TOURISM-MENTALITY:
POWER AND POLITICS OF BATTLEFIELD TOURISM
IN KINMEN, TAIWAN

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NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE
2009
TOURISM-MENTALITY:
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(B. Soc. Sci. (Hons.)), NUS

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2009
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Randy Pausch in his much celebrated book, “The Last Lecture”, advised his reader that, "Brick walls are there for a reason: they let us prove how badly we want certain things." Brick walls are however, not overcome alone. I am grateful to those who have in one way or another assisted me in overcoming the multiple challenges in the course of completing this thesis.

My utmost gratitude goes to my supervisor, A/P T.C. Chang. Thank you for your magnanimous guidance and kind understanding throughout my graduate years. I have benefitted immensely from your supervision and mentorship, be it in research or teaching.

The Department of Geography has been (and still is) a great place to be. I am thankful to the wonderful people who have shown interest in my research topic and helped shape what follows in this thesis, but who are not to be blamed for it. They include Dr. C.P. Pow, Dr. Noorashikin, A/P Tim Bunnell, A/P Shirlena Huang and Professor Henry Yeung. I remain especially appreciative to A/Ps Peggy Teo and Victor Savage, who have always been so supportive and candid.

The two-year stint as a graduate student would not have been so smooth-sailing without the support rendered by staff members in the department. I sincerely thank Ms. Pauline Lee for her professionalism in helping me deal with all sorts of administrative matters. I also owe the beautifully crafted maps to Mrs. Lee Li Kheng’s excellent cartographic work. Financial assistance from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Graduate Research Support Scheme is gratefully acknowledged.

My fieldwork in Kinmen was successful due to the enthusiastic participation of my respondents. Special thanks to my interviewees from the Kinmen County Government: Mr. Lin Chen-Cha, Mr. Chen Chao-Jin, Mr. Li Zai-Hang, and Ms. Cung Meng-Chi; from the Kinmen National Park: Ms. Huang Tzu-Chuan, Mr. Su Cheng-Chi, and Ms. Li Ming-Yi; and from the Institute for Physical Planning & Information: Ms. Carol Y. Lin.

Not forgetting my interviewees from the private sector for sharing their thoughts with me: Mr. Li Min-De from Bar Sa Restaurant, Mr. Chen Chin-Fu from Min-Jih Gong Tang, Ms. Chen Li-Lin from Yi Lai Shuen, Mr. Wu Tseng-Dong from Chin Ho Li Knife, Mr. Lin Yong-Biao from Chang Ling Travel Agency, Ms. Gao Shu-Zhen from Kinma Travel Service, and Mr. Chen Ho-Hai from Golden Universal Travel Service.

The Kinmen locals were splendid informants. Thank you for considering me as a fellow Kinmenese throughout my stay in Kinmen. Our ingenious conversations have contributed significantly to the analytical vigour of this research. My earnest thanks go to Sheu Yen-Hsueh, Lee Chiung-Fang, He Ying-Cyuan, Yu-Zi, Jing-Yi, Hui-Hsin, Miao-Chen, Lin Cheng-Shih, Shu-Yi, Rui-Yi, Wan-Ling and Yi-Jie for providing timely assistance during and after my fieldwork in Kinmen.
It is my privilege to meet renowned scholars in the course of my academic journey. They include A/P Chiang Bo-Wei from National Kinmen Institute of Technology, A/P Michael Szonyi from Harvard University and Professor Wang Gungwu from East Asia Institute, National University of Singapore. Your affirmation and stimulating inputs have been a great source of motivation.

Graduate life would have been much less interesting without the company of fellow geography enthusiasts, both local and international, past and present. I thank Li Na, Fred, Sarah Moser, Kanchan, Diganta, Chen Rui, Liu Yi and Kanhaiya, for creating such a friendly and warm environment. Our chatting sessions and moments of joy in the graduate room would be fondly remembered. I am grateful to Chen Rui for the Chinese translation of my interview questions.

Fieldwork is fun, but thesis writing is a chore. I thank Alvin Sim, Choon Hon, Gladys, Jacqueline and Wanying for cheering me on right from the start. Your encouragement and support have made this process less painful.

To my best friend Jianhong, thank you for always being there for me, both in times of happiness and sorrow.

I was able to taste the intimate slices of life during my stay with relatives in Taipei and Kinmen. This has contributed significantly to the smooth progress of my overseas fieldwork.

I am hugely indebted to my mother and family members for their unfailing love and support. Words alone cannot express my gratitude and appreciation towards each of you.

Last but not least, I extend my heartfelt gratitude to those whom I have inadvertently missed. Thank you!

This thesis is dedicated to the loving memory of my late grandfather, Teo Chew Hock.

Zhang Jiajie
August 2009
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ABSTRACT

The political dimensions of tourism have been traditionally studied through binary understandings of ‘top-down vs bottom-up’ approaches, ‘hegemony vs resistance’, ‘winners vs losers’ etc. This thesis aims to go beyond binary understandings and re-conceptualise the notion of ‘power’ in the discussion of tourism politics. By synergising analytical tools from Foucault’s ‘governmentality’ and the concept of ‘landscape’ in cultural geography, this exploratory research introduces the analytics of ‘tourism-mentality’ in explicating the power and politics inherent in the government of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape. More specifically, three main locales of power practices are discussed. First, ‘technologies of government’ utilised by the tourism planners (i.e. Kinmen National Park and the county government) in their attempt to convey both nationalist ideologies and post-war reconciliation mentality through the promotion of battlefield tourism are unravelled. Second, the ways in which such technologies are in turn incorporated or negotiated by the local entrepreneurs in their day to day operations are analysed. Third, ordinary Kinmen people’s conduct of citizenship in terms of their attitude and behaviour towards Kinmen’s battlefield heritage are explicated. Discussion highlights the importance of seeing power as horizontally distributed in the government of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape in order to fully appreciate its tourism politics. Kinmen remains a symbolic if not critical element in the delicate balance between fostering warmer ties with China and Taiwan’s long-standing claim to sovereignty in this post-conflict era of peace and co-prosperity.

Keywords: battlefield, tourism politics, tourism-mentality, governmentality, landscape, non-representational theory, Kinmen, Taiwan.
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<td>BMoCA</td>
<td>Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network, US</td>
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<td>CWAAQ</td>
<td>Council for War Area Administration in Quemoy</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party</td>
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<td>IPPI</td>
<td>Institute for Physical Planning and Information</td>
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<td>KMNP</td>
<td>Kinmen National Park</td>
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<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
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<td>QDC</td>
<td>Quemoy Defence Command</td>
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<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
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ROMANISATION OF CHINESE WORDS

Names of all tourist attractions mentioned in this thesis are romanised according to the Hanyu Pinyin system. However, I choose to use ‘Kinmen’ instead of its Hanyu Pinyin equivalent, ‘Jinmen’, as the former is a romanisation according to the pronunciation of the local dialect and is the official name used by the state. The island is also popularly referred to as ‘Quemoy’ in the western context.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Beginning of an Era of Peace & Co-Prosperity

4 July 2008 marks a historic moment in cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. For the first time in almost six decades, mainland Chinese were permitted to visit Taiwan via direct charter flights. Under the agreement signed by the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits based in China, and the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation, there is no need to travel to a third country before landing. Evidently, such a development goes in tandem with Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s doctrine of “Economic Cooperation Before Politics”. The landslide victory of Taiwan’s Nationalist party, Kuomintang (KMT), in the parliamentary election and Ma Ying-jeou winning the presidential election, paved the way for improvement of cross-strait ties, which were dampened significantly by the pro-independence stance adopted by the previous administration. Head of China's Tourism Administration, Shao Qi Wei, lauded the normalisation of travel between the two politically divided territories, hailing the launch of regular commercial flights and the beginning of mass tourism from China as akin to building “a bridge of friendship” (Morning Star Online, 4 July 2008). The opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists is indeed as much an economic decision as it is a political manoeuvre. Such a gesture of political goodwill was reciprocated and extended further when in September of the same year, Wang Yi, director of Beijing's State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, announced, amongst a slew of incentives to boost tourism exchanges, that on top of weekend direct flights,

1 Tourists from China have to travel via a third country, for example, Hong Kong, before touching down at their destination, Taiwan.
2 The KMT won 81 of the 113 seats in the parliamentary election in January 2008 and Ma won the presidential election in March of the same year.
residents from thirteen provinces and cities in China\(^3\) will be allowed to travel *daily* to and from Taiwan via the Taiwan-held islands of Kinmen, Ma-tsu and Peng-hu (*Central News Agency*, 8 September 2008) (see Figure 1.1).

**Figure 1.1 Location of Kinmen**

![Figure 1.1 Location of Kinmen](image)

Such an arrangement brings the three offshore islands of Taiwan into the limelight in terms of tourism development. Of the three islands highlighted, Kinmen possesses the best potential to be developed into a successful destination and point of transit for tourists travelling between China and mainland Taiwan. Its geographical proximity to the port city of Xiamen on mainland China defines its technical advantage over Ma-tsu and Peng-hu. Infrastructure built for the existing ferry service

\(^3\) The 13 administrative districts are Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shangdong, Hubei, Guangdong, Yunnan and Shaanxi provinces and the cities of Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing (*Central News Agency English News*, 7 September 2008).
between Xiamen and Kinmen under the “mini three links”\(^4\) agreement can be readily tapped on. Tourists from China entering Taiwan via Kinmen (and vice versa) can thus save significantly on travel cost.

As a student researcher fascinated by Kinmen’s battlefield past, such political underpinnings to its tourism development serve as a context for a more nuanced understanding of cultural politics behind the production and consumption of the (battlefield) tourism landscape. Kinmen’s identity as a former battlefield presents both challenges and opportunities in positioning and branding it as a tourist destination. The meaning of its battlefield identity becomes significant in an era of mutual economic benefit and peaceful reconciliation between China and Taiwan. Preliminary observation in my Honours thesis shows that both nationalist ideologies and post-war reconciliation mentality co-exist to form the geopolitical intricacies behind the presentation and re-presentation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage (Zhang, 2007). The strategies adopted by the state to convey these messages, and the underlying power relationship remain to be discussed. To do this, there is a need to rethink the politics of battlefield tourism in Kinmen. This thesis thus goes further to explore how the Kinmen locals are convinced into accepting these ideologies, and how some have become battlefield tourism subjects as their attitude and behaviour echo government’s initiatives and ideologies.

\(^4\) The three links refer to economic and social links for direct trade, postal and shipping between Kinmen and Ma-tsu of Taiwan, and Xiamen and Fuzhou of PRC (The Economist, 6 January 2001). The ‘mini three links’ was an experimental scheme to boost cross-strait ties prior to current developments.
1.2 **Kinmen in Context: From Battlefield to Tourist Destination**

Before explicating the objectives of this thesis, let me foreground the historical events that form the basis of Kinmen’s battlefield identity. Covering an area of 150km$^2$ and a population of 72,000, Kinmen$^5$ is located 350km southwest of Taipei, Taiwan, but a mere 8km from the city of Xiamen in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The island became a military stronghold of the Kuomintang’s (KMT) Nationalist Army after its forces retreated from mainland China during the Civil War with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1949. Kinmen, together with Ma-tsu and a number of other off-shore islands were intended to be “stepping stones” for Chiang Kai-shek’s forces to reclaim mainland China.

Initial attempts by the communists to capture Kinmen were thwarted by KMT’s victory in the Guningtou Battle on Kinmen in late 1949. The onset of the global Cold War and the American doctrine of containment further acted as deterrence to the communist’s plans for invasion. However, the First and Second Straits Crisis in 1954 and 1958 respectively, saw the PRC engaging Kinmen in fierce artillery battles. Intervention by the United States (US) denied the prospect of a take-over. Therefore, the status of Kinmen had and still has symbolic meaning for Taiwan in the wider geopolitical context. The involvement of the US in the prevention of a CCP take-over testifies to the importance of the island’s strategic position as a bastion against communist threat.

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$^5$ Kinmen is an archipelago consisting of 12 islands. This thesis focuses on the 2 main islands, namely ‘Big Kinmen’ and ‘Little Kinmen’. Unless otherwise stated, ‘Kinmen’ refers to both islands.
As a result of these events, Kinmen became a highly militarised area. Fortresses, pillboxes and underground tunnels burgeoned and as much as one-third of Taiwan’s total army was stationed on the island, outnumbering the local population of 60,000 (Szonyi, 2005). Apart from the conscripted soldiers, a militia system had also been set up whereby civilian villages were transformed into ‘combat villages’ (Chi, 2004). In 1956, the KMT government introduced the “Experimental Scheme of War Area Administration on Kinmen and Ma-tsu”, which subjected the islands to absolute military control (Jinmen xianzhi, 1992, cited in Chi, 2004). In Kinmen, the troops were the main consumer base that sustained the local economy until 1992 when tourism became increasingly important.

Several reasons explain why people are attracted to Kinmen. As the battlefront of conflicts between PRC and Taiwan, Kinmen was inaccessible until 1992. The curious want to see it for themselves, what Kinmen is really like. Retired soldiers who have once served on the island have returned to reminisce the past and more importantly, seek closure, usually in the company of family members. After the establishment of the ‘mini three links’, ferry services between Xiamen and Kinmen became available, and tourists from the PRC are keen to explore the mysterious military bastion that the PLA surprisingly failed to capture in the past. Finally, Kinmen’s new role as a gateway to Taiwan will be crucial in sustaining the island’s tourism receipts. The battlefield landscape that represented a bastion of military might and symbol of war was transformed almost overnight into a tourism landscape of appeal for tourist consumption. Moreover, Kinmen’s battlefield identity is continually being politicised in the midst of recent cross-strait relations. Therefore, it is the

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6 Although the garrison size was never disclosed, it is estimated at 100,000.
battlefield tourism landscape that this timely thesis contextualises its analyses. In short, tourism is seen not only as an important economic activity but a necessary diplomatic tool since the de-militarisation of Kinmen. Therefore it is timely to examine the politics of space and the power relations underlying the battlefield landscape as this island is being transformed into a tourist destination.

Questions pertaining to ‘government’ (Foucault, 1991) arise: What are the strategies adopted by the state to convince the Kinmen people that battlefield tourism is appropriate or beneficial? Is there outright domination, as seen during the martial law period, or is there room for subjectivities and negotiations? How does this development trajectory play out at the different sectors of society, namely the public (central and county government), the private (local entrepreneurs), and the people (tourists and locals)? How are macro- and micro-politics enmeshed in the battlefield tourism landscape? These preliminary questions serve as an overture to the next section where I present the research objectives and argument of this thesis.

1.3 Research Objectives and Argument

This thesis aims to fulfil both conceptual and empirical objectives while remaining policy-relevant. Firstly, I discuss the politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism using the concept of ‘governmentality’ (Foucault, 1991), and applying both interpretative (i.e. landscape as texts) and non-representational readings (landscape effects) of ‘landscape’ in the so-called ‘new cultural geography’. I posit that a synergy of these analytical tools is necessary for a more comprehensive understanding of tourism politics. This is as much an endeavour to utilise cultural geography concepts in a
tourism context as it is an effort for tourism studies to engage more rigorously with social and cultural theories (see section 1.4).

Secondly, I hope to contribute to the literature on tourism politics and battlefield tourism by recognising the horizontal distribution of power in the production and consumption of a cultural landscape rather than a simple binary (e.g. top-down vs bottom-up) understanding of power relations. I argue that such an approach can better interrogate the power dynamics behind how a particular landscape affects and is in turn formed by people’s perceptions and behaviour.

Empirically, it would be interesting to document the interplay between the symbolism of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape and the rationale for peace and improved cross-strait ties. Thus, I aim to unravel the strategies (i.e. ‘technologies of government’ (Foucault, 1991)) utilised by tourism planners in their attempt to convey both nationalist ideologies and post-war reconciliation mentality through the promotion of battlefield tourism. However, I postulate that a tourism landscape is not governed solely by the state. Other tourism stakeholders can also form institutions of power in their creation of Kinmen’s battlefield identity. As such, I seek to analyse how technologies of government are in turn incorporated or negotiated by local entrepreneurs in their day-to-day operations. This shows how the battlefield tourism landscape influences and is influenced by local entrepreneurs’ business decisions. Finally, ordinary Kinmen people that have also become tourism subjects themselves are discussed in terms of their attitude and behaviour towards the battlefield heritage. Discussion will reveal the effects of the ‘government of landscape’ (Bunnell, 2004) as
both entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens become complicit in sustaining Kinmen’s battlefield landscape and its associated idea(l)s.

With regards to policy relevance, this research hopes to offer empirical examples of how a particular developmental policy can be introduced and gradually adopted by the society. Especially for Kinmen, which has only recently ended its martial law administration and entered a post-war reconstruction era, such discussion on power relations that goes beyond the previous culture of outright domination might provide an alternative platform for the government to better understand its population and thus contribute to more effective implementation of policies. Furthermore, local entrepreneurs may also find this study useful in helping them position their products according to Kinmen’s development trajectories.

1.4 Key Concepts

1.4.1 Governmentality

It is useful at this juncture to briefly introduce the main concepts employed in the discussion of the power and politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape. Firstly, I draw upon the governmentality literature (Foucault, 1991; see Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999; and Bunnell, 2004, for overviews) to analyse the various practices of power that shape people’s attitude and behaviour towards Kinmen’s battlefield identity; or more aptly, the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault, 1991). As Rose (1999: 4) indicated:

To govern is to act upon action. This entails trying to understand what mobilizes the domains or entities to be governed: to govern one must act upon these forces, instrumentalize them in order to shape actions, processes and outcomes in desired directions.
In other words, Foucault uses governmentality to “understand and describe how modern forms of power and regulation achieve their full effects not by forcing people toward state-mandated goals but by turning them into accomplices” (Agrawal, 2005: 216-217). As Caroline Winter (2007: 103) suggests, “The myriad processes involved in the practice of tourism can be conceptualised as a ‘technology’, a term used by Foucault to encompass all of the techniques used in the practical operation of power…” For this thesis, the array of rationalities and technologies involved in the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape, and how they play out in practice will be explicated.

As the focus of our discussion entails a form of cultural heritage, or more accurately, cultural-geo-political heritage, Bennett’s (1989) conceptualisation of culture serves as a unique segue for the application of ‘governmentality’ in the theorising of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism. For Bennett, culture is understood as “the institutions, symbol systems, and forms of regulation and training responsible for forming, maintaining and/or changing the mental and behavioural attributes of populations” (Bennett, 1989: 10). Indeed, the Kinmen battlefield landscape is constantly being (re)shaped by its stakeholders, which include but are not limited to state-related institutions. In fact “[t]he administration of culture understood in this sense might be carried on through various state agencies, markets, corporations, institutions of ‘civil society’ such as schools, universities or broadcasters, or more informal but routinized practices of everyday life” (Barnett, 1999: 371-372). Such an understanding of the administration of culture provides a critical platform for my endeavour to understand the governance of the battlefield tourism landscape. It is through the lenses of the public, private and people sectors that I would plough for the
locales of power practices. I would also suggest the ‘practices of everyday life’ to include the mentality and behaviour of Kinmen residents as they are being “recruited” as ‘battlefield tourism subjects’.

The applicability of the governmentality concept can be justified by at least two more points. For one, the shift from a more totalising view of the state in *Discipline and Punish* to the conceptualisation of ‘governmentality’ is indeed Foucault’s answer to his critics about the lack of agency in his explication of ‘power’. In his later writings, Foucault’s distinction between ‘domination’, and ‘government’ as different modalities of ‘power relationship’, and his concept of ‘governmentality’ offer an opportunity to unravel the interconnectedness of big ‘P’ (macro) politics and small ‘p’ (micro) politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism. More importantly, he had “unsettled taken-for-granted notions of the unity and coherence of state power (Foucault, 1991, cited in Bunnell, 2002: 1697). This shift in the notion of power from ‘domination’ to ‘government’ could be juxtaposed alongside the genealogy of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape – from one which is enclosed under state domination during the martial law period to one that has become a platform for liberal transformations after it is opened to tourism. Furthermore this converges with the broader debates amongst political theorists who adopt Foucauldian thoughts in the differentiation between liberal and non-liberal forms of governance (see, for example, Barry *et al.*, 1996; Hindess, 1996; Hunt and Wickham, 1994). For them “liberal governance is understood as a set of rationalities and technologies for governing conduct through practices of self-regulation” (Hindess, 1997; Miller and Rose, 1990, cited in Barnett, 1999: 371). This has come to characterise what Barnett (1999: 372) calls ‘modern democratic citizenship’ – one of the political attributes maintained by
the Republic of China on Taiwan (as opposed to communism in the PRC), and extended to the Kinmen people after the martial law period.

The second reason is the ability of governmentality to satisfy the aim of my thesis to go beyond binary analytics of tourism politics. As Bunnell (2002: 1697) argues, “analysis at the level of rationalities of government unsettles existing conceptualisations of power and contest in urban landscapes…[more specifically], it is misleading to see these authorities [e.g. the state, architects, planners, sociologists, NGOs, city government officials, planners and property developers] as constitutive of ‘power’ acting upon and/or resisted by everyday individuals and groups.” Rather, “power is formed as a network of relations between people acting in various social roles…” (C.Winter, 2007: 102). Therefore, it is hoped that the governmentality approach can shed light on the power practices amongst the different tourism stakeholders in Kinmen.

I find the multiple possibilities that ‘governmentality’ has to offer as intriguing in the nourishment of this academic enterprise. However, there is a practical need for a discussion platform – one that can stage and bind all these different facets together in a coherent manner, such that they are not lost in abstract theoretical space. This led me to consider the second key concept for this thesis – ‘landscape’.

1.4.2 Landscape

In order to better “ground” this research, the concept of ‘landscape’ in cultural geography will be utilised to act as a platform for discussion of the various spaces of governance in the context of battlefield tourism. Both interpretative reading of
landscape (Duncan and Duncan, 1988; Daniels and Cosgrove, 1988; Duncan, 1990; Donald, 1992; Goh and Yeoh, 2003) and non-representational theory (Thrift, 1996; 1997) will be cardinal in the discussion (see Schein (1997); Bunnell (2004), for overviews of landscape literature).

Teo et al. (2004) have provided a concise overview to the development of the concept of landscape in cultural geography. In this section however, I would only elucidate some of the main landscape concepts that would be utilised in this thesis. At the most fundamental level, landscape refers to a “territory which the eye can comprehend in a single view” (Johnston et al., 1994, cited in Teo et al., 2004: 3). However, other than the material/real aspect, landscape can also be understood in terms of the symbolic/imagined. Cosgrove and Daniels (1988: 1) describe landscape as ‘a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings’. As can be inferred, tourism landscapes, both the real and imagined, are embodiments of social, cultural and political meanings.

The interpretation of landscapes as literary texts is promoted by Duncan and Duncan (1988). According to them, “landscapes can be seen as texts, which are transformations of ideologies into a concrete form” (p. 117). Borrowing the idea of ‘ideological sediment’ from Barthes (1986), landscape as ‘text’ is seen as an important avenue in which ideologies become naturalized, thereby “supporting a set of ideas and values, unquestioned assumptions about the way a society is, or should be organized” (Duncan and Duncan, 1988: 123). Therefore, denaturalization is seen as one of the most important task that can be performed, in order to unravel the ideological underpinnings of a landscape.
Schein (1997) however argues that a better metaphor is that of ‘landscape as palimpsest’ (p.662). If landscape can be seen as a text being created or inscribed by the dominant culture, it can also be modified or re-inscribed; suggesting the multiple layers of discourses upon which the landscape is based. Such an analogy suggests “the co-existence of several different scripts, implying not just different historical eras, but several historical and contemporary actors as well” (Schein, 1997: 662). In this way, it is recognised that the landscape is not a fixed entity, but an ever changing one, shaping and being shaped by symbolic meanings held by the various stakeholders.

The concept of landscape is explored in political geography as well, in terms of ‘landscapes of power’ (Zukin, 1991; Jones et al., 2004). Landscapes are often seen as representative of the meanings and beliefs that people attribute to certain places. In studying the politics of monuments, memorials and statues, Jones et al. (2004: 116) explain:

Points in the landscape can symbolise particular memories and meanings of place, including messages about power and politics. We refer to landscapes that work in this way as landscapes of power. A landscape of power operates as a political device because it reminds people of who is in charge, or of what the dominant ideology or philosophy is, or it helps to engender a sense of place identity that can reinforce the position of a political leader.

As such, collective memories are constructed. It is by memorialising state-sanctioned memories that dominant individuals seek to control the people. Landscape can therefore be interpreted for relationships of power.

However, there are also cases of contesting representations where people’s imagined landscapes or ‘way of seeing’ differ (Mitchell, 2003; Cosgrove, 1984). This leads to the multiplicity in interpretations and meanings. Thus, Johnson (1995)
observes that “statuary offers a way of understanding nation-building which moves beyond top-down structural analyses to more dialectical conceptualisations”, whereby, negotiations by bottom-up processes can be incorporated. Such an approach corresponds to effort made by academics like Cartier and Lew (2005) and Crouch (1999) to move beyond emphasis on textual representations, and engage in the complexities of tourism landscape production and consumption.

Furthermore, landscape is not merely reflective of the meanings and ideologies of a set of players; it can also affect the way people think and behave. In explicating the ‘non-representational theory’, Thrift (2001: 556) criticises that “much cultural geography, with its commitment to representation, is seen as producing elitist intellectual practices whilst arguing the opposite.” He advocates for a shift “towards theories of practice which amplify the potential of the flow of events…” (ibid). In other words, instead of treating landscape as a fixed entity, waiting to be read as ‘text’ by the “experts”, representations have to be analysed in terms of the role they perform – their effects. Therefore, material landscapes are “thus not merely signs or clues to understanding pre-existing politico-cultural formations or geo-historical structures, but bound up in the unfolding of ongoing transformation” (Bunnell, 2004: 27-28) induced by the power practices of various stakeholders. Indeed, landscape has to be understood as both a ‘work’ and as something that ‘does work’ (Mitchell, 2000, cited in Bunnell, 2002: 1686). As such, beyond the interpretative stance adopted in most landscape studies, it is important to also unravel the effects of landscape on the attitude and behaviour of a population.
1.4.3 Tourism-mentality

As Dean (1999: 7) acknowledges, “‘governmentality’ itself is a mixed substance and one that only works when alloyed with others.” Therefore, this thesis seeks to study the politics of battlefield tourism in Kinmen through the optics offered by a synergistic combination of ‘governmentality’ and ‘landscape’. More precisely, I seek to analyse the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape through the lens of what I call ‘tourism-mentality’ at different scales. How are spaces tourism-mentalised? How are people “recruited”? How are the agencies or subjectivities of the people realised, and in what forms do they take? If governmentality “deals with what we think about governing…” (Dean, 1999: 16), tourism-mentality deals with what we think about a certain tourism development. In the case of Kinmen, the concept entails what tourism stakeholders think about its battlefield tourism development, and how people’s thoughts and behaviour are influenced by and at the same time influencing rationalities and technologies of government.

1.5 Thesis Organisation

This thesis is organised into six chapters. In this prolegomenary chapter, I have provided a brief introduction of the political climate surrounding the current interest in battlefield tourism in Kinmen, Taiwan. Contemporary cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan that espouse peaceful reconciliation and economically mutual development, and historical events that formed the prerequisites for Kinmen’s battlefield identity have been discussed. The objectives and argument of this research are also spelt out. I have also introduced the concepts of governmentality, landscape and tourism-mentality, which are immanent in the entire thesis.
The ensuing chapter covers the literature review. Changing approaches and emerging trends of research related to the power and politics of tourism will be examined to position the contribution of this thesis in the wider field of tourism research. Chapter 3 provides a space to discuss methodological concerns and the author’s reflexive comments.

Chapters 4 and 5 present the empirical findings of this study with regard to three separate but interrelated sectors namely the ‘public’, ‘private’ and ‘people’. Chapter 4 covers the tourism planners’ effort in ‘tourism-mentalising’ Battlefield Kinmen, ranging from coercive policies to ideological programmes. In short, it presents the strategies in producing Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape. In order to transcend typical understanding of power as something that is necessarily vertically distributed (i.e. top-down vs bottom-up),

Chapter 5 situates local entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmen people as institutes of power in their own rights. It discusses the effects of ‘tourism-mentalisation’ by showing how entrepreneurs incorporate the battlefield identity in their daily operations and product innovation while still practising their agencies. Empirical data collected from the field range from producers of tourist souvenirs to food manufacturers and restaurant operators. The chapter then goes on to highlight ordinary Kinmeneses’ attitude and behaviour towards the discourse of preserving battlefield heritage. I conclude with Chapter 6 by summing up the arguments and findings of the thesis, and discussing its theoretical and policy implications.

7 I acknowledge that tourists are also important to the tourism-mentalisation of Kinmen. However, my rationale is to focus on the effects of tourism-mentalisation on the local population. As such, a discussion on how the attitude and behaviour of tourists are affected by tourism technologies is beyond the scope of this thesis. See section 6.2 for potentials to incorporate tourists in future research.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Politics and Power in Tourism

More than a decade ago, the political dimensions of tourism were not widely recognised despite the intensive growth of tourism research in the 1980s and 1990s. Richter (1989, 1994) and Hall (1994) were among the first tourism scholars to advocate for a serious treatment of tourism studies and more specifically, of the intrinsic political nature of tourism. Although there has been a recent proliferation of studies on the political aspects of tourism, its political nature, as Butcher (2006) laments, is still under-acknowledged. Since the works of Linda Richter and Michael Hall, there is little attempt by tourism researchers to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature pertaining to the politics of tourism. Therefore, it is in the interest of this chapter to tease out the various strands of research in order to map the changing approaches and emerging trends over the years. Nevertheless, it is not exhaustive, nor is it merely an inventory of existing literature. Rather, my rationale here is to look at what others have done, assess their contributions, highlight gaps in the literature, and synthesise various perspectives for this thesis.

Preliminary observation reveals a burgeoning of multiple approaches to the study of the ‘politics’ in tourism; some concentrate on macro-political issues (e.g. policy making; international relations; state hegemony), while others explore issues of micro-politics (e.g. power relations amongst stakeholders; resistance; politics of the

8 This chapter decidedly focuses on the ‘politics’ of tourism rather than the underlying concept of ‘power’ per se as the latter has already been covered extensively by Church and Coles’ (2007) edited book on tourism, power and space.
body). In my opinion, although this affirms the proposition that tourism is a highly political phenomenon, there is no “dialogue” amongst the various commentators. Writings on the politics of tourism from the macro perspective tend to be too institution-centric, while academics working on the micro aspects might overly emphasise the significance of agency, individual identities and infinite subjectivities. Therefore, I argue that analysis should not stop at the level of policy making; neither should we focus idiosyncratically on micro issues. Instead, a more integrative stance that recognises that a tourism landscape is formed by the interaction of both macro and micro political issues is desired.

Apart from the unnatural separation between macro and micro politics, the notion of ‘power’ assumed in many studies is also problematic in capturing the nuances of contemporary tourism politics. Such works either take power for granted or conceptualise it as “existing on its own as practically a commodity or a capacity or a currency which could be traded or fought over” (Church and Coles, 2007: xi). This kind of thinking about power often sets the stage for discussions on domination (by political institutions) and resistance (by the minority individuals). Bourdieu (1991) has warned of the limitations of the “implicit David versus Goliath romanticism…[such that] everything has to be forced into the dichotomy of resistance or submission and all of the paradoxical effects which cannot be understood in this way remain hidden” (cited in Thrift, 1997: 124). As the literature review unfolds, such conceptualisation of power will be eminent in the various writings on tourism. However, I find myself in agreement with more subtle appreciations of power practices as inspired by Foucault’s later writings on governmentality. In summarising Foucault’s changing views on power, Miller (2003: 205) asserts that:
Power should not be understood according to the model of a generalised domination exerted by one group over another. Power must be understood as a multiplicity of force relations which are immanent to the domain in which they operate and are constitutive of their own organisation. Power does not derive from a single point of origin but is to be found where it operates, at the mobile and unstable interrelation of force relations at local levels...It is ‘everywhere’.

This thesis recognises such horizontal distribution of power and is concerned with locating the multiple sites of power practices. More specifically, the politics of a tourism landscape has to be understood via the chaotic web of power within which both institutional and “micro governmental practices” are performed (Coles and Church, 2007: 25). Indeed, “power relations are rooted in the whole network of the social” (Foucault, 1982: 345). This chapter is therefore as much a literature review as it is an attempt to establish a more comprehensive and meaningful approach to the study of tourism politics.

This literature review is organised in both spatial and temporal terms. Spatially, the sections on macro-politics and micro-politics reflect the different scales (i.e. international; regional; local; self) at which the political aspects of tourism are being discussed. In temporal terms, I attempt to elicit the changing paradigms in defining the ‘politics’ of tourism within the social sciences in general and Geography in particular. In macro-politics (section 2.2), discussion revolves around policy (making) issues at the national and international levels. A separate but related section on ideology and hegemony is also raised (section 2.3). Conversely, at the micro level (section 2.4), there is an increasing interest in the study of power relations amongst tourism stakeholders, especially from a ‘bottom-up’/post-structural perspective. Furthermore, sections 2.5 to 2.7 provide a review of literature pertaining to the
politics of heritage tourism and battlefield tourism, as well as that of current tourism research in Kinmen.

2.2 Macro-politics and Tourism

Politics is about control. At the local, regional and national levels, various interests attempt to affect the determination of policy, policy outcomes and the position of tourism in the political agenda.

(C.Hall, 1991: 213)

Early works on the politics of tourism focus on the macro aspects of politics. They concern themselves with tourism development policies of an individual country or region (e.g. Richter, 1980, 1989; Seymour, 1980; Richter and Richter, 1985; Williams and Shaw, 1988; D.Hall, 1991; Davidson and Maitland, 1997). For example, in her book *The Politics of Tourism in Asia*, Richter (1989: 3), argues for the “immediate attention” to the international political and policy implications of tourism. She discusses the effect of political dimensions of tourism on national policies in various Asian countries and is optimistic about the political potential of tourism in terms of advocating for policies on environmental cooperation and peace initiatives. In a similar fashion, Hall (1994) adopts an institutional-centric view of the politics of tourism. He laments that due to the perception of tourism as a frivolous affair, the political aspects of tourism are “not willingly acknowledged by individuals or institutions involved in the decision-and policy-making process” (Hall, 1994: 4). He argues that a better understanding of the political ramifications of tourism can improve a country’s tourism planning.
Another related field of interest focuses on public sector management. As the tourism industry becomes increasingly influential in a country’s economic and political well-being, it rapidly becomes intertwined with other aspects of public sector administration. For instance, Richter (1989) examines the concomitant importance in taking on additional administrative roles for “convention management, new taxation initiatives…labour-management decisions…health and security issues”, as the state “takes on more responsibility for tourism development” (pp. 12-13). In a perhaps less ingenuous case of “management”, Cruz and Bersales (2007) report on the support for a particular candidate in a national voting event by local residents of Intramuros, Manila due to his promise for tourism friendly developments. It is clear that tourism, with its perceived positive economic impacts, can be used as a political tool to “manage” and garner support from voters (see also Thirumaran, 2007). Concerns about the political utility of tourism of course do not stop at the scale of the national. The stakes are even higher when tourism becomes appealing to international politics.

The political uses of tourism in terms of international relations or public relations form another strand of scholarly inquiry (Richter, 1989, 1994; Mowlana and Smith, 1990; Hall, 1994; Craik, 1997; L’Etang et al., 2007). Citing examples from the opening up of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Cuba, and Vietnam to western tourism, Richter (1989: 2) attests that “[t]ourist flows in general can be seen as crude but reliable barometer of international relations among tourist-generating and tourist-receiving countries”. Building on to the empirical evidence to Richter’s claim, Hall (1994) analyses international tourism policies of countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, China and the Philippines, shedding light on issues ranging from foreign diplomacy and trade, restrictions and restraints, to
international recognition and political stability. Similarly, according to Robinson and Smith (2006: 2),

Each nation, no matter what their position in any notional global political league table, promotes tourism as an actual and potential source of external revenue, a marker of political status that draws upon cultural capital, and as a means to legitimise itself as a territorial entity.

As such, tourism is seen not only as an economically important industry, but also a politically useful tool in gaining publicity, relaying desired messages, and for participating countries to harness on the improved relations to attain desired recognition in the global arena. With regard to this research, the promotion of battlefield tourism in Kinmen might be part of a larger political endeavour by the Republic of China on Taiwan to establish and maintain its political entity since it is not recognised as a sovereign state under United Nation’s definition. However, current tourism exchanges between China and Taiwan are believed to foster better friendship and thus bring forth security in the region.

Diplomatic ties between two countries involved in tourism exchanges can also be linked to local politics. By opposing Elliott’s (1997) claim that governments promote tourism for economic gains, Thirumaran (2007) provides an interesting example to justify his argument that tourism “is embedded with power dimensions within the local and between the local and global forces” (p.194). He relates the Malaysian cabinet’s move to open the Zheng He\(^9\) Gallery in Malacca within a two-week notice, to coincide with the visit of a deputy minister for culture from China. In a Malay-majority State where heritage of the minority Chinese is often subdued, such

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\(^9\) Zheng He, also known as Cheng Ho, was a Chinese admiral of Muslim descent, born in 1371 in Yunan, China. He was an ocean navigator famous for his diplomatic voyages between 1405 and 1433 to port cities, including Malacca, Malaysia.
an episode proved to be unprecedented, prompting Thirumaran to conclude that “the extent to which the ethnic minorities are included in the national tourism landscape is dependent on domestic Malay politics and the economic importance of China (2007: 206). Conversely, heritage attractions can serve to incorporate the excluded/marginalised in a society and challenge established definitions of a country’s national identity (Butcher, 2006).

Discussion thus far has looked at tourism from developmental and diplomatic perspectives, and it is generally agreed that a sound tourism policy at the national and international levels will propel the economy forward. Critical voices do exist though. More specifically, there are those who take a political economy approach in the critical evaluation of tourism development, especially in developing economies (e.g. Nash, 1977; de Kadt, 1979; Richter, 1980; Britton, 1983; Jenkins and Henry, 1982; Keller, 1984; Britton and Clarke, 1987; Harrison, 1992; Milne, 1997). For instance, in view of the distribution of and access to resources and wealth, some have argued that on the basis of equity, the benefits derived from tourism development/policies are not evenly spread within the host community (Haveman, 1976; McDonald, 1986), and that the government and foreign companies benefit at the expense of the locals (Greenwood, 1976).10

On the global front, although proponents of international relations and diplomacy celebrate the interconnectedness and interdependence amongst countries, brought about by international travel, Britton (1982, cited in Hall, 1994: 60) observes that “uneven flow of tourists in developed countries to Third World region has also

10 In fact, as Britton (1991) elucidates, the lucrative tourism sector might even be sustained by labour exploitation, to which women are most vulnerable (Richter, 1989).
been criticised for creating economic dependence.” Similarly, Richter (1989) attests that concerns about poor countries’ limited power in determining their own tourism development direction remains one of the most pressing issues related to the politics of tourism. However, political mismanagement and corruption within the developing countries might be more fundamental causes.

Critical evaluation of tourism policies of late has included recommendations for change. For example, Williams (2002: 365) argues,

To plan is to engage in a politics of place and in the public sector this underscores the necessity to move from a top-down, expert-driven management style to one that is more bottom-up and inclusive. The redesign of planning/decision making processes and institutions needs to be radically participatory and democratic.

Indeed, decentralisation of power such that the locals have a say in shaping the tourism landscape, not only recognises them as one of the stakeholders in tourism development, but could also instil within them a stronger sense of place and belonging. In the case of Kinmen, local entrepreneurs contribute to the tourism landscape by coming up with battlefield-related food and tourist souvenirs. These products help to instil a sense of pride amongst the Kinmen people. Burns (2004) takes the discussion further by advocating for a “Third Way” in tourism planning, aiming to strike a middle ground between policies that lead to either equity or exploitation (as discussed above), and the “eco-centric, ultra-cautious approach of ecotourism [that] will protect the environment but fail to produce economic benefit to all but a handful” (p.24). Among the suggestions are proposals for participatory planning, incentives given by the government to encourage local entrepreneurs in tourism-related businesses, and a corresponding set of disincentives for foreign investors that create external
diseconomies for the host country. It is hoped that the “Third Way” approach to
tourism policy making can “provide a platform for sustainable growth and human
development” (Burns, 2004: 40). Discussions hitherto have focused on the more
direct or “tangible” forms of tourism politics. There is another dimension where
politics are played out in a more subtle way, which I shall now turn to.

2.3 Ideology and Hegemony

Tourism can be a highly politicised activity when it is utilised as a platform to
exercise the state’s hegemony. Moving beyond the apparently “benign” or neutral
realm of policy analysis, this genre of tourism research, informed by structural
discourses in the social sciences, seeks to explicate the inherent motives behind
tourism development. According to Eagleton (1983: 135),

“It is one of the functions of ideology to ‘naturalize’ social reality, to make it
seem as innocent and unchangeable as Nature itself…Ideology seeks to convert
culture into nature …[it] is a kind of contemporary mythology, a realm which
has purged itself of ambiguity and alternative possibility.

By uncovering the ideologies behind tourism landscapes, studies on the politics of
tourism have evolved from a policy-centred approach to a paradigm of hegemonic
power and identity (re)construction.

According to Brown (1973, cited in Hall, 1994: 11), “[i]deologies are systems
of belief about social and political issues that have strong effects in structuring and
influencing thoughts, feelings and behaviour.” Tourism landscapes are often invested
with state ideologies (Williams and Shaw, 1988; D.Hall, 1991) and these landscapes
are both real (e.g. heritage buildings) and imagined (e.g. landscapes depicted in tourism marketing imageries).

Historical buildings are often appropriated as tourist attractions. For instance, Light (2001) demonstrates the importance of tourism in the Romanian authority’s imaging effort to “project and affirm distinctly post-socialist identities as part of the process of re-integration into the political and economic structures of Western Europe” (p.1053). The historical building, previously known as the ‘House of the People’ during the totalitarian regime, is being re-appropriated into a tourist sight and re-configured to “accord better with Romanian’s post-socialist identity” (Light, 2001: 1053). Indeed, as Stokowski (2002: 374) corroborates in his analysis of the politics of place,

Understanding the social construction of place and sense of place re-focuses thinking away from the taken-for-granted physical characteristics of space, and toward the possibility that places are always in the process of being created, always provisional and uncertain, and always capable of being discursively manipulated towards desired (individual or collective) ends.

Such fluidity of place construction can also be observed in Kinmen’s battlefield tourism. War museums were built by the military to instil nationalist ideologies and patriotism in the past. Now, due to improved cross-strait ties, tourism planners are beginning to refurbish these museums to reflect a less contested history so as to cater to increasing mainland Chinese tourists.

Apart from relying on a nation’s past to promote tourism, hallmark events are also good opportunities for host countries to instil state ideologies. Ritchie (1984) analyses the political impacts of the World Fairs and Olympic Games and identifies
the significance of ideology in the staging of these events, and the possible enhancement of the state’s legitimacy as a result. International mega events hosted by a country could also be used as a stage to perform what L’Etang et al. (2007) call ‘public relations’. In particular, they observe that the “Olympics are clearly the mega-event in sports tourism in which national ideologies are played alongside the transnational ideology of Olympism”. More specifically, the “Olympics offer nations a strategic opportunity to promote the nation-state and its values, and to articulate national identity to audiences at home and abroad” (p. 74).11

Forays into the political implications of tourism marketing/imag(in)ing have been dominated by tourism geographers (Goss, 1993; Chang, 1997, Ateljevic and Doorne, 2002; Teo, 2003; Page and Hall, 2003). As Johnson (1999) observes, analyses of tourist brochures, postcards and other promotional literature have indeed begun to deconstruct destination images presented to tourists (Selwyn, 1990, 1996; Cohen, 1995; Crang, 1996). For example, Goss (1993) discusses the advertising strategies of the Hawaiian Islands. Through textual analysis of the marketing materials produced by the visitor bureau and sponsored by the state, he examines how “advertising of tourist destinations plays an important role in the construction of place imagery…” particularly in the portrayal of specific place identities to attract their ‘target audience’ (p. 663). Other than the strategic positioning of a tourist destination to attract specific types of audience, tourism imaging could also be utilised for nation building. Chang’s (1997) research on Singapore’s promotional campaigns from the 1960s to the 1990s exemplifies the imaging strategies employed by the nation-state to instil upon Singaporeans “a sense of national identity and selfhood” (p.542). He

11 See also Reid (2007) for a commentary on the MTV Europe Music Awards’ impact on Edinburgh’s re-imagining.
affirms that “urban imaging policies embody both economic goals and sociopolitical functions and are directed at both visitors and residents” (Chang, 1997: 542). This is also true in the marketing of Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination. Both nation-building agenda and national well-being mentality in the face of improved cross-strait ties co-exist in the tourism promotion. The former is aimed at the locals while the latter has Chinese tourists in mind.

Being influenced by critical cultural studies in the social sciences, Page and Hall (2003) even adopted a landscape-analysis approach in the study of urban tourism landscape and place marketing. They attest that the ability to ‘read’ landscapes not only open up avenues to understand the ideology of the landscape (Cosgrove, 1984), but also enable us to appreciate how it may “reproduce social and political practices” (Duncan, 1990, cited in Page and Hall, 2003: 297). In this thesis, landscape analysis will be critical in unravelling the various state ideologies and tourism technologies of government.

2.4 Micro-politics: A View ‘From Below’

The preceding sections have focused on the macro-political dimensions of tourism. A ‘top-down’ perspective was adopted to highlight issues of tourism management (e.g. policy making, international relations), as well as ideology and hegemony in shaping the tourism landscape. Such structural analysis is but one of many ways in which to understand tourism politics. In fact, Bramwell (2006: 959) highlights Long’s (2001) concern that although macro level structure is “highly significant…, it is theoretically unsatisfactory to rely on the concept of structural determination because precise paths of change cannot be explained through an inexorable structural logic.” Therefore,
there is a need to understand the politics of tourism ‘from below’, “which involves documenting everyday micro-situations and situated social practices” (Bramwell, 2006: 959). Such ‘bottom-up’ or post-structural analysis, which takes into consideration the power relations and conflict amongst different stakeholders, as well as the resultant impacts on the tourism landscape, is the focus of this section.

Conflict between the tourism authority and locals over the representation of their ethnicity or culture is one of the ways in which micro-politics are played out (D’Arcus, 2000; Higgins-Desbiolles, 2007; Cooper et al., 2007; Keitumetse, 2007). A good example of this power relation is given by D’Arcus’ (2000) discussion of the conflicts over ethnic tourism in Gallup, New Mexico, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The American Southwest of Gallup was being marketed as a “Land of Enchantment” by the tourism authority, in a bid to create a National Indian Memorial Park there. Such an attempt to create an enchanted landscape for the tourists was resisted by the ethnic Indian Americans, who claimed that they had been objectified by the tourism authority and that the touristic portrayal was not reflective of their disadvantaged socio-economic situation. Resistance to such a production of space is manifested through various material and representational efforts by the Indians Against Exploitation group. The strategies employed by the Indian activists include distributing leaflets at staged Indian ceremonial events questioning their authenticity, and setting up alternative Indian arts and crafts markets and dance performances for tourists.

Relationships between the tourists and locals are not always cordial. Moreover, locals themselves might have conflicting views on tourism matters too. According to
Ashworth and Tunbridge (1990) urban tourist landscapes serve multiple functions such as entertainment, commercial and residential. For this reason, “the power relations between various stakeholders provide an opportunity to look at cities as shared spaces” (Chang, 2000: 347), and a “function of conflict and compromise” (Short, 1996: 168). In this respect, Chang (2000) captures such interplay of micro-political forces in Singapore’s Little India historic district. He sees Little India as a contested landscape and discusses the relationship between tourists and locals, tensions between the Indian and Chinese communities, and disagreements between planners and users.

Discussion on power relations among stakeholders thus far has focused on opposing forces. However, there remain practices that elude rather than subvert/confront power. A limited, but nevertheless important strand of research on state-trained tour guides serves as a good example here. Unlike the structural analysis adopted by some scholars that emphasises the state’s hegemony in tour guide training (see, for example Nyiri, 2009), writings informed by micro-political optics focus on the agency of the tour guides. As Bras (2000, cited in Dahles, 2002: 784) points out,

Guides are not altruistic mediators by vocation, nor can they be expected to submit blindly to government rules and regulations exacting them to tell pre-fabricated stories….Successful guides know how to turn their social relations and narratives into a profitable enterprise.

A more vivid example of negotiation by tour guides is discussed in Salazar’s (2006) case study of Tanzanian tour guides in Arusha. During their training, tour guides “are instructed, both implicitly and explicitly [on] how to use global discourses to represent and sell their natural and cultural heritage as authentically local”. However,
in reality, “they do not merely reproduce the narratives and practices they were taught
at school; instead they themselves become creative storytellers, often subtly
questioning or contesting the normative templates” (p.833).

In my opinion, an important contribution of such analysis of tourism politics is
that it transcends taken-for-granted notions of state dominance in the tourism policy-
making process (as adopted by a structural view), and the necessarily conflicting
relationship between structure and agency (as often assumed by post-structural
analysis). In contrast, it portrays the real politics behind the construction of discourses
and knowledge by the different actors in the alignment and negotiation of their
interest with tourism policies. In Kinmen, this is particular relevant in understanding
local entrepreneurs’ and ordinary Kinmen people’s effort in their embrace of the
island’s battlefield identity through everyday practices. Although influenced to a
certain extent by governmental initiatives, these stakeholders still possess their
agencies in interpreting and presenting the battlefield heritage to tourists. Such
recognition of the complex power relations amongst tourism stakeholders is useful for
a better understanding of tourism politics.

Related to the body of literature on agency in tourism politics, there has been
an emerging interest in the ‘body’ as a political entity in its own right; in other words,
the micro-politics of identity. I refer to the “phenomenological study of embodiment
that attempts to understand human practices or the performativity of the body”
(Turner, 2006: 223, emphasis in original; see also, Thrift’s (1997; 2001) non-
representational theory). Such micro-politics of identity will be explored when the
thesis touches on ordinary Kinmen people’s performance of their citizenship with
regard to the preservation of the battlefield heritage. Locals are no longer passive actors at the losing end of cultural/tourism commodification (Greenwood, 1989; Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos, 2004), but active performers and reflexive tourism subjects who see tourism as a stage for them to construct and re-construct their identities. Such research on performative geographies contributes significantly to the literature on the politics of tourism by demonstrating the potential of individuals as unique political entities in the negotiation of their everyday identities.

2.5 Heritage Tourism Politics: Ideological Framing of the Past?

The potent but unstable mix of politics, ideologies and economic principles become even fuzzier when culture and heritage are thrown into the pot as frequently happens with the development of tourism. (Selwyn, 1996, cited in Burns and Novelli, 2007: 1)

The argument that there are political imperatives and ideological underpinnings in the promotion of tourism, other than economic rationales, becomes even more compelling when the variables of ‘heritage’ and ‘culture’ are factored in. An increase in interest on heritage as a tourism commodity has contributed to a burgeoning literature on the spatialities of heritage politics (Johnson, 1999; Dwyer, 2000; Agyei-Mensah, 2006; Kelly, 2006; Winter, 2007; Yan and Bramwell, 2008; Su and Teo, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2008; Logan and Reeves, 2008). As reiterated by Johnson (1999: 187) heritage tourism is not merely “a set of commercial transactions, but the ideological framing of history and identity”. Similarly, in their attempt to define the realm of cultural politics, Jordan and Weedon (1995: 4) question: “What cultures shall be regarded as worthy of display and which shall be hidden? Whose history shall be remembered and whose forgotten? What image of social life shall be projected and
which shall be marginalised? What voices shall be heard and which silenced? Who is representing whom, and on what basis?” 12 However, discussion on the cultural politics of heritage tourism does not stop at the level of hegemonic representation.

Another aspect of heritage tourism politics lies in the contesting representations of history by various stakeholders. Such studies recognise the plurality in the interpretations of history by different sectors of the society, and thus highlight the politics behind multiple representations at heritage attractions. For instance, Dwyer (2000: 660) gives an overview of the “current memorial practices and representations of the Civil Rights movement [of the 1950s and 1960s]” at various memorial landscapes of the US South. Critical analysis of various monuments and museums dedicated to the movement reveals that the role of women in organising and leading the movement is obscured from the heritage tourism sites. Furthermore, Dwyer discovers two contesting historiographical perspectives in representing the movement – one that celebrates the supremacy of the white elites, as opposed to one that reflects everyday African-American grassroots struggle for civil rights. As such, Dwyer sheds light on the politics of the movement as well as the politics of representing it. A similar case of multiple representations can be found in India. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008) interpret the advent of heritage tourism as an avenue for “renegotiation and dissemination of identities” (p.790). Their study reveals the ways India’s heritage is portrayed by three groups of stakeholders, namely the Indian government, the domestic tourism trade media, and the popular tourism media. They suggest that the private sector’s representation of India as “an ethnically diverse nation in which Hinduism preceded and prevailed over all other ethnicities/religions”

12 See also Kelly’s (2006) case study of the Ulster American Folk Park in Northern Ireland.
Heritage tourism developments are not without negative impacts. In a bid to (re)create heritage spaces to conform to tourists’ expectations, everyday landscapes of the local might be rearranged at the expense of the people’s well-being. Su and Teo’s (2008) exposition of the Lijiang Ancient Town, a World Heritage Site, is an appropriate example where the indigenous Naxi people were marginalised due to rapid tourism development. They were deprived of their original accommodation when their houses were converted to guesthouses and other tourist facilities. However, they were able to exercise their agency by “reclaim[ing] touristic spaces for everyday activities” and through a food outlet, define a “symbolic representational space of their own cultural identity” (Su and Teo, 2008: 150).

Nevertheless, there are also instances whereby the state compromises under societal pressure at heritage sites. According to Yan and Bramwell (2008), the approval for locals to perform a Confucian ceremony at Qufu World Heritage Site, shows the Communist Party-led national government’s changing attitude towards cultural heritage and Confucianism. Although the “cult ceremony” (performed to commemorate the death of Confucius during the feudal period) was disallowed since Mao Zedong’s administration, Confucianism nevertheless was and still is highly influential in the Chinese society. This, coupled with the increasing importance of heritage tourism in China, led to the state’s giving permission to restore the public
“cult ceremony”. Indeed, as the authors noted, the state “is likely to respond to societal pressures and local government initiative in order to maintain its political hegemony” (Yan and Bramwell, 2008: 969). With regard to the politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism, in an attempt to win over support of the locals, the Kinmen National Park, a central government subsidiary, changes its focus from environmental protection to battlefield landscape preservation. The former has been criticised by the locals as a hindrance to development while the latter, however, is perceived as economically beneficial.

Heritage, as has been discussed thus far, is assumed to encompass, in Logan and Reeves’ (2008: 1) terms, “the great and beautiful creations of the past, [and] reflections of the creative genius of humanity”. However, historical events that were unpleasant, but nevertheless play a significant role in social memory, are beginning to be emphasised in the context of heritage conservation (Winter, 2007; Logan and Reeves, 2008). For example, Logan and Reeves’ collection of case studies on ‘difficult heritage’ focus on the painful and/or shameful episodes of a nation’s or community’s history and “the ways that government agencies, heritage professionals and the communities themselves seek to remember, commemorate and conserve these cases – or, conversely, choose to forget them” (ibid: 1). In a similar vein, Tim Winter’s (2007) case study on the World Heritage Site of Angkor, Cambodia also reflects on post-conflict developmental issues surrounding stakeholders’ competing claims to the heritage space and identity. Research on the politics of tourism needs to engage with such emerging but important genre of study so as to continue to be critical and relevant. In a time where nations and communities are beginning to acknowledge and reconcile with their (inglorious/problematic) past, heritage tourism
might provide an avenue for a transition to a less tumultuous future. The next section looks at a quintessential form of ‘difficult heritage’ tourism – battlefield tourism, on which my thesis is based.

2.6 Politics of Battlefield Tourism

If heritage increases the complexities associated with tourism politics, heritage tourism becomes even more sensitive when it is associated with historical sites of war. In this thesis, I refer to this form of tourism as ‘battlefield tourism’. Battlefield tourism has often been subsumed under the likes of ‘Thanatourism’ (Seaton, 1996) and ‘Dark Tourism’ (Foley and Lennon, 1996), which are generic terms for “travel associated with death, atrocity or disaster” (Seaton and Lennon, 2004: 63). Approaching from a production perspective, Foley and Lennon (1996) have discussed tourism associated with the Holocaust (e.g. concentration camps in Germany, death camps in Poland and the US Holocaust Memorial Museum), and war sites of the First and Second World Wars. By examining such sites and how they have been “interpreted and are presented to tourists and how history has shaped those interpretations through media, political forces, and social change”, they argue that “politics, sociology, and current technologies are just as important in creating dark tourism sites as the events that occurred at the sites themselves” (Smith, 2002: 1188).

More recent development in the literature concerns the analysis of cultural politics inherent in the production and consumption of battlefield tourism destinations (Henderson, 2000; Seaton, 2000; Timothy et al., 2004; Cooper, 2006; Hannam, 2006;

13 However, for this thesis, I use the term ‘battlefield tourism’ to highlight the politics of heritage and at the same time, avoid (unnecessary) voyeuristic connotations of ‘Dark’- or ‘Thanatourism’- associated with this form of tourism (Slade, 2003; Lisle, 2007). See Zhang (2007) for a more comprehensive literature review of ‘Thanatourism’.
Ryan, 2007). Hannam (2006) analyses the heritage dissonance over contested British and Indian representations of the British Residency at Lucknow, India. For the British tourists, “the landscape of the residency became a rallying point for the construction of a heroic, monumental, national history” (ibid: 206-7). However, for the Indian locals, the site represents “patriotism, sacrifice and heroic deeds of countless freedom fighters who lost their lives when it was besieged” (Fonia, 2002, cited in Hannam, 2006: 209-10). Contestation also exists between tourism producers and locals. At Glencoe, Scotland, the locals contest the representation of the locality by the tourism producer, the National Trust for Scotland. While the Massacre of Glencoe dominates the official narration of the locale and offers an avenue for portraying ‘Highland Scottishness’, the locals offer a “communal narrative” of the area’s history, focusing on “real-life histories”, through a community-managed museum (Knox, 2006). As is evident, the tourism landscape is a platform where cultural politics is played out in the dialectical relationship between various stakeholders.

Battlefield tourism sites are not just for commemorative purposes. To a certain extent, they are also educational and entertainment platforms. According to Uzzell (1989), “if a museum or a site is to have an educational value...they must also honestly represent the more shameful events of our past...if interpretation is to be a social good, then it must alert us to the future through the past” (cited in Kelly, 2006: 14).

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14 See Ryan (2007) for a collection of battlefield tourism sites and case studies in China, the United States, the South Pacific and Europe.
15 The British Residency, built in 1775, was the symbol of colonial power in the city of Lucknow. It was a site of bloodshed between the British and Indians during the First War of Indian Independence/The Indian Mutiny in 1857.
16 The Massacre of Glencoe (1692), also known as the Highland War, is an extended conflict between the Highland clans and the Hanoverian British state, which deposed the Stuart line of monarchs (Knox, 2006).
However, to attract tourists or the young generation who are apathetic about history, heritage attractions are beginning to incorporate entertainment features. This leaves Henderson (2000) to ponder the function of heritage attractions in post-war Vietnam - should they be a source of education or an avenue for leisure and recreation? Exploring this issue, she discusses the “dilemma of achieving a satisfactory balance between education and entertainment while providing an appropriate experience for visitors who come for different needs and expectations” (p.269). In addition, she concludes that for wartime heritage to attain its educational purpose (e.g. remind people of the atrocities of war and the value of peace), there is a need for “honesty and veracity” in the management and presentation of the various attractions, so as to avoid situations “where commercial imperatives or political expediency dictate decisions” (Henderson, 2000: 279).

Visits to past battlefields have the potential to bring across the cruelty of war, and indeed of humankind, and to remind people that peace is priceless. In recent years, there has been an emerging interest in research pertaining to battlefield tourism and its promotion of peace between enemies, both past and present. Studies by Long (2003), Timothy et al. (2004), Cooper (2006), Guo et al. (2006) and Cho (2007) explore the possibilities of reconciliation between belligerents. These authors corroborate the utility of battlefield tourism as a bridge to foster peace and stability between former enemies. Activities or commemoration ceremonies that involve both sides are seen as potential reconciliation tools. Kinmen’s battlefield tourism could well be a valuable asset for Taiwan and China in the era of peace and co-prosperity.
In empirical terms, much research has been done on the more ‘established wars’. Tourism case studies related to ‘less significant wars’, like the Chinese Civil War, are seldom heard of if any. In my thesis, battlefield tourism is situated in real geopolitics and embedded in contemporary cross-strait relations. Hence the political dimensions (both macro and micro) become even more important to analyse.

2.7 Academic Literature on Kinmen’s Tourism

Academic literature on Taiwan shows a strong inclination towards the development and management aspects of Kinmen’s tourism. Issues pertaining to the governing of Kinmen’s cultural industry and tourism resources (Yang and Hsing, 2001; Ku and Liau, 2004), tourism imaging and museum improvement (Hou, 1998), and development of new tourism facilities (Kuo, 2004) have been extensively researched. Inquiries into the consumer realm are dominated by positivist/quantitative analysis of tourists’ satisfaction and service quality of the tourism industry (Chang, 1998), tourists’ motivations for travel (Kuo, 2004), and residents’ attitude towards sustainable tourism in Kinmen (Shen, 2003).

Only recently have critical analyses of Kinmen’s tourism emerged. For instance, Chiang (2006) discusses the politics of war museum displays and criticises the focus on nationalist ideologies rather than collective memory of the locals. Going further, Szonyi (2005) analyses the disjuncture between nationalist portrayal and tourists’ interpretation of the Wang Yulan cult, thus revealing the added layer of

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17 Examples include the Great War (Lloyd, 1998; Seaton, 2000), World War II (Gordon, 1998; Muzaini, 2004; Butcher, 2006), Korean War (Timothy et al., 2004; Lee, 2006) and Vietnam War (Henderson, 2000; Agrusa et al., 2006).
18 Unless otherwise stated, all literature reviewed in this section are written in Chinese.
19 Written in English.
complexity brought about by tourism. He also critically points out the difference in ritual performance in the propitiation of the “deity” between tourists and locals, to suggest a re-interpretation of the cult by visitors.\textsuperscript{20} Such endeavour for a more critical analysis of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism will continue to be undertaken in this thesis.

\section*{2.8 Conclusion: Towards a More Comprehensive Approach in Understanding Tourism Politics}

In the above discussion, I have attempted to provide an overview of research on the politics of tourism, in terms of the scale of political concern and also the underlying paradigm changes within the social sciences. The progress from earlier research on the macro-politics of tourism to the recent focus on micro-political issues was also mapped out in the preceding sections. Such a change in interest is related to the changing theoretical/ontological approaches in the understanding of tourism. For instance, macro-political inquiry of policy issues, international relations, and ideology and hegemony are informed by a structural/‘top-down’ approach, while the post-structural/‘bottom-up’ paradigm underlies discussion on the micro-political aspects of power relations amongst tourism stakeholders. A glimpse at some of the emerging research themes is also provided. I have also noted the dominance of “positivism and scientism” (Jamal and Hollinshead, 2001) in existing analysis of Kinmen’s tourism, which makes it difficult to address cultural-political nuances. However, more critical engagements are on the rise. Of course, this review is not exhaustive and there remain other modes of classifying the wide array of scholarly writings from various disciplines, some from the social sciences and others from tourism/hospitality studies.

\textsuperscript{20} See Szonyi (2008) for a more comprehensive coverage of the politics of deification in Kinmen during the Cold War years.
I have avoided the tendency to “compartmentalise” the various strands of literature into discipline-specific genres, as that would ultimately dilute the multidisciplinary nature of tourism. In fact, such a classification reflects the current situation of the multiple loci of discussion but the lack of ‘dialogue’ amongst the various strands of scholarship. In reality the macro and micro components come together to form the tourism fabric. It is therefore necessary to “stitch” these “patches” of scholarly inquiries together in order to better represent the political intricacies at any tourist destination. Geography, as an eclectic discipline, has the capacity to act as a platform for the discussion of cross-disciplinary issues pertaining to the politics of tourism. To recognise this is not difficult, but to operationalise it is not easy either. The challenge really is to devise a theoretical framework that encompasses both the macro and micro dimensions of tourism in a way that goes beyond binary understandings of ‘top-down’ vs ‘bottom-up’, ‘hegemony’ vs ‘resistance’, ‘winners’ vs losers’; one that recognises the inter-connectedness of macro-and micro-politics. In other words, it is pertinent to understand how macro-political issues are shaping and simultaneously being shaped by micro-political practices in tourism. The conception of ‘power’ as horizontally distributed and ‘everywhere’, as explicated in the beginning of this chapter, might provide a clue in achieving a better understanding of the politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism. But before this is further explored in and through the two empirical chapters, issues pertaining to the research methodology of my thesis are next to be scrutinised.
CHAPTER THREE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

Research methods form an integral part of an academic project. They are not only tools to achieve intended results, but are also means by which the researcher engages the researched community in a social process. It is by going to the field that one gets to appreciate a place and its people, and above all, its geographies. This chapter elucidates the research techniques undertaken during my overseas fieldwork before ending on a reflective note.21

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Semi-structured in-depth interviews

Respondents for this thesis are divided into three groups, namely the public sector, local entrepreneurs (private sector), and the community (comprising tourists and locals). A total of 33 semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted to better understand the power relations in the development of Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination. More precisely, eight representatives from governmental institutions22 presiding over Kinmen’s tourism development were interviewed (see Appendix A). Insights were also garnered from interviewing seven personnel from the private sector, whose businesses are in one way or another related to Kinmen’s battlefield tourism

21 Primary data were collected during two phases of overseas fieldwork (May – July 2007 and December 2007).
22 Of the eight interviewees, one works at the Institute for Physical Planning & Information based in Taipei, four are from the Kinmen County Government, and three are from the Kinmen National Park.
Furthermore, less formal interviews were carried out with 18 Kinmen locals (see Appendix C). Where appropriate, interview quotes from my previous research in Kinmen would also be utilised. These serve to reveal continuities and changes in people’s perception of battlefield tourism development.

Gaining access to government officials and local entrepreneurs was not easy. Therefore, snowballing personal contacts in both Taipei and Kinmen became a critical tool. It was a matter of identifying various ‘gatekeepers’ (e.g. contacts in a local university, relatives and friends, etc) that access to desired interviewees was possible. The cultural context of Kinmen – a society that prefers personal connections and relationships to formal encounters – allowed the effectiveness of snowballing to be realised, as trust was more easily gained (Valentine, 2005a).

All interviews were conducted in Mandarin and/or Hokkien (South Min dialect), at a time and place suited to the respondents’ convenience, and lasted about 45-60 minutes each. Although prepared in English, a Chinese version of the interview questions was provided to interviewees before the start of the interview so as not to put him/her at any disadvantage (see Appendix D). I adopted a semi-structured format in order to be flexible, with the questions serving as an aide-memoire to allow the interview to proceed in a conversational mode. This, I believe, allowed for effective interaction and better rapport with the respondents. In relating to the government officials, it was sometimes important to ‘gild the lily’ or to offer something in return (Clark et al., 1998). For instance, I was asked to provide feedback on how to improve the war museums and to share research findings with my interviewees. These gave me

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23 For example, restaurant operators and entrepreneurs producing tourist souvenirs and products.
the opportunity to re-visit respondents and feed back to them my preliminary findings and suggestions. It was often during those sessions that I was able to garner more opinions as they became more willing to share their knowledge. All interviews, at the interviewees’ consent, were taped. Transcriptions were done as soon as possible after the interviews as it was easier to elicit main themes when the conversations were still fresh in the mind (Longhurst, 2003).

The degree of formality of an interview needs to be adjusted so as to adapt to the various conditions and to yield maximum results. For instance, informal interviews proved to be useful when interacting with local residents. Apart from the practicality of this method, the informal setting made it possible for me to “understand how individual people experience and make sense of their own lives” (Valentine, 2005a: 111). This is especially important as it is in the interest of this thesis to understand the inner-workings of power and how they are reflected in the attitude and behaviour of the people. Snowballing again was effective. However, I was careful to use ‘multiple initial contact points’ to prevent having a limited circle of like-minded contacts (ibid). Perceptions of the tourism landscape could also be gathered during conversations with tourists.

In order to appreciate the local residents’ perception and attitude towards Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape, it is important for me to blend into their living environment (i.e. in terms of dressing down and speaking the local language). I concur with Bunge’s (1971, cited in Cloke et al., 1991: 41) assertion that “[i]t is

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24 All quotations used in the text are verbatim. Pseudonyms are used for some informants and interviewees to ensure confidentiality.

25 Although it is not the focus of this thesis to provide a detailed discussion on tourists, I interviewed some to understand how certain attractions or products were received by end users.
impossible to understand a neighbourhood without becoming a neighbour”. Apart from gathering information for this thesis, ethnographic fieldwork gave me the opportunity to have a better understanding of local people and their culture, and that for me, is priceless. The three months stay in Kinmen allowed me to participate in the locals’ activities ranging from basketball games at the community sports hall to meet-the-residents sessions conducted by the authorities. These informal settings provided me with valuable opportunities to engage with the locals’ ‘flow of everyday life’ (Hay, 2000) and appreciate the political nuances within the community. It is through such mundane and ingenuous encounters with locals in the ‘field’ that makes my fieldwork experience an extraordinary one. As Chang (2000) expresses succinctly, “it is through the subtle power relations between people that we can best appreciate landscape evolution” (p. 346).

3.2.2 Participant observation

For a research that aims to unravel the effects of landscape on the attitude and behaviour of locals and tourists, participant observation is useful. It was employed during fieldtrips to various attractions such as war museums and underground tunnels, souvenir shops, and battlefield tourism-related events/fun fairs. The degree of participation as an observer (Hay, 2000) differs across time. Whenever I encountered a new field site, I would participate as a tourist more than I observe other participants. After repeated visits, I would begin to observe the behaviour of others more than I participate in the tour experience. This allowed me to relate better to tourists’ and locals’ experiences when I eventually interviewed them. Local respondents would often prefer to be interviewed at home and some might gave me a tour of their village to show me their effort in preserving various war relics. In such cases, I adopted the
‘non-representational theory’ stance to “become an observant participant rather than a participant observer” (Thrift, 2001: 556) so as to “understand the meanings of place [construction] and the contexts of everyday life” (Kearns, 2000: 108). It was through such subtle manoeuvring between participation and observation that I was able to achieve more meaningful readings of the landscape.

3.2.3 Secondary data

A variety of secondary sources was also tapped. Access to the Taiwan National Library opened up the methodological route to review theses and publications by Taiwanese academics on Kinmen’s tourism. Books on oral histories and the local newspapers proved to be crucial in eliciting local people’s experience during and after the war. Furthermore, official tourism plans/policies provided by the county government’s tourism bureau and Kinmen National Park were referred to. Television programmes, postcards and children story books were also analysed to unravel the various cultural technologies of government.

3.3 Fieldwork as a Social Process: Experiences and Reflections

It is appropriate to end this chapter on a reflective note. Being reflexive certainly accounts for part of the methodology as research is never a ‘unilinear’ process (see, for example, Dowling’s (2000) piece on ‘critical reflexivity’). I need to constantly reflect upon my positionality and fine-tune research methods in the course of my fieldwork so as to proceed. According to Star (1991, cited in Thrift, 1997: 135), “people inhabit many different domains at once…and the negotiation of identities, within and across groups, is an extraordinarily complex and delicate task…; we are all
marginal in some regard, as members of more than one community…” My positionality as a Singaporean student researcher is substantiated by my identity as an ‘Overseas Chinese’ returning to his grandfather’s hometown to research for his thesis. Contacts with relatives still staying in Kinmen further ‘legitimised’ my work. Being simultaneously an insider and an outsider proves to be effective in eliciting more sensitive insights from local respondents. On one hand, they were more forthcoming during discussions as I am a fellow Kinmenese to them. Conversely, because I am a Singaporean, they felt relatively at ease to disclose more sensitive sentiments as they knew that I would not be entangled in their much complicated socio-politics. Furthermore, as Duncan (1990: 18) posits,

The juxtaposition of the outsider’s and the insider’s readings can help to defamiliarize the relationship between landscapes, dominant ideologies, and political or social practices. It can illuminate the way dominant ideologies which are communicated through the medium of landscape reproduce social and political practices.

Therefore, careful threading in and between my positionalities during the fieldwork process, contributed significantly to a fruitful learning journey.

Proficiency in the Chinese language and the local (South Min) dialect also gave me an added advantage in establishing commonality and rapport with my respondents, and gaining their views and concerns. I have always believed that these are prerequisites for a more ‘grounded’ research, compared to the elitist type of analysis that treats “‘objects’, buildings and neighbourhoods, from on high and from afar” (Lefebvre, 1991, cited in Yeoh, 2003: vii). Concomitantly, ethnographic fieldwork on the island provides a unique segue to a better understanding of China-Taiwan relations in the post-war reconciliation era.
Apart from negotiating my multiple identities, I constantly reflect upon the moral obligation to undertake an ethical research. As Blomley (1994) and Castree (1999) have suggested, there is a rich history of social activism in human geography that espouses the need to make a difference or improve the social condition of the researched (Cloke, 2002; Valentine, 2005b). Yet, increasingly, geographers are being criticised for being more concerned over intellectual aspects rather than the political relevance of research (Mitchell, 1995; Philo, 2000; Cloke, 2002). Similarly, many researchers are doubted for their commitment towards the researched community vis-à-vis that of fulfilling publications and funding requirements (Cloke, 2002). Therefore, there is a constant call for academics to revive the discipline’s commitment to social activism, “to get off their wall of self-importance and take down the walls of impenetrable language” (Fox, 1979, cited in Kearns, 2001: 301).

I argue that such commitment to the community in which we conduct our research can be reflected in many ways that are not restricted to the direct contributions of research. In other words, our relationship with the community stretches beyond the boundaries of the research process. Herman and Mattingley (1999) stress the importance for reciprocity between the researcher and the researched. In this respect, such reciprocities can benefit the researched community in humble but practical ways – what I term ‘ethics beyond research’. For example, during my stay in Kinmen, I volunteered my service in translating and correcting the explanatory texts at the Civil Defence Tunnel and the Chiang Ching-Kuo Memorial Hall. Although this was not directly related to my fieldwork agenda, I felt it was nevertheless a humble way to reciprocate the community, especially in a time when the tourism industry is
aiming to attract international tourists. A decent English translation effort is definitely essential to reach out to foreign tourists.

This simple example serves to illustrate that an ethical research need not necessarily realise abstract notions of social justice or activism. Such small acts of care and concern to the researched community reflects Kearns’ (2001) definition of a compassionate geography that possesses the spirit of solidarity and empathy, and involves “being down to earth so as to reconnect with the roots of both our humanity and our discipline” (p. 301).

In retrospect, the contribution of my research on battlefield tourism to the betterment of Kinmen’s society, if any, might not be realised in the short run. However, the continuity of my relationship with the local community brings about beneficial “externalities” that actually contribute to its development in a humble but practical way. Furthermore, helping the tourism authorities translate gives me an opportunity to reciprocate their kindness and support. Thus, the vocabulary of ‘social justice’ should be expanded to go beyond abstract understandings that are often held hostage in the ‘ivory towers’ of knowledge. ‘Down-to-earth’ ethical behaviours help to create a climate of trust between the researcher and the researched community (Korgensen, 1971; Mitchell and Draper, 1982; Walsh, 1992, cited in Israel and Hay, 2006) so that people may be more willing to participate in the research we undertake. Indeed, developing a sense for the other (Augé, 1998) serves as a basis for “living ethically and acting politically” (Cloke, 2002: 587).
3.4 Conclusion

The points that constitute the various discussions in this thesis were garnered from a personal log book. Effort was made to record and reflect on the findings and development on a daily basis; both to draw a closure to each day’s fieldwork and in preparation for this thesis. Therefore, I agree with Cloke et al. (2004) when they espouse that the final report for a piece of research is not a matter of “writing up” at the end, but “writing through”. As the authors put it succinctly, “even the most preliminary notes and observations made in the field are already casting a particular interpretive light on the eventual ‘findings’ of the research” (p.360). Indeed, this thesis is the result of twelve months of “writing”.

In conclusion, the data collected and the interpretations made are context-based and the result of ‘situated knowledges’ (Haraway, 1991, cited in Nightingale, 2003). Therefore, they are by no means representative of the entire spectrum of views. Also, the methods employed and perspectives adopted are but one of the many angles from which the research objectives may be fulfilled. It is with this in mind that the thesis now presents its empirical findings.
CHAPTER FOUR

FROM POLICIES TO PROGRAMMES: THE GOVERNMENT OF KINMEN’S BATTLEFIELD (TOURISM) LANDSCAPE

4.1 Introduction

An analytics of government examines the conditions under which regimes of practices come into being, are maintained and are transformed.

(Dean, 1999: 21)

An analytics of government removes the ‘naturalness’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ character of how things are done.

(ibid: 38)

The governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape has experienced gradual transformation through the years, metamorphosing from the martial law years (1956-1992) and the initial stages of tourism development (1990s) to the battlefield tourism focus of today. Therefore, the battlefield tourism landscape in Kinmen does not appear out of nowhere, but is a result of the changing regimes of power practices for the past six decades since the KMT government occupied the island towards the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. Yet, it is constantly evolving; constantly in a state of becoming rather than being. I have earlier introduced the heightened interest in developing Kinmen’s battlefield tourism in the midst of improved cross-strait ties since the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou as the 12th Taiwanese president in 2008. In order to answer some of the research questions on the politics of landscape governance asked at the outset, this chapter attempts to capture the various methods adopted by the tourism planners to convince the Kinmen people that battlefield tourism is the way forward. Drawing inspirations from the ‘government of landscape’ (Bunnell, 2004), I seek to discuss the various rationalities and technologies of the
government involved in the process of ‘tourism-mentalising’ Kinmen. Before proceeding further, it is beneficial to discuss the genealogy of the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape in order to better contextualise this chapter. I propose that there are two broad phases of landscape governance, namely the ‘Domination and Coercion Phase’ (1949-1992) and the ‘Post-conflict Tourism and Reconciliation Mentality Phase’ (1992-present). While the former took place during the martial law period, the latter is predicated on the opening of the military bastion to tourism and improved cross-strait ties of late. As such, an underlying objective here is to show that state formation is not fixed; landscape governance changes with macro political environment and micro political realities on the ground. In order to better govern the population, the state has to adapt to changing times and fine-tune its technologies accordingly. Important to note here is that the two phases are not distinctive of each other’s existence; they overlap each other in the fabric of contemporary battlefield tourism development.

4.2 From Disciplinary Power to Governmental Technologies

4.2.1 Domination & Coercion Phase (1949-1992)

The first phase of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape governance started in 1949 towards the end of the Chinese Civil War and lasted through the martial law years until its abolition in 1992. Instead of recruiting citizens to become allies of the state (as we shall see in the tourism phase), the KMT government coerced the Kinmen people into compliance of state policies.

The impending defeat of KMT by the communists saw Chiang Kai-shek transferring his army, government personnel and funds to Taiwan by October 1949
Kinmen, an island lying between Taiwan and Xiamen (Mainland China), immediately became not only a critical first line of defence for the KMT government on Taiwan, but also a strategic launch pad for the KMT to ‘recover the mainland’. Conversely, for the PRC, claiming of Kinmen “was the first step toward the liberation of Taiwan” (Chi, 2000: 70). As many as 60,000 KMT troops were stationed on the island to hold the frontline (National History Bureau, 1979). Kinmen “was henceforth transformed into a beleaguered bastion, a symbol of the constant threat from the PRC justifying the KMT dream of recovering the mainland” (Chi, 2000: 77).

In 1956, the KMT government enforced the ‘Experimental Scheme of War Area Administration’ on Kinmen. Under this scheme, the Council for War Area Administration in Quemoy26 (CWAAQ), formed by high ranking military officers from the Quemoy Defence Command (QDC), had absolute control over Kinmen. According to Chi (2000: 84), “All central government branch offices in Quemoy were subject to CWAAQ, not to mention the county government and county party branch.” At the mean time, the KMT government was able to secure the loyalty of the military in the governing of the battlefield landscape. To entice the military, certain top positions in the government were reserved only for retired military officers. Moreover, all military officers had to subscribe to party membership. Some of the members of the Central Standing Committee of the KMT were also high ranking officers (Cheng, 1990). Indeed, the military “was a part of the party structure and vice versa” (Chi, 2000: 81). The military and the security forces (which in turn were formed by the military) thus constituted the ‘gaze’ of the government in monitoring citizens’ compliance to KMT’s hegemony. According to an informant who was a young man

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26 ‘Quemoy’ and ‘Jinmen’ are early Spanish Romanisation and Hanyu Pinyin versions of ‘Kinmen’ respectively.
during the martial law years, no one dared to offend or go against the authority of the military. “Those who were caught bad-mouthing Chiang Kai-shek or thought to be enemy spies were taken away immediately. The lucky ones were locked up for a few days, but some never returned, No one knew what happened to them…no one dared to ask” (Mr. Dong, personal interview, 11 June 2008).

Control of the Kinmen people got further individualised when the ‘combat village project’ was introduced in 1968. The process of militarisation infiltrated from the public spaces to the living domain of the residents when all the natural villages were transformed into 73 combat villages. This system “aimed to conduct guerrilla warfare swiftly against the enemy when a war broke out to alleviate the army’s burden of protecting civilians” (CWAAQ, 1968, cited in Chi, 2000: 107). Furthermore, each combat village had a militia system to support the regular army. Villagers were organised into ziwei dui (self defence teams) where everyone was trained as a reserve soldier and assigned a role to execute in times of war (Table 4.1).

**Table 4.1 Assignment teams in a combat village**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Team</td>
<td>Men between 16 and 35</td>
<td>Defence of village; attack of enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Team</td>
<td>Men between 36 and 55; Unmarried women</td>
<td>Fight against paratroopers; Provide logistical services; Guard prisoners of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>between 16 and 35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Team</td>
<td>Married women between 16 and 45</td>
<td>Logistical duties; psychological warfare; attend to wounded personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Team</td>
<td>Teens between 12 and 15</td>
<td>Patrol; check and search; traffic control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Team</td>
<td>Children under 11 and elders over 56</td>
<td>Persons who are in good health condition conduct evacuation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: (Chiang, 1994: 176)*
Other than the militarization of the Kinmen population, fortification installations also took over the traditional village space. Pillboxes, air-raid shelters and tunnel networks were erected based on the military’s master plan that was oftentimes in conflict with the geomancy blueprints under which villages were organised. The locals’ cultural belief system was severely desecrated, but no one dared to resist. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) refer to such oppressive organisation of citizens’ life and living space as “microscopic techniques” that target individuals. This is akin to what Foucault (1979: 139) identified as the ‘anatomo-politics of the human body’ where ‘power over life’ is deployed via the “precise, localized and detailed management of individualized bodies” (Barnett, 1999: 381). In Kinmen, “[m]ilitary disciplinary power distributed individuals in an orderly military grid in which they are disciplined and supervised on a military calendar” (Chi, 2000: 99).

Oppressive domination through disciplinary power held by the military was certainly not the only technique employed by the KMT in the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape. Other than “individualised bodies who [were] the objects of disciplinary power” (Barnett, 1999: 381), public spaces were also ordered according to the power matrix. To that extent, the military was the chief architect in the reconstruction of Kinmen into a “heavy-duty bunker in which official memory and ideology were meticulously mapped on to the landscape” (Chi, 2000: 87). The various monuments, war museums, wall inscriptions and the hall of martyrs that constructed the social ‘memoryscape’ of the Kinmen people were built to instil nationalist ideologies and related anti-Communism sentiments. As such, these constructions not only sought to remind the Kinmenese of the impending threat of Communism, but also normalise the militarization of Kinmen and legitimise the KMT hegemony.
Another hegemonic strategy utilised by the KMT government was that of psychological warfare. Previous failed attempts by the CCP to capture Kinmen after a series of battles\(^\text{27}\) saw the Communists engaged in symbolic warfare against Kinmen. In the beginning, the PRC switched to leaflets bombs, which they would fire on odd days and the KMT would respond on even days. These leaflets bomb would explode in mid air, scattering propaganda leaflets all over the island. According to Mr. Cai, a Kinmen local, “Those who were caught in possession of communist propaganda leaflets would be prosecuted by the military” (Personal interview, 27 May 2008). Both sides later came up with more innovative ways to propagate their message, for example through broadcasting their ideologies, sending seaborne packages and hot air balloons to each other (Plate 4.1). Chi (2000: 95-96) provided an interesting account of the exchanges:

\[\text{[Kinmen] sent off more than 10,000 seaborne packages loaded with towels, shampoo, soap, etc. every year. The balloons, printed with “Long Live the Three Principles” (as opposed to Communism) on it, were loaded with underwear, soap, toys, biscuits emblazoned with Chiang Kai-shek’s pictures, blankets, and tape recorders. On holidays, the package became a gift basket with special holiday foods. The balloons reached as far as Xinjiang, Northeast China, and the Yangzi River provinces (Quemoy County Gazetteer, 1992). Incredibly, one of the balloons landed in Norway, but the military authority had no word on how people there responded. The PRC sent back beef jerky, tea, Maotai liquor, and soap, but no reciprocal pictures of Mao (New York Times, April 5 1986, p 2). Their packages reached [Kinmen] and Taiwan.}\]

The broadcasting of propaganda (Plate 4.1) brought the psychological warfare onto another level. The three broadcasting stations on Kinmen were responsible for propagating the KMT’s ideologies and coaxing the ‘comrades’ from the mainland to join their ‘liberated’ counterparts in Taiwan. According to Chi (2000: 97):

\(^{27}\) The battles include Guningtou Battle in 1949, Da Er Dan Battle in 1950, 9-3 Artillery Battle in 1954 and 8-23 Artillery Battle in 1958. The 9-3 Artillery Battle and the 8-23 Artillery Battle were also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis respectively.
The military engaged psychological bombardment using massive 24,000-watt loudspeakers to spread propaganda biased news and music up to 20 hours a day. National Defense Ministry officers claimed the messages could go as far as 16 miles into Fujian province. As antagonisms began to ease in the 1980s, Taiwan reduced the program to 6 hours a day and Taiwan pop replaced propaganda as the core of the program. [Kinmen] and Taiwan were exposed to the similar treatment from the mainland (*New York Times*, April 5 1986, p 2). As the military could not block the radio transmission, they intercepted the information by using the mutual surveillance system and its secret informants to monitor who listened to enemy broadcasting.

Such broadcasting was by no means targeted merely at the soldiers and citizens on the mainland; it also served to cultivate the nationalistic mentality of the Kinmen people such that the military presence on the island became a necessity and its militarization a natural given.

![Plate 4.1 Sending of hot air balloons (left) and broadcasting of propaganda via 24,000-watt loudspeakers](image-url)

As can be seen from the discussion above, Kinmen’s battlefield landscape during the martial law years was governed by disciplinary power. The predominant nationalist endeavour to recover the mainland was the motivating factor and
justification to militarize the island. The Kinmen people were subject to coercive domination by the military as the latter seek to cultivate the desired battlefield mentality amongst the locals and legitimise their hegemonic presence. Today, six decades after the Chinese Civil War, 17 years after the abolition of the martial law and the opening of Kinmen for tourism development, and a new Taiwan under the fourth generation of KMT government, the fate of the military island has taken on a twist. Now, the battlefield landscape is no longer associated with hostility between the former enemies. Quite the contrary, with improved cross-strait ties and the tremendous multiplier effect brought about by mainland tourists, the battlefield heritage is now considered an asset to be cherished if the locals were to benefit from tourist dollars. Economic rationality has taken over political reality as technologies of government in the post-martial law period took on a new form – to convince the Kinmen people that battlefield tourism is the way forward and to recruit them as allies/’tourism subjects’ in the course of economic recovery. Governance of the battlefield landscape, as we shall see in the following sections, has been transformed from that of domination to one that influences locals’ mentality about battlefield tourism development. Indeed, state formation is never fixed.

4.2.2 Post-conflict tourism & reconciliation mentality phase (1992-present)

With the abolition of martial law in 1992, Kinmen heralded in a new phase of landscape governance. The ‘Battlefield Military Administration’ was replaced by a civilian county government. Kinmen was opened to tourism in the same year; attracting the first Taiwanese tour groups to the island. A total of 247,264 tourists visited Kinmen in 1993, and this increased two-fold to 531,683 in 1997 (Kinmen Statistics Department, 2006). Tourist arrivals consist mainly of domestic tourists from
mainland Taiwan (78.5%), with the rest primarily represented by PRC tourists (21.3%) since the establishment of the ‘mini three links’. The gradual de-militarisation and opening up of Kinmen resulted in its evolution from a military outpost to a tourist destination.

With the partial withdrawal of troops from the island, the economic void left behind by the garrison had to be filled up. Tourism emerged as the lifeline of Kinmen. The military landscape, defence installations and infrastructure were readily utilised for tourism development. In addition, according to Yang and Hsing (2001: 78), Kinmen’s “culture industries… have [also] become the potential cultural consumption resources that… [help] long-term … reconstruction and regeneration since the abolition of martial law”. Indeed, apart from war heritage, Kinmen also boasts well preserved traditional houses of South-Min architecture. Nature tourism has also been promoted recently due to the well-preserved natural environment. However, being one of the few Cold War fronts where conflicts between parties remain unresolved, but yet open for tourism, I argue that the battlefield identity is most characteristic of Kinmen.

Although the majority of tourists are domestic, the establishment of the “mini three links” since January 2001 meant that PRC tourists were also allowed to visit Kinmen. According to the Ministry of Transport and Communications, “the transit of people and commodities from Kinmen to China has grown substantially over the past years since the ‘mini three links’ were established” (The Taiwan Economic News, 7 February 2003). The recent improvement in cross-strait ties and liberalising of travel restrictions between China and Taiwan are expected to provide a further boost

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28 In line with the de-militarisation of Kinmen, the number of soldiers based on the island has been reduced from the initial 100,000 to the target of 5,000.
29 Previously, Kinmen was primarily visited by domestic Taiwanese tourists.
in Chinese tourist arrivals. Recognising the great potential of the Chinese market, tourism planners have made efforts to cater to this increasingly important clientele by, for example, amending sensitive captions in various war museums so as not to offend the PRC tourists. Such efforts to moderate the otherwise hostile attitude towards the communist regime in China will be discussed in a later section.

The Kinmen National Park (KMNP), a subsidiary of the Taiwanese central government’s Ministry of Interior, was established in 1995 and joined ranks with the county government’s Transportation and Tourism Bureau as official planners of Kinmen’s tourism landscape. Both agencies are referred here as ‘tourism planners’ as they have been actively involved in the transformation of Kinmen from a military stronghold to a tourist destination. Military infrastructure and facilities that were left behind by the shrinking garrison were rapidly re-appropriated to become tourist attractions. War museums are no longer just places to commemorate the “heroics” of the KMT army, but have become tourist attractions and sights of curiosity.

Under the administration of the county government and the KMNP, I posit that the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape has been transformed from the mode of ‘domination’ to that of ‘government’ (Foucault, 1991). As opposed to micro management of citizens in a confined space as seen during the martial law years, “successful government of others is often thought to depend on the ability of those others to govern themselves, and it must therefore aim to secure the conditions under which they are enabled to do so” (Hindess, 1996: 105, emphasis in original). Therefore, in the development of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism the Kinmen locals are no longer coerced into obeying state-mandated policies, but are incorporated into
programmes that emphasise the island’s battlefield heritage and the importance of preserving it as a viable economic resource. In other words, rather than forced domination, the tourism planners create “frameworks in which individuals will ‘voluntarily’ regulate their own conduct in relation to given norms” (Barnett, 1999: 372). In the rest of this chapter, I shall explicate the power relations amongst various governmental institutions, and the diverse rationalities and technologies utilised by the tourism planners in ‘tourism-mentalising’ Kinmen.

4.3 Tourism-mentalising Battlefield Kinmen: The Heterogeneous State

The process of tourism-mentalising Kinmen has taken on different forms since the opening of the island for tourism development. According to Allen (2007: 64), government or quasi-governmental tourism agencies, as important players within the stakeholder tourism framework, “typically occupy a leadership role in constructing the marketing/brand framework”. However, this is apparent for Kinmen only in recent years. I would argue that branding efforts in terms of marketing Kinmen island as a battlefield tourism destination is a phenomenon of late. As Gao Shu-Zhen, Director of a local tour agency concurs:

There is little need to market or brand the place during the early 90s when Kinmen was opened for tourism. Tourists from Taiwan mainland arrived in flocks purely out of curiosity to see for themselves the military bastion that they have long heard of but never been to.

(Personal interview, 28 May 2008)

Nevertheless, a change in the central government’s development strategies for offshore islands has led to renewed interest in the battlefield identity of Kinmen. As the policy saga unfolds, one would realise that not only is state formation not fixed, the
state itself is not a homogenous entity either. Rather, it is made up of a variety of institutions with differing strategies to tourism-mentalise Kinmen.

The recent positioning of Kinmen as a gateway to Taiwan coincided with a change in the central government’s development policies for off-shore islands, which led to renewed interests in the island’s battlefield identity. In the course of gaining a better understanding of the subject matter, I attended the inaugural meeting of the International Geographical Union Commission on Island Conference held in Taipei in October 2007. It was there where I learned about the Taiwanese central government’s re-appropriation of the Offshore Development Fund and the positioning of Kinmen as a battlefield tourist destination. Previously, a certain amount of development fund was appropriated by the central government to an off-shore island according to its population. In reality, there was no monitoring of fund usage and this led to ineffective spending in the construction sector. In 2005, the central government shifted the administration of the Off-shore Development Fund from the Construction Bureau to the Council for Economic Development (Liu, 2007). An Off-shore Islands Development Fund Office was subsequently set up to manage the fund distribution based on the developmental potential of each island.

The Institute for Physical Planning and Information (IPPI) was commissioned to study the unique characteristics and identity of each off-shore island, so as to suggest its direction of development. For Kinmen, the battlefield heritage was identified as the most valuable asset. The IPPI has since held meetings with the Kinmen County Government to share with them their findings and suggestions. As an IPPI official commented, “We have made it clear to the county government that
applications for the Off-shore Development Fund will only be approved based on proposals that are related to the preservation of the island’s battlefield heritage” (Personal interview, 13 May 2008). This might explain the current enthusiasm of tourism planners to develop Kinmen’s battlefield tourism.30 Its newfound geopolitical identity in the post-war reconciliation era further justifies its developmental potential into a battlefield tourism destination.

Following the central government’s initiative to develop Kinmen’s battlefield tourism, I notice a slight adaptation in KMNP’s agenda. Instead of emphasising its fundamental creed of environmental conservation, it now sees preserving the battlefield landscape of Kinmen as its main objective. I offer two circumstances propelling this change in state formation. Firstly, the environmental conservation story was not well received by the locals in the first place. Due to stringent regulations imposed by the National Park, locals, whose lands are under its jurisdiction,31 are not allowed to develop them according to their own desires. Therefore locals have always denounced the legitimacy of the National Park. Secondly, the KMNP’s principle of environmental protection has always been at loggerheads with the county government’s urge to modernise Kinmen. For example, the locally-elected government has been under constant pressure from the locals to build five-star hotels in order to attract more tourists. However, such plans are deemed not feasible by KMNP. Moreover, although the county government has political autonomy, land use change would still have to be approved by the central government. Therefore, such

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30 The commercialisation of Kinmen into a tourist destination becomes more promising after the Council for Economic Development’s endorsement of its battlefield identity.

31 The Kinmen National Park is one of the seven National Parks in Taiwan. It owns approximately 25% of land area in Kinmen (see Figure 4.1).
proposals to modernise the island were usually shelved or merely used as electoral tools to win popular support.

Due to the above circumstances, to change the prevailing agenda from one of environmental conservation to that of battlefield landscape preservation, KMNP is essentially hitting two birds with one stone. On one hand, battlefield tourism has in a sense become a KMNP’s strategy to protect the environment. Conversely, by rallying its support behind battlefield tourism development, it not only appeases the locals because of the potential economic spin off, but also creates a “cooperative platform with the county government” (Li Ming-Yi, Chief of Recreational Services Section, KMNP, personal interview, 25 December 2008).

I have shown in the discussion above that the state is not a homogeneous entity. The tourism-mentalisation of Kinmen is a result of power relations amongst different governmental institutions. Also, as the institutions adapt to changing political circumstances, state formation evolves. In sections 4.4 and 4.5, I shall elaborate on the differing strategies utilised by the Kinmen National Park and the Kinmen County Government in tourism-mentalising Kinmen. Although both institutions have a common endeavour to promote Kinmen’s battlefield tourism, the former focuses more on realigning the battlefield past while the latter relies generally on reinforcing the peace agenda.
4.4 Realigning the Battlefield Past

Foucault (1991) concentrates on the practices of power...all those endeavours to shape, guide, and divert the conduct of others, including the ways in which one might be urged to control one's own passions, to govern oneself. Foucault, in other words, considered the formation of theories, programs, strategies, and technologies for the "conduct of conduct".

(Thrift, 2000a: 676)

Military museums, battlefield monuments and nationalistic slogans, which were used to instil a war mentality amongst the Kinmen people during the martial law years, serve a different purpose in the age of tourism development. Such cultural-geo-political artefacts of the battlefield past are now realigned as an important part of the island’s heritage tourism. According to Li Ming-Yi, “Kinmen’s battlefield heritage has to be preserved not only for future generations of Kinmenese to learn about the past, but also to be promoted for tourist consumption.” I contend that the re-appropriation of military installations as educational material and tourism resource is one of the technologies in which the tourism planners seek to convince the locals of the development potential of battlefield tourism. Furthermore, I posit that the nationalist ideologies undergirding various forms of military establishments are still very much alive. Yet, with the rise of PRC tourists, post-war interpretations and contemporary efforts towards a less contested history, reflecting heightened sensibilities towards the neighbour, are also inherent in the battlefield tourism scene. Both nationalist and post-war ideologies/messages co-exist to form the geopolitical intricacies behind the (re)presentation of historical events. I shall now bring on the examples of a war museum, an old barrack and a tunnel, which are all under the jurisdiction of KMNP, before ending the section with more general military landscapes (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1 Map of attractions mentioned in thesis
The Guningtou Battle Museum (Plate 4.2) was built in 1984 to commemorate the heroics of the KMT army during the battle of Guningtou in October 1949. The communists had attempted to capture the island, but to no avail after 56 hours of deterrence by Chiang Kai-shek’s forces. The museum was built at Guningtou where the battle was fought, and being “the first major KMT victory in many months of the long civil war, Guningtou became a symbol of the survival of the Republic of China on Taiwan” (Szonyi, 2005: 88). In 2000, KMNP took over the operation of the museum from the military.

Plate 4.2 Façade of Guningtou Battle Museum

The presence of pillboxes, anti-parachuting fortresses and tankers surrounding the museum serves to ‘cement the past to the present’ and add to the military ambience. Inside the museum, tourists are greeted with a wall map that depicts the details of the Guningtou Battle, such as routes taken by the armed forces and number of casualties. They are then directed by the tour guide to view a series of 13 murals.

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32 There are three military museums in Kinmen, namely Guningtou Battle Museum, 8-23 Artillery Battle Museum and Hujingtou War Museum.
(Plate 4.3). These landscape paintings narrate the various events that took place before, during and after the battle, concentrating on KMT’s preparation for war, PLA invasion, fierce fights and the eventual surrender of the communist soldiers at Guningtou. Collectively, the artists apply their “artistic and historical imaginations to the creation of a glorious past” (Osborne, 1992: 250). According to one Taiwanese tourist, the venue and time stated in the paintings “create a kind of reality…as though you are in the battle yourself” (Personal communication, 19 June 2008).

Other than the spatial and temporal dimensions, the paintings also serve to relay nationalist ideologies and beliefs, emphasising themes like hardship, loyalty and bravery. Indeed, as Daniels (1993: 5) has observed, “National identities are co-ordinated, often largely defined, by ‘legends and landscapes’, by stories of golden ages, enduring traditions, heroic deeds and dramatic destinies…” For instance, one of the paintings illustrates the valour of Colonel Lee Kuang-Chien, who sacrificed himself when leading a charge against the “enemy” (Plate 4.4).
Also, the paintings never fail to portray the KMT soldiers as the stronger side. This contrast is best represented in the painting illustrating the surrender of the PLA, where frail-bodied communist soldiers pleaded with the “strong and mighty” KMT soldiers (Plate 4.5). Such meta-narration in pictorial form was constituted by, and I would argue still constitutes the dominant social imaginings of the communists as the ‘Other’.

Plate 4.5 Mural on the surrender of the People’s Liberation Army
In examining the notion of “artists as creators of national consciousness”, Osborne (1992: 231) argues that “states are able to establish identities [through art work] and thus create collective memories or ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1983).” To say that memories are created brings to mind Foucault’s (1977: 25-26) exposition that “if one controls people’s memories, one controls their dynamism…It is vital to have possession of this memory, to control it, administer it, tell it what it must contain.” Further, Seaton and Lennon (2004: 80) proffer that, “Politics has…historically driven the development of museums and exhibitions, not just to commemorate dead victims, but to mobilize populations to support living regimes”. Indeed, according to one of the wall inscriptions, this museum serves to “rally the solidarity of the Kinmen people, in their commemoration of the loyal and brave armed forces…not to forget this place [Guningtou] and recognise the common destiny in defeating the communists so as to reclaim our country”. Such strong nationalist sentiments are considered to be too sensitive for PRC tourists, and this is the main reason why war museums are still not included in the itineraries of Chinese tour groups.

In recent years, the battlefield “brand” of Kinmen has taken on a more diplomatic approach. Captions accompanying the paintings have been altered to “provide a more objective version of the history and to show an increased sensitivity towards the PRC tourists” (Huang Tzu-Chuan, Chief of Interpretation and Education Section, KMNP, personal interview, 23 May 2006). The reference of the PLA as ‘communist bandits' (共匪), for example, has been changed to the more neutral term of “communist soldiers” (共军). Such a move attests to the idea of ‘landscape as a palimpsest’, where meanings can be (re)inscribed (Duncan and Duncan, 1988)
depending on the politics of consumption. As such, the process of tourism-mentalising Kinmen can be seen as one that is moving towards creating a destination that is more welcoming to the Chinese tourists. However, in my opinion, pictorial representations of the battle still serve as a dominant signifier of the victorious KMT army and a mechanism of socialisation into the grand narratives of national history, in order to legitimise the nationalist hegemony (Chiang, 2006). As Seaton and Lennon (2004: 72; emphasis added) elaborate:

Public representations of man-made horror and violence invariably construct for the viewer judgemental positions in which some are seen as victims and others as offenders; some as heroes, others as oppressors; some as innocent, others as guilty. In the same way that atrocity stories have been used to engineer public support for a war, through demonization of the enemy, so attractions based on the horrific have been and continue to be, used to inculcate support for states, regimes and other groups, and conversely, to subvert their opponents.

To this end, the governance of landscape is politically-charged. In the tourism-mentalising process, there is an obvious agenda to reach out to different audiences. This adds to the complexity of the politics of landscape governance. The technologies utilised by KMNP are certainly not a means to an absolute end, but are attempts “to shape with some degree of deliberation aspects of [one’s] behaviour according to particular sets of norms and for a variety of ends” (Dean, 1999: 10).

Other than war museums, defunct military infrastructures are also refurbished for tourist consumption. The Rushan Old Barrack at the KMNP’s headquarters is a vivid example. The military-themed park exhibits the various weapons used by the KMT army. A mixture of authentic and model weapons manned by wax soldiers with expressions of anxiety, form the background to the staged battle (Plate 4.6). Green-coloured sand bags, camouflaged walls and a command centre mimicking the actual
war time situation create the setting of a barrack. At regular intervals, audio effects of bombing and air raid sirens would be played to add to the ambience.

Plate 4.6 Wax figures “manning” various weapons at the Rushan Old Barrack

Visitors, both locals and tourists can be seen “participating” in the pseudo battle by posing playfully with the wax figures or helping the gunners “load” their guns (Plate 4.7). It is through such benign and subtle means that the process of tourism-mentality gets operationalised. What better ways to recruit the locals into accepting and believing in Kinmen’s battlefield heritage than to involve them in the battlefield tourism experience?
In fact, the boundaries between the authentic and inauthentic are blurred in the presentation of the battlefield heritage. When interviewed, Su Cheng-Chi, Chief of KMNP’s Planning and Management Department, replied:

This is an interesting way to let the people interact with the exhibits. In fact, if this is successful, we have plans to develop the whole island into a theme park, concentrating on providing tourists with battlefield experience. We can let the tourists put on our army uniform, eat army food, and re-enact the battle. We can even integrate with paint ball games, something that is popular amongst the youngsters nowadays. We can also provide photo-taking services and if they are interested, they can purchase the uniform, as a souvenir. Perhaps, tourists from China can join in the fun too!

(Personal interview, 2 June 2006)

The production of battlefield tourism landscape through re-creating the war memories is increasingly being commercialised, focusing on the touristic experience rather than authenticity of display. Indeed, the “image takes over the original” (Eco, 1986, cited in Freire, 2005: 355) for such fabricated events (Boorstin, 1992). Development of a military theme park may provide a viable platform to engage PRC tourists in a battlefield experience that is less contested than say a visit to a military museum.

Plate 4.7 A visitor interacting with the wax figures
When asked for his view on the possible ‘de-sacralisation’ of the former battlefield through such staged authenticity (MacCannell, 1976), General (retired) Liao, who has served on Kinmen before, begged to differ:

We have to change with the times. Although I strongly feel that we should maintain vigilant and that the young generation should still possess a war mentality, there is nothing to stop the state from achieving this through the ‘fun’ way. National education can be taught using the ‘fun’ method. Maybe it is more effective.

(Personal interview, 4 July 2006)

Therefore, the tourism-mentalisation of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape not only possesses underlying geopolitical agenda, but also considers changing consumers’ preferences. This goes to testify yet again that state formation is not fixed as rationalities and technologies of government respond to macro and micro political circumstances.

Another prominent example whereby a military infrastructure is transformed into a tourist spectacle by the National Park is Zhaishan Underground Tunnel. An introduction to the tunnel reads, “Kinmen as a park on the ocean presents a different face of fortitude and solidity with its underground fortresses” (Kinmen Sightseeing Guidebook, 2002: 64). After the artillery battle in 1958, the military sensed an urgency to construct underground tunnels so as to preserve their combat capability during artillery bombardments. This intensified the ‘tunnelisation’ process, giving rise to ‘underground Kinmen’, which in recent years appears to be a valuable tourism resource. Built in 1961 and completed in 1966, Zhaishan Tunnel (Plate 4.8) leads directly from the inner land to the ocean. In the tunnel, tourists get to see a series of rooms where the soldiers once lived. During my fieldtrips there, the guides always
emphasised the “almost impossible task of excavating through the bedrock of granite gneiss” and the “sufferings that soldiers experienced during the round-the-clock construction”. This was usually followed by a sense of awe and the impressive gaze of the tourists.

\[\text{Plate 4.8 Zhaishan Underground Tunnel}\]

Indeed, “much of the symbolic importance of these places stems from their emotional associations, the feelings they inspire of awe, dread, worry, [or] loss” (Davidson et al., 2005: 3). Thus, such sites serve as effective platforms to disseminate state messages. As Su Cheng-Chi averred, “We want to let the tourists understand better the hardship suffered by our soldiers, and for the young Taiwanese to realise how much their forefathers had gone through. Without Kinmen, there is no Taiwan. So, by converting it [the tunnel] to a tourist site, they can see it for themselves…more effective than textbook [knowledge]” (Personal interview, 21 May 2008).
Transforming military facilities and infrastructure into tourist sites and presenting them in their original state not only provides a unique experience for the tourists, but also “raise their emotional quotient by [allowing them to] empathis[e] with the events” (Muzaini, 2004: 53). I see this as the main reason why senior elementary school children in Kinmen are taken on “graduation trips” to these military sites. According to Li Zai-Hang, Director-General of the Kinmen County Government Education Bureau, “Trips to the military sites are part of the ‘Local Knowledge Education Programme’. Students in Kinmen have to be equipped with such basic knowledge so that they can become future ambassadors should their friends from overseas come to visit them” (Personal interview, 21 May 2008). Therefore, fieldtrips to these battlefield tourism sights can be seen “as part of [school children’s] political socialization to their nation and supportive of their sense of citizenship” (Richter, 2007: 8).

For the returning war veterans, a different type of emotional geography prevails: that of a sense of place accompanied by the therapeutic activity of ‘reminiscence’ (Hockey et al., 2005) and closure as they narrate their war memories to family and friends.33 Younger generation soldiers who have fulfilled their military service on the island also contribute to an important part of the puzzle in the tourism-mentalisation process. In August 2008, a retired soldier who returned to Kinmen to attend the 50th Anniversary of the 8-23 Artillery Battle quipped:

33 In August 2009, KMNP will be inviting former soldiers who have served on Kinmen to return to the island with their family members. Apart from attending reunion dinners, they will also be brought to the various battlefield tourism attractions.
This is an important event for me. Although I was not involved in the battle, I spent my army days on Kinmen. Every corner of this island brings back memories of the past. The battlefield heritage is something that the people should protect and promote. My friends...once they hear that I was a soldier on Kinmen, they would pester me to bring them on a battlefield tour. I have since come back to Kinmen almost every year, acting like a tour guide. I think the tourism authority should give me a tourism ambassador award!

(Personal communication, 23 August 2008)

Instead of the usual ‘top-down’ governance of the tourism landscape, what we see here is a self-motivated case of battlefield heritage promotion. It is one thing to convince the people about the battlefield tourism potential of Kinmen, but another to influence their behaviour. The issue of a ‘tourism subject’ will be elaborated further in Chapter 5, but it suffices to note here that power in the governance of a tourism landscape is indeed horizontally distributed. In the rest of this section, I go on to discuss general battlefield landscapes that are not necessarily under the jurisdiction of KMNP, but nevertheless fits the wider theme of realigning the past for tourist consumption.

Chang-Hui Chi (2004) has provided a brilliant account of the militarisation of Kinmen and the making of nationalist hegemony from 1949 to 1992. Since then, tourism has added another level of complexity to the nationalised (everyday) landscape. The vernacular landscape has become a landscape of spectacle for tourists, in the form of monuments, statues and wall inscriptions. These sights not only “speak of” Kinmen’s battlefield past, but also function as ‘national education texts’ from which state ideologies are conveyed, especially to the Taiwanese tourists.

At almost every round-about in the road system, stands a military structure, a monument or a statue (normally that of Chiang Kai-shek), erected during the martial
law period (Plate 4.9). The monuments either celebrate the 1958 artillery battle victory or serve as a platform to communicate political messages. In elucidating the notion of ‘landscapes of power’ (Zukin, 1991), Jones et al. (2004: 116) show that such “points in the landscape can symbolise particular memories and meanings of place, including messages about power and politics”. In this case, the state demonstrated its power in the organising and ordering of physical spaces (Johnson, 1995; Mitchell, 2003) by positioning these ‘structures’ at strategic locations to effectively legitimise and naturalise its hegemony. Duncan (1990) refers to such repetition of state ideologies as a ‘recurrent narrative structure’, which “consists of a system of repetitions strategically designed by the city builders…to ensure optimum reception of a message” (p.22).

Chi (2004: 540) observes that such monuments and statues have become “so inscribed in everyday life that they are no longer seen [by the locals] as forms of political and ideological control”, but “conceived as natural and orthodox.” I argue that such effects of ‘landscape of power’ spill over to the tourists when these monuments, statues and fortresses become subject to the tourist gaze (Urry, 1990), thereby revealing the state’s attempt to instil, sustain and perpetuate state ideologies amongst the Taiwanese tourists.

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34 These are not under the jurisdiction of the Kinmen National Park. All roundabouts on the island still belongs to the military.
Plate 4.9 Military structures, monuments and statues at various round-abouts
Dominant ideologies are also embodied in the symbolic meanings of wall inscriptions or literally ‘spiritual slogans’ on civilian houses (Plate 4.10). Thompson (1984, cited in Baker, 1992: 3) defines ‘ideology’ as “a system of signification which facilitates the pursuit of particular interests and sustains specific relations of domination”. The genre of such slogans consist of those that serve to “concretise military governance” (Huang, 2003) (e.g. ‘Obey the Leader’; ‘Fight Against Communism and the Soviet Union’; ‘Attack the Mainland [PRC], Save our Comrades’), and those that emphasise desired values of a Kinmenese (e.g. ‘Not Afraid of Death, Not Greedy, Love the Country, Love Its People’). When the concern
of a lack of sensitivity to PRC tourists was raised, an official from the tourism bureau disclosed:

We have had dilemmas when it comes to such monuments and spiritual slogans. Should they be put away or should we present them as it is? I think we should preserve them. The Chinese tourists of today are more sophisticated and matured. When they come to Kinmen, they want to see such battlefield landscape. We have to accept the fact that this was what really happened in the past. It is only by acknowledging the conflict of the past that the peace of today will be cherished even more.

(Personal communication, 27 December 2008)

As such, catering to the expected influx of PRC tourists not only means a complete erasure of the sensitive past as seen in the amendments of captions in the Guntingtou Museum example. It also involves strategic portrayal of ‘difficult heritage’ (Logan and Reeves, 2008).

Re-appropriating military facilities and infrastructures in the process of tourism-mentalising Kinmen is perhaps the most convenient method employed by the tourism planners in the early stages of battlefield tourism development. However, in preparation for an increasing number of PRC tourists, there is a need to balance between making the historical narration less contested/more neutral and preserving authentic war relics (e.g. wall inscriptions) that may have motivated them to visit Kinmen in the first place. Meanwhile, as the macro political climate between China and Taiwan changes for the better, more innovative technologies of the government that emphasise on peace are called into practice. These, I observed, are capitalised largely by the county government.
4.5 Reinforcing the Peace and Co-prosperity Agenda

Governmental technologies and rationalities continue to evolve in the 21st century. The phenomenal rise of China over the last decade saw the two republics engaging each other on a totally different political game. Taiwan has increasingly come to terms with the fact that ‘independence’ is simply not a realistic option. Pushing for independence could only upset China and strain both cross-strait and international relations. China, on the other hand, is beginning to abandon the futile efforts in engaging Taiwan in non-constructive verbal disputes over the latter’s sovereignty, in preference of the potential economic benefits to be reaped from a Greater China sphere of co-prosperity. Such sentiments for peaceful and mutual economic development are reflected in the existing form of tourism-mentalisation on Kinmen.

In this section, I shall discuss the array of technologies utilised by the Kinmen County Government. This will be done in scalar terms, starting from outdoor events like the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art and Peace.Love Fair, to indoor TV programmes and the more personal/intimate cultural technologies found in calendars, postcards and children story books.

The Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art 2004-5 (BMoCA) is one of many recent events coordinated by the county government that exemplify the notion of peace and co-prosperity through the promotion of battlefield tourism. In contrast to the usual portrayal of a historical past that often highlights or evokes at best nationalistic sentiments, and at worst antagonistic emotions, the new initiative focuses on the faculties of creativity, sensitivity and reflexivity in the bid for peace and post-war reconciliation. The BMoCA, signifying the ‘art-for-peace agenda’ of its founder, Chinese artist Cai Guo-Qiang, was organised by Kinmen County and the National
Museum of History – under the direction of five government agencies\(^{35}\) (Vine, 2005). It showcased abandoned bunkers that were transformed to art pieces by 18 artists from Taiwan and China (Plate 4.11a-b). For example, Lee Shi-Chi, the only participating Kinmenese artist, created an outdoor canopy made of 823 empty kaoliang (sorghum) bottles\(^{36}\) designed in the shape of artillery shells outside a bunker (Plate 4.11a). In order to elicit the satirical flavour in the title of the art piece – “War Bets on Peace” – visitors were invited to place bets with a gambling machine inside the bunker. Winners went home with the 8-23 Artillery Battle commemorative liquor. As the curator explains, “This interactive installation turns [the] bunker into a site that consumes and spends war and violence in an aesthetic game, through which to contemplate the meaning of survival, memory and peace” (BMoCA Passport, 2004: 34-35).

Nineteen local elementary schools also participated in the re-interpretation process by transforming bunkers “into an exhibition space for children’s artwork” (BMoCA, 2004). This reflects the exhibition’s effort to include the ‘voices’ of ordinary Kinmenese. Such events not only provide opportunities for the younger generation to express their creativity and imagination, but also allow the state to disseminate messages on peace and reconciliation (Plate 4.11c-d). This softer façade appeals to a much wider audience, especially the PRC tourists.

\(^{35}\) The five government agencies are education, national defence, interior, transportation and communications, and cultural affairs.

\(^{36}\) The 823 kaoliang bottles were used to signify the 8-23 Artillery Battle in 1958. See Chapter 5 for the symbolic relationship between kaoliang liquor and battlefield Kinmen.
Plate 4.11a War Bets on Peace


Plate 4.11b: A replica of the world’s largest military propaganda speakers found on Dadeng Military Base, the nearest Mainland island to Kinmen. The artist captured the historic moment where both sides of the Strait exchanged propaganda broadcasting. A giant tongue was added to the speaker to “signify the messages it formerly dispensed.” Visitors were served tea… “and the once opposing rhetoric becomes teatime talk amongst cross-strait friends and family” (ibid: 50).

Plate 4.11c The sounds of Bells and Fish off the Bunker Walls

Plate 4.11c: “Ceramic bells and fish made by children are hung on the walls of the bunker. To the children the bells represent peaceful prayers while the fish represents freedom” (BMoCA Passport, 2004: 77).

Plate 4.11d Bunker of the Wind Lion God

Plate 4.11d: “Wind Lion God statues are used by local villagers to help ward off evil spirits. Reshaping the bunker into a sculpture of the god, the children substitute the Wind Lion for the soldiers as protector of the island” (ibid: 72).
As Osborne (1992: 232) opines, “Often, artistic imaginations are rooted in their lived-in worlds and their creative responses may informally contribute new and insightful dimensions to their culture-group’s identification with their locus.” Programmes like the BMoCA are effective technologies of the government as the mentality for peaceful post-war reconciliation was skilfully embedded within, “for the direction and reform of conduct” (Dean, 1999: 18). Yet, the local participants were free to express their sentiments in and through the art pieces they created. “Hence when it comes to governing human beings, to govern is to presuppose the freedom of the governed. To govern human beings is not to crush their capacity to act, but to acknowledge it and to utilize it for one’s own objectives” (Rose, 1999: 4). Indeed, the BMoCA serves as a platform for visitors and participants to “deepen their understanding of history and challenge the making of new history” (BMoCA Passport, 2004: 67).

Another programme initiated by the county government is the Peace.Love Fair held in 2006\(^\text{37}\) to promote and celebrate the era of peace since the abolition of the martial law. The Fair was held in a carnival setting at a defunct military barrack, and it attracted both locals and tourists. Participants, mostly children were presented with the lighter side of history as they took part in games like rifle shooting, learned how to make toy guns out of bamboo sticks, competed in the construction of pseudo rocket launchers, and took photos in military uniforms (Plate 4.12). Thrift (1997) utilises the concept of ‘play’ to illustrate how dance performers exert their existence and convey their way of thinking while at the same time remain elusive, rather than confrontational of external power acting upon them. In this case, the notion of ‘play’

\(^{37}\) Due to its success in 2006, the Peace.Love Fair was also organised in 2007 and 2008.
could be analysed the other way round. It is evident that the county government is attempting to use such softer technologies of government to inculcate amongst younger generation the ‘fun’ aspect of their battlefield heritage and more subtly, the importance to cherish the peace brought about by improved cross-strait ties.

Plate 4.12 A myriad of activities at the Peace.Love Fair

Other than children’s activities, there were also programmes lined up for the adults. For instance, the organisers invited a University professor to give a presentation on how Kinmen could learn from Normandy in terms of battlefield
tourism development. Different scenarios and possibilities of a battlefield tourism destination were put forth and discussed with the audience, before a war movie based on the 8-23 Artillery Battle was screened. The engagement of academics certainly helps to give some credibility to the county government’s effort in tourism-mentalising Kinmen.

Technologies of government utilised to tourism-mentalise Kinmen in the era of peace and co-prosperity have been space-bounded as discussed hitherto. In other words, it has been assumed that the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape occurs ‘out there’ as different strategies are applied to specific places. However, I observe emerging forms of technologies that go beyond spatial constraints in their implementation and effects. For example, during my fieldwork in Kinmen, it is not uncommon to notice local television channels broadcasting programmes that discuss tourism development on the island. A typical example is the “Executives, Let’s Talk” (头家来开讲) programme that is broadcasted daily at 7p.m. The show consists of a discussion panel that includes a host and two or three guests, usually representing the county government, KMNP and a tourism organisation. The content varies depending on the topic of discussion, but they always end with an analytical note to convince the viewers and rationalise that the future of Kinmen lies with tourism, and that people should not depend on the garrison economy anymore. As Lin Chen-Cha, Director General of the Transportation and Tourism Bureau confirmed:

We can do a lot of things to develop battlefield tourism on Kinmen. We can preserve the landscape, we can organise events that highlight our battlefield heritage and so on. However, I think the mentality of the locals is the most important. They have to believe that tourism can work for Kinmen before all our efforts can bear fruits. The TV programme is a good way to educate them.

(Personal interview, 21 May 2008)
Such a strategy to tourism-mentalise the Kinmen population is akin to what Clive Barnett (1999) refers to as the “cultural technologies” of government. According to Barnett, this form of technology requires a different perception of space and time in explicating power relations. He noted:

Considerations of the specificities of radio and television require a shift from thinking of governmental power in relation to an areal conceptualization of the spaces of subjectification, towards a notion of the articulation of dispersed spaces through networks of communication, implying a nonterritorialized conceptualization of space.

(ibid: 384)

Similarly, Thompson (1995, cited in Barnett, 1999: 384) also attests that “mass media institutions reconstitute the spatial and temporal conditions for social interaction and communication.” For one, “the relationship between broadcasters and listeners/viewers is ‘unforced’ because it is ‘unenforceable’” (Scannell, 1996, cited in Barnett, 1999: 385). Therefore, the use of the mass media as a cultural technology in influencing the Kinmen local’s perception on battlefield tourism warrants a re-thinking of how power can be practised in the realm of landscape governance.

Although Barnett focuses on radio and television for his explication of cultural technologies, I would posit that they encompass a wider range of cultural items. Other notable tools for tourism-mentalising Kinmen hail from more intimate everyday items such as calendar, postcards and children’s story books (Plate 4.13a-c).
Plate 4.13 Examples of cultural technologies of government

Plate 4.13a: Typical wall calendar found in households depicting the potential for tourism development of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape. Examples here show the anti-vessel defence structures (left) and shattered glasses to deter beach attacks scattered along the island’s coastlines.

Plate 4.13b: Free postcards provided by the county government (right) and KMNP. Note that the postcard on the left features a pink camouflaged background, and silhouettes of soldiers and helicopters; suggesting a more benign battlefield identity.

Plate 4.13c: Children’s story books that narrate the battlefield history of Kinmen in a simple and fun manner.
Wall calendars printed with battlefield landscape designs are a common sight in Kinmen households (Plate 4.13a). These calendars are usually issued to the residents as a gesture of goodwill from the county government. Every page of the calendar covers a certain aspect of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage, constantly reminding people of the island’s potential for battlefield tourism development. If that is not enough, the county government also gives out free postcards with sceneries of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape (Plate 4.13b). In line with the government’s effort to promote battlefield tourism, the locals are encouraged to send these postcards to their friends overseas to invite them to visit Kinmen. I have personally received such a postcard from my Kinmenese friend. Indeed, “principles of political action and those of personal conduct can be seen as being intimately related” (Hindess, 1996: 105).

Furthermore, children are increasingly being incorporated into the tourism-mentalisation process. As Li Zai-Hang believes, “Every Kinmen citizen should be familiar with the island’s battlefield heritage so that they can show their friends around. Children learn the fastest…so it is important to start from young.” Apart from encouraging them to participate in programmes like the BMoCA and the Peace.Love Fair, the Kinmen County Government Cultural Affairs Bureau has recently published a series of children story books that depict Kinmen’s battlefield history and heritage tourism resources (e.g. underground tunnel) in a pictorial and easy-read format (Plate 4.13c). These story books typically end by reminding its readers to cherish the present day peaceful cross-strait relations. It is therefore evident that technologies of government in the course of tourism-mentalising Kinmen are not fixed, but are constantly evolving innovatively across temporal, spatial and scalar domains.
4.6 Conclusion

MacCannell (1992) has long reminded us that tourism cannot be seen merely as an economic activity since “it is an ideological framing of history, nature and tradition; a framing that has the power to reshape culture and nature to its own needs” (p.1). In this chapter, I have attempted to push this notion a little further by explicating on the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape via the variety of rationalities and technologies of government in temporal, spatial and scalar terms. This was done by discussing the genealogy of battlefield landscape governance from the domination and coercion phase during the martial law years to the post-war reconciliation and co-prosperity phase of tourism development.

A few concluding remarks could be made. An analytics of government reveals that while objectives of the state were achieved through coercive disciplinary power during the war years, battlefield landscape governance is now performed in a more subtle manner through a horizontal distribution of power. Rather than controlling individuals by forced domination, tourism planners engage in “an array of political rationalities and organizing practices that are concerned with directing the conduct of individuals and groups and, in particular, are concerned with inculcating those specific ethical competencies and styles of conduct which have been considered to be basic attributes of modern democratic citizenship” (Barnett, 1999: 372). More specifically, I have discussed the aim to recruit the Kinmen population as allies in the development of battlefield tourism through a series of rationalities and technologies of government employed by KMNP and the county government.
Strategies employed by KMNP focus largely on realigning the battlefield past for tourist consumption. As was immanent throughout the examples, technologies of government evolve across time, but may still possess qualities or resemblances of previous regimes of power. This is evident in how places like the Guningtou Battle Museum, Rushan Old Barrack and Zhaishan Tunnel are realigned by KMNP to accommodate present day tourism requirements, but at the same time strategically exude nationalistic sentiments. The co-existence of nationalist ideologies and post-war reconciliation mentality shows that the different phases of landscape governance do not exist independent of each other. In fact, power practices of the past may overflow to contemporary politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism albeit in different forms. In interpreting Foucault’s perception of ‘sovereignty’, ‘discipline’ and ‘government’ as modes of power, Dean (1999: 20) sums it up succinctly:

Foucault (1991a: 102) warns us, it is best now to see these three forms of power as a ‘sovereignty-discipline-government’ series which is fundamental to modern forms of authority. Rather than replacing discipline or sovereignty, the modern art of government recasts them within this concern for the population and its optimization (in terms of wealth, health, happiness, prosperity, efficiency), and the forms of knowledge and technical means appropriate to it.

It is therefore clear that technologies of government do not evolve in a ‘unilinear’ manner. “An analytics of government thus views practices of government in their complex and variable relations to the different ways in which ‘truth’ is produced in social, cultural and political practices” (Dean, 1999: 18).

Conversely, emerging technologies of government utilised by the county government in tourism-mentalising Kinmen have largely reflected the improving cross-strait relationship of late. Such technologies in contrast place much emphasis on the rationality of peaceful development and the idea of mutual economic benefits.
Indeed, “[d]iscursive practices of tourism functions at and between macro and micro levels” (Richter, 2007: 8). Apart from outdoor events like the BMoCA and Peace.Love Fair, cultural technologies like television programmes that seek to convince locals of Kinmen’s tourism potential were also highlighted. “Electronic media therefore transform the conditions for communication, and in so doing they alter the spatial and temporal conditions through which individuals interact and exercise power” (Barnett, 1999: 385). Other forms of cultural technologies that are more personal/intimate in nature (e.g. calendar, postcards and story books) were also introduce to explicate the relationship between political action and personal conduct.

In all, state formation is not fixed. It evolves and adapts according to changing political, economic, social and cultural circumstances. Further, in the case of Kinmen, the state itself is not a homogeneous entity. It is formed by various institutions, each employing differing technologies of government albeit sharing a common agenda to tourism-mentalise Kinmen. It is by appreciating such undercurrents of realities that one can truly understand contemporary tourism politics.

This chapter has mainly focused on the governance of landscape from the tourism planners’ perspective. I reiterate that a tourism landscape is not created by the planners alone; neither is it governed solely by them. Other tourism stakeholders can also form institutions of power in their creation of Kinmen’s battlefield identity. How do local entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmen people fit into Kinmen’s battlefield tourism-mentality? The next chapter goes further to explore the effects of tourism-mentalisation and how practices of power are played out by these two groups of tourism stakeholders.
CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTS OF TOURISM-MENTALISATION: LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS & ORDINARY KINMEN PEOPLE AS TOURISM SUBJECTS

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has covered the various rationalities and technologies employed by the authorities in the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape. In particular, practices of tourism-mentalising the island’s battlefield heritage were examined. This chapter goes further to analyse the effects of the battlefield landscape on the tourism enterprise in terms of how such rationalities are incorporated in various forms by both local entrepreneurs in their daily operations, and ordinary Kinmen people in the performance of their citizenship. If an enterprise is taken to mean a business organisation, its brand image becomes of interest here. As such, the effort by the authorities to tourism-mentalise Kinmen is inextricably linked to convincing tourism stakeholders to believe in the battlefield brand themselves. Of course, this is not to romanticise the notion of tourism-mentality as a totalising concept that frames people’s thoughts and actions. Rather the verb ‘incorporate’ suggests an active participation by local entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmenese. As Barnett (1999: 374) citing O’Malley (1996) argues, “The governmentality literature is related to representations of governmental programmes as univocal, systematic and highly coherent. As a result, much of this literature has difficulty in acknowledging the agency of the governed in shaping practices of rule. It therefore fails to attend in detail to the contradictions that beset practices of government.”
I would agree with Barnett that we should not adopt a totalising and all-encompassing view about the study of power and that more should be done to recognise the agency of the governed. However, I challenge the presumption that agency is necessarily in conflict with governmental rationalities. In that respect, I concur with Coles and Church’s (2007: 25) exposition that the study of power “must also incorporate a study of all ‘micro’ governmental practices to reveal the connections between the ‘political’ and all the other types of power relation, practice and technologies.” Tourism-mentality allows for agency on the part of the local entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens in how they interpret and choose to signify the island’s battlefield identity. It is therefore this chapter’s goal to capture the multiple locales where such entrepreneurial power and practices of citizenship are unleashed, and how these practices are constitutive of and at the same time constitute the battlefield tourism landscape. Several cultural artefacts produced by local entrepreneurs ranging from food and drinks to household items and souvenirs, together with ordinary people’s attitude and actions as ‘good citizens’ will be discussed. However, before I unveil the specific examples, it is important at this juncture to explicate briefly the wider literature on ‘place branding’ in order to better showcase the contribution of my thesis.
5.2 Place Branding & the Branding of Kinmen

The unbranded state has a difficult time attracting economic \textit{and} political attention. Image and reputation are becoming essential parts of the state’s strategic equity.

(Van Ham, 2004: 17; emphasis in original)

While Van Ham might be referring to a particular geographical unit in this instance, he is actually reflecting on the wider phenomenon of ‘place branding’. There has been a growing interest of late in both the public sector and academic arena on place branding. Branding of places is seen by country and city governments as a marketing tool to attract investors and tourists (Allen, 2007). In this era of globalisation and technological advancement, countries and increasingly, cities, seek to differentiate themselves as they compete amongst each other to be financial centres and choice locations for foot-loose industries. Moreover, as the World Tourism Organisation acknowledges, tourists, with increased mobility, are treating tourism destinations as fashion accessories (Morgan \textit{et al.}, 2002) that reflect their self-identities. In a semiotic society, signs and images give meaning to consumption (Baudrillard, 1968), and brands are able to create and transmit them efficiently (Freire, 2005). A brand thus goes beyond its original function “to distinguish and identify”; it assumes “fetishistic qualities of image and power” as advertisers [and, I would say here, government officials] craft “associations, attributes and characterizations designed to induce a psychological response…” (Donald and Gammack, 2007: 46). Therefore, place brand has become an important determining factor for the success of a tourist destination. It is no wonder that ‘destination branding’ (Morgan \textit{et al.}, 2002) has landed itself such a high priority in the eyes of tourism planners.
It is not the intention of this chapter to provide a comprehensive literature review of academic research on place branding. Moreover, Dinnie (2004) and Gould and Skinner (2007) have been excellent in capturing the changing approaches and emerging trends in the literature. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to realise that the place branding lexicon typically evolves around the likes of ‘nation branding’ (Anholt, 2004; Gudjonsson, 2005), ‘city branding’ (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2006; Donald and Gammack, 2007), ‘place branding’ (Papadopoulos, 2004; Anholt, 2005), ‘geobranding’ (Freire, 2005), ‘destination branding’ (Morgan et al., 2002), and more recently, ‘island branding’ (Zhang, forthcoming).

McLaren (1998: 27) describes the media as “dream weavers and spin doctors”. After all, tourism is really about discovering or even creating a destination and then packaging and marketing it. Conversely, Dann (1996) argues cogently that tourism can in fact be considered a language. Here, I propose that images of tourist destinations found in the media constitute an imperative component to the language of tourism. Magnetic and powerful images can be compelling enough to fire the imagination and awake the desires of people (Cohen, 1982). Such is the utility of pre-destination branding. Imaging results in landscapes being promoted and commodified as “touristscapes”. In the case of Kinmen, images of its battlefield landscape appear in brochures, travel magazines, newspapers, television commercials, the Internet, and even in books and films. Although appearing in diverse sources, these images serve a fundamental function – to communicate to people, and in doing so, entice them to make the journey. Hence, potential tourists already possess a pre-place brand experience (Allen, 2003) of battlefield Kinmen even before they set foot on the island.
The place brand experience (Allen, 2007) unfolds on Kinmen itself. Military infrastructure and facilities that were left behind by the shrinking garrison\(^{38}\) (e.g. tunnels; pillboxes; forts) were rapidly re-appropriated to become tourist attractions. War museums are no longer just a place to commemorate the “heroics” of the KMT army, but have become tourist attractions and sights of curiosity. The battlefield landscape that represented a bastion of military might and symbol of war was transformed almost overnight into a \textit{tourism landscape} of appeal for pleasure consumption. In addition, television programmes, calendars, postcards and story books as mentioned in the preceding chapter can be seen as the government’s effort to promote Kinmen’s battlefield brand to the population. This chapter goes further to interrogate the \textit{effects} of such governmental technologies.

In analysing the battlefield tourism landscape, I have suggested that both nationalist ideologies and post-war reconciliation mentality co-exist in Kinmen. Successful branding of the island thus relies on careful negotiation and positioning. Such analysis of tourism landscape though important, still could not capture the essence of more fluid processes of place construction. Indeed, as Crang (2006: 52) states, “describing and unpacking the images (signifiers) is not the same as analysing the practices of signification.” Furthermore, as this chapter seeks to critique, the increased mobility of tourists, and for that matter, place brands have been mapped onto fixed notions of tourist destinations as is evident in most academic expositions. In other words, studies on place branding tend to focus on the representational aspects of a destination, such that it is delimited to a fixed entity. Also, branding seems to be conceived as the responsibility of state-employed brand managers who are tasked to

\(^{38}\) In line with the de-militarisation of Kinmen, the number of soldiers based on the island has been reducing from the initial 100,000 to the target of 5000.
come up with tourism taglines like “Uniquely Singapore”, “Incredible India” or “Welcome 2 Taiwan”.

Such semiological and managerialist approaches to the study of tourism destinations miss the point that these places are “fluid and created through performance” (Crang and Coleman, 2002: 1). Also, the interpretative stance taken by landscape/semiotic studies “tends to work for an assumed reader, working through the textual shaping of places or decoding the iconographic significance of images…” (Crang, 2006: 52). Thus, Thrift’s (1997: 127) ‘non-representational theory’, which focuses on “everyday practices that shape the conduct of human beings towards others and themselves in particular sites…”, presents itself as a more grounded alternative to a better understanding of the human condition. Of course, this is not to say that representations are not important. Rather, it is a shift from studying the representations of destinations to an analysis of the processes and practices of signification (Crang, 2006), which I will argue, not only help to explicate the fluidity of a tourist destination, but also expound the effects of landscape on people’s behaviour and decisions.

In the context of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism, I take ‘performance’ to mean the performance of one’s identity through the practices of signification by local entrepreneurs and the conduct of citizenship by ordinary Kinmen people. Conversely, ‘fluidity’ operates at two interrelated levels. Firstly, the branding of Kinmen by the tourism authorities alone does not account for the ongoing happenings at the destination itself. Innovative creations by local entrepreneurs, whose businesses are related to Kinmen’s battlefield identity, and ordinary Kinmenese’s attitude and
actions with regard to preserving their battlefield heritage, are constantly (re)shaping the tourism landscape. Secondly, tourism does not merely occur ‘out there’, neither are tourist destinations ‘delimitable’ and ‘definable’ (Crang, 2006: 47); the battlefield tourism experience overflows beyond the physical borders of the destination itself. The locally produced products or souvenirs become a tourist’s cultural capital, and when brought back to be shared with relatives and friends, contribute to the post-place brand experience (Allen, 2003) of Kinmen. Similarly, when the Kinmen people become tourism ambassadors themselves, the battlefield image of Kinmen can be perpetuated beyond its borders. I will now turn to the empirical examples to illustrate.

5.3 Of Kaoliang, Bullets, Mines and Knives: Local Entrepreneurs as Branding Agents

As Allen (2007: 64) argues, “While government agencies often lead brand initiatives, the stakeholder domains within which they operate are arguably more difficult to manage than those faced by corporate brand managers.” In the case of Kinmen, other than the official planners, local entrepreneurs also play a major role in shaping the battlefield tourism brand by investing their own meanings through the commodification of war symbolism. Consumers go beyond the functional features when purchasing a product and “acquire certain symbolic features that are incorporated in the brand” (Aaker, 1996, cited in Freire, 2005: 347). I refer to the Kinmen te-chan (特产 – specially produced consumer items) and how these products are actively being signified with personal meanings by the local entrepreneurs. Although it is not my intention to provide a full consumption analysis, I would still

39 There is an entire body of literature that looks at souvenirs as material culture. See Winter (2009) for an excellent overview. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage with this genre of analysis as I am more interested in uncovering the practices of signification rather than the material aspect of souvenirs.
draw on consumers’ (both locals and tourists) responses to understand how these products are received by end users. The “three treasures” of Kinmen, namely Kinmen Kaoliang (sorghum) Liquor (金门高粱酒), Kinmen Peanut Candy (金门贡唐) and the Kinmen Steel Knife (金门钢刀) will be drawn upon to elaborate.

5.3.1 The Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor

The consumption culture of kaoliang liquor started in North China. When the KMT forces retreated from PRC to Kinmen, the military brought with them the consumption habit and introduced the growing of sorghum to residents. The liquor has since become the most important export commodity and is inextricably linked to the island’s battlefield identity. With the rise of tourism, local entrepreneurs have since come up with ‘commemorative liquor’ featuring the major battles for tourist consumption. The bottles come in the shape of tankers, helmets, army boots and artillery shells, marrying the consumption of kaoliang liquor with war commemoration (Plate 5.1).

The association of kaoliang liquor with the battlefield identity of Kinmen sets off a co-branding relationship. The kaoliang liquor is no longer just any liquor made from sorghum; it is “Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor”. Such a brand name “add[s] value to the basic product (brand equity)... and this [battlefield image] provides differentiation that goes beyond price competition” (Aaker, 1991, cited in Donald and Gammack, 2007: 46). Concomitantly, the kaoliang liquor, high in its alcohol content and believed to be only consumed by the strong and courageous, is also a brand in itself, which underscores the character of Kinmen as a military stronghold.
The significance of ‘Kinmen’ and ‘Kaoliang’ as co-brands is evident from a Taiwanese tourist’s response:

I bought this bombshell-bottled Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor as a souvenir for my brother. For one, Kinmen is famous for its high quality kaoliang liquor. Moreover, the battlefield aspect of this island is represented by the bombshell bottle. People will know straight away that I have visited Kinmen. So, I am hitting two birds with one stone. I don’t mind paying more for the design.

(Personal communication, 1 July 2008)
As can be seen from this example, the symbolic consumption of the kaoliang liquor gives the local entrepreneurs an edge over other liquor manufacturers. Indeed, brand equity is effective in reducing the price sensitivity of a product.

During my stay in Kinmen, it was not difficult to notice rows of such commemorative kaoliang liquor on display in the living rooms of locals’ residences. One of the locals, Mr. Chang, enthused when asked about the display:

These kaoliang liquor bottles encapsulate Kinmen’s battlefield history. Moreover, they are quite nice and unique…Something to show to friends and relatives when they visit us from Taiwan. So, this has become something like a hobby for me…collecting these bottles.

(Personal interview, 22 December 2008)

The branding of Kinmen has indeed crossed the domain of tourism planners into that of the local people and their everyday lives. In fact, Donald and Gammack (2007) have highlighted the importance of “every citizen [being] an ambassador” and believing in the brand, as the key difference between product and place branding (p.61). For a successful and sustainable branding effort, the Kinmen locals must believe in the battlefield identity themselves. If this criterion is fulfilled, the consumers can be utilised as “the most powerful communication tool in the branding toolbox (Gudjonsson, 2005: 288). As such, by collecting and displaying the commemorative kaoliang liquor, the Kinmen locals can be seen as “brand stewards” (Allen, 2007) in promoting and sustaining the battlefield brand.
5.3.2 The Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series

Other than the kaoliang liquor bottles, one young and innovative local entrepreneur caught up with the changing kaoliang consumption habit and introduced the “Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series” (Plate 5.2). Li Min-De, the manager of Bar Sa Restaurant returned to Kinmen from mainland Taiwan in 1994.\textsuperscript{40} He joined the then booming tourism industry as a tour guide, and opened his own travel agency soon after. Together with another business partner, the Bar Sa pub-cum-restaurant was opened in 1998.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{kinmen_battlefield_cocktails.png}
\caption{Plate 5.2 Menu showing the Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series (left) and the ‘Kuningtou Battle’ cocktail (right)}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{40} Li has previously studied, completed his national (military) service and worked as a stage designer in Taiwan. It was after he sustained a back muscle injury that he decided to return to his homeland.
Popular amongst the younger locals and tourists, this cocktail series encompasses a total of six brightly coloured mixture of kaoliang liquor and fruit juice. Each cocktail’s presentation has a symbolic meaning and is interestingly named after a major battle, a historical event, or a certain ideology. A local home stay operator confirmed the cocktail’s popularity:

I bring my guests here almost every week. Many tourists have read about the Battlefield Cocktail Series from internet forum discussions and would like to try them. I think the kaoliang series is a noble idea to let people from outside Kinmen know about us and our history and even better, attract them to visit Kinmen.

(Personal communication, 22 August 2008)

When asked about where the idea of the cocktail series came from and the symbolic meanings behind the naming of the drinks, Li enthused at length:

The Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series was inspired by the county government-sponsored Kaoliang Tourism Season in 2000. Bartenders were invited from Taiwan to perform. We got the idea form the event and thought that it would be great if we could create some cocktail drinks based on Kinmen’s battlefield heritage. Moreover, it is through battlefield tourism that this place can be promoted internationally…so that we can attract international tourists. This was how the cocktail series came about.

Basically the cocktail series reflects Kinmen’s battlefield history in the 40s, 50s, 60s, until now. The ‘Kunningtou Battle’ is a mixture of Kaoliang liquor, orange juice and guava juice. This gives the cocktail a tinge of red to signify bloodshed during the Kunningtou Battle.

Actually, before the 823 Artillery Battle, there are other battles, like the Battle of Da Dan and Er Dan, and 93 Artillery Battle. But people are perhaps more aware of these two [Kunningtou and 823]. The 823 Bombardment is an aerial battle…That’s why this cocktail is blue in colour. There is salt at the rim of the glass to signify that they [the communist soldiers] were rubbing salt onto our wounds.

In the 50s, they [the KMT army] started to build tunnels, in preparation for larger scale warfare and to protect civilians. So when we created ‘Tunnel’, we gave it a dark/dull purple colour, to mimic the ambience inside a tunnel.
As for ‘Night Attack’, both sides used to deploy divers, known as “water ghosts”, during the night, either to collect intelligence or to cut off the heads of enemy divers. That’s why it is made from lemon and guava juice, to give it a red tone to signify such atrocities.

In the 70s, there was no more war. Both sides were more or less at peace. Kaoliang (sorghum) can once again be grown on the fields, creating large areas of greenery – A kind of “Kaoliang awakening”… A green Kinmen indeed…That’s why this cocktail is green in colour.

Lastly, everyone is talking about peace now…That’s why this cocktail, ‘Peace’, has a honey base. We want to savour the sweetness of peace.

(Personal interview, 3 June 2008, italics added)

From the above example, it is evident that tourism-mentality operates at the level of the local entrepreneurs in terms of their business decisions and outlook. The governmental rationalities in developing Kinmen into a battlefield tourism destination play themselves out in the form of the rationale behind the creation of the Kinmen Battlefield Cocktail Series. Li’s personal narration and interpretation of Kinmen’s past and present are clearly influenced by the meta-narration in terms of its selective focus on certain battles and flow of events. The stories behind the ‘823 Artillery Battle’ and ‘Night Attack’ cocktails reflect the hostile binary of “us and them”, which is very much prominent in the narrative thread found in various war museums on the island.

However, it is the nuances in power relations between the governance of the battlefield tourism landscape (through the various technologies) and the governance of the entrepreneurial self that adds to the salience of tourism-mentality as a concept to understand the politics of a tourism landscape. While the governance of his own business decisions might be influenced by the authorities’ tourism initiatives, Li never forgets to add a pinch of innovation to “spice up” the stories. The cocktail series is
thus as much a (re)presentation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage as it is a performance of the entrepreneur’s own sentiments about the historical events and current happenings in Kinmen. Furthermore, his ideal of utilising battlefield heritage to attract international tourists presents a kind of micro-disjuncture in scalar terms with the government’s rationale to focus, at the national-regional scale, on national identity and cross-strait peaceful ties. Such micro-disjunctures testify that local entrepreneurs possess agency and do not behave according to a prescribed trajectory of actions, but neither are they in opposition with official idea(l)s. In fact, they contribute to the advancement of battlefield tourism development, and their innovations might form the basis for future inventions of landscape governance by the authorities.

The commitment and enthusiasm does not merely stop at the level of the manager. Li also aims to encourage his subordinates to do the same. He “hope[s] that [his] waitresses will not only serve the themed cocktail to the customers, but also tell them the stories behind these cocktails… Just like there is no use showing a thousand fortresses without a captivating narration by a good guide.”
5.3.3 The Kinmen Peanut Candy

The peanut candy is one of the Kinmen delicacies popular amongst tourists. Local entrepreneurs are quick to jump onto the bandwagon of battlefield tourism development to come up with war-related themes for the peanut candy. However, they are not passive followers, but make use of tourism to express their own interpretation of contemporary cross-strait relations. For instance, Chen Chin-Fu, General Manager of Min-Jih Gong Tang, invented the “Bullet Crackers” series (Plate 5.3). These crackers take the shape of bullets and are specially packed in containers that resemble ammunition boxes. On explaining his rationale for creating these products, he enthused:

I wanted these peanut candies to represent peace between Taiwan and China. These bullet-shaped peanut crackers symbolise those bullets that were left behind after the war. We don’t want anymore conflict, so the best way to deal with these excess bullets, is to eat them! The tourists love them. Moreover, people here are also finding this to be the perfect gift for relatives and friends who come over…usually for them to bring back to Taiwan. I am in the midst of designing more of such candy. Peanut candy in the forms of tankers, machine guns and grenades will be next.

(Personal interview, 1 June 2006)

Entrepreneurial innovations such as the Bullet Crackers, when bought by the tourists and locals as souvenirs, contribute to the post-place brand experience (Allen, 2003) of Kinmen. In this case, they help to perpetuate the Kinmen battlefield brand by purchasing these souvenirs and giving them as gifts to relatives and friends overseas. For example, when asked the reason for purchasing the bullet crackers, one PRC tourist replied:
I bought it for fun, not really for the taste. It is interesting and I like the peace agenda behind its creation. This serves as a very good souvenir for my friends back home. Who would have thought that you can actually eat a bullet?!

(Personal communication, 1 June 2006)

Plate 5.3 “Bullet” Crackers
(Source: Min Jih promotional booklet)

Obviously, the bullet crackers were bought for their symbolic meaning rather than its taste. Although ‘piggy-backing’ on the government’s branding initiative, Chen is actively expressing his agency in the branding process by creating his own story behind the product, which acts as a medium for relaying his own interpretation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage.
5.3.4 The Battlefield Mines Biscuit

Revisiting the *te-chan* landscape two years after my first encounter with the bullet crackers, I realised that the power to perform Kinmen’s battlefield identity has spread horizontally. The success of the ‘Bullet Crackers” has triggered an “arms race” among other local entrepreneurs. For instance, Chen Li-Lin, Manager of Yi Lai Shuen (another peanut candy brand) has come up with the idea of “Battlefield Mines Biscuit” (Plate 5.4). Individually packed in sachets with camouflage design to accentuate the battlefield theme, these chocolate-coated biscuits have fillings that come in a variety of different flavours ranging from kaoliang to strawberry and peanut.

According to Chen,

> It is important to instil life into a product. History provides the perfect storyline to promote the Battlefield Mines Biscuit. Its round shape mimics the shape of the anti-tank mines that were scattered all over the beaches during the war years. Apart from the camouflage design, we have also printed a timeline of the major battles behind each sachet. I want to use this product to tell people about Kinmen’s unique battlefield heritage…I mean where on earth can you find a former battlefield that is so well-preserved?

(Personal interview, 20 December 2008)
The sprouting of locally produced products that are associated with Kinmen’s battlefield heritage is telling of the generative effects of tourism landscape governance by the tourism planners. However as evident in the various inventions as discussed hitherto, the performativity of the battlefield identity varies in terms of underlying motivations, messages conveyed and stories told. Following Taipei’s friendly stance towards Beijing and the increased economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, local entrepreneurs with battlefield-related products to offer are beginning to set their sights not just on PRC tourists visiting Kinmen, but at the larger Chinese market on the mainland. As such, the increased sensitivity towards PRC tourists as seen from the Bullet Crackers example has evolved into greater awareness of the Chinese market as a whole. As Chen revealed:

I have originally thought of coming up with a comic to instil a certain storyline behind this product…for instance someone stepping on a mine and how he was rescued – a common experience for people in Kinmen. However, as I intend to promote this biscuit in mainland China, it is wise not to deal with the battlefield history too much, if not it might be censored by the Chinese authorities.

Other than responding to macro political circumstances, Chen provided a more practical rationale for her marketing strategy:

Previously, our local economy depended 100% on the garrison. Our family business started out 24 years ago…as a military convenience stall. But since demilitarization, 70% of the economy depends on the tourists. We have to accept the fact that we can’t depend on the military anymore…and what better way is there to use our battlefield heritage to promote our products? As a Kinmense, I can’t imagine our battlefield history being forgotten. It is only right to remember our heritage. I think to make people realize this fact, personal growth is important…personal growth needs to catch up with changes in the economy…we have to accept the fact that tourism will eventually take over the garrison economy, yet we still have to remember our battlefield heritage.

It is clear from this account that the performance of the battlefield identity has transcended from that of a commercial decision to that of a moral issue – “personal
growth” as it were. The inner development of the self to recognise the importance of tourism and the moral obligation to safeguard Kinmen’s battlefield heritage stand out glaringly in this quotation. Such moralisation of the battlefield tourism landscape sheds light on the governance of the self as local entrepreneurs go about formulating new inventions to add on to the te-chan landscape.

The Battlefield Mines Biscuit is just but one of the many items sold in Yi Lai Shuen that has a military flavour. In order to entice the locals to purchase the seemingly touristic peanut candy products, Chen came up with promotions during festive seasons. For example, during Christmas and Lunar New Year celebrations, Yi Lai Shuen gives out souvenir military vehicles and figurines made from porcelain (Plate 5.5) to customers who spend over a certain amount on the shop’s products. According to Chen, these battlefield themed souvenirs are so popular amongst the locals that they do not mind spending that stipulated amount just for the souvenir military vehicles and figurines. One of the local customers revealed:

I will always send some peanut candy to my relatives in Singapore and Malaysia before the Lunar New Year. Our Kinmen peanut candy is very famous over there. These limited edition porcelain military vehicles and figurines are related to our battlefield heritage and I’m sure my relatives will like them.

(Personal communication, 20 December 2008)

Therefore, it is clear that the battlefield tourism-mentality has diffused to the everyday lives of the Kinmen people as they increasingly embrace the battlefield identity of Kinmen. I choose to use ‘diffuse’ rather than more structural verbs like ‘infiltrate’ as the latter denotes a top-down introduction of ideas. Rather, the process here is diffusion – a more encompassing dissemination of battlefield tourism-mentality.
5.3.5 The Kinmen Steel Knife

The Kinmen Steel Knife\(^{41}\) is even more closely related to the war (Plate 5.6). Manufactured using the artillery shells left behind after the bombardment by the communist forces during the Cold War years, it has gained popularity all over the world, and is often featured in media reports and documentaries.\(^{42}\) According to Wu Tseng-Dong, Director of Chin Ho Li,\(^{43}\)

The kitchen knife is used in every household... both in China and Taiwan. I want to remind people of the great sufferings caused by the battle. At the same time, this common household item would also remind the users of the kinship and culture that both sides share. We are ultimately one family.

(Personal interview, 29 May 2006)

\(^{41}\) Although famous for its kitchen knives, souvenir knives of varying sizes are also available.
\(^{42}\) Major television networks like CNN from the United States, NHK from Japan and TVBS from Taiwan, and international magazines like TIME, all have had special reports on the “Chin Ho Li Steel Knife Story”.
\(^{43}\) “Chin Ho Li” is the name of Wu’s Kinmen Steel Knife factory.
In this example of the Kinmen Steel Knife, the battlefield brand is skilfully embedded in its creation. With its functionality and durability, the knife can be an effective “brand agent” in the long run. During my visit to Chin Ho Li, I chanced upon a Japanese tourist who had travelled to Kinmen especially for the kitchen knife. A chef by profession, the tourist confessed:

I have long heard about the Kinmen knife that is made from artillery shells. This is amazing and its durability has been verified by my friends in Japan. Today, I am buying not only for myself, but also for others back home. It has become a trusted brand among a lot of people.

(Personal communication, 30 May 2008)

Wu is also attempting to reach out to younger clientele with continuing innovations in design and product development. As such, the Kinmen Steel Knife is constantly transforming itself to meet the preferences of different tourists (Plate 5.7).
The Chin Ho Li example illustrates how Kinmen’s battlefield brand can also be shaped through the production of consumer items by a local entrepreneur. The knife reminds the tourist of the existing conflict between China and Taiwan and conveys the message for peaceful reconciliation. Such product innovations serve as a medium for the local entrepreneurs to express their sentiments about the war and how they would like the war to be represented to the tourists. Furthermore, this example testifies to Crang’s observation that “places are made but they are not bounded, fixed entities but are relationally linked to other places. In other words…the paradox of experiencing a place is that it depends on other absent places” (Crang, 2006: 53). In this case the place brand experience (Allen, 2007) created by the Kinmen Steel Knife does not exist solely based on Kinmen, but is made possible through the co-existence of Kinmen’s relationship with mainland China.
5.4 Allies of the State – Ordinary Kinmen People as Tourism Subjects

The object of disciplinary power is the regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within that territory, e.g. in practices of schooling, military training or the organization of work. The new object of government, by contrast, regards these subjects, and the forces and capacities of living individuals, as members of a population, as resources to be fostered, to be used and to be optimized.

(Dean, 1999: 20)

Discussion thus far has focused on the effects of tourism-mentalisation on local entrepreneurs, and snippets of Kinmen people’s everyday behaviour with regard to battlefield tourism. In fact, the mentality of such ordinary people deserve to be discussed in detail as they are important allies of the state that make up the bulk of ‘tourism subjects’ in Kinmen’s battlefield tourism enterprise. Unlike the entrepreneurs who are to a large extent driven by economic motivation, this group of ordinary Kinmenese constitute to a more selfless form of tourism subjects. This section thus focuses on the local people’s ‘self-government’ in embracing battlefield tourism development in Kinmen.

One way to study the effects of tourism-mentalisation on the ordinary people is to enquire about their perceptions on Kinmen’s battlefield tourism and see to what extent these go in tandem with the authorities’ vision of an ideal Kinmense when it comes to the promotion of battlefield tourism. According to Lin Chen-cha, Director General of the county government’s Tourism Bureau,

The most crucial factor for the success of battlefield tourism development comes down to the locals. The government can come up with all the necessary infrastructures and facilities, but the locals must also adopt a tourism mentality. They are the ones who can truly contribute to the island’s tourism enterprise when they start to believe in their own product.

(Personal interview, 21 May 2008)
Some questions pertaining to the locals’ performative geographies come to mind: How do they engage actively with the island’s battlefield heritage? How do they behave as hosts to friends from abroad? How do they perform their identities as citizens of Kinmen? The nature of my fieldwork that allowed me to make multiple visits to Kinmen gave me the privilege to analyse people’s changing perceptions on issues like battlefield tourism development and citizenship over a period of time. By way of illustration, when asked about whether visits to battlefield heritage sites should be incorporated into the National Education curriculum, the genre of answers from respondents three years ago when I first conducted fieldwork on the island differs from the sentiments of locals today. For instance, in 2006, one of the local interviewees, Mr. Lee, replied:

"Battlefield heritage should be incorporated as part of National Education. We are Kinmense, of course we need to have a better understanding of our hometown. By having battlefield history included in the National Education curriculum, it can also help foster locals’ love of their hometown."

(Personal communication, 22 December 2006)

Similarly, another respondent emphasised, “The locals should be more familiar with Kinmen’s battlefield culture, and have a sense of belonging to the hometown” (Personal communication, 15 June 2006). Furthermore, some others would answer with a sense of pride and fervour:

"We should educate the younger generation on the stories behind these valuable battlefield establishments and infrastructures…how they came about. If not for the victories in the Guntingou Battle and the 8-23 Battle, there will be no Taiwan. Therefore we should remind Kinmen people about the greatness of our forefathers!"

(Personal communication, 27 June 2006)
As is evident with this sample of responses, references to the hometown and sense of belonging, with traces of nationalist sentiments were the main ingredients that make up the concoction of answers back then.

When the same question was asked two years later, there was an obvious change in the type of moral obligation as a Kinmen citizen. Now, there is an increasing awareness of the tourism potential of the battlefield heritage. Instead of the more inward looking sense of belonging or camaraderie, respondents now recognise such unity and warmth amongst the locals as a unique character that make them desirable hosts to tourists. The ability to act as a good tour guide has thus been perceived as part of the moral duties of a good citizen. I offer three quotes from my informants that succinctly capture the above observation:

Visits to battlefield heritage sites can educate the young people not only about the past, but also prepare them for the future. They need to be aware that battlefield tourism development is beneficial to Kinmen’s economy. Before tourism development, ‘Kinmen’ is merely a term that appeared in history textbooks. Kinmen, as a former military outpost exudes a kind of curiosity amongst the tourists. Its battlefield identity is also a unique selling point compared to other tourist destinations.

(Dr. Lin, personal interview, 22 December 2008)

To learn about the battlefield history through National Education is important. As a Kinmense, it will be a shame if we are not informed about our battlefield heritage. How then can we introduce Kinmen to our friends abroad? How then can we act as a guide to our friends should they come to visit?

(Mdm. Lee, personal interview, 19 December 2008)

Visits to the battlefield heritage sites are important. During the martial law years, there were many places that even the locals were forbidden to enter. Also, many places have changed since then. Since there are plans now to develop tourism, we as locals should gain a better understanding of the changing environment. If Kinmen is to be transformed into a battlefield tourism destination, wouldn’t it
be nice if every single one of us can be a museum guide or even a tour guide? This can only be advantageous to the island’s tourism development.

(Mr. Sheu, personal interview, 19 December 2008)

Clearly, instead of key phrases like “sense of belonging” or “love for the hometown”, we now see a substantial reference to tourism and what the locals must do as hosts. In deconstructing the ‘conduct of conduct’, Dean (1999: 10) explains that “the ethical or moral sense of the word starts to appear when we consider the reflexive verb ‘to conduct oneself’.” In the case of Kinmen, to conduct oneself as a responsible citizen is strongly related to the moral obligation of being a good host to tourists. More importantly, there is a shift in the citizens’ imagination of their relation with their hometown beyond affectionate geographies to that of performative geographies. In other words, instead of a more passive relation that was bounded by personal emotions, the citizens of today are more actively exercising their “freedom” to participate in the shaping of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape. Indeed, as “Don Mitchell has suggested, landscape is something that ‘does work’, then this is not to imply simple spatial or environmental determinism (Mitchell, 2000, cited in Bunnell, 2004: 103). As such, the idealised Kinmen citizens are those who could discover their own roles in the battlefield tourism enterprise.

I would like to abstain from painting a totalising picture of the concept of tourism-mentality. People are not simply “brain-washed” to follow what the tourism planners hope they would do. For one, the roles that ideal Kinmen locals play are definitely not restricted to supportive ones like tour guides or museum guides. People I spoke to were critical about government initiatives and shared enthusiastically their vision for the future of battlefield tourism development. One of the themes that
surfaced is that of the desire for more local involvement. For example, one of the interviewees proposed:

There are many things that the locals can do. The retirees can volunteer as tour guides and share their stories. The same story seems to be more convincing when told by the old folks than by young tour guides in uniform. The local community can even challenge the possibility of setting aside a place to re-enact the life of ordinary Kinmen people during the martial law years.

(Ms. Wang, personal interview, 6 June 2008)

Some were more critical about the government. A persistent complaint was about the short-sightedness of the tourism planners when it comes to tourism campaigns like the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art (BMoCA). As Mr. Chen lamented:

I think events like the BMoCA lacks continuity. The problem with the county government is that they don’t think long term. They just pump in the money, make the event happen, and then forget all about it. Wouldn’t it be better if the BMoCA is an annual or bi-annual event? I will support government’s initiatives only if they are long term and sustainable.

(Personal interview, 16 June 2008)

Other than concerns on the sustainability of tourism activities, the younger interviewees advocated for more interactive and experiential elements to be built into existing attractions. An undergraduate enthused:

The battlefield heritage is the most important selling point of Kinmen. It will be too boring to show tourists museums after museums. Therefore there should be more engaging activities like paintball games. Participants could be dressed in military uniform. This makes the battlefield experience more surreal. Tourists can also be taken on military boat excursions through the tunnel passages.

(Personal communication, 8 December 2008)

As can be seen from the above responses, locals are not only practising self-government, they are in fact actively involved in the governance of the battlefield
tourism landscape themselves. Therefore, “further to define government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is to open up the examination of self-government or cases in which governor and governed are two aspects of the one actor, whether that actor be a human individual or a collective or corporation” (Dean, 1999: 12). However, perception still defers from action for it is not only the people’s attitude and way of thinking that are important, but also how they behave, how they (re)act, how they perform their identities that are crucial in the actual shaping of the tourism landscape.

Rose (1996, cited in Thrift, 1997: 136) reminds us that “[h]uman beings are not the unified subjects of some coherent regime of domination that produces persons in the form in which it dreams. On the contrary, they live their lives in a constant movement across different practices that address them in different ways…” Similarly, not everyone in Kinmen embraces the battlefield tourism concept – some use actions to express their discontent. Since the abolition of martial law and the recent demilitarization of Kinmen, private land that was once occupied by the military has been gradually returned to the civilians. According to Associate Professor Bo-wei Chiang of the National Kinmen Institute of Technology, he observed that:

Once land is returned to the locals, many of them would immediately dismantle the defunct military infrastructures. On one hand they might have more practical plans like setting up farms or expanding their houses. Conversely, this is also an act of reclaiming lost spaces from the military. This is an understandable behaviour from a society that has been suppressed by the military for so long.

(Personal communication, 27 December 2008)

Such practices of spatial reclamation by the locals act as an opposition to the battlefield tourism development as many valuable battlefield relics were indeed destroyed. However, in cases where the land falls under the jurisdiction of KMNP, the
locals would not be allowed to knock down any battlefield relics even if they own the land. This has been one of the main reasons for the locals’ discontent with the central government’s subsidiary. However, the onset of tourism-mentalisation has seen the power relation between the locals and the authorities over land issues evolved over the years. I shall elaborate with a KMNP initiative that would later act as a prototype for locals’ self government with regard to battlefield tourism development.

Qionglin, which was once a combat village, has in recent years been marketed as an attraction by the National Park. Tourists pay a small maintenance fee of NT$10 at the Village Administration Office to visit the underground tunnel (Plate 5.8) and experience what life was like during war times. The narrow and dimly lit passage way leads to an underground military command post where notice boards detailing the different roles that residents were expected to perform during a battle and military slogans remain intact (Plate 5.9).

Plate 5.8 Façade of the Qionglin Tunnel (left) and a narrow passage way inside the tunnel
Mr. Huang, a Qionglin resident recollected:

During the martial law years, people here used to bear grudges against the military for digging passage ways under the village. Many believed that the tunnel network would spoil the *feng shui* of the entire village…especially our ancestral hall. But now, the war is over and the KMNP people have spoken to us on many occasions on the importance of preserving the battlefield heritage. So I think the tunnel as well as future plans to showcase life during the martial law years are good ideas. The villagers are supportive of this initiative.

(Personal interview, 18 December 2008)

There were also plans to set up a civil defence museum to showcase civilian life during the tumultuous years.\(^44\) Tourists would be able to understand why the lighting in houses back then had to be dimmed at night and the various combat roles performed by civilians. It is through participating in the daily ‘rituals’ of the Kinmen residents that the tourists can better appreciate the battlefield experience. I posit that

\(^{44}\) In April 2009, the Qionglin Civil Defence Exhibition Hall was opened.
implicit in this strategy to represent Kinmen’s battlefield in the form of everyday lived experiences, is the effort to localise the battlefield landscape, and to acknowledge that battles were not only fought by the army, but also involved the residents. The local, the familiar, and the common place become integral to the tourism-mentalisation process. This move can be analysed as a response to recent critics on the overly nationalised history portrayed in war museums as compared to the preferred collective memories of the Kinmenese (Chiang, 2006).

The KMNP’s effort in preserving the battlefield flavour of Qionglin Village has become a predecessor for later innovations and initiatives by the locals. I bring on the experience of He Ying-Cyuan\textsuperscript{45} and his community at Pubian Village to illustrate. He shared his community’s aspiration to preserve its battlefield heritage:\textsuperscript{46}

> For us, we thought that preservation of the surrounding battlefield relics is an important task of the present generation, so that our future generations can understand our own history. Moreover, just like the other villages, to be able to showcase battlefield relics to tourists in own backyard is an achievement for all of us. It helps to create a kind of identity for the Pubian people.

(Personal interview, 19 December 2008)

According to He, his village had only recently organised an exhibition in its air raid shelter (Plate 5.10):

> We thought that it would be a good idea to open up the shelter to the public instead of letting it remain buried underground. The war has ended…the shelter is an excellent classroom for the young people and the tourists will be curious to learn about ordinary people’s war encounters too. So what we did was do up the

\textsuperscript{45} He Ying-Cyuan is a committee member of the Pubian Community Development Society, a non-governmental organisation set up by Pubian residents.

\textsuperscript{46} Pubian’s villagers are not the first to come up with initiatives to preserve the battlefield heritage. Dongkeng Village, with the guidance of its town council was able to successfully preserve its battlefield relics. The ability to preserve and showcase the various forts and civilian tunnels to tourists brought pride to the people in that village. After that, the local community at Huangcuo Village [not under KMNP’s jurisdiction] followed suit.
shelter and displayed the various tools that were used by the villagers to build it. There was no need for guides as there was always a constant stream of old folks from the village who would reminisce about their past.

Interestingly, the Pubian Village, unlike Qionglin, is not even under the jurisdiction of KMNP. That means the villagers are not under any legal obligation to preserve the battlefield relics left behind by the military. Yet, the villagers possess impressive moral obligation in safeguarding their battlefield heritage. The exhibition for locals and tourists was not planned by the authorities. In fact, the villagers took the initiative to apply for funding from the central government’s Council for Cultural Affairs via the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Kinmen county government. Throughout my field interview with Mr. He, he brought me around his village, enthusiastically pointing out to me the various entrances to tunnels and fortresses, and well-concealed pillboxes along the coast and at road bends (Plate 5.11); disclosing his community’s plans for future projects aim at converting these war relics into tourist attractions while at the same time preserving them for future generations.

Plate 5.10 Pubian Village Air Raid Shelter Exhibition
Plate 5.11 Battlefield heritage in Pubian Village pointed out by Mr. He
In this section, I have attempted to discuss the effects of tourism-mentalisation on ordinary Kinmen people. More specifically, I explore the altruistic form of ‘tourism subjects’ whose attitude and actions towards battlefield tourism development are not necessarily driven by personal monetary gains. I have also highlighted that resistance to battlefield tourism development does exist. As Mann (1986, cited in Schein, 1997: 676, emphasis in original) argues, “Societies are not unitary…they are not totalities…Societies are much messier than our theories of them.” ‘Tourism-mentality’ is a concept that is comprehensive enough to cater for contestations to battlefield tourism development. Oppositional voices go to show that the process of tourism-mentalisation has not reached its full effect yet. In other words, these people have not become ‘tourism subjects’ or ‘allies of the state’. Furthermore, although there is evidence that the locals are increasingly being recruited as tourism subjects, it does not mean that they are dispossessed of agency. In fact, they are actively engaging with tourism planners’ initiatives in the process of shaping the battlefield tourism landscape. Conventional vertical interpretation of power relations gives way to a horizontal understanding of power distribution. As such, ‘tourism-mentality’ in the context of cultural landscape studies is not a destination but a journey in itself. It is an optic to better understand the dynamic, fluid and on-going processes of power formation and relations in and through Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape.
5.5 Discussion

The above narration of local entrepreneurs’ innovations and ordinary citizens’ behaviour has prompted us to ponder about the fluidity of producing destinations. Inspired by Nigel Thrift’s ‘non-representational theory’, this chapter has gone beyond conventional interpretative tools in landscape reading in order to elicit more fluid practices of power that took place on the ground. Indeed the various practices of signification by the entrepreneurial self and the reflexive individual exemplify that tourist destinations are “[f]ar from being the static ground on which tourism happens… [these] places are themselves happenings;…they are made and constructed” (Crang, 2006: 62). Such analytics serve to address concerns that landscape studies are “becoming theoreticist” and that “cultural work too often, in Sivanandan’s (1993) phrase, turns the world into the word…” (Thrift, 2000b: 1).

Apart from highlighting the fluidity of destination making, the practices of signification also showcase the extent to which local entrepreneurs’ behaviour is influenced by the governance of Kinmen’s tourism landscape. As was highlighted earlier on, I wish to avoid the romanticised stance taken by cultural-policy studies that “assume a high degree of fit between the political rationalities of institutions and actual processes of subject-formation;…[one that] present[s] an image of the ‘souls’ of citizens being completely controlled and regulated by governmental practices” (Barnett, 1999: 377). Instead, from the interviews conducted, I observe that actions by local entrepreneurs are at best subconsciously shaped by governmental rationalities. Moreover, the locals possess agency in their portrayal and construction of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism landscape. As Dean (1999: 13) reminds us:
Government is an activity that shapes the field of action and thus, in this sense, attempts to shape freedom. However, while government gives shape to freedom, it is not constitutive of freedom. The governed are free in that they are actors, i.e. it is possible for them to act and to think in a variety of ways, and sometimes in ways not foreseen by authorities.

The various examples discussed are thus snippets of how “governmental rationalities actually play themselves out in ‘practice’” (Barnett, 1999: 377). Furthermore, I share Mike Crang’s sentiments that:

[A]t issue are not just the representational strategies and structures that code places, but the ontological construction of places. That is it is not about the image of places as beheld by tourists, but rather the processes and practices of signification – where tourism takes up discourses and representations and uses them in ordering places, making meanings, making distinctions and thus making places through actions. It is not about what representations show so much as what they do.

(Crang, 2006: 48, emphasis in original)

The Bullet Crackers, the Kaoliang Cocktail Series and the Kinmen Steel Knives, amongst others, are products of the practices of signification by local entrepreneurs. However, it is not merely the battlefield representation/image that is important (i.e. what they show), but the meanings they convey that (re)shape the battlefield tourism landscape that are of interest here (i.e. what they do). The desire for a peaceful and mutual relationship between China and Taiwan, which is so prominent in the narrative thread of such cultural artefacts, is as much expressed in micro-political signifying practices as it is the modus operandi of the present Taiwanese government. As such, micro-political practices are influenced by and influencing macro-political realities.

These cultural artefacts are also a medium through which the local entrepreneurs express their political self via sentiments and interpretation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage. As Crang (2006: 61) laments, “Very little critical theory has really
engaged with the material cultures of tourism, and how they support and undercut notions of tourism destinations.” Previous studies have concentrated on the commodification of cultures due to external tourism forces, putting the locals and their culture at a vulnerable position. The analytics of government shed a new perspective to the analysis of such cultural artefacts. They are no longer just objects of commodification, but are also subjects that are created by and creating subjectivities of the local entrepreneurs. In fact, they are “‘geographical subjects’ in three senses: they are our subject for enquiry; they present geographical practices which go to make up senses of self; they are produced through and seek to produce geographical subjectivities” (Matless, 2000: 336).

Perpetuation of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism image by the tourists and locals is also important to analyse. The “three treasures” of Kinmen illustrate the production and consumption of Kinmen’s battlefield brand in a symbolic sense. They show how tourist consumption of such te-chan can interact with locals’ interpretation of Kinmen’s battlefield past, and when bought home, contribute to the perpetuation of the battlefield tourism experience beyond Kinmen’s geographical limits. As Crang (2006: 61) argues, “tourism is in part sustaining and being sustained by stories we tell that define ourselves, and these stories are sustained and worked through a range of objects.” Therefore, the battlefield tourism brand is constitutive of and at the same time constituted by the locally produced goods. It is evident that local entrepreneurs, Kinmen people and tourists do contribute in one way or another to the post-place brand experience of Kinmen. The featuring of the Battlefield Cocktail Series by tourists in online discussion forums; the sending of Mines Biscuits by locals as gifts to relatives overseas, and the purchase of Kinmen Steel Knives as souvenirs, are all
practices that help perpetuate Kinmen’s battlefield brand. According to Morgan (2004: 19), tourism remains a “highly involving experience, extensively planned, excitedly anticipated and fondly remembered. Souvenirs and mementos evoke and materialise those experiences…” Indeed, the Kinmen brand does travel to places out of Kinmen. This starts off another cycle of ‘pre-place experience’ and helps in the attraction of more tourists to Kinmen.

The post-place brand experience is thus an important aspect in the branding process as it contributes significantly to the perpetuation and sustainability of the Kinmen brand. In economic terms, the many places from which the tourists originate and where the Kinmen Battlefield Brand is promoted, experienced and perpetuated become viable economic hinterlands of Kinmen Island. As such, the post-place brand experience can also evolve into a form of ‘power at a distance’ when Kinmen’s battlefield tourism-mentality begins to operate in the minds of the potential tourists. Indeed, as Allen (2003, cited in Coles and Church, 2007: 31) claims, “space is dominated by a ‘seductive presence’ so that what seem like low key, intimate consumer invitations involve effective power from a distance…” In this case, the stories told by tourists when they returned from Kinmen and the souvenirs bought for family and friends enact a kind of ‘seductive space’ to entice people to visit Kinmen. Therefore, Kinmen’s battlefield tourism-mentality operates not just beyond geographical boundaries, but also across bodies; the tourism subjects are not restricted to locals, but can also include tourists, both past and future.

Socially, battlefield tourism development provides a platform for constructing a common identity and a sense of belonging amongst the islanders. This sense of
belonging is predicated on an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1983), which is invented through the collective production and consumption of the various cultural artefacts supporting the Kinmen Battlefield Brand. Foster (1991, cited in C. Winter, 2007: 105) “refers to nations as artefacts which are continually imagined, invented, contested and transformed by individuals, the state and global commodity flows.” In the case of Kinmen, the sense of community is invented and re-invented through the production and consumption of the various locally produced goods. The act of collecting and displaying the commemorative kaoliang liquor by the Kinmen resident, and the consumer behaviour of the locals as seen in the Yi Lai Sheun example are telling of how the effects of tourism spill over to the realm of everyday lives. Indeed, the manufacturing and sales of locally produced products can become a “source of pride that may be more deep-rooted than the ephemeral satisfaction of attracting inward investment” (Dinnie, 2004: 109). This sense of pride and identity about their battlefield heritage has also affected ordinary Kinmen people’s attitude and actions as responsible citizens in the promotion of Kinmen’s tourism. Indeed, a ‘tourism-mentality’ approach “provides a language and a framework for thinking about the linkages between questions of government, authority and politics, and questions of identity, self and person” (Dean, 1999: 13). Furthermore, the moral obligation and practices of these reflexive tourism subjects to preserve and showcase battlefield heritage in their own community, as seen in the Pubian Village example, provides grounds for forays into non-representational theory, whereby “performative ‘presentations’, ‘showings’ and ‘manifestations’ of everyday life” are given priority over “representation and meaning” (Thrift, 1997: 127).
The discussion of local entrepreneurs and ordinary citizens offers an avenue for us to understand the making of a tourist destination beyond conventional interpretative tools of ‘landscape reading’, which assume a stable and fixed notion of place. Tourism stakeholders other than the state are seen as performing their identities, rather than producing soulless commodities of the battlefield tourism enterprise. More importantly, through such non-representational (Thrift, 2001) discussion of the branding practices, we can understand better that the branding of Kinmen is not merely a top-down process; the Kinmen Brand is a result of both top-down ‘imagineering’ efforts by the state and bottom-up initiatives by local entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmen people. In all, it is believed that planners’ identification of Kinmen has to be substantiated by locals’ self-recognition with the island’s identity so as to sustain any branding effort.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to discuss the effects of tourism-mentalisation on local entrepreneurs’ and Kinmen people’s behaviour. This is mainly achieved by explicating various practices of signification as they negotiate and perform their identities in the midst of preserving Kinmen’s battlefield heritage. Indeed, tourist destinations are constantly (re)created through performance of one’s identity. Furthermore, as has been discussed, the Kinmen battlefield tourism experience is not spatially and temporally tied down to the physical limits of the island. As the pre-place and post-place tourist encounters show, “stories and objects spill out beyond containable episodes and boxes” (Crang, 2006: 61).
In all, I have highlighted the intricacies of the island branding process by presenting contributions by the various tourism stakeholders in a dialectical manner. As such, the Kinmen brand is a negotiated reality; it is a dynamic organism that feeds on both top-down branding initiatives by the tourism planners and bottom-up practices by local entrepreneurs, Kinmen people and tourists. Furthermore, tourism-mentality, far from being a totalising concept, allows for negotiations and alternative interpretations. Although interpretations of ‘nationalism’, the ‘China-Taiwan conflict’ and ‘post-war reconciliation’ might not be congruous with official notions, the overall battlefield image of Kinmen is still maintained through the tourism stakeholders’ practices of signification. Through the discussion, it can be seen that the battlefield tourist destination is not a fixed entity; it is constantly being invested with emotions and meanings by the various stakeholders. Therefore, following the likes of Nigel Thrift and Mike Crang in advocating for a shift from the epistemology of landscape interpretation to an ontology of place construction, I have suggested seeing the various cultural artefacts created by local entrepreneurs, and community-led battlefield heritage preservation initiatives, less as texts or sites of representations, than as locales where power of the entrepreneurial self and the reflexive individual are practised.
CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

6.1 Summary of Findings

In this section, I reiterate the main discussions of this thesis. It has been the motivation of this study to gain a better understanding of the politics of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism. It is argued that conventional analytics of tourism studies that either create an arbitrary separation between macro politics and micro politics, or assume a vertical analysis of power where ‘powerful authorities’ and ‘disadvantaged locals’ are necessarily in conflict, are inadequate, to say the least, in explaining the happenings in Kinmen. As such I proposed the concept of ‘tourism-mentality’ in an attempt to provide an optic through which to garner a more comprehensive analysis of tourism politics.

In part, this thesis serves to reverberate Burns’ and Novelli’s conviction that “tourism deserves a more nuanced analysis than familiar binary divisions (‘left-right’, ‘good-bad’, ‘right-wrong’, ‘North-South’, ‘authentic-staged’ and ‘hosts-guests’) can provide” (2007: 4). It has also attempted to answer Grossberg’s (1996, cited in Thrift, 1997: 150) call for cultural studies “to move beyond models of oppression, both the ‘colonial model’ of the oppressor and the oppressed, and the ‘transgression model’ of oppression and resistance…Both models of oppression are not only inappropriate to contemporary relations of power, they are also incapable of creating alliances…” The diverse spread of examples used to operationalise the concept of tourism-mentality have indeed provided “a platform for critical discourse and reflection on tourism, politics, democracy and the deriving chaotic web of power relations” (Burns and
Novelli, 2007: 4). The recognition of a horizontal form of power distribution in the government of Kinmen’s battlefield landscape as explicated throughout the discussion thus contribute to a burgeoning direction in the study of tourism politics.

More specifically, I have attempted to conceptualise the governance of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism through the synergistic deployment of the concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘landscape’. The various rationalities and technologies employed by tourism planners to promote the discourse of battlefield heritage preservation were highlighted. It is observed that while the Kinmen National Park (KMNP) concentrates more on realigning the past for tourist consumption, the county government works on reinforcing the peace agenda in its promotion of battlefield tourism. Nevertheless, although strategies to tourism-mentalise Kinmen differ to a certain extent between the central government’s subsidiary and its local counterpart, the underlying agenda of national well-being through tourism promotion and peaceful cross-strait relations remain consistent. Furthermore, by analysing the genealogy of battlefield landscape governance since the martial law years, I have also shown that state formation is never fixed. Technologies of the government are constantly evolving to adapt to changing circumstances, be it political, economic or societal. However, as power is immanent, the governance of a tourism landscape lies not solely in the hands of the state, but is also realised in and through practices by other tourism stakeholders. In this respect, I have attempted to elicit the locales of power practices where the effects of tourism-mentalisation can be explicated.

The effects of tourism-mentalisation were elucidated using two groups of tourism subjects, namely the local entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmen people. I have
highlighted that while the former might be largely driven by monetary incentives in their incorporation of a battlefield tourism mentality, the latter represents a more altruistic form of tourism subject. In fact, as is evident in some of the cases of self-government by the Kinmen people, the performance of their citizenship presents a kind of moralisation of the battlefield heritage preservation discourse. Although the underlying motivations and the extent to which individuals are tourism-mentality differ, both entrepreneurs and ordinary Kinmenese are nevertheless allies of the state when it comes to the promotion of Kinmen’s battlefield identity. However discussion has shown that their attitude and actions are never entirely choreographed by the state as they retain their agencies in everyday practices. Therefore, as aptly posited by C. Winter (2007: 102), “power is formed as a network of relations between people acting in various social roles, rather than through a ‘top down’ structure.” The battlefield tourism landscape then should be conceptualised as “a negotiated reality, a social construction by a purposeful set of actors” (Ley, 1981, cited in Ringer, 1998: 5).

Other than showcasing the attitude towards Kinmen’s battlefield heritage, power practices of various tourism stakeholders also testify to the fluidity of a tourist destination. On one hand, products that signify the entrepreneurs’ own interpretation of Kinmen’s battlefield history and contemporary cross-strait ties are constantly (re)shaping the battlefield tourism landscape. Conversely, locals’ and tourists’ practices of buying and giving locally-produced souvenirs and food to friends and relatives overseas contribute to the perpetuation of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism experience beyond its borders. As Crang (2006: 58) reminds us, “since the destination is not a simple place, then nor can we say tourism is located there.” Indeed, the battlefield tourism experience is not merely contained within the boundaries of
Kinmen, but spills over to other places and populations. In all, such an analysis of the practices of signification of the entrepreneurial self and the performances of citizenship of the reflexive Kinmenese brings us beyond the epistemology of landscape reading to an ontology of place construction that focuses on non-representational understandings of power practices by people on the ground. Therefore, as much as it is important to analyse tourism landscapes, both real and imagined, and uncover their representations, it is equally pertinent to understand the effects such landscapes have on the population. ‘Tourism-mentality’ is therefore a salient concept that allows for an intimate approach to understanding people’s mentality and a grounded perspective in appreciating their behaviour.

6.2 Potentials for Future Research

What is the future for ‘tourism-mentality’? In my opinion, the functionality of the concept in gaining a more nuanced understanding of tourism politics has been averred throughout the thesis. However, its applicability could be expanded. For one, as Dean (1999: 20) has noted:

The final characteristics of ‘governmentality’ stressed by Foucault is the long process by which the juridical and administrative apparatuses of the state come to incorporate the disparate arenas of rule concerned with [the] government of the population. This is the process he calls the ‘governmentalization of the state’

We are beginning to see this happening in Kinmen. For instance, the effectiveness of the *te-chan* in perpetuating the battlefield image has been recognised by the tourism planners as these products are increasingly being featured in the county government’s promotional materials about Kinmen. Furthermore, following the success of battlefield themed menus created by entrepreneurs, KMNP has recently set up its own
cafeteria near the entrance of a tunnel attraction, decorating it with portraits of prominent military personnel, and serving the specialty – The Tunnel Coffee. Such foray into the governmentalisation or, if you like, tourism-mentalisation of the state provides a promising ground for future research on the government of a tourism landscape.

Discussion on tourism-mentalisation effects could also be extended to include the tourists. I have discussed briefly how tourists contribute to post-place battlefield tourism experiences when they bring back memories and souvenirs to share with friends back home. It would be interesting to push this further to analyse how their attitude and behaviour are affected by tourism technologies before, during and after a trip, and how their agencies play out in the interpretation and perpetuation of Kinmen’s battlefield heritage. As such, tourism-mentality could then be seen as a concept that is applicable not only to a local population, but one that sees tourism technologies reaching populations beyond the jurisdiction of the state. This is especially important when it comes to assessing how people on the ground are responding to macro-political circumstances in the post-conflict era of cross-strait relations. This brings us to the final section of this thesis where I share my thoughts on the wider political implications of Kinmen’s battlefield tourism.

6.3 Concluding Remarks: Sustaining the Peace & Co-Prosperity Agenda

To close, I would like to take a step back and offer some speculations into the future of the Kinmen’s battlefield tourism development. To do this, we have to ask ourselves: Will the historical contextualisation of the island still be pivotal to Kinmen and Taiwan, or will it be downplayed? The answer to this question lies in Taiwan’s
political climate vis-à-vis China’s attitude towards its perceived unclaimed territory of Taiwan. There are at least three scenarios that could be discussed: 1) Taiwan under the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); 2) Taiwan under the pro-status quo and economic-driven Kuomintang (KMT); 3) Taiwan after re-unification with China.

First, considering the attempt by the then ruling DPP to ‘de-Sinicise’ Taiwan in 2007 (The Straits Times, 30 January 2007; 9 February 2007), it would be a matter of time that the military island of Kinmen would experience the political ripples if the party were to come back to power. If this were to happen, the historical context of the island will be downplayed in an attempt to sever historical ties with China altogether. Yet, the fact that Kinmen remained untouched throughout the de-Sinicisation campaign hints at DPP’s preference to portray the military island as a symbolic representation of the formal separation of Taiwan from China and the establishment of an independent political entity. In this case, the battlefield identity will remain relevant for the promotion of Kinmen’s tourism.

In the second scenario, the KMT will most likely strengthen Kinmen’s economic ties with the Chinese Mainland. As is evident from the initiatives of the administration thus far, cross-strait ties are indeed improving. A large in-flux of Chinese tourists is expected and the diplomatic façade of the battlefield brand as discussed earlier is likely to be more prevalent. In such a situation, the Kinmen brand will be particularly important in attracting tourists and inward investments.

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47 Examples include the editing of high school history textbooks to downplay historical ties with PRC, replacing “China” with “Taiwan” on the stamps, and a proposal to keep away statues of Chiang Kai-shek.

48 Tourist numbers have increased from about 474,000 in 2007 to more than 568,000 in 2008 (The Straits Times, 25 May 2009).
Finally, in the event of re-unification, which is very unlikely, but not entirely impossible, the battlefield image of Kinmen will still be maintained by the Chinese authorities. Other than the possibility of utilising Kinmen as a launch pad for stronger socio-cultural, economic and political ties with Taiwan, the island could be developed into a national education site to remind its people of the separation history and the tedious effort by the Chinese authorities in reclaiming its final unclaimed territory. With a war museum and military theme park already operating on the islet of DaDeng off Xiamen Island, there is little reason why Kinmen will not be incorporated into the larger plan for a ‘national education tourism corridor’.

In my opinion, the second scenario, which Kinmen is now experiencing, has the highest possibility of being sustainable. In fact, in almost every possible scenario, the battlefield identity of Kinmen remains central for the island’s development and continual survival. Therefore, it is indeed advantageous in both the near future and long run that tourism planners, local entrepreneurs and Kinmen citizens continue to invest in the battlefield brand of Kinmen. Contemporary efforts to portray a less contested history between Taiwan and China, and a desire for peaceful settlement of their conflicts are welcomed. Meanwhile, Kinmen is set to benefit from better cross-strait ties.

It is observed that as Hu Jintao subtly changed the Chinese take on the Taiwan issue from the political rhetoric of ‘peaceful reunification’ to an economic rationality of ‘peaceful development’ in his address to the Communist Party’s 17th National
Congress in 2007 (Chu, 2009), China has begun to engage Taiwan beyond conventional political platforms. We now see entirely new but ever evolving cross-strait relations that span across a wide spectrum of people’s everyday lives and lived environments, which include but are not limited to cultural activities, popular culture, tourism and so on. In other words, cross-strait engagement has metamorphosed into one that not only concentrate on macro-political issues, but micro-political nuances as well. As such, tourism activities that infiltrate into the lives of both populations become even more important to analyse. In departing from the main stream academic writings that focus primarily on the macro (international) politics of the China-Taiwan conflict (see, for example, Sheng, 2001), we should aim to garner a more nuanced understanding of cross-strait ties through such everyday cultural exchanges. In this thesis for instance, I have shown how macro and micro politics interact and interweave into the tourism fabric. Indeed, “[t]he local interactions of tourism with politics and democracy are increasingly being framed by global realities…” (Burns and Novelli, 2007: 2)

A delicate equilibrium needs to be achieved to maintain peace and co-prosperity between China and Taiwan. Ma Ying-jeou would have to balance between improving ties with China (e.g. re-affirming the ‘1992 Consensus’) while not compromising Taiwan’s claim as a sovereign state. Also, in the midst of increasing economic exchanges with China, Taiwan should not trivialise its traditional allies. With Ma already being elected as Chairman of the KMT in July 2009, and a high possibility of him serving his second term as President after the 2012 election, such balancing acts could be achieved rather confidently. Beijing on the other hand should

49 The agenda for peaceful development was reiterated by Hu in a speech to commemorate the 30th Anniversary of the Mainland’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” on 31 December 2008 (Xinhua News Agency, 1 January 2009).
continue to concentrate on the current pragmatic approach towards Taiwan, while concomitantly tame the at times overwhelming nationalistic and/or patriotic sentiments of its population, so as to garner regional support and allay fears of a domineering China. Tourism provides a useful stage for discussion as it encapsulates the socio-cultural, economic and political conditions of a society. It also functions as a bridge to bring about the realisation of the mutual benefit agenda under the discourse for peaceful reconciliation of China and Taiwan. Understanding the nuances involved in the politics of battlefield tourism development in Kinmen marks a humble, but crucial starting point.
References


*Central News Agency*, 8 September 2008.


Morning Star Online, 4 July 2008.


*Xinhua News Agency*, 1 January 2009.


## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

**PUBLIC SECTOR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>DATE OF INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ms. Carol Y. Lin</td>
<td>Associate Researcher&lt;br&gt; Institute for Physical Planning &amp; Information</td>
<td>13 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mr. Chen Chao-Jin</td>
<td>Director General&lt;br&gt; Research Development &amp; Evaluation,&lt;br&gt; Kinmen County Government</td>
<td>20 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mr. Li Zai-Hang</td>
<td>Director General&lt;br&gt; Education Bureau, Kinmen County Government</td>
<td>21 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mr. Lin Chen-Cha</td>
<td>Director General&lt;br&gt; Transportation &amp; Tourism Bureau, Kinmen County Government</td>
<td>21 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Su Cheng-Chi</td>
<td>Chief of Department&lt;br&gt; Planning &amp; Management, Kinmen National Park</td>
<td>2 June 2006; 21 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Ms. Huang Tzu-Chuan</td>
<td>Chief&lt;br&gt; Interpretation &amp; Education Section, Kinmen National Park</td>
<td>23 May 2006; 22 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ms. Cung Meng-Chi</td>
<td>Tour Guide Trainer&lt;br&gt; Transportation and Tourism Bureau, Kinmen County Government</td>
<td>13 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ms. Li Ming-Yi</td>
<td>Chief&lt;br&gt; Recreational Services Section, Kinmen National Park</td>
<td>25 December 2008</td>
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# APPENDIX B

## LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

### (PRIVATE SECTOR)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>DATE OF INTERVIEW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Lin Yong-Biao</td>
<td>General Manager Chang Ling Travel Agency</td>
<td>26 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ms. Gao Shu-Zhen</td>
<td>Director Kinma Travel Service</td>
<td>28 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mr. Wu Tseng-Dong</td>
<td>Director Chin Ho Li Knife</td>
<td>29 May 2006; 30 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mr. Li Min-De</td>
<td>Manager Bar Sa Restaurant</td>
<td>3 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Chen Chin-Fu</td>
<td>General Manager Min-Jih Gong Tang</td>
<td>1 June 2006; 10 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mr. Chen Ho-Hai</td>
<td>Local Tour Guide, Golden Universal Travel Service</td>
<td>17 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ms. Chen Li-Lin</td>
<td>Manager Yi Lai Shuen</td>
<td>20 December 2008</td>
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</tbody>
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# APPENDIX C

## LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

(KINMEN LOCALS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>DATE OF INTERVIEW</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Liao Ming-Zhe</td>
<td>Retired General; Writer</td>
<td>4 July 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Mr. Lee*</td>
<td>Retired military personnel</td>
<td>22 December 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mr. Cai Zhu-Qiu</td>
<td>Retired teacher</td>
<td>27 May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ms. Wang*</td>
<td>Office administrator</td>
<td>6 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mr. Dong Guo-Xing</td>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>11 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Daniel Zhou*</td>
<td>Tourist coach driver</td>
<td>12 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mr. Chen Shuai-Xiang</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>16 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Ms. Hong*</td>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>18 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Johnson Weng*</td>
<td>Policeman</td>
<td>19 June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mr. Huang*</td>
<td>Qionglin resident</td>
<td>18 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Mr. Sheu Yen-Hsueh</td>
<td>Retiree; Graduate student</td>
<td>19 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mdm. Lee Chiung-Fang</td>
<td>Retiree; Graduate student</td>
<td>19 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mr. He Ying-Cyuan</td>
<td>Committee member, Pubian Community Development Society</td>
<td>19 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Mr. Chang Fu-Ji</td>
<td>Food vendor</td>
<td>22 December 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Dr. Lin Cheng-Shih</td>
<td>Assistant Professor</td>
<td>22 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Joyce Chang</td>
<td>Undergraduate</td>
<td>24 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sandra Wu*</td>
<td>School teacher</td>
<td>25 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Mr. Shi</td>
<td>Electrician</td>
<td>26 December 2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Pseudonym
Aide Memoire for Interview with Public Sector: Officials from government tourism agencies and related departments (semi-structured; in-depth)

1) What is the rationale behind the change of criteria for the appropriation of the Off-shore Islands Development Fund to Kinmen?

2) The central government’s main goal in tourism is to promote Kinmen’s battlefield sites. Why is battlefield tourism emphasised?

3) What is being done to develop Kinmen into a battlefield tourism site?

4) Are there promotional efforts to promote Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination? In what ways are they carried out?

5) There is a general disagreement in terms of tourism development between proponents of battlefield tourism and eco-tourism. What is the government’s take on this?

6) What strategies are employed by the government to convince the Kinmen locals that battlefield tourism is crucial for the island’s economic development?

7) To what extent does the authority take into consideration the views of local residents in the promotion of Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination?

8) What opportunities if any are available for locals to contribute to Kinmen’s battlefield image?

9) Are there any messages or ideologies that the government hope to relay to the Kinmen locals and tourists (both domestic and international)?

10) In view of the on-going conflict between Taiwan and China, what do you think is the significance of promoting and developing Kinmen’s battlefield tourism?
公共部門（來自觀光局和相關部門的公務員）訪談問題（半結構；深度）

1) 金門離岛建設基金撥款變化背後的原因是什麼？

2) 中央政府對旅遊事業的主要目標就是推動金門戰地風光的發展。為什麼要強調戰地呢？

3) 金門的戰地旅遊景點發展有什麼進展？

4) 在發展／推廣金門戰地旅遊方面有什麼努力？它們是如何被執行的？

5) 在旅遊發展方面，戰地旅遊和生態旅遊之間存在較大的分歧。政府如何處理這個問題？

6) 政府採用了什麼策略來說服金門本地人，讓他們也覺得戰地旅遊對他們的經濟發展很重要？

7) 政府在推動金門的戰地旅遊方面在多大程度上考慮了金門本地人的視角？

8) 金門本地人有什麼機會可以在發展金門的戰地形象上做出貢獻嗎？

9) 政府是否希望傳播什麼資訊或意識形態給金門本地人和觀光客（國內和國際）？

10) 從臺灣與大陸的關係角度看，您覺得推進金門戰地旅遊有什麼意義？
Aide Memoire for Interview with Private Sector: Local Entrepreneurs (semi-structured; in-depth)

1) How has the branding of Kinmen as a battlefield tourism destination affected your promotional strategies/ the way you run your business?

2) What is your main motivation behind the development/ invention/ introduction of the particular product that is associated with Kinmen’s battlefield image? (E.g. Kinmen knife made from bomb shells; bullet biscuit, etc.)

3) How are the “stories” behind your products tailored in tandem with the battlefield image?

4) What is the message that you are trying to convey with your product?

5) Do you think that you have the autonomy when it comes to the way you run your business?

6) Who is your clientele? How effective is the battlefield image of your products in attracting your clients?

7) Considering the fact that Kinmen is undergoing de-militarisation, do you think that battlefield tourism is important for the island’s economy and therefore here to stay?
Aide Memoire for Interview with Kinmen Locals (semi-structured; in-depth)

1) What do you think of the government’s current efforts to develop Kinmen into a battlefield tourism destination?

2) Do you think tourism is important to Kinmen? How should Kinmen be promoted as a tourist destination?

3) Have you visited any site of war commemoration/war museums? Which ones have you visited? Under what conditions do you visit them?

4) Do you think that Kinmen people should visit these sites as part of National Education? Why?

5) Do you participate in battlefield related activities such as visiting the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art exhibition, Military Art exhibition, and Love.Peace funfair? What are your views of these programmes?

6) Do you think that the opening up of Kinmen war sites for tourism will benefit the economy? In what ways?

7) What are other advantages/disadvantages of opening up the war sites for tourism?

8) Other than war memorials and museums, what other ways are/can the Guningtou Battle and the 823 Artillery War remembered/be remembered by the Kinmen people?

9) Do you support the government’s move of opening up the war sites for tourism? Do you think there are better uses for the war sites?

10) What role should Kinmen locals play in the process of developing Kinmen into a battlefield tourism destination?

11) Imagine that you have a friend who is visiting you in Kinmen for two days. He/she wants you to show him/her what is so unique about Kinmen. Where will you bring your friend to and why?
金門本地人訪談問題 (半結構；深度)

1) 您對政府目前發展金門戰地旅遊的看法是什麼？

2) 您是否認為戰地旅遊對金門很重要？金門要如何發展它的旅遊事業？

3) 您是否有去過金門戰地旅遊景點？您去過哪些？您是在什麼情況下去參觀它們的？

4) 您是否認為金門人應當將參觀這些地方作為國民教育的一部分？為什麼？

5) 您有沒有參加與戰地相關的一些活動，比如參觀「碉堡藝術展」(BMoCA)、「軍事藝術展」、「和平愛」古坵營區軍事體驗園遊會？您對這些項目有什麼看法？

6) 您是否認為發展金門的戰地旅遊會有利於金門的經濟？為什麼？

7) 還有什麼其他的好處/壞處嗎？

8) 除了戰爭紀念碑和戰史館，目前還有沒有其他方式讓金門人記得古寧頭戰役和 823 炮戰？

9) 您是否支持政府把戰地旅遊化的行動？您是否覺得有更好的應用方式？

10) 金門本地人在發展金門戰地旅遊的過程中應當扮演什麼樣的角色？

11) 假如您有一個朋友來金門參觀兩天，他/她希望你介紹給他/她一些金門的獨特景點。您會帶您的朋友去哪裡？為什麼？
Aide Memoire for Interview with Tourists (Informal)

1) What is it about Kinmen that attracts you most?
2) How do you know of Kinmen?
3) What do you think of the government’s current effort to develop Kinmen into a battlefield tourism destination?
4) How should Kinmen be promoted as a tourist destination?
5) Have you visited any site of war commemoration/ war museums? Which ones have you visited? What are your views on these battlefield related sites?
6) Do you participate in battlefield related activities such as visiting the Bunker Museum of Contemporary Art exhibition, Military Art exhibition, and Love.Peace funfair? What are your views of these programmes?
7) What kinds of souvenirs do you buy? Why?

旅遊者訪談問題 (非正式)

1) 金門最吸引你的是什麼？
2) 你是怎麼知道金門的？
3) 對政府最近發展金門戰地旅遊的做法你有什麼看法？
4) 金門應當如何發展它的旅遊？
5) 你是否去過戰地風光景點？你已經參觀過哪些？你對那些戰地景點有什麼看法？
6) 你是否有參加有一些與戰地相關的活動，如比如參觀「碉堡藝術展」(BMoCA)、「軍事藝術展」、「和平愛」古坵營區軍事體驗園遊會？你對這些項目有什麼看法？
7) 你會買那些紀念品？為什麼？