

Non-Additive Anonymous Games

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Abstract

This paper introduces a class of non-additive anonymous games where agents are assumed to be uncertain (in the sense of Knight) about opponents' strategies and about the initial distribution over players' characteristics in the game. These uncertainties are modelled by non-additive measures or capacities. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence theorem is proven for this class of games. It is shown that the equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized under milder conditions than in the case of additive games. In particular, it is not required for the space characteristics to be atomless under capacities. The set-valued map of the Cournot-Nash equilibria is upper-semicontinuous as a function of initial beliefs of the players for non-additive anonymous games.

Key words: anonymous game, uncertainty, non-additive measure, capacity.

JEL Classification: C72, D81

1 Introduction

Standard non-cooperative game theory assumes that players involved in a game behave strategically and rationally. They form beliefs about their opponents' actions and choose their best response given those beliefs. In most complex situations it is difficult (or even impossible) to guess the action of an opponent precisely, therefore beliefs are usually modelled in a probabilistic manner. That is, a player would construct

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a probability distribution which represents her beliefs about future actions of other players.

This assumption however is not realistic and too restrictive in many circumstances. There is a growing body of literature which demonstrates that individuals do not form probabilistic beliefs in a wide range of real-world situations. A classical example is the Ellsberg's Paradox (Ellsberg 1961) which shows that individual's preferences cannot be supported by a probability measure as suggested by the subjective expected utility model (Savage 1954).

The main reason for this is the lack of information about future outcomes. The psychological nature of perceiving uncertainty generated by the incompleteness of information turns out to be much more richer than it could be explained by a probability distribution. The notion of uncertainty was introduced back in 1921 by Frank Knight (Knight 1921) who proposed the distinction between those situations where individual's preferences can be described by a probabilistic model (risk) and where such models do not exist (uncertainty).

Uncertainty naturally would seem to increase as information becomes more complex. Generally in a game with one opponent a player will face less uncertainty than in the game with ten participants. As the number of players grows, it becomes crucial to be able to model uncertainty correctly. In this paper we focus on games with a large number of players who play under informational uncertainty. In such games players do not consider their opponents individually but rather look at their future actions in aggregate. Mas-Colell (1986) proposed an approach where players' beliefs about the aggregate structure of participants is modelled by a probability distribution and this distribution is a common knowledge. This assumption is very often unrealistic as in such big games players do not have precise information about the other participants. It is unlikely that all players in such a situation would be able to correctly estimate the probability and agree on this distribution. Can we precisely identify the distribution of the beliefs of all traders in London Stock Exchange? If individuals do not behave in accordance with the standard theory in simple situations, as in Ellsberg's paradox, we cannot expect them to do so in more complex situations. This is the place where many different psychological biases enter the decision process which lead to paradoxical outcomes observed in real life games and experiments.

What is the alternative model for players' beliefs if we are not going to use a probability measure? A number of authors have introduced models which describe individuals' beliefs about future outcomes in the face of uncertainty by a non-additive

measure (also called capacity or fuzzy measure).¹ Within these frameworks a representative agent maximizes his preference functional, defined as a Choquet integral over a utility function of future payoffs.

Many empirical investigations provide strong evidence that individuals are not uncertainty neutral in real life and react to uncertainty differently than they do to risk. In the majority of cases people are uncertainty-averse (Ellsberg (1961), Camerer and Ho (1994), Tversky and Fox (1995)); however in some situations they tend to be uncertainty-loving as well (Curley and Yates (1989), Hogarth and Einhorn (1990)). The strength of the Choquet expected utility approach is that it makes it possible to model these different psychological attitudes to uncertainty. In fact, players can be optimistic, pessimistic or they can have other forms of mixed preferences. The notion of non-additive beliefs allows us to model simultaneously the imprecision of information and the attitude of participants to this imprecision. This brings substantial flexibility into modelling the structure of players' beliefs.

The notion of Knightian Uncertainty is not new in Game Theory. Dow and Werlang (1994), Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996), Groes, Jacobsen, Sloth and Tranaes (1998), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000), Mukerji (1997), Marinacci (2000) and Ghirardato and LeBreton (2000) apply this approach to non-corporative games with a finite number of players and generalize the notion of Nash equilibria to games with uncertainty averse players. Again, players do not form beliefs about their opponents' strategies as a probability measure but their beliefs appear instead to be non-additive functions of subsets of pure strategies. In some special cases they can be interpreted as a set of possible mixed strategies that the opponent might play (see Klibanoff (1996), Lo (1996)). Recently Kozhan and Zarichnyi (2008) generalized the notion of Nash equilibria in capacities. They extended the results of Glycopantis and Muir (1999), Glycopantis and Muir (2000) and Aliprantis, Glycopantis and Puzzello (2006) regarding the continuity of expected payoffs and approximations of mixed strategies to the case of games under Knightian Uncertainty. Glycopantis and Muir (2008) provided an example of such games for the case of 2 players.

In this paper we develop a concept of Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium of anonymous games with players facing uncertainty. In its classical form an anonymous game is a generalization of a game with continuum players, introduced initially by Schmeidler (1973). Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974) and Mas-Colell (1986) developed the

¹The reader is referred to Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for a more detailed description of these models.

concept of equilibrium based on the probability distribution of players' characteristics rather than on the set of players itself. The contribution of the present paper is to provide an extension of Mas-Colell's equilibrium to cases when the players' are not able to use a probabilistic distribution due to presence of uncertainty. Instead, they form their beliefs about the the characteristics of opponents in the form of non-additive measures or capacities. As a consequence, a whole range of new equilibria arises in this setup.

The extension of Nash's existence theorem for non-additive anonymous games is not as straightforward as in the case of games with finite number of players. The reason for this is that a Nash equilibrium of an anonymous game is a function of initial beliefs about agents' characteristics. In Mas-Colell (1986), this function is defined only on the space of all additive probability measures while its extension onto the space of capacities is required for non-additive anonymous games. This extension is provided below.

Introducing uncertainty into anonymous games allows to relax an assumption under which a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. It is also shown that a non-additive equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized in case of atomic spaces and compact action spaces.

Another issue investigated in the paper is how the set of equilibria changes as the beliefs about the distribution over agents' characteristics change. Since the set of CN equilibria in anonymous games is a function of the initially defined distribution, some small distortions in beliefs may cause big deviations in equilibria. Thus, the question of the sensitivity of the set of CN equilibria to modeling assumptions is also addressed. Similar problems of the sensitivity of Nash equilibria in the case of additive games have been considered by Green (1984), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Kajii and Morris (1998) and others. In line with these papers we investigate the continuity of the equilibrium set in the topology of weak-* convergence on the space of non-additive measures.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section definitions and preliminaries are provided. Section 2 provides some preliminary notions and definitions needed for the analysis and Section 3 gives the definition of a non-additive anonymous game and a motivating application. The existence theorem is stated and proven in Section 4. The symmetrization theorem is given in Section 5 and Section 6 provides the result about upper-semicontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Some concluding remarks are given in Section 7.

2 Preliminaries

Functor of capacities.²

Let X be a compact Hausdorff space and \mathcal{B} a σ -algebra of its Borel subsets. Denote by $C(X)$ the space of all continuous functions on X endowed with the sup-norm topology.

Definition 2.1. A real-valued set function μ on (X, \mathcal{B}) is called a capacity if $\mu(\emptyset) = 0$, $\mu(X) = 1$ and $\mu(A) \leq \mu(B)$ for all $A \subseteq B$, $A, B \in \mathcal{B}$.

Definition 2.2. A capacity μ is upper-continuous if $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \mu(A_n) = \mu(\bigcap_{n=1}^{\infty} A_n)$ for any non-increasing sequence of sets $\{A_n\} \subset \mathcal{B}$.

Capacities are often called *non-additive* measures as they differ from measures only in the additivity axiom.

For any capacity τ defined on a product of spaces $(X \times Y, \mathcal{B}_X \times \mathcal{B}_Y)$ we can define its marginals τ_X and τ_Y by $\tau_X(F) = \tau(F \times Y)$ and $\tau_Y(G) = \tau(X \times G)$ for $F \in \mathcal{B}_X$ and $G \in \mathcal{B}_Y$.

We denote the set of all upper-continuous capacities on X by $M(X)$, and according to Zhou's representation theorem (see Zhou (1998)) we can identify it with the set of all comonotonically additive, monotonic and continuous functionals on $C(X)$ by the formula

$$\mu(f) = \int_0^{\infty} \mu(f \geq t) dt + \int_{-\infty}^0 (\mu(f \geq t) - 1) dt.$$

The above integral is called the Choquet integral.³

The set $M(X)$ endowed with the weak-* topology is a compact Hausdorff space. The base of this topology consists of the set of form

$$O(\mu_0, f_1, \dots, f_n, \varepsilon) = \{\mu \in M(X) : |\mu_0(f_i) - \mu(f_i)| < \varepsilon, i = 1, \dots, n\},$$

where $\mu_0 \in M(X)$, $f_1, \dots, f_n \in C(X)$ and $\varepsilon > 0$.⁴

²It is assumed that readers have some basic background in the theory of normal functors and categorical topology. For more information about topological functors see Eilenberg and Moore (1965), Zarichnyi (1990), Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999)

³In the name of Gustave Choquet who introduced the notion of integral with respect to non-additive measures. See Choquet (1953) for more detailed description of its properties. The theory of the Choquet integral is also described in Denneberg (1994).

⁴For spaces of probability measures weak and weak-* topologies coincide because of the reflexivity

The map $M: \text{Comp} \rightarrow \text{Comp}$ forms a covariant functor in the category Comp of compact Hausdorff spaces and their continuous maps. It maps a compact Hausdorff space X to the spaces of all upper-continuous capacities $M(X)$. Its morphism (action on continuous functions between compact Hausdorff spaces) $Mf: M(X) \rightarrow M(Y)$ is defined as follows: for given $f: X \rightarrow Y$, $M(f(\nu))(B) = \nu(f^{-1}(B))$ for $\nu \in M(X)$, B a Borel set of Y . It is shown in Nykyforchyn and Zarichnyi (2006), this functor is weakly normal.

Continuous correspondences. Let X and Y be compact Hausdorff spaces. Hereafter we denote by $F: X \rightrightarrows Y$ a set-valued map or correspondence. If all values of F are closed subsets of Y we will use an alternative notation $F: X \rightarrow \exp(Y)$, where $\exp(Y)$ denotes the space of all closed subsets of Y endowed with the Vietoris topology. A base of this topology consists of the sets of the form

$$\langle U_1, \dots, U_n \rangle = \{A \in \exp(Y) : A \subset U_1 \cup \dots \cup U_n \text{ and } A \cap U_i \neq \emptyset \text{ for every } i\},$$

where U_1, \dots, U_n run through the topology of Y (see Michael (1951) for more detailed information).

Definition 2.3. A correspondence $F: X \rightrightarrows Y$ is upper-semicontinuous at x_0 if for each sequence $\{x_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset X$ convergent to $x_0 \in X$ and a sequence $\{y_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset Y$ such that $y_n \in F(x_n)$ the condition $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y_n = y_0$ implies $y_0 \in F(x_0)$.

F is upper-semicontinuous if it is upper-semicontinuous at all points $x \in X$.

Definition 2.4. A correspondence $F: X \rightrightarrows Y$ is lower-semicontinuous at x_0 if for each convergent to $x_0 \in X$ sequence $\{x_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset X$ and a point $y_0 \in F(x_0)$ there exists a sequence $\{y_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that $y_n \in F(x_n)$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} y_n = y_0$.

F is lower-semicontinuous if it is lower-semicontinuous at all points $x \in X$.

Definition 2.5. A correspondence $F: X \rightrightarrows Y$ is continuous if it is upper- and lower-semicontinuous.

The following two lemmata state continuity properties of the intersection and the union correspondences.

Lemma 2.6. Let X be a compact Hausdorff space. Then the map $\cap: \exp(X) \times \exp(X) \rightarrow \exp(X)$ is upper-semicontinuous.

of the space of continuous functions on a compact Hausdorff space. In the case of capacities it is not the case any more. We specify the topology on $M(X)$ in the way that its restriction on the space of probability measures $P(X) \subset M(X)$ coincides with the weak-* topology on $P(X)$.

Proof. Let $\{A_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\{B_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a sequences of closed subsets of X such that $A_n \cap B_n \neq \emptyset$. Let $A = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} A_n$ and $B = \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} B_n$. Consider the sequence $\{c_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ of points from $A_n \cap B_n$ converges to the point c_0 and assume that $c_0 \notin A \cap B$. Without loss of generality we can suppose that $c_0 \notin A$. Since the space X is compact and Hausdorff it is regular and therefore there exist two open sets U and V such that $c_0 \in U$, $A \subset V$ and $U \cap V = \emptyset$. Starting from some number n_0 all points c_n belong to the neighborhood U of c_0 and, thus, do not belong to V . On the other hand, there exists n_1 such that for all $n > \max\{n_0, n_1\}$ all sets A_n should be in the neighborhood $\langle V \rangle$ of the set A . It is, however, not true because at least one point c_n from A_n does not belong to V and therefore $A_n \not\subset \langle V \rangle$. An alternative proof of this lemma can be also found in Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999). \square

Lemma 2.7. *Let X be a compact Hausdorff space. Then the map $\cup: \exp(X) \times \exp(X) \rightarrow \exp(X)$ is continuous.*

See Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999) for the proof.

Let us recall the notion of support of capacities which is defined from the categorical topology point of view. Let F be a covariant functor and $a \in F(X)$ for some compact Hausdorff space X .

Definition 2.8. *The support of an element $a \in FX$ is the set*

$$\text{supp}_F(a) = \cap \{A \subset X : A \text{ is closed and } a \in F(A)\}.$$

Intuitively, Definition 2.8 refers to the smallest closed subset of X which carry all the capacity for subsets of X .

The reader is referred to Teleiko and Zarichnyi (1999) for the proof of the following lemma.

Lemma 2.9. *Let F be a monomorphic functor in the category Comp that preserves the intersections. Then the map $\text{supp}_{F,X}: F(X) \rightarrow \exp(X)$ is lower-semicontinuous.*

3 Non-Additive Anonymous Games

We extend the definition of anonymous games given in Mas-Colell (1986) and present the concept of a non-additive anonymous game.

Let A be a non-empty compact Hausdorff space of *actions*. Every player is characterized by its continuous utility function $u: A \times M(A) \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Given an action $a \in A$

taken by a player with a utility function u and the action distribution of all players $\nu \in M(A)$, the value $u(a, \nu)$ reflects the utility of the player for choosing the action a . Let us denote by \mathcal{U} a compact set of characteristics of the players, i.e. a set of continuous utility functions on $A \times M(A)$ endowed with the supremum norm. A game with uncertain players is represented by a capacity μ on \mathcal{U} which represents common beliefs about a true distribution over players' characteristic. The capacity reflects players' attitudes to uncertainty which is assumed to be present in the game. As it was mentioned above, a capacity in general is a non-additive measure and therefore we naturally call such games non-additive anonymous games. Let us also note that a probability measure is a special case of capacities which implies that the notion of Mas-Colell's anonymous game is a special case of the concept of non-additive games introduced here. The non-additive equilibrium introduced below generalizes the concept of equilibrium proposed by Hart et al. (1974) and Mas-Colell (1986) for additive anonymous games.

Definition 3.1. *A capacity $\tau \in M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ is called a Cournot-Nash (CN) equilibrium capacity if:*

- i) $\tau_{\mathcal{U}} = \mu$;
- ii) $\tau(\{(u, a) : u(a, \tau_A) \geq u(a', \tau_A) \text{ for any } a' \in A\}) = 1$,

The notion of Mas-Colell's anonymous game is a generalized version of a Schmeidler's games with a continuum of players. Anonymity in the game arises since only the distribution of players' characteristics μ matters.

According to Mas-Colell's interpretation the distribution μ is an objective distribution of players' characteristics, known to all participants of the game. It can be understood as a mass assigned to every utility of the players involved in the game.

In this paper we assume, however, that the measure μ is non-additive and represents all players common beliefs about this distribution. As an example of such a situation let us consider a foreign exchange market consisting of customers who create demand and supply for domestic and foreign currencies and dealers who set prices and are essentially market-makers. The strategy for the dealers is to set bid and ask quotes for currencies to maximize their profits. On the one hand, the bid-ask spread should be big enough to be able to make a profit, but on the other hand the bigger it is the less customers will be willing to trade with the dealer. At the same time some customers may be informed about future changes in fundamentals or other macro variables. As stated in Lyons (2001):

”Dealers know that when they trade with someone who is better informed, they can expect to lose money on the trade. If one could identify better-informed traders before trading, then this would not be a problem – dealers could choose not to trade, or could adjust price appropriately – but dealers typically cannot identify those who are better informed.”

Thus, it is critical for dealers to predict the ratio of informed (*inf*) versus uninformed (*unf*) traders in the market. Let us assume that a dealer estimates the proportion of better-informed traders by $0 < \pi < 1$ but he is uncertain about this value. If he underestimates the true value and sets prices with a small bid-ask spread, he may lose money. In order to insure himself against underestimation of this proportion the dealer can make his decision by assuming that the fraction of informed traders is $\pi_1 > \pi$. This will lead to an increase in the bid-ask spread which could decrease the number of customers willing to trade with him substantially. Thus, both cases are undesirable. If we assume that the dealer is uncertainty averse and his preferences satisfy the axioms given by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) then the dealer will behave in this situation according to the worst-case scenario. The capacity which describes the dealer’s beliefs about the distribution of market participants is given by $\min\{p\delta_{inf} + (1 - p)\delta_{unf} : p \in (\pi - \varepsilon, \pi + \varepsilon)\}$ for some positive (perhaps small) ε which is subjectively determined. Hence, the dealer’s belief about the agents’ distributions is formed by a non-additive measure.

Another source of uncertainty which appears in this game is that concerning the opponents’ actions. Again, in Mas-Colell’s anonymous games beliefs about opponents’ actions are modelled by a probability distributions which are reflected in equilibrium by the marginal τ_A . In the game under uncertainty this marginal becomes a non-additive measure in general.

3.1 Example

Let us a consider simpler but more formal example.⁵ There is a continuum of players who will be randomly paired and will play a game where two opponents simultaneously choose one of two actions L and R . Suppose there are two possible types of people in the population, the first like to match what their partner does and the second like to mismatch. Specifically, suppose the payoff matrix for this game is given as follows:

⁵I was advised with the example what I am very grateful for.

		<i>Player 2</i>	
		<i>L</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>Player 1</i>	<i>L</i>	1,0	0,1
	<i>R</i>	0,1	1,0

Each player cannot identify the type of his opponent. His 'expected' payoff from choosing to play either L or R depends on his beliefs about how other players in the population will play. In particular, if his beliefs about the distribution of action choices in the population is represented by the capacity τ_A over $\{L, R\}$ then we have the payoff for a player of type 1, from playing L is given by the Choquet integral

$$u_1(L, \tau_A) = \tau_A(\{L\})u_1(L, L) + (1 - \tau_A(\{L\}))u_1(L, R) = \tau_A(\{L\}).$$

The expected payoff of a player of type 1 from playing R is given by the Choquet integral

$$u_1(R, \tau_A) = \tau_A(\{R\})u_1(R, R) + (1 - \tau_A(\{R\}))u_1(R, L) = \tau_A(\{R\}).$$

Similarly, the expected payoff of a player of type 2 from playing L or R are given by the respective Choquet integrals

$$\begin{aligned} u_2(L, \tau_A) &= \tau_A(\{R\})u_2(L, R) + (1 - \tau_A(\{R\}))u_2(L, L) = \tau_A(\{R\}) \\ u_2(R, \tau_A) &= \tau_A(\{L\})u_2(R, L) + (1 - \tau_A(\{L\}))u_2(R, R) = \tau_A(\{L\}). \end{aligned}$$

A game is characterized by a capacity μ on $\mathcal{U} = \{1, 2\}$. Let us assume that $\mu(\{1\}) > 0$ and $\mu(\{2\}) > 0$, that is, there are positive common beliefs (possibly non-additive) about the presence in the population of players of both types.

Let us consider some special cases of CN equilibria. Let

$$\begin{aligned} \tau^*(\emptyset) &= 0 \text{ and } \tau^*(\mathcal{U} \times A) = 1 \\ \tau^*(\{i, a\}) &= 0 \text{ for all } (i, a) \in \mathcal{U} \times A \\ \tau^*(\{(1, L), (2, R)\}) &= 1 \\ \tau^*(\{(1, R), (2, L)\}) &= 0 \\ \tau^*(\{(1, L), (1, R)\}) &= \mu(\{1\}) \\ \tau^*(\{(2, L), (2, R)\}) &= \mu(\{2\}) \\ \tau^*(\{(1, L), (2, L)\}) &= 1 \\ \tau^*(\{(1, R), (2, R)\}) &= 1 \\ \tau^*(\mathcal{U} \times A \setminus \{(i, a)\}) &= 1 \text{ for all } (i, a) \in \mathcal{U} \times A \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to see that τ^* is a capacity. Let us show that τ^* is also a CN equilibrium. First note that $\tau_{\mathcal{U}}^*(\{1\}) = \tau^*({(1, L), (1, R)}) = \mu(\{1\})$ and $\tau_{\mathcal{U}}^*(\{2\}) = \tau^*({(2, L), (2, R)}) = \mu(\{2\})$. Finally, we have

$$\begin{aligned} u_1(L, \tau_A^*) &= \tau_A^*(\{L\}) = \tau_A^*(\{R\}) = u_1(R, \tau_A^*) = 1 \\ u_2(R, \tau_A^*) &= \tau_A^*(\{L\}) = \tau_A^*(\{R\}) = u_2(L, \tau_A^*) = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Hence

$$\tau^*({(u, a) : u(a, \tau_A^*) \geq u(A, \tau_A^*)}) = 1$$

as required.

Let us note that by construction $\tau_A(\{L\}) = \tau_A(\{R\}) = 1$. This means that there exists an equilibrium where players are extremely optimistic and believe with probability (non-additive) one that the nature will always be on their side. Therefore, according to their beliefs, whatever they choose to play their payoff will be positive. This fact may seem counter-intuitive. However, human behavior in real life is also inconsistent with the classical notion of rationality. People buy lotteries knowing that on average (under additive probability) they will lose. This fact however does not prevent them from expecting to get a valuable prize. They are optimistic and this optimism makes their decisions not fully rational in the classical sense. This example illustrates how game theory can explain why people often do not behave in accordance with a ("additive") CN equilibrium.

In the same way we can derive a pessimistic equilibrium where players will always expect a zero payoff.

4 CN Equilibria and the Existence Theorem

In this section the first result we give is the existence theorem for CN equilibria in non-additive anonymous games. To establish this we need the following auxiliary lemmata. Let

$$\begin{aligned} K(\tau_A) &= \{(u, a) : u(a, \tau_A) \geq u(A, \tau_A)\}, \\ B'_1(\mu) &= \{\tau' : \tau'_{\mathcal{U}} = \mu\}, \\ B''_1(\tau_A) &= \{\tau' : \tau'_A = \tau_A\}, \\ B(\tau_A) &= \{\tau' : \tau'(K(\tau_A)) = 1\}. \end{aligned}$$

Lemma 4.1. *The correspondence $K : M(A) \rightarrow \mathcal{U} \times A$ is upper-semicontinuous.*

Proof. Let us consider an arbitrary sequence $\{\nu_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset M(A)$ which converges to a capacity $\nu_0 \in M(A)$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$ and assume that there exists a sequence $\{(u_n, a_n)\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}} \subset \mathcal{U} \times A$ such that $(u_n, a_n) \rightarrow (u_0, a_0)$ with $(u_n, a_n) \in K(\nu_n)$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $(u_0, a_0) \notin K(\nu_0)$. This last condition implies that there is an $a' \in A$ such that $u_0(a_0, \nu_0) < u_0(a', \nu_0)$. Denote $\varepsilon = u_0(a', \nu_0) - u_0(a_0, \nu_0)$.

Since $u_n \rightarrow u_0$ uniformly with $n \rightarrow \infty$ there exists a number $N_1 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for all $n > N_1$ and all $(a, \nu) \in A \times M(A)$

$$|u_0(a, \nu) - u_n(a, \nu)| < \frac{\varepsilon}{4}.$$

On the other hand the continuity of u_0 implies that there exists $N_2 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for each $n > N_2$ it hold

$$|u_0(a_0, \nu_0) - u_0(a_n, \nu_n)| < \frac{\varepsilon}{4} \quad \text{and} \quad |u_0(a', \nu_0) - u_0(a', \nu_n)| < \frac{\varepsilon}{4}.$$

Thus, if $n > \max\{N_1, N_2\}$ we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} u_n(a_n, \nu_n) &< u_0(a_n, \nu_n) + \frac{\varepsilon}{4} < u_0(a_0, \nu_0) + \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \\ &= u_0(a', \nu_0) - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} < u_0(a', \nu_n) - \frac{\varepsilon}{4} < u_n(a', \nu_n). \end{aligned}$$

This condition however contradicts the assumption that $(u_n, a_n) \in K(\nu_n)$. Hence, $(u_0, a_0) \in K(\nu_0)$ and this implies the upper-semicontinuity of the correspondence K . \square

Lemma 4.2. *The correspondence $B: M(A) \rightarrow M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ is upper-semicontinuous.*

Proof. Let $\nu_n \in M(A)$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $\nu \in M(A)$ and $\nu_n \rightarrow \nu$. Consider arbitrary sequence $\tau'_n \in M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ which converges to $\tau' \in M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ with $n \rightarrow \infty$ and covers $\{\nu_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, i.e. $\tau'_n \in B(\nu_n)$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Let us assume that $\tau' \notin B(\nu)$, that is $\tau'(K(\nu)) < 1$. This means that there exists $(u_0, a_0) \in \text{supp}(\tau') \subset \mathcal{U} \times A$ such that

$$(u_0, a_0) \notin K(\nu). \tag{4.1}$$

On the other hand, since $\tau'_n \in B(\nu_n)$ we have that

$$\text{supp}(\tau'_n) \subset K(\nu_n) \tag{4.2}$$

for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Lower semicontinuity of the map supp (see Lemma 2.9) implies that there exists a sequence $(u_n, a_n)_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ converging to (u_0, a_0) such that $(u_n, a_n) \in \text{supp}(\tau'_n)$ for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and, according to (4.2) $(u_n, a_n) \in K(\nu_n)$. Upper-semicontinuity of the

correspondence K (see Lemma 4.1) implies however that $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} (u_n, a_n) = (u_0, a_0) \in K(\nu)$ which contradicts with (4.1). Thus, $\tau' \in B(\nu)$ and therefore the correspondence B is upper-semicontinuous. \square

Mas-Colell (1986) proved that the set CNE of all CN equilibria of an additive anonymous game is not empty. We now consider the analogous result for CN equilibria in non-additive anonymous games. The proof is similar in spirit to that given by Mas-Colell (1986) and is based on the topological results stated above.

Theorem 4.3. *Let μ be a non-additive anonymous game. Then $\text{CNE} \neq \emptyset$.*

Proof. Since \mathcal{U} and A are compact Hausdorff spaces, so are $M(\mathcal{U})$ and $M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$. The set $B'_1(\mu)$ is compact and convex subset of $M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ and the set $K(\tau_A)$ is closed in $\mathcal{U} \times A$. Define a correspondence $\Phi: B'_1(\mu) \rightarrow B'_1(\mu)$ by $\Phi(\tau) = B'_1(\mu) \cap B(\tau_A)$ for each $\tau \in B'_1(\mu)$. It is clear that $\Phi(\tau)$ is convex and compact for all τ . This correspondence is upper-semicontinuous due to Lemmata 2.6 and 4.2. Therefore, the conditions of the Fan fixed point theorem are satisfied (see Fan (1952)). Hence, there exists $\tau \in \Phi(\tau)$, that is, $\tau(K(\tau_A)) = 1$. \square

Remark 4.4. Note that in spite of the fact that in the case of additive measure μ , additive equilibria is a subset of non-additive equilibria, the above existence theorem for non-additive games is not a consequence of Mas-Colell's Theorem 1 in general. Mas-Colell's case can only cover situations where beliefs about the player's distribution is additive and does not tell us anything about the existence of equilibrium under uncertainty. Let us look at this in more detail.

First of all let us note that the characteristics spaces \mathcal{U} are not identical for additive and non-additive games. Since $P(A) \subset M(A)$, the set of players characteristics under uncertainty is broader. Each player has to determine the expected payoff in the case if beliefs about opponents actions are non-additive and this brings more variety to the set of possible payoff functions. Let us denote by \mathcal{U}' the set of payoff functions on $A \times P(A)$ defined as restrictions of those from \mathcal{U} . In this way we define a continuous restriction map $r: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow \mathcal{U}'$.

In order to make a connection between the two types of anonymous games (additive and non-additive) we define a restriction μ' of the capacity $\mu \in M(\mathcal{U})$ on $M(\mathcal{U}')$ by $\mu' = Mr(\mu)$. If μ happens to be additive (there is no uncertainty in the game), so is its restriction μ' . Thus, if $\tau' \in P(\mathcal{U}' \times A)$ is an equilibrium for the game μ' , one can easily construct an equilibrium $\tau \in P(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ for μ by $\tau(E) = \tau'(E \cap (\mathcal{U}' \times A))$. Thus, in

the case of an additive capacity we do not need to prove a separate existence theorem. However, if μ is not additive, its restriction μ' might not be additive in general and hence Mas-Colell's theorem would not be applicable. This motivates the use of non-additive equilibria in the presence of uncertainty and shows that Mas-Colell's concept of equilibrium does not always work.

5 Symmetric equilibria

An important property of CN equilibria, considered by Mas-Colell (1986), is their symmetry.

Definition 5.1. *A CN equilibrium τ for a game μ is symmetric if there is a measurable function $f: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow A$ such that $\tau(\text{graph}(f)) = 1$.*

Under a symmetric equilibrium distribution players with the same characteristic take the same action from A . In fact, a symmetric equilibrium in an anonymous game is analogous to a pure strategy equilibrium in a finite player game. The function f assigns to each characteristic u from \mathcal{U} a unique action a from A that all players with characteristic u choose under this equilibrium. Thus, existence of a symmetric equilibrium in the anonymous additive game implies existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.

There is a difference between symmetric equilibrium in additive and non-additive anonymous games. In additive games payers will play strategies that are not specified by function f with probability 0 while a symmetric equilibrium does not rule out possibilities of other strategies in non-additive games due to presence of uncertainty.

Coming back to the example in Section 3.1, equilibrium distribution τ^* is symmetric. There exists function $f: \{1, 2\} \rightarrow \{\mathbb{R}, L\}$, defined by $f(1) = R$, $f(2) = L$, which satisfies the condition of Definition 5.1. Indeed, $\text{graph}(f) = \{(1, R), (2, L)\}$ and it is shown that $\tau^*(\text{graph}(f)) = 1$. In this equilibrium each player has optimistic beliefs according to which he will be matched with an opponent of type 1. In this case a player of type 1 is better off if he plays R and a player of type two receives higher payoff under strategy L .

Although, a CN equilibrium distribution always exists for additive anonymous games, there may be no symmetric equilibrium in general. Mas-Colell (1986) showed that if the game μ is atomless and the action set is finite, then there is a symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium.

The concept of non-additive anonymous games allow us to establish a much more general result. The sufficient condition when a CN equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized is given as follows.

Definition 5.2. *A CN equilibrium τ for a game μ can be symmetrized if there exists a symmetric CN equilibrium distribution τ' such that $K(\tau_A) = K(\tau'_A)$.*

Let $\tau \in M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ be a CN equilibrium distribution for a non-additive game μ . Consider the correspondence $B_\tau: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow A$ acting by the formula $B_\tau(u) = \{a \in A: (u, a) \in K(\tau_A)\}$.

In the case of additive anonymous games, Khan and Sun (1987) prove that every CN equilibrium distribution can be symmetrized if μ is atomless and finite. Later, Khan and Sun (1995) relaxed the finiteness assumption and extended the result up to countable compact action spaces. Rath, Sun and Yamashige (1995) go further and establish a more general result which states that each CN equilibrium distribution τ of an atomless game can be symmetrized if the set $D = \{\mu \circ f^{-1}: f \text{ is a measurable selection from } B_\tau\}$ is closed. However, in all these cases, the game is required to be atomless. In the non-additive case, this condition is not necessary any more.

Proposition 5.3. *If there is a Borel selection $f: \mathcal{U} \rightarrow A$ of B_τ such that*

$$\tau_A(\text{im}(f)) = 1$$

then τ can be symmetrized.

Proof. Let us construct a symmetric CN equilibrium capacity τ' satisfying the condition of Definition 5.2. For any Borel set $G \in \mathcal{U} \times A$ we set $\tau'(G) = \tau(G)$ if $\text{graph}(f) \not\subseteq G$ and $\tau'(G) = 1$ if $\text{graph}(f) \subseteq G$.

Let us note first that τ' is a capacity. Indeed, for any $F, G \in \mathcal{U} \times A$ such that $F \subset G$ we have $\tau'(F) = \tau(F) \leq \tau(G) = \tau'(G)$ if $\text{graph}(f) \not\subseteq G$, $\tau'(F) = \tau(F) \leq 1 = \tau'(G)$ if $f(\mathcal{U}) \not\subseteq F$ and $\text{graph}(f) \subseteq F$, $\tau'(F) = 1 = \tau'(G)$ if $\text{graph}(f) \subseteq F$.

Let us show that $K(\tau'_A) = K(\tau_A)$. As the set $K(\tau_A)$ depends on the marginal τ_A , we have to show that this marginal does not change while switching from capacity τ to τ' . Let $F \subset A$ such that $\text{im}(f) \subset F$. According to the condition of the proposition, $\tau(F) = 1 = \tau'(F)$. If $\text{im}(f) \not\subseteq F$ then $\text{graph}(f) \not\subseteq \mathcal{U} \times F$ which implies that $\tau(\mathcal{U} \times F) = \tau'(\mathcal{U} \times F)$ by the construction of τ' . Thus, $\tau'_A(F) = \tau_A(F)$.

Finally, τ' is a CN equilibrium capacity, since $\text{im}(f) \subseteq K(\tau_A) = K(\tau'_A)$ and hence $\tau'(K(\tau'_A)) = 1$. □

Remark 5.4. By definition, the capacity of the set of actions $\text{im}(f)$, which players use in the new symmetrized equilibrium, has to be equal to 1. The condition $\tau_A(\text{im}(f)) = 1$ makes sure that it is possible to modify the equilibrium τ without changing its marginal distribution τ_A .

By definition of the equilibrium, $\tau(K(\tau_A)) = 1$. As a result, according to the construction of the correspondence B_τ one finds that $\tau_A(\text{im}(B_\tau)) = 1$. This means that all actions which are in the set of pay-off maximizing actions have a total (non-additive) measure of 1.

When the equilibrium distribution (capacity) τ is being symmetrized, the same condition should hold for the symmetrized equilibrium τ' . By the concept of symmetrization, we do not want to change the marginal τ_A and therefore the condition $\tau'_A = \tau_A$ should be satisfied. Thus, one should be able to find a selection from the correspondence B_τ such that all actions from the set of pay-off maximizing actions should have in total measure 1.

For example, let $A = \{a_1, a_2\}$ and $\mathcal{U} = \{u_1, u_2\}$ and let τ being the equilibrium such that $K(\tau_A) = \{(a_1, u_1), (a_2, u_1), (a_2, u_2)\}$ and $\tau_A(a_2) < 1$. There exist two possible selections: either $f(u_1) = a_1$ and $f(u_2) = a_2$ or $f(u_1) = a_2$ and $f(u_2) = a_2$. If one decides to use the second option to construct the symmetrized equilibrium τ' , this will destroy the condition $\tau'_A = \tau_A$ since $\tau'(a_2) = 1$.

Remark 5.5. An additive game with atoms may not have a symmetric CNED. The following example is due to Rath et al. (1995). Consider a game with the action set $A = \{a_1, a_2\}$ and let $u \in \mathcal{U}$ be given by $u(a_1, \nu) = \frac{1}{2}$, $u(a_2, \nu) = 1 - \nu(a_2)$ with $\nu \in P(A)$. Let $\mu = \delta_u$ denote the game (a Dirac measure concentrated on u).

Let τ be a CNED of μ . Suppose $\tau_A(a_2) < \frac{1}{2}$. Then $u(a_1, \tau_A) < u(a_2, \tau_A) \Rightarrow \tau(K(\tau_A)) = \tau(u, a_2) = 1 \Rightarrow \tau_A(a_2) = 1$ and we get a contradiction. Hence, $\tau_A(a_2) \not< \frac{1}{2}$. In the same way we can conclude that $\tau_A(a_2) \not> \frac{1}{2}$ and thus, the only possible case is $\tau_A(a_1) = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\tau_A(a_2) = \frac{1}{2}$. The only equilibrium distribution τ is that defined by $\tau(\{u, a_1\}) = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\tau(\{u, a_2\}) = \frac{1}{2}$. Since every player has the same utility function, the space of characteristics is a singleton $\{u\}$ and $B_\tau(u) = \{a_1, a_2\}$. There may be only two possible selections: $f(u) = a_1$ or $f(u) = a_2$ each of them has graph of measure $\frac{1}{2}$. This implies τ is not symmetric and cannot be symmetrized.

If one allows distributions to be non-additive, then a symmetric equilibrium can be easily constructed. For example, capacity $\tau(u, a_1) = 1$, $\tau(u, a_2) = \frac{3}{4}$ is a CN equilibrium capacity for μ , as the selection f which maps u to a_1 has a graph $\{(u, a_1)\}$ of capacity

1. However, it is worth noting that not every CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. For instance, a capacity defined by $\tau(u, a_1) = \tau(u, a_2) = \frac{1}{2}$ (which is additive) cannot be symmetrized even under non-additive beliefs (the same argument as above applies).

Therefore, the previous result holds under weaker conditions than in the additive case. This can be seen from the proof of the Theorem from Khan and Sun (1987). They in fact show how to construct the selection which satisfies the condition of Proposition 5.3 for games with atomless space of players' characteristics and finite number of actions. Under uncertainty, a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized for games with any compact space of actions (not necessarily finite) and it also does not require the space of characteristics to be atomless.

6 Upper-semicontinuity of CN Equilibria

Having proved the existence theorem, we now consider a sequence of non-additive games to study how variations in players' beliefs affects the set of equilibria. The second result of the paper is given in the following theorem, where we investigate the sensitivity of the CN equilibrium to the initial parameter. It asserts then when the beliefs vary "continuously", the set of CN equilibria varies upper-semicontinuously.

Theorem 6.1. *The CN equilibria correspondence $\text{CNE}: M(\mathcal{U}) \rightarrow M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ is upper-semicontinuous.*

Proof. Let us define a correspondence $B_1: M(\mathcal{U}) \times M(A) \rightarrow M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ by $B_1(\mu, \tau_A) = B'_1(\mu) \cap B''_1(\tau_A)$. The fact that the correspondence B_1 is continuous implies from the open-multicommutativity of the functor M , which is proved in Kozhan (2006).

The set of all CN equilibria of the game μ can be represented as $\text{CNE} = \bigcup_{\tau_A \in M(A)} (B_1(\mu, \tau_A) \cap B(\tau_A))$. Lemmata 2.6, 2.7 and 4.2 imply that the correspondence CNE is upper-semicontinuous. \square

The statement of Theorem 6.1 says that if we consider a sequence of games $\{\mu_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ with $\mu_k \in M(\mathcal{U})$ which converges to μ^* and a sequence of their CN equilibria $\{\tau_k\}_{k \in \mathbb{N}}$ such that $\tau_k \in \text{CNE}(\mu_k) \subset M(\mathcal{U} \times A)$ which converges to τ^* then τ^* is a CN equilibria for the game μ^* (that is, $\tau^* \in \text{CNE}(\mu^*)$). This means that small deviations from the initial beliefs will not decrease the set of CN equilibria.

7 Conclusion

Much of economic theory studies situations which can be modelled by anonymous games. Many models of market games involve the notion of perfect competition, where no participant has the market power to influence prices. The framework of anonymous games developed by Schmeidler (1973) provides the required tools to model this situation.

This paper considers an extension of anonymous games to the case where players are faced with Knightian Uncertainty. In particular, it is assumed that there are two types of uncertainty: about possible strategies of opponents and about the distribution over agents' characteristics involved in the game. Both types of uncertainty have been modelled using capacities, which are generalizations of probability distributions. This paper has generalized Mas-Colell's (Mas-Colell 1986) equilibrium concept for anonymous games to the case of games under uncertainty. We have established the existence theorem of CN equilibria for such games. A sufficient condition is given under which a CN equilibrium can be symmetrized. This condition is weaker than for additive anonymous games.

Moreover, we have shown that the CN equilibrium correspondence which maps initial beliefs about the distribution over agents' characteristics into the set of CN equilibria is upper-semicontinuous. This fact could be useful when considering approximations and investigating stability and sensitivity of the set of CN equilibria.

The notion of uncertainty brings more flexibility into the structure of CN equilibria of the games. A clear advantage is that we can incorporate more psychological aspects into the model which will reflect the real world more realistically. Players are allowed to construct their beliefs in optimistic or pessimistic manners, to be uncertainty averse or uncertainty loving. The cost is the increase in the number of equilibria in the game, although some equilibria can be easily filtered out as unrealistic.

Another issue which concerns capacities is how to use them in real games. The problem is that up to our knowledge there is no randomization device which could generate realizations from a non-additive distribution. Since there is uncertainty in the model, there is also uncertainty in the equilibrium and in what a realization of the equilibrium will be. A non-additive equilibrium distribution gives us a general picture of how equilibrium strategies would look on average. A non-additive equilibrium enables us to see how the players will tend to play. This has a strong relation to the notion of fuzzy sets – one could see where approximately the set is, but cannot

precisely determine its boundaries. How to play a capacity strategy remains an open and challenging question.

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