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Corporate Governance and Corruption: A Cross-Country Analysis

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Abstract

While the empirical literature on the causes of corruption has focused primarily on the demand side of corruption, that is, the corrupt officials who receive bribe payments, the role of the private sector as the supply side of corruption has not been examined thoroughly in this literature. In this paper, we argue that corporate governance is among the important factors determining the level of corruption. Using a cross-country dataset, we test hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate governance to the level of corruption. Our results show that corporate governance standards can have profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign.

Key Words: Corruption and corporate governance

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Introduction

Corporate governance has emerged as a major policy concern for many developing countries following the financial crisis in Asia, Russia and Latin America. The collapse of Enron suggests that even the highly industrialized countries such as the U.S. are not immune from the disastrous effects of bad corporate governance. Studies have shown that low corporate governance standards raise cost of capital, lower operating performance of industry, and impede the flow of investment (Daily and Dalton; Agrawal and Knoeber; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love). Following corporate scandals of Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, more and more countries have embarked on corporate governance reforms to strengthen the protection of the interests of investors.

Policy-makers around the world have another important reason to be concerned with corporate governance: poor corporate governance also breeds corruption. Corruption, defined here as the misuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 1978), has both the demand and supply sides to it. While much attention of the global anti-corruption campaign has been directed towards the demand side of corruption (Vogl), that is, the corrupt government officials, the supply side of corruption is just as important, and the role of the corporations as the main contributors of bribe payment should not be underestimated. Rules of corporate governance, such as accountability, transparency and fairness, have profound impacts on the motives and constraints for both the bribe takers and bribe payers involved in corrupt practices.

The linkage between corporate governance and corruption is especially relevant in the context of developing countries. For instance, many developing countries have embarked on various forms of market-oriented reforms to modernize their economies,

and the privatization of state-owned enterprises has often been a centerpiece of such reforms. Privatization, however, presents special challenges for both the public sector governance and corporate governance in developing countries. In some transition economies, weak corporate governance has facilitated the corrupt officials in looting the already impoverished states during the process of privatization (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova).

Globalization also poses both the opportunities and challenges to corporate governance reforms in developing countries. On the one hand, globalization can accelerate the convergence of corporate governance to international standards (Khanna, Kogan and Palepu); on the other hand, however, globalization can increase the competition for a large number of inefficient domestic firms and thus may create high pressure for them to bribe in order to survive. In addition, the role of multinational companies in the battle against corruption should not be overlooked. While they certainly are capable of making significant impacts in improving the global business environment, some recent high profile corporate bribery scandals involving multinational companies (for example, Xerox in India, IBM in Argentina and Siemens in Singapore) indicate that bribery may have been used by some multinationals as a marketing strategy to penetrate into emerging markets. Transparency International's Bribe Payers Index shows that companies from some of the leading exporting nations in the world are among the most likely to pay bribes in foreign countries to gain unfair advantages over their competitors (Transparency International). As a result, in an era of globalization bad corporate governance may facilitate the exporting of bribery practices cross the borders, and thus may undermine the effectiveness of the global anti-

corruption campaign.

A better understanding of the linkage between corporate governance and corruption is of paramount importance to a more balanced approach to corruption. While empirical studies on the causes of corruption have significantly advanced our understanding on the demand side of corruption, that is, on the motives and constraints facing public officials in corrupt practices, critical questions regarding the supply side of corruption remain unanswered.

This paper complements the existing empirical literature on corruption by explicitly exploring the linkage between corporate governance and corruption in a cross-country context. The paper proceeds as follows: the next section focuses on theories that link various aspects of corporate governance to corruption and presents several testable hypotheses. Section Three describes the data and presents empirical evidences based on a cross-country analysis. In the last section we conclude.

Corporate Governance and Corruption: Theories and Hypotheses

Corporate governance specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs (OECD). To understand how corporate governance would affect the level of corruption, we need to first study how various participants of the firms would be affected by bribery practices and why bribery practices have been pervasive in business. In this section, we focus on three questions: 1) Are bribery practices rational from the firms' perspective? 2) Why are bribery practices so pervasive

if bribery is counterproductive for firms? 3) How would good corporate governance help to reduce the level of corruption?

The Hidden Costs of Bribery

Bribery can take place in a wide spectrum of business activities over which some government officials hold discretionary powers. For example, firms may bribe public officials to avoid or reduce tax, to secure public procurement contracts, to bypass laws and regulations, or to block the entry of potential competitors. At the surface bribery seems to be cost-effective for the firms because bribe payment is often a fraction of the monetary value of the services rendered by the corrupt officials. The reason to bribe becomes even more compelling when public officials hold the power to punish the firms for not paying the bribe (revoking the business license, for example).

The seemingly justifiable bribery practices (for economic gains or for survival) have several hidden costs for the owners or the shareholders of the firms that might be overlooked, or at least underestimated. First of all, bribery exposes the firms to substantial legal and financial risks in the future. Firms involved in bribery will bear the risks of legal actions against them if the bribery acts are caught. Corporate managers who are convicted of bribery are often prosecuted under criminal laws and face not only fine but also jail sentence. There are substantial financial risks involved as well. Government may decide to nullify contracts that have been initiated or influenced by bribery, or to blacklist the firms for future government projects. In 1996, five multinational companies (Siemens, Pirelle, BICC, Marubeni and Tomen) were banned by the Government of Singapore for bidding on any government projects for five year

after their consultant was convicted of paying bribes for utilities construction contracts. For an established firm, its reputation amounts to a significant component of its overall market value and bribery practices expose the firms to the risk of losing such value. In a recent empirical study on corruption and international corporate value, Charles Lee and David Ng find that level of corruption has negative impacts on shareholder value of the firms.

Second, firms opening their doors for corruption may find it difficult to resist demands for bribery payments in the future (Rose-Acekerman, 1999). Firms with a reputation of bribing their way out are more likely to be demanded for higher bribe payment by the corrupt officials, sometimes for services that are normally free of bribery for other firms. Bribe payment from firms with such a reputation may be perceived to be "safe" from the perspective of the potential corrupt officials and they (the corrupt officials) may increase the level of bureaucratic interferences in order to secure bribe payments from these firms. As a result, firms that hope to circumvent government regulations may actually face an increased level of bureaucratic interferences. Using firm level data, Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei find that firms pay more bribes face higher, not lower, effective red tap because corrupt officials can often customize the nature and amount of harassment on firms in order to maximize bribe collection.

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of bribery for the firms is that it undermines the firms' drive in developing long-term competitive advantages. If managers realize that they can win business through bribery rather than through providing better products or services, they would be busy courting governmental officials rather than concentrating on developing the competitiveness of the firms

through innovation and better investment decisions. In 1977, when the U.S. government first enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to prevent the U.S. firms from bribing foreign public officials, the critic questioned that such a unilateral move by the U.S. government would put U.S. companies in a competitiveness disadvantage in many emerging markets. Today, multinational companies based in the U.S. have been recognized as global leaders in many fields they operate. In retrospect, tough on bribery might have forced the U.S. companies to focus their attention on developing long-term competitive advantages through innovation and better investment decisions.

In summary, bribery practices have several hidden costs for the firms that may dwarf any immediate gains from such practices, and therefore, firms should avoid or minimize the opportunities of bribery practices in order to protect the interests of the owners or shareholders.

The Principal-Agent Problem and Bribery

A distinction should be made between passive and active bribe before we proceed further. Passive bribe occurs when the firms feel that they have to pay to avoid being punished, and active bribe occurs when firms initiate the transaction of bribe payment in order to evade their responsibilities to the public or to undermine the efforts of their competitors. Such distinction is crucial because in the former case it is difficult for the firms to “opt out” of the corrupt practices, while in the latter case firms have many options available. Here we turn our attention to the latter cases.

The *principal-agent problem* or *agency problem* in modern corporate system may account for the fact that many firms do get involved in corrupt practices despite the

costs of bribery may outweigh the benefits. The principal-agent problem arises when there is a separation between those who own the firm—the principals—and those who control it—the agents, and the interests of the principals may not coincide with those of the agents. For example, while the owners (the principals) are more interested in maximizing the return for their investments in the long run, the managers (the agents) might be motivated by their own personal interests. The incentive structure for the managers differs from that of owners, and so does their time horizon and risk attitudes. Bribery may offer the managers the opportunities of cashing in on any immediate upside movement from bribery activities while leaving the future potential risks and costs to the owners or shareholders. For example, securing a public project by bribing public officials may increase the value of the cooperation for the short-run, and thus significantly increase the compensations for the managers, but the firms may be held criminally liable for the bribery involvement for the years to come and the shareholders are forced to bear such a risk. The abilities to win business through bribery may also allow non-performing managers to temporarily conceal their failure in increasing the value of the firms through strategic planning and hardworking, and bribery may actually enable the managers to shirk without facing the consequences of such behaviors.

Another dimension of the principal-agent problem arises from the divergence of interests and objectives between the inside shareholders and outside shareholders. Because of their differences in the control of top management, the access to the firm's financial information and the portfolio of holdings, inside shareholders and outside shareholders can be affected differently by bribery practices. For example, the inside shareholders, through their control of the management, can shift the burden of bribe

payments completely to the outside shareholders. The information advantage of the inside shareholders over the outside shareholders allows them to pull out quickly should anything go wrong. Inside shareholders may also have controlling stakes in multiple firms, enabling them to redistribute the costs and benefits of bribery practices among a set of different firms—a strategy that can be detrimental to the outside shareholders in these firms. A derivative suit filed by the minority shareholders of South Korea's Samsung Corporation in 2001 against the chairman and directors (mostly inside shareholders) of the company for bribery provides an excellent example of the clash between the inside shareholders and outside shareholders over the bribery practices.

Furthermore, the challenges in monitoring and controlling today's many large corporations also add multiple layers to the principal-agent problem. Many bribery cases involve low level managers and employees instead of the top management. Even if the top management may be committed to ethical business conduct, middle or low level managers may have strong incentive to boost their performance and pay through bribery, and as a result, the decisions to bribe could be made by managers at various levels without the knowledge of the top management. For example, many multinational companies have established wholly owned subsidiary companies in many regions or countries they operate, and some of these subsidiaries have become big spenders in the market for corrupt services.

Last, information asymmetry between the principals and the agents regarding bribery makes it more difficult for the owners or the shareholders to solve the principal-agent problem of bribery through monitoring. The agents have the tendency to hide any information that they think reflects poorly on them, may it be safety violation or

involvement in bribery practices. The fact that bribery is illegal and often kept in secret allows the managers (the agents) to collude with corrupt officials in deceiving the firms' owners as well as the public.

The Coordination Game and Bribery

The principal-agent model of bribery may have limited applicability in explaining the widespread bribery practices arising from two circumstances. The first is that, while we have focused our attention on the active bribe so far, many bribery practices are initiated by managers who try to avoid punishment of not paying the bribes. For example, in a society with high level of corruption, the fear of being undercut by its competitors with bribe payment forces all firms to do the same in order to survive. Under the second circumstance, the level of corruption is found very high in countries where most firms are family-owned businesses that do not encounter principal-agent problems. For example, Haider Khan questions the merit of applying the principal-agent model of corporate governance to Asia where the majority of the businesses are family-owned.

We can use a simple coordination game as follows to illustrate firms' choices in those situations. We assume two firms compete for a public contract, and the payoff matrix is shown in the table below. The number in the top-left corner in each cell represents the payoff for Firm A and the number in the bottom-right corner in each cell represents the payoff for Firm B. We assume that the firm involved in bribery can gain an unfair advantage over the other firm if the other doesn't bribe, but such gain would be offset by potential costs discussed in the last section. The firm choosing not to bribe given the other firm bribes will suffer big losses as indicated by the change from 4 to 0.

When both firms offer bribe (4th Scenario), no firm can gain an unfair advantage over the other, and the award of the public contract would be determined by the same probability distribution prior to the bribery; but the corrupt officials can charge higher premium for their services because demand for them are higher. This game has two equilibriums: (not bribe, not bribe) and (bribe, bribe). While the best strategy for each firm given the other firm doesn't bribe is not to bribe, the best strategy in the situation that other firm bribes is to bribe in order to avoid the worst scenario (2nd Scenario for Firm A and 3rd Scenario for Firm B).

		Firm B	
		Not bribe	Bribe
Firm A	Not bribe	4 1 st Scenario 4	0 2 nd Scenario 3
	Bribe	3 3 rd Scenario 0	1 4 th Scenario 1

The implications of the simple coordination game are straightforward. A firm's decision to pay bribe has negative effects on other firms in the game by decreasing their rate of success with a given bribe payment or raising the bribe amount needed for success, or both. While the individual firm's best choice is to bribe given others would do the same, this best strategy from the perspective of the individual firm leads to the

worst scenario collectively for all firms involved. On the other hand, the simple coordination game shows that the equilibrium at which no firm bribes is also a stable outcome: once everyone stops to bribe there is no incentive to defect from this equilibrium (Rose-Acekerman, 2002).

The simple model of coordination game helps to explain why bribery practices are more widespread and persistent in some industries than in others. Transnational International's Bribe Payers Index 2002 reports a high occurrence of bribery practices in industries such as public work, arms and defense, and oil and gas. Bribery will be a dominant strategy for firms in a specific industry once it becomes an industry norm. It also explains why a country with high level of corruption may find it extremely difficult to move away from the equilibrium at which many firms are engaged in bribery practices in one form or another.

Corporate Governance and Corruption: Hypotheses

Good corporate governance can lead to the reduction of corruption by addressing both the principle-agent problem and the problem of the coordination game. The principles of good corporate governance such as accountability and transparency not only can improve firms' operating performance, but also can reduce the level of corruption by imposing more constraints facing both the corrupt officials and the corruptors from the private sector. In order to verify our claims empirically, we propose the following two hypotheses to explore the linkage between corporate governance and corruption.

Hypothesis 1: Corruption will be lower in countries where the corporate boards are more accountable to the shareholders

The accountability of the corporate boards to the shareholders, particularly outside shareholders, reduces the incidence of bribery. First of all, an independent and competent corporate board that truly represents the interest of shareholders can help to prevent the opportunistic behaviors of the managers (and/or inside shareholders). While the managers (and/or inside shareholders) of the firms might be tempted by the immediate gains from bribery, it is in the interest of the shareholders of firms not to be involved in bribery activities.

In addition, having strong corporate boards also makes it more credible for the managers to commit to a “no bribe” policy when dealing with public officials who demand bribe payment. George Clarke and Lixin Colin Xu find that the level of bribe payment depends on the ability of the firms to pay instead of on the potential gains from the services provided by the corrupt officials. An independent and competent corporate board limits the firm’s ability to pay bribe and can actually boost the bargaining power of the managers in dealing with corrupt officials.

Furthermore, having a strong corporate board helps to deter the extortion demands from corrupt officials by increasing the risks they face because there will be more people in the know and the chance of whistle blowing from insiders will be increased.

Increasing the accountability of the corporate boards to shareholders can also help to solve the problem of the coordination game by providing firms a mechanism to

signal to their competitors that they are unwilling to cope with demand from corrupt officials for bribe payment, and thus the best strategy for all firms is not to offer bribe.

Hypothesis 2: Corruption will be lower in countries that have higher standards for accounting information reporting

The transparency in the provision of accounting information can help to reduce the level of corruption by increasing the probability of detecting bribery acts. First of all, better accounting practices helps to reduce the information asymmetry between the principals and the agents and enable the principals to monitoring the behaviors of the agents more effectively. With higher accounting standards, corporate managers who are engaged in bribery practices against the will of the shareholders often face a more difficult task of hiding the bribe payments. In addition, strengthening the rules and regulations regarding accounting information reporting and disclosure helps to fortify the internal control and monitoring system within the firms. In 2001, IBM, the American computer giant, brought forward to the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against its wholly-owned subsidiary (IBM Argentina) in a bribery case which involved a bribe payment of \$4.5 million to public officials of Banco de la Nacion Argentina. It'll be much difficult to uncover the corrupt practices committed by insiders if the company's accounting practice is of low standard. Furthermore, transparency in accounting information reporting and disclosure also deters corrupt practices from the demand side because it increases the probability of the corrupt practices being caught.

Last, high accounting standards help to solve the information asymmetric problem in the coordination game discussed earlier. Since bribery practices are often kept in secret, the corrupt officials hold information advantage over the firms regarding the existence and amount of bribery payments. Better accounting information may provide firms better access to information about the activities of other firms in this regard and help them to move together to the equilibrium of no bribery.

Corporate Governance and Corruption: Evidence

Data Description

The lack of empirical studies on the linkage between corporate governance and corruption is in part due to the paucity of data on corporate governance. In recent years, however, a few attempts have been made by several international consulting firms to measure the corporate governance at the country level. For example, in 2001 *PricewaterhouseCooper* published its Opacity Index for 35 countries, in which corporate governance is one of five components in determining the opacity level of a country. In May 2002, *McKinsey & Company* has ranked 21 economies around the world based on perceived quality of corporate governance from a survey of institutional investors. *Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA)*, an investment consulting firm based in Hong Kong, has also published its own corporate governance rating of 25 emerging markets based on a comprehensive analysis of 495 companies in these economies. Table 1 shows the coverage and ratings of these different corporate governance indices.

These newly available corporate governance ratings serve as timely addition to the tools available to the investors, but they are not suitable for our empirical analysis

here for three reasons. First of all, these ratings reflect mainly the knowledge and perception of institutional investors thus may not be representative of other potential important informants. Second, the coverage of these ratings is quite limited, and may not provide enough variation for our multivariate analysis. Last, corporate governance involves a set of complex relationships and rules, and includes several related yet different components. These ratings tend to average out the effects of different components and cannot afford us the opportunities of individually assessing the effects of different components on corruption.

Corresponding to the two hypotheses regarding the corporate governance and corruption, we use two measures of corporate governance –one on the efficacy of corporate boards in representing outside shareholders (SHAREHOLDER) and the other on the quality of accounting practices (ACCOUNT)—both taken from Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). GCR covers about 75 major economies around the world, and its ratings reflect the views of more than 4,600 business leaders and entrepreneurs from the countries surveyed.

The first measure of corporate governance—the efficacy of corporate boards in representing outside shareholders—is based upon the question: “corporate boards in your country are (selected from 1 to 7 where 1=controlled by management and 7=powerful and represent outside shareholders)?” While many studies on corporate governance have used measures such as ownership of firms, size of corporate board and composition of corporate boards to proxy for the quality of the corporate boards, the index provided by GCR has the distinct advantage of being able to directly measure the effectiveness of the corporate boards in representing shareholders.

The second measure of corporate governance focuses on the quality of accounting practices across countries. It is based on the question: "What amount of profits and wages does a company in your industry typically 'keep off the books' (selected from 1 to 10, where 1=less than 5%, 2=5-10%, 3=11-20%, 4=21-30%, ..., 9=71-80%, 10=more than 80%)?" Higher percentage of unreported profits and wages represents more frequent occurrence of accounting irregularities which imply that it might be relatively easy to hide the expenses of bribery. Table 2 shows the GCR's ratings on the two corporate governance indices for 2001-2002.

Transparency International's corruption index has been noted both for its internal consistency and for its consistency with other major corruption indices (Treisman). We choose the Transparency International's corruption index for 2002 as the measure of corruption across countries. For the convenience of interpretation, we have adjusted the original index so that while the range of index is still from 0 to 10, a 10 reflects the highest level of corruption and 0 the lowest.

Besides the variables for corporate governance, several plausible determinants of corruption are included in our model as control variables. First of all, almost all major studies of the determinants of corruption have included GDP per capita as a determinant for corruption, and have reported a high level of correlation between high GDP per capita and low level of corruption. Felipe Larrain and Jose Tavares postulate that the demand for good governance is higher in rich countries than in poor countries, and that good institutions are more affordable in high-income countries as human capital capacity is unlikely to be a constraint. In this analysis, we use the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1999 to measure the difference in economic wealth across countries.

The second economic variable included measures the openness of countries. Alberto Ales and Rafael Di Tella (1996 and 1999) find that countries that are more open to foreign trade tend to be less corrupt. Treisman further elaborates on the idea by pointing out that high level of imports reduces corruption by increasing the market competition and thus limiting the ability of the public officials to provide profitable protection to the potential bribe payers. In this paper, we use the share of imports in 1999 divided by GDP to represent the openness across countries.

We also include variables to account for the legal and cultural roots of corruption. The effectiveness of a country's legal system may affect the risk of the corrupt officials being caught and punished. Treisman argues that countries with British colonial heritage inherited not only a common law but also a particular legal culture that emphasizes procedural justice. Religious traditions may also affect the level of corruption, and in particular, more egalitarian religions such as the Protestantism pose more challenge to authorities than more "hierarchical" religions. We include whether or not a country was once a British colony (BRITISH COLONY) and the percentage of population professing Protestant faith (PROTESTANT) to account for the legal and cultural factors determining the level of corruption.

Last, the effects of the characteristics of the political institutions on corruption are also considered. Democratic norms and values de-legitimize corrupt practices, and a number of researchers (Treisman; Sandholtz and Koetzle) have found that countries that had been democracies for a long period time experience lower level of corruption. The distribution of power between central and local governments can also have an impacts on the level of corruption. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny argue that federalism

helps to curtail corruption practices by creating competition in the provision of public goods. In this paper, we use whether or not a country has been in democracy continuously since 1950 (DEMOCRACY) and whether or not a country is a federal state (FEDERAL) to capture the effects of political institutions on corruption.

Table 3 presents the variable names, brief description and source of data. A statistical summary of our data is shown in Table 4.

Regression Results

In order to test the two hypotheses regarding corporate governance and corruption, we analyze a set of multivariate models with Transparency International's corruption index as dependent variable, and the results of OLS regression² are shown in Table 5. Column (1) reports the unstandardized coefficients and standard errors when we include the two corporate governance variables as well as the full set of control variables discussed earlier. The regression coefficients indicate that the results from our data analysis are generally consistent with both the prediction of theories and the findings of other empirical studies. Economic wealth has a significant and negative coefficient, suggesting that a poor country plagued with a high level of corruption may grow its way out of corruption. The openness of the countries matters in the battle against corruption as indicated by the statistically significant coefficients on IMPORT: higher level of import has been found correlated with the lower level of corruption while controlling for other plausible determinants of corruption. Both the high percentage of Protestants in the population and the British colonial heritage corresponds to a low level of corruption.

² We've used the White estimator to deal with potential issue of heteroskedastic error variance.

The findings also show that the two political institution variables, DEMOCRACY and FEDERAL, have the expected effects on the level of corruption: countries having been in democracy for a long time have lower level of corruption, and federal states are more corrupted than states that have more decentralized administrative structure. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Such results are consistent when we add one variable at a time in Column (2) and (3) to account for the potential correlation between these two variables. In addition, there is virtually no change in the overall fitness of the model measured by R^2 when we exclude these two variables as shown in Column (4), indicating that adding these control variables contributes little to the explanatory power of the model. Overall, our regression analysis suggests that the variables representing political institutions are weak predictors of the corruption given other determinants of corruption are accounted for.

The results provide compelling evidence in favor of the two hypotheses that link corporate governance and corruption. Controlling for key determinants widely studied in the empirical studies on the causes of corruption, the coefficients on SHAREHOLDER and ACCOUNT have the expected effects on corruption and they are statistically significant. There will be less corruption in a country where the corporate boards truly represent the interests of shareholders; the prevention of accounting irregularity such as keeping profits and wage off the book can also play a positive role in the battle against corruption.

The relative predictive power of the two corporate governance variables is also impressive. The last column, Column (5), shows the standardized coefficients of the variables when we only include the statistically significant variables (SHAREHOLDER,

ACCOUNT, GDP, IMPORT, PROTESTANT, and BRITISH COLONY) in the model. The most powerful predictor of in our model is income level ($\beta=-0.506$), followed by the level of accounting irregularity ($\beta=0.263$). The relative explanatory weight of the efficacy of the corporate board in presenting the shareholders ($\beta=0.15$) is in the same range as Protestant values ($\beta=-0.173$). Overall, the standardized coefficients show that the corporate governance indicators are powerful predictors of the level of corruption.

To test the robustness of our results regarding the effects of the corporate governance indicators to corruption, we also use Transnational International's Bribe Payers Index 2002 as dependent variable³ to run a regression analysis. Bribe Payers Index ranks 21 leading exporting countries in terms of the degree to which their corporations are perceived to be paying bribes abroad. Since the Bribe Payers Index focuses on the behaviors of the firms only, variables account for the demand side of the corruption are dropped out of the model. Table 6 shows that the two corporate governance measures have the expected effects on the perceived level of corrupt practices of the firms from nations ranked in the Bribe Payers Index. Firms from countries with lower corporate governance standards are more likely to export corrupt practices to other nations.

Concluding Remarks

The recent surge of interests in corporate governance from institutional investors, international organizations and governments around the world should be a welcome news for the global anti-corruption campaign. Our empirical results support a

³ To be consistent with results reported earlier, we have adjusted the original index so that while the range of index is still from 0 to 10, a 10 reflects the highest level of bribery and 0 the lowest.

theoretical projection that good corporate governance can lead to reduced level of corruption. More emphasis should be directed to the bribe payers instead of focusing solely on the bribe takers.

While studies focusing on the demand side of corruption have provided a rather pessimistic outlook of the global anti-corruption campaign (Treisman), our analysis based on both the demand and supply sides of corruption offers reasons for optimism. It is in the interest of the firms to improve corporate governance, and such improvement will not only impose more constraints on the firms' decisions to bribe but also expose corrupt officials to higher risks of being caught.

Corporate governance can well become a critical ingredient to break a vicious cycle of bribery and corruption. This vicious cycle starts when firms are forced into bribery practices because of a high level of corruption, but widened participation of firms in bribery practices further feeds into the perception of high corruption, which in turn makes the bribery practices even more uncontrollable. Our analysis of the linkage between corporate governance and corruption suggests that the improvement in corporate governance may be a catalyst to break the vicious cycle of bribery and corruption.

Shareholders and investors in countries that are experiencing a high level of corruption may receive double dividends from the improvement in corporate government. Companies with better corporate governance have better prospects of growth and command higher valuation in the market. The McKinsey study we mentioned earlier shows that global investors are willing to pay more for better governed companies. At the same time, better corporate governance also helps to reduce

the bribery practices at the firm level, which potentially can further increase the valuation of the firms.

At the country level, improvement in corporate governance may help a country with a high level of corruption to partially offset the negative impacts of the perception of corruption on the flow of capital (both financial and human capital), and the additional capital induced by good corporate government serves as catalyst for further improvement in both corporate governance and the governance of the public sector.

On the other hand, however, bad corporate governance may also undermine the effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign in an era of globalization. We find that firms from countries with lower corporate governance standards are more likely to be involved in bribery practices when they export goods or services to other nations. Therefore, improving corporate governance in some leading exporting nations should be a top priority in the global anti-corruption campaign.

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Table 1 Corporate Governance Ratings

<i>Country</i>	<i>PWC Rating</i>	<i>McKinsey Rating</i>	<i>CISA Rating</i>
Argentina	49	24	5
Brazil	63	24	4
Canada		11	
Chile	28	18	6
China	86	25	3
Colombia	55	21	4
Czech Republic	77		2
Ecuador	68		
Egypt	68	39	
France		13	
Germany		13	
Greece	49		4
Guatemala	71		
Hong Kong	53		6
Hungary	65		4
India	79	23	5
Indonesia	68	25	3
Israel	62		
Italy	26	16	
Japan	81	21	
Kenya	72		
Lithuania	59		
Malaysia		22	3
Mexico	29	19	6
Morocco		41	
Pakistan	62		3
Peru	61		5
Philippines		22	3
Poland	55	23	3
Romania	78		
Russia	81	38	2
Singapore	38	21	7
South Africa	82	22	5
South Korea	90	20	3
Spain		14	
Sweden		13	
Switzerland		15	
Taiwan	56	19	5
Thailand	78	20	3
Turkey	80	27	4
United Kingdom	45	12	
United States	25	14	
Uruguay	56		
Venezuela	50	24	

Table 2 Corruption Index, Efficacy of Corporate and Unreported Profits/Wages

country	Corruption Index (TI)	Efficacy of Corporate Board	Unreported Profits/Wages	country	Corruption Index (TI)	Efficacy of Corporate Board	Unreported Profits/Wages
Albania	7.5			Latvia	6.3	3.8	2.6
Angola	8.3			Lithuania	5.2	3.8	2.2
Argentina	7.2	4.0	2.4	Luxembourg	1.0	.	.
Australia	1.4	5.5	1.3	Madagascar	8.3	.	.
Austria	2.2	4.8	1.4	Malawi	7.1	.	.
Azerbaijan	8.0			Malaysia	5.1	3.7	1.7
Bangladesh	8.8	2.2	3.8	Mauritius	5.5	2.6	1.9
Belarus	5.2			Mexico	6.4	3.5	2.0
Belgium	2.9	4.8	1.0	Moldova	7.9		
Bolivia	7.8	3.3	3.0	Morocco	6.3		
Botswana	3.6			Namibia	4.3		
Brazil	6.0	3.5	2.6	Netherlands	1.0	5.0	1.4
Bulgaria	6.0	3.3	2.6	New Zealand	0.5	5.3	1.2
Cameroon	7.8			Nicaragua	7.5	3.5	2.3
Canada	1.0	5.2	1.4	Nigeria	8.4	4.2	3.4
Chile	2.5	4.5	1.4	Norway	1.5	5.5	1.1
China	6.5	3.3	2.4	Pakistan	7.4		
Colombia	6.4	4.2	2.0	Panama	7.0	4.0	2.5
Costa Rica	5.5	4.6	2.6	Paraguay	8.3	3.5	2.7
Cote d'Ivoire	7.3			Peru	6.0	3.8	2.3
Croatia	6.2			Philippines	7.4	3.8	3.0
Czech Republic	6.3	3.2	2.6	Poland	6.0	4.7	2.4
Denmark	0.5	5.2	1.1	Portugal	3.7	3.6	2.6
Dominican Republic	6.5	3.7	2.6	Romania	7.4	5.1	4.2
Ecuador	7.8	3.5	3.2	Russia	7.3	3.9	3.2
Egypt	6.6	3.7	2.2	Senegal	6.9		
El Salvador	6.6	3.5	2.0	Singapore	0.7	4.8	1.2
Estonia	4.4	4.8	2.6	Slovak Republic	6.3	3.8	3.2
Ethiopia	6.5			Slovenia	4.0	4.0	2.6
Finland	0.3	5.9	1.0	South Africa	5.2	5.1	1.6
France	3.7	4.9	1.2	South Korea	5.5	3.5	2.0
Georgia	7.6			Spain	2.9	5.0	1.3
Germany	2.7	5.2	1.5	Sri Lanka	6.3	3.5	2.5
Ghana	6.1			Sweden	0.7	5.6	1.2
Greece	5.8	3.1	2.5	Switzerland	1.5	5.3	1.3
Guatemala	7.5	3.3	2.7	Taiwan	4.4	4.8	1.6
Haiti	7.8			Tanzania	7.3		
Honduras	7.3	2.5	2.5	Thailand	6.8	3.9	2.7
Hong Kong	1.8	3.9	1.4	Trinidad and Tobago	5.1	3.8	2.1
Hungary	5.1	4.7	2.2	Tunisia	5.2		
Iceland	0.6	4.8	1.2	Turkey	6.8	2.8	3.4
India	7.3	3.5	2.0	Uganda	7.9		
Indonesia	8.1	3.3	2.1	Ukraine	7.6	4.3	4.2
Ireland	3.1	4.6	1.3	United Kingdom	1.3	5.5	1.4
Israel	2.7	4.7	1.6	United States	2.3	5.7	1.2
Italy	4.8	4.4	1.9	Uruguay	4.9	3.8	2.5
Jamaica	6.0	4.5	2.5	Uzbekistan	7.1		
Japan	2.9	2.9	1.1	Venezuela	7.5	3.3	2.0
Jordan	5.5	3.8	2.5	Vietnam	7.6	4.1	2.7
Kazakhstan	7.7			Zambia	7.4		
Kenya	8.1			Zimbabwe	7.3	4.1	1.6

Table 3 Description of Variables

CORRUPTION	Corruption Perception Index. Ranging from 0 to 10 with 10 representing the highest level of corruption	Transparency International (2002)
SHAREHOLDER	Rating on the effectiveness of corporate boards in representing the interests of shareholders. Scale from 1 to 7 (1=corporate boards controlled by management, 7=powerful and represent outside shareholders)	Global Competitiveness Report (2001-2002)
ACCOUNT	Average amount of profits and wages companies in a country typically "keep off the books". Scale from 1 to 10 (1=less than 5%, 2=5-10%, 3=11-20%, 4=21-30%, ? 9=71-80%, 10=more than 80%)	Global Competitiveness Report (2001-2002)
GDP	Log of GDP per capita	World Development Indicators, World Bank
IMPORT	Imports as % of GDP	World Development Indicators, World Bank
PROTESTANT	% of Protestant in population	La Porta et al. (1999)
BRITISH COLONY	A dummy variable indicates whether or not country is a former British colony or UK.	Treisman (2000)
DEMOCRACY	A dummy variable indicates whether or not a country had been democratic continuously since 1950.	Treisman (2000)
FEDERAL	A dummy variable indicates whether or not a country is a federal state	Treisman (2000)

Table 4 Statistical Summary of Variables

	Number of Observations	Mean	Std. Dev
SHAREHOLDER	72	4.14	0.85
ACCOUNT	72	2.14	0.77
GDP	72	9.06	0.89
IMPORT	72	41.26	24.50
PROTESTANT	72	15.25	25.60
BRITISH COLONY	72	0.29	0.46
FEDERAL	72	0.22	0.42
DEMOCRACY	72	0.28	0.45

Table 5 Regression Results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
SHAREHOLDER	-0.416** (0.201)	-0.391* (0.197)	-0.479** (0.174)	-0.438** (0.166)	-0.150
ACCOUNT	0.844*** (0.231)	0.821*** (0.232)	0.869*** (0.217)	0.841*** (0.213)	0.263
GDP	-1.370*** (0.202)	-1.377*** (0.199)	-1.418*** (0.206)	-1.410*** (0.203)	-0.506
IMPORT	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.010* (0.005)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.087
PROTESTANT	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.173
BRITISH COLONY	-0.488* (0.253)	-0.469* (0.256)	-0.529** (0.256)	-0.500* (0.256)	-0.093
DEMOCRACY	-0.336 (0.403)	-0.224 (0.387)			
FEDERAL	0.394 (0.276)		0.336 (0.264)		
CONSTANT	18.066*** (1.929)	18.202*** (1.926)	18.595*** (2.003)	18.558 (2.001)	
Number of Obs.	72	72	72	72	
R ²	0.90	0.89	0.89	0.89	

The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses
 *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6 Model Using Bribe Payers Index 2002 as Dependent Variable

	Coefficient
SHAREHOLDER	-1.119*** (0.310)
ACCOUNT	1.480*** (0.351)
CONSTANT	6.959*** (1.646)
Number of observations	21
R ²	0.59

The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01