African Development and Global Governance: Canadian and European Contribution to Human Development/Security at the Turn of the Century

Timothy M. Shaw
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
University of London

Paper presented at the Workshop on Cooperation with Africa: Comparing European and Canadian Positions (November 2001)

Working paper n°. 04/01
African Development and Global Governance: Canadian and European Contributions to Human Development/Security at the Turn of the Century

© Timothy M. Shaw*

‘The new millennium has not blessed Africa.’ (IISS 2001: 223)

‘Close to a fifth of the continent’s people now live in countries disrupted by wars and civil unrest that inflict enormous costs on these economies.’ (ADB 2000: 23)

‘What needs to be recognized is that the African state is not failing as much as our understanding of the state.’ (Dunn 2001b: 49)

‘...it is an enormous mistake to marginalize Africa...the continent exists at the center of various paradigms and discourses generally ignored by traditional IR. For example, Africa exists in the privileged center of global discourses on the environment, migration flows, biodiversity, ecology, gender, human security, land mines, development, NGOs, IFIs, and SAPs. While Africa may be marginal to the world’s legitimate trade, it is central to illegal global trade in drugs, arms, and ivory.’ (Dunn 2001a: 3)

‘Expect a more African Africa in 1999. The continent will look to its own resources as it tries to fend off the effects of global recession and patch up its turbulent regional alliances. There is little choice – the bail-outs of Asia and Russia mean that the international agencies will be cutting back on Africa’s share of assistance in 1999.’ (Smith 1998: 84)

Globalisation(s) and Africa at Start of New Century

There are many definitions as well as implications of ‘globalization(s)’ – (very uneven) compressions of time and space, flexible production and distribution patterns, information technologies, instant communication, global brands and consumption (www.polity.co.uk/global), increased inequalities both between and within states...and now reactions like the ‘anti-globalization’ movement (www.attac.org, www.nologo.org) and fundamentalisms – but there is one theme running through them all: Africa is marginal, however (anti-)globalizations are formulated.

Nevertheless, this paper urges caution about writing-off the continent so readily as there are several distinct ‘Africas’. Furthermore, if globalization includes contemporary issues like ecology, energy, HIV/AIDS, migrations, militias/mafias, small arms, viruses etc, then, as Kevin Dunn indicates in one of the opening citations above, the continent is not

* Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London (tim.shaw@sas.ca.uk).
simply or homogeneously marginal. Africa certainly illustrates the growing costs of uneven globalizations and consequent unacceptable levels of inequalities, leading to myriad conflicts (Luckham 2001, Willett 2001). Moreover, ‘Africa’ is no longer if it ever was an exotic, distant continent. Rather, as indicated below, its peoples and problems as well as diversities and opportunities are embedded in Canada and Europe as well as other countries/continents. Such are the challenges for Canadian and European state and non-state development agencies and policies at the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Such reconsideration/reconceptualization has profound implications for policy – for state (G-7 and others) and non-state actors alike – as well as for analysis, both academic and applied. In short, as always, Africa poses a range of challenges to assumptions and projections (Dunn and Shaw 2001). If this was the case before the awful events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, then it is even more so as we all experience endless ‘aftershocks’ of that terrorist attack.

Reflective of the state of research and advocacy given the pressures of global competition – the race to the bottom – many of these contemporary development/security issues have been put on the global agenda by think tanks rather than African or other states or universities (Stone 2001). In turn, such think tanks and NGOs have been in the vanguard of ‘advocacy coalitions’ seeking to get such issues advanced on the international agenda (Hubert 2000, Tomlin 1998). And, given the range of contemporary threats to human development/security, they have become active partners in tracks two or three diplomacy seeking to advance negotiations, confidence- and peace-building among a range of actors. On particular ‘technical’ of ‘functional’ issues like bio-diversity, genetic modification, global warming, landmines, marine pollution or ozone-depletion, they may acquire specialized knowledge and leverage so becoming influential ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1989 and 1992).

As Dunn (2001a: 3) suggests:

> Though Africa may be marginal to traditional security discussion, the continent is central to discourses on “new” security issues that focus on the environment, women’s bodies, human welfare, and sustainable development. Thus by adjusting one’s focus slightly, it becomes obvious that Africa occupies a central position in the practice of IR.

However, the ranking of such ‘new’/human’ security factors and explanations varies depending on analytic and national/ideational/institutional perspectives… as well as time period (e.g. before/after the Cold War/September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001 etc). I turn to a particular contemporary form of conflict – the political economy of violence – in e) below.
Beyond Neo-liberalism: what prospects for poverty reduction?

By the turn of the century, under pressure from a variety of sources, such as African, development and debt lobbies (see e.g. New African Initiative (www.dfa.gov.za/events/afrinit) and Jubilee 2000 (www.jubilee2000.org)), as well as fear of failures [see recent ten-country comparative study of SAPs in Africa, with just a pair of (relative!) ‘successes: Ghana and Uganda (Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren 2000)] as well as competing demands (eg bailing out Asia, Russia, Argentina etc), the IBRD has revised or at least moderated its near-theological commitment to neo-liberalism. Instead, under Wolfensohn’s presidency, it has moved towards a more pragmatic, accommodating ‘comprehensive development framework’ (CDF) (World Bank 1999). Such a policy or paradigm shift would not have occurred without the sustained pressure of advocacy coalitions like Jubilee 2000, which has approached the status of epistemic community over debt reduction, at least in some cases like Uganda (Callaghy 2002, Mbabazi et al 2002, Mbabazi and Shaw 2002).

This includes poverty reduction strategy programs (PRSP) under HIPC II for those Fourth World countries which meet the qualifications such as Mozambique and Uganda. PRSPs involve more national inputs than SAPs. In the case of Uganda, the Uganda Debt Network (UDN) (www.udn.or.ug) has become an influential advocacy coalition in terms of both policy formulation and implementation. Clearly, as with other NGO-IBRD relations, this entails the danger of cooptation by both national state and global regimes. Yet if indigenous and intermediary as well as international NGOs and think tanks are to be influential in terms of advocacy as well as delivery, such risks are inevitable. In turn, accountability and transparency can minimize such dangers (Callaghy 2002, Mbabazi et al 2002, Mbabazi and Shaw 2002).

Meanwhile, led by post-apartheid and -Mandela South Africa, and supported by democratic Nigeria and Senegal, Thabo Mbeki has been articulating and animating an ‘African Renaissance’, the latest version of which is the synthetic New African Initiative (NAI) (www.dfa.gov.za/events/afrinit) with its comprehensive purview. While some analysts have criticized both renaissance (Vale and Maseko 1998) and NAI (Taylor 2002), they do at least constitute African rather than international voices and perspectives, an indigenous response to the benefits and costs, opportunities and constraints of globalizations.

In turn, after meeting with the NAI advocates at the G-8 summit in Okinawa in mid-2001, the G-7 has prioritized Africa between summits in Japan and Canada, with Robert Fowler, the Canadian PM’s chief sherpa for the Kananaskis meetings in mid-2002, serving as the Canadian participant; he was leading author/animatork of ‘Fowler report’ (2000) for the UN in early-2000 on UNITA’s breaking/violation of UN sanctions in its exports of ‘blood diamonds’ and importation of weapons, largely from the FSU (see map from Africa Research Bulletin (ARB)). This opening/opportunity is already leading onto civil society consultations pre-G8 in Canada and elsewhere orchestrated by coalitions of like-minded NGOs/think tanks like Alternatives, Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), Partnership Africa Canada etc.
Meanwhile, early in the twenty-first century, several donors in the DAC of the OECD like Ireland and the UK plan to increase their percentages of GDP being allocated to ODA, especially to sub-Saharan Africa, while the most generous and most multilateral - the Scandinavians - already concentrate on anglophone, Commonwealth Africa (cf Smith 1998). Inevitably, in a post-bipolar world, even a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union, some EU and other OECD aid will continue to go to EE/FSU, in part for conflict prevention. Nevertheless, ODA from the expanded EU of the 15 will increasingly flow to Africa, so Canada’s relative rank/relevance/leverage rank in the list of donors in most African countries will decline likewise, especially given its apparent reluctance to hike its own level of ODA, despite domestic pressure from development and disaster NGOs, numerous African diasporas, think tanks on human development/security etc?

The US has consistently been the least generous OECD donor of ODA. It has also tended to be the most inclined to bilateralism. James Jude Hentz (2001: 185) laments that: ‘US foreign policy for Africa remains a residue of the Cold War…(with a) focus on what the Clinton administration calls “big emerging markets” or what Paul Kennedy calls “pivotal states”’

Hentz (2001: 190-191) cites the ‘African Growth and Opportunity Act’ as the latest variant of such bilateralism which has been criticized by both radical and liberal analysts of US policy, even though it has created some market opportunities for mobile global capital in some African states.

The UN system is committed to achieving significant levels of poverty reduction by 2015. Conversely current, seemingly exponential, inequalities, the result of two decades or more of neo-liberalism, are increasingly recognized to be both undesirable and unsustainable. But whether the international community has the political and financial resources let alone inclination to make a significant impact in levels of global inequality and poverty remains problematic (c.f. global conferences as well as global civil society: see Schechter 2001).

Shifts in policy by international organizations (e.g. IFIs and UN), national regimes, NGOs and global corporations are a reflection of changing calculations of opportunity and risk. In the case of Africa, such calculations increasingly take non-state as well as state interests into account, now reinforced by analyses generated by think tanks both inside as well as outside the continent (Stone 2001). In the unstable, unconfident – post-neoliberal or at least post-neoliberal over-confidence/hegemony? – world of the early twenty-first century, there is a window of opportunity for creative policy development around Africa. Hence the timeliness of the G-8/NAI now reinforced by some more informed reflections on the causes of September 11th. And, unlike the conjuncture of the end of the 1970s/start of the 1980s, when the more critical, indigenous Lagos Plan of Action was overshadowed by the new confidence in the salience of the market reflected in the Berg Report (Shaw 1993), now the neo-liberals reveal a new sense of doubt rather than over-confidence, reinforced by the rising risks and costs associated with structural adjustment failures or fatigue.
Africa in the North: civil societies, diasporas, migrations

Foreign relations – economic, political, social, strategic – are no longer (if ever?) only among states but increasingly also involve civil societies and private companies both directly and indirectly. The ‘triangle’ or ‘tri-sector’ of this trio of actor types, as encouraged by the World Bank (1999) et al, exists at all levels, from the local to global and constitutes the prevailing contemporary form of ‘governance’ (Commonwealth Foundation 1999: 16, MacLean, Quadir and Shaw 2001). It can be managed/directed to enhance sustainable long-term human development/security as well as for shorter-term profit or image. Such ‘trilateral’ ‘partnerships’ have become increasingly popular in the 1990s as states and other actors sought to rebalance their relationships in the interests of democracy and sustainability (see www.copenhagencentre.org, www.unglobalcompact.org) as well as development and security.

In the case of relations with Africa, there is a particular dimension to the role of civil society: the increasing presence and role of immigrant communities in the North, some long-standing, others first-generation. Now much of the EU, especially major states like Germany, France and the UK, as well as many of the dozen aspirants, like Canada, has large immigrant communities from Africa and elsewhere, so they have become multiracial/-cultural whether intentionally or not. Thus, just as Germany cannot ignore Turkey or France Algeria/Maghreb or Senegal/Côte d’Ivoire, so Canada cannot overlook Africa…or the Ukraine. And ubiquitous conflicts and peace-keeping responses (PKOs) increasingly engage diasporas in the EU and Canada, making the continent unavoidable as a policy focus. In short, Sierra Leone is a matter of concern in Nova Scotia as well as London; the traumas of the Congo are played out in Montreal as well as Paris; and the endless wars in the Horn engage diasporas throughout Europe and North America.

Such transnational communities tend to favor continued engagement to advance prospects of human development/security. As Canada is at best a ‘middle power’ with no colonial/military connections to the continent, perhaps it should not come as a surprise that the last Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy (2001), developed and promoted the notion of ‘human security’ as the framework for foreign policy in the 1990s (Hampson, Hilmer and Molot 2001). Largely compatible with human development/security as espoused by the UNDP (1999), the emphasis was on ‘non-traditional’ threats to personal and community development/security: economic, ecological, gender and social vulnerabilities. In turn, there was a recognition that neither states alone nor traditional forms of military response are likely to be appropriate or efficacious by century’s turn in responding to the growing range of ‘non-traditional’ threats. I contrast two particular Canadian foreign policy initiatives based on a human security approach - the Sudan and landmines – which resonate with contemporary European initiatives, like the post-Lome Cotonou Agreement with the ACP countries (www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou).

In the late-1990s, Axworthy tried to develop such an approach to the long-standing conflict in the Sudan with its new twist of oil production and exportation via a 1 600 km pipeline to the Red Sea (Field 2000). But the Harker Report (2000) was not implemented by DFAIT as apparently other Canadian interests intruded (MacLean and Shaw 2001).
And Talisman has continuously declined to seriously negotiate a proposed Development Trust Fund with concerned and involved INGOs whilst claiming to adhere to a Code of Ethics in its Sudanese operations (Forcese 2001). Nevertheless, the oil consortium in the Southern Sudan, involving national oil companies from China and Malaysia and a Swedish corporation – Lundin Oil – as well as Talisman Energy of Calgary, remains under pressure from a ‘European Coalition on Oil in Sudan’ orchestrated by Christian Aid (www.christian-aid.org.uk). Yet in the late-1990s, the US sanctioned the Khartoum regime as a ‘rogue state’ while the Congress continues to discuss whether to escalate these sanctions because of the perceived misuse of DFI in the South; ie the Islamic regime using its new revenue source to buy arms to further oppress non-Islamic communities in the south.

However, Axworthy’s human security initiative was much more successful in the case of the international campaign or coalition to ban landmines (www.icbl.org): the complicated and fraught ‘Ottawa Process’ among state and non-state actors was more rapid and conclusive than most had anticipated (Hubert 2000, Tomlin 1998) with profound relevance for the killing fields of Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique and former Yugoslavia inter alia. From a handful of NGO associates in Kenya and Norway as well as Canada, the ICBL has become a major force in global civil society, reflecting the consensus of its very heterogeneous 1 300 members. It remains to be seen whether other new security issues attract the same attention (eg ‘blood diamonds’) (Smillie 2000). Meanwhile, the human security network which Axworthy inaugurated, initially with Norway, has continued to expand in terms of members and targets (www.humansecuritynetwork.org, www.unesco.org/securipax).

The North in Africa: from colonial commodities to value chains and franchise brands

Canada’s interests in Africa, like those of the EU, especially the colonial powers, have always reflected its own political economy as well as political culture. So it has long been involved in mining, energy and communication, especially gold and IT; ie both ‘old’ and ‘new’ economies. In the early 21st century, along with others, it is apparently more successful in the former than in the latter… see Barrick and Placer Dome in South Africa, Tanzania and West Africa as well as Southern Africa, Talisman in Southern Sudan (see previous section c)) etc. But this raises the specter of essential security arrangements for such enclaves/gated communities, as mining and oil companies often resort to private security in the absence of effective state control, itself a function of downward competitive pressures (Howe 2001, Musah and Fayemi 2000, Shearrer 1998). So Sandline had good connections to Friedman’s Diamondworks and, as indicated in the previous section, Talisman has already been the subject of state inquiry (‘Harker report’ of 2000) and pressures from NGOs, investors, consumers etc (see Naomi Klein’s range of boycotts/sanctions in No Logo), though UN Global Compact provides some comfort/respectability for vulnerable companies like Nike, Shell etc (www.unglobalcompact.org).

Meanwhile, Africa is not averse to global brands, with their contracting out/flexible production etc. And with the brave new world of refrigerated airfreight and shipping containers, it may be able to enter ‘new’ global commodity supply chains for such commodities as cut flowers and fresh fruits and vegetables as well as ‘old’ colonial commodities.
commodities like cocoa, coffee, cotton, gold, tea etc (Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001). Finally, the world of franchising is not unknown on the continent, from up-market luxury goods to mass consumption items from Nestle, Unilever etc. But post-apartheid, some of the continent’s best known labels are South African brands; eg Castle, MTN/MTV, Nando, Shoprite, Spur, Steer etc.

The ‘New’ Political Economy of Violence: beyond ‘humanitarian interventions’

The turn of the century marked a period of profound revisionist (re)analysis of the causes and consequences of conflicts in Africa, in part stimulated by the apparent failure of several peace operations on the continent and reinforced by parliamentary enquiries in Belgium, Canada, France etc. This growing interest in the political economy (PE) of violence was encouraged by the belated recognition that some of the continent’s conflicts are of considerable vintage and a parallel concern about the impacts of SAPs on states’ ability to respond to them. As William Reno (2000a and b) has argued weak(ened) regimes began to lose control over their territories, so conflicts intensified over the shrinking national cake (cf Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia etc (Uvin 1998)). In several instances, survival strategies involve informal mining/extraction etc and with shrinking state, security is increasingly problematic/privatized/personalized.

So ‘blood diamonds’, put on the global agenda by Partnership Africa Canada (Smillie et al 2000), Global Witness et al (2000), are not really new phenomena, just the reflections of an informal sector survival strategy which has escalated in terms of connections and violence as global mafias have proliferated and spread post-Cold War, exacerbated by the demise of state in countries like Sierra Leone given structural adjustment/corruption etc (Berdal and Malone 2000, Cilliers and Dietrich 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2001, Hirsch 2001, Reno 1998 and 2000, World Bank 2000). There is also clearly a regional dimension to the production, transportation, protection and accumulation around conflict diamonds as revealing UN reports in 2000 have indicated: allies and logistics pass through neighboring states, like Liberia under Charles Taylor, en route to Antwerp etc, just as the arms trade flows in the opposite direction. Thus PKO responses have to become more appropriate/targeted, not standard short-term humanitarian interventions.

While only a few ‘junior’ INGOs managed to put such an issue on the international agenda, it has taken on a life and importance of its own (Malaquias 2001), enhanced by the attentions of global players like De Beers, which has engaged in a series of defensive strategies such as restructuring, privatizing, rebranding etc (cf Klein 2000), and the world industry (www.worlddiamondcouncil.com): further IPE in practice and analysis, with profound gender dimensions given final consumption versus production.

As already indicated, the role of NGOs and think tanks in advancing analysis of conflict as well as advocacy of peace is growing inside as well as outside the continent. They are increasingly engaged in tracks 2 and 3 diplomacy to get parties to the conflict around the negotiating table. Some of them were active in the anti-apartheid struggle and all tend to have global connections (Shaw 2000). It remains to be seen whether their remarkable successes in the ‘Ottawa Process’ over landmines (Hubert 2000, Tomlin 1998) can be replicated in the new ‘Kimberley’ and ‘London Processes’ over conflict diamonds let
alone the fraught talks about small arms. The Kimberley talks are more similar to those in Ottawa as they involve a range of interested actors such as cities, companies, consumers, NGOs, retailers, unions, World Diamond Council and Federation etc whereas the London talks are more exclusively just among states, including the G-7 and UN (cf PAC ‘Other Facets’ occasionally).

**Alternative futures for Africa(s): renaissance and/or regression?**

I conclude by identifying a range of possible futures/implications for policies and paradigms and policies for the trio of actor types involved not only in both Canada and EU, but also regional groupings in both North (e.g. EU, Scandinavians) (c.f. Canada’s human security network with Norway et al (www.humansecuritynetwork.org) and Africa (e.g. ECOWAS/ECOMOG, SADC, revived EAC and anticipated AU plus AEC) along with Commonwealth (Shaw 2001) and la francophonie.

Whilst inter-state regional institutions in much of the continent are moribund, new arrangements are emerging with greater development potential, such as the inter-regime East African Community and the non-state MWENGO, a regional NGO network in Southern Africa (www.mwengo.org). Furthermore, regional links are being forged for flexible tertiary education (eg AERC) and some donors are supporting ecological regions, like Sida’s project for the Lake Victoria Basin.

Despite claims of diasporas in the EU and Canada, most Northern state and non-state actors are still most interested in links with southern Africa rather than any other region of the continent, both because of its potential and also because of its history. Such preferences are reinforced by the palpable problems facing inter-state regional projects elsewhere on the continent (cf possibilities of innovative forms of governance in, for example, Lake Victoria Basin, Nile Valley or Zambezi Basin) (Swatuk 2001). Moreover, in reflection of its distinctive status in the continent, southern Africa has embarked on a couple of experiments in innovative regional governance involving a range of actors, such as communities, companies and NGOs as well as regional governments.

First, most developed in the case of the Maputo Corridor, several ‘development corridors’ are being proposed by a set of private-public partnerships to advance communications, infrastructure and other development in specific spatial routes: electricity transmission, fixed and mobile phones, railways, roads (for buses, trucks, migrants etc), water and gas pipelines etc in Trans-Kalahari and Lubombo as well as Maputo Corridors, along with the possible rehabilitation of the earlier Beira, Nacala and Tazara Corridors. And second, the development of cross-border peace-parks between adjoining games reserves around South Africa and its neighbors. The first was the Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park with Botswana, but others are expected to follow with Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. These indigenous forms of ‘new regionalisms’ may yet come to constitute novel types of human security community supported by a variety of non-state actors/donors, in this case, companies and WWF, respectively.
Africa’s Challenge to Prevailing Policies and Paradigms

‘Africa’ has often challenged assumptions about analysis and policy, never more so than at the dawn of the new millennium (Dunn and Shaw 2001). Contemporary changes – economic, ecological, social, strategic etc - entail profound implications for prevailing paradigms in overlapping fields like political science/international relations/political economy/development studies etc: onto improved governance for enhanced human development/security in both South and North in the new century given negative consequences for almost all of fundamentalisms, violence etc? But ‘disciplines’ give up their ‘canons’ very reluctantly: are not the combination of myriad conflicts/PKOs in Africa combined with September 11th in the US yet sufficient to enforce a rethink?!

Below I highlight four areas of analytic and policy reform of relevance to a range of both Canadian and European as well as African actors.

First, contemporary African development challenges should lead to innovative responses at the level of analysis and practice for both state and non-state actors, particularly in terms of the burgeoning debates around civil society/governance/political science. Given the profound impacts of both globalizations and neo-liberalism over the last two decades, the relationship among the trio of actor types already identified in c) above is quite transformed from the initial post-independence period, whether bi- and multi-lateral donors so recognize or reflect or not. Given the apparent momentum and resilience of the anti-globalization movement, Canadian and European state and non-state development organizations should respond creatively to the triangular character of most relationships/emergencies, especially ahead of the G-7 meeting in Alberta.

Second, international relations/political economy/foreign policy within and around the continent are quite transformed at both formal and informal levels (Dunn and Shaw 2001), leading to new forms of relationships, regionalisms etc. Smaller donors (eg Canada and Scandinavia) and companies may be better at so recognizing than the larger (eg US) yet appreciating the new politics of brands, diasporas, resistance etc is still problematic.

Third, given the above, along with Africa’s own designs for a renaissance/initiative, development studies/policies are in flux with both problematic and promising dimensions: beyond any NAI to new niches in global production chains such as fresh flowers, fruits and vegetables (Gereffi and Kaplinsky 2001) as well as old colonial commodities to new advocacy coalitions over blood diamonds, gender, ozone, viruses etc as well as landmines.

And finally, fourth, security or strategic studies in the new century, especially after September 11th, have to take a range of non-state actors into account, from mafias and militias to think tanks and NGOs: a much more complicated and problematic world than the bipolar, inter-state one, requiring a range of innovative and sustained responses. In short, as before, Africa challenges assumptions and responses of state and non-state actors alike…yet both deserves and requires a range of innovative policies and programs in the new as past century (Dunn and Shaw 2001, Duffield 2001).
References


Berdal, Mats and David Malone (eds.) (2000), *Greed and Grievance: economic agendas in civil wars* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner for IDRC and IPA)

Cilliers, Jakkie and Peggy Mason (eds) (1999), *Peace, Profit or Plunder? The privatisation of security in war-torn African societies*, Halfway House: ISS


Forcese, Craig (2001), “‘Militarised Commerce’ in Sudan’s Oilfields: lessons for Canadian foreign policy”, *Canadian Foreign Policy* 8(3), Spring: 37-56


Mbabazi, Pamela K and Shaw, Timothy M (2002), ‘NGOs, Think Tanks and Transnational Development Networks: learning about/advancing human security / development
in the twenty-first century’ in Higgott, Richard et al., *Beyond Multidisciplinary Approaches to Development* (eds), London: Routledge.


Shearer, David (1998) ‘Outsourcing War’ *Foreign Policy* 112, Fall: 6881


www.allafrica.com

www.euforic.org/euconflict

www.europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou

www.gdnet.org

www.globalpolicy.org

www.unesco.org/securipax