American system, above all the claim to democratize the Philippines:

> The democratic doctrine suddenly launched upon the masses is changing their [Filipino] character. The polite and submissive native is developing into an ill-bred, up-to-date wrangling politician. Hence rule by coercion instead of sentiment is forced upon America, for up to the present she has made no progress in winning the hearts of the people.\footnote{Foreman, John. *The Philippine Islands. A political, geographical, ethnographical, social and commercial history of the Philippine Archipelago.* Singapore: Kelly and Walsh, Ltd, 1906, p. 9.}

Foreman attacked the American government by accusing them of fostering bossism and, above all, of implementing a coercive system which forced Filipinos to accept the American occupation at least tacitly. It seems that these words displeased LeRoy, who judged Foreman’s book to be inaccurate. However, Foreman used as sources the American reports themselves. Hence, he was as reliable as LeRoy since both explained the American occupation through official sources.

As for Retana, this author could be a serious danger since his works reflected the new Spanish colonial restructuring that LeRoy
wanted to erase from the record. LeRoy, as in his other works, refers to the “few reform decrees remaining thus dead letters in the Philippines.” He illustrates the Maura law but, as he did in The Americans in the Philippines, he suppresses the large bibliography dedicated to highlighting this law, reducing this bibliography to a single work: the Report of the Schurman Commission!

LeRoy also warns the reader against Paterno’s book, Régimen Municipal de las Islas Filipinas: “This work is at least not merely ridiculous, as are this author’s writings on an imaginary primitive religion and civilization.” At the time LeRoy wrote his essay, Paterno was running for a seat in Laguna province. Perhaps LeRoy wanted to subvert Paterno’s political career by undermining his intellectual reputation.

LeRoy’s objective in constructing the essay was to present to the readers of the Blair and Robertson documentary series a clear and well-ordered review of Spanish rule in the Philippines “with keen but impartial comments.” LeRoy was anything but impartial, of course. As we have seen, his essay promoted American imperialism in the Philippines by establishing an opposition between the American present and a past Spanish regime that was cleverly stereotyped and turned into an unassailable truth. LeRoy’s comments and bibliography provided a timely reference point for the construction of a new Philippine history under American rule. We can see the outlines of this history in the following passage from the essay:

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Of course, the various reform programs of liberal and revolutionary governments in Spain must have some attention; but these and the 1872 revolt are really to be relegated to a secondary place. But in the eighties and nineties the propaganda for reforms conducted on the part of the Filipinos, especially in Spain, laid the foundation for the later more radical movements in the islands themselves, though it was itself not a separatist propaganda. The katipunan was a sort of Filipino excrescence on the part of more ignorant leaders of the lower classes.

Epilogue

The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 was an economic failure. The Arthur H. Clark Company lost a lot of money with this enterprise. As Arthur Clark explained to Ayer, “I am sorry to tell you confidentially that my venture in the publication of The Philippine Islands 1493-1898 has been a serious financial loss to me, in fact I have lost $20,000,000 upon it.” Despite this loss the company was not forced to close as Domingo Abella states in the preface to the reprint of the multivolume work. The Arthur H. Clark Company continued to publish Americana books. The American public, however, did not see the Philippines as part of “Americana” and even libraries refused to buy this multivolume work.

Judged on its own merits, the work had serious defects that alienated potential readers and buyers. It was fragmented and inaccurate, with 43 volumes devoted to the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries which are explained through friars’ accounts or secondary sources; and only seven devoted to the eighteenth century—also inaccurate and with lots of present interpolations—and finally just two volumes devoted to


\[^{342}\text{Abella Domingo. ‘Preface to the reprint of the first reissue.’ The Philippine Islands 1493-1898. ‘The Arthur Clark Company was forced to close shortly thereafter for economic reasons.’ p. viii.}\]
the nineteenth century, which were tendentious, partial and sectarian. For these and other reasons, the series could not sell on its own.

The U.S. government and the academe ultimately intervened to alter the work’s fate. An important campaign was mounted to introduce the multivolume work in all the universities. American scholars began to cite *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898* in all the bibliographies as the most valuable collection of primary sources. The future Filipinist would come to depend on this multivolume and, with the Americanization (and stress on English) of the educational system in the Philippines, Filipinos themselves would need this multivolume to in order to know about their history, no matter that this history was partial, distorted, and profoundly anti-Spanish. A work that was considered at the beginning to be of little value as far as Zulueta, LeRoy, Barrows and Pardo de Tavera were concerned, has become the “best and most comprehensive source of historical materials on the Philippines during the Spanish term,” according to John Leddy Phelan.

Because of nearly a century now of using the Blair and Robertson compendium, stereotyped images of the Spanish regime are difficult to de-construct. It is difficult even to try retranslate the documents by going back to the transcripts used by Blair and Robertson, which are lodged in the Newberry Library, because even the originals are untrustworthy. In any case, there seems to be no end in sight to the continued use of *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. It was re-issued in 1962 and again in

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143 Robertson James Alexander, 1873-1939. Transcripts of Selected Documents pertaining to the History of the Philippines between 1493-1843. There are 24 volumes of transcriptions, 23 of them are devoted to the sixteenth and seventeenth century and only one to the eighteenth century. Most of these documents were mentioned in the volume 53 and some of them published erroneously. The transcriptions are inaccurate. These transcripts are in Newberry Library, Chicago.
1973. Filipino archivist Domingo Abella’s preface to the 1962 reprint is a eulogy to James A. Robertson and Emma H. Blair. Abella insisted on the cultural value of *The Philippine Islands* and stressed that “It is the only collection of historical sources in English available to our scholars and students who are unable to read the originals in Spanish.” This view of “Blair & Robertson” is contrary to the assessments made by earlier Filipino scholars like Zulueta, Pardo de Tavera, Albert and others, who had actually lived through Spanish times. Abella’s perception reveals the triumph of Americanization in the Philippines. But he was merely stating what most scholars, even today, believe.

In 1973, Alfredo and Benjamin Ramos and Jorge M. Juco approved a project to again re-issue *The Philippine Islands 1493-1898*. Together with Abella’s these reprints made available to new generations of American and Filipino students “primary sources translated into English.” The preface to the 1973 reprint even reiterates the justifications given by Blair and Robertson for the selection and publication of the documents:

> The Americans were to govern a people whom they had very little knowledge of. They wanted to train the Filipinos in the art of self-government, but the problem was how and where to start. The information regarding the culture and capacity of their wards were contradictory. The Spaniards reported that the Filipinos possessed a limited ability.

The language in the prefaces to the 1962 and 1973 reprints reflect the triumph of the policies of Taft era and the influence of LeRoy works.


uplifting, presumably because the Spanish regime had done nothing for
them. The last sentence about the limited ability of the Filipinos reflects
the accounts of the friars and other conservative works, which Blair,
Robertson, and LeRoy favored.

While these reprints of Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work
have become a standard reference work in English for Americans and
Filipinos, Spanish scholars do not use it. Partly it is because they have
access to the true primary sources in their archives, but partly it is also
because they consider this work as part and parcel of the American
imperial enterprise. There are some projects to demystify the relevance of
*The Philippine Islands* by publishing the original documents and
comparing the original Spanish with Blair and Robertson’s translations.
But the work of undoing what Blair, Robertson, LeRoy and others have
built up, and of providing alternative constructions, has really only just
begun.
CHAPTER IX: THE CLOSE OF AN ERA

The power of the cacique or landed boss to retain his tenants attached to the soil in a condition somewhat resembling peonage is lessening year by year, as the small man grows more self-confident and independent.

Francis Burton Harrison

The Taft era marked a milestone in the construction of American colonial discourse. Three coordinates of Philippine history were generated from 1902 to 1914. The first one was the representation of Spanish colonial administration as essentially medieval, following upon the idea that “The conquest of the Philippines was essentially a missionary conquest.”

A second coordinate was the notion that the colonial government was patterned on that of Spanish America. And the third coordinate was that “Caciquism or bossism government by local aristocrats was the prime feature of village life in the islands during the entire period of Spanish rule and existed long before their arrival.”

These arguments were provided by James A. Robertson for the Encyclopedia Britannica in 1920. They emerged with the publication of Blair and Robertson’s The Philippine Islands and the article written by James A. LeRoy in 1905, “Our Spanish Inheritance in the Philippines.”

Therefore, although 1913 marked the end of the Taft era, the colonial

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1 I have selected this excerpt since this is the underside of the history explained in this chapter. One wonders if the continuance of the Filipinization policy would have eradicated landlordism. The official history, precisely, presents us a reversal of this story – that the Filipinization fostered caciquism or landlordism.


3 Robertson, James A. The Encyclopedia Britannica, p. 398.
discourse generated by this era was in fact to be intensified in order to block the advance of independence for the Filipinos.

1914 was a fruitful year for the publication of books warning about the dangers of the Filipinization of the archipelago. LeRoy had elaborated a system called “caciquism” in 1905, Worcester was to perfect it in 1914 with the publication of *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands* and above all the influential book, *The Philippines: Past and Present*. The cacique system was further stigmatized as a system of land holding, rural-based feudal barons with great power over the land and its people.

**Worcester’s crusade to paralyze the process of independence**

Taft and LeRoy, as we have seen, built up a picture of an evil called caciquism. They were ambiguous about it. LeRoy on the one hand subsumed into the category of caciques the federalists, the landowners, the rich and educated, the military leaders, and so on. Taft, on the other hand, considered caciques as the wealthy and propertied men. Taft, wisely, to support his argument looked back to the “Filipino insurrection” to define caciquism. He put the blame on rebel officials who destroyed the will of the poor taos in order to make them commit the most atrocious crimes. This argument surfaced in most of the textbooks which appeared in 1914. Taft could no longer rely on LeRoy who had died in 1909. The alternative was Dean C. Worcester, who built up the caciquism phenomenon even further, adding new features that assimilated

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caciquism to slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage. Between 1908 and 1914 Worcester became involved in a bitter contest with the Philippine Assembly and the nationalist press. On the grounds of protecting individuals from virtual slavery, he mounted a campaign to secure the enactment of legislation which would explicitly penalize slavery, involuntary servitude and peonage anywhere in the Philippines.

In 1909, the American-led Commission approved the bill proposed by Worcester. The Filipino-dominated National Assembly, however, disapproved it. Its leader, Manuel Quezon, a veteran of the Philippine-American war, felt that the passage of this law would be an insult to the Filipino people, implying a tacit agreement that slavery existed in the Philippines.

Despite his failure to get the bill of 1909 passed, Worcester did not give up and even less did Washington back down when Taft observed that they could not stop the process of independence. In 1910, 1911 and 1912 similar bills were passed by the Commission and rejected by the Assembly. Worcester penned strong statements regarding the situation in order that the issue might be forcibly brought to the attention of the American people. According to Hayden, in his introduction to the 1930 edition of Worcester’s *The Philippines: Past and Present*, for three years the strong statements provided by Worcester were eliminated from his reports before publication. The publication of the reports with Worcester’s statements would imply the tacit recognition that the

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Americans were unable to eradicate the so-called slavery, and instead were conniving with it.

Let us examine the context in which the anti-slavery bill was finally passed. Several important events took place in 1912, which made it a crucial year for American and Philippine politics. The Democratic Party platform of 1912 reaffirmed the position of the party “against a policy of imperialism and exploitation in the Philippines” and favored “an immediate declaration of the nation’s purpose to recognize the independence of the Islands as soon as a stable government can be established.”

In addition to this declaration of intentions by the Democrats, on 20 March 1912, William A. Jones, a Congressman from Virginia and Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, introduced in the House of Representatives a bill that sought to “establish a qualified independence for the Philippines, and to fix the date when such qualified independence shall become absolute and complete.” Congressman Jones, after whom the Jones bill was named, promised independence at a fixed date, July 4, 1921.

Taft obviously disliked this bill. He had been re-nominated by the Republicans for the Presidency of the United States. But Roosevelt bolted the party to lead the Progressives, thus guaranteeing the election of Woodrow Wilson. The Jones Bill would be welcomed in the Philippines and all the political parties would unanimously adhere to the

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Jones Bill. The *Partido Progresista* (a faction of the old *Partido Federal*) and the *Partido Nacionalista* unconditionally accepted the provisions of Jones bill. Both parties sent to the United States some Commissioners for the “recognition of their independence.”

Woodrow Wilson’s victory in the 1912 elections brought an end to Taft’s predominance in politics. He was fiercely criticized by the government he had set up in the Philippines. His argument about the Jones bill, which he termed a “suicidal and highly defective” measure, was seriously questioned. Taft and some of his officials such as Forbes and Worcester continued to argue that to confer independence upon the Filipinos meant to hand power over to an oligarchical minority. Taft informed the U.S. Congress that

A present declaration even of future independence would retard progress by the dissension and disorder it would arouse. I not only assert, but I shall undertake to prove by incontrovertible facts, that the government which the United States has imposed upon the Filipinos and under the dominance of which they are now forced to live, is an oligarchy of the most intolerable, despotic and unrestricted character.

Jones accused Taft’s government of implementing in the Islands an irresponsible and odious autocracy by misinforming the United States of the real state of the Philippines. Jones criticized this autocracy for having systematically denied self-government to the Filipinos, paralyzing the Filipinization of the civil service, hiding the graft committed by some American officials who continued to receive their high salaries, and above all the misappropriation by some officials of the public revenues of

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the Insular Treasury. Given the attacks on the Taft government by individuals like Congressman Jones and considering that the Democrats would govern the country for four years at least, we should not be surprised by the publication in 1914 of Worcester’s *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*. This book would become a powerful weapon for a Republican counter-offensive to discredit the Filipino nationalists.

It is important to add that the above speech of Jones severely questioned the conduct of Dean Worcester. Worcester allegedly had endeavored “to bring to bear repressive measures in the United States upon the press favorable to Philippine independence similar to those exerted by him upon Manila newspapers.”\(^{12}\) Worcester was accused of preparing a campaign of antagonism towards, and vilification of, the Filipinos, the Democrats and the anti-imperialists.

In this context of mounting unpopularity, Worcester wrote his last report in which he recommended that a final effort be made to secure the concurrence of the Philippine Assembly in the passage of the legislation prohibiting slavery and peonage. *La Vanguardia* responded to Worcester with an editorial entitled, “There is no such Slavery.”\(^{13}\) *La Vanguardia* asked a rhetorical question, “Does slavery exist at present in the Christian

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\(^{12}\) ‘Petition of Frank B. Sanborn, Frederic Starr and others to the President, the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress’ in Jones, William A. *Misgovernment in the Philippines…* p. 28.

\(^{13}\) ‘There is no such Slavery.’ *La Vanguardia*, Tuesday, October 29, 1912. The whole editorial was published by Worcester in his *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*, pp. 35-38. *La Vanguardia* became the successor of *El Renacimiento* even more radical than the former. In fact in 1912 during the anniversary of the American occupation of Manila called forth an editorial containing the following passage:

“There are not a few who have considered that date the anniversary of tyranny and bad faith which entered the waters of Manila in disguise under the fascinating ensign of liberty and redemption…”

provinces of the Archipelago? The answer to this must be in the negative.”

La Vanguardia suggested the following reasons why the Commission wanted so badly to pass this law and to prohibit so-called slavery:

A law prohibiting the slavery in the Philippines presupposes the existence of this social condition, which could constitute an argument against our aspirations to a free life. The fact is that a people who devote themselves to certain primitive practices do not deserve the benefit of self-government.14

La Vanguardia felt that the attempt to pass this anti-slavery law was also a subtle maneuver to paralyze the process of increasing self-government. The newspaper asked why “the government only noticed the existence of an abnormal phenomenon at this late hour after twelve years of governing.”

Worcester was not willing to give up and this time he did not wait for a reply and instead sent to the printers his report, Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands, with the connivance, of course, of Governor William Cameron Forbes. While Forbes was in the United States on leave,15 he criticized the attitude of the Filipinos on the slavery question and organized a campaign to convince the Americans of the necessity to retain the Philippines. Forbes, Taft and Worcester were paving the way for a counterattack on the Jones bill. An effective tactic they used was to provide cases of flagrant oligarchism linked to a system of slavery and involuntary servitude.

14 “There is no such Slavery.” La Vanguardia, October 29, 1912.
In July 1913, Forbes and Worcester exchanged correspondence about the matter of slavery in the Philippines. Worcester explained to Forbes that he had obtained more witnesses from Isabela, Misamis and Romblon. Moreover, he could rely on the testimony of the Constabulary. Forbes, this time, gave his acquiescence to go ahead with the report:

Dean C. Worcester has completed recently an exhaustive examination regarding the slavery situation in the Islands which will be printed and copies mailed to Washington, D.C. He finds human beings are bought and sold. There are slave traders in Pampanga and he has secured names, dates, prices and all details of numerous instances including a number of slaves held in Manila...there is nothing in the law to enable us to punish traders or purchasers unless illegal detention can be proved...

The published report was sent to Washington and to individuals in the United States. On 25 August 1913, a long Associated Press dispatch went out from Washington giving the substance of Worcester’s statement and on that very day newspapers in all parts of the United States informed the country that slavery and peonage existed in the Philippines.

This report was a serious blow to any expectation of independence for the Filipinos. The passage of the law prohibiting slavery and peonage took place during the transition from Taft’s presidency to Wilson’s. For Taft and the Republicans, passage of this law meant they could advocate indefinitely for American tutelage in the Philippines. Worcester’s crusade proved successful and the Filipino nationalists were completely discredited before American public opinion, which unanimously

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16 Forbes will echo this fact in his book *The Philippine Islands* published in 1928 in two volumes and reprinted in 1945. “The Honorable Dean C. Worcester, Secretary of the Interior of the Philippine government, was stirred to activity in this matter and he prepared, printed, and sent out a pamphlet which he described as “arranging in logical sequence a small part of the written and signed testimony of Filipinos and Americans, declaring that slavery and peonage exist in the Philippines.” Forbes W. Cameron. *The Philippine Islands*. Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1945, p. 239.

17 Cablegram sent the Government of the Philippine Islands Executive Bureau. Sewar, Washington. Confidential, July 14, 1913. A copy was sent Dean C. Worcester the following day.
condemned the human trafficking in the Philippines, and even before the world.

*Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands* was written with a specific purpose in mind: political propaganda. Published in April 1913, it clearly was meant to check any attempt on the part of the Democrats to concede independence to the Filipinos. It also served as a platform for Worcester to respond fiercely to his critics such as *La Vanguardia* and its article, “There is no such slavery,” and Manuel Quezon and his report, “The Filipinos as legislators.” His discussion of slavery and peonage was really a vehicle with which to mount propaganda against the Filipinization process and eventual independence.

Quezon, for example, wrote: “Governor-General Forbes draws the conclusion that the premature withdrawal of the United States would result in the establishment of an oligarchy composed of small and favored ruling classes who would oppress the masses.”18 This was not true, he insisted. Worcester responded to Quezon’s argument by calling it “puerile.” He accused Filipino politicians like Quezon of being thoroughly insensitive towards problems like slavery: “The Filipino politicians have persistently sought to conceal the truth and befog the issue. There is not now, nor has there ever been, among Filipinos of the ‘ruling class’ anything approaching a general sentiment opposed to slavery and peonage.”19

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19 Worcester, Dean C. *The suppression of involuntary servitude in the Philippines*. Dean C. Worcester papers.
Statements like Worcester’s above brought to the attention of the American public a condition of endemic tyranny among Filipinos who are able to buy and sell their fellow creatures for cash. Worcester remarks upon the term “ruling class,” defining it as an oligarchy, the government of a few which connived and tolerated slavery and peonage. As LeRoy had done in 1905, Worcester de-contextualized and misinterpreted the Spanish term *clase directora*, which educated Filipinos considered as a necessary enlightened body of individuals whom the masses could look up to in the complex process of obtaining self-government. A political discourse which used terminology in vogue at the turn of the nineteenth century was misused by Worcester to demonstrate instead the essential corruption of the Filipino elite. Furthermore, he could not resist the temptation to identify this class as another type of Filipino caciques whose influence makes it impossible for democratic institutions to take root:

The willingness of the caciques to hold the common people in debt, servitude, and peonage, and the lack of power on the part of their victims successfully to resist them, render impossible the establishment of truly representative institutions in the Philippine Islands at this time.\(^{20}\)

Worcester condemned slavery in the Philippines but he clearly confined his discussion of this phenomenon to the non-Christian tribes. It was the issue of peonage that sparked more controversy because this system was deep-rooted among Filipinos Christians, was common and widespread in numerous provinces and prevalent in nearly every municipality in the Philippines.

Worcester defines peonage as “the condition of a debtor held by his creditor in a form of qualified servitude to work out a debt.”

By delimiting the prevalence of peonage to municipalities, Worcester aimed to render “peonage,” “caciquism” and “usury” practically synonymous. Also, this was a splendid opportunity to condemn de facto the system of local native government as LeRoy did in 1905.

According to Worcester,

The rich and powerful man, commonly known in this country as a “cacique,” encourages the poor man to borrow money from him under such conditions that the debt can never be repaid, and holds the debtor, and frequently the members of his family as well, in debt servitude for life.

Not only is Worcester here associating peonage with caciquism but he also infers that peonage, because of its identification with caciquism, is something inherited from immemorial times. We again come across the suggestion that the Spanish regime is the referent for explaining present problems. For this purpose, Worcester uses two coordinates: the first is his assertion that the Spanish connived with this system of peonage; and the second (and most important) is his co-optation and de-contextualization of the Spanish term “peonaje” itself.

Worcester states clearly that during Spanish rule slavery was not recognized as a legal institution, “but there was no determined effort to eradicate it, and the course to be pursued in any given case was in practice left largely to the discretion of the government officer concerned.”

Therefore, despite the different royal decrees which

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22 Worcester, Dean C. Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands, p. 52.
23 Worcester, Dean C. The Suppression of the Slavery in the Philippines, p. 1. Worcester was familiar with Spanish historiography on the Philippines and he de-contextualized the facts. As it has been
prohibited slavery and peonage, according to Worcester these decrees were a dead letter. Slavery and peonage therefore persisted and the Americans, alas, inherited these evils.

The term “peonage” has become standardized in the Anglo-Saxon world, above all in the United States where the system was widespread in the Southern plantations from 1901 to 1945. “Peonage” however is not an English word. Worcester co-opted a Spanish term and gave it a pejorative connotation. As in the case of caciquism, the term peonage was never used in the Philippines by the Spaniards and the system was not imposed by them.

Worcester created a perfect definition of “peonage” as a system of involuntary servitude based on the indebtedness of the laborer—peon—to his creditor. Since this system was prevalent in Spanish America, especially in Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador and Peru, Anglo-Saxon scholarship has established a parallelism among the different systems known as encomienda, repartimiento and mita, therefore tracing their origins to as far back as the Spanish conquest. These systems implemented by the Spanish conquerors were systems of forced labor. In the Philippines it was called servicios personales or polos but this was not related to the system of peonage or debt bondage at all. Peonage is inextricably linked to the emergence of the plantation system in the nineteenth century. Thus, peonage was widespread in Latin America after Spain lost her colonies there in 1821. Peonage in Mexico, for instance, is related to the Hacienda system.

explained the slavery was forbidden as early as 1571, but the Spaniards enacted a condition under which the slavery was permitted and even compulsory—in case of “justa Guerra.”
The dictionary of La Real Academia Espanola (RAE) defines encomienda, repartimiento, mita or polo as the forced labor that the Indios had to render to the Spaniards, with nuances relating to different areas. Curiously, we cannot find any analogy made with the term “peonaje” (this is the spelling in Spanish). The term “peon” in Spanish has different meanings—the most spread is laborer—with not one being pejorative. However, there is an old meaning of the word: infantry soldier. From this old sense of peon derives the term “peonaje” which means “a group of infantry soldiers.” There is no connotation whatsoever of debt bondage in the Spanish word.

We will recall how LeRoy made political capital out of the term cacique and its associated system, caciquism, by inferring that they were institutions inherited from the Spanish era, and their continued existence was frustrating American attempts to instill social and political progress in the Philippines. Worcester practiced the same maneuver using the term peonage instead of bondage. He inferred that peonage and slavery were inherent in the pre-Hispanic Filipino community—for this he cites Plasencia and Morga.

Worcester’s definition of peonage inaugurated a new ramification of the term cacique which has prevailed up to now. Cacique became a money-lender, a usurer, a rich and powerful hacendero or big landowner. Worcester conferred an omnipotent power to the caciques and started to describe them as despicable beings who used coercion, threats and their prestige to keep their serfs under subjection. Worcester further

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24 In varieties of English used in Southeast Asia a “peon” is usually an office boy, an attendant or an orderly. Historically it also means a policeman or foot soldier—such as in Spanish.
stigmatized the term cacique by relating it to hacenderos. Moreover, he inferred that caciquism would never be eradicated because it was linked to other corrupt activities such as gambling.\(^{25}\)

Worcester’s report did not leave impassive to the Filipinos who reacted immediately. The Philippine Assembly was forced under threat to vote the passage of anti-slavery bill. Arthur Earnshaw\(^{26}\) explained in great detail to Worcester that “[Manuel Quezon] made no reference to the fact that the law had been forced from them under threat.”\(^{27}\) Quezon, indeed, never mentioned that he voted for the passage of this law under threat. Worcester had obtained, thanks to his friend Bourns, the personal and police history of important Filipinos, above all those who were to be members of the Philippine Assembly. This is what the record stated about Quezon:

Court of First Instance, Tayabas
1899 - Charged with shooting prisoners while Major, insurrecto army.
Recommended to be Provincial Fiscal of Mindoro by Pardo de Tavera
Judge Paul W. Leneberger recommends that Quezon be requested to resign
December 7, 1904 - Charges of attempted rape, abduction and various act of abuse sustained on administrative investigation. Aggravated cases of authority.\(^{28}\)

We do not know if these charges were true or not, or what Worcester actually did with the information, but no doubt they could have been the perfect spur to force Quezon to support the passage the

\(^{25}\) The worst vice of the poor was gambling. In order to get money they asked from the caciques and by not repaying the debt, they became serfs. Worcester, Dean C. *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*, p. 63.

\(^{26}\) I have been unable to find information of Arthur Earnshaw. I know he was close to Quezon and his name only appears in Worcester’s book *The Philippine: Past and Present*.

\(^{27}\) Arthur Earnshaw to Dean C. Worcester, Manila, 16 November, 1913. Dean C. Worcester papers. Box 1, Personal Correspondence.

\(^{28}\) ‘Personal and police history of deputies to the First Filipino Assembly,’ October 19, 1907. Dean C. Worcester Papers. Volume 11, Folder 11.18.
Anti-Slavery Law. The fact is, Quezon convinced his fellow Filipinos by reversing the argument and showing how Filipinos were mature and civilized by passing a law categorically forbidding slavery. Earnshaw put it well to Worcester:

The sub-stratum of his argument towards its close was not what the people of the United States would think about the Filipinos but “What about the other nations”? What would they think of a country that did not have such a law in their books? And therefore the law should be passed so as to let the world at large see that they were a civilized people, thus evidently paving the way for independence.

Obviously Quezon and most of his fellow Assemblymen were worried lest this issue be used as a powerful argument against independence or increase of autonomy. The Filipino people were being represented as “still far removed from that stage of civilization.” These Filipinos, of course, knew better. Despite Worcester’s arguments about the existence of slavery in the Philippines and his insistence that there had been no laws prohibiting it, the Philippine Assembly members—mostly educated during the Spanish era—knew that Worcester was wrong. They knew about the different royal decrees enacted by the Spaniards explicitly prohibiting slavery as early as 1571, allowing it only in cases of “just war.” But Worcester, in the tradition of LeRoy, Blair and Robertson, could readily mobilize the black legend of Spanish rule and argue that these decrees never really took effect. The Republicans, with Worcester as their main authoritative voice, were determined to demonstrate that slavery was endemic in Filipino societies.

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The Filipino press took up the issues raised by *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*. The newspapers *La Vanguardia, El Ideal, La Democracia, El Mercantil* and *La Consolidación Nacional* all disputed Worcester’s arguments about the existence of slavery in the Philippines. They deemed the report to be part of a strategy to discredit Filipinos in the eyes of the world, and they were right. Worcester and Forbes were implementing a well-devised campaign to demonstrate the volatility and incapacity of Filipino politicians and they were successful. As one of them put it, “If it can be proved that the Filipino is essentially volatile in his nature and cannot hold by necessary things without having somebody on hand to insist upon it, it will be a serious argument against the extension of further political powers to the Filipinos.”

The campaign to demonstrate the “volatility” of the Filipino seems to have affected Quezon, who was vilified by some American officials and had to bear the stigma of someone whose adherence to the independence cause was unstable. McIntyre wrote that “Quezon had to speak passionately for independence in public to maintain his reputation as a nationalist in the Philippines, but in private he was ready to conform to the views of Taft, Wilson and Roosevelt.” This statement has become a dictum of the truth. One must be careful, however, of McIntyre’s assertions since he was involved in the false resignation of Worcester.

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30 This excerpt corresponds to a letter addressed to General Edwards in November 11, 1911. The letter is not signed and I am not sure if it was written by Forbes or Worcester. This letter was confidential and I found it fragmented. The specific mission of this letter was to discredit the Nationalist Party dismissing the arguments of the party such as antagonism of race, the ephemeral Filipino republic, public order and likes. Dean Conan Worcester papers, volume 11.

I found a fragment of a letter among the James A. Robertson papers. The letter belongs to someone from the Partido Progresista. I suspect it was written by José Albert and translated into English. The members of this party believed that an independent government would subject the docile Filipino to a despotic authority. Therefore, if Albert wrote this statement, he was following the position of the Republican Party. But the most important thing about this letter is its assumption that all the Filipino leaders demanded independence when they spoke before the masses but in private they argued that Filipinos were not prepared for the establishment and preservation of a Republic. The letter states:

I believe it is for the best interest of the Filipinos that the present relation with the United States be continued until the work, now in progress, of educating the masses has practically been done. These are, in substance, my political creeds and I am not “only” voicing the sentiments of the Progresistas but also those of all sober-thinking Filipino leaders, though many of them, for political expediency, seem to profess and even agitate for IMMEDIATE INDEPENDENCE.

Be that as it may, whoever wrote this statement made clear that the desire for independence alone was not enough to maintain and preserve a democratic form of government since Filipino traditions, habits and customs—in which debt of servitude was included—were oligarchic. This statement paves the way for the notion of a dual loyalty or a symbiotic relationship between Filipino politicians and their American patrons, in what has been called “compadre colonialism.” However, it seems to me that this letter was deliberately misinterpreted in order to

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32 I assume that this fragmented letter or this statement was written by José Albert, since he was called Dr. Albert, and in a passage of the letter he explained during Aguinaldo’s Republic someone told him “My dear doctor.” Moreover it was written in Spanish and translated in English and there are deliberate omissions.

33 The author of this letter writes in capital letters this sentence. He emphasizes along the letter in capital letter the term “independence.”
furnish a political strategy to prove that Filipinos were volatile and therefore their independence must be deferred.

All the newspapers echoed features of Worcester’s report and all of them concluded that this report had political ends. They believed firmly that Worcester had concentrated, in his work, upon discrediting the Filipinos, by concealing from the American public the Filipinos’ actual state of fitness to govern themselves. He constantly made reference to the ignorant natives until he had made his American readers believe that the Filipinos indeed were a mass of half-naked head-hunters.34

The Filipino campaigners and their newspapers were right. A report without sufficient foundation became a salutary lesson to subvert any attempt to gain independence. An example is the Cablenews-American which stated in 1913: “Worcester slavery reply astounds country, embarrasses independentists, congressional investigation possible. . .ridicules independence. Wilson visitors today object ultimate not immediate independence.”35

It is believed that this heated debate led Worcester to resign his position. Most historians of this period conclude that Worcester’s crusade against slavery led to the end of his political career, being forced by Washington to resign. The reality is quite far from this. A confidential letter sent by Forbes to Washington suggests otherwise:

Dean C. Worcester tenders resignation, to take effect March first. Believes can accomplish more for Filipino people out of the service than in it under coming administration. Will remain here to complete book called quote The Philippines, Past and Present End of quotation which will answer Blount’s book and remarkable

34 This excerpt could be extrapolated to other newspapers. This concretely belongs to La Vanguardia, October 2, 1913.
series of films and slides showing past and present conditions. Then return to the United States for lecture season, speaking as often as possible...His book and lectures in the United States will be of greatest possible value in coming campaign.

The real objective of Worcester’s resignation was to return to the United States in order to propagate an image of the Philippines and the Filipinos that would lower American support for the Filipinization and independence movements. As soon as he arrived home the University of Michigan congratulated him for his _Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands_ which was judged to be interesting and provocative:

As you have doubtless noticed, the American newspapers are giving considerable space to the discussion of your conclusions, one fact becoming more and more obvious as the discussion continues: that is that you have set before the new governor general and his supporters a hard nut to crack.

The crusade begun in the Philippines to paralyze the process of more autonomy or independence for Filipinos would prove more effective in the United States. To counter the pro-Filipino policies undertaken by Governor Harrison, Worcester delivered a course of lectures in Washington, New York, Yale and Harvard in which he described the conditions in the archipelago. Universities were now participating in the development of a colonial discourse.

_The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission and The Philippine Problem_

Once Taft lost the elections he began a campaign of discrediting the Filipino independence campaigners and above all the new

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36 Letter Cameron Forbes to Secretary of War, January 24, 1913. Dean C. Worcester papers. Box 1.
37 Francis W. Kelsy from the University of Michigan to Dean C. Worcester, September 15, 1913. Dean C. Worcester paper. Box 2.
administration in the Philippines. His campaign was supported by the publication of other books in 1913. Daniel R. Williams wrote *The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission* and Frederik Chamberlin, *The Philippine Problem 1898-1913*. Taft, Williams and Chamberlin were determined to heighten public awareness about the achievements of Taft’s policy and to warn the American people about the dangers of independence for the Filipinos. In arguing this they drew on images of peonage, oligarchism and caciquism as endemic features of the Philippines which made its inhabitants unfit for independence at least in the near future. All three also engaged in propaganda against the rival Democratic Party.

*The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission* is a clear-cut case of Republican haste in countering Blount’s book, the anti-imperialist literature, and above all any attempt at Filipinization or self-government. In the introduction Williams informs us that the book, except for its last chapter, is a fragmentary account of the letters that he wrote home at the time of the Taft Commission’s visit to the Philippines. Williams makes clear the intention of this book: to inform to the general public of the big problems Taft and his commissioners had to confront. He claimed that “no book has yet appeared describing the establishment of civil government in the Philippines, nor conveying an adequate idea of the difficulties encountered and overcome by the Commission in its work.”

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38 1913 was important for the emergence of some publication related to the Democratic Party. Emma L. Teich compiled some articles *Selected articles on Independence of the Philippines*. However, the most important work would be *The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912* written by James H. Blount. *The Philippines Past and Present* will be the alternative to this book.

39 Williams, Daniel R. *The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission*. Chicago: A.C. McClurg & Co., 1913, preface, p. v. Williams is deliberately ignoring *Our Philippine Problem* written by Parker Willis
There are many other such claims in this book. Another surprising one is the assertion that

Our country was fortunate in having such statesmanlike men sent to meet and solve such big problems, and any contribution which will help our people to further realize and appreciate this fact, and at the same time deepen their interest in the welfare of our Filipino wards, cannot come amiss.40

The introduction emphasizes the altruistic goals of the Americans in the Philippines. Williams is not clear about “such big problems” that the Americans had to sort out, but one can suspect that these problems were inherited41 from Spanish rule, “inherited” being a term used frequently in the new campaign against Filipino independence. There is not a single recognition that the Americans benefited considerably from Spain’s accomplishments. The inherent paternalism of the Americans is reflected on the phrase “welfare of our Filipino wards.” The use of such terms infers the necessity to protect and tutor the “Filipino wards” who had yet to come of age. There is a clear message that Filipinos were not prepared for self-government, Democrat propaganda notwithstanding.

Williams illustrates the despotism of the natives by claiming that those who sought American alliance had suffered persecution and vexations at the hands of the insurrectionists—this argument surfaces in just about all the stories published by the Republicans.42 Williams does

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40 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. v.
41 Since LeRoy came out with the argument “the Americans inherited the Spanish problems” in 1905 many scholars have echoed in 1913, 1914, 1920s, 1940s and so on. The discourse has prevailed until the present, and this argument can be found in Glenn May’s book Social Engineering in the Philippines. The aims, execution and impact of American colonial Policy 1900-1913. Westport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980, preface, p. xvi
42 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 106.
not provide any new argument in this book despite the claims in his preface. However the work has become a reference for American scholars. In the same way that LeRoy, Barrows, Atkinson and Chamberlin praised the Taft Commission in 1905 and blamed the “others”—i.e., Spaniards and Filipinos—Williams assumes the same inveterate arguments. LeRoy concluded that the Spanish had left a legacy to the Americans called caciquism. Williams subscribed to this argument, and even expanded it:

Had Spain purposely created a condition to embarrass us she could not have done it more completely. Not only did we inherit an insurrection, and a church problem upon which her own government was wrecked, but the whole administrative machinery is so antiquated and disorganized as not to admit of patching or repair.

The first sentence reveals the traditional argument that the “big problems” the Americans had inherited were in fact the Spanish problems. The second sentence is a denial of the Filipino-American war. During the years 1913 and 1914 the term “war” would be suppressed from the textbooks. Williams infers that the insurrection begun in 1896 continued until 1902. The last part of the sentence categorically affirms the anachronism of the Spanish administration and reflects the legacy of LeRoy’s writings. This sentence establishes Spanish medievalism as the fundamental challenge to American modernization.

The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission concludes with a chapter describing the twelve years of Taft’s era. It starts by rebuking those who claim that the Philippines is a burden for the Americans, referring to the anti-imperialists and James Blount who advocated that

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43 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 110.
the U.S. leave the Philippines. 44 Williams provides a counterargument to those who accused Taft and his Commissioners of misinforming the American general public. He states, “What the United States have done in the Philippines is an open book which all who will may read.”45 He then starts to enumerate point by point the achievements during the twelve years of the Republican term in the Philippines. In the prosaic list provided by Williams there is no mention of a single blunder committed by American rule in the Islands.

Finally, in order to demonstrate that the Filipinos were not prepared for self-government and even less for independence Williams emphasizes some important references to the issue made by Republicans and Democrats. One was the lecture given by Wilson at Columbia in which he stated categorically, “We cannot give them self-government.”46 The publication of this lecture by Williams, and later on by Worcester and other partisans of the Republicans was to prove their contention that the discourse of the Democrats was filled with nice words but really empty.

The Philippine Problem 1898-1913 was written by Frederic Chamberlin who had already contributed to the altruistic ends of the American occupation in 1903 with a book entitled The Blow from

44 James H. Blount became an alternative to the imperialist discourse in 1907 when he published Philippine Independence -When? This article was a criticism of Taft’s policy in the Philippines. Blount echoed several important issues such as consciousness of racial unity in the Philippines, and a general consensus in the definition of independence. He asserted that the Filipinos were governed against their consent. This article gave way to a second published in North American Review: Philippine Independence-Why? Blount considered the Philippines was a costly burden, a nuisance and a danger for the United States. He urged to get rid of them “as soon as may be honourably possible.” p. 385. I owe this information to Professor Josep M. Delgado.

45 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, p. 332.

46 Williams, Daniel R. The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission, pp. 352-354.
If Williams’s book was addressed to the general public, Chamberlin wrote this book for students who needed to know the Philippine problem “for a mastery of the subject upon all its broad lines.” Some of the chapters are a summary of his first contribution to the official discourse.

For Chamberlin The Philippine Problem literally begins in 1898, therefore the marker is Spanish rule again. He misrepresents the Spanish era, assuming from the very beginning that “the church was supreme.” Another point Chamberlin belabors is the innate corruption of the Spanish officials. The twin notions of evangelizing mission and innate corruption are in fact derived from Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work; by 1913 this had become a basic reference for Philippine history.

Students would learn from reading Chamberlin’s book that Spanish rule was an anachronism that kept the Filipinos in a state of ignorance and fanaticism. This misleading history of Spanish rule is linked to a pre-Hispanic history and a survey of Filipino behavior. The most remarkable facet of this patchy history is its denomination of the Ilustrados as gente illustrada—important for the connotations that Chamberlin gives to this class as potential caciques. For inextricably related to his discussion of gente illustrada is his argument that slavery and peonage were endemic in the Filipino communities, and that peonage degenerated into

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47 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Blow from behind or some features of the anti-imperialist movement attending the war with Spain. Boston: Lee and Shepard, 1903. Chamberlin was the first one in criticizing the contention of the democrats in 1903 and counter-argued that the anti-imperialist argument of the Constitution of the United States did not provide a government for colonies.
49 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 8.
50 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 12.
caciquism. Chamberlin here clearly echoes the arguments of Worcester and Taft. He was also counterattacking some of the pro-Filipino arguments in Selected articles on independence for the Philippines. Chamberlin’s principal argument is contained in the following passage:

In many instances, a man spent his whole life in the slavery of an unscrupulous and better educated native, to pay no more than a few dollars. That is the device that is called peonage in other lands. In the Philippines it is caciquism, an institution that exerted a far greater effect upon its victim, who felt obliged to obey any command of the master, no matter what its nature might be.

I have highlighted the terms “peonage” and “caciquism” since Chamberlin’s haste to discredit the Filipinos and the Democrats made him commit some significant blunders. He assumes that peonage is the condition of a debtor held by his creditor in the form of qualified servitude to work out a debt—this is the same argument as Worcester’s in his Slavery and Peonage. But Chamberlin goes a step further by making peonage synonymous with caciquism. Although Worcester stated that peonage was practiced by some caciques, he never assumed their equivalence. We can see how subsequent commentators like Chamberlin could further build up this evil called caciquism once the discourse had been established.

Chamberlin, taking the cue from a lecture by Taft before the students of The Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, further argues

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51 Teich, Emma L. (ed.), The Abridged Debater’s Handbook Series. Selected articles on Independence for the Philippines. Minneapolis: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1913. Emma L. Teich included in this compilation ‘The Philippine Independence’ by Sergio Osmeña. She extracted this paper from the Congressional Record. This paper had been already published in Dickinson Report in 1910 in Appendix C, Letter of the Nationalista Party and in Manila under the title Memorial Político del Partido Nacionalista (1911). The American public could read for first time the underside of the meaning of caciquism since Osmeña made clear that caciquism, or whatever the name given to it, was endemic in all societies.

52 Chamberlin Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 48
that to the condition called caciquism “must be ascribed the terrible crimes committed by natives from 1896 to 1900”—the insurrection against the Spaniards and the war with the Americans. Chamberlin was suggesting that granting independence to the Filipinos would provoke an internecine conflict, which would lead to the formation of an oligarchy-or cacique-dominated government.

Chamberlin’s last chapter, “The Problem in 1913,” is an obvious rejoinder against the recent victory of the Democrats. He starts by stating “we have performed veritable prodigies of altruism” as evidenced, for example, by the Filipinization of government that began as early as Taft’s Commission. But what does Filipinization really mean? Chamberlin then argues that the *gente ilustrada* constitutes an oligarchy in the Philippines. He quotes excerpts from Manuel Quezon’s speeches to illustrate this. Would the United States want to hand over power to this group? We can see how American colonial discourse operates in the following remarkable statement:

> With all the wealth, all the learning, and with caciquism, the *gente ilustrada* before we came had a grip upon the other ninety per cent of their fellow Filipinos as absolute as that of master over slave. The ambition of the *gente ilustrada*, the ten per cent every turn, is not the independence of the Philippines, but the independence of the *gente ilustrada*.54

Independence would de facto be only for a minority, ten percent, of Filipinos. Chamberlin supports his argument by recalling Aguinaldo’s Republic. The *gente ilustrada* evokes memories, he says, of the Aguinaldo years from 1896 to 1901 when Filipinos formed an ephemeral

independent government. Chamberlin dismisses this era by echoing Taft’s address before the Chamber of Commerce in New York: “it was a rule of assassination and cruelty. It was even more despotic and oppressive than the Spanish Government had ever been.” This negative invocation of Aguinaldo’s Republic can be regarded as Chamberlin’s retort to the following image of the Republic found in Selected articles on independence for the Philippines:

The people of the Philippine Islands had control of their own territory; they had restored order and peace; they had planned a Republican form of government and framed a Constitution…the charges against Aguinaldo have been refuted again and again on the authority of the advocates of imperialism.

In sum, Chamberlin’s argument displays again the duality “bad Filipinos and Spaniards” versus “good Americans” and above all helps him to conclude that self-government and ultimate independence are unthinkable taking into consideration the natural traits of the Filipinos as potential caciques.

These three books, Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands; The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission and The Philippine Problem are a collective example of how the Republicans had put in motion all the mechanisms to silence the voices of the Democrats in the academe. All of these mechanisms were designed to emphasize the evils inherent in the “others”—Spanish and Filipinos—and specifically to delimit political oligarchism and rural caciquism as the main problems. Both systems are inextricably related since the caciques would become the intermediaries between municipal and provincial governments. Williams and

55 Chamberlin, Frederick. The Philippine Problem 1898-1913, p. 220.
Chamberlin pointed out another important issue: the prevalence of a few families in the provinces which monopolized power and dragged down the ignorant masses. These families are related to the notion of “gente illustrada,” and later scholars would further mix up these terms with oligarchy and caciquism. The overriding message is the same in all: we cannot possibly grant independence to this severely flawed society.

**Worcester: The Philippines Past and Present**

1913 was a year of impasse. As we have seen, the Republicans were trying to defer the process of Philippine independence but Wilson, the new President, had not come up with a conclusive policy for the archipelago either. 1914 saw the triumph of Filipinization by which the most important positions in government were to be occupied by Filipinos. The Republicans frantically tried to distort the new era in the Philippines by spreading rumors of business depression, political purges, grave native uprisings and like, in order to demonstrate the Filipinos’ unfitness for this measure of self-government allowed by Wilson. In this context, Worcester’s book *The Philippines Past and Present* would become the catalyst of American discourse against Filipino self-rule. It was much discussed in newspapers, clubs and universities. It became compulsory reading specially after Joseph Ralston Hayden reissued it in 1930 with some important changes.57

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57 David P. Barrows reissued in 1914 his *History of the Philippines*. There are no changes as in the 1907 edition. Barrows had no time to include *A Decade of American Government in the Philippines 1903-1913*. This was prepared as additional chapter of *History of the Philippines*. Barrows' book was part of the propaganda effort but he is more scholarly than Worcester. The posthumous work of James A. LeRoy, *The Americans in the Philippines* was also published in 1914.
Worcester resigned when Harrison became Governor General of the Philippines. It seems that this was a logical move since Worcester was a recalcitrant defender of Republican policies implemented in the colony. Some have speculated that he resigned because of the publication of *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands*. But as we have seen, Worcester left his position because he was more useful in the United States. He was to carry out a fierce campaign which had as its main objective the negation of Filipino national aspirations.

*The Philippines Past and Present* is an indictment against James Blount and his *The American Occupation of the Philippines*, which met great demand, with second edition finalized in late December. Taft and Forbes were anxious that Blount’s charges about the illegitimacy of the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines and his argument that the Taft era was despotic and exploitative for the Filipinos, be countered in print. Dean Worcester was deemed to be the best person to manage this owing to his first-hand experience in the Philippines, his skill in handling controversy, and his temperament.

Worcester displays all these skills as early as the first chapter titled “View-Point and Subject-Matter” where he explains the reasons for publishing the book. He intends to inform the public audience of the real conditions prevalent in the archipelago. He is concerned since, in the United States, there is a preponderance of false and misleading statements about the Philippines. This falsehood is spread primarily by “those persons with whom the climate disagrees and who in consequence are invalided home, and those who are separated from the service in the
interest of the public good, who return to the United States and get an audience there. The reference here is to James H. Blount, one of the targets of the book. The other concern of Worcester is his deep belief that the inhabitants of the archipelago were confronted by a grave danger. At this point he does not explain the reasons, but he will make them clear along the way.

After Worcester justifies his viewpoint he states outright”

It is my intention to correct some of the very numerous misstatements which have been made concerning past and present conditions in the Philippines. I shall quote from time to time such statements, both verbal and written, and more especially some of those which have recently appeared in a book entitled “The Americans Occupation of the Philippines, 1899-1912,” by James H. Blount.69

Blount had written a critical history of the American occupation of the Philippines, *The American Occupation of the Philippines 1899-1912*, which was actually financed by Manuel Quezon. Blount argued that the American occupation of the Philippines was illegitimate and that the implantation of American civil government was despotic and exploitative. He accused the Taft administration of practicing censorship and misinforming the government and the American people.

Blount had examined a vast amount of official documents, above all the material related to the Filipino-American war. Probably the sharpest argument he supported was that the Filipinos deserved and were prepared for independence. He substantiated this by presenting a different view of Aguinaldo’s government, which he considered well-organized despite its ephemeral rule.

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Worcester attacked these arguments by inferring that they were a hyperbole built up by “his bitter personal animosities.” Therefore, they could not be taken seriously. As for the materials used by Blount, Worcester accused him of misusing documents by neglecting important reports. He was willing to fill in the gaps that Blount had left. For this purpose, Worcester introduced to his readers the *Philippine Insurgent Records* provided by Captain John R. M. Taylor. These records, according to Worcester—and future scholars have echoed him—were to become the most valuable information on the Filipino “insurgency.” Worcester highlights the term “insurgent”; “I use the word ‘Insurgents’ as a proper noun, to designate the Filipinos who took up arms against the United States.”

Worcester’s insistence upon the use of the term “insurgent” is highly significant: He was categorically denying the Filipino-American War. Whereas Blount had called the event a “war,” for Worcester, upheld by Taylor, it was an “insurgency.” Worcester might have been paving the way for a clarification of the ambiguous terminology generated by the Commission Reports and reiterated by propagandistic textbooks. The Commission Reports, by delimiting the “problem” to the Tagalog provinces, categorized the war that was then raging as an “insurrection.” Textbooks, however, were ambiguous and some of them

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60 It has been explained in the sixth chapter how this work was never published. However, it is interesting to note in 1907 the work was to be called *The Insurgent War Records*. In 1909, when Clarence Edward asked for LeRoy to review the first two volumes, Edwards called them *Insurgent Records*. The term “war” had disappeared. Dean C. Worcester will introduce the records definitely as *Philippine Insurgent Records*.


62 Blount devoted three chapters to this topic. Otis and the War; Otis and the War (continued) and McArthur and the War. Blount, James H. *The Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912.*
used the term “war.” Barrows himself, a superintendent of education, has a section in his history textbook entitled “War with the Americans.” He clearly states that it was a war. However, several pages later, in explaining the Taft Commission, Barrows devotes a brief section to the end of the “Insurrection.” This is the sort of “confusion” that Worcester finally sought to put an end to by categorically defining the events of 1899-1901 as an “insurgency.”

In concluding the section on “subject-matter” Worcester revisits the present situation in the Philippines:

. . .a new administration is bestowing on Filipino political offices, and giving them opportunities, for which they are as yet utterly unprepared, thus endangering the results of years of hard, patient, self-sacrificing work performed by experienced and competent men.64

Worcester wanted to show to the American public that the Filipinos were not prepared for the positions that they had attained under the Democrats. He was willing to reveal unpleasant facts which had not been disclosed in order to inform Americans, “who were entitled to know the truth,” of the dangers of the present situation of the Philippines. This excerpt categorically states that the Democrats were destroying what Taft and his men had built up during the first thirteen years of U.S. occupation.

One of the “unpleasant facts” that Worcester would reveal was the tyranny and despotism of Filipino leaders as shown during the ephemeral

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64 Worcester, Dean C. The Philippine Past and Present, p. 15.
república—behavior which could recur by conceding the independence of
the Philippines:

I shall then show that these leaders never established a government
which adequately protected life and property, or gave to their
people peace, happiness or justice, but on the contrary inaugurated
a veritable reign of terror under which murder became a
governmental institution.  

Worcester would provide the underside to Blount’s history which
defended Aguinaldo’s government by considering it well-established.
Aguinaldo and his people knew exactly what they wanted, wrote Blount,
“At all the times and in all places they made it clear that independence
was the one thing they had pledged.”  He added that the Filipinos were
more capable of self-government than the people of Cuba. Worcester
reversed the argument, portraying Aguinaldo and his government as
perpetrators of oligarchic rule, assassination, and oppression. He would
“prove” his allegations by drawing upon still another flawed
compendium of documentary sources about Philippine history: Taylor’s
Insurgent Records.

The edition of Worcester’s book published in 1914 became an
immediate success. It is important to note, however, that the book was re-
issued in 1930, edited by Joseph Ralston Hayden who added some
chapters and also decided to omit some important parts of Worcester’s
original text.

In the 1930 preface Hayden informs the reader that “In preparing
this revision of the work the editor has sought to avoid making any

\[\text{65} \text{ Worcester, Dean C.} \text{ The Philippines Past and Present, p. 15.} \]

\[\text{66} \text{ Blount, James H.} \text{ The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912, p. 284.} \]
changes that would impair its value as an historical document.\textsuperscript{67} However, he did make some changes that impaired the value of Worcester’s book. For one thing, he purged those parts of the first chapter “View-Point and Subject Matter” that referred to Blount’s work. Hayden intended to suppress discussion of any alternative history of the American war and occupation of the Philippines. He emphasized that there was no war, only an insurgency provoked by those Filipinos who took up arms. From 1930 on, under the sponsorship of Professor Joseph Ralston Hayden, Worcester book would become a classic work of reference.

\textit{The Philippines Past and Present} is far from being a history of the Philippines; it is a flagrant isomorphism of past and present. It draws upon history to demonstrate that a native administration in the country, or an immediate grant of independence, would squarely lead to an anarchical and corrupt government. To support this argument Worcester starts his narrative in 1898, arguing that nobody connected with the American government ever held out false hopes to Aguinaldo. This argument was not new to Worcester, since as early as 1899 he had delivered a speech at the Hamilton Club of Chicago arguing that independence was never promised by the Americans.\textsuperscript{68} His aim then was to silence the voices of the anti-imperialist camp.

This time around Worcester had again important reasons to revisit that topic. Blount had presented some details that seemed to substantiate

the dishonored promise of independence made to Aguinaldo by American consular officials and military personnel. Worcester challenged Blount’s claim by pointing out that the alleged promise was a misinterpretation and mistranslation of event by the intermediary between Pratt and Aguinaldo. Worcester based practically his whole rebuttal of Blount on excerpts from the *Philippine Insurgent Records*. In actual fact, Worcester used Sastron’s book, *Insurrección en Filipinas*, from which he had translated two chapters. Taylor, however, had included excerpts from Sastron in his compilation of records, and this is what Worcester cited. His argument seemed more rigorous by quoting *The Philippine Insurgent Records* rather than a Spanish source!

Topics such as the denial of any promise of independence, the collaboration of the “insurgents,” or episodes about the “insurgency” treated in other chapters devoted to this period—all these were really secondary to Worcester. They were co-opted in order to bring the past to bear upon present conditions in the Philippines. By digging into history, Worcester was trying to overturn the argument of some Filipino politicians that the United States had destroyed a republic in the Philippines and erected an oligarchy. Worcester was determined to prove that this oligarchy actually had its foundations in Aguinaldo’s government.

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69 It is important to note that Ralston Hayden, in the edition of 1930, corroborated Worcester’s argument that Aguinaldo was never promised independence by any American official. Ralston Hayden based his argument on LeRoy, Elliot, Kalaw and Fernandez. He emphasized the argument of Kalaw and Fernandez in order to demonstrate that despite they were Filipino scholars they substantiated Worcester’s argument. Obviously, in 1930 Filipino scholars had been educated under the American tradition and above all, Barrow’s book had become like a bible to them.
The Partido Nacionalista (Nacionalista Party) for several years had been claiming that the Malolos government demonstrated the capacity to establish an independent national life. Blount in his book supported this claim, showing how Aguinaldo managed to build up an organized government in which public order prevailed. In 1913, the legitimacy of Aguinaldo’s government became part of the rhetoric of the speeches of Quezon and Osmeña in order to demonstrate that Filipinos could rule their destinies now as they did in 1898.

In this context, we need to understand the new rhetoric of the Republican platform, which for first the time attempted to define two systems endemic in the Philippines: oligarchism and caciquism. The Philippines Past and Present is an important text in this regard since it succeeded in giving past and present native governments the stigma of an oligarchy. Worcester’s narrative about the Filipino Republic was intended to demonstrate how a sudden withdrawal of the United States would degenerate into an anarchy. Three chapters in all develop this argument, based on Taylor’s documents. Worcester draws up a perfect frame for his narrative since by co-opting and de-contextualizing past facts, the transition to later chapters dealing with present conditions becomes quite smooth. The common nucleus of the various chapters is “murder as a government agency”—the title of one chapter.

Probably the most important statement in the book is found in the chapter entitled “Did we destroy a republic?.” This title is a direct reference to Blount’s argument that the imperialists destroyed the Filipino Republic. By taking the Filipino Republic as the starting point,
Worcester was able to develop the argument that immediate independence would result in oligarchism. “While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic,” Worcester states, “it was in fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great mass of the people had no share. Their duty—to obey without question the orders the masses received from the military heads of their provinces.”

What became a “dictatorship” in 1898 was redefined in 1914 as “Tagalog military oligarchy.” This new terminology came to prevail during the American administration and up to a certain extent we can extrapolate it to the present, since the Filipino government today is still defined routinely as “oligarchic government.” Worcester was also able to establish an analogy with caciquism as this was understood in 1905. The oligarchic government of Aguinaldo destroyed the will of the masses who blindly obeyed without questioning the orders received from the military heads of the provinces.

Worcester adds that these military heads, who perpetrated outrages during the Republic, are still around today, powerful in their respective communities. Through these asides, Worcester ushers in another important issue: the centralization of the Filipino government and compadrazgo. Centralization was imposed by Aguinaldo in 1898. He provided a strong and highly centralized military dictatorship in which under the form of election provision was made for the filling of all offices by men devoted to the group which had seized control. All elections were subject to Aguinaldo’s approval and every province was under the command of a military representative of his who could and did call upon the civil authorities for such supplies as he deemed fit. All the real power was vested in the

central group and the central group was composed of Emilio Aguinaldo and his public and private advisers.71

Worcester here warns the American public that this kind of independent “government” Aguinaldo had established could return if the Democrats gave them the chance. Murder would once again be rife but, worse, “among the persons to be tortured and murdered would now be those Americans who failed to escape seasonably. Sooner yet ‘the united Filipino people’ would split up on old tribal lines and fly at each other’s throats.”72

Volume 1 of *The Philippines Past and Present* gives shape to the idea that “oligarchism” was the main political feature of the Philippines.73 It is important to note that Hayden’s edition of 1930 did not change a single word of the abovementioned arguments since the Americans still considered the Filipinos unprepared for independence at that time.

Volume 2 develops the thesis that “caciquism” was the main feature of politics at the local level. For this purpose Worcester devotes a long chapter to slavery and peonage based in part on his book devoted to these institutions. He adds in support of this topic three previous chapters on the non-Christian tribes as the real sources of slavery and peonage.

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73 The arguments presented by Worcester about Aguinaldo’s Republic have not changed that much. The tone is not as fatalist as that coming from Worcester. However the content is quite similar with a language that is more sophisticated. Topics such as centralization and oligarchic government give shape to a linear enplotment. See for instance: Milagros C. Guerrero, ‘The Provincial and Municipal Elites of Luzon during the Revolution, 1898-1902.’ Guerrero asserts that the government of Aguinaldo was based on the co-optation of local elites in order to give prestige his republic. Furthermore, she infers, by marking 1893 as the main foundation of Aguinaldo’s Republic, that Aguinaldo implanted a centralized government, such as the Spaniards had done. However, she misses the impact of the Maura law, precisely intended to create a de-centralized government. The Spaniards and Aguinaldo had no time to demonstrate whether they would have been successful.
Worcester assimilates caciquism to slavery and peonage. LeRoy in 1905 had developed the ideas that caciquism was the chief obstacle to social and political progress. Worcester, in 1914, states a similar point:

Without hesitation I assert that their existence [slavery and peonage] in the Philippine Islands is the greatest single problem that confronts the government of the United States in its efforts to build up a respectable and responsible electorate and establish representative government.  

Worcester infers that slavery and peonage were caused by caciquism which prevailed in every municipality. His argument is supported by witnesses who maintained that caciquism still prevailed in parts of some provinces such as Cagayan. This new caciquism presented by Worcester restricted “complete and real liberty.” He establishes caciquism as the main institution of peonage, and caciques as the rich and powerful men who are the true perpetuators of peonage. 

This new dimension of caciquism as a surviving institution in all the municipalities is reinforced by Worcester’s chapter, *Philippine Lands*. “Cacique” is identified with landowner and “peon” are the tenants:

The cacique does not wish his laborers to acquire land in their own right, for he knows well enough that if they did so they would become self-supporting, and it would cease to be possible for him to hold them as “peons” as is commonly done at present.

Starting with a historical account of the Republic of 1898, Worcester develops an argument that makes oligarchy and caciquism the main curses of the Philippines today (1914). Oligarchy had murder on the government agenda; caciquism restricted real liberty. Oligarchy and

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caciquism are interwoven to establish the peculiar form of government in the past (the Malolos republic) that should not be allowed to reinstate itself in the future.

Worcester concludes his book with the present: *Is Philippine independence now possible?* This rhetorical question has a categorical answer--no! He had devoted more than nine hundred pages to deny the possibility of a “yes” answer. As if this were not enough, Worcester added more arguments against independence in this final chapter. Ninety percent of the population were ignorant, credulous and fanatical, he pointed out. The clash between a small, intelligent, educated, and opportunistic class of Filipinos who wanted independence and the ordinary Filipino masses who did not even know what independence was, surely banishes the thought that the Philippines should be given independence now.

**Worcester’s press campaign**

Worcester’s campaign against independence did not cease with the publication of his book but continued with a press campaign. In fact his influence was to be felt until 1921, since he was the architect of the conclusions reached by the special Wood-Forbes mission to the Philippines. This new campaign until 1921 was to have several stages. The first one took place immediately after his book’s publication. He used the press to spread rumors of native uprisings and revolt plots and to

The most important article was published in The Independent.\footnote{Worcester, Dean C. ‘Danger of the Present Philippine situation.’ The Independent, February 23, 1914. Dean C. Worcester papers.} This article is the final outcome of a draft entitled “Some Dangers of the Present Philippine Situation.” Worcester justifies the American occupation of the Philippines since during the Spanish days the Filipinos were steeped in ignorance and superstition. Therefore, they needed American tutelage. He lists all the problems the Americans had to confront when they decided to hold the archipelago. He pays special attention to the civil service, following a historical sequence from Spanish times to Governor Harrison. He deliberately de-contextualizes the Spanish administration by assuming that the Spanish practice of selling some public offices had degenerated into an endemic corruption. This sale of offices was governed by strict rules, but its de-contextualization at the hands of Worcester paid off—he was able to highlight the magnanimity of the U.S. administration that cleansed the archipelago of such evil traditions. Worcester could always latch on to the widely accepted binary opposition “bad Spanish and Filipinos” versus “good Americans.”

Worcester’s discussion of the history of the civil service gave him the perfect excuse to distort and demonize Harrison’s policy. The worst
thing Harrison did, he says, was to appoint natives who were now destroying Taft’s good work. He augurs that the Filipinization of the civil service would fail and the damage done would not be repaired easily; “It will take years of patient endeavor to overcome the harm already done and the fact that politics was controlled [by Filipinos] even for a time, and the fear that they may control it again, will be a lasting obstacle to the restoration of the lost morale of the Philippine civil service." This argument would be used by Leonard Wood to justify his reactionary policy by which the Americans were to regain control over the main civil service positions.

In July, Worcester, co-opting the Mexican question, wrote an article for The Outlook warning of the dangers of Filipino independence. He advocated establishing in Mexico a government akin to what had been implanted in the Philippines by McKinley, Taft and Roosevelt. Mexico was suffering from the same defects as the Philippines, said Worcester, since it had been a Spanish colony as well; no wonder its officials were inept and corrupt. The present disorder in Mexico serves as a warning that Philippine independence would lead to revolutionary disorder necessitating outside intervention.

After President Wilson ordered the U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz, Mexico, in April 1914, Worcester wrote approvingly that American military and civil experience in the Philippines could provide experienced personnel and a model for the task of establishing good

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79 Worcester, D.C. Danger of the present Philippine situation. Section entitled wrecking the civil service.
80 Worcester, D.C. ‘The Mexican question in the light of Philippine experience.’ The Outlook, July 11, 1914
government in another country such as Mexico. In this article not only did Worcester plead for the retention of the Philippines but he also advocated the Filipinization of Mexico.

This series of articles about rumors of revolt and the dangers of Filipinization were to continue in 1915. In fact, there is a second stage of this press campaign, from 1915 to 1921, that consisted of a systematical discrediting of the new policy implanted by Wilson and Harrison. Worcester sought to prove to the American public that the Filipinos were unable to understand Harrison’s policy. The Americans had to know that there was no royal road to independence; “Not only are the 90 per cent of the Filipinos unfit to take care of themselves, except in the crudest semi-civilized way, but the educated 10 per cent who must control do not even understand self-government in the sense in which Americans use the term.”

Worcester was showing the American public that the Philippines was peopled by savages and ignorant people who had to be led into civilized society by the American administration. After demonstrating the unfittness of the Filipinos for self-government, Worcester attacked Harrison and his policy of “retrogression.” Worcester provided a canvas on which to portray loyal Americans as being displaced by incompetent, corrupt Filipinos, with devastating consequences. An example of this an article in the journal Schenectady entitled “Native rule danger.” Worcester epitomizes “native rule” in Manuel Tinio, a former General in Aguinaldo’s army who had been appointed to direct the Bureau of Lands.

Worcester argued that Tinio was incapable of running this bureau because, being a member of the wealthy class, Tinio must want a continuation of “peonage,” whereas his American predecessor was a true democrat:

Very many wealthy Filipinos who are large land owners dislike to have the less fortunate people secure land preferring to keep them tenants […] Capt. Sleeper had generally interested himself in instructing the poor and ignorant as to their rights and in assisting them to assert those rights.83

Captain Sleeper had been in charge of the Bureau of Lands, battling caciquism and peonage. This fact, says Worcester, made him unpopular among the Filipino politicians. Tinio, in contrast, protected the wealthy Filipinos to the detriment of the poor, thus maintaining peonage as institution. As we shall see, Hayden in 1947 considered Tinio a petty tyrant who promoted caciquism.

Worcester’s press campaign culminated in 1915 with two articles published by Public Ledger National Editorial.84 These articles are the outcome of a draft entitled “Philippine Independence and the Jones Bill.” Worcester starts off “Philippine Independence” by citing the preamble of the Jones Bill which states that Philippine independence would be recognized as soon as a stable government could be established therein. McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft had expressed the same wish before but, wonders Worcester, how can the stability of a government could be determined in advance? His question was not rhetorical at all. “We cannot honorably leave the Philippines,” he says, “until a just and

efficient representative government is established there and the people have showed reasonable ability intelligently to maintain it.\textsuperscript{85}

Once again the Republic is trotted out: Experience has shown, says Worcester, that during the independence of the Philippines in 1898 the government became a “cruel and arbitrary military oligarchy.” Independence now would produce the same kind of government. Besides, Worcester supports the idea that the desire for independence was far from universal. He was to spread the idea that “Many of the politicians loudly demand independence in public, although many of them frankly admit in private that they do not want real independence.”\textsuperscript{86}

Statements such as this were to generate a long-lasting argument about the nature of “compadre colonialism.” Worcester was right, but he was broadcasting the thinking of a few instead of the many. The American government in the Philippines was fond of transforming particular facts into generalized truths. Schurman and Taft, for example, spread the idea that most of the Filipinos were supporting the American occupation when in fact they had only interviewed a few individuals. Now Worcester was suggesting that independence was only a rhetorical device or strategy on the part of the Filipinos but he was actually referring to a few isolated cases. The notion of “compadre colonialism” was necessary for Worcester’s persuasive argument that the Philippines could not survive without the protection of the United States and that the intelligent Filipinos knew it. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the people,

\textsuperscript{85} Worcester, D.C. ‘Philippine Independence.’
\textsuperscript{86} Worcester, D.C. ‘Philippine Independence.’
illiterate and superstitious, had their hopes pinned on their continued protection by the United States.

Worcester had distorted the situation by taking isolated cases and transforming them into a dictum of the truth. But campaign had its desired impact on public opinion and the morale of the Harrison government. It may appear that after 1915 Worcester’s campaign ended since he returned to the Philippines as a businessman. In reality, Worcester continued his Republican campaigning in the shadows. His fight to defer the independence of the Philippines culminated in 1921 with his draft of the report of the special Wood-Forbes mission.

**Worcester and the special report of Wood-Forbes**

In November 1920, the Republicans regained power and Warren G. Harding was set to take over as new President of the United States. As was usually the case with a party change in government, a special fact-finding mission to the Philippines was sent. Called the Wood-Forbes mission, it generated a special report in 1921 that Worcester himself drafted. Its impact would be tremendous.

From 1913 to 1920 President Wilson had implanted in the archipelago a policy of Filipinization, conceding to Filipinos the most important positions in the civil service. In 1916, the Jones Bill was finally passed and the U.S. Congress promised independence as soon as a stable government would be established. On 7 December 1920 the departing President Wilson announced that

The people of the Philippine Islands have succeeded in maintaining a stable government and have fulfilled the condition set by the
Congress as precedent to a consideration of granting independence to the Islands. It is now our liberty and our duty to keep our promise to the people of those islands by granting them the independence.  

Wilson handed over to the Congress reports and documents which demonstrated that the Filipinos were able to maintain a stable government. Harding was quite opposed to independence but he followed the rituals in order to ease relations with the Filipinos, suggesting that independence was still on the agenda. He then took steps against it. In March 1921 he sent a special mission to the Philippines to observe in situ if a stable government had been established. He appointed William Forbes (Governor-General until 1913) and General Leonard Wood to head the mission. Its findings were published in October of that year.

It seems that the conditions found by Wood and Forbes were not as dramatic as the report portrays in its final conclusions and recommendations. Probably they found a rather stable government in operation and did not know how to reverse the argument in order to portray a chaotic situation which would prove the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government and ultimate independence. This, at least, is what the Republicans wanted to hear.

Worcester states that on 13 July he received a letter from General Wood requesting from him “a statement of [his] judgment and suggestions relative to the general administration of government in these islands, the character and ability of officials and the effectiveness of their work.” Wood and the other members of the Mission were anxious to

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have Worcester’s “well considered opinion on the future policy of the United States in regard to the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{88} Now this is a puzzling request. One wonders why General Wood needed suggestions and judgments “relative to the general administration of government” if he had just been there for several months observing its workings. Was what Wood saw in the Philippines more stable than what the Republicans would have liked?

Worcester not only was asked to give his judgment and suggestions, but he was eventually invited to elaborate upon the draft of the Mission’s report. Much of what he contributed was incorporated in the final report.

Worcester started out by analyzing the “Administration of Justice.” He concluded that Governor Harrison had undermined the important task undertaken by Taft and now the judges had become indolent and corrupt. Filipino judges, in the first place, lacked ability and were insufficiently trained. The report repeats Worcester’s words: “In later years the same care has not been exercised.”\textsuperscript{89}

The language of the report is not as vehement as Worcester’s. For, in order to make his arguments more effective, Worcester illustrated them with examples. He used the same structure as in his previous works: to make out of a particular case something general or even universal. He gave special emphasis to the “administration of insular, provincial and municipal finances.” He focused on the “very great present unfitness of

\textsuperscript{88} Worcester, Dean C. Manila, P.I., August 4, 1921. The Special Mission to the Philippine Islands. Manila. This report has never been published, and even Worcester never signed it. I found it among Worcester papers volume 11. Ann Arbor: Harlan Hatcher Library, the University of Michigan.

the Filipino to take charge of the financial administration.” He dwelt upon the scandal in the Philippine National Bank[90]. The Special Report was to devote three pages to the Philippine National Bank.

“The building up of an efficient and capable body of government officers and employees,” wrote Worcester, “was the practical result of the enactment and strict enforcement of an adequate civil service law, and was one of the most substantial benefits accruing to the people of the Philippine Islands as the result of American rule.”[91] This was during the Taft era. Harrison and his Filipinization policy, however, by employing natives had caused a deterioration in the quality of the public service. The special report emphasizes this point by Worcester in the same manner.[92]

The report tried to avoid publicizing some controversial issues exposed by Worcester. One can nevertheless read between the lines. Worcester had portrayed “graft” as “a prerequisite” to the performance of the duties of the government; “The public service in these islands has become rotten with graft from the bottom to a point dangerously near the top can be fully substantiated.”[93]

This prerequisite of graft was complemented by fraud in elections and the endemic oligarchism of Filipino politicians. Worcester explained that fraud in connection with elections was endemic. However electoral fraud had grown to such proportions that it had generated an oligarchic government: “These islands, so far as they are governed by Filipinos at

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this time, are governed by an oligarchy which has been steadily 
entrenching itself and increasing its power."[94]

The hand of Worcester in the Mission’s report is revealed pretty 
clearly in the details about electoral fraud. The Wood-Forbes report 
points out that control of the election machinery was in the hands of the 
dominant parties and that electoral inspectors were just their hirelings. 
But the people were unaware of their civil rights regarding elections. 
Fraud in elections can be explained, says the report, in terms of a 
patriarchal society in which “caciquism” and “familism” held sway:

The social organization as exists is of patriarchal form 
characterized by a strong clan feeling and centuries of leadership 
by a few influential individuals known as “caciques. The 
subservience of the people to these leaders has not yet been 
supplanted by new ideals.”[95]

Wood and Forbes were stating that caciquism was something 
inherent in Filipino behavior. Caciquism conjoined with “familism” led 
to a situation in which democracy could not possibly flourish. Wood and 
Forbes point out that there was little evidence of a party system with 
competing programs. Instead there was a bitter contest among families. 
The omnipotence of familism in the Philippines, says the special report, 
made elections something to be fought out among personalities rather 
than on principles.[96] These observations and arguments are 
characteristically Worcester’s. These issues are still being debated today.

Worcester analyzed other topics which are reflected in the special 
report. In the last two sections of Worcester’s report—which would 
become the “general conclusions” and “recommendations” of the special

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report—he states categorically that Filipinos were lacking in “executive ability”:

While some government positions are filled by honorable and efficient Filipinos it is undoubtedly true that the majority of the Filipinos holding important positions lack sufficient executive ability to perform their work successfully. The work of government bureaus is in general seriously in arrears. Filipino executives have generally shown themselves particularly weak in the administration of insular, provincial and municipal finances, and graft is very prevalent.

The main points of this paragraph surface in one of the conclusions of the Wood-Forbes report. Wood and Forbes, however, delete the word “graft,” using instead a more polite language: “marked deterioration due to the injections of politics.”

Worcester concluded by making important recommendations for the future government of the Philippines. The first step is to eliminate the incompetent employees of the bureaus, who happen to be Filipinos. He suggests the reinstatement of competent Americans to be put in charge of the more important bureaus of the government. Furthermore, “It is of fundamental importance that the next Governor-General should be a strong man who will insist upon and will exercise his rights.” Worcester was appealing for the restoration of a strong government like Taft’s and this would be reflected in the Mission’s report.

The report of the Wood-Forbes mission did not entirely convince Washington and it certainly failed to impress the Filipinos. Worcester had to defend and justify the report in December 1921. In the end he succeeded in having his way, for General Wood was appointed

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97 Worcester D. C. The Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, p. 20.
99 Worcester D.C. The Special Mission to the Philippine Islands, p. 20.
Governor-General of the Philippines. Worcester had been able to influence Philippine affairs in the penumbra. He died in 1923 but his legacy was picked up by Daniel R. Williams and above all, Katherine Mayo, whose books were to effectively mobilize support for the anti-Filipino policies of Leonard Wood’s administration.
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION - TRIUMPH AND PERPETUATION
OF THE DISCOURSE

As early as January 1922 the Wood-Forbes report was challenged by a Filipino, Isauro Gabaldon. A member of the House of Representatives, Gabaldon complained that the report was arbitrary and had failed to prove the unfitness of the Filipinos for self-government. Above all, he said in his speech to his fellow representatives, “The recommendations are autocratic, militaristic and reactionary.”

Gabaldon recalled that President Harding had promised Quezon that in no case would a backward policy be pursued. However, the Wood-Forbes report recommended a return to an imperialistic policy. In fact, this policy would be implemented through the appointment of General Leonard Wood as Governor-General.

Wood showed indifference to the pro-independence labors of the Filipino officials who were compelled to go on independence missions to the United States. He believed, after all, that the Philippines should never be independent. 1924 would prove to be an important year for him. Representative Manuel Roxas sent a mission to the United States to remind Congress of the promise it made in 1916 to recognize Philippine independence as soon as a stable government could be established. Roxas emphasized that the Filipinos had been successful in establishing and

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maintaining a stable government. He urged the Americans to take a final and definite action granting the Philippines their independence.

Wood replied to Roxas that, while he sympathized with the desire of the Filipino people for independence, they were not yet prepared to assume such a responsibility, either from the standpoint of instructed public opinion, preparedness for defense, a common language or economic resources. Wood stated in an article in the Free Press:

I am convinced the true situation in the Philippines is not understood either by Congress or the American people who have been misinformed and deceived by misleading propaganda and information which has been circulated by the Independence Mission’s Press Bureau and others and I urge that the fullest opportunity for a hearing be given to those who have lived here long years.

Wood spurned Roxas’s mission for independence and argued that the Filipinos as a whole appreciated to be under the flag and government of the United States. In any case the leaders, as a whole, were not yet ready for independence; “They admit freely that a considerable number of years will be required before the people will be prepared for independence, either from the standpoint of national defense or resources.”

Wood asked the U.S. Congress to ignore the claims made by some agitators and disseminators of false and misleading propaganda. His statements appear to have been effective. Wood also successfully engendered divisions within Philippine politics as attempts were made to determine responsibility for the alleged shortcomings of Filipino leaders

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(as outlined in the Wood-Forbes report). The Nacionalistas soon were being accused by the Democrata Party of forming an oligarchy. Wood’s strategy was helped along by the publication of some important books. One writer stood out as a champion of Wood’s administration: Daniel R. Williams.

*The United States and the Philippines*

Williams set out on a rather familiar tack. He sought to prove the incapacity of Filipinos for self-government and ultimate independence. He highlighted the graft and corruption that followed upon the Filipinization movement, as well as the ignorance of the masses. His book, *The United States and The Philippines*, can be regarded as the heir to Worcester’s *The Philippines Past and Present*. It follows the same contours as Worcester’s book, with some similar arguments pursued. Aside from fostering Wood’s imperialistic policy, Williams also set out to demolish [ex-Governor] Harrison’s *The Cornerstone of Philippine independence* and Charles Edward Russell’s *The Outlook for the Philippines*.

Williams’ book is a history of the past in the present. We can distinguish different sequences in this book: The first can be termed the “dark age of the Philippines” which covers the Spanish era and encompasses the “Tagalog oligarchy.” Then there is the “golden age”

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5 Harrison, Francis B. *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence. A Narrative of Seven years*. New York: The Century Co., 1922. Harrison justifies his policy in the Philippines and above all advocates for the independence of the islands. This book is the underside of the propagandistic books by answering practically all the criticism made against his policy. Harrison shows a different portrayal of the Filipinos which has become silenced. Russell Charles E. *The Outlook for the Philippines*. New York: The Century Co., 1922. Russell demonstrates the capacity of the Filipinos for self-government and emphasizes that the Democrat Party in the Philippines is the party of the bosses. This argument is the underside of Williams’ argument who states that the Nationalist, and above all Quezon is a dictator and his party an oligarchy.
which covers Taft’s era, followed by the “wrecking” during Harrison’s term. And then, finally, there is a “new hope” under Wood’s term. Williams does not contribute any new arguments in his book. He simply follows upon or builds on what Worcester had laid down earlier. He opposes the independence of the country by putting down Filipino politicians as a mere oligarchic class and above all he fiercely criticizes the Nacionalista Party and its leader, Quezon, who is called “dictator.” Of course Williams, like Worcester in *The Philippines Past and Present*, addresses the issues of caciques and oligarchy. Caciques, he says, are different from oligarchs in that their activities remain confined to local communities.

The dark age for Williams, not surprisingly, was the long-lasting medievalism of Spanish (mis)rule. As he puts it, “In Manila the process of ‘cleaning up’ and of replacing a sixteenth century civilization with some of the decencies and opportunities of modern life, began almost with the day of [American] occupation.” This argument, repeated in nearly all the books devoted to the American project, conforms to the observation Reynaldo Ileto has made about the discourse of Barrow’s textbook:

> [Barrows’ *History of the Philippines*] exhibits the emplotment of Philippine history along the medieval-to-modern axis or time-line. In textbooks of this genre American tutelage, or fatherhood, or big brotherhood fits in naturally, leading Filipinos out of the medieval age through the development of a modern state peopled by modern individuals or citizens whose passions have been subordinated to reason.

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Williams felt that the Filipino people have every reason to thank Providence that the American flag did remain in the archipelago, since the Americans led Filipinos out of Spanish medieval administration and the oligarchy of the Republic at Malolos. Obviously a heritage of medievalism and oligarchism offers no evidence of the ability to establish self-government and even less to attain independence. Such dark age conditions would end with the arrival of Taft and his commissioners who, with the help of the most conservative and intelligent element of the native population—i.e., those who tacitly accepted American tutelage—implanted an established government. The achievements of Taft would lead to a “golden age” in the Philippines.

Harrison and his policy of Filipinization mark the wrecking of Taft’s achievements. Williams puts emphasis on these years, devoting to them two chapters entitled “The wrecking of a Government.” Williams is tendentious and misleading, discrediting the Nacionalistas who are accused of implementation a politics of patronage. “Educated Filipinos,” he writes, “talk, eat, and sleep politics, their newspapers being devoted to little else. The actual tendency is to affiliate with the party which controls the patronage.”

Although “patronage” is inherent in any country and appointments are natural even in a meritocracy, Williams gives these practices a derogatory or negative meaning in the Philippine context. He criticizes Quezon and Osmeña of dictating appointments. He infers that these

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8 Williams, Daniel R. *The United States and the Philippines*, p. 163. The divergence between caciquism and patronage is prevalent at present. Americans scholars have established a dichotomy between good patronage implanted by the Americans, and bad caciquism established by the Spaniards. Caciquism is simply a system of patronage related exclusively to the policy which gave political structure to Spain.
political leaders furnished introduced cronyism and nepotism in the Philippines. Of course he does not use terms such as “cronyism,” which belongs to a later period in history. But precisely the connotations he gives to a term like patronage allow it to be associated with present-day cronyism.

Williams also brings up the subject of “honesty.” He reminds the reader that “One of the things America was supposed to instill in the Filipinos above all else was a sense of civic honesty to punish with severity every infringement of political rights.” Quezon, Osmeña and the Nacionalistas had transgressed civic honesty by flagrantly resorting to fraud in elections, committing graft in financial matters and furthering peonage or caciquism at the local level. Williams congratulates the Wood-Forbes report for bringing out these problems and wisely explaining to the American people why Filipinos were not yet fit to safeguard their own interests.

Williams cannot really prove the unfitness of Filipinos to govern their own country. As a matter of fact, his main argument for discrediting Filipino governance is to dwell on the corruption scandal that resulted in the bankruptcy of the Philippine National Bank, using the word “retrogression” to describe the mess. These are the points raised by Worcester in the draft of the Wood-Forbes report.

Williams’ *The United States and the Philippines* concludes with a reference to what we can recognize now as two key sets of figures in American colonial discourse: caciques and oligarchs. Williams

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9 Williams, Daniel R. *The United States and the Philippines*, p. 164.
definitively identifies caciquism as a local phenomenon. Now since local or municipal governments were run by native officials, readily assimilated into the category of caciques, caciquism therefore was endemic in Filipino society. These local bosses were the ones thwarting American efforts to democratize society:

Liberty means “equal laws for all, a recognition of civil rights, and exemption from the exercise of arbitrary power.” It is this we have given the Filipinos—except as thwarted by local caciques—and which we are seeking to preserve to them against a small coterie of their own people who seek to control the Government, free from all interference.10

At this point, the caciques in the towns have a fully derogatory connotation. LeRoy’s efforts to instill this meaning in 1905 had borne fruit. But there is another, even greater, danger to democracy—the “small coterie” that seeks to control the Government, free from American interference. This coterie is precisely the group of Filipinos that seeks independence; the masses themselves are ignorant and indifferent about independence. This “small coterie” is none other than the political oligarchy. The thrust of Williams’ argument is that the Americans should stay around and protect the people from both evils—caciques and oligarchs.

Williams’ book could be questioned or dismissed as official and biased since he had been the personal secretary of Bernard Moses, one of Taft’s commissioners. However, his arguments found support and were even extended in Katherine Mayo’s *The Isles of Fear*, published in 1925. This influential book gave full shape to the discourse on caciques in the Philippines during American rule. Through it we can readily see how the

10 Williams, Daniel R. *The United States and the Philippines*, p. 234.
discourse had taken shape over the twenty years since James LeRoy crystallized it in 1905.

**The Isles of Fear**

Katherine Mayo’s book *The Isles of Fear: The Truth about the Philippinines*, established the dominant image of the Philippines for millions of American readers in the late 1920’s. The title is reminiscent of Worcester’s *Slavery and Peonage in the Philippine Islands* in the suggestion that a terrible and frightening side of the islands, previously hidden, is about to be revealed. In format, as well, there is a similarity with Worcester’s book since Mayo’s narrative is also anchored in particular cases that are graphically described.

Mayo bases her whole book on the investigation and description of the “caciques” in the Philippines. There has been a well-established hierarchy of caciques in the archipelago since immemorial times, she says. They range from the bottom to the high levels of society. Caciques make up the political oligarchy; they are the usurers, landowners, money-lenders—in fact, except for the ordinary *taos* practically the rest of the population was cacique, making *caciquism* the moral malady of the land. They are all pictured as despicable beings in the book.

Mayo recognizes two types of Filipinos: the *Malay tao* and the *mestizo cacique*. The power of this book lies in the author’s use of personal testimonies, which give a certain credibility to the narrative. Usually it is the Malay tao that speaks, at the risk of his life, about the
evils perpetrated by the mestizo caciques. Mayo portrays herself as a selfless spokesperson for those oppressed by caciques:

I want to inform about you and your country to my own people. Whatever you say and whatever my eyes see, I will do my best faithfully to convey to them without any color and favor. And if you desire it, in reporting you I will withhold your name, although to do so weakens testimony.

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I wish to declare that I have made what amends I can for exposing its author by printing it. That is to say, I shall be informed by cable of, after its publication, any reprisals, direct or indirect, are begun upon the man who has risked his life to lay his people’s case before America.

We must not forget the political context in which Mayo exposes the truth about the cacique-dominated society. The last sentence above is tendentious since Mayo implies a “reign of terror” in the Philippines in the aftermath of a decade of Filipinization. As a matter of fact, the title Isles of Fear implicitly suggests this backdrop of “reign of terror.” As Worcester did before, Mayo makes generalizations out of a few particular cases. One wonders if the people she interviewed were not co-opted ad hoc to exaggerate the facts and damn the so-called caciques. We mustn’t forget that the Schurman and Taft commissions made use of testimonies by the most rude and ignorant informants in order to demonstrate the Filipinos’ unfitness for self-government.

From the very beginning the reader can see that the book is subservient to American imperialism and that its main objective is to reverse the process of independence for the archipelago:

For some few years past, we, the American people, have been vaguely aware of a sensation of “unrest” in the region of the

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12 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear..., p. 77.
Philippine Islands—and of Voices, once and again, asking for Philippine independence.\textsuperscript{13}

By “sensation of unrest,” Mayo is referring to the demoralized condition of the Insular government that Leonard Wood discovered when he took over. This demoralization was due to the policy of overhasty Filipinization by Wood’s predecessor. She explains in detail that the fruit of Filipinization was a legislature composed of caciques who used nepotism and graft to attain and hold on to power.

There are eight chapters which describe to mainly the American reading public what Mayo observed and heard and above all what cacique meant and who caciques were:

Malays as they are, no caste system exists among them. And they show but two classes—the cacique, or moneyed class, which bosses and from which all politicians come; and the tao, or peasant class, which is bossed and which has, in practice, no voice whatever in governmental or political affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

This definition does not differ from that furnished by LeRoy in 1905. He presented a picture of a cacique class but was still ambiguous about its features. Mayo is quite clear in her identification: cacique is a person who has one occupation—“politics;” one industry—usury; and one hobby—gambling. Cacique was a mestizo Chinese or mestizo Spanish who exploited and oppressed the ordinary tao.

In order to display before American public opinion the despotism of the caciques—the cause of fear in the isles—Mayo uses conspicuous titles for attracting the readers. Under the chapter “The mark of the beast,” for example, she explains the basic units in politics. She states,

\textsuperscript{13} Mayo, Katherine. *The Isle of Fear…*, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{14} Mayo, Katherine. *The Isle of Fear…*, p. 10.
typically, “The political unit in the Philippine Islands is the little cacique—the small local boss. This is the key fact in the make-up of Filipino-conceived control.”

After defining the political unit—the little cacique—Mayo establishes a hierarchy of caciques since these small bosses take their orders from caciques bigger than them. At the top of this pyramid of caciques, municipal and provincial, there are the Big Caciques who have their seats in Manila. These Big Caciques have been elected through the intervention of the small caciques who use usury and peonage as channels to control public opinion. Mayo illustrates this pyramidal structure making use of particular cases to demonstrate that the cacique imposes his will through terror. This is the reason she titled this chapter “The mark of the beast.”

If caciquism for Katherine Mayo was the moral malady of the land, then usury was its curse. Mayo shows how usury was endemic in the archipelago, an existent curse before the arrival of the Spaniards. She supports her arguments by using as a reference Blair and Robertson’s multivolume work. This makes her work appear scholarly.

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15 Mayo, Katherine. *The Isle of Fear...* p. 11. The reader can find many similarities between Katherine Mayo’s *Isles of Fear* and John Sidel’s *Capital, Coercion and Crime*. The titles are quite conspicuous and directly lead the reader to a specific narrative. My attention is called to the definition of the political unit and Sidel’s chapter devoted to “Small town bosses.” Although Sidel uses a post-colonial and modern language, and he avoids use of the term cacique, he builds up his book following quite closely Mayo’s structure and narrative.

16 In 1929, Serafin E. Macaraig in *Social Problems* devoted a chapter to usury. Macaraig follows Mayo’s argument by stating that “usury is undoubtedly one of the greatest social problems in the Philippines.” Macaraig—an assistant Professor of sociology at the University of the Philippines—is an example of the triumph of the Americanization during the decade of the twenties. The Wood-Forbes report means a landmark for the policy of adjustment of the archipelago. Macaraig, like Mayo, establishes an analogy between caciquism and usury. Macaraig, Serafin E. *Social Problems*. Manila, P.I. The Education Supply Co, 1929, p. 396.
Mayo establishes connections among usury, caciques, slavery, and peonage. All of the different components of the colonial discourse developed since LeRoy’s time are now brought together and interlinked, such as in the following paragraph:

The power of the political chiefs in Manila depends on the power of the ward politicians, each in his own little place all over the land. The main grip of these minor caciques lies in the practice of money-lending at [levels of] usury, which makes them masters of the lives, including the votes, of the people.17

It is important to remind ourselves of the political context of Mayo’s “innocent” descriptions. Her emphasis on the caciques as the masters of people’s lives and votes is a subtle reference to Governor Harrison’s legislature dominated by natives, which was by Mayo’s definition a cacique legislature that fostered the money-lenders instead of, say, setting up an agricultural bank or allowing rural credit.

Perhaps the chapter that best enables us to understand the book’s intention to reverse the process of self-government and independence, is “Vultures in the Sky.” Mayo follows, practically ad literam, Worcester’s arguments in The Philippines Past and Present. This chapter aims to justify the good purposes of the Americans to the detriment of the Filipinos. Mayo specifies the cacique as hacendero (big landowner), just as Worcester had defined him in Slavery and Peonage. She justifies the implementation of the Public Land Act of 1904 and considers it as a

17 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear…, p. 29.

18 At this point it is important to note that in 1989 another journalist, Stanley Karnow, wrote a book entitled In Our Image. America’s empire in the Philippines which tried to show why the Americans failed to implement democracy in the Philippines. One of the reasons Karnow gives was that the Americans inherited the problems that the Spanish left behind in the Archipelago. Karnow asserts that “Spain left another heritage, in the form of land grants to Spanish settlers—which passed on to the rich Filipino mestizos families, created the oligarchy that wields power today,” p. 13. Karnow stresses the idea that caciquism or oligarchism was endemic before the arrival of the Americans, therefore he supports the argument furnished in 1905 by LeRoy. But it is significant to establish a parallelism
good law, which made liberal provisions for the small landowner. However, this good law was infringed upon with the arrival of the Democrats who handed governmental control over to the natives:

The Bureau of the Lands felt the effect promptly. The American Director of Lands, known as one of the most efficient men in the Insular service, was removed in favor of a young “cacique,” himself a large landowner of Nueva Ecija.\[19\]

The reference is to Manuel Tinio, of course, but Mayo does not mention his name at any time. She alludes to him as that man or cacique director who urged for his own “purse” and the purses of other caciques, the passage of a new Land Act. This new law allegedly destroyed the livelihoods of poor Filipinos who could not then escape from slavery.

In sum the Americans did their best for the advancement of the Filipino people, Mayo states in the finest literary language. Whatever was done to their harm, loss and oppression was done by the Filipino himself. This categorical statement is supported by some witnesses, such as the one who is quoted by Mayo as saying that “The American government is the best we ever had. But our politicos—our caciques—they want the independence from America in order to get more personal power for themselves.”\[20\]

Through her account of “the truth about the Philippines,” Mayo was informing the reader that the U.S. administration in the Philippines under Leonard Wood was rescuing the Filipinos from actual ruin. The

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19 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear..., p. 50.
20 Mayo, Katherine. The Isle of Fear..., p. 74.
American system was far from the cacique system exemplified by the behavior of the oppressive Filipino *politicos*. Wood was liberating the Filipino masses from the “retrogression” suffered during Harrison’s administration. Mayo was implicitly calling for a return to the old methods instituted by Taft. And no way should the Americans leave, for the immediate result would be strife, disorder and bloodshed.

*The Isles of Fear* became a success and Mayo got to popularize her views even more by publishing articles in newspapers and magazines. *The Washington Post* published, for example, “Mountaineers of the Philippines, anxious that America keep the Isles, see warfare under Filipino rule.” This article was extracted from her book. She asked the rhetorical question, what would happen if the “mountaineers” desired the independence of the Philippines, the establishment of native government and the withdrawal of America? The response to this question is contained in her testimonies, which are made to collectively protest: “If America goes we shall be exploited and maltreated worse than the Spaniards ever maltreated the Filipinos.”

The pattern developed by Mayo is familiar to us by now: a dichotomy between “bad Filipino and Spaniard” and “good American.” She had contributed to the misrepresentation of the Christian Filipinos as tyrannical, despotic, oppressor and corrupt; while the non-Christians were simply shown as semi-savage tribes.

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21 ‘Mountaineers of the Philippines, anxious that America keep Isles see warfare under Filipino rule.’ *The Washington Post*, 1926. Dean C. Worcester papers.
The decade of the twenties produced other important publications which emphasized “the renaissance of the Taft era” and above all the Americanization of the archipelago. The arguments about caciquism as a malady of local government had triumphed and a new generation of American-educated Filipino scholars such as Serafin Macaraig considered caciquism as their own pathology.

The Philippines A Study in National Development the culmination of the discourse

The development of the discourse, whose genealogy started during the Schurman Commission and took shape with James LeRoy, culminated with Joseph Ralston Hayden’s *The Philippines A Study in National Development*, published in 1947. This book was addressed mainly to political science students and other scholars. This work was to be part of Hayden’s courses on colonial policy—such as “Modern Imperialism.” Some chapters clearly follow the pattern established in 1905 by LeRoy, a reference in Hayden’s courses.

We observed in an earlier chapter that the Schurman report gave shape to the traditional image of the “dark age” of Spanish rule. Hayden supported this image and quoted the Commission report at length:

The Report of the First Philippine Commission contained the following observations upon the general government of the Islands at the end of the Spanish regime: “It failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government—the preservation of the peace

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22 David P. Barrows published a revised edition of *History of the Philippines*. Barrows was to devote a chapter to the retrogression of the Filipinization. This book was published in 1925 and 1926; Nicholas Roosevelt (1926): *The Philippines: A Treasure and a Problem*; William Cameron Forbes waited until 1928 to publish *The Philippine Islands*. Forbes was to support the policy implemented by Stimson—the new governor-general of the Philippines.

and order, and even the administration of justice; nor can there be any doubt that it provided an engine of oppression and exploitation of the Filipinos.”

Hayden set out to produce a new study of Filipino politics, escaping from the structure of conventional textbooks. But whenever he probed deeply into the dysfunctions in the development of Filipino politics, he always seemed to encounter their origins in the Spanish regime.

Moreover, we have seen in this thesis how James LeRoy effectively introduced to the American public a social and political malady called caciquism that could be blamed for the problems they were having in governing the Philippines. Hayden referred to this topic throughout his book. Caciquism and caciques are illustrated specifically in the chapter devoted to local self-government. Hayden considered local politics as an arena dominated by petty tyranny.

However, we must note an important difference in Hayden’s work. This book was written after the independence of the Philippines in 1946. Thus, he is subtler in the language he uses, although the content is the same.

Hayden begins his book by boasting about the successful experiment introduced in the Philippines:

The American-Philippine relationship has, on the whole, been happier and more fruitful than any other which has existed in modern times between a dominant and a dependent people. Although mistakes have been made by the sovereign power, it may be fairly said that the US has applied the principle of trusteeship in dealing with the Philippines.

Seemingly, there is a tacit recognition that the Americans had made mistakes. However, this admission is only partial since the mistakes are only conferred upon Harrison’s term. The experiment in Filipino self-government introduced by Governor Harrison led to involution and retrogression by leaving in Filipino hands too much responsibility for which they were not prepared. Hayden notes this “blunder” in the preface. But he will not miss the chance to look at Harrison’s term in other chapters.

The first chapter follows the pattern of the official history of the American regime and this is, in fact, the emplotment of the book. Hayden introduces the Filipino people under the guise of an ethnographic survey. The discourse does not differ from those displayed by earlier American reports. Hayden concludes in this section that “the most important political consequence of the diversity of tongues in the Philippines is that the absence of a common language is an impediment to the development of national and democratic institutions in the Islands.”

After the granting of independence, authoritative writers like Hayden were still presenting a picture of a fragmented country populated by heterogeneous people, a hindrance to the normal development of a democracy. The educated, wealthy, and powerful Filipinos in all parts of the Archipelago possessed a common language, English or Spanish, plus local languages while the masses still had effective command only of their local idioms. This is one of the reasons, Hayden says, why the wealthy and educated have become the bosses or caciques of their towns,

and the despotism of these caciques was what hindered the development of national and democratic institutions. In fact, Hayden tried to present an image of political disunity in the archipelago.

We have seen that Hayden in the preface admitted some mistakes. However, several pages later he praises the achievements of the American government. He highlights education as the cornerstone of the American administration. Lamentably, education had not shown itself to be a solution at the local level:

Yet through influence over the justice of the peace courts and other agencies of local government, through the operation of laws favoring the usurer and the land grabber, and even more as a result of the tenacity of ancient customs, the rich exploit the poor, and the barefooted tao still stands in a world removed from the sophisticated ilustrado upon whom he is economically and politically dependent.27

At this point Hayden starts to develop two important arguments. The first one is that inherent in Philippine society is the tendency towards an oligarchic government based on “personalism”—a word Hayden uses quite often through his book. The second argument is that Filipinos still engage in the corruption inherited from the centuries of being under Spanish administration.

These arguments in the first chapter are developed in detail in the chapter titled Local Self-government. This chapter, according to Hayden, is fundamental to understanding why the American institutions implanted in the Philippines did not take work in the end. Hayden explains that Filipino self-government was traditionally rooted in the barangays, the original settlement units. When the Americans occupied the archipelago,

they were confronted with these deep-rooted political units. They could not eradicate traditional customs in these political units. Instead, they had to adapt their policies to local Filipino behavior.  

Hayden emphasizes throughout the book the power of the barrios (i.e., barangays) and municipalities, which are defined by him as “the arenas in which leaders and families fight for power; and almost every voter is a partisan of one faction or the other.” The argument was not new. The Wood-Forbes report had similarly emphasized the strong power of the local families and the prevalence of “personalism.” This cultural feature of personalism, says Hayden, ensured that national politicians were virtually local heroes and the champions of their towns and provinces. It all starts at the municipal level; “For the common man, political favors or oppression come most often from the mayor, the chief of police, the justice of the peace or the local boss.” Hayden constructed a picture of Philippine politics as a pyramid of personal

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28 This argument emerged by Ralston Hayden will have continuity in the 1970s at the University of Michigan with the book entitled Compadre Colonialism. Norman Owen in ‘Philippine Society and American Colonialism’ emphasizes the fact the Americans had to sacrifice an efficient implementation of their institutions in order not to alter Philippine society, pp. 6-7.  
29 Ralston Hayden J. The Philippines A Study in National Development, p. 261. Alfred McCoy in An Anarchy of Families produces the same argument in 1994: “The volume’s familial approach to Philippine politics carries with it a series of linked hypotheses: (a) the family-based oligarchies are, to state the obvious, a significant factor in Philippine history; (b) that relations among these elite families have a discernible influence on the course of Philippine politics; (c) that elite families, organized on complex patterns of bilateral kinship, bring a contradictory mix of unified kinship networks and a fissiparous, even volatile, factionalism into the political arena; and (d) that the interaction between powerful rent-seeking families and a correspondingly weak Philippine state has been synergistic; McCoy, Alfred W. (ed.), An Anarchy of Families. State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994, p. 19. McCoy uses a more sophisticated language to define the same type of political behaviour as Ralston Hayden did in 1947. Both of them agree that familism and factionalism are interacting factors for the maintenance of the flawed political structure of the Philippines. These interacting factors have created a weak state which ensured failure of the implementation of American democracy in the Philippines. In the case of McCoy, Cory Aquino’s administration failed to implant a true democracy since she herself was part of the family-based oligarchy. In sum, Filipino traditions could not be surmounted by the Americans. The failure in the making of a showcase of American democracy is attributed to deep-rooted Filipino modes of behaviour. There is not a single mention of the idea that the Americans needed and used for their own political and economic purposes the so-called family-based oligarchies by furnishing their power.  
relationships, reinforced by economic dependence or oppression. This pyramidal structure is reinforced by the prevalence of usury and graft.

Another image presented by Hayden in the “local self-government” chapter is that of a centralized administrative system. This centralization was a heritage from the Spanish regime.\(^3\) As we have seen in previous chapters, this argument was not new. Hayden echoes other authors who repeated this point over the fifty years of American rule. This categorical assertion is enabled by the tacit negation of the Maura law which attempted, and up to a certain extent achieved, the creation of a decentralized administration in the Spanish colony. It was the Americans who, in fact, again centralized the administration by exercising a large amount of supervision over the municipalities through the provincial and insular authorities.

In any case, according Hayden, the tradition of Spanish centralization undermined the development of local autonomy which the Americans and Filipinos desired. Centralization has proven to be very difficult to reduce both because it is “an ingrained Filipino practice” and because it has served the necessary purpose of keeping the less-advanced municipalities and provinces up to a minimum standard of honesty and efficiency.\(^3\)

Hayden bemoans the fact that there was an increase of centralization during the American regime. This was one of the negative

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\(^3\) McCoy in *An Anarchy of Families* emphasizes this argument of a powerful central bureaucracy furnished by the Spanish regime, which American inherited and extended. He states: “American colonials extended the powers of the central bureaucracy they had inherited from Spain,” p. 11. Needless to say, McCoy is denying the implementation of Maura law. The Americans found an incipient decentralized administration, precisely the underside of their argument.

effects of the Filipinization period under Harrison: “As power has passed into Filipino hands the trend towards the autonomous and democratic control over local affairs which was the distinguishing characteristic of American policy with reference to local government down to 1913, seems to have been reversed.”³³ There is an implicit suggestion here that the Filipino leaders themselves reversed the move towards autonomy in local government introduced by Taft in 1901. Filipinos themselves undertook to centralize their administration, betraying the altruistic intentions of the Americans and reverting to a practice of Spanish times.

Hayden’s argument about centralization as an effect of Filipinization had a definite purpose: to insist upon the persistence of caciquism or bossism in Philippine politics. The persistence of this evil is illustrated by a specific case, brought out by Worcester and emphasized by Williams and Mayo—that of General Manuel Tinio,³⁴ director of the Bureau of Lands during Harrison’s term. While Hayden recognized a certain degree of quality in Philippine local government, he lamented the fact that most of provinces still suffered a measure of weakness in local government. He draws an example from Nueva Ecija, a province which “has long been known as a centre of caciquism. For years the political

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³⁴ In 1981, Lewis Gleeck stated that “General Tinio was not only the supreme cacique of Nueva Ecija, but because of his absolute domination of the province came to symbolize, for the outside world from Katherine Mayo to Ralston Hayden, the very prototype of the species.” Nueva Ecija in American Times: Homesteaders, Hacenderos & Politicos. Historical Conservation Society XXXIII, Manila, 1981, p. 130. Gleeck devotes a section entitled General Tinio, the Prototype of the cacique. Gleeck, in order to foster the figure of General Tinio as the supreme cacique, cites ad literam Ralston Hayden’s argument. For Gleeck, Hayden had put the case lucidly and emphatically with respect to the sources of powers of the office and those of a cacique like Tinio. This example demonstrates de facto the continuity of the discourse engendered by Worcester in The Philippines Past and Present. There is not any allusion to the creation of a misleading narrative with the aim of reversing the period of Filipinization. Be what as it may, if General Tinio were the prototype of the cacique we should not forget that Tinio’s power was fostered by the Americans, specifically William Cameron Forbes.
machine of the province was under the control of General Manuel Tinio.  

Hayden illustrates the case of General Tinio using statements of witnesses—just as Worcester and Katherine Mayo had done previously—in order to categorize Tinio as a local tyrant whom few Filipinos dared to resist. Indirectly, Hayden was arguing that greed, brutality and power came together in the practice of local government. These abuses of misgovernment, tyranny and dishonesty are identified with Governor Harrison’s term of office. Indeed, asserts Hayden, when Filipinos were completely in control with scarcely a pretence of American supervision and inspection, the quality of local government declined. Even Governor Leonard Wood was unable to prevent or to punish violations. Local government had become a bastion of tyranny and an anarchy in the Islands.

Hayden regrets that the era of reform inaugurated by Leonard Wood was too brief to fully purge the system of certain unfortunate qualities that resulted in handicaps to good government everywhere. And unfortunately these handicaps had been accentuated by a Filipino tradition and experience of local rule shaped by their long history. A considerable number of the 15 per cent of the people at the top were still able to use the agencies of local government to control and exploit some members of the 85 per cent at the bottom. The message is pretty clear: although the Americans tried, they could not eradicate an endemic

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Filipino disease. What the ills of local government showed was the persistence of caciquism.

In sum, Hayden was following the practice established in the 1920s of demonizing the Filipinization of the administration under Harrison’s governorship. He instead praised the revitalization of Philippine administration during Wood’s term, which was characterized by the fostering of the spirit as well as form of American government. Hayden notes approvingly that the reversal of the Filipinization movement gave way to the further Americanization of the archipelago.

Finally, we need to look closely at what Hayden said about party politics in the Philippines, for this inaugurated an important issue that would be taken up by later scholars. Hayden concluded that the party system of the Islands was organized and functioned primarily with reference to just two things: the independence issue and the personalities of a handful of leaders. Hayden seems to infer that this type of party system was fostered by the advent of President Wilson’s administration. Party policies were shaped, it seems, primarily with reference to the overshadowing issue of independence rather than to the everyday problems of Philippine life; thus, “to a considerable extent Philippine parties were abnormal as compared with modern parties in an independent state.” Political scientists like Carl Landé, as we shall see, would build on this idea later.

In 1946 the Philippines had come of age, to follow the discourse inaugurated by Taft in 1900. As if to mark this event, Hayden’s The

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"Philippine A Study in National Development" was published around this time. For Hayden’s book also represents the coming of age, or the triumph, of the discourse on Filipino politics inaugurated in 1905 by LeRoy’s *Our Spanish Inheritance*. Its not-so-subtle message was that Filipinos were finally independent, but the Americans still considered them unfit for this independence. Deeply-rooted Filipino traditions, customs, habits and a historical heritage had resulted in an independent but dysfunctional political regime in which an oppressive and tyrannical system called “caciquism” still prevailed.

In 1963 Charles O. Houston, Professor Emeritus of Social Science at the Western Michigan University made the following observation about American scholarship during the early decades of the century:

> The Library’s collection is extremely rich in the period 1898 and contains as well matter on the preceding period which reflects the interests and biases of Americans who were concerned with Philippine affairs in the opening years of this century. Enough was discovered to make necessary and almost complete revision of the history of the period 1898-1934, and which makes tendentious or misleading most works printed about the Philippines since 1900.

This powerful statement by Houston, who was then doing research in the Library of Congress, does not seem to have been picked up by other scholars. I have tried in this thesis to revisit the period from 1898 to 1946 through textbooks, journals, newspapers, primary sources and personal correspondence. The official history is tendentious and misleading, indeed, but despite Houston’s strong words the decade of the

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39 Charles O. Houston earned a doctoral degree in absentia from Columbia University in 1952 while he was teaching at the University of the Philippines. He also served as associate curator at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C.

40 Manuscripts and other material relating to the Philippines in the Manuscript Divisions, Library of Congress.
1960s witnessed a continuity of the discourse. I would like to close this thesis by examining two important books that follow the legacy of Hayden (and those before him) although using post-colonial language and ostensibly new methodological and theoretical frameworks.

Mary Racelis Hollnsteiner, a pioneering Filipino political scientist, argues in her book, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality*, that political parties coalesced around important elite families of the towns which traced their rivalries back to the Spanish era. Her argument lends support to earlier views about the prevalence of family ties in local political contests. Hollnsteiner also states that elections were not much more than just “factions forming about certain personalities.”

Hayden had said the same thing in the 1940’s. After seventeen years of independence Filipinos in Hollnsteiner’s time still were unable to transcend their party platforms based on loyalty, debts of gratitude, patron-client relationships, and the like. Hollnsteiner’s study in turn had an influence on Carl Landé, whose *Leaders, factions and parties. The Structure of Philippine politics* has become a standard reference for the study of Philippine politics.

Landé’s work should be contextualized within the emergence of Southeast Asian Studies in the United States. Landé, with the encouragement of Harry Benda, inaugurated a framework for Philippine

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42 Hollnsteiner, Mary R. *The Dynamics of Power...*, p. 40.
studies while at Yale University which would be widely used and cited.\textsuperscript{43} Beneath the new vocabulary of Political Science, however, we can readily identify in Lande’s work the arguments put forward earlier by Hayden. “Leaders,” after all, can mean the same as Hayden’s “personalities,” while the other two terms—factions and parties—are prevalent in Hayden’s statements about local self-government being plagued by factionalism and an abnormal party system.

Hayden’s asserted that political parties in the Philippines were all the same in being only interested in the issue of independence rather than problems of normal life. Landé also sees the two major political parties in the Philippines as being really “quite identical.”\textsuperscript{44} Whereas Hayden assumed that the party system was built upon personal interest instead of principles, Landé asserts that

Behavioral patterns rooted in the Philippine kinship system is structured less by organized interest groups or by individual who in politics think of themselves as members of categories, i.e. of distinctive social classes or occupations, than by a network of mutual aid relationships between pairs of individual— dyadic ties with significance for Philippine politics are vertical ones bonds between prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients.\textsuperscript{45}

Landé’s “dyadic ties” between patron-client corresponds to the stereotypical relationship narrated by Hayden in his \textit{Local self-government} where the patron is the cacique and the clients are the exploited taos. The patron-client relationship is arguably the same as the relationship established by Worcester between the caciques and his peons—that is, Worcester’s famed peonage system. The patronage

\textsuperscript{43} Carl Lande was to influence scholars as Glenn May, Alfred McCoy, John Sidel and Paul Hutchcroft who have followed a similar pattern.

\textsuperscript{44} Landé, Carl H. \textit{Leaders, Factions and Parties. The structure of Philippine Politics.} Monograph Series, No. 6. Southeast Asia Studies Yale University, 1964, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{45} Landé, Carl H. \textit{Leaders, Factions and Parties...}, p. 1.
system is, in fact, licit and legitimate. Caciquism is, in fact, a patronage system. However, the discourse of dyadic ties from the sixties and the genealogy of caciquism from 1905 onwards, have given these terms connotations that are completely derogatory.

Hayden in 1947 stated that the municipalities were “the arenas in which leaders and families fought for power, and almost every voter was a partisan of one faction or the other.” Landé in 1964 states, “The character of Philippine parties is determined more by local considerations than by national ones.” Therefore, the building blocks of the national political party system were the local parties, such as Hayden showed in 1947.

Landé emphasizes the domination of the families using a more sophisticated language: “Local faction is an amorphous cluster or constellation of political leaders or families and their respective followers drawn together by a web of personal ties.” This statement links up to Hayden’s argument that the Philippine parties were abnormal as compared to modern parties in an independent state. Landé stresses this abnormality noted by Hayden by dating the Philippine party system back to the Spanish regime or system, which accentuated the power of families in the Philippines.

Landé’s interpretation of history after the U.S. takeover of the islands boils down to the fact that “the Americans began to prepare the Philippines for eventual independence by entrusting Filipinos rather quickly with the control of a wide variety of representative

46 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties..., p. 6.
47 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties..., p. 7.
The words “rather quickly” seem to be a reference to the Filipinization policy of Harrison. But overall the statement is quite misleading since the Americans were not actually preparing the Filipinos for their independence. On the contrary by giving control to the natives they entrenched their power over the Philippines. As early as 1900, as we have seen in previous chapters, the U.S. administration encouraged a patronage system by using its powers of appointment. As LeRoy explained in 1905 to Roosevelt, they must use the “patron,” “boss” or “cacique” for “our interest,” to increase American control. The system implanted by the Americans was legitimate. The problems arise when they systematically deny that they themselves furnished the institutions of “patronage” or “caciquism” since their intention was altruistic.

In sum, Landé shows that despite the vigorous attempts at change by American administrators and the constant infusion of American ideals and institutions for nearly half a century, the political institutions of the Philippines were, are, and always will be, the natural product of a tropical Asiatic people who for three hundred years were governed by the Spanish.

We must not underestimate the continuous assumption, from the works of LeRoy to that of Landé, that the long duration of Spanish rule had left a lasting imprint on the way Philippine politics would take shape in the twentieth century. It is therefore not surprising that further scholarship on Philippine politics in the seventies and eighties would continue to extrapolate to the Philippines certain Spanish or Latin

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48 Landé, Carl H. Leaders, Factions and Parties..., p. 28.
American terms—e.g., caudillo, caudillaje—with which to frame Filipino political behavior.

The use of such terminology continues to encapsulate the Philippines within the Spanish empire as a whole—a project initiated, as we have seen, by LeRoy, Blair, and Robertson. Up to a certain extent, modern scholars see more similarities between the Philippines and Latin America rather than Southeast Asia. They consider phenomena such as caciquism, compadrazgo or “bossism” as uniquely Filipino owing to historical circumstances, with little or no comparisons in Southeast Asia.\[49\] Although they try to escape from clichés such as caciquism, behind their political analyses we can discern the ghosts of “our Spanish inheritance.”

In short, we can conclude that while new terminologies have appeared since 1946 for the study of Philippine politics, a discursive transformation has really not taken place. The discourse of the “dark age” of Spanish rule first elaborated upon by James LeRoy, and further developed by Blair and Robertson, Bourne, Worcester, Williams, Mayo, Hayden and others, continues to flourish up to the present day.

\[49\] This approach has had continuity in John Sidel’s *Capital, Coercion and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* and Paul Hutchcroft’s *Booty capitalism*, among others.
Epilogue

This thesis has challenged and pursued two main arguments, which interact with each other. The first argument is that American scholarship has played a crucial role in the portrayal of a “dark age” of Spanish rule in its vast empire. It is important to note that the medievalism conferred upon the Spanish system did not emerge in 1898. The Americans started to outline this image during the mid-nineteenth century, when the U.S. administration decided to annex Texas and California, territories which had belonged to Spain. The books published during those years presented a misleading Spanish history by which Spain was depicted as medieval, anachronistic, decrepit, and the like. In fact, in order to support the image of medievalism the Americans introduced their books with a picture of a medieval knight.

The picture of a Spanish medieval knight was mobilized to justify the American occupation and conquest of the Philippines. At this point the other main argument of this thesis emerges: the American construction of Philippine history. As early as 1898 the American administration put into motion the machinery to write a history of the Philippines which differed from the reality but which has since been perpetuated, thanks to the homogeneity of the imperialist discourse. The imperialists were able to rely on the support of Christian reverends, universities, publishers, private collectors and the like in the face of a heterogeneous anti-imperialist group constituted by writers such as Mark Twain as well as Americans whose deep racial prejudice led them to
become anti-imperialist. They considered the Filipinos as an inferior race, not advanced enough to participate in the political life of the American people and therefore destined to remain an alien people. This heterogeneity of the anti-imperialist group and the suppression of important books which advocated for the independence of the Philippines facilitated the triumph of the imperialist discourse in the academe.

In spite of antagonistic perspectives about the future of the Philippines and the Filipinos, imperialists and anti-imperialist attained a consensus when they described the Spanish colonial system. For instance, the reverend Josiah Strong, a recalcitrant imperialist full of racial prejudices stated in 1898:

We have freed the Filipinos from the abuses of Spanish rule. We cannot have them to drift alone on a dark aimless sea. We must save these less fortunate people from barbarism. We must patiently and with kindness teach theses people to govern themselves and enjoy the blessing of Christian civilization.50

This idea of a tyrannical Spanish rule was corroborated by anti-imperialists such as Mark Twain who thought that liberating the Filipinos from “the government under which they had suffered for three hundred years was a good business for us to be in.”51

Josiah Strong and Mark Twain outlined a picture of the “dark age” of Spanish rule. Strong was more convincing than Twain in his discourse since he was able to indoctrinate his parishioners into the necessity of holding the archipelago and to influence McKinley, Roosevelt and Root about adopting a paternalistic discourse. Strong instituted two false premises that justified the conquest of the Philippines. On the one hand,

50 Address of the Reverend Josiah Strong delivered before the United States Missionary Council in Boston, 1898. Letters/Speeches from Imperialism Simulation.
51 Mark Twain Home, New York Tribune. [New York, October, 15, 1900].
he depicted the Filipinos as backward people, primitive and pagan. This picture fitted into the colonial discourse as a whole, in the so-called white man’s burden. In fact, it was a common colonial pretext for the intervention by Great Britain, France and Holland in Southeast Asia. But, the case of the Philippines was not comparable since in 1898 the Filipinos became independent for a brief period and they continued to demand their independence. The Philippines was the most modern country in Southeast Asian with an important number of educated natives, familiar with liberal ideas, European manners, and the like. In spite of the American construction by which the United States needed to make heroic efforts to free the oppressed and teach “millions of ignorant people with a diversity of languages,” Spanish was the language of the 60 per cent of the population. Actually Spanish was the official language and as Galicano Apacible stated in 1898, the Spaniards had never denied citizenship to the Filipinos.

The Philippines had become the most important colony for the Spaniards and this importance was reflected in the books and newspapers. In fact, the Spanish administration from 1868 to the collapse of the empire implemented many reforms in order to restructure an old administration in the archipelago. Perhaps the most relevant reforms were institutional at the municipal and judicial levels. However, from Josiah Strong onwards this “modernism” of the late colonial Philippines was depicted as its opposite: “backwardness.”

The other false premise of Strong, inextricably related to the apparent barbarism of the Filipinos, is the idea of the Manifest Destiny of
the United States. Strong and his Missionary Council did not support a grab for empire, but they supported a paternal relationship of their government with the Philippines. God had outfitted the Americans with the task to teach millions of ignorant, debased human beings how to live. “It is a divine mission.”

Strong was shaping the later report of the Schurman Commission and was debunking the promise of independence made to Aguinaldo.

As has been explained in this thesis, Aguinaldo received a promise of independence and there are sources which *de facto* corroborate this promise. But perhaps the most explicit source is a letter written by Aguinaldo to President McKinley. Aguinaldo realized the Americans had used him to expel the Spaniards from the Philippines and he stated categorically “Mr. President, you know we will not willingly surrender our freedom. If you do not withdraw your army, there will be a war.”

The Schurman Commission came to the Philippines seemingly to pacify the archipelago, but failed to do so. However, it set four important precedents. Schurman wrote the most exhaustive history of Spanish rule, shaping the contours of the “dark age” by concluding that the Spanish system failed to accomplish even the primary ends of good government. Moreover, Schurman constructed a discourse that emphasized the “black legend” of the Filipino Republic, demonstrating the incapacity of the Filipinos to govern themselves by examining a great number of witnesses. These witnesses were deliberately co-opted and Schurman concluded that most of the Filipinos did not want independence. Needless

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52 Address of the Reverend Josiah Strong delivered before the U.S. Missionary Council in Boston, 1898.
53 Letter from Emilio Aguinaldo to President McKinley. Letters/Speeches for Imperialism Simulation.
to say the witnesses were favorable to the American occupation, becoming, thus, the *vox populi* of the Philippines. Schurman laid the foundation for the further development of the discourses of “caciquism” besides supporting the idea of a perennial chaos, anarchy and incipient oligarchism in the islands. Finally, the Commission predicted that the Filipinos would become more Americans than themselves.

This optimistic view, as this thesis has argued, soon became a problem and even a burden for the Americans. A terrible war ensued, which demonstrated that the Filipinos were more prepared for their self-government as the Americans had in fact foreseen. But the Americans, intending to stay, needed to reverse the arguments and what originally was a “war,” such as Aguinaldo stated to McKinley, become known as an “insurgency” for a hundred years. The reality of the Filipino-American war was concealed in the American libraries under the entries of “insurgency” until 1998. Those so-called “collaborators” of the Americans became a burden when they started in 1904 to complain of the imperialistic government implemented by the United States. As for the Filipinos who would become more American than the people from the United States, they remained a “problem” until the decade of the 1920s. David P. Barrows stated in the Eighth Annual Report of the Commission (1908) that “Spanish continues to be the most important language spoken in political, journalistic and commercial circles.”

The Imperialists did not give up the fight, and so to construct their version of Filipino history they started to reverse the arguments so as not...

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to concede more self-government to the recalcitrant Filipinos. They invented an exploitative system such as caciquism which sometimes was a Spanish inheritance and at other times inherent in the Filipino ethos. This argument would emerge during the periods of crisis when the Filipinos thought they had come of age to govern themselves or to achieve the ultimate goal of independence.

We can conclude that the Americans finally achieved their objectives and the Filipinos forgot their war, assumed that there was a repugnant system called caciquism, and became Americanized. Today few Filipinos know that their forebears such as Agoncillo, Apacible or Sixto Lopez brought anticolonial discourse to the debate about imperialism within the U.S. since they are rarely mentioned in histories of the anti-imperialist movement. Their role in the debate was important for a number of reasons. Most importantly, Filipino opposition to the U.S. rule gave the Anti-Imperialist League justification for its work. Lamentably, this political effervescence came to an end when Leonard Wood became the governor-general of the Philippines and implanted a policy of involution. At that point, the Filipinos had been Americanized.

This thesis has not aimed to provide a definitive and deterministic history. On the contrary, it has been an invitation to revisit and to re-write the history of the period from 1898 to 1946. I have tried to present an alternative to the dominant history of so-called Spanish [mis]rule or the Spanish medieval yoke. At present we still do not know the true impact of Spanish reformism since we are not familiar enough with the important Spanish historiography on the Philippines that emerged during
the nineteenth century, and we have not made any survey of the rich archives with this aim in mind. Therefore it is not rare to find the image generated by the Americans a century ago still being reproduced today. It still seems natural to assume that “the religious orders, the army and an obsolete, despotic administration, in spite of an assimilist discourse of the Spanish administration, controlled until the end the influences of the colonial machinery.”55 This citation is an example of the Spanish Imperial School which has established chronological markers such as, for example, that Philippine history starts with the arrival of Legazpi and finishes in 1898. The Philippines is to this date still encapsulated in Departments of “Historia de América” (Latin American History), such as Blair and Robertson, in their *Philippine Islands 1493-1898*, conceived of the archipelago a hundred years ago. This thesis has sought to uncover the lineages of, and ultimately challenge, such stereotypical images.

aniquilar had several acceptations in Spanish in the nineteenth century, one of them which has fallen into disuse is “to humiliate.” Aniquilar was translated by the Americans into “annihilate.” The Spanish term differs from the English one. A possible translation could be “to destroy” but never to kill in mass.

cacicazgo This term was used by the Spaniards as early as the fifteenth century. The first edition of the RAE (1729) defined cacicazgo as dignity of the cacique or noble among the Indios; it is also taken by the territory or dominion the cacique has. In 1925, the term adopted a new acception related to the prevalent Spanish system: Autoridad or power of the cacique. At this point, cacicazgo becomes a synonymous of caciquismo. Blair and Robertson translated the term cacicazgo into caciquedom in order to infer the present evils the Americans confronted were inherited from Spanish times.

cacique This term was used by the Spaniards in the fifteenth century. The RAE defined it in 1729 as chief of vassals, or superior in the Indian province or towns: and although in many places the Indios have other names according to their languages, the Spaniards call them caciques. It seems that the Spaniards took [the name] from the Isles of Barlovento which were the first they conquered. It is a Mexican voice which means señor. This first generalization gave way to infer that the term cacique was used in the Philippines as well. This term underwent a change in 1884 related to the Spanish democratic system. At that moment, the term such as emerged in the literature acquired a derogatory meaning figuratively: any principal person in a town which exerted excessive influence in political and administrative matters. Far from these definitions, the caciques were an essential vehicle in the

1 I have used to define this term the Diccionario de la Lengua Castellana por la Real Academia Española. Decimatercia Edición, Año 1899. I have chosen this year as a marker since the Filipinos used these words such as the RAE defined at the turn of the nineteenth century.
democratic mechanism since they were able to attract the masses to the national life, exerting their votes.

caciquismo

excessive influence of the caciques in the towns. At the opening of the twentieth century the term degenerated to political system in which there is no more law than the will of the caciques. This definition is related to the criticisms of the regenerationists. This is the acceptation taken by LeRoy in 1905 and prevailing in the present literature. However caciquism is a political system, a form of socialization of the constitutional mechanism in the Spanish Restoration (1875-1923). It was the formal framework of liberalism. In fact caciquism is a patronage system.

compadrazgo

This term appeared in the first edition of the dictionary of *RAE*. In 1729 it meant the resulting connection or kinship among the godfather and the parents of baptized children. In 1884, coinciding with the Restoration, the term acquired a derogatory meaning developing in Spanish into *compadraje* union and concert of several persons to praise and to assist each other.

compadre

means godfather. There is a second acceptation: In Andalucia and other places vulgar people call *compadres* to their friends, and it becomes a way of greeting when they meet each other. In 1884, compadre takes a new acceptation: protector, benefactor. This is the meaning the Americans co-opted. *Compadre* such as has been used in the Philippines has become a synonymous of crony.

caudillo

In 1899, this word meant head/leader and superior who leads and orders the army. Head and director of a guild, community or body.

clase directora

was the classic terminology used in the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century to define the political class or ruling class.

dictator

In 1899, meant supreme magistrate among the old Romans to whom appointed the consuls during dangerous times for the Republic in order to rule as sovereign. In some modern republics, supreme magistrate with extraordinary faculties as those of Roman dictator.
filibustero This term appeared for first time in the RAE in 1869 defined as pirates who in the seventeenth century invaded the West Indian seas. In 1899 at the request of Retana, a filibustero was who works for the emancipation of “our” overseas provinces.

ladrón who robs or steals something.

ladronismo This term does not exist in the dictionary of RAE. I have found it used in some countries of Latin American as a synonymous of caciquism, compadraje or tyranny.

latrofaccioso This word has not any entry in the dictionary of RAE. It is composed of two words –ladrón and faccioso which means armed rebel. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries latrofaccioso was used to designate the bandits in Spain.

peonage meant until 1822 group of peons or infantry soldiers. The term peona[g]e changed in 1822 to peona[j]e with the same meaning. The change of the consonant took place in order to distinguish the Spanish etymology from the new connotations the term was acquiring in Latin American. Peonage emerged in Mexico, after the collapse of the empire with a new meaning: a system by which the debtors are bound in servitude to their creditors until the debts are paid. Dean C. Worcester co-opted this term in order to infer the Americans inherited this coercive system from the Spaniards.

reconcentración the reconcentration policy was implemented by Valeriano Weyler in Cuba. This term must not be confused with the concentration camps from the twentieth century since the idea of reconcentración was to move the civilians to central localizations in order to keep the Cuban civilians alive and protected from the Cubans insurgents.
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I have divided the bibliography into several sections since I have used different books and materials from the United States, Spain and the Philippines. Therefore there are three sections devoted to the Spanish regime. The first one covers the turn of the eighteenth century. The second section is devoted to part of the bibliography which emerged in the nineteenth century. I have included in this section some Filipino authors since they published most of their books in Madrid. The last section covers the collapse of the Spanish empire to the Filipino independence 1946.

There is a section devoted to American occupation from 1898 to 1946 and a Filipino section which covers the same years.

I have mentioned some journals I have used for specific years such as 1905, related to Taft’s visit to the Philippines and the emergence of caciquism, and 1913 on the rise to pre-eminence of the slavery issue.

Finally, there is a section with a general bibliography from 1949 to 2005. This general bibliography relies on some books which came out at the beginning of the twentieth century written by foreigners such as Foreman, Sawyer, and Ireland.

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