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## **Digital Traces of “Twitter Revolutions”: Resistance, Polarization, and Surveillance via Contested Images and Texts of Occupy Gezi**

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Protest movements have been galvanized recently by social media and are commonly, and somewhat hyperbolically, referred to by mainstream media as “Twitter revolutions.” This article identifies social media as a battleground for disseminating contending versions of reality, not only during Twitter revolutions, but also in their aftermath. Articulating the enduring impact of popular social movements and examining how protestors and governmental supporters contest their meaning over time, the article studies the digital traces of the Gezi Park protests in Turkey (2013) after the mobilization dissipated. The digital traces of protests act as critical digital artifacts of contestation with actors on both sides (pro- and anti-AKP [Justice and Development Party] government in Turkey). These digital traces are reanimated by both actors to build support, assert truth claims, foster identity/community, and/or demand recognition. The article deploys content and multimodal analyses of texts and images on Twitter, shared through hashtags on the protests when the protests’ alleged leaders faced trials (2018–2019).

*Keywords: digital traces, online polarization, resistance, surveillance, Occupy Gezi, political image*

Protests unfold in a given time and space, but they live on in symbols, cultural artifacts, and memories, and can be reappropriated by protestors and opponents to build political capital. Protest movements such as the Arab Spring were fueled by social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, and are commonly referred to as “Twitter revolutions” (see Christensen, 2011; Morozov, 2009). The consequences of the early 2010s protests have continued to transform people’s everyday lives, political identities, and the social media

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practices of the activists and their opponents. As an example, the Gezi protests are still at the forefront of the Turkish agenda after seven years and social media users continue to engage with the memory, iconography, and symbols of the protests on a range of digital platforms. This article demonstrates how digital traces of texts and images are contested by diverse actors across time on social media. Users take advantage of this mutability (Rose, 2016) to present a particular narrative or elaborate an argument that supports a certain worldview. We argue that the digital traces of the Gezi Park protests act as critical digital artifacts of contestation for actors on both sides, pro- and anti-AKP (the Justice and Development Party) government. We argue that these digital traces are not temporary trails that disappear over time, but are reanimated by actors on both sides to build support, assert truth claims, foster identity/community, and/or demand recognition. Preserving traces on digital platforms becomes a critical issue specifically because of intense pressure on Internet freedoms, which causes the disappearance of initial traces of the protests.

In examining the digital traces of protests in their aftermath by using a content and multimodal discourse analysis of texts and visuals, our research fills a gap in the existing literature as most of the previous literature on digital political voice related to social movements has focused exclusively on the peak of protest activity (see Khondker, 2011; McGarry et al., 2019a; Varnali & Gorgulu, 2015). Our research methodology captures the visual and textual expression of social movements' messages when their political expression becomes more latent, making it easier for an authoritarian state to arrest activists. More specifically, our article interrogates the political discourse in Turkey following the Gezi Park protests by analyzing texts and images shared through popular hashtags and mentions related to the protests when their alleged leaders faced trial in 2018 and 2019.

We seek to show how Gezi Park protestors and their opponents imagine or reimagine the events of 2013, their legacy and their enduring appeal, not least as a resource to galvanize others to act or react in the material or digital spheres. Following Milan (2018), it is crucial to foreground "the role of human agency and meaning-making through protest. Likes, shares, check-ins, selfies, and other expressivity, interaction, and affectivity on social media are only some of the visible digital traces disseminated by users in an equivalent of virtual footprints" (p. 509). Our research explores how digital traces are seized, reanimated, and reappropriated by diverse actors for specific performative and expressive purposes, namely, to establish meaning, build solidarity, raise awareness, and deliver hate speech. We argue that digital traces exist on social media as a legacy and testament to the Gezi Park protests in 2013, while identifying the visual realm as an ongoing "site of struggle" on social media platforms (Doerr et al., 2013, p. xii).

Interrogating how digital traces can be protected or reimaged and the trajectory of online trails of protests, the article brings a novel perspective on social media and its relation to (recent) memory as well as its affinity to social and political change. The article goes beyond a simplistic presentation of archetypes of actors in protest movements: "Images of protest in the news rely on a selective portrayal in the sense that they are usually limited to a few archetypes such as the rioter, the picket or the performer" (Doerr et al., 2013, p. xiv). In this respect, we not only look at the reappropriation of texts and images on digital geographies in the aftermath of the protests, but also capture how some of the shared visual culture and texts are corrupted or fake stories that actually were not viral during the peak of the protests. We illustrate the ways Twitter users contested the meaning and significance of "Gezi" over time and voiced

polarized views about the protests, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup in July 2016. During this time, the Gezi activists mobilized empathy, togetherness, and solidarity by continuously taking the Gezi protests as a symbolic reference point, and anti-Gezi protesters mobilized violence, hatred, and anger on digital platforms. Gezi activists posted texts and images on Twitter primarily to point out that the protests were a leaderless mobilization. Anti-Gezi groups, however, displayed instances of how internal and external enemies were at work in mobilizing the Gezi protests from above. Using fake images and videos, these groups portrayed the protestors as dangerous and violent "others" to show support for the recent raid of the alleged leaders of the protests.

We argue that social media platforms can take neither credit nor blame for single-handedly transforming social processes or for turning around events. We do not intend to applaud the successes of social media or rally against their insidious effects; the aim here is to systematically analyze social media mechanisms as sources of transformation (van Dijck & Poell, 2013, p. 11) and contestation in relation to protest movements and their symbols. This article also does not seek to determine whether digital media augment polarization or solidarity but seeks to uncover how digital media are harnessed by actors seeking to shape meaning and engage in consciousness-raising through contesting and reanimating the texts and images of the protests. In this respect, the first part of the article introduces the background of resistance and polarization in Turkey in relation to the Gezi protests. The ensuing section theorizes digital traces to inform the conceptual framework, and the next part foregrounds the methodological approach of the research. The following two sections analyze digital traces of the protests in the form of discourses and images in 2018 and 2019 when hate speech, allegations, contestation, and polarization were at a peak in Turkey and across the world.

### **The Gezi Park Protests as a Response to Rising Authoritarianism**

From a historical perspective, the 1980s were marked by the proliferation and mainstreaming of radical right-wing parties across the globe, such as Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, Ronald Reagan in the United States, and Turgut Özal in Turkey, united by their anticommunist and neoliberal agendas, populist politics, and ethnic nationalism. In the 2000s, far-right parties received large and enduring electoral support in Europe, such as the Front National (France), the FPÖ (Austria), and the Danish People's Party (Denmark; Rydgren, 2017, p. 485). Election legislation and party coalitions, levels of immigration, unemployment, gender and education level of voters, and dissatisfaction with the functioning of mainstream parties and democratic institutions help account for the increasing popularity of far-right parties (Doroshenko, 2018, p. 3187) as well as their mainstreaming. Following the 2008 financial crisis, populism made historical electoral advances across the globe, including Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, Vladimir Putin, Jair Bolsonaro, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Matteo Salvini, Viktor Orbán, and K. P. Sharma Oli, with xenophobic tendencies combined with corporate power (Wallgren, Pyakurel, Pardo, & Teivainen, 2020, p. 178) and increasing use of religious references. Like its global counterparts, the populism of the AKP is neoliberal, authoritarian, and nationalist in character and in constant search for internal and external enemies to galvanize supporters (Özçetin, 2019, p. 942).

The driving social force of the Gezi protests

was the alienation of non-conservative citizens (e.g., secularists, liberals, and Alevis) from the authoritarianism of the AKP governments (2002–present). This represents a social force opposed to the AKP’s construction of a new collective identity and political regime—the New Turkey (Göksel & Tekdemir, 2018, p. 382),

which primarily rests on a neoliberal and Islamist political agenda. The Gezi protests initially unfolded as an opposition to the radical urban restructuring programs and the commodification of urban space (Karakayalı & Yaka, 2014; Kuymulu, 2013), symbolized by the intention of protestors to protect the trees in Gezi Park as the government intended to transform it into a shopping mall and artillery barracks. This reaction turned into a wider political mobilization, which opened new and ongoing possibilities in claiming the rights to the city and media and standing up against growing authoritarianism (Eslen-Ziya et al., 2019; McGarry et al., 2019a, 2019b; Ozduzen, 2018, 2019).

It is estimated that “approximately 3,600,000 activists participated in protests held in 80 of 81 provinces. Moreover, the number of Twitter users in Turkey increased from 1.8M to over 9.5M in the first five days of the Gezi protests alone in May 2013” (Yaman, 2014, p. 21). In the same period, more than 13 million tweets were shared with hashtags such as #direngeziparki (#resistgezipark; Saka, 2019, p. 33). Political hashtags on social media, specifically on Twitter, came to prominence in events such as the 2009 Iran presidential election (#iranelection; Small, 2011) or the protests that constituted the Arab Spring (see Bruns, Highfield, & Burgess, 2013; Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011; Khondker, 2011; Wolfsfeld, Segev, & Sheaffer, 2013). Similar to the 2013 protests in Brazil, Bulgaria, and the 2014 Umbrella movement in Hong Kong, social media, especially Twitter, were some of the main conduits of the Gezi uprising (Demirhan, 2014; Mercea, Karatas, & Bastos, 2017; Karatas & Saka, 2017) and other social movements in Turkey in the 2010s that paved the way to the uprising, such as environmental activism (Şen & Şen, 2016). Research has also demonstrated how protestors during the Gezi protests used images to challenge the government’s representation of the protestors as lawless thugs and to present a prefigurative vision of Turkish society that was participatory, open, inclusive, and democratic (McGarry et al., 2019b; Ozduzen, 2020).

The “right to the city” during the protests entailed the right to access media with an aim of going beyond the “penguin media”<sup>2</sup> in Turkey, wherein activists created their own media content and used technology for their own ends, which had been a common feature of so-called Twitter revolutions such as the Arab Spring. Citizens turned to social media networks when it became apparent that mainstream media had been co-opted and was untrustworthy, pushing misinformation, propaganda, and lies. Gezi activists attempted to challenge the narrative presented by the government, government supporters, and mainstream media in the government’s support. In the face of the concomitant dismantling of the mainstream media, we see the emergence and development of an alternative, critical, and autonomous new media landscape, which Ataman and Çoban (2018) describe as a kind of countersurveillance institution. Digital media in Turkey, especially Twitter and Facebook, attracted citizens seeking the truth regarding events in Gezi Park, the issues of police brutality, and the erosion of civil liberties. People who wanted a space to discuss events unfolding in Istanbul and elsewhere connected with fellow citizens, expressed

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<sup>2</sup> The mainstream media was then referred to as “the penguin media.” While millions of people protested the government, TV channels such as CNN Turk aired documentaries on penguins.

solidarity, and built resistance. Activists engaged in live historicizing of the park occupation through social media, for example, through image circulation on Twitter, video dissemination on YouTube, discussions on Facebook page forums, drone footage, creation of alt-media TV, live streaming, and documenting events digitally as they unfolded. Trolls and AKP supporters also harnessed social media to engage in manipulation, insult, and accusation (Bulut & Yörük, 2017), while using digital surveillance technologies that triggered restrictive consequences for citizens located in the ranks of Turkey's opposition (Saka, 2019, p. 68).


### Method

In delineating the complexity of online user engagement, we posed critical questions on the social and cultural dynamics of digital activism by selecting the most popular hashtags in the aftermath of the protests when the alleged protest leaders were put on trial. To examine the textual and visual discourse that digital publics generate through Twitter hashtags in this period, we determined the most ubiquitous terms in Tweets following selected hashtags. Through tracing these terms, metaphors, narratives, images, and categories of social representations, we show how the memory of collective action forges proponents and opponents and is useful for solidarity, polarization, and state surveillance. In our study, Twitter was selected as it "affords an opportunity to generate broadly applicable insights" (Tafesse & Wien, 2017, p. 6) as a platform for both textual and visual expression. Whereas the majority of existing research on Twitter looks at the peak of political events as case studies (see Ahmed, Jaidka, & Cho, 2017; Wilson & Dunn, 2011; Yardi & boyd, 2010), we proposed that social movements are constituted of a broader cycle of events in their online and offline effects, following the conceptual framework of Tarrow (1993). Tarrow's (pp. 284–286) concept of "protest cycles" implies a sequence of stages in social unrest by producing new or transformed symbols and frames of meaning around which subsequent mobilizations take place. Our study identified Twitter as a digital geography, arguing that the "Web not only functions as a place of freedom of expression and opposition" (Saka, 2017, p. 2), but also acts as a competitive and performative space where competing views meet, intersect, and/or coalesce.

Both pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi advocates used a shared set of neutral hashtags (e.g., #Gezi or #GeziPark) as common sets of nonneutral hashtags (e.g., #DirenGezi [#ResistGezi], #GeziyiHatirla [#RememberGezi], #GeziyiUnutma [#DontForgetGezi], or #GezicilerFransaya [#GeziProtestorsGoToFrance]). The progovernmental camp used some of the popular hashtags on the Gezi protests to villainize the protests/protestors (e.g., #GezicilerFransaya [#GeziProtestorsGoToFrance]), but other hashtags such as #GeziyiHatirla (#RememberGezi) and #GeziyiUnutma (#DontForgetGezi) became sources for the pro-Gezi activists to memorialize the resistance and its culture following its demise. Like the Kefaya movement in Egypt, as identified by Lim (2012) the Gezi protests' becoming inactive does not mean that their impact was lost because its instigators and opponents "continued to communicate, deliberate, and spread information online" (p. 238). To be clear, contestation over the meaning of Gezi continued well after the protests dissipated in August 2013. We argue that new digital technologies make instant recall possible, hold the promise of endless storage capacities (Askanius, 2012, p. 16), and afford further opportunities to disseminate fabricated images and news that reimagine the memory of the protests.

To collect Gezi-related Tweets between November 19–27, 2018, February 23–March 6, 2019, and May 12–13, 2019, when Gezi-related hashtags hit Twitter trends for Turkey (<https://trends24.in/turkey/>),

we made use of Mozdeh software to download tweets using Twitter's API. Overall, 6,856 Gezi-related tweets were collected using the hashtags #HepimizGezideydik (#WeWereAllAtGeziPark), #GeziyiSavunuyoruz (#WeDefendGeziPark), and #GeziYargilanamaz (#GeziCannotGoToTrial). Nearly all tweets were in Turkish except for a few in English. As one of the authors is a native speaker of Turkish, the texts of collected tweets were examined in Turkish using Excel and Nvivo for coding purposes. Only the most popular tweets were translated into English by the same author. Excel was used for a content analysis of the users' political opinions related to Gezi, and Nvivo helped to qualitatively code the data. A total 70% of the collected tweets represented pro-Gezi political opinions, and 22% of tweets were against the protests. The remaining 8% were either unrelated posts (e.g., advertisements) or they were automated and/or meaningless messages (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1. Tweet counts and percentages of Political opinion on the Gezi protests when the protests were raided in 2018 and 2019.**

In addition to circulated texts, we analyzed the images shared along with the hashtags. In total, 327 images shared on these tweets were collected employing the software Webometric Analyst (Thelwall, 2014). We chose the most popular tweets and images for an in-depth analysis. Although the most tweeted images may not have been the most influential, they became the most visible representation of the events in this period. Pictures, portraits, photographs, and videos of protest, like media texts, are key strategies used by protestors to communicate with different audiences, sometimes with ambivalent consequences given the complex and contentious reception of culturally coded visual frames (Doerr & Milman, 2014, p. 422). As such, we also used multimodal discourse analysis to deal with "contested" texts and images shared through hashtags and mentions on Twitter.

Multimodal discourse analysis combines the study of language with other resources such as images, gesture, and sound (O'Halloran, 2011, p. 120). Doerr (2014) argues that social movement scholars who focus on narrative, discourse, framing, and performance tend to show how activists actively construct and

mobilize collective memory, but we know much less about interactions between multiple layers and forms of remembering stored in images, stories, performances, or discursive forms. Other than putting forward political messages, "social movements produce and evoke images, either as a result of a planned, explicit, and strategic effort, or accidentally, in an unintended or undesired manner" (Doerr et al., 2013, p. xii). The use of images in protest is nothing new (Reed, 2005), but the scale and scope of visual images have proliferated through the spread of digital media (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013).

Images in the form of photographs, memes, screen grabs, selfies, and video stills, among others, have emerged as a common currency for protestors on social media. An emerging strand of literature has examined visual culture and protest (Doerr et al., 2013; Memou, 2013; Rovisco, 2017), exploring the power of particular images for protest movements (Olesen, 2018) and how images help protestors communicate their ideas on social media (Aiello & Parry, 2019; McGarry et al., 2019b). Visual images thus emerge as a site of struggle overrepresentation (Doerr et al., 2013) with agency centered on how and why protestors, as well as their opponents, use images. The challenge is to develop a rigorous and abductive methodological approach that codes and categorizes images in a systematic manner to accommodate this flexible meaning-making and the processes that underpin this action. Shared images in our sample represent a planned and strategic effort of pro-Gezi and anti-Gezi users to make their political statements. Some of these images distort the actual "digital traces" and disseminate pseudofacts, pseudorealities, and conspiracy theories in the same strategic manner.

### **Digital Traces**

Through our everyday activities on social media, we leave digital footprints or traces behind in the form of texts and images, which compose an archive. A trace can refer to a unit of information or an object, or can refer to an action or a process and as such can be described as "fragments of past interactions or activities" (Reigeluth, 2014, p. 250). Digital traces capture the lingering and residual imprint of previous activity leaving a mark of prior interactions and digital activity. Producing traces is "an inevitable by-product—if not an integral part—of communicating in the 'information society'" (Reigeluth, 2014, p. 249). Such traces are important as information, which is why data-processing companies and organizations are interested in this kind of aggregation (Hepp, Breiter, & Friemel, 2018, p. 440).

However, there is a broader challenge to understanding how digital traces are reappropriated and reanimated by actors seeking to make claims or to challenge the meaning of particular events. Survey evidence has shown that dramatic social or political events, such as the assassination of Martin Luther King or the attacks in New York City on 9/11, tend to polarize attitudes (Yardi & boyd, 2010). Whereas Yardi and boyd (2010) were interested in interactions between mainstream news sources and Twitter users in relation to polarization, we are concerned with popular protests and Twitter users related to current cultural wars in Turkey on a quotidian level. Digital traces are potential "multimodal symbolic artefacts" (Milner, 2013, p. 2359) connected to memory work and are the product of the "remix culture" prevalent on digital media (Bayerl & Stoynov, 2016). Traces help to create narratives about the past that avoid nuance, and thus "may concurrently lead to polarized and antagonistic representations of the past" (Smit, Heinrich, & Broersma, 2018, p. 3133). Digital traces created by protestors are never neutral as they are rendered in a moment of rupture and carry a high potential to foster (future) dissent as a historically structured conception of memory and identity.



A trace is thus not an isolated object, mark, or thing, offering us a direct access to the social world (Hepp et al., 2018, p. 443; van Dijck, 2014). It becomes actualized only through the social processes of interpretation, conflict, and subjectification (Reigeluth, 2014, p. 252) while signifying digital artifacts of contestation in which meaning, consciousness, memory, and world-making collide. It is the interplay of the actors and digital platforms that has the potential to reveal how protestors attribute meaning to protestors after the intense protest action has dissipated through evoking, reanimating, or reappropriating discourses, ideas, norms, claims, and symbols of the protest movement. Suffice it to say, digital traces, once created, do not belong to any one actor and can be seized upon, reappropriated, and given new meaning and significance by a diverse range of actors. The power to control and mediate the meaning of digital traces is a political act with the capacity to build solidarities or augment societal polarization or hate. This is partly because social media campaigns during the trials of the alleged leaders of the Gezi protests were ingrained with negative information and fake news.

### **Twitter, Occupy Gezi, and the Traces of Ongoing Resistance**

Protestors and their opponents engage on digital media through performances of communication and commemoration. Milan (2018) demonstrates that "digital traces 'rematerialize' the meanings produced by social actors" (p. 519), and in doing so, protestors reappropriate digital traces to try to recuperate their perceived agency. Due to increasing polarization in Turkey and the AKP government turning the screw on social and political freedoms and basic civil rights, including Internet freedoms, digital traces of the most significant popular uprising in recent political history, namely Gezi, have become highly contested. Milan (2018, p. 517) argues that digital traces are narrative builders, which turn raw data into collective narratives through a process of interpretation and creation on digital media. When Gezi Park protestors invoke and reappropriate the memory of the protests, they engage in narrative-building and reinterpretation of the protests on digital platforms. This is acutely important and empowering in a context of rising authoritarianism, erosion of civil liberties, and restrictions on a free press, including the imprisonment of journalists (Turkey imprisons more journalists than any other state) and academics. The memory of Gezi Park and "Gezi Spirit" thus becomes a rallying cry for people to reawaken dormant political agency.

With a view to reawaken dormant political agency, the narrative of the pro-Gezi tweets focuses on, first, affirming the self-identity of protestors; second, seeking recognition of others through awareness raising; and, third, critiquing ongoing and rising authoritarianism in Turkey. The most crucial shared aspect of the pro-Gezi tweets is their insistence that the Gezi protests were a leaderless uprising that manifested through the participation of millions of citizens across Turkey. Eslen-Ziya and Erhart (2015) describe the leadership during the protests as a postheroic and collaborative leadership. In appropriating the digital traces of the Gezi protests, the tweets renarrate the protests to show that protestors did not protest the government on the call of an individual and/or a political organization. The same attitude was a crucial component of the park occupations to show the police and other state institutions that they were not a bunch of isolated and opportunistic *çapulcus* ("looters") protesting, but millions of ordinary citizens. This trend was the main narrative of the digital commemoration following the Gezi protests when their alleged leaders were accused of attempting to overthrow the government in 2018 and 2019. In our sample, the most shared tweet was retweeted 291 times between May 12 and 13, 2019:

@fikirkulupleri Gezi resistance was not a conspiracy that someone organized behind closed doors. It was a popular social movement against the destruction of the AKP government. Gezi is the future of Turkey. It cannot be put on trial. #GeziYargılanamaz (#GeziCannotBePutOnTrial)

The tweet condemns the attempts to ascribe the protests to the leadership of certain individuals who were previously active in nongovernmental organizations, unions, or political organizations. Gezi developed without the initiatives of leaders, but of communities such as the Taksim Solidarity Network, which only functioned as a symbolic initiative to negotiate with the governor of Istanbul to lessen the police violence or with the government to change its authoritarian policies: "Like previous movements, such as the Global Justice, Occupy's aversion to hierarchy and central leadership was accompanied by a rejection of the role of the spokesperson and the authority attached to it" (Kavada, 2015, p. 881). During the Occupy Wall Street protests, as was the case of the Gezi protests, discussions were always open and the workings of the movement were intentionally transparent. Notes of working groups were published on the Internet for any interested party to access (Watkins, 2012, p. 11). However, like the recent raid of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong (2014) in 2019, the Turkish government aimed to apportion blame to certain individuals and political organizations to corrupt the traces of the Gezi protests. Occurring a year after the Gezi, the Umbrella movement burst out to make elections more open and aimed for the stepping down of Hong Kong's leaders in a similar fashion to Gezi. Recently, a Hong Kong court sentenced the alleged leaders of the movement to prison terms of up to 16 months. Similarly, the Turkish government, by punishing the Gezi protestors, aimed to instill fear among individuals and communities that have the potential to voice their dissidence.

Along with the abovementioned tweet of Fikir Klupleri, the most shared image in Figure 2 was retweeted 291 times. Figure 2 draws attention to the crowds that populated Taksim Square. Rather than focusing on faces or close-up images of the protest camps, the image shows the united square movement on Taksim Square next to Gezi Park using an extreme aerial shot of the area potentially from a drone over the top of the demolished AKM building. Unlike media analysis of text documents, the analysis of images used by activists requires a deeper reflection on the meaning of distinct visual imagery used for specific local protest events (Doerr & Milman, 2014, p. 422). The Turkish flag forms the central object of the photo, which consolidates the "unification" of this flagless movement under the existing flag of the nation. During the protests, the protestors commonly used the flags of Kurdish movements, LGBTI+ communities, or other flags as much as the Turkish flag, which is proof of the "cosmopolitan and inclusive character of the Gezi protests" (Ozduzen, 2020, p. 3). However, the chosen image in these tweets includes a Turkish flag in the center, potentially to show that the protestors were not enemies of the state and to prevent the prosecution of the alleged leaders. Arguably, this image intended to address accusations that Gezi protestors were anti-Turkey and/or unpatriotic.



**Figure 2. Crowd at Taksim Square, May 2013.**

The second most shared tweet in our sample was by Erkan Baş on November 19, 2018. Baş is currently a member of parliament of the TIP party (Turkish Workers Party) who initially entered the parliament as an MP of the pro-Kurdish party HDP. During the Gezi protests, he was detained along with thousands of other protestors and he has an ongoing trial accused of being one of the leaders of the protests. Retweeted 242 times, his tweet aimed to show that the Gezi protests were a wider protest movement and that he was not a leader:

@erkanbas Just because we participated in the Gezi protests, an informant gave the police our names. Like we have always said that #WeWereAllAtGeziPark and we are proud of it. Four years ago, when we restarted our journey, we said "my right side rots but my left side is so alive." We do not have anything to say about the limits of the decay today.

Although the most important aspect of Baş's post is its insistence that the Gezi protests included millions of protestors, not a few people or leaders, it also aims to show how common citizens were divided and became enemies of each other in the atmosphere of fear and paranoia created by the AKP government. In many of his speeches, Erdoğan individually encouraged local mayors and officials to inform police or the party (AKP) about potential ongoing terrorist activities or traitors. Baş, in this regard, also criticizes the decay and destruction created by the government on a cultural and everyday domain, where ordinary citizens became part and parcel of the wider reach and functioning of the state surveillance.

The second most tweeted image was of the young people who lost their lives because of heavy police violence during the Gezi protests. The seven different versions of the image originated from the Gezi martyrs drawing by Faruk Tariñç. The twofold aim in using the Figure 3 was to highlight the solidarity dynamic within the protests, while informing the public about the youth who were killed during the protests.

As an example, Abdullah Cömert's trial took place in May 2019 in Balıkesir, which is a little city in inner Turkey, where inhabitants predominantly vote for right-wing parties. Also, not so many activists live there and, therefore, not so many people participate in the trials. In isolating the trials from the wider public, the government hoped to remove the traces of the protests and justify the acts of killers in its renarration of the uprising. In using Figure 3 of the young people killed during the protests, the aim was to commemorate the losses visually and thus create "responsibility," hope, and solidarity across activists. The image has become a powerful icon for protestors to remember their dead, while serving to mobilize presence and solidarity in a desperate situation in which physical presence during the trials was challenging. Özcan (2013) argues that "visual images are much more than supplementary material accompanying the written message" (p. 428). The dead of the movement call on the surviving protestors to help their actual and potential prisoners. The visual image shows these young dead protestors as joyful, which is a powerful symbol of resistance to death and repression. A joyful commemoration of loss and death functions as a reference point for digitally remembering the trajectory and legacy of the protest movement.



**Figure 3. Gezi martyrs.**

### **Twitter, Occupy Gezi, and the Traces of Hate and Surveillance**

Social media can foster both solidarity and polarization based on the legacy and memory of protests. Previous research has shown that Facebook may contribute to depolarization effects for people who primarily use the network for news as they encounter pro- and counterattitudinal messages (Beam, Hutchens, & Hmielowski, 2018). However, research has also sought to determine how certain groups in society engage in digital enclaves and use these so-called echo chambers to attract more supporters, incite anger and hatred, and mobilize against defined oppositional actors (typically government, institutions of the state, the media, international bodies, regimes, multinational corporations, states, politicians, protestors) as well as more ephemeral challenges (including ideologies, ideas, norms, values; Eslen-Ziya et al., 2019). The past was and remains a site of contestation as actors on all sides of a conflict seek to assert authorship over what happened, with an aim of claiming the moral high ground and clarify "the truth."

As Bail et al. (2018, p. 9216) point out, despite the hope that people using digital media might be exposed to a variety of sources and angles on political phenomenon, there is growing concern that digital media exacerbate political polarization because of social network homophily, with people preferring to nurture social network ties to those with similar views to their own. In studying the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, Lim (2017, p. 424) defines algorithmic enclaves whereby social media users claim and legitimize their own versions of tribal nationalism by excluding equality and justice for others, which deepens divisions among social groups in society and amplifies animosity and intolerance against each other. Lee, Shin, and Hong (2018) show that in South Korea social media indirectly contribute to polarization through increased political engagement with those using social media being pushed toward the ideological poles, developing more extreme political attitudes.

Turkey's sociopolitical polarization is invariably attributed to the persistence of echo chambers that fuel cleavages along ethnonationalist, class, gender, and religious divides, as is the case in our sample. The well-trodden argument is that people engage solely (or primarily) in cycles of consuming and sharing information that reinforce extant political ideas, preferences, interests, and opinions, and deliberately limit their exposure to opposing beliefs. In an almost contradictory perspective to "homely" references considering the protests, the progovernmental groups aimed to vilify their opponents by referring to them by caustic labels such as "baby killers" or "gun grabbers," while designating them as the responsible agents for standing in the way of the changes Turkey seeks. Such vilifying framing (Benford & Hunt, 1992) of the collective character of an antagonist/opponent demarcates boundaries between "us" and "them," good and evil, and right and wrong (van Stekelenburg, 2014, p. 542). Beginning with the caustic labeling of protesters by the then Prime Minister Erdoğan during the protests, especially with the word *çapulcu*, the Gezi activists were vilified in offline and online spaces. This vilification has continued to inform contemporary Turkish cultural fabric and political agenda. The anti-Gezi users mainly consist of, first, trolls employed (indirectly) by the government; second, they are representatives of the AKP local branches, municipality leaders or other AKP supporters; and third, they include groups that are members of or sympathetic to the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party, 1969–present), which is the far-right ultranationalist political party that has formed a pact with the AKP since 2018.

Whereas the common narrative of the pro-Gezi users rested on the appropriation of the protests as a leaderless and widespread movement without emphasizing or vilifying any of the groups that have/have not participated in it, the progovernmental groups used the same hashtag to show that Gezi was treason, which they framed as similar to the actions of the previously separatist Kurdish armed force PKK. Shared 204 times in November 2018, the most popular of the anti-Gezi tweets in our sample aimed to account for the power of the progovernmental forces vis-à-vis the Gezi protestors, which also represented the general nationalist and patriarchal tendency of this camp:

**@ObaSiyasi** You resisted the TOMA vehicle that only sprayed water, but we resisted the tank that shot a fire! You hung PKK's rags! WE HUNG THE GLORIOUS TURKISH FLAG! You consumed alcohol! We performed ablution! You looted the city and burnt the cars! We did not even scratch the tank that shot a fire on us! You are sold! We are dedicated!  
#GeziyiSavunuyoruz

In the narrative of the progovernmental camp, the Gezi protests not only represented a mobilization with leaders, but this leadership was also depicted as nonheroic leadership vis-à-vis the leadership and initiative during the attempted coup of July 15, 2016. Other than glorifying the struggles against the attempted coup of the AKP, the discourses in this popular tweet glorify Islamic practices and posit the Gezi protestors' aims against the trajectories of Islam. Like the emphasis of the consumption of alcohol in this tweet, many similar tweets used photos and texts related to condoms and open relationships as an excuse to denigrate the perceived loose morality that was said to characterize the protestors. Although a variety of Muslim groups also protested the government during the Gezi protests, the progovernmental users produced such narratives to manipulate the digital traces of the Gezi protests in such a way that the protestors were against Islam and the unity of the Turkish state. Thus, the common discourses on these texts and images aimed to depict millions of protestors as a "terrorist" group. The fact that this camp consistently used the progovernmental discourses shows the ways in which digital publics have the potential to foster official narratives about protest movements. This camp also replied to the tweets of the accused and alleged leaders of the Gezi protests such as Mücella Yapıcı to denigrate their political identities, their political messages, and the Gezi protests in general.

The most widely shared image used in anti-Gezi tweets is shown in Figure 4. The image shows an alleged composition of the Gezi Park protests with people holding the flag of the imprisoned leader of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan along with others holding the flag of the founder of the modern Turkey Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with a text saying "Kemalism and PKK hand in hand." To capture the underlying meanings revealed through this image, the image was circulated at a time when the CHP<sup>3</sup> (the Republican People's Party 1923–present) reclaimed power from the AKP in main cities of Turkey in the recent local elections in March 2019. Seven different versions of this image were used along with different texts including the above tweet. The image together with the text aims to villainize not only the Gezi protests/protestors, but also denigrates CHP supporters' potential pact with the Kurdish groups. The image also intends to intentionally pick out the specific communities or individuals that protested by making use of a close-up or a medium shot of the protestors. From a broader perspective, the image attempts to insult leaders and councils of the Kemalist party CHP for the AKP government to reclaim power and to consolidate legitimacy by declaring nonsupporters of the AKP as terrorists. During this time period, the government did not accept the results of the mayoral elections of Istanbul and sought to rerun the elections. As such, the image disseminates a distorted trace of the protests by using a fake event as its basis.

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<sup>3</sup> The oldest political party in Turkey, a Kemalist, social-democratic party that has also been statist.




**Figure 4. Anti-Gezi image.**

The second most shared tweet of this camp used a shorter text and presented a video rather than an image, which was not a widespread video during the time of the protests.

@ruyaselcuk This is for those who say #GeziyiSavunuyoruz :/ TOMA hits and scores a goal! 😂😂😂 <https://t.co/haZJXDHyUv> 162

Like the most popular tweet of this camp, this second most popular tweet also intended to not glorify the aims and intentions of the protestors. It also turned the Gezi protests into a masculine game of power in which the aim was to compete for the most heroic and patrimonial position in the hierarchy. The common video shared on these tweets (represented by the top screen-shot in Figure 5) is a male protestor that challenges and stands by a TOMA vehicle who then is exposed to heavy physical violence by the water coming from the vehicle. By using the above tweet, the anti-Gezi users made fun of this protestor with discourses such as *gezizekali* (Gezidiot). Along with such discourses, the-anti Gezi camp also used the hashtag #HesabiSorulur (#YouWillPaythePrice) to curse and threaten the protestors and the potential Gezi-leaning public for its potential future acts.



**Figure 5. The TOMA vehicle.**

In her research on visual images depicting Muslim women in German media, Özcan (2013, p. 428) identifies the analysis of visuals as a source of imaginary contact with different religious and ethnic minorities. The video in Figure 5 creates an imaginary contact of the police (representing the state) with the general pro-Gezi public, bolstering the idea of the "strong state" vis-à-vis "weak marauders" and legitimizing state-sponsored violence and surveillance against its own populaces. More broadly, the anti-Gezi users employed visual imagery as a way of securing the regime's stability while consolidating the nation-state's aims of securitization. In focusing on right-wing visual communication through Twitter, the visuals in Figure 5 show the AKP supporters' claims to truth and authentic patriotism in relation to the "history" of treason to the Turkish state by positing a gender divide between "the glorified male tank driver" and "the weak/feminized looter" (Forchtner & Kølvråa, 2017, p. 254).

### **Conclusion**

Although it has been years since various Twitter revolutions took place, their impact is persistent as they may potentially function as resources for future mobilization while impeding the agendas of far-right



governments and mobilization. The recent arrests of the alleged leaders of the Gezi protests in Turkey and the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong exemplify these tendencies across the globe for the prevention of left-wing protest movements. Although divisive societies form the existing networks of political communities today on a global scale, the ways these divisive societies function and the ways images and texts of social movements are contested on digital platforms contribute to an understanding of the ways different communities use digital platforms for political expression. The political discourses and accompanying images and videos of activists and their opponents highlight the movement dynamics that these groups seek in the era of authoritarianism. Digital traces of the Gezi protests foster (future) dissent as a historically structured conception of memory and identity in the sense that the Gezi activists adhered to the nonheroic leadership practices that have emerged during the protests while using a less radical trajectory following the protests, to keep activists safe from state scrutiny and surveillance (i.e., using an image with a Turkish flag). At the same time, anti-Gezi users share fake images and unpopular videos from the protests to target and denigrate the protests and to support the government in their prosecution of the alleged leaders.

In engaging with the digital traces of popular social movements, in this case Occupy Gezi, the article highlights how the activists or the pro-Gezi communities continue to use the Gezi protests as a reference point to raise consciousness about nonheroic and collaborative social and political change in the face of the other parties' efforts to villainize not only the Gezi protests and the protestors, but also the newer ones that may arise today. It points out that intensive pressures on the Internet and decreasing overall media freedoms cause the disappearance of the initial traces of the Gezi protests. The visual and discursive traces of toxic masculinity, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism attached to hashtags on Twitter account for the ways the progovernmental sources aim to shadow, isolate, and alienate the leaderless, multiple, and diverse characteristics of the crowds that have composed the movements, although pro-Gezi users also resort to nation-state symbols such as the Turkish flag. Overall, the article shows that at a time when populist movements are on the rise globally, a conceptualization of "digital traces" of widespread social movements contributes to research on digital media, agency, and political engagement, by showing ongoing strategies and tactics in disseminating the political messages online in the interests of their imagined and potential audiences.

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