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What do they mean by *saying* ESDP?

Exploring the social construction of European security

by

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Declaration

Hereby I declare that the thesis is totally based on my own work. The thesis has not been submitted for a degree at another university. Also, the thesis does not incorporate work which neither has been submitted for another degree nor published previously.

Abstract

This thesis addresses the question of how actors of the EU's security policy were able to *say* ESDP at the turn of the 21st century. Despite previous attempts to implement a security policy at the EU or EC level, ESDP was first launched in 1999 and became operational in 2003. The very interest of the thesis is how central EU actors – who were responsible for the institutional development and implementation of ESDP – understood security; that is: what they perceived as referent object, what they perceived as threats or as security problems, and how this made possible the implementation of a security policy at the EU level. By asking these questions the thesis does what discourse analysis is best in: discourse analysis enables the researcher to discover the underlying rationalities which led EU actors to presume a security policy as being necessary at the EU level.

This argument on discourse analysis is derived from Nicolas Onuf's work, which most plausibly conceptualises the role of language in the construction of social reality. The thesis starts from a constructivist perspective arguing that actors' behaviour is based on their identity and that they perceive the world from this intersubjective perspective. The rational of security is based on this intersubjective perspective and constructed by relating identity to the perception of threats or security problems. This relation of threats and referent objects lead to the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of security. These processes of social interaction take place through language and can best be studied from a discursive perspective.

The concept of security established at the EU level leading to the institutionalisation of ESDP is understood to be a result of this type of social interaction. Overtime, it led EU actors to a robust construction of the EU as an international actor in the field of security facing dynamic security problems by a cooperative and multilateral approach but also by using civilian and military capabilities.

Abbreviations

ALTHEA	EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIVCOM	Civilian Crisis Management Committee
COREPER	Permanent Representatives' Committee
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Community
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	EU force
EUJUST	EU Rule of Law Mission
EUPM	EU Police Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EUPOL	EU Police Mission
FYROM	Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of mass destructions

Introduction

In the summer of 2003, the European Union (EU) conducted its first out-of-area military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 1,800 military personnel were to establish security in Bunia, the capital of the Ituri province. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) provided the framework for the French lead battle group to support the United Nations (UN) mission in the DRC. The operation was deployed in the name of the EU without assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The operation itself was a remarkable achievement in the development of a foreign – and especially – a security policy at the EU level. For the first time, the EU's tool box was equipped with military and civilian capabilities to support the EU's external action. Despite previous attempts to implement a security policy at the EU or European Community (EC) level, ESDP was first launched in 1999 and only became operational in 2003.

The puzzling question is what kind of security policy do relevant EU actors call for when they *say* ESDP? Do they call for defence policy in a traditional sense, is the concept of security underlying ESDP designed to carry out interventions and if so what would be the goal of such interventions, how is the EU's concept of security linked and intertwined with other policy fields, what are the security challenges which are to be faced by the EU's security policy, and who or what is the referent object of security?. All these questions can be subsumed in one general question of what is the rationale of the security policy established at the EU level and how did the meaning of security change over time to enable the implementation of the EU's security policy especially between the mid 1990s and the mid 2000s?

I argue that the implementation of a security policy in form of ESDP was a strong sign of change of the EU's self-perception as provider of security and stability, not only within the EU but on the international stage. This change did not only affect the rationale of security implemented at the EU level it made it possible. Prior to the launch of ESDP, the EU member states understood security as national defence. (see Pilegaard 2004: 28) In this regard, NATO was important, its institutional outlook changed over time to include out-of-area operations to establish peace and security on the international level. (see Terriff et al. 2002: 9-10) Despite this alternative, the meaning of security dominant in EU discourses enabled the implementation of a security policy at the EU level by inaugurating ESDP. Relevant actors, including those of the European Council, the Council and its sub-bodies, engaged in processes of reasoning on the meaning of security. This affected the rationale of security which then enabled the outset of EU institutions as well as the EU's equipment with military and civilian capabilities and their use in support of the EU's external action in the field of security.

The very interest of the thesis is how central EU actors – who were responsible for the institutional development and implementation of ESDP and decision-making processes within ESDP – understood security; that is: what they perceived as referent object, what they perceived as threats or as security problems, and how this made possible the implementation of a security policy at the EU level. By asking these questions the thesis does what discourse analysis is best in: discourse analysis enables the researcher to discover the underlying rationalities which led EU actors to presume a security policy as being necessary at the EU level. The institutional development of ESDP and the treaty revisions decided by the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) as well as the growing number of ESDP operations deployed

since 2003 prove the fact that the decision to implement a security policy was the result of a political process centrally lasting from the mid 1990s until the mid 2000s. Taking the argument of social constructivism and discourse analysis seriously, this process is a strong sign of changes in actors' social reality. In other words, relevant EU actors over time changed or developed their understanding of security and the need to establish a respective policy at the EU level.

This process is exactly what the thesis intends to analyse. Hence, the thesis is not about ESDP as an institution: its decision making processes, its bodies and their competences, its military and civilian capabilities and its standardised procedures, and certainly not a review of implemented operations which has been done elsewhere. (see Smith 2004a; Gourlay 2004; Smith and Webber 2008; Steward 2008). This project explicitly analyses the meaning of security, how it developed and changed over time and how discursive practices enabled relevant EU actors to presume that a security policy had to be established at the EU level, how the EU was perceived as reference object of security, how threats or security problems were constructed, and how this led to a special rationale of security policy as being interlinked with the EU's external policies and especially development policies.

In other words, the thesis focuses on the context in which the implementation of ESDP became possible. Context here is the social reality in which relevant actors find themselves and which consists of intersubjectively shared meanings. In this context, actors make sense of external actors or phenomena from their intersubjective perspective which can lead to the construction of threats or security problems which then leads to the construction of appropriate rules applicable to situations of insecurity. This complex as part of actors' social reality can best be analysed from a discursive perspective taking into account relevant texts constituting

the institutionalised discourses on security established at the EU level representing the common language of relevant EU actors.

Following this argument, at the very heart of my thesis rests the assumption that reasoning takes place through the use of language affecting actors' understanding of the world and their position within it. Taking this assumption seriously, the recent implementation of ESDP could only have become possible based on a changed understanding of security and the perception that the EU became responsible for security policy. Therefore, the thesis in particular addresses the question of how actors, responsible for decision-making processes within, and in regard to, the EU's foreign and security policy were able to *say* ESDP at the turn of the 21st century. This question will be divided into two sub-questions: first, how were the different meanings of security constituted, and second, how did these meanings change over time? The meaning of security can be analysed within the intersection of identity constructions and respective perceptions of threats, leading to rules applying in the case of insecurity. It can be argued that these rules were formally and informally institutionalised within ESDP.

The thesis hypothesises a link between identity constructions and the formation and exploitation of institutions by following a theoretical argument of discursive approaches which convincingly argued that discourses enable certain policy options and disable others. The meaning of security established within discourses at the EU level therefore led to a certain type of security policy institutionalised at that level. The research concentrates on discourses which took place in the highly institutionalised setting at the EU level, in particular the European Council, the Council and its sub-bodies, for example the General Secretariat, the Permanent Representatives' Committee (COREPER) the Political and Security Committee

(PSC) or the Civilian Crisis Management Committee (CIVCOM).. It rigorously applies a discursive approach to the texts produced by these institutions and involved actors analysing the inherent constructions of subjects, objects and their relations. Overall, the thesis will show that over time, the EU was constructed as an international actor finally responsible for security policy.

The approach identifies and analyses moments of change and explains these moments by its differentiated conceptualisation of change. What the thesis does not is an in-depth genealogical analysis of where meanings in use came from and how other discourses influenced the institutionalised one. Analysing influences of other discourses is a very complex undertaking and can only be the second step following the results of this thesis, although the institutionalised discourse on security most likely had been influenced by a variety of other discourses outside of the institutional framework of the EU, e.g. national discourses, elite discourses, and discourses within NATO etc. First of all, this research project discovers moments of change and explains these moments based on a differentiated conceptualisation of change. At the same time, the thesis points out discourses which were very likely to be the source of influence by referring to secondary literature.

In order to conduct the research, I will use a constructivist account to analyse discourses on the meaning of security. The approach starts with the assumption that humans seek reasoning through the use of language and thereby produce order. The 'order' of interest constitutes the meaning of security. It relates EU identity constructions to the EU's perceptions of threats and established rules of appropriate behaviour in the case on insecurity. These rules have been institutionalised within ESDP. In order to analyse these constructions, I will analyse processes of reasoning during three different periods of time, beginning with the years 1996-7 as the final

moment prior to an EU decision in favour of ESDP, followed by the years 2000-1, including the IGC of Nice and its follow up process but leaving out the period following the events of 11 September 2001 as constituting a crisis of discourse, and finally 2003-4, in which the first ESDP operations were deployed. I will demonstrate that at the very beginning the EU did not consider it their responsibility to act externally in the domain of security policy. This changed over time by the reconstruction of meanings constituting EU identity and its perception of threats. In the end, the meaning of security enabled the EU to construct rules for its security policy to use civilian and military capabilities in support of its approach to tackle development, poverty, conflict and crisis.

Traditional approaches in international relations theory understand security as an objective given, affected by the international system or fixed interests of actors. Such a concept is ill-suited to understand the internal logic of security policies as a research object. Therefore, I argue that security is as much influenced by actors' intersubjectivity as any other social interaction. This argument is based on the theoretical assumption that humans' behaviour is based on their understanding of themselves – identity – and their understanding of the world surrounding them. (see Wendt 1999: 337-43; Kratochwil 1989) Following this argument, security is best understood as a relational concept shaped by social interaction. (see Buzan et al. 1998)

The meaning of security is composed by three dimensions. The first is identity and hence the definition of the self. The second is the perception of threats from this intersubjective perspective. The third dimension is rules which define appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The relation of these three aspects constitutes the meaning of security which enabled EU actors to presume a security policy and hence

ESDP necessary. All three dimensions are mutual constitutive through social interaction.

Social interaction takes place through the use of language as the medium through which humans seek reasoning and thereby find, or produce, order in the world. (Onuf 1989: 39) Processes of reasoning can best be analysed utilising discourse analysis. According to Foucault, (Foucault 1989) discourses provide a range of possible articulations which promote a limited range of meanings. (see Larsen 2004: 65) The underlying argument is that in the social world, reality does not exist a priori. (Derrida 1978: 279) Actors understand the world surrounding them only by giving meaning to reality. This does not lead to a perfect description of reality but to how actors understand the world. (see Zehfuss 2002: 197-207) Actors' social reality enables certain policy options accordingly, whereas others are either understood as being inappropriate or just not possible. (see Diez 1999: 603) Following Onuf's argument that humans are discourse dependent, (see Onuf 1989: 38) the analysis allows this research project to discover the rationale of security and to understand how it developed over time to finally enable actors to implement ESDP and conduct EU's security policy accordingly.

In order to address the research question this project is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter I will start by locating this project in the existing literature. I will show that a reasonable amount of literature has argued that socialisation processes take place on the EU level affecting actors' behaviour in developing an EU foreign and security policy. (see Juncos and Reynolds 2007; Øhrgaard 1997, 2004; Smith 2004) Authors have argued that these socialisation processes pushed the CFSP and ESDP to be more than intergovernmental but less than supranational. Thereby, they contrast other literature which perceives EU's foreign policy as exclusively state

driven, reflecting the lowest common denominator or being a tool to balance the power of the United States (US). (see Gordon 1998; Peterson 2005; Posen 2006)

My research project picks up on the findings of the first literature and reflects its finding from a discursive perspective. This can be done by transferring the concept of socialisation into discourse theory. What, for example, neo-functionalism calls socialisation in discourse analysis is conceptualised as social interaction through the use of language. Language plays the important role for actors to produce common sense, to intersubjectively share meanings and hence ordering the world. Thereby, the literature above supports the argument that processes of social interaction on the EU level produce meanings which are different to those on the national level. In this light, another body of literature uses discourse analysis to conduct research on EU foreign policy. (see Larsen 2000a, 2000b; Sjursen 2004) Especially Larsen recommends “research which more directly uses a discourse analytical theory and method”, in order to produce knowledge of the EU’s foreign policy. (Larsen 2004: 78) By following this recommendation, my project explicitly focuses on the meaning of security and how it changed over time to enable EU actors to presume a security policy and hence ESDP necessary to be implemented at the EU level.

The literature review directly leads the chapter to the debate on the theoretical approach implemented throughout this project. I will argue for a discursive approach rooted in assumptions of social constructivism. On the one hand, through language, actors make sense of the world and thereby construct their social reality which they take for granted and which guides their behaviour. On the other hand, language and the meanings constituted by actors’ social interaction serve as an almost ideal field of research providing access to actors’ rationalities. Both aspects have been most convincingly recognised and conceptualised by Nicolas G. Onuf. Therefore, the

theoretical account of this project starts with his assumptions. Also, I apply the theoretical concepts of identity and identity constructions which are based on discourses about them to conceptualise the EU's self and its self-perception of being an international actor. Then, I conceptualise security as a relational meaning which relates identities to the perceptions of threats from the intersubjective perspective. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 21) Together, they lead to the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour applying to situations of insecurity. The relational concept of security enables the analysis to focus in more detail on three different discursive fields: the first is on European integration, the second on global challenges and the third on international order. The area in which these discursive fields overlap includes discourses which constitute the meaning of security established within discourses taking place within the highly institutionalised arena at the EU level. This perspective helps the analysis to be located in space – to be connected to a certain area, region or group of people. As stated above, relevant discourses are those which are institutionalised at the EU level and include processes of reasoning connected to at least one of these three fields. In the last section of the theory chapter, I provide the methodology used to analyse discourses and argue for the relevance of official documents and texts used for the analysis. This includes a section conceptualising change as a central concept of the thesis, a section on research techniques and a section on the actual research strategy.

The analysis is located in time by identifying three key events or periods which marked constitutive moments – like IGCs – in the development and implementation of ESDP. Documents of these key events or key periods are publicly taken and represent common agreements on how to proceed in the field of security. These public statements of agreement and their status as products of the institutionalised

cooperation which sometimes are even legally binding underline the importance of each period analysed within this thesis.

The first period is 1996-7 as the run up to the IGC of Amsterdam and the latest period prior to the EU agreement on establishing a security policy on the EU level. The second period is 2000-1, representing i) the final year prior to the IGC of Nice and ii) the starting date of the post Nice process leading to the Laeken declaration and the Convent on the Future of Europe as the beginning of process of recasting EU identity in a moment of identity crisis. Apart from that, it needs to be noted that this period ends with 11 September 2001, erupting into a discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism leading to new constructions of threats and more forceful constructions of EU identity as juxtapositioning self and other. The third period is 2003-4, the years of the first deployments of ESDP civilian and military operations and the decision on the first ever European security strategy mainstreaming ESDP into the EU's external action. In the empirical chapters I will analyse the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats, and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in situations of insecurity during each period.

The system of the empirical chapters will be interrupted by a chapter focusing explicitly on the first half of 2003. At this time, a discursive crisis unfolded on the way of how to proceed with Iraq. This interim chapter will deconstruct processes of sense making on the war on Iraq, the EU's role in this regard, and proposals on ESDP made during the time of crisis. The chapter will maintain that the dominant discourse was robust on the meaning of security, contrasting with contrary arguments which are prevalent in the literature.

Throughout the empirical analysis I will show that despite the fact that constructions of EU identity remained relatively stable, central meanings were re-constituted over time. EU identity was stabilised by building up on EU core principles like democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the meanings of integration, cooperation and responsibility. However, it changed in a variety of other meanings which finally enabled the EU consider it its responsibility to solve crises and conflict outside of the EU and act as a security actor on the international stage accordingly. Furthermore, I will show that changes in the construction of EU identity affected the construction of threats. Most importantly, in 2000-1 the EU perceived development and poverty to be security relevant and potentially leading to conflict. This perspective was not evident in the discourses of the period 1996-7. In the period 2003-4, the construction of threats was also strongly affected by processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. These processes led the EU to more forcefully differentiate between ‘self’ and ‘other’ and to understand security threats as systematically being affected by dynamism influencing unattached problems and making them worse. This perspective finally enabled the implementation of civilian and military capabilities on the EU level and the implementation of procedures of how to use them.

These findings will bring this project to the conclusion that ESDP became possible based on changes of the EU’s self-perception affecting the construction of threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. Also, it will show that the rationale of security which enabled EU actors to implement ESDP built up on the logic that security was a problem interrelated with development and poverty, and that other security problems were in one way or the other related to both these problems. This led the EU to the understanding that conflict prevention and crisis management added to

development policy conducted by other means – using civilian and military capabilities to stabilise states in order to pave the way for effective development policies.

Chapter I

Constructing Security

1. Literature Review

A missing piece of literature on ESDP is one which understands ESDP as a social construction. My research project will address this and, as I argue below, thereby enhance the knowledge of ESDP in a specific way.

In this regard, I will first show that the existing literature on European integration points to a gap which understands the institutionalisation of ESDP based on processes of what neo-functionalism, for example, calls socialisation taking place on the EU level. Arguments have been brought forward by authors of neo-functionalism, sociological institutionalism and social constructivism. (see Øhrgaard 1997, 2004; Smith 2001, 2004; Juncos and Reynolds 2007)

While developing these arguments I also intend to introduce the approach of discourse analysis to the subject field of EU security policy. In particular, neo-functionalism identifies processes of socialisation underway at the EU level shifting loyalties of involved (national) actors towards the EU level. These are very strong findings. From a discursive perspective they point to the existence of processes of social interaction through the use of language. Language can not be seen as separate from socialisation but as having socialising functions. (see Ochs and Schieffelin 2009: 296) Following March and Olson, socialisation can be understood as “the development of codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of acting on them”. (March and Olsen 1998: 948) Translated into a discursive approach, socialisation is understood as the process of social interaction by which through language actors develop common ways of reasoning and common understandings,

perspectives and identities. (see Simhandl 2007: 40-1; Milliken 1999b: 229; Kitchen 2009: 101) These processes rest in the centre of interest of this thesis because through social interaction, humans construct the social reality in which they find themselves and of which the meaning of security is a part. Situated in this intersubjectively shared social reality, only certain policy options are available to actors whereas others do not exist. This social reality accounts for the meaning of security established in discourses connected to the highly institutionalised arena at the EU level. And it is this meaning which enabled EU actors to implement ESDP as the EU's security policy at that level.

In this regard, literature utilising discursive approaches identifies change in the rationale of security in Europe. This literature is informed by the linguistic turn in social constructivism, highlighting the importance of language for the construction actors' identities and their knowledge of the world, arguing for a discursive approach in order to analyse change in the construction of EU identity, the reference object of security and the best practice of security. (see Larsen 2000b; Sjursen 2004)

I will show that although discursive approaches have been used to analyse aspects of these constructions, the literature will benefit from a perspective analysing the meaning of security on which the implementation of ESDP as a security policy on the EU level became possible. In the second part of this chapter, I will develop the theoretical approach of the analysis. I will start by arguing that security is as much influenced by actors' intersubjectivity as every other social interaction. This argument helps the chapter develop the theoretical approach informed by social constructivism and discourse analysis by which security can be understood as a relational concept.

1.1 ESDP and social interaction at the EU level

So far, two main theories of European integration, i.e. intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, have been applied to explain the institutional development of CFSP/ESDP. The most prominent scholars are Philip H. Gordon utilising intergovernmentalism and Jacob Øhrgaard utilising neo-functionalism. They are fundamentally divided as to what they understand by integration and the purpose of CFSP/ESDP. In terms of intergovernmentalism, integration only occurs when perceived gains of member states' cooperation outweigh the potential costs of losing sovereignty. (Gordon 1998: 164) If member states expect higher outcomes while cooperating on the EU level, they delegate sovereignty to the EU. (see Moravcsik 1993) The same holds true for cooperation within the framework of CFSP. (Gordon 1998: 166) The reason why CFSP is failing or at least why it is underdeveloped, compared with the economic cooperation on the EU level, can be explained on this basis. Member states are very reluctant to delegate sovereignty in the field of foreign and security policy since, for a long period, they did not expect higher outcomes. It was only the end of the Cold War that so shifted the circumstances that at least large member states perceived higher gains from cooperation. (see Gordon 1998: 170-1) Although Gordon focuses exclusively on CFSP, it can be argued that his findings can be applied to ESDP as well. Gordon narrowly defines the purpose of CFSP. According to him, the purpose of CFSP is to deal with international crises and the stabilisation and defence of European security. This is almost identical with the EU's security policy of today.

However, the findings of neo-liberalism would lead to a totally different research design than implemented in this thesis because it assumes the national level – national interests – as the most important independent variable to explain the EU's

policy including the field of security. While intergovernmentalism concentrates particularly on national interests and the lowest common denominator outcomes, it lacks to recognise what neo-functionalism defines as integration. Neo-functionalism conceptualises integration as the process of implementing a particular quality of cooperation which takes place through socialisation. The experience of advanced cooperation in one field can lead to further cooperation in another field. The quality of cooperation can be measured in different mechanisms, e.g. *esprit de corps* (Nuttall 1992: 16), coordination reflex, knock-on-effect (Hill 1982: 199), spill-over (Schmitter 1969: 169) and *acquis politique* as a more or less formally codified common position. (Øhrgaard 2004: 30-4) The process of integration is, therefore, influenced by these mechanisms of socialisation and starts as soon as cooperation reaches a certain level. In this sense, CFSP is a success, since it now includes closer cooperation compared with the initial European Political Cooperation (EPC) of 1970. EPC was a platform to discuss and coordinate foreign policies of participating EC member states. This cooperation has evolved qualitatively. It has expanded into such political fields as security and defence, which were previously not included. In this regard, neo-functionalism understands ESDP as part of European integration which again is just a special form of socialisation.

The level of integration can be analysed by neo-functionalism, since it recognises cooperation as a quality of its own. The definition of integration therefore differentiates neo-functionalism from intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalism pays little attention to the process of integration. It is unable to reach beyond a state centric perspective. In contrast, neo-functionalism discovers processes “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new centre, whose

institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states”. (Haas 1958: 16) The level of integration is not a matter of member states’ interests but a matter of how specific groups and individuals perceived their interests and values as being best reflected. (see Haas 1958: 5) Depending on their perception, actors integrate or disintegrate. Integration can shift the centre of gravity of individual interests and values from the national to the European level. (see Haas 1958: 11; Øhrgaard 1997, 2004)

However, both approaches are similarly under-theorised, when regarding the origin of interests and values. They are more or less taken as given, as a pre-text of action and interaction. This is a problematic constrain of both theories because they are unable to recognise and understand change in these central categories. This seems to be a problem especially in regard to neo-functionalism, since it uses socialisation as a concept leading to integration. Through processes of socialisation, loyalty’s centre of gravity can change since “it should be possible to detect even subtle changes in member states’ definitions of [...] interests”. (Øhrgaard 2004: 33) If that is true, socialisation can not be exclusively understood as a one directional process creating new structures of cooperation on the EU level. New structures alone do not shift loyalties. If the focal point of loyalties shifts, this has a huge impact on the interests and values of the group in question – in other words, it changes collective identities.

This argument is also brought forward by sociological institutionalism. (see Lewis 2000; March and Olsen 1998) Ana Juncos and Christopher Reynolds have implemented such an argument in regard to the role of the PSC of the EU plaid within ESDP. (see Juncos and Reynolds 2007) Also, the findings of Michael E. Smith are very helpful. He identifies areas in which these shifts are recognisable. (see Smith 1998: 8-30) Smith argues that empirical data on decision-making

procedures provides evidence that “the EU foreign policy system, largely through socialization processes, produced its own rules to fill in the gaps left by the original intergovernmental bargain.” (Smith 2004bb: 98) Whereas the EU foreign policy system builds up on unanimity and, in some fields, qualified majority voting, the policy outcomes rarely represent lowest common denominator. He argues that “the preference-outliers often adapt their positions in favour of the common one rather than veto such decisions”. (Smith 2004bb: 97; Nuttall 1992: 12) Therefore, EU foreign policy formation did not exclusively follow formalised rules of decision-making but intersubjectively shared rules and common interests or identities which lead to certain behaviour which does not follow the logic of national interests. (see Smith 2004bb: 122; Hopf 1998; Whitman 1998)

As a result, Smith argues that the process of institutionalisation of EU foreign and security policy can best be analysed from a constructivist perspective analysing social interaction and discourse practices. (Smith 2004b: 122; Smith 2001) This perspective allows research to recognise actors’ reasoning on available solutions “based on their collective definition of the problem”. (Smith 2004b: 102) In this view, the institutionalisation of CFSP and ESDP has enabled institutionalised discourses which produce intersubjective meanings affecting actors’ identity and their view of the world. This “new reference point” constitutes a new social reality in which participants see themselves as colleagues, somewhat independent from their national background, acting in a common project. (see Smith 2004b: 102, 106) This research project in particular picks up on this argument and translates it into a discursive approach. Here, socialisation is conceptualised as social interaction through the use of language which then produces common sense or in other words

intersubjective meanings which constitute actors' social reality and limit what can and can not be said.

In sum, the arguments developed by Øhrgaard as well as Smith provide a central argument for the relevance of the research question explored in this thesis. Both show that the development of an EU foreign and security policy was more than intergovernmental but less than supranational. (see Wessels 1982: 15) This contrasts other arguments on CFSP and ESDP which followed positivist perspective in saying that both policies are only about lowest common denominator outcomes. (see Hyde-Price 2006: 231; Harpaz 2007: 105)

Øhrgaard's findings evidence nothing less than that, in regard to CFSP and ESDP, a process of socialisation is underway. This is even further supported by Smith, who argues that social interaction and discursive practices need to stay at the centre of research on how change took place in the EU foreign policy system, including security policy and ESDP. By translating socialisation into a discursive approach, it is this process of social interaction through the use of language which rests in the focus of my research project. Compared with neo-functionalism, the underlying theoretical account goes a step further. My research project argues that processes of socialisation mutually constitute agency and structure. Thereby, they shape actors' identity and their understanding of the world. (see later and Onuf 1989: 86; Wendt 1999; Katzenstein 1996a) Accordingly, this enables certain policy options and disables others. Even when such an argument has also been brought forward by sociological institutionalism, in the following section I will argue for a constructivist approach and the linguistic turn in social constructivism.

1.2 European Security

The literature I have gathered under the header ‘European security’ approaches the topic from a linguistic perspective. It starts by a similar assumption as discussed above, highlighting the role of language as an important force in the social construction of European security. (see Wæver 1996: 107) It thereby pushes the argument a bit further by arguing for actors’ discourse dependencies. (see Onuf 1989: 38) In the following, I will present two different approaches to European security, whereas the first by Helen Sjursen takes on a communicative perspective and the second, by Henrik Larsen, analyses discourses as context constituting actors’ intersubjectivity. (see Sjursen 2004; Larsen 2000b) The discussion of both approaches will evolve into the argument that the research question of this project needs to focus on the meaning of security underlying the institutionalisation of ESDP.

The starting point of Helen Sjursen’s article is that the “core rationale of security policy can change”. (Sjursen 2004: 112) If that is the case, the meaning of security and according policies are not exogenously given but dependent on actors’ social interaction. (see Wendt 1992) She argues that the shift from traditional approaches to a wider understanding of security, including not only military security, can best be understood from a constructivist perspective. Her assumption is based on two observations. First, traditional approaches to security come from a state-centric perspective. Since the wider security concept includes ‘comprehensive security’, ‘human security’, ‘de-securitization’, ‘soft power’ and ‘soft security’, (see Sjursen 2004: 107) state-centric perspectives overlook important aspects of security, since nation-states are not the only referent objects of security. (see Sjursen 2004: 108) Second, the understanding and practice of how security can best be achieved has

changed. Security is pursued by multilateral approaches, collective institutions, and legally binding agreements. (see Sjursen 2004: 108) The decision in favour of certain means is based on a normative outset regulating appropriate behaviour. Both assumptions lead Sjursen to conclude that a “conception of actors as communicatively competent is helpful” in understanding security. (Sjursen 2004: 112) New concepts of security do not necessarily include national security interests and balance of power as important guidelines for actors’ behaviour but include normative standards to conduct security policy. (see Sjursen 2004: 111)

Later in the text, Sjursen argues that Europe’s approach to security is particularly driven by the wider understanding of security. (see Sjursen 2004: 118-2) She relates her argument to the debate on Europe as a civilian or normative power. (see Duchêne 1972, 1973; Manners 2002, 2006) From a communicative perspective, it is plausible that the EU acts as a normative power because this is what actors think they ought to do. (see Sjursen 2004: 122) For example, empirical research could show if and how “arguments and public deliberation [...] can make a difference to international security”. (Sjursen 2004: 122) Whether or not civilian power Europe can make a difference depends not only on its own lack of coherence in foreign policy but also in the limited role of international law. The EU could be successful in acting exclusively as a civilian or normative power only if international law was enforceable. (see Sjursen 2004: 122) However, Sjursen argues that although the international level lacks a high quality of legally binding laws, it is different for Europe. (see Sjursen 2004: 123) She uses this to argue that European security has changed in two ways: first, the reference object of security has shifted away from exclusively focusing on nation states to include individual citizens. Second, practices have changed by which security is established.

Therefore, Sjursen's article contains two important arguments. First, language is important in understanding actors' behaviour and the context in which this behaviour takes place. This argument leads Sjursen to utilise a communicative perspective which understands action based on actors' valid verbal claims – which can only be valid in reference to a specific context. Second, in order to understand security, it is important to understand how security is constructed. According to Sjursen's perspective, security is either constructed through a legal order or it purely follows the interests of actors. Here, Sjursen takes on two different perspectives: i) without a common judicial order, communicative acts potentially turn out to be nothing other than moral arguments to cover interests which are different to these claims. (see Sjursen 2004: 122; Eriksen 2001) Thereby she implicitly implements the difference between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. (see Smith 2004b: 99) And ii) Since, within Europe, legal sources link politics to human rights, international law and fundamental freedoms, actors are able to make normative claims in security policy because the legal context validates these claims. As a result, her focus is on the EU's internal security policy rather than its external behaviour.

We see here fundamental differences in Sjursen's approaches and the one applied in this thesis. Sjursen argues that the observed change in security policy is based on a normative, meaning moral, shift which becomes possible only under a common judicial order. In this scenario, the context is nothing other than the legal system. Since the international sphere does not have such a legal system, change in security policy is not possible – or at least it is hard to verify because moral claims can always be a cover-up for actors' real interests. In contrast, I especially focus on the context, the social reality, which provides meaning to actors' behaviour. The social reality provides the boundaries and logics of actors' rationale of security, which are

constructed by processes of sense making through social action and interaction. These processes generate intersubjective meanings which affect and shape actors' understanding of the world surrounding them. This does not implement a normative, let alone moral argument.

In Sjørnsen's perspective, two different logics of actors' behaviour are at work, the first is rationality and the second is normative or moral behaviour. She intends to analyse individual speech acts only in regard to the second logic, since claims can only be validated when the context provides normative standards of behaviour – preferably legally binding standards. But why not make it an empirical question of whether or not discursive practices exclusively produce normative, meaning moral, knowledge? I argue that actors' behaviour is essentially dependent on their understanding of the world surrounding them, and it is doubtful that this exclusively contains categories of normative or moral behaviour in Sjørnsen's sense.

In order to understand how actors' behaviour becomes possible, the construction and outset of their social reality needs to be analysed. I argue that this can best be done by analysing the language in use, which provides meanings to social action and interaction understood as the process of socialisation.

In contrast to Sjørnsen, Henrik Larsen's approach is very close to this perspective. He not only focuses on the context in which action takes place but also focuses on how this context affects the EU's external behaviour. (see Larsen 1997b, 2000b, 2004) He sees language as an independent force constituting meaning. (see Larsen 2004: 62-3) Actors' understanding of their social world is established by these meanings. There is no meaning "residing outside language". (p.64) In order to understand the social world and actors' behaviour within it, Larsen argues for discourse analysis. "[T]he basic assumption [...] is that meaning can be studied by studying language." (Larsen

2000a: 338) His discursive analysis is based on Foucault (see Foucault 1989) and says that discourse needs to be understood as a limited range of possible statements. This limited range also affects actors' behaviour, enabling particular policy choices while disabling others. (see Larsen 1997a)

The analysis is led by three “analytically distinguishable bundles of theoretical claims”. (Milliken 1999b: 228, see also 231) First, discourses are systems of representation. They provide meaning to reality and thereby construct the social reality in which actors find themselves. Second, discourses produce subjects and objects. By producing relationships between subjects and subjects on the one hand and subjects and objects on the other hand, discourses establish order and a system of power. This order constrains actors' behaviour. Third, discourses are open to change. It is only by articulation that meanings are (re-)produced which makes discourses potentially instable. Research needs to analyse those forces which stabilise and maintain dominant meanings. Such an analysis needs to include the search for alternative discourses which are silenced or constrained by hegemonic discourses. Equipped with these three theoretical claims, discourse analysis will be able to analyse social reality.

The theoretical claims above are taken from Larsen's chapter in the book edited by Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen. (see Tonra and Christiansen 2004) He argues for the need of further research on European foreign policy from a discursive perspective. In earlier attempts, Larsen has applied discourse analysis to different aspects of European integration, although his research methodology was less explicit than for which he argued in his 2004 chapter. (see Larsen 1997a, 1997b, 2004) Larsen focused on how national backgrounds have shaped European policies. (see Larsen 1999) He also analysed whether a common language was used to discuss

security in the EU Council. (see Larsen 2000a) He concluded that the meaning of security relevant in the context of the Council was understood as security of the European continent but lacking an external dimension going beyond this sphere. (see Larsen 2000a: 344-47) Even if actors in the Council recognised security problems beyond this contiguity, the EU more or less only contributed to international security by stabilizing the European continent. (p.347-8) In addition, he reached the conclusion that the EU understood itself as a civilian power promoting its liberal values. That was understood as a contribution to international security based on the thesis of democratic peace. (see Larsen 2000a: 353)

Summary

Overall, I have shown in the literature review that my research project will add to the literature on European integration and European security while analysing processes of social interaction on the EU level connected to the field of security policy. Larsen's findings can be used to further argue for the gap in literature in four ways. First, although he analysed the common language of security, the question is how this common language changed over time and how it enabled EU actors to implement ESDP at the end of the 20th century? This question is puzzling and of even more importance today, since the EU not only implemented an EU security policy by the time of ESDP's inauguration but implemented its first civilian and military operations in 2003, which showed the effects of the EU's security policy on the ground. This dynamic and the change or development in the meaning of security has not been explained by Larsen. He showed that prior to 2000, when the article was published, the EU had a security dimension exclusively focusing on security within Europe. This conclusion does not seem to fit the later period, when the EU used civilian and military capabilities in the DRC. I will also show that the EU

implemented a concept of security which was strongly connected to development policy reaching beyond the European continent as early as 2000 and 2001. Therefore, the question is how the meaning of security has developed in order to enable actors to implement ESDP.

Second, Larsen used a very broad concept of security. For him, European enlargement counted as a security policy of the EU. Since he showed that actors claimed enlargement to be security relevant, his findings were absolutely correct. But, my research project will narrow down the focus explicitly on the meaning security which enabled actors to implement a rather hard power like security policy within ESDP. The project is situated between, so to speak, Larsen's work and the notion of security applied by scholars of the strategic culture focusing on the use of force exclusively. (see Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2005; Rynning 2003)

Third, the advantage of this narrow perspective is that my project provides room to systematically analyse the construction of security. I argue that this can best be done by understanding security as a relational concept. The meaning of security is constituted through the relation of identity and the perception of threats from this intersubjective perspective. Larsen's approach was missing an explicit conceptualisation of how the meaning of security is constructed.

Fourth, due to his broader understanding of security, his findings were very general. This may also be due to a methodological weakness. In his research, he had identified subjects and objects implemented in the dominant discourses on European security within the EU Council. To understand in depth how subjects and objects as well as how they were situated towards each other, the analysis needs to focus on the established order and power relations between them. (see Doty 1993: 306) Subject positioning can be analysed focusing on binary oppositions and their creation of

power relations. (see Milliken 2001: 143) Also, dominant discourses need to be identified and reflected in relation to underlying discourses and how they conceptualise subjects and objects differently. These and further methodologies will enhance the research capacities of discursive approaches. They will be implemented throughout this thesis. In the following I develop the constructivist approach and its linguistic dimension implemented throughout this thesis

2. *Discourse and Social Reality*

In this section I develop my theoretical account of constructivism in order to analyse how central EU actors, responsible for the institutionalisation and implementation of ESDP, perceived security. The approach needs to address the following questions: how was the referent object of security constructed; how were the threats or security problems constructed with which the referent object was confronted and how did this make possible the implementation of a security policy at the EU level?

The theoretical part is organised in five sub-parts: the first addresses actors' discourse dependency and the importance of meanings for actors' interaction. The second part develops the theoretical groundwork of my approach. The main argument of this part points to security as being as much influenced by actors' intersubjectivity as every other social interaction. The third part develops the understanding that security is socially constructed. It argues for a relational conceptualisation of security relating identity constructions to the perception of threats and the construction of rules applying in the case of insecurity. In the fourth section, this concept is related to the meaning of security constituting ESDP. It develops a map of discourses which are relevant to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The map can be divided into

three discursive fields: i) European integration, ii) global challenges, and iii) international order. This leads my argument to conceptualise that discourses are connected to time and space. Following this conceptualisation I will discuss the most dominating narratives in each field. This straightens the focus on relevant aspects of the meaning of security. The fifth part provides the methods of how to analyse the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. In this part I will develop a set of research methods by which I will analyse documents, speeches, and other texts relevant to my question. It serves to unfold the methods I will use to rigorously apply the discursive analysis to relevant texts. Finally, in the summary I will conclude the key points of my approach in order to prepare the reader for the empirical analysis.

2.1 Constructivist Account

My approach rests on four central assumptions: discourse dependency (see Onuf 1989: 38) – language as the practice of social interaction –, intersubjective meanings as discursively upheld rules and knowledge, mutual constitution of agency and structure, and collective identities which affect actors' understanding of themselves and the world surrounding them. The important pre-assumption of my analysis is that actors can only make sense of the world through the use of language. (see Foucault 1991: 58) Language plays an important role in defining intersubjective meanings. Meanings are the centrepiece to access reality – or rather what is perceived as such. In the following sections of this chapter I will develop my theoretical account in five steps: i) argue for discourse dependency, ii) present the basic theoretical assumptions, iii) conceptualise security as a relational complex, iv) connect the research to time and space, v) develop the research methods. Finally, the

conclusion provides a summary of my approach to highlight the most important aspects. This will lead into the analytical sections of this thesis.

2.1.1 Discourse Dependency

Humans are not able to know all features of the world independent of discourses about them. They are discourse dependent. (see Onuf 1989: 38) This position is the basic theoretical assumption of my thesis. Humans are language users. They use language to make sense of the world, to communicate and, therefore, interact with each other. (see Hansen 2006: 18-9) “Through the medium of language, mind subordinated world.” (Onuf 1989: 39) This quote reflects the ontological perspective of discursive approaches which can be located in post-positivist perspective of constructivism and post-structuralism. (see Hansen 2006; Milliken 1999a; Campbell 1992; Doty 1996; Neumann 2001; Simhandl 2007) The question is not to deny the existence of ‘reality’. ‘Reality’ refers to the material existence of the world and all its features. Instead, the ontological position starts with the assumption that humans can not know reality independently from making sense of it. (see Burr 2003: 81-2) Making sense means to produce knowledge about reality. (see Angermüller et al. 2005: 8) Humans make sense of the world through language. (see Foucault 1984: 127) Language is the medium through which humans seek reason and thereby find, or produce, order in the world.(see Onuf 1989: 39)

Producing order is the effect which this thesis intends to analyse. Finding order can be understood as in particularly applicable to natural phenomena as an outcome of natural laws. But these natural laws are not applicable to social life. Social life is constituted by social interaction of humans. This interaction does not follow natural laws. It is fundamentally characterised by meanings given to action and interaction. (see Foucault 1984: 403) For example, in British working life when someone refers

to a ‘tea-break’ it does not necessarily mean that the person will drink tea. The meaning of the sentence is that the person is a member of staff who will have a break, interrupting her working day. In that break she may or may not drink and eat something. The fundamental meaning is, however, that the person during that break will not be available for business purposes. She refers to a widely accepted practice on which she legitimately can claim not to be available. Through that sentence she defines herself as a valuable member of staff who can rightfully claim a break. Thereby, she participates in a commonly established practice ordering working life.

The example shows that ‘producing order’ is the effect of humans’ sense making. Sense making is the process by which humans apply meaning to reality. (see Onuf 1989: 127; Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 59; Crossley 1996) These meanings are not ‘out there’, available in the ‘real world’. The underlying claim is that individuals do not act based on objective, independent knowledge of the world. (see Potter 1996:13; Berger 1966) Their knowledge of the world is intersubjective, produced and reproduced through social interaction via the use of language. The argument is that language can not be grounded in anything but language, because grounding depends again on “linguistic conventions and presuppositions”. (Crossley 1996: 41; Wittgenstein 1953: 20) It is through the use of language that agents produce and reproduce their understanding of reality. Through the interaction of actors, meanings become intersubjectively shared and constitute actors’ social reality. (see Derrida 1978: 279) This logic denies that world and words are independent from each other. Instead, it sees them as mutually constitutive. (see Luckmann and Berger 1966: 94) Here, world again refers to the intersubjective knowledge of it. Mutual constitution of world and words means that while agents use language to make sense of the world, at the same time they define how the world is ordered, who they are and

where they see themselves positioned in the world. In other words, “the world of ‘things’ has no meaningful structure except in connection with the standards we employ to ascribe qualities to it”. (Shapiro 1981: 20) This process of sense making leads to an intersubjectively held understanding of the world, including rules and knowledge of how to act and how to reason. (see Berger and Luckmann 2002: 48) These knowledge and rules are taken for granted as reality, as the objective truth of the world. (see Giddens 1984: 37, Giddens 1984: 321-2) Agents act within their social reality based on rules and their knowledge of it. From this perspective, agents are context bound, since rules and knowledge enables only particular options of behaviour, whereas others are either inappropriate or just not available from the agent’s perspective. (see Diez 1999: 603)

The only way agents can learn rules and gain knowledge about the world is through social interaction. Through social interaction actors “reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible”. (Giddens 1982: 2, see also Wendt 1999) Social interaction is first and foremost communication, the process of giving meaning to reality. For example, the *conditions* that make activities possible are those defining a master as the ruler and the slave as the dominated object. (see Wendt 1999: 25) The context and practice of the relationship – and hence the rules immanent to both agents – are produced and reproduced through language. (see Butler 1997: 5)

Without a meaning, interaction would not be possible because agents would not know in which interaction they are involved, what they should expect from it, or how they should behave. Hence, it is fundamentally important that meanings are communicated. Only through their communication, can meanings define and redefine conditions of action and interaction. In other words, the situation in which ‘words subordinated world’ is that of intersubjectively shared meanings. This is the

condition where not only one agent but a group of people uses a particular meaning. Meanings only make sense to different actors when they are shared among them.

2.1.2 From Discourse to Social Reality

In the above, I have used notions like language, meanings, and discourse, without defining them in detail. At the first glance they might look interchangeable, but they are not. In the following I will first clarify these three notions. Second, I will address the question how intersubjective meanings can be understood as discursively upheld rules and knowledge. This is the fundamental part of my theoretical approach. It shall clarify how social structures are constituted through discourses. Here, the aspect of contestedness and change will be discussed to enable the analysis to recognise changes in the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. This leads, third, to the perspective that agency and structure are mutually constituted. This discussion will shift the focus from social structure to agents and their identities. This will lead the chapter into the next sub-section conceptualising collective identity as a category of stable and consolidated definitions of the self and its immanent rules of behaviour. The section on identity then leads me to the conceptualisation of social processes by which actors perceive other actors or phenomena as a security problem or as a threat.

To start with the first point, Onuf has argued that humans are language users and that “through the medium of language, mind subordinated world”. (Onuf 1989: 39) The process of ‘mind subordinating world’ is fundamentally related to the use of language. (see Crossley 1996: 38) Language, here, is just the written or spoken words which together – following a particular grammar – build English, German, Portuguese etc. The rules of a particular language are shared among a group of people. They use that language to communicate with each other. Language is the

vehicle through which communication becomes possible. But this dimension of communication is only one dimension of social interaction. It is not the focus of this analysis.

Meanings are another dimension of communication. They are the focus of this analysis. Meanings are always joined with language. Meanings can be defined, redefined and stabilised only through the use of language. The difference between meaning and language is a qualitative one. Language is not only representative but also performative. (see Foucault 1984: 82) Whereas language is the ‘medium’, ‘meanings’ are the result of ‘mind subordinating world’. Meanings are (re-)defined within discourses. A discourse describes the process of making sense of the world. In the literature, different concepts of discourse exist. Especially for Foucault and scholars using or referring to his work, discourse is much more than an analytical concept. (see Foucault 1984) Their notion of discourse is close to what I call meaning. However, I will use ‘discourse’ as an analytical concept to distinguish between different processes of sense making. In other words, discourse can be defined “as an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being”. (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 3; Parker 1992) The purpose is to be able to distinguish between dynamics of social interaction and their analytical account. With the notion discourse I intend to categorise different process of (re-)defining and stabilising meanings. Whereas meanings are the crucial parts of discourses which define rules, knowledge and identities as parts of the social reality.

Whereas discourse is an analytical concept to categorise different aspects of social life, meanings have ontological status in constituting social reality. Intersubjective meanings are the cornerstones of social reality. (see Onuf 1989: 43; Cortese and

Duszak 2005: 11, 24-5) Foucault argued that “we must conceive discourse as violence which we do to things, or in any case as a practice which we impose on them”. (Foucault 1984: 127) From here, it follows that ‘making sense’ is not only labelling something as *master* or as a *tea-break*. Making sense is also ‘doing’. (see Kratochwil 1989: 8; Holtgraves 2001: 10-12; Austin 1975) It is doing in the sense that through the use of language and the definition of meanings, rules are defined and knowledge established which again affect actors’ behaviour. This aspect leads to the second sub-section on the fundamental parts of my approach.

Meanings are the cornerstones of constructing social reality. (see Onuf 1989: 43) They constitute effects, they make them possible. (see Wendt 1992: 403; Wendt 1999: 25) The meaning which we give to the world mutually constitutes rules and knowledge. Meanings describe objects, properties, characters, roles, or processes. Through that description, meanings at the same time tell how to deal with objects or how to behave in a specific situation. Also, meanings establish knowledge about what they describe. Meanings mutually constitute rules and knowledge. These rules and knowledge affect actors’ behaviour in a specific context. But, meanings develop this force only when they are intersubjectively shared.

The process of defining and redefining meanings through the use of language is a continuous process. Meanings do not exist out there, independent or ‘free floating’. They need to be articulated. (Diez 1999: 609; Guzzini 2000: 164) Meanings can be redefined and re-established only through their articulation. A meaning not articulated would no longer form a part of social reality. It would not be practiced and would then be forgotten. In this sense, meanings have a dual quality as structuring and as constructed. Or in other words, they are *reflexive*. (see Giddens 1979: 69) On the one side, meanings provide meaning to action and thereby affect

actor's behaviour. On the other side, they only have this force through their articulation, through their practice. Meanings essentially lie *in* the practice. (see Taylor 1993: 58; Wiener 2004: 191-2) Through this process, meanings become intersubjectively shared.

This reflexive process could be criticised as being self-referential. It certainly does not establish a causal mechanism in which one exists prior to the other. That would mean that meanings exist prior to action and therefore cause a particular action. It would establish meanings as independent variables and make them exogenously and pre-fixed. Reflexivity highlights the duality of both: structuring and constructed. (see Giddens 1979: 69; Wiener 2004: 191) The process of defining and redefining meaning can be understood as a path which can take different directions. (see Diez 1999: 607; Derrida 1978) During the process in which intersubjectivity is established, different interpretations battle with each other to become the meaning in practice. Meanings are contested when their definitions are not fixed or already fixed meanings are being contested by new definitions. (Diez 1999: 602-3; Connolly 1993) If actors' understanding of the world is intersubjective, then different understandings of the world exist. Otherwise, the understanding of the world would be objective because every single individual would share it. The understanding would then exist exogenous to interaction. But, since meanings which form actors' understanding of the world are intersubjective, different interpretations of certain aspects at least co-exist. Contestedness is the process in which a meaning becomes (more widely) intersubjectively shared through social interaction. (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897; Payne 2001: 38-9) Meanings are defined and redefined until they reach a status of relative stability. On the way to that stability they are contested, their definition and redefinition battles for stability with other meanings or interpretations.

This process opens up the possibility for change. It is very likely that sense making by different actors produces different perspectives onto the world. But sense making here is defined as essentially a process of interaction, as an open process which is constantly constructed and set together to be (re)defined over time. (see Diez 1999: 610; Laclau and Mouffe 1985) How the process develops is not fixed prior to its construction. The process of humans' sense making is responsible for the definition and redefinition of meanings. The question why the process develops in a certain way is of lesser importance to my analysis. Such questions have been addressed by critical approaches. (see Laclau and Mouffe 2001: 48-54; see Cox 1981; 1983)

However, I am interested in how the meaning of security established at the EU level changed over time, making possible the EU's approach to foreign but especially to security policy. In this regard, two different concepts of change are essential: first, that by which meanings are contested and finally become fixed and intersubjectively shared. In other words, change takes place as development when marginalised discourses gain more support – based on structural circumstances or speech acts. Second, discursive crises take place when new developments do not fit already fixed meanings. The word crisis shifts the focus to short periods of times in which changes can be observed. Both concepts of change will be discussed later in the section on research methods.

While meanings are intersubjectively held, they mutually constitute rules and knowledge. Rules and knowledge are discursively upheld. Intersubjective rules give meaning to actors' behaviour, (see Guzzini 2000: 155) since agents take the social reality for granted and behave accordingly. In this sense, rules are “collective expectations”. (Katzenstein 1996b: 7) They order the social world and humans' interaction. For example, when someone claims “I'm having my tea”, everybody

expects him to take a break from work, not to attend a business meeting. The rule is collectively shared and re-constructed through the practice. (see Guzzini 2000: 166) Everybody expects the same result from following the rule.

In the literature, two or sometimes three different notions have been used to describe these regulative and constitutive effects. These notions are rules, norms, and ideas. (see Kratochwil 1989: Ch 1; Checkel 1993, 1999; Finnemore 1996; Jepperson et al. 1996: 54; Thomson 1993; Wendt 1999: Ch. 6) However, I will use the notion ‘rules’ exclusively as have a regulative and a constitutive effect.

Katzenstein argues to differentiate between norms and rules. Norms serve as standards of behaviour. They are regulative, whereas rules are constitutive. He argues that rules define actor’s identity. (see Katzenstein 1996b: 5) The difference between regulative and constitutive is hard to distinguish empirically, and it therefore can only be an analytical one. But even on that level, rules and norms are difficult to distinguish. Therefore, rules always have a regulative and constitutive effect simultaneously. (see Onuf 1989: 86; March and Olsen 1998: 951) That is what Wendt described as “the nature of each is a function of its relation to the other”. (Wendt 1999: 199) Wendt used this description to clarify the effect of mutual constitution of agency and structure. This effect will be discussed in detail below. Here, it serves to illustrate the difficulty – or impossibility – to differentiate between regulative norms and constitutive rules.

Social reality is ‘organised’ through rules which are mutually constituted by actors while they make sense of the world. This establishes a social structure which ‘organises’ the relation between actors. In turn the social structure is organised through rules. They establish “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity”. (Jepperson et al. 1996: 54; see Katzenstein 1996b: 5) This quote

makes it clear why regulative and constitutive effects are not distinguishable. Rules are related to *a given identity*. If they are related to a given identity they include aspects of this identity. Therefore, as a matter of parsimony rules have constitutive and regulative effect.

From here, the question follows why actors behave in accordance with rules? The state of the art literature in the field of international relations theory gives a fairly clear answer. The logic of appropriateness argues that action is rule-based because rules are associated with “particular identities to particular situations”. (March and Olsen 1998: 951) The logic is contrasted by the logic of expectations of consequences by which rational actors choose among alternatives based on their interest with the aim to maximise their own gains. (March and Olsen 1998: 949) And finally, it is argued that the logics are not mutually exclusive but that actor’s behaviour almost always carries elements of both. (March and Olsen 1998: 952)

The perspective taken within this thesis is somewhat different. It focuses on the politics of discourse and its force not to cause but to enable action. (see Diez 1999: 605) Building on the work of Nicolas Onuf, the thesis focuses on the logics of action and interaction established through language constituting social reality. In other words, the rational of how to behave in a given situation is located in the discourse. It is more than possible that rules are established within discourses requiring interest driven behaviour or which require the logic of appropriateness. To develop this argument it is essential to remind the reader of the very starting point that agents produce order through their practice by using language. This reproduces rules with such a high consistency that they are taken as “objective properties”. (Onuf 1989: 60) Thus, applying to rules and following their guidance becomes perceived as rational behaviour. Onuf understands rational behaviour as being based on rules

which organise social life. (see Onuf 1989: 60) It is rational in the sense that behaviour is examined to be proper and collectively expected. At the same time, this behaviour mutually (re)constitutes identities. 'Rational' behaviour – understood as following objective properties of actors' social reality – stabilises those rules already in practice. It strongly stabilises the social reality in place which is taken for granted and accepted as reality. (see Luckmann and Berger 1966: 37)

Rules do not govern everything that is social. Humans can make choices by deciding whether or not to follow a rule. Also, social reality is not so simple that in a given situation, actors only have one rule at their disposal. But rules govern the construction of a situation in which humans make choices about their behaviour. (see Onuf 1989: 261) Individuals are able to make choices. They are able to foresee and to countenance alternatives. (see Elster 1979: 4-28) Furthermore, in the process of making choices actors must deal with uncertainty. (see Onuf 1989: 261) Uncertainty can depend on two reasons. First, the actor who chooses has a weak knowledge. Second, the decision is also effected by other actors who make their choices by anticipating the decision of the first actor. Their decisions might affect each other in an unpredictable way. (see Onuf 1989: 261) In other words, the social structure in which individuals make choices affects these choices. Individuals make sense about how to choose within the boundaries of their social reality. The process of choosing within social 'boundaries' is called reasoning. (see Kratochwil 1989: 11-2; Onuf 1989: 96) Reasoning is a process of choosing from available means to achieve ends, goals, or objectives. (see Onuf 1989: 258-9) Reasoning is based on intersubjectively held meanings which constitute social reality. Therefore, reasoning always takes place in a given set of rules and knowledge which is the discourse about them. This defines what is perceived as rational behaviour which may include behaviour

following the logic of consequences and appropriateness. The very central argument is, however, that both depend on actors reasoning which again is located within the discourse. As argued above, discourses and their inherent meanings enable certain behaviour and disable others.

Here, the discussion has reached a point in which it is necessary to develop the relationship between rules and actors more thoroughly, because I frequently referred implicitly or explicitly above to the process of mutual constitution of agency and structure. The relation between the two is important in developing a concept of collective identity which is central to my analysis. It is central since it serves as the foundation on which threat constructions become possible, which again is constitutive for the meaning of security. In the light of the discussion above, the purpose of the following section is to clarify the mutual constitution of agency and structure. Thereby I will develop a concept of collective identity and develop how collective identities are crucial for the relation between ‘self’ and ‘other’. This finally will lead me to discuss how threats are constructed and how this depends on collective identities respectively. I further argue that the relation of the two establishes a social structure defining appropriate behaviour in a situation of insecurity. This social structure constitutes the meaning of security which is institutionalised with ESDP.

2.1.3 Collective Identities and the Construction of Threats

In the following I am going to discuss how collective identities affect actors’ behaviour. I first highlight the importance of the context in which actors find themselves. Second, I refer to the literature on the formation of collective identities. Here, I will conceptualise two different dimensions of identity, the internal and external dimensions which are understood to play different roles in identity

formations. Then I discuss how collective identities affect actors' behaviour. I especially focus on how identities enable the construction of threats. This is important to answer my research question on the meaning of security.

I have introduced rules as discursively upheld by intersubjective meanings. The process of social interaction not only constitutes rules as social structure, at the same time it affects actors in their behaviour, their constitution and their existence. (see Jepperson et al. 1996: 41) Social reality and actors penetrate each other in a process of mutual constitution. (see Giddens 1984: 1-2; Checkel 1998: 326) In this sense, Wendt has argued that identities are a reflection of actors' socialization. (see Wendt 1992: 404) Within the process of sense making, agents interact with each other through the use of language by which identities are continuously constituted through conversation. (see Benwell and Stokoe 2006: 35)

Collective identities provide actors with a particular understanding of the world surrounding them. (see Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Wendt 1994) They are constitutionally related to the process of sense making which identities reflect. Collective identities "affect the way in which members interpret and react to issues" facing them. (Hardy et al. 2005: 61) It is very likely that actors are involved in different processes of sense making. Therefore, they are members of various 'we'-groups or communities. Accordingly, actors can hold multiple identities which apply in certain contexts. (see Katzenstein 1996b: 24-5; Marcussen et al. 1999: 103; Neumann 2001: 144) Identities define appropriate behaviour as well as collective expectations for those acting within – as a member of – a particular 'we'-group. Therefore, they are reflexively connected with rules of actors' social reality. Also, equipped with their intersubjective perspectives, actors approach the world outside of 'their' groups. (see Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Wendt 1994; Hardy et al. 2005)

Identities establish a particular understanding of the world shared by members of the community. The community is a domain in which actors share understandings of themselves and each other, which then leads to predictable and replicable patterns of action within a specific context. (see Hopf 1998: 199)

Identity formation necessarily presupposes the existence of alternative others. Collective identities by definition include a dimension of “boundary drawing”, (Wendt 1999: 74) because they apply only to members of a defined community. If that is the case, identities have an internal as well as an external dimension. For this thesis, both dimensions are important. In contrast to Wendt, the concept of identity formation does not presuppose the existence of identities outside of discourse and hence outside of the social interaction through the use of language. In other words, identities are given meaning to them by articulations of group members constituting the group as an actor in a particular social field. (see Larsen 2002: 287)

As a first step, I will discuss different processes of identity formation. The literature includes at least three different approaches dealing with identity formations. They can be called ‘liberal constructivism’, ‘symbolic interactionism’, and ‘critical constructivism’. (see Rumelili 2004: 30-1) In regard to identity formation and its relation to the ‘other’, they conceptualise the external dimension of identity formation differently. I will discuss the approaches in order to develop an understanding of how identities make possible threat constructions while referring, in a second step, to Rumelili’s heuristic definition of inclusive and exclusive identities. (see Rumelili 2004: 29)

The approaches vary in the degree of how far identity formation is dependent on its relation to a significant ‘other’. The question is whether “identity requires difference”. (Campbell 1992: 69; see Rumelili 2004: 35) Critical constructivism

understands identity as a process of juxtapositioning. (see Doty 1996: 136) This logic does not have a behavioural dimension to it. (see Rumelili 2004: 29) Instead, juxtapose means that a positive term always and necessarily establishes its negative counterpart. This logic is immanent to discourses which are the only way through which humans can understand the world surrounding them. (see Foucault 1989: 151) Foucault has pointed out this effect. The argument is that language is unable to preserve stable meanings over time. (see Neumann 1996: 160) “[C]ontradiction is always anterior to the discourse [and] then functions [...] as the principle of its historicity.” (Foucault 1989: 151) In this view, othering is immanent to discourses since through juxtaposing, meanings reach higher stability. From this perspective, discourses always produce two identities, the moral superior as ‘self’ and its negative ‘other’. For example, David Campbell has analysed the importance of the significant ‘other’ to the construction of an US foreign policy. (see Campbell 1992)

In contrast to this approach, symbolic interactionism does not recognise such a dynamic. It understands identity formation “as a process of socialisation through which an individual comes to see herself in the way others do”. (Rumelili 2004: 30) Here, the meaning of ‘others’ is different to that of the critical approach. Within symbolic interactionism, ‘others’ are members of the same group as the individual in question. The approach does not conceptualise the external ‘other’ as being important for identity formations. In contrast to critical constructivism, in which ‘othering’ is the only way of identity formation, symbolic interactionism does not at all recognise the external ‘other’ as relevant.

The somewhat middle ground is provided by liberal constructivism. It argues that collective identities are generated by interaction within a given social structure constituted by norms, institutions, ideas, and collective meanings. (see Rumelili

2004: 30-1; Jepperson et al. 1996) It also establishes behavioural implications of self/other relations as a continuum ranging from negative to positive. (see Rumelili 2004: 34) This continuum measures whether identities are developed so that states can positively ascribe to each other. If they can, a collective identity is formed which leads to a security community through which anarchy can be defeated. (see Mattern 2000: 299; Adler and Barnett 1998) Although the approach to security communities strongly supports the argument that identities contribute to security, it does not address the question how identities make possible threat constructions because it focuses on the positive side of association.

A way out is provided by Bahar Rumelili, who has introduced two heuristic concepts of identities which affect group relations. Both concepts are helpful for the conceptualisation of processes of threat construction. She calls the concepts inclusive and exclusive identities. (see Rumelili 2004: 33) The interesting point about these concepts is that they are related to different types of discourses responsible for particular relations to the 'other'. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The concept thereby takes note of the post-structuralist understanding of juxtapositioning, but recognises, at the same time, the importance of group internal sense making processes. This serves my approach to collective identities and the construction of threats.

The process of sense making as social interaction is important regarding the group internal logic of identity formation. Social interaction is communication through the use of language and leads to intersubjectively shared meanings. It leads to a common understanding establishing rules which perform regulative as well as constitutive acts leading to a particular identity. In this sense, identities are not particular about boundary drawing. They are produced alongside the definition of a social structure which relates different actors within a group or community. This process does not

include a process of othering which juxtapositioning imposes. (see Foucault 1989: 151) Identities, and the appropriate behaviour inherent to this identity, are not produced by a process of ‘othering’. They are based on an internal socialisation process. But external behaviour also depends on this way of identity construction, since the identity in question provides an understanding of the world surrounding it. In other words, the social reality certainly does not end at the boundaries of the collective identity. As soon as identities also regulate external behaviour, they need to correspond to this external sphere.

Keeping that in mind, othering may well play an important role regarding the relationship between collective identities and the outside or ‘other’. ‘Othering’ is assumed as an inherent characteristic of discourses by which identities are stabilised. However, it seems to be impossible to combine the two epistemological perspectives of i) group internal sense making and its importance to identity formation with ii) othering as an internal logic of discourses. But Rumelili has provided a way out by developing his heuristic definition of inclusive and exclusive identities, on which I will draw in the following.

Inclusive identities “embody a conception of difference based on acquired characteristics”. (Rumelili 2004: 37) The logic behind this concept is that identity formation rests on rules and knowledge to which ‘others’ can positively ascribe. In this sense, the other is less ‘self’. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The formation process of the inclusive identity follows the logic of socialisation of group members. It rests on internal processes of ‘producing order’. (see Onuf 1989: 39) In contrast, exclusive identities “are defined around some inherent characteristics”. (Rumelili 2004: 37) The logic here is that the other is non-self. A barrier exists which makes it impossible for the other to ascribe to the identity and its inherent rules. The process

which leads to exclusive identities could be explained in terms of juxtapositioning. However, up to this point, it is difficult to develop categories of rules which apply only to the one but not to the other kind of identity. The difference between inclusive and exclusive identity can not rest exclusively on their types of rules. The important aspect is instead the way in which identities are socially constructed and how they are politically contested. (see Rumelili 2004: 37) The analysis of the social construction of identities and the analysis of whether and how they are politically contested can best be done by analysing the discourses which define the meanings of identities.

For example, the identity of the EU has always been defined by following the logic of an inclusive identity, understanding enlargement as being at the heart of European integration. In the 1990s, EU understood itself as “a ‘widening’ organization in so far as any ‘democratic nation’ of Europe was a potential member“. (Fierke and Wiener 1999: 722) The identity of being democratic includes a number of rules to which actors can positively ascribe. From this perspective, it was possible to understand former communist countries in Middle and Eastern Europe as being less ‘self’ and not ‘other’. This identity enabled the success of a massive European enlargement during the last 10 or so years. Today, the EU includes 27 member states. But the inclusiveness of EU identity seems to be contested especially vis-à-vis the question of membership of Turkey. Member states discussed whether or not the draft constitution should include a reference to Christianity as early as the European Convention on the Future of Europe in 2003. (see European Convention 2003: 3) Although the final draft did not include that reference, the debate showed that the definition is contested of whether or not European identity is neutral in regard to religion. The argument for Christian roots as important for EU identity is frequently

used as an argument against Turkish EU membership. (see Die Welt 2006; Financial Times 2006) In this regard, it seems that EU identity shifts from an inclusive to an exclusive definition – at least in regard to Turkey’s accession. This can also be seen by the growing importance of geography in the definition of EU identity. Even though geographic references always played a role in the definition of EU identity, it was not a central part of it. (see Fierke and Wiener 1999: 722) Geography served as a reference to an area only rudimentarily defined but did not impose clearly defined borders to the geographical reach of EU identity. Again, the example of Turkey shows a shift here. Geography plays a greater role in relation to the question of whether Turkey should be allowed to join the EU. In this context, Turkey is not regarded as part of Europe geographically. (see International Herald Tribune 2006) Based upon this, the question is whether Turkey can become a member of the EU or if by definition Turkey is disabled to apply for EU identity. The example shows how identities can include inclusive and exclusive characters. Within the discourse on EU identity, it seems to be contested whether the inclusive or exclusive definition produces order in Europe.

Both concepts, inclusive and exclusive identity, assume an important role of collective identities in affecting the construction of threats. It thereby refers to a wider debate on collective identities. In the following I will show in what way this debate is relevant. In the literature, collective identities are assumed to affect interstate structures, normative structures, institutions, and regimes. (see Jepperson et al. 1996: 62-3; Adler and Barnett 2000) In this vein of literature, threats are conceptualised as being constructed. “Since what constitutes a threat can never be stated a priori, primordial constant, it should be approached as a social construction of an Other, and theorized at that level.” (Hopf 1998: 199) The construction of

threats can be conceptualised following the logic of intersubjectivity. Intersubjective meanings provide a particular understanding of the world to actors. Equipped with this perspective, actors approach the world surrounding them. Intersubjective meanings provide “a system that already contains the objects one can speak about and the relationships one can invoke”. (Shapiro 1981: 132) The identity of actors then not only defines who “we” are but also the boundaries of the ‘self’ against the ‘other’. “[A]ctors infer external behaviour from the values and norms governing the domestic political processes that shape the identities of their partners”. (Risse-Kappen 1996: 367; Doyle 1986: 1161) If these values and norms – or in my terms ‘rules’ – are different to the ‘self’, they can be perceived as ‘other’ and as a potential threat.

The literature discussed above assumes two important aspects which affect the relation between ‘we’-groups or communities and the external spheres. That is, on the one hand groups’ intersubjective perspective onto the world, and on the other the interpretation of the other’s behaviour. Depending on the contestedness of identities, they are either constructed as inclusive or exclusive identities. The purpose of this section was to illustrate how, based on the conception of collective identities, threat constructions become possible. In the literature, these conceptualisations assume that identities affect state relations. (see Jepperson et al. 1996: 62; Wendt 1994; Katzenstein 1996a; Risse 2000) A similar role is given to collective identities in this thesis. The difference is that I am not sticking to the state level but take seriously the findings of the literature on CFSP and ESDP, which identified processes of socialisation on the EU level. These processes are central to this analysis. This does not mean that national discourses are totally kept out of the picture; National and European levels are inseparable, also in regard to identity formations, to an ever

larger extent. (see Wæver 1996: 125-6; Banchoff 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999) These processes and discourses will be reflected in the institutionalised discourses on the EU level. Those institutionalised discourses reflect the production of collective identities on the EU level and more explicitly within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. In order to answer my research question, these discourses are central. Accordingly, I transfer the effects ascribed to collective identities onto the EU level, arguing that the meaning of security is constituted through the perception of threats from the EU's intersubjective position leading to rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The next section will focus on how this relation can be analysed.

2.2 The EU: actorness, identity and institution

In the following, I will bring together the theoretical discussion of collective identity to the research object: the EU. I discuss the special characteristic of the EU's collective identity as being constructed not only as an international actor but as an international actor in the field of security. This aspect is centre piece for the research question. I will clarify the notion of international actor in reference to the existing literature which discusses the question of whether the EU is a civilian or a military actor. Basically, the literature conceptualises the character of the EU's external action in the field of security as the hard case for judging on the EU's civilian or military character. Therefore, the debate is very helpful in clarifying what remains in the centre of the thesis' analysis.

In addition to this aspect of what is out there in the EU's external action empirically, the following discussion leads to a theoretical argument. The literature intends to answer the question on the EU's actorness by analysing the means and ends of the

EU's external action. This is putting the cart before the horse, when considering the theoretical discussion on discourse dependency and collective identity above. The following discussion will bring me to the conclusion that the analysis of the EU's actorness and the effects on its behaviour needs to focus on the discursive practices of the EU's self-perception, especially in relation to security policy. Such an analysis brings back in the argument of social constructivism that collective identities and their immanent rules help to understand actors' behaviour. In regard to ESDP, *behaviour* can be translated into the institutionalisation of informal and formal rules of how to conduct security policy in accordance with the EU's self-perception. The argument that the discursive practice of identity formation enables certain behaviour is derived from the literature on discourse theory arguing that dominant interpretations enable certain policy choices and disable others.

Actorness

The process of integrating military means at the EU level has fuelled a debate on how to categorise the EU's external presence. The literature can be subsumed under the header 'actorness debate' or 'performance debate'. The central questions are whether or not the EU can be understood as an international actor and, if so, how this actorness can be conceptualised. The debate on EU's actorness focuses on the external performance of the EU. This performance has been categorised in two different ways. The starting point of both is that the EU is an international actor. The first category focuses on the reason why the EU can be conceptualised as an international actor, whether the EU is an actor by presence, opportunity or capability. (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999; Bretherton and Vogler 2006). The second category distinguishes the nature of actorness, whether the EU is a civilian power (Duchêne 1972; Hettne and Söderbaum 2005), military actor (Bull 1982; Smith 2000; Treacher

2004) or a normative power (Diez 2004; Manners 2002, 2006). Both strands of literature do not exclusively focus on ESDP. Sometimes, ESDP is only a foot note.

However, the literature, especially on civilian versus military actor, has been fuelled by the inauguration of ESDP and the availability of military means. This development has been interpreted as change in the EU's external action. The question of the character of the EU's actorness is discussed from this perspective. The literature approaches the *nature* of the EU and how the EU acts by applying previously defined typologies which are re-calibrated in the light of empirical findings.

Treacher, for example, defines the EU as a military actor by opportunity. He argues that initiatives to establish a security and defence policy within the framework of the EC/EU have long been discussed but not established by member states. (Treacher 2004) He argues that in the second half of the 1990s, external factors offered the opportunity to establish a security and defence pillar within the EU. The logic of this analysis is taken from the actorness debate of Bretherton and Vogler (2006), who argue that actorness can occur in three different ways: first, by presence, which is conceptualised as the relationship between internal developments and external expectations. Second, opportunity is when external factors enable or constrain actors. Third, capability is the combination of the above two. Actorness by capability is understood as the capacity to act effectively to external expectations and opportunities. (see Bretherton and Vogler 1999: 5)

Treacher argues that the EU became an actor in security and defence by opportunity. Although the EU and its member states were unable to solve the conflicts in Ex-Yugoslavia, internationally, the EU was expected to do so. External expectations were based on the economic power of the EU and the EU's external behaviour as

being an international actor in economic terms. Also, the conflicts in Ex-Yugoslavia took place at the EU's 'back door'. Since the EU effectively implemented stability not only in Western Europe but also in Middle and Eastern Europe, the EU was expected to do the same in the Balkans. (see Treacher 2004: 53, 56) Furthermore, Treacher argues that the US reduced their capabilities to take care of Europe's security and defence at the end of the Cold War. This opened up the opportunity for the EU and its member states to organise security and defence differently by inaugurating ESDP at the EU level. Based on this institutional development, Treacher argues for the EU being a military actor by opportunity.

In contrast, the concept 'Civilian Power Europe' has been reviewed in regard to the 'militarisation' of the EU, arguing that despite this development the EU remains a civilian actor centrally based on the civilian ends of the EU's external action. The concept civilian actor has been introduced by Duchêne. (Duchêne 1972, 1973) He observed that the EC gained socio-economic power to conduct its foreign policy. Furthermore, he identified a general tendency of change in the international sphere from power politics backed by military capabilities towards a growing importance of trade policy as foreign policy. (Bull 1982: 150) In this regard, civilian power is contrasted by military power. The dividing line cuts across whether or not the actor in question has military means at its disposal to serve military ends. (Smith 2004: 1-2) The dichotomy is implicitly created in front of the blue print of the traditional nation-state, who is expected to be militarily capable in order to be powerful at the international level.

The literature on civilian actor argues for the necessity to overcome this perspective. The debate includes an implicit normative judgement which says that civilian power is good and which necessarily means military power is bad. (see Sjørnsen 2006: 236)

That judgement is contrasted by Stavridis arguing that the EU strengthened its civilian nature through its military capabilities. (Stavridis 2001a: 47-8; Stavridis 2001b). Despite its military capabilities the EU was active in civilising security policy. (see Lodge 1993: 233-4) Using Bull's article on the concept of civilian power (1982), he argues that, in the case of the EU, military capabilities back the very civilian ends of its foreign policy. This is a character not seen before and it makes the EU different to nation-states. Whereas early contributors to the debate on civilian power contrasted civilian actorness to the foreign policy of traditional nation-states, Stavridis and others contrast it to the US's foreign policy since the 1990s. (see Diez 2004: 7) This comparison remains implicit, since no attempt has either openly discussed or empirically proved this contrast. (see for example Stavridis 2001b: 20)

The dispute of whether to define the EU as a civilian or military actor remains unsolved, not in the least because it is unclear whether to focus on the means or ends of the EU's external action. On the one hand, military capabilities are important to understand the EU as an international actor in the field of security. In this vein of literature Hedley Bull, as a responder to Duchêne, points out the importance of military capabilities in order to evaluate actorness. The logic is that the EC/EU can only implement its own foreign policy when the EU is militarily capable to act autonomously – especially autonomously from the US. (Bull 1982: 154) In this view, ESDP enables the EU to conduct its own foreign and security policy, which makes the EU autonomous from the US. Hence, the EU is a military actor by capability. (Smith 2000, 2004; Treacher 2004) On the other hand, authors argue that this view focuses too much on means rather than on the civilian ends of the EU's external action. (Stavridis 2001b; Whitman 2002; see also Maull 2000).

Identity

Overall, the civilian vs. military actor dichotomy tries to develop a concept of actorness while being relatively blind on international relations theory and its contribution to the debate. (Whitman 2002: 3) The problem of the civilian vs. military actor literature is that it starts by analysing the EU's behaviour and derives at the conclusion that the EU accordingly represents a certain type of actorness. Thereby, the literature reverses well established arguments of international relations theory, such as those of social constructivism which argue that collective identities and their immanent rules help to understand the EU's behaviour. The collective identity defining the EU's actorness is upheld by discursive practices and its inherent meanings are constituted through this practice by relevant actors within the EU. (see Larsen 2002: 286) Therefore, I argue that the EU's international actorness in the field of security, as an aspect of the EU's identity, needs to be analysed with a discursive perspective in order to develop insight of how the EU perceives itself as the referent object of security, how its role as a security actor is constructed and how it reasons on the way to establish a security policy at the EU level. The analysis discovers the dominant logics of the EU's actorness in the field of security as well as how and why the EU perceived it necessary to establish a security policy at the EU level accordingly.

Institution

Therefore, the thesis conceptualises security as a relational concept. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 10) This concept is developed in the following section. Basically it argues that the perception of an external actor or phenomenon as security relevant or as a threat is enabled by the boundaries of the actors' understanding of the world and hence their collective identity. The construction of security problems or threats are

sidelined by the implementation of rules which reflect what is perceived as appropriate in the case of insecurity, again within the limits of the actors' collective identity. These rules are discursively upheld, which provides them with the discursive power to affect relevant EU actors in their policy options. Although this is a theoretical argument of discourse theory, (see Fairclough 2003: 8; Diez 1999: 603; Wæver 2002) the perspective opens up the possibility to argue that discourses on the meaning of security enabled the institutionalisation of formal and informal rules of security policy at the EU level.

In other words, the theoretical perspective assumes that the attempt of relevant EU actors to establish and institutionalise a security policy at that very level is based on their reasoning on the EU's external role and their perceptions of the security problems and threats. These actors take part in discourses on security, and it is these discourses and their dominant interpretations of the world which enable and at the same time limit actors' policy choices. And, it is these discourses which need to be analysed in order to discover the rationale of the EU's security policy. Therefore, a rigorous analysis of the discursively upheld meaning of security provides answers to the research question of how ESDP became possible at the turn of the 21st century. In order to do so, the following sections will closely develop how security as a relational concept and its practice within discourses can be conceptualised.

2.3 Conceptualising the Social Construction of Security

In this section, I develop the research design with which I approach the analysis of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. This section will again be divided into four sub-sections. Based on the theoretical discussion above, I will first conceptualise how the social construction of security

can be understood. Security always establishes a relation between a community and its external surrounding which is perceived as i) seriously threatening the actor's compliance with core elements of his identity, ii) threatening the identity itself, or iii) threatening the physical existence. In each case, certain rules of appropriate responses apply in arguing for the use of particular means and ways of reaction.

The second section identifies relevant discourses in regard to the meaning of security. Based on the conceptualisation of the social construction of security, I will identify three fields of discourses which are important for the meaning of security. These fields are i) European integration, ii) international challenges, and iii) international order. Within the first discursive field collective identities are constituted. The second discursive field especially affects the perception of the outside world as threatening or as a security problem. This perspective is based on the EU's intersubjective understanding of the world. Based on the relation between EU identity and perceived threats, social order is produced. This social order is reflected within the third discursive field and establishes rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity.

In the third section I will exemplarily show how processes of sense making are connected to a particular time and space. Relevant discourses are connected to a particular space in the sense that utterances take place within institutionalised discourses bound to the formal structures of the EU. In regard to time, the connection can be conceptualised in relation to each discursive field. The discursive fields are streamlined by particular stories or particular moods, or in other words, narratives. These narratives impute an underlying logic onto processes of sense making. The purpose of this section is to further clarify the map of discourses which will be analysed. I will develop discursive narratives for the most important aspects of the

social construction of security. Relevant narratives are on European identity, global challenges and appropriate means of responses. They serve as a starting point of the analysis. At the same time, these narratives can be understood as having hypothetical status. They will be contested throughout the analysis.

In the final sub-section I will visually show how the three discursive fields overlap and point out the area in which the meaning of security is constituted; relating identity constructions, the perception of threats and the construction of rules. Following this section, I will develop the research methods to analyse the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

2.3.1 Security

In order to conceptualise the social construction of security, the most fundamental question to answer is: how can security be understood? Following the logic of my theoretical approach, security can only be understood as a social construction. Security establishes a relation between a self and a significant other. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 21) Security is relational in the sense that it relates reference objects to threats which are perceived as such from the reference object's perspective. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 10) The reference object is a group or community with a given identity. Collective identities are the most relevant aspects with which to discuss whether or not a group or community perceives something as a threat. Actors approach the world surrounding them from the perspective of collective identities. (see Marcussen et al. 1999: 103) This may lead to the perception of others as a threat. Something is perceived as a threat because it is understood to be different, not understandable, negating, or in contrast to certain aspects of the identity. This is dependent on the social construction of the collective identity and the processes of sense making on external factors which are different to this identity. This does not necessarily mean

that threats are only and exclusively those phenomena which are perceived to physically attack the group or community in question. The construction of security starts much earlier. For example, I will show that the EU perceived poverty as a threat or security problem, since it was understood as potentially leading to conflict. Conflict again was perceived to jeopardise achievements made by the EU's development policy. Therefore, in 2000 and 2001, security policy was understood to support the EU's development policy as a last resort in stopping crisis and conflict from further harming the achievement of the EU's development policy. These rules stabilised the self-perception of the EU as being an international actor in the making.

As a starting point, the probability of threat constructions can be measured based on the established type of identity. Identity types can be inclusive or exclusive and define whether or not it is possible for others to become more 'self'. From this perspective, the behaviour of an 'other' or an external phenomenon is interpreted and probabilities of behaviour or effects are ascribed to it. For example, if EU identity is constructed as an inclusive identity containing democracy as a core principle, then states which also have built their identity on such a core principle would not be perceived as a threat from the EU's perspective. The second important aspect of whether or not threat constructions are likely concerns the political contestedness of collective identities as well as perceptions of the other's behaviour. Political contestedness provides further characters and traits to collective identities which enable or disable threat constructions. Contestedness takes place when aspects of EU identity which were not part of its external behaviour become important for the EU's external behaviour. EU identity constructions in regard to Turkey's EU membership can serve as an example of political contestedness.

Overall, threat constructions establish the relation between a referent object and an ‘other’ and thereby constitute the intersubjective understanding of security. This intersubjective understanding is “one key to understanding behaviour”. (Buzan et al. 1998: 31) It constitutes social order including rules ordering actors’ behaviour in the situation of insecurity. In regard to the EU, these rules are institutionalised within ESDP. They address conditions for action and the use of force, cooperation with other institutions, and the objectives which are envisaged by the EU’s security policy. In this sense, ESDP is a reflection of the process of sense making on European security.

2.3.2 Mapping the Fields

The social construction of security includes three dimensions: collective identity as referent object, perception of the other’s behaviour or external phenomena form the intersubjective position of the community in question, and rules of appropriate responses applying to the situation of insecurity. The meaning of security is interwoven with different processes of sense making taking place in one of these three dimensions. It is understood as a contextual concept, which can be fluid and change over time and space. (see Browning and Joenniemi 2004: 706) They refer to, and build up on, each other and thereby (re)define the meaning of security. For example, a discourse on intervention refers to a particular meaning of security and thereby stabilises this meaning in a manner of mutual constitution. Intervention only makes sense when the behaviour of state ‘A’ is perceived as breaking international rules of action and interaction. This would lead to a construction of threat only when other collective identities encompass international law as core principles. From such an intersubjective perspective, the behaviour of state ‘A’ would be perceived as threatening these core principles. As a consequence, this would establish the rule to

intervene in the situation when state ‘A’ acts against or breaks rules of international law.

In accordance with this three dimensional concept, meanings which add to the construction of security fall into three different discursive fields. As an analytical tool, discursive fields gather similar discourses which can be subsumed under a common header. In regard to my analysis, they fall into the three fields of i) European integration, ii) international challenges, and iii) international order.

Discursive fields help to anchor discourses in time and space. First, the connection of discourses to space is most easily conceptualised by defining a forum in which discourses take place. Within the EU, discourses on security are institutionalised within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Accordingly, relevant actors are from the political elites of EU member states and EU institutions which have been involved in the institutional development of, and policy making within, ESDP. Second, apart from that, processes of sense making are connected to a particular time. This connectedness can be expressed in narratives which have streamlined processes of sense making during particular time episodes. Time connectedness is again an analytical tool to characterise, in broader terms, processes of sense making. In other words, narratives are nothing else than meanings which strongly dominated processes of sense making over a long period of time and on a high level of intersubjectivity. Dominant meanings affect other processes of sense making because they disable other ways of interpretations. In the literature, this effect has been discussed as power of discourses. (see Foucault 1980: 119) This is relevant to my analysis, since I am analysing three different periods of time, e.g. 1996-7, 2000-1, and 2003-4. Discourses of these periods are constrained by

particular moods of sense making, by narratives which were dominant during their time.

2.3.3 Narratives as Story Tellers

In the following, I will consider the narratives for all three discursive fields. By this, I intend to prepare the field of research and ‘hypothesise’ the most relevant dynamics with which the analysis will be confronted. This serves three goals. First, I will clarify the borders of all three discursive fields and thereby clarify which discourses have to be analysed. Second, I make explicit my perspective on the field of research and add a deductive perspective to it. Third, the narratives shall serve as propositions or hypotheses mapping the expected dynamics at work in the construction of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The empirical analysis has to clarify whether the proposed narratives prove to be dominant.

a European Integration

The discursive field on European integration includes a variety of discourses on concepts applying to the political, social, legal, and economic order within the EU. Discourses can be found on integration, political union, democracy, common market, and so forth. Discourses may vary in connotations over space, including national borders. The discursive field on European integration is streamlined by an understanding of political unity which goes further than applying solely to an effective economic cooperation within a common market. The process of European integration has brought peace and unity to the rivalled European continent. Without European integration, conflict lines between great European powers would cut across the continent with a high probability of conflict and war. This is disabled by

integration. But integration is more than just a peace project for Europe. The meaning of political union is based on the idea that unity is more than the sum of its parts. Political unity is about an European identity in favour of political, economic and legal cooperation organised through supranational institutions. Member states pool their sovereignty within European institutions which are designed to direct actors' objectives towards higher common interests. Political unity goes hand in hand with an understanding of democracy and its European form of multilevel governance, as well as with the rule of law.

Furthermore, political unity constructs the EU not as a nation-state but as a member of the international community. From this perspective, the EU intends to possess similar capabilities as other members of the international community, e.g. nation-states. This can be seen most clearly within the discourse on actorness. The logic of why it is necessary for the EU to conduct the full scale of foreign policy is based on the understanding of what is expected from a member of the international community. Such a member is expected to include economic as well as political and military power in order to conduct international politics. This streamlines the construction of the EU as an international actor and refers to the discursive field on international order requiring the EU to face its obligations internationally. These obligations are created by the international order containing nation-states as their constituting units and the UN Charter and international law as containing current rules of international action. Since the EU perceives itself as an equal member of the international community, the EU has to include all capabilities applying to the principle units of this community, e.g. nation-states.

By and large, within the discursive field on European integration the most relevant narrative is the one on political unity. The meaning of political unity refers to other

logically interrelated concepts of political and legal order, such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, effectiveness etc. This narrative has affected the mood of sense making on European integration which led to the construction of the EU's self-perception of being an international actor capable of security policy. Based on this perspective, it was necessary to have civilian and military capabilities at the EU's disposal to conduct security policy. The question remains whether or not this perspective was established during the time periods under review here. For example, the analysis will show that especially in 1996-7, EU identity did not include an external dimension in the sense of international actor in the field of foreign and security policy.

b) Global Challenges

The discursive field of global challenges includes discourses on issues, actors, and problems which are considered to have the potential of de-stabilising the international order, or those which question EU identity as a whole or aspects of it. Understanding what makes a global challenge is fundamentally important for the meaning of security. Discourses of this field are not necessarily connected to the space of the EU. Actors which take part within this discursive field are spread out worldwide. The most relevant actors are political elites, scholars, the media, and interest groups. Although discourses in this field seem to be free floating, they are dominated by different narratives as a matter of space. In regard to my analysis, three levels of space can be conceptualised. First, the international level connected to international institutions such as the UN may well be one dimension. The second level of space could be called the 'West' or the 'transatlantic arena'. Here, discourses on global challenges are connected to something which has been called transatlantic security community. (see Deutsch 1957; Risse-Kappen 1996) The final and most

relevant space is connected to Europe and institutionalised discourses on global challenges within the EU institutions. The third level is most important because meanings need to be translated onto this level in order to add meaning to security institutionalised within ESDP.

Whereas on these different levels narratives might vary, the meaning of globalisation is a narrative spread across these spaces. Globalisation is interrelated with other meanings which only make sense and which are possible only in reference to an understanding of globalisation. Globalisation here means nothing more than a world which becomes more and more interdependent in an economic, political, social, and environmental sense. This means that events mostly can not be taken as singular, isolated events. They depend on, and are interrelated with, other events, even when these links are not easily recognisable. This meaning of globalisation constitutes the international system as a complex one, more complex than during the Cold War. The international system of the Cold War was characterised by a bipolar confrontation. At the end of the Cold War, the meaning of globalisation became the next most influential narrative within the discursive field of global challenges. The globalised world does not include clear borders of confrontations. Also, the problems arising due to global challenges are more manifold, causing conflict and war. In this regard, the debate on the 'new wars' became possible at the end of the Cold War, even though it is contestable whether or not they were a new phenomenon. (see Chojnacki 2004; Neuman 2004)

Globalisation makes other narratives within the discursive field of global challenges possible. One of the most striking narratives is that of international terrorism. This narrative has existed at least since the events in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. (see Silberstein 2002) For example, 29 papers submitted to the

International Studies Association annual meeting in 2007 included ‘war on terror’ in their titles, in 123 papers ‘war on terror’ was quoted in the abstract and a total of 693 papers are listed under a full-text search on ‘war on terror’. This gives an impression of how influential the meaning of international terrorism has become, knowing that this is not exclusively true for the academic debate on international studies. The narrative has influenced a variety of areas pertaining to social and political life, domestically as well as internationally. (see Lavranos 2003: 263; Heupel 2008: 8; Cronin 2002: 33; Liese 2007; O’Loughlin 2007; Reitan 2007)

The narrative of international terrorism is fundamentally interlinked with the narrative of globalisation. International terrorism is understood as a global strategy interlinking local problems to Western or even American dominance in a globalised world. (see Cronin 2002: 38; Schneckener 2004) Only within a globalised world is it possible for local impressions or problems such as poverty, religious differences, or conflict to be connected to more distanced causes. Without a concept of globalisation, interdependence of local and distanced events would not be possible. For example, it is very difficult to reconstruct the rationale of the attacks of 11 September 2001 without the meaning of globalisation. Mostly, objectives are understood to address differences in Muslim norms and values vis-à-vis American liberal capitalism or the “Zionist-Crusader” alliance. (Nacos 2003: 1) Another objective – it was said – was to show that the powerful “United States was not invulnerable”. (Schroeder 2001: 34) However, the connection of both ‘ways of life’ only makes sense within a globalised world. Distanced events can be constructed to have an effect on each other only within an interdependent world.

Variety over space seems to be important in regard to connotations in the narrative of international terrorism. The European perspective seems to be different compared to

an American perspective. (see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006: 94) The perspectives ascribe different causes to the emergence of international terrorism. The EU's perspective of this problem will be analysed in the empirical chapters. For example, I will show that the narrative of international terrorism affected other processes of sense making which were not previously connected to a meaning of terrorism. This applies to the meaning of dynamic threats. Whereas it might first be considered that the construction of dynamic threats was enabled by the narrative of globalisation, I will show that the construction of dynamic threats became possible only in reference to the phenomenon of international terrorism. Dynamic threats encompass, for example, weak states, organised crime, poverty, and non-proliferation of WMDs. These problems are perceived to depend on each other and thereby worsen the seriousness of each.

The empirical analysis will show how the dynamics of global challenges affect threat constructions in Europe and how the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP is thereby constructed. Two narratives have to be taken into consideration affecting processes of sense making within the discursive field on global challenges: globalisation and international terrorism. Connotations in narratives and their effects on other sense making processes vary over space. Again, institutionalised discourses on the EU level constitute the most relevant space in the analysis of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

c) *International Order*

The discursive field on international order includes discourses on international cooperation, international organisations, and normative claims of just behaviour on the international, regional and domestic level. In regard to my analysis, sense making

processes regarding the institutional design of ESDP and the code of conduct towards security issues are related to discourses within this discursive field. Two narratives seem to be very important within this field: i) nation-states as international actors and stabilisers of the international system and ii) multilateralism by which nation-states are supported or monitored in their compliance with international law. The international system and its structure are constituted by nation-states through international law. But responsibility for stability has been widened since the late 1980s, including international organisations. (see Peou 2002: 51) This widened system again has been institutionalised through the UN Charter. Nation-states have the responsibility to protect their citizens. Today, it is discussed that if a state is not willing or able to take on this responsibility, the UN Security Council can justify intervention or peace-enforcement. (see Durch 1993: 9; Morris and McCoubrey 1999: 130; ICISS 2001: 11-2) Thereby, the meaning of sovereignty has changed to be ensured only to those states which take on their obligations by protecting their citizens. (see Thakur 2002: 328; ICISS 2001: 12) However, human intervention addresses the primary responsibility of nation-states as the stabilising entities of international order. The goal of human intervention is to bring back order to nation-states and to re-establish governance applying to human rights, international law, democracy and the rule of law. (see Dobbins 2005: 56) Therefore, the narrative on nation-states as stabilisers of the international systems is very important here.

The meaning of multilateralism also seems to have widespread effects on sense making. (see Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003: 836-7) For instance, the UN is a multilateral system by which international cooperation is pushed into more coherent and stabilising grounds. International cooperation has been institutionalised by international agreements such as GATT/WTO. And finally, the EU itself represents

multilateralism on a very high level, including supranational institutions and decision-making processes. The success of international organisations is based on the quality of stability they provide to member states. (see Ruggie 1992: 562-4) Multilateralism, therefore, fits the obligation of nation-states to stabilise the international and domestic order, as well as being responsible for the protection of their citizens. In this regard, multilateralism affects the nation-states' perspective of appropriate behaviour. For example, commitment in resolving conflict and sustainable peace initiatives are interlinked with international rules established by the UN Charter and reflected in institutional settings such as the UNSC. (see Abbott and Snidal 1998: 3-4) Overall, the narrative of multilateralism affects the process of state actors' sense making and gives higher priority to the construction of compliance with international norms. (see Risse and Ropp 1999: 237; Chapman 2007: 135)


Both narratives are very important for the social construction of security institutionalised within ESDP. This is especially the case because the EU itself is nothing else than an example of effective and successful multilateralism, understood as integration. Therefore, both narratives are central in regard to the EU's sense making on security policy. However, the first narrative on nation-states may well affect the process of sense making of the EU's role as an international actor and its permissible capacities. This may well correspond with the EU's self-perception as member of the international community. Furthermore, it is interrelated with the narrative of multilateralism and the demand to meet institutional and procedural requirements established by international norms. (see Risse and Ropp 1999; Checkel 1997) Therefore, the discursive field on international order is of high relevance in regard to the institutional settings and policy-mechanisms of ESDP. Respective

processes on sense making may also be affected by discourses on European integration understood as the specialised field on political order within Europe.

2.3.4 Locating the Meaning of Security

All three discursive fields are relevant for the social construction of security institutionalised within ESDP. They affect different dimensions of security: referent object/collective identity, construction of threat, and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. Within these fields, discourses can be found defining and redefining meanings mutually constituting the meaning of European security. The fields can be imagined as circles which overlap. The space in which they overlap symbolises the space of the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. This model is illustrated below and will guide the discourse analysis conducted in the empirical chapters.

Discursive Fields and the Meaning of Security



In the next section I will discuss the methodological approach of my analysis which leads this chapter to its conclusion.

3. *Research Methods*

The thesis analyses the politics of discourse constructing the meaning of security which enabled, or made possible, a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

The politics of discourse understands discursive practice as political practice. This refers to the discussion that humans are language users to “enter a system that already contains the objects one can speak about and the relationships one can invoke”. (Shapiro 1981: 130) Here, ‘system’ does not mean language as such. The ‘system’ contains a huge variety of meanings which can be practiced through language. Or to put it differently, this system of meanings constitutes a particular discursive practice. The analysis of this practice provides insights into political structures. They constitute subjects “who have the legitimacy to speak and act in such a way that they control [...] objects”. (Shapiro 1981: 141) Discourses constitute “conceptualizations that are used to understand the phenomena which emerge”. (Shapiro 1981: 130; see Foucault 1977: 199) These conceptualizations can change over time. Here, the meaning of security changed over time to finally enable a security policy at the EU level. The meaning of security first did not and then did enable a security policy because meanings limit the range of objects available; they constrain the processes of appropriate and rational reasoning, and constitute only certain actors as agents of knowledge. This process is the politics of discourses.

In order to analyse the politics of discourses, this project focuses on the EU level and explicitly on the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies, such as the general secretariat including the High Representative of CFSP, COREPER, the PSC, and the CIVCOM. Together, they constitute the political structure of relevance on which level the meaning of security has been (re-)constructed and institutionalised within ESDP.

Apart from a concept of change, Foucault’s quote above includes three aspects of the politics of discourse which are central for my analysis: first, the ‘phenomenon which emerges’ is European security. The central question of this thesis is how ESDP

became possible at the turn of the 21st century. The thesis analyses the meaning of security constituting ESDP. Second, ‘conceptualizations’ need to be understood as the aspects mutually constituting the meaning of European security in regard to identity/referent object, threat construction, and rules of appropriate behaviour in the situation of insecurity. In order to analyse these three constitutive elements, the thesis will explicitly focus on the EU’s policies relating and adding to the rationale of security. Texts on the institutional implementations are of lesser importance than those of policy-making because the analysis starts by hypothesising that institutions reflect the rationale of security based on a given identity. Therefore, texts on institutional implementations will be used to double check the findings in regard to rules of appropriate behaviour applying in the case of insecurity. Third, ‘agents of knowledge’ are central for the discursive practice because they can legitimately establish rules of how security and its aspects can be conceptualised. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 31-2) My analysis focuses on how agents of knowledge conceptualise the meaning of European security. I have conceptualised agents of knowledge as the political elite of EU member states and EU institutions which have taken part in processes of sense making on European security within the named institutions. Processes of sense making can lead to change in how agents of knowledge conceptualise security. Change can be evaluated while analysing the empirical data used throughout this thesis. Before I will define relevant empirical data and discuss its limits, I develop a concept of change.

3.1 Change

The basic argument of the thesis is that the inauguration of a security policy at the EU level and the enhanced use of military and civilian capabilities by the EU are signifiers for change in the EU’s external action. From a discursive perspective, this

highlights change in the process of how involved actors make sense of themselves, the world surrounding them and appropriate action facing security challenges identified from their intersubjective perspective. Overall, the thesis intends to identify changes in the rationale of security over time and explain how implemented logics enabled a security policy at the EU level. In order to do so, the following section develops a concept of change and typologies to identify change in more detail. On the very basic level, the first typology of change is development, meaning that changes take place slowly over time without one identifiable moment enabling change. The other typology is change in the face of discursive crises leading to new processes of sense making and thereby changing established ways of reasoning. Both will be developed in more detail below.

First of all, it is important to recall that from a discursive perspective, change is expected to be likely. Discourses are less likely to be stable over a longer period of time than being affected by change. The reason for that is twofold. The first structure based argument is that discourses contest each other because they provide different understandings of facts and events. (see Hansen 2006: 32) This contestedness may lead to meanings which are stable for a certain period of time until they are again contested by other discourses, and earlier marginalised discourses gain more support. The second argument is agent based and refers to Onuf's understanding of speech acts. Agents make sense of the world through the use of language. Therefore, they produce order in the world. The process of sense making does not take place in free space but is indeed socially embedded. Order is only established when its rules, boundaries and characteristics are intersubjectively shared which makes social order relatively stable. A social order may then be questioned or contested by actors who reason about a particular situation and communicate their reasoning through speech

acts. Depending on the actors' position, the context of the speech act and the audience, the speech act may be successful in paving the way to, or initiating, change. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 26-33)

The research design of the thesis is directed to identify change on a structural level. The thesis is interested in the social order which was established at the EU level and which enabled a security policy at that level. The characteristic of a social order needs to be intersubjectively shared in order to be relevant, and to be forceful, in directing actors' behaviour. The analysis needs to identify dominant meanings and how they changed or how they were replaced by other meanings over time. Intersubjectively shared meanings are those which are dominant in a particular discourse. Dominance again is a matter of frequency of use and the amount of references of the meaning in question to others in order to make sense and in order to provide meaning to others.¹ Single speech acts are of lesser importance for the analysis – even in moments of success – because they become relevant and are recognised as soon as they affect the intersubjectively shared social order of a European security policy. In other words, speech acts are not as important as the discursive structure because they may or may not lead to changes at the structural level. Change at the structural level takes place when discursive practices refer to changed or altered meanings. These effects are recognised and analysed not only in regard to dominant meanings but also in regard to marginalised discourses, which are important to identify potentialities of change. Following this research approach, the following paragraphs conceptualise change and how it can be identified on a structural, discursive level.

¹ The section on research techniques will provide a concept of how this can be empirically evaluated.

To begin with, change is the moment when potentiality is translated into actuality. (see Ringmar 2005: 18) What does this mean in regard to discourse? Actuality can only apply to the dominant interpretation of facts and events at a given moment in time. Potentialities are meanings which do not gain dominant support by discursive practices because of unsuccessful speech acts or because they are part of a marginalised discourse. Change in discourses takes place when dominant interpretations are different in one period of time compared with another one, hence when earlier marginalised discourses gain support and contest established interpretations.

In order to identify change and explain the effects of logics which are newly introduced or altered by these changes, the thesis focuses on three moments in time in which discourses on the meaning of security changed. The details of the periods of analysis will be developed below in section 2.4.3. Here, it is important to highlight that they are systematically selected as ‘key events’ in the development of a security policy at the EU level. Key events are situations “where ‘important facts’ manifest themselves on the political [...] agenda”. (Hansen 2006: 32) Key events in regard to enabling the inauguration and implementation of a security policy at the EU level were those which led to, or circle around, treaty revisions or other formalisations of security policies at the EU level. Along this line, the first key event is actually prior to the formal integration of a security policy in the EU treaties in the years 1996 and 1997; the second is the key event of the treaty revision of Nice and the post-Nice process of revising the treaties again in the years 2000 and 2001; and the third key event is when the EU deployed military and civilian operations for the first time under the ESDP umbrella in 2003 and 2004. Whereas the first period will be used to

identify the ‘state of the art’ at the beginning of the analysis, the analysis of the successive periods will in particular focus on changes to the earlier periods.

With this approach, the analysis will be able to identify how potentialities turned into actualities. How these moments can be identified empirically will be discussed in the following. First, I focus on change as development when marginalised discourses gain more support. Second, I focus on discursive crises and why and how change takes place through processes of sense making in the aftermath of such crises.

When change is conceptualised as development it highlights the very characteristic of discourses which are contested by other discourses at all times but gain support in particular moments of time. This may be due to four reasons. First, meanings battle for dominance following the argument of contestedness, in the process of becoming intersubjectively shared. Dominance then becomes a matter of how widely meanings are shared among actors and how stable this dominance is over time. This is a structure based argument, highlighting the politics of discourses by which discourses enfold power over the way actors make sense of the world.

The next three reasons for development include a concept of agency. Therefore, second, the literature on security communities argues that security communities are widened by spreading background knowledge, which is the very identity and immanent rules of that security community. (see Adler 2008: 204) The conceptualisation of security developed above highlights such a process. Through discursive practices, the rational of security is established by relating identity to the external world and identifying threats and security problems as well as appropriate rules to react from this perspective. Therefore, “members of the community sustain and change their identity through arguments about the kinds of threat they face”, (Kitchen 2009: 103) about what kind of role the EU should play in the field of

security and how this relates to other policy fields and its self-perception of being an international actor in security. In other words, change takes place through sense making on how the EU should act internationally, what kind of security challenges it faces and how the EU should react to these challenges. This is the discursive practice of (re-)defining identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity and will be analysed at that level.

Third, the EU's security policy is a fairly new tool compared with its external action in economic or development terms. Therefore, the EU's security policy needs to correspond to these other policy fields. This is not only true for EU policies but more generally for those of all three levels: national, supranational and intergovernmental. They need to correspond to each other in order to be coherent and effective. In this regard, Veronica Kitchen brings forward a very strong argument that when a policymaker tries to obtain support for his policy he uses the logics, phrases and arguments already established within the community in question. (see Kitchen 2009: 103) Hence, arguments to establish a new policy such as the EU's security policy ride the arguments of those already established in order to ensure continuity and reassure others. (see Kitchen 2009: 109) This aspect is very important in regard to the argument of why ESDP was not only legitimate but necessary to ensure continuity of the EU's policies. The analysis in chapter III shows that the main argument of why a security policy at the EU level was necessary was established in regard to development policies whose achievements were jeopardised by crises and conflicts within or between states. In order for the EU's development policy to remain effective, a security policy was necessary as the last resort.

Fourth, actors refer to grand designs in order to support their arguments for change. In regard to the EU, the grand design of what accounts for an international actor was

an international actor which was recognised by the international community. The ability to autonomously in the field of security was perceived to be necessary in order to be recognised by others. Frequently, references to this grand design could be identified in discourses on the meaning of security and almost always establish the logic that the EU needs to be able to comply with this archetype actor in order to be a full-fledged international actor.

Apart from change as development, change can also take place in the face of a discursive crisis. Two types of discursive crises are important for the analysis. First, a crisis occurs when existing meanings are unable to cope with new phenomena and experience. (see Diez 2001: 14) Such a situation leads to new processes of sense making through which actors try to understand new phenomena and construct meanings which fit into their social reality. (see Croft 2006: 8; Croft 2000) This aspect of a ‘self-healing power’ is important to conceptualise discursive crisis. In this sense, Harbermas argues that “the crisis cannot be separated from the viewpoint of the one who is undergoing it”. (in Koselleck 1988: 104) This is true in two ways: first, the actor in question perceives the phenomenon as a crisis based on his terms of perceiving the world; and second what he does to overcome or tackle the crisis is again enabled by its intersubjective perspective. This aspect of discursive crisis was particularly important in the aftermath of the events of the 11 September 2001. The construction of international terrorism as a threat was used to argue for a fundamental characteristic of threats as being dynamic, and dynamically affecting and worsening previously unrelated security problems. This understanding strengthened the legitimacy to call for civilian and military capabilities to be implemented at the EU level. At the same time, processes of sense making in the

aftermath of these events led to a strengthened and more exclusive definition of EU identity based on juxtapositioning of self and other. (see Chapter V)

The second type of discursive crisis relevant to the analysis refers to Habermas who defines two different types of crises and of which the second is relevant here. A system crisis is characterised by “the exhaustion of techniques” which is in its very essence a positivist definition by which “internal contradictions and steering difficulties” are recalibrated in order to overcome the crisis. (see Hay 1996: 88) The situation in which a group of actors is not able to handle the exhaustion of techniques can lead to an identity crisis. An identity crisis occurs when members of a group realise that their group and its institutions are undergoing a system crisis. (see Hay 1996: 89) They “feel their identity threatened”. (Habermas 1975: 3) This definition helps to understand how discrepancies between an identity and the ability to apply to essential characteristics of this identity can lead to a crisis. For example, in the years 2000 and 2001, the EU also perceived itself as being an international actor in the field of security but realised that it was unable to apply to the characteristics of acting as an international actor. (see Chapter III and IV)

Overall, the six types developed above enable the analysis to identify change and evaluate its character. The empirical chapters refer to these types and make moments of change more explicit to make findings more comprehensive. In order to do so, the following sections provides arguments for the selection of empirical date, of the periods of research and the research techniques applied throughout the empirical chapters.

3.2 Empirical Data

The thesis intends to analyse the shared understanding of EU actors on what security means, the perception of threats and security problems perceived from actors' intersubjective perspective and the understanding of how to face these threats and problems. The thesis analyses this shared understanding of relevant EU actors. Relevant EU actors are those who have the competence to formulate and revise the EU's security policy, i.e. the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. It is therefore important to discover the logics of shared understandings that constitute actors' perception and understanding of the world, and which define appropriate actions in specific circumstances. (see Gheciu 2005: 27) This is exactly what discourse analysis can do. Discourse analysis provides access to the internal logics of actors' reasoning on themselves and the world surrounding them. These internal logics are embedded in discourses about them and can be identified by analysing subjects and objects and the relations among them as being constructed through discourse. (see Milliken 2001 and below) Such an analysis provides answers to the questions of how EU identity is constructed, how threats or security problems are perceived and how rules of appropriate action in the case of insecurity are formulated.

Before I dig deeper into the research techniques of discourse analysis, I will clarify what types of texts count as data for my analysis. First and foremost are texts authored by the most relevant actors at the EU level in regard to the EU's security policy. I then argue that relevant texts are those which represent a final agreement, an official statement or other official texts produced by these authors. These documents represent common agreements of all EU member states gathered at the EU level. And since the statements are not only part of the formalised procedure but

are also publicly adopted, they are not about “cheap talk” but strongly add to the construction of the EU’s identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour – and hence the meaning of security. By choosing these types of texts I follow Barry Buzan et al. who argue that “if discourse is operative in a given community, it is expected to materialize in those texts whenever the debate is sufficiently important”. (Buzan et al. 1998: 177) In other words, the discourses on the meaning of security and the EU’s action in this regard materialise in official documents produced by the most relevant EU actors. At the end of this section, I discuss the advances and limits of the strategy to select these texts.

Relevant EU actors

These processes of sense making by political elites of EU member states and EU institutions are institutionalised at the EU level within the institutions of CFSP/ESDP. This includes first of all the European Council. Within the European Council, heads of states and governments agree on the general directions of the EU. This not only includes the institutional outlook of the EU, which has frequently been reformulated during Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs). In addition, the European Council is active in discussing and providing general directions for EU policies, including foreign and security policy. Second, from a legal perspective the Council of the EU is responsible for the EU’s foreign relation and security policy. The Council meets in various settings and brings together the foreign ministers, development ministers, defence ministers or ministers of other resources of the member states. This is dependent upon the subjects discussed and the structure of the member states’ government. The Councils relevant for this thesis are the General Affairs and External Relations Council, the External Relations Council as such and the Development Council. Finally, the Council is supported by a variety of bodies

including COREPER, the General Secretariat, the PSC and CIVCOM. The discourses on the meaning of security are institutionalised within these EU bodies.

Types of documents

Official documents of these bodies provide access to the institutionalised discourse on the meaning of security. Being official, however, is not the only selection criterion for a document to be taken into account. In accordance with the concept of security, the documents had to meet at least one of three other criteria: first, texts which actively and clearly defined or (re-)constituted the EU's identity; second, texts which actively engaged in the construction of threats or security problems as problems of or for the EU; third, texts which established or defined reasonable action which had to be taken by the EU in order to face defined threats or security problems. All official documents of one of the three research periods which applied to at least one of the three criteria are taken into account and analysed by a rigorous discourse analysis. In the following I briefly define what kinds of official documents are incorporated in this selection.

First, this includes texts and documents of the European Council. The European Council is a very powerful agent of knowledge, even if its role in the decision-making process is not completely institutionalised. However, the European Council takes part in the discourse through its Presidency Conclusions and Conclusions of the European Council, which can be understood as documents strategically summarising the positioning of the EU as a whole and pointing out the way ahead. This is also true for the presidency reports which prepare European Council meetings and declarations of the European Council, which sometimes were jointly taken by other European institutions.

Second, the Council of the EU is legally the most relevant body in the domain of security policy and is equipped with the most central competencies. The discourse analysis of this research project takes into account the conclusions of three different Councils, namely the General Affairs Council, the Council on External Relations and the Development Council. Furthermore, the analysis includes Council's decisions, regulations, joint actions, and common positions. Differing in their binding force, these documents represent policy decisions and their implementations on the supranational and intergovernmental level. Finally, the analysis comprises answers of the Council to written questions by the European Parliament. All these documents provide fruitful access to the institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. They represent the discussions of, and decisions on, policies within the domain of external relations, foreign and explicitly security policy.

Third, in order to take into account the whole picture of discourses on the meaning of security, the supplemented bodies of the Council and their production of texts need to be considered, as well. Therefore, the analysis includes texts and documents of the High Representative of CFSP/ESDP, COREPER, PSC, and CIVCOM as central institutions in regard to policy formulations in the domain of the EU's security policy.

Advances and limits

The thesis is based on these documents in order to discover the internal logics of the shared understandings of security established at the EU level. The decision to focus on official documents is made in favour of other data and the research method of discourse analysis is made in favour of other techniques due to three reasons: first, the data includes only those aspects which are commonly agreed upon by relevant actors and therefore they are highly relevant in formulating the EU's security policy;

second and building upon the first, the documents do not include cheap talk but highly binding common statements, not in the least because of their legal status as treaty revisions, common decisions and so forth. Third, documents represent the way of thinking of the respective period of time without being influenced or biased by interviews of individuals taken out of context later in time. Based on these three advances, the thesis is able to reconstruct the ways of reasoning on security at the EU level dominant at the respective time. Also, the thesis is able to demonstrate that a significant change has occurred in the way relevant actors intersubjectively perceived themselves, the threats and security problems they face and reasonable action in facing these problems. Although such an analysis has its limits, it can be assumed that actors who redefined their perceptions also act accordingly, which is to say – again – that the reasoning on security enabled the institutionalisation of security policy at the EU level. (see Gheciu 2005: 31-2)

At the same time, the approach has its limits in tracking the sources of influence. The analysis focuses exclusively on data produced at the EU level and produced by relevant actors. This limits the perspective to the very core of the research question. At the same time, it disables the research to identify the sources of influence of whether, for example, dominant meanings were imported from NATO discourses. As I have argued above, such a tracking is a research project in and of itself. What this thesis intends to do is to identify change and explain how new logics, introduced by these changes, affected the EU's security policy. When appropriate, the thesis will highlight discourses likely to be the sources of influence by referring to secondary literature.

3.3 Periods

The analysis is separated into three periods. Each period consists of two years, whereas the first is 1996-1997, the second 2000-2001 and the third 2003-2004. At the end or during these periods important moments of common agreement were taken publicly. This was for example a treaty revision resulting from an IGC. Public events are very central since they visibly reflect the dominant interpretations established at that particular moment of time. (see Buzan et al. 1998: 177) The periods, which led up to these events, are central for the analysis because dominant interpretations are a production of previous processes of social interaction. The events publicly re-establish the common sense and by agreeing on a revised treaty these interpretations became legally binding. This research project investigates the dominant interpretations established in a particular moment of time and analyses how they became dominant. Therefore, in each period I analyse the construction of EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity.

Apart from these periods, I also argue for the need to separately examine the first half of 2003. During that time, EU member states discussed how to proceed with Iraq and more generally with subjects of European foreign policy and integration. The interim section is important to address criticisms of the literature which argued that the dispute over the war on Iraq showed that CFSP and especially ESDP were not successful but marginalised. I will contest this perspective by demonstrating the robustness of discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

The analysis is divided into these periods in order to identify more easily changes in the meaning of security and its constituting discourses on EU identity, the construction of threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. In each individual section

I will start by analysing the construction of EU identity, followed by the analysis of how threats are perceived and then how rules are constructed. I will especially focus on changes in the constructions compared with previous periods in order to highlight how the meaning of security evolved over time, as well as how this enabled actors to presume a security policy necessary on the EU level. In the following, I will argue the decision to select these three periods.

To start with, the period 1996-7 is crucial to my analysis because it represents the latest time frame before a security policy was implemented at the EU level. It was the run up to the IGC of Amsterdam which changed the EU Treaty of Maastricht which not very specifically envisaged “the eventual framing of a defence policy” at the EU level. (TEU Maastricht, Article J.4.1) The run up to the IGC of Amsterdam was a very important time for the later inauguration of ESDP since for the first time the EU treaty encompassed a more concrete outlook to an EU security policy by including the Petersberg Tasks into the treaties.

The Amsterdam Treaty was signed by the EU member states during the IGC in October 1997. The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty enhanced the EU’s external dimension with a security component. Despite this inclusion, security and defence still was organised outside of the EU framework. At the end of the IGC of Amsterdam, all 15 EU member states declared to aim for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) to be established within NATO. (see European Council 1997c) It was intended to strengthen the “institutional and practical cooperation” (European Council 1997c: No: B, 9) of the WEU and NATO. In regard to the EU, WEU was declared as being an “integral part of the development of the Union” (TEU Amsterdam J.4.2) in the way that the

“Union requests the WEU [...] to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications”. (TEU Amsterdam J.4.2)

Therefore, the period 1996-7 is most suitable for the analysis because, on the one hand, EU member states were used to procedures and mechanisms implemented by the Maastricht Treaty which had been in force for three years. The Maastricht Treaty inaugurated CFSP which enabled the institutionalisation of discourses on foreign and security policy on the EU level. These discourses are central to the analysis. On the other hand, the period represented the last moment before EU member states agreed on a new treaty which included further references to security and defence policy, although these references did not integrate security and defence into the EU framework. In 1996-7 and still so with the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU did not have a security and defence policy at its disposal. By declaring ESDI as an objective, the EU went for the option to accumulate security and defence within the framework of NATO while using the existing structures of WEU.

The second empirical chapter will focus on the period of 2000 to 2001. During this period, the IGC of Nice introduced ESDP into the Treaty on the EU. Prior to this event, the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies were actively engaged in revising the treaties. This included processes of reasoning on European security as was discussed in 1998 and 1999 during the St. Malo meeting between France and Britain, as well as during the European Council meetings taking place under Austrian and German presidency. Although the years 1998 and 1999 are most frequently regarded as the years of change in the EU's approach in setting up its own security policy, (see Howorth 2000a: 34; Howorth 2000a, 2000b; Gnesotto 2004) this project focuses on 2000 and 2001 for good reasons: first, the year 2000 included the very run up to the IGC of Nice and the discourses of that time represented the

knowledge and dominant interpretations which were established throughout the previous two years. Second, the year 1999 is left out of the analysis in favour of the year 2001 since the Treaty of Nice was declared being of lower-value almost immediately after the IGC because it did not address the challenges ahead, e.g. enlargement and how the EU was able to carry out its role on the international level after enlargement. It was this understanding of a system crisis which led to an identity crisis which initiated the post-Nice process paving the way to the Laeken declaration, the Convention on the Future of Europe and the process of reforming the EU, its treaties and institutions by utilising a deliberative approach different to the IGC model. In other words, the year 2001 marked the beginning of a process of recasting EU identity and one in which EU actors realised the potential of the EU's security policy. (see Solana 2004) Therefore, the analysis focuses on the period of 2000 and 2001. It favours 2001 over 1999 because the post-Nice process was very central for EU identity constructions; also, relevant discourses of the run up to the IGC taking place in 1999 were reflected and visible in discourses of the year 2000.

The above developed period ends with the 11th September 2001. The events of that day and the processes of reasoning followed by these events will not be taken into account. They constituted a discursive crisis by which earlier meanings did not match new phenomena. (see Diez 2001: 14; Croft 2006: 8) This crisis affected ways of reasoning on EU identity and global challenges as well as rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. Therefore, they will not be considered as part of the period 2000 and 2001.

Following this chapter, I will focus on the first half of 2003. Discourses on the meaning of security were challenged by a disagreement of EU member states on how to proceed with Iraq. I will show that the discursive crisis taking place in the first

half of 2003 triggered the EU member states' disregard of established rules of interaction and cooperation on the EU level. Despite arguments of the literature, the intensity of the crisis could neither be explained by subject disputes nor did it change the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The discourse on the way forward with Iraq took place outside of institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. The purpose of this chapter is, first, to address discussions in the literature which have identified a paradox of crisis and success when, despite the crisis over Iraq, EU member states agreed on successful steps in regard to ESDP. Second, the chapter will endorse the robustness of institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security by deconstructing the discursive battle on the question of Iraq and ESDP's next steps of institutionalisation and implementation. This chapter will strongly support the final chapter by showing that the meaning of security was much less contested compared with earlier moments in discourse.

The final chapter analyses the time frame 2003 to 2004 as the final period in which the EU fully established ESDP by inaugurating its first ever strategic security strategy, e.g. ESS. It also conducted its first police missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) called PROXIMA, and its first military operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) and in FYROM (CONCORDIA). (see Missiroli 2003a: 500) This all took place in 2003. The following year was marked by the full implementation of the ESS in all aspects of EU's external relation, i.e. economic, development, foreign and security policy. Also, ESDP operations were enhanced and revisited by lessons learned initiatives. This period publicly and visibly established the EU's ability to act as a security actor at the international level. Furthermore, the ESS was not only important as the first ever commonly taken and legally relevant security strategy of

the EU and its member states. Also, it included the EU's perception of international terrorism as the most challenging security problem. Therefore, the ESS re-established the EU's dominant interpretations of the phenomenon of international terrorism which were constitutive for the meaning of security in 2003 and 2004. Finally, the analysis focuses on these two years in order to show that despite the very controversial discussions on the way forward in Iraq, the meaning of security established at the EU level remained very robust. As a result, the chapter will demonstrate that the EU strongly settled into its self-perception as international actorness, for example by defining detailed rules of appropriate behaviour on how to use civilian and military capabilities. Also, the chapter will show that sense making processes on international terrorism integrated a meaning of dynamism as a structural security problem into the discourses of security, which made more robust reactions necessary.

3.4 Research Techniques

In the following I will discuss the methods of how to analyse processes of sense making. It is important to conceptualise how discursively upheld meanings and discursive practices constitute agency and structure. Three aspects are important in this regard. First, the analysis needs to identify subjects and objects available within the discursive practices. Second, the relationship between them needs to be analysed. Third, both agents and structures need to be qualitatively evaluated. In the following I will provide suitable methods of discourse analysis to excavate the meanings of the discursive practices and the aspects it constitutes. These three aspects will be rigorously applied to analyse a great number of texts which represent the institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. They enable the analysis to carry out ground work on the meaning of security. Finally, I lay out the research

strategy of how I conduct the analysis as a grounded theory based on discourse analysis. The strategy includes a full reading of each individual text, definition of meanings as codes and identifications of respective quotes, a quantitative evaluation of how significant codes were, and finally a qualitative analysis of how codes related to others logically.

Techniques of Discourse Analysis

The research methods developed here need to bring about a conceptualisation of how the internal dynamics, the politics of discourses, can be studied by analysing written words. The key is to understand discourse as creating “subjects, objects, and relationships among them”. (see Shapiro 1981: 141; Foucault 1972; Milliken 1999b) Therefore, as a first step, the analysis needs to identify subjects and objects which are constituted through discursive practices. The second step needs to analyse the relationships between i) subjects and ii) subjects and objects.

After identifying subjects, objects and their relations, the research needs to go a step further by focusing on the quality or character of each. In the literature a variety of methods can be found to analyse these qualities. In my analysis I will use three different methods. They are predicate analysis, (see Milliken 1999b: 231) juxtapositional method, (see Milliken 1999b: 243; Campbell 1992) and method of subjugated knowledge. (see Milliken 1999b: 243; Doty 1996: 6) These methods will be briefly introduced in the next paragraphs. Overall, the analysis will be conducted in terms of a ‘grounded theory’ approach. The approach needs to combine empirical study and the attempt to abstract from its findings in order to create theoretical categories which again are able to explain the empirical material. (see Milliken 1999b: 234; Glaser and Strauss 1967) This approach also provides proof of whether the analysis needs to include more data or not. In the case that new texts do not add

new aspects to the theoretical categories, or when theoretical categories are not falsified by new findings, the categories are defined appropriately to explain the empirical data.

Predicate analysis “focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs, and adjectives that attach to nouns”. (Milliken 1999b: 232) Predicates mount particular qualities and characters to subjects, objects, and relationships. An example should clarify this.

“Our experience in the European Union is clear: we have been more successful when we have worked with other partners. Take the example of Congo, among many. We sent a military force at the request of the United Nations. Our soldiers worked with theirs. And we all together managed to crown with free and fair elections a very complex democratic transition.” (Solana 2004: 2)

This section is particular interesting in regard to the construction of EU identity. What is referred to as ‘we’ most times, albeit not all, refers to the European Union as a community. The subject European Union as a ‘we’-group is given quality by different predicates:

1. successful
2. working with others (cooperation)
3. sending military force (strength)
4. at the request of the UN (multilateralism)
5. managed to crown with free and fair elections a very complex democratic transition (successful problem solving, and democracy)

These qualities together represent the EU as a successful international actor which is able to deal with very complex problems by (multilateral) cooperation and strength. At this stage, this predicate analysis is only a singular shot without providing any indications of whether findings can be generalised. However, the analysis conducted in the following chapters will follow the rules of grounded theory in order to create theoretical categories.

The juxtapositional method and subjugated knowledge can be seen as similar approaches to analyse the discursive practice. Juxtapositional methods assume that discourses, by constituting meanings, always establish their diametrical others. The focus of this method not only rests on the subject, object, or relationship itself but on the discursive practice establishing the other. It thereby enables the analysis to recognise qualities and characters of subjects, objects and relations while their diametrical others are constructed. The purpose of this method is to render “predominant interpretations [...] and to demonstrate the inherently political nature of official discourses”. (Milliken 1999b: 243; see Campbell 1992, 1993)

Whereas the juxtapositional method only points out alternative concepts, the method which focuses on subjugated knowledge intends to analyse these alternatives in more detail. The approach assumes that alternative concepts become possible in discourses which do not significantly overlap with dominant discourses. (see Milliken 1999b: 243) This method is very important in making sense of political contestedness. Different meanings are possible only if processes of sense making are not dominated by one meaning. In order to analyse different meanings in more detail, different processes of sense making need to be identified and analysed. The concept of subjugated knowledge enables the researcher to recognise different processes more easily.

Research strategy

This section makes explicit how the discourse analysis is actually conducted and how I deal with the texts selected for the analysis. The research strategy includes seven steps which are carried out individually for each period of time. This is necessary because it is expected that the ways of reasoning changed over time and the analysis must track these changes accordingly.

After selecting the documents, the first task is to read all documents and highlight text passages which engage in one of the three constructions: i) EU identity constructions; ii) construction of threats and security problems; and iii) construction of rules of appropriate action in the case of insecurity. The second step is to identify codes for specific aspects of identity constructions, threat constructions, and rule constructions respectively. The codes represent particular meanings dominant in the discourse on security. Codes are identified for each period of time and each element of construction, e.g. identity, threats, and rules. Based on the codes, the third step is to mark and highlight quotes as shorter passages of texts which represent a particular code. In other words, the quotes actively construct a meaning as part of the discourse on security. In the fourth step, the analysis identifies subjects, objects and the relations among them by using the research techniques developed above. This step is essential to discover the inherent logics of the meanings per quote. The following fifth step is carried out as a grounded theory checking whether or not identified quotes support the related quote and hence the meaning constructed by the text passage. The grounded theory is constantly searching for texts which falsify earlier findings. This process only ends when the findings could not be falsified by texts previously not considered. (see Glaser and Strauss 1967) By this approach, identified quotes are qualitatively checked for whether they support or falsify the codes they are related to. The first case supports the code, the second leads to the identification of another code for which further text passages are searched. In the sixth step, the codes are quantitatively evaluated. The number of quotes supporting a specific code is calculated and codes are ranked in regard to their significance as the measure of frequency of use. This is again carried out in regard to each element of construction, e.g. identity, threats, and rules. In the final step, both levels of analysis, qualitative

and quantitative, are brought together in a mind map which logically relates codes to each other while reflecting the significance of the codes.

This research strategy leads to three mind maps per research period – one on EU identity, one on threat, and one on rules. They reflect the internal relation of meanings, as well as their dominance in the discourse on security. The following empirical chapters are written based on this research strategy and the mind maps. The findings are presented by referring to supportive quotes and references to secondary literature. I have selected quotes in order to make the meaning discussed as clear as possible. This sometimes leads to catchy or blunt quotes. But the meanings they represent are double checked by the grounded theory approach and the research strategy developed here.

Summary

In this chapter I have argued for a constructivist approach to analyse the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The approach enables the research to focus on endogenous processes of social action and interaction which mutually constitute agency and structure. This mutual constitution is subjectively shared among a group of people which together share a common identity. In regard to this thesis, this group of people encompasses the political elite, diplomats, politicians and staff of the EU. Together they share a common EU identity. From this intersubjective perspective, I have argued that relevant EU bodies such as the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies frame the institutionalised discourses of EU identity and security policy by which actors approach the world and perceive certain external actors and phenomena as security problems or threats. The relation between both, identity and threat perceptions,

affects the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. Based on the theoretical discussions above – building up on international relations theory and more broadly social sciences literature – rules are not only understood to constitute agency but also in structuring actors' behaviour. This leads to the theoretical claim that rules which apply in the case of insecurity translate into formally and informally institutionalised rules and procedures within ESDP. Therefore, the thesis hypothesises that identity constructions affect institution building and the use of available policy tools. The thesis will focus on this hypothesis by answering the research question of how ESDP became possible at the turn of the 21st century.

Socialisation processes of involved actors are considered to be important in regard to European integration, of which ESDP is a part. (see Checkel 1999; Øhrgaard 1997, 2004; Smith 2004b) Traditional approaches such as neo-realism or neo-liberalism are not able to take into consideration endogenous factors of social interaction. Therefore, I have argued for a constructivist account. In the vein of the literature on social constructivism, authors have differently conceptualised how human action and interaction takes place and how this affects the social construction of reality. The approach developed in this chapter is fundamentally based on Onuf's work. Onuf most plausibly conceptualises the role of language as responsible for the social construction of reality. He argues that agents are discourse dependent. Intersubjective meanings affect the way agents make sense of the world. Through this process, agents find and produce order which constitutes the social reality which they take for granted.

Equipped with this theoretical approach, I have conceptualised the social construction of security as a relational complex. Security always relates a referent

object to threats and thereby establishes rules of appropriate behaviour applicable in a situation of insecurity. In this regard, I have argued for two different ways of identity formations. The first leads to an inclusive, the second to an exclusive identity. Both are heuristic concepts which can only be identified by analysing the political contestedness of identity constructions. On the one hand, the construction of threats becomes possible depending on the type of identity. On the other hand, threat construction depends on the perception of the behaviour of the 'other'. Together, identity construction and the perception of the other can either lead to association or dissociation.

Following this logic, the thesis analyses how social reality is constructed in the domain of security within relevant European institutions. Actors of the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies have produced order by giving meaning to security which enabled the institutionalised of ESDP. In other words, the thesis considers ESDP and its policies to be possible based on particular sense making processes defining the rationale of security. These processes are accessible while studying discourse. My approach, which starts with Onuf's perspective, enables the research to directly link the ontological observation of texts to the epistemological approach of constructivism.

As I have argued, meanings can be analysed by the discursive methodology discussed above. In order to answer the research question, I have argued for a discourse analysis focusing on discursive practices establishing subjects, objects, and their (inter)relationships. In regard to the research techniques, I have argued for predicate analysis, juxtapositional method and the method focusing on subjugated knowledge. Furthermore, I have identified relevant discursive fields in which discourses on the meaning of security can be located. I have argued that identity

formation takes place in the discursive field of European integration, whereas the perception of the ‘other’ hugely depends on discourses of global challenges. Finally, rules of appropriate behaviour applying in the case of insecurity had to correspond to discourses within the discursive field on international order. The meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP can be found in the space where these three discursive fields overlap. While using this research design, the analysis will rigorously conduct a discourse analysis producing a detailed and diversified picture of how security has been constructed, how this construction has changed and how these processes have made ESDP possible and the implementation of corresponding policy tools.

In the following empirical chapters, I will answer the research question while focusing on the meaning of security and its development within each period of time. The structure of every empirical chapter always follows the same logic: I will start by analysing identity formations taking place in the discursive field on European integration. I will then focus on the construction of threats which largely depends on discourses on global challenges. Finally, I will analyse how rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity have been constructed. I will analyse all aspects of security discourses, starting with the chapter on the period 1996-7. In the successive empirical chapters on the period 2000-1 and 2003-4, I will only focus on those aspects or meanings which were constructed differently. By this approach, I will be able to precisely point out the changes and developments in the meaning of security which accounted for a shift in the intersubjective understanding of relevant actors that finally perceived the EU as responsible for security policy. This enabled the institutionalisation of security on the EU level, as well as the deployment of security action further afield.

The structure of the empirical chapters is interrupted only by Chapter IV, which focuses on the first half of 2003 and the discursive crises which took place in the lead up to the war on Iraq. Here, I will deconstruct individual speech acts which strongly affected European discourses on Iraq, European security and EU identity. The purpose of this approach is to show that the dispute on how to proceed with Iraq did not relate to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. In other words, disarmament by military force was never understood as an appropriate tool for ESDP. I will also show that the intensity of the discursive crises can best be explained by actors' disregard of established European rules of interaction and cooperation. Finally, this explains how success in regard to ESDP matters was possible, despite the crisis. The chapter will also endorse the robustness of discourses on the meaning of security. This will support the findings of the other empirical chapters arguing for change in the intersubjective perception of the EU as an international actor responsible for security policy on the international level.

In the following, I will start with the chapter focusing on the period 1996-7, followed by the chapter on 2000-1. The interruptive chapter on the discursive crises in early 2003 will be followed by the final empirical chapter focusing on the period 2003-4. In the summary I will bring together the theoretical discussions and empirical findings of this thesis.

Chapter II

Avoiding Duplication in EU's External Action

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the processes of constructing EU identity, perceiving threats from the EU's intersubjective perspective, and constructing rules of appropriate behaviour for a situation of insecurity. I have argued above that discourses on European security at the EU level were institutionalised within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Documents produced within, or in relation to, this institutionalised discourse need to be analysed in order to gain knowledge of the meaning of security. In the following, I will first give an overview of the findings which I then will present in more detail. At the end of this chapter I will summarise my findings and relate these findings to my general argument in order to prepare the conclusion of my thesis. Also, the summary will lead to the next chapter analysing the period 2000-1.

The period of 1996-7 was dominated by a variety of central meanings. Two meanings dominated in the discursive field of European integration. First, in regard to external action, the EU acted within the limits of the EC and did not consider it its responsibility to act in the field of security policy. Based on its economic success and potentials, the EU perceived its own history as one of success. This perspective affected the internal as well as external dimensions of EU identity. Internally, the EU tried to ensure the prosperous development of all its citizens. Externally, the EU at times carried the "bulk" of the financial aid. (Council 1996j) This perspective not only led the EU to external action using its economic power almost exclusively. It also constructed a limited meaning of responsibility by which the EU did not perceive itself as an actor in security but as a source of financial aid at the

international level. Second, EU identity was constructed referring to the cooperative and integrative nature of the integration process. European integration made war unthinkable between EU member states. If cooperation could make war history within the European continent, this could be nothing but true for other regions of the world. As a result, the EU understood cooperation as the most powerful tool to overcome differences between actors and to improve economic, social, and political circumstances. I will later show in more detail how this self perception not only influenced the construction of EU identity but also how it affected its external approach. Derived from its historic perspective, the baseline of the EU's foreign policy and external relations was built on a particular understanding of cooperation and duplication. It was this meaning of duplication which did not allow the EU to expand its action into spheres which already were covered by other actors or institutions, e.g. security policy.

The discursive field of global challenges was dominated by a meaning that development, crisis and conflict were the most striking global challenges. This was reflected within the institutionalised discourses at the EU level. Crisis and conflict, as well as development, ranked high on the agenda in Europe. However, these situations were not perceived as security relevant. First, this was disabled by the EU's self-perception of not being responsible to act in the field of security. Second, the meaning of duplication disabled the conclusion that the EU should enhance its abilities in fields already dealt with by other institutions or actors. Overall, threat constructions only took place in regard to weapons and their procurement, as well as in regard to landmines.

Finally, the discursive field of international order was dominated by the end of the Cold War. In this post-Cold War period, international organisations were given

particular relevance in stabilising world peace and security. This applied primarily to the UN. Furthermore, the stabilising of international relations was assigned to regional organisations, such as the OSCE and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). This was also understood in the European Council and Council of the EU and affected all three aspects under review here: EU identity, perception of threats, and rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The EU understood itself as a regional organisation almost exclusively responsible for the well being of the people in its own territory. In regard to other regions, the EU understood itself as being able to step in and provide (financial) aid – still avoiding duplication – but only after stable conditions were established either by conflicting parties themselves or by responsible regional organisations. (see Council 1996k)

1. EU Identity

In the following I will analyse the construction of EU identity. The findings will be clustered in five subsections. The chronology represents the internal logic of the identity construction. It starts first with the historical dimension or memory of EU identity, through which European integration was constituted as a successful attempt to overcome the war-shaken past of the continent initiated by European states themselves. This enabled the construction of responsibility as a central meaning of EU identity. Also, the historical dimension provided normative arguments for the support of international cooperation as the way to overcome differences. The second subsection deals with EU core principles as the very foundation of EU identity. They contained democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights. Third, I will show that EU identity construction strongly built up on the meaning of ‘civil society’ and the rational that responsibility did not only apply to EU member states but to the citizens, as well. In reference to EU core principles, civil society had to be enabled to

be actively involved in policy processes and thereby stabilise state structures and the EU governance system. Fourth, another central meaning of EU identity was that of ‘EU self-awareness’. It constituted the EU to possess actor-like characters, which was related to the historical dimension of EU identity. Fifth, the final meaning dealt with ‘cooperation and integration’. It referred to the rules of organised cooperation within Europe and at the international level. Finally, I will summarise the findings and argue that EU identity was constructed as an inclusive identity.

1.1 Memory

EU identity constructions very dominantly included references to Europe’s war-shaken past. The EU memory implemented the logic that EU member states were to bring an end to that evil past by cooperation and integration. EU member states themselves initiated this process. This perspective was central for EU identity constructions and enabled the meaning of responsibility as a central requirement by which actors – not only European actors – were able to overcome their own problems. The Council basically stated that the “success of the EU has made major war in Western Europe unthinkable.” (Council 1996l: EU-India/Political Issues) This perspective juxtaposed today’s Europe with its own past. In this sense, past was the time before the end of the Second World War and before the beginning of European integration. The time of concern was different in regard to enlargement. Here, the evil past meant the Cold War and the period preceding European reunification in the 1990s. However, the initial step was the signing of the treaty establishing the European Community of Coal and Steel in 1951. This crossroad was understood to divert the evil past of Europe from its cooperative and successful presence.

The Foundation of successes has been “the principle of the equality of all the Member States, respect for the cultural identities and national and institutional

specificities of each and every one, respect for fundamental human rights, political, economic and social solidarity between peoples, regions and States and the principle of sufficiency of means.” (Portuguese delegation 1996: 9)

The past was constructed as being dominated by brutal conflict and insurmountable differences between European states. The European states themselves banished evil times into history by establishing cooperation through economic integration. (see Mitzen 2006: 271) The EU invited Middle and Eastern European countries to share “the Union's commitment to building a Europe free of the divisions and difficulties of the past”. (European Council 1997a: paragh. 5, introduction) This perspective was important for the internal dynamic of European integration. The juxtapositioning was important for the dynamic of European integration, since it offered the logic that the evil past could only be defeated through integration. This perspective was supported by the understanding that the process of cooperation and integration was made possible by European states acting responsibly. They acted responsibly by taking control of their own history. The meaning of responsibility was very central to the construction of EU identity – which I will discuss in further detail in the section of rules of cooperation. Following the logic of responsibility, European integration in this view did not depend on any other force than the willingness of member states to overcome the conflicting periods of history. The EU was able to “build trust, boost confidence, break down the barriers and bring prosperity to” Europe. (Council 1996l: EU-India/Political Issues) The importance of the historical dimension of EU identity again became apparent in a declaration made by the EU and addressed to “the people of the FRY”, which affected the EU’s approach to the outside world:

“Many of the countries in the Union have faced economic problems similar to those that now beset you. [...] The lesson of the last forty years is that it is by working together with other Europeans that economic well-being is most speedily restored.” (Council 1997f)

In general, this perspective was important to the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies in showing that European integration was a success story. Also, the quote above showed that the historical dimension affected the EU's approach towards the outside. The logic was that taking up responsibility to initiate change did not exclusively apply to Europe. By taking on their responsibility, actors were able to overcome any difficulty facing them. It enabled every actor to overcome differences with its neighbours. They only had to choose cooperation and economic integration.

“Drawing from its own experience, it is the Union's view that the future prosperity and stability of its partners rest on increased cooperation between themselves in the economic, social and political spheres. The elimination of barriers will foster economies of scale and greater market opportunities thus encouraging investment, facilitating the exchange of ideas and increasing mutual understanding.” (Council 1996g: EU Mediterranean Policy)

The beginning of the quote most prominently referred to the juxtaposition of European history and the success of today. EU member states experienced how cooperation could help to overcome poverty and conflict. In this regard, the quote referred to ‘prosperity’ and ‘stability’. In the logic of juxtaposition, the evil past of the European continent was dominated by the opposite, e.g. poverty and instability or conflict. The basic message of this quote was that these evil times could be overcome when states cooperated with each other. Most centrally, cooperation had to take place in the economic sphere. Cooperation in the social and political sphere seemed to depend on that of the economic sphere. The second sentence established the understanding that closer cooperation in the economic sphere will lead to ‘mutual understanding’ and therefore to much more than just cooperation, i.e. trust and friendship. Therefore, the quote established a functionalist logic of spill over

following the logic that after economic cooperation was implemented, the social and political spheres would almost inevitably benefit from that cooperation.

1.2 Core Principles

Apart from the historical dimension, the most central aspect of EU identity was constituted by EU core principles. (see European Council 1997b: Annex III) These core principles were: democracy, the rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. (see Article J.1 no. 2 of Maastricht Treaty) They remained central and unchanged throughout the whole period of analysis conducted in this thesis. EU core principles provided the very foundation on which cooperation and integration were possible. This was right for EU internal cooperation. In this regard, the EU perceived itself as a community of shared values which were constituted by the EU core principles. This is well illustrated by the debates on treaty reformulations by the IGC:

“As Member States are committed to respect human rights, democratic values [...] and as the Union is a community of shared values, the IGC should consider whether and how far it will be possible to strengthen these fundamental rights and improve the safeguarding of them.” (European Council 1996a)

This quote exemplified the rationale which was implemented by the meaning of EU core principles. Since EU member states respected human rights and democratic values, they shared common values which again bonded together in a common spirit. (see Youngs 2004: 416) In this sense, EU core principles were constructed as the very preconditions enabling peaceful coexistence. In the following I will briefly explore the meaning of each EU core principle.

The EU understood itself as an experienced actor of democratisation who was able to overcome un-democratic times. The meaning of democracy was very much

interlinked with the meaning of responsibility. Apart from other democratic rules, responsibility established the meaning that actors had to get involved in changing for the better circumstances in which they were involved. (see Council 1996o: Ex-Yugoslavia) Furthermore, democratic processes had to include

“the setting of precise dates for the electoral process and the advancement of the date for the constitutional referendum, the elaboration of a new constitution after consultation of a broadly representative national forum, and the announcement of the imminent reactivation of political parties”. Council 1996p: Nigeria)

Overall, a genuine process facing up to these standards and including actors who accepted their responsibility was understood as a blue print democracy. (see Council 1997g: Belarus)

The rule of law was another component of such a genuine process. “The judiciary in all EU Member States is independent of Governments and Parliaments.” (Council 1996q) It established “[...] a proper balance between the functions and duties of the members of the legislative, executive and judicial powers”. (Council 1997h) The rule of law and the separation of powers was part of the blue print of democracy.

In regard to human rights, the EU reaffirmed its pledge “[...] to respect and defend the rights of all human beings” (European Council 1997a: Annex 3) in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights and fundamental freedoms went hand in hand. They universally applied, “regardless of race, gender, language or religion”. (European Council 1997a: Annex 3) “[R]espect for human rights” was “an integral part of the general principles of Community law and constitute[d] a condition for the legality of Community acts”. (European Parliament 1996b: Answer) Therefore, EU core principles and especially human rights were constituted as fundamental parts of EU identity. Their construction referred prominently to the international law as providing the basic outset of individual EU

core principles. (see Council 1996k: MEDA, EU-Turkey) Both can not be used interchangeably but EU core principles inherently built up on norms established within international law.

However, the central aspect of EU core principles was that they did not exclusively apply to the internal sphere of the EU. They dominantly affected the construction of EU identity and thereby affected the way in which the EU made sense of its external sphere. In a way, EU core principles were the starting point of the EU's external action. Reference to the EU core principles could be found in nearly all documents addressing the external policies of 1996 and 1997, whether in regard to Cuba, Niger, Yugoslavia, the Great Lakes Region, the Middle East or Afghanistan. (see Council 1996c; Council 1996h: 2; European Council 1996c: Russia, Belarus) This can be exemplarily shown in regard to ex-Yugoslavia, when the Council stated that resolutions were “based on respect for democratic principles and the rule of law and for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which [were] an essential aspect”. (Council 1996e: Ex-Yugoslavia) The quote established EU core principles as the very core of EU's identity, not only applying to the internal sphere of the EU but also to the external. It perceived the establishment of EU core principles as fundamental in resolving conflict. For example, in regard to Belarus, the Council constituted the existence of a “blueprint of a genuine process of democratization”. (Council 1997g) The blueprint referred to the successes of European integration through which European states, while applying to EU core principle, were able to overcome conflict.

1.3 Civil Society

Another important meaning of the construction of EU identity was that of ‘civil society’. The meaning was important for the construction of EU identity because it expanded the process of European integration to include not only nation-states but their citizens, as well. (see Warleigh 2001: 620-1) The purpose of European integration was to create “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. (European Council 1996a) This perspective required an understanding of how a union among peoples could be established. In the first place, European integration had to be reasoned as a process encompassing not only states but their peoples. In order to become a union among peoples, the meaning of civil society had to cross national boundaries to establish a union of the peoples. In the following I will develop the meaning of civil society and explain how it related to other central meanings of EU identity.

To start with, the meaning of civil society referred to EU core principles and especially to the meaning of democracy as the pre-condition for a civil society to develop. (see European Council 1997a: Annex 3 pt. 6) In addition, a civil society was constituted by a group of subjects bound together on a national level. This logic could be read out of documents dealing with external relations and foreign policy when, for example, the Council stated that the citizenship had to be defined in “accordance with international law”. (Council 1997n: Great Lakes Region) This quote again supports the argument that EU core principles and other central meanings of EU identity referred to the international law as the source of definition. However, from the EU’s perspective, the purpose of a civil society was to establish “mutual understanding” (Council 1996s) within the society as well as “dialogue and [...] mutual confidence between parties” constituting this society. (European Council

1997a: Palestinian track) Following this argument, the EU established a much more ambiguous perspective. A well established civil society was perceived to play an “important role” in “preventing and resolving violent conflicts” (Council 1997e: III A) by working “with the international community for the stabilization, democratization and economic recovery of their country”. (Council 1997l: Albania)

This was a far reaching understanding of civil society which not only applied to EU’s internal sphere but to the external, as well. Its high ‘standards’ could be explained by EU internal identity constructions. The way of reasoning was informed by the active role played by the civil society within European nation-states and the EU more general. They were involved in processes of policy making on almost all levels. (see Youngs 2004: 418) The meaning of a union among people implied that not only states were responsible for the existence and performance of the EU but the civil society, as well. Both were mutually constitutive and dependent on each other.

In order to play such an important role, a civil society had to be well developed and effectively organised. Also, interfaces had to be implemented for civil society to take part in policy processes such as agenda setting, for example.

The Council supported “the participation of civil society in policy making and development activity; the aim is to promote participation and social dialogue on a broad basis, not just at the project level; a systematic assessment of the social and societal impact of policies, programmes and projects is required.” (Council 1996i: human empowerment)

Such a high quality of civil society required a very high degree of well educated and economically independent individuals. Equal opportunity was therefore another principle which contributed to EU identity. Equality was a general aspect of EU identity which not only applied to citizens but informed the reasoning on external action. It was “a policy based on a fair approach to, and equal opportunities for, all

the countries of the region.” (Council 1997f: Annex I) Hence, equality and fairness was constructed to be a general principle which applied to any community or society independent of the level on which the community was established. In regard to domestic societies, equal chances first and foremost were defined by economic chances in the way that “an open and modern economy [...] brings benefits to all”. (Council 1997f: Annex I)

Another important aspect of a well-established civil society was freedom of speech. In the documents on the EU’s external relations and foreign policies, freedom of speech was mostly required by establishing a free media. The Council underlined “the importance it attaches to [...] the role of free [...] media in the pre-election information effort”. (Council 1997h: Albania) It was also argued that the media must respect international norms or standards of freedom of information. The media “must refrain from any propaganda inimical to the peace process as well as any incitement of violence”. (Council 1997m: Ex-Yugoslavia) These quotes make clear that the media was perceived as having two different characteristics. On the one hand, the media was understood as crucial for a strong civil society to develop. On the other hand, the media was understood to have the potential of destabilising civil societies or even causing or abetting violence. The second problem only arose when structural aspects of the media did not apply to international norms. (see Council 1997h: Belarus) These norms required a media free and independent of the state. As soon as the state in any way gained control of the media, it had the potential to destabilise the civil society. Therefore, the meaning of freedom of speech was important for the EU’s understanding of how civil societies could be implemented and function well. It was a main principle of civil society and hence of EU identity.

The principles discussed above added to the construction of EU identity and its perspective onto the world surrounding it. In this regard, priority was given to a well functioning civil society as a cornerstone of overcoming crisis and conflict and establishing democracy, the rule of law and human rights. This meaning was combined with the understanding that European states and their citizens were acting responsibly by overcoming their evil past. Generally, state actors and actors in civil society were responsible for tackling their own problems. (see European Parliament 1997b: Answer) The central role given to the civil society was constructed based on the EU's understanding of democracy and the meaning of responsibility. As I will show in the section on the perception of threats, these principles were very important for the EU's understanding of what constituted a security problem. Also, they affected the definition of appropriate behaviour. I will discuss these aspects later in this thesis. In the following, I will analyse aspects of EU identity which began to constitute a meaning of actorness. As this process was barely obvious, I will not use the header actorness but self-awareness.

1.4 EU Self-awareness

In the sections above, I have discussed principles of EU identity of a rather general kind. They were concerned with EU core principles and further central meanings of EU identity. What I now cluster under the header of 'EU self-awareness' can be understood as a contested attempt to equip the EU with actor-like characters. This argument will be developed in the following.

First and foremost, EU identity was constructed as a "European family of modern states" located geographically within Europe. (see Council 1997f: Annex I) This perspective strongly referred to previously discussed principles of democracy and

civil society. But it was more than just the understanding of a community sharing democratic values. The development of a European family was a result of socialisation processes. Only a limited number of states and people were involved in these processes. They shared more than just democratic values; they shared a particular understanding of how this family worked, how family members lived together and what kinds of aspects were uniquely important to this particular family. Those principles are presented in the following section addressing the question of what constitutes the European family of modern states.

The very beginning was dedicated to the initiative of a few states and their civil societies to take up their responsibility to overcome conflict and mistrust. “Ultimately the successful socioeconomic development [...] will depend on their own efforts.” (Council 1996g) In this sense, the European family was born in the 1950’s, when European states accepted their responsibility. The integration of this family, as well as its growth, was constructed as a natural or inescapable process – also because the past could otherwise not have been left behind. It was an “ever closer Union”. (European Council 1996a)

Rules organising the political and social life as the means of European integration fundamentally constituted this European family. Effectiveness and coherence took on a very prominent role. (see European Council 1996c) Effectiveness could be attained, for example, by following the rules of transparency and simplicity. “[F]or transparency and simplicity, the interruption of certain economic relations [...] should be governed by only one legal instrument”. (Council 1997c) Another aspect of effectiveness was to ensure compliance through monitoring systems. (see European Council 1996a: Ex-Yugoslavia) Overall, effectiveness was an important character of the European family of modern states. The approach to effectiveness

was dominated by the understanding that it could be established by institutionalised procedures. (see European Council 1996a: pt. 3)

The picture was a bit more complicated in regard to coherence. On the one hand, especially in the debate within the IGC about how to develop further EU's foreign and security policy, coherence was prominently referred to as important. The "Union external policy is to have greater consistency, continuity and visibility." (Presidency of the EU 1996: 4) These three aspects added to the meaning of coherence as a matter of how external relations by the EU, EC and EU member states should be organised. Similar to effectiveness, coherence was a matter of institutionalised procedures which enabled consistency, continuity and visibility of these processes. On the other hand, coherence was contrasted by the understanding that solutions had to take into account member states' individual point of view. Only by taking them seriously, could the European family develop. "The agreement must be consistent, while taking account of the special nature of each country's individual situation." (Council 1996j: Ex-Yugoslavia; see Article J.4 no. 4 Maastricht Treaty) This perspective was enabled by the meaning of equality by which each actor, member states as well as EU institutions, had to be equally involved in the decision-making processes. This aspect was discussed in regard to stabilising the constitutional balance of EU institutions. (see Presidency of the EU 1996: 4) Following this meaning, EU's external action would only be based on the lowest common denominator.

Such a meaning of coherence did not go well with the meaning of effectiveness. Coherence required the recognition of all individual situations. This may have led to a coherent external action but which did not apply to the understanding of effectiveness. Effectiveness could be ensured by decision-making structures which

enabled faster decisions. It required “procedures and structures designed to allow decisions to be taken in a more effective and timely manner, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”. (Presidency of the EU 1996: pt. 3) This quote very clearly shows why both meanings contested each other. Whereas coherence required the recognition of every individual situation, effectiveness not only required faster decisions but also a common spirit. The wording ‘spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity’ called for unity among member states and EU institutions by overcoming differences of individual interests. This contestedness showed that the meaning of effectiveness and coherence – although already introduced into the discourses on EU integration and security – was not able to dominate processes of sense making.

The next aspect of ‘EU self-awareness’ did not deal with the means of cooperation but with its ends. References to EU’s objectives or interests could be found in the discourse on EU identity. Therefore, the EU established an actor-like character by following interests in its external action. For example, the declaration on the Middle East Peace Process produced by the European Council of Florence in 1996 referred to the EU’s “fundamental interests” in the peace process. (European Council 1996b) A Joint Action on the Great Lakes Region stated that the special envoy “may make recommendations [...] on measures which the Union might undertake to fulfil its objectives in the region”. (Council 1996u: Article 3) In regard to mine clearance, operations “having priority for the Union” should be financed by the EU. (Council 1997q) These actor-like characters of following objectives, interests or priorities were rarely further specified. Their meaning could only be deduced from the context in which they were stated without providing access to their internal logics. They did not seem to be defined properly. Rather, it seemed that the EU used the language already known from a national context as the grand design acquiring changes.

Nation-states were understood to act on interests, objectives, and priorities. But whenever the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies referred to interest, objectives and priorities, their meaning was not constructed in detail. Only their policy field could be reconstructed. However, even when these constructions lacked precise meanings, their role within the discourses on EU identity was remarkable because they inscribed actor-like characters to EU identity.

In sum, EU self-awareness rested on three principles. First, the EU perceived itself as an European family sharing a common spirit and democratic values. Second, the common spirit referred to effectiveness and coherence as the envisaged logic of interaction. Both principles organised in a how members of the family had to cooperate with each other in a particular way. Finally, the socialisation process of forming an European family led to the perspective that the EU was acting on common interests, objectives and priorities, even when they were not further defined in most cases. Thus, the EU implemented actor-like characters.

1.5 Cooperation and Integration

In this section I focus on how EU identity constituted its relation to, and situation within, the external sphere, i.e. the international system. This endeavour should not be confused with the question of how the EU defined appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. Rather, this section focuses on how sense making processes on EU identity corresponded with the external sphere. The most relevant meanings in this regard were economic cooperation, regional cooperation and cooperation with organisations. In general, constructions of EU identity included aspects which located and defined the EU as an entity within the international system and especially within the multilateral system of international treaties, regimes, and

organisations. In this regard, the most fundamental principle was that of cooperation. Cooperation basically meant that interaction with other organisations or actors should be institutionalised. (see European Council 1996c: Russia; Council 1997b)

Economic cooperation constituted the starting point of European integration and thereby added fundamentally to the construction of EU identity. As a result, it affected processes of sense making on the EU's approach towards cooperation with external actors. (see European Council 1997b: South Africa; Hanson 1998: 67, 78)

From this perspective, it was a matter of logic that EU identity and its positioning within the international system dominantly referred to economic cooperation as its central sphere. For example, the biggest part of the EU Mediterranean policy fell into the field of economic cooperation. (see Edis 1998: 97) Although the Barcelona declaration contained a security policy and a social basket, the central aim of the EU Mediterranean policy was to establish economic cooperation based on association agreements with third countries. (see Zaim 1999: 39) Another aim was to establish economic cooperation and free trade between the third countries themselves. (see Council 1996g)

Similar logics could be applied to the meaning of regional cooperation. The meaning of regional cooperation referred to cooperation within Europe and perceived stability as a result of cooperation. "Regional cooperation [played] a major role in stability and prosperity in Europe." (European Council 1997a) Regional cooperation was understood to be established by individual nation-states implementing institutionalised processes of interaction. In regard to Europe, European integration was understood as a special form of regional cooperation and in a later period it served as the grand design for the Balkans.

However, the interesting turn in the meaning of regional cooperation was that it also included cooperation among regional institutions and organisations. The EU constituted itself as an institution which was able to cooperate with other institutions. Therefore, another actor-like character was added to EU identity. The EU attached importance to cooperation with the WEU, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the OAU, and the UN. (see Council 1996j; Council 1997m) Cooperation took place in almost all policy fields, depending on the individual outset of the organisation in question. In regard to the field of security policy, this included conflict resolution, as well. Where ever regional aspects of conflict resolution were concerned, regional organisations were held responsible for solving these problems – sidelined by the UN. This applied to the OSCE as well as the OAU, for example. The EU itself did not consider it its responsibility to act but to support – almost always financially – regional organisations.

Although the EU understood regional cooperation as important, the EU's responsibility to engage was limited by the meaning of duplication. Duplication was understood to be a matter of institutional development and policy action of the EU in general. The EU perceived duplication of structures, capabilities and fields of action as inappropriate. Duplication addressed the moment when an EU policy began to touch on policy fields of other institutions or actors, including almost every international organisation of interest to the EU and its member states, such as OSCE, Council of Europe, UN, OAU, and WTO.

The following examples will clarify this meaning. First, in order to eliminate technical barriers of trade, the relationship between WTO and international standardised institutions should be close in order to “eliminate unnecessary duplication”. (Council 1997i: Trade, A) This included the EC and the EU

Commission (COM) as a source of defining standards. Second, cooperation with Russia in the field of justice and home affairs should avoid “any duplication of Council of Europe initiatives”. (Council 1996r: Cooperation with Russia, III) Third, the Council required that enlargement negotiations of the COM with Middle and Eastern European countries should recognise the OECD’s Multilateral Agreement on Investment so “that duplication of work in other negotiation fora is avoided”. (Council 1997j: MAI) Fourth, another example was the EU’s Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region, which had to “coordinate closely with the representatives of the UN and the OAU in the region avoiding duplication of the initiatives of these organizations”. (Council 1996n: Great Lakes Region) In all these cases, the EU did not act when another institutions or actors were already in place to act on the concerned subject.

Probably the most central case in which the EU showed that it did not consider it its responsibility to act in the field of security was that of the crisis in Albania. In 1992, Sali Berisha was elected as head of government in Albania gaining support from the US and Europe. The later offered \$800 million of financial aid making Albania the recipient of the highest aid per capita of that time. (see Perlez 1997) After his re-election in 1996 which already was criticised by the OSCE, the country suffered from a collapse of financial pyramid schemes leading to political protests. This led to the breakdown of public order and to the brutal attempts by the government to re-establish public order. In this situation, rebels were able to control the most important cities in southern Albania which again led to a massive refugee movement especially into Greece and Italy. (see Permuter 1998: 206) Although France, Greece and Italy were ready to engage in an EU/WEU security operation to establish order in Albania, the project was rejected mainly by opposition of Germany, Great Britain

and Sweden. (see Greco 1998: 205) Finally, on 24 March 1997, the EU Council decided to send an advisory mission to Albania as soon as order had been established by the Albanian government. (see Greco 1998: 205; Economist 1997) Thereby, the EU member states followed the dominant meaning of responsibility. The Albanian government was expected to take up its responsibility in establishing order and turn back into the path of democracy. Also, the EU avoided duplication because at the same day, the UNSC approved Resolution 1101 calling for a Multinational Protection Force for Albania.

The very interesting turn was that this meaning of duplication was also applied internally to EU member states. One example was the debate on the research and technological development (RTD), which was developed to “achieve the objectives of the European Union’s development policy”. (Council 1997e: I 1) RTD was understood to support developing countries. Coordination between the COM, the member states, other donors and the beneficiaries was perceived important by the Council in order to “avoid cases of duplication”. (Council 1997e: I 11) This framing did not only differentiate between EU’s action and those of other donors but between action of the COM and EU member states. Although coordination was required to make the actions of both more effective, the reference to duplication stabilised the understanding that the EU as a whole did not or only reluctantly engage when policies were already implemented by others, including member states.

This meaning of duplication was very dominant in the discourses during the period 1996-7. It disabled EU’s action whenever other institutions or actors were already involved and the Albanian case highlights that this especially applied to the field of security. This way of reasoning explains why the EU did not understand itself as responsible in the field of security. As soon as other institutions were already active,

the EU supported these institutions in their action but did not consider autonomous action.

Such a meaning of duplication was only possible based on the absence of a concept of international actorhood in the field of security at the EU level. As I have shown above, the EU was only slightly equipped with actor-like characters but did not understand itself as an international actor in the field of security. Such a meaning of actorhood was contested by the inter-relation of i) the dominance of the meaning of duplication and ii) by the limitedness of the meaning of responsibility. In regard to the first, the meaning of duplication disabled the EU to enlarge its institutional and policy outlook in field of security. Therefore, the EU could not enhance its understanding of being an actor on the international or regional level in the field of security. In regard to the second, the meaning of responsibility was limited in the sense that the EU's understanding of responsibility seemed to be connected to a regional understanding. On the regional level and when countries became closer to the EU's self, as in regard to the Middle and Eastern European countries, the EU perceived itself as responsible to support and assist other European countries in the process of successful European integration. But, this responsibility took for granted that the respective countries took seriously their own responsibility in engaging in cooperation and keeping at least the basic requirements such as public order, the establishment of democracy and the respect for the rule of law and human rights. When states, such as Albania, did not take up their responsibility as a consequence the EU did not consider it its responsibility to support them. This was particularly the case at the international level. Here the EU did not perceive it its responsibility to act. Only, the EU financially supported regional organisations or the UN in their attempts to support others. This way of reasoning remained in utmost contrast to that

of 2003-4, when the EU perceived itself as responsible to act on the international level in the field of security. By then, the meaning of duplication had almost vanished from discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour.

Summary

EU identity was constructed around five aspects which were connected logically in such a way that they constructed an inclusive identity. These aspects were the memory of EU's success in overcoming the evil past, EU core principles, civil society, self-awareness and cooperation. The meaning of the historical dimension juxtaposed the present as successful, in contrast to Europe's evil past. It would be misleading to understand this meaning as constructing a kind of exclusiveness, applying exclusively to Europe. The meaning strongly helped to implement the meaning of responsibility, stating that actors were able to help themselves when they joined in cooperation. Therefore, the historical dimension was given universal logic. The European victory over its evil past was just one example in history looking for similar successes. By implementing responsibility, cooperation and equality between cooperating actors, the success of European integration was perceived to be reproducible. Hence, the historical dimension of EU identity helped to construct EU identity as inclusive.

Furthermore, EU identity was based on a variety of central meanings which could be separated into four categories. EU core principles served as the very basis of EU identity. They defined the basic values by which interaction was organised. The second and third categories built up on these EU core principles. In the section on civil society I have shown that principles, while referring to EU core principles, highlighted the importance of civil society in the project of European integration.

The third category of EU self-awareness addressed principles which could be understood as a result of a European socialisation process. European integration led to the understanding of a community which shared common rules of interaction and common interests. Finally, I have shown that a meaning of cooperation was central for EU identity, even though it was contested by the meaning of duplication.

Overall, EU identity was constructed as an inclusive identity to which other actors could become more 'self' by applying to established rules. The only meaning to which other actors could only limitedly ascribe to was that of being a European family of modern states. The meaning had a geographic dimension to it, which limited the possibility to become more 'self'.

This way of constructing EU identity was important for the construction of threats because it more or less disabled an understanding of other actors as being fundamentally different or 'other'. In other words, the EU was not constructed as the referent object of security. Inclusive identities enable others to become more 'self' as soon as actors start to ascribe to basic rules constituting the identity in question. As I have argued in the theory chapter, inclusive identities only feel threatened when other actors are understood to be unwilling to become more 'self' which did not, or very rarely, take place as I will show in the next section.

2. *Construction of Threats*

The purpose of this section is to analyse how, based on EU identity, security problems were perceived by the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies as the main actors within the institutionalised discourses of security policy at the EU level. Findings are again generated by a discursive analysis. I will focus on discourses on global challenges and analyse whether or not the EU was engaged in

threat constructions perceived by its intersubjective perspective. I will argue that threat constructions did not take place. The only exception was the EU's perception of weapons and landmines.

The most striking aspect was that during the period 1996-7, threat constructions were almost completely absent. Weapons and their proliferation among states was the only sphere in which something like threat constructions took place. This applied to weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their delivery systems, to conventional weapons and landmines. Other sources of threats did not exist, apart from those which did fall into the domain of domestic security policy, such as organised crime and terrorism. Both problems were addressed by the EU's justice and home affairs policy.

However, the meanings which dominated discourses on security were conflicts and crises on the state or sub-state level. In the following, I will start with identifying the meaning of crisis and conflict as the most frequently used meanings of discourses of global challenges. This will be followed by the argument that the EU, based on its identity, was disabled to understand conflict and crisis as posing a security problem on the EU as referent object. This section will be followed by focusing on the way in which weapons, organised crime and terrorism were constructed as a security problem. Especially the final two were important in regard to recognising changes in the construction of threats during the following periods. For example, in the period under review here, terrorism did not add to the meaning of security because it was perceived as a matter of domestic policies. This changed following the events of 11 September 2001. In order to recognise these changes, I will discuss the perception of organised crime and terrorism, although they did not fall into the domain of (external) security policy during the period 1996-7.

2.1 Conflict and Crisis

Discourses related to global challenges frequently dealt with conflict or crisis situations. These situations were connected to four regions or countries. They included the Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and especially sub-Saharan Africa, and Afghanistan. The perspective of each conflict was characterised by a general, underlying understanding of what constituted a conflict or crisis situation. Even when each individual conflict or crisis was perceived to be different in intensity or in the level of violence, the underlying perception of what constituted a conflict or crisis was almost always the same. The EU understood conflict as being based on a variety of “root causes”. (European Council 1996c: Great Lake) Root causes were for example ethnic, cultural and religious factors which were “often combined with weak social, economic and political structures, rapid socio-economic transition, inequality and environmental degradation.” (Council 1997k: Africa) Violence was only a result of a worsening situation. Root causes led to political and socioeconomic imbalance and disregard of human rights and ineffective “democratic governance, freedom of press and good governance”. (Council 1997k) Also, “the availability of arms, in quantities exceeding the needs for self-defence, may be a factor contributing to situations of instability.” (Council 1997e: development policy)

These root causes led to situations in which EU core principles were disregarded. For example, abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as difficult humanitarian situations were understood to add to situations of conflict and crisis. “Violent conflicts in developing countries have in many instances caused great suffering.” (Council 1997e: Development, A) The meaning of human rights abuses was understood as “practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labour, abuse of women, political arrests, forced displacement of the population and

restriction on the fundamental rights of freedom of speech, movement and assembly”. (Council 1996b) The inappropriate implementation of democratic rules was understood to contribute to a crisis or conflict situation. A situation of instability based on inappropriate compliance with democratic principles was given when elected governments were overthrown by other actors, when outcomes of elections were manipulated or not taken seriously, or when politicians or parties were hindered in their work. (see Council 1996p: Niger) Therefore, the Council attached “the utmost importance to respect for human rights and the restoration of democracy”. (Council 1997d: Nigeria)

Conflict and crisis carried elements of juxtapositioning of EU core principles. Conflicts and crises were understood to be possible only in a situation of disregard of international law, EU core principles, and principles constituting a civil society. As a result, conflicts and crises negatively affected conditions of the political, economic and social sphere. Based on this understanding, it would have been possible to construct conflicts and crisis as threats. But this did not take place. The EU did not understand conflicts and crises as posing a security problem on the EU as referent object. Although it was stated that the “international community [...] cannot remain indifferent to events” (Council 1997k) such as conflicts or crises, the EU did not perceive itself as responsible to act in these situations. The EU, based on its intersubjective perspective, was unable to understand regional conflict and crisis as a security threat – and as a result, an EU security policy was not necessary. This can be explained by the logic of the meaning of responsibility. As argued earlier, the meaning of responsibility required actors to take their fate into their own hands. This was to be done by fostering cooperation. For example, a “blueprint” of a genuine process of democratisation did not work without actors taking seriously their

responsibility in initiating change for their own benefits and those of other actors of the region. (see Council 1997g) That meant that conflicting parties “themselves must take the lead in, as well as the main responsibility for, the prevention and resolution of conflicts”. (Council 1997k: Africa) From this perspective, it followed that the EU was not responsible to solve conflicts and crises outside of Europe, if not outside of EU territory. This meaning of responsibility was so dominantly constructed that it led the Council to state: “The EU should abstain from acting in a manner likely to be perceived as an attempt to impose solutions” on others’ problems. (Council 1997k: Africa) This was by far the most remarkable reasoning on EU’s external action.

The logic of this reasoning was fourfold. First, as I have argued in the section on EU’s self-awareness, the EU did not understand itself as an international actor in the field of security. Second, this perspective was further supported by the meaning of responsibility which argued for regional actors to act on their own behalf. Third, if the EU’s external action was disabled by these two ways of reasoning, it was further disabled by the meaning of duplication. As soon as the EU’s action touched an area in which another international organisation or another state was already engaged, the EU avoided further duplication. Based on the meaning of responsibility and the meaning of duplication, the EU could do nothing else but perceive other organisations as responsible and already capable of acting in the situation of conflict or crisis. This was true in regard to Africa, where the OAU and the UN would have been responsible. This was also true for the Balkans, where the OSCE, NATO or UN was responsible. And fourth, the meaning of cooperation disabled EU’s action in conflict and crisis situations. Equality between involved actors was perceived as the most fundamental aspect of cooperation to be successful. (see above) Development policy took note of this because it was implemented in cooperation with the actors

concerned. For example, development policy was understood as development cooperation through the promotion of “mutually beneficial investment by Community operators [...] with local operators” (Council 1996n: Regulations concerning development cooperation) Cooperation was understood to be impossible in a “situation of continuing conflict and ongoing mistrust and tension between the parties who were to come together”. (Council 1996y: pt 12) Cooperation was possible again in a conflict situation only after involved actors returned to reason. This argument was based on the meaning of responsibility which added effectiveness by including the logic that “support of the international community and the European Union will not achieve its full potential unless the States directly concerned move towards true cooperation.” (Council 1996n: FRY, pt.4) But the situation would then no longer be one of conflict and crisis. Hence, external action as a security policy was no longer necessary. Together, these four meanings disabled the EU to perceive conflicts and crises as threats and the EU as the referent object.

The EU understood conflicts or crises as a problem affecting itself only in one regard. Crises and conflicts “seriously undermine[d] the efforts of the European Union to foster sustainable development”. (Council 1997e) Through this framing, conflict and crisis were constructed as jeopardising achievements of development policy. EU’s development policy was designed “to address the causes, in particular the root causes, as well as precipitating factors of violent conflicts, previously identified on a country-by-country/region-by-region basis, in a targeted manner”. (Council 1997e: conflict prevention) As argued earlier, root causes of conflicts and crises were understood to be a matter of development. Root causes could be tackled by long-term initiatives of development policies. (see Stewart 2008: 236; Stokke 1997) From this perspective, outbreak of conflicts or crises had to be a sign of failure

of the EU's development policy. Despite this reasoning, it did not lead the EU to the conclusion that a security policy was necessary in order to bring to a halt conflict and crisis. This would have added to the meaning of security and enabled the implementation of civilian but also military capabilities at the EU level. But such a way of reasoning was not available, based on the EU's understanding that it should not impose solutions on others' problems. In contrast, during the period 2000-1 such reasoning existed in discourses on European security. At this time, the EU's security policy was connected to development policy as providing a policy tool of the last resort – although it was not implemented on the ground.

In sum, during the period under review here, conflict and crisis were not perceived as security threats. Conflict and crisis were understood to be results of particular political, economic and social root causes. From the EU's perspective, they had to be tackled by the group of people suffering from these problems – the EU only perceived development policy appropriate to support these people in a long-term approach. But EU identity did not provide a basis for understanding conflicts and crises as posing a security problem on the EU.

2.2 Weapons

Apart from that, the only area in which threat constructions took place was regarding weapons. Weapons of mass destruction and their proliferation were perceived as a problem which was security relevant. "In connection with the Union's common foreign and security policy the Council attaches particular importance to the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation." (European Parliament 1997a: answer) This applied to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. They were perceived to threaten international peace and security. Therefore, banning these

weapons would be “a landmark in the history of disarmament”. (Council 1997h: CWC) The EU’s strategy to prevent this threat was by cooperation on the international level. “The European Union is an active player in international efforts to prevent and counteract the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” (European Parliament 1997c: answer) International treaties and agreements on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were understood to “contribute to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the enhancement of international peace and security”. (Council 1996p: CTBT)

In contrast, conventional weapons were not only perceived to be security relevant in the sense of international peace and security but to produce immanent regional security problems. They were understood to build up tensions between conflicting parties on the regional or domestic level which could lead to crises and conflicts. For example, “the flow of arms and ammunition into Afghanistan from outside its borders must end without delay” because it was understood as an act of disregarding the sovereignty of Afghanistan, which built tensions within the country. (Council 1996m: Situation in Afghanistan) Anti-personal landmines fell into the category of arms, which negatively affected not only anxieties between conflicting parties within a country. The continued “irresponsible supply and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines” also produced a threat to innocent civilians. (Council 1996t) The difference between conventional weapons and anti-personal landmines was that landmines were considered more problematic and were labelled “inhumane weapons”. (European Parliament 1996e) The EU attached grave concern to the use and spread of anti-personal landmines which were “deemed to be excessively injurious”. (Council 1997q) Anti-personal landmines were understood to be a more

serious problem since they did not make a difference between members of conflicting parties and military personal on the one side and “innocent humans” on the other. (Council 1996m: Situation in Afghanistan) Therefore, the use of anti-personal landmines caused violence against the civilian population. Landmines had the potential to further destabilise situations leading to crises or conflicts. In regard to the EU, these conflicts and crises were perceived as a problem for and within the region but did not affect the EU itself.

2.3 Organised Crime and Terrorism

Finally, processes of reasoning on organised crime and terrorism took place within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies. Strictly speaking, both processes did not relate to the meaning of security researched here. Both problems were not understood as security problems but as a matter of combating crime. However, both problems are briefly introduced here because terrorism especially played a fundamental role in regard to the construction of threats and the EU’s perspective onto the world surrounding it in 2003-4. Therefore, processes of sense making on a phenomenon called ‘terrorism’ was very different during both periods. In 2003-4, terrorism was understood to be an extraordinary threat, whereas in 1996-7 it was understood to be related to organised crime.

To start with, organised crime and terrorism included two different dimensions. First, their origins or their appearances were perceived to be external. Second, they were addressed almost exclusively by the EU’s justice and home affairs. This could be explained by the EU’s reasoning on organised crime and terrorism as being a matter of crime. (see European Council 1996a: IGC, pt.1) This may well be no revolutionary finding in regard to organised crime but is in regard to terrorism,

which was understood as a sub-problem of organised crime. This opened up the possibility to understand terrorism as crime. For example, the Council was to develop a convention for the “fight against organised crime including terrorism”. (European Council 1996b: JHA; European Council 1996a: JHA) The perception that terrorism was a matter of crime could be read out of the processes of sense making on both phenomena. For example, organised crime and terrorism were understood to be part of the same core of problems, such as “visas, asylum, immigration, the crossing of external borders, the fight against drugs and international crime including terrorism, offences against children and trafficking in persons”. (European Council 1996c: pt IV) The problems listed in this quote fall extensively into the status of injustices or crimes. The link between terrorism and crime became even more explicit in other circumstances. The most prominent example of reasoning on terrorist action taking place outside of the EU’s borders was the suicide attacks sidelining the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. (see Council 1997p) Terrorism took place in the form of “criminal and cowardly attacks”. (Council 1996j: bomb attacks in Jerusalem) This framing again referred terrorism to crime by saying that the attacks were ‘criminal’. This way of thinking was also visible vis-à-vis terrorism in Afghanistan – although not as strongly. (see Council 1996m: Afghanistan) However, the link was again made explicit when the Council stated that “the murderous attack against innocent [...] tourists” led it to confirm that all EU member states were determined to “confront terrorism decisively”. (Council 1996p: Greek victims) Terrorist attacks were again understood as a matter of crime – as ‘murderous’ attacks.

This link between terrorism and (organised) crime helps to explain why terrorism, alongside organised crime, was meant to be tackled by the EU’s justice and home

affairs pillar exclusively. It was not a matter of foreign policy but of protecting the people from crime. Increasing cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs was required to “ensure better protection of the Union's citizens against international crime, in particular, terrorism and drug trafficking” (European Council 1996a: JHA) This could only be done domestically – through arrangements for extradition between EU member states and strengthened control at external borders of the EU. (see European Council 1996b: JHA)

Summary

In this section of the chapter, I have shown that threat constructions rarely took place in the discursive field of global challenges. Only weapons of mass destruction were understood to directly threaten international peace and security. In this sense, they also threatened the EU. Apart from these weapons, nothing was constructed as a threat against the EU or its identity. On the contrary, conflict and crisis situations were not perceived as a threat, although they could have been, since they were defined as situations in which EU core principles were disregarded and the achievements of EU's development policy were seriously jeopardised. Based on the meanings of cooperation, responsibility and duplication, the EU thought action inappropriate in a situation of crisis or conflict. Here, active meant nothing more than advising. Based on this, threat constructions were impossible because of three reasons: first, the EU did not understand itself as responsible, second, it did not want to duplicate others' capabilities. Third, based on the inclusiveness of EU identity, actors (previously) involved in conflict or crisis could easily be seen as trying to become more 'self' again – by taking up their responsibility. The result was that the meaning of conflict and crisis did not add to the meaning of security. After a

conflict, action was appropriate as soon as actors were open for cooperation. Crisis and conflict then turned into a matter of development policy again.

In the next section of this chapter, I will show that this perspective on crisis, conflict and responsibility affected the EU's external action. Based on the meaning of responsibility, actors were required to at least try to implement EU core principles and the rule of law. The EU started to engage in cooperation only when actors accepted their responsibility.

3. *Rules of Appropriate Behaviour*

In this section I will analyse how rules were constructed defining appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. This section completes the three dimensional construction of security. As I have argued in the theory chapter, security can only be understood as relating an identity to issues which are understood to be threatening to the identity. This relation mutually establishes rules which apply in situations of insecurity. These rules are interlinked, on the one hand, with the identity construction in question because identity constructions limit what can be understood to be appropriate. On the other hand, rules of appropriate behaviour in a case of insecurity only make sense facing a particular, previously defined security threat against which the identity needs to be defended.

The problem of this chapter is that within the discursive field of global challenges, none or only minor threat constructions took place. Following the logic of the three dimensional understanding of security, rules of appropriate behaviour could not exist applying in the case of insecurity. In the section above, I have shown that threat constructions only took place in relation to weapons of mass destruction. The threat coming from these weapons was understood to be global rather than directed against

the EU itself. I will show later in this section that rules which define appropriate behaviour in the field of weapons of mass destruction requested multilateral arrangements, treaties and monitoring systems and hence cooperation. (Council 1996m: Dual use goods) These rules were the only ones to add to the meaning of security.

However, conflict and crisis situations ranked highest on the agenda discussed within discourses of global challenges. They were not constructed as threatening EU identity but as situations lacking in the implementation of cooperation and that what I have called EU core principles. Therefore, conflict and crisis situations were less 'self'. It could be argued that from the EU's perspective, they represented those times in which European integration had succeeded. This refers to the historical dimension of EU identity and the success of integration in overcoming the brutal past. As I have argued above, success was ensured by the responsibility taken over by European states in changing circumstances for the better. The same was expected from external actors, especially those sought out in conflict and crisis. Based on this perspective, it was inappropriate to engage in a conflict and crisis situation until local actors accepted their responsibility. Whether or not actors acted responsibly could be measured by how many EU core principles were implemented in the region of conflict or crisis. The rule which applied to these situations said that help and support of the EU was only available when certain conditions were met. (see Hill 2001: 328) The Council considered "the gradual improvement of relations with the FRY and to adopt appropriate measures depending on the latter's attitude". (European Parliament 1996c: answer) Gradual improvement referred to EU core principles and hence the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, implementation of democratic rules and the rule of law, as well as compliance with

the international law. If “human rights and democratic principles” (Council 1996n: MEDA) were violated, leading to a situation of conflict or crisis, the EU intended to suspend its aid. As soon as actors stood up to their responsibility – at least by trying to implement EU core principles – the EU reconsidered its action. “It is not European Union policy to try to bring about change by coercive measures” (Council 1996c) But, the “European Union considers that full cooperation [...] will depend upon improvements in human rights and political freedom”. (Council 1996c)

The rule behind this kind of policy said that actors themselves were responsible for establishing democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedom. The Council recognised that “the primary responsibility for preventing and resolving violent conflicts lies with the people concerned.” (Council 1997e: coherence of development policy with other policies/pt B; see Council 1997k: conflict resolution in Africa) Here, a meaning of ownership was implemented saying that people themselves had to change things for the better, rather than any external actor. (see Manners 2006: 186) The EU provided aid and initiated cooperation only when local or regional actors took on their responsibility and the situation on the ground started to improve. For example, the Council stated that the EU “will find it easier to increase its support if it can be certain that procedures will actually be in place for rebuilding good neighbourly relations between the States concerned”. (Council 1996n: FRY, pt.4) However, this help and cooperation was not constructed as a security policy. It fell into the sphere of development policy. Development policy was understood to support actors and states in such a way that they were enabled to help themselves. (see Council 1997o) Again, this was based on the EU’s perspective that a well functioning and good governed state was understood to be important for peaceful and cooperative development, not only on its domestic level

but towards other states in the region. (see Council 1997m: Albania) A well developed civil society could help to stabilise the state and improve its functioning by providing services to its citizens. (see Council 1997e: III A) This understanding was based on EU identity which was constituted by EU core principles, the construction of civil society and rules of cooperation. Based on this understanding, the EU's approach to crisis and conflict situations could be summarized as being conducted by development policy in order to establish a stable state. “[P]eace, stability and sustainable development, as well as respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance, in Africa are of interest and relevance to the Union for reasons of preserving peace and strengthening international security” (Council 1997k: Prevention and Resolution of Conflict in Africa, pt.3; see Council 1996f, 1996g)

However, the approach of the EU towards crisis and conflict situations was not one of security policy but took place in the domain of development policy and almost exclusively by financial aid. (see Council 1996e) The EU “reminded its interlocutors that the EU was, and is, the main donor of humanitarian assistance in the region and that a transition to a more structured cooperation with the EU would depend on concrete steps towards peace and reconciliation”. (European Parliament 1996a: answer) The EU supported recovery in economic and social terms “when political and security conditions make it possible to begin [...] rehabilitation” of the country in question. (Council 1996k: Burundi) Apart from some exceptions, for example in Mostar, the EU's main channel to provide financial aid was through international organisations, such as the UN and its sub-bodies, the OAU, the OSCE and other regional organisations. (see Council 1996t: 0002) In this regard, the Council stated that the “Union shall pursue its policies and actions within the appropriate political

and legal framework (United Nations, OAU, sub regional organisations), where necessary, and in close cooperation with the relevant bodies.” (Council 1997a) If the UN itself was not going to be active, the decision which organisation should be supported was again a matter of responsibility on a regional basis. After this decision was made, the EU intended “to identify ways of contributing financially” to the initiatives taken by the international or regional organisation. (Council 1997h: Albania)

Apart from financial support, the EU’s external action was affected by its understanding of integration and cooperation, leading the EU to opt for regional dialogue to open doors for further cooperation. Regional dialogue was understood to lead to “a fair, comprehensive and internationally acceptable solution”. (Council 1996a) From the EU’s perspective, dialogue could create a peaceful and cooperative atmosphere which opened the way to achieve common agreements. Responsible actors were required to “enter into meaningful dialogue with pro-democracy groups with a view to bringing about national reconciliation”. (Council 1996b) In this sense, dialogue could not start too early because “the complex problems at issue can only be resolved through early and substantive dialogue”. (Council 1996m: Eastern Zaire) Dialogue was a precondition for the improvement of conditions in a crisis or conflict situation and opened the way for cooperation. (see Council 1997l: Albania, pt.8; European Parliament 1996d: answer) The position of an EU special envoy was established to help improve relations going from dialogue to cooperation. Special envoys were engaged in stimulating dialogue in regions where conflicts deeply irritated structures of negotiations by supporting “the efforts aimed at creating the conditions for solving the crisis” (Council 1996v) The goal was to integrate international and regional organisations, as well as conflicting parties. From the

EU's perspective, dialogue was the indispensable starting point to solve conflict situations and find common agreements. This perspective was informed by the EU's memory of successfully overcoming its brutal past through ways of dialogue, cooperation and finally integration.

Overall, the EU's approach to crisis and conflict situations was characterised by development policies and financial aid. Rules applying in this regard did everything but add to a meaning of security. As I have shown above, discourses of global challenges at no time constructed threats in a meaningful sense. Rather, conflict and crisis situations were understood to be best addressed through development policy.

Apart from the dominance of development policy in regard to conflict and crisis, discourses under review here eventually referred to "defence implications" of EU's foreign policy. (Council 1996w) It was said that as soon as EU's external action had defence implications "use should be made of the Western European Union". (Council 1996x) The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in late 1997, also included for the first time a reference to WEU as being an integral part of CFSP. (EU-Treaty Amsterdam, Article J.7) This was the result of discourses of effectiveness and coherence. They took place within the IGC, leading to the revision of the Treaty on European Union. Effectiveness and coherence were the main concepts around which treaty revisions were discussed. Both implemented the logic that internal structures of decision-making and cooperation between the different bodies of the EU had to be organised more rationally and thereby more effectively and coherently. (see Presidency of the EU 1996: 7-8) However, as I have argued above, the discourses of effectiveness and coherence were contested by the meaning of duplication, which stated that the EU's action and institutional structure should abstain from duplicating those of other institutions and actors already established. Therefore, the discourse of

defence implications led the EU to go for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) integrated into NATO by utilising WEU as the organisation which more or less was already structuring the European dimension of defence. (see European Council 1997c) Therefore, even the discourse on defence implications did not add to the meaning of security affecting the EU's external action in the domain of security. (see Treacher 2004: 51)

Finally, one area in which threats to international peace and security were perceived was that of weapons of mass destruction. Problems relating to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or any material which could lead to proliferation of related technology were dealt with in a multilateral approach. (see Council 1996d) In the same manner, the EU addressed problems related to anti-personal landmines and its clearances. (see Council 1996t) Also, the EU acted in support whenever an UNSC resolution required embargos on arms, goods and services, or diplomatic sanctions. (see Council 1996b) These methods of cooperation fell into the EU's perception of what constituted appropriate behaviour. The meanings of cooperation and integration added strongly to the construction of EU identity. Hence, the EU intended to address or solve problems of the international community by following a cooperative approach.

Summary

The most central meanings of EU identity were EU core principles, cooperation and integration, and the juxtaposition of EU's past and presence. EU core principles incorporated democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. They referred to the international law as the international source of these values. EU core principles will remain central in each period analysed in this thesis. The same

holds true for cooperation and integration. Integration was understood as a special form of cooperation reaching higher levels of formalisation. However, cooperation itself meant formalised interaction. Both were central in overcoming the EU's past by initiating economic growth and thereby establishing 'mutual understanding'. All three meanings were related to the meaning of responsibility, which required actors to take hold of their problems themselves. All these meanings were central to EU identity, not only during the period 1996-7 but in all other periods analysed here.

However, differences between the constructions of EU identity in 1996-7 and those of a later stage relied on the contestedness of EU identity based on the meanings of effectiveness, coherence and duplication. Effectiveness and coherence contested each other. The first required a common spirit to implement more effective and faster decision-making. The second implemented the logic that EU's external action could only be a single and forceful one when situations of individual member states were taken into account. The meanings contradicted each other in the period 1996-7 and thereby weakened the construction of EU's actorness also in the field of security. The meaning of duplication had the same effect. Duplication defined EU's action as inappropriate when it fell into the field of another organisation or actor. Finally, in reference to the meaning of responsibility, the Council stated that the "EU should abstain from acting in a manner likely to be perceived as an attempt to impose solutions". (Council 1997k: Africa) Therefore, the EU was not constructed as an actor in the field of security and this claim furthermore disabled the construction of threats almost entirely.

Although conflict and crisis were frequently discussed in institutionalised discourses on EU's external action, they were not perceived as security relevant. First of all, the responsibility to solve crisis and conflict rested with the people concerned. Second,

in compliance with its understanding of duplication, the EU did not act when other organisations or actors were already in place. This was the case in regard to the Balkans, to Africa and the Great Lakes Region. Actors which already had established relevant competences and capabilities were the OSCE, the Council of Europe, NATO, WEU and the UN. The EU committed itself in the area of development policy through financial aid, as soon as conflicting actors returned to reason by starting dialogue and cooperation.

The result of these processes of reasoning was that a security policy including civilian and military capabilities was not necessary. The fight against weapons, their procurement and proliferation were the only policy field which added to the meaning of security. But the fight against these problems required cooperative approaches on the international level by implementing formalised structures of disarmament, monitoring, control and procurement regulations.

This very limited meaning of security will expand over time. In the following chapter covering the period 2000-1, I will show that EU identity was more robustly defined, including a stronger self-perception of actorness in the field of security. Together with the reduced contestedness of EU identity, this perspective enabled the EU to perceive conflict and crisis as affecting itself by putting its achievements of development policy at risk. As a result, conflict resolution was perceived as an appropriate tool of last resort in order to secure its development policy achievements. The EU was perceived to be directly affected by conflicts and crises in its effective implementation of development policy making the EU the reference object of security accordingly.

However, I will show that the rule to implement conflict resolution did not dominate discourses on the meaning of security because it was still contested by the debate on

autonomy versus duplication. Also, it did not contain clear cut rules of how and when to use civilian or military capabilities. Apart from that, the institutional development of the security policy was very much driven by discourses on effectiveness and coherence and thereby followed internal logics instead of being informed by the EU's perception of the world surrounding it. Yet, the way of reasoning on the institutionalisation of security policy at the EU level paved the way for the re-constitution of EU's self-perception as an international and security actor. Both constructions became visible in the final period reviewed within this project.

Chapter III

Realising its Actorness

In this chapter I will analyse the process of EU identity constructions, the perception of threats, and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity during the period 2000-1. Compared with the previous chapter, I will highlight differences in the (re-)constitution of meanings relevant in these three contexts. In this regard, it is not necessary to once again go through the corner stones of EU identity constructions when they have remained unchanged, compared with the period of 1996-7. By focusing on differences, I will be able to show how processes of reasoning changed over time and thus how the meaning of security developed.

The most significant changes took place in the construction of EU identity. This is not to say EU identity changed fundamentally. For example, EU core principles did not change. The same was true for the meaning of cooperation and integration. However, in regard to EU identity, almost every corner of EU policy went through a 'review process' which checked its effectiveness and coherence. Discourses of these two meanings were dominant in the period 2000-1. Change could also be recognised in the way in which the EU understood itself. It constructed itself as an actor on the international stage. I will show that the EU explicitly attached a meaning of actorness to its security policy, showing its ability to act internationally and, hence, enforcing its status as an international actor. This change can be explained by the development to apply to the grand design of becoming a recognised international actor. Also, an identity crisis which unfolded after the IGC of Nice led to a re-constitution of EU identity.

Another important change took place in regard to the conception of the people as the principle addressees of policies – referring to the debate within the UN on the responsibility to protect. This was obvious during the period of 1996-7 but did not dominate the EU's security policy because the EU did not consider itself as being responsible in the domain of security policy outside of its own territory. This changed in 2000-1. In regard to external action, the meaning of the people was fundamentally important for the EU's conceptualisation of development policy. The dominance of the meaning of people enabled the EU to perceive itself responsible to protect individuals from development, poverty, crisis and conflict. Here, the EU adopted dominant interpretations established in discourses at the UN level.

This way of reasoning not only affected the EU's development policy by more strongly focusing on poverty prevention in order to prevent individuals from being harmed. It also affected the meaning of security and helped to establish a security policy as a tool of last resort when crisis and conflict threatened the people and the achievements of the EU's development policy. In this regard, the meaning of the responsibility to protect the people was much more important to EU's identity in 2000-1 than in the previous period. This way of reasoning enabled the construction of a development-conflict cycle, by which the EU perceived situations of development as including a high probability to expand into conflict. This understanding added meaning to security established within ESDP as a tool of last resort to engage in conflict resolution.

Finally, in the section on rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity, I will show that these newly defined meanings only slowly translated into rules. I will argue that, although a meaning of security began to develop, this had limited effects on rules of appropriate behaviour. Compared to the period of 1996-7, discourses of

rules and international order were richer in the sense that they contained more differentiated meanings. Two rules were newly defined in regard to external relations, conflict prevention and crisis management. Especially the second rule added meaning to security policy. However, both rules remained contested for a variety of reasons. One reason was the indifference in preferring long- or short-term approaches in regard to crisis management. As a result, the rules added to the meaning of security but limited its intersubjectivity by being contested.

Finally, I will summarise the findings of this chapter and lead to the next, focusing on the crisis of discourse taking place in the first half of 2003 when EU member states were divided on how to proceed with Iraq. This ‘interim’ chapter will help me to argue for the robustness of institutionalised discourses on the EU level. This will directly lead my project to the final analysis of the period 2003-4.

1. EU Identity

The most important changes within the construction of EU identity took place in regard to the EU’s self-perception of being an actor on the international level. Discourses of actorness were enabled by a mutual constitution of the EU’s external action and the construction of EU identity. If in earlier periods, EU identity constructions were informed by processes of reasoning on internal cooperation and integration and the EU member states’ ability to overcome their brutal past, in 2000-1 the EU’s external action was understood to stabilise EU identity by implementing the same principles externally that were required internally. Through these processes, the EU implemented such meanings of actorness as international, regional or military actor. These changes derived from developments of earlier marginalised discourses which gained support over time leading to a stable discourse on the EU’s actorness

in the field of security. This process was further supported by an identity crisis affecting discourses after the IGC in Nice.

Furthermore, discourses of EU identity constituted a meaning of the responsibility to protect the people and the people as being the principle addressees of the EU's policy. The interesting turn is that the meaning not only applied to the internal but also to the external sphere, dominating discourses of foreign and development policy. This meaning was already apparent in 1996 and 1997. However, it did not dominate the conception of foreign or development policy because the EU did not understand itself as responsible for the well being of the people outside of its territory. The EU only engaged in dialogue and cooperation when a minimum of standards were established in accordance with EU core principles. In 2000-1, the meaning of people in relation to the meaning of actorness enabled the EU to recognise its responsibility to protect the people outside of its own territory. While constituting itself as an international actor, the EU had to take up this responsibility on the international stage. This change occurred based on a dominant discourse at the international level constructing a new grand design of what accounts for a responsible international actor. This grand design influenced the shared understanding of EU actors.

Finally, another important area of change was that of discourses of effectiveness and coherence. Both meanings dominated almost all issues of the EU's policies in the period under review. They also affected the self-understanding of the EU and its view of the international system. The meanings of effectiveness and coherence were less contested in 2000-1 because coherence did not explicitly require taking into account member states' individual situation. Rather, it organised a well functioning workflow among the different levels of EU governance. As a result, both meanings

slightly re-constituted the meaning of cooperation. The meaning of cooperation was more dominantly affected by the meanings of effectiveness and coherence which implemented a rational or objective way to organise cooperation. The meaning of effectiveness and coherence was already established in discourses on policies of the supranational level. Arguments were applied to the EU's security field as an attempt to ensure continuity of the EU's identity and its external policies in other fields.

In the following, I will analyse these three aspects and conclude that the EU was on its way to realise its actorness on the international stage. Situations of development and poverty were perceived to contradict the EU's minimum standards. Accordingly, the newly established meaning of actorness required action by the EU to help to solve this miss match.

1.1 Actorness

During the period under review here, the meaning of EU actorness was in the process of being developed. It began with actor-like characters analysed in the previous chapter. These actor-like characters established the reasoning that the EU was able to act on the international level, based upon its own experience of overcoming its brutal past and hence conflict. At this point, the EU's self-perception of actorness was related to discourses of conflict prevention. These relations established the EU as a capable actor in supporting cooperation and peace on the international level. In other words, the identity construction experienced a process of development in which discourses on the EU's actorness in the field of security gained more support because the grand design of being an international actor was still not established. However, processes of sense making on EU actorness were contested in 2000-1. There were some reassuring moments, in which the EU tried to

convince itself of its actorness. The meaning of actorness also vacillated between being an international, regional or military actor which contested each other to a certain extent. (see Rosecrance 1998; Stavridis 2001a, 2001b; Treacher 2004) All these aspects of the construction of EU actorness will be analysed step by step in the following pages.

Discourses of EU actorness were connected to already existing self-perceptions of actor-like characters. These characters had remained constant since 1996-7. For example, the capacity to learn was one dominant meaning in this regard. “The knowledge and experience of the EU can be of particular importance.” (Council 2001c: Conflict Prevention) Through this sentence, the EU constituted itself as an actor capable of learning and having the ability to recall knowledge and experiences. In contrast to the period of 1996-7, this perspective was directly linked to the EU’s external action and here conflict prevention. The Council was “in favour of an extensive, consistent, coordinated EU role in the region”. (Council 2001e: Africa) Similarly, the European Council was “of the view that the European Union [...] should play a leading role” in conflict prevention. (European Council 2001b: Annex D)

The relation of EU actorness to conflict prevention and the role this link played in this construction needs to be further analysed. First of all, in 2000 and 2001, the EU’s perspective on conflict prevention dominated processes of sense making of the EU’s role on the international level. (see below) Therefore, discourses of conflict prevention contributed to the meaning of actorness. (see Manners 2006: 185; McLean and Lilly 2000: 8) The rationale which made this link possible was reflected by the Council, who declared European integration as a successful way of conflict prevention. “Many ministers stressed that European integration was an excellent

example of conflict prevention.” (Council 2001f: open debate) The understanding of the European integration process as a form of conflict prevention opened up the possibility for the EU to perceive itself as a capable actor in this field. “Preserving peace, promoting stability and strengthening international security worldwide” was a “fundamental objective of the Union, and preventing violent conflict” constituted “one of the most important external policy challenges”. (Solana 2000: pt. I.1) Therefore, the EU constituted itself as an experienced actor who was well-equipped in the field of conflict prevention. To be explicit, until now this link served the argument of why the EU should act on the international level and why it was legitimate to do so. In the section on rules I will show that the implementation of a policy of conflict prevention remained contested.

This link was new during the period under review here. The European integration process was previously not explicitly called conflict prevention, although the juxtapositioning constituting EU’s memory stated exactly this. But even when this link had been implemented during the earlier period, the meanings of responsibility and duplication would have prevented the EU from considering a role in conflict prevention externally. Therefore, the meaning of responsibility and duplication must have been different for the period 2000-1, in order to enable the link of EU actorness and conflict prevention.

First, in the period 1996-7, responsibility was limited to the EU’s own territory. This way of reasoning did not fit the perspective of being an international actor. The meaning of responsibility had to be expanded to include objects of responsibility further afield as a matter of ensuring continuity of the newly introduced international actorness and the attempt to be an international in the field of security. In this regard, I will later show that changes in the meaning of responsibility were enabled through

the meaning of the responsibility to protect and the people as principle addressees of policies. It led the EU to protect civilian populations internally as well as externally. For example, the EU acted responsibly in implementing a policy to eradicate poverty. Such a re-constitution of the meaning of responsibility was central to the construction of EU actorness. It did not follow the meaning of duplication as implemented in the period 1996-7, since in order to be meaningful EU actorness could not stop at the borders of duplication but required a redefined meaning of responsibility.

Second, the meaning of duplication was contested more and more by the meaning of coherence and autonomy and thereby marginalised. Whereas in 1996-7, coherence required the explicit inclusion of member state's individual situations, in 2000-1 coherence meant "deploying the right combination and sequence of instruments in a timely and integrated manner". (Solana 2000: pt. II, 7) Therefore, coherence required well functioning policies and instruments working together across all levels of EU governance. In order to achieve this, new structures were necessary. Following the logic of coherence, it was not important whether or not a particular policy or structure was already provided by another actor or institution, but whether or not it was necessary for the EU's coherent action. This way of reasoning strongly contested the meaning of duplication.

Also, the meaning of duplication was affected by the meaning of autonomy, arguing for structures which enabled the EU to act autonomous from NATO. "Development of consultation and cooperation between the EU and NATO must take place in full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making." (European Council 2000a: Appendix 2 pt. 1) This meaning of autonomy was to contest the meaning of duplication and thereby enabled the EU to develop capacities and procedures in

policy fields previously perceived as producing duplication. This change affected the meaning of security because the EU intended to establish military capabilities as a tool of last resort in the case of conflict. Change in this regard can be explained as a matter of reaching for the grand design of an international actor in the field of security but also by a rising identity crisis of the EU because EU actors realised at least following the IGC in Nice that the EU hardly applied to the standards defined by its identity of being an international actor in the field of security. (see European Council, 2001e: Laeken Declaration) This aspect will be discussed later on.

However, in the period 2000-1 EU actorness was still in the making, the meaning was not fixed within discourses of EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour. The EU engaged in constructing actorness in a reassuring manner. Or in other words, the meaning of actorness seemed to be established on a lower level of intersubjectivity. The process of constructing EU actorness used the logic of mutual constitution of EU's external action and its actorness. For example, the Council argued that it was "appropriate [...] at the same time to ensure greater visibility for the Union's action." (Council 2001b) 'At the same time' referred to the actual policy implemented by the Council decision. Therefore, the EU's external action was mutually linked to the visibility and hence EU actorness. In the quote, the Council made explicit that it was appropriate to establish EU's visibility. The reference to 'appropriateness' could be understood as a sign that the meaning of actorness was still in the making and approved the legitimacy of the claim to be an international actor. In a similar way, the European Council reaffirmed "its commitment to building a Common European Security and Defence Policy capable of reinforcing the Union's external action". (European Council 2000a: I C)

Furthermore, the EU's self-perception of being an actor on the international stage was reassured by the way in which external actors responded to the EU's external policies. For example, the Council welcomed "the warm reception received from the three countries by the Troika visit, perceived as a sign of the EU's continued commitment to the region." (Council 2001g: Southern Caucasus) On the one hand, the sentence re-established the relevance of the EU in the external sphere. On the other hand, the "warm welcome" was recognised as a sign that external actors perceived the EU as an international actor, as well. States, here Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, already recognised the EU as an actor. This recognition positively affected processes of reasoning on EU actorness. The Council argued in a similar way by saying that all states of the Southern Caucasus supported "a stronger EU role". (Council 2001g: Southern Caucasus) All these examples showed that in 2000-1, the meaning of EU actorness was still in the making and far from being widely intersubjectively shared, let alone dominant.

Finally, this weakness was also visible in the EU's indifference in types of actorness and their capabilities. The EU claimed to be an international, regional or military actor at various points. The types of international and regional actorness were at least contested. On the one hand, the Council stated that the EU should "pull its full weight in international affairs" (Council 2000f: 7). On the other hand, it argued for the "importance to the EU of stabilisation and development in the region". (Council 2000i: Western Balkans) Especially the meaning of regional actor contradicted the meaning of international actorness. Whereas an international actor could also act in the nearby region, a regional actor would not act further afield. (see Larsen 2000b; Missiroli 2003a)

Also, not all types were well equipped with rules of appropriate behaviour by which they would have gained more meaning. This was especially the case in regard to EU's military actorness. During its development, the concept of military actorness exclusively related to conflict prevention and crisis management policies. The EU "highlighted its determination to develop an autonomous capability to decide on and [...] to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crisis." (Council 2000k: 5; see Larsen 2002; Smith 2000; Stavridis 2001b) But this type of actorness lacked well established rules to guide this type of actor in its appropriate behaviour. This deficiency could be explained by two factors. First, in the section on effectiveness and coherence, I will show that they established the logic that an effective and coherent ESDP was needed to support the EU's external action. The most effective and coherent way to institutionalise security could be identified by objective, rational reasoning. Therefore, the EU was relatively blind on actual needs derived from its experience of implemented security policies. "[T]he Council called for closer co-ordination among Member States and the Commission in the delivery of assistance to meet the challenges set out above so as to promote a more coherent, effective and visible role of the Union as a whole." (Council 2001j: Indonesia) These discourses established a logic that the EU had to have a security policy and military capabilities at its disposal in order to be able to act effectively and coherently. This debate, however, was not connected to actual security challenges which had to be faced by these capabilities. Therefore, rules on how to behave were only weakly established or not at all. Second, in the section on the construction of rules I will show that the EU's approach to crisis management as the primordial sphere of military actorness was very much contested. As a result, the meaning of the EU's military actorness was weakly implemented.

1.2 Protection of the People

The meaning of the responsibility to protect led to the shared understanding that the EU's policy had to support the people not only at home but also externally and thereby the EU was constructed as the reference objects of security – or at least as being responsible for the referent object of security. This meaning dominated discourses on EU identity in 2000-1. I will analyse this dominance while focusing explicitly on the effects of this reasoning on the EU's perception of the world. Here, the meaning of the responsibility to protect was imported from a dominant discourse on the international level taking place especially at the UN level. The meaning was logically connected to a meaning of (under-)development and led to the EU's perception that it was responsible to protect the people in these circumstances. This again referred to EU core principles as the source which defined minimum standards for peoples' well being. As a result, people were constructed as referent objects of security. This included not only European citizens but also citizens of third world countries. The EU was expected to support people in third world countries in the case EU core principles were not adequately implemented. This way of reasoning finally enabled the EU to further engage in conflict prevention which – following this logic – was still a matter of development policy. However, conflict prevention also related to security policy and the implementation of a rule allowing for the use of military capabilities as a last resort to protect people suffering from conflict and crisis. In order to develop this argument I will first clarify the meaning of development as informed by EU core principles. I will then develop the meaning of the responsibility to protect. Overall, the goal of this section is to help analyse threat constructions to recognise people as the referent objects of global challenges and security threats.

The meaning of development referred to EU core principles as the founding principles of European integration. In discourses in 2000 and 2001, these EU core principles were labelled as European standards. EU identity was constructed around “European standards” (Council 2000l: Annex), to which the EU and its member states as well as other states had to apply if they wanted to draw “closer to the European structures”. (Council 2000g) As I have shown in the previous chapter, these core principles were “respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law [...] and to respect international law and standards”. (Council 2000m: Zimbabwe)

In the period under review here, these core principles were equipped with an external dimension by having global legitimacy. (see Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 545) This affected the EU’s approach towards its external sphere. EU core principles were reflected in almost all external policies, whether in regard to the Great Lakes Region, Indonesia, the Western Balkans, Ex-Yugoslavia, or Cuba.

“[T]he objective of the European Union [...] remains the encouragement of a process of peaceful transition to pluralist democracy, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the [...] people.” (Council 2000g: Cuba – conclusion)

The quote above exemplifies EU core principles and their applicability to EU’s external action. The absence of EU core principles was understood as a situation of development. This was reflected in the statement of the Council on development policy which was “grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development. Promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance [were] an integral part of it.” (Council 2000e: no. 6) As a result, the protection of the civilian population was the

object of the EU's policy. They had to be protected from violence, suppression and undemocratic rules. The meaning of development built up on the understanding that EU core principles were not only good for the people but protected them from the threat of violence, conflict and suppression. For example, the Council concluded that action was necessary in "countries characterised by the absence of organised government and the rule of law". (Council 2001c: LLRD pt. 2.2) The perspective again was based on the EU's experience of its own successful integration. "[E]uropean integration had proved to be a model for regional cooperation and hence conflict prevention elsewhere in the world". (Council 2001f: open debate) As I have argued in the previous chapter, European integration centrally included EU core principles as the very basis of peaceful and equal coexistence. From this perspective, development was perceived as a situation in which EU core principles were not implemented.

In this regard, processes of reasoning on EU core principle and civil society almost inevitable made necessary a meaning of 'people' as the principle addressees of EU's policy, as they were the constituting units of EU core principles. They included democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. The meaning of 'people' was constitutive for all these principles. In the earlier period, the EU actively engaged in implementing EU core principles domestically or in close cooperation with Middle and Eastern European countries reaching for membership. The dominant discourse on the responsibility to protect taking place at the UN level affected the EU's reasoning on its international responsibility. Since the late 1980s, the UN more often had to face situations of domestic violence, intra-state conflict, human crises and so forth. These situations, such as in Somalia in 1992, were interpreted as threats to international peace and security. (see UNSC 1992) By the beginning of the 21st

Century the UN prepared itself to be capable of solving civil wars, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse and thereby argued for a responsibility to protect “ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them.” (ICISS 2001: 11) This framing required a security policy capable of civilian and military operations in support of the suffering people – which was nothing less than the EU’s shared understanding of the purpose of security policies in cooperation with development policies.

The remarkable development was that this meaning was applied not only to internal but also to external policies and was related to security policies. Internally, in regard to the discourses of the future of Europe, reforms were called for to bring the political structure of the EU closer to its citizens. (see European Council 2001a: pt.6) But, the centrality of the concept of human rights and the responsibility to protect for the EU’s policies was also apparent in the EU’s external action. (see Manners 2006: 192) Together, the Council demanded for Angola “to implement transparent management of public resources for the benefit of all her peoples”. (Council 2000b: 2) In other words, the quote required the implementation of EU core principles by state structures in order to protect the citizens.

This role of state structures could be read out of further documents. For example, the Council expressed its expectation of “concrete steps towards national reconciliation, democracy and respect for the human rights of all the people”. (Council 2001k: Burma) The way in which the argument was brought forward again highlighted the importance of policies to serve ‘all the people’. National reconciliation by respecting rules of democracy and human rights was one step in establishing good living conditions for each individual. In this sense, state building was not an end in itself but a means to protect the people. “The free expression of the political will of the

people by a secret and equal vote, through a universal, fair, transparent and participatory election process” represented “a cornerstone of an inclusive and sustainable democracy.” (Council 2001c: Election assistance) Here, political structures were again presented as to serve the people. They were not, in the first place, implemented to lead to a strong government which could control its territory and be an actor within the international system. But their implementation would enable the people to express their political will and be protected from harm, injustices and poverty.

However, as soon as EU core principles were implemented, the people had to accept their responsibility in acting in accordance with these core principles. “The people of Croatia have shown” that they intend to follow the right path forward “by voting for peace, freedom and justice. There is a movement towards true ‘Ownership’ by the people and by civil society, with democratic freedom and economic transparency finally taking root.” (Council 2000j: EU Declaration on PIC) Therefore, the meaning of the civil society as being responsible for establishing and stabilising a well functioning state similarly applied to the people.

1.3 Effectiveness and Coherence

In the years 2000 and 2001, discourses of effectiveness and coherence influenced all EU policy areas. Both concepts became constitutional for EU identity. They affected the way in which the EU understood itself and its role in regard to security policies. The purpose was “ensuring coherent action, building more effective partnerships, [and] improving long term and short term measures”. (Council 2001f: Conflict Prevention) A huge variety of discourses of effectiveness and coherence took place during 2000 and 2001. The most relevant were those relating to development policy.

The Council considered “that improving the quality and efficiency of EC development assistance” was “its core priority for future action”. (Council 2001c: the follow-up of EC development policy) “[E]ffective coordination at all levels” was “essential to ensure maximum impact in the country concerned”. (Council 2001c: LRRD) The discourse became dominance in order to ensure continuity in a time of a strengthened identity construction and the implementation of new policies such as in the field of security.

The interesting aspect of discourses of effectiveness and coherence was that they established an objective logic of why the EU had to implement a security policy and how this policy and its structures should look like. Both implemented a meaning of rationality and objectivity by which structures were reviewed independently from actual experience on the ground. This logic could be contrasted with a lessons learned approach by which the institutional structures and procedures were double checked by its performances in the field. Such an approach was stated very clearly by CIVCOM:

“The UN has a unique role in and experience of civilian crisis management, including police operations, but also strengthening of the rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Experiences and lessons learned from these and other areas, including those set out in the report by the Brahimi panel, should be fully taken into account by the EU in developing its civilian crisis management capacity.” (CIVCOM 2001a: pt.4)

However, discourses of effectiveness and coherence implemented a different logic by which the EU’s security policy was not developed because its necessity was double checked with the EU’s experience. Effectiveness almost exclusively strove for the best, objective way to equip itself with decision-making procedures and coordination. For example, the Council discussed that “effective conflict prevention also means the coordination of Community instruments in a coherent manner with

those of Member States, of the CFSP – and in that context the ESDP – and other international partners.” (Council 2001f: open debate) Also, decision-making procedures of ESDP were under review to be more effective. Further institutions were established which followed the logic of making ESDP more effective. “[T]he Satellite Centre [...] will support the decision-making of the Union in the context [...] of ESDP”. (Council 2001e: ESDP). “The Council also reviewed and discussed instruments of early warning and conflict prevention available to the EU, and how they could be used to strengthen the Union’ short and long term conflict prevention.” (Council 2001e: Conflict Prevention) These quotes support the argument that effective and coherent structures were perceived exogenously and given identity by rational reviewing and discussions. This was also visible in regard to the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), implementing the meaning that effectiveness and coherence was a management problem which could be solved by appropriate structures. The RRM was “designed to allow the Community to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner, to situations of urgency or crisis or to the emergence of crisis”. (Council 2001g: RRM) The weakness of RRM “should also be seen as a consequence of insufficient co-ordination of available resources and instruments”. (Council 2001c: LRRD, pt. 2.1)

These logics implemented effectiveness and coherence as ways to objectively address management problems. Effectiveness could be ensured by particular decision-making structures. This was also true for coherence. Therefore, the meaning of coherence was re-constituted, compared with the earlier period, when it asked for equal involvement of member state’s individual position. The re-defined meaning of serving as measurement on how to organise workflows between the different levels of EU governance could be read out of a document produced by CIVCOM, stating

that it was “of paramount importance to ensure co-ordination and coherence of action between the EU civilian administration components and other elements of an EU crisis management operation”. (CIVCOM 2001b: 4) Here, it became clear that coherence no longer focused on the recognition of individual situations. It focused on management problems and the organisation of workflows between bodies and actors on different EU levels. This included EU member states, although coherence no longer focused on all individual situations of member states. Coherence ensured “effective coordination of the assistance efforts made by the Community and each Member State and to reinforce their coherence and complementarity.” (Council 2000f: Effectiveness of EU’s External Relations, pt. 1.2; see Keane 2004: 492) This meaning of coherence fundamentally differed to that of 1996-7, it required that different policy levels had to be managed effectively.

Both meanings, effectiveness and coherence, opened up the way for the institutionalisation of security policy but highlighted that this new policy applied to already established measurements which again ensure continuity. The EU acknowledged that it had different policies at its disposal which already contributed to a security policy. They only had to be managed in an appropriate, meaning effective and coherent way. “In principle we have adequate mechanisms for conflict prevention, including early warning, analysis and reaction. Now the key is putting these to effective use.” (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention) This reasoning had a huge impact on discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Discourses were to focus on management problems of how to make the EU’s capabilities more effective and coherent. One example of this way of reasoning was the Council’s pledge for greater civilian capabilities. “The Council gave strong support to the ‘Call for Contributions’ process [...]. This and the

work underway on development of an EU professional capacity to plan and conduct police operations represent important steps towards realising the targets on police agreed in Feira.” (Council 2001i: ESDP) In Feira, this process was already a matter of effectiveness. “Improving European [...] capabilities remains central to the credibility and effectiveness of” ESDP. (European Council 2000a: I C pt.8)

Finally, discourses of effectiveness and coherence were relevant in regard to the EU’s cooperation with external actors. The meaning of cooperation as an important way to overcome differences was stabilised by the meanings of effectiveness and coherence. The EU’s efforts in cooperation were evaluated along the lines of effectiveness and coherence. For example, the Council stressed “that co-ordination of measures taken at international level, e.g. in the framework of the UN, OSCE and NATO, should be enhanced in order to rationalise the use of the resources involved”. (Council 2001g: International cooperation) Therefore, the meanings of effectiveness and coherence did not add new aspects to the meaning of cooperation. But the approaches to cooperation were strengthened while their effectiveness and coherence were measured. This could be read out of the Council’s conclusion on the International Day for Support of Victims of Torture. The Council underscored “the need for more intensive and concerted action, at national, regional and international level towards the goal of eradication of torture. [...] Co-operation by States with international mechanisms [...] is essential to make our international system of protection and promotion of human rights effective.” (Council 2001h: External Relations) Both quotes above further stabilised the meaning of cooperation by attaching measurements of effectiveness and coherence.

Summary

Overall, discourses on EU identity during the period 2000-1 differed from those of the period 1996-7 in three ways. First, they established not only actor-like characters but a meaning of EU actorness. The construction of EU actorness was still in the making because utterances actively constituted the meaning of actorness as a matter of mutual constitution of EU's external action. Also, the recognition of the EU as an international actor by external actors seemed to be noteworthy. Both processes underscored the fact that the meaning of actorness was in the process of becoming intersubjectively shared but did not dominate the construction of EU identity.

Second, the meaning of EU actorness was enabled by another change in the construction of EU identity. This was the meaning of people as the principle addressees of policies. The EU perceived people as the principle addressees of policies because individuals were the constituting units or objects of EU core principles. In reference to this logic, the meaning of civil society was individualised by the meaning of people. The dominance of this meaning enabled changes in the meaning of responsibility. Responsibility more explicitly included the protection of the people. This not only affected the EU's internal policy but its external policy, as well. Again, this meaning of responsibility enabled the construction of EU actorness by which the EU was perceived to be potentially responsible for the people outside of its own territory.

Finally, the meanings of effectiveness and coherence dominated almost all discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour. They affected processes of reasoning on the institutionalisation of security policy as a matter of objectively measuring the best way of organising the EU's external policy, including security. In this regard, the meaning of coherence contested its earlier versions. The

meaning of coherence was reconstituted, since it no longer required the equal recognition of EU member states' individual situation but required the organisation all EU governance levels in a way to make processes and workflows most effective. These three changes together changed aspects of EU identity and the way in which the EU perceived itself positioned within the world.

2. *Construction of Threats*

In this section I will analyse processes of threat construction which took place in the years 2000 and 2001. The focus will again be on those constructions which were new in, or had been changed by, the years 2000 and 2001. Processes of threat construction circled around two central aspects. First, the concept of people as the primary objects of protection influenced processes of threat construction. I will show that threats to the people served as the argument why the EU perceived as necessary its involvement in conflict prevention and crisis management. Poverty was first understood to be a problem for the EU's self-perception. Since it perceived itself as an actor on the international stage equipped with an identity which was built upon EU core principles, situations of poverty were 'other' to the EU's 'self'. This alone did not make poverty a security problem. The link between the people and conflict was constructed through the meaning of development. In cases in which EU core principles were absent, the population was understood to be at high risk, threatened by a variety of problems ranging from poverty to crisis and conflict. Situations of poverty were constituted as potential security problems. They were linked to conflict and thereby became security relevant. The link between development and poverty to conflict was implemented through the construction of a high probability that situations of development and poverty could dynamically lead to conflict.

The second central meaning for the construction of security was that of conflict. The meaning of conflict was related to violence and development. Conflict and development were understood to mutually invoke each other. The link between development and conflict was constituted by violence. Through violence, development could easily lead to a conflict situation. At the same time, conflict could further undermine the progress of development. These processes of reasoning established the meaning of a development-conflict cycle through which situations of development carried a high probability to lead to conflict and thereby worsen the people's situation. Conflicts were understood as a security problem for the EU because of this logic. (see Stewart 2008: 236)

I will show that conflict and the tendency of every development situation to worsen and lead to conflict was understood to be a security problem for the people rather than the state, or the regional and international order. Based on the EU's identity including the meaning of peoples as the principle objects of protection, the EU equipped itself with the ability to rescue people in the case of conflict – also by military capabilities, as a last resort. In situations in which individuals not only suffered from a lack of development but also from the danger of conflict, the EU understood to develop crisis management and conflict prevention mechanisms appropriately.

In the following, I will show how these two aspects constituted the EU's perspective of security problems and threats. Finally, this will directly lead to the last section on how rules of appropriate behaviour were constructed as a response to the perceived security problems.

2.1 Threats to the People

The construction of threats referred to the concept of people as the principle objects of policies, including their protection in situations lacking the minimum of EU core principles. In general, the absence of EU core principles already qualified as a problem which had to be addressed by responsible actors. The lack of established EU core principles qualified as a relevant security problem as soon as it seriously affected the people, or in the event that the EU was able to identify subjects which were perceived responsible for the disregard of EU core principles or the worsening of a situation. These situations constituted a security problem because the EU perceived itself as responsible to protect the people from situations of development – which were constituted by the lack of EU core principles implementation. In the following, I will provide two examples in which situations of development were perceived as security relevant – if not a security problem. The first analyses how poverty was perceived as a divergence from the EU's self-ascribed actorness of responsibility for people outside of its own territory suffering from inappropriate implementation of EU core principles, as well as how poverty was dynamically interlinked with conflict. The second analyses human rights abuses while focusing on how the construction of a responsible subject led the EU to perceive these abuses as a security problem. Both were perceived as situations of development lacking the implementation of EU core principles.

Poverty

Based on the EU's perspective, poverty qualified as security relevant. In discourses, the EU's policies of poverty reduction were presented as a fight against evil. The EU's development policy was to "fight against poverty". (Council 2000d: 9; see Nielson 2001; Stewart 2008: 237-8) The evil was twofold. First, poverty undermined

main principles of EU identity. Second, it was related to conflict and therefore added meaning to security. Both dimensions will be analysed in the following.

In regard to the first dimension, poverty disadvantaged “people to have control over their development, enjoy equality of opportunities and live in a safer environment”. (Council 2000e: 5) In this sense, poverty was not only the lack of financial resources but expanded to include all aspects of human life. (see Flint 2008: 57) The result was understood to always be the same: Civilian populations which lived in poverty were excluded from certain standards of living either because they could not afford these standards or because structures which should provide access to these standards were not available.

“Poverty is defined not simply as the lack of income and financial resources but also as encompassing the notion of vulnerability and such factors as no access to adequate food supplies, education and health, natural resources and drinking water, land, employment and credit facilities, information and political involvement, services and infrastructure.” (Council 2000e: no. 8)

The list of ‘factors’ in the quote above was clearly related to EU core principles and therefore related poverty to an important aspect of EU identity. This included democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Environmental damages were also understood as a factor of poverty, as well as transmittable or communicable diseases. (see Flint 2008: 56-8) The Council argued “the need to set up action to combat the major transmittable diseases (AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis) in the context of reducing poverty”. (Council 2000f: 12) The Council “recognised the complexity of poverty and, noting in particular the global dimension and impact on poverty of communicable disease”. (Council 2001j: Development)

The first dimension of poverty was constructed as a problem affecting the people. Factors of poverty were measured in regard to whether or not access to appropriate

recourses and services were provided to the population. In the quote on poverty above, “access” clearly did not mean that state institutions had access to adequate resources. State institutions did not suffer from poverty. Instead, access referred to the civilian population which were constructed as the only objects suffering from poverty. They were characterised as “vulnerable”, (Council 2000a: no. 8) which could be translated into violable, unprotected or endangered. Overall, it meant that the population was unable to change these circumstances, even when they tried to act responsible. This understanding was the most central reason why poverty was understood as a problem for the EU. Poverty made people suffer from inadequate implementation of EU core principles. This made them less ‘self’ to the EU. (see Council 2000e: statement by the Council and the Commission, pt.8) Poverty was understood to undermine these main principles.

In contrast, the subjects of poverty were not clearly identified. Poverty was measured in a list of factors which added to the situation of poverty. But they were not constructed as subjects. The factors represented a list of possible causes of poverty which needed to be reduced in order to relieve the civilian population from poverty. However, these causes did not include states as the subjects actively engaged in causing poverty. Instead, states were responsible for implementing EU core principles which enhanced the living conditions of the population. But states were not clearly addressed as subjects causing poverty; they only shared some responsibility in preventing poverty from increasing. This perspective may well be based on the meaning of globalisation as being a process which apart from others reduced the influence of state actors not only internationally but on the domestic level. (see Council 200e: 4)

The ‘fight against poverty’ fell first and foremost into the competences of the European Community and had to be dealt with on that level. “The development policy of the Community defines the fight against poverty as the overarching objective of Community development co-operation.” (Council 2000d: 11; see Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 112) In this regard, the EU, together with its individual member states, was active in development policy. The EU provided “approximately half of all public aid to the developing countries[...]. This effort reflects the essential solidarity which is an underlying feature of its international activity.” (Council 2000e: no. 2) Overall, this first dimension of poverty diverged from the EU’s self-perception of being an international actor responsible for protecting civilians suffering from poverty. Therefore, poverty was addressed by Community mechanism to take up the responsibility self-ascribed by the meaning of EU actorness.

In regard to the second dimension, poverty was understood to include the potential to lead to crisis and conflict situations. “Poverty, and the exclusion which it creates, are the root causes of conflict and are endangering the stability and security of too many countries and regions.” (Council 2000e: Statement by the Council and the Commission, pt.1) The quote nicely shows the reasoning on international security. The EU perceived poverty and conflict as being interlinked or interdependent.

The construction of the causal link between poverty and conflict enabled the EU to construct poverty as security relevant. In regard to the first dimension, poverty was difficult to construct as a threat because subjects responsible for poverty could not be clearly identified. Poverty was understood to be caused by complex factors for which states could not be held responsible. From this perspective, the construction of poverty as a security problem remained contested. This dramatically changed in

regard to the second dimension of poverty, which implemented a dynamic link from poverty to conflict. (see Hadfield 2007: 53; Chandler 2007) As I will show in the section on conflict, the dynamic qualified as a security problem because it led to serious suffering of civilians by violence and conflict. Since poverty and conflict were logically linked, poverty already qualified as security relevant because it carried the burden of leading to conflict which would make crisis management policies necessary. (see Council 2000e: EC's development policy)

However, before I focus on this dynamic, I will show that human rights violations followed a similar logic which made them security relevant. In this section I will exemplify how issues were constructed as adding to EU identity and their disregard was essentially perceived as a security problem.

Human Rights Violations

During the years 2000 and 2001, the EU criticised the violation of human rights and democratic principles. The EU was deeply “concerned about the continued reports of human rights and international humanitarian law” violations. (Council 2000h: 11) In regard to democratic principles, the EU blamed the “continuing mass arrests and detention of opposition representatives and student leaders, heavy punishment of independent media, repression of journalists and obstacles to public rallies of the democratic forces”. (Council 2000j: 7) And finally, refugees were understood to suffer from the same problems. “The Council expressed its concern over the humanitarian situation of refugees and displaced persons in the region”. (Council 2000j: 11) As such, the disregard of human rights and democratic principles did not qualify as security problems. They were taken as problems with which the EU had to deal within the framework of its development policy and in cooperation with the international bodies. (see Council 2000e: 4)

In contrast, disregard of human rights and democratic principles qualified as a security problem when it qualified as human rights ‘violation’ conducted by identifiable subjects. “Specifically on human rights, the Council expressed its deep concern about the continuous violations that” were “perpetrated by both state and non-state parties”. (Council 2000j: 10) Here, the problem was defined as violation. The way in which ‘violation’ was introduced showed that it had a higher potential to cause problems than the disregard of human rights. In contrast to disregard, the meaning of violence had a more active character. Therefore, it constituted the existence of a subject. Following the quote above, the linguistic connection of ‘violation’ and ‘perpetrate’ finally pushed the act of disregard over the edge of purpose. Thus, violation constituted a subject which was on purpose acting against central EU core principles and the international law. This perspective was further supported by the introduction of state and non-state actors as subjects of violence. They were responsible for the “increased occurrence of unacceptable acts of political violence and intimidation”. (Council 2001j: Zimbabwe) It was by this link that violation of human rights and democratic principles qualified as a security problem. The implemented link from human rights to security problems was similar to that of poverty and conflict.

2.2 Conflict

The meaning of conflict included a dynamic potential. The meaning of conflict built up on the meaning of violence in the way that a situation of violence constituted the precondition of conflict. First of all, situations in which EU core principles were not implemented but seriously breached qualified as a situation of violence. Such a situation was perceived as constituting conflict because it posed “a threat to law and order, the security and safety of individuals, situations threatening to escalate into

armed conflict or to destabilise the country”. (Council 2001g: RRM) The difference between both meanings, i.e. violence and conflict, was that violence enabled the EU to identify subjects which were responsible for the breaching of EU core principles. The meaning of violence constructed an actor who ignored or acted against EU core principles or those which led up to them. Through violence, an ‘other’ was constructed as being responsible for the act of violence. For example, the Council “condemned the continuing ethnically motivated violence in Kosovo and urged the leaders of all communities to commit themselves fully, to the fight against such violence.” (Council 2000g: 8) Also, the Council strongly condemned “the violent and illegal actions by ethnic Albanian armed groups in Southern Serbia and particularly in the Ground Safety Zone”. (Council 2001f: Western Balkans) In contrast, conflict was understood to lead to further breaches of EU core principles as a result of a dynamic process by which different subjects ended up violating these rules. In a situation of conflict, the EU was unable to identify subjects which were responsible for the worsening of the situation. Rather, conflict per se led to the derogation of peoples’ situation.

This meaning of conflict was important to understand how poverty included the potential to become a security problem. In this regard, it is important to recall the “multi-dimensional nature” of poverty including the following aspects: (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention and development)

“[O]ver 40% of the population are still living below the poverty line: throughout the world, 800 million people, 200 million of them children, are suffering from chronic malnutrition. [...] The major communicable diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, are disproportionately rife among the poor peoples of the developing countries. Globalisation [...] offers some opportunities but also entails the risk of marginalisation. The debt burden often leaves developing countries no room for manoeuvre.” (Council 2000e: 4)

The threshold by which poverty or development qualified as being worse ‘enough’ to count as a conflict situation depended on the level of disregard or violence of EU core principles and other rules of appropriate behaviour. The level of disregard or violence had to be high in order to qualify as a situation of conflict. However, this level was not quantified within discourses of poverty, development, conflict or security. In linking poverty to conflict and thereby making development a security problem, the EU determined its belief to be justified by data stating that the probability of conflict was much higher in situations of poverty or development. (see Chandler 2007: 365-6; Council 2000e: 4) As a result, the Council emphasised the “strategic role of development co-operation in conflict, as well as [...] post conflict situations”. (Council 2001j: Africa, pt.1)

Through this perspective, the EU established the meaning of a development-conflict cycle. (see Hadfield 2007; Chandler 2007) The forces of this cycle not only dynamically led from development to conflict but also vice versa. As argued above, situations of development and poverty were perceived to contain a high probability to lead into conflict. The effect was also possible in the reverse, by which conflict worsened situations of development and poverty. This was perceived as a problem for the EU’s development policy because conflicts potentially ruined the achievements established by the EU’s development policy. This aspect was clearly stated by the Council, saying that “such situations are likely to jeopardise the beneficial effects of assistance and co-operation policies and programmes, their effectiveness and/or conditions for their proper implementation.” (Council 2001g: RRM) In this regard, conflict constituted a threat to the EU’s development and cooperation policies.

Summary

Taken together, the EU established a development-conflict cycle which dominated the EU's perspective on situations of development or poverty and their potential to lead to conflict. (see Hadfield 2007: 58; Chandler 2007; Council 2001c: Conflict prevention) Another mechanism which added to the meaning of conflict assumed a horizontal expansion. The Council "expressed concern about the risk of spill-over of the conflict to neighbouring countries". (Council 2000h: 10) This way of reasoning on development and conflict as dynamically affecting each other was not only established by the EU but already by other international organisations and state actors dominating the discursive field of global challenges. (see Craig and Porter 2003: 53; Abrahamsen 2005; Duffield 2003) However, the development-conflict cycle did not constitute a threat to the EU's physical existence rather it was perceived as diverging from the standards of living required by EU identity.

Poverty and development was perceived as contradicting the minimum standards of EU core principles and other core meanings of EU identity because people suffered from these situations. The EU felt responsible to act since it perceived itself as an actor on the international stage. Acting as an agenda setter, in the field of development or other ways was necessary to apply to its own standards of actorness. This perspective enabled the construction of poverty and development as security relevant and the dynamic of the development-conflict cycle as a security problem.

3. *Rules of Appropriate Behaviour*

In the above sections on EU identity and threat constructions, I have shown that meanings were redefined and became dominant in the discourses under review. The meaning of the people – as the principle addressees of EU policies – as well as

effectiveness and coherence dominated discourses on EU identity in 2000 and 2001. Furthermore, a meaning of actorness was strongly attached to EU identity. The EU promoted itself as an international actor capable of dealing with international problems. On this basis, the EU understood the dynamism of development and poverty potentially leading to conflict as a security problem. Development, poverty and conflict were perceived as situations which lacked the implementation of EU core principles and the international law. These situations were ‘other’ to the EU’s ‘self’ and had to be addressed following the meaning of responsibility and EU actorness.

The EU established rules of appropriate behaviour in accordance with these security problems. Rules included i) conflict prevention and ii) crisis management. (see Article 17, no. 3 of Nice Treaty on the EU) The meaning of conflict prevention could be understood as the umbrella including crisis management. The logic behind this was that conflict prevention accounted more or less for all situations in which EU core principles were not fully implemented. These situations were labelled as situations of development or poverty which again were perceived as including a high probability to lead to conflict and crisis. In order to prevent situations of development and poverty leading to conflict, the EU implemented a rule requiring long term approaches for conflict prevention especially carried out by development and other external policies in the field of trade or financial aid. In contrast, crisis management directly addressed situations of conflict. As I have argued above, conflict was understood to be a situation in which EU core principles were seriously breached or violated. Peoples were suffering from these situations and the violence carried out against them by state and non-state actors. The rule of crisis management required the use of civilian capabilities to enable conflicting parties – almost

exclusively state actors – to restore domestic order. Also, the rule required military capabilities and the possibility to use NATO's military assets.

Overall, both rules were relevant for the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP, although crisis management was more central to it because it directly addressed situations of violence. These changes were enabled by a re-construction of EU's identity and its perception of being an international actor in the field of security who had to take up the responsibility to protect also the people outside of its own territory. Therefore, these changes resulted in a change of the EU's identity constructions. Also, it was a matter of continuity that the EU's security policy had to support already established policies such as development policies. However, I will demonstrate that both rules were strongly contested, which weakened their intersubjectivity status and their effect on security policy. In the following I will analyse the construction of both rules.

3.1 Conflict Prevention

The meaning of conflict prevention was closely related to the meaning of development and development policy as well as to the meaning of the responsibility to protect. "The added value of development programmes in conflict prevention" was "their ability to analyse the structural causes of conflict and instability and long-term development needs and priorities. The role of development cooperation" was "conflict prevention rather than crisis management." (Council 2001c: Conflict Prevention and Development) By this quote, conflict prevention was perceived to be established through development policy and development cooperation. The meaning of development cooperation was central in this regard. It again referred to the European success of overcoming its brutal past through cooperation. (see Council

2001f: open debate) Informed by this perspective, development cooperation built up on a list of action including: “trade policy instruments, trade and cooperation agreements, development cooperation programmes, social and environmental instruments, political dialogue and cooperation with international partners and countries at risk”. (Council 2001f: open debate) Overall, the logic of conflict prevention was that “[o]nce peace is restored the EU is ready to consider long-term cooperation in support of national reconstruction”. (Council 2001a: 1)

Based on the EU’s perception of the development-conflict cycle, conflict prevention was understood to be a security policy framed within a long term perspective of development policy. (see Stewart 2008: 233) It included policies and action in the political, social, economic, environmental, and health area. For example, in the political area the EU supported:

“Democratic institutions which work are a condition of sustainable development. Good governance, which includes the fight against corruption, and the rule of law are decisive in strategies to reduce poverty. In that connection, the Community is especially well placed to support the strengthening of the partner countries' institutional capacities.” (Council 2000e: 6)

In this regard, elections were taken as a sign of solid processes of democratisation.

“The completion of these elections [...] in full respect for OSCE standards will contribute to the further strengthening of the democratic institutions of the country and to its rapprochement to European structures”. (Council 2001h: Western Balkans)

Objectives in the economic area included “in particular sustainable development in developing countries, their inclusion in the world economy and the fight against poverty.” (Council 2000d: 8) Starting from its perspective as an international actor, the Council claimed that the EU was a “leading player in the area of trade and development aid”. (Council 2000e: Link between development and trade) As a

result, the Community had to “ensure that development policies and trade and investment policies” were “complementary and mutually beneficial.” (Council 2000e: Link between development and trade)

The leading idea of conflict prevention was to initiate a process which would lead to regional integration following the idea of European integration and thereby making crisis and conflict impossible. As well as European integration, conflict prevention is a peace project and hence a security policy by other means. This perspective could be read out of the quote given above on the purpose of elections which contributed to countries “rapprochement to European structures” (Council 2001h: Western Balkans) In its close neighbourhood, motivations to engage in long-term reconstruction efforts should be created by “a credible prospect of potential membership once relevant conditions have been met.” (Council 2001d: Annex) Further afield, long-term reconstruction efforts carried out by the EU intended to initiate similar processes of integration in the respective region. Here, the EU again focused on cooperation and ‘constructive’ dialogues initiated by regional organisations. For example, the Council “expressed its readiness to increase its long-term capacity-building support to ECOWAS, in particular in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management and regional peacekeeping.” (Council 2001h: West Africa)

Nation building was a central means to achieve the end of poverty eradication and development finally making crisis and conflict impossible. The EU’s long-term action of reconstruction focused first and foremost on nation building and democratisation. The Council argued for the importance “to build national capacity to prevent and resolve conflicts.” (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention and development) Accordingly, apart from being framed as development policy, the

discussion of how the EU's civilian and military capabilities should look like already highlighted the point that ESDP should be active in nation building. In the following of the quote above, the Council listed possible contributions of the EU to nation-building and democratisation. "Our contribution could include support to democratic institutions, judicial systems and the security sector. Support must also be granted for democratisation, demobilisation and reintegration programmes, and civil society." (Council 2001c: Conflict prevention and development) The list of contributions strongly referred to EU core principles. Also, the meaning of the civil society as a guarantor of state stability was re-constituted. This again was apparent in more detail in a statement on the situation in Indonesia: "In the Council's view, legal reform, the rule of law, civilian control and democratic accountability of the police and armed forces, a vibrant civil society, decentralisation and the strengthening of local administration remain crucial for Indonesia's stability and prosperity." (Council 2001j: Indonesia)

The role of the UN was important in the field of conflict prevention, although the UN was perceived as one of many international organisations. This is not to say that discourses of conflict prevention did not explicitly refer to the UN. (see Council 2001j: EU-UN relations) But the UN was almost exclusively referred to as one international organisation apart from others which were active in conflict prevention. For example, CIVCOM pointed out that the EU "should develop its crisis management capacity with a view to improve its ability to contribute to operations conducted by lead agencies, such as the UN or the OSCE," but also that the EU should be able to "carry out EU-led autonomous missions". (CIVCOM 2001a: Annex, p.1) The reason for that might have been that the EU perceived itself as a successful actor in conflict prevention. Discourses of conflict prevention frequently

referred to this meaning. (see above; Council 2001f: open debate) This quest for autonomy demonstrated two things: first, the EU seemed to be more settled in its role of international actorness in the field of security; second, the meaning of duplication, which dominated discourses in the period of 1996-7, was no longer relevant for the EU's policies and institutional build up in 2000-1. Despite these processes of reasoning, the EU had an "inconsistent record of conflict prevention in EU development documents" which "undoubtedly reflects difficulties in defining the concept and tying it in with other pressing development objectives". (Stewart 2008: 238) This argument on the contestedness of the meaning of conflict prevention will be developed further in regard to crisis management.

3.2 Crisis Management

The meaning of crisis management addressed situations in which violence took place and it was related to the meaning of responsibility to protect. If violence was carried out, a situation previously understood as development turned out to be a security problem. The rule requiring crisis management applied in situations of development or poverty which were worsened by violence and, therefore, were labelled crisis or conflict. As I have described earlier, violence did not have to include the use of force. The threshold for a situation to become security relevant was the seriousness of disregard or violation of EU core principles. On the one hand, violence could be done against individuals or ethnic-groups. On the other hand, disregard included situations in which state structures were unable to provide serious policies in support of their citizens or to prevent circumstances from harming the civilian situation. The situation was then understood to be a security problem, including the potential to undermine the EU's development policy.

This perspective led to the reasoning that civil crisis management approaches and capabilities were appropriate to push a situation of crisis back into the boundaries of development. In general, approaches in this regard were closely related to the efforts of the UN. The UN was held as primarily responsible for defining how to approach situations of conflict. For example, in regard to Afghanistan the Council agreed on a common position in “order to support the United Nations peace efforts”. (Council 2000a: Article 2)

In any case, crisis situations were addressed first by civilian operations. They addressed civilian administration, the rule of law, and civil protection. Civilian administration included “[g]eneral administrative functions: Civil registration, Registration of poverty, Elections/appointments to political bodies, Taxation, Local administration, Custom Service” as well as “social functions” and “infrastructural functions”. (European Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) Even though it was understood as crisis management, civil administration mechanisms were very closely interlinked with development cooperation and hence conflict prevention. In both policies, “rapid build-up of local capacity and subsequent hand-over to local ownership” was perceived to be “essential.” (European Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) “The close link between civilian administration in crisis management and long-term structural assistance” made “continuity crucial.” (European Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) Although crisis was perceived as being security relevant and as requiring EU’s action, the EU still focused on long-term strategies following the logic of development policy and economic support. (see Stewart 2008: 237-8) This argument could be exemplified in regard to the implementation and strengthening of the rule of law. For example, the European Council stated:

“Experience shows that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition of peace and security. International efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system.” (European Council 2001b: Annex III of Annex)

In this regard, police missions also accounted for crisis management. They ranged “from advice, assistance or training assignments to substituting for local police”. (European Council 2000b: Annex II to Annex VI) But these missions focused on long-term achievements rather than on re-establishing order by the use of short-term initiatives such as conflict resolution, peace-keeping or peace-enforcement.

In contrast to civilian crisis management operations, civil protection operations explicitly focused on short-term goals. They should assist humanitarian actors “in covering the immediate survival and protection needs of affected populations, in respect to e.g. search and rescue, construction of refugee camps and systems of communications and provisions of other types of logistical support.” (European Council 2001b: Annex III to Annex) Based on this list, which referred to the Petersberg Tasks, the EU perceived as appropriate the development of military capabilities at the EU level. (see European Council 1999b: HHG; Keukeleier 2003: 39;)

The development of appropriate military capabilities under the leadership of the EU were not truly finalised but contested in the period of 2000-1, although the goal was to “make the EU quickly operational”. (European Council 2001b: 11; see Wivel 2005: 401; Hill 2001) In order to face up to the problem of lacking in military capabilities, the European Council, for example, “called for an arrangements permitting EU access to NATO assets and capabilities.” (European Council 2001b: 11; see Deighton 2002: 728; Stavridis 2001a) This request again showed that the

meaning of duplication no longer dominated processes of sense making on the EU's external action. It was pushed away by meanings such as responsibility, actorness and coherence. (see above) Overall, in the period under review here, the EU perceived robust action necessary to face up to situations of crisis but it was not capable of applying to its own perspectives, since the EU did not have military capabilities at its disposal nor was the agreement with NATO in place before 2003. The perception that the EU had to be enabled for robust action in security policy derived from changes in the construction of EU's international actorness following the grand design of being a full-fledged member of the international community for which it was perceived to be necessary to be capable of acting in security. Furthermore, the dominant discourse on the responsibility to protect affected the EU's perception of its international role in the field of security. The attempt to cooperate with NATO can be explained on the one hand as the attempt to approve continuity but on the other hand, cooperation was necessary in order to prevent the EU from worsening the identity crisis because it already formulated that it wanted to engage in security policy internationally but was not capable of doing so without using NATO's assets. (see European Council 1999: Annex IV; European Council 2000: no. 8-9; Gordon 2000: 15-6)

The interesting aspect was that the rule requiring active engagement in a situation of crisis did not exist in 1996-7. Back then, any direct involvement in advising other states was perceived as inappropriate. But in 2000-1, the implementation of a variety of mechanisms of crisis management was perceived appropriate. As I have argued in the sections on EU identity and threat constructions, this change can be explained, on the one hand, by developments in the construction of EU identity. The EU's self-perception of being an international actor in the field of security was especially

crucial here. The strengthened meaning of actorness required action by the EU on the international stage which, from the EU's perspective, meant nothing else than taking up responsibility. On the other hand, the the responsibility to protect became dominant in discourses of EU identity. In reference to the meaning of actorness, the EU perceived itself as responsible for the peoples in other regions of the world. Situations in which civilians suffered from situations of development and poverty were perceived as a problem by being 'other' to the EU's 'self'. These situations qualified as a security problem when they escalated into conflict and crisis. The EU required conflict prevention and crisis management to address these situations as a matter of appropriateness. This went so far that the Council stated that a situation of conflict or crisis required "in the last resort, the readiness to use military force for conflict solution". (Council 2001f: open debate)

Overall, the rules of conflict prevention and crisis management were still contested in the period under review here. On first glance, they seemed clearly defined. Conflict prevention required action in the field of development policy and external action of trade cooperation and financial aid, whereas crisis management operations required robust capabilities of ESDP. But both rules were not strictly defined, which made the differentiation between both logics of action almost impossible. Although crisis was defined as a serious problem which required immediate reactions by the international community, the EU preferred long-term approaches instead of providing capabilities for robust conflict resolution. Accordingly, the distribution of competencies among EU institutions such as the COM and its Directorate-Generals, as well as CFSP and ESDP, remained contested and unresolved. (see Stewart 2008: 238) Also, processes of sense making on EU's capabilities to carry out robust crisis management and nation-building operations were contested. As a result, the EU did

not implement civilian and military capabilities in order to be able to conduct crisis management. Rather, it referred to its long-term development policies as appropriate tools. (see Hill 2001: 320) Therefore, the EU required other actors to carry out crisis management operations. For example, in regard to the Great Lakes Region the Council concluded that progress was “primarily the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda. In order to support and encourage its efforts, the European Union shall pursue a constructive and critical dialogue with the Government of Rwanda” (see Council 2000c: Article 2)

In sum, although the meanings of conflict prevention and crisis management were very central for the process of reasoning on rules of appropriate behaviour in a situation of insecurity, both rules were still in the process of becoming intersubjectively shared. This can explain the EU’s inactiveness in conflict prevention and crisis management where security policies, including civilian and military actions, were concerned. (see Hill 2001: 330; Treacher 2004: 58)

Summary

In this chapter I have shown that in the period 2000-1, EU identity was still based on EU core principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, there were three important changes recognisable in the time period under review here. First, the EU more explicitly understood itself as an international actor in the field of security. The meaning of actorness was still in the making and discursive moments constituting the EU as an actor were very frequent. Thereby, change as development was visible based on the actors’ attempt to apply to the grand design of being a responsible and capable international actor also in the field of security. An occurring identity crisis by realising that the EU was

not able to apply to this grand design supported discourses which re-constituting the meaning of actorness in the field of security. Second, discourses were dominated by the meanings of effectiveness and coherence. They implemented an objective or rational perspective by which problems in EU's policies were understood to be management problems. They could be dealt with by objective measurements of effectiveness and coherence. In regard to coherence, a remarkable change in the meaning was visible, compared to the construction established in 1996-7. Coherence no longer focused exclusively on EU member states' individual situations which had to be recognised. Coherence required effective workflows between all levels of EU governance without particularly highlighting that of member states. Thereby, the new security policy was presented as continuity of other already established policies because it also applied to the EU's attempt of being effective and coherent. Three, discourses of EU identity established a meaning of responsibility to protect and the people as the principle addressees of EU's policies. This meaning was introduced into the EU's discourse by the discourse at the UN level unfolding since the beginning of the 1990s. The EU discourse was able to relate to the UN discourse because it could build up on the EU's core principles which all were design to support and empower the people.

However, these changes together enabled the EU to perceive situations of development and poverty as security relevant. This perspective was enabled by the broader meaning of responsibility. Thereby, the EU's responsibility to protect the people was shifted onto the international level. As a result, situations of development and poverty were perceived as a problem with which the EU had to deal. These situations were constituted by lacking the implementation of EU core principles and the international law. In order to apply to the requirement of its own construction of

actorness, the EU had to engage in these situations. This was especially the case when situations of development transformed into conflict and crisis. Generally, development and poverty were understood to systematically include a high probability to lead into conflict. Such a transition led to worsening conditions for civilians, who therefore had to be protected.

As a result, the EU constituted rules on conflict prevention and crisis management. Both required a broad variety of policy tools ranging from development cooperation, financial aid to civilian crisis management operations and rather robust approaches of conflict resolution. As I have shown, the process of sense making on these rules of appropriate behaviour was contested in the period under review here. Especially rules of action including civilian and military crisis management remained contested. This contestedness was reflected by the lack of capabilities on the EU level.

Overall, this chapter argued for the stability of EU identity, compared with the period of 1996-7, although it identified changes in some constitutive meanings. These changes were responsible for changes in the EU's perception of the world surrounding it. It enabled the EU to perceive situations of development and poverty as security relevant. This perspective enabled the EU to construct rules requiring conflict prevention and crisis management accordingly.

In the empirical chapter dealing with the period of 2003-4, I will show that EU identity was still consistent. This was also true for the constitution of EU actorness, consistently developed over time to include much more differentiated characters. They enabled the EU to define rules of appropriate behaviour more accurately than in the period of 2000-1. However, an important change took place in regard to the perception of threats. Processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism dominated threat perceptions. By these processes, security problems were

understood to systematically include a strong moment of dynamism. This affected not only the EU's threat perception but also the way in which the EU perceived itself positioned within this world of dynamic threats, including international terrorism as a serious threat against the EU's 'self'.

However, before I focus on the period 2003-4, I will need to address the first half of 2003 explicitly. These six months were marked by a discursive crisis. As a result of processes of sense making on international terrorism, the approach towards Iraq as a host and in corporation with international terrorism was discussed on the international level. The EU had to position itself to this problem. The EU's inability to do so was described in the literature as constituting a crisis of the EU. Especially its instruments of CFSP and ESDP somewhat mystically combined success in the development of ESDP. (see Allen and Smith 2004; Hill 2004; Menon 2004) In contrast, I will show that discourse on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP was robust and remained fairly unaffected by the discursive crisis. This robustness can be argued by showing that utterances dealing with Iraq took place almost always outside of the institutionalised discourses on the meaning of security. Also, if disputes took place within these institutionalised discourses, they evolved from the disregard of established rules of interaction rather than from the content of the utterances themselves. This 'interim' chapter will demonstrate the robustness of discourses of European security, even in a situation perceived as constituting an existential crisis. It will lead my thesis to the final period of analysis covering the years 2003 and 2004.

Chapter IV

The Paradox of Crisis and Success

The achievements in the field of European security and defence policy became contested, if not irrelevant, in the year 2003. This, at least, has been argued by a strand of literature. (see Hill 2004: 152; Menon 2004: 640; Stahl et al. 2004: 417) During the year 2003, EU member states publicly battled over the war on Iraq, a second UN resolution, and the correct behaviour of EU member states and candidate countries alike. (see Aznar et al. 2003; Chriac 2003; Dimore 2003) In the literature, these events were reflected as a matter of crisis regarding the EU's foreign policy somehow combined with successful strategies within ESDP. (see Menon 2004: 640; Brenner 2003: 200; Eilstrup Sangiovanni 2003: 194) These successes included the final agreement between NATO and the EU on Berlin Plus in March 2003, (Robertson 2003) the agreement between France, Germany and the UK on planning capabilities of ESDP, (Financial Times 2003), the launch of ESDP operations, such as Concordia in Macedonia and Artemis in the DRC, and the inauguration of the ESS in December 2003. (ESS 2003) Despite these successes, the year 2003 was labelled as damaging for ESDP – and more generally CFSP – and taken as evidence for the irrelevance of both policies. (Stahl et al. 2004: 417)

This chapter starts with the assumption that the coexistence of crisis and successes can be explained by the fact that the question of war over Iraq was by no means connected to the use of ESDP's military capabilities. As evident by the findings of both previous chapters, as well as the following on the meaning of security, ESDP was not meant to tackle proliferation problems by force. But since this was the dominant logic for going to war with Iraq, no immediate or logical connection to

ESDP existed. Although change would have been possible, the discourses on the meaning of security remained robust in facing the crisis. Therefore, this chapter will address the question of why the discursive crisis did not affect the meaning of security but left room for institutional developments as a strong sine of unity among relevant actors following the established understanding of security.

As argued in the theory chapter, crisis is a moment in which available meanings are unable to cope with new phenomena. European disunity on the war in Iraq was a sign of such a crisis. The phenomenon which had to be addressed by available meanings was the way in which developments within Iraq were perceived on the international level and especially by the US administration. As a result, the international community represented by both, the UNSC and the US administration together with its international partners, had to decide on whether or not to disarm Iraq by war. The EU and its member states had to position themselves to this question because a common position of the EU was necessary to apply to the EU's self-perception of being an international actor. It was also necessary because member states were involved in the UNSC decision-making process and therefore had to contribute to the debate.

EU member states were highly divided on the question of war. This dispute could have led to two results: it could have either changed the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP to include military force as a tool of non-proliferation policies or kept the meaning of security robust enough to keep the discourse on the war in Iraq outside of institutionalised boundaries. It was this second option which secured the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP from being changed or harmed by the discursive crisis. The discursive crisis took place outside of discourses on the meaning of

security. Since disputes over Iraq took place outside of this frame, agreements on institutional matters of ESDP were possible even though the crisis shattered relations among European partners. Indeed, shortly after the crisis, the development of ESDP was again initiated by a new impetuosity. (see Menon 2004; Brenner 2003: 205)

The central argument of this chapter is that the crisis unfolded by the disregard of established European rules on interaction and cooperation. I will demonstrate that the crisis did not unfold by disputes over subjects. Two examples may briefly underline this. First, the authors of the letter of eight did not consult European partners before taking a final position. (see Smith 2004b: 107) Therefore, they disregarded a well established European rule applicable in the context of CFSP/ESDP. (see Smith 2004b: 107; Mitzen 2006: 275-6) This was even more so the case because the authors claimed to speak in the name of Europe. (see Aznar et al. 2003) In regard to the content, the letter of eight did not include claims to which other EU member states could not have agreed to. (see Menon 2004: 638; Howorth 2003: 248) Second, in regard to autonomous planning capabilities of ESDP, the conclusion of the so called Chocolate Summit was perceived by some EU member states as unthinkable. The Chocolate Summit brought the crisis to its peak because it not only proposed changes to the EU, but intended to implement parts of these changes on the national level without EU approval. Such behaviour did not fall into line with the established rules which allowed bi- or trilateral proposals on the EU's future development but did not allow one-sided implementations without previous approval by European institutions. However, almost all aspects proposed by the Chocolate Summit were again proposed by the Berlin Mini Summit of France, Germany, and the UK at a later date. (see Dempsey 2003c; Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 2003) This exemplified that division was not a matter of subjects but of inappropriate behaviour.

During the crisis, actors of the EU did not apply to rules which had been established within discourses on European integration and EU identity. Utterances which were constitutive for the crisis took place in a less institutionalised environment. Actors did not even use EU institutions and their procedures to find common ground. (see Allen and Smith 2004: 95-6)

In order to answer the question addressed in this chapter, the methodological approach needs to differ from the other empirical chapters. The approach follows a two fold strategy in order to deconstruct how individual speech acts were used to influence the overall structure of reasoning on the war in Iraq and the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP more generally. First, I will analyse the discursive structure of the debate on the war in Iraq in a European context. Methodologically, this part of the analysis focuses on subjects and objects constituted within discourses. Therefore, I will identify the discursive structures in which speech acts were embedded.

Second, the analysis will focus on individual speech acts and analyse how individual speakers were active in framing processes of sense making. (see Onuf 2001: 81-3) Here, speakers are understood as norm entrepreneurs. (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 897-901) Relevant speakers were those granted a high position in decision-making processes on EU's foreign policy. In particular, this applied to heads of states and governments of EU member states and candidate countries alike. The analysis will include candidate countries, since they were informally involved in the political structures of the EU and participated in various Council and European Council meetings at this time. Overall, this approach deconstructs not only the structure of the discourse on the war on Iraq but also the individual speech acts by which speakers – as norm entrepreneurs – tried to influence processes of reasoning

by arguing for their interpretations to become intersubjectively shared. Since utterances took place outside of established discourses on European integration and the meaning of security, actors could only weakly relate to the social reality – the mutual constitution of agency and structure – created through these discourses. Each speaker individually had to justify his or her position, enabling him or her to powerfully produce order and thereby create social reality. Speakers had to validate their utterances by constituting themselves as relevant speakers. Only when their utterances were perceived as being powerful were they able to influence discourses on the reasoning on the war in Iraq and the EU's or member states' involvement.

Speakers could create these strong discursive positions in different ways. One option could have been to claim to be the rightful speaker of European common interests. I will argue that such claims were not successfully made; speakers did not draw on the established social reality of the meaning of security, which would have granted a rightful speaker a strong and established position. Examples were the reaction of Jacques Chirac and the outcome of the Chocolate Summit. In both cases, utterances were perceived as individual perspectives rather than acts to reach common interests. Furthermore, utterances of the crisis bluntly showed that in regard to the war in Iraq, common positions were non-existent which made the claim to speak up to European common interests unjustifiable. The only possible claim in regard to European common interests would have been to argue for compliance with established European rules which “orientated towards consensus-building, problem-solving and the creation of common understandings, interests or reference points“. (Smith 2004b: 107) But at the peak of the crisis, no speaker took such a position – or at least nobody was able to speak up forcefully in this regard. Speakers had to, or did, establish their power as rightful speaker outside of established discourses. They

thereby tried to produce social order affecting the way of reasoning on the war in Iraq and tried to establish themselves as powerful speakers while disregarding institutionalised rules on the EU level. It is exactly this phenomenon which was responsible for the crisis.

In order to analyse this phenomenon, I will focus on discursive events which were perceived in public discourses and in the literature as the most critical showing division among EU member states as well as candidate countries. In each situation, I will analyse the rules of the discourse enabling or justifying certain utterances and the subject matter accounting for disunity. The analysis will take into account i) primary sources of information such as official documents, press releases or press briefings, ii) newspaper articles on these events, and iii) literature on the Iraq crisis, ESDP and the transatlantic relations. Official documents of the EU and its institutions will be used rarely because utterances usually took place outside of this institutionalised framework. By following this approach, I will be able to argue two things: first, that the dispute over the war in Iraq took place outside of established discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP; and second, that disunity unfolded by the disregard of rules of interaction established at the EU level.

In order to develop this argument, I will deconstruct discursive moments of the crisis. The findings will be compared with basic lines of arguments prior to and following the crisis. This will enable the analysis to demonstrate more clearly that subjects discussed in regard to ESDP could not explain the outbreak of the crisis. Therefore, relevant discursive moments can be divided into three periods of time: the first was that of a peaking crisis marked by the disagreement on a follow-up mission in Macedonia in late 2002. The second period was the crisis peak which included the

letter of eight on 30 January 2003 and the declaration of the Vilnius Group as a follow up initiative, Jacques Chirac's reaction to it following the extraordinary European Council meeting on 17 February 2003, and the so called Chocolate Summit of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in April 2003. In the analysis, I will focus on the letter of eight and not on the declaration of the Vilnius Group, as the latter almost repeated the former. (see Vilnius Group 2003) The third period started with the summer of 2003, when – little by little – discussions slowly returned to normal. The crisis slowly was resolved by the Weimar Triangle meeting between France, Germany, and Poland in May 2003, the so called Berlin Mini Summit between France, Germany, and the UK in September 2003 and finally, the extraordinary North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting at the demand of US NATO ambassador Nicholas Burns in October 2003. (see Dempsey 2003b) In the following, I will start by focusing on these periods chronologically while the main analytical focus rests on moments of crisis. In order to be able to contextualise the discursive moments of the crisis, I will discuss moments prior to and following the crisis. This will be brief, since the other empirical chapters support the argument that proposals made during the crisis on the development of ESDP were not fundamentally different to other moments in discourses.

1. A Peaking Crisis?

In late 2002, EU member states were willing to take over NATO's mission Amber Fox in Macedonia but EU member states were divided over whether or not Berlin Plus was essential for this operation. The mandate of NATO's mission was to end on 15 December 2002 and the EU wanted to take over a follow up mission as its first operation using its rapid reaction force under the ESDP umbrella. (see Black 2002) In order to be able to do so, Berlin Plus had to be agreed upon to make NATO assets

available to ESDP operations. (see Missiroli 2003a: 494-5; Gourlay 2004: 410) An agreement could not be reached because Greece and Turkey vetoed. Greece was not eager to open up bodies of ESDP for participation of NATO members, i.e. Turkey. And Turkey feared that the EU would intend to use NATO assets in Cyprus. (see Schweiss 2003: 216-7) Both countries finally shifted positions in December 2002 to basically agree on Berlin Plus on 16 December 2002, but NATO and EU finally concluded the agreement only on 17 March 2003. (Mace 2004: 482) In any case, it was too late for the EU to take over NATO's mission in Macedonia, which expired on 15 December 2002.

The reason for this moment's relevancy here was that during the period of unsettled agreement, France proposed to take over NATO's mission even without previous agreement on Berlin Plus. (see Boulton and Dempsey 2002) The argument was that although the agreement would have helped to strengthen EU's military presence in Macedonia, the EU did not need to use NATO assets for a limited mission. (see Mace 2004: 481) This followed a well known position of France which long was pushed for more autonomy of ESDP. France was keen to show that the EU was able to act without NATO. This long lasting policy goal did not become reality any earlier than ESDP's 2003 operation Artemis in the DRC, the first without using NATO capabilities. (see Gegout 2005: 437-8) However, in late 2002, the France's move was perceived as possibly leading to a precedent case of autonomy of ESDP. This perception was not only true for the US administration but for the governments of Germany and the UK, as well. (see Schweiss 2003: 216; Black 2002; La Guardia 2002)

In and of itself, the reluctance of Germany and the UK to agree on an autonomous mission in Macedonia without recognising US worries was no hint that crisis was

peaking. France's bid for autonomy did not come as a surprise. The disagreement of France on the one side and Germany and the UK on the other was predictable and far from constituting a crisis. However, this well known position of France was again publicly adopted by the Chocolate Summit in April 2003 of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg. It then pushed the crisis of discourse to its final peak, (see Black 2003; Dempsey 2003a) although it was not impossible to bridge differences to earlier initiatives and those of the UK on ESDP's planning structures. (see Lichfield 2003)

The disagreement in late 2002 on a Macedonian mission supports the argument that the discursive crisis did not unfold among disputes over subjects. In 2002, the dispute on autonomy did not lead to fierce reaction as those following the Chocolate Summit did – knowing that in essence the summit did not come up with any different ideas. Whereas the dispute over the Macedonian mission was dealt with within EU institutions and in accordance with European rules, the Chocolate Summit brought forward the idea of autonomy in an uncompromising manner disregarding established rules of interaction.

2. *The Peak of Crisis*

In the first quarter of the year 2003, the crisis on Iraq reached its most intensive moment. This peak was marked by three events: the publication of the letter of eight and the declaration of the Vilnius Group as one event, the reaction of Jacques Chirac following the extraordinary European Council meeting and the meeting of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg, called the Chocolate Summit. Before analysing these three events it is essential to clarify the background of the dispute, namely the run up to the war on Iraq.

The goal of an Iraq intervention, pushed especially by the US administration, was to end Iraq's breach of UN resolutions and disarm the Iraqi regime. (see Hastings Dunn 2003: 288) In addition to that, the Bush administration intended a regime change which was considered to be the start of liberalising the Arab World as part of its broader Middle East initiative. (see Hastings Dunn 2003: 290) Publicly, the debate on going to war in Iraq was presented with the logic of non-proliferation of WMD and the disarmament of Iraq. This was especially true for the UN context and the UNSC. (see Perlez 2003; Tyler 2002; UNSC 2002) Only the US administration considered regime change as the primary goal from the very beginning, (see Sanger 2002) although it was hesitant to openly discuss this as such. (see State Department 2002; Weisman 2002) This may well be because of diverging perceptions of the problem in Europe.

In Europe, the debate on Iraq was connected to the UNSC, in which Iraq's non-compliance to the weapons inspections were discussed. (see Sciolino 2003) The idea of regime change was not considered and certainly not as a means to further democratise the Middle East. Despite this fact, Britain turned to the idea of regime change in early 2003, following a humanitarian argument. (see Elliott 2003) The regime in Iraq was argued to seriously breach human rights and that this could only be ended by the establishment of a democratic government. Preferably, the intervention to cause regime change should have been legalised by the UNSC. If that were not possible, the UK decided to take part in a coalition to relieve the Iraqi people from the arbitrary regime without a second resolution. (see Beeston and Evans 2003) This argument was brought forward by Britain at a later stage of the debate. Previously, the debate almost exclusively unfolded on non-proliferation and Iraq's non-compliance to the weapons inspections.

Following this logic, Germany and France opposed a military intervention in Iraq. (see Bremner 2002; Knowlton 2002; Riddell 2003) Very early and on various occasions, both governments publicly concluded that a war against Iraq should not be on the agenda. For example, in September 2002, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder secured his re-election by campaigning against the war in Iraq. (see Hoagland 2002) Also, during the UNSC meeting on 5 February 2003, in which Secretary of State Collin Powell made the case for war, the French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin stated that the time for war had not yet come and that weapon inspectors should be given more time and more capabilities. (see UNSC 2003) And, in reaction to Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld arguing for war on Iraq, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer claimed in his widely noted speech during the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy that “I am not convinced” by the arguments brought forward by the US administration. (see Telegraph 2003)

Apart from France and the UK as permanent members of the Security Council, Germany’s stance on the war on Iraq was considered to be important, since it chaired the UNSC. Overall, the debate on going to war against Iraq unfolded on arguments of non-proliferation and Iraq’s non-cooperation with the weapon inspectors. The UK government introduced the argument of regime change and its goal to relief the Iraqi people only later, in February 2003. But this argument did not become dominant in the European context.

Overall, the context is important to demonstrate that the discourse on going to war with Iraq took place outside of established discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The outcome of the previous two empirical chapters as well as the following supports this argument. ESDP was institutionalised because of a changing self-perception of the EU and its

member states. This self-perception included more and more a concept of actorness by which the EU was constructed as an international actor. (see Chapter II and III; Manners 2002; Rosecrance 1998) The meaning of international actorness referred to central meanings of EU identity and EU core principles. These principles focused on the people as the principle objects of policies. ESDP was designed to take over crisis management in the event that achievements of development policy were jeopardised by conflicts. This was the central meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Civilian and military capabilities had to be developed in this regard. However, the problems of non-proliferation of WMDs and the breach of UN resolutions were not covered by that meaning. On the EU level, no rule was constructed allowing for the use of military capabilities as a tool of non-proliferation policies. Since this rule did not exist, the debate on going to war against Iraq did not connect in any meaningful sense to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Discourses on the meaning of security established a different logic for the use of force. Hence, the utterances on whether or not to go to war against Iraq could not build up on the social order established through discourses on the meaning of security.

The fact that the discourse on going to war did take place outside of established discourses on the meaning of security does not mean that the crisis of discourse did not affect these discourses or the behaviour of actors within the institutionalised setting of ESDP. In the following, I will deconstruct how the crisis unfolded during the first half of 2003 and whether or not this affected actors in their processes of reasoning.

2.1 Letter of eight

The letter of eight was signed by eight European governments, EU member states and candidates alike. It was published in the Wall Street Journal on 30 January 2003. (Aznar et al. 2003) The open letter argued for unity among transatlantic partners on the question of how to react to Iraq's non-compliance to the weapon inspections agreement and its breach of UN resolutions. Therefore, the letter's arguments centred around two meanings. The first was unity by which the transatlantic partners should remember their common values and remain united in the fight against international terrorism and Iraq, as being related to this problem by its WMDs. Also, it meant that the international community needed to remember its responsibility to secure world peace and stability by enforcing international rules. Both aspects referred to EU identity. The second meaning was threat to international security. This meaning of threat was constructed in a threefold way. It included i) international terrorism as seriously questioning or intending to destroy common values of the transatlantic partners, ii) Iraq as breaching basic rules of the international community, and iii) disunity of the international community itself endangering the foundation of world peace. By laying out these two meanings and their different aspects, the letter of eight did not include much to which other European heads of states or governments could not have agreed. (see Menon 2004: 638; Howorth 2003: 248) It contained aspects only in regard to the meaning of threat which were not previously discussed in discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

In the following, I will first develop the argument that most of the content of the letter of eight should not have led to disunity. This will be done by deconstructing the narratives which were implemented in the letter of eight. This section will be

followed by a section focusing on the way by which the authors agreed on the letter. They did this without consulting other EU member states, including the strongest opponents of war, France and Germany, as well as the EU presidency. By doing so, the signing countries disregarded established rules of interaction and coordination established in the context of CFSP/ESDP. (see Smith 2004b: 107) To summarise the argument, this section will demonstrate that the content of the letter should not have been able to lead other member states to opposition but did so by the disregard of established European rules of interaction and cooperation. Therefore, the intensity of the crisis of discourse can best be explained by actors' inappropriate behaviour.

2.1.1 Unity

The meaning of unity established within the letter of eight referred to dominant meanings of EU identity which were further enhanced by references to the common past of Europe and the United States. "The real bond between the United States and Europe is the values we share: democracy, individual freedom, human rights and the Rule of Law. These values crossed the Atlantic with those who sailed from Europe to help create the USA." (Aznar et al. 2003) This quote was an almost ideal example of constructing EU identity and its historic dimension in the traditions of democracy and human rights. Identical constructions were made by discourses on EU identity, such as in the Laeken declaration which read:

"Europe as the continent of humane values, the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution and the fall of the Berlin Wall; the continent of liberty, solidarity and above all diversity, meaning respect for others' languages, cultures and traditions. The European Union's one boundary is democracy and human rights." (European Council 2001e: 20)

The EU presented itself as a valuable actor who had the right and the obligation based on its past to turn the world into a better, more equal, peaceful and prosperous

place. (see European Council 2001e: 20) This position referred to the meaning of responsibility as an important aspect of EU identity. This perception of European history was also established in the letter of eight.

The link to the US as having the same values was established by constructing the meaning of a friendly ‘ping pong game’ of values. The first step established Europeans as the sailors of democracy crossing the Atlantic and serving as the foundation of the US. (see above) The next step was constructed by the following quote: “Thanks in large part to American bravery, generosity and far-sightedness, Europe was set free from the two forms of tyranny that devastated our continent in the 20th century: Nazism and Communism.” (Aznar et al. 2003) Here, the US played back the ball of values to the Europeans. Their values were re-established by the ‘bravery’ of the US. This finally led to the “transatlantic bond” which was “a guarantee of our freedom” and “which has stood the test of time”. (Aznar et al. 2003)

The historic dimension of the relationship between Europe and the US was used to argue for the case of unity even in times of difficult decisions, e.g. in the run up to the war on Iraq. “The transatlantic relationship must not become a casualty of the current Iraqi regime’s president attempts to threaten world security.” (Aznar et al. 2003) The historic dimension constituted a somewhat fateful bond of a community of values between Europe and the US. This meaning was enforced by the perception of international terrorism as a serious threat to these values. “The attacks of 11 September showed just how far terrorists – the enemies of our common values – are prepared to go to destroy them.” (Aznar et al. 2003) In times of international terrorism, unity had primary importance to defend not only the values but the very existence of the transatlantic partners, since terrorism was perceived as attacking the

partnership as such: “[t]hose outrages were an attack on all of us”. (Aznar et al. 2003)

This logic perfectly fitted the discourses on EU identity following the events of the 11 September 2001. For example, the conclusion of the extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 21 September 2001 already stated that the “European Council is totally supportive to the American people in the face of the deadly terrorist attacks. These attacks are an assault on our open, democratic, and multilateral society.” (European Council 2001c) One year after the events, the EU jointly stated that “[w]e will continue to stand side by side with the United States [...] and seek to build a just international order that promotes peace and prosperity for all.” (EU 2002) Through this framing, the EU constituted itself as being responsible for keeping international peace and stability. This responsibility was shared with the US.

In the letter of eight, the meaning of unity was finally applied to the international community. The meaning of unity unfolded among common rules to establish and maintain world peace. The “day-to-day battle” to ensure this peace demanded “unwavering determination and firm international cohesion on the part of all countries for whom freedom is precious.” (Aznar et al. 2003) These common rules were established by the United Nations Charter which “charges the Security Council with the task of preserving international peace and security.” (Aznar et al. 2003) The logic behind the construction of unity was that only in unity could common rules be forcefully implemented to ensure world peace. In turn, the logic goes as follows: if world peace could not be established, the entire world order could fall apart, jeopardising the stability of every single state. Hence, if world peace and established rules were challenged by any given state, “[t]he solidarity, cohesion and determination of the international community are our best hope of achieving this [the

disarmament of Iraq; the author] peacefully.” (Aznar et al. 2003) To ensure stability, unity among the international community was essential. This was also argued in regard to the case of Iraq’s non-compliance to UN resolutions and non-proliferation. Since the decision was taken unanimously, “[a]ll of us are bound by Security Council Resolution 1441”. (Aznar et al. 2003) The meaning of unity called to the international community to take their responsibility seriously.

In contrast, this meaning of unity among the international community differed from that which applied exclusively to the transatlantic relationship. The unity among Europe and the US was constructed among positive terms. It was established in a friendly environment by which each partner supported or enlightened the other with values of democracy, human rights, individual freedoms and the rule of law. Unity among the international community was constructed on negative connotations, arguing that only by unity could challenges of instability or conflict be kept at bay. In the letter of eight, unity of the international community was constructed as a threat by which disunity threatened international peace. This aspect will be further discussed in the section on threats below.

Overall, the construction of unity among the transatlantic partners, as well as the unity among the international community, was not newly invented by the letter of eight but referred to already established meanings of unity and responsibility. The construction of unity thereby fell into the line of processes of reasoning on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Therefore, the construction of unity should not have been disputable between EU member states or candidate countries.

Also, the letter of eight was not uncompromisingly forceful on the war in Iraq. It stated that if the international community were united on the issue of implementing

the UN resolutions on Iraq, the problem could be dealt with peacefully. It therefore supported the position of France and Germany, who argued for strengthened weapon inspections and further time to evaluate Iraq's weapons programme. (see UNSC 2003) In sum, the construction of unity and its implications for further action could not serve as the reason for the crisis because it referred to already established meanings of EU identity and did not contrast positions of EU member states who did not sign the letter.

2.1.2 Threat

Three different threats were constructed in the letter of eight. The first meaning was terrorism, the second Iraq's non-compliance and its supposed WMD programme, and third, the meaning of disunity within the international community. In the following, I will analyse each meaning in order to endorse that, first, terrorism was constructed almost equally on the EU level and, second, that the other two meanings were constructed differently compared with discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. In order to support these claims I will deconstruct the meanings of the letter of eight and compare them with those implemented in discourses on the meaning of security.

Within the letter of eight, international terrorism was constructed as the 'other' seriously threatening the EU, its transatlantic partners and world peace in general. This construction was nothing new at the time of the letter of eight. Immediately after the events of 11 September 2001, the EU perceived international terrorism as fundamentally opposing European values. This was visible in the discourse of international terrorism, which added meaning to that of security institutionalised within ESDP. The events of 11 September 2001 were perceived as "terrorist attacks". (Council 2001n: 6) They were "tragic events" (Council 2001l: challenge for

development), “terrible” (Council 2001m: 3) and “horrific attacks”. (European Council 2001d: 10) All four adjectives established the meaning of unimaginable or surreal events. They contain a hint of destiny. Such a meaning was strengthened within the Laeken Declaration by the understanding that the terrorist attacks constituted a “rude awakening”. (European Council 2001e: 20) This framing was related to the construction of EU identity which was shown a little earlier in the text: “it looked briefly as though we would for a long while be living in a stable world order, free from conflict, founded upon human rights”. (European Council 2001e: 20) This glory past was brought to an end by the events of 11 September 2001. The attacks were perceived as “an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural society”. (European Council 2001c) The Laeken Declaration constituted terrorism as a serious threat questioning the very foundation of European values or principles. (see above and European Council 2001e)

This way of perceiving terrorism was similar to how the letter of eight constructed the threat produced by terrorists as “the enemies of our common values”. (Aznar et al. 2003) Similarities went even further, including the perception of terrorists as seeking WMDs. This perception was implemented in the letter of eight, as well as in the ESS. (see ESS 2003; Solana 2003a; Solana 2003b) Another similarity of the construction of terrorism was the claim that terrorism affected everybody. Terrorism was perceived to be a phenomenon with a “global profile [...] from which no country can consider itself free or safe”. (Council 2003a: 25) This was equal to the claim that the threat of terrorism was “one at which all of us should feel concerned” as stated by the letter of eight. (Aznar et al. 2003)

This comparison showed that the meaning of terrorism constructed by the letter of eight referred to the meaning of international terrorism implemented through

discourses on the meaning of security. But to be clear, at no point in time did discourses on the meaning of security implement the logic that ESDP should be used to combat terrorism militarily. In contrast to the US' approach of conducting counter terrorism militarily, the EU opted for another way by which regional cooperation, development policy and economic as well as social cooperation were intended to tackle the very foundation of terrorism. (see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006) In this regard, terrorism was perceived to arise "out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies." (ESS 2003: 3) Here, modernisation as well as cultural, social and political crises, were connected to situations of development or poverty. (see Council 2000e: no8) Crises in this sense related to the meaning of globalisation as a process establishing political, economic and social interdependence in a highly fragmented world. (see European Council 2003b: 1; Council 2003d: XII; Council 2003b: 9) Globalisation put people under pressure who were not able to respond to these processes. This understanding opened up a link to the development-conflict cycle. From this perspective, the most effective way to tackle the cause of terrorism was to solve the problems such as development, poverty, inappropriate implementation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Overall, the perception of terrorism was similar in the discourses on the meaning of security and the letter of eight, but this did not mean that both opened up the possibility to argue for the use of ESDP's military capabilities to fight terrorism, let alone to disarm Iraq as the potential provider of WMDs to terrorist groups.

In contrast to terrorism, the letter of eight went further in constructing Iraq as a threat than simply discourses on the meaning of security. It implemented a clear language of how to interpret the situation. "The Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass

destruction represent a clear threat to world security”. (Aznar et al. 2003) In contrast, the conclusion of the General Affairs and External Relations Council of 27 January 2003 did not clearly refer to world security. Rather, it focused on the final opportunity of Iraq’s government “to solve the crisis peacefully”. (Council 2003c) Combined with the conclusion of the Extraordinary European Council of Brussels on 17 February 2003 saying that “war is not inevitable”, (European Council 2003a) the EU did not implement a forceful stance. The decisiveness of the EU’s position was further reduced by saying that the Resolution 1441 gave an “unambiguous message”. (Council 2003c) The adjective ‘unambiguous’ in relation to the UNSC resolution 1441 meant that military action could not be directly deduced from the resolution in the case of Iraq’s non-compliance. This perfectly represented the position of France and Germany as opponents of the war on Iraq. The interpretation can be further validated by the following quote taken from the conclusion of the Extraordinary European Council of 17 February 2003: “The Union’s objective for Iraq remains fully and effective disarmament in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, in particular resolution 1441. We want to achieve this peacefully. It is clear that this is what the people of Europe want.” (European Council 2003a) This clearly reflected the stance of France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg, if not further EU member states.

In contrast to the official EU documents, the letter of eight implemented a different perspective. Iraq was perceived as a threat to world peace and security. Following this argument, the authors of the letter of eight argued for the use of military means to disarm Iraq. Therefore, they could not refer to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Although proliferation of WMDs was perceived as a threat by the EU as early as 1996-7, ESDP was never designed to

militarily solve the problem of proliferation. The problem of proliferation was always to be solved by multilateral institutions such as the UN and the IAEA. (see Council 2002: 267-8; Council 2003e: 109) Therefore, the idea of going to war in Iraq was incomparable to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. This made the discourse on the war on Iraq a separate discourse.

Finally, the construction of the international community's division as a threat against international peace and security did not directly reflect on discourses about the meaning of security. The letter of eight stated that if UN resolutions were not complied with, "the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result." (Azhar et al. 2003) By this reference, it became clear the 'unity' had a negative connotation. The world did not break into chaos only when unity was ensured. This perception could not be found in discourses on the meaning of security. Here, the UN was perceived to play a fundamental part in maintaining international peace and security as well as in providing the framework to authorise interventions. (see EU and UN 2003: 217) But this was not to say that by the absence of unity, the international order would be seriously damaged. This could not even implicitly be read out of the discourse on the meaning of security, which frequently contained the phrase: "The European Union recognises the primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for maintaining peace and international stability." (see European Council 2000b: Annex VI) Here, responsibility for peace and stability rested with the UNSC, not with the international community. The discourses on the meaning of security implemented a much more institutional perspective, while discussing how to ensure the stability and peace of the international community. This was visible in the ESS. The EU wanted "international

organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security”, and the EU “must therefore be ready to act” only if these rules were broken. (ESS 2003: 9) Here, disunity was not constructed as a threat to the international community. Keeping international peace and stability was a matter of implementing effective multilateralism as a structural approach.

Summing up

Although the EU’s perspective was not much different from the threat perception implemented in the letter of eight, various arguments can be brought forward demonstrating that the speech act was not successful. First, France and Germany did not change their positions following the letter of eight, even though they were the strongest opponents of the war on Iraq. Knowing that both countries were members of the UNSC, it can be considered that they were the primary addressees of the speech act. Second, the EU documents representing the discourses on the meaning of security published after the letter of eight did not include disunity as a threat. Within the discourses on the meaning of security, the UN was still understood as being primarily responsible for maintaining world peace and stability. In contrast, disunity was understood to be manageable by effective multilateralism. (see ESS 2003: 9)

In sum, the letter of eight constituted a meaning of unity referring to already established meanings in the discourses of EU identity and the meaning of security. This was also true in regard to discourses of global challenges constructing terrorism as a serious threat. Whereas European actors could positively ascribe to these meanings, this was not possible in regard to the constructions of Iraq and disunity of the international community as a threat. Thereby, the authors of the letter of eight positioned themselves outside of established discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Although the authors

tried to influence the way of reasoning on the war in Iraq through the letter of eight, this was not or not completely successful, since the speech act was neither reflected within discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP nor did France and Germany change their positions.

2.1.3 Disregard of Common Rules

The way in which the letter of eight was created remains a disputed story. What is clear is that the authors did not consult all EU member states and candidate countries but grouped around heads of states and governments which already had openly stated their support of a war on Iraq. What remains unclear was i) the role of the UK government as to whether or not it was spinning on the call of the Bush administration, and ii) whether or not the editors of the Wall Street Journal pushed certain European governments to agree on such a letter on behalf of the Bush administration. (see Gonzalez 2003)

However, the question of whether or not the Bush administration pushed European states to publish such a letter was less important in regard to the outbreak of crisis than the fact that the authors did not consult other European heads of states and governments. Therefore, authors disregarded established rules of coordination relevant at the EU level. Since the EPC, cooperation in the field of foreign policy has initiated a so called ‘coordination reflex’ which has led EU member states to consult each other before taking final positions. (see Smith 2004b: 107-8; Tonra 2003: 740)

This was obviously not done by the authors of the letter of eight. Therefore, they disregarded the European social order of coordinating foreign policy. This was perceived as a remarkable and inappropriate behaviour by other states. The reaction of Jacques Chirac to the letter of eight and the declaration of the Vilnius Group made

this pretty clear. In his reaction he again disregarded established rules. The way in which this added to the discursive crisis will be analysed in the following section.

2.2 Chirac Strikes Back

The letter of eight, followed by a similar statement of the so called Vilnius Group, (see Vilnius Group 2003) did not only make public the disunity among European states on the war on Iraq. It finally set off the discursive crisis. Before the letter of eight, differences between European states were almost exclusively carried out in the context of the UNSC as the international body which had to decide on the course on Iraq. The letter of eight brought a European dimension to the discussions because the authors explicitly positioned themselves as speaking with their European voices, saying that “we in Europe” support the policy of the US administration on Iraq. (see Aznar et al. 2003) This initiated ample reactions on the European side. The most prominent and highly recognised one was the reaction of French President Jacques Chirac following the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 17 February 2003. In the following I will focus on the circumstances which enabled the extraordinary meeting to take place, as well as the reactions of Jacques Chirac in a press briefing which followed the meeting.

Therefore, the section will focus on the second aspect of the analysis deconstructing individual speech acts carried out by relevant speakers. Jacques Chirac was a relevant speaker, since he was head of state of France and, therefore, integrated into the institutional structures on the EU level. He also represented the ‘counter camp’ of the letter of eight, arguing against the war on Iraq. He obtained a strong speaker position because of two reasons: first, France held a permanent seat in the UNSC, which made his opinion highly relevant in regard to the UNSC’s ability to come to a

conclusion on Iraq. Second, France was a founding member of the EC and EU and remained active in the integration process. This granted Jacques Chirac a highly recognised role as a speaker on behalf of European interests. By obtaining this position, Jacques Chirac tried to influence the way of reasoning on the war on Iraq, as well as on how interaction to reach European common interests should be carried out. He acted as a norm entrepreneur trying to implement his way of reasoning to be intersubjectively shared. This was similar to what the authors of the letter of eight intended. In the following, I will first contextualise the event of the Extraordinary European Council as a moment of unity and Chirac's press conference in which he tried to position himself against the letter of eight at a moment of crisis. This will be followed by the deconstruction of how Chirac intended to argue for his position. Since his reactions almost exclusively addressed the disregard of established rules of interaction by the candidate countries, this section will support my argument that disputes enfolded exactly here: by the disregard of established rules of interaction and cooperation on the EU level.

The Extraordinary European Council meeting was remarkable in itself. Usually, since candidate countries were invited to take part in the European Convention on the Future of Europe, they were invited as guests to every European Council – at least those countries ready for accession in 2004. On 17 February 2003, during the Extraordinary European Council, they were not permitted to remain in the room when EU member states discussed the reaction of the EU to the debate on the war in Iraq. This was based on a decision of the Greek presidency to limit the number of participants to a manageable amount, (see European Council 2003a: 348) which was welcomed by Jacques Chirac, if not pushed by him. (Independent 2003a) The European Council agreed on a conclusion balanced in its wording which did not

clearly position itself on the pro or contra side of the question of war. In public, the meeting was perceived as a success in overcoming disputes between EU member states. (see Dempsey and Parker 2003) Although candidate countries were not included in the discussions, the outcome was accepted by member states and candidate countries alike, potentially bringing the debate over Iraq back to reason and pushing the discussions back to the UNSC level. (see European Council 2003a)

This moment of unity was destroyed again by Jacques Chirac by his reactions to the letter of eight and the statement of the Vilnius Group. In a press briefing on 17 February 2003, Chirac was asked to comment on the statement of the Vilnius Group. Even if Chirac distinguished between candidate countries who signed the letter of eight and those who signed the statement of the Vilnius Group, his response was perceived as addressing all candidate countries likewise. (see Bartram 1996; Guardian 2003; Independent 2003b) During his response, he went on about what he perceived as misbehaviour of the candidate countries. First, he said that “C’est cette lettre qui était apparue comme créant une crise ou une mini-crise au sein de l’Union européenne, en tous les cas comme contraire à l’idée d’une politique étrangère européenne commune, à juste titre.”¹ (Chirac 2003) He complained that the letter of eight did not support the idea of a common foreign policy. However, when it came to the statement of the Vilnius Group, he became more furious.

“Car entrer dans l’Union européenne, cela suppose tout de même un minimum de considération pour les autres, un minimum de concertation. Si, sur le premier sujet difficile, on se met à donner son point de vue indépendamment de toute concertation avec l’ensemble dans lequel, par ailleurs, on veut entrer, alors, ce n’est pas un comportement bien responsable. En tous les cas, ce n’est pas très

¹ “It is this letter which occurred as if to evoke a crisis or mini-crisis within the European Union, however, opposing the idea of a common foreign policy of Europe.” (translation by the author)

bien élevé. Donc, je crois qu'ils ont manqué une bonne occasion de se taire."²
(Chirac 2003)

By saying that candidate countries who signed the statement of the Vilnius Group showed that they were badly brought up and that they missed a good opportunity to keep quiet, (see Blitz and Parker 2003) he tried to establish a relationship between EU member states and candidate countries in which the candidates clearly were reduced to a junior partner. Thereby, Chirac tried to establish a social order in which the member states took on the role of privileged actors ordering candidate countries. This order was clearly stated by Chirac in another response: "Parce que les uns sont candidats et que les autres sont déjà dans la famille. Quand on est dans la famille, on a tout de même plus de droits que lorsque l'on demande à entrer, que l'on frappe à la porte."³ (Chirac 2003) He could not clearer on the role of the candidate countries as junior partners.

Overall, the statements of Jacques Chirac were not only undiplomatic but broke with established rules of interaction and cooperation. Although the candidate countries were not yet members, they never were considered be second in a hierarchy and certainly did not have to take orders from any EU member state. This view was shared, for example, by Chris Patten, Commissioner of External Relations, saying that candidate countries were going to join "a club of equals and everybody has to be listened to". (Independent 2003b) Also, the question of accession never was constructed as a matter of sympathy and did not require that accession countries had

² "To enter the European Union means to recognise each other, it requires a minimum of considerations. Indeed, to state at the first glance of difficulties onse own point of view without considering the ensemble, to which one wants to become apart of, can not be said to be very responsible. In any case, it is not very well brought up. Therefore, I believe they mist a good opportunity to keep quite." (translation by the author)

³ "Ones are candidates and the others are already members of the family. Being in the family means to have more rights than those which apply for membership, more than those who knock on the door." (translation by the author)

to run the same tracks as member states. But this was what Chirac suggested. At least in regard to Romania and Bulgaria, Chirac said that they were in a delicate position in regard to their EU membership because of their signature on the Vilnius Group statement. “Si elles voulaient diminuer leurs chances d’entrer dans l’Europe, elles ne pouvaient pas trouver un meilleur moyen.”⁴ (Chirac 2003)

By these statements, Chirac pushed himself out of the established social order of interaction and cooperation. He did not even try to paraphrase his opinion by diplomatic wording but bluntly stated his grief about the behaviour of the candidate countries. His words were commented upon by almost all heads of states or governments of the candidate countries, who were not amused by Chirac’s behaviour, saying that it was “totally unjustified, unwise and undemocratic”. (Guardian 2003) Or, like the Hungarian Prime Minister Medgyesey, who generously overlooked Chirac’s statement because “M. Chirac had spoken ‘at the end of a difficult evening’, adding: ‘I understand. These things happen from time to time.’” (Independent 2003b) Also, Tony Blair stood by the candidate countries, who he thought should have been “there at our meeting” and that they were “perfectly entitled to express their views”. (Blair 2004) Furthermore, he admired their “leadership” which they showed in their attempt to unite the transatlantic partners. (Independent 2003b)

Overall, the reaction of Jacques Chirac demonstrated that the discursive crisis unfolded on disregarded rules of interaction and cooperation. The responses of Jacques Chirac were widely considered as irresponsible and inappropriate, which showed that the dispute unfolded on the disregard of established rules rather than on

⁴ “If they wanted to reduce their chances of entering Europe they couldn’t have tracked better means.” (translated by the author)

subjects. This argument can be further supported by the analysis of the so called Chocolate Summit of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg.

2.3 From Security Policy to Defence Union

On 29 April 2003, Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg met in Brussels to discuss further steps in the development of ESDP at the invitation of Belgium. They proposed a variety of steps to make ESDP more effective. They suggested enhanced cooperation in the field of security policy, including the possibility for EU member states to introduce a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) within the EU framework. The final document established a very strong language in calling for the EU's defence. "It is our common conviction that Europe must be able to speak with one voice and fully play its role on the international stage. [...] The European Union must indeed have a credible security and defence policy." (Belgium 2003: 76) Even if these points were not consensus among all EU member states – and especially not the idea to establish an ESDU – the meeting did not invent revolutionary ideas which could have been considered as being contrary to existing ones. This included the UK's government and its opinion on most points proposed by the Chocolate Summit. (see Le Touquet 2003; Lichfield 2003) The following chapter will further support this argument by showing that the language on EU actorness and the establishment of civilian and military capabilities were similarly as strong as in the final declaration of the Chocolate Summit. Indeed, in September 2003, the UK together with France and Germany agreed on a paper including similar proposals. (see Dempsey 2003c; Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 2003) However, at the time of the Chocolate Summit in April 2003, its propositions were perceived by other European actors as inappropriate or at least puzzling because the declaration stated: "Diplomatic action is only credible – and thus efficient – if it can also be based on

real civilian and military capabilities”. (Belgium 2003: 76) Thereby, the sentence repeated the argument of those favouring a war on Iraq in order to enforce the UNSC resolutions. But this argument was perceived to argue not only for autonomy of the EU but to negate the transatlantic relationship, although this was not said in the declaration. “We believe time has come to take new steps in the construction of a Europe of Security and Defence [...] which will also give a new vitality to the Atlantic Alliance and open the way to a renewed transatlantic relation”. (Belgium 2003: 77) But even when the Chocolate Summit called for enhanced cooperation in the field of security, this proposal could not explain why the crisis was pushed to its final peak – especially since later in the year France, Germany, and the UK agreed on similar proposals. (see Peterson 2004b: 20; Biscop 2004a: 524-5) Therefore, the question remains puzzling as to why the Chocolate Summit further fuelled the crisis.

Again, this example demonstrated that the Chocolate Summit did not fuel the crisis through its proposals. In contrast, it was perceived as being problematic because actors disregarded established rules of interaction and cooperation. The logic was different to that discussed above. Although meetings between limited numbers of member states were not unusual, the intensity of the crisis made it necessary to meticulously follow established rules. In the view of non-participants, this was not done during the Chocolate Summit. This argument remains at the centre of the following paragraphs, whereby the propositions of the Chocolate Summit will not be discussed at length, since most of them were again made by the so called Berlin Mini Summit. (see Peterson 2004b: 20) This will make very clear that differences between both propositions were minor and bridgeable and that dispute unfolded on the disregard of rules.

The difference in the declaration of the Chocolate Summit to similar initiatives, including the meeting in St Malo in 1998 between France and the UK, was that participants did not only propose how to develop ESDP but stated that suggestions were implemented un- or bilaterally immediately after the meeting. (see Belgium 2003; France and the UK 1998) Normally, those types of meetings were used to influence the agenda setting. In contrast, participants of the Chocolate Summit not only intended to influence the agenda but intended to implement propositions without any European wide discussion or agreement. “With regard to the military field, we have decided, as far as we are concerned, to implement here and now [...] a number of concrete initiatives that are meant to bring our national defence instruments further together.” (see Belgium 2003: 78) Therefore, the participants of the Chocolate Summit openly stated that they were going alone on security and defence without awaiting a debate, let alone a decision, on the EU level.

This was perceived as inappropriate, especially during the crisis over the war on Iraq. For other member states, the anti-war stance of the participants of the Chocolate Summit, together with the initiative of France in late 2002 to take over the mission in Macedonia without Berlin Plus, was proof enough of the one sidedness of these actors. The dividing line between pro and cons of a war on Iraq was perceived to cut off those who were sticking to the transatlantic relationship from those who did not only favour EU’s autonomy but intended to implement it without European wide agreement. (see Evans 2003; Riddell and Hurst 2003) It remains a matter of speculation whether the participants of the Chocolate Summit were struck by surprise by this perception or strategically intended this. However, surprise showed in their reaction. This could at least be read out of their utterances following the meeting. For example, Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of Luxembourg, said

that this summit was “in no way anti-American nor is it an exclusive one”. (Dempsey and Dombey 2003) Also Gerhard Schröder, German chancellor, pointed out that in “NATO, we do not have too much America, we have too little Europe [...] and that is what we want to change.” (Black 2003) By these reactions, participants intended to disperse their anti-NATO image and the image that they initiated an exclusive European core group on defence. But this could not change the perception of the meeting as highly problematic and as widening the difference among European partners. (see Menon 2004: 647)

Summary

In the above section I have demonstrated that the crisis on the war in Iraq unfolded by the disregard of established European rules. At the beginning, the debate on Iraq took place in the context of the UNSC. Also, it did not have any logical connection to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP, since ESDP was never intended to be used for non-proliferation policies or the disarmament of a state that was in breach of UNSC resolutions. The debate on Iraq took on a European turn by the letter of eight and the statement of the Vilnius Group. Again, the letter did not include aspects to which other EU member states could not have agreed. Only the perception of Iraq as a threat to world peace and the threat of disunity of the international community were constructed more strongly by the letter of eight compared to discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. But the tipping point leading to the crisis outbreak was the very fact that the authors of the letter did not even inform, let alone consult, other member states of the EU prior to its publication. It was this disregard of established rules which ignited the crisis on the war in Iraq.

The crisis was then further fuelled by the reaction of Jacques Chirac following the Extraordinary European Council meeting in March 2003 and the meeting of Belgium, France, Germany, and Luxemburg in April 2003. Both events were marked by the disregard of European rules of interaction and cooperation. This was particularly true for the outrageous reactions of Chirac, by which he tried to establish member states and in particular France as the leader ruling over the candidate countries in their bid for membership. He thereby positioned himself outside of any European discourse on integration, enlargement and democracy. Compared to this remarkable and un-diplomatic behaviour, the Chocolate Summit was just a strategic mistake, since the core points of the declaration were later not only affirmed by the Berlin Mini Summit but were introduced into the new treaty agreed upon by the IGC in December 2003. (see Peterson 2004b: 20) The Chocolate Summit was a strategic mistake in the sense that it did transport the image that the anti-war camp intended to go alone on European security. Even if the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit did not include revolutionary ideas, it failed to re-unite member states because it not only proposed ideas for further European wide discussions but included aspects for immediate implementation without further consultations. Therefore, the Chocolate Summit disregarded central rules of interaction and coordination. This brought the crisis over Iraq to its final peak.

3. *Resolving the Crisis*

Shortly after the Chocolate Summit, member states and candidate countries tried to solve disputes and misunderstandings. The first initiative – which was already planned before the outbreak of the crisis – was the meeting of the Weimar Triangle on 9 May 2003, consisting of France, Germany and Poland. Whereas the Weimar Triangle meeting was limited in its success, the Berlin Mini Summit of France,

Germany, and the UK on European defence taking place on 20 September 2003 was the most important endeavour in overcoming the crisis. During the summit, Blair, Chirac, and Schröder agreed on a proposal for the development of military and civilian capabilities of ESDP and enhanced cooperation, including propositions similar to those of the Chocolate Summit. The situation in Europe was finally back to normal when the US NATO ambassador called an extraordinary NAC meeting in order to discuss fears of the US administration on EU's autonomy in security matters.

The purpose of the following section is to briefly show that discourses on security returned to 'normal' and participants resolved their disputes. This will support the argument of this chapter that the crisis on Iraq unfolded on the disregard of established European rules rather than unbridgeable or dividing ideas on European security. However, the next empirical chapter on the period 2003-4 will analyse in detail discourses on the meaning of security and thereby demonstrate that they were highly stable – during and especially following the crisis. Therefore, the three situations of resolve which need to be considered as external to institutionalised discourses do not need to be analysed in detail. To support the argument of this chapter, it is enough to show that subjects discussed fell again into the line of the established meaning of security. Consequently, the section will briefly present the basic line of discussions and agreements of the three events. It will be based on newspaper articles and some official press releases. This is not at least due to the problem of accessing concluding documents of the three events.

3.1 Weimar Triangle

The Weimar Triangle meeting which took place on 9 May 2003 was part of the regular meetings of France, Germany and Poland to initiate good and friendly relations, not only on the state but also on the sub-state level. Although the meeting was planned before the crisis over Iraq broke out, it was the first time that opponents of the war on Iraq officially met and attempted to find common ground to resolve the crisis.

The heads of states and governments of France, Germany and Poland were not able to address and solve disputes over the war on Iraq or the breach of trust. The meeting produced nothing new on the subjects discussed. Subjects such as the proposals of the European Constitution or the policy towards enlargement had already been common. (see France 2003; Weimar Triangle 2003) However, the meeting was significant because members followed established rules of interaction and cooperation and thereby began to resolve the crisis. This was also done by the meeting of the foreign ministers of these three countries, which took place three weeks later on 26 May 2003 in Warsaw. The foreign ministers highlighted the importance to make ESDP more effective, which again was anything but a new idea. They called for a European foreign minister to be responsible for CFSP/ESDP, as well as for EU's external relations. Furthermore, they discussed qualified majority voting, enhanced cooperation, and strengthening ESDP's civilian and military capabilities. (see France 2003)

Therefore, the outcome of both meetings, that of the heads of states and governments as well as that of the foreign ministers, concentrated on safe issues and left out aspects which would have touched the heart of the crisis. (see Simonian 2003) Still, both meetings counted as an attempt to solve the crisis because participants followed

established rules of interaction and cooperation. This was different compared to earlier moments. Also, during the meeting the members of the Weimar Triangle agreed to expand discussions from economic issues to those of broader political weight and potentially including foreign policy. (see Reed and Simonian 2003). Overall, the meeting was remarkable because participants followed established European rules and thereby opened up the opportunity to return to ‘normal’ social interaction of European actors. Participants signalled their will to follow European rules not only inside but also outside of EU institutions at a very early stage. In other words, they returned to the social order constituted through discourses of European integration and EU identity. The meeting can count as the initial step to overcome the crisis which unfolded on the disregard of European rules constituting this social order.

3.2 Berlin Mini Summit

The Berlin Mini Summit was even more important in solving the crisis because first, European rules of interaction and coordination were re-established by the meeting and second, during the meeting strong opponents of the crisis agreed on aspects which were disputable during the crisis.

The summit was one in a series of earlier meetings between France, Germany and the UK, during which participants discussed issues of European integration and very frequently European security. Earlier meetings usually took place in bilateral settings, such as between France and the UK in St Malo in 1998 or the latest in Le Touque in early 2003, but also between France and Germany as in Nantes in 2001 or Schwerin in 2002. The Berlin Mini Summit, however, was an initiative to meet as three. In Berlin, the governments intended to find common ground on European

security by taking into considerations the draft constitution of the European Convention. The meeting applied to established European rules allowing bilateral or trilateral attempts to formulate common positions prior to European Council meetings. This was common practice in the EU, conducted by a variety of EU member states and candidate countries. (see Haine 2003; Missiroli 2003b; Rutten 2002; Rutten 2001) But the meeting did not only help to overcome the crisis by re-establishing European rules. It also helped to define common ground on European security among three big EU member states which, during the crisis, were not able to agree on similar subjects.

During their meeting in Berlin, the three agreed on a variety of issues which had been unbridgeable during the crisis. This included the question of ESDP's autonomy from NATO. The summit's conclusion stated on autonomy that "we are together convinced that the EU must be able to plan and conduct operations without the backing of NATO assets and NATO capability". (see Evans-Pritchard and Connolly 2003) Although autonomy was not a new idea, the pledge for autonomy was perceived as highly disputable during the crisis. Another example of agreement was the call for ESDP headquarters to integrate into SHAPE. (Biscop 2004a: 524-5) Furthermore, the three regarded structured cooperation as a chance for a limited number of member states to cooperate closer in the field of security policy while keeping this cooperation open for all EU member states. (see Dempsey 2003c) In the conclusion it read that "structured co-operation in security and defence policy should be allowed for those countries ready to achieve faster and deeper co-operation". (see Castle 2003a)

Overall, the three agreed to enable ESDP to conduct operations without using NATO assets, including planning and command. (see Black and Wintour 2003) Exactly this

point was agitatedly discussed following the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit. The remarkable aspect of the Berlin Mini Summit was that almost all points of the Chocolate Summit – except the idea of an ESDU – were in one way or the other adopted in Berlin. (see Evans 2003) It became clear, when comparing the conclusions of the Chocolate Summit and the Berlin Mini Summit, that propositions or arguments should not have been able to cause the crisis to break out – at least not in its intensity. (see Biscop 2004a: 524-5; Peterson 2004b: 20) Rather, the Berlin Mini Summit again supported the argument that the crisis did not unfold on disputed subjects but on the disregard of European rules of interaction and cooperation. Actors did not apply to these rules during the crisis but again during the Weimar Triangle meeting and the Berlin Mini Summit. Hence, no other EU member state or candidate country perceived the summits as harassment.

3.3 Extraordinary NATO Meeting

The inauguration of an extraordinary NAC meeting in October 2003 was the final sign that matters on ESDP and European security had returned to ‘normal’. The meeting was called by US NATO ambassador Nicholas Burns to take place on 20 October 2003. The US administration seemed to be concerned that NATO would be kept out of the debate on European security taking place in the run up to the IGC. (see Eaglesham et al. 2003) In newspapers, Burns was quoted as saying that the EU’s plans on ESDP headquarters were “the most serious threat to the future of NATO”. (see Castle 2003b) The US administration thought the IGC not transparent enough on the debate on security issues, including ESDP headquarters and the inclusion of territorial defence as a goal of ESDP. (see Eaglesham et al. 2003) This impression was further supported by the cooperation of the three member states France, Germany, and the UK, who agreed on a common position on European security

during their Berlin Mini Summit. This was puzzling for the US administration, since not much earlier the three had been seriously divided on how to proceed with Iraq. For example, during the war in Iraq a decision by the NAC was blocked by France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg, intended to make available NATO assets for the defence of Turkey in the event of war. (see Peterson 2004b: 16) The ‘reunification’ of France, Germany, and the UK was commented upon by an US diplomat saying that “[w]e don’t know where we stand with Blair over EU defence[. . .] We get one answer from the foreign office, a different one from the ministry of defence another from Downing Street”. (see Dempsey 2003b)

However, by calling for an extraordinary NAC meeting, the US administration reconstituted a transatlantic division on the question of whether EU’s capabilities should be integrated into NATO or organised independently. This was remarkable, since during the Iraq crisis Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld – if not the US administration – was busy highlighting the differences between i) ‘old Europe’ of France and Germany and ii) the candidate countries and thereby establishing a division between European partners. (see Rumsfeld 2003) The call for an extraordinary NAC meeting demonstrated that the line of division on European security did not cross the European continent but the Atlantic. The extraordinary meeting was a clear sign that debates were back to ‘normal’, since US administrations almost exclusively argued for Europe to take over more burden sharing but became anxious if it happened outside of NATO. (see Peterson 2004a: 617; Peterson 2005) This division was resuscitated by the US ambassador’s call for an extraordinary NAC meeting.

Summary

In the literature, it was perceived puzzling why, on the one side, EU member states were engaged in a damaging battle on the question of going to war on Iraq and why, on the other side, EU member states agreed on important steps in regard to the development and implementation of ESDP, including Berlin Plus and the missions of Artemis and Concordia. Within this chapter I have argued that this paradox can be explained because discourses on the meaning of security remained robust against the pressure of the discursive crisis and the dispute over Iraq. This argument is threefold. First, the question of whether or not to go to war against Iraq could not be connected to the use of ESDP assets. As I have argued in the previous empirical chapters – and as I will do in the following – ESDP was never designed to carry out non-proliferation policies by force. Therefore, the discussion on the war on Iraq could not be meaningfully connected to the EU, let alone ESDP context. In the above, I have endorsed that the letter of eight tried to establish Iraq as a threat to which the EU had to respond. This speech act was not successful because at no time in the discourse on European security was Iraq considered as a threat against which the use of military force would have been appropriate. This will again become clear in the following chapter analysing the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP during the period 2003-4.

Second, in the run up to the war on Iraq, European actors also discussed how to develop ESDP to include enhanced cooperation, military and civilian capabilities, and autonomous headquarters at the EU's disposal. All these suggestions were received by fierce reactions from other European actors. The so called Chocolate Summit was a prominent example. Despite these reactions, all proposals were commonly accepted by opponents after the crisis. This argument was strengthened

while comparing the conclusion of the Chocolate Summit and the Berlin Mini Summit. In essence, both conclusions covered the same agreements, only differing on the proposal of an ESDU. However, when one reads the proposal of an ESDU as an example to enhance cooperation in the field of security, the basic idea was again reflected in the conclusion of the Berlin Mini Summit. In sum, suggestions did not vary fundamentally. Therefore, subjects discussed can not explain the outbreak of crisis – at least not its degree of intensity.

Third, for each individual discursive moment I have argued that, on the one hand, subjects discussed or suggested could not count for the eruption of the crisis, since neither were they newly invented during the crisis nor did they cause similar reactions after the crisis. On the other hand, and that is the third point of the argument, I have verified that each individual speech act more or less massively disregarded rules of interaction and cooperation established on the EU level and in the context of CFSP and ESDP. This finding finally supported my argument that inappropriate behaviour – the disregard of established rules – served as an explanation for the outbreak of the crisis.

All in all, the findings of this chapter, together with the other empirical chapters and especially the following one on the period 2003-4, demonstrate the robustness of the discourses on the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Although the discursive crisis of the first half of 2003 had to be considered as a strong interruption in the unity of European actors, it did not affect let alone destroy the discourses on the meaning of security. In this chapter I have demonstrated that the high intensity of the crisis could be explained by the disregard of established rules and that the resolve of the crisis started immediately when actors again complied with these rules. The following chapter will directly pick up at this

argument by analysing the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats, and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity which took place during the period 2003-4. Therefore, I will endorse that overall discourses on the meaning of security were highly consistent compared with earlier periods. And although the processes of reasoning on the new phenomenon of international terrorism led to an unprecedented construction of a structural problem of threats as being dynamic, this logic was already established by the development-conflict cycle during the period 2000-1. Therefore, the next and final chapter will recognise changes in the constructions of EU identity, threats, and rules, but these changes will be identified as a consistent development of already established meanings.

Chapter V

Settling in Actorness

In this chapter, I will analyse discourses on the meaning of security during the period 2003-4. Discourses within this period were dominated by two aspects. First, the self-perception of the EU and its role in the world was dominated by a stable and uncontested construction of EU actorness. This was visible in discourses of EU identity as well as of rules of appropriate behaviour. Discourses were affected by the EU's self-perception as a rational international actor who had been able to overcome history by cooperation and whose obligation was to help the world to this end by supporting cooperation. The second aspect which dominated the discourses of 2003-4 was the construction of dynamic threats in reference to sense making processes of international terrorism and its complex root causes. Overall, both aspects had an impact on the construction of EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. To start with, I will in the following present an overview of these impacts in regard to each discursive field.

In regard to EU identity, the EU constituted itself as an international actor open to engaging in cooperation with, and support of, others when these others recognised the EU's core principles and the international law, and when cooperation followed a structured, formalised and legalised approach analogous to the very early steps of integration. Discourses on EU identity were dominated by three logics: core principles, integration and (international) actorness. The difference in their earlier meanings was the preciseness by which they were applied to external actors, including clearly defined requirements to be fulfilled by these actors. Here, we can see change as development in which discourses were further stabilised and thereby

marginalised others by using arguments of continuity. Also, as I will argue later on, the discursive crisis following the events of 11 September 2001 enabled a reformulation of what was perceived as a threat and helped to strengthen the construction of EU identity by juxtapositioning self and other.

In regard to core principles, EU identity still rested on the same EU core principles as in previous periods, e.g. democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. (see Manners 2002: 242-3) The new aspect of EU core principles was that it made possible the construction of what I call conditional identity. It included some EU core principles as obligatory. External actors had to observe these in order to be included in cooperation and support policies of the EU. When other actors – especially state actors – recognised these core principles, the EU understood cooperation to be worthwhile – depending not necessarily on the implementation of core principles but on the willingness of actors to take up their responsibility to change circumstances for the better. Thereby the EU strengthened its external approach as a matter of continuity by keeping in line with its own standards while conducting external action also in the field of security.

Apart from core principles, the construction of EU identity was dominated by references to the project of integration as a successful example to overcome war and conflict. Integration was constructed to symbolise the only possible approach to overcome differences, disputes, development and conflict. Depending on the context, the meaning of integration was translated into cooperation varying from multilateralism to regional cooperation and the question of effectiveness and coherence. The new aspect visible during the period under review here, again, was the preciseness of the construction and the enhancement of the EU's external action. This perspective is important to explain the meaning of security. It is hugely linked

to the overall external approach and in certain circumstances supports for example development policies by other means.

Both aspects, the central role of core principles and the meaning of integration and cooperation, enabled a straight forward construction of EU actorness which included a huge variety of different interpretations, such as that of an international actor, security actor, economic actor, civilian actor, and pro-active or rational actor. However, the EU's self-perception was dominated by the meaning of international actorness, constituting an actor who was acting on core principles and whose decisions were based on the experience of successfully overcoming war and conflict by cooperation and integration. (see Mitzen 2006: 271) This construction was further supported by processes of reasoning following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism. They not only affected the EU's understanding of threats but enabled a process of 'othering' through which the self was more clearly and stringently defined. As a result, this affected rules of appropriate behaviour which also were defined more precisely where the use of military and civilian capabilities was concerned. This led to a more determined construction of the EU's international actorness in the field of security.

The construction of threats was dominated by processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism, which enabled the meaning of dynamic threats to become generally dominant in discourses of threat constructions. Although the reasoning on international terrorism started immediately after the events of 11 September 2001, in 2003 and 2004 processes of sense making were much more settled. Dominant interpretations were the result which affected the construction of 'self' and 'other', enabling threat constructions which for the first time included a threat to the very existence of the 'self'. It would be too easy to ascribe every single

change in threat constructions to the sense making processes following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism. In fact, threat constructions on terrorism fell onto a fruitful ground by picking up previous tendencies. Probably the most prominent example was that of dynamic threats. In the previous chapter analysing discourses of the period 2000-1, I have shown that the EU understood development and conflict as potentially interrelated, allowing a situation of development to easily transform into conflict. This was not called ‘dynamic threat’ but in its rationality it was nothing else. Likewise, the EU understood the phenomenon of terrorism as being intertwined with other phenomena. Terrorism was understood to have its root causes in extreme fundamentalism, for example, which again was understood to be interconnected with poverty. Poverty described a situation of inappropriate access to food, information, education and the lack of state structures to provide these services. From this perspective alone, terrorism was taken as a phenomenon relating poverty, weak states and fundamentalism to an extreme form of violence. Even when processes of both dynamics were similar, the dynamic logic of the development-conflict cycle did not generally affect processes of threat constructions. This effect was only ascribed to international terrorism but was then constructed as a general characteristic of security problems or threats. Thereby, processes of reasoning on international terrorism picked up on already established discourses on security problems and threats. As a result, dynamic threats included a huge variety of problems such as terrorism, under-development, WMDs and proliferation, violence, fragile states and organised crime.

Furthermore, international terrorism was perceived to question the very foundation of the EU’s identity. The events of 11 September 2001 were perceived to show that terrorism negated norms and principles of a liberal, freedom oriented society which

previously never been a target. Hence, EU core principles were questioned by international terrorism. As a response of juxtapositioning, EU core principles became more explicitly defined and the risk of being negated was used to legitimise responses by EU's external action in the field of security, including the use of ESDP capabilities. ESDP was declared helpful in strengthening or re-establishing state structures which again prevented the dynamism described above from taking effect, knowing the potential of poverty and other root causes to lead to international terrorism. By this process, the EU did not fundamentally change its identity, but it is recalibrated and re-constituted in the face of threat constructions. (see Kitchen 2009: 100)

Finally, rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity were re-constructed in more detail, compared with the period 2000-1. Basically, rules fell into two different categories: i) cooperation, and ii) the use of ESDP/EU capabilities. They corresponded nicely with the strengthened construction of EU identity. The meaning of integration was reflected in rules on cooperation asking for cooperation within multilateral structures, regional and bilateral cooperation, structured approaches based on different forms of formalised agreements, and finally state building for which ESDP was important. The second category of rules dealt with the questions of how to use and implement ESDP capabilities effectively and coherently. Whereas in 2000-1, the institutionalisation of security exclusively corresponded with internal logics of effectiveness and coherence, in 2003-4, institutionalisation was equipped with an external dimension enabled by dominant constructions of EU actorness.

In the following I will analyse these constructions, starting with EU identity, followed by the construction of threats to EU's security and ending with the analysis of rules of appropriate behaviour. This will finally lead to the conclusion of this

chapter. As in the previous chapters, I will conduct a discourse analysis using relevant texts of the institutionalised discourse as argued in the theory chapter.

1. EU Identity

The construction of EU identity during the period 2003-4 was marked by changes in the meaning of i) core principles, ii) cooperation, and iii) actorness. These meanings were strongly interrelated, unlike in previous periods. Apart from this mutual reference, the construction of each meaning showed strong signs of continuity. All elements had been part of EU identity constructions in the period 2000-1; only during the period 1996-7 did the EU not consider itself as an actor on the international stage in the field of security. Thus, the meaning of integration did not include effectiveness and coherence as fundamental aspects. In combination, the three meanings established the EU as an international actor in the field of security deriving its legitimacy to act from its experience of successfully overcoming its war shaken past. Within these boundaries, EU actorness was forcefully constructed.

Furthermore, the construction of EU core principles included principles which were understood as being indispensable. This brought a taste of exclusiveness to the construction of EU identity arguing, for example, that Balkan countries comply with EU core principles. Otherwise they would not be included in the EU's enlargement policy. (see Council 2003c: 16; Council 2003b: 11, 13) Even if the construction of an exclusive identity did not dominate the discourses on EU identity, it was visible in the discourses and enabled by juxtapositioning in the face of the threat construction of international terrorism.

During this period, integration combined the historic dimension of European integration with the meanings of effectiveness and coherence. Again, both aspects

had been part of EU identity constructions in earlier periods. But both aspects had not been strongly interrelated in previous periods. In 2003-4, the combination of both aspects enabled a much stronger construction of EU actorness in the field of security as the third important aspect of change in the sense of development by establishing continuity of identity constructions – especially after overcoming the identity crisis. The re-constituted meaning of integration argued for the right and obligation of the EU to act externally. In effect, integration and actorness were mutually constitutive.

In the following, I will analyse in depth these three meanings. In doing so, I will support the argument of this section that during the period 2003-4, EU identity was more precisely and stably defined, based on the interrelation of the three meanings.

1.1 Core Principles

This section looks at changes in the construction of core principles. They included democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. (see previous chapters; Manners 2002: 242-3) They remained basically the same in the period 2003-4. (see Council 2003h: 9; Council 2004e: 14; Council 2004n: V) However, two aspects were important while focusing on changes: first the list of European core principles had been further expanded and unfolded to include sub-principles of how core principles could be defined in more detail. It can be argued that these more detailed definitions were enabled the identity crisis from which the EU suffered following the treaty revisions of Nice which led to the Laeken process and the inauguration of the Convent on the Future of Europe. The EU realised that it did not apply to its own expectations of being an international actor in the field of security, for example. (see European Council 2001e: Laeken Declaration) And second, within the discourses, EU core principles and sub-principles were put together to define a

very essence to which external actors had to ascribe to in order to be considered (more) ‘self’. This is what I call conditional identity. Conditional in the sense that only when external actors displayed at least their willingness to establish core principles, did the EU understand these actors to be(come) more ‘self’. The actual content of conditional identities varied in time and space but core principles and their sub-principles were always the reference points. (see Petrov 2008)

Before analysing the construction of conditional identities, the next section focuses on the construction of sub-principles. This is important to understand the construction of conditional identities. Sub-principles translated core principles into more detailed requirements of how to implement EU core principles. Their implementation could be evaluated more easily, which again helped to define conditional identities.

1.1.1 Sub-principles

The construction of sub-principles built up on EU core principles. On a less abstract level, sub-principles defined conditions which were supposed to lead to the implementation of core principles. In discourses of EU identity as well as rules of appropriate behaviour, these conditions required effectively established states. (Council 2003g: 11; Council 2004u; Youngs 2004) Therefore, sub-principles referred to human rights and democracy asking for “social cohesion, ethnic and religious tolerance, [and] multiculturalism”, and as “a critical element of democratic reform” sub-principles were required to ensure “civilian control over the military”. (Council 2003b: 12, see also Council 2004p: 14) Detailed sub-principles were also implemented in the conclusion on Angola, asking for:

“a pluralistic democracy based on institutional strengthening of the parliamentary process and a multi-party system as well as capacity building to foster a dynamic,

participatory civil society; [...] to reinforce overall administrative capacity, creating a coherent and functional country-wide administration and market oriented policies, and to strengthen capacities in the legal and judicial system”. (Council 2003m: V)

All these sub-principles, which in the quote were applied to external partners, built up on EU’s core principles. They were meant to establish a “prosperous and stable” (European Council 2003b: 25, also Council 2004t: 23-4) state in which the civilian population could “live in freedom, dignity and prosperity” (European Council 2003e: 32) “with a representative government and a thriving civil society” (European Council 2003b: 25; see Council 2004m: 24) which were “at peace with its neighbours and an active member of the international community”. (European Council 2003e: 32; Council 2004q: 8; European Council 2003e: 14) In all these examples, core principles were the reference point of sub-principles. For example, the meaning of justice referred to the rule of law; (see Council 2004q: 8; Council 2004f: 12) strengthening the civil society and conducting elections referred to democracy; (see Council 2003m: IV; Council 2004g: 16) and tolerance and freedom of speech referred to human rights. (see Council 2003b: 12; Council 2003f: 9)

The list of sub-principles could be expanded in ever more detail. The important aspect, however, was that core principles were equipped with sub-principles. In discourses, these sub-principles almost exclusively were constructed as the EU’s requirements to be implemented by external actors. Implementation was perceived necessary to solve crisis or conflict situations, although no single list of sub-principles could be identified applying systematically to every conflict situation. (see Youngs 2004: 532) The construction of sub-principles, in reference to core principles, mutually constituted logics of appropriate behaviour. These changes were enabled mainly by three processes of change: first, in the aftermath of the identity

crisis of the EU, the EU had to strengthen its effectiveness and coherence of its external action and especially security policy. Second, the construction is a matter of continuity translating central aspects of EU identity into sub-principles leading its external action and security policy. And finally, as a matter of juxtapositioning, the meaning of EU's actorness in the field of security became more dominantly defined facing the threat of international terrorism and dynamic threats more generally. In sum, this enabled the construction of sub-principles which enhanced core principles by detailed rules of how to translate them into action using civilian and military capabilities of ESDP. This can be demonstrated on the sub-principle 'justice'.

Justice

The meaning of justice referred back to the core principles rule of law and democracy. The meaning itself was not differently defined from other European contexts, such as on national levels. (see Locke 1991; Montesquieu 1959) However, the meaning was introduced dominantly into European discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour while highlighting its external dimension. Disregard of this principle by other states was perceived as potentially leading to a security problem. (see Council 2004g: 16) Hence, the use of civilian and sometimes military capabilities to re-establish order and the rule of law was understood to be generally appropriate.

The Council's declaration on the African Great Lake Region endorsed this meaning of justice: the EU intended to "create a just and lasting peace based on democratic principles, fostering truth and reconciliation while achieving justice." (Council 2004t: 23) It emphasised "the importance of combating impunity and of bringing criminals to justice". (Council 2004t: 23) The EU highlighted that people who disregarded the law "cannot go unpunished". (Council 2003f: 17) These claims were

as much self-referential, constructing EU identity, as they constituted the EU's perspective of the world surrounding it. "The EU praises the determination of the authorities [...] to bring the perpetrators to justice." (Council 2003h: 7) Therefore, the EU supported authorities by implementing sub-principles, such as by the 2004 EU rule of law mission in Georgia. (see Council 2004k: 14) By this operation, the EU did not only constitute its actorness but also the sub-principle of justice as an important part of its identity.

In sum, the definition of justice was not innovative or different to other contexts but its applicability to the EU's perception of the world was remarkable. It exemplarily showed that underlying core principles were translated to become more easily evaluable. Based on sub-principles, the EU was enabled to pin down distinct differences between its 'self' and the behaviour of other actors identifying their non-compliance with EU core principles. When the EU condemned "in the strongest terms the atrocities recently committed", (Council 2003c: 10) the EU implemented a rule which authorised the suspension of cooperation. Also, it allowed the implementation of sanctions, (see Council 2004c) or a structured approach in regard to multilateralism. (see Council 2004i: 6; European Council 2004c: 14) And finally, civilian and military capabilities were made available for state building operations which not only were used to implement justice, order and the rule of law but also to train national actors in third countries to make the state system more effective. (see Council 2003a: 8; European Council 2004b: 45) Through these responses, the EU stabilised its actorness.

1.1.2 Conditional identity

What I call 'conditional identity' of the EU built up on the sub-principles defined above. The notion can be translated into 'conditions to become more self',

constituting a border which had to be crossed by external actors in order to be considered a partner worth inclusion in EU's external cooperation. This aspect is centrally important when it comes to the construction of threats or security problems. Conditional identities support the juxtapositioning of self and other leading to the construction of threats or security problems when the other is perceived as different or not willing to become more self. Accordingly, implementing "all the needed reforms" was perceived necessary in order to "rapidly further advance towards European structures and notably the EU". (Council 2003h: 7) Although this example of the Western Balkans especially addressed what potentially could turn into enlargement policy, it showed the construction of conditional identity and the likely effect when the countries do not apply to the conditional identity. The process of advancing towards European structures was conditional, since "needed reforms" had to be implemented. The phrasing of 'needed reforms' exemplified the conditionality of this process. Needed reforms referred to a conditional identity including similar sub-principles as developed above. (see Council 2003o: VI)

The EU core principles and sub-principles which constituted various connotations of conditional identities changed over time and space. Also, in the field of security they are not or far less formalised compared with the EC's external relations in the field of economic or political cooperation where the EU intends to export its *acquis communautaire*. (see Petrov 2008: 35) But similar to that field, the EU applied different conditions to different contexts. They varied from Nigeria to the Western Balkans and again to Rwanda, for example. (see Council 2003o: VI; Council 2003h: 7; Council 2003d: VII) In regard to Rwanda, these conditions encompassed "to ensure that all Rwandans can enjoy constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, and to promote the fully inclusive involvement of Rwandan society [...]"

in the country's political development, which remains a precondition for real economic and social progress in Rwanda.” (Council 2003d: VII) In other words, the conditional identity recognised principles which had to be established by the Rwandan government in order to gain support for its economic and social progress by the EU. A similar logic was implemented vis-à-vis Belarus. (see Smith 2005: 770)

Even when this approach was not totally new to the EU's external relations, (see Allen and Smith 1999: 100; Petrov 2008) the interesting aspect of these constructions was not so much to which principles they referred. The fact that the construction of EU identity included an external dimension openly requiring almost identical standards from external actors is a remarkable process. It is worth noting that in 1996-7, the EU perceived it inappropriate to point the way ahead to external actors. (see Council 1997k: Africa) Compared to that, the construction of conditional identities was almost revolutionary. The EU transferred founding principles of EU identity to be applicable to external actors and thereby argued others to apply to these principles. During the period 2000-1, the EU still focused on the implementation of responsibility, only. Following this logic, the EU considered its engagement after actors had taken up their responsibility. But the EU did not define in detail what the actors in question had to implement. In 2003-4, the implementation of EU core principles was understood to be “for the benefit of the people”. (Council 2003h: 7) This perspective was enabled by the experience of the integration process. From the EU's perspective, required principles already served the people of Europe for the better, and they would do the same for other people in other regions. When these core principles were not established the EU, by following its responsibility for the people, perceived it necessary to implement external action and if necessary and

appropriate security action. As I will argue in the section on rules, the situation had to meet certain criterions before the EU considered to be active.

In order to enhance cooperation with the EU, states had to implement these principles – or at least show responsibility in trying to implement them. This again constituted change in the construction of EU identity. Whereas previously, responsibility was already a dominant meaning in the discourses, its disregard by external actors was not perceived as an act which made EU's action necessary. This was not the case in the period 2003-4. The EU perceived non-compliance with, or disregard of, these principles as security relevant. Moreover, in some situations, the construction of conditional identities was pushed even further carrying an exclusive tone enabling self and other constructions more easily. The Council “encouraged intensified work [...] to finalise, without any delay” the implementation of sub-principles “in order to allow for further progress towards the EU”. (Council 2003c: 16) It reaffirmed “that there is no alternative” to do so. (Council 2003c: 16) This established a very strong language arguing for the implementation of EU core principles without any conciliation to alternatives narrowing down the road of inclusiveness to enable self/other constructions more easily.

Even though the construction of exclusiveness did not dominate the discourses in the period 2003-4, the tone of exclusiveness was frequently used in EU's external cooperation, such as with the Western Balkans, which established the admonition of potentially being excluded from the EU's enlargement policy. This at least underlined the importance of what I call ‘conditional identities’ to the construction of the EU's approach to the world surrounding it. By conditional identities, EU core principles and their sub-principles were translated into universally binding principles. External actors were required to implement them. If not, the EU was able

to perceive this as a threat to its identity and as irresponsible of the actors in question leading to the need to implement external action potentially including security measures.

1.2 Cooperation

The meaning of European integration added fundamentally to the construction of EU identity from the very beginning. In previous chapters I have shown that integration was understood to be a process of cooperation by which European states themselves were able to overcome their war shaken past. This meaning still existed in the period under review here. However, within discourses of European integration and international order, another underlying logic of both integration and cooperation became visible. Interdependence was perceived to be the result of integration and cooperation. The notion of interdependence probably leads almost every reader to immediately think of an economic and social process which was enabled or caused by globalisation. This is not the meaning here. In the discourses, interdependence was constructed as an effect of cooperation having a very positive connotation. It was understood as the guarantor of successful integration and cooperation because interdependence disabled free riding and turned actors' benefits into mutual benefits. In this logic, actors were no longer able to act alone but had to work together to achieve successful integration or cooperation. This way of reasoning affected the EU's security policy because security was not only defined as the absence of conflict or violence but *real* security was only reached through cooperation and integration leading to a prosperous development. This perspective was derived from the EU's

past and strongly linked together security policy and development – the second being security policy by other means.¹

In general, the Council “highlighted the need to [...] strengthening co-operation and interdependence”. (Council 2003i: 7) In this regard, enlargement was perceived to present “a unique opportunity to strengthen co-operation and interdependence”. (Council 2003i: 7) Interdependence was also welcomed in regard to military capabilities. Here, the Council recognised that “a degree of interdependence already exists in Europe as a result of current co-operation on major defence equipment programs”. (Council 2003b: III) Interdependence was also recognised in regard to transatlantic relations. In order to “reassert the fundamental importance of the EU-US relationship”, the Council understood it as key to emphasise “the far reaching transatlantic interdependence linking our economies together”. (Council 2003p: 2)

These quotes make explicit the link understood to exist between cooperation and interdependence. The meaning of interdependence was constructed as the logic and positive outcome of cooperation. This perspective was based on the rational that cooperation enabled peaceful and fruitful actors’ relations and hence a meaning which gained more support over time by dominant discourses on integration and cooperation. European integration was the most prominent example in this regard. Here, structures of cooperation were established which bound together actors who previously were divided in conflict. These structures led to interdependence, which disabled free riding but bound actors together in acting cooperatively in the faith of their mutual benefits. In this sense, interdependence was understood to be the very positive result of cooperation.

¹ This perspective is not only based on the EU’s experience of overcoming its war shaken past. It is also reflected in the definition of poverty and led to the development conflict cycle.

From this perspective, gain for cooperation was simply the rational way to secure Europe “in a better World”. (ESS 2003) The meaning of interdependence thereby supported the perspective that cooperation was a feasible approach to establish peaceful relations among international actors, to solve conflicts on a regional and sub-regional level, and to establish development, wealth and prosperity. Since European integration secured these positive outcomes for Europe, and since cooperation was nothing else than the translation of externally applying integration, the EU necessarily opted for cooperation as the very concept for its external action including security policy. Therefore, cooperation with regional organisations was the prioritised choice of the EU to establish cooperation because they already bring about a certain degree of cooperation. (see Hettne and Söderbaum 2005: 550)

1.3 EU's Actorness

The EU constructed itself as an actor of international range with a distinct understanding of the world and its problems, interests directing its action, and capabilities establishing the EU's actorness in the field of security on the ground. The meaning of actorness in the field of security was already introduced to the discourses on EU identity and European integration in 2000 and 2001. However, in the period under review here, the meaning of actorness was much more routed in the EU's self-perception including a broader understanding of how this actorness could be practiced also in terms of security policy. This could be seen in the broader variety of established types of actors. For example, the EU constituted itself as an international actor, (European Council 2003e: 22) regional actor, (Council 2004j: 18) civilian actor, (Council 2003j: 8), security actor, (Council 2004g: 8-9), and economic actor. (Council 2003g: 8) All types of actorness required different action constituting the EU actorness in question. The most central and dominant meaning was that of

international actorness including security policy dimensions Overall, constructions of actorness had never before so clearly dominated the construction of EU identity.

Two aspects were central to this new development. First, the EU used a very emotional and affective language to constitute its actorness. This included direct references to EU core principles and other constitutional aspects of EU identity. Also, it included the construction of an exclusive character of EU identity. Especially in regard to the discourses of international terrorism, the EU positioned itself as the good and lawful opposition of terrorism. This perception built up on the logic that the process of European integration was a success story, giving the EU the ability and duty to bring similar results to the people outside of the EU. First, I will discuss this aspect under the header ‘EU’s global pride’. Second, this self-perception resulted in a strongly constructed actorness which was equipped with different connotations, depending on the context to which the actorness applied. Although the meaning international actorness was the most dominant, types of actorness depended on the context of EU’s external action. These aspects of actorness will be analysed in the final part of this section while focusing on international actorness and security actorness as the most relevant to the meaning of security.

1.3.1 EU’s Global Pride

Probably the most powerful phrase by which the EU constituted itself as an international actor of good could be found in the ESS: “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” (ESS 2003: 1) The ESS was the first document by which the EU visibly announced its overall approach to international relations and security policy. It was developed in a situation of discord within the EU, when heads of states and governments of EU member states were divided on the question of the war in Iraq. From this perspective,

the ESS may well have been an initiative to publicly overcome these differences while highlighting common ground. But it would be wrong to understand the ESS exclusively in this way. In the previous chapter I have shown the robustness of European discourses and those relevant to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. Following this argument, the ESS was a product of the EU's self-perception and its growing awareness of being an international actor.

In the following, I will show that the EU's actorness was constructed in reference to the integration process as a force of good not only for the European people, but as an ideal example to overcome conflict and crisis, and capable of initiating prosperity anywhere on the planet. From this perspective, EU's actorness on the international stage was not only logical but necessary. I will also show that this perspective was further supported by the reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. The way in which international terrorism was perceived enabled the construction of EU's actorness as its juxtaposition representing the peaceful, freedom orientated and integrating way of life. In this regard, the construction of actorness and the role of the reasoning on international terrorism was a matter of continuity. To show this, I will – where helpful – refer to moments of discourses on the immediate aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. This served as the starting point of understanding this phenomenon.

Within the ESS, the process of European integration was argued to provide the legitimacy and right of the EU to act on the international stage and to gain similar results for world wide. "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the 20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union

has been central to this development.” (ESS 2003: 1) In this quote, the European integration process was set in relation to the well being of European states and its people in today’s world. This was further approved in the document while claiming actor status for the EU, based on EU’s capabilities. These capabilities were understood to be the outcome of the successful process of cooperation and integration. “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player.” (ESS 2003: 2) And finally, these aspects were understood by the EU to become an international actor in the area of security and stability. “The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor.” (ESS 2003: 1)

Apart from the ESS, the language used within the Athens Declaration of the European Council celebrating the signing of the accession treaty of the new members constructed EU’s actorness on similar grounds.

“This Union represents our common determination to put an end to centuries of conflict and to transcend former divisions on our continent. This Union represents our will to embark on a new future based on cooperation, respect for diversity and mutual understanding.” (European Council 2003c: 1)

Although the declaration reproduced the understanding of the successful integration process as the reason for the EU to play an active role externally, it also was busy in constructing EU identity as contrasting a significant ‘other’. This significant ‘other’ was constituted by international terrorism. The declaration read: “We are proud to be part of a Union founded on the principles of freedom, democracy and the rule of law. A Union committed to furthering respect for human dignity, liberty and human rights. A Union devoted to the practice of tolerance, justice and solidarity.”

(European Council 2003c: 1) All these aspects clearly referred to EU core principles, and it was difficult up to this point to see that they were used for boundary drawing. This only became clear later in the text when, in reference to “challenges of tomorrow”, the text read: “We will continue to uphold and defend fundamental human rights, both inside and outside the European Union, including the fight against all types of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or convictions, disability, age or sexual orientation.” (European Council 2003c: 1) Here, international challenges were constructed as jeopardising the cornerstones of EU identity. This way of threat construction was unprecedented. One of the most prominent international challenges of that time was international terrorism. The quote above referred to challenges caused by international terrorism. In order to fully understand the meaning of these challenges, it is necessary to analyse the construction of EU identity vis-à-vis the processes of reasoning on the events of 11 September 2001 and others ascribed to the phenomenon of international terrorism. In order to do so, it is central to briefly describe how the events were perceived by the EU. This section will add to what has been analysed in chapter IV. However, the section on threat constructions later in this chapter will analyse the processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism in further detail.

The phenomenon of international terrorism was constructed as unpredictable, disregarding any established rule of peaceful coexistence. (see Council 2001n: 6; Council 2001m: 3; European Council 2001d: 10; Council 2001l: challenge for development) It was juxtaposed by the well being of Europe and the world prior to the terrorist threat. (see European Council 2001e: 20) Based on this unequivocal reasoning on the phenomenon of terrorism, EU identity was re-constituted regarding the construction of EU actorness and actor-like capabilities. In general, European

core principles and other aspects of EU identity remained the same. But the constitution of EU actorness was never as strongly argued as following the events of 11 September 2001. EU identity was still based on democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, the argument had changed dramatically how EU core principles added to the meaning of international actorness. “Does Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many countries and people?” (European Council 2001e: 20) In that sentence, the EU was constructed as the origin of democracy and human rights referring to the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, and the French Revolution. The EU presented itself as a valuable actor who had the right and the obligation to turn the world into a better, more equal, peaceful and prosperous place. This position referred to actor-like capabilities constructed within the period 2000-1. They included the ability to learn and to use experience for future action, making it more effective, coherent and just. “Constant renewal, while learning from our rich traditions and history, is our very nature”. (European Council 2003c: 2) The perspective of being an actor which had the right and obligation to make the world ‘a better place’ was also reflected in the ESS title. Such a construction of obligation or duty to act internationally did not exist prior to the events of 11 September 2001. Also, the EU never declared itself dedicated to advising other actors on their way forward.

The EU constructed itself as an international actor not merely by choice but by duty. “The role it has to play is that of a power resolutely doing battle against all violence, all terror and all fanaticism, but which also does not turn a blind eye to the world’s heartrending injustices.” (Council 2001i: 20) This perspective did not only occur as an impulsive reaction to the “horrific attacks” in 2001. (European Council 2001d:

10) However, in 2003 and 2004, this perspective shaped EU identity. “We are committed to facing up to our global responsibilities.” (European Council 2003c: 2; see European Council 2004a: 1) In regard to international terrorism, the EU wanted to “continue to fulfil as a first priority its responsibility to prevent and eradicate this threat”. (Council 2003c: 25) From the EU’s perspective, terrorist violence was understood to be “unjustifiable in any place or under any circumstances. No pretext, be it political, ethnic or religious, can be invoked to condone it.” (ibid) This is the reason why the EU claimed that “the fight against all types of discrimination on the basis of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or convictions, disability, age or sexual orientation” (European Council 2003c: 1) was necessary.

At this point, EU identity turned out to at least be equipped with an exclusive moment. By strengthening actorness through juxtapositioning, EU identity was more than ever about boundary drawing. Following the events of 11 September 2001, the EU strengthened its perspective to be a just and valuable international actor whose duty was to “point the way ahead” (see above) for other actors on the international stage. It also limited its cooperation and openness “only to countries which uphold basic values”. (European Council 2001e: 20) EU identity constructions included boundaries between the EU and those who refused EU core principles. Consequently, on the one hand, EU identity was marked by an exclusive moment which more clearly enabled the differentiation between ‘self’ and ‘other’. On the other hand and more generally, the EU strengthened its self-perception of being an international actor arguing the success of its integration process as legalising its external action.

1.3.2 Types of Actorness

Within the discourses of EU identity, different types of EU actorness were constructed. They affected the way in which the EU perceived the world surrounding it. In general, the EU most often perceived itself as an international actor. This type of actorness corresponded with the meaning of cooperation, EU core principles and conditional identity as well as effective multilateralism. For example, effective multilateralism was perceived as the only logical way to organise cooperation among the international community, following the logic of the European approach to integration. Also, another type of actorness was important in regard to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. The EU constructed itself as a security actor conducting crisis-management operations outside of the EU by using military and civilian capabilities. The meaning of security actorness established the link between ESDP and development policy, understanding the use of military and civilian capabilities to (re-)establish state structures in order to prevent crisis situations which could jeopardise improvements of development policies. (see Faust and Messner 2005: 425; Chapter III: 2.1) The way in which ESDP was to support development policies was explicitly constructed for the first time during the period 2003-4. The use of military and civilian capabilities did not only focus on the support of development policy, rather it was constructed as an equal tool of the EU's foreign policy. This change can be categorised as development in the sense that the EU followed a grand design of a well established and recognised international actor. This grand design led the EU to reach for a security policy and autonomous capabilities to support it. Also, as I will show in the section on rules of appropriate behaviour, this construction became possible in reference to the underlying logic of security challenges as being dynamic.

These two aspects of EU actorness, i.e. international and security, did not cover all but most relevant to the thesis in the period 2003-4. Although an even greater variety of types of actorness was implemented in the discourses, the named two especially added to the meaning of security institutionalised with ESDP. They will be analysed in the following sections.

International Actor

The meaning of international actorness was already introduced into the discourses of 2000 and 2001. Its basic meaning remained the same in the period 2003-4. However, the construction of international actorness became more dominant over time by a process of contestedness which led to the dominance of the interpretation of the EU as an international actor. This can be exemplified by the fact that national foreign policies of EU member states were presented as counting for EU's external action. This aspect will be addressed in the following.

A very interesting turn in the construction of EU's actorness was the perception that EU member states' foreign policy added to the EU's external action. Although this perspective did not dominate the construction of EU actorness, the reference to member states' foreign policy was frequently implemented in the discourses of actorness. This way of constructing EU actorness was remarkable especially in relation to member states' involvement in post war Iraq and Afghanistan. (see European Council 2004b: 46; European Council 2004c: 20) The presentation of member states' action as constituting EU's actorness was enabled by the understanding of effective multilateralism as a special form of cooperation. The logic went as follows: EU member states, while supporting the UN, helped to implement a constitutive moment of the EU's international actorness, e.g. effective multilateralism. Since the implementation of effective multilateralism was a general

goal of the EU, member states' support of UNSC resolutions was easily presented as falling in line with the EU's objectives. Afghanistan was a prominent example in this regard. EU member states' action was presented as contributing to EU's international actorness. EU member states' engagement in Afghanistan in contributing to the "importance of the international military presence" was perceived to pave the way for "future EU involvement" in state building. (Council 2004o: 14; see European Council 2004c: 20) Therefore, member states' engagement was constructed as a pretext of EU involvement by which member states implemented the EU's policy approach through their national policies.

This way of constructing EU actorness was new in the period 2003-4. Even if references to EU member states' action could be found in earlier periods, it was never related systematically to the EU's objectives. (see Bono 2004: 452) This way of constructing demonstrated change in the construction of EU actorness as a meaning starting to dominate not only the EU but also the member states level. Also, this argument was very helpful for presenting the ability and capacity of the EU to apply to its own standards of being an international actor in the field of security. In previous times, the EU's external action and security policy was perceived to be different from the individual member states policies. By arguing for the inclusion of individual foreign and security policies, the EU's approach became a stronger outlook.

Security Actor

Growing self-confidence was also visible in the construction of security actorness as the type applying to the context of using military and civilian capabilities. This type was reflected in the institutional developments and capacity building which enabled the EU to act externally using its military and civilian capabilities. The first military

and civilian operations supported the construction of this type of actorness. (see Ulriksen 2004: 469)

In 2003, the EU conducted its first military and civilian operations. The first military operation (Artemis) was deployed in the DRC in order to implement an UN mandate to stabilise the Ituri region in the north-east Congo and to support the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) which facilitated the Lusaka Peace Agreement. (see Ulriksen et al. 2004: 11-2) The conditions of the operation were defined as explicitly limited to prevent the risk of confrontation with unexpected violence. (see Biscop 2004b: 7; Missiroli 2003b: 99) Overall, the military and civilian operations were used to construct the EU as a security actor. For example, the Council underlined “that the year 2003 has witnessed remarkable progress in the field of ESDP, notably by the successful launch and conduct of three crisis management missions” (Council 2003j: 7; see Menon 2004: 642), not only including the military operation Artemis but also the civilian operation in Macedonia (Concordia) and the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPOL).

The starting point for these policies was that state building, conflict resolution, conflict management, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement were the central aims of the EU’s security actorness. (see Council 2003j: 8; Council 2003g: 11; Council 2003c: 8; Council 2004g: 8-9) These aims were reached by i) financial support and therefore through development policy, (see Council 2004i: 13) or by ii) providing support for state building by civilian means, such as the integrated police units (IPU) or by iii) the use of military capabilities to establish security or (re-)construct state structures. (see European Council 2004c: 20) The Council “confirmed that the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks”. (Council 2003c: 8) In other words, the EU’s civilian and military operations finally pushed the

EU to apply to its self-perception as capable of preventing situations of conflict to harm achievements of its development policies. The necessity of this ability was already identified in the period 2000-1 and during the identity crisis following the IGC in Nice. But, it is still being contested by the EU's indifference on how to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management. The ability to conduct an operation like Artemis finally stabilised the meaning of security which was previously contested. The rules applying to this type of actorness will be analysed in the final section of this chapter dealing with the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity, including those applying to the use of civilian and military capabilities.

Summary

During the period 2003-4, the EU's level of self-awareness was very high. This could be read from different aspects of the construction of EU identity analysed above.

First, the construction of EU identity was not only based on core principles. Discourses included more detailed sub-principles which further developed core principles. Sub-principles were more easily implemented because they were defined on a lower abstract level. It was easier to identify if an actor applied to these principles or not. Also, they enabled the construction of – what I have called – conditional identities which had to be recognised by external actors in order to be included in the EU's external cooperation as defined in previous chapters.

Second, EU identity was still based on the understanding of integration and cooperation as a successful way to overcome differences and gain mutual benefits. The analysis has shown that cooperation and integration were related to the meaning

of interdependence which bound actors together, disabling free riding or conflict and turning individual into mutual benefits.

Third, the historical dimension of European integration and the conduct of military and civilian operations enabled the construction of a much stronger meaning of EU actorness, compared with the period of 2000-1. As I will argue in the next section, this strengthened perspective was also affected by the way of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism and the events of 11 September 2001. Overall, in the period 2003-4, the EU's self-perception as an actor included a huge variety of aspects. The construction of being an international and a security actor was most central in regard to the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP.

These three changes can be explained by three different aspects. First of all, the identity crisis which took place in the aftermath of the IGC of Nice and which resulted in the Laeken declaration and the inauguration of the Convent on the Future of Europe created the need to re-constitute the EU's identity and its way of conducting actorness in the field of security. Second, as a matter of continuity the EU's external action and security policy had to be reconsidered in the line of the terms of appropriate behaviour defined by the EU identity. This led for example to the construction of sub-principles making core principles more explicit. The final aspect explaining change in the period of 2003 and 2004 is the processes of reasoning following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism. Basically, this led to a re-constitution of the EU identity by processes of juxtapositioning of self and other. This aspect will be further analysed in the following section on the construction of threats. Overall, changes in the construction of EU identity were based on these three processes of change.

2. *Construction of Threats*

In this section I will analyse the construction of threats to European security. The purpose of this chapter is to identify new aspects of these constructions and comparing the findings with those of earlier periods. In regard to the construction of threats, two aspects were central: international terrorism and dynamic threats. Both aspects were closely interlinked. The reasoning on international terrorism enabled the construction of dynamism as a structural problem of threats. This enabled a shift in the understanding of threats by regarding them as interconnected. The intersubjective meaning of dynamic threats constructed other, already known threats as interlinked and negatively affecting each other. This included violence, development, organised crime, human trafficking, and proliferation, to name a few. In 2000-1, the concept of dynamism was already introduced in the discourses while reasoning on the development-conflict cycle. During that time, two aspects were different: i) the development-conflict cycle was not labelled as a dynamic threat and ii) the understanding of dynamism did not structurally dominate the construction of threats and security problems. This changed in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 and the discursive crisis which occurred as a result. Processes of reasoning corresponded with those of other discourses, for example within NATO, in the transatlantic area and within the US administration. However, the EU way of reasoning led to other results. (see Berenskötter 2005; Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006; Shepherd 2006b) In any case, the reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism was important for the construction of threats in two ways. Terrorism was not only constituted as the first ever serious threat to European security. Also, it enabled the construction of dynamism as a structural problem. In the following section I show that processes of sense making on international

terrorism almost inevitably enabled the introduction of dynamism as the dominating character of threats. This section is followed by the analysis of different dynamic threats ranging from poverty, development and conflict to bad governance, fragile states, unstable international environment, and weapons programmes as the most relevant dynamic threats in regard to the meaning of security enabling the institutionalisation of ESDP.

2.1 Terrorism

The reasoning on the events of 11 September 2001 was responsible for a remarkable interruption in discourses on security and threat constructions. In the following I not only focus on the period of 2003-4 but expand the time frame of the analysis in order to identify dominant meanings in the context of terror, terrorist attacks and terrorism since the events of 11 September 2001 in order to check whether they remained dominant for a longer period of time. Apart from discursive moments of 2003-4, I include those of the immediate aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001 up until December 2001. Therefore, this section builds up on the analysis of meanings of international terrorism conducted earlier in this chapter, as well as in chapter IV.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the language which was used within the European Council, the Council and its supplement bodies became stronger in juxtapositioning ‘self’ and ‘other’, when issues of security were concerned. Up until then, no security threat had been constructed so decisively and so understood to attack the very foundation of the EU’s identity. (see Council 2004b: 29; European Council 2004c: 8) Only the development-conflict cycle had been constructed as a security problem. This cycle was reconsidered in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. International terrorism was understood to threaten EU identity by harming

democratic principles while targeting not only the institutional structure of its society but innocent civilians. Combined with the understanding that the world following the Cold War was more fragmented, international terrorism was understood to be a problem of global proportions, causing other security problems and worsening their already negative impact on a peace loving international community. (see ESS 2003: 17)

Terrorism was perceived as acting outside of any boundaries of rationality or human responsibility. In the section on EU's global pride and earlier in chapter IV, I have provided some quotes referring to this way of reasoning. The picture painted by these quotes established terrorism as acting outside of the bounds of rational behaviour, constituting a threat which was previously not only unknown but unimaginable. This was most clearly stated in the Laeken Declaration and the ESS. Terrorism was juxtaposed to peaceful times prior to the events of 11 September 2001 and thereby showing the seriousness of the discursive crisis. The events themselves were considered as a rude awakening. (see European Council 2001e: 20)

“Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties.” (ESS 2003: 3)

The interesting point in this quote was how forcefully terrorism was constructed as the ‘other’, juxtaposing every aspect of EU identity including EU core principles, cooperation, and integration. Terrorist acts were labelled “horrible and barbaric” which “brutally confirmed the fact that terrorism [...] represents an increasing threat against democracy and against international peace and security, from which non country can consider itself free or safe.” (Council 2003c: 25) This decisive

construction of the ‘other’, in contrast, enabled the glorification of the EU ‘self’. A bright picture of the self was painted by the Laeken Declaration by describing the world prior to the events of 11 September 2001 as one without conflict but effective human rights. (see European Council 2001e: 20) Thereby, the EU’s actorness as a gate keeper of this peaceful world was strengthened. However, the myth of earlier times being peaceful did not fit ways of reasoning on conflicts in Africa and the separation wars in Ex-Yugoslavia, for example. But the myth helped to forcefully construct terrorism as the ‘other’ opposing the very foundation of the EU, its responsibility to protect and its actorness in the field of security.

The seriousness of the threat of terrorism was perceived as being caused by its indifference in selecting targets. From the EU’s perspective, terrorism intended to attack every part of public and private life: it negated democratic principles and human rights, it caused negative economic consequences internationally, (see European Council 2001d: 2) and its main targets were innocent individuals world wide. (see European Council 2001c: 1) Especially the last point was perceived as being outside of any established rule of appropriate behaviour. This understanding was linked to the meaning of responsibility and democracy. Even if individuals had to take up their responsibility by following democratic rules on the domestic level, they were not responsible for defending the basic structures and foundations of their society against external actors. Hence, if terrorists wanted to challenge the basic political structure and normative standards of any society they were expected to attack their representing institutions, e.g. states and state institutions. (see Wilkinson 2005: 14-5) This perspective referred to basic rules of the international system in the Geneva Conventions, for example. In contrast, international terrorism not only disregarded these rules, they were also indifferent to causing “a large number of

casualties among civilians of various nationalities” (Council 2003c: 25) and “faith”. (European Council 2003e: 15) This indifference in the selection of targets seemed to be remarkable, not only because civilians rather than state authorities or institutions were targeted but also because no difference was made between nationalities, ethnics, and religions. (see European Council 2004c: 19)

The fact that the EU highlighted this aspect said a lot about its understanding of terrorism. Terrorism was perceived as ‘irrational’, ‘horrible’ and ‘barbaric’ because terrorists did not even differentiate among national, ethnic or religious boundaries – which would have been rather rational from the EU’s perspective. But the EU’s threat perception was inconsistent because it understood root causes of terrorism to build up on these boundaries of nationalities, ethnicities and so forth. This may well be the case because the EU had no other explanation at hand. Consequently, acts of terrorist groups were explained as “fanatical” (Council 2001l: 7) based on “national, racist and xenophobic” drifts (European Council 2003a: 4) and “anti-Semitism”, (Council 2003o: IV) even though this could not explain why terrorists did not differentiate between targets

Additional root causes were also identified. They ranged from development, poverty and other social problems to weakness in the rule of law, fragile statehood and conflict. (see Council 2004r: 8; Council 2004b: 26; European Council 2004a: 12, 16) The variety of root causes highlighted the complexity of the problem. It was this complexity which led the EU to consider international terrorism as a dynamic threat interlinked and interwoven with other security problems. This aspect will be further analysed in the next section.

2.2 Dynamic Threats

The reasoning on international terrorism as a phenomenon based on complex root causes was influenced by, and did influence, other perceptions of security problems which were understood to be linked or intertwined. This perspective was further supported by the understanding of the world as being “highly fragmented”, thereby enabling to regard former disconnected security problems as interrelated. (Council 2003g: 9) One prominent example in this regard was the combination of terrorism and WMD; international terrorism was understood to search for biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as well as their delivery systems. (see European Council 2003b: 37) The ESS stated very clearly that a terrorist attack using WMD or related material was the “most frightening scenario”. (ESS 2003: 4) Hence, international terrorism was not only understood as a global threat in itself, it also seemed to be connected or interrelated with other security problems, here the proliferation of WMD. (see Council 2004v) The logic behind this reasoning understood security problems – which previously were perceived individually – as being intertwined, resulting in more dangerous threats. This aspect was discussed, for example, in the Council Conclusions of 16 June 2003. “Key threats [...] included international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed States and organised crime. They were significant threats by themselves but their combination constituted a radical challenge to security”. (European Council 2003b: 9; see Council 2004g: 28) This meaning of dynamic threats was enabled by processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism based on the understanding that terrorism arose “out of complex causes”. (ESS 2003: 3; see Berenskötter and Giegerich 2006)

The meaning of dynamism did not only work when international terrorism was concerned. It ‘travelled’ to affect other threats without even being related to

international terrorism. The logic of dynamic threats constituted the link between different security problems which previously were not understood as being connected. It introduced a link between poverty, regional instability, conflict, or WMD and understood some problems as the root causes of others. One example was the development-conflict cycle.

“Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty.” (ESS 2003: 2)

The quote again refers to conflict as negatively affecting development and economic relief. In the period 2000-1, the dynamism of this cycle was not constructed as dominating every aspect of security challenges. This changed during the period under review here, when dynamism generally dominated the construction of threats as a result of processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism. (see Council 2004b; Council 2004m: 18; Council 2004g: 27; European Council 2004c: 18) For example, in 2004, the Council agreed on a Common Position which exclusively focused on “structural root causes” of conflict and how conflict prevention, management and resolution could be dealt with. (Council 2004b: 26). These structural root causes included illicit trafficking, an unstable and unpredictable international environment, economic factors, the behaviour of non-state actors, the availability of small arms and light weapons, the fragility of states, and widespread transmittable diseases. (see Council 2004b; European Council 2004a: 12) Conflict was perceived to affect other security problems. It could lead “to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime.” (ESS

2003: 4) All these root causes added meaning to dynamism, since they were constructed as mutually affecting each other.

The ESS was one source which presented in a very condensed way the understanding of dynamic threats by listing possible scenarios. “Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability – and civil conflict corrode States from within. [...] State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability.” (ESS 2003: 4) “Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD.” (ESS 2003: 4) And finally, organised crime, primarily a domestic problem, was understood to have “an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons account for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism.” (ESS 2003: 4) Through these framings, the meaning of dynamism, by which security problems negatively affected each other, was constructed in its purest sense. In the following I will focus on the most relevant dynamic security problems in more detail.

Fragile States and Regional Instability

Dynamism was applied to fragile states. Domestic instability of any given state was perceived to potentially destabilise its regional and international surrounding, which again could lead to conflict. (see Council 2003o: V) In regard to small arms and light weapons, the Council reported that “[t]he inability of state and civil society to ensure the rule of law is possibly the main underlying cause of insecurity.” (Council 2003q: 8) Here, both sides were understood to potentially destabilise the other: i) state internal instability or domestic conflicts were understood to have a knock-on effect on the surrounding region; (see Council 2004s: II) the Council also noted ii) “that regional instability may play a part in jeopardising the achievement” (Council

2003d: VII) of “reconstruction, poverty reduction and development”. (Council 2003d: VI) In the EU’s perspective, Iraq and the Middle East served as an example of how state internal problems and instabilities mutually affect the regional level and vice versa. “The Iraqi crisis makes it all the more imperative that the other problems of the region be tackled and resolved. The Israeli-Palestine conflict, in particular, remains a cause of great concern.” (European Council 2003i: 34)

Unpredictable and Unstable International Order

This example leads to a more general perspective which became clear in the Council’s Common Position on conflict prevention. From this perspective, an unpredictable and unstable international environment was understood to have the potential of dynamically leading to conflict. Knowing this perspective, it can explain why the EU intended to establish effective multilateralism. Effective multilateralism was perceived to establish “conditions for a stable and more predictable international environment, and comprehensive and balanced aid and developmental assistance programmes to alleviate the pressures that trigger violent conflict”. (Council 2004s: 26) This would ensure stable states which again would ensure a stable international society because the latter “depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation.” (ESS 2003: 10) By making the international environment more stable and predictable, the dynamism affecting fragile states and instable regions would be reduced.

Weapons Programmes

Finally, weapons programmes were understood to cause regional instability as well as instability on the domestic state level. The European Council addressed “the problems of regional instability and insecurity and the situations of conflict which lie

behind many weapons programmes, recognising that instability does not occur in a vacuum.” (European Council 2003b: Annex II) In this quote, vacuum referred to the understanding that weapons programmes were almost exclusively implemented in a situation of tensions between at least two opponent states. However, weapons programmes were also related to state internal dynamics. Financing these programmes was perceived as potentially leading to domestic instability or conflict. Based on this understanding, for example, the Council called “to introduce a certification system for trade in rough diamonds with the aim of breaking the link between diamonds and the arms trade.” (Council 2003n: II) Here, the understanding of dynamism became apparent: trade regimes for diamonds were able to reduce the sources enabling actors to procure weapons and thereby reduced the potential of domestic and regional conflict. And finally, the existence of unofficial or paramilitary fighters was perceived as a dynamic threat. This explicitly introduced a sub-state level as being relevant in regard to dynamic threats. For example, the Council recognised “the close link between the reintegration of fighters [...] and the success of the peace process”. (Council 2003d: VIII) Furthermore, these dependencies were linked to the fight against poverty and thereby closed the dynamic cycle of weapons programmes, instability, conflict, poverty, and development.

Summary

In sum, the EU constructed almost all security problems as having the potential to dynamically affecting other security problems and threats. In previous periods the development-conflict cycle was perceived as a dynamic process, but it was not labelled as such. The meaning of dynamism did not become dominant as a general character of every security problem. The meaning of dynamic threats became

dominant in discourses on European security in the aftermath of the discursive crisis on the events of 11 September 2001 leading to processes of reasoning on international terrorism. Processes of reasoning on international terrorism enabled the construction of dynamism as a general character of threats. This way of perceiving international terrorism was informed by the understanding of the development-conflict cycle which already had introduced something similar to dynamism to two separate problems. Following this already established understanding, the meaning of dynamic threats became transferred and generalised as being the generic character of each individual threat. This would lead to a complex set of security problems which could be only tackled if all areas of EU's external action were engaged. As I will show in the next section, this explicitly included a link between development policy and security policy while especially focusing on state building. Although this link was already established in 2000 and 2001 it was more forcefully constructed and stringently applied in the period under review here.

3. Rules of Appropriate Behaviour

In this section, I will analyse how rules of appropriate behaviour were constructed based on the relational construction of EU identity and perceived threats. These rules served as the foundation of the institutional development of ESDP. The analysis can be organised in two sub sections which focus on a particular set of rules. The first set deals with rules of cooperation. In particular, rules on cooperation were constructed based on the meaning of integration and cooperation as a central part of EU identity. In contrast to the rules on cooperation, the second set of rules deals explicitly with the capacities and institutional development of ESDP. Here, rules addressed how ESDP's capacity, including military and civilian capabilities, should be used, how

capacities related to the first set of rules and how capacities were to be further developed.

3.1 Rules on Cooperation

From the EU's perspective, cooperation was perceived as the most appropriate way to deal with third actors, international institutions and other actors, as well as how to solve security problems. Rules on cooperation could be sub-divided into three categories: i) cooperation with(in) multilateral structures and institutions – meaning effective multilateralism. Although these rules were re-constituted under a new header – that of effective multilateralism –, rules within this category were already introduced into the discourses on appropriate behaviour in 2000-1. Therefore, the section discussing these rules will be presented in a very condensed way. Effective multilateralism is central for the EU's security policy because the EU's security action is required to be mandated or accepted by the UN as the main body of multilateralism. (see Article 11, no. 1 of Nice Treaty on the EU) Rules on ii) structured approaches constitute the second category. Basically, these rules asked for external cooperation to be organised along formally fixed agreements including an agreed plan of how to solve international or regional problems step by step. The last sub-category of rules on cooperation can be labelled as iii) state building. Whereas the sub-category on multilateral cooperation focused on the international and regional level, rules on state building followed the understanding that a stable international system “depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation.” (ESS 2003: 10) The rule on state building asked for the implementation of EU core principles, including good governance, and international law on the domestic level by the use of civilian and military capabilities of ESDP. These rules will be analysed in the following sections.

3.1.1 Effective Multilateralism

The concept effective multilateralism was most prominently introduced into the discourses on EU identity and appropriate behaviour by the ESS. (see ESS 2003: 9-10; Lindstrom and Schmitt 2003: 90; Quille 2004: 427-8) Certainly, multilateralism was not a European or EU idea but the EU actively engaged in making multilateralism the dominant understanding of what constitutes appropriate action at the international level.

The concept translated integration and cooperation, as well as EU core principles in order to apply to the international level. Basically, effective multilateralism built up on the understanding that through cooperation, interdependence could be created and peaceful and supportive coexistence would be implemented. Also, it translated democracy and the rule of law as applying not only to the domestic state level but to the international level in order to establish a stable and predictable international environment. This could be read in the ESS: “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective.” (ESS 2003: 9) By examining the sentence, it becomes clear how EU core principles were translated. The ‘rule-based international order’ clearly referred to the understanding of the rule of law. Institutions were required as arenas of decision-making processes of the international society which referred to democratic rules. And finally, the call for an international society was related to the meaning of society available on the domestic state level. The logic of effective multilateralism followed the same root in saying that stability of the international environment could only be secured by a strong and effective engagement of its constituting units, e.g. states which constitute the international society. (see ESS 2003: 10) In this regard, the meaning of effective multilateralism

was informed by the meaning of integration and cooperation, as well as by EU core principles transferring their meanings to the international level.

The most central rule of effective multilateralism asked for cooperation with the UN as the archetype body of multilateralism. This also applied to the EU's security policy. For example, the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ALTHEA) had to be authorised by an UNSC resolution. (see Council 2004w: no 8) In this regard, the Council reaffirmed "the deeply rooted commitment of the European Union to make effective multilateralism a central element of its external action, with at its heart a strong UN." (Council 2003d: II; see Eriksen 2006: 260) Cooperation with the UN was perceived as important in order to make multilateralism more effective and to make the international system more stable and predictable. (see Council 2004g: 28; Quille 2004: 428; Duke 2004: 474) Stability and predictability of the international system already falls into the area of security policy, although without military means. An instable and unpredictable international environment was identified as a root cause of conflict, underdevelopment and poverty. (see Council 2004y; European Council 2004b: 12)

However, the need to cooperate with the UN and engage in multilateralism applied to all areas of security policy, ranging from combating terrorism to non-proliferation, conflict prevention and human rights abuses. (see European Council 2004a: 14; Council 2004j: 10; European Council 2003e: 23; Council 2004q: 11; Biscop 2004a: 509) It also included the rule to follow and help to implement UNSC resolutions. (see Council 2004a: 50; Shepherd 2006a: 74) Accordingly, all civilian and military operations of the EU were authorised by the UN. Furthermore, the EU was "determined to play a major role within the UN". (European Council 2004c: 17) This engagement did not end with the main UN bodies but included affiliated

organisations, such as the IAEA and ICC as well as ad hoc bodies like the ICTY. (see Council 2004v; Council 2004t: 23; Council 2004x: 14)

3.1.2 Structured Approach

Another rule was implemented in discourses on EU identity and appropriate behaviour asking for structured, formalised initiatives to solve crises and conflicts, as well as to organise peace and state building processes. What I call formalised initiatives were the attempt to agree with third actors, preferably on a multilateral basis, on a plan including individual steps to solve a problem, crisis or conflict. When the EU perceived a certain situation as being a security problem, such as human rights abuses, fragile state structures, or conflict, its attempt at resolution was to agree on a plan to solve the situation with the actors involved. (see Council 2004d: 10) For example, in regard to the question of how ESDP could support the African states, “the Council agreed on the Action Plan for ESDP-support to Peace and Security in Africa”. (Council 2004p: 13) Also, ALTHEA was requested to ensure a coherent approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina addressing not only the initiatives of the COM but also the cooperation with the government and thirds states. (see Council 2004w: Article 7)

The construction of this rule included the reference to the meaning of effectiveness and coherence asking for an objective analysis of conflict situations in order to find the most effective way to solve the problem. This way of constructing the rule was visible in the discourses on appropriate behaviour referring to “fact finding missions” conducted previous to ESDP operations which were implemented to identify underlying causes of security problems. (European Council 2004b: 45) The language of ‘fact finding’ strongly constructed the rule of a structured approach as being informed by the EU’s rationality and objectivity. Thereby, the EU constituted

itself as a rational actor which did not act on self-interest but on objectively given facts to solve problems or crisis situations by using its civilian and military capabilities.

Apart from this rationality, structured approaches had to take into consideration the perspectives of third actors. Agreements had to be found in consultations “with the partners in the region”. (Council 2004j: 17) This perspective referred to the rule asking for political dialogue as the very basic rule of cooperation. This rule of consultation also translated the meaning of responsibility and ownership into a rule, meaning that those actors who were directly affected by a problem had to take action and had to be included in any approach by the EU. Based on this perspective, the EU tried to find international or regional agreements, rather than bilateral. The latter would not necessarily correspond with the meanings of responsibility. In contrast, the adoption of an agreement by all responsible actors was perceived by the EU as a “major event”. (see Council 2004g: 19) In regard to civilian and military operations, this included not only a mandate of the UN and the cooperation with the state of deployment but also the cooperation with third states and other organizations such as NATO in conducting the operation. (see Council 2004w: Article 11) This view logically followed the rationality implemented in discourses on EU identity and rules of appropriate behaviour which understood integration and cooperation as the best possible way to solve problems and implement stability and predictability.

3.1.3 State Building

The final sub-section on rules of cooperation deals with rules for state building. The EU constructed state building efforts as appropriate behaviour in order to establish regional and international peace and security. This rule was constructed more clearly than in previous periods and it clearly included the reference to, and use of, the EU’s

civilian and military capabilities. The rule was also to establish a stable and more predictable international environment. This perspective was rational from the EU's point of view because it perceived a stable state as the precondition for a stable international environment. (see Council 2004s: 26; ESS 2003: 10) The second dimension of the rule on state building expected states to implement what most frequently has been called good governance. This perspective became clear in the Council's conclusion on how governance could help to increase development. (Good) Governance was perceived as "a key component of policies and reforms for poverty reduction and global security as well as for the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law" which were "essential elements in the EU relationship with third countries". (Council 2003j: 28)

This second dimension of state building included the rule to strengthen and support the civil society. Through this support, civil societies were perceived as capable of accepting their responsibilities to stabilise the state in question and ensure that core principles were established. (see Council 2004g: 17; Council 2004o: 13; Manners 2006: 186) This was the reason why elections were perceived as central to establish well functioning states respecting EU core principles and the international law. Elections were understood to be the tipping point of implementing core principles because they evidenced whether or not a given state did implement democratic rules and whether or not the state respected the attempt of its population to take up their democratic responsibility by going to the ballots. (see Council 2004f: 16; Council 2004i: 14; Council 2004m: 15) In this way, elections were perceived as a measure to evaluate the transition process from instability to stability, predictability and finally democracy. (see Council 2004d: 11; Youngs 2004: 536) After all, the EU established

a rule which asked for the implementation of a constitution as the final step of state building. (see Council 2003h: 7; European Council 2003d: 18; Council 2003l: 14)

In regard to the rules discussed above, the EU perceived appropriate the support and assistance of third actors in taking up their responsibility and implementing appropriate structures as defined by these rules. Support and assistance by the EU was implemented along the full spectrum of capabilities available, ranging from financial support, development policies, to civilian and military means. (see Council 2004l: 14; Council 2004s: II; Council 2004q: 9; Council 2004f; 17-8) For example, the EU used its military capabilities to implement order and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the operation ALTHEA. (see Council 2004w) The same holds true for civilian and military operations in the DRC and other countries. (see Council 2004y; Council 2003r; Council 2003s) Therefore, the rules discussed above could be considered as falling in line with earlier meanings. The following section especially focuses on the rules of civilian and military capabilities, as well as rules requiring further development and institutional reform. These rules, at least in their detailed outlook, were unprecedented.

3.2 EU/ESDP Capabilities

The rules discussed in the section above defined appropriate behaviour in regard to external action broadly understood. In contrast, this section focuses explicitly on rules applying to ESDP defining appropriate behaviour in regard to the use of civilian and military capabilities. The construction of rules in this regard was already apparent in the years 2000 and 2001. I have shown that in the period 2000-1, rules of security policy allowed the use of ESDP's capabilities as a last resort in the case of development policy and other forms of support, such as financial aid, failed to ensure

conflict prevention and crisis management. At that time, these rules existed in an empty space because the meanings of conflict prevention and crisis management were contested, which was evident by the lack of capabilities at the EU's disposal. Conflict prevention and crisis management were almost exclusively regarded as a matter of long-term policies and therefore covered by development policy. This perspective changed in 2003-4. (see Stewart 2008: 233-4) By then, a rule existed which allowed for civilian and military capabilities to be used for conflict prevention and conflict resolution, as well as crisis management- not only as a last resort but as an equal tool of foreign policy alongside development policies and financial aid, for example. "The envisaged ESDP operation will add in a significant way to the Union's political engagement, its assistance programs and its ongoing police missions". (Council 2004f: 17; see Ulriksen et al. 2004: 522) The rule allowing use of ESDP's civilian and military capabilities as an equal tool of external policy was an innovation which did not exist in the period 2000-1.

In the following I will focus on rules dealing with the use of ESDP's capabilities, starting with a basic rule defining the conditions under which the use of ESDP's capabilities was perceived appropriate. This logic built up on three meanings: responsibility, conditional identity and cooperation. This rule can help to understand the EU's regional focus on Africa and especially the Great Lakes Region as well as the Western Balkans in its security policies. Another rule directly addressed how the civilian and military capabilities should be implemented. Both rules will be discussed in the following.

3.2.1 Preconditions to Use ESDP's Capabilities

The EU established a rule defining appropriate preconditions for the use of ESDP's capabilities. In addition to defining the tipping point of when to deploy ESDP

operations, this rule helped to understand the limited regional spread of ESDP's operations. ESDP military and civilian operations were implemented in only two regions of the world: Africa, and especially the Great Lakes Region, and the Western Balkans. (see Larsen 2002) The EU later deployed an integrated rule of law mission to support the Iraqi police and judiciary. (see Council 2005) The police mission in Afghanistan was deployed even later. (see Council 2007b) This limited regional spread disregarded the fact that similar conflicts and crises took place in other regions at the same time. (see Dobbins 2005) But the EU did not engage in these situations. Three meanings help to understand this: responsibility, conditional identity, and cooperation. The use of ESDP's capabilities was perceived appropriate only when all three meanings were thought to be applicable to a situation. In order to clarify this argument, I first develop the logic of the rule based on these three meanings. This will be done mostly by referring to their internal logics developed above in the section on EU identity. This will be followed by the discussion of two examples in which the rule was applied: operations in the Western Balkans and the Great Lakes Region.

The rule on preconditions built up on the logic of three meanings. First, EU's identity included the meaning of responsibility which defined an important character of actors. Responsible actors actively engaged in changing circumstances for the better. If the EU perceived actors as not actively engaging in solving 'their' crises or conflicts, the use of EU's military and civilian capabilities was perceived inappropriate, since they were only implemented as a means to support responsible actors. Second, the EU perceived the implementation of its core principles and the international law – or at least the attempt to implement them – as a necessary precondition for cooperation. The construction of what I have called conditional

identity was the result. If actors did not apply to the conditional identity, direct involvement of the EU by using its civilian and military capabilities, for example, was again considered inappropriate. And finally, the meaning of integration and cooperation dominated the EU's self-perception and thereby affected its approach to the external, including policies towards crises and conflict situations. In regard to conflict and crisis, cooperation could help to overcome these situations, since cooperation was perceived to lead to interdependence disabling free riding, violence and conflict. Based on the EU's understanding of cooperation, regional organisations were perceived as responsible to solve crisis and conflict and bring similar results to the region as done by the EU. (see Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2005: 258) From the EU's perspective, regional organisations had to push for cooperation among regional actors who were drowned in conflict. Hence, if regional organisations were taking up their responsibility to solve regional conflicts or crises, support by the EU was perceived appropriate, including the use of its military and civilian capabilities. This last aspect did not only include regional organisations but also the UN. (see European Council 2004c: 13) Put together, these three meanings constituted a precondition which had to be implemented prior to the deployment of ESDP's capabilities.

The regional focus of the EU's action could be argued in reference to these three meanings. This can be demonstrated by two examples, e.g. the Western Balkans and the Great Lakes Region. First, in regard to the Western Balkans, the EU defined conditions which had to be implemented by regional states of the Western Balkans so that they became more 'self'. (see Youngs 2004: 528) These states had to implement EU core principles and the international law, including the recognition of, and cooperation with, the ICTY. (see Council 2003k: 8) Since the countries of the

Western Balkans had shown their willingness to apply to this conditional identity, the EU perceived their behaviour as responsible. (see Council 2003c: 16; European Council 2003e: 13) This perception enabled a shift from security policy to enlargement in the EU's policy towards the Western Balkans. This was based on two logics: first, states applied to the EU's conditions which made them more self. As a result, they were eligible for cooperation, including the possibility of membership. Second, the EU perceived itself as the responsible regional organisation which had to be active in solving the conflict or crisis in the Western Balkans. Following both logics, the use of military and civilian capabilities was perceived appropriate. It resulted in the operations CONCORDIA and PROXIMA, for example.

Second, these preconditions were also met in the Great Lakes Region. The EU defined conditions on the basis of EU core principles and international law to which regional actors had to apply. Actors tried to do so, although they were not always successful. (see Council 2004d: 11) As developed above, the attempt to implement EU core principles was perceived as an act of responsibility, even when the implementation of these principles was weak. However, probably more important than the attempt of individual states, the AU as a regional organisation actively engaged in conflict resolution and thereby tried to implement core principles. "The promotion of peace, security and stability on the continent is one of the objectives of the African Union and the peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States is one of the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU." (Council 2004b: 25) Therefore, the AU was taking up its responsibility in the field of regional security and conflict resolution, which made the AU a suitable partner for cooperation. As a result, the use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived appropriate because regional states and the AU were perceived to act responsible in

applying to the conditional identity, including the attempt of the AU to establish long term regional cooperation. If the AU, together with other regional actors, had not taken up their responsibility, the EU would not have engaged in the region. The case of Sudan could serve as an example. Action within the framework of ESDP was understood inappropriate, since the Sudanese government missed out on every chance to act responsibly. (see Council 2004h: 7) the EU started to reconsider its engagement only after the AU, together with the UN, took up responsibility in a ‘Hybrid-operation’. (see Council 2007c; Council 2007a: 8)

Overall, the three meanings discussed above defined preconditions for whether or not the use of civilian and military capabilities was appropriate in the first place. Only when all three meanings applied, was the use of ESDP’s capabilities in conflict resolution, crisis management or post-conflict management understood as appropriate.

3.2.2 The Use of Military and Civilian Capabilities

The rule discussed above addressing the appropriateness of using military and civilian capabilities pointed to a remarkable change in the construction of appropriate behaviour for the EU’s security policy. In 2000-1, the EU constructed a rule arguing for the use of ESDP’s capabilities in order to prevent crises or conflicts from jeopardising positive effects of development policy and financial aid. (see Chapter III: 3) This rule neither dominated the discourses on security action nor did it explicitly define conditions on usage of ESDP’s capabilities but implemented the logic of last resort – or as Hill put it in 2001, the approach of using civilian and military capabilities was “still in the process of gestation”. (Hill 2001: 316) In contrast, in the period 2003-4, very precise rules existed on when and how the use of military and civilian capabilities was appropriate. The construction of these rules will

be analysed in this section. It will start by showing how the construction of dynamic threats affected the reasoning on the use of ESDP's capabilities in general, followed by the analysis of the rules at work.

The EU's understanding of conflict and crisis remained the same during the periods of 2000-1 and 2003-4. Conflict and crisis could be avoided by a long term strategy of development policy addressing all fields of social and political life, the eradication of poverty and finally, economic growth. (see Chapter III: 3) Compared with this continuity, the perception changed of how the EU could and should react in a crisis or conflict situation. In 2000-1, ESDP's capabilities were understood to prevent crisis and conflict from jeopardising efforts of EU's development policies. The use of ESDP's capabilities followed the logic of last resort – knowing that the build up and use of ESDP's capabilities was contested. Development policy and financial aid was understood to be the most promising long term strategy for conflict prevention because the EU perceived poverty and development as the most central root causes of conflict. (see Chapter III: 2.2) As a result, conflict prevention was a matter of development policy focusing on the goal of eradicating poverty. This perspective also applied to crisis management. This perspective left little room for the use of ESDP's capabilities which also – or as a result – had not been implemented.

This perspective was different in 2003-4. Here, the construction of threats was dominated by the meaning of dynamism as an underlying logic of all security problems and threats; this included the meaning of conflict and crisis. Although the basic understanding of conflict and crisis did not change, the potential of dynamic processes to worsen security problems made changes in the EU's approach of dealing with these problems necessary. Accordingly, the EU's understanding of an appropriate response to conflict and crisis situations changed from a rather

development policy orientated approach in 2000-1 to the use of civilian and military capabilities of ESDP in 2003-4. (see Stewart 2008: 235)

Following this logic, new rules on how and when to use military and civilian capabilities were established on the EU level. Previously, discourses on ESDP's capabilities most frequently used the Petersberg Tasks as their reference point to define the appropriate use of civilian and military capabilities. This reference point still existed in 2003-4 but it was neither dominant nor the only one. Rules defining the appropriateness of ESDP's capabilities addressed a broader spectrum of possible tasks. (see Council 2004k: 13) The Petersberg Tasks followed the logic of using civilian and military capabilities as a last resort. (see TEU Nice, § 17 P. 2) According to this logic, appropriate ESDP operations would have focused only on the actual conflict situation and hence on peace-making – or bringing violence and conflict to a standstill. Even when crisis management remained at the centre of ESDP's tasks, the use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived appropriate not only in the actual situation of violence and conflict but also in a slightly longer timeframe prior to and following the actual crisis situation. This included situations potentially leading to, as well as following, a crisis when security was re-established. The longer timeframe of engagement did not mean that operations themselves had a long term perspective. ESDP operations required rules in order to re-establish statehood by supplementing or re-establishing state structures.

Overall, operations no longer exclusively followed the logic of last resort, which would have focused purely on crisis management, peace-making and peace-keeping. (see Council 2004q: 9; Council 2004g: 8; Stewart 2008) The EU's military and civilian capabilities were perceived appropriate tools of crisis management and state building to re-establish security. (see Council 2004w: 10) They were supposed to

implement effective state structures, such as an accountable military, an effective police, and a functioning judicial system, as well as other parts of public administration. Operations included the “implementation of support measures to capacity building; [...] planning support; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants; security sector reform and EU internal and external coordination”. (Council 2004p: 12) The aim of these operations was to establish security. Here, the meaning of security was positively defined as public order established by responsible state actors respecting EU core principles and the international law. For example, the EU was exploring options to engage “in the civilian crisis management areas of police, rule of law and civilian administration as well as elections”. (see Council 2004i: 12) The goal was to provide “security to the [...] government and institutions” to the country of deployment. (Council 2004g: 9) Therefore, aspects of development policy became institutionalised within ESDP in favour of responsibility to be carried out by the Council and its supplement bodies, rather than by the COM. (see Gourlay 2004: 416-7)

ESDP’s capabilities were used to implement and stabilise state structures and to enable states to comply with EU core principles and the international law. (see Council 2004h: 8-9; Council 2004b: 21-2) In regard to the civilian capabilities, goals of operations included structural support and knowledge transfer to implement public administration, a working police and an effective judiciary system. (see European Council 2003b: 17; Council 2004o: 21; Gourlay 2004: 414-5) For example, the Union Police Mission PROXIMA in FYROM was to support “the development of an efficient and professional police service based on European standards of policing”. (Council 2004r: 17) In contrast, military capabilities were used to stabilise situations of insecurity, initiate security sector reform (SSR) or implement operations gaining

for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). (see Council 2004k: 13) Furthermore, the EU used its knowledge in military as well as civilian crisis management to help the AU to develop effective conflict prevention and management capabilities and structures. (see Council 2004e: 7; Council 2004n: IV)

Overall, the use of civilian and military capabilities was perceived appropriate in regard to almost all levels of crisis and conflict. The implementation of both capabilities did not vary much in regard to the level of escalation of a conflict or crisis situation. Again, preconditions had to be met prior to the deployment. Whereas the preconditions defined the earliest starting point of operations, their implementation focused on rather short or medium term goals, (see Cornish and Edwards 2005: 808) although operations were perceived as beginning to “sustain [...] long term objectives of a stable, viable, [and] peaceful” state. (Council 2004g: 8) But these long term objectives fell under the responsibility of other policy fields, such as development policy, economic aid, and external cooperation.

Summary

Overall, the period under review in this chapter was affected by two important aspects. On the one hand, it demonstrated the stability of earlier processes of sense making because most of the meanings discussed were constructed in the spirit of their ‘earlier versions’. On the other hand, processes of reasoning on international terrorism boosted the EU’s perception of threats. This change can be explained based on three aspects; first the EU faced an identity crisis following the IGC of Nice which enforced a process of re-constituting its identity and ensuring the compliance of its security policy to established meanings of EU identity and inherent rules of appropriate behaviour. Second, the EU had to construct meanings to more concretely

pin down how to apply to its identity in the light of continuity with earlier shared understandings and by keeping in line with the earlier identified grand design of an international actor capable in the field of security. Third, the discursive crisis following the events of 11 September 2001 led to processes of sense making which had to contextualise the new experience of international terrorism to earlier defined threat constructions.

This again resulted in two processes. First, EU identity built up more strongly than ever on boundary drawing and the juxtapositioning of 'self' and 'other'. Second, dynamism was defined as a structural problem of security threats. Although a meaning of dynamism was already implemented by the meaning of the development-conflict cycle, it was dominantly implemented in discourses on global challenges through processes of sense making on international terrorism. This strongly affected the definition of rules on how to implement ESDP.

The rules on the use of ESDP's capabilities were first drawn up in 2000-1. At that time, discourses did not include dominant meanings which could forcefully establish robust rules on how to implement and deploy military and civilian capabilities. Discourses on conflict and crisis were dominated by the understanding of the development-conflict cycle which made long-term engagement of development policy and financial aid necessary. These perspectives still existed in 2003-4 but at this time, discourses on security were dominated by the meaning of dynamisms, which was perceived as a structural character of all security problems. From this perspective, the EU had to develop tools for crisis management which could produce results on shorter notice and measurable success. This was because crisis and conflict not only negatively effected development policy but could also potentially

lead to other security problems, such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, and organised crime.

Differences in the construction of EU identity served as another explanation as to why rules on the use of civilian and military capabilities had been more firmly reconstructed. In the period 2003-4, the construction of EU's actorness was forcefully implemented, dominating the EU's approach to its external. This dominance resulted out of processes of sense making in the light of the identity crisis and the discursive crisis. Also, in order to apply to its self-perception as an international actor capable of acting in the field of security as the grand design, ESDP operations were welcome to support this image. (see Cornish and Edwards 2005: 808; Andersson 2006: 9) Furthermore, as I have argued above, EU core principles were equipped with an external dimension. Core principles were perceived as not only applying to the internal sphere of the EU but more generally to almost every external actor. This changing perspective began to be visible in 2000-1, only to be dominant in the period under review here. It led to the construction of conditional identities defining the very core of EU principles which were perceived to be indispensable and which had to be implemented by actors of a certain region.

In general, these changes in the EU's self-perspective and its understanding of the world surrounding it enabled a shift in the EU's external behaviour. In the field of security policy, it enabled the construction of rules defining appropriate ways of using civilian and military capabilities in crisis and conflict situations. Thereby, the EU equipped itself with a short term approach to establish security and engage in state building which was supposed to add to its already established, long term approach of conflict prevention using tools of development policies and financial aid. (see Stewart 2008)

Conclusion

In this thesis I analysed the social construction of security in order to answer the research question of how the meaning of security, its rational, have been established and did change over time to enable the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level at the turn of the 21st century I argued that the meaning of security was linked to processes of reasoning on security at the EU level. Security needs to be understood as a relational concept by which identities are related to the perception of threats and security problems derived from this intersubjective perspective. The relation of identity and threats leads to the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. To analyse these processes, the thesis focused on social interaction of relevant EU actors within the EU bodies responsible for formulating, reorganising and deciding in the domain of the EU's security policy. The EU level is important because it provides an institutionalised arena in which a group identity is formed, the role of the EU on the international level defined, informal and formal institutions established and policies discussed and agreed upon. This perspective is supported by the literature on European integration which identified socialisation processes at the EU level which shifted the loyalty of actors to that level. From a discursive perspective, socialisation processes can be considered as processes of social interaction through the use of language. They can best be studied utilising discourse analysis. This argument was derived from Onuf's work, which most plausibly conceptualises the role of language in the construction of social reality. The complex of security needs to be understood as being part of this social reality, as a meaningful structure relating identity constructions to perceptions

of threats from this intersubjective position leading to the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. The thesis puts forward the theoretical argument that these rules are formally and informally institutionalised within ESDP. Following this argument, I analysed discourses within three fields: i) European integration, ii) global challenges, and iii) international order. The analysis was separated into three periods which were central for the institutional development of ESDP, as well as for the implementation of its policy tools.

The thesis established a concept of change with two main categories including further specifications. The first main category is change as development. Here, change does not take place at one particular moment of time but rather as a development over a period of time. First of all, development takes place based on the discursive nature of contestedness. Meanings battle for dominance through discursive practices by which marginalised discourses may gain more support in a certain period of time. Second, the relational concepts of security establishes a moment of reflexivity by which threat constructions can lead to a re-constitution and hence change of the identity in question. Third, agents reach for support of their policies through arguments of continuity. This affects the way in which actors can talk about security at the EU level, for example. It had to stay in line with already established policies such as development or with the basic characters of EU identity more generally. Fourth, actors are influenced by grand designs while reasoning on security policies. For example, the grand design for the EU was to reach the status of a recognised and valuable international actor. Such an actor is expected to be capable and able to act autonomously at the international level in the field of security. In order to reach this goal, a security policy at the EU level was more or less inevitable. The second main category is change in the moment of crisis. I have identified two

different types of crises. The first type is discursive crisis in which existing interpretations are not able to cope with new phenomena. This leads to processes of reasoning likely to change established meanings. The second type is identity crisis. An identity crisis occurs when members of a group realise that their group and its institutions undergo a system crisis which is when the institutions of the group in question suffer from internal contradictions and steering difficulties. An identity crisis leads to a recalibration of the identity and its inherent rules. This was the case during and following the EU identity crisis unfolding after the IGC in Nice which led to the Laeken Declaration and the EU reform process which was institutionalised within the Convent on the Future of Europe. Overall, these six concepts of change are important not only to identify but also explain moments of change in the periods under review in this thesis.

I was able to show that throughout the periods concerned core concepts of EU identity remained stable, although relevant meanings changed over time. Processes of sense making enabled the stabilisation of the EU's self-perception as an international actor responsible for security policy on the international level. These processes were supported mainly by the grand design of becoming an international actor, by the identity crisis following the IGC in Nice and by a discursive crisis which unfolded after the events of 11 September 2001. Especially this crisis led to a rising self-awareness through juxtapositioning of self and other, and equipped EU identity with an exclusive tone unheard before. Prior to the crisis, the EU perceived security as being almost exclusively related to development and the understanding that situations of underdevelopment and poverty were likely to lead into conflict and crisis, thus harming the achievements of development policy and disabling prosperous developments. Based on this development-conflict cycle, situations of

development and poverty were perceived as being security relevant. Following this rationale, appropriate policy tools had to support development policies in the case of conflict and crisis as a last resort. This perspective initiated a huge debate on how to develop and implement not only civilian but also the military capabilities of ESDP. However, since the concept of crisis management and conflict prevention was still blurred as to the line separating the use of ESDP or development policy tools, the EU was unable to agree on the type and structure of military capabilities. This inability can be explained by the identity crisis which the EU underwent. In 2000 and 2001 the EU was aware that its foreign and security policy was not as successful as expected and that the EU had to reconsider its policies and strengthen its capabilities and procedures. In this period the EU was still suffering from its identity crisis and the time had not yet come in which problems were solved.

In the wake of the events of 11 September 2001, the logic of the link between development and security was widened by the understanding that dynamism was a constitutive character of security problems. Dynamism was understood to affect previously unattached problems and to make them worse in quantity, quality and rapidness of occurrence. Different problems became interdependent. Therefore, the meaning of security was somewhat emancipated from solemnly addressing the development-conflict cycle. The rising in the seriousness and complexity of security problems incorporated the necessity to implement and use civilian and military capabilities deployable on a short notice to prevent dynamic processes from taking effect. As a result, the EU was enabled to agree on military and civilian capabilities and deployed a number of civilian and military operations in 2003 such as Artemis, its first military operation in the DRC, or ALTHEA, a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The perception of dynamism as an underlying characteristic of all

security problems resulted from the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism which was in itself perceived as a dynamic threat.

The decisions to implement civilian and military operations in 2003 and 2004 marked the operability of ESDP which was a huge achievement at the end of a long process institutionalising a security policy at the EU level. This process was visible within discourses on EU identity, the perception of threats and security problems, and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. It resulted in a robustly defined meaning of security, building up on a strongly defined EU identity, constructing the EU as an international actor responsible for solving international problems, including those which were perceived as security relevant. Indeed, the EU implemented military operations as crisis management and conflict resolution through its security policy structure. This must be understood as a clear change in the EU's external behaviour, compared with the period prior to the implementation of ESDP.

With regard to the empirical findings, I have argued for a gap in the literature to understand the EU's security policy as qualitatively reaching beyond purely national constraints. Therefore, I have analysed the rationale of security at the EU level. I have shown that EU identity became more stably defined over time. Finally, the EU's self-perception included a dominant meaning of actorness which enabled the EU to perceive security policy as a necessary field of politics following its grand design of a full-fledged international actor who had to be able to act autonomously in the field of security. In other words, the EU had to implement a security policy in order to apply to its own characters and categories of being an international actor. This changing perspective was visible in the periods under review in this thesis. In 1996 and 1997, the EU did not perceive itself responsible for security policy outside

of its own territory. Accordingly, rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity did not exist in that period but developed over time through processes of sense making on the meaning of security influenced by the different ways of change, e.g. contestedness of discourses, reflexive construction of threats especially vis-à-vis international terrorism leading to juxtapositioning of self and other, arguments of continuity by which the meaning of security had to correspond with earlier established policies, grand design of an international actor capable of autonomous action, the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism and the identity crisis following the IGC in Nice.

Finally, these processes led to a dominant meaning of security which enabled the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level leading to ESDP and implemented by a number of civilian and military operations deployed since 2003. During the development of this meaning of security, the EU understood the development-conflict cycle as security relevant, and tried to implement a security policy accordingly. This attempt was not successful because the concepts of crisis management and conflict prevention were blurred in the sense of whether they were a matter of development policy or of ESDP's security policy. Finally, processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism enabled a firm construction of EU identity, including the use, for the first time, of an exclusive tone. Based on this slightly modified EU identity as an international actor responsible for security policy on the international stage, the EU perceived security problems as being dynamic. Through this understanding, the meaning of security emancipated itself from the meaning as the tool of last resort in the domain of development policy.

However, the first half of 2003 seemed to manifest a crisis for this evolving rationale of security. This, at least, has been argued by some authors. But I have shown that the meaning of security itself was robustly defined, and did not seriously suffer from the discursive crisis unfolding in the run up to the war on Iraq in early 2003. The crisis of discourses did not take place within discourses on the meaning of security. Rather, it unfolded on the disregard of established rules and procedure of interaction and cooperation at the EU level. The discourse on the meaning of security remained almost unaffected – at least in the longer run. Shortly following the crisis, almost all propositions made in the domain of security policy that seemed to be un-agreeable during the crisis were finally implemented. I was especially able to support this argument in the final empirical chapter focusing on the period of 2003-4 by showing the robustness of the discourses on the meaning of security, which were in line with earlier interpretations. Finally, the operations of ESDP prepared and implemented in 2003 and 2004 were a strong sign for stability in the meaning of security.

EU's growing self-awareness

In the following I will summarise the above listed findings in more detail starting with those on EU identity, followed by the constructions of threats and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour. At the end I will again summarise the argument of the robustness of discourses on the meaning of security before I reflect on the research approach of this thesis.

The very foundation of EU identity remained unchanged during the periods under review here. Core principles such as democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and international law, the central role of civil society and people as well as the meanings of responsibility, cooperation and integration were very central to the construction of EU identity. Furthermore, the construction of the European past as the evil 'other'

was constitutive for its construction. In this regard, European integration was constructed as a success story to overcome Europe's war shaken past.

All these constituting elements remained stable over time and constructed EU identity as inclusive. In contrast to this stability, change took place in regard to the following: in 1996-7 the EU did not perceive itself responsible for acting in the field of security policy, in 2000-1 this had changed but by a still contested self-perception of being an international actor. This change can be explained by the grand design of an international actor capable in the field of security. At the same time, the EU realised discrepancies in stepping up to this grand design during the identity crisis following the IGC in Nice. In 2003-4 the EU identity construction dominantly included a meaning of actorness enhancing the EU's self-awareness and to recognise its abilities and potentials of acting on the international stage and in the field of security. This change was mainly enabled by the juxtapositioning of self and other following the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism which further supported the process of the EU to come to terms to the grand design of being an international actor.

In 1996-7, the EU did not consider itself responsible for acting on the international stage, due to a consensus on the meaning and implications of the term duplication. By this meaning, the EU considered it inappropriate to duplicate structures and functions of other international or regional institutions as well as of nation states. The meaning of duplication disabled the EU from perceiving itself as responsible to act in the field of security policy because this policy domain was already covered by nation states, NATO, the UN and the OSCE. Duplicating these structures was perceived to be an inappropriate course of action. Also, in 1996-7, the meanings of coherence and effectiveness still contradicted each other, because the meaning of

coherence was contested. On the one hand, coherence meant that the EU's external relations, including the EC, EU and member states level, had to be commonly organised. On the other hand, reaching coherence in the field of foreign policy explicitly required member states' individual points of view to be taken into account. This contradicted the understanding of effectiveness, which required simplicity of decision-making procedures, for example. As a result, the EU's foreign policy was affected by member states' individual and potentially contradicting stand points because it was perceived inappropriate to undermine their importance as a whole.

During 2000-1, the meaning of coherence was contested no longer, as it no longer contradicted the meaning of effectiveness, but rather supported the overall understanding of the EU as a rational actor as a matter of establishing continuity of security policy with earlier established policies. The EU acted rationally in the sense that it was looking for effective and coherent policies. This character was also applied to the EU's security policy.

Another reason why duplication was a dominant meaning and why coherence contested the meaning of effectiveness in 1996-7 can be found in the meaning of EU actorness. In 1996-7 the EU was only equipped with actor-like capabilities but not as a full-fledged actor on the international level let alone in the field of security. In 2000-1, the meaning of actorness was in the process of becoming more widely intersubjectively shared and hence becoming dominant. This process was supported by the EU's grand design of an international actor but also by discourses on the meaning of responsibility to protect which dominated the UN level at that time and influenced discourses within the EU accordingly. The EU perceived it its responsibility to not only support and foster people at home but also to protect people in other states and regions. The EU perceived itself responsible to protect and

support the people, especially those who suffered from development and poverty and hence from situations which had to be understood as contradicting core principles of EU identity on a very essential level. Parallel to this perspective, the EU defined more clearly what had to be understood as appropriate living conditions, including detailed meanings of poverty and development. As a result, the EU perceived it its responsibility to act at the international level supporting or changing the living conditions in situations where poverty and (under-)development was prevailing. This perspective affected not only the EU's development policy but enabled the perception of situations of underdevelopment and poverty as security problems since they were understood to be likely to lead into conflict and crisis.

EU identity constructions were finally stabilised within the period 2003-4. The dominant self-perception defined the EU as an international actor responsible for solving international security problems and take up its responsibility to protect. The successful implementation of this meaning was also supported by processes of sense making on the events of 11 September 2001. Through processes of sense making on the phenomenon of international terrorism, EU identity was re-constructed by juxtapositioning of self and other. This equipped EU identity with an exclusive tone. This resulted in the construction of 'conditional identities' which more explicitly than ever before included inevitable rules to which external actors had to apply to in order to participate in cooperation and association with the EU. 'Conditional identities' included sub-principles which were defined on a lower abstract level and which could be more easily checked for actor's compliance. Here, the meaning of interdependence enhanced the meanings of integration and cooperation which were central to the EU's external approach including its security policy. Cooperation was understood to lead to interdependence which disabled free riding or conflict, turning

individual into mutual benefits. This understanding was applied to the EU's security policy. The EU cooperated with international, regional and national actors in the field of security and by deploying civilian and military operations as a matter of appropriate behaviour.

In sum, the EU was more self-aware of its abilities and potentials of acting at the international level in the field of security which led to the constructions of more detailed rules of appropriate action in security which the EU had to follow not at least in order to apply to its own 'standards' of being an international actor in the field of security and avoiding another identity crisis.

Emancipation of security

Throughout the periods under review here, the EU never perceived a security problem as threatening its *existence* regarding the construction of threats. The EU's perception of threats dealt almost exclusively with problems which were security relevant, which could potentially lead to security problems for a greater region, or which contradicted or threatened core principles of EU identity. For example, poverty and development were perceived as a problem with which the EU had to deal because it contradicted core principles of the EU's identity, and clearly defined standards of living in reference to these core principles. Situations of development were finally perceived as security relevant because it was understood that they could easily lead to crisis and conflict. Therefore, they could jeopardise achievements of development policies, which again was understood as a problem of the EU's effectiveness. These situations were perceived as a security problem because they caused sufferings for the people. In other words, compared with classic definitions of security implemented in the international relations literature, the meaning of security which enabled the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level by ESDP

began much earlier. Problems became security relevant when they opposed or questioned basic rules of EU identity. Also, these problems were perceived as not necessarily require the use of force. Appropriate responses to these security problems can start as early as agenda setting but can reach until the use of military force. This is a very important aspect in order to understand the meaning of security enabling a security policy at the EU level. It was less about defence and more about a wider definition of security, including non-military threats or security problems. In the following I highlight the most important steps in the development of the construction of threats which were constitutive for the meaning of security.

To start with, during the period 1996-7, threat constructions did not take place at the EU level, since the EU did not perceive itself responsible for acting in the domain of security policy. The meaning of duplication disabled the construction of threats because it was not understood appropriate to duplicate structures and policies of existing international or regional organisations, let alone member states. Also, the inclusive identity construction – which expects association from other actors – enabled the EU to perceive actors previously involved in conflict as becoming more ‘self’ to the EU as soon as they started to take up their responsibility in solving the crisis. And finally, the EU did not perceive itself responsible in the field of security. The only area of threat construction was that of WMD and landmines. But security policies addressing these problems were organised by already established international structures and institutions. The EU did not implement a new policy on its own due to the meaning of duplication.

In contrast, in 2000-1, when the meaning of EU actorness became more dominant and the EU established a meaning of responsibility to protect, threats or security problems were constructed. Situations of (under)development and poverty were

perceived as problematic because EU identity required higher standards of living as defined in detail by discourses of poverty. In 2000-1, the EU perceived itself responsible not only for its own people but for those people who suffered from development and poverty, and whose standards of living were thus lower than those defined by the EU as minimum. This led the EU to further implement its development policies. However, situations of development and poverty were perceived to significantly increase the likelihood of crisis and conflict. Accordingly, the EU perceived situations of development and poverty as security relevant and started to design policy tools to be used when achievements of its development policies were jeopardised by crisis and conflict. These tools were still contested within discourses. On the one hand, conflict prevention as well as crisis management was understood to be a matter of a security policy using military and civilian capabilities. However, conflict prevention and crisis management was still more dominantly constructed as being part of development policies.

This was different in 2003-4. Processes of reasoning on the phenomenon of international terrorism enabled the implementation of dynamism as a general character of security problems. From this perspective, the EU perceived a much higher number of issues as security relevant because every single security problem was understood to carry the potential of worsening others. In general, this led to a much stronger and dominant construction of threats. As a result, security policy experienced a much higher relevance in the EU's external relations and emancipated itself from the status of a last resort development policy. Overall, the introduction of the meaning of dynamism enabled the construction of rules for appropriate behaviour in situations of insecurity on a much higher level of firmness and elaborateness.

In accordance with the developments in the constructions of EU identity and threats, rules of appropriate behaviour in situations of insecurity enfolded in quality and became more robustly and dominantly defined over time. Since there were no threat constructions in 1996-7, no rule was necessary to apply in situations of insecurity. This was different in 2000-1. Since the development-conflict cycle was perceived as a security problem, the EU understood security policy necessary to support its development policies by civilian and military means. They were to be used when achievements became jeopardised by conflict and crisis. This newly defined purpose enabled a huge debate on the effectiveness of the existing military and civilian structures, including the aspect of what was necessary to further develop the EU's ability as an international in the field of security.

However, rules on how to deal with situations of crisis and conflict were still very much contested. Thus, military and civilian means were not implemented or used because an agreement was lacking on the type of capabilities and the way of using them.

This again was different in the following period of 2003-4. Here, the EU had to implement more clearly defined rules on how and when to use civilian and military capabilities, based on a more dominantly defined meaning of actorness and the perception of threats as being dynamic. This was not only necessary to face up to more serious threats and security problems, but to apply to the EU's own standards as an international actor. Finally, these firm and elaborated rules of how and when to use civilian and military capabilities enabled the development, implementation and deployment of the very first civilian and military operations within the structure of ESDP.

Robustness of Discourses

In contrast to the findings of existing literature, I have demonstrated that this meaning of security was robustly defined and remained fairly unaffected by the discursive crisis which unfolded on how to proceed in Iraq in the first half of 2003. Authors recognised a paradox of crisis and success which seemed to take place almost simultaneously in the EU's foreign and security policy. On the one side, the EU and its member states were divided over the question of whether or not to disarm Iraq and change the Iraqi regime by war. This disunity seemed to affect the basic agreement of a common European security and defence policy. On the other side, successful steps in institutional developments, as well as policy implementations, already were discussed and finally taken during and in the immediate aftermath of the crisis.

At first glance, both aspects contradict each other. But by taking into account the findings of the empirical chapters of this thesis and deconstructing relevant speech acts from the first half of 2003, I was able to do away with the impression of a paradox. I deconstructed key texts of the discursive crisis such as the letter of eight, the press conference of Jacques Chirac following the Extraordinary European Council in Brussels on 17 February 2003, and the final document of the so called Chocolate Summit of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxemburg. In doing so I referred to the following three aspects. First of all, ESDP and its underlying meaning of security could not be meaningfully linked to the argument of disarming, or changing, the Iraqi regime by force. This was never part of the rationale of security established at the EU level enabling the institutionalisation of a security policy by ESDP. The question of going to war could not be related to ESDP, which made the discourse on the war on Iraq different and unattached. Second, controversies over

proposals in the domain of security policy during the crisis could not explain the intensity of the crisis because they were almost completely immediately implemented after the crisis. This again supports the argument that the discursive crisis did not represent a dispute over matters of EU security policy. The third and main argument is that the crisis unfolded on the disregard of established rules of interaction and cooperation at the EU level. In reference to the well established literature, I have shown a number of rules which were disregarded during the crisis. This included for example, the rule to at least inform if not consult all EU heads of states or government before addressing a potentially controversial position publicly. Indeed, the crisis unfolded on the non-compliance of relevant EU actors with at least informally established rules. The disregard of these rules can explain the fierce reaction of other European actors and can thus explain why the crisis took place. Disregarding established rules always and necessarily leads to strong reactions by the other actors of the group who intend to re-enforce the relevance of the broken rule.

The interim chapter on the crisis, especially, supports the argument of this thesis that processes of sense making led to a robustly defined meaning of security. Indeed, even the highly intense battles during the discursive crisis were not able to change, let alone destroy, the social construction of security established at the EU level. In other words, the first half of 2003 proved to be ‘a hard case’ for the meaning of security.

Overall, the empirical analysis demonstrated that the EU’s security policy became possible due to a stable and robust construction of EU identity based on core principles, the meaning of integration and cooperation. It was also due to the EU’s growing self-awareness of being an international actor and capable of autonomous

action in the field of security. The process of change in which this meaning of international actorness became dominant can be explained by the influence of the grand design and the identity crisis which made explicit that the EU was not able to apply to its own expectations. Furthermore, the discursive crisis on the phenomenon of international terrorism did not only lead to the construction of more serious threats but enforced identity constructions by juxtapositioning of self and other. Whereas first, the development-conflict cycle was perceived as the main security problem of the EU, discourses on the meaning of international terrorism led to the perception of terrorism as a serious threat and to the perception of dynamism as being a general character worsening individual security problems. This finally led to the construction of rules which defined the use of military and civilian capabilities as being appropriate to prevent dynamism from taking effect.

In sum, these processes of sense making led to the construction of the meaning of security and enabled the institutionalisation of a security policy at the EU level and within ESDP. These processes took place within discourses and affected the construction of EU identity, the perception of threats and the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in its particular way.

Evaluating the theoretical approach

The research project was able to produce these findings based on its research approach applied throughout this thesis. The approach enabled the researcher to systematically focus on the discursive construction of reality, namely the construction of EU identity, threats and rules of appropriate behaviour. The rigorously applied methods helped to explore the constructions of subjects, objects and their relations within discourses on European integration, global challenges and international order. The approach also included a concept of change and research

techniques which enabled the analysis to identify dominant discourses, separate them from other forms of interpretations and explaining how changes in dominant discourses occurred. Both provided access to underlying, non-dominant discourses by shifting the focus of the analysis to forms of interpretations which were different, or which contradicted, dominant meanings. For example, the slight change in the meaning of coherence from the period 1996-7 to 2000-1 was only recognisable through the concept of change. In the first period, coherence explicitly stated that member states' individual points of views were to take into account in order to reach a common decision. In the second period, coherence required stepping down from individual stand points for the sake of a common policy across all EU levels. This change as development was explained by argument of continuity which applied meanings already established in other policy fields of the EU such as at the supranational level to the 'new' policy of security action. And finally, the research strategy provided the tools to distinguish between periods and analyse them separately by a structured mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques in order to identify dominant discourses and change over time more easily. Therefore, the development of the meaning of security could explicitly be addressed, which again was particularly important for answering the research question. In sum, the approach proved to be very handy in analysing the meaning of security and its development or change over time, and it may be argued that the approach could be very fruitfully applied to other empirical situations.

However, in order to check the productiveness of this approach more generally, further research is necessary to apply this approach to other contexts. In order to sharpen the focus of the analysis, the approach could also profit from further

theoretical and methodological discussions. These discussions need to focus on the following four points:

First, within this thesis I have hypothesised a link between identity constructions and the design and implementation of institutions. This link was developed throughout the theoretical part and endorsed in the empirical chapters. But further theoretical discussions and research is necessary to thoroughly conceptualise this link and generalise its assumptions. To focus on this hypothesis more firmly, an approach is necessary which combines discourse analysis and institutionalist approaches. Within a discursive approach, it is difficult to differentiate between rules of appropriate behaviour constructed through processes of sense making and regulations and procedures formally and informally institutionalised within the structure of interest. Here, an institutionalised approach could be used to discover the institutionalised practices while using different assumptions and methods than those of a discursive approach. Findings could be used to systematically support the hypothesised link between identities and institutions.

Second, the approach applied within this thesis builds up on a heuristic concept of inclusive vs. exclusive identities. The heuristic concept was linked to the overall discursive approach by the argument that it is a matter of political contestedness as to whether identities are constructed as inclusive or exclusive. Therefore, the concept can be connected to the concept of how discourses produce dominant meanings. Meanings are contested as long as they are not or only weakly intersubjectively shared. However, further conceptualisations are necessary to make the concepts of inclusiveness and exclusiveness more fruitful for the analysis of identity constructions and the construction of threats.

This aspect directly leads to the third point. With reference to international relations theory, I have conceptualised security as a relational complex, relating identity constructions to the construction of threats which then lead to the construction of rules of appropriate behaviour in the case of insecurity. However, it remains under theorised as to how and when identity constructions lead to the construction of threats or when they make them possible. This aspect needs to be addressed in more depth. To start with, the research findings of this thesis can serve as one case in which a certain type of identity enabled particular threat constructions. Further cases need to be analysed in order to systematise the conditions which make threat constructions possible. In this regard, the final point is also relevant.

Finally, the findings of this thesis show that the meaning of security starts much earlier than assumed by traditional approaches which understand security as a matter of (military) defence and hence insecurity as a (military) threat against the pure existence of the referent object. In contrast, I have shown that threat constructions or the perception of a problem as security relevant include those phenomena which are understood to be different to, contrasting or negating aspects of the identity in question. Therefore, a security problem or threat is not only understood as a threat of force. I have demonstrated that the meaning of security starts as early as a phenomenon questions, contradicts or seems to be an act against aspects of the identity in question. For example, the EU perceives situations which potentially jeopardise achievements of its development policies, namely crisis and conflict, as a security problem, knowing that these situations do not threaten the existence of the EU itself. However, this aspect of differentiated and distinguished types of threats, security problems or risks needs to be further conceptualised. Discursive research may well be helpful here because it can inductively search for types of threat

perceptions in order to distinguish general structures of threat constructions. The thesis provided interesting insights in this regard.

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