

Forging Success : Soviet Managers and False Accounting,
1943 to 1962

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Forging Success: Soviet Managers and False Accounting, 1943 to 1962

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Abstract

Attempting to satisfy their political masters in a target-driven culture, Soviet managers had to optimize on many margins simultaneously. One of these was the margin of truthfulness. False accounting for the value of production appears to have been widespread in some branches of the economy and some periods of time. A feature of cases of false accounting was that they commonly involved the aggravating element of conspiracy. The paper provides new evidence on the nature and extent of false accounting; the scale and optimal size of underlying conspiracies; the authorities' difficulty in committing to penalize it and the importance of political connections in securing leniency; and the importance of herd effects, leading to correlated risk taking and periodic asset price bubbles in the socialist market where interpersonal trust was traded.

Keywords: White-Collar Crime, Performance-Based Incentives, Trust, Soviet Economy.

JEL Codes: D21, L51, N44, P21.

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I just wanted to say that pripiski are a system. And this system continues to operate despite decades of monitoring and so on. That's the first thing. Here's the second: in practice, criminal penalization of pripiski is a rare event, regardless of the level of the enterprise. And the third is that the gunfire on pripiski is concentrated on petty targets, on enterprises. The enterprises are certainly accountable for it, but as we raise our sights, [our gunfire] weakens when the target becomes more significant. Do you understand? (A Soviet statistical official, interviewed in 1989.)¹

Soviet managers worked from day to day within in a target-driven culture. The Politburo set overarching priorities, from which planners set ministerial and regional production quotas or “plans.” Ministries and regional authorities disaggregated the plans to factories, farms, and offices. Production (including construction and transportation) quotas were usually in rubles at “fixed” plan prices. Procurement quotas for agricultural and forestry products were in units of weight or volume. The ratio of performance to plan formed the personal rewards and reputations of most officials and managers.

Did managers shade the truth about performance? That this was common is suggested by the emergence of a specialized Soviet jargon. Everyone used the verb *pripisyvat'*, literally “to add on,” to mean the inclusion of fictional goods in the report of plan fulfillment. The noun *pripiska* (plural *pripiski*) defined the “add-ons,” the fictional goods added into the plan report.

In terms of the economics of information, pripiski should be thought of as potentially both apparent to an attentive observer and verifiable to a third party such as a court. We are not discussing the sort of unobservable or unverifiable shading implied by the manipulation of hidden qualities of goods and services. Pripiski generally involved unambiguous lies.

In Soviet law, such lies were doubly incriminating. First, since the plans themselves had the force of law, to lie about their fulfillment was not only a moral violation (“deception of the state and party”) but a violation of the USSR criminal code. Second, bare-faced lies risked immediate exposure unless they were signed off by others that were in a position to know the truth, so pripiski frequently involved the aggravating circumstance of conspiracy to break the law.

The phenomenon of false accounting among Soviet managers raises many questions for historians and social scientists. Historians of the Russian and Soviet

¹ Hoover Archive, Paul R. Gregory collection, Box 1 (document titled “Nachalo 3-go interv'iu”; the passage cited is on page 9).

economy have long been curious to know: How widespread were cases of pripiski? If widespread, did they significantly affect our measures of real output and real growth? If they affected supply measures, how did they affect consistent measures of intermediate and final consumption? Since pripiski required criminal collusion, how was collusion maintained and enforced? Finally, what were the limiting factors on pripiski: Why didn't they grow indefinitely -- or did they?

Questions also arise from a social-science perspective. We are studying a command economy under a harsh dictator. It must be destructive of such institutions when agents can cheat principals, and most certainly when they successfully collude with each other to do so. We have historical data that relate to a kind of cheating that in principle was both observable and verifiable; we are not discussing unverifiable shading. These data allow us to ask: In playing the dangerous game of false accounting, how did agents collude and how far did they go? How did the dictator's own loyal agents perceive the offense of false accounting, and conspiracy to account falsely for success, and how did they penalize it?

In this paper, I first review various literatures that can contribute to understanding our topic from varying standpoints. Second, I describe the data from once closed Soviet-era archives that I draw on for this study. Third, I narrate a small number of apparently typical crime stories. I consider, fourth, what we can infer about undetected crime; and fifth, the fit between punishment and crime, conditional on detection. Sixth, there are implications for Soviet managers as rational agents.

The final section concludes as follows. The evidence of detected crimes is consistent with a background of undetected offending that was pervasive but low-level. Conspiratorial networks may have had an optimal size to avoid detection. Despite the criminality of false accounting, the authorities had difficulty with committing to criminalize it; it was normal for offenses that were detected to be punished leniently by the use of administrative or party reprimands, without reference to the courts. Leniency may have been exercised disproportionately on behalf of politically connected offenders, even during crackdowns, and perhaps especially then. The patterns we observe suggest short run optimizing by managers with the intermediate objective of fulfilling the plan. In the medium run, we see herd effects, leading to periodic overinvestment in interpersonal trust.

The Literature

Soviet managers' rule breaking is addressed by several historical and social science literatures. Previous research on the behaviour of managers in the Soviet command economy (Berliner 1957, Granick 1960) has generally accepted that Soviet managers pursued multiple objectives including personal income, promotion, a quiet life. Implicitly or explicitly, however, most of these resolved into one objective: fulfill the plan (Kontorovich 1986). To fulfill the plan, managers had to know which rules to break (Gregory 1990; Belova 2001). They also needed to know who would cover for them if detection threatened, particularly because the authorities could not readily tell the difference between loyal and disloyal rule breaking (Gregory 1990). For this

reason *ZiS* – an acronym with a double meaning: a luxury brand of Soviet automobile, and an abbreviation of *znakomstvo i sviazi*, networks of “acquaintance and contacts” – was crucial. Such networks were vulnerable to the prisoner’s dilemma, but defended by the tradition of *krugovaia poruka*, or collective responsibility (Ledeneva 2007).

False accounting was investigated specifically in the Sovietological literature, both from press reports and from interviews with emigrating Soviet economic officials. Providing a number of early examples, Alec Nove (1956) formulated his widely cited law of “equal cheating.” Accepting that false accounting would surely affect measures of the *level* of Soviet output:

Over the economy as a whole, there is no reason to suppose that Soviet managers and their accountants falsify more in one year than in another, and so the *rate of growth* is unlikely to be exaggerated on that account.

Investigations of the same era by Joseph Berliner (1957) and Gregory Grossman (1960) added not only examples but also further evaluations. Berliner’s informants, for example, suggested that “Taking a figure out of the air” is “a great crime and is rarely risked”; but decisions are “frequently” taken to “prolong the day” (and month), or to “borrow” output from the next accounting period to fulfill this period’s plan.

Over time the volumes of both media reporting and emigrant testimony increased. A survey by Stephen Shenfield (1983) suggested that what was known from such sources was likely to be the tip of a vast iceberg of undetected crime. Shenfield countered Nove’s law of equal cheating with the hypothesis that false accounting might rise and fall with plan tension; the more ambitious the plan, the more likely it was to be fulfilled with false reports.

A survey of former statistical personnel by Shenfield and Hanson (1986) concluded: “Pripiski are indeed widespread, but not as a general rule large.” A former ministry official stated: “a serious person does not falsify report data, because falsification is very dangerous. Everyone is checking up all the time.” A managers’ survey by Susan Linz (1988) reached a similar conclusion: Nearly all her respondents (except accountants!) “were quite familiar with falsified reports” but “uniformly describe falsifying only marginal magnitudes: “Nobody complains about small errors,” but “Falsification on a grand scale is dangerous.” At the end of the Soviet era Paul Gregory (1990) surmised that the authorities “tolerate small deceptions, but they are unwilling to accept large ones.”

As Robert Porter (2005) has noted, white collar crimes involving collusion can be hard to detect unless an insider will blow the whistle. Whistleblowers played an important role in exposing management abuses in the Soviet economy (Lampert 1983, 1985). Whistleblowing was facilitated by the ready supply of evidence of wrongdoing: working under everyday Soviet arrangements, everyone was guilty of some infraction or other.

If the supply was abundant, Soviet principals also showed a high level of demand for evidence of their subordinates’ wrongdoing. Proof of bad behavior went by the

generic term *kompromat*, short for “compromising documents.” Principals could exploit *kompromat* in more than one way. Obviously, they could use it to penalize those that merited punishment. Less obviously, they could use it to control those with a compromised past, and were often willing to recruit and promote those against whom *kompromat* was held (Ledeneva 2007, Gregory 2009).

The fact that, given proof of wrong doing, Soviet officials often chose to keep it in reserve rather than use it in evidence to punish, is just one aspect of a wider phenomenon in Soviet justice: an inability to commit to punishment of party violators. The many burdensome demands laid on their shoulders ensured that party members regularly had to commit infractions to get the job done. When a party member broke the rules, their superiors commonly did not know whether the violator had acted from loyal or self-serving impulses, and whether the action that was called for on their own part should be, in the phrase of Markevich (2007) “to punish or to assist.” An atmosphere of impunity would encourage opportunism. But too hasty punishment would write off the party’s investment in a most likely loyal member. After the indiscriminate bloodletting of the Great Terror, Stalin learned the value of human capital. The evidence of the postwar years (Belova and Lazarev 2009) is that the loyalty constraint on party members became as soft as the financial constraints on the enterprises they managed.

The problem of correction was often accentuated by the complicity of the correctors in the crime. Farm and enterprise managers were directly overlooked by local party and government officials, but such officials relied on the smooth fulfillment of plans in their own localities to become known as effective organizers of production and procurement and so win promotion or avoid criticism. This could make them ready accomplices of the primary producers or sellers in falsely accounting for the plan. Aware that he could not rely on the executive hierarchies of the party and state to tell him the disinterested truth, Stalin gave the role of truth-telling to a narrow circle of agencies specialized in planning, statistics, and party discipline, and police work (Gregory 1990; Belova and Gregory 2002). One of these was the party’s “control commission,” charged with the correction of malfeasance by party members (Getty 1997; Markevich 2007).

The Soviet authorities’ inability to commit to punish party violators was matched by its inability to commit to protect the whistleblowers that exposed them. Lampert’s pathbreaking studies (1983, 1985) showed that Soviet whistleblowing was an activity with few external rewards and many penalties. Although encouraged from above, whistleblowers could be seen as trouble makers for their peers – and so were often hated by them. In an invented dialogue, Lampert (1985) described whistleblowers as “the totalitarians of the piece, spying on their colleagues and fellow workers and setting themselves up as agents for the prying eyes of the state.” Since whistleblowers often complained about their immediate superiors, who were much closer to them than the remote authorities to whom the whistleblowers could appeal, retaliation and victimization were normal.

What drove such lone voices to speak out against violations and abuses despite the obstacles put in their way? In some cases, fear of keeping silent must have been a factor, since the authorities frequently penalized those that “must have known”

yet acquiesced in wrong doing. Newcomers may have been more likely to speak out, since silence would mean accepting responsibility for past malpractices from which they were unlikely to benefit.² In other cases, whistleblowers were clearly driven by inner beliefs, such as personal commitment to Soviet legality and ideals (Harrison 2008 provides an example).

The general social science literature is suggestive of the personal characteristics of white collar criminals. Lance Lochner (2004) has noted that white collar crime is increasing in human capital; the propensity to offend declines more slowly in age and education than for less skilled or more violent crimes. Empirical sociologists have contributed cross sectional comparisons of high ranking white collar criminals and business executives. In many respects, for example intelligence, offending and non-offending managers have turned out to have similar profiles. Collins and Schmidt (1993) found that in the United States white collar criminals displayed relatively low “social conscientiousness” or personal integrity – not surprisingly, perhaps. More recently Blickle, Fassbender, Klein, and Schlegel (2006) put a twist into the story by showing that, in Europe, white collar criminals “combine high conscientiousness with low integrity.” This is intriguing when combined with the observation that many white collar offenses have blurred motivation (Braithwaite 1985): offenders appear to break rules sometimes for personal gain, sometimes for corporate advantage.

Economists divide on the status of inner motivation and ethical constraints on the propensity to offend. Becker’s (1968) canonical approach suggests that a person commits a crime when the expected subjective gain from the offense, net of punishment conditional on detection, is positive. The shape of the person’s psychology is excluded as irrelevant. This simplifying limitation has not prevented the economic analysis of deterrence and detection from making significant contributions, for example, Jeffrey Grogger’s (1991) finding that the returns to an increase in certainty of punishment tend to exceed those to an increase in its severity of the same proportion.

Experimental and behavioral approaches to rule breaking have also provided relevant insights. One finding relevant to hierarchal systems and command economies is that intensive monitoring does not only reduce openness to corrupt opportunities of higher value; it also reduces intrinsic honesty (Schulze and Frank 2003). Another finding is that, according to Nina Mazar and Dan Ariely (2006), the relationship between dishonesty and opportunity is non-linear. Most adults have an internal psychological mechanism that rewards ethical behavior. This mechanism permits minor rearrangement of the truth, but inhibits gross dishonesty, even in the absence of external checks, until the external reward is substantial.

Consistently, a recent systematic review of the literature on scientific fraud by Daniele Fanelli (2009) found that an average of 2 per cent of scientific workers (across a number of studies) admitted to falsifying data to obtain desired results, while up to one third admitted to less serious-sounding malpractices such as

² Thanks to Paul Gregory for this point.

dropping data points. Much higher proportions were aware of such practices by others (without necessarily having reported them).

More generally, Andrew Clark and Andrew Oswald (1998) have shown that how a person reacts to others' behavior depends on the comparison term in their utility function: the majority, with comparison-concave utility, is conformist, while a minority with comparison-convex utility acts deviantly. The empirical relevance of conformism can be illustrated by a recent sample of Harvard MBA students (Scott Snook forthcoming), of which one third operated from a largely transactional view of the world (it's okay if it benefits me); another third were predominantly other-directed (it's okay if others do it too); leaving only one third to have reached a fully-developed, self-authored adult perspective (it's okay because, having fully-weighed the costs and benefits to others, I have decided that it is).

The Data

Much of the evidence on false accounting in Soviet enterprises that was previously available was gathered in the course of interviews with Soviet emigrants. Emigrant testimony was limited by selection, because the Soviet authorities permitted only low-level personnel to emigrate, and by the impressionistic quality resulting from the fact that the interviewees were often distant in place and time from relevant events. Other evidence was gathered from Soviet press reports; these were censored beforehand and selected for disclosure only when they were considered to support the goals of public policy.

Compared with the evidence previously available, the social scientist and historical researcher will find several advantages in the official records left by the Soviet courts, prosecutors, and party controllers. These are direct records of the behaviors that interest us. They have not been previously selected in order to limit disclosure or bias public perceptions. They are amenable to quantitative analysis.

Our new evidence comes in three parts. First, on July 16, 1946, the Soviet government issued a secret decree "On pripiski to state accountability for fulfillment of plans." Condemning pripiski as a "criminal, anti-state practice," and the "liberalism" shown towards them by prosecutors and the courts, the decree called for "resolute struggle" against offenders.

Hoover Archive records show that, in four months, October 1946 to January 1947, the courts heard 129 cases involving 249 persons, of whom 242 were convicted.³ Defendants were typically given jail time. Four were condemned to death (with the centre's approval). A handful received suspended terms of forced labour at place of work; the centre criticized and/or appealed these more lenient sentences.

The justice ministries of all union republics were required to submit monthly reports to Moscow on implementation – but only seven did so (Armenia, Estonia,

³ Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State Microfilm Collection: GARF (State Archive of the Russian Federation), fond R-9492 (files of the USSR Ministry of Justice), opis 1a, file 495.

Georgia, Kirgizia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldavia, and Tadzhik republic did not report at all!). Of the 129 cases, 59 were selected for summary in monthly reports. Summaries are brief; rarely extending over more than a single paragraph, they typically specify all those brought to account, the scale of offenses, and the verdicts and sentences of the court. The 59 summaries form one of the two datasets used in this paper.

The second dataset arises as follows. Soviet managers were generally party members. When party members committed a legal violation, before they could go to trial, they had to be expelled from the party (Shenfield and Hanson 1986). Before possible expulsion, they had to be investigated. Initial party investigation was generally done by local (ward, city, and district) party committees. However, there was also a national agency, the party control commission (KPK), to which complainants could turn (Getty 1997; Markevich 2007). This seems to have happened most commonly when local investigations were perceived to have been wrongly concluded or delayed, but it also happened in the first instance.

Records in the Hoover Archive show that, between 1943 and 1962, party control investigators reported on 101 cases of *pripiski*.⁴ In 13, the complaint was found to be not proven, leaving 88 that were considered proven. (Of the proven cases, 63 were concluded by the investigator, leaving 15 open to further review.) The 88 party control investigations form our second dataset.

The party control reports follow a narrative format, listing the original complaint, the results of prior investigation (if any), the facts as seen by the investigator, and recommendations for further action as appropriate. The typical party control report is considerably more detailed than the court summaries, usually occupying at least one page and sometimes many pages; but they are also more variable in format and the factual aspects covered.

The two datasets are described and compared in Table 1. In addition to basic enumeration, the table gives some indication of the composition of cases in each dataset by geographical and economic setting, type of offense, the numbers of accused persons, the responsibilities of the accused, the extent of falsification for which they answered, and the value of private gain obtained as a result.

The geography of the two datasets differs substantially. Table 1 uses a single measure, the mean distance of offenses from Moscow. Offenses prosecuted in the courts after the war were on average twice as distant, more than 1,600 kilometers from the centre of power, than those investigated within the party. This discrepancy will throw light on how cases were selected for investigation and punishment.

⁴ Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State Microfilm Collection: RGANI (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), fond 6 (files of the Soviet Communist Party Committee of Party Control), opis 6, files 1583, 1652, 1706, 1765, 1815, and 1816.

Table 1. Judicial and Party Control Datasets, Descriptive Statistics

	The Courts	Party Control
Number of cases	59	101
Year of first case	1943	1943
Last case	1947	1962
Number of cases proven	59	88
Not proven	...	13
Proven cases, location:		
Mean distance from Moscow, km	58 (1,674)	84 (799)
Proven cases by production branch:		
Agriculture and food distribution	28 (47%)	29 (33%)
Construction	7 (12%)	10 (11%)
Industry	20 (34%)	45 (51%)
Timber	4 (7%)	1 (1%)
Transport	3 (3%)
Proven cases by type ("crime story"):		
BRIBE (false receipt for bribe)	3 (5%)	
DC (double counting or carousel fraud)	13 (15%)
HID (hidden inputs)	3 (3%)
IOU (false receipt, redeemable)	...	12 (14%)
PRICE (inflated price)	1 (2%)	1 (1%)
SUB (substitution)	12 (14%)
WIP (work in progress)	1 (2%)	22 (25%)
WO (inventories written off)	4 (5%)
NS (not specified)	54 (92%)	33 (38%)
Proven cases, number of accused:		
Total of accused persons	164	454
Median (mean) per case	2 (2.78)	3 (5.16)
Accused persons by role:		
Supplier	136 (83%)	306 (67%)
Supplier's internal party committee	18 (4%)
Supplier's superior:		
Local party	2 (1%)	45 (10%)
Local government	7 (4%)	40 (9%)
Ministerial administration	7 (2%)
Buyer	19 (12%)	38 (8%)
Proven cases, extent of falsification:		
False account, % of plan (median value)	10 (22%)	29 (16%)
Private gain, rubles (median value)	20 (47,605)	11 (41,000)

* Key to "crime stories" (totals sum to more than 100% because some cases involved more than one type of offense):

BRIBE (false receipt for bribe): The seller met the plan with a false receipt obtained by bribing a state buyer.

DC (double counting or carousel fraud): The seller met the plan by reselling to the state buyer goods illegally bought back from state inventories or the population rather than producing them as planned.

HID (hidden inventories): The seller met the plan with the help of inventories hidden from the planner.

IOU (false receipt, redeemable): The seller met the plan with a receipt obtained from a state buyer; the seller was obliged to redeem the IOU in future with goods or compensate the buyer with a cash premium in case of default.

PRICE (inflated price): The seller met the plan by illegally inflating the plan price.

SUB (substitution): The seller met the plan by illegally substituting inferior goods.

WIP (work in progress): The seller met the plan by illegally reporting work in progress as finished output.

WO (inventories written off): The seller met the plan for an inventory, then wrote the inventory off to wastage with the aim of embezzling the value of the stock.

NS (not specified).

Sources: Appendices 1 and 2.

If we look at the production branch where falsification occurred, we see that agriculture, industry, and construction accounted for almost all cases. The court cases appear representative in so far as, in 1950, industry and construction accounted for 27 percent of the Soviet workforce (including collective farmers) and agriculture and forestry for 48 percent (TsSU 1968, p. 20). By 1959 the national proportions had shifted to 39 percent (in agriculture and forestry) and 32 percent (in industry and construction) (TsSU 1962, p. 104), but even by this later standard industry and construction were considerably overrepresented in the cases taken under party control. It may be significant, in this male-dominated system, that the party control proportions are closer to those for male employment in 1959.

Table 1 provides a rough classification of cases by the underlying “crime story” of offending behaviour. Notes to the table give more detail of each story. Virtually all our information on this score comes from the party control sample. In practice, only four types of offense were quantitatively important; we will find that each was characteristic of a particular production context. These were the offenses that I will describe as the “double counting” scam (or carousel fraud); the IOU or “false receipt” scam; the “substitution” scam; and the “work-in-progress” scam (or “borrowing from the future”).

While some cases involved a single defendant, the typical case involved two (in the courts) or three (under party control). We will see considerable variation; a few cases were very large indeed. The largest court case in our data involved 12 defendants, but the large case under party control appears to have involved more than 70 conspirators that shared guilty knowledge of the offense.

While collusion was normal, the types of collusion represented in cases prosecuted differ markedly from those dealt with under party control. In addition to those directly responsible as low-level agents, the party control investigators dealt with a wide range of superiors in the party, government, and economic hierarchies


that shared guilty knowledge of lower level wrongdoing. But these superiors rarely featured in postwar court appearances.

How much was lost – and gained – as a result of *pripiski*? In each dataset a minority of cases is detailed enough to allow evaluation of the plan shortfall that was covered by lying. In proportion to the plan, over various production profiles and periods of time, the amounts involved could be substantial; the median lie before the courts amounted to 22% of the plan (for a duration of 6 months) and that under party control to 16%. This was more than just “rounding upwards.”

The private gain from *pripiski* could also be considerable. It came primarily in the form of illegal bonuses from falsely claiming successful fulfilment of the plan. The private gain could be shared among many accused, and among innocent people too, but the median value reported to the courts was nearly 50,000 rubles (with a maximum of 400,000); the median gain under party control was more than 40,000 rubles (with a maximum of more than one million). In comparison, the average monthly wage of a Soviet public sector employee was around 570 rubles in 1946, rising to 1,000 in 1961 (Nove 1966).

Finally, the time profile of cases is of interest. The postwar court cases were processed within a few months. Chart 1 shows the dynamic of cases before the Russian Federation courts over four months of 1946 and 1947; these accounted for four fifths of all cases across the country.

Chart 1. Cases in the RSFSR Courts, October 1946 to January 1947




Source: Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 36 (USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o *pripiskakh* k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov," April 1947).

After an initial flurry, from the autumn of 1946 the frequency of cases was in monotonic decline. By the late spring of 1947 most republics, if they continued to report, cited one or two cases per month or none at all. In June 1947 the RSFSR minister of justice asked to be released from the obligation to report monthly on the grounds that the number of fresh cases had fallen to an insignificant level, and none

involved offenses committed since the 1946 decree.⁵ The last document in the file is a report from Kazakhstan: “No cases of this category have come before the Kazakh SSR courts since April 1947 ... I ask for your instructions on the necessity of informing you about the cases indicated above.”⁶ Other republics seem to have freed themselves from the obligation to report by failing to do so. It can be inferred that the background or normal frequency of court cases involving *pripiski* was approximately zero.

Taking the campaign at its most intense, the number of cases appears notably small. This was a country of two hundred million citizens, with tens of thousands of farms and factories, yet a determined drive against false accounting could produce at most 40 prosecutions a month in the largest of its republics.

Chart 2. Cases Under Party Control, 1943 to 1962



Source: As Appendix 2.

The profile of cases under party control, tracked year by year over two decades in Chart 2, adds notably to this picture. On an annual basis, the flow of cases was again meager. One explanation may be that nearly all cases under party investigation were concluded locally; when we see the cases selected for central party control, we are surely looking at the tip of a much larger iceberg. Considered over time, there are three distinct peaks, the first in wartime when the data start; the second in the last full year of Stalin’s rule (he died in March, 1953); and the third and most dramatic in 1960. After each peak, the annual value of the series falls to zero or almost zero. Underlying this fluctuation may have been swings in the underlying propensity to offend, but it is also likely that party controllers had limited

⁵ Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 47 (RSFSR minister of justice Basavin, memorandum to USSR minister of justice Rychkov N. M., June 18, 1947).

⁶ Hoover/GARF, R-9492/1a/495, folio 51 (Kazakh SSR, deputy minister of justice Bepal’ko L., memorandum to USSR minister of justice Rychkov N. M., Dec. 4, 1947).

attention and other resources and reallocated it from time to time in line with the shifting priorities of their own superiors.

The Hoover Archive also provides a third dataset, not enumerated in Table 1, and of relatively incidental importance. This is a file of seven cases kept by the USSR Procurator's Office in 1948 and 1949.⁷ The only feature these cases appear to have in common is that in various ways they were difficult to prosecute.

Crime Stories

What were the typical features of the crime of false accounting? These are, at first sight, bewilderingly diverse. On closer inspection, only a few stories mattered. Table 3 classifies the frequency of these stories by the production sector in which they transpired. We see that agriculture yielded stories of double counting (DC) and false receipts (IOU); from industry and construction come stories of substitution (SUB) and work in progress (WIP). Other stories are rare and untypical.

Table 2. Crime Stories Under Party Control by Production Sector, 1943 to 1962

	Agri- culture	Con- struction	Industry	Timber	Transport	Total
DC	12	..	1	13
HID	1	..	2	3
IOU	11	..	1	12
PRICE	1	1
SUB	3	2	5	..	2	12
WIP	..	2	20	22
WO	1	2	1	4
NS	6	7	18	1	1	33
Total	34	13	49	1	3	100

Sources and definitions: As Table 1.

The Work-In-Progress Scam

Sometimes the seller met the plan by illegally reporting work in progress as finished output. Case 205 (1943) provides a straightforward story that emerged from a factory audit by the regional party control commissioner for Cheliabinsk, a major centre of war production in the Urals. On August 31, 1943, Director Moroz of tank factory no. 255 reported to Moscow that the August plan was fulfilled 100%. In truth, the August plan was completed only on September 15. This had the natural consequence that on the last day of the month 44% of the September plan was still outstanding.

At this point the local party stepped in, not to correct but to collude with concealment of the overstatement. Cheliabinsk oblast party secretary for the tank


⁷ Hoover Institution, Archives of the Soviet Communist Party and Soviet State Microfilm Collection: RGANI (Russian State Archive of Contemporary History), fond R-8131 (files of the USSR state prosecutor), opis 25, file 583.

industry Malenenko tasked Moroz to complete the September plan by October 5, i.e. to achieve 44% of the monthly quota in five days. On October 2, Moroz reported 100.3% fulfillment to Moscow.

On October 6, Minister of the tank industry Malyshev congratulated the factory, awarding it third prize in a nationwide inter-factory “socialist competition.” The party control commissioner adds that when the workers heard of the prize they were indignant, knowing it was undeserved, so Moroz concealed both Malyshev's congratulations and the fact that the prize was for September.

The September plan was actually completed on October 15; the factory's output as reported to Moscow in those first two weeks of October was zero. Recounting this and similar cases, the party control investigator recommended further discussion and interventions to curtail the practice.

Chart 3. Monthly Storming at Aircraft Factory no. 7 (Moscow), 1939



Source: Mukhin (2008, p. 202).

The work-in-progress scam has relevance for the literature on the topic of “storming” in command economies (Hutchings 1971; Rostowski and Auerbach 1986; 1988; Mukhin 2008). Like *pripiski*, the prevalence of storming is evidenced by the spread of its own jargon, *shturmovshchina*. According to the specialist literature, a common feature of Soviet-type enterprise management was the bunching of effort at the end of the plan period. Subjected to plan deadlines, managers and workers would idle away the early part of the accounting period, and then meet the plan with a burst of effort in the last days before the deadline. For illustration, consider the time profile of output at aircraft factory no. 7 within the summer months of 1939, shown in Chart 3.

Storming is observationally identical with the work-in-progress scam, but the two are theoretically quite different. The work-in-progress scam is readily rationalized as a smoothing of effort in the expectation that the enterprise can return to plan compliance in future, at some date later the planner's deadline. Storming, in contrast, involves a deliberate and predictable deviation from

smoothing, and so requires some additional (if plausible) behavioral or cognitive restriction on rationality. This raises a question that we cannot answer right now: did storming ever truly exist – or was it just a fiction that managers invented to blame the workforce for apparently uneven effort and so provide a convenient cover for their own work-in-progress scams?

The Substitution Scam

Sometimes the seller met the plan by illegally substituting inferior goods. The goods delivered could be inferior simply by being unfinished, but this differed from the work-in-progress scam by the fact that there was no intention to finish them in future. Case 261 (1960) involved large-scale substitution in construction. In the late 1950s party leader Nikita Khrushchev made a big commitment to resolve the postwar urban housing shortage. A party control investigation into Cheliabinsk city construction was prompted by a press report of wrongdoing by seven top officials of city and district party, which party control took up because the press reporting did not lead to corrective action.

Investigation showed that Cheliabinsk was adding to its urban construction at a rapid pace: in 1960, Cheliabinsk 279,000 cubic meters of residential housing, 1,415 kinder-garten places, and 3,800 school places. Of the annual residential construction plan, more than half was completed during the month of December alone (there were similar figures for December in 1959 and 1958). In the last days of December 1960, the city party and government leaders illegally accepted as finished 36 apartment blocks of 50,000 square metres that lacked floors, plastering, water supplies, drainage, heating; in some cases there no roofs, and in others, no paintwork, glasswork, sinks, or toilets. This was also the pattern of previous years; repairs to new housing added in 1959 had cost 11 million rubles, and 16 million to repair that added in 1958. A new boarding school and four of six new kindergartens were closed or never opened. The scandal was effectively public, since residents were up in arms. In face of criticism, however, the district party had not only taken no action but had defended those responsible.

The investigation noted that the false reports had enabled the city administration to receive large illegal bonuses continued to be paid; in 1959, for example, one million rubles to reward fulfillment of a plan that the city executive itself had illegally reduced. Included in this was the sum of 53,000 rubles paid to the city construction administration. As for action, the investigator recommended discussion by the party Central Committee for further review.

Substitution scams also took place in industry. Case 237 (1953) concerns brick factory no. 5 of the interior ministry (MVD), located near Moscow in the town of Istrino. MVD ownership means that the workforce was made up by prisoners; the complainant was the former factory director (titled “commandant”) Selivanov. Selivanov made several complaints against the current director Vasilevskii, his deputy Kletskin, and the chief engineer Berezovskii, including an allegation of pripiski.

With regard to pripiski, investigation found that Vasilevskii had included in the December 1951 plan 345,500 bricks that were not sorted or submitted to internal

quality control until January; substandard bricks were mixed with high-grade bricks; the factory received illegal bonuses as a result. A feature common in many such crime stories is that *prispiski* were mixed with other kinds of malfeasance. In 1951, for example, Vasilevskii had paid Berezovskii 1,200 rubles for work he had not done. In 1952 Berezovskii diverted labour, materials, and transport to build a memorial for his father for which he did not reimburse the factory. He also paid 4,134 rubles to an Odintsovo factory worker for repair of an excavator; the worker did no actual work, but supplied parts and machinery stolen from the Odintsovo factory. So, petty theft and embezzlement cropped up alongside false accounting.

As for action, the investigation noted that the Istrino ward party committee and the USSR ministry of state control had previously investigated the case and had already imposed reprimands and demotions; unusually, Berezovskii was dismissed permanently from the MVD “system,” meaning that he was not given other work but cast adrift in the general labour market. In view of this, the party controllers closed the file.

The case had an aftermath, involving a threat to victimize the initial complainant. Party member Osipov complained to the party control commission that former director Selivanov, in making his original complaint, had slandered the current factory leadership. Osipov did not say what the slander was and did not attend when invited for interview. This further complaint was rejected.

The IOU Scam

In agricultural procurements it could happen that the seller met the plan with a receipt obtained from a state buyer, without goods having changed hands. This receipt, effectively an IOU, was known as a *bestovarnaia kvitantsiia* (commodity-less receipt), but it appears that the more correct term was a *sokhrannaia raspiska* (storage certificate). In this way the sale took place and was reported as complete for purposes of the plan; at the same time, the seller agreed to store the goods until delivery at a later date.

If delivery took place later as agreed, this was quite similar to the work-in-progress scam. Often, however, it did not take place, and buyer and seller shared this expectation. Produce might be “stored” in the fields as a standing crop, where it could easily be spoiled before harvest, or in farm inventories where it might be consumed before delivery; “storage” might be a convenient cover for produce that did not and would not exist. The shared expectation of default was written into the contract as a penalty clause: the seller that defaulted on delivery of goods was obliged to buy back from the buyer the goods not delivered in the first place at a premium price – the retail price, which equalled the state procurement price plus the retail margin.

The result of this was to satisfy most formal plan requirements. The farmer was reported to have sold produce in planned quantities at plan prices to the state buyer and could show the false receipt to prove it. The state buyer would be recorded as having bought the goods at the (low) state buying price and sold the same goods at the (high) state retail price. There would be two negative signals, however. The state retail system would be making its profit on fictional sales to the farms, not true sales

to the population. Farms would show deteriorating balance sheets. Households, in contrast, would be flush with unspent cash; despite buoyant retail figures, their tables would be bare.

Case 258 (1960) illustrates this story. Many complaints reached the party controllers about the procurement of potatoes by the party and state officials of Ovruch ward, Zhitomir district, in the Ukraine. In 1960, the rural districts of the western Ukraine were planned to supply 607,000 tons of potatoes to the industrialized eastern districts. On November 1, short of 147,000 tons, the Ukraine government decided to allow the plan to be met with storage certificates for potatoes that would be shipped out the following spring. On November 12, the Ovruch ward leaders met the local collective farm managers and receipted 2,000 tons of potatoes at 340 rubles per ton (the state buying price), for which the state procurement office paid them 680,000 rubles. In case of default, however, each farm would compensate the local procurement office at the retail price of 700 rubles per ton.

In the spring of 1961, deliveries fell due, but the promised stocks had been consumed on the farms, so instead the farms paid 1.4 million rubles to the cooperative procurement office. As a result the farms could show that they had met the potato supply plan, the procurement office had bought and sold 2,000 tons of potatoes at the planned margin. The downside was that the farms had lost 720,000 rubles from their balance sheets, while the workers of the eastern Ukraine were hungry.

Many people must have shared guilty knowledge of this offense. The documents name five (two party officials, two government officials, and the The party control investigation documented similar scams that were ongoing in other wards across Zhitomir district and involving other products (milk and butter). Other related documents extend allegations to the corruption of local officials and links to organized crime.

The Carousel (Double-Counting)

In some cases the agricultural procurement plan was met with goods that actually existed, but went round and round like a carousel. Case 252 (1958) arose from a complaint by a collective farmer and party member that party and government officials had conspired with farming and trade managers to execute a carousel fraud in the Krasnyi kholm ward of Kalinin district.

The 1958 procurement plan for this ward included 38.4 tons of dairy products. In December of that year the local officials set out to manage a looming shortfall. They convened 12 farm managers and instructed them to pool their cash and send out agents to buy up dairy products from retail stores, depots, and warehouses in Moscow, Leningrad, and neighboring towns. The local government agricultural inspectorate advised farm accountants that farms would buy dairy products on the side and not to obstruct cash payments. The consumer union gave passes to farm representatives to travel by road and rail to do this. The operation yielded 1½ tons that were duly included in the plan.

The result was that the plan was fulfilled with dairy products that were sold to the state twice. As with the IOU scam, the farms suffered financially since they bought up butter at the state retail price and resold it at the lower state buying price – but they paid this financial premium, and other transaction costs, willingly to show compliance with the plan. It was households in the neighboring towns that suffered a real loss, since butter intended for their tables was diverted to the Krasnyi kholm operation; consumption was double counted, as well as production. In a related operation that yielded similar results, one of the local farms was found to have bought up livestock from its own members for sale to the state. The party controllers recommended the district party committee to impose reprimands on those responsible.

While not typical, carousel scams could also be found in industry. Case 270 (1960) involved two Leningrad breweries, “Stepan Razin” (director Konstantinov) and “Red Bavaria” (Bystrov). Party controllers investigated an unsigned complaint of deception at both plants. They found that in the course of 1960 Krasnaia Bavariia had paid Stepan Razin for 1.7 million rubles’ worth of malt, and then resold a similar quantity back to the seller for a similar sum. Each factory then included the sale in their plan. (They also engaged in a substitution racket, counting another 900 million rubles of germinated barley as finished output. These were large scale enterprises and the impact on fulfillment was small, between one and two percent of each factory’s quarterly plan, but in each case the false accounting just squeezed them over 100%.

The contextual reporting makes entertaining reading. Stepan Razin is singled out as a case of bad management, with excessive overtime, failure to exploit new equipment, theft, habitual drunkenness at every level from the shop floor to the manager’s office, losses and breakages in production, serious accidents, discipline violations, bad working conditions. For the workers living on site, living conditions were appalling while money for repairs remains unspent. The party controllers recommended further review with those responsible present.

As a footnote, it is remarkable how enterprises were able to encash money to execute the IOU and carousel scams. Traditional accounts of the Soviet financial system (e.g. Garvy 1966) emphasized the separation of anonymous cash from traceable non-cash bank credits, used to monitor production and trade. In practice, enterprises and farms were able to encash large sums from institutional bank deposits when they needed, and the need to fulfil the plan was clearly sufficient.

Undetected Crime

Our datasets contain only cases of crimes that were detected. A first question is: What can we infer about undetected crime? The little that we can establish from our data is inspired by the literature and first principles.

We will look at two dimensions of undetected crime, the scale of crime and the scale of criminal networks. We will not be able to reach any strong conclusions. But we can look for gaps in the data that are suggestive of undetected crimes. These gaps are consistent with two ideas. One is that detected offenses were the visible tip

of a vast iceberg of widespread petty offending. The other is that detection was hindered by criminal networks for which there was an optimal size for concealment.

Did *pripiski* matter? The Soviet Union was a country of tens of thousands of enterprises and a hundred million workers. The Soviet-era evidence, reported earlier, consistently described *pripiski* as frequent and pervasive – “a system.” Yet, over twenty years, the files of the KPK accumulated fewer than 200 cases. True, these were most likely selected out of a much larger number arising at lower levels, because they had proved difficult to resolve locally. But even the purge of 1946/47, which raked over evidence dating back to 1943, yielded fewer than 130 cases across the whole country. If managerial deception was truly widespread, it must be that most offenses escaped detection.

Can we infer anything about this from our new data? The empirical studies reviewed earlier are helpful. Suppose Soviet managers were no less honest than the scientific workers reviewed by Fanelli (2009); then 2% of them would have owned up to significant fabrication of results but 34%, or seventeen times as many, would have admitted rounding upward to mislead.⁸ Put differently, wherever we draw the line between major and minor offending, and whatever the number of offenses counted as major and so falling above the line, we should expect to find very many times that number of minor offenses below it.

Does the distribution of offenses in our data, conditional on detection, match this predicted distribution of all offenses *whether or not detected*? The answer is: Surely not. We already know (from Table 1) that the *median* offenses in our datasets were 22 and 16 percent of the plan in cases before the courts and under party control, respectively. These medians were unquestionably above the line for major offenses, yet the lesser offenses reported were by definition no more numerous than offenses of the same or a higher level.

More detail is available in Chart 4, where Panel A shows the court cases, and Panel B shows the cases taken under party control. In each panel, the horizontal axis measures the level of offending by the proportion of the plan that was falsified; the intervals are scaled logarithmically. The vertical axis shows the number of cases that were detected at each level of offending. In both datasets, very few cases were detected that involved deception below 4 per cent of the plan: two out of 10 in Panel A and 3 out of 29 in Panel B.


By inference, at the lower end of the scale of offending, much larger numbers of offenses were escaping detection than any numbers reported for higher levels.

Other gaps in the data also suggest successful concealment of offending. The literature maintains that bare-faced lies were vulnerable to exposure. Managers could create a personal safety zone, however, by maintaining networks of collective responsibility within which each member would cover for the others. The safety provided by a network was increasing in scope but diminishing in size. Scope was beneficial to concealment because buyers and sellers, subordinates and superiors

⁸ Given that intensive monitoring seems to reduce intrinsic honesty (Schulze and Frank 2003), our Soviet managers were probably less honest than this.


could all vouch for each other in their different roles and collude in a consistent story. Size, in contrast was dangerous because each additional member represented a heightening of the risk of betrayal. The larger the network, the more difficult it surely was to introduce newcomers, distribute rents fairly, enforce loyalty, and screen out potential traitors.

Chart 4. The Distribution of Cases by Level of Deception



Key: Panel A shows cases in the courts, 1946 to 1947, and Panel B shows those under party control, 1943 to 1962.
Source: Appendixes 1 and 2.

Chart 5. The Distribution of Cases by Size of Network



Key: Panel A shows cases in the courts, 1946 to 1947, and Panel B shows those under party control, 1943 to 1962.
Source: Appendixes 1 and 2.

Most likely, collusive networks had an optimal size. A network that was too small would lack the scope to cover infractions. A network that was too large would tend to unravel under the strain of the prisoner’s dilemma. Given this, what distribution of offenses should we expect, conditional on detection? We should expect the distribution to be comprised mainly of two types of offense: those based on networks either of insufficient scope or excessive size for concealment. And this is more or less what the data show.

Chart 5 again has two panels. In Panel A, 37 cases with just one or two accused persons make up three fifths of the 59 total. The next part of the distribution, with three to five defendants, is underpopulated, with only six cases. Then there is a fat tail of five cases involving six to 12 defendants. In fact, the distribution is bimodal, looking as if someone took a bite out of it in the range of three to five persons per case. This suggests the range in which collusion was relatively effective at concealment. The distribution in Panel B shows some similarities and contrasts. There are 39 cases with just one or two accused persons, making up nearly half the

86 total. The middle segment, with from three to five accused, is thicker than in Panel A, with 34 cases; the right-hand tail, with 14 cases, is thinner but much longer, including networks as large as 64 and 76 accused persons. In fact, these 14 cases involved more than half of all the guilty persons that came under party control.

To summarize, the crime data, although gathered conditional on detection, are suggestive of undetected offending in two ways. First, the rarity of petty offending in the data does not mean that petty offending did not occur. More likely, it was overlooked. Second, offending was more likely to be overlooked when the offenders were well organized for that purpose, and this required a criminal association large enough to cover but not so large as to risk defection.

Crime and Punishment

Not all offenses that were detected were treated as crimes; evidently, most were filed as mere violations of the administrative order. Given that an offense was detected, what divided criminals from violators? Specifically, did value to the party inhibit criminalization of the offense? Here the data provide us with a somewhat poorly controlled experiment. The court records show us a set of cases that were taken to court and harshly punished over the period of a campaign; the party control records show us cases at the previous stage of investigation, when party accountability had to be established, over a much longer period.

One salient difference between the two datasets featured in Table 1 is geographical. Cases prosecuted in the courts after the war were on average more than 1,600 kilometers distant from Moscow – as far away as Makhachkala, the capital city of Dagestan. Those investigated within the party averaged a bare 800 kilometers from Moscow, along a ring that passed (for illustration) through the city of Kirov. To give context, the average citizen registered in the USSR population census of 1959 lived somewhere between these two rings, on a circle 1,350 kilometers of Moscow that ran, for example, through Karaganda in northwestern Kazakhstan.

To pick out the grain of this difference, I divided the 1959 Soviet population into deciles by distance from Moscow of the provincial (oblast, krai, or autonomous republic) centre with which the census associated them, and calculated the over- or underrepresentation of each decile in the two datasets. Chart 6 shows the result. The horizontal axis measures the distance intervals inhabited by each decile. The vertical axis measures proportional representativeness. The columns are darker for court cases and lighter for cases under party control.


While there is a certain amount of visible noise, most striking are the positions of Moscow and its surrounding districts, the two inner deciles, which contributed half the cases under party control, yet almost no court cases; and the vast, sparsely settled territory from the Urals through Central Asia and Siberia, the outer eighth and ninth deciles, which contributed half the court cases. As far as judicial repression is concerned, the implication is obvious, Connectedness mattered. Those that lived within a day's drive of the capital would not be required to go to court.

Above, Table 1 captured another aspect of connectedness by showing that seniority brought judicial impunity. Superior officials in the party and ministerial hierarchies were almost never brought to court. In contrast, cases under party control regularly cited such officials for guilty knowledge of *pripiski*, and sometimes for having instigated them.

Chart 6 shows that those in proximity to Moscow were much more likely to be called upon to answer to the party. By implication, the connectedness of whistle blowers mattered too. If you lived in *Iaroslavl'*, it made sense to mail a letter to Moscow 250 kilometers away to expose local malfeasance. If you lived in *Iakutsk* (4,900 kilometers), you didn't bother.

When managers were brought to court, what risks did they face? Repression in 1946/47 was savage. Nearly all those convicted were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, and a few were shot. The judicial authorities in Moscow marked out cases where local courts imposed lighter or suspended penalties for criticism and sometimes appeal for a heavier sentence.

Chart 6. Representativeness of USSR Population of 1959 by Distance from Moscow in Kilometers




Source: Court and party control cases are those listed in Appendices 1 and 2. For regional populations and distances, based on the 1959 USSR census, see Appendix 4.

Charts 7 to 9 show what how the heaviest sentence imposed in each case can be related to the case's measurable characteristics. There are many missing observations and only three are common to all three charts. Chart 7 shows that sentences were increasing in the size of the criminal network before the court. Chart

8 shows that sentencing bore little relationship to the public loss, measured by plan inflation, but Chart 9 suggests (with one outlier) a tendency to raise the penalty where private gains (usually illegal bonuses, but sometimes bribes too) were larger.


Chart 7. Highest Penalty and Number of Accused in Court, 1946/47



Note: In 1947 the Soviet Union temporarily replaced the death penalty with 25 years' imprisonment, and that is how executions are represented in this chart.

Source: As Appendix 1.

Chart 8. Highest Penalty in Court and Plan Shortfall, 1946/47




Source: Appendix 1.

The cases taken under party control show a contrast. Party controllers could endorse, impose, or recommend penalties under the aegis of the party, the employer, the judicial authorities, or all three. The worst party penalty was expulsion, which brought loss of career and could be a prelude to prosecution. The

worst administrative penalty was to be dismissed “from the system” which meant that the ministerial employer took no responsibility for finding the defaulter another position; otherwise, “dismissal” generally meant nothing worse than transfer and demotion. The worst judicial recommendation was for the documents to be turned over to the prosecutors, which could lead to imprisonment or worse.

Chart 9. Highest Penalty in Court and Private Gain, 1946/47



Note: In 1947 the Soviet Union temporarily replaced the death penalty with 25 years' imprisonment, and that is how executions are represented in this chart.

Source: As Appendix 1.

Table 3. Cases Investigated by Party Control: Highest Penalty Imposed

Number of cases	
Party penalty:	
Criticism or reprimand	30
Demotion or dismissal	14
Expulsion	4
Not stated	5
Ministerial penalty:	
Criticism or reprimand	7
Demotion or dismissal	19
Dismissal from system	2
Not stated	30
Judicial penalty:	
Investigation	8
Prosecution	2
No information	16

Source: Appendix 2. Totals exceed the total of cases because penalties could be set under more than one heading.

Table 3 summarizes the highest penalty under each heading that was set in each case taken under party control. Under every heading the most severe penalties were applied in a small minority of cases: four ended in expulsion from the party, two ended in dismissal from the system, and 10 were prosecuted or recommended for the prosecutor's attention. In fact, nearly all cases were settled by a reprimand or demotion.

Superficially there is a paradox. False accounting, when prosecuted with the full rigour of the law, could be penalized at the same level as homicide or treason. Yet in the absence of some political imperative to impose this, penalization was normally light. Here it is possible to see something more specific than the general failure of commitment suggested by the literature. Pripiski involved rule breaking and conspiracy. A dictator with complete confidence in the correctness of his own decisions would always see this as a crime of disloyalty. After Stalin, however, Soviet leaders knew they could make mistakes in their own decisions. If a plan could be mistaken, the first-best solution was to correct the mistake, for example, by reducing an infeasible plan. If mistakes were not easily acknowledged, however, pripiski might not be such a bad thing. If the plan was excessive, the second-best solution might well be for the manager to lie and for others to collude. This would save the face of the dictator, who did not have to own up to a mistake. It would also avoid the social costs of maintaining society in the permanent state of mobilization and overstrain required to fulfill every plan at any price.⁹

The reluctance of party controllers and prosecutors to pursue offenders speaks loudly from many documents. When party controllers found that a case had already been dealt with under party or administrative sanctions, they hastened to close the file without further action. Reasons given by prosecutors for failure to pursue charges in cases arising in 1948/49 (those listed in Appendix 3) are also revealing. Case 402, involving an illegal bonus of 40,000 rubles, was dropped because the managers had left the factory; case 403, involving fictional construction work of nearly 70,000 rubles, was abandoned because the high rate of project management turnover made culpability hard to pin down. In case 405 charges were initially dropped on the grounds of a first offense, and resumed only after a higher level review. Case 407, dated October 1949, involved three managers of Azovstal', one of the Soviet Union's great steel factories, who had secured the payment of nearly 130,000 rubles of illegal bonuses, including thousands personally to themselves, but the prosecutors waived charges in view of party reprimands and promises of restitution. Three years earlier, men had been shot for less. Truly, the gunfire weakened as the target became more prominent.

⁹ The complicity of Soviet leaders in lying about results was expressed in a well known anecdote of later years (Lewis 2008). A train is carrying Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev. The train stops and won't move; each has a proposal. Lenin: mobilize some volunteers to get the train moving. Stalin: shoot the driver. Khrushchev: take up the track behind the train and lay it in front. Brezhnev: draw the curtains, play music, and pretend the train is moving.


Only in two cases (401 and 406) were the defendants taken to court. In the first of these the pripski were just an incidental cover for wholesale asset stripping and resale: the factory had essentially fallen into the hands of a gang of thieves that robbed it before escaping into the underworld.

Implications

The picture of management behavior that we draw from these records is rational in the short run. Managers had many objectives, but most of these depended on reporting fulfillment of the plan. To report fulfillment they had to optimize over several margins simultaneously.

Chart 10 provides a simple illustration of optimization over two margins, the margins of truth and effort. Real output is costly, requiring outlays of productive capital and effort. The line sloping upward from the origin is the marginal cost of real output. The plan for real output is π . Without the opportunity to lie, the manager must incur marginal cost c'_1 . Like production, lying requires outlays of capital (social, not productive) and effort. The marginal cost of lying is shown by the line that slopes upward to the left, starting from π . The intersection of the two marginal cost curves shows the combination of true and false output that minimizes total costs. Marginal costs are lower at c'_2 and total costs are less than if only truth is told.

Chart 10. Rational Managers



Note: in equilibrium, fictional output $\lambda = \pi - x^*$.

This model has simple implications. The rational manager always lies in some degree. The comparative statics are that an increase in plan tension raises real and fictional output simultaneously. An adverse technology shock, on the other hand, reduces real output and raises fictional output. Farmers caught out by harvest difficulties late in the season, for example, could often meet the plan only by lying.

This framework could be extended to include other margins, including time, and so dynamic effects. Over time, the rational manager's first priority was to secure a lower plan before setting both effort and the optimal lie. This has a clear reflection in the party control data: despite generous rewards for plan overfulfillment,

managers that made false claims rarely went more than one or two percent above the plan. Across 16 cases where this figure is given, the minimum report was 100% and the median report was 100.9%. Their modesty is best understood in a dynamic setting in which managers were trying to lower planners' expectations (and so future plans) at the same time that planners tried to lift performance. Introducing a time dimension leaves the principles of our model unchanged, however.


Some features of the data, however, are poorly explained in terms of classical optimization. One is the wave-like motion of the time series that we have, shown in Chart 2. By itself, this pattern is hard to evaluate; as I wrote above, we cannot clearly separate time variation in the propensity of detection from that of offending. It leaves the impression, however, that false accounting came in waves. Another unexplained aspect is equally impressionistic, harder to convey, and impossible to quantify, but jumps out at the reader from many of the crime narratives in the documentation: the sense that in many cases the scale of offenses and the scope of networks mushroomed far beyond anything that could have seemed rational either before or after the event. The largest conspiracy in our data (Case 268, in the Zubova Poliana ward of the Mordovian autonomous republic in 1960), was an IOU and carousel fraud involving hundreds of livestock, thousands of tons of dairy products, and almost a million eggs. When we count up all those that shared guilty knowledge, we find a total of 76 people including 39 farm managers, 24 local government and party officials, and 13 buying agents.

When they were breaking so many rules, and when so many people knew about it, how could they possibly have expected to escape detection and its consequences? *What on earth were they thinking about?* As one reads, one cannot avoid the conclusion that offending was sometimes so blatant, and was known about by so many, that detection was absolutely inevitable. Then why did they set out on a course guaranteed to fail? In some minor cases, most likely, the culprit was not very clever or failed to take elementary precautions; this must apply where the guilty party acted alone or nearly alone. In a few cases the culprit may have maximized some short-run gain and then made a run for it. But these cannot apply to most stories told here, and especially not to those where *pripiski* involved large networks that were established to defend reputations and advance careers.

In such cases a cognitive failure to evaluate the true risks of criminal behavior is the most straightforward hypothesis. When cases involved many conspirators, and particularly when conspirators followed practices that were known to be already prevalent in neighboring factories or districts, risks may have seemed to be reduced by perceived safety in numbers, or because perpetrators were engaging in following (or conformist) behavior in ethical norms-setting.

Another factor in the underestimation of risks associated with false accounting, specific to this period, may have been declining real volatility of the economy, which encouraged unjustified trust in false claims of real growth. Chart 11 shows that, with the 1950s, Soviet managers' macroeconomic environment entered a period of stability unprecedented since the 1920s.

Chart 11: Real GDP Volatility in the USSR, 1928 to 1962



Sources: Soviet GDP, 1928 to 1939 and 1946 to 1962 from Moorsteen and Powell (1966, pp. 622-4); 1940 to 1945 from Harrison (1996, p. 92).

While perceived risks of false accounting were in decline, true risks were surely increasing in both the numbers of conspirators and in numbers of cases – maybe at an increasing rate. One increasing risk was that, out of growing numbers of conspirators, at least one would blow the whistle. Another was the risk that correlated rule breaking would have observable aggregate consequences. A few inflated claims might be lost in the general noise of good and bad luck. Many such claims, however, made at the same time, were more likely to be exposed by supply breakdowns and consumer protests. Exposure was particularly likely to follow when a sector (such as agriculture) suffered an aggregate technology or plan shock.

In short, *cheating was not “equal”*. We could think of the frequency of *pipiski* as time-varying under the influence of imitative behavior with aggregate effects that showed up in periodic overvaluation of plan reports – an asset price bubble, where the asset being traded, and periodically overpriced, was interpersonal trust.

The events of 1960 are consistent with the bursting of such a bubble. In the late 1950s, Nikita Khrushchev set about trying to put more meat on the tables of Soviet consumers. Regional party leaders rose to his challenge, none with greater enthusiasm than Aleksei Larionov, first secretary of the agricultural district of Riazan, less than 200 kilometers from Moscow (Khlevniuk forthcoming). Building what appeared to be a brilliant career, Larionov made overambitious promises, which Khrushchev took at face value and endorsed in public. Other regional leaders followed Larionov’s lead. Promises on such a scale could not be kept, and their collapse was made more certain by their being made simultaneously; for example, one province could buy up meat from its neighbors to fulfil the plan, but not all could do this at the same time.

The Riazan affair ended badly with a public scandal, suicide for Larionov, reprimands for many, arrests and dismissals for a few, and long remembered

grudges against Khrushchev himself for the overextension of political credit that made the whole affair possible. In fact, the bursting of the bubble brought a political credit crunch. It threw sand in the Soviet transactions mechanism, which ground to a halt. Toxic assets had to be identified, and then liquidated – quickly. Only after that could normal business be carefully resumed.

Conclusions

In this paper I have introduced new data on false accounting in the Soviet enterprise in the 1940s and 1950s. These support four main conclusions.

First, the evidence of detected crimes is consistent with a background of undetected offending that was pervasive but low-level. Conspiratorial networks may have had an optimal size to avoid detection. Second, while false accounting broke the law, the authorities had difficulty in committing to criminalize it; it was normal for offenses that were detected to be punished leniently by the use of administrative or party reprimands, without reference to the courts. Third, leniency seems to have been exercised disproportionately on behalf of politically connected offenders, even during crackdowns, and perhaps especially then.

Fourth, the empirical pattern suggests short-run optimizing by managers with the intermediate objective of fulfilling the plan. In the medium run, however, we see a socialist asset price bubble developing, where the asset was interpersonal trust. Cheating was not equal. False accounting was subject to herd effects, leading to correlated risk taking. The result was periodic overinvestments in trust, followed by market collapse when the bubble burst.

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Appendix 1. Court Cases, 1946 and 1947

Cases 101 to 159 are taken from the files of the USSR Ministry of Justice held on microfilm by the Hoover Archive (GARF, fond R-9492, opis 1a, file 495), as follows. The accused are named first, then the reference is listed, followed by the document title and date.

101. Zavarnitsina and others. Folios 2-2ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za fevral' mesiat 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 1, 1947).
102. Plylov and others. Folios 2-2ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za fevral' mesiat 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 1, 1947).
103. Ishnazarov. Folio 3: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 2, 1947).
104. Sergeev. Folio 4: Kazakh Minister of Justice M. Nurbaev, "O vypolnenii direktivnogo pis'ma Miu Soiuza SSR ot 23/VII-46 g. No. 18/32 s "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov"," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 9, 1947).
105. Diusekov. Folio 4: Kazakh Minister of Justice M. Nurbaev, "O vypolnenii direktivnogo pis'ma Miu Soiuza SSR ot 23/VII-46 g. No. 18/32 s "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov"," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Apr. 9, 1947).
106. Savitskii and others. Folios 5-5ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration (name not clear), "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh planov," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Apr. 20, 1947).
107. Bam and others. Folios 5-5ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration (name not clear), "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh

- planov," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Apr. 20, 1947). Folios 32-32ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za mart mesiaty 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (May 21, 1947).
108. Fedorov. Folio 6: Azerbaidzhan SSR Minister of Justice S. Alimamedov, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 2, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
109. Piateriia and others. Folio 6: S. Azerbaidzhan SSR Minister of Justice S. Alimamedov, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 2, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
110. Grishchuk and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
111. Agapov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
112. Furkin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
113. Bredekhin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
114. Nikitin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
115. Martynov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
116. Rybakov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
117. Astashkin and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946).
118. Ugarov and others. Folios 9-10ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za oktiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 20, 1946).
119. Alimatov. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam svyazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoiianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
120. Abubakirov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam svyazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoiianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946).

121. Burnashev and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
122. Collective farmer Khalikov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946).
123. Buyer Khalikov and others. Folios 11-16: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice Kamilov, "O rabote sudov UzSSR po delam sviazannym s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po sostoianiiu na 1.XII. 46 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Dec. 12, 1946). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
124. Gambarian. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum to, USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
125. Ataian and others. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum to USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
126. Melikov and others. Folios 17-18: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Guseinov, memorandum to USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Jan. 6, 1947).
127. Karchmachin and others. Folio 20: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 15, 1947). Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR Deputy Minister of Justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekab'r' mesiat's 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
128. Denisevich. Folio 21: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice (name not clear), memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 21, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
129. Tkachuk. Folio 22: Ukraine SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Voronov, "Spetsdonesenie po delam o pripiskakh k gosotchetnosti za dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 27, 1947).
130. Efimov. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
131. Artsebashev. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
132. Karamanov and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
133. Khodzhaikuliev and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
134. Nurburdyev and others. Folios 23-24: Turkmen SSR Minister of Justice Karadzhaev, "O rasmotrenii sudami Turkmenskoi SSR del sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh v otchetakh (sic) o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov za oktiabr', noiabr' i dekab'r' 1946 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Jan. 29, 1947).
135. Kroshechkin. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiat's 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR

- Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
136. Beliad'ko. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 137. Chernikov. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
 138. Shurovskii and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
 139. Frolov and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 140. Falakiants and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947).
 141. Sevost'ianov and others. Folios 25-26: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za noiabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 8, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 142. Ostrovernin and others. Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 143. Zalesskaia and others. Folios 27-27ob: RSFSR deputy minister of justice Perlov, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za dekabr' mesiaty 1946 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947).
 144. Avgustinchik. Folio 28: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Feb. 14, 1947).
 145. Karpuk. Folio 29: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice (name not clear), memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Feb. 27, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 146. Lukichev and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiaty 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 147. Parshukov and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiaty 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947). Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
 148. Beliankin and others. Folios 30-30ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za ianvar' mesiaty 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Mar. 10, 1947).
 149. Smirnov and others. Folios 31-31ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin, "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh planov," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Mar. 13, 1947).
 150. Murashov and others. Folios 31-31ob: RSFSR Ministry of Justice, chief of Leningrad administration Averin, "O pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti predpriatii po vypolneniiu proizvodstvennykh planov," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov and RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin (Mar. 13, 1947).

151. Shilov and others. Folios 32-32ob: RSFSR Minister of Justice Basavin, "Ob usilenie bor'by s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov po RSFSR za mart mesiaty 1947 goda," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (May 21, 1947).
152. Zheltyshev and others. Folios 33-34: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, "O sostoianii rassmotreniia v sudakh Uzbek. SSR del, sviazannykh s pripiskami k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti za mai 1947 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Jul. 8, 1947).
153. Agafonov and others. Folios 35-43: USSR Ministry of Justice, inspector of general courts Chugunov, "Obobshchenie sudeb'noi praktiki po delam o pripiskakh k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po vypolneniiu planov" (April 1947).
154. Kozyrov and others. Folio 44: Azerbaidzhan SSR Deputy Minister of Justice Alimamedov, memorandum to, USSR Deputy Minister of Justice Rubichev (Aug. 15, 1947).
155. Naumenko. Folio 46: Belorussian SSR Minister of Justice Paduto, "O rassmotrenii sudami Belorusskoi SSR del o pripiskakh v otchetakh o vypolnenii proizvodstvennykh planov," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (May 24, 1947).
156. Nurmetov and others. Folio 49: Uzbek SSR Minister of Justice V. Umarov, memorandum to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Nov. 24, 1947).
157. Sharikov. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v narodnye sudy Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za iun' mes. 1947 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).
158. Tashibaev. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v narodnye sudy Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za iun' mes. 1947 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).
159. Akhmedov and others. Folios 52-53: Uzbek SSR Deputy Minister of Justice, "O delakh, postupivshikh v narodnye sudy Uzb. SSR, sviazannykh s pripiskami v otchetakh o vypolnenii gosudarstvennykh planov za iun' mes. 1947 g.," to USSR Minister of Justice Rychkov (Aug. 28, 1947).

Appendix 2. Party Control Cases, 1943 to 1962

Cases 201 to 301 are taken from the files of the party control commission of the Soviet Communist Party, held on microfilm by the Hoover Archive, (RGANI, fond 6, opis 6), as follows.

201. Tarasenko and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
202. Fratkin and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
203. Dikarev and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
204. Vasil'ev. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
205. Moroz and others. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
206. Aleshin. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
207. Babaev. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).
208. Minasov. File 1583, folios 10-14. KPK controller Samusenko, "O faktakh ochkovtiratel'stva v soobshcheniakh o vypolnenii programmy na zavodakh No. 8 NKB i No. 266 NKAP, No. 255 NKTP, No. 541 NKB i trestakh Azneftekombinata," to KPK chair Andreev A. A. (July 15, 1944).

209. Demidov and others. File 1583, folios 15-16. KPK controller Samusenko, "Spravka po pis'mu byvshego direktora zavoda No. 63 NKB t. Demidova I. D.," to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date).
210. Isaev and others. File 1583, folios 20-21ob. KPK controller Alekseev, "Spravka po zapiske Ministra gosudarstvennogo kontroliia SSSR t. Mekhlisa," to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
211. Nilov and others. File 1583, folio 22; 26-27. KPK controller Velichkin, memorandum to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (no date). Kaluga district party committee Secretary Popov I., "Vypiska iz protokola No. 104 zasedaniia biuro Kaluzhskogo Obkoma VKP(b) ot 19 noiabria 1946 goda. O faktakh antigosudarstvennoi praktiki v provedenii khlebozagotovok po Spas-Demenskomu raionu v 1945 godu" (25 Nov., 1946).
212. Sysoev and others. File 1583, folio 28. KPK controller Nikoforov, "Spravka po zapiske Upolnomochennogo KPK pri TsK VKP(b) po Udmurtskoi ASSR t. Gal'tsova 'O rezul'tatakh proverki anonimnykh zaiavlenii na byvshego sekretaria Grakhovetskogo raikoma VKP(b) Sysoeva P.P.," to KPK chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
213. Batov. File 1583, folio 29. KPK controller Sarafonov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (May 13, 1948)
214. Zubenko and others. File 1583, folios 31-33. KPK controller Zakharov, "Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlena VKP(b), p.b. No. 1981699 tov. Shaganskogo R.L.," to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (Oct. 26, 1948)
215. Pichko and others. File 1583, folios 34-35. KPK controller Gurov, "Spravka po zaiavleniiam Zheligovskogo," to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (no date)
216. Dvornikov and others. File 1583, folios 39-40. KPK controller Petrova, memorandum to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (no date)
217. Rybina and others. File 1583, folios 41-42. KPK controller Zhuravlev, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki anonimnogo zaiavleniia o neporiadkakh v rabote 4-i avtobazy 1-go Moskovskogo tresta khlebopecheniia Ministerstva pishchevoi promyshlennosti SSSR," to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (March 25, 1950)
218. Bessolov and others. File 1583, folio 43. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (no date).
219. Sil'vanets. File 1583, folios 44-45. KPK controller Tamirov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair lagodkin I. A. (no date).
220. Martynov and others. File 1583, folios 46-47; 48-49; 58. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date); Cheliabinsk district party committee secretary Beloborodov, "Vypiska iz protokola No. 159 punkt No. 4 zasedaniia biuro obkoma ot 30.VIII.1949 g." (Jan. 6, 1950); Shkiriatov M., memorandum to Malenkov G. M. (April 19, 1951)
221. Zuev and others. File 1583, folios 50-51; 52-55; 56-57. KPK controller Prokhorov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (March 27, 1951); KPK Party Collegium, assistant member Mironov, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki zaiavleniia chlena VKP(b) t. Pakhomova F.G.," to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date); Klin city party committee secretary Zakharov, memorandum to KPK (March 20, 1951)
222. Fedorov and others. File 1583, folios 59-60. KPK controller Golovin, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1951)
223. Miklashevskii and others. File 1583, folio 61. KPK controller Tarasov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1951)
224. Zhukov V.D. and others. File 1583, folios 62-63; 64; 65-66; 67-68ob. KPK controller Byshov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1951); Moscow district party committee, department of engineering, manager Grishin, memorandum to Shkiriatov, M.F. (Sept. 10, 1951); Moscow district party committee, department of engineering, manager Grishin, "Spravka po pis'mu (bez podpisi) s Orekho-Zuevskogo zavoda 'Respirator'," to Moscow district party committee secretary Volkov A. P. (Sept. 5, 1951); Orekho-Zuevskii city party committee secretary (name illegible), "Vypiska iz protokola No. 24 zasedaniia biuro ot 30 avgusta 1951 g." (Sept. 17, 1951)
225. Serezhnikov and others. File 1583, folios 69-70; 71. KPK controller Kalistratov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (1952); Moscow district party committee secretary Grishin V., "Spravka po pis'mu t. Tsvetkovoi M.D.," to KPK (Dec. 2, 1952)
226. Radchik and others. File 1583, folios 72-74. KPK controller Vnuздаev, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
227. Krivosheev and others. File 1583, folios 79-81. KPK controller Fedorenko, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Shkiriatov M. F. (no date)
228. Valitskii. File 1652, folios 1-2. KPK controller Chesnokov, memorandum to KPK chair lagodkin I. A. (Oct. 17, 1952)

229. Andreev and others. File 1652, folio 3. KPK controller Vnuzdaev, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (October 20, 1952)
230. Kirilovich and others. File 1652, folios 4-5. KPK controller Tarasov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (August 27, 1952)
231. Vershinin and others. File 1652, folios 8-10. KPK controller Obalin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (Jan. 19, 1953)
232. Milov and others. File 1652, folios 11-12. KPK controller Oreshin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (Feb. 19, 1953)
233. Kochnev and others. File 1652, folio 25. KPK controller Zhukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 8, 1953)
234. Luk'ianenko and others. File 1652, folios 28-30. KPK controller Cherenov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 26, 1953); KPK controller Ablazov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 20, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov, memorandum to KPK secretariat manager Sidorov (April 30, 1953)
235. Alekseev and others. File 1652, folio 31; 32-33; 34-35. KPK controller Ablazov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 20, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov, memorandum to KPK secretariat manager Sidorov (April 30, 1953); Odessa district party committee secretary Makarov, memorandum to KPK secretariat manager Sidorov (March 4, 1953)
236. Egorov and others. File 1652, folios 36-37. KPK controller Guliaev, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 21, 1953)
237. Vasilevskii and others. File 1652, folios 38-39; 40. KPK controller Fedostsev, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (March 23, 1953); KPK controller Ovchinnikov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (April 18, 1953)
238. Semenko and others. File 1652, folios 41-42. KPK controller Verushkin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (May 20, 1953)
239. Vol'-Epshtein. File 1652, folios 43-44. KPK controller Alferov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (May 21, 1953)
240. Mirsaidov. File 1652, folios 45-46. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (June 1, 1953)
241. Semenov and others. File 1652, folios 47-48. KPK controller Osadchii, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (June 30, 1953)
242. Bol'shakov and others. File 1652, folios 49-50. KPK controller Sudakov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (July 11, 1953)
243. Bol'shakov and others. File 1652, folio 52. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (July 16, 1953)
244. Ermikov and others. File 1652, folio 53; 59-60; 61. KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (Aug. 3, 1953); KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (no date); Kaluga district party committee secretary Zarubin, memorandum to KPK (July 10, 1953, replying to KPK memorandum dated April 29, 1953)
245. Tarasenko and others. File 1652, folios 62; 63-64. KPK controller Sdobnov, memorandum to KPK deputy chair Komarov P. T. (no date); Moscow district party committee secretary Grishin V., "Spravka po pis'mu bez podpisi," to KPK (May 19, 1953)
246. Tregubov and others. File 1652, folios 65-66. KPK controller Konovalov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (no date)
247. Denisov and others. File 1652, folio 67. KPK controller Kharitonov, memorandum to KPK chair Shkiriatirov M. F. (Oct. 1, 1953)
248. Shoshin and others. File 1706, folios 1-5. Shvernik, "O narusheniakh zakonov po zagotovkam s/x produktov v Pushkinskom raione Moskovskoi oblasti," to the RSFSR party central committee bureau (June 5, 1956).
249. Jews and others. File 1706, folios 14-14ob. KPK instructor Savin, memorandum to KPK (Aug. 5, 1957)
250. Rogachev and others. File 1706, folio 15; 16-21; 22; 23-24. Komarov, memorandum to the party Central Committee bureau for the RSFSR (July 25, 1957); KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK (8 July 1957); KPK controller Vologzhanin, "V dopolnenie k zapiske" (1957); Tiumen district party committee secretary Kosov, "Vypiska iz protokola No. 44 zasedaniia biuro obkoma KPSS ot 27 avgusta 1957. Zapiska

otvetstvennogo kontrolera KPK pri TsK KPSS tov. Vologzhanina 'O faktakh nedostachi khleba na glubinnnykh punktakh Ishimskogo raiona.'

251. Nadkernichniy and others. File 1706, folios 35-36. Vinnitsa district party committee secretary Kozyr, "O faktakh pripisok k gosudarstvennoi otchetnosti po proizvodstvu produktov zhyvotnovodstva v kolkhoze im. Shevchenko, Vinnitskogo raiona" (Dec. 9, 1958)
252. Diukov and others. File 1765, folio 1; 2-4; 5. Boitsov, memorandum to the party Central Committee (1959); KPK instructor Trofimov, memorandum to KPK (1959); Draft resolution of KPK "Zaiavlenie t. Guseva I. ob antigosudarstvennoi praktike prodazhi gosudarstvu molochnykh produktov kolkhozami Krasnokholmskogo raiona Kalininskoi oblasti" (1959)
253. Khaidarov and others. File 1765, folios 6-16; 17. KPK instructor Fedorenko, "O rezul'tatakh proverki zhaloby Nikolaenko M.A. i o faktakh nepravil'nogo otnosheniia k kritike nedostatkov v Surkhan-Dar'inskoi oblasti Uzbekistana," to KPK (Aug. 19, 1959); KPK member Dzhurabaev, memorandum to KPK (Oct. 22, 1959)
254. Palii and others. File 1765, folio 18. KPK controller Serdiukov, "Spravka" (Oct. 10, 1959)
255. Bagurkin and others. File 1765, folios 19-23. KPK instructor Egorov, memorandum to KPK (1960)
256. Pushkarev and others. File 1765, folios 24-25. KPK instructor Guliaev, memorandum to KPK (March 16, 1960)
257. Kryzhanovskii and others. File 1765, folio 26. KPK controller Gurov, memorandum (May 26, 1960)
258. Trosteniuk and others. File 1765, folios 28-32; 33-35; 36-37; 38-39. KPK controller Vologzhanin, memorandum to KPK (Jan. 4, 1961); Predsedateli kolkhozov, "Ob antigosudarstvennoi praktiki pripisok i postoiannom ochkovitiratel'stve i obmane gosudarstva so storony rukovoditelei Zhitomiskoi oblasti" (1961); Shvernik N. M., memorandum to the Ukraine party central committee, comrade Podgorny N. V. (Feb. 20, 1961); Ukraine party central committee secretary Podgorny N. V., memorandum to the CPSU central committee, Shvernik N. M. (April 13, 1961)
259. Popov and others. File 1765, folio 40. KPK controller Serdiukov, "Spravka," (Feb. 8, 1961)
260. Not named. File 1765, folio 41. KPK instructor Breivo, "Spravka" (1961)
261. Voronin and others. File 1765, folio 42; 43-48. Baskakov S., Efremov M., and Boitsov I., to the party central committee (March 1961); RSFSR party central committee department of industry and transport, instructor Mordvintsev, RSFSR department of party organs, instructor Bezotvetnykh, and KPK controller Gurov, to the party central committee (1961).
262. Fufygin and others. File 1765, folios 49-52. KPK controller Chesnokov, "Spravka o faktakh ochkovitiratel'stva i pripiskakh v Kaliniskoi oblasti," to KPK (no date)
263. Mymrenko. File 1765, folio 53. KPK controller Sudakov, "Spravka" (1961)
264. Filatov and others. File 1765, folio 54. KPK instructor Ivanin, "Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlenov partbiuro partorganizatsii Tsentral'nogo otdeleniia sovkhoza 'Krasnaia Zaria' Stupinskogo raiona" (April 13, 1961)
265. Not named. File 1765, folio 55. KPK instructor Guliaev, "Spravka" (1961)
266. Bazarov and others. File 1765, folios 57-58. KPK controller Kharitonov, Spravka (1961)
267. Kalygin and others. File 1765, folios 59-60ob. KPK instructor Guliaev, memorandum to KPK (1961)
268. Sheikin and others. File 1765, folios 61; 62-8. KPK controller Zhukov, "Spravka" (1961); KPK controllers Zhukov and Shuvalova, RSFSR central committee, department of party organs, instructor Timofeev, and department of agriculture, instructor Golosov, memorandum to KPK chair Shvernik N.M. (Sept. 1, 1961)
269. Nekhamkin. File 1765, folios 69-71. KPK instructor Ivashura, "Spravka" to KPK (June , 8 1961)
270. Konstantinov and others. File 1765, folios 72-77. KPK controller Cherenov, memorandum to KPK (June 17, 1961)
271. Ofrin and others. File 1765, folios 78-79. KPK controller Vologzhanin, "Spravka," to KPK (1961)
272. Pavlov and others. File 1765, folio 80. KPK instructor Khalevin, "Spravka" (20 June 1961)
273. Chachin and others. File 1765, folio 81. KPK instructor Kazakov, "Spravka po pis'mu t. Ianina A.N." (July 26, 1961)
274. Shmatov. File 1765, folios 86-87. KPK controller Serdiukov, memorandum to KPK (1961)
275. Tkachenko and others. File 1765, folios 88-90. KPK controller Sudakov, "Spravka" (1961)
276. Galkin. File 1765, folios 91-92. KPK instructor Ivashura, "Spravka" to KPK (1961)

277. Volkov and others. File 1765, folios 94-95. KPK instructor Guliaev, , "Spravka" (1961)
278. Ignatenko and others. File 1765, folio 99. KPK controller Sudakov, "Spravka" to KPK (1961)
279. Not named. File 1815, folio 1. KPK controller Kharitonov, "Spravka" (1961)
280. Besedin and others. File 1815, folios 2-3. KPK controller Morozov, memorandum to KPK (Nov. 14, 1961)
281. Tuimedov. File 1815, folio 4. KPK instructor Ivanin, "Spravka po zaiavleniiu chlenov KPSS Saigina I.P. i Ivashkina P.E." (Dec. 27, 1961).
282. Samedov and others. File 1815, folios 5-6. KPK controller Kirillov, "Spravka" (1962)
283. Kolevatov and others. File 1815, folio 7. KPK instructor Gorbenko, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki pis'ma v KPK chlena KPSS Anikina A.I." (Jan. 29, 62)
284. Not named. File 1815, folio 8. KPK instructor Urusov, memorandum to KPK (Feb. 13, 1962)
285. Zakharov. File 1815, folio 9. KPK instructor Ivashura, "Spravka" to KPK (March 2, 1962)
286. Sokolov and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki pis'ma (bez podpis) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti" (1962)
287. Kukhorenko and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki pis'ma (bez podpis) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti" (1962)
288. Nazarov and others. File 1815, folios 10-12. KPK instructor Gorbenko, instructor KPK, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki pis'ma (bez podpis) iz gor. Gukovo, Rostovskoi oblasti" (1962)
289. Galachalov and others. File 1815, folios 13-15. KPK controller Kharitonov, "Spravka" (April 28, 1962)
290. Roizenblit and others. File 1815, folios 18-20. KPK instructor Sarafonov, "Spravka," to KPK (May 21, 1962)
291. Leonov. File 1815, folio 22. KPK instructor Gorbenko, "Spravka po pis'mu v Komitet Partiinogo Kontrolia kommunistov Taganrogskoi partorganizatsii Solomakha N.K., Bondareva G.T., i Tsenenkova S.M." (1962)
292. Poletaev. File 1815, folio 23. KPK instructor Ivanin, "Spravka po anonimnomu pis'mu iz g. Serpukhov" (June 11, 1962).
293. Maliuk. File 1815, folio 24. KPK controller Sudakov, "Spravka" (Aug. 23, 1962)
294. Nemov. File 1815, folios 25-26. KPK instructor Guliaev, "Spravka" (1962)
295. Agabalaev. File 1816, folios 1-2. KPK instructor Bondarev, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki telegrammy, postupivshei v KPK pri TsK KPSS ot kolkhoznika sel'khozarteli imeni Zhdanova Kubinskogo raiona Azerbaidzhanskoi SSR Atamoglanova" (Nov. 14, 1962)
296. Liubitskii and others. File 1816, folios 3-4. KPK controller Smorodin, to KPK chair Shkiriakov (1953)
297. Nikitin and others. File 1816, folios 8-10. KPK controller Khorin, "Spravka" (1959)
298. Ivanov. File 1816, folio 12. KPK controller Vologzhanin, "Spravka" (1960)
299. Fadeev and others. File 1816, folio 13. KPK controller Cherenov, "Spravka" (1960)
300. Shelepov and others. File 1816, folios 14-16. KPK controller Gorbachev, "Spravka o rezul'tatakh proverki zaiavleniia Novikova iz Uiarskogo zernosovkhoza Krasnoarskogo kraia" (1961)
301. Baburkin and others. File 1816, folio 17. KPK instructor Ivanin, "Spravka po anonimnomu pis'mu, postupivshemu iz Lotoshinskogo raiona Moscovskoi oblasti" (1961)

Appendix 3. Prosecution Cases, 1948 and 1949

Cases 401 to 407 are taken from the files of the USSR Procurator's Office held on microfilm by the Hoover Archive (GARF, fond R-8131, opisi 25 and 26), as follows.

401. Egorov and others. Opis 25, file 583, folios 10-11: Kishinev city prosecutor Almazov, "Spetsdonesenie," to USSR prosecution service, chief of investigative section Sheinin (Jan. 20, 1948). File 583, folios 38-39: Kishinev procuracy, investigative department chief Bondarenko, "Obvinitel'noe zakliuchenie" (March 26, 1948).
402. Unnamed managers of the Smelianskii engineering factory. Opis 25, file 583, folios 12-13: Kiev district procuracy, investigation department chief Kipnis, memorandum to USSR prosecution service, chief of investigative department Sheinin (Jan. 30, 1948)

403. Gurinovich and others. Opis 25, file 583, f. 21: Belorussian SSR procuracy, investigation department chief (name illegible), memorandum to USSR procuracy, deputy chief of investigative section Aleksandrov (1/3/48)
404. Mirkin and others. Opis 25, file 583, f. 22: Stalino city prosecutor Filatov, memorandum to USSR prosecutor general Safonov (March 2, 1948); File 583, folios 44-45: Stalino city, Kalinin ward, court of district no. 1, verdict in the case of Batozskii D. I. and Mirkin L. Ia.
405. Grienko. Opis 25, file 583, f. 28: Kiev district procuracy, investigation department chief Kipnis, memorandum to USSR procuracy, chief of investigative section Sheinin (March 30, 1948)
406. Pudovkin and others. Opis 25, file 583, folios 61: Stalingrad district prosecutor Vavilov, memorandum to USSR procuracy, investigation department chief Sheinin (August 5, 1948)
407. Kogan and others. Opis 26, file 821, folios 1-2: USSR deputy minister for the metallurgical industry Sheremet'ev A., "Prikaz po Ministerstvu metallurgicheskoi promyshlennosti No. 681" (Oct 31, 1949) (Mekhlis L., "Prikaz Ministra goskontroli SSSR No. 941")

Appendix 4. Populations and Distances, 1959

The table below lists the populations of 150 Soviet districts (defined as major city, oblast, krai, ASSR, and SSR) in the 1959 USSR census and the distances from Moscow in kilometres of the associated district centres. Census figures of 1959 by district are from TsSU (1962). For each district, I used Google Earth to measure the great circle distance to the nearest 5 kilometers from the provincial centre to Moscow, except that I give any points within Moscow city and the surrounding oblast as one and 50 kilometers from the centre respectively.

Territory	Status	District Centre	Population	Km from Moscow
Moscow	City	Moscow	5085581	1
Moscow	Oblast	Moscow	5863093	50
Kalinin	Oblast	Kalinin	1806787	160
Kaluga	Oblast	Kaluga	935852	165
Tula	Oblast	Tula	1920308	175
Vladimir	Oblast	Vladimir	1402371	180
Riazan	Oblast	Riazan	1444755	185
Iaroslavl	Oblast	Iaroslavl	1395627	250
Ivanovo	Oblast	Ivanovo	1322152	250
Kostroma	Oblast	Kostroma	919999	300
Orel	Oblast	Orel	929013	335
Briansk	Oblast	Briansk	1549945	345
Smolensk	Oblast	Smolensk	1142969	370
Lipetsk	Oblast	Lipetsk	1141522	375
Vologda	Oblast	Vologda	1307531	405
Gorkii	Oblast	Gorkii	3590813	405
Tambov	Oblast	Tambov	1549001	415
Kursk	Oblast	Kursk	1483305	455
Voronezh	Oblast	Voronezh	2368740	465
Vitebsk	Oblast	Vitebsk	1276113	470
Novgorod	Oblast	Novgorod	736529	495
Mogilev	Oblast	Mogilev	1166081	510
Mordovia	ASSR	Saransk	1000193	515
Chuvash	ASSR	Shumerlia	1097859	555
Gomel	Oblast	Gomel	1361841	560
Penza	Oblast	Penza	1509566	560
Belgorod	Oblast	Belgorod	1226328	580
Sumy	Oblast	Sumy	1513718	590
Pskov	Oblast	Pskov	951866	610
Cherkass	Oblast	Cherkaska	1503254	615
Leningrad	City	Leningrad	3321196	635
Leningrad	Oblast	Leningrad	1244991	635
Chernigov	Oblast	Chernigov	1553773	635

Territory	Status	District Centre	Population	Km from Moscow
Mari	ASSR	Yoshkar-Ola	647680	640
Kharkov	Oblast	Kharkov	2520129	650
Minsk	City	Minsk	509489	675
Minsk	Oblast	Minsk	1473030	675
Karelia	ASSR	Petrozavodsk	651346	695
Ulianovsk	Oblast	Ulianovsk	1117359	705
Poltava	Oblast	Poltava	1631706	715
Tatar	ASSR	Kazan	2850417	720
Saratov	Oblast	Saratov	2162751	730
Kiev	City	Kiev	1104334	755
Kiev	Oblast	Kiev	1719100	755
Lugansk	Oblast	Lugansk	2452172	765
Lithuania	SSR	Vilnius	2711445	795
Kirov	Oblast	Kirov	1916493	820
Dnepropetrovsk	Oblast	Dnepropetrovsk	2704783	830
Nikolaevsk	Oblast	Nikolaevsk	1013839	830
Latvia	SSR	Riga	2093458	845
Zhitomir	Oblast	Zhitomir	1603604	855
Donetsk	Oblast	Donetsk	4262048	860
Kuibyshev	Oblast	Kuibyshev	2258359	865
Estonia	SSR	Tallin	1196791	870
Kirovograd	Oblast	Kirovograd	1217929	885
Zaporozhe	Oblast	Zaporozhe	1463849	895
Grodno	Oblast	Grodno	1077365	915
Volgograd	Oblast	Stalingrad	1853928	915
Rovno	Oblast	Rovno	926225	945
Vinnitsa	Oblast	Vinnitsa	2142045	945
Rostov	Oblast	Rostov on Don	3311747	960
Udmurt	ASSR	Izhevsk	1336927	970
Volyn	Oblast	Lutsk	890456	990
Brest	Oblast	Brest-Litovsk	1190729	995
Arkhangel	Oblast	Arkhangelsk	1275839	1000
Komi	ASSR	Syktvykar	806199	1005
Khmelnitska	Oblast	Khmelnitska	1611412	1015
Ural	Oblast	Uralsk	381181	1035
Ternopol	Oblast	Ternopol	1085586	1055
Kherson	Oblast	Kherson	824167	1065
Kaliningrad	Oblast	Kaliningrad	610885	1090
Lvov	Oblast	L'vov	2107858	1125
Moldavia	SSR	Kishinev	2884477	1130
Odessa	Oblast	Odessa	2026609	1140
Kalmyk	ASSR	Elista	184857	1145
Chernovitsa	Oblast	Chernovtsy	774121	1145
Ivano-Frankovsk	Oblast	Ivano-Frankovsk	1094639	1155
Perm	Oblast	Perm	2992876	1155
Bashkir	ASSR	Ufa	3341609	1170
Krasnodar	Krai	Krasnodar	3762499	1195
Stavropol	Krai	Stavropol	1882911	1230
Orenburg	Oblast	Orenburg	1829481	1235
Crimea	Oblast	Sevastopol	1201517	1260
Astrakhan	Oblast	Astrakhan	701974	1265
Zakarpattia	Oblast	Uzhgorod	920173	1300
Karaganda	Oblast	Karaganda	1018661	1320
Gurev	Oblast	Atyrau	287803	1370
Sverdlovsk	Oblast	Sverdlovsk	4044416	1420
Kabardino-Balkar	ASSR	Nalchik	420115	1430
Aktiubinsk	Oblast	Aktiubinsk	401049	1450
Murmansk	Oblast	Murmansk	567672	1490
Chechen-Ingush	ASSR	Groznyi	710424	1500
Cheliabinsk	Oblast	Cheliabinsk	2976625	1500

Territory	Status	District Centre	Population	Km from Moscow
N Osetia	ASSR	Vladikavkaz	450581	1510
Dagestan	ASSR	Makhachkala	1062472	1590
Georgia	SSR	Tbilisi	4044045	1640
Kustanaisk	Oblast	Kustanay	710690	1700
Tiumen	Oblast	Tiumen	1092126	1720
Kurgan	Oblast	Kurgan	999170	1735
Armenia	SSR	Erevan	1763048	1810
Azerbaidzhan	SSR	Baku	3697717	1935
N Kazakh	Oblast	Petropavlovsk	456999	1980
Kokchetavsk	Oblast	Kokshetau	493319	2050
Kzyl-Ordinsk	Oblast	Qyzylorda	327323	2180
Tashauz	Oblast	Tashauz	294832	2240
Omsk	Oblast	Omsk	1645017	2240
Tselinograd	Oblast	Astana	637115	2275
Khorezm	Oblast	Khiva	380583	2300
Kara-Kalpak	ASSR	Nukus	510101	2385
Ashkhabad	City	Ashkhabad	169935	2515
Ashkhabad	Raiony	Ashkhabad	313233	2515
Bukhara	Oblast	Bukhara	584810	2545
Pavlodar	Oblast	Pavlodar	455013	2565
Chardzhou	Oblast	Chardzhou	320797	2675
Mari	Oblast	Mari	417578	2710
Chimkent	Oblast	Shymkent	921370	2730
Dzhambul	Oblast	Taraz	561546	2785
Samarkand	Oblast	Samarkand	1148231	2795
Tashkent	City	Tashkent	911930	2795
Tashkent	Oblast	Tashkent	1348951	2795
Fergana	Oblast	Fergana	1138770	2805
Novosibirsk	Oblast	Novosibirsk	2298481	2820
Semipalatinsk	Oblast	Semipalatinsk	520229	2865
Tomsk	Oblast	Tomsk	746802	2880
Altai	Krai	Barnaul	2683231	2945
Surkhan-Daria	Oblast	Denau	919348	2965
Frunze	City	Bishkek	219711	3000
Frunze	Raiony	Bishkek	840696	3000
Dushanbe	City	Dushanbe	227137	3000
Dushanbe	Raiony	Dushanbe	1679723	3000
Kemerovo	Oblast	Kemerovo	2785906	3000
Andizhan	Oblast	Andizhan	1162980	3020
E Kazakh	Krai	Oskemen	734924	3020
Osh	Oblast	Osh	869408	3070
Alma Ata	City	Almaty	456481	3115
Alma Ata	Oblast	Almaty	946144	3115
Tian-Shan	Oblast	Naryn	136022	3190
Gorno-Badakhshan	Ao	Khorugh	73037	3255
Krasnoiarsk	Krai	Krasnoiarsk	2615098	3365
Tuva	ASSR	Kyzyl	171928	3665
Irkutsk	Oblast	Irkutsk	1976453	4220
Buriat	ASSR	Ulan-Ude	673326	4445
Chita	Oblast	Chita	1036387	4770
Iakut	ASSR	Iakutsk	487343	4900
Amur	Oblast	Blagoveshchensk	717514	5625
Magadan	Oblast	Magadan	235578	5900
Khabarovsk	Krai	Khabarovsk	1142535	6135
Primorsk	Krai	Vladivostok	1381018	6405
Sakhalin	Oblast	Iuzhno-Sakhalinsk	649405	6665
Kamchatka	Oblast	Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii	220753	6850