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Norwegian Cultural Policy: A Civilising Mission?

By

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in Cultural Policy Studies

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For Michelle

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Tiddington, Stratford upon Avon, 22nd October 2009

Declaration

I declare that the present thesis is the result of my own work. I would also like to confirm that neither the thesis nor parts of it has ever been submitted before for a degree at another university.

Abstract: Norwegian Cultural Policy: A Civilising Mission?

This dissertation aims to explore the extent to which what has been termed ‘the civilising mission’ has been a central rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.

In order to contextualise the research the German term *Bildung*, which refers to human growth processes, is used as a conceptual framework. *Bildung* can be achieved in two different, albeit related, ways: firstly, through an object approach, which takes great works of arts as its point of departure and where personal growth can be achieved through exposure to these and which endorses clear cultural hierarchies, and secondly, through a subject approach, which emphasises each individual’s own preferences and desires and where a much greater range of cultural activities can facilitate personal growth.

In addition to an historical analysis of the ideas that have informed Norwegian cultural policies dating back to 1814, this project draws upon ‘green papers’ published by the Norwegian government through its Ministry of Culture. This is supplemented by a more detailed analysis of a key cultural policy initiative of the 2000s: *den kulturelle skolesekken* (DKS)¹, which is a major programme initiated to enable children in

¹ Translated to English as *the Cultural Rucksack*.

primary school to be exposed to art-works produced by professional artists.

The project concludes that although a subject and an object approach to *Bildung* have co-existed throughout the period charted here there has since the 90s been an increased focus on the object oriented approach. This appears evident both in the general cultural policy discourse but particularly through the disciplining aspect of DKS and its strong focus on, what is being referred to as, the 'professional arts' as a vehicle for *Bildung*.

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Introduction: Norwegian Cultural Policy – A Civilising Mission?

Oliver Bennett argues that the dominant rationale behind governmental intervention in the field of culture in the UK and other European democracies since the nineteenth century, has been what he has termed 'the civilising mission'.² The level of authoritarianism within this policy rationale has, according to Bennett, in the UK at least, varied over the years. Whereas in the nineteenth century the arts and culture were crudely perceived to have the power to uphold public order, this diminished somewhat in the twentieth century. However, the mission to civilise, in terms of giving people guidance, pulling them out of their ignorance, forming their character and encouraging an ordered mind persists. All these civilising measures have, according to Bennett, been based on the fundamental assumption that European high art is of superior value, and that it is this culture that has the power to civilise.³

The civilising mission relates to the understanding that culture has the capacity to transform people who come in contact with it. This understanding can, as we shall see, attach itself to such a transformation

² Oliver Bennett, 'Cultural Policy in the United Kingdom: Collapsing Rationales and the End of a Tradition', in *The European Journal of Cultural Policy* 2.4 (1995), pp. 199 - 216; Oliver Bennett, 'Cultural Policy, Cultural Pessimism and Postmodernity', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 4.1 (1997), pp. 67 - 84. Bennett argues that modern cultural policy (since 1945) has been informed by other rationales as well, namely national identity and prestige and more recently the economic benefits that it has been claimed investments in culture can yield. However, the rationale behind the foundation of most of the cultural institutions established since 1945 to administer culture and create cultural policy, has, according to Bennett, been based on a civilising mission, (Bennett (1995)). In his paper published in 1997 Bennett extends this argument and claims that the civilising influence of the arts has acted as the dominant justification amongst European advocates of cultural policy.

³ Bennett (1995), p. 214.

in two ways: either through the exposure to culture, narrowly defined as the arts, paternalistically selected and programmed by elite experts, or alternatively through the experience of culture more widely defined and where the choice of cultural activities is codetermined by people themselves. Referring to the understood transforming power of the more narrowly defined arts, Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett argue that their frequently expressed capacity 'to transform the lives not just of individuals but of whole communities', is one of the most fundamental reasons behind their continuously strong position in society.⁴ A position which, according to the two authors, is illustrated by the place the arts are being given in school and university curricula, government agencies that have been established in so many countries to support them and the ever increasing number of institutions set up to mediate them to a large audience.⁵

This mission to transform people can be perceived on two levels. Firstly, based on a broad understanding that the arts (or culture defined more widely) have transforming effects at an aggregated level not necessarily informed by what Sigrid Røyseng describes as a 'calculating interest and a utility calculating rationality',⁶ which can be explained and tangibly perceived, but rather by a more abstract faith in the transforming effects of culture. Secondly on a more crude level where it is assumed that the

⁴ Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, *The Social Impact of the Arts* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 2.

⁵ Belfiore and Bennett (2008), pp. 1 - 2.

⁶ Sigrid Røyseng, *Den gode, hellige og disiplinerte kunsten: Forestillinger om kunstens autonomi i kulturpolitikk og kunstledelse* (Bø: Telemarksforskning-Bø, 2007).

positive social impacts of the exposure to or participation in cultural activities can be measured.

Belfiore and Bennett argue that most arts policy nowadays is informed by this second level where a demand to measure the alleged social impacts of the arts has become something of an orthodoxy and that this is part of a shift towards more crude evidence-based policy-making in the public sector more generally. However, the trouble for the arts is that their alleged transformative powers are extremely difficult to substantiate, let alone measure, and this becomes highly problematic in a climate where public policies are increasingly informed by a demand to achieve such measurable outcomes. Consequentially, Belfiore and Bennett suggest that twinned with the already mentioned prominent position given to the arts in society exists another narrative, which expresses a sense that the arts are beleaguered and that the rationales for their existence and indeed the public support for the production and mediation of them is regularly questioned and not put forward with as much confidence as seen in many other areas of public life and public administration.⁷

Others have also observed that the value of culture, more broadly defined, no longer rests on a conviction, but that it must demonstrate its contribution to measurable economic impacts. Peter Duelund for example

⁷ Bennett places this lack of confidence in a wider context in his book *Cultural Pessimism*, where he suggests that as part of a growing pessimism in the West during the last decades of the twentieth century, a strong narrative of intellectual decline has evolved. This was partly fuelled by a narrative of artistic decline, which ‘included within it an account of a widespread relativism within the general culture that had the effect of reducing art to little more than just another component of the leisure industry’; Oliver Bennett, *Cultural Pessimism: Narratives of Decline in the Postmodern World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), p. 132.

argues that the arts and culture in the Nordic countries have been made subject to an intense instrumental pressure, which has had devastating impacts. He goes as far as characterising Nordic cultural policy thus:

today, the state, regional and local authorities have entered into a symbiosis with the private sector in order to give a higher priority to the economic basis of the arts and culture. Experience and turnover have gradually replaced the original goals of cultural policy, i.e. participation, education and enlightenment. [...] the financial and political media have colonised the intrinsic values of the arts and culture.⁸

In other words, participation, education and enlightenment have been sacrificed at the expense of culture's economic impact.

Similarly, Jim McGuigan suggests that amongst three different 'general discourses of cultural policy', which define culture and position agents within this field, a market discourse has lately been in the ascendancy.⁹ State intervention in the field of culture persists but is informed by a 'market reasoning' where:

market mechanisms are the superior means for allocating resources, producing and circulating cultural products, giving the customer what he or she is said to want.¹⁰

Others have uttered similar sentiments, and there is a common understanding amongst cultural policy scholars that the arts in particular

⁸ Peter Duelund, 'The Nordic Cultural Model. Summary', in Peter Duelund (ed.), *The Nordic Cultural Model* (Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute, 2003), pp. 520 - 521.

⁹ Jim McGuigan, *Rethinking Cultural Policy* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2004). The other two general discourses are, according to McGuigan, that of 'state' and 'civil/communicate'.

¹⁰ McGuigan (2004), p. 59.

are beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened.¹¹ My project is not preoccupied with the arts only, but will attempt to analyse cultural policy more widely. However, the above-mentioned observations may imply that the civilising mission might be losing its potency and influence.

However, in a Nordic context and casting some doubt on both McGuigan and Duelund's above-mentioned observations, Mangset et. al. ask whether some of the transformation processes that Nordic cultural policies allegedly have been made subject to (because of the general challenges that welfare states have been faced with), might have been overstated by both politicians and cultural policy researchers.¹²

It is within these, albeit far from consensual, observations of a cultural and political context that I shape the research question of this thesis.

Research question

Hence, this thesis takes as its main task:

¹¹ Jo Caust, 'Putting the "art" back into arts policy making: how arts policy has been "captured" by the economists and the marketers', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 9.1 (2003), pp. 51 - 63; Clive Gray, 'Commodification and Instrumentality in Cultural Policy', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13.2 (2007), pp. 203 - 215; Oliver Bennett, 'Beyond Machinery: The Cultural Policies of Matthew Arnold', in *History of Political Economy* 37.3 (2005), pp. 455 - 482; Eleonora Belfiore, 'Art as a means of alleviating social exclusion: does it really work? A critique of instrumental cultural policies and social impact studies in the UK', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 8.1 (2002), pp. 91 - 106; Belfiore and Bennett (2008).

¹² Per Mangset, Anita Kangas, Dorte Skot-Hansen and Geir Vestheim, 'Editor's introduction: Nordic cultural policy', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 14.1 (2008), p. 3.

- **An assessment of the extent to which the civilising mission has been and still is a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.**

In order to address this I shall not limit myself to exploring arts policies only, but cultural policy more generally. However, although, as we shall see, Norwegian cultural policy traditionally has defined culture widely, and at times advocated what in the 1970s and 1980s was referred to as a cultural democracy, what are being referred to as the 'professional arts' have – at the beginning of the twenty-first century – become at the heart of the civilising mission. Hence, my analysis of policy rationales in the twenty-first century will, in Chapter Seven of this dissertation, turn its attention to the arts in a more narrow sense through a study of the rationales behind a national scheme, which was formally launched in 2001 under the heading, *Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS)*.

In addition to the above-mentioned main research question, a related objective is to assess how culture is valued discursively amongst elites within the field of culture itself. This is of intrinsic importance to this project, but also to eventually shedding light on the extent to which culture is being de-valued and reduced to a tool which facilitates measurable impacts versus the more abstract idea of its broader civilising potential.

A civilising mission that aims to pull people out of their ignorance and to form their character relates to governmental or other institutions' objectives to enlighten. In a Norwegian context, the origins of this rationale (to enlighten) can be found in the nineteenth century.

Notes on Civilisation and Culture

Although 'civilisations' are often referred to in the plural, Raymond Williams stressed that in modern English, 'civilisation still refers to a general condition or state, and is still contrasted with savagery or barbarism',¹³ in other words a universal condition, rather than a process or a specific place in space or time. The emergence of the term 'civilisation' in this absolute form as a condition or state coincides with, and relates to, the period of the Enlightenment. In fact, Williams emphasised that civilisation 'has behind it the general spirit of the Enlightenment':¹⁴ based on ideas, which broadly speaking advocate tolerance, reason, common sense and the encouragement of science and technology.

That the civilising mission has been a major rationale behind public cultural policy is perhaps not so strange because the terms 'civilisation' and 'culture' are closely related. In fact, in their use in German the two terms were, in the late eighteenth century, synonymous, first referring to

¹³ Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society* (London: Fontana Press, 1988), p. 59.

¹⁴ Williams (1988), p. 58.

the ‘general process of becoming “civilized” or “cultivated”’, and later ‘as a description of the secular process of human development’,¹⁵ in accordance with Enlightenment ideas. As mentioned above, culture and civilisation thus referred to a set of values and ideas that were perceived to be of universal application.

Culture with a capital ‘C’ was the culture of the Enlightenment, which had developed over the centuries and reached its climax as a dominant and predominately European culture. This equation of one culture and one civilisation, with whatever falls outside of it being branded as barbarous, was, according to Williams, commonly subscribed to until Johann Gottfried von Herder towards the end of the eighteenth century challenged this Eurocentric approach, that celebrated European subjugation and domination of the rest of the world. Herder argued instead for replacing culture with a capital ‘C’ with ‘cultures’ in the plural, in other words, a departure from one universal civilisation, against which everything can be measured, replaced by a much more relativistic approach to culture. Consequently and from then on the relationship between the terms ‘civilisation’ and ‘culture’ becomes, according to Williams, more complex.

Where the concept of one universal culture versus ‘cultures’ in the plural resonates in the context of this thesis, that is, Norwegian cultural policy, is in its objective to enlighten, meaning ‘to give them [people] more

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

knowledge and greater understanding about something'.¹⁶ Enlightenment, of which the literal Norwegian translation is *opplysning*, has been a central concept in Norwegian cultural and educational policy. Derived from this is the term *folkeopplysning*, which according to Geir Vestheim can be interpreted in two different ways: either as 'enlightenment of the people', or 'enlightenment by the people'. The former regards people as an empty goblet, and thereby in need of being enlightened from the outside, which calls for a paternalistic approach where the elite in society have an important mission to pass down great ideas from a universal canon of art and thinking, in other words, an object model. The alternative perception rejects the function of the elite in society because people, or their representatives, can themselves determine the content of what they should be enlightened about, in accordance with Herder's relativistic idea of several *cultures*. This is what Vestheim calls the subject model.¹⁷

In his assessment of the civilising mission cited above, Oliver Bennett emphasised that a fundamental assumption behind this cultural policy rationale was the superior value of European high art. Similarly, in Norway, as in most Western European states, the cultural policies that have been derived from a wish to enlighten people have manifested themselves in the policy of 'democratising culture'.¹⁸ The objective of this policy has been to make cultural expressions and offerings available, to as wide a part of a constituency as possible, transcending social,

¹⁶ (Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary, 1987). To enlighten is here referred to with a small e, not meaning a designation of a historic movement or a time-period.

¹⁷ Geir Vestheim, *Kulturpolitikk i det moderne Norge* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1995), p. 89.

¹⁸ Per Mangset, *Kulturliv og forvaltning: Innføring i kulturpolitikk* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992).

geographical, demographical and other barriers. Culture in this context, has also in Norway primarily meant intellectual and artistic expressions and, more often than not, traditionally been drawn from an already established and canonised range of art-forms and even art-works, or what is often referred to as the 'high arts'. However, Norway has seen a parallel development in the enlightenment *by* the people rationale when, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the concept of *folkeopplysning* also 'became a tool in the fight for better conditions and democratic rights'.¹⁹ In order to fight for their cause, and to position themselves in an increasingly democratic society, representatives from the lower classes themselves initiated and managed activities that were formed with the objective of enlightening people from these social strata.²⁰ Vestheim argues that a shift can be observed during the second half of the nineteenth century from simply enlightenment *of* the people to 'enlightenment *of* the people *by* the people'.²¹

It is of course too simplistic to say that these two approaches to *folkeopplysning* are radically opposed to each other in the sense that one perceives culture in accordance with the eighteenth century idea of a total condition of just one culture whereas the other is being perceived in a completely relativistic way. Just as the two terms 'civilisation' and 'culture' stand in a complex relationship with each other, so too do the two approaches to *folkeopplysning*. However, a trajectory of these two

¹⁹ Vestheim (1995), p. 88.

²⁰ The most typical example of such activities is perhaps *folkehøgskolen*, which was an independent school system that grew out of the rural counter-cultures of the nineteenth century. I will return to this phenomenon in Chapter Four.

²¹ Vestheim (1995), p. 89.

different sets of ideas can be found in Norwegian cultural policy discourses dating back to as far as 1814 and the birth of Norway as a nation. From then on a hegemonic struggle can be observed between culture to be understood as universal and predominately continental as the harbinger of enlightenment and human growth, as opposed to the understanding that this enlightenment and growth can be achieved through a much wider range of cultural manifestations.

Hence, this dissertation is informed by Vestheim's two approaches to *folkeopplysning*: a subject and an object approach. Based on this let me briefly outline my research design.

Research design and methodology

It is commonly acknowledged that the state in Norway did not intervene in the field of culture in a coherent and structured way until 1945.²² However, Vestheim's two approaches to *folkeopplysning* as mentioned above both have their origin in the nineteenth century. Hence, a study of twentieth-century, or indeed post-1945, cultural policy rhetoric without any acknowledgment of its legacy from the previous century would have robbed the analysis of an important explanatory dimension. I am therefore starting this study by going as far back as 1814 when Norway broke from its union with Denmark and got its first constitution in the process. This historical study up until 1973 is based on secondary

²² Vestheim (1995); Mangset (1992); Marit Bakke, 'Cultural Policy in Norway', in Peter Duelund (ed.), *The Nordic Cultural Model* (Copenhagen: Nordic Cultural Institute, 2003), pp. 147 - 181.

sources by other scholars, and is followed by a more in-depth analysis of policy documents covering the period of the 1970s to 2003, as well as the reception of these papers in parliament.

The study observes, acknowledges and concludes that both the object and subject approaches to *folkeopplysning* mentioned above have featured prominently in the cultural policy discourse all the way back to the nineteenth century, alternating in their ascendancy. However, it became clear during my textual analysis of policy papers that the subject approach, with its wide definition of culture in accordance with what in the 1970s and 1980s was referred to as the objective to facilitate a cultural democracy, lost its potency in the 1990s and 2000s. Instead what are being referred to as the 'professional arts' gained prominence as a vehicle of *folkeopplysning*.

Hence, in order to study whether the civilising mission still plays a prominent role during the first decade of the twenty-first century as well as to interrogate what culture was deemed valid in this context, I chose to focus more comprehensively on the national scheme DKS. This is a programme which aims to expose all children in primary schools to the 'professional' arts. In order to assess the extent to which the civilising mission might still hold a dominant position in the cultural policy discourse I decided to, in addition to analysing public policy documents, also conduct interviews with elite figures including artists, arts managers,

bureaucrats and politicians, when analysing the rationales behind this scheme.

Hence, the thesis is made up of a historical analysis based on secondary sources, a textual analysis of policy papers and their reception in parliament and an in-depth study of the rationales behind DKS. Let me briefly sketch out the dissertation's chapter outline.

Structure of dissertation – chapter by chapter

The thesis comprises seven chapters in addition to this introduction. Apart from this introduction and the final conclusion (Chapter Eight) the chapters can broadly be categorised into two: Chapters One to Three, which construct a theoretical and methodological framework for the thesis and Chapters Four to Seven, which contain the empirical analysis.

Chapter One starts out by developing the two approaches to *folkeopplysning* mentioned above into a more specific theoretical framework. I launch the German term *Bildung*, which can be broadly translated as human growth processes and which fairly accurately describes the ideas behind the two diverging approaches to *folkeopplysning*, and I identify four eighteenth to nineteenth century-theorists, which I will in turn use to illuminate the concept of the civilising mission in a Norwegian context.

The ideas by the thinkers that will be presented in Chapter One are all normative in the sense that they prescribed recipes for how *Bildung* can be achieved. The civilising mission can also be perceived to have a power dimension, and Chapter Two explores this in the context of Antonio Gramsci's concept of cultural hegemonies and Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality. Despite these thinkers' conceptualisation of power often being coined in opposition to one another, I argue that they are in fact complementary in light of the research question of this project.

Chapter Three outlines my methodological approach in detail. It contains a reflexive analysis of my own position as a researcher as well as a short contextualisation of how this compares with a limited selection of other academic works within the field of cultural policy studies. I then move on to discuss the concept of the study of discursive practices and make a case for why taking this approach is useful for a study of cultural policy rationales. I finally introduce my empirical approach, including a delimitation of my area of study and definition of terms as well as the level of analysis. The empirical data material is presented in more detail in Appendix One.

The next four chapters trail the development of the *Bildung* rationale in Norwegian cultural policy from 1814 to 2003. Chapter Four starts by charting the period between 1814 and 1905, whereas Chapter Five concentrates on the period 1905 to 1973. Both chapters rely on

secondary sources only. Furthermore, these chapters help to historically contextualise the *Bildung* rationale in Norwegian cultural policy historically.

Chapter Six contains an in-depth textual analysis of the government's Green Papers on cultural policy (six in all) between 1973 and 2003 as well as their reception in parliament. The focus is on how the concept of *Bildung* is represented in these texts, and although I identify a distinct *Bildung* discourse, which appears to be a key policy rationale I also identify two alternative discourses, which I identify as the marketisation discourse and the Progress Party discourse.

My analysis of the manifestation of the *Bildung* discourse based on the above-mentioned policy papers indicates that an object approach to *Bildung*, which emphasised the significance of exposure to the 'professional' arts, appeared to be in the ascendancy from the 1990s onwards and hence, in Chapter Seven I report on an in-depth discursive analysis of the rationales behind the arts in the school programme DKS. I suggest that what I call the object focused DKS discourse is a related sub-section of the general *Bildung* discourse.

Chapter Eight contains a brief summary of the thesis and a conclusion, which argues that the civilising mission has indeed been a strong rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy at least since the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the object and subject approaches to *Bildung* have alternated throughout this period, the former is clearly in the

ascendancy during the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is epitomised by DKS, through which I conclude that the civilising mission is intensifying rather than disappearing. The rationales behind DKS are informed by a discourse, which harbours a fear of a culturally relativist intellectual anarchy fuelled by the power of the culture provided by the commercial cultural industries. This is based on a powerful understanding of the transformative power of the 'professional' arts and is fuelled by an effective discursive practice, which relies both on explicit statements that are taken as orthodox, but also on what is regarded as so obvious that it does not need to be said or uttered. Consequently, DKS does not need to demonstrate measurable impacts. Its support rests instead on an abstract faith in its *Bildung* potential and transformative power.

Before reflecting on some of the limitations of this study and some suggestions for further research, Chapter Eight continues by attempting to situate my findings within the context of what appears to have become a dominant position amongst cultural policy scholars: that the arts have become beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. I conclude that the object focused *Bildung* rationale that informs DKS appears to nuance the conclusion that a utility calculating rationale permeates the cultural policy research completely. This does not, at least not in a Norwegian context, appear to show the complete picture.

Before I move on to develop my theoretical framework in the next chapter let me briefly say a few words about the cultural context in which this thesis has been conceived.

Some notes about cultural context

I have researched this thesis based at the University of Warwick in the UK, but focused on Norway. I am not attempting to make a comparative study of these two countries. However, due to the fact that I have been based in the UK and submitting and defending the thesis at a British university, some examples from cultural policy decisions taken in the UK will at times be brought in to support and illuminate my argument. This does also relate to the fact that the ideas of Matthew Arnold, which will be given a central position in the next chapter, have been found to influence twentieth-century British cultural policy.

Finally, I should point out that I do not master German, French nor Italian at a sufficient level for me to engage with the writings of the authors I am referring to who write in these languages in their original language. Reading these writers in translation might put me at a certain distance from them or from their originally intended messages. However, I still believe that these texts have illuminated my project to a great extent and that the benefit of making use of them albeit in translation outweighs the disadvantage of not reading the original versions of these texts.

Moreover, my quotations from Norwegian texts - whether from academic or non-academic sources - have been translated by myself. I also use the term *Bildung* quite frequently throughout the thesis, and this term will be subject to a comprehensive discussion in the next chapter. There are not really any direct translations of this term in either Norwegian or English: the closest word in Norwegian is *dannelse*. However, both the terms *Bildung* and *dannelse* relate broadly to the English terms human growth and enlightenment, and these four terms: *Bildung*, *dannelse*, enlightenment and growth, are thereby at times used interchangeably. However, I shall attempt to stick to the former term *Bildung*, which I shall demonstrate in the next chapter as the one that most precisely captures a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.

1. The Civilising Mission: Object Versus Subject Approaches to *Bildung*

In this chapter I shall present two sets of theoretical frameworks drawn from a carefully selected group of eighteenth and nineteenth-century thinkers: firstly, the German thinkers Johann Gottfried von Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and secondly, the Victorian English thinkers Thomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold. I will argue that some of the theories of these two sets of thinkers broadly correspond with the idea that I spelled out in my Introduction Chapter: that Norwegian cultural policy has been guided by two different approaches to *folkeopplysning*, one subject-oriented, where people themselves should determine the content of the cultural activities that can facilitate *Bildung*, and how they can be enlightened, and an object approach, which is based on the understanding that enlightenment can be achieved through the exposure to a pre-established canon of art and thinking passed down by an enlightened elite. The objective of this presentation is to develop a theoretical framework, which will help illuminate and interrogate the civilising mission in Norwegian cultural policy discourses analysed in the subsequent chapters. Central to this is the term *Bildung* as this is being coined by the two German thinkers Herder and Humboldt.

1.1 *Bildung*: two approaches

A term closely linked with *opplysning* is what in Norwegian is called *dannelse* or to be *dannet*.²³ There is no common translation of this term in English. The German equivalent is *Bildung*, which in Germany has a long history, although the term was not fully established until the early nineteenth century.²⁴ Henrik Kaare Nielsen has argued that *Bildung* in English conceptualises:

human growth processes, which integrate the development of individuals' sensuous, emotional and intellectual potentials and make them capable of reflecting on themselves in term of their embeddedness in, and obligation toward, the social and cultural context.²⁵

Korsgaard and Løvlie argue that *Bildung* relates to people's personal growth in relation to themselves, in relation to the wider world and in relation to the society in which they live.²⁶

Rather than just taking these definitions at face value, in the first part of this chapter I will elaborate further on *Bildung*. Given that it is so established, I shall refer to *Bildung* rather than the Norwegian term *dannelse*. In fact, the latter term is not used much in Norwegian, and is not even, according to Rune Slagstad, included in seminal Norwegian

²³ Ove Korsgaard and Lars Løvlie, 'Innledning', in Rune Slagstad, Ove Korsgaard and Lars Løvlie (eds.), *Dannelsens forvandlinger* (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2003), p. 10.

²⁴ Hansjörg Hohr, 'Does beauty matter in education? Friedrich Schiller's neo-humanistic approach', in *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 34.1 (2002), pp. 59 - 75.

²⁵ Henrik Kaare Nielsen, 'The Technocratisation of the Field of Cultural Policy and the Role of Critical Research', in *Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift* 9.1 (2006), p. 152, note no. 1.

²⁶ Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), p. 11.

encyclopaedia.²⁷ References to *dannelse* (*Bildung*) in Norwegian language generally, and in cultural policy discourses in particular, are, as I shall demonstrate in Chapters Five to Seven, instead often not articulated explicitly, but rely on unstated assumptions. Finally, it should be noted that *Bildung* could be used both when referring to the result of a process and to the process itself.²⁸

According to Belfiore and Bennett, the idea that culture, and particularly the arts, can have positive social impacts dates back as far as Classical Greece and the writings of Aristotle. Some of Aristotle's ideas, like the cathartic effects that theatre can have on its audience, have, according to these authors, reverberated through history and resonate strongly even in a contemporary discourse about the impacts of the arts.²⁹ The German tradition of the celebration of *Bildung* can also be said to be influenced by this tradition of the positive impact of culture, but as we shall see this is not necessarily exclusively the case in the context of the arts and aesthetics. Instead, as Korsgaard and Løvlie argue, there are several approaches to both enlightenment and *Bildung*.³⁰

²⁷ Rune Slagstad, 'Nasjonalbiblioteket som samfunnsinstitusjon', *Morgenbladet*, 2 - 8 September 2005, pp. 18 - 20. There is not a strong tradition for referring to the term nor the concept of *Bildung* in a British context either, (certainly not within a cultural policy context). A simplified translation when referring to the term in a British context could simply be just 'formation' as the *Bildung* process, or 'to be cultured' as the result of the *Bildung* process. Michael Forster, in his preface to his translation of some of Johan Gottfried von Herder's, work argues that the German term *Bildung* can invariably be translated to English as *form/formation*, *educate/education*, *civilise/civilisation*, *cultivate/cultivation* or *culture*, Michael N. Forster, *Johann Gottfried von Herder: Philosophical Writings*, edited and translated by Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. xliii. However, as will be seen below, this is too simplistic and does not capture the versatility of the term as well as the different meanings given to it by different thinkers.

²⁸ Hence, one can talk about both a process of *Bildung* (or a *Bildung* process) and reaching (or achieving) *Bildung*. Both these uses of the term will appear successively in this thesis.

²⁹ Belfiore and Bennett (2008).

³⁰ Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), p. 11.

Based on the two different ways in which culture and civilisation have been interpreted since the eighteenth century, as pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, I shall rely on two broad sets of theories that have attempted to establish how culture can facilitate *Bildung*. The first, if not unequivocally equating culture and civilisation then at least presenting a clear idea about how different cultures or cultural manifestations compare in a cultural hierarchy, draws on the ideas of Matthew Arnold and Thomas Carlyle. Particularly Arnold's thoughts on culture and anarchy will be given due prominence.

However, Arnold's thoughts were preceded by the notion of *Bildung*, as it appeared amongst what has been termed the Weimar circle of German thinkers around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Here, the ideas of two thinkers from this tradition (JG Herder, and W von Humboldt) will be discussed. It will be acknowledged that Matthew Arnold and Thomas Carlyle were aware of the three mentioned Weimar thinkers and also to an extent influenced by them. Hence, just as the terms 'culture' and 'civilisation' relate to each other in a complex association, and just as Vestheim's two approaches to *folkeopplysning* are also related, so are the two groups of theorists presented here. However, rather than emphasising how the thinkers might have influenced each other, their approach to *Bildung* will take centre-stage, in order to create a theoretical framework for the study of modern cultural policy in Norway.

What both sets of theories have in common is a preoccupation with how culture can improve the well-being of individuals. However, they differ in terms of what type of culture can facilitate this. Hence, taking how these writers relate to Vestheim's object and subject model of *folkeopplysning* as a starting point, it will be argued that two different blocs crystallise, with Carlyle and Arnold broadly supporting the object model and Herder and Humboldt broadly supporting the subject model. These can act as two separate theoretical rationales behind the two policy objectives of democratising culture and facilitating a cultural democracy respectively.

It should be emphasised straight away that it is not necessarily 'influential' theories that are being charted here, in the sense that I do not argue that these theories have had a direct influence on cultural policy in Norway (or anywhere else for that matter). There are, for example, few, if any, direct traces of Matthew Arnold's thinking on either Norwegian ideas in general or on Norwegian cultural policy more specifically, as in the UK. Neither will it be argued that Victorian theories are direct derivatives of those of the Weimar-thinkers, although some connections have been acknowledged.³¹ The different thinkers have been chosen for their ability to illuminate Vestheim's two different approaches to *folkeopplysning* and to create a theoretical framework within which to analyse how these play out within Norwegian cultural policy discourse in order to assess to what extent the 'civilising mission' has acted and continues to act as a rationale

³¹ Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1935), p. 70 and pp. 126 - 127, W.H. Bruford, *Culture and Society in Classical Weimar: 1775 - 1806* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 2; J.W. Burrow, 'Editor's Introduction', in J.W. Burrow (ed.), *Wilhelm Von Humboldt: The limits of state action* (Indiapolis: Liberty Fund, 1993), p. xvii and xlvi-xlvii.

behind Norwegian cultural policy. Hence, it is the differences, as well as the similarities, between the two sets of ideas and how these can illuminate this project, that are of relevance in this context.³²

The journey starts from what many regard as the heyday of German thinking and philosophy in Weimar around the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century.

1.1.1 The German concept of *Bildung* – The Weimar circle

Nielsen's broad definition of the classical German term *Bildung* presented above emphasised its preoccupation with growth processes and people's self-reflection. However, such processes have been given different meanings at different points in history and by different thinkers: the *Bildungsidee* can in other words differ.³³ The roots of the *Bildungsidee* can be traced back to the sixteenth century, but reached its crescendo in what Bruford calls 'Classical Weimar' during the second half of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.³⁴

³² By the same token, it must also be emphasised that the ideas of scholars often change during the course of their lifetime and it is thus not each writer's overall philosophy that is being presented here, but some of their ideas. It is therefore acknowledged that these might have been different before the actual work that is being cited here or might subsequently have changed again later on during each writer's career. Finally, a disclaimer must be added to the effect that I did not attempt to paint a complete picture of the Weimar thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century neither is all the thinking about culture and society in nineteenth-century England included. Instead, an eclectic mix of thoughts from a bundle of eclectically chosen thinkers have been chosen, where it is the thought's potential to support the two mentioned approaches to cultural policy that have acted as the selection criteria.

³³ Susanne Hermeling, 'Bildung – the freedom of the educated', in *Journal of Adult and Continuing Education* 9 (Autumn 2003), pp. 167 - 180.

³⁴ Bruford (1962).

It may be argued that the most influential *Bildung* thinker was Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who, particularly in his so-called *Bildung* novels (*Bildungsroman*), propagated many of the same sentiments and ideas that will be presented in this chapter. His ideas, however, were spread around a range of publications and it is hard to find a coherent strong course of argument, or a scholarly project, in his work. Hermeling, argues that the foundation of the *Bildungsidee* was laid by the philosophers of German Idealism (Kant, Hegel, Schelling and Fichte), and was theorised as a *Bildungsidee*, by Herder and Humboldt and also by the poets of the *Bildungsidee*, Goethe and Schiller. Hermeling also traces the term to the Middle Ages, and the mystics, through the Baroque period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and up to the eighteenth century. Throughout this period the term had strong Christian connotations.³⁵ The term represents a religious paradox:

How can a human being be an image³⁶ of God (*Imago Dei*) at the same time as it strives to realise what one already is, through achieving a reunion (*Imitatio Christi*).³⁷

³⁵ According to Hermeling reference was first made by the mystics of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries to *Bildung* as a symbol of how man could be reborn in the image of God or 'the moulding of the soul into the form of God' (Hermeling 2003, p. 169). During the baroque period, the term was being referred to as a battleground between the Holy Ghost and the devil, before in the eighteenth century it became a platform of a Christian ethic, which puts great emphasis on equality 'upon which the demands of a not yet established social class could be based' (ibid., p. 170). *Bildung* would thus not only harbour a liberating growth for each individual but for the whole of humanity.

³⁶ Image being *ein bild* in German; *Bildung* referring to the Image of God, (Korsgaard and Løvlie 2003, p. 10).

³⁷ Ibid.

It was however not until the eighteenth century that the term's firm connection with religion was relaxed, and the religious paradox was replaced by a pedagogical paradox:

How to obtain authority through education, when education implies being subjugated to somebody else's authority, and authority at the same time is each individual's own achievement.³⁸

The term thus became associated with some of the conundrums surrounding man's genuine realisation of his self. However, the link with the Christian religion prevailed (as was also the case with some of the Weimar thinkers), and self-development was rather referred to as an example of how individual redemption could be achieved.³⁹

Because of the already mentioned lack of a scholarly project in the writings of Goethe his writings will not be included here. Instead the focus will be on Herder and Humboldt, whose writings about *Bildung* were clearer and more coherent.⁴⁰ What all these writers had in common was a

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ The Romantic F Schlegel puts it thus: 'Becoming God, being human, educating (*bilden*) oneself are expressions that mean exactly the same' (Hermeling 2003, p. 171). The eighteenth century idea of self-development was also influenced by the thinking of Leibniz (the idea that the human soul is a self-contained entity that follows its own laws) and Shaftesbury (who emphasised the importance of self-formation in order to shape an inner moral beauty) (Hermeling 2003). I am not making a major argument out of the *bildung* term's connection with Christian thought. However, it is worth keeping this in mind when applying this theoretical framework to a study of Norwegian cultural policy as a 'civilising mission'.

⁴⁰ Again, it should be emphasised that there could be good reasons for choosing an entirely different group of *bildung* thinkers. For many, Kant and even Rousseau would spring to mind (the latter not even being German but could easily be argued to be writing in the same tradition, if not being the main inspiration of all the others). However, Kant and Rousseau's theories do not contrast so much with that of Carlyle and Arnold as Herder and Humboldt do, and are thus not so pertinent for the purpose of my work. Firstly, Rousseau (as Kant) puts more emphasises on the importance of the state; that is he argues for a political category of sovereignty based on a legal foundation, whereas for Herder and Humboldt such sovereignty should be based on culture and language of the people or the *Volk*. Another difference lies in how Rousseau makes a clear

view that the ideas of the Enlightenment are too simplistic, mechanistic and limited 'to accommodate the full richness of the concrete world and the full range of human potentialities'.⁴¹

Bildung through a wide definition of culture - Johann Gottfried von Herder

In the period between 1784 – 1791 JG Herder (1744 – 1803) published his philosophy of history, *Ideas for the Philosophy of History of Humanity*.⁴² In this seminal work Herder cautioned against a singular definition of one culture with a capital C, and advocated instead for a more diverse and complex approach to *cultures* in the plural.⁴³ Within this context of different cultures across nations but also within nations he argued that man's chief aim in life was to develop his own potential in order for him to contribute positively to the maintenance and extension of his civilisation. It was this civilisation's (in whichever form it is classified, for example as a tribe, nation or group) culture (*Kultur*), which was important for Herder. Each civilisation's humanity (*Humanität*) was at any one time, on a developing scale, implying an inherent potential for development.⁴⁴ Herder explicitly rejected the notion that the culture of some civilisations or societies should be regarded as of higher value than others. The difference between different groups of people in this respect

distinction between the formation of society and the formation of the individual, whereas Herder does not see this distinction but instead as part of one and the same process; that *Bildung* of society can only be achieved through the *Bildung* of the individual. This view is also shared by Humboldt. Finally, Kant takes a more paternalistic approach to *Bildung* where this process also contains a strong element of discipline (Korsgaard and Løvlie 2003).

⁴¹ Burrow (1993), p. xxv.

⁴² Forster (2002), p. xxxvii.

⁴³ F.M. Barnard, *J.G. Herder on social and political culture* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 24.

⁴⁴ Bruford (1962), p. 236.

was a relative one of degree and not of kind.⁴⁵ The same scale could be applied when describing the development of each individual, and wherever she was on this scale she had something to live for, which would bring her contentment.⁴⁶ This, of course, did not mean that she should not try to climb up the chain and excel, but not having reached the top (whether that would be possible or not) did not imply barbarism or that she, in any way, was ‘uncultured’. Consequently, depending on its ‘image of *Humanität*’, the self determination of each individual or civilisation will take different forms, all of which must be regarded with equal respect.⁴⁷

According to Herder, there is no such thing as a people devoid of culture. Enlightenment and culture were not concepts solely confined to Europe in the era of ‘Enlightenment’, but continuous and found world-wide. Consequently, the idea that European culture would for some reason be superior to other cultures was rejected by Herder as preposterous:

For ‘European culture’ is a mere abstraction, an empty concept. Where does, or did, it actually exist in its entirety? In which nation? In which period? Besides, it can scarcely pose as the most perfect manifestation of man’s culture, having – who can deny? – far too many deficiencies, weaknesses, perversions and abominations associated with it. Only a real misanthrope could regard European culture as the universal condition of our species. The culture of *man* is not the culture of the

⁴⁵ Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003).

⁴⁶ Bruford (1962), p. 207.

⁴⁷ Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003).

European; it manifests itself according to place and time in every people.⁴⁸

Hence, 'If we take the ideas of European culture for our standard, we shall, indeed, only find it applicable to Europe'.⁴⁹ Consequently, there was, according to Herder, 'no single standard of 'culture', in terms of which [...] human phenomena [...] could be judged' and he thus went on to apply a wide definition of culture, which did not include only works of intellectual or artistic sophistication.⁵⁰ Hence, Herder did not make any distinction between 'material' and 'non-material' manifestations of creativity, between what man *does* and *thinks*. As F. M. Barnard puts it:

Art, technology, industry and commerce form as much part of culture as do ideas, beliefs, values and myths. For culture is held to derive from both the physical and spiritual nature of man.⁵¹

All these 'material and 'non-material' manifestations of human culture were accumulated and contributed to the maintenance and extension of a civilisation, bringing it forward to future generations as well as nourishing everything that had contributed to it from previous ones. A society's collective political identity should be based on a 'common culture' rather than on a 'common sovereign power' and form a common consciousness, where, as Barnard puts it, 'each individual recognized himself as an

⁴⁸ Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 24, footnote no. 56.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 313.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 23.

⁵¹ Ibid.

integral part of a social whole'.⁵² Where the individual and collective identity merged was through language, which was the chief source of a common culture's emergence and perpetuation, which rendered it possible for a *Volk* or a nationality to be formed, and which, as described by Barnard, refers to 'a territorial unit in which men conscious of sharing a common cultural heritage are free to order their lives within a legal framework of their own making'.⁵³

However, even though each individual's cultural identity was rendered more important than voting-rights and representational democracy, it was clear that the *Volkstaat* could not be achieved without popular participation. Herder stressed the need for a political process where a decay from above (amongst the aristocratic power elite) would, combined with a growth from below, lead to a new society with this common culture. Herder acknowledged that the necessary popular participation could not happen without some guidance from 'popular leaders' whom he called the 'aristo-democrats', who would be men of intellectual excellence, rather than men of property, whose mission, importantly, would be complete once everybody had reached a political maturity. This was a kind of enlightenment *of* the people *by* the people, or at least by the representatives of the people, assisting them in 'the attainment of universal civic consciousness within the nation'.⁵⁴

⁵² Barnard (1969), p. 7.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Barnard (1969), p. 9.

Although Herder acknowledged that some guidance was needed in order to enlighten people as described above, the objective was not to 'pass down' a pre-established cultural or intellectual canon, or, adversely, to elevate the common man, and help him to achieve the cultural capital of the upper classes or the more educated. Rather than a process where man merely passively received external wisdom and intellect, for Herder *Bildung* was an:

interactive social process in which men influence each other within a specific social setting and in which they both receive from and add to their distinctive historical and communal heritage.⁵⁵

In fact Herder was sceptical about the alleged transforming power of 'refinement', 'education' and 'the arts', in accordance with the ideas of the Enlightenment. He links this to happiness and asks whether refinement actually promotes happiness:

Think not, sons of men, that a premature, disproportionate refinement or education constitutes happiness; or that the dead nomenclature of all the sciences and the pretentious parading of all the arts will help you in any way to enjoy life.⁵⁶

Instead he is afraid that too much exposure to the refined, education and the arts might have damaging effects:

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁶ Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 308.

The feeling of happiness is not acquired from words learned by rote, or a knowledge of the arts. A head stuffed with knowledge, even golden knowledge, oppresses the body, restricts the breast, dims the eye, and adds a morbid burden to one thus afflicted.⁵⁷

Happiness is instead an internal state, originating 'within the breast of every individual'.⁵⁸

The already mentioned interactive social processes where men influence each other were, by Herder, thought of as fundamental for his ideal *Volkstaat*. A basic prerequisite for this was freedom of thought and expression, which it was the State's responsibility to facilitate. However, Herder thought that clear limitations should be set as regards the areas the state should be involved in since, he argued, too many laws and regulations would only stifle human creativity. Neither was people's happiness the business of the state, because happiness could not spring from this institution: 'For how many people of the world are entirely ignorant of this institution [the state] and yet are happier than a good many devoted servants of the state'?⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Herder quoted in Barnard (1969), p. 310.

Bildung through cultural diversity and Man's own free choice - Wilhelm Von Humboldt

Like Herder, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767 – 1834) believed that everybody carries within them the potential for perfection and formulated *Bildung*,⁶⁰ as meaning 'the highest and most harmonious development of his [Man's] powers to a complete and consistent whole'⁶¹ as the true purpose of human existence.⁶² Two conditions had to be in place in order for man to be able to achieve this. He needed freedom and should be exposed to a diverse range of experiences, which Humboldt calls a 'variety of situations'.⁶³

Humboldt emphasised, just like Herder, the importance of language, and made references to the *Volkstaat* based on a common culture rather than on a political doctrine, as well as referring to a notion of community that had developed organically over time. He also argued along the same lines as Herder in terms of the importance he gave to any language and indeed any culture. However, although any language and culture should be regarded with respect, Humboldt argued that classical Greek poetry, art and philosophy were the fundamental *Bildung* ideal. However, this Hellenism should more than anything act as an inspiration and facilitate self-cultivation. As Korsgaard and Løvlie put it:

⁶⁰ Most of Wilhelm von Humboldt's thinking about *Bildung* can be found in his essay *Limits of state action* (1993), on which most of this section will be based. However, reflections around this theme can also be found scattered around several of the other publications he wrote, for example in some of his many letters that have been published. The main focus here will however be on the *Limits of state action*, and other sources are only referred to indirectly, that is through secondary sources. As with Herder, several of Humboldt's letters and diaries are yet to be translated into English.

⁶¹ Humbolt (1993), p. 10.

⁶² Hermeling (2003), p. 174.

⁶³ Humbolt (1993), p. 10.

The ethos of the past should act as the midwife for the moral and humanity of the present. The past should first and foremost act as an inspiration – literally animation and enthusiasm. *Bildung* was more important than learning and the [development of the] character more important than knowledge.⁶⁴

Humboldt defined culture widely when arguing for the type of activities that could achieve *Bildung*. He argued that if man had freedom and was exposed to a ‘variety of situations’, then whatever development and realisation he was going through was of noble value and gave ‘to human nature some worthy and determinate form’.⁶⁵ However, this could only be achieved if whatever *Bildung* activity man embarked on was not carried out simply as a means to an end, but rather succeeded ‘in filling and satisfying the wants of his soul’.⁶⁶ If the main rationale for carrying out the activity was guided by the intrinsic value of doing it, then it would awaken love and esteem and consequently contribute to the ennoblement of human nature. Hence, self-cultivation could be achieved literally through any activity or means, it was a matter of approach and attitude that would determine whether the activity would contribute to *Bildung* or not.

In fact, Humboldt was only marginally interested in how an activity improved the outside world, or whether it contributed to reaching an external objective. Instead it was how it could improve one’s inner self, or

⁶⁴ Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003), pp. 24-25.

⁶⁵ Humboldt (1993), p. 23.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

satisfy one's inner restlessness that mattered.⁶⁷ Elsewhere he wrote: 'The first rule of a true ethical code is "Improve yourself", and "Influence others through what you are" comes only second'.⁶⁸

Anything being imposed from outside through instructions and guidance which did 'not spring from a man's free choice', would not receive his full attention, 'but still remains alien to his true nature'. Such tasks or activities, would not be performed 'with truly human energies, but merely with mechanical exactness'.⁶⁹

A key concept in Humboldt's writing was thus that self-development or self education could not be imposed from above and the state would hence just act as an obstacle to a *Bildung* process. In fact, Humboldt was tempted to argue that there should be no state interference in private affairs at all, unless each individual's rights were under threat.⁷⁰ A summary of Humboldt's approach to self-cultivation has been expressed by Bruford thus: 'there must be a minimum of interference from without and a maximum of variety in their opportunities for experience'.⁷¹

Such an idea of leaving people's growth to themselves in this way was not shared by what I call the Victorian civilisers: Robert Carlyle and Matthew Arnold.

⁶⁷ W.H. Bruford, *The German tradition of Self-cultivation: Bildung from Humboldt to Thomas Mann* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 17.

⁶⁸ Humboldt quoted in Bruford (1975), pp. 14 - 15.

⁶⁹ Humboldt (1993), p. 23.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁷¹ Bruford (1975), p. 16.

1.1.2 The Victorian Civilisers

Matthew Arnold's writing about the potential formative effects of great works of art and thinking fit into an English tradition of arguments about the civilising effects of the arts, coined by thinkers, politicians and art critics alike. These arguments both predate and are again subsequent to the publication of Arnold's seminal series of essays, *Culture and Anarchy*, after which some critics explicitly refer to Arnold when phrasing their argument.⁷²

It has been acknowledged that Matthew Arnold was surely aware of the thinking that originated from the *Bildung* writers of Weimar.⁷³ However, there were, as we shall see, some significant differences in his cultural theory from that of his German predecessors. Arnold was also heavily influenced by several of his English predecessors, amongst them Thomas Carlyle (1795 – 1881)⁷⁴, who again was also influenced by the Weimar thinkers.⁷⁵ A potential chain of influences can thus be drawn from Weimar Germany via Thomas Carlyle to Matthew Arnold, whose ideas, it is again acknowledged, have been highly influential over modern British cultural policy.⁷⁶

⁷² See Janet Minihan, *The Nationalization of Culture: The Development of State Subsidies to the Arts in Great Britain* (New York: New York University Press, 1977), as well as Bennett (1995).

⁷³ Arnold in fact named Herder as an example of what he called 'great men of culture' Arnold (1935), p. 70. He also acknowledged Humboldt's work on the limits of state action (Ibid, pp. 126 - 127). See also Bruford (1962), p. 2 and Burrow (1993), p. xvii and xlvi-xlvii.

⁷⁴ Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society: 1780 – 1950* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), p. 115.

⁷⁵ Bennett (2001) p. 7, Williams (1958), p. 71. Carlyle also wrote a biography of *The Life of Schiller*; CR. Vanden Bossche, *Carlyle and the Search for Authority*, available online at www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/vandenbossche/2a.html#schiller1

⁷⁶ It must be acknowledged though that other nineteenth-century writers might also have been influenced by the Weimar thinkers, and that other nineteenth-century English writers might also

The need for a 'spiritual aristocracy' - Thomas Carlyle

It should be noted that the critics from Victorian England conducted their criticism in response to, and under different conditions from, the Weimar circle. By the time Carlyle, and subsequently Arnold, coined their critique, English society was to a great extent being characterised by industrialism and capitalism, whereas the German society, which Herder and Humboldt wrote about, could largely be described as pre-industrial.

In his seminal essay 'Sign of the Times' (1829) Carlyle described the time of his writing around the 1820s as the Age of Machinery, where the mechanical had invaded all spheres of life in such a way that no longer were men masters of the mechanical, but had instead become slaves to it. Even the internal and spiritual dimensions of life (including art) had been subdued to mechanics. All the industrial and technical advances had resulted in a formidable material accumulation of wealth, however, only at the expense of the internal and the spiritual. Carlyle lamented this deeply. 'Philosophy, Science, Art, Literature all depend on machinery'⁷⁷ he argued, and 'Men are grown mechanical in head and in heart, as well as in hand'.⁷⁸

This mechanical hegemony also influenced the way government was perceived, where, according to Carlyle, there was an over inflated interest

have influenced British cultural policy, and finally that Arnold was also influenced by other English thinkers but Carlyle; Williams, for example, mentions Coleridge, Burke and Newman (Williams (1958), p. 115).

⁷⁷ Thomas Carlyle, *The Collected Works of Thomas Carlyle* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1858), p. 102, available online at www.victorianweb.org/authors/carlyle/signs1.html

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

in political arrangements: 'Where the laws, the government, in good order, all were well with us; the rest would care for itself'.⁷⁹

This worried Carlyle, because his answer to the lack of spiritual and inner growth was, in contrast to that of Herder and Humboldt: rather more government than less. Although the government was preoccupied with laws, it still took, in his view, too much of a *laissez-faire*⁸⁰ approach to politics. However, a strong government did not necessarily mean more democracy, which to Carlyle again seemed to represent machinery, and a rather unhealthy preoccupation with power. Democracy was surely not the answer, for 'while civil liberty is more and more secured to us, our moral liberty is all but lost', and whilst 'free in hand and foot, we are shackled in heart and soul with far straiter than feudal chains'.⁸¹ For Carlyle there lay no finality in democracy, because it could not free man from the mentioned shackles. Democracy offers nothing, 'except emptiness, and the free chance to win'.⁸² In fact he saw democracy as representing the same as *laissez-faire*, because it left men to follow their own interest.

What was needed to free man from his shackles was a 'spiritual aristocracy', as Williams puts it, 'a highly cultivated and responsible minority, concerned to define and emphasize the highest values at which

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 106.

⁸⁰ Laissez-faire; meaning that activities in society would be subject to a minimum of governmental interference.

⁸¹ Carlyle (1858), p. 115.

⁸² Quoted in Williams (1958), p. 79.

society must aim'.⁸³ Such a class of 'Writing and Teaching Heroes' should form the back-bone of a strong government, whose prime task was to educate.

To impart the gift of thinking to those who cannot think, and yet who could in that case think: this, one would imagine, was the first function a government had to set about discharging.⁸⁴

Several of the ideas and critiques coined by Carlyle clearly influenced Matthew Arnold who, it could be argued, developed them into a more coherent normative cultural theory.

Matthew Arnold

Matthew Arnold's seminal series of essays brought together under the title of *Culture and Anarchy* was published in the UK in 1865. Here Arnold expressed his fear of what increased liberalism and freedom for the individual could lead to. He was critical of a prevalent notion that 'it is a most happy and important thing for a man merely to be able to do as he likes', without much consideration as to 'what he is to do when he is thus free to do as he likes'.⁸⁵ Arnold was afraid that this increased freedom for everybody could lead to anarchy. In fact, Arnold was pessimistic and disillusioned with the time he was living in, which he considered to be preoccupied with ends rather than means and the mechanical nature of nineteenth-century society.

⁸³ Williams (1958), p. 84.

⁸⁴ Quoted in Williams (1958), p. 82.

⁸⁵ Arnold (1935), p. 74.

His answer to these potential difficulties was culture, which he argued would benefit both each individual citizen and society as a whole:

Culture, which is the study of perfection, leads us [...] to conceive of true human perfection as a *harmonious* perfection, developing all sides of our humanity; and a *general* perfection, developing all parts of our society.⁸⁶

Although Arnold's notion of culture did include all sides of humanity he was not particularly referring to ordinary people's own expressions, but instead to a culture of perfection through great works of art and thought (Perfection and Intelligence or what Arnold called Sweetness and Light).

His culture was defined as:

a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know, on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said in the world.⁸⁷

In order to administer this culture of 'Sweetness and Light' and make sure it was being diffused to as many as possible, Arnold argued, just like Carlyle, for the importance of a strong state. The English state at the time was not one of a strong central power, but was rather ruled through the principle of *laissez-faire*. However, who should lead the state? It was in response to this that Arnold launched his idea of the 'great men of culture', who:

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 6.

are those who have had a passion for diffusing, for making prevail, for carrying from one end of society to the other, the best knowledge, the best ideas of their time; who have laboured to divest knowledge of all that was harsh, uncouth, difficult, abstract, professional, exclusive; to humanise it, to make it efficient outside the clique of the cultivated and learned, yet still remaining the best knowledge and thought of the time, and a true source, therefore, of sweetness and light.⁸⁸

However, it was not immediately obvious where these 'great men of culture' were to be found. Arnold, like Carlyle, could not see how any of the social classes in the UK at the time, as an entity, could fulfil such a noble task. Similarly to Herder who talked about a 'decay from above', Arnold argued that the aristocracy, which he termed the Barbarians, was not suited because they were too preoccupied with defending the *status quo* and were unable to approach new ideas. The middle class (or the Philistines) was also useless because they were too focused on their own individual success and the faith in 'machinery'. Finally, the working class (or the Populace) was either too eager to become Philistines or simply too degraded and brutal to contribute anything towards the sweetness and light that Arnold argued was needed. The majority of people within all these classes lived in what Arnold called their 'ordinary selves', and they could not see beyond the interests of their own class.

Arnold's response to this was to identify a fictitious group of people who instead were driven by their 'best selves'. These were people 'who are

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

mainly led, not by their class spirit, but by a general *humane* spirit, by the love of human perfection'.⁸⁹ Such people, whom Arnold called 'aliens' and who to an extent resemble Herder's notion of 'aristo-democrats', existed within all the three classes, and needed not to be feared because they represented unity and harmony and would hence not clash with other 'ordinary selves' and were thus fit to govern the nation's culture with authority as 'the great men of culture'. However, as pointed out by Bennett, Arnold never said anything about how these 'great men of culture' should be identified.⁹⁰

1.2 A theoretical framework

There are clear similarities between the ideas of the four thinkers presented above, but when analysing them in more detail two different blocs crystallize: Herder and Humboldt versus Carlyle and Arnold. What the ideas of all the thinkers have in common were the importance of what the Weimar thinkers called *Bildung*, and which Nielsen has described as human growth processes. They all also acknowledged that this could be facilitated through culture (however this was defined). However, the prescription for what is needed in order to achieve this varies between the two blocs.

In Herder and Humboldt's thinking self-development or self-cultivation was the prime objective of *Bildung*. It was thus man himself who had to

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 109.

⁹⁰ Bennett (2005).

take responsibility for his development. Humboldt also went as far as saying that anything imposed from outside would not work; whatever man does must spring from his own choice. This again, would, according to Herder, contribute to the wider civilisation (although it should be noted that this was of less importance to Humboldt).

Arnold agreed that any development of society as such hinged on the development of the individual. However, his view of who the agent for this development should be, contrasts with that of Herder and Humboldt. The guidance had to come from outside, from a selected few who were guided by their 'best selves'. Ordinary people, no matter their class-background, were just too concerned with their own interests and their cultivation could not be left to themselves. This echoes Carlyle, who referred to the need for a 'spiritual aristocracy'. Herder also talked about 'aristo-democrats' who in a transitional period would help people start their self-cultivation, but he stressed that they should be 'popular leaders' whose remit would expire once the process of self-cultivation had started. Hence, the two blocs' approach to *Bildung* differed: the position of Herder and Humboldt can be described as supporting enlightenment *of* the people *by* the people, as opposed to Carlyle and Arnold who prescribed enlightenment *of* the people.

How the theories differ regarding who should be the agent for the development and cultivation of man is linked to the thinkers' attitude to people's freedom. Where Herder and Humboldt argued that freedom of

thought and expression were an absolute prerequisite for an environment within which it was possible to achieve *Bildung*, Arnold, although he did not reject the increased level of freedom being granted to people in Victorian England, seems to have been more preoccupied with what people would do with this freedom. This again might explain the thinkers' different position regarding the role of the state, where Herder and Humboldt wanted less state interference and in reality advocated a *laissez-faire* approach to government, whereas Arnold and Carlyle took the diametrically opposite view and lamented the government's hands-off approach in England of their time. A stronger state did not necessarily mean more democracy though, and Carlyle even rejected this outright.

Regarding the means through which *Bildung* could be achieved, there were also differences. Arnold referred to a culture of perfection, which was partly pursued by beauty, as the basis for his civilising project.⁹¹ This is challenged by Herder who rejected the notion that the culture of any people or civilisation (however this was defined) could be regarded as barbaric or coarse, which is linked to what culture, according to him and Humboldt, encapsulated. They defined culture widely and argued that all civilisations or cultures (in the plural), wherever they were located historically, geographically or socially, were of equal value.

As will be seen in Chapter Four, a subject oriented approach to cultural policy has long traditions in Norway. This started with the Populist

⁹¹ Arnold (1935), p. 72.

Nationalist counter cultural movements in the nineteenth century, was kept warm in the socialist Labour-movement of the early twentieth century and was turned into a real policy-programme in the 1970s. By then it had also been informed by an international trend in cultural policy thinking, which had emerged in response to what had become the dominating approach: the democratisation of culture, the objective of which, to a large extent, tallies with the ideas of Matthew Arnold, and was countered by this new trend which had cultural democracy as its objective.⁹² It is striking how many of Herder and Humboldt's ideas can be traced in these cultural democracy policies, which were based on the idea that people should have more influence over cultural policy decisions and the allocation of money. Hence, the policies entailed more cultural policy decisions to be taken at a local level away from central government: that is, to minimise state intervention. These cultural policies did not only include signifying practices or aesthetic experiences but defined culture widely, which implicitly meant that cultural hierarchies were, if not abandoned, at least given less importance. Finally, a key corner-stone in this, by then, 'new' cultural policy was active participation as supposed to passive exposure to excellent art.

Table One below summarises the differences in ideas between the two groups of thinkers and how this again relates to the two policy objectives of democratisation of culture and cultural democracy.

⁹² J.A. Simpson, *Towards cultural democracy* (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 1976).

Summary of <i>Bildung</i> ideas	
Herder and Humboldt	Carlyle and Arnold
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enlightenment <i>by</i> the people (self-cultivation) • Minimise state intervention • Wide definition of culture • All cultures and civilisations of equal value • All activities must spring from man's own choice • <i>Bildung</i> through active participation or through exposure to a 'variety of situations' • Freedom a prerequisite 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enlightenment <i>of</i> the people (paternalistically imposed) • Stronger state • Culture as Beauty and perfection • Clear cultural hierarchies • Guidance should come from a selected few who are guided by their 'best selves' • Growth through exposure to Beauty and excellence • Concern with what people do with their freedom
Approach to <i>Bildung</i>:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Subject oriented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Object oriented
Related objective in modern cultural policy	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural democracy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democratisation of culture

Table 1: Subject vs. Object approach to *Folkeopplysning*: Summary of ideas

However, it should be noted that there are still many similarities between both groups of thinkers and the corresponding cultural policy objectives. Chris Bilton, for example, points out that it is a mistake to see the two above-mentioned policy objectives (democratisation of culture versus cultural democracy) as completely separate and unrelated. In his view, both rely on idealistic assumptions that aesthetic experiences can have transforming effects on the individual.⁹³ Hence the division between the

⁹³ Chris Bilton, 'Towards cultural democracy: Contradiction and crisis in British and U.S. cultural policy 1870 – 1990' (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, 1997).

two concepts is far from clear and obvious. As we shall see in Chapter Five, the idea of cultural democracy has, in Norway, not been exclusively preoccupied with aesthetic experiences. However, cultural democracy advocates have, as has also been pointed out by Oliver Bennett, in similar ways to those advocating the democratisation of culture, 'accorded culture and the arts a key role in personal and social transformation'.⁹⁴ In other words, although they appear to be different they are both 'essentially "culturalist"'.⁹⁵

Even a subject oriented approach to *Bildung* has to rely on a certain element of selection. Rather than a curriculum imposed by a benign, but paternalistic state, education was for Humboldt 'essentially the modification of our sensibility through culture and experience'.⁹⁶ However, J.W. Burrow, who edited and translated into English Humboldt's *The Limits of State Action*, points out that there is an inherent dilemma in this, in that no matter how liberal an educational system is, somebody has got to make curricular decisions.⁹⁷ In one of a few direct references to Humboldt, Arnold himself commented that although Humboldt wished for less state intervention he was flexible enough to conclude that it would take a long time before the objective to have each individual stand

⁹⁴ Oliver Bennett, 'Cultural Policy and the Crisis of Legitimacy: Entrepreneurial Answers in the United Kingdom' (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, Working Paper 2, University of Warwick, 1996), p. 7.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Burrow (1993), p. lv.

⁹⁷ The irony is that Humboldt went on to become Minister of Education and Art in 1806, and hence responsible for the syllabus of the Prussian *Gymnasia*. Burrow continues by arguing that this syllabus might have been wider than most alternatives, but 'it was still a selection from a number of possibilities', Burrow (1993), p. xlvii.

'perfect on his own', would be fulfilled.⁹⁸ In a similar fashion Barnard argues that Herder was 'realistic enough' when he recommended that, albeit only for a transitional period, a group of 'aristo-democrats' were needed to support growth from below in response to the decay from above.⁹⁹ To conclude that these two approaches to culture and democracy are diametrically in opposition to each other is thus premature. It can therefore be argued that to divide *Bildung* motivated cultural policies into two clear factions: subject focused versus object focused is rather too neat. Both have *Bildung* as their prime objective and as we shall see in Chapter Five, in modern Norwegian cultural policy of the late twentieth century, they have existed fairly harmoniously together.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Oliver Bennett argues that the civilising mission has traditionally been based on the assumption that European high art is of superior value. However, in a Norwegian context I shall argue that there is also a civilising dimension to the cultural policy efforts that aim to facilitate a cultural democracy, although this has very much been based on the assumption that people themselves should decide which cultural activities that were perceived to have a *Bildung* potential. However, there have been limits to such codetermination, which has traditionally, as we shall see, not included culture presented in a commercial context. Policies that aim to help people achieve *Bildung*, whether this is sought through the exposure to the 'high' arts or through participation in cultural activities that people, or their representatives,

⁹⁸ Arnold (1935), pp. 126 - 127.

⁹⁹ Barnard (1969), p. 9.

have chosen themselves, are both initiated with the aim to give people guidance, pulling them out of their ignorance, forming their character and encouraging an ordered mind: in short they all aim to make people more civilised. Even policies that aim to allow people themselves to define their own cultural activities are rooted in this objective. Hence, although this term is not used in Norwegian I shall apply *Bildung* when identifying references to such human growth processes in Norwegian cultural policy discourse. Similarly, both the two theoretical traditions outlined in this chapter will be brought forward into the next chapters in my analysis of how both the *subject* and *object* models have been applied within Norwegian cultural policy.

1.3 Summary

This chapter has presented two sets of thinkers who have approached how culture can facilitate *Bildung*. Although it was acknowledged that the theories had not necessarily been directly influential on Norwegian cultural policy, it was argued that they were useful in debating and conceptualising policy objectives in Norway. It was further argued that of the ideas by the four thinkers presented, those of Arnold and Carlyle supported an object oriented approach to *Bildung* and hence the policy objective of democratising culture, whilst those of Herder and Humboldt supported a subject oriented approach and hence the policy objective of facilitating a cultural democracy. With reference to Chris Bilton and Oliver Bennett it was argued, however, that the differences between the

rationales behind these two policy objectives are subtle, in that they both rely on assumptions that culture can have transforming effects on the individual, or by using the Weimar thinkers' term: that they could both be a process of, or facilitate, *Bildung*.

The ideas presented by the thinkers in this chapter were all normative in the sense that they prescribed recipes for how *Bildung* could be achieved and they all assumed that everybody carried within them the potential to grow and to become a fuller person. However, none of these thinkers proposed to use culture to cement power relations or as a means for the state to govern its subjects. The scholarship of other writers has taken a more critical approach to how culture acts as a central component in a struggle for power. This is the subject of the next chapter.

2.0 The Civilising Mission: Hegemony and Government

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Matthew Arnold's theory of culture was highly idealistic. He sincerely believed that many of England's challenges at the time of his writing could be met by letting in more 'sweetness and light'. However, he did not subscribe to the idea that culture was to be used as a factor in conserving existing power structures. Instead, according to Bennett, he:

specifically rejects the idea of possessing culture, of culture as an engine of social or class distinction, separating its holder, like a badge or title, from other people who have not got it.¹⁰⁰

Other writers have approached cultural theory rather differently and acknowledged to a greater extent Raymond Williams' dictum that:

the one vital lesson which the nineteenth century had to learn [...] was that the basic economic organization could not be separated and excluded from its moral and intellectual concerns.¹⁰¹

Herder and Humboldt had emphasised the potential to gain freedom through culture. However, they referred predominately to an 'inner freedom': in fact they had all turned their back on the French revolution, with its 'vulgar' preoccupation with democracy, and material redistribution.

¹⁰⁰ Bennett (2005), p. 468.

¹⁰¹ Williams (1958), p. 25.

However, as already mentioned, according to Vestheim, growth and empowerment achieved through *Bildung* could also be applied by people to fight a tangible, as opposed to an inner cause, or for groups or classes to position themselves in relation to other groups in society. Such an instrumental use of culture to position a class or a 'bloc' of people, in relation to other classes, or to use culture to achieve consent about a cause or a certain understanding of reality in order to defend or create a 'hegemony', has less to do with both the Weimar thinkers or Carlyle's and Arnold's idealism. It is instead related to culture's power-potential, where, rather than to facilitate inner growth, culture's perceived civilising potential might act as an instrument to 'govern', or be used as an instrument to maintain or dispute existing class relations in, perhaps, more sinister ways.

Hence, following the previous chapter's attempt to develop a theoretical framework in order to analyse the two approaches to *Bildung*, this chapter will move on to discuss two different theoretical approaches to the question whether the promotion of *Bildung* in some way may be related to power, which again will be used to formulate a methodology for the empirical section in the following chapter. This chapter will focus on some of the ideas of the Italian neo-Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his concept of hegemony, and some of the ideas of the French thinker Michel Foucault and his concept of 'governmentality' as well as his emphasis on how power is manifest through discourses of 'truth'. I have chosen these two thinkers because they are complementary, and although their approaches

might be perceived to be in diametrical opposition to each other, I will argue that a theoretical framework that includes the ideas of both is of benefit to my investigation of Norwegian cultural policy as a civilising mission. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the final section will compare some of the ideas of these two thinkers.

2.1 Antonio Gramsci and the notion of cultural hegemony

Robert Hewison argues that the power structure within the arts sector in Britain exemplifies how the elite sections, or the upper classes, have used culture to achieve consent in order to cement their power. Hewison cites T.S. Eliot as a writer who embraced the cultural importance of the elite in society. Although a guardian of the world's great artistic achievements, he did not quite agree with Matthew Arnold regarding the democratisation of culture. Eliot argued that 'the true purpose of education was 'to preserve the class and to select the elite',¹⁰² rightly interpreted by Hewison as implying that 'The elite would preserve Culture – and Culture would preserve the elite'.¹⁰³

As opposed to Arnold's paternalistic 'care' and his argument about culture's inherently beneficial potential, Eliot emphasised that an essential condition for the preservation of the quality of culture with a capital 'C', or what he referred to as the 'more conscious part of culture' was 'that it

¹⁰² T.S. Eliot, *Notes towards the Definition of Culture* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1948), p. 100.

¹⁰³ Robert Hewison, *Culture and Consensus: England, art and politics since 1940* (London: Methuen, 1995), p. 53.

should continue to be a minority culture' for the 'cultured' classes and elites.¹⁰⁴

However, according to Hewison, such a national elite culture must be treated carefully by the dominant group in order for it to be an efficient tool for the country's leadership.¹⁰⁵ Hence, it is not sufficient for the elite to exclusively treat this culture as a minority culture. Instead, the dominant classes of society must be employed in servicing but also in policing culture. It is important that the culture of the dominant class is not enjoyed exclusively by that class, but disseminated to the whole of society, so that the dominant culture 'becomes identified with the culture of society as a whole'.¹⁰⁶ According to Gramsci, bourgeois-democratic forms of rule differed from those of the previous ruling classes, such as the sovereign rulers prior to the eighteenth century, in that they were not exclusive, and cut off from the populace. Instead, according to Tony Bennett, the bourgeois-democratic forms of rule aimed:

not merely at exacting the obedience of the popular classes but further aspire[d] to win their active support for, and participation in, the projects of the ruling classes¹⁰⁷.

Bennett continues that, according to Gramsci, this is the end to which:

¹⁰⁴ Eliot (1948), p. 107

¹⁰⁵ Hewison (1995), p. 15.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

¹⁰⁷ Tony Bennett, *Culture: A Reformer's Science* (London: Sage Publications, 1998a), pp. 67 - 68.

all of the major ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society – from popular schooling through the media to the institutions of art and culture – are dedicated.¹⁰⁸

The operative principle behind this bourgeois hegemony of consent is primarily psychological, where the subordinate classes are repeatedly being made subject to bourgeois ideologies and values. Hence, even though the working class, or the working class together with the peasants, would outnumber all other classes (this was certainly the case at the time of Gramsci's writing), obtaining socialism through democratic means (which indeed was the objective of the social-democratic movement), is, according to Gramsci, impossible. Such an objective is purely illusory because the ideological power in the public sphere 'neutralizes the democratic potential of the representative State [...] through [...] its indoctrination through the means of communication'.¹⁰⁹ Gramsci argued that the bourgeois hegemony in Western democracies had reached a stage where its ideology and understanding of reality had prevailed over all other subordinate groups, which had thus brought about:

not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages, not on a corporate but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the

¹⁰⁸ Bennett: (1998a), p 68.

¹⁰⁹ Perry Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', in *New Left Review* 100 (November - December 1976), p. 28.

hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.¹¹⁰

When Gramsci referred to civil society as the arena where the bourgeoisie exercised its ideological power he was referring to ‘the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”’,¹¹¹ including institutions like the church, trade unions, schools and so on. To this, referring to Hewison’s interpretation of hegemony when analysing the British arts sector, could be added arts organisations and other cultural institutions such as national broadcasting. The function of ‘hegemony’, which the dominant group exercises throughout society, comprised of:

The spontaneous consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.¹¹²

As opposed to Arnold’s idealistic faith in culture as a benign tool for the common good, Gramsci’s idea of the intellectual and moral leadership on which the supremacy of the ruling group was based has the domination of antagonistic groups and the leadership of kindred groups as its objective. Arnold did not explicitly propagate such domination. For example, he did not have sufficient faith in the objectives of the members of any existing

¹¹⁰ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 181 - 182.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 12.

¹¹² Ibid.

single class in society because they were not necessarily guided by their 'best selves'.

Gramsci argued that the bourgeois power in the West had undergone a shift from a previous situation, which was determined by force, domination and violence, to one of consent, hegemony and civilisation,¹¹³ or a shift from a political hegemony exercised through the state to a civil hegemony exercised through civil society.¹¹⁴ Such a hegemony was an unstable equilibrium between the dominant group and the subordinate groups, where the former had to take account of the 'interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised',¹¹⁵ meaning the leading group had to make some sacrifices on behalf of subordinate groups. This was a perpetual battle based on an 'incurable structural contradiction' between different groups in the hegemony. However, even though the hegemony was ethico-political, in the sense that it bonded society by means of ideological, moral and cultural

¹¹³ Anderson (1976), pp. 20 - 21.

¹¹⁴ It is this concept of Civil Hegemony that is of interest here. Elsewhere in his writing, Gramsci argues that the dominant group in society uses both coercion and consent in order to achieve hegemony; that is both a concept of political Hegemony through the state and a civil hegemony through civil society and that power is exercised through a combination of these. Elsewhere the distinction between civil and political society disappears altogether. 'Thus, in the enigmatic mosaic that Gramsci laboriously assembled in prison, the words "State", "civil society" "political society", "hegemony", "domination" or "direction" all undergo a persistent *slippage*', (Anderson (1976), p. 25). However, it is acknowledged that it is the notion of Civil Hegemony that is mostly prevalent in Gramsci's writing, and certainly the one that has been most influential and also most relevant for my argument. The mentioned persistent slippage is probably due to the extremely difficult conditions under which Gramsci wrote. From November 1926, Gramsci was imprisoned by the Italian Fascist dictatorship and was either still imprisoned or medically too weak to leave prison until his death in April 1937. All of Gramsci's work referred to in this dissertation was written during this period. To avoid his notes and letters being censored by his prison guards, he had to conceal his true message when writing. For example when referring to different groups or classes in society, Gramsci tended to 'neutralise' his position through generalisations. The bourgeoisie and the proletariat for example often 'alternate simultaneously as the hypothetical subjects of the same passage – whenever, in fact, Gramsci writes in the abstract of a "dominant class"' (Anderson (1976), p. 20).

¹¹⁵ David Forgacs, *A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988), p. 211.

cements, it also had to be economic, and this is what sustained the hegemonies in the West, where the bourgeoisie both kept control of the economy and exercised a cultural, moral and ideological leadership. 'Cultural activity' and a 'cultural front' were necessary 'alongside the merely economic and political ones'.¹¹⁷ Given that this thesis is concerned with how culture has been applied to civilise, it is this cultural, moral and ideological leadership, rather than the purely economic one, that is of most interest here.

Tony Bennett also refers to Gramsci in his study on the development of Western public museums where he argues that 'a Gramscian perspective is essential to an adequate theorization of the museum's relations to bourgeois-democratic politics'.¹¹⁸

However, Bennett continues by saying that a Gramscian analysis of hegemony is only equipped to analyse the broader cultural battles and alliances in society, and does not take account of the specific rationales inherent within different sectors or indeed within particular institutions. In order to unpick what he calls the political rationality of the museum, Bennett argues that Gramsci's theories fall short, because the study of hegemony appears to be 'institutionally indifferent'. This gap can be filled through the scholarship of Michel Foucault, which takes institutions, their technologies and their discourses as the starting point for its analysis of power.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 194.

¹¹⁸ Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, theory, politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 91.

2.2 Governmentality and discourse: Michel Foucault

Governmentality

In Michel Foucault's lecture on Governmentality, 'government' and 'to govern' were posed as central terms. He argued that since the sixteenth century a new, more complex approach to government has emerged, breaking with a Machiavellian inspired account, which only emphasised a strong leader, with scant attention being paid to the ruler's principality. This new approach put more emphasis on how each individual citizen should behave and conduct his affairs. Man's successful government of himself would enable him to govern his family (meaning his goods and his patrimony), which again was a prerequisite for a successful government of the state. There was thus an upward continuity between man, family and the state, but also a downward continuity, which stipulated that 'when a state is well run, the head of the family will know how to look after his family, his goods and his patrimony, which means that individuals will, in turn, behave as they should'.¹¹⁹

The link in this continuity is the government of the family where 'the art of government' is thus how to introduce the meticulous attention of the father into the management of the state:

¹¹⁹ Michel Foucault, 'Governmentality', in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.), *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 92.

that is to say, the correct manner of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family (which a good father is expected to do in relation to his wife, children and servants) and of making the family fortune prosper.¹²⁰

Hence, just as a father would exercise a certain amount of surveillance and control over his household and goods, similar mechanisms would be introduced to monitor the state's inhabitants' wealth and behaviour. The family thus becomes a model for the 'art of government', which has as its objective to create common welfare for all through a set of specific 'finalities', such as to ensure:

that the greatest possible quantity of wealth is produced, that the people are provided with sufficient means of subsistence, that the population is enabled to multiply, etc.¹²¹

The sovereign prince had previously not been interested in any of this, as long as he could accumulate his wealth and keep his enemies, whether internal or external, at bay. He would thus instead have governed primarily through law.

Foucault observed (as did Gramsci) that from about the middle of the eighteenth century, the sovereignty of single rulers started to loosen its grip in Europe. However, whereas Gramsci emphasised how this made the bourgeoisie want the popular classes to support and participate in

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Foucault (1991), p. 95.

their culture, Foucault emphasised how this power-transmission from a principality to the emerging bourgeois class enabled the family as a model for the 'art of government' to become mobilised at an aggregated level on the entire population.

It could of course be thought that a consequence of the shift from a sovereign prince to more democratic types of government would be a decreased need for discipline. Foucault argued the opposite and said that:

the need for discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the moment when it became important to manage a population; the managing of a population not only concerns the collective mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its depths and its details.¹²²

Hence, by the time bourgeois parliamentary democracies were established across much of Europe in the nineteenth century, in order to secure cohesion and prevent deviations from normality, the increased freedom and rights which followed were, according to Foucault, combined with a tightly knit grid of disciplinary coercions, the purpose of which was to survey and control the same people. This can be compared to Gramsci's idea of how a ruling class, through the state and its political hegemony, had coercive forces at its disposal to protect the hegemony should the consent of the civil hegemony be threatened. The difference

¹²² Ibid., p. 102.

was that Foucault did not, like Gramsci, relate this to a conflict between different social groups or social classes, but emphasised instead the disciplining and governing potentials within institutions, like the prison, the asylum, the school and the hospital.¹²³

According to Tony Bennett, the mentioned aggregation of the populace into a people also had its effect in the area of culture:

For it was the emerging ascendancy of new ways of thinking about the population which made it intelligible to expect that general benefits might result from culture's more extended distribution.¹²⁴

Elsewhere Bennett argues that it is due to such a governmentality that modern governments have increasingly become preoccupied with culture as 'a distinctive area of policy concern'.¹²⁵ Consequently, he argues that the whole academic field of cultural policy studies can be perceived to be preoccupied with 'the many and diverse ways governments seek to influence cultural activity' through:

'a historically distinctive set of concerns and relationships through which cultural resources are managed in ways that are calculated to regulate

¹²³ As will be shown later on in this chapter, Tony Bennett has suggested the public museum as an example of a cultural institution with disciplining power. Others have argued that literary education, and to an extent also the theatre have been used for the same objective (H. Lee, 'Use of civilising claims: Three moments in British theatre history', in *Poetics* 36.4 (2008), pp. 287 - 300).

¹²⁴ Bennett (1998a), p. 124.

¹²⁵ Tony Bennett, 'Culture and Policy – Acting on the Social', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 4.2 (1998b), pp. 271 - 289.

ways of life and the relationships between them with a view to, in so doing, acting on the social in a particular manner'.¹²⁶

Implicit in this statement about what constitutes the field of cultural policy studies lies a subscription to a Foucauldian understanding of the government of culture, which has as its objective, through cultural policies, to 'influence on the relationships between different ways of life', to 'provide a means of acting on the social'¹²⁷, through a construction of a particular society, meaning a specific realm of conducts and relationships.

Taking such an approach to governmentality, where culture is used to influence people's conducts and relationships, Tony Bennett has researched what he calls the birth of the museum. Rather than approach the function and power of museums, in a broad context using grand theories like Marxism, he studies their role by focusing specifically on what he calls the political rationality of the institutions itself, which he argues has been different from the rhetoric that governs their stated aim. Bennett acknowledges that museums have had an important role to play in the Gramscian thesis that a ruling class will rule partly by means of making concessions to other classes to retain hegemony, in that it has 'allowed' people from the lower classes to mingle and mix with the elite in order to facilitate social cohesion. Such promotion of social cohesion across classes was one of the objectives behind the museums that were established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, at the same time museums also served as instruments to differentiate people,

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 272.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 278 - 279.

through techniques of regulation and self-regulation with the objective of improving people's manners. Bennett argues that:

the practices of the museum served to drive a wedge between the publics it attracted and that recalcitrant portion of the population whose manners remained those of the tavern and the fair.¹²⁸

According to Bennett, the museum aimed to contribute to cohesion around a bourgeois hegemony through promoting its activities as representing a culture, which was primarily bourgeois but framed as belonging to all, at the same time as it also contributed to the same hegemony through the programming of behaviour. Analysing the museum as a 'technology of behaviour management', which took on these tasks due to its own political rationality, makes this Foucauldian analysis of the power of the museum different from a Gramscian one, although the approaches are connected.

The discourse of 'truth'

Foucault also added that governmental power could not be exercised without upholding a universally held 'truth'. A bourgeois democracy would have fewer visible tools of power than an absolute ruler. Hence, according to Foucault 'we are subjected to the production of truth through

¹²⁸ Bennett (1995), p. 99.

power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth'.¹²⁹

This truth is produced through discourses, which according to Iver Neumann can be understood as a system:

for production of a set of statements and expressions, which, through being written into institutions and to appear as more or less normal, constitute reality for its bearers and have a degree of regularity in a set of social relations.¹³⁰

Whoever can develop (or construct) a discourse of truth will potentially have the power to set the agenda and determine what can be discussed and what cannot. Or, as Robert Young has remarked, once 'discursive practices' of truth are established, it becomes 'virtually impossible to think outside of them'.¹³¹

Such discursive practices can also act as instruments, which secure cultural cohesion and prevent deviations from normality, through the way they 'produce' people's skills and understanding. As described by Pål Augestad:

¹²⁹ Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures', in Michael Kelly (ed.), *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 31.

¹³⁰ Iver B. Neumann, *Norge – en kritikk: Begrepsmakt i Europa-debatten* (Oslo: Pax, 2001a), p. 18.

¹³¹ Robert Young (ed.), *Untying the Text: A Post-Structuralist Reader* (London and New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 48.

People's thinking and actions can be influenced by getting [them] to subscribe to certain sets of knowledge and models of understanding - getting them to use these as a basis on which to understand reality and oneself.¹³²

According to Foucault, power does not have to be suppressive in the sense that it is guarded by sticks, penalties, rules and regulations. It can just as much invest in pleasure. Power can be concealed in what appears as enjoyable and obvious, where power, knowledge and pleasure are tightly connected.¹³³ As an example, Augestad describes how Norwegian health policy has managed to institutionalise the enjoyment of living a healthy life, through a discursive power which penetrates people's behaviour and makes things which many at the outset regard as less pleasant, like eating healthily and exercising, be perceived as enjoyable.¹³⁴ The power produces pleasure and expectations, and this is made obvious to everybody through the production of truths, as manifested by knowledge and discourse. These expectations are subscribed to by, if not all, then at least the majority, and they do not necessarily need to correlate with one's own actual behaviour. Most people who only eat burgers and other junk-food and become overweight in the process, appreciate and 'buy into' the superiority of salads, vegetables and other healthy food, in other words the latter are, by most, positioned at a higher level within a 'food-hierarchy'. The message that

¹³² Pål Augestad, 'Resept for et sunnere Norge: Et foucaultsk blick på norsk helsepolitikk', in *Sosiologi i dag* 35.2 (2005), pp. 33 - 52.

¹³³ Ibid., p. 44.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

salad is best is internalised beyond people's own behaviour. The government's objective, though, is that through this pleasure discourse people will, over time at least, change their behaviour.

2.3 Gramsci and Foucault – strange bedfellows?

Rather than applying a totalising form of analysis on power relations between different classes or groups in society as Gramsci did, Foucault was preoccupied with the micro power of individual institutions, and on the 'singularity' of events. In other words, rather than analysing social structures in society, Foucault's focus was on strategies and mechanisms, in other words, on the application of power. Such an approach to the study of social phenomena will inevitably determine the methodologies applied to the research problem in question, and at first glance, this seems incompatible with a Gramscian focus on hegemony. Some contemporary scholars, like Tony Bennett, argue that Gramsci's focus on hegemony was too preoccupied with an antagonism between the people and a bourgeois power bloc. Bennett further argues that the problem with a Gramscian criticism is that it:

is often a politics which is all phrase and no content, except for a rhetorically contrived one; a politics in which everything is invested in the production of a 'people versus the power-bloc' antagonism, but one in which it becomes impossible to say who 'the people' are or who they

might be, whom this category should include and whom it should exclude.¹³⁵

The subscription to such a people/power bloc antagonism as a basis for the study of power rests on the assumption that the fundamental, or the ruling, classes' structural economic importance forms a relatively fixed point of reference, around which all the subordinate groups in society can form a unitary force of opposition.¹³⁶ According to Bennett, to perceive power struggles in this way is too simplistic. This antagonism is even more problematic when applied to the Norwegian context where, as will be shown in Chapters Four and Five, the correlation between economic control and hegemonic power has been less pronounced during the second halves of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries than such a subscription to Gramscian theory would indicate.

Secondly, it is argued that Gramsci's theory is indifferent to the political rationality of the institutions of power. Gramsci was not concerned with the carriers of ideologies and values, meaning that he looked *through*, rather than *at* ideological apparatuses (as for example in cultural institutions) where their capacity to transmit bourgeois values to subordinate classes were taken as pre-given, or as neutral carriers who did not take on any rationality of their own. For Gramsci it was the battle of ideas that mattered most, not the organisations per se. Hence he 'fails

¹³⁵ Tony Bennett, *Outside literature* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 254.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

to take adequate account of the more mundane and technical means through which power is routinely exercised'.¹³⁷

Central to Gramsci's theory is the idea that the ruling power-bloc can maintain its hegemony in one of two ways: through coercion or through consent, where the non-violent latter is by far preferable and also taken to be the most effective.

According to Bennett, a Foucauldian approach to power differs radically in that it neither subscribes to the idea that one bloc maintains its hegemony 'in a unified manner as the expressions of a general form of power' nor to the notion of consent. Instead, Foucault emphasised the importance of knowledges, 'conceived as discourses which function as 'the truth' in a particular set of social relations',¹³⁸ as well as the importance of the technologies that develop within, and form part of the political rationality of, institutions. Hence, rather than seeing through the institutions that mediate power, Foucault made these the prime objects of his research. The subscription to Foucault's governmentality thesis, where reform of each individual's self determines the extent to which he can also look after his family, which again determines the condition for the state to control the populace, makes, according to Bennett, Gramsci's emphasis on ideologies-in-struggle seem less important:

than the institutional mechanisms which provide for a particular organisation of the relations between persons, positions, symbolic

¹³⁷ Bennett (1998a), p. 70.

¹³⁸ Bennett (1990), p. 243.

resources, architectural contexts, etc. within the framework of a particular technology.¹³⁹

With the family as the model for government, these technologies, which can be institutions of culture, like libraries, public lectures and art galleries, play an important part in the reform of the self. Tony Bennett explains this connection thus:

If, in this way, culture is brought within the province of government, its conception is on a par with other regions of government. The reform of the self – of the inner life – is just as much dependent on the provision of appropriate technologies for this purpose as is the achievement of desired ends in any other area of social administration.¹⁴⁰

Such an objective to facilitate the reform of the self is, according to Bennett, not only found in policies that aim to grant access to an elitist concept of the arts. Cultural policies that define culture more widely, as a ‘whole way of life’, and which place less emphasis on distinctions of value between different kinds of culture, more in line with Herder’s ideas, have, rather than removing the desire to reform, laid ‘open the ways of life of different sections of the populace to reformist programs of government’.¹⁴¹ In other words, the wish to facilitate cultural democracy is as engaged in a reformist programme (perhaps an even more potent one in that it by definition should reach out to more people) as policies that want to democratise the ‘high arts’.

¹³⁹ Bennett (1998a), p. 71.

¹⁴⁰ Bennett (1995), p. 18.

¹⁴¹ Bennett (1998a), p. 91.

It is clear that a Foucauldian approach to the study of power differs significantly from a Gramscian one, particularly in terms of their levels of analysis and starting points. Tony Bennett concludes that the former's approach is best suited for the study of power within the fields of cultural studies and cultural policy studies. The differences between the two approaches to power are summarised in Table Two.

Power-dimension	Gramscian approach	Foucauldian approach
Class	Antagonistic relationship between the bourgeoisie and subordinate classes.	Discards the Marxist notion of ideology and class as determining factors.
Hegemony/ Governmentality	Hegemony based on both economic power and moral leadership by the ruling bourgeois class.	Governmentality as an upward and downward continuity between the management of the self and the management of the state.
Tools of power	Rule by consent.	Power exercised through the discursive production of 'truths'.
The role of institutions	Indifferent to the political rationality of institutions of power.	Institutions take on a political rationality of their own through technologies of power.

Table 2: Gramsci vs. Foucault – summary of ideas

However, this does not mean that Foucault's theories necessarily have to be located in diametrical opposition to Gramsci. A focus on hegemony and power blocs does not necessarily negate the political rationality of the organisations involved and vice versa. As mentioned above, Gramsci's ideas are not being discarded by Tony Bennett, who sees the value of both thinkers:

With thinkers as complex and many-sided as Gramsci and Foucault, there is, of course, little point to be served in siding with the one in an unqualified way against the other and no point at all in discounting the contributions of either.¹⁴²

Although critical of grand theories, Foucault's work does not contain a sustained discussion of Marxist theory. However, as was mentioned above, it is still argued by some that Foucault's work can be read 'as a response to, or in effect as a critique of fundamental elements of both Marxist analysis and socialist political strategy'.¹⁴³

According to Tony Bennett, both Gramsci and Foucault acknowledge:

that modern systems of rule are distinguished from their predecessors in terms of the degree and kind of interest they display in the conditions of life of the population.¹⁴⁴

Following on from this, they are also both concerned with the lives of people from the subordinate classes.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁴³ Barry Smart, 'The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony', in David Couzens Hoy (ed.), *Foucault: A Critical Reader* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 157.

¹⁴⁴ Bennett (1998a), p. 67.

Foucault does not make references to the theories of Gramsci, but the former's concept of power and knowledge can be read as similar to the latter's concept of hegemony. Barry Smart has even argued that Foucault's work here is anticipated on several points by Gramsci's.¹⁴⁵ Gramsci argued, for example, that, when a hegemony was established, it resulted in an intellectual and moral unity, which universally posed all the questions over which the struggle raged: that is, the establishment of a certain truth. Foucault argued that there was a mutual dependency between truth and power where one could not exist without the other, and that 'truth' manifests itself through discursive practices. Hence, it is as if hegemony gives birth, or acts as a prerequisite, to discursive practices.

It is also possible to analyse Gramsci's thoughts through a Foucauldian lens. Gramsci argued that a consensual hegemony is achieved by actively pursuing a programme of cultural leadership in addition to governing through economic and political means. This hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion, through practices, which have as their objective the creation of forms of knowledge and truth where people have learned to recognise themselves as subjects, and can be perceived as tools of government implemented through institutions. The above-mentioned practices, techniques and methods would be described by Foucault as 'technologies of power'¹⁴⁶, conceived in terms of a process of 'governmentalisation'.

¹⁴⁵ Smart (1986), p. 158.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 161.

To sum up, both the ideas of Gramsci and Foucault, as described here, are preoccupied with an analysis of reality, rather than with normative suggestions as to how things can improve. There are several intersections between these thoughts and I will argue that they can both be utilised for the practical purpose of this project, particularly with reference to the relationship between hegemony and discursive practices, which will be explored further in the next chapter.

2.4 Summary

Following from Chapter One, which aimed at illuminating the 'civilising mission' through a set of normative theories about culture and growth, this chapter started by discussing how culture, according to Gramsci, could contribute to a political hegemony. This was then followed by a discussion of Foucault's notion of micro power and the political rationality of institutions, applied to cultural policy, through Tony Bennett's study of the museum. Foucault's ideas are often contrasted to a Marxist theoretical tradition, in which Gramsci belong. However, due to Gramsci being less reductive than traditional Marxism, it was argued that there are several similarities between a theoretical framework based on the thinking of both Gramsci and Foucault. It was contended that the same phenomena could be studied using both a Gramscian and a Foucauldian approach, and that these approaches could complement each other.

The theories presented by the thinkers in Chapter One were normative in that they prescribed recipes for how things could improve. This was not the case with Gramsci and Foucault who instead took a step back and analysed social phenomena critically, putting less emphasis on prescribing solutions.¹⁴⁷ A combination of these two normative and critical theoretical approaches will be referred to when analysing to what extent the ‘civilising mission’ has been a central rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy, both in a historical and contemporary context. The actual approach to the empirical research will be outlined in detail in the following chapter, but it should be mentioned here that the normative theories will be used as an attempt to put the notion of *Bildung* into a wider theoretical context in order to tease out more specific aspects of these policies. With reference to critical theories, I will attempt to identify whether cultural policy might have been used to establish and/or maintain hegemony as well as to analyse the political rationality of specific policies and organisations and to identify power-related discursive practices. I argue that it makes valid sense to use both a Gramscian and Foucauldian approach to investigate the extent to which the civilising mission has been a core rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.

In the next chapter I shall outline in more detail how I will go about identifying the mentioned policy rationales.

¹⁴⁷ This is a truth with modifications. Gramsci started out as a political activist (which subsequently led to his imprisonment), but as already mentioned, his writing changed from one of action to one of analysis during the course of his imprisonment. Foucault was also involved in activist movements; for example, he was a central figure in the revolts in Paris during the spring of 1968. This is not reflected in the writing referred to in this thesis though, and is of less importance here.

3.0 Research Design

In this chapter I shall introduce the concept of discursive practices, and why an analysis of such practices is useful for this project. This will be followed by an exposition of what I understand to be a hegemonic understanding amongst several cultural policy scholars and how these scholars may contribute to an overall cultural policy discourse, in which the arts, in particular, are presented as being beleaguered by instrumentalism, partly because their alleged transformative powers are so hard to substantiate. I shall argue that the arguments by these scholars are based on the assumption that the arts ideally should be celebrated for their intrinsic value. I will declare my own values in this context, which harbour a certain scepticism to this assumption. In the concluding section I will briefly introduce my empirical approach to this project, which is outlined in more detail in Appendix One.

3.1 Discursive practices

In November 2006 the former Member of Parliament for the Socialist Left (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti SV*), Paul Chaffey, wrote in an article in the Norwegian periodical *Samtiden* about how the left in Norwegian politics, despite perhaps not being supported by the majority of voters, has obtained an ideological hegemony in current social debate. Chaffey, who himself left SV for a job with the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise

(*Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon NHO*)¹⁴⁸ and admitted that he had of late voted for the Conservative Party (*Høyre*), argued that this hegemony, which he terms the ‘goodness hegemony’, sets the standard for what can be debated in the public sphere and how it can be debated. He argued that having ideological hegemony implies winning the debates about concrete issues:

This implies that one will achieve that NRK¹⁴⁹ always asks whether there is enough money for welfare in the national budget and never asks whether the increase in expenditure in the budget can be damaging for the Norwegian economy. Or that a slightly lower growth in the public budgets is always described as a cut-back. And this is the left’s most important victory in Norwegian politics. This way of asking the questions is adopted by many more than a relatively few socialists who want to abolish capitalism. Hence, SV has a value-based hegemony in the political debate which extends way beyond its own voters.¹⁵⁰

Chaffey thus argues that what can be talked about and the questions that can be asked in the public sphere are dictated by a strong hegemony. At the same time, this hegemony continues to be upheld by how language is being used through what Michael Shapiro calls ‘discursive practices’:¹⁵¹ a concept that I shall return to below. I find Chaffey’s reflections about Norwegian public debate in the area of social and economic policy enlightening. This dissertation is not about social or economic policy, and I shall not make any further comments about Chaffey’s claim. However, I

¹⁴⁸ UK equivalent, Confederation of British Industry (CBI).

¹⁴⁹ The Norwegian public broadcasting company (*Norsk Rikskringkasting*).

¹⁵⁰ Paul Chaffey, ‘En politisk reise’, *Dagbladet*, 16 November 2006, available online at <http://www.dagbladet.no/kultur/2006/11/16/483081.html>

¹⁵¹ Michael Shapiro, *Language and Political Understanding: The Politics of Discursive Practices* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1981).

am compelled by the idea of taking language as the starting point for studies of social phenomena, and my aim to assess to what extent the 'civilising mission' has been a prevalent rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy, will thus be achieved through disclosing how this rationale might be detected through the analysis of discursive practices. Such discursive practices might harbour automatic subscriptions to truths and knowledge, which are internalised to such an extent that they are not necessarily explicitly articulated, whereas others rely on being repeated again and again.

Many scholars in the fields of the social sciences and the humanities are increasingly subscribing to the idea that the subjects they focus on are not necessarily absolute truths but rather more fluid in the sense that they are constructed by the way they are being referred to, debated and talked about. Neumann argues that as a consequence, a new methodology literature is needed, which accepts the implicit uncertainty that comes with questioning the division between 'reality understood as a physically given reality, and reality understood as a social representation'.¹⁵²

The acknowledgement of such a division, and that social representations are bearers of meaning, truth and knowledge and hence also power, is informed by the earlier scholarship of Michel Foucault, particularly his *Archaeology of Knowledge*. Representations in this context are understood as:

¹⁵² Iver B. Neumann, *Mening, materialitet, makt: En innføring i diskursanalyse* (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2001b), p. 15.

things and phenomena in the way they appear for us, thus not the thing in itself, but the things filtered through what comes between us and the world; language, categories and so on.¹⁵³

What makes Foucault's scholarship radically different from more positivistic approaches to social science research is his postulate that meaning lies on the surface of a discourse. The discourse *is* meaning. Hence, rather than searching for discourses, whether in the present or the past, as representing some deeper meaning, his methodology, which he calls archaeology, searches for 'monuments' in the discourse that do not need to be deciphered:

Archaeology tries to define not the thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in discourses: but those discourses themselves, those discourses as practices obey certain rules'.¹⁵⁴

The unique quality of language and texts is that their task is primarily to create meaning, and a possible methodological approach is thus to focus mainly on language and texts.¹⁵⁵ Research that is concerned with discursive relations focuses on the foundations which determine the rules about what can be talked about. As argued by Shapiro:

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 33.

¹⁵⁴ Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 155.

¹⁵⁵ The term 'text' here is not necessarily reduced to physical texts (like signs on paper or screen) only; other social practices can be read as text, meaning as signifying systems. Sociologists of culture, for example, refer to any signifying practice, what in everyday speech often is referred to as art-works, such as films, books and songs, as text.

To analyze such [discursive] relations is to politicize a far broader aspect of human relations than is characteristic of the kinds of analyses directed toward relationships that a society explicitly recognizes as political. It is to analyze not simply what we talk about but also why and how we talk about it.¹⁵⁶

There is a strong relationship between human actions and language. Actions, in whatever shape or form, cannot be interpreted, except through language. Similarly, intended actions cannot be expressed but through language. Hence, according to Shapiro again:

When we therefore review the sets of constructs relating to conduct that exist in language, we are viewing not only the horizons of possible speech but also the horizons of possible actions. The possibilities of action, then, exist in the language of a culture, and the actions that actually emerge are presented as a result of the controlling interpretations, those with general legitimacy.¹⁵⁷

Following from this he terms discursive practices as those:

interpretations of conduct that produce and affirm actions and their concomitant subjects and objects that are institutionalized because the interpretations are oft repeated and accepted.¹⁵⁸

Whether intentional or not, discursive practices, if successful, have the ability to define the terms on which subjects and phenomena can be talked about. Such practices define which views and opinions are accepted as normal and which are branded as deviant. Discursive

¹⁵⁶ Shapiro (1981). pp. 154 - 155.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

practices are therefore strongly related to power, not necessarily in terms of cohesive forces, but in terms of the power to define the truth.

Although discursive practices set limitations about what can be talked about, by whom, and in which ways, within a particular discursive context, this does not mean that it is impossible for other people to discuss and debate other things. However, this would if so not take place within this discourse but within other alternative discourses. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, Jim McGuigan has identified three different, what he terms, 'discursive formations' of cultural policy: 'state', 'market' and 'civil/communicative'. He argues that these position 'agents and subjects, producers, consumers, citizens and mediators, within the discursive practice of the cultural field'.¹⁵⁹ Although all the three formations remain in play, the market discourse is, according to McGuigan, now hegemonic.¹⁶⁰

When focusing specifically on the arts and the institutions that produce and mediate them, as well as how they are supported and regulated by governments, different discourses might crystallize. Belfiore and Bennett argue, as outlined in the introductory chapter, for the existence of twin narratives about the arts' position in society. On the one hand, a narrative which allocates a central place for the arts due to its alleged positive transformative power: twinned with an alternative narrative of beleaguerment, which portrays the arts as vulnerable, simply because the already mentioned transformative powers are so hard to substantiate.

¹⁵⁹ McGuigan (2004), p. 35.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 60.

The latter narrative, they argue, has partly evolved because of the current climate within the public sector where public bodies increasingly are guided by evidence-based policy-making, which puts the arts under pressure to demonstrate their social impacts, instead of being celebrated as an end in itself.

Belfiore and Bennett give examples of the laments over the beleaguered position of the arts from a range of different countries, including the UK, the USA, Australia and Italy. Almost all these examples refer to responses by arts advocates to suggested cuts in public funding of the arts,¹⁶¹ and it is perhaps not surprising that any recipient of public funds starts 'banging the drum' when their funding is threatened. However, the increasing lamentation of the so-called instrumental use of the arts (or culture),¹⁶² also represents this sense of beleaguering. These 'cries against the excessive politicisation of Arts Councils and Ministries of Culture, and the laments over the excessive pressure and demands placed by governments of today over the arts they finance and promote'¹⁶³ can, according to Belfiore and Bennett, be found amongst both arts advocates outside and within academia. An example of one of the most vociferous voices from within the arts sector in the UK is John Tusa, who laments that arts institutions are increasingly being judged by

¹⁶¹ The exception is the case from Australia, which pertains to a philosopher, who argued that universities typically despise their own departments of literature and the fine arts.

¹⁶² Geir Vestheim defines instrumental cultural policies as using 'cultural ventures and cultural investments as a means or instrument to attain goals in other than cultural areas. [...] The instrumental aspect lies in emphasizing culture and cultural ventures as a means, not an end in itself', (Geir Vestheim, 'Instrumental Cultural Policy in Scandinavian Countries: A Critical Historical Perspective', in *European Journal of Cultural Policy* 1.1 (1994), p. 65).

¹⁶³ Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 194.

whether they 'deliver product' rather than whether they 'offer programming', and that they are:

rated, and possibly, funded, by their commitment to access, outreach and their contribution to economic regeneration and urban renewal and redevelopment.¹⁶⁴

However, such cries against the instrumentalisation of the arts can also be heard within academia. Lianne Gibson goes as far as saying that we are experiencing an 'open season attack' on instrumental cultural policies.¹⁶⁵

3.2 The discourses of cultural policy research

In an extended book review-essay, Oliver Bennett focuses on two books (Justin Lewis and Toby Miller's edited book *Critical Cultural Policy Studies: A Reader* and Mark J. Schuster's *Informing Cultural Policy: The Research and Information Infrastructure*) and argues that both are 'staking claims to the ownership of cultural policy research'.¹⁶⁶ Bennett criticises both books for taking a too narrow approach to cultural policy research, where on the one hand the first, presenting a bundle of articles mostly from the 'cultural studies' tradition, (which Bennett argues are inherently preoccupied with power-relations, and which define cultural

¹⁶⁴ John Tusa, 'Thou shalt worship the arts for what they are'. Edited version of a speech delivered at the Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis, USA, available online at <http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006DA07.htm>.

¹⁶⁵ Lianne Gibson, 'In defence of instrumentality', in *Cultural Trends* 17.4 (2008), p. 248.

¹⁶⁶ Oliver Bennett, 'The Torn Halves of Cultural Policy Research', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 10.2 (2004), p. 237.

policy studies as a 'reformist project'), is based on the assumption that cultural policy is a project of governmentality which has the 'management of populations through suggested behaviour' as its objective.¹⁶⁷ Schuster's book, on the other hand, defines cultural policy simply to be 'what governments, their ministries of culture, arts councils and related organisations determine them to be',¹⁶⁸ and hence harbours a rather reductive approach. Neither of these two cultural policy 'traditions' acknowledge the existence of the other, nor do they acknowledge the approach of alternative 'traditions' or 'schools' of cultural policy studies. Bennett calls for more reflexivity and Lewis and Miller are particularly singled out for not being 'engaged in a constant and rigorous interrogation of one's own assumptions as well as those of others',¹⁶⁹ which he argues is the very essence of being 'critical'. However, Schuster is also accused of tending to 'see everyone's politics but his own'.¹⁷⁰

Although Bennett does not claim that these two book projects represent two seminal traditions or 'schools', he implicitly maintains that the intellectual trajectory (or lack of such in the case of Schuster) found in them can be identified in much of what is today presented as cultural policy research internationally. Thus, Bennett indicates that cultural policy research might be made up of 'torn halves that never add up to a whole'.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 238; citations of the original source by Lewis and Miller.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 242

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 240.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 244.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 246.

However, despite Bennett's call for more reflexivity amongst writers in the field of cultural policy studies there is, in my view, also a lack of reflexivity on his own account, in that in this article he fails to acknowledge a third direction (or a 'third way') in cultural policy studies. I am referring to some of the work by a segment of scholars who are either based in the humanities or in what Bennett refers to as 'critical sociology'.¹⁷² Bennett can himself be categorised as part of this category, which is distinguished from the two traditions represented in his review-essay in that it does not subscribe to the cultural studies tradition of a highly theory-based preoccupation with disciplining governmentality and the assumption that all arts policy is based on elitism; neither does it subscribe to Schuster's empirical preoccupation with the collection of facts and statistics, which has been drained of any preoccupation with 'history, values and meaning'.¹⁷³ Instead I argue that this third tradition is often explicit in its condemnation of advocacy-based research, particularly when this is based on the alleged social and economic impacts of arts activities. This is twinned with a disapproval of neo-liberal trends in the field of governmental cultural policy, and contains instead an implicit celebration of the *intrinsic* values of the arts or the value of the arts for their own sake and expresses a fear of these values being threatened by increased managerialism and public interference in that which should normatively be an autonomous field of the arts.

¹⁷² Oliver Bennett, 'Intellectuals, romantics and cultural policy', in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 12.2 (2006), p. 123.

¹⁷³ Bennett (2004), p. 244.

One of Bennett's own intellectual projects appears to mount a strong, albeit implicit critique of what he has observed to be an increasing tendency since the 1980s, particularly in the UK, of governmental bodies' use of the arts in instrumental ways to meet other public policy objectives. This is twinned with an explicitly articulated scepticism about whether the impact of the arts in these instrumental terms can be measured. Bennett laments the forces of relativism and instrumentalism and instead suggests the return to Matthew Arnold's 'principle of authority'. He asks why it appears as if arguments in favour of governmental support 'based on the intrinsic merits of the arts seem to be 'losing their potency''.¹⁷⁴ In accordance with Arnoldian values, Bennett laments the disappearance of a process which:

represent[s] a constant and public interrogation of what actually constituted the best: the process would become the principle. In this way, the search for cultural value would itself become the driving force of cultural policy.¹⁷⁵

Such a statement contains an implicit critique of anything that can threaten the intrinsic value of the arts.

Similar laments can be traced in the writing of Belfiore, who is sceptical about all 'instrumental' cultural policies. She fears that the logical consequence of an instrumental cultural policy might be that there will not

¹⁷⁴ Bennett (2005), p. 478.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 479 - 480.

be any rationale for a cultural policy at all, because ‘arts provision could be easily absorbed within existing social policies’.¹⁷⁶

She further articulates clearly how she perceives the value of culture and the autonomy of the cultural field (or rather the arts and the arts field), when she argues that:

Culture is not a means to an end. It is an end in itself.¹⁷⁷

The author ponders less on why this is so, and presumably perceives the intrinsic value of the arts (or culture) to be such a powerful and obvious assumption that it does not merit any further exploration. Instead, Belfiore appears to identify the field of the arts as a sector which is ideally entitled to a large degree of autonomy, and assumes that what the arts sector provides should be part of a general welfare provision, and that it should ‘attempt to elaborate a definition of what makes the arts *intrinsically* valuable to society’,¹⁷⁸ again without giving any suggestions as to what this might be. The importance of these unidentified ‘intrinsic’ values of the arts appears to be a crucial, unstated, but underlying, assumption amongst a range of scholars within this ‘third way’ of cultural policy studies.

¹⁷⁶ Belfiore (2002), p. 104. From the focus of the rest of this article, which is on ‘the arts’ rather than culture in any wider sense, I detect that it is really ‘arts’ policies that the author is here referring to.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. Again, I presume that the author is referring to the arts rather than culture in the wider sense (including for example food, sports and wider leisure activities) given that the rest of the article focuses almost exclusively on the arts. I should emphasise that the term ‘the arts’ is not given a definition either.

¹⁷⁸ Belfiore (2002), p. 185.

In their most recent project Belfiore and Bennett attempt to identify where the assumptions of the transformative powers of the arts originate from and how they have been able to maintain their discursive power and influence throughout history up to today.¹⁷⁹ This appears to be a more open ended and explorative approach to the valuation of the arts than the examples listed above. However, the authors cannot free themselves from arguing that impact studies do not ‘engage with the real purpose of the arts’, and that the arts’ eventual economic and social impacts ‘are not the primary characteristics of the aesthetic experience’.¹⁸⁰ From a scholarly point of view, these authors appear to observe and lament that the arts are being beleaguered by utilitarian forces, which aim to make use of the arts for instrumental purposes rather than celebrating them for their own sake.¹⁸¹ However, this celebration of the arts’ intrinsic values is often implicit and taken as given and not made subject to further elaboration.

Røyseng takes issue with this conclusion in a Norwegian context. To refer to cultural policies as instrumental, she argues, implies that they are governed by utilitarian principles, which ‘reduce culture to a useful tool, which is awarded little value by virtue of itself’.¹⁸² The instrumental application of the arts produced by publicly financed organisations (the professional arts) allegedly challenge their autonomy and this, she argues,

¹⁷⁹ Belfiore and Bennett (2008).

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸¹ For examples of other scholars with a similar position see; Caust (2003) and Gray (2007). In a Scandinavian context this diagnosis of instrumentality has been echoed by scholars like Per Mangset (1992), Geir Vestheim (1994 and 1995) and Peter Duelund (2003).

¹⁸² Røyseng (2007), p. 230.

has triggered unease and has consequently been the focus of much writing and scholarly works within the field of cultural policy studies. However, Røyseng questions the extent to which this actually has weakened the autonomy and status of the arts. Instead, she argues that the increasing 'cultural turn' in the business sector, in the public sector's regeneration and integration efforts, the health sector and so on signifies a deep respect for the arts and their alleged transforming potentials.¹⁸³

The continuous discourse of beleaguerment that portrays the arts as vulnerable and subdued under the forces of instrumentalism, can, according to Røyseng, actually give the arts strength rather than weaken them. Belfiore and Bennett do not question whether this vulnerable position is real, but argue instead that this is due to the transformative claims made for them being 'extremely hard to substantiate'.¹⁸⁴ Røyseng suggests instead that the discursive efforts that go into warning against the corruption that the alleged utilitarian demands are causing the arts, are part of a 'purifying' process and that 'the instrumental diagnosis [can] supply a strength that the same diagnoses deny'.¹⁸⁵

Hence, the discourse of beleaguerment draws on contributions both from within and outside of academia. A specific policy field might be informed by several discourses, which sometimes co-exist alongside each other and at other times are involved in fierce hegemonic battles about different understandings of what is true. I am intrigued by the possibility of

¹⁸³ Ibid., p. 231.

¹⁸⁴ Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 5.

¹⁸⁵ Røyseng (2007), p. 232.

exploring policy rationales through the analysis of how discourses are practiced by different constituents in a field and shall adopt this approach to my analysis of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy. In this chapter I have presented how several scholars within academia contribute to the discourse of beleaguerment. In the next four chapters, I will attempt to identify how the rationales behind Norwegian public cultural policy are manifest through discursive practices that originate within the administrative and political fields that govern cultural policy (such as central government and parliament), as well as within the cultural sector itself.

The field of cultural and arts policy studies, is saturated with references to value and where subjective opinions - almost by definition – will have an impact on the kinds of research questions scholars ask and the platform from which they conduct their intellectual interrogation. Scholars' value might again be determined by their cultural and social background.

3.3 The cultural policy researcher and the field

Røyseng suggests that many researchers in the area of culture are unfulfilled or frustrated artists.¹⁸⁶ Whether this is also the case within the field of cultural policy research shall not be said but it appears that many of them - at least in a British and Norwegian context, which is where most of the cultural policy research work that I am familiar with originates -

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 80.

have some sort of affinity with the arts, either through having had a previous career as artists, arts administrators or arts managers or at least through a university degree in the humanities. With this in mind, Røyseng continues by assessing the level of autonomy amongst cultural policy researchers and debates the extent to which research in the field of cultural policy has been carried out in close proximity either to the state apparatus or in accordance with what she describes as dominant values within the field of the arts and culture itself. Amongst others she cites Dag Solhjel who argues that cultural policy researchers, at least in Norway, have defined the term cultural policy in accordance with their own political conviction which implies that culture should be a public good, and that it is the state's task to re-distribute it to an as wide selection of the population as possible, in accordance with social-democratic and welfare-ideological principles.¹⁸⁷

It could be argued that the potentially causal relationship between the researcher and the field in terms of how the former determines the problems being raised and approaches being taken, and indeed again the assumptions on which these problems and approaches are based, will increase with the level of proximity between the researcher and the field. Solhjel's critique can, in this context, be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, his claim that cultural policy researchers allegedly have defined the term 'cultural policy' as being preoccupied with social-democratic policies where mediation of the arts is an inherent

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 18.

responsibility of the welfare-state, could imply that the values and ideas of scholars are to an extent aligned with the ways of thinking found within politics and the bureaucratic machinery of the state. On the other hand, his argument that cultural policy researchers perceive culture to have a specific importance that must be protected seems to indicate a set of values close to what can be found within the sector itself. Røyseng is not conclusive about which direction cultural policy scholars lean but based on her above-mentioned conception of the values inherent within the arts sector, she indicates that cultural policy researchers have had ‘an equally great, if not greater, proximity to the values of the field of the arts and culture, as to those of the government’.¹⁸⁸

Just as intellectual legacies that inform cultural policy might persist only in what Oliver Bennett calls ‘unstated institutional assumptions’¹⁸⁹, so could a similar claim be made for cultural policy research. For Belfiore and Bennett, for example, such an assumption, from which they conduct their intellectual interrogation, appears to be the normative idea that the arts should be celebrated and nourished as an end.

For Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant it is very important that researchers in the social sciences go through a process of reflexivity in their attempt to objectify their research question and the field they investigate. Bourdieu and Wacquant argue that the social science researcher must acknowledge that everybody, including themselves as

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁸⁹ Bennett (2006), p. 117.

academic researchers, is part of the reality that is the object of their research, and that:

the problems that he [the researcher] raises about it [the social world] and the concepts he uses have every chance of being the product of this object itself.¹⁹⁰

Only by making themselves subject to such a reflection can researchers be able to make, what Bourdieu and Wacquant call, epistemological breaks, meaning:

breaks with the fundamental beliefs of a group and, sometimes, with the core beliefs of the body of professionals, with the body of shared certainties that found the *communis doctorum opinio*.¹⁹¹

In her doctoral dissertation, Røyseng argues for the rewards that the mentioned epistemological breaks can render and she outlines the journey she herself undertook in order to detach herself from the field which she investigated and which she traditionally had been very close to, if not a part of. She reflects on her own position as a researcher and concludes that her own values correlate with those of the field of the arts, which she states as having 'the faith in the arts as a space of experience, which is genuinely different from others'.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant, 'The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology (The Paris Workshop)', in Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant (eds.), *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 235.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁹² Røyseng (2007), p. 82.

These values have repercussions for how the state should relate to this sector, which as far as possible should:

be content with transferring a reasonable amount of money, keep a simple control with the use of this money, and beyond this not interfere with the arts' internal affairs.¹⁹³

Based on this declaration she argues that to make the autonomy of the arts (which she initially strongly perceived to be under threat from neo-liberal inspired policies) the subject of her research was for her almost inevitable. However, the result of her studies is different to that of, for example, McGuigan and Belfiore and Bennett in that she does not conclude that the arts' own logic would melt together with the logic of the market and economics, as a result of the alleged neo-liberal pressure, materialised through the government's increased reliance on performance indicators in accordance with the principles of New Public Management. Instead she concludes that the arts are in fact awarded a 'holy' status, which makes them robust and resilient against the challenges put to them from a wider society that is increasingly governed by those same neo-liberal values. In order to reach such a conclusion, Røyseng admits that she herself had to undergo epistemological breaks, which enabled her to objectify understandings that are 'subjectified' by the people in the field that she studies, as well as by herself.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

A truly reflexive research project might dwell on why it poses certain research questions. Choosing one path for one's research will inevitably lead to the discarding of other paths, which of course is entirely legitimate. Similarly, it is neither avoidable nor discreditable to have a political conviction. However, epistemological obstacles might come about when convictions and the rationales for the choice of research questions and approaches are not recognised. Oliver Bennett talks about the importance of 'retain[ing] our ideals',¹⁹⁴ but his own ideals are left vague and implicit. Bourdieu suggests that really reflexive research will systematically explore 'unthought categories of thought which delimit the thinkable and predetermine the thought'.¹⁹⁵ After having briefly described the assumptions on which, according to my understanding, some cultural policy research is based, let me present my own assumptions.

3.4 The suspicious researcher

As mentioned above, many researchers in the field of cultural policy studies have, or have had, some sort of affiliation with the field they are studying. This is also my personal case (although I cannot be classified as a frustrated or unfulfilled artist). However, I often get the feeling that my social, and perhaps even educational, background is different from that of many of the people I have encountered who work in the cultural sector, as well as from that of my colleagues in the field of cultural policy studies. I come from a home where neither of my parents had undergone

¹⁹⁴ Bennett (2005), p. 480.

¹⁹⁵ Bourdieu cited in Loïc Wacquant, 'Toward a Social Praxeology: The Structure and Logic of Bourdieu's Sociology', in Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p. 40.

higher education and where visiting arts events away from home were not high on the agenda when I grew up. Apart from a few cinema visits I was rarely, if ever, taken to see exhibitions or live performing arts events with my parents. However, from my early teens I became a frequent consumer of artistic expressions that could be consumed at home, particularly music through radio-listening and music recordings. Later on in my 20s, I also started frequenting exhibitions and live performing arts events on my own initiative. However, it was not until I was in my 30s that I encountered the arts sector at first hand through being employed in organisations that either funded and supported or directly produced art works (mostly in the field of theatre).

As already mentioned Oliver Bennett argues that contemporary public cultural policy has much to learn from Matthew Arnold, particularly in his critical disposition, which in its consequence would make the process of 'a constant and public interrogation of what actually constituted the best',¹⁹⁶ the principle of policy-making. The problem with this idealist position is that it is based on the assumption that such a constant and public interrogation is actually possible in practice. Should it be possible it would obviously constantly be debating the terms and principles on which an interrogation of what was best should be based. This is of course highly subjective, and something I have reflected over myself with respect to my own personal way of valuing culture.

¹⁹⁶ Bennett (2005), p. 479.

I rarely find clarity in references to the 'intrinsic' values of the arts; on the one hand such references could be perceived to be the argument of last resort; the only one that can be clung to when all other claims for the importance of the arts have been rejected, but on the other hand this term can also, in my view, be embedded with power and is a term for whom those who understand what it implies can subjectively just nod in recognition, implicitly excluding those who do not. Roger Scruton compares the intrinsic value of art with that of religious faith, arguing that 'art suddenly leapt into prominence at the Enlightenment', at the same time as religion started to lose its impact and significance.¹⁹⁷ He continues by arguing that the arts and religion are similar in that they both give great meaning to those who have either religious faith or an understanding of the intrinsic values of the arts. Just as the faithful experience that their belonging to their religion is not a means but an end in itself, so can those who are 'blessed by a high culture' be able 'to retain the consoling vision which religion grants to all its supplicants'.¹⁹⁸ Scruton continues that it is impossible for the unbelieving anthropologist, who observes a religion from the outside to appreciate this preoccupation with ends rather than means.

When experiencing a common discourse whereby one or more individuals share an understanding of the 'intrinsic values of the arts', particularly when expressed in general terms, I often find myself somehow bewildered, in the shoes of the anthropologist who observes

¹⁹⁷ Roger Scruton, *An Intelligent Person's Guide to Modern Culture* (London : Duckworth, 1998), p. 37.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

from the outside, and who would perhaps like to enter the conversation, but who find it difficult to do so. Each individual attaches of course value to an art-work that he or she is experiencing, particularly during this experience itself, and this is often a value, which is intrinsic in that it is concerned with the art-work as an end in itself. This varies greatly between individuals, based on their background, preferences and taste. However, from then to apply an aggregated value to 'the arts' or 'culture', in the plural, or as a totality, which is commensurate for everybody or for humanity (particularly when the terms 'the arts' or 'culture' are not even defined, but even if they were) is for me problematic. Similarly I am sceptical about the idea that the arts have a unique potential to stimulate *Bildung*. Instead it is my inherent understanding, purely based on my own life experiences and observations, that *Bildung* can be achieved through a range of different means in a range of different ways. This does include the exposure to, or participation in, the arts, but similarly to Belfiore and Bennett, I question whether this potential is commensurate.¹⁹⁹ I absolutely believe that some art works can harbour this potential in certain circumstances. I equally believe that other art-works in other circumstances have very little of this potential. I acknowledge that my understanding of both the alleged intrinsic values of the arts and the arts' *Bildung* potential might be related to the cultural capital I acquired through my upbringing.

¹⁹⁹ Belfiore and Bennett (2007), p. 136.

I have attempted to problematise the term 'intrinsic' value of the arts. Equally problematic is the term 'instrumental' when used in the context of cultural policy. Inspired by Matthew Arnold, Oliver Bennett argues, as mentioned above, that, rather than valuing culture (or the arts) for its instrumental utility rationale, cultural policy should engage in a constant search for cultural value. However, he says little about how this could pan out in practice. It might be relatively easy to identify 'instrumental' cultural policy decisions, whereas it might be more difficult to grasp, in practical terms, policies that are entirely occupied by culture as an end in itself. Would not all interventions in the field of culture (for example through financial support) whether from governments or others be instrumental in that they are concerned with some kind of mean, something that should be achieved? Clive Gray admits that all public policies are initiated to achieve *something*.²⁰⁰ It is therefore more fruitful to refer to instrumental cultural policies more as a matter of degree than of kind. If we relate this to *Bildung* then policies that are based on a more abstract faith in the transforming effects of the arts can perhaps be regarded as less instrumental. It is perhaps not until these transforming effects are articulated explicitly as tangible, or even measurable, impacts, and that this is coined as the prime rationale for the instigation and funding of arts activities that they become unashamedly instrumental.²⁰¹

²⁰⁰ Gray (2007), p. 205.

²⁰¹ By means of an example Estelle Morris, the former Arts Minister in the UK, has argued that she knows that the arts and culture make positive contributions to 'health, education and crime reduction' (quoted in Belfiore and Bennett (2007), p. 136). Policies that are explicitly designed to make use of cultural activities or cultural schemes to contribute to these areas, and where the social (or educational) impacts are sought measured, can perhaps be described as crudely instrumental.

However, there is, according to Lisanne Gibson, little consensus about the valuation of the degree to which different policies are instrumental or indeed whether a policy celebrates the intrinsic value²⁰² of an art-work or arts activity as opposed to reaping its instrumental contribution to other objectives. Hence, this instrumental versus intrinsic dichotomy is in her view false, but even if it was not it does little to assist scholars or policy makers in thinking about whether particular policies, or ‘programme and policy environments’ are intrinsic or instrumental. She singles out museums as a typical example of an operation which ‘cannot be reduced to [such a] simplistic binary opposition’.²⁰³ Again, different scholars’ take on this will be informed by their values. Gibson, for example, displays a different value than those inherent in Belfiore and Bennett’s suggestion that the real purpose of the arts is not to generate social or economic impacts and that these are not the primary characteristics of the aesthetic

²⁰² The term ‘intrinsic value’ is not un-contentious. The term is closely linked to the term ‘goodness’ and Christine M. Korsgaard emphasises that a distinction should be made between things which have their value in themselves; intrinsically good things, and things valued for their own sake; ends or final goods. Due to a certain sloppiness, also amongst philosophers, this distinction is not always made. I shall not make this subject to an extensive debate here, but just stress that this distinction is important in the context of the valuation of cultural manifestations or cultural artefacts. This is because, according to Korsgaard, an equation of intrinsically good things (that have their value in themselves) and things valued for their own sake (as ends) ignores the fact ‘that different people value different things for their own sake’. When referring to the intrinsic values of the arts versus the arts as ends, this distinction ought to be made, because the former is different from the latter in that a thing’s possession of intrinsic goodness is quite independent on whether anyone cares about it or not, whereas things valued for their own sake is dependent on this valuation. This brings us to the core of the value debate in a cultural policy context, because it begs the question; who should make the valuation that things have for their own sake? Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Two distinctions in Goodness’, in *The Philosophical Review* 92.2 (1983), pp. 169 - 195.

²⁰³ Gibson (2008), p. 249. It should be mentioned that Gibson draws the majority of her examples from public policy for museums and galleries. By means of example of how there is a lack of consensus in terms of which policies are instrumental and which are intrinsic, Gibson cites Clive Gray, who argues that a museum’s education programme is amongst its core activities, but that instrumentality would mean that the museum shifted away from these activities and instead tried to meet what he terms ‘externally derived objectives’ such as facilitating social inclusion or community regeneration. However, according to Gibson, these are typical key rationales behind a museum’s decision to set up education departments in the first place, and others will therefore perceive education activities as inherently instrumental.

experience. Gibson argues instead that cultural policy is 'constitutively instrumental', and that ignoring its instrumental value might pave the way back to 'the kinds of elite, exclusionary policies which have characterized cultural administration in the past, and in many cases still do'.²⁰⁴ In other words, Gibson fears the celebration of the intrinsic value of the arts, and hence her reading of the current situation, both in Britain and Australia, is significantly different from that of Belfiore and Bennett.

I shall not elaborate more on this here, but just emphasise that I do not see this research project as part of what Gibson terms an 'open season attack' on instrumental cultural policies, and rather than being influenced by the aim to protect (or indeed protest), is probably informed by a critique of the assumptions on which the ideas of the alleged intrinsic values of the arts rest. My scepticism to some of the assumptions that I alleged that some cultural policy research is informed by, as outlined so far in this chapter, apart from having an impact on my research questions and approach, might also impact on my results. This has implicitly informed my research question, choice of theoretical approach, my reading of the chosen texts and my choice of empirical methodologies, and may subsequently also affect my conclusions. Given that both my own biography and opinions might have an impact on my results it is important to clarify that this is not an ontological research project, but one that is more engaged with epistemology through reflections and critique. Thus, this project attempts to illuminate, not necessarily to prove anything.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 247.

Although I am constantly reflecting on my position as a researcher and my proximity (or lack of) to the field I am investigating, I am not convinced whether I myself have been able to make the necessary epistemological breaks in order for my research to be as open, objective and explorative as I aspired it to be.

Let me now move on to present my empirical material.

3.5 Empirical approach

The past tense of my research question indicates that the focus should be on a historical study of the extent to which the 'civilising mission' has been a prevalent rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. The ultimate aim though is to say something about the contemporary reality through contemporary discourses. However, disentangling contemporary policies as well as their surrounding discourses from their historical forbears would mean that knowledge about the evolving rationales and possible hegemonic structures would be lost. The longer historical lines are particularly important when studying Norwegian cultural policy because, as will be shown in the next chapter, they have been so closely connected to the development of a national identity, which has evolved slowly over time, in a climate of political consensus.

3.5.1 Delimitation and definition of terms

Before an empirical focus can be determined, a clear delimitation of the subject matter is called for. Cultural policy is obviously closely related to

culture, the meaning of which is by no means obvious. As will be demonstrated in the following chapters, the notion of culture has, in a Norwegian cultural policy context, been subject to changes over the years.

A useful and, commonly used, starting point for a delimitation of culture is Raymond Williams' seminal interrogation of the term in his book *Keywords*. Here Williams argues that in contemporary English (the book was originally published in 1976) the word culture can be given three broad meanings. These, which broadly correspond with their use in the Norwegian language too, are: the idea of culture as 'a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development', culture as 'a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general' and finally culture as 'the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic creativity'.²⁰⁵ Later Williams elaborated on these definitions and merged the first and third meanings into an understanding of culture as a 'signifying practice', which incorporates not only 'the traditional arts and forms of intellectual production' but also everything that could be labelled as a general signifying system such as language, philosophy, journalism, fashion and advertising.²⁰⁶

Picking up on this idea, Oliver Bennett argues that cultural policy routinely refers to the actions taken within the sectors that produce culture as a 'signifying system' and 'the measures adopted by both central and local

²⁰⁵ Williams (1988), p. 90.

²⁰⁶ Raymond Williams, *Culture* (London: Fontana Paperbacks, 1981), p. 13.

government to support' these sectors.²⁰⁷ This may be the case because it is difficult in policy terms to apply a wider, what sometimes is described as an anthropological, approach to culture. Such an approach to culture as 'a collective consciousness', and more in line with Williams' reference to culture as a whole way of life, is according to Carl-Johan Kleberg, relativistic and useful for social science researchers but problematic for practical cultural policy-making.²⁰⁸ For, as Erik Henningsen argues: to define the 'territory of cultural policy' in this way would be absurd in that it would have to include almost every human activity, and thus 'points to a dimension of meaning integral to *all* social action'.²⁰⁹ It is thus important to distinguish between how the term culture is being used for analytical purposes and how it realistically can be approached in terms of cultural policy and cultural policy studies.

However, to focus on support for culture as a 'signifying system' only, misses out on a range of areas, which in the Nordic countries, have been regarded as elements of a cultural policy. As will be demonstrated in Chapters Five and Six, in Norway, the term culture has traditionally (at least since the 1970s) been defined widely in a cultural policy context to certainly include sports but also what is termed youth work (for example

²⁰⁷ Bennett refers to cultural policy as the 'totality of actions', taken within the sectors that produce culture as a 'signifying system', 'such as broadcasting, film, design, publishing and recording as well as the live performing arts, museums and heritage' and 'the measures adopted by both central and local government to support' these sectors (Bennett (2006), p. 123). I presume that these are the sectors that Belfiore and Bennett, whom I cited earlier on in this chapter, refer to when making use of the term 'the arts'.

²⁰⁸ Carl-Johan Kleberg, 'The Concept of Culture in the Stockholm Action Plan and its Consequences for Policy Making', in *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 7.1 (2000), p. 51.

²⁰⁹ Erik Henningsen, 'Reply to Carl-Johan Kleberg' in *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 7.1 (2000), p. 75.

leisure-time clubs for young people or scouting) and general leisure activities like outdoor life (including for example rambling and skiing). Kleberg argues that in order to relate a scientific definition of culture (in whatever way) to how this is applied to cultural policy, it might be useful to distinguish between culture 'as an aspect of development, [or] the cultural dimension of development' and 'culture as a sector of society'.²¹⁰ There is an analogy between this distinction in policy terms by Kleberg, and Williams' above-mentioned elaboration in that an understanding of culture as being constituted by other social activities (or policies) aligns to an understanding of culture simply as a sector of society, as opposed to being constitutive and hence being an aspect or dimension of development in other sectors.

As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, Norwegian cultural policy documents have at times explicitly argued that this policy should be defined widely and facilitate general development and deliver the terms for other sectors in society, such as regional, housing and social policy, and hence not be perceived as a sector separate from other sectors, but in line with an understanding of culture to be constitutive. Cultural policy perceived in this way, might realise Belfiore's fear that cultural policy would be absorbed within more general public policies. If so, it could be that the policies would move from being, what Jeremy Ahearne termed explicit cultural policies (meaning policies that government would label as cultural), to implicit cultural policies (meaning 'any political strategy that

²¹⁰ Kleberg (2000), p. 54.

looks to work on the culture of the territory over which it presides').²¹¹ Regional, housing, social and other policies would all have an impact on culture in the widest sense, but not necessarily be labelled as cultural. How the Norwegian government of the 1970s and 1980s envisaged these policies to be labelled is of less importance, but Ahearne's distinction between implicit and explicit cultural policy, highlights that what cultural policy can be is highly fluid and can vary between policy contexts.

Even the administrative definition of cultural policy can be complex in terms of which bodies are involved in planning and executing the policy. Let me move on to present a rationale for which institutions' policies I shall actually focus on.

3.5.2 Level of analysis

Marit Bakke argues that cultural policy in Norway is dealt with by a range of governmental ministries:

Church and Education²¹² (for example artists' education and music schools), Children and Family (for example initiatives for children and youth, voluntary leisure clubs), Environment (cultural preservation) and Foreign Affairs (cultural export).²¹³

²¹¹ Jeremy Ahearne, 'Between Cultural Theory and Policy: The cultural policy thinking of Pierre Bourdieu, Michel de Certeau and Régis Debray' (Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, Working Paper 7, University of Warwick, 2004), p. 114.

²¹² Please note that this was published before the last change in the ministerial set-up (see footnote 216 below). As of 1992 culture is again rejoined with church affairs in the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs (*Kultur og Kirkedepartementet*).

²¹³ Marit Bakke (2003), p. 163. It could be argued that, perhaps with the exception of Children and Family, this is still only dealing with culture as a 'signifying system'. Carl-Johan Kleberg goes even further in his anthropological approach to culture, arguing that traditional cultural

Equally, it could be argued that this project should take cultural policy as embedded in education policy, as its focus.²¹⁴ Another ministry, which, according to Bakke, is deeply involved in culture is the Ministry of Local Government and Labour (*Kommunal- og arbeidsdepartementet*) since it is responsible for the transfer of state funds to local and regional government.²¹⁵ As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, these funds, together with funds generated through local and regional taxation, make up a significant proportion of the funding of cultural activities in Norway. An important feature of Norwegian cultural policy is also that regional and local councils have a large amount of autonomy in the area of culture and hence are able to make their own cultural policy decisions.

However, even though culture is defined more widely than to include only culture as a 'signifying system', the Ministry of Culture has been absolutely central to policy formulations in this area.²¹⁶ Hence, although I have acknowledged that public cultural policy is being developed by a range of public bodies, both nationally, regionally and locally, this project will focus exclusively on the policies of central government through the Ministry of Culture, with the objective of identifying which rationales these

policy interacts (both in terms of how it is influencing and being influenced by) with a range of policy areas from town planning and neighbourhood policies, to employment, schools and higher education, (Kleberg (2000), p. 65).

²¹⁴ There is thus a vast potential for future research here.

²¹⁵ The responsibility of local government has from 2005 been located at Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (*Kommunal og regionaldepartementet*).

²¹⁶ What is being referred to as the Ministry of Culture in this context was in fact between 1938 and 1982 the Division for Culture within the Ministry of Church and Education; between 1982 and 1990 the Ministry of Culture and Science; in 1990 the Ministry of Church and Cultural Affairs; between 1991 and 2001 the Ministry of Culture; and from 2002 the Ministry of Church and Cultural Affairs. However, for the purpose of clarity, the distinction between these different names will not always be made, but instead be replaced with the generic term; 'Ministry of Culture'.

policies have been informed by. Regional and local government will be referred to inasmuch as this decentralisation of power is part of state policy, but falls otherwise outside the remit of this project. I will be focusing on policies that are labelled as cultural and are thus explicit.

Currently, the Ministry of Culture's activities are broadly divided into three areas: culture, sport and media.²¹⁷ It can of course be argued that there is a strong civilising dimension to any country's media policy through its emphasis on regulation and censorship. However, as pointed out by McGuigan, communications and media policies have 'largely been thought through in terms of political economy, signifying their industrial and economic importance.'²¹⁸ And although the censorship dimension in media policies might be interesting in a historical perspective, I find such explicit measures of less interest than the objective to facilitate *Bildung* through the wider cultural sector including the arts. Policy-making in the area of sport will also fall outside the remit of this project, as do non-governmental cultural policies developed within the cultural industries or within other non-governmental organisations. This latter exclusion is based on the conviction that few agencies, other than the Norwegian government, have by far the same potential to attempt to achieve *Bildung* purely through cultural means.

As already argued by Young, once discursive practices have been established it is very difficult to think outside of them. They might also be

²¹⁷ There is thus a different classification of culture here, certainly due to media (including the press and broadcasting) for administrative reasons being separated from other cultural areas.

²¹⁸ McGuigan (2004), p. 34.

internalised to such an extent that it might be difficult to identify where to find them. If they exist, as argued by Foucault, as a 'system of exclusion', an important challenge is how to identify a slit that can be torn in order to get on the 'inside' of the discourse. Keeping in mind my reflections over my own position as a researcher, this can be difficult and I believe would always be open to scrutiny. I shall not conclude that the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy are based on discursive practices that govern what can be said and what are regarded as truths about this in society as such, but rather within one particular discourse; how these rationales are internalised within a cultural policy discourse. Although I am focusing on formal channels through my analysis of policy papers, which seems to denote a narrow policy-definition, I will be widening my scope and also collect information from other sources, which indicates a somewhat wider approach to this policy nexus. I have chosen to approach this in three ways, which broadly correspond with, and which make up the content of, the next four chapters: first an historical study of cultural policy-rationales with reference to secondary sources only (work by other scholars), covering the period between 1814 and 1973, followed by a in-depth textual analysis of general governmental green papers,²¹⁹ which have outlined the broad ideas and principles of central government's cultural policies for the period between 1973 and 2003, and finally an in-depth study of the national programme that is DKS, which is based on a combination of the analysis of policy papers and interviews with elites.

²¹⁹ By Green Papers I refer to official reports which outline the government's policy on a particular subject; in Norwegian; *Stortingsmelding* (abbr; St.meld).

The rationales behind these different approaches, as well as the selection of empirical material, will be outlined in more detail in Appendix One.

3.6 Summary

This chapter started out by introducing the concept of discursive practices. I accepted that discursive practices have the ability to define the terms on which subjects and phenomena can be talked about. Several cultural policy scholars writing at the beginning of the twenty-first century argue that the market discourse has become hegemonic. The same scholars tend to lament an instrumental use of cultural policies. I argued that the writing of these scholars contributes to what Belfiore and Bennett have called a narrative of beleaguerment, which describes the arts as being in a vulnerable position because the claims of their transformative power are so hard to substantiate. This beleaguerment discourse is held up by voices both from within and outside of academia. I emphasised Belfiore and Bennett as two writers who lament the instrumental application of the arts and who would rather like to see them being celebrated for their intrinsic value. I continued by arguing that cultural policy studies are saturated with references to values that are interpreted subjectively, which again will impact on the platform from which cultural policy scholars conduct their research, so too with Belfiore and Bennett. I also referred to Røyseng who suggests that most cultural policy researchers identify themselves more closely with the values of the arts than the values of the state apparatus, and that this might be because many researchers have some sort of affinity with the arts field. She argues that this might mean

that scholars find it hard to objectify the field they are investigating, which might mean that they are facing epistemological obstacles. With this in mind I attempted to declare my own background and how I myself perceive the instrumental versus intrinsic cultural policy nexus and on how this might have influenced some of my own assumptions.

As already mentioned, discursive practices (whether they originate from within or outside of academia) might be identified by frequent repetitions and high intensity, whereas others might rely on what is not said, and what does not have to be said. I am not going to focus on academic discourses in particular in this project. Instead, this study attempts to identify discursive practices as markers of the 'civilising mission', as well as other eventual rationale(s) behind Norwegian cultural policy. In my search for discursive practices that could shed light on my research question I decided to interrogate both historical trajectories as well as the existing understandings of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy as they are manifest in contemporary discourses.

This was followed by a presentation of my approach to and choice of empirical material, including delimitations and definitions of terms. A more detailed elaboration of my empirical material is included in Appendix One.

The next four chapters trace the development of the *Bildung* rationale in Norwegian cultural policy from the ideas behind the first measures by

central government in the first half of the nineteenth century to the launch of DKS at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

4.0 *Bildung* in nineteenth-century Norway

This chapter and the next will attempt to chart the ideas and rationales that have underpinned Norwegian cultural policy between 1814 and 1973, with particular reference to the policies' objective to stimulate *Bildung*. My research question attempts to assess whether and the extent to which the civilising mission has been a rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy historically and whether it still is. Hence, these next two chapters are fulfilling two objectives: both to contextualise contemporary rationales historically, but also to address an inherent aspect to my research question, which is to assess the extent to which the civilising mission has been a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. This chapter will focus on the period between 1814: the year when Norway ceased being part of a composite state with Denmark and entered a union with Sweden instead, and 1905 when the country split with Sweden and became an independent state amongst states. As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, many of the ideas that originated during the period Norway was in union with Sweden (a period characterised by great nation building efforts) and that are relevant for an understanding of cultural policy rationales, can be rediscovered amongst the ideas uttered after 1905. However, in order to make the argument easier to follow, I have chosen to discuss these two time-periods in separate chapters.²²⁰ The two

²²⁰ Although this chapter will primarily refer to the nineteenth century (up to 1905) and the next chapter to the period between 1905 and 1973, there will be some referencing across the two chapters. In fact the final section in Chapter Five attempts to summarise both chapters.

chapters rely primarily on secondary sources: mostly academic and historical accounts presented by other scholars.

The subjugation to Denmark that ended in 1814 had lasted for about 400 years, and by entering into a union with Sweden, Norway got much more autonomy and gained its own constitution in the process. Thus, this period is of utmost importance, both when tracing Norwegian nation building generally and more specifically, when tracing cultural policy rationales.

I will start by outlining how the Norwegian nation building project in the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century can be perceived as a hegemonic battle, characterised by how each of the battling groups made use of concepts of power, which related to how what being 'Norwegian' represented. Inspired by Neumann this will be followed by an explication of three such representations: the Statist, the Romantic Nationalist and the Populist Nationalist representations. I will also present the cultural policy measures - in the widest sense - that originated within each of these representations, before I reflect on the eventual civilising aspect of these policies. I finally attempt to briefly summarise the different 'historical blocs', and the manifestations of their different cultural policies in a table in the concluding section.

4.1 The battle for cultural hegemony in Norway

In Chapter Three I made reference to Tony Bennett's critique of Gramscian analysis, which he argues relies too much on how 'the people' are subjugated by a static power-bloc, but where it becomes difficult to assess exactly who 'the people' are and who should be included or excluded from this concept. However, Neumann argues that defining 'the people', has been an essential part of the struggle in the Norwegian hegemonic battle during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries because 'the people' became one of several central power concepts. Such power concepts are used discursively by different groups to represent different interpretations of reality. I shall therefore start by presenting how the ideas of hegemony and concepts of power can act as a helpful theoretical framework for a historical analysis of cultural power battles in Norway.

4.1.1 A hegemonic battle of the 'Norwegian'

Applying the meaning of hegemonies to different classes at different historical times, Øystein Sørensen has described the Norwegian nation building project during the nineteenth century as a hegemonic battle of the meaning of the term 'the Norwegian'.²²¹ In other words what did this term include and what did it exclude; how did it accentuate a particular meaning? Hence, Sørensen's interpretation of this term echoes Gramsci's reference to power-blocs and suggests that hegemony is not exclusively preoccupied with the means by which one ruling class (or

²²¹ Øystein Sørensen, 'Hegemonikamp om det norske: Elitenes nasjonsbyggingsprosjekter 1770 – 1945', in Øystein Sørensen (ed.), *Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet* (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 17 - 48.

elite) exercised power over subordinate classes. Sørensen argues that rather than referring to one ruling elite, it often makes sense to talk about several elites, and in Norway these elites were involved in several different nation building projects. It is within this perspective that he tries to assess which of these projects were 'winners' or 'losers', the winners successfully achieving and 'having control of a society's intellectual life purely through cultural means', and to set the terms 'for the production of ideas in society'.²²²

Such a hegemony does not necessarily have to be held by a traditional elite or a 'ruling class'. As we shall see below, by the end of the nineteenth century a Populist Nationalist representation, which sprang out of counter cultural movements in the Norwegian countryside, had become hegemonic in Norway, both through their definition of what the term 'Norwegian' contained, but also because representatives from these movements gained parliamentary power when they were elected as MPs. Later on in the twentieth century this was to be replaced by a new hegemony rooted in the Labour movement. These different representations were carried forward by what Gramsci calls 'historical blocs'.²²³ The notion of historical blocs is more complex than the Marxist crude concept of class, in that:

²²² Ibid., p. 20.

²²³ Forgacs (1988), p. 424.

it promotes analysis of social formations that cut across categories of ownership and non-ownership that are bound by religious or other ideological ties as well as those of economic interest.²²⁴

Such historic blocs may or may not become hegemonic. This depends on whether their leaders are able to:

develop a world view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, and they must be able to claim with some plausibility that their particular interests are those of society at large.²²⁵

The main focus of this chapter will be on Norwegian elites, and the battle for hegemonies. Different historic blocs have throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries been jockeying for power in a system where no ruling class has entirely dominated. Thus, different hegemonies have been in place at different times in a climate of change where they have been challenged, and later toppled by, counter-hegemonies.

4.1.2 Hegemonic positioning through the application of concepts of power

Cultural hegemony often includes controlling, discursively, what Neumann refers to as concepts of power, meaning the 'ability to establish, institutionalise, and activate concepts in such a way that they affect political actions'.²²⁶ These are concepts charged with meaning but which, rather than being subject to an explicit political power struggle on an

²²⁴ T.J. Jackson Lears, 'The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities', in *The American Historical Review* 90.3 (June 1985), p. 571.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 571.

²²⁶ Neumann (2001a), p. 18.

every-day basis, will typically be bearers of a hegemonic power in the sense that they are not explicitly challenged. In other words they form part of discursive practices, because they produce and affirm actions through an institutionalised interpretation that has generally become accepted within a discourse. However, different groups that are involved in a hegemonic struggle might allocate different meanings or understandings to these terms, in other words, they might not agree on their social representation. Neumann argues that an important aspect of participating in a political battle is to strive to internalise certain aspects of the power-concepts that are favourable to one's own position to such an extent that their meaning is beyond discussion. According to Neumann, central power-concepts in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Norway include 'the people', 'the elite', 'civil servants', 'Norway', 'the state' and 'the nation'. Different 'historical blocs' will read different meanings into these concepts as part of their battle to regain hegemony. Apart from making concessions to other groups, it is also important to convince other groups to accept one's own definition:

because it results in them [those one wants to convince] formulating the world on certain terms, becoming implicated in a given set of ways to make decisions about the world on, and developing a set of commitments to this perspective and these decisions.²²⁷

Hence, an important aspect of any political battle is this struggle about the representation of these concepts. This is highly relevant when analysing the wider intellectual climate that has impacted on cultural

²²⁷ Ibid., pp. 26 - 27.

policy rationales historically, and this will thus, together with the ideas of cultural hegemony, be applied in the following historical account (in this chapter and the next). Neumann has identified three representations by three different demographic groups amongst whom a hegemonic definition of some central concepts of power shifted throughout the nineteenth century. The following section will present this hegemonic battle and the different representations presented by the different historical blocs.

4.2 Cultural representations of the 'Norwegian': nineteenth-century cultural legacies

A modern account of Norwegian history can start as early as 1536, when King Christian III of Denmark reduced Norway's status to a province of Denmark. Prior to that, Norway had been part of a troubled union first both with Sweden and Denmark and later with Denmark only. Norway was, in the beginning of this new period, a province administered on a shoestring with very little resources allocated to it by the court in Denmark.²²⁸ The elite in Norway was during this period primarily made up of a stratum that was working on behalf of the Danish crown.

This elite was initially the undisputed 'bearer' of culture in Norway and was known as *øvrigheten* (loosely 'the authorities') who governed the rest

²²⁸ Iver B. Neumann, 'This little piggy stayed at home: Why Norway is not a member of the EU', in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 88 - 129.

of the population, *almuen* (loosely ‘the populace’).²²⁹ According to Neumann, the authorities were part of a corps for which European elitist cultural ideals were held in high esteem.²³⁰ This influx did, of course, also bring new cultural impulses. Hence, the culture of the Norwegian state bearing civil servant elite was firmly rooted in continental culture.

After its defeat in the Napoleonic Wars in 1814, Denmark was forced to break away from its Norwegian province, which instead entered into a union with Sweden. By then, ‘the authorities’ made up of the civil servants had consolidated their power in Norway to such an extent that, according to Neumann, they had both state bearing potential and state bearing aspirations. As the unchallenged elite, the civil servants managed, together with representatives from some other groups (including the peasants), to agree on a Norwegian constitution on which much of the legal basis of the union with Sweden was based. The constitution was strongly influenced by European Enlightenment ideas of the time. This was Norway’s first step towards becoming an independent state amongst equals, and in this process, which took place over the following ninety years or so, three representations of what Norway and being Norwegian should be were, according to Neumann, involved in a hegemonic struggle: the Statist representation, the Romantic Nationalist representation and finally the Populist Nationalist representation. The next sections outline the development of these representations during the nineteenth century.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

²³⁰ Neumann (2002).

4.2.1 The 'Statist' representation

In order for it to become such a state amongst equals, what was unique about Norway, or what distinguished it from the rest of Europe, needed to be defined. One could assume that since the elite was to such a high extent influenced by trends in Europe, a Norwegian identity would primarily be based on continental culture: the culture of the cities. The core civil servants, or those Neumann coins as the 'Statists', did not after all break their cultural ties with Denmark after 1814.

However, although the Statists were the undisputed elite with the state bearing potential and inspiration, the populace also had, compared with most other European countries at the time, a strong position in society. The majority of Norwegian society was, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, employed in the primary industries including agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (about 80 per cent in 1801).²³¹ People employed in working the land in this way would in most other countries be termed peasants but this is not an entirely accurate description of this group in Norway.²³² In fact, Norwegian peasants²³³ enjoyed a stature very different from their brothers and sisters elsewhere in Europe. They were not legally bound to their landowners, who were rarely 'big' as in England,

²³¹ Tore Pryser, *Norsk historie 1814-1860* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1999). Pryser emphasises that this figure only includes women to a limited extent. Additionally, the fact that many people were involved in more than one profession means that these figures can only be regarded as a broad calculation of the demographic composition of the population at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

²³² In fact 'the core of the peasant myth is a figure that is difficult to conceptualize with the term "peasant", which connotes subordination in a feudal order. The Nordic peasant is rather somewhere between a yeoman and a freeholder in an English context, moving toward a farmer around 1900' (Bo Stråth and Øystein Sørensen, quoted in Neumann (2001), p. 93).

²³³ Despite Stråth and Sørensen's re-description I will continue to use the term 'peasant' in the absence of a better term.

for example. In fact, many Norwegian peasants owned their own land. Hence, Norwegian peasants were represented amongst the men who drafted the constitution of 1814. Almost half of all Norwegians gained the right to vote in 1814, which is a comparatively high proportion for that time, with the result that the majority of the electorate was made up of peasants.²³⁴ At the same time, the elite was weaker than in many other countries, because it drew its power and legitimacy from filling an administrative role as opposed to the possession of land or other wealth.

Hence, the civil servant stratum could not ignore the peasants. Instead, many nourished a great admiration for them, and throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the Norwegian elite continued to hail the Norwegian peasant as a bearer of Norwegian identity. But why was this? Why was it, as Neumann asks, that:

a [bourgeois or civil servant] project based on a common European development and central modernisation variables such as literacy, industrialisation and bourgeois culture is positioned against an isolationistic [peasant-based] project based on a semi-literate language, disorganised agriculture and peasant culture?²³⁵

Anne-Lise Seip suggests that this may be in response to a common experience amongst both the elite and the peasants: 'that the country

²³⁴ Sørensen (2001), p. 26. Land-ownership, which many of the 'peasants' had was the criteria for having the right to vote; 'everybody who owned or leased registered land got the vote' (Sørensen (2001), p. 26). In comparison; when Britain introduced its first parliamentary reform act in 1832, only men who lived in towns and who occupied property with an annual value of more than £10 got the vote. This excluded six out of seven adult men from the voting process in that country; http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/citizenship/struggle_democracy/getting_vote.htm

²³⁵ Neumann (2001a), p. 69.

was poor, underdeveloped, divided and under pressure from an external power [Sweden].²³⁶ Another suggestion may be that focusing on the raw, free and clean ambience of nature was very much a trend in Romantic European thinking at the time.²³⁷ Similarly, Iver Sagmo argues that Norway became a travel destination for intellectuals from England and the continent.²³⁸ This was all part of a Romantic movement in Europe where people longed for the pure, free, clean and harsh nature, of which there was, of course, plenty in Norway.

These Romantic ideas were influential to some of the members of the civil service strata at the time. The free peasant was seized upon as something uniquely Norwegian²³⁹ and would come to inform a National Romantic movement, whereby some of the civil servant elite:

melded older identity elements into a new patriotism, whose ... main elements were the freedom of ideas of the European Enlightenment, and whose main symbol was the free peasant that European intellectuals had sighted in Norway and which the civil servants had made their own.²⁴⁰

²³⁶ Anne-Lise Seip, 'Jakten på nasjonal identitet: Kultur, politikk og nasjonsbygging i Norge i årene omkring. "Det nasjonale gjennombrudd" 1830 – 1870', in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 3.4 (1994), pp. 281 - 294.

²³⁷ The North (meaning Norway) had, since Montesquieu published his *L'esprit des lois* in 1748, been the subject of such sentiments. After having read the old Nordic sagas, which had recently been translated into several languages, Montesquieu hailed the old Norsemen for their great democratic traditions with their *Allting* (where everybody had a vote) as well as the fact that Norwegian peasants and women had much liberty in comparison to several other countries at that time. He also mentioned that the Vikings had contributed to state-building in the areas they had conquered. Intellectuals such as Thomas Malthus and Mary Wollstonecraft visited Norway in the late eighteenth century and confirmed in their books how free the Norwegian peasant was; Neumann (2001a), p. 53.

²³⁸ Historians have identified altogether 2472 books with travel-descriptions by mostly English and German visitors to Norway up to the year 1900; Ivar Sagmo, 'Norge – et forbilde eller et utviklingsland? Folk og land i første halvdel av 1800-tallet – sett med tyske reisendes øyne', in Øystein Sørensen, *Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 2001) pp. 75 - 76.

²³⁹ Sørensen (2001).

²⁴⁰ Neumann (2001a), p. 59.

It could be argued that there was a civilising element in the plans and discourse of the civil servants and that this was rooted in Enlightenment ideas. However, rather than copying other elite cultures from Europe, the emphasis was on building an alternative Norwegian culture based on Norwegian cultural heritage and history where the Nordic myths, ideas of democracy and the status of the Norwegian peasant were central. However, the initial focus on the peasants was a construction in an attempt to create a national culture, but one where the elite culture was still assumed to be superior. Hence, although there was both an element of 'looking back' (towards a medieval culture that had existed before Norway and Denmark merged into a composite state) as well as 'looking in' (at a traditional Norwegian culture as opposed to a culture with its roots abroad), indications of clear quality hierarchies can be detected amongst the elites. Someone like the influential historian and later newspaper editor P. A. Munch, for example, declared that although the hegemonic elite culture should absorb elements from the national peasant culture, it was certainly not at the expense of the former. Others argued even more clearly and deliberately that the elite had a mission to civilise the populace. The academic and poet Johan Sebastian Welhaven²⁴¹ argued in 1834 that the arts had to come out of their private and dilettantish forms, so that:

²⁴¹ Johan Sebastian Welhaven was part of what Rune Slagstad calls the 'intelligentsia'. They were a new generation of reform-eager intellectuals with a strong academic authority, which also included the law-scholar and long-standing member of parliament Anton Martin Schweigaard. There were many differences between these two figures; the latter subscribing to a highly utilitarian philosophy on which he wrote two ideological studies, whilst the former subscribed to an ethical-expressive idealism informed by Romanticism. However, their approach to *Bildung* was also similar in that they both subscribed to an object-approach. As Norwegian nineteenth-century *Bildung* thinkers, the 'intelligentsia' was preceded by the philosophy professor and Cabinet Minister of the Ministry of Church and Education, Niels Treschow. Treschow published

the enjoyment of the lower classes little by little breeds [...] under the eyes of a finer audience as well as under their management – the light must here, as everywhere, come from above.²⁴²

The superiority of elite culture was, in other words, indisputable. Hence, the civil servants' references to terms like the populace, the peasant and the people, were, according to Neumann, discursive constructions. Although the civil servants upheld a representation of the people as the bearers of the nation, this same civil servant elite would still play a decisive role. As Neumann points out:

Specimens of the 'people' could perhaps be let loose amongst the mahogany furniture for a short period, for example to perform its authentic music, but it was clear for P.A Munch and other civil servants that the people needs the official class in order to achieve a satisfying cultural level.²⁴³

Hence, the Norwegian Statist project appears to take an object approach to *Bildung* that chimes well with Arnoldian ideals.

the three volume work *About the State*, between 1820 and 1823, one of which was dedicated to questions around religion, customs and culture. This could have acted as a written rationale for a cultural policy, but it never received anything like a seminal reception, due to the volume advocating a system of government, which could be described as close to enlightened despotism. For a further exposition of Treshow and the intelligentsia's impact on nineteenth-century cultural policy see Hans Fredrik Dahl and Tore Helseth, *To knurrende løver: Kulturpolitikens historie 1814 - 2014* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2006); Rune Slagstad, *De nasjonale strateger* (Oslo: Pax, 2001) and Dag Solhjell, *Akademiregime og Kunstinstitusjon: Kunstpolitikk fram til 1850* (Oslo: Unipub, 2004a).

²⁴² Welhaven, quoted in Seip (1994), p. 284.

²⁴³ Neumann (2001a), p. 70.

The 'Statists' arts policies: looking back and looking out

Elite culture enjoyed by civil servants and the bourgeoisie in the cities in Norway at the time was similar to that in Copenhagen and other European cities. Mangset argues that, by the end of the nineteenth century, Norway had reached 'a climax in the bourgeoisie's interest in literature, theatre and the visual arts'.²⁴⁴ However, all these art forms had become a natural part of the bourgeoisie's public sphere even earlier.

An example of an institutionalised arts policy of the nineteenth century is the Drawing-school (*Tegneskole*), which was established in 1818, only four years after the split with Denmark. Although Norway did not have an institution named the The State Academy for Arts (*Statens kunstakademi*) until 1909, the Drawing-school was in practice such an academy and was from 1822 named The Royal Drawing and Art school in Christiania²⁴⁵ (*Den kongelige Tegne- og Kunstscole i Christiania*).²⁴⁶ A clear and distinct policy for the visual arts developed through this 'academy', which amongst a range of functions, such as the training of new artists, the guardian of a national art collection and the active establishment of artist organisations, also supported activities that would further encourage what was regarded to be good taste. The school was unashamedly elitist through its highly competitive selection of members; it was for the few and it was to celebrate the best in the visual arts. As from 1884 the

²⁴⁴ Mangset (1992), p. 27.

²⁴⁵ Norway's capital (Oslo) was between 1624 and 1924 called Christiania. From the late nineteenth century the name Kristiania was also frequently used.

²⁴⁶ Dag Solhjell, 'Kunstpolitikkenes nye kunnskapsregime', in *Nytt Norsk Tidsskrift* 03 - 04 (2004b), pp. 456 - 467.

function of the art academy, which in practice acted as a visual arts council situated at arms length from government, was given to the Board of Visual Artists (*Bildende Kunstneres Style*) the aim of which was to 'guard the good taste and the good art'.²⁴⁷

In addition to the foundation of an 'art academy', which also saw the creation of a National Gallery, which opened in 1836, the government would set up two theatres in the second half of the nineteenth century: the National Stage (*Den Nationale Scene*) in Bergen in 1876 and the National Theatre (*Nationaltheatret*) in Oslo (1899),²⁴⁸ hence by the 1830s, the performing arts had come out of the intimate private organisations from where they originated. Parliament also granted a range of stipends to artists (mostly writers) throughout the nineteenth century, starting in 1836.

Most of these organisations, which developed in the first half of the nineteenth century, had as their purpose the dissemination of what was predominantly a continental culture, such as theatre, painting and music composed by continental composers. It was curated, and chosen, by the elite, but also distributed primarily to the same elite.

Hence, although Neumann argues that the Statists hailed the peasant as the bearer of Norwegian identity, this was not revealed in cultural policy measures initiated by this representation. The hegemonic elite culture

²⁴⁷ Solhjell (2004b), p. 462.

²⁴⁸ Vestheim (1995), p. 23.

was informed by continental ideas. In Gramscian terms, concessions were made in an attempt to produce consent with the populace, but without letting the 'superior' continental culture go. Although the peasant was hailed as the bearer of Norwegian identity, it was clear who should run the state. With reference to Rune Slagstad, Neumann describes it thus:

The civil servants programmatically defined their role as being that of running the state, and the role of the state as being that of 'leading and correcting public opinion' so as to bring about progress.²⁴⁹

This signals an object approach to *Bildung*, where the civil servants clearly defined the state as an entity led by themselves with the attempt to guide the populace, but not necessarily through the mentioned arts organisations, which were mostly directed towards people from their own strata. There are clear distinctions between the elite and the populace.

4.2.2 Romantic Nationalism

Looking back, one could easily think that such a nation-building project devised by the elite but emphasising the values and culture of the peasants (the majority) would be bound for success. However, the Statists were faced with dissenters from within the civil servants, who were less concerned with a liberal representation of the Norwegian peasant. This group wanted to go further and explicitly rejected any cultural ties with Denmark (the continent). One prominent representative of this group was the author Henrik Wergeland, who postulated

²⁴⁹ Neumann (2002), p. 94.

Norwegian history as falling into two 'semi-circles', one representing Norway's proud medieval Viking heritage prior to its union with Denmark, and the other its history since 1814. What was left in the middle should best be forgotten. This meant a radical break with Danish culture where 'Norwegian culture, which had survived in the nooks and crannies of Norwegian valleys and fjords, had to be resuscitated'.²⁵⁰

Again, the peasant was central, though not through an elitist representation, but because peasants' culture was considered as 'real' and unspoilt by 400 years of Danish colonisation and hence, represented what was regarded as authentic Norwegian culture. This representation was initially advocated by a marginal group, which was still mostly drawn from the civil servant elite, but was in line with influential National Romantic ideas in continental Europe at the time. Both Rousseau's focus on feelings, where the original and uncorrupted human, unaffected by the development in society, as well as Herder's idea of a nation's common culture, based on the people's way of life, were influential.²⁵¹ An example of how this representation became manifest in cultural life was through the numerous expositions of 'folk'-culture in the cities, where folk-musicians were invited to perform for the civil service strata and where members of this stratum even dressed up as peasants and participated in tableau scenes through 'staged city fairs characterised by rural happiness'.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 95.

²⁵¹ Bjarne Hodne, *Norsk nasjonalkultur: En kulturpolitisk oversikt* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995), p. 28.

²⁵² Neumann (2001a), p. 69.

According to Neumann, we see a shift from an emphasis on the concept of 'the populace', which encompassed about 95 per cent of the population and which was not part of the civil servant stratum, to the concept of 'the people', which 'had a normatively more positive ring to it',²⁵³ and which is a concept that harbours immense symbolic power in Norway up to this day. The concept of 'the populace' clearly did not encompass the civil servant elite, but whether the elite would be covered by the concept of 'the people' is a question which, according to Neumann, is left undecided in the National Romantic representation.²⁵⁴ Within this representation the concept of the 'nation' rests on 'the people' as opposed to the previous representation through which the concept of the elite had been coined in opposition to 'the populace'. By the 1840s this National Romantic representation was, according to Neumann, about to become hegemonic, in the sense that it became impossible to refer to a nation bearing entity which was not based on the people. In Gramscian terms, the elite make further compromises to produce consent, but the civil servants are still the only state bearing stratum. The concept of the 'nation', which is now firmly established as being made up of the people, is in other words distinguished from that of the state. The reason for this is because the guidance of the civil servants is still needed 'to obtain a satisfactory level of culture',²⁵⁵ which implies a 'top-down' object approach to *Bildung*. However, this top-down approach did look increasingly inwards at a typical Norwegian past and displayed a keen interest in cultural

²⁵³ Neumann (2002), p. 95.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ Neumann (2002), p. 96.

manifestations that had their roots in a medieval history unspoilt by continental influences.

Romantic Nationalist cultural policies

Presumably referring to the privately funded cultural institutions that were mentioned in the previous section, many of which did not receive financial support from public bodies until much later, both Mangset and Bakke argue that the bourgeois elite of the nineteenth century established their own cultural institutions, to present their own culture to themselves.²⁵⁶ Given that the elite (or 'the authorities'), as we have seen, only made up about 5% of the population, this does not appear to imply an attempt to civilise 'the populace' (or indeed 'the people') through facilitating *Bildung*. Bakke goes as far as saying that:

Cultural values and everyday life among people in rural areas – judged by many to be the location of genuine Norwegian culture – were more or less ignored by the city establishment [of the time].²⁵⁷

Hence, she argues that this was a period of cultural exclusion. This may be the case in the beginning of the nineteenth century but it ignores many of the other important cultural policy initiatives that were initiated later on, which had a strong focus on peasants and rural culture. However, according to Bjarne Hodne:

²⁵⁶ Mangset (1992); Bakke (2003).

²⁵⁷ Bakke (2003), p. 152.

It was not the peasant culture as a total way of life, which triggered interest, but those elements in this way of life that carried cultural continuity. Those parts of the peasant culture that could build a bridge to the middle ages and independence for country and people, were attractive with an objective to create a platform of common culture.²⁵⁸

But in order to create tangible representations of this rediscovered peasant culture, a greater understanding of it had to be acquired, and many of its artistic expressions, apart from crafts and architecture, did not exist in a tangible form but were passed on orally from generation to generation. The Romantic Nationalists realised that this culture needed to be collected before it was too late. Thus, throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, a range of scholars travelled through the rural parts of Norway collecting legends, folk-tales, ballads and folk-music in a true Romantic spirit. The most well-known are perhaps Asbjørnsen and Moe, who collected fairy-tales, many of which live on in the Norwegian public psyche today. This work was also inspired by continental ideas of the time, and was certainly not a uniquely Norwegian project.²⁵⁹ It is peculiar to note that these activities received public funding through scholarships from the University of Oslo, and were as such an integrated part of state cultural policy.

However, the more tangible aspect of a medieval history was also given priority. Hans Fredrik Dahl and Tore Helseth argue that of all the sciences, historical research was the most important for cultural policy in the early nineteenth century. Funding allocations to the research and publications

²⁵⁸ Hodne (1995), p. 41.

²⁵⁹ Both Goethe and the Grimm brothers from Germany are cited as inspirations; Hodne (1995).

of historic source-material such as old law-scripts increased rapidly in the first half of the century. Similarly, archaeological projects, and particularly funds to restore the great Nidaros Cathedral (*Nidarosdomen*) in Trondheim, were given significant funds, to such an extent that Dahl and Helseth conclude that:

we must regard 'digging for antiquities' [in the widest sense, including intangible antiques] as something of a budgetary main item during the nineteenth century.²⁶⁰

This was all fuelled by the National Romantic representation and had as its objective to 'strengthen the nation's identity and honour'²⁶¹ through identifying relics from the time before the 400-year-long unification with Denmark.²⁶²

Another significant institutional development was the establishment of several museums. The University Museum of Antiquities was established in 1817 and had as its most important task the documentation of medieval history, and hence, contributed to the representation of this period. Norway did not have many other publicly funded museums until 1880, when several folk-museums were established across the country to display Norwegian architectural heritage. Again, the main focus was on peasant and rural culture, in accordance with nationalist sentiments.

²⁶⁰ Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 70.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Governmental cultural policy developed hand in hand with private initiatives, such as the Society for the Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments, (*Foreningen til Norske Fortids Mindesmaerkeres Bevaring*), which received public funding in order to achieve its objectives, but which also raised significant funds from private donors; Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 72.

Institutions that were initially established as projects supporting the hegemonic Statist representation gradually became part of a nation building project, first in accordance with National Romantic ideas but still with the objective to civilise in accordance with European Enlightenment ideals. However, there was a sufficiently inward-looking dimension to these projects, for what Neumann terms a Populist Nationalist representation to break through. This breakthrough empowered 'the people' to express themselves and hence, laid the foundation for a new hegemony.

4.2.3 A new hegemony: Populist Nationalism

The Populist Nationalists went much further than the Romantic Nationalists in their suggestions and demands. This was the first Norwegian social or political movement since the sixteenth century that was not exclusively made up of representatives from the elite. Their project was preoccupied with a *Bildung* based on Norwegian culture, language and history rooted in people's own everyday lives, rather than on a Danish (or continental) culture, and it paid little attention to a universal notion of 'the best that has been thought and said in the world' in the Arnoldian sense. Thus, it appears that it perceived the concept of the people more like 'subjects' in terms of *Bildung*, in that it was more open to celebrating the culture that emerged amongst the communities around Norway.

This counter culture manifested itself initially through four specific sub-movements: the pietistic religious Christian movement, the language movement, the teetotal movement and the peasant movement.²⁶³ Albeit rooted in different value systems and also to an extent having their origins in different parts of the country, these sub-movements all had in common their contribution to a Populist Nationalist representation of Norway. Their first significant break with the Statist representation can, according to Neumann, be observed around 1866-1867, when a group made up of peasants, supporters of a new Norwegian language and young dissident academics fiercely rejected a move by the civil servant elite to strengthen the union with Sweden.²⁶⁴

What all these voluntary organisations had in common was a hostility to the Statists, and instead of being indecisive about what the concept of 'the people' should encompass, Populist Nationalists seized the radical consequence of the nation resting on the people in that the nation should take over the state, which left little space and purpose for the Statists. In fact, the Populist Nationalist representation regarded the latter with deep suspicion, and argued that there existed two cultures in Norway: a people's culture and a foreign 'civil servants' culture, where the latter had not just been hegemonic for a long time but also controlled the state. Accordingly, the civil servant stratum was, according to Neumann 'banished from the Norwegian nation, branded as a separate nation with

²⁶³ Vestheim (1995).

²⁶⁴ Neumann (2001a), p. 81.

close ties to the Danish one, and as the enemy of the Norwegian nation'.²⁶⁵

In other words, there was no longer any need for the elite:

The *dannede* [cultured or enlightened] strata do not have any *dannende* [enlightening] function for the people, because the people can manage on their own.²⁶⁶

Not only do we here see a break with an elitist European Enlightenment-culture, but the Populist Nationalist representation also advocates a shift from an object approach to a subject approach to *Bildung*. The Populist Nationalists cultural policy programme went beyond a preoccupation with cultural manifestations in its more narrow sense such as the fine arts and cultural heritage. Their focus was geared more towards policies for language, education and cultural activities rooted locally.

Language as a marker of identity and empowerment

The most important of the above-mentioned four sub-movements was arguably the one preoccupied with Norway's need to have its own language. The thesis that Norway was made up of two cultures and that the elite culture of the cities was suspect, was put forward by Arne Garborg, who was one of the most vocal advocates for a new written

²⁶⁵ Neumann (2002), p. 99.

²⁶⁶ Neumann (2001), p. 171.

Norwegian language.²⁶⁷ In fact, the battle between the Populist and the Romantic Nationalist representation was very much fought over language, typified by a public battle between Arne Garborg and Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, where the latter argued that language, and in his view, the Danish-derived language was:

the most important cultural marker and the condition for “*dannelse*”. “*Dannelse*” was for Bjørnson [...] an enlightened condition within an exclusive area, which every individual according to his/her own abilities had to attempt to get in touch with. The arena for *dannelse* could be localised and qualitatively determined meaning that it “is” where the intellectual elite at any point is. [...] It was thus the peasant and the people who should commit themselves to wake up and come to Culture and Language, not the other way around.²⁶⁸

Bjørnson was clearly a National Democrat, who towards the end of the nineteenth century, advocated a militant kind of political nationalism.²⁶⁹ However, he was at the same time a representative of the elite and distanced himself from some of what the Populist Nationalists stood for, particularly on the language question. Thus, Bjørnson took a paternalistic stance with the intention of civilising his subjects: the peasants and their culture, and he makes it clear who defines what *dannelse* means.

The New Norwegian language movement, on the other hand, had both a national and a democratic objective: it would both contribute to people’s

²⁶⁷ Sveinung Time, ‘Nasjon og narrasjon: Om Garborg som aktør i fortellinga om “det norske”’, in Øystein Sørensen, *Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet* (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 2001), pp. 339 - 356.

²⁶⁸ Time (2001), p. 351.

²⁶⁹ Sørensen (2001), p. 32.

national sense of being Norwegian as well as making it easier for people to acquire knowledge through a language that was perceived as being closer to them. This movement, together with the peasant movement, found its outlet through a voluntary educational sector, which emerged alongside the official one.

A new educational agenda and the role of voluntary organisations

One of the most significant manifestations of the Populist Nationalist representation was perhaps what is called the people's high schools (*folkehøgskole*), the first of which was established in 1864. Although the aims and focus of these schools varied, they had in common a rejection of the Statists' project and a wish to develop an alternative educational system for peasants and others living in rural Norway.²⁷⁰ The schools were counter-cultural initiatives, leaning towards a subject approach to *Bildung* at least in terms of their rejection of a Danish curriculum in favour of one based on experiences closer to home. These schools developed alongside the official school system, funded privately and acted, according to Vestheim, as:

voices for a populist nationalistic rural Norway, and they worked for Norwegian peasant culture, a liberal Christian view, for tolerance and for assisting people to adopt new knowledge through reading and independent thinking.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ Jostein Nærbøvik, *Norsk Historie: 1860 – 1914* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1999); Dag Thorkildsen, 'En nasjonal og moderne utdanning', in Øystein Sørensen, *Jakten på det norske: Perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet* (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1995), pp. 268 - 284.

²⁷¹ Vestheim (1995), p. 92.

Another important outlet for nationalistic ideas and the struggle for a new Norwegian language was a growing number of liberal youth organisations, which were also based on the principle that *Bildung* could not be achieved through a 'top-down' approach and represented interests and ideas that primarily had their base in the regions. These organisations, which shared many of the same ideas as the *folkehøgskole*, became a significant nationalist force in the 1890s, also supported by members of the elite, such as Henrik Wergeland, who had been a keen supporter of using voluntary organisations to educate people.

All these initiatives had in common a sceptical and hostile attitude to the Statists' project.²⁷² They played a key role in the hegemonic change in favour of the Populist Nationalist representation and they also, as we shall see, came to have a profound influence of Norwegian cultural policy in the twentieth century.

As demonstrated in these previous sections, *Bildung* was an important objective for all the different strata who were involved in the nineteenth century nation-building project, and we have seen that the approach to this *Bildung* gradually moved from an object to a subject orientation. As

²⁷² Another influential initiative was the establishment of the Society for the Promotion of *Folkeopplysning* (*Selskabet for Folkeopplysningens Fremme*), which became the main coalition of elites who wanted to promote *folkeopplysning*. This society laid the basis for both the pedagogical theory and practice that has influenced the Norwegian education system to this day. One of its leading members was Ole Vig, who was influenced by the Danish teacher, writer and priest Nicolaj Grundtvig. Grundtvig's Herder-inspired educational reform programmes were highly influential in Denmark and through Ole Vig, he also casts long shadows over Norwegian *folkeopplysning*. After Vig's death in 1857 his ideas were carried forward by Christopher Bruun who was the mobilising ideologist in the movement out of which the already mentioned *folkehøgskole* sprang. For a more in-depth introduction to Ole Vig, Christopher Bruun and the Society for the Promotion of *Folkeopplysning*, see Slagstad (2001), and Korsgaard and Løvlie (2003).

articulated by Neumann: there was a change ‘from an Enlightenment celebration of the people’s potential for learning to a celebration of the people’s innate qualities’.²⁷³

Let me discuss in a little more detail the civilising aspects of these early cultural policy developments of the nineteenth century.

4.2.4 The civilising aspect of nineteenth-century cultural policy

All the organisations mentioned here contribute to cultural policy in the widest sense, but as I am particularly interested in state cultural policies, the reference to other organisations such as the liberal youth organisations and the *folkehøgskole* have been included to contextualise general trends and approaches to *Bildung*. However, even if we look at those schemes and institutions that were initiated and funded by the state, it becomes clear that both an object focused and a subject focused approach to *Bildung* are at play, and that this gradually shifted according to which representation was hegemonic.

It was not that the Danish inspired institutions like the drawing schools and the subsequent National Gallery disappeared, but they were complemented by museums and archival activities, which were more inward-looking and concerned with what was increasingly perceived to be a more genuine Norwegian culture, situated closer to the people. Neither is it that the latter initiatives were entirely based on a subject approach to

²⁷³ Neumann (2002), p. 94.

Bildung in the sense that people themselves (or rather people situated very close to them) decided on a programme of *folkeopplysning*. The museums, for example, were institutions established by the civil servants in accordance with National Romantic ideas. However, they focused more on what was regarded as genuinely Norwegian and represented a break with Danish and continental culture.

The establishments of the earlier institutions like the drawing school were perhaps less concerned with *Bildung*, and were rather initiatives which celebrated an elite culture for the elite. Both Bakke and Mangset claim that the bourgeoisie had established their own cultural institutions to celebrate their own culture.²⁷⁴ However, electoral reforms that would lead to democratic franchise on the basis of 'one man – one vote', made the civil servants face a new situation. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Foucault has argued that an increased democratisation of society calls for ever more measures to be put in place to manage the population. Absolute monarchies can make use of force to control the population, but in a democracy it becomes vital to control the population through a different set of disciplinary measures. It appears as if the institutions established in the early part of the nineteenth century, to celebrate what was primarily a bourgeois civil servant culture typified by the above-mentioned drawing school, were less concerned with civilising the wider parts of the populace. Although Solhjell argues that they had as one of their functions to educate the bourgeoisie and help them to acquire a

²⁷⁴ Mangset (1992); Bakke (2003).

certain taste,²⁷⁵ this does not appear to be part of a well planned social programme. And even though members of the elite, such as the poet Welhaven, argued that the light should shine from above, it appears that a real reform programme did not evolve before the ascendancy of the Romantic Nationalist, and even more so, the Populist Nationalist project later on.

Primarily taking his examples from the UK, Tony Bennett argues that the object oriented approach to *Bildung* found in the museum, the art gallery and the library, was portrayed as 'a disciplinary alternative to the alehouse'.²⁷⁶ If there was such a civilising dimension to, for example, the establishment of the National Gallery, it does not appear to be nearly as potent as the nationalist projects. The shift towards a more subject focused *Bildung* project did not indicate that it was less concerned with discipline and reform. Particularly, the Populist Nationalist project would not limit its *Bildung* project to an engagement with the arts, but would move its reform programme forward through the education system, language policies and also through the voluntary sector.

Albeit in a contemporary context, Tony Bennett argues that defining culture more widely in cultural policy terms, implies that a larger range of activities, or aspects of society are being 'brought into the sphere of

²⁷⁵ Dag Solhjell, 'Kommentar til anmeldelse av Fra Embetmannsregime til nytt Akademieregime. Kunstpolitikk 1850 – 1940', in *Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift* 9.1 (2007), p. 58.

²⁷⁶ Bennett (1998a), p. 125.

culture as a field of government and [...] as such, are laid open to reforming administrative programmes'.²⁷⁷

Bennett is here referring to how a wider definition of culture enables a wider aspect of human activities to become subject to governmental interference (a subject I shall return to in Chapter Six). The creators of Populist Nationalist policies of the nineteenth century did not perceive their education and language policies as cultural policies and, as such, this reference might not appear as immediately relevant. However, it appears clear to me that the reform programme of the nationalists had a stronger and better planned reformist and civilising agenda, albeit with a subject focus, than the Statist project had in the immediate years after 1814. Clear traces of this project can be found also in the labour-movements' policies of the twentieth century.

Hence, Norwegian *folkeopplysning* was, towards the end of the nineteenth century, leaning towards being subject focused, at least in the sense that it rejected a continental bourgeois *dannelse* in favour of a culture much closer to home, where the people, excluding the elite, were admired and on which the nation should be built. As we shall see in the next chapter, this reverberated strongly in many of the ideas originating within the Labour movement during the first half of the twentieth century. But let me first summarise and conclude my findings in this chapter.

²⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 101.

4.3 Summary

As mentioned early on in this chapter, a hegemonic power implies having control of a society's intellectual life through cultural means. Sometimes such an intellectual hegemony goes hand in hand with a tangible political power, for example through control of parliament. However, this is not always the case as we can see in the hegemonic battle of Norway's nation-building. In this concluding section I shall attempt to summarise the different cultural hegemonies charted in this chapter by means of a table, before I finally ask to what extent the Norwegian *folkeopplysning* project, whether informed by an object or a subject approach, epitomised a civilising mission during the nineteenth century.

It can be concluded that there was indeed a civilising project in nineteenth-century Norway, initiated by a civil servant elite. The Statist representation had always emphasised that they were the embodiment of a common European civilising project in Norway. This took continental culture and Enlightenment values as its starting point, but realised that a representation of the peasant was necessary as part of its nation-building project: a representation which can be seen as a concession to the majority who made up the populace. However, since 'the populace' was not sufficiently enlightened, civil servants were of the opinion that they had to carry the state, and guide 'the populace' according to Arnoldian principles. However, I argue that these civilising measures did not take form as a fully fledged reform project. The civil servants elite appear to be

mostly concerned with nourishing their own culture for themselves. This view was hegemonic during the first decades of the nineteenth century.

According to Neumann, when the National Romantics and their representation of the nation became hegemonic from the 1840s, in the sense that the concept of the people was now the absolute foundation for the nation, the focus shifted away from continental values and the peasant culture was even more romanticised. Hence, further concessions were given, now to the people rather than merely the populace, but it was still a civilising project, where the civil servants were the only ones with a state bearing potential, which implied that it was thus left unclear whether this stratum formed part of the nation or not.

As seen from Table Three, this triggered cultural policy measures, that gave more attention to traditional Norwegian culture, which had its origin prior to Norway's union with Denmark, such as peasant and medieval culture. However this was not at the expense of the continental culture that had traditionally been celebrated by the civil servant elites.

Hegemonic Representation	Power Concepts	Examples of cultural policy measures		
Statism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The authorities govern the populace The state is the bearer of culture, and the civil servant's culture which is continental, is superior. However, the peasant is hailed as a representative of the typically 'Norwegian'. 	<p>Norwegian culture is a seamless part of continental culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Mostly focused on establishing institutions, which could produce and distribute the arts.</i> <i>Examples are the drawing school and the National Galleries and private arts associations.</i> 		
→				
Romantic Nationalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The populace is replaced by the people. Unclear whether the civil servant elite belongs to the people. The nation rests on the people, but The state is separate from the nation and still governed by the elite. 	<p>Increased attention to traditional Norwegian culture, but not at the expense of continental culture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Celebration of peasant culture through the collection of fairy tales and folk-music.</i> <i>Folk-museums</i> <i>The Society for the Preservation of Norwegian Ancient Monuments.</i> 		
→				
Populist Nationalism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both the nation and the state rest on the people. The nation does not encompass the civil servant elites. No need for the elite because the people can manage on their own. Danish and continental culture branded as illegitimate, and not belonging to Norwegian culture. 	<p>The country is made up of two cultures: a people's culture and a foreign 'civil servant' culture. Only the former can be regarded as legitimate</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Efforts to construct a pure Norwegian language.</i> <i>A subject focused educational system through the folkehøgskole.</i> <i>The Society for the Promotion of Folkeopplysning.</i> 		
→				
Timeline:	1814	1840	1884	1905
	Constitution signed	Rise of Nationalist Romanticism	Introduction of Parliamentarianism	Norway gains full independence

Table 3: Hegemonic Representations in nineteenth-century Norway (1814 – 1905)

The ascendancy of the Populist Nationalists saw a significant shift towards culture as a common expression, where values emerged from below. Vestheim supports this view, when he argues that *folkeopplysning* developed from an 'object model' to a 'subject model'.²⁷⁸ Although people from the civil servant strata contributed to this populist representation, it becomes clear that there really is no need for them or their culture anymore. The people do not only make up the nation, but also encompass the strata on which the administration of the state is based on.

Oliver Bennett argues that in addition to the civilising mission, governments also get involved in culture for its potential economic benefits, or as a way to further national identity and prestige.²⁷⁹ The economic justifications are of less relevance for nineteenth-century Norwegian cultural policy. However, it seems from the focus of this chapter that furthering and strengthening a national identity was a stronger rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy in the first half of the nineteenth century than a civilising mission, at least in the Arnoldian sense. However, these rationales are related in that, initially at least, certain representations emerged from above where civil servants made clear their role as the cultural leaders of public opinion. A new national identity was to be formed with peasants as a symbol, albeit under the guidance of civil servants.

²⁷⁸ Vestheim (1995).

²⁷⁹ Bennett (1995); Bennett (1997).

So from this account of the Norwegian nation building project and cultural policies in the nineteenth century, it seems that a different civilising mission took hold in Norway. This resembled to start with, to a certain degree, Arnold's emphasis on the power of culture, but changed during the course of the century from focusing on the elite's notion of culture to increasingly placing local culture in the centre. As mentioned earlier, a national culture is, according to Hewison, useful in retaining a cultural hegemony, through historical memory and mythology. Given that the Norwegian elite did not have its own Norwegian historical memory, one had to be constructed. This memory and mythology was captured and made 'real' by the peasants and this formed the basis for a new hegemony.

This move away from a continental Enlightenment celebration to one where people themselves set the agenda met relatively little resistance in Norway, firstly because of the absence of an aristocracy but also because the civil servant elite's representation was not strong enough and because its construction of the Norwegian peasant as a national symbol in a way became an unwanted reality.

Although we see a gradual shift from an object to a subject approach to *folkeopplysning* there are no all-out winners or losers in this hegemonic

battle,²⁸⁰ and traces of all the nineteenth century policy ideas can be found after 1905, which I shall explore in the next chapter.

²⁸⁰ One example is one of the Populist Nationalist's main objectives, which was to agree on one new language to unify the whole nation. This objective was never reached. *Landsmål* (New Norwegian) was indeed formally given status as an official Norwegian language and the same status as the Danish-derived written language, which was practiced by the elite. However, the language movement never reached its objective of creating consensus around one national written and spoken language, and although New Norwegian is still an official language to this day, it is only practiced by a minority of the population.

5.0 Towards Cultural Democracy: cultural policies of the twentieth century

With Norway gaining full independence from Sweden in 1905, the Populist Nationalist counter-movements, discussed in the previous chapter, had won their battle against the civil servant elite. This coincided with a rapid increase in an urban Labour-movement, partly as a result of increased industrialisation. With the peasants and their supporters eventually integrating into the non-socialist liberal party of Norway (*Venstre- V*) the political struggle between Populist Nationalists and the civil servant elite was replaced by a struggle between the non-socialist parties and the socialist Labour Party with its roots in the Labour movement. During this period ideas related to cultural policy in the widest sense also became more articulate. Following on from Chapter Four's account of nineteenth-century cultural legacies, this chapter will thus continue to focus on cultural policies after 1905.

This chapter will only chart ideas up to 1973, which was the year when the Norwegian government started producing green papers that focused exclusively on cultural policy. These and subsequent papers will be made subject to a more in-depth textual analysis in the next chapter. The first section of this chapter will focus on the period between 1905 and 1945, followed by an exposition of the policies conceived between 1945 and 1973.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ I am not including the period between 1940 and 1945 when Norway was occupied by Nazi Germany. The rationale for this exclusion is explicated in Appendix 1.

Just as in the previous chapter I shall briefly attempt to summarise the different 'historical blocs', and the manifestations of their different cultural policies in terms of a table, before in the final section I attempt to draw some conclusions about the extent to which *Bildung* has figured in the cultural policy rhetoric (whether such a rhetoric has referred to culture as an explicit policy concern or not).

5.1 1905 to 1940: from Popular Nationalism to Social Democracy

Just as the cultural movements initiated by the Populist Nationalists in the late nineteenth / early twentieth century were counter-cultural, so was the Labour movement during the first decades of the twentieth century, in that it represented an alternative to the establishment. However, as we have seen, this bourgeois culture was not very strong and factions of the elite had themselves been advocates for the construction of a new Norwegian culture distinctly different from the Danish, although the Statist position was that this had to come in addition to a civilising continental culture, where their own representation should remain as the leading one. It did not take long though before the Labour movement came to represent the new hegemony.²⁸² Vestheim argues that without comparison, the Labour movement was the most extensive and powerful movement in twentieth

²⁸² Neumann (2001a). Apart from a brief period for about a month in 1928, the Norwegian Labour party (*Det Norske Arbeiderparti*) did not take control of the government until 1935, from when, apart from a post-war coalition of about five months after the Nazis' occupation, it was solely in charge until 1963. During the German occupation between 1940 and 1945, the Labour government, which was branded illegitimate by the Nazis, was based in London. Berge Furre, *Norsk Historie 1914 – 2000: Industrisamfunnet – frå vokstervisje til framtidsvil* (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 2000).

century Norway.²⁸³ It was not revolutionary but opted instead for social democracy where the struggle for a new hegemony was founded on democratic principles. The overall concern of the Labour movement in these first decades of the twentieth century was a political fight against capitalists and employers. However, this struggle was soon replaced by a representation, which, similarly to the Populist Nationalists of the late nineteenth century, firmly rested on the notion of the people as the core of the nation, which became hegemonic to such an extent that any other classes or groups had to attend to it, whether they wanted to or not.²⁸⁴

This hegemonic representation of the people came to have a profound influence on Norwegian cultural policy later on in the century. Its cultural influence followed naturally from the *folkeopplysning* and language movement of the nineteenth century. In fact Vestheim argues that a straight line can be drawn from the Populist Nationalists to the cultural policies of the Labour movement:

the labour movement inherited the fundamental idea that the cultures of the populace were independent, adequate cultures, which had the right to develop on their own terms, from the *folkeopplysning*- and language-traditions of the nineteenth century.²⁸⁵

Hence, although the nature of the Norwegian political landscape changed from an antagonism running between an urban elite and a rural counter culture to one between a socialist and a non-socialist fraction, the Labour

²⁸³ Vestheim (1995), p. 97.

²⁸⁴ Neumann (2001), pp. 171 - 172.

²⁸⁵ Vestheim (1995), p. 95.

movement's cultural policies did not represent a radical break from the Populist Nationalists.

The Labour movement concluded early that in order for the common worker to gain any real political influence, people needed to be enlightened and educated to gain knowledge and understanding of their own culture and values. The objectives were to give the working classes inner strength and help in the fight against the bourgeoisie. The strategy for the Labour movement was both to become involved in and gain influence over existing cultural organisations and institutions, as well as to establish alternatives. The former can, according to Vestheim, be termed a quantitative cultural policy, where the level of cultural experiences and artefacts and how they should be distributed or re-distributed are emphasised: in other words, to democratise culture. The latter is related to the Labour movement wanting to create an alternative culture, and define culture qualitatively different. These latter ideas were however not translated into official policy until the 1970s, and although a straight line can be drawn from the Populist Nationalist to the Labour movement, the latter would also want what was referred to as the high arts, such as music by classically trained musicians, theatre, and professional visual arts, to be available for the working class.

According to Vestheim, the one organisation, which next to the Labour Party itself was the most important in spreading and establishing an alternative culture was the the Workers' Educational Association

(*Arbeidernes Opplysnings Forbund – AOF*).²⁸⁶ Several other organisations were also central²⁸⁷ and they all had in common a more or less firm connection with the Labour Party. AOF was established in 1931, as a culmination of several attempts to create a national socialist organisation for education and *folkeopplysning*. The Labour Party had as early as around 1910 organised evening classes for workers to teach general subjects as well as to prepare them for participation in public life, but AOF's mission went further:

The main task for AOF was to create a socialist and counter cultural alternative organisation for *folkeopplysning*. The mission statement said amongst other things that the organisation should 'be part of the workers' socialist class struggle and work for the Norwegian working class' economic and political education and for an elevation of its intellectual and cultural level.²⁸⁸

AOF argued strongly for a new and more democratic cultural policy. In one of its publications from 1936, it states that until now, culture (read: a canonised artistic heritage) has only been available to a few selected people. The Labour movement wanted to change this and:

make culture a common guide for the whole of the people. Through theatre performances, art exhibitions and first and foremost through reading valuable literature shall the worker learn to appreciate real cultural values.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ Vestheim (1995).

²⁸⁷ Such as The Workers Sports Federation (*Arbeidernes Idrettsforbund*) and The Socialist Cultural Front (*Sosialistisk Kulturfront*).

²⁸⁸ Vestheim (1995), p. 108.

²⁸⁹ Cited in Vestheim (1995), p. 115.

In addition to the many documents and plans published by the Labour Party and by AOF in the 1930s, the government of the time also published papers containing policy-ideas. A resolution from the Ministry of Church Affairs' Council for *Folkeopplysning* (*Kirkedepartementets folkeopplysningsnemnd*), which was published in 1934, outlined what the government saw as the most important tasks for a publicly funded cultural policy. It suggested crisis aid to arts organisations facing hardship, support for a seminar series, study circles, touring exhibitions and film.²⁹⁰ A theatre committee had also been established in 1935, which suggested a range of measures to meet what had become a growing financial crisis for the theatres. An important organisational change was introduced in 1938 when a separate cultural department responsible for universities and higher education, broadcasting, and the arts and culture, was established within the Ministry for Church Affairs.

In another publication from 1935, Håkon Lie (who was later to become party secretary of the Labour Party) argued that in addition to creating their own cultural expressions, workers must learn to appreciate the culture that has been created by other classes:

Slowly theatre, music, song, painting, film, literature has demanded its place. The labour movement is not only a political, industrial and economic movement. In its deepest sense I guess its aim is to give workers the same part in the cultural heritage as other social classes.²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Mangset (1995), pp. 123 - 124.

²⁹¹ Vestheim (1995), p. 115.

He continued by saying that the socialist cultural organisations had as one of their tasks to 'educate workers to acquire the value of the arts'.²⁹² In other words, it is the socialist cultural organisations, which are given the task to educate and to help the common man to grow by being exposed to the arts, here articulated as including theatre, music, and so on. In Gramscian terms, it is as if a bourgeois civilising project has succeeded by achieving consensus around bourgeois culture, here exemplified by the subscription to it by one of the main representatives of the working class. The arts are given a universal value in this statement, from which all groups and classes ought to learn. Vestheim describes the Labour movement's cultural policy thus:

The labour movement thus gets a double task regarding culture and enlightenment. It shall both celebrate its own, new working class culture and administer the cultural heritage.²⁹³

Hence, bourgeois enlightenment values continued to inform the cultural policy of the counter-cultural Labour movement of the early twentieth century, with the change that this time it was representatives from the working classes themselves who advocated Arnoldian values.

In a similar way to the National Romantic movement of the nineteenth century, the Labour movement thus continued to straddle two horses. Using more modern cultural policy notions, they wanted to democratise

²⁹² Ibid., p. 116.

²⁹³ Ibid.

culture and at the same time enhance a cultural democracy. In other words, they wanted to celebrate and develop further an alternative culture of the people but without allowing it to replace an established artistic canon. Another similarity between the Populist Nationalist movement of the nineteenth century and the Labour movement of the 1930s is that they both used culture politically to 'create a political platform and a cultural legitimacy for political power'.²⁹⁴

The Labour Party formed its first long-term government in 1935, but the ideas about cultural policy that had informed the discussions within the party, AOF and other Labour organisations, were not translated into government policy just yet. Instead, these policies were formulated outside the parliamentary decision-making system, but they would come to have, as will be shown, a profound influence on governmental cultural policy decisions (from both sides of the political spectrum) decades after the Second World War. In the meantime, cultural policies remained patchy and reactive. Some decisions were made such as a law which stated that every Norwegian municipality should have a public library (the library act of 1935), a cinema act regulating public cinema exhibition from 1913 and the appointment of a Chief Inspector of Ancient Monuments and Historic Buildings (*riksantikvar*) in 1912. In addition to this the parliament continued to give grants directly to selected artists. However, it was not until after 1945 that Norway developed a coherent and structural

²⁹⁴ Vestheim (1995), p. 125.

cultural policy with its own administrative apparatus:²⁹⁵ what I call a modern cultural policy.²⁹⁶

5.2 Cultural policy between 1945 and 1973 – towards consensus

The emerging rhetoric and documents about cultural policy issues after the war originated mostly either within the Labour Party or from organisations with strong links to it.²⁹⁷ However, the ideas debated during the 1930s about supporting an alternative culture growing from the grass-roots and up, were pretty much absent and did not resurface until the 1970s, I shall focus on these in Chapter Six. I should emphasise that the period charted in this chapter also saw the advent of television, which obviously became a formidable cultural force, which would reach out to most Norwegian households, and also become a tool for *folkeopplysning*. However, as pointed out in Chapter Three this falls outside of the remit of this research project.

²⁹⁵ Mangset (1992).

²⁹⁶ To locate 1945 as the year from which Norway only got a ‘proper’ cultural policy has been disputed by Dag Solhjell, who argues that many policies were also instigated prior to and during the Second World War; Dag Solhjell, ‘Når fikk Norge en kulturpolitikk? Et debattinnlegg mot den konvensjonelle visdom’, in *Nordisk Kulturpolitisk Tidsskrift* 8.2 (2005), pp. 143 - 155. I am elaborating a bit further on Solhjel’s critique in Appendix 1.

²⁹⁷ Vestheim (1995); Helene Roshauw, ‘Fra mesenvirkosomhet til velferdspolitik: Utviklingen av norsk kulturpolitikk’ (M.Phil thesis, University of Oslo, 1980).

5.2.1 Culture for all: the cultural policy of the post-war Norwegian Labour Party

Vestheim has analysed the debate within the Labour Party in the 1950s and concludes that the emphasis on class struggle and an alternative working class culture withered somewhat after the war.²⁹⁸ Some critics within the Labour movement argued for a more humanistic and individualistic approach to cultural policy with intellectual and aesthetic objectives. The historian Halvdan Koht for example, who was also an active politician interested in cultural policy issues, argued that the Labour movement's class struggle was part of a national development and that all social classes had contributed at different times to the growth of a common national culture. Echoing Herder, he argued that none of these cultures were, more valuable than others but they had all instead, at different times, made their contribution. In the twentieth century the time had come for the working class to carry forward the traditions that had previously been laid by the bourgeoisie and the peasants. This is an important part of a socialist mission, which has as its objective to do away with social class, and hence also class culture, altogether. It was argued that a new culture which would encompass elements of the culture of all previous social classes would emerge.²⁹⁹

This type of rhetoric echoes in some way the Romantic Nationalist representation of the nineteenth century when arguing that working class culture (as previously peasant culture) should not replace bourgeois

²⁹⁸ Vestheim (1995).

²⁹⁹ Vestheim (1995), p. 134.

culture but come in addition to it. It differed from the strong emphasis on the use of culture in a utilitarian class struggle, which could be found in the policy documents of the 1930s. If this rhetoric is part of a hegemonic political battle, then it appears as if the working class again is making concessions in order to establish its culture at the core of the nation: not coined in opposition to a middle class culture but instead co-opting it.

Another advocate for the humanistic and individualistic importance of the arts and literature was the editor of the newspaper '*Arbeideravisa*' in Trondheim, Ole Øisang. In a pamphlet published by AOF in 1951, he is not rejecting the welfare potential in an increased focus on culture, but he argues that there are also intrinsic values in the arts and literature that are important for the whole of humanity. Taking this Arnoldian stance it is argued that everybody (including the working classes) ought to experience the arts. There is also a strong *Bildung* aspect to his argument, when he reasons that reading makes people feel more secure due to increased knowledge and understanding as well as making them more unprejudiced and tolerant. There are also other impacts, which are related to a welfare agenda such as culture contributing to people's self-confidence and their ability to take part in democratic processes, presumably to further the working class' agenda.

However, although Koht and Øisang's works were influential to a certain degree, they were exceptions and most of the publications about cultural policy originating from within the Labour Party emphasised culture's

welfare potential. In 1959, the Labour Party issued a publication with the title: 'a Cultural programme for debate' (*et kulturprogram til debatt*), which was the result of the work of a committee that had been given the task of developing a cultural programme for the party. Helge Sivertsen, a politician who was central in this committee, has argued that this document informed the Labour Party's cultural policy all the way up to the seventies.³⁰⁰ This document, like Koht's, also argues that the objective of socialism, and indeed socialist cultural policy, is to do away with class divisions altogether. However, it puts the main emphasis on the social benefits of culture and, according to Vestheim:

points in the direction of an understanding of culture in accordance with a social science approach, where the social effects of a cultural policy are given most importance, not aesthetic qualities.³⁰¹

The emphasis on class struggle and the development of an alternative working class culture of the 1930s was replaced by a welfare policy aimed at everybody. The social impact, based on a wide definition of culture rather than aesthetic qualities, was given the most importance.³⁰²

However, modern cultural policy would not be informed by these ideas just yet. Although the debates within the Labour Party defined culture widely, this was not necessarily reflected in governmental policies of the first years after the war.

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 138.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 140.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 144.

In 1949 the Ministry for Education and Church Affairs (*Kirke of Undervisningsdepartementet* - KUD) issued a green paper entitled *About Support for Organised Youth Work and Initiatives for Leisure Culture*. It has been argued that this paper, which proposed 'a fundamental and general cultural programme',³⁰³ was the first proper green paper about cultural policy in Norway. Although the paper does not refer to notions such as 'cultural democracy' and 'a wider definition of culture' it clearly laid the foundation for these new ideas to come. The result of this proposal was that the government started a systematic funding of community halls around the country. The funding was partly raised from the official state football pools, which the government had introduced in 1946.³⁰⁴ These venues were designed to host a range of different activities, including 'elite culture', cultural activities organised by the voluntary sector as well as sports. According to Vestheim: 'As a symbol and signifier the community hall stood for stronger popular involvement and an open and manifold notion of culture'.³⁰⁵

These cultural policy measures attempt to straddle both the high arts and community culture and rely on both an object and a subject approach to *Bildung*. I shall now outline how the need to disseminate the arts became a key objective of post-war cultural policy.

³⁰³ Mangset (1992), p. 126.

³⁰⁴ Given that DKS is funded by the state lottery, I shall cover the historical development of this source of finance in more detail in Chapter Six.

³⁰⁵ Vestheim (1995), p. 160.

5.2.2 Democratisation of culture and the dissemination of the arts

Despite all the rhetoric both within the labour movement in the 1930s about a new and different working class culture as well as the mentioned debates in the Labour Party in the 1950s, which focused on culture as being an integrated part of welfare policy, many of the decisions taken between 1945 and the 1970s were informed by the idea of democratising culture, meaning to bring the established arts (or high arts) to as many people as possible, crossing both social and geographical boundaries. The parliament decided to establish and fund a range of organisations, whose remit was to tour the arts around the country. The Norwegian Touring Theatre (*Riksteatret*) and a touring cinema (*Norsk Bygdekino*) were established in 1948, the Touring Art Gallery (*Riksutstillinger*) in 1952 and a touring organisation for music (*Rikskonsertene*) in 1968. The idea behind all these institutions was to bring high quality art to audiences around the country who would otherwise not have had the opportunity to experience such expressions by professional artists. A national opera company (*Den Norske Opera*) was established in 1957, with a similar objective.³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ In addition to the establishment of these institutions, the arrangements where parliament gave stipends and guaranteed income to artists continued until 1963. Several of these stipends took the form of life-long salaries for distinguished artists, mostly writers. This was abolished and replaced with three-year working stipends for artists, which were decided on by expert groups and representatives of the Norwegian Association of Writers (*Den Norske Forfatterforening*); Geir Vestheim, "'(...) der er gift paa Pennen hans": Kampen i Stortinget om diktargasjane 1863-1962' (Oslo: Unipub, 2005). Artists have also since 1975 been able to negotiate terms for artists' copyright compensations with the objective of improving their living conditions and enabling them to continue their practice; Mangset (1992), p. 144.

Mangset argues that all these decisions were taken in an atmosphere of optimism where the decision-makers thought that the arts only needed a vitamin injection or kick start as part of the rebuilding of the country after the war and that artists and arts institutions would survive on the private market as soon as people got more leisure time and more spending power due to an anticipated improved financial situation.³⁰⁷ However, it soon became clear that this was over-optimistic and that people's arts consumption in reality had instead declined.³⁰⁸ The financial condition for artists and arts institutions was thus far from as promising as had been predicted.

Politicians, publishers, authors and others were particularly concerned about the future of Norwegian literature, particularly what was termed 'quality' fiction.³⁰⁹ People had not taken up reading this type of literature to the extent hoped for by the government.³¹⁰ In response to this the government decided to set up a Norwegian Cultural Fund (*Norsk Kulturfond*) and an arts council (*Norsk Kulturråd*) to administer it, which was to be financed through a tax on popular weekly magazines. It was

³⁰⁷ Mangset (1992).

³⁰⁸ The average Norwegian's expenditure on public performances at theatres, concerts and cinemas as a percentage of total expenditure went down from 1,1 per cent in 1946 to 0,3 per cent in 1968; Nils Øye quoted in Mangset (2002), p. 130.

³⁰⁹ Vestheim (1995), p. 129.

³¹⁰ In fact, the number of Norwegian publications of novels, short-stories, poetry and plays had gone down from 136 in 1938 to only 86 in 1963, and the percentage of Norwegian published fiction (as opposed to in translation) went down from 68 per cent in 1931 to 31 per cent in 1959.

also decided that the government should purchase 1000 copies of every fictional book and assign them to the country's libraries.³¹¹

Vestheim suggests that this shift away from the wish to create a new working-class culture, which was revered to such an extent in the 1930s, towards the inclination to democratise the arts can be explained by culture increasingly being perceived as a welfare good. In order to achieve this, decisionmakers focused primarily on designing and implementing a delivery system for established cultural expressions to reach a wide audience.³¹²

The objectives were quantitative, where efficient delivery systems were given more prominence than considerations related to content, the programming of which would be determined by the four national touring organisations for film, visual art, theatre and music, as well as through the foundation of the Norwegian Cultural Fund / Arts Council, Norway, in accordance with 'the arms' length principle'.

However, Vestheim does not say much about what the rationale behind including culture (meaning what he terms the high arts) as part of the provisions facilitated by the welfare-state was. The analysis of these policies through secondary sources such as the works of Vestheim, Mangset and Roshauw unveils only to a limited extent which rationales

³¹¹ It is important to notice though that this was to exclude what was classified as "western and pocket crime" books.

³¹² Vestheim (1995), p. 170.

they were based on, although Vestheim argues that this is related to *folkeopplysning* in the object sense, through the enlightenment of the people.³¹³ Let me summarise this chapter, before I attempt to go beyond these writers and assess the extent to which a civilising mission has been a key rationale behind the cultural policies of the nineteenth century and twentieth century up to 1973.

5.3 Summary

By 1905 the Nationalist Populist representation had, according to Neumann, become hegemonic, where the notion of the people, meaning the people defined in opposition to and excluding the elite, was a central concept of power. Consequentially, the elite stratum was treated with suspicion. This is, according to Neumann, still the case today, particularly in debates about Europe, and this central position of the people was strengthened even further with the rise of the Labour movement during the first few decades of the twentieth century.

This social democratic representation can be viewed as a 'historic bloc', through which a hegemony, based on social democratic principles, emerges. In creating this historical bloc, which rests firmly on the notion of the people, the labour movement is 'entering into an intimate collaboration with other working people, especially the peasants'.³¹⁴

³¹³ Vestheim (1995).

³¹⁴ Neumann (2001a), p. 100.

Hence, the social democratic representation, which acquires real power in 1935 when it takes control of parliament (a control it will keep with one exception until 1963) does not signify a radical break from Populist Nationalism. The main difference was the emphasis on working people rather than 'the people', which included both manual workers in the industries as well as people working in the primary sector in the districts.

This would also come to influence the cultural policies of the Labour movement, which through the Labour Party learnt to straddle two horses. In the 1930s, the antagonism between working class culture and bourgeois culture was replaced by a representation of the Norwegian nation, which did away with this conflict altogether and replaced it with one with the people at its core. Hence, the movement never rejected the high arts, but rather emphasised that everybody should have access to them and that a new working class culture came in addition to, not instead of, the arts. This policy rhetoric was instrumental, in that it emphasised culture's potential to enlighten and support people, but it also referred to the intrinsic values of the arts and the idea that society should celebrate both the new working class culture and cultural heritage. However, apart from 'relief measures' to arts organisations facing economic hardship, few of these ideas were translated into real policies prior to the Second World War. Hence, several of the power concepts remain rhetorical, but both a subject and object approach to *Bildung* is present in the discourse.

A summary of the two hegemonic representations of the twentieth century (up to 1973) are presented in Table Four.

Hegemonic Representation	Power Concepts	Examples of cultural policy measures		
Social Democracy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Class and the working people as an antithesis to the state, replaced by the working people as the nation's core. • The nation encompasses the working people plus everybody else. • The culture of the working people is independent and adequate. • But the arts given universal value 	<p><i>The people need to gain knowledge and understanding of their <u>own</u> culture.</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Various measures to address economic hardship for cultural organisations.</i> • <i>Plus an expression that all cultures (including the bourgeois cultural heritage) should be accessible for all.</i> 		
				
Welfare provision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A socialist nation, made up of a people encompassing everybody independent of class (nobody being excluded). • Consequently the nation shall do away with class and class culture altogether. 	<p>Less emphasis on an alternative grass-root based culture and more on culture as part of welfare-provision accessible to all</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Funding of community halls (disseminating both elite and folk culture).</i> • <i>Four touring organisations (for film, music, theatre and the visual arts), plus a national opera company</i> • <i>Guaranteed income for artists</i> • <i>The Norwegian Cultural Fund and Arts Council, Norway</i> 		
				
Timeline:	1905	1930	1945	1973
	Norway gains full independence	Rise of the Labour party	Liberation from Nazis occupation	Green papers and 'new' cultural policy

Table 4: Hegemonic Representations in twentieth-century Norway (1905 – 1973)

The 1950s saw a rhetoric originating from the Labour Party and its affiliated organisations, where the concept of the people covers everybody, including both the working-class and the bourgeoisie, aiming towards a socialist nation, which does away with class altogether. Consequently, the cultural policies after the war were less preoccupied with grass-root culture originating from the working classes and emphasise instead a universal culture, which should be part of the state's welfare-provision. Hence, it puts much emphasis on the arts, such as music performed by professional musicians, theatre and the visual arts.

We see a turn towards an object approach, which celebrates a universal culture's ability to facilitate *Bildung*. There are thus fewer policies with the aim to re-focus on the alternative working class culture, which featured distinctly in the rhetoric of the 1930s.

Before I move on to analyse in more depth how the idea-trajectories of the period between 1814 and 1973 informed the new cultural policies from 1973 and onwards, let me briefly take stock of the *Bildung* dimension in these earlier policies.

5.4 Summary of Chapters Four and Five: The trajectories of the Folkeopplysnings idea

In this and the previous chapter I have attempted to contextualise the analysis of late twentieth-century policy rationales by exploring the history of Norwegian cultural policy ideas, dating back to 1814 with a particular focus on the *Bildung* aspect of these policies. Because there are so few

papers articulating clear policy rationales and because I have only analysed them through secondary sources (through other scholars' work) it is at this stage difficult to make any decisive conclusions regarding how understandings of culture's role in a civilising mission were internalised in the discourses of the nineteenth century and the twentieth century up to 1973. Some important concepts of power have been introduced, but they only relate to cultural policies indirectly. As we shall see in the next two chapters, clearer discursive practices crystallise from 1973, but several of these, particularly regarding culture's *Bildungs* potential, are informed by trajectories, going all the way back to the nineteenth century.

Despite not necessarily being informed by explicitly articulated rationales, most of the cultural policies that I have charted in these two chapters (covering almost 160 years) have had as their aim to facilitate personal or social transformations. The articulations of some of the Statist and particularly the Romantic Nationalist projects of the nineteenth century had an object focused civilising dimension to them, expressed explicitly by some of the influential representatives from the elite that I quoted in the previous chapter, including Welhaven, Munch and Bjørnson.

The increasing power gained by the Populist Nationalists towards the end of the nineteenth century, has, according to Vestheim, on the other hand profoundly influenced the cultural and educational agenda in Norway.³¹⁵ Although these Populist Nationalist ideas originated in the nineteenth

³¹⁵ Vestheim (1995).

century, they resonated strongly in the discourses of the Labour movement in the first half of the twentieth century and since 1945 as an important rationale behind aspects of modern cultural policy through its principle of cultural democracy. This demonstrates clearly, in Vestheim's view, how Norwegian *folkeopplysning* has seen a development from an object model to a subject model.³¹⁶

However, the Labour movement straddles two horses at the same time. On the one hand a class-less approach to culture was advocated, for example typified by Håkon Lie when he argued that workers should take part in the same cultural heritage as other classes, such as theatre, music painting and literature, as, in Arnoldian terms, an object approach to *Bildung*. In other words, the peasants and the workers aimed to educate themselves in accordance with Arnoldian values. On the other hand, the people should also gain knowledge and understanding of their own culture. This is inward-looking and less engaged with a European continental heritage.³¹⁷

However, such an inward-looking understanding does not appear to have been rooted in the policies after 1945, which saw a return to a perception of a universal culture, which everybody should subscribe to, in what was still hoped to become a class-less socialist society.

³¹⁶ Vestheim (1995), p. 89.

³¹⁷ Neumann appears to indicate that they succeeded in this to the extent that, over one hundred years later the nation has chosen to turn inwards in its encounter with the wider Europe through two EEC/EU referenda.

The *Bildung* potential in cultural policy has, in other words, developed along two parallel lines, where, perhaps apart from the Populist Nationalist project of the last decades of the nineteenth century, it was not a question of 'either – or'. Stuart Hall, writing about British culture, has argued that:

It is crucial to replace the notion of 'culture' with the more concrete, historical concept of 'cultures': a redefinition which brings out more clearly the fact that cultures always stand in relations of domination – and subordination – to one another, are always, in some sense, in struggle with another.³¹⁸

This has clearly been the case in Norway too. However, Norway differs from the UK because these different cultures have also been part of the official cultural policy at different times, whereas in the UK it is easier to detect 'a dominant culture, which represents itself as the culture'.³¹⁹

As mentioned, the *Bildung* rationale (whether with a subject or object approach) has been running like a red thread throughout all the cultural policies of the nineteenth century and twentieth centuries. I shall argue that this is epitomised by DKS. However, before that I shall focus in more detail on the policy texts published between 1973 and 2003, which are the subject of the next chapter. I shall start with the policy rationales of the so-called 'new' cultural policies of the 1970s, which had cultural democracy as an objective and which aimed to define the content of governmental cultural provisions differently from the policies immediately

³¹⁸ Stuart Hall cited in Hewison (1995), p. 17.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 16.

after 1945. These policies were partly inspired by ideas which originated in the Labour movement of the thirties, and which we have already established go in a straight line back to the Populist Nationalist movement of the late nineteenth century. There are thus clear continuities in the *Bildung* rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy.

6.0 Cultural policy discourses: 1973 - 2003

As argued in previous chapters, what I term a 'modern' Norwegian cultural policy was initiated after the Second World War, when central government took a more active role in providing access to cultural expressions and activities. This policy's main objective in the beginning was to democratise culture, a policy-rationale which continues to be at the forefront, and which, I shall argue, reached a peak with the introduction of DKS in 2001. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, DKS is to a high extent concerned with *Bildung*, and in this respect, it sits comfortably within Norwegian post-war cultural policies. However, this *Bildung* objective has also, at times during the second half of the twentieth century, been invoked by other types of cultural policy measures, which have been more subject focused in their orientation. However, such policy rationales were only to a limited extent articulated in the 1940s, 50s and 60s.

Few documents were published during the first decades after the war that gave clear ideas about why the government should allocate public money to culture or set long-term objectives for its cultural policy. This changed in the 1970s, when central government began publishing its first cultural policy Green papers, which coincided with a substantial increase in public spending on culture. The purpose of the first Green paper, published in 1973, was, according to Roshaw, for the first time:

to make a total evaluation of the public involvement in the cultural sector, based on the fact that different support arrangements had developed randomly without any clear political consideration.³²⁰

Hence, following on from the broad presentation of Norwegian cultural policies in Chapters Four and Five, which took us all the way back to the dissolution of the union between Norway and Denmark in 1814, this chapter will explore the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy since 1973 in more detail. As will be demonstrated below, the policy papers between 1973 and 2004, as outlined in this analysis, harbour both a subject and an object approach to *Bildung*.

The aim of the chapter is to interrogate these Green papers (six altogether) and the subsequent debates in parliament with the aim, through an analysis of the discourses harboured in these texts, to understand better the rationales on which these policies were based. The mentioned papers, which have been published at regular intervals (approximately every ten years),³²¹ outline central government's ideas and plans for its cultural policy over each following ten-year period or so.

The chapter will start with a presentation of the background to the policy papers as well as the political context within which they were produced, followed by a brief introduction to the selection of texts and the approach I have taken to analysing them. This will be followed by a detailed

³²⁰ Roshauw (1980), p. 133.

³²¹ Two of these six papers were published as additional papers two or three years after the original paper was published, due to a change in government in the meantime. Hence, two Green Papers were published in the 1970s, and the 1980s, and one in the 1990s and 2000s respectively. This is explained in somewhat more detail in Appendix 1.

examination of actual papers. The way in which the presentation of these documents is structured is informed by the policy rationales I have identified, which will be discussed further in the subsequent section. I argue that the main rationale harboured by these texts, is concerned with how people's exposure to culture can facilitate *Bildung*. This view is internalised by means of a powerful discourse, which, although it changes over time and is made up of different layers, still holds together some strong assumptions about the *Bildung* potential of cultural activities. This *Bildung* discourse includes four sets of arguments, on which the foundation of these policies are based: a 'value' argument, a 'growth' argument, an 'anti-commercial' argument and a 'protection-of-national-culture' argument. These arguments all have policy implications, which I shall also present in this chapter.

The national budget's allocation to cultural activities and cultural organisations had increased steadily since 1945 and received a significant boost in the 1970s. However, in the 1980s it was clear that this bonanza would not continue and the cultural sector was requested to find alternative funds from private sources in order to secure its continual growth. This laid the foundation for what I term a 'marketisation' discourse, which developed alongside the other discourses already mentioned and which increased in intensity over the years.

It is curious to note that both the *Bildung* and the marketisation discourses were subscribed to by most of the actors and institutions

contributing to the policy papers and debates analysed, and this is what makes them strong and resilient. Differences in opinion could only in exceptional cases be traced to party-political allegiances. However, one exception to this was an alternative discourse held up by members of the Progress Party, who also entered the debate in the 1980s and who more or less argued that there was no need for any governmental intervention in the cultural sector at all, and hence implicitly rejected the *Bildung* discourse.

Despite these being minority discourses, in the sense that they are eclipsed by the main *Bildung* discourse, I include a presentation of these two 'alternative' discourses (marketisation and Progress Party) in this chapter, because they have grown to have a central position in these policy papers. Having said that, it is clear that the main rationale behind Norwegian cultural policies as represented in these policy documents, whether articulated explicitly or implicitly, is to facilitate *Bildung*. Both the Arnoldian emphasis on the transforming and civilising power of great works of arts, as well as Herder's more relativist, open definition of what types of culture have a *Bildung* potential are at play in these texts. Curiously, they are rarely coined in opposition to each other, but are mostly subscribed to amongst all the contributors. However, there appears to be a gradual change in the discursive intensity in favour of the object approach to *Bildung*, and DKS seems to have been introduced in a cultural policy climate which mostly celebrates the professional arts as

opposed to one where the *Bildung* potential is defined more widely through participation in a wider range of cultural activities.

6.1 Background and methodological approach

Before presenting the actual analysis of the policy papers and the debates, I shall briefly explain the political context within which these texts were produced, particularly in the case of the two seminal Green papers produced in the 1970s. I shall also elaborate on the rationales behind my selections of texts and the analytical approach I have taken.

6.1.1 Political context

A key finding that I will highlight in this chapter is that political party affiliation only determined the different understandings and assumptions in the Norwegian discourse on cultural policy to a limited degree.³²² However, it is still useful to include a general presentation of the political landscape at the time of the publications and debates, to set the context.³²³

In Chapter Five I argued that the cultural policies of the post-war years were integrated parts of the welfare policies of the government. The objective was to democratise culture, and the Labour Party expressed a

³²² Instances where such differences have been identified will be pointed out, otherwise it can be assumed that the representations presented in this paper have broad support across the Norwegian political party spectrum.

³²³ Please see Appendix 2 for a table with all the policy texts I have consulted and Appendix 6 for a table of all the governments of the period covered in this policy-paper based study (1973 and 2004), which also includes a listing of the prime minister and the parties that made up each government, the Norwegian abbreviation of each party-name as well as the location of all the policy-papers (Green Papers, responses by the parliamentary committee or minutes of plenary sessions in parliament) that I have analysed within each governmental period.

break from the tradition of active participation, which had been prevalent in the rhetoric of the 1930s. Vestheim argues that the ideas from the 1930s were picked up again about forty years later, in the 1970s, and turned into policies which were also influenced by international trends at that time.³²⁴

In 1974, the budget of the cultural section of the Department for Educational and Church Affairs' was distributed as follows: 64 per cent allocated to institutions primarily mediating the 'high arts', 16 per cent on cultural heritage activities and 20 per cent for decentralised activities, meaning activities that could be characterised by a wider definition of culture.³²⁵ However, it became clear that the establishment of the four touring organisations mentioned in Chapter Five and the Arts Council, Norway had achieved little in actually democratising culture. As Vestheim puts it:

The well-to-do middle class in the cities, with sufficient cultural capital and a relatively good financial situation, were in reality the receivers of the irrigation-policy of the 50s and the 60s.³²⁶

Since 1960 politicians and bureaucrats had been working on a Green paper for culture but for various reasons this never materialised.³²⁷

³²⁴ Vestheim (1995).

³²⁵ Roshauw (1980), p. 115. Roshauw has carried out the commendable task of breaking down the ministry's budget. The basket she characterises as the high arts includes established institutions like the National Gallery and the National Theatre, located in central areas (42 per cent), funding for the four touring organisations for film, theatre, music and the visual arts (10 per cent), and the Norwegian Cultural Fund (12 per cent).

³²⁶ Vestheim (1995), p. 175.

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

However, the failure of the policies from the 1950s and 1960s was not ignored. Dahl and Helseth refer to a 'second cultural panic', (the first had been the fear of the international cultural industries, which led to the foundation of the Arts Council, Norway in 1965), because most people still did not make use of the high arts provision that was made possible as a result of public funding.³²⁸

The response from politicians was a critical interrogation of the Government's cultural policy, including its priorities and objectives, where it was argued that the focus of governmental cultural policy should, to a greater extent, be on activating people rather than just mediating the arts. Another argument was that cultural policy decisions ought to become much more decentralised.³²⁹ This coincided with an acknowledgement of the potential power of the ever-growing cultural industries, which, as we shall see, were perceived as vulgar and as having a damaging effect on people.

The resulting first Green papers of the 1970s were inspired by and in line with the recommendations from UNESCO and other international organisations as well as international trends at the time.³³⁰ The governments in both Sweden and Denmark had presented similar papers to their parliaments, and these new ideas in all the three Scandinavian countries were highly influenced by the recommendations put forward after an international conference in Venice in 1970, organised by

³²⁸ Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 229.

³²⁹ Vestheim (1995), p. 175.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

UNESCO. The Council of Europe had also produced documents arguing that an increased support for culture could be viewed as an investment in people and as a basis for democracy and increased freedom.³³¹

The UNESCO influence

Given that much of the rhetoric in the first Green papers of the 1970s to such an extent departed from the principle to democratise culture, meaning the arts, I shall elaborate a little further on the international trends it was influenced by, particularly the ideas originating from Unesco. Robert Hewison has juxtaposed the democratisation of culture with cultural democracy and argues that there is a:

difference between a view of culture that, following the definition offered by Matthew Arnold in 1869, [...] [which] sees it as a 'pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know the best which has been thought and said in the world' and that other view which sees culture as the common expression of a people, where values emerge from below, and are not imposed from above.³³²

It is the juxtaposing of these two cultural policy ideas that the Venice conference and the subsequent and seminal book 'Cultural development: Experience and policies' authored by the French civil servant and cultural policy maker Augustin Girard, were debating. The book was highly influential on the new cultural policies of all the Scandinavian countries: specifically Girard's recommendation to shift the focus of cultural policy

³³¹ Ibid., p. 60.

³³² Hewison (1995), p. 34.

from a focus on the democratisation of culture to one of a cultural democracy.³³³

Vestheim argues that Girard's book is seminal in the sense that it expresses underlying thoughts of this particular period. Girard's intellectual project does not take culture's intrinsic values as its point of departure, but emphasises instead how culture can satisfy the 'need for quality of life and identity'.³³⁴

Hence, cultural policy shall not 'exist for the arts, but for the citizens and their lives. The arts are, in such a perspective, given a social function'.³³⁵

Girard's writing is less concerned with civilising measures in the more crude Arnoldian sense, in that he does not talk about anarchy and disorder. He is in no doubt of culture's universal value though: 'Culture is the response to man's highest needs, the need which gives him his dignity, which makes him man'.³³⁶

However, Girard lamented what he called the piecemeal and dehumanising work that many workers were made subject to, and argued that this also spilled over into their leisure life, which Girard argued was:

³³³ Vestheim (1995), p. 72.

³³⁴ Ibid., p. 63.

³³⁵ Ibid., p. 65.

³³⁶ Augustin Girard and Geneviève Gentil, *Cultural Development: experiences and policies* (Paris: Unesco, 1983), p. 16.

governed by the attitudes imposed during working hours. Those who are most creatively employed also enjoy the most creative leisure, and those most passive in their work are equally so in their leisure.³³⁷

This desolate situation could only be overcome by a policy:

aimed at using the workers' leisure to overcome their alienation of body and mind, enabling them to realize all their natural potential and accept their responsibilities in social life, [only this] will be likely sooner or later to fulfil their deepest aspirations.³³⁸

This statement's emphasis on the realisation of people's own potential and the importance of giving people the ability to take responsibilities for their own social life has a strong Herderian *Bildung* element to it. In line with such an approach to *Bildung*, Girard explicitly rejects the idea of workers' leisure time being filled with what he calls 'the cultural activities typical of the leisured classes of former times',³³⁹ which has little relevance to most people who face obstacles because they do not have the necessary 'language, that complex code of symbols to which the uninitiated public does not have the key'.³⁴⁰

A cultural policy, which is preoccupied with these 'fine arts' does not deserve to take its place alongside other more worthy areas like social policy and economic policy:

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 66.

Unless it is explicitly associated with a number of ultimate ends accepted by society and linked to a blueprint for civilization; unless it is a combat which can fire the minds of the young.³⁴¹

Thus, the intrinsic value of culture or the intrinsic value of the arts, is not a strong enough justification for a cultural or arts policy, unless it has these mentioned impacts and transformative effects.

Girard argues that all these democratisation efforts have failed and that if the aim was to remove cultural inequalities, they have been counterproductive and instead increased them, 'since it benefits those who already have access and the desire and means to ensure it [the high arts]'.³⁴²

Hence, the culture of the leisured classes or the intellectual aristocracy has no place in Girard's cultural policy ideas because they can only to a limited extent facilitate *Bildung*.

Girard is equally sceptical about the *Bildung* potential of the profit-making cultural industries, which he describes as an 'audio-visual bombardment'. By making use of participation, independence and creativity, television might be able to contribute to universal communication.³⁴³ However, Girard is sceptical of whether this is possible in practice and instead

³⁴¹ Ibid., p. 23.

³⁴² Ibid., p. 67.

³⁴³ Ibid., p. 18.

describes television as an expression of 'passiveness, superficiality, voyeurism and reduction to the lowest common denominator'.³⁴⁴

Girard's *Bildung* objectives can thus neither be achieved by a cultural policy which attempts to democratise the 'fine arts', nor by the cultural industries, at least not in their current manifestation. Growth of the individual can instead be achieved through a cultural action which:

has its source in the need to give leisure back its value as an element of culture, that is, its role in the re-creation of the personality, individual expression and social communication.³⁴⁵

In other words, people's leisure time should be characterised by active participation. Girard breaks with the main principle behind the idea to democratise culture, which perceives the main cultural policy challenges in terms of quantity: that the culture on offer does not reach out to a wide enough audience, crossing social and geographical barriers. Girard asks instead a qualitative question: what type of culture should be mediated?

As will be demonstrated below, these policy principles, which depart quite radically from the idea to mediate the high arts as widely as possible, were to a large extent adopted in the Norwegian cultural policy discourse, particularly in the 1970s, but also in the 1980s. This can, according to Vestheim, be explained because of the long traditions of subject focused

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

folkeopplysnings- traditions dating back to the Populist Nationalist movements of the nineteenth century.

The political climate

In 1971, inspired by these international trends, the Labour government started drafting a Green paper on a new cultural policy, but before the paper was finalised the government was forced to resign.³⁴⁶ It was thereafter a non-socialist coalition government made up of the Centre Party (*Senterpartiet* - SP),³⁴⁷ the Christian Democrats (*Kristelig Folkeparti* - KrF) and the Liberal Party of Norway (*Venstre* - (V))³⁴⁸ which finally presented the paper entitled 'About organising and financing the cultural sector' (*Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeidet*).³⁴⁹ Later, in 1973, the Labour Party was back in government and this administration published an additional Green paper, called 'New cultural policy' (*Ny kulturpolitikk*).³⁵⁰

In 1981 the Labour Party had to relinquish power to the Conservatives (*Høyre* - H) who, together with the Christian Democrats and the Centre

³⁴⁶ Due to the overall negative result in the referendum on Norway's membership of the EEC in 1972.

³⁴⁷ A party which traditionally represented and gained support from people in rural communities employed in the primary sector, like fishing, agriculture and forestry.

³⁴⁸ *Venstre*, which is a liberal party, was introduced in Chapter Five. *Venstre* is Norway's oldest political party, but has since 1945 had a marginal role and only been able to exercise power in collaboration with other parties.

³⁴⁹ Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1973. *St.meld. nr. 8 (1973-74): Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeid*, Oslo. (KUD (1973)). For the sake of clarity, the first time a public document is referenced in a footnote, the full reference will be followed by an abbreviation, in this case (KUD (1973)). Subsequent references to the same document will be using this abbreviated connotation. A list of all the public documents I have consulted, with a short description, is listed in Appendix Two.

³⁵⁰ Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1974. *St.meld. nr. 52 (1973-74): Ny kulturpolitikk, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 8 for 1973-74 Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeid*, Oslo. (KUD (1974)).

Party, gained majority in parliament.³⁵¹ The two papers published in the early eighties called 'Cultural policy for the 1980s' (*Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra*)³⁵² and particularly 'New tasks in cultural policy' (*Nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken*)³⁵³ were conceived during a period characterised by major political changes in the name of liberalism.³⁵⁴ The 1980s were volatile times in Norwegian politics. The traditionally two strongest political parties, the Labour Party and the Conservatives, lost their dominance to parties further out on the left and the right flank of the political spectrum, notably the Socialist Left Party (*Sosialistisk Venstreparti* - SV) and the Progress Party (FrP), the latter experiencing a continuous rise, which, by the parliamentary elections of 1989 had gained 13 per cent of the votes and twenty-two seats in parliament.³⁵⁵ Until 1989, it had been regarded as a marginal party with a radical financial policy but had now become the third most popular party in the country. Its *laissez-faire* policies were based on a radically liberal financial policy, with huge tax-cuts and a rollback of the welfare state. This had implications for the party's approach to cultural policy, which broke significantly with the broad consensus of the parliamentary debates of the 1970s and the 1980s (more about this below).

³⁵¹ The Conservatives governed on their own between 1981 and 1983, after which the two latter parties joined the Conservatives in a three-party coalition.

³⁵² Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1981. *St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra*, Oslo. (KUD (1981)).

³⁵³ Kultur og vitenskapsdepartementet (KUV), 1983. *St.meld. nr. 27 (1983-84): Nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra* Oslo. (KUV (1983)).

³⁵⁴ Examples of this liberalisation are deregulation of the finance and exchange markets, tax cuts for both businesses and individuals, privatisation of public companies and permission for commercial actors to enter the health sector; Furre (2000), p. 274.

³⁵⁵ The Progress party originated from the *Anders Lange's parti*, which had four seats in parliament in 1973.

In 1992 the Labour Party was back in power and formed a government, which presented the third Green paper on cultural policy in 1992, called 'Culture in our Time' (*Kultur i tiden*).³⁵⁶ However, the Labour Party did not stay in power for long and the 1990s was a volatile time in Norwegian politics, with several different minority governments in charge for relatively short periods of time. At the parliamentary election of 2001, a centre-right government made up of the Conservatives (H), the Christian Democrats (KrF) and *Venstre*, with parliamentary support from the Progress Party, formed the government, and it was this coalition which presented the last Green paper that I analyse here: 'Cultural policy towards 2014', (*Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014*).³⁵⁷

The Green papers discussed in this chapter were thus presented by a range of different governmental constellations including most of the parties that have been represented in parliament over the same period. The parties that were not part of the government at the time of publication of the respective papers had their chance to voice their opinions in parliament.

³⁵⁶ Kulturdepartementet (KUL), 1992. *St.meld. nr. 61 (1991-92): Kultur i tiden*, Oslo. (KUL (1992)).

³⁵⁷ Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. *St.meld. nr. 48 (2002-2003): Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014*, Oslo. (KUL (2003a)). As described in footnote 214, cultural policy has over the years been placed under different ministries (with different names) together with a shifting selection of other policy-areas. By 2003 and the publication of KUL (2003a), culture was again joined by church affairs in the department for Culture and Church Affairs. The most significant of all these changes is perhaps culture being defined as a separate policy-area in ministry-terms (initially together with science) in 1982. Dahl and Helseth argue that this is significant but also a paradox, because, whereas the Green Papers of the 1970s, as we shall see, argued that culture should be perceived as an aspect of all other policies, the separation of culture in a separate department does, in their view, narrow down the concept of culture (Dahl and Helseth, 2006, pp. 243 - 244).

I have included a more extensive introduction to my methodological approach to this whole project, in Appendix One. However, I shall briefly give a rationale for my selection of policy texts below.

6.1.2 Choice of texts and analytical approach

These Green papers and the parliamentary responses have set out long-term policy plans and also to an extent articulated why the policies have been necessary as well as the rationales on which they have been based. However, they do not exclusively set out to explain the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy. For example, they devote more space to what the government intends to do in the area of culture, rather than to why they are doing it. However, I argue that in these texts there are statements and formulations, which represent the rationales that underpin the policies. The challenge is thus to tease out a possibly underlying, albeit explicitly formulated, discourse, which harbours information about these rationales. With only a few exceptions, all the agencies that could contribute to these discourses (the political leadership in government (which importantly includes the bureaucrats who actually drafted the papers)³⁵⁸ as well as a broad parliament made up of both members from parties in government and in opposition) demonstrated a virtually consensual agreement about most of the main assumptions behind these policies as well as a subscription to their main elements. Some strong and resilient discursive practices, based on most agents' subscription to a

³⁵⁸ The power potential held by the bureaucrats in the current Ministry of Culture has in recent years been highlighted by newspaper editors and researchers alike, where it has been argued that the bureaucrats have more influence over policies than the politicians (Røyseng (2006)). However, an analysis that only focuses on explicitly formulated policy-papers is not best suited to identify any power-distinction between bureaucrats and politicians and I shall thus not speculate any further on this here.

set of durable assumptions, particularly in terms of culture's potential to facilitate *Bildung*, appear to permeate these policy papers and the subsequent parliamentary responses. It is as if all the arguments, despite the potential contradictions within and between them, are being held up by all the voices presented here.

The papers thus act as a useful starting point when analysing explicitly articulated Norwegian cultural policy measures. Upon publication, the Green papers are subsequently discussed by a parliamentary ³⁵⁹ committee,³⁶⁰ which publishes its response in a parliamentary report³⁶¹ and finally this response and the original paper are debated by the whole parliament.³⁶² I have identified the contributions of the government and its opposition in parliament through the analysis of these texts (the Green paper, the parliamentary committee's report and the minutes of the final debate in the parliament). This is the focus of this chapter.

The inclusion of the parliamentary response both in terms of how it has been articulated in the committee's report but also in the subsequent debate in parliament, ensures that diverging voices are also included in the analysis. Another advantage of including the minutes from the open

³⁵⁹ The Norwegian parliament is called *Storting*, although I will continue to refer to this entity as the parliament.

³⁶⁰ The names of these committees have changed over the years, reflecting their responsibilities: culture has been grouped together with other, different policy areas. The correct name will be cited in the footnotes the first time each committee is referred to. In the main text the committee will be referred to simply as the 'parliamentary committee'.

³⁶¹ These parliamentary reports detail the parliamentary committee's response to the Government's Green Paper, in Norwegian; *instilling* (from the respective committee) (abbr; Innst. S.).

³⁶² Minutes of these debates are taken and published in the official report of the proceedings of the parliament (*Stortingstidende*).

debate in parliament is that it will include both MPs from the party (or parties) in government as well as members of the opposition. The governmental minister responsible for cultural policy also contributes to this debate, and receives questions from other members of parliament. Thus, all these actors get the chance to engage in an open debate. This context helps in teasing out possible different discursive practices as well as in demonstrating the practice of an eventual dominant one.³⁶³

It is pertinent to start with the first Green papers from the 1970s because the policies as well as the policy-rationales outlined during this period have, as I explained above, been canonical in that they have been referred to frequently.³⁶⁴ They have also acted as reference points for subsequent Green papers and have thus had an impact on the Norwegian policy discourse ever since.

As mentioned already, I have identified a main *Bildung* discourse, which incorporates four policy rationales: 'value', 'growth', 'anti-commerce' and 'protection of national culture'. In addition to this I have identified two alternative discourses: the 'marketisation' and the 'Progress Party' discourses. The following section will start by outlining these discourses followed by an exposition of their policy implications.

³⁶³ It should also be acknowledged that the Green Paper is circulated amongst a range of organisations for consultation. The government and parliament are also subject to the activities of lobby groups. However, any contributions by such organisations or individuals to the discourse only have an indirect impact, being filtered through the civil servants, political leaders in government and MPs. An analysis of the responses to such consultations is beyond the scope of this research.

³⁶⁴ Bakke (2003), Mangset (1992), Vestheim (1995) and Dahl and Helseth (2006).

Rather than presenting each set of policy papers separately and chronologically, the focus here is on the different rationales that I have identified, and how some of them are discursively connected, as well as different representations of the main discourse. Most span the thirty years that I have charted. Some disappear or become less prominent over time and new ones appear later on.

6.2 Tracing the rationales: The Bildung discourse and its policy implications

Upon analysing the papers and the parliamentary responses, it soon became clear that these were permeated by a concern to facilitate *Bildung*. This was manifested through several rationales, which are all interconnected: the 'value' argument, the 'growth' argument, the 'anti-commercial' argument and the 'national culture under threat' argument. All these cultural policy arguments are *Bildung* related, with a deep concern for the individual, but also for the nation's culture as a whole. In this section, I shall trace these rationales, and the cultural policy measures that were suggested in response to them, before I, in the following section, present the two alternative policy-discourses (the marketisation and Progress Party discourses).

6.2.1 Values

Within the *Bildung* discourse, a dominant argument was how society had become impoverished of values, and that people increasingly felt rootless.

Culture was presented as a force that could combat these worrying trends but this narrative did not go into more detail about the cultural content, or what kind of cultural expressions (beyond being based on a wide definition of culture), that would be useful in this respect. Two alternative arguments emphasised that cultural values were also related to the content of culture: one emphasising that culture could also have negative impacts and another that culture could help emancipate people and contribute to a class struggle.

The main argument: the loss of values and our rootless society

The term 'values' was an important and oft repeated concept, which harboured a, presumably, commonly understood but not explicitly articulated, meaning. Only exceptionally was the intrinsic meaning of values spelt out, for example when reference was made to Christian values. These references to 'values' or 'cultural values' were inherent in the discourse right from the first policy texts that I have analysed. The parliamentary committee's response to the two Green papers of the 1970s, for example, emphasised that 'a conscious connection to cultural values is of essential importance for each individual's human development'.³⁶⁵

As we shall see below, the first Green papers explicitly stated that the government should not attempt to define culture or to get engaged in

³⁶⁵ Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1974. *Innst. S. nr. 23; Innstilling fra kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kulturarbeid og kulturpolitikk (St. Meld. Nr. 8 og nr. 52 for 1973-74)*, Oslo, p. 5. (KUK (1974)).

decisions about cultural content. However, this did not mean that a total relativism (or what was referred to as value-nihilism) should be allowed. The joint parliamentary committee of 1974 stressed that cultural policy decisions, and the objectives they were informed by, would implicitly influence the content of culture, either directly or indirectly. All cultural policy decisions would be based on value judgments founded on aesthetic, ethical and other overarching principles. Hence, a debate about cultural policy directions should not shy away from what culture is and should be:

so that the necessary value choices can be made on a thought through and clear basis. In a democratic society, which emphasises intellectual freedom and tolerance, a basic requirement is that such value choices must be based on norms that have broad support amongst people, but which at the same time are broad enough to secure rights and opportunities for development amongst minorities.³⁶⁶

This value rationale was also present in the 1980s when, in KUV (1983), it was argued that cultural policy was, to a higher extent than other policy areas, concerned with values.³⁶⁷ The parliamentary committee responded by setting out the overarching aim of cultural policy to be:

to make it possible for everybody to experience cultural values so that each individual can grow and develop, widen their understanding and their insight. Cultural activities have had and must continue to have as

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 3.

³⁶⁷ KUV (1983), p. 3.

their overarching objective to give access to real values, and to make society more human³⁶⁸ (author's emphasis).

Again, although 'values' were referred to frequently the term was left undefined and the meaning of the term was not made clear or explored in depth, but instead presumed to be commonly accepted. In KUV (1983), for example, it was emphasised that it was necessary to 'protect those values that we know as ours',³⁶⁹ without further explication as to what these values referred to exactly.

The unspecified values concept was linked to the growth argument (presented below) in that, giving people access to cultural 'values', was seen as an important element in their opportunity to achieve personal growth,³⁷⁰ and a distinctive feature of people's identity.³⁷¹

This value rationale was sometimes coined as a response to the threat, particularly to children and young people, posed by the commercial, cultural industries (more about this below). The negative influences of entertainment-content consumed at home should be combated through a 'value' and quality conscious alternative, based on 'our national heritage and Western cultural tradition'.³⁷²

³⁶⁸ Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1985. *Innst. S. nr. 132 (1984-85); Innstilling fra kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken (St.meld. Nr.23 for 1891-82 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 for 1983-84)*, Oslo, p. 21. (KUK (1985)).

³⁶⁹ KUV (1983), p. 16.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³⁷² Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1993. *Innst. S. nr. 115 (1992-93); Innstilling fra kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kultur i tiden (St.meld. nr. 61 for 1991-92 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 for 1992-93)*, p. 24. (KUK (1993)).

The value rationale was strongly represented in the discourse throughout the first three decades charted here but in the 2000s, it was toned down.

In the 1970s, 80s and 90s, the articulation of the value rationale was often preceded by an expressed cultural pessimism, which lamented certain developments in society and warned against the detrimental effects these could have on individuals and the national culture as such. In addition to the already mentioned fear of commercial culture and the forces of globalisation, this pessimism was also of a more generic character, often lamenting a loss of values. The situation and prospects for young people were particularly subject to laments. Citing a previous parliamentary committee that looked into the government's youth work, it was argued that 'the great majority of young people is passive, incapable of managing their own affairs, and little engaged in what happens outside their own environment'.³⁷³

Thus, youth work had to be seen as an important part of cultural policy in order (as expressed by the parliamentary committee) to create 'the best possible conditions for personal development, creative participation and social contact'.³⁷⁴

Also more generally, the fast pace of development and changing social structures could have a detrimental effect on people's psyche and well-being. In the parliamentary debates of 1975, the cabinet minister for

³⁷³ KUD (1973), p. 60.

³⁷⁴ KUK (1974), p. 7.

culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, argued that people had increasingly become alienated from the work they did and the tools they used.

Another MP, Liv Andersen, commented about the impact of people's media-consumption, which had resulted in thousands of people just sitting glued in front of the television, without contact even with their own family, and that this had led to a strong sense of loneliness and isolation even amongst people who lived in central and urban areas.³⁷⁵

In the 1980s it was also suggested that people's growth potential could be restricted due to insecurity and rootless feelings and what was referred to as 'value-poverty'³⁷⁶, where people had lost the real 'values' in life. The task of cultural policy was thereby to urgently meet these challenges:

Cultural policy must set as its objective the release of counter forces against the 'lack of roots and value-poor' tendencies in society. [...] A conscious cultural policy which gives people access to real values, will prevent and resist the dissolution of norms and values, by stimulating consciousness, reflection, individual and social responsibility'.³⁷⁷
(author's emphasis)

In the parliamentary committee's statement, it was further argued that people were more occupied with material things than with each other.

³⁷⁵ MP (Member of Parliament) Liv Andersen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS)*, 1975. nr. 317: 1975 9. Januar – *Kulturdebatt* Oslo, p. 2453. (FIS (1975)).

³⁷⁶ KUV (1983), p. 4.

³⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Related to this, the committee tended to observe an attitude where cultural activities were only affordable in financially good times.³⁷⁸

Such tendencies, it was argued, contradicted Norwegian traditions, which implied a view of humanity and morality that places economical production targets on an equal footing with 'a cultural policy objective, which is built on values like love for your next in kind, solidarity and the inviolability of each individual'.³⁷⁹

In the 1990s a break in the discourse can be observed where cultural policy was not only perceived as a remedy against the effects of structural changes in society, but where these changes were seen as opportunities. KUL (1992) argued that these opportunities begged for a positive response in cultural policy terms. Rapid change would make people face challenges 'that would condition creative thinking, critical choice and independent action'.³⁸⁰

A cultural policy for the 1990s thus had to be 'shaped in the span between tradition and innovation'.³⁸¹

The discourse of the 2000s also acknowledges that rapid changes in society require a more active cultural policy. The approach was now more

³⁷⁸ KUK (1985), p. 21.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

³⁸⁰ KUL (1992), p. 10.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

positive where the forces of the global cultural industries should be countered by 'quality conscious and critical consumers'.³⁸²

Alternative value-arguments

As explained above, the articulation of the value rationale rarely made it clear what was really meant by the importance of, or, giving access to, 'real' values. However, in the 1970s, two minority factions engaged in the discourse, articulating more explicitly what they meant by values and emphasising a more active engagement with the content of culture. This was related to the assumption, on the one hand, that culture also had potentially negative impacts, and, on the other, that it could also facilitate emancipation. This led to two more concrete ways of articulating values, originating from two factions in parliament: the Christian Democrats' centre ground and the left-wing faction respectively. Given that these are minority factions, which present an understanding that is somewhat different from the main *Bildung* discourse, I shall just briefly mention these here.

Firstly, the Christian Democrats (KrF) argued that value judgments had to come to the fore when priorities were to be set, and that a more active engagement with the artistic content of culture was called for. Cultural policy should thus be subject to:

³⁸² Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2004. *Innst. S. nr. 155 (2003-2004); Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014 St.meld. Nr.48 (2002-2003)*, Oslo, p. 34. (FKD (2004)).

an ideological debate and conscious willingness to cultural engagement, by putting the significant, contemporary, intellectual currents to the test, and through a critique of the outcomes of certain activities, which, according to these members' view, are not true expressions of honest artistic efforts, or which represent a value-nihilism which should be opposed.³⁸³

This approach did not emphasise quality in a positive Arnoldian way, but rather negatively through what should be excluded from public cultural policy.

For the Christian Democrats such moral considerations translated into explicit condemnation of certain cultural expressions, particularly those that, in their view, 'speculated' in violence and sex.³⁸⁴ A similar sentiment was echoed by the KrF members on the parliamentary committee in 1993, who again questioned whether cultural freedom should be without any limits. They argued that society should show willingness to expose such speculation and to impose limitations in order to 'restrain the abuse of art and the degrading of human dignity and other ideals that our culture rests on'.³⁸⁵

The left-wing faction in parliament had, in common with the Christian Democrats, a more proactive approach to culture, but rather than restricting content they emphasised that culture had the power to emancipate. Culture, in their view, should not be seen only as activities to

³⁸³ KUK (1974), p. 3.

³⁸⁴ Ibid.

³⁸⁵ KUK (1993), p. 8.

fill people's increasing amount of leisure time. In 1974, a member from *Sosialistisk Valgforbund*,³⁸⁶ Otto Hauglin, argued that culture should instead be seen as a 'power-tool' with the aim to 'increase people's understanding of their social situation and motivate their effort to change social conditions'.³⁸⁷

The cultural activities on offer were, according to Hauglin, benign and impotent and not suitable to facilitate political change. A real socialist cultural policy would have drawn attention to 'the fundamental social inequalities and controversial questions in society',³⁸⁸ in other words, a cultural policy which was intimately tied in with class struggle.

Closely linked to the claim that society was becoming increasingly value-poor, was the response that people needed to be helped in their efforts to achieve human growth, which is the focus of the following section.

6.2.2 Growth

The 'growth' argument is particularly linked to and acts as a basis for cultural policies directed towards young people. Youth work was one of the policy areas embraced by the 'new' cultural policies, where the objectives were the 'best possible conditions for personal development, creative participation, well-being and social contact'.³⁸⁹

³⁸⁶ *Sosialistisk Valgforbund* was an alliance party made up of anti-EEC people from the Socialist People's Party (*Sosialistisk Folkeparti*) and the Norwegian Communist Party (*Norges Kommunistiske Parti*) amongst others.

³⁸⁷ KUK (1974), p. 4.

³⁸⁸ MP Otto Hauglin, FIS (1975), p. 2446.

³⁸⁹ KUD (1973), p. 7.

However, the 'growth' argument can also be easily located in more general terms in these policy texts. For example, echoing Herder's *Bildung* philosophy, the parliamentary committee of 1974 claimed that the prime objective of all cultural policies was to contribute to each individual's development or growth:

to stimulate each individual's development of their own abilities and possibilities, extended comprehension, richer experiences, development of emotional life, ability to think, maturity in the appreciations and taste – in short, to human growth³⁹⁰

For the Labour Party this was closely interconnected with a strong social cultural policy agenda, which is well illustrated in the following quote from Cabinet Minister Bjartmar Gjerde in the parliamentary debate of 1975:

The objective is to build a qualitatively improved society with equality between groups of people and individuals, build a society where each individual can develop abilities and talents in a rich and safe environment.³⁹¹

Although 'growth' was given less emphasis in KUD (1981), KUV (1983) linked this concept to the 'value' argument, which I have already presented, and argued that:

³⁹⁰ KUK (1974), p. 5.

³⁹¹ Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2469.

The task must be to create the right conditions for everybody to come in contact with cultural values, so that each individual can get the opportunity for human growth.³⁹²

Similarly, the committee leader in parliament, Reiulf Steen, argued that:

The cultural revolution of the 1980s and 1990s must have as its objective to develop independent, creative and conscious individuals in an interplay built on a deep and experienced feeling of solidarity.³⁹³

The growth objective was just as important in the discourse of the 1990s, by which time it had become not just as an idealist goal in itself but increasingly phrased in response to needs created by rapid changes in society, as described in KUL (1992):

Today's and tomorrow's people must be prepared for bigger changes during their life-time than previous generations. In today's complicated reality each individual's ability to sort impressions and information, to find new solutions, will thus be decisive. We will increasingly be faced with challenges which assume creative thinking, critical choices and independent actions.³⁹⁴

This was echoed by the parliamentary committee, where the representative from the Centre Party emphasised:

the great value cultural activities have for the development of each individual and for the development of a common culture and values heritage. In a society of rapid changes, where increasingly strong

³⁹² KUV (1983), p. 3.

³⁹³ MP Reiulf Steen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS)*, 1985. nr. 203: 1985 28. Mars – *Kulturpolitikken for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken* Oslo, p. 3027. (FIS (1985)).

³⁹⁴ KUL (1992), p. 10.

demands are put on the individual, the importance of the cultural platform will just increase.³⁹⁵

The instrumental need for growth in response to the fast changes in society was equally important in the 2000s, when it was once again emphasised that people need to develop cultural competences not only for their own sake but also in order to contribute to society's needs at a macro level.³⁹⁶

The chair of the parliamentary committee, Olemic Thommessen articulated this connection, between a strong level of cultural competence for the individual and for society at large, in the following way:

A strong cultural competence gives space for a diverse type of development and good cultural competence is the best basis for all of us to contribute our best to the common good. High cultural competence is thus a central criteria for a good society where the objective is quality in every link.³⁹⁷

This is a move away from the more idealistic approach in previous texts where human growth was celebrated for its intrinsic value, to one where human growth processes achieved through culture should not only benefit each individual person, but also, to a higher extent, be of benefit to society at large. To use an analogy often used when referring to the

³⁹⁵ KUK (1993), p. 8.

³⁹⁶ KUL (2003a), p. 7.

³⁹⁷ MP Olemic Thommessen, *Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS)*, 2004. nr. 68: 2004 I. April – *Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014* Oslo, p. 2388. (FIS (2004)).

autonomy of the arts, it is as if there was a shift from 'growth for growth's sake' to growth as a means to an end.

The values and growth rhetoric in the texts analysed here seem to underpin the broader approaches to cultural policy that the same texts outlined. In line with Vestheim's subject versus object approach to *folkeopplysning*, the two corresponding cultural policy principles: cultural democracy and the democratisation of culture (both of which were outlined in Chapter One), were given ample exposure in these policy texts. I argue that these signify two main representations in the *Bildung* discourse in terms of how the *Bildung* potential in culture could be achieved, through a wide definition of culture, a relative approach to quality, emphasis on participation and decentralisation or through the exposure to what was called the professional arts. I observe a shift from the former to the latter, over the three decades in question here, and I will demonstrate this in the next two sections.

6.2.3 Policy responses – Subject representation

The subject oriented representation was permeated by a sceptical approach to the Arnoldian view that experts or any representatives of the elite should determine cultural policy. Decisions about the delimitation of what should be included in the notion of culture, how quality could be assessed and ultimately which areas, projects or tasks should be prioritised or receive public support should be taken as close to the users of the subsequent cultural activities as possible. And just as Herder had

emphasised participation as an important dimension on people's path to *Bildung*, so did the subject oriented representation underline this idea that to 'enhance one's values' people had to participate in cultural activities (or to contribute to the creation of culture) and that one's self-growth could be better achieved thus (rather than, on the contrary, through one's exposure to great works of arts and thinking, which would have been more in line with Arnoldian ideas). Central to this representation was an emphasis on decentralisation, where resources should be allocated to district councils and municipalities for cultural policy decisions to be taken as close to, and preferably by, participants themselves.

This had, for a start, significant consequences for the definition of culture.

The definition of culture

Both Green papers presented in the 1970s: KUD (1973) and KUD (1974), shied away from attempting to define culture. It was deemed acceptable to define culture in administrative terms, in terms of which areas a cultural administration, whether at a local, regional or national level, should cover. However, given that cultural policy should not only be formulated for all, but, to an extent, by all, a rigid definition of culture, which potentially could exclude cultural content and cultural activities championed by people themselves, could not be supported. Consequentially, KUD (1973) concluded:

The department does not see it as its task to give an official definition of culture. However, administrative limits for culture as a policy-area must be drawn.³⁹⁸

Similarly, the assessment of quality should also be carried out locally by those who are involved in policy decision-making. The quality judgements of any activity, should thus, according to the paper 'here, as otherwise in the cultural sector, [...] take place within each separate milieu'.³⁹⁹

This was echoed by KUD (1974), which argued that:

In the department's [KUD] opinion, it is not the task of central public authorities to give an authoritative definition of the notion of *culture*, or to decide the content of cultural expressions.⁴⁰⁰

Similarly, the parliamentary committee, unanimously subscribed to this statement:

The state authorities can contribute to freedom becoming a reality, and a good for as many people and communities as possible. But in a democratic society the state does not see it as its task to decide what should be emphasised in the cultural creative process. This would mean to preside over the cultural policy, which could easily imply dangerous limitations on intellectual freedom in society.⁴⁰¹

When the Green papers and the parliamentary report were discussed in parliament, some individual MPs went even further in taking the Arnoldian concept of 'the great men of culture' into account. The MP Thorbjørn

³⁹⁸ KUD (1973), p. 6.

³⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁰ KUD (1974), p. 6.

⁴⁰¹ KUK (1974), p.2.

Kultorp, for example, argued that the cultural boards that should be established within each municipality should keep away from making qualitatively informed priorities between different cultural activities, and said that:

Neither must it be the cultural board's task to challenge activities for which there is a demand with the argument that other activities are of more value. No member of a cultural board is better equipped to interpret each individual [member of the community]'s needs than the persons concerned themselves. Activities, which are not regarded as valuable will be dropped automatically due to lack of enthusiasm. People's own felt need must in principle be the starting point for support of activities and not what public cultural 'prophets' consider as more valuable.⁴⁰²

This statement harbours an inherent distrust of cultural authorities, a sentiment similarly repeated in the way some of the rhetoric in these papers dealt with judgments of quality.

Hence, in line with the thinking of Herder and Humboldt, this subject oriented *Bildung* representation was based on a wide approach to culture, where 'all forms of cultural activities and cultural experiences must be regarded as being of equal value [and importance]'.⁴⁰³

In practical policy terms this open approach to culture meant that two new areas, youth work and sports, were included as integrated areas of cultural policy. However, even within what was termed the 'traditional cultural area', (meaning areas that had previously received public

⁴⁰² MP Thorbjørn Kultorp, FIS (1975), p. 2440. It is worth noting that Kultorp here anticipates the argument of the right-wing Progress Party that was to surface later on.

⁴⁰³ KUD (1974), p. 21.

support), it was argued that the demarcation lines for cultural policy in the future could not be determined by:

the activities, which have been understood as cultural activities within the dominant cultural sphere, neither the cultural activities that have previously received public support.⁴⁰⁴

This echoes Augustin Girard's rejection of what he called the activities of the leisured classes of former times.

Lars Roar Langslet, the chair of the parliamentary committee, subscribed to this emphasis on culture as anything that enriched people's lives. He took a wide anthropological approach to culture, not limiting it to ideas of great art and thinking passed down from an elite, when he argued that, for him:

'culture' is the word that we use for all values that give life meaning and elevation beyond the short-sightedness of the everyday tasks and which open the mind for new perspectives and new horizons. [...] And this can refer to many types of phenomena: the ability to experience, and the need to create within each culture; common norms and interests in a working environment are culture; life style and sense of form in a local community are culture; the written language and dialects, good craft, a beautiful building, a painting, a folk song or a symphony – all these are expressions of culture. Because all these express values, which give life meaning and human dignity.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰⁴ KUD (1973), p. 54.

⁴⁰⁵ MP Lars Roar Langslet, FIS (1975), p. 2424.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on culture's *Bildung* potential in such a statement, implying that culture has the power to elevate human beings, this representation goes much further and includes many phenomena that had traditionally not been regarded as culture in a cultural policy context, and, that are closer to a Herderian/Humboldtian view that *Bildung* can only be achieved through activities that spring from man's own choice as opposed to the Arnoldian prescription of culture as the 'best that has been thought and said in the world'.

This wide approach to culture, which is interlinked with the principle of people's involvement in the actual making of policy decisions, has survived as a significant principle and was repeatedly referred to in the policy papers of the 1980s and the 1990s. The definition of culture was again a wide one, and should not be reduced to 'values and experiences connected to professional art and cultural heritage protection'.⁴⁰⁶

This anthropological approach forms a strong discursive practice, which, in the 1970s and 1980s at least, was hardly challenged at all, but instead hailed as conciliatory in the effort to cement cultural policy within a wider constituency, or as MP Ernst Wroldsen put it:

The wider notion of culture has also contributed to making many who before felt a distance to the notion of culture, come to have a nearer and more positive relationship to a wider range of cultural activities.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁶ KUD (1981), p. 34.

⁴⁰⁷ MP Ernst Wroldsen, FIS (1985), p. 3056.

And again echoing Herder's view, KUL (1992), stated that:

quality must be found in the expression or in the experience which gives meaning and engagement, which creates or changes attitudes, which gives insight and knowledge, gives identity and creates models. Both aesthetic and function, hand-craft and expression, appeal and communication must have quality built-in.⁴⁰⁸

This brings us to the question of how to assess quality, which also had to be re-thought within a subject oriented context.

Quality

Quality was indeed important, and Bjartmar Gjerde warned against a trap of value nihilism. However, similar to the way culture was to be defined, we see a perception of value, which harbours doubt about the authority of qualified experts. Gjerde argued that people's appreciation of quality would instead be best developed if this was based on their own abilities, rather than on:

norms which are developed under other and perhaps more privileged conditions. Quality-dictates from outside can also sometimes act as disabling and mostly make cultural activities unpleasant.⁴⁰⁹

This rather un-Arnoldian approach to quality resonated well with the focus on equality in the subject oriented representation, and was echoed in KUD (1981) where quality was again defined in relative terms, and where

⁴⁰⁸ KUL (1992), pp. 27 - 28.

⁴⁰⁹ Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2470.

it was emphasised that any quality judgments should be decided within each context. There was thus a high level of consensus about this approach to quality in the discourses of the 1970s and the 1980s.

With reference to what he calls the Nordic countries' shift towards a pluralistic cultural democracy, the Danish cultural studies scholar Henrik Kaare Nielsen celebrates this, by arguing that only by opening up for 'a dialogical exchange with cultural political goals',⁴¹⁰ can a quality-debate achieve relevance. Hence, the 'mono-cultural' objectives of the 'democratisation of culture' with its 'expert viewpoints' based on the principle of the intrinsic values of the arts, will only contribute to the achievement of cultural policy objectives if it also happened to 'give birth to a processes of enlightenment ("*Bildung*")',⁴¹¹ something he argues would most probably only be a mere coincidence.

It appears that the policy-discourse of the 1970s and 1980s is informed by such a less artistically driven approach to quality assessment, and instead takes the politically stated objectives to facilitate *Bildung* as the yardstick against which success is measured. A more relative quality-approach was particularly taken to participatory projects where more stringent quality-criteria were deemed to be less suitable. Participation was also in general perceived to have a stronger *Bildung* potential compared to mere exposure.

⁴¹⁰ Henrik Kaare Nielsen, 'Cultural Policy and Evaluation of Quality', in *The International Journal of Cultural Policy* 9.3 (2003), p. 242.

⁴¹¹ Ibid.

Participation versus exposure

Both KUD (1973) and KUD (1974) emphasised participation in what can be described as artistic activities such as music, singing, amateur theatre, painting and dance, which should be partly supported and supervised by national institutions.⁴¹² However, this did not exclude other activities, which could:

develop intellectual or practical abilities, or abilities to solve problems together with others, for example through studies and work in voluntary organisations.⁴¹³

The parliamentary committee emphasised that in the widest sense, everybody should participate in cultural activities based on their own conditions and in their own way. Again, in contrast to the ideas of Arnold, it emphasised that: 'Culture is thus not something that is 'created' by the few and 'received' by the many. In the cultural creative process everybody participates'.⁴¹⁴

MP Ambjørn Sælthun summed up this principle by saying that the new cultural policy should be based on the belief that each person, 'is a creative, not just receiving and consuming, individual'.⁴¹⁵

⁴¹² KUK (1974), p. 10.

⁴¹³ KUD (1973), p. 45.

⁴¹⁴ KUK (1974), p. 6.

⁴¹⁵ MP Ambjørn Sælthun, FIS (1975), p. 2454.

This participatory approach to culture survived in the discourse all the way to the 1990s, when this principle was emphasised particularly in cultural policies for children and young people. As stated in KUL (1992):

there should be a large space for participation. Thus, the government will particularly support activities where children and young people are active participants in the shaping and adaptation of them.⁴¹⁶

In addition to celebrating participation in cultural activities, this quote also stresses that young people should be part of the policy-making process, which was a central principle in the subject oriented policies right from the first Green paper of 1973. Rather than 'managing demand' in terms of pre-determining which cultural activities were good for young people, the cultural provision should be based on their own needs as expressed by themselves.⁴¹⁷ Hence, it was argued that all the extra funding for the new subject oriented cultural policies should be allocated to regional and local municipalities, who in turn should appoint their own cultural boards, whose task it was to distribute funding. This brings us to another central policy principle, the decentralisation of both decision-making and funds for culture.

Decentralisation

The wide definition of culture and the emphasis on participation and engagement were closely related to the radical decentralisation measures

⁴¹⁶ KUL (1992), p. 96.

⁴¹⁷ KUD (1973), p. 63.

in the Green papers of the 1970s. In addition to fitting naturally with these two principles (wide definition and participation), it also signalled an increased focus on the 'local' away from the 'national', which, as will be seen through subsequent policies, was outlined as a response to globalisation, and which also implied a shift away from the international. As will be shown below, this decentralisation-policy represented suspicion towards centrally located high arts institutions as well as the commercial cultural industries.

As already mentioned, an important measure proposed (and subsequently implemented) in KUD (1973) was that each county council and local council should elect a cultural board responsible for all the regional and local cultural activities respectively. This did not imply that these boards were actually supposed to run the cultural facilities in the respective counties and municipalities, but that they would allocate funds to cultural activities, many of which would be governed and executed by voluntary organisations.⁴¹⁸

This principle had significant ramifications for the financing of the cultural sector. The state departments would still finance and govern national cultural initiatives, including the support for national institutions, but a significant amount of additional funding would be transferred to district councils and municipalities, with the aim of reaching two objectives: to even out the disproportionate allocation of funding for culture between

⁴¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 8 - 9.

different districts and municipalities, as well as to boost the funding for culture and hence increase the priority given to this policy area, both regionally and locally. The levelling out of the current imbalance between counties and municipalities (with fewer resources and fewer citizens) would be achieved through positive discrimination.⁴¹⁹ None of this would be achieved through re-allocations from current national schemes or institutions but through additional funding for regional and local culture.

In return for this, municipalities and regional councils had to commit to establishing a minimum level of organisation amongst the democratically elected councils as well as in their local administration. This meant that every regional and local council had to establish a cultural committee dealing with cultural affairs as well as a cultural manager leading a cultural office in the local and regional administration.

The focus on decentralisation was partly a response to a rejection of the idea that Norway harboured one national culture, informed only by a canonised national heritage supplemented by contemporary (of that time) high arts expressions, or an emphasis on the canonised 'best'. Echoing the Populist Nationalist representation of the late nineteenth century and the Labour movement of the 1930s, the parliamentary committee of 1974 argued that this was too simplistic and that Norway was in fact made up of a range of sub-cultures, which coexisted in a tense relationship with

⁴¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.

national culture, with both feeding off each other.⁴²⁰ It was emphasised that despite being threatened by increased mobility, improved educational opportunities and the development of the mass media, many of the regional sub-cultures had retained their characteristics.

The continuation of the subject representation

When analysing the explicitly formulated cultural policy rhetoric of the 1970s, it appears as if the subject oriented, *Bildung* argument completely saturated the discourse of the time. Despite being challenged in later years, cultural democracy principles have endured and were mentioned in all the subsequent sets of documents. However, this focus was to lose its dominance, and rather than being repeated as the best path to *Bildung*, some voices lamented how little progress there had been in this area. Despite all the efforts that had gone into a more subject focused cultural policy, an accomplished cultural democracy was still perceived to be something of an illusion. For example, KUD (1981) particularly emphasised that the attempt to develop a cultural democracy was still incomplete and that efforts to include as many people as possible in the shaping and prioritisation of cultural activities that received public funds should continue. Cultural democracy was thus still singled out as a priority area. This remained 'alive' in the Green paper of 2003 (KUL (2003a)), particularly due to the continuing emphasis being put on voluntary organisations.

⁴²⁰ KUD (1974), p. 5.

The reason why the subject oriented representation appeared to permeate the discourse in the 1970s was partly due to these policies being new and informed by international trends like the writings of Girard. However, as mentioned earlier, they did not replace already existing support-structures for culture (primarily earmarked for high arts institutions). Hence, although not so prevalent in the rhetoric to start with, support for the 'professional arts' was not absent from the discourse. Instead it just grew in strength over the next three decades charted here.

6.2.4 Policy responses – Object representation

The wide definition of culture, or indeed the reluctance to define it at all, did not exclude the traditional art forms from the *Bildung* discourse. In 1974, the chairman of the parliamentary committee, Lars Roar Langslet, argued, that the new policies should not 'under any circumstances' replace support for the professional arts and culture.⁴²¹

However, the term 'art', or the common reference in English to 'the arts' have not been commonly used in Norway.⁴²² Perhaps because the wider definition of culture is still accepted as an inherent dimension of cultural policy, policy papers have often referred to 'art and culture', even when

⁴²¹ MP Lars Roar Langslet, FIS (1975), p. 2425.

⁴²² In Norwegian the term 'art' is often colloquially interpreted as the visual arts. The more generic term 'the arts' (in an English speaking context) invariably embraces a range of signifying practices, whether they are practiced by amateurs or professionals or whether they are profit-making or not. I acknowledge, however, that there is not one unambiguous use of the term "the arts" in English, where the inclusion of products of some sectors within the cultural industries like popular music and film, is relatively recent, whereas others like classical music and fictional literature (for example the novel) have been included in this term for much longer.

what is referred to are (what in English would have been termed as) ‘the arts’. For example, under the heading ‘The significance of the arts in society’ in the parliamentary committee report from the 1980s, it is stated that:

The arts and artists play a fundamental role in society. The arts and culture have a fundamental significance for any nation and any human being. It is above anything the arts and culture, which create a nation’s identity, give it self-respect and connect its citizens together in a community.⁴²³ (author’s emphasis).

In the 1990s, in the parliamentary committee’s response to the Green paper, the Conservative Party argued that it was the state authorities’ responsibility to create the necessary conditions for Norwegian arts and culture to develop in terms of diversity and freedom, partly through being responsible for typical funding beneficiaries like arts education, support schemes, and securing the funding of national institutions.⁴²⁴ Although these schemes and institutions were included within the definition of the arts and culture, the policy discourse increasingly made references to ‘the professional arts’. This did not have a prominent position in the initial discourse of the 1970s, but was by the 1990s, given increased emphasis. Similar to ‘the arts’ more generally, the term the ‘professional arts’ was rarely defined either. Instead, it rested on an implicit assumption of what it was not: namely amateur culture, commercial culture or culture defined more widely than just the arts. Thus, ‘the professional arts’ were, implicitly at least, understood in accordance with one of Raymond Williams’

⁴²³ KUK (1985), p. 22.

⁴²⁴ KUK (1993).

definitions of culture as: ‘the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic creativity’,⁴²⁵ which exclude a whole array of other cultural activities, that have been the subject of the government’s cultural policies. As we shall see in the next chapter, the professional arts are what children and young people should be exposed to through DKS, but again without a thorough and specific definition, other than its clear object oriented approach to *Bildung*.

As mentioned earlier this object oriented representation sits fairly comfortably alongside the subject oriented one, and the agents involved in these discourses⁴²⁶ only to a limited extent divided into factions. Instead, it seems that everyone, with some exceptions, subscribed to several arguments.⁴²⁷ This was partly because the subject and object oriented representations were not mutually exclusive. There was broad consensus about most of the ideas and the rationales on which these cultural policies should be based.

⁴²⁵ Williams (1988), p. 90.

⁴²⁶ The people involved in drafting the two Green Papers, including bureaucrats and centrally positioned governmental politicians as well as MPs from both the governmental and oppositional parties in parliament.

⁴²⁷ This is partly signified by the composition of parties in government and the corresponding parliamentary committees. KUD (1973) was presented by a centre coalition made up of the Centre Party, the Christian Democrats and the *Venstre* party, and KUD (1974) by a Labour government. The parliamentary committee was chaired by a Conservative MP, with a secretary from the Christian Democrats. The Labour party published KUD (1981), whereas KUV (1983) was presented by the Conservatives. This time the parliamentary committee was chaired by a Labour MP with a secretary from the Centre Party. KUL (1992) was presented by a Labour government, this time with a parliamentary committee chaired by the Conservatives and the leader from the Socialist Left. Finally, in 2003, KUL (2003a) was presented by a centre-right government made up of the Conservatives, Christian Democrats and *Venstre*, responded to by a parliamentary committee chaired by the Conservatives. All the political parties represented in the parliament at any time have thus contributed to the discourse and the only real dissenter has been the Progress Party.

The subject oriented cultural democracy argument was not particularly engaged with the conditions of artists. However, this was an important concern for the section of the papers, which emphasised the *Bildung* potential harboured within the 'professional arts'.

Conditions for artists

Just as much as being concerned with access to the arts and heritage as well as emphasising their *Bildung* potential and aggregated importance for the nation and national identity, the professional arts rationale has also been about the conditions for professional artists.⁴²⁸ In the set of papers from the 1970s it was already emphasised that the mediation of and the reduction of access barriers to the arts, as well as support for professional artists, were key policy objectives, which should be met by both the strengthening of existing arts organisations as well as the development of new ones situated regionally and locally.⁴²⁹ It was also suggested that amateurs and professionals should seek new ways of collaborating. The protection of cultural heritage, including the protection of the Norwegian language, was emphasised as well.⁴³⁰

The first Green papers of the 1980s (KUD (1981)) discussed each art form in detail,⁴³¹ including the conditions of artists as well as how these

⁴²⁸ This was in fact the subject of a separate Green Paper published in 1976, but falls outside of this analysis.

⁴²⁹ KUD (1973), p. 6, 11, 57 and 58; KUK (1974), pp. 10 - 11.

⁴³⁰ KUD (1973), pp. 55 - 56; KUD (1974), p. 5.

⁴³¹ In addition to chapters covering sport and cultural heritage, KUD (1981) dedicated a chapter to each of the following art-forms; literature and libraries, the performing arts, music as well as visual arts and crafts.

should be nourished and mediated. The general conditions of artists were also given due attention in this paper, where a main objective was to create working conditions for this profession, that should be as equal as possible to those of other professions in society. Through a unique collaboration agreement, artists had been given the right to negotiate with the government through their membership organisations.⁴³² The Green papers of the 1980s also argued that the public sector, and particularly central government, should 'take a bigger responsibility for artists' working conditions and for the mediation of their art'.⁴³³ Some of the tools in place included the guaranteed income scheme, which guaranteed a minimum wage for certain artists as well as three-yearly 'working-stipends'.⁴³⁴

However, what is perhaps more important in this account of *Bildung* rationales was how as many as possible should have access to the professional arts.

Access to the professional arts

The distribution of the professional arts as widely as possible was emphasised in the parliamentary response to the two Green papers of the 1980s:

⁴³² Mangset (1992), p. 244.

⁴³³ KUD (1981), p. 14.

⁴³⁴ Ibid.

The arts have something to give everybody in society, and it is necessary with a conscious effort by society to ensure that the arts reach out to all groups in all parts of the country.⁴³⁵

The MP Tom Thoresen argued in 1985 that although the broader definition of culture had created new possibilities for people to create and enjoy, as well as to break down barriers between forms of culture, it was important that the traditional notion of the arts was not forgotten. As he said: 'It is good that we have torn down the ivory-towers. But we must acknowledge that they contained much of value, which we must develop further'.⁴³⁶

Moreover, in the rhetoric of the 1990s, it was argued that, although culture could be used instrumentally to reach social objectives (more about this below), this should not happen at the expense of its intrinsic value.⁴³⁷ The arts had the power to act as a critical corrective and to 'act as a protective means against habitual thinking and social stagnation'.⁴³⁸

This emphasis on the arts' intrinsic values was brought forward into the 2000s.⁴³⁹ In fact, when comparing KUL (2003a) with the initial Green papers of the 1970s, a shift from a subject oriented to an object oriented representation to *Bildung* emerges. KUL (2003a) focused to a significantly higher extent with the professional arts and its parliamentary response emphasised that the celebration of the intrinsic value of the arts

⁴³⁵ KUK (1985), p. 22.

⁴³⁶ MP Tom Thoresen, FIS (1985), p. 3060.

⁴³⁷ KUL (1992), p. 29 and KUK (1993), p. 2.

⁴³⁸ KUL (1992), p. 24.

⁴³⁹ KUL (2003a), p. 7 and p. 108.

was based on the acknowledgment that: 'each individual has needs beyond the material, and that the arts and culture are necessary conditions for a complete life'.⁴⁴⁰

Support for the arts' intrinsic values can also be detected implicitly through how they were defended against an increased marketisation. As we shall see below, a call for arts organisations to become more efficient, to get more funding from the private sector and to set clearer performance indicators had grown steadily since the publication of KUV (1983). However, such a marketisation has been met with resistance throughout these 20 years, and in 2004, a significant minority coalition in the parliamentary committee, made up of members from A, SV and SP, argued that success in the arts could not be reduced to (number) counting of sold tickets or to the number of productions. These members questioned whether the arts and culture should be made subject to quantitative objectives at all, asking whether this could lead to a straitjacketing of the sector.

The object oriented representation of *Bildung* could also be detected in the increased emphasis on architecture and design from 1992 and onwards.

⁴⁴⁰ FKD (2004), p. 33.

Architecture and design

Since the first Green papers of the 1970s, all the texts presented here had given a broad definition of culture. Architecture and design were included in such definitions, but these had not been given any particular emphasis before. Architectural issues, for example, had been the responsibility of other departments than the Ministry of Culture. This was about to change with the Green paper presented in 1992, which incorporated a new emphasis on both the built environment and other design. This new priority certainly fitted in with the object oriented *Bildung* argument. The main objective was to ensure that the quality, particularly regarding architecture and design, of public spaces, but also within the area of design more generally, should improve. Emphasis was put on better coordination between different ministries, particularly with regards to public building projects, but also with the aim of changing public attitudes with regards to design: as the minister with responsibility for culture at the time, Åse Kleveland said in the parliamentary debate: to make 'our surroundings more beautiful'.⁴⁴¹ The appearance of the surroundings could have an important influence on people and their well-being:

The quality of our surroundings concerns everybody, every day. Our surroundings are being shaped by human activity, but this design goes two ways: Surroundings, at the same time, make an impact on all human interactions. [...] People's surroundings must be taken seriously by a society which wishes to prioritise quality. Reflection and creativity when

⁴⁴¹ Minister of Culture Åse Kleveland, Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1993. nr. 74: 1993 30. *Mars – Kultur i tiden* Oslo, p. 3126. (FIS (1993)).

designing our visual environment gives greater experiences and better well-being.⁴⁴²

In similar ways that the high arts had a potential to enlighten people, so could good architecture and design, and it was thus emphasised that the aesthetic quality of the public sphere should be given priority. Quality was also given much emphasis more generally in this object oriented 'professional art' case.

Quality

As mentioned above, there was a high level of consensus regarding the relative approach to quality in the discourses of the 1970s and the 1980s. However, by 1993 cracks in this cross-party alliance's idea of quality could be observed. Again, it was emphasised that a quality-focused cultural policy should not contradict a broad support for local culture, which was regarded as essential in order to nourish talents and excellence. The members from A, SV, KrF and SP on the parliamentary committee argued that if the quality criteria were set too narrowly or too statically, based 'on alleged objective standards', this would 'prevent innovative expressions of art and culture, both in terms of content and form'.⁴⁴³ The Green paper (KUL (1992)) also argued against elitism in this context and with support from SV, KrF and SP emphasised that to

⁴⁴² KUL (1992), p. 29.

⁴⁴³ KUK (1993), p. 3.

support quality meant to 'create the necessary conditions to allow most people the ability to develop according to their abilities'.⁴⁴⁴

The Conservatives, however, thought that this was pushing it too far, and that a wide notion of quality was relativistic and ran the risk of becoming utterly meaningless. They argued instead, in a more Arnoldian way, for allowing the professional arts themselves to determine the measure of quality. It was 'the artistic production that aims to create the most outstanding, that will develop and renew artistic expressions'.⁴⁴⁵

This represented a different rationale for cultural policy, emphasising excellence in the arts. By 2003, this Arnoldian approach to quality had manifested itself even more strongly in the discourse, where the three parties in government in particular emphasised the importance of quality and that, although this was not a static notion, it should be the subject of a qualified public debate, as for example outlined in KUL (2003a):

A main message is to continue to support the professional arts and the professionally anchored cultural efforts as a value in itself. Moreover, quality is emphasised as a decisive criteria in order for a cultural activity to receive priority within the central government's cultural policy.⁴⁴⁶

This was not met by the same resistance as previously from the opposition parties in parliament, which indicates that although *Bildung* was still a main objective, so increasingly was the celebration of the

⁴⁴⁴ KUL (1992), p. 27.

⁴⁴⁵ KUK (1993), p. 3.

⁴⁴⁶ KUL (2003a), p.7.

intrinsic values of the arts. Although this quality-focus only to a limited extent emphasised the social impacts of the professional arts, such positive impacts could be detected in the object oriented policy suggestions, in the sense that it was argued that there was a *Bildung* dimension to being exposed to professional arts expressions. However, the assumption that public support for culture would make a positive social contribution to society was perhaps stronger in the subject oriented representation. This idea that cultural policy was equated with social policy is the focus of the next section.

6.2.5 Cultural policy as social policy

As already mentioned, right from the first Green paper (KUD (1973)), a strong emphasis was laid on cultural policy's potential to contribute to other policy areas. In fact, this paper attempted to get away from the perception of cultural policy as separate from other public policy sectors and advocated instead an aspect approach, where cultural policy should act as an overarching superstructure informing a range of other areas, particularly general social policies. It would have meant a shift away from cultural policy as an explicitly stated policy area, to an implicit policy as suggested by Jeremy Ahearne.⁴⁴⁷ Completely unconcerned by warnings like the one expressed by Belfiore, which I presented in Chapter Three, that the consequence of treating the arts and cultural policy as a public utility, might be that they could become absorbed within more general

⁴⁴⁷ Ahearne (2004), p. 114.

social and economical policies, KUD (1973) stressed instead that cultural policy was part of general social policies, and an active cultural policy could itself contribute to shaping a desirable society. In this it echoes Augustin Girard's claim that only a cultural policy that was preoccupied with reaching social objectives deserved to take its place alongside economic and social policy. This was initially an inherent part of the subject oriented representation. However, as already mentioned and as will be demonstrated below, this instrumental approach to cultural policy, emphasising its social effects beyond its mere intrinsic values, was also increasingly applied to the object oriented *Bildung* representation.

But it was in the initial papers that this argument chimed the strongest. KUD (1974) for example, emphasised that cultural policy should be regarded as part of a general social policy and that cultural policy was about social change:

Cultural policy as a means to improve the social environment and create a qualitatively richer society is now the great challenge for cultural policy planning and practical work with culture.⁴⁴⁸

To perceive cultural policy as an aspect of all other policies rather than an independent policy-sector can, in theory at least, be perceived to have wide implications. A separate post (or posts) on the annual budget had been earmarked for cultural affairs ever since the foundation of a department of culture within KUD in 1938. Culture was thus to be regarded as a sector, alongside other sectors such as, for example,

⁴⁴⁸ KUD (1974), p. 5.

health, agriculture and industry. Under such a sector-model, the administration of culture is relatively simple and limited to the funding of institutions and individual artists supplemented with activities to make the artistic output available to a wider audience. The wider definition of culture does not necessarily make the administration of culture more intricate: it only implies that it will cover a wider area to include, for example, sports and amateur activities. However, the Green papers for the new cultural policy (particularly KUD (1974)) emphasised that cultural policy should set the terms for a range of other policy areas such as regional, housing and social policy, where the socialist principle of equality was a central objective. As pointed out by Roshauw:

The starting point for the ministry [of culture] is that the whole of society must be the framework for cultural policy, and not as before be limited to a narrow sector, with funding of the arts as the main task.⁴⁴⁹

This was very much in line with the thinking behind some of the policy documents published by the Labour Party in the 1950s (for example 'a cultural programme for debate'). Thus, although not altogether a new idea, this was the first time that such an understanding, which perceives cultural policy not only to be preoccupied with a particular sector (in terms of organisations and delivery mechanisms that are established to mediate the arts), but rather to affect a whole aspect of society, was put forward as official policy.

⁴⁴⁹ Roshauw (1980), p. 119.

Cultural policy was seen as a crucial vehicle in achieving the Labour government's overarching objective, which was to 'build a qualitatively better society with equality between groups and individuals'.⁴⁵⁰

KUD (1974) went even further and, with reference to a Labour Party policy paper presented at the party's annual meeting in 1973, argued for the importance of cultural policy in the creation of a radically different and socialist society.⁴⁵¹ Achieving socialism through democratic means was an explicitly stated objective for the Labour Party at the time and should also inform cultural policy, which should be an integral part of the instruments applied to reach this goal.

As could be expected, MPs from the non-socialist parties objected to cultural policy becoming a tool in such an explicitly left-oriented policy and references were made to the limitation on speech and artistic freedom in countries labelling themselves as socialist. However, their protest was surprisingly mild, and a reading of their statements today gives the impression that it was mostly the word 'socialist' that they objected to, not the policies as such. After having distanced themselves from this socialist orientation, committee members from the Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and the Centre Party stated that there were broad agreements about the most important opinions and suggestions raised in the two Green papers.⁴⁵² The Christian Democrat MP, Jakob Aano, suggested that the Labour Party find another word for 'socialist' to

⁴⁵⁰ KUD (1974), p. 17.

⁴⁵¹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁵² KUK (1974), p. 3.

describe their policies, since they were not socialist in the crude term of the word at all.⁴⁵³ Thus, this subject oriented representation contained a strong emphasis on the inherent capacity of an active cultural policy to contribute to far-reaching social change. A further interrogation of a statement by Erik Gjems-Onstad from the right-wing Anders Lange's Party (the predecessor of the Progress Party), which was the only party that subjected the Green papers to a fierce attack, seems to support this. Gjems-Onstad expressed surprise at what he saw as the other non-socialist parties' subscription to the Labour Party's rhetoric, grouping them all together in the same socialist camp.⁴⁵⁴ He thus observed that there was cross-party agreement on the policies that the Labour Party chose to call 'socialist'.

The subject oriented *Bildung* representation was thus highly instrumental in the sense that cultural policy was perceived to have the potential to contribute to social change. This was closely connected to the wider definition of culture, on which the new cultural policies should be based, and in KUD (1974) it was argued (very much in line with Augustin Girard's ideas) that the aesthetic and partly intellectual dimension of traditional cultural activities was less suited to achieve these goals.⁴⁵⁵ Cultural policy would play a crucial role in the government's efforts to solve tomorrow's problems and the minister, Bjartmar Gjerde, argued that these new

⁴⁵³ MP Jakob Aano, FIS (1975), p. 2442.

⁴⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 2428.

⁴⁵⁵ KUD (1974), p. 19.

proposed policies were a response to the government's analysis of social tasks and future problems.⁴⁵⁶

The rationale behind this aspect approach, where cultural policy should act as an overarching superstructure informing a range of other areas, may be twofold. On the one hand, it may act as an acknowledgement of how fundamental and important culture is in people's lives. In fact, using one of Raymond Williams' categories of the modern usage of the word 'culture', it can mean a particular way of life.⁴⁵⁷ Used in this way, culture incorporates everything people do, at their work place and in their leisure time, whether at or away from home. The idea to allow cultural policy to fundamentally influence and work in harmony with policies for most other areas could be a way to acknowledge that everything is culture, and that a policy which does not take people's common culture seriously, but only prioritises cultural heritage (particularly if this heritage originates from and is mostly enjoyed by an exclusive elite), cannot be justified as a social democratic policy where equality is a prime objective. Such a rationale can be traced back to the ideas and rhetoric of the Labour movement of the 1930s, which emphasised the importance of empowering an alternative working class culture to rival the existing bourgeois hegemony. The Green papers of the 1970s did not refer to working class culture explicitly though but rather to the popular culture (or way of life) amongst ordinary people.

⁴⁵⁶ Minister of Culture, Bjartmar Gjerde, FIS (1975), p. 2468. Gjerde emphasised, however, that cultural policy could not patch up or treat damages caused by the development within other policy sectors. Instead, cultural policy should prevent social problems to occur in the first place, *Ibid.*, p. 2469.

⁴⁵⁷ Williams (1988).

The issue of how cultural policy could and should contribute to a more general social policy was also present in the discourse of the 1980s, and this time not only supporting the subject oriented representation to *Bildung* but also the democratisation of traditional art forms. This is perhaps epitomised by the leader of the parliamentary committee, Reiulf Steen, who emphasised that the arts did not exist outside a social, economic and political context and that a:

‘people, who do not have a culture and who do not have the arts, will be a people without identity, without tools to show them the direction and without means of getting to know the truth.’⁴⁵⁸

Several specific and tangible effects of an increased prioritisation of culture were mentioned, such as the fight against unemployment and a positive impact on people’s physical, social and mental health.⁴⁵⁹ KUD (1981) also emphasised that:

Cultural and environmental work become even more important if we shall manage to create a society that is more humane, safe and based on solidarity.⁴⁶⁰

A consequence of this was again that cultural policy should not be reduced to one sector of society but have an overarching aspect-oriented remit.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁸ MP Reiulf Steen, FIS (1985), p. 3026.

⁴⁵⁹ KUV (1983), p. 15; KUD (1981), p. 86.

⁴⁶⁰ KUD (1981), p. 2.

⁴⁶¹ MP Ragnhild Queseth Haarstad, FIS (1985), p. 3022.

This sector-overarching aspect approach was again put forward in the Green paper of the 1990s.⁴⁶² Support initiatives for culture were to be prioritised in areas where this could have social consequences in addition to the purely cultural objectives, although this was not to happen at the expense of culture's intrinsic values.⁴⁶³ In addition to specific and tangible policy objectives like the fight against unemployment, the development of cultural business enterprises such as tourism (which were mentioned briefly), and the use of culture to attract people to particular cities or regions due to their cultural provision, culture was seen to have the potential to improve quality of life more generally.⁴⁶⁴

This was particularly picked up by members of the Labour Party in the parliamentary committee, who argued that the sector-overarching principle had become even more important due to the impact of the international media-industries. Although their intrinsic values were acknowledged, cultural activities and cultural participation also contributed to 'the encouragement of creativity and independence, and improve the ability to meet new challenges'.⁴⁶⁵

Members of the Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party in the parliamentary committee also subscribed to the sector-overarching approach. Members from SV also emphasised that cultural policy was the real policy and that it should determine developments in other fields such

⁴⁶² KUL (1992), p. 11.

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 29.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 30.

⁴⁶⁵ KUK (1993), p. 4.

as 'education, building and construction, work environment and product design through strong standards for aesthetics, value-consciousness and quality'.⁴⁶⁶

On the other hand, SP members emphasised the principle that cultural policy should be overarching and integrated into all parts of society and not 'overshadowed by other sectors'.⁴⁶⁷

The aspect approach to cultural policy was significantly toned down in the 2000s, where KUL (2003a) focused much more on the professional arts, with little reference to their potential contribution to social policy. Again, it was instead mostly members from the centre-left parties that still emphasised that culture could have a positive social impact and thus lamented that cultural policy was still steeped in a sector-focus.⁴⁶⁸

The aspect oriented approach to cultural policy emphasised that culture had a positive social impact on the individual. However, as from the 1980s, it was argued that it was not just each individual that was threatened by a passive consumption of commercial culture, but the 'common' Norwegian culture as a whole. This threat to national culture has been another important argument that underpins cultural policy rationales, and this is the focus of the following section.

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

⁴⁶⁸ FKD (2004), p. 35.

6.2.6 National culture under threat

As mentioned above, the value rhetoric from the 1970s and onwards was very much linked to another rationale, which argued that Norwegian culture and Norwegian cultural identity were under threat, particularly from the forces of the global cultural industries. The strong impact of commercial culture was, in line with Girard's critique of the pacifying forces of these industries, regarded by many as the main cause of the alleged rootless feelings and lack of values, which harboured the two previously mentioned interlinked, and again, pessimistic arguments. Firstly, a general reservation against the outputs of the commercial cultural industries, and secondly, a fear of the perceived threat posed by globalisation (partly due to the former) to Norwegian culture and identity. However, as will be shown, the anti-commercial argument changed during the course of the four decades analysed here, where commercial culture was gradually met with less scepticism, before it was embraced and actually hailed as the solution to the threat to national identity. The perceived threat to a Norwegian national identity also mellowed over the years.

From the danger of commercial culture to embracing the cultural industries

Right from the start in KUD (1973), the commercialisation of the cultural sector was seen as something inherently negative. A phrase that was often repeated was 'undesirable commercialisation', which should be

counteracted in order to 'secure everybody's real free choice of cultural activities and cultural provisions'.⁴⁶⁹

This was echoed even more strongly in KUD (1974), which made it clear that:

certain forms of commercialisation [were seen] as a serious cultural policy problem. There is reason to believe that this question will become even more intense in the future, partly because of developments in the multinational cultural industries.⁴⁷⁰

Hence, it was suggested that the government might intervene where market forces had undesirable effects. This included producing and distributing cultural products (particularly within the field of music), if private actors did not secure real choice.⁴⁷¹ One of the alleged negative consequences of the commercial sector was that cultural areas that were not deemed profitable were not allowed to flourish within a market-context.⁴⁷² The freedom provided by the cultural industries was thus not always real, but perceived as an illusion brought forward by an aggressive advertising industry.⁴⁷³ This was particularly perceived to be a problem for young people, whose 'commercialised leisure culture, gives an undesirable and one-sided offer, mainly developed with the aim to make a profit,⁴⁷⁴ and often resulted in 'unhealthy consumption needs and

⁴⁶⁹ KUD (1973), p. 6.

⁴⁷⁰ KUD (1974), p. 7.

⁴⁷¹ KUD (1973), p. 51 and KUD (1974), p. 17.

⁴⁷² KUD (1973), p. 51.

⁴⁷³ KUD (1974), p. 23.

⁴⁷⁴ KUD (1973), p. 63.

undesirable status norms',⁴⁷⁵ as well as turning people into passive consumers.⁴⁷⁶

Seven years later, KUD (1981) repeated these deep reservations towards the cultural industries, and revealed particular concerns regarding new technologies. However, the response was more reflective and less rigid. Although the paper still proposed regulations, for example through a ban on strong violence on videocassettes, it also emphasised that the power of the cultural industries could only be resisted through securing a thriving live culture. Undesirable commercialisation should thus be opposed through the encouragement of alternative quality products.⁴⁷⁷ It is interesting to observe that, although the previous Green papers of the 1970s had been reluctant to define quality, KUD (1981) did this implicitly when it lamented the products of the cultural industries, and their inferior quality when compared to the publicly financed professional arts. This contradicts the relativist approach to quality that was so apparent elsewhere in these policy texts and indicates a subtle discursive practice: a default position where quality is perceived in relative terms, but this does not extend to commercial culture, the inferior quality of which is taken for granted. Hence, this distinction between commercial and non commercial culture does not merit any further discussion.

However, KUV (1983) presented an even more prominent proactive approach which, rather than just lamenting the impact of the cultural

⁴⁷⁵ KUD (1974), p. 40.

⁴⁷⁶ MP Liv Andersen, FIS (1975), p. 2453.

⁴⁷⁷ KUD (1981), pp. 2 - 3.

industries, proposed a positive response. Here, the equation of mass produced cultural products with 'undesirable commercialisation' was explicitly rejected as a gross simplification. Instead, the cultural industries' democratic potential, (because of their capacity to disseminate high quality art to everybody, beyond a narrow elite), was emphasised.⁴⁷⁸

In order to counter the negative effects of the commercial cultural industries, a vibrant domestic production of content was suggested, as well as the support of what was termed 'superior' cultural production.⁴⁷⁹ Again, a subtle distinction between 'superior' non-commercial versus the 'inferior' commercial appears as an implicit assumption.

Moreover, due to the inherent value of increased international contacts, possibilities of opening up the media-landscape were considered to be inherently valuable, and a policy of isolation was unthinkable.⁴⁸⁰ However, a less isolationistic cultural policy, particularly in the area of broadcasting, made it more important to ensure that:

Norwegian culture can excel through its own quality, and it is a social task to support superior cultural production, which cannot survive the competition without subsidies.⁴⁸¹

KUL (2003a) also contained a critical reflection on commercial culture, which should be combated through a diverse cultural sector, where:

⁴⁷⁸ KUV (1983), p. 12.

⁴⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁰ KUV (1983), p. 4.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid.

a broad spectrum of creative, executive, documenting and mediating efforts from all parts of the cultural field are a valuable counterweight against the standardised power represented by different commercial powers in society.⁴⁸²

However, the paper acknowledged that many cultural changes took place beyond political control, and that, although policies should be attentive to this, they could only create a framework within which these developments could come to fruition. Hence, a more receptive approach to the cultural industries was proposed, where rather than regulate and oppose, the government should interact with these industries and encourage a diverse production.

The previously dark and pessimistic analysis of the products of the cultural industries had also changed. An intense consumption of media-content had, for example, previously been seen as encouraging passivity or perhaps even as damaging, particularly for children. KUL (2003a), on the other hand, described some of these activities thus:

Activities like watching television or playing computer games cannot only be appreciated as passive or damaging pastimes. Quite the opposite, these are activities which are very important in order to enable children to integrate with other children of the same age-group, through play and other social activities. Children gain confidence through an arsenal of stories, ideas and conceptions, which can be used creatively in their own play-times. Not at least for this age-group [children] is the media supply important, in giving common references for interaction across social and cultural divides.⁴⁸³

⁴⁸² KUL (2003a), p. 7.

⁴⁸³ Ibid., p. 29.

This marks a shift from an object oriented policy-measure where the role of decision-makers within government was to interfere with the market in order to protect audiences from content, which represented anti-*Bildung*, to an increased trust in people's self-determination also in terms of their consumption of commercial culture: a subject orientation. But it breaks with the Girard inspired cultural democracy policies, which did not include commercial culture amongst the manifestations that could facilitate *Bildung*.

However, the paper still warned against 'the standardised power' of different commercial actors⁴⁸⁴ and argued that this challenge should be met by an active cultural sector with a high level of production of Norwegian content.⁴⁸⁵ This would be combined with an attempt to increase the level of knowledge and cultural competence in the population.⁴⁸⁶

It was argued that the threat to national identity was primarily posed by global cultural industries, but also by other major trends connected with globalisation, such as increased immigration. Again, a significant discursive change can be observed from scepticism and pessimism to an active positive response. The next section will look more specifically at how cultural policies were formulated as a response to the forces of globalisation.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

⁴⁸⁵ FKD (2004), p. 44, the chair of the parliamentary committee, Olemic Thommessen, particularly emphasised the importance of increasing Norwegian content on the net, FIS (2004), p. 2390.

⁴⁸⁶ FKD (2004), p. 34.

From pressure on national identity to abandonment of the national project

Although it was not until the 1980s that the anti-globalisation argument was articulated with full force, the perception that Norway was a small and vulnerable country in cultural terms was already expressed in the 1970s. It was argued that to democratise the professional arts as well as to attempt to create a cultural democracy were big challenges for a small country like Norway with what was described as a relatively short history of cultural traditions compared with the so-called 'cultural nations' abroad. This was not made easier due to international cultural exchange being more intense than ever. Hence:

It is even more important to recognise that cultural policy is of decisive importance for our ability to uphold our independence and distinctive character as a participant in international cultural exchange.⁴⁸⁷

Although the 1980s saw a more positive approach to the cultural industries, concerns over the pressure on Norwegian culture and identity were expressed with a stronger force. The parliamentary committee in particular picked up on this and warned against the enormous power of media technologies, which in terms of content provision, presented uneven power relations between global industry-actors and domestic content providers, particularly within the audio-visual industries. The big media players produced 'standardised' content that was designed to be marketed globally, and because of their market-base were able to 'undersell' their products on domestic markets with the result that

⁴⁸⁷ KUK (1974), p. 6.

Norwegian content lost out in the competition. Hence, the parliamentary committee observed that the 'international consumption oriented cultural industry' was about to take over completely, and argued that:

international major producers focus on products, which are produced with a world market in mind, where the conditions for crossing national cultural borders seem to make the products standardised and without character.⁴⁸⁸

Again it was assumed that domestic content, and content not produced in the context of a commercial framework, by definition contribute more to diversity than what was branded as commercial. KUD (1981) was even more specific and lamented how new technology had supported a strong and undesirable commercialisation.⁴⁸⁹

It was argued that this could, in the worst instance, threaten Norwegian culture at its core:

There is a danger that commercial products and the efficient marketing of the multinational media and leisure industries, will characterise the use of leisure time in a way that can threaten even the foundation of Norwegian culture.⁴⁹⁰

Hence, local content should be defended in order to protect:

what is our own, the culture which burst out of our character, from our

⁴⁸⁸ KUK (1985), p. 23.

⁴⁸⁹ KUD (1981), p. 36.

⁴⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

experiences and deeply rooted values, which chimes in with the reality that is ours.⁴⁹¹

Increased Norwegian content-production, particularly within radio and television, with emphasis on quality and diversity, was prescribed as the remedy. It was thus seen as a national task for central government to create the necessary conditions for content producers to increase their production.⁴⁹² The parliamentary committee emphasised that this was a national responsibility, and the most important cultural policy task ahead was 'to lead an active policy which consciously secures our language, national and cultural identity'.⁴⁹³

It was also emphasised, to a larger extent than in the 1970s, how culture could unite people through a shared national identity,⁴⁹⁴ and that this could counter an increasing dissolution of norms and a crisis of identity,⁴⁹⁵ which again indicates a discursive subscription to the *Bildung* potential of national culture.

The perceived threat to Norwegian identity was thus strong and remedies had to be identified to 'save' what was perceived to be Norwegian.

⁴⁹¹ KUK (1985), p. 23.

⁴⁹² KUD (1981), p. 16; KUK (1985), p. 23, 24, 26 and 27; MP Ragnild Queseth Haarstad, FIS (1985), p. 3023 and 3024.

⁴⁹³ KUK (1985), p. 23.

⁴⁹⁴ MP Mona Espelid, FIS (1985), p. 3047; Minister of Culture Lars Roar Langslet, FIS (1985) p. 3050 and MP Tom Thoresen, FIS (1985), p. 3059.

⁴⁹⁵ KUV (1983), p. 9.

The most important identity marker was, unsurprisingly, the language, and the need to protect and nourish the two Norwegian languages was thus given utmost importance by all members of the parliamentary committee. MP Tore Austad, summarised this thus:

Our call [...] is to ensure that the language that is being spoken and written in our corner [of the world], remains a genuine and fine-tuned and a sonorous instrument for thoughts, and feelings and meanings. This is simply cultural task number one.⁴⁹⁶

By the 1990s, a common Norwegian national culture was perceived to be in an even stronger squeeze: as before, by the global media industry on the one hand but increasingly also by regional and local culture on the other. It was thought that all this might lead to a more diverse culture, but that 'this diversity might displace important parts of the culture, which should be our common heritage and give us our identity'.⁴⁹⁷

Thus, it was understood that a cultural policy for the 1990s should recognise this interplay between the national and the international, but at the same time be built 'on our national roots and our tradition, in the way it is being expressed in Norwegian society'.⁴⁹⁸

Hence, the objective was an interplay with global culture. However, in accordance with Herderian ideas, an interplay where the national culture and identity were valued and respected:

⁴⁹⁶ MP Tore Austad, FIS (1985), p. 3072.

⁴⁹⁷ KUL (1992), p. 10.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

There is no necessary contradiction between the need to take care of our own culture and the desire to be open to other countries' cultural expressions. It is important to keep this in mind when Norway now has become a multi-cultural society. Our art and culture have always been shaped and developed in an interplay, partly between the regional cultures in different parts of the country, partly through impulses from the world outside.⁴⁹⁹

This was echoed by the parliamentary committee, where the majority commented that it had become more difficult than previously to protect national identity and values due to the intense influx of cultural content from abroad. The subsequent parliamentary debate exposed strong voices in support of the anti-globalisation rationale. It was argued that Norwegian culture had come under increased pressure from global mass media through a diverse number of TV-channels and the video-industry. To combat this a 'state of readiness' should, according to MP Johan J. Jacobsen, be prepared against:

a cultural influence, which over time can weaken the values which have given us a national distinctive character, kept us rooted with an identity as country and people. Thus, it is a national duty to protect our national cultural heritage, and renew and develop it. Not through isolation, not due to a fear of the unknown and the untried. We shall receive impulses from outside and give impulses in a fruitful interplay with the rest of the world. However, we must look after the balance in this interplay, so that important values in the Norwegian society do not get lost.⁵⁰⁰

Hence, as expressed by a member from the Conservative Party (on the parliamentary committee), a historic consciousness, anchored in a

⁴⁹⁹ KUL (1992), p. 25.

⁵⁰⁰ MP Johan J. Jacobsen, FIS (1993), p. 3140.

national cultural heritage, would give 'greater safety in a society increasingly characterised by fast and significant change'.⁵⁰¹

This was to change radically and by 2003 was replaced by a rhetoric which argued that (used in this context for the first time) 'globalisation', as well as an increased level of individualisation, had resulted in 'a more complex cultural situation, [...] where traditional ideas of a Norwegian common culture and national identity were challenged'.⁵⁰²

Hence, rather than the usual emphasis on a common national culture, this paper focused more on how contemporary cultural policy should encourage cultural diversity, both nationally and internationally. Globalisation had also increased the opportunities for international cultural exchange, where the importance of the arts and culture, including what was traditionally perceived as having a more 'narrow' appeal, was emphasised as important.

KUL (2003a) also stressed that there was a relationship between globalisation and people's renewed interest in local communities and local culture. This had contributed to increased activities locally and regionally, many of which had developed outside established institutions, but sometimes as part of international networks, which had enabled new opportunities, in an atmosphere of 'glocalisation'. Due to their

⁵⁰¹ KUK (1993), pp. 4 - 5.

⁵⁰² KUL (2003a), p. 9.

independent status some of these projects had also contributed to a blurring of the distinction between different genres.⁵⁰³

All of this had, according to KUL (2003a), created a radically different context for cultural policy-making, which begged fundamental questions about the assumptions on which a common cultural policy had been based. There was thus a need:

to create a new understanding of what a Norwegian common culture is made up of. Traditional ideas of the Norwegian and national identity are changing.⁵⁰⁴

Hence, cultural policy, instead of nourishing a national culture under threat from globalisation as before, should:

turn its perspective away from the construction of a uniform common culture and facilitate the development of culture based on diversity and complexity, which characterises today's cultural situation. This demands an understanding of culture as an open process, not as an isolated system. The basis must be that culture is something which originates, grows and changes in its encounter with other cultures. In this perspective cultural diversity becomes a condition for the creation and development of a living culture.⁵⁰⁵

This new representation was marked by three concepts: a positive response to globalisation (a word which did not signify something unambiguously negative), a celebration of Norway as a multi-ethnic and

⁵⁰³ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 107.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

multi-cultural society, and finally, a more positive approach to the cultural industries.

This received wide support, including from opposition parties. Similarly to the already mentioned changed perception of the commercial cultural industries, which implied a more positive approach to people's own self determination in terms of cultural consumption, this shift away from the emphasis on a common national culture (to the celebration of cultural diversity) signified a return of the subject representation. The subscription to one common monoculture was replaced with a celebration of diversity, where a range of cultures, situated in close proximity to, and even defined by, people themselves, implies a departure from the sole understanding that only a prescribed canon of cultural outputs can lead to *Bildung*. This implies the return of the subject representation where it is acknowledged that Norway was made up of several cultures and where decisions about what should be celebrated and supported should be taken as close to people as possible.

The multi-cultural consequence of increased immigration had, in certain ways, made the social make-up of Norway more complex, and this could not be ignored.⁵⁰⁶ It was emphasised that new efforts, which made it possible for cultural expressions from immigrant-communities to make use of the full supply of cultural activities, should be instigated and that the majority should show respect and tolerance for these communities.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid., pp. 28 - 29.

However, access to new and more diverse cultural expressions should go even further, where the long-term objective was to 'develop changes in attitudes, so that what is different is perceived as something natural, valuable and of equal value'.⁵⁰⁷

In the words of the then Minister for Culture, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland:

Cultural policy must in future turn its perspective away from the construction of such a [national] common culture and accept the complexity of today's cultural situation. It must be based on a dynamic and inclusive cultural perspective, which gives space for a plurality of different voices.⁵⁰⁸

However, this description of Norway as part of a wider and more diverse culture, both internationally and at home, was still being challenged by an anti-globalisation / anti-commerce rhetoric. As mentioned above, KUL (2003a) presented globalisation as having both homogenising and heterogeneous effects. Members from A, SV and SP (on the parliamentary committee), argued that the diversity brought about by globalisation, paradoxically could be threatened by the same globalisation. This perceived threat was also still taken seriously in the Green paper, which concluded that a new cultural policy thus had to deliver a balancing

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 110.

⁵⁰⁸ Minister of Culture, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, FIS (2004), p. 2404. It is pertinent to point out that the assumption that Norway harboured one 'common' culture had been rejected already in the 1970s (see for example KUK (1975), p. 5). However, at that time it was emphasised that different regions, local communities or even social groups represented different sub-cultures as alternatives to one national culture. However, these had all originated from within Norway and should not be confused with the new cultural impulses that now challenged a 'common' culture as a result of globalisation.

act between 'collecting the gains from globalisation and implementing counter-strategies where diversity is threatened'.⁵⁰⁹

The aim to continue to strengthen the Norwegian language was also still seen as a priority, which received broad support. The Centre Party, for example, argued that the Norwegian language was threatened and that an 'aggressive language policy' was important to protect the two official languages.⁵¹⁰

Notwithstanding all the celebratory rhetoric about cultural diversity and the positive effects of globalisation, 'common' culture as an identity marker still received some support. Representatives from the Conservatives and the Christian Democrats for example, emphasised that belonging to '[our] cultural heritage, strengthens our identity as individuals and our common cultural reference points as a nation'.⁵¹¹

Hence, the open response to globalisation existed alongside a still critical and negative approach, which highlighted that Norway's common culture should receive protection.

The analysis has so far exposed cultural policy arguments, which in one way or another prescribed how culture affected the individual or the society as a whole. I argue that they all, more or less tightly, sit together as an overall *Bildung* discourse. Whether through emphasising that

⁵⁰⁹ KUL (2003a), p. 110.

⁵¹⁰ MP Eli Sollied Øveraas, FIS (2004), p. 2401.

⁵¹¹ FKD (2004), p. 34.

culture should be defined widely and that as many people as possible should influence the policy about what should be supported; whether the emphasis has been on the professional arts' potential to enlighten or whether the people and the culture as such should be protected from the forces of globalisation or commercial culture, it is the effect on and the well-being of the individual and the culture of the nation as a whole that has been the focus.

I also identified two alternative discourses in my policy-material. These are not concerned with rationales for why Norway should put in place certain cultural policy measures. However, albeit alternative, both these discourses are so prevalent in the policy rhetoric that I have included them in my analysis, and this is the focus of the next section.

6.3 Tracing the rationales: Alternative Discourses

How the cultural sector is financed does not strictly speaking relate to cultural policy rationales. It is however still relevant to analyse how a 'marketisation' rhetoric has developed over the thirty years charted here, partly because this would get close to advocating that the collaboration between the cultural and business sectors was an intrinsic cultural policy objective in the 2000s, but also because it is being given much attention in these papers. Hence, I shall relatively briefly present this, together with the radical alternative discourse uttered by representatives from the Progress Party.

6.3.1 The 'marketisation' of cultural policy: from diverse sources of funding to 'culture and business'

The discourse of the 1970s did not question the sources of funding for culture at all. The institutions and schemes that were established by, or received a big part of their funding from, the government, were not expected to raise money, perhaps with the exception of a small proportion through ticketing income, from elsewhere. This was partly because improvements to the cultural infrastructure were seen as a public responsibility at a time when the Norwegian economy was doing very well. In fact, this was a period of general growth in the public sector.

This changed in the 1980s. KUD (1981) reported that the funding for culture had tripled in real terms between 1970 and 1981, but that this bonanza, at least for that period, was coming to an end. Hence, rather than promising increased funding to new initiatives, the paper emphasised budget restraints, and an increased need for a re-prioritisation within existing budgets. The funding restraints were echoed in KUV (1983). However, rather than reallocating budgets it was argued that extra funding had to be sourced from elsewhere, and that the cultural sector had to become more active in exploring alternative revenue streams. The Conservative government behind KUV (1983) argued that increased financial support did not necessarily boost either cultural output or consumption. At the same time as public funding for culture had increased significantly, people's consumption of some cultural activities

had gone down, and this was perceived as a problem.⁵¹² It was also argued that there was, most probably, a non-exploited potential for cultural funding from private sources.⁵¹³ However, funding from non-public sources would not come instead of, but in addition to, existing levels of public funds. The administration of culture was also regarded as too inflexible, which restrained the margins for cultural output.⁵¹⁴

Several MPs, particularly from the Conservative Party, supported this view in parliament. Halgrim Berg, for instance, clearly argued that:

the financing of intellectual life and cultural activities should never be exclusively a public responsibility, even though some might find such a policy both comfortable and ideologically correct.⁵¹⁵

Interestingly, the response by the parliamentary committee was broadly negative. A joint committee rejected a call for cultural institutions to increase their revenue through earned income. Neither did they embrace revenue from sponsorship and advertising. The majority, made up of H, KrF and SP argued that there were both positive and negative aspects of new revenue streams but that such funding in no way would exempt the government from its responsibilities. Sponsorship could be relevant for specific events, concerts and festivals but not as revenue for publicly funded cultural institutions. It also warned against events or institutions

⁵¹² The private consumption of cinema tickets had for example been reduced from 124 million Norwegian kroner in 1975 to 108 in 1982, whereas for theatre tickets the spending had gone down from 26 million kroner in 1975 to 25 million in 1982 (KUV (1983), p. 18).

⁵¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 4 and p. 10.

⁵¹⁵ MP Hallgrim Berg, FIS (1985), p. 3031.

becoming dependent on private funding, which was regarded as unacceptable. The minority made up of representatives from the Labour Party went even further and argued that a strong reliance on support from private business would be a step back in time to when the arts were supported by private patrons. This would compromise integrity, and this faction argued that such a threat from private industry should be countered through even more public support. This did not imply a total rejection of private funding, but the main message was one of scepticism. Above all, a joint committee reiterated that any gifts or sponsor-support from the business sector should not be granted at the expense of the recipient's artistic integrity.⁵¹⁶

However, by 1992 the attitude towards private business sponsorship had changed, and the Green paper (KUL (1992)) presented by a Labour government now argued that such contributions were positive, as long as the agreements did not violate the integrity of the artists involved. As before, the paper stressed that such funding should never replace the public sector's responsibility, but should be used for increased activity and special projects, and that organisations should not become dependent on this type of funding.⁵¹⁷ Conservative members argued that alternative sources of funding should not be perceived as of less value than public funding, and that to prevent such funding with the argument that it could lead to 'undesirable commercialisation' was too simple.⁵¹⁸ Conservative members declared that 'the extent, and especially the

⁵¹⁶ KUK (1985), p. 31.

⁵¹⁷ KUL (1992), p. 13.

⁵¹⁸ KUK (1993), p. 5.

quality, of the cultural activities in our society is not determined by the public authorities or by public subsidies'.⁵¹⁹

It was argued that it was the government's task to create the right conditions for a healthy cultural sector, but within this framework other financial sources should also be encouraged and allowed to flourish.

Although KUL (1993) did not signal a reduction in funds, it emphasised the need for an efficient utilisation of money allocated. It therefore stressed that better performance indicators had to be developed. It emphasised particularly that a set of indicators to measure the qualitative dimension, in addition to quantitative measures, should be introduced.⁵²⁰ Rather than focus on alternative sources of funding, this paper was thus more preoccupied with efficiency-measures within the cultural sector.

By 2003, this marketisation rhetoric had moved a big step further, and both the Green paper, the parliamentary reply and the subsequent parliamentary debate revealed a much more open approach to increased interaction between the cultural and business sectors. An active cultural sector was increasingly perceived as a competitive advantage for Norway as a nation, which could partly be achieved through an increased Norwegian presence on the 'international cultural arena'.⁵²¹ Another argument emphasised that the divisions between the cultural sector and the business sector had become so blurred that it was difficult to identify

⁵¹⁹ MP Anders Talleraas, FIS (1993), p. 3142.

⁵²⁰ KUL (1992), p. 62.

⁵²¹ KUL (2003a), p. 9.

a clear distinction any longer. The paper argued that increased collaboration between the arts and business would have general positive external consequences but that it was also necessary in order to achieve increased growth of the cultural sector.⁵²²

However, the marketisation agenda was not only marked by the call for increasing collaboration between the arts and business, but also for the sector itself to be administered according to management principles more akin to those found in private business companies. Firstly, cultural institutions were requested to re-prioritise their activities in the name of efficiency to secure better utilisation of limited resources. Tighter financial control and more cost-effective operations were emphasised. Larger institutions were also expected to make more use of independent artistic partners and to initiate more temporary projects.⁵²³ The rationale behind these demands was not only for the organisations to become more efficient but also to enable them to be more flexible in artistic terms and to:

be attentive and susceptible to impulses from outside, pick up new needs and collaborate both between each other [the institutions] and external actors in a dynamic way.⁵²⁴

⁵²² Ibid., p. 10.

⁵²³ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵²⁴ Ibid.

Thus, in the marketisation rationale, the need for cultural organisations to become more efficient went hand in hand with a demand for them to also become artistically more innovative.

This marketisation discourse never questioned the public financing of cultural activities and institutions as such. Although it initially argued that the growth in spending could not continue and later that a funding-potential from private sources should be exploited, it was still understood that the government was responsible for a cultural infrastructure, including not only the support of main institutions, but also individual artists. This position was perceived radically differently in the last discourse that I have identified, namely, that produced by the members of the Progress Party.

6.3.2 The Progress Party: the end of policy and the return to the national project

As mentioned above, the main elements of the *Bildung* discourse were supported by both the government and across most parties in parliament, and differing views appeared thus not as contradictory, but rather as complementary. However, one party distanced itself utterly from the others and championed a radically different approach, asking fundamental questions about Norwegian cultural policy and its public financing. The Progress Party was not represented in the parliamentary committees, that responded to the Green papers until the 1990s. However, judging from the party members' participation in the

parliamentary debate, their stance was clearly visible already in 1985.⁵²⁵ At that time, their most vocal proponent was MP Jens Marcussen, who came up with clear recommendations for how certain cultural institutions could reduce their burden on the tax-paying public. Theatres, for example, should first do their utmost to cut costs, particularly by reducing their technical staffing. If they also 'programmed plays that people actually want to see and increase the ticket-prices', then performing arts institutions would, in his view, be in less need of public money.⁵²⁶ Also for museums and libraries the public should be expected to pay more of the costs. Furthermore, they fiercely attacked the government's policy on artists. The party could not find any rationale for why support for individual artists should be of any importance and suggested instead that all support schemes should be abolished. Artists should instead be perceived as self-employed tradesmen, who should accept that they had to live off the sale of their products: 'Artists who do not manage to live off their products should have no claim to have their hobby activities paid by Norwegian tax-payers'.⁵²⁷

All these arguments were underpinned by a strong liberal ideology supporting a laissez-faire approach to culture, where the sector should manage on its own.

⁵²⁵ This followed naturally from Erik Gjems-Onstad from Anders Lange's Party's (from which the Progress Party evolved) already mentioned arguments in parliament in 1975, which were also extremely critical of public spending on culture.

⁵²⁶ MP Jens Marcussen, FIS (1985), p. 3046.

⁵²⁷ Ibid., p. 3047.

By 1993, the party had four representatives on the parliamentary committee,⁵²⁸ and again their views presented a radically different stance.

Their definition of culture was relativistic and echoed in many ways the approach from the Green papers of the seventies:

Culture is an open notion which expresses those values and qualities which each individual attaches a high value to. [...] Culture can be defined individually and generally. People's relationship to culture varies. How they interpret this notion will also vary strongly.⁵²⁹

The committee members from FrP argued, in radical opposition to the other parties in parliament, that the government should only secure a legal framework and stop financing cultural activities. The cultural sector should be guided by people's own choices but the current cultural policy obstructed this through its taxation of individuals in order to spend it on politically prioritised cultural areas. Instead of this redistribution there should be an open market for culture.⁵³⁰

Culture should encourage innovation and progress, both intellectually and materially. However, governmental interference in cultural policy had the opposite effect and would instead lead to 'passivity and stagnation'.⁵³¹

⁵²⁸ One of the members, Finn Thoresen, had actually broken ranks with FrP by the time the parliamentary committee debated the Green Paper. However, his views on the Green Paper and cultural policy generally were more or less the same as those of other FrP members. Hence, statements from the FrP members will include those of Finn Thoresen.

⁵²⁹ KUK (1993), p. 5.

⁵³⁰ Ibid.

⁵³¹ KUK (1993), p. 6.

This was a liberal, highly un-Arnoldian approach, where people's freedom to choose should be secured through private markets. Any decisions taken by elites such as politicians or bureaucrats were, by definition, selective and thus unjust. Because the arts and culture were omnipresent and such an integrated part of people's lives, they did not need to be made subject to political governance.⁵³²

Such a liberal cultural policy would, according to FrP members, not have a devastating effect on cultural provision in Norway. Instead, the party argued that if there was, as claimed by others, popular support for the funding of culture, and that culture was absolutely necessary and had to be supported, then these cultural expressions and institutions would certainly survive in a free market, because of the allegedly massive support for maintaining them.⁵³³ However, the party members were realistic enough to conclude that some cultural organisations might not survive without public funding, and they explained, rather bluntly, the consequences of a laissez-faire approach thus:

Cultural activities which today are managed or supported by the public sector, would, according to a liberalistic objective, have to either; a) be transformed into commercial institutions, b) be supported on the basis of voluntary and idealistic activities or c) be shut down.⁵³⁴

This sounds harsh and uncompromising, but it is worth noting that the Labour MP Thorbjørn Kultorp had uttered similar sentiments in 1974

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ KUK (1993), p. 15.

⁵³⁴ Ibid., p. 7.

when he suggested dropping local cultural activities, which did not have popular support.⁵³⁵

Money allocated to the arts in times of tight public budgets, where it could be better spent on social needs, such as the elderly, was seen as deeply problematic, and the party attacked the Conservatives for voting together with all the other parties, including the Socialist Left, for public support of culture.⁵³⁶

The Progress Party's view had not changed much by the 2000s. The centre-right government behind KUL (2003a) had been criticised, by the opposition in parliament, for going too far in their emphasis on the marketisation of the cultural sector. However, the Progress Party presented again a much more radical approach. This time, attacking the funding of high arts institutions, their members lamented that broad cultural movements had been given so little emphasis.⁵³⁷ It is interesting that in this they built on the cultural democracy rhetoric of the seventies. However, this made them no closer to any of the other parties, and this was particularly evident in their condemnation of the government's alleged responsibility to support culture with a narrow appeal. Such expressions, and whether they would survive or not, would be determined by the market, where artists, businesses and audiences would meet and where different artistic expressions would develop naturally in one direction or another. The FrP members argued that 'it is completely wrong

⁵³⁵ See Chapter Six, sub-section 6.2.3.

⁵³⁶ MP Jan Simonsen, FIS (1993), p. 3110.

⁵³⁷ FKD (2004), p. 37.

to use public money and resources to attempt to influence this natural development'.⁵³⁸

Again, it was also argued that people who wanted to work as artists or in other jobs in the cultural sector did so as a career choice, and it was not the public sector's responsibility to continue to support them. However, FrP members argued that efforts should be made to create the right conditions for such workers so that they became independent of public support for example by assisting artists to exploit their intellectual property rights better.⁵³⁹

The Progress Party also differed radically from other parties in their approach to the Green paper's celebration of cultural diversity, where, in their view, it was clear that to mix immigrant culture and Norwegian culture could have a detrimental effect on traditional culture. Hence, their assessment of immigrant culture was less relativistic and they warned against a policy that encouraged diversity, the results of which, according to this party, would be that after not many years:

our own traditions would be blurred and Norwegian cultural tradition would be represented as a mixture of different cultural elements. These members cannot recommend this.⁵⁴⁰

⁵³⁸ Ibid., p. 38.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ FKD (2004), p. 37.

The Progress Party's rhetoric thus differed radically from the rest of the discourse on two accounts: on the rationales for having a cultural policy at all, and on the celebration of Norway as a diverse and multicultural society, which the party could not accept.

Let me summarise the different discourses, as well as how they were manifested in the proposed policies by means of a table.

6.4 Summary and discursive analysis

Based on my analysis of these policy texts I argue that they harbour a strong understanding of, and subscription to, an inherent *Bildung* potential in cultural activities. This forms a discourse that is made up of four interrelated arguments: the 'value' argument, the 'growth' argument, the 'anti-commerce' argument and the 'protection of national identity' argument. Alongside this main discourse I have located two alternative discourses, which are less about policy-rationales per se, but which still take up a prominent space in these texts and hence merit inclusion, they are the marketisation discourse and the Progress Party discourse.

6.4.1 The *Bildung* discourse

Discounting the Progress Party's radical alternative suggestion to abandon the public support for cultural activities altogether,⁵⁴¹ there is consensus amongst all agents here that such activities should receive

⁵⁴¹ Rather than continuously having to discount the Progress Party's counter-discourse, it should be taken as given that the discourses presented in this section are not subscribed to by this party.

public support, because they harbour a great *Bildung* potential both for each individual and for the nation as a whole. This was made most explicit in the 'growth' argument where direct references were made to terms like 'individual development', 'comprehension', and 'human growth'. However, the argument that the nation had become value poor and that it was a public responsibility to compensate for this by providing culture of high moral value is also evidence of a *Bildung* rationale, as is the argument that Norwegian culture is under threat from a global cultural industry and from commercial culture more generally.

This discourse has deep roots and can be traced in all the policy papers that I have analysed. There is thus a strong degree of durability in the subscription to these *Bildung* ideas. Neumann argues that discourses can often be perceived as being made up of several layers, depending on, exactly, the degree of durability of the different elements of the discursive structure.⁵⁴² Ole Wæver refers to the degree of sedimentation in the discourse, where 'the deeper structures are more solidly sedimented and more difficult to politicise and change',⁵⁴³ meaning that the 'deeper' layers in the discourse, or the trunk and roots to use a tree-metaphor, signify characteristics of the representations over which there are fewer disputes. The branches and twigs, on the other hand, represent the surface level of the discourse, about which there might be less consensus. Neumann argues that:

⁵⁴² Neumann (2001b), p. 62.

⁵⁴³ Ole Wæver, 'Identity, communities and foreign policy: Discourse analysis as foreign policy theory', in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic states* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 32.

If some characteristics [of the representation] unify and others differentiate, then it is reasonable to imagine that the characteristics which unite are more lasting.⁵⁴⁴

The discourse I have identified spans thirty years, and what holds it together is a deeply rooted subscription to the *Bildung* potential in cultural activities and artefacts. However, the discourse harbours two representations about the most effective way to facilitate *Bildung*: a subject representation, which defines culture widely in this respect, and which takes a relative approach to quality and emphasises participation and decentralisation, and an object representation, which emphasises the ‘professional arts’. The weight of these two representations in the discourse varies both within the discourse at different points in time, but also over these thirty years. Consequently, the suitability of different policy-implications in terms of fulfilling this *Bildung* potential varies as well, or in other words, with reference to Vestheim’s enlightenment-concepts, whether the policies had a subject or an object approach to *Bildung*. I summarise all the features of this discourse in a Table Five.

⁵⁴⁴ Neumann (2001b), p. 62.

Policy-implications:	Subject representation - Cultural Democracy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wide definition of culture • Relative approach to quality • Emphasis on participation • Decentralisation <p><u>From the Left:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture and emancipation 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural policy as Social policy 	
Discourse:	Object representation - Democratisation of culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conditions for artists • Access to the professional arts <p><u>From Christian Democrats:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The negative impacts of culture 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cultural policy as Social policy <p><u>From 1980s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hierarchical approach to quality <p><u>From 1990s</u></p> <p>Architecture and design</p>	
Policy-implications:	Value	Growth
	BILDUNG	
Policy-implications:	Commercial culture	National Culture
	Object representation: The danger of commercial culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased regulation and governmental intervention. • Develop mature broadcasting audiences. • Censorship of violent texts. • Clear quality hierarchies, where the products of the cultural industries are deemed inferior. <p><u>From 1980s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Counter negative effects of commercial culture through increased production of domestic content. 	Object representation: Pressure on national identity <p><u>From 1980s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased domestic content production to secure language, national and cultural identity. <p><u>From 1990s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthen Norwegian culture for its uniqueness. • Interplay between national and global culture. • Strengthen historic consciousness through national cultural heritage.
	Subject representation: The embracing of the cultural industries <p><u>From 2000s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Media-content deemed not to make audiences passive, but to stimulate. 	Subject representation: Abandonment of the national project <p><u>From 2000s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abandon the idea of a uniform common culture and develop a culture based on diversity and complexity. • Change attitudes in the face of multiculturalism. • Abandon the national project.

Table 5: The *Bildung* discourse

There are few contradictory voices within this discourse, in the sense that most agents appear to subscribe to the two representations. However, there are some contradictions that I shall discuss below. The point of departure for this discourse in the 1970s was one of cultural pessimism. Due to the structural changes in society, Norway was perceived to be threatened by a loss of 'values', and there was hence a need for growth. Neumann argues that if a discourse only contains one representation of reality without any alternatives, then the discourse is politically closed and not politicised.⁵⁴⁵ It is tempting to draw this conclusion when reading the first set of policy texts from the 1970s. The mentioned focus on cultural democracy seems to be the unchallenged explicit representation. The response to the loss of value and the need for growth is heavily geared towards the wide definition of culture, the relative notion of quality, the decentralisation of decision-making and the emphasis on participation. This had such a dominant position and was repeated so many times that it almost totally permeated the discourse. As pointed out by Vestheim, much of this echoes the ideas of Augustin Girard.

Leaving the commercial culture and 'the protection of national culture' argument aside, we see a shift towards a more object oriented *Bildung* representation. Already in the 1980s, the relative approach to quality is being challenged by a strong argument in favour of clearer quality hierarchies and there is generally a stronger emphasis on facilitating access to 'the professional arts' (and related to this the conditions for

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 60.

artists), and in the 1990s an increased focus on architecture and design. This tension between the subject and the object representation does not mean that the former ideas of the 1970s disappear, but they are given less emphasis and play a less prominent role. However, the subject representation continued to play its part and was still present in 2003; neither does it sit uncomfortably next to the object representation. Instead they both contribute to the strong *Bildung* rationale, which forms the roots of this discourse.

The discourse is being held together both by frequently and explicitly uttered arguments, which are easy to locate, as well as more implicit assumptions, which are either taken for granted, or which rest on their assumed acceptance, some of which, as we shall see, are somewhat contradictory. A good example of this combination of repetitions and assumptions is the reference to the lack of values in society and how culture can act as a remedy for this. The frequent reference to lack of values is a distinct discursive practice, both through its frequent repetition but also because it is a concept that does not merit any further explanation. 'Values' is a subjective term, which can be interpreted in several ways. However, this policy-discourse assumes a common subscription to what a lack of values actually means. It is coined in such a way that the immediate answer to their erosion is the provision of cultural content and cultural activities. Reading these policy texts thirty years later, it can only be assumed what these references to values imply. The term was particularly prevalent in the way it was applied in the context of

young people, and in this it relates to commercial culture, which was perceived to have a corrupting effect on this 'vulnerable' group; commercial culture was perceived to be a force of anti-*Bildung*. The only departure from the assumed understanding of the interpretation of values in the 1970s, came from the Christian Democrats and from the Left, who respectively designated, in more tangible terms, a Christian interpretation and a socialist class struggle of emancipation when referring to values.

The policy texts were generally more tangible in their reference to growth, where the exposure to cultural values could facilitate extended knowledge and insight. The early policy papers were interspersed with reference to growth, and this was related to values in the sense that by being exposed to cultural values people would grow, but also that growth would lead people to come in contact with cultural values. In the 1970s, the focus of this was on how this could lead to growth in each individual, but in the 1990s and the 2000s this was given importance on an aggregated level, in that growth was not only given an intrinsic importance for each individual, but also as a response to a new social reality, which demanded that people could think creatively, make critical choices and take independent actions. A high cultural competence was argued to be the route to this growth.

I mentioned above that the subject focused policy implications have cultural democracy as their objective, a concept that strongly rested on the principles of a wide definition of culture and a relative approach to

quality. However, this open view to culture and rejection of hierarchies does not extend to the 'anti-commerce' argument, which instead harbours an implicit condemnation of the impacts of the cultural industries, particularly on young people. These two branches of the discourse: the explicit condemnation and patronisation of global commercial culture, sit uneasily together with the wide definition of culture and the relative approach to quality. Whereas, when debating the rationale behind cultural democracy measures the policy papers showed an explicit contempt for cultural hierarchies and cultural 'prophets', the term 'quality' became an indisputable assumption when the danger posed by globalisation and commercialisation was exposed. KUV (1983) for example, championed the necessity of supporting a 'superior' cultural production, and thereby reintroduced the concept of cultural hierarchies that had been explicitly rejected from the rest of the discourse. The rejection of cultural hierarchies, which was such a central principle in the subject representation, was not applied to commercial culture, which was inherently evaluated as being of lower quality. Røyseng argues that by juxtaposing such a 'superior' cultural production with the products of the cultural industries, popular culture is being perceived as the publicly financed culture's 'other'. The latter is positively defined against this 'other', in the sense that the output of the cultural industries stands in opposition to publicly financed culture.⁵⁴⁶ I believe that such a juxtaposition is clear in these documents.

⁵⁴⁶ Røyseng (2007), p. 238. Referring to Peter Larsen, Røyseng applies this idea of the discursive perception of popular culture as the 'other' in relation to the publicly subsidised performing arts. Based on the discourses analysed here, I argue that Røyseng's conclusion is equally valid for the less elitist participatory cultural activities in accordance with the subject-oriented approach.

In a similar way, the products of the multinational cultural industries were, by definition, standardised and without character, and more domestic content was both of higher quality and more diverse, and would strengthen Norwegian identity: the protection of the Norwegian language was an important response to this. The perceived commercial threat should both be countered by increased production of 'quality' content as well as ensuring that Norwegian consumers became increasingly quality conscious and critical. Elites, presumably governmentally elected politicians, bureaucrats or perhaps other representatives of the cultural elite were given a clear role in accordance with Arnoldian principles that somebody should interfere in the cultural sector and the market to prevent people from being exposed to offensive material. Although this chimed well with the Populist Nationalist representation of the nineteenth century in its scepticism of global culture, it is essentially object oriented in its focus due to its paternalistic approach and its subscription to clear cultural hierarchies.

In the 1980s, this 'anti-commercial' argument developed into a broader critique of the forces of the international cultural industries, which not only took each individual citizen as its point of departure but expressed concern for the protection of Norwegian national culture and identity as such. However, by 2003 the 'anti-commerce' argument had mellowed down, and media-content was regarded as less negative in *Bildung* terms, and as with the narrative of the cultural democracy policies of the 1970s, people were to a higher extent trusted to determine their own cultural

consumption. Similarly, the 'national identity' argument, has been significantly rethought since 2003 when the idea of a uniform common culture and a national cultural project was abandoned in favour of a culture based on diversity and complexity. The words of the minister for Culture, Valgjerd Svarstad Haugland in parliament about cultural policy turning its back on the construction of a common culture thus mark a significant shift away from the strong 'anti-globalisation' argument of the 1980s. The discourse thereby underwent a radical transformation over the years analysed here, where the object oriented need to protect national culture gave way to a subject orientation, which, to a lesser extent, emphasised public intervention to protect a national culture.

Girard's case for cultural policy to have a clear social objective is also strongly present in the *Bildung* discourse. Particularly in the articulation that cultural policy was in fact social policy. This took its most explicit form in the Labour Party's suggestion that cultural policy was an integrated instrument in the efforts to create a socialist society. And although the non-socialist parties in parliament distanced themselves from the term 'socialist', there was broad consensus (again with the exception of the parliamentary predecessors to the Progress Party) about equality and freedom being clear cultural policy objectives. Just as with the wide definition of culture and the relative approach to quality-judgements, and again echoing the ideas of Girard, it was argued that the aesthetic and intellectual dimension to what was referred to as 'traditional' cultural policy was less suited to achieving social objectives. As pointed out by

Vestheim,⁵⁴⁷ this echoes clearly both the Populist Nationalist representation of the nineteenth century, which rejected the elitist culture from Denmark and Europe as well as the Labour project of the 1930s. Many of the ideas from that time are inherent in these initial policy discourses. There is a prevailing un-Arnoldian element of anti-elitism and scepticism of international, central and even national culture. In addition to being an 'anti-commercial' argument, it celebrates the local and peripheral at the expense of the central. A common Norwegian culture as it had developed in the local communities is presented as beleaguered by both commercial culture and the high arts. It implies a Herderian focus on people's own culture, which should be defined widely and encourage participation, and a distaste of experts or 'cultural prophets' and a definition of culture based on universal quality criteria (in accordance with Arnoldian principles). This echoed the Populist, Nationalist assessment of the nineteenth century, which, according to Neumann, rejected the role of the elite in society and their role vis-à-vis the people, because the latter could manage by themselves.⁵⁴⁸ The focus was on people's innate qualities rather than on how they could become enlightened by the knowledge passed 'down' from others.

Also the more object oriented policies from the 1980s rationalised on their social impact, such as their ability to contribute to the fight against unemployment or to have a positive impact on people's physical, social

⁵⁴⁷ Vestheim (1995), p. 174.

⁵⁴⁸ Neumann (2001a), p. 171.

and mental health. The rhetoric celebrates cultural policy as the policy, which should not be overshadowed by other sectors.

In Chapter One, I made reference to Chris Bilton and Oliver Bennett who both argue that it is a mistake to see the policy objectives ‘democratisation of culture’ versus ‘cultural democracy’ as completely separate and unrelated because they are both ‘culturalist’ due to relying on idealistic assumptions that culture can have transforming impacts.⁵⁴⁹ Their observation appears to be validated by this Norwegian *Bildung* discourse because both the subject focused cultural democracy policies, as well as the object focused aim to democratise the professional arts, sit tightly together, initially together with a rejection of commercial culture and with the wish to protect a common national culture. As demonstrated, these four arguments form policy-rationales, the focus of which changes somewhat over the years I have charted. However, from the first Green paper in 1973 to the last one in 2003, a subscription to *Bildung* according to Henrik Kaare Nielsen’s definition forms the lasting roots of this cultural policy discourse.

In addition to this I have also identified two alternative discourses.

6.4.2 Alternative discourses

The policy papers contain two alternative discourses, neither of which attempt to give rationales for governmental intervention in culture: one of

⁵⁴⁹ Bilton (1997); Bennett (1996).

them argues instead that government should take a much more laissez-faire approach. This latter discourse, which originated primarily from parliamentary members of the Progress Party, is truly a counter-discourse in that it rejects all the assumptions and ideas on which the *Bildung* discourse rests. The marketisation discourse is not concerned with policy rationales, but it is oft repeated and broadly receives support from most agents, and does therefore in my view merit a mention in the context of this research.

The Marketisation discourse

From the 1980s it was clear that the finance-bonanza, which the cultural sector had benefited from for many years, would not continue. KUV (1983), presented by a Conservative government, argued that the sector should explore alternative sources of funding, particularly from the private sector. From then on this alternative discourse evolved, and would later celebrate culture's potential contribution to business and the economy as an intrinsic good.

	The Marketisation Discourse
Policy implications:	<p><u>From 1980s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased funding for culture must be sourced from the private sector - Funding for culture should not be an exclusive public responsibility (met with resistance from the centre and the left) <p><u>From 1990s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Private business sponsorship should be encouraged - Increased efficiency in the cultural sector through the introduction of performance indicators <p><u>From 2000s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The cultural sector and the business sector should interact more - An active cultural sector is a competitive advantage for Norway - Tighter financial control and more cost-effective cultural organisations - Marketisation will also lead to artistically more innovative organisations

Table 6: The Marketisation Discourse

The suggestion that cultural institutions should increasingly look for funding from private sources was initially opposed by the opposition parties, particularly those from the left. However, by 1992 the Labour Party's attitude to such contributions, including business sponsorship, had become more positive and by 2003 a closer collaboration between the cultural and business sectors was said to have positive effects beyond the cultural sector itself and would also contribute to Norway's competitive advantage as a nation. This coincided with a closer embrace of the cultural industries, as mentioned above. The demand for more diverse revenue streams was joined by a demand for cultural institutions to become more efficient and to take a new approach to how they interacted with their external surroundings, including the use of freelance artists.

Finally, the counter-discourse originating within the Progress Party.

The Progress Party discourse

I am including this discourse because, from the 1980s, the Progress Party had grown in size and become an increasingly important force in Norwegian politics. The views of the Progress Party marked a radical departure from the hegemonic *Bildung* discourse.

The Progress Party Discourse	
Policy implications	<p><u>From 1980s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultural organisations to cut costs and produce more popular work - More funding to be covered by the audience and the consumer (also for museums and libraries) - Abolish support-schemes for artists <p><u>From 1990s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relativistic definition of culture - Cultural policy to be based on common European values - The cultural output to be guided by people's own choices - Governmental interference would lead to stagnation - Cultural organisations should either be transformed to commercial institutions, supported on a voluntary basis or shut down - Each cultural form to be treated equally <p><u>From 2000s</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More support for broad cultural movements - The mixture of immigrant culture and Norwegian culture would have detrimental impacts.

Table 7: The Progress Party Discourse

Initially, the Progress Party argued that the cultural sector should manage on its own and not receive subsidies from the public sector at all. This was particularly the case for individual artists. By 1993, the party was represented on the parliamentary committee, whose members chose to

formulate minority motions on most issues. For example, they defined culture as the values and qualities that each individual attached high value to, and thus moved in the direction of a subject oriented focus. This continued in the 2000s when the party lamented that so much money was allocated to high arts institutions in the capital at the expense of broad and locally anchored cultural movements. The party said little about culture's *Bildung* potential and was still reluctant to spend public money on the cultural sector. Instead the development of culture should be determined by the market where artists, businesses and audiences would meet. Finally, the party argued strongly against the mixture of traditional Norwegian and immigrant culture.

6.4.3 Conclusion

As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, DKS epitomises the *Bildung* discourse at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This chapter has attempted to contextualise the trajectory of ideas within which this conception took place, and concludes that the *Bildung* discourse has been the key cultural policy rationale during the period between 1973 and 2003. And although the subject representation, and its cultural democracy advocacy, had such a strong position in these policy texts in the 1970s and the 1980s, the already existing policies, which championed the 'professional arts', continued to be centrally positioned within the discourse. This object oriented 'professional arts' representation was not threatened in financial terms either. In fact, the budget allocation to, what Roshauw describes as, institutions primarily mediating the high arts, grew

steadily between and after the publication of KUD (1973) and KUD (1974).⁵⁵⁰ Thus, there seems to be a disparity between what is explicitly uttered in the rhetoric and the real priorities and allocations in the budgets, and the question is thus whether the object representation has perhaps been hegemonic all along.

There is a strong civilising aspect to the *Bildung* discourse's prescribed provision of alternatives to commercial culture. The subject representation's claim to define culture widely, for example, and to assess quality in relative terms does not extend to commercial culture. This culture is regarded to be of inferior value and does not harbour a *Bildung* rationale. In fact, commercial culture partly obstructs growth and contributes to the lack of values in society. The main rationale behind public cultural policy is to provide alternatives, and although we see a gradual change in the perceived damage to commercial culture in the 1990s and the 2000s, publicly supported culture, whether the professional arts or a wider more participatory and locally founded culture, is still being regarded as popular culture's 'other'. The return of the subject oriented *Bildung* representation in the 2000s, which was less condemning of commercial and global culture, did not have a significant impact on the rationales behind the initiation of DKS, which I shall demonstrate in the next chapter. This representation is again based on the juxtaposition of commercial culture and cultural content as certified by the government. The subject oriented representation - with its focus on

⁵⁵⁰ Between 1975 and 1980 the proportion of the cultural budget allocated to high arts such as established institutions like the National Gallery and the National Theatre, located in central areas increased from 41 per cent to 42 per cent.

cultural democracy - appears to have lost its discursive power in the 2000s, and DKS is thus introduced in a climate where the focus has shifted from participation to the celebration of the *Bildung* powers harboured by the 'professional arts', and is strongly reflected in the DKS-discourse. This is the focus of the next chapter.

7.0 Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS)

As demonstrated in Chapter Six, the understanding that *Bildung* can be facilitated through culture has been one of, if not the most, central rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy since the 1970s at least. I argue that this rationale is still very much alive, and in order to analyse how *Bildung* is understood to be happening as well as to interrogate what culture is valid in this context, this chapter will focus on a national scheme, which was formally launched in 2001 under the heading, *den kulturelle skolesekken*⁵⁵¹ (DKS). The rationale behind this specific scheme will be discussed as well as how it relates to the *Bildung* rationale as explored in Chapter Six. I will argue that the scheme rests on an understanding that what is needed for children to achieve *Bildung* and *dannelse* is an object oriented approach, based primarily on being exposed to what is being referred to as the ‘professional’ arts, where participation and what in some initial policy-papers was being described as children and young people’s ‘own culture’ are given less emphasis. Instead, it is understood that children need to gain ‘cultural competence’ within which rests a *Bildung* potential in itself, and that such competence is also necessary to reap the *Bildung* potential inherent in the ‘professional’ arts. This is pertinent given that school pupils today are by no means devoid of culture: quite the opposite, children and young people consume more culture than ever, albeit a commercial popular culture.

⁵⁵¹ ‘The Cultural Rucksack’.

The analysis in this chapter is based on a selection of documents dating back to 1996, all having in common a focus on the cultural provision in schools and includes two green papers published in 2003, and a follow up paper published in 2007, which set out the ideas behind, and objectives of, DKS. However, how DKS can facilitate *Bildung* is left rather vague in these papers, and my analysis of these papers is therefore, as outlined in Appendix One, complemented with interviews of a selection of elites (as opposed to 'ordinary people') drawn from the political, administrative and artistic sphere in Norway. The rationale for this is also based on my argument, as spelt out in Chapter Three, that an eventual hegemonic understanding of the *Bildung* potential in culture, and in this context a culture mediated by DKS, is held up by a wider discourse to which several constituencies contribute. I argue that DKS is a socio-cultural practice or a socio-cultural phenomenon which can be analysed discursively for two reasons. Firstly, because it appears that the understanding that DKS can contribute positively towards children and young people's *Bildung* is taken for granted without being questioned, and secondly, because it appears that the DKS discourse harbours ideologies and power relations which are not generally obvious and whose effectiveness might depend on the fact that these issues are being left vague.

I am referring to a DKS discourse, which harbours the two above-mentioned characteristics, and which situate it comfortably within the

wider *Bildung* discourse that I presented in Chapter Six.⁵⁵² Hence, through an analysis of policy papers combined with the mentioned interviews, where it was possible to engage with people whose opinions are influential and actually ask questions if things were left unclear, it is my objective to critically explore this discourse with the aim to uncover hidden distinctions and connections that are not necessarily expressed directly. Hence, I have identified several discursive practices, which represent how DKS can achieve *Bildung*. These will be clearly signposted throughout the chapter.

In line with my research design, which takes a discursive analysis of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy generally and DKS particularly as its starting point, I shall not evaluate the success of DKS either in terms of whether it is able to reach its objectives, or in terms of its efficiency. Nor shall I interrogate the arts programme offered by the scheme. It is the rationales on which it is based that I am interested in, and how these sit within a broader analysis of the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy more generally. Hence, I am only to a limited extent, making reference to the arts actually offered by the scheme, but instead analysing what is being said about what DKS should be.

I shall also refer to some of the ideas that I presented in Chapters One and Two in order to illuminate the different potential approaches to *Bildung*. Some of the terms that I launched in these chapters will also be

⁵⁵² In this chapter I will refer to a DKS discourse and a *Bildung* discourse interchangeably.

frequently referred to here. Firstly, the term *Bildung*, which I have adopted from the Weimar circle of German thinkers around the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century: secondly, the term *dannelse*, which I argued came close to being a Norwegian equivalent to *Bildung*. Hence, I am initially equating the two terms. However, *dannelse* is used frequently both in the policy texts that I have analysed and by my interviewees (initially without further explication). I therefore asked my interviewees explicitly how they interpret this term, in order to unpick this further. Otherwise the understanding of these two terms can be regarded as fairly similar.

I will conclude that DKS represents a certain 'official' culture, which is being understood to have a *Bildung* potential and that it is constructed as a departure from another culture, which represents anti-*Bildung*: that is, what is provided by the commercial cultural industries. This understanding sits within the wider *Bildung* discourse and has become institutionalised through a number of discursive practices, which in a DKS context has an implicit and explicit dimension: implicit in the sense that the 'professional' arts' unique *Bildung* potential is not questioned and taken for granted, and explicit in the practice of branding the culture that children and young people relate to on an everyday basis as one of anti-*Bildung*, meaning that it does not have the potential to enlighten as does the DKS certified culture.

The chapter will start with a brief introduction to DKS, followed by an introduction to some of the documents that the scheme is informed by. I move on to articulate how the *Bildung* rationale is manifest in DKS, through a set of discursive practices, which indicates a return to an object oriented approach to *Bildung*. Thus, exposure to the ‘professional arts’ is superior to participation in its *Bildung* potential, commercial culture is a force of anti-*Bildung* and children and young people need to gain ‘cultural competence’ both to gain access to the ‘professional arts’ but also as an inherent path to *Bildung*. These discursive practices are internalised to such an extent that there is no need to interrogate any further how exposure to the arts actually facilitate *Bildung*. I then move on to discuss whether DKS acts as a civilising project.

7.1 Introduction to DKS

As mentioned in Chapter One, DKS is a permanent national scheme set up to enable all pupils in primary school to be exposed to a wide variety of ‘professional’ arts and culture. The scheme has three overarching objectives:

- to contribute to pupils in primary school getting a supply of professional culture,
- to facilitate the access to and familiarisation with a wide range of artistic and cultural expressions for pupils in primary school in order for them to be favourably inclined towards these [the artistic and cultural expressions],

- to contribute to the development of a holistic incorporation of artistic and cultural expressions in the realisation of the school's learning objectives.⁵⁵³

In practice the scheme is a collaborative project involving a range of organisations nationally, regionally and locally, such as local authorities, the cultural office in the county councils, national organisations for the mediation of different art-forms, as well as the actual artists and arts-organisations who visit schools.

As pointed out in Chapter Six, Norwegian cultural policy has, since the 1970s at least, given due attention to children and young people. Norway has, for example, had a strong tradition of municipal music schools and later cultural schools for children and young people. Norway was in fact the first country in the world to legislate the provision of cultural schools for children and young people.⁵⁵⁴ Apart from the funding of music and cultural schools, many cultural activities for children and young people have over the years been financed through lottery money. In 1987, a new game called *Lotto* was introduced, which gave a significant funding-boost for cultural activities. It was a decision initiated by the Progress Party in 2002 to change the lottery-distribution in favour of cultural causes for

⁵⁵³ Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. St.meld. nr. 38 (2002-2003): Den kulturelle skulesekken, Oslo, pp. 9 - 10. (KUL (2003b)). The underlined section of the second bullet point in this quote about “being favourably inclined towards” was in Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2007. *St.meld. nr. 8 (2007-2008): Kulturell skulesekk for framtida*, Oslo, p. 22 (KUL (2007a)) replaced with ‘develop understanding of arts and cultural expressions of all kinds’ because it was acknowledged that not all encounters with the arts and culture might leave a positive attitude, due to their ability to also annoy and provoke.

⁵⁵⁴ Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 256.

children and young people that enabled the decision to roll out DKS nationally.⁵⁵⁵

During the 1990s several municipalities and county councils had created more comprehensive models for the mediation of the arts and culture to primary schools. These models came to act as trial schemes and were adopted by the Ministry of Culture and launched under the DKS-label with a small budget post on the national budget, primarily with the aim of piloting a handful of collaborative projects, of NOK 23.6 million.⁵⁵⁶ When DKS was introduced nationally it was in a way capitalising on experiments that were rooted regionally and locally. With the added proceedings from the National Lottery the DKS's budget received a tremendous boost in 2002 and for the academic year 2008/2009 the budget had increased to NOK 167 million.⁵⁵⁷ This is a major allocation, which makes DKS financially potent and one of the most significant

⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 247. It was increasingly understood that activities for children and young people should be a prioritised area for lottery-money allocated to culture, and by 2000, it was decided that at least 10 per cent of the proceeds channelled to sports and other cultural causes should be allocated to voluntary organisations working with these groups (Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 259. Parallel to this, another significant development occurred in 2002, when the Progress Party proposed a parliamentary bill which suggested that the proceeds from the lottery should only go to sports and other cultural causes (with the funding for research to be allocated from elsewhere), under the condition that these funds should primarily be allocated to local activities for children and young people, particularly through the work carried out by voluntary organisations. The bill was approved, and from 2003 this meant a significant boost for sports and other cultural causes, and it was decided that 40 per cent of the lottery-proceeds that were not allocated to sports should be used to finance the new scheme that was called DKS. Ibid., pp. 258 - 260; KUL (2003b), p. 7; Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2002. *Innst. O. nr. 44 (2001-2002); Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Per Sandberg og Ulf Erik Knudsen om lov om endring i lov 28. august 1992 nr. 103 om pengespill mv. (Etter at det er foretatt fondsavsettelser skal selskapets overskudd fordeles med en halvdel til idrettsformål og en halvdel til kulturformål)*, Oslo, (FKD (2002)); KUL (2007a), p. 10). The parliamentary response to the Progress Party's bill proposal (by a majority made up of all members except from the Christian Democratic and the Conservative party) emphasised that DKS should both make sure that children and young people get access to cultural experiences and the ability to participate themselves; in other words, to combine a subject- and object-approach.

⁵⁵⁶ KUL (2003b), p. 53.

⁵⁵⁷ <http://www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no/index.php?id=om&sub=oko>

Norwegian cultural policy moves of recent years. It should also be stressed that this is all new money for cultural production and mediation, which has not been re-allocated from elsewhere.⁵⁵⁸

DKS is overseen by a steering committee made up of one politically appointed *Statssekretær*⁵⁵⁹ from the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs and one *Statssekretær* from the Ministry of Education and Research (*Kunnskapsdepartementet*). The scheme is coordinated on a day to day basis by a secretariat. The operation is supported by, and receives advice from, an advisory group made up of representatives from the education sector, the bureaucracy, the arts sector and arts education professionals, whose remit is to give advice to the steering committee and the secretariat.

KUL (2007a) positioned DKS in the context of two other schemes for children and young people: cultural schools and *Ungdommens Kulturmønstring* (a national performance and arts contest for people below the age of nineteen). The objectives of these three schemes were juxtaposed in the following way: in the cultural schools training was most important, in *Ungdommens Kulturmønstring* the activity itself was most

⁵⁵⁸ KUL 2003b. Most of the money (NOK 123 million) is allocated directly to nineteen county councils (including Oslo city council), whereas the rest (NOK 44 million or 26 per cent) is allocated to a few national museums, galleries and science centres as well as to *Rikskonsertene*, Arts Council Norway and the National Touring Network for the Performing Arts (*Scenekunstbruket*) (KUL (2007a)). The majority of the proportion allocated to the county councils is subsequently allocated to municipalities. It is an explicit principle that the scheme shall be organised with a minimum of interference from central government, and the county councils are given significant freedom (KUL (2003b), p. 11). There are thus significant regional variations in how the scheme is implemented, for example, in terms of content (www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no).

⁵⁵⁹ A *statssekretær* is a politically appointed senior executive officer in a Ministry. They are appointed by the cabinet and work closely with each minister.

important whereas for DKS, the experience was of most importance. DKS was, according to KUL (2007a) 'the core in the government's policy for the mediation of culture to children and young people.'⁵⁶⁰

This, as I shall demonstrate, indicates that DKS takes an object approach to its *Bildung* efforts.

7.2 Policy background

The policies and rationales for DKS are laid out in three green papers, two published by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs (KUL (2003b); KUL, (2007)) and one by the Ministry of Education and Research (UDF, 2003). KUL (2003b) and UDF (2003) was published by a centre government made up of the Christian Democrats, the Centre Party and *Venstre* (the same government, that published KUL (2003a)). A subsequent centre-left government made up of Arbeiderpartiet (DNA), Senterpartiet (Sp) and Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) published KUL (2007a), which took stock of the development of DKS thus far, and outlined its development for the future. All three papers emphasise the *Bildung* rationale behind DKS, and I will refer extensively to these below. However, the understood *Bildung* potential in the mediation of the 'professional' arts in a DKS context goes back as far as 1996 and is reiterated in several documents in between. Before I focus on KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL (2007a), as well as some of the statements made by my interviewees, I shall briefly explore how the

⁵⁶⁰ KUL (2007a), p. 8.

rationale behind the DKS policy is contained in these earlier policy documents.

In 1996 the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Church, Education and Research (*Kirke- Utdannings og Forskningsdepartementet*)⁵⁶¹ published a joint plan.⁵⁶² In what appears as a combined subject and object based approach to *Bildung*, the plan emphasised that pupils in primary school should both be offered meetings with the ‘professional’ arts of high quality, as well as be able to develop through their own participation in cultural activities, based on what was described as ‘their own’ culture. However, the plan seems to conclude that the time is ripe for a change in the schools’ relation with the cultural sector and how children and young people engage with the arts. Consequently, the joint plan suggests a range of actions and objectives. The most important of these in a DKS context is that there must be a much closer and obliging collaboration between schools and the cultural sector regarding the mediation of the arts, where pupils in primary school get to meet and work collaboratively with artists and experience a diverse range of artistic expressions.⁵⁶³

Furthermore, in 2002 the Ministry of Children and Equality (*Barne- og Likestillingsdepartementet*), published a green paper on a common youth policy (BLD, 2002), which also emphasised the importance of the arts

⁵⁶¹ The predecessor of the Ministry of Education and Research, before church affairs was moved to the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs in 2002.

⁵⁶² Kulturdepartementet og Kirke-, Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet (KKU), 1996: *Handlingsplanen Broen og den blå hesten*. (KKU (1996)), available online at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Brundtland-III/Kulturdepartementet/231603/231642/broen_og_den_bla_hesten.html?id=231646

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

and culture in the context of children and young people's personal development and identity.⁵⁶⁴ Allowing children and young people to get in touch with professional artists and mediators as well as to participate themselves, were amongst the 'best investments' a society could make.⁵⁶⁵ It was argued that children and young people were under intense pressure from different kinds of media, that advocate 'different' sets of values, and it was therefore important to help young people to sort out what was regarded as positive and valuable from the negative, and to be conscious of non-material values. However, traces of the cultural democracy mind-set of the 1970s and 1980s could be traced when it was emphasised that young people themselves get the opportunity to influence which activities should be prioritised through their own ideas and involvement, and that this could counter some of the 'homogeneity, intolerance and lack of knowledge', harboured within what was referred to as the commercial entertainment industry.⁵⁶⁶ Again, it appears that a combination of subject and object focused *Bildung* methods is being encouraged.

The alleged benefits of children and young people being more closely involved with culture and the arts, particularly in a school-context, had thus been emphasised in several governmental publications before the Ministry of Cultural and Church Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Research published their two respective papers, which both clarified the

⁵⁶⁴ Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2002. St.meld. nr. 39 (2001-2002): Oppvekst og levekår for barn og unge i Norge. (BLD, 2002).

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 148.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 138.

rationales behind, and the implementation, of DKS.⁵⁶⁷ However, the subject oriented approach to *Bildung* that co-existed with the more object oriented focus on the ‘professional’ arts in the earlier papers, was to almost disappear in these two DKS green papers.

7.3 DKS and the *Bildung* rationale

The importance of *Bildung* is more or less explicitly articulated in all the material I have analysed, but how is this contextualised? How can *Bildung* be achieved and what type of culture is valid in this context? I will attempt to illuminate these questions by mapping out how *Bildung* is understood in the DKS discourse, by scrutinising both the three mentioned green papers and transcripts from my interview subjects. Most of the respondents that I interviewed also perceived DKS as a continuation of a cultural policy project, whose rationale has been to improve people’s quality of life through the democratisation of culture. In fact, when asked how they understood ‘values’ in the way they are being presented in various public cultural policy papers, this term was linked to growth or *Bildung*, implying that the ‘professional’ arts could help people not only improve their quality of life but also become better people. Pluralism was also mentioned in this context, where people’s opportunities could be improved in accordance with the level of choices they have. As opposed to the discourse identified in some of the initial policy papers presented above, KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL

⁵⁶⁷ KUL (2003b); Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementetn (UDF), 2003. *St.meld. nr. 39 (2002-2003): "Ei blot til Lyst": Om kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til grunnskolen*, Oslo. (UDF (2003)).

(2007a), as well as my interviewees, all appear to exclusively advocate a return to an object oriented approach to *Bildung*.

7.3.1 Return to an object oriented approach

An important principle behind Thomas Carlyle's and Matthew Arnold's ideas of culture's transforming potential was that a minority of enlightened people informed by their 'best selves' and 'guided by a general humane spirit' should mediate culture because of their understanding of the type of culture that could have the power to transform: a culture which, according to Arnold, should pursue total perfection, meaning the best that has been thought and said in the world.⁵⁶⁸ The culture mediated by DKS is understood to be a culture of quality and professionalism. This is repeatedly underlined both in the policy papers that spell out the ideas behind DKS, and by my interviewees. Consequentially, the culture offered to children should be 'as good as possible'. This of course does not imply that it necessarily has to be the best the world has ever seen, but what is clear is what it is not: culture which is not created in a professional context or by professionals, amateur culture, and, as we shall see, culture that is produced primarily to generate a profit in a market.

As pointed out in Chapter Six, the *Bildung* discourse does only to a limited extent explicitly specify what is meant by the 'professional' arts. Similarly the DKS discourse does not specify what kind of 'professional' art is suitable for children and young people: instead it rests on an implicit

⁵⁶⁸ Arnold (1935).

understanding of the type of culture that is not suitable: the culture that children and young people mostly consume outside of a DKS-context that is provided by the commercial cultural industries. KUL (2007a) acknowledged that the distinction between what should be regarded as professional or not is blurred. Still, in this paper, a professional in a DKS context was defined as somebody who had 'artistic or cultural work as their profession'.⁵⁶⁹ This can in principle of course include artists and others employed in the profit-making cultural industries but it does not appear as if these are covered by this definition.⁵⁷⁰

The *Bildung* potential in DKS refers mostly to the inherent potential in children's exposure to the 'professional' arts and, to a much lesser degree, to what both KKU (1996) and BLD (2002) referred to as children's 'own culture'. Furthermore, in the cases where the pupils were to be given influence over which activities should be prioritised, through their own ideas and involvement, this should be restricted to, and conditioned by, a framework, which emphasised the 'professional' arts. KUL (2003b) mentions only once that the pupil's own participation should be regarded on the same terms as the meeting with the 'professional' arts and culture, but without elaborating further. Hence, the DKS discourse does not appear to subscribe to Humboldt's argument that self-cultivation could be achieved literally through any activity or means, where *Bildung*

⁵⁶⁹ KUL (2007a), p. 38. It was also acknowledged that some sectors (for example within cultural heritage) relied on volunteers or other individuals, who did not have the mediation of culture as their main *preoccupation*. However, it was important that any project was quality assured within a professional framework.

⁵⁷⁰ Although it should of course be acknowledged that film has a central position in DKS, it is important to emphasise that this covers film-project specifically designed for this scheme.

would be determined by the matter of approach and attitude, rather than on the content of the culture one was exposed to.⁵⁷¹

What was described as 'creative competence' was deemed important in order to prepare the pupils for their future working life, where things like the ability to communicate, to deal with symbols and to develop a sense of graphic modelling were mentioned. However, a more prominent principle in both KUL (2003b) and KUL (2007a) was that the arts and culture should be celebrated for their less tangible *Bildung* potentials, and that they:

can have a major impact for each individual and society as a whole.[...] The arts and culture can give experiences, which can have decisive influence on each individual's personality and quality of life.⁵⁷²

More concrete utilitarian rationales like facilitating more innovation or the creation of jobs in the creative sector were only given secondary importance and only mentioned by a minority of the interviewees. An example of how little emphasis was put on the more crude instrumental potentials of a scheme like DKS is the response given by one previous minister for culture who, when asked whether an increased cultural competence amongst young people would also be beneficial for the economy, answered in the affirmative that yes it probably would, but 'I am

⁵⁷¹ Humboldt (1993), p. 23.

⁵⁷² KUL (2003b), p. 15; KUL (2007a), p. 8.

not first and foremost preoccupied with that part of it [the economical impact],⁵⁷³

Another example of how the arts were regarded to have a solid *Bildung* potential can be found in a quotation in KUL (2007a) from one of the institutions supplying content for DKS: Nordnorsk kunstnersenter (Northern Norway Artists' Centre), which reads: 'The objective [of DKS] is not first and foremost to become clever, but to grow as a person and fellow human being'.⁵⁷⁴

However, KUL (2007a) also argued that the business sector increasingly demanded values that exist in the cultural sector, such as 'creativity, wealth of ideas, the ability to be curious and the ability to readjust'.⁵⁷⁵

In a similar vein to the marketisation discourse that I presented in Chapter Six, KUL (2007a) also argued that 'the arts and culture, design, entertainment and experiences [as in the experience economy]' would contribute to 'economical growth, innovation and the creation of wealth'.⁵⁷⁶ It is interesting to note though that in this more instrumental valuation, 'design, entertainment and experiences' have been added to the usual reference to the arts and culture, which again appear to imply that the latter are celebrated to a lesser extent for their ability to contribute to the above-mentioned instrumental objectives.

⁵⁷³ Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁵⁷⁴ KUL (2007a), p. 17.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁷⁶ Ibid.

It is my strong impression that more instrumental rationales, such as DKS's contribution to the creative economy, were given less emphasis. Instead, the green paper echoes the ideas of Matthew Arnold, and his emphasis on how culture could both lead to human perfection by developing all sides of humanity and consequently to a general perfection that could develop all parts of society.⁵⁷⁷

Echoing the emphasis on 'values' as it was articulated in the green papers presented in Chapter Six, KUL (2003b) continues by arguing that taking part in cultural activities and experiencing culture would make the pupils participate in 'the great story, the deep community of values, which make us civilised people'.⁵⁷⁸ The importance of identity was echoed in KUL (2007a), where it was argued that: 'The arts, culture and cultural heritage create identity, and contribute to and make us privy to who we are and where we come from'.⁵⁷⁹

There is hence, such a thing as *the* great story, which again alludes, on the one hand, to an Arnoldian view of culture, and his emphasis on perfection.⁵⁸⁰ Herder, on the other hand, rejected this and argued for a pluralistic or multiple approach to culture,⁵⁸¹ later echoed by Stuart Hall who advocated for a rhetorical shift away from the talk about culture and instead to replace it by the term *cultures*.⁵⁸² In fact, it is in Herder's

⁵⁷⁷ Arnold (1935), p. 11.

⁵⁷⁸ KUL (2003b), p. 15. My own emphasis.

⁵⁷⁹ KUL (2007a), p.7.

⁵⁸⁰ Arnold (1935), p. 6.

⁵⁸¹ Barnard (1969), p. 24.

⁵⁸² Hewison (1995), p. 17.

opinion preposterous to argue that some cultures are superior to others.⁵⁸³ However, the green papers concerning DKS argue that it is the 'professional' arts that harbour a potential *Bildung* effect. This is echoed amongst my interviewees, most of whom argued that by being exposed to the arts, pupils would become more enlightened and better people. It would make them gain increased comprehension both of themselves and their surroundings, which would make their lives richer and enable them to utilise their own potential better, as well as to release their curiosity in the arts and stimulate their fantasy and creative zest. This again would have a positive impact on society at large. Herder also argued that the chief aim of everybody should be to develop their own potential and hence contribute to the wider society.⁵⁸⁴ However, he maintained that there was no single standard of culture in terms of which human phenomena could be judged. Instead, he applied a definition of culture, that was not limited to works of intellectual and artistic sophistication, and it is in this context that the DKS discourse is more Arnoldian than Herderian. Consequently, the main focus is on an object oriented approach to *Bildung*, which does not take the pupils' own ideas, identity and culture as its point of departure, but rather a pre-established canonised range of art-forms.

This understanding of the 'professional' arts' unique *Bildung* power is the first stable condition inherent in this DKS discourse. This can perhaps best be demonstrated by referring to a speech given at a national

⁵⁸³ Barnard (1969).

⁵⁸⁴ Bruford (1962).

conference about DKS by the then *statssekretær* in the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, Yngve Slettholm. After having referred to research which concluded that the arts, as presented by DKS, can help pupils with their learning in other subjects as well as contribute to the creative economy, (which he, in accordance with the discursive practices that I present in this chapter, gives less importance to), he proclaims: ‘For us who know the value of the arts and culture, it is of course unnecessary to refer to research’.⁵⁸⁵

He takes it for granted that everybody present (people who, in some way or another, are involved with DKS) share the understanding that the arts have this strong transformative power, on which the rationale of DKS is based; this forms an unquestioned and stable discursive practice.

With this strong emphasis on the exposure to the ‘professional’ arts as a path to *Bildung*, what about participation?

7.3.2 What about participation?

As argued in Chapter Six, Norwegian cultural policy has, at least since the 1970s, put much emphasis on participation in cultural activities, which has been perceived as an integrated part of the objective to facilitate a cultural democracy. However, I have suggested that this has been given

⁵⁸⁵ Yngve Slettholm, ‘Kunst og kultur – mer enn pynten på kransekaka’, Speech at the opening of a national conference about DKS, Sandefjord, 7 June 2004. Available online at http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Bondevik-II/Kultur--og-kirkedepartementet/265337/267816/kunst_og_kultur_mer_enn_pynten.html?id=268450, not paginated. When referring to the arts and culture in this quote he means primarily the arts; this is revealed further on in his speech. As mentioned in Chapter Five this imprecise reference to “the arts and culture” is quite common in Norway.

less prominence in the cultural policy rhetoric since the 1990s. BLD (2002) and KKU (1996) stressed that cultural democracy and what was referred to as children and young people's own culture was not forgotten in a school-context. BLD (2002), for example, emphasised that children and young people should be able to contribute to how the cultural activities provided for them were shaped:

We must look after children and young people's own ideas and commitments. Children and young people must be allowed to try out a broad field of activities and experiences.⁵⁸⁶

KKU (1996) also stressed the need for a combination of an object approach, which would foster 'the artistic, aesthetical and creative dimension in children and young people's everyday life', with a subject approach, which would facilitate 'children and young people's own culture'.⁵⁸⁷

This action plan continued by emphasising that the role played by the media industries was not necessarily vulgar, but that it could instead help build cross-cultural bridges and mediate youth culture. Just as it was important that children and young people got to experience the arts in order to gain knowledge, it was equally important to stimulate creativity in the children and young people themselves.⁵⁸⁸

⁵⁸⁶ BLD (2002), p. 138.

⁵⁸⁷ KKU (1996), not paginated.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

However, this rhetoric was toned down a great deal in KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL (2007a). The parliamentary response to KUL (2003b) emphasised that the exposure to the arts should in itself be regarded as an active process, albeit complemented by measures, which enabled the pupils to express themselves and 'to give good arenas to cultural productions developed by young people themselves.'⁵⁸⁹ The participating pupils should not be reduced to passive spectators. There is thus a certain emphasis on participation here.

However, most of my interviewees placed little emphasis on participation by pupils beyond mere exposure to art-works. It was argued that so many other governmental schemes had participation as their main objective, and that DKS should instead be about a different kind of activity: that of experiencing the arts. Echoing FKD (2003) this was supported by the understanding that attending arts events was an active process and several interviewees argued that sitting on a chair and watching a theatre performance or listening to a piece of music performed live was not at all passive because it triggered responses beyond merely being entertained. The pupils might be passive during the actual performance, but it was assumed that they would reflect over what they had seen or heard afterwards. This was echoed by KUL (2007a), which stipulated that:

Even in an event where those who are on stage, apparently are the most active, there will be a large element of dialogue with the audience. Even

⁵⁸⁹ Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2003. *Innst. S. nr. 50 (2003-2004); Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om Den Kulturelle skulesekken St.meld. Nr.38 (2002-2003)*, Oslo, p. 5. (FKD (2003)).

a spectator or listener is active, and an audience member who sits quietly, can both experience and learn.⁵⁹⁰

Similarly, the participatory element was pretty much neglected by most of my interviewees. It was instead argued that the emphasis should be on enabling children to be directly exposed to art works created by others. If children were to participate then this should at least be mediated by professional artists, who could initiate and inspire children's creativity. This would stimulate children's growth through their interaction with the art-works and be guided through experiences of works that were more demanding, and through which they would actively get in touch with a universe 'greater than their own'.

Jorunn Spord Borgen and Synnøve S. Brandt, who in 2006 published an evaluation of DKS, refer to two approaches to the mediation of the arts and culture for young people: a 'monological' versus a 'dialogical' approach, where the former does not call for much dialogue between artist and audience and where the pupils are typically receivers and the artists senders. The 'dialogical' approach emphasises instead that both pupils and teachers participate actively.⁵⁹¹ It seems clear from both the green papers and the parliamentary response that DKS is meant to mediate the arts and culture in both a 'monological' and 'dialogical' way. KUL (2003b) mentions that there is an untapped potential in terms of dialogue-based methods of mediation, and Spord Borgen and Brandt,

⁵⁹⁰ KUL (2007a), p. 40.

⁵⁹¹ Jorunn Spord Borgen and Synnøve S. Brandt, *Ekstraordinært eller selvfølgelig: Evaluering av Den Kulturelle skolesekken i grunnskolen*, rapport 5 (2006). Oslo: NIFU STEP.

based on interviews with both teachers and pupils, conclude, in their evaluation, that many artists and schools have found 'dialogical' ways of mediating content, despite this needing more effort and being more expensive. They also conclude that pupils seem to 'get more out of' 'dialogical' events than 'monological' ones.⁵⁹²

Humboldt argued that it was the things that spring from people's own free choice that would receive their full attention, as opposed to anything being imposed from outside through instructions and guidance, which he argued would not receive the same attention and merely be performed with 'mechanistic exactness' without true human energies.⁵⁹³ Both a 'monological' and a 'dialogical' approach to arts mediation rely on a certain level of instruction and guidance. A scheme such as DKS requires indeed a minimum of structure and programming: it could probably not be run by the pupils themselves without any involvement of facilitators. It could still be argued, though, that a dialogical approach would be more open to involve the pupils on their own terms, and hopefully avoid them following whatever is being presented to them with 'mechanical exactness'. However, despite the emphasis on participation as well as on children and young people's 'own' culture in the initial papers (KKU (1996) and BLD (2002)), Spord Borgen and Brandt's informants seem to indicate that the structure of DKS does not appear to invite a 'dialogical'

⁵⁹² Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006), p. 19. It should be emphasised here that the report is less clear about what getting 'more or less out of' DKS events actually means, in other words; what the criteria are.

⁵⁹³ Humboldt (1993), p. 23.

model,⁵⁹⁴ and consequently, in the context of Humboldt's view at least, being less suitable in helping the pupils achieve *Bildung*. In fact, with reference to the above-mentioned idea that being exposed to an arts event is in itself an active process, KUL (2007a) rejected Spord Borgen and Brandt's juxtaposing of monological versus dialogical modes of mediation. This implies the view that all mediation of the arts is by definition dialogical.

It is as if what was emphasised in the initial papers like KKU (1996) regarding the importance of participating in what was described as children and young people's 'own culture', had been submerged by the object oriented representation. To create arenas for the pupils' own cultural productions is mentioned briefly in the parliamentary response FKD (2003), but this does not act as a discursive condition in the way the importance of the 'professional' arts is, and the policy rationale to facilitate a cultural democracy, is, as far as I can see, not a rationale behind DKS at all. And although DKS is a decentralised scheme with a significant amount of decision-making power being devolved to regional and local councils, this does not appear to extend to the children themselves and their parents.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹⁴ Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006), p. 112.

⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, the term 'young people's own culture' is of course not unproblematic. Most children and young people in Norway, as in the rest of the developed world, are exposed to an array of aesthetic culture on a daily basis, most of which is consumed at home (or on portable technological devices). Statistics Norway's own survey for 2006 *Norwegian Media Barometer* shows that in the 9 to 12 year old age bracket 51 per cent play TV or computer games daily; that 56 per cent of all 9 to 15 year olds use the internet daily; that 52 per cent listen to records, cassettes, CDs or MP3 daily on average for 38 minutes; and that 90 per cent watch television daily on average for 123 minutes. Odd Frank Vaage, *Norsk mediebarometer 2006* (Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2007), available online at <http://www.ssb.no/emner/07/02/30/medie/>. To refer to this as children's own culture is questionable given that much of this is arguably provided

KUL (2007a), was published four years after DKS had been given its significant funding-boost due to the decision to change the lottery-distribution in 2002, and attempted to take stock and reflect over the level of success thus far and the road ahead. In the response by the parliamentary committee to this green paper, the members from the Progress Party argued that DKS had not developed according to the intentions laid out in FKD (2002)⁵⁹⁶ because it focused to such a low extent on children and young people's participation as opposed to how they should relate to artistic expressions as audience members. These committee members noted that KUL (2007a), hardly made any references to activities in the voluntary organisations, which according to these members were supposed to benefit from the scheme.⁵⁹⁷ These members therefore felt somewhat cheated, given that it was their suggestion to change the lottery-funding in the first place in such a way that it would benefit culture, and their suggestion had hence come to act as a midwife for DKS. The fact that the Progress Party was in a minority position in this context, appears again to imply that the object oriented approach to *Bildung* permeates the discourse, where DKS's participatory

by large media conglomerates, and although it could be argued that these cultural artefacts are responding to demand, many might claim that they in fact create demand. The formation of the type of culture that children and young people engage with on an everyday basis lies outside of the remit of this project, and I shall not make this subject to an in-depth analysis here. However, several agencies, including the mentioned media conglomerates, parents, friends (again perhaps indirectly conveying products from the media industries), as well as other cultural activities offered through governmental supported schemes outside of DKS, such as the already mentioned music and cultural schools, youth clubs and other participatory activities like performing in a brass band or singing in a choir, all contribute perhaps to the children and young people's 'own' culture.

⁵⁹⁶ The parliamentary response to the bill to change the allocation of lottery-money proposed by the Progress Party.

⁵⁹⁷ Familie- og kulturkomiteen (FKD), 2008. *Innst. S. nr. 200 (2007-2008)*; *Innstilling fra familie og kulturkomiteen om kulturell skulesekk for framtida, St.meld. nr.8 (2007-2008)*, Oslo, p. 8 (FKD (2008)).

dimension, which was mentioned in BLD (2002) and KKU (1996) somehow got lost along the way.

The lack of emphasis on cultural democracy in a DKS-context, makes way for an explicit expression of the lack of *Bildung* potential in the culture provided by the commercial cultural industries, which is regarded to represent a force of anti-*Bildung*.

7.3.3 The commercial cultural industries: a force of anti-*Bildung*

One of Arnold's principal concerns was what people would do with the increased freedom they had acquired in nineteenth-century Britain. In this new age characterised by liberties and democratic reform, Arnold saw a need for people to be 'steered' towards perfection in order to prevent the newly acquired liberties leading to anarchy. Arnold's perception of anarchy is, according to Bennett, not limited to a potential social anarchy manifest by chaos in the streets where people worshipped 'freedom in and for itself', but also to an intellectual anarchy where all opinions were given equal value and where any hierarchies were abandoned.⁵⁹⁸ The fear of social anarchy is naturally long gone, or at least no longer explicitly articulated. However, the fear of an intellectual anarchy as it might be manifest in a relativistic valuation of culture can be traced in the DKS discourse, and it is partly to counter this that the understanding of the arts' ability to contribute to a better life, and, as mentioned above,

⁵⁹⁸ Bennett (2005), p. 467; Arnold, (1935) p. 76. Arnold also referred to a spiritual anarchy within religion warning against the fragmentation of the Anglican Church.

also having an accumulated positive effect on society as a whole, endures.

The fear of social anarchy seems to have been replaced by an anxiety about the power of the high arts' 'other': commercial culture, which is what DKS is coined in opposition to. The DKS discourse does not reject commercial culture and has acknowledged that this is a phenomenon that has come to stay. However, this is not a culture which harbours the ability to enlighten. As mentioned earlier, BLD (2002) referred to the homogeneity, intolerance and lack of knowledge harboured by the commercial entertainment industry. In fact hardly any positive references to commercial culture (and marginally few to the children's 'own' culture) can be traced in KUL (2003b), UDF (2003) and KUL (2007a), and it is clear that it is the 'professional' arts that have the ability to enable the:

human '*dannings*'-process to become as complete as possible, so that we also develop people's '*åndsliv*',⁵⁹⁹ and not only the distant intellect and the purely instrumental abilities.⁶⁰⁰

As mentioned in Chapter Six, the nature of the term the 'professional' arts was hardly made explicit in the *Bildung* discourse, the way it was

⁵⁹⁹ The word '*åndsliv*' is difficult to translate to English, particularly when it appears in the same sentence as, and is juxtaposed with, the term 'intellect'. The linguistic challenge to translate this term might relate to a central difference between Norwegian cultural policy discourse and the one found in English-speaking countries. '*Åndelig*' can be translated as intellectual; the English term intellectual property for example is translated to Norwegian as '*åndsverk*' ('intellectual work'). However, '*åndelig*' relates to a deeper meaning and can also be translated as spiritual, sometimes, but not necessarily, in a religious sense. By using the term '*åndelig*'/spiritual in connection to art, the Norwegian language signals that for instance a poet through her poetry or a sculptor through his sculpture is aiming to convey a non-material intention, a reflection on human experiences and achievements. I am indebted to Kjell Magne Mælen for his assistance on this clarification.

⁶⁰⁰ KUL (2003b), p. 16.

manifest in the green papers between 1973 and 2003. However, as already mentioned, KUL (2007a) defined 'professionals' as anybody who had artistic and cultural work as their profession, and subsequently gave a breakdown of the art-forms that were included in DKS over the 2006-2007 school year. These were (listed in the order of the number of pupils experiencing events within each art form): music, the performing arts, literature, cultural heritage, visual art, film, and the multidisciplinary arts.⁶⁰¹ Although there is of course scope for cultural artefacts produced within the context of the profit-making cultural industries to be included within such a list of art-forms (for example within music, film and literature), and notwithstanding the fact that culture produced by the profit-making commercial cultural industries is inevitably also professional, the paper does not give the impression that this is prioritised, if considered at all.

A range of cultural manifestations that are often classified as high arts is provided by the commercial cultural industries: seminal literary works, avant-garde contemporary music and non-commercial films all rely invariably on the profit-making companies to be produced and distributed. It is therefore too simplistic to juxtapose what in the DKS discourse is being referred to as the 'professional' arts on the one hand, and 'commercial' culture on the other. No definition of these terms has been attempted in the data material that I have analysed (neither in policy papers nor amongst my interviewees). Instead, reference is made (in the

⁶⁰¹ KUL (2007a), p. 27.

interview context partly prompted by me as the interviewer) to all the culture that children and young people consume outside of a DKS-context as commercial.

In fact, the green papers make little reference to cultural artefacts originating within the cultural industries at all. This is further demonstrated by Yngve Slettholm, who in the above-mentioned speech, emphasised that schools should work closely with 'local museums, libraries, music and cultural schools, cultural monuments, the church, local professional artists or others in the local community'.⁶⁰²

There might be room for children and young people's 'own culture' here but this is certainly not emphasised. Instead, as I shall make clear later on in this chapter, despite a lack of definition, the DKS discourse makes it clear that the 'commercial' culture consumed by children outside a DKS-context, and the forces of what in the initial policy papers were referred to as children and young people's own culture were regarded to be of anti-*Bildung*.

However, the earlier policy-papers took a different stance. KKU (1996), for example, argued that youth culture was:

often expressed through life-style, language and cultural activities like for example music and sports. Young people are drawn to international genres and fashion. Although many will claim that media can contribute

⁶⁰² Slettholm (2004), not paginated.

to cultural vulgarisation, it is pertinent to emphasise the role media plays as a cross-cultural bridge-builder and mediator of youth culture.⁶⁰³

What is here referred to as the media, presumably implying the cultural industries, is deemed as an agency that can contribute positively to the development of young people's own culture. However, the gravity of DKS lies elsewhere. This is, for example, typified in Slettholm's emphasis on the quality dimension of the DKS content:

It is however important to emphasise the importance of quality assurance, both in terms of the arts and culture and educationally. The rucksack shall not be characterised by amateurish activities or dilettantism, but be filled with good professional activities from A to Z.⁶⁰⁴

As already mentioned, children do not need a scheme like DKS to be exposed to culture, particularly if we refer to culture as a signifying practice in accordance with Raymond Williams' interpretation. The objective of DKS is thus not to give access to aesthetic experiences as such, but to a particular type of aesthetics. Just a cursory glance at the type of productions that are currently on offer to schools by DKS in the different counties in Norway shows that they are not preoccupied with the type of aesthetics that children and young people are exposed to through the popular culture they consume in their spare-time, such as pop-music, computer games or television content.⁶⁰⁵ Obviously, given that these DKS productions are devised particularly for children and young people they

⁶⁰³ KKU (1996), not paginated.

⁶⁰⁴ Slettholm (2004), not paginated.

⁶⁰⁵ For a breakdown of all the DKS productions currently available see <http://www.denkulturelleskolesekken.no/index>.

are different and perhaps more accessible to children in their expression than what is on offer in traditional theatres, concert-halls and galleries around the country. However, it appears that these productions represent a clear alternative to mainstream commercial culture, with significant differences both in terms of its content and delivery, the most apparent example of the latter perhaps being that most productions (apart from film) are being performed live. Only a few productions rely heavily on the pupils' own participation, and then in a fairly strictly designed scheme supervised by professional artists or mediators.⁶⁰⁶ Although there are elements of dialogical modes of mediation within these productions, the DKS culture is a far cry from the culture most children and young people consume on an everyday basis.

The green papers' lack of celebration of commercial culture was echoed by my interviewees, who expressed an antagonistic attitude, at least to this culture's *Bildung* potential. Interviewees elaborated on this in response to a comment I made during my interviews about the fact that most children and young people are being exposed to culture most of the time. Most of the interviewees did not perceive commercial culture as downright negative or dangerous. Instead, its presence was accepted as a given. However, almost all interviewees agreed that commercial or 'media'-culture is less able to mediate the emotions and meaning that the

⁶⁰⁶ KUL (2007a) cites a DKS project, which appears to be typical. It is the 'transparent realism' project supplied by North Norway's Artists' Centre (Nordnorsk Kunstnarsenter) where; 'pupils in fifth grade, are offered a tour by glass-artist Kari Malmberg. The tour covers a conversation about glass and what it is made of, an assessment of the exhibited art-works of glass, and finally drawing and engraving on glass supervised by the artist. The school has been prepared for the meeting and everything is agreed beforehand' (KUL (2007a), p. 24).

'professional' arts can, and the latter should instead act as a counter-force to commercial culture. To get behind the media-pictures in order to gain understanding and growth, children and young people needed something more profound, which can bring them out of a superficial and trivial sphere. As mentioned by a former Minister of Culture:

But I think there is an emotional level, which we are absolutely reliant on tuning into [...] the emotional [...] in other words, the register, which I believe these technical media find difficult to mediate. Hence, I mean that children need a counter-force, in order to get behind those pictures [conveyed by the media industry] and understand some of the universe that they consume. And there is something like feelings, something like smell, something like nerve [...] other layers within ourselves, which I sense that many gradually are a little underfed on.⁶⁰⁷

The 'generalisation of everything', was, by another respondent, deemed to completely destroy children's curiosity and ability to experience artworks that aimed to hit deeper. He continued by saying that:

our society is overloaded by superficialities and trivialities. In other words the generalisation of any context in society completely destroys our curiosity and ability for arts' experiences. DKS has an important task in this respect. To bring us out of the trivial and over into that, which in a way scratches and hits a little deeper.⁶⁰⁸

Hence, children should have access to a wider menu of expressions in order to give them a taste of things they would otherwise not encounter. What would be of greater value to children would be to 'experience

⁶⁰⁷ Ellen Horn, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁶⁰⁸ Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007.

people [artists] who actually contribute something, who add a personal stimulus, or a personal involvement'.⁶⁰⁹

This clear understanding that commercial culture is less able to offer this is another condition on which the *Bildung* potential in the DKS discourse is based: the stimulation of creativity, experiences, dreams and individual thinking can not be achieved through commercial culture. Similarly, knowledge was also mentioned:

For those who attempt to penetrate ever new spheres of comprehension, it is obvious that the answer is more knowledge. We need to understand more, we need a wider perspective, a more long-term perspective, hence we need knowledge. Then you have to see where knowledge exists and that is not within pulp fiction [metaphorically; popular culture].⁶¹⁰

This again would help pupils to make their own valuation of culture, and the exposure to the type of art presented by DKS, would help young people to obtain:

a totality and a language, which enables you to discriminate between what is good and bad, and gives you the opportunity to make some choices about where you are going.⁶¹¹

Following on from this, Slettholm makes a strong contribution to this understanding of a dichotomy between the arts and commercial media culture when he advocates for more experimental arts to be included in

⁶⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ Stein Olav Henrichsen, interviewed 20th April 2007.

⁶¹¹ Vidar Thorbjørnsen, interviewed 16th April 2007.

the DKS programme. Pupils in schools, he argued, should be exposed to content which is initially not familiar or accessible to the children:

There shall be room for what can be both challenging and difficult to receive. I am thinking for example of expressions from other cultures, contemporary art, contemporary music, dance and experimental art-forms. It is important to develop qualities like tolerance, interest and wonder for what is unknown and not immediately comprehensible. The pupils deserve to have access to the best, and to get something they perhaps did not know that they needed – and perhaps did not know existed – and which was also unknown for the teachers and other grown-ups.⁶¹²

A little further down in his speech Slettholm continues:

The arts can give pinpricks to our anaesthetic feeling of well-being. Today, it is so easy to opt out of what is challenging. One can just close oneself in one's living-room, sit down on the sofa and change channel. In its encounter with an increasingly commercialised children- and youth-culture I hope DKS can contribute to a more critical and reflective attitude amongst children and young people.⁶¹³

This idea that commercial culture like TV is of less value and not very edifying was echoed by most of my interviewees, and it was suggested that children and young people perhaps spend too much time on such content. It could have damaging effects, but rather than cursing it, the emphasis was on what commercial culture was not:

⁶¹² Slettholm (2004), not paginated.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

The point for me is that if they are only going to absorb that part, which they can get through children's TV and such things, they will get a too restricted part of culture, and perhaps not the most edifying or, in my view, the most valuable.⁶¹⁴

This was related to commercial culture's reliance on the market, which in turn required it to satisfy customer demand. As a consequence commercial culture was less able to say something important about ourselves as human beings. Echoing Matthew Arnold's call for a culture 'guided by a general humane spirit',⁶¹⁵ my interviewees called for artworks that are not restrained by commercial limitations, but which instead are allowed to put 'humanistic' values at the forefront. Such art has the potential to penetrate ever new spheres of comprehension. There is thus a need for knowledge: a knowledge that does not exist within 'pulp fiction'. As opposed to within the sphere of commercial culture, outside of it, artists may be found, who:

have thought about completely new things, who have taken completely new approaches, who have found answers to several both important and unimportant questions that humanity has always asked, and those are the ones we in a way must get in touch with.⁶¹⁶

Cultural manifestations that had to relate to market-parameters would have fewer qualities than the 'professional' arts mediated through DKS, which were better able to convey humanistic values:

⁶¹⁴ Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁶¹⁵ Arnold (1935), p. 109.

⁶¹⁶ Stein Olav Henrichsen, interviewed, 20th April 2007.

that would say something important about us as human beings. In other words, a purely human project, a humanistic project, if you like. It will be there [in culture that had to relate to market-parameters], there will be lyrics, there will be tunes, that definitely have that value, but it is less of it than in a project, ..., in an artistic project, which immerses itself in exactly that. [...] As a composer I all the time work to find, ... I research a material both musical and humanistic where I all the time attempt to say something important about society, and what it means to be a human being. Right? I don't think about whether it will sell, that I need to relate to an audience as consumers. I relate to an audience, definitely, and write for an audience, but not as consumers.⁶¹⁷

For most of my interviewees, therefore, commercial culture is not diverse enough to facilitate *Bildung*, hence, by exposing children and young people to a wider menu of arts-experiences than those on offer in the commercial sector, they will be better able to discriminate between what is good and bad, meaning to place artistic expressions in a quality hierarchy, which again will enable them to make decisions about their own direction in life. People will always be fascinated by commercial culture's technology fuelled fulfilment of their need for entertainment, but in this sense it is a force of anti-*Bildung*, because 'the more you want culture to entertain you, the less it gives you the impulses that enable you to get in dialogue with yourself'.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁷ Glen Erik Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁶¹⁸ Trond Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007.

What is referred to by some as commercial culture, is characterised as 'typically one-sided. In other words, it does not contain the whole breadth of expressions, at least this is not secured'.⁶¹⁹

Hence, although commercial culture cannot be stemmed, its inability to be critical and ask fundamental questions (in short to facilitate *Bildung*) serves as a powerful discursive practice. Commercial culture does not take any responsibility in terms of giving children and young people the culture that they need. Hence, the public sector, and in a DKS context, the schools have to facilitate alternatives in order to secure pluralism and quality. In the words of one interviewee: 'The use of public money on culture is about filling the weaknesses of the market and to complement it'.⁶²⁰

It is argued that cultural competence cannot be obtained through exposure to commercial culture, and it is thus inferior because these experiences are less diverse. It does not have all the expressions, nuances and details that are on offer in a wider arts context: instead commercial culture is perceived to be homogenous in comparison. This is often repeated and subscribed to across the two green papers, by most of my interviews and certainly by the then *statssekretær* Slettholm.

Hence, commercial culture should not be an area of priority for DKS, and if at all included, it should merely act as a starting point, from which

⁶¹⁹ Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007.

⁶²⁰ Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007.

children can explore more challenging arts expressions. Instead pupils should gain the necessary 'cultural competence' in order to both be able to appreciate the arts as well as to reap the *Bildung* effect of such competence itself.

7.3.4 'Cultural competence' - The need to learn the arts

The arts are understood to have an inherent *Bildung* potential. However, this potential is conditioned by knowledge and ability. KUL (2003b) explicitly argues that:

The audience's ability to experience and understand the arts is something that must be developed – if one shall reach most of the richness, which the world of art contains.⁶²¹

This is also emphasised by Slettholm, who argues that despite being competent and engaging with culture, there are aspects of the arts that children need to learn that require knowledge and experience. This is, in his view, the *dannelses*-project.⁶²²

The schools' aim to give the pupils basic and complete qualifications cannot, according to KUL (2003b), be achieved without cultural competence being a 'natural, integrated and important' part of this.⁶²³ To understand their cultural identity and the cultural historical tradition within

⁶²¹ KUL (2003b), p. 15.

⁶²² Slettholm (2004).

⁶²³ KUL (2003b), p. 17.

which they live, is regarded as a necessary condition for participation in society.

In KUL (2007a), a succinct 'cultural competence' rationale for DKS is given, when it argues that:

The meeting with the arts and culture throughout adolescence can contribute to children and young people having experiences and knowledge that can form the basis of their own creative activities and ability to judge different artistic and cultural expressions. To understand the arts and culture is in many cases a learning-process.⁶²⁴

Hence, an important rationale behind DKS is to give pupils this 'cultural competence'. However, 'cultural competence' is not just an important skill that children and young people need to be able to acquire knowledge about the arts in order to improve their experience: such skills also have inherent values. This is particularly emphasised in UDF (2003) where it was argued that cultural competence 'has both an intrinsic value, great significance for an increased quality of life, and for qualification for the future and career'.⁶²⁵ This was echoed in the parliamentary response to UDF (2003), which stated that cultural competence was decisive for the pupil's ability to 'interpret a complex society, and a condition for acquiring the diversity of expressions one encounters'.⁶²⁶

⁶²⁴ KUL (2007a), p. 7.

⁶²⁵ UDF (2003), p. 8.

⁶²⁶ Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen (KUF), 2004. *Innst. S. nr. 131 (2003-2004); Innstilling fra Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen om kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til grunnskolen ("Ei blot til lyst") St.meld. Nr.39 (2002-2003)*, Oslo, p. 3. (KUF (2004)).

Hence, in addition to allowing the arts and culture to contribute to the fulfilment of the curriculum, DKS is perceived as giving a supply of culture beyond this.

Drafted by the Ministry of Education and Research, it was perhaps not surprising that UDF (2003) also stressed that one aim of DKS is to develop a cultural competence, which can also help pupils prepare for the future.⁶²⁷ However, it is the intrinsic value of such a competence and its ability to facilitate pupils' growth and development inherently contained within the arts, in short *Bildung*, that is emphasised most, even in a green paper drafted by the Ministry of Education and Research:

the concept of culture can be connected to the aesthetic and to individual 'dannelses'-processes. Culture is also something that challenges, aids reflection and innovation. It is something we acquire, a result of our thoughts and a background where the frames of reference for understanding is developed; this is what is called a horizon of understanding. The school's role as a cultural bearer makes way for all these forms of cultural expressions. The school is thus a central arena for children's meetings, communication and learning in terms of concepts such as aesthetic, culture and 'dannelse'. The school as a cultural bearer can make it possible for the pupil's cultural competence to develop as part of a broader process of 'dannelse' and learning.⁶²⁸

Slettholm argues for the importance of playfulness and mentions that the pupils will get most out of their engagement with an art-work if they and the teachers play together with it. However, Slettholm also maintains that

⁶²⁷ UDF (2003), p. 8.

⁶²⁸ Ibid., p. 9.

this can have a positive utilitarian impact on the children's learning in other subjects.⁶²⁹

The importance of this cultural competence was reiterated by my interviewees, who were mostly in agreement about what was meant by this term and why it was important in a DKS context. The more utilitarian dimension of cultural competence was mentioned by several: for example, that it might help young people in their future career (at least within some professions).⁶³⁰ It was also argued that the richer the lives people manage to live on their own terms, the more they would contribute to the wider community, and that the path to a good society goes through the realisation of what is harboured within each individual. It would also play a part in the nation's self-esteem by contributing to domestic creativity and avoid Norway lapsing into a nation of passive consumers on an international market.⁶³¹

However, these understandings of more utilitarian and collective benefits were again overshadowed by the representation of cultural competence as something inherently beneficial for each individual, more in line with the thinking of Humboldt who advocated that whatever *Bildung* activity man embarked on, it should not be carried out simply as a means to an end.⁶³² Instead, my interviewees asserted that cultural competence is

⁶²⁹ Slettholm (2004).

⁶³⁰ One interviewee argued that if you had a certain level of 'cultural competence', you would probably not gravitate towards a profession such as stock-broking, interview with Trond Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007.

⁶³¹ Olemic Thommessen, interviewed 17th April 2007.

⁶³² Humboldt (1993), p. 23.

related to having the tools to master something, or to have the necessary knowledge in order to break codes (for example, to understand music). Hence, pupils should have access to both cultural heritage and the contemporary arts, which were perceived as connected. An understanding of contemporary art in the context of arts history would also help pupils conceptualise how they are related. All of this would, according to the interviewees, contribute to *Bildung*.

People with a wide cultural competence would find it easier than others to value and utilise the cultural impulses they come across, as well as to relate to other cultures, in order to communicate, understand, appreciate and be respectful and tolerant. It is something on which each individual's personality could be based: with cultural competence people would have a platform for their own confidence and be conscious of their belonging and point of departure. This would facilitate *Bildung* where cultural competence is argued to be of importance to people's emotional life, self-confidence and ability to reflect on a range of different impulses.⁶³³ Without cultural competence, people would simply be less able to judge what would influence their life and how they should position themselves. Cultural competence is thus both a tool needed to appreciate the arts, which again is a prerequisite for *Bildung* as well as a path to personal growth itself.

⁶³³ It is important to emphasise at this stage that the respondents frequently generalised statements about children and young people in a DKS context to be of relevance to people more generally. Similarly, when being asked about issues relating to DKS they often also answered more generally.

In their emphasis on exposing children and young people to a wide range of artistic and cultural expressions, the green papers, as well as my interviewees (who all argued that pupils should be exposed to as wide a range of 'professional' arts as possible), echo Humboldt's argument that *Bildung* can only be achieved by exposing the individual to a 'variety of situations':⁶³⁴ however, this means a 'variety of situations', which, in a DKS context at least, does not include popular culture.

Cultural competence is closely related to *dannelse*, and when asked how they interpreted this term, most of my interviewees argued that this implied that one had been trained to know what to appreciate in life as well as to realise one's own limitations and that these are not the same as everybody else's. *Dannelse* would thus make people more empathic, or in other words help them to understand others and be able to enter into their situation; *Dannelse* meant to be considerate, caring and respectful.

It was also argued that *dannelse* was determined by diverse forms of knowledge and one's ability to refine and mediate this in accordance with different circumstances. This diverse set of knowledge could only be obtained through the exposure to a diverse set of experiences, and this was why public support for a diverse range of cultural expressions was an essential part of public cultural policy: the market was not sufficient in that it was not able to sustain the same diverse range of cultural expressions, and thus not to the same extent able to tear down prejudices and

⁶³⁴ Humbolt (1993), p. 10.

promote respect and tolerance. Finally, cultural competence was also related to being able to become articulate as well as to apply one's own experiences creatively when meeting new situations.

The programming of the arts to be mediated through DKS can obviously not be left to chance, and just as Arnold called for a strong state represented by the great men of culture,⁶³⁵ it is DKS and those who govern and make decisions for this scheme that are granted the privilege to steer the pupils and help them gain knowledge and the ability to break the codes. Whether they are guided by their 'best selves', which was what Arnold hoped for, shall not be said, but they are at least understood to be purer and more benign than those cultural mediators the pupils meet at home in their interaction with the commercial cultural industries.

Despite the focus on a subject oriented approach to enlightenment throughout the twentieth century, this emphasis on guidance 'from above' has also had, as described in Chapters Four and Five, long traditions in Norway, with P.A. Munch, Johan Sebastian Welhaven and Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson as pertinent advocates of an elite informed approach to *dannelse* in the nineteenth century, and in 1935, even the future Labour Party secretary Håkon Lie argued that the working classes should be guided by the cultural taste and habits of the middle classes.

⁶³⁵ Arnold (1935), p. 70.

However, where the inherent benefits of cultural competence (or *Bildung*) and the idea that this could be achieved through the exposure to a wide range of cultural expressions echo the thoughts of Humboldt, the object-focused aspect of DKS, which relies on a pre-prepared programme of cultural offerings drawn from what is being termed the ‘professional’ arts, does not. Humboldt argued instead that the best conditions for self-cultivation (or cultural competence) would be achieved when there was a minimum of interference from without, and where the maximum variety of choice in the opportunities for experience was not necessarily limited to the arts. As mentioned in the introduction to DKS earlier on in this chapter, it is an explicit principle that the scheme shall be organised with a minimum of interference from central government. This seems to suggest a subject oriented approach in the spirit of cultural democracy: one of the principles of which, as outlined in Chapter Five, was that cultural policy decisions should be taken as close to the users as possible. However, whereas county councils and municipalities are allowed to make decisions away from central government, this does not appear to extend to pupils themselves, or their families.

So, to sum up, there is a clear understanding that cultural competence is needed in order to understand and acquire an appreciation for the arts at the same time as such competence is important for its own sake. The fundamental role of this cultural competence, which perhaps should be better described as an arts competence, in acquiring *Bildung* acts as another discursive practice. The understanding that there might be other

alternative routes to *Bildung*, which do not rest on the values of the 'professional' arts is excluded by the discourse.

However, what is still being left vague is how exactly this growth, through the exposure to the DKS-culture, can happen.

7.3.5 How exactly can *Bildung* be facilitated?

The DKS discourse is based on the claim that children's meeting with the 'professional' arts can facilitate *Bildung*. This is put forward as obvious without the need for further explication. However, how can this happen? The 'professional' arts are allegedly able to help pupils gain comprehension both of themselves and their surroundings, which again will make their life richer and enable them to utilise their own potential and so on, but how? Although participation is not excluded from DKS, in the material I am referring to it is argued that this *Bildung* can be facilitated through mere exposure, for example by children sitting on their chairs listening to music or watching a theatre performance, because this is not regarded as passive but an active process.

Given that neither the green papers nor the parliamentary responses appear to attempt to dissect these alleged impacts further, nor refer to any empirical research that could 'prove' such growth, I asked my interviewees to explain how the arts and culture could have such influences on children and young people. Again, there was consensus about the arts having such effects. One informant mentioned that this

could primarily be achieved through participation as opposed to the mere exposure to artistic content. However, the main understanding is that the arts represent a unique vehicle through which people can share experiences, and which could give their lives a wider perspective and greater insight: it is the arts' distinctive character to give people who come into contact with artistic expressions a broader platform for their experiences, and if this contact is given through DKS early in life it could consequently give children and young people wider associations, which in turn could enable them to have an increased set of experiences later on in life. It was further understood that the more knowledge children have about what life is represented by, the greater chance they have to develop their own lives and organise them according to their own presuppositions and preferences. Hence, exposure to the arts and culture can help children expose their own personalities as well as to see themselves in a larger context. It is also thought to help them express themselves better. Those who are able to do this will have a better quality of life because they have fewer inhibitions that would prevent them from developing further.

It is being argued that this is part of a humanistic project, where to be a human means that you are able to communicate with others:

'all these unfinished things, form part of what it means to be a human being. And to relate to both one's unanswered questions and others'

unanswered questions are absolutely fundamental, and there I think that the meeting with the arts is absolutely fundamental.⁶³⁶

Hence, the arts are perceived as unique in this respect. They could perhaps overlap with other things:

but if you [...] value the whole breadth of human expressions, then nothing can replace what it is to express oneself through pictures, through movement and music.⁶³⁷

It is argued that the arts would enable children to access some 'rooms' in their mind, which they would otherwise not be able to enter; to give them aspirations, which would enable them to see outside of the space they live in. This was seen as a crucial addition to the theoretical approach offered in the formal part of the school curriculum. As opposed to the other topics taught in school, the arts and culture engage a range of children's senses, where they would make use of the whole body in a different way than they would in traditional learning. Children's quality of life would be limited if they were not exposed to these experiences. These references to using the whole body and expressing oneself through the arts like movement or music seem to indicate that DKS should contain a significant proportion of participation. However, almost all my interviewees made it clear that DKS should primarily focus on exposing pupils to the 'professional' arts.

⁶³⁶ Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007.

⁶³⁷ Ibid.

It was difficult, in my view, to get a clear explanation of exactly *how* children's exposure to the 'professional' arts could facilitate growth. This rests on an understanding that the arts have such transforming powers. Instead, this is repeated again and again, not based on any kind of empirical proof but on a conviction. Hence, exactly *how* the arts help children and young people achieve *Bildung* is left unclear.

Moreover, although DKS sits comfortably in a Norwegian cultural policy context, which for so many years has had as an important rationale to democratise culture, this scheme is unique in that its provision of culture is compulsory and something pupils cannot avoid. Within this lies the potential to use culture actively to civilise its audience.

7.4 DKS as a civilising project

Bildung is understood in the DKS discourse as enabling children and young people to become aware of their own limitations, to become more empathic, considerate, caring and respectful as well as to improve their ability to articulate their experiences. The opportunity for future generations to attain this *Bildung* is democratised through an authorised and sanctioned selection of arts-experiences, which excludes the culture that children and young people are mostly inclined to engage with. Hence, I shall make reference to the DKS-'sanctioned' or DKS-'authorised' arts. DKS harbours an underlying power-dynamic, which is manifest through the fact that the children, or their parents for that matter, have little influence over the means by which this *Bildung* develops.

7.4.1 The DKS-sanctioned 'professional' arts

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, within Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric, as it has been presented by central government, the 'battle' against commercial culture has given way to a more nuanced and perhaps more constructive way of dealing with what is still regarded as a challenge. At the same time, the consumption-level of the content provided by the commercial cultural industries increases year on year and pervades most people's everyday lives in unprecedented ways. Nowhere is this as evident as with children and young people. Popular culture is being disseminated in ever new ways, and children and young people have access to content wherever they are, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.⁶³⁸ If perhaps not sharing the same cultural content, it could be argued that the difference in cultural habits between children and parents is also contracting, at least in terms of the channels through which culture is consumed: both parents and children are, for example, active on the internet, both groups watch TV and DVDs, both listen to iPods, both play computer-games and so on.⁶³⁹ I shall not speculate on the nature of the content that each of these segments consumes, but it can be assumed that it is primarily what can be described as popular culture, which indicates a development towards convergence: if not in terms of the actual content of the culture consumed by parents and

⁶³⁸ See footnote 592 for statistics of the media habits for children and young people.

⁶³⁹ For example, where 53 per cent of Norwegian children and young people between 9 and 15 listened to recorded music daily in 2006, the percentage for 25-44 year olds was 48 per cent, and they listened for longer; 45 minutes on average versus 38 minutes for the younger ones. For watching television the figures were 90 per cent and 123 minutes for 9 to 15 year olds, 81 per cent and 142 minutes for 25 to 44 year olds and 81 per cent and 146 minutes for 45 to 66 year olds. Vaage (2007), available online at: <http://www.ssb.no/emner/07/02/30/medie/>.

children then at least in terms of the type of culture, in the sense that it is commercial and popular.

However, this is, as already mentioned above, not the culture sanctioned by DKS, and it can therefore be assumed that this is not the 'dominant' culture, at least if compared hierarchically in terms of quality-judgments as approved by official bodies, artists and others who are involved in the programming of DKS. As outlined in Chapter Two, Antonio Gramsci argued that a 'dominant' culture must be treated carefully by a dominant group in society and not enjoyed exclusively by them. Instead, the 'dominant' culture must be identified with the culture of society as a whole.⁶⁴⁰ If the 'dominant' culture is not represented by popular culture supplied by the commercial cultural industries but instead the one sanctioned by public bodies, then the elite, according to Gramsci, ought to ensure that this culture be adopted by the populace as a whole. Gramsci argued that most of the ideological institutions of both the state and civil society have been established in order to obtain consent from the populace for the 'dominant' culture.⁶⁴¹ Applying Gramsci's ideas of hegemonies by consent to the DKS project is of course contentious. It can equally be argued, perhaps much more convincingly, that the real dominant culture is the one produced by the commercial cultural industries, in terms of its popularity and impact. Hence, I shall place the term 'dominant' in inverted commas.

⁶⁴⁰ Hewison (1995).

⁶⁴¹ Bennett (1998a).

However, as argued above, in a public cultural policy context, and certainly in terms of DKS, the professional arts are dominant. I argue that one of the rationales behind DKS is exactly to counter the forces of popular culture, and the fact that such a large effort goes into this project, indicates that this is a hegemonic battle. Whether DKS will succeed in its effort to internalise the 'professional' arts and dominate popular culture is a different matter, which remains to be seen.⁶⁴² However, as quoted at the very beginning of this chapter, one of DKS's overarching objectives, as stated in KUL (2003b), is to facilitate access to and familiarisation with a wide range of artistic and cultural expressions for pupils in primary school in order for them to be favourably inclined towards, or to develop an understanding of, them. It is an authorised official culture that the pupils should be favourably inclined towards. Hence, the DKS-sanctioned arts are dominant within a cultural policy discourse, and more specifically within a DKS discourse, which is based on a strong wish that the 'professional' arts could dominate, or at least counter, the forces of most of the culture provided by the commercial cultural industries.

Gramsci's reference to an elite or a 'power bloc' is equally contentious in the context of a discussion of the DKS-sanctioned arts, because who constitutes the elite is not obvious. As mentioned in Chapter Two, Tony Bennett questions Gramscian criticism, partly because in a people versus the power-bloc antagonism it becomes impossible to identify who the

⁶⁴² An investigation into the success or otherwise of DKS falls outside the remit of this project.

people are and whom they include or exclude.⁶⁴³ Similarly, it is problematic to identify who the elite is, and finally the extent to which class belonging determines cultural consumption has been questioned in recent years.⁶⁴⁴ Furthermore, Norway is regarded as a more egalitarian country with not so distinct class differences when compared to other countries like the UK. It might therefore be difficult to catch sight of the assumed antagonism between the people and a bourgeois power-bloc (or indeed between any power-blocs) nowadays, and the extent to which a Gramscian hegemony- concept is relevant might therefore be questioned.

I therefore find it more convincing to perceive power as exercised through the discursive production of 'truths', and the discursive practices I have analysed have emanated from policy papers, a speech by a *statssekretær*, and from several interviews with bureaucrats, politicians, artists and arts managers. In this material I have found discursive practices which position the 'professional' arts in a superior position when compared with commercial culture and hence at least attempt to make these manifestations dominant.

7.4.2 The fear of intellectual anarchy

There seems to be an Arnoldian fear of the anarchical potential in young people's own culture, or indeed the culture of their parents, which I have attempted to demonstrate as not being significantly dissimilar, and that

⁶⁴³ Bennett (1990), p. 254.

⁶⁴⁴ Nobuko Kawashima, 'Beyond the Division of Attenders vs Non-Attenders' (Coventry: Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, Working Paper 6, University of Warwick, 2000), p 24.

this does not, as already mentioned, facilitate *Bildung*, but also that it is a threat to the 'dominant' culture. One interviewee, for example, argued that DKS was primarily targeted at children from homes 'without a bookshelf', and continued: 'The objective of DKS is to give all people equal right to an as rich a life as possible'.⁶⁴⁵

This was echoed in KUL (2007a), where it was argued that DKS:

also has a democratic and socially distributive perspective, which sits well both within [more general governmental] cultural and educational objectives.⁶⁴⁶

Several respondents argued that the level of arts exposure currently granted to children was deemed, to a great extent, to be dependent on their parents' cultural consumption and cultural habits. Hence, the work should start now, in the school system, to create the next generation of arts-loving parents who would learn to experience and seek out the arts for themselves as well as passing it on to their children to enable them to get closer to the universe and expressions of artists. The aim is thus partly to even out differences, as part of a democratising project, and to stimulate a bigger arts audience for the future. Similar ideas were echoed in the response by the parliamentary committee (FKD (2003)). In its attempt to even out differences and allow all children access to a universal culture, the DKS discourse echoes the rhetoric from the Labour Party of the 1950s, which was less concerned with a grass-root culture,

⁶⁴⁵ Ellen Horn, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁶⁴⁶ KUL (2007a), p. 20.

and aimed instead to democratise the arts as part of a welfare-provision programme. Thus, DKS clearly attempts to democratise the arts.

The importance of cultural competence was also stressed in UDF (2003) which emphasised how this is related to children's identity through their cultural expressions and cultural background. The response by the parliamentary committee states that 'schools have a great responsibility to balance and compensate for pupils' unequal cultural ballast'.⁶⁴⁷

A similar argument is put forward by Spord Borgen and Brandt who state that the objective of DKS must be to democratise children's *dannelses*-potential, in the sense that pupils acquire common reference points, common tools and access to common arenas, and that this can best be achieved within a school context.⁶⁴⁸ Norway has few private alternatives to the public school system, hence, children from a range of different backgrounds meet in the same schools, and my interviewees argued that this enables a scheme like DKS to level out children's cultural competence. However, the expressed 'fear' of the culture most children and young people consume outside of a DKS context (like watching TV, playing computer games and so on) might also demonstrate a perceived threat to the 'dominant' culture, whereby it might be assumed that if the latter is not nourished and shared with the wider populace, it might lose its hierarchical dominance: the 'dominant' culture representing a certain cultural identity and historical tradition.

⁶⁴⁷ KUF (2004), p. 3.

⁶⁴⁸ Spord Borgen and Brandt (2006).

It thus appears as if the culture represented by DKS is part of a hegemonic battle, where the supporters of the 'dominant' DKS-sanctioned 'professional' arts attempt to attain consent around the importance of this culture when challenged by the impact of the culture that people mostly engage with on an everyday basis. In this battle it appears as if the initial emphasis on what initially was referred to as children and young people's own culture has been eclipsed and that popular culture is regarded to be a force of anti-*Bildung*. DKS can thus be perceived as a response to a fear that certain identities and historical traditions might become irrelevant and lose their justifications.

Although two of my interviewees, in a criticism of the Progress Party's cultural policy (or the lack of such), made reference to representatives from this party allegedly having equated the value of attending opera or ballet with going to the pub or the bar (a comparison which both interviewees regarded as preposterous),⁶⁴⁹ what Tony Bennett refers to as a bourgeois fear of the tavern and the fair is presumably a thing of the past. However, it is pertinent to ask whether this fear has been replaced by an anxiety about the power of the culture provided by the commercial cultural industries.

Dannelse and *Bildung* could be achieved through an enhanced understanding of one's cultural identity, and knowledge of one's cultural historical traditions. However, the extent to which the culture mediated

⁶⁴⁹ Trond Okkelmo, interviewed 13th April 2007, p. 7; Einar Solbu, interviewed 13th April 2007.

through DKS would mesh with the cultural identity as experienced by the pupils through their own upbringing is not questioned. Instead it appears as if the DKS discourse on some levels echoes Tony Bennett's analysis of the museum of the nineteenth century as an agent for the promotion of a primarily bourgeois culture presented as belonging to all in order to contribute to cohesion around a bourgeois hegemony as well as programming the behaviour of its audience. My data-material is not sufficient for me to argue that the DKS discourse is part of a bourgeois or middle-class project, which aims to discipline other classes, in accordance with what Gramsci suggested was the purpose of all major ideological apparatuses of both the state and civil society.⁶⁵⁰ However, it appears as if there is an inherent fear of the potential negative impact that too much exposure to what is being provided by the commercial cultural industries can have, twinned with an anxiety of what children and young people would lose out from in terms of *Bildung* potential if they were not being made subject to a sufficient measure of the 'professional' arts.

Similarly, there appears to be a disciplining aspect to the *Bildung* measures presented through DKS where the school is not only preoccupied with giving its pupils knowledge through learning. Additionally, they should obtain *dannelse* and *Bildung* through an authorised path facilitated through exposure to the DKS sanctioned arts. It is as if the government, through the school, is capturing some of the space previously being left for the family, in a way which is perhaps more

⁶⁵⁰ Bennett (1998a), pp. 67 - 68.

efficient, but also more intrusive, than any other cultural policy measure due to this scheme being sanctioned through the school system and therefore something that all children have to be exposed to, whether they like it or not. Unlike other state supported arts policies, DKS is not just about providing the arts but given that it is delivered through the school and not being optional, pupils are in a way 'forced' to experience this culture.

By entering into the sphere of the family, it is as if DKS is being used as a vehicle of 'governmentality', which, as presented in Chapter Two, in Foucault's terms is characterised by an upwards and downwards continuity between man, his family and the state: when the state is run properly, the head of the family will look after his unit, and individuals will behave well, and on the other hand, man's government of himself will enable him to look after his family, which again is a prerequisite for the successful government of the state.⁶⁵¹ Such governmentality is thus reliant on the maturity of man's family and its ability to look after itself. Those families with a small book-shelf, who, as expressed by one interviewee, have fewer resources (not just financially but also socially), who do not read to their children or take them out to the cinema or to concerts,⁶⁵² are not fit to govern the 'family'-link in the 'governmentality'-chain, and hence this responsibility must be replaced by DKS, which will take on the role of fulfilling the expected *Bildung* function, and level the

⁶⁵¹ Foucault (1991), p. 92.

⁶⁵² Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.

differences so that all children are familiarised with and socialised into the enjoyment of the 'dominant' culture.

With reference to Foucault, Tony Bennett argues that cultural institutions like museums can historically be perceived as technologies of behavioural management. Bennett explains that this disciplining aspect of museums and their preoccupation with the reform of the inner self (the inner life):

is just as much dependent on the provision of appropriate technologies for this purpose as is the achievement of desired ends in any other area of social administration.⁶⁵³

In other words, museums were perceived to form part of social policy, albeit a social policy which focused on *Bildung*, as opposed to physical health. Can we perceive DKS to be such a technology of behaviour management? The DKS discourse does not appear to refer directly to children and young people's behaviour. However, I sense a fear of what could be the consequences of children (and their families) being left to decide their own cultural repertoire. Hence, if DKS is a technology in the Foucauldian sense, 'which aims at regulating the conduct of individuals and populations',⁶⁵⁴ then this relates to children and young people's cultural consumption: not necessarily in terms of reducing their consumption of commercial culture, but rather to offer alternatives that are perceived to be better for them. This discourse appears to harbour a

⁶⁵³ Bennett (1995), p. 18.

⁶⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 89 - 90.

fear of anarchy, not unlike Matthew Arnold's reference to an intellectual anarchy: an anarchy of value-nihilism and cultural relativism.

Tony Bennett argues how the manner in which governments have applied culture historically 'as a field of social management' has seen:

culture's governmental deployment in two ways. First, it carried that reach beyond the public surface of civic conduct and into the interior of the person in the expectation that culture would serve to fashion new forms of self-reflexiveness and reformed codes of personal conduct. Second, it developed new capillary systems for the distribution of culture that were calculated to extend its reach throughout the social body without any impediment or restriction.⁶⁵⁵

This is a fairly accurate description of the policy rationale to democratise culture. In other words, to extend the access to a certain established culture to as many as possible in order to facilitate *Bildung*. If this is a technology of behavioural management, then DKS appears to be its most advanced application, particularly due to its compulsory inclusion during school hours and hence it reaching every child without 'impediment or restriction'.

The familiarisation and socialisation of children into, what I term, the 'dominant' culture should happen perpetually from generation to generation, as described by one interviewee:

⁶⁵⁵ Bennett (1998a), p. 129.

in order to get culturally alert parents, you have to actually already during childhood give them [the children] experiences, which make them want to experience themselves, to seek out [arts experiences] when they get older.⁶⁵⁶

Such sentiments appear to harbour a fear of the repercussions of children and young people not being made subject to the type of arts that DKS has to offer; what would happen if they were not to become 'favourably inclined' towards these manifestations of 'professional' culture? Presumably, the outcome would be that children and young people would favour the type of culture they mostly consume anyway on their TVs, game-consoles and iPods. This culture is not 'dominant' in the *Bildung* discourse, and, as I have said, represents anti-*Bildung*, because it is not perceived to harbour a *Bildung* potential as the DKS sanctioned arts do. The normality represented by DKS could thus be under threat, with the result that tomorrow's audiences would neither subscribe to the 'professional arts' like music (mediated by professional musicians from a diverse range of genres), the visual arts, performing arts, literature and libraries, cultural heritage and cultural relics and film, nor the institutions that mediate them. The power relations between the government and the pupils (and their families) are thus 'productive' in the sense that they shape their skills and understandings.

The disciplining dimension of DKS is portrayed as enjoyable, and it is through an internalisation of such pleasures that Foucault argues that

⁶⁵⁶ Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April, 2007.

power can be executed. In Chapter Two I presented, with reference to Foucault and Augestad, the example of how Norwegian health policy has attempted to internalise amongst people the enjoyment of living a healthy life, exercising and eating healthy food.⁶⁵⁷ Similarly, parents who know that their children (and perhaps themselves) spend a lot of time playing computer-games might, if asked, argue that theatre is of higher value. One of my interviewees argued that it is important that people go around with a little bad consciousness because they do not go more often to the theatre:⁶⁵⁸ in other words, a bad consciousness because they do not to a higher extent 'help themselves' to what they presumably know the arts can offer.

7.4.3 The understood commensurate *Bildung* potential of the 'professional arts'

If there is a hegemonic battle between a 'dominant' culture, that is, the 'professional' arts, and commercial culture, then it appears as if the former still stands firm as dominant. However, the maintenance of such a hegemony is reliant on the internalisation of discursive practices in order to cement the ideologies that advocate a certain truth and knowledge in such a way that any contention would be hidden away and the 'right truth' will be obvious and taken for granted. DKS can be perceived as an important element in such a discursive practice, which institutionalises the *Bildung* potential in the 'professional' arts.

⁶⁵⁷ Augestad (2005).

⁶⁵⁸ Trond Okkelmo, interviewed on 13th April.

There is continuity between how the alleged impacts of the ‘professional’ arts are presented in the policy papers and how they are understood by my interviewees, and they all seem to subscribe to the same hegemonic practice. This indicates that it is within a DKS-context that we find this hegemonic perception of the superiority of what is being termed the ‘professional’ arts, and that this demonstrates that the object approach to *Bildung* still stands strong within Norwegian cultural policy discourse.⁶⁵⁹

Interestingly, the professional arts’ hegemony is based on an understanding that the experiences that all pupils will have when meeting the range of art-forms on offer through DKS are commensurate, meaning that it is possible to generalise about their ‘experiences of the arts within art forms, across art forms and across a diverse population’.⁶⁶⁰

In their critique of the alleged social impacts of the arts in the context of British arts policy, Belfiore and Bennett argue that the assumption that arts experiences can be commensurate is highly questionable and argue instead that the:

value or impact of the arts will vary enormously, according to all the factors that make up a person’s identity, including age, class, health, wealth and so on.⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁹ Having said that, I must stress again that this does not negate that the culture supplied by the global cultural industries may have a greater impact on most people’s everyday lives, at least in terms of the amount of time people chose to be exposed to this culture. It is in terms of their perceived *bildung* potential that the ‘professional arts’ continue to dominate.

⁶⁶⁰ Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, ‘Rethinking the social impacts of the arts’, in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 13.2 (2007), pp. 135 - 151.

⁶⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

Children exposed to an art-work in a DKS-context, will all be of the same age, but apart from that they come from a range of different backgrounds: from families whose book-shelves are of various sizes. At the same time, as one of the objectives of DKS is to level out the differences that are caused by the pupils' backgrounds, these same differences impact on how pupils experience, value and engage with what is being offered. The DKS discourse ignores this and assumes instead that DKS activities as such can contribute to *Bildung* and *dannelse*. However, since how this can happen is left vague and unclear, it is difficult to argue rationally either for or against these impacts. Equally, there appears to be a similar commensurate understanding of the absence of *Bildung* potential in commercial culture, where little consideration is given to the opposite: that some commercial culture can also perhaps facilitate *Bildung*. Instead, the power of commercial culture is understood to be one of anti-*Bildung*.

Due to the mentioned vagueness, the understood superior impacts of this 'dominant' culture rest on the institutionalised discursive terms which claim them to be so. The kind of art that harbours the ability to facilitate *Bildung* is not specified, only that it is different from the culture children and young people consume that is provided by the commercial cultural industries. This rests on an implicit and explicit dimension to this discourse: the superiority of the 'professional' arts, which does not need to be specified further, is institutionalised, obvious and taken as given whereas the culture provided by the cultural industries in a *Bildung* context is explicitly expressed as not having such a *Bildung* potential.

7.5 Summary

This chapter started with an introduction to DKS and some of the policy papers in which the ideas and rationales behind this scheme were formulated. I then moved on to present the results of an in-depth discursive analysis of these policy papers as well as the results of interviews I conducted with key elite opinion-makers and which draw from the political, bureaucratic and arts-sector in Norway. Through this analysis, I identified that the dominant understanding of the *Bildung* potential in the ‘professional’ arts is sustained by the following range of discursive practices: that an object oriented approach, which relies on the ‘professional’ arts, is superior in terms of its potential to facilitate *Bildung*, implying that participation is inferior, that the culture that children and young people relate to on an everyday basis is one of anti-*Bildung*, because the market is not able to sustain a similarly wide range of cultural expressions as DKS and where pupils need cultural competence both to gain access to the ‘professional’ arts (to learn how to break the codes) as well as to facilitate *Bildung* as such. Finally, these discursive practices are internalised to such an extent that exactly how *Bildung* is facilitated does not need to be subject to further interrogation and can be left vague.

Based on this, I moved on to argue that there is a civilising aspect to DKS, because this is a scheme that is compulsory for all primary school children, and because it presents children and young people with a ‘sanctioned’ programme of the professional arts, partly in response to a

fear of an intellectual anarchy. These 'professional' arts are understood to have a commensurate *bildung* potential which transcends any differences in the pupils' demographic background. However, this civilising aspect does not appear as authoritarian with raised magisterial forefingers. It is internalised as positive and sets the terms for how *Bildung*, through culture in school, can be achieved. It is a value-based hegemony, whose influence stretches beyond the people who engage with DKS strategically or on a day-to-day basis. It also appears to fit with a wider *Bildung* discourse, which, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, appears to have returned to an object oriented approach to *Bildung* more generally.

8.0 Norwegian Cultural Policy: A Civilising Mission?

In this dissertation, I have set out to assess the extent to which a civilising mission has been a prime rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. In this concluding chapter I shall attempt to address and answer this question. I shall also reflect on my observations about how culture, and particularly the arts, are valued discursively in Norway (particularly amongst elites within the cultural field itself), in order to make some concluding remarks about whether a civilising mission emerges as a demand for publicly funded cultural activities to demonstrate measurable impacts, or as more abstract ideas about its broader civilising potential.

I started the thesis by identifying a selection of theorists who could help me to contextualise how Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric has been informed by a wish to facilitate enlightenment and growth: the Norwegian term for this being *folkeopplysning*. In doing so I adopted the German term *Bildung*, which, according to Henrik Kaare Nielsen, can be understood as integrating ‘the development of individuals’ sensuous, emotional and intellectual potentials’ and thus help people to reflect on themselves,⁶⁶² and I applied this as a concept with which to theorise *folkeopplysning*.

⁶⁶² Nielsen (2006).

In this concluding chapter I shall start by briefly summarising how the idea of *Bildung* has acted as a rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy, between the middle of the nineteenth century up to today. I conclude that this has been a key rationale. So strongly has it featured in the cultural policy rhetoric that I refer to a *Bildung* discourse. This is followed by a discussion of how this relates to the civilising mission, where I conclude that this has been a key rationale and still is represented by DKS.

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, there is a common understanding amongst many cultural policy scholars that the arts are beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. I shall attempt to position my research findings alongside some of these, who I argue are gaining a seminal position within the field of cultural policy research. I will conclude that my findings appear to nuance the picture they paint somewhat in that I conclude that there is still space for the civilising mission in Norwegian cultural policy and that this is epitomised by DKS.

In Chapter Three, I defined discursive practices as those:

interpretations of conduct that produce and affirm actions and their concomitant subjects and objects that are institutionalized because the interpretations are oft repeated and accepted.⁶⁶³

This civilising mission bears all the hallmarks of resting on such strong discursive practices, which advocate the transformative power of what is

⁶⁶³ Shapiro (1981), p. 130.

being termed 'the professional arts'. These discursive practices rely both on what is being explicitly uttered and what is understood to be so obvious that it does not need to be said, let alone questioned. What is explicitly uttered is repeated often and accepted by all the empirical sources that I have analysed (apart from the Progress Party). In this chapter, I refer to a general *Bildung* discourse as well as a DKS-discourse, the latter being part of the former but permeated by an object approach to *Bildung*, which branded commercial culture as representing anti-*Bildung*. I acknowledge the existence of a marketisation discourse as well though, and the Ministry of Culture has also recently published a number of policy papers that celebrate art-forms which are traditionally positioned in a commercially industrial context, such as film, interactive leisure software and, what is referred to as 'rhythmic' music,⁶⁶⁴ as well as a paper on the potential synergies between the cultural sector and other business sectors. I shall present these very briefly. However, this does in my view not detract from my claim that the object approach to *Bildung* is still strong in Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric, and that this is based on the abstract faith in the transformative powers of the arts.⁶⁶⁵ This abstract faith implies that DKS is not an instrumental cultural policy in the crude sense that its social impacts are expected to be measured in accordance with evidence-based policy practices.

⁶⁶⁴ This is a term which encompasses pop, rock, jazz, folk-music and world-music.

⁶⁶⁵ As a consequence of the increased object-focused *Bildung* discourse of the 2000s and that DKS is preoccupied with the 'professional arts', this concluding chapter will focus mostly on the arts according to how this was defined in a DKS context in Chapter Seven (including music, the performing arts, literature, cultural heritage, visual art, film and the multidisciplinary arts (KUL (2007a), p. 27)), rather than culture in the wider sense. As demonstrated in Chapter Six and Seven a subject-approach to *Bildung* based on a wider definition seem to have lost its position in the *Bildung* discourse and is certainly not part of the DKS-discourse.

Finally, I will declare some of the limitations of this project as well as make some suggestions for further research.

8.1 Summary of dissertation

I shall start by summarising briefly how *Bildung* features in Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric before I move on to talk about how this underpins the civilising mission as a continuous key rationale.

8.1.1 *Bildung* in Norwegian cultural policy – a brief summary

Civilisation is a concept rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment⁶⁶⁶, and accordingly, Oliver Bennett argues that what he has coined the civilising mission is based on the superior value of European high art.⁶⁶⁷ Geir Vestheim, on the other hand, suggests that in Norway, the Norwegian term for enlightenment – *opplysning* – and the derived term *folkeopplysning*, have been interpreted in two different ways: as ‘enlightenment *of* the people’, or ‘enlightenment *by* the people’, where only the former has been based on a certain universal approach to culture in accordance with Bennett’s suggestion about the civilising potential of European high art. The enlightenment *by* the people is more open in its valuation of culture, implicitly negating the idea of one universal culture in favour of the more relativistic idea of several cultures, which is more in line with the ideas of Herder and Humboldt. Accordingly,

⁶⁶⁶ Williams (1998).

⁶⁶⁷ Bennett (1995).

Vestheim coined the concept of object versus subject approach to *folkeopplysning*.

With reference to Øystein Sørensen, the nation building project in nineteenth-century Norway was, in Chapter Four, referred to as a hegemonic battle in terms of getting 'control of a society's intellectual life purely through cultural means'.⁶⁶⁸ Several historic blocs: the Statists, the National Romantics and the Populist Nationalist, which perceived the path to *Bildung* in different, albeit related, ways were hegemonic at different times during the nineteenth century. No matter whether these blocs took an object or a subject approach to *Bildung*, there was a reforming dimension to them. The Populist Nationalist project, which I have argued leaned more towards a subject approach was, for example, as concerned with discipline and reform (possibly even more so) than the object focused measures of the Statists. Most of the latter's initiatives in the field of culture, like the establishment of the Drawing-school and the National Gallery, were unashamedly elitist and the *Bildung* remit of these measures did not extend beyond guarding 'the good taste and the good art',⁶⁶⁹ primarily for the middle and upper classes. The Populist Nationalist initiatives on the other hand, and their efforts to create consensus around the construction of a new pure Norwegian language, the alternative subject focused educational system through the *folkehøgskole* and the foundation of the Society for the Promotion of *Folkeopplysning*, were, despite largely being made outside of the state apparatus, arguably all

⁶⁶⁸ Sørensen (2001), p. 20.

⁶⁶⁹ Solhjell (2004b), p. 462.

administrative programmes. With reference to Tony Bennett in Chapter Two, I referred to these as programmes that ‘act on the social’.⁶⁷⁰

As can be observed throughout my exposition in Chapters Four to Six, a subject and object approach to *Bildung* are not mutually exclusive and both these paths to *Bildung* have co-existed in the Norwegian *Bildung* discourse. According to Oliver Bennett, as mentioned in Chapter One, they are both essentially ‘culturalist’ in that they both accord culture a key role in personal and social transformation.⁶⁷¹ So when the Statists of the nineteenth century took the Arnoldian view that it was the great European cultural heritage originating in Denmark and further south that was best suited for *Bildung* purposes, and in the words of Welhaven, that the light should always shine from above,⁶⁷² this coexisted with the Romantic Nationalists’ celebration of the peasants’ own culture, but where the elite was still the governing strata. Hence, the Romantic Nationalists’ subject approach to *Bildung* was, at this stage, only half-baked because the populace was not entirely trusted to define their own culture in the spirit of what in the 1970s would be referred to as a cultural democracy. Such a subject approach would not receive a stronger following until the Populist Nationalist representation of concepts like the ‘people’ and the ‘nation’ became hegemonic during the second half of the nineteenth century and where the role of the elite was abandoned because the people were deemed to be able to manage themselves. This manifested itself in cultural policy measures like the efforts to construct a new Norwegian

⁶⁷⁰ Bennett (1998b).

⁶⁷¹ Bennett (1996), p. 7.

⁶⁷² Seip (1994), p. 284.

language based on what most people actually spoke and an independent school-system (the *folkehøgskole*), which rejected a Danish curriculum and attempted instead to make knowledge about local culture its starting point.

Vestheim argues that the ideas harboured within these subject focused traditions profoundly influenced the cultural policy discourse of the Labour movement of the 1930s. One of the prime objectives of this movement was to make the working classes conscious of their own culture, but in tandem with an object approach with the aim to gain control over and reap the perceived benefits of being exposed to the culture mediated through established cultural organisations and institutions. It is during this period that the field of culture becomes a distinctive policy concern: championed by the Labour movement both outside and inside of government. Already here we can see a desire by the Labour movement to manage cultural resources to 'regulate ways of life'.⁶⁷³

However, the period between the 1930s (or more specifically after 1945) and the publication of the first proper Green paper about cultural policy in 1973, was mostly characterised by the wish to democratise a certain universal culture, represented by the arts such as theatre, music by classically trained composers and musicians and the visual arts. The approach to *Bildung* is mostly object focused.

⁶⁷³ Bennett (1998b), p. 272.

It is not until the 1970s that we see the emergence of a clearly articulated *Bildung* discourse, from which the understanding that *Bildung* could be facilitated through culture became a key rationale. So central was this understanding that I refer to the first green papers (the *kulturmeldinger*) and their reception in parliament as being dominated by a *Bildung* discourse. As mentioned above, the *Bildung* discourse in these policy papers harbours a strong disciplining aspect where the lack of values in society is lamented and where people's need for access to culture in order to facilitate growth is emphasised. The forces of commercial culture, on the other hand, are lamented and the national culture is perceived to be under threat.

The key responses to this threat in policy-terms are both to facilitate a cultural democracy based on co-determination, a wide definition of culture, decentralisation and the emphasis on participation, as well as to continue the efforts to democratise culture by facilitating access to the 'professional' arts. In fact, both these representations harboured a belief in cultural policy as social policy. As mentioned in Chapter Four, Tony Bennett suggests that institutions like museums have traditionally been coined partly as disciplinary alternatives to the alehouse.⁶⁷⁴ Similarly, the measures to facilitate a cultural democracy were equally coined as a response to a fear of the increasing value deficit in society and people's need for human growth, partly as a counter-weight to the commercial cultural industries. Indeed, in the 1970s and 1980s, the cultural

⁶⁷⁴ Bennett (1998a), p. 125.

democracy rhetoric almost permeates the *Bildung* discourse. This changes in the 2000s when the 'battle' against commercial culture is perceived as lost, and this culture is accepted as less harmful, which indicates a subject representation of *Bildung* with respect to the cultural industries. Similarly the idea of a uniform common culture is abandoned in favour of the development of a culture based on diversity and complexity.

So, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, an object and a subject approach to *Bildung* were represented side by side, albeit the former ascending in the 1990s and 2000s. What is noticeable, though, is that - with the exception of the voices from the Progress Party, which formed an alternative discourse - all constituencies, across political party-lines - both in government and parliament (over the thirty years I have charted), as well as the bureaucratic apparatus of the Ministry of Culture - appear to subscribe to both *Bildung* approaches.

The mentioned shift in attitude to commercial culture in the Green paper of 2003 and its reception in parliament, where such culture is perceived more positively are not, according to my account in Chapter Seven, echoed in DKS. The DKS discourse brands commercial culture again as a force of anti-*Bildung* not having the same transforming power as the 'professional arts': consequently the latter is still needed as an alternative.

8.1.2 *Bildung* in DKS – a Civilising Mission?

Hence, DKS is inherently about not only servicing, but also policing a certain culture, and it harbours a concern about the uneven distribution of cultural capital amongst children. This is particularly evident in DKS's preoccupation with children 'learning' the arts, or helping them gain cultural competence in order to even out differences, in other words to democratise the children's *dannelses*-potential. It is risky to conclude whether the culture provided by DKS can be classified as bourgeois or middle-class, but it is surely 'official' or 'certified' and it excludes popular commercial culture which, based on cultural consumption statistics presented in Chapter Seven, is the culture consumed by most people most of the time. In its aim to democratise children's *dannelses* potential, DKS fits in with a long tradition in Norwegian cultural policy, which has had the democratising of culture as its objective. This predates the 'new' cultural policies of the 1970s which instead aimed to civilise by means of facilitating a cultural democracy.

DKS is firmly committed to making children and young people favourably inclined to a pre-defined set of cultural and artistic expressions, which do not only exclude commercial culture, but which are coined in opposition to it. I have, admittedly somewhat ambiguously, referred to this culture, which translates as the 'professional arts' as 'dominant'. DKS has as one of its prime objectives to create consent around this 'dominant' culture: not necessarily to cement any power-relations, but in order to assume a cultural, moral and ideological leadership about which culture is superior

in facilitating *Bildung*. This superior positioning of the 'professional' arts, compared with commercial culture is upheld by discursive practices that institutionalise their exclusive *Bildung* potential. Such practices exclude both commercial culture and the participation in activities that define culture widely beyond the 'professional arts'.

DKS is also programmed by an elite, where the children themselves, or indeed their parents, have little influence over its programming. Instead, the government steps in and substitutes for those parents who have a small book-shelf and who do not have the necessary resources (financially, socially or intellectually) to engage with their children culturally in a *Bildung* productive way. Hence, weak links in the governmentality-chain are addressed, and DKS attempts to rectify the unequal cultural provisions that different children are granted at home. This is what Tony Bennett with reference to Foucault calls a technology of behaviour management.

A cultural policy rhetoric that targets young people dates all the way back to the first Green papers of the 1970s. However, the DKS-discourse differs from the *Bildung* discourse of the 1970s and 1980s in acknowledging that the battle to prevent young people engaging with commercial culture has now been lost. However, its project to provide alternatives so as to prevent the descent into a culturally relativist intellectual anarchy fuelled by the power of commercial culture, echoes the warnings uttered in the general *Bildung* discourse before it

represented a more positive approach to commercial culture in the 2000s. The fear of such a cultural anarchy is an inherent dimension of the DKS-discourse.

Hence, whether successful or not, the civilising mission as a cultural policy rationale in Norway is not disappearing: if anything it is intensifying. DKS is explicitly set up to offer alternatives to the commercial culture that children and young people are mostly inclined to consume in their spare time: a commercial culture, which is branded as anti-*Bildung*. DKS signifies a return to an object approach to *folkeopplysning*, very much in accordance with how Oliver Bennett coined the civilising mission as a response to the superior value of European high art. The hegemonic project of DKS is not exclusively preoccupied with European high art, but strives to achieve consent around a 'certified' culture, which is coined implicitly on what it excludes: the popular, commercial and the participatory.

The object focused civilising mission rests on some significant understandings about the transformative powers of the arts, which are held up by powerful discursive practices. This is the subject of the next section.

8.2 The social impacts of the arts: crude instrumentality or an abstract faith?

This dissertation concludes that what has been termed ‘the civilising mission’ has been, and still is, a central rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy. However, as mentioned in the Introduction Chapter, Jim McGuigan argues that cultural policy is increasingly informed by a market discourse, and that state intervention in the cultural field is informed by a market reasoning, where the prime objective is to offer people (as customers) what they want.⁶⁷⁵ Peter Duelund goes even further and argues that traditional cultural policy goals like education and enlightenment had been replaced by the notion that people should be offered experiences. Similarly a key objective was now to achieve turnover and profit, and hence the intrinsic values of the arts and culture had been ‘colonised’ by financial and political concerns.⁶⁷⁶ Neither McGuigan nor Duelund’s description of the status quo leave much room for a paternalistically imposed path to *Bildung*, but instead trust people to make their own judgements about the culture they would like to engage with, free from a cultural offering determined by public policy makers. Let me attempt to demonstrate how the *Bildung* discourse sits in the context of this alleged hegemonic market discourse.

8.2.1 Is cultural policy conquered by market forces?

In Chapter Three, I made reference to some of Oliver Bennett and Eleonora Belfiore’s earlier work and I concluded that these works

⁶⁷⁵ McGuigan (2004).

⁶⁷⁶ Duelund (2003).

harboured a concern for the autonomy, and intrinsic values, of the arts, as well as uneasiness with contemporary cultural policy's alleged lack of concern with cultural value.⁶⁷⁷ To this could also be added Clive Gray, who argues that cultural policies are increasingly suffering a 'burden of expectation' whereby they should 'host a solution to problems that are originally economic, social, political or ideological (or some combination of these)'.⁶⁷⁸ In the Nordic countries this diagnosis of instrumentality has been echoed by scholars like Per Mangset, Geir Vestheim and Peter Duelund.⁶⁷⁹

These writers observe (and to an extent lament) that public cultural policy has increasingly become guided by evidence-based policy-making, and that this puts the arts, in particular, under pressure to demonstrate its social impacts, instead of being celebrated as an end in itself.

As mentioned in my introduction to this dissertation, Belfiore and Bennett acknowledge that the arts have secured a prominent position in society and that this is due to the understanding that they can transform lives. This is exemplified well by DKS, which rests on such an understanding. However, as mentioned in Chapter Three, according to Belfiore and Bennett, despite having been given such a prominent place in society, the arts are also marred by an alternative narrative of beleaguerment, due to the above-mentioned transformative powers being hard to substantiate or

⁶⁷⁷ Bennett (2005); Belfiore (2002); Caust (2003).

⁶⁷⁸ Gray (2007), p. 206.

⁶⁷⁹ Røyseng (2007), p. 230; Mangset (1992); Vestheim (1994 and 1995); Duelund (2003).

prove. The increasing lamentation of the so-called instrumental use of the arts (or culture), also represents this sense of beleaguerment.

It is the threat against the arts being celebrated as an end that triggers cries against the politicisation of, and excessive pressure and demands on, arts policy. As mentioned in Chapter Three, such cries can be found amongst both arts advocates outside and within academia, for example by the likes of John Tusa. All these voices contribute to this discourse of beleaguerment, which can be perceived as a response to the alleged ascendancy of the market discourse as pointed out by McGuigan.

8.2.2 Marketisation discourses

As outlined in Chapter Six, I concluded that the *Bildung* discourse in Norway exists alongside two alternative discourses: the marketisation discourse and the Progress Party discourse. McGuigan argues that a consequence of the ascendancy of the market discourse is that publicly funded organisations must increasingly behave like private businesses. There is an indication in my empirical material that, from the 1990s at least, this kind of reasoning was also evident in Norway. The marketisation discourse was brought to bear with the Green papers of the 1980s, and emphasised that eventual increases in the financing of that part of the cultural sector, which normally received public funds, had to be sourced from the private sector. Similarly increased efficiency was encouraged through the introduction of performance indicators. In the 2000s a closer interaction between the cultural sector and the business

sector was encouraged and it was argued that an active cultural sector would act as a competitive advantage for Norway. However, none of this contradicted the *Bildung* discourse: in fact this discourse was not really about cultural policy rationales in the first sense, but focused more on how the cultural sector should be managed.

Having said that, the Ministry of Culture has published other policy papers, which help to nuance the idea that cultural policy is dominated by a *Bildung* discourse. This pertains particularly to the way the government has identified the cultural sector's potential contribution to economic growth and how it can collaborate more closely with that part of the business sector, which is not primarily concerned with the production of the symbolic, aesthetic or artistic,⁶⁸⁰ as well as to how in recent years it has attempted to 'upgrade' the valuation of art-forms or artistic genres, which traditionally have been perceived as popular or commercial.⁶⁸¹ These include two papers on the economic conditions and public support for the Norwegian film-industry (KUL (2004) and KUL (2007b)), one on interactive leisure software (or computer games) (KUL (2008a)) and one on the support for rhythmic music, (KUL (2008b)), and finally one paper on the collaboration between culture and business (KUL (2005)). However, I would argue that none of these counter the continuous existence of a

⁶⁸⁰ For a more extensive discussion on how to define industries as cultural and creative as opposed to other industries, see; David Hesmondhalgh and Andy C Pratt, 'Cultural Industries and Cultural Policy, in *International Journal of Cultural Policy* 11.1 (2005), p. 6.

⁶⁸¹ Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2004. St.meld. nr. 25 (2003-2004): *Økonomiske rammebetingelser for filmproduksjon*, Oslo. (KUL (2004)); Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2005. St.meld. nr. 22 (2004-2005): *Kultur og næring*, Oslo. (KUL (2005)); Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2007 St.meld. nr. 22 (2006-2007): *Veiviseren: For det norske filmloftet*, Oslo. (KUL (2007b)); Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2008. St.meld. nr. 14 (2007-2008): *Dataspill*, Oslo. (KUL (2008a)); Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2008. St.meld. nr. 21 (2007-2008): *Samspill: Et løft for rytmisk musikk*, Oslo. (KUL (2008b)).

strong *Bildung* discourse. KUL (2005) for example does not suggest that public cultural policy should change, but that cultural policy and business policy should remain separate, with separate objectives, tools and impacts. The main objective of cultural policy is still, according to this paper:

to encourage cultural and aesthetic diversity, stimulate artistic quality and innovation, preserve and secure cultural heritage and enable all citizens' access to a rich and diverse cultural offer. [...] The development of the cultural sector should be guided by the demand of artistic and culturally professional quality and not commercial interests.⁶⁸²

Similarly, the other papers do not, in my view, threaten the *Bildung* discourse either: KUL (2004) and KUL (2007b) call attention to the importance of public support for the production of Norwegian films 'of a certain quality', which reflects a Norwegian way of thinking and promotes Norwegian culture and its traditions,⁶⁸³ whereas KUL (2008a) argues for the importance of giving children and young people access to 'games of high quality based on the Norwegian language and culture'.⁶⁸⁴ The only exception is perhaps KUL (2008b), which explicitly argues that the already mentioned rhythmic music, 'should be given equal status to other musical forms in terms of recognition and importance'.⁶⁸⁵ This indicates an increasing subject focused response to the challenges posed by the commercial cultural industries, similar to that found in KUL (2003a), and

⁶⁸² KUL (2005), p. 6.

⁶⁸³ KUL (2004), p. 7; KUL (2007b), p. 7.

⁶⁸⁴ KUL (2008a), p. 6.

⁶⁸⁵ KUL (2008b), p. 7.

sits perhaps less comfortably next to the *Bildung* ideas that inform DKS.⁶⁸⁶

Nevertheless, based on the material that I have collected (especially about DKS) I will still argue that despite the government's recent focus on art-forms that traditionally fit within a commercial industrial context and its focus on the cultural sector's potential contribution to other business-sectors, the object approach to *Bildung* is still strong in Norwegian policy-rhetoric. Hence, if there is a trend towards an increased celebration of popular culture's stimulating potential, this is far from the whole picture. The democratisation of culture and its objective to give access to the (professional) arts still has a profound position in Norwegian cultural policy, where the key objective is to facilitate *Bildung*. DKS, for example, harbours strong ideas of which cultural manifestations should be given priority, and this is far from related to children and young people's own 'demand'.

I mentioned above that the narrative of beleaguerment, as outlined by Belfiore and Bennett, is characterised by a lament over the increasingly instrumentalised employment of the arts as a means for other purposes

⁶⁸⁶ Sigrid Røyseng has also observed that the legitimacy of popular culture has increased in cultural policy papers over the last couple of decades, for example, through support schemes for popular music and comic strips. However, this changed perception of the value of popular culture is in KUL (2003a) explained by the population's increased level of education, which allegedly makes people prone to accept more sophisticated content, also within 'the cultural industries and popular culture'. Hence, popular culture is no longer perceived as one discreet artistic field. Instead, some genres have been given higher status and are: 'redefined by being embraced by the morale positive valuations that normally the arts are favoured by', Røyseng (2007), p. 239. In other words, parts of popular culture become 'artified'. However she continues: 'Those parts of popular culture, which do not reach high enough on this scale, are hit just as mercilessly as before by moral devaluation', Røyseng (2007), p. 23.

than the art work itself. However, are not cultural policies or public interferences in the field of culture instrumental by definition?

8.2.3 What kind of instrumentality?

The conclusion that the arts now are being applied as an instrument to such an extent that their autonomy is threatened and no longer celebrated for their intrinsic value, have triggered unease and consequently been the focus of much writing and scholarly works within the field of cultural policy studies. However, Sigrid Røyseng takes issue with this conclusion and argues that to refer to cultural policies as instrumental implies that they are governed by utilitarian principles, which 'reduce culture to a useful tool, which is awarded little value by virtue of itself'.⁶⁸⁷ Such narratives would, according to Røyseng, partly be fuelled by discourses that advocate marketisation, which, according to Jim McGuigan, as mentioned above, dominates contemporary cultural policy. She argues that, in a Norwegian context, rather than having threatened the position of the arts, the increasing 'cultural turn' in the business sector, in the public sector's regeneration and integration efforts, the health sector and so on, signifies instead a deep respect for the arts and their alleged transforming potentials.⁶⁸⁸

Røyseng labels the new cultural policies that are a consequence of the mentioned 'cultural turn' as 'ritual' and argues that these are informed by an abstract faith in their transforming potential rather than a crude

⁶⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 230.

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 231.

measurable calculated interest.⁶⁸⁹ This assumption that something actually happens to people when they are exposed to the arts seems, according to Røyseng, to be firmly rooted in Norway's cultural policy discourse. However, what eventually happens is rarely articulated explicitly.⁶⁹⁰ It is rather understood as given according to the discursive practice of *Bildung* as mentioned above. Given this lack of explication it is of course also difficult to formulate concrete impacts that can be measured.

However, some cultural policies, at least in the UK, are explicitly instrumental in the sense that they aim to reach tangible 'non-cultural' objectives. As mentioned in Chapter Three, it might be relatively easy to identify such cultural policy decisions, whereas it might be more difficult to grasp, in practical terms, policies that are entirely occupied by culture as an end in itself. As mentioned in Chapter Six, KUL (1992) referred to the arts' ability to 'act as a critical corrective' and as a 'protective means against habitual thinking and social stagnation' as part of their 'intrinsic' value.⁶⁹¹ It is therefore pertinent to ask whether these alleged powers of the arts are part of their valuation as ends in themselves, and that they are only valued instrumentally, when their alleged transformative impacts are articulated more explicitly as measurable. Due to this conundrum, I suggested in Chapter Three that it is perhaps more fruitful to refer to instrumental cultural policy as a matter of degree rather than as an absolute.

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 230.

⁶⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁹¹ KUL (1992), p. 24.

Measuring the social (or economic) impacts of cultural activities is an expected consequence of the increasing application of evidence-based policy-making, which, according to Belfiore and Bennett, developed in the 1990s. Such policy-making implies that decisions are based on pragmatic evidence of impacts as opposed to ideologies or values. However, cultural policies prior to the advent of this alleged new evidence-based paradigm were also designed to achieve results, no matter how intangible.⁶⁹² I have argued that both policies designed to achieve a cultural democracy and the policies designed to democratise culture were to a large extent based on the idea to facilitate *Bildung*, with the intention to civilise. Both these policy objectives subscribe to the understanding that culture (however defined) has a transformative potential, but not necessarily in a crude measurable sense.

8.2.4 The abstract faith in the transformative powers of the arts

DKS falls into this category, which hinges on an abstract faith in the transforming impacts of the arts. This is not sought measured, for example through a decrease of bullying in the school-yard or through the children's improved academic achievements. Instead it fits in with a tradition of attempting to civilise the population, not on a measurable micro-level, but on an aggregated level, for the population as a whole: particularly for those children who come from families with low cultural capital.

⁶⁹² In fact, as mentioned in Chapter Six, the cultural policies of the 1970s were explicitly articulated as forming an integral part of social policy.

Hence, according to my understanding, DKS is not a scheme that instrumentalises the arts in a crude sense, but more a 'ritual' cultural policy to follow Røyseng's terminology. The lack of measurable evidence has not prevented the Norwegian *Bildung* discourse from underlining its transformative powers. Both the two DKS green papers KUL (2003b) and KUL (2007a) for example, were unequivocal about the arts and culture's capacity to influence each individual's (who come into contact with it) personality and quality of life.⁶⁹³ Former minister of culture Valgerd Svarstad Haugland echoed this when she argued that the objective of DKS first and foremost was to make children and young people grow as people and fellow human beings.⁶⁹⁴ However, the discourse deals with this *Bildung* rather metaphorically as a faith, as opposed to resting on claims that can be substantiated through impact studies. The measurement of *Bildung* impacts (or other impacts) is almost absent from both the DKS-discourse and the wider *Bildung* discourse. In fact, the *statssekretær* Yngve Slettholm argued that there was no need to refer to research and that everybody would share the understanding that the arts have strong positive transformative powers.⁶⁹⁵ This understanding rests as much on what is not said (or what does not have to be said) about the arts' *Bildung* potential as on what is explicitly uttered. Again, this silent understanding is a strong discursive practice.

Furthermore, DKS does not support the idea of an artistic decline, which fuels and account of widespread relativism, and which Oliver Bennett

⁶⁹³ KUL (2003b), p. 15; KUL (2007a), p. 8.

⁶⁹⁴ Valgerd Svarstad Haugland, interviewed 12th April 2007.

⁶⁹⁵ Slettholm (2004).

suggests was presented as a powerful narrative of cultural pessimism, either. Instead, DKS sets out, in my opinion, to offer an alternative to the relativist cultural industries with the objective to make children and young people experience 'proper' art to prevent their descent into a culturally relativist anarchy.

McGuigan argues that the discourse of the market has gained the upper hand in public cultural policy, whereas other cultural policy scholars like Caust, Belfiore, Bennett, Duelund and Gray suggest that the arts have been made subject to an instrumentality to such an extent that their intrinsic value is under threat. Hence, similar to McGuigan's claim that the market rationale is in its ascendancy within cultural policy discourse, it might perhaps be pertinent to suggest that the understanding that the arts are beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened is gaining a rather dominant position amongst cultural policy scholars. However, as mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Mangset et. al. have lately suggested that some of the alleged 'transformation processes' that the above-mentioned authors appear to have observed might have been overestimated.⁶⁹⁶ My research findings appear to indicate that this might be the case, at least in a Norwegian context.

My conclusion is that whether Norwegian cultural policy has become increasingly instrumental depends on how this instrumentality is defined. Accepting that all cultural policies are initiated to achieve *something*, then

⁶⁹⁶ Mangset et. al. (2008), p. 3.

this something has to a large extent in Norway been to facilitate people's *Bildung*, both on an individual level and for society as a whole, and this is increasingly based on the abstract faith in the transformative power of the arts. If by instrumental we mean the wish to achieve tangible and measurable outcomes in accordance with neo-liberal evidence-based policies, then DKS appears to buck the trend. There is still a significant space for policies that aim to civilise the population on a generic, not necessarily measurable, level and this is epitomised by DKS. Hence, the conclusion that Norwegian cultural policy is entirely governed by a tangible utility calculating rationale is in my view questionable.

But why is it then that different scholars appear to reach such different conclusions when analysing the same policy objects? I shall suggest that this is related to the scholars' positions in the field they are investigating and their subjectivity, which might lead to epistemological obstacles. So also with me, and this, as well as some suggestions for further research, is the topic of the final section.

8.3 Limitations of this study and issues for further research.

Both Belfiore and Bennett on the one hand, and Røyseng on the other, appear to have made similar observations: that there is a strong understanding of the arts' transformative powers both in the UK and Norway. However, the interpretation of how this impacts on the arts in terms of the extent to which they are treated as a policy-instrument

seems to vary significantly. Where Belfiore and Bennett argue that the arts occupy a 'fragile position in public policy'⁶⁹⁷ because their alleged transformative powers are so hard to substantiate, Røyseng concludes that the arts (and culture) are given a central position in society because any societal problem can find 'healing powers' in them. Hence, Røyseng does not read the ritual cultural policy primarily as a threat to the autonomy of the arts. There might be two reasons why Belfiore and Bennett on the one hand, and Røyseng on the other, reach different conclusions: because the normative platforms from which they conduct their analysis differ, or because there are significant differences between Britain and Norway. The validity of the latter hypothesis, which would appear to indicate that a scheme like DKS is made subject to less of the imperative of evidence-based policy-making than in Britain, is difficult to assess given that this project does not include a comparative study of the two countries.⁶⁹⁸ Hence, I must leave that aside, but I would like to reflect a little over the normative platform from which researchers operate.

8.3.1 The values of the cultural policy researcher

First I should declare that my own approach to the study of the civilising mission in Norway was not informed by a perceived threat to the intrinsic values of the arts. As pointed out in Chapter Three, my research interest has been informed by a critique of the assumptions on which the ideas of the alleged intrinsic values of the arts rest, as well as an investigation into how culture has been used to civilise. This might of course have coloured

⁶⁹⁷ Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 5.

⁶⁹⁸ This could however be an interesting follow-up to this project.

my research question, research approach, readings and selection of empirical material. This might also explain the different conclusion between Belfiore and Bennett versus Røyseng, the latter of whom had to undertake what she termed epistemological breaks in order to be able to objectify her research object.⁶⁹⁹

As mentioned in Chapter Three, cultural policy studies is an academic field which, almost by definition, is informed by the subjective values of its researchers, who might find it difficult to 'objectify' the area they are investigating. I referred to Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant who stressed that any researcher should reflect on how the research questions she raises might easily be the product of the very same object that is the focus of the research.⁷⁰⁰ This is particularly relevant for much cultural policy research, including this project, because, as argued by Røyseng, it appears as if many cultural policy scholars associate strongly with what she terms the values of the field of the arts and culture.⁷⁰¹

Not all cultural policy researchers do of course subscribe to these alleged values, but my observation, as outlined in Chapter Three, is that many researchers in the field of culture, and perhaps particularly the arts, have some personal affinity with the field they are researching.⁷⁰² Evidently only based on anecdotal evidence, I assume for example that few cultural policy researchers subscribe to the Progress Party's liberalist take on

⁶⁹⁹ Røyseng (2007), p. 79.

⁷⁰⁰ Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992).

⁷⁰¹ I outlined how Røyseng perceives these values in Chapter Three.

⁷⁰² This is of course not exclusive to cultural policy studies, but can be found in other area of public policy-making, like health, education and development policies.

public cultural policy. Belfiore and Bennett also reveal their values when they argue, as mentioned in Chapter Three, that impact studies do not 'engage with the real purpose of the arts', and that the arts' eventual economic and social impacts 'are not the primary characteristics of the aesthetic experience'.⁷⁰³ The platform from which they conduct their intellectual interrogation, is hence based on the normative idea that the arts should be celebrated and nourished as an end.

This distances them from a more instrumental policy-maker (and scholar) like Augustin Girard, who was so influential on the cultural democracy movement of the 1970s and who argued that only a cultural policy that was 'explicitly associated with a number of ultimate ends accepted by society'⁷⁰⁴ could take its place as an equal next to social and economic policy. Such a subscription to the idea that cultural policy should put human and social qualities, if not before then at least on a par with artistic ones, might imply a different perception of the value of the arts and what is instrumental and what is not, compared to somebody who is more inclined to celebrate what they would refer to as the intrinsic values of the arts. I am instinctively sympathetic to Girard's position, and this might of course act as my epistemological obstacle.

Furthermore, a potential shortcoming of this project is that it engages primarily with policy rhetoric the way it is manifest in policy reports and other so-called 'grey' literature, or indeed empirical data-collections

⁷⁰³ Belfiore and Bennett (2008), p. 7.

⁷⁰⁴ Girard and Gentil (1983), p. 23.

amongst policy-makers and other elites. The way I have collected and analysed my material will of course be informed by my research question, which again might be informed by my own personal conviction about how culture should be valued. The analysis of policy rhetoric might be carried out at the expense of rigorous empirical studies of the actual consequences of shifts in the rhetoric; not only the impact on audiences, but the impact on culture and cultural provision itself. Without in-depth studies of how changes in policy rhetoric impact on both the conditions of culture and how it is largely valued, cultural policy researchers are limited to making their conclusions on the rhetoric only. Mangset et. al. argue that cultural policy researchers perhaps should focus more on ‘actual, substantial structural changes’ in the field of culture than reducing their research to focus on rhetorical statements only.⁷⁰⁵ I mentioned very briefly in the conclusion of Chapter Six that the increased attention given to cultural democracy in the 1970s did not, in monetary terms, happen at the expense of funding to institutions primarily mediating the high arts. In fact, the funding of such institutions grew steadily at the same time as the subject focused cultural democracy rhetoric almost permeated the *Bildung* discourse, which might indicate that in monetary terms the object approach to *Bildung* has been hegemonic all along. A research design like mine, which exclusively focuses on policy rhetoric, would not capture such an observation.

⁷⁰⁵ Mangset et.al. (2008), p. 3.

8.3.2 Other limitations of this study

There are perhaps two other limitations to this project: one relating to my theoretical framework, and the other to my empirical data collection. I have consciously selected a limited theoretical framework in order to shed light on the extent to which Norwegian cultural policy has been and still is informed by the mission to civilise its populace. In terms of ideas about the function of culture (particularly the arts), Belfiore and Bennett's already mentioned book on the origins of the value of the arts, presents a substantial selection of thinkers dating all the way back to Plato's *Republic* published 2500 years ago.⁷⁰⁶ Such an extensive (and impressive) literature review was unfortunately beyond the scope of my project. However, rather than tracing intellectual trajectories, my project focuses on whether the civilising mission has been a rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy and none of the four thinkers that I drew upon from eighteenth and nineteenth-century Germany and Britain were chosen for their documented influence on Norwegian thinking on culture. Instead the rationale for my selection was these scholars' power to illuminate. But my theoretical framework might have been strengthened by a larger (or different) selection of theorists.

It must also be acknowledged that my data-material is limited, certainly in terms of the informants that I interviewed. I could have interviewed more people from the constituencies that I chose to focus on: politicians, artists

⁷⁰⁶ Belfiore and Bennett (2008).

and central elites in the arts field. As I have outlined in Appendix One I could also have included other constituencies.⁷⁰⁷

8.3.3 Suggested further research

As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, KUL (2003a) abandoned the idea of a uniform common culture in favour of the development of a culture based on diversity and complexity. This has become a much prioritised topic during the current government in Norway, and policy makers are increasingly coming to terms with Norway becoming more complex in ethnic terms.⁷⁰⁸ This has triggered some reflection into how this impacts on cultural policy, and a recent Green paper asked: how can the society of the majority facilitate minority groups' ability to participate in and continue to develop their own cultural activities? On the other hand, the paper asked to what extent should minority-cultures become integrated in the society of the majority's own established schemes and institutions, and how should established culture reflect a multicultural reality?⁷⁰⁹

This, in my view, demonstrates that the object and subject approach still continues to play out in the government's policy-rhetoric, where both

⁷⁰⁷ Similarly, I did not make the more recent Green Papers published by the Ministry of Culture on the economic conditions and public support for the film industry (KUL (2004) and KUL (2007b)), on interactive leisure software (KUL (2008a)), on the support for rhythmic music (KUL (2008b)) and on the collaboration between culture and business (KUL (2005)) subject to the same in-depth analysis as I did with the general Green Papers presented in Chapter Six. Neither have I made a more in-depth study of a phenomenon equivalent to DKS relating to more commercially oriented culture (for example, the government's film-funding scheme).

⁷⁰⁸ As an example, 2008 was designated the Norwegian Year of Cultural Diversity by the Ministry of Culture.

⁷⁰⁹ Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2006. St.meld. nr. 17 (2005-2006): *2008 som markeringsår for kulturelt mangfold*, Oslo (KUL, 2006). (KUL (2006)).

approaches are being considered. Cultural democracy was not necessarily referred to in this context, but this is essentially about the extent to which the culture of ethnic groups that have established themselves more recently in Norway and added to its social fabric should be reflected in cultural programmes decided by elite decision-makers and curators, or the extent to which these groups should be allowed to devise their own programmes. These are topical issues, which deserve more research-focus and I believe that much of the theoretical framework developed in this thesis can be applied for this purpose. For example, how does the civilising mission play out in such policies, which potentially have an integration-dimension to them?

8.4 Summary

In this concluding chapter I have briefly summarised the findings of my empirical study of Norwegian cultural policy rhetoric from about 1814 up to today. I have demonstrated how the civilising mission, through the ambition to facilitate *Bildung*, has been a key rationale behind Norwegian cultural policy and still is. Although a subject and object approach to this *Bildung* have traditionally sat comfortably alongside each other the object presentation has taken precedent during the 2000s. The exception to this has been the discourse's perception of commercial culture, which since 2003 has been accepted as less harmful. However, this changed understanding of the *Bildung* potential in commercial culture is not brought forward into the DKS-discourse, which is based on a pure object

representation of *Bildung* where commercial culture is branded as a force of anti-*Bildung*. Hence, I have concluded that the civilising mission is not disappearing as a Norwegian cultural policy rationale: rather, it is intensifying.

I continued by attempting to situate my findings within the context of what appears to have become a dominant position amongst cultural policy scholars: that the arts have become beleaguered and that their intrinsic values are threatened. I repeated that there is a marketisation discourse within Norwegian cultural policy discourse too, and the government has since 2004 published several Green papers, which it can be argued contribute to such a discourse. However, despite this discourse I concluded that an object focused *Bildung* rationale still stands strong in Norwegian cultural policy and that this is manifest through DKS. This is based on an abstract faith in the transformative powers of the 'professional arts' and not informed by a more crude instrumental interest based on measurable evidence. I therefore concluded the middle section of this chapter by arguing that there is still a significant space in Norwegian cultural policy for the civilising mission and that this is epitomised by DKS.

In the final section of the chapter I reflected first on some of the limitations of this study, namely the potential bias caused by my own subjective position, and that this could be exacerbated by the fact that I am analysing cultural policy rhetorically only. This was followed by a critique

of my use of theory and empirical data. I finally suggested very briefly some suggestions as how this project could give birth to future research projects.

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APPENDIX 1: Empirical material

As mentioned in the introductory chapter to this thesis, my empirical study of Norwegian cultural policy rationales can be divided into three parts. Firstly I gave a historical study covering the period between 1814 and 1973 based on secondary sources by other scholars. This was followed by an in-depth textual analysis of key policy documents covering the period between 1873 and 2003, as well as the reception of these papers in parliament. Finally, I provided a comprehensive analysis of the rationales behind the national arts in school programme DKS. In this appendix I shall outline my choice of this empirical information and how and why I chose the material that I did.

An historical approach to policy contexts: 1814 - 1973

Chapters Four and Five focus on how concepts of power influenced the formation of a Norwegian identity from the early nineteenth century onwards, taking different positions and understandings in this discourse as the starting point, and applying these to locate the priorities in the cultural policy discourse for the period between 1814 to 1905 and 1905 to 1973 respectively. This is based on secondary literature, presenting studies carried out by other scholars such as political scientists, historians and cultural policy scholars, some of whom have made it a more or less explicit project to focus their analysis on discourses and representations.

There are several reasons why this focus on secondary literature is being adopted for the focus of the first 159 years (1814 to 1973) of this study. First, it is beyond the scope of this project to analyse archived documents dating all the way back to 1814. Secondly, it is of course also more difficult to get access to documents the further back the focus of the research stretches. Finally, the reason why I chose 1814 as the departure point is because this was the year when Norway left its 400 year long union with Denmark and instead entered into a union with Sweden and received its constitution in the process. This paved the way for a real nation-building project in Norway, although it did not gain complete independence from Sweden and recognition as a sovereign state amongst states until 1905.

I mentioned in the introduction that it is commonly acknowledged that the state in Norway did not intervene in the field of culture in a coherent and structured way until 1945.⁷¹¹ Similar observations have also been made for several other Western countries. Cummings and Katz, for example, argue that, although for some countries state patronage for the arts date back many years, it has since 1945 'expanded tremendously'.⁷¹² This is not to say that the state in Norway did not intervene in cultural affairs prior to 1945 (or in other countries for that matter). Dag Solhjell for example takes issue with what has been termed 'the conventional wisdom' amongst Norwegian cultural policy researchers, who in his view, over-

⁷¹¹ Vestheim (1995); Mangset (1992); Bakke (2003).

⁷¹² Milton C. Cummings and Richard S. Katz, 'Government and the Arts: An Overview', in Milton C. Cummings and Richard S. Katz, *The patron state: Government and the Arts in Europe, North America, and Japan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 4.

emphasise 1945 as the time when Norway developed its cultural policy. Such a conception, he argues, undermines the fact that Norway was both made subject to a conscious and structured cultural policy during 1940-1945, which were the years when Norway was under Nazi occupation, but also that Norway has had a clear state-sanctioned cultural policy all the way back to 1814.⁷¹³

I have chosen not to include the period 1940 – 1945 in my analysis because this period was characterised by a political climate of totalitarianism and dictatorship and was not representative of the period afterwards, and I have not found any suggestions that the policies of this regime has been influential on policy measures after 1945. I believe that the cultural policies of the Norwegian Nazi regime, which has not been researched much,⁷¹⁴ merits a separate scholarly analysis.

The reason why I chose 1973 as the cut-off point for my reliance on secondary sources was because this was when the Norwegian government published its first green paper devoted to an articulation of the nation's cultural analysis in general terms.

⁷¹³ Solhjell (2005), pp. 143 – 155.

⁷¹⁴ Dahl and Helseth (2007).

Policy discourses: 1973 – 2003

For the cultural policy discourse from 1973 until 2003, the study will be based on primary analysis of texts⁷¹⁵ from governmental documents, originating from the Ministry of Culture as well as their reception in parliament. This analysis will be presented in Chapter Six.

When identifying public documents like policy papers, an immediate question is which documents (or even type or classification of documents) contain information that can help address the research question? The focus of this research project covers a wide field of Norwegian cultural policy (apart from sport and media), on a national level as formulated by the Ministry of Culture, making use of a wide definition of culture. Such policies are drafted in a range of documents and it is not necessarily obvious where to start. Neumann argues that the researcher should look for those texts, which are canonical 'in that they are often referred to and cited from. They have a wide reception, which in itself implies that they play a prominent role in the discourse'.⁷¹⁶

I could therefore quickly conclude that the six green papers that the government has published over the 30 years charted here - the so-called *kulturmeldingene* - were amongst the most seminal public policy documents in terms of their impact on scholarly work. However, these are not the only green papers published by the Ministry of Culture. Just a

⁷¹⁵ 'Text' is here referred to as text the way we refer to it in everyday speech as signs on paper (or screen), not as defined in Chapter Three as any signifier of meaning.

⁷¹⁶ Neumann (2001b), p. 52.

quick glance on the ministry's website shows that it has produced green papers on a range of cultural topics over the last year. During the time-period 1996 and 2003 the government also published papers focusing on the impact of digital technology on archives, libraries and museums, the use of the Norwegian languages in the public sector, the government's involvement in the welfare of artists and the arts-community and the government's relationship with voluntary organisations.⁷¹⁷ Since 2003 the government has also published green papers, amongst others, on the economic conditions for film production, the development, conditions and challenges for culture-based business development and the collaboration between culture and business, cultural diversity, on policies for the performing arts and on making an 'effort' for popular music. None of these papers have in my view been as seminal as the *'kulturmeldingene'* and I have therefore decided to base this textual analysis on the latter only, where the last of these published in 2003 will act as a cut-off point for this selection of green papers. However, I am contextualising my findings against some of these other green papers in the conclusion

Each of the green papers presented by government receive a written response by the corresponding parliamentary committee, before both the green paper and this response are made subject to a debate in parliament, where the secretary of state responsible for culture also participate. My empirical material is thus made up of altogether 14

⁷¹⁷ See

<http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/kkd/dok/regpubl/stmeld.html?id=578&epslanguage=NO> for a list of the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs' Green Papers from the parliamentary year 1996-97 until today.

documents (six green papers, four written responses by the parliamentary committee, and four sets of minutes from the parliamentary debates).⁷¹⁸ A list of all these papers can be found in Appendix Two. Each of the six papers and their responses is presented in more detail in Chapter Six.

Cultural policy documents, like other policy documents, contain information about policy priorities and policy instruments such as the funding of schemes, projects or institutions, various forms of incentives (for example in the area of tax), legislation (for example in the area of copyright) and so on. Policy papers may also reveal reasons and rationales based on values or ideologies on which policies or policy-suggestions are based. These may be spelt out explicitly or may be embedded in the text, through the already mentioned representations, and it has been my objective to identify whether these representations form part of a discursive practice, in other words, how they are being institutionalised through, for example, repetitive interpretations and production. It may be relatively easy to locate such discursive practices: they may be revealed by their assumed acceptance, or by the representations being 'taken for granted'. Other times this might be more subtle. The frequency of their appearance is also an indicator.

⁷¹⁸ Two of the Green Papers were additions to a paper that had been published one or two years before. The reason for this was that a change in government took place soon after these two first Green Papers had been published and the new government decided to publish an additional paper to supplement and correct the previous one. This happened both in the 1970s and the 1980s, and given that parliament had not had the chance to respond to the paper before the government changed and a new Green Paper was published, it gave a joint response to the two papers and the debate in parliament referred also to the two papers. This is why there are only four parliamentary responses and four minutes from the parliamentary debates, despite there being six Green Papers.

The objective of this research is partly to learn more about the relationship between discourses and social or political practices. However, by analysing policy documents it will only be possible to say something about social practices within the institution whose public documents are being analysed, in this case the government and its ministries responsible for culture as well as parliament. Hence, these policy papers were supplemented with interviews of elites, some of whom represented a different sphere from the political one: that of the arts-sector. The rationale for the selection of these will be explained below. In addition to talking to these interviewees about the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy generally, they were particularly questioned about the art in school programme, DKS.

Arts policy in the 2000s: Den Kulturelle Skolesekken

According to Dahl and Helseth, Den Kulturelle Skolesekken (DKS) is one of the most ambitious cultural policy programmes in Norway in recent years.⁷¹⁹ It is a programme that aims to make all children in primary schools get in contact with, what is being termed, the 'professional arts'. Although the objectives of DKS are presented in more detail in Chapter Seven, I will here present the one object, which caught my attention and which made me conclude that the programme is highly suitable for an analysis of the civilising mission in Norwegian cultural policy. The scheme states as one of its overarching objectives:

⁷¹⁹ Dahl and Helseth (2006), p. 260.

to facilitate the access to and familiarisation of a wide range of artistic and cultural expressions for pupils in primary school in order for them to be favourably inclined towards these [artistic and cultural expressions].⁷²⁰

I should emphasise here that I did not choose to focus on DKS in more depth until after I had carried out the textual analysis of policy documents as presented above. During this phase of my research, I detected a tendency of the cultural policy discourses of the 1990s and 2000s to return to an object approach to enlightenment where the path to *Bildung* would be achieved through, what Norwegian policy-papers often refer to as, the 'professional arts', and I also detected a certain civilising dimension to this. DKS might not be representative of Norwegian cultural policy as such, but it can be argued that it is like a microcosm of that part of Norwegian cultural policy, which attempts to promote and disseminate these 'professional arts'. I found that many of the same rationales that appear to govern contemporary arts policy more generally were also rationales for DKS.

However, although DKS sits comfortably in a Norwegian cultural policy context, which for so many years has had as its most important objective to democratise culture, this programme is unique in that its provision of culture is compulsory and something the pupils cannot avoid. If there is a civilising dimension to Norwegian cultural policy, it could be argued that this scheme goes even further in accomplishing this mission than other policy measures, and I thus concluded that the discourses on which the

⁷²⁰ KUL (2003b), p. 9.

scheme was based would serve as good empirical material. Having said that, it must be declared that this third part of my empirical investigation is primarily concerned with arts policy, defining culture more narrowly as signifying practices (by professional artists it should be added), rather than cultural policy in the wider sense. This is due to the already mentioned general shift in focus to an object oriented path to growth in Norwegian cultural policy discourses in the 1990s and 2000s.⁷²¹ I should emphasise that it is the rationales behind DKS, that are the focus of my research, not how efficient or effective this programme have been in reaching its objectives. I am not evaluating DKS.

I had initially also meant to analyse another major public investment in the cultural field: the decision to build a major opera house in Oslo to house *Den Norske Opera* (DNO), a building which was opened in April 2008. However, it became clear to me, when I started analysing my empirical material, that to include two examples implied a level of complexity, both in terms of the sheer volume of information that I had to deal with but also because of the multifaceted dimension that this would bring to my study that was beyond the scope of the project. Hence, I chose to mostly ignore the data material I had collected regarding this project, although references to this were made both in the initial letters I sent to potential interviewees as listed in Appendix Four and within the interview guide I used for my field research as listed in Appendix Five.

⁷²¹ This shift is documented in detail in Chapter Six.

Policy papers

The policies and rationales for DKS are laid out in two green papers, one published by the Ministry of Culture and one by the Ministry of Education and Research (*Kunnskapsdepartementet*). They were both published in 2003 and formed a natural starting point for the search on the rationales behind DKS as they are contained in public policy papers. These papers were complemented by a third paper published by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs in 2007. Reading these papers, it soon became apparent that they were again informed by other papers dating back to 1996. These were an action plan for the aesthetic subjects and the cultural dimension in schools jointly published by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry for Church, Education and Research. Another green paper that was referred to in the two above-mentioned green papers was on a common youth policy published by the Ministry of Children and Equality (*Barne og likestillingsdepartementet*) in 2002. I also quote extensively from a speech by statssekretær in the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, Yngve Slettholm, where he accounts for the rationales behind DKS and the values he hopes that it will fulfil.⁷²² In addition to this, I found some factual information on DKS's own web-site. Together these papers laid the foundation for my textual analysis of the rationales on which DKS was based.

Although I open up the analysis to also include contributions to the discourse, or alternative counter-discourses, from opponents to the

⁷²² Thanks to Nina Vestby for prompting me towards this speech.

government in office at the time, by including the parliamentary response documents and the debates in parliament, these documents only chart politico-bureaucratic contributions. However, an exclusive focus on policy documents published by governmental bodies, and responses by politicians in parliament would exclude eventual other contributions to the discourse. I therefore decided to supplement my analysis of policy documents with in-depth interviews of a sample of elite-informants drawn both from the politico-bureaucratic sphere and from the arts sector.

DKS – Interview informants and interview guide

The rationales for conducting interviews of key people in the field are three-fold. In addition to the weaknesses of defining discourses too narrowly as I have just mentioned, conducting interviews following a semi-structured interview-guide enabled me to follow up on some of the observations I had made through my analysis of the policy papers. As already mentioned, discourses can gain their resilience and longevity by assumptions, knowledge and truths that are internalised and taken for granted. They don't necessarily have to be spelt out or explained frequently because of how they have become internalised. Given that I observed several assumptions in this vein, I thought it would be useful to attempt to unpick them further through asking questions and follow-up questions in cases where the assumptions were still left opaque. Finally, I wanted to secure the validity of my results by triangulating more than one type of data collection, both sampling policy papers and conducting interviews.

The discursive practices, on which commonly accepted rationales for Norwegian cultural policy can be understood, might draw their contributors from a range of constituencies. At the top of my head I could think of several: civil servants and elected politicians, cultural administrators, critics and academics, the media, teachers and parents (with particular reference to DKS), managers and investors in the private business sector and 'ordinary people' (encompassing more or less everybody else). For my empirical study I chose to focus only on the first three of these constituencies or categories: civil servants/elected politicians, cultural administrators and critics/academics. It would have been interesting and pertinent to also have included the media and ordinary people. However, due to limited resources, I abandoned a focus on ordinary people and the media in favour of in-depth interviews with elites from the political, bureaucratic, intellectual and cultural sector. I chose these three categories because, through my observations, they contribute more explicitly to cultural policy discourses in the public sphere than the other groups. I mentioned earlier that this is not an ontological research project that aims to prove generalised truths. This is reflected in this aspect of the chosen research methodology, which focuses on discourses collected through qualitative interviews of relatively few informants. In her doctoral dissertation, Jenny Johannisson writes that the consequence of the qualitative approach for her research is that it is geared towards *understanding* rather than *explanation*.⁷²³ It is a closer understanding of what the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy are

⁷²³ Jenny Johannisson, *Det lokala möter världen: Kulturpolitisk förändringsarbete i 1990-talets Göteborg*, (Högskolan i Borås og Göteborgs universitet: Valfrid, 2006), p. 28.

and what they are based on, partly using DKS as an example, which is the purpose of this project. A list of all the interviewees, including material from interviews I have actually made use of in the project is listed in Appendix Three.

These interviews, which all lasted between one and two hours went generally well and the results are analysed in detail in Chapter Seven. However, three of the four interviewees drawn from the category critics/academics and who were all academics, appeared to be less informed or less interested and engaged in the subject matter than the others. The transcripts from these interviews did not unveil much in terms of rationales behind cultural policy generally or DKS particularly. I therefore decided to exclude the data-material that I had gathered from all the informants in the category critics/academics and was thus left with twelve informants drawn from the categories arts-administrators and politicians/bureaucrats. The interviews with these twelve interviewees have all been included in my empirical data material.

As mentioned above, my definition of culture for the purpose of this project is wide. As I demonstrate in Chapter Six, such a wide definition complies with what has been a common principle behind Norwegian cultural policy, at least since the 1970s. However, the informants that I sampled from the cultural sector all represented what in Norwegian policy-discourse is often referred to as the 'professional arts' (a term I interrogate in further detail in Chapter Six and Seven). All my informants

from the cultural sector had a background in institutions, which either represented or mediated performing art-works created or performed by artists who had been formerly trained in their field, and who all relied on public subsidies. None of my informants from the cultural sector represented artists or organisations who are described as commercial or who mediate popular culture, and neither were they employed in broadcasting or acted as cultural 'animateurs' in the wider sense. The reason for this is that DKS is a scheme which aims to bring pupils in primary school in contact with the 'professional arts'. This is upheld by a discourse that advocates how the professional arts can facilitate human growth in this context, and I was interested in interrogating how elites in the cultural, politico-bureaucratic and academic/intellectual fields contribute to this discourse.

Four of the interviewees sampled from the politico-bureaucratic constituency were or had been either elected members of parliament or appointed cabinet ministers. Two had served for the Labour Party, one for the Conservative Party and one for the Christian Democratic Party. As will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, the textual analysis of the green papers showed a remarkable consensus about most of the common understandings on which the rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy are based. However, an alternative understanding advocated by the members of the Progress Party was significantly at odds with that of the government and most other parties in parliament. I shall not go into more detail about this here, but it could be argued that a natural consequence

of this would be to include representatives of this understanding in my sample. However, I deliberately chose not to do so, because I was more interested in the main representations within the discourse or indeed the main discourse. Accounting for this, I believe the sample of four politicians (or ex-politicians) I interviewed, safeguards a valid political spread.

Please refer to Appendix Five for an English translation of an interview guide that was sent to informants about two weeks before each interview, outlining approximately what the interview would cover. The interview guide was pilot-tested on a colleague who has long experience as an arts manager in Norway. This same interview guide was followed for all the sixteen interviews. However, the interviews were loosely structured and took the shape of conversations. Hence, both I as the interviewer and the interviewees often strayed from the guide. The questions asked in relation to DKS and to cultural policy more generally were informed both by my textual analysis of general green papers on cultural policy as well as my analysis of policy papers pertaining to DKS. I was particularly interested in gauging the informants' opinion about whether and why DKS was an important scheme, as well as the type of impacts that could be expected from it and particularly how it related to *Bildung*. Given that I had detected a return to an object oriented approach to enlightenment in more recent cultural policy discourse, I wanted to converse with the respondents on, how they related these object/subject approaches to each other and, which of them they thought most important. I also wanted

to gauge their opinion on how cultural policy is aiming to relay a set of values and to what extent such policies should contribute to *Bildung*, and finally whether a public cultural policy should have as its objective to restrain commercial culture and offer alternatives.

When meeting the interview subject and entering the room where the interview was to take place, I often got the feeling that the interviewee signalled that the two of us had a common understanding in terms of how we perceived the value of the arts. After all, and in terms of what I mention in Chapter Three, most researchers in the field of cultural policy, and particularly arts policy, might, in accordance with Solhjel's description of cultural policy researchers, designate specific values to the arts as needing protection and that this can be obtained through social-democratic and welfare-ideological principles. I shall leave the details about the results of my empirical interview-study for Chapter Seven, but just mention here that I got the impression that most of my interview subjects subscribed to the above-mentioned ideas based on social-democratic and welfare-ideological principles themselves, but more importantly that they also assumed that I did. This posed a significant challenge, particularly during interviews with respondents who I had met before in an arts-management or arts-promotional context. The only strategy I could level in face of this challenge was to avoid being dragged into conversations that were not related to the actual interview and otherwise acting as objectively and professionally as possible. I must admit though that this was difficult and there might of course have been

times when this has slipped. This might create a potential flaw in the data material in that I as a researcher might be perceived to verify a certain discourse that the interviewees themselves want to be part of, which again might influence what they say. However, given that the subject was being approached from several angles through the number of questions I asked, and the fact that most of the interviews lasted around ninety minutes, I believe that in practice for the purpose of this project this was in the end less of a problem.

All interviewees had the opportunity to read my analysis of their interviews and to make comments about any quotes that I included.

Summary

In this appendix I have presented my empirical material, which was divided into three parts, and which more or less corresponds with the focus of Chapters Four to Seven: an analysis of cultural policy discourses as presented in secondary literature, covering the period between 1814 and 1973, followed by an analysis of key policy texts from the period 1973 and 2003 which are finally complemented by in-depth interviews with elites from the politico-bureaucratic and arts sector, focusing both on cultural policy rationales in general and rationales behind the arts in school project *Den Kulturelle Skolesekken* in particular.

APPENDIX 2: Policy documents consulted, with abbreviations

Abbreviation	Document	Description
KUD (1973)	Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1973. St.meld. nr. 8 (1973-74): <i>Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeid</i> , Oslo.	Green paper from the Ministry of Church and Education Affairs, entitled: 'About the organisation and financing of the cultural sector'.
KUD (1974)	Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1974. St.meld. nr. 52 (1973-74): <i>Ny kulturpolitikk, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 8 for 1973-74 Om organisering og finansiering av kulturarbeid</i> , Oslo.	Green paper from the Ministry of Church and Education Affairs (addition to KUD (1973)), entitled: 'New cultural policy'.
KUK (1974)	Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1974. Innst. S. nr. 23: <i>Innstilling fra kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kulturarbeid og kulturpolitikk (St. Meld. Nr. 8 og nr. 52 for 1973-74)</i> , Oslo.	Response by the parliamentary committee of church and education affairs to KUD (1973) and KUD (1974).
FIS (1975)	Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1975. nr. 317: <i>1975 9. Januar – Kulturdebatt</i> , Oslo	Negotiations in parliament: 9 th January 1975.
KUD (1981)	Kyrkje og undervisningsdepartementet (KUD), 1981. St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): <i>Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra</i> , Oslo.	Green paper from the Ministry of Church and Education Affairs, entitled: 'Cultural policy for the 1980s'.
KUV (1983)	Kultur og vitskapsdepartementet (KUV), 1983. St.meld. nr. 27 (1983-84): <i>Nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken, Tillegg til St.meld. nr. 23 (1981-82): Kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra</i> , Oslo.	Green paper from the Ministry of Culture and Science (addition to KUD (1981)), entitled: 'New cultural policy assignments'.
KUK (1985)	Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1985. Innst. S. nr. 132 (1984-85): <i>Innstilling fra</i>	Response by the parliamentary committee of church and education affairs to

	<i>kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kulturpolitikk for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken (St.meld. Nr.23 for 1891-82 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 for 1983-84), Oslo.</i>	KUD (1981) and KUV (1983).
FIS (1985)	Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1985. nr. 203: 1985 28. Mars – Kulturpolitikken for 1980-åra og nye oppgaver i kulturpolitikken, Oslo.	Negotiations in parliament: 28 th March 1985.
KUL (1992)	Kulturdepartementet (KUL), 1992. St.meld. nr. 61 (1991-92): <i>Kultur i tiden</i> , Oslo	Green paper from the Ministry of Culture, entitled 'Culture in our time'.
KUK (1993)	Kirke og undervisningskomiteen (KUK), 1993. <i>Innst. S. nr. 115 (1992-93): Innstilling fra kirke og undervisningskomiteen om kultur i tiden (St.meld. nr. 61 for 1991-92 og St. Meld. Nr. 27 for 1992-93)</i> , Oslo.	Response by the parliamentary committee of church and education affairs to KUL (1992).
FIS (1993)	Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 1993. nr. 74: 1993 30. Mars – <i>Kultur i tiden</i> , Oslo.	Negotiations in parliament: 30 th March 1993.
KKU (1996)	Kulturdepartementet og Kirke-, Utdannings- og forskningsdepartementet (KKU), 1996: <i>Handlingsplanen Broen og den blå hesten</i> , Oslo.	Joint action plan by the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education and Research about aesthetic subjects and the cultural dimension in schools.
FKD (2002)	Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2002. <i>Innst. O. nr. 44 (2001-2002): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om forslag fra stortingsrepresentantene Per Sandberg og Ulf Erik Knudsen om lov om endring i lov 28. august 1992 nr. 103</i>	Proposal by the two MPs Per Sandberg and Ulf Erik Knudsen from the Progress Party to change the distribution of lottery money, with 50 per cent allocated to sports and 50 per cent to cultural causes.

	<i>om pengespill mv. (Etter at det er foretatt fondsavsettelser skal selskapets overskudd fordeles med en halvdel til idrettsformål og en halvdel til kulturformål), Oslo</i>	
BLD (2002)	Barne- og likestillingsdepartementet, 2002. St.meld. nr. 39 (2001-2002): <i>Oppvekst og levekår for barn og unge i Norge</i> , Oslo.	Green paper by the ministry for Children and Equality about adolescence and conditions for children and young people.
KUL (2003a)	Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. St.meld. nr. 48 (2002-2003): <i>Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014</i> , Oslo.	Green paper from the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled: cultural policy towards 2014.
KUL (2003b)	Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2003. St.meld. nr. 38 (2002-2003): <i>Den kulturelle skulesekken</i> , Oslo.	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled 'Den Kulturelle Skulesekken'.
FKD (2003)	Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2003. <i>Innst. S. nr. 50 (2003-2004): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om Den Kulturelle skulesekken St.meld. Nr.38 (2002-2003)</i> , Oslo.	Response by the parliamentary committee for family, culture and administration to KUL (2003b).
UDF (2003)	Utdannings- of forskningsdepartementet, St.meld. nr. 39 (2002-2003): <i>'Ei blot til Lyst': Om kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til grunnskolen</i> , Oslo.	Green paper by the Ministry for Education and Research about the arts and culture in and in connection with primary schools.
KUL (2004)	Kultur- og kirkedepartementet (KUL), 2004. St.meld. nr. 25 (2003-2004): <i>Økonomiske rammebetingelser for filmproduksjon</i> , Oslo.	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled 'Economic conditions for film production'.
KUF (2004)	Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen (KUF), 2004. <i>Innst. S. nr. 131 (2003-2004): Innstilling fra Kirke-, utdannings- og forskningskomiteen om</i>	Response by the parliamentary committee for church, education and research to UDF (2003).

	<i>kunst og kultur i og i tilknytning til grunnskolen ('Ei blot til lyst') St.meld. Nr.39 (2002-2003), Oslo.</i>	
FKD (2004)	Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2004. <i>Innst. S. nr. 155 (2003-2004): Innstilling fra familie-, kultur-, og administrasjonskomiteen om kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014 St.meld. Nr. 48 (2002-2003), Oslo.</i>	Response by the parliamentary committee of family, culture and administration to KUL (2003a).
FIS (2004)	Forhandlinger i Stortinget (FIS), 2004. <i>nr. 68: 2004 1. April – Kulturpolitikk fram mot 2014, Oslo.</i>	Negotiations in parliament: 1 st April 2004.
KUL (2005)	Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2005. <i>St.meld. nr. 22 (2004-2005): Kultur og næring, Oslo.</i>	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled 'Culture and business'.
KUL (2006)	Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2006. <i>St.meld. nr. 17 (2005-2006): 2008 som markeringsår for kulturelt mangfold, Oslo.</i>	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled '2008 as a year of celebration of cultural diversity'.
KUL (2007a)	Kultur- og kyrkjedepartementet (KUL), 2007. <i>St.meld. nr. 8 (2007-2008): Kulturell skulesekk for framtida, Oslo.</i>	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs about the future of DKS.
KUL (2007b)	Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2007. <i>St.meld. nr. 22 (2006-2007): Veiviseren: For the norske filmloftet, Oslo.</i>	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled 'The Pathfinder: for the Norwegian film effort'
FKD (2008)	Familie-, kultur- og administrasjonskomiteen (FKD), 2008. <i>Innst. S. nr. 200 (2007-2008): Innstilling fra familie- og, kulturkomiteen om kulturell skulesekk for framtida, St.meld. Nr. 8 (2007-2008), Oslo.</i>	Response by the parliamentary committee of family, culture and administration to KUL (2007a).
KUL (2008a)	Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2008. <i>St.meld. nr. 14 (2007-</i>	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled

	2008): <i>Dataspill</i> , Oslo.	'Computer games'.
KUL (2008b)	Kultur- og kirke departementet (KUL), 2008. St.meld. nr. 21 (2007-2008): <i>Samspill: Et løft for rytmisk musikk</i> , Oslo.	Green paper by the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs, entitled 'Harmony: An effort for rhythmic music'.

APPENDIX 3: Interviewees

Interviewee	Position
Ellen Horn	Currently Artistic Director for Riksteatret (The Norwegian Touring Theatre) and since June 2007, Chair of the Board of Den Norske Opera (The Norwegian Opera and Ballet). Was Minister for Culture between March 2000 and October 2001.
Valgerd Svarstad Haugland	Currently church-warden in Oslo. Was Minister for Culture and Church Affairs between October 2001 and October 2005.
Britt Hildeng	MP for the Labour Party and member of the parliamentary committee for family, culture and administration.
Olemic Thommessen	MP and cultural spokesperson for the Conservative Party (Høyre) and member of the parliamentary committee for family, culture and administration.
Arne Holen	Project Director in the Ministry of Culture and Church Affairs.
Vidar Thorbjørnsen	Director, Department of Culture, Vestfold County Council. Often referred to as 'the father of DKS'.
Einar Solbu	Freelance consultant, previously Director for Rikskonsertene (the national touring organisation for music) and until January 2007 Chair of the Board of Den Norske Opera (The Norwegian Opera and Ballet).
Trond Okkelmo	Director of NTO (Association of Norwegian Theatres and Orchestras). Previously Managing

	Director for Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra.
Glen Erik Haugland	Composer. Previously Chair of the Norwegian Society of Composers.
Geir Johnson	Artistic Director of Ultima, Oslo Contemporary Music Festival
Aadne Sekkelsten	Manager of The National Touring Network for the Performing Arts.
Stein Olav Henrichsen	Artistic Director of BIT20 (a contemporary music ensemble) and Opera Vest (a contemporary opera company), Bergen
Ida Lou Larsen *)	Freelance theatre critique, writing for a range of Norwegian broadsheets.
Svein Bjørkås *)	Director, Music Information Centre Norway. Previously Head of Research, Arts Council, Norway.
Siri Meyer *)	Professor of Art History, University of Bergen.
Jostein Gripsrud *)	Professor of Media Studies, University of Bergen.

*) The interview transcripts from these four interviewees were excluded from the final analysis-sample.

APPENDIX 4: Email-letter to potential interviewees (English translation)

Egil Bjørnsen
Centre for Cultural Policy Studies
University of Warwick
Coventry
CV4 7AL
UK

To:

REQUEST FOR AN INTERVIEW IN CONNECTION WITH A RESEARCH PROJECT ABOUT NORWEGIAN CULTURAL POLICY GENERALLY AND DEN KULTURELLE SKOLESEKKEN/DECISION TO BUILD A NEW VENUE FOR DEN NORSKE OPERA PARTICULARLY.

I am currently working on a doctoral project at the Centre for Cultural Policy Studies, University of Warwick, UK. The project has as its working title: *A Civilising Mission? Rationales behind Norwegian cultural policy*. I wish to illuminate the underlying ideas that Norwegian cultural policy is based on through an analysis of Norwegian cultural policy from 1945 up until the present time. Some might perhaps argue that this is obvious and already illuminated thoroughly. I am of the opinion however that, even though several researchers have lately studied the history of Norwegian cultural policy, most studies have first and foremost focused on how Norwegian cultural policy has developed throughout the years and less on why it has developed the way it has. This is where my focus lies.

I wish to interview central politicians, administrators, employees in cultural organisations and cultural commentators about two specific cases in more recent Norwegian cultural policy: den Kulturelle Skolesekken, and the decision to build a new venue for Den Norske Opera in Oslo. Thus, I hereby take the liberty to enquire whether you have the opportunity to be interviewed and thus share your opinions and understandings about these cases with me for my doctoral project.

I am particularly interested in the two mentioned cases because as well as being amongst the largest Norwegian cultural policy initiatives in recent years, they have high symbolic value and expose some of the contradictions and tensions, which Norwegian cultural policy is characterised by. *Den kulturelle skolesekken* for example, has both an instrumental objective to 'give children in primary school cultural capital and cultural competence, which will improve their ability to meet the challenges in society', as well as an ideal objective, which implies that 'knowledge about and understanding of the arts and culture is an important and basic knowledge, which is important that children and young people obtain' (St. meld. Nr. 38 (2002-2003) *Den Kulturelle Skolesekken*). My other case: the decision to build a new venue for Den Norske Opera in Oslo was subject to intense debate in the 1990s, and

even though this debate appears to have calmed down somewhat by now, I am of the opinion that the decision is still a good case for my project, which focuses on underlying ideas in Norwegian cultural policy.

In my interview with you I wish to understand what cultural policy significance you give to these projects, and which values you believe they are based on. I wish to carry out a relatively free and loosely structured conversation lasting about an hour to 90 minutes. The information that I collect through the interview will be included in my analysis material at an aggregated level and will be treated confidentially. I should bring to your attention the fact that I wish to record the interview. I would like to make contact in a few days by telephone and if you would be interested in being interviewed then I will give you further information about myself and my project. I will also, prior to the interview, send you a more detailed interview guide, which will indicate how I wish to structure our conversation. I believe that the time you eventually will set aside for the interview will be fruitful and interesting for both parts.

I am planning to spend the time between 12th and 20th April in Norway, and wish to make all the interviews during this time-period. I hope to be able to establish a more specific time for the interview when I call you in a few days' time.

I look forward to talking to you.

Yours sincerely,

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APPENDIX 5: Interview guide

Den kulturelle skolesekken (DKS)

1. What is, in your view, the objective of DKS?
2. Which values, in your opinion, does the DKS project attempt to disseminate?
3. In St.meld. nr. 38 (2002 – 2003) 'Den Kulturelle Skulesekken' it is stipulated that '*Art and culture has an intrinsic value and can have great impact on both each individual and society as a whole*'. Further on: '*Art and culture give experiences, which can have decisive impact on the development of each individual human being's personality and life-quality*'. Do you have any thoughts about how art and culture can have such an impact on children and young people?
4. In another green paper from the Ministry of Education and Research, St. meld. Nr. 39 (2002 – 2003) 'Ei blot til Lyst: About art and culture in and in connection with the primary school' it is argued that '*Cultural competence has both intrinsic values, big importance for increased life-quality and can contribute to qualifications for the future and for working-life*'. Further on it is stated that '*The school as a cultural pillar will be able to facilitate the development of the pupils' cultural competence as a part of a wider "dannelses"- and learning-process*'. The aim of DKS is partly to develop the pupils' cultural competence. How do you interpret cultural competence? Do you agree that it is important to develop pupils' cultural competence, and if so, why?
5. Can you say something about what type of artistic and cultural expressions DKS, in your opinion, should mediate? Why?
6. To what extent does DKS, in your view, represent the development of Norwegian cultural policy in later years?
- 7.

New venue for Den Norske Opera in Oslo

1. Do you agree that the building of a new opera-house was the right cultural policy decision? Why?
2. There has been political agreement in Norway across the board about the building of a new venue for Den Norske Opera, particularly in parliament. The only members of parliament who actively opposed it were the representatives from *Fremskrittspartiet*. Are you of the opinion that people who either express support for or reject this decision by taking either of these two stances implicitly reveal something about their attitude to the arts more generally?
3. In the green papers about the new opera-house it is stipulated explicitly that opera and ballet do not have long traditions in Norway and that therefore there is not a large audience for these art-forms today, and that it is important to develop a new audience for opera and ballet. Do you agree that this is important? If so, why?
 - What type of repertoire should Den Norske Opera programme when they move into the new building?
4. To what extent does the building of a new opera-house, in your view, exemplify the development of Norwegian cultural policy in recent years?

Cultural policy generally.

These questions relate to the cultural policies of the Norwegian state. However, you may want to answer with reference to the two already mentioned cases should you wish to do so. State cultural policy is here defined as arrangements that are implemented in order to support and regulate Norwegian culture in the widest sense.

1. Norwegian cultural policy has over the last thirty years both had as an objective to mediate the professional arts as well as to enable participation where the decisions about what should receive

support should be taken as close to the users as possible. Which of these objectives do you think is most important? Why?

2. To what extent does Norwegian cultural policy aim to mediate a set of values to people? If so, what type of values?
3. It is being argued from time to time that state cultural policy is about contributing to people's ['dannelse']. How do you define the notion ['dannelse']? Do you think it is important that cultural policy contributes to people's ['dannelse']? Why?
4. The green papers on cultural policy from the 1980s and 1990s emphasised that there were several dangers connected to an increased consumption of commercial culture. The cultural policy rhetoric of that time emphasised, to a large extent, the importance of countering these cultural impulses, as well as offering alternatives. Do you think that this is still important?
5. To what extent is Norwegian cultural policy, in your view, about protecting a Norwegian national culture? Should it?

APPENDIX 6: Norwegian governments: 1973 - 2004⁷²⁴

Period	Prime Minister	Parties (with party abbreviations)	Policy document
18.10.1972 - 16.10.1973	Lars Korvald (KrF)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democrats – KrF) • Senterpartiet (Centre Party – Sp) • Venstre (The Liberal Party – V) 	KUD (1973)
16.10.1973 - 15.01.1976	Trygve Bratteli (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	KUD (1974) KUK (1974) FIS (1975)
15.01.1976 - 04.02.1981	Odvar Nordli (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	
04.02.1981 - 14.10.1981	Gro Harlem Brundtland (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	KUD (1981)
14.10.1981 - 08.06.1983	Kåre Willoch (H)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Høyre (the Conservative Party – H) 	
08.06.1983 - 09.05.1986	Kåre Willoch (H)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Høyre (the Conservative Party – H) • Kristelig Folkeparti (the Christian Democrats – KrF) • Senterpartiet (the Centre Party – Sp) 	KUV (1983) KUK (1985) FIS (1985)
09.05.1986 - 16.10.1989	Gro Harlem Brundtland (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	

⁷²⁴ Source:

www.regjeringen.no/nb/om_regjeringen/tidligere/oversikt/ministerier_regjeringer/nyere_tid/regjeringer.html?id=438715&epslanguage=NO

16.10.1989 - 03.11.1990	Jan P. Syse (H)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Høyre (the Conservative Party – H) • Kristelig Folkeparti (the Christian Democrats – KrF) • Senterpartiet (the Centre Party – Sp)) 	
03.11.1990 - 25.10.1996	Gro Harlem Brundtland (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	KUL (1992) KUK (1993) FIS (1993) KKU (1996)
25.10.1996 - 17.10.1997	Thorbjørn Jagland (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	
17.10.1997 - 17.03.2000	Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democrats – KrF) • Senterpartiet (Centre Party – Sp) • Venstre (The Liberal Party – V) 	
17.03.2000 - 19.10.2001	Jens Stoltenberg (A)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour Party – A) 	
19.10.2001 - 17.10.2005	Kjell Magne Bondevik (KrF)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kristelig Folkeparti (Christian Democrats – KrF) • Senterpartiet (Centre Party – Sp) • Venstre (The Liberal Party – V) 	FKD (2002) BLD (2002) KUL (2003a) KUL (2003b) FKD (2003) UDF (2003) KUL (2004) KUF (2004) FKD (2004) FIS (2004) KUL (2005)
17.10.2005 -	Jens Stoltenberg (A)	Coalition between: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arbeiderpartiet (the Labour 	KUL (2006) KUL (2007a) KUL (2007b)

		Party – A) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senterpartiet (Centre Party – Sp) • Sosialistisk Venstreparti (The Socialist Left Party – SV) 	KUL (2008a) KUL (2008b)
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