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Abstract

A comparison of the point forecasts and the central tendencies of probability distributions of inflation and output growth of the SPF indicates that the point forecasts are sometimes optimistic relative to the probability distributions. We consider and evaluate a number of possible explanations for this finding, including the degree of uncertainty concerning the future, computational costs, delayed updating, and asymmetric loss. We also consider the relative accuracy of the two sets of forecasts.

Journal of Economic Literature classification: C53, E32, E37

Keywords: Rationality, point forecasts, probability distributions.

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Explanations of the inconsistencies in survey respondents' forecasts

A comparison of the point forecasts and the central tendencies of probability distributions of inflation and output growth of the SPF indicates that the point forecasts are sometimes optimistic relative to the probability distributions. We consider and evaluate a number of possible explanations for this finding, including the degree of uncertainty concerning the future, computational costs, delayed updating, and asymmetric loss. We also consider the relative accuracy of the two sets of forecasts.

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1 Introduction

There is a now a large literature addressing various aspects of the rationality of point forecasts of key macro aggregates, such as output and inflation (see Stekler (2002) for a recent review), and smaller but expanding literatures on the evaluation of probability distributions (e.g., Diebold, Gunther and Tay (1998), Diebold, Hahn and Tay (1999a)), interval and quantile forecasts (e.g., Granger, White and Kamstra (1989), Christoffersen (1998) and Giacomini and Komunjer (2005)), volatility forecasts (e.g., Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003)), and probability forecasts (e.g., Clements and Harvey (2006)). Recently, a number of authors have sought to assess forecaster rationality in terms of the internal consistency of the different types of forecasts simultaneously made by individual forecasters. The key papers are Engelberg, Manski and Williams (2007), who compare the point forecasts and histograms of the respondents to the US Survey of Professional Forecasters, and Clements (2008), who in addition assesses the evidence for consistency of the SPF respondents' histograms and forecast probabilities of declines in real output growth. Inconsistencies are found, and are generally in the direction of the point and probability forecasts indicating a rosier outlook than the histograms: the point forecasts of output growth and inflation are higher and lower, respectively, than implied by the histogram forecasts,¹ and the histogram probabilities of declines in output tend to overstate the directly-reported probabilities that respondents assign to such an event.

The aim of this paper is to explore a number of potential explanations of the tendency of some forecasters to produce forecasts which are more optimistic than measures of central tendency derived from their histograms. We consider the possibility that the apparent inconsistencies may result from the difficulties inherent in deriving measures of central tendency from the reported histograms, as well as from lack of knowledge of what it is that the point forecasts are. We also allow the possibility that the two sets of forecasters are consistent once we allow the forecasters to have more general loss functions. We can make our analysis reasonably robust to some of these aspects, as well as testing whether others (e.g., more general loss functions) are fully coherent with the data. We also consider explanations which would suggest that the professional forecasters have difficulty undertaking the (relatively simple) calculations that are required to produce consistent forecasts, as well as an argument that there are significant costs that prohibit even professional forecasters from updating their histogram forecasts in a timely fashion.

To date the inconsistencies have been documented in the cited papers, but remain largely unexplained. Engelberg *et al.* (2007) consider whether the tendency of survey respondents to

¹García and Manzanares (2007) report a similar tendency for the GDP growth and inflation forecasts of the ECB's Survey of Professional Forecasters, for the period 1999Q1 to 2006Q4.

round the probabilities of their histogram forecasts might be responsible, but find that their results are qualitatively unchanged if they allow for rounding. Clements (2008) considers the possibility that respondents' point forecast loss functions are asymmetric (whilst the reported histograms accurately reflect the individuals' true beliefs). Then, the forecaster may rationally report as a point forecast a quantile of their probability distribution other than the central tendency (see, e.g., Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005a) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)). As individuals may have loss functions with different degrees of asymmetry, Clements (2008) tests for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss separately for each individual, based on whether the difference between the histogram mean and point forecasts varies systematically with variables in the information set (other than the conditional variance or standard deviation). We will revisit this issue using panel regressions, as we find that forecast uncertainty appears to play an important role, as would be predicted by the asymmetric loss explanation: forecast uncertainty will drive a wedge between the optimal point forecast and the conditional mean. However, there are other explanations that suggest a role for uncertainty, and these will also be explored, as well as a wider range of possibilities. As suggested above, these include explanations motivated by the literature on bounded rationality and learning (see, e.g., Evans and Honkapohja (2001), Mankiw and Reis (2002), and Carroll (2003)), and we use panel regressions to assess the evidence that the two types of forecast differ in terms of the rate at which they are updated.

A set of possible issues that we do not address is that forecasters may face economic incentives to act strategically in the sense of balancing accuracy against conflicting aims, such as convincing the market that they are well-informed, or of attracting media attention (see, e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996), Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006)). It is possible that these factors may impinge differently on the point forecasts and histograms. Whilst the anonymity of the SPF respondents might be expected to rule out some of these strategic motives, one might also argue that the respondents are likely to report the same forecasts to the SPF as they make public, so that these issues remain pertinent.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the SPF survey, and section 3 records the evidence for inconsistencies between the point forecasts and measures of central tendency of the histograms for inflation and output growth, and how these inconsistencies are distributed over respondent and time. Section 4 considers the possibility that respondents with more highly-peaked underlying distributions are less likely to produce inconsistent forecasts than respondents with relatively flatter densities. This is borne out by the data, although in section 5 we attempt to disentangle this effect - the shape of the distribution - from the possibility that the greater computational complexity from assigning probability mass to more bins results in inconsistencies. Section 6 considers the possibility that forecasters react differently to the arrival of new information

when they update point and histogram forecasts, and that the efficiency of the two types of forecasts may differ. Section 7 presents panel regressions that investigate possible determinants of the difference between the point forecast and the histogram, motivated by asymmetric loss, although the results are amenable to alternative interpretations, as indicated by the discussion in sections 4 and 5. Section 8 compares the point forecasts and histogram means in terms of forecast accuracy, and indicates that rather than speaking of a tendency of the point forecasts to optimism we ought instead to label the histograms as tending to be too pessimistic, at least in terms of first moments. Section 9 concludes.

2 The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)

The SPF is a quarterly survey of professional macroeconomic forecasters that elicits information on the outlook for the US economy. The respondents provide point forecasts for a number of macro variables, as well as reporting histograms for output growth and inflation: see Croushore (1993) for details. The survey began in the fourth quarter of 1968.

We use data from 1968:4 to 2006:4 for inflation, and from 1981:3 onwards for output growth, as prior to 1981:3 the histograms for output growth referred to nominal output, and point forecasts for real GDP (GNP) were not recorded. For these surveys, we have individual respondents' point forecasts for the levels of output and the GNP/GDP deflator in the current year, as well as for the previous quarter, for the current quarter, and the next four quarters. We construct forecasts of the annual growth rates as follows. The current year annual value is constructed by summing the forecasts of the quarters and actual values as appropriate, and then dividing by the previous year's value. The actual values are taken from the Real Time Data Set for Macroeconomists (RTDSM) maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see Croushore and Stark (2001)). The RTDSMs contain the values of output that would have been available at the time the forecast was made, as subsequent revisions, base-year and other definitional changes that occurred after the reference date are omitted. Thus, for a forecast made in 2001:Q1, the 2000 value of output would be taken from the 2001:Q1 RTDSM, and the forecast for 2001 would be calculated by summing the forecast of the current quarter (2001:Q1) and the forecasts of the next three quarters (2001:Q2 to 2001:Q4). For a forecast made in 2001:Q4, the value in 2000 is taken from the 2001:Q4 RTDSM, and the current year forecast consists of the current quarter forecast of 2001:Q4 and the actual values of the first three quarters of the year taken from the same RTDSM. As of the 1981:3 survey, respondents annual forecasts of the current year were also recorded. For both variables from the 1981:3 survey onwards the actual annual level of the variable in the previous year is provided to the survey respondents.

3 Consistency of the point forecasts and histograms

Establishing whether the point forecasts and probability distributions are consistent is complicated by it being unclear whether the point forecasts should be interpreted as the means, modes or even medians of the probability distributions. Engelberg *et al.* (2007) calculate non-parametric bounds for the three measures of central tendency from the histograms, and obtain similar results, in the sense that roughly similar proportions of the pairs of point forecasts and histograms are found to be inconsistent whether we assume that the point forecasts are the means, the medians, or the modes of the underlying subjective distributions. Our analysis of consistency using bounds replicates that of Engelberg *et al.* (2007), but extends the sample. Engelberg *et al.* (2007) restrict their start period to 1992:1, in part because it is not clear whether prior to this period respondents were always provided with the previous year's level of output / deflator. There is therefore uncertainty over the previous year's value of output that the forecaster had in mind when reporting their current year forecast level. We use all the available surveys and construct the previous years' levels of output and the deflator using the RTDSMs.

The bounds approach allows us calculate the lower and upper values (the 'bounds') of each of the three measures of central tendency that are consistent with a histogram when we do not wish to make any assumption about the distribution of probability mass within the histogram bins. We obtain an upper and lower bound on the measure of central tendency, rather than a point estimate, and the point forecast can then be compared to the bounds to see whether it is consistent with the interpretation that it is the mean, median or mode (or any number of these three) of the underlying distribution reported in the form of the histogram. For the mean, the lower (upper) bound is calculated by assuming that all the probability lies at the lower (upper) limit of the histogram bin. For the median, the bounds are given by the interval which contains 50% of the cumulative probability, and the mode is given by the interval with the maximum probability.²

Point estimates of moments can be calculated from histograms by assuming that the probability mass is uniform within a bin (e.g., Diebold, Tay and Wallis (1999b) make this assumption in the context of calculating probability integral transforms), as well as by fitting parametric distributions such as the normal (e.g., Giordani and Söderlind (2003, p. 1044)) or the unimodal generalized beta distribution (Engelberg *et al.* (2007)).

Table 1 reports the percentages of point forecasts which are within, below and above the bounds calculated on the mean, median and mode. The results aggregate over all respondents and all time

²See Engelberg *et al.* (2007) for details. We simplify by considering only histograms with two or more contiguous bins with non-zero probabilities. When two adjacent bins share the maximum probability, the bounds on the mode double to take in both intervals.

periods, although they are presented separately for each quarter to control for differences that might arise because of the length of the forecast horizon. The results are broadly similar, in that similar proportions of point forecasts are found to be favourable for each measure of central tendency. We conclude that respondents' point forecasts are more optimistic than their histograms to similar degrees for both these variables. The degree of inconsistency diminishes as the horizon shortens (going from the Q1 to Q4 surveys) but the tendency toward optimism persists.

A problem with this is that there is no reason to assume that all the respondents report the same measure, or even that an individual reports the same measure through time. As we do not know what it is that is being reported, we report evidence of inconsistency which is loaded in favour of finding that the point forecasts and histograms are consistent. For each pair of point forecast and histogram, we require only that the point forecast lies within the bounds on any one of the three measures of central tendency in order for the two types of forecast to be ruled mutually consistent. A forecast is ruled favourable only if it exceeds the upper bounds on each of the three measures (in the case of output growth), and is unfavourable if it lies below the lowest of the three lower bounds. Even in this most conservative case we find that approximately 85% of the inflation forecasts made in the first quarter surveys are inconsistent, and the favourable inflation point forecasts outnumber the unfavourable approximately two to one. A similar tendency to optimism is also still apparent for output growth in this conservative scenario.

In the following, we will define inconsistent forecasts as those for which the point forecast is outside the bounds on the mean. To better understand the distribution of inconsistencies, we disaggregate our findings in two dimensions. We consider whether a relatively small number of respondents are responsible for the inconsistencies, and whether the inconsistencies primarily arise from a small number of time periods. Figures 1 and 2 present histograms of the distribution of respondents by the percentage of their forecasts which are above or below the bounds. For both inflation and output it is apparent that the vast majority of respondents fall in the first few cells, indicating that the inconsistencies we observe are not attributable to a small number of errant respondents who habitually report inconsistent forecasts. Figure 3 indicates that for output growth point forecasts may have been more optimistic in the 90s than in the prior decade, whereas for inflation (figure 4) there are no clear patterns.

4 Shape of underlying probability distributions

A possible explanation of the inconsistencies between the histograms and point forecasts is the following. It seems reasonable to suppose that respondents with highly-peaked probability density functions are less likely to produce inconsistent forecasts (in the sense of point forecasts outside of

histogram mean bounds) than respondents with flatter densities. When the respondent assigns a large probability to the outcome falling in a relatively narrowly defined range one might suppose that the point forecast and histogram are more likely to be mutually-consistent way.³ A testable implication would be that inconsistent forecasts should be associated with more dispersed probability distributions. We calculate measures of dispersion for all the reported histograms, and report averages of those measures conditional on whether the histograms correspond to the point forecast lying within the bounds on the histogram mean, below the bounds, or above the bounds. The measures of dispersion are the variance and the inter-quartile range (IQ).⁴ We take as the averages of these measures the median, to lessen dependence on a small number of extreme values.⁵ Table 2 bears out our hypothesis: the median variances and IQs for the optimistic output and inflation forecasts (labelled ‘above’ and ‘below’, respectively) are markedly higher than the within. However, at least for inflation the pessimistic forecasts are similar to the consistent forecasts in terms of the degree of uncertainty, whilst for output the pessimistic forecasts are generally characterised by more uncertainty. So for output growth greater uncertainty is associated with more optimistic point forecasts, but for inflation greater uncertainty is associated with bound violations in either direction.

It is worth remarking that the bounds approach is required because of the ‘grouping’ or ‘discretization’ of the histogram, and the size of the bound is given by the bin width, and does not depend on the degree of uncertainty given by the spread of the histogram.

5 Computational complexity

Table 3 reports the number of violations of the bounds according to the number of bins to which the respondent attached positive probabilities. As the maximum number of permitted bins has changed over the period, we report results separately for two sub-periods for output growth, and for three sub-periods for inflation (see notes to table). Except for the first sub-period for output, it is apparent that the proportion of optimistic point forecasts increases with the number of bins used by the respondent. Note that the majority tend to use only a relatively small number of bins.

³So, for example, one would expect the two to be more likely to be consistent in the extreme case of all the probability mass being assigned to a single interval, compared to when positive probability is attached to all the bins.

⁴The variance is calculated assuming the probability mass lies at the mid-point of each bin, and applying Sheppard’s correction, and the IQ is calculated from linear interpolation (assuming the probability mass is uniform within a bin).

⁵The results reported in the table are based on histograms for which there are two or more bins with non-zero probability, and for which the non-zero bins are contiguous, but neither of these assumptions is crucial. The results are qualitatively unchanged if, for example, we require at least three non-zero bins and allow multi-modal distributions. Requiring at least three non-zero bins has the greatest effect on the shorter horizon forecasts - about a half of the Q4 survey histograms make use of only two bins, reflecting less uncertainty one-step ahead.

For example, aggregating over the sub-periods, for both variables around 60% of the total number of histograms have positive probabilities attached to only 2 or 3 bins. The table also shows that forecasts using low numbers of bins tend to be those made in the third and fourth quarters of the year, as expected, because there is less uncertainty surrounding the shorter horizon forecasts.

Because the number of non-zero bins (henceforth, b) is positively correlated with forecast uncertainty, the correlation between b and the number of bounds violations may simply reflect the dependence of bounds violations on the shape of the underlying probability distribution, as discussed in section 4. Alternatively, the correlation between violations and uncertainty evident in table 2 may itself be attributable to the greater computational demands of producing mutually consistent histograms and point forecasts for larger b .

Can we disentangle the ‘computational costs’ and ‘distribution shape’ explanations of bounds violations? To check whether there is a correlation between inconsistency and uncertainty holding computational complexity (b) fixed, for b equal to one of $\{2, 3, 4\}$ we calculate the median variance and IQ of the histograms separately depending on whether the point forecast is within the bounds, below the bounds, or above the bounds. Table 4 records the results for small values of b , namely $b = 2, 3, 4$.⁶ Apart from the first subsample for inflation, for the other periods for both variables the median histogram variance is higher for the more optimistic forecasts (‘below’ for inflation, ‘above’ for output growth) for $b = 3$ and $b = 4$. So controlling for computational complexity we still find a positive correlation between bounds violations and forecast uncertainty.

An alternative approach is to try and exploit the changes in the degree of discretization of the histogram that occurred over the period for both output and inflation, as documented in the notes to table 3. Essentially, the bin widths were 2 percentage points between 1981:3 and 1991:4, but only 1 percentage point subsequently (1992:1 to 2006:4), and in the earlier period in the case on the inflation forecasts (1968:4 to 1981:2). If the degree of computational complexity is assumed to depend solely on the number of bins assigned non-zero probabilities, and given on average that uncertainty will be higher for a given b for a coarser discretization, we can infer the following directly from table 3. For output, comparing the two periods for either $b = 2$ or 3 , it is evident that the optimistic proportion is similar, and for $b = 4$ or 5 optimism is greater in the second period. Qualitatively the same results hold for inflation. This would suggest that the shape of the underlying probability distributions is not the explanation: computational complexity is key. For a given degree of complexity (given by b) the tendency towards optimism does not increase with the finer discretization (going from 1981:3 - 1991:4 to 1992:1 - 2006:4). The main problem with this is the assumption that the degree of complexity does not depend on the degree of discretization for a

⁶As is evident from table 3, for values of b in excess of 4 the number of respondents tails off.

given b .

The evidence presented in this section points in both directions, which is perhaps not unsurprising given the difficulty of unravelling the two closely related effects. Both explanations share the drawback of not being able to explain the tendency of the point forecasts to relative optimism (as opposed to the two sets of forecasts simply being inconsistent).

6 Delayed updating

A possible explanation for the inconsistency of the point forecasts and histograms is that forecasters react differently to the arrival of new information when they come to update point and histogram forecasts. One possibility is that the costs of information acquisition and processing differ for the two types of forecasts.⁷ One might suppose that a histogram is more costly to produce, and that agents may not revise their histograms as frequently as their point forecasts. Optimistic point forecasts would then arise if over the period under study the shocks to the economy were predominantly favourable, in terms of output growth and inflation being higher and lower, respectively, than anticipated. We investigate the possibility that point forecasts and histogram means are revised differently when new information arises.⁸

As well as assessing how the two sets of forecasts are revised in response to new information, we also consider whether an efficient use is made of past information. If so, then revisions to ‘fixed-event’ forecasts should not be systematically related to any information available at the time the initial forecast was made (see, e.g., Nordhaus (1987), Clements (1995)). We allow for information sets comprising macro-economic variables known at the time the initial forecast was made.

We analyse these two issues using panels of individual forecasters. The panels are unbalanced because few respondents are ever-present given the duration of the surveys (1968 onwards for inflation; 1981 onwards for real output). We include all individuals who reported full sets of point forecasts and histograms for five or more years. We estimate the following two regressions for both point forecasts and histogram means:

$$x_{it,q} = \alpha_{1,q}x_{it,q-1} + \alpha_{2,q}\bar{x}_{t,q} + u_{it,q} \quad (1)$$

⁷That latest information may not be incorporated in expectations is an implication of the sticky-information model: Mankiw and Reis (2002), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) and Carroll (2003). However, one might argue that such a model is unlikely to apply to professional forecasters - Carroll (2003) takes the view that professional forecasts embody the latest news.

⁸This may also arise within a Bayesian learning setting, whereby individual i updates their prior forecaster (say, their first forecast of y_t , made at $t-p$; $y_{i,t|t-p}$) as new information accrues to produce a posterior forecasts (say, $y_{i,t|t-p+1}$). Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) consider the possibility that individuals interpret the new information differently, and these ideas are applied by Lahiri and Sheng (2007).

and:

$$x_{it,q} - x_{it,q-1} = \beta_q Z_{t,q-1} + u'_{it,q} \quad (2)$$

where $t \in [1982, 1983, \dots, 2006]$ for output growth and $t \in [1969, 1983, \dots, 2006]$ for inflation, q indexes the survey quarter, and i the respondent. Hence when $q = 2$, $x_{it,q}$ denotes a forecast of the annual rate of output or inflation made in the second quarter of that year, and $Z_{t,q-1}$ in (2) contains macro-variables known at the time of the first-quarter survey of year t (or the fourth quarter of the previous year when $q = 1$).

We estimate (1) and (2) separately for $q = 2, 3, 4$. This allows for the possibility that the rate at which ‘news’ is incorporated may depend on the forecast horizon, in the case of (1), and that the efficiency of the forecasts may depend on the horizon, in the case of (2).

Consider first (1). $\bar{x}_{t,q}$ is the ‘consensus’ or average forecast over all those who responded to the quarter q survey in year t . The consensus forecast is assumed to incorporate all the latest available information or ‘news’. We are assuming the consensus forecast is known when the individual makes their forecast. Literally, this requires that an individual knows the forecast being made by all other respondents. This may not be too unreasonable - as professional forecasters, the SPF respondents are likely to contribute forecasts to analysts reports (etc.) on a regular basis, which are likely to be read by their fellow forecasters. Alternatively, the consensus view can be assumed to be a proxy for a forecast informed by the latest information on monthly indicators, federal announcements, etc. Of interest in (1) is the value of α_2 , and whether this differs between the point forecasts and histogram means.⁹

In (2), $\beta = 0$ implies that revisions are not correlated with information in the agents’ information sets. The macro-variables we include are the unemployment rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate, as well as output growth and the rate of inflation (GNP/GDP deflator), all taken from the RTDSMs. We construct series consisting of the latest available value at each point in time (so, for example, $Z_{t,q-1}$ is the value of the macro-variable in the RTDSM available in quarter $q - 1$ of year t : this will be the first-release value for quarter $q - 2$).¹⁰

Tables 5 and 6 report the results of estimating (1) and (2). Both are estimated using the fixed effects estimator (FE) and the random effects GLS estimator (RE-GLS).¹¹ Note that for (2) there

⁹Note that Carroll (2003) derives a model of ‘sticky’ *aggregate* expectations due to some individuals only occasionally paying attention to the latest news bulletins and reports, and tests the null that $H_0: \alpha_2 = 1$. At the level of the individual, our interest is in whether the population value of α differs between the two sets of forecasts.

¹⁰Output growth and inflation are constructed as quarterly changes. The Treasury bill and unemployment rate are entered as levels.

Note that the 1996:1 vintage value of output and the deflator for 1995:4 is missing. In the test regressions this is replaced by the 1996:1 vintage value of 1995:3 (relative to 1995:2).

¹¹Both models are estimated in STATA using ‘panel robust’ estimation of the covariance matrix of the estimated

are no individual-specific explanatory variables, and the use of pooled OLS (with an appropriate estimator of the coefficient covariance matrix) gave very similar results to those reported in the table.¹² In each case we include all four macro-variables and record the p -value of a test of joint insignificance.

The estimates in table 5 indicate a smaller weight on the consensus forecast at the long horizon (the Q2 forecasts) for the histogram means compared to the point forecasts - the longer-horizon histogram mean forecasts do not incorporate the latest information to the same extent as the point forecasts. This is true of the regressions for output growth and inflation, and does not depend on the panel data model we adopt - it holds for both the FE estimator and RE-GLS. The results at the shorter horizons are more mixed - e.g., the estimated value of α_2 for the output growth histogram means exceeds that for the point forecasts for the Q4 surveys - but the longer horizon forecasts are of more interest because it is at the longer horizons that more bounds violations occur. (Unfortunately we are unable to run a regression such as (1) for the Q1 survey forecasts).

Next, the results in table 6 indicate that generally the revision to the point forecasts and histogram means are systematically related to macro-variables known at the time the initial forecast was made. There are exceptions: the long-horizon point forecasts of output growth appear to be efficient, as do the Q3 histogram mean output growth forecasts. The results reported in table 6 on the efficiency of the revisions to the forecasts do not suggest clear differences by type of forecast that might explain the inconsistencies between the two types of forecasts. Although the results on delayed updating point to some differences at the longer horizon, we are left to conclude that the regressions in this section, which consider the properties of the two types of forecasts separately, shed little light on the reasons for the inconsistencies documented in table 1. We are also assuming that the point estimates of histogram means (rather than the bounds) adequately reflect the means of the subjective distributions reported as histograms. In the next section we pair the two types of forecast by individual to address the question of interest in a more direct fashion.

7 Asymmetric loss functions

In this section we pair the two types of forecasts (histogram mean and point forecast) by individual and report panel regressions of whether the discrepancy between the two is systematically related to a number of explanatory variables. The approach we adopt is motivated by the recent literature on

parameters. If we write the composite error in (1) (and similarly for (2)) as $u_{it,q} = \delta_{i,q} + v_{it,q}$, then RE-GLS requires that the $\{v_{it,q}\}$ are serially independent. Because we run separate regressions for each forecast horizon (i.e., for the first-quarter surveys, the second quarter, etc) this may be a reasonable assumption.

¹²Note that OLS is a consistent estimator of the RE model even if autocorrelation in $\{v_{it,q}\}$ induces correlation in the composite errors $\{u_{it,q}\}$, but is inconsistent for the FE model in these circumstances.

testing for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss, and the recognition that systematic differences between histogram means and point forecasts may be consistent with optimal forecasting under asymmetric loss. However, the empirical results in this section can simply be interpreted in terms of whether the differences between point forecasts and histograms vary systematically with known factors without invoking the assumption of asymmetric point-forecast loss functions, and we have already discussed in sections 4 and 5 other reasons which would indicate a dependence between these differences and forecast uncertainty.

For the asymmetric loss explanation we need to assume that the histograms accurately reflect the individuals' true (subjective) beliefs, in the sense that the histograms are not an intentionally 'biased' representation of the individuals' probability assessments. By way of contrast, individuals report point forecasts that are optimal for asymmetric loss functions, in the sense that greater costs are attached to (say) under-predictions compared to over-predictions.¹³ Clements (2008) considers whether asymmetric loss can explain the tendency to report relatively optimistic output growth forecasts. He estimates separate regressions for each individual (who made a minimum number of returns), whereas we will pool over individuals, and consider both the output growth and inflation forecasts. We will also contrast the results we obtain using the estimated histogram means with a panel-logit approach that only requires the calculation of the non-parametric bounds on the histogram mean.

Using the results in Patton and Timmermann (2007), we can show that, under relatively weak restrictions on the form of the loss function and the data generating process, the optimal forecast is given by:

$$f_{t+h,t} = E_t(y_{t+h}) + \phi_h \cdot \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}$$

where $E_t(y_{t+h}) \equiv E(y_{t+h} | \Omega_t)$, $V_t(y_{t+h}) \equiv Var(y_{t+h} | \Omega_t)$, with the data generating process $y_{t+h} | \Omega_t \sim D(E_t[y_{t+h}], V_t[y_{t+h}])$ for some constant distribution function D , and where ϕ_h is a constant that depends only on the form of D and the forecast loss function. $f_{t+h,t}$ is the directly reported point forecast. $\phi_h < 0$ when over-predictions ($e_{t+h,t} < 0$) are penalised more heavily than under-predictions, and vice versa. The deviation between the optimal point forecast and the conditional mean depends on the conditional standard deviation. Intuitively, the more costly over-predictions relative to under-predictions, say, and the more likely both over- and under-predictions (because the more uncertain the outlook), then the more the forecaster will aim to under-predict on average. Under the assumptions we have made, the bias of a rational forecaster should depend on

¹³The literature on the properties of optimal forecasts under asymmetric loss includes, *inter alia*, Granger (1969), Zellner (1986), Christoffersen and Diebold (1997), Elliott and Timmermann (2004, p. 48), Elliott *et al.* (2005a), Elliott, Komunjer and Timmermann (2005b) and Patton and Timmermann (2007), and is used to motivate this section.

the forecast standard deviation but should not be systematically related to other variables known at time t :

$$\begin{aligned} E(y_{t+h} - f_{t+h,t} | \Omega_t) &= E\left(y_{t+h} - \left(E_t(y_{t+h}) + \phi_h \cdot \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}\right) | \Omega_t\right) \\ &= -\phi_h \cdot \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})} \end{aligned}$$

This motivates the suggestion of Pesaran and Weale (2006) to test for rational expectations with asymmetric losses by running a regression such as:

$$e_{t+h,t} \equiv y_{t+h} - f_{t+h,t} = \tilde{\zeta}_1 \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})} + \tilde{\zeta}_2' \mathbf{Z}_t + \tilde{\epsilon}_{t+h} \quad (3)$$

where under the null we would expect to find $\tilde{\zeta}_2 = \mathbf{0}$, but $\tilde{\zeta}_1 \neq 0$ if loss is asymmetric. Alternatively, the same implications hold for a regression in which the dependent variable is not the forecast error but the difference between the histogram mean and the point forecast, say

$$E_t(y_{t+h}) - f_{t+h,t} = \zeta_1 \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})} + \zeta_2' \mathbf{Z}_t + \epsilon_{t+h} \quad (4)$$

In general, (4) might be preferred to (3) for the following reason. Suppose y_{t+h} and $E_t(y_{t+h})$ differ by a random term, $\xi_{t+h} = y_{t+h} - E_t(y_{t+h})$. In this interpretation, ξ_{t+h} is a measurement error, such that the dependent variable in (3) is a noisy proxy for the dependent variable $E_t(Y_{t+h}) - f_{t+h,t}$ in (4). Standard analysis suggests that even if $E(\xi_{t+h} | \Omega_t) = 0$, so that ξ_{t+h} is uncorrelated with any variables that might be included as explanatory variables, then inference based on (3) will be less precise than tests based on (4). But when in addition $E(\xi_{t+h}, \mathbf{X}_t) \neq \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{X}_t = \left[\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})} \quad \mathbf{Z}_t \right]'$, then inference based on (3) is invalid.¹⁴ Clements (2008) provides further discussion of (4) relative to (3) when we allow for individual heterogeneity¹⁵: we will simply report

¹⁴Consider the simplest case where the only explanatory variable is $\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}$, and the population regression is given by:

$$E_t(Y_{t+h}) - f_{t+h,t} = \delta_1 \sqrt{V_t(Y_{t+h})} + \varepsilon_{t+h}$$

where in fact $\delta_1 = 0$, so that loss is quadratic. Inference is based on this regression but with the dependent variable measured with error, $e_{t+h,t} = y_{t+h} - f_{t+h,t} = E_t(Y_{t+h}) - f_{t+h,t} + \xi_{t+h}$, so that the actual regression the investigator runs is:

$$e_{t+h,t} = \zeta_1 \sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})} + \epsilon_{t+h}$$

where $\epsilon_{t+h} = \varepsilon_{t+h} + \xi_{t+h}$. Then $\hat{\zeta}_1 \xrightarrow{p} \delta_1 + Cov\left(\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}, \varepsilon_{t+h} + \xi_{t+h}\right) \times Var\left(\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}\right)^{-1}$. Therefore, $\hat{\zeta}_1 \xrightarrow{p} Cov\left(\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}, \xi_{t+h}\right) \times Var\left(\sqrt{V_t(y_{t+h})}\right)^{-1}$. If ξ_{t+h} is positively (negatively) correlated with the conditional standard deviation, then we may conclude that δ_1 is positive (negative).

¹⁵Essentially the use of (4) allows tests of the asymmetry of the loss function without requiring that the forecasts make full use of all available information. Consider the standard way of testing for asymmetry. This regresses the

tests based on (4) as the dependent variable in this regression is the quantity of direct interest in our context.

When we allow heterogeneous information sets and individual-specific ϕ_h values, ϕ_{hi} , then $f_{t+h,t,i} = E_{t,i}(y_{t+h}) + \phi_{hi}\sqrt{V_{t,i}(y_{t+h})}$, where the conditional mean and variance are defined as expectations with respect to the individual's information set $\Omega_{t,i}$. In general, this suggests that ζ_1 in (4) may differ over individuals, and we test the assumption that the coefficients of the panel regression are the same over individuals by allowing both random effects and random coefficients.

The results of the panel regressions are given in table 7. We restrict the explanatory variables to the standard deviation, an intercept, and either the value of output growth or inflation known at the time the forecast was made (taken from the RTDSMs), in order that we can more easily interpret the estimated coefficients. Separate regressions are run for forecasts made in the four quarters of the year, as the theory suggests the coefficient on the forecast standard deviation may depend on the forecast horizon. We begin by reporting results for the random-effects GLS estimator, as the Hausman specification tests do not reject the assumptions that support the use of this more efficient estimator relative to the fixed-effects estimator. (The Hausman tests are calculated assuming the random-effects estimator is fully efficient). For inflation, we find that the standard deviation is positive and (last period's) inflation rate is negative for the Q1 survey forecasts, and that these terms are individually and jointly significant. At shorter horizons neither term is statistically significant. Interpreted in the context of asymmetric (point forecast) loss functions, the positive effect of the forecast standard deviation would suggest higher costs to over-predicting relative to under-prediction. For the forecasts of output, actual output is significant for the Q1 forecasts, and remains so for the Q2 forecasts. The sign on the standard deviation is now negative, so in terms of asymmetric loss, has the interpretation that it pays to be optimistic, but is not statistically significant from zero. For both the output and inflation forecasts the negative coefficient on the actual value indicates that higher output growth (inflation) is systematically related with next period's point forecast exceeding the histogram mean, at least for the Q1 survey forecasts. In table 6 we rejected the efficiency of both types of forecast in separate regressions. Our results

forecast error (constructed from the outcomes and point forecasts) on variables known at the time the forecast was made, and the conditional standard deviation of the forecasts. Suppose that, relative to an individual's information set, there are a series of negative shocks to output growth over the sample period, so that the individual's point forecasts tend to be too favourable - this could be taken as evidence that the individual has asymmetric loss such that over-predictions are less costly than under-predictions. Using (4), the conditional mean would control for the negative shocks - it would be higher than warranted based on an information set that includes the shocks, but under the asymmetry hypothesis the deviation between the conditional mean and the point forecast should only depend on the conditional standard deviation of the forecast. Under quadratic loss this deviation should not differ systematically from zero and should not be related to any variables known at the time the forecasts are made.

here indicate that the difference between the two varies systematically with lagged output growth (inflation), at least for the Q1 survey forecasts.

The random-coefficients estimator treats the parameter vector as a different realization of a stochastic process for each individual respondent. This may be warranted to the extent that the degree of asymmetry of the loss function is not the same over individuals. The coefficient estimates reported in table 7 are the means of the distributions. In addition, we report a test of parameter constancy, which for both variables and all four horizons rejects the assumption that the coefficients are the same across the individuals. Even so, the picture that emerges is similar to that assuming random effects - we reject the joint null of insignificance of both the explanatory variables (other than the constant) for the Q1 forecasts, and the signs of the average coefficients agree with the random-effects estimates.

Finally, although the panel regressions pair the two types of forecast by individual, we also wish to check whether the results are qualitatively unchanged if we change the assumptions behind the calculation of the histogram means. We could make a different assumption about the distributions that underlie the reported histograms, or we could simply use the non-parametric bounds approach. We choose to do the latter, and define a binary dependent variable which is unity when the forecasts are more optimistic than the bounds (i.e., exceed the upper bound, fall below the lower bound, for output and inflation, respectively).¹⁶ The cost of using the bounds approach is a loss of information because large mean-point forecast discrepancies are treated on a par with those which are only just inconsistent with the bounds. Against this, we can be confident that the observed discrepancies are a characteristic of the point forecasts and underlying subjective distributions and not just our chosen method of calculating moments from histograms.

The final set of results in table 7 are for the random-effects panel-logit estimator. The results confirm the finding that the forecast standard deviation and the actual value in the previous period are significant for the Q1 forecasts for both variables. In addition we find that both variables remain significant for the Q2 output growth forecasts, and that the forecast standard deviation matters for inflation for all quarters. The signs on the standard deviations are consistent with the signs we found earlier given the definitions of the dependent variables.

We also report a specification test of whether the panel (individual) dimension is statistically significant, that is, whether the individual-level variance component matters. For output, we reject the likelihood ratio test that the panel and pooled-OLS estimators are equivalent, but for inflation we find the opposite (except for the Q2 forecasts).

¹⁶It may seem natural to allow three categories - 'optimistic', 'pessimistic' and 'consistent with the bounds', but have not done this because there are few pessimistic forecasts.

In summary, the different models and panel estimators all indicate a role for the forecast standard deviation and last period’s actual value in explaining the discrepancy (or the inconsistency, in the case of the panel-logit regressions) between the mean and point forecasts, especially at the longest horizon forecasts, which are those made in the first quarter of the year. In terms of the discussion of asymmetric loss, the relevance of the forecast standard deviation would point towards asymmetry, whilst the significance of the lagged actual value is inconsistent with rational behaviour by the forecaster for the class of loss functions we have allowed. The lagged values of output growth and inflation should not be systematically related to the difference between the respondent’s histogram mean and point forecast. The significance of the forecast standard deviation in these regressions is consistent with the explanations of distribution shape and computational complexity of sections 4 and 5, but it is only in conjunction with the hypothesis of asymmetric loss that this factor explains the direction of the inconsistencies (i.e., the tendency to over-optimism of the point forecasts). In the next section we consider forecast accuracy, which as we will show is not supportive of the asymmetric loss hypothesis.

8 Accuracy of point forecasts and histogram means

Hitherto we have not considered which of the two types of forecast are the more accurate. This is primarily because forecast accuracy is distinct from consistency, but it is natural to ask whether the ‘optimism’ of the point forecasts is well founded. One of the problems with measuring forecast accuracy is that it is unclear what should be used as outturns to calculate forecast errors. Respondents may be seeking to forecast the first announcements of the data, or the second, or some subsequent revision. A number of authors have chosen to use the second data release (e.g., Romer and Romer (2000) and Patton and Timmermann (2007)) and we report results for this choice of outturns. One might justify the use of a relatively early vintage if revisions are ‘news’ in the sense of being unpredictable at the time the initial estimates was released,¹⁷ as well as when there are ‘benchmark revisions’, such that the latest estimates are compiled using different accounting procedures or methodological practices.

Table 8 reports the accuracy (measured by mean squared forecast error - MSFE) of the point forecasts and histogram means for a number of sub-periods, and also compares the relative accuracy of the two sets of forecasts when they are inconsistent (in the sense that the point forecasts lie outside the non-parametric bounds on the histogram means). If we consider all the forecasts for both variables, then the point forecasts are markedly more accurate than the histogram means

¹⁷Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) found that revisions to real output added news - see Croushore (2006) for a full discussion of data vintage revisions.

calculated in the conventional way (assuming all the probability mass is located at the midpoints of the bins) or via a normal approximation (following Giordani and Söderlind (2003)), for all the sub-periods. Although the differences in MSFE are often large (for output growth, for example, the MSFE of the point forecasts is only 53% of that of the histogram means for the period 1981:3 to 1991:4, and only 72% for the period 1992:1 to 2006:4), we are assuming that the methods we use to calculate the histogram means accurately reflect the respondents' means. To counter the possibility that our finding in favour of the point forecasts in terms of accuracy is an artifact of the way the histogram means are calculated, we next focus on those pairs of forecasts when the means and point forecasts are inconsistent, either because the point forecast exceeds the upper bound, or falls below the lower bound. For these two sets of forecasts, we undertake a comparison where the histogram mean is calculated so as to minimize the squared forecast error, subject to it lying within the bounds.¹⁸ The MSFEs of this most-favourable scenario for the histogram means are given in the final column of the table. For inflation, the point forecasts are more accurate than the histogram mean when they are more optimistic (rows headed by 'point < bound') for the second and third subperiods, but not for the first. For output growth, the 'optimistic' ('point > bound') point forecasts are more accurate for the first subperiod and just about the same in the second period.

This would suggest that the point forecasts are more accurate indicators of first moments than the histograms. Engelberg *et al.* (2007) view the discrepancies between the point forecasts and histograms as suggesting 'that point predictions may have a systematic, favourable bias', and infer from this that measures of central tendency should be calculated from 'probabilistic expectations'. The evidence presented here indicates instead that first moments derived from survey respondents histograms have a tendency toward pessimism, and that directly reported point forecasts are more accurate.

These findings also bear on the credibility of the asymmetric loss explanation of the observed inconsistencies. This is because the expected squared error of a point forecast must be at least as large as the expected squared error of the conditional mean; the conditional mean minimizes the expected squared error amongst all possible forecasts. The expected squared error of the point forecast will equal that of the conditional mean when loss is quadratic, when the optimal point forecast is the conditional mean, but for asymmetric loss the squared-error loss of the optimal point forecast should exceed that of the conditional mean. Our finding that point forecasts are more accurate under quadratic loss (MSFE) counts against the asymmetric loss argument.

¹⁸Thus the histogram mean equals the actual when the actual lies within the bounds, giving a zero error; equals the upper bound when the actual lies above the upper bound; and equals the lower bound when the actual lies below the lower bound.

Clements (2008) also reports comparisons of the relative accuracy of the two types of forecasts for output growth, and obtains less clear-cut results. However, his comparison is of the relative accuracy of the set of point forecasts which are consistent with the bounds against the set of point forecasts which lie outside the bounds. This will not necessarily be informative about the two types of forecasts (histograms versus point) if the composition of the two sets of point forecasts depends on factors which are related to predictability: for example, if it were the case that point forecasts and bounds are less likely to be consistent during periods of change when output growth is less predictable.

9 Conclusions

We have sought explanations for the finding that respondents to the Survey of Professional Forecasters habitually report point forecasts of annual output growth and inflation which are more optimistic than the mean forecasts of their forecast histograms for these two variables. This occurs most frequently for the forecasts made in the first quarter - approximately 20% of first-quarter output growth and inflation forecasts lie above and below, respectively, the bounds on the corresponding histogram means. We show that this finding is not driven by an incorrect assumption that respondents' reported point forecasts correspond to their means - approximately 85% of the point forecasts of inflation made in the first quarter surveys are not compatible with the histograms whether we interpret them as either the mean or the mode or the median of the underlying subjective probability distributions. Moreover, we find that these inconsistencies are not attributable to a small number of errant respondents, and that they can not be accounted for by a small number of surveys.

We find that the degree of forecast uncertainty, as measured by the dispersion of the histogram, is systematically related to the tendency for the point forecasts to present a rosier outlook than the histograms. We have considered a number of possible reasons for this correlation. These include the shape of the underlying distribution function, and whether it is due to computational complexity. These two explanations are hard to distinguish, as a more dispersed underlying distribution will be correlated with non-zero probabilities being assigned to a greater number of histogram bins, and the use of a greater number of bins may decrease the likelihood of the respondent calculating mutually consistent point forecasts and histogram means. Comparing across histograms before and after a change in the bin widths (allowing greater dispersion for a given level of computational complexity) provides some tentative evidence that computational complexity, rather than the shape of the underlying probability distributions, is the relevant factor, although the evidence is somewhat mixed.

However, the recent literature on testing for rationality allowing for asymmetric loss also suggests that forecast uncertainty will affect the relationship between the conditional mean and the point forecasts. If the histograms accurately reflect the individuals' true (subjective) beliefs, then individuals will report point forecasts that under or over-predict relative to their mean forecast if they have asymmetric loss functions, and the extent to which they do so will depend on their perceived forecast uncertainty. Our results are generally not supportive of the asymmetric loss explanation, for two reasons. Firstly, although we find a role for the forecast standard deviation in our panel regressions, we also find that last period's actual value helps predict the difference between the mean and point forecast. The significance of the lagged actual value is inconsistent with rational behaviour by the forecaster for the class of loss functions we have allowed. Secondly, we find that point forecasts are more accurate (assuming a squared-error loss function) than the histogram means. If the respondents have asymmetric loss functions, then the expected squared error of a point forecast must exceed the expected squared error of the conditional mean. Our relative forecast accuracy findings count against the asymmetric loss explanation. The discrepancies between the point forecasts and histograms have been viewed as evidence 'that point predictions may have a systematic, favourable bias' (Engelberg *et al.* (2007)), but this appears to be unwarranted. Rather, our findings indicate that first moments derived from survey respondents histograms have a tendency toward pessimism relative to the outcomes. The relative accuracy of the point forecasts judged by squared-error loss would also tend to lend support to our maintained assumption that the point forecasts are estimates of the mean.

As an alternative explanation for the inconsistency of the point forecasts and histograms, we consider the possibility forecasters react differently to the arrival of new information when they come to update point and histogram forecasts, as might be the case if the costs of information acquisition and processing differ for the two types of forecasts. There is some evidence that the longer-horizon histogram mean forecasts are not updated to incorporate the latest information at same rate as the point forecasts.

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Table 1: Bounds violations: mean, mode, median and conservative

Q	#	mean			median			mode			conservative		
		within	below	above	within	below	above	within	below	above	within	below	above
Output growth													
1	547	75.50	4.57	19.93	71.48	5.85	22.67	81.35	6.03	12.61	89.03	2.56	7.86
2	586	80.72	3.75	15.53	76.11	3.75	20.14	84.98	4.10	10.92	91.13	2.39	6.48
3	523	81.84	4.21	13.96	81.07	4.02	14.91	86.04	4.59	9.37	91.59	2.10	6.12
4	424	87.74	3.77	8.49	81.84	5.42	12.74	84.91	5.19	9.91	91.75	3.07	5.19
Inflation													
1	1046	71.89	21.51	6.60	69.12	17.59	13.29	75.14	15.01	9.85	83.84	11.28	4.59
2	1075	75.07	19.72	5.21	73.21	14.33	12.47	78.70	12.74	8.56	86.60	9.30	4.09
3	894	76.29	13.65	10.07	69.80	11.08	19.13	75.17	10.96	13.87	84.12	7.72	8.17
4	541	84.10	11.65	4.25	78.19	10.17	11.65	82.81	10.35	6.84	89.65	6.84	3.51

Output growth. The figures are based on surveys from 1981:3 to 2006:4, and are similar to those reported by Clements (2008) on a shorter sample. The Q1 surveys of 1985 and 1986 are excluded as the Philadelphia Fed has documented possible problems with the forecast distributions in these surveys.

The point forecasts of the growth rate are calculated using the actual data for the previous year from the RTDSM available in the quarter of the survey. The one exception is that the RTDSM for 1996Q1 is missing the value for 1995Q4. In constructing the year-on-year point forecast growth rates for the respondents to the 1996Q1 survey we use the previous-quarter forecasts (of 1995Q4).

Inflation. Based on surveys 68:4 to 06:4. There are missing observations for the histograms for a number of surveys, because respondents were mistakenly asked about the wrong year in those surveys. See the online documentation provided by the Philadelphia Fed: ‘Documentation for the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters’, <http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/>. The problematic survey quarters are 1985.1, 1986.1, 1968.4, 1969.4, 1970.4, 1971.4, 1972.3, 1972.4, 1973.4, 1975.4, 1976.4, 1977.4, 1978.4, 1979.2, 1979.3, 1979.4. That these are predominantly Q4 surveys accounts for the smaller number of respondents to Q4 surveys in the table.




Figure 1: Inflation. The number of respondents with percentages of their point forecasts below (top panel) and above (bottom panel) their bounds, where the bars are less than 5%, 5 to 10% etc.




Figure 2: Output Growth. The number of respondents with percentages of their point forecasts below (top panel) and above (bottom panel) their bounds, where the bars are less than 5%, 5 to 10% etc.




Figure 3: Output growth. For each survey quarter, the two bars report the percentage of individuals whose point forecasts were below their mean bounds ('b'), and the percentage above the bounds ('a'). The top left panel is for forecasts made in the first quarter, the top right for second quarter forecasts etc.




Figure 4: Inflation. For each survey quarter, the two bars report the percentage of individuals whose point forecasts were below their mean bounds ('b'), and the percentage above the bounds ('a'). The top left panel is for forecasts made in the first quarter, the top right for second quarter forecasts etc.

Table 2: Bounds violations and measures of uncertainty

Survey quarter	forecasts	% point forecasts			point forecasts:			point forecasts:		
		within mean	below bounds	above	within median	below variance	above	within median IQ	below	above
Output growth										
Q1	547	75.50	4.57	19.93	0.66	0.76	1.02	1.18	1.20	1.40
Q2	586	80.72	3.75	15.53	0.54	0.67	0.78	1.12	1.18	1.27
Q3	523	81.84	4.21	13.96	0.34	0.88	0.77	0.99	1.42	1.30
Q4	424	87.74	3.77	8.49	0.17	0.44	0.40	0.89	1.27	1.05
Inflation										
Q1	1046	71.89	21.51	6.60	0.43	0.78	0.43	1.07	1.25	1.07
Q2	1075	75.07	19.72	5.21	0.38	0.69	0.54	1.06	1.20	1.12
Q3	894	76.29	13.65	10.07	0.33	0.58	0.33	1.01	1.18	1.00
Q4	541	84.10	11.65	4.25	0.18	0.38	0.43	0.96	1.06	1.06

See notes to Table 1.

Table 3: Violations of bounds and the number of non-zero histogram bins

No. bins	No. forecasts	% within	% below	% above	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4
Inflation, 68:4 to 81:2								
2	199	76.88	9.55	13.57	46	74	62	17
3	537	70.20	14.15	15.64	180	181	149	27
4	311	63.67	23.79	12.54	128	105	65	13
5	160	66.25	23.75	10.00	61	63	31	5
6	64	54.69	35.94	9.38	32	15	17	0
7	47	51.06	42.55	6.38	23	14	8	2
8	30	40.00	43.33	16.67	16	9	5	0
9	23	34.78	43.48	21.74	11	11	1	0
10	10	50.00	30.00	20.00	7	1	1	1
11	4	100.00	0.00	0.00	2	1	1	0
12	3	33.33	33.33	33.33	2	0	1	0
13
14	3	33.33	66.67	0.00	1	2	0	0
15	7	28.57	28.57	42.86	2	3	2	0
Inflation, 81:3 to 91:4								
2	282	88.30	9.22	2.48	40	69	74	99
3	273	86.08	10.99	2.93	52	87	84	50
4	92	78.26	18.48	3.26	31	29	19	13
5	38	78.95	18.42	2.63	13	11	10	4
6	38	52.63	47.37	0.00	15	12	7	4
Inflation, 92:1 to 2006:4								
2	367	88.28	10.35	1.36	53	73	95	146
3	496	86.09	11.69	2.22	135	129	138	94
4	270	81.48	16.30	2.22	88	80	59	43
5	139	74.10	23.74	2.16	49	46	33	11
6	70	65.71	34.29	0.00	23	31	11	5
7	44	47.73	52.27	0.00	22	10	10	2
8	14	35.71	42.86	21.43	2	9	3	0
9	15	53.33	46.67	0.00	5	6	2	2
10	20	50.00	50.00	0.00	7	4	6	3
Output Growth, 81:3 to 91:4								
2	200	89.00	4.00	7.00	26	57	64	53
3	202	86.14	5.94	7.92	55	64	45	38
4	78	91.03	2.56	6.41	26	30	15	7
5	36	88.89	2.78	8.33	12	9	8	7
6	36	63.89	22.22	13.89	15	9	7	5
Output Growth, 92:1 to 06:4								
2	312	89.10	3.85	7.05	28	54	84	146
3	455	88.35	2.42	9.23	105	117	138	95
4	282	77.66	3.19	19.15	91	84	66	41
5	211	72.99	4.27	22.75	79	73	41	18
6	92	58.70	4.35	36.96	41	28	18	5
7	71	63.38	30.845	28.17	31	22	14	4
8	37	72.97	0.00	27.03	14	16	7	0
9	19	47.37	10.53	42.11	8	7	3	1
10	49	40.82	2.04	57.14	16	16	13	4

Output Growth Between 1981:3 and 1991:4 respondents attached probabilities to up to 6 bins, each with width of 2% points. From 1992:1 onwards there were 10 bins with widths of 1% point.

Inflation Between 68:4 and 81:2 there were 15 bins with width of 1 %, between 81:4 and 91:4, 6 bins with width of 2, and from 92:1 onwards 10 bins with a width of 1.

Table 4: Median variance estimates for bounds violations conditional on the number of bins

No. bins	point forecast		
	within	below	above
	median variance		
Inflation			
68:4 to 81:2			
2	0.14	0.17	0.17
3	0.29	0.31	0.29
4	0.57	0.58	0.58
81:3 to 91:4			
2	0.45	0.54	0.54
3	0.86	1.30	0.61
4	2.05	2.29	2.30
92:1 to 2006:4			
2	0.14	0.17	0.02
3	0.22	0.29	0.22
4	0.46	0.57	0.58
Output Growth			
81:3 to 91:4			
2	0.45	0.60	0.54
3	0.86	1.05	1.40
4	1.86	1.30	2.30
92:4 to 06:4			
2	0.12	0.17	0.14
3	0.22	0.29	0.29
4	0.46	0.42	0.58

Table 5: Point forecasts, histogram means and ‘news’

Dep. variable	Point forecasts				Histogram means				
	Fixed effects		Random effects		Fixed effects		Random effects		
	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	Coeff.	s.e.	
Output growth									
Q4	α_1	0.067	0.024	0.069	0.022	0.024	0.083	0.043	0.075
	α_2	0.934	0.024	0.934	0.022	1.002	0.072	0.994	0.072
Q3	α_1	0.069	0.022	0.094	0.027	0.083	0.070	0.145	0.073
	α_2	0.956	0.032	0.934	0.036	0.922	0.052	0.868	0.058
Q2	α_1	0.138	0.049	0.167	0.052	0.299	0.056	0.358	0.045
	α_2	0.852	0.037	0.831	0.039	0.744	0.073	0.697	0.067
Inflation									
Q4	α_1	0.046	0.034	0.062	0.036	0.146	0.127	0.184	0.132
	α_2	0.964	0.037	0.943	0.038	0.840	0.130	0.791	0.133
Q3	α_1	0.077	0.031	0.094	0.031	0.115	0.095	0.131	0.105
	α_2	0.917	0.026	0.901	0.027	0.951	0.122	0.897	0.120
Q2	α_1	0.127	0.047	0.152	0.044	0.158	0.045	0.211	0.054
	α_2	0.863	0.045	0.835	0.043	0.802	0.064	0.749	0.071

Table 6: Point forecasts, histogram means and past information

Dep. variable	Point forecasts		Histogram means	
	Fixed effects	Random effects	Fixed effects	Random effects
	Output growth			
Q4	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
Q3	0.011	0.002	0.168	0.181
Q2	0.229	0.151	0.002	0.001
	Inflation			
Q4	0.000	0.000	0.014	0.000
Q3	0.000	0.000	0.035	0.099
Q2	0.025	0.000	0.039	0.001

The entries in the table are the p -values of tests that the four macro-variables are jointly insignificant.

Table 7: Panel regressions explaining the discrepancy between the histogram mean and point forecasts, and the probability of the point forecast being more ‘optimistic’ than the bound on the histogram mean (‘random-effects logistic’)

		Random-effects GLS			Random-coefficients			Random-effects logistic		
		Coeff.	Std. Err	z	Coeff.	Std. Err	z	Coeff.	Std. Err	z
Inflation										
Q1	σ	.449	.119	3.77	.302	.192	1.58	1.73	.377	4.61
	Inf	-.048	.009	-5.48	-.059	.027	-2.15	-.277	.118	-2.33
	Con	-.007	.064	-0.10	.0811	.126	0.64	-2.48	.379	-6.55
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.000			0.006; 0.045			0.272; 0.000		
Q2	σ	.113	.109	1.04	.131	.200	0.66	1.49	.450	3.32
	Inf	-.015	.025	-0.60	-.041	.042	-0.98	-.123	.126	-0.98
	Con	.137	.077	1.77	.154	.137	1.12	-2.50	.497	-5.03
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.571			0.000; 0.609			0.007; 0.004		
Q3	σ	.255	.148	1.73	.099	.185	0.54	2.79	.615	4.53
	Inf	-.005	.030	-0.16	.005	.038	0.15	-.354	.163	-2.17
	Con	-.015	.089	-0.16	.003	.139	0.02	-2.89	.564	-5.12
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.142			0.000; 0.841			0.241; 0.000		
Q4	σ	.109	.067	1.62	.052	.384	0.14	1.29	.546	2.36
	Inf	-.032	.022	-1.49	-.060	.056	-1.07	-.288	.196	-1.47
	Con	.092	.061	1.52	.151	.216	0.70	-2.24	.456	-4.90
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.117			0.000; 0.543			1.00; 0.046		
Output growth										
Q1	σ	-.169	.122	-1.38	-.202	.184	-1.10	1.85	.544	3.40
	Out	-.067	.017	-4.02	-.058	.018	-3.16	.330	.091	3.61
	Con	.186	.115	1.62	.208	.153	1.36	-4.70	.786	-5.99
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.000			0.000; 0.007			0.000; 0.000		
Q2	σ	-.133	.103	-1.29	-.166	.188	-0.88	1.28	.586	2.18
	Out	-.047	.019	-2.41	-.044	.016	-2.81	.394	.110	3.57
	Con	.075	.120	0.63	.142	.138	1.03	-4.81	.818	-5.88
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.029			0.000; 0.017			0.000; 0.000		
Q3	σ	-.035	.073	-0.47	.156	.200	0.78	1.14	.646	1.76
	Out	-.057	.039	-1.44	-.037	.034	-1.09	.350	.118	2.98
	Con	.047	.124	0.38	-.098	.1149	-0.85	-3.97	.643	-6.18
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.347			0.000; 0.514			0.083; 0.004		
Q4	σ	-.121	.092	-1.31	.372	.215	1.73	-.163	1.028	-0.16
	Out	.016	.028	0.58	.014	.029	0.50	.073	.170	0.43
	Con	-.072	.142	-0.51	-.276	.157	-1.76	-3.46	.935	-3.70
		Wald p -value			Constancy; Wald p -value			Panel vs pooled; Wald p -value		
		0.105			0.000; 0.222			0.022; 0.902		

The columns headed ‘ z ’ are the ‘ t -statistics’, where z denotes that the small-sample distributions are unknown. The ‘Wald p -values’ are for the tests of the joint insignificance of the regressors other than the constant (‘Con’); where σ is the standard deviation of the histogram; and Inf and Out are the actual quarterly inflation rates and output growth (at an annual rate) in the previous quarter. ‘Constancy’ is the p -value of a test that parameter vector is the same over all individuals. ‘Panel vs pooled’ is the p -value of a likelihood ratio test that the panel-dimension is unimportant in the panel-logit regression, in the sense that the pooled estimator and panel estimator are equivalent.

Table 8: Accuracy of point forecasts and histogram means

	No. of forecasts	Point forecast	Histogram mean	Histogram mean Normal approx.	Histogram mean 'bounds'
Inflation					
68:4 to 81:2					
All	1410	1.37	1.61	1.66	
point > bound	192	1.99	3.32	3.48	2.28
point < bound	285	1.72	2.08	2.07	1.30
81:3 to 91:4					
All	786	0.39	0.87	0.76	
point > bound	21	1.46	1.07	1.46	0.13
point < bound	100	0.95	3.53	3.01	1.18
92:1 to 06:4					
All	1507	0.12	0.27	0.25	
point > bound	28	0.11	0.42	0.50	0.07
point < bound	243	0.16	0.89	0.76	0.38
Output growth					
81:3 to 91:4					
All	607	0.58	1.08	1.08	
point > bound	43	0.69	4.27	4.12	1.82
point > bound	33	0.56	3.12	3.01	0.99
92:1 to 06:4					
All	1606	0.39	0.55	0.54	
point > bound	267	0.61	1.31	1.20	0.60
point < bound	54	0.40	0.52	0.61	0.18

The actual values used to calculate the forecast errors are the second-release real-time data.