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The International Politics of Famine Relief Operations in  
Ethiopia: A Case Study of the 1984-86 Famine Relief  
Operations.

by

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the requirements for the Degree of  
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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the international relief assistance to Ethiopia during the 1984-86 famine.

It begins by examining the country's glorious past vis-a-vis its present international status. In Part One, the underlying causes of the famine are discussed to provide a background to the subsequent analysis of the international relief effort. Also discussed, is the role of the international media in alerting public opinion and successfully transforming the famine into an issue of international concern.

In Part Two, the responses of the various actors are analysed: in particular the bilateral response of Ethiopia's political allies and her opponents; of the Western non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the role of the United Nations in coordinating the international relief effort at the multilateral level.

Part Three (Chapter Eight), tests the theoretical assumptions outlined at the beginning of the thesis. With regard to the first, namely the relative importance of opponents and allies, the study concludes Ethiopia's political opponents were more responsive to her appeal for emergency relief than her allies. With regard to the second, namely the role of the NGOs the conclusion is that these organizations played the most important role in shaping the international response to the emergency. Chapter Nine summarizes our general conclusions.

ACRONYMS

AICL	International Action Contre La Faim
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
DEC	Disaster Emergency Committee (UK)
EEC	European Economic Community
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ITV	Independent Television
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MSF(Belgium)	Medicine Sans Frontiere
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (UK)
RRC	Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
UN	United Nations
WVRO	World Vision Relief Organization

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To the memory of my late brothers, Abu'nas and Idris, my  
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## CHAPTER ONE

### General Introduction

Studies of the 1984 famine in Ethiopia can, generally speaking, be grouped into two categories. On one hand, there are those that are concerned with analysing the underlying causes of the famine; on the other, there are those that concentrate analysis on the various international responses to the disaster.

Examples of studies in the first group are the works of Timberlake<sup>1</sup> and Hancock,<sup>2</sup> while those in the second group include the writings of Peter Gill,<sup>3</sup> Jansson,<sup>4</sup> Dawit<sup>5</sup> and Clarke.<sup>6</sup>

Timberlake's work focuses on the relationship between the causes of famine and environmental degradation. Graham Hancock's book is a treatment of the causes and a critique of the international response of donors.

Peter Gill's book is about the failure of aid donors to bring quick respite to the famine victims.

Kurt Jansson's book offers a personal insight into the role of the UN by a man who was head of its relief effort. Dawit's work is an account of the personal experiences of one of the principal actors in Ethiopia's internal politics and the former head of the country's Relief and Rehabilitation Organization- the Government body concerned with the coordination of donors' relief

inside Ethiopia. Finally, Clarke's book examines the Government's resettlement programme as its own form of response to the famine.

By contrast none of these studies, has examined the famine in the framework of superpower rivalry in Ethiopia. In this study we have chosen to focus on this aspect because of its pertinence to Ethiopia at the time of the crisis. It offers an interesting angle from which we can study the international response of donors, the period being critical in the country's history. This thesis argues that contrary to the general assumption, humanitarian relief is not unfettered by political motives.

The conclusions reached in our analysis are that the apparent ideological fraternity of Ethiopia's allies was not matched by them in terms of the aid expected by Ethiopia to cope with the emergency; and that as a result the involvement of Western donor states (brought about through Western non-governmental organizations and public opinion) was necessary for the emergency relief operations to succeed.

In this Introductory Chapter we propose to discuss the country's history in brief, and relate that to the origins of the rivalry of the superpowers in Ethiopia before examining their response in the subsequent chapters.

1. Ethiopia: The Land and its People

Ethiopia is in many respects a fascinating country, whether examined in the context of her ancient past or of the more recent Marxist-Leninist period. <sup>Byind</sup> notes:

Ethiopia is, in many ways the odd man out of Africa. Apart from a few years after the Italian invasion in 1935, it was never a European colony; it had recorded contacts with the outside world going back several centuries; almost half the population are Coptic Christians; its social structure has changed little. This unusual background gave Ethiopia a fascination to both Europeans and Africans, not to mention the West Indian Rastafarians.<sup>7</sup>

The Ethiopians are a proud people with ancient history and a deep sense of national identity. Ethiopia is located on the Horn of Africa, at the meeting point between Africa and Asia. On the North-East the country is bounded by the Red Sea, on the East by Djibouti and Somalia, on the South by Kenya and on the West by Sudan. Ethiopia has a land area of 1,221,900 kms, extending 1,577kms from North to South, and 1,639kms from East to West. Although most of the country is high plateau (around 7,000 feet) with over 60 percent of the total land area arable, only 11 percent is cultivated.<sup>8</sup>

Ethiopia's strategic location, however, has thrust her "into the international arena as a potential crisis zone", thus making her of "significance as regards the world-wide defence strategy of both superpowers".<sup>9</sup>

2. Ethiopia in Historical Perspectives:

The Glorious Past vis-a-vis the Inglorious Present

Ethiopia's self image and more generally the country's reputation in the international community has been seriously affected by the consequences of the famine. Until recently, Ethiopia's image, unique among African states, was both positive and innovatory, and generally viewed favourably within the international community.

According to Mengistu Haile-Mariam, Ethiopia's current image is one of a country reduced to destitution, begging, moral degradation, and humiliation.<sup>10</sup> It is the image of a country that relies on foreign food gifts for its survival.

Until the intervention of the military in the mid 1970s, Ethiopia had had for centuries, a continuous political order. The country was formerly ruled by a monarchy, with power heavily concentrated in the person of the monarch. After the revolution in 1974, Ethiopia switched to a Marxist-Leninist political order.<sup>11</sup>

(a). The Glorious Past

Princes shall come out of Egypt,  
Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her  
hands to God.<sup>12</sup>

Ethiopia is unique in many respects among modern African states. The name "Ethiopia", meaning "the country of the people with burned faces", was given to her by the Greeks.<sup>13</sup> Her Arab neighbours referred to her as

Abyssinia.<sup>14</sup> Ethiopia is the only country south of the Sahara mentioned in both the Bible and the Holy Qur'an<sup>15</sup>, and is among the most ancient states, whose Aksum empire flourished during classical times.<sup>16</sup> R.A. Rogers, writing about the country in 1936, spoke of her with great admiration. He said:

Ethiopia, conquering Lion of the Tribe of Judah, saw the rise and fall of the Pharaohs. She saw the Empires of Cambyses, Darius, Cyrus and Alexander the Great melt into nothingness. She saw the glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome become heaps of stone. This most ancient of nations saw the rising and the setting of the Caesars of the West and the East. She saw the birth of Islam, witnessed its sweep across the entire Old World and aided in its check. She saw the rise and decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the discovery of the New World....<sup>17</sup>

Until the deposition of the Emperor in 1974, the Ethiopian monarchy was one of the most ancient.<sup>18</sup> The Emperor assumed the title "King of Kings, the Lion of Judah...", tracing his ancestry back to about 1000 BC, to King Solomon of Judah.<sup>19</sup>

According to popular belief, particularly among Ethiopians, their origins date from the union of Queen Sheba and King Solomon, from which the dynasty of the Ethiopian royal family was conceived. Thus, the Ethiopians claimed that they were a chosen people of God and the descendants of a great and divine race:

An Ethiopian legend maintained in the classic chronicle of the kings, Kebra Nagast (Glory of the Kings),

contends that Menelik 1 and his successors are descendants of holy men, since Solomon was one of a series through whose bodies had passed a "pear" first placed by God in Adam and intended finally, having entered the body of Hannah, to be the essence of her daughter, the virgin Mary. Christ being the son of God and Menelik a Kinsman of Christ, the kings of Ethiopia descendants of Menelik are of a divine line.<sup>20</sup>

Although the source of this myth is buried in history, it is a claim highly valued by Ethiopians and by diaspora Africans. This aside, Ethiopians have distinguished themselves in many ways. First they have evolved a system of writing found nowhere else<sup>21</sup>, so comparing with the ancient Greeks, Romans, Chinese, Indians and the Egyptians with whom they share the waters of the Nile. The possession of a literary tradition provides evidence of a great past. As has been argued by Professor Mazrui, one of the reasons for black Africa's backwardness may have to do with the absence of a literary culture that preserves the past in the written form instead of the oral tradition.<sup>22</sup>

Ethiopia has also evolved its own calendar to which it still adheres. The calendar bears a fixed relationship to the Gregorian calendar, although it has 13 months instead of twelve, with 12 months of thirty days each and the thirteenth of five days (six days in a leap year).<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, the early introduction of Christianity to Ethiopia in the fourth century sets a record of sovereign existence on the continent. It is noted:

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the oldest established church in Christendom, dating back over 1,500 years had survived, indeed thrived, despite centuries of isolation from (sic) the rest of the Christian world. During the middle ages, this isolation helped fuel rumours in the West of Prester John, a mythical Christian priest-king said to live somewhere in the East, who, westerners believed, would one day march in his armies to defend western Christendom against the Muslim hordes. From the 13th century, it was thought that Prester John must be the ruler of Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup>

As in its ancient past, modern Ethiopia has distinguished herself during the period of European colonial adventures in Africa. At the battle of Adowa in 1896, Ethiopia soundly defeated the Italians, thus becoming the first and only black African nation to defeat<sup>a</sup> European colonial power and therefore escape formal colonialism. An Ethiopian scholar, Professor Negussay Ayele, speaks of this:

Ethiopia distinguished herself as the only African nation to defeat an imperial power and contain the forward progress of the colonial powers on the Horn-Britain, France and Italy- by signing boundary treaties, although by those same treaties her own expansion towards the sea was being checked.<sup>25</sup>

And, as Professor Schwab also noted:

Ethiopia is the only state south of the Sahara, that utilised classical techniques of imperialism and expansion through military conquests to determine its geographical boundaries. It is therefore distinctive within Africa where all other states south of the Sahara have

had their geographical limits  
established by European powers.<sup>26</sup>

Having escaped Italian occupation and rule (except between 1936-1941) Ethiopia became a founder member of the defunct League of Nations at a time when the rest of black Africa and Asian countries were still under colonial rule. This paved the way for the country to become also a founder member of the United Nations in 1945. By 1963, when the rest of Africa had emerged from colonial rule to independence, Ethiopia successfully wooed them to establish the headquarters of the continental "Organisation of African Unity" in its capital, Addis Ababa.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, recent archaeological findings traced the oldest human fossils yet discovered, ~~to~~ Ethiopia, which have provided suggestion that Ethiopia may well be the first home of Man.<sup>28</sup> The findings shattered earlier contending theories about the "historic" origin of man:

Three major findings have been in the running for mainstream man:  
Australopithecus, first found by Raymond Dart in South Africa, Homo Habilis or handy man, found by Dr. Louis Leakey's "1470" skull which with a brain size twice as large as Australopithecus yet one Million years older,.....threw previously accepted theories into disarray. The common ancestor to all may well be found in Ethiopia.<sup>29</sup>

Today, however, it is Ethiopia's more recent losing battle against famine and starvation rather than its ancient culture and achievements, that colours its image in the international community.

(b). The Inglorious Present

Consequent upon the 1984 famine, Mengistu expressed his dissatisfaction with the country's international image.<sup>30</sup> As Clapham rightly observed:

Famine is of course the starkest indicator of failure for a regime which itself came to power in the midst of famine, and set agricultural transformation as the first of its development priorities.<sup>31</sup>

Ethiopia is bedevilled by famine, drought, wars and grinding poverty. Only six percent of the country's population has access to clean water; the country has a high infant mortality rate and average life expectancy of less than 40 years. Per capita income is \$114 per annum, while the receipt of development aid, at \$6 per capita puts her at the bottom of the league even among African states, whose average is \$20 per capita.<sup>32</sup> The country is now classified by the United Nations as one of the 29 least developed countries (LLDC).<sup>33</sup> Yet Ethiopia is forced to spend more per capita on military hardware than any other country south of the Sahara.<sup>34</sup>

What is startling, however, is that under normal circumstances Ethiopia can produce enough food to feed its population. And although Ethiopia is currently at the bottom of the international league of states in many respects, the country is famous for her leading position in the world coffee market (the word "coffee" originated from Kaffa, the coffee producing area of the country).<sup>35</sup> Ethiopia has also contributed to world grain production.

As observed by Mackenzie in the wake of the 1984-1986 famine:

Grain is pouring into Ethiopia as the rich nations belatedly respond to the famine that has been killing people there for two years. There is a deep irony to this: most of the grain evolved in Ethiopia. Many of the high yielding strains of wheat and barley depend on genes which came originally from wild grasses of the Ethiopian highlands. The world depends on them for food.<sup>36</sup>

Thus, Ethiopia is a country with both a glorious past and an unenviable present low standing, manifested in her reliance on others for the food the country needs to survive during emergencies. It is in this context that we study the international politics behind the relief that was mounted in 1984-86. First, we distinguish the country's two phases of foreign outlooks.

### 3. Ethiopia's World Outlook up to the mid 1970s

Throughout his reign, from October 1928 until his deposition in September 1974, the late Emperor Haile-Salassie personally dominated Ethiopia's foreign policy. As will become clear in the thesis (see Chapter Five), during this time Ethiopia's foreign relations were Western oriented.

Haile-Selassie's relations with the West dated from his service as regent to the crown. In the wake of the Italian occupation he lived in exile in Britain, whence he "continued to function as a chief of state".<sup>37</sup> When

the occupation ended he was brought back to Ethiopia in 1941 with the assistance of Britain. Subsequently he cultivated good relations with the West, particularly with the United States and Britain.

In 1945 the Emperor adopted the American currency name "dollar" for the name of his country's currency<sup>38</sup> and in 1953 permitted the United States to build the Kagnev communication satellite centre at Asmara. In return, the US provided him with massive financial and military assistance. The warm relationship with the West, did not preclude him from establishing relations with both the Soviet Union or with China. He undertook a trip in 1959 to the Soviet Union and in 1971 to China. But on the whole Ethiopia's main allies were the Western countries,<sup>39</sup> until the revolution of 1974 when the country's outlook entered a different phase.

#### 4. Ethiopia's Outlook since the mid 1970s

The transition from feudal state to socialist order was the beginning of a new chapter in Ethiopia's history. From the beginning, however, the transition was marked by turbulent changes and internal strife. Schwab observed:

To move from feudalism to state socialism, without going through the intervening stages.....demands an extraordinary upheaval and this is precisely what has taken place in Ethiopia.<sup>40</sup>

The competition for leadership was fiercely fought between three rival groups all claiming some form of marxist ideological orientation. The period saw initially the so-called white Terror Campaign, waged between the Trotskyite student dominated Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the more classically marxist All Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Me'ison), led by intellectuals. The rivalry between the two was only brought to an end by the appearance of the "Red Terror", under the leadership of the Derg, which at first directed its activities principally against the Trotskyites and then later against Me'ison, before emerging as the unchallenged architect of Ethiopia's internal and external political destiny.<sup>41</sup>

Having dethroned the Emperor, the new leadership also changed Ethiopia's world outlook. In place of the old order a new political and economic system based on the Soviet model was created, with the Soviet Union and Cuba emerging as the country's main military and political allies and major sources of foreign aid.<sup>42</sup> In line with this the land and the economy, including foreign companies, industries, banks, financial institutions and investment houses were nationalized.<sup>43</sup> It is in this context that we will study the international famine relief operations mounted in Ethiopia from 1984-86.

##### 5. Scope of the Thesis

This thesis dwells exclusively on the 1984-86 famine

relief operations in Ethiopia. Its focus is the international response of donors. It examines, in turn, the response of the media; the bilateral assistance provided by Eastern and Western countries; the response of Western non-governmental organizations, and the role of the United Nations.

In the section that treats Western bilateral donors, the US, UK and Canada are selected for detailed study as representatives of Ethiopia's political "opponents" for three reasons. First, both the US and UK are leading members of the Western alliance and were at one time Ethiopia's main allies, while Canada seems an appropriate choice as a representative of the smaller Western countries with a reputation of good relations with Third World countries. Second, both the US and UK have been central in the relief operations. Third, in all these three countries English is used as a primary medium of communication.

In the section pertaining to the media, only television is selected, the main reason being the central role played by the television broadcast in October 1984: it is this coverage that is of immediate relevance for our purpose.

## 6. Methodology And Hypothesis

Two approaches have been employed in this study for data collection, interpretation and analysis. The first is the extensive interviewing of donor representatives:

bilaterals, the UN, NGOs, RRC officials. Such data has also been collected from television documentaries about the famine. The other consists in library research of documented works: books, journals, magazines and newspapers.

The basic assumption of the thesis is that contrary to our expectation it is not Ethiopia's political allies that have responded more to her appeals for humanitarian assistance but rather her political opponents. However, the effective response of the latter was made possible only through the critical role played by the non-governmental organizations.

Part One begins by discussing Ethiopia in historical context and examining the background causes of the famine as well as the role of the media. Part Two examines the international response of donors. Part Three consists of Chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Eight discusses the relationship between humanitarian aid and international politics. Chapter Nine summarizes our general conclusions.

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8. National Westminster Bank, Quarterly publication, 1986, p.2
9. Schwab, P., Ethiopia, Politics, Economics and society, (London: Francis Pinter, 1985), p.5.
10. Reported in Interview with Trevor McDonald. Thames Television, Channel 4 News, April 1, 88.
11. Between the overthrow of the monarch and the assumption of power by Mengistu two other leaders have appeared briefly on the Ethiopian political scene. The first was late General Mikhail Amman Andom, (from September 1974 to November 1974) and the second was late Brigadier Teferi Benti (from November 1974 to February 1977).
12. Psalm 68: 31, The Holy Bible, Old Testament Edition, (Oxford University Press, p.755). Refer also to Genesis ii:13; Num.xii:i; Jer.xxxviii; and Acts viii:27.
13. Africa Today (London: Africa Journal ltd, 1981), p.520.
14. Ibid., p.520.
15. The Holy Qur'an, Chapter 105, (Fil or "The Elephant"). Abyssinia as it was then known was a powerful nation comparable to any of the powerful states of the period.
16. New Africa Yearbook(seventh edition, I.C.Publishers,

1987/88), p.110.

17. Rogers, J.A. writing about Ethiopia in 1936, quoted in Giorgis D.W., op.cit. p.371.

18. Ayele Negussay, "The Foreign Policy of Ethiopia" in Aluko ,O., (ed) The Foreign Policies of African States, (Hodder and Stoughton, 1977), p.52.

19. Ibid.,p.46.

20. Lipsky A.G., Ethiopia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962)p.6. See also Schwab P., op. cit., p.5.

21. According to Russel, one of the earliest forms of civilization was the invention of writing. Hence the greatness of a society and of its people can be judged through the possession of writing. See Russel, B. ,History of Western Philosophy, (London: George Allen and Unwin 1948), see chp. 1.

22. Mazrui, A. A, The Africans: a Triple Heritage. (London:BBC Publications 1986). Although other societies in Africa, particularly Islamic ones, have assimilated borrowed Arabic scripts to their culture, thus preserving some aspects in documented form prior to the advent and the more dominating Western or Roman orthography.

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24. Harrison P., and Palmer R., News Out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid (London: Hilary Shipman, 1986), p.41.

25. Ayele Negussay, in Aluko o. (ed) op.cit., p.47.

26. Schwab, P., op. cit.,p.5.

27. The foundation charter was signed on the 25th of May and its Headquarters established in Addis Ababa. This paved the way later for the siting of important regional organizations in Addis Ababa like the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, thus enhancing Ethiopia's international image.

28. Africa Research Bulletin, October 1-31.,1974. p.3415.

29. ARB, January 1-31, 1974, p.3123 A.

30. See footnote 3

31. Clapham C., Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.241.

32. Gill Peter, op. cit., p.175.

33. See "Africa Emergency Overview" UNDRO, March 1, 1985.
34. Harrison and Palmer, op. cit. p.94.
35. Kurian,op.cit., p.600.
36. Mackenzie D.,"Ethiopia: famine amid genetic plenty" in The New Scientist, August 8, 1985, p.22. Ethiopia is also in the lead in Livestock production on the continent See,Africa Review op.cit., p.119.
37. Lipsky, op.cit., p.218.
38. The Ethiopian birr replaced the Ethiopian dollar on September 20, 1976. See Africa Contemporary Record, 1977, p.B212
39. Ayele in Aluko op.cit., p.52.
40. Schwab, op.cit., p.95.
41. Africa Review, op.cit., p.117.
42. Kurian, op.cit.,p.59.
43. New Africa Yearbook, op. cit., p.598.

PART ONE

CONTEXT OF THE 1984-86 FAMINE

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Causes of Famine

#### 1. Introduction

It is necessary to begin this chapter by examining the background causes of the famine. In doing so it is relevant to discuss the role played by both the immediate and the remote factors involved in contributing towards the development of the emergency. This will help us appreciate both the intensity and magnitude of the crisis as it emerged. The importance of discussing the background becomes relevant because of its implications for the international assistance required by and provided to Ethiopia.

#### 2. History of Famine in Ethiopia

Ethiopia has known famines throughout its history. According to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), (the Government's agency responsible for dealing with famine and famine relief related matters), drought in Ethiopia dates as far back as to the beginning of the country's history.<sup>1</sup> Degefu, lists 28 different incidents of drought and famine dating from pre-biblical times (253-243BC) to 1982.<sup>2</sup> In this century alone there has been seven major famines in Ethiopia: 1916-1920: 1927-1928: 1934-1935: 1947-1958: 1964-1965: 1971-1974 and 1984-1985.<sup>3</sup> Of those the 1984 famine was the most severe.<sup>4</sup>

### 3. The Role of Geo-physical Factors

There exists a strong relationship between the country's topographical features and the frequent occurrence of famines. As a result of the favourable climate of the northern highlands, 90% of the country's population is settled there, although the area accounts for only 49% of the country's land surface area.

Thus the remaining 10% of the population inhabit the lowland areas, which constitute 51% of the country's land mass, and therefore the greater part of it.<sup>5</sup>

As a result, the highlands, are densely populated while the lowlands are conversely sparsely populated. One immediate by-product of this is that the highlands are over cultivated. This in turn accelerates the problem of soil erosion in the area and further complicate issues. As one observer noted:

[the] Very high densities of people and of livestock especially in the north have compounded the difficulties and contributed to the overworking and destruction of the soil. The country now loses an estimated 1.6 billion tonnes of top soil annually through wind and water erosion, principally from the highland areas.<sup>6</sup>

Thus whatever rain is received in these areas is emptied in the lowlands areas. The impact of soil erosion alone, is estimated to affect the food production capacity of more than seventy-five percent of the high land population.<sup>7</sup>

Furthermore the topography of the country would inhibit the application of modern techniques of farming

such as irrigation even if the resources to do so were available. Ethiopia is:

Characterised by very high plateaus with precipitous edges, towering mounting peaks, deep gorges and valleys, mighty river systems, lakes, great grasslands, warm and arid lowlands. The low land areas in the east, south, south-east and west are characterised by high temperatures, excessive evaporation, scanty rainfall and limited vegetation.<sup>8</sup>

(a) Deforestation

Added to the problems of soil erosion is that of the continual cutting of the country's forest to meet the fuel demands of the rising population. At the turn of this century much of Ethiopia was heavily forested. But the cutting of trees for fuel and for building residential houses has left much of the country deforested. As Vestal, points out:

most peasants have no chemical fertilisers and the animal dung that they once used to enrich the soil is now being burned for fuel. This happened because of continuing deforestation. At the turn of the century, 40 per cent of Ethiopia was covered by forest. Twenty years ago, the figure was down to 16 per cent, while today only 3.1 per cent of forest land remains.<sup>9</sup>

(b) Overgrazing

The rapid growth and increase in the number of cattle in the country leads to the overgrazing of the land and the removal of its vegetation cover. Ethiopia has the

highest head count of cattle in Africa.<sup>10</sup>

#### 4. The Population Factor

Like most developing countries Ethiopia's population is on the rise. Ethiopia's estimated population of forty six million people makes her the second largest country south of the Sahara. The population is growing at the rate of 2.9 per cent per annum.<sup>11</sup> And according to a World Bank report it means that "one million" persons are added to the population every twelve calendar months.<sup>12</sup> More people certainly means more mouths to feed. And in the case of Ethiopia this indeed means quite a lot to feed. In 1946 the country's population was six<sup>teen</sup> million, but by 1986 it has risen to forty six million.

The relationship of population to famine is obvious in a country where 85% of the population is engaged in agriculture and depend on the local land for their food supply.

#### 5. Poor Technology

The farming methods in Ethiopia, and indeed in the rest of the continent, are still very traditional. They have not improved since ancient times. Ploughing, weeding and threshing are still done by hand, with weak oxen and simple tools.<sup>13</sup> The lack of technological advancement has affected the performance of the agricultural sector. As a result of the poor management of the land, food production

in the country declined by about 5% during the six years that preceded the famine.<sup>14</sup> In fact, Ethiopia's food production, per capita has been on a steady decline since the end of the Second World War.<sup>15</sup>

## 6. Political Factors

### (a). Governmental Policies

The Government's agricultural policies have contributed in three ways to the low level of agricultural productivity.

In the first place, the Government agricultural budget favours the state farm sectors rather than the peasant producers. Between 70 and 90 percent of the Government's investment in agriculture go to the state farms and cooperatives which produce only 10 percent of the country's food needs.<sup>16</sup> Giorghis noted the impact of the government collective farms:

Even though the number of collectivised farms is small, their effect on nation-wide production has been catastrophic. These farms are given more fertiliser per hectare than peasant farms; they are given more land per household, they are given tractors and more draft animals than the rest of the peasants. But for all the attention they get, productivity is extremely low and almost no surplus is produced for market.<sup>17</sup>

The state cooperatives also, have low output, as a result of the low morale of workers. As one critic sadly observed:

Even in the best time Ethiopian farms operated on the brink of

agricultural disaster but some how the delicate balance needed to farm the same land continually for thousands of years was maintained. This changed when state control of the economy was added to the peasants plight. The result has been a famine affecting 7.9 million people.<sup>18</sup>

Secondly, the policy of fixing prices demotivates farmers from producing more than their immediate requirements for consumption since they are not allowed to trade their surplus.<sup>19</sup> Finally, the policy of redistributing the land prevents them from making long term investment in the farms. All these factors, sapped their motivation to make up for the shortfall of food in deficit areas.<sup>20</sup>

(b). Wars and Famine.

In his description of war, Thomas Hobbes wrote:

so the nature of war, consisteth not in actual fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.....In such condition there is no place for industry.....no letters and ..... the life of man is solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short.

Indeed in 1984-1986, the worst areas affected by famine in Africa were countries that had one form of unrest or another: Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Chad and Angola.

In Ethiopia, fighting has been endemic in Eritrea, Tigray, parts of Wollo, and in the Oromo land. In addition, Ethiopia's relations with her neighbours, particularly

Somalia and Sudan, are also frequently conflictual.

(i) Eritrea

The northern province has had no peace for three decades now.

To understand the nature of the conflict it is necessary to sketch its historical origins. Eritrea was created as an Italian colony from 1890. It remained under Italy's colonial rule until 1941. When the Italians were defeated in the Second World War, Britain took over the administration of the territory from 1941 until 1952. From then, Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia under the UN auspices. However in 1962 the late Emperor dissolved the Eritrean Parliament, thereby abrogating the arrangement under which Eritrea was federated to Ethiopia. Instead, the status of Eritrea was reduced to one of Ethiopia's fourteen provinces. Eritrea has since then been fighting for its independence.

In 1962 the first Eritrean Liberation movement emerged-the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). The organization embarked on guerrilla warfare against the central Government with devastating consequences for both life and property. In 1970, a breakaway group emerged from the ELF to form a separate organization (as a result of disagreement within the leadership, as to who should lead it)-the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF).<sup>21</sup> However an internal war ensued between the two liberation movements from 1972-1974 and further deepened the crises

that the province had to cope with. By 1975 they reached a settlement and agreed to take on the central Government forces instead of fighting amongst themselves.

The beleaguered situation in the province has been summed up:

Eritrea.. ..... butchered by Haile-Selassie's forces in the late 1950's, bombed by the American-backed regime in the 1960's, napalmed and nerve gassed by Russian-backed junta in the 1970's and now find themselves up against a Russian equipped, trained and led Ethiopian Army.<sup>22</sup>

Eritrean raids on Asmara airport in 1986 and the oil depot in Massawa underlined the continuing destruction caused by the lack of peace and failure to reach a political settlement.<sup>23</sup>

Eritrea is of strategic, military and security importance to Ethiopia. Economically, it provides the country with its main access to the sea, and politically, Eritrea's secession may spell the end of Ethiopia as a political entity.

However the continuation of the conflict has worsened the agrarian crisis through the damage inflicted on the people and the rural economy.

(ii) Tigray

The conflict between Tigray and the central Government is a post revolution phenomenon. Unlike in Eritrea, the basis of dispute here is not the demand for independence or secession. At first the province's

objective was secession, but this was subsequently modified to the goal of "self determination" for the people of Tigray within the context of a united Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup>

As a result, in 1975 the first liberation movement, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) was formed (with the help of the EPLF). Besides the TPLF, The Tigray Liberation Movement (TLM) and the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP) are also waging a struggle against the Government.<sup>25</sup>

The resort to military means to effect change has inadvertently affected the pattern of rural life in the province, with devastating impact on food production. The continuation of the conflict between the liberation movements and the Government has contributed to the development of famine in the province. The failure to agree a cease-fire even at the peak of the 1984 famine, clearly underlines the severity with which the conflict rages on:

there were three fierce clashes in the province of Wollo, as guerrillas from the TPLF attacked the garrison towns of Rabit and Godye on the main road north out of the Ethiopian Capital.<sup>26</sup>

The civil wars had disruptive effects on food production and supply throughout the northern region.

(iii) The Oromo

The largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, the Oromos, are discontented too. Although they have not been as successful militarily or as effective as the Eritreans and the

Tigreans in their campaigns, the existence of their cause provides an additional set of problems for the Government in Addis Ababa. In the 1960s, the Oromo people founded The Oromo Liberation Front [OLF], an organization committed to the achievement of self-determination for all the Oromo people, on the basis of their common culture and language. The OLF subsequently mounted armed operations in Bale, Sidamo and Hererghe.

In 1976 The Somali Government assisted in the founding of another liberation group among the Oromos, the Somali and Abo Liberation Front (SALF) aimed at tapping Oromo discontent.<sup>27</sup>

(iv). Conditions Along the Border with Sudan

Conditions along their common border, (stretching 1,200 miles along the north-western part of Ethiopia and the eastern part of Sudan) are for the most part strained.<sup>28</sup> Although actual war has never broken out between the two states, there were occasions when troops were mobilised along both sides of the border. However each side provides direct military and material support to secessionist group(s) operating against the other side. For Sudan this means providing support to the EPLF and the TPLF. For Ethiopia it means providing support to the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Front (SPLA).

(v). The War with Somalia

The most serious threat yet posed to Ethiopia comes

from Somalia's challenge to the Ogaden, Ethiopia's south eastern province.<sup>29</sup> The first outbreak of armed conflict between them occurred in 1964 at the border village of Tug-Wajale.<sup>30</sup> In 1969 Ethiopian troops and Somali civilians clashed again at Ramaleh.

However the nine month Ogaden war from July 1977 to March 1978 nearly brought Ethiopia to external occupation but for the massive military assistance it received from the Soviet Union and Cuba. By the end of the war, Ethiopia had incurred half a billion dollars in costs and the displacement of two million people.<sup>31</sup> And no sooner had the two sides stopped, than they began another encounter in 1980.<sup>32</sup>

#### 7. Costs of The wars

The various conflicts confronting Ethiopia from both within and without have been costly to her in many respects. In the first place they have denied her peace and the prospects of peaceful development.

Secondly they have intensified the process of famine especially in the northern provinces through their constraints on food production and the enormous destruction of lives and property they have caused.<sup>33</sup>

Thirdly the lack of political settlement in all these conflicts means that the country continues to be in perpetual state of turmoil. Thus in the absence of peace there could be no meaningful development in agriculture or industry because resources are continually diverted to

defence. Already the government's defence and military spending is the highest, per capita, in Black Africa.<sup>34</sup> It is noted:

Some forty-six per cent of Ethiopia's budget goes on defence and internal security and that does not include credit payments on armaments bought from the Soviet Union. Yet the regime militarisation-Ethiopia has an army of 300,000 troops and over 100 combat aircraft-has failed to halt the spread of armed opposition to its rule. It now confronts not only the Eritrean fighting for independence, but also powerful guerrilla movements in Tigray and northern Wollo which are demanding a democratic Ethiopian state.<sup>35</sup>

It is apparent from the foregoing that all these factors have made the prospects of famine more conducive in Ethiopia. However, the immediate trigger is, as it has always been the lack of rain.

#### 8. The Nature of the Current Crisis

There are three seasons in Ethiopia. From early September to mid March the country receives no rainfall at all. Between March and June, it receives the little rains, known as the (Belg). From mid-June to early September, it experiences its main rainfall (the Meher).<sup>36</sup>The Meher season accounts for about 85-95% of the national food production, while the Belg rains account for the remaining 5-15%.

However because of the country's geographical location and proximity to the Equator, its rainfall is not evenly distributed.<sup>37</sup> For instance Addis Ababa, receives

on the average 1250 millimetres annually, while Asmara receives not more than 450 millimetres. The eastern highlands on the other hand because of their extreme dryness are generally arid and barren.<sup>38</sup> Thus severe lack of rain can spell disastrous consequences for the country, and could lead to drought and even famine.

(a) The Lack of Rains and the On Set of Famine

The immediate cause of the 1984 famine was the lack of rain in most parts of the country for three consecutive crop seasons. From 1982 up to 1984 all the fourteen regions experienced severe shortage of rainfall; the Belg rains of 1982/83, the Meher rains of 1983 and the Belg rains of 1984 had all failed.<sup>39</sup>

The failure of the 1983 Meher rains,<sup>40</sup> led to low precipitation (about half normal) right across the country and with no rains at all in many parts.

The drought led to crop failures in most parts of the country. The 1983 failure led to a failure of 80% of crop production in Sidamo, (the one province which had always suffered least) whenever the northern provinces of Tigray, Eritrea and Wollo were affected by drought.<sup>41</sup> The continued lack of rain in 1984 resulted in an 80 % crop failure in Wollo, and the remaining 13 provinces as well.<sup>42</sup> As a result over five million people were at risk of starvation by early 1984. In Wollo, over 1.7 million people were affected out of a population of 2.5 million. In Tigray the number was 1.3 million. In Eritrea close to a million were

affected.43

The Table below gives the geographical scope of the famine and the detail breakdown of the number of people affected in each of the regions.

Table 1

Estimates of The Number of People Affected in The 14 Regions.

<u>Administrative Region</u>	<u>Number of People Affected</u>
1. Wollo	1,790,830
2. Tigray	1,331,890
3. Eritrea	827,000
4. Gondar	376,500
5. Harerghe	346,889
6. Sidamo	209,968
7. Shoa	131,034
8. Gamo-Goffa	79,880
9. Bale	52,950
10. Assab	45,000
11. Gojjam	35,200
12. Illubabor	33,077
14. Arssi	2,530
14. Keffa	<u>1,550</u>
Total	<u>5,264,298</u>

Source: Assistance Requirements 1984, published by The RRC, Addis Ababa, March 1984, p.5.

By October 1984 the number of people affected had increased by another one million people.<sup>44</sup> The pervasive nature of the famine is clear since none of the provinces remained untouched. Death was a frequent occurrence in all of the provinces but more especially in the northern provinces where the situation was worst.

(b) Build up to the Emergency

From the middle of 1984 the hardship intensified as more people became affected. As the situation became more desperate children risked death by kneeling on traffic roads in order to beg for food from travellers and passers-by. People were forced to try wild roots and berries and the lucky ones mixed mud with porridge to make the food go even further.

In response, there was an increase in the number of NGOs (non-governmental organizations) arriving to meet the rising demand for humanitarian aid.<sup>45</sup>

(c) The Emergence of Relief Camps

Meanwhile, as the scarcity intensified, emergency relief camps sprung up all over the country, as the famine victims saw this as their last possible defence against starvation.<sup>46</sup>

In 1984 numerous relief camps emerged in Wollo, Tigray, Shoa, and Gondar: in Wollo for instance there were camps at Korem, Alomata, <sup>Bati</sup> and Lalibela; in Tigray there were camps at Makelle; while in Gondar and Sidamo there

were camps at Ibbat and Walaita respectively.

(d) The Intensity of Famine: Korem, Makelle, Bati.

Korem

Today 35 people died here,  
12 adults and 23 children,  
Yesterday was 19,  
the day before was 16,  
the day before that 29,  
the day before that 41....47

Korem was the epicentre of the famine and was the site of the biggest relief camp in 1984. The combination of lack of rain for three consecutive years combined with the insurrections in parts of Wollo worsened the situation. Over three quarters of the people of the province were affected by the shortage of food.

In March 1984, Korem's population of 3000 people swelled to over 10,000 due to the severity of the famine. By September the camp population had exploded to over 100,000.<sup>48</sup> People were crowded together in poor sanitary conditions which resulted in the outbreak of diseases: diarrhoea, dysentery, pneumonia, bronchitis and malaria and added to the death rate among the camp population. The situation was further made worse by the falling temperatures at night since the people had no protection against the cold.<sup>49</sup> In October 1984, additional arrivals to the camp were still at the rate of 1000 per day.

In March 1985 (at the peak of the crisis) the death

rate was over 100 people per day with over 17,000 children being looked after by relief agencies.

### Makelle

The story of Makelle is similar in many respects to that of Korem. It was the second biggest relief camp. At the peak of crisis Makelle town sheltered over 80,000 people. Conditions in the camps were severe and agonisingly painful. The death rate at the start of the crisis was between thirty and forty people per day and reached 90 to 100, in March 1985. The people were crowded together in tents without food, water or clothing. One reporter on the scene at the time said the sight of so many people at Makelle was quite awesome:"they stretched out in their thousands like some nomadic tribes".50

### Bati

In Bati the story was similar. There were over 630 tents with over 40 people crowded into each. There were thirty-two full time grave diggers employed. A relief nurse at the camp observed:

There, the people seem to have gone beyond despair, even beyond feeling, they sit like breathing statues, drained of everything save the mechanics of being alive. It is hard to admit, but it is almost as if they do not appear to be people any more. At Bati the response is more devastatingly human. People.... stare in silent accusation.51

Before enough food was brought into the country

officials had to make difficult choices between those who should receive food and those who would be refused. It was a difficult time for the relief agencies because the situation dictated that a choice had to be made in order to minimise the loss of life by "selecting" those who had a better chance of surviving. According to Brian Stewart:

Around every aid centre crowds are locked out by barbed wire fences, or stone walls because there wasn't enough food.<sup>52</sup>

Yet despite that, there were people who couldn't eat the food because their stomachs were bloated. Some were so seriously affected that they needed intensive feeding after every twenty minutes.<sup>53</sup> And those strong enough amongst them had to pick through the dirt for each individual grain when the food arrived.

Throughout the country, at the peak of the emergency 6000 people were dying daily and an estimated 1,000,000 people were being treated in 43 emergency shelters.<sup>54</sup> Six months after the emergency was brought to international attention, the situation was still critical although it had started to show signs of improvement (the number of deaths began to come down). And still a year after, there were more than 20,000 people being treated in Korem. Even in 1986, the death toll averaged 2000 per day and there were still about 70,000 people being attended to, in 23 camps.<sup>55</sup>

9. Conclusion

In 1985 there were not less than forty three relief shelters, 280 distribution points and a 150 feeding centres throughout Ethiopia to cope with the emergency. The accurate number of people who perished may never be known. But The UN co-ordinator puts the figure at one million.<sup>56</sup> There is no reason why this figure should be doubted bearing in mind the extent of the affected population in the country as evidenced by the high daily death toll in the relief camps over an extended period of time.

If this is accepted then it follows that the magnitude of the death toll is five times the number that died during the 1970s famine, which led to the deposition of the Emperor and the consequent establishment of the military in power. Compared with the casualties involved in the First World War, the 1984 famine was severe, (representing a tenth of the total people who died between 1914-1918).<sup>57</sup>

Also at least 200,000 children were officially orphaned. For these children the consequences will linger into their adult lives.

And there were millions permanently dislocated from their villages as they were resettled elsewhere in the country.<sup>58</sup> Over all there were between 8-9 million people affected by the famine.

In the next chapter we examine how the international community was mobilised to respond to the cries for help.

Notes and References.

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17. Giorgis D.W., Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia (New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1989), p.272
18. 70 to 90 % of government agricultural investment goes to the state farms and cooperatives, although they

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19. In realisation of this fact the Government has abolished this policy to encourage producers to produce more. "Eye Witness", ITV, May 20, 1990.

20. The Washington Post, December 31, 1985, p. A1

21. Africa South of The Sahara(Europa Publications, 1988), p.439

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28. ARB, March 1967, and January 1987.

29. Since Somalia's independence in 1960, the country has committed itself to the liberation of all the lands inhabited by the Somali people in the neighbouring states of Kenya, Djoubiti and Ethiopia. See,ARB, May 1-31, 1966, pp.530-532.

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32. This was between the Ethiopian troops and the pro-Somali guerrillas of Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) See,ARB, March 1-31, 1980, p.5604.

33. For details, See, Review Of African Political Economy, vol.33, 1985; and the 1983/84 issues.

34. See "The editorial", Review of African Political Economy vol. 33, 1985, p.1

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41. Keesing's Contemporary Achieve (KCA), vol.xxx1, February 1985. p.33382
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45. In early 1984 there were only 21 NGOs but by the middle of 1985, their number had rose to 48, with over 600 foreign staff and over 2000 Ethiopian employees. See, Giorgis op.cit., p.228
46. There were camps at Makelle in Tigray and at Ibnat in Gondar, a year before October 1984. See The Times (London), May 14, 1983, p.22c
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58. Others took refuge abroad in the Sudan, Europe and Israel.

## CHAPTER THREE

### The Media And The Internationalization of Concern

#### 1. Introduction

What triggered the current flurry of relief activity was the screening by the BBC, of a harrowing documentary on the misery of the drought victims.<sup>2</sup>

It is perhaps necessary to begin this chapter by saying that without the media coverage of the crisis, the mobilization of relief assistance from both allies and opponents and indeed from the Western public, would not have been realized in earnest, nor would it have achieved the same degree of success that it did.

The BBC coverage on October 23 1984, however, marked a turning point, because from that date the famine was given prominence by both bilateral, multilateral and public donors. Before that time there had been sporadic attempts mainly by NGOs and the public to meet the demands but these efforts were by themselves inadequate to counter the massive relief needs in Ethiopia.

From October 23 the international community focused its attention on the crisis, as a result of the scale of suffering shown on Television, which affected public opinion and triggered it to demand increased action from its governments. From then onwards measures were taken by the major donors in line with demands from their public to meet the relief needs of the famine victims.

In this chapter we will focus attention on how the media was instrumental in transforming the famine into an issue of international concern, thereby initiating the mounting of the relief operation that was necessary to overcome the problem.

## 2. The Media as a Relief Actor<sup>3</sup>

The media plays two important roles as an actor in relief. First, it is a source of news for millions of readers, listeners, and viewers. In providing news it reaches a wide range of audiences, including governmental elites, non-governmental and intergovernmental audiences.<sup>4</sup>

Thus the information it provides can play a significant role in influencing public opinion, and even indirectly shaping the official policies of governments. Indeed it is acknowledged that more often than is usually realized, government decisions are in part based on information received through the news channels.<sup>5</sup>

Because it reaches a wide range of audiences all simultaneously it is therefore an indispensable tool in mobilizing support for causes. Indeed, it is well documented that the response to droughts in the past is based on the publicity generated for them through the media.<sup>6</sup> Thus an essential requirement for mobilizing humanitarian assistance is a powerful publicity machine.<sup>7</sup> As James Lewis observed:

However, assessments made by the news media will certainly have been used as a basis for response by the general public who provide

contributions for the relief aid sent by non governmental organization. And the non governmental organizations will base the presentation of their appeals on the degree of coverage presented by the news media and will use the same news media to carry their appeal.<sup>8</sup>

Second, the media plays the important role of "Agenda setting". In performing this function the media sets the priorities that the other relief actors devote to any given disaster.<sup>9</sup> Therefore the response and attention allocated to any particular emergency is determined to a very large extent by the emphasis given to it by the media.

The question that then follows is how did the media "set the agenda" in the Ethiopian famine? Before addressing this question we first need to place the media in its global setting.

### 3. Media's International Setting

As a result of the current global communication structure, news flows mostly from the industrial north to the industrializing south. The dominance of the north in the technological field endows it with a powerful advantage in taking the lead in defining what should constitute global news and issues. For the south, its lack of resources and technology imposes limitations over its ability to internationalise issues. For these reasons the influence of the south is limited to its areas of influence, which are mainly national, or at best regional in scope. The implication of this is that it is the media

in the north that determines what issues have the potential of becoming internationalized and what issues remain dormant.<sup>10</sup>

Within the industrialized north however the capacity of the Eastern Bloc countries' media is circumscribed by the structural set up of these societies. First, the press and media in general is government and Party controlled.<sup>11</sup> Second, there is the question of lack of resources. In view of these constraints it is Western media that has taken the lead in globalizing issues.<sup>12</sup>

It is also in this context that the strategic position of London reinforces the current structure. First, every international airline in the world passes through London at some stage. Second, there is the factor of English being an international language in which many communication and media specialists have their training.<sup>13</sup> Third, there is the fact that "most of the foreign news seen on television screens throughout the world will at some stage have been processed in London".<sup>14</sup>

#### 4. Internationalizing the Famine: The Role of BBC TV

##### (a). TV's edge over other Mediums

Television has replaced newspapers and the radio as a prime source of news for most people in Western Europe and North America. The success of television in transforming the famine into a global issue is connected to the enormous power it wields as a medium. This power lies in its ability to announce its "message not merely to the king but

instantly to a massive public all watching, all affected, all reacting simultaneously".<sup>15</sup> In performing its daily routine, television "telescopes complex distant events into immediate "live" pictures which can have immediate live and anguishing results".<sup>16</sup> It is its power to relay distant events "live" that gives the medium its competitive advantage over the press and the radio as a prime source of news in the industrialized world.

In the Third World the radio is still the leading source of news for most people, with the press serving the urban centres and the educated elites. Below we chart the course of how the media covered the famine in the period before October, and how the October 23 programme, created its impact.

(b). Early Media Efforts to Raise Relief

From the spring of 1983 through to early October 1984, numerous efforts were undertaken by the international media to bring home to the viewing public what was then a developing crisis in Ethiopia. These efforts achieved a modest degree of success. Early television programmes and appeals date from the spring of 1983 when both the BBC and ITN teams toured the northern provinces of Ethiopia and issued a joint appeal to the British public which brought in £2 million for the famine.<sup>17</sup>

In March 1984 the Irish Concern in Ethiopia made a documentary on the crisis based on conditions in Walaita. This was later shown in June 1984 on Channel 4 news and

"News at Ten" and the evening news bulletin of RTE (the Irish television station) and in twelve other countries.<sup>18</sup> Also in March 1983 Mohammed Amin head of Visnews, Africa Bureau, had filmed and published material on the famine: some of the scripts produced by Amin stated that Ethiopia would suffer its severest famine disaster since that of 1973 if no international help was forthcoming. Amin's script was headed "International Aid call for drought stricken Ethiopia".<sup>19</sup> Later in the same month Amin did another story titled "Ethiopia: food and Aid from Europe for the starving refugees".<sup>20</sup>

In April one of Visnew's scripts read "Ethiopia: relief work continues in Ethiopia where aid workers taken hostage".<sup>21</sup> Again in July 1983 a photographer on the Denvor post personally financed a visit to Ethiopia after seeing a TV report on the famine, but despite the troubles he encountered both before he left the US and while in Ethiopia, his pictures were rejected by the major media outlets in America. None of the networks accepted his story on the grounds that the pictures were not strong enough, and because at that time there had been few people at the point of death. CBS for instance told Tony Suan, "It was not a Biafra,.... it was not a situation where people were dropping like flies".<sup>22</sup>

In April 1984, Amin went to Ethiopia again and did a story which was picked up by Reuters, yet that too failed to produce a major response from the broadcasting organizations.<sup>23</sup> In May 1984 Earth-scan's organized tour

trip for twenty international journalists equally failed to excite interest. According to one of the journalists on the tour the story "sank without a trace in terms of exciting interest in the organizations".<sup>24</sup>

In June 1984 the Irish Concern documentary was again televised and met with a similar fate to that of earlier efforts. The first serious inroad made by the famine in terms of winning attention and generating interest was in July of 1984 following the Central Television documentary by Charles Stewart titled "Seeds of Despair"-a sixty minute long documentary- which was shown on July 17 and subsequently on all the independent television networks at 10.30 P.M.<sup>25</sup>

The screening of this documentary served two important functions. First, it was the basis of the first major appeal on the famine in Britain. The appeal organized by the British Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC), however was not meant for Ethiopia alone but for ten other African countries as well. Second, it initiated competition between the two television networks in the UK-the BBC and ITV-which spurred them to give the famine the much needed attention for publicity. The BBC's knowledge that ITV were to use Stewart's documentary pushed them into doing a story on Ethiopia. As a result, Michael Buerk's July report was produced. Indeed despite the fact that the latter derived inspiration from the knowledge of ITV's intention, it succeeded in being televised a few hours before the ITV's documentary "Seeds of Despair".

On July 19, the DEC then launched two appeals simultaneously on both the BBC and ITV for the famine in Africa. Four days later extracts from the Irish Concern documentary were televised again on channel 4 news, and ITN's "News At Ten".<sup>26</sup> These messages evidently served in getting public attention and generating the required response. They brought in £10 million for the DEC's appeals. The fact that the DEC had never raised such a record sum in its entire history suggests that at this point the crisis had gained ground with audiences in the UK. In retrospect, it had served to prepare the ground for the subsequent appeals in October. In this sense the July appeals served to prepare the British public for what was to follow in October. Incidentally, the two major television networks did not return to the issue with full force until sometime in October. The story faded with only four items done for the whole of August, September and early October by both networks.<sup>27</sup>

(c). The October Coverage and its Impact

October 23 1984 marked an important landmark by way of shaping the focus of international attention on the disaster in Ethiopia. Private individuals, relief organizations and governments were shocked beyond belief with the disturbing revelations that thousands of people were dying for want of food now in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

Anxious private donors and the public in the West,

in conjunction with relief agencies, reacted spontaneously with donations of money and food for the suffering victims in a manner that was unprecedented in recent times. Fund raising activities for the famine started in earnest after the broadcast. One of the most famous fund raisers, Bob Geldof, who also affected the shape of the global response in a profound way, derived inspiration from the October BBC footage. Together with other concerned citizens and private relief agencies they called on their governments to respond to the emergency. It was the combined pressure from the public and the relief agencies that literally moved Western governments to respond in a manner that these governments would otherwise not have done (because of their opposition to the marxist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam).<sup>28</sup> Their impact on government yielded immediate results in the sense that for the first time these governments undertook a firm commitment to act. At the bilateral level the UK and the US Governments increased their assistance substantially. Likewise at the multilateral level governments adopted appropriate measures to meet the emergency by setting up the United Nations Office of Emergency Relief Operation in Ethiopia. The UN Assistant Secretary General Kurt Jansson was appointed to head the Office barely less than two weeks after the BBC program.<sup>29</sup>

The question that merits analysis at this juncture is how did television succeed in transforming the famine into the phenomenal success it achieved as an issue of

global concern? And what was unique about the October 23 television coverage that made it possible to move both people and governments to act to the degree that they did?

The October 23 story, like the July coverage, was produced in similar circumstance. Here too the hidden hand of competition operated in shaping the two networks' interest in the famine and their subsequent coverage of the story. Once again circumstances worked in favour of the BBC, even though the pace was set by ITV stations. The story of how the BBC succeeded in bringing the October footage to the public before the ITV, derived greatly from their knowledge of ITV's planned program.

It appears that by some combination of chance and luck the BBC overtook the ITV once more. Peter Gill of Thames Television had prepared a documentary on the crisis titled "Bitter Harvest".<sup>30</sup> However, arrangements to have the documentary screened were overtaken by a Thames television technicians' strike.

Five days after Gill had left Ethiopia, Buerk, Amin and Michael Wooldridge of the BBC radio arrived to do a story on the famine. The trio got permission to travel to Makelle, Lalibella and Korem, having been aware that Gill had been to Korem. Within five days they had accomplished their assignment. By October 22, they had left Ethiopia and by October 23, Buerk had arrived in London with the story ready for transmission. The first broadcast went out at lunch time with what is now the famous BBC footage on the Ethiopian famine story. In the following

words of Buerk accompanied by the film shots of Amin the BBC captured the attention of millions of viewers and listeners:

Dawn, and as the sun breaks through the piercing chill of night on the plain outside Korem, it lights up a biblical famine, now, in the 20th century. This place, say workers here is the closest thing to hell on earth. Thousands of wasted people are coming here for help. Many find only death. They flood in every day from villages hundreds of miles away, felled by hunger, driven beyond the point of desperation. Death is all around. A child or adult dies every 20 minutes. Korem, an insignificant town, has become an important place of grief.<sup>31</sup>

By the six o'clock news the story was repeated as the leading story and was left to run for eight minutes. It was repeated again on the nine o'clock news though as the fourth item this time. The next day, October 24, Buerk's second report went out both at midday and on the six o'clock news.<sup>32</sup> The footage and the way it was relayed triggered other stations and the media around the world to focus on Ethiopia. Thus the way the BBC handled the story assured it the success it achieved. On this Harrison and Palmer noted:

For a start by leading on two consecutive days with items of eight and seven minutes in length in news programme where two minutes was the norm the BBC was quite clearly saying: "Here is an event of major importance".

And once the BBC was assured of success:

the story was retold and kept running on the regional television stations and on home, local and world service radio.<sup>33</sup>

It was after this report, coupled with appeals from Oxfam and the Save the Children Fund (SCF) that Gill's "bitter harvest" documentary was finally allowed to be shown by the striking Union on October 25, 1985. With the story now firmly in place in peoples' minds, public pressure began mounting on governments to respond to the emergency. In spite of the story's significant success with the media in the UK, other networks were still slow in picking it up. For instance after the lunch news report on October 23, Visnews offered the story to Eurovision and NBC on the same day and both organizations rejected the story. According to Kevin Hamilton, the managing editor of Visnews in London, both Joe Angotti, the then European manager of NBC and Frieda Morris, NBC's bureau chief in London tried several times to have NBC New York take the pictures. The reaction from NBC NY, was that "the show is full up, we don't have any room for them. Why don't you send them over in a aeroplane, we take a look at them next week".<sup>34</sup>

After a lot of insistence from Joe Angotti, NBC NY accepted the pictures but not without recutting them before finally putting them as the eighth item on their Nightly News, with remembrance of the Beirut bombing, five items before the pictures.<sup>35</sup> Tom Brokaw, the presenter of the program introduced the footage with this comment:

For sometime now we have been hearing reports of another famine in Africa, this time in Ethiopia. Stories of mass hunger and death, but with all else going on these days so often those reports don't have much impact- words from far off places. No more. Tonight we end this program with this report: "Dawn.....an important place of grief".

Meanwhile, Eurovision called for the pictures the following day, October 24, after hearing about their impact. Kevin Hamilton lamented bitterly over the failure of the major media networks, particularly, those in the US to realize the potential of the crisis before this period. He observed:

I am surprised given the competitiveness and the expertise that does exist in American network TV, that someone didn't pick up on Ethiopia, until it was handed to them on a plate.<sup>36</sup>

5. The Transformation of The Famine

When people saw the pictures for themselves the impact was created. The pertinent question here is, why did this particular piece succeed in exciting organizational and public interest beyond the audience in the UK? The answers to this question lies in a combination of factors. Four are outlined by Wiseberg<sup>37</sup> that condition media success in evoking public opinion on a given issue. These relate to the timing of the issue; the nature of the issue itself; the values of the society being addressed; and the organizational orientation of the media institution. Using Wiseberg's theoretical framework the following explanations can be offered. One factor that may also be

added here is the factor of chance.

(a). The Timing Factor

It is indeed the case that timing played a critical role in October. First, because there was no competing news event in Europe and around the world at the time, it enabled the media networks in Britain to focus on the issue for quite a considerable length of time. For instance a week later media attention was shifted to the news of the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi.<sup>38</sup>

Thus if there had been an event judged by the media to be more newsworthy than the famine, perhaps the story would not have been as successful as it turned out to be. Compare for instance what happened to the coverage of the Nigerian civil war in the 1960s, media fortunes of which were affected by its coincidence with the outbreak of the seven day Arab-Israeli war. The International media focused its attention on the latter which it judged to be more important.<sup>39</sup> October was also winter time in the UK when most people were at home and not on holiday. This too contributed in broadening the scale of public reaction since there were more people at home than in the summer. On this Gill is quoted:

The fact that there were two days of hard news coverage on the BBC which was stressing the suffering and simply the suffering in northern Ethiopia, followed by our coming in on the Thursday night with an hour of the essential politics before an audience of 6-7 million contributed to what was precisely the right combination of news and current affairs and with precisely the right timing.<sup>40</sup>

Moreover the July DEC appeal had helped in priming the British public before the October footage. But it was not sufficient on its own to excite interest in the absence of right timing and other factors. The story simply faded in spite of the fact that it was as dramatic as any story could be. For instance Buerk was filmed holding a starving child who subsequently died. Although the piece in combination with the other pieces carried by both the BBC and ITV generated a big response, the coverage did not lead to a global response like the October footage.

(b). The Power of Pictures

The nature of the issue itself appeals easily to public sympathy. The point about starvation is that it is reducible to dimensions which people can understand very easily. One of the factors that brought the famine to public attention was the fact that thousands of people were seen on television screen in very pathetic conditions. Thus while people could listen to the radio and hear the same words or turn to the pages of papers and read all about it, the effect could not be the same, as when they saw the pictures. To hear, read or be told about the story was not enough. To see the pictures "live" made a great difference. Seeing and witnessing the endless mass of people crying and dying on TV in our presence as it were is quite disturbing. The power of the pictures did indeed make an impact on people's consciences:

The scale of the response owes much to the fact that people did see the faces

of famine-the victims were right there  
in their living rooms.<sup>41</sup>

This, coupled with the fact that television audience is larger than that of either the radio or the press was effective in magnifying the impact of the story.

(c). Organizational Values

The organizational orientation of the media institution was also operative in the October coverage of the issue. For instance on occasions the media prioritised the story while on other occasions it did not. In the July report, Buerk's story was slotted mid bulletin between the French Prime Minister's resignation and Israeli's involvement in Lebanon. In the case of the October report it was broadcast at lunch time and the six o'clock news as the lead item on both news programmes, although the story was transferred to the fourth item by the time of the nine o'clock news bulletin.<sup>42</sup> Similarly with the NBC the story was first slotted as the eighth and last item on the news bulletin. In this sense then, the institutional imperatives were clearly at work. Also operative was the commercial competition between the two major networks, which is deeply embedded in the organizational orientation of the media. Cris Crammer of the BBC said :

I will be conning you if I suggested  
the fact that ITV was there was not  
an influence.<sup>43</sup>

The fact that the pictures were emotionally charged

meant that the media could focus on them for a while since one of the unwritten rules of media coverage is to dwell on the sensational and the dramatic. Indeed this was why Tony Suan's pictures were rejected initially because at that point people were not dropping dead, or at least not on the same scale as they did later in October. It has to be stressed here that it is not intended to imply that this was deliberate on the part of the media but rather a consequence of their organizational set up. As David Kline, remarked "we don't report on all the planes that landed safely on a given day". The implication being that they report on the ones that did not. The media by definition reports on problems that have reach a crisis point.

(d). The Chance Factor

There is also the operative "hand" of chance.

According to BBC's John Simpson, October 23 was by chance a slack news day when they could have used any story. He said:

We could have led with any of a handful of fairly substantial stories.... in the end it was decided to try an imaginative lead.<sup>44</sup>

Indeed even after it was shown, other media houses at first turned it down.

Added to this was the pairing of Amin and Buerk on the same trip. This might have played a role in the BBC's decision to pay extra attention to the story. If the story had broken a year later when South Africa had become

the dominating news story it would have been unlikely that Buerk could have been sent to Ethiopia.<sup>45</sup> The coincidence of record grain harvests in Europe that year corresponding with the scenes of destitution from Ethiopia, round about Christmas time sat uneasily on many peoples' minds. Then there was the chance factor that Bob Geldof happened to be one of those watching television that day, which had been decisive in turning the story into an international issue of concern.

Finally there was the equally important factor that the story was told in societies where public opinion could influence public policy. The fact that private interest groups could demand and focus government attention on any issue of interest for immediate debate and action ensured the successful globalization of concern. Three days after the story The Guardian observed:

European Governments and the EEC have at last begun to take vigorous action to deal with the Ethiopian famine under pressure from the aid agencies and public opinion.<sup>46</sup>

The media had clearly played a role in bringing about a climate of change about the famine. Without its intervention the response of the international community, especially that of the major bilateral donors, might never have come about. However, the media, like any other human institution was slow in picking the story and in showing great interest in it both before October and shortly after the October 23 broadcast.

6. Conclusion

From the spring of 1983, up to the last quarter of 1984 attempts by individuals, relief organizations and officials to get international action and relief for Ethiopia met with varying degrees of success. However, with the October BBC report international concern was galvanized as a result of the impact of the piece on the television watching public in Europe. The scale of the suffering affected public opinion to an unprecedented level, and consequently the public demanded greater action from their governments. Indeed the role of the media in igniting world concern is fully acknowledged:

All the relief efforts would not have gotten off the ground without the BBC program.<sup>47</sup>

Despite the efforts of concerned organizations and groups it is evident that without the media's intervention, the Ethiopian famine would not have achieved the international recognition and subsequent universal action that it did.

In this sense the media was instrumental in transforming the famine into an issue of universal concern. After it focused its attention and aroused the public in the West to make demands on their governments, the stage was set for the relief actors to go into full action. How they became involved after the stage had been set, is the focus of analysis in the next chapters.

## Notes and References

1. This chapter limits itself to the role of the television media. The coverage of the famine in the quality press in Britain during the first half of 1984 did not generate public concern as did television, when it focused its attention on the famine. To this extent therefore the focus of analysis for this chapter is the television rather than the press or the radio. On this see The Guardian, October 20, 1986; The Times, January 28, 1985, p.D8. and February 22, 1985, p.A5; New Society, October 18, 1985. Radio coverage had described in words what the newspapers had carried in writing but neither had any impact. Television was able to demonstrate in pictures what the press and radio had been saying for sometime.
2. "The Editorial", UNDRO News, November/ December 1984, p.9
3. The media occupies a vital place in the structure of the international disaster relief system. Indeed it constitutes the fourth tier in the chain after governments, relief agencies and the United Nations Organization. See, Green, S., International Disaster Relief: Towards a Responsive System( McGraw Hill 1977), chapter 4, and Kent, R.C., The Anatomy of Disaster Relief (London: Francis Pinter, 1987.) p.106.
4. Cohen, C. Bernard, The Press and Foreign Policy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 269.
5. Stagaard Einar, " Factors influencing the flow of news" Journal of Peace Research no 1, 1965, p.54.
6. See, Morentz, J.W. "The making of an International event: communication and the Drought in West Africa", (Ph.D Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1976).
7. Green, S.J., and Stephens, L.H., (ed) Disaster Appraisal, Reform and New Approaches( New York: New York University Press 1977), p.50.
8. Ibid, p.110.
9. Kent R.C., The Anatomy of Disaster Relief: The International Network in Action (London: Francis Pinter, 1987) p.106.
10. On the direction of the flow of news see Ostagaard op.cit., p.43.
11. Siebert F.S., Peterson T., Schramm Wilbur, Four Theories of the Press (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p.132.

12. This is not to imply that the media people in the Eastern Bloc and Third World media institutions have no regard for championing humanitarian concerns. The fact of the matter is they are constrained in their ability to effectively to do so by the factors we have enumerated.

13. Harrison P., and Palmer R., News out of Africa: Biafra to Band Aid, (London: Hilary Shipman, 1986).

14. Ibid, p.73.

15. The Economist, July 20, 1985, p.13.

16. Ibid.

17. Harrison and Palmer op. cit., p.100.

18. Ibid, p.104.

19. See Consuming Hunger Part I. A Channel Four Television documentary about media treatment of the flight of Ethiopians. Narrated by Nick Ullet.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid. Surprisingly after the October Buerk and Amin footage, Tony's rejected pictures won a Pulitzer Prize.

23. The Guardian, October 20, 1986.

24. Ibid.

25. Harrison and Palmer op. cit., p.107.

26. Ibid.

27. The Guardian, October 20, 1986.

28. See Chapter Five below.

29. Jansson K., et. al, op. cit..

30. Gill had been in Korem, Ethiopia in early October 1984 where he prepared his documentary on the famine. By the second week of October he had already completed filming and had left Ethiopia.

31. Quoted in Harrison and Palmer, op.cit., p.122.

32. Ibid, p.124.

33. Ibid., p.129.

34. Consuming Hunger Part 1, op. cit.

35. See Assignment Africa. A Television documentary on how Africa is covered in the American media.
36. Ibid.
37. Wiseberg L.S., "The International Politics of Relief: A Case Study of the Relief Operations mounted during the Nigerian Civil War" ( Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, 1973 ). I should state here, that I have benefited from reading Wiseberg's thesis, especially in having a clear picture of the conceptual issues involved in relief.
38. The Times, November 1, 1984, p.1.
39. According to Palmer coverage of the Nigerian civil war was virtually nill. Palmer in Consuming Hunger Part 1, op. cit.,
40. Quoted in Harrison and Palmer op. cit., p.127.
41. Charity Statistics, 1984/85, p.102-103.
42. The Guardian, October 20, 1986.
43. Consuming Hunger Part 1., op. cit.
44. Quoted in The Guardian, October 20, 1986.
45. Harrison and Palmer op. cit., p.127.
46. The Guardian, October 27, 1984.
47. Cooperative Agreement on Settlement and Resource Systems Analysis: The African Drought and Famine, 1981-86: Chronologies of Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Mali, Kenya and Botswana: Appendix to Accompany the report, "Drought and Famine in Africa, 1881-86: The US response", Institute for Development Anthropology, Clark University.

PART TWO

THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE OF DONORS

## CHAPTER FOUR

### The Bilateral Response of Ethiopia's Political Allies

#### 1. Introduction

Ethiopians expected the Soviet Union to provide a substantial portion of the famine relief aid between 1984 and 1986, but they were disappointed...1

Since Ethiopia switched its allies in 1977, the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries have been Ethiopia's main political and ideological backers.<sup>2</sup> As a result extensive networks of social, economic, cultural and political links have been developed and maintained and have replaced earlier Western ties (beside the one area of commercial trading).

The East has given Ethiopia both development aid including oil subsidy, and more importantly has been the country's source of military supply. In 1977 the Soviet Union mounted a massive military airlift that ensured the political survival of the country following its attack by Somalia. At the end of the war the two sides signed a twenty year trade and technical cooperation pact that required each party to consult the other on all matters of common interest. By the time of the outbreak of the 1984 crisis Ethiopia was already finalising arrangements for the adoption of a one party political model along the lines of other socialist states.

Yet, as we will see, despite these extensive linkages

between Ethiopia and its allies the latter have been unable (for a variety of political and economic reasons) to respond adequately to Ethiopia's appeal for emergency assistance.

In this chapter we will focus our attention on the reaction of Ethiopia's allies following the latter's appeals for humanitarian help. In doing so however we have to place it in the context of their improved relations. Below we examine Ethiopia's relations with its allies and analyze their aid against the background of their leading position.

## 2. Interstate Relations

### (a). Early Historical Relations

Despite the fact that early relations predated the October 1917 Revolution in Russia it was not until 1956 that a Soviet Embassy was opened in Addis Ababa.<sup>3</sup>

The first Russian official delegation to Ethiopia took place in 1890-91 and four years later an Ethiopian mission (largely military in composition) visited Russia. Indeed a Russian officer acted as a military adviser to Emperor Menelik II, during the battle of Adowa (1896), which resulted in the defeat of the invading Italian forces. After Ethiopia's military success, Russian officers continued to serve in Menelik's army and a Russian Red Cross mission began active involvement in Ethiopia. But although cordial relations were maintained even in the days of Emperor Haile Selassie, on the whole,

the Russians did not have a firm footing in Ethiopia, despite the fact that the late Emperor was the first African leader to visit the Soviet Union (in 1959).<sup>4</sup>

With the overthrow of the monarchy in 1974 and the subsequent realignment that followed, the Soviet Union and its allies gained an unprecedented position in Ethiopia.

(b). Realignment And Soviet Ascendancy

Ethiopia's switch to the Soviet Union had been viewed as the most dramatic change there had ever been in the post war period. With that move the country was "lost" to the Soviets and their allies, after a quarter of a century of unchallenged United States domination.<sup>5</sup> However the circumstances leading to the change have been interpreted differently by scholars. According to Halliday it was Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia with US's encouragement, that led to the Russian and Cuban advance in Ethiopia.<sup>6</sup> ~~Some~~ on the other hand argued that it was the US Government's decision of April 1977 to stop the \$100m military supply that served as the turning point, because it left Ethiopia with no alternative but to turn to the Soviet Union.<sup>7</sup> Whatever were the reasons behind Ethiopia's move it was certainly clear that the country turned to the USSR of its own volition. As David observed:

without any interference from the Soviet Union, a socialist pro Soviet government took power in what had once been the most important U.S. ally in black Africa.....<sup>8</sup>

And if this was the case then the Soviet Union could hardly have ignored Ethiopia, since to do so would have been to miss a great opportunity and to preclude the future exploitation of similar developments in other countries.<sup>9</sup> In any case the Soviet Union gladly took on the offer. The immediate consequence was that the Soviet Union not only filled in the military aid vacuum left by the US.<sup>10</sup> but also stepped in to the political and ideological vacuum left by the West.

Within a short time Soviet influence had gained such ascendancy that one writer commented it was "unthinkable" for Ethiopia to oppose Soviet policies.<sup>11</sup> Indeed it is for this reason that most commentators described post revolutionary Ethiopia in a variety of eye catching aphorisms ranging from being Moscow's declared ally,<sup>12</sup> to its most loyal friend in Africa.<sup>13</sup>

Therefore against this background of such a widely shared perception it becomes imperative to delve into the nature of the alliance and to inquire whether they have matched their political and ideological dominance with their ally's appeals for humanitarian assistance.

(c). Post Revolution Relations with the East

From the beginning of the February 1974 uprising to February, 1977 (the time when Mengistu emerged as the leader of the Dergue), -Ethiopia was strictly speaking non-aligned to either the West or the East. During this period the leadership was preoccupied with coping with internal

unrests that the revolution unleashed and with internal power struggles. It was a period of uncertainty for Ethiopia.<sup>14</sup>

However with the supremacy of Mengistu, Ethiopia turned to the Soviet bloc. According to Steven David four reasons were important in influencing Mengistu to turn to the East. The first had to do with his own self-proclaimed revolutionary and socialist disposition. As a declared revolutionary it was becoming embarrassing and politically dangerous for him to be dependent on the chief benefactor of the previous regime and world's leading capitalist power.

Secondly, a socialist ideology and Soviet orientation seemed more in keeping with his plan of drastic land reform and the continuation of terror, which he felt was necessary to perpetuate his rule.

Thirdly, tilting towards the Soviet would enable him to undercut much of the Eritrean communist and radical support and at the same time provide him with the opportunity of getting the Soviets to restrain their Somali clients.

Lastly, Mengistu was unhappy with the record of US military support and especially at the sharp drop of arms deliveries.<sup>15</sup> Mengistu's emergence to the leadership position was therefore undoubtedly decisive in the reorientation of Ethiopia towards the Soviets.<sup>16</sup> As a result since February 1977 Ethiopia's international relations have been changed

so as to be in line with its new ideology. The question that immediately arises is how strong has the Soviet and Eastern bloc countries influence been in Ethiopia?

(i). Socio-cultural Relations

Socio-cultural relations is one area that has bonded Ethiopia and its new allies together. Thousands of Soviet, East German, Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian specialists of all kinds are spread around Ethiopia in far greater number than westerners.<sup>17</sup> The Soviets are found in all fields of Ethiopia's economic life. The Russians are in the construction industry; in agriculture, energy and education sectors.

The Soviets have provided Ethiopia with professors and instructors to help train Ethiopians in areas ranging from medicine and geology to ideology and political education. In 1977, Soviet professors and lecturers were put in charge of teaching ideology at the country's only University then and at Ethiopia's Yekatit 66 Party School.<sup>18</sup>

Earlier on, the Soviet Union together with Cuba, the GDR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland donated books on socialist philosophy and marxist literature to the Yekatit 66 Political School as a token of sympathy and solidarity after the destruction of part of the school by a bomb.

Furthermore the Soviet Union provides scholarships annually to Ethiopian students for studies in the USSR for

a period of four to seven years in all fields of learning such as: engineering; agriculture; natural science; and the social sciences. In the 1979/80 academic session alone the USSR provided scholarships to over 1200 Ethiopians while the other Eastern Bloc countries provided another 1800 places.<sup>19</sup>

In addition official visits between the Ethiopian capital and those of its allies take place on a regular basis. Mengistu himself has travelled to almost all the capitals of his allies' countries, (in the aftermath of the famine he made his eighth visit to Moscow since he seized power in 1977).<sup>20</sup> He visited Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Romania in 1978. Similarly his top officials have frequently visited the Eastern European capitals, e.g. Czechoslovakia in July 1977;<sup>21</sup> Yugoslavia;<sup>22</sup> the GDR;<sup>23</sup> Cuba;<sup>24</sup> etc. etc. On the other hand, his allies have frequently visited Ethiopia, e.g. Cuba's Fidel Castro was there in 1977 and 1978; the GDR's leader Mr Eric Honecker in 1979; Yugoslavia's Vice President and his federal secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1979; and Mr. Alexei Kosygin of the Politburo of the CPSU, Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1979.

(ii). Economic Relations

Development Aid

Economic relations between the two sides are dominated by development aid rather than by serious commercial trading. Although the Soviets gave assistance to

Ethiopia during the time of the Emperor (e.g. building the country's only oil refinery at Asseb in 1959 and a loan of \$200m), these, cannot match their efforts since the revolution. For instance the two countries signed a shipping agreement to facilitate bilateral trade on August 8 1978, and an Air link agreement aimed at strengthening trade and cultural ties.<sup>25</sup> The Soviets have also been providing Ethiopia with an oil subsidy (20%) below the world market prices.<sup>26</sup> Similarly they have built a cement factory, a hydro electric station and a tractor assembly plant among others.<sup>27</sup>

### Trade

Despite their impressive record of co-operation and assistance however, there is little trade between the two countries, and such as there is, tends to be to the advantage of the Soviet Union. Discussing Ethiopia-Soviet trade in 1986 Professor Halliday and Maxine Molyneau noted that :

of annual exports of around \$400 million, the majority went to the US (\$100 million) and the EEC (\$130 million). Soviet figures for 1983 show that of a total of bilateral trade of 186 million roubles (equivalent to around \$220 million), Soviet exports account for \$168 million, but imports from Ethiopia for a mere \$18 million.<sup>28</sup>

Or as another scholar pointed out:

Soviet economic aid and trade have been poor instruments of influence. The Soviet Union has consistently maintained

a favourable balance of trade with developing countries. This trade is usually bilateral, with Soviet manufactured goods being exchanged for Third world raw materials and crops. In the case of Ethiopia, there have been claims that the Soviet union has taken most of Ethiopia's coffee as part payment for arms, and that has left Ethiopia with little currency for other goods on the international market.<sup>29</sup>

But despite the lack of strong trading links, the two sides have more than compensated for this, in other ways in particular in the political arena of their relations.

(iii). Political Relations

Military Aid

Indeed Soviet military assistance is the foundation of political relations between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. Soviet military aid during the 1977/78 Ogaden war served to bring the two countries closer together than ever before. In November 1977 the Soviet Union undertook a massive military airlift to Ethiopia, after attempts to bring both Ethiopia and Somalia to the Soviet fold failed. Ethiopia was assisted with more than a billion dollars worth of arms, (three times the amount supplied to her by the United States in over 25 years).<sup>30</sup>

There was also the direct involvement of Soviet and Cuban personnel in the war.<sup>31</sup> It was this singular act more than any other that cemented the alliance between Moscow and Addis Ababa.<sup>32</sup> In return Ethiopia signed a twenty year friendship and co-operation treaty on November 20 1978, which set the seal on the evolving new

alliance.<sup>33</sup> Regarding the treaty it is observed that:

The accord has set the seal on the close alliance which had developed between Moscow and Addis Ababa, since the Soviet Union rallied [sic] behind the Mengistu regime in its war with Somalia. In terms of the treaty both countries pledged to collaborate in the political, economic and military fields for the next twenty years. The treaty binds each side to consult the other on important international questions directly involving the interests of the two.<sup>34</sup>

The treaty was undoubtedly an important milestone in Ethiopia-Soviet relations. In its own words it is significant because it has "set the seal on close alliance" between the two states, thus paving the way for the USSR to influence events in Ethiopia in a more fundamental way, such as by the formation of a socialist political party along Soviet lines.

(iv). The Formation of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE)

By any measure the transformation of Ethiopia from a feudal political society to a socialist one party state within such a short period confirms the degree of Soviet influence in the country and much more than that solidified their treaty.

The Soviet Union had encouraged Mengistu to create a socialist party of the kind that exists in other socialist countries. The importance of promoting such structures in its satellite states lies in the sense that it makes for easier dealings with these countries. The

Soviet Union uses the existence of such structures as evidence of the regime's commitment to socialism.<sup>35</sup> Thus, a year after the signing of the friendship and co-operation treaty the Provisional Military and Administrative Council announced the formation of the Commission for Organising the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE) in December 1979. Thereafter the commission held two congresses (in June 1980 and January 1983) prior to the formal launching of the Party on September 12 1984, (exactly ten years after the overthrow of the Emperor). After the formation of the Party, TASS was quoted as saying:

The creation of the Worker's Party of Ethiopia heralds an important event in the development of the revolutionary process and is a confirmation of the viable force of marxist-leninist ideas.<sup>36</sup>

(v). The Role of other Socialist Partners

Other Socialist Bloc countries beside the Soviet Union have also been engaged in assisting Ethiopia to move closer to their camp. We have already mentioned that these states provided scholarships to Ethiopian students to study in their countries, and their donation of revolutionary literature. In addition, Ethiopia has signed trade and technical agreements with a number of these countries.

Cultural, technical and scientific agreements were signed with Hungary in 1977;<sup>37</sup> and with Yugoslavia in 1978. Similar agreements were signed with the GDR,

Bulgaria, Cuba and Czechoslovakia.<sup>38</sup> These states have also assisted Ethiopia in the supply of arms, personnel and advisers. For instance Cuba and the GDR, have both provided arms and advisers (in the case of the GDR, for the purpose of training the Ethiopian state security force) while Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia provided light arms and armunitions, particularly in the early days of the revolution.<sup>39</sup> They also provided economic aid and loans to Ethiopia. For instance the GDR helped in the construction of Ethiopia's biggest cement plant;<sup>40</sup> Czechoslovakia provided loans for the establishment of a polyester textiles factory, pipe assembly plant and the modernisation of Addis Ababa's abattoir,<sup>41</sup> in addition to its large military support made during the 1977/78 Ogaden war; and Cuba has contributed immensely in the provision of medical assistance to Ethiopia.<sup>42</sup> At one point the Cuban medical mission in Ethiopia was the largest in Africa and provided services to eleven out of the fourteen provinces of the country.<sup>43</sup>

(vi). International Solidarity with Allies

Without a doubt Ethiopia has moved in the direction of the Socialist Bloc countries. Evidence of this move is expressed not only in economic and military support but in other symbolic forms. For instance in the aftermath of the 1977/78 Ogaden war, Cuba's Castro named some schools in Havanna "Gara marda" after the Ethiopian and Cuban war heroes who died during the war, and another one was named

after Col. Mengistu. The Ethiopian Government likewise built a statue of Lenin in Addis Ababa, (the first of its kind in Africa) and adopted favorable positions for their allies on a variety of international issues. For example Ethiopia boycotted the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics games in solidarity with the Soviet bloc; voted against the UN General Assembly resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1980; and supported the USSR'S position on Kampuchea. As late as February 1985 the Ethiopian leader ordered all senior government personnel to discard their European business dress and don Khaki or blue North Korean style uniforms.<sup>44</sup>

In view of the tremendous increase in cultural, economic and political ties, what has been the allies' response to Ethiopia's appeals for help?

The allies have come up with food, transport and other forms of relief. But as will become clear in the discussion, their major contribution in the emergency was in the provision of transport and their subsequent participation in the Government's resettlement programme. Below we examine and analyse each of those areas of allies' aid.

### 3. The Relief Response of Allies

#### (a). Food Aid<sup>45</sup>

Following Mengistu's visit to the Soviet Union in December 1984 (to appeal for more relief assistance) the late Soviet President Chernenko indicated to him that the

Soviet Union could render only a limited assistance.

Reporting the meeting, TASS was cited:

Chernenko pointed out that the Soviet people take to heart the ordeal that has befallen the people of Ethiopia as a result of the protracted drought and strive to render necessary help and support as far as possible.<sup>46</sup>

The Soviet Union made food donations in only two instances. The first donation made through the RRC was for 3100 mt. tonnes in 1984. The second donation (made in 1985), was for another 7,045 mt. tonnes of food. There was no further food aid donation made by the Soviets for the rest of the relief period. Therefore, the total amount provided by the Soviet Union between 1984-86 sums up to just a little over 10,000 mt. tonnes. This was less than the amount provided by the Peoples Republic of China during the relief operation. The Chinese provided 1,000 mt. tonnes of food grain in 1984: over 22,000 mt. tonnes in 1985 and another 2,000 mt. tonnes in 1986.

Thus even in comparison with states of the same ideological inclination Soviet food assistance lags far behind that made available by China.

Indeed among all the socialist countries it is only the Peoples Republic of China that provided grain in all the three years of relief consecutively.

But the assistance from the Peoples Republic of China was for grain alone because they did not provide supplementary food. However, the Soviet Union did not supply supplementary food either.<sup>47</sup> Only a few countries

such as the GDR and Cuba made substantial supplementary food grain donations.

Put together food aid assistance from the twelve leading countries of the Socialist bloc<sup>48</sup> in 1984 stood at 5,545 mt. tonnes of grain and 6,876 mt. tonnes of supplementary food; in 1985 they provided 50,203 mt. tonnes of grain and 5,032 of supplementary food; while in 1986 they provided only 2,024 mt. tonnes of food grain.

Thus it is evident from these figures that for the whole of 1984 (at the time when the images of the starving were continuously at the centre of global attention), they provided just around 12,500 mt. tonnes of both food grain and supplementary food. They also gave their most substantial assistance in 1985, (over 55,000 mt. tonnes of both food grain and supplementary food) while in 1986 their assistance was just a little over 2,000 mt. tonnes (and even this was from from the Peoples' Republic of China rather than from the Soviet Union or its allies).

All in all, the Eastern Bloc countries provided under 70,000 mt. tonnes of food aid for the whole period of the relief operation. This figure comprises 57,772 mt. tonnes of grain and 11,908 mt. tonnes of supplementary food aid.

If comparison is made with the smallest donation of food from the EEC for 1984 alone it would be seen that EEC's donation of 73,000 mt. tonnes of food grain (excluding their supplementary food aid for 1984) is higher than the total of both grain and supplementary food provided

by the entire Soviet Bloc countries for the whole of the relief period (1984-1986), and even this takes into account the contribution provided by the Peoples' Republic of China.

Likewise if comparison were made with what was given by the World Food Programme (WFP) in 1984 the tonnage of 65,145 mt. tonnes of grain (excluding supplementary food), is indeed higher than the total provided by the Eastern Bloc for the duration of the relief operation. However even if the EEC and WFP are inter-governmental organisations rather than bilateral donors, a comparison with a single donor state say for instance, Canada, brings out the relatively small size of Ethiopian allies' aid: in 1984 Canada provided 51,000 mt.tonnes of food grain (which was close to the 57,000 mt.tonnes provided by the Soviet Bloc countries). Indeed Soviet's aid of 10,000 mt. tonnes pales in comparison to that of countries like India, Sweden and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe gave twice as much as the Soviet Union. The country donated over 12,000 mt.tonnes of food in both 1985 and 1986.

Despite the relative size of their aid nevertheless their contributions were important. But much more important than their food aid donations was their transport assistance.

(b). Transport Assistance

Land Vehicles

The most notable area of Eastern Bloc aid was in the

provision of transportation. In this area the East was generous. They provided trucks, trailers, light vehicles and air transport. Between October 1984 and March 1985 when the problem of transportation was acute the Soviet Union made a significant contribution in this area. In 1985 the RRC received 300 trucks and 9 light vehicles from the USSR. In 1986 a further donation of 9 light vehicles was made by the Soviets. The GDR and the Democratic Republic of Korea gave 171 trucks in 1985. Thus, the allies have provided land transportation to the tune of over 550 trucks.

The Soviet Union's own share constituted about 60% of all Eastern Bloc land transportation assistance. But despite this, a closer examination reveals that they did not have an overall lead even in this sector.

It is true that in the early stages of the international response, 87% of the land transportation was provided by the GDR and the Republic of Korea, while 13% was provided by the non-Eastern bloc countries. However, in 1985 (despite the massive figure of over 300 trucks and light vehicles from the allies) they provided only 44% of the total land transport. The remaining 56% came from Western donor Governments and international organisations. Eastern and Western land transportation combined exceeded over 1000 trucks, trailers and light vehicles.

In 1986 Ethiopia's allies provided only 2% (9 vehicles) of the total of the land transportation and the non-socialist countries contributed the remaining 98% (352

vehicles).<sup>49</sup> Thus for the duration of the three year relief period, the Soviet Bloc gave 44% of the total land transportation while the remainder (56%) was made by the non-socialist group.

(c). Air Assistance

The USSR made available 12 AN-12 Aircraft and 22 Mi-8 helicopters in November 1984.<sup>50</sup> However in an effort to portray his allies as not lagging behind the West, Mengistu plunged the operation into controversy by stating that 75% of the air transportation used in the food airlift was provided by the Soviet Union.<sup>51</sup> Certainly the Soviets provided more transport planes than any other country East or West. It is also true that their planes stayed in Ethiopia beyond the end of the relief operation in 1986.<sup>52</sup>

In addition to the Soviet planes, the GDR provided 2 AN-26, and one IL-18 from November 1984 to October 1985 while Poland provided 3 Mi-8 helicopters. Libya provided another 2 AN-26 from February 1985 to October 1985. A measure of the Eastern Bloc's solidarity however was in the support it gave to the Government's resettlement programme especially compared to the unfavorable view taken of the programme by most Western donors.

(d). Transport and Resettlement

The bulk of Soviet assistance was absorbed in the transportation of settlers from the denuded provinces of Tigray, Wollo, and Shoa to the resettlement sites in the

south and western parts of the country.

The Ethiopian Government embarked on the programme in early November 1984 in the belief that a realistic solution to the continuous cycle of famine in the northern provinces must involve the resettlement of the population to the more fertile areas of the country.<sup>53</sup>

However, before the programme could reach its target of resettling 1.5 million people<sup>54</sup> it met with stiff opposition from the USG, Britain and the EEC, as a result of which it was suspended from August 1985 until April 1987.<sup>55</sup>

Western governments refused to assist the programme on the grounds that the Ethiopian Government was using force and was insensitive to the human rights aspects involved.<sup>56</sup> Judging from the support given by other Western states like Canada and Italy, and a host of Western agencies such as the CRDA, West German Menschen fur Menschen, Irish Concern and Band Aid to the program (on humanitarian grounds), it looks as though the critics' refusal to assist may have been derived largely from the reservations they held about the regime and its allies.<sup>57</sup>

(e). Other Assistance from the East

Other relief items received from the Eastern Bloc included medical equipment, blankets, clothing and footwear; shelter materials and household utensils and spare parts.

Poland made a substantial contribution of medical

items at the beginning of the crisis. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the GDR and Hungary were also important donors of these items in 1985.

Although the GDR, Bulgaria and China provided agricultural machinery, water supply equipment, power materials and communication equipment in 1985, these items are development rather than relief items. Their nature therefore underscores a fundamental difference in the perception and response to relief between the East and the West. In the East there is no clear distinction between relief and development. In the West the distinction makes a great deal of difference. Western countries are prepared to participate in relief activities whenever necessary. From their point of view other criteria have to be met before a country becomes eligible for development assistance.

#### 4. Evaluation of the Allies' Humanitarian Assistance

From the outset controversy surrounded the role and response of Ethiopia's allies. According to some scholars there was no record of either the RRC making an appeal to the Soviets for relief nor a record of the Soviet union sending relief to Ethiopia until after October 1984.<sup>58</sup> Other scholars disagree and argue that the Soviet Union responded to the March 1984 appeal made by the Ethiopian Government. The first view is held by Legum who claims:

Yet, there is no record of the RRC having made appeal to the soviet bloc or of the dispatch of emergency aid from that source until after western aid had

began to pour into Ethiopia in October 1984, following the traumatic impact of a seven minute film by the distinguished Kenyan cameraman Mohammed Amin with commentary by a BBC reporter Michael Buerk.<sup>59</sup>

Representing the other view is Mr. Gill who claims that the Soviet Union alone with Canada, the EEC and the WFP, promised to send some grain in response to the 1984 March appeal. The Russians came up with 10,000 tons of rice, the North Koreans and Chinese with 6,000 tons of grain, and the Cubans said they would send 5000 tonnes of Sugar.<sup>60</sup> However in what appears as a middle of the road position the former US Charge d'affaires in Addis Ababa, David Korn points out:

The Soviet Union had made its yearly donation of 10,000 tons of rice in June before the extent of the crisis could be known. The Soviet union made no further donation of food during 1984 or up to the first half of 1985, though other eastern bloc governments sent small shipments of food.<sup>61</sup>

Whatever the truth of the matter, it is evident that the Soviet Union was not unaware of conditions in Ethiopia before October 1984. Indeed, in May 1984, the Soviet Red Cross organisation sent a gift of relief aid along with many Western NGOs to the famine areas.<sup>62</sup> The Soviet media however did not report the drought until the end of October 1984.<sup>63</sup>

But one area beyond contention is with regard to the large quantity of trucks, trailers and air transport provided by the allies. Following the October BBC appeal the USSR committed massive transport assistance for

used in the relief. This was certainly essential in moving the food in to the famine zones. Indeed without this support certainly more lives would have been lost. But despite this, should the allies' response be judged as adequate? In other words was the assistance provided, what should have been expected of the allies particularly in the face of a tragedy of such magnitude?

If the account of the Soviet Union's response to the March appeal was indeed correct then it is obvious that this gave the Soviet Union an edge over the US and Britain, whom it was observed at this juncture, pledged nothing.<sup>64</sup> But although the response came early it appears to have fallen far short of what was needed and what would be expected of a major ally, especially in view of the magnitude of the disaster.

Looking at the size of Soviet food assistance, one cannot but argue that it was a poor donor of food aid. For instance the 10,000 mt. tonnes of rice pledged in March 1984 beside being relatively small was also the wrong kind of aid at the time, as rice is not a major part of the Ethiopian diet. Hence the Ethiopian Government had to resell it in order to buy the staple diet "teff" instead.

Explanation as to why the Soviet Union was a poor donor of food is not hard to find. To start with the Soviet Union is a net importer itself.<sup>65</sup> The Soviet Union purchases much of its wheat grain from the West despite the fact that it is also an important world producer.<sup>66</sup> Indeed in the whole of the COMECON countries only Hungary and

Romania are food exporters.<sup>67</sup> This perhaps explains why the East could not match Western food donation (we will come back to this in the next chapter). And also perhaps this was why Bulgaria and Hungary were the most important donors of food in 1985 after the Soviet Union.

Again, Cuba's decision to send 5,000 tonnes of sugar must not be unrelated to Cuba's leading position in the world sugar market. It does certainly look as if the donation was made from surplus availability of the commodity rather than on the actual needs of the famine victims. In the circumstance it was the grain provided by the North Koreans and the Chinese that was of immediate relevance. And since the Chinese are a competing power with the Soviet Union it can be argued that Ethiopia's allies response fell short of the expectations of their ally's appeals for emergency aid (at least as far as food is concerned). Admittedly, in 1988 the Soviet Union provided a quarter of a million tonnes of grain although the internal transportation cost had to be found from elsewhere.

The most visible form of Eastern aid therefore (as evident from the preceding analysis) is in the provision of manufactured hardware items such as machinery, trucks, trailers, light vehicles and air transport. The obvious explanation behind Eastern Bloc high visibility in this area certainly has to do with the nature of their economies-Soviet and Eastern Bloc economies are better producers of industrial goods.

Another feature of the allies' aid is that throughout the relief period their assistance was completely Government oriented. Why this was so may be explained from two angles. First it is the case that they did not extend their humanitarian assistance to the rebel areas. This may have to do with either the fear of offending their ally's sensitivities or more realistically their lack of surplus food. Secondly and more importantly their assistance was Government focused because they could not run a programme of their own in terms of setting up their own relief or shelter camps and food distribution points. Essentially this is the field of NGOs and therefore a phenomenon of Western societies. In the words of an Eastern Bloc diplomat, NGOs are a western invention and luxury. But beneath this axiom is the implied issue of lack of resources. In addition, allies' participation in the Government's resettlement programme was partly based on solidarity with the Government, and partly on the appeal of the programme itself.

Finally a fundamental influence on allies' response is their perception of the issues at stake. They perceived the crisis basically as a problem of underdevelopment and poverty and as such this affected their approach and response. The Socialist states' philosophy favoured more development assistance as the ultimate solution to the crisis, instead of relief which they saw as a palliative. And this more than any other factor explains why they responded to their ally in the manner they did.

## 5. Conclusion

In this Chapter we concentrated on examining the bilateral response of Ethiopia's political allies to her appeals for emergency assistance.

It is evident from the preceding discussions that since the revolution of 1974 there had been a vast expansion of socio-cultural, technical and political ties between Ethiopia and the Eastern Bloc.

In response to Ethiopia's appeals the allies have come up with food and other relief items, although their most visible area of assistance was in the provision of land and air transport and associated with that their participation in the resettlement of the famine victims.

But in view of their inadequate response to meet the massive needs, Ethiopia was left with no option but to turn to other donors for help. And in this case it inevitably meant turning to her political opponents.

TABLE 2

Food Aid Assistance from Ethiopia's Allies 1984-1986.

<u>Year</u>	<u>1984</u>		<u>1985</u>		<u>1986</u>	
	<u>Column (A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>	<u>(A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>	<u>(A)</u>	<u>(B)</u>
USSR	3100	....	7045	....	....	.....
GDR	230	2234	336	1985	....	.....
YUG'	210	....	71	325	....	.....
N/KOREA	1005	....	1005	....	....	.....
CUBA	....	4588	....	....	....	.....
CZECHOS	....	8	14	242	....	.....
BULGARIA	....	13	17011	821	....	.....
HUNGARY	....	33	1006	1559	....	.....
CHINA	1000	....	22257	....	2024	.....
POLAND	....	....	870	100	....	.....
ROMANIA	....	....	588	....	....	.....
Sub/						
Total	<u>5545</u>	<u>6876</u>	<u>50203</u>	<u>5032</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>.....</u>

The Total of Food Grain provided between 1984-86, 57772. mt tonnes. While the Total of supplementary food 1984-1986 11,908. Therefore the Gross total of both food grains and supplementary food provided by the Allies for the three Year Period, 69,680 mt tonnes .

Source: RRC (Aid Coordination Office).

Notes: Column(A), refers to quantity of food grain given in Metric tonnes. Column(B) refers to the quantity of supplementary food grain provided.

TABLE 3

Transportation Assistance from Ethiopia's Allies, 1984-86.

<u>Year</u>	<u>1984</u>		<u>1985</u>		<u>1986</u>	
	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Qty</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Qty</u>	
<u>Value</u>						
USSR			309	EB 15180000	9	EB155,000
GDR	35	1575000	35	1575000		
N/KOREA	30	618690				
CUBA						
CZECHOS			34	397600		
BULGARIA			22	998000		
HUNGARY						
CHINA						
POLAND						
ROMANIA			80	9500000		
Total	<u>65</u>	<u>EB 2193690</u>	<u>480</u>	<u>EB 27650600</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>EB155000</u>

Grand Total of Vehicles 554.

Total in value EB 29,999,290.

Source: RRC (Aid Coordination Office).

Notes.

1)The quantity, includes trucks, trailers, and light vehicles.

2)The value is given in Ethiopian Birr. The Birr is fixed at 2.07= US \$ 1, and at 3.13= £1 to UK pound Sterling as at May 1986.

## Notes and References

1. Makinda Samuel M., Superpower Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p.190.
2. following the deposition of the Emperor in 1974, Ethiopia was declared a socialist state on December 13 1974. See, Prouty C., and Rosenfeld E., Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia (The Scarecrow Press, 1981, p.154).
3. Indeed Ethiopia was the only African country with which Russia had standing relations prior to 1917. See, Brind, Harry, "Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa" International Affairs, vol. 60, no.1., winter 1983/84, p.92.
4. Halliday F., and Molyneux M., "The Soviet Union and the Ethiopian Revolution" Third World Affairs 1986, p.181.
5. Halliday, Fred, "U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa: Aboulia or Proxy intervention?" Review of African Political Economy, no 10 September- December, 1978, p.30.
6. Ibid, p.31.
7. Lyons, Roy, "The USSR, China and the Horn of Africa" Review of African Political Economy, no 12, May- August 1978, p.11.
8. David, Steven, "Realignment in the Horn: The Soviet advantage" International Security, vol. 4, no 2, Fall 1979, p.77.
9. Ibid., p.77.
10. Schwab, Peter, "Cold war on the Horn of Africa", African Affairs, no. 77, October 1978, p.17.
11. The Times, September 11, 1984, p.9.
12. Legum, C. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol xvii, 1984-85 P.B 216.
13. Africa Research Bulletin, vol 21, Oct/ Nov., 1984, p.7227A.
14. The country defined its brand of socialism as "African socialism" rather than the Soviet type of scientific socialism. Ethiopia was declared a socialist state on the 13th of December 1974. See Prouty C., and Rosenfeld E., Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia, ( The Scarecrow Press, 1981), p.154.
15. Steven op. cit., p.74.
16. Halliday F., and Molyneux M., op. cit., p.185.

17. The research was began prior to the changes in Eastern Europe brought about by President Gorbachev's "glasnost" and "perestroika". With the end of cold war, and USSR's intention to cut its military aid to Ethiopia, the latter is forced to look for new sources of assistance. It is in this light that the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel on November 3, 1989 comes as no surprise. Israel is expected to fill the vacuum created as a result of the new developments. See Keesing's Contemporary Archive, Vol.35, No 11, 1989,p.37034
18. Makinda, op.cit, p.187.
19. Africa Diary, vol.19, 1979, p. 9668.
20. The Times, December 17, 1984, p. 6.
21. Africa Diary, vol. 17. 1977, p.8634.
22. Ibid. p. 8400.
23. Ibid. p.8474.
24. Africa Diary, vol. 19. 1979. p.9552.
25. Africa Diary, vol.18, 1978, p. 9204.
26. Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 19, July 1982, P. 6616 A.
27. Selamu, Tesfa, " The USSR and the Ethiopian Famine" Detente, vol. vii, Autumn, 1986. P 9. Also see Ethiopian Profile, Vol.3, no.15, August 1984, for a comprehensive statistical information, showing the extent of soviet technical and economic co-operation between the soviet union and Ethiopia.
28. Halliday f., and Molyneux M., op. cit., p.185.
29. Makinda op. cit., p.190.
30. Steven op. cit., p. 80. Brind Harry, puts the figure much higher (\$1.5 billion). See Harry, "Soviet policy in the Horn of Africa" International Affairs, Vol.60, no.1, 1983/84, p.93. In other words that represents 15 percent of the Soviet Union total airlift capacity.
31. Steven, op. cit, p.80.
32. See Harry, op. cit., p.93.
33. Somalia was the first sub-Saharan African country to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the soviet union. The treaty was signed in July 1974 and lasted until November 1977 when it was abrogated by

Somalia. The other two African countries that signed similar agreements with the Soviet union were Angola, in October 1976, and Mozambique in March 1977.

34. Africa Diary, vol.19, 1979, p. 9384. For a full text of the treaty refer to pp. 9384-9385.

35. Roy, op.cit., p.14.

36. Makinda op. cit., p.187.

37. Africa Diary, vol.17, 1977. p. 8593.

38. Ethiopian Profile, vol.3. no.15, August 1984, p.16 and footnote no.1 above.

39. Roy, op.cit., p.11.

40. Africa Diary, vol. 20, 1980, p. 10262.

41. Africa Research Bulletin., vol.23, February 1986, p. 8099C.

42. The Cubans moved enmasse in December 1977, at the prompting of the soviet union. Prior to that time their presence in Ethiopia was minimal, estimated at around 400 advisers, in November 1977. But at the end of the war, their number had risen to 17000 regular troops. See Brind, Harry , op.cit, P80. Although Steven put their figure at 20,000. See Steven op.cit.,p.87.

43. Africa Diary, vol. 18, 1978. p. 9278.

44. Korn A.D., "Ethiopia: Dilemma for the West" Third World Today, RIIA, 1986, p.7.

45. Except <sup>where</sup> otherwise indicated all the figures used for this section including the section on transportation and other assistance, is based on the "Summary of Major Bilateral Aid received by the RRC, for 1984, 1985 and 1986". The data is made available to me by the office of statistics, Aid and International relations department of the RRC, Addis Ababa. For a summary refer to Tables 2 and 3 at the end of the chapter.

46. The Times(London), December 18, 1984. p.6.

47. "Supplementary food" is different from "food grain" in both its substance and its intended users. First, it is rich in high protein and second, it is targeted to most vulnerable groups in disasters such as malnourished children, lactating mothers and the old. See, Kent R. C., The Anatomy of Disaster Relief(London: Francis Pinter, 1987), p. 102

48. USSR, GDR, Yugoslavia, Democratic peoples Republic of Korea, Cuba, China, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, PDRY, Hungary.

49. The UN's WTOE donated 316 trucks.
50. See Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian Drought/Famine, Fiscal Years 1985/86, (prepared by the Staff of the USAID office, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), p.86.
51. Relief workers challenged Mengistu's claims that the Soviet Union and its allies provided three-quarters of the total air transport service. See, Makinda op.cit., p. 190.
52. See Final Disaster Report, Fiscal Years 1985/86, op.cit.
53. Interview with Ato Shimelis Adugna, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, in Addis Ababa, July 18, 1988 (9-10:20 A.M.).
54. "Resettlement" by Irish Concern, August 27, 1986.
55. "An Overview: Resettlement And Villigization" by Irish Concern, May 1, 1987, p.7
56. The Times, (London), July 15, 1985, p.5d.
57. The USG. recommended the resettlement of three million people in 1972-73 to the Government of Emperor Haile Selassie, just before it collapsed. Interviews with Ato Shimelis Adugna, op.cit., and Fr. John Finucane, Director of Irish Concern, in Addis Ababa Ethiopia, August 4, 1988 (10-11:00 A.M.).
58. Africa Contemporary Record, op.cit., p.B216.
59. Ibid.
60. Gill Peter op.cit., p.39.
61. Korn, op.cit., p.4.
62. USSR and Third world, vol.14, no.4,5,6, 1984, p.33.
63. Ibid. p.33.
64. Gill op.cit., p. 39. From available evidence The Soviet Union certainly did send 10,000 mt. tonnes of food grain in 1984 to the RRC. Refer to Appendix I.
65. Korn, op.cit., p.9.
66. The World in Figures, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987, p.26.
67. The Times(London), June 28, 1985. p.5.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### The Bilateral Response of Ethiopia's Political Opponents

#### 1. Introduction

In this chapter attention will be focused on discussing the response of Ethiopia's political opponents to her appeals for humanitarian aid. It is perhaps worth pointing out here that since 1977 when Ethiopia switched its allies, relations between the country and its former Western allies have been anything but warm.

Whereas earlier on (in the days of the Emperor) probably no African nation enjoyed better relations with the West than Ethiopia, the deposition of the Emperor and subsequent developments changed all that. Although trade, continued, unaffected by ideological differences, Ethiopia never saw eye to eye with the West in any other area of contact. As a result there was sharp decline in socio-cultural, military and political ties.

It is against this backdrop that Ethiopia's onetime allies responded to the country's appeals for humanitarian assistance. Consequently, Western bilateral responses reflected a range of political attitudes towards the Ethiopian Government.

But first we consider the nature of Ethiopia's relations with the West and afterwards analyse the response of the latter in this context.

## 2. Interstate Relations

### (a) Early Historical Relations

In its external relations Ethiopia has had closer links with the West than it had with the Eastern Bloc countries. This was true until the revolution of 1974, which altered the direction of the country's international relations. Below we trace the rise and decline of those relations.

### (b). Diplomatic Relations

The level at which diplomatic relations are maintained between states indicates the significance attached by Governments to those relations. With the exception of Norway and Denmark, all Western European countries are represented in Addis Ababa.<sup>1</sup> Ethiopia maintains diplomatic ties at Ambassadorial level with the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Sweden, Germany and France. With the United States, however, diplomatic relations are restricted to Charge d'Affaires level.

Thus, in the wake of the famine, diplomatic relations between the US and Ethiopia were the poorest among the alliance group. With the rest of the countries Ethiopia's diplomatic relations have been maintained at Ambassadorial level and conducted in accordance with the dictates of normal day-to-day interstate relations.

### (c). Socio-cultural Relations

Socio-cultural relations had existed between Ethiopia

and the West for many years. In the days of the Emperor, these relations flourished, and there were American, Canadian, Greek, German, French, British, Dutch, Norwegian, Australian and Italian citizens living and working in Ethiopia.<sup>2</sup>

Europeans travelled to Ethiopia as tourists. Others preceded them as missionaries. Some went in as teachers, businessmen, relief officials, engineers and medical personnel- all keen to assist the country in its development. At the same time Ethiopians were sent to Europe and North America to study and train. But while the trend in the 1960s and 1970s was towards an expansion of these ties, more recently they have declined sharply. Lamenting the situation, one writer observed that there were about 1250 Britons living in Ethiopia at the time of the revolution, but that the number shrank to about 50 in the following three years.<sup>3</sup> The case of the US Peace Corps was even worse. It was noted that twenty years ago, Ethiopia had the largest number of Peace Corps volunteers in Africa.<sup>4</sup> Now all that has changed, even though these relations are continuing. On the whole, however, the trend is that of sharp decline.

(d). Development Aid and Drought Relief

As a result of the diminished relations, the US, UK, and France stopped supplies of development aid to Ethiopia, following the Government's nationalization programme, shortly after the revolution.<sup>5</sup>

The US's bilateral development aid was phased out completely in 1979 and no new loans or investments were extended to Ethiopia. With regard to drought relief, however, the USG, did provide a cheque of \$750,000 for the support of livestock development and afforestation projects, which formed part of a \$1 million dollar commitment by the US at a time when the the RRC was scouting for \$430m for its activities in relief and development. It was like a drop in the ocean.

The British Government's position on bilateral development aid was similar to that of the US, and remained so until the famine. Progress was made during the relief operation however, when a British firm reached an agreement with the Ethiopian Government for compensation of its nationalized assets.<sup>6</sup>

The French followed the American and British response and refused provision of loans or new investment. Nor did they respond to Ethiopia's ritual annual appeal to donors for drought-relief assistance. On one occasion, however, they gave Ethiopia \$600,000 towards controlling "the potential of flooding in Addis Ababa"; and on another, in 1983, they provided Djoubiti and Ethiopia with \$90 million French Francs for the modernization of the French-built Addis-Djoubiti railway.

In contrast, Italy, Sweden, Canada and Germany have been Ethiopia's main providers of development aid, loans and drought-relief assistance.

Italy is currently the biggest Western donor to

Ethiopia in spite of the fact that, they too have suffered nationalization of their investment in Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup> In their view their efforts there "serve Western economic interests as a whole". For instance, in 1983, Canada, Sweden and Italy agreed to donate through Unicef 9.5m Birr to facilitate water supplies to areas stricken by drought: Italy's share of the contribution was the largest by far, amounting to 8.07m Birr. Again, in February 1984, Italy agreed to assist the RRC with \$3m for the construction of ten warehouses near the port of Asseb."<sup>8</sup>

The Federal Republic of Germany has given Ethiopia loans on several occasions to assist the country in tackling its development problems. In 1975 Germany advanced a \$36.6m loan to help finance water supply. Germany's drought-relief assistance prior to 1984 was also given in forestry development, soil conservation, as well as in the provision of spare parts for the expansion of equipment and garages in Addis Ababa.

The Swedish Government too through its development agencies (SAREC and SIDA) has provided bilateral development assistance in projects which include education, agriculture, energy conservation, public health, industry and telecommunication. With regard to the consistency, of Swedish aid assistance, it is noted:

Sweden, which for four years has been giving Ethiopia about \$17m development aid annually has agreed to raise it to \$20.8 m for fiscal year 1980-81.<sup>9</sup>

Like Sweden, Canada only suspended aid to Ethiopia at

the peak of political unrest in the country in 1977 but it was immediately reinstated when calm was restored. For instance, in 1977 Canada provided aid to Ethiopia worth \$9.2m for the development of rural water supplies. Canada has also provided Ethiopia with both grain and money through direct bilateral channels as well as through multilateral channels such as the World Food Program (WFP) and Unicef. Again, in 1980 the Canadian Government provided 9,400 tons of wheat (worth \$3.5m). In the same year the Canadian Government provided 52,455 tons of wheat and edible oil to Ethiopia, through WFP.<sup>10</sup> In 1983, a \$1.06m Ethiopian Birr contribution was given to Ethiopia through Unicef for vaccination as well as providing 346,500 quintals of grain and a promise of another 120,000 quintals.<sup>11</sup>

(e). Economic Relations

Ethiopia's external trade is largely conducted with the West, despite the political and ideological re-orientation of the country's foreign policy. The West is Ethiopia's principal source of imports: machinery, fuels, transport, chemicals, manufactures and cereals.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, the destination of Ethiopia's principal exports: coffee, hides and skins, oilseeds, tea and spices is the West. The US in particular remains Ethiopia's largest export market.<sup>13</sup> In a computation of Ethiopia's external-trade direction over a six year period from 1980-1986 (from IMF's Direction of Trade statistics year book), the

following picture emerges. After the US, the next most important export market for Ethiopia's principal exports is the Federal Republic of Germany, followed by France, Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Over the same period, Italy was Ethiopia's principal source of imports, followed by the US, Germany, Japan, the UK, France, Canada and Sweden.<sup>14</sup> These trade patterns reveal that political and ideological differences notwithstanding, Ethiopia's trade relations are primarily conducted with the West. What is even more interesting is that this aspect of relations with the West is expanding. For instance it is said because of the country's commercial reputation which is noted as probably unparalleled in present day Africa (Ethiopia pays its international obligations promptly):

Both the U.S. Export-Import Bank [Eximbank] and U.K.'s Export Credits Guarantee Department [ECGD] have provided considerable cover the past three years. Recent ECGD (sic) include 24m (\$36.3m) on commercial consideration. Only section one, terms for two ships being supplied by the British ship builder's affiliate Austin and Pickersgill Eximbank, which in 1979 helped arranged the purchase of Ethiopian Airlines, is now helping to finance the National carrier's order for two Boeing 767s valued at over \$150m.<sup>15</sup>

Asked to explain this apparent anomaly, the US Charge D'Affaires responded that both sides need each other. Ethiopia needs the West for its machinery and manufactures, while the West sees in Ethiopia the potential of an

expanding market.<sup>16</sup>

(f). Political Relations

Warm political relations with the West ended with the deposition of the Emperor. The level of decline, however, varies from one country to another. The sharpest occurred in Ethiopia / US relations.

This was due to the fact that the US was closely associated with the deposed Emperor and his government; consequently from the outset political relations with the Dergue were surrounded by suspicion and mistrust. The nationalization of foreign assets provided the excuse for US criticism of the Dergue's handling of the country's former political leaders, and with the executions that followed, Ethiopia drew heavy criticisms from the US, Britain and the other Western countries on human rights grounds.

Thereafter, the United States suspended development assistance and limited arms sales to the Dergue. Ethiopia in turn retaliated by closing four US institutions: the Kagnev communications station in Asmara, the US military advisory group, the US naval medical research group and the US information service.<sup>17</sup> However, the two issues that aggravated the worsening state of relations between Ethiopia and the West were the Ogaden War and internal conflict in its Eritrean province.

(i). The Final Parting of Ways

The Ogaden war

The US decision to cut off military grants in 1977 and its refusal to sell arms to Ethiopia (in the wake of Somalia's attack on the Ogaden) angered the Ethiopians and finally led Ethiopia to part ways with the West, and to re-orientate its policy towards the socialist-bloc camp.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the manner in which other Western European countries supported the US decision led to the further deterioration of relations between Ethiopia and the rest of West European countries. Britain's support for the US position, for instance, provoked bitter response and was considered parallel to her 1935 blockade of arms to Ethiopia.

Unlike the US and Britain (who withheld arms to both Ethiopia and Somalia), Italy chose to side with Somalia and supplied her with arms. The Ethiopia Government said Italy, with a long record of infringement of the sanctity of Ethiopian independence, was least entitled to support fresh aggression against it.<sup>19</sup> After the conflict was over Ethiopia expelled the then US Ambassador, Mr. Frederic Chaplin, and downgraded diplomatic relations to Charge D'Affaires level.

(ii). The Eritrean War

Like the Ogaden war the Eritrean secessionist conflict spilled over into Ethiopia's political relations

with the West. The conflict became a thorny issue, especially in Ethiopia's relations with the US, Britain and France. With the US and Britain it was a question of policy differences. In 1978 it led the then Ethiopian Ambassador in London, Mr. Ayalew Wolde Georghis, to walk out on Britain's Foreign Secretary, Dr. David Owen, accusing him of referring to the Eritrean regional problem as if it were a question of a liberation movement like that in Rhodesia. Disagreement over the same issue led the Ethiopian Government in 1982 to request the French Charge D'Affaires to withdraw half of his diplomatic staff within forty-eight hours.

By 1984 only the FRG, Sweden and Canada among the Western donor countries managed to steer clear of major political disagreements with Ethiopia. In the case of the US, deteriorating political relations continued as late as February 1984, when four American diplomats were expelled.

It is against this background that the West had to respond to Ethiopia's appeal for humanitarian aid. The immediate question here is what was their response? Below we examine the response of the US, UK, and Canada (the focus of this study) in detail, and, more briefly, of the other alliance countries.

### 3. USG's Bilateral Response

The response of the U.S in any one disaster is normally dependent upon its relationship with the affected country. If the country is considered "friendly" or strategically important the aid provided following a disaster can be massive.<sup>20</sup>

Until the last quarter of 1984 the United States Government paid little attention to events in Ethiopia despite their good knowledge of the situation. When sufficient pressure was brought to bear on the Administration however, steps were taken in line with popular demand and having "bowed" to the new line of thinking the Administration put its response firmly at the forefront until the end of the relief operation.

In analysing the Government's involvement three policy phases emerge: the first, from December 1982 to September 1984, is basically a continuation of the prior policies pursued in the late 1970s. The second, from October 1984 to May 1985, is marked by intense US involvement. Although this phase witnessed increased assistance, restrictions regarding the use of the aid nevertheless remained in place. Between May 1985 and the end of the relief period in 1986, however, these restrictions were relaxed, thereby facilitating the implementation of the program. The third phase coincides with the general improvement of famine conditions, the return of the rains, a reduction of needs in Ethiopia and a trimming of the level of US assistance. The highlight of the phase is the withdrawal of US development aid, which in a way heralded the end of active US role and a return to its former position.

Considering the state of relations, it was not surprising that even after a number of USG departments had in the early 1980s, deliberated on what was then a

developing crisis, the Reagan Administration did not initiate an early response.

Just as emergency needs were building, so was the attitude of the United States Government hardening towards Ethiopia. The late 1970s witnessed an end of US development aid. At the start of the 1980s, measures were being considered to deprive the country even of US humanitarian assistance. Peter Gill charts this development of diminishing US interest from figures made available to Congress. Clearly the country's relief entitlement under Title 11 of Public Law 480 (PL 480) was being trimmed severely. In 1980 Ethiopia received 43,000 tonnes of American PL 480 relief aid; in 1981 the figure had been almost halved to 24,000 tonnes; by 1982 that had been quartered to 6000 tonnes.<sup>21</sup>

This downward trend in Ethiopia's share of US relief aid culminated in the removal of the Ethiopian Government from the list of US food distributors. The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) was next targeted for phasing out. As if these moves were not enough, the 1983 US budget contained proposals to remove Ethiopia completely from the list of recipients of US humanitarian assistance. This, ironically, was at a time when appeals for increased donations were being made as a result of the growing food shortages within the country.

(a). Early Warnings And Neglected Appeals

An analysis of developments from late 1982 to mid

October 1984 suggests that the US Government withheld assistance to Ethiopia not for want of information but for a variety of reasons. It is evident, however, that when the public in the US and elsewhere in Western Europe took interest in the famine there was a shift in US attitude in accordance with the prevailing public mood. Writing in the Washington Post<sup>22</sup>, Jack Anderson, cited official US Government documents which acknowledged that there were appeals for help to the US Government by both the Ethiopian Government and the United Nations as early as November 1982. US non-governmental organisations working there as well as the US Embassy, in Addis Ababa were "regularly and accurately reporting to Washington on the impending tragedy". What emerges from the report is that the US Government was aware of the impending crisis but refused to have anything to do with it. Below we trace developments inside Ethiopia and in the US which bear out this argument.

A month after both the Ethiopian Government and the **CRS** appealed for help in November, the Field Director of the CRS relief organization approached the US Embassy for relief assistance (for the people of Makelle region where it had been involved in relief and development). The Director was encouraged by Embassy officials to submit his application to the USAID office in Washington, since the office was inoperational at the time (having been closed down in 1979).<sup>23</sup> He accepted the advice and submitted an application for 838 mt. tonnes of food aid,

plus the ocean transportation cost to Ethiopia, estimated at \$397000. This, the CRS believed, could cater for about 5000 families for a period of nine months.<sup>24</sup> This application however failed to get approval until May 7, 1983, five months later and two days after the US Charge D'Affaires had declared Ethiopia a disaster state.<sup>25</sup> By June 1983 the State Department was informed about the deteriorating conditions as a result of which up to one hundred people were dying every day from starvation.<sup>26</sup>

With worsening food shortages in July the CRS submitted another application for 4500 tonnes of food in order to meet the ever expanding needs in Makelle. This was approved in less than ten days, while at the same time the CRS had its regular mother- and-child programme restored.<sup>27</sup> However, its application for trucks and spare-parts funding, which would facilitate the transportation of the food to the outlying areas, was refused.<sup>28</sup> By August 1983, two teams from the US showed an interest in the crisis and visited Ethiopia. The first, from USAID, spent two weeks there and on its return to Washington recommended 15000 tonnes of food to be made available to Ethiopia.<sup>29</sup> The second, an eight man congressional mission was led by representative Howard Wolpe.

Like the USAID team, the Congressional mission called for a massive increase in US aid and appealed to both the US State Department and USAID to give their appeal very urgent consideration. By October 1983 conditions in Ethiopia had grown worse. This time CRS

applied for another 16000 tonnes of food aid for its programme in Tigre and Eritrea. Two months later, another USAID team visited Ethiopia and made recommendations to the effect that CRS's application for 16000 tonnes of food be given urgent approval. Unfortunately this was not approved until 12 May 1984, and even then only half of the original request was approved.<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, there was a spate of increased pressure on USAID from members of both Congress and Senate to be more liberal in their treatment of aid requests. Finally in September 1984 after the Government had celebrated its 10th anniversary in power, three events occurred within a two day period that ultimately led to a dramatic change in US policy. According to an official report:

On 19 September, a senior PVO official with extensive world wide famine experience informed the U.S. Embassy that he had never seen a situation as bad as that which existed in Northern Ethiopia. On the same day the A.I.D. Administrator met with a number of PVO representatives, one of whom said his organization had reached its absorptive capacity and the U.S. should begin channelling food aid through the Ethiopian Government. On 20 September, a senior Western Ambassador to Ethiopia reported that "Ethiopia is starving to death" and about 900,000 Ethiopians will have died of malnutrition and related diseases by the end of 1984.<sup>31</sup>

After these developments a USAID team was sent to assess the magnitude and severity of the crisis.<sup>32</sup> By the time the team returned to Washington pictures of the familiar scenes of disease death and destitution were

already being broadcast on western television stations. Following the BBC footage and its subsequent transmission by the NBC network,<sup>33</sup> the USG altered its fundamental attitude.

(b). US Government's New Outlook

Comparing US Government response before and after the media footage there is a clear shift in the level of US interest and involvement. Hitherto, US response had been very slow and very tight-fisted.<sup>34</sup> In a press briefing made on October 25, 1984 in Washington, the USAID Administrator, Peter Mcpherson, said that he had received orders from the President to respond to the needs in Ethiopia. Mcpherson said:

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN FOLLOWING THE MATTER VERY CLOSELY. OVER THE PAST MONTHS AND YEARS, I'VE GIVEN HIM SEVERAL REPORTS. MY LATEST REPORT TO HIM WAS THIS MORNING, TELLING HIM WHAT WE HAVE DONE EXACTLY SO FAR THIS YEAR IN ETHIOPIA. THROUGH ME, HE WISHES TO CONVEY HIS REALLY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THIS ENORMOUS HUMAN TRAGEDY, THAT IS OCCURRING IN ETHIOPIA AND THROUGHOUT AFRICA. HE HAS INSTRUCTED ME AND THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO RESPOND TO THE NEEDS THERE.<sup>35</sup>  
(Emphasis Added).

Although the briefing did not explicitly state what the new form of American response would look like it nevertheless contained a very useful passage underlining the contemporary nature of the response, as well as revealing its size. On this, we quote Mr. Mcpherson again, who said:

BY ANY MEASURE, HISTORICAL OR OTHERWISE, DOLLARS 43 MILLION IN LESS THAN A MONTH OF OBLIGATION IS AN ENORMOUS FIGURE. IT IS OF HISTORICAL PROPORTIONS. OBVIOUSLY IT IS A COMMITMENT MADE WITH DEEP INTEREST ON THE PART OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, TO RESPOND TO THESE TERRIBLY STRICKEN PEOPLE, AND WE ARE GOING TO PROVIDE - WE ARE GOING TO RESPOND TO THIS NEED AS BEST WE CAN.<sup>36</sup>  
(Emphasis added)

On October 26, the Administration authorized the dispatch of about 45,000 tonnes of food aid, consisting of cereals, dried milk, vegetables and oil.<sup>37</sup> Soon after the Government followed this with a pledge of additional emergency food aid.<sup>38</sup>

With the sudden increase in US assistance, Ethiopia instituted measures to ensure its effective implementation. A commitment was made by the relief Commissioner, Dawit, allowing the closed USAID office to reopen. However, the office was allowed only five officers to staff it.<sup>39</sup>

In November the US declared Ethiopia a "friendly State" (for the purpose of channelling aid direct to the Ethiopian Government). In the same month Peter Mcpherson arrived to take personal control of the US relief programme. In his first meeting with Dawit, Mcpherson said that the US would provide food and two aircraft directly to the Ethiopian Government.<sup>40</sup> This was the first time that the United States made such a direct offer- previously all its assistance had been made through US non-governmental organizations and the UN's agencies. Towards the end of November another congressional delegation led

by Mickey Leland, Chairman of the Congress Select Committee on Hunger arrived on a four-day tour to study the famine conditions. Alarmed by the severity of the situation, they sent cables to the President appealing for increased assistance.

In response, ships carrying US food to other destinations were given instructions to re-route their Cargo to Ethiopia.<sup>41</sup>

With additional appeals from Senator Kennedy and other Congressional advocates of aid, the size of US assistance as well as the level of its involvement began to expand, so much so that by the end of December 1984 almost a quarter of a million tonnes of grain, about two thirds of that food donated or pledged to Ethiopia, was supplied by the United States.<sup>42</sup> Despite its generosity the US attached restrictions to its aid. Emphasizing this point Peter Gill observed:

Title 11 of PL 480 food assistance is intended specifically for relief purpose and there were supposed to be no political barriers to its distributions. Such food is intended "to meet famine or other urgent requirements to combat malnutrition (especially in children) and to promote economic and community development". Since 1982, one significant restriction had been placed on Title 11 emergency shipments to Ethiopia when USAID refused to channel food through the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The restriction remained in place for two years. It was relaxed only when Peter Mcpherson of USAID reached a formal agreement with Commissioner Dawit of the RRC in Washington in November 1984 in the aftermath of massive television exposure of the

famine in the United States. Ethiopia had been declared a friendly country so that it could again receive direct government-to-government food assistance.<sup>43</sup> (Emphasis added)

It was in this context of relaxation that the US on one occasion utilized the bilateral channels as the route for 50,000 mt. tonnes of food aid. The restrictions were relaxed only for a short while, however, and were never removed completely. From October 1984 to April 1985, US aid was subjected to a variety of restrictions. It was to be used for saving lives only, since any of its use considered developmental was disallowed by the Hickenlooper and Brooke Amendments Acts. Had the Administration wished, however, these laws could have been lifted and therefore need not have been an impediment to relief. It was much later, when the relief operation was well underway, that action was taken temporarily to abandon them.

Thus if the intention of declaring the country a "friendly state" was essentially to expedite direct US assistance, the efforts had only a limited success. The restrictions remained in place until May 1985, when there was change in US relief policy.<sup>44</sup> This was mandated by Congress when \$137.5 million of "supplemental appropriation for Africa emergency relief" was approved. It was also consequent upon a more liberal interpretation of US laws by the State Department.<sup>45</sup>

Exactly a year after the crisis had begun, US commitment to the relief effort stood at \$380 million.<sup>46</sup> By

the end of the relief period the US Government was Ethiopia's largest benefactor, providing \$460 million in food and supplies in both 1985 and 1986. This amount accounted for one third of all Ethiopia's famine relief. With the improvement of conditions the US relief program was trimmed from an average figure of well over \$200 million in both 1985 and 1986 to \$20 million in 1987. In effect this reduction marked the end of active US participation in the operations and the resumption of its no-development-aid policy.

(c). Evaluation of US Response

In analysing the US response, four observations can be made, with regard to the issues of timing; the choice of channels; the scale and size of the aid; and the motivations of involvement. Although we have discussed the first three it is necessary to refer to them in our discussion of the last; in so doing, we will comment on some of those aspects previously mentioned only in passing.

The US provided more assistance than any country of either East or West. This assistance undoubtedly saved millions of lives that would otherwise have perished. The question that attracts attention, however, is not whether the US was the leading donor (important as it is), but rather why it took the Administration so long to react to the numerous appeals made to it? Related to this, why did the Administration keep the Ethiopian Government at

arm's length even after agreeing to provide the necessary help? That it did so is seen in the Administration's preference for channels other than the Ethiopian RRC, which had been created to coordinate external assistance.

According to the findings of the Government's General Accounting Office (GAO), published in 1985,<sup>47</sup> the Administration acknowledged the existence of a disaster situation in May 1983 but refused to respond. When USAID was convinced of its existence it set up an interagency task force to address the problem. This Committee drew representatives from six of the most influential US Government departments: the State Department; the Defence and Agriculture Departments; the CIA; the National Security Council; and USAID. By 1983 the Committee was meeting at least once a month to deliberate on the crisis and it was from this committee that criticism of the early US response was first heard. It is not certain which of the representatives caused the delay in early response. Missing information made it impossible even for the powerful GAO to reach a conclusive judgement in this regard. For instance, documentation pertaining to the deliberations of CRS requests were missing or were not, at least, made available to the investigators: information with regard to when the committee met, how many times they discussed Ethiopia's needs or what views the different members expressed regarding the requests was never obtained. Even simple questions such as which committee members chaired

the meetings were evaded.<sup>48</sup>

Jack Anderson points to the NSC representative on the committee as being instrumental. According to him, it was the NSC representative, Fred Waterings, who blocked Ethiopia's requests. Waterings insisted that since the famine was the creation of Government it should take care of its own mess. Failing that, it should seek help from its Soviet allies. If, however, the Government needed American help there should be a price: it should make strategic concessions. In effect Waterings was advocating conditional US assistance.<sup>49</sup>

Janowski, the US Counselor in Ethiopia, said it was after Mother Teresa telephoned the President, shortly after the media sensitized the issue, that the President gave the orders for the USAID to start responding. It was this, combined with appeals from the public, the legislators and incessant demands from their leaders such as Mickey Leland, House Speaker Thomas P. O'Neil and Senator Edward Kennedy, that influenced the Administration to re-examine its attitude. In this regard it was not surprising that the response was sudden. According to the Washington Post:

In the 2 months since fiscal 1985 began October 1, five times that amount (for all of fiscal 1984, US food aid to Ethiopia was 41,000 mt. tons, valued at \$23 million) has been committed. Of the 215,000 tons of food worth \$98 million already sent or on the way two thirds of it was committed after October 23.<sup>50</sup>

Ideological differences appear to have provided the underlying motivation for the delayed US response, seeming to explain why the Administration was unwilling to address the problem, despite appeals from the CRS, UN, and Ethiopia. At first the Administration justified its refusal on grounds of lack of accurate information. The Ethiopia Government figures were said to be inflated and those of the UN were rejected on similar grounds.

Two additional problems were later added to the list of US complaints. The first was the absence of its AID office, which could have verified the authenticity of the amount requested. The second was the fear that the food could be diverted for use by the Army. This was why the US subsequently preferred to use channels other than the Ethiopian RRC. Even after assurances were made by both the EEC and the UN following their investigation, the US did not greatly alter its position. Behind those delaying tactics was perhaps the hope that the Addis Ababa regime might fall. Although this did not happen the possibility of wooing the country away from the Soviets might be the reason behind Washington's rather big carrot; after all, it has happened before with Ethiopia's neighbours- Egypt under Sadat, Sudan under Numeiri and Somalia under Barre.

#### 4. British Government Bilateral Response

Ethiopia's relations with Britain were only marginally warmer than those with the U.S.

Peter Gill

(a) Neglected Appeals and Subsequent Aid

Like the US, the British Government (BG), was aware of the famine through a variety of channels but was reluctant to respond in time: its information derived from media reports;<sup>51</sup> from Ethiopia's direct appeals;<sup>52</sup> and from its own sources.<sup>53</sup>

Although the BG did provide some assistance prior to 1984, it is clear that the Government increased its aid after public opinion demanded so.

However, Timothy Raison, the then Minister for Overseas Development, reacted strongly, against criticism of the BG's late action. In October, in a Commons debate on the famine he said:

It was simply not true to say the Government had not done anything about providing goods until the past few weeks.....In 1983 Britain had sent 9000 tonnes of cereals to Ethiopia and this year it had sent 26500 tonnes before the recent additional supplies were announced.<sup>54</sup>

Indeed it was reported that no sooner had the plight of the suffering Ethiopians been brought vividly into British homes on Tuesday night by the BBC, than the BG ordered extra emergency food aid to Ethiopia, responding with a donation of £5 million and 6000 tonnes of food.<sup>55</sup> Thereafter the Government took the decision to send two RAF Hercules planes to assist with the internal distribution of food relief.<sup>56</sup>

All these actions were taken in the first week after

BBC news bulletin in October. By the end of the month the British Prime Minister had announced further that the Government was providing lorries to facilitate the transportation of aid. In addition she hinted that the Government was considering the provision of drilling rigs (to secure water places for relief tanks) and would continue to provide other forms of disaster relief including medical supplies.<sup>57</sup>

The £5 million and the 6000 tonnes however, was to remain the Government's most substantial contribution for the rest of 1984. It later became a controversial issue, moreover, because it was drawn from ODA's existing budgetary funds rather than coming from a new source entirely. The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee observed that:

In respect of the sums devoted to the crisis in 1984-85, no increase was made to the ODA's cash limit: resources provided by the ODA were all allocations within the original aid budget. Only the cost of the RAF airlift in Ethiopia, paid for the 1984-85 by Ministry of Defence was additional money.<sup>58</sup>

In December the ODA Minister visited Ethiopia to assess the relief operations. On his return he announced a further Government grant of £750,000 (channelled via British charities: War on want, SCF, and Christian Aid),<sup>59</sup> and the provision of grain conveyors and mills and 18000 Blankets-all at the cost of £215000.<sup>60</sup>

The Government later made another donation of 5000 tonnes of grain to Oxfam and another 10,000 tonnes to the WFP (inclusive in the later is 5,000 tonnes of British contribution to the international emergency reserve).<sup>61</sup>

In May 1985, the Government provided another £2 million towards the relief in both Ethiopia and Sudan (in response to requests from the British NGOs there),<sup>62</sup> and in June the Government added a further £750,000 to meet the acute transport needs in Ethiopia. In July the ODA Minister went to Ethiopia again to assess the needs and the progress being made.<sup>63</sup> Although this was the last visit of a top-ranking Government official, BG emergency assistance continued, especially in the transport sector.

(b). BG Transport Assistance

In addition to food and other relief commodities the BG made a substantial contribution to the transport sector of the relief operation. The Government provided two RAF Hercules aircraft, which played a key role in airlifting and airdropping of relief food.<sup>64</sup> Although the RAF operations were initially intended for a month, they lasted for fourteen months during which period they distributed more than 32000 tonnes of cargo. Commenting on their achievement the then ODA Minister said :

Our major contribution to food distribution in Ethiopia has been the provision since November 3 last year of two RAF Hercules aircraft and their accompanying detachment, including a team from the Royal Corps of Transport. This operation has now

airlifted well over 12600 tonnes of grain and dropped a further 7000 tonnes to places inaccessible by any other means of transport.<sup>65</sup>

At the end of their stay in Ethiopia the crew had clocked more than 4000 hours and flew over 2,100 missions. The cost of maintaining their operations was, however, shared between the Government and the Ministry of Defence.<sup>66</sup>

Thus at the end of the relief operation the BG had donated to Ethiopia bilaterally (through the ODA), multilaterally (through the WFP and the EEC) and through British charities. It is evident from the foregoing that the Government increased its aid after public opinion swung in favour of more Government participation. Despite the BG's expanding involvement, its aid was drawn from the existing budgetary allocation. Indeed, the Foreign Affairs Committee felt that the Government should have provided substantial new money, in view of the fact that the tragedy was a new situation altogether.<sup>67</sup>

## 5. Canadian Government Bilateral Response

### (a). Government's Early Interest

What distinguished the response of the Canadian Government from that of both the British and the American Governments was the early interest it took in the crisis at the very highest level of government decision making.

Apparently, after a five-day visit to Ethiopia in August 1983, the then Agriculture Minister, Eugene Whelan,

proposed a \$20 million Government emergency support scheme. Had it been acted upon, this scheme would have constituted an early preventive response to what was then only a crisis in the making. This particular scheme, however, never got off the ground because it was blocked by the External Affairs Cabinet Committee, and was consequently never put to the whole Cabinet.

What is significant to note here is that the issue was discussed at the highest level (below the cabinet) as early as December 1983.<sup>68</sup>

In the fall of 1983, the Trudeau Government then sent an inter-departmental committee of senior civil servants on a fact-finding tour to Ethiopia. It was the reported findings of this committee that dealt a death blow to Whelan's proposal for early intervention. Following the committee's report the issue was not discussed again by the cabinet until almost a year later after the October BBC report, by which time there was a new Government in Canada.

(b). Government's Favourable Attitude

Following the media broadcast of the famine in mid-winter of 1984, there was an immediate change of Government attitude. The office of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) received a barrage of calls in reaction to the bulletin, from aid organizations, legislators, private individuals and the media.<sup>69</sup>

In response, the External Affairs Minister, Joe

Clark, visited Ethiopia in early November (the first top-ranking Western official to go there), to gain a first-hand knowledge of Ethiopia's relief requirements. This is an indication of Canada's special interest in the famine. At the same time the Government appointed David McDonald as Canada's coordinator of emergency aid to Africa.<sup>70</sup> During his tour, the then Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Tibabu Bekele, requested that Canada should act as a "bridge" between Ethiopia and Western donor governments and lead a "new world drive" for more assistance to Ethiopia. The choice of Canada for this crucial role was later explained by Ethiopia's Minister on the grounds that:

Canada has no political axe to grind, so perhaps it is in a position to explain to others what is involved in this, what the needs and preoccupations of this country are and why Canada believes there should be assistance regardless of political orientation.<sup>71</sup>

Meanwhile, at the United Nations, Canada's Ambassador, Stephen Lewis, made an impassioned plea to the international community for increased emergency aid to Ethiopia and the other drought-affected countries of Africa. Appealing to the Assembly members to take the threat of the crisis seriously he said:

I cannot remember in my entire adult life scenes of such unendurable human desolation.<sup>72</sup>

The magnanimous stance adopted by the Canadian Government contrasts strikingly with the position adopted

by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Jean Kirkpatrick. On one occasion Kirkpatrick complained about the rationale of supplying food to the marxist government on the grounds that the food would not reach those it is intended for.<sup>73</sup>

Meanwhile, the Canadian Government reviewed its aid policy and adapted it to immediate requirements in Ethiopia.

By the November 1, the Government External Relations Minister Monique Vezina indicated the possibility of increased Government aid as well as what form this aid should take, i.e. whether the Government should send more money and trucks or more food.<sup>74</sup>

(c). Government's High Profile

One special feature that set Canada's response apart was its high profile. The policies adopted by the Government in the course of the relief operation were consistent with a pattern established by Canada with respect to Third World problems. It was a case of the Government encouraging and complimenting the efforts of its citizens or, more appropriately, a case of the Government leading and the people following.

Government representatives were quick to realize that the starvation issue in Ethiopia required joint action by Government and citizens and the Government acted accordingly.<sup>75</sup>

For instance, despite the emergence of some criticism

regarding the political complexities involved in mounting the relief operation, Canada's official response was rather to encourage it. A good example of this is Clark's response to the question of whether the civil war constituted an obstacle to the relief effort. He said:

My view is that (it) is minor and on the margins and it should not deter the people of Canada from giving the aid that is necessary.<sup>76</sup>

He went on further to say:

I am looking for reasons to encourage Canadians to give aid that will help the starving. I am not looking for reasons to stop that aid.<sup>77</sup>

To this end the government introduced a new aid policy of matching private donations.

The interesting aspect of its approach was that while it matched the number of donations, the value of government contributions was sometimes two or even three times that contributed by the private sector.<sup>78</sup> In essence this meant encouraging the public in Canada to donate generously through the knowledge that a donation from an individual would generate a multiple effect. Canada was the only donor state to have adopted this policy during the period of the relief.

Thus the government created a special African emergency aid fund in November 1984 and allocated \$50 million to it and also earmarked another \$15 million for private donations.<sup>79</sup> This, paved the way for a cooperative relationship between the national relief agencies and the

Federal Government, (the Government's chief representative, David McDonald, headed the new coalition of the NGOs and the Federal relief program). Thus NGOs and the Government worked together, thereby channelling their resources more effectively.

(d). Government Assistance:

Matching Words with deeds

One of the first steps taken by the Government was to restore to CIDA some of the money cut from its budget in November 1984 (this, contrasts with the action of the British Government in cutting the ODA budget). This enabled the Government to contribute immediately an extra \$7.5 million to Ethiopia.<sup>80</sup>

Again, we must not forget that the Canadian Government was Ethiopia's Chief benefactor of food aid before the current emergency programme. According to CIDA officials, Canada provided one quarter to one third of all food aid prior to the crisis. Indeed, in 1984-85 fiscal year Canada provided more than \$25 million worth of food aid to Ethiopia.<sup>81</sup>

Alongside questions regarding the nature of emergency food provided was that regarding the medium of transfer. In this regard the Government unlike that of the US made optimum use of all channels available to it. The Government donated aid bilaterally as well as multilaterally through the United Nations (WFP) and through a host of Canadian NGOs such as the LWFC, the

Canadian Red Cross, SIM, etc.

By the end of the first year of the relief operation the Government had offered Ethiopia emergency aid worth \$26 million, as well as contributing almost \$1 million dollars to finance seven of Ethiopia's resettlement projects.<sup>82</sup>

#### 6. The Response of other Western Countries

Italy, Sweden, the FRG and France all featured prominently during the relief period. For instance, Swedish bilateral food assistance in 1985 and 1986 was larger than that of the United Kingdom in both years. In fact, Sweden was the second largest donor of bilateral food aid in 1986 after the Canadian Government: it was the also the top donor in spare parts and blankets in 1984.

The French bilateral response was also made mainly in food aid. France donated 6000 mt. tonnes of food aid in 1984, 1,000 mt. tonnes in 1985, and 8,000 mt. tonnes in 1986.<sup>83</sup> Overall, however, the French were content with a low-key involvement, although in 1985 they provided blankets (worth EB. 28,8000) and an Aircraft C-160, which served from the beginning of January 1985 to the end of that month.<sup>84</sup>

By contrast, Italy and the FRG adopted a very high-profile bilateral position akin to that of the Canadian Government. In 1984, the FRG was the second largest donor of food after Canada and the third largest in 1985. In 1984 it was also the second largest donor of

medical equipment and the only donor of transport and shelter materials, while in 1985 it was the largest donor of medical equipment and shelter materials and the second largest of transport vehicles.<sup>85</sup> And in 1986, the FRG was an important donor of household utensils. Additionally the FRG provided two C-160 aircraft.

The Italian Government provided food (986mt. tonnes) and spare parts in 1984, and was the largest single donor of medical equipment. In 1985 it donated 5,000 tonnes of food aid and was the largest single donor of transport assistance (331 vehicles), and in 1986 the Italian Government was the largest single donor of medical equipment and transport.

## 7. Conclusion

This Chapter has focused on the response of Western states to Ethiopia's appeal for humanitarian aid.

It appears that despite the ideological gulf between Ethiopia and Western governments, much of Ethiopia's emergency relief was provided by these states. The United States Government, for instance, was Ethiopia's chief benefactor during the period.

Having said that, we should note that there are similarities and differences in the manner in which Western donors responded to the appeals. On one hand, the governments of those states that had formerly maintained marginal relations with the Ethiopian Government (for instance the US and UK) showed a tendency to play down the

Ethiopian Government's appeals and consequently their own response, until they were influenced critically by public opinion. On the other hand, those Governments that had no axe to grind (for instance Canada) were more favourably inclined to the appeals. The responses of the rest of the Western alliance members were similar to those of Canada. Table 4, at the end of the chapter summarizes Western states contribution to Ethiopia during the crisis.

How Ethiopia was able to obtain its humanitarian assistance, despite the apparent lack of convivial relations with the major donor states, is examined in more detail in the next chapter.

TABLE 4

Summary of Major Items Donated by Ethiopia's Political Opponents: 1984-1986, (valued in Ethiopia Birr).

Country: (USA)

<u>Year</u> <u>Items</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>
Food Aid	.....	28,524,666 (a)	.....
Spares	.....	...	.....
Medical Equipment	.....	...	.....
Blankets and Clothing	.....	65,620	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household Equipment	.....	18,000	.....
Water, Power Supply and Equipment	.....	...	.....
Communication Equip,...	.....	...	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<hr/>	<b>28,608,286</b> <hr/>	<hr/>

(BRITAIN)

Food Aid	2,302,690 (b)	2,650,000 (c)	.....
Transport	.....	1,117,128	70000
Spare Parts	.....	304,792	.....
Medical Equip	.....	...	.....
Blankets and Clothing	.....	869,040	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household Utensils	.....	.....	.....
Water and Power supply Equip.	.....	.....	.....
Communication Equip ...	.....	.....	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<hr/> <b>2,302,690</b> <hr/>	<hr/> <b>3,940,960</b> <hr/>	<hr/> <b>70,000</b> <hr/>

TABLE 4 CONTINUED

(FRANCE)

Food Aid	2,133,250 (d)	589,293 (e)	4,194,947 (f)
Transport	....	.....	.....
Spare parts	....	.....	.....
Medical Equip.	....	.....	.....
Blankets and Clothing	....	288,000	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household Equip.	....	.....	.....
Water, Power supply and Equip.	....	.....	.....
Communication Equip. ...	....	.....	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<u>2,133,250</u>	<u>877,293</u>	<u>4,194,947</u>

(CANADA)

Food Aid	18,413,700 (g)	5,555,250 (h)	14,951,042 (i)
Transport	....	.....	.....
Spare Parts	806,587	.....	.....
Medical Equip.	....	.....	.....
Blankets and Clothing	....	.....	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household Equip...	....	.....	.....
Water, Power supply and Equip.	.....	.....	.....
Communication Equip....	.....	.....	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<u>19,220,287</u>	<u>5,555,250</u>	<u>14,951,042</u>

(FED. REP. GERMANY)

Food Aid	3,568,630 (j)	6,413,613 (k)	.....
Transport	491,830	10,737,184	.....
Spare Parts	257,414	1,013,975	23,700
Medical Equip.	175,650	3,505,093	.....
Blankets and Clothing	....	682,320	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household utensils	5,000	698,400	6,000
Water, Power supply and Equip.	.....	9,500	.....
Communication Equip....	.....	500	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<u>4,498,524</u>	<u>23,060,585</u>	<u>29,700</u>

TABLE 4 CONTINUED

(SWEDEN)

Food Aid	.....	5,300,000(1)	4,593,392(m)
Transport	.....	.....	.....
Spare parts	936,160	3,600	23,700
Medical Equip.	.....	.....	.....
Blankets and Clothing	170,000	.....	.....
Shelter Materials and H/Household Utensils	.....	.....	.....
Water,Power supply and Equip.	.....	.....	.....
Communication Equip.	...	.....	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<u>1,106,160</u>	<u>5,303,600</u>	<u>4,617,092</u>

(ITALY)

Food Aid	702,190(n)	6,093,011(o)	1,679,360(p)
Transport	.....	.....	485,400
Spare parts	171,820	1,527,580	1,059,796
Medical Equip.	188,400	165,000	9,359,700
Blankets and Clothing	....	.....	....
Shelter Materials and H/ Household Utensils	....	.....	100,000
Water,Power supply and Equip.	....	.....	.....
<b>Totals</b>	<u>1,062,410</u>	<u>7,785,591</u>	<u>12,684,256</u>

Source:RRC (Aid Coordination Office)

Notes

- a) For 50,000 mt tonnes of food aid.
- b) " 7000 " " "
- c) " 5000 " " "
- d) " 6000 " " "
- e) " 1000 " " "
- f) " 8000 " " "
- g) " 52000 " " "
- h) " 25000 " " "
- i) " 48000 " " "
- j) " 10000 " " "
- K) " 11000 " " "
- l) " 10000 " " "
- m) " 9000 " " "
- n) " 9000 " " "
- o) " 5000 " " "
- p) " 2000 " " "

## Notes and References

1. Jansson K., Harris M., & Penrose A., The Ethiopian Famine: The story of the Emergency Relief Operation (London: Zed Books Ltd. 1987).
2. In the 1960s there were more than 10,000 foreigners living in the country, the majority of whom were from Western Europe and the US. In the city of Asmara alone, which had the highest foreign population at the time, a survey revealed that there were 2,752 Americans, 5170 Italians, 21 Swedish, 217 Greeks, 11 Germans, 17 French, 150 British, 5 Canadians, 3 Australians as well as 25 Russians and even 1 Japanese. There were foreigners who settled or were working outside Asmara. For instance there were Americans in Gasera and Ginir, Gondar, Gemu-Goffa, Gembella, and Harar. There were Italians in Awassa, Shoa and Gemu-Goffa. The British were found in Arussi, Harar and Awussa. And the French in Harar and Awussa. See, Ethiopian Statistical Bulletin, vol 12, 1974-75, p.64.
3. Africa Research Bulletin, vol 12, 1975, p. 3731C
4. Ethiopian Profile, vol. VI, nos. 23, 1987, p.15.
5. This was enshrined in two American laws, the Hickenlooper Amendment Act and the Brook Amendment Act. Under these laws any country that nationalized American assets or those of its citizens should not be a recipient of American development aid until compensation or settlement had been made.
6. Ibid. Mitchell Cotts is the British firm which began negotiations of settlements of its nationalized assets.
7. Africa Research Bulletin, vol 18, 1981, p. 6130B.
8. Africa Research Bulletin, vol.21, 1984, p.7210A.
9. Ibid., p.5594C.
10. Ibid., p.5668B.
11. Ibid.
12. Ethiopia, Economic Report, 1986. ( Produced by Lloyds Bank, 1986), p. 13.
13. Ibid., p.13.
14. IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, (1987) p.173.
15. Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 20 1983, p.6834C.

16. Interview with US Charge D'affaires, Mr Louis F. Janowski JR, (Counsellor) of Embassy of the United States of America. 3 August, 1988, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
17. The staff of these organizations numbering around three hundred were given four days to leave. See Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 14, 1977, p.4395B.
18. In the US the Carter administration argued that to provide arms to Ethiopia would escalate the war in the Horn and further worsen the already fragile situation there by inviting intervention by other foreign powers. In the aftermath of Vietnam it was also the Administration 's policy to avoid getting entangled in foreign conflicts.
19. Africa Research Bulletin, vol. 17, 1980, p.5763A.
20. Cuny, F. Disaster and Development: sponsored by Oxfam America. (Oxford University press, 1983), p.56
21. Gill, Peter, A Year in the Death of Africa: Politics , Bureaucracy and the Famine(london:Paladin, 1986), p. 56.
22. The Washington Post, Jan 16, 1985, p. E19.
23. Interview with Louis F. Janowski, Jr., counselor of Embassy of the United States of America, Addis Ababa. 3, August 1988.
24. See Appendix to Accompany the Report "Drought and Famine in Africa 1981-1986: The U.S. response", (Clark University), P.4.
25. Ibid., p. 6.
26. The Washington Post, January 16, 1985, p. E 19.
27. Gill op. cit., p.58.
28. The Washington Post, January 16, 1985, p. E 19.
29. See Appendix to Accompany the Report "Drought and Famine in Africa 1981-1986" op. cit. p.8.
30. Gill op. cit., p.59.
31. See Appendix to Accompany the Report " Drought and Famine in Africa 1981-1986": op.cit. p.12.
32. See Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian Drought and Famine: Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986( prepared by the Staff of the USAID office, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), p. 11.

33. On the first day of its transmission it did not receive the same prominence accorded it by the BBC. Rather it was the last on an eight-item News bulletin list for that evening. For more on this point see the chapter on the response of the Media.
34. The International Herald Tribune, October 27, 1984.
35. Press briefing by Mr. Mcpherson, Administrator of the US Agency for the International Development, October 25th 1984"( USIS), 30th October, 1984.
36. Ibid.
37. The Times(London), October 26, 1984, p.1E.
38. The International Herald Tribune, October 27, 1984.
39. These were the US co-ordinator for emergency relief, his deputy, one food-for-peace corp officer, one program officer and one secretary. See Final Disaster Report, The Ethiopian Drought and Famine: Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986. op cit p.12.
40. The International Herald Tribune, November 5, 1984.
41. The Telegraph, November 29, 1984, and The Washington Post, November 29, 1984, p. A 1.
42. The International Herald Tribune, December 25, 1984.
43. Gill op cit., pp. 55-56.
44. International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1985.
45. International Herald Tribune, May 10, 1985.
46. The International Herald Tribune, August 31/ September 1, 1985. In February 1985, the House appropriation sub committee and the senate foreign relations committee approved aid to the Africa famine relief which tripled the requested amount submitted by the White House. The President had requested \$225 million in emergency supplemental appropriation but instead was given approval for \$880 million. See, The Washington Post, February 21, 1985 p. A15. and February 22 1985 p. A6.
47. See Jack Anderson's article title, "compassion by committee" in The Washington Post January 17, 1985.
48. Gill op. cit., p.62.
49. The US counselor in Addis Ababa Mr. Loius F. Janowski, Jr. confirmed in an interview the views credited to the NSC. Interviewed in Addis Ababa, 3 August, 1988.

50. The Washington Post, November 21, 1984, p. A10D.
51. See story of allegation of EEC food aid diversion by the Ethiopian Army, The Times(London), April 22, 1983.
52. Former Commissioner of the RRC, Mr. Dawit Wolde Ghioghis, was in New York, at the United Nations HQTs, to appeal for assistance to his Country. Although, he did not seek audience with the U.S. government, he nevertheless approached the UK Government directly as well as the Canadian and Italian government. See Gill P., A Year in the Death of Africa: Politics, Bureaucracy And the Famine(London:Paladin, 1986), p.34.
53. Minister Malcolm Rifkind( Junior Minister, Foreign and Commonwealth office) was in Ethiopia, in July 1984, see Africa Research Bulletin, vol 21, 1984, p.7321A.
54. The Times (london), November 10, 1984 p.4. The Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, agreeing with the ODA minister said the British government's response started since 1982. The Times (London), November 23, 1984, p.4.
55. The Times (London), October 25, 1984 p.1.
56. The original idea was to send the two aircraft for one month but after criticism from the Ethiopian RRC commissioner the idea was dropped in favour of sending only one aircraft for a six month duration. But as we shall read later it was two aircraft that were sent and for a much longer period than the six months.
57. The Times,(London), October 26, 1984 p.1.
58. See, "Famine in Africa" Foreign Affairs Committee, Second Report, session 1984-85, p.xxxviii.
59. The Times (London), December 22, 1984 p. 6.
60. Ibid., December 4, 1984, p.4.
61. Ibid.
62. This was to be divided between Ethiopia and Sudan with each country receiving flm towards the cost of food, supplementary food, seeds and tools.
63. The Times (London ) July 17, 1985 p.7.
64. A distinction has to be made between airlifting and airdropping of food aid. The former refers to the mass transportation from one zone to another. The latter refers to the actual process of dropping the food from air, in otherwise inaccessible locations.

65. The Times (London), July 23, 1985 p.4.
66. For the first three months of 1985 the Government's contribution was £4.5 million. See, footnote 92, on page. xxxvii, in "Famine in Africa", Foreign Affairs Committee Report, op.cit
67. Ibid.
68. A cabinet paper dated December 5, prepared by the Treasury Board and titled "Famine Emergency in Ethiopia" was considered so sensitive that its specifics were said to have been discussed with the highest levels of the relevant departments, namely the External Affairs, the National Defence and the Department of Agriculture. See The Sunday Star, November 4, 1984 p.A 1 and p.A 17
69. The Vancouver Sun, October 30, 1984, PA 7
70. All these developments took place within the first week of November 1984, barely a week after the Media focused interest on the crisis.
71. The Toronto Star, November 5, 1984 PA 4
72. The Vancouver Sun, November 7, 1984 PE 1
73. Toronto Star, November 24, 1984 PA 1 and PA 10
74. The Globe And Mail, November 1, 1984 PA 4
75. The idea of partisanship was ardently encouraged by the Government; the External Affairs Minister Joe Clark drew attention to it in the Canadian House of Commons, having previously made a statement while on his tour of Ethiopia to the effect that in addition to mapping out clearly what Canada's Government role ought to be in the famine, there was the obvious need of the Government "to inspire individual Canadians and non-governmental organizations to do the same". See, The Globe And Mail, November 17, 1984 P 1
76. The Toronto Star, November 8, 1984 PA 15
77. Ibid.
78. The Globe And Mail, November 10 1984 P 9
79. The Toronto Star, November 28, PA 10
80. Three and half million was made available to ICRC, the overseas arm of the Canadian Roman Catholic Church (Development and Peace) and Oxfam Canada, while, about \$4 million was utilized as food aid, to send between 10,000 and 15000 tonnes of additional cereal to Ethiopia. The Globe And Mail, November 17, 1984 P1

81. The Vancouver Sun, October 31, 84 PD 17

82. WFP, August 1, 1986 P 50.

83. See Table 4 below, prepared from the data received, from Office of Statistics, RRC.

84. See, Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian Drought Famine, Fiscal years 1985 And 1986 (prepared by the Staff of the USAID office, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), p.86. The report was made available to me courtesy of Sheila B. Reed, Food Aid Monitor, USAID office, US Embassy, Addis Ababa.

85. See Table 4.

## CHAPTER SIX

### The Response of NGOs and Others in The UK, US and Canada

#### 1. Introduction

In this chapter attention will be focused on the contribution of humanitarian agencies and the general public and how this has affected the course of the relief operations.

In the US and UK the involvement of NGOs and the public played a much more critical role in shaping the course of the relief operations than it did in Canada: while in the former countries the involvement of the charity organizations and the public was instrumental in bringing about the desired change in Government policy, it was not necessary in the case of Canada since the Government there was already predisposed to Ethiopia's appeals.

As will be seen, NGOs' impact on the relief process has been in three principal areas: first, they mobilized resources from the public through direct appeals; second, they influenced governments attitude through raising public awareness and pressure which consequently led to increased government aid; third, they undertook the responsibility of administering the mobilized assistance directly to the famine victims. In this chapter the discussion will focus on the first two roles as they are more relevant in shaping the course of the relief at the

donors' end.

The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part examines the response of the non-state actors in the UK. The second part, looks at the process in the US, while the third and final part focuses attention on Canada.

## 2. The Response in UK

British charity organizations like Oxfam, the Save the Children Fund (SCF), World Vision (WV), British Red cross (BRC), War on Want (WOW), Christian aid, the Irish Concern and Catholic Fund For Overseas Development (CAFOD) have played a central role in mobilizing relief and in changing public attitude and subsequent response to the crisis.

As a result, all segments of British society from pop stars to the clergy, from school going children to University lecturers, from farmers to big business corporations and from pensioners to rich philanthropists came to empathise with the sufferings of Ethiopians. Through employing a variety of methods suitable for each group the quantity of the relief material increased.

### (a). NGOs' Appeals and the Origins of Public Involvement

The British public response dated from around July 1984. This was when "news of the famine first seriously impressed the western public",<sup>1</sup> following the BBC television documentary broadcast based on Michael Buerk's visit to Ethiopia. After the documentary, the Disaster

Emergency Committee (DEC) sent out appeals for public donations. This raised £8.5 million: that this amount represents half of all money the organization had received since its inception in the sixties indicates the strength of the public response to the NGOs' appeal.<sup>2</sup>

After the BBC bulletin in October 1984, there was a tremendous outburst of concern and interest regarding events in Ethiopia. Almost everybody wanted to contribute. According to a BBC spokesman, within minutes of screening the film their telephone switchboard was inundated with calls from people asking how they could help.<sup>3</sup> Similar stories were told by the relief agencies themselves.

According to a staff of the SCF:

massive pressure was felt first of all on the telephone system: staff and volunteers organized themselves into evening, weekday and weekend.<sup>4</sup>

This was the start of a long campaign of public solidarity that was to last for the duration of the relief operation. How this was achieved by the NGOs and the different groups in Britain is analysed below.

(b). NGOs' Mounted Pressure

Indeed, even before the nationwide mass response in October the voluntary agencies had been following developments in Ethiopia with keen interest and had been taking measures to remedy the situation. In early October, representatives of Oxfam, SCF and the British Red Cross met Foreign Office and Overseas Development Administration

(ODA) officials and pleaded for more emergency aid for Ethiopia.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the Deputy Director of SCF, Mark Bowden, met with the EEC food aid representatives and appealed to them to attend to the emergency needs on humanitarian grounds.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, at the end of the SCF's general meeting officials urged the 2000 attendants:

to write to their MPs to pressure Mr. Timothy Raison and Mr. Malcolm Rifkin, the Ministers responsible for aid, to give more assistance to Ethiopia.<sup>7</sup>

Their efforts paid dividends and the ODA released 3000 tonnes of cereals shortly thereafter.

In October Oxfam and SCF made successful representations to the striking editors of Thames TV to allow the documentary Bitter Harvest to be screened on October 25 1984, as a sequel to Michael Buerk's BBC report, to broaden public awareness of and interest in the famine. Oxfam appealed to the public to protest at the lack of strong Government aid and, as a result, 500 protesters surrounded a locked and guarded EEC grain store at Tyneside, demanding that the grain be released for the famine victims.<sup>8</sup> These efforts, in addition to the coordinated campaigns mounted through the DEC, softened the British Government and EEC official attitudes. Both subsequently increased their relief assistance to Ethiopia:

European Governments and the EEC have at last begun to take vigorous action to deal with the Ethiopian famine

under pressure from the aid agencies and public opinion.<sup>9</sup>

NGOs' efforts were, however, supplemented by the contributions made by other sections of society.<sup>10</sup>

(i). Pressure from Others

Church Leaders

Church leaders played a vital role in publicizing the issue and ensuring sustained public interest. On several occasions Church leaders were instrumental in persuading the Government to play a more active role.<sup>11</sup> The involvement of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Robert Runcie, the Archbishop of Westminster, Cardinal Basil Hume, and the Moderator of the Free Church Federal Council was crucial in raising public consciousness and keeping pressure on the Government and the EEC to expedite their assistance. For instance, the church leaders' intervention through correspondences with the then Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, helped in averting the early withdrawal of the RAF Hercules from Ethiopia.<sup>12</sup>

(ii). Workers

Workers throughout the country joined in the relief efforts enthusiastically. Dock workers picketed on learning about the Government's plans to stockpile food.<sup>13</sup> Others called off their industrial strike in order to increase the effectiveness of relief mobilization.<sup>14</sup> TUC leader Mr. Norman Willis added his voice to those of the Church leaders on hearing of Government's intention to withdraw the RAF Hercules prematurely. He appealed to the

Foreign Secretary, arguing that the withdrawal would be seen by the public as an abdication of the Government's responsibility to assist the famine victims.<sup>15</sup>

(c). Sustaining the Pressure and Awareness Campaign:

The Emergence of Band Aid and Live Aid

If there was one individual that epitomized public concern it was Bob Geldof, referred to by the media as Bob "the Saint".<sup>16</sup> Geldof was the brain behind Band Aid, Live Aid, and Sports Aid (Race Against Time). These events each represented milestones in the campaign for mobilizing international relief assistance. It all started on the night of October 23 1984, with the BBC Television pictures. On seeing them Geldof was moved and wanted to do something. He said:

I sat there.... feeling horrified,  
ashamed and disgusted. What could I do  
personally? Doing something with music  
seemed the logical thing.....<sup>17</sup>

His response was immediate and spontaneous. He telephoned his friends, fellow musicians and music companies and got them to agree to produce a record to raise money for the famine victims. Within a week, he was able to gain the cooperation of "virtually every top-line British pop star". His initial target\_ was to raise £100,000 from the sales of 500,000 copies. As things turn out the recording served not only to focus international awareness on the famines, but also became an agent of resource mobilization.

(i). The Making of the Record

The making of "Do They Know It's Christmas ?" was the first event to popularize the famine in Britain and later throughout Western Europe and America. The recording itself was hastily organized in view of the enormity of the crisis. According to the producers, production started on a Sunday and by the following Friday the disc was on sale in record shops. In the first two weeks it was declared the most successful single in the history of pop music, selling more than two and a half million copies. Proceeds for the first two months brought £8 million into the coffers of the trustees.<sup>18</sup>

(ii). Impact of Band Aid

The success of the Band Aid record inspired Geldof and his colleagues to organize the Live Aid concert in July and later Sports Aid and Telethon. The Live Aid concert, staged simultaneously at both Wembley Stadium and John F. Kennedy Stadium in Philadelphia, represented the climax in the global mobilization of humanitarian assistance. The two stadiums sold tickets to an estimated audience well over 160,000 (90,000 at JFK and 70,000 at Wembley Stadium). Globally, close to 2 billion people viewed the event according to Syntat, an American company that distributes television programmes by satellite.<sup>19</sup>

By staging the concert in July, already half way into the year, public interest was rekindled and another \$14 million was raised at the Philadelphia show in America. In

this way funds were raised and awareness was heightened .

If the 2 billion figure claimed is correct, then nearly half the world population had switched on their television sets for at least a moment or two. In America, which has a population of over 230 million (representing about 4% of world population), three quarters of the population is estimated to have watched the concerts; in China, with a fifth of the world's population, the country bought four-hour rights to the programme; in India, with a sixth of the world population, but only two million television sets, it was estimated that more than 100 million people with access to a television watched the event. All Western European countries tuned in, although only Yugoslavia among the Eastern European countries was able to view "non-stop", while the Soviet Union allowed selected viewers to watch the program. In the rest of the world two thirds of the countries bought rights to the show.<sup>20</sup> The event raised more than £50 million with more than a quarter of the sum coming from the United Kingdom. To this extent the money raised from the record and Live Aid concert dwarfed other efforts.

The success of Band Aid and Live Aid can be perceived from several perspectives. First, they have raised large sums for the cause. Second, they raised public consciousness to an unprecedented level thereby facilitating the transformation of the relief overnight. Third, the organizers succeeded in getting aid directly to the needy areas of Ethiopia including the war zones of

Eritrea and Tigray, in itself no mean achievement, given the difficulties involved in dealing with the central Government and the rebels.

Given the spontaneous emergence of Band Aid, its ad hoc nature and the non professionalism of its management, its success thus indicates the potential more generally of music for raising global awareness on shared global problems. To what extent can the success of Band Aid be extended to such issues as a free nuclear world, the equitable distribution of shared world resources and environmental issues? Both Band Aid and Live Aid have made the climate more favourable for the NGOs to mobilize greater relief assistance.

(d). The Mobilization of Resources

(i). NGOs and Mobilization

The gravity of the crisis led Oxfam to make its largest ever single donation,<sup>21</sup> the biggest by far of all NGO donations from Britain and also among the earliest efforts. Indeed, Oxfam was the first organization to draw government and public attention to the crisis, acting well before October 1984. In July, the organization produced a report warning governments and the international community about the impending disaster. When it realized the situation needed urgent action, it went out of its way to purchase 10,000 tonnes of grain, which it sent to Ethiopia.<sup>22</sup> In early November, Oxfam dispatched a further shipment of 14,000 tonnes of grain.<sup>23</sup> Oxfam continued with

its relief appeals and raised £23 million (barely three weeks after the BBC bulletin), for Africa as a whole, out of which it directed £19 million to Ethiopia.<sup>24</sup>

The SCF raised £2 million by November 14,<sup>25</sup> and was the second most successful relief agency in fund raising by the end of the operation. Of the £18.2 million that the charity raised by October 1985, it committed £7.5m in Ethiopia and £4.7m to the Ethiopian refugees in Sudan.<sup>26</sup> In addition it undertook close to a dozen airlifts during the period of the relief operation.<sup>27</sup>

War on Want took active interest in campaigning for the supervision of the relief operations through calling for the setting-up of an International Commission. This, the agency believed, would minimize the Central Government's mismanagement of relief food sent in by Western donors. War on Want's high profile sets it apart from the other non-governmental organizations. Its active support for the EPLF and TPLF, (with whom it worked for more than 10 years), highlighted the plight of those areas.<sup>28</sup>

By the end of the relief operation British charities raised somewhere between £75m and £100m.<sup>29</sup>

(ii). The Role of Others In Resource Mobilization

Church Leaders

Church leaders were active in taking measures that helped the relief cause. Cardinal Hume went on a five-day study tour to Ethiopia in October 1984 shortly after the

broadcast.<sup>30</sup> On his return, Hume together with other Church leaders intensified efforts and called on the Government to increase its assistance.<sup>31</sup> During the launching of the Daily Mirror's "Mercy Mission" the Anglican Bishop of Liverpool, the Rt. Rev. David Shepherd, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool, the most Rev. Derek Worlock, added their influential voices to the efforts being undertaken.

The role of the Church leaders has been important in establishing a measure of credibility for the cause where the involvement of a politically less-neutral body would have met with resistance from the Government.<sup>32</sup>

(iii). Workers

The involvement of workers further contributed to the additional quantity of aid made available for relief. Workers volunteered their services free. At Fox's biscuit factory in Batley, West York, they worked an extra shift so that high-energy biscuits could be produced for the famine victims. Dockers worked overtime during the Christmas break to load relief items for shipment to Ethiopia.<sup>33</sup>

(iv). Corporate Organisations

A number of private and public corporations responded to appeals by contributing their services or goods. Phonogram produced the Band Aid record without charging for its services and forfeited its share of sales profit;

ICI (one of Britain's leading chemical companies) provided Phonogram with the Vinyl used to produce the first half a million copies of the Band Aid record;<sup>34</sup> the print media provided free advertising space for the promotion of sales; the Independent Broadcasting Authority waived its normal procedures on charity-appeal advertising, thereby allowing Tyne-Tees, Granada, and Border television stations to join in giving the relief effort free publicity in their local areas.<sup>35</sup>

The Manufacturer's Stationers Association (MSA) donated six million envelopes to the SCF for use in the collection of donations. British Airways provided an airliner for the Daily Mirror "mercy flight", while British Telecom opened three special lines and a Disc line on Christmas Day 1984, donating proceeds from calls made to those numbers to the relief. The Post Office allowed its staff to distribute the six million envelopes donated by the MSA free throughout the country (the first time such a delivery had been made free of charge).<sup>36</sup>

The leading food stores contributed quantities of a variety of needed relief items. Sugar was donated by Agyll Foods and Tate and Lyle, condensed milk by Sainsburys, flour by Tesco, Horlicks by Beechams, porridge oats by Quaker Oats, cooking oil by Craigmillar and medical supplies by Boots.<sup>37</sup>

The banking world organized "Bond aid", while the Leeds Permanent Building Society allied with Band Aid and Help the Aged and made its 475 branches available as

centres for deposit of blankets by customers.<sup>38</sup>

Finally, as a result of a project organized by Rod Cousens of "Quicksilver", in conjunction with Band Aid, 16 software houses collaborated together to produce 10 computer games in two versions, in aid of the relief. The games help raised £200,000 through sales of 50,000 copies of the software.<sup>39</sup>

Notwithstanding the altruistic objectives of these companies, it is clear that they too stood to derive advantages from their involvement. For instance, goodwill was expected to accrue from these efforts: their identification with a humanitarian cause, it was perceived, would enhance their public image, particularly given the publicity surrounding the event. For the computer companies there was the spin-off possibility that the new games would provide opportunities for testing ideas that could be marketed later.

(v). Educational Institutions

British educational institutions and colleges contributed tremendously both in raising funds and creating awareness of the cause. One of the earliest responses came from school children, who after seeing the film contacted the Sheffield Whirlow Hall farm - and asked that a ton of their harvest of grain be sent to Ethiopia.<sup>40</sup> Universities throughout the UK organized rag weeks and other funds raising events which increased publicity and raised resources.<sup>41</sup>

(f). Response of the Left

Two contradictory positions emerged in the response of the British left. On the one hand, there were those in favour of active involvement; this was demonstrated in the Labour Party's attempt to get all socialist parties in Europe to arrange a joint response.<sup>42</sup>

On the other, there were those who advocated non-involvement. They argued that involvement was misguided, first because the "famine movement" ignored the conditions that created the crisis in the first place and second, because it detracted attention from those responsible for the conditions. Hence, they argued, response by the left, would create an "ideological bloc" against the fundamental questions that ought to be raised.<sup>43</sup> Consequently, those who took part were blamed by this group for exploiting the consequences of the crisis.<sup>44</sup> Hall and Jacques noted:

By and large the organised left has been almost totally absent from the whole movement and process. The left sought no popular points of entry into it.... Following Live Aid, there was a series of initiative such as Fashion aid and Art aid but no Union aid.<sup>45</sup>

(g). The Response of Public

The contribution of ordinary people lent significant support to the efforts of the relief agencies and others involved. Many people identified with those suffering. Some sold their possessions in order to assist; others contributed savings and earnings. One Hertfordshire farmer

sent 32 tonnes of grain to Ethiopia as part of the "Send a Tonne to Africa" campaign, while the Cambridgeshire farmers' appeal for the "Send a Tonne to Africa" campaign raised over 2000 mt. tonnes of farm produce.<sup>46</sup>

The public have used a variety of methods to mobilize resources. These included: street and pub collections; exhibitions and concerts; film and slide shows; sponsored walks; swims; sit-ins; artists sketching; book publication; raffles and even parachute jumps.

The NGOs shaped the level of material assistance raised for the famine using public support, encouraging increased public donations and direct public protests, which put pressure on the British government to take more concrete policy steps towards relieving the famine. How these efforts resemble or differ from similar efforts undertaken in the US and Canada we shall find out below.

### 3. The Response in the US

In the US the exercise did not gather momentum in time. This was due to the lack of information and interest concerning Africa in general and the crisis in particular. The major newspapers had run a number of articles;<sup>47</sup> relief organizations had sent out mass mailings;<sup>48</sup> the churches had pleaded for assistance. All these produced few results. Nonetheless, they were important in preparing the ground for what was to follow. Indeed, The Washington Post's, five-part series on the issue was the basis of Representative Harold Wolpe's seven-member delegation to Ethiopia in July 1983.<sup>49</sup>

When the media focused its attention in October, however, public apathy ended:

The turning point was television. On October 23, "NBC Nightly News" aired a BBC film of emaciated children huddled by the hundreds in squalid camps. The picture was horrible, riveting as any sight of a starving child can be. The dormant apathy broke at both government and private levels.<sup>50</sup>

The public became suddenly motivated: school children, teachers, priests, politicians, company executives, in short people from all walks of life, suddenly became interested and concerned. The relief organizations were flooded with calls and enquiries. Public reaction was overwhelming, the outpouring of offers of help unprecedented. The American NBC was one of the earliest to receive such calls. On the night of the broadcast alone the network received more than 1000

telephone calls.<sup>51</sup> The story was repeated all over the country.

According to James Sheffield, President of the US Committee for the UNICEF, many of the callers were in tears. Betty Woodward of the SCF said they had never seen anything like this in terms of the volume of telephone response: staff and volunteers were fully employed in taking calls up to 2.00 a.m.<sup>52</sup> Robert Burch, a Vice President of SCF, said it was a record response in the organization's fifty-one year history.<sup>53</sup> Melissa Lowe, a spokesperson of the WV, said there was an "unprecedented bonanza of financial contributions that buy food, shelter, medical care, blankets and other items for the Ethiopians".<sup>54</sup> Keith Griffin of the Christian Relief Service (CRS) organization said:

I have never seen a fund-raising effort that brought in so much money from so many people in so little a time.<sup>55</sup>

The major relief and development organizations were deluged by volunteers, who worked in squads each night to assist in fielding telephone calls from the many million of donors across America. Many small organizations also sprang up overnight in response. The sections following outline and analyze the public contribution to the relief effort.

- (a). Pressure on the American Government
- (i). Pressure from Concerned Organizations

One of the earliest public appeals made to the

President of the US was from a group of 162 religious leaders operating under the auspices of the Bread For The World Organization (a relief organization representing major US religious denominations), who requested the authorization of a "Berlin- style" airlift of food to save human lives. The appeal is significant as the first major organized pressure on the Administration, and notable in its invocation of "Berlin style" airlift, thus drawing the comparison with one of the greatest human tragedies this century. The appeal sought to emphasize the central role the US had played in the earlier crisis and thereby appealed to the Government to play that role once more. The priests urged the President to "mobilize the same kind of response to save human lives".<sup>56</sup>

Likewise, the consortium of Bay Area clergymen, representing different local and national black church organizations such as the National Baptist Connection USA inc., Church World Service and the Methodist Federation of San Francisco, appealed to the President and Congressmen to increase their relief effort. They urged the President to launch an expedited relief program and pleaded with Congress for the quick passage of all Africa relief legislation.

In what looks like the most comprehensively thought-out strategy for coping with the disaster, the clergy presented the Administration with a five-point plan and demanded its immediate implementation. For the first time the Administration was faced with concrete demands from

the public regarding its action. These demands were:

- 1). The establishment of an Africa airlift, utilizing military and other Aircraft to deliver food and transportation;
- 2). The coordination of food airlifts and food convoys within Africa;
- 3).The re-routng of grain shipments now at sea to African ports;
- 4).The development of a short-term food-delivery network within Africa.
- 5).The development of a long-term international plan aimed at reducing the projected famine death toll.<sup>57</sup>

By mounting pressure on the Administration public opinion changed government policy. Accordingly:

Washington moved quickly to approve increased aid requests through private agencies and initiated a bilateral government-government grant of food<sup>58</sup>

As the former US Ambassador McCloskey acknowledges, public opinion cannot shape government's policy more directly than it did in this instance.<sup>59</sup>

(ii). The Response of Black Americans

Despite the early interest showed by a section of the black community, in general the black response was not radically different from that of the rest of the country. This appears to be the case even after the BBC/NBC programme was televised nation-wide in October. A concerned black American activist and businessman, Ed Brown, reflecting upon the general situation at the time, lamented:

Despite mutterings among us, despite scenes of starving babies in Ethiopia on Evening News, this situation hasn't received the exposure it needs. And what is sadder to me is that there has been no articulate black leadership on this issue.<sup>60</sup>

The response of the black community was therefore slow, gathering momentum concurrently with the national response. This can be seen from the fact that the earliest black organization to express interest -BARAC- owed its origins to a UN report about the impending disaster, which had prompted fifty black-American clergy to convene, and consequently to form BARAC in February 1984.

The organization's leaders went on a fact-finding tour to Ethiopia and on their return mounted a campaign to raise funds. Tapping the rich talents of its community, the group organized concerts and showed film of the drought at community functions and gatherings. BARAC was able to raise about \$100,000 by September 1, 1984.<sup>61</sup> Explaining the

motive of the organization's involvement, the Chairman, Reverend Alfred Smith, said the organization was motivated by what other American minorities such as Italians, Polish, Jewish, Germans, and Irish have done for their homelands. He said:

When there's hunger in Poland, the Polish rise to the occasion. When there's an earthquake in Italy the Italians respond. We as black Americans are just trying to do the same.<sup>62</sup>

Expanding on the point, Larry Carroll, the National Media Director agreed:

It's our homeland. We as a people are the only ones who have a vested hereditary interest.<sup>63</sup>

In a similar fashion the Ethiopian community in Washington joined the efforts to raise funds for the homeland. Steered by the Ethiopian Hunger Relief Coordinating Committee they helped in the campaigns within their community and in their neighbourhood.<sup>64</sup>

(b). NGOs and Raising Consciousness

An important component of fund-raising is the creation of the right climate to generate the required response. American relief organizations undertook a number of projects that educated the public on the nature of the crisis and at the same time reminded them of the needs required to overcome the problem. The activities themselves created awareness and helped to sustain the drive of the

fund-raising campaigns. An example is the WV's calls for the public to fast during the weekend of April 26-28. In this way the public could individually identify with the cause in addition to being involved in raising funds. Reverend Richard Maloney's twenty-three mile jog at Christmas - popularly referred to as "preaching with his feet" - raised \$9000 and attracted press coverage.<sup>65</sup> Subsequently the baton of sustaining the campaign was taken over by the music industry.

(i). The US Artists

The campaign was sustained to a large extent by the emergence of impromptu organizations which developed in response to the needs. The United States Artists for Africa organized two major events which raised awareness and sustained public interest.

(ii). Origins of the Song

The idea of writing a song and organizing a benefit concert in the States drew inspiration from Band Aid. The idea was to make it "bigger and better", and its initiator, Harry Belafonte, aimed at improving on Band Aid's success. In December 1984, Belafonte telephoned Ken Kragen (the manager of Kenney Rogers and Lionel Riche) and discussed with him the idea of organizing a benefit concert. Instead, Kragen suggested making a benefit record with video spin-off possibilities as a better way to raise large sums.<sup>66</sup> On January 28, forty-five musicians assembled at the A & M

recording studio and produced the record.<sup>67</sup>

By the middle of May the single had sold about 7.5 million copies, while the album had sold about 4.5 million copies. Commenting on the project's success, Kragen expressed belief that the impact of the song ("We Are The World") marked a fundamental shift in the American psyche and that the "selfish narcissism of the 1970s has suddenly given way to a national altruism".<sup>68</sup> In under ten weeks, proceeds from sales plus donations raised over \$45 million.<sup>69</sup>

(iii) The Impact of the Song: ("We Are The World")

Expanding the Publicity Drive

To ensure maximum publicity was given to the event, the song was aired all over the world in a mass "simulcast" that lasted six minutes, twenty-two seconds. It was estimated that about five thousand radio stations in the US alone participated in giving the song airplay, together with another one thousand stations in the rest of the world.<sup>70</sup> In the USA alone, the impact was phenomenal. Both national and international US network stations such as Muzak, the American Cable Rock Channel MTV, the Voice of America (VOA) and the Armed Services Radio tuned in and helped to spread the message to millions of people. In the case of Muzak it is observed:

Muzak, which piped background music into 110,000 offices, shops and factories around the country, broadcast a human voice only once before,..... The first time was to announce the release of American

hostages from Iran in 1981. Muzak reaches 80 million Americans daily through satellite transmission around the U.S..71

While the amount of money raised is quantifiable, the achievement of USA in raising public awareness is beyond measurement. As underscored by Kragen:

You try to influence a time. Whatever it is. Five, 10, 15, 20 years. The song "We Are The World" did that. The kids who grow up with "We Are The World" as one of their major influences will make a society that is better about giving. It's a big mistake to try and accomplish too much.72

An immediate by-product of the USA was the "Hands Across America" campaign which addressed the problem of American poor in the same manner as it did to the African problem. Perhaps without the birth of the "We Are The World", "Hands Across America" would never have been "conceived". Indeed the contribution made by musicians in both Europe and America will be remembered as the greatest single event that united the world on the famine issue and helped mobilized relief for it.

(c). NGOs and Mobilization of Relief

(i). NGOs and Mobilization

Both secular and religious organizations such as the CRS, WV, SCF, CARE, the American Red Cross, Oxfam America, and other smaller ones such as the Americans Friends Service Committee, World Alliance of YMCAS, the Hunger

project, the American Jewish Joint Distribution committee, Africare and Black American Response for the African Crisis (BARAC) collected funds for the relief. It is estimated that not less than 125 organizations were involved.<sup>73</sup>

These organizations coalesced under an umbrella name Interaction and together by the first week of February 1985 mobilized over \$40 million.<sup>74</sup> The six largest American relief agencies collected \$10 million in the first five weeks.<sup>75</sup> Later as the fund-raising continued, the CRS alone raised \$20 million in three months.<sup>76</sup> By the first half of January that figure had risen to \$29 million. This makes an interesting comparison with previous CRS efforts during the same quarter of 1984, which raised less than \$1m dollars.<sup>77</sup> By March 1985 the American public donation had reached close to \$100 million. According to the Washington Post:

The outpouring of American generosity, public and private, exceeds modern precedent. Almost \$90 million has been donated by the public to the organizations that are working to feed the millions who have been forced off their land and are near starvation.<sup>78</sup>

Their success reflects the dynamism of the different fund-raising strategies adopted. The smaller organizations raised funds and transferred them to the bigger and more experienced. For instance, BARAC initially donated its money to the WV, which undertook the direct administration of the relief plus long-term development projects.<sup>79</sup> BARAC later started its own food distribution in Ethiopia under the direction of WV.<sup>80</sup> This is an example of church-based

organizations cooperating for the same cause. Another example is the case of the American bishops who raised \$7 million through parish congregational collections for the CRS. The secular organizations relied mainly on direct donations from the public, or in organizing fund-raising events such as sales and auctions, sponsorships and direct mailings. The majority of them accepted US Governments subventions.

(ii). The Public and Relief

The success of the US relief organizations would have been negligible were it not again for the support they received from the public both in quantifiable terms and expressed moral support. This was invaluable in terms of the impact upon the lives of the affected people and in terms of encouraging the organized agencies to demand more from their governments. Various sections of American society were generous with their donations. A law student from the George Washington University collected more than \$1,900 on the campus.<sup>81</sup> Through their door-to-door collections, organized dances and car washes the students in return received public recognition for their contribution. Donations received were from every social strata.

(iii). Corporate Firms and Relief

Those with the financial power to influence the

operation also responded substantially to the public demands for more aid. Financial companies that would normally not associate themselves with humanitarian endeavours contributed to the relief efforts. Examples of household American names that identified with the cause were the American Telephone and Telecommunication (AT&T), Chevrolet, Pepsi, Kodak and Tower Records. These companies provided funds, material resources and expertise.

#### 4. The Response in Canada

Among the Canadian relief agencies<sup>82</sup> working in Ethiopia were the Mennonite Central Committee, which has been active for over ten years in the country; the Lutheran World Relief (LWR), which has been in Ethiopia since 1968; the Society of International Missionaries (SIM), which was in the country prior to the 1974 famine, and the Food for the Hungry International (FFHI), which was established in Ethiopia in December 1984.

As a result of their grassroots knowledge of what was happening, the World Vision of Canada (WVC) attempted to raise public awareness long before October 1984. According to Weale, a relief official of the WVC, the agency tried to bring what was then a developing crisis to the notice of Canadians 18 months earlier, but regrettably no one seemed to notice, until the BBC film broke the story.<sup>83</sup> In this respect, the mass public in Canada was no different from the public in the UK or the US.

However, once the media had provoked public response to the crisis, first in Britain, and subsequently in the US and Canada, everybody seemed involved: virtually all relief agencies in Canada were inundated with calls from the public, seeking to offer help.

The Director of Oxfam, Mr. Mckinnon B.C., said their telephone lines were literally off the hook. People were phoning and pledging their donations non stop.<sup>84</sup> The response was so overwhelming that according to one Oxfam Canada report, they received 300 to 400 phone calls in one

day, when on normal days they receive three to four calls only.<sup>85</sup> All the relief agencies were flooded with calls. According to the Director of WVC, Bill Newell, his agency had to put in special lines to accommodate the additional traffic.<sup>86</sup> The Canadian Save the Children (CanSave) reported a tremendous increase in telephone calls from the public. Shortly after the television reports, the organization put the figure in the region of 2000 calls.<sup>87</sup>

Enthusiasm for the cause pervaded the entire political landscape in Canada. In Ottawa, the Government agency CIDA was flooded with what it described as a "barrage of calls from aid organizations, MPs' offices, private individuals and the media, in response to the footage". Lorna McCornick, International Affairs officer for the Red Cross national headquarters in Toronto, claimed the response to be the heaviest since that for the Vietnam Boat People.<sup>88</sup>

Offers of public assistance came from people in all walks of life.

(a). Public Relief Mobilization

(i). The Public and Mobilization

Reports of public generosity are many: the man who walked off the street to hand a \$1000 dollar donation to the Canadian Save the Children Fund<sup>89</sup>; a company that sent a donation of \$3000 to CanSave yet asked not to be named; a woman who was so touched by the sufferings she

saw on the screen that she organized a campaign encouraging all mothers in Canada to donate their November family-allowance cheques: according to one Ottawa-based relief agency, so great was her success that they were overwhelmed with cheques from responding mothers.<sup>90</sup> Fred Benson, a farmer who had personally witnessed the earlier Ethiopian famine in 1973, donated his 43 hectare farm, estimated to be worth \$400,000 to the relief effort in Africa.<sup>91</sup> Making the donation to the Mennonite Central Committee of Ontario, he said:

I have a full belly every day. We in Canada have a responsibility to those less fortunate.<sup>92</sup>

One of the most moving responses to the famine was that of the Inuit Eskimo community of the North West Territory. With vivid and painful memories of the famine that affected their own community in the 1950s, they related to the suffering of the Ethiopians. One Canadian Inuit, Mr. Panagoniak said:

I hurt for those people, I was skinny like them. My little sister was better off because my mother could feed her, but the rest of us were under the snow, with only heads showing, waiting waiting.....<sup>93</sup>

The community raised \$48,000, representing about 10% of their savings, in a matter of weeks.<sup>94</sup>

(ii). The Active Support of Public Officials

Many public officers, such as Mayor Michael Harcourt

of Vancouver and James Matkin, President of the British Columbia Business Council reacted enthusiastically. Supported by David McDonald (Africa Emergency Aid co-ordinator), the Secretary of State for External Affairs, they chaired a 100 member committee of businessmen, religious leaders, trade unionists, teachers and representatives of aid agencies, to raise a \$1 million dollar relief- fund. Involving over 50,000 school children in the fund-raising effort, Harcourt and his committee expanded their project to include a live entertainment benefit concert and a Telethon. The mayor sought to ensure that suffering of this kind would not be repeated, and to apply pressure on the Canadian Government to this end:

We hope that this pressures Governments into realising that what we're after is draining the swamp. We want to get rid of famine and we want to make sure that we don't have to do this again.<sup>95</sup>

The Speaker of the Ontario Legislature, John Turner, cancelled his annual Christmas party ( normally the most lavish celebration held at the Legislature) and donated the money to Unicef.<sup>96</sup>

(iii). The Contribution of Provincial Governments

Closely related to the efforts of public officers were those of the various provincial governments. Many followed the Federal Government by donating generous sums of money to the cause. The government of Quebec sent \$100,000 to the Christian Relief and Development Agency in

Ethiopia.<sup>97</sup>The Mayor of Toronto promoted the relief effort in Ontario by declaring November 16, 1984 "give up your lunch day", the lunch money saved being donated for assistance in Ethiopia. This was in addition to the pledge of \$ 60,000 made by the city.<sup>98</sup> Other provincial governments such as Alberta, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba all made pledges of financial aid.<sup>99</sup>

(b). Canadian NGOs and the Mobilization of Aid

(i). NGOs and Mobilization

According to Rev. David Robins of WVC, 1985 was its "biggest year ever". The agency raised \$43 million, of which almost \$12 million came from the provincial governments.

The contributions made by CanSave, Oxfam, the Canadian Roman Catholic Church, and the other NGOs, was similarly impressive. All the relief agencies manned telephone shifts to receive public donations. They provided forums for coordinating the public response and in particular instances took measures to articulate public demands to both the provincial and Federal governments. For instance, in early November 1984 a concerned citizen group, The Ethiopian Action Train Committee, was formed and with the assistance of the Red Cross raised funds for the Red Cross organization in Metro.<sup>100</sup> In British Columbia, the Federation of International Agencies (BCFIA), which included 16 member organizations such as Oxfam, the Red Cross, YMCA, etc, made representation to the

Columbia provincial cabinet in November, appealing for \$2 million "out of concern that private donations won't be enough to maintain relief to the drought stricken African nation".101

(ii). The Church

The Church in Canada (the Roman Catholic Church) undertook one of the earliest measures in response to the tragedy by setting up two special funds. An Africa Drought Relief Fund and an Ethiopia Drought Relief Fund were set up to collect donations.102 In the same vein, the Canadian Red Cross launched a \$23 million disaster-appeal fund (its biggest appeal ever) and raised close to \$0.5 million in under two weeks.103

(iii). Corporate Organizations

Finally, there was the participation and involvement of the corporate community. The Royal Bank of Canada made available its branches as collection points for donations on behalf of the Canadian relief organizations.104 Air Canada provided five flights to Ethiopia at a cost \$500,000, with LWF, Cancross, Oxfam, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, and Unicef assembling the Cargo.

The Canadian musical group, Northern Lights, added another \$2.4 million to the donations, through sales of their single "Tears Are Not Enough", modelled on Band Aid's " Do They Know Its Christmas?".105

As stated by the Globe and Mail, by early December 1984 Canadians from coast to coast had raised \$11 million for the Africa relief projects allocating almost \$9.7 million to Ethiopia.<sup>106</sup>

5. Conclusion

It is evident from the foregoing that the active involvement of the charity organizations and the general public in the US, UK and Canada played a central role in mobilizing emergency assistance for Ethiopia. This was more so in the US and UK where both the official and non-official response was affected considerably by their actions. Once the relief organizations took it upon themselves to champion the cause, the speed and direction of the operation was positively changed. Subsequently, Governments increased their assistance and opened direct bilateral channels to move their aid. It was in the light of what the NGOs had accomplished that the UN was called to coordinate the operation.

Notes and References.

1. New Society, October 18, 1985
2. Ibid.
3. The Times(London), October 25, 1984, p.1.
4. Millar Rosemary, "Fund raising and Spending in the African Disaster" Charity Statistics, 1984/85, pp.102-103.
5. The Times (London), October 5, 1984 p.11
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. The Times (London) December 10, 1984, p.3.
9. The Guardian, October 27, 1984
10. Also noteworthy of mention here is the the involvement of Robert Maxwell. In the early days of the relief operation he visited Ethiopia to inspect the famine conditions in the country. On his return he formed the "Mirror Readers Appeal" and promoted the relief efforts. The money collected paid for fuel and navigational fees, for three "mercy mission" flights, organized with the assistance of British Airways. The first delivered 30 tons of cargo food supplies to Tigre and Eritrea in the first week of the appeal; the second delivered relief supplies to Bati in December 1984; and the third delivered supplies to refugees near Kassalla between Ethiopia and Sudan Border. A similar endeavour was organized by Anglo Cargo, who made a plane available to Oxfam free, while the cost of fuelling the plane was met by the Brighton evening Argus Newspaper. See, Daily Mirror, November 2, 1984, p.1.
11. One of the first steps taken by church-leaders, in particular the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr. Runcie, Cardinal Basil Hume, and the moderator of the Free church council, was to write a joint letter to the Prime Minister asking the Government to send its RAF Hercules transport planes to Ethiopia. See, The Times (London), November 20, 1984, p.1. Their involvement was acknowledged as having influenced the Government in this direction.  
See, Daily Mirror, October 27, 1984, p.2
12. The Times (London) July 19, 1985, p.3.
13. According to the trade union, Government action was immoral and sick. Daily Mirror, October 29, 1984.
14. This is instanced by the action of the striking

Thames Television technicians, who consented, on representation from Oxfam and SCF, to screen the documentary film Bitter Harvest as originally scheduled. The Times, (London) October 25, 1984, p.1.

15. The Times ( London), July 19, 1985, p.3.

16. See, The Sunday Times December 23, 1984, p.10.

17. The Times(London), December 23, 1984, p.10.

18. The trustees included Michael Grade of the BBC, Lord Harlech, Lord Gowrie, and the Arts Minister. The trust was made up of eight administrators and four secretaries with an additional representative who later took charge of the Band Aid Sudan operation. See Ibid and New Society October 18, 1985.

19. The Economist, July 20 1985, p.51.

20. Ibid.

21. The Times (London), September 11, 1984. p.2.

22. Ethiopia: Behind the weather. Lessons to be learned, (Oxfam Public Affairs Unit, July 1984).

23. The Times(London) November 7, 1984, p.10.

24. The Times (London), November 8, 1985, p.2.

25. The Times (London) November 14, 1984, p.6.

26. The Times, ( London), November 8, 1985 p.2.

27. Millar op.cit.:The British Red Cross raised £0.5 million by November 1984 and used the money in financing the purchase of relief items like stoves, tents, bedding and feeding equipment for the Bati camp in Wollo. WV UK raised over £160,000 by November 1986 and used the money to supply and service five feeding and medical centres in Wollo, Shoa and Gondar. See, The Times(london) November 16, 1984, p.6.; Christian Aid, (part of the British council of Churches) raised £1 million out of which it made cash grants to Eritrea and Tigre. See, The Times (London), November 14, 1984, p.6.

28. This is not surprising in view of the "nationalist" position of Mr. Galloway, the Secretary of the organization. He admits that being a "nationalist" himself he also supports some form of Scottish assembly. See, The Sunday Times (London) November 4, 1984, p.11.

29. The British Government contributed "just over £50m" from the overseas aid budget and even this sum was

deflected from other areas. New society, 18 october.1985 P101.

30. He took with him a cheque of £50,000 for the Christian Aid Organisation working there. See The Times(London) November 3, 1984, p.2.

31. See Cardinal Hume's appeal to the Prime Minister in The Times (London) November 14, 1984, p.6.

32. Church support was also important in the mounting of the Church Airlift operation under the umbrella name of Joint Relief Partnership (JRP). The JRP comprised three local churches in Ethiopia - the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Evangelical Church of Mekane Yesus (EECMY) and the Ethiopian Catholic secretariat in league with the World Council of Churches and the Lutheran World Federation.

33. This action in itself was estimated to have saved labour charges approximating £25,000.Daily Mirror (London), December 29, 1984, p.3.

34. The Sunday Times December 23, 1984, p.10.

35. The Sunday Times, January 6,1985 p.4.

36. The Times,(London) November 24, 1984, p.4.

37. For details of the quantities provided by these companies refer to The Daily Mirror October 30, 1984, p.4., and December 7, 1984, p.16.

38. Daily Mirror, June 11, 1985, p.14.

39. The Times (London) January 30, 1985 P6, and March 12, 1985, p.25., and May 7, 1985, p.22.

40. The Times (London), October 25, 1984, p.1.

41. In March 1985, 58 crews from Oxford and Cambridge Universities organized a boat race which raised about £15,000. See,The Times Higher Educational supplement(London ), March 15, 1985, p.3.

42. Mr. Kinnock appealed to Europe's elder statesman Willy Brandt of West Germany to arrange a joint aid from the west's left wing parties. Daily Mirror, October 26, 1984, p.5. The then Chairman of the Conservative Party, John S. Gummer, launched a similar campaign in October to mobilize aid from the centre and centre-right parties in Europe. He contacted 17 European countries, urging them to provide immediate aid. See,The Times (London), October 27, 1984, p.2.

43. Okojie Paul,"Africa and the famine Movement" Journal of African Marxists, Issue 10, June 1987, pp. 80-89.

44. Leston John and Ward David, "Beyond Band Aid:Charity is not enough" Fabian Society no.520.
45. Marxism Today, July 1986, p.14.
46. Then there was the story of one Billy Sage who was so moved by the images he saw that he sought directly ahead to begin collecting money for the appeal. Without knowing that the law requires a permit before people can collect for charity, Mr. Sage was arrested, though he was later discharged after appearing before a magistrate in Liverpool. Another family in Scotland were so moved that they sold their household goods including a caravan to raise money for the appeal.
47. See,The Washington Post, November 21, 1984, p. A 10 D.
48. The largest nationwide mass mailings by the CRS charity organization raised less than \$800,000 for the period up to the first quarter of 1984; a black organization which came into being as a result of the crisis raised only about \$100,000 by the 1st of September 1984. See,The Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1984, p.1:4.
49. The Washington Post, November 21, 1984, p. A 10 D.
50. The Washington Post, November 21, 1984, p. A 10.
51. San Francisco Chronicle, October 38, 1984, pp. A 20-1.
52. The International Herald Tribune, October 29, 1984.
53. San Francisco Chronicle, October 28, 1984, pp.A 20-1.
54. The Los Angeles Time, January 12, 1985, p. 11: 6:1.
55. Ibid.
56. Los Angeles Times, November 30, 1984, p. 14.2.
57. San Francisco Chronicle November 27, 1984, p. 11-5.
58. Robert J. McCloskey, " When opinion leads Government follows" in International Herald Tribune, January 30, 1985.
59. Ibid.
60. The Washington Post, November 7, 1984.
61. Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1984, p. v: 1:4.
62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. The Ethiopian community in exile set aside its political differences with the government in Addis Ababa, and assisted in the humanitarian endeavours

65. The Washington Post, December 26, 1984, p.A 1.

66. After agreeing on this, Kragen (later the executive producer of the record) called Lionel Riche and finalised discussions. Riche got together with Michael Jackson and wrote the song. Kragen then called Belafonte and informed him about developments. See, The Washington Post, January 19, 1985, p. B1.

67. The Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1985, pp. V1 and 1:1.

68. Ibid.

69. Soon after its release the record was selling at five to ten times the figure that the normal "No.1" record registers in a week. See, The Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1985, p. 1:1.

The Washington Post, May 16, 1985, p. B1.

70. The Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1985, p. vi:10.

71. The Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1985, p. 1V:9:1.

72. The Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1985, p. vi:1:1.

73. The figure provided by USAID with which it cooperated was put at about 170. See The Washington Post, January 12, 1985, p. A 2E.

A few examples of the organizations that sprang up during the period include "The Ethiopian crisis" established in February 1984; Broadway Feeds The World, established April 1985, Brothers of the Third World, established March 1985, Children of the World Project, established April 1985; Christian Artists unite to save the Earth (CAUSE); established January 1985. For a list of some of these see The Los Angeles Times, June 9, 1985, p. 1.1.

74. The Los Angeles Times, February 1985, p.1:1.

75. The Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1984, p. 24:4.

76. The Washington Post, December 26, 1984, p. A1.

77. The Los Angeles Times, January 12, 1985, p. 11: 6:1.

78. The Washington Post, March 5, 1985, p. A 15.

79. Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1984, p. v:1:4.

80. San Francisco Chronicle, December 18, 1985, pp.12-3.

81. Students raised \$400,000 through car washes and the money was donated to InterAction who allocated the sum to Unicef, WV, Africare, American Jewish Distribution Committee. The Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1985, p. V1:1:1.

82. Strictly speaking, there was only one Canadian Non-Governmental Organization that served in Ethiopia. This was the Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, which was established in Ethiopia in early 1985. The organization was founded in 1984 in the wake of the Ethiopian crisis. All the other NGOs referred to in this section have their headquarters based in either the U.S. or Switzerland, although they have branch offices in Canada. Thus, once again highlighting the international character of the NGOs and even better still underlining their non partisan nature in Humanitarian endeavour. More will be said on this point in a subsequent section.

83. The Globe And Mail, December 8, 1984, p.4.

84. The Vancouver Sun, October 31, 1984, p. D17.

85. Winnipeg Free Press (WFP), November 6, 1984, p.1.

86. The Toronto Star, November 4, 1984, p.A3.

87. Ibid, November 6, 1984 p. A17.

88. The Vancouver Sun, October 30 1984, p.A7.

89. The Toronto Star, November 6, 1984, p.A17.

90. The Globe And Mail, November 17, 1984, p.1.

91. Mr. Benson donated the property, See, The Vancouver Sun, December 17, 1984, p.A12

92. The Vancouver Sun, December 17, 1984, p.A12.

93. The Globe And Mail, November 12, 1984, p.8.

94. However, a Hamlet Law inhibited this money getting through, since the approval of the Territorial Commissioner must be granted for any transfer of donation outside the Eskimo community of more than \$200. The issue was finally resolved, however, when the Government decided to match local contributions of up to \$1 for each person in the community. See The Globe And Mail, December 4, 1984, p.1.

95. The Vancouver Sun, January 12, 1985, p.A13. Refer also to the Globe And Mail of January 11, 1985, p.5.

96. The Globe And Mail, November 28, 1984, p.B6.

97. The Toronto Star, November 6, 1984 p.A17.

98. The Toronto Star, November 8, 1984, p.A15.
99. The Toronto Star, November 2, 1984, p.4.
100. The Toronto Star, November 8, 1984, p.15.
101. The Vancouver Sun, November 22 1984 p.D9.
102. Earlier on the Church had sent \$60,000 in immediate donations to both Ethiopia and Sudan through the Church's overseas Development agency known as Development and Peace.
103. The Globe And Mail, NOVember 12, 1984 p.8.
104. The Vancouver Sun, November 10, 1984, PA 7
105. The money raised by the group included sales from T-Shirts, other merchandise and the film about the recording session of the Single. See The Globe And Mail, October 3, 1985, p.D1.
106. The Globe And Mail, December 8, 1984, p. M1.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### The Role of The United Nations

#### 1. Introduction

Unlike its intervention in other disaster situations, the United Nations played a central role in the coordination of humanitarian relief in Ethiopia. Its involvement came in the wake of the general concern about events in Ethiopia following the BBC film which showed the appalling conditions of life around the relief camps in the north of the country. Like the rest of the international community, the UN's response came late. The first action of the Secretary General, on October 26, was to issue a special appeal to the international community for expedited relief assistance to Ethiopia. Because of the critical food shortage there and the ominous prospect that vast numbers might die, he urged quick and coordinated action.<sup>1</sup> The following week, on November 2, the former RRC Commissioner addressed the United Nations General Assembly and reiterated the magnitude of the crisis engulfing his country.<sup>2</sup> On November 5, the Secretary General created a special Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (OEOE), and appointed Mr. Kurt Jansson to head the office as his special representative. Jansson was designated United Nations Assistant Secretary General for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (UN ASG/EOE). On the same day (November 6) that Kurt Jansson accepted his

appointment, the UN General Assembly debated the crisis affecting not only Ethiopia but the entire sub-Saharan region. On November 8, the Secretary General arrived in Ethiopia and visited the Korem relief camp to assess the situation for himself.<sup>3</sup> His visit indicated the high level of concern within the UN and its determination to play an important role in the relief process. In order to put the UN role into proper perspective a review of its earlier involvement seems appropriate.

## 2. UN Involvement

### (a) UN's Early Effort

The UN involvement with the Ethiopian crisis predates the creation of the special office. In March 1983, following the warnings made by the UN Resident Representative in Addis Ababa, at a meeting of donor governments and international agencies in Geneva, the international community was informed of the developing crisis. On the basis of this information the United Nations Office of Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) issued an appeal for assistance.<sup>4</sup> On April 22, UNDRO issued another appeal for \$30m.<sup>5</sup> By June 1983, a special meeting of donor governments, UN agencies and NGOs was convened by UNDRO to raise further assistance for the country.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile, to maintain the momentum of these appeals, the former RRC Commissioner Mr. Dawit Wolde Giorgis undertook a tour of Western European countries. In Rome he appealed to both the WFP and the Food and Agricultural

Organization (FAO) and in Geneva he requested assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNCHR) and UNDR0.<sup>7</sup> In November, he addressed the UN General Assembly and pleaded for more aid.<sup>8</sup>

Faced with an with ever-rising demand for emergency relief, the RRC launched a major appeal on March 30, 1984 in Addis Ababa. On the basis of the RRC 's outlined aid requirements, UNDR0 issued a special appeal for food, transport and medicines in April.<sup>9</sup>In May, Dawit made another appearance before the United Nations General Assembly and reiterated the worsening of the crisis in Ethiopia.<sup>10</sup>UNDR0 meanwhile pursued its role of issuing appeals for assistance. Although it is difficult to know exactly how much assistance was secured at this stage through the UN's efforts, it seems safe to assume that it was minimal: the increased frequency of appeals to donors by both the UN and the RRC underlined the low level of response to previous appeals for help.

(b). UN And Relief Operations in General

The creation of a special office to coordinate the international response to the disaster (instead of using existing structures) within the UN was evidence of how seriously the crisis was now taken, as was the fact that the other affected offices within the UN system cooperated fully with it. The most appropriate office to coordinate the UN involvement would otherwise have been UNDR0, which had been created in the early 1970s in response to the

perceived need for effective multilateral involvement in disaster relief operations. As a result of the 1970 earthquake in Peru, and the tidal wave in what is now Bangladesh, the UN General Assembly authorized the creation of UNDR0 in resolution 2816(xxv1) on December 14 1971.<sup>11</sup>The coordinator was appointed the same year and the office began operations from its headquarters in Geneva on March 1, 1972.<sup>12</sup> The chief functions of the coordinator as defined in the resolution include:

.....(b) to mobilize, direct and coordinate the relief activities of the various organizations of the United Nations system in response to a request for disaster relief from a stricken state;

.....(c) to coordinate United Nations assistance with assistance given by the intergovernmental organizations, in particular by the international Red Cross...<sup>13</sup>

Schiavone summarized the overall functions of the coordinator thus:

The coordinator is empowered on behalf of the Secretary General to direct all relief activities of the United Nations system, to receive contribution in kind or cash for disaster relief assistance and to serve as a clearing house for information on assistance provided by all sources of external aid.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of its mandate however UNDR0 was not meant to be operational at the site of disasters. Its lack of human and financial resources limited its ability to develop into an operational agency. The UN cannot in general respond to

emergencies in the manner that western non-governmental organizations are able to do: only The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and WFP have adjusted their machinery to respond to emergencies, and the activities even of these two agencies in this respect are geared towards medium and long-term development.<sup>15</sup> For this reason the UN Secretary General created the special Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia.

(c). Creation of The OEOE

The special Office was created, in response to pressure from both the donor community and the recipient state, on the realization that there was a need for a much stronger role for the United Nations in the operations.<sup>16</sup> Two views emerged regarding the inauguration of the office. The first, promulgated by Kurt Jansson and later by Peter Gill, claimed that the UN Secretary General created the Office on the advice of James Grant, head of UNICEF, and James Ingram, head of WFP, who wrote an urgent memorandum to the Secretary General after the BBC film, in which they proposed the need for a UN special office to respond to the famine, and suggested the best person to head it.<sup>17</sup>

Alternatively Dawit claims that it was he, who put forward the case for a much stronger UN involvement to the Secretary General during their meeting in November 1984. According to Dawit, James Grant advised him that to achieve assistance from the international community he

should request that the Secretary General create the special office and put Mr. Kurt Jansson in charge. This would both ensure the "smooth coordination of supply" and confer "international credibility" for the emergency.<sup>18</sup>

A number of observations can be made. First, serious UN response was made after, not before, the media focused its attention on the crisis. We infer that the UN decision to create the office was made against the background of an already desperate situation and the Office was created substantially to strengthen the UN's effective role in the relief operation.<sup>19</sup> Second, both versions attribute a central role to Dr. Grant in the creation of the Office. The question left unexplained is why Dr. Grant should have featured prominently? As has been stated, the only UN agencies able to respond to emergencies are UNICEF and WFP, and this could be why Drs. Grant and Ingram were able to influence the Secretary General. Last, whatever the motivation of the UN in creating the Office, both the donor community and the recipient government wanted it to play a central role.

The primary objective in establishing the Office was to coordinate the international response to the emergency.<sup>20</sup> In this respect it was in charge of overseeing the effective coordination of all aspects of the operation, including ensuring that the assistance reach its intended beneficiaries, so that the loss of lives could be reduced drastically. How did the UN discharge this task? Four key roles were undertaken by the Office in the course

of coordinating the operation: as mobilizer of resources; as legitimizer of recipient relief requirements; as mediator between donors and the recipient; and finally as distributor of donor aid (or rather guarantor of its efficient distribution).<sup>21</sup>

(d). Organizational Set Up of the Office

When the Office was set up in Addis Ababa in November 1984, Kurt Jansson needed the services of a handful of specialists and experts to assist him in carrying out his job. UN agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, WFP, World Health Organization (WHO) and UNDRO provided for his staff requirements. The WFP provided nine officers, including the deputy Resident Representative, who deputised for Kurt Jansson whenever he travelled abroad to New York or Geneva for consultations. UNDRO provided him with six officers, some of whom served as field monitors. The WHO assigned a public health specialist to the office, while UNICEF provided the bulk of the office's staff including an Administrative Assistant, the secretarial staff and the office drivers.

The Assistant Secretary General (ASG) in turn assigned duties to these officers. Thomas Fitzpatric was assigned to the RRC to liaise with the RRC on all aspects of the relief and in particular to work out food relief requirements and analyse the food distribution reports. Ms Bilge O' Reid was assigned the task of monitoring bilateral contributions and pledges; Thomas Franklin was

assigned data management and NGO coordination; Ms Asbjorn Devold liaised with UNDR0; Ms Inger Wiren served as information officer; Mr. Roman Roos worked as the Logistics/Transport officer; Mr. Burkard Oberle as the food supply coordinator; Mr. Hans Pedersen as the Assab ports officer; and Mr. Paavo Pitkanen looked after the Air Transport coordination aspects of the operation.<sup>22</sup> Working with these officers Kurt Jansson steered the relief operation from November 1984 to December 1985.

### 3. The Role of Mobilizer of Relief

The Office mobilized relief assistance from the donor community for the period of the emergency.<sup>23</sup> It became the focal point in the mobilization of food, transportation (both land and air), medical aid and all the auxiliary needs, such as spare parts, money for rebagging and fuel for transportation.

The approach adopted by Kurt Jansson for carrying out this task was to base his operation in Addis Ababa. The advantages offered by Addis Ababa over New York and Geneva are numerous. First, most of the major donor states were represented in the capital. Second it was easier and faster to collect and analyse data on the relief requirements in Ethiopia and pass the information to the representatives of the donor governments and relief organizations based in Addis Ababa. This provided the opportunity for donors' queries to be clarified quickly. For this reason it was felt better to concentrate this aspect of the operation at

the local level.<sup>24</sup>

The UN Assistant Secretary General utilized a number of mechanisms in the execution of this task. He organized donor meetings where all the major donors bilateral, multilateral and NGOs were invited to attend and these became the forum where he presented his relief requirements to donors. They were also used as the main forum for review of progress made and problems encountered. Initially they were held once every two weeks. Later they were held once every month, and as the situation improved they were held less frequently. This was the basic forum adopted by the ASG/EOE for the mobilization of relief aid. Most of the major Western donors sent their ambassadors in Addis Ababa or a representative from the Embassy to the meetings.<sup>25</sup>

Kurt Jansson also worked through channels outside Ethiopia. These were occasional meetings at UN headquarters in New York or at the headquarters of UNDRO in Geneva. On

December 18, 1984, in New York, he presented his first major appeal to the international community.<sup>26</sup> This was followed in March by the UN convened conference in Geneva, aimed at increased mobilization of relief and international support for the African crisis.<sup>27</sup> Although the aim of the conference was to raise about \$1.5 billion<sup>28</sup> for the sub-Saharan countries as a whole, there was no doubt that the Ethiopian crisis provided the main impetus. With regard to the significance of the conference, UNDRO said:

It is also clearly the biggest single rescue and relief operation ever

mounted by the United Nations in its 40 year history and to that extent highlights the key role of the United Nations system in mobilizing international support and sustenance for peoples and nations afflicted by natural and other disasters.<sup>29</sup>

An important component of the external mobilization effort was through the office's links with UNDRO headquarters in Geneva. Indeed, UNDRO remained the OEOE's chief channel for relaying information to the donor community outside Ethiopia.<sup>30</sup> The EOE sent its reports of relief requirements to UNDRO for onward transmission to donors. These reports were then telexed to donor governments and relief agencies or were distributed to them in the form of UNDRO's situation reports, which provided an overview of the relief aid required, a description of the condition of the affected population and other related aspects of the relief.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, UNDRO relayed the OEOE's assessment of relief aid requirement and the ASG's identification of unmet needs. UNDRO issued a series of appeals on behalf of the ASG on December 12 1984; February 5, 8, 22; and on August 1, 1985.<sup>32</sup> A substantial portion of the relief aid was mobilized in this way.<sup>33</sup> It was estimated that during the ASG/EOE's tenure UNDRO issued a total of twenty situation report which detailed the overview of the emergency, its progress and problems.<sup>34</sup>

#### 4. The Legitimizing of Recipient's Relief Requirements

Another role played by the UN Office was that of

ascertaining the validity of the recipient's aid requests. Because of the political differences between the major donors and the Ethiopian government, most Western donors wanted a neutral body to ascertain accurately the relief requirements of the country. The RRC's assessment of its relief requirements were on many occasions distrusted by both the bilateral and multilateral donors. In 1984 the RRC calculated that it needed 900,000 mt. tonnes of food aid relief for 1984; but as a result of its transport difficulties it appealed to donors, for half that amount. FAO mission, however, further slashed the figure to 125,000 mt. tonnes and it was this that emerged as the UN backed appeal for the country's relief requirement. Thus the antagonistic relations between Ethiopia and the major donors necessitated the involvement of a body acceptable to both parties.

Jansson's first major task after his appointment was the preparation of estimates of emergency needs for the forthcoming period, from December 1984 to December 1985. However, for Jansson to prepare these on time for the December 18, 1984 donor meeting in New York, he had to rely on RRC's own data of its relief aid requirements. Jansson's report included estimates of both food aid relief and logistical requirements for delivery of food from the sea ports into the interior of the country. Estimates of the former for the period, including supplementary food and edible oil, were set at a total of 1,330,000 mt. tons; For the latter which covered trucks,

port handling, spare parts, medical supplies, inland transportation subsidies, materials for shelter and clothing, at \$139.2 million. These were the estimates presented by Kurt Jansson at the first donor meeting on December 18 1984, which were accepted by the donor community as targets for the international community.<sup>35</sup> They later became the basis for the evaluation of subsequent periodic estimates for appeals and appraisals of the situation. In this way the type of assistance, and the quantity were established by the UN office, although the Office's estimates were in actual fact derived from the RRC's own data.

The UN office fulfilled this role, in particular because the bilateral donors preferred any assessment to that made by the Ethiopian Government.<sup>36</sup> The UN Office and Ethiopian Government agreed that the UN judgement carried more weight and had helped win the confidence of donors.<sup>37</sup> Table 5 (on the next page) gives a summary breakdown of the estimates of food assistance required for the twelve-month period from January to December 1985. Compare the stated requirement of grain in Jansson's December request (1,330,000 mt.tonnes) with the figure shown here (1,295,764.18). The two figures are indeed similar bearing in mind that the former included supplementary food and edible oil estimates which the latter omitted.

Table 5  
FOOD ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS OF 1985  
(January -December)

<u>REGION</u>	<u>GRAIN</u>	<u>SUP.FOOD</u>	<u>EDIBLE OIL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1.ARSI	14,293.19	1,292.69	329.06	15,914.94
2.BALE	33,050.43	2,916.19	805.43	36,772.05
3.ERITREA	143,102.11	13,429.81	3,282.84	159,814.05
4.G/GOFFA	19,158.56	1,416.31	482.32	21,057.19
5.GOJJAM	13,044.03	1,287.94	209.48	14,622.45
6.GONDAR	62,118.00	6,133.50	1,383.30	69,634.80
7.HARARGHE	153,261.49	13,681.26	3,528.32	170,471.07
8.SHEWA	149,189.57	13,492.98	3,434.59	166,117.14
9.SIDAMO	95,945.85	7,093.17	2,415.42	105,454.44
10.TIGRAI	143,139.30	24,185.27	5,454.47	172,779.04
11.WOLLO	469,461.65	38,190.31	11,009.39	518,661.35
GRAND/				
TOTAL	1,295,764.18	123,299.43	32,415.62	1,451,479.23

Source: RRC, February 1985, from documents of The UN  
 ASG/EOE, Addis Ababa.

The UN figures were taken as the last word on the famine.  
 Kent observed that donors believed Jansson's assessment  
 although his estimates were the same as those issued by the  
 RRC in October 1984. He noted:

The bilaterals assumed that the OEOE's  
 independent assessment of relief needs  
 issued one month after Jansson's  
 arrival represented a realistic

picture of the situation.<sup>38</sup>

5. The Guarantor of Donors' Aid

Amidst fears of the likelihood of recipient mismanagement, the UN office was seen as guarantor of the efficient distribution of donor aid. The office discharged this role by concentrating its efforts on two levels. First, it ensured the efficient planning of the arrival of the mobilized relief materials from the point of origin in the donor countries to the point of delivery at the Ethiopian ports. Second it followed the distribution from the ports to its final destination and its distribution to its intended beneficiaries.

6. The Role of Coordinator

(a) Coordinating Relief from Outside

After the office had presented its estimates of relief needs to donors and obtained their pledges there remained the task of coordinating the delivery of these items. The aid had to be transported, stored in warehouses and ultimately distributed. Donors provided the bulk food and the relief items. They also provided the trucks and warehouse-related equipment and the money to cover the internal transportation costs within Ethiopia. But the task of ensuring that all went well was left to the UN office.<sup>39</sup>

The Office in conjunction with WFP devised the means of coordinating the arrival and discharge of all relief shipments coming to the Ethiopian ports. In undertaking this task the aim was always to avoid port congestion and

thus ensure optimum utilization. WFP appointed a shipping coordinator for all donor commodity-donations. He liaised with donors on all matters concerning shipments. Donors informed him of forthcoming vessels with details of approximate dates of arrival at Ethiopian ports. He in turn recommended a port for the vessel(s), and assigned a suitable berth and time when the commodities could best be discharged.<sup>40</sup>The port officer at Assab then telexed Addis Ababa with the daily update of stocks at the ports, the number of trucks on call, as well as the off-take rates.<sup>41</sup> Through this mechanism the UN office was kept informed at all the various stages of the movement of donated relief items.

To facilitate the process, WFP further produced a weekly shipping bulletin which was issued to donors, informing them of the arrival and off-takes of food aid deliveries.<sup>42</sup>In this way the office coordinated the planning of donor shipments of relief with the assistance of the WFP and the support of the Ethiopian Ministry of Transport.<sup>43</sup>Table 6, below, shows the amount of emergency food aid delivered to the Ethiopian ports, on a monthly basis, from December 1 1984 to December 31 1985. The amount is close to that for which the UN ASG appealed in December 1984, representing over 91 per cent of the UN target.

Table 6

EMERGENCY FOOD AID DELIVERED AT PORTS-DEC.1,1984- DEC.31, 1985

(All figures in Metric Tonnes)

TABLE 6 CONTINUED

	CER	CGR	BLF	NCR(1)	TOTAL
Dec. '84	97,439		4,248	5,032	106,719
Jan. '85	93,607	3,590	1,000	27,952	126,149
Feb.	117,379	6,102	5,205	8,457	137,143
Mar.	45,692	6,830	6,715	7,299	66,536
Apr.	46,206	1,481	1,801	10,422	59,910
May.	106,091	171	14846	16265	137,373
Jun.	66,424	534	14,815	1,786	83,559
Jul.	69,998	773	4,546	13,658	88,975
Aug.	88,635	9,778	2,781	11,124	112,318
Sep.	40,971	307	586	11,166	53,030
Oct.	85,601	-	7,240	7040	99,881
Nov.	54,239	12,469	5,159	6,644	78,511
Dec.	41,795	8,094	6,856	6,679	63,424
Total(1985)	856,638	50,129	71,550	128,492	1,106,809
Grand Total					
(13 months)	954,077	50,129	75,798	133,524	1,213,528
	1,004,206		209,322		1,213,528

Source: WFP, Shipping Bulletins- Nos 11-21, From documents of the UN ASG/EOE office, Addis Ababa.  
(1) CER=Cereal, CGR=CourseGrain, BLF=BlendedFood, NCR=NonCereal

(b). Internal Coordination of the Operation

Coordinating the distribution of food from the ports to the relief camps and shelters was a much harder task than getting it to the country's ports. Although, at the start of the operation, it was not the intention of the

office to become involved with this aspect of the program, the exigencies of the situation entailed its involvement especially with the transportation of relief. Kurt Jansson held meetings with Ethiopian government officials and donor agencies and calculated the measures necessary to resolve aspects of the transportation problems. In his first estimates, transport was identified as the ASG's second most important area of concern after food.

On January 17 1985, Kurt Jansson met with top Ethiopian officials and a representative of WFP to work out the logistics for the January-April quarter when there was a heavy schedule of aid shipments expected.<sup>44</sup> Among the Ethiopian officials was the then RRC Commissioner, the Vice-Minister of Transport, and a high Politburo member. At that time it was felt that at least 4000 trucks were required to assist in the transportation of relief from the ports to various destinations in Ethiopia.<sup>45</sup> When this was found, to be inadequate, in April 1985, Kurt Jansson obtained the support of the Ethiopian authorities for the use of 100 army trucks to clear the stockpile at the port of Asseb.<sup>46</sup>

In May 1985 the Office established its own UN transport fund which allowed it to hire trucks to overcome the temporary shortage of transport and to meet other logistical problems.<sup>47</sup> The fund enabled the ASG to hire vehicles from the Ethiopian National Transport Corporation (NATRACOR) and from "Katena" (a <sup>government organization responsible for requisitioning</sup> private transport) to  
A

ease the trucking difficulties.

Part of the fund was also used to procure tyres and spare parts to keep the trucks and vehicles on the road. It was also used to subsidize NGOs food transport. However, from November 1985, when the WFP established its own transport fleet -World Food Program Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE) -with a fleet of over 1,100 trucks, the land transport situation was substantially eased.<sup>48</sup>

The UN officials spent much time monitoring the distribution program, covering it from the ports all the way to the beneficiaries.<sup>49</sup> It was they who ensured the final distribution of the relief at the camps, shelters and the distribution points throughout the country. Nevertheless it proved difficult to escape problems altogether, especially given the vast scale of the relief operation. Hence certain problems were experienced such as port congestion at Asseb, and in the delivery of relief to Eritrea and Tigray. The office did its best, however to resolve these problems. That of port congestion was never allowed to persist for long; and in the search for better solutions the ASG talked periodically with the Head of State whose involvement emphasized the measure of the problems the office faced and the priority it attached to the famine.

Storage was another problem, especially as the grain piled up at Asseb and incurred rain damage although the timely intervention of the office, in procuring tarpaulins limited this damaged to a very small

percentage. Overall, the office's activities greatly enhanced both port capacities and storage facilities; the off-take capacity of the ports of Asseb increased three times and that of Massawa six times; additional storage put in place by the office improved the internal transport situation as a whole.<sup>50</sup>

(i). Coordinating Relief Delivery in Eritrea and Tigray

The mandate of the UN office extended to coordinating all aspects of the relief throughout Ethiopia. However, ensuring that relief reached certain parts of the country, in particular the provinces of Eritrea and Tigray and parts of Wollo, complicated its task. Because of the civil war in parts of these provinces, the central Government in Addis Ababa did not permit unrestricted access to these areas. The estimates of relief requirements for March and October 1984 showed that over 1,331,890 people needed assistance in Tigray while another 1000,000 were affected between the period January 1985 to December 1986; in Eritrea 827,000 people needed assistance in March and October (1984) and at least 650,000 needed assistance between January 1985 and December 1986.<sup>51</sup> Overall, these provinces were amongst the hardest hit by the famine and constituted a serious challenge in terms of getting food to the people. The rough terrain of the country, the poor state of its roads and the urgency of the situation all compounded the problem.

Because of the insurrections, food distribution in these provinces was difficult. Relatively few organizations

were allowed to work in those areas, even under Government control. Basically, those allowed were local Ethiopian church related organizations, plus a few foreign NGOs and an international organization, the ICRC. In Tigray, the ICRC, Africare, Action Internationale Contra La Faim, MSF (Belgium) were allowed to operate. Generally, however, the food distribution was undertaken by such local Ethiopian organizations as the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and the Ethiopian Evangelical Church of Mekana Yesus, etc. In areas under rebel control, food distribution was usually carried out by the relief arm of the Tigrian People's Liberation Front -the Tigray Relief Society and by the few NGOs who risked assisting them.<sup>52</sup>

In Eritrea the situation was similar. In areas under Government control only a few international organizations and a few church related local organizations were allowed to work: for example, the ICRC, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat and the Evangelical Faith Mission. In areas controlled by the rebels, food distribution was undertaken by the Eritrean Relief Association and a few foreign NGOs.<sup>53</sup>

In order for the UN to ensure increased aid to those areas cut off by war, the ASG appealed to the central Government (and the rebels) to allow increased aid and greater UN coordination. The ASG sought the permission of the government to allow both the UN and the ICRC to undertake their food operation in these areas. At a

meeting on January 19 1985, Kurt Jansson presented Mengistu with the UN and ICRC plans on how they might be able to undertake their operations.

The UN proposal asked the Ethiopian government to allow UN trucks to move relief into the interior. The idea was to move food from Makelle in Tigray and from Asmara in Eritrea (both Government controlled areas) to the regions in the north outside the control of Government. If the Government (and the rebels) agreed to the plan it was hoped that it would ensure the safe passage of UN convoys and increased relief aid to the affected population in these areas.

The ICRC attached three further conditions before it would operate in the affected areas. First, it demanded that the Government should de-mine the roads; second, that the ICRC rather than the RRC should undertake the distribution of relief; and third that the civilians registered for its feeding program should not be involved in the resettlement program.<sup>54</sup> Despite these efforts, neither proposal was accepted by the Government. Agreeing to either plan would have implied conferring a degree of official recognition on both the TPLF and EPLF. It would have also implied acknowledgement that the areas were outside the effective control of the Government. The Government's fears were confirmed when the rebels attacked convoys of UN relief assistance later in March.<sup>55</sup> Thus both sides frustrated the efforts of the international community to deliver assistance to famine victims.

(ii). The Air Lift and Airdrop Operations

The UN office organized and coordinated the Airlift and Airdrop operations, with the support and cooperation of the RRC and donor community, in order to get relief to areas inaccessible by other means. In the early days of the emergency, there were areas where huge needs existed but which could not be reached in time by land, and as a result the only effective alternatives were airlifting or mounted airdrop operations. The airlift operation started in November 1984 and involved moving food from Asseb to scores of areas in Tigray, Eritrea, Wollo, Gondar and on a small scale to parts of Hererghe. In Tigray food was airlifted to Makelle and Aksum where an estimated 40-50,000 people were in need.<sup>56</sup> In Eritrea food was airlifted to Asmara. In Gondar the airlift was carried to Gondar town itself and to Metema: while in Wollo the town of Alamata was served.<sup>57</sup>

In parts of Wollo and Shoa it was not possible to reach the population through airlifts. The rugged high plateaux terrain of these provinces, and the absence of airstrips, necessitated the mounting of airdrop operations. These were carried out in six different spots in Wollo and seven in Shoa.<sup>58</sup> The British Hercules transport planes, the German Transalls planes and the Polish relief squadron helicopters undertook the operations. The Polish squadron prepared the zones of the airdrop in advance. They carried the radio navigation teams which guided the planes. The Hercules flying low, dropped the grain from an altitude

of about 15 ft and a speed of 130 miles per hour.<sup>59</sup>In some places, even after the planes had dropped the relief, the Polish helicopters had to carry the grain further into the interior.<sup>60</sup>By the time the operations were completed in December 1985, approximately 168,000 mt. tonnes of food had been airlifted (sufficient for 900,000 people) and 20,000 mt. tonnes was airdropped (sufficient for 180,000 people) at an estimated value of \$100 million.<sup>61</sup> Governments in both East and West helped with the operations; the UK, West German, US, USSR, Italian, Polish, French, Belgian, Swedish, Libyan and Botswana Governments all contributed the use of their Airforces. The British RAF and the German Luftwaffe spent \$1.5 million and \$1.2 million respectively on both the airdrop and the airlift operations monthly. Table 7 below gives details of the countries that participated in the operations and the duration of their service.

Table 7

EMERGENCY AIRLIFT RESOURCES

<u>Sponsor</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Service Dates</u>	<u>Operation</u>
USG	2 C-130s	11/84-11/85	Airlanding from Asmara to Mekele and other towns in Tigray and Eritrea.
UK	2 C-130s	11/84-12/85	One C-130 used for airlanding food from Assab to Mekele, the other for airdrops in northern Shewa and Souther(sic) Welo
FRG	2 C-160	11/84-12/85	Same as UK aircraft

Table 7 CONTINUED

GDR	2 AN-26	11/84-10/85	General airlift
	1 IL-18		
Libya	2 AN-26	2/85-10/85	General Airlift
France	1 C-160	1/85-1/85	General Airlift
Poland	3 MI-8*	2/85	Airlanding food in Shewa and Harerge and support of FRG and UK airdrops.
USSR	12AN-12 22MI-8(1)	11/84-	Mostly movement of resettlers
ICRC	1 or 2 C-130s 1 Twin Otter 2 Pilatus Porters	3/85-	Airlanding for towns in Tigray and Eritrea, and airdrops in Southern Welo (C-130s provided by Belgium and Sweden, or under contract from private companies)
WVRO	2Twin Otters	1/85-12/85	Airlift of personnel and supplies to WVRO camps (supported by USG)
LWF	1 C-130	9/85-3/86	Airlanding for Eritrea and Tigray
EEC	1 C-130	7/86-9/86	Airlanding for Tigray

Source: Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian Drought/Famine, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986.  
By the Staff of the USAID Office, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. p.86

Note: (1) Helicopters

Although the airlift and airdrop were costly to implement, they represented the only realistic alternative for getting relief to otherwise inaccessible areas and thereby saving lives. The experience gained from the exercise, meant that aid could be deployed similarly and faster to other areas in the future. The joint cooperation under the auspices of the United Nations has already brought the airforces of NATO and the WARSAW Pact countries together.

(iii). Coordinating other UN Agencies

The task of coordinating the UN agencies did not present the UN Office with a serious problem.<sup>62</sup> Each of the offices cooperated during the operation. In addition to the secondment of officers and specialists, the sister agencies provided assistance in their areas of competence. For instance, the FAO assisted in assessing the emergency needs; UNHCR provided resources worth \$3.3 of relief program to the 300,000 refugees who needed relief assistance in Hererghe<sup>63</sup>; UNICEF provided drugs, vaccines and supplementary feeding; and the WHO made available \$300,000 for the purchase of medical supplies. The WFP financed the provision of tarpaulins, trucks, and paid for the air-freighting of Oxfam's relief items with funds provided it by the World Bank.<sup>64</sup>

7. The Mediator Between Donors and the Recipient

(a) The Ibnat Incident

Many donors felt that one of the most important roles played by the UNs Office was that of persuading the Ethiopian Government to change or adjust some of its policies in the light of donor requests or complaints. A typical example relates to its role during an incident at Ibnat. In the last week of April 1985, the Party Chief in Gondar, Melaku Teferra, ordered closure of the camp and forced the people to go back to their homes without adequate arrangements.<sup>65</sup>

Ordinarily the closure of relief camps would be greeted with relief to the extent that it heralds the end of the operation and therefore is a sign of its success. In this case, however, the process was prematurely and "overzealously" executed by the Party Secretary. Many of the camp dwellers who were already weak and sick, were coerced to leave the camp further injuring some in the process. This action angered western donor governments and the relief agencies and threatened the relief operation. The crisis was averted by the prompt intervention of the UN ASG. The Ethiopian Government admitted its mistake, rendered an apology and gave assurances that such an action would not be taken again. This assurance pacified the regime's critics and ensured the continuation of relief.<sup>66</sup>

(b). Other Areas of Mediation

The UN mediated in getting the Government to make concessions in a number of areas. For instance, the influence of the ASG was vital in getting port charges reduced<sup>67</sup>; in assisting NGOs to obtain travel permits; in helping the USAID mission to secure visas; and in preventing the expulsion of the French relief organization MSF on two occasions.<sup>68</sup>

8. Conclusion

After the Ibbat incident the UN monitors took control of supervising the return of the camp populations to their homes in an orderly manner. There

were about one million people in April 1985 but as a result of the success of the operation the figure fell to under 20,000 by the end of the year. By May 1986 the number had been reduced to a few hundred, most of whom remained in the camps for medical attention.<sup>69</sup> With the closure of the camps, NGOs switched their operations from relief to rehabilitation.<sup>70</sup>

## Notes and References

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3. The UN Chronicle, vol.xx1, no.9, 1984, p.4.
4. UNDRO NEWS, July/August, 1983, p.16.
5. Ibid., p.16.
6. Ibid.
7. Giorgis, W. Dawit, Red Tears: War, Famine and Revolution in Ethiopia. ( New Jersey: The Red Sea Press inc., 1989), p.131.
8. Ibid. p. 131.
9. UNDRO IN AFRICA, 1984-1985, ( U.Ns. Publication Geneva, May 1986).
10. Giorgis op. cit., p.151.
11. The Yearbook of the United Nations, op. cit.p.503.
12. Resolution 2816 (xxv1) was adopted at the UN General Assembly Twenty-Sixth session which endorsed the recommendation of the Economic and Social Council Resolution 1612 (L1). This Resolution called upon the Secretary General to appoint a Disaster Relief Coordinator, on the basis of the need for an adequate and permanent office of the UNs which should be the focal point of the UN in all disaster relief matters. See "Report of the Secretary General," in UN's Economic and Social Council, Fifty Third session, E/5151/ 17 May 1972.
13. See United Nations Press Release ND/92, "UNDRO's role in man-made, accidental and longer-term disaster situations", (Geneva), 9 October, 1981, p.1.
14. Giuseppe Schiavone: International Organization: A dictionary and directory. (London: Macmillan Reference, 1983), p.196.
15. Jansson K., et. al., op. cit. p.2.
16. Interview with Michael Priestly, UNDP Resident Representative and successor to Kurt Jansson. Addis Ababa 22 July, 1988.
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22. From documents of the U.N office of Emergency operations in Ethiopia. Documents made available through the kind permission of Mr. Michael Priestly UNDRP Resident Representative. And the interview with Mr. Paavo Pitkanen, Addis Ababa, August 1988.
23. The UN Chronicle, vol. xx11, no. 1, 1985.
24. Jansson k., et. al., op. cit., p. 8.
25. Ibid., p. 8.
26. The U.N. Chronicle vol.xx11, no.1, 1985.
27. Lincoff D.Doran (ed) Annual Review of United Nations Affairs (New York:Oceana Publications inc., 1985.), p. 222.
28. See Maurice F. Strong(Executive coordinator office for Emergency operations in Africa), "Beyond The Famine: New Hope for Africa" Annual Memorial Lecture, The David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies, November 11, 1985.
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30. UNDRO NEWS, November/December 1984, p.16.
31. The UN Chronicle Vol.xx11, no.1. 1985, p.19.
32. UNDRO IN AFRICA, 1984-85( United Nations Publication, Geneva, May 1986), p.6.
33. Between <sup>revised</sup> April 1 1984 to March 31 1985 about \$1 billion was <sup>revised</sup> through UNDRP for the emergency in Africa. See UNDRO NEWS, May/June 1985. p.14.
34. UNDRO IN AFRICA 1984- 85( United Nations Publications, Geneva, May 1986).
35. Jansson K., et al., op. cit., pp. 5-8.

36. A Senior UN Official who requested anonymity said the creation of the UN office emanated from Western donor government pressure who prefer relief assessment from a neutral body other than the recipient own assessment of its needs.
37. Jansson K., et. al., op. cit., p. 8 and Giorgis Op. cit., p.152.
38. See, Kent, " The Office of Emergency Operations in Ethiopia" op.cit., p. 30.
39. UNDRO NEWS, May/June, 1986, p.6.
40. From official documents of the office of the UN ASG/EOE. dated 30.1. 85.
41. From official documents of the office of UN ASG/EOE. dated 13.1.86.
42. The shipping b<sup>o</sup>ttled off take and storage situation of donors with project<sup>en</sup>abled<sup>the</sup> make better decisions on the<sup>the</sup> ports which enabled<sup>the</sup> make better decisions on the best time to send their aid assistance.
43. The transport committee, of the Ethiopian ministry of transport held weekly coordinating meetings to which the WFP attended on behalf of the donor community. The meetings were chaired by the Ethiopian Vice-Minister of transport.
44. From documents of the office of UN ASG/ EOE. Outgoing cable, dated 18.1.85
45. Ibid.
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47. UNDRO IN AFRICA 1984-85( United Nations publication, Geneva, May 1986), p.7.
48. Jansson K., et. al., op cit., p.35.
49. UNDRO NEWS, May/June 1985, p.9.
50. See Maurice F. Strong op. cit., p.7.
51. Assistance Requirement 1984, of the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia.( RRC publication, March 1984), p.5. also refer to to the Table, in Chapter two showing the relief aid requirements and the number of people affected in the 14 administrative regions of the country.
52. Location of on going Activities of NGOs, operating in Ethiopia under the Auspices of the commission. (RRC:Addis

Ababa, 30 March 1985).The British Christian Aid Organization and War on Want, were the best known NGOs who assisted both provinces with relief aid openly. The aid was usually channelled through Sudan. See The Times(London), November 14, 1984, p. 6A.

53. Ibid.

54. Gill op.cit., p. 133 and Jansson K., et. al., op.cit., p.49.

55. The Washington Post, March 5, 1985, p. A 15.

56. Giorgis op. cit., p.233.

57. See Operation by the British Military detachment, Ethiopia (Operation Bushel) p.7, documents of the office of UN ASG/EOE. The Times(London), November 2, 5, 23, 1984, pp. 6A, 7E, and 8G respectively.

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59. The Times,(London), April 23, 1985, p. A17.

60. Interview with Dr. Andrzej K. KonopacKi. Ambassador of Poland. Addis Ababa. 18.7. 88.

61. See Kent R.C., " Air Operations 1984-88, A summary. Prepared for the evaluation exercise", Unpublished report. Dated 14.7. 1988, p.2.

62. Ibid. p. 3.

63. The UN Chronicle, Vol xx11, no. 1, 1985 p. 22.

64. Ibid p.22.

65. Giorgis op.cit.,p. 250.

66. Jansson K., et. al, op. cit., pp. 59-64.

67. See Kent, "The office for Emergency operation in Ethiopia: Enduring lessons from a one off shot" op.cit., p. 36.

68. Jansson K., et. al, op. cit., pp. 21- 25.

69. Jansson K., et. al, op.cit., p.64.

70. International Herald Tribune December 13, 1986. Kurt Jansson handed over to Michael Priestly in November 1985 and the office continued operations until December 31, 1986 when it officially terminated its operations. Its responsibilities were carried over by the UNDP office under the newly created office for Emergency Preparedness

and Prevention Group (EPPG), which took off in January 1987.

PART THREE  
EVALUATING THESIS UNDERLINING ASSUMPTIONS

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### Humanitarian Relief And International Politics

#### 1. Introduction

In this chapter we will focus attention on the relationship between humanitarian aid and international politics. The aim is to evaluate the stated assumptions of the thesis in the light of our discussion of the various donor responses in the preceding section. We will accomplish this after we have first examine the theoretical positions in the literature underlying donors' involvement in relief operations.

#### 2. The Origins of Humanitarian Relief

The origin of humanitarian help to those in need goes back beyond the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome. Most probably it arose in the context of meeting the demands of tribal communities for hospitality when forced by natural calamity to move from their traditional hunting lands and pasture. Afterwards it was elevated into a principle of social justice.<sup>1</sup> As Nightingale points out :

There thus was precedent for helping people unknown to you; and as nomadic tribes became communities, and communities cities and nations, family responsibility developed naturally enough into social responsibility. The need to divert the fruits of sacrifice became apparent, the

justification easy, the obligation increasingly strong. Thus, in Egypt, we find the Pharaohs giving shelter to the poor, and distributing bread and clothing; and Greece and Rome followed.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, all the world's great religions enjoin us to help the poor and the weak: Buddhism stresses compassion for the suffering, Islam and Hinduism the obligation of the wealthy towards the unfortunate while Judaism and Christianity the love of one another.<sup>3</sup>

During the current crises, similar calls of concern were made to meet the demands of the famine victims. For example The Times said:

The public has no great interests in whose fault it is, in fine theories which put the blame on western development aid policies or incompetent marxists governments. It goes to the heart of the Ethiopian matter; here are human beings, fellow men, women, children and babies of the same species in deadly trouble and they must be helped. Christmas 1984 isn't christmas without " the bitter sting of tears" .....<sup>4</sup>

### 3. The Assumptions of Humanitarian Relief And the International Response

Ideally, humanitarian assistance should rest on the assumption of the universal brotherhood of man.<sup>5</sup> The aid is supposed to be given because of the shared primordial origins of mankind. The rationale behind it, is that a calamity that affects one section of mankind affects humanity as a whole. This is why such aid is referred to as

humanitarian, meaning that it is given in the interest of humanity.

Because of this, the aid should ideally be divorced from politics. However studies reveal that often this is not the case because donors have additional motives accompanying their relief. Disentangling the true motives as opposed to the humanitarian ones therefore becomes the major problem of every analyst.

Cuny believes that if aid is provided quickly to a disaster afflicted country, the effect of such a quick response could ensure the stability and continuity of the recipient Government. In other words, a timely intervention is an indication of positive donor concern for the recipient. By contrast where donors withhold aid to a government, or delay it, the intention may be to create a crisis for that government. Cuny, concludes that, usually, the primary objective of government intervention is to maintain and expand their influence.<sup>6</sup> However, even where donors' objectives are not easily visible some scholars argue that there is no such thing as unpolitical relief. Bloomstien is quoted by Linden as saying:

In the hard realities of the international situation there is no such thing as unpolitical relief. It is true that aid can be rendered solely on the basis of need, without respect to race, creed, or political affiliation. But it is also true that the very giving of help carries with it implicitly if not explicitly a message of friendship and international human solidarity. In these precarious times such a message is loaded with political implications of the most fundamental

sort.....7

Relief aid is therefore political. This is, particularly so, at the bilateral level: afflicted nations may have to look a lot harder to secure relief, especially if they are not getting on well with the major donor states.<sup>8</sup>The international response to the Sahelian drought of the 1970s provides a good example. Hal Sheets and Roger Moris ascribed the ineptitude of donors due to the low priority accorded the Sahelian countries in the donors' priority scale.<sup>9</sup> The criteria of allocating humanitarian aid on the basis of need was set aside in favour of what tangible advantages the donors could gain. Unfortunately in the case of the Sahel, it turned out to be a disaster because the region has little to offer donors.

Similarly Curti's study of American philanthropy abroad, reveals that both religious and secular factors enter into peoples motives in donating relief abroad. Interestingly, political sympathies, social pressure, habit, national pride tied to national policy and national interest are all factors that featured prominently in Curti's findings. Although Curti's study is concerned mainly with NGO relief abroad, it showed that even at the non-governmental level donors' motives resembled those behind official government relief-such as the desire to open new markets, or to check the spread of communism.<sup>10</sup>

The convergence of humanitarian motives and self interest need not, necessarily, be considered negative.<sup>11</sup> Humanitarianism, as we have been reminded by Wiseberg,

is always a mixture of concern for humanity on the one hand and self or partisan interests on the other.<sup>12</sup> What is important is that we should be alert to the idea that not all NGOs are faithful to their humanitarian charter despite the fact that their very *raison d'etre* lies in relief and development.<sup>13</sup>

No doubt NGOs are, by virtue of their role in relief, classed (in strict legal terms) as non-profit entities oriented towards the fulfilment of the public good.<sup>14</sup> This is certainly the basis of their legitimacy as humanitarian organizations.<sup>15</sup> However, there is no doubt also that there are times when they engage in relief for their own survival reasons. As Cuny explains:

The greater the tragedy, the greater the opportunity for a successful appeal. Therefore many organizations for reasons of self-preservation start up disaster relief programs.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, their acceptance of Government resources affects their autonomy and independence.<sup>17</sup>

Shawcross believes political, military, strategic and commercial concerns undoubtedly rear their heads in the humanitarian arena.<sup>18</sup> His examination of NGO responses during the brief but brutal rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia shows that relief could be manipulated by individuals and groups for their own benefit. The role played by Rosalind Carter was cited as an example. In the midst of the American Presidential elections Mrs Carter visited Cambodia and on her return to the US publicised the plight of the Cambodians. In doing so not only did she

draw attention to the plight of the victims but also helped her husband's electoral campaign. For the public, giving relief is always accompanied *by* a sense of satisfaction. In its most basic form the act of giving is an act of friendship.<sup>19</sup> Macalister-Smith accurately sums up the complex relationship between humanitarian aid and politics when he noted that all humanitarian action has a political content in it. He said:

The expression of such concern is itself a political act and involves a form of political commitment. Those engaged in humanitarian activity are thus engaged in politics in the broad sense in the struggle to achieve the implementation of particular principles or policy.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, all those involved in relief, be they Governments, relief organizations or individuals, are indeed involved in politics though each comes in with a different motive. How then did the the donors fare during the current crises?

Below (Table 8) we outline the summary response of Eastern and Western donors and analyse the possible motives for their assistance.

TABLE 8  
DONOR FOOD AID, 1985 AND 1986 (IN MTS)

DONOR TO:	1985			1986			% (1)
	RRC	NGO	TOTAL	RRC	NGO	TOTAL	
USG	50,000	413,903	463,903	0	315845	315,845	41
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY & MEMBER STATES							
EEC	123,633	49,511	173,144	121,970	60030	182,000	

TABLE 8 CONTINUED

Belgium	24	15,033	15,077	0	0	0	
Denmark	0	1,437	1,437	0	415	0	
France	1,230	8,043	9,273	8000	0	8,000	
FRG	6,938	41,460	48,398	0	22647	22,647	
Greece	7,540	0	7,540	0	0	0	
Ireland	0	1,543	1,543	0	0	0	
Italy	7,173	3,148	10,321	2304	11740	14,044	
Netherlands	282	5,280	5,562	0	5276	5,276	
Spain	358	5,279	5,637	0	0	0	
U.K.	25,338	14,576	39,914	0	7000	7,000	
EEC TOTAL	172,516	145,310	317,826	132,274	107108	239,382	30
Canada	27,972	52,922	80,894	47,500	3,000	50,500	7
OTHER OECD STATES							
Australia	630	19,568	20,198	6,304	8,900	15,204	
Austria	4,000	837	4,837	4000	3,984	7,984	
Finland	0	4,958	4,958	0	0	0	
Iceland	0	64	64	0	0	0	
Japan	0	10,063	10,063	0	0	0	
N/Zealand	0	140	140	0	0	0	
Norway	9,500	513	10,013	0	0	0	
Sweden	14,000	423	14,423	9000	10,900	19,900	
Switzerland	0	3,196	3,196	0	1,000	1,000	
OTHER OECD							
TOTAL	28,130	39,762	67,892	19,304	24,784	44,088	6
WARSAW PACT							
Bulgaria	17,958	54	18,012	0	0	0	
Cze/lovakia	391	0	391	0	0	0	
GDR	2,060	0	2,060	0	0	0	
Hungary	2,484	0	2,484	0	0	0	
Poland	1,110	897	1,986	0	0	0	
WARSAW PACT							
TOTAL	24,003	930	24933	0	0	0	1
OTHER GOVTS							
China	23,594	0	23,594	2000	3000	5000	
India	0	0	0	4000	0	4000	
Iran	0	5,158	5,158	0	0	0	
Israel	0	204	204	0	0	0	
Libya	0	1,000	1,000	0	0	0	
Pakistan	1,000	0	1,000	0	0	0	
UAE	1,825	0	1,825	0	0	0	
Yugoslavia	0	5,771	5,771	0	0	0	
Zimbabwe	12,469	0	12,469	12246	0	12246	
Minor donors	181	12	193	0	0	0	
OTHERS TOTAL	39,069	12,145	51,214	18,246	3000	21,246	4
WFP	7,918	38,439	46,357	53,640	1000	54,640	5
Private Donors	15,589	36,383	51,974	1,751	53296	55,047	6
GRAND/							
TOTAL	365,197	739,796	1,104,993	272,715	508,033	780,748	100

Source: Final Disaster Report, op. cit., p.38A.

Note(1) % of total food aid.

From the foregoing it is clear the USG was by far the biggest single food aid donor nation to Ethiopia during the famine years, providing 41% of the food aid followed by the EEC, in the second place with 30 %. Canada came third with 7% of the overall food aid and indeed in the second place after the US at the bilateral level. Other OECD states provided 6%, and the WFP donated 5%. Private donors and other states accounted for 10 % while the Warsaw pact countries the remaining 1%.

However, because of the problems associated with assigning a monetary value to all items of aid, it is instructive that we bear the following in mind when we make comparison between the response of Ethiopia's allies and that of her political opponents. First, the various donors ascribe different values to their contributions. For example it is recognized that trucks donated by the USSR were valued at \$24,000 per truck while those donated by the USG are valued four times higher even though they had ten times the capacity of Soviet trucks.<sup>21</sup> Secondly, Eastern Bloc countries submitted all their aid to the Ethiopian Government, while Western state Governments used both the RRC and the NGOs simultaneously. A clear illustration of this is seen in the difference between the RRC's and UN's reports on their aid receipt from donors over the same period of time. In 1985 donors reported giving the UN, \$680,604 worth of non-food aid assistance, while in 1986 their aid totalled \$200,792 (See Table 9 below). For the same period however their non-food

assistance through the RRC was \$48,883,242 in 1985 and \$7,929,529 in 1986 (See Table 10 below). The implication of this is that there is a significant variation in what donors reported to the RRC and to the UN and to this extent, therefore, it is difficult to be exact on over all donors aid during the crisis. Tables 9 and 10 below illustrate the discrepancies of donors' report of aid during the relief.

**TABLE 9**  
**TOTAL NON-FOOD ASSISTANCE TO THE U.N, 1985-86**  
(IN '000s)

	1985	1986
Australia	\$9,849	\$0
Austria	830	0
Belgium	3,109	0
Bulgaria	8,916	0
Canada	10,044	1,050
China	3,163	850
Cuba	774	0
Czechoslovakia	2,852	0
Denmark	4,028	0
EEC	22,650	23,120
Finland	796	980
France	370	0
GDR	10,036	0
FRG	55,076	1,000
Greece	152	0
Hungary	700	0
Ireland	0	1,000
Italy	49,344	0
Japan	18,178	1,570
Republic of Korea	710	0
Libya	1,836	0
Netherlands	2,705	0
Norway	360	0
Poland	4,215	2,590
Romania	19,000	0
Spain	600	0
Sweden	12,250	5,690
Switzerland	2,467	100
USSR	260,000	62,000
U.K,	37,205	4,540
USA (1)	93,606	47,782
Yugoslavia	133	0
FAO	4,200	0
IBRD	0	4000
IFAD	0	2000
UNDRO	1,655	0

TABLE 9 CONTINUED

UNCHR	8,761	50
UNICEF	26,396	640
WHO	220	0
WFP	3,418	0
Private/NGO	N/A	24,860
Recovery(donor unspecified)	N/A	<u>16,970</u>
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b><u>\$680,604</u></b>	<b><u>\$200,792</u></b>

Source: Final Disaster Report, The Ethiopian Drought/ Famine Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986, (by the staff of the USAID office American Embassy, Addis Ababa). p.38 B

TABLE 10

NON-FOOD AID CONTRIBUTION TO THE RRC, 1984-1986

	1984	1985	1986	TOTAL
Austria	\$0	472,195	16,379	488,574
Belgium	73,171	0	0	73,171
Bulgaria	0	2,660,279	0	2,660,279
Canada	393,457	0	0	393,457
China	0	118,021	18,146	136,167
Czech/kia	17,561	997,079	0	1,014,640
Egypt	0	158,537	0	158,537
EEC	165,854	5516	438,318	609,687
France	0	140,488	0	140,488
GDR	801,463	2,351,078	0	3,152,541
FRG	453,607	8,120,474	12,249	8,586,330
Greece	167,074	321,471	142,729	631,274
Hungary	0	487,341	0	487,341
India	0	0	20,000	20,000
Japan	18,763	603,483	67,841	690,088
Kenya	0	11,707	0	11,707
Korea/Rep 301800	0	71,474	364	373,638
Netherlands	0	126,293	78,802	205,095
OPEC Fund	0	1,609,756	0	1,609,756
Poland	381,760	98,295	0	480,055
Private	0	7,380,488	0	7,380,488
S/Arabia	691,996	0	0	691,996
Spain	0	103,858	0	103,858
Sweden	539,590	1,756	11,561	552,907
UNDRO	0	15,591	14,034	29,625
UNCHR	12,195	0	199,167	211,362
UNICEF	0	40,273	58,933	99,206
USA	0	42,254	0	42,254
USSR	0	9,884,720	107,000	9,991,720
U.K	0	693,831	107,245	801,076
WFP/WTOE	0	0	468,262	468,262
Yugoslavia	9,891	0	110,839	120,730
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b><u>\$4,203,900</u></b>	<b><u>\$48,883,242</u></b>	<b><u>\$7,929,529</u></b>	<b><u>\$61,016,671</u></b>

Source: Ibid p.39.

But despite these problems, the overwhelming evidence indicates that when Western states' food aid contribution is placed side by side with that of the Eastern Bloc countries, the difference between the two sides is quite wide. In 1984, Western states food contribution was in excess of 100,000 mt. tonnes. The Canadian Government alone donated over 50,000 mt. tonnes of food aid. The EEC donated over 70,000 mt. tonnes. These figures do not include food aid donation made by both the USG and that of the individual member states of the EEC as national donors.

In 1985, Western countries further increased their food aid donations. They provided Ethiopia with over 200,000 mt. tonnes of food. Canada's contribution of 24,000 mt. tonnes together with the EEC's donation of over 100,000 mt. tons and the USG's single contribution through the RRC of 40,000 mt. tons, indicates the magnitude of Western states' food aid to Ethiopia.

And in 1986, the whole of the food aid donated to Ethiopia came from Western states, since the Eastern Bloc countries did not provide further food aid. In that year over 185,000 mt. tons. was provided to Ethiopia. The Canadian Government provided 47,000 mt. tons, while the EEC donated over 120,000 mt. tons.

Thus, it is clear that Western donor nations provided Ethiopia with more food grain assistance than its socialist allies. Extending the analysis further into other areas of relief like transport, medical aid, and

spare parts, it still appears the West provided greater assistance to Ethiopia than the Eastern Bloc countries (refer to Chapters Four and Five).

Over all, by the end of the relief operation, the assistance to Ethiopia from governments and public donations was over \$2 billion dollars.<sup>22</sup> This was a major contribution from the international community, representing more than one-third of Ethiopia's annual GNP. The USG alone contributed over one half billion US dollars.<sup>23</sup> Thus when the contribution of Ethiopia's political opponents is put side by side with that of her allies, it is clear that Western states performed better than Ethiopia's allies. One question that needs examination here is why West gave aid to Ethiopia on a larger scale than the East, especially in view of the ideological gulf between Ethiopia and the West? A related question to consider is whether the aid from donors was given solely on humanitarian grounds or whether there were other considerations that moved them to act also? The last question is relevant to both state and non state donors alike.

The following factors are suggested as responsible for the generosity of Western countries vis-a-vis the Eastern Bloc. Those factors may also account for the apparent contradiction between the response of Ethiopia's opponents and allies respectively.

4. The Needs Factor and the Humanitarian Basis  
of the international response

The size and scale of the crises was a major determining factor in the international community's response to the disaster. By 1984 there was a massive need for all kinds of relief: food grain and supplementary food; medicines; blankets; cooking oil; transport; tarpaulins; syringes; spare parts; shelter materials and utensils, and the personnel to organize the operation such as nurses, engineers, medical doctors and administrators.

Deaths were running at over a hundred people per day in most of the relief camps and so the only option open to the international community if the death rate was to be cut was to intervene massively. It is for this reason primarily that donors responded to Ethiopia's appeals for help.

The magnitude of the disaster was of such a compelling nature that no civilized nation could stand by and watch. Long ago Vattel advocated the need for nations to assist others in those circumstances:

.....if a nation is visited with famine, all those who have provisions enough to spare should come to its assistance .... Help in such an extremity is so much in accord with the dictates of humanity that no civilized nation could altogether fail to respond.... whatever the nature of the disaster that overtakes a nation, the same help is due to it.<sup>24</sup>

In the past nations helped other nations on this basis. The US, for example has a record of providing

overseas relief that stretches back to the eighteenth century; in 1793 relief was provided to Santo Domingans; in 1812 it was given to the victims of the Venezuelan earthquake; in the 1820s Greece benefited during its war against the Ottomans; and in 1847, Ireland was aided during the potato famine.<sup>25</sup> The globalization of relief is however a twentieth century development, particularly since the first and second world wars.

The 1984 famine clearly needed nothing less than a massive international action. It is for this reason that both West and East gave assistance to Ethiopia. However the existence of needs alone does not explain why Western donors came up with more aid than the Soviets. We therefore have to look for other possible explanations.

##### 5. The Availability Factor

Another reason that easily draws itself to attention is the availability of the relief commodities in surplus in the West. Availability is indeed a necessary condition for helping others. The US and Common Market countries are the world's largest producers of grains and consumer goods. In 1984 the EEC had produced more grains than it could store.<sup>26</sup>

Eastern Bloc countries, on the other hand, are themselves importers of grain from the world market. In 1985 the USG, Canada and France were in the top league of the five leading exporters of wheat grains. On the other hand the Soviet Union, Japan and China were in the top

league of the five major importers of wheat.<sup>27</sup>

Thus the availability of surplus is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition why the West supplied Ethiopia with aid during the crises. The Eastern Bloc countries are yet to attain the same level of economic development as the West, and as such even if they wanted to match Western assistance they had to divert resources from elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> This explains why they were rather better donors of industrial and manufactured goods than food aid.

#### 6. The Nature of The Political Systems

Coupled with the above, a third explanatory factor why the West was more generous is to be found in the nature of Western political system. Western political systems expect governments to respond to demands of lobby groups. Here the influence of pressure groups and public opinion is an accepted feature of the political systems. Groups outside government place demands on the machinery of government and expect to influence the outcome. As we have seen, in the western democracies, generally governments bowed to the power of pressure groups and public opinion and increased their aid to Ethiopia.

By contrast, in the East there is no place for pressure groups or charity organizations.<sup>29</sup> For this reason Eastern governments were shielded from the demands of pressure groups and the influence of public opinion. What exists instead is a strong involvement of the state in all

facets of public life. If these forces had existed, perhaps they too would have influenced the shape and size of their governments' response. With the absence of NGOs, and a limited role for the media, Eastern Bloc governments responded to the famine at their own pace.

It was also the reason why their assistance to Ethiopia was limited to the bilateral channel. Hence, where pressure groups and public opinion are accepted norms of the political process (and where such groups bring their power of influence to bear on the decision makers), they help shape the response of elected governments on both domestic and international issues. Thus, because of the pluralistic nature of the West, the UK and US Governments responded to appeals from pressure groups and the public. For example the Thatcher Government increased its aid to Ethiopia in response to appeals from the Archbishop of Canterbury and Church leaders. Similarly the ~~former~~ US President Ronald Reagan acted more expeditiously only after receiving a telephone call from mother Teresa.<sup>30</sup>

## 7. The Expectations of Donors

### (i) Western Bilateral Donors

In addition to their genuine concern for the famine victims, Western bilateral donors, especially the US and UK governments, took into account non-humanitarian factors in making their relief aid. The contrast between their aid to Ethiopia and that given to other African countries makes this fact very obvious.

In 1984 out of the twenty four African countries affected by drought and famine, only the marxist states of Mozambique and Ethiopia failed to get what they needed. Ethiopia was continually refused even after repeated pleas from their Government, from charity organizations and above all from organizations set up by Western governments.<sup>31</sup>

Again, the contrast between Western governments' assistance to Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, and their assistance to the marxist regime further reinforces the argument. The US gave more food to Haile-Salassie's Ethiopia in six months than it did in the three years preceding 1984.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, it is evident that there is a link between the food aid fortunes of dependent countries and cordial political relations with the major food aid donors. For example other than Liberia, the other three leading recipients of US aid in sub-Saharan Africa- Sudan, Somalia and Kenya all are of strategic interest to the US in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

Ethiopia on the other hand had poor political relations with the US and as a result did not have its requests for food aid met. In fact when the donors sent food to Ethiopia they did so after they were pressured by their angered public. Lancaster is cited by M.Li, as stating that the US did not send aid to Ethiopia until after pressure was brought to bear on the US Government. M.Li noted that:

Although the socialist government had appealed for international aid as early as 1983, the US Agency for international Development( USAID) did not send significant quantities of food directly until forced by the public pressure after the BBC-NBC news broadcast in the fall of 1984. Allocations by USAID have always been closely tied to political considerations over the few years, that the largest recipients of aid in sub-saharan Africa have been Sudan, Liberia, Somalia and Kenya- each critical to the United States strategic interests in the middle east and the Indian Ocean.<sup>33</sup>

The implication of this is that without the pressure from the public, Ethiopia stood no chance of getting aid from the US. The cool relationship between the two states has therefore been an important factor in USG reluctance to assist Ethiopia (at least initially). Jack Shepherd, lamented on the attitude of the USG when he said:

Having first ignored Ethiopian requests for emergency food aid the Reagan Administration then denied them. Food, it appeared was to be an instrument of U.S foreign policy. The marxist government was the only African nation whose entire U.S food aid allotment was eliminated by the Reagan Administration in its fiscal 1984 proposals.<sup>34</sup>

The British Government's attitude was similar to that of the USG. The Government dragged its feet for political reasons. Ethiopia falls within a category of British Government blacklisted countries. For this reason Ethiopia was excluded from all British Government aid

including food aid. Indeed, at the time of the famine there was a general embargo on all government-to-government aid between the British and Ethiopian Governments.<sup>35</sup>

Perhaps this was why even after Western governments accepted public appeals, the majority of them chose channels other than the Ethiopian Government RRC as a sign of keeping their distance from that Government.<sup>36</sup>

One reason behind the delay of the UK and US Governments was the hope that the famine could create unrest that would topple the marxist government.<sup>37</sup> Short of that the delay was intended to "punish" the Ethiopian Government.<sup>38</sup>

There was a place for the cold war as well in Western donors' aid to Ethiopia. By providing aid more generously than the Soviets it was expected that the regime in Addis Ababa would appreciate the practical concern given to it and hopefully change sides. As one observer elaborated:

Indeed in view of the general anti-western stance of the Mengistu Government, the only explanation for the extent of western aid- described as humanitarian- is in fact the cold war. The west if possible wants to prise Mengistu from the Soviet grasp- as it sees the situation. This is certainly the hope of the Americans, but it is not very realistic- at least at present"<sup>39</sup>

Indeed a powerful reason behind the massive US aid to Ethiopia was the hope of opening a dialogue with the Ethiopian Government and the anticipation of resuming

more cordial relations.<sup>40</sup> Given the close resemblance of the foreign policies of the US and UK Governments towards Ethiopia probably the same motive may have been behind the UK aid.

Canada's aid on the other hand seemed to be a continuation of its aid policy to Ethiopia prior to the famine. This is in accord with its tradition of giving high priority to third world states. Italy's aid however may not be unrelated to the special relationship between Italy and Ethiopia. Apart from Libya in the north, Italy's former colonies on the continent are all in the Horn of Africa. And perhaps that is why after the US, Italy was the second largest donor country to Ethiopia over all. France's assistance on the other hand was small, compared to its aid to the Sahelian countries. It was certainly small in comparison to France's economic size and political power.

(ii). Eastern Bilateral Donors

If Ethiopia's political opponents have delayed their aid for political reasons, Ethiopia's allies were unable to accelerate it for economic reasons.

The USSR and its allies are poor donors of food aid. USSR food aid to Ethiopia during the relief was the equivalent of three percent of US food aid.<sup>41</sup> In contrast their military hardware aid to Ethiopia between 1977 and 1984 was \$3 billion.<sup>42</sup> The USSR and Eastern Bloc countries, are generally speaking, poor donors of humanitarian aid,

partly because they are not important producers of surplus relief commodities and partly because they do not encourage aid in general. Instead they prefer to encourage development from within, or when they give aid they prefer to render it in areas where they have a competitive advantage such as in the areas of military hardware or industrial goods like transport.

Furthermore, because they do not make distinction between relief and development aid they were able to provide assistance to the Ethiopian Government in areas that Western governments were hesitant to get involved.

(iii). Non-Governmental Organizations

There were NGOs from the US, UK, Canada, Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, Australia, Finland, Norway and Japan. These NGOs were central in shaping the response of donor governments especially in the US and the UK. However once they arrived in Ethiopia they too became influenced with the realities of the relief.

With over sixty four NGOs involved it is difficult to follow their operations in depth and to analyse how each NGO was influenced in carrying out its relief programme.<sup>43</sup>

Broadly speaking we can classify all the NGOs into two categories: church related NGOs and non-church related (secular) organizations. Both lobbied governments and the public and raised funds for Ethiopia. Their officials criticised reluctant Western governments for their failure to respond to the crisis early and pleaded with them to set

politics aside for the sake of the lives of the starving.<sup>44</sup>

The secular NGOs appealed to the public to lobby their members of Parliament and to pressure their Governments to increase their aid. For example dock workers in the UK went on strike on the urging of Oxfam, and protested against the off loading of EEC grains as a symbolic gesture to highlight the Ethiopian cause. The British DEC appealed to the British Government and public and to the the EEC officials in Brussels for increased food aid.

Clearly without the NGOs and public pressure the US and British Governments would not have responded to the famine in the manner they did after October 1984. In Ethiopia the NGOs took charge of the relief operation including the administration of the relief camps. They provided tents, sheets of plastics to the shelter camps at Korem, Makelle, Bati, Alamata, Ibnat and other less internationally publicised camps. Together with their local trained staff they attended to the needs of the camps' populations. They provided health services and facilities within the shelter camps such as cooking utensils; they undertook the bulk of the grain distribution and its administration; they successfully mounted feeding programs for the seriously malnourished children and adult population and helped overcome the crisis.<sup>45</sup>

Having overcome the critical phase they initiated rehabilitation schemes to put the communities back on their feet. Initially they set up food distribution points as

close to the peoples homes as possible to minimize difficulties of access to food. Indeed the NGOs accounted for over two-thirds of all the grain distribution during the famine. As the situation improved they also supervised emptying the camps, by providing the people with seeds, equipment, ploughs, oxen and other agricultural goods. Having accomplished these tasks they stayed on to continue development programmes geared towards tackling the root causes of the famines.

(a). Humanitarianism: The basis of NGOs' Involvement

The involvement of NGOs in relief is derived primarily from their concern with easing the suffering endured by the famine victims. As one Oxfam spokesperson explains, NGOs are concerned primarily with the welfare of people:

Our concern is always with people not with governments and we do not see why we should refuse to help people just because they are unfortunate enough to live under regimes which have an odd sense of values.<sup>46</sup>

As such the operational side of relief was carried out by the NGOs. They undertook the distribution of food aid and the supplementary feeding of the seriously malnourished; they attended to the medical and psychological needs of the camp populations. And after overcoming the crises they assisted the people in returning to normal life.

Indeed some of them have been working among the

people and helping them to overcome hardship even before October 1984. For instance the SCF (UK) had a supplementary feeding centre in Korem from late 1982 and had already provided assistance to over 400,000 children by early 1984<sup>47</sup>; the Irish Concern was already operational at the end of 1982 in Wollo and Gondar<sup>48</sup> ; the US Catholic Relief Service Organization was also operational in Tigray by 1983<sup>49</sup>, as were the US World Vision International relief Organization and the Geneva based LWF.

The majority of the NGOs, however, came in response to the international appeal for help, after the famine had reached catastrophic proportions. Examples of NGOs in this category are: Africare, FFHI, SCF (US), CARE Ethiopia, JVC, AICL, Canadian Physicians, MSF Belgium and Hope International.<sup>50</sup> In implementing their relief programmes the NGOs, like their bilateral counterparts could not completely shake-off other considerations altogether.

(b). The Religious Motive

Starting with the indigenous religious organizations there was the EECMY, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Ethiopian Catholic Church. These church organizations undertook their operations in their areas of influence or where they had their main congregations. Normally these are areas where they have been long established. The rationale for working mainly in these areas is justified on grounds of working among their followers.

According to one relief official, his organization

was happy to participate in relief although it was not willing to receive funds from sources that were at variance with its religious persuasion. The relief official cited the example of £4 million donated to the CRDA. His organization declined to accept any part of the donation because the money came from the American Rock Musician group-USA for Africa, which they considered to be a non religious source of funding.<sup>51</sup>

The extent to which religion was a major motive in the involvement of organizations with a religious background is difficult to assess. There was certainly a substantial representation of church organizations such as: Baptist Mission; Evangelical Church; Seven Day Adventist Mission; Jesuit Relief Service; Society of International Missionaries; Faith Mission; Church of Christ; Mennonite Missions etc etc. Religion certainly appears to be an important consideration taken into account by some of those who took part in the relief. For instance, one relief official told me that even though his primary concern was with easing the suffering of the people, he was certainly willing to share and exchange his spiritual values amongst the people he was working with.<sup>52</sup>

The factor was certainly important in fashioning the working relationship between overseas church groups and their Ethiopian counterparts. For instance the bulk of ECS received assistance came from the CRS and Caritas Internationalis; that of EECMY came from LWF, while the EOC, got its help mainly from the WCC.<sup>53</sup> Similarly the

choice of Gondar province by the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) for its operations was motivated in part by the presence there of the Falashas. The organization did not work with the Falashas only, although by the same token it never worked anywhere outside the province. According to its programme officer, the reason why it did not mount programmes elsewhere in Ethiopia is to do with its philosophy which is focused on the social problems of small groups.<sup>54</sup>

(c). The High Visibility Motive

A number of NGOs had a preference for certain types of areas for their work.<sup>55</sup> For instance locations that were easily accessible to cameras were areas sought after because of the advantages attached to those locations. High visibility locations provide viewers back home with first hand information about the activities of the NGOs on the scene. The importance of this is underlined by the effect of the publicity on NGO income. This appears to be the case especially with the secular organizations. On the other hand, church organizations are happy undertaking their relief activities out of the panoramic view of the cameras. Church organizations do not need the cameras as much as the secular NGOs since their source of funds is mainly from church donations.

(d). The Economic Factor

Small NGOs avoided areas with heavy logistical

problems since working in those areas might increase their operational costs. As such they preferred areas close to the capital where such costs of operations are much lower than in regions far away from the centre.<sup>56</sup>

(e). The Survival Motive

A very important consideration for all the organizations was survival. Although most of NGOs justification for involvement was the huge relief requirements, very few left Ethiopia after the operation was over. One known example that folded its operations was the small Japanese 24 Hour TV. Even in this case the organization was small and so perhaps one of the driving motive behind its involvement was the publicity associated with the famine. The majority of the NGOs branched into development programmes as soon as the relief phase was over, as the ultimate solution to the root causes of famine.

8. The Western Public

There are difficulties involved in understanding why people give in the first instance. As Jordan rightly points out the most essential datum remains buried deep in the recesses of our nature.<sup>57</sup> Individual and family donations undoubtedly were made with the utmost of concern for the lives of the starving. Pensioners, teachers, miners, children and even the unemployed gave generously to coffers of the aid agencies. Millions were raised within a matter of weeks of launching the appeal.

The epitome of public concern is no where better illustrated than in the involvement of Bob Geldof. Geldof himself summed up the individual's reason for involvement. He said:

But I can't sit and watch people die on my Television. Aid is a perversion of an individual's instinct to help another suffering human. The simple compassionate act of giving a pound to help others is without condition and is pure. It is never so simple when there are billions at stake.<sup>58</sup>

It is for the same altruistic reasons that the public support for the Band Aid and Live Aid appeals were made. The general public likewise identified with Band Aid and Live Aid because they saw in those organizations objectives which they themselves identified with. As Geldof again pointed out, the public:

began to see Band Aid as something which stood for common sense and common decency in a world marked by self interest.<sup>59</sup>

Indeed it is precisely because Band Aid, Live Aid and Sports Aid represented a moral rather than a political constituency that these events attracted people to them and ensured their success. As Hamelink acknowledged:

only because of the virtue of being apolitical can they get so many people together in front of the Television and can they get so many people to spend so much in this big charity.<sup>60</sup>

However, not every one that supported the Band Aid and Live Aid did so for the same reason. This is the case

especially with big business organizations. They hoped to gain commercially in addition to saving lives. For instance the AT & T and Pepsi Cola companies in the US provided substantial support to Live Aid (via sponsorships). Although during the event none of them put out direct commercial advertisements it was nevertheless left in the minds of viewers that these organizations cared and identified with the cause. For AT & T there was an additional motive for their involvement. They had just broken up with the Bell system and so the Live Aid show offered them the opportunity to demonstrate to their rivals their capacity to handle a massive 800 telephone program. According to AT & T's Public Relations manager the show was an opportunity for experimenting with their new services as well as a chance to bring their employees together to market to their major customers.<sup>61</sup>

Otis, a small record company, believed that there was a publicity benefit in joining Live Aid.<sup>62</sup> There were firms that also sought tax write offs which their donations could bring.<sup>63</sup> The majority took part for the glory of the cause as an historic event worthy of involvement.<sup>64</sup>

## 9. Conclusion

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that both Eastern Bloc and Western countries have made significant contribution to Ethiopia's appeals for aid although the overwhelming response was made by Western bilateral donors. At the forefront of the major Western bilateral donors was

the USG which contributed nearly half a million mt. tonnes of emergency food aid between October 84 and September 1985, and over one-third of the food aid requirement in 1985/86.<sup>65</sup> Translated in monetary terms USG contribution was over half a billion dollar out of the two billion relief funds given to Ethiopia during the period of the relief operation.<sup>66</sup>

Part of the reasons behind greater Western response derives from the acuteness of needs in Ethiopia: the availability of the needed items in the West and the nature of the political systems is such that it allows forces outside the governmental machinery to influence the response of governments to meet Ethiopia's relief requirement.

By contrast Ethiopia's allies were not able to respond to her appeals to the same degree as the West for both economic and political reasons.

The involvement of Western NGOs on the other hand has been guided primarily by the preponderance of the humanitarian needs, although in the implementation of their programmes other factors such as the need for high visibility, the need for survival and religion have also featured. In the final analysis it is the response of the public that has been most humanitarian baring the difficulty of evaluating their motives as highlighted by Jordan, that the essential datum remains buried deep in the recesses of our minds.<sup>67</sup>

## Notes and References

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19. Nightingale op. cit. p.136.

20. Macalister-Smith P., International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organization. (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp.72-73.

21. See Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian Drought and Famine, Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986(produced by the USAID office, American Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia), pp. 36-37.

22. See Final Disaster Report: The Ethiopian drought and famine: fiscal Years 1985 and 1986, p.10.

23. Ibid.

24. Quoted in Macalister-Smith op.cit, p.1

25. Sommer op.cit.

26. The Daily Mirror, (London) October 25, 1984, p.2.

27. The World in figures, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987, p.26.

28. This a common view held by relief officials involved in the relief operation in Ethiopia.

29. See New Statesman, ( London) July 19, 1985, p.2.

30. Interview with Louis F. Janowski Jr., Counselor of Embassy of the United States of America, Addis Ababa, 3 August, 1988.

31. See "The Politics of starvation", Television documentary.

32. Ibid.

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34. International Herald Tribune, November 19, 1984.

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42. Ibid.
43. ( See Appendix IV, from United Nations Newsletter, Ethiopia, January/February 1988, pp.16-19 )
44. Dr. Charles Elliot and Barbara Huddleston in "Politics of Starvation", Television documentary.
45. From interviews with Brother Augustine Okeefe of CRDA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 22 July, 1988, 3-4:15 p.m. and Jim Maud of SCF (UK) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 18 July, 1988, 3-4 p.m.
46. Ibid., p.225
47. Interview with Jim Maud, Op.cit.
48. Interview with Fr. John Finucane in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 4 August 1988, 10- 11:45 a.m.
49. Interview with Ato Zelleke Shibeshi in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 13 July, 1988 , 9-10:30 A.M.
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54. Interview with Mr. Bornstein, ADJC., in Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 21/7/88. 11:00- 12:00 noon.
55. Because this is sensitive to some of them it is difficult to mention names.
56. Interview with Bro. Augustine Okeefe, CRDA, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 22/7/88. 3:00-4:15 p.m.
57. Cited in Nightingale op.cit.
58. Bob-Geldof Is that it?(London:Guild Publishing, 1986), p.319.
59. Ibid, p.316. It is a point emphasised by Professor Cees Hamelink mentioned earlier.
60. See "Consuming Hunger", Television documentary.
61. Don Honicky, Division Manager and Public Relations, AT & T, in Ibid.
62. The Los Angeles Times, June 8, 1985, p.1:1.
63. The San Francisco Chronicle, December 24, 1984, p.8-1.
64. The Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1985, p.v1:4:1.
65. See Appendix to Accompany the Report "Drought and Famine in Africa: 1981-1986, The US response", op. cit, p.100
66. "The Final Disaster Report", op.cit, p.10
67. Cited in Nightingale B., Op. cit.

## CHAPTER NINE

### General Conclusion

This thesis has been concerned with studying the international response to Ethiopia's famine of 1984-86.

Unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia is a country known by the outside world even before the European scramble for Africa. It is a country with a distinctive history and a long tradition of international contact with the outside world. In the Introduction we highlighted the country's declining international status, contrasting this with its "glorious past".

In Part One, we examined the background causes of the country's present predicament and noted the scope of damage inflicted by the famine on millions among the country's population. We also examined the critical role played by the media (television) in ending donors' inertia, thereby bringing about a large-scale international response.

In Part Two we discussed the various responses of international donors: first, we examined the response of bilateral donors in the context of their international relations with the recipient government; we then discussed the critical role played by Western non-governmental organizations and the public in affecting the response of their governments; and lastly, we looked at the essential

coordinating role played by the UN.

In Part Three (Chapter Eight) we explored the relationship between humanitarian aid and politics and evaluated the performance of international donors in that context.

What emerges from the study is the discrepancy between Ethiopia's expectations of its donors and their actual response. It was expected, for example, that Ethiopia's Eastern allies would rally around Ethiopia and provide the necessary support the country required.

Although they did not offer the degree of support expected, there is no doubt that they made their contribution to Ethiopia during the crisis. Their response is distinguished, however, by their participation in certain aspects of the relief operation rather than others.

First, the Soviet Union and its allies distinguished themselves as key donors of transportation assistance rather than of food aid. This is evidenced by their response from the very beginning of the relief operation. For instance, in the early stages of the operation Eastern Bloc countries provided 87% of the total land transportation to Ethiopia. In 1985 their assistance in this sector constituted 44% of the total. However, by 1986 their contribution had dropped to less than 5% (the main bulk of the transportation assistance was provided by the World Food Programme Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE)). Similarly, the Soviet Union

provided more transport planes than any one country in either East or West.

Second, the East assisted Ethiopia's resettlement programme of famine victims from the north to south and South-Western parts of the country. Indeed, without this support it is doubtful whether Ethiopia could have pursued the programme, since most Western countries disassociated themselves from it and refused to lend it any support.

As we noted in Chapter Four, part of the objection of Western governments to the resettlement programme pertained to the lack of adequate preparation made by the Ethiopian Government and the manner in which it was carrying out the programme. Despite these objections Ethiopia's allies rallied their support and assisted the Government in tackling difficulties with the programme.

Lastly, Eastern Bloc response is distinguished from that of the West in terms of their perception of the problem involved. The East does not differentiate between development aid and relief assistance. And as a result their response to Ethiopia was affected by this perception. In general the East favours long-term development assistance (even better, development from within) as an answer to the problem of poverty, over relief assistance. It is partly for this reason that the allies did not run a programme of their own in terms of setting up relief camps and food-distribution points.

By contrast, the Western Bloc countries, that were least expected to assist, proved to be the more

responsive to Ethiopia's appeals for help. There is, however, a caveat to be noted here. It is true that Western Bloc countries were Ethiopia's largest benefactors. However, their involvement resulted from demands placed on their governments by pressure groups and public opinion.

In the case of the three countries we selected for detailed study, the evidence presented in the thesis suggests that although the USG was Ethiopia's largest benefactor, both the USG and UK Governments were slow to initiate their response in earnest. It was only after the BBC television footage of October 23 that both governments increased their relief. In fact, in the case of the UK, government assistance was drawn from the ODA budget. The additional element of the Government's aid consisted in the RAF's cost of operating the airlift operation.

Of the three, the Canadian Governmental response was unique. The Government appointed an Emergency Coordinator to coordinate Canada's response, established a special fund and introduced the policy of matching every dollar raised by the public with an equivalent dollar from the Government.

Although Western countries have been Ethiopia's largest benefactors, there appear to be differences in the manner of their response, arising mainly from differences in the nature of interstate relations maintained between Ethiopia and these countries. Those countries with which Ethiopia had poor relations before the crisis, such as the

US and UK, demonstrated a reluctance to respond promptly to her appeals, while those others such as Canada, with which slightly better relations were maintained, showed more readiness to come to her rescue. On the whole, however, the state of relations did not preclude the West from emerging as Ethiopia's largest donors of relief.

Some reasons for the greater scale of Western aid compared with that from the Eastern Bloc countries can be derived from the political and economic nature of these states. The West is affluent, as a result of which there are abundant surpluses of the relevant relief commodities. Politically too, there are institutional mechanisms, such as the Press and non-governmental organizations, that play critical roles in shaping the policies of elected governments. It is not, then, the absence of the concept of charity per se in the Eastern Bloc that most probably dictated their response but rather the absence of these societal institutions. The implication of this observation is that as the Eastern Bloc countries achieve a greater degree of economic and political development, so will their perception of and capacity to respond to emergencies be affected.

In spite of the scale of Western bilateral response, it is apparent that the avoidance of future large scale starvation in Ethiopia will be dependent on a number of factors. The first is the issue of early response. Famine, unlike sudden disasters such as earthquakes and floods can be predicted. As such its early warning can at least in

theory be heeded before disaster strikes. As the 1984-86 famine bears witness the problem is not that of lack of early warning to donors: rather it was the problem of convincing donors to believe the warnings sent to them. If donors can heed early warning signals from the RRC, FAO, their aid agencies or reports from their representatives then there will be hope that a repeat of past famines could be avoided. One of the reasons for the large-scale suffering in 1984 was the failure of donors to respond promptly to the appeals made to them. However, this point need not be overemphasized since the avoidance of famines subsequently (e.g. in 1987, 1988 and 1989) was achieved largely through the readiness of Western Governments to heed the early appeals made for relief.<sup>1</sup> In other words, Western governments do appear to have learned something from their previous failures.

The advantage of speedy donor response needs to be emphasized here even because of its multiple benefits. A speedy donor response helps to nip the tragedy in the bud, and thus avoid causing distress to thousands of would be victims. It also avoids the cost of mounting expensive airlift operations. For instance, the costs of undertaking an airlift operation could be avoided when aid is sent in good time by sea.

There is also the need to revive the idea of maintaining food security reserves in strategic parts of the country.<sup>2</sup> The main advantage offered by this idea is that it makes food readily available in the country which

could be moved to crisis areas when the need arises. Its disadvantage however relates to the cost of maintenance of the stock and the associated problems of storage. Overall benefits outweigh shortcomings and therefore help to strengthen the case for its improvement;<sup>3</sup> i.e since donors would inevitably have to donate in emergency they might consider doing so through the stock reserve system rather than wait till the problem reaches a crisis point.

Furthermore there is the need for donor states and aid agencies to consider the idea of local purchase of food from surplus regions of affected countries or from surplus producing countries in the same regions for use in the famine affected zones.<sup>4</sup> The advantage of this approach is that it speeds up the transportation process compared to importing it from Europe or North America. Additionally it encourages local production and boosts the economies of these areas.

Second, it appears that the role of Western NGOs is critical as far as the initiation of large-scale relief operations is concerned, especially if the circumstances are such that bilateral donors are hesitant. This given, these organizations are indispensable within the field of humanitarian relief. On the one hand their publicity drives were necessary in developing and sustaining donor interest. This is evident from their performance during the 1984-86 and subsequent famines, in influencing the scope of both governments' and public response. It is also in this context that the pertinent place of Band Aid and Live Aid,

is established in terms of raising and sustaining the momentum of international interest and response to the crisis. On the other, their direct involvement with the famine victims in administering relief is irreplaceable.

During the course of the relief operation the NGOs distributed more than two-thirds of the emergency aid donated to Ethiopia. Without their involvement the degree of success of the relief operation would hardly have been achieved. In the case of Ethiopia the problem of distribution and logistics further underscored the role of these organizations. There is the practical problem of inadequate infrastructure: the roads are not good, the terrain difficult to negotiate and the state of transportation services poor. In addition, the ongoing political stalemate in parts of the country further complicates their role. In spite of these difficulties the NGOs performed their tasks.

The role of such programmes as "Band Aid" and "Live Aid" might not be a necessary feature were Governments (who in the final analysis are the largest donors of relief) prepared to respond on time. Where, however, an early response to international disaster is lacking, and the situation is as desperate as was the 1984 Ethiopian case, then the emergence of such organizations will need to recur, to fill the vacuum and keep the issue on the international agenda until it is resolved.

Finally, and especially in the case of Ethiopia, a permanent and lasting solution to famine does not lie in

continuous international relief but in a firm and permanent resolution of the civil war in the north.

However, in view of the fact that the war is not the central theme of this thesis its further discussion is better left to the experts in that field. One thing is certain: it is evident that peace is necessary for the avoidance of repeated famines; and (as it appears thus far from the histories of these conflicts) only political settlements will secure peace.

All these measures however are to be seen in the context of undertaking purely humanitarian relief operations. These measures are in themselves far from enough in being the ultimate solution to the avoidance of famine in Ethiopia.

Food aid and food handouts are not enough: they only provide stop-gap relief. Indeed the continued provision of this kind of aid only serves to underline the failure of getting to the root causes of the problem. Clearly what Ethiopia (and indeed other affected African countries) needs is sustained agricultural reform. If the sector had been robust, the issue of relief would not have been there in the first place. The chief lesson to learn from this rather sordid state of affairs is for both donors and the affected states to move away from relief and to focus on substantive issues of development. This calls for foreign investment and capital and the accompanying technical know-how that would improve not only the state of agricultural production but the general state of the economy. It also

means the need for better terms of trade for the produce of those countries. At the moment the terms of trade are unfavourable to these countries. For example in 1974 10 units of coffee was needed by these countries to buy one unit of oil, but today they need 100 units of coffee to buy the same measure of oil.<sup>5</sup> As Hancock argues the natural response of countries such as Ethiopia, in these circumstance is to devote more of its good land to coffee and other cash crops in order to pay for its imports. In the process they end up unable to feed themselves.

Thus a fairer system of trade is called for. Such a system would be to the advantage of both the poor and rich countries, instead of the stop-gap measures of pumping large sums of money into relief or returning to the problem after every five or ten years. This is what Bob Geldof had in mind when he said:

A healthy continent to our south is the best thing that could happen for European business. The best. You have thriving markets; we would be the ones to benefit because we're financially stronger. Keeping them in subjugation financially is the worst financial theory. Even a moron understands that. When you have things to trade, there is no sense in pouring down aid and making them dependent.<sup>6</sup>

This is the lesson to be learned from the crisis. Already the lessons of the 1974 crisis seemed to have been lost. We should not lose those of 1984. The world has the resources and the technical know how to get rid of the problem once and for all.<sup>7</sup> Whether there is the political

will to apply the lessons however remains to be seen. As the time tested adage reminds us, giving a man a fish is akin to giving him a meal for a day, but teaching a man to fish is feeding him for life.

In conclusion, what has emerged from the evidence presented in this thesis is that, as far as the 1984-86 Ethiopian famine is concerned, it is Ethiopia's political opponents rather than her allies that have been more responsive to her appeals for humanitarian assistance, even though it took the influence of the Western non-governmental organizations and public to bring that about.

Notes and References.

1. See The Independent, December 5, 1985 p.14
2. This idea is favoured by many experienced members of the relief community I have spoken to. One of such officials is Brother Augustine Okeefe, Director of the CRDA.
3. According to Gill, the idea was first canvassed in 1975 and was commended by the FAO of the UN in 1979. See Gill P., op. cit p.36. Due to lack of donor enthusiasm the idea still remains far from being given a chance.
4. The Economist, July 20, 1985 p.22
5. Hancock Graham, op. cit p.122
6. In interview in South Magazine, January 1987, p25
7. It is calculated that 0.002 per cent of the annual harvest of cereals would be enough to save 15 million lives each year and that no more than 2 per cent of the grain grown yearly is what is required to take adequate care of the 800 million of world's absolute poor. See, South March 1987, p13.

## APPENDIX I

A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR BILATERAL AID ITEMS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984

				Value (Birr)
I.	FOOD AID			88,852,080
		Quantity (MT)	Value (Birr)	
	1.1 Food Grain	222,701	78,222,605	
	1.2 Supplementary Food	14,945	10,629,475	
	Total	<u>237,646</u>	<u>88,852,080</u>	
II.	TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT			2,710,520
		Quantity (PCS)	Value (Birr)	
	2.1 Trucks	78	2,658,520	
	2.2 Light Vehicles	2	52,000	
	Total	<u>75</u>	<u>2,710,520</u>	
II <sup>1</sup> .	SPARE PARTS			2,171,981
III.	MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY			1,335,124
IV.	BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS			681,383
V.	SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS			1,718,987
	GRAND TOTAL			<u>97,470,075</u>

I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organisation	Food Grain		Supplementary Food		Total	
		Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr
1	China	1,000	350,000	-	-	1,000	350,000
2	Yemen Arab Republic	25	8,805	4	3,195	29	12,000
3	WFP	65,164	22,807,400	2,814	1,997,940	67,978	24,805,340
4	EEC	73,000	25,550,000	3,400	2,414,000	76,400	27,964,000
5	France	6,095	2,133,250	-	-	6,095	2,133,250
6	Canada	51,576	18,051,600	510	362,100	52,086	18,413,700
7	USSR	3,100	1,085,000	-	-	3,100	1,085,000
8	Italy	770	546,700	219	155,490	989	702,190
9	PDRY	1,531	535,850	-	-	1,531	535,850
10	Libya	40	14,000	-	-	40	14,000
11	UK	6,500	2,275,000	39	27,690	6,539	2,302,690
12	GDR	230	80,500	2,234	1,586,140	2,464	1,666,640
13	Yugoslavia	210	73,500	-	-	210	73,500
14	Dem. Peoples Republic of Korea	1,005	351,750	-	-	1,005	351,750
15	UNHCR	500	175,000	-	-	500	175,000
16	Cuba	-	-	4,588	3,257,480	4,588	3,257,480
17	Jordan	-	-	17	12,070	17	12,070
18	Czechoslovakia	-	-	8	5,680	8	5,680
19	Bulgaria	-	-	13	9,230	13	9,230
20	Hungary	-	-	33	23,430	33	23,430
21	Japan	-	-	94	66,740	94	66,740
22	Saudi Arabia	486	170,100	168	119,280	654	289,380
23	Iran	-	-	97	68,870	97	68,870
24	FRG	10,119	3,541,650	38	26,980	10,157	3,568,630
25	Greece	-	-	154	109,340	154	109,340
26	UNICEF	-	-	442	313,820	442	313,820
27	Switzerland	1,350	472,500	73	70,000	1,423	542,500
Total		222,701	78,222,605	14,945	10,629,475	237,646	88,852,080

**II. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984**

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	T R U C K S		T R A I L O R S		L I G H T V E H I C L E S	
		pcs	Value in Birr	pcs	Value in Birr	pcs	Value in Birr
1	German Democratic Republic	35	1,575,000	-	-	-	-
2	Republic of Korea	30	618,690	-	-	-	-
3	UNHCR	-	-	-	-	1	25,000
4	FRC	8	464,830	-	-	1	27,000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>73</b>	<b>2,658,520</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>52,000</b>

## APPENDIX II

B. SUMMARY OF MAJOR BILATERAL AID ITEMS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

				Value (Birr)
I.	FOOD AID			207,725,067
		Quantity	Value	
		<u>(MT)</u>	<u>(Birr)</u>	
	1.1 Food Grain	362,999	170,400,810	
	1.2 Supplementary Food	34,960	37,324,257	
	Total	<u>397,959</u>	<u>207,725,067</u>	
II.	TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT			45,009,734
		Quantity	Value	
		<u>(PCS)</u>	<u>(Birr)</u>	
	2.1 Trucks	849	39,553,813	
	2.2 Trailors	164	4,099,318	
	2.3 Light Vehicles	69	1,356,603	
	Total	<u>1082</u>	<u>45,009,734</u>	
III.	SPARE PARTS			4,541,316
IV.	MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY			6,903,812
V.	BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS			5,242,481
VI.	AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPLEMENTS & INPUTS			6,266,198
VII.	SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS			2,711,675
VIII.	CONSTRUCTION, WATER & POWER SUPPLY MATERIALS & EQUIPMENT			9,170,612
IX.	COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT			987,612
X.	MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS			461,933
	GRAND TOTAL			<u>289,020,618</u>

I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organisation	Food Grain		Supplementary Food		Total	
		Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr
1	Austria	4,000	2,120,000	55	39,192	4,055	2,159,192
2	Australia	4,400	2,332,000	25	76,875	4,425	2,408,875
3	Bulgaria	17,011	9,030,853	821	2,534,046	17,832	11,564,889
4	Canada	24,510	5,550,250	-	-	24,510	5,555,250
5	China	22,257	6,843,889	-	-	22,257	6,843,889
6	Czechoslovakia	14	10,045	242	578,551	256	588,596
7	EEC	107,000	55,815,360	2,830	3,198,820	109,830	59,014,180
8	France	1,097	584,701	8	4,592	1,105	589,293
9	Federal Republic of Germany	11,140	5,907,263	246	506,350	11,386	6,413,613
10	Gabon	150	98,400	75	115,927	225	214,327
11	Greece	6,491	3,460,995	1,202	1,759,310	7,693	5,220,305
12	Hungary	1,006	536,198	1,559	1,372,168	2,565	1,908,366
13	India	10,000	5,300,000	-	-	10,000	5,300,000
14	Italy	3,782	2,713,586	955	3,379,425	4,737	6,093,011
15	Japan	-	-	6	18,450	6	18,450
16	Pakistan	1,000	717,500	-	-	1,000	717,500
17	PDRY	-	-	2	6,970	2	6,970
18	Poland	870	2,152,500	100	270,000	980	2,422,500
19	Republic of Korea	1,005	351,750	-	-	1,005	351,750
20	Romania	588	313,404	-	-	588	313,404
21	Spain	48	27,626	265	366,764	313	394,390
22	Sri Lanka	-	-	18	5,330	18	5,330
23	Switzerland	-	-	27	83,025	27	83,025
24	Sweden	10,000	5,300,000	-	-	10,000	5,300,000
SUB TOTAL		226,369	109,171,320	8,446	14,215,795	234,815	123,487,115

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organisation	Food Grain		Supplementary Food		Total	
		Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr
25	United Kingdom	5,000	2,650,000	-	-	5,000	2,650,000
26	United States of America	40,222	21,317,660	10,046	7,207,006	50,268	28,524,666
27	USSR	7,045	5,054,788	-	-	7,045	5,054,788
28	Yugoslavia	71	53,095	325	974,980	396	1,028,075
29	Band Aid	22,393	4,667,518	-	-	22,393	4,667,518
30	UNICEF	-	-	1,432	4,668,447	1,432	4,668,447
31	WFP	39,786	17,936,220	5,273	3,954,810	45,059	21,891,030
32	Belgium	-	-	19	13,490	19	13,490
33	German Democratic Republic	336	179,088	1,985	6,007,279	2,321	8,186,367
34	Netherlands	4,995	2,647,350	26	79,950	5,021	2,727,300
35	Zimbabwe	12,550	6,651,500	-	-	12,550	6,651,500
36	SOS Enfats San Frontiers	100	39,071	-	-	100	39,071
37	Polish Cath. Episc. Relief Com.	132	33,200	-	-	132	33,200
38	Africa with Love	-	-	16	102,500	16	102,500
<b>Grand Total</b>		<b>362,999</b>	<b>170,400,810</b>	<b>34,960</b>	<b>37,324,257</b>	<b>397,959</b>	<b>207,725,067</b>

II. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organisation	TRUCKS		TRAILORS		LIGHT VEHICLES		T O T A L	
		Qu(pcs)	Value (Birr)	Qu(pcs)	Value (Birr)	Qu(pcs)	Value (Birr)	Qu(pcs)	Value (Birr)
1	Austria	19	950,000	-	-	-	-	19	950,000
2	Bulgaria	10	788,000	12	210,000	-	-	22	998,000
3	Czechoslovakia	34	397,600	-	-	-	-	34	397,600
4	FRG	128	10,537,184	-	-	10	200,000	138	10,737,184
5	Italy	198	16,830,000	115	2,875,000	18	324,000	531	20,029,000
6	Japan	3	35,773	-	-	10	156,043	13	191,816
7	OPEC Fund	33	3,300,000	-	-	-	-	33	3,300,000
8	Romania	80	9,500,000	-	-	-	-	80	9,500,000
9	UK	-	-	30	817,128	12	300,000	42	1,117,128
10	USSR	300	15,000,000	-	-	9	180,000	309	15,180,000
11	GDR	35	1,575,000	-	-	-	-	35	1,575,000
12	Menschen fur Men. Foundation	7	616,394	7	197,190	-	-	14	813,584
13	Mitsubishi Motors	2	23,862	-	-	4	51,452	6	75,314
14	J.H. Rayner	-	-	-	-	1	20,121	1	20,121
15	Ethiopian Comm. in Italy	-	-	-	-	5	124,987	5	124,987
TOTAL		849	59,553,813	164	4,099,318	69	1,356,603	1,082	65,009,734



I. FOOD AID RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organisation	Food Grain		Supplementary Food		Total	
		Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr	Quantity (MT)	Value in Birr
1	Austria	4,000	1,396,000	-	-	4,000	1,396,000
2	Australia	5,800	2,494,000	50	153,000	5,850	2,647,000
3	Canada	47,500	14,951,042	-	-	47,500	14,951,042
4	China	2,024	838,011	-	-	2,024	838,011
5	EEC	121,361	54,369,728	600	998,600	121,961	55,363,328
6	France	8,000	4,194,947	-	-	8,000	4,194,947
7	Italy	-	-	2,304	1,679,360	2,304	1,679,360
8	India	4,000	1,400,000	-	-	4,000	1,400,000
9	Sweden	9,000	4,593,392	-	-	9,000	4,593,392
10	Zimbabwe	12,246	4,286,100	-	-	12,246	4,286,100
11	WFP	60,726	20,080,983	3,657	6,786,115	64,383	26,867,098
12	Greece	-	-	16	731,445	16	731,455
13	Band Aid	979	342,650	428	303,880	1,407	646,530
14	To Africa with Love	39	112,750	-	-	39	112,750
15	Medicin Sans Frontiers - France	-	-	16	4,800	16	4,800
16	UNHCR	996	445,712	1,049	1,825,866	2,045	2,271,578
<b>Total</b>		<b>276,671</b>	<b>109,505,315</b>	<b>8,120</b>	<b>12,479,066</b>	<b>284,791</b>	<b>121,983,391</b>

II. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	T R U C K S		T R A I L O R S		L I G H T V E H I C L E S	
		pcs	Value in Birr	pcs	Value in Birr	pcs	Value in Birr
1	Austria	-	-	-	-	1	30,847
2	Italy	2	30,400	28	455,000	-	-
3	UK	2	70,000	-	-	-	-
4	USSR	-	-	-	-	9	155,000
5	UNHCR	-	-	-	-	2	85,857
6	Mennonite Mission in Ethiopia	-	-	-	-	1	15,533
7	WTOE	206	16,091,777	102	4,000,350	8	163,905
	TOTAL	210	16,192,177	130	4,455,350	21	451,142

III. THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED  
BY THE RRC IN 1984

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Belgium	150,000
2	FRG	175,600
3	Italy	188,400
4	Japan	38,465
5	Poland	782,609
TOTAL		<u>1,335,124</u>

IV. THE VALUE OF BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS  
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Czechoslovakia	36,000
2	Greece	34,000
3	GDR	68,000
4	EEC	340,000
5	Sweden	170,000
6	Yugoslavia	20,276
7	Saudi Arabia	13,107
TOTAL		<u>681,383</u>

V. THE VALUE OF SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS  
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Saudi Arabia	1,405,485
2	FRG	5,000
3	Greece	308,502
TOTAL		<u>1,718,987</u>

II<sup>1</sup>. VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1984

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	FRG	257,414
2	Canada	806,587
3	Sweden	936,160
4	Italy	171,820
TOTAL		<u>2,171,981</u>

III. THE VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Austria	18,000
2	Czechoslovakia	8,100
3	EEC	11,307
4	Federal Republic of Germany	1,013,975
5	Italy	1,527,580
6	Japan	339,877
7	Republic of Korea	4,670
8	Romania	1,156,000
9	Sweden	3,600
10	UK	304,792
11	UNDRO	28,770
12	Germany Democratic Republic	95,900
13	USSR	28,745
14	CRIAA - Paris	19,117
TOTAL		<u>4,541,316</u>

III. THE VALUE OF MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC  
IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Czechoslovakia	1,210,650
2	Egypt	325,000
3	Federal Republic of Germany	3,505,093
4	Greece	26,000
5	Hungary	8,450
6	Italy	165,000
7	Japan	457,150
8	Romania	114,000
9	Spain	69
10	German Democratic Republic	67,275
11	Bulgaria	1,000,000
12	CRIAA - Paris	5,125
13	ARO KAHSAI WIGIROGIS	20,000
TOTAL		<u>6,903,812</u>

IV. THE VALUE OF BLANKETS, CLOTHINGS & FOOTWEARS RECEIVED BY  
THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Bulgaria	360,452
2	China	170,000
3	Czechoslovakia	362,862
4	France	288,000
5	Federal Republic of Germany	682,320
6	Greece	44,055
7	Hungary	85,000
8	Poland	164,604
9	Republic of Korea	136,948
10	Spain	42,840
11	United Kingdom	869,040
12	United States of America	65,620
13	USSR	139,000
14	Japan	9,820
15	German Democratic Republic	1,563,220
16	Netherlands	258,700
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5,242,481</b>

V. THE VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY IMPLEMENT & INSPECTS  
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Bulgaria	420,000
2	China	71,943
3	Italy	813,240
4	Kenya	24,000
5	Romania	4,000,000
6	United Kingdom	129,600
7	Germany Democratic Republic	563,550
8	Church of Sweden in Denmark	4,159
9	Mirror Group	239,706
TOTAL		<u>6,266,198</u>

VI. THE VALUE OF SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS RECEIVED  
BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Czechoslovakia	64,800
2	Federal Republic of Germany	698,400
3	Greece	588,960
4	Poland	36,900
5	United States of America	18,000
6	USSR	349,850
7	German Democratic Republic	954,765
TOTAL		<u>2,711,675</u>

VII. THE VALUE OF CONSTRUCTION, WATER & POWER SUPPLY MATERIALS  
& EQUIPMENT

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Bulgaria	2,675,120
2	Federal Republic of Germany	9,500
3	Hungary	40,600
4	Italy	1,108,660
5	Japan	238,478
6	Romania	360,000
7	USSR	4,566,082
8	UNICEF	82,556
9	Mirror Group	89,794
TOTAL		<u>9,170,790</u>

VIII. THE VALUE OF COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT RECEIVED BY THE RRC  
IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Federal Republic of Germany	500
2	Hungary	865,000
3	United Kingdom	118,921
4	UNDRO	3,191
TOTAL		<u>987,612</u>

IX. THE VALUE OF MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS: RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1985

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Daily Mirror	139,620
2	Band Aid	322,313
TOTAL		<u>461,933</u>

II<sup>1</sup>. THE VALUE OF SPARE PARTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Austria	2,729
2	EEC	106,612
3	FRG	19,110
4	Italy	1,059,796
5	Republic of Korea	746
6	Sweden	23,700
7	USSR	60,350
8	UNDRO	28,770
9	WTOE	445,028
10	Olympia Obitrous	2,500
11	MSF - France	21,675
12	Menschen fur Menschen Foundation	1,392
13	Netherlands	209
Total		<u>1,772,617</u>

III. MEDICAL EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Italy	9,359,700
2	USSR	4,000
3	Orphans Relief Fund	256,081
4	Dr. Tadesse Adnew	5,520
5	Yugoslavia	227,220
6	India	41,000
Total		<u>9,893,521</u>

IV. BLANKETS, CLOTHING & FOOTWEAR RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	UNICEF	19,680
2	UNHCR	48,150
3	China	37,200
4	Greece	292,595
Total		<u>397,625</u>

V. AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, IMPLEMENTS & INPUTS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	UK	149,852
2	Band Aid	789,250
3	UNICEF	66,133
4	WFP	364,910
5	Crown Agents	85,734
6	Fin.- Eth. Friendship Soc.	110,000
7	Netherlands	11,796
8	UNHCR	66,133
Total		<u>1,643,808</u>

VI. SHELTER MATERIALS & HOUSEHOLD UTENSILS RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	UNICEF	7,000
2	UNHCR	138,107
3	MSF - France	1,600
4	Menschen fur Menschen Foundation	32,239
5	Italy	100,000
6	FRG	6,000
Total		<u>351,189</u>

VII. CONSTRUCTION, WATER & POWER SUPPLY EQUIPMENT & MATERIAL  
RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Finland	4,475
2	Japan	139,074
3	UNHCR (for their own project)	70,045
4	Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus	85,000
5	EEC	791,939
6	Netherlands	149,539
Total		<u>1,240,072</u>

VIII. OFFICE EQUIPMENT & SUPPLY RECEIVED BY THE RRC IN 1986

Ser. No.	Donor Gov't or Organization	Value in Birr
1	Finland	2,308
2	UNICEF	28,000
Total		<u>30,308</u>

APPENDIX IV

Non-Governmental Organizations Involved in Relief And  
Development in Ethiopia.

1. Adventist, Development and Relief Agency (ADRA).
2. AFRICARE.
3. Agri Service.
4. American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC).
5. Air Service International
6. Action International Contre La Faim (AICF).
7. Baptist Mission of Ethiopia (BME).
8. Baptist General Conference Mission (BGCM).
9. Canadian Physicians for Medical Aid in Africa.
10. CARE Ethiopia.
11. Christian Relief & Development Association (CRDA).
12. Christoffell Blinden Mission (CBM).
13. Catholic Relief Services (CRS).
14. Church of Christ (COC).
15. CONCERN.
16. Espoir Ethiopia.
17. Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS).
18. Ethiopian Orthodox Church (DICAD).
19. Ethiopian Cooperative Union of the Blind.
20. Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus (EECMY).
21. Ethiopian Red Cross Society (ERCS).
22. Faith Mission.
23. Feed The Children International Ministries (FCIM).
24. Food For The Hungry International (FFHI).

25. Finnish Mission.
26. German Agro Action
27. Hope Enterprises.
28. Hope International
29. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
30. Japan International Volunteer Centre (JVC).
31. Jerusalem Memorial of Ethiopian Believers.
32. Jesuit Relief Services.
33. Joint Relief Partnership.
34. Kale Heywet Church Development Programme.
35. League of Red Cross and Crescent Societies (LRCCS).
36. L'Esperance Children Aid.
37. Lutheran World Federation.
38. Medicins Sans Frontieres/Belgique.
39. Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA).
40. Mennonite Mission in Ethiopia.
41. Menchen fur Menschen.
42. Missionaries of Charity.
43. Norwegian Church Aid.
44. Norwegian Lutheran Mission.
45. Norwegian Save the Children (Redd Barna).
46. OXFAM U.K.
47. OXFAM U.S.
48. Ryder Cheshire Foundation for the Relief of Suffering.
49. Save the Children Fund U.K.
50. Save the Children Fund U.S.
51. Secours Populaire Francais.

52. Society of International Missionaries (SIM).
53. SOS Enfants Sans Frontiers.
54. SOS Children's Village in Ethiopia.
55. St. Mathew's Church.
56. Swedish Save the Children (Redd Barna).
57. Swedish Philadelphia Church Mission.
58. Swiss Evangelical Nile Mission.
59. Terra des Hommes Lausanne.
60. Terra des Homme Netherlands.
61. 24 Hour TV Charity-NTV.
62. World University Service of Canada.
63. World Vision International.
64. World Missionary Evangelism of Ethiopia.

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