East Asian Security and Its Non-East Asian Factors

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1. The Post-Cold War New World System

One hidden theme of this title is to explore the extent to which a regional cooperation specific to East Asia is possible when the processes of globalization and United States’ dominance of the world are taking place.

A striking phenomenon that has come about in the ten-odd years since the end of the Cold War is, as Joseph Nye Jr. pointed out, not just that the unipolar dominance by the U.S. has become clear and that transnational actors have emerged, but also that a new distribution of power in the world system has taken place at three levels, which are intertwined in a very complicated way. One sees a unipolar situation in the military field, a multipolar situation in the economic field, and a diffusion situation in the transnational field, with the role of soft power, in particular, becoming more and more apparent.1

In East Asia in this new phase, one can observe situations characterized by these phenomena such as: American unipolar dominance, the globalization of crisis due to the deep economic interdependence, threats of “non-institutional violence” called terrorism, and China becoming a regional great power. If the new world system is examined in a stratified way, “non-East Asian factors” for East Asia include more than just states or powers such as the U.S., Russia, and Australia.

2. East Asia and Its “Non-East Asian Factors”

First, it is necessary to ask the question of what constitutes “East Asia.” The question of what should be included in East Asia itself is a subject of political debate. The general practice is to consider East Asia to be composed of the countries of ASEAN +3 (Japan, China, and South Korea). The author also follows this and considers the Korean Peninsula, China, Taiwan, Japan, and the ten ASEAN countries to be included in East Asia. Mongolia, along with Russian Far East and Siberia, could be added to this.

The “East Asian Community” initiative put forward by Japanese Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi on January 14 2002 in Singapore, may bring about a debate about what constitutes East Asia. Koizumi defined Japan and ASEAN as “partners” who are “acting together, advancing together,” and promised to spare no efforts in cooperation for the reform, stability, and future of East Asia in order to make it a “community that acts together and advances together.” Concretely speaking, he advocated “an Initiative for Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership,” “an Initiative for Development in East Asia (IDEA)” and cooperation between Japan and ASEAN in the field of non-military security, such as energy and anti-terrorism. He stressed the openness of the East Asian Community and defined Australia and New Zealand as its “core members.” Simultaneously, he emphasized the strengthening of the Japan-U.S. alliance remarking “the role to be played by the United States is indispensable because of its contribution to regional security and the scale of its economic interdependence with the region.”2

However, it is said that the response to this initiative from South East Asian countries in general has been cool. The impression has generally been that there is little new or concrete in it, and that it was assumed to be set against the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area agreement. Moreover, there were doubts about the validity of the “flying geese pattern” model of economic development where Japan was supposed
to lead the Asian group. The biggest question likely involves the persuasiveness and validity of talk about “open regionalism” encompassing Oceania and the U.S., and something “smaller than APEC and bigger than ‘ASEAN plus three,’” in terms of economic development, stability and cooperation in East Asia.3

Let us confirm the following two points before concretely discussing “non-East Asian factors.” First, they include things that are not included in the regions and concepts of “East Asia,” as well as things that are not specific to East Asia. Second, they involve both actors and factors. In this paper, the following are considered as major non-East Asian actors and factors that may have a strong influence on regional relationships in East Asia:

**Non-East Asian elements**

**Actors:**
- States and regions: the U.S., Russia, Oceania, Europe, South Asia, Middle East, etc.
- International organizations: the U.N., multinational corporations, etc.

**Factors:** (not specific to East Asia)
- Globalization (including economic crises),
- Terrorism (religious and non-religious),
- Energy, etc.

As it goes without saying that the globalization of economic crises and religious and non-religious terrorism will greatly influence the future of East Asia, we will not discuss these issues. However, the energy issue should be touched upon here. At present, the Asia-Pacific region is dependent upon the Middle East for 80% to 90% of its oil supply. Furthermore, the volume of oil imports from the Middle East is expected to double by 2020. Deepening dependency on the politically unstable Middle East is a serious problem for the energy security in this region. In this sense, the Middle East could become a very important actor affecting the stable economic development of East Asia. Oil imports from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region in 1999 were 12.7 million barrels a day, accounting for 85% of its total oil imports (39% in the case of Western Europe and 25% in North America). The figure is expected to grow to 28.6 million barrels a day by 2020, accounting for 87% of the total (33% for Western Europe and 26% for North America).4

With these facts in mind, let us examine “non-East Asian factors,” with a focus on the U.S. and Russia, mainly from the standpoint on security issues.

### 3. American Hegemony and East Asia

U.S. Department of Defense has mentioned that America will remain as the predominant power in the Asia-Pacific region in its “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region” (often referred as “Nye Report”), that was published in February 1995 to reevaluate that of the post-Cold War. Let us look at the U.S. presence in East Asia. First, we will examine its economic dimension (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Shares of the U.S. and Japanese direct investments in East Asia (2001) (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Both Table 1 and 2 are made by Mr. Katsuhide Takahashi from JETRO Trade and Investment White Paper 2002 [JETRO Boeki Toshi Hakusho, 2002 nenban])

In summary, the East Asian region, excluding Japan, is dependent on the U.S. for more than 11% of its direct investments and 20% for its exports, and the shares in both categories of the U.S. are higher than those of Japan. Only in imports does Japan surpass the United States’ 12.6% by the shares of 17%. In other words, a look at investments and trade alone shows that the U.S. economic presence in East Asia exceeds that of Japan, and that the region remains economically dependent on the U.S. to a great extent.

What about the military presence? American military power accounts for 40% of the world’s total. According to Military Balance, the total international military expenditures in 1998 amounted to $803.7 billion, with the U.S. accounting for its 34%, at $273 billion, and if the U.S. and European NATO countries combined the amount jumps to 60%, at $454.1 billion. The Soviet Union (Russia), which was the leading military power of the world in the 1980s, spending $380 billion for military expenditures, spent only $64 billion and shrank to a medium level military power, although it ranked second as a single nation. In East Asia, Japan and China are by far the biggest spenders, with the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and India being other major military powers. As for countries outside the region, Australia cannot be ignored (see Figure 1).

The U.S. military presence in Asia is expanding through the bilateral military alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia. At present, there are 100,000 troops deployed in the region (37,000 in the ROK and 47,000 in Japan). The
American security network in East Asia also reaches Taiwan. There is even a view that the relationship with Taiwan is proceeding toward that of a semi-military alliance, as a large amount of weapons are being exported there.\(^5\)

To put it succinctly, although the U.S. is not a power “within the region,” it is much more than simply a power “outside the region” and it could even be said that it would be meaningless to talk about cooperation and security without taking the U.S. factor into account. However, for East Asian countries and people living there, it is important to consider what kind of relationship they will have with the American power and in what way they make the U.S. involved with East Asia.

### Figure 1 Military Expenditures of 5 Countries, 1985, 90, 95, 98

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>USSR</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
<th>S.Korea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>376.6</td>
<td>345.8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>303.7</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The U.S. has considered the great changes in the global distribution of power, expansion of transnational new issues such as terrorism and environmental problems, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the largest international issues. Thus it has been trying to restructure its global strategies accordingly. Cold-War strategies consisting of the forward deployment strategy and alliance strategy were reconsidered through the “Bottom-Up Review” in 1983, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in 1997, etc. As a result, reductions in the military budget and forces, a review of the modernization plan of weapons, and a restructuring of U.S. forces including the adoption of a posture of being ready to fight two major regional wars were taken place. The foreign policy strategy based upon this new defense strategy is
the “engagement and enlargement strategy.”

With regard to East Asia, the “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region” (often referred to as Nye Report) published by the U.S. Department of Defense during the Clinton administration on February 27, 1995, clearly presents a med-term American strategy for the post-Cold War era.6

The report states “For the security and prosperity of today to be maintained for the next twenty years, the United States must remain engaged in Asia, committed to peace in the region, and dedicated to strengthening alliances and friendships.” And even in the new century, “The United States' role as a force for regional stability remains central and has not diminished.” The most important point is that the U.S. promised to maintain a stable forward-deployed force of about 100,000 United States personnel in this region and to “strengthen our (U.S.) bilateral partnership with Japan which serves as the basic mechanism through which we work together to promote regional and global security” by quoting that “it is fundamental to both our Pacific security policy and our global strategic objectives.” Although it does not reject mechanism of multilateral dialogue, the basic claim is to maintain the U.S. presence in East Asia on the basis of its military power and alliance structure. It is still not long ago that a “redefinition” of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was conducted between the two countries based on this report.

Let us analyze at the strategic intention of the U.S., drawing from a paper written by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., the main author of the report who served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

In this paper, he advocates the strategy of U.S. leadership in East Asia, or “strategy of engagement and enlargement,” based on the following points:

(1) It should not be neglected that the American alliances in the region and the continued presence of substantial U.S. forces lies behind the East Asian economic prosperity.

(2) The U.S. presence functions as a stabilizer or “oxygen” for security deterring arms races and the emergence of any hegemon in East Asia, which is going through a period of power shifts and great instability with the emergence of China, the regeneration of Russia, the growth in Japan’s role, and the tensions on Korean Peninsula.

(3) Unlike Europe, multilateral institutions in East Asia is relatively weak. The U.S. is the only global political and economic power there. 7

The Nye paper dismisses objections that might be expected in the U.S. such as: the U.S. should be satisfied to be an Atlantic state; alliances are not necessary in the post-Cold War era; soft multilateral mechanisms are more effective than the alliances; a regional alliance like NATO should be created in East Asia; American capability to maintain big military force is questionable; the U.S. would be rejected economically even after shouldering huge costs, etc. He then declares that the strategy of maintaining U.S. leadership in East Asia is the best choice for both the U.S. and the countries of the region.

The Nye paper advocates the following as actual policies for leadership in East Asia:

(1) Reinforcing American alliances to identify their new basis after the Cold War.
(2) Maintaining U.S. forward-basis troop presence.
(3) Developing regional institutions.

One thing that stands out in the Nye paper is the central placement of the alliance strategy. He asserts that “multilateral activities complement our bilateral ties, but they do not diminish, nor can they replace, these important bilateral relationships.” He also states that U.S. leadership is intended to protect American interests, and that the alliance relationships backs up American economic interests in East Asia.

In sum, Nye asserts that “the United States is the critical variable in the East Asia security equation” and thus should remain in Asia for the next 20 years.

Then, is the U.S. strategy of leadership in East Asia, with the maintenance and enlargement of American national interests, can be accepted by East Asia? What kinds of possibilities and prospects could be drew by the premise of the above-mentioned U.S. presence and intention?


Since 9/11, the new “threats” of the combination of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have been forcing the U.S. to transform its world strategy for the second time in the post-Cold War era. After the bombing of Afghanistan and the naming of North Korea and Iraq as the “axis of evil,” a new U.S. strategy is taking shape as the Bush Doctrine. “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” released on September 20, 2002, by the White House, clearly declared that unipolar dominance would continue for a long time to come and that the U.S. would not hesitate to carry out preemptive strikes and unilateral action against new threats such as terrorism. The aggressive unilateralism of the U.S. based on the military capability is becoming more and more apparent.

The report states, without hesitation, that the U.S. is the world’s sole superpower, saying “our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military buildup in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States,” and “United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence.” It also asserts that the freedom and democracy is “a single sustainable model for national success” and made it clear that the U.S. would implement the following strategy against “threats”:

1. “As a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
2. “The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”
3. The U.S. will concentrate on “identifying and destroying the terrorists before [they] reach our borders. The U.S. will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists.”
4. The U.S. will work to expand NATO and strengthen the various military alliances of the U.S.

While stating the “the United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China,” a future rival, the report comments, in “pursuing advanced military
capabilities that can threaten its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path,” and does not forget to give a warning stating “our commitment to the self-defense of Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act.”

According to one Japanese military specialist, the new U.S. strategy can be characterized by:

(1) A restructuring of defense strategy from what based on threats to what based on capabilities and actual military distribution. Thus it can be called as strategic transformation.

(2) A “denial deterrence” of strengthening the deterrence effect by exercising the right of self-defense preemptively to destroy and prevent the threat when there is a sign of it. This differs from the deterrence strategy that U.S. has deployed before, which relies on punishment based on the assumption of the enemy initiating an attack.

He states that this unilateralism would have a sensitive effect on the U.S. allies such as NATO countries. Is this “denial deterrence” legal according to the international law and militarily rational? Does it lead the international society to further anxiety? By asking these questions, he reveals his concern on this issue.

It is impossible to deny the actual U.S. presence in East Asia. The U.S. will maintain its strategy of leadership in East Asia. It is involved in all the major security issues in East Asia, including those related to Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and transnational violence such as terrorism. It is also true that the U.S., and its military presence in particular, has functioned as a stabilizer in the strategic balance in East Asia.

However, it should also be pointed out that the U.S. is a major destabilizing factor in East Asia from the following reasons.

First, for the U.S., East Asia is a “space” for the maintenance and enlargement of its global power. U.S. has not formulated its strategy based on the issues specific to East Asia. This “American internationalism” may cause instability in the emerging, unshaped East Asia.

Second, the American East Asia policy was formed with a focus on China during the Clinton administration, and on Japan during the Bush administration. This caused instability in its policy and the relationship between Japan and China, the two major actors in East Asia.

Third, the U.S. security strategy after 9/11, as characterized by the absolute idealization of the model of freedom and democracy, “denial deterrence,” unqualified reliance on military power, etc., may lead East Asia, which is politically and culturally diverse as well as unstable, to confusion and confrontation rather than to stability.

6. Russia and East Asia

There is only a weak relationship between East Asia and Russia, which considers itself the major power of Eurasia. By the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost 40% of its territory and 24% of its population. By 2000, its GDP had recovered to only 80% of the level of 1992. Stagnation and confusion continue. It can be said that Russia has practically no economic presence in East Asia.

Russian forces, which numbered more than 2.8 million in 1991, was reduced 1.2
million by 1999, and are scheduled to be reduced further to between 800 and 850 thousand by the end of 2003. In the same time, paramilitary forces, such as border guards, are expected to be reduced by 600,000, and Far East Russian forces by 20%. The reason for these reductions is the costs. The ratio of military expenditures to GDP, which was 4.7% in 1992, has dropped steeply to 2.1%. Furthermore, some of the Far East Russian forces, which had already been cut back, have to be redeployed to Chechnya and Central Asia to deal with the conflicts there.

A Japanese Soviet Union specialist has assumed that Russian military power may take the form of (1) cold-war type military power, (2) nuclear superpower but small military power in the world; or (3) regionally major power but globally stands at medium level. He thinks that the possibility of Russia choosing the second option is the highest.13

What about Russian foreign policy? Russian (Soviet) foreign policy has traditionally been formulated on its relations with China. A new East Asian regional foreign policy was launched with the 1996 Vladivostok speech and 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech during the Gorbachev era, and there has only been a weak East Asia strategy. This situation has continued through Yeltsin and Putin eras.

In the paper written by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in February 1994 during Yeltsin administration, Asia was placed forth after the CIS, Europe, and G7 countries in Russian diplomacy’s priorities. After stabilization of the disorder along the border with China, the utmost priority in East Asia has been given to economic cooperation for the development of Siberia and the Far East. There is a view that the position of East Asia has fallen compared to the place it occupied during the former Soviet period.14

The same tendency can be observed in the Putin era. “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation” by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (approved by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, June 28, 2000) states that the goals of Russian foreign policy are:

(1) To preserve and strengthen its sovereignty and territorial integrity and to achieve firm and prestigious positions in the world community, most fully consistent with the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power,
(2) To influence general world processes,
(3) To create favorable external conditions for steady development of Russia, for improving its economy, and
(4) To form a good-neighbor belt along its borders.

It criticizes the unilateralism of the U.S. and basically demands to create a peaceful international environment led by the United Nations, with a focus on the enlargement of Russian economic interests. The ranking of regional priorities are:

(1) CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States),
(2) Europe (EU and NATO),
(3) U.S. (cooperation in disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in particular),
(4) ASEAN, China, India, Japan, South East Asia, and (5) Iran, Afghanistan, etc.15

In other words, Russia’s interest in and relationship with East Asia are minimal, and the regional goal does not go beyond economic cooperation. Russia has considered
its relationship with “the Great Power” China to be important, and concluded an agreement on “the Strategic Partnership” in April 1996 and a Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation in June 2001. As for Korean Peninsula, Russia is trying to build balanced relations with both North and South Koreas.

This ranking of priorities has not changed fundamentally since 9/11. The only change is that Russia now places high value on the regional role of ARF and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the regional regime it set up in June 2001 with Central Asian countries and China to fight against Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.16

Thus, the situation is that “the political and economic ties between Russia and Asia are still weak and Russia has not been recognized as ‘the great power in Eurasia’.”17 In East Asia, Russia is seen as just a medium sized power located outside the region, and its role is limited either as a promoting or disturbing factor in terms of regional cooperation. This situation will most likely continue as long as Russia remains busy with its domestic ethnic and religious issues, such as those in Chechnya. The following contention by one Chinese critique is persuasive: In addition to the weakness of its national power, Russia’s unique view on security and self-image in the world make it difficult for it to join the West for the time being, even if its society is westernized.18

7. Conclusion

Influence of the overwhelming power and intervention by the U.S. can work both as stabilizing and destabilizing factors in East Asia. Under such situation, the following two points should be made on cooperation and security.

The first point concerns the rights and wrongs of U.S. leadership (or hegemony). In his 1995 paper, Nye assumed the following three possibilities for the mid-term future directions of East Asia: (1) achievement of the balance of power. (2) leadership (or hegemony) of the U.S., and (3) creation of the community. He concludes that the second option is the best choice both for the U.S. and East Asia. Strengthening of the existing military alliances functions as the key element to accomplish it. When judging the rights and wrongs of U.S. leadership, with military alliances as the key element, East Asia should use the following yardsticks:

(1) Does it contribute to the political and economic stability of the region?
(2) Does it lead to the prevention and deterrence of regional conflicts?
(3) Does it make it possible for the entire region to respond to transnational and non-traditional threats such as terrorism effectively?
(4) Will it lead to regional cooperation and eventually to the growth of East Asian Security Community in the future?

As sources of threats and conflicts in East Asia in the near future, one can think of North Korea, Taiwan Straits, religious and non-religious or ethnic terrorism, a second coming of the 1997 Asian Economic crisis, etc. The most probable for the East Asia region may be an outbreak of a new Asian economic crisis. If this occurs, the most effective security measures for prevention and deterrence would not necessarily be limited to those of a military nature. East Asia should rather make quick strides toward the formation of a regional regime in non-military security field by members of the region.
The second point concerns issues related to military alliances. “Alliances are formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.”\(^{19}\) There have been various discussions since the end of the Cold War about the effectiveness and inevitability of alliances. The main reasons given for supporting alliances such as NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance involve “alliance as institution” and “alliance as public goods.”

However, in the assertion for U.S. leadership based on alliances as key elements, there is a strong motivation toward maintaining U.S. interests rather than the common interests of the region. It also carries a clear intention of fighting against either existing or potential “threats.” In other words, alliances have had a dual nature since the end of the Cold War: the function of fighting against threats on the one hand, and of preserving the security of the region on the other.

It is important to consider the following points when discussing security cooperation in East Asia: how to prevent the alliance from regressing to the counter-threat type (i.e., the Cold War type); and how to establish security cooperation for the common interests of the region. In this sense, the promotion of a “crisis-management type” non-military security cooperation would be a step forward. The following claim by a scholar should not be ignored: The biggest crisis expected in this region is the downfall of the Asian economy, including that of Japan. Complication of crises disordered by various issues are also foreseen. Thus, it is the “non-military management of non-military security” which has the vital importance.\(^{20}\) In any case, it is clear that the concept of “alliance” has entered a period to be reconsidered.

\(^{2}\) Prime Minister of Japan, Jun’ichiro Koizumi, “Japan and ASEAN in East Asia: A Sincere and Open Partnership (Higashi Ajia no nakano Nihon to ASEAN: Sotchoku na patonashippu wo motomete),” cited from, http://www.mofa.go.jp/jofaj/press/enzetsu/14/ekoi_0114.html
\(^{3}\) For local responses to the Koizumi initiatives, see: Kuroyanagi, Yoneji, “Japan and a Scenario for the Revitalization of ASEAN (ASEAN sai-kasseika no shinario to Nihon),” *World Affairs Weekly* (Sekai Shuho), Feb. 26, 2002, and so on.
\(^{5}\) Harry Harding, “Getting Along with Developed China (Yu fazhan de Zhongguo xiangchuu),” *Global Times* (Huanqiu Shibao), Aug. 8, 2002.
\(^{8}\) Ibid., pp. 94-95.
\(^{9}\) Ibid., p. 102.
\(^{10}\) Ibid.
\(^{12}\) Morimoto, Satoshi, “American Perception on Threats and Changes in Its Security
Strategy after the Cold War (Reisen-go ni okeru Beikoku no kyo ni ninshiki to anzen-hosho senryaku henka)," Japan Review of International Affairs (Kokusai Mondai), No. 511, Oct. 2002. Concerning the measures to be taken by Japan, etc., Morimoto writes: “Rather than becoming a small-scale alliance partner with the same functions with the U.S., it is wiser to explore the possibility to become a partner who can complement the functions that the U.S. lacks in the region.”

13 These facts are mostly based on, Research Institute for Peace and Security (Heiwa Anzen-hosho kenkyusho), Future Direction of Russia’s Military Power under the Putin Administration (Puchin seiken ka no Roshia no gunjiryoku no kongo no hoko), Oct. 2001.


17 Motohide Saito, ed., Dynamism of International Relations in East Asia (Higashi Ajia kokusai kankei no dainamizumu), Toyo Keizai Inc., 1998, p. 41.

18 Zheng Yu, “Can Russia Enter the West? (Eluosi hui rongru xifang?),” Global Times (Huanqiuyibao), July 18, 2002.
