

**MULTILEVEL NETWORKS IN
BRITISH AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1990-95**

A Ph.D. Thesis submitted by
Elke Krahnmann

2000
University of London
London School of Economics

UMI Number: U127079

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U127079

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F

7800



736644

Abstract

In the 1990s a consensus has emerged in international relations and foreign policy analysis according to which it has become necessary to move from single-level approaches towards multilevel theorising. The thesis suggests that the network approach is especially suited for the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making because it has already been successfully applied to national, transnational and international levels of analysis. The thesis expands the scope of the network approach by proposing a 'multilevel network theory' that combines all three levels. Moreover, the thesis addresses the widespread criticism that network models fail to explain the process of decision-making by putting forward testable hypotheses regarding the exercise of pressure and the changing preferences among political actors. The aim of the approach is to examine how networks among national, transnational and international actors influence foreign policy making. The thesis suggests that the outcome of the decision-making process can be explained by the formation of a majority coalition in favour of a particular policy. In order to test the proposed multilevel network theory, the thesis examines four cases of foreign policy decision-making after the end of the Cold War. The case studies include: (1) the decision of the British government to support air strikes in Bosnia, (2) the abolition of the tactical air-to-surface missile project by the British government in 1993, (3) the first despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia, and (4) the reduction of German export controls on goods with civil and military applications ('dual-use'). By analysing cases in which two Western European governments had the final decision-making authority, the thesis illustrates how 'national' foreign policy decisions can be the consequences of domestic, transnational and international pressure.

In memory of my grandfather Wilhelm Karasinski (1908-2000)

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my family and friends for their help in every possible respect; Prof. William Wallace, Prof. Helga Haftendorn, Dr. Daphne Josselin, the members of the annual PhD review panel and the Foreign Policy workshop at the LSE, the members of the Graduiertenkolleg 'Das Neue Europa' of the Free University Berlin, and the discussants of various sections of this thesis at the Graduate Conference of the DVPW in Arnoldshain, the BISA Conference in Leeds, the Joint ISA-ECPR International Relations Conference in Vienna and the ISA Annual Convention in Los Angeles for their critical questions and advice; the Department of Politics at the University of Cologne and the European University Institute in Florence for free access to their resources; Daniel Fearn of the Foreign Office, John Dowie and Anthony Dewick of the DTI, Ian Gambles of the Treasury, David Williams, Mike Davies and Colin Davenport of the MoD for interviews on the structure of the British foreign policy network; the Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft (DFG), the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) and the British Council for financial support; and the members of the ESRC project 'Security Governance in the New Europe' for their trust and patience.

Contents

1. From National Foreign Policy to Multilevel Networks.....	11
2. Multilevel Network Theory.....	40
3. Case I: The Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia.....	81
4. Case II: The Abolition of the Tactical Airt-to-Surface Missile Project.....	127
5. Case III: The Despatch of Tornados to Bosnia.....	175
6. Case IV: The Relaxation of Dual-Use Export Regulations.....	224
7. Conclusion.....	273
Primary Sources	295
Secondary Sources	300
Bibliography	303
Appendices:	
Appendix 1 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'	325
Appendix 2 'German Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'	342
Appendix 3 'Pressure for the Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia'	364
Appendix 4 'Pressure for the Abolition of the TASM Project'	378
Appendix 5 'Pressure for the Despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia'	387
Appendix 6 'Pressure for a Reduction of German Dual-Use Export Controls'	395

List of Tables

Chapter 1

Table 1.1 <i>Case Studies</i>	36
-------------------------------	----

Chapter 2

Table 2.1 <i>Matrix of Dyadic Relations</i>	46
Table 2.2 <i>Types of Power Relations</i>	47
Table 2.3 <i>Combined Power Relations</i>	51
Table 2.4 <i>Rational Action</i>	66

Chapter 3

Table 3.1 <i>Preference Changes: 15 May - 8 August 1992</i>	90
Table 3.2 <i>Preference Changes: 8 August - 29 October 1992</i>	101
Table 3.3 <i>Preference Changes: 30 October 1992 - 19 January 1993</i>	109
Table 3.4 <i>Preference Changes: 19 January - 30 April 1993</i>	115
Table 3.5 <i>Descriptive Statistics</i>	120
Table 3.6 <i>Timing of Preference Changes</i>	121

Chapter 4

Table 4.1 <i>Preference Changes: 4 May 1990 - 11 August 1991</i>	134
Table 4.2 <i>Preference Changes: 11 August - 14 November 1991</i>	151
Table 4.3 <i>Preference Changes: 14 November 1991 - 9 October 1992</i>	157
Table 4.4 <i>Preference Changes: 9 October 1992 - 18 October 1993</i>	164
Table 4.5 <i>Descriptive Statistics</i>	169
Table 4.6 <i>Timing of Preference Changes</i>	170

Chapter 5

Table 5.1 <i>Preference Changes: 1 January - 12 June 1994</i>	182
Table 5.2 <i>Preference Changes: 12 June - 9 December 1994</i>	192
Table 5.3 <i>Preference Changes: 10 - 20 December 1994</i>	204
Table 5.4 <i>Preference Changes: 20 December 1994 - 30 June 1995</i>	210
Table 5.5 <i>Descriptive Statistics</i>	220
Table 5.6 <i>Timing of Preference Changes</i>	221

Chapter 6

Table 6.1 <i>Preference Changes: 14 February 1992 - 1 January 1993</i>	233
Table 6.2 <i>Preference Changes: 1 January - 5 December 1993</i>	244
Table 6.3 <i>Preference Changes: 5 December 1993 - 9 December 1994</i>	253
Table 6.4 <i>Descriptive Statistics</i>	268
Table 6.5 <i>Timing of Preference Changes</i>	269

Conclusion

Table 7.1 <i>Average Pressure in Cross-Case Comparison</i>	275
Table 7.2 <i>Blocking Strategy</i>	280
Table 7.3 <i>Descriptive Statistics (Cumulative)</i>	282

List of Graphs

Chapter 3

Graph 3.1 <i>Frequency / Probability</i>	118
Graph 3.2 <i>No Change</i>	119
Graph 3.3 <i>Unclear or Undecided</i>	119
Graph 3.4 <i>Change</i>	119
Graph 3.5 <i>Blocked</i>	122

Chapter 4

Graph 4.1 <i>Frequency / Probability</i>	167
Graph 4.2 <i>No Change</i>	168
Graph 4.3 <i>Unclear or Undecided</i>	168
Graph 4.4 <i>Change</i>	168
Graph 4.5 <i>Blocked</i>	171

Chapter 5

Graph 5.1 <i>Frequency / Probability</i>	218
Graph 5.2 <i>No Change</i>	219
Graph 5.3 <i>Unclear or Undecided</i>	219
Graph 5.4 <i>Change</i>	219
Graph 5.5 <i>Blocked</i>	221

Chapter 6

Graph 6.1 <i>Frequency / Probability</i>	266
Graph 6.2 <i>No Change</i>	267
Graph 6.3 <i>Unclear or Undecided</i>	267
Graph 6.4 <i>Change</i>	267

Conclusion

Graph 7.1 <i>Frequency / Probability</i>	276
Graph 7.2 <i>Probability Estimate</i>	276
Graph 7.3 <i>No Change</i>	277
Graph 7.4 <i>Change</i>	278
Graph 7.5 <i>Unclear or Undecided</i>	279
Graph 7.6 <i>Blocked</i>	280

Abbreviations in Text

BDI	Federation of German Industries
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CND	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CSU	Christian Social Union
DGB	German Labour Union Association
DIHT	German Chambers of Commerce and Industry
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EDIG	European Defence Industry Group
FDP	Free Democratic Party
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDS	Party of Democratic Socialism
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SPD	Social Democratic Party
TASM	Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile
UN	United Nations
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederation of Europe
US	United States of America
VDMA	German Association of Machinery and Plant Manufacturers
WEU	Western European Union

Abbreviations in Tables and Appendices

Au	Austria
Be	Belgium
BR	Bundesrat
BT	Bundestag
BVG	Federal Constitutional Court (Germany)
Ca	Canada
Cab	Cabinet (Germany)
cdu/csu	Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parliamentary party
CE	Chancellor of Exchequer (UK)
Cha	German Chancellor
CM	Chancellor's Office Minister (Germany)
cnd	Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
Coa	Coalition Meeting (Germany)
COF	Chancellor's Office (Germany)
Com	Committees
con	Conservative parliamentary party
De	Denmark
Dm	Defence Ministry (Germany)
DM	Defence Minister (Germany)
DS	Defence Secretary (UK)
Dti	Department of Trade and Industry (UK)
Em	Economics Ministry (Germany)
EM	Economics Minister (Germany)
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EU-CM	European Union Council of Ministers
EU-Co	European Union Commission
Fco	Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
fdp	Free Democratic parliamentary party
Fi	Finland
Fim	Finance Ministry (Germany)
FiM	Finance Minister (Germany)
Fm	Foreign Ministry (Germany)
FM	Foreign Minister (Germany)
Fr	France
FS	Foreign Secretary (UK)
gr	Green parliamentary group
Gr	Greece
Ic	Iceland
Ind	Industry
Ir	Ireland
It	Italy
lab	Labour parliamentary party
lib	Liberal Democratic parliamentary party
Lu	Luxembourg

Med	Media
Mod	Ministry of Defence (UK)
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
Nato-CM	North Atlantic Council
Nato-Org	NATO Headquarters
Ne	Netherlands
No	Norway
Par	House of Commons
pds	Party of Democratic Socialism parliamentary group
PM	Prime Minister (UK)
Po	Portugal
Ru	Russia
Sp	Spain
spd	Social Democratic parliamentary party
Sw	Sweden
Tre	Treasury (UK)
TS	Trade Secretary (UK)
Tu	Turkey
UK	United Kingdom
UN-Org	United Nations Organisations
UN-SC	United Nations Security Council
Uns	Unions (Germany)
US-Cd	Commerce Department (US)
US-Co	Congress (US)
US-Nsa	National Security Advisor (US)
US-pen	Pentagon (US)
US-Pre	President (US)
US-Sd	State Department (US)
US-SD	Secretary of Defence (US)
US-SS	Secretary of State (US)
US-TR	Trade Representative (US)
US-Wh	White House (US)
vote	Voter

1. From National Foreign Policy to Multilevel Networks

1.1 Introduction

In the 1990s a 'growing consensus' has emerged in the empiricist analysis of foreign policy decision-making.¹ According to this consensus, it has become necessary to move from single-level approaches in international relations and foreign policy analysis towards a theoretical integration of the domestic, transnational and international levels of analysis. While historical or constructivist approaches have traditionally crossed levels of analysis, this thesis attempts to respond to the above theoretical challenge within the 'empiricist' paradigm.² As such, its aim is the search for theoretical generalizations across countries and issues, and its primary standard of evaluation is empirical validation.³ Following a critique of the three most broadly used existing approaches, which have proposed the theoretical integration of multiple levels within the empiricist study of international relations in the United States and Western Europe, namely transnationalism, the 'two-level game' and network analysis, this thesis contends that the latter approach provides a fruitful basis for the analysis of contemporary foreign policy decision-making. However, it argues that the explanatory value of the network approach can be improved by several modifications which are developed in the form of a new 'multilevel network theory'. Multilevel network theory combines network analysis with rational choice assumptions to illustrate how foreign policy actors strategically use their national, transnational and international relations in order to influence the foreign policy decision-making process.

¹ Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'From the Outside In and from the Inside Out. International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy', in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy. Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), pp.25-48, p.47.

² On the respective critique of the empiricist (or 'scientific'), traditional and post-positivist approaches in International Relations see Hedley Bull, 'International Theory. The Case for a Classical Approach', in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.20-37; Morton A. Kaplan, 'The New Great Debate. Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations', in *ibid.*, pp.39-61; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding in International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Thomas J. Biersteker, 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 33:3, 1989, pp.263-267.

³ For a summary of other criteria for the evaluation of theories within the empiricist paradigm see John A. Vasquez, 'The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp.217-240, p.230. Taking an empiricist perspective this thesis is located in what Steve Smith identifies as the 'Comparative Foreign Policy Theory' approach to Foreign Policy Analysis. See Steve Smith, 'Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations', *Millennium* 16:2, 1987, pp.345-348.

The call for multilevel approaches in international relations and foreign policy analysis originates from the observation that foreign policy decision-making within Western Europe and the transatlantic community in particular, has become more integrated since the last World War. As a consequence, it has been suggested that Western governments are unable to unilaterally control their foreign or even domestic affairs, as presumed by single level models of foreign policy decision-making. Conversely, foreign policy making in Western democracies appears to be influenced by a broad variety of public and private actors at the national, transnational and international levels of analysis. In reaction to this development, a range of authors have proclaimed a crisis of the nation-state and the emergence of regional or global structures of governance.⁴

Moreover, several analytical frameworks have been proposed which combine different levels of analysis. Specifically in Western Europe, where the trend towards a fusion of decision-making processes has been recognised in the context of the European Union (EU), multilevel approaches have become increasingly popular.⁵ However, many of these models apply only to the specific context of EU institutions and relations. Indeed, some authors have argued that the integrated foreign policy making process among EU member states differs from transnational and international decision-making in other arenas and, therefore, requires distinct theoretical approaches.⁶ While this thesis accepts the claim that relations among EU states might be unique, the following section seeks to show that increasing integration is not merely a European phenomenon, but applies to the broader transatlantic community. Moreover, it argues that Western European foreign and security policy making is crucially influenced by actors in the United States (US) and international institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). As a consequence, this thesis contends that a multilevel theory which seeks to analyse contemporary foreign policy processes in Western Europe and the transatlantic community

⁴ Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992); Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ed., *Die anachronistische Souveränität* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969); Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32:4, 1991, pp.621-634. For the counter argument see Paul Hirst and G. Thompson, 'Globalization and the Future of the Nation State', *Economy and Society* 24:3, 1995, pp.408-442.

⁵ Wolfgang Wessels, 'An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35:2, 1997, pp.267-297.

⁶ Christopher Hill and William Wallace, 'Introduction. Actors and Actions', in Christopher Hill, ed., *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.1-16.

should integrate not only a variety of actors across levels of analysis, but also be able to model differences in the relations among these actors.

Three sets of multilevel approaches can be identified which seek such general applicability in foreign policy analysis: transnationalism⁷, two-level games⁸ and network models⁹. Each of these models seeks to answer the key question of this thesis: who is able to influence foreign policy decision-making and how? However, the success of these multilevel approaches in modelling and explaining contemporary foreign policy processes has been limited. Transnationalism, two-level games and network approaches can be criticised for two main shortcomings.¹⁰ First, although the three approaches have moved away from single-level analysis to the examination of how actors and decisions are linked across the domestic-international divide, most of them fail to integrate sufficiently all three levels of analysis. The theoretical focus of network models has so far been decision-making at single levels.¹¹ Transnationalism has focussed exclusively on transnational relations, whereas the two-level game has failed to take transnational relations into account, but reduced multilevel decision-making to domestic and international influences on governmental decision-makers. Second, neither transnationalism nor two-level games or network models provide testable hypotheses which help to explain the process of

⁷ See for instance Matthew Evangelista, 'The Paradox of State Strength - Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet-Union', *International Organization* 49:1, 1995, pp.1-38; Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁸ The model was first proposed by Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization* 42:3, 1988, pp.427-460.

⁹ See for example David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998); R.A.W. Rhodes, *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain* (London: Routledge, Allen & Unwin, 1992); Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, 'Introduction', in *ibid.*, eds., *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.11-23; Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988).

¹⁰ Keith Dowding, 'Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach', *Political Studies* XLIII:1, 1995, pp.136-158; Keith Dowding, 'Policy Networks: Don't Stretch a Good Idea Too Far', in Patrick Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer, eds., *Contemporary Political Studies 1994: Proceedings of the Annual Conference Held at the University of Wales* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1994); Hussein Kassim, 'Policy Networks, Networks and European Union Policy-Making: A Sceptical View', *West European Politics* 17:4, 1994, pp.15-27; Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in *ibid.*, eds., *The New European Community: Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.1-40.

¹¹ David Marsh, 'The Utility and Future of Policy Network Analysis', in *ibid.*, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.185-197, p.186. For an attempt at theory building with regard to transnational networks see John Benington and Janet Harvey, 'Transnational Local Authority Networking within the European Union: Passing Fashion or New Paradigm?' in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.149-166.

decision-making. While these models deal with the question *who* is able to influence foreign policies, they fail to address *how* various actors participate in foreign policy decision-making.¹² Specifically, few models illustrate how actors form domestic, transnational and international coalitions which are regarded by all three approaches as critical for explaining the actors' ability to influence the 'ultimate decision unit'¹³, i.e. the final political authority in the decision-making process.

In response to these criticisms, this thesis proposes and tests a multilevel network theory which seeks to address these two shortcomings. To achieve its twofold objective, this thesis is structured in a theoretical and an empirical part. The first theoretical part, develops a multilevel network theory of foreign policy decision-making. In order to do so, it builds upon various network approaches which have proved their ability to map relations among a broad variety of actors at different levels in a number of studies which examine decision-making in the European Union, in transnational networks and domestic policy sectors.¹⁴ However, it suggests four modifications.

First, this thesis proposes a theoretical definition of networks which explicitly includes national, transnational and international actors. In order to do so, it reexamines the basic concepts and dimensions of network analysis with regard to the question whether and how they can be consistently applied to multiple levels. Its propositions are based on the contention that the distinction between domestic, transnational and international policy networks, which has so far been predominant in network analysis, has been superceded by changes in the decision-making process in Western Europe and the transatlantic area. Not only are actors linked across levels of analysis, the structure of their relations in the domestic and international arena has also become increasingly similar. The traditional ideal-typical distinction between hierarchical, institutionalised relations in the national system, and anarchic, informal linkages in the international system which underpinned the division between theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis meets

¹² Marsh, 'The Utility and Future of Policy Network Analysis', pp.186f.

¹³ Margaret Hermann, Charles F. Hermann and Joe D. Hagan, 'How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior', in Charles F. Hermann, James N. Rosenau and Charles Kegley, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.309-336.

¹⁴ John Peterson, 'Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy* 2:1, 1995, pp.69-93; Philip Gummert and Judith Reppy, 'Military Industrial Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment', *Government and Opposition* 25:3, 1990, pp.287-303; Rhodes, *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*.

empirical observations less and less. Both in the domestic and the international arena, we find today a mixture of formal and informal relations between the public and private actors engaged in foreign policy decision-making. Moreover, multilevel network theory suggests that these formal and informal relations can be defined by a single concept of power based on a combination of resource-dependencies and institutional authority.

Second, this thesis seeks to strengthen the argument that network analysis can be fruitfully applied to the study of foreign and security policy.¹⁵ However, rather than because of changes in the concept of networks, the following section illustrates that recent developments in foreign policy decision-making have made it more accessible to network analysis. In particular, network analysis is able to accommodate the increasing number and diversity of public and private actors which are engaged in contemporary foreign policy processes. Foreign policy is no longer the domain of 'high' politics characterised by a limited number of, mostly governmental, actors. It has come to embrace a plurality of actors, as in other issue areas such as health, agriculture, or economics where network analysis has its origins. The advantages of network analysis for the study of foreign policy, however, go further than its ability to integrate a multiplicity of public and private actors. Its capacity to map a mixture of relations enables the theory to model the increasing institutionalisation of transnational and international relations, while also taking into account the remaining anarchical elements of the international system.

Third, this thesis proposes to synthesise the analysis of network structures with a concept of agency as suggested by rational choice theory in order to hypothesise about the decision-making process as an intermediate variable between structures and outcomes.¹⁶ The utility of rational choice theory for network analysis derives from its ability to hypothesise about how actors may use their relations in a network to exert pressure on each other and the ultimate decision unit. Specifically, the concept of *bounded* rationality conforms with network analysis in that the members of a network by definition interact regularly with each other. It can, therefore, be presumed that actors have clear

¹⁵ So far the application of network theory to the analysis of foreign and defence policy has been rather limited. See for instance Gummert and Reppy, 'Military Industrial Networks'.

¹⁶ Dowding, 'Policy Networks: Don't Stretch a Good Idea Too Far', p.60; Carsten Daugbjerg and David Marsh, 'Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-level and Micro-level Analysis', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.52-71, pp.67f.

expectations regarding the cost and utility of exerting pressure on other actors in order to change their policy preferences within their network. In short, the structure of a network sets the boundaries in which actors rationally seek to influence the decision-making process.

Moreover, the rational use of network relations, if defined by resource-dependence and institutional authority, has been indirectly pointed out by studies which have investigated the compatibility of rational choice theory with new institutionalism or behaviouralist analyses.¹⁷ The advantage of rational choice assumptions for the study of political decision-making processes is that they provide general hypotheses about the ways in which actors use their relations to influence each other and the decision-making process. By doing so, rational choice assumptions cannot only be utilised to illustrate some common features in the actions of a variety of actors, but also to generalise interactions across cases and issues. While the focus on the commonalities of the decision-making process regarding different issues necessarily limits the understanding of a particular historic foreign policy decision, it permits comparisons and the development of general propositions which might help to explain other cases.

Finally, this thesis proposes a quantitative measurement for the ability of actors to influence each other in terms of the number of actors in the network who exert pressure on a single actor at any moment of the decision-making process. Multilevel network theory, thus, addresses another criticism of network models, namely that they are able to observe and describe actors' influence over policy outcomes, but do not offer testable hypotheses which help to explain the process and dynamics of influencing policy outcomes.¹⁸ The proposed quantitative measurement reflects the notion advanced by, amongst others, pluralist and corporatist approaches, that political actors, such as ministers or even civil servants, are responsive to the policy preferences of their 'constituencies', understood here in the wider sense as the actors on whom they depend

¹⁷ Keith Dowding, 'The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and New Institutionalism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:1, 1994, pp.105-117; Asbjørn Sonne Nørgaard, 'Rediscovering Reasonable Rationality in Institutional Analysis', *European Journal of Political Research* 29:1, 1996, pp.31-57; Donald D. Searing, 'Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism', *American Political Science Review* 85:4, 1991, pp.1249-1260; Aaron Wildavsky, 'Why Self-interest Means Less Outside of a Social Context - Cultural Contributions to a Theory of Rational Choices', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:2, 1994, pp.131-159.

¹⁸ Dowding, 'Model or Metaphor?'; Guy Peters, 'Policy Networks: Myth, Metaphor and Reality', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.21-32, p.24.

and with whom they regularly interact. Moreover, analysing the number of actors who support a policy is implicitly linked to the ideal notion of democratic decision-making in that both elections and parliamentary decisions are commonly based on the preferences of a majority.

The reason for adopting a quantitative rather than a qualitative measurement of influence for multilevel network theory lies in the aim of this thesis to make its findings replicable and encourage further theory building and testing. While the evaluation of qualitative-descriptive network models has often been impeded by the complexity and ambiguity of their measures for influence, the quantitative approach adopted here provides a clear and consistent standard.¹⁹ This standard not only allows the direct comparison of pressure and influence between different sectoral networks, actors or cases, it also provides a rigorous criterion for the assessment of the hypotheses proposed by multilevel network theory in the conclusion of this thesis.

The second empirical part of this thesis proceeds to test multilevel network theory in four case studies which examine how multilevel networks can help to explain foreign policy making in the transatlantic community in the 1990s. Specifically, the case studies focus on the national, transnational and international influence on the governments of Britain and Germany. By selecting cases in which two Western European governments were the ultimate decision units, this thesis seeks to provide some insights into the question whether national governments have indeed lost their control of foreign policy decision-making. Moreover, by analysing the distinct, but overlapping multilevel foreign policy networks surrounding the British and German governments, the case studies further provide a test as to whether the hypotheses of multilevel network theory hold independently from differences in national cultures or styles of decision-making.²⁰ In addition, the cases were selected from an issue area which has until recently been regarded as under the exclusive authority of national governments, namely foreign and security policy, to serve as a 'crucial' test of the theory.²¹ The cases include: (1) the decision of the British government to support a United Nations Security Council resolution in favour of

¹⁹ Dowding, 'Policy Networks: Don't Stretch a Good Idea Too Far'.

²⁰ Richard Rose, 'Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis', *Political Studies* 39:3, 1991, pp.446-462.

²¹ Alexander L. George, 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison', in Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy - New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (London: The Free Press, 1979), pp.43-68, p.53

air strikes in Bosnia in 1993, (2) the British abandonment of its tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) programme, (3) the first out-of-area despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia in the summer of 1995 and (4) the reduction of export restrictions on technology with civil and military applications ('dual-use') by the German government between 1992 and 1995.

Based on the two objectives outlined above, this chapter is structured in three parts. The first section examines the characteristics of foreign policy processes in Western Europe and the broader transatlantic community in the 1990s. It thereby sets the parameters for a contemporary theory of foreign policy decision-making in this area. In particular, it investigates the increasing integration of the domestic and the international. The second part discusses the merits and limitations of the three multilevel approaches mentioned above: transnationalism, two-level games and network models. It argues that, in spite of its shortcomings, the network approach is particularly suited for modelling contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes. The final section discusses the criteria for the selection of the four case studies and the requirements for the testing of multilevel network theory.

1.2 Foreign Policy Decision-Making in the 1990s

Before the question how foreign policy decisions are made in the contemporary transatlantic community can be examined, it is necessary to define foreign policy. If contemporary foreign policy making is influenced by public and private actors at various levels of analysis, traditional notions of foreign policy as 'high' politics, i.e. decisions involving the head of state, the foreign secretary and the foreign office, are not sufficient to define foreign policy. Not only do a variety of actors participate in the decision-making process, also the authority over the affairs among states has been increasingly transferred to organisations beyond national governments. In this respect, it is helpful to distinguish between 'foreign affairs' and 'foreign policy decisions'. While the former can be defined as the political deliberations and actions of public and private actors across national boundaries, the latter will be reserved to denote authoritative political choices of action or legislative regulation which are directed to some actual or potential sphere outside the

jurisdiction of the state polity.²²

The focus of this thesis on the foreign policy decision-making processes can be justified on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, the concern about political decision-making derives from the fact that governments continue to hold a unique position with regard to the legitimate control over transnational and international affairs. In so far as international organisations have replaced them in determining authoritative political choices, they have done so on the basis of national policies - or the lack thereof.²³ Indeed, most international organisations continue to subject themselves to the authority of national governments by providing member states with a veto. Theoretically, the normative implications of the question to what degree and how national foreign policies are determined by national or international influences, places the government at the centre of this study. The aim of multilevel analysis is not only to provide a better understanding of contemporary decision-making processes, but also to give an answer to the question of who governs foreign policy decision-making.

The consensus that foreign policy decision-making cannot be adequately grasped by single-level analysis has built on a broad range of studies observing changes in the nature of the political process over the past decades. These studies widely agree that contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes in Western Europe and in the transatlantic community are characterised by three features: multiplicity, diversity and interdependence among foreign policy actors.²⁴ It is difficult to assess the degree to which these three aspects have changed over the past decades. Increasing interdependence among industrialised nations has been observed since the 1960s. Initially, academics argued that the ability of governments to control their relations with other states had been curtailed by the economic integration associated with the emergence of multinational corporations and the European Economic Community.²⁵ However, most scholars concluded that national governments maintained their decision-making power in the area

²² Compare John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984).

²³ Michael Mann, 'Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, not Dying', *Daedalus* 122:3, 1993, pp.115-140.

²⁴ Compare Scharpf, 'Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates'.

²⁵ Richard N. Cooper, 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies', *World Politics*, 24:2, 1972, pp.161-181; Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, *Policy Making in the European Communities* (London: Wiley, 1977).

of foreign and defence policy.²⁶

In the 1990s, the development towards greater multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of foreign policy actors appears to have deepened and accelerated. In addition to economic developments, the end of the Cold War has led to greater integration in foreign and security policy from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Expectations that in the absence of the constraints of bipolarity, foreign policies would be 're-nationalised'²⁷, have so far been disconfirmed. Contrary to arguments that the closeness of transatlantic relations relied on the specific conditions of the superpower competition, the transformation of foreign policy decision-making seems to be progressive in nature. Examining each aspect in turn, it can be argued that the trend towards greater multiplicity, diversity and interdependence among foreign policy actors at various levels appears to have been strengthened rather than reversed in the 1990s.

Multiplicity

The notion of multiplicity commonly refers to the observation that the number of actors which are able to influence the foreign political process and its outcomes has steadily grown over the past 50 years.²⁸ Traditionally foreign and security policy has appeared to be a distinct area of decision-making which predominantly involved heads of state, foreign and defence ministers and their respective ministries. Where the necessity arose to regulate transnational and international dealings, they were channelled through these ministries. Today most governmental agencies within Western Europe conduct their daily foreign affairs directly with their counterparts in other countries. In the area of security policy in

²⁶ James Barber, *Who makes British Foreign Policy* (Milton Keynes: The Open University Press, 1976), p.5; Joseph Frankel, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.1f., p.12, p.54; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p.25. Few analysts regarded the integration of both spheres as sufficient to merit a new theory. See for example Czempel, *Die anachronistische Souveränität*; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Indeed, even today some scholars argue that national governments have preserved their control over foreign policy decision-making in the area of military security. See for instance Mann, 'Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents'.

²⁷ John Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security* 15:1, 1990, pp.5-56; Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security* 18:2, 1993, pp.44-79.

²⁸ See for instance Simon Webb, *NATO and 1992. Defence Acquisition and Free Markets* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989, R-3758-FF); Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction', in *ibid.*, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp.3-33, pp.10f.

particular they are complemented by close formal and informal relations with the US through the UN Security Council, NATO and the OSCE and bilateral contacts.

However, the dispersion of influence in international relations has not been limited to administrative departments. Private actors directly participate in foreign policy decision-making because of transnational business interests or international causes, such as the protection of the environment and human rights. Transnational mergers have created an increasing number of multinational corporations which by means of their internal structure engage in international relations. Even in the armaments sector, national industries are increasingly the exception.²⁹ In addition to industries, non-governmental organisations have become regular actors in international relations. Valued as providers of information and services, as in the case of the International Red Cross, or feared as critics of governmental action, as in the case of Greenpeace or Amnesty International, non-governmental organisations have gained access to foreign policy making processes.

Furthermore, a range of international organisations has been created which function not only as forums for intergovernmental coordination, but due to their authority and staff, have often developed independent means and interests in international affairs. The density of these organisations in foreign and security policy in Western Europe and the transatlantic community has increased steadily since the Second World War. It gained new impetus in the 1990s with the proliferation of international regimes and organisations in response to the perceived volatility generated by the end of the bipolar structure. Specifically, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)³⁰, its successor the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)³¹ and the Partnership for Peace (PfP)³² were set up in order to establish security cooperation with Central and Eastern European states after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Moreover, the functional and

²⁹ Margaret Blunden, 'Armaments Collaboration: What Form and What For?', *Science and Public Policy* 17:3, 1990, pp.132-141; W. Walker and S. Willett, 'Restructuring the European Defense Industrial Base', *Defence Economics* 4:2, 1993, pp.141-160. See also presentations at the Royal United Services Institute conferences 'Defence Equipment Acquisition. The Atlantic Dimension', 28-29 May 1997 and 'Defence Equipment Acquisition. The European Dimension', 10-11 July 1997.

³⁰ North Atlantic Council, *North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation*, Brussels, 20 December 1991, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911220a.htm>.

³¹ North Atlantic Council, *Ministerial Communique*, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm>.

³² North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>. See also NATO Fact Sheet, *The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP)*, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm>.

geographical scope of existing international organisations has been enlarged. NATO has been transformed from a collective defence organisation into one of cooperative security. The new NATO is able to conduct peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions with or without the explicit mandate of the UN or the OSCE.³³ Moreover, at the 50th Anniversary of NATO on 16 March 1999, three former Warsaw Pact members, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, joined NATO. Further applications for accession have been submitted by Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.³⁴ Similar developments have characterised the Western European Union (WEU). Shortly after the NATO decision, the WEU too offered its resources for UN and OSCE missions out-of-area.³⁵ And, while many former Warsaw Pact members have preferred to seek membership of NATO, most have also accepted associate partnerships with the WEU.³⁶ At the same time, the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe has developed from a forum for security negotiations, the OSCE, into a regional organisation under the UN charter. Its new tasks include the legitimisation and monitoring of peace missions in the Euro-Atlantic area.³⁷

Diversity

The above enumeration leads us to the second feature of contemporary foreign policy making: the actors involved are highly diverse. They not only cross the public-private divide, but also levels of analysis. The actors which participate in contemporary foreign policy decision processes are located at the national, transnational as well as international arena. Although it can be argued that diverse actors have been affected by foreign affairs at all times, the nature of their involvement appears to have changed by the 1990s. As a consequence of functional differentiation within and across national borders, a broad range

³³ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>.

³⁴ See NATO Fact Sheets, *The Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland*, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/access.htm>, and *NATO's Open Door Policy*, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm>.

³⁵ WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

³⁶ See NATO Fact Sheet, *Development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO*, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm>.

³⁷ CSCE, *Helsinki Document 1992 'The Challenges of Change'*, Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992, at <http://www.osce.org/indexe-da.htm>.

of actors have become affected by, and able to influence, authoritative decision-making with regard to foreign relations.

In particular, the taking on of governmental functions by private actors has increased their ability to influence foreign policies not only in the area of trade, but also national and international security. Since the latter has been, until recently, a preserve of national governments, it shows specifically the new degree to which actors in foreign policy making have diversified. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which is related to two of the following case studies, private actors participated on the side of the warring factions, e.g. arms suppliers, as well as in the international intervention, such as charities which delivered humanitarian support while safeguarded by NATO troops. With their increased involvement in foreign relations, these actors also have growing influence over the foreign policy decision-making process.

A similar transfer of functions to the international level has increased diversity of foreign policy actors among international organisations. Thus, the Post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of new institutions which has enhanced the role of existing actors in foreign policy decision-making and introduced new ones. The transformation of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe into an organisation with a secretariat and permanent staff is one case; PfP and NACC are other examples. Moreover, after a period of perceived stagnation, the Maastricht Treaty has significantly enlarged the authority of the EU not only in economic and monetary policy, but also in foreign relations with the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) framework.³⁸

The deepening of international institutions has been matched by a trend towards the widening of memberships, not only in the EU, but also within NATO and the WEU. Although the first candidates for EU accession have been Western European states, namely Austria, Finland and Sweden, many Central and Eastern European states have applied for accession.³⁹ NATO has already accepted new members in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Increasing diversity of foreign policy actors, therefore, can be noted within and without international organisations. Internally, widening in particular towards Eastern Europe, has led to greater differences among the member states, and thus,

³⁸ *Treaty on European Union*, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/cu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.

³⁹ See *Agenda 2000*, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm.

regular actors in European foreign policy making, in economic, political, social and military terms. Externally, the institutionalisation of international relations has created new organisational actors.

Interdependence

The result of the functional differentiation between governmental departments, public and private actors and international organisations described above has been increasing interdependence among a broad variety of foreign policy actors in the 1990s. Due to functional specialization, actors within and across national boundaries depend to a larger degree on each other's resources for the fulfilment of their needs and functions. Moreover, foreign policy decision-making and implementation has come to rely on contributions from a large number of actors.

In the private sector, increasing interdependence has been the result of specialisation in production on one hand and global marketing on the other. In the public sector, governments have increasingly been willing to accept the interdependence that comes with multinational economic and political collaboration. A particular example has been the growing cooperation in armaments research and development which has often been identified with national sovereignty. Not only have national armaments industries lost their military rationale if national defence and international interventions depend on the cooperation of allies. It has also become more difficult to defend high military spending politically and economically if it is less costly to buy weapons 'off the shelf' from allied countries or to collaborate in arms production. However, as governments sell national armaments industries to private actors, accept transnational mergers of procurement companies and favour international cooperation in the development and production of weapons, national defence policy becomes vulnerable to transnational and domestic influence.⁴⁰

In addition, transnational and international interdependence has increased as a result of the functional and regional enlargement of international organisations. In

⁴⁰ See for instance Richard A. Bitzinger, 'The Globalization of the Arms Industry. The Next Proliferation Challenge', *International Security* 19:2, 1994, pp.170-198; Terence R. Guay, *At Arm's Length: the European Union and Europe's Defence Industry* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998); Elisabeth Skoens and Herbert Wulf, 'The Internationalization of the Arms Industry', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 535, 1994, pp.43-57; Webb, *NATO and 1992*; Herbert Wulf, ed. *Arms Industry Limited* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

particular in the area of security policy, interdependence has reached new levels in recent years. One reason for this has been the progressive decline in national defence budgets since the 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, popular demands for a 'peace dividend' have further reduced national defence capabilities to the degree that large scale interventions and national defence rely on multilateral cooperation.⁴¹

1.3 Multilevel Approaches in Foreign Policy Analysis

In recent years, several attempts have been made to synthesise different levels of analysis in order to arrive at more comprehensive theories in response to the changes of the foreign policy decision-making process pointed out above. In particular, three multilevel approaches can be discerned which suggest general explanations of decision-making across countries and issues: transnationalism⁴², the two-level game⁴³ and network models⁴⁴. This section argues that the network approach provides the best basis for a multilevel theory of foreign policy making.

Transnationalism

Transnationalism is perhaps the oldest multilevel approach to international relations and foreign policy analysis. It originated in the 1970s from the theoretical work of, among others, Ernst-Otto Czempiel, James N. Rosenau, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye⁴⁵. At the beginning of the 1990s, Thomas Risse-Kappen sought to revive the interest in transnationalism in an edited volume '*Bringing Transnationalism Back In*'. In spite of its history, however, transnationalism has not evolved into a unified theory. It comprises a range of different theoretical frameworks which often only share their focus on interactions

⁴¹ David Greenwood, 'Expenditure and Management', in Peter Byrd, ed., *British Defence Policy: Thatcher and Beyond* (New York: Philip Allan, 1991), pp.36-66; Ron Smith, 'Resources, Commitments and the Defence Industry', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds., *British Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp.73-89.

⁴² Risse-Kappen, *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*.

⁴³ Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games'.

⁴⁴ See for example John Peterson, 'The European Technology Community', in R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp.226-248; Boelie Elzen, Bert Enserink and Wim Smit, 'Weapons Innovation - Networks and Guiding Principles', *Science and Public Policy* 17:3, 1990, pp.171-193.

⁴⁵ Keohane and Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics*.

and influences across national boundaries.⁴⁶ It is, therefore, difficult to develop a general critique. The following takes the approach proposed by Risse-Kappen in his volume as an illustrative example of some of the problems associated with transnationalism.⁴⁷

The theoretical framework proposed by Risse-Kappen analyses the ability of transnational actors to gain access to and influence domestic decision-making. Three state structures act as constraints to transnational accessibility on the domestic level: the 'political', the 'social' and the 'network' structure.⁴⁸ Each can take two forms, the first limiting transnational influence, the second permitting it. Specifically, the 'political structure' of a state, which denotes the dispersion of executive authority within the administration, is described as either centralised or fragmented. The societal structure which describes societal polarization along ideological or class lines can be either strong or weak. The network structure, defined as the institutions which link state and society and the 'norms regulating the coalition-building processes in these networks', can be consensual or polarised.⁴⁹ In addition, the degree of institutionalisation within a particular issue area acts as another filter for transnational influence on the international level. The resulting typology of state structures is linked to hypotheses about the impact of transnational actors on domestic decisions. Thus, Risse-Kappen suggests that the ability of transnational actors to access the decision-making process is inversely related to the strength of their influence on political decisions.

One of the main values of the model lies in pointing out the compatibility of structural theories at the domestic and international level. Rather than devising a new theoretical framework, Risse-Kappen attempts to integrate different middle-range models. Crucially, he suggests that such theoretical integration can proceed across levels of analysis, namely between theories of state structures and international institutions. Since both models are based on the same theoretical concepts, i.e. institutional and social

⁴⁶ See for instance Philip D. Stewart, Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, 'Modelling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt', *American Political Science Review* 83:1, 1989, pp.35-59; Daniel Duedney and John G. Ikenberry, 'The International Sources of Soviet Change', *International Security* 16:3, 1991-92, pp.74-118.

⁴⁷ Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction'.

⁴⁸ Risse-Kappen uses the term 'networks' not as defined by network theorists. Networks, for him, denote the 'institutions ... linking state and society and the norms regulating the coalition-building processes'. See Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction', p.22.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.20-22.

structures, the proposed approach to transnational analysis avoids the pitfalls of conceptual inconsistency. Nevertheless, a number of criticisms can be put forward regarding the approach and its ability to model the three characteristics of contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes as outlined in the previous section. Some of these limitations are self-imposed, but others are typical for the problems encountered by attempts to synthesise middle-range theories across levels of analysis.

The main (self)restriction of the model lies in its exclusive focus on transnational relations defined as ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an international organisation’.⁵⁰ While responding to the call for a theoretical synthesis across levels of analysis, the model thus offers explanations for only part of contemporary multilevel foreign decision-making processes. Although a model can hardly be criticised for its explicit theoretical focus, in terms of the aim of this thesis to contribute to the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making which is able to model the changes in the decision-making process pointed out above, it is therefore of limited utility.

Moreover, further problems arise from the failure to examine sufficiently how distinct middle-range models can be combined within the approach. Thus, while the model suggests that both international and domestic structures serve as a ‘filter’ for transnational influence, the combination of both filters is not fully elaborated in the proposed typology.⁵¹ In particular, the countervailing effect of specific types of domestic and international structures in limiting or permitting transnational influence calls for further explanations.⁵² Thus, the question arises whether the effect of the two structures can cancel each other out or whether it is modified to various degrees.

Similarly, the decision-making process which the approach identifies as ‘coalition building’ could be developed in greater detail.⁵³ The rejection of the concept of ‘tacit’ alliances suggests that national and international actors have to be linked to each other in

⁵⁰ Risse-Kappen, ‘Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction’, p.3.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p.28.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.30.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.22, p.26, p.27.

order to build a coalition.⁵⁴ However, based on the sixfold typology of state structures proposed by the model, it cannot be established which transnational and domestic actors are in fact connected. In fact, the nature of the coalition building process across national boundaries remains rather elusive. Do transnational actors only seek to influence governmental actors directly or do they also influence other domestic actors in order to expand their coalition? How do transnational actors influence other actors? Do strategies play a role?

In summary, while the model shows how different middle-range approaches can potentially be combined, it only partly models the increasing multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of actors which participate in foreign policy decision-making today. Moreover, the model leaves a range of theoretical questions unanswered. In particular, it does not sufficiently illustrate how state and international structures can help to explain the coalition building processes which influence policy outcomes.

Two-Level Games

A second approach which combines the domestic and international into a more comprehensive model rather than limiting itself to the analysis of transnational relations is the two-level game developed by Robert Putnam in 1988.⁵⁵ Next to transnationalism Robert Putnam's two-level game has perhaps gained the most widespread recognition in the empiricist multilevel analysis of international relations. Since its publication, it has been employed in a wide range of studies, including an edition published by Putnam et al. which has sought to refine the approach.⁵⁶ The model explains intergovernmental negotiations in terms of a two-stage game in which diplomats simultaneously seek to accommodate domestic and international demands. These demands are analysed on one hand in the form of domestic coalitions, termed 'win-sets', which support a certain political outcome, and on the other by the preferences of the second party in the international negotiations.

The strength of the two-level game lies in its recognition that actions on the domestic level influence the negotiator's position on the international level. Rather than

⁵⁴ Risse-Kappen, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction', p.10.

⁵⁵ Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games'.

⁵⁶ Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

simply combining domestic and international explanatory factors, it focuses on their interaction. Thus, the two-level game hypothesises that the negotiator, who holds a gatekeeper position between the national and the international arena, can coax the domestic audience into accepting an agreement by pretending that the constraints of the opposing side will not allow for any compromises. The negotiator can also extract higher international concessions by alleging strong domestic pressures.

Nevertheless, several criticisms can be made with regard to the synthesis of multiple levels and its analysis of the decision-making process. First, although the two-level game realises that a multiplicity of public and private actors is directly and indirectly involved in international negotiation processes, its analysis is limited to domestic and governmental actors. The governmental level embraces exclusively the negotiators of each state and their staff. Representatives of domestic actors may be present at the international negotiations, but are not considered to become actively involved. Although Putnam mentions the impact of transnational interactions in his case study of the Bonn summit in 1978, he fails to conceptualise transnational relations in his original model. The original two-level game merely accounts for tacit transnational alliances between domestic constituents of both countries or between internal actors and the foreign negotiator. However, they seem to originate in a coincidental convergence of interests, rather than the formation of a transnational 'win-set' through direct interaction. Although this shortcoming has been addressed by Jeffrey Knopf's 'Three-Level Game', the diversity of actors in the modified approach is still limited.⁵⁷ In particular, the staff of international organisations, such as the EU or the OSCE, who frequently mediate in intergovernmental negotiations, do not feature within either model. Nor do the two approaches illustrate how third states can directly or indirectly influence the bargaining process.

Similar to the transnationalist model discussed above, the main weakness of the two-level game lies in its conceptualisation of the decision-making process. In particular, the concept of win-sets obscures the relationship between agency and structure, since it can be interpreted as three distinct, but interrelated, variables. First, the win-set is defined as 'all possible Level I [i.e. international] agreements that could 'win' - that is, gain the

⁵⁷ Jeffrey Knopf, 'Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Negotiations', *International Organization* 47:3, 1993, pp.599-628, p.599.

necessary majority among the constituents - when simply voted up or down'⁵⁸. Thus, win-sets appear to refer to the policy preferences which are the basis of a negotiation. Second, the term win-set is employed with reference to the distinctive constituencies, i.e. the sets of agents who support specific policies. Third, possible win-sets are said to be determined by the distribution of power among domestic actors.⁵⁹

As a consequence of these three interpretations, the two-level game fails to address the relationships among these variables. In particular, the ability of actors within a win-set to use their power in order to influence the preferences of the negotiator or actors in other win-sets is not considered. Conversely, the negotiator appears to be the only agent in the model in that he or she can influence and change policy preferences. The negotiator alone can rally and restructure win-sets in support for a certain negotiation agreement. In order to do so, the negotiator can use his institutional position, the information available to him and payoffs to different actors, i.e. variables which determine the power of the negotiator vis-à-vis domestic actors. The actors who are part of a domestic win-set are entirely passive. They seek neither to influence the negotiator nor to enlarge their win-set by persuading other domestic actors to join. Finally, the government representative is in the position to 'select' one of the win-sets as the basis for an international agreement rather than being influenced by domestic pressure in favour of a particular policy.

In evaluation, the two-level game and its extension, the three-level game, appear more suited to the analysis of contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes than the transnationalist model discussed above. The two-level game not only integrates theoretically the domestic and international system, but also presents testable hypotheses as to how both levels of analysis interdependently determine foreign policy outcomes. However, while the two-level game reflects the increasing multiplicity and diversity of actors in Western European and transatlantic foreign policy making, it offers few insights into the decision-making process beyond the influence of the government which is still perceived as the gatekeeper between the national and the international arena. The network approach which will be discussed in the following has traditionally focussed on the analysis of the relations among political actors at different levels of analysis.

⁵⁸ Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', p.439.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.443.

Network Models

Network models have originally been used to examine the relations between public and private actors in domestic decision-making processes. The models emerged as a reaction to the observation that traditional models of hierarchical decision-making structures within the intrastate system were decreasingly met by empirical observations.⁶⁰ In particular in Britain, the trend towards privatisation and deregulation in various policy sectors such as housing, transport and telecommunications had increased the number, diversity and interdependence of public and private actors who are engaged in political decision-making. Thus, in the 1980s the term 'networks' was increasingly employed to denote a specific theoretical concept in models of the domestic decision-making process. It described the non-hierarchical relations among a set of public and private actors who participated regularly in the decision-making process within a particular policy sector. In this tradition, networks were defined as 'policy arrangements characterized by the predominance of informal, decentralized and horizontal relations'.⁶¹ Further research, however, showed that informal policy structures displayed a mixture of relations ranging from hierarchical to pluralist or horizontal arrangements. In the ensuing debate, most proponents of the network approach came to embrace a different definition of networks which acknowledged their flexible and multifaceted structure.⁶² The new consensus was summarised by Kenis and Schneider who observed:

The networks 'integrative logic cannot be reduced to any single logic such as bureaucracy, market, community, or corporatist association, for example, but is characterized by the capacity for mixing different combinations of them'.⁶³

It is this definition which makes the network concept especially suited for theorizing about

⁶⁰ Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies', *British Journal of Political Science* 19:1, 1989, pp.47-67; Grant Jordan, 'Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process', *Journal of Public Policy* 1:1, 1981, pp.95-123; Rhodes, *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall*.

⁶¹ Marin and Mayntz, 'Introduction', p.16.

⁶² Hans Bressers, Laurence J. O'Toole and Jeremy Richardson, 'Networks as Models of Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative Perspective', *Environmental Politics* 3:4, 1994, pp.1-23, p.5.

⁶³ Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.25-59, p.42.

contemporary foreign policy decision-making which crosses different levels of analysis.

Although a broad variety of models have been developed on the basis of this definition, most authors agree on the central features of the network approach as an analytical framework. According to this common ground, networks can be defined as all public and private actors who share an interest in a specific policy area and who are linked to each other through stable formal or informal relations. The key hypothesis of the network approach is that the distribution of these relations, i.e. the 'structure' of the network, determines the ability of its members to influence decision-making processes.⁶⁴ Specifically, various network models suggest typologies of different network structures defined by the dominance of certain actors or coalitions of actors who typically determine the outcomes of the decision-making processes within the network.

The advantage of the network approach is that it seems best to reflect the multiplicity and diversity of agents in contemporary decision-making. The application of the framework at different levels of analysis and across various issue areas has proved the ability of the approach to model political networks among public and private agents in the domestic, transnational and international arenas. Moreover, the network approach proposes a general model of political decision-making which is not confined to a specific type of decision-making, such as international negotiations or transnational influence. The network approach achieves its parsimony by focussing on distinct policy sectors or domains. Most crucially, however, the network approach does not presume the dominance of specific positions within the network or a gatekeeper role of governments, but treats the distribution of linkages within and across national boundaries as an open question -which has to be answered by empirical analysis.

Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysing foreign policy decision-making in contemporary Western Europe and North America, existing network models are challenged in two ways. First, although network models have been employed in empirical studies of decision-making at the national, transnational and international level, few attempts have been made to theorise about the synthesis of multiple levels within the network approach. In particular, the question how networks, actors and their relations have to be defined in order to be consistently applicable across levels of analysis has rarely

⁶⁴ Frans van Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.

been addressed. Second, like transnationalism and the two-level game, few network models provide testable hypotheses which could help to explain the interactions and coalition building processes among public and private actors. In fact, due to the predominant concern of the network approach with the link between network structures and policy outcomes, most models neglect the role of decision-making processes as an intermediate variable. Typically, network models link network structures and outcomes in typologies which assume the form of quasi-causal propositions. However, since network types are usually defined according to a broad number of variable dimensions, the number of possible network structures often exceeds the number of the proposed ideal-types thus making it difficult to test these propositions. As Maurice Wright observes, policy outcomes are more often 'read off' a type of network than 'explained'.⁶⁵

Moreover, because of their failure to hypothesise about interactions, many network models have problems explaining changes in policy preferences and coalitions during the decision-making process. In particular, network models which define network types according to 'dominant' coalitions only allow change as a result of transformations in a network's structure. In doing so, these network approaches fail to recognise that policy preferences and coalitions can be influenced by the decision-making process as well as network structures.

Crucially for the argument presented here, that the network approach is the most appropriate framework for the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making, several suggestions have been made to improve the network approach. Specifically, the limitations of network typologies for the explanation rather than the understanding of decision-making have been widely recognised. In response, networks are increasingly treated as unique, and analysis has focussed on the mapping of individual networks rather than the categorization into ideal types. Most important, it has been suggested that network analysis can be fruitfully combined with rational choice assumptions in order to hypothesise about changing policy preferences and coalitions. Taking on board these suggestions, this thesis proposes a definition of networks which moves away from typologies and suggests testable hypotheses regarding the decision-

⁶⁵ Maurice Wright, 'Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies', *Political Studies* XXXVI:4, 1988, pp.593-612, p.595. On the difference between 'explaining' and 'understanding' as used in this thesis see Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding in International Relations*.

making process as an intermediate variable between network structures and outcomes on the basis of rational choice. Furthermore, this thesis proceeds to test whether the derived propositions have empirical value for the explanation of foreign policy decision-making in Western Europe and the broader transatlantic community.

1.4 Method

In order to assess the explanatory value of multilevel network theory, this thesis tests the model in a number of case studies. Its evaluation rests on a critical realist epistemology and empiricist method which offers, if not undebated, at least clear standards. Nevertheless, this thesis pays heed to some of the criticism which has been raised against empiricism during the 'Third Debate'. Specifically, it acknowledges the necessity to take the spatio-temporal and cultural limitations of empirical evidence and theories into account.⁶⁶ In the final instance, however, it recognises that the validity of empirical evidence and the explanatory value of the theoretical approach presented in the following can only be assessed in the academic debate.

Case Selection

The context and area of application and the criteria for the selection of suitable test cases directly derive from the preceding sections. Multilevel network theory seeks to contribute to the theoretical modelling of the changed nature of foreign policy decision-making processes in the 1990s. It recognises that decision-making structures are subject to change, as indeed they have significantly after the end of the Cold War. Network analysis can only provide a 'snapshot' of the relations among the relevant actors during a particular period of time. While many structures, such as the distribution of authority within the democratic systems in the transatlantic area are relatively permanent, others, such as international regimes can be subject to considerable change and require regular updates.

In addition, multilevel network theory has a clear geographical focus. Although the observed transformation of foreign policy decision-making has not been limited to Western Europe and North America, it has both its origins and its centre here. Multilevel network

⁶⁶ See for instance Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, 'Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* 35:4, 1991, pp.363-386.

theory should, therefore, first and foremost be applied to and assessed with regard to its ability to examine and illustrate foreign policy decision-making in this region. Moreover, multilevel network theory is an integral part of the academic and political debate in the Western community. It is directly related to the normative values underlying the question of multilevel influences on national governments raised in the literature regarding the 'crisis' of the nation-state. Its underlying concern is the question of democratic accountability. By examining the influence of public and private actors at the domestic, transnational and international levels as compared to the legitimate authority of national governments, multilevel network theory contributes to identifying the challenges which confront democratic decision-making in a changing environment.

The focus of the following case studies is a consequence of these contextual limitations. By choosing the governments of two Western European countries, namely Britain and Germany, it not only conforms with the geographical confines of network theory, it also reacts to the normative debate in Britain and Germany over the loss of national sovereignty. The choice of cases in which the democratically elected governments of two Western European countries had the ultimate decision-making authority should illuminate which and how national, transnational and international actors were able to influence 'national' foreign policies. Since the increased multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of political actors at different levels of analysis coincided with theoretical developments in the early 1990s, the cases were selected from the period between 1990 and 1995. The restriction of the research period to five years also helped to maintain the stability of the network structures. Some changes due to the transformation of international institutions or as the result of national elections, however, could not be avoided. They were mapped accordingly and reflected by changes in the associated hypotheses.⁶⁷

While these epistemological concerns defined the range of possible cases, further criteria were chosen to explore the scope for the application of multilevel network theory within these limits. In particular, the four cases were selected for their variance in two

⁶⁷ See Appendix 1 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95' and Appendix 2 'German Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

areas: the structure of the network and the nature of the policy issue.⁶⁸ Thus, in order to test whether the hypotheses of multilevel network theory can help to explain the foreign policy decision-making of different Western European governments, two cases each involved the distinct, but overlapping networks of Britain and Germany. Second, one case study for each country explored the decision-making process regarding a security policy issue, while the other applied to a policy decision in the area of defence economics. Since the area of security and defence policy has traditionally been perceived as dominated by governmental decision-making, the four cases essentially presented a ‘crucial’ test for multilevel network theory. Most importantly for the testing of the proposed theory, all cases were characterised by a change of policy by the government as the ultimate decision unit. If the hypotheses of multilevel network theory are correct, this policy change should have been preceded by a series of preference changes within the network which eventually led to the formation of a ‘winning coalition’ in favour of the final policy outcome. In order to assure that the governmental policy reversal was the result of interactions within and not due to factors outside the network, the cases were also controlled for changes in the situation or broader international context.

Table 1.1 Case Studies

	BRITAIN	GERMANY
SECURITY	Case I: Air strikes in Bosnia	Case III: Tornados to Bosnia
DEFENCE ECONOMICS	Case II: Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile	Case IV: Dual-use Export Regulations

The four cases which were selected on the ground of these criteria included, first, the British endorsement of air strikes in Bosnia in 1993 following a year in which the British administration had vehemently opposed military action; second, the progressive abandonment of the British tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) programme between 1990 and 1993; third, the first out-of-area despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia in the summer of 1995 in spite of earlier assertions by the German government that the

⁶⁸ Andrew Murray Faure, ‘Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics’, *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:3, 1994, pp.307-322., p.316; Tom Mackie and David Marsh, ‘The Comparative Method’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.173-188, pp.178f.

Bundeswehr would not intervene in the former Yugoslavia because of historical reasons; and finally, the reduction of export restrictions on technology with civil and military applications ('dual-use' goods) by the German government in 1995 although the law had only been introduced in 1992.

Theory Testing

The testing of any theory has to address two questions as to the conditions under which a hypothesis or theory can be empirically evaluated: First, how many case studies have to be conducted in order to arrive at a valid assessment? Second, is a hypothesis 'falsified' by one disconfirming instance?⁶⁹

The first question is associated with the problem of 'many variables, small N' which means that the number of explanatory variables exceeds the number of cases. In these circumstances, the test of the theory will always be inconclusive.⁷⁰ Within the context of this thesis, the problem could be avoided, however, since the hypotheses of multilevel network theory concern the preference changes of the actors in the network rather than the outcome of a case. Within the analytical framework of multilevel network theory, the outcome of the decision-making process is merely the preference change of the ultimate decision unit. It is preceded by a series of preference changes among the actors within the network which leads to the formation of a 'winning coalition' in favour of a particular policy. Instead of case studies, the number of preference changes was the object of the test. The change or maintenance of their policy preference by each of the network actors represented a 'case' for a plausibility probe of the hypotheses.⁷¹

More serious was the second problem for the testing of multilevel network theory, since its hypotheses are necessarily probabilistic. As such, they prevent their testing through simple falsification.⁷² Deterministic causal relations which are the basis for falsifiable hypotheses, however, can only be rejected in social science. Not only is it

⁶⁹ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper & Collins, 1959).

⁷⁰ Arend Lijphart, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method', *American Political Science Review* 65:3, 1971, pp.682-695.

⁷¹ On the measurement and observation of preference changes see chapter 2.

⁷² Donald A. Gillies, 'A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 22:3, 1971, pp.231-261; Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.91-195.

impossible to control for the full range of environmental factors which affect a single case study, the nature of social interaction itself prohibits a deterministic conception of causality since the social world is inter-subjectively constructed. The empiricist paradigm, nevertheless, asserts that theoretical explanations of social phenomena can be inter-subjectively assessed. Several criteria have been agreed upon as evaluative standards for theoretical models within this methodological framework, such as explanatory power, progressive research programmes, consistency, parsimony and their correspondence with empirical findings.⁷³ These criteria imply that theories and alternative hypotheses have to be evaluated in comparison to each other. Moreover, this study offers clear evidence for the assessment of the hypotheses by measuring the number of instances in which they were corroborated. Whether the degree to which the hypotheses meet empirical observation is acceptable will have to be decided in the academic debate. Although this methodology prohibits the immediate corroboration or falsification of the hypotheses, it allows an assessment of the theory according to the above-mentioned standards. Moreover, it encourages the identification of variables or conditions which help to explain unusual variations in the findings and to increase the degree to which the hypotheses meet empirical observation.

In the following this thesis is structured in six chapters. The second chapter develops multilevel network theory by examining the key concepts of existing network approaches and modifying them for the purpose of multilevel analysis. The third and fourth chapters deal with the British decision-making process regarding air strikes in Bosnia and the abolition of the tactical air-to-surface missile project, and the fifth and sixth chapters analyse the German decisions to despatch Tornados to Bosnia and reduce national dual-use export controls. Each case includes a separate assessment of the explanatory value of the hypotheses suggested by the theory. Finally, the conclusion draws together the findings from all cases in order to arrive at a general evaluation of multilevel network theory. Furthermore, it seeks to refine the hypotheses where the empirical evidence suggests additional variables or conditions. The final section examines multilevel network theory

⁷³ Oran R. Young, 'The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations', in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.179-203, p.181; Vasquez, 'The Post-Positivist Debate', p.230. See also Benjamin Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

in comparison with the three multilevel approaches criticised in this chapter and proposes additional case studies and new areas of application.

2. Multilevel Network Theory

2.1 Introduction

Multilevel network theory builds on and modifies existing network approaches in several ways in order to model contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes in Europe and North America and to enhance the explanatory capabilities of the approach. This chapter proceeds to discuss these modifications in four sections. The first section reexamines the concept of networks in the context of the increasing multiplicity of actors engaged in foreign policy making. It asks how the boundaries of networks can be defined if contemporary foreign policy decision-making involves a variety of public and private actors across levels of analysis. The second part deals with the consequences of the growing diversity and interdependence of network actors for the analysis of power relations in networks. The third part examines the concept of actors in the light of their increasing variety. It argues that the notion of individual role actors cannot only be consistently applied to public as well as private agents, but also to multiple levels of analysis. While the policy preferences of role actors differ widely and can only be established inductively, this section proposes that rational choice theory can suggest suitable hypotheses which may help to explain changes in the policy preferences of the actors and the formation of coalitions in favour of particular policies during the foreign policy decision-making process. Finally, the last section of this chapter illustrates the operationalisation of multilevel network theory in the following four case studies.

2.2 Concept and Boundaries of Multilevel Networks

It has been argued in the introduction of this thesis that the concept of policy networks is especially suited for the analysis of contemporary multilevel decision-making because it is able to model a variety of actors engaged in the modern policy process as well as the flexible and multifaceted relations among them.¹ This ability is based on a definition of policy networks as a set of public and private actors who share an interest in a particular

¹ Hans Bressers, Laurence O'Toole and Jeremy Richardson, 'Networks as Models of Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative Perspective', *Environmental Politics* 3:4, 1994, pp.1-23, p.5; Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.25-59, p.42

issue area, who routinely interact with each other and who are connected to each other through stable formal and informal relations of various kinds.² The problem which arises from this definition, however, is that it provides no clear criteria for delineating the boundaries of distinct networks. The attempt to define the boundaries of networks has therefore led to various approaches in network analysis. Most network theorists have attempted to distinguish separate networks by their internal features. Thus, according to R.A.W. Rhodes, different networks are determined by their membership, degree of integration, distribution of resource dependence and distribution of power.³ In a more recent review of network models, Frans van Waarden observes that networks are commonly distinguished along seven dimensions. They include the number and type of actors, function and structure of the networks, the degree of institutionalisation, rules of conduct, power relations and actors' strategies.⁴

A close scrutiny of these dimensions shows that distinct networks are defined by two aspects: their agents and their structure. In addition to the above mentioned disagreements over which specific dimensions should be taken into account in delineating different networks, this poses a particular problem. According to the definition of networks presented in the previous chapter, the characteristic feature of networks is that they include a diversity of agents and different types of relations. Moreover, each network combines a different mixture of them. It follows that attempts to delineate the boundaries of networks on the basis of a distinction, for instance, between public and private actors or hierarchical and horizontal structures are inherently inconsistent with the notion of networks. Returning to the definition of networks, it emerges that the only characteristic which distinguishes one network from another is the stability of the relations among the actors and the regularity with which they interact. It follows that the boundaries of networks can only be identified as disconnections among sets of political actors. Benson has pointed this out in an early sociological definition of a network as a 'complex of organisations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from

² Compare Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance', *Governance* 5:2, 1992, pp.154-180.

³ R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches', in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.1-26.

⁴ Frans van Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.

other ... complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies'.⁵

Two lines of reasoning support the proposition that these breaks generally comply with 'policy sectors' or 'issue areas', such as education, health, agriculture, transportation, monetary policy, energy or labour.⁶ The first argument contends that networks conform with the sectoral division of policy sectors because of functional differentiation among political actors.⁷ It proceeds from the observation that political decision-making in Western industrialised democracies is structured along the divisions of labour between sectoral ministries. Separate departments deal with policy making and implementation in the agriculture, health or defence sectors, for instance. Moreover, the sectoral division of public institutions shapes the relations through which private actors can seek to influence the political decision-making process. Thus, large armaments companies will usually have strong and stable ties with ministries of defence, while farming associations are typically linked to ministries for agriculture.

The second argument in favour of the sectoral boundaries of networks is that stable relationships evolve among actors who depend on each other for the exchange of material or ideational resources, such as money or expertise. Since political influence and information are ideational resources, the second argument supports the first. In addition, it points out the role of resource-dependencies in defining relations which are not institutionalised, but informal and flexible. Expressions of such relations in the private sphere include the subcontracting of production as well as collaboration in research and development among companies in the same sector. In the following case studies, such informal relations can be found in particular in Britain where industry relations were deregulated in the 1980s.⁸ In Germany, conversely, existing resource-dependencies and commonalties of interest have produced strong industry associations which institutionalise

⁵ J.K. Benson, 'A Framework for Policy Analysis', in D. Rogers et al., eds., *Interorganizational Coordination* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982) cited in R.A.W. Rhodes, *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p.77. Compare John Peterson, 'Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Reply to Kassim', *West European Politics* 18:2, 1995, pp.389-407, p.402.

⁶ See Maurice Wright, 'Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies', *Political Studies* XXXVI, 1988, pp.593-614, p.596; Atkinson and Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance', p.157; John P. Heinz et al., 'Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems', *Journal of Politics* 52:2, 1990, pp.356-390.

⁷ Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, 'Introduction', in *ibid.*, eds., *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), p.17.

⁸ However, in the mid-1990s the British Department of Trade and Industry has actively encouraged the reestablishment of industry associations in order to structure and simplify public-private relations.

the relations within sectors and represent their members vis-à-vis governmental actors.

Foreign policy analysis has traditionally posed a problem for the delineation of network boundaries because it did not conform with the sectoral divisions of domestic policy processes. On the one hand foreign policy making transgressed national boundaries because it routinely involved transnational and international actors, on the other hand it crossed sectoral lines because each ministry conducted its foreign relations through the Foreign Office. The transformations of the foreign policy decision-making process in Western Europe and the transatlantic community described in the introduction have changed both conditions.⁹ Transgovernmental relations today conform with issue areas since departmental ministries increasingly cooperate directly with their counterparts in other Western European countries and across the Atlantic. In fact, sectoral departments such as the Economic Ministries now often take the prime responsibility for leading EU negotiations in their issue area, as will be shown in the case study regarding the German dual-use goods export regulations. Functional divisions also dominate among international organisations which channel transnational and international cooperation between states. Moreover, where international organisations have attained some authority over foreign relations, these have been structured along functional lines. In particular, this can be observed in the continuing distinction between predominantly economic institutions such as the European Union (EU) and security organisations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). Indeed, the European Union itself is structured according to issue areas which are represented by the divisions within the Commission, sectoral councils and their hierarchies of committees. It follows that rather than adapting the network concept for the analysis of multilevel foreign policy decision-making, recent changes of the process have increased its similarity with domestic decision-making processes and thus made it more susceptible to network analysis.

⁹ David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond Typology', in *ibid.*, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp.249-268, p.258; John Peterson, 'The European Technology Community', in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 226-248; Philip Gummett and Judith Reppy, 'Military Industrial Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment', *Government and Opposition* 25:3, 1990, pp.287-303; Atkinson and Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and Problems of Governance', p.163.

The consequence of the expansion of sectoral decision-making structures in virtually all issue areas across national boundaries, however, raises the question whether a distinct 'foreign policy' network exists. If most sectoral policy networks in contemporary Western democracies cross levels of analysis, they all are potentially foreign policy networks in that some of the decisions made within them would be 'directed to some actual or potential sphere outside the jurisdiction of the state polity'¹⁰. Nevertheless, it can be argued that a foreign policy network can be found alongside increasingly transnational sectoral networks such as agriculture, industry or telecommunications. Although the latter are characterised by transnational and transgovernmental interaction in political decision-making, the decisions taken within these networks typically apply to and are implemented at the domestic level. As such, these decisions are not foreign policies as defined above. Furthermore, based on the definition of networks as sets of actors who share a specific interest in a particular issue area and who are linked to each other through stable relations, a range of actors networks can be identified which are predominantly concerned with policies directed to and implemented at the international arena. They subsume all public and private actors whose primary interests lie beyond the national boundaries of their countries. Actors concerned with national security and defence policy certainly fall into this category as their only interests are matters beyond their national boundaries. However, foreign policy networks also include export industries because they are mainly affected by the political regulation of transnational relations.

Finally, the question emerges how networks in general, and foreign policy networks in particular, change and how this affects their delineation. The introduction of this thesis has suggested that the foreign policy decision-making process has been considerably transformed over the past 40 years. This transformation has not only included the emergence of new actors in decision-making processes, but also the increasing interdependence between public and private actors at the national and international level. Analytically two causes can be distinguished which may lead to changes in networks: external and internal causes. External causes might involve the advent of new actors who share an interest in an issue area and seek to gain access to the decision-making process. Internal causes may be self-induced changes, e.g. political decisions which redefine the

¹⁰ See definition of 'foreign policy' in chapter 1, p.19.

formal relations among sets of actors in a sector, material changes in the resources of actors, or routine and institutionalised changes, such as elections which bring new parties into government. All impact directly on the delineation of networks and, therefore, any map of a network can only provide a temporary 'snapshot' of the actors and relations involved. However, since a network by definition consists of a stable set of agents who regularly interact, only long-term changes which apply not only to a single case, but indicate a more permanent transformation of the network across a range of issues, are considered relevant. Within the five-year range of the case studies the institutional changes in a number of international organisations, such as NATO and the OSCE, certainly belonged to this category. But elections, such as the coming to power of Bill Clinton in the United States (US), also changed some relations within the British and German foreign policy networks. The following section examines how these relations are defined.

2.3 Network Structures as Dyadic Power Relations

While the actors and their relations cannot distinguish between networks, the two are essential for the analysis of network structures and the ways in which they affect the decision-making process. Since multilevel network theory seeks to explain how political actors influence each other's policy preferences, this structure has to be analysed in terms of how it affects the ability of actors to exert influence. The ability to influence is grasped in the concept of power. However, the notion of power has been regarded as an essentially contested concept.¹¹ In particular, different conceptions and measures of power have been employed in the analysis of the domestic on one hand and the international policy making on the other. This section develops a definition of power which can be applied to actors across multiple levels of analysis.

Any theory which seeks to analyse the ability of political actors to influence each other is *per definitionem* based on a concept of power. Power can be defined as the potential or actual ability of an actor A to deliberately change the preferences or the behaviour of another actor B with respect to an issue X.¹² It can be differentiated from the

¹¹ William E. Connolly, *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

¹² Compare Keith Dowding, *Rational Choice and Political Power* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991), p.68; Connolly, *Terms of Political Discourse*; David Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Blackwell, 1989).

concept of influence in that power can be both the potential and actual capacity to modify another actor's beliefs or actions, while influence only applies to actual, observable changes. Two key features characterise this definition of power. First, it describes a dyadic relationship, namely the relation between two actors A and B.¹³ It follows that the analysis of networks which utilises the concept of power should describe a network as a set of dyadic relationships. Following from this definition of power, the structure of a network is best described in terms of the relations between any two actors expressed in the form of a matrix, such as Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Matrix of Dyadic Relations

	Actor A	Actor B	Actor C	Actor D
Actor A		relation A to B	relation A to C	relation A to D
Actor B	relation B to A		relation B to C	relation B to D
Actor C	relation C to A	relation C to B		relation C to D
Actor D	relation D to A	relation D to B	relation D to C	

The second feature of this definition of power is that, unlike influence, it cannot be directly observed or measured because it also denotes the potential to influence. Power has to be analysed either deductively or inductively, i.e. it can be inferred from A's capabilities in advance of its exertion or it can be measured *a posteriori* by changes in B's behaviour or preferences.¹⁴ While the former relies on the study of material and ideational properties, the latter investigates behaviour. Both methods have been used in the study of domestic policy networks. However, only the deductive approach suggests an explanation as to why the actor A can influence actor B. Conversely, the inductive approach concludes that power is the result of influence. Where an actor A has the observed ability to influence B, it is presumed that he or she has also the capability to do so in future. The question what enables A to modify B's behaviour is not addressed.

The difference between the two approaches is based on their understanding of the

¹³ Richard M. Emerson, 'Power-Dependence Relations', *American Sociological Review* 27:1, 1962, pp.31-40; Baldwin, *Paradoxes of Power*.

¹⁴ Connolly, *Terms of Political Discourse*.

nature of power. The inductive approach treats power as a type of relationship, while the deductive approach conceives of power as a causal hypothesis.¹⁵ Specifically, the deductive approach suggests that a causal relationship exists between the preferences and actions of actor A and the preferences and actions of actor B. However, in order to denote a causal relation and not merely a correlation, the deductive approach has to distinguish between cause and effect. Stating that A's and B's preferences and actions correlate would not describe a genuine causal relationship between both actors. A causal relationship has to identify the direction of the causality, i.e. it has to differentiate whether A influences B or vice versa. Analytically, four types of power relations can be distinguished with regard to causation, i.e. the direction in which power can be exerted:

- (1) A has power over B [$A > B$, 'hierarchical'],
- (2) B has power over A [$A < B$, 'pluralistic'],
- (3) A and B have power over each other [$A \diamond B$, 'interdependent'] and
- (4) neither A nor B has power over the other [$A|B$ or $A B$, 'autonomous'].

The structure of a network can then be described as the distribution of these four types of relations among all members of the network. They can best be displayed in the form of a two-dimensional matrix as in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Types of Power Relations

		A	
		no power	power
B	no power	A B (autonomous)	A > B (hierarchical)
	power	A < B (pluralistic)	A <> B (interdependent)

In addition to distinguishing between the direction of a causal power relationship, the

¹⁵ Jack H. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

distinction between cause and effect has to be justified in order to meet the definition of causality. Such justification is provided by an explanation as to *why* A has the actual or potential ability to influence the behaviour and preferences of B. In political theory such an explanation is referred to as the 'bases' of a power relation.¹⁶ Two alternative explanations have dominated the analysis of domestic policy analysis on one hand and international relations on the other until the 1980s. In international relations, power was traditionally associated with material resources, while in the domestic system power was predominantly explained by institutional structures.¹⁷ The different explanations were a result of the perceived structural differences between the national and the international system. Thus, in the domestic arena, institutional analysis traditionally featured strongly because of the perceived dominance of formal, institutionalised decision-making structures. The international arena, which was viewed by neo-realists as the realm of anarchy characterised by the absence or limited influence of formal institutions, material resources were favoured as indicators of power.¹⁸

Although the distinction between institutionalised domestic structures and international anarchy has never been clear-cut, the transformation of decision-making processes in the transatlantic community has led to an increasing convergence of domestic and international structures. While domestic public-private relations have been characterised by deregulation since in the 1980s and privatisation continues in sectors such as telecommunication, transport and health, international institutions have proliferated due to the expansion of the functional scope of the EU, NATO or the OSCE for instance. As a consequence of these changes and due to the extension of decision-making networks across systemic boundaries, it has become necessary to integrate the analysis of resources and institutions for the study of power in multilevel networks. The following investigates how the analysis of institutions and resources can be combined across levels of analysis in order to deduce power relations in multilevel networks.

¹⁶ Connolly, *Terms of Political Discourse*.

¹⁷ R.A.W. Rhodes, *The National World of Local Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p.17.

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

Relational Bases of Power

Since this thesis defines power as a causal relation, its analysis requires relational indicators. This does not pose a problem with regard to institutions. Institutions denote social relations in their definition as ‘persistent and connected sets of rules (informal and formal) that prescribe roles, constrain activities and shape expectations’.¹⁹ They attribute competence and legitimate authority to certain political actors within the decision-making process by describing their relations with other actors and by prescribing legitimate modes of action between actors. In Western democracies, most formal institutional relations are codified in national constitutions, laws and regulations. In addition, informal institutional relations have emerged through convention and can be observed in the regular interactions between public and private actors. Britain holds a special position in this respect because it does not have a written constitution, but relies primarily on conventions for the definition of its institutional relations in the political realm. However, as has been argued above, formal institutional relations are not confined to the domestic level. In the international arena, formal institutional relations have been set up by treaties, regimes and documents of the main international organisations. They not only define legitimate relations and modes of interaction among state governments, but also between private actors, such as firms, interest groups or even individuals.

Contrary to institutions, the distribution of resources among actors at different levels of analysis may be coined in relative terms, but it is not a relational concept. An actor’s possession of specific resources does not *per se* reveal anything about his or her power relations with other actors. Although an actor might attempt to use his or her resources in bargaining situations or to force other actors to modify their behaviour, these efforts are likely to be unsuccessful if the targeted actors have control over similar resources. In order to provide A with power over B, A’s resources have to meet the needs and/or lack of resources by B.²⁰ Specifically, resources can be the basis of two forms of power relations. First, resources can be used in exchanges as described by the relational concept of ‘resource-dependence’ among actors. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye define such (inter)dependence as situations ‘where there are reciprocal (although not

¹⁹ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1989), p.3.

²⁰ Emerson, ‘Power-Dependence Relations’; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*.

necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions'.²¹ Second, resources can be employed to force or threaten to force actors to change their behaviour if they lack matching resources.

Since multilevel networks are based on a stable set of actors who regularly interact with each other, it can be argued that physical force or the threat of force plays a negligible role in the analysis of multilevel networks. As will be argued in more detail below, all network actors potentially depend on each other for the formation of coalitions in the political decision-making process. The use or threat of force would endanger future cooperation in such coalitions and, therefore, is believed to entail greater long-term risks than short-term benefits. As a consequence, resource-dependence has been regarded as the primary basis of material relations within networks. They require the examination of two variables: the distribution of resources and the respective needs of each actor. Given the variety of actors in multilevel networks, multilevel network theory practically rules out the possibility of arriving at a conclusive list of power resources.²² Conversely, multilevel network theory requires a flexible approach to power resources which essentially includes all tangible and intangible assets which may determine resource-dependence relations between any two particular actors. Due to the infinite range of resources which may be the basis of resource-dependence relations, the analysis of the exchange relations among network actors best begins with an examination of the specific needs of each actor and by whom these needs can be met.

In multilevel network analysis 'needs' can best be defined as the 'objective welfare demands' of actors because they allow needs to be deduced from the basic functions of the actors.²³ According to this definition, needs stem from basic physical requirements necessary to ensure survival and prosperity. Commonly, physical needs of individuals are listed as food, shelter, safety and employment.²⁴ They also include all resources which are required for the fulfilment of the specific functions of public and private actors, such as the

²¹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1989), p.9.

²² Thus, Rhodes suggests that five resources are central to networks: authority, money, legitimacy, information and organisational resources. See R. A. W. Rhodes, *The National World of Local Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p.17.

²³ Dowding, *Rational Choice and Political Power*, p.35.

²⁴ Felix E. Oppenheim, *Political Concepts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p.128, p.141.

development and implementation of policies by ministerial departments and the provision of goods and services by private companies. Most of the functions of public actors are laid down in the documents which define their institutional relations with other actors within the network, while the functions of private actors arise from the objective demands of organisational welfare, i.e. the survival of a firm in a competitive market, and the need for resources for production and service. Once an actor's functional need for a specific set of resources has been established, it can be analysed which actors in the network are able to meet these needs and stand in a resource-exchange relation with the actor.

While the above asserts that institutional and resource-dependence relations are defined by different variables, both simultaneously define the type of power relation between any two actors in the network. However, the type and direction of power as determined by the two dimensions can differ. Thus, the resource-dependence relationship between an actor A and another actor B may give B power over A, while the institutional relationship between both might give A power over B. An example would be the relationship between a minister and his or her civil servants. Although the minister depends on information and expertise from the civil servants, he or she has institutional authority over their actions. In order to understand the power relations between any two actors in a multilevel network, therefore, the combined effect of both dimensions on the ability of actors to influence another has to be analysed.

Table 2.3 Combined Power Relations

		Resource-Dependence			
		A > B	A < B	A <> B	A B
Institutional Authority	A > B	A > B	A <> B	A <> B	A > B
	A < B	A <> B	A < B	A <> B	A < B
	A <> B	A <> B	A <> B	A <> B	A <> B
	A B	A > B	A < B	A < > B	A B

The cumulative influence of institutions and resource-dependencies on power relations can be perceived as a two-dimensional space which is displayed in Table 2.3. In each dimension, the power relation can take one of the four types of causal direction identified

above, namely hierarchical [A > B], pluralistic [B > A], interdependent [A <> B] and autonomous [A | B]. However, in so far as resources and institutions determine the relationship between two specific actors in a single network, they generate one power relation between them which combines both.

The cumulative definition of the power relation between any two actors by the two dimensions can be understood by three logical axioms. First, if one dimension is characterised by interdependence, the combined power relation is also interdependent. This proposition can be justified because the mutual dependence of the actors on each other cannot be terminated by any other type of relationship in the other dimension. To illustrate: If two ministries depend on each other for the exchange of information and expertise, a higher institutional authority of one ministry over the other in some issues does not change the fact that they are mutually dependent. From this axiom follows, second, hierarchical or pluralist types of power relations can only exist where the institutional and resource-dependence dimensions are characterised by either the same type or if the other relation is marked as autonomy. Thus to stay with the above example, the power relation between two ministries would be hierarchical if ministry B was dependent upon resources from ministry A as well as institutionally subordinate or autonomous from it. Third, if at least one dimension is hierarchical and at least one other pluralistic, the resulting power relation can be defined as interdependent. For instance, it can be argued that if actor A depends upon the resources of B, but can influence B because of his or her institutional authority, both actors will have the capability to exert power over another. To take another example from ministerial relations, such a combination is represented by the relationship between ministers and their civil servants. Typically, ministers would have the superior institutional control over the bureaucratic apparatus, but they require expertise and information which are provided by the civil servants. As a consequence both can exert some influence over each other.

Degrees of Power

The additive axioms presented above neglect that interdependence can be symmetrical as well as asymmetrical.²⁵ The analogy of resource-dependence with supply and demand

²⁵ Oppenheim, *Political Concepts*, p.34.

relations points to the fact that the power relation between any two actors A and B cannot be accurately understood outside the context of their respective relations with other network actors. A's power over B might be diminished, if B is able to satisfy his or her needs from alternative sources, such as actors C or D. Viewed from this contextual perspective, power relations are not absolute as implied by the four types of power relations identified above. Depending on the availability of resources, power should rather be conceptualised as a continuum which allows for different degrees. The same argument can be made with regard to institutions. Some actors have higher institutional authority over another actor than others. For instance, although both a parliamentary political party and a minister have the ability to influence the prime minister, the institutional influence of the minister will commonly be regarded as stronger than that of the parliamentary party.

In spite of the apparent reductionism of distinguishing merely four types of power relations in terms of their causal direction, several arguments support the usage of this approach for multilevel network theory. They show that a directional typology of power relations is not only empirically more rigorous than degrees of power, but also more conducive to the network approach. The main problem of degrees of power lie in their theoretical conceptualization and empirical measurement if power is defined in relational terms. Unlike the power as currency approach, it is not sufficient to measure the amount of power of each actor as indicated by his or her possession of selected variables, such as weapons, financial resources or personnel.²⁶ The relational definition of power also requires the measurement of the degree of need among other actors. To assess different degrees of power consistent criteria not only have to be developed for the evaluation of the degree of power provided by resource-dependence and institutions, but also for their combined effect. Contrary to the directional approach to power relations, the simple additive combination of the two dimensions is prohibited by such questions as whether resource-dependencies or institutions can overrule each other or whether and to what degree they enhance each other. The selection of consistent criteria for measuring and comparing degrees of resource-dependence and institutional power is obviously very problematic.

²⁶ See for instance Richard L. Merritt and Diana A. Zinnes, 'Alternative Indexes of National Power', in Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp.11-28.

Existing network models have tended to circumvent the theoretical and practical difficulties of measuring different degrees of power in favour of subjective-descriptive evaluations of power relations.²⁷ Thus, some inductive network approaches have resorted to questioning the members of the networks about perceived differences in their power. Other deductive network analyses have been based on the subjective assessment of power by academics. While these approaches allow for a more differentiated depiction of power relations in networks, they have been one of the main obstacles for the development of a network theory due to the problem of arriving at inter-subjectively agreed criteria. Network analysis has been hampered by a profusion of typologies of networks each based on different and rather vague criteria. Moreover, the preoccupation with the power structure of networks has led to the under-theorization of the concepts of agency and process in network models as has been criticised by both the advocates of the approach and its critics.

The definition of power relations in terms of their causal direction not only avoids these problems, it also returns to the origins of network analysis which focussed on the position of actors within the structure of their network. While a number of sociologists have continued to develop this approach with highly theoretical models, political science has proceeded towards greater descriptive detail in the analysis of the individual relations in networks. As an example of the former, Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore and Toshio Yamagishi, have examined how the simple presence or absence of relations among network actors bestows power upon those actors who have a high number of linkages and who are centrally placed to bridge sections of the network.²⁸ Conversely, the latter is represented by policy network models which emulate pluralist or bureaucratic decision-making models in seeking to explain the influence of network actors by descriptive accounts of the variegated characteristics of their relations.²⁹ Choosing a simple fourfold typology of causally directed network relations, multilevel network theory

²⁷ Rhodes, *National World of Local Government*, p.17.

²⁸ See for example Karen S. Cook, Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore and Toshio Yamagishi, 'The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results', *American Journal of Sociology* 89:2, 1983, pp.275-305; John Skvoretz and David Willer, 'Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks', *American Sociological Review* 58:6, 1993, pp.801-818; Toshio Yamagishi, Mary R. Gillmore and Karen S. Cook, 'Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks', *American Journal of Sociology* 93:4, 1988, pp.833-851.

²⁹ For a review of various approaches see Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks'.

returns to the origins of network analysis. It redirects the focus of network analysis on how the position of actors within a network affects their interactions and their ability to influence the decision-making process.³⁰

2.4 Actors, Preferences and Rational Choices

The preceding analysis of the power relations in networks takes the central place in network analysis because it is presumed that the actors will use their power in order to influence the decision-making process in their favour.³¹ The power structure of the network determines the ability of different actors to change each other's preferences regarding particular policies. However, in order to explain the resulting decision-making process, multilevel network theory has to make theoretically guided assumptions about the ways in which actors use their power relations within the network to exert pressure and when actors modify their policy preferences in response to pressure from other actors.³² In short, multilevel network theory has to illustrate the relationship between network structures and behaviour of political actors in the decision-making process.

Three connected variables determine the decision-making process: the actors, their preferences and the calculations which guide their actions. In existing network models various ways have been proposed to conceptualise them. The following section examines which is best suited for analysing the foreign policy decision-making process across levels of analysis. Moreover, this section proposes that multilevel network theory can fruitfully draw on rational choice theory which has been utilised by theories at both levels of analysis to arrive at general hypotheses regarding the behaviour of political actors in the national as well as international domain.

Collective Actors, Human Agents or Political Roles

The concept of actors in networks is crucial for an analysis of decision-making processes in two respects. First, the conceptualisation of network actors determines their resources

³⁰ Compare Keith Dowding, 'Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach', *Political Studies* XLIII:1, 1995, pp.136-158, pp.152f.

³¹ Edward O. Laumann et al., 'Organisations in Political Action: Representing Interests in National Policy Making', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), p.63.

³² Most and Starr, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics*.

and needs in the analysis of a network's structure. Second, the concept of network actors influences our understanding of their political preferences and their behaviour in the decision-making process. Three competing concepts of actors can be distinguished in various network models: collective actors, individual agents and role actors. Each poses different problems for the analysis of multilevel decision-making.

The concept of collective actors presumes that decision-making networks consist of relations among collective organisations, such as parties, interest groups, large firms, unions or governmental agencies.³³ The advantage of this approach is that the assumptions and conclusions regarding the power and interests of collective actors can be generalised. Although the membership of collective actors is subject to constant or periodical changes, the power relations and functions which refer to the organisations rather than their individual members are relatively stable. Moreover, institutionalised collective actors hold resources independent from the contributions of their membership. These resources can be employed for purposes which lie outside the immediate interests of their members. Among these interests, the most important goal is that of organisational welfare. The interest of organisations in their continued existence regardless of the necessity to fulfil certain functions within the political, social or economic system can be explained by the division between membership and consumers on one hand and leadership and employees on the other. Since the human agents who are employed by an organisation have a stake in its maintenance, i.e. their personal welfare, organisational survival is not merely an intermediate goal, but a primary objective in itself. Thus, collective actors do not only hold a stable position within a network as determined by their resources and institutional attributes, but also have a range of stable needs which derive from the independent and often prevalent goal of organisational survival and welfare.

For the development of a multilevel network theory of foreign policy decision-making in the 1990s, however, the utility of the collective actor approach is limited. Specifically, it poses a problem for the consistent conceptualization of diverse actors at the national and international level within a single theoretical framework. Most crucially, the

³³ See Michael Atkinson and William Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies', *British Journal of Political Science* 19:1, 1989, pp.47-67; Kenis and Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis', p.41; Rhodes and Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics', p.9; Renate Mayntz, 'Networks, Issues and Games', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp.189-209, p.192.

membership of collective actors at different levels of analysis varies between individuals, organisations and even states. As a consequence it is not possible to provide a consistent definition of collective actors for multilevel analysis. Additional disadvantages of the approach concern our definition of power which requires actors to use their relations with other actors intentionally. Rational choice theory has shown that collective actors fail to meet the requirement of intentional action since, as non-unitary actors, they do not necessarily have consistent preference hierarchies.³⁴

An alternative to the collective actor concept is presented by the individualist approach. The individual actor concept models networks as linkages and communication lines between individual human agents.³⁵ In fact, any empirical study of decision-making in networks will deal with the interactions of individuals, not impersonal organisations. The individualist perspective avoids the problem of intentional action since goal directed behaviour is a distinctive feature of human agency. In addition, the individualist perspective recognises that the ability to wield power also depends on personal capacities and characteristics. Similarly, the preferences of an actor may be determined by their organisational environment, but also by their personal desires. The descriptive and explanatory capacity of an individualist perspective, thus, is much higher than that of the collective actor approach.

By introducing additional variables related to the individual character of actors in decision-making networks, the analysis of specific cases is more comprehensive. Nevertheless, for the construction of a multilevel network theory the individual actor concept can only be rejected because it eventually inhibits theoretical generalisation. If personal characteristics play a dominant role in defining the relations among network actors and their interactions, no general statements can be made about them. The usage of the individual actor concept by network models has, therefore, contributed to its limitation to empirical-descriptive analysis which has been criticised in the introduction of

³⁴ See Donal P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p.15; James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p.13.

³⁵ See for instance Hugh Heclo, 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp.87-124; J.J. Richardson and A.G. Jordan, *Governing under Pressure* (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1979); Hans Bressers, Laurence O'Toole and Jeremy Richardson, 'Networks as Models of Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative Perspective', *Environmental Politics* 3:4, 1994, pp.1-23, p.6; Wright, 'Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies'; Steven Wilks and Maurice Wright, eds., *Comparative Government - Industry Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).

this thesis.

The preceding argument suggests that in the conceptualization of network actors a choice has to be made between theoretical generalisation and descriptive detail. Although this is ultimately true for the empirical analysis, both can be accommodated within the framework of multilevel network theory. The two perspectives can be reconciled by the concept of actors as individuals who play political, social, or economic roles.³⁶ A role is defined by the rights and obligations attributed to it by formal and informal institutions, its command over resources and the expectations which the role player and other members of a system or organisation hold with regard to it. Roles can only be understood in their institutional and social context. However, roles are held by individuals. They provide a conceptual bridge between the individual who bears a role and the social collective which shapes it. Moreover, the concept of roles can be employed in general theoretical accounts as well as in detailed empirical analyses.

On the level of a general network theory, roles are sufficiently defined by their enduring features. These are the aspects by which any individual who impersonates a role will be affected. Ranking in order of stability, formal institutions prescribe the most enduring attributes of roles. Informal institutions, resources, perceptions and expectations complement them. In all these respects, roles are crucially related to collective organisations and hence to the collective actor approach. In modern societies, organisations prescribe the institutional setting for roles, provide resources to enable them to fulfil their functions and shape the expectations regarding roles as captured in the notion of organisational cultures.³⁷ These variables not only define general features of actors in decision-making networks, empirical studies also suggest that they dominate individual preferences and behaviour. Thus, it can be argued that individuals have to fulfil their role in order to obtain personal objectives.³⁸ In fact, individuals are commonly appointed to a certain position because they meet the cultural expectations connected with it. For instance, bureaucrats, politicians as well as managers often share not only similar norms,

³⁶ Keith Dowding and Desmond King, eds., *Preferences, Institutions and Rational Choice* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p.11; Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', p.33; David Knoke, *Political Networks. The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.7.

³⁷ Dowding, *Rational Choice and Political Power*, p.147; Donald D. Searing, 'Roles, Rules and Rationality in the New Institutionalism', *American Political Science Review* 85:4, 1991, pp.1249-1260, p.1245.

³⁸ Searing, 'Roles, Rules and Rationality', p.1254.

cultures and preferences, but also aspects in their personal history, such as a university education. Moreover, roles shape the behaviour and preferences of human agents through internalisation as they learn to meet the standards and expectations which constantly confront them.³⁹ In sum, the concept of actors as role players can accommodate both theoretical generality and descriptive accuracy.

The conceptualisation of network actors as individuals playing roles, however, has to deal with the question of multiple roles. It arises from the fact that human agents typically hold a multiplicity of roles.⁴⁰ With regard to network relations, multiple roles increase the number of network relations which individual human agents can wield. A specific case is the so-called 'boundary role' which bridges levels of analysis or policy sectors. Here actors with boundary positions are defined as holding several, separate roles within different policy sectors or at the domestic and international level.⁴¹ Usually, boundary roles are held by high-ranking politicians, civil servants and the military who not only have national political and bureaucratic roles, but also have institutional roles in international organisations, such as the EU or NATO and the WEU. Among the latter two, the concept of 'double-hatting', which denotes individuals who serve as representatives in two organisations simultaneously, has added another international dimension to the concept of boundary roles which links international organisations.

Each of the roles held by an actor in a boundary position is typically linked to a number of actors. Therefore, actors with boundary roles are distinct from agents who hold only a single role, but have transnational or trans-sectoral linkages with other actors. Boundary roles are also distinct from the 'gatekeeper' concept employed in the two-level game. While actors with boundary roles may have an advantage in the decision-making process because they can influence a broad range of national and international actors, they are not the only actors who can do so. Actors with transnational linkages can also exert pressure across national borders. Moreover, actors with boundary roles cannot prevent transnational contacts and interactions among other actors and can therefore hardly be

³⁹ Bressers, O'Toole and Richardson, 'Networks as Models of Analysis', p.6.

⁴⁰ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision-Making', *British Journal of Political Science* 16:3, 1986, pp. 269-286, p.276.

⁴¹ In this sense the term boundary 'role' which has been used in the literature on transnational relations is misleading since it is not the role that crosses national boundaries, but the agents who hold multiple roles at different levels or in distinct sectors.

understood as 'gates' between the national and the international arena.

For the theoretical and empirical analysis multiple roles such as boundary roles, nevertheless, do not pose a problem. In the analysis of the British and German foreign policy networks each role is treated separately. In the case studies, individuals who hold multiple roles combine the features of each. In doing so, the analysis follows the axioms which defined the synthesis of resource-dependence relations and institutional authority in Table 2.3. Similarly, the needs of actors with multiple roles can be identified through an analysis of the needs of each role which either complement or reinforce each other. The question of the interests and preferences of individuals who represent multiple roles will be discussed in more detail below.

Interests and Preferences

The key question which multilevel network theory seeks to answer is how actors are able to influence each other's policy preferences and ultimately the outcome of the decision-making process. In order to do so, it has to distinguish between the political preferences of actors in the absence of external influence and those which result from changes due to intentional pressure from other members of the network. The former is usually referred to as interests, while the latter will here be termed preferences.⁴² While preferences and their changes can only be examined empirically, the interests of network actors can be established either inductively or deductively within the empiricist paradigm.⁴³ The following argues that the inductive approach is preferable because of the problems associated with the identification of 'objective' interests.

The deductive analysis of interests is commonly based on an examination of the needs of actors. It presumes that the policies which enable actors to ensure their welfare and fulfil their functions define their 'objective' interests. While such assumptions underlie a number of theories in international relations - in particular models which treat states as unitary actors - it conflicts with the basic concepts of multilevel network theory. Specifically, it encounters the problem of multiple roles mentioned above. Different roles often have conflicting objective interests. Since individual human agents typically hold

⁴² Dowding, *Rational Choice and Political Power*, p.30.

⁴³ In accordance with the empiricist paradigm embraced in this thesis, alternative notions of interest formation as suggested by constructivist approaches are not discussed.

multiple roles, the deductive determination of interests would require additional hypotheses about the way in which agents resolve the conflicting interests of their diverse roles. More critical in terms of network analysis is the problem which arises from the notion of 'mistaken' interests.⁴⁴ The deduction of interests from needs allows actors to be mistaken about their objective interests, i.e. if they do not recognise their need for specified tangible and intangible commodities.⁴⁵ This concept fundamentally contradicts network analysis which requires that actors are aware of their interests. Only if actors are, can they influence the decision-making process *intentionally* as required by the definition of power in the previous section.

As a consequence, it can be contended that an inductive approach to the analysis of interests is more appropriate for multilevel network theory. According to this method the interests of actors can be inferred from their publicly expressed preferences. This approach avoids the concepts of original or mistaken interests. It proceeds from the premise that interests can only be truly known to individuals themselves. The analyst has to contend with whatever preferences actors chose to make public. Obviously, these preferences may change. Moreover, actors might adjust their public preferences in order to pre-empt a controversy.⁴⁶ Since multilevel network theory seeks to establish the effects of intentional influence on the decision-making process, however, it is not relevant whether the observed preferences at the beginning of a research period are the original interests of political actors. Multilevel network theory should be able to explain the actions and preference changes at any possible (starting) point of the decision-making process. While it would be generally desirable to trace the decision-making process from its perceived 'beginning' as marked by the emergence of a particular issue or problem perhaps, the hypotheses of multilevel network theory which concern the actions and preference changes of network actors should be valid at any stage of the political process.⁴⁷ The basis for these hypotheses is rational choice.

⁴⁴ Brian Barry, *Political Argument* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1965/1990), p.179.

⁴⁵ Dowding, *Rational Choice and Political Power*, p.36.

⁴⁶ Connolly, *Terms of Political Discourse*, pp.49f.

⁴⁷ The 'beginning' of a political debate has of course always to be treated with caution because of the problem of infinite regress. See for instance John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p.77.

Rational Choice in Multilevel Networks

It has been stated above that multilevel network theory proceeds from the premise that political actors seek to ensure that their political preferences will be served by the outcome of the decision-making process. In order to do so, actors attempt to influence each other and, finally, the ultimate decision maker. The interactions which evolve due to these attempts are a result of the structure of the network on one hand, and the distribution of preferences with regard to a political issue on the other. However, neither does pressure always lead to preference changes, nor do network structures prescribe a single course of action in order to influence the decision-making process. Actors can choose among their network linkages. Most crucially, actors choose whether to change their preferences and join a group of actors or 'coalition' in favour of a particular policy. These choices are strategic choices since they depend on the choices and behaviour of other actors within the network. By hypothesising about the choices of network actors, multilevel network theory proposes a causal link between the structure of the network and the behaviour of political agents in the decision-making process. The following examines the axioms on which hypothesis regarding the choices of preferences and actions can be based. It suggests that cost-utility calculations derived from rational choice theory can provide a range of hypotheses which illustrate how actors may utilise their position in multilevel networks in order to influence the decision-making process.

Rational choice theory posits that human agents can be modelled as calculating actors who pursue cost-utility optimising behaviour.⁴⁸ That is actors choose rationally if they select the behaviour or preferences which they believe will yield their desired outcome at the lowest cost.⁴⁹ The problem of analysing the expectations of different actors regarding the rationality of different options 'under due consideration of the circumstances'⁵⁰ has led to the introduction of the concept of bounded rationality.⁵¹ Actors assess the costs of only those options of which they are immediately aware since the investigation of all possible alternatives is too costly. As such, the concept of bounded

⁴⁸ Patrick Dunleavy, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* (London: Harvester, 1991), p.3; Green and Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory*, pp.14f.

⁴⁹ Hollis and Smith, 'Roles and Reasons', p.272.

⁵⁰ Oppenheim, *Political Concepts*, p.126.

⁵¹ Jon Elster, 'Introduction', in Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.1-33, p.5.

rationality is closely related to network analysis. By definition networks are described as stable and routinely used linkages among a set of actors. As a consequence, the members of a network have a clear understanding of the nature of their power relations with others and whether they have the potential to influence other actors.

The value of the rational choice approach for network analysis has been pointed out in various studies.⁵² It lies in the fact that rational choice proposes a general principle for choosing strategies and preferences. It fulfils on one hand the requirement of generalisation which is the basis for a theory of choice, on the other it is characterised by variability and specificity. Moreover, if rational choice is defined in terms of cost-utility calculations, it enters any theory which acknowledges that actors choose among various options for action by considering the required resources and the likelihood of succeeding to obtain their objective. Many international relations theories and models of decision-making implicitly or explicitly refer to such calculations to explain the behaviour of political actors. One reason for its wide usage seems to be that rational choice is inherent in the concept of power as it has been defined at the beginning of this chapter. The assumption that power can be deduced from bases such as resource-dependencies and institutional relations is grounded on the notion that A can and presumably will impose costs on B, if B does not comply with his or her wishes.⁵³ An analysis of decision-making networks in terms of power relations, therefore, suggests a theory of agency based on rational choice.

In order to employ the concept of rational choice to explain the behaviour of actors in multilevel decision-making processes, network theory has to specify two factors: the utility of different behavioural strategies to an actor and their relative cost. In a network of power relations, the utility of a network linkage is defined by the location of the ultimate decision unit, i.e. the role actor or actors who have the formal institutional authority to make legitimate and binding political decisions regarding a particular issue.

⁵² Arthur Benz, 'Commentary of O'Toole and Scharpf: The Network Concept as a Theoretical Approach', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1993), pp.167-175; Dowding, 'Model of Metaphor?'; Carsten Daughjerg and David Marsh, 'Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-Level and Micro-Level Analysis', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.52-71.

⁵³ See for instance Connolly, *Terms of Political Discourse*, p.102; John C. Harsanyi, 'Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games', *Behavioral Science* 7:1, 1962, pp.67-80.

The further the ultimate decision unit is removed from an actor, that is the more actors serve as intermediates, the weaker is his or her power and the smaller the utility of pressure exerted through these relations. Although the network position of the actors themselves is stable, the utility of an actor's linkages can vary because of changes in the ultimate decision unit. The location of the ultimate decision unit not only changes from issue to issue, but can also shift as a result of the interactions among network actors during the decision-making process. Typical ultimate decision units are ministers for routine issues, cabinets and parliaments for important or controversial decisions and international organisations for multilateral actions. Most issues start at lower levels such as ministries, but some might move up to the cabinet or even international organisations because of internal dissent or the inability to provide adequate solutions at a sub-national or national level.

The cost of an action is determined by the type of power relationship with each actor. Several premises regarding the relative costs of each type of power relation can be derived from rational choice theory. First, the exercise of pressure is always costly.⁵⁴ Not only do actors have to invest in communication, they also have to consider the costs of using their resources or institutional authority in order to exert pressure on another actor. From this follows the basic premise that actors will only seek to influence the decision-making process if their preferences are affected and the cost of an adverse policy outcome is higher than that of interaction.⁵⁵ The costly initiative lies, therefore, with the actors who perceive their policy preference to be threatened or in a minority. They have to engage in the decision-making process in order to increase the support for their preferred policy outcome. Conversely, actors who are part of the majority view will refrain from pressing other actors to support them until their preferred policy outcome is seriously threatened. As a result, the number of network actors engaged in the decision-making process should rise over time as more and more actors are pressed to take a stance for or against a

⁵⁴ Compare the concept of 'transaction costs' by Keohane, *After Hegemony*, p.89-92; and more generally on the cost of interaction and cooperation Heinz-Jürgen Axt, 'Kooperation unter Konkurrenten: Das Regime als Theorie der außenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 40:3, 1993, pp.242-245.

⁵⁵ See for instance Mayntz, 'Networks, Issues and Games', pp.189f.; Boelie Elzen, Bert Enserink and Wim Smit, 'Weapon Innovation - Networks and Guiding Principles', *Science and Public Policy* 17:3, 1990, pp.171-193, pp.186f.; Wright, 'Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies', p.596.

policy.⁵⁶ Thus, the first premise states:

Premise 1: Actors will only seek to influence the policy preferences of other actors in the network if they perceive their preferred policy to be in a minority.

Second, the costs for exercising pressure are lower for hierarchical or interdependent power relations than for pluralistic and autonomous types. The usage of pluralistic relations to exercise pressure is prohibitive because no cost can be inflicted upon the superior actor to support the demands. Autonomous relations prevent the exertion of influence due to the absence of an established institutional or resource exchange relation. Although a coalition cannot be ruled out in the case of similar interests, the cost of establishing a new relationship can be regarded as higher than the usage of already existing network linkages. The costs of each power relation can be summarised in form of a simple hierarchy: Low costs for A are associated with hierarchical [A > B] and interdependent power relations [A <> B], while high costs are linked to pluralistic relations [A < B] and autonomy [A | B].⁵⁷ Accordingly, it follows:

Premise 2: Actors whose policy preference is in a minority will use their hierarchical [A > B] or interdependent [A <> B] relations in order to exert pressure on actors who hold different policy preferences or who are undecided.

Finally, choice theories at all levels of analysis have recognised that legitimised pressure is less costly than not legitimised.⁵⁸ That is, actors who have recognised institutional authority over another's actions have lower costs in trying to influence them than actors without legitimate control. For instance, ministers have lower costs influencing their staff than representatives of interest groups. The difference is of particular interest in collective decision-making units, i.e. collective political bodies with institutionalised legitimate decision-making rules, such as majority voting or consensus. In collective decision-making

⁵⁶ Compare Mayntz, 'Networks, Issues and Games', p.207; Atkinson and Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and Problems of Governance', p.160.

⁵⁷ Compare the notion of 'opportunity costs' in Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp.70-73.

⁵⁸ See Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power*, pp.5f.; Oran Young, 'International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', *World Politics* 32:3, 1980, pp.331-356, pp.338ff.

units, most of which are national parliaments or the ministerial councils of international organisations, the formal institutional influence of members can thus be differentiated from the informal, and non-legitimate, influence of actors who are merely linked to the collective decision-making unit. Members with a voice or veto in a collective decision-making unit have lower costs in influencing decisions within the body than nonmembers.

Premise 3: The legitimate pressure of members with a simple majority or veto position in a collective decision-making unit is less costly than the pressure from actors who are only linked to the organisation.

The above premises postulate how actors use their power relations within the network in order to influence each other and the decision-making process according to Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Rational Action

		Type of Power Relation			
		A > B	A < B	A \leftrightarrow B	A B
Preferences	A = B (same)	<i>builds coalition</i>	<i>builds coalition</i>	<i>builds coalition</i>	-
	A ≠ B (different)	<i>exerts pressure</i>	-	<i>exerts pressure or veto</i>	-

Based on these assumptions multilevel network theory proposes two hypotheses which specify when actors are likely to succeed in changing each other's policy preferences and influencing the policy outcome. By stating its hypotheses in probabilistic rather than deterministic terms, multilevel network theory acknowledges the range of possible factors which may contribute to policy changes. However, the following suggests that rational choice can help to identify some general tendencies regarding the relationship between pressure and modifications in actors' policy preferences.

From the simple additive cumulation of the potential cost which can be imposed upon a network actor by those who have power over him follows the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The higher the degree of pressure (P, in per cent), i.e. number of directly related actors exerting pressure (E) on a single actor X out of all actors who could exert pressure on him or her (L), the more likely is actor X to change his or her policy preference.*

According to the first hypothesis actors who are exposed to higher pressure to change their policy preferences are more likely to modify their position than those who are subject to lower degrees of pressure. The degree of pressure P on actor X during a phase T, which is delineated by two preference changes T-1st and Tst, is calculated in the form of:

$$P_T [X] = \text{number of 'E'} / \text{number of 'L'} \text{ }^{59}$$

To take an illustrative example from the following case study regarding air strikes in Bosnia, seven out of 39 actors who were directly linked to the British Prime Minister pressed him in May 1992 to support air strikes in order to contain the Serb advances in Bosnia. According to the formula, $P_1 [\text{PM}] = 7/39 = 18\%$, this amounted to a degree of pressure of 18 per cent. By comparison, 28 per cent of the actors who are able to exert power over the American President urged him to adopt air strikes in May, namely nine out of 32 with $P_1 [\text{Pre}] = 9/32 = 28\%$. Following the proposition of the first hypothesis, the American President was, therefore, more likely to change his preference in favour of air strikes than the British Prime Minister. Indeed, as the case study will show, President Bush publicly endorsed air strikes in the following month, while Prime Minister Major resisted the calls for military strikes until spring 1993 by which time the pressure on him had increased to 36 per cent.

The actors who are able to exert direct pressure on an actor (L) are also called his or her 'constituency'. It is important to note that each actor has a different constituency, since each is linked to different actors in the network. As a consequence, the degree of pressure in favour of a particular policy is always relative with regard to the target of the pressure. Some actors have fewer pluralistic or interdependent power relations than others and can thus be described as relatively insulated from external pressure. However, this

⁵⁹ The degree of pressure is given in per cent.

often means that they also have fewer linkages through which they themselves can exert pressure for their preferred policy. Other actors, in particular actors with multiple or boundary roles, are more tightly integrated into the network by means of a large range of linkages. These tend to be exposed to more pressure, but are on the other hand frequently able to use their relations to mobilise pressure.

Crucially for the explanation of the decision-making process, the role actor who forms the ultimate decision unit for a specific issue or at a certain point during the decision-making process is subject to the same behavioural rules as other network actors. Since the policy outcome is the preference of the ultimate decision unit, it is determined by the degree of pressure to which this actor is exposed from other actors in the network. The concept of the 'winning coalition', which has been used in network models as well as other multilevel theories, here always refers to actors who are directly linked to an ultimate decision unit, i.e. his or her constituency. Actors who are not directly connected to a decision-maker cannot influence the outcome, except indirectly through a series of preference changes which involves actors who are directly linked to the ultimate decision unit. Since most actors are not directly linked to the ultimate decision unit, the decision-making process becomes therefore an essential element in the explanation of the formation of a winning coalition and the policy outcome.

However, the first hypothesis can be qualified according to the third premise to form hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: Collective decision-making units can resist higher degrees of pressure than role actors if members use a veto or if a decision requires a (qualified) majority ['veto' or 'blocking' strategy].

The second hypothesis, which will be referred to as 'veto or blocking strategy' in the following case studies, suggests that collective decision-making units, such as parliaments or international organisations, will typically modify their policy preferences at higher degrees of pressure than unitary role actors if one or several members use a veto or if a required majority blocks a preference change. In order to explain this difference in behaviour, collective decision-making units are best understood as a 'network within the network'. Internally, the decision-making process within collective decision-making units

is defined by hypotheses 1 and 2. However, externally collective decision-making units act as a unitary role actor within the network. In order to do so these organisations have to reach a certain degree of consensus in order to arrive at a single policy preference which is then supported and expressed by the collective body mainly in the form of communiqués.

In addition to increasing the ability of collective decision-making units to resist network pressure, the blocking of a decision-making unit influences the decision-making process in that it can cause the issue to be referred to another decision unit, usually with higher institutional authority. For instance, the first case study will show that the inability of most European organisations such as the EU and the WEU to agree on a decision to intervene in Bosnia led to the transfer of the responsibility over the international response to the Yugoslav crisis to the UN Security Council in summer 1992. In fact, the case study illustrates that some actors intentionally blocked a decision in these organisations in order to transfer the authority over the issue to the UN Security Council where they not only had a veto, but the balance of preferences was also more in favour of air strikes. These examples illustrate that the multilevel network theory which has been outlined in this section has to be further specified in order to be utilised in empirical analyses. The final part of this chapter, therefore, proceeds to set the parameters for the following four case studies.

2.5 The Operationalisation of Multilevel Network Theory

In order to operationalise multilevel network theory various questions have to be addressed which concern the delineation of the British and the German foreign policy networks, the deduction of the power relations in these networks as well as the induction of the preferences and strategic interactions in the case studies. The ways in which these variables were measured or observed in the four cases depended crucially on the data used. The following, therefore, discusses the availability, reliability and validity of the primary and secondary sources employed in the testing of multilevel network theory.

Mapping the British and German Foreign Policy Networks

Although the multilevel network theory outlined above can be used as a general model of political decision-making processes, it has been argued in the introduction of this thesis

that in particular foreign policy analysis can gain from multilevel theorizing. Moreover, it has been contended that the degree of transnational and international integration of decision-making has been much higher among Western European governments and within the transatlantic community. The focus of this thesis on two Western European states is a response to the limits within which multilevel network theory is believed to be most fruitful. It also specifies the sectoral boundaries of the networks which are to be analysed, namely all actors who routinely seek to influence the foreign policy decision-making processes of the British or German governments.

The maps of the two distinct, but overlapping Western European multilevel foreign policy decision-making networks, in the following case studies were derived from primary sources and secondary literature about the foreign policy decision-making process in Britain and Germany. From this literature a stable set of national and international role actors could be identified which were predominantly involved in foreign policy issues. The involvement of these actors in the network arose from their role functions and how they were affected by political decision-making processes. Analytically, three types of roles could be distinguished among the actors of the British and German foreign policy networks: political, administrative and socioeconomic roles. The former two were primarily defined by formal and informal political institutions on the national and international level. They typically involved the government and various departments primarily engaged in foreign policy decision-making.⁶⁰ Specifically, the British foreign policy network included the Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary, the Secretary of Defence, the Chancellor of Exchequer, the Trade Secretary and their respective departments. In addition, the Members of the House of Commons and its Foreign and Defence Standing Committees, both in their roles as parliament members and as members of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Liberal-Democratic Party played a role in foreign policy decision-making. The German multilevel foreign policy network correspondingly included the Chancellor, the Cabinet, the Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister, the Finance Minister, the Economic Minister, the Minister of the Chancellor's Office and their ministries. Political roles outside the government and the

⁶⁰ In the case of Germany, the analysis of formal institutions involved the Basic Law, the Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages and the Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung. In Britain because of the lack of a written constitution secondary literature was used.

administration which regularly participated in foreign policy decision-making were the members of the 'Coalition Meeting' which brings together the Cabinet as well as the leader of the coalition parties, the Bundestag, its Foreign and Defence Committees, the Bundesrat, the Bundestag members of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS).

A major difference between the two networks could be found in the relations between parties and the administration. Thus, unlike in Britain where civil servants take pride in party political neutrality, the CDU/CSU and FDP had close links with members of the bureaucracy. The differences could be attributed to the fact that in Germany not only are high level departmental offices given to members of the government parties, but civil servants have also traditionally been selected and promoted according to party membership. Furthermore, in Germany the Federal Constitutional Court engages in policy decision-making albeit indirectly through its ruling, specifically on the case of international engagements of the German Bundeswehr.

In the international arena, the two foreign policy networks overlapped by including a range of roles in multilateral organisations. In foreign policy, it involved specifically the EU, NATO, the WEU, the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN). The roles within these organisations were mainly prescribed by the primary documents such as the founding treaties and their subsequent amendments. Typically actors who held positions in international institutions simultaneously wielded high-ranking domestic roles. As such, they were holding boundary roles between the national and the international system.

The roles of social and economic actors were primarily described by convention and practice. The analysis, therefore, drew almost exclusively on secondary literature about the roles of private actors in the political decision-making process.⁶¹ Generally, the role actors of two types of socioeconomic pressure groups could be distinguished which displayed distinct characteristics in the political decision-making process: interest or sectional groups and cause groups. The representatives of interest groups are motivated

⁶¹ See Appendix 1 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95' and Appendix 2 'German Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

by the specific, often economic, needs of the actors who are organised in them. They subsume the leading members of trade unions, employer associations as well as large companies which can be conceived of as pursuing the main interest of their management and employees, i.e. continued employment.

The representatives of cause groups, on the contrary, pursue interests which are not directly determined by the basic needs of their members. While in the first case some general propositions regarding the roles of interest group representatives can be deduced from the requirements for organisational welfare and its functions, the characteristics of cause groups can only be inferred from their explicit goals and observable behaviour. Due to their variable nature, however, the members of cause groups are rarely part of stable decision-making networks. In the case of Britain, only the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) appeared to have sufficiently stable linkages with key actors in the foreign policy decision-making process to merit inclusion into the network. Its role could be attributed to strong linkages with the Labour Party and a prominent voice in the media. In Germany, no cause group could be regarded as regular actor in the foreign policy decision-making network.

Leading members of interest groups, on the other hand, were regularly and strongly engaged in both the British and the German multilevel foreign policy decision-making network. In Britain, the key economic actors in the policy network generally involved large export-dependent companies and the defence industry, although only the latter was actively engaged in one of the case studies. The trade unions appeared to have lost their role in the decision-making process since the dismantling of trade union influence under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and were consequently not included in the current British foreign policy network. Conversely in Germany, representatives of both industry and unions were identified as central actors in the foreign policy decision-making network. Only a few major armaments companies, such as German Aerospace (DASA), directly participated in the debate.⁶² Most firms left the role of their representation in the political process to the two employers federations, the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) and the Federation of German Industries (BDI). Similarly, the German trade unions were mainly involved through their collective body, the German Trade Union

⁶² 'Keine gezielten Hilfen für Dasa', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 28/10/93.

Association (DGB), but sectoral trade unions also unilaterally articulated their political preferences.⁶³ In addition, the British and German voter, whose preferences were expressed in opinion polls, as well as the national and international media engaged in the foreign policy debates in both Britain and Germany. Having delineated the members of the two multilevel networks, the analysis turned to the power relations between them.

Power Relations in the Empirical Analysis

Since the analysis of power relations in multilevel networks prohibits the development of conclusive lists of power bases, the power relations in the British and German decision-making networks were deduced from a comprehensive study of the directional influence prescribed by formal and informal institutions and resource-dependencies among the actors. The formal institutional authority of different roles at the national and international level was primarily defined by basic laws, rules and regulations. In the British political system, which is not based on a single well-defined constitution, conventions and procedures provided further evidence for the nature of the institutional relations among network actors. Fortunately for the analysis, the British government embarked in the early 1990s upon a policy of greater openness which has led to the publication of several informal procedural codes which had previously been secret. Most importantly for the analysis of the political decision-making process, was the publication of the 'Rules of Procedure for Ministers'. In the German case, formal stipulations regarding the roles of political actors were freely available in form of the *Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung* and *Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages*.⁶⁴ The formal institutions, nevertheless, gave considerable freedom for interpretations because their operation sometimes deviates from the legal understanding. The analysis of the primary documents was, therefore, complemented by an inquiry into the actual functions and usage of political

⁶³ Manfred Hirner, 'Der Deutsche Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorff and Bernhard Wessels, eds., *Parlament und Gesellschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp.138-183; Jürgen Weber, *Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977); Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1145-1157; Bernhard Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft: Öffentliche Anhörungen, informellen Kontakte und innere Lobby in wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Parlamentsausschüssen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 18:2, 1987, pp. 285-311; Rudolf Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.217-258.

⁶⁴ *Die Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung*, GMBI. S.382, 1987, 17.7.

and administrative roles. It was achieved by an in-depth analysis of the secondary literature regarding the political decision-making process in both countries.⁶⁵

The analysis of the resource-dependence relations among the members of the two networks proceeded in two steps. First, the needs of each role actor were deduced from the role's functions which typically included 'survival', i.e. the preservation of the role itself and the control over it by a particular actor, as well as a range of attributes defined by formal and informal institutions and expectations within the network. Second, these needs were matched with the corresponding resources of other actors. While again the list of these individual needs and resources was infinite, most roles required information, expertise, support and cooperation in some form from each other. In order to investigate the distribution of both needs and resources, the same primary and secondary sources were used which helped to establish the institutional relations among the network actors.

Issues, Options and Preferences in the Four Case Studies

Before the decision-making process could be analysed, the situation and the issue of the political debate had to be examined. The definition of the circumstances of a decision involved two main questions: how was the policy problem defined and what political responses were considered? Generally, issues can arise from either factors external or internal to a network. Events or actions of actors who are located outside a network can be conceived of as external factors. In such situations, the origins of the issue are beyond the immediate control of network actors. However, their needs and preferences are affected by these events or actions in such a way that they require a political decision regarding their response. Since networks by definition involve all actors who are commonly affected by an issue-area and connected through stable resource dependencies and institutional structures, issues which emanate from the external environment often represent non-routine matters or even crises. Internal issues, on the contrary, arise from the needs and interests of network members. They typically concern routine questions. Although it has been argued elsewhere that in foreign affairs issues often arise from events

⁶⁵ For details see Appendix 1 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95' and Appendix 2 'German Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

or actors beyond the domestic arena⁶⁶, a multilevel approach would define these issues as 'internal' if they stemmed from the interactions within the international community delineated in Western Europe primarily by the members of the EU, the WEU and NATO.

The nature of the issue determines the location of the legitimate ultimate decision-making unit. While in crises the ultimate decision-makers will be those who wield the highest legitimate authority, on routine matters more subordinate actors will take a decision. However, this general tendency does not apply when an issue is particularly controversial among the members of a decision-making network. If subordinate decision units are not able to agree on a political decision or if specific actors use a blocking strategy, the issue will be transferred to a higher decision-making authority. Generally, the ultimate decision unit in the British and German foreign policy decision-making networks are the respective foreign or defence ministries for routine issues and the cabinets or parliaments in crises or controversial cases. If an issue is perceived to require a multilateral response, the ultimate decision unit can also be an international organisation, such as the EU or the UN Security Council.

In fact, in all four case studies the national policies and, for the purposes of this thesis, the 'outcomes' of the decision-making processes led to additional international policies. Thus, the decision of the British government to support air strikes in Bosnia led to the passing of a respective resolution in the UN Security Council in the first case study. Conversely, the decision to abandon the requirement for Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles (TASM) within NATO increased the pressure for the cancellation of the British TASM programme in the second case. In the German case studies the two decisions were not immediately necessary for subsequent international actions which included the military intervention in Bosnia and the establishment of common European dual-use goods export regulations, but contributed to them. However, because of the focus of this thesis, the case studies were confined to the decisions taken by the two governments.

The character of the issue also determines whether network actors can use a blocking strategy. In this respect two situations have to be distinguished, namely whether a policy requires a proactive decision, as in the two British and the first German case, or will be the result of a non-decision, as in the second German case study. Only a policy

⁶⁶ Dan B. Wood and Jeffrey S. Peake, 'The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting', *American Political Science Review* 92:1, 1998, pp.173-184.

change which is based on an active decision can be prevented by blocking behaviour. Conversely, if a new policy will emerge because of the failure to react to a transformation of external or internal factors, a veto will lead to a change of the status quo, not its preservation.

Moreover, the nature of the issue limits the policies which are considered in response. The solutions which are proposed for an issue are defined by the needs, resources and preferences of the actors. Moreover, they are influenced by the ability of different actors to set the agenda and define the policy options.⁶⁷ The number of options and preferences with regard to an issue is theoretically infinite. Many rational choice approaches, therefore, assume that each actor has to compute a preference schedule, ranking each policy according to an expected cost-utility function.⁶⁸ This view has been disconfirmed by a number of empirical studies. They have revealed that role actors resolve policy problems in a series of incremental binary choices. Rather than considering an issue and all its solutions at once, actors typically debate a single policy solution and decide for or against it before moving on to debate other options. As a result, the decision-making process consists of a sequence of binary pro-contra choices.⁶⁹ An exhaustive analysis of an issue would, therefore, require the examination of several simultaneous debates and decisions. Due to the incremental nature of the decision-making process these would not be linked and would frequently lead to incompatible and contradictory policies.⁷⁰ The consequences of this behaviour for network analysis are considerable. Most important, multilevel network analysis does not have to establish a preference hierarchy for each actor, but merely their preferences with regard to one particular policy option. As has been argued above, these preferences can be inferred by empirical observation.

In the four case studies, the analysis of preferences was based on public statements

⁶⁷ On agenda setting see for instance Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies*; Fay Lomax Cook et al., 'Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers and Policy', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47: 1, 1983, pp.16-35; Mark Considine, 'Making Up the Government's Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System', *Governance* 11:3, 1998, pp.297-317; Wood and Peake, 'The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting'.

⁶⁸ Elster, 'Introduction', p.4.

⁶⁹ See for instance Paul A. Anderson, 'What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision? The Implications for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.285-308; Irntraud N. Gallhofer and Willem E. Saris, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Political Argumentation* (Westport: Praeger, 1996).

⁷⁰ See for instance Chapter 1.

by the network actors themselves such as policy drafts submitted for Parliamentary debates and the views expressed in these debates, party programmes and organisational declarations. It was complemented by an analysis of preferences as expressed in the print media. The British debates were covered by keyword analysis of the UKNEWS-file available on FT-Profile which includes 25 daily newspapers in Britain as well as the DEFENCE news file for the TASM case.⁷¹ Jane's Defence Weekly was also included because of its unique coverage of foreign and defence issues. For the domestic debate and the interactions between German and international role actors, keyword-searches were conducted using FT-Profile UKNEWS-File, as well as files of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Reuters German News*. In addition, the newspaper clip collection of the Freie Universität Berlin provided relevant articles from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, *Das Parlament*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, *Die Welt* and *Der Spiegel*.

Strategic Interactions and Preference Changes

In order to test the hypotheses of network theory regarding the preference modifications among network actors and the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a particular policy outcome, their actions and preference changes had to be traced. The sequence of the preference changes was the essential indicator which was used to establish the causality between the original preferences and the power structure on one hand and the exertion of pressure and subsequent preference changes on the other. Following the determination of the preferences at the beginning of the case studies, multilevel network analysis proposed the relations which specific actors should use to exert power, or 'influence', the actors who are likely to change their preferences and the collective units which should be blocked from a preference change.

The exercise of pressure was observed in a range of forms. Specifically, it included unilateral action, such as force, threat or persuasion, as well as transactions, such as

⁷¹ For a comprehensive list of the newspapers included in the newsfile see Secondary Sources. The keywords used were for the first British case 'air strikes', the second British case 'Tactical Air-to-Surface Missiles' or 'TASM', for the first German case 'Tornados' and 'out-of-area' and for the second German case 'dual-use' as well as 'defence industry'.

negotiation and transactions.⁷² Transactions were defined in the broadest sense including the exchange of tangible as well as intangible resources, such as information or skill. Since the formation of a coalition among a set of actors was rarely made explicit⁷³, it was regarded as sufficient to infer them from simultaneous preference statements often made in international organisations or in the media. Blocking behaviour, however, was almost always publicised. The degree of pressure (P) to which each of the actors was exposed at different stages during the decision-making process was computed with SPSS on the basis of the number of actual pressures (E) divided by the number of possible pressures as defined by the linkages leading towards an actor (L).

The degree of pressure was then set in relation to the preference changes of these actors. Specifically, preference changes were noted when actors modified their original preferences defined as the preferences they held at the beginning of the research period. With regard to the behaviour of the actors, the analysis distinguished four categories of preference-formation: no change (NC), unclear or undecided (U), change (C) and blocked (B). The first category was defined as the preservation of a preference after it had been stated in public. The first expressed preference was always noted as the initial preference of an actor, even though it might have been the result of network pressures before the beginning of the research period. Actors who did not state a preference at the beginning of the analysis, but only took a position at later stages of the debate, were not ascribed a preference change, unless they changed this preference in the following. Actors who did not explicate a preference at all were not included in the calculations.

The blocking of a preference change was an option that only applied to collective decision-making units in the network, namely national parliaments and international organisations. A blocking strategy was recorded if a member expressed a veto and the organisation failed to reach a decision in its communiqué. An unclear or undecided preference was recorded when the data provided contradictory evidence or, in collective decision-making organisations as those noted above, the membership was equally divided. If there was a clear majority within a collective decision-making organisation with a

⁷² Compare R.A.W. Rhodes, *Power-Dependence, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks*, (Colchester: Department of Government University of Essex, 1985), p.3.

⁷³ The few exceptions included a Labour-LibDem agreement to abolish TAsMs in case of a hung Parliament in Britain and the transnational coalition between the German Inspector-General Klaus Naumann and his American colleagues in NATO in favour of a despatch of German Tornados.

majority decision-making rule, such as the national parliaments of Britain and Germany, the preference of this majority was attributed to the organisation as a whole. A clear change of preference was recorded when actors publicly embraced the policy preference which they had previously opposed.

To trace the interactions and preference changes three sources were considered, each with its own bias and problems for operationalisation: (1) personal recollection, (2) primary documentation and (3) secondary sources such as newspaper articles and academic literature. Personal accounts of interactions would obviously have been coloured by the intentions of the individual actor. Thus, interviewees could distort information about interactions as to rationalise their behaviour *a posteriori*. Moreover, in test interviews it emerged that because of the considerable duration of the decision-making process, it was difficult for actors to remember the exact timing of interactions and preference changes which played such a crucial role in the testing of multilevel network theory. For the purposes of this thesis, written records and statements made at the time were, therefore, regarded as more reliable indicators of the preferences of the actors. Administrative recordings of the decision-making process would have been the most accurate, however, their usage was limited because of the access restrictions associated with such recent decisions. Where such sources were publicly available, such as the transcripts of debates as well as written and oral questions from members of parliament (MPs) and the answers provided by civil servants and the government, were used. They were complemented by the analysis of committee reports, although with respect to sequencing these were less helpful because the reports did not give account of the development of the discussion within the committees, but merely a summary of the consensus which was eventually achieved.

For the main part, the analysis of the decision-making process relied on the same media sources which were used to establish the initial preferences of the network actors. Obviously, media coverage as a secondary source had to be treated more carefully as regards its reliability. Since specific newspapers and authors often attempted to meet their own objectives, they introduced a bias to the analysis which may be political or simply aimed at suiting its audience. The practical advantage of media sources, however, was that they were very easily accessible and the amount of information which could be collected in this way was unrivalled by the other options. In order to counterbalance any biases, the

range of newspapers covered in the analysis was designed to be as broad as possible. By crosschecking pressures and preference changes reported by different national papers, the study sought to increase the reliability of the reports. Indeed, the analysis of the cases showed that in most instances newspapers across the political spectrum agreed in their attribution of preferences and actions to the main political actors.

3. Case I: The Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia

3.1 Introduction

The question whether the international community should use air strikes in response to the Serb attack on Bosnia-Herzegovina¹ arose formally with the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution 752 which was approved on 15 May 1992.² In the resolution, the Security Council condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Serb forces from Bosnian territory. The Security Council resolution acknowledged that the international community had a responsibility to seek to bring an end to the fighting. In order to do so the UN Secretary General was tasked with an examination of ways to protect human aid deliveries to the Bosnian capital Sarajevo and initiate an international peacekeeping operation. It was agreed that additional measures would be considered in the light of the further development of the crisis.

During the following year, the international community increasingly engaged in various efforts to contain and end the conflict. The main policy options had already been considered after the Serb invasion of Croatia in 1991. They included international negotiations, economic and military sanctions, humanitarian aid and military intervention. Although peaceful measures had been of little success in Croatia, the members of the UN Security Council initially ruled out military action in Bosnia. In spite of the danger that large numbers of refugees might flood into Northern Europe, the five permanent members agreed that the conflict did not affect any of their 'vital security interests' as to justify such a step.³ Nevertheless, over the course of the year the positions of the Security Council members with regard to military action changed radically. Among them was the British government which had resisted pressure for air strikes for nearly a year. Following the change of policy by the British administration, the UN Security Council decided on 4 June 1993 to endorse air strikes to protect the safe havens which it had established around the

¹ In the following 'Bosnia'.

² S/RES/752 (1992) 15 May 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

³ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, 'Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt und die Folgen für die sicherheitspolitische Kooperation in Europa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 95:B6, 1995, pp.13-20, pp.13f.; Thomas Paulsen, *Die Jugoslawienpolitik der USA 1989 -1994* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), p.38.

cities of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica.⁴

This case study seeks to test multilevel network theory by analysing how the pressures of various national and international actors on the British government contributed to its change of policy concerning the use of air strikes in Bosnia in spring 1993.⁵ Specifically, the case study examines how the proponents of air strikes were able to form and enlarge their coalition in favour of military action by using strategically their positions within the British foreign policy network. According to multilevel network theory the degree of pressure on each actor was determined by the number of air strike supporters among the actors to which he or she was directly linked within the network. The degree of pressure (P) is represented in percentages with P standing for the number of actors who exerted pressure (E) on an actor X out of all who had power over him or her (L).⁶ The higher the percentage, the greater the pressure. If the first hypothesis is correct, rising degrees of pressure should indicate the increasing likelihood that an actor would abandon his or her opposition against air strikes. The instances of actors who joined the coalition in favour of air strikes should increase with higher degrees of pressure.

The second hypothesis relates to what can be termed in short as 'blocking or veto strategy'. It asserts that specific actors should have been able to block increasing pressure in favour of air strikes by issuing a veto in collective decision-making units, such as the ministerial councils of international organisations, or block a decision due to majority requirements in their national parliaments. In the case of air strikes in Bosnia, veto positions were held by the members of the ministerial councils of all international organisations involved, namely the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the members of the UN Security Council.⁷ If these organisations generally resisted higher pressures for air strikes than other actors

⁴ S/RES/836 (1993) 4 June 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>.

⁵ The case study does not cover the debate over the implementation of air strikes after the resolution had been approved. Due to continuing dissent, particularly by the British and Russian governments, over questions of procedure air strikes were not implemented until 10-11 April 1994.

⁶ References denote the degree of pressure P on actor X during phase T between the T-1st and Tst preference change in the form of: $P_T [X] = \text{number of 'E'} / \text{number of 'L'}$
The degree of pressure is given in per cent rounded to the full digit. See for details Appendix 3 'Pressure for Air Strikes in Bosnia'.

⁷ Actors with a veto are marked with a * in Appendix 1 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

when a veto was used by one of their members, it would support the second hypothesis. A blocking strategy could have been pursued by the majority party in the House of Commons which decided on the basis of a simple majority.

The following analysis distinguishes four behavioural options: no change of preference (NC), unclear or undecided preferences (U), change in preference (C) and the vetoing or blocking of a preference change (B). Crucially for the analysis of the decision-making process, actors who changed their preferences in favour of air strikes in turn used their own links within the network to exert pressure for this policy. The chronological analysis of the case study regarding the decision to implement air strikes in Bosnia should, therefore, reveal that the sequence of preference changes and the emergence of a winning coalition in favour of military strikes were influenced by the structure of the network. The policy preference change of the British government represents the final change in this sequence. However, following the British change of policy and the lifting of its veto within the UN Security Council, NATO and the WEU, these organisations soon decided in favour of air strikes and, thus, continued the process beyond the scope of this case study. In fact, these organisations authorised and eventually implemented the air strikes. Nevertheless, the case study ends with the decision of the British government in order to enable the comparison with other cases and the multilevel theories examined in the introduction of this thesis which focus national foreign policy decisions.

Two factors mean the case of air strikes in Bosnia is especially suited for the testing of the hypotheses put forward by multilevel network theory. First, between the recognition of the Bosnian crisis by the UN in May 1992 and UN resolution 836 in June 1993 which threatened air strikes, the British government effectively reversed its official policy regarding air strikes. According to network theory, the reversal should have been matched by the strategic interactions in the multilevel network surrounding the British government and the coming about and sequence of changes in the preferences of key actors. The decision of the British government to approve the authorisation of air strikes in the UN Security Council should have coincided with the formation of a winning coalition in favour of air strikes within the British multilevel foreign policy network.

Second, exogenous factors, i.e. the environment of the British multilevel network, were relatively stable. The fighting between the Serbs and the Bosnian Muslims continued irrespectively of the various attempts to solve the crisis which were coordinated by the

CSCE, the EC, the UN and their negotiators Lord Carrington, later Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen. The cease-fires and peace settlements, which were achieved by the negotiations, were too short-lived to have brought about more than a temporary change in the perceptions and preferences of the network actors.⁸ The observed variances in the policy preferences of actors in the British decision-making network should, therefore, be explicable on the basis of the interactions among these actors themselves.

The specific focus of multilevel network theory on intentional pressure for political action and decisions, obviously reduces the analysis to a small number of explanatory variables. In particular, the approach does not examine the direct impact of arguments, norms, or ideas on the behaviour and preferences of the actors. If any statement can be made regarding alternative explanations, the findings derived from multilevel network analysis appear to suggest that the power relations of actors within their network were more important than the nature of the arguments which these actors used to promote their preferred policy. Thus, the persuasiveness of an argument seemed more closely associated with the power and authority of the actors who proposed it, than with the argument's inherent logic, morality or practicality. The convincingness of this suggestion cannot be explored in this study, but will have to be assessed in comparison with the answers provided by such theories. Nevertheless, some brief points can be made which indicate that a focus on the 'objective' arguments for the various responses to the conflict which were considered by the international community does not sufficiently explain the change in British foreign policy.

In particular, the notion that the air strike resolution in June 1993 represented the end point of a rational, progressive escalation of means appears to be flawed. The following chronological analysis will show that air strikes were not only considered from the beginning of the conflict, but also that most of the military experts had believed that

⁸ 'Leading article: Carrot or stick needed for Serbia', *Guardian*, 26/8/92; 'Owen faces up to big task as the fighting goes on', *Northern Echo*, 29/8/92; Robert Fox, 'Analysis: More jaw at peace conference means more war on the ground', *Daily Telegraph*, 25/1/93. Compare also Michael Moodie, 'The Balkan Tragedy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541, 1995, pp.101-115, p.106; Roland Schönfeld, 'Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft', *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 34:4, 1994, pp.257-278, p.270; Richard Ware and Fiona M. Watson, *The Former Yugoslavia: A Further Update* (London: House of Commons Library, 1992), p.2.

an early and massive use of military force could have prevented the escalation of the war.⁹ In fact, the more the UN engaged in a humanitarian operation, the greater became the obstacles and risks associated with air strikes. The governments of Britain and France, the two countries which had the largest contingents of peacekeepers in Bosnia, naturally had strong inhibitions against military action. They feared that the Serbs would retaliate and attack their ground troops if air strikes were implemented.¹⁰ Their fears were vindicated in 1994 when the Bosnian Serbs responded to military action in defence of the no-fly zone by taking UN peacekeepers hostage.¹¹ Air strikes were not an escalation of the international involvement in Bosnia, but an alternative policy which conflicted with the logic of the ongoing humanitarian operation.

In the following this chapter presents a chronological analysis of the decision-making process and concludes by evaluating the explanatory power of multilevel network theory. The case study begins by outlining the emergence of the issue and the policy options at the beginning of the research period. It continues by tracing in detail the interactions between the network actors and the resulting preference changes among the members of the British multilevel decision-making network. The conclusion summarises the findings in order to assess how far the hypotheses of multilevel network theory were corroborated by the data. Specifically, it draws on the percentages in the text and tables which show the degrees of pressure to which different actors were subjected at crucial points in the decision-making process.

Often a set of closely linked actors changed policy preferences within weeks or even days. At other times pressure had to build up over months before actors who were only indirectly linked to the proponents of air strikes modified their position. These breaks in the decision-making process which were the indirect result of gaps in the network's structure are reflected by the division of the account into four stages. During the first stage, between 15 May and 5 August 1992, the majority of actors within the British

⁹ Already in July 1991 civil servants in the American State Department acknowledged that only a credible military threat could prevent the escalation of the conflict. See *Newsweek*, 15 July 1991, cited in Paulsen, *Jugoslawienpolitik der USA*, p.40.

¹⁰ Stephen Robinson and Jon Hibbs, 'Draft resolution opens door to the use of force', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/8/92; James Bone and Tim Judah, 'UN forbids military flights over Bosnia', *Times*, 10/10/92; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, 'US canvasses Europe over enforcement of air ban', *Times*, 15/12/92.

¹¹ See Chapter 5.

foreign policy network were opposed to air strikes. In Britain, only the Liberal Democratic Party under the leadership of Paddy Ashdown advocated a military intervention into the war in Bosnia. The strongest proponents of air strikes were the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. However, their pressure for a military solution was soon blocked by British and French vetos in the international organisations involved in the conflict. On 6 August, the debate over air strikes received new impetus when TV coverage of Serb 'concentration camps' was broadcasted in the US and Western Europe. The public outrage initiated a second stage until 30 October in which the American government became one of the most ardent supporters of air strikes. The British administration, however, maintained its critical stance towards any form of military intervention. It was only during the third stage, from 1 November to 30 January, that the growing international pressure eventually began to affect the preferences of key government actors in Britain. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and officials in the Foreign Office reversed their position at the beginning of December. They received further support from the Labour Party and a growing number of Conservative parliamentarians. The dissolution of the British opposition to military action eventually led to the reversal of the government's policy during the final stage, from 1 February to 30 April. At the end of April, Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind and Prime Minister John Major acceded to the pressures. The Cabinet decided to support a resolution allowing air strikes in the UN Security Council.

3.2 Air Strikes in Bosnia: From British Opposition to Acquiescence

The conflict between the Serbs and other ethnic groups in Yugoslavia started as early as the beginning of 1990 with human rights abuses in Kosovo and the rise of the autonomy movement among the local Albanian minority. However, the breakup of the Yugoslav republic only progressed from summer 1991.¹² When on 25 June Slovenia and Croatia formally declared their independence, Serb forces moved into Slovenia to prevent its

¹² For detailed accounts of the Yugoslav break-up see James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst&Company, 1997); Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996).

secession.¹³ The key members of the UN Security Council and the North Atlantic Alliance decided at this stage that their vital security interests were not at stake.¹⁴ The concern among Western governments was limited to keeping the conflict at bay and civilians within the warring republics. To achieve its aims, the international community embarked upon the long-term effort to contain the conflict by economic and military sanctions. In addition, it made an attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiations under the auspices of the EC and the CSCE.¹⁵

After the fighting in Croatia subsided in spring 1992, the conflict moved to Bosnia.¹⁶ Although the UN had already despatched a small peacekeeping mission to Croatia, the spread of the conflict to another part of the Balkans again presented the international community with the question of the terms of its involvement.¹⁷ Bosnia provided an opportunity to reassess previous policies and, if deemed necessary, to modify them. The aims and options were essentially the same. Yet, in spring 1992, they had already been debated once and their implications were known.

The option of seeking a peaceful settlement through international negotiations under the auspices of the CSCE, the EC and the UN had so far proved unsuccessful in solving the conflict. The efforts of the CSCE had been inhibited by its recent reform and new, untested, procedures, such as the crisis mechanism.¹⁸ Moreover, lacking sanctions,

¹³ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.46.

¹⁴ Neal Ascheron, 'Bring on the fire engines not the pantomime horses', *Independent on Sunday*, 16/8/92; Marie-Janine Calic, 'Jugoslawienpolitik am Wendepunkt', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 93:B37, 1993, pp.11-20, p.14; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.189, pp.206f.; Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Multilateralism Matters but How? The Impact of Multilateralism on Great Power Policy Towards the Break-up of Yugoslavia* (San Domenico: Badia Fiesolana, 1994), p.5; Alex Macleod, 'French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership', *International Journal* LII:2, 1997, pp.243-264, p.250; Paulsen, *Jugoslawienpolitik der USA*, p.38.

¹⁵ Paulsen, *Jugoslawienpolitik der USA*, pp.39ff.

¹⁶ Gazmen Xhudo, *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans. A US Foreign Policy Perspective* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.86.

¹⁷ The Security Council had set the terms for a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in resolution 743. See S/RES/743 (1992) 21 February 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>. Compare Tom Dodd, *War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995), p.9; Thomas Halverson, 'American Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.1-28, p.9; Schönfeld, 'Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft', p.266.

¹⁸ Günther Bächler, *Bosnien-Herzegowina: Friedliche Streitbeilegung zwischen Realität und konkreter Utopie* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 1993), p.5.

the CSCE relied on the cooperation of the warring parties - a condition for which there was little prospect in 1991. The consensus rule in the CSCE provided the Yugoslav government and, in their support, Russia with the opportunity to veto stronger action.¹⁹ Similarly, the EC was neither prepared nor suited for negotiating a peace in the former Yugoslavia. The end of the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia was marked by the EU-negotiated 'Brioni Accords'. However, it was the achievement of Serb objectives in Croatia, namely the control over the Krajina, and the reassessment of their interests and their ability to force Slovenia to return to a unified Yugoslavia, that had induced the Serb leadership to accept the cease-fire.²⁰ The disunity among the EC member states, which was displayed over the issue of the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, partly accounted for the EC's inability to contain Serb expansion.²¹ Some member states seemed, albeit unintentionally, to encourage Serb aggression by proclaiming their support for a united Yugoslavia.²² Others threatened to deploy an international peace force which strengthened the secessionist movement. In short, the European governments' messages were far from clear.

Embargos also had only a limited impact. The economic sanctions which had immediately been imposed by the EC could only be effective in the long term. Yet, when the Serb economy eventually showed signs of weakening, it did not appear to affect military capabilities or the willingness of the Serb leadership to continue the war.²³ The weapons embargo, which had been initiated by the UN in September 1991, had been equally futile.²⁴ After a delay of the maritime control of the embargo by the WEU and NATO until July 1992, it took another four months to authorise the patrolling ships to pursue and search suspected offenders.²⁵ Generally, the best that could have been expected

¹⁹ Paulsen, *Jugoslawienpolitik der USA*, p.40.

²⁰ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*.

²¹ 'Leading article: A common policy of Balkans bungling', *Independent on Sunday*, 24/5/92; Macleod, 'French Policy', p.245; Bächler, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, p.2; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.54.

²² Stefan Oeter, 'Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft. Die Normalität der Barbarei und das Problem der (präventiven) Konflikt diplomatie', *Kritische Justiz* 29:1, 1996, pp.15-36, pp.23f.

²³ Schönfeld, 'Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft', p.271.

²⁴ S/RES/713 (1991) 25 September 1991, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm>.

²⁵ *Extraordinary meeting of WEU Council Ministers on the situation in Yugoslavia*, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, File: 10-07-92.e, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>; NATO Fact Sheet *NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina* at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>; Robert Mauthner and Judy

from the embargo was a freeze of the military capabilities in the former Yugoslavia. But any hopes that the embargoes would lead to an end of the fighting ignored the fact that all republics, especially Serbia, had built up considerable weapons arsenals over the preceding years.²⁶

The third policy option, the UN peacekeeping force, had been successful in providing humanitarian relief. Moreover, it had helped to alleviate the consequences of the war for the international community. In particular, it had contained the exodus of the civilian population. However, it could not resolve the conflict.²⁷

Due to the apparent lack of success of peaceful measures²⁸ and the repeated disregard shown by the warring parties to their own commitments²⁹, the fourth option - the use of military force in the form of ground troops or air strikes - had been discussed as early as 1991.³⁰ Since Western governments were unanimous in their resolve not to become embroiled in a ground war, 'military action' soon became synonymous with air strikes. In the following, the terms 'military action' and 'military intervention' are, therefore, used in this sense. The possible objectives of air strikes were fourfold: reducing (Serb) military capabilities, safeguarding human aid, pressurising the warring factions into negotiations and imposing a peace settlement by force. The military capabilities required for the operation could be provided by NATO or its member states in an *ad hoc* arrangement similar to the Gulf War 'Desert Storm'. While the international community agreed that the costs of imposing a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia was out of proportion with their interests in the region, the first three options matched the need for

Dempsey, 'Western warships to tighten Serbian sanctions', *Financial Times*, 10/7/92.

²⁶ Sabrina Petra Ramet, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding "Vietnam" and Blundering into "Abyssinia"', *East European Politics and Societies* 8:1, 1994, pp.189-219, p.201; Paul Beaver, 'Success at all costs', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:14, 4/3/92, p.588.

²⁷ Bächler, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, p.13.

²⁸ Stefan Oeter even argues that the experience of Western disunity and the lack of sanctions strengthened the position of the 'hawks' among the Serb military and thus contributed to the escalation of the war in Bosnia. See Oeter, *Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft*, pp.23f. Compare Thomas Genett, 'Die konfliktverschärfenden Folgen von Beschwichtigungspolitik. Das jugoslawische Sezessionsdrama', *Berliner Debatte Initial* 2, 1996, pp.102-113.

²⁹ Calic, 'Jugoslawienpolitik am Wendepunkt', pp.11f.; Xhudo, *Diplomacy and Crisis Management*, p.85.

³⁰ Ian Taylor and Michael White, 'EC says wait to recognise Croatia', *Guardian*, 12/12/91; Misha Glenny, 'Jugoslawien -Der große Zerfall', *Leviathan* 23:4, 1995, pp.472-495, p.486; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.160; Halverson, 'American Perspectives', p.5.

'action' with the costs which governments were willing to consider. Nevertheless, the following analysis of the decision-making process from May 1992 to April 1993 illustrates how it took nearly a year for the advocates of air strikes to gather sufficient support for a military intervention.

Air Strike Advocates Reach Early Impasse

At the beginning of the debate over air strikes in mid-May 1992, the opposition of the British government to military action reflected the distribution of preferences within the British foreign policy network which stretched from the government, the key ministries, the parliamentary parties and the House of Commons to the international organisations involved in foreign and security matters and the governments of their member states.³¹ While the pressure for air strikes was too low to elicit organised opposition, the overwhelming majority of domestic and international actors unilaterally rejected military intervention as disproportionate and unsuitable. In fact, the salience of the issue was so low that some actors within the network, such as the European Commission and the British Labour Party, did not have a public position on the question of air strikes at the beginning of summer 1992.

The British government was strongly opposed to military intervention. Although Prime Minister John Major was careful not to exclude military strikes as a last resort, the extensive conditions set by his government for such action *de facto* ruled

Table 3.1
Preference Changes:
15 May - 8 August 1992

Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
WEU	53	B
Nato-Org.	45	NC
EU-CM	40	B
Nato-CM	37	B
US-Pen	37	NC
EU-Co	36	NC
UN-Org	36	NC
CSCE	35	B
EP	33	NC
US-SD	33	NC
MoD	29	NC
US-Pre	28	NC
Fco	27	NC
US-Wh	25	NC
FS	22	NC
DS	21	NC
Med	20	C
US-con	20	C
PM	18	NC
UN-SC	10	NC
Par	9	NC
vote	5	NC
Cab	0	NC
con	0	NC
lab	0	NC
Com	0	NC

³¹ See Appendix 1: 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

air strikes out.³² Indeed, at the beginning of the summer, the British government was still unwilling to consider any form of active participation in Bosnia, including the provision of ground troops to an international peacekeeping force. Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind concurred with their staff's assessment that the war in the former Yugoslavia did not affect British interests such as to justify the risks involved in military action.³³ Officials in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in particular were strongly opposed to air strikes. The military argued that in the absence of a clear political imperative a half-hearted intervention would lead to disaster, as the American involvement in Vietnam had shown before.³⁴ In the Foreign Office opinions had initially been split. After Serb forces had invaded Croatia at the end of 1991, a small number of senior officials had considered the threat of air strikes.³⁵ However, by May 1992 the internal consensus in the Foreign Office was that military intervention was not politically viable.³⁶ Part of this conclusion was due to the fact that the British public and members of Parliament (MPs) had so far taken little notice of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The country was of little direct relevance to the United Kingdom and lacked a strong national lobby.

Lady Margaret Thatcher was the only prominent political figure in the government party who advocated air strikes. However, her calls for military intervention were met with incomprehension, if not embarrassment, within the Conservative Party.³⁷ Conservative MPs fully backed the position of the government, as did the Labour opposition members when they eventually took a stance on the issue at the end of the summer. Essentially Labour MPs shared the government's assessment that the conflict did not justify action

³² John Palmer and Hella Pick, 'EC may send troops to Sarajevo', *Guardian*, 26/6/92; Colin Brown, 'Bosnia may get Nato air cover', *Independent*, 5/8/92. Compare Gow, 'British Perspectives', p.95.

³³ David Wallen, 'Yugoslav envoy expelled and flights stopped', *Scotsman*, 2/6/92.

³⁴ General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley (former NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces Northern Europe), 'Should we intervene?', *Sunday Times*, 9/8/92. Compare Ware and Watson, *Former Yugoslavia*, p.25 citing C.J. Dick in *British Army Review*, December 1992.

³⁵ John Palmer and Michael White, 'German plan to recognise Croatia puts EC in turmoil', *Guardian*, 16/12/91.

³⁶ Michael Smith, 'Pressure grows for sanctions against Serbia', *Daily Telegraph*, 15/5/92.

³⁷ John Palmer and Michael White, 'German plan to recognise Croatia puts EC in turmoil', *Guardian*, 16/12/91.

which would put the lives of British soldiers in jeopardy.³⁸

Among the domestic actors in the British foreign policy network, the Liberal Democrats were the only outspoken proponents of air strikes at the beginning of summer 1992.³⁹ However, their ability to influence the policy of the government was restricted by their weak position in the British foreign policy network and the absence of further supporters of military strikes in Britain. In particular, Liberal MPs lacked direct influence over the administration since their linkages with government ministers and civil servants in the key departments were characterised by dependence rather than authority.⁴⁰ The Liberal MPs' only options for exerting pressure on the government were indirectly through Parliament and the Parliamentary Defence Committee, or by using their relations with the electorate and the media.⁴¹ However, within the first two, the position of the Liberal Democrats was very weak. Due to the first-past-the-post system, the party had won only 20 out of 651 seats in the previous general election.⁴² Proportionally, the pressure of the Liberal MPs amounted to only 9 per cent within the Commons.⁴³ In the House of Commons Standing Defence Committee, where the Liberal Democrats were granted a single seat, their influence was negligible.

The highest probability of affecting the preference of another actor lay with representatives of the media who were exposed to much higher pressure than Parliament as a collective decision unit. While the relations of the House of Commons were mainly restricted to the government and the parties represented in it, the journalists were dependent on information not only from domestic, but also international actors. Accessible to pressure for military intervention from a wide range of actors, the international press

³⁸ Philip Stephens, 'Unease in UK over Bosnia troops decision', *Financial Times*, 20/8/92; Michael Jones, 'MPs left in summer slumber as perilous military acts take shape', *Sunday Times*, 23/8/92.

³⁹ Alan Philips, 'Bosnia "relief zones" urged for refugees', *Daily Telegraph*, 31/7/92; Hella Pick, 'Refugees flee, diplomats dither', *Guardian*, 1/8/92; 'Save the children; Leading article', *Times*, 3/8/92; Colin Brown, 'Appeals for UK military action in Bosnia rejected', *Independent*, 4/8/92; Colin Brown and Annika Savill, 'Bosnia may get Nato air cover', *Independent*, 5/8/92.

⁴⁰ See Appendix 1: 'British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95'.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² General Elections 1992, at <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/timb/UK92.HTM>.

⁴³ Altogether 16 actors were linked to the 651 MPs in the House of Commons, accounting for $L=16 \times 651=10416$, among these 20 liberal MPs used their links to exert pressure in the Commons as well as on other MPs, raising E to $E=320+631=951$ and $P_1 [Par] = E/L = 951/10416 = 9\%$.

was used specifically by the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria to promote the option of air strikes. In fact, together with the Liberal MPs, politicians and officials from these seven administrations accounted for 20 per cent of the actors from whom journalists gained their information.⁴⁴ Since this pressure was higher than on any other actors to which Liberal MPs were directly linked, party leader Paddy Ashdown acted rationally in his use of network relations when he concentrated his efforts on a media campaign to raise the prominence of the conflict in Bosnia, rather than attempting to exert pressure on the government via Parliament. In particular, Ashdown travelled repeatedly to the former Yugoslavia, trailing groups of journalists who reported directly back from the war-torn country to the British public.⁴⁵ In addition, Ashdown published several articles in the *Guardian* in which he urged for international intervention in Bosnia.⁴⁶ The Liberal Party leader also approached the government in personal letters and was eventually granted private meetings with Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd. Although Ashdown was unable to influence the policy of the government directly, the meetings furthered his cause by receiving considerable media attention.⁴⁷

Between May and August 1992, the strongest advocates of air strikes were politicians and officials from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria.⁴⁸ Unlike members of the Liberal Democratic Party, these governments had

⁴⁴ Eleven of 56 actors to whom the national and international media had links in the network favoured air strikes, namely the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, US Secretary of State James Baker, US National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, officials in the US State Department and the members of the Liberal Democrats, accounting for $P_1 [\text{Med}] = 11/56 = 20\%$.

⁴⁵ Michael Evans and Alan McGregor, 'Europe shies away from military role with Bosnia convoys', *Times*, 31/7/91; Colin Brown, 'Appeals for UK military action in Bosnia rejected', *Independent*, 4/8/92; John McGhie and Patrick Brogan, 'Major backs armed convoys', *Observer*, 9/8/92; Leonard Doyle and Patricia Wynn Davies, 'Give us weapons to fight', *Independent*, 10/8/92; James Bone, 'Britain, France and US agree on Bosnia force', *Sunday Times*, 11/8/92; 'Britannia rules the waverers', *Economist*, 15/8/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'Summit talks for Major and Bush over Bosnia', *Times*, 15/12/92; Ewen MacAskill and Gary Duncan, 'Fears grow of all-out Balkan war', *Scotsman*, 16/12/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs', *Times*, 16/12/92.

⁴⁶ Alan Travis, 'Major says firm no to Nato force in Bosnia', *Guardian*, 4/8/92.

⁴⁷ Colin Brown, 'Bosnia may get Nato air cover', *Independent*, 5/8/92.

⁴⁸ Calic, 'German Perspectives', p.58, p.62; Michael White and Kurt Schork, 'Renewed peace effort as Gorazde convoy fails', *Guardian*, 27/7/92; Will Huton, Hella Pick and Larry Elliot, 'The Munich Summit: Yeltsin accepts tough IMF loan terms', *Guardian*, 7/7/92; John Palmer and Hella Pick, 'EC may send troops to Sarajevo', *Guardian*, 26/6/92; 'Save the children: Leading article', *Times*, 3/8/92.

a considerable number of influential relations with key actors in the British government and international organisations. Since their ministers and officials were in regular bilateral and multilateral contact, not only with each other, but also with their British counterparts, they were particularly able to press the British administration on the air strike question. In fact, collectively the foreign and defence ministers from the seven countries accounted for 22 per cent of the linkages of Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd in the network⁴⁹. Their pressure was only marginally lower on Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind for whom they represented 21 per cent of his regular contacts.⁵⁰ Practically, it meant that nearly a quarter of the actors to which the two ministers were directly linked within the British multilevel foreign policy network urged them to implement air strikes in Bosnia. In the case of Foreign Office and MoD officials, the degree of pressure was even higher at 27 per cent⁵¹ and 29 per cent⁵² respectively because they had fewer linkages than their ministers. Consequentially, their colleagues in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria represented a larger proportion of their relations.

However, although the staff in the Foreign Office and the MoD were under acute transnational pressure, the strong consensus within the British executive and Parliament helped them to resist the calls for air strikes. Most of the domestic actors with whom civil servants from the two ministries had regular contacts, such as their ministers, the Cabinet, Prime Minister Major and officials from other ministries, maintained their opposition against military strikes. While significant, the pressure on the officials from the Foreign Office or the MoD was not sufficient for them to abandon their doubts. Crucially for the decision-making process, the resistance from the officials in the Foreign Office and the MoD prevented the formation of a transnational coalition among the bureaucracies in

⁴⁹ Eight out of 36 actors to whom Foreign Secretary Hurd was linked in the network favoured air strikes, including, US Secretary of State James Baker and the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, accounting for $P_1 [FS] = 8/36 = 22\%$.

⁵⁰ In the case of Defence Secretary Rifkind, six actors advocated air strikes among his 29 linkages, namely the defence ministers of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, raising the pressure to $P_1 [DS] = 6/29 = 21\%$.

⁵¹ Foreign Office officials were pressed for air strikes by their counterparts in the US State Department and the Foreign Ministries of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, accounting for $P_1 [Fco] = 8/30 = 27\%$.

⁵² Similarly, the British Ministry of Defence staff was pressurised by their defence ministry colleagues in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, i.e. $P_1 [Mod] = 6/21 = 29\%$.

favour of military action during summer 1992. Their boundary position, thus, enabled them to insulate a large number of domestic actors in the British network from international pressure.

However, ministers and officials from the European governments who favoured air strikes had alternative network relations which they could use to persuade or press other actors to support air strikes. Specifically, they were able to use their common membership in the international organisations which had become involved in the crisis, i.e. the EC, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE, to form an intergovernmental coalition. The rationale behind this strategy was that the participation of these organisations, in the resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, would provide them with indirect influence over the British administration if the organisations adopted a favourable stance towards air strikes. Moreover, the nature of these organisations as collective decision units ensured that the preferences of all members were reflected. Due to differences in the membership of each organisation, the balance of pressure for military action was highest within the WEU where 53 per cent of the actors linked to it favoured air strikes.⁵³ The pressure was marginally lower in the NATO's integrated military organisation at 45 per cent⁵⁴, the European Council of Ministers at 40 per cent⁵⁵, the North Atlantic Council at 37 per cent⁵⁶ and the CSCE at 35 per cent⁵⁷. The UN Security Council was almost free from direct pressure for air strikes since its permanent members, in particular the US, Britain, France and Russia, were opposed to military action. Latent support for air strikes

⁵³ In the Western European Union, the heads of state, foreign ministers, defence ministers, foreign ministry staff and military officials from Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium accounted for $P_1 [Weu] = 25/47 = 53\%$.

⁵⁴ In NATO's integrated organisation, the diplomatic and military staff from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium as well as US State Department officials raised the pressure to thirteen out of 29 linkages, i.e. $P_1 [Nato-Org.] = 13/29 = 45\%$.

⁵⁵ In the European Union Council of Ministers, the same balance applied as to the Western European Union with $P_1 [EU-CM] = 25/63 = 40\%$.

⁵⁶ In the North Atlantic Council, the advocacy of air strikes by the heads of state, foreign ministers and defence ministers from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, as well as James Baker accounted for nineteen of its 51 linkages in the network, with $P_1 [Nato-CM] = 19/51 = 37\%$.

⁵⁷ In the CSCE air strikes were supported by 23 out of 65 actors who were linked to the organisation, including, the heads of state, foreign ministers and diplomatic officials from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, the US Secretary of State and State Department staff, with $P_1 [CSCE] = 23/65 = 35\%$.

from US Secretary of State James Baker raised the pressure to a mere 10 per cent.⁵⁸

In spite of the considerable pressure in these international organisations, the limited authority of these multilateral institutions over an international operation like air strikes impeded the effectiveness of the international coalition in favour of military action. The CSCE was still in the process of being transformed from a series of conferences into an international security organisation. Although several mechanisms had just been established which permitted CSCE delegations to monitor and intervene peacefully into the solution of conflicts among its member states, military action was beyond their capabilities.⁵⁹ Similarly, the European Council of Ministers had neither the military means nor the legitimacy to order air strikes in Bosnia. Recent attempts to include the WEU into the structure of the EC in order to provide it with a defence arm had not been very successful. The strengthening of the EC's role in foreign and security policy matters had been prevented by the disagreement among member states over the degree to which an EC-WEU force should be independent from NATO.⁶⁰ As a result, the Franco-German Euro-Corps remained the only integrated military unit under the command of the WEU. However, as a lightly equipped land force the Euro-Corps was not more suitable for a full-scale intervention than for selective air strikes.⁶¹ Moreover, the corps was not yet operational. In order to implement air strikes, the EC Council of Ministers would have to call upon the member states of NATO or the WEU to act on its behalf. This would mean transferring the decision-making authority over the international involvement in Bosnia to these organisations. However, in terms of international law, an intervention by NATO, the WEU, or an *ad-hoc* arrangement between the major powers comparable to that in the Gulf War could only be authorised by the UN Security Council. This would remove the issue further from the influence of the European advocates of air strikes. Moreover, NATO and the WEU were not yet legitimised to take action beyond the territory of their member

⁵⁸ $P_1 [\text{UN-SC}] = 1/10 = 10\%$.

⁵⁹ Ehrhart, 'Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt', p. 15.

⁶⁰ *Treaty on European Union*, III Final Act, Declaration on the WEU, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf; WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

⁶¹ Moreover, the corps was not expected to be operational before 1 October 1995. See 'Presseerklärung über die Aufstellung eines Europäischen Korps, veröffentlicht zum Abschluß der deutsch-französischen Konsultationen in La Rochelle am 22. Mai 1992', *Europa Archiv* 13, 1992, pp.D154-D155.

states. Since the treaties of both organisations stipulated their functions as collective self-defence rather than collective security, the intervention into a conflict that did not involve any of their member states was outside their scope.⁶²

While the functional scope of NATO and the WEU could be changed, just as the CSCE had taken on new tasks, the most serious obstacle lay in the decision-making structures of the two institutions. Both provided member states with a veto due to their formal requirement of a consensus for all Council decisions. While multilevel network theory suggests that a veto can be overruled if the pressure is sufficiently high, it also contends that a veto of one or several of their members allows organisations, such as NATO and the WEU, to withstand higher degrees of pressure than actors without veto rules such as in ministerial departments or political parties. Indeed, although the pressure for air strikes was considerable in all organisations, their veto position not only allowed member states which opposed military action to block an endorsement of air strikes, but also the extension of the authority of these organisations to implement them.

In the CSCE, the Russian and Serbian veto effectively prevented a direct involvement of the organisation in most of the international operation in Bosnia. While uncontroversial tasks, such as fact-finding missions, had been permitted at the beginning of the conflict, by 1992 it had been recognised that due to its large membership and the prominent Russian veto of outside intervention, the ability of the CSCE to end the war was restricted.⁶³ The EC Council of Ministers was equally divided over military action, in spite of the smaller number of its member states and their greater homogeneity. In fact, the failure of the EC to achieve any significant progress in the peace negotiations which were under its authority had been partly attributed to the conflicting signals emanating from its members' governments.⁶⁴ The split within the EC had its origins in the debate over the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991.⁶⁵ The failure of the EC Council of Ministers to agree on measures other than economic sanctions, while the UN Security Council

⁶² *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington, 4 April 1949, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm> and the *Brussels Treaty - Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence*, Brussels, 17 March 1948, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

⁶³ Paulsen, *Jugoslawienpolitik der USA*, p.40.

⁶⁴ Bächler, *Bosnien-Herzegowina*, p.2; Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.54.

⁶⁵ 'Leading article: A common policy of Balkans bungling', *Independent on Sunday*, 24/5/92. Compare Macleod, 'French Policy', p.245; Oeter, 'Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft', pp.23f.

decided upon and implemented a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to safeguard aid deliveries in Bosnia, eventually contributed to the transfer of the issue to the primary authority to the Security Council.⁶⁶ In fact, some member states appeared to block action by the EC, NATO and the WEU with the aim to pass the responsibility over the international response to the Yugoslav crisis to the Security Council. The French government in particular was wary of its lack of influence over NATO's military decisions if air strikes were considered. Its representatives, therefore, vehemently demanded a UN resolution to back such action.

The French interposition came at a time when the supporters of air strikes began to focus their pressure on enlarging the functional scope of NATO in order to prepare it for intervention 'out-of-area', such as in the former Yugoslavia. At the beginning of June, the Dutch Defence Minister took the lead on the issue by proposing to make NATO forces available to UN and CSCE peacekeeping operations outside the borders of its member states.⁶⁷ Recognised as a necessary first step towards military action in Bosnia, the proposal was supported by the representatives of Germany, Italy and Turkey.⁶⁸ The governments in Britain and the US were divided over the issue. On the one hand, both administrations had long been in favour of enlarging the functional scope of NATO. It would enable them to more easily use NATO's integrated military structure in cases like the Gulf War. On the other hand, most British and American politicians and officials were strongly opposed to similar involvement in the former Yugoslavia.⁶⁹ Doubts over the transformation of NATO were also expressed by the governments of Spain and Belgium, in spite of the latter's support for air strikes in Bosnia. The strongest opposition came from the French administration which not only disapproved of military strikes in Bosnia, but also of the extension of the functions and the authority of NATO. With regard to military action in Bosnia, the French government preferred the authority to rest with the UN Security Council where it had a veto and where the consensus was against air strikes. As to out-of-area missions, the French administration envisaged a global peacekeeping role

⁶⁶ S/RES/743 (1992), 21 February 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

⁶⁷ Michael Evans, 'Nato chief lists perils for peace force', *Times*, 3/6/92.

⁶⁸ Chris McLaughlin, 'Practical difficulties set against moral rectitude', *Scotsman*, 12/8/92.

⁶⁹ Hella Pick, 'Nato accepts wider peacekeeping role', *Guardian*, 5/6/92.

for the WEU.⁷⁰ Since the representatives of Britain and the US sided with the advocates of air strikes on the question of out-of-area missions, the French veto was easily overruled in the North Atlantic Council.⁷¹

Nevertheless, on the issue of Bosnia, the French government succeeded with the support of the British and Americans in blocking further moves towards military action in the North Atlantic Council. The representatives of the three governments insisted that such measures could only be decided on the basis of a UN Security Council resolution. The demand implied the transfer of the ultimate decision-making authority over the international operation in Bosnia to the Security Council. Although the transfer of the authority was not favoured by the air strike advocates, they were not able to prevent it. The EC and NATO had proved incapable of agreeing on effective measures. Moreover, the support of the three Security Council members, France, Britain and the US, was in any case a condition for air strikes because of their military contributions to NATO or the WEU. In the absence of any prospects for an agreement, the transfer at least relieved the other European governments from their responsibility with regard to the conflict. Essentially, however, the coalition between the governments of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Austria had reached an impasse. Although their ministers and officials continued to press for air strikes in the EC and the WEU, the sidelining of these organisations on the Bosnia issue deprived them of direct control over the international intervention. Since the advocates of air strikes had used all their linkages within the network to exert pressure, but not succeeded in gaining new supporters, the option of air strikes appeared to have been finally ruled out. However, at the same time the pressure for air strikes was reaching critical degrees in the US. The new Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and President George Bush were especially susceptible to further pressure when news about Serb ethnic cleansing in Bosnia emerged at the

⁷⁰ Michael Evans, 'Nato chief lists perils for peace force', *Times*, 3/6/92; Hella Pick, 'Nato accepts wider peacekeeping role', *Guardian*, 5/6/92; Michael Binyon and James Bone, 'Hurd demands end to Bosnia camp atrocities', *Times*, 8/8/92. Indeed, France had suggested sending a WEU peacekeeping force to the former Yugoslavia, but the proposal was vetoed by Britain. See Lepick, 'French Perspectives', p.79; David Fairhall and Mark Tran, 'Nato role in new British force for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 8/10/92.

⁷¹ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>. The WEU followed suit with a similar offer on 19 June 1992. See WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

beginning of August 1992.

'Concentration Camp' Report Triggers US Policy Change

The second stage of the debate over air strikes in Bosnia was marked by a decisive shift of US foreign policy towards military action. It was followed by attempts from US officials to press their French and British partners in the UN Security Council into supporting air strikes. The American policy change in favour of air strikes was triggered by a broadcast from Independent Television News which showed 80 starving prisoners in a Serb 'concentration camp' near Omarska. As the pictures flashed about television screens in the US and Europe, voters and parliamentarians who so far had been largely ignorant about the conflict were outraged.⁷² Within days leading Congressmen and Senators urged the US administration to intervene militarily in order to end the atrocities. Although Congress did not have any immediate decision-making authority in this case, its direct influence over the President and the Secretary of State due to the general institutional dependence of the US administration on Congress in other matters allowed its members to exert considerable pressure. Journalists through their own relations as provider of information for the government and as mediator of the public opinion reinforced the demands of Congress members by reports about other Serb camps in Bosnia and commentaries on the viability of military action.

As opinions changed, they profited from the latent support for air strikes within the State Department. Officials within the State Department had for some time been dissatisfied with the government's reluctance to take action in Bosnia. In fact, several had resigned in protest of the official policy.⁷³ When the ITN broadcast finally raised the public awareness of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, members of the State Department authenticated the news about the killing of civilians in the Serb camps without consulting their political leadership. Although Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles was subsequently forced to deny the announcement, his assurance that the administration could

⁷² Halverson, 'American Perspectives', p.8. By 10 August, 53 per cent of the American public supported air strikes against Serb positions. See also Simon Tisdall, Hella Pick and Kurt Schork, 'UN edges towards Bosnia force', *Guardian*, 5/8/92; Patrick Cockburn, 'US under domestic pressure to act', *Independent*, 10/8/92. On the position of the Congress see Patrick Cockburn, 'The Bosnia crisis: Sight that shook the world', *Independent on Sunday*, 9/8/92; Ramet, *Yugoslav Crisis*, p.204.

⁷³ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.211; Ramet, *Yugoslav Crisis*, p.204.

not 'confirm reports of Serb death camps' now lacked credibility.⁷⁴

Table 3.2 Preference Changes: 8 August - 29 October 1992

2 nd Phase (-10/8/92)			3 rd Phase (-16/8/92)			4 th Phase (-29/9/92)			5 th Phase (-29/10/92)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
WEU	55	B	US-Wh	75	NC	US-Wh	100	C	WEU	55	B
US-Wh	50	NC	WEU	55	B	WEU	55	B	EP	47	C
Nato-Org	45	NC	EP	47	NC	EP	47	NC	US-SD	46	NC
US-SD	42	NC	Nato-Org	45	NC	US-SD	46	NC	Nato-Org	45	NC
EU-CM	41	B	EU-CM	43	NC	Nato-Org	45	NC	EU-CM	43	B
EP	40	NC	US-SD	42	NC	EU-CM	43	B	US-Pen	42	NC
EU-Co	39	C	Nato-CM	39	B	US-Pen	42	NC	Nato-CM	41	B
Nato-CM	39	B	CSCE	37	B	Nato-CM	41	B	CSCE	38	B
CSCE	37	B	US-Pen	37	NC	CSCE	38	B	UN-Org	36	NC
US-Pen	37	NC	UN-Org	36	NC	UN-Org	36	NC	UN-SC	30	NC
UN-Org	36	NC	US-Pre	34	C	UN-SC	30	NC	Mod	29	NC
US-Pre	34	B	Mod	29	NC	Mod	29	NC	Fco	27	NC
Mod	29	NC	Fco	27	NC	Fco	27	NC	FS	25	NC
Fco	27	NC	FS	25	NC	FS	25	NC	DS	24	NC
FS	25	NC	DS	24	NC	DS	24	NC	PM	23	NC
DS	24	NC	PM	21	NC	PM	23	NC	con	17	NC
PM	21	NC	UN-SC	20	NC	con	17	NC	lab	17	U
UN-SC	20	NC	con	17	NC	lab	17	NC	Par	15	NC
con	17	NC	lab	17	NC	Par	15	NC	vole	14	NC
lab	17	NC	Par	15	NC	vole	14	NC	Cab	7	NC
Par	15	NC	vole	14	NC	Cab	7	NC	Com	6	NC
vole	10	NC	Cab	7	NC	Com	6	NC			
Cab	7	NC	Com	6	NC						
Com	6	NC									

President Bush was particularly exposed to the rising pressure from members of Congress, the media and the American public. Not only was he linked, through a web of formal and

⁷⁴ Simon Tisdall, Hella Pick and Kurt Schork, 'UN edges towards Bosnia force', *Guardian*, 5/8/92; Phil Davidson, 'West presses for access to Bosnia camps', *Independent*, 5/8/92.

informal relations to Senators and journalists, Bush also had to be especially wary about the view of the American electorate due to the upcoming presidential elections.⁷⁵ The resolve of the Democratic candidate Bill Clinton, who called for selective air strikes to end the conflict, appeared more favourably in the American public than the wavering of President Bush. Within two weeks the national and international pressure on the President increased from 28 to 34 per cent of his contacts in the network⁷⁶ and Bush began to sway.⁷⁷ Although the Secretary of Defence Richard Cheney and officials from the Pentagon reiterated their opposition against military action⁷⁸, Bush indicated an impending change of policy with regard to the military strikes on 16 August 1992.

The Secretary of Defence and his staff, however, resisted the calls for air strikes from 42 and 37 per cent of the actors with whom they had contacts in the network.⁷⁹ They were supported by their colleagues in NATO who agreed on the dangers of intervening in Bosnia. Crucially, the continuing internal disputes between the 'hawkish' officials in the State Department and the 'dovish' military in the Pentagon seriously reduced the ability of the administration to press for military action.⁸⁰ In fact, the officials from both departments used their relations within the network to pursue their divergent policy preferences, sometimes undermining the position of the US government in international organisations and among its European partners. While State Department officials embarked upon a policy of persuasion and negotiation with America's closest allies in the UN Security Council during autumn in order to promote the new US policy⁸¹, Pentagon

⁷⁵ Jon Hibbs and Patricia Wilson, 'Agreement near on use of UN troops', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/8/92; Halverson, 'American Perspectives', p.10.

⁷⁶ Due to the changes of opinion among Congress members and journalists the pressure on the Bush increased from nine out of 32 actors to eleven, i.e. from P_1 [Pre] = $9/32 = 28\%$ to P_2 [Pre] = $11/32 = 34\%$.

⁷⁷ Adam Lebor and Michael Binyon, 'Mourners flee mortar attack on Sarajevo children's funeral', *Times*, 5/8/92; Jurek Martin, Judy Dempsey and Laura Silber, 'Bush calls on UN to sanction use of force in Bosnia', *Financial Times*, 7/8/92; John Lichfield, 'The Bosnia crisis: Bush feels pressure for intervention', *Independent*, 8/8/92; James Adams and Andrew Hogg, 'America considers air strikes against Serbia', *Sunday Times*, 9/8/92.

⁷⁸ A position which the Pentagon continued to hold. See George Graham, 'How to lead the world without becoming its policeman', *Financial Times*, 7/1/93.

⁷⁹ Due to the preference change among Senators, the media and President Bush, ten and seven actors who were linked to Defence Secretary Cheney and Pentagon official respectively favoured air strikes, raising the pressure on the former to P_3 [US-SD] = $10/24 = 42\%$ and the latter to P_3 [US-pen] = $7/19 = 37\%$.

⁸⁰ Ware and Watson, *Former Yugoslavia*, p.7.

⁸¹ Jakobsen, *Multilateralism Matters but How*, p.20.

staff used their linkages within the US administration and NATO's integrated military organisation to urge caution.⁸²

Since the transfer of the ultimate decision-making authority to the Security Council, the main targets for pressure from State Department officials had to be their colleagues in Britain and France who continued to veto air strikes. Although the European press and public were equally outraged at the ITN pictures of the Serb detention camps as the Americans, they shared the scepticism of their political representatives as to whether military strikes could resolve the conflict in Bosnia. Risking the lives of British or French military personnel without a clear objective or strategy appeared self-defeating.⁸³ Nevertheless, the calls for military action had increased in Europe as well. Among the new proponents of military action were the members of the European Commission, represented by Jacques Delors and the External Relations Commissioner Hans van den Broek and the European Parliament. The Commissioner who had so far been neutral on the issue responded to calls for air strikes from the German, Italian, Portuguese, Dutch and Belgian administration, which together with the media accounted for 41 per cent of the Commission's links within the network.⁸⁴ Moreover, without immediate authority or responsibility over the international operation in Bosnia, the Commission could safely take a radical stance. Speaking to the European Parliament, Commission President Jacques Delors advocated air strikes as the new solution to the Yugoslav 'quagmire'.⁸⁵ Among the European Parliament members his views were increasingly shared.⁸⁶ However, in spite of the growing pressure from EU institutions, the representatives of Britain and France

⁸² George Graham, 'How to lead the world without becoming its policeman', *Financial Times*, 7/1/93.

⁸³ Patrick Cockburn, 'The Bosnia crisis: Sight that shook the world', *Independent on Sunday*, 9/8/92; 'Leading article: The crossing of a Rubicon', *Independent*, 11/8/92. See also Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.211.

⁸⁴ P_2 [EU-Co] = 11/27 = 41%.

⁸⁵ Commission President Jaques Delors' speech at the special session of European Parliament Committees on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 1992, SPEECH/92/77 at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/>. See also Andrew Hill, 'Delors condemns EC lack of resolve', *Financial Times*, 11/8/92; Martin Walker and Patrick Wintour, 'West backs air force for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 11/8/92; James Bone and Michael Binyon, 'Britain, France and US agree on Bosnia force', *Times*, 11/8/92; Chris McLaughlin 'UN close to vote on military role in Bosnia', *Scotsman*, 11/8/92; 'Britannia rules the waverers', *Economist*, 15/8/92.

⁸⁶ Andrew Hill, 'Delors condemns EC lack of resolve', *Financial Times*, 11/8/92.

continued to veto the endorsement of air strikes in the EC Council of Ministers.⁸⁷

While President Bush was still wavering about his position on air strikes during the second week of August, officials from the US State Department began to focus their pressure for military action on diplomats in the UN Security Council. Specifically, State Department officials proposed a resolution authorising the use of 'all necessary means' in Bosnia.⁸⁸ Although the phrase had obvious similarities with the UN resolution which preceded the international intervention in the Gulf War, the formulation was sufficiently vague to accommodate the diverse positions in the US, Britain and France. It stipulated neither the form of the measures to be taken, nor a deadline for an intervention. The British and French administrations accepted the resolution to placate the media and the increasing proportion of their public who were favouring military action.

The British and French acquiescence to a resolution which could pave the way for air strikes gave an indication of the increasing pressure on the two governments with the emerging shift in US foreign policy. However, accounting for 23 per cent, the number of air strikes supporters among the actors to whom the British Prime Minister John Major was linked in the network, was still significantly lower than the 34 per cent which led President Bush to adopt air strikes as an official policy objective only days after the UN resolution.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the resolution effectively committed the governments in Britain and France to some form of action in Bosnia. The French administration was certainly aware of the implicit change of policy. The question which international organisation would implement military action, if it could be agreed upon, already caused disagreements between US and French officials. The latter insisted that the UN should maintain the command over the operations in Bosnia, including military action implemented by NATO. Conversely, the US administration preferred a fully independent NATO mission.⁹⁰ The outcome of this debate was a nominal compromise which revealed how far the Security

⁸⁷ See joint statement of the Council of Ministers within the EPC, 'Former Yugoslavia', 5 October 1992, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Commission, 25/10, p.91.

⁸⁸ John McGhie and Patrick Brogan, 'Major backs armed convoys', *Observer*, 9/8/92; Jon Hibbs and Patricia Wilson, 'Agreement near on use of UN troops', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/8/92.

⁸⁹ Specifically, nine out of 39 actors to whom Major had regular contacts favoured air strikes, including, the heads of state in Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, the international press and the EU Commission, accounting for $P_4 [PM] = 9/39 = 23\%$.

⁹⁰ Martin Walker and Patrick Wintour, 'West backs aid force for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 11/8/92; Stephen Robinson and Jon Hibbs, 'Draft resolution opens door to the use of force', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/8/92.

Council was from considering military action in practice.⁹¹ In the text of resolution 770, which was approved on 13 August, the members of the Security Council declared to 'take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations' the delivery of aid to Bosnia. Practically, it meant that the specific nature of the intervention would be decided upon when the UN Security Council members had reached a consensus on the question.⁹²

If US State Department officials had assumed that the new resolution would open the way for air strikes in Bosnia, their hopes were soon shattered. Not only did their colleagues in Britain and France insist that all other measures were tried before military action was even considered, the American plans for air strikes also met the resistance of a Pentagon-led transgovernmental coalition among the military staff in NATO. The military used the fact that the UN Security Council had tasked NATO with examining the options for the implementation of resolution 770 to question a military intervention in Bosnia. The suggestion to seize the Bosnian capital Sarajevo with a 100,000 strength force made by military officials from the headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance in Brussels was, as newspapers commented, 'an impractical proposal designed to get a thumbs-down from Congress, the Bush administration and NATO'⁹³. It was well known to the military that neither American, nor European politicians were willing to despatch fighting troops to the former Yugoslavia. However, NATO commanders claimed that this was necessary if the international community wanted to enforce the UN resolution with military means.

In addition, Pentagon officials and their British colleagues used their domestic relations in the network to repeat the estimates in conversations with their political leaders and with parliamentary representatives. In the US, the assistant to General Colin Powell, Lt General Barry Mc Caffrey, told the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that between 60,000 and 120,000 troops were required to secure Sarajevo for the delivery

⁹¹ Martin Walker and Patrick Wintour, 'West backs aid force for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 11/8/92; James Bone and Michael Binyon, 'Britain, France and US agree on Bosnia force', *Times*, 11/8/92; Chris McLaughlin, 'UN close to vote on military role in Bosnia', *Scotsman*, 11/8/92; Stephen Robinson and Jon Hibbs, 'Draft resolution opens door to the use of force', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/8/92.

⁹² S/RES/770 (1992) 13 August 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

⁹³ James Adams, Louise Branson, Ian Glover-James and Andrew Hogg, 'Have they got away with it?', *Sunday Times*, 16/8/92; Christopher Bellamy, 'Nato ponders how to turn words into action', *Independent*, 12/8/92.

of humanitarian aid as envisaged by the UN resolution. He pointed out that such military intervention would certainly involve a high number of casualties.⁹⁴ When questioned by the British government, the Chiefs of Staff even topped the dire scenario painted by the American military. They suggested the creation of corridors for aid convoys to Sarajevo would require at least 300,000 fighting troops.⁹⁵

As both European and American politicians were alarmed by the vision of becoming embroiled in the Yugoslav war, the prospect of a military solution again received a setback. It was hardly noted that the less risky option of air strikes on Serb bases had been *prima facie* excluded by the military under the pretence that nothing short of a full-scale intervention would be 'effective'. Thus, with the explicit support from NATO military planners, British and French representatives in the North Atlantic Council were able to maintain their veto regarding air strikes in spite of the increase in pressure from 39 to 41 per cent following President Bush's preference change in support of air strikes.⁹⁶

After NATO military action had been ruled out, the governments of Britain and France decided unilaterally to implement resolution 770 by means of a small, defensive protection force of about 3,000 soldiers. In Britain where the news of Serb 'concentration camps' had not changed the doubts of politicians and the public over military action, the decision was met by broad approval within the executive and legislative.⁹⁷ In the House of Commons, even the members of the Labour Shadow Cabinet supported the government's policy.⁹⁸ The failure of Labour Party leader John Smith to request a recall of Parliament from its summer recess in order to debate this decision led to some protest within the party. However, the substance of the government's decision was not a subject

⁹⁴ Barbara Starr, 'No speedy end to war, warns USA', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:8, 22/8/92, p.12.

⁹⁵ Patrick Wintour, Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, 'Major sends planes to Gulf and offers 1,800 troops for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 19/8/92.

⁹⁶ The pressure on the North Atlantic Council had increased due to President Bush's preference change by one out of 51 from P_3 [Nato-CM] = 20/51 = 39% to P_4 [Nato-CM] = 21/51 = 41%.

⁹⁷ Patrick Wintour, Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, 'Major sends planes to Gulf and offers 1,800 troops for Bosnia', *Guardian*, 19/8/92.

⁹⁸ Philip Stephens, 'Unease in UK over Bosnia troops decision', *Financial Times*, 20/8/92; Michael Jones, 'MPs left in summer slumber as perilous military acts take shape', *Sunday Times*, 23/8/92.

of controversy.⁹⁹

Effectively the emerging coalition in favour of air strikes stalled at the borders of the United Kingdom in October 1992. The effect of the American policy change on domestic actors in Britain was limited. Officials in the British MoD who had been under the highest pressure within the British administration at 29 per cent, were not exposed to American pressure for military action because they were only linked to their colleagues in the Pentagon who continued to oppose air strikes. The main change in pressure was noticed by Prime Minister Major who was now confronted with President Bush's support for military strikes in international summits. While the pressure on the key roles within the British government ranged between 21 and 29 per cent, it did not lead to an immediate response, with its long-term consequences showing during the winter of 1992-93.

First Preference Changes in Britain

During autumn 1992 the international pressure on the British administration persisted. Since resolution 770 had failed to induce the governments of Britain and France to shift towards the implementation of military action, US officials embarked on renegotiating the issue in the UN Security Council. The vagueness of the resolution's stipulations had been one of the reasons why the British and the French governments had been able to circumvent military strikes by taking alternative action. With a new resolution, President Bush and Secretary of State Eagleburger wanted to endorse explicitly the use of offensive means of action. Since the representatives of Britain and France ruled out a straightforward air attack on Serb targets such as airfields and artillery, US State Department officials proposed the extension and subsequent enforcement of the no-fly zone to the Bosnian airspace.¹⁰⁰ The repeated violations by Serb and Croat planes provided

⁹⁹ Philip Stephens, 'Labour seeks assurances on RAF operations in Iraq', *Financial Times*, 22/8/92; Colin Brown, 'Labour may demand recall of Parliament', *Independent*, 24/8/92; 'Leading article: Time to break into the holidays', *Guardian*, 24/8/92; Patrick Wintour, 'Major "within rights" to refuse recall', *Guardian*, 4/9/92; Anthony Bevins, 'Labour criticises refusal to recall MPs as arrogant', *Independent*, 4/9/92; David Wallen, 'Troops heading for Bosnia get permission to open fire first', *Scotsman*, 16/9/92.

¹⁰⁰ Ware and Watson, *Former Yugoslavia*, p.7; Laura Silber, Robert Mauthner and George Graham, 'Sarajevo airlift resumes', *Financial Times*, 3/10/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'UK ready to back air strikes on Serbs', *Times*, 3/12/92; 'Bosnian-Serb air violations continue', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:24-25, 12/12/92, p.8; Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, 'Clinton calls for West to "turn up heat" on Serbs', *Guardian*, 12/12/92; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, 'US canvasses Europe over enforcement of air ban', *Times*, 15/12/92.

suitable justification, although most of the flights had been for logistic purposes and travel, rather than offensive action. In reality, the US were little concerned about the breaches of the no-fly zone. As one official admitted later, the question of pursuing planes in violation of the no-fly zone was seized upon as an opportunity to introduce air strikes on Serb airfields as a 'logical extension' of the enforcement measures.¹⁰¹ Since the American proposal avoided the mentioning of air strikes, the members of the UN Security Council quickly agreed on the principle of extending the no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia to Bosnia. On 9 October, the Security Council approved, in resolution 781, the extension of the no-fly zone.¹⁰²

It was little surprising, however, that British and French representatives at the UN vetoed any efforts to enforce the zone by shooting down planes caught in violation. Their ability to resist the pressure for air strikes was enhanced by similar inhibitions within the Canadian, Danish and Spanish administrations. The three countries had contributed ground troops to UNPROFOR and shared French and British fears of retaliation.¹⁰³ Moreover, the Russian government had been fundamentally opposed to any intervention in the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the conflict. Air strikes were unacceptable to the Russian leadership, not only because of close historical ties with the Serbs, but also because it might set a precedent for Western intervention into the former Soviet Union and its sphere of influence.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, the persistent pressure from Eagleburger and US State Department officials, as well as from the administrations of the seven European countries who had advocated air strikes since May, slowly eroded the opposition to an enforcement of the no-fly zone between October and December 1992. British Foreign Office officials were particularly likely to change their view on the issue because 27 per cent of the actors with

¹⁰¹ James Fergusson, 'Six ways to turn up the heat', *European*, 17/12/92.

¹⁰² S/RES/781 (1992) 9 October 1992, at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>. See also James Bone and Tim Judah, 'UN forbids military flights over Bosnia', *Times*, 10/10/92.

¹⁰³ Simon Tisdall and David Fairhall, 'Clinton calls for West to "turn up heat" on Serbs', *Guardian*, 12/12/92; Ewen MacAskill and Gary Duncan, 'Fears grow of all-out Balkan war', *Scotsman*, 16/12/92; Alan Philips, Michael Montgomery and Philip Johnston, 'Cautious Nato ready to back no-fly zone', *Daily Telegraph*, 18/12/92; Ian Mather and Dusko Doder, 'Bosnia's last chance', *European*, 7/1/93.

¹⁰⁴ George Jones and Peter Almond, 'Britain considers force against Serbs', *Daily Telegraph*, 3/12/92; Alan Philips, 'Kosyrev U-turn is warning to West', *Daily Telegraph*, 15/12/92.

whom they regularly cooperated in the network supported air strikes.¹⁰⁵ Moreover, due to their involvement in the UN negotiations about the implementation of the no-fly zone, Foreign Office diplomats were constantly exposed to the international demands for military action. At the beginning of December 1992, Foreign Office officials speaking to the press expressed a changed preference in favour of air strikes.¹⁰⁶

Table 3.3 Preference Changes: 30 October 1992 - 19 January 1993

6 th Phase (-1/12/92)			7 th Phase (-3/12/92)			8 th Phase (-4/12/92)			9 th Phase (-19/1/93)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
WEU	55	B	WEU	57	B	WEU	60	B	WEU	60	B
US-SD	46	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC	Par	59	U
Nato-Org	45	NC	EC-CM	46	B	EU-CM	48	B	Nato-Org	48	NC
EU-CM	44	B	US-SD	46	NC	US-SD	46	NC	EU-CM	48	B
US-Pen	42	NC	US-Pen	42	NC	Nato-CM	43	B	US-SD	46	C
Nato-CM	41	B	Nato-CM	41	B	CSCE	42	B	Nato-CM	43	B
CSCE	38	B	UN-Org	41	NC	US-Pen	42	NC	CSCE	42	B
UN-Org	36	NC	CSCE	40	B	UN-Org	41	NC	US-Pen	42	NC
UN-SC	30	NC	Mod	33	NC	UN-SC	40	NC	UN-Org	41	U
Mod	29	NC	UN-SC	30	NC	Mod	33	NC	UN-SC	40	NC
Fco	27	C	FS	28	C	vote	24	NC	Mod	33	NC
FS	25	NC	PM	26	NC	PM	28	NC	vote	29	U
DS	24	NC	DS	24	NC	DS	28	NC	PM	28	NC
PM	23	NC	vote	19	NC	con	25	NC	DS	28	NC
vote	19	NC	con	17	NC	lab	25	C	con	25	U
con	17	U	lab	17	U	Cab	21	NC	Com	25	NC
lab	17	U	Par	15	NC	Par	21	NC	Cab	21	NC
Par	15	NC	Cab	14	NC	Com	19	NC			
Cab	7	NC	Com	13	NC						
Com	6	NC									

¹⁰⁵ $P_6 [Fco] = 8/30 = 27\%$. Compare footnote 52.

¹⁰⁶ Andrew Marr, 'Downing Street ponders the prospect of war', *Independent*, 1/12/92; Michael Binyon and Michael Evans, 'UK to call Bosnia summit', *Times*, 2/12/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'UK ready to back air strikes on Serbs', *Times*, 3/12/92; Anthony Bevin and Andrew Marshall, 'Pressure mounting for intervention in Bosnia', *Independent*, 3/12/92; Patrick Wintour and Michael Simons, 'Yugoslav War: Britain warns off Serbs', *Guardian*, 4/12/92.

The consequences of their preference reversal for the formation of a winning coalition in favour of air strikes were considerable. Specifically, the advocacy of air strikes by Foreign Office officials instantly increased the pressure for military action on Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd from 25 to 28 per cent of his contacts in the network.¹⁰⁷ Only three days later, Douglas Hurd announced in the media that, according to his opinion, the time had come to consider the use of air strikes in Bosnia.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the support for air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd and Foreign Office officials in turn raised the pressure for, and the credibility of, military strikes among MPs and the members of the Conservative and Labour Parties who looked to these two actors for expertise and information on the issue. Of the actors to which Conservatives and Labour members were directly linked within the British foreign policy network, 25 per cent now called for a military intervention.¹⁰⁹ However, while the Labour opposition joined the coalition in favour of air strikes¹¹⁰, the same increase in pressure had less effect on the members of the Conservative Party. Although the number of proponents of military action was increasing among the Conservatives, the majority of MPs maintained their support for the government's policy.¹¹¹

The scope of the preference changes among civil servants and politicians significantly weakened the opposition against air strikes in the British foreign policy network. By mid-December, the support for air strikes by Douglas Hurd and Foreign Office officials had increased the pressure on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of Defence to 28 per cent¹¹² and on the military and civilian staff in the MoD to 33 per cent

¹⁰⁷ The preference change among Foreign Office officials increased the pressure on the Foreign Secretary by one from nine to ten out of 36 actors, i.e. from P_6 [FS] = $9/36 = 25\%$ to P_7 [FS] = $10/36 = 28\%$.

¹⁰⁸ Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'UK ready to back air strikes on Serbs', *Times*, 3/12/92; Philip Stephens, 'Parliament and Politics: Caution on Bosnia reflects risks of entanglement', *Financial Times*, 16/12/92; Anthony Bevins and Annika Savill, 'Major wants tough, swift response if Serbs attack', *Independent*, 16/12/92.

¹⁰⁹ Specifically, the support for air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd increased the pressure on the members of the two parties from P_7 [con; lab] = $2/12 = 17\%$ to P_8 [con; lab] = $3/12 = 25\%$.

¹¹⁰ Philip Stephens, 'Parliament and Politics: Caution on Bosnia reflects risks of entanglement', *Financial Times*, 16/12/92; Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs', *Times*, 16/12/92; Geoffrey Parkhouse, 'Major resists pleas on Bosnia', *Herald*, 16/12/92.

¹¹¹ Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs', *Times*, 16/12/92; Ralph Atkins, 'Parliament and Politics: PM "would not block UN effort"', *Financial Times*, 16/12/92.

¹¹² In addition to their counterparts from seven European countries, US President Bush, the international media, now Foreign Secretary Hurd and Foreign office staff supported air strikes, raising the pressure on

of their network contacts¹¹³. Yet, collectively the members of the Cabinet maintained their objections to military action during December. Moreover, as a consequence of the convention of collective responsibility in the Cabinet, Foreign Secretary Hurd was forced to defend the official policy line nationally in the media and internationally in the ongoing negotiations about the enforcement of the no-fly zone. While the preference changes had stopped short of British acquiescence to air strikes, the split within the British administration weakened its ability and willingness to resist the pressure for the implementation of the no-fly zone by air strikes. In the Cabinet's Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, the differences between Foreign Secretary Hurd and Defence Secretary Rifkind were resolved by a compromise in favour of a UN resolution which authorised the enforcement of the no-fly zone, but ruled out air strikes on ground targets.¹¹⁴

In the international negotiations the discussions focussed on the question of how to implement the no-fly zone. A draft resolution tabled by the French government with support from the US, the Netherlands and Turkey set the starting point for extended bargaining between the governments over the means of enforcement.¹¹⁵ In the North Atlantic Council, the representatives of the US and the other Western European governments which supported military action secured a blank agreement in which NATO offered its military capabilities to the UN for the implementation of the resolution. However, ministers from twelve out of sixteen member states warned about any action which could put the lives of UNPROFOR soldiers in jeopardy. NATO's final communiqué stressed that the effects of enforcement action on the humanitarian operation would be

Prime Minister Major to P₈ [PM] = 11/39 = 28% and on Defence Secretary Rifkind to P₈ [DS] = 8/29 = 28%. Compare footnotes 90 and 51.

¹¹³ The preference change among Foreign Office staff increased the pressure on their MoD colleagues by one to P₈ [Mod] = 7/21 = 33%. Compare footnote 53.

¹¹⁴ Patrick Wintour and Michael Simons, 'Yugoslav War: Britain warns off Serbs', *Guardian*, 4/12/92; Philip Johnston and Peter Almond, 'Major dismisses talk of Bosnia offensive', *Daily Telegraph*, 4/12/92; Philip Stephens, 'Parliament and Politics: Caution on Bosnia reflects risks of entanglement', *Financial Times*, 16/12/92.

¹¹⁵ Nicholas Wood and Michael Binyon, 'Nato prepares for air strikes against Serbs', *Times*, 16/12/92; Annika Savill and Colin Brown, 'NATO backs "pause" over no-fly zone', *Independent*, 18/12/92; 'Shame at a war without end', *Economist*, 19/12/92.

taken into account.¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, in the further course of the international negotiations in the UN, a coalition between the British and French representatives, with the support of the Canadian government, broke up because of the increasing tacit support for military action within the British administration.¹¹⁷ In a meeting with President Bush at Camp David, Prime Minister Major acceded to the use of air strikes as a last resort and after a 30-day warning period.¹¹⁸ Once the British government had changed sides on the issue, French and Canadian diplomats were not able to prevent further moves towards a UN Security Council resolution. The text of the resolution was eventually agreed along the lines agreed between Bush and Major.¹¹⁹

The Security Council vote on the resolution, however, was delayed because of the election of a new government in the US. Although President-elect Bill Clinton had strongly argued in favour of air strikes during his election campaign, the incoming administration was not prepared to endorse the resolution which had been negotiated by its predecessor without a policy review.¹²⁰ Instead, the new administration embarked upon a reassessment of the situation in Bosnia and the policy options at its disposal which put a halt to the resolution until March 1993.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Annika Savill and Colin Brown, 'NATO backs "pause" over no-fly zone', *Independent*, 18/12/92; Robert Mauthner and Philip Stephens, 'Nato wary of military response in Bosnia', *Financial Times*, 18/12/92; Alan Philips, Michael Montgomery and Philip Johnston, 'Cautious Nato ready to back no-fly zone', *Daily Telegraph*, 18/12/92; 'Nato agrees to use force despite split', *Times*, 18/12/92.

¹¹⁷ Geoffrey Parkhouse, 'Major puts risk to troops above Serbs' UN defiance', *Herald*, 18/12/92; George Jones 'Bush gives Major pledge on unhampered air for Bosnia', *Daily Telegraph*, 19/12/92.

¹¹⁸ Prime Minister Major pressed for a deadline of at least 21 days, while American Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney preferred an ultimatum of merely 15 days. See Philip Webster and Michael Evans, 'Major presses for extended deadline to clear skies', *Times*, 22/12/92; Trevor Fishlock, David Wastell and Robin Lodge, 'Major agrees two-week Bosnia deadline', *Sunday Telegraph*, 20/12/92.

¹¹⁹ Julian Nundy, 'Mitterrand and Bush unite over no-fly zone', *Independent*, 4/1/93; Roger Boyes and Alan McGregor, 'Fears of Muslims persist', *Times*, 4/1/93.

¹²⁰ Hella Pick, 'Refugees flee, diplomats dither', *Guardian*, 1/8/92; Simon Tisdall, Mark Tran and Hella Pick, 'UN reluctant to support use of force in Bosnia', *Guardian*, 6/8/92; Leonard Doyle, 'UN will give aid convoys armed support', *Independent*, 14/8/92; Peter Pringle, 'Owen takes the battle to the hear of the ally', *Independent on Sunday*, 7/2/93; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, 'US plan aims to roll back Serbs' gains in Bosnia', *Times*, 11/2/93.

¹²¹ Jeremy Campbell, 'Clinton: our time has come', *Standard*, 20/1/93; James Adams, 'Government urges Clinton not to intervene in Bosnia', *Sunday Times*, 31/1/93; Ian Brodie and Michael Evans, 'Owen hopes to sell Bosnia peace plan to sceptical Clinton', *Times*, 1/2/93; 'Clinton wants more time over Bosnia', *Standard*, 2/2/93; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, 'US plan aims to roll back Serbs' gains in Bosnia', *Times*, 11/2/93.

British Public and Politicians Support Military Action

The fourth and final stage of the debate over air strikes was characterised by increasing public and parliamentary support for military action in Britain. At the beginning of 1993, however, the debate appeared to have come to a standstill because of the US policy review. For a short period in February, it even seemed as if the new US government had reversed its stance on air strikes because of the opposition from Pentagon officials and the governments of Britain and France.¹²² The Vance-Owen Plan which at the time had been accepted by the leaderships of the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims raised expectations in the US and Western Europe that a peace settlement was close. However, Bill Clinton's six-point initiative included the enforcement of the no-fly zone as one of its key measures.¹²³ When the Serbs continued their policy of ethnic cleansing in spite of the Vance-Owen peace plan, the pressure from State Department officials, Senators and the American public which had existed before the election soon came to bear upon the members of the new administration.¹²⁴ Although Secretary of State Warren Christopher adopted a cautious stance, while the new Secretary of Defence Les Aspin became an ardent promoter of air strikes, the overall balance of pressures in the administration remained unchanged.¹²⁵ By March, Clinton resumed the course of the previous government in favour of air strikes. To exert pressure on their European colleagues US administrators threatened to unilaterally lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and to consider 'other options', i.e. air strikes, to stop the war.¹²⁶ Moreover, State Department officials took advantage of the increasing domestic pressure on the British government by organizing a series of bilateral meetings with their British counterparts to discuss military

¹²² Martin Fletcher and Eve-Ann Prentice, 'US resistance brings Owen's Bosnia deal to brink of failure', *Times*, 5/2/93; Annika Savill, 'Hurd to press US over Bosnia plan', *Independent*, 6/2/93; Roger Boyes, 'American bluster masks qualified approval for peace plan', *Times*, 9/2/93; Patricia Wilson and Stephen Robinson, 'Clinton may send troops to Bosnia', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/2/93; Martin Fletcher and Michael Evans, 'US plan aims to roll back Serbs' gains in Bosnia', *Times*, 11/2/93.

¹²³ Patricia Wilson and Stephen Robinson, 'Clinton may send troops to Bosnia', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/2/93.

¹²⁴ Andrew Marr, 'The case for trying to bully the bullies', *Independent*, 25/3/93; Jeremy Campbell, 'US "ready to bomb Serbian forces"', *Standard*, 29/3/93.

¹²⁵ Martin Fletcher, 'Recall of Carter old guard tests global policy resolve', *Times*, 19/1/93; Roger Boyes, 'American bluster masks qualified approval for peace plan', *Times*, 9/2/93.

¹²⁶ Ewen McAskill, 'Britain denies rift over arms for Bosnia', *Scotsman*, 16/4/93; Eve-Ann Prentice, 'Russians raise fears over role of West in Bosnia', *Times*, 20/4/93; David White and Philip Stephens, 'UK may back US on bombing Serbs', *Financial Times*, 23/4/93.

action in Bosnia.¹²⁷

In Britain, the additional support for air strikes from Foreign Secretary Hurd, Foreign Office civil servants and Labour MPs that had increased the pressure on Parliament from 15 to 59 per cent began to show its effect.¹²⁸ Although the Conservative MPs remained divided over the question of air strikes, the support for military action increased to up to a third of the Conservative Parliamentary Party during the spring.¹²⁹ Among the latter were the chairmen of the Commons Committees on Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy, David Howell and Nicholas Bonsor, who advised the government to consider 'stronger' action.¹³⁰ Yet, these experts spoke as individual MPs. Collectively, the Conservative Parliamentary Party did not challenge the government but supported its policy with its blocking majority in the Commons and its Committees. Noting the growing support for military action, however, the government sought to exert counter pressure on MPs through extensive briefings of the Standing Committees and the Commons about the dangers of military intervention.¹³¹

The government could do less to prevent a change of opinion among the British public. The electorate had been exposed to calls for air strikes from the media and other actors since August. In December, the balance appeared to be shifting, but the public remained divided over the viability of military action. By the first week of April a MORI poll confirmed that 60 per cent of the British population were dissatisfied with the government's performance and as many as 64 per cent supported a despatch of British

¹²⁷ George Jones and Maurice Weaver, 'Crisis in Bosnia: Reluctant Britain ready to back US over air strikes', *Daily Telegraph*, 23/4/93; Peter Osborne, 'British troops outraged by new massacre', *Standard*, 23/4/93; Andrew Marr, Colin Brown and David Osborne, 'Britain set to break with US over Bosnia', *Independent*, 29/4/93.

¹²⁸ Among the actors linked to the House of Commons four, namely Foreign Secretary Hurd, the media and the members of the Liberal and Labour Parties increased the pressure to $P_{10} [\text{Par}] = 6096/10416 = 59\%$.

¹²⁹ Jill Sherman 'Major under pressure to toughen line on Bosnia', *Times*, 19/4/93.

¹³⁰ John Williams, 'Bosnia: "No John Wayne Solution"', *Standard*, 7/4/93; Christy Campbell, David Wastell, Toby Helm and Charles Glass, 'Midnight mercy deal for Srebrenica', *Sunday Telegraph*, 18/4/93; John Williams, 'Cabinet rules out military help for Moslems', *Standard*, 19/4/93; Marcus Tanner, 'Srebrenica victims airlifted to safety', *Independent*, 19/4/93; Paul Wilenius, 'Britain prepares for air strikes', *Today*, 19/4/93; Julie Kirkbride, 'Bosnia: Tories shift towards action in Balkans', *Daily Telegraph*, 19/4/93.

¹³¹ Ralph Atkins, 'Parliament and Politics: Hurd wins backing for Bosnia blockade', *Financial Times*, 20/4/93.

Table 3.4 Preference Changes: 19 January - 30 April 1993

10 th Phase (-23/3/93)			11 th Phase (-7/4/93)			12 th Phase (-15/4/93)			13 th Phase (-25/4/93)			14 th Phase (-30/4/93)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
WEU	60	B	WEU	60	B	Par	62	U	Par	65	U	Par	69	U
Par	59	U	Par	59	U	WEU	60	B	WEU	62	B	WEU	64	B
Nato-Org	48	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC	con	50	U
EU-CM	48	C	US-Pen	47	NC	US-Pen	47	NC	US-Pen	47	NC	Nato-Org	48	NC
US-Pen	47	NC	US-SS	43	NC	US-SS	43	NC	Nato-CM	45	B	US-Pen	47	NC
US-SS	43	NC	Nato-CM	43	B	Nato-CM	43	B	US-SS	43	NC	Nato-CM	47	B
Nato-CM	43	B	UN-Org	41	U	UN-Org	41	U	con	42	U	CE	45	C
UN-Org	41	U	CSCE	40	B	CSCE	40	B	UN-Org	41	U	Com	44	U
CSCE	40	B	Mod	33	NC	DS	34	C	CSCE	40	B	Cab	43	C
Mod	33	NC	vote	33	C	con	33	U	Mod	38	NC	Mod	43	NC
DS	31	NC	DS	31	NC	PM	33	NC	Com	38	U	US-SS	43	NC
UN-SC	30	NC	PM	31	NC	Mod	33	NC	PM	36	C	CSCE	42	B
vote	29	U	UN-SC	30	NC	Com	31	U	Cab	36	U	UN-Org	41	U
PM	28	NC	con	25	U	UN-SC	30	NC	CE	36	NC	UN-SC	40	NC
con	25	U	Com	25	U	Cab	29	U	UN-SC	30	NC			
Com	25	NC	Cab	21	NC	CE	27	NC						
Cab	21	NC												

troops to Bosnia to stop the fighting.¹³² The change of public opinion in favour of military action increased the pressure on MPs and cabinet ministers. Due to his boundary position in the network Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind was not only exposed to transgovernmental pressure from the governments which called for air strikes, but also to the demands of his colleague Foreign Secretary Hurd. The recent swing in opinion polls increased the percentage of actors who supported air strikes among Rifkind's linkages in the network from 31 to 35.¹³³ The change of the public mood also raised the pressure for air strikes on Prime Minister Major from 31 to 33 per cent¹³⁴ and on the Cabinet from 21 to 29 per cent¹³⁵. On 25 April, Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind acceded and expressed his support for air strikes.¹³⁶ His preference change in turn raised the stakes for Prime Minister Major from 33 to 36 per cent of his network contacts.¹³⁷ Ten days later, John Major announced that the government did not rule out air strikes anymore.¹³⁸

As a policy change in the Cabinet appeared close, the NATO military made a final attempt to prevent air strikes through a transgovernmental coalition. At the core of this counter-coalition was the military staff from the British MoD. Unlike their political leaders, the military were not dependent on support from the public and Parliament and, thus, unaffected by their increasing pressure. Conversely, military officers were able to use their position as provider of authoritative information on defence issues for journalists and politicians to try to convince them of the unsuitability of air strikes. In a coalition with their colleagues in NATO, British military leaders decided to focus their efforts on the media. One day before the crucial meeting of the British Cabinet, the NATO Chiefs of Staff issued a statement in the international press in which they warned collectively of the

¹³² John Keegan, 'How to silence the guns?', *Daily Telegraph*, 16/12/92.

¹³³ The change of public opinion increased the pressure on Rifkind from nine to ten out of 29 actors to which the Defence Secretary was linked, i.e. from $P_{11} [DS] = 9/29 = 31\%$ to $P_{12} [DS] = 10/29 = 34\%$.

¹³⁴ The pressure on Prime Minister Major increased with the electorate by one out of 39 actors from $P_{11} [PM] = 12/39 = 31\%$ to $P_{12} [PM] = 13/39 = 33\%$.

¹³⁵ The pressure on the Cabinet increased from three to four out of 14 actors, i.e. from $P_{11} [Cab] = 3/14 = 21\%$ to $P_{12} [Cab] = 4/14 = 29\%$.

¹³⁶ Philip Stephens, 'Parliament and Politics: Little appetite for diet of military involvement', *Sunday Telegraph*, 28/4/93; Andrew Marr, 'A British tail wagging the American dog', *Independent*, 29/4/93.

¹³⁷ The preference change of the Defence Secretary raised the pressure on the Prime Minister by one to $P_{13} [PM] = 14/39 = 36\%$.

¹³⁸ Andrew Marr, 'A British tail wagging the American dog', *Independent*, 29/4/93.

dangers of military intervention. In the Cabinet, Chancellor Norman Lamont, Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke, Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley and Scottish Secretary Ian Lang also rejected air strikes. However, these ministers had little influence on the decision because most of them were not part of the foreign policy network.¹³⁹ In the end, neither they nor the military were able to prevent the formation of a 'winning coalition' in favour of air strikes in the British Cabinet. The collective pressure from the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, Foreign Office officials and the public which represented 43 per cent of the actors linked to the Cabinet was overwhelming.¹⁴⁰ On 30 April, the British government approved air strikes in Bosnia.¹⁴¹

3.3 Conclusion

The previous analysis has revealed a strong correlation between the pressure which actors were able to exert in the British multilevel foreign policy network and the formation of a winning coalition in favour of air strikes. In order to evaluate the two hypotheses proposed by multilevel network theory, this conclusion summarises the data across actors. It thereby seeks to assess how far the two hypotheses were generally corroborated by the case study. Specifically, it examines four indicators: (1) the frequency of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure, (2) the distribution of the four behavioural categories 'no change' 'unclear or undecided', 'change' and 'blocked' across the range of pressure from zero to 100 per cent, (3) the average degree of pressure for each behavioural category and (4) the timing of the preference changes during the research period. In addition, it attempts to identify general tendencies in the decision-making process which may suggest further inductive conclusions or a refinement of the initial hypotheses. Finally, this preliminary conclusion investigates whether the multilevel network analysis of the case was able to provide new insights into the British policy change on the question of air strikes in Bosnia.


¹³⁹ Boris Johnson, David Wastell and Christy Campbell, 'Tornados on Bosnia alert', *Sunday Telegraph*, 25/4/93.

¹⁴⁰ $P_{14} [\text{Cab}] = 6/14 = 43\%$. Compare footnote 136.

¹⁴¹ George Jones, 'Peace talks on Bosnia to resume', *Daily Telegraph*, 30/4/93; Ian Black, Patrick Wintour and Martin Walker, 'Serbs join last-ditch peace talks', *Guardian*, 30/4/93; Ewen McAskill, 'Approval close for air strikes on Serbs', *Scotsman*, 30/4/93.

Assessment of the Hypotheses

The validity of the first hypothesis which suggests that higher degrees of pressure increase the probability that an actor will change his or her policy preference can directly be evaluated through the number of preference changes among all actors who were subject to pressure of a particular range.¹⁴² Thus, for instance, none out of five actors who were subject to very low pressure in the range of 0-5



per cent changed their preferences, whereas one of twenty actors who were subject to higher pressure of 15-20 per cent changed theirs. The results displayed in Graph 3.1 confirm that the frequency of preference changes increased almost monotonously with rising degrees of pressure. The gaps in the distribution and the decrease in the range between 40 and 45 per cent can be attributed to the fact that a single case study does not provide a sufficiently large number of instances to provide a continuous curve. Nevertheless, the first hypothesis was confirmed in 209 out of 214 instances of preference change, i.e. 98 per cent.

A second measure for the explanatory value of the first hypothesis is the distribution of the four behavioural categories which have been identified, namely 'change', 'unclear or undecided', 'change' and 'blocked', across different degrees of pressure from zero to 100 per cent. Thus, according to the first hypothesis it can be expected that the number of instances of 'no change' behaviour is higher at lower degrees of pressure, while 'changes' occur primarily at higher degrees of pressure. In addition, an analysis of the distribution of each behavioural category can suggest more specific hypotheses about the relationship between changes of the political preferences of network actors and the degrees of pressure to which they are subjected.

Taking the instances in which actors who did not change their policy preferences


¹⁴² Frequency = number 'changed' / number 'changed' + 'unclear or undecided' + 'no change'

Instances of blocked preferences are excluded from the calculation because they are explained by the second hypothesis.


first, it initially appears surprising that the distribution shown in Graph 3.2 approaches a 'normal' curve with two peaks at 20-25 and 40-45 per cent pressure and lower frequencies to both sides of them, i.e. pressures between zero and 15 per cent and above 45 per cent. The first hypothesis would lead to the expectation that the number of actors who maintain their preferences decreases steadily with the higher degrees of pressure. Visually, this would be represented by a diagonal distribution from a high rating on the left to a low rating on the right of the picture. However, the divergence can easily be explained by the choice of the research period. Since the case study examined the decision-making process during the months in which the British government came under increasing pressure to support air strikes in Bosnia, very few actors were under no or little pressure. A different selection of the research period, beginning at a time when none of the actors seriously pressed for air strikes, for instance in 1991, would increase the number of actors who were subject to pressure between zero and 15 per cent.

This aside, the curve supports the hypothesis that actors are less able to resist demands for changes in their policy preference the higher the pressure from other actors in the network. Thus, the findings show that none of the actors were able to maintain their opposition to air strikes when the collective


Graph 3.2 'Change'



Graph 3.3 'Unclear or Undecided'



Graph 3.4 'Change'



pressure on increased above 50 per cent. It suggests the inductive proposition that there is a threshold pressure which actors are not able to withstand. Interestingly, this threshold occurs here at exactly 50 per cent which represented the situation in which half of the actors who have power over a specific member of the network urged him or her to support air strikes.

The distribution of preference ‘change’ in Graph 3.4, is a better indicator for the explanatory value of the first hypothesis because it shows only the instances in which actors modified their preferences. As hypothesised, it shows a steady and almost monotonous increase in the number of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure. Moreover, the evidence shows that actors only began to change their preferences if the pressure increased above 15 per cent. Again the curve indicates a threshold at a pressure of 50 per cent, although there is one instance in which an actor withstood higher degrees of pressure, indeed up to 100 percent. Out of 16 instances, it can be regarded as a deviation.

A second inductive proposition can be made with regard to the considerable overlap among the three categories of behaviour at pressures between about 25 and 50 per cent. It implies a critical range of pressure in which actors are unsure about their preferences. This inductive proposition is supported by the distribution of unclear preferences in Graph 3.3. It shows that the number of actors whose preferences are unclear or who are undecided peaks just before the 50 per cent threshold. It can, thus, be suggested that actors pass through a stage of reorientation which is linked to the degree of pressure to which they are exposed.

Table 3.5 Descriptive Statistics

Preferences	Number of Instances	Range of Pressure	Minimum Pressure	Maximum Pressure	Average Pressure
No Change (NC)	169	50%	0%	50%	29%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	29	52%	17%	69%	40%
Change (C)	16	80%	20%	100%	40%
Blocked (B)	51	28%	35%	64%	46%

A third measure for the correlation between the degree of pressure and preference changes

is the statistically significant difference in the average degree of the pressures in each behavioural category. Table 3.5 shows that actors were able to withstand pressure at a mean of 29 per cent, while they were undecided or changed at a mean of 40 per cent. A veto position, indeed, enabled actors to resist higher degree of pressure at an average of 46 per cent.

Table 3.6 Timing of Preference Changes

1st phase after an increase in pressure	Other
Med (0% -> 20%)	US-Pre (28% -> 34%): 2 nd Phase
US-con (0% -> 20%)	EU-CMi (46% -> 48%, no further rise over 3 phases): 3 rd Phase
EU-Co (36% -> 39%)	Fco (0% -> 27%): 5 th Phase
vote (29% -> 33%)	US-DS (42% -> 46%, no further rise over 6 phases): 6 th Phase
US-Wh (75% -> 100%)	
FS (25% -> 28%)	
lab (17% -> 25%)	
DS (31% -> 34%)	
PM (33% -> 36%)	
Cab (36% -> 43%)	
CE (36% -> 45%)	


The final indicator for the plausibility of the first hypothesis is the timing of the preference changes during the research period. It shows a strong link between increases in the degree of pressure and subsequent changes in the policy preferences of the actors. In this case, ten out of fifteen actors changed their preferences immediately after the pressure on them had increased, i.e. in the following phase. One actor, the American President, modified his preference in the second phase after the pressure on him had increased. Four role actors resisted an initial strengthening of the demand for air strikes, namely the US President, US Secretary of Defence, the EU Council of Ministers and Foreign Office officials. However, the ability of these actors to resist the pressure appears to be due to the fact that two of these four actors were subject to no further increases until they changed their preferences. Moreover, the degree of pressure on each of them was below the 50 per cent threshold identified above. The time span over which actors were able to withstand the demands

forced upon them varied considerably, ranging between two and six phases.¹⁴³

Due to these differences in time and position of the actors in the network, no inductive conclusions could be drawn which might explain these exceptions. While network theory leads one to expect that the high pressure on the US Secretary of Defence should have eventually led to a preference change, it appears in this case that the modification of preference was also determined by the change of government and the personal inclinations of Les Aspin. The behaviour of the US President and the European Council of Ministers who resisted for only two or three phases, however, can be regarded as supporting the first hypothesis. Although Foreign Office officials maintained their objection to air strikes over five phases, their ability to resist pressures for a change in their preferences appears to be explicable by the observation that they were subject to lower degrees of pressure, namely 27 per cent, than any of the other actors who failed to change their preferences within one phase.

The empirical findings of this case also support the second hypothesis regarding the role of a veto or blocking strategy in the decision-making process. According to the premises set out by network theory, actors should seek to block pressure from opponents by using their veto in collective decision-making institutions and by attempting to transfer the authority to decision units over which they have a power advantage, i.e. a veto, or within which the balance of preferences is more in their favour. Both options are linked in that the inability to agree on a decision within subordinate decision-making units often leads to the transfer of the issue to units of higher institutional authority. The second hypothesis proposes that the blocking strategy used by one or several actors within a collective decision-making institution allows them to resist higher degrees of pressure.

In the case of air strikes in Bosnia,



¹⁴³ Note that each phase varies in terms of chronological time, since the duration of the phases was determined by the timing of the preference changes.

a veto strategy was open to sixteen actors at various stages during the decision-making process. The relevance of the analysis of the process of decision-making was confirmed in that the number of the actors which were able to veto a decision regarding the air strikes decreased in the later stages due to a transfer of the decision-making authority to the UN Security Council. During the initial phases of the debate all major international organisations, such as the WEU, the EC, NATO and the UN Security Council, were involved in the negotiation of an international response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, thus giving a maximum range of actors a veto. Because of disunity within the WEU, the EC and NATO, however, the French government succeeded in transferring the authority over the international response to the conflict in Bosnia to a 'higher' international decision unit, the UN Security Council, by summer 1992. Although the change in the ultimate decision unit limited the ability of most European governments to determine the nature of the international response to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, they accepted the transfer in return for decreased responsibility.¹⁴⁴ It enabled them to stand aside, while two Security Council members, namely France and Britain, provided the majority of ground troops for the United Nations protection force UNPROFOR. For the permanent UN Security Council members, who were unanimously opposed to air strikes at the time of the transfer, the change of the ultimate decision unit decreased the likelihood of a decision in favour of military action.

In most international organisations the member governments respected the transfer of the authority to the UN Security Council and refrained from taking further decisions on the issue. Although the members of NATO and the WEU were increasingly divided over air strikes, further action on their part was repeatedly made dependent upon prior authorization by the Security Council. The only exception was the EC Council of Ministers which called upon the international community to consider military action on 23 March 1993. However, since the EC, as a collective organisation, was unable to organise or implement air strikes itself, the decision was more directed towards the Security Council members than a statement of intent on its own behalf.

Among the domestic actors of the British foreign policy network, a veto of the

¹⁴⁴ WEU Council of Ministers, *Extraordinary Meeting of WEU Council of Ministers on the Situation in Yugoslavia*, Helsinki, 10 July 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>; WEU Council of Ministers, *Declaration on Former Yugoslavia*, Rome, 20 November 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

government's decision to support air strikes in April 1993 was theoretically open to a majority in Parliament, if only at the high cost of a vote of no-confidence and new general elections. The option was not used, however, because the Conservative parliamentary party was internally divided until the government decision. According to newspaper reports between a third and half of the Conservative MPs supported air strikes. But without a clear majority within the Conservative Party the consensus was that the policy of the Cabinet would not be challenged. When the Cabinet decided not to veto air strikes in the UN Security Council, the combined pressure for the policy and the support for military action which existed among the Conservative and the opposition parties was sufficient to ensure the backing of the House of Commons.

The members of the Cabinet who belonged to the British multilevel foreign policy network could also have blocked the decision for air strikes. However, when the pressure on the Cabinet reached a critical level in mid-April, Prime Minister John Major, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind quickly reached an agreement in favour of air strikes. Although formally all Cabinet decisions are taken by consensus, the criticism of Chancellor Norman Lamont was overruled and he conceded. The protests from Home Secretary Kenneth Clarke, Social Security Secretary Peter Lilley and Scottish Secretary Ian Lang were without noticeable effect which confirmed the notion that they did not belong to the foreign policy network.

In general, the findings show that the use of a blocking strategy enhanced the ability of the involved actors to resist higher degrees of network pressures. The difference is indicated by the average pressure of the categories 'blocked' at 46 per cent and 'change' at 40 per cent. The evidence also shows that the ability of actors to block certain policy decisions cannot be understood independently from the first hypothesis. Thus, the blocking strategy of various actors led to a deferral of the decision to implement air strikes, but it could not prevent it. Moreover, the mean of the pressure that actors withstood in the collective decision-making institutions in which they formally held a veto position was at 46 per cent below the simple majority threshold of 50 per cent. It appears, thus, that in spite of its formal institutional meaning, a veto does not enable actors to prevent a decision in practice. While a veto position increased the ability of actors to resist pressure from other members of the network, it did not fully isolate them.

New Insights into the British Decision to Support Air Strikes in Bosnia

In addition to empirical evidence for the testing of multilevel network theory, several new insights can be gained from the preceding analysis. Specifically, multilevel network theory illustrates that pressure for the permission of air strikes in Bosnia was exerted within and across levels of analysis. At the international level, ministers and officials from Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in particular lobbied for air strikes. In order to do so, they used their membership in international organisations, such as NATO, the WEU and the EU, as well as transgovernmental relations with their colleagues in the Foreign and Defence Ministries in the transatlantic community. From autumn 1992 additional transnational pressure emerged from the members of the international media and the US Congress. And finally, nationally, the British government was under pressure first from Liberal and later from Labour MPs in the House of Commons.

The scope of the relations through which the advocates of air strikes could and did seek to influence British ministers, thus, disconfirms the notion of the government as a 'gatekeeper' between the national and the international arena. However, it is interesting to note that transnational coalitions in favour of or against air strikes did not emerge in this case. While there were a number of international and transgovernmental coalitions, both the distribution of preferences and the structure of the network prevented the formation of alliances among non-governmental actors. Conversely, two coalitions among ministers and officials emerged during the decision-making process. The first coalition was formed among the representatives of Germany, Italy, Turkey, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium in NATO and the WEU. Although they were able to raise the pressure for air strikes within these international organisations to a considerable degree, multilevel network theory suggests that a policy change was blocked due to vetos from Britain, France and, initially, the US. A second coalition emerged much later among military officials within NATO with the aim to prevent air strikes in Bosnia which they regarded as the first step towards a dangerous military intervention into the conflict. However, the coalition failed since by that time a majority of international and national actors in Britain had changed their preferences in favour of air strikes.

Another new insight into the British decision to support air strikes in the UN Security Council regards the importance of the sequence of interactions and preference

changes during the decision-making process for the outcome. Specifically, the study suggests that the pressure of the initial proponents of military intervention was insufficient in bringing about a preference reversal among key actors in the summer of 1992. All major international organisations were blocked from taking action by vetos from Britain, France and the US. Moreover, the transgovernmental pressure on British ministers and officials was too low to overcome persistent majority against military action among British MPs and the MoD. It was only after US President Bush and his administration changed their position on air strikes following news of Serb 'concentration camps', that the decision-making process gained new impetus due to US pressure for air strikes.

Finally, although the winning coalition is by definition confined to actors directly linked to the ultimate decision unit, a multilevel network analysis of the case suggests that it might be more than coincidental that the final decision of the British government to endorse air strikes came about at a time when air strikes were supported by a majority of actors across the network and, crucially, all levels of analysis. It suggests that single-level models which focus on domestic, transnational or international factors would have equally been able to explain the decision of the British government to support air strikes. However, they would have missed an important aspect of the decision-making process in the convergence of preferences among national and international actors.

4. Case II: The Abolition of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile Project

4.1 Introduction

The debate over the British development of a tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) arose with the end of the Cold War. As democratic reforms spread over Eastern Europe, existing nuclear defences aimed at these countries appeared obsolete, if not counterproductive.¹ In particular, the Lance missile system with its 300-mile radius did not conform to the changed international environment. In May 1990, a review of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) nuclear strategy was set up to consider tactical alternatives as the basis for a new nuclear defence posture in Western Europe. During the review it emerged that the majority of NATO member states opposed the replacement of the short-range Lance by TASMs as had been proposed by the governments of the United States (US) and Britain. Yet, in spite of the international opposition, the British government proceeded with the examination of TASMs as part of its independent nuclear deterrent and as a contribution to NATO's nuclear defences. Over the following three years, the British government considered specifically two alternatives: a collaborative development of the missile with the French Aerospatiale company and two off-the-shelf platforms from the American companies Boeing and Martin Marietta. During this period, the international and domestic support for a new nuclear missile diminished steadily. By August 1992 the TASM had effectively lost all backing within the British administration and the Cabinet. However, only after a year of conspicuous silence, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind announced the cancellation of the TASM programme on 18 October 1993.

This case study examines whether multilevel network theory can help to explain the decision-making process which led to the British government's policy reversal regarding the TASM in 1993. Specifically, it addresses the question why the government pursued the development of the missile for three years after the changes in the international environment and budgetary pressures, which were later cited as reasons for the cancellation of the TASM programme, had manifested themselves. It is suggested that the delay in the decision can be attributed to the need of political decision-makers to secure the support of a majority of actors to whom they are linked in the foreign policy network

¹ Jeffrey Boutwell, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (London: Brassey's, 1990), pp.218f.

for their policies. Multilevel network theory illustrates the formation of such a 'winning coalition' in the form of a series of preference changes among the international, transnational and domestic actors of the British multilevel foreign policy network. Moreover, this case study seeks to test the two hypotheses of multilevel network theory which suggest that these preference changes were related to the degree of pressure to which each actor was exposed to due to their position within the network. Since the opposition to the TASM originated in the international arena, multilevel network theory hypothesises that these actors were able to use their transnational relations with the British administration to exert pressure directly or within the network at large to increase the pressure on the British government indirectly.

However, according to the second hypothesis, actors who had a *de facto* veto within international organisations or held a majority in parliamentary assemblies on the issue were able to resist higher degrees of pressure. In the case of nuclear policy the formal decision-making authority and the ability to veto a decision was restricted to the governments of the three nuclear powers, the US, Britain and France, and NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) which takes decisions on the basis of a consensus among its members. Even the House of Commons had no direct authority over the details of British nuclear policy, but only over the entire defence budget. While the second hypothesis states that an institutional veto or blocking position should increase the ability of an actor to withstand pressure for a preference change, this does not mean that a veto can prevent a policy change. The second hypothesis still falls under the conditions of the first which proposes that sufficiently high pressure increases the likelihood of a preference change. Thus, the theory assumes that the North Atlantic Council was able to abandon NATO's existing requirement for a TASM because of international opposition even though both Britain and the US had a veto in the NPG.

The selection of the cancellation of the TASM programme as a test case was based on two criteria. First, the case was characterised by a policy reversal by the ultimate decision unit. Second, it can be argued that the requirement of a defence system like the TASM was not affected by exogenous factors, such as the changing international security environment. The ultimate decision unit in this case was the British Cabinet which changed its policy radically over the three years. Originally, the British government maintained its commitment to the development of a TASM in spite of the end of the Cold War. In fact,

some actors argued that the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and later the Soviet Union enhanced the requirement for sub-strategic nuclear weapons. Tactical missiles appeared to be more suitable for the new threats in form of small, but volatile states in Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since these external conditions were still in place in 1993, the policy reversal of the government cannot simply be attributed to changes in the structure of the international security environment.

The application of multilevel network theory to the TASM case receives further justification from the fact that the arguments put forward by the British government for its cancellation of the TASM project in November 1993, namely that the decision had been due to budgetary pressures, only partly account for the policy change.² In particular, the timing of the policy reversal remains incomprehensible. Pressures to reduce defence spending had already emerged in the late 1980s and were reinforced by the end of the Cold War in 1990.³ Nevertheless, the British government resisted them at the time by claiming that the changed nature of the threat required a new tactical nuclear weapon. While the TASM project was maintained, the government made the unpopular decision to reduce its standing forces which involved substantial job losses in sensitive regions across Britain.⁴ In fact, as late as September 1992, the government invested another 4.8m dollars in pre-project studies for a TASM by the US companies Boeing and Martin Marietta and France's Aerospatiale.⁵ Moreover, it can be contended that, if budgetary reasons had been the primary concern of the government, the TASM would have been preferable to a fourth Trident, which was chosen as the sub-strategic alternative to the TASM in 1993.

² A similar argument has been made by Milan Rai, *Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The Foreign and Security Policy Implications of the Treaty of the European Union* (London: Drava Papers, 1993), pp.15-17.

³ Michael Carver, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945* (London: Random Century, 1992), p.155; Stuart Croft and David H. Dunn, 'The Impact of the Defence Budget on Arms Control Policy', in Mark Hoffmann, *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp.53-69.

⁴ Michael White and David Fairhall, 'Ministers back cuts in defence', *Guardian*, 26/7/90; Robert Fox, 'British troops starting a long retreat from the Rhine, says King', *Daily Telegraph*, 26/7/90; Michael Evans, 'Cabinet slices 18% from armed forces', *Times*, 26/7/90; Peter Hetherington, 'Scots rally to defence threatened regiments', *Guardian*, 22/8/92.

⁵ 'Martin awarded dollars 1.6 million UK TASM studies contract', *Defense Daily*, 9/9/92; 'US wavering may put it out of TASM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:12, 19/9/92, p.21; 'Britain pursues [sic!] missile studies. US - Martin Marietta wins UK TASM contract', *Defense News*, 20/9/92; 'Martin-Marietta TASM-UK award', *Interavia-Aerospace World*, 28/10/92.

Not only was the TASM cheaper, it was according to military experts also more suitable for British defence.⁶ In fact, the British government itself had argued so in November 1992 and again in 1993.⁷

The following case study is again structured in a chronological-analytical section and a conclusion which evaluates the findings from the case with regard to the explanatory value of multilevel network theory. The analytical section begins by exploring the nature of the issue and the conditions which led to the review of the TASM project. It continues with a detailed analysis of the decision-making process regarding its future between May 1990 and October 1993. Specifically, the study examines the relationship between the competing pressures exerted by various members of the multilevel British foreign policy network and changes in their preferences with regard to the TASM project.

The chronological analysis of the resulting decision-making process is structured in four stages. During the first stage, from May 1990 to August 1991, an international coalition against the development of the missile began to emerge among most NATO member states. However, in NATO's strategic review the US and the British government remained firmly committed to the development of a TASM. Only during the second stage between August and November 1991, did the effects of the international opposition to the missile begin to show in the US. Since their European partners were unwilling to allow the missile to be stationed on their territory, officials from the State Department and the Pentagon withdrew the government's financial support for the development of the missile by American companies. The Post-Cold War defence review by the US Congress came to the conclusion that the rationale for the missile had been lost. President Bush pre-empted the cancellation of the TASM by Congress and abandoned the project. Following the American decision, the Atlantic Alliance quietly dropped its requirement for a TASM. The decisions of both the US government and NATO considerably raised the pressure on the

⁶ Michael White, 'Tory defence planners split over Trident purchase', *Guardian*, 14/1/92. See also Robert H. Paterson, *Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident*. (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1997), pp.113f. who contends that giving a sub-strategic role to Trident was plainly 'illogical'.

⁷ Malcolm Rifkind, *UK Defence Strategy: A Continued Role for Nuclear Weapons?*, speech delivered 16 November 1993, House of Commons, Session 1993-94, cited in the Second Report of the Defence Committee, *Progress of the Trident Programme*, House of Commons Paper (London: HMSO, 4 May 1994), p.32; First Report of the Defence Committee, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*, House of Commons Paper 218 (London: HMSO, 11 November 1992), p.X.

British administration to back out of the programme during the third stage from November 1991 to October 1992. Ministry of Defence (MoD) staff were especially hard pressed to acknowledge the reduced viability of developing a new tactical nuclear weapon. As a substitute officials in the MoD began to consider a sub-strategic role for the Trident submarines. Yet, the government refrained from announcing the cancellation of the project because of the ongoing general election campaign. It believed that a strong position on national defence was popular with the electorate. Moreover, the Conservative parliamentary party objected to the abolition. During the following fourth stage between October 1992 and October 1993, the British administration attempted to change the preference of the Commons. Cabinet ministers alleged that the cancellation was required because of budgetary pressures from the Treasury and succeeded in silencing protest from Conservative backbenchers over the loss of the TASM. On 18 October 1993 Defence Secretary Rifkind announced in the House of Commons that Britain had scrapped its plans for a TASM.

4.2 The Abandonment of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile

The issue of reconsidering the development of a TASM arose with the end of the Cold War. Although the weapon system had always been controversial within the Atlantic Alliance, national and international doubts over the necessity of the missile increased considerably after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. Most Western European governments agreed that the changed nature of the international system reduced the need for large nuclear arsenals. Although few governments questioned the continued relevance of nuclear defences in principle, the development of new nuclear weapons systems appeared to contradict the dismantling of old stocks by NATO and the former Warsaw Pact countries. Moreover, the increasing development cost of new weapons weighed heavily on national defence budgets which were drastically cut back in the early 1990s to meet popular demands for a 'peace dividend'. Still at the pre-development stage, the TASM project was particularly vulnerable to the calls for cutbacks. The investigation into a TASM had been begun by the United States in 1987 without the consultation of its Western European allies.⁸ At the time, the project had already caused some controversy

⁸ Duncan Lennox, 'Stand-off delivery comes of age', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:11, 13/3/91, p.394.

in NATO because the governments in Belgium and Germany challenged the requirement for new nuclear weapons in Europe. Only the British administration, which sought a replacement for its WE-177 free-fall nuclear bombs, was keen to purchase the missile.⁹ However, the British government also investigated a collaboration with France in the design of a TASM.¹⁰ In November 1989, the British Ministry of Defence awarded £ 1m to the French Aerospatiale company for a pre-feasibility study.¹¹ Apart from political reasons, problems with the development of nuclear warheads at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment increased the attractiveness of the Franco-British option. While the US military was prohibited from sharing certain information about nuclear development under the US Atomic Energy Act of 1959, a collaboration with France was not legally restricted. However, a Franco-British project could endanger British nuclear testing in the US sites in Nevada.¹² Moreover, Royal Air Force (RAF) staff preferred the US American options which included Boeing's SRAM-T and Martin Marietta's Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM).¹³ In May 1990, both options were still under investigation.¹⁴ As the criticism of the project increased, the focus of the decision-making process shifted from the selection of the missile to the question of whether TASMs were required at all. Moreover, in the latter stages of the debate, the issue was redefined as a direct competition between TASMs and a tactical missile to be carried by Britain's Trident submarines. This case study examines how the interactions among the members of the British multilevel foreign policy network shaped the debate for and against the TASM.

NATO Split over TASM

The first stage of the decision-making process regarding the British TASM stretched over

⁹ Mark Urban, 'US pressing ahead with plans for new nuclear missile', *Independent*, 29/10/88; David Marsh, Ian Davidson and Adriana Ierodiaconou, 'W Germany reluctant to accept new US nuclear weapons', *Financial Times*, 15/2/89.

¹⁰ Rai, *Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb*, p.15.

¹¹ Jaques Isnard, 'France lines up ASLP for RAF', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:16, 21/4/90, p.728.

¹² Robin Oakley and Peter Stothard, 'Thatcher basks in Bush's approval', *Times*, 16/4/90.

¹³ John Keegan, 'French missile may replace RAF's A-Bombs', *Daily Telegraph*, 2/11/89; Nick Cook, 'SRAM T "natural" choice for UK', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:5, 3/2/90, p.185.

¹⁴ Secretary of Defence Tom King in 'The JDW Interview', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:8, 24/2/90, p.368; *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990*, Cm 1022-I (London: HMSO, April 1990), p.19.

a year from NATO's recognition of the end of the Cold War on 4 May 1990 to the publication of the British Defence White Paper on 9 July 1991. In spite of the international criticism of the missile during the year, the 1991 White Paper confirmed the continued commitment of the British government to the development and purchase of a TASM.

The international debate over TASMs began in early 1990, when the US President George Bush proposed the abolition of plans to replace Lance as a starting point for US-Soviet negotiations to remove all short-range nuclear weapons from Europe. In addition, Bush initiated a review of NATO's nuclear strategy in a summit proposed for June or July.¹⁵ In spite of these measures, American and British political leaders agreed that the US should maintain its nuclear presence in Europe.¹⁶ Both governments planned to deploy the air-launched TASM as replacement for the land-based Lance.¹⁷ In the US, the TASM was praised as a weapon which would be suitable for the changed international security environment after the end of the Cold War.¹⁸ Nevertheless, other actors within the British multilevel foreign policy network soon voiced their opposition to the missile. Specifically, the German administration objected strongly to the British and American plans for basing the TASM on the European continent. Following the dismantling of the Lance the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had hoped for the denuclearisation of Central Europe. The opposition of the German administration to the missile was shared by several

¹⁵ Colin Hughes, Isabel Hilton and David Osborne, 'US signals nuclear rethink in Europe', *Independent*, 4/5/90; J.A.C. Lewis, 'Lance follow-on to be axed', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:17, 5/5/90, p.836; Peter Riddell, 'Bush treads warily in European minefield', *Financial Times*, 8/5/90; Hella Pick, 'Tactical arms would go in Soviet offer', *Guardian*, 16/6/90; 'Drip, drip, drip - US continues to leak Nato summit proposals', *Economist*, 7/7/90.

¹⁶ Carver, *Tightrope Walking*, p.165.

¹⁷ 'UK MoD admits to US basing talks', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:14, 7/4/90, p.627; Martin Fletcher, 'Bush approves plan for Nato summit this year', *Times*, 20/4/90; Hella Pick, 'Nato pressed on nuclear missiles', *Guardian*, 27/4/90; Peter Stothard, 'Baker sets out to sell US vision for new Germany', *Times*, 3/5/90; Martin Fletcher, 'Bush prepares way for higher cuts in forces', *Times*, 5/5/90; Colin Hughes, 'Bush favours new airborne nuclear arsenal in Europe', *Independent*, 5/5/90; Michael Evans, 'West rallies to aid Gorbachev', *Times*, 7/5/90; Peter Riddell, 'Bush treads warily in European minefield', *Financial Times*, 8/5/90; 'Leading article: Hugger-mugger deployment', *Independent*, 8/5/90. Compare also Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: The Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics and Arms Control', in Mark Hoffman, *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp.32-52, p.43.

¹⁸ J.A.C. Lewis, 'Lance follow-on to be axed', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:17, 5/5/90, p.836; Barbara Starr, 'Filling the gap left by Lance', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:20, 19/5/90, p.954.

of its European neighbours, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and to some degree Italy.¹⁹ In addition, the development of new nuclear weapons was criticised by representatives of the British Labour Party and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).

At the beginning of May 1990, however, the opposition to the TASM had yet to organise itself. The linkages within the network through which the four governments and the two domestic opponents of the missile could exert pressure for the abolition of the missile programme were restricted. The strongest relations existed between the foreign and defence ministers of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Britain, and the officials from their respective ministries. However, combined, the politicians and civil servants of four countries did not amount to more than 28 per cent of the actors to whom the British Secretary of Defence, who had the primary authority on the issue, was linked in the network.²⁰ Moreover, the four administrations did not have any contacts with the domestic opposition to the TASM in Britain among the Liberal Democrats, the Labour Party and the CND with whom they could have formed a transnational coalition.

Table 4.1
Preference Changes:
4 May 1990 - 11 August 1991

Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
Nato-Org	48	NC
Par	46	B
Nato-CM	41	NC
US-Pen	37	NC
Mod	33	NC
US-SD	33	NC
US-Sd	31	NC
DS	28	NC
Fco	27	NC
US-SS	27	NC
US-Pre	25	NC
FS	22	NC
PM	21	NC
Med	20	NC
vote	14	U
US-Con	13	C
Com	6	NC
Cab	0	NC
con	0	NC

¹⁹ Martin Fletcher, 'Bush prepares way for higher cuts in forces', *Times*, 5/5/90; Ian Brodie and George Jones, 'Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/5/90; Martin Fletcher, 'Nato chiefs divided over short-range missile plan', *Times*, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, "'First-strike" option to stay in Nato plans', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, 'King faces tough questions on Nato nuclear fission', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/5/90; Barbara Starr, 'USA "may pull out nuclear shells"', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:20, 19/5/90, p.943; Ian Brodie, 'Nato leader plays down reports of nuclear arms rift', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/5/90; 'Leading article: Nato family planning', *Times*, 11/5/90; 'Drip, Drip, drip - US continues to leak Nato summit proposals', *Economist*, 7/7/90.

²⁰ Specifically, the defence ministers and staff from the four countries accounted for eight out of 29 actors to whom the British Secretary of Defence was linked, raising the pressure on him to $P_1 [DS] = 8/29 = 28\%$.

The best prospects of increasing the pressure on the governments of Britain and the US existed within NATO which was the only international organisation in Western Europe with a significant role in nuclear decision-making. Since the TASM had been made a requirement under NATO's integrated nuclear strategy in the 1980s, a common review of the Alliance's strategic defence posture could lead to a reevaluation of the missile. Indeed, the defence ministers from the four governments used the next meeting of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Kananaskis, Canada, on 9-10 May 1990, to express their criticism of the TASM. Predictably the four ministers clashed with the British Defence Secretary Tom King who had hoped to gain the member states' approval for the deployment of the TASM on the continent.²¹ Questioned by journalists, NATO General Secretary Manfred Wörner admitted that the policy faced not only the opposition from many European governments, but also the Soviet Union which demanded a nuclear-free Europe as condition for its consent to German reunification.²²

Further discussions in the NPG revealed the scope of the opposition to the missile in NATO. Not only the representations of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy criticised the proposal to station TASMs in Europe, but also Denmark, Iceland and Norway. The defence secretaries of the US and Canada spoke out in favour of the TASMs. However, their countries were not suited for deployment if the missile was to be used in conflicts in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. This left only the British and, perhaps, the Turkish government prepared to base the missile in their country. The governments of France and Spain did not object to the TASMs, but because they were not integrated into the military structure of NATO, they had no voice in the NPG.²³ With seven NPG members explicitly opposed to the stationing of TASMs in Europe, 41 per cent of the actors linked to and represented within NATO exerted pressure against the missile.²⁴

²¹ Ian Brodie, George Jones and Patricia Wilson, 'Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/5/90; Michael Evans, 'West rallies to aid Gorbachev', *Times*, 7/5/90; Ian Brodie, 'German must stay nuclear says Nato chief', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/5/90; Sarah Helm, 'Thatcher to seek Nato backing for air missile', *Independent*, 12/5/90.

²² Ian Brodie, 'German must stay nuclear says Nato chief', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/5/90; Hella Pick, 'Bonn sets its face against new missile', *Guardian*, 12/5/90.

²³ Colin Brown, 'Doubts over siting of missiles', *Independent*, 14/5/90. For Belgium's position see also 'Truppenabzug bis Ende 1996', *Reuter German News Service*, 29/11/90.

²⁴ In the North Atlantic Council the seven member states were represented through their heads of state, their foreign or defence ministers, thus accounting for $E=3 \times 7=21$ links in the network and raising the

However, in spite of the strong opposition, the international coalition among the defence ministers from the seven countries failed to achieve the unequivocal cancellation of the programme in the North Atlantic Council. The factual veto position of all NATO member states enabled the British and American representatives to block a change of NATO policy at this point. Crucial for the success of this strategy was the fact that the requirement for a tactical nuclear missile as part of NATO's nuclear defence strategy had already been approved in the 1980s. The abandonment of TAsMs was, therefore, a change from the *status quo* which Britain and the US could veto. The blocking position of the two governments in the Alliance effectively increased the pressure required for a policy change in the Alliance. Furthermore, the opposition to the missile was internally divided. Although not in favour of the missile, most NATO members had not yet developed a clear policy preference with regard to the future of NATO's nuclear defence strategy.

In particular, the German administration would have preferred to avoid the topic of nuclear weapons altogether because it feared that its discussion would endanger the ongoing 'two-plus-four' negotiations with the Soviet Union over German unification.²⁵ Moreover, German politicians were aware that a public debate over the stationing of nuclear missiles in Germany would almost certainly lead to public protests as occurred after the deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in the 1980s.²⁶ Further indications of unclear policy preferences were differences in the governmental policy as expressed by the German Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry. While Foreign Minister Genscher and his staff objected to the replacement of nuclear missiles in Germany, Defence Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg avoided taking a critical stance on the issue of the TASM.²⁷

pressure to P₁ [Nato CM] = 21/51 = 41%.

²⁵ David Marsh and Christopher Bobinski, 'Bonn expected to oppose deployment of new missile', *Financial Times*, 4/5/90; David White, 'UK urges Nato to keep some US missiles', *Financial Times*, 10/5/90; Hella Pick, 'Bonn sets its face against new missile', *Guardian*, 12/5/90.

²⁶ Robert Mauthner, 'Historic task for Nato summit', *Financial Times*, 5/7/90; Isabel Hilton, 'Will Nato train stop at "unity station"', *Independent*, 5/7/90; Ian Mater, 'Farewell to arms - or is it just "au revoir"', *European*, 4/10/91. The modernization of Lance had been opposed by the German government since 1988. See for instance Phil Williams, 'British Security and Arms Control Policy: The Changing Context' in Mark Hoffman, ed., *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp.11-31, pp.20f.

²⁷ Ian Brodie, George Jones and Patricia Wilson, 'Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/5/90; David Marsh and Christopher Bobinski, 'Bonn expected to oppose deployment of new missiles', *Financial Times*, 4/5/90; Hella Pick, 'Bonn sets its face against new missile', *Guardian*, 12/5/90.

Chancellor Kohl's resistance to a modernisation of nuclear weapons in Germany appeared to be due more to its effect on the negotiations over German unification and the upcoming general elections in December, than to fundamental objections to nuclear weapons. Kohl certainly disagreed with Foreign Minister Genscher's advocacy of a denuclearised Europe. However, on the issue of the TASM, the differences between Kohl and Genscher were less clear-cut. To avoid a controversy with his national, as well as international partners, Chancellor Kohl argued that it was too early to decide about the issue.²⁸ Even the American intentions were unclear. Although President Bush had suggested a review of NATO nuclear strategy for the summer, Defence Secretary Richard Cheney stated at the meeting of the NPG that NATO's doctrine of 'flexible response' would not be put into question.²⁹

In order to allow for a policy review both internally and among its member states, the NPG decided to postpone the issue. In the NPG's Final Communiqué, the conflicting views among its members over the future of nuclear weapons in Europe were played down. The TASM programme was not mentioned. The communiqué stated, however, that due to a reduction of short-range nuclear missiles, sub-strategic systems would 'assume relatively greater importance'.³⁰ If this suggested that the British and American delegates had prevailed in the discussion, their victory was built on shaky grounds because the NPG also agreed to task General John Galvin, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), with a comprehensive review of conventional and nuclear weapons requirements after the end of the Cold War.³¹ The review would enable the opponents of the missile to express their concerns and co-ordinate their pressure along their national, transnational and international relations within the network over the coming months. In particular, foreign and defence ministers and officials from the seven countries were able to use the transgovernmental linkages with their British and American counterparts to

²⁸ Colin Brown, 'Doubts over siting of missiles', *Independent*, 14/5/90; 'Leading article: Genscher taps a pacifist vein', *Independent*, 17/5/90; Robert Mauthner, 'Foreign Affairs: Discretely embarrassed by defence', *Financial Times*, 19/6/90. See also Boutwell, *German Nuclear Dilemma*, pp.229f.

²⁹ Martin Fletcher, 'Nato chiefs divided over short-range missile plan', *Times*, 10/5/90; Ian Brodie, "'First-strike" option to stay in Nato plans', *Daily Telegraph*, 10/5/90.

³⁰ Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Kananaskis, Canada, 9-10 May 1990, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900510a.htm>. See also Colin Hughes and John Eisenhammer, 'Nato rejects Moscow's stand on German status', *Independent*, 11/5/90.

³¹ Martin Fletcher, 'Nato papers over the cracks', *Times*, 11/5/90.

press for a review of the TASM programme.

Thus, the transgovernmental pressure on the American administration was considerable. The degree of pressure was, at 37 per cent, highest on the relevant officials in the Pentagon who had close relations with their partners bilaterally and through NATO, but few other linkages within the network.³² The American Secretary of Defence Cheney was also subject to considerable pressure at 33 per cent³³, while President Bush was less affected as the seven heads of state only accounted for 25 per cent of his linkages³⁴. In Britain, the pressure on the administration was equally high at the level of the Ministry of Defence staff where the counterparts from the eight countries accounted for 33 per cent of their contacts in the network. However, the pressure from the eight administrations was significantly lower on Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd at 22 per cent and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at 21 per cent.³⁵ Crucially, the British Cabinet was only indirectly linked to the governments through the departmental ministers and, therefore, insulated from international pressure as long as British ministers refused to abandon the TASM.

The lack of direct pressure on the Cabinet helps to explain why, in spite of the international protests, the British government continued to support the TASM programme during autumn 1990. In the House of Commons, Minister of State for Defence Archie Hamilton emphasised the government's determination to proceed with the deployment of TASMs regardless of the opposition from its European partners.³⁶ Speaking to the Commons Defence Committee, three former military service chiefs and a former civil servant from the Ministry of Defence pointed out that in order to maintain a viable defence, it was essential for Britain to retain its nuclear deterrent. While they endorsed the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons by the superpowers, they recommended the

³² Thus, the pressure from their counterparts in seven NATO member states accounted for 37 per cent of the Pentagon staffs' linkages in the network, i.e. $P_1 [\text{US-pen}] = 7/19 = 37\%$.

³³ The pressure on the US Secretary of Defence was somewhat lower than on this staff because he had more contacts within the network, so that his eight colleagues accounted only for 33 per cent, with $P_1 [\text{US-SD}] = 8/24 = 33\%$.

³⁴ The number of linkages of the US President was even higher than those of the US Defence Secretary raising the pressure to 25 per cent, i.e. $P_1 [\text{US-Pre}] = 8/32 = 25\%$.

³⁵ The pressure from the seven NATO countries accounted respectively for $P_1 [\text{Mod}] = 7/21 = 33\%$, $P_1 [\text{FS}] = 8/36 = 22\%$ and $P_1 [\text{PM}] = 8/39 = 21\%$.

³⁶ Stephen Goodwin, 'Parliament and Politics: Nato "must maintain nuclear stalemate"', *Independent*, 16/6/90.

deployment of medium-range missiles such as TASM in their place.³⁷ The American administration, too, decided to proceed with the development of the missile for the time being. At the end of May it awarded a 181m-dollar follow-on contract to Boeing Aerospace and Electronics for the full development of the SRAM-T.³⁸

In May 1990, the main question for the British government was not whether to proceed with the development of the TASM, but with whom to collaborate. MoD officials were still evaluating its two options: the purchase of American missiles or to cooperate with France. Prime Minister Thatcher increasingly appeared to support the French option. As a result of bilateral talks with President Mitterrand on 7 May, Thatcher agreed to enhance the cooperation between the British and French armed forces.³⁹ The French government was little affected by the opposition to the missile within NATO and, thus, would be a reliable partner in the development of a TASM. While the US and Britain were increasingly under pressure in NATO, the French administration was unconcerned about the debate in the Atlantic Alliance as France had left NATO's integrated military structure and maintained its nuclear independence.⁴⁰ Moreover, the French government agreed with its counterparts in the US and Britain over the need to retain nuclear forces in Europe. In the view of the French administration, the end of the Cold War did not question the necessity of an independent nuclear deterrent for France. On the contrary, as the potential nuclear threat moved from the Warsaw Pact to the Soviet Union, the Middle East and Third World countries, the French military had identified the TASM as a key element of its new defence posture.⁴¹

Although the British and American representations had temporarily prevailed in the North Atlantic Council and resisted international pressures for the abolition of the TASM, both governments recognised that it was crucial to gain the active support of their European partners if they planned to deploy the TASM in Europe. In order to do so, the

³⁷ Robert Fox, 'Soviet threat in Europe "now negligible"', *Daily Telegraph*, 17/5/90.

³⁸ 'SRAM-T go-ahead', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:21, 26/5/90, p.1011.

³⁹ Ian Brodie, George Jones and Patricia Wilson, 'Nato split over plans for new nuclear missile', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/5/90.

⁴⁰ Michael Evans, 'Britain and France resist Bush nuclear war doctrine', *Times*, 6/7/90.

⁴¹ Bruce D. Larkin, *Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), p.26.

British and American military began in turn to exert pressure on their colleagues for a positive reevaluation of the TASM. Soon after the NPG meeting in May, information was leaked from officials in Bonn and Washington about a Whitehall plan to overcome German objections to the TASM. According to a proposal discussed between senior NATO and Pentagon officials, a joint British, American and German air force based in Britain could integrate the German Bundeswehr into NATO's nuclear defences, yet avoid the stationing of the missile on German soil.⁴² The plan was a step back from the original British intentions to station the TASM on the continent. Nevertheless, when Foreign Secretary Hurd raised the question during a meeting in Bonn, the German Foreign Minister Genscher immediately rejected the plan. Further discussions were envisaged for a gathering of NATO defence ministers in the Defence Planning Committee later in the week, but the plan was quietly dropped.⁴³

In June 1990, the leadership of the Soviet Union used the discord within NATO to add to the transgovernmental pressure on the British and American administrations for the abolition of the TASM programme to achieve its own ends. Soviet representatives suggested the inclusion of British and French tactical nuclear arsenals into the disarmament negotiations with the US. Soviet officials argued that TASMs and sea-launched cruise missiles effectively undermined the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty which had been signed in 1987. The treaty applied only to ground-launched nuclear weapons.⁴⁴ The claim received unexpected support from US Admiral Eugene Carroll who admitted that the modernisation of NATO's nuclear forces was 'in breach of the spirit, if not the letter, of the INF Treaty'.⁴⁵ In Britain, representatives of the Labour Party and the CND made a similar argument.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, politicians in the US and even Germany, which was opposed to the TASM, rejected the suggestion because of its possibly far-

⁴² Simon Tisdall, 'Luftwaffe jets may fly from British bases as part of proposed NATO nuclear force', *Guardian*, 15/5/90.

⁴³ Simon O'Dwyer-Russell, 'British Luftwaffe plan hits turbulence', *Sunday Telegraph*, 20/5/90.

⁴⁴ *Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles*, Washington, 8 December 1987, at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/inf1.html>

⁴⁵ Quoted in Martin Walker, 'Soviet generals may be behind nuclear stance', *Guardian*, 7/6/90.

⁴⁶ Colin Brown, 'New nuclear weapons for UK', *Independent*, 27/12/90.

reaching consequences.⁴⁷

At the next meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Turnberry, Scotland, on 7-8 June 1990, the distribution of preferences among the member states was unchanged. The British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher reiterated her intentions to station TASMs in Britain and other European countries in order to maintain NATO's nuclear defences. She was again challenged by the German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher who was informally quoted as having said that Germany would refuse outright the deployment of TASMs if asked. An open confrontation between them was narrowly avoided when Genscher denied the statement. However, German representatives at NATO repeatedly made clear that their government was not in favour of basing TASMs in Germany. Again NATO ministers agreed to postpone a decision regarding the TASM - this time until 1992. Although the degree of pressure on the Alliance had not changed, its consistently high level of 41 per cent began to wear down the ability of the American and British foreign ministers to veto the abolition of the TASM requirement. In the Turnberry communiqué, the Alliance position was certainly formulated more carefully than it had been in May. In particular, NATO member states now expressed their willingness to consider and initiate adjustments in their number of conventional and nuclear forces.⁴⁸

Soon after the NATO meeting, the Soviet leadership proposed to abolish all short-range nuclear arsenals and to cancel the French and American development of TASMs in negotiations which were to start in September. However, the French government rejected the suggestion. It fundamentally refused to negotiate its nuclear defences under a comprehensive multilateral framework together with those of the US and Britain.⁴⁹ The explicit position of the French President Mitterrand was that his administration would not

⁴⁷ Hella Pick, 'US sees hope in new Soviet line on Germany', *Guardian*, 29/5/90; Martin Walker, 'Soviet bid to end UK deterrent', *Guardian*, 6/6/90; Martin Walker, 'Soviet generals may be behind nuclear stance', *Guardian*, 7/6/90.

⁴⁸ North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7-8 June 1990, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608a.htm>; Philip Stephens and Robert Mauthner, 'Thatcher calls for broader NATO role', *Financial Times*, 8/6/90; Hella Pick, 'Thatcher calls on NATO to move into new areas', *Guardian*, 8/6/90; Michael Evans, 'Baker hails Soviet hope of reaching German deal', *Times*, 8/6/90; 'Leading article: Spotting Britain's true enemies', *Independent*, 8/6/90; Ian Glover-James, 'West steps up arms talks to tie down Russians', *Sunday Times*, 10/6/90; 'Rift threat over TASM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:24, 16/6/90, p.1186; Robert Mauthner, 'Foreign Affairs: Discretely embarrassed by defence', *Financial Times*, 19/6/90.

⁴⁹ Hella Pick, 'Tactical arms would go in Soviet offer', *Guardian*, 16/6/90.

join the international negotiations before the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers had reached levels comparative to that of France.⁵⁰ In the meantime the French government would continue with the development of its new tactical nuclear missile. In fact, French and US scientists had carried out nuclear tests for the design of TASM's only days before the Soviet announcement.⁵¹ The North Atlantic Council also rejected the Soviet proposals, but agreed on negotiations over short-range nuclear forces (SNF) with the Soviet Union to begin in 1991. Moreover, the persisting international pressure from the representatives of many NATO member states and the Soviet Union for the abolition of the TASM showed first signs of weakening the American government's resolve to update its tactical nuclear weapons.

The issue reemerged during the review of NATO's nuclear doctrine at the summit in London on 5-6 July. In a letter to Alliance leaders, the American President George Bush suggested making NATO's tactical weapons means of 'last resort'. In addition, Bush pressed for a common position on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces.⁵² While US Secretary of State James Baker agreed with his British colleagues that the Alliance should reserve its right to respond to a conventional attack with nuclear missiles, his government seemed increasingly divided. The split ran between the 'hawks', led by Defence Secretary Richard Cheney and Vice-President Dan Quayle and the cautious President Bush. To avoid the public debacle of the previous meetings, NATO heads of state agreed not to discuss the contentious TASM's at the summit.⁵³ However, this informal agreement did not prevent the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from raising the subject of the missile in her speech. Thatcher pointed out that the Soviet Union continued to build 100 TASM's per week implying that NATO should respond in kind.⁵⁴ Thatcher also opposed

⁵⁰ Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, pp.139-141.

⁵¹ Christopher Bellamy, 'US and France may be testing warheads for tactical missiles', *Independent*, 19/6/90.

⁵² Susan Ellicott and Michael Evans, 'Bush urges 'last resort' policy on nuclear arms', *Times*, 3/7/90.

⁵³ Simon Tisdall and Hella Pick, 'US shifts to nuclear arms "last resort"', *Guardian*, 3/7/90.

⁵⁴ Sarah Helm, 'NATO all set for a bitter war of words', *Independent*, 4/7/90; Isabel Hilton, 'Will NATO train stop at "unity station"', *Independent*, 5/7/90; Robert Mauthner, 'Historic task for NATO summit', *Financial Times*, 5/7/90; Hella Pick, 'NATO to tell Moscow it is set for change', *Guardian*, 5/7/90; Michael Evans, 'Britain and France resist Bush nuclear war doctrine', *Times*, 6/7/90; Sarah Helm, 'NATO shows it can adapt, but may die', *Independent*, 7/7/90; Robert Fox, 'NATO summit: Radical change in approach to defence', *Daily Telegraph*, 7/7/90.

President Bush's proposal to make tactical nuclear weapons means of last resort. Conversely, the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl supported the American initiative.⁵⁵ Moreover, Chancellor Kohl himself privately dismissed the deployment of TASMs in Germany.⁵⁶

The eventual endorsement of President Bush's proposal by NATO leaders was perceived by the media as a surprise considering the unabated opposition of the British Prime Minister to a reduction in NATO's nuclear defence posture. However, the degree of international pressure on the members of the North Atlantic Council can account for the erosion of NATO's commitment to tactical nuclear weapons. Although the veto position of Britain and the US enabled Prime Minister Thatcher and President Bush to block the outright cancellation of the TASM requirement in the Council, the persistent pressure from 41 per cent of NATO's members was forcing progressive shifts in its nuclear policy.⁵⁷ In their final communiqué, NATO heads of state declared that nuclear forces would be made 'truly weapons of last resort'.⁵⁸ Although British officials tried to play down the associated change in NATO strategy, the new policy implied that its nuclear defence would now rest on long-range strategic weapons. It put the future role of the middle-range TASM implicitly into question.⁵⁹

Following the defeat of the British administration on the question of making nuclear weapons means of last resort in NATO's strategy, the domestic opponents of the TASM in Britain, namely members of the Labour Party and the CND, reasserted their criticism. In the absence of direct influence on the government they focussed their pressure on the national and international media. Spokespersons for the Labour Party used the public attention created by the NATO summit to expressly welcome NATO's decision. The new NATO strategy matched the preference of Labour members for a no first-use policy of nuclear weapons. Moreover, party leader Neil Kinnock expressed his scepticism

⁵⁵ Hella Pick and David Fairhall, 'Nuclear arms to be last resort', *Guardian*, 6/7/90; Hella Pick, 'The London Declaration: Thatcher claims the fame while others take the credit', *Guardian*, 7/7/90.

⁵⁶ Michael Evans, 'Kohl sells his vision of Europe with bravura performance', *Times*, 7/7/90.

⁵⁷ See footnote 22.

⁵⁸ North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, London, 5-6 July 1990, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>.

⁵⁹ Hella Pick and David Fairhall, 'Nuclear arms to be last resort', *Guardian*, 6/7/90; Hella Pick, 'The London Declaration: Thatcher claims the fame while others take the credit', *Guardian*, 7/7/90.

about the development of the TASM in the American press during a visit to Washington. However, Labour leaders indicated that they would honour British commitments if NATO decided to base the missiles in Europe.⁶⁰ In Labour's 1990 party programme, 'Looking to the Future', the Labour Party appeared similarly divided. While the programme advocated the destruction of all land-based short-range nuclear weapons, it did not discuss other nuclear weapons such as the TASM.⁶¹ Labour leaders themselves were under pressure from representatives of the CND among their members.⁶² CND representatives intended to use the issue of the TASM as a lever for a broader critique of NATO policy after the end of the Cold War. They planned a campaign against the deployment of the TASMs for the beginning of 1991.⁶³ Moreover, CND members could claim to have broad support from the British public. According to a survey, which the CND had commissioned from Gallup, 60 per cent of the population were opposed to the TASM.⁶⁴ Members of the Liberal Democrats also criticised the government for its plan to go ahead with the purchase of a TASM.⁶⁵ In a political paper for its party conference, titled 'Reshaping Europe', Liberal Democrat leaders expressed their opposition to the replacement of the WE-177 free-fall nuclear bomb by TASMs.⁶⁶

However, the ability of opposition MPs and members of the CND to exert pressure within the British foreign policy network was very limited. In particular, they lacked direct leverage over cabinet ministers or officials. In order to influence the administration, they had to use indirect linkages through the House of Commons, the members of the

⁶⁰ Philip Webster, 'Kinnock heading for friendlier Washington', *Times*, 11/7/90; Alan Travis, 'Labour leader reports strong agreement after first White House meeting with Bush', *Guardian*, 18/7/90.

⁶¹ Labour Party, *Looking to the Future* (London: Labour Party, 1990), p.46.

⁶² Patrick Wintour, 'The day in politics: Labour hints at NATO alternative', *Guardian*, 12/6/90; Bruce Kent, Mary Midgley, Richard Rogers, Hugh Casson, Maggie Gee and Paul Eddington (CND), 'Letter: NATO fails to lay down its arms', *Independent*, 5/7/90; Letter from Majorie Thompson (CND), 'European security after NATO', *Independent*, 17/12/90.

⁶³ Colin Brown, 'Peace campaign gains support', *Independent*, 27/12/90; Colin Brown, 'New nuclear weapons for UK', *Independent*, 27/12/90.

⁶⁴ Patrick Wintour, 'The day in politics: Labour hints at NATO alternative', *Guardian*, 12/6/90; Bruce Kent, Mary Midgley, Richard Rogers, Hugh Casson, Maggie Gee and Paul Eddington (CND), 'Letter: NATO fails to lay down its arms', *Independent*, 5/7/90.

⁶⁵ Martin Linton, 'MP's welcome King's defence cuts', *Guardian*, 26/7/90; John Pienaar, 'SLD seeks defence spending cuts', *Independent*, 31/8/90.

⁶⁶ 'Vote expected to back retention of nuclear arms', *Times*, 19/9/90; Liberal Democrats, *Reshaping Europe*, Federal White Paper No 3 (London: Hedben Royd, August 1990), pp.25f.

Parliamentary Defence Committee and journalists.⁶⁷ In Parliament, a preference change was ruled out due to the blocking position of the Conservative parliamentary party. Thus, although the opposition members collectively raised the pressure on the Commons to 46 per cent, this was not sufficient to overcome the dominance of the Conservative parliamentary majority.⁶⁸ A change of the Parliament's support for the TASM required first a preference change among the Conservative MPs. However, this was highly unlikely. Not only were Conservative MPs the main supporters of the TASM, they were also insulated from the international and national pressure against the project because the opponents of the TASM lacked direct relations with the members of the Conservative parliamentary party.

In the Commons Defence Committee, the Conservative majority was equally dominant. However, the balance of pressures in the committee was at 6 per cent slightly more favourable for the opposition parties as a result of the small number of members in the committee and their restricted linkages within the network.⁶⁹ In their Tenth Report of 11 July 1990, the members of the Defence Committee, thus, recognised that the deployment of the missiles in Germany or other NATO countries was in doubt.⁷⁰ In the light of the opposition within the Alliance, the report concluded that there was 'no evident urgency to deploy a nuclear-armed TASM: rather the opposite'.⁷¹ Moreover, the Defence Committee members suggested that a decision over its stationing 'should be taken by NATO as a whole in the light of arms control negotiations'.⁷² Nevertheless, the committee members demanded that a credible nuclear deterrent, including a 'spectrum of sub-strategic weapons', should be retained. In another paragraph, the members of the Defence Committee supported the technical development of a TASM, perhaps in closer

⁶⁷ See Appendix 1: *British Foreign Policy Network, 1990-95*.

⁶⁸ With 251 Labour and Liberal Democratic MPs using the 16 linkages of Parliament to oppose the TASM and exerting pressure on the remaining 399 MPs, $E=(16 \times 251) + (2 \times 399) = 4814$ and $P_1 [\text{Par}] = 4814/10400 = 46\%$.

⁶⁹ Among the fifteen linkages of the Defence Committee members in the British multilevel foreign policy network, only the Labour MPs opposed the TASM, raising the pressure on them to $P_1 [\text{Com}] = 1/16 = 6\%$.

⁷⁰ Robert Mauthner, 'The Defence Cuts: Changes will not be cheap', *Financial Times*, 26/7/90; Christopher Bellamy, 'MPs call for public debate on review of defence structure', *Independent*, 25/7/90.

⁷¹ Tenth Report of the Defence Committee, *Defence Implications of Recent Events*, Session 1989-90, House of Commons Paper 320 (London: HMSO, 11 July 1990), p.xxx-xxxii, p.xxxv.

⁷² *Ibid.*

cooperation with France.⁷³

The British electorate had theoretically the widest influence within the British foreign policy network because its voting power over both government and MPs. However, on the question of the TASM public opinion was unclear. The government believed that the electorate supported a 'strong' policy on national defence. This view was based on opinion polls which suggested that the public remained in favour of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.⁷⁴ Conversely, a CND poll suggested that voters were increasingly critical of tactical nuclear missiles. Given the different phrasing of the questions and the highly technical nature of the issue, the lack of a clear opinion was little surprising. In the event, however, the lack of a clear preference meant that public opinion did not exert pressure on the government in either direction.

In October 1990, the British plans for the missile received another setback when the US Congress announced that it would cut the budget for the development of the American TASM back from 118m to 35m dollars. In a review of American security policy after the end of the Cold War, congressional leaders had concluded that the TASM was not a priority.⁷⁵ US Air Force officials were also increasingly doubtful of the project because of repeated problems with the development of the missile.⁷⁶ Although the withdrawal of US government funds limited the choices for British defence planners, it did not generally put the MoD requirement for a TASM into question. Instead, the British government began to redirect its attention to Franco-British collaboration in the construction of a TASM. Following the congressional decision, the British Defence Secretary Tom King met his French colleague Jean-Pierre Chevenement to further explore

⁷³ Tenth Report of the Defence Committee, *Defence Implications of Recent Events*, Session 1989-90, House of Commons Paper 320 (London: HMSO, 11 July 1990), p.xxx-xxxii, p.xxxv; John Keegan, "No justification" for defence role to be expanded', *Daily Telegraph*, 26/7/90.

⁷⁴ Michael White and David Fairhall, 'Defence Cuts: Britain resolute on improved deterrent', *Guardian*, 30/1/92; Michael Evans, 'US proposals put Britain on spot', *Times*, 30/1/92; Ralph Atkins, 'Parliament and Politics: Lib Dems revise policy on spending cuts', *Financial Times*, 28/2/92; Christopher Bellamy, 'Election 1992: Ashdown wants defence cutbacks halted', *Independent*, 13/3/92. See also John Simpson, 'Nuclear Decision-Making in Britain', in Harald Müller, ed., *How Western European Nuclear Policy Is Made* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp.48-73, pp.65f.

⁷⁵ Sarah Helm, 'Blow to hopes for new NATO missile', *Independent*, 18/10/90; Peter Almond, 'Missile dilemma facing Britain', *Daily Telegraph*, 29/10/90; David Fairhall, 'NATO set for new cut in nuclear weapons', *Guardian*, 8/12/90; Peter Pringle and Sarah Helm, 'Bush finalises Nato proposals', *Independent*, 2/7/90. See also Boutwell, *German Nuclear Dilemma*, p.221.

⁷⁶ Peter Almond, 'Missile dilemma facing Britain', *Daily Telegraph*, 29/10/90.

the possibility of jointly developing a TASM. The French Prime Minister Michel Rocard favoured the collaboration as a step towards an independent European security identity. In addition, Franco-British cooperation would split the costs for the research and development of the weapon. Closer European collaboration in defence procurement was also widely supported among British MPs and the members of the Commons Defence Committee. According to David Owen, MP, it would be 'a historic decision...profoundly important for the development of Europe'. MoD staff, however, were not ready to decide on the question. They were waiting for the results of a feasibility study of a Franco-British missile which were expected by the end of the year.⁷⁷

In the meantime, the international opposition from within Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Iceland, Norway and the Soviet Union to the development of tactical nuclear missiles by Britain and the US persisted. After the signing of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty in late November, the Soviet Union urged again for negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons, which had been agreed with NATO in the summer.⁷⁸ The leadership in Moscow indicated that it would seek the abolition of the TASM project by NATO. The call for nuclear reductions was widely shared among the European public. In particular, the German government was coming increasingly under pressure from the electorate to reject the stationing of TASMs and to declare Germany a nuclear-free zone.⁷⁹

However, the opponents of the TASM had so far not been able to enlarge their coalition by pressurizing or persuading any other actors within the British foreign policy network to abandon the project. In particular, the British Cabinet remained free from direct pressure from British ministers and was, therefore, able to maintain its commitment to the TASM during winter 1990. The resignation of Prime Minister Thatcher, who had been a strong supporter of the missile within the government, did not bring about a change in policy preferences. In December 1990, cabinet ministers reconfirmed their determination to go ahead with the deployment of the TASM. RAF staff were particularly eager to

⁷⁷ Andrew McEwen, 'Britain 'poised to pick France' as partner in nuclear missile project', *Times*, 24/10/90.

⁷⁸ *Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)*, at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cfe.html>.

⁷⁹ Hella Pick, 'NATO set to scrap Lance missiles', *Guardian*, 6/12/90.

purchase the weapon in order to preserve their role in the nuclear defence of Britain after the phasing out of the WE-177 bomb. Although officials in the MoD were still considering both the American and French options, Franco-British collaboration received new support due to the interest of Prime Minister John Major in strengthening European relations.⁸⁰ The Minister of State for Defence Procurement Alan Clark and his Parliamentary Under-Secretary Kenneth Carlisle were also believed to favour collaboration with France.⁸¹ However, by February 1991 MoD officials who were subject to the highest degree of pressure at 33 per cent because of their linkages with their colleagues in NATO showed first signs of a preference change. After an internal dispute over the selection and the cost of the weapon among the three services, the officials postponed the decision regarding the purchase of a missile platform for another year.⁸² It had become increasingly difficult for MoD staff to ignore the effects of the international opposition to the TASM. Crucially, the refusal of Britain's NATO partners to station the TASM on the continent reduced the practical value of the missile for British forward defence against rogue states in the Middle East. In addition, the development cost of the missile was rising because of the congressional cutbacks in the American involvement in the programme. When Navy officials suggested the conversion of Trident missiles for sub-strategic use as a less costly and independent alternative to the TASM, the programme was for the first time openly put into doubt within the British administration.

While the British government maintained its support for the missile in public, the American debate over the future of the TASM project intensified during spring 1991. Driven by countervailing demands from its partners in NATO and American Senators on one hand, and the Secretary of Defence and the American armaments industry on the other, the policy of the US administration began to waver. In February 1991, a US government spokesman announced that the administration planned to withdraw its F-111 aircraft, which would have carried the TASM, from Britain. However, he hastened to add

⁸⁰ Christopher Bellamy, 'Anglo-French deal likely for missiles', *Independent*, 29/12/90; Colin Brown, 'New nuclear weapons for UK', *Independent*, 27/12/90; 'GEC considers TASM-UK bid', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:1, 5/1/91, p.5; Colin Brown, 'New nuclear bunkers at US bases', *Independent*, 14/4/91.

⁸¹ 'UK may spurn US to develop nuclear missile', *Defence News*, 7/1/91.

⁸² 'Selection of new nuclear missile for RAF Tornados delayed', *Financial Times*, 6/2/91; Nick Cook, 'TASM-UK delayed by MoD dispute', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:6, 9/2/91, p.165; Christy Campbell and Mike Witt, 'BAe pleads with Major over pounds 2bn copter deal', *Sunday Telegraph*, 11/8/91.

that some of the bombers would be replaced with nuclear-capable F-15E planes. The decision implied that the administration still intended to deploy TASM's in Europe in spite of wide ranging cuts of US forces there.⁸³ Ironically, the cuts in the defence budget enhanced the commitment of the US government to the TASM deployment which was perceived as a cheap alternative to American soldiers in Europe. The argument was outlined in a report by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute in March. In the face of US troop reductions in Germany, the report called for the deployment of TASM's 'at a limited number of airfields in Germany and other countries'.⁸⁴ The report was supported by leading Senators, such as Democrat Sam Nunn, the Republican chairman of the Armed Services Committee William Cohen, the former Democratic Defence Secretary Harold Brown and the Republican William Simon, former US government officials, military heads and defence experts. However, the widespread publicity of the report could not conceal that the advocates of the TASM were increasingly on the defensive. Most Senators were eager to abolish the missile project.

In Britain, the argument over the choice between the TASM and a sub-strategic Trident increasingly split opinions within the MoD. RAF officers naturally argued the case for preserving a tactical role for the Air Force after the phasing out of the WE-177 in addition to the strategic Trident submarines. In a speech in April, the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Harding affirmed: 'Ministers in this nuclear proliferation world are going to need wider options'.⁸⁵ However, during the review of British defence policy before the publication of the annual Defence White Paper on 9 July 1991, RAF staff were more and more on the defensive. In addition to the international opposition to the development and stationing of the missile, budgetary pressures from Treasury officials led to tension between the three MoD services.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, cabinet ministers and

⁸³ Alan Travis, Peter Hetherington and Simon Tisdall, 'Holy Loch nuclear base to close', *Guardian*, 6/2/91; Colin Brown and Will Bennett, 'US Navy to pull out of Holy Loch nuclear base', *Independent*, 6/2/91.

⁸⁴ Sarah Helm, 'Nuclear arms return to European agenda', *Independent*, 1/3/91; Sarah Helm, 'US exaggerating Soviet threat', *Independent*, 2/3/91; Peter Riddell, 'US to keep 'sizeable' forces in Europe', *Financial Times*, 5/3/91.

⁸⁵ Christy Campbell, 'Nuclear role for Tornado crews', *Sunday Telegraph*, 28/4/91.

⁸⁶ Colin Brown and Anthony Bevins, 'Parliament and Politics: Treasury alarmed at pounds 1.5 bn MoD overspend', *Independent*, 1/5/91; Colin Brown, 'Parliament and Politics: Defence White Paper will sidestep regiments issue', *Independent*, 27/6/91.

Conservative MPs remained in favour of the missile, so the cancellation of the TASM was out of the question. Just before the publication of the White Paper, officials from the RAF and the Navy reached an agreement to keep the TASM and leave the strategic Trident as a last resort.⁸⁷ The 1991 White Paper 'Britain's Defence for the 90s' maintained that the RAF would 'continue to make our major contribution to the provision of sub-strategic nuclear forces in support of NATO and to provide a national independent sub-strategic deterrent'. For this purpose, the government was 'studying US and French options to replace [the free-fall nuclear bomb] around the end of the century with a tactical air-to-surface missile to deliver a British warhead'.⁸⁸ To meet the budgetary demands, MoD ministers and officials decided to cut its civilian staff and the British troops in Germany.⁸⁹ The decision was deeply unpopular with MoD troops and service suppliers. However, it allowed the MoD to keep its options regarding the future of the TASM open. The first stage of the debate, thus, ended without a major policy review by any of the members of the British multilevel foreign policy network. However, the international opposition to the TASM had shown some impact on NATO where the British government had to accept a series of decisions which put the future role of the TASM for Europe's nuclear defences increasingly into question. The pressure from many of the continental European governments had also weakened the rationale of the missile for the US government. In the following months this would lead to the first preference changes which resulted in President Bush's cancellation of the American TASM in autumn 1991. The North Atlantic Council and NATO's integrated staff followed suit within weeks.

US Withdraws Support for TASM

In August 1991, it became public that the members of the US Congress, who had been critical of the TASM since October 1990, planned to end the government's contributions for Boeing's SRAM-T. The missile programme had already been rejected in the House of

⁸⁷ Christopher Bellamy, 'RAF looks for smaller and stronger force', *Independent*, 2/8/90.

⁸⁸ *Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90s*, Cm 1559-I (London: HMSO, July 1991), p.40. See also Carver, *Tightrope Walking*, p.169.

⁸⁹ Michael White and David Fairhall, 'Ministers back cuts in defence', *Guardian*, 26/7/90; Robert Fox, 'British troops starting a long retreat from the Rhine, says King', *Daily Telegraph*, 26/7/90; Michael Evans, 'Cabinet slices 18% from armed forces', *Times*, 26/7/90. See also Carver, *Tightrope Walking*, p.169.

Representatives when US Senators temporarily blocked further funds for the development of the SRAM-T. The impending blockage of the administration's contribution to the TASM represented the final straw for Pentagon officials. For more than a year the Pentagon staff had been subject to the highest degree of transgovernmental pressures within the American administration at 37 per cent.⁹⁰ Now the military withdrew its support for the missile programme.⁹¹

Table 4.2 Preference Changes: 11 August - 14 November 1991

2 nd Phase (-30/9/91)			3 rd Phase (-3/10/91)			4 th Phase (-12/10/91)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
Nato-Org	48	NC	Nato-Org	52	U	Nato-Org	55	C
Par	46	B	Par	46	B	Nato-CM	47	C
Nato-CM	41	NC	US-SD	42	C	Par	46	B
US-SD	38	NC	Nato-CM	41	U	Mod	38	U
US-Pen	37	C	Mod	38	NC	DS	31	NC
Mod	33	NC	US-Sd	35	C	Fco	30	NC
US-Sd	31	NC	US-Pre	31	C	Med	30	NC
US-SS	30	NC	US-SS	30	C	FS	25	NC
US-Pre	28	NC	DS	28	NC	PM	23	NC
DS	28	NC	Fco	27	NC	vole	14	U
Fco	27	NC	Med	23	NC	con	8	NC
FS	22	NC	FS	22	NC	Com	6	NC
Med	21	NC	PM	21	NC	Ind	3	NC
PM	21	NC	vole	14	U	Cab	0	NC
vole	14	U	con	8	NC			
con	8	NC	Com	6	NC			
Com	6	NC	Ind	3	NC			
Ind	3	NC	Cab	0	NC			
Cab	0	NC						

⁹⁰ See footnote 30.

⁹¹ Peter Almond, 'Fears over shifting American defence policy priorities', *Daily Telegraph*, 18/10/91; Christy Campbell and Mike Witt, 'BAe pleads with Major over pounds 2bn copter deal', *Sunday Telegraph*, 11/8/91.

The consequences of preference change in the Pentagon for the decision-making process were extensive. Not only did Pentagon staff have the main authority over the decision whether to proceed with the development of an American TASM, the department was also well connected within the multilevel network between the US, Britain and the other NATO members. By using their national and international linkages, Pentagon officials were able to exert pressure on other actors to abandon the programme. Specifically, their support for the cancellation of the missile increased the pressure on the head of their department, Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, from 38 to 42 per cent as Pentagon officials contended that the missile had lost its rationale.⁹² Moreover, since Pentagon officials had direct linkages to the President through the Chiefs of Staff, the number of actors in the network who pressed President Bush to abandon the TASM increased from 28 to 31 per cent.⁹³ The President soon responded to the changed balance of preferences. In September 1991, President Bush announced that the US government would cancel its support for the development of Boeing's SRAM-T as part of his unilateral reductions of nuclear weapons.⁹⁴ The policy change of the President pre-empted a congressional vote on the issue. The question whether another missile would be converted to a TASM remained open. Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams commented: 'We have made a decision on that specific system. But we have not made a decision on whether we want to follow along with a TASM-like programme. That is something we want to pursue with our NATO allies'.⁹⁵

When the US abandoned their missile programme the balance of pressures in NATO turned against the TASM. Following the preference changes within the Pentagon

⁹² Due to the preference change among Pentagon officials, the number of actors who favoured the cancellation of the missile increased from P_2 [US-SD] = $9/24 = 38\%$ to P_3 [US-SD] = $10/24 = 42\%$ among those who were directly linked to Defence Secretary Cheney.

⁹³ The Pentagon staff also increased to pressure on the US President from P_2 [US-Pre] = $9/32 = 28\%$ to P_3 [US-Pre] = $10/32 = 31\%$ of his contacts in the network.

⁹⁴ David White, 'Bush's nuclear cuts: questions remain over role of airborne tactical missiles', *Financial Times*, 30/9/91; David Fairhall, 'Impact of US arms cuts may be grater than defence ministry admits', *Guardian*, 3/10/91; Nick Cook, 'The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:16, 19/10/91, p.708; Peter Almond, 'US team in arms talks with Moscow', *Daily Telegraph*, 4/10/91; Michael Evans, 'Nato cuts its nuclear bomb stock by half', *Times*, 9/10/91.

⁹⁵ Nick Cook, 'The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:16, 19/10/91, p.708. See also 'SRAM II cancelled for cause', *Aerospace Daily*, 2/10/91; 'Bush plan does not rule out TASM', *Defense Daily*, 2/10/91; 'UK may spurn US to develop nuclear missile', *Defense News*, 7/1/91.

and by President Bush, 55 per cent of NATO's military links⁹⁶ and 47 per cent of the actors directly connected to or represented in the North Atlantic Council⁹⁷ were now opposed to the development and stationing of TASMs in Europe. The intergovernmental European coalition among politicians and civil servants against the TASMs used the increased pressure to propose far ranging arms reductions which included the Alliance's stockpile of tactical nuclear bombs. The scope of the reductions was scheduled for discussion at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Taormina, Sicily, in mid-October. A formal agreement was expected for the NATO summit in Rome in November. Discussed were two proposals: the removal of all land-based short-range nuclear weapons and cuts of between 1,300 and 1,400 American free-fall nuclear bombs in Europe as well as the British WE-177.⁹⁸ After the American government had practically backed out of its TASM programme, representatives within NATO quickly reached a tacit agreement about the cancellation of NATO's requirement for TASMs. Even before the formal meeting of the Council of Ministers in Taormina, a senior NATO official confirmed that the Alliance had decided to suspend its development of TASMs - at least until 1995.⁹⁹ The opposition among NATO's members to the TASM programme was simply overwhelming and without the support of the US administration, the British government was unable to veto a policy change any longer. Several NATO member governments welcomed the end of the debate which they believed to be final. The Belgian Defence Minister Guy Come declared: 'The abandonment of TASM is a fundamental change'.¹⁰⁰

In spite of the agreement, however, the debate within NATO over the future of the TASM continued until the end of November 1991 as opponents and proponents reiterated

⁹⁶ Among the linkages of NATO's bureaucratic organisation, officials from the foreign and defence departments of US, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Iceland favoured the cancellation of the TASM, accounting for P₄ [Nato-Org] = 16/29 = 55%.

⁹⁷ At this time 24 out of 51 actors linked to the North Atlantic Council opposed the TASM, namely the representatives of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the US, accounting for P₄ [Nato-CM] = 24/51 = 47%. Compare footnote 22.

⁹⁸ Nick Cook, 'The tactical missile debate that refuses to lie down', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:16, 19/10/91, p.708. See also 'SRAM II cancelled for cause', *Aerospace Daily*, 2/10/91; 'Bush plan does not rule out TASM', *Defense Daily*, 2/10/91; 'UK/5/spurn US to develop nuclear missile', *Defense News*, 7/1/91.

⁹⁹ 'Nato plans cutback in nuclear bombs', *Independent*, 9/10/91. Compare also Robert Shrimmsley and Peter Almond, 'RAF to lose its nuclear capability', *Daily Telegraph*, 16/10/93.

¹⁰⁰ Marc Rogers, 'NATO relived as SRAM-T is cut', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:15, 12/10/91, p.643.

their arguments. Central to the discussion was President Bush's wish to maintain an effective nuclear defence in Europe in spite of arms reductions.¹⁰¹ As replacement for the cancelled SRAM-T programme, the US government considered another TASM: the AM-127 supersonic low altitude target missile.¹⁰² TASMs were still viewed by both US and British ministers as the best option to fill the gap created by the disarmament negotiations.¹⁰³ Conversely, the European governments which opposed the TASM demanded the inclusion of the missile in the negotiations. The Soviet President Gorbachev repeatedly expressed his interest in an agreement to remove all tactical air weapons from service.¹⁰⁴ The Soviet proposal was supported by the members of the two main opposition parties in Britain. Labour representatives publicly called upon the British government to use its international role in order to advance the armaments negotiations. Members of the Liberal Democrats demanded in the press that the British government should take the opportunity created by Gorbachev's defence cuts to reduce its military spending by abandoning its TASM programme.¹⁰⁵ The British government had to recognise the growing likelihood that the 'temporary' suspension of the American and NATO requirement of a TASM would be final.¹⁰⁶ Nevertheless, before the NATO Council meeting in Sicily the British Defence Secretary Tom King assured that, whatever the decision in NATO, Britain would go ahead with the deployment of its TASM.¹⁰⁷ Technically, Britain could still pursue both options, i.e. the development of a missile with

¹⁰¹ David White, 'Bush's nuclear cuts: questions remain over role of airborne tactical missiles', *Financial Times*, 30/9/91; David Fairhall, 'The nuclear lobby disarmed', *Guardian*, 3/10/91.

¹⁰² Peter Almond, 'US team in arms talks with Moscow', *Daily Telegraph*, 4/10/91.

¹⁰³ Sarah Helm, 'Doubts over Europe's next nuclear generation', *Independent*, 7/9/91.

¹⁰⁴ David Fairhall, 'Gorbachev challenges US to new nuclear cuts', *Guardian*, 7/10/91.

¹⁰⁵ 'Major hails Soviet defence cuts but stays committed to Trident', *Scotsman*, 7/10/91; Alan Travis, 'Trident programme will go ahead despite Soviet cuts, insists Major', *Guardian*, 7/10/91.

¹⁰⁶ David Wallen, 'Britain likely to make cut in nuclear bombs stock', *Scotsman*, 9/10/91; David Fairhall and Hella Pick, 'NATO joins rush to throw bombs on scrap-heap', *Guardian*, 9/10/91; 'NATO plans cutback in nuclear bombs', *Independent*, 9/10/91; Michael Smith, 'NATO to cut back nuclear bombs', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/10/91; Michael Evans, 'NATO to cut its nuclear bomb stock by half', *Times*, 9/10/91.

¹⁰⁷ Michael Evans, 'Soviet collapse will not bring new cuts in forces', *Times*, 16/9/91; David White, 'Bush's nuclear cuts: questions remain over role of airborne tactical missiles', *Financial Times*, 30/9/91; David Fairhall, 'The nuclear lobby disarmed', *Guardian*, 3/10/91; Ian Mater, 'Farewell to arms - or is it just "au revoir"', *European*, 4/10/91; Barbara Starr, 'Bush offers deep cut in warheads', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:14, 5/10/91, p.585; Michael Evans, 'Superpower initiative undermines NATO doctrine', *Times*, 7/10/91.

France and the purchase of an off-the-shelf missile from American suppliers because Boeing continued to research into the development of the SRAM-T for Britain.¹⁰⁸

Although the meeting of the NPG in Taormina, Sicily, on 17-18 October 1991 was supposed to resolve the discussion about the future of tactical weapons in Europe, a decision about the TASM was not reached.¹⁰⁹ At the meeting the British Defence Minister King continued to insist on deploying the TASM. King predictably clashed with the German Foreign Minister Genscher who in turn reiterated his demands for the dismantling of all short-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including air-launched missiles. While the Belgian, Dutch and Danish representatives supported Genscher's position, the US delegation came once again to the rescue of Britain.¹¹⁰ In their final communiqué, the members of the NPG went little beyond the reductions that had been achieved between the two superpowers. In addition, NATO members declared that they would cut their stockpile of sub-strategic weapons, including the British WE-177 free-fall nuclear bombs, by 80 per cent. However, in a paragraph born out of British insistence, the NPG members declared that NATO would 'continue to base effective and up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces in Europe'. These would 'consist solely of dual-capable aircraft, with continued widespread participation in nuclear roles and peacetime basing by Allies'.¹¹¹

The 'New Strategic Concept' of NATO which was announced at the summit in Rome 7-8 November 1991 essentially reiterated the Taormina compromise. With regard to NATO's nuclear force structure it stated that, due to the changed nature of the threats faced by NATO and the recent successes in nuclear disarmament, sub-strategic weapons could be significantly reduced. However, NATO would 'maintain adequate sub-strategic forces based in Europe, which will provide an essential link with strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the trans-Atlantic link. These [would] consist solely of dual capable aircraft

¹⁰⁸ 'News: Boeing persists on RAF SRAM T', *Flight International*, 19/2/92; 'Boeing persists on RAF SRAM T', *Flight International*, 25/2/92; Simon Fluendy, 'GEC and Boeing to join forces on several defence contract bids', *Electronics Times*, 23/4/92.

¹⁰⁹ Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Taormina, Italy, 17-18 October 1991, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>.

¹¹⁰ Peter Almond, 'The Soviet Split: Britain seeks new air-launch atomic missile', *Daily Telegraph*, 9/9/91.

¹¹¹ Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Taormina, Italy, 17-18 October 1991, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>.

that could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems'.¹¹² Tellingly the phrase that NATO members were expected to base dual-capable aircraft in their countries was omitted. *De facto*, the TASM had been eliminated from NATO's defence doctrine. Whether NATO member states were willing to develop and deploy the missile would rest on national decisions. The US government immediately drew its conclusions from the Alliance decision. Speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Under-Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz announced that neither the American government nor NATO planned to develop an alternative to the SRAM-T as tactical air-to-surface missile.¹¹³

Although the second stage of the TASM debate had seen the expansion of the international opposition to the missile from Western Europe to the US, and the abandonment of the programme by NATO, the British government persisted in its determination to go ahead with its TASM. While their limited exposure to international pressure meant that the Cabinet and Conservative MPs were able to maintain their support for the TASM, officials in the Ministry of Defence as the main target of the international protests over the missile was increasingly divided.

MoD Backs Trident Alternative for TASM

During the winter of 1991-92, the British government remained firmly committed to TASM despite the cancellation of the requirement within NATO and the US. Defence Secretary King defended the development of a sub-strategic deterrent in the House of Commons.¹¹⁴ British Ministers emphasised in particular the dangers associated with nuclear proliferation after the breakup of the Soviet Union.¹¹⁵ Since the international support for the missile was lost, it became crucial for the government and MoD officials to prevent increasing pressure for the cancellation of the TASM among the domestic actors to whom they were linked in the British multilevel foreign policy network. As long as the domestic actors within the network unanimously supported the missile, the

¹¹² North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Rome, 7-8 November 1991, Part IV 2.4, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>.

¹¹³ 'No SRAM replacement seen', *Defense Daily*, 14/11/91.

¹¹⁴ Christopher Bellamy, 'Britain "spending 350m pounds on Trident missiles from US"', *Independent*, 22/11/91; Christopher Bellamy, 'Twin potential of British "cruise"', *Independent*, 5/12/91.

¹¹⁵ Colin Brown and Chris Bellamy, 'Nuclear fears over Soviet break-up', *Independent*, 23/10/91; Michael White and David Failhall, 'Defence Cuts: Britain resolute on improved deterrent', *Guardian*, 30/1/92.

government was able to resist the international calls for the abolition of the missile. However, three sets of actors were increasingly susceptible to a change of preference regarding the TASM because their linkages within the network exposed them to considerable transgovernmental pressure or because they were already divided over the issue: MoD staff, the new Defence Secretary Rifkind and the British public. MoD officials, in particular, had close direct relations with their colleagues in the US Pentagon and the other defence departments within NATO. Since their counterparts in NATO had collectively abandoned the missile, the pressure on the British MoD staff to follow suit had increased from 38 to 48 per cent.¹¹⁶ The transgovernmental pressure was compounded by the financial problems at the MoD, which had suffered from a series of budget cuts since the late 1980s. To reduce spending on the TASM, RAF officers suggested limiting the range of the missile.¹¹⁷

Table 4.3 Preference Changes: 14 November 1991 - 9 October 1992

5 th Phase (-7/8/92)			6 th Phase (-9/10/92)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
Par	46	B	Par	52	B
Mod	43	C	DS	38	C
DS	34	NC	Fco	37	NC
Med	34	NC	Med	36	NC
Fco	33	NC	PM	28	NC
FS	28	NC	FS	28	NC
PM	26	NC	vote	14	U
vote	14	U	Com	13	NC
con	8	NC	con	8	NC
Com	6	NC	Cab	7	NC
Ind	3	NC	Ind	7	NC
Cab	0	NC			

¹¹⁶ The preference changes among the Pentagon staff and NATO military increased the pressure on MoD officials from $P_2 [\text{Mod}] = 8/21 = 38\%$ to $P_3 [\text{Mod}] = 9/21 = 43\%$ of their linkages in the network.

¹¹⁷ David Fairhall, 'RAF out to trim new missile cost', *Guardian*, 22/11/91.

However, during the campaign for the upcoming British general elections in April 1992, the government again decided to postpone a decision regarding the missile. The position of the electorate on the question of nuclear weapons was still unclear, and the government preferred to keep the contentious project out of the public debate. Labour and Liberal Democratic MPs shared this sentiment and refrained from using their relations with the media to increase the public attention to the issue.¹¹⁸ Although the members of the two opposition parties publicly expressed their intentions to cancel the purchase of a TASM, these statements remained very low-key. Specifically, the Labour and Liberal Democrats leadership had agreed with each other not to purchase a TASM in the case of a hung parliament. However, the members of the two opposition parties wanted to avoid an anti-nuclear image.¹¹⁹ They feared that Conservative ministers and MPs would be able to ridicule such a position as 'unrealistic'. At the heart of their reluctance was the continued insecurity among the members of the government and the opposition about the preferences of the electorate. On the one hand, the government believed that the British public supported the country's nuclear forces. Moreover, the Trident nuclear submarine was associated with jobs in the marginal constituency of Barrow-in-Furness and the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment.¹²⁰ On the other hand, senior officials believed that the electorate was increasingly doubtful of the alleged Russian threat.¹²¹ Nevertheless, Labour leaders welcomed the achievements in the disarmament negotiations between the two superpowers in its party programme 'Agenda for Change' and reiterated their long-term goal of the 'total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide'.¹²² In Parliament, Labour and Liberal Democratic MPs urged the government at least to reduce

¹¹⁸ Nick Cook, 'Politics hold up TASM decision', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:2, 13/7/91, p.45.

¹¹⁹ Alan Travis, 'Ashdown firm on fourth Trident', *Guardian*, 28/2/92; Michael White and Favid Fairhall, 'Defence Cuts: Britain resolute on improved Deterrent', *Guardian*, 30/1/92. See also Carver, *Tightrope Walking*, p.172.

¹²⁰ Michael White and David Fairhall, 'Defence Cuts: Britain resolute on improved deterrent', *Guardian*, 30/1/92; Michael Evans, 'US proposals put Britain on spot', *Times*, 30/1/92; Ralph Atkins, 'Parliament and Politics: Lib Dems revise policy on spending cuts', *Financial Times*, 28/2/92; Christopher Bellamy, 'Election 1992: Ashdown wants defence cutbacks halted', *Independent*, 13/3/92. See also Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, p.36; Christopher Tugendhat and William Wallace, *Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s* (London: Routledge and RIIA, 1988), pp.68f.

¹²¹ Jonathan Eyal and David Fairhall, 'Defence: The nuclear future - Britain struggles to defend size of arsenal', *Guardian*, 1/2/92.

¹²² Labour Party, *Agenda for Change* (London: Labour Party, 1992), p.22.

its nuclear deterrent by cutting the purchase of a fourth Trident submarine and cancelling the TASM.¹²³ However, because of the blocking majority of the Conservatives in the House of Commons, the combined pressure from opposition MPs of 46 per cent was unsuccessful in bringing about a change of policy.¹²⁴

In the MoD the controversy over the form of Britain's nuclear deterrent intensified during spring 1992. Since the withdrawal of American funds for the missile had increased the development cost of the TASM, MoD officials felt increasingly forced to choose between a fourth Trident and the TASM. The cancellation of Trident would enable the ministry to spend more on the missile, perhaps to increase its range. Sir Michael Quinlan, Permanent Secretary at the MoD and Mr Clark supported this idea. Conversely, the abolition of the TASM would enable MoD staff to redirect the funds to the army and other projects which had been severely affected by previous budgetary cutbacks. By May 1992 first signs indicated that MoD officials had decided against the TASM. They tasked Royal Navy planners with the assessment of a sub-strategic role for Trident, which would allow the TASM to be cancelled.¹²⁵ Moreover, the Defence White Paper, published on 7 July 1992, failed for the first time to mention the TASM. Conversely, it stated that the government was 'studying possible replacements' for the WE-177 free fall nuclear bomb - a clear reference to a sub-strategic role for Trident.¹²⁶

As the policy change within the US and NATO had raised the pressure on the staff

¹²³ Michael White and David Fairhall, 'Defence Cuts: Britain resolute on improved deterrent', *Guardian*, 30/1/92; Michael Evans, 'US proposals put Britain on spot', *Times*, 30/1/92; Ralph Atkins, 'Parliament and Politics: Lib Dems revise policy on spending cuts', *Financial Times*, 28/2/92; Christopher Bellamy, 'Election 1992: Ashdown wants defence cutbacks halted', *Independent*, 13/3/92. The options of reducing the number of Trident submarines or its nuclear warheads were raised by the Labour Party as early as 1990. See Wheeler, 'Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent', pp.44f.; Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, p.34.

¹²⁴ $P_3 [Par] = 4814/10400 = 45\%$.

¹²⁵ Severin Carrell, 'Navy study looks at tactical nuclear role for Trident', *Scotsman*, 8/5/92; Nick Cook, 'RN probes tactical role for Trident', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:19, 9/5/92, p.789; Christopher Bellamy, 'Britain out on a limb with weapons plans', *Independent*, 18/6/92; Nick Cook, 'GPALS offer slows UK nuclear plans', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:1, 4/7/92, p.9; Colin Brown, 'Tory MP's oppose plans to scrap new missile', *Independent*, 13/8/92; Nick Cook, 'The flight begins for the few', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:10, 5/9/92, pp.49-58, pp.50f.; 'News: UK studies air-launched Trident warhead for RAF', *Flight International*, 16/9/92; Ian Bruce, 'RAF counts cost of fighter project', *Herald*, 22/10/92; Charles Bickers, 'UK nuclear options widen as gravity bombs soldier on', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:10, 6/3/93, p.17.

¹²⁶ *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*, Cm 1981 (London: HMSO, July 1992), p.28; Christopher Bellamy, 'Nuclear missile may be scrapped', *Independent*, 8/7/92; Christopher Bellamy, 'Defence strategy casts doubt on tactical missiles', *Independent*, 8/7/92.

in the British Ministry of Defence, the preference change among MoD officials in turn increased the opposition to the TASM within the British administration. Specifically, the actors who were directly linked to MoD officials, such as Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind and Prime Minister John Major, were exposed to rising pressure to abandon the TASM. With the military making the case for a sub-strategic role for Trident, the number of actors who advocated a cancellation of the missile increased from 34 to 38 per cent among those who were linked to Rifkind¹²⁷ and from 26 to 28 per cent of John Major's linkages¹²⁸. Since the House of Commons, which was subject to the highest pressure among the British decision units at 52 per cent¹²⁹, was prevented from a policy change by the blocking majority of the Conservative MPs, the Secretary of Defence was the most likely to abandon the TASM programme.

At this point, however, the impending abolition of the TASM project triggered countervailing action from Conservative MPs in the Commons and the members of the Defence Committee. Both were insulated from the pressure of the international actors who advocated the abolition of the nuclear missile project. In fact, among the critics of the TASM only MoD officials were able to exert influence over Conservative MPs and the members of the Defence Committee, as they were dependent on the MoD staff for expert information. However, MoD officials amounted to only 8 per cent and 13 per cent respectively of the actors to whom Conservative MPs and the Defence Committee members were linked in the British foreign policy network.¹³⁰ Since most other actors with whom they had close relations remained supportive of the missile, the Conservative MPs and committee members could afford to disregard the pressure from MoD staff for the cancellation.¹³¹ Conversely, alerted by the news that defence ministers were planning to abandon the development of the TASM, the Conservative members of the Commons

¹²⁷ The preference change among the MoD staff increased the pressure on Defence Secretary Rifkind from P_5 [DS] = 10/29 = 34% to P_6 [DS] = 11/29 = 38% of the actors to whom he was linked in the network.

¹²⁸ MoD officials further increased the number of actors who supported a cancellation of the British TASM from P_5 [PM] = 10/39 = 26% to P_6 [PM] = 11/39 = 28% among the network linkages of Prime Minister Major.

¹²⁹ Due to changes in the composition of the House of Commons following the April 1992 General Election, P_6 [Par] = 5376/10416 = 48%. See Appendix 4.

¹³⁰ The preference change among MoD officials raising the pressure on the members of the Defence Committee to P_6 [Com] = 2/16 = 13%, while the pressure on the Conservatives remained constant.

¹³¹ Croft and Dunn, 'Impact of the Defence Budget', p.64.

Defence Committee demanded an inquiry into the issue. The chairman of the committee, Sir Nicholas Bonsor, commented: 'I don't see why this nuclear capability is no longer needed, when one looks to the Middle East'.¹³²

Indeed, after the government had argued for two years that the TASM was essential to British defence because of new threats from rogue states like Iraq, cabinet ministers were at a loss to explain why they now wanted to cancel the project. Since Conservative MPs remained staunchly committed to the TASM, the government chose to continue with the development for the time being. According to *Defense Daily*, the British government awarded the three contenders for the missile follow-on contracts, Martin Marietta, Boeing and Aerospatiale, in September 1992 each 1.6m dollars for a pre-project definition study into a tactical air-to-surface missile, including the development of a prototype. The claim that, if TASM was made a NATO requirement in 1995, Britain would be able to profit from sales to other NATO members once the TASM design was completed was scarcely convincing, however.¹³³

By autumn, new international problems emerged with regard to the American contenders for the British missile. A nuclear test ban installed by the US Congress on 1 October 1992 put the British TASM project further under strain because it prevented British scientists from testing the new warhead at US sites. Although the missile programme was increasingly unlikely, the British government urged the US to resume its nuclear tests as late as July 1993.¹³⁴ Similar problems challenged the French ASLP. After the Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev announced that his government would extend its temporary nuclear test ban until at least mid-1993, a French Defence Ministry spokesman stated that it was considering extending its own one-year moratorium which

¹³² Colin Brown, 'Tory MP's oppose plans to scrap new missile', *Independent*, 13/8/92.

¹³³ 'Martin awarded dollars 1.6 million UK TASM studies contract', *Defense Daily*, 9/9/92; 'US wavering may put it out of TASM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:12, 19/9/92, p.21; 'Britain pursues [sic] missile studies. US - Martin Marietta wins UK TASM contract', *Defense News*, 20/9/92; 'Martin-Marietta TASM-UK award', *Interavia-Aerospace World*, 28/10/92.

¹³⁴ 'US wavering may put it out of TASM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:12, 19/9/92, p.21. See also Charles Bickers, 'UK nuclear options widen as gravity bombs soldier on', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:10, 6/3/93, p.17; Simon Tisdall, David Fairhall and Martin Walker, 'US to scrap test ban: Clinton gives in to Britain and military', *Guardian*, 18/5/93; Nick Cook, "'Uncertainties" delay Trident decisions', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:24, 12/6/93, p.5; Martin Walker and Simon Tisdall, 'US to press ahead with nuclear tests', *Guardian*, 17/6/93; Martin Walker, 'Clinton rethinks new nuclear tests', *Guardian*, 1/7/93.

was to end.¹³⁵ Although the French government assured that the test ban would not affect its nuclear capabilities¹³⁶, the ASLP appeared to run into further problems as the French government, too, was pressed to reduce its defence spending.¹³⁷

In October 1992, Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind withdrew his support for the missile project. The minister not only had to take into account pressure from his staff for a cancellation of the missile, but also the international opposition from his NATO colleagues to the TASM, which together amounted to 38 per cent of his contacts in the network.¹³⁸ Speaking to journalists, Rifkind acknowledged that Britain's defence commitments might have to be reduced, allegedly because of budgetary restraints. He intimated that the cuts could include the TASM.¹³⁹ The Defence Minister warned the Cabinet, however, that further cuts would force a reconsideration of British strategy as outlined in 'Options for Change'.¹⁴⁰ At the meeting of NATO defence ministers in Gleneagles, Rifkind stated that the review into the options for a British TASM would be completed by early 1993. The design of a nuclear warhead for the TASM had almost been finalised at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment.¹⁴¹ The Defence Ministry had earmarked 1.5m pounds for 1993 to determine a missile platform for its TASM programme which was to be decided soon.¹⁴²

Although the fact that Defence Secretary Rifkind was prepared to cut the TASM slightly increased the pressure on Parliament to accept the cancellation of the missile, the

¹³⁵ Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, p.141.

¹³⁶ 'France is set to extend ban', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:17, 24/10/92, p.18; Barbara Starr and J.A.C. Lewis, 'USA and France face nuclear test dilemma', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:20, 15/5/93, p.5.

¹³⁷ Carol Reed, J.A.C. Lewis and Duncan Lennox, 'Country Survey: France', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:25, 20/6/92, pp.1065-1084, p.1068, p.1079, p.1083; 'France cuts nuclear funding', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:15, 10/10/92, p.18.

¹³⁸ See footnote 125.

¹³⁹ Colin Brown, 'The Conservatives in Brighton: Cuts may hit defence commitments', *Independent*, 9/10/92. Malcolm Rifkind admitted in the Commons on 27 October 1992 that there were 'a number of ways in which the United Kingdom's sub-strategic requirements can be met'. See *Hansard*, Vol. 212, Oral Answers, Col. 860, 27 October 1992.

¹⁴⁰ Colin Brown, 'The Autumn Statement: Defence cut by pounds 575m', *Independent*, 12/11/92.

¹⁴¹ Severin Carrell, 'UK nuclear bomb study "complete next year"', *Scotsman*, 22/10/92; David Fairhall, 'New British nuclear bomb under threat', *Guardian*, 22/10/92; 'News: UK finances WE 177 replacement study', *Flight International*, 10/2/93.

¹⁴² 'News: UK finances WE 177 replacement study', *Flight International*, 10/2/93; Charles Bickers, 'UK nuclear options widen as gravity bombs soldier on', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:10, 6/3/93, p.17.

comparative insulation of Conservative MPs and the members of the Commons Defence Committee from international actors limited the pressure on both. Thus, while Defence Committee members accepted that 'financial considerations will quite properly play a part' in the decision over the future of the TASM project, they warned the government that the 'risks inherent in any proposal whereby strategic and sub-strategic deterrents are dependent upon the same launch platform', namely the Trident submarines, had to be addressed.¹⁴³ In February, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs used the increasing differences within the government to propose to the House of Commons the abolition of the TASM in order to save 3bn pounds for defence cuts which had been requested by Treasury staff. However, since the opponents of the missile could only exert indirect pressure on the Conservatives via Parliament, the Conservative MPs were able to maintain their resistance. In the Commons, the Conservative majority could easily block the proposed cancellation.¹⁴⁴

The preference changes of the British MoD and Secretary of Defence Malcolm Rifkind during the summer of 1992 extended the transgovernmental pressure for the cancellation of the TASM programme into the domestic sphere of the British multilevel foreign policy network. However, the government hesitated in cutting the TASM. In particular, the blocking position of Conservative MPs in the Commons meant that the government had to convince its parliamentary party first before it could risk a vote on a defence budget which incorporated the abolition of the TASM programme. The struggle of the British administration to build a consensus among domestic actors for the cancellation of the TASM extended over another year from October 1992 to October 1993.

TASM Cancellation Pushed through Parliament

By the beginning of 1992 RAF staff were resigned to losing their role in Britain's nuclear defence. By giving up the TASM, Air Force officers could reallocate resources to retain

¹⁴³ First Report of the Defence Committee, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*, House of Commons Paper 218 (London: HMSO, 11 November 1992), p.x. For the arguments regarding a sub-strategic role for Trident see Paterson, *Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent*, pp.113f.

¹⁴⁴ Colin Brown, 'Anger greets sacking of officers in the front line', *Independent*, 25/2/93.

the Eurofighter Aircraft programme.¹⁴⁵ The 1993 Defence White Paper 'Defending Our Future' published in July was expected to give the final blow to the TASM project. However, the defence review merely stated that the decision would be announced 'in due course'. In a concession to Conservative opposition, the government's White Paper emphasised the continued need for sub-strategic nuclear weapons. In fact, the White Paper mentioned the 'Provision of an Effective Independent Strategic and Substrategic Nuclear Capability' first among Britain's military tasks.¹⁴⁶

Table 4.4 Preference Changes: 9 October 1992 - 18 October 1993

7 th Phase (-3/7/93)			8 th Phase (-30/9/93)			9 th Phase (-18/10/93)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
Par	55	B	Par	59	B	Par	72	C
Med	38	NC	Med	39	NC	con	50	C
Fco	37	NC	Fco	37	C	Med	46	NC
FS	33	NC	FS	36	C	vote	38	U
PM	31	NC	PM	33	C	Ind	10	NC
Com	19	C	con	25	NC			
vote	19	U	vote	24	U			
con	17	NC	Cab	21	C			
Cab	14	U	Ind	10	NC			
Ind	7	NC						

By the time of the publication of the White Paper, however, Defence Secretary Rifkind and MoD officials were making progress in convincing Conservative MPs that a tactical missile for Trident could substitute for a TASM. In particular, the government had focussed its efforts rationally on the members of the Commons Defence Committee who

¹⁴⁵ Ian Bruce, 'RAF counts cost of fighter project', *Herald*, 22/10/92; Peter Almond, 'Britain's forces stand by for further cuts', *Daily Telegraph*, 13/4/93; Nick Cook, "'Tactical" Trident set to kill RAF's TASM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 20:1, 3/7/93, p.5; David Fairhall, 'MPs call for end to Trident secrecy', *Guardian*, 7/7/93.

¹⁴⁶ *Defending Our Future - Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993*, Cm 2270 (London: HMSO, July 1993), p.14, p.20, p.24; Ian Bruce, 'Cut-price defence of the realm', *Herald*, 6/7/93; Anthony Bevin and Colin Brown, 'Tories divided over defence cuts', *Independent*, 5/7/93; Colin Brown, 'Tories say defence cuts can go no deeper', *Independent*, 6/7/93; Colin Brown, 'Navy bears brunt of cuts as four submarines are axed', *Independent*, 6/7/93; David Fairhall, 'Blasting a hole in nuclear plan', *Guardian*, 19/7/93.

were, at 19 per cent¹⁴⁷, under marginally higher collective pressure within the network than the Conservatives at 17 per cent¹⁴⁸. After extensive briefings from the MoD staff, the members of the Defence Committee changed their position on the TASM. In June, the Defence Committee announced that there were no reasons why Trident could not take the sub-strategic role originally envisaged for the TASM.¹⁴⁹

For the following development of a winning coalition in favour of a cancellation of the TASM, the preference change among the members of the Defence Committee proved critical. In particular, the support for the abolition of the TASM programme by the committee members increased the pressure on Conservative MPs, among whom the committee members had particular authority on matters of defence, to 25 per cent of their links in the network.¹⁵⁰ Furthermore, due to the preference change of the committee members, the pressure on the House of Commons as a collective decision unit rose to 59 per cent.¹⁵¹ The considerable support for the cancellation of the TASM in Parliament meant that it became increasingly politically unviable for the Conservative majority to block the abolition.

Following the approval of committee members of the abolition of the TASM project, Defence Secretary Rifkind raised the issue in the Cabinet on 30 September 1993. Although a small number of cabinet ministers were critical of the severe cuts in the defence budget, none challenged the 'technical' choice between the TASM and a sub-strategic Trident missile. Moreover, when the Cabinet announced its decision to cancel the TASM in Parliament, Conservative MPs acceded without major protests. With the Cabinet's official change in policy an overwhelming 55 per cent of the actors to whom the Conservative MPs were connected in the network supported the decision, thus raising the

¹⁴⁷ The preference change of Rifkind had increased the number of actors who opposed the TASM among the linkages of the Defence Committee members to three, accounting for $P_7 [\text{Com}] = 3/15 = 20\%$. Compare footnote 128.

¹⁴⁸ The pressure on the Conservatives remained at $P_7 [\text{con}] = 2/12 = 17\%$. See footnote 128.

¹⁴⁹ Nick Cook, "'Tactical' Trident set to kill RAF's TASM", *Jane's Defence Weekly* 20:1, 3/7/93, p.5; David Fairhall, 'MPs call for end to Trident secrecy', *Guardian*, 7/7/93; Severin Carrell, 'Submerged in a murky future', *Scotsman*, 7/7/93.

¹⁵⁰ Specifically, three out of eleven actors to whom the Conservatives were linked in the network supported the cancellation of the TASM, namely Defence Secretary Rifkind, the members of the Defence Committee and US politicians, accounting for $P_8 [\text{con}] = 3/11 = 27\%$.

¹⁵¹ $P_8 [\text{Par}] = 6096/10416 = 59\%$.

political stakes of a rejection.¹⁵² Their acceptance was made easier by a preceding public ‘showdown’ over the defence budget between the Chancellor of Exchequer Kenneth Clarke and Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind. To the Conservative MPs and the media, the government presented the TASM as the ‘sacrificial lamb’ which not only helped to prevent job losses in the armed forces of more than 20 per cent, but also the cancellation of the European Fighter Aircraft.¹⁵³ The budget argument was preferable to admitting to the international pressures which had influenced the government’s decision. It maintained the image that British nuclear decision-making remained a national preserve. Although Conservative backbenchers continued to express fears that the abolition of a nuclear role for the RAF would undermine Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the threat of further redundancies among the armed services was a more serious concern to them.¹⁵⁴ When Defence Secretary Rifkind announced in the House of Commons on 18 October 1993 that Britain was backing out of the TASM programme, the Conservative Party did not challenge the decision.¹⁵⁵

4.3 Conclusion

In order to assess the explanatory value of the hypotheses suggested by multilevel network theory the conclusion of this case study examines four indicators: the frequency and

¹⁵² The open advocacy of the TASM cancellation by the Cabinet, including Prime Minister Major and Foreign Secretary Hurd increased the number of the actors who exerted pressure on the Conservatives by three to P_3 [con] = $6/12 = 50\%$. Compare footnote 148.

¹⁵³ Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith cited in Tim Barlass, ‘Clarke’s axe set to fall on pounds 3bn nuclear missile’, *Standard*, 15/10/93. Compare Christopher Bellamy, ‘Missile system “no longer needed”’, *Independent*, 19/10/93; Peter Almond, ‘Defence budget: Rifkind confirms RAF’s nuclear loss’, *Daily Telegraph*, 19/10/93.


¹⁵⁴ Ninth Report of the Defence Committee, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993*, House of Commons Paper 869 (London: HMSO, 29 September 1993), pp. ix, xiii; Robert Chote and Donald MacIntyre, ‘Pressure on Clarke to cut rates’, *Independent*, 14/10/93; Tim Barlass, ‘Clarke’s axe set to fall on pounds 3bn nuclear missile’, *Standard*, 15/10/93; John Deans, ‘RAF is likely to lose its nuclear strike potential’, *Daily Mail*, 16/10/93; Joy Copley, ‘Tories split on threat of pounds 1 bn defence cuts’, *Scotsman*, 16/10/93; David White, ‘Britain to drop project for new pounds 3bn n-missile’, *Financial Times*, 16/10/93; Will Hutton and Patrick Wintour, ‘Ministers look for slow-burn tax changes’, *Guardian*, 16/10/93; Donald MacIntyre, ‘Tory unrest over pounds 1bn defence cuts’, *Independent*, 16/10/93; Robert Shrimley and Peter Almond, ‘RAF to lose its nuclear capability’, *Daily Telegraph*, 16/10/93; Ian Bruce, ‘Rifkind shops in America to arm Trident’, *Herald*, 18/10/93.

¹⁵⁵ Tim Barlass, ‘New Trident role will save pounds 750m’, *Standard*, 18/10/93; Gary Duncan and Severin Carrell, ‘Rosyth sell-off fuels defence row’, *Scotsman*, 19/10/93; ‘Parliament: Fury as Rifkind axes new RAF missile’, *Herald*, 19/10/93.

probability of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure, the distribution of the four behavioural categories 'no change' 'unclear or undecided', 'change' and 'blocked' across the range of pressure from zero to 100 per cent, the average degree of pressure for each behavioural category and the timing of the preference changes in the research period. Moreover, by summarizing the findings of the case regarding the relationship between network pressure and preference changes, this section seeks to identify new inductive propositions or consolidate the inductive hypotheses derived from the first case study. Finally, it discusses whether multilevel network theory provides new insights into the decision to abolish the British tactical air-to-surface missile project.

Assessment of the Hypotheses

Summarizing its findings, the case of the decision to abolish the tactical air-to-surface missile programme generally corroborates the probabilistic causal relationship between pressure and preference changes by the actors in the British multilevel foreign policy network. The explanatory value of the first hypothesis as evaluated by the relative frequency of preference changes is



confirmed in 110 out of 115 instances, i.e. 96 per cent. Indeed, as displayed in Graph 4.1, the probability of a preference reversal increased steadily with rising degrees of pressure.


Graph 4.2 also shows that the frequency distribution of the 'no change' category matches the expectations derived from the first hypothesis. Although there are two peaks, the occurrence of which has been explained in the first case study, the number of actors who were able to maintain their original preference decreases steadily from the second peak with increasing degrees of pressure. Crucially for the refinement of the initial first

hypothesis, the impression of a threshold is supported by the findings from this case study. As in the case of air strikes in Bosnia, none of the actors was able to resist degrees of pressure higher than 50 per cent.


The distribution of actors or instances whose preferences were unclear or who were undecided in Graph 4.3 appears to be almost analogous to the frequency of the 'no change' category with two peaks. A first group of actors was undecided at pressures between 10 and 15 per cent and a second between 35 and 55 per cent. Since there are two groups, the inductive proposition that actors experience a phase of reorientation at intermediate degrees of pressure which had been suggested in the first case study is only weakly supported.

The frequency distribution of actors who changed their preferences regarding the TASM project in Graph 4.4 confirms more clearly the first hypothesis of multilevel network theory. The number of preference changes increases significantly at higher degrees of pressure. Moreover, while the curve in the 'no change' category peaks at a range between 30-35 per cent, the highest frequency of preference change occurs between 30 and 40 per cent. The curve illustrates clearly that actors start changing their preferences if they become subject to pressure from other actors in the network. Thus, there are very few preference changes


Graph 4.2 'No Change'



Graph 4.3 'Unclear or Undecided'



Graph 4.4 'Change'



among actors who are subject to pressure from less than 30 per cent of their network linkages. Unlike in the first case study, there are fewer changes of preferences at high pressure rates beyond the 50 per cent threshold, the only exception being the House of Commons at 72 per cent. The deviation of Parliament, however, appears to reaffirm the evidence from the first case study which suggested that the members of collective decision-making units are in certain circumstances able to withstand higher pressures than other role actors.

Table 4.5 Descriptive Statistics

Preference Changes	Number of Instances	Range of Pressure	Minimum Pressure	Maximum Pressure	Average Pressure
No Change (NC)	81	48%	0%	48%	22%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	12	37%	14%	52%	25%
Change (C)	22	59%	13%	72%	36%
Blocked (B)	8	12%	46%	59%	50%

As Table 4.5 shows, the first hypothesis which causally links higher degrees of pressure to the probability of a preference change is again clearly supported by the difference among the average pressure in each of the four behavioural categories ‘no change’, ‘unclear or undecided’, ‘change’ and ‘blocked’. The average pressure which actors were able to resist was, at 22 per cent, significantly lower than the average pressure at which actors withdrew their support for the TASM programme at 36 per cent. Unlike in the first case, the mean of pressure at which network actors were divided over their preference or unclear was at 25 per cent also below the mean of pressure at which they succumbed to external influence. The averages, therefore, appear to confirm the inductive proposition drawn that actors pass through a phase of reorientation expressed by unclear preferences before they adopt a new policy preference. The range of pressure for each behavioural response was relatively broad, indicating the freedom of manoeuvre which actors have in spite of the probabilistic tendency associated with specific degrees of pressure.

The final indicator, the correlation between the degree of pressure exerted on network actors and the timing of their preference changes, is supported even more strongly than in the first case study. Out of fifteen actors who changed their preference

during the decision-making process, thirteen modified their position immediately after the pressure on them had increased.¹⁵⁶ The remaining two actors abandoned their support for the TASM project in the second phase after the pressure on them had been raised. None of the actors were able to withstand an increase in the degree of external pressure for more than two consecutive periods.

Table 4.6 Timing of Preference Changes

1 st phase after an increase in pressure	2 nd phase after an increase of pressure
US -Con (0->13%)	US-Pentagon (0% -> 37%)
US-DS (38% -> 42%)	US-Secretary of State (27% -> 30%)
US-Sd (31% -> 35%)	
US-Pre (28% -> 31%)	
Nato-CM (41% -> 47%)	
Nato-Org (52% -> 55%)	
Mod (38% -> 43%)	
DS (34% -> 38%)	
FS (33% -> 36%)	
Cab (14% -> 21%)	
Com (13% -> 19%)	
Par (59% -> 72%)	
con (25% -> 50%)	

Turning to the second hypothesis, it has to be pointed out that a blocking strategy was open to only a very limited number of actors in the British multilevel foreign policy network regarding the decision over the TASM programme. Since the issue concerned nuclear defence policy, most international organisations did not have any authority over the decisions of the key actors - Britain, France, or the US. The only exception was the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO. However, its decision-making capacity applied merely to the nuclear defence doctrine of the Atlantic Alliance as a collective organisation to which the member states designated specific weapon systems. Whether and how the three Western nuclear powers decided to maintain their nuclear defence capabilities was under


¹⁵⁶ See Table 4.6 *Timing of Preference Changes*.

the exclusive authority of their governments. It is, therefore, questionable if the British government used its veto in the NPG. It could have been possible since formally all Alliance members hold a veto in the collective decision-making process. However, the fact that a veto was not necessary to maintain Britain's freedom of action on the issue and the observation that NATO changed its defence requirement immediately after the US had withdrawn its support for the development of the SRAM-T, speak against such speculation. If Britain had exercised a blocking strategy, it should at least have delayed the NATO decision. In fact, there was no evidence of a 'veto' in the primary sources.

Indeed, with respect to the intra-governmental decision-making process in Britain, even the final control of Parliament over the outcome was restricted. The approval of the House of Commons to nuclear policy could only be given to the Defence White Paper as a whole, not to single projects. Since a rejection of the White Paper would be synonymous with a vote of no-confidence, the stakes against such action were prohibitively high. Nevertheless, in the decision regarding the future of the TASM programme, the Cabinet went through great pains to receive the backing of Parliament. For nearly three years, from summer 1990 to summer 1993, the support of the Conservative parliamentary party was crucial in order to fend off the collective

pressure of the opposition parties for the cancellation of the TASM. During this period, the Conservative majority in the House of Commons successfully vetoed a rejection of the TASM programme. However, even after key cabinet members had changed their preference with regard to the missile, the blocking majority remained in place; much to the detriment of the government which now increased the pressure on the reluctant MPs. At the maximum, the British Parliament was able to withstand a pressure of 72 per cent of the actors to whom it had direct links. Due to its nature as a collective decision-making unit, however, the crucial degree of pressure was that on the Conservative MPs who represented the majority in the Commons. Incidentally, the pressure on the Conservative MPs amounted to only 50 per cent and thus explains the

Graph 4.5 'Blocked'



ability of the Parliament as a whole to resist the great amount of pressure placed on it. Since the strategy of the Conservative parliamentary party was the only instance of blocking behaviour, the average degree of pressure which Parliament was able to withstand is less insightful than in the first case study. However, at 50 per cent it is generally comparable.¹⁵⁷

New Insights into the British TASM Cancellation

From the findings of multilevel network theory presented above, three new insights can be gained into the decision of the British government to abolish its TASM project. In particular, multilevel network theory helps to explain the resistance of the British government to a cancellation of its TASM programme until autumn 1993. It suggests that the British redefinition of its nuclear requirements following the changes in the international arena with the end of the Cold War was, if not brought about, at least significantly influenced by Britain's NATO allies who pressed for the abolition of most nuclear weapons in Europe in the aftermath of 1990. The argument is supported by the finding that the British administration invested 1.6m dollars into the development of the missile as late as September 1992 which illustrates that, in the views of British military planners and politicians, the end of the Cold War did not immediately reduce the requirement for the missile. Moreover, the case study raises questions regarding the suggestion that cuts in the defence budget were the primary reason for the government's policy reversal. Thus, the above analysis points out that MoD officials considered the option of cancelling their order for a fourth Trident which would have led to even greater savings, but this was nevertheless rejected.

The alternative explanations offered by multilevel network theory to both puzzles rest on its examination of the decision-making process. Specifically, multilevel network theory links the prolonged deferral of a decision regarding the future of the TASM to the lack of direct influence over the government among the actors who advocated an abolition of the missile. In particular, the Cabinet and Parliament which held the ultimate decision-making authority in this case had no direct relations with other national administrations and were thus insulated from the international opposition to the TASM which had

¹⁵⁷ See Table 4.5 *Descriptive Statistics*.

emerged within NATO. As a consequence, the pressure for the abolition of the weapon had to build up gradually through indirect linkages. According to multilevel network theory, the preference change among officials in the British MoD who held a boundary role in the network, i.e. they were linked transnationally to their NATO colleagues and nationally to British politicians, was critical for this build-up. By forming a transgovernmental coalition in favour of the cancellation of the TASM, the British military helped to extend the international pressure among domestic actors in Britain. It thereby fostered the formation of a winning coalition between cabinet ministers and the members of the Commons Defence Committee which eventually overcame the objections of Conservative MPs to the cancellation of the missile in the House of Commons.

Interestingly, as in the first case, multilevel network theory shows that the British government changed its policy only after a majority of national as well as international actors had come to favour the abolition of its TASM programme. The notion that Western European governments are increasingly controlled by international or transnational relations is thus modified from a multilevel network perspective. Although the case study illustrates that international pressures played a considerable role in bringing about the policy change of the British government, it also shows that the government resisted these pressures until it had gained the support of a range of domestic actors, in particular of the Conservative MPs, the House of Commons and the members of the Defence Committee, for the cancellation of the missile project.

Multilevel network theory offers a similar explanation for the decision of MoD officials to prefer a fourth Trident over the TASM. Thus, the case study suggests that the international opposition to the stationing of the missile and the following decision of the North Atlantic Council to cancel its TASM requirement removed the rationale for the missile for British forward defence. The Trident, on the contrary, did not directly affect Britain's NATO partners and did not incur any international opposition. In the absence of international pressure, the decision in favour of a fourth Trident was therefore much easier to defend in the British foreign policy decision-making network.

Finally, multilevel network theory provides further insights into the nature of the decision-making process in terms of the scope of the pressure and the coalitions which emerged in opposition to the TASM programme. As has been noted in the above study, a range of actors across all levels of analysis exerted pressure for the abolition of the

British TASM. In the initial stages of the decision-making process ministers and officials from most NATO member states exerted transgovernmental pressure on their British counterparts to cancel the programme. Through an international coalition within NATO these actors soon gained the support of the North Atlantic Council which abolished its TASM requirement by December 1991 and contributed to the international pressure on the British government. Moreover, a multilevel analysis of the case shows that the transgovernmental coalition among officials from these countries was eventually joined by the MoD military. As a consequence, Cabinet ministers and MPs not only came under international, but also national pressure.

While the case appears to illustrate the importance of the boundary and bridging roles of ministers and civil servants between national and international actors in that they can seek to influence and draw on the support from both arenas. It also shows that the concept of the government as a gatekeeper is not quite met by the empirical findings. In this case study it was specifically challenged in two ways. First, transnational pressure, such as that from US Congress members on British parliamentarians, was able to circumvent the administration. Second, the administration itself was divided and, as a consequence, could not successfully act as gatekeeper. In particular, the control of government ministers over policies was undermined by the ability and willingness of civil servants to forge a transgovernmental coalition with their colleagues in other NATO countries and the pressure which this coalition exerted on the politicians.

5. Case III: The Despatch of Tornados to Bosnia

5.1 Introduction

The question whether German soldiers could be deployed in out-of-area missions¹ under the authority of the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) had been controversially discussed since German unification and the achievement of full sovereignty in March 1991. The debate came to a climax over the question whether Germany could and should send ECR²-Tornado aircraft to Bosnia to safeguard the regrouping or withdrawal of UN peacekeeping troops in 1995. It was argued that with a decision in favour, German involvement in international affairs would reach a new level. Previous German contributions to international crisis managements like in Cambodia, Somalia or in the form of personnel on board of NATO's airborne warning and control system (AWACS) surveillance planes had been undoubtedly humanitarian or defensive. The Tornados, on the contrary, had the task to detect and destroy Serbian anti-aircraft radar and missiles.

The debate entered a new stage when the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in June 1994 that the German Basic Law permitted military action under the aegis of the UN or NATO. Moreover, the Constitutional Court concluded that action as part of Germany's membership within international organisations could be approved by a simple majority in the Bundestag. Although the ruling solved the legal question, the political decision to use the newly acquired freedom of action was only taken during the course of 1994-95. A heated debate across all parties and sections of the German public preceded it. In addition, the government came under intense pressure from its allies across the Atlantic and in Europe as the situation in Bosnia worsened and the administrations in France and Britain considered pulling their troops out of the region. On 30 June 1995, the German Bundestag eventually approved the despatch of Tornados to Bosnia. The German government and its parliamentary majority, thereby, rejected the principle of non-military

¹ The German Basic Law stipulated that the German Bundeswehr was only to be used for national self-defence or due to Germany's obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty for the defence of NATO territory. Action beyond the territory of the NATO member states was defined as 'out of area' and not permitted by the constitution.

² Electronic Combat and Reconnaissance.

intervention which had been fundamental to German foreign policy since the Second World War. It opened the road to a new, stronger international role of the united Germany.

The case study examines the decision to despatch Tornados to Bosnia as the final episode of the German government's progressive abandonment of the principle of military restraint following international and domestic pressure. By applying multilevel network theory to the different, but overlapping multilevel foreign policy decision-making network which surrounds the German government and the Bundestag, this and the following chapter seeks to establish the applicability of the multilevel network theory to distinct networks in Western Europe. However, while the British and the German networks differ with regard to their ultimate decision units and their domestic actors, they share their membership in international organisations such as NATO, the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Moreover, Britain and Germany both maintain strong bilateral linkages with most administrations in Western Europe and North America. The most significant difference between the international network relations of the two governments is the fact that the British government, unlike the German, has a seat on the UN Security Council.

In spite of these distinctions, multilevel network theory hypothesises that the decision-making processes in these networks are determined by the same basic axioms. Specifically, the first hypothesis suggests in this case that the degree of pressure to which the actors within the German multilevel foreign policy network were exposed at any time in the decision-making process explains their increasing support for the despatch of Tornados to Bosnia between spring 1994 and summer 1995. Moreover, the hypothesis proposes that the policy change of the ultimate decision unit, namely the German Bundestag which had to approve the despatch of the Tornados according to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, was preceded by a sequence of preference changes which increased the direct pressure on key domestic actors. The second hypothesis states that collective decision units, such as international organisations and parliaments, can withstand higher degrees of network pressure if their members have a formal or informal veto. It will illustrate why the German Bundestag was able to block the despatch of Tornados in spite of considerable domestic and international pressure until June 1995.

Although the case generally meets the criteria for its selection, it should be noted

that its environmental factors were not as ideal for the testing of the theory as the two British cases. As the first case study of the British decision to support air strikes in Bosnia has illustrated, the terms of the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia changed considerably due to conflicting policy preferences in the United States (US) and Western Europe. The sending of Tornados was closely linked to this context. However, while the broader debate over the intervention in the former Yugoslavia is not re-examined here, the case study illustrates the changes in the policy preferences of Germany's allies which directly related to the issue of the Tornados. In particular, the increased assertiveness of the French and American administrations in the second half of 1994 and in May 1995, which led to the deployment of additional forces in Bosnia, will be attributed to the election of a Republican majority to Congress and the coming to power of Jacques Chirac in France. The role of the French presidential election in changing the policy preferences of the government is confirmed by the fact that, although events that were exogenous to the network, such as the taking of hostages in May 1995, might have contributed to the French demands for an increase in the firepower for UNPROFOR, a similar 'hostage crisis' in November 1994 had not triggered such calls.

In addition to the testing of multilevel network theory, the case study seeks to add to our understanding of the Bundestag's approval of the despatch of Tornados to Bosnia by examining factors that have been neglected in the public and even academic debate on the decision. It raises the question what role international and domestic pressures played in the decision of the Cabinet and, eventually, the German Bundestag to despatch the Tornados. Thus, it moves beyond the level of the moral and practical arguments which characterised the German debate over the decision to the underlying dependency relations which influence foreign policy decision-making. Several observations show that the 'objective' arguments in favour of the despatch which were put forward by the German government do not sufficiently explain its decision. In particular, the claim that Germany's ECR-Tornados were crucial for the defence of UNPROFOR and could not be provided by other NATO members, is questionable on three grounds. First, Germany was not the only European country in possession of this type of fighter plane. The Italian government had also ordered ECR-Tornados which, according to defence journals, should have been

operational by 1995.³ Although it could be argued that Italy as a neighbouring country might have been ruled out from military operations over Bosnia, Italian planes were involved in the safeguarding of the Adriatic.⁴ Second, American EF-111 planes could have served as an alternative to the ECR-Tornados. The EF-111's capabilities were more limited and had to be complemented with additional fighter planes, but they were successfully employed in the destruction of Serb positions in November 1994.⁵ Third, serious doubts about whether the German ECR-Tornados were fully operational emerged before their despatch.⁶ While at the time, information about problems with the Tornados was suppressed, their extent was revealed in a television report of the German news programme *Panorama* on 27 June 1997 which investigated the accident of an ECR-Tornado. The programme quoted an internal report from the Defence Ministry which confirmed that serious technical faults with the aircraft had been known when the planes were offered to NATO in 1995.

Like the two British case studies, the analysis of the German decision regarding the despatch of ECR-Tornados is structured into a chronological-analytical part and a concluding evaluation of multilevel network theory. The chronological analysis begins with a brief description of the circumstances which led to the international request for German military action in Bosnia and, thus, 'out of area'. It continues by examining the interactions and preference changes within the network which eventually led the Bundestag to approve the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia in June 1995, in four chronological stages. Specifically, the analysis seeks to establish how network relations accounted for the ability

³ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zurückhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94; Antonio Ciampi, 'First Tornado IT ECR takes off', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:6, 8/8/92, p.11; Antonio Ciampi, 'First ECR Tornado moves SEAD ahead', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:15, 11/4/92, p.601; Charles Bickers, 'Europe's "Wild Weasels"', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:15, 11/4/92, pp.615f.; Charles Bickers, 'Luftwaffe Tornados receive full ECR fit', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:9, 27/2/93, p.5.

⁴ 'Serbische Streitkräfte suchen zunehmend die Konfrontation mit Einheiten der UN', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/5/94.

⁵ 'Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten für die Sicherung der Blauhelme an', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94; 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94, p.23

⁶ In December 1994, Jürgen Koppelin (FDP) questioned the government's assurances that the ECR-Tornados were fully operational. See fy., 'Koppelin: Tornados nur bedingt einsatzbereit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 27/12/94. The doubts reemerged in summer 1995 after the decision to despatch the Tornados had been taken. This time, the pilots themselves expressed their reservations over the state of the weapons system on board of the Tornados. See Wolfgang Stock, 'Sorgen hinter der Fassade', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/7/95.

of the actors to exert pressure for or against the despatch.

During the first stage of the debate from January to June 1994, the unresolved constitutional question allowed the opposition parties to veto a despatch of German military to Bosnia in the Bundestag. Although the governments of the US, Britain and France had expressed their interest in a German contribution, they recognised the inability of the Kohl administration to conform under these circumstances. On 12 June 1994, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court removed the opposition's ability to veto the despatch by stipulating that a simple majority was sufficient to approve a Bundeswehr out-of-area mission under the auspices of an international organisation. During the following stage, between June and December, a transnational coalition between the German military and their colleagues from NATO member states supported by members of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) parliamentary party initiated a formal NATO request for German ECR-Tornados in order to force the German government into action. Within two weeks of the request, the Cabinet which had initially been opposed to the mission reversed its policy. Nevertheless, since the ultimate decision-making authority in this case lay with the Bundestag, the debate continued during the third stage. In the final part of the debate between December 1994 to June 1995, the German administration attempted to increase the support for the despatch among the parliamentarians of all parties. Given the unique historical nature of the issue and the narrow majority of the governing coalition in the Bundestag, the government did not want to risk a negative vote.

Summarizing these findings, the conclusion of the chapter assess the explanatory value of multilevel network theory in this case. In order to do so, it abstracts the relations between different degrees of pressure and the four behavioural categories identified in the methodological section of the second chapter. Moreover, it seeks to improve the hypotheses and identify additional explanatory variables where systematic correlations can be observed. A comparison with the British cases is not attempted, but will be reserved for the final chapter of this thesis which integrates the findings from all four case studies.

5.2 The Erosion of German Objections to a Tornado Despatch

The question whether out-of-area operations of the Bundeswehr were constitutionally permissible already arose with the reunification of Germany in October 1990. However,

since the Basic Law was not replaced by a new constitution, article 87a, sec. 22, which prohibited out-of-area missions of German soldiers, remained intact. At least the restrictive interpretation of the article which had been shared by politicians and legal experts for more than 40 years was not immediately challenged.⁷ The question which role the Bundeswehr should adopt after the end of the Cold War, however, led to the progressive erosion of this constitutional consensus. Specifically, the Gulf War in 1991 increased the willingness of Conservative politicians and the military in Germany to participate in multilateral international operations. They perceived the inability to give more than financial support and the consequent derision of German foreign policy as ‘chequebook diplomacy’ as a national embarrassment.⁸ In the subsequent domestic debate, leading members of the CDU/CSU, Defence Minister Volker Rühle and Inspector General Klaus Naumann emerged as proponents of Bundeswehr operations out of area.⁹ Although Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the members of the junior coalition partner in the government, the liberal Free-Democratic Party (FDP), were highly critical of sending German soldiers abroad, the support for German participation at least in peacekeeping operations increased progressively from German reunification in 1990 to the summer of 1995.¹⁰

⁷ ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, *Spiegel* 30, 27/7/92, p.27; Sabine Berghahn, ‘Bundeswehreinsätze “out of area”’, *Gegenwartskunde* 43:4, 1994, pp.467-477, p.467. The position had been acknowledged by the two recent governments. See Joachim F. Weber, ‘Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr auch “out of area”? Im Kern ein Streit um Deutschlands neue Verantwortung’, *Parlament*, 11/11/94; Dr. Hermann Otto Solms (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21179; Harald Müller, ‘Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate’, in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 125-141, p.129. See also ‘Kohl urges change in constitution’, *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:12, 23/3/91, p.424; ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, *Spiegel* 30, 27/7/92, p.27; “‘Bis an die Schmerzgrenze””, *Spiegel* 15, 12/4/93, p.24; David Gow, ‘Court frees Bonn for military role’, *Guardian*, 13/7/94.

⁸ ‘Leading Article: Germany’s new role’, *Daily Telegraph*, 13/7/94; David Gow, ‘Court frees Bonn for military role’, *Guardian*, 13/7/94; Fredrick Studemann, ‘Court removes the Bundeswehr’s shackles’, *European*, 15/7/94; Andrew Gimson and Sally Malcolm-Smith, ‘Germany’s war machine is back’, *Sunday Telegraph*, 17/7/94. See also Michael J. Inaker, *Unter Ausschluss der Öffentlichkeit? Die Deutschen in der Golfallianz* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).

⁹ ‘Out-of-area debate urged’, *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:23, 7/12/91, p.1082; ‘Nahe dran am echten Krieg’, *Spiegel* 30, 27/7/92, p.27; Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann, ‘Standortbestimmung’, in Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, ‘Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den Herausforderungen, 34. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5. bis 7. Oktober 1993’, *Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Oktober 1993, pp. 21-42, p.36; Müller, ‘Military Intervention for European Security’, p.137. See also the interview with Defence Minister Volker Rühle in “‘Das ist keine Drohgebärde””, *Spiegel* 30, 27/7/92, p.34.

¹⁰ Andrea Lederer (PDS), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21196. See also ‘Antreten zum Krieg’, *Spiegel* 31, 3/8/92, p.29; Müller, ‘Military Intervention for European

The request for the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia emerged from the conflict in the former Yugoslavia which raised international pressure for German contributions to the international peacekeeping mission. However, while members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party were prepared to exclude peacekeeping operations from the legal restrictions of the Basic Law, their FDP coalition partners insisted on an amendment of the constitution. The required two-thirds majority for a constitutional amendment, however, was not attainable in the Bundestag without support from the opposition parties. Several attempts to forge a compromise between the coalition parties and the main opposition party, the German Social-Democratic Party (SPD), over the terms of an amendment in favour of out-of-area missions failed.¹¹ Nevertheless, the government responded positively to WEU and NATO requests for contributions to the monitoring of the Adriatic and the airspace over Bosnia. The decisions almost caused the breakup of the coalition government.¹² Together with the SPD, the FDP parliamentary party sued the government, including its own cabinet ministers, in the Federal Constitutional Court over a breach of the German Basic Law.¹³

In spring 1994 the ruling of the Constitutional Court was still pending. However, a step-up of international military pressure on Bosnia increased international demands for a German participation in the multinational operation. Between 1991 and 1993 the out-of-area question had almost exclusively been discussed in the abstract or with reference to

Security', p. 128.

¹¹ 'Mogelei mit Blauhelmen', *Spiegel* 27, 6/7/92, p.52; 'Toter Vogel', *Spiegel* 29, 20/7/92, p.23; 'UN no-fly-order puts NATO into war zone', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:15, 10/4/93, p.5; Müller, 'Military Intervention for European Security', pp.13 ff.; O. Diehl 'UN-Einsätze der Bundeswehr. Außenpolitische Handlungszwänge und innenpolitischer Konsensbedarf', *Europa Archiv* 48:8, 1993, pp.219-227; Gerd Roellecke, 'Bewaffnete Auslandseinsätze - Krieg, Aussenpolitik oder Innenpolitik?', *Der Staat* 34, 1995, pp.415-428, p.415.

¹² Paul Beaver, 'The UN secures a foothold towards peace in Sarajevo', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:2, 11/7/92, p.18; 'Angetreten zum Krieg', *Spiegel* 31, 10/8/92, p.29; 'UK AWACS fly with NATO crews', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:20, 14/11/92, p.7.

¹³ 'Ein pathologischer Fall', *Spiegel* 13, 29/3/93, pp.23f.; 'Kohl und Kinkel vor Gericht', *Spiegel* 14, 5/4/93, pp.18-22; Steve Crawshaw, 'Germany to let its soldiers serve abroad', *Independent*, 13/7/94; David Gow, 'Court frees Bonn for military role', *Guardian*, 13/7/94; Joachim F. Weber, 'Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr auch "out of area"?' Im Kern ein Streit um Deutschlands neue Verantwortung', *Parlament*, 11/11/94. See also Marie-Janine Calic, 'German Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 52-75, p.65; Dietmut Majer, 'Bundeswehr und Auslandseinsätze - Diskussion ohne Ende?', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 36, 1995, pp.523-530, p.524; Müller, 'Military Intervention for European Security', pp.128f.

German contributions to peacekeeping operations.¹⁴ Now, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, an offensive mission was considered for the Bundeswehr.¹⁵

International Pressure for German Participation in Bosnia

Between 1 January and 12 June 1994 the decision-making process was defined by the ability of the German opposition parties to veto military action out of area in the Bundestag due to the unresolved constitutional issue. The question of German participation in offensive military action in the former Yugoslavia was first raised in spring 1994 by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the US General George Joulwan, who inquired of all NATO members how many planes they could contribute to the defence of the no-fly zone over Bosnia. However, when officials from the German Defence Ministry used their close links with NATO to ask Joulwan informally to refrain from seeking German military support because of the impending decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the out-of-area question, Joulwan obliged. Moreover, the NATO General held back the request for a second time when Bundeswehr generals asked for another suspension of the request until after the general election which was coming up in summer

**Table 5.1
Preference Changes:
1 January -12 June 1994**

1st Phase (-12/6/94)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
BT	57	B
Nato-CM	27	NC
COF	25	NC
Fm	24	NC
Com	20	U
Coa	20	NC
spd	20	NC
BR	18	U
Cha	17	NC
fdp	16	U
Med	16	NC
CM	15	NC
Cab	15	NC
FM	13	NC
90/G	12	NC
pds	12	NC
vote	12	NC
Uns	11	NC
BVG	0	C

¹⁴ FDP party leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff had threatened that his party would leave the governmental coalition if German soldiers on board AWACS surveillance planes would become involved in directing operational missions in the former Yugoslavia. See Waldemar Schreckenberger, 'Eine chaotische Sicherheitspolitik', *Spiegel* 7, 15/2/93, p.40; 'Mut zum Absurden', *Spiegel* 13, 29/3/93, p.19.

¹⁵ Diehl, 'UN-Einsätze der Bundeswehr', p.219. See also Karl Lamers (CDU/CSU), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p.18919.

1994.¹⁶

Although a transnational coalition in favour of a German contribution to the offensive capabilities of NATO in the former Yugoslavia extended from NATO's integrated staff over their colleagues in the German Bundeswehr to Defence Minister Volker R  he and members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary parties, their hesitation can be explained by their lack of power over the key decision-makers in the German foreign policy network.¹⁷ Since the degree of collective pressure which the transnational coalition could exert directly through their relations ranged between 25 per cent on the Chancellor's Office staff¹⁸ and 15 per cent on the Cabinet¹⁹, the probability that the transnational pressure could overcome their continuing inhibitions about an offensive mission of the Bundeswehr was rather low. In fact, it was not in the government, but in the Bundestag where the pressure for military action was highest at 57 per cent due to the large number of CDU/CSU parliamentarians.²⁰ However, the two-thirds majority required for an amendment of the constitution in favour of Bundeswehr missions out of area provided the members of the opposition parties with a veto position and, thus, the ability to block a decision. As long as the constitutional provisions remained in place, the members of the emerging coalition in favour of out-of-area missions had little prospect of bringing about a policy change.

In order to gain the necessary two-thirds majority, the proponents of a Bundeswehr operation in Bosnia would have had to change the preferences of the opposition members who strongly objected to such a mission. Practically, however, the

¹⁶ Karl Feldmeyer, "Es gibt keine Garantie, aber es gibt auch keine Alternative", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95.

¹⁷ "Einsatz ins Ungewisse", *Spiegel* 5, 30/1/95, p.75.

¹⁸ With the officials from the Defence Ministry and members of the CDU/CSU only two out of eight actors to whom the staff of the Chancellor's Office were linked in the network favoured out-of-area action accounting for. $P_1 [\text{COF}] = 2/8 = 25\%$.

¹⁹ The Cabinet was linked to three out of 22 actors who supported out-of-area missions, namely Defence Minister Volker R  he, his staff and CDU/CSU parliamentarians, amounting to $P_1 [\text{Cab}] = 3/20 = 15\%$.

²⁰ The pressure in the Bundestag can be calculated in terms of its members and linkages. The composition of the Bundestag at the time included 319 members of the CDU/CSU, 79 FDP members, 239 SPD members, 8 Green members and 17 PDS members, i.e. altogether 662. Each of them had 24 linkages with other actors in the network raising, i.e. $L=24 \times 662 = 15888$. Since the members of the CDU/CSU supported out-of-area missions, i.e. $24 \times 319 = 7656$ and four out of the 24 actors to whom all other parliament members were linked urged them to support out-of-area missions, too, i.e. $4 \times 343 = 1372$, E amounted to $E=7656+1372=9028$ with $P_1 [\text{BT}] = E/L = 9028/15888 = 57\%$.

advocates of out-of-area action lacked the relations with the opposition which would allow them to exert sufficient pressure. The parliamentary opposition was insulated from the international pressures which affected the German government because the members of the Bundestag lacked linkages with the American and Western European governments who advocated German engagement in Bosnia. Moreover, the members of the CDU/CSU who were the strongest supporters of Bundeswehr missions out-of-area among the domestic actors in Germany had no direct influence on the opposition. Only the Defence Minister and his staff could seek to influence the members of the opposition parties who they relied on their expert advice and information on the issue. However, since the collective pressure from the Ministry of Defence staff and Defence Minister R  he accounted for only 12 per cent of the network linkages of parliamentarians from the Green Party and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)²¹, the pressure on the members of the two parliamentary parties in favour of military action was rather low. The members of the SPD opposition were slightly more exposed to actors who advocated military action through their involvement in the Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees. Indeed, the progress of the debate below shows that under pressure from 20 per cent of their contacts in the network, SPD members proved more likely to change their view on the issue.²² Nevertheless, the members of the transnational coalition among the defence staff, its NATO colleagues and the CDU/CSU parliamentarians acted rationally when they recognised the limits of their influence on the opposition parties and waited for the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court.

In the meantime, Inspector General Klaus Naumann began to prepare the Bundeswehr for a global role. Although unnecessary within the integrated military structure of NATO, the Inspector General set up a preliminary independent Generalstab²³ in the Defence Ministry. In addition, the Bundeswehr conducted extensive planning for the

²¹ The members of the PDS and the Green parliamentary party were linked two out of 17 actors, namely the Defence Ministry staff and Defence Minister R  he, who argued in favour of out-of-area missions, accounting for $P_1[\text{pds; gr}] = 2/17 = 12\%$.

²² Specifically, SPD members were linked to the Ministry of Defence staff, Defence Minister R  he, representatives of the German industry which had taken a public stance on the issue and US Congress members who had travelled to Europe to discuss Germany's new role in the international system, raising the pressure to $P_1[\text{spd}] = 4/20 = 20\%$.

²³ Chiefs of Staff.

deployment of troops in the former Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that the despatch of ground troops had been ruled out by the Cabinet.²⁴ Naumann received tacit backing from Defence Minister R  he, who did little to stop him. In spite of rumours that Naumann and R  he were not on best personal terms, they were pursuing the same goal in this case.²⁵ The close institutional relations between the two roles and their boundary positions between national and international members of the German multilevel foreign policy network, explain how the minister and the Bundeswehr were not only able to form a coalition within the German administration, but also to mobilise and profit from the transnational support of their NATO colleagues.²⁶ As mentioned above, the administrations of the US, Britain and France favoured a stronger German contribution to the operation in the former Yugoslavia beyond its participation in the AWACS surveillance planes and the monitoring of the Adriatic. However, asked by Naumann not to interfere during the ongoing constitutional review, these administrations kept a low profile with regard to the German debate over the out-of-area issue until the summer of 1994.

During this time, the developments in the international arena and changes in the Bosnia strategy of its allies had indirect repercussions on Germany. Specifically, the increase in military action by NATO led to the first involvement of German soldiers in a fighting operation out of area on 28 February 1994. With the support of an AWACS aircraft which included a German crew member American NATO fighters shot down four planes in violation of the air exclusion zone in East Bosnia.²⁷ The German government backed the response, but members of the FDP parliamentary party expressed their concern over the participation of a German soldier in military action.²⁸ The first active contribution of a German soldier to offensive action revived the debate over the constitutional and

²⁴ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst&Company, 1997), p.174.

²⁵ 'Nahe dran am echten Krieg', *Spiegel* 30, 3/8/92, p.26; Bundesministers der Verteidigung Volker R  he, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Aufgaben - Bilanz und Perspektiven', in Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat   ffentlichkeitsarbeit, 'Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den Herausforderungen, 34. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5.-7. Oktober', *Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Oktober 1993, pp.11-20, p.14.

²⁶ Naumann's selection as chairman of NATO's Military Council in December 1994 strengthened his transnational linkages through even more regular contacts.

²⁷ K.F., 'Der erste Milit  reinsatz der Nato - verborgen in einer knappen Mitteilung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/3/94; Steve Doughty, 'West united on Serb jet attack', *Daily Mail*, 1/3/94.

²⁸ Steve Doughty, 'West united on Serb jet attack', *Daily Mail*, 1/3/94.

moral limits of German military action out of area. Two days after the incident, the PDS parliamentary group requested an emergency debate about the policy of the federal government.²⁹ During the Bundestag debate, all sides reiterated their position on the out-of-area question.

The unity of the coalition government, however, showed first strains due to contradictory pressures from members of the FDP and the CDU/CSU. Although Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) agreed with his party over the need to achieve constitutional clarity, Kinkel expressed the conviction that Germany should not stand aside if the international community required means for action.³⁰ Defence Minister Volker R  he (CDU) contended that German engagement under the authority of the UN should not be rejected, but qualified that in the 'special' case of the former Yugoslavia German soldiers should not become involved in military action. Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a similar view. The Chancellor stated that even after a constitutional amendment, German history in the Balkans raised doubts about whether the Bundeswehr would be the right partner in offensive action.³¹ With regards to a military operation of German troops in the former Yugoslavia the Chancellor was 'very reluctant'.³² Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel acted rationally when they resisted the pressure from Defence Minister R  he, the Defence Ministry staff and members of the CDU/CSU. They had to take into account that the majority of domestic actors to whom they had direct contacts in the network still objected to a military operation of the Bundeswehr unless for the purpose of self-defence. In particular, among the FDP coalition partner doubts over military action were widespread. As a consequence, the collective pressure on Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel remained comparatively low at 17 per cent³³ and 13 per cent³⁴

²⁹ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 213. Sitzung, 3 March 1994, pp. 18423-18438.

³⁰ Klaus Kinkel (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 213. Sitzung, 3 March 1994, p. 18429.

³¹ Volker R  he (CDU), *ibid.*, p. 18424.

³² Interview with Helmut Kohl in the *S  ddeutsche Zeitung* cited in 'Die Bundeswehr nach Bosnien?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 16/4/94.

³³ Chancellor Kohl was linked to seven out of 42 actors who supported military action, including Ministry of Defence staff, Defence Minister R  he, CDU/CSU parliament members and the leaders of the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands raising the pressure to P_1 [Cha] = $7/42 = 17\%$.

³⁴ Foreign Minister Kinkel was under less pressure than the Chancellor, since he was linked only to Defence Minister R  he and his counterparts in the US, Britain, France and the Netherlands, with P_1 [FM] = $5/38 = 13\%$.

respectively.

Failing to achieve a policy shift in the Bundestag or the Cabinet during the early months of 1994, CDU/CSU parliamentarians sought to use their contacts with journalists and the electorate to influence the public debate and, thereby, to increase the pressure on the Chancellor and cabinet ministers indirectly.³⁵ In particular, the leader of the CDU/CSU faction, Wolfgang Schäuble, argued in favour of a German participation in the military operation in Bosnia.³⁶ The electorate and journalists were suitable targets since CDU/CSU parliamentarians had, so far unsuccessfully, used all other relations in the network through which they could influence the decision-making process. As long as the constitutional situation was unresolved, the Bundestag was blocked by the veto of the opposition parties. Moreover, due to the coalition structure of the German government, CDU/CSU parliamentarians had no direct influence over FDP cabinet ministers like Foreign Minister Kinkel.

In order to change the position of the government on the out-of-area issue, the support of FDP parliamentarians and ministers was essential. Fortunately, for the advocates of military action, the FDP parliamentary party was increasingly divided over the issue, despite low external pressure at 16 per cent.³⁷ Only a small number of FDP parliamentarians continued to adhere to the original reasons for appealing to the Federal Constitutional Court over the participation of German soldiers in military action out of area, i.e. the limitation of the constitutional role of the Bundeswehr to national defence.³⁸ Conversely, most members had by now embraced the notion that the party's appeal served to clarify the constitutional situation. In principle, the majority of FDP parliamentarians supported military action of German soldiers under the authority of multilateral institutions. However, doubts remained whether Bosnia was a suitable location for a first

³⁵ Compare an article by Helmut Kohl's speech writer, Dr Christoph Hoppe and his brother Joachim Hoppe, Captain in the German Bundeswehr, 'A role for German might and diplomacy in a better Europe', *European*, 18/2/94.

³⁶ Christian Schmidt (CDU/CSU), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 18915. Compare Cohen in the *International Herald Tribune* of 30 March 1993, cited in Joachim F. Weber, 'Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr auch "out of area"? Im Kern ein Streit um Deutschlands neue Verantwortung', *Parlament*, 11/11/94.

³⁷ $P_1 [\text{fdp}] = 3/19 = 16\%$.

³⁸ Dr. Burkhard Hirsch (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p. 18917.

offensive mission.³⁹

Support for German participation in the former Yugoslavia also began to mount in the SPD opposition party whose members were under pressure from the Defence Minister, his staff, US politicians and industry representatives which accounted for 20 per cent of their linkages.⁴⁰ Dependent on the Defence Ministry for information about the international operation in Bosnia, SPD parliamentarians were easily impressed by the alleged success of military action in forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiation table.⁴¹ However, the leadership of the SPD was divided. While some senior figures supported a German contribution, the deputy party leader Heidemarie Wieczoreck-Zeul insisted that German soldiers had no place in the Balkans.⁴²

In April 1994, the demand for military action in Bosnia increased after heavy Serb bombardment of Gorazde. The call for a contribution to the international operation in Bosnia came directly from the command of UNPROFOR which formally asked NATO for air support. Military strikes by American planes followed on 10 and 11 April as authorised by UN resolution 836.⁴³ The UN Security Council approved the action on 11 April with the abstention of the Russian representative.⁴⁴ The establishment of the Contact Group, consisting of the diplomats from the US, Russia, France, Britain and Germany, after the attack on Gorazde strengthened the links between the officials from the Foreign Offices of the four countries and Germany by instituting regular meetings on the Bosnian crisis.⁴⁵ The US and Russian governments set up the Contact Group because of Russian protests that it had failed to receive advance warning of US air strikes against the Serbs around Gorazde.⁴⁶

³⁹ Ulrich Irmer (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p.18915.

⁴⁰ $P_1 [\text{spd}] = 4/20 = 20\%$.

⁴¹ Freimut Duve (SPD), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p.18426. Dieter Schloten (SPD) changed his preference from opposition to support. See *ibid.*, p.18437. Compare also 'Balkan in Bonn', *Spiegel* 16, 18/4/94, pp.18-20.

⁴² *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, p.18435.

⁴³ Tom Dodd, *War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995), p.13.

⁴⁴ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 219. Sitzung, 14 April 1994, pp.18907-18925, pp.18908f.

⁴⁵ Halverson, 'American Perspectives', p.22.

⁴⁶ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.166.

While the membership of the US and Russia as the two world superpowers and those of Britain and France because of their role as main contributors to UNPROFOR was undisputed, the inclusion of Germany was less obvious. Some authors have proposed Germany's influence over the Croats as the reason.⁴⁷ Others have argued that Germany participated as representative of the EU in which it held the presidency at the time.⁴⁸ While the underlying reasons for the decision are not the subject of this study, the inclusion of German representatives in the Contact Group 'represented a small step towards an equal and responsible role' in the international community.⁴⁹ It also meant that the network relations between the German Foreign Office, the Bundeswehr and its colleagues in the four countries were strengthened through even more frequent interaction than had been the case before the Contact Group was established. By means of these linkages, staff from the German Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence were now continuously subject to the considerations and influence of their colleagues in the countries that had the strongest interest in Bundeswehr participation in Bosnia, namely Britain, France and the US. Indeed, in the week following the attack, Inspector General Klaus Naumann used an unrelated incident in which eleven employees of a German radio station had to be rescued by Belgian soldiers in Ruanda to argue in the media for the 'legitimate right' of the German forces to protect German citizens anywhere in the world. Naumann added that the allies expected Germany to contribute to UN and NATO operations.⁵⁰

By summer 1994, the governments of Britain and France increasingly considered the withdrawal of their troops from UNPROFOR. Ironically, this shift was caused by the political debate in the US, although the US government feared that the pullout of peacekeeping forces from the former Yugoslavia would raise calls for US intervention. Unwilling to despatch troops, the American administration was one of the most fervent proponents of the continued presence of UNPROFOR.⁵¹ Yet the apparent unwillingness

⁴⁷ Fiona M. Watson and Tom Dodd, *Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995), p.1.

⁴⁸ Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, p.157.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.173.

⁵⁰ 'Die Bundeswehr nach Bosnien?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 16/4/94.

⁵¹ Sir David Hannay, 'The UN's Role in Bosnia Assessed', *The Oxford International Review* 7:2, 1996, pp.4-12, p.7.

of the Clinton administration to engage with ground troops in the former Yugoslavia, combined with the threat that the Republican-dominated US Congress would end the arms embargo over Bosnia, caused the administrations in France and Britain to contemplate plans for a withdrawal in the first place.⁵² The plans were supported by UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali who appeared disillusioned about the effectiveness of the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia.⁵³ With the governments in France and Britain increasingly unwilling to carry the main weight of the international operation in the former Yugoslavia and the US reluctant to step up its engagement, German participation was the obvious alternative. While UN and Contact Group officials hesitated to discuss a formal request of a German contribution in Bosnia, the question of Bundeswehr action out-of-area was repeatedly raised with regard to other issues. Thus, UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali publicly encouraged a German contribution to a permanent standby force for the UN⁵⁴ and the French government suggested that it might ask the Bundeswehr to join its mission in setting up a safe zone for refugees in Rwanda.⁵⁵ In Washington, the issue was discussed perhaps most explicitly in calls for German leadership 'to solve the problems within Europe, like Bosnia and beyond Europe's borders'.⁵⁶

Although the Federal Constitutional Court had only been indirectly affected by the national and international pressure for the despatch of German soldiers out of area, it ruled on 12 July 1994 that any type of out-of-area mission was permissible under the existing stipulations of the Basic Law if undertaken as part of Germany's contribution to multilateral international organisations. Moreover, according to the Constitutional Court, a simple majority in the Bundestag could approve out-of-area operations.⁵⁷ The Federal

⁵² Marc Rogers, 'NATO ponders force to cover UN pull-out', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:12, 24/9/94, p.4.

⁵³ Halverson, 'American Perspectives', p.22.

⁵⁴ 'Marching orders for a German UN force', *Daily Mail*, 12/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, 'Kohl treads tightrope over military missions and electors' votes', *Herald*, 20/7/94.

⁵⁵ 'Marching orders for a German UN force', *Daily Mail*, 12/7/94; David Gow, 'Court frees Bonn for military role', *Guardian*, 13/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, 'Kohl treads tightrope over military missions and electors' votes', *Herald*, 20/7/94.

⁵⁶ David Gow, 'US ends British "special link"', *Guardian*, 12/7/94. See also Roger Boyes, 'Clinton enhances Bonn's role on the world stage', *Times*, 12/7/94; Matthew Beard, 'Bonn rules out military duty in world's hotspots', *Times*, 14/7/94.

⁵⁷ For a discussion of the ruling see Ernst-Otto Czempiel, 'Schritt zurück bei der Anwendung militärischer Gewalt', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 24/8/94.

Constitutional Court, thereby, ended the veto position of the opposition parties in the Bundestag and changed the conditions of the German foreign policy decision-making process. In fact, it can be argued that the decision modified the network relation between the opposition parties and the Bundestag in that it limited the institutional authority of the opposition members on issues such as military intervention. The consequences of the Constitutional Court's ruling for the despatch of German Tornados were comprehensive. Not only did the ruling end the self-restraint of Germany's NATO allies who in the second stage used their relations with NATO to publicly call for a German participation in Bosnia, it also decreased the ability of the members of the opposition parties in the Bundestag to resist the pressure for German participation in military action in Bosnia.

NATO Requests German Tornados

From 12 June to 10 December 1994, a transgovernmental coalition between officials from the US, Britain, France and the Bundeswehr strategically used its relations within the German foreign policy network to exert pressure on cabinet ministers. Although the government's willingness and ability to participate in military action world-wide was undoubted after the ruling of the Constitutional Court,⁵⁸ the Kohl Cabinet maintained that in the case of the former Yugoslavia special historical considerations had to be taken into account.⁵⁹ The leader of the FDP parliamentary party in the Bundestag, Hermann Otto Solms, insisted that a broad consensus among all democratic parties beyond the simple majority required by the Constitutional Court should remain a condition for military action out of area. However, while the Chancellor appeared to share Solms' view, his position was challenged even within the FDP. In particular the newly elected FDP party leader, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, refused to make a decision dependent upon support from the opposition parties.⁶⁰ Given that Green and PDS parliamentarians maintained their

⁵⁸ Dr. Klaus Kinkel (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp. 21165-21218, pp. 21166-21168.

⁵⁹ Even Defence Minister Volker Rühle supported this position in public. See Matthew Beard, 'Bonn rules out military duty in world's hotspots', *Times*, 14/7/94.

⁶⁰ Charima Reinhardt, 'Adria-Einsatz nachträglich gebilligt', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 23/7/94.

fundamental opposition to out-of-area operations, such a condition would continue to compromise German foreign policy options.⁶¹ Nevertheless, a 'grand coalition' between the government parliamentary parties and the members of the SPD main opposition party appeared within the range of possibility.

Already, before the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the support for military action among some sections of the SPD parliamentary party had increased. The ruling itself further transformed the position of SPD parliamentarians who unlike the members of the other opposition parties accepted the new interpretation of the Basic Law.⁶² Only a few days after the publication of the ruling, SPD parliamentarians approved a decision to extend the participation of German soldiers in the AWACS planes and in the Adriatic - the action for which their party had sued the government in the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, a majority of the SPD parliament members supported government proposals to expand the area covered by the AWACS beyond NATO territory and to permit military action of ships patrolling the Adriatic as part of their engagements.⁶³

Table 5.2
Preference Changes:
12 June - 9 December 1994

2nd Phase (- 9/12/94)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
BT	59	U
Nato-CM	51	C
Fm	36	NC
Cha	26	NC
COF	25	NC
FM	24	NC
Med	24	NC
Com	20	U
Coa	20	NC
spd	20	NC
Cab	20	NC
BR	18	U
fdp	16	U
CM	15	NC
grü	12	NC
pds	12	NC
vote	12	NC
Uns	11	NC

⁶¹ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp. 21180-21184. See also Charima Reinhardt, 'Adria-Einsatz nachträglich gebilligt', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 23/7/94.

⁶² The disagreements mainly regarded the question whether military action had to be authorised by the UN Security Council or whether a decision within Councils of NATO or the WEU was sufficient. See 'Kinkel und Scharping deuten das Bundeswehr-Urteil', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/7/94. Compare also Ernst-Otto Czempel, 'Schritt zurück bei der Anwendung militärischer Gewalt', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 24/8/94.

⁶³ Antrag der Bundesregierung, 'Deutsche Beteiligung an Maßnahmen von NATO und WEU zur Durchsetzung von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen zum Adria-Embargo und Flugverbot über Bosnien-Herzegowina', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/8303, 22 July 1994. See also Dr. Klaus Kinkel (FDP) *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July

Like the Cabinet, however, SPD Bundestag members maintained their objections with regard to a German participation in an offensive mission in Bosnia. One reason for the consensus between government and opposition on this particular issue was the fact that the German electorate continued to reject the idea of sending the Bundeswehr into combat.⁶⁴ With a general election upcoming in October, politicians from all parties could not ignore public opinion on this hotly debated issue. Questioned by the visiting US President Clinton on a German contribution to out-of-area missions, Chancellor Kohl explained that the German public was not yet convinced of the need to participate in international peacekeeping.

Most of Germany's NATO allies, its Eastern neighbours and the UN General Secretary Boutros Ghali welcomed the ruling.⁶⁵ They believed that the ruling had finally removed all obstacles for a German participation in multilateral peacekeeping and fighting missions. While the American, British and French administrations had restrained their pressure for a German participation in Bosnia before the Constitutional Court's decision, they did not hesitate to employ their wide range of direct and indirect links with cabinet ministers, officials in the German Foreign Office, the Defence Ministry and the international media to increase the pressure for a German contribution in Bosnia immediately after the ruling. The British administration in particular lauded the prospect of German forces being deployed out-of-area. The Conservative government even ignored the fears among its own backbenchers and the public over a resurgent Germany.⁶⁶ In an interview with the *BBC World Service*, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd stated that Germany 'should be able to send troops to international crisis zones in the same way that Britain, France and the US do. ...it was 'absolutely artificial' that a handful of European powers risked their troops in places such as Bosnia when Germany did not'.⁶⁷ Since the

1994, p.21168. Among the SPD Parliament members, 111 voted for the government bill, 32 voted against, 14 abstained. See *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, pp.21208-21210. See also 'Alles gedeckt', *Spiegel* 30, 25/7/94, p.29.

⁶⁴ 'Leading Article: Germany's role', *Financial Times*, 12/7/94; 'Leading Article: Germany's new role', *Daily Mail*, 13/7/94; Jochen Gaugele, 'Kohl treads tightrope over military mission and electors' votes', *Herald*, 20/7/94.

⁶⁵ Quentin Peel and George Graham, 'German forces cleared for UN action', *Financial Times*, 13/7/94; Matthew Beard, 'Bonn rules out military duty in world's hotspots', *Times*, 14/7/94.

⁶⁶ Jochen Gaugele, 'Kohl treads tightrope over military mission and electors' votes', *Herald*, 20/7/94.

⁶⁷ John Deans and Christopher Bell, 'Room for one more at world's top table', *Daily Mail*, 30/7/94.

relationship between Britain and Germany was characterised by mutual dependence rather than unilateral dominance, Hurd offered as incentive for German cooperation in Bosnia his support for a permanent German seat on the UN Security Council.⁶⁸ US President Bill Clinton used his visit to Germany immediately after the constitutional decision to tell key politicians that Germany now had to accept a leading role in Europe and the world and that an active engagement in UN operations was expected.⁶⁹ The US administration wanted to encourage German participation to counter the demand for American ground troops in the former Yugoslavia.⁷⁰

The assertion of their demands by officials and politicians from the US, Britain, France, the Netherlands and four other NATO members through their direct bilateral relations with domestic actors in the German foreign policy network increased the degree of pressure on the government within days of the re-interpretation of the Basic Law. The pressure on Foreign Office staff grew from 24 to 36 per cent, thus, increasing the probability that the department would change its policy preference.⁷¹ In fact, officials in the Foreign Office were subject to the highest pressure within the government because of their links with colleagues in other foreign departments in the Atlantic Alliance and their close interdependent relations with staff in the German Defence Ministry. The pressure on Chancellor Kohl who was more widely linked with domestic actors in the German network increased from 17 to 26 per cent, and the support of a German involvement from actors directly connected to Foreign Minister Kinkel increased from 13 to 24 per cent.⁷² Moreover, in the North Atlantic Council, the representatives of the US, Britain and France were able to form an international coalition with the majority of NATO members which raised the pressure for a German contribution to the Alliance's operation in Bosnia to 51

⁶⁸ John Deans and Christopher Bell, 'Room for one more at world's top table', *Daily Mail*, 30/7/94.

⁶⁹ Quentin Peel and George Graham, 'German forces cleared for UN actions', *Financial Times*, 13/7/94; Kurt Kister, 'Pulling a Kennedy', *Guardian*, 14/7/94; Matthew Beard, 'Bonn rules out military duty in world's hotspots', *Times*, 14/7/94. See also Michael Glos (CDU/CSU) *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 240. Sitzung, 22 July 1994, p.21174.

⁷⁰ Steve Doughty, 'The German army rolls once again', *Daily Mail*, 13/12/94.

⁷¹ The public calls for a German participation from officials from another four NATO member states raised the pressure on Foreign Office civil servants from P_1 [Fm] = $8/33 = 24\%$ to P_2 [Fm] = $12/33 = 36\%$ of their linkages in the network.

⁷² The pressure from the same four NATO governments increased P_1 [Cha] = $7/42 = 17\%$ to P_2 [Cha] = $11/42 = 26\%$ and, in the case of Foreign Minister Kinkel, P_1 [FM] = $5/38 = 13\%$ increased to P_2 [FM] = $9/38 = 24\%$.

per cent.⁷³

In this situation, Inspector General Klaus Naumann used his transnational linkages within NATO to coax the German government into action. The circumstances were perfect for forcing the government to take the step towards participating in international fighting missions. The Bundeswehr was prepared, domestic politicians were increasingly in favour of military action and the international pressure on cabinet ministers was considerable. Specifically, Naumann instigated a series of requests from the NATO militaries for a Bundeswehr contribution to the Bosnia mission. The first request was made at the beginning of November, when the representatives of the US, Belgium and the Netherlands inquired about German fighter planes for NATO's operation 'Deny Flight'. The German government hesitated. In the press, officials from the Foreign and Defence Ministry rejected speculations that German soldiers could participate in the control of the no-fly zone. According to the official government line a 'formal' request had not yet been made.⁷⁴ A second international attempt at engaging the German Bundeswehr was made later in November when the conflict in Bosnia took a new turn with a Serb counteroffensive on the Muslim enclave Bihac in Serb-held Krajina. Differences between the governments of the US and France over the 'lift and strike' option, which envisaged the ending of military sanctions and selective air strikes on Serb positions, increased the likelihood of a massive withdrawal of UN forces from the former Yugoslavia and consequently a German participation in a NATO support operation.

The 'lift and strike' policy had been reconsidered in the US following the Congressional elections in which the Republicans had gained majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Preempting a Republican bill to lift the arms embargo, President Clinton announced in mid-November, that the US would no longer enforce the sanctions on the former Yugoslavia.⁷⁵ In addition, the US Secretary of State urged the

⁷³ The North Atlantic Council was linked to 26 out of 51 actors in the network who supported a German contribution to the international intervention in the former Yugoslavia, namely the heads of state, foreign and defence ministers of the US, Britain, France, the Netherlands and four unnamed other NATO member states, NATO's integrated military staff and the German Defence Minister R uhe, accounting for P_2 [Nato-CM] = $26/51 = 51\%$.

⁷⁴ "Da m ussen wir hin", *Spiegel* 45, 7/11/94, pp.18f.

⁷⁵ Barbara Starr, 'US Navy to let through Bosnia-bound arms', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:20, 19/11/94, p.3.

NATO Ministerial Council to launch an air raid against Serb positions. Although the British and French representatives had threatened to withdraw unilaterally from Bosnia if the US government pursued a 'lift and strike' policy, the two governments eventually acceded to the American pressure. On 21 and 23 November, NATO aircraft bombed a Serb airfield in Croatia in response to three attacks from planes within Croatia on civilian targets around Bihac. However, the operation proved misguided as the British and French administrations had feared. The Serb forces responded to the strikes by taking UN peacekeepers as hostages. Moreover, the Serb military began to target allied planes with anti-aircraft missiles thus forcing a suspension of UN aid flights into Bosnia.⁷⁶

Incidentally, the use of anti-aircraft missiles by the Serbs in response to NATO strikes gave the transnational coalition among military officers in the Alliance a convincing argument to demand a German participation in the former Yugoslavia. Germany was one of the few NATO members, other than the US, in possession of ECR-Tornados which could target and destroy anti-aircraft missiles when attacked. On 28 November, Inspector General Naumann, in association with his American colleagues, tipped off General George Joulwan, the Supreme Commander of NATO's European forces, to ask the German government for six to eight ECR-Tornados.⁷⁷ Since the US planes were involved in the Gulf, the General contended, the German planes were the only ones at hand.⁷⁸ Doubts as to whether this was indeed the case, however, were soon raised. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* already reported at the time that Italy also had ECR-Tornados.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ "Einsatz hätte nur Eskalation zur Folge", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94.

⁷⁷ Sir Richard Vincent, Chairman of NATO's Military Committee, admitted later that Naumann had instigated the request. See "Kein Hurra geschrien", *Spiegel* 51, 19/12/94, p.19. See also fy., 'Kinkel schließt den Einsatz deutscher Flugzeuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 2/12/94; James Bone and George Brock, 'Allies offer new sweetener to Serbs in push for peace', *Times*, 2/12/94; Olaf Ihlau, 'Kommentar: Nato, Bonn und Bihac', *Spiegel* 49, 5/12/94, p.21; Martin Winter, 'Was Tornados mit Sardinien zu tun haben', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, 'Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94; 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.24; Marc Rogers, 'NATO defies criticism over impotence...', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:23, 10/12/94, p.13; 'Einsatz ins Ungewisse', *Spiegel* 5, 30/1/95, p.78.

⁷⁸ Judy Dempsey, 'Germany to decide on Nato's request for jets', *Financial Times*, 6/12/94; Theo Sommer, 'Deutsche Tornados über Sarajevo?', *Zeit*, 9/12/94; Tony Paterson, 'Will the Luftwaffe fly to the UN's aid in Bosnia?', *European*, 16/12/94.

⁷⁹ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zurückhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94. The Italian Tornados were expected to be operational in 1995. See Antonio Ciampi, 'First ECR Tornado moves SEAD ahead', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:15, 11/4/92, p.601; Charles Bickers, 'Europe's "Wild Weasels"', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:15, 11/4/92, pp. 615f.; Antonio Ciampi, 'First Tornado IT ECR

In Germany, the request caused turmoil in the coalition government.⁸⁰ Although the problem of out-of-area missions had been resolved with the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the government was not prepared to engage in military action in the former Yugoslavia. In an assessment of the request, Defence Ministry staff who advocated the despatch of the Tornados clashed with officials in the Foreign Office and the Chancellor's Office.⁸¹ An emergency Coalition Meeting, i.e. the semi-formal decision-making unit of the coalition parties and the government, which was attended by Chancellor Kohl, Defence Minister R  he, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Finance Minister Theo Waigel and the head of the Chancellor's Office, Friedrich Bohl showed the government divided over the issue.⁸² Foreign Minister Kinkel objected to sending German soldiers to the former Yugoslavia - 'not even in the air'.⁸³ The Foreign Minister could not imagine the first fighting operation of the Bundeswehr to take place in Bosnia.⁸⁴ Furthermore, Kinkel believed that it was unlikely that the Bundestag would approve of the mission.⁸⁵ In fact, before the Bundestag elections 59 per cent of the actors linked to or represented in the Bundestag had supported military action. Due to the losses of the CDU/CSU, however, this number had decreased to 56 per cent, i.e. it was only marginally above the majority

takes off', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 18:6, 8/8/92, p.11; Charles Bickers, 'Luftwaffe Tornados receive full ECR fit', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 19:9, 27/2/93, p.5. Moreover, Italian planes had already become involved before in the Adriatic. See 'Serbische Streitkr  fte suchen zunehmend die Konfrontation mit Einheiten der UN', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/5/94.

⁸⁰ The request was not as surprising as the government claimed. In principle, the German government had accepted the out-of-area deployment of its ECR-Tornados in April 1994 when it decided to commit its Fighter-Bomber Wing 32 to NATO's rapid reaction forces. See Nick Cook, 'A new force for Europe', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 21:15, 16/4/94, pp.37f. The despatch of German troops had been discussed in the Nato Council months before the request. See 'Scharping: Bonn verletzt deutsche Interessen', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 20/12/94.

⁸¹ Rmc./DW, 'Bonn pr  uft Tornado-Kampfeinsatz in Bosnien', *Welt*, 2/12/94; Martin Winter, 'Was Tornados mit Sardinien zu tun haben', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7/12/94.

⁸² 'Kanzler ber  t mit Kinkel und R  he', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 6/12/94; Judy Dempsey, 'Germany to decide on NATO's request for jets', *Financial Times*, 6/12/94; C.G./fy., 'Deutsche "Tornados" vorerst nicht nach Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 8/12/94; ub., 'Deutsche "Tornados" nicht nach Bosnien', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94.

⁸³ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94.

⁸⁴ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94. Compare Calic, 'German Perspectives', p.67.

⁸⁵ Rmc./DW, 'Bonn pr  uft Tornado-Kampfeinsatz in Bosnien', *Welt*, 2/12/94; fy., 'Kinkel schlie  t den Einsatz deutscher Flugzeuge in Bosnien nicht mehr aus', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 2/12/94.

threshold.⁸⁶ Kinkel's position was strengthened by the fact that Chancellor Kohl continued to share his inhibitions.⁸⁷ Only Defence Minister R  he asked for a favourable consideration of the request.⁸⁸ R  he argued that Germany had to prove its solidarity with NATO.⁸⁹

However, all ministers agreed in their puzzlement about the fact that the military had directly sent the request to Bonn without first clearing it with the political representatives at NATO's headquarters.⁹⁰ Suspicions emerged that the NATO military had calculated that the request would never get beyond the diplomats. Instead of using the proper institutional relations via the German Foreign Office, which opposed an offensive German mission in Bosnia, the military had tactically circumvented them by using their informal network with the German Defence Ministry staff.⁹¹ Since the differences among the cabinet members could not be immediately resolved, the Chancellor decided to defer the decision until a formal cabinet meeting which was scheduled for 20 December.⁹² To justify the postponement the government claimed that the NATO request had been informal and, therefore, did not immediately require a response. Since the Alliance request had indeed not been processed through the correct institutional channels, NATO's new General Secretary, Willy Claes, confirmed the German government's interpretation.⁹³ In a letter to the German Foreign Minister, Claes agreed that Joulwan's telex was merely a

⁸⁶ P_2 [BT] = 9351/15888 = 59% decreased to P_3 [BT] = 8965/16128 as the number of CDU/CSU parliamentarians fell from 319 to 295.

⁸⁷ At the OSCE conference in Budapest starting 5 December, Chancellor Helmut Kohl reiterated that he would 'not send any soldiers into the conflict'. See 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.22. See also C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94; ub., 'Bonn will einen Einsatz deutscher Kampfflugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawien ohne Gesichtsverlust vermeiden', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 3/12/94.

⁸⁸ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94; 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.23; 'Bonn vertagt Tornado-Entscheidung', *Welt*, 8/12/94.

⁸⁹ ub., 'Bonn will einen Einsatz deutscher Kampfflugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawien ohne Gesichtsverlust vermeiden', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 3/12/94; C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94.

⁹⁰ C.G., 'Bonn reagiert zur  ckhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94.

⁹¹ Martin Winter, 'Was Tornados mit Sardinien zu tun haben', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7/12/94; 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, pp.22f.

⁹² Martin S. Lambeck, 'Bonn vertagt Tornado-Entscheidung', *Welt*, 8/12/94; Martin Winter, 'Bonn l  sst Frage nach Tornados unbeantwortet', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8/12/94; C.G./fy., 'Deutsche "Tornados" vorerst nicht nach Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 8/12/94; ub., 'Deutsche "Tornados" nicht nach Bosnien', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94.

⁹³ Karl Feldmeyer, "'Es gibt keine Garantie, aber es gibt auch keine Alternative'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95.

'preliminary request' and served to assess informally whether German aircraft could be supplied.⁹⁴

During the following weeks, the government sought to assess the distribution of preferences and its ability to increase the support for a Tornado despatch among the domestic actors in the German foreign policy network. Within Bundestag, which had to approve the despatch, opinions over the issue were split. However, since the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition government had only gained a slim parliamentary majority in the general election in October, a vote would have to be carefully prepared if the government did not want to risk a rejection.⁹⁵ Consistent with the position they had taken since the beginning of the debate, the members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party were amongst the strongest supporters of the mission. CDU/CSU parliamentary party leader, Wolfgang Schäuble, announced that he would fight for a Bundestag majority in favour of sending the Tornados to Bosnia.⁹⁶ He was backed by the designated chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, Karl-Heinz Hornhues (CDU). Critical voices within the CDU/CSU were few, but included the designated chairman of the Defence Committee, Klaus Rose (CSU) who warned of a premature agreement to send fighter aircraft. Conversely, the majority of FDP parliamentarians opposed sending German Tornados with an offensive mission to Bosnia.⁹⁷ Among them were such leading figures as defence expert Jürgen Koppelin, parliamentary party leader Hermann Otto Solms and the honorary party leader Otto Graf Lambsdorff.⁹⁸ SPD parliamentarians also announced that they objected

⁹⁴ 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.23; Martin S. Lambeck, 'Bonn vertagt Tornado-Entscheidung', *Welt*, 8/12/94; 'Bonn läßt Frage nach Tornados unbeantwortet', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, 'Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94; Tony Paterson, 'Will the Luftwaffe fly to the UN's aid in Bosnia?', *European*, 16/12/94; Karl Feldmeyer, "Es gibt keine Garantie, es gibt aber auch keine Alternative", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95.

⁹⁵ Ferdos Forudasten, 'Tornado-Einsatz Fall für den Bundestag', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, 'Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94; 'Germany puts off Tornado vote', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:24, 17/12/94, p.9.

⁹⁶ Friedbert Pflüger, Peter Kurt Würzbach, Hartmut Koschyk and Dietrich Austermann (all CDU/CSU) favoured sending German Tornados to Bosnia. See "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5/12/94.

⁹⁷ DW/rmc., 'Kontroverse um Tornado-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Welt*, 3/12/92; 'Sarajevo will den neuen Plan der Kontaktgruppe ablehnen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/12/94; "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5/12/94.

⁹⁸ 'Bonn reagiert zurückhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94; DW/rmc., 'Kontroverse um Tornado-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Welt*, 3/12/94; 'Tornado-Einsatz Fall für den Bundestag', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3/12/94; C.G., "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet", *Süddeutsche*

to the operation.⁹⁹ Since the members of the Greens and the PDS rejected a Bundeswehr engagement out of area even in principle, it appeared that a majority of parliamentarians were opposed to the despatch.¹⁰⁰ The German public shared the reluctance of the politicians. In an *Emnid* opinion poll for the weekly political magazine *Der Spiegel*, 62 per cent of the German electorate rejected the despatch. In the former East Germany, 71 per cent opposed the deployment of German Tornados in Bosnia.¹⁰¹

While in Germany the domestic debate over the first offensive Bundeswehr mission since the Second World War split the country, the international situation was characterised by a rapprochement between the governments of the US, Britain and France over the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia.¹⁰² In response to the deterioration of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, President Clinton indicated that he was prepared to commit up to 4,000 US troops to help fly out British and French UN peacekeepers if necessary.¹⁰³ A withdrawal had become more and more likely because Bob Dole, the Republican leader of the Senate, was expected to lead the Republican-dominated Congress into unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁴ At the request of UN General-Secretary Boutros Ghali, the NATO Council of Ministers approved the plans for the withdrawal operation on Friday 9 December.¹⁰⁵

Zeitung, 5/12/94.

⁹⁹ 'Bonn reagiert zurückhaltend auf die Anfrage der Nato', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/94; Ferdos Forudasten, 'Tornado-Einsatz Fall für den Bundestag', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3/12/94; ub., 'Bonn will einen Einsatz deutscher Kampfflugzeuge in Ex-Jugoslawien ohne Gesichtsverlust vermeiden', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3/12/94; DW/rmc., 'Kontroverse um Tornado-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Welt*, 3/12/94; 'Nato-Anfrage entzweit die Koalition', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3/12/94.

¹⁰⁰ "Keine Bodentruppen ins bosnische Kampfgebiet", *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5/12/94; Ferdos Forudasten, 'Tornado-Einsatz Fall für den Bundestag', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3/12/94; 'Sarajevo will den neuen Plan der Kontaktgruppe ablehnen', 5/12/94; Udo Bergdoll, 'Aus Bonn ein vernebeltes Nein', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/12/94.

¹⁰¹ 'Bonn vertagt Tornado-Entscheidung', *Welt*, 8/12/94; "'Tornado" über Bosnien?', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.26.

¹⁰² James Bone and George Brock, 'Allies to offer sweetener to Serbs in push for peace', *Times*, 2/12/94.

¹⁰³ According to 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.26, Clinton promised even 10,000 troops.

¹⁰⁴ James Adams, John Davidson and Michael Prescott, 'Ties that unwind', *Sunday Times*, 4/12/94; Kathleen Bunten, 'Clinton says US troops will aid UN pull-out', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:24, 17/12/94, p.4.

¹⁰⁵ James Adams, John Davidson and Michael Prescott, 'Ties that unwind', *Sunday Times*, 4/12/94; Fiona M. Watson and Tom Dodd, *Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995), p. 21.

Although the decision implied that the request for German ECR-Tornados that had been made in November would now be formalised, the German representative did not attempt to prevent the decision. The German administration seemed to recognise that its ability to veto the withdrawal plans in the North Atlantic Council was limited since balance of pressure in NATO was in favour of the decision with 51 per cent of the actors linked to it supporting military action.¹⁰⁶ As a consequence of the decision, the full pressure of the NATO Council to contribute to the operation in order to meet its obligations to the Alliance came to bear upon the German government. In the following week, SACEUR General Joulwan asked each of the NATO member states formally to give an indication of their possible contributions to the relief forces. This time Germany was not excluded from the request.¹⁰⁷ Foreign Minister Kinkel and Foreign Office officials who participated in frequent meetings of the NATO Council and the military to discuss the pull-out of French and British forces during December were particularly exposed to international pressure for a positive answer.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, Inspector General Naumann sought to put further pressure on his government by claiming that NATO needed a definite answer with regard to Germany's contribution by the end of the year to prepare adequately for the withdrawal.¹⁰⁹

In addition to the pressure from the military, US officials and politicians sought to influence the German government directly through their respective bilateral linkages with the staff in the Foreign Office and the Defence Ministry as well as CDU/CSU parliamentarians. They hoped that a German contribution would reduce the necessity and the pressure for an American involvement. In fact, the designated speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich and the speaker of the Senate, Bob Dole, tried to make an American contribution dependent on a participation of the Bundeswehr.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ See footnote 74.

¹⁰⁷ 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.26; fy., 'Die Nato fragt nach deutschen Bodentruppen für Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 13/12/94; Martin Winter, 'Bonn will bei Abzug der Blauhelme helfen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14/12/94; fy., "'Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/12/94.

¹⁰⁸ 'UN/NATO powerless to stop Serbs', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 22:22, 3/12/94, p.1; 'Nato-Verteidigungsminister bereiten Verbleib und Abzug vor', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 15/12/94.

¹⁰⁹ fy., "'Die Nato braucht genaue Vorgaben'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 16/12/94.

¹¹⁰ fy., "'Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/12/94.

Simultaneously, UN officials stepped up their efforts to persuade German decision-makers. In Germany for personal talks with cabinet ministers and opposition leaders, UN General-Secretary Boutros Ghali repeatedly raised the issue of Germany's future role in the UN and its participation in UN peacekeeping missions.¹¹¹

Although the German government initially resisted the increased transnational and international pressure during autumn 1994, it set the stage for the policy change of the Kohl Cabinet. Specifically, the transgovernmental coalition among the NATO military and the approval of the North Atlantic Council to the international plans for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR soldiers, put the resolve of the German government to use its new freedom of action in foreign affairs to the test. As the domestic and international proponents of a Bundeswehr mission in Bosnia re-asserted their demands at the beginning of December, they prepared the change in government policy that took place within the following ten days.

German Cabinet Accepts Tornado Despatch

The third stage of the debate, from 10 to 20 December, was characterised by a series of preference changes within the Cabinet. Due to the increased international and transnational pressure following NATO's formal request for German Tornados, Chancellor Kohl began to modify his position regarding military action almost immediately after he had postponed a decision. In a TV interview with the *ZDF* channel on the weekend of the 10-11 December, Kohl indicated that he could imagine an engagement of German Tornados 'under certain circumstances'.¹¹² The sudden preference change of the Chancellor is less surprising if it is considered that Kohl was under the highest degree of pressure in the Cabinet. With the decision of the North Atlantic Council to prepare for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, 29 per cent of the actors to whom Kohl had regular contacts in the network,

¹¹¹ 'Boutros-Ghali kommt nach Deutschland', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 17/1/95; 'Bundesregierung verweigert Ghali konkrete Zusage', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 19/1/95. Boutros Ghali continued to lobby for German participation in his planned standby force during meetings with the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee in January 1995. See *ibid.* and *eli*, 'Boutros Ghali wirbt für Eingreiftruppe', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20/1/95.

¹¹² 'Tornado-Einsatz unter bestimmten Umständen möglich', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 12/12/94; 'Ganz verbindlich', *Spiegel* 50, 12/12/94, p.26; *fy.*, 'Die Nato fragt nach deutschen Bodentruppen für Bosnia', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 13/12/94; Tony Paterson, 'Will the Luftwaffe fly to the UN's aid in Bosnia?', *European*, 16/12/94.

favoured a despatch of German Tornados.¹¹³

The Chancellor's support for a despatch of German fighter planes to Bosnia raised the pressure on other actors within the German foreign policy network to approve the mission. In particular, Foreign Minister Kinkel who had for weeks been the target of transnational and international demands for a German contribution to the operation in Bosnia was sensitive to a further increase in pressure. Including Chancellor Kohl, now 29 per cent of Kinkel's links in the network urged him to accede to the Tornado despatch.¹¹⁴ On 13 December, merely two days after Chancellor Kohl, the Foreign Minister declared his support for helping Germany's NATO allies with ECR-Tornados.¹¹⁵ On the same day, the representatives of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties approved of a German participation in the possible withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Bosnia in a Coalition Meeting. The decision in the Coalition Meeting reflected the considerable support for the action among the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians. However, the Coalition Meeting agreed that the Bundeswehr should offer primarily logistical and medical help. A decision regarding the despatch of German ECR-Tornados was again deferred. Nevertheless, the decision indicated that the coalition government's position was on the brink of change. It might have been encouraged by the publication of a survey by the Bundeswehr Academy for Information and Communication which claimed that 53 per cent of the West German population supported a German participation in military action under the authority of the UN.¹¹⁶ Even if other polls showed different results, it could be assumed that the German public was at least divided over the question.

During the following week, Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defence Minister R  he used their linkages with the Bundestag, its committees and the parliamentary parties to lobby for the Tornado mission. On 15 December, Defence Minister R  he personally talked to the members of the Bundestag Defence Committee

¹¹³ The North Atlantic Council's decision to call for a German contribution added another actor's pressure on the Chancellor raising P_2 [Cha] = 11/42 = 26% to P_3 [Cha] = 12/42 = 29%.

¹¹⁴ The Chancellor's support for the despatch meant that eleven out of 38 actors to whom Kinkel had close contacts in the network favoured a German contribution to the relief operation in Bosnia, raising the pressure on the Foreign Minister by one from P_3 [FM] = 10/38 = 26% to P_4 [FM] = 11/38 = 29%.

¹¹⁵ 'Bonn will bei Abzug der Blauhelme helfen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14/12/94.

¹¹⁶ The support for a fighting mission was still considerably lower in East Germany, where only 40 per cent favoured such action. See fy., 'Wenig Unterst  tzung in der Bev  lkerung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/12/94.

about the situation in the former Yugoslavia.¹¹⁷ In the Bundestag's budget debate that day, Chancellor Kohl argued that it might become necessary to investigate whether Germany's partners required its help in Bosnia. If they did, Germany could not deny it.¹¹⁸

Table 5.3 Preference Changes: 10 - 20 December 1994

3 rd Phase (-11/12/94)			4 th Phase (-13/12/94)			5 th Phase (-16/12/94)			6 th Phase (-20/12/94)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
BT	56	U	BT	58	U	BT	60	U	BT	67	U
Med	43	NC	Med	44	NC	Med	46	NC	Med	49	NC
Fm	36	NC	COF	38	NC	Fm	39	NC	Fm	42	NC
Cha	29	C	Fm	36	NC	COF	38	NC	Cab	40	C
FM	26	U	FM	29	C	Coa	33	C	CM	38	C
COF	25	NC	Coa	27	U	CM	31	NC	COF	38	NC
Com	20	U	Com	25	U	Cab	30	U	BR	35	U
Coa	20	U	Cab	25	U	spd	30	U	Com	35	U
spd	20	U	spd	25	U	Com	30	U	vote	31	U
Cab	20	NC	BR	24	U	BR	29	U	spd	30	U
BR	18	U	CM	23	NC	fdp	26	C	grü	24	NC
fdp	16	U	fdp	21	U	grü	24	NC	pds	24	NC
CM	15	NC	vote	19	NC	pds	24	NC	Uns	11	NC
vote	15	NC	grü	18	NC	vote	23	U			
grü	12	NC	pds	18	NC	Uns	11	NC			
pds	12	NC	Uns	11	NC						
Uns	11	NC									

The pressure for a despatch remained the highest in the Coalition Meeting in which the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister participated as leaders of their parties. Also present were Finance Minister Theo Waigel who was also the leader of the CSU, the parliamentary party leaders Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), Michael Glos (CSU) and Hermann Otto Solms (FDP), as well as the First Parliamentary Secretaries of the parliamentary parties and the

¹¹⁷ fy., "Die Nato braucht genaue Vorgaben", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 16/12/94.

¹¹⁸ C.G., 'Die SPD zu Gesprächen über einen deutschen Beitrag bereit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, 'Scharping und Kohl nähern sich', *Welt*, 16/12/94.

General-Secretaries of the coalition parties.¹¹⁹ On 16 December the Coalition Meeting eventually examined the general conditions for a German participation in Bosnia. Since the recent change of policy by the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister had increased the support for the mission among the actors linked to the coalition meeting from 20 to 33 per cent, the probability that the meeting would agree to the despatch was rising.¹²⁰ In the event, the members of the Coalition Meeting not only decided to offer German Tornados for a withdrawal of UNPROFOR, but also to protect aid deliveries if the UN should revive its humanitarian efforts in Bosnia.¹²¹ However, in accordance with the position taken by FDP parliamentarians after the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, the members of the Coalition Meeting decided that the government should seek the approval of more than a simple majority in the Bundestag given the historical weight of the mission. While it appeared that the members of the coalition, thereby, voluntarily extended the ability of the opposition parties to block the Bundeswehr's first engagement out of area, the scope of this informal requirement was at the hands of the coalition parties. If they failed to secure the assent of the opposition, a despatch could still be approved by the Bundestag.

In order to gain the support of the opposition parties, the members of the Coalition Meeting asked the Minister of the Chancellor's Office, Bohl, to speak with the parliamentary party leaders of SPD and the Greens, Rudolf Scharping and Joschka Fischer.¹²² Foreign Minister Kinkel was convinced that SPD parliamentarians would not refuse their support if a withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia should become necessary.¹²³ The assessment of the Foreign Minister matched the suggestion by multilevel network theory that the pressure on SPD parliamentarians had increased from 25 to 30 per

¹¹⁹ fy., "Bundeswehr-Einsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/12/94.

¹²⁰ The actors which pressed the representatives in the Coalition Meeting to support the despatch included in addition to CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, Defence Minister Rühle, now also Foreign Minister Kinkel and Chancellor Kohl, increasing P_3 [Coa] = $3/15 = 20$ to P_3 [Coa] = $5/15 = 33\%$.

¹²¹ Charima Reinhardt, 'Umfangreicher Einsatz für UN-Rückzug geplant', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 16/12/94; fy., 'Bonn zur Entsendung von Tornados für Einsätze in Bosnien bereit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 17/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, 'Deutsche Tornados für Bosnien', *Welt*, 17/12/94.

¹²² eli, 'Kohl und Scharping: Kein Entscheidungszwang', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14/12/94; Martin Winter, 'Bonn will bei Abzug der Blauhelme helfen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14/12/94; fy., "Bundeswehreinsatz steht nicht auf der Tagesordnung", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/12/94.

¹²³ ub., 'Kinkel rechnet fest mit SPD-Zustimmung', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 15/12/94.

cent.¹²⁴ Among the opposition parties, the members of the SPD were now under the highest pressure to support the despatch. Moreover, the SPD had been internally divided over the issue for some time.¹²⁵

In particular, the party leadership and the SPD members in the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees were swayed by government ministers who could use their influence as provider of expertise and information for the committees to convince the opposition members of the necessity to engage in Bosnia. The party leadership was also attracted by the government's implicit offer to involve them more closely in the decision-making process in return for their support.¹²⁶ Following talks with Chancellor's Office Minister Bohl, SPD party leader Rudolf Scharping admitted that German Tornados might be required to safeguard aid deliveries and the possible withdrawal of UN troops.¹²⁷ His position was shared among the foreign and defence policy experts of the parliamentary party¹²⁸ and SPD's right-wing group 'Seeheimer Kreis'.¹²⁹ The opposition to the Tornado despatch in the SPD included the two deputy party leaders Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul and Oskar Lafontaine, as well as party manager Günter Verheugen.¹³⁰ They based their objections on a decision of the SPD party conference in Wiesbaden from November 1993 which stipulated that only peacekeeping operations should be permissible out of area.¹³¹

¹²⁴ $P_4 [\text{spd}] = 5/20 = 25\%$ increased to $P_5 [\text{spd}] = 6/20 = 30\%$.

¹²⁵ Sto., 'Grüne gegen deutsche Beteiligung in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 15/12/94; Tony Paterson, 'Will Luftwaffe fly to the UN's aid in Bosnia?', *European*, 16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck 'Scharping und Kohl nähern sich', *Welt*, 16/12/94; ban., 'SPD streitet über Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/12/94; "'Einsatz hätte Eskalation zur Folge'", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94; 'Grüne nicht mehr generell gegen Blauhelmeinsätze', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27/12/94.

¹²⁶ Martin S. Lambeck, 'Scharping and Kohl nähern sich', *Welt*, 16/12/94; 'Kein Hurra geschrien', *Spiegel* 51, 19/12/94, p.9; 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94, p.22.

¹²⁷ ban., 'Scharping erinnert an Bündnispflichten', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 23/12/94.

¹²⁸ Especially Freimut Druve, Karsten Voigt and Hans-Ulrich Klose supported military action in Bosnia. See 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94, p.24

¹²⁹ ban., 'SPD streitet über Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/12/94.

¹³⁰ Ibid.; deu., 'Lafontaine geht auf Distanz zu Scharping', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31/12/94; 'Die neuen Kreuzritter', *Spiegel* 1, 2/1/95, pp.21f.; "'Unser Profil muß klar sein'", *Spiegel* 2, 9/1/95, p.16; 'Lafontaine widerspricht Scharping', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/2/95.

¹³¹ SPD, *Politik: Perspektiven einer neuen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, Beschluß des SPD-Parteitag (Wiesbaden, 16-19 November 1993), p.15. See also 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94; Ulrich Rosenbaum, 'Showdown in der SPD', *Welt*, 11/1/95; Ada Brandes, 'Streiten statt feiern muß der Sozialdemokrat', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/6/95.

In fact, the outcome of the Wiesbaden conference had been recently reaffirmed by similar decisions by the party presidium.¹³² Lafontaine insisted that a change in the party's position on out-of-area missions would first have to be approved by a new SPD party conference.¹³³

In spite of the increasing domestic pressure, the government failed to gain the unanimous consent of the SPD parliamentary party in December. Faced with apparently insurmountable divisions within the party, the SPD presidium agreed instead to defer a decision until the Cabinet had submitted a draft to the Bundestag.¹³⁴ The government was also rebuffed by the members of the Green party who rejected 'any participation of German fighting forces in military action in the former Yugoslavia'.¹³⁵ The ability of the Greens to resist the government's pressure was enhanced by the fact that it was linked to fewer proponents of the Tornado despatch than the SPD. The collective pressure from 24 per cent of their contacts in the network was still sizeable and suggested a likelihood that at least a section of the Greens would succumb to it in time.¹³⁶ Moreover, even if only the declared proponents of military action within the SPD sided with the government, the decision in favour of Tornado despatch had a comfortable majority in the Bundestag.¹³⁷ Thus, in spite of the government's failure to obtain the support of the opposition parties at the time, the prospects that a contribution of the German Bundeswehr in Bosnia would eventually be approved by the Bundestag were good.

¹³² ban., 'SPD streitet über Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/12/94; 'Wieczorek-Zeul lehnt Einsatz deutscher Tornados ab', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 20/12/94; 'Unser Profil muß klar sein', *Spiegel* 2, 9/1/95, p. 16; Ulrich Rosenbaum, 'Showdown in der SPD', *Welt*, 11/1/95.

¹³³ 'Vorbehalt von Scharping zu Bosnien-Einsatz', *Welt*, 21/12/94. At its special party conference at the end of 1992, the SPD decided that German peacekeeping troops had the right to use force for their protection. However, it demanded that the line to military action should not be crossed. See 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94, p. 24.

¹³⁴ Sto., 'Voigt: Grüne müssen bündnisfähig werden', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21/12/94.

¹³⁵ Sto., 'Grüne gegen deutsche Beteiligung in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 15/12/94; Tony Paterson, 'Will Luftwaffe fly to the UN's aid in Bosnia?', *European*, 16/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck 'Scharping und Kohl nähern sich', *Welt*, 16/12/94; ban., 'SPD streitet über Bundeswehr-Einsatz in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/12/94; "'Einsatz hätte Eskalation zur Folge'", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94; 'Grüne nicht mehr generell gegen Blauhelmeinsätze', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 27/12/94.

¹³⁶ The members of the Green parliamentary party were specifically exposed to the pressure and arguments in favour of a German contribution to the relief mission in Bosnia from Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister Rühle and Defence Ministry staff, with P_6 [gr] = $4/17 = 24\%$.

¹³⁷ C.G./Sto., 'Rühle: Keine deutschen Bodentruppen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21/12/94.

When the Cabinet met on 20 December with Inspector General Naumann to consider which forces would be offered to NATO for a withdrawal operation, the Chancellor could placate FDP ministers that the requirement of a significant parliamentary majority in support of the decision would be met. With the Coalition Meeting having already decided in favour of the Tornado despatch and 40 per cent of the actors linked to the Cabinet supporting the decision, the meeting formalised the government's policy reversal.¹³⁸ The Cabinet specified that the Bundeswehr should offer NATO eight Tornados, ten Transall transport aircraft, a minesweeper and fast patrol boats. Cabinet ministers, thereby, followed the recommendations of Inspector General Naumann who had just returned from the meeting of the NATO chiefs of defence staff in Den Haag.¹³⁹ In public, cabinet ministers justified the abandonment of the government's principle not to become involved in the former Yugoslavia with the argument that Germany could not leave its allies 'in the ditch'.¹⁴⁰

Although the cabinet decision had to be approved in the Bundestag before troops could be despatched, Germany's NATO allies chose to interpret the offer as a firm commitment.¹⁴¹ In the following months, officials at NATO's headquarters and in the Contact Group proceeded with their planning for the withdrawal and the regrouping of UNPROFOR on the basis of a Bundeswehr contribution. The transgovernmental coalition between the NATO military and German Bundeswehr, thus, made it increasingly difficult for Bundestag members to withdraw the offer. As the preparations for a withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces from Bosnia were pressed ahead because of the danger that the US Congress would lift the arms embargo by February, the German administration incorrectly claimed that the Bundestag's rejection of the Bundeswehr mission would be synonymous

¹³⁸ The actors which supported the despatch included Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister Rühle, officials from the Defence Ministry who advised the Cabinet, the Coalition Meeting, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians and, implicitly, the members of the Federal Constitutional Court, accounting for P₆ [Cab] = 8/20 = 40%.

¹³⁹ 'Bonner Hilfezusage für Blauhelm-Abzug aus Bosnien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, 'Vorbehalt von Scharping zu Bosnien-Einsatz', *Welt*, 21/12/94; fy., 'Bonn sagt Nato Hilfe zu', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 22/12/94; Charima Reinhardt, 'Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten für die Sicherung der Blauhelme an', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94.

¹⁴⁰ C.G., 'Die Bundesregierung bietet der Nato Flugzeuge und Schiffe an', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21/12/94; 'Bonner Hilfezusage für Blauhelm-Abzug aus Bosnien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21/12/94; Martin S. Lambeck, 'Vorbehalt von Scharping zu Bosnien-Einsatz', *Welt*, 21/12/94.

¹⁴¹ "Kein Hurra geschrien", *Spiegel* 51, 19/12/94, p.19.

with a breach of the North Atlantic Treaty.¹⁴²

The question whether the withdrawal, termed by NATO as 'Operation Determined Effort', required a German participation was not raised. The evidence in favour of this view was limited. In fact, only a day after the Cabinet meeting, the UN continued its aid delivery to Sarajevo without the allegedly indispensable protection of ECR-Tornados.¹⁴³ When the spokesman of the Green party, Jürgen Trittin, stated that it was not the SAM-6 missiles which were to be the target of Tornados that posed a threat for aid planes in Sarajevo, but the automatic guns which were fired from the surrounding mountains, the government brushed off his statement.¹⁴⁴ Doubts over the requirement of German Tornados were also raised by a report of the British journal 'Aviation Week & Space Technology' according to which US EF-111 planes had been used successfully against Serb anti-aircraft missiles on 21 and 23 November.¹⁴⁵

The domestic debate over the Tornado despatch dominated the decision-making process during its final stage until summer 1995. As argued above, the central claims made by the proponents of the mission such as the reliance of NATO on a Bundeswehr contribution and the obligation of Germany to participate in the NATO operation had been proved incorrect. Nevertheless, due to the formal and informal authority and influence of the actors who used these arguments in the German multilevel foreign policy network, they were effectively employed to exert pressure on the German public and the Bundestag.

Opposition Split Over Tornado Despatch

During the fourth and final stage of the Tornado debate from 20 December 1994 to 30 June 1995, the transnational coalition for a Bundeswehr operation in Bosnia was not able to further increase the pressure on the Bundestag as it had already exhausted all its direct and indirect linkages within the German foreign policy network. However, the pressure on the opposition parties was considerable and it was likely that they would eventually

¹⁴² "Kein Hurra geschrien", *Spiegel* 51, 19/12/94, p.18.

¹⁴³ See interview with Green spokesman Jürgen Trittin, "Einsatz hätte Eskalation zur Folge", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94.

¹⁴⁴ "Einsatz hätte Eskalation zur Folge", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94.

¹⁴⁵ 'Bonn bietet bis zu 2500 Soldaten für die Sicherung der Blauhelme an', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 22/12/94. See also 'Luft und Wasser', *Spiegel* 52, 26/12/94, p.23

acquiesce to the despatch.

Following the policy change of the Cabinet, the domestic debate slowed down until May 1995. Already in December the advocates of a Tornado despatch had employed unsuccessfully all their formal and informal relations with the parliamentary opposition to press for the approval of the Bundestag. However, the government could expect to wear the opposition down on the issue given that not only the members of the opposition parties, but also the Bundestag and its committees collectively were exposed to significant pressure from the cabinet ministers,

officials from the Defence Ministry and the members of the coalition parties. Although NATO military staff proceeded with their contingency plans on the basis of a German participation, the German government asserted that the question of a despatch was still open. The aim of the German government was to defer a vote in the Bundestag for as long as possible. The postponement had two advantages. First, the situation in the former Yugoslavia could improve and make a despatch of German Tornados obsolete. Second, the German administration had the opportunity to increase the support for military action among the opposition parties. Although the government could expect a secure vote in the Bundestag where CDU/CSU and FPD parliamentarians were in a majority and a collective pressure of 77 per cent should have ensured the support of a number of opposition members, the Kohl government continued to insist on a multiparty consensus for the decision.¹⁴⁶ The probability that the government would gain supporters among the opposition parties was highest in the SPD parliamentary party and the Bundestag

**Table 5.4 Preference Changes:
20 December 1994 - 30 June 1995**

7 th Phase (-28/6/95)			8 th Phase (-30/6/95)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
BT	71	U	BT	73	C
Med	52	NC	Med	54	NC
COF	50	NC	COF	50	NC
BR	47	U	BR	47	U
Fm	42	NC	spd	45	U
Com	40	C	Fm	42	NC
spd	40	U	grü	41	NC
vote	38	U	pds	41	NC
grü	35	NC	vote	38	U
pds	35	NC	Uns	11	NC
Uns	11	NC			

¹⁴⁶ $P_7 [BT] = 11508/16128 = 71\%$.

committees, which were under pressure from 40 per cent of the actors to which they were linked with the German foreign policy network.¹⁴⁷ At 35 per cent, the probability was somewhat lower among the Greens, yet still considerable.¹⁴⁸

In order to keep up the pressure on the opposition members, cabinet ministers closely cooperated with their NATO allies. By the end of January 1995, the detailed planning for 'Operation Determined Effort' was completed. However, when SACEUR US-General Joulwan asked NATO members to confirm their contribution offers for the withdrawal mission on 6 February, Chancellor Kohl agreed with Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister R  he and the Minister of the Chancellor's Office Bohl, that the permission of the Bundestag was not required until the actual despatch.¹⁴⁹ On Wednesday 22 February the Cabinet approved the contingency plans for a NATO operation in the former Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁰ The decision was designed to raise the stakes for a rejection of the despatch by the Bundestag. A parliamentary veto would have put the entire NATO operation into question and seriously damaged Germany's standing among its allies.¹⁵¹ Parliamentarians across all parties felt that Germany could not afford such an embarrassment. In addition, cabinet ministers and members of the coalition parties argued that Germany had an obligation to participate in Bosnia as a member of NATO. Although legal experts refuted this suggestion¹⁵², the argument was reiterated widely in the Bundestag and the media because it carried the authority of the government.

In spite of the Kohl government's strategic self-entanglement in NATO's withdrawal operation, both the SPD and the Greens remained split over the issue. The

¹⁴⁷ SPD parliamentarians were through their linkages in the network exposed to pressure from Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister R  he, Chancellor's Office Minister Bohl, Defence Ministry officials, the collective Cabinet, industry representatives and some US politicians, accounting for $P_7[\text{spd}] = 8/20 = 40\%$.

¹⁴⁸ The pressure on Green parliamentarians was somewhat lower than on the SPD due to fewer linkages to actors who supported a despatch, including Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Kinkel, Defence Minister R  he, Chancellor's Office Minister Bohl, Defence Ministry officials and the collective Cabinet which amounted to $P_7[\text{gr}] = 6/17 = 35\%$.

¹⁴⁹ eli, 'Vorerst kein Votum des Bundestages', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 8/2/95. See also Watson and Dodd, *Bosnia and Croatia*, p.22.

¹⁵⁰ fy., 'Bonn benennt Verb  nde f  r einen m  glichen Balkan-Einsatz', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 23/2/95.

¹⁵¹ Andrea Lederer (PDS), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 13. Wahlperiode, 18. Sitzung, 9 February 1995, p.1256. Compare 'Nur noch Gewalt', *Spiegel* 23, 5/6/95, p.31.

¹⁵² See for instance Alexia Hostein, *Das Verh  ltnis des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NATO und OSZE* (Stuttgart: Richard Boorberg Verlag, 1996), pp.151-208.

internal division of the SPD was represented by the continuing disagreement between its leading figures, in particular, party leader Rudolf Scharping and deputy leader Oskar Lafontaine.¹⁵³ However, the members of the right-wing 'Seeheimer Kreis' sided increasingly with the government and used their relations within the SPD parliamentary party to argue that if German Tornados were requested for the protection of UN aid delivery or the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, it was a question of solidarity which could not be rejected.¹⁵⁴

Since the governments of France and Britain were not able to agree on a withdrawal between February and May, but appeared to move away from it, the domestic debate in Germany abated. It was revived on 25 May, after a Serb attack on Tuzla killed 71 people and injured 150. The situation in Bosnia escalated when retaliatory air strikes by NATO planes destroyed five ammunition bunkers near the key Bosnian Serb base of Pale¹⁵⁵ and Serb forces responded by taking French, Ukrainian and Russian UN peacekeepers hostage and hand-cuffing them to strategically important positions.¹⁵⁶ The news of Serb hostage taking emerged during a meeting between Defence Minister Rühle and his British colleague Rifkind. An emergency meeting between Rühle, Rifkind and US Secretary of Defence William Perry failed to produce a political agreement on a military or diplomatic response.¹⁵⁷ However, among the NATO military, demands for a Bundeswehr contribution were reiterated as they considered various scenarios. Officers in the NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium, even raised the question whether German Tornados could protect helicopters during an evacuation of UN peacekeepers or in a rescue operation for the hostages.

¹⁵³ Ban., 'Lafontaine widerspricht Scharping', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/2/95. See also the interview with Oskar Lafontaine, 'Keine Tornados nach Bosnien', *Zeit*, 17/3/95.

¹⁵⁴ A policy paper by the groups was published in a shortened version in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. See Dieter Schloten and Wolfgang Bruckmann, 'Außen- und sicherheitspolitisch ist die SPD nicht regierungsfähig', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 19/1/95, p. 12. See also Günter Bannas, 'In der SPD wächst das Mißbehagen über außenpolitische Orientierungslosigkeit der Partei', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 17/1/95.

¹⁵⁵ Charles Reiss and Harriet Martin, 'Peacemen in human shield', *Evening Standard*, 26/5/95.

¹⁵⁶ Charles Reiss and Harriet Martin, 'Peacemen in human shield', *Evening Standard*, 26/5/95; 'Durch Luftangriffe haben sich die UN und Nato abermals geschwächt', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 29/5/95. According to UN sources, the Bosnian Serbs held altogether 328 UN soldiers hostage. See 'Paris, London und Washington schicken mehr Soldaten nach Bosnien und in die Adria', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 30/5/95.

¹⁵⁷ Kurt Scharf and Tom Condon, 'Serbs turn the screw on UN', *Scotland on Sunday*, 28/5/95.

The plan for the first time suggested that the Tornados' engagement should not be limited to a withdrawal of UNPROFOR as had been assumed by the German Cabinet in its decision in February. Conversely, the militaries in NATO intended for the Bundeswehr an active involvement in the increase of troops and the restructuring of the international forces in the former Yugoslavia. While still in Britain with his colleague Rifkind, R  he narrowly prevented a formal request.¹⁵⁸ However, as the French government increased its support for the step-up of military power in Bosnia, the German government's ability to postpone a decision in the Bundestag on the scope of Germany's contribution diminished. In a memorandum submitted to the North Atlantic Council, the French representative specifically proposed the reinforcement of UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction force. Fortunately for the German government, it was able to reject rumours that the French government planned to employ the German-French brigade in the operation. The brigade was not fully operational, amongst other reasons because conscripts were present in all its parts.¹⁵⁹

In the North Atlantic Council the French proposal for a rapid reaction force was controversially discussed. While there was no agreement on whether a withdrawal or an increase in military power was desirable, the deployment of additional troops had the advantage that it supported both alternatives.¹⁶⁰ The two main providers of troops for UNPROFOR, France and Britain, however, had abandoned their plans for a withdrawal.¹⁶¹ This shift in the policy was welcomed in the US and Germany, although for quite contrary reasons. In spite of domestic opposition in both countries, the two governments had offered their military support for a pull-out in the hope that this case would never come about. Increasing the military capabilities of UNPROFOR by a rapid reaction force was a gamble. While it prevented a withdrawal in the short term by safeguarding peacekeepers from Serb attacks, it raised the likelihood of a pull-out in the long term because the rapid reaction force was in danger of being drawn into the military conflict.

¹⁵⁸ 'Nur noch Gewalt', *Spiegel* 23, 5/6/95, p.30.

¹⁵⁹ fy., 'R  he rechnet mit milit  rischen Anforderungen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/6/95; fy., 'Welches Mandat? Welche Befehle?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 7/6/95.

¹⁶⁰ John Palmer, Julian Borger and Ian Black, 'Allies on Bosnia war footing', *Guardian*, 30/5/95.

¹⁶¹ John Major rejected a withdrawal in talks with US President Clinton and the French President Jacques Chirac.

Since neither the US nor German administration was able to reverse the French and British decision to despatch additional military troops, both governments decided to take the risk and support the reinforcement of UNRPOFOR. On 1 June, Bill Clinton offered to send American troops to Bosnia if the UN had to retreat. The German government in turn offered air support for the mission. Although the Cabinet had assured the opposition parties as late as 30 May that German forces would only become involved in Bosnia if UNPROFOR withdrew¹⁶², Defence Minister R  he also agreed to commit German Tornados for the planned regrouping of the peacekeeping troops.¹⁶³

As the four governments reached an agreement to step-up the military support for UNPROFOR, the Paris Conference on 3 June approved a joint French-British memorandum for an intervention with a rapid reaction force of 10,000 troops.¹⁶⁴ At the conference, the main proponents of the intervention, namely the representatives of France, Britain and the Netherlands, repeated their expectations that the other participating countries would contribute to the safeguarding and support of the rapid reaction force. Less than a week later, during their annual spring meeting, NATO defence ministers responded by offering NATO air fighting forces as backup for the intervention.¹⁶⁵ As part of these forces, the North Atlantic Council formally requested the air cover of Germany's ECR-Tornados.¹⁶⁶

The NATO request meant that a Bundestag vote on the despatch of the Tornados could no longer be avoided. Foreign Minister Kinkel and Defence Minister R  he had

¹⁶² Sto., 'Deutschland stellt Soldaten bereit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 31/5/95.

¹⁶³ Sto., 'R  he: Deutsche Soldaten m  ssen auf dem Balkan helfen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/6/95; 'Bonner Planspiele f  r Milit  raktion', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2/6/95; Jochen Siemens, 'Keine Vorratsentscheidung f  r Bundeswehreinsetze', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2/6/95; ban., 'SPD Fraktion wartet mit Entscheidung zu Bosnien auf die Bundesregierung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21/6/95.

¹⁶⁴ Mark Atkinson, 'Bosnia: Major to pressure Clinton on force for Bosnia', *Press Association*, 15/6/95. Compare Alex Macleod, 'French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership', *International Journal* LII:2, 1997, pp.243-264, p.260.

¹⁶⁵ Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqu  *, Brussels, 8 June 1995, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c950608a.htm>. See also Antrag der Bundesregierung, 'Deutsche Beteiligung an den Ma  nahmen zum Schutz und zur Unterst  tzung des schnellen Einsatzverbands im fr  heren Jugoslawien einschlie  lich des Unterst  tzung eines eventuellen Abzugs der VN-Friedenstruppen', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13/1802, 26 June 1995.

¹⁶⁶ "'Tornados" vor Verlegung nach Italien', *S  ddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/6/95; 'Auch Risiken f  r Deutsche', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 8/6/95; Manfred Geist, 'Deutsches Kontingent bis 2000 Mann - Einsatz im Juli', *Welt am Sonntag*, 11/6/95; Sto., 'Bundeskabinett entscheidet am Montag', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 22/6/95.

already started to use their linkages within the German foreign policy network to lobby for parliamentary support in discussions with the parliamentary party leaders and the members of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees.¹⁶⁷ In fact, Defence Minister Volker Rühle indicated that his British and French colleagues had communicated their intentions to him even before the Paris Conference, enabling him to prepare for the request.¹⁶⁸ The hostage crisis had already revived the debate over the German involvement in the former Yugoslavia among the opposition parties.¹⁶⁹ According to Karsten Voigt (SPD) who spoke to the *Südwestfunk* radio station on 29 May, a majority of SPD parliamentary party members were prepared to support a German participation in a withdrawal operation from Bosnia.¹⁷⁰ Voigt's estimate was exaggerated, but due to the persistent pressure from cabinet ministers and Defence Ministry officials, about 50 SPD parliamentarians had indicated their support for the mission.¹⁷¹ However, the SPD party leadership decided to reject the despatch of German Tornados in an internal vote on 12 June.¹⁷² To prevent the defection of their party colleagues, the left wing of the SPD demanded the imposition of a party whip.¹⁷³ However, party leader Scharping rejected the idea. Among the Greens, the debate over the possibility of a German involvement in the Bosnian crisis was equally fierce. In a meeting between the Green parliamentary party and

¹⁶⁷ 'Rühle: Deutsche Soldaten müssen auf dem Balkan helfen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/6/95; 'Bonner Plangspiele für Militäraktion', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 2/6/95; 'SPD-Fraktion wartet mit Entscheidung zu Bosnien auf die Bundesregierung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 21/6/95.

¹⁶⁸ *fy.*, 'Rühle rechnet mit militärischen Anforderungen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/6/95.

¹⁶⁹ 'Voigt für Militäreinsatz', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 30/5/95; *ban.*, "'Luftangriffe wirken nicht mäßigend'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 31/5/95.

¹⁷⁰ 'Voigt für Militäreinsatz', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 30/5/95.

¹⁷¹ *ub.*, '50 SPD-Abgeordnete wollen Regierung unterstützen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24/6/95; *ub./ck.*, 'Regierung bemüht sich um Stimmen der Opposition', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26/6/95. Compare also *ub./deu.*, "'Tornados" vor Verlegung nach Italien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/6/95; Ada Brandes, 'Entscheidung über Einsatz naht', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 7/6/95.

¹⁷² *ban.*, 'SPD-Vorstand gegen Einsatz deutscher Tornados in Bosnien', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 13/6/95; *ban.*, 'Entschluß des SPD-Vorstands umstritten', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 17/6/95; Ada Brandes, 'SPD streitet sich erneut über Tornado-Einsatz', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17/6/95; Ada Brandes, 'Bonn soll nicht schon Stimmen der SPD für Einsatz zählen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 20/6/95.

¹⁷³ *ban.*, 'Die SPD-Linke fodert eine "politische Vorgabe"', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 8/6/95; Günter Bannas, 'Und wenn die Serben den Sozialdemokraten Koschnik zur Geisel nähmen?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95. Compare also Lafontaine in an interview with *Die Zeit*, "'Die SPD muß nein sagen'", *Zeit*, 9/6/95.

their party leadership a common position failed to emerge.¹⁷⁴ The lobbying from the administration which accounted for 35 per cent of the actors to which the Greens were linked in the German foreign policy network had apparently been successful.¹⁷⁵ About a fifth of the Green parliament members were believed to agree with an intervention.¹⁷⁶

Since the internal debate in the opposition parties was still not resolved, officials from the Chancellor's Office and the Foreign Ministry again tried to postpone the Bundestag vote.¹⁷⁷ However, British and French defence ministers urged the German government finally to commit its Tornados to the despatch. Tactically just before a meeting of the German Cabinet on Wednesday 21 June, the French government issued a statement in which it expressed its determination to increase the military pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At the same time, the French Defence Minister Charles Millon arrived for talks with his German counterpart Rühle.¹⁷⁸ The time pressure on the German government to submit the issue to the Bundestag further increased when Britain threatened to announce the withdrawal of its forces by the end of September.¹⁷⁹ This would immediately require the send-off of the German Tornados. On Monday 26 June, the German Cabinet eventually met to decide on the issue. Unsurprisingly given its previous commitment and the balance of preferences in the German foreign policy network, the Cabinet agreed to support the reordering of UNPROFOR with ECR-Tornados.¹⁸⁰ In addition, the Cabinet offered naval minesweeping and a field hospital. The operation was estimated to cost

¹⁷⁴ 'Rühle: Deutsche Soldaten müssen auf dem Balkan helfen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/6/95; Ada Brandes, 'Fixiert auf den Tornado-Einsatz', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 3-5/6/95; Sto., 'Grüne streiten über Bundeswehreinsätze', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95.

¹⁷⁵ P_7 [gr] = 6/17 = 35%.

¹⁷⁶ ub., '50 SPD-Abgeordnete wollen Regierung unterstützen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 24/6/95. Compare also ub./deu., "'Tornados" vor Verlegung nach Italien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/6/95; Sto., 'Grüne streiten über Bundeswehreinsätze', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/95. According to Ursula Schönberger the circle of members in favour of intervention had even grown to a fourth or third. See 'Grüne über möglichen Einsatz', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/6/95; Peter Ziller, 'Grüne Tabubrecher rütteln am Pazifismus', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 14-15/6/95.

¹⁷⁷ Martin Fietz, 'Rühle: Keine militärische Lösung in Bosnien', *Welt*, 14/6/95.

¹⁷⁸ Martin S. Lambeck, 'Bosnien: Druck auf Bonn wächst', *Welt*, 20/6/95.

¹⁷⁹ Ian Bruce, 'UK planning Bosnia troop pull-out', *Herald*, 26/6/95.

¹⁸⁰ Antrag der Bundesregierung, 'Deutsche Beteiligung an den Maßnahmen zum Schutz und zur Unterstützung des schnellen Einsatzverbands im früheren Jugoslawien einschließlich der Unterstützung eines eventuellen Abzugs der VN-Friedenstruppen', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13/1802, 26 June 1995. See also C.G./ban., 'Kabinetts stimmt Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 27/6/95.

345m Deutsche Mark, 200m of which were to be made available through savings in the defence budget, 145m from reductions in the national budget. Finance Minister Waigel criticised the expenses, but the majority of ministers in the Cabinet were determined to contribute to the international operation in Bosnia.¹⁸¹

Once the Cabinet had decided on the exact contributions, a proposal for submission to the Bundestag was drafted. In spite of a degree of pressure of 45 per cent¹⁸², the members of the SPD presidium narrowly agreed to bring in an alternative bill in which the involvement of German ECR-Tornados was rejected because of the offensive character of their mission.¹⁸³ However, in concession to the divisions within the party, SPD leader Scharping assured that all members were free to vote in the Bundestag according to their own conscience.¹⁸⁴ The discussion in the Foreign Affairs Committee which met a day before the Bundestag debate was more consensual. In the committee the pressure from the administration, including the recent lobbying of the Defence Ministry, had succeeded in gaining the support of nearly all members for the despatch. In fact, all but one of the SPD members in the committee would eventually side with the government.¹⁸⁵

On 30 June, after a four-hour debate the Bundestag approved the despatch of German troops to the former Yugoslavia with a simple majority of 386 members to 258.¹⁸⁶ Reflecting the support for the despatch of the Tornados among the actors to which they were linked in the network, 45 SPD parliamentarians supported the government.¹⁸⁷ Only four members of the Green party voted for the government bill. The members of the

¹⁸¹ msl., 'Kabinett für Bosnien-Einsatz', *Welt*, 27/6/95.

¹⁸² $P_g[\text{spd}] = 9/20 = 45\%$.

¹⁸³ C.G./ban., 'Kabinett stimmt Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 27/6/95; msl., 'Kabinett für Bosnien-Einsatz', *Welt*, 27/6/95; Ada Brandes and Stephan Hebel, 'Kabinett beschließt Kriegseinsatz', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 27/6/95; u.b., 'SPD will deutschen Piloten nur Aufklärung erlauben', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 28/6/95; Ada Brandes and Peter Ziller, 'Opposition lehnt Einsatzplanung für Bosnien ab', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 28/6/95.

¹⁸⁴ ban., 'Scharping: SPD nicht isoliert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 28/6/95.

¹⁸⁵ ban., 'Scharping: SPD nicht isoliert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 28/6/95; 'Kinkel will nicht mehr werden, als er jetzt ist', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/7/95.

¹⁸⁶ Out of 655 parliamentarians which had been present for the vote.

¹⁸⁷ These were fewer than the 69 who had supported the despatch of Tornados before the vote. See ub./csc, 'Wehrpflichtige nur als Freiwillige nach Bosnien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 29/6/95.


coalition parties unanimously supported the government decision.¹⁸⁸ Despite the support of 49 opposition members, the result fell short of a two-thirds majority which would have been required for a constitutional amendment. It, thus, hardly met the standards implied by the Kohl Cabinet in December 1994 when it announced that only a 'significant' majority in the Bundestag would suffice for a decision regarding the first military operation of the Bundeswehr out of area. Nevertheless, the government accepted the decision.

5.3 Conclusion

In order to summarise the findings and evaluate the propositions of multilevel network theory in the case regarding the decision of the German Bundestag to despatch Tornados to Bosnia, this conclusion turns again to the four indicators identified in the previous case studies, namely the frequency and probability of preference changes with rising degrees of pressure, the distribution of the four behavioural categories 'no change' 'unclear or undecided', 'change' and 'blocked' across the range of pressure from zero to 100 per cent, the average degree of pressure for each behavioural category and the timing of the preference changes in the research period. It refrains from comparing in detail the findings of this case with the two British case studies which will be reserved for the final chapter of this thesis. However, it examines whether the inductive propositions derived from the British cases also apply to the German foreign policy decision-making process. Finally, it discusses which new insights into the decision to despatch German Tornados to Bosnia were presented by multilevel network theory.

Assessment of the Hypotheses

The first hypothesis which asserts that increasing degrees of pressure are related to higher probabilities of preference change is confirmed by the empirical evidence for




¹⁸⁸ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 13. Wahlperiode, 48. Sitzung, 30 June 1995, pp.3955-4039; ban./fy., 'Der Bundestag mit deutlicher Mehrheit für den Bosnien-Einsatz der Bundeswehr', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 1/7/95; Steve Crawshaw, 'German vote to send planes', *Independent*, 1/7/95.


all behavioural categories. Although the relative frequency of preference changes as displayed in Graph 5.1 appears to deviate from the hypothesised increase with rising degrees of pressure, the first hypothesis was corroborated in 113 out of 118 instances. The seemingly contradictory findings can be explained by the fact that the deviation in the first degree range is due to only a single instance, while the deviations in the 25-35 per cent degree ranges is based on four instances. With five deviations out of 118 instances, the first hypothesis was matched by 96 per cent of the observed preference changes.

The proposed probabilistic causal relationship between degrees of pressure and preference changes is further supported by the second indicator, i.e. the frequency distribution of the three behavioural categories 'no change', 'unclear or undecided' and 'change'. Although the clarity of the findings is impeded by the low number of preference changes in this case, the empirical evidence generally conforms with the first hypothesis. The distribution of the 'no change' category matches almost exactly the expectation of an early peak at low degrees of pressure followed by an almost consistent decline. As in the British case studies, it appears to meet a threshold, although at a slightly higher level than the previous


Graph 5.2 'No Change'



Graph 5.3 'Unclear or Undecided'



Graph 5.4 'Change'



cases, between 50 and 55 per cent.

The distribution of the 'no change' category is closely matched by the frequency of the unclear and undecided instances. However, as hypothesised, the peak and slope are shifted to the right. An interesting observation is that the number of unclear or undecided positions was particularly high in proportion to the other behavioural categories in this case. Moreover, in six instances shifting preference positions were maintained in spite of very high degrees of pressure ranging from 55 to 75 per cent. The exception was in all six instances the Bundestag. It meets the observation made with regard to the two British cases that collective decision units are able to resist higher degrees of pressure. However, an explanation of this exception has to go beyond multilevel network theory. Thus, it emerges from the previous analysis of the case that it was Chancellor Kohl who insisted that a decision in favour of the despatch had to be based on a broader parliamentary majority than constitutionally necessary. In network terms, he single-handedly changed - or rather maintained - the veto power of a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag members it as had been the case before the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court.

The frequency curve of the 'change' category, nevertheless, meets the predictions. Specifically, the number of actors who changed their preferences peaks at a range between 25 and 45 per cent. The degree of pressure is significantly higher than that of actors who retained their original policy position. The single instance in the 50-55 per cent bracket still falls within the critical range, leaving the Bundestag's final reversal at 73 per cent, which has been explained above, as the only deviation.

Table 5.5 Descriptive Statistics

Preference Changes	Number of Instances	Range of Pressure	Minimum Pressure	Maximum Pressure	Average Pressure
No Change (NC)	70	43%	11%	54%	25%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	38	65%	16%	71%	33%
Change (C)	10	73%	0%	73%	36%
Blocked (B)	1	0%	57%	57%	57%

Again, the averages as displayed in Table 5.5 show a much clearer picture of the correlation between degrees of pressure and preference modification. The average


pressure which actors were able to withstand was at 25 per cent significantly lower than the average pressure at which actors changed their preferences at 36 per cent. The mean of pressure at which actors were divided or their position was unclear lay at 33 per cent again between the two.

The timing of preference reversals also supports the link between the degree of pressure to which actors were exposed and their policy position. As outlined in Table 5.6 all actors with the exception of the Federal Constitutional Court modified their preferences immediately after the number of related network actors who demanded a change in policy had increased.

Table 5.6
Timing of Preference Changes

1st phase after an increase in pressure	Other
Nato-CM (27% -> 51%)	BVG (0%, no increase)
Cha (26% -> 29%)	
FM (26% -> 29%)	
Coa (27% -> 33%)	
fdp ((21% -> 26%)	
Cab (30% -> 40%)	
CM (31% -> 38%)	
Com (35% -> 40%)	
BT (71% -> 73%)	

In the case of the German Tornados the number of blocking instances was too small to give any general indications about the circumstances and use of a veto strategy. The absence of veto behaviour in international organisations can be explained by the overwhelming majority in favour of a German engagement in Bosnia in the North Atlantic Council and the Contact Group. Although the German government could have attempted to veto the formal NATO request for a German contribution at the Council meeting in early December 1994, no evidence could be found which confirms such a strategy. This can be explained by the observation that half of the German NATO representatives, namely Defence Minister Volker R  he and the Defence Ministry were in favour of the request. In fact, the minister and Bundeswehr officials appeared to have used their linkages within NATO to exert pressure on their own government. Moreover, if any conclusions can be transferred from the British to the German



cases, they would suggest that the pressure for a despatch of the ECR-Tornados in the North Atlantic Council would have overruled a German veto. A similar assessment can be made with regard to the Contact Group. In addition, the German government was unable to prevent being drawn into the conflict by blocking the UN's consideration of a withdrawal. In particular, it lacked a seat on the UN Security Council which had the authority over the international peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

The only instance of blocking behaviour occurred in the Bundestag before the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on 12 July. Because of the two-thirds requirement for the approval of a constitutional amendment, the members of the opposition parties were able to veto a German military contribution to the peacekeeping operation. The high average pressure withstood by the Bundestag at 57 per cent has to be understood in these terms. The decision of the Constitutional Court that out-of-area missions were permissible under the existing regulations of the Basic Law deprived the opposition of their veto option. The decision of Chancellor Kohl to try to achieve the largest majority possible in the Bundestag for Germany's first military out-of-area mission, however, informally continued the two-thirds requirement. Nevertheless, the fact that the government parties were supported by only a small number of SPD and Green parliamentarians amounting to a 58 per cent majority in the Bundestag vote on 30 June, eventually did not prevent the despatch.

New Insights into the Despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia

In addition to providing confirmation for the empirical validity of the hypotheses proposed by multilevel network theory across different networks, the preceding analysis offers a distinct perspective of the German decision to despatch Tornados to Bosnia. In particular, multilevel network theory raises doubts over the suggestion that in the debate over the Tornado despatch the German government pursued a clear strategy designed to overcome public inhibitions against military action out of area.¹⁸⁹ Conversely, the empirical evidence from the case study reveals that the government was initially divided over the question of a Tornado deployment in Bosnia. In particular, Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister

¹⁸⁹ Michael E. Smith, 'Sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans: The Domestic Politics of Reflexive Multilateralism', *German Politics and Society* 14:4, 1996, pp.49-67.

Kinkel appeared to have honestly been opposed to a first military mission in the Balkans due to Germany's history in the region. The government's repeated postponement of the decision and Kohl's insistence that a Tornado despatch would have to be approved by more than a simple majority in the Bundestag provide further evidence for the view that not all cabinet ministers were convinced of the need or political viability of the despatch.

Multilevel network analysis suggests conversely that the German government and, later, the Bundestag changed its position in the issue due to considerable international and transgovernmental pressure for a military contribution to the international operation in Bosnia. In particular, it illustrates the emergence and critical role of a transgovernmental coalition between the NATO military, Defence Minister Rühle and Bundeswehr officials in bringing about the policy change of the German government. The analysis of the decision-making process indicates that the latter were able to use their boundary position within the network strategically to exert pressure over a range of domestic actors, in particular, Chancellor Kohl and his cabinet ministers and, thus, form a winning coalition in favour of the Tornado despatch.

However, multilevel network theory suggests that while their boundary position helped Rühle and Bundeswehr officials such as General Inspector Naumann to press to the Tornado mission, it did not relieve them of the need to gain broader domestic support for the decision. In particular, the analysis reveals that the Cabinet only decided to submit the issue to a vote in the Bundestag after a range of national actors in the German foreign policy network, such as the members of the FDP parliamentary party and sections of the SPD and Greens, had modified their views in favour of the despatch. Moreover, as in the two British case studies, the eventual policy change appears to have been linked to the emergence of a national as well as international majority in support of the decision.

6. Case IV: The Relaxation of Dual-Use Export Regulations

6.1 Introduction

When in 1989 news emerged that German companies had played a significant role in the construction of a chemical weapons factory in Rabta, Libya, the German government responded by introducing tighter controls on the transfer of goods with civilian and military applications ('dual-use'). In a number of amendments between 1989 and 1992 the German Foreign Trade Act became one of the most restrictive export regulations in Europe. However, while initially stronger national and international controls of sensitive exports were widely supported in Germany and the transatlantic community, by 1992 domestic pressure began to mount for a relaxation of the regulations. In particular, the German machine and electronic industries pressed for a re-evaluation of the export controls on dual-use equipment because they felt internationally disadvantaged.

Following the introduction of the single European market in January 1993 which abolished border controls for intra-European exports, the question whether to maintain national controls for dual-use transfers or to introduce a common European scheme, the German export regulations came also under international pressure. The governments of Britain and France insisted that any common European dual-use transfer controls would have to be based on the lowest common denominator among the member states. Due to the pressure from their European counterparts, officials from the German Economics Ministry, who led the European negotiations for the German government, soon adjusted their policy advice in favour of less restrictive controls. Moreover, representatives of the German industry were able to gain the backing of the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) members in the Bundestag. By the end of 1994, the balance of pressures in the German foreign policy network had changed in favour of a relaxation of the German controls. Following this shift, the German government not only acceded to the common framework for European dual-use transfers, but also reduced its controls beyond the requirements of the common regulations.

This case study examines why the German government decided to relax its dual-use goods export controls in 1994-95, although it had tightened the regulations only two years earlier. Specifically, it analyses the role of the decision-making process defined as

the formation of a winning coalition for the reduction of the German dual-use export controls in this radical policy change. Using multilevel network theory, the case study investigates how the actors of the German foreign policy network used their relations to influence each others' preferences. Specifically, it seeks to test the theory's two hypotheses which link the degree of pressure and the ability to use a veto in collective decision-making institutions to the probability that an actor would change his or her policy preference.

As in the previous case study, the ultimate decision unit with regard to dual-use export controls was the German Bundestag which had to approve all amendments to the German Foreign Trade Act. Although the European negotiations over common controls were instrumental in the revision of the German Foreign Trade Act, the focus on the national decision is merited by two reasons. First, the negotiations over common European export regulations proceeded on an intergovernmental level, i.e. outside the formal decision-making procedures of the European Community, since security-related issues are excluded from the EC's competences under article 223 of the Treaty of Rome.¹ Thus, the German government, like all other EC member states, had the ability to veto or opt out of common European dual-use export regulations at any time during the decision-making process. In addition, as indicated above, the national reduction of German dual-use export controls in 1995 went *beyond* the stipulations of the European agreement and, therefore, requires further explanation.

In order to avoid confusion between causes internal to the network and those external to it, particular attention in the selection of this case was paid to changes in the environment of the German foreign policy network. Several arguments can be brought forward to support the view that exogenous factors did not significantly change with regard to the sale of dual-use equipment during the research period. First, the danger of conventional, nuclear, chemical and biological proliferation did not decrease so as to justify less restrictive dual-use export controls. While the end of the Cold War reduced perceptions of threat from the former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the sale of its military technology to Third World

¹ *Treaty Establishing the European Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957, Part Six, Article 223, at <http://europa.eu.int/>.

countries actually increased the dangers of international proliferation. Second, the Gulf War and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia illustrated that a multipolar international system was not necessarily more peaceful. Conversely, rogue states in the Middle East or Eastern Europe showed that they were willing to use the weapons they had acquired to achieve political and military aims. Third, although the governments of Germany and other Western industrialised countries enhanced their export controls, the series of arms export scandals continued unabated after the Rabta affair. In particular, the UN investigation into the Iraqi weapons programme after the end of the Gulf War provided a continuous stream of information about the contribution of American and Western European companies to the build-up of Third World weapons arsenals.² Further scandals included the sale of sensitive technology to Iran and the building of a second Libyan chemical weapons plant near Tarhuna.³

In addition, the case of the German dual-use goods export controls is particularly interesting for multilevel network analysis because the argument put forward by the German government to justify its decision, namely that its policy reversal was attributable to the common European export regulations is insufficient, if not incorrect. The European negotiations, which are to a large extent analysed by multilevel network theory, contributed to the change of the German dual-use export controls in early 1995. However, the negotiations do not explain why the German Cabinet decreased its controls beyond the common requirements stipulated by the EC. Indeed, the German government could have maintained stricter export regulations in some areas since the agreement included a clause which allowed tighter national regulations if they were regarded as necessary to safeguard national security interests. Specifically, the German government could have preserved its export restrictions for certain volatile countries which were identified in the so called 'H' list. The 'H' list had been the most contentious section of the German Foreign Trade Act among national and international actors. However, country controls were the most efficient means of dual-use export controls. Ironically, the German government itself had

² Ian Mather and Roman Rollnick, 'Iraq arms build-up "portends second Gulf war"', *European*, 1/7/93.

³ Simon Tisdall, 'Oil gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies', *Guardian*, 28/11/92; Michael Evans, 'Spy agencies join forces to combat secret arms trade', *Times*, 20/9/93.

made this argument in the introduction of the H list.⁴ Thus, the Kohl Cabinet's decision to drastically shorten Germany's country list even before the EC regulations came into place indicates that the common European controls were neither the only nor the main reason for the government's policy change. The fact that the British government maintained its country list under the European agreement increases the doubts over the explanation offered by the German government.

The case study follows the pattern of the previous studies of an extensive chronological analysis of the decision-making process and a summary of the findings with regard to the testing of the two hypotheses of multilevel network theory. The first section of the case study examines the conditions which led to the initial strengthening of German dual-use export controls after the Rabta affair and the re-emergence of the issue in 1992. The following chronological analysis of the decision-making process between 1992 and 1995 is structured in three parts. During the first part, from February 1992 to January 1993, the beginning of the European negotiations over common dual-use transfer controls led to increasing European pressure on the German government to accept lower controls standards. Since the majority of European governments objected to tight controls, the European Commissioner in charge of the internal market, Martin Bangemann, who had initially envisaged restrictive and centralised controls soon modified his proposals accordingly. Moreover, the German government's attempts to strengthen export controls through multilateral regimes such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and a weapons register at the United Nations (UN) suffered from a similar lack of international support.

While the German administration was at first able to resist international demands for a reduction of its controls, it came under increasing domestic pressure between January 1993 to April 1994. In addition to transnational pressure from their European colleagues, officials in the Ministry of Economics in particular were subject to mounting demands from CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians who challenged the viability of maintaining the

⁴ 'Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Hermann Bachmeier, Wolfgang Roth, Ernst Schwanhold, Lieselott Blunck (Uetersen), Dr. Ulrich Böhme (Unna), Edelgard Bulmahn, Ursula Burchardt, Hans Martin Bury, Norbert Gansel, Lothar Ibrügger, Walter Kolbow, Dr. Klaus Kübler, Bernd Reuter, Dieter Schloten, Dr. Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Dr. Peter Struck, Hans-Ulrich Klose und der Fraktion der SPD - Drucksache 12/3229', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/4241, 1 February 1993, pp.9f.

high export control standard of the Foreign Trade Act. When Economics Ministry officials changed their position on the issue, the emerging transnational coalition among the various representatives of the European Economics Ministries was soon able to convince Minister of Economics Günter Rexrodt (FDP), Defence Minister Volker Rühle (CDU) and the relevant staff in the Defence Ministry of the necessity to reduce controls. However, the government maintained its export policy because Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) insisted that the country list in particular should not be touched. Nevertheless, during the final stage of the debate between April and December 1994, the ability of Foreign Minister Kinkel to resist the national and international pressure weakened. On 9 December the German Cabinet announced its decision to cut back the country list from 32 to nine states. A majority in the Bundestag approved the amendment of the Foreign Trade Act in spring 1995. Summarizing these findings, the conclusion evaluates the explanatory value of the hypotheses of multilevel network theory and assesses the insights into German foreign policy decision-making which were gained from the analysis.

6.2 German Dual-use Export Policy

The reconsideration of the German dual-use export regulations is best understood in the context of the national and international conditions which defined the agenda and the options with regard to the development of a comprehensive and restrictive dual-use control system in Germany between 1990 and 1992. The initial tightening of German dual-use export regulations followed the Rabta affair at the beginning of 1989.⁵ Intelligence information published by US American news sources revealed that German companies had sold dual-use technology to Libya where it had been used to build a chemical weapons factory in Rabta. The reaction to the news was outrage, both abroad and in Germany.⁶ The

⁵ For details see Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen Bundestag über eine mögliche Beteiligung deutscher Firmen an einer C-Waffen-Produktion in Libyen', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/3995, 15 February 1989; Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht der Bundesregierung über legale und illegale Waffenexporte in den Irak und die Aufrüstung des Irak durch Firmen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/487, 8 May 1991.

⁶ Herbert Wulf, 'The Federal Republic of Germany', in Ian Anthony, ed., *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.72-85, p.83; Wolfgang Hantke, 'Stricter Controls on Arms Exports for Dual-use Goods: A Case Study for Drafting and Enacting Statutory Regulations' in Hans Günter Brauch, Henny Van Der Graaf, John Grin and Wim A. Smit, eds., *Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp.257-268, p.257; Hartwig

heated international and domestic debate about the need for stricter export controls for dual-use equipment which followed was fuelled by the discovery that German firms had also contributed to the military build-up of Iraq. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91, the fact that German soldiers did not participate in the Gulf War alongside contingents from the US, France and Britain contributed to the international criticism of Germany's foreign policy. In reaction to national and international demands for tighter controls on dual-use equipment, the government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl introduced a range of amendments to the Weapons of War Act and the Foreign Trade Act between 1990 and 1992.⁷ Among others, the German government introduced the 'H' country list which established special controls for dual-use exports to 54 states.⁸ Although the list was shortened to 35 after the end of the Cold War, the new German export regulations for dual-use equipment were now among the strictest in Europe.⁹

However, German companies had not be alone in exporting extensively to sensitive regions in the Middle East. By 1992, the British administration was compromised by the 'supergun' and 'Matrix Churchill' affairs¹⁰ and the US Commerce Department was accused of having ignored warnings from the Pentagon over American arms sales to Iraq

Hummel, *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Münster: Lit, 1991), p.226; Ulrich Egger, *"Dual-Use"-Waren. Exportkontrolle und EG-Vertrag* (Köln: Heymann, 1996), p.1; Thomas Jestädt and Nicholas Baron von Behr, 'Das neue Exportkontrollrecht für Dual-use-Güter', *RJW* 9, 1995, pp.715-719, p.716.

⁷ Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Fünften Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4230, 16 March 1989; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4568, 19 May 1989; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes, des Strafgesetzbuches und anderer Gesetze', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1134, 10 September 1991; Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Errichtung eines Bundesausfuhramtes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1461, 5 November 1991.

⁸ Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), p.7; Wulf, 'The Federal Republic of Germany', p.75.

⁹ Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.7.

¹⁰ Rosie Waterhouse and Sarah Strickland, 'British firms "helped Saddam"', *Independent on Sunday*, 31/3/91; Philip Johnston, 'Matrix Churchill Affair: Did ministers alter sales policy and then mount a cover-up?', *Daily Telegraph*, 12/11/92. The British government admitted exports in the House of Commons. See Mr. Aitken, *Hansard*, Vol.214, Col.250, Written Answers, 18 November 1992. Compare also David Pallister, Kathy Evans and Simon Tisdall, 'The Tehran Connection: Oil sales to US help bankroll Iranian drive for rearmament', *Guardian*, 11/11/92; Tim Kelsey, 'EC "could become a heaven for arms trade"', *Independent*, 31/12/92.

and Jordan.¹¹ As most Western European governments and the US were forced to acknowledge that they were by far free from blame, the tightening of export legislation in Germany was matched by similar developments in the US¹², Britain¹³, France¹⁴, Italy¹⁵, the Netherlands¹⁶, Belgium¹⁷ and Denmark¹⁸.

The range of international anti-proliferation agreements was also expanded. Alerted by the construction of a chemical weapons factory from fertiliser plant components in Rabta, the 'Australia Group', an informal group of 31 countries committed to chemical and biological non-proliferation, extended its controls to cover dual-use equipment and technology which could be used to manufacture chemical weapons.¹⁹ The Australia Group, which included among others Germany, Britain, France and the US, also expanded its list

¹¹ Alan Friedman and Peter Riddell, 'Crisis in the Gulf: US officials ignored objections to "dual-use" exports to Iraq', *Financial Times*, 19/9/90; Alan Friedman, 'US ignored alert on arms to Baghdad', *Financial Times*, 17/4/91; Simon Tisdall, 'Baker "signed clearance for Iraqi arms company"', *Guardian*, 19/10/92; Simon Tisdall, 'Scandal haunting Bush's dog-days', *Guardian*, 19/10/92; Simon Tisdall, 'Oil gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies', *Guardian*, 28/11/92.

¹² 'Bush tightens export laws', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:1, 5/1/91, p.7; Louise Kehoe, 'US call to curb navigation aid sales: Proposal to place security restriction on equipment used to pinpoint Gulf war targets', *Financial Times*, 14/6/91; Louise Kehoe, 'Technology: Competition threatened from the enemy within', *Financial Times*, 20/6/91.

¹³ In Britain, the tightening of controls led to educational measures in the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) to help the identification of dual-use equipment and a reinstatement of several items which had been previously eliminated from the 1989 *Export of Goods (Control) Order*. See Holly Porteous, 'UK puts onus on industry', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:13, 28/9/91, p.577. Officials nevertheless took a 'relaxed view' of dual-use equipment transfers. See David Pallister, 'Arms and the salesman: In the wake of war, arms control is high on the agenda - but there are commercial considerations', *Guardian*, 13/5/91. Stricter regulations were only introduced on nuclear equipment. See David White, 'A sharp shock to the system: Iraq's nuclear programme has exposed weaknesses in the Non-Proliferation Treaty', *Financial Times*, 5/10/91. In 1993, Britain tightened its controls over dual-use exports to Iran. See 'Parliament & Politics: Britain tightens arms export curbs on Iran', *Herald*, 2/3/93.

¹⁴ 'Export law review', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:13, 30/3/91, p.466. After a public outcry over French sales to Iraq, State Secretary for Defence Genon Renon was tasked with at tightening of arms export controls. See 'French to list export details', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:19, 11/5/91, p.775.

¹⁵ James Walker, 'Exports eased as arms ban bites', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:3, 20/1/90, p.97; 'Italy's new rules', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:19, 12/5/90, p.930. See also Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.7.

¹⁶ Marc Rogers, 'One Europe, one policy', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:7, 17/7/91, p.290.

¹⁷ J.A.C. Lewis, 'Belgians move on export law', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:12, 23/3/91, p.430.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Sten Lundbo, 'Non-Proliferation: Expansion of Export Control Mechanisms', *Aussenpolitik* 42:2, 1997, pp.137-147, p.138. The Australia Group includes among others all Germany, Britain, France and the United States. For a full list of member states see 'Table of membership of multilateral military related export control regimes', at http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/natexpcon/country_matrix.html.

of precursor chemical substances from nine to fifty.²⁰ The discovery of the 'supergun' project in Iraq triggered a revision of the Missile Technology Control Regime among a similar set of member states. The regime had been established in 1987 and issued common guidelines for the export of missiles and related equipment, material and technology.²¹ The transfer of nuclear related technology was in turn further regulated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, two informal groups of countries which, unlike the Australia Group, not only included most Western European states and the US, but also Russia.²² At their meeting in Warsaw on 3 April 1992, the Nuclear Suppliers Group specifically agreed on common export regulations for dual-use goods with nuclear applications.²³

In spite of the broad consensus underlying the unilateral and multilateral tightening of dual-use export regulations between 1990 and 1992, the impending implementation of the European single market on 1 January 1993 put the new export controls almost immediately into question. The dismantling of border controls and licensing procedures for EC internal transfers threatened to undermine not only national export regulations on armaments and dual-use technology all over Europe, but also the multilateral regimes which were all nationally implemented. If effective controls were to be maintained, EC member states had to coordinate their policies. How this was to be achieved was a contentious issue among the member states. While EC members agreed that weapons exports should remain strictly under national authority according to article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, the distribution of competences was not so clear in the case of dual-use goods because they had primarily civilian applications.²⁴

The EC member states had three options. First, they could treat the transfer of

²⁰ Hantke, 'Stricter Controls on Arms Exports for Dual-use Goods', p.260.

²¹ See <http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/>.

²² Lundbo, 'Non-Proliferation', pp.141f.; Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.14. For a full list of member states see 'Table of membership of multilateral military related export control regimes', at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/country_matrix.html.

²³ See *The Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting, Warsaw, Poland, 3 April 1992 and its Memorandum of Understanding on Implementation of the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology*, at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/nsg_plenary92.htm. See also Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.14.

²⁴ *Treaty Establishing the European Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957, Part Six, Article 223, at <http://europa.eu.int/>.

dual-use equipment as weapons exports and continue their national controls. Second, EC members could dismantle their national regulations and replace them by common European controls which would apply to all exports outside the EC. Finally, member states could seek to establish a multilateral control regime for dual-use equipment which included not only the EC, but also the United States and other industrialised countries. The impending renegotiation of the COCOM regime which had regulated dual-use exports of Western industrialised countries during the Cold War presented an opportunity for the latter. During the first stage of the decision-making process, all three options were still under consideration. However, as the following analysis will show, the pressure from various national and international actors in the German multilevel foreign policy network soon narrowed the debate down to the establishment of common EC regulations.

EC Negotiations Increase Pressure for Reduction of German Controls

The beginning of the debate over a revision of the German controls in view of common European dual-use controls immediately followed the approval of the German Bundestag for the nineteenth amendment of the Foreign Trade Act on 14 February 1992 which completed the tightening of the German dual-use export control system. While the distribution of preferences had been very much in favour of restrictive controls during the previous two years, the negotiations in the EC over common regulations for dual-use exports after the implementation of the internal market considerably changed the conditions which had led to the establishment of the new restrictive German legislation. Most importantly, it gave Germany's European partners a direct interest in the level of the German dual-use export controls.

Before the start of the European negotiations the German industry, represented by its national associations such as the German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) and the Federation of German Industries (BDI), had been isolated in its advocacy of less restrictive export rules. In fact, key figures of the German industry themselves had initially supported stricter export controls after the scandals in Iraq and Libya. The international outrage at media reports of German armaments exports had been perceived as detrimental to the industry's reputation. However, as early as 1991, industry spokespersons had criticised the extent of the new regulations because it reduced the industry's international

competitiveness.²⁵

The passing of the nineteenth amendment of the Foreign Trade Act, however, showed the resolve of the government and parliamentarians from all parties that German companies should not again be allowed to become involved in the military build-up in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world. Successive export scandals kept the public wary about the assurances of the industry that there had merely been a few 'black sheep'. Due to the widespread national consensus regarding the tightening of the controls, the industry had not been able to prevent or change the revision of the German export regulations. With the start of negotiations about common European dual-use export controls, the industry instantly received support for controls at the level of the lowest common denominator from most other European countries where export regulations were much less restrictive than in Germany.

The fact that defence-related exports were a national prerogative according to article 223 of the EEC Treaty complicated the negotiations. It meant that a decision could not be taken within the regular decision-making framework of the EC, but had to be agreed upon in intergovernmental bargaining. Crucially for an

Table 6.1
Preference Changes:
14 February 1992 - 1 January 1993

1 st Phase (-31/8/92)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
EC-Co	82	C
Dm	40	NC
UN-SC	40	U
Em	39	NC
EM	34	NC
Fm	33	NC
FM	32	NC
DM	31	NC
Cha	29	NC
Med	21	NC
Uns	11	NC
vote	8	NC
UN-Org	9	NC
EP	7	NC
BR	6	NC
fdp	5	NC
Com	5	NC
spd	5	NC
cdu	5	NC
BT	4	NC
Cab	0	NC
Coa	0	NC
grü	0	NC
pds	0	NC

²⁵ 'Stimmung bei Hertel in Moll - Aber Hoffnungen', *Reuter German News Service*, 19/6/91; 'Deckel trotz Sanierungserfolgen weiter im Minus', *Reuter German News Service*, 26/7/91; 'Deckel vor weiterem Ertragseinbruch', *Reuter German News Service*, 26/7/91; 'Großauftrag für deutsche Werften?', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23/8/91; Dr Johann Schäffler (German Aerospace), 'Building on unity', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:14, 5/10/91, p.616.

understanding of the case, the intergovernmental nature of the decision-making process provided all EC governments with the ability to veto or block the outcome of the negotiations. This enabled the EC governments, including the German administration, to resist higher degrees of pressure than could have been expected under other circumstances. Moreover, the veto position of the German government had direct impact on the strategies which the advocates of less restrictive dual-use transfer laws could rationally pursue. Specifically, the German industry associations could not expect that British and French resistance to strict common European dual-use regulations would force the German government to accept lower national standards. The Kohl government could veto or opt out of the European scheme at any time if it believed the controls to be insufficient. Moreover, the German government retained the ultimate decision-making authority over its national export controls. In order to reduce the German controls the industry had to increase the active support for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act within the multilevel German foreign policy network.

In accord with these considerations, the German industry pursued a twofold strategy during the research period. On one hand industry representatives used their transnational linkages with European Commission and European Parliament members to lobby for common European dual-use transfer regulations. The negotiations would ensure continuous pressure of Germany's European partners on the Kohl administration. An example of this strategy was a letter by the chairman of the Daimler-Benz AG Edzard Reuter addressed to Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the President of the European Commission Jacques Delors which called for joint European export controls on dual-use equipment as early as 1991.²⁶ On the other hand, representatives of the BDI, the DIHT, sectoral industry associations and the largest German technological companies²⁷ mobilised their relations with other domestic actors such as the members of the CDU/CSU and the FDP parliamentary parties, officials in the Economic, Foreign and Defence Ministries and cabinet ministers to argue that Germany should conform with the lower dual-use export

²⁶ 'Daimler fordert EG-weite Rüstungsexportkontrolle', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23/3/91.

²⁷ In particular, the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandel, BGA), the German Association of Machinery and Plant Manufacturers (Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau, VDMA) and such companies as Daimler-Benz and German Aerospace had high stakes in the issue of dual-use exports.

control standards of its European neighbours.

The influence of industry representatives was based on the crucial role of manufacturing for the German economy. Particularly sensitive were regions such as Lower Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania where disproportionately large sections of the electorate were employed in technical and manufacturing industries. Given that unemployment had increased considerably due to German reunification and the problems associated with the economic restructuring of the former East German Länder, the threat of further redundancies because of decreasing exports was very persuasive. In this line, spokespersons of the DIHT complained that the German dual-use controls deterred potential costumers because they were not sure to receive export licenses. The Bavarian Economic Minister Georg von Aldenfels (CSU) agreed. However, the role of the Länder governments in the decision-making process was limited. Since export laws were exclusively under the authority of the federal government, the Länder governments could at best seek to influence the administration, and thus the decision, indirectly. Economics Minister Jürgen Möllemann (FDP), however, rebuffed the complaints from industry representatives and some Länder ministers. In the light of the recent experiences with illegal armaments exports the government perceived the legislation as necessary in the interest of national and international security.²⁸

While German companies were the only domestic actors in the multilevel German foreign policy network who unreservedly supported a reduction of the German dual-use controls in February 1992, the beginning of the intra-European negotiations soon led to additional European pressure.²⁹ It emerged quickly that most EC governments objected to common European dual-use controls at a level comparable to the German Foreign Trade Act. Among the EC member states, the German government's demands for comprehensive dual-use export regulations were only supported by the Italian administration. However, the members of the European Commission and a majority in the European Parliament also favoured high standards for dual-use export controls. The fact that the Commissioner in charge of the internal market was the German Martin

²⁸ Peter Ziller, 'Heikle Rüstungsgeschäfte - Rexrodts Brücke soll Exporteuren den Weg frei machen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/9/94.

²⁹ Rüdiger Scheidges, 'Keine europäische Rüstungsexportkontrolle', *Tagesspiegel*, 15/2/91.

Bangemann almost certainly contributed to this position on dual-use exports.

The influence of the European Commissioner on the intergovernmental negotiations was initially enhanced because the Council of Ministers decided to task Bangemann to produce a first draft for a common dual-use export control system in January 1992.³⁰ Bangemann's proposal was accepted by the Commission later that month and communicated to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The draft proceeded from the premise that dual-use equipment was not defence technology under article 223 of the Treaty of Rome and that intra-EC restrictions on the free movement of dual-use goods should end with the implementation of the internal market. In order to prevent the export of technology with civil and military applications to sensitive destinations, Bangemann suggested the creation of an 'external fence' of controls for transfers outside the EC. The controls would apply to a list of dual-use technologies and a common list of countries which were to be agreed by all member states.

The German government welcomed the proposal which matched the German Foreign Trade Act. Moreover, the German administration agreed in principle with the Commission that the authority over common dual-use export regulations should lie with the EC. Nevertheless, German representatives warned that their political leadership would not compromise on the content of the lists.³¹ In the first discussions of the draft, the disagreement between the German delegates and their European colleagues was more fundamental. The British and French representatives outrightly rejected the introduction of a common country list.³² To settle this dispute and to negotiate the substantive contents of a common regulation, representatives agreed to pass on the issue to a high-level working group staffed by national officials.³³ The strategy of transferring direct authority over the drafting process from the Commission, which was in favour of a comprehensive and centralised dual-use export controls system, was designed to remove the issue from

³⁰ Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.11.

³¹ 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992, p.2; Andrew Hill, 'Brussels move on 'dual-use' goods', *Financial Times*, 23/1/92; 'EC moves to tighten rules', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 17:5, 1/2/92, p.144; Andrew Hill, 'The European Market: Dual-use goods expose EC export control disparities', *Financial Times*, 17/2/92.

³² Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.12.

³³ Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.11.

its influence. Moreover, the intergovernmental working group further institutionalised the existing close network among the EC administrations and provided through regular meetings additional opportunities to co-ordinate the opposition against high controls standards in the form of an intergovernmental coalition. Led by the British and French delegates, this intergovernmental coalition was able to exert considerable pressure on the European Commission and the German administration to accept the lowest common denominator as the basis for the European regulations during the course of summer 1992.³⁴

The Commissioners who were directly selected by the national governments and consequently sensitive to their demands were under the highest pressure within the multilevel foreign policy network at 82 per cent.³⁵ The degree of pressure helps to explain why the Commissioners were the first actors within the network to succumb to the international opposition to strict controls for dual-use exports. When the Commission submitted its second proposal on the basis of the deliberations in the intergovernmental working group, the framework for the common regulations had been significantly watered down. The new proposal accepted that the lists of sensitive goods, destinations and licensing criteria were to be decided unanimously by the member states. However, the direct pressure from the intergovernmental coalition in the working group also affected the ability of the German representatives to implement and maintain their preferences with regard to the common dual-use goods export regulations. The staff from the Economics Ministry, which led the German representation in the working group, was especially vulnerable because of their constant exposure to the pressure from their European colleagues who accounted for 39 per cent of their relations within the network.³⁶

³⁴ Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a council regulation (EEC) on the control of exports of certain dual-use goods and technologies and of certain nuclear products and technologies', COM (1992) 317 final, Brussels, 31 August 1992; Mr. Needham, *Hansard*, Vol.220, Col.155, Written Answers, 3/3/93; Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.11; Paul Cornish, *The Arms Trade and Europe* (London: Pinter, 1995), p.40; 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992, p.2.

³⁵ P_1 [EU-Co] = 23/28 = 82%. See Appendix 6: Pressure for a Reduction in German Dual-Use Export Controls.

³⁶ The staff in the Economics Ministry was under pressure from twelve out of 31 actors to whom their had regular contacts in the network, i.e. the representatives of the German industry, their colleagues in France, Britain, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and the European Council of Ministers, equaling P_1 [Em] = 12/31 = 39%.

Germany's European partners were also able to exert additional indirect pressure on the government through their linkages with staff in the German Defence Ministry. Although the Defence staff were not immediately involved in the international negotiations, they had a central interest in the debate since the level of the controls would considerably impact on collaborative armaments projects within the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, the German Defence Ministry staff was a strategic target for pressure from fellow European military officials since they had fewer linkages within the network than their colleagues in the Economics Ministry. Thus, the direct pressure from European Defence Ministry staffs and the Germany industry amounted to 40 per cent of the German military's contacts in the network.³⁷ The pressure on the heads of the two departments, Minister of Economics Möllemann and Defence Minister Volker Rühle was significantly lower at 34 and 31 per cent respectively.³⁸

Although the staff from the two ministries maintained their support for the introduction of common EC regulations similar to the German Foreign Trade Act during the summer of 1992, the German negotiators had to concede on a range of issues as a consequence of the high international pressure. In spite of the veto position of the German government, they were only able to extract one major concession: the new proposal included a 'catch-all clause' similar to §5c of the German Foreign Trade Act. The 'catch-all clause' subjected any technology which to the knowledge of the exporter was intended for military use to controls. However, the German negotiators were not able to secure the regulation of knowledge and service transfers in the proposal. In addition, they had to accept concessions on the content of the two lists regarding dual-use technology and country restrictions. Four groups of sensitive goods were excluded from the common European list. However, it was assured that these could remain under national controls.³⁹

³⁷ With the representatives of the German industry and their colleagues in France, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg eleven out of 25 actors to whom the Defence Ministry staff were linked, i.e. $P_1 [Dm] = 10/25 = 44\%$, called for less restrictive controls.

³⁸ Economics Minister Möllemann was subject to pressure from twelve out of 35 actors including the German industry, his European colleagues and the EC Council of Ministers, with $P_1 [EM] = 12/35 = 34\%$. Whereas Defence Minister Rühle was under similar pressure from his European colleagues who accounted for ten out of 32 actors to whom he was linked in the network, i.e. $P_1 [DM] = 10/32 = 31\%$.

³⁹ 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992, p.3; 'Kommission schlägt Rahmenverordnung für Ausfuhren von 'Dual-Use' Gütern und Technologien vor', *Agence Europe*, 17/7/92; David Buchan, 'EC plan for dual-use arms exports',

In spite of the new proposal, the German administration was forced to admit by September 1992 that due to diverging national preferences a compromise about the regulation of dual-use exports was not in sight.⁴⁰ In particular, the representations of Britain and France were dissatisfied with the new draft. Nevertheless, the German government resisted pressure to further compromise on its policy during the autumn of 1992.

The new proposal was also criticised in the European Parliament. However, for contrary reasons. A substantial number of European Parliamentarians attacked the Commission proposal because it allowed the member states with the least restrictive trade controls to determine the common European standard.⁴¹ In order to assure that tight criteria for the controls were introduced, the French Socialist Gerard Fuchs suggested transferring the authority over the control of dual-use exports to the Commission. Fuchs had been tasked by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy to report on the Commission draft. However, his report had little impact. While the members of the European Parliament could exert pressure over the Commission and the political parties within each member state, they lacked direct influence over the European governments at the negotiation table. Although a majority in the European Parliament adopted a range of amendments to the draft and presented these to the European Commission, its views on the issue were disregarded.⁴²

Given the predictable difficulties in the European negotiations over common dual-use export controls, the German government simultaneously pursued the tightening of multilateral dual-use export controls in the wider international community. A possible ally was the US government which was not only in favour of common European controls in order to simplify American exports to the EC, but also among the few countries who sought to strengthen international export controls. On 15 June 1992, the US government announced that it was tightening its controls on missile-related technologies to 21

Financial Times, 17/7/92; 'Eckhoff - Grenzkontrollen hängen an Dual Use', *Reuter German News Service*, 22/9/92.

⁴⁰ Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992. See also 'Kobra mit Loch', *Spiegel* 18, 5/5/93.

⁴¹ wff, 'Umstellung der Industrie soll gefördert werden', *Handelsblatt*, 17/9/92.

⁴² *European Parliament Report*, Doc. A3-0398/B/92; 'Plenartagung des Europäischen Parlaments 8.-12. März', *Agence Europe*, 26/2/93

countries in order to encourage the implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The decision was followed by an agreement among the members of the regime at their 29 June-2 July meeting to extend its scope to missiles capable of delivering biological, chemical and nuclear weapons.⁴³

With regard to dual-use technology US pressure for controls was more selective. The US administration was primarily concerned about exports to Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.⁴⁴ Thus, in October 1992, senior officials from the US State, Defence and Commerce Departments made trips to Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Holland to try to persuade these governments to ban dual-use sales to Iran.⁴⁵ However, even with regard to specific countries such as Iran, there was little support for dual-use transfer restrictions in these countries.⁴⁶ While nuclear proliferation and the export of dual-use goods with nuclear applications were high on the political agenda, most Western European governments were hesitant to generally limit the transfer of dual-use technology because of its consequences for their national export industries.⁴⁷ The difference was epitomised by the approval of the British and French administrations to export guidelines for weapons of mass destruction and to an international arms register in the UN Security Council on one hand, while the two governments advocated the reductions of controls on dual-use equipment on the other.⁴⁸

Among the dual-use regulations which were questioned was the COCOM regime. The COCOM had regulated the export of dual-use goods from the Western allies during

⁴³ See <http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/>; Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.17; Barbara Starr, 'Third World SSM threat studied', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 16:20, 16/11/91, p.944.

⁴⁴ Mr. Llew Smith (question), *Hansard*, Vol.226, Col.640, Written Answers, 16 June 1993; Nancy Dunne, 'US calls for joint action to control arms sales', *Financial Times*, 28/5/92.

⁴⁵ Simon Tisdall, 'Bush urges blanket ban on military materials for Iran', *Guardian*, 11/11/92; Ian Brodie, 'US calls for arms ban on Teheran', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/11/92; 'New policy, old foes', *Economist*, 14/11/92; Charles Richards and Robert Block, 'Inspectors give a clean bill of health', *Independent*, 30/11/92.

⁴⁶ Simon Tisdall, 'Oil gush produces unlikely bedfellows in the boardrooms of US and its allies', *Guardian*, 28/1/92; Simon Tisdall, 'Bush urges blanket ban on military materials for Iran', *Guardian*, 11/11/92; Ian Brodie, 'US calls for arms ban on Teheran', *Daily Telegraph*, 11/11/92.

⁴⁷ Thus, the EC agreed on controls of a common list of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use equipment in 1991. See *Hansard*, Vol.211, Col. 586, Written Answers, 14 July 1992. The Nuclear Suppliers Group adopted new guidelines to improve controls on its meeting in Warsaw April 1992. See *Hansard*, Vol.211, Col.735, Written Answers, 15 July 1992.

⁴⁸ Bauer and Eavis, *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC*, p.15, p.20.

the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the rationale for COCOM had ceased to exist. Keen to export to the newly opened markets of Eastern Europe, technological companies in the US, Britain and France had successfully pressed their governments to abolish the restrictions.⁴⁹ As a result, a temporary revised COCOM list, the 'New Industrial List', had been agreed in summer 1991.⁵⁰ Moreover, a US proposal to enhance cooperation with the former Warsaw Treaty members by replacing COCOM with a less restrictive regime was widely welcomed in Western Europe where the US had been criticised as too slow on export-control liberalisation after the end of the Cold War.⁵¹ In May 1992, an informal COCOM Cooperation Forum was set up to re-negotiate the regime.

Crucially for the German administration's intentions to increase multilateral dual-use controls, COCOM members acknowledged that the need for modern technology in the former Warsaw Treaty countries could not lead to the dismissal of the new danger of proliferation.⁵² Moreover, since the revision of the COCOM regime proceeded simultaneously and concurrently with the European negotiations, the German government could seek to use the regime to impose a wider multilateral framework on the EC controls. In coalition with the US government which appeared to support the preservation of at least some of the COCOM controls, the balance of pressures among the COCOM members was marginally more favourable for tighter controls than among Germany's European partners. In order to push the multilateral regime, the German government set up an informal working-group on dual-use goods during its preparation for the G-7 summit in Munich 1992. The group was to continue its work after the world trade summit. However, in spite of the support of the US the German administration was not able to shift

⁴⁹ Barbara Starr, 'NSC reviews export bar', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:2, 13/1/90, p.45; John Boatman, 'Industry calls for export equality', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:11, 17/3/90, p.517; Barbara Starr, 'Bush to agree COCOM easing', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:17, 28/4/90, p.824; John Boatman and Barbara Starr, 'US Export Policy: Keeping a hold on control', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:22, 2/6/90, p.1109; John Boatman, 'Trading after the thaw: COCOM lowers the barriers', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 13:25, 23/6/90, p.1243; Holly Porteous, 'Dispute over core list delays COCOM', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:10, 9/3/91, p.357.

⁵⁰ Holly Porteous, 'COCOM agrees to export reforms', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:22, 1/6/91, p.932; Holly Porteous, 'Securing export controls', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 15:22, 29/6/91, p.1194.

⁵¹ Nancy Dunne, 'US calls for joint action to control arms sales', *Financial Times*, 28/5/92.

⁵² Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, p.35.

the preferences among the COCOM members in favour of a strict follow-up agreement.⁵³ The proposal for a new successor institution published on 16 November 1992 not only transferred the control of the regime from the international to the national level, but also abolished controls for a large number of goods.⁵⁴

In the European negotiations the German administration failed similarly. In spite of the impending implementation of the internal market, no agreement was reached before the end of 1992. In fact, the British and French representatives vetoed the new proposal which had been suggested in the autumn.⁵⁵ To prevent the collapse of dual-use goods controls, the EC Foreign Affairs Council agreed on 21 December to establish interim controls starting 1 January 1993.⁵⁶ During the first phase of the decision-making process the German government thus had not only failed to mobilise support for the adjustment of the European and international controls to the German standard, it was itself increasingly under pressure to modify the Foreign Trade Act. When in the course of 1993 the staff from the Economics Ministry relented to the pressure, it strengthened the transnational coalition in favour of a reduction of dual-use export regulations among the European industry and the officials in the economics and trade departments which were engaged in the negotiations. Moreover, additional pressure from political actors in the German foreign policy network began to emerge.

Transnational Coalition Achieves First Preference Changes

The implementation of the internal market on 1 January 1993 was used by the transnational coalition among industry representatives and civil servants to reiterate their

⁵³ Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992.

⁵⁴ David Dodwell, 'COCOM: a brute turned super sleuth', *Financial Times*, 16/11/93.

⁵⁵ Andrew Hill, 'EC states asked to lift border controls', *Financial Times*, 24/12/92.

⁵⁶ Mr. Hurd, *Hansard*, Vol.216, Col.724. Written Answer, 12 January 1993. The Council statement on completion of the internal market in dual-use goods and technologies. Adopted by the Council on 21 December. does not mention such an interim agreement. In fact, it states that 'the member states agree that, as from 1 January 1993, intra-Community trade in them will no longer be subject to internal frontier controls...' see Council of Ministers, Statement on the Completion of the Internal Market, 21 December 1992, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p.60.

arguments in favour of less restrictive dual-use export controls.⁵⁷ Thus, spokespersons of the European industry association, the Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederation of Europe (UNICE), expressed their concern about 'licence shopping' in the absence of a European dual-use export law.⁵⁸ According to the interim agreement, member states were able to maintain their national border controls until a compromise on common regulations for dual-use export controls was reached.⁵⁹ Thus, the agreement continued the competitive disadvantages in the export laws across Europe. In fact, with the practical elimination of the COCOM regime, the differences among the dual-use export controls in Western Europe had become even greater. Since member states seemed unwilling to submit to common EC controls, UNICE representatives suggested a series of bilateral agreements in their place.⁶⁰

In Germany, industry leaders could point directly to the increasingly visible effects of the new German export legislation on the technological industrial base. One example was the decision of the Iranian Defence Industries Organisation to move its bureau from Düsseldorf to London. The office had organised the sale of dual-use equipment from over 250 German companies to Iran, all of which had previously been licensed by the government.⁶¹ According to industry representatives 200,000 jobs were in danger due to decreased exports. Although the decline in exports was primarily attributable to international economic developments, industry spokespersons used the argument to demand a lifting of German dual-use export restrictions. In addition, exporters complained that they were discredited by their European competitors as not reliable because the German licensing system could prohibit agreed sales. Since the German controls were not acceptable to other European partners, representatives of the Federation of German Wholesale and Foreign Trade (BGA)⁶² argued that the law should be adjusted to the lower

⁵⁷ Tim Kelsey, 'EC "could become a heaven for arms trade"', *Independent*, 31/12/92; 'Kobra mit Loch', *Spiegel* 18, 5/5/93, p.27.

⁵⁸ David White, 'Single market fear on weapons', *Financial Times*, 11/12/92.

⁵⁹ Michael Heseltine, *Hansard*, Vol.216, Cols.473f., Written Answers, 17 December 1992.

⁶⁰ David White, 'Single market fear on weapons', *Financial Times*, 11/12/92.

⁶¹ Udo Ulfkotte, 'Aufrüstung am Golf', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 18/5/93; ulf., 'Zusammenarbeit seit zwei Jahren', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/10/93.

⁶² Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels (BGA).

Table 6.2 Preference Changes: 1 January - 5 December 1993

2 nd Phase (-23/10/93)			3 rd Phase (-28/10/93)			4 th Phase (-12/11/93)			5 th Phase (-5/12/93)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
Dm	40	NC	BT	65	U	BT	67	U	BT	68	U
UN-SC	40	U	Dm	48	NC	Dm	52	NC	Dm	52	NC
Em	39	NC	Em	45	C	Fm	42	NC	Fm	42	NC
EM	34	NC	UN-SC	40	U	EM	40	C	UN-SC	40	U
Fm	33	NC	Fm	39	NC	UN-SC	40	U	DM	38	C
FM	32	NC	EM	37	NC	DM	34	U	FM	37	NC
DM	31	U	FM	34	NC	FM	34	NC	Cha	36	NC
Cha	29	NC	DM	34	U	Cha	33	NC	Uns	33	NC
Med	22	NC	Cha	31	NC	Uns	33	NC	Med	29	NC
EP	13	NC	Med	25	NC	Med	27	NC	Coa	27	NC
vote	12	NC	Uns	22	NC	Com	20	U	Com	25	U
Uns	11	NC	vote	19	NC	Coa	20	NC	BR	24	NC
UN-Org	9	NC	BR	18	NC	vote	19	NC	vote	23	NC
BR	6	NC	Com	15	NC	BR	18	NC	Cab	20	NC
fdp	5	C	Coa	13	U	Cab	15	NC	spd	15	NC
Com	5	NC	EP	13	NC	EP	13	NC	EP	13	NC
spd	5	NC	Cab	10	NC	spd	10	NC	grü	12	NC
cdu	5	C	UN-Org	9	NC	UN-Org	9	NC	pds	12	NC
BT	4	NC	spd	5	NC	grü	6	NC	UN-Org	9	NC
Cab	0	NC	grü	0	NC	pds	6	NC			
Coa	0	NC	pds	0	NC						
grü	0	NC									
pds	0	NC									

European standards.⁶³ In February 1993, the industry gained support from a group of 125 CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians. In a proposal submitted to the President of the Bundestag, the members of the group urged their own government to revise Germany's export restrictions.⁶⁴ The preference change among these politicians came somewhat as

⁶³ Stue., 'Außenhandel: 200 000 Arbeitsplätze gefährdet', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26/5/93.

⁶⁴ 'U-Boot-Export Taiwan', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 12/2/93. The parliamentarians appeared to favour not only a relaxation of dual-use, but also of weapons exports. See 'Kinkel: Keine U-Boote für Taiwan',

a surprise as both CDU/CSU and FDP members in the German Bundestag had supported the strengthening of the controls a year earlier. Moreover, the pressure for a lowering of the dual-use export controls on German parliamentarians amounted to only 5 per cent of their linkages within the network, coming exclusively from representatives of the German industry.⁶⁵ However, while the motion was indicative of increasing scepticism over the administration's restrictive export policy among coalition members, the group represented only about a third of the government party members in the Bundestag at the time. It was not until October 1993, that the members of the CDU/CSU and the FDP factions collectively criticised the policy of their ministers on the dual-use issue. It followed the persistent lobbying from industry representatives and the group of the 125 over the summer. Although the parliamentary parties had approved the establishment of the restrictive German dual-use control regime little more than a year ago, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians now unanimously called for the liberalization of German dual-use transfers.

The consequences of the preference change in the CDU/CSU and FDP for the decision-making process were considerable. Specifically, it raised the stakes for the coalition government which relied directly on the support of the CDU/CSU and FDP in the Bundestag for the approval of new export control regulations.⁶⁶ In addition, the members of the government parties had close links with the bureaucracy where even lower ranking positions were traditionally held by party members.⁶⁷ Officials in the Economics Ministry and the Defence Ministry were particularly sensitive to further pressure since they were already subject to the demand for a reduction of the German dual-use controls of their European counterparts. By utilising their linkages with civil servants in the two departments, the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP increased the pressure on the staff in the Defence Ministry from 40 to 48 per cent⁶⁸ and in the Economics Ministry from 39

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 20/8/93

⁶⁵ Industry representatives accounted for one of 21 linkages of the CDU/CSU and one of 19 linkages of the FDP parliamentarians, i.e. $P_2[\text{cdu}] = 1/21 = 5\%$ and $P_2[\text{fdp}] = 1/19 = 5\%$.

⁶⁶ deu., 'EG wehrt sich gegen deutsche Richtlinien', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 23/10/93.

⁶⁷ Renate Mayntz and Hans-Ulrich Derlien, 'Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987 - Toward Hybridization?' *Governance* 2:4, 1989, pp.384-404.

⁶⁸ Due to the preference change among CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, the pressure on officials in the Defence Ministry increased by two out of 26 actors to which the officials were linked in the

to 45 per cent⁶⁹. The probability that the officials from the two departments would acquiesce to the demands of the politicians was thus growing. Indeed, within a week after the coalition parties had collectively expressed their support for a revision of the German dual-use export controls, Reinhard Goehner (CDU), Parliamentary State Secretary in the Economics Ministry, announced that officials in the Economics Ministry supported a revision of the Foreign Trade Act. In line with the German industry associations and the coalition parties, civil servants from the ministry advised that control regulations should be reduced to the European standard.⁷⁰

The sequence of preference changes continued as the staff in the Economics Ministry raised in turn the pressure on the new Economics Minister Rexrodt (FDP) and officials from other departments who were affected by the issue. Among the members of the Kohl Cabinet, Economics Minister Rexrodt was now the most exposed to the pressure for a change in government policy. In total 40 per cent of the actors to whom Rexrodt was linked in the network advocated a revision of the German Foreign Trade Act.⁷¹ However, the pressure was even higher on officials from the Defence Ministry and the Foreign Office. The change of view by their colleagues in the Economics Ministry meant that now respectively 52 and 42 per cent of the Defence Ministry and Foreign Office contacts in the network favoured a reduction of dual-use export controls.⁷² Moreover, due to their boundary position between national and international actors, officials from the Economics Ministry were able to provide a transnational bridge between the intergovernmental coalition for a revision of the German dual-use controls among their European colleagues and domestic actors in the multilevel foreign policy network. Over the following months this position allowed Economics Ministry staff to link the pressure from both international and national actors on the German administration.

Only shortly after these changes, an announcement of another Parliamentary

network, i.e. from P_2 [Dm] = $10/25 = 40\%$ to P_3 [Dm] = $12/25 = 48\%$.

⁶⁹ Similarly, the pressure on officials in the Economics Ministry increased by two from P_2 [Em] = $12/31 = 39\%$ to P_3 [Em] = $14/31 = 45\%$

⁷⁰ hal, 'Keine gezielten Hilfen für Dasa', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 28/10/93.

⁷¹ The pressure from his own ministerial staff increased the pressure on Economics Minister Rexrodt by one from P_3 [EM] = $13/35 = 37\%$ to P_4 [EM] = $14/35 = 40\%$.

⁷² That is P_3 [Dm] = $12/25 = 48\%$ increased to P_4 [Dm] = $13/25 = 52\%$ and P_3 [Fm] = $13/33 = 39\%$ to P_3 [Fm] = $14/33 = 42\%$.

Secretary in the Economics Ministry, Heinrich Kolb (FDP) raised expectations about an impending change in government policy. Kolb stated that the government had recognised the need to examine the consequences of its national export legislation. Moreover, according to Economic Ministry officials, the administration had recognised that it was preferable to accept lower standards than to prevent the harmonization of the dual-use controls in the EC. However, cabinet ministers remained intent on bargaining for the highest standards possible. The strict line over dual-use export controls was in particular based on resistance from Foreign Minister Kinkel and officials in the Foreign Office who had borne the brunt of the criticism over the German arms export scandals during the early 1990s and were, therefore, critical of less restrictive controls.

Foreign Office staff continued to oppose the weakening of German dual-use export controls during 1993, although they were at the centre of considerable pressure from their European colleagues, from the Economics Ministry and from the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary party who together accounted for 42 per cent of their relations in the network.⁷³ They formed a close alliance with Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who was especially reluctant to modify his position on the issue. The ability of Kinkel to maintain his opposition to a reduction in German dual-use regulations was enhanced by the fact that he was exposed to one of the lowest degrees of pressure in the German administration at 34 per cent.⁷⁴ However, the balance in favour of retaining the existing German dual-use export laws was shifting among other government ministers. In August 1993, Defence Minister R  he tentatively supported calls from the German industry to reestablish its ability to compete on the international technological market. Since R  he had no direct authority over the issue, however, he continued to adhere to the government position that German dual-use export controls would not be reduced.⁷⁵

In the meantime, the European negotiations made first progress on the basis of a Belgian proposal which suggested a distinction between the general framework of the controls set by a Commission regulation and the content of the lists which would be flexible and under constant review under the Common Foreign and Security Policy

⁷³ See footnote 71.

⁷⁴ P_4 [FM] = 13/38 = 34%.

⁷⁵ K.B., 'Was wird aus der deutschen R  stungsindustrie?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 31/8/93.

decision-making process.⁷⁶ On the basis of this compromise, the European Commission submitted a new draft in autumn 1993. The question of a country list remained open. The request of the German representatives for an obligatory catch-all-clause, similar to §5c of the German Foreign Trade Act, was again rejected. However, on condition that it was restricted to weapons of mass destruction and carrier missiles, the governments of some member states appeared to consider supporting the clause. In particular, within the Italian administration there was initial encouragement for tighter regulations. Thus, German negotiators continued to demand a catch-all-clause.⁷⁷ Nevertheless, the pressure from the German administration had weakened since officials from the German Economics Ministry, who led the German representation, had publicly expressed their support for less restrictive common controls. The German delegation appeared content to seek to safeguard existing national dual-use export regulations. To this purpose they used the German veto position in the intergovernmental negotiations. Specifically, German Economics Ministry representatives secured an 'opt-out' formula which allowed member states to maintain or implement stricter regulations. Amongst others, the opt-out formula would apply to the control of technological knowledge and services which was regulated in the German Foreign Trade Act.

The revision of the COCOM regime which was concluded at the same time equally failed to establish more comprehensive multilateral dual-use transfer regulations. Meeting in The Hague on 16 November 1993, COCOM member states agreed to dismantle the old regime and to replace it with a new institution by the end of 1994. During the interim period only a core list, the so-called 'Interim List', was to be controlled which gave more discretion to the member governments.⁷⁸ The weakening of the COCOM regime was a direct result of a change of policy in the US. Initially, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher had argued that non-proliferation was the most important challenge to the US

⁷⁶ Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, p.40.

⁷⁷ Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht der Bundesregierung zum Stand der EG-Harmonisierung des Exportkontrollrechts für Güter und Technologien mit doppeltem Verwendungszweck (Dual-use-Waren), Stand Ende Oktober 1993', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/6187, 18 November 1993; sm, 'Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Rüstungsgütern als Standortnachteil', *Handelsblatt*, 12/11/93.

⁷⁸ 'Obsolete COCOM to be dissolved', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 20:22, 27/11/93, p.8; Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, p.35.

and Europe in the 1990s and had praised the efforts of the EC to regulate its dual-use exports. However, the new US administration was more concerned about its export figures than about proliferation.⁷⁹ President-elect Bill Clinton announced that it was his intention to encourage the research and development of dual-use goods through a range of government incentives.⁸⁰

In the meantime, the domestic support for a revision of the German export laws continued to mount. CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians strategically lobbied Minister of Economics Günter Rexrodt and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. Both actors were not only under pressure from the transnational coalition that had emerged among officials from the German and Western European Economics Ministries, but also had the direct authority over the issue in the Cabinet. In a direct appeal to the two ministers, CDU/CSU foreign trade spokesman, Peter Kittelmann, asked the government to reconsider its position on dual-use export regulations. With reference to the opposition from within the Foreign Office to a revision of the Foreign Trade Act, Kittelmann demanded that the Economics Ministry should recover its 'leadership' on the issue. According to CDU/CSU parliamentarians the progress towards common European dual-use export controls should not be prevented by the Foreign Office.⁸¹

Given the combined international and domestic pressure on Rexrodt, the strategy of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties soon paid off. By mid-November, the Economics Minister publicly expressed his support for a review of the Foreign Trade Act. Rexrodt was, thus, the first cabinet minister to abandon the existing German dual-use transfer policy. Rexrodt's support was a crucial success for the growing coalition in favour of a revision of the German dual-use export regulations. With the support of the minister, the coalition had not only gained direct influence over other cabinet ministers, but also a central voice in the Cabinet itself. Due to the preference change of the Economics Minister the pressure on all other members in the Cabinet increased notably. Defence Minister Rühle was now subject to the highest pressure with 38 per cent of the actors to whom he was

⁷⁹ 'Weitgehend Einigung zwischen Christopher und der EG über Jugoslawien', *Agence Europe*, 10/6/93.

⁸⁰ Louise Kehoe, 'Technology: Driving down a "superhighway"', *Financial Times*, 19/11/92.

⁸¹ sm, 'Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Rüstungsgütern als Standortnachteil', *Handelsblatt*, 12/11/93; K.B., 'Euro-Exportkontrolle in der Sackgasse', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 12/11/93. See also Peter Ziller, 'Heikle Rüstungsgeschäfte - Rexrodts Brücke soll Exporteuren den Weg frei machen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/9/94.

linked in the network supporting the reduction of German export controls.⁸² As has been noted above, Rühle had expressed his doubts over the tight German regulations already in August, but had been forced to adhere to the official government line on the issue. Following Rexrodt's preference change, Rühle soon came out in support of Rexrodt's position.⁸³ In the Cabinet, Foreign Minister Kinkel again prevented a change of policy. The Foreign Minister voiced his concern that a reduction of dual-use controls would encourage the arms build-up in volatile regions such as the Middle East.⁸⁴ However, the preference changes of his two Cabinet colleagues put Kinkel increasingly on the defensive since now 42 per cent of his contacts in the network called for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act.⁸⁵

The series of preference changes in autumn 1993, thus, ended with a stalemate in the German Cabinet. Although the combined pressure from the international community and an increasing number of domestic actors in the German foreign policy network had brought the government to the brink of a revision of the Foreign Trade Act, it was only when the pressure was maintained during the following year that the German administration began to make gradual changes in its dual-use export policy.

Majorities Shift in German Cabinet

Due to their failure to achieve a change in policy, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians, as well as industry leaders, expanded the use of their relations within the German foreign policy network during the winter of 1993-94. While the parliamentarians initially concentrated on their direct relations with cabinet ministers and civil servants, the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP now increasingly also employed their relations with the media, through the Bundestag and its committees to exert indirect pressure on the Cabinet. As part of this strategy which sought to broaden the support for a reduction of dual-use export controls within the network rather than focus directly on decision-makers, members of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party submitted several memoranda drafted by

⁸² P₃ [DM] = 12/32 = 38%.

⁸³ 'Allein auf der Bank', *Spiegel* 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.; K.B., 'Nachteile für deutsche Rüstungsfirmen müssen verschwinden', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94.

⁸⁴ sm, 'Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Rüstungsgütern als Standortnachteil', *Handelsblatt*, 12/11/93.

⁸⁵ P₆ [FM] = 16/38 = 42%.

its foreign policy working-group to cabinet ministers and officials. In the documents, the party's foreign policy and economic experts appealed to the government to proceed with the harmonization of European export regulations even if this entailed the reduction of German dual-use goods controls. Specifically, they urged ministers to accept concessions on the equipment and country lists.⁸⁶ Another part of this strategy involved the distribution of these proposals to the media in order to increase public pressure.⁸⁷

In addition, members of the coalition parties began to use their parliamentary majority in the Bundestag to collectively exert pressure on the administration. Since the coalition members hesitated to challenge the government directly in the Bundestag as a matter of party solidarity⁸⁸, the CDU/CSU parliamentary party decided to convene a Bundestag hearing of industry representatives at the beginning of December. The hearing provided spokespersons of industry associations and major companies with an opportunity to exert direct pressure on the relevant politicians. Moreover, parliamentarians were able to use the evidence from the hearing to support their demands for less restrictive dual-use export controls.⁸⁹ During the hearing, representatives from the main German industry associations reiterated their concern that the current regulations undermined the ability of the German industry to compete in the world market.⁹⁰ In particular, the representatives attacked the catch-all-clause and the control of knowledge and service exports which remained under national control due to the EC's opt-out agreement.⁹¹

At the same time the industry employed its links with the media to exert indirectly pressure on the government for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act. Speaking to

⁸⁶ K.B., 'Westlicher Rüstungsexport ausser Kontrolle', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 23/11/93; 'Germany to consider easing export laws', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 20:23, 4/12/93, p.9; K.B., "'Nachteile für deutsche Rüstungsfirmen müssen verschwinden'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94.

⁸⁷ ban, 'Schäuble: Kein Unterschied mehr zwischen innerer und äußerer Sicherheit', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 22/12/93.

⁸⁸ 'Volksbegehren und Volksentscheid', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/11/93.

⁸⁹ *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 202. Sitzung, Bonn, 13. Januar 1994, pp.17449-17465; 'Bei der Kontrolle von Dual-use-Ausfuhren ist die Bundesregierung kompromißbereit', *Handelsblatt*, 14/1/94; K.B. "'Nachteile für deutsche Rüstungsfirmen müssen verschwinden'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94.

⁹⁰ Peter Kittelmann (CDU/CSU), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 202. Sitzung, 13 January 1994, pp.17450f.; sm, 'Die rigorose deutsche Exportkontrolle bei Rüstungsgütern als Standortnachteil', *Handelsblatt*, 12/11/93; K.B., 'Euro-Exportkontrolle in der Sackgasse', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 12/11/93.

⁹¹ Peter Ziller, 'Heikle Rüstungsgeschäfte - Rexrodt's Brücke soll Exporteuren den Weg frei machen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/9/94.

Germany's main national newspaper, the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, representatives of the Federation of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT) and the German Association of Machinery and Plant Manufacturers (VDMA) repeated their demands that German laws were adjusted to the average European standard.⁹² The industry associations' spokespersons claimed that the existing controls contributed to or even were the cause of the increasing difficulties of the German armaments and manufacturing industry and the rising unemployment in the sector.

The statement indicated a shift in the debate which was marked by the increasing demand to relax not only controls for dual-use equipment, but also for armaments exports. The problems of the arms industry were symbolised by DASA in Lower Saxony, one of the German Länder that had been suffering most from the conversion of the arms industry since the late 1980s. Although German labour unions, as represented by the German Labour Union Association (DGB), generally tended to be in favour of strict export controls, union representatives of DASA met personally with ministers and parliamentarians to ask for a relaxation of German export rules on dual-use goods in order to rescue the company's future.⁹³ The governments of Länder with a high proportion of armaments and manufacturing industry were especially susceptible to the warning that unemployment in the sector was rising. Moreover, the Bavarian Minister for Economics and Transport, Dr Otto Wiesheu (CSU), argued that Germany also had to harmonise its weapons export controls to recover its ability to co-operate in multinational armaments projects and to maintain Germany's influence in NATO.⁹⁴ Even SPD-governed states such as Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, which had a high percentage of armaments and shipbuilding industry, were divided over the tight German export controls. However, the representatives of the Länder in the Bundesrat had no direct authority over national export legislation.

Although the evidence available did not support the argument that the German technological base and employment in Northern Germany could only be maintained

⁹² K.B., 'Deutsche Alleingänge in der Kontrollpolitik gefährden Exportaufträge', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 3/12/93.

⁹³ 'DASA-Betriebsrat will Milliarden-Programm', *Reuter German News Service*, 4/2/94.

⁹⁴ Otto Wiesheu, 'Zwischen Emotion und Verantwortung', *Welt*, 7/1/94.

authoritative influence of the Foreign Office.⁹⁵ The extension of the dual-use control debate to armaments exports, presented another attempt by industry representatives to change the conditions of the policy process by strategically shifting the decision-making authority over the issue to actors who were more favourable towards a revision of the German Foreign Trade Act.

Table 6.3 Preference Changes: 5 December 1993 - 9 December 1994

6 th Phase (-14/4/93)			7 th Phase (-5/12/94)			8 th Phase (-9/12/94)		
Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change	Actor	Pressure (per cent)	Change
BT	73	U	BT	69	U	BT	69	U
Dm	56	C	Coa	53	C	Fm	48	C
Coa	47	NC	Fm	48	NC	Cha	45	C
Fm	45	NC	Cha	43	NC	Cab	45	C
Cha	43	NC	FM	42	NC	FM	45	C
FM	42	NC	UN-SC	40	U	Com	45	U
UN-SC	40	U	Cab	40	U	UN-SC	40	U
Cab	35	U	Com	35	U	Med	37	NC
BR	35	U	spd	35	NC	grü	35	NC
Uns	33	U	grü	35	NC	pds	35	NC
Med	33	NC	pds	35	NC	BR	35	U
vote	31	NC	BR	35	U	spd	35	NC
Com	30	U	Med	35	NC	vote	35	U
spd	30	NC	Uns	33	U	Uns	33	U
grü	29	NC	vote	31	U	EP	13	NC
pds	29	NC	EP	13	NC	UN-Org	9	NC
EP	13	NC	UN-Org	9	NC			
UN-Org	9	NC						

While the issue of dual-use transfers had been exclusively under the authority of the Economics and Foreign Ministries, the question of armaments exports led to a greater involvement of the Ministry of Defence in the decision-making process. Crucially for the aims of the industry, Defence Minister Volker Rühle supported its demands on both the

⁹⁵ 'Germany to consider easing export laws', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 20:23, 4/12/93, p.9.

dual-use and armaments export control issue. In a letter to Chancellor Kohl, Defence Minister R  he contended that it was in Germany's security interest to maintain a defence industrial base and to be able to collaborate in international armaments projects which were currently prevented by differences between the national export regulations in Western Europe. Like industry representatives, the Defence Minister criticised Foreign Minister Kinkel and the Foreign Office as the main obstacle to the required revision of Germany's export rules. Only recently Foreign Minister Kinkel had blocked the licensing of arms transfers to Taiwan in the Cabinet's Federal Security Council.⁹⁶

Shortly after the Bundestag hearing, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians sought to extract further concessions from cabinet ministers at the institutionalised Coalition Meeting. At the Coalition Meeting, the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP factions as well as the leading cabinet ministers were represented and able to exert direct pressure on each other. Given the unanimous support for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act among the CDU/CSU and the FDP parliamentary parties, the pressure on the Coalition Meeting in favour of a revision of the German dual-use controls was at 47 per cent⁹⁷ significantly higher than in the Cabinet at 35 per cent⁹⁸. In fact, the Coalition Meeting was subject to the third highest degree of pressure in the German foreign policy network following the Bundestag and officials in the Defence Ministry. As a result of the pressure from within the coalition, Chancellor Kohl and the leading members of the CDU/CSU and FDP conceded that the government would show a greater willingness to reconsider the German dual-use legislation in the European negotiations in order to allow for a settlement. However, Chancellor Kohl continued to urge for a European harmonization on the basis of the German legislation - as far as possible.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ 'Allein auf der Bank', *Spiegel* 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.

⁹⁷ Specifically, seven out of fifteen actors to which the Coalition Meeting was linked in the network, namely Economics Minister Rexrodt, Defence Minister R  he, officials from the Economics Ministry, the Defence Ministry, CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians and industry representatives, raised the pressure to P_6 [Coa] = $7/15 = 47\%$.

⁹⁸ The Cabinet was under pressure from Economics Minister Rexrodt, Defence Minister R  he, the Chancellor's Office minister, officials from the Economics Ministry, the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition parties as well as industry representatives, who accounted for seven of its 20 links in the network, i.e. P_6 [Cab] = $7/20 = 35\%$.

⁹⁹ 'Allein auf der Bank', *Spiegel* 51, 20/12/93, pp.20f.; K.B., "Nachteile f  r deutsche R  stungsfirmer m  ssen verschwinden", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94; Peter Kittelmann (CDU/CSU), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 202. Sitzung, 13 January 1994, p.17451; Ariane Genillard, 'World Trade

To discuss the terms of new German export rules, the government set up a working group of officials from the Economics Ministry, the Defence Ministry and the Foreign Office. In response to the lobbying from the industry and the Defence Ministry, the ministries were, for the first time, ordered also to consider the effects of the dual-use sale regulations on employment and the maintenance of the defence industrial base. The talks concentrated on attempts to speed up the licensing of collaboration between German and European technological companies.¹⁰⁰ With respect to international collaboration in technological developments, the issue of linking dual-use export controls with weapons transfer regulations reemerged. In particular, an alliance between industry representatives and officials in the Defence Ministry favoured a regulation that combined the Foreign Trade Act with the War Weapons Control Act in a comprehensive and less restrictive form. However, the attempt to link the two issues failed. While the Cabinet was prepared to compromise on the controls of dual-capable technology¹⁰¹, the majority of cabinet ministers opposed the liberalisation of armaments sales.¹⁰² Foreign Minister Kinkel and Minister of Economics Rexrodt proclaimed publicly that the War Weapons Control Act of 1982 would not be changed.¹⁰³

The ability of the Cabinet to resist demands for the coupling of dual-use with arms exports was enhanced by the fact that CDU/CSU and FDP coalition parties were internally split on the question of liberalising weapons transfers. Foreign policy spokesman of the CDU/CSU, Karl Lamers, published a memorandum in which he advocated the reduction of German armaments export regulations along with common European regulations for dual-use equipment.¹⁰⁴ Conversely, CDU/CSU deputy faction leader Johannes Gerster

News: Germany to relax dual-use curbs', *Financial Times*, 14/1/94.

¹⁰⁰ deu, 'Regierung prüft Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/1/94.

¹⁰¹ 'Rexrodt sieht Lockerungen bei Dual-Use Regeln', *Reuter German News Service*, 10/1/94; 'Rexrodt sieht Abstriche bei Dual-Use-Kontrollen', *Reuter German News Service*, 13/1/94; K.B., 'Rüstungs-Richtlinien bleiben unverändert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/1/94.

¹⁰² K.B., "'Nachteile für deutsche Rüstungsfirmen müssen verschwinden'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94.

¹⁰³ Stue, "'Grundsätze nicht ändern'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 11/1/94; K.B., 'Rüstungs-Richtlinien bleiben unverändert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/1/94.

¹⁰⁴ deu, 'Regierung prüft Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/1/94. The proposal by Lamers was welcomed by the Federation of German Industries and the electronics and aerospace industry association. See also 'Bonn darf nicht zaudern', *Focus*, 24/1/94; Ho, 'Die Industrie blickt skeptisch auf Europa', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 4/2/94; hfc, 'Gegen nationale Exportkontrolle',

contended that illegal armaments exports should be fought first, before more generous export licensing was considered.¹⁰⁵ Several leading members of the CDU/CSU faction stated their objections to Lamer's memorandum. Germany's labour unions were similarly divided on this question. On one hand, Klaus Zwickel, the leader of the national federation of the metal workers, IG Metall, took the view that armaments exports were dangerous and without future. On the other, representatives of the Rheinmetall union contended that it was necessary to maintain a national defence industry as a contribution to the Western security system.¹⁰⁶

The Cabinet reacted to the competing pressures by distinguishing between licensing procedures for collaborative armaments projects among the members of the EC and NATO and armaments exports to third countries.¹⁰⁷ While cabinet ministers did not want to appear to promote global proliferation, the former were supported by Defence Minister Rühle and civil servants in the Defence Ministry and the Economics Ministry.¹⁰⁸ Initially, Defence Ministry officials had demanded that the German defence industry should not only be able to collaborate in European armaments projects for the home market, but also for international exports.¹⁰⁹ However, ministers agreed to maintain Germany's tight weapons export regulations.¹¹⁰ On 13 January 1994, the German Cabinet resolved the issue with a law designed to enable the cooperation and the sharing of information under a European armaments export regulation.¹¹¹

In the European negotiations over the dual-use export controls, the German representation had resigned to the fact that it would not be able to achieve stricter

Frankfurter Allgemeine, 28/2/94.

¹⁰⁵ deu, 'Regierung prüft Lockerung der Lieferbedingungen', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 7/1/94.

¹⁰⁶ K.B., 'Kontroverse in IG Metall um Rüstungsexporte', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 20/1/94. See also Volker Kauder (CDU/CSU), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 214. Sitzung, 4 March 1994, p.18551.

¹⁰⁷ K.B., 'Unerwarteter Protest gegen vereinfachte Rüstungsexporte', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 6/1/94; Stue, "'Grundsätze nicht ändern'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 11/1/94; K.B., 'Rüstungs-Richtlinien bleiben unverändert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/1/94.

¹⁰⁸ K.B., "'Nachteile für deutsche Rüstungsfirmen müssen verschwinden'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/1/94; deu, 'CDU/CSU fordert EU-einheitliche Regelung', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5/1/94.

¹⁰⁹ 'Bonn erwägt Rüstungsexport-Harmonisierung', *Reuter German News Service*, 6/1/94.

¹¹⁰ K.B., "'Harmonisierung in Europa nötig'", *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 12/1/94.

¹¹¹ 'Kabinet will Zoll-Abhörermächtigung verlängern', *Reuter German News Service*, 13/1/94; Ariane Genillard, 'World Trade News: Germany to relax dual-use curbs', *Financial Times*, 14/1/94.

regulations than had been agreed in the compromise of October 1993.¹¹² Although the European Council of Ministers was expected to approve the draft for common European dual-use export regulations in May or June for implementation on 1 January 1995¹¹³, an agreement with the governments of France, Britain and Italy over which countries should be banned from dual-use exports was still missing.¹¹⁴ Nevertheless, the German Cabinet approved a series of amendments to the Foreign Trade Act which were designed to pave the way for the common European dual-use controls. The first amendment of the Foreign Trade Act on 28 February 1994, primarily made terminological corrections in response to the internal market. It also allocated the authority over the implementation of the common EC regulations to the appropriate national departments.¹¹⁵

SPD opposition members criticised the amendments and demanded that the loopholes which were created by the common European regulations be closed by additional national controls.¹¹⁶ Moreover, SPD parliamentarians argued that the government was giving the wrong signals to Brussels. Members of the Greens and the PDS, who favoured the prohibition of all armaments exports, supported this criticism. However, in spite of their unified opposition to the relaxation of German export controls, the opposition parties were not able to prevent the impending policy change. Following the extension of the transnational coalition in favour of a reduction of the German dual-use controls from civil servants to two cabinet ministers as well as the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary majority, the pressure on the German Cabinet was considerable, amounting to 35 per cent of its linkages within the network.¹¹⁷

While the previous analysis has suggested that the Kohl Cabinet had been able to

¹¹² Minister of Economics Dr. Günter Rexrodt (FDP), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 202. Sitzung, 13 January 1994, p.17455; 'Bei der Kontrolle von Dual-use-Ausfuhren ist die Bundesregierung kompromißbereit', *Handelsblatt*, 14/1/94.

¹¹³ Stue, 'Keine vollständige Harmonisierung der Exportkontrolle in Europa', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26/4/94; Stue, 'Keine deutschen U-Boote für Taiwan', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 28/4/94.

¹¹⁴ fy, 'Besorgt um deutsche Rüstung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 14/4/94.

¹¹⁵ Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Achten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/6911, 28 February 1994; 'Wie kann illegaler Rüstungsexport verhindert werden?', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/3/94.

¹¹⁶ Dr. Elke Leonhard-Schmid (SPD), *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, 214. Sitzung, 4 March 1994, pp.18550f.; 'Rüstungsexporte bleiben Streitthema', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 5/3/94; Hans Monath, 'Etappensieg für Waffenhändler', *Tageszeitung*, 5/3/94.

¹¹⁷ See footnote 100.

withstand the collective pressure from nearly all European governments due to the veto position of the government in the international negotiations, the combined demands from national and international actors began to compromise the Cabinet's resistance. Due to the support for a revision of the German dual-use goods controls among domestic actors, cabinet ministers began to consider the lifting of its national dual-use controls even beyond the requirements of the European compromise. In talks with the Saudi-Arabian leadership in early February, Minister of Economics Rexrodt suggested that a revision of the government's policy on dual-use exports was imminent.¹¹⁸ Rexrodt envisaged specifically a reduction of Germany's country list.¹¹⁹ To sustain the pressure on the Cabinet, the Economics Minister and officials from the Defence Ministry sought to use transnational and international linkages with their European colleagues. In particular, Rexrodt attempted to transfer the issue of dual-use exports to international organisations where he could draw on their support for less restrictive regulations by redefining the authority over the issue. Thus, Minister of Economics Rexrodt argued that the Germany Foreign Trade Act needed to be reduced to comply with the 'higher' authority of international standards set by the multilateral dual-use control regimes of which Germany was a member.

Incidentally, multilateral dual-use export controls had been significantly cut back with the abolition of the COCOM regime in the previous year. Moreover, although an *ad-hoc* working group had been set up at a meeting in Wassenaar, Netherlands, in November 1993 to draft a proposal for a COCOM successor regime, it soon became clear that the new regime would be much weaker than its predecessor.¹²⁰ The first round of negotiations failed to reach an agreement and a second round had just opened on the bureaucratic level in March 1994.¹²¹ The French government, in particular, opposed tight controls. With reference to its national sovereignty, the French delegation vetoed the full control of conventional armaments technology.¹²² The US administration, which had initially resisted

¹¹⁸ The reference had particular weight for Saudi-Arabia because it was on Germany's country list. See Carl Graf Hohenthal, 'Saudi-Arabien versucht einen behutsamen Umbruch', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 7/2/94.

¹¹⁹ Stue, 'Exportkontrolle: Rexrodt für Sonderregeln', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 7/3/94.

¹²⁰ 'COCOM offiziell aufgelöst', *Agence Europe*, 6/4/94.

¹²¹ Nancy Dunne, 'World Trade news: Demise of a battle-scarred veteran of the cold war', *Financial Times*, 31/3/94.

¹²² Stue, 'Ein neues Exportkontrollsystem für Rüstungsgüter', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 29/3/94.

the weakening of the COCOM controls, had also relinquished its stance on dual-use exports.¹²³ Thus, the Clinton administration issued a general licence dual-use exports to the former Soviet Union and China in order to ease exports. The move prompted fears among the European armaments industry that the US would take advantage of the weak multilateral regimes, while European exports were curtailed by the emerging common export regulations.¹²⁴

The proposal for a COCOM successor regime, which was unveiled in April, confirmed fears among proliferation experts that national differences of interest would prevail. Although the member states had agreed on a set of common rules, the draft envisaged that licensing would be conducted nationally. Moreover, country controls were reduced to very few states such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.¹²⁵ While a decision on the draft was still outstanding and, in fact, not reached until July 1996¹²⁶, Economics Minister Günter Rexrodt immediately suggested the reduction of Germany's country list from 33 to eight or ten countries to conform with the new arrangement. However when questioned by the press about the position of the German government on his proposal, Rexrodt had to admit that his initiative had not been co-ordinated with his Cabinet colleagues.¹²⁷

Officials from the Defence Ministry pursued the same strategy of transferring the issue of export regulations to other authorities. Following the officials' failed attempts of December 1993 to reduce German armaments export controls in line with the revision of its dual-use transfer regulations, Defence Ministry officials now sought to utilise the opposition to strict multilateral controls among its European partners for their cause. In a working paper published on 24 May, the civil servants proposed the creation of a European Armaments Agency with full authority over European arms exports. The paper had been designed as the basis for negotiations about a West European Armament Group

¹²³ '1500 "Dual-use"-Exporte in vier Jahren gebilligt', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/5/94.

¹²⁴ 'COCOM-Anschlußregelung noch in der Schwebe', *Reuter German News Service*, 3/1/94. See also Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, p.37.

¹²⁵ Theodor Troev, 'Business: Cold War trade bars call time', *European*, 1/4/94.

¹²⁶ *The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies*, Vienna, 12 July 1996, at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/wass_elements.htm.

¹²⁷ Peter Ziller, 'Rexrodt rüttelt an Export-Kontrollen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 12/4/94; 'Rexrodt will Exportkontrollen lockern', *Reuter German News Service*, 12/4/94.

in the WEU. Although the officials from the Defence Ministry insisted that the organization was not intended to undermine the German armaments export legislation, it would obviously limit the scope for national exceptions. Crucially, the paper suggested changing article 223 of the Treaty of Rome in the planned revision of the Maastricht Treaty in 1996 to transfer the decision-making authority on armaments questions to the European level.¹²⁸ The plan was criticised by the SPD opposition as ‘dangerous and stupid’.¹²⁹ SPD members pointed out that a European Armaments Agency could be used to end national export controls. Thus, the agency would threaten the clause that had been secured in the negotiations over common European dual-use export regulations which allowed for additional national controls.

However, in May 1994, the combined pressure from officials in the German Economics and Defence Ministry and their European colleagues in NATO, COCOM and other multilateral export control regimes showed some success. As consequence of the negotiations about the COCOM successor regime, officials from the German Economics Ministry announced that the government was relaxing the rules for armaments cooperation with members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).¹³⁰ The new regulation allowed German companies to export sensitive technology to OECD members without a licence if the goods contributed to not more than 20 per cent of the finished product. Weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, however, were exempted from the licence. The Cabinet approved the decision on 8 June 1994.¹³¹

Encouraged by the success of the transgovernmental coalition among the civil servants from the European Economics and Defence Ministries, representatives from the German technological industry also mobilised their transnational relations in order to exert

¹²⁸ Sto, ‘Rüstungsagentur für Europa?’, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 25/5/94; ‘SPD nennt Bonner Pläne für Rüstungsexport “gefährlich”’, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 26/5/94.

¹²⁹ ‘SPD: Richtlinien für deutsche Waffenexporte nicht lockern’, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26/5/94.

¹³⁰ The members included in 1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. See <http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htm>.

¹³¹ ‘Germany relaxes rules for arms industry cooperation’, *The Reuter European Business Report*, 31/5/94; Hermann-Josef Tenhagen, ‘Deutsche Waffen leichter in alle Welt’, *Tageszeitung*, 1/6/94; ‘SPD: Ausweitung des Waffenexports’, *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 3/6/94; Holger H. Mey, ‘Nicht länger Rüstungsexporte verweigern’, *Welt*, 6/6/94; Stue, ‘Die Ausfuhrliste wird geändert’, *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 9/6/94.

pressure on the German administration. As the European negotiations were drawing to a close, the industry used its international European associations to lobby against the stipulations which allowed EC members to maintain additional national export controls.¹³² 'It would be difficult, if not impossible, for a major company to contemplate collaboration with another company unless that company exists in a country where the government has accepted common principles of exporting policy', concluded a spokesperson of the European Defence Industry Group (EDIG).¹³³ Representatives of UNICE, the European association of businesses, demanded a quick resolution of the negotiations in Brussels in order to create an equal competitive environment.¹³⁴

However, industry representatives were less successful than the civil servants. At their meeting of the European Council on Corfu, 24-25 June 1994, European foreign ministers approved of the draft for common dual-use export controls as it had been agreed over the past year.¹³⁵ The general framework of the regulation was to be implemented in the form of a directive by the Commission. But the specific content of the contentious equipment and country lists would be open to constant review by the member states under the 'joint action' decision-making institutions of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).¹³⁶ The final package contained lists of chemical, biological, nuclear and missile products which would require an export licence for transfers outside the EC. Their content widely matched the German lists. However, unlike the German Foreign Trade Act, the document did not include the transfer of sensitive knowledge and services. A regulation similar to the German 'catch-all clause' §5c which controlled equipment that to the knowledge of the exporter was intended for armaments production had also not been acceptable to the other EC members. To compensate for these

¹³² Stue, 'Keine vollständige Harmonisierung der Exportkontrolle in Europa', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 26/4/94.

¹³³ Carol Reed and Heinz Schulte, 'Germany views the way to go', *Jane's Defence Weekly* 21:24, 18/6/94, pp.52f., p.52.

¹³⁴ 'UNICE betont Dringlichkeit einer Entscheidung des Rates über "Dual-Use-Güter"', *Agence Europe*, 16/4/94.

¹³⁵ 'Vorbehalte Belgiens und Dänemarks verzögern Dossier betreffend Dual-Use Güter', *Agence Europe*, 15/6/94; Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, *Hansard*, Vol.245, Cols.182f., Written Answers, 22 June 1994; Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, pp.40f.

¹³⁶ 'Vorbehalte Belgiens und Dänemarks verzögern Dossier betreffend Dual-Use Güter', *Agence Europe*, 15 June 1994; Mr. Heathcoat-Amory, *Hansard*, Vol.245, Cols.182f., Written Answers, 22 June 1994; Cornish, *Arms Trade and Europe*, pp.40f.

omissions, an opt-out formula allowed member states to maintain stricter national regulations where considered essential for national security. Although this formula should have paved the way for an agreement on the country lists by leaving the decision over the scope of the controls with the member states, the member governments continued to deliberate the content of a common European country list.¹³⁷

Whether officials from the German Economics Ministry actively prolonged the discussions about the country controls does not emerge from the data. However, the continuing debate had a crucial impact on the decision-making process as it reasserted transnational and international pressure for a reduction of the German country list during the summer and autumn of 1994. Minister of Economics Rexrodt used the deadlock in the European negotiations on the country list question to insist in the German Cabinet on a reduction of the German country controls. Specifically, Rexrodt wanted to restrict Germany's national exemptions from 32 to six states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria. Rexrodt's fellow FDP party member and Cabinet colleague Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel and officials from the Foreign Office opposed the plan. Kinkel justified his objections with the argument that a reduction of the list would permit exports to Algeria, Angola, Pakistan, Cuba and Vietnam which were known for their human rights violations.¹³⁸ In an official statement, Foreign Office civil servants rebutted the suggestion with the comment that with regard to the country list an agreement had not been reached. However, Kinkel and his staff were under high pressure due to their boundary position which exposed them to pressure from both national and international actors. Including the united coalition among the other European Foreign Ministries and his FDP party colleagues, 42 per cent of Kinkel's contacts in the network demanded a reduction of the country controls.¹³⁹

Support for the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Office staff on the question of the country controls came only from members of the SPD, the Green and the PDS

¹³⁷ Peter Ziller, 'Heikle Rüstungsgeschäfte - Rexrodts Brücke soll Exporteuren den Weg frei machen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/9/94.

¹³⁸ 'Amnesty fordert: Rüstungsexporte nicht erleichtern', *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 13/12/94.

¹³⁹ P₇ [FM] = 16/38 = 42%.

opposition parties.¹⁴⁰ However, the influence of the opposition members on the government was limited. Conversely, opposition parliamentarians were dependent on cabinet ministers and civil servants for expertise and regular information about the international negotiations. At best opposition members could exert indirect pressure via the media and the electorate during the ongoing general election campaign. An opportunity to direct public attention to the impending change of government policy arose during a meeting between EC foreign ministers and governmental representatives of ASEAN states. Using the meeting as a platform, SPD members urged the Cabinet in the media to refrain from allowing arms transfers to the region.¹⁴¹ In their election manifesto the SPD promised to restrict armaments exports to members of NATO and the EC, if elected to government.

However, during the election campaign the question was not promoted as a central issue because of its association with job losses in the technological industries.¹⁴² Since even the German labour unions were divided over the question of armaments exports, the SPD was best advised not to raise the issue with its grass roots supporters. In fact, only 39 per cent of the electorate in West Germany favoured the banning of armaments transfers. In the former East, where the PDS had its main base, 52 per cent of the electorate supported the abolition of weapons exports. The PDS wanted to prohibit all arms exports, as did the Greens.¹⁴³ However, when the Kohl coalition government won a third term in office in the general election of 16 October 1994, the only chance of the opposition members to prevent the revision of the German dual-use export controls by gaining control over the decision-making process was lost.¹⁴⁴

In early December, a Coalition Meeting between the Chancellor, key cabinet ministers and the leaders of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties decided to reduce German dual-use export controls. The decision was no surprise. The Coalition Meeting had been under considerable pressure during the autumn from 53 per cent of the

¹⁴⁰ Peter Ziller, 'Heikle Rüstungsgeschäfte - Rexroths Brücke soll Exporteuren den Weg frei machen', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/9/94. See also Peter Ziller, 'Bonn erleichtert Rüstungsgeschäft', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/12/94; Stue, 'Neue Länderliste für Exportkontrollen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 10/12/94.

¹⁴¹ ren, 'SPD kritisiert Ostasien-Politik der Bundesregierung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 23/9/94.

¹⁴² ban, 'SPD Parteirat stellt sich mit großer Geschlossenheit hinter Scharping', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 4/5/94.

¹⁴³ Sto, 'PDS will rot-grüne Regierung unterstützen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 22/8/94.

¹⁴⁴ Elisabeth Noelle -Neumann, 'Wahlkampf der Gefühle', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 5/10/94.

actors to whom it was linked in the network. In particular, the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties, Economics Minister Rexrodt and Defence Minister Rühle favoured a revision of the Foreign Trade Act.¹⁴⁵ Although not a formal institution of the German policy process, the decision of the Cabinet Meeting had important consequences. Practically, the Coalition Meeting served to negotiate all controversial issues in the coalition government. As such, it had direct influence over the Cabinet. With the approval of the Meeting to a reduction in the German dual-use export controls, the pressure on the collective Cabinet was raised from 40 to 45 per cent.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the Cabinet Meeting increased the pressure on both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Kinkel also to 45 per cent, that is nearly half of the actors to which both were linked within the German foreign policy network supported the revision of the German dual-use export licensing conditions.¹⁴⁷ On 9 December 1994, the Cabinet approved the amendment of the German Foreign Trade Act.

Following the Cabinet decision, officials from the Economics Ministry and the Foreign Office reduced the country list from 32 to 9 states in long and protracted negotiations between the two ministries.¹⁴⁸ Removed from the list were among others Egypt, China, Pakistan, India, Angola, Algeria, Vietnam, Yemen, Cambodia, Lebanon and Taiwan.¹⁴⁹ Foreign Office staff had originally wanted to include ten new countries which were affected by civil war, such as Georgia and Tajikistan, or which were subject to international embargos, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Haiti, Nigeria, Ruanda, Sudan and Zaire. However, after the decision of the Cabinet, the ability of the Foreign Office to influence the content of the country list was very limited.¹⁵⁰

When it came to justifying the reduction of the country list in public, however, the German government was at a loss. Cabinet ministers could hardly admit that the revision of government policy had been a consequence of persistent and strategic pressure from the

¹⁴⁵ $P_7 [\text{Coa}] = 8/15 = 53\%$.

¹⁴⁶ $P_7 [\text{Cab}] = 8/20 = 40\%$ to $P_8 [\text{Cab}] = 9/20 = 45\%$.

¹⁴⁷ $P_8 [\text{Cha}] = 19/42 = 45\%$ and $P_8 [\text{FM}] = 17/38 = 45\%$.

¹⁴⁸ The list now comprised dual-use exports to Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Iran, Birma, North Korea, Syria, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia.

¹⁴⁹ Peter Ziller, 'Bonn erleichtert Rüstungsgeschäft', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 10/12/94; Stue, 'Neue Länderliste für Exportkontrollen', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 10/12/94.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

German armaments and export industry. Instead, Economics Minister Rexrodt falsely claimed that the amendment had become necessary due to the European agreement on common dual-use export regulations.¹⁵¹ As the German European Parliament Member Jannis Sakkellariou (SPD) correctly pointed out, however, the shortening of the country list was by no means required by the EC regulations.¹⁵² The British government, for instance, maintained a list of 44-45 countries for special controls.¹⁵³

On 19 December 1994, shortly after the policy reversal of the German government, the European Council approved the common regulation for the control of exports of dual-use goods.¹⁵⁴ Differences between the German controls and the common European regulation pertained to the lists of dual-use equipment which were less comprehensive than the Foreign Trade Act in the area of chemical and biological goods. However, with the support of a number of other member states, the German government had achieved the inclusion of a catch-all clause for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Due to the opposition of the French administration, the catch-all clause exempted conventional technology. Moreover, exporters only required a licence if they had been informed by the authorities of the military use of their equipment or if they had 'positive knowledge' that it was intended for military purposes. Yet, the European regulation included several stipulations which enabled member states to maintain stricter controls if they chose to do so.¹⁵⁵ In line with these, the German government retained its controls for dual-use goods which could be converted to conventional weapons. Furthermore, Germany required licensing for dual-use equipment which was to be exported to countries on its new country list, the 'X list'. National regulations for the

¹⁵¹ 'Regierung einig über Regeln für Dual-Use-Güter', *Reuter German News Service*, 9/12/94.

¹⁵² 'Militärexporte - Jannis Sakellariou attackiert deutsche Regierung', *Agence Europe*, 14/12/94.

¹⁵³ The numbers vary since the list is under constant review. See Mr. Ian Taylor, *Hansard*, Vol.254, Col.353, Written Answers, 9 February 1995; Mr. Nelson, *Hansard*, Vol.263, Col.1550, Written Answers, 19 July 1995.

¹⁵⁴ *Regulation No 3381/94*, at CELEX CD-ROM; 'Kontrolle der Ausfuhr von 'Dual-Use-Gütern'', *Agence Europe*, 28/12/94. After further delays the regulation was implemented on 1 July 1995.

¹⁵⁵ Alexander Reuter, *Außenwirtschafts- und Exportkontrollrecht Deutschland, Europäische Union* (München: Beck, 1995); Egger, "Dual-Use"-Waren. *Exportkontrolle und EG-Vertrag*; Jestädt and Behr, 'Exportkontrollrecht für Dual-use-Güter'.


transfer of sensitive know-how and technical services also remained in force.¹⁵⁶

6.3 Conclusion

In order to assess the explanatory value of multilevel network theory, the following draws together the evidence from the above case study with regard to the plausibility of its two hypotheses. As in the previous case studies, it examines the hypotheses with regard to four measures: the probability of preference change, the distribution of the four behavioural categories across the range of pressure, the average degree of pressure in each category and the timing of the preference changes. Finally, it discusses the insights provided by multilevel network analysis into the u-turn of the German government on dual-use export regulations.

Assessment of the Hypotheses

The first hypothesis of multilevel network theory which suggests that rising degrees of pressure can be linked to preference changes among the affected network actors is widely supported by the results of this case. As displayed in Graph 6.1, higher degrees of pressure were nearly always associated with an increasing proportion of preference changes. In fact, the first hypothesis was confirmed by the empirical evidence in 155 out of 157 instances, i.e. 99 per cent.






Further confirmation of the first hypothesis was derived from the distribution of instances in each of the four behavioural categories - 'no change', 'unclear or undecided', 'change' and 'blocked'. Thus, the distribution of the frequency of instances in which actors

¹⁵⁶ 'Exportkontrolle in Europa wird harmonisiert', *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, 19/12/94; 'Bonn paßt Außenwirtschaftsrecht an EU-Norm an', *Reuter German News Service*, 7/2/95. See also Egger, "Dual-Use"-Waren. Exportkontrolle und EG-Vertrag, p.93; Jestädt and Behr, 'Exportkontrollrecht für Dual-use-Güter', p.717, p.719; Reuter, *Außenwirtschafts- und Exportkontrollrecht Deutschland*, p.98.

did not change their original preferences in Graph 6.2 conformed with the by now familiar picture of high numbers at a low range of 0-10 per cent, a slump at 15-30 per cent and an early peak at 30-35 per cent. After the peak, the frequency falls steeply to zero at a degree of pressure of 55 per cent. Beyond this degree none of the actors was able to advocate the preservation of German dual-use controls, thus providing further evidence for a threshold which has been identified in the previous case studies.

The frequency distribution of the instances in which actors's preferences were unclear or divided which is shown in Graph 6.3 reaches its peak at slightly higher pressures than the previous category, namely at 30-45 per cent. It supports the notion of an intermediate phase. The six deviating instances at a range of 65-75 per cent suggest that unclear preferences enable actors to resist higher degrees of pressure. As in the other cases, the actor who was able to withstand these pressures was a collective decision-making institution, namely the German Bundestag. However, in this case the fact that the Bundestag's preference was codified as 'unclear or undecided' was a consequence of the formal support for the government among the members of the coalition parliamentary parties. If the parties had decided to approve of an amendment of the Foreign Trade Act before a Cabinet decision,



this would have been an open rebellion and could have led to a vote of no confidence. Although the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties were unanimously in favour of a reduction of dual-use controls, they chose not to challenge their government in the Bundestag. Nevertheless, as party members, they repeatedly and publicly criticised the government's policy.

The distribution of the number of preference changes in Graph 6.4 further supports the first hypothesis as it reaches its peak at a higher degree of pressure than both the 'no change' and the 'unclear or undecided' category, namely between 40 and 50 per cent. The preference changes among the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties at 5 per cent pressure, cannot be explained within the framework of this theory. They also do not correlate with similar occurrences in the other cases and, therefore, do not suggest a revision of the existing hypothesis. An explanation could involve degrees of power to account for the presumed close relationship between the German industry and the coalition parties. Thus, in particular the FDP perceives itself as the party political representation of the German industry. However, as has been argued in the exposition of multilevel network theory, such an approach would incur serious theoretical and methodological problems. Since the error margin encountered this way is rather narrow, it appears more fruitful to treat the two instances as exceptions from a generally highly valuable hypothesis.

Table 6.4 Descriptive Statistics

Preference Changes	Number of Instances	Range of Pressure	Minimum Pressure	Maximum Pressure	Average Pressure
No Change (NC)	112	52%	0%	52%	22%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	33	58%	15%	73%	41%
Change (C)	12	77%	5%	82%	42%
Blocked (B)	0	-	-	-	-

The second indicator which supports the first hypothesis is the significant difference in the average degrees of pressure at which actors were able to maintain their original preferences at 22 per cent and those at which they modified them at 42 per cent.¹⁵⁷ The average of the pressure at which actors were unclear or divided at 41 per cent is slightly

¹⁵⁷ See Table 6.4 *Descriptive Statistics*.

below the mean of pressure at which actors change preferences, providing further indication for an intermediate phase of reconsideration and insecurity at an intermediate range of pressure.

The timing of the preference changes lends additional support for the hypothesis which links the preference reversals to the degree of pressure exerted over network actors. Nine of twelve actors changed their policy position immediately after an increase in their pressure quotient. Among the three actors which did not immediately respond to the growing demand for a modification in their preferences one role actor, i.e. Foreign Office staff, responded in the second phase after an increase. The belated preference change among Foreign Office officials matches their long-standing dedication to the cause of tight dual-use controls. However, the deferment of their preference reversal by merely one phase does not seriously challenge the generally close relationship between pressure increases and the timing of preference changes. The other two exceptions pertain again to the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties who modified their policy preferences although they were not subject to increasing, or indeed substantive, pressure from other actors within the German multilevel foreign policy network.

Table 6.5 Timing of Preference Changes

1 st phase after an increase in pressure	Other
1. EC-Co (0 -> 82)	1. cdu (change without increase in pressure at 5%)
2. Em (39% -> 45%)	2. fdp (change without increase in pressure at 5%)
3. EM (37% -> 40%)	3. Fm (change in 2 nd phase after increase, 45% -> 48%)
4. DM (34% -> 38%)	
5. Dm (52% -> 56%)	
6. Coa (47% -> 53%)	
7. Cha (43% -> 45%)	
8. Cab (40% -> 45%)	
9. FM (42% -> 45%)	

The use of a blocking strategy was employed by none of the actors in the case of dual-use export regulations, primarily because of the nature of the issue. Unlike the first German case and the two British cases, the maintenance of high export standards in Germany required a positive decision in favour of a policy change which included the establishment

of tight international controls. Since the introduction of the internal market threatened to undermine German dual-use controls by default, the German government had to lobby for support in favour of strict European regulations rather than merely block the issue. A similar situation applied to the negotiations for a COCOM successor regime. The nature of the regime as intergovernmental and voluntary agreement did not allow for a German veto over the dismantling of the controls. Again, the government was conversely forced to mobilise support for a multilateral control regime. In the national section of the German foreign and security policy network, however, the impending policy reversal could have been blocked by a majority in the Bundestag. Yet since the coalition government's parliamentary parties were among the strongest and earliest advocates of less restrictive dual-use export controls, a veto was not considered by them. Conversely, members from the three opposition parties, which were opposed to an amendment of the Foreign Trade Act, were unable to veto the revision of German dual-use export regulations due to their minority position within the Bundestag.

New Insights into the Reduction of German Dual-Use Export Regulations

The preceding analysis illustrates that the hypotheses of multilevel network theory are not only confirmed by the case of German dual-use export regulations, but also reveal interesting insights into the case and the German foreign policy decision-making process. Specifically, multilevel network analysis illustrates the range of national, transnational and international pressures which contributed to the amendment of German dual-use export controls. Moreover, multilevel network theory can help to explain why the German government changed its national regulations beyond the requirements of the common European framework by pointing to the increasing domestic support for a revision of the Foreign Trade Act.

According to multilevel network theory, the emergence of a winning coalition in favour of less restrictive dual-use regulations can be linked to the strategic pressure of German industry representatives. As part of their strategy the two main German industry associations and major technological companies used not only their national linkages to officials in the Economics Ministry and the members of the CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentary parties, but also transnational contacts with the European Commission and international employers associations to exert pressure for their policy preference. Once

officials in the German Economics Ministry had succumbed to the mounting national, transnational and international pressure, they contributed to the direct pressure of this coalition on German cabinet ministers. In particular, Economics Minister Rexrodt proved susceptible to the mounting demands and, following his own preference change, in turn lobbied for the reduction of the German dual-use controls among his fellow ministers and in the Cabinet.

With regard to the question of a governmental gatekeeper position between the national and the international arena and the consequences for its ability to control foreign policy decisions, multilevel network theory suggests two conclusions in this case. First, the boundary position of ministers and civil servants played an important part in bringing about the policy change of the German government as roles were able to draw on both national and international support for a reduction of German dual-use export controls - once they had changed their preferences on the issue. However, the latter qualification alerts to some misconceptions regarding the gatekeeper concept. In particular, the evidence suggests that gatekeeper or 'boundary' roles, as they are termed here, are not only able to use their national and international relations to promote their own policy preferences, but are also more exposed to pressures for preference changes from actors in both arenas. Second, the case study indicates again that gatekeepers can be circumvented by transnational linkages among private actors such as German industry representatives with the EU or international industry associations.

In addition to its insights into multilevel coalitions, multilevel network theory offers a possible explanation for the observation that the German government reduced its 'H' list beyond the requirements of the common European dual-use export regulations although it had the option of maintaining its original length. It suggests that the extension of the support for the revision of the German Foreign Trade Act among domestic actors in Germany proved critical for the Cabinet's decision to amend the law. The transgovernmental coalition among European civil servants, as well as national and transnational pressure from the industry, played an important role in raising the pressure on the government in the international negotiations. However, with increasing domestic support for the reduction of dual-use controls, the government could go further in the revision of its national regulations. Multilevel network analysis thereby shows again a convergence between national and international policy preferences. As in the previous case

studies, the change in Cabinet policy came about when a majority of both national and international actors supported the relaxation of the German dual-use export controls.

7. Conclusion

This thesis has started with the observation that the study of contemporary foreign policy decision-making processes in Western Europe and North America increasingly requires the combination of multiple levels of analysis. As decision-making has come to involve a broad range of political, social and economic actors in the national and international arena, the division between empiricist theories of international relations and foreign policy analysis has been criticised for inhibiting more comprehensive explanations of foreign policy processes and outcomes. A range of multilevel models, such as transnationalism, the two-level game and network models, offer insights into the integrated policy decision-making processes in this area. This thesis has argued that the network approach is particularly well suited for modelling the increasing multiplicity, diversity and interdependence of actors across the national, transnational and international levels of analysis. However, it has pointed out that most existing network models fail to address sufficiently the theoretical implications of integrating all three levels of analysis. Moreover, few network models propose testable hypotheses regarding decision-making processes as an intermediate variable between structure and outcomes. To address these criticisms this thesis has proposed a multilevel network theory which offers new developments in both areas. Specifically, multilevel network theory seeks to illustrate that rational choice hypotheses can help to explain how public and private actors are able to influence the foreign policy decision-making process and its outcome. In addition to proposing further theoretical developments in network analysis, this thesis sought to provide empirical insights into the question whether governments in Western Europe and the broader transatlantic community have lost their control over the determination of national foreign policies due to the emergence of multilevel networks. The specific focus of this thesis has, therefore, been the analysis of multilevel networks in the foreign policy decision-making processes of Britain and Germany.

By returning to the theoretical and empirical questions of this thesis, the following seeks to provide an overall assessment of multilevel network theory and its insights on contemporary British and German foreign policy decision-making. In order to do so, the first section analyses the findings from the four case studies to assess the empirical evidence for the validity of the two hypotheses presented by the theory and to induce

modifications or new hypotheses. The second section turns to the empirical and theoretical debates outlined in the introduction. It first discusses the four case studies in the light of the insights suggested by multilevel network theory to the question whether governments in Western Europe and across the Atlantic are losing their control over the foreign policy decision-making process. It then proceeds to evaluate multilevel network theory in comparison with transnationalism, the two-level game and other network approaches. Finally, the conclusion proposes further areas for the testing and the development of multilevel network theory.

7.1 Evaluation of Multilevel Network Theory

In the exposition of multilevel network theory, it has been suggested that the axioms which guide the behaviour and preference changes of network actors in the foreign policy decision-making process should be valid independently of the specific network or issue area. In order to test this proposition, the four case studies analysed in the previous chapters were selected for their differences in two dimensions. First, the cases analysed decision-making processes in the distinct, though overlapping, foreign policy networks of Britain and Germany. Second, the cases included a security and a defence economic issue in each country. Before this section turns to the analysis of all cases, it returns to this question by examining whether the findings from the four cases were comparable or whether there were systematic differences between the British and the German network or between security and defence economic foreign policy decision-making. The section then proceeds to evaluate the degree to which the hypotheses of multilevel network theory were corroborated by empirical evidence from the four cases. In addition, it uses the findings from the four case studies to refine the two key hypotheses and induce additional propositions where possible.

Cross-Case Comparison and General Application of Multilevel Network Theory

In accordance with the initial assumptions of multilevel network theory, the comparison between the four cases [Table 7.1] shows no systematic differences between countries or issue areas. In so far as general conclusions can be drawn from four case studies, neither the British and the German multilevel foreign policy process nor security and defence economic decision-making are characterised by consistently higher or lower averages in

each of the four behavioural categories, 'no change', 'unclear or undecided', 'change' or 'blocked'. Both the British and the German cases show a higher than average and a lower than average value in the four behavioural categories. Across issues the findings vary, too. Thus, the same average of 22 per cent in the 'no change' category of the two defence economic cases is not matched by similarities in the other behavioural categories. The averages in the security cases also show no consistent similarities. Only the results regarding blocking behaviour are inconclusive since there are no instances of blocking behaviour in the second German case.

Table 7.1 Average Pressure in Cross-Case Comparison

Preference Changes	BRITAIN		GERMANY		Cross-Country
	Case I Security	Case II Defence Economics	Case III Security	Case VI Defence Economics	Cross-Issues
No Change (NC)	29%	22%	25%	22%	25%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	40%	25%	33%	41%	35%
Change (C)	40%	36%	36%	42%	39%
Blocked (B)	46%	50%	57%	-	51%


While there are no symmetries between countries or issues, the cross-case comparison of the averages reveals a strong correlation within the four behavioural categories. In fact, the differences within these categories are consistently smaller than within a country or issue area. With the qualification that the small number of cases only permits preliminary conclusions, the findings confirm that neither the location of the ultimate decision-making unit within a particular country nor the nature of the issues leads to differences in the behaviour of the network actors. It follows, that a cumulative analysis of all cases is not only possible, but also imperative in order to test the general hypotheses of multilevel network theory.

Cumulative Evaluation of the Hypotheses


According to the first hypothesis the higher the degree of pressure ($P=E/L$), i.e. number of directly related actors exerting pressure (E) on a single actor X in proportion to his or her absolute number of linkages within the network (L), the more likely is actor X -

including the ultimate decision unit - to change his or her policy preference. As the four case studies have showed, the empirical evidence generally confirms the first hypothesis. However, the general characteristics of the distribution of each behavioural category in relation to the degree of pressure to which actors were exposed became clearer in the cumulative analysis. Specifically, the distribution of the relative frequency or probability of preference changes at different degrees of pressure reveals itself as a continuous curve if the findings from all cases are combined. Graph 7.1 shows that the relative frequency or probability of preference changes rises almost without interruptions in the cumulative analysis. In addition, the combined data from the four case studies offers further insights into the general nature of the probabilistic causal relationship between network pressure and preference changes. Thus, in deviation from the single case studies, the probability of a preference change reaches 100 per cent only at a degree of pressure between 80-85 per cent. The increase in the probability of a preference change is, thus, less steep than in some of the single case studies. However, since the first hypothesis does not specify the scale of the increase in the probability of a preference change with rising degrees of pressure, i.e. the steepness of the curve, the empirical evidence from the single case studies as well as the cumulative analysis support the proposition. In fact, the empirical findings conform with the first hypothesis in 600 out of 604 instances of preference change, i.e. 99 per cent.

Graph 7.1 Frequency / Probability



Graph 7.2 Probability Estimates




The distribution of the curve in the cross-case analysis suggests, however, that the increase in the probability of a preference change with rising degrees of pressure can be further specified. Thus, Graph 7.2 indicates that the probability of an actor changing his

or her policy preference rises exponentially with increasing degrees of pressure. A refined first hypothesis can, therefore, be stated as:

Hypothesis 1': *The probability of an actor changing his or her policy preference increases exponentially with rising degrees of pressure ($P=E/L$), i.e. the number of directly related actors exerting pressure on a single actor (E) in proportion to his or her absolute number of linkages within the network (L).*

Further new insights are provided by the cumulative analysis of each of the four behavioural categories. Especially the distribution of the instances in which actors maintained their original preferences, shown in Graph 7.3, gives further indication about the behaviour of network members in the foreign policy decision-making process. The cumulative analysis shows a



consistently high distribution of instances of preference preservation at low degrees of pressure up to a range of 45-50 per cent. Moreover, although interrupted, the curve suggests a decrease in the ability of actors to maintain their policy preferences with rising pressure from its peak at 20-25 per cent. In addition, the curve supports the proposition of a threshold. Remarkably, this threshold lies almost exactly at a pressure of 50 per cent which characterises a situation in which an actor is exposed to pressure from half of the actors on which he or she is linked within the network. It conforms with the notion that in democracies a policy is determined by the preference of the majority. However, the findings derived from multilevel network theory suggest that the view of the majority of actors not only influences the policy preferences of cabinets or parliaments, but of all members in a network. Who is part of the 'majority view' differs for each actor or decision-making unit because every member in the network has a different constituency, i.e. is linked to a different group of actors. It is the policy preferences of this group which


matter to each actor.

Although the original exposition of multilevel network theory did not predict the existence of a threshold, it generally conforms with the premises and propositions of the model and thus can be incorporated into the approach. On the basis of the empirical findings, the new additional inductive hypothesis 1" can be stated as follows.

Hypothesis 1": *Actors are unlikely to maintain their original preferences at a degree of pressure ($P=E/L$) higher than 50 per cent if their preference change is not blocked. They will either change their preferences, or appear unclear or undecided over their preferred policies.*

The existence of a threshold implies that the degree of pressure is a sufficient, but not necessary explanation for changing preferences. In addition to the pressure from other actors within their network, each actor apparently also considers other variables. They can help to explain whether an actor modifies his or her preference at pressures lower than 50 per cent. The nature of these variables and the degree to which they influence policy changes can only be established in further studies. However, the case studies indicate that once the pressure reaches the threshold level, alternative considerations recede into the background of an actor's calculations. As multilevel network theory suggests, rational actors should not and, as the case studies confirm, do not ignore the policy preferences of the majority of actors to whom they are linked in their network, regardless of their other motives or the strength of their convictions.


The distribution of pressure in the category in which actors changed their policy preferences in Graph 7.4 provides further evidence for the above argument. While a small number of actors reversed their policy position in the absence of significant pressures and others were able to withstand strong external demands, the number of preference



changes peaks between 30 and 50 per cent, i.e. just before the threshold level.

The dispersion of the curve beyond the majority threshold can be explained by differences in the intervals in which the pressure on each individual actor rises. Actors with few linkages within the foreign policy network have larger intervals than actors with a large number of linkages. Sudden, steep increases in pressure are also a result of simultaneous preference changes, often among a set of closely linked actors or towards the end of the research periods when overall pressures on a number of actors have reached high degrees.

The findings from the four cases further suggest that the difference between the behavioural categories 'no change' and 'change' is filled by a third category which has been described as 'unclear or undecided'. The distribution of the pressures in this category, displayed in Graph 7.5, indicates that actors frequently pass through a phase in which their initial conviction falters,




but a new policy position has yet to be adopted. As a consequence, an individual or different representatives of a particular role express diverging positions or contradictory preferences. In collective decision-making units which take decisions by vote or consensus, such as parliaments or the ministerial councils of international organisations, this behaviour usually signifies a split among their members.

The fact that the number of unclear or undecided positions peaks before the number of actors who changed their preferences implies that this phase precedes an eventual preference change. Interesting is the additional observation that an unclear or undecided preference not only precedes a change in policy preference, but also seems to delay it in some circumstances. Thus, in nineteen out of 112 instances, unclear preferences appeared to enable actors to withstand pressures beyond the threshold degree of 50 per cent.

According to the second hypothesis, the ability to resist network pressure is also

enhanced by a veto or blocking position in collective decision-making units, like parliaments or international organisations. That is, a policy preference change in these organisations can be prevented by their members, if they have a veto or if decisions require a (qualified) majority or a consensus. The empirical findings from all cases



affirm this proposition in the distribution of blocking behaviour over different degrees of pressure in Graph 7.6 and in the average pressure shown in Table 7.2. Although it is difficult to make generalizations with regard to the German cases where no blocking strategy was used in the case of dual-use export regulations, the findings are generally consistent with the second hypothesis with averages ranging between 46 and 57 per cent. The cumulative average lies at 51 per cent and, thus, significantly above the average of actors who changed their preferences at 39 per cent.

Table 7.2 Blocking Strategy

	Case I	Case II	Case III	Case IV	All Cases
Number of Instances	51	8	1	-	60
Range of Pressure	28	12	0	-	28
Minimum Pressure	35%	46%	57%	-	46%
Maximum Pressure	64%	59%	57%	-	60%
Average Pressure	46%	50%	57%	-	51%

From Graph 7.6, it emerges further that actors only used a veto strategy if the degree of pressure on their organisation increased beyond 35 per cent. This can be explained by the fact that a veto is not necessary to prevent a decision in collective decision-making units unless a considerable number of members support a change in policy. It seems far from incidental that at a starting range of pressures from 35-40 per cent, blocking behaviour

falls into the same bracket in which actors on average have a high probability of changing their preferences. Yet considering that decisions in all collective decision-making units required either a majority or a consensus among its members, the degree at which blocking behaviour fails appears to be rather low. At about 60 per cent it is only ten per cent above the majority threshold and, thus, far from meeting a qualified majority or, indeed, a consensus.

Differences between the degrees of pressure at which collective decision-making units with diverging decision-making rules, i.e. veto, (qualified) majority or consensus, changed their preferences could not be observed. As far as the limited evidence from the four cases can suggest any relationship, it appears to contradict institutional requirements. Among the international organisations involved in foreign policy decision-making, a consensus was formally the basis of all decisions. However, the findings from the two British cases in particular suggests that actual decision-making did not conform with the formal consensus rule. The average pressure of a winning coalition within a collective decision-making unit represented at 46 and 50 per cent a simple majority of the members, but clearly not a consensus. In fact, the North Atlantic Council ignored the explicit veto of one of its members in two instances, namely of France in the decision to go 'out-of-area' and Britain in the abolition of its tactical air-to-surface missile requirement.

Conversely, the British House of Commons and the Bundestag overcame the blocking position of key parties only at high pressure levels of 72 and 73 per cent respectively in spite of the fact that both required only a simple majority to change their policies.¹ It has to be qualified, however, that in the German case a two-thirds requirement was informally upheld by the government because of the historical weight of the decision regarding the despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia. The only instance in which a formal veto was exercised in a German case, namely the objection of the Bundestag to the amendment of the Basic Law prior to the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, confirms the strength of the two-thirds requirement as the Bundestag withstood a pressure of 57 per cent.

The fact that vetos failed to prevent changes of policy preferences in collective

¹ See Chapter 4 'The Abolition of the Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile Project' and chapter 5 'The Despatch of Tornados to Bosnia'.

decision-making units even if less than 60 per cent of the members supported them, illustrates that collective decision-making units are still subject to the first hypothesis. Accordingly, a revised and more specific second hypothesis can be defined as follows:

Hypothesis 2': Collective decision-making units can resist pressure of up to 60 per cent if members use a veto or if a decision requires a (qualified) majority ['veto or blocking strategy'].

The average pressure within each of the four behavioural categories across all cases as shown in Table 7.3 further corroborates the above findings. The first hypothesis is supported by the observation that the mean pressure which actors were able to withstand was at 25 per cent significantly lower than the average pressure at which actors changed their policy preferences at 38 per cent. The average pressure at which actors were unclear or undecided lies at 36 per cent only slightly below the mean pressure at which actors modified their preferences. Nevertheless, this average, and the finding that the maximum pressure in the 'unclear or undecided' category is at 73 per cent considerably lower than the maximum pressure in the 'change' category, can be taken as evidence for the proposition made above, namely that some actors pass through a phase of reorientation before they adapt their preferences to conform with network pressure. The second hypothesis is also met by the empirical evidence. Thus, it was observed across all cases that collective decision-making units were at 47 per cent able to resist significantly higher average pressure than unitary role actors.

Table 7.3 Descriptive Statistics (Cumulative)

Preference Changes	Number of Instances	Range of Pressure	Minimum Pressure	Maximum Pressure	Average Pressure
No Change (NC)	432	54	0%	54%	25%
Unclear or Undecided (U)	112	59	14%	73%	36%
Change (C)	60	100	0%	100%	38%
Blocked (B)	60	28	35%	64%	47%

Assessed by the standard of empirical corroboration which is key to the scientific

paradigm, the test of multilevel network theory in the four case studies supports the hypotheses proposed by the approach. However, even within this paradigm the explanatory value of a theory can in the final instance only be assessed in comparison with other approaches. Specifically, multilevel network theory has to be evaluated with regard to its ability to respond to the empirical and theoretical challenges outlined in the introduction of this thesis.

7.3 Insights into Contemporary Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Three aspects are essential for a positive evaluation of multilevel network theory in comparison with other empiricist multilevel approaches: (1) its ability to provide empirical insights into the question who influences national foreign policy decision-making and how, (2) the parsimony and empirical validity of its theoretical propositions and (3) its contribution to the theoretical integration of multiple levels in empiricist Foreign Policy Analysis. This section examines each aspect in turn before suggesting further areas for the application and development of multilevel network theory.

National Control over Foreign Policy Decision-Making

One of the objectives for the development of multilevel network theory has been the question who determines national foreign policies in decision-making processes which have come to involve a multiplicity of actors across national boundaries. It arises from the concern that governmental control over foreign policies, and with it national sovereignty², might be undermined by changes in the decision-making process. This section analyses whether the four case studies presented in this thesis support the notion that national control over foreign policy decision-making has been reduced by multilevel networks.

² Often the question of governmental control over foreign policies is confused with sovereignty and vice versa. Thus, while national sovereignty is formally understood as a government's monopoly in the authoritative regulation of the internal and external relations of their societies. Informally, sovereignty is typically equated with control over decision-making processes and their outcomes. See for instance Ellen Kennedy, 'Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain', in Lawrence Freedman and Michael Clarke, eds., *Britain in the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.143-165; Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32:4, 1991, pp.621-634; Janice E. Thomson, 'State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Empirical Research', *International Studies Quarterly* 39, 1995, pp.213-233. Withstanding its implications for sovereignty, the focus of this thesis has been on governmental control over the taking of national foreign policy decisions.

Crucially for an assessment of the relative strength of national, transnational and international foreign policy actors, multilevel network theory examines the power relations among these actors across levels of analysis. Moreover, multilevel network theory investigates the role of formal veto or blocking positions in national or international collective decision-making units, such as parliaments or international organisations, in the ability of actors to influence policy processes and outcomes.

The specific contribution of multilevel network theory, however, lies in its analysis of decision-making processes as the formation of coalitions among national, transnational and international actors in Western Europe and North America. Based on this analysis multilevel network theory seeks to scrutinise the claim that national control over foreign policy decision-making has been subject to a steady erosion over the past decades. In particular, the increasing interdependence among public and private actors at the national and international level, pointed out in the introduction of this thesis, appears to have enhanced the ability of these actors to influence government policies. By analysing the relations and interactions between national governments and a multiplicity of actors, multilevel network theory seeks to assess whether, by whom and how governments are indeed influenced in their decisions. However, unlike transnationalism or the two-level game, the concept of multilevel networks highlights the dual nature of most power relations. Thus, in networks of predominantly interdependent relations, the ability of governments to resist external influence can be enhanced either by isolation or by integration. Each entailed different problems for the control of foreign policy decision-making in the four cases.

Through the perspective of multilevel network theory, isolation denotes actors who have only a limited number of relations with other actors in a network. In the British and German foreign policy networks such positions were held by the members of domestic parties, especially the opposition parties, the parliaments and parliamentary committees. As a consequence of their lack of linkages, the actors in these roles were less exposed to direct or indirect pressures within the multilevel network and, thus, under little external control in the four case studies. Actors who wanted to influence the members of political parties or Members of Parliament (MPs) could utilise only few direct relations and often had to resort to indirect, and therefore weaker, linkages with intermediary actors. In Britain representatives of the electorate, the media and pressure groups, in particular,

served as intermediaries between a variety of domestic and international actors on one hand and party or parliament members on the other. The members of the governmental party and their MPs had a slightly greater number of linkages in the network due to their relations with civil servants which also functioned as intermediaries between them and other Western European or North American governments, thereby exposing them to additional transnational influences. In Germany, the members of all major parties, including the SPD opposition party, were directly linked to civil servants in the key ministries because of widespread party membership among leading officials. Consequently, the members of the main German parties were also exposed to indirect influence from the government through their linkages with officials in the Foreign and Chancellor's Office, the Defence and the Finance Ministry.

While a low number of linkages within the network limited the range of actors who could directly or indirectly exert pressure on British and German party and parliament members, multilevel network theory suggests that the reverse side of their comparative isolation within the network was that the relative weight of the pressure from each actor who was directly linked to them was greater than with actors who had a large number of linkages in the network. With regard to party members and parliamentarians, this meant that the close and exclusive relations between party and parliament members on one hand and representatives of the electorate, media and government on the other hand, ensured that the former were primarily responsive and accountable to the latter. Moreover with respect to the question of national control over foreign policies it should be noted that the linkages of both party members and parliamentarians were virtually limited to the domestic arena. Given that the democratic systems of Britain and Germany seek to ensure the responsiveness of political parties and their national parliaments to the preferences of the electorate and interest groups, the exclusiveness of the former's relations should be evaluated positively.

The disadvantage of an isolated position within the multilevel foreign policy decision-making networks of Britain and Germany, however, was that the ability of these actors to exert influence in the network was also diminished. When the ultimate decision-making authority did not rest with the parliaments, but with the cabinets or international organisations, the House of Commons and the Bundestag had very little influence over the policy process and its outcome. While actors who had a large and broad range of linkages

within the network, such as civil servants and ministers, were able to exert direct pressure on transnational and international actors and decision units, the members of the national parliaments and parties were very much confined to domestic influence. Since an increasing number of foreign policy decisions in Western Europe and the transatlantic community are either taken by the cabinets or by international organisations and not national parliaments, the lack of linkages of party political representatives in the two multilevel foreign policy networks, thus, could lead to a democratic deficit.

The problem of insulation and limited influence among party political representatives and national MPs was particularly apparent in the decision regarding air strikes in Bosnia. In this case, the members of the British Cabinet simply disregarded the lack of support within the Conservative parliamentary party for military action. Conservative MPs only 'rallied around the flag' after the government had already approved the mission. In Germany, the weakness of the Bundestag and its members was exemplified by the prolonged inability of the coalition party members to convince cabinet ministers to reduce the country's dual-use export regulations, although a policy change was supported unanimously by the CDU/CSU and FDP factions as soon as the beginning of 1993.

Multilevel network theory suggests that the alternative to maintaining national control over foreign policy decision-making through insulation from external influence is a highly integrated position in the network defined by a multiplicity of relations with national, transnational and international actors. In Britain and Germany, mainly ministers and civil servants held such roles. Typically, these actors had between twenty and forty linkages with national, transnational and international actors in their network. While the large number of their relations in the multilevel network made them accessible to pressure from a broad range of different actors, many of them not domestic, the relative impact of each was low according to the quantitative measurement for pressure proposed by multilevel network theory. Since the pressure on any actor is measured in relation to the absolute number of his or her linkages (L), more actors have to exert pressure (E) on an actor with many links than on an actor with few linkages in order to achieve the same degree of pressure ($P=E/L$).

The case of the British TASM project attests that even though most of Britain's NATO partners were opposed to its nuclear policy, they were not able to increase their

pressure on the British cabinet ministers above the critical 50 per cent threshold. Conversely, since the key cabinet ministers had a high number of linkages, many of them with domestic actors who continued to support the missile programme, they were able to resist the international pressure for the abolition of the missile for some time. Only after a policy change became increasingly accepted by members of the Conservative Party, in particular, in the Commons Defence Committee, the British Cabinet decided to cancel the TASM project. Similarly, civil servants in the German Economics Ministry and their Minister Günter Rexrodt resisted transnational and international pressure for the reduction of German dual-use export controls until a change of the Foreign Trade Act was also supported by CDU/CSU and FDP parliamentarians in the Bundestag.

The concepts of isolation and integration as well as the empirical observations from the four case studies, thus, illustrate that it is unlikely that national foreign policies are determined either by 'national interests' or 'international pressure'. Conversely, due to the fact that government ministers were linked to about the same number of national and international actors, it can rather be suggested that they were equally responsive to domestic and international demands. Indeed, the four case studies reveal that policy decisions typically came about when a majority of national *and* international actors supported them.

A second observation which refutes the concern that national control over foreign policies is threatened by multilevel networks, is that a large number of national and international relations increased the ability of the two governments to mobilise support for their own policy preferences. This capacity was enhanced by the boundary position of ministers and civil servants between the national and international arena. At the centre of a number of crosscutting relations, both administrations could not only form coalitions with actors who had the same policy preference, but also exert pressure on their opponents. Moreover, multilevel network theory illustrated in the four case studies that transnational coalitions were as common as national or international alliances since opponents and supporters of a policy were usually dispersed across levels of analysis. The notion that the loss of national control over decision-making processes compromises the 'national interest' is thus disconfirmed as it presumes a non-existent consensus among domestic actors about foreign policies.

Finally, multilevel network theory offers further insights into the question of

whether national governments have lost their control over foreign policy decision-making due to the increase in the number and functional authority of international organisations. Specifically, multilevel network theory suggests that governmental actors maintain considerable control not only over national foreign policies, but also over multilateral decisions through their roles in international organisations and in intergovernmental negotiations. In particular, the corroboration of the second hypothesis in the four case studies indicates that the veto or blocking position of national governments in international organisations can contribute to preserving their capacity to prevent unfavourable decisions. Although the findings from the four case studies reveal that the term 'veto' power is misleading in that national governments were not able to avert a decision when the international and transnational pressure on these organisations rose above approximately 60 per cent of the actors linked to an organisation, governments usually maintained the ability to opt-out of a multilateral decision if they did not support it. Moreover, the multinational actions investigated in the case studies did not necessarily require the participation of the British or German governments. Air strikes in Bosnia could have been implemented by the United States and France; NATO's abolition of its TASM requirement did not rule out the stationing of the missile in Britain; the reinforcement of UNPROFOR in Bosnia did not rely on German Tornados; and the common European regulations of dual-use goods export controls permitted national exceptions.

In comparison, the distinction between isolation and integration which is suggested by multilevel network theory indicates that the danger to national control over foreign policy preferences and outcomes appears to be greater for actors who have few linkages within the network than for those who have many. If policy problems in contemporary Western Europe increasingly require multilateral decisions, it can thus be contended that the administrations of Britain and Germany are in fact in a good position to assert their interests.

Multilevel Network Theory in Comparison

In addition to addressing the empirical question of governmental control over contemporary foreign policy making processes in Western Europe and the transatlantic community, multilevel network theory suggests several theoretical developments for the empiricist analysis of multilevel decision-making. How far these developments offer a

different perspective of foreign policy making can only be evaluated in comparison with other multilevel theories. Returning to the three multilevel approaches identified in the introduction of this thesis, namely transnationalism, the two-level game and network models, the following examines where multilevel network theory provides alternative or additional insights into the foreign policy process.

One of the key differences between multilevel network theory and the three multilevel approaches criticised in the introduction is the range of actors and their relations which are the basis of their theoretical propositions. While transnationalism focuses on transnational relations, two- or three-level games analyse domestic and international demands on international negotiators, and most network models and typologies are derived from conceptualisations of the domestic levels of analysis, multilevel network theory proposes a possible theoretical integration of the national, transnational and international levels. Only by doing so can multilevel network theory attempt to examine empirically whether there are significant differences in the frequency and form of participation between actors at different levels.

In the four test cases, multilevel network theory is thus able to show that national, transnational and international actors not only regularly sought to influence national or international decision-makers, but also each other across levels of analysis. Specifically, the empirical evidence from the four case studies refutes the premise of the two- or three-level game according to which governmental representatives at the international level are in the exclusive position to influence the formation of national or transnational coalitions in favour of a particular policy outcome. Although ministers and civil servants were, as has been pointed out above, able to exert pressure on a range of actors at the national and international level by means of their boundary role in the network, they were not the only actors which held transnational linkages, nor were they the only actors who influenced the formation of coalitions in favour of particular policies. Conversely, the insights gained by multilevel network theory illustrate that all actors sought to use their national, transnational or international relations within the foreign policy network to exert pressure on each other in favour of their most preferred policy. Moreover, the four case studies show that coalitions formed as often within as across levels of analysis.

The second difference between multilevel network theory and these three multilevel approaches regards its ability to hypothesise about the process of decision-

making. This process is understood as a sequence of preference changes which leads to the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a specific policy outcome. By hypothesising about processes, multilevel network theory expands upon existing multilevel approaches in two ways. First, it introduces a concept of agency in the form of rational choice premises into the static and structural hypotheses which are often prevalent among transnationalism, two- and three-level games and network models. Second, it seeks to help to explain rather than to describe the foreign policy decision-making process and its outcomes.

The concept of agency is of particular importance for the explanation of the decision-making process and its outcomes because, as the four case studies indicate, neither the policy preferences nor the coalitions among public and private actors can be regarded as static. Contrary to the assumptions of the two- or three-level game and many network models, actors could and in many instances did change their policy preferences and coalition allegiances during the decision-making process. Indeed, the findings demonstrate that actors even chose whether to engage at all in the decision-making process or whether to remain neutral. Thus, actors joined the public debates regarding a policy only if their preferences were directly affected or if they were under pressure from other network actors to become part of a coalition for or against a policy.

It follows that the behaviour of actors and the process of decision-making are important elements in the explanation of policy outcomes. Rather than reading a decision off the distribution of preferences among the members of a network, multilevel network theory offers new insights into the decision-making process as an intermediate variable between preferences and outcomes. Specifically, it suggests that outcomes are influenced by a coalition formation process in which actors try to modify each others' policy preferences. Network structures retain their importance in that they determine which actors have the potential to influence each other. However, this thesis illustrates that by combining structural analysis with rational choice assumptions, multilevel network theory can help to explain which actors will exert pressure on others and when actors will change their preferences and coalition in response to this pressure.

The formation and changes in the coalitions among network actors ultimately determine whether a winning coalition can emerge in favour of a particular policy. According to all four approaches, it is the winning coalition which defines the outcome of

the decision-making process. However, while the two- or three-level game and some network models appear to identify the members of this coalition exclusively on the basis of similar policy preferences, multilevel network theory advances an alternative view. It contends not only that the members of a coalition have to be linked to each other, but also that, in order to influence policy outcomes, the members of the winning coalition have to be linked to the ultimate decision unit.

Evidence from the four case studies, supports this proposition. A particular example is the case regarding the abolition of the TASM programme by the British government. Although an overwhelming majority of actors in the international arena, officials from the MoD and members of the opposition parties were in favour of the cancellation of the TASM as early as August 1992, the relative insulation of the ultimate decision unit, i.e. the British Cabinet, from their pressure delayed the decision on the missile. Only in autumn 1993 when the abolition of the missile project had gained a majority among the actors who had direct influence over the Cabinet, namely the members of the Conservative parliamentary party and key cabinet ministers, did the government abandon its plans for the development of a TASM.

The above example illustrates that the decision-making process, defined as the sequence of preference changes among the members of a network, is an important factor in our understanding of policy outcomes since not all network actors have direct influence over the ultimate decision unit. It suggests that actors who lack direct linkages with the ultimate decision unit can influence policy outcomes only indirectly by changing the policy preferences of the actors who have direct influence over the decision-maker. How many and which actors serve as intermediate linkages between an actor and the ultimate decision unit determines the sequence of preference changes required for him or her to exert pressure indirectly. However, if the advocates of a policy fail to change the preferences of the actors who are directly linked to the ultimate decision unit, they should not be able to affect the outcome of the decision-making process.

Multilevel network theory, thus, suggests that while the structure of the network and the location of the ultimate decision unit delineate the scope of a winning coalition, it is the process which defines the preference of the winning coalition. Moreover, since the exertion of indirect pressure involves intermediaries, the number of actors advocating the eventual policy outcome should go beyond the winning coalition. Indeed, the findings from

the four case studies suggest that the formation of a winning coalition in favour of a particular policy typically came about when a majority of national and international actors supported the policy.

The third theoretical development advanced by multilevel network theory is a quantitative measurement of political pressure in multilevel networks in terms of the number of actors who seek to influence another actor in order to change his or her policy preferences. Multilevel network theory, thereby, attempts to go beyond the qualitative descriptive analyses which dominate in transnationalism, the two-level game and British network analysis³. The explanatory value of this measurement is affirmed by the four case studies. In addition, the advantages of this quantitative measurement of pressure can be pointed out in comparison with the two-level game and descriptive network models in particular. Thus, unlike the notion of 'win-sets' advanced by the two-level game, the quantitative measurement of pressure proposes a clear and consistent criteria. Specifically, it remains ambiguous if the 'size' of different win-sets, which is regarded as central to the explanation of outcomes in the two-level game, is understood in terms of the number of actors who support a particular policy, the number of actors who form a coalition, or the influence of these actors. Explanations, therefore, run the risk of being circular with greater size or power being attributed to the win-set whose policy is eventually adopted by the decision-makers. Multilevel network theory, on the contrary, can measure and hypothesise about the influence of different coalitions independently from outcomes. Moreover, the quantitative measure proposed by multilevel network theory helps to assess changes in the size of win-sets or coalitions and thus their ability to exert influence in the foreign policy decision-making process. In the four case studies, multilevel network theory was able to link the likelihood of changes in the actors' policy preferences to the degree of pressure to which they were exposed from other actors in the network.

The quantitative measurement of pressure in multilevel network theory also offers an alternative to the qualitative assessment of influence which has led to the unfruitful

³ In particular in the German network literature and Sociology, alternative quantitative measures have been proposed. See for instance Volker Schneider, 'The Structure of Policy Networks - A Comparison of the "Chemicals Control" and "Telecommunications" Policy Domains in Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.109-130; Toshio Yamagishi, Mary R. Gillmore and Karen S. Cook, 'Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks', *American Journal of Sociology* 93:4, 1988, pp.833-851.

proliferation of competing models and typologies in network analysis.⁴ These typologies attempt to link policy outcomes to the preferences of specific actors or stable coalitions which are believed to 'dominate' decision-making in distinct types of networks. One problem with this approach has been the tendency to identify new types of networks whenever empirical observations point to different dominant actors. Another is that the large number of variables or dimensions according to which network types are categorised inhibits comparisons between the ability of different actors to influence policy outcomes.⁵ It appears that disagreement about the nature of these variables among different network models has contributed to the disillusionment with the network approach.⁶

Multilevel network theory avoids these problems by relating outcomes to processes rather than types of networks. Specifically, it suggests that different dominant or 'winning' coalitions, as they have been termed in this thesis, can emerge within the same network as a result of the pressure which actors are able to exert on each other. This perspective not only precludes the need for new types of networks if a new winning coalition is identified, it also permits the analysis of how coalitions among actors form and transform across time and issues. In addition, multilevel network theory offers a way of increasing the parsimony of the approach by defining power relations exclusively in terms of their direction and reducing the measurement of the influence which is exerted through these relations to a single variable, namely the number of actors who seek to change the policy preferences of a particular actor in the network at a specific point of the decision-making process. The parsimony of multilevel network theory, aside from being an objective of empiricist theorizing, suggests how the divisions between competing network models over the number and nature of the variables which define different types of networks and dominant coalitions may fruitfully be overcome by identifying the common ground between them.

⁴ See for instance Grant Jordan, 'Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process', *Journal of Public Policy* 1:1, 1981, pp.95-123; R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches', in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.1-26. Even the more quantitatively oriented German network literature usually attempts to develop typologies of networks. See for instance Schneider, 'Structure of Policy Networks'.

⁵ For a review see Frans van Waarden, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.

⁶ See for instance Keith Dowding, 'Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach', *Political Studies* XLIII:1, 1995, pp.136-158.

Moreover, the reduction of influence to a quantitative measurement offers an objective and consistent analysis of pressure which permits the comparison of decision-making processes in multilevel networks across countries and cases. Finally, as has been argued in the introduction of this thesis, a more parsimonious network approach returns to the origins of network analysis which proceeded from the assumption that the distribution of linkages among actors makes a difference in policy decision-making.

Further Research in Multilevel Network Theory

From the preceding evaluation several areas for the further development and testing of multilevel network theory can be identified. First, new case studies will have to be conducted in order to test the refined and additional inductive hypotheses within the framework of multilevel network theory. Second, additional tests should include non-decisions in order to examine whether this theory can also account for the failure to form a winning coalition. Finally, since multilevel network theory claims to help to explain foreign policies independently from the location of the ultimate decision unit, further case studies should be conducted which examine the foreign policies of international organisations, such as NATO or the EU.

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Documents

CSCE/OSCE

CSCE, *Helsinki Document 1992 'The Challenges of Change'*, Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992, at <http://www.osce.org/indexe-da.htm>.

CSCE, *Helsinki Final Act*, Helsinki, 1 August 1975, at <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/helfa75e.htm>.

CSCE, *Prague Council*, 30-31 January 1992, at <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm>.

CSCE, *Charter of Paris*, Paris, 19-21 November 1990, at <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm>.

CSCE, *Budapest Summit*, Budapest, 4-5 December 1994, at <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm>.

European Community/Union

Treaty Establishing the European Community, Rome, 25 March 1957, at <http://europa.eu.int/>.

Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf.

Commission President Jacques Delors at the special session of the European Parliament Committees on the Former Yugoslavia, Brussels, 10 August 1992, SPEECH/92/77 at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/>.

Commission of the European Communities, 'Proposal for a council regulation (EEC) on the control of exports of certain dual-use goods and technologies and of certain nuclear products and technologies', *COM (1992) 317 final*, Brussels, 31 August 1992.

Council of Ministers within the EPC, Joint Statement 'Former Yugoslavia', 5 October 1992, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Commission, 25/10, p.91.

Council of Ministers, Statement on the Completion of the Internal Market, 21 December 1992, *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1992, p.60.

European Parliament Report, Doc.A3-0398/B/92.

Regulation No 3381/94, at CELEX CD-ROM.

British Government

Statement on the Defence Estimates 1990, Cm 1022-I (London: HMSO, April 1990).

Statement on the Defence Estimates: Britain's Defence for the 90s, Cm 1559-I (London: HMSO, July 1991).

Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992, Cm 1981 (London: HMSO, July 1992).

Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure for Ministers* (London: HMSO, 1992).

Defending Our Future - Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993, Cm 2270 (London: HMSO, July 1993).

Bundestag

Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages (GOBT)

Deutscher Bundestag, Debatten 1990-1995, 12.-13. Wahlperiode.

German Government

Bundesverfassungsgericht Gesetz (BverfGG)

Bundeswahlgesetz (BWahlG)

Grundgesetz (GG)

Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung (GOBReg.)

Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht der Bundesregierung an den Deutschen Bundestag über eine mögliche Beteiligung deutscher Firmen an einer C-Waffen-Produktion in Libyen', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/3995, 15 February 1989.

Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Fünften Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4230, 16 March 1989.

Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Sechsten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 11. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 11/4568, 19 May 1989.

Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht der Bundesregierung über legale und illegale Waffenexporte in den Irak und die Aufrüstung des Irak durch Firmen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/487, 8 May 1991.

Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes, des Strafgesetzbuches und anderer Gesetze', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1134, 10 September 1991.

Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Gesetzes über die Einrichtung eines Bundesausfuhramtes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/1461, 5 November 1991.

'Presseerklärung über die Aufstellung eines Europäischen Korps, veröffentlicht zum Abschluß der deutsch-französischen Konsultationen in La Rochelle am 22. Mai 1992', *Europa Archiv* 13, 1992, pp.D154-D155.

Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht über den Stand der Bemühungen um EG-Harmonisierung bei den Exportkontrollen von zivil und militärisch verwendbaren Gütern', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/3275, 18 September 1992.

'Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Hermann Bachmeier, Wolfgang Roth, Ernst Schwanhold, Liselotte Blunck (Uetersen), Dr. Ulrich Böhme (Unna), Edelgard Bulmahn, Ursula Burchhardt, Hans Martin Bury, Norbert Gansel, Lothar Ibrügger, Walter Kolbow, Dr. Klaus Kübler, Bernd Reuter, Dieter Schloten, Dr. Sigrid Skarpelis-Sperk, Dr. Peter Struck, Hans-Ulrich Klose und der Fraktion der SPD - Drucksache 12/3229', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/4241, 1 February 1993.

Bundesministers der Verteidigung Volker Rühle, 'Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik vor neuen Aufgaben - Bilanz und Perspektiven', in Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, 'Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den Herausforderungen, 34. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5.-7. Oktober', *Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Oktober 1993, pp.11-20.

Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr General Klaus Naumann, 'Standortbestimmung', in Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, Informationsstab, Referat Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, 'Bundeswehr 1993 - Wir stellen uns den Herausforderungen,

34. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Mainz, 5. bis 7. Oktober 1993', *Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik*, Oktober 1993, pp. 21-42.

Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Bericht über den Stand der EG-Harmonisierung des Exportkontrollrechts für Güter und Technologien mit doppletem Verwendungszweck (Dual-use Waren), Stand Ende Oktober 1993', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/6187, 18 November 1993.

Antrag der Bundesregierung, 'Deutsche Beteiligung an Maßnahmen von NATO und WEU zur Durchsetzung von Beschlüssen des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zum Adria-Embargo und Flugverbot über Bosnien-Herzegovina', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/8303.

Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung, 'Entwurf eines Achten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes - Drucksache 12/6911 - hier: Gegenäußerung der Bundesregierung zur Stellungnahme des Bundesrates', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/7115, 17 March 1994.

'Entwurf eines Achten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Außenwirtschaftsgesetzes', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 12. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 12/6911.

Antrag der Bundesregierung, 'Deutsche Beteiligung an den Maßnahmen zum Schutz und zur Unterstützung des schnellen Einsatzverbandes im früheren Jugoslawien einschließlich der Unterstützung eines eventuellen Abzugs der VN-Friedenstruppen', *Deutscher Bundestag*, 13. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 13/1802, 26 June 1995.

House of Commons

Hansard 1990-1995.

Tenth Report of the Defence Committee, *Defence Implications of Recent Events*, House of Commons Paper 320 (London: HMSO, 11 July 1990).

First Report of the Defence Committee, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992*, House of Commons Paper 218 (London: HMSO, 11 November 1992).

Ninth Report of the Defence Committee, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1993*, House of Commons Paper 869 (London: HMSO, 29 September 1993).

Second Report of the Defence Committee, *Progress of the Trident Programme*, House of Commons Paper (London: HMSO, 4 May 1994).

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, 4 April 1949,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>.

Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Kananaskis, Canada, 9-10 May 1990,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900510a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Turnberry, United Kingdom, 7-8 June 1990,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900608a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance*, London, 5-6 July 1990,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c900706a.htm>.

Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Taormina, Italy, 17-18 October 1991,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911018a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, Rome, 7-9 November 1991,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation*, Brussels, 20 December 1991,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911220a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm>.

North Atlantic Cooperation Council, *Partnership for Peace: Framework Document*, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm>.

Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, *Final Communiqué*, Brussels, 8 June 1995,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c950608a.htm>.

North Atlantic Council, *Ministerial Communiqué*, Sintra, Portugal, 29 May 1997,

at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-065e.htm>.

United Nations

United Nations, *Charter*, San Francisco, 26 June 1945,

at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>.

S/RES/713 (1991), 25 September 1991

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm>.

S/RES/743 (1992), 21 February 1992

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

S/RES/752 (1992), 15 May 1992,

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

S/RES/770 (1992), 13 August 1992,

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

S/RES/781 (1992), 9 October 1992,

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1992/scres92.htm>.

S/RES/836 (1993), 4 June 1992,

at <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1993/scres93.htm>.

WEU

Brussels Treaty - Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Brussels, 17 March 1948,

at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992,

at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

Extraordinary Meeting of WEU Council Ministers on the Situation in Yugoslavia, Helsinki, 10 July 1992,

at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

WEU Council of Ministers, *Declaration on Former Yugoslavia*, Rome, 20 November 1992,

at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>.

Other

Treaty between the United States of American and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range

Missiles, Washington, 8 December 1987,

at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/infl.html>.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE),

at <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/cfe.html>.

The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, Vienna, 12 July 1996,

at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/wass_elements.htm.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Newspapers, Weeklies and News Services

British Press

FT-Profile: UKNEWS file

Daily Mail & The Mail on Sunday
Daily & Sunday Mirror
Daily Record & Sunday Mail
The Daily Telegraph & The Sunday Telegraph
The Economist
The European
Evening Standard
Financial Times
The Guardian
The Herald
Hermes (UK Government Press Releases)
The Independent & The Independent on Sunday
The Irish Times
Lloyd's List
The Northern Echo
Observer
The People
Press Association
Regulatory News Service
The Scotsman & Scotland on Sunday
The Times & Sunday Times
The Times Educational Supplement
The Times Higher Educational Supplement
Today
Today's Financial Times

FT-Profile: Aerospace and Defence file

Aerospace Daily (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Aerospace Propulsion (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Airline Business (from the Flightline)
Airports (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Aviation Daily (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Aviation Europe (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Aviation Week & Space Technology (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Flight International (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
Regional Aviation (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)
The Weekly Business of Aviation (from McGraw-Hill Aerospace file)

Jane's Defence Weekly

German Press

FT-Profile:

Agence Europe
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Reuter German News Service

Newspaper Clip Collection of the Otto-Suhr Institut, Free University Berlin:

Frankfurter Allgemeine
Frankfurter Rundschau
Handelsblatt
Das Parlament
Süddeutsche Zeitung
Der Spiegel
Der Tagesspiegel
Tageszeitung
Die Welt
Die Zeit

3. Internet pages

EU

Agenda 2000, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/agenda2000/index_en.htm.

NATO

NATO Fact Sheet, *NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina*,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>.

NATO Fact Sheet, *The Enhanced Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP)*,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/pfp-enh.htm>.

NATO Fact Sheet, *The Accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland*,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/access.htm>.

NATO Fact Sheet, *NATO's Open Door Policy*,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/opendoor.htm>

NATO Fact Sheet, *Development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO*,
at <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/dev-esdi.htm>.

OSCE

Members,

at http://www.osce.org/general/participating_states/partstat.htm.

Fact Sheet 'What is the OSCE',

at <http://www.osceprag.cz>.

WEU

Members,

at <http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members.htm>.

Others

General Elections 1992

at <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/tuimb/UK92.HTM>

Table of membership of multilateral military related export control regimes,

at http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/natexpcon/country_matrix.html

The Nuclear Suppliers Group Plenary Meeting, Warsaw, Poland, 3 April 1992 and its Memorandum of Understanding on Implementation of the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology,

at http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/nsg_plenary92.htm

International export control agreements

<http://www.sipri.se/projects/expcon/>

OECD members

<http://www.oecd.org/about/general/member-countries.htm>

Bibliography

- 'Globalization - The Interweaving of Foreign and Domestic Policy-making', *Government and Opposition*, Special Issue, 1993.
- Algieri, Franco and Dietrich Rometsch, 'Europäische Kommission und organisierte Interessen', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.131-149.
- Allebeck, Agnes Courades, 'France', in Ian Anthony, ed., *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.64-71.
- Andersen, Svein S. and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. The Eurofication of National Policy-Making* (London: Sage, 1993), pp.19-33.
- Andersen, Svein S. and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Complex Policy-Making: Lobbying the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. The Eurofication of National Policy-Making* (London: Sage, 1993), pp.35-53.
- Anderson, Paula A., 'What Do Decision Makers Do When They Make a Foreign Policy Decision? The Implications for the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.285-308.
- Anderson, Stephanie, 'EU, NATO, and CSCE Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: Testing Europe's New Security Architecture', *European Security* 4:2, 1995, pp.328-353.
- Andreae, Lisette, and Karl Kaiser, 'Die 'Außenpolitik' der Fachministerien', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.29-46.
- Anthony, Ian, 'The United Kingdom', in Ian Anthony, ed., *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.175-182.
- Anthony, Ian, 'The United States', in Ian Anthony, ed., *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.184-204.
- Atkinson, Michael, and William Coleman, 'Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies', *British Journal of Political Science* 19:1, 1989, pp.47-67.
- Atkinson, Michael, and William Coleman, 'Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance', *Governance* 5:2, 1992, pp.154-180.
- Axt, Hans-Jürgen, 'Kooperation unter Konkurrenten. Das Regime als Theorie der Außenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 40:3, 1993, pp.241-259.
- Axt, Hans-Jürgen, 'Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Außenpolitik des Vereinten Deutschlands', *Europa Archiv* 48:12, 1993, pp.351-360.
- Bächler, Günther, *Bosnien-Herzegowina: Friedliche Streitbeilegung zwischen Realität und konkreter Utopie* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktanalyse, 1993).
- Baldwin, David A., 'Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis', *International Organization* 34:4, 1980, pp.471-506.
- Baldwin, David S., *Paradoxes of Power* (New York: Blackwell, 1989).

- Barber, James, *Who makes British Foreign Policy?* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1976).
- Barry, Brian, *Political Argument* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1965/1990).
- Bartsch, Sebastian, 'Außenpolitischer Einfluß und Außenbeziehungen der Parteien', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.167-184.
- Bartsch, Sebastian, 'Politische Stiftungen: Grenzgänger zwischen Gesellschafts- und Staatenwelt', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neuen Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.185-198.
- Bauer, Harald, and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992).
- Bauer, Harald, and Owen Greene, 'The Present State of Export Controls within the EC and its Member States', in Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), pp.5-21.
- Benington, John, and Janet Harvey, 'Transnational Local Authority Networking within the European Union: Passing Fashion or New Paradigm?', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.149-166.
- Benz, Arthur, 'Commentary on O'Toole and Scharpf: The Network Concept as a Theoretical Approach', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp.168-175.
- Berghahn, Sabine, 'Bundeswehreinsetze "out of area"', *Gegenwartskunde* 43:4, 1994, pp.467-477.
- Berry, Phyllis, 'The Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory during the Schmidt and Kohl Chancellorships', *Governance* 2:3, 1989, pp.339-355.
- Beyme, Klaus von, 'Informelle Komponenten des Regierens', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrick Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik II. Formale und Informale Komponenten des Regierens in den Bereichen Führung, Entscheidung, Personal und Organisation* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1991), pp.31-50.
- Biersteker, Thomas J., 'Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations', *International Studies Quarterly* 33:3, 1989, pp.263-267.
- Bishop, Donald G., 'The Cabinet and Foreign Policy', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations*, (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.137-160.
- Bitzinger, Richard A., 'The Globalization of the Arms Industry. The Next Proliferation Challenge', *International Security* 19:2, 1994, pp.170-198.
- Bloed, Arie and Ramses A. Wessel, *The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU). Introduction and Basic Documents* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994).
- Blunden, Margaret, 'Armaments Collaboration: What Form and What For?', *Science and Public Policy* 17:3, 1990, pp.132-141.
- Bomberg, Elizabeth, 'Issue Networks and the Environment: Explaining European Union Environmental Policy', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.167-184.

- Borawski, John, 'The OSCE: In Search of Cooperative Security', *Security Dialogue* 27:4, 1996, pp.401-408.
- Borthwick, R.L., 'The Defence Committee', in Gavin Drewry, ed., *The New Select Committees* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), pp.72-86.
- Bortloff, Jens, *Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Eine völkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme* (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996).
- Boutwell, Jeffrey, *The German Nuclear Dilemma* (London: Brassey's, 1990).
- Boutwell, Jeffrey, 'Party Politics and Security Policies in the FRG', in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., *The Bundeswehr and Western Security* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp.123-147.
- Bressers, Hans, Laurence J. O'Toole and Jeremy Richardson, 'Networks as Models of Analysis: Water Policy in Comparative Perspective', *Environmental Politics* 3:4, 1994, pp.1-23.
- Brettschneider, Frank, 'Massenmedien, öffentliche Meinung und Außenpolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.215-226.
- Brzoska, Michael, 'The Erosion of Restraint in West German Arms Transfer Policy', *Journal of Peace Research* 26:2, 1989, pp.165-177.
- Brzoska, Michael, 'Militärisch-industrieller Komplex in der Bundesrepublik und Rüstungsexportpolitik', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 40:8, 1989, pp.501-512.
- Budd, Adrian, *The EC and Foreign and Security Policy* (London: University of North London Press, 1993).
- Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock, *The Calculus of Consent* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
- Bull, Hedley, 'International Theory. The Case for a Classical Approach', in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.20-37.
- Burch, Martin, and Ian Holliday, *The British Cabinet System* (London: Prentice Hall / Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996).
- Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure for Ministers* (London: HMSO, 1992).
- Calic, Marie-Janine, 'Jugoslawienpolitik am Wendepunkt', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 93:B37, 1993, pp.11-20.
- Calic, Marie-Janine, 'German Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.52-75.
- Camilleri, Joseph A., and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992).
- Carlsnaes, Walter, 'The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis', *International Studies Quarterly* 36:3, 1992, pp.245-270.
- Carstairs, C.Y., 'The Foreign Affairs Committee', in Gavin Drewry, ed., *The New Select Committees* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), pp.165-181.
- Carstairs, Charles and Richard Ware, eds., *Parliament and International Relations* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991).
- Carstairs, Charles and Richard Ware, 'Introduction,' in Charles Carstairs and Richard Ware, eds., *Parliament and International Relations* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), pp.1-7.

- Carver, Michael, *Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945* (London: Random Century, 1992).
- Clarke, Michael, 'The Policy-Making Process', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith, and Brian White, eds., *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Continuity* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp.71-95.
- Clemens, Clay, 'The Chancellor as Manager: Helmut Kohl, the CDU and Governance in Germany', *West European Politics* 17:4, 1994, pp.28-51.
- Connolly, William E., *The Terms of Political Discourse*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Robertson, 1983).
- Considine, Mark, 'Making Up the Government's Mind: Agenda Setting in a Parliamentary System', *Governance* 11:3, 1998, pp.297-317.
- Cook, Karen S., Richard M. Emerson, Mary R. Gillmore, and Toshio Yamagishi, 'The Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks: Theory and Experimental Results', *American Journal of Sociology* 89:2, 1983, pp.275-305.
- Cooper, Alice H., 'When Just Causes Conflict with Accepted Means: The German Peace Movement and Military Intervention in Bosnia', *German Politics and Society* 15:3, 1997, pp.99-118.
- Cooper, Richard N., 'Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies', *World Politics* 24:2, 1972, pp.161-181.
- Cornish, Paul, *The Arms Trade and Europe* (London: Pinter, 1995).
- Croft, Stuart, 'European Integration, Nuclear Deterrence and Franco-British Nuclear Cooperation', *International Affairs* 72:4, 1996, pp.771-787.
- Croft, Stuart, and David H. Dunn, 'The Impact of the Defence Budget on Arms Control Policy', in Mark Hoffmann, ed., *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp.53-69.
- Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, ed., *Die anachronistische Souveränität* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969).
- Dach, R. Peter, 'Das Ausschlußverfahren nach der Geschäftsordnung und in der Praxis', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1103-1130.
- Dahl, Robert, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science* 2, 1957, pp.201-215.
- Daugbjerg, Carsten, and David Marsh, 'Explaining Policy Outcomes: Integrating the Policy Network Approach with Macro-level and Micro-level Analysis', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.52-71.
- Dessler, David, 'What Is at Stake in the Agency-Structure Debate?', *International Organization* 43:3, 1989, pp.441-473.
- Diehl, O., 'UN-Einsätze der Bundeswehr. Außenpolitische Handlungszwänge und innenpolitischer Konsensbedarf', *Europa Archiv* 48:8, 1993, pp.219-227.
- Dodd, Tom, *War and Peacekeeping in the Former Yugoslavia* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995).
- Dorff, Robert H., 'Normal Actor or Reluctant Power? The Future of German Security Policy', *European Security* 6:2, 1997, pp.56-69.
- Dowding, Keith, *Rational Choice and Political Power* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1991).
- Dowding, Keith, 'The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and New Institutionalism', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:1, 1994, pp.105-117.
- Dowding, Keith, 'Policy Networks: Don't Stretch a Good Idea Too Far', in Patrick

- Dunleavy and Jeffrey Stanyer, eds., *Contemporary Political Studies 1994: Proceedings of the Annual Conference Held at the University of Wales* (Belfast: Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, 1994).
- Dowding, Keith, 'Model or Metaphor? A Critical Review of the Policy Network Approach', *Political Studies* XLIII:1, 1995, pp.136-158.
- Dowding, Keith and Desmond King, eds., *Preferences, Institutions, and Rational Choice* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995).
- Duedney, Daniel, and John G. Ikenberry, 'The International Sources of Soviet Change', *International Security* 16:3, 1991-92, pp.74-118.
- Dumbrell, John, *The Making of US Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).
- Dunleavy, Patrick, *Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice* (London: Harvester, 1991).
- Dunleavy, Patrick and R. A. W Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995).
- Dunleavy, Patrick, 'Estimating the Distribution of Positional Influence in Cabinet Committees under Major', in Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.298-321.
- Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter, and Karl Kaiser, 'Einleitung: Wissenschaft und Außenpolitischer Entscheidungsprozeß', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.1-12.
- Eberwein, Wolf-Dieter, and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998).
- Edemskii, Andrei, 'Russian Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.29-51.
- Egger, Ulrich, *"Dual-Use"-Waren. Exportkontrolle und EG-Vertrag* (Köln: Heymann, 1996).
- Ehrhart, Hans-Georg, 'Peacekeeping im Jugoslawienkonflikt und die Folgen für die sicherheitspolitische Kooperation in Europa', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 95:B6, 1995, pp.13-20.
- Eichenberg, Richard C., 'Strategy and Defence Budgeting in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., *The Bundeswehr and Western Security* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp.149-168.
- Ellwein, Thomas, and Joachim Jens Hesse, *Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 6th ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987).
- Elster, Jon, 'Introduction' in Jon Elster, ed., *Rational Choice* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.1-33.
- Elzen, Boelie, Bert Enserink and Wim Smit, 'Weapon Innovation - Networks and Guiding Principles', *Science and Public Policy* 17:3, 1990, pp.171-193.
- Emerson, Richard M., 'Power-Dependence Relations', *American Sociological Review* 27:1, 1962, pp.31-40.
- Emiliou, Nicholas, 'Strategic Export Controls, National Security and the Common Commercial Policy', *European Foreign Affairs Review* 1:1, 1996, pp.55-78.
- Evangelista, Matthew, 'The Paradox of State Strength - Transnational Relations,

- Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and the Soviet-Union', *International Organization* 49:1, 1995, pp.1-38.
- Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
- Faure, Andrew Murray, 'Some Methodological Problems in Comparative Politics', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:3, 1994, pp.307-322.
- Ferguson, Yale, and Richard Mansbach, *The Elusive Quest. Theory and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988).
- Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach, 'Between Celebration and Despair: Constructive Suggestions for Future International Theory', *International Studies Quarterly* 35:4, 1991, pp.363-386.
- Fischer, Wolfgang, and Petra Holtrup, 'Institutionelle Strukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse der Umweltaußenpolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.121-136.
- Frankel, Joseph, *The Making of Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).
- Freedman, Lawrence, ed. *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
- Fröhlich, Stefan, 'Wie mächtig ist der britische Premier? Neuere britische Forschungsansätze zu einem alten Disput,' *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 26:1, 1997, pp.60-173.
- Gallhofer, Irmtraud N., and Willem E. Saris, *Foreign Policy Decision-Making: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Political Argumentation* (Westport: Praeger, 1996).
- Garnham, David, *The Politics of European Defense Cooperation. Germany, France, Britain and America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988).
- Genett, Timm, 'Die konfliktverschärfenden Folgen von Beschwichtigungspolitik. Das jugoslawische Sezessionsdrama', *Berliner Debatte Initial* 2, 1996, pp.102-113.
- George, Alexander L., 'Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured Focused Comparison', in Paul G. Lauren, ed., *Diplomacy - New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy* (London: The Free Press, 1979), pp.43-68.
- Gillies, Donald A., 'A Falsifying Rule for Probability Statements', *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 22:2, 1971, pp.231-261.
- Glenny, Misha, 'Jugoslawien -Der große Zerfall', *Leviathan* 23:4, 1995, pp.472-495.
- Goldstein, Joshua S., and Jon C. Pevehouse, 'Reciprocity, Bullying, and International Cooperation: Time-series Analysis of the Bosnian Conflict', *American Political Science Review* 91:3, 1997, pp.515-529.
- Goldstein, Judith, and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).
- Gordon, Philip H., 'The Normalization of German Foreign Policy', *Orbis* 38:2, 1994, pp.225-244.
- Gordon, Sir Charles, ed., *Erskine May's Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usages of Parliament*, 20th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1983).
- Gow, James, 'British Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.87-99.

- Gow, James, *Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (London: Hurst&Company, 1997).
- Gray, Andrew and Bill Jenkins, 'Ministers, Departments and Civil Servants', in Bill Jones, ed., *Politics UK*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.402-425.
- Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory. A Critique of Applications in Political Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
- Greene, Owen, 'Developing and Implementing Export Control Guidelines', in Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), pp.69-85.
- Greenwood, David, 'Expenditure and Management', in Peter Byrd, ed., *British Defence Policy: Thatcher and Beyond* (New York: Philip Allan, 1991), pp.36-66.
- Guay, Terence R., *At Arm's Length: The European Union and Europe's Defence Industry* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998).
- Gummett, Philip, and Judith Reppy, 'Military Industrial Networks and Technical Change in the New Strategic Environment', *Government and Opposition* 25:3, 1990, pp.287-303.
- Gutjahr, Lothar, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification* (London: Pinter, 1994).
- Haftendorn, Helga, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 83:B43, 1983, pp.3-15.
- Halverson, Thomas, 'American Perspectives', in Alexander Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.1-28.
- Hampton, Mary N., 'Institutions and Learning: Explaining Incremental German Foreign Policy Innovation', *European Security* 5:4, 1996, pp.543-563.
- Hannay, Sir David, 'The UN's Role in Bosnia Assessed', *The Oxford International Review* 7:2, 1996, pp.4-12.
- Hantke, Wolfgang, 'Stricter Controls on Arms Exports for Dual-use Goods: A Case Study for Drafting and Enacting Statutory Regulations', in Hans Günter Brauch, Henny Van Der Graaf, John Grin and Wim A. Smit, eds., *Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp.257-268.
- Harsanyi, John C., 'Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-Person Bargaining Games', *Behavioral Science* 7:1, 1962, pp.67-80.
- Hart, Jeffrey, 'Three Approaches to the Measurement of Power in International Relations', *International Organization* 30:2, 1976, pp.289-305.
- Hartmann, Jürgen, 'Organisierte Interessen und Außenpolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.239-252.
- Haungs, Peter, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von Adenauer bis Kohl', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 33:1, 1986, pp.44-66.
- Haungs, Peter, 'Parteipräsidien als Entscheidungszentrum der Regierungspolitik - das Beispiel der CDU', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik II. Formale und Informale Komponenten des Regierens in den Bereichen Führung, Entscheidung, Personal und Organisation* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1991), pp.113-123.

- Haungs, Peter, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik im Vergleich: Adenauers Nachfolger', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 89:B1-2, 1989, pp.28-39.
- Hecló, Hugh, 'Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment', in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), pp.87-124.
- Heinrich, Arthur, 'Der Normalisierer geht', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 41:3, 1996, pp.347-358.
- Heinz, John P., Edward O. Laumann, Robert H. Salisbury, and Robert L. Nelson, 'Inner Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems', *Journal of Politics* 52:2, 1990, pp.356-390.
- Helms, Ludger, 'Parteienregierung im Parteienstaat. Strukturelle Voraussetzungen und Charakteristika der Parteienregierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Österreich (1949 bis 1992)', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 24:4, 1993, pp.635-654.
- Helms, Ludger, 'Executive Leadership in Parliamentary Democracies: The British Prime Minister and the German Chancellor Compared', *German Politics* 5:1, 1996, pp.101-120.
- Helms, Ludger, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers in historisch und international vergleichender Perspektive', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 27:4, 1996, pp.697-711.
- Hennes, Michael, 'Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik', *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 44:3, 1993, pp.190-200.
- Hermann, Charles F., and Gregory Peacock, 'The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Jr. Kegley and James N. Rosenau, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen&Unwin, 1987), pp.13-32.
- Hermann, Margaret, Charles F. Hermann, and Joe D. Hagan, 'How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy Behavior', in Charles F. Hermann, James N. Rosenau and Charles Kegley, eds., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp.309-336.
- Higgins, Rosalyn, 'The New United Nations and Former Yugoslavia', *International Affairs* 69:3, 1993, pp.465-483.
- Hill, Christopher, and William Wallace, 'Introduction. Actors and Actions', in Christopher Hill, eds., *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp.1-16.
- Hirner, Manfred, 'Der Deutsche Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., *Parlament und Gesellschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp.138-183.
- Hirst, Paul, and G. Thompson, 'Globalization and the Future of the Nation State', *Economy and Society* 24:3, 1995, pp.408-442.
- Hobkirk, Michael D., *The Politics of Defence Budgeting* (London: Macmillan, 1984).
- Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula, 'Positional Power and Political Influence in the Federal Republic of Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 17:1, 1989, pp.51-76.
- Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', *British Journal of Political Science* 16:3, 1986, pp.269-286.
- Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding in International*

- Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
- Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith, 'Beware of Gurus: Structure and Action in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 17:4, 1991, pp.393-410.
- Holoboff, Elaine M., 'Russian Views on Military Intervention: Benevolent Peace-Keeping, Monroe Doctrine, or Neo-Imperialism', in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.154-174.
- Holst, Christian, 'Einstellungen der Bevölkerung und der Eliten: Vom alten zum neuen außenpolitischen Konsens?', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.227-238.
- Holstein, Alexia, *Das Verhältnis des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NATO und OSZE* (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1996).
- Honig, Jan Willem, 'The Netherlands and Military Intervention', in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.142-153.
- Howorth, Jolyon, 'The Debate in France over Military Intervention in Europe', in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.106-124.
- Hoyer, Werner, 'Nationale Entscheidungsstrukturen deutscher Europapolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.75-86.
- Huber, Rainer K., 'Wäre Abschreckung im Balkan-Konflikt möglich gewesen? Eine retrospektive Analyse der militärischen Forderungen und finanziellen Kosten am Beispiel Bosnien-Herzegowina', in Erhard Forndran and Hans-Dieter Lemke, eds., *Sicherheitspolitik für Europa zwischen Konsens und Konflikt* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), pp.99-110.
- Hudson, Valerie M., and Christopher S. Vore, 'Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow', *Mershon International Studies Review* 39:2, 1995, pp.209-238.
- Hummel, Hartwig, *Rüstungsexportbeschränkungen in Japan und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Münster: Lit, 1991).
- Inacker, Michael J., *Unter Ausschluß der Öffentlichkeit? Die Deutschen in der Golfallianz* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).
- Ismayr, Wolfgang, 'Parteien in Bundestag und Bundesregierung', in Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Stöß, eds., *Parteiendemokratie Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), pp.384-406.
- Jacobsen, Carl G., 'Yugoslav's Wars of Secession and Succession: Media Manipulation, Historical Amnesia, and Subjective Morality', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 5:3, 1994, pp.24-41.
- Jäger, Wolfgang, 'Eine Lanze für den Kanzlerwahlverein!', in Manfred Mols, Hans-Otto Mühleisen, Theo Stamm and Bernhard Vogel, eds., *Normative und institutionelle Ordnungsprobleme des modernen Staates* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1990), pp.96-110.
- Jäger, Wolfgang, 'Von der Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 35:1, 1988, pp.15-32.
- Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, *Multilateralism Matters but How? The Impact of Multilateralism on Great Power Policy Towards the Break-up of Yugoslavia* (San Domenico: Badia Fiesolana, 1994).

- Jekewitz, Jürgen, 'Politische Bedeutung, Rechtstellung und Verfahren der Bundestagsfraktionen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1021-1053.
- Jestädt, Thomas, and Nicholas Baron von Behr, 'Das neue Exportkontrollrecht für Dual-use-Güter', *RIW* 9, 1995, pp.715-719.
- Jones, Bill, and Denis Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', in Bill Jones, ed., *Politics UK* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.220-237.
- Jordan, Grant, 'Iron Triangles, Woolly Corporatism and Elastic Nets: Images of the Policy Process', *Journal of Public Policy* 1:1, 1981, pp.95-123.
- Jordan, Grant, 'Sub-Governments, Policy Communities and Networks. Refilling Old bottles?', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2:3, 1990, pp.319-338.
- Jordan, Grant, 'Effective Lobbying: the Hidden Hand', in Grant Jordan, ed., *The Commercial Lobbyists: Politics for Profit in Britain* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), pp.173-189.
- Jordan, Grant, and Klaus Schubert, 'A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network Labelling', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1993, pp.7-28.
- Jung, Ernst Friedrich, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Goettrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik V. Souveränität, Integration, Interdependenz - Staatliches Handeln in der Außen- und Europapolitik* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1993), pp.183-192.
- Kaarbo, Juliet, 'Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy', *International Studies Quarterly* 40:4, 1996, pp.501-530.
- Kaiser, Karl, and Roger Morgan, 'Introduction: Society and Foreign Policy - Implications for Theory and Practice', in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., *Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.1-15.
- Kaltefleiter, Werner, 'Die Kanzlerdemokratie des Helmut Kohl', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 27:1, 1996, pp.27-36.
- Kaplan, Morton A., 'The New Great Debate. Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations', in Klaus Knorr and James R. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches in International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp.39-61.
- Kassim, Hussein, 'Policy Networks, Networks and European Union Policy-Making: A Sceptical View', *West European Politics* 17:4, 1994, pp.15-27.
- Kavanagh, Dennis, *British Politics. Continuities and Change*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
- Kenis, Patrick, and Volker Schneider, 'Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.25-59.
- Keohane, Robert O., *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
- Keohane, Robert O., *International Institutions and State Power* (Boulder, Col.: Westview

- Press, 1989).
- Keohane, Robert O., and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community - Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991).
- Keohane, Robert O., and Stanley Hoffmann, 'Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s', in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.1-39.
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
- Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
- Kingdon, John W., *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984).
- Kirchhof, Paul, and Eberhart Schmidt-Abmann, *Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht. Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 1997).
- Knodt, Michele, 'Auswärtiges Handeln der deutschen Länder', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.153-166.
- Knoke, David, *Political Networks. The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
- Knopf, Jeffrey, 'Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Nuclear Forces Negotiations', *International Organization* 47:3, 1993, pp.599-628.
- Kohler-Koch, Beate, 'Inselillusion und Interdependenz: Nationales Regieren unter den Bedingungen von "international governance"', in Bernhard Blanke and Helmut Wollmann, eds., *Die alte Bundesrepublik. Kontinuität und Wandel* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), pp.45-67.
- König, Thomas, 'Kollektive Entscheidungsfindung im deutschen Politikfeld 'Arbeit' - Ein modellorientierter Politikfeld-ansatz', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 33:4, 1992, pp.597-621.
- König, Klaus, 'Vom Umgang mit Komplexität in Organisationen: Das Bundeskanzleramt', *Der Staat* 28:1, 1989, pp.49-70.
- Koslowski, Gerd, *Die Nato und der Krieg in Bosnien-Herzegovina. Deutschland, Frankreich und die USA im internationalen Krisenmanagement* (Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1995).
- Krasner, Stephen D., ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).
- Kratochwil, Friedrich, and John Ruggie, 'International Institutions: A State of the Art on the Art of the State', *International Organization* 40:4, 1986, pp.753-775.
- Kratochwil, Friedrich, *Rules, Norms, and Decisions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
- Krause, Joachim, 'Die Rolle des Bundestages in der Außenpolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.137-152.
- Kubicek, P., 'Ethnic Conflict and Three-level Games: Turks, Kurds and Foreign Actors', *International Negotiation* 2:1, 1997, pp.79-101.
- Kühne, Winrich, 'Die Friedenssicherung der Vereinten Nationen in der Krise', *Aus Politik*

- und Zeitgeschichte* 94:B2, 1994, pp.18-28.
- Labour Party, *Looking to the Future* (London: Labour Party, 1990).
- Labour Party, *Agenda for Change* (London: Labour Party, 1992).
- Lakatos, Imre, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Imre Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp.91-195.
- Lantis, Jeffrey S., 'Rising to the Challenge : German Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era', *German Politics and Society* 14:2, 1996, pp.19-35.
- Lapid, Yosef, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era', *International Studies Quarterly* 33:3, 1989, pp.235-354.
- Larkin, Bruce D., *Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996).
- Larner, Christina, 'The Organisation and Structure of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.31-73.
- Laumann, Edward O., and John P. Heinz, with Robert Nelson and Robert Salisbury, 'Organizations in Political Action: Representing Interests in National Policy Making', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks. Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991).
- Lefebvre, Stephane, and Ben Lombardi, 'Germany and Peace Enforcement: Participating in IFOR', *European Security* 5:4, 1996, pp.564-587.
- Lepick, Oliver, 'French Perspectives', in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson, eds., *International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Crisis* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp.76-86.
- Liberal Democrats, *Reshaping Europe*, Federal White Paper No 3 (London:Hedben Royd, August 1990).
- Lijphart, Arend, 'Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method', *American Political Science Review* 65:3, 1971, pp.682-695.
- Lomax Cook, Fay, Tom R. Tyler, Edward G. Goetz, Margaret T. Gordon, David Protes, Donna R. Leff, and Harvey L. Moloch, 'Media and Agenda Setting: Effects on the Public, Interest Group Leaders, Policy Makers, and Policy', *Public Opinion Quarterly* 47:1, 1983, pp.16-35.
- Lowe, Vaughan, 'The Definition of Restricted Exports', in Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), pp.25-43.
- Ludlow, Peter, 'The European Commission', in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.85-132.
- Lukes, Steven, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Macmillan, 1974).
- Lundbo, Sten, 'Non-Proliferation: Expansion of Export Control Mechanisms', *Aussenpolitik* 42:2, 1997, pp.137-147.
- Lynch, Allen, and Reneo Lukic, 'Russland und der Krieg im ehemaligen Jugoslawien', *Europa Archiv* 49:3, 1994, pp.80-88.
- Mackie, Tom, and David Marsh, 'The Compative Method', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.173-188.
- Macleod, Alex, 'French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for

- International Leadership', *International Journal* LII:2, 1997, pp.243-264.
- Madgwick, Peter and Diana Woodhouse, *The Law and Politics of the Constitution of the United Kingdom* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).
- Majer, Dietmut, 'Bundeswehr und Auslandseinsätze - Diskussion ohne Ende?', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 36:3, 1995, pp.523-530.
- Mann, Michael, 'Nation-States in Europe and other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, not Dying', *Daedalus* 122:3, 1993, pp.115-140.
- Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991).
- Marin, Bernd, and Renate Mayntz, 'Introduction: Studying Policy Networks', in Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz, eds., *Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1991), pp.11-23.
- Marsh, David, 'Introduction: Interest Groups in Britain: Their Access and Power,' in David Marsh, ed., *Pressure Politics. Interest Groups in Britain* (London: Junction Books, 1983), pp.1-16.
- Marsh, David, and R.A.W. Rhodes, 'Policy Communities and Issue Networks. Beyond Typology', in David Marsh and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp.249-268.
- Marsh, David, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998).
- Marsh, David, 'The Development of the Policy Network Approach', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.3-17.
- Marsh, David, 'The Utility and Future of Policy Network Analysis', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.185-197.
- Martin, Mathias, and Paul Schäfer, 'Militärische Dimensionen der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 38:10, 1993, pp.1185-1199.
- Martin, Mathias, and Paul Schäfer, 'Die Bundeswehr als Instrument deutscher Machtprojektion', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* 39:1, 1994, pp.44-55.
- Mayntz, Renate, 'Executive Leadership in Germany: Dispersion of Power or 'Kanzlerdemokratie'', in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), pp.139-170.
- Mayntz, Renate, 'Networks, Issues, and Games: Multiorganizational Interactions in the Restructuring of a National Research System', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp.189-209.
- Mayntz, Renate, and Hans-Ulrich Derlien, 'Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987 - Toward Hybridization?', *Governance* 2:4, 1989, pp.384-404.
- McCormick, John, *The European Union. Politics and Policies* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996).
- Mearsheimer, John, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War', *International Security* 15:1, 1990, pp.5-56.
- Melzer, Michael, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschubarbeit durch die Fraktionen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und*

- Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1131-1143.
- Merritt, Richard L., and Diana A. Zinnes, 'Alternative Indexes of National Power', in Richard J. Stoll and Michael D. Ward, eds., *Power in World Politics* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 1989), pp.11-28.
- Meyers, Reinhard, 'Metatheoretische und methodologische Betrachtungen zur Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen', in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen* (Opladen: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 1990), pp.48-68.
- Meyn, Herrmann, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Alte und neue Bundesländer* (Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1992).
- Miller, Davina, *Export or Die: Britain's Defence Trade with Iran and Iraq* (London: Cassell, 1996).
- Mlyn, Eric, 'The OSCE, the United States and European Security', *European Security* 5:3, 1996, pp.426-447.
- Molm, Linda, 'Linking Power Structure and Power Use', in Karen S. Cook, ed., *Social Exchange Theory* (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), pp.101-129.
- Mols, Manfred, 'Politikberatung im außenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozeß', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.253-264.
- Moodie, Michael, 'The Balkan Tragedy', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 541, 1995, pp.101-115.
- Morphet, Sally, 'The Influence of States and Groups of States on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980-94', *Review of International Studies* 21:4, 1995, pp.435-462.
- Morriss, Peter, *Power: A Philosophical Analysis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987).
- Most, Benjamin, and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
- Müller, Harald, ed., *How Western European Nuclear Policy Is Made. Deciding on the Atom* (London: Macmillan, 1991).
- Müller, Harald, 'The Internalization of Principles, Norms and Rules by Governments. The Case of Security Regimes', in Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), pp.361-388.
- Müller, Harald, 'Military Intervention for European Security: The German Debate', in Lawrence Freedman, eds., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.125-141.
- Müller, Harald, 'Frieden in Europa - Versagen der Institutionen?', in Gerhard Lehbruch, eds., *Einigung und Zerfall: Deutschland und Europa nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts* (19. Wissenschaftlicher Kongress der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft: 1995), pp.205-220.
- Müller, Harald, and Thomas Risse-Kappen, 'From the Outside In and from the Inside Out. International Relations, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy', in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy. Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), pp.25-48.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, 'The Centre of Government in West Germany: Changing

- Patterns under 14 Legislatures (1949-1987)', *European Journal of Political Research* 16:2, 1988, pp.171-190.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, 'Federal Republic of Germany: A System of Chancellor Government', in Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds., *Cabinets in Western Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp.171-191.
- Müller-Rommel, Ferdinand, and Gabriele Pieper, 'Das Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 91:B21-22, 1991, pp.3-13.
- Murswieck, Axel, 'Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kanzlerdemokratie, Koordinationsdemokratie oder was sonst?', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Götztrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland I. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1990), pp.151-169.
- Nagel, Jack H., *The Descriptive Analysis of Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).
- Nailor, Peter, 'Defence and Foreign Policy', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.221-241.
- NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 1998-99).
- Niclauß, Karlheinz, *Kanzlerdemokratie: Bonner Regierungspraxis von Konrad Adenauer bis Helmut Kohl* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1988).
- Nicoll, William and Trevor C. Salmon, *Understanding the New European Community* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).
- Nørgaard, Asbjørn Sonne, 'Rediscovering Reasonable Rationality in Institutional Analysis', *European Journal of Political Research* 29:1, 1996, pp.31-57.
- Norton, Philip, 'The Liberal Party in Parliament', in Vernon Bogdanor, ed., *Liberal Party Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.143-171.
- Norton, Philip, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom: Balancing Effectiveness and Consent?', in Philip Norton, ed., *Parliaments in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp.10-31.
- Nugent, Neill, 'The European Dimension', in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele, eds., *Developments in British Politics 4* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp.40-68.
- O'Neill, Barry, 'Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2, 1996, pp.219-237.
- Oberreuter, Heinrich, 'Parlamentarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Walter Euchner, ed., *Politische Opposition in Deutschland und im internationalen Vergleich* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), pp.60-75.
- Oeter, Stefan, 'Jugoslawien und die Staatengemeinschaft. Die Normalität der Barbarei und das Problem der (präventiven) Konflikt diplomatie', *Kritische Justiz* 29:1, 1996, pp.15-36.
- Oppenheim, Felix E., *Political Concepts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).
- Paterson, Robert H., *Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1997).
- Peters, Guy, 'Policy Networks: Myth, Metaphor and Reality', in David Marsh, ed., *Comparing Policy Networks* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), pp.21-32.
- Paterson, Robert H., *Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. From Before the V-Bomber*

- to *Beyond Trident* (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1997).
- Paulsen, Thomas, *Die Jugoslawienpolitik der USA 1989-1994* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995).
- Peterson, John, 'The European Technology Community. Policy Networks in a Supranational Setting', in R. A. W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.226-248.
- Peterson, John, 'Policy Networks and European Union Policy Making: A Reply to Kassim', *West European Politics* 18:2, 1995, pp.389-407.
- Peterson, John, 'Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for Analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy* 2:1, 1995, pp.69-93.
- Ploetz, Hans-Friedrich von, 'Der Auswärtige Dienst vor neuen Herausforderungen', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.59-74.
- Plowden, William, *Ministers and Mandarins* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1994).
- Popper, Karl, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper & Collins, 1959).
- Poyser, C., 'Proceedings on the Record: The Floor of the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee and Other Committees,' in Charles Carstairs and Richards Ware, eds., *Parliament and International Relations* (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991), pp.8-36.
- Prouvez, Nathalie, 'Implementation and Enforcement of an EC Arms and dual-use Goods Export Policy', in Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), pp.87-115.
- Putnam, Robert, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization* 42:3, 1988, pp.427-460.
- Rai, Milan, *Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The Foreign and Security Policy Implications of the Treaty of the European Union* (London: Drava Papers, 1993).
- Ramet, Sabrina Petra, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding "Vietnam" and Blundering into "Abyssinia"', *East European Politics and Society* 8:1, 1994, pp.189-219.
- Ramet, Sabrina Petra, *Balkan Babel. The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to Ethnic War* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996).
- Rattinger, Hans, 'The Bundeswehr and Public Opinion', in Stephen F. Szabo, ed., *The Bundeswehr and Western Security* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp.93-121.
- Reuter, Alexander, 'Nationale Exportkontrollen und EU-Recht', *RIW* 9, 1996, pp.719-721.
- Reuter, Alexander, *Außenwirtschafts- und Exportkontrollrecht Deutschland, Europäische Union* (München: Beck, 1995).
- Rhodes, R.A.W., *Power-Dependence, Policy Communities and Intergovernmental Networks* (Colchester: Department of Government University of Essex, 1985).
- Rhodes, R. A.W., *The National World of Local Government* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
- Rhodes, R.A.W., 'Policy Networks. A British Perspective', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2:3, 1990, pp.293-317.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., *Beyond Westminster and Whitehall: The Sub-Central Governments of Britain* (London: Routledge, Allen & Unwin, 1992).

- Rhodes, R.A.W., and David Marsh, 'Policy Networks in British Politics. A Critique of Existing Approaches', in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.1-26.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., and D. Marsh, 'New Directions in the Study of Policy Networks', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.181-205.
- Rhodes, R.A.W., and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
- Rhodes, R.A.W., and David Marsh, 'Policy Communities and Issue Networks', in R.A.W. Rhodes and David Marsh, eds., *Policy Networks in British Government* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.249-268.
- Richardson, Jeremy, 'EU Water Policy: Uncertain Agendas, Shifting Networks and Complex Coalitions', *Environmental Politics* 3:4, 1994, pp.139-167.
- Richardson, Jeremy, ed., *European Union. Power and Policy-Making* (London: Routledge, 1996).
- Richardson, J.J., and A.G. Jordan, *Governing under Pressure* (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1979).
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', *World Politics* 43:4, 1991, pp.479-512.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 'Ideas Do Not Float Freely - Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War', *International Organization* 48:2, 1994, pp.185-214.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas, 'Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction', in Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.3-33.
- Rittberger, Volker, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Roberts, Adam, 'The United Nations and International Security', *Survival* 35:2, 1993, pp.3-30.
- Roellecke, Gerd, 'Bewaffnet Auslandseinsätze - Krieg, Aussenpolitik oder Innenpolitik?', *Der Staat* 34:3, 1995, pp.415-428.
- Ronneberger, Franz, 'Die Rolle von Public Relations im politischen Entscheidungsprozeß', in Frank E. Böckelmann, ed., *Medienmacht und Politik* (Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag Volker Spieß, 1989), pp.149-160.
- Rose, Richard, 'British Government: The Job at the Top', in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), pp.1-41.
- Rose, Richard, *Ministers and Ministries: A Functional Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
- Rose, Richard, 'Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis', *Political Studies* 39:3, 1991, pp.446-462.
- Rosenau, James N., and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
- Royal United Services Institute Conference, 'Defence Equipment Acquisition. The

- Atlantic Dimension', 28-29 May 1997.
- Royal United Services Institute Conference, 'Defence Equipment Acquisition. The European Dimension', 10-11 July 1997.
- Rudzio, Wolfgang, 'Informelle Entscheidungsmuster in Bonner Koalitionsregierungen', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Goettrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik II. Formale und informale Komponenten des Regierens in den Bereichen Führung, Entscheidung, Personal und Organisation* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1991), pp.125-141.
- Rühl, Lothar, 'Sicherheitspolitik: Nationale Strukturen und multilaterale Verflechtung', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.87-100.
- Rush, Michael, ed., *Parliament and Pressure Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990).
- Rush, Michael, 'Pressure Politics', in Michael Rush, ed., *Parliament and Pressure Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp.3-16.
- Saalfeld, Thomas, 'The West German Bundestag after 40 Years: The Role of Parliament in a 'Party Democracy'', in Philip Norton, ed., *Parliaments in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp.68-89.
- Salmon, Trevor C., 'Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992', *International Affairs* 68:2, 1992, pp.233-253.
- Sanders, David, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele, eds., *Developments in British Politics 4* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp.285-304.
- Sanz, Timothy L., 'NATO and the Bosnian Conflict: The Published Literature', *European Security* 6:2, 1997, pp.105-128.
- Scharpf, Fritz W., ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988).
- Scharpf, Fritz W., 'Coordination in Hierarchies and Networks', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp.126-163.
- Scharpf, Fritz W., 'Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 32:4, 1991, pp.621-634.
- Schneider, Volker, 'The Structure of Policy Networks - A Comparison of the "Chemicals Control" and "Telecommunications" Policy Domains in Germany', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.109-130.
- Schönfeld, Roland, 'Balkankrieg und internationale Gemeinschaft', *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 34:4, 1994, pp.257-278.
- Schreckenberger, Waldemar, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Mehrheitsfraktionen: Koalitionsgespräche und Koalitionswunden', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 25:3, 1994, pp.329-346.
- Schumann, Wolfgang, 'Das politische System der Europäischen Union als Rahmen für Verbandsaktivitäten', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Völzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.71-108.
- Schumann, Hartmut, 'Wirtschaftliche Dimensionen der Außenpolitik', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 41:2, 1994, pp.146-161.
- Schüttemeyer, Suzanne S., 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and

- Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1145-1157.
- Searing, Donald D., 'Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New Institutionalism', *American Political Science Review* 85:4, 1991, pp.1249-1260.
- Shapiro, Miriam, 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation', *American Journal of International Law* 89:3, 1995, pp.631-636.
- Sharp, Jane M.O., *Bankrupt in the Balkans. British Policy in Bosnia* (London: IPPR, 1993).
- Shaw, Malcolm, 'Members of Parliament', in Michael Rush, ed., *Parliament and Pressure Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp.85-113.
- Shepherd, Colin, 'The Members' Need for Information', in Dermot Englefield, ed., *Workings of Westminster* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), pp.25-30.
- Simic, Predrag, 'Dynamics of the Yugoslav Crisis', *Security Dialogue* 26:2, 1995, pp.153-172.
- Simpson, John, 'Nuclear Decision-Making in Britain', in Harald Müller, ed., *How Western European Nuclear Policy Is Made* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), pp.48-73.
- Siwert-Probst, Judith, 'Die klassischen außenpolitischen Institutionen', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.13-28.
- Skidmore, David, and Valerie Hudson, eds., *The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993).
- Skoens, Elisabeth, and Herbert Wulf, 'The Internationalization of the Arms Industry', *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 535, 1994, pp.43-57.
- Skvoretz, John, and David Willer, 'Exclusion and Power: A Test of Four Theories of Power in Exchange Networks', *American Sociological Review* 58:6, 1993, pp.801-818.
- Smith, Gordon, 'The Resources of a German Chancellor', *West European Politics* 14:2, 1991, pp.48-61.
- Smith, Martin J, David Marsh, and David Richards, 'Central Government Departments and the Policy Process', in Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.38-60.
- Smith, Michael E., 'Sending the Bundeswehr to the Balkans: The Domestic Politics of Reflexive Multilateralism', *German Politics and Society* 14:4, 1996, pp.49-67.
- Smith, Ron, 'Resources, Commitments and the Defence Industry', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin, eds., *British Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century* (London: Brassey's, 1993), pp.73-89.
- Smith, Steve, 'Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations', *Millennium* 16:2, 1987, pp.345-348.
- Spasovska, Verica, 'Der Jugoslawienkonflikt als Medienergebnis - der Einfluß der Medien auf die öffentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik', *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 35:1, 1995, pp.8-17.
- SPD, *Politik: Perspektiven einer neuen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik*, Beschluß des SPD-Parteitag (Wiesbaden, 16-19 November 1993).
- Steffani, Winfried, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees in the Bundestag', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert Gerald Livingston, eds., *The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990),

pp.273-295.

- Steinberg, Rudolf, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.217-258.
- Stewart, Philip, Margaret G. Hermann, and Charles F. Hermann, 'Modelling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt', *American Political Science Review* 83:1, 1989, pp.35-59.
- Strutz, Stefan, *Der fremde Freund: IG-Metall and Friedensbewegung vom NATO-Doppelbeschluss bis zum Bosnienkrieg* (Frankfurt/M.: Verlag Neue Wissenschaft, 1997).
- Sturm, Roland, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik - Zum Selbstverständnis der Haushaltsausschüsse des Deutschen Bundestages', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 26:3, 1985, pp.245-269.
- Thiebault, Jean-Louis, 'The Organisational Structure of Western European Cabinets and its Impact on Decision-Making', in Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds., *Governing Together. The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp.77-98.
- Thumann, Michael, 'Between Ambition and Paralysis - Germany's Policy Toward Yugoslavia 1991-1993', *Nationalities Papers* 25:3, 1997, pp.575-585.
- Trifunovska, Snezana, 'The International Involvement in the Former Yugoslavia's Dissolution and Peace Settlement', *Nationalities Papers* 25:3, 1997, pp.517-535.
- Towle, Philip, 'The British Debate About Intervention In European Conflicts', in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.94-105.
- Tugendhat, Christopher, and William Wallace, *Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1988).
- Vasquez, John A., 'The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., *International Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp.217-240.
- Waarden, Frans van, 'Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks', *European Journal of Political Research* 21:1-2, 1992, pp.29-52.
- Walker, W., and S. Willett, 'Restructuring the European Defense Industrial Base', *Defence Economics* 4:2, 1993, pp.141-160.
- Wallace, William, *Britain's Bilateral Links within Western Europe* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984).
- Wallace, Helen, William Wallace, and Carole Webb, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Communities* (London: Wiley, 1977).
- Waltz, Kenneth, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security* 18:2, 1993, pp.44-79.
- Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Ma.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
- Ward, Hugh, 'Structural Power - A Contradiction in Terms?', *Political Studies* XXXV:4, 1987, pp.593-610.
- Ware, Richard, and Fiona M. Watson, *The Former Yugoslavia: A Further Update* (London: House of Commons Library, 1992).
- Watson, Fiona M., and Richard Ware, *The Bosnian Conflict - A Turning Point?* (London:

- House of Commons Library, 1993).
- Watson, Fiona M., *Peace Proposals for Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: House of Commons Library, 1993).
- Watson, Fiona M., and Tom Dodd, *Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues* (London: House of Commons Library, 1995).
- Webb, Carole, 'Introduction: Variations on a Theoretical Theme', in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Carole Webb, eds., *Policy-Making in the European Communities* (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1977), pp.1-31.
- Webb, Simon, *NATO and 1992. Defence Acquisition and Free Markets* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1989, R-3758-FF).
- Weber, Jürgen, *Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977).
- Weller, Marc, 'The Guidelines Governing Export Controls', in Harald Bauer and Paul Eavis, eds., *Arms and Dual-Use Exports from the EC: A Common Policy for Regulation and Control* (Bristol: Saferworld, 1992), pp.45-67.
- Werner, Camilla, 'Das Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., *Parlament und Gesellschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp.184-217.
- Wessels, Berhard, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft: Öffentliche Anhörungen, informellen Kontakte und innere Lobby in wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Parlamentsausschüssen', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 18:2, 1987, pp.285-311.
- Wessels, Wolfgang, 'An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35:2, 1997, pp.267-297.
- Westerhoff, Horst-Dieter, 'Die Gestaltung der Wirtschaftspolitik bei wachsender internationaler Verflechtung', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.101-120.
- Wewer, Göttrik, 'Spielregeln, Netzwerke, Entscheidungen - auf der Suche nach der anderen Seite des Regierens', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik II. Formale und informale Komponenten des Regierens in den Bereichen Führung, Entscheidung, Personal und Organisation* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1991), pp.9-29.
- Wewer, Göttrik, 'Richtlinienkompetenz und Koalitionsregierung: Wo wird die Politik definiert?', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland I. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1990), pp.145-150.
- Wheeler, Nicholas J., 'The Dual Imperative of Britain's Nuclear Deterrent: The Soviet Threat, Alliance Politics and Arms Control', in Mark Hoffman, ed., *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp.32-52.
- Wieck, Hans-Georg, 'Der Bundesnachrichtendienst in den Entscheidungsprozessen der Außenpolitik', in Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser, eds., *Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen* (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), pp.47-58.
- Wildavsky, Aaron, 'Why Self-Interest Means Less Outside of a Social Context - Cultural

- Contributions to a Theory of Rational Choices', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6:2, 1994, pp.131-159.
- Wilker, Lothar, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert Gerald Livingston, eds., *The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), pp.395-412.
- Wilks, Steven, and Maurice Wright, *Comparative Government - Industry Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987).
- Williams, Phil, 'British Security and Arms Control Policy: The Changing Context', in Mark Hoffman, ed., *UK Arms Control Policy in the 1990s* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), pp.11-31.
- Wood, B. Dan, and Jeffrey S. Peake, 'The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting', *American Political Science Review* 92:1, 1998, pp.173-184.
- Wright, Joanne, 'European Security - Post-Bosnia', *European Security* 6:2, 1997, pp.1-17.
- Wright, Maurice, 'Policy Community, Policy Networks and Comparative Industrial Policies', *Political Studies* XXXVI: 4, 1988, pp.593-612.
- Wrong, Dennis H., *Power: Its Forms, Bases and Uses* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979).
- Wulf, Herbert, 'The Federal Republic of Germany', in Ian Anthony, ed., *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.72-85.
- Wulf, Herbert, ed., *Arms Industry Limited* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Xhudo, Gazmen, *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans. A US Foreign Policy Perspective* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
- Yamagishi, Toshio, Mary R. Gillmore, and Karen S. Cook, 'Network Connections and the Distribution of Power in Exchange Networks', *American Journal of Sociology* 93:4, 1988, pp.833-851.
- Yamaguchi, Kazuo, 'Power in Networks of Substitutable and Complementary Exchange Relations: A Rational Choice Model and an Analysis of Power Centralization', *American Sociological Review* 61, 1996, pp.308-332.
- Young, Oran R., 'The Perils of Odysseus: On Constructing Theories of International Relations', in Raymond Tanter and Richard Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp.179-203.
- Young, Oran, 'International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation', *World Politics* 32:3, 1980, pp.331-356.
- Zintl, Reinhard, 'Commentary on O'Toole and Scharpf: Networks as a Challenge for Theory', in Fritz W. Scharpf, ed., *Games in Hierarchies and Networks* (Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1988), pp.177-186.

Codes:

- * veto positions
- 1 became WEU member in 1995
- 2 became EU member in 1995
- X not analysed by British multilevel foreign policy network analysis

Linkages of International Organisations and Collective Decision Units:

L [Par] = 16 linkages x 651 MPs = 10416

L [Weu] = (PM, FS, DS, Fco, Mod in 9 member states) + Med + UN-SC = 47

L [EU-CM] = (PM, FS, TS, Fco, dti in 12 member states) + Med + EU-Co + EP = 63

L [EU-Co] = (PM, Cab in 12 member states) + Ind + Med + EU-CM + EP = 28

L [Nato-CM] = (PM, FS, DS in 16 member states) + Med + Nato-Org + UN-SC = 51

L [Nato-Org] = (Fco, Mod in 14 member states) + Nato-CM = 29

L [Osce] = (PM, FS, Fco in 21 states) + Med + UN-SC = 65

L [UN-SC] = (PM, FS in 4 states) + Med + UN-Org = 10

L [UN-Org] = (Fm in member states) + Med = 22

References

Prime Minister - Cabinet

Institutional Authority: Donald G. Bishop, 'The Cabinet and Foreign Policy', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.137-160, p.144 [>], p.158 [<]; Michael Clarke, 'The Policy-Making Process', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White, eds., *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change, and Continuity* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp.71-95, p.85 [>]; Patrick Dunleavy, 'Estimating the Distribution of Positional Influence in Cabinet Committees under Major', in Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.298-321, p.307 [>]; Stefan Fröhlich, 'Wie mächtig ist der britische Premier? Neuere britische Forschungsansätze zu einem alten Disput', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 26:1, 1997, pp.160-173, p.161 [>]; Michael D. Hobkirk, *The Politics of Defence Budgeting* (London: Macmillan, 1984), p.40 [>]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure for Ministers* (London: HMSO, 1992) [<]; Richard Rose, 'British Government: The Job at the Top', in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), pp.1-41, p.25 [<], pp.4f. [>], p.23 [>], p.29 [>]; David Sanders, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', in Patrick Dunleavy et al., eds., *Developments in British Politics 4* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp.285-304, p.289 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Bishop, 'Cabinet and Foreign Policy', p.145 [>]; Fröhlich, 'Der britische Premier', pp.161f. [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Prime Minister - Ministers

Institutional Authority: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.74 [>]; Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), p.40 [>], p.41 [<]; Fröhlich, 'Der britische Premier', p.161 [>]; Peter Madgwick and Diana Woodhouse, *The Law and Politics of the Constitution of the United Kingdom* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995), p.84 [>], p.133 [>]; Cabinet Office,

Questions of Procedure, 32-35 [>]; Rose, 'British Government', pp.4f. [>], p.7 [>], p.33 [<]; Richard Rose, *Ministers and Ministries: A Functional Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), p.79 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Rose, 'British Government', p.23 [◊]; Martin J. Smith, David Marsh, and David Richards, 'Central Government Departments and the Policy Process', in Patrick Dunleavy and R.A.W. Rhodes, eds., *Prime Minister, Cabinet and Core Executive* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp.38-60, p.40 [<], p.41 [<].

Power Relationship: ◊

Prime Minister - Ministries

Institutional Authority: Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.146 [>]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 32-35 [>]; Rose, 'British Government', pp.4f. [>], p.33 [||].

Resource-Dependence: Rose, 'British Government', p.23 [◊], p.32 [<], p.34 [||], p.37 [<].

Power Relationship: <◊

Prime Minister - Parliament

Institutional Authority: Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.162 [>], p.163 [<]; Rose, 'British Government', p.34 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Rose, 'British Government', p.34 [>]; Philip Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom: Balancing Effectiveness and Consent?', in Philip Norton, ed., *Parliaments in Western Europe* (London: Frank Cass, 1990), pp.10-31, p.12 [<].

Power Relationship: ◊

Prime Minister - Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees

Institutional Authority: Charles Carstairs, 'Proceedings on the Record: The Floor of the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee and Other Committees,' in Charles Carstairs and Richards Ware, eds., *Parliament and International Relations* (Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1991), pp.8-36, pp.29f. [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [>]

Power Relationship: ◊

Prime Minister - Conservative Party

Institutional Authority: Fröhlich, 'Der britische Premier', p.161 [>], p.163 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, pp.129f. [>]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.17 [>]; Rose, 'British Government', p.7 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Rose, 'British Government', p.7 [<].

Power Relationship: ◊

Prime Minister - Opposition Parties

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.22 [>]; Philip Norton, 'The Liberal Party in Parliament', in Vernon Bogdanor, ed., *Liberal Party Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.143-171, p.164 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Prime Minister - Voter
see Parliament - Voter

Prime Minister - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Fröhlich, 'Der britische Premier', p.162 [>]; Dennis Kavanagh, *British Politics. Continuities and Change*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.207 [<>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.130 [>]; Rose, 'British Government', p.34 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Prime Minister - WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC

see WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC

[for transnational and transgovernmental relations between national actors and international organisations see the respective organisation]

Prime Minister - Other Heads of State

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

Cabinet - Ministers

Institutional Authority: Bishop, 'Cabinet and Foreign Policy', p.147 [>], p.158 [>]; Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.85 [>]; Dunleavy, 'Estimating the Distribution of Positional Influence', p.316 [[]]; Dunleavy and Rhodes, *Prime Minister*, p.55 [[]]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.40 [I, >]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 1.2.17 [>], 1.2.18 [<]; Rose, 'British Government', p.24 [<], p.25 [>]; Sanders, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', p.289 [>]; Smith et al., 'Central Government Departments', p.41 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.40 [<]; Sanders, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', p.298 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Cabinet - Ministries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.42 [<, chiefs of defence staff]; Rose, 'British Government', p.32 [<]; Sanders, 'Foreign and Defence Policy', p.298 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Parliament

Institutional Authority: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.15 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<], p.53 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.124 [<], p.133 [<], p.154 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.56 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.75 [>]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.12 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Cabinet - Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees

Institutional Authority: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, pp.29f. [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Cabinet - Conservative Party

Institutional Authority: Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.17 [{}]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, pp.52f.[<>]

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <|>

Cabinet - Opposition Parties

see Prime Minister - Opposition Parties

Cabinet - Voter

see Parliament - Voter

Cabinet - Media

see Prime Minister - Media, Ministers - Media

Ministers - Ministers

see Cabinet - Ministers

Ministers - their Ministries

Institutional Authority: Andrew Gray and Bill Jenkins, 'Ministers, Departments and Civil Servants', in Bill Jones, ed., *Politics UK*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.402-425, p.403 [>]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.42 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.172 [<]; William Plowden, *Ministers and Mandarins* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1994), pp.102f. [<]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 11 [>]; p.40 [>]

Resource-Dependence: Gray and Jenkins, *Ministers*, p.403 [<], p.407 [<]; Christina Larnier, 'The Organisation and Structure of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.31-70, pp.59f. [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.172 [<]; Plowden, *Ministers and Mandarins*, pp.102f. [<]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 55 [<]; Smith et al., 'Central Government Departments', p.40 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - Parliament

Institutional Authority: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.15 [<]; Gray and Jenkins, *Ministers*, p.403 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.132 [<], p.133 [<], p.137 [<], p.155 [>], p.168 [<]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 27 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.18 [<], 26 [>]; Rose, 'British Government', p.32 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Gray and Jenkins, *Ministers*, p.403 [>]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.41 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.133 [>], p.154 [>], 168 [>], p.180 [<]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.12 [<], p.14 [>]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 27 [>];

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees

Institutional Authority: B.L. Borthwick, 'The Defence Committee', in Gavin Drewry, ed., *The New Select Committees* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), pp.72-86, p.82 [<]; C.Y. Carstairs, 'The Foreign Affairs Committee', in Gavin Drewry, ed., *The New Select Committees* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985), pp.165-181, p.171 [<]; Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, pp.29f. [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.133 [<]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 27 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.171 [>]; Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.31 [<>]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p. 133 [>], p.180 [<]; Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 27 [>];

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - Conservative Party

Institutional Authority: Cabinet Office, *Questions of Procedure*, 46 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.41 [<]; Norton, 'Liberal Party', p.164 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.17 [<]; Smith et al., 'Central Government Departments', p.41 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Martin Burch and Ian Holliday, *The British Cabinet System* (London: Prentice Hall / Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996), p.94 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - Opposition Parties

see Prime Minister - Opposition Parties

Ministers - Voter

see Parliament - Voter

Ministers - Interest Groups in their issue area

Institutional Authority: Bill Jones and Denis Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', in Bill Jones, ed., *Politics UK* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994), pp.220-237, p.225 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', pp.221f. [<]; Grant Jordan, 'Effective Lobbying: the Hidden Hand', in Grant Jordan, ed., *The Commercial Lobbyists: Politics for Profit in Britain* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1990), pp.173-189, p.175 [<]; David Marsh 'Introduction: Interest Groups in Britain: Their Access and Power,' in David Marsh, ed., *Pressure Politics. Interest Groups in Britain* (London: Junction Books, 1983), pp.1-16, p.3 [<]; Michael Rush, 'Pressure Politics', in Michael Rush, ed., *Parliament and Pressure Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp.3-16, p.5 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, *British Politics*, p.207 [<>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.133 [<], p.135 [<]; Burch and Holliday, *British Cabinet*

System, pp.100-102 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - international organisations

see WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, EP, NATO-CM, NATO-Org, OSCE, UN-SC, UN-Org

Ministers - Counterparts in other countries

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

Ministries - Ministries

Institutional Authority: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.87 [<]; Dunleavy, 'Estimating the Distribution of Positional Influence', p.309 [<]; Larner, 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office', p.63 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.138 [<]; Cabinet Office, *Question of Procedure*, p.8 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.21 [<]; Smith et al., 'Central Government Departments', p.43 [Treasury >], p.44 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Broadbent (1988), p.103 [<]; Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.87 [<]; Larner, 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office', p.64 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.138 [<]; Peter Nailor, 'Defence and Foreign Policy', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom, eds., *The Management of Britain's External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp.221-229, p.226 [<]; Rose, 'British Government', p.30 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministries - Parliament

Institutional Authority: Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.132 [()], p.146 [()]

Resource-Dependence: Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.154 [>].

Power Relationship: |>

Ministries - Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.168 [>], p.171 [>]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [>]; Larner, 'Foreign and Commonwealth Office', p.64 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.148 [>], p.182 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministries - Interest Groups in their issue area

Institutional Authority: Gray and Jenkins, *Ministers*, p.406 [>]; Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', p.225 [>]; Marsh, 'Introduction', p.5 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Gray and Jenkins, *Ministers*, p.406 [<]; Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', pp.221f. [<]; Jordan, 'Effective Lobbying', p.174 [<]; Marsh, 'Introduction', p.3 [<]; Rush, 'Pressure Politics', p.5 [<].

Power Relationship: >, <

Ministries - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.148 [>]; Burch

and Holliday, *British Cabinet System*, pp.100-102 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministries - Counterparts in other countries

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

Parliament - Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees

Institutional Authority: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.76 [|>].

Resource-Dependence: Borthwick, 'Defence Committee', p.82 [<]; Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', pp.174f. [<]; Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.30 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Parliament - Conservative Party [1990- April 1992: 376 MPs, April 1992-1995: 336 MPs]

Institutional Authority: Fröhlich, 'Der britische Premier', p.164 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, pp.52f. [<], p.54 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.155 [<], pp.168f. [<]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.11 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.76 [<]; Clarke, 'The Policy-Making Process', p.87 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.53 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Parliament - Opposition Parties [1990 - April 1992: 229 lab, 22 lib, 23 other; April 1992 - 1995: 271 lab, 20 lib, 24 other]

Institutional Authority: Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.155 [<], pp.168f. [<]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.11 [<]; Norton, 'Liberal Party', pp.143-171 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Norton, 'Liberal Party', p.160 [>].

Power Relationship: ◇

Parliament - Voter

Institutional Authority: Sir Charles Gordon, ed., *Erskine May's Treatise on The Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usages of Parliament*, Twentieth Edition ed. (London: Butterworths, 1983), p.9[<], p.55 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.153 [>], p.168 [<], p.191 [<]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.56 [>]; Shaw, 'Members of Parliament', p.88 [<]; Colin Shepherd, 'The Members' Need for Information', in Dermot Englefield, ed., *Workings of Westminster* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1991), pp.25-30, p.25 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.64 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.155 [<], p.168 [<]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.12 [<]; Norton, 'Liberal Party', p.164 [>]; Shepherd, 'The Members' Need for Information', p.25 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Parliament - Interest Groups

Institutional Authority: Gordon, *Erskine May's Treatise*, p.55 [>]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.153 [>]; Rose, *Ministers and Ministries*, p.56 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, pp.49f. [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence*

Budgeting, p.47 [<]; Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', p.22 [<]; Jordan, 'Effective Lobbying', p.174 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.169 [◇]; Marsh, 'Introduction', p.3 [<]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.12 [<]; Malcolm Shaw, 'Members of Parliament', in Michael Rush, ed., *Parliament and Pressure Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), pp.85-113, p.108 [<], p.110 [>]; Shepherd, 'The Members' Need for Information', p.25 [<], p.27 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Parliament - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.67 [>]; Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.77 [<]; Kavanagh, *British Politics*, p.207 [◇]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.155 [<], p.185 [>]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.12 [<]; Shepherd, 'The Members' Need for Information', p.26 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees - Conservative Party, Labour Party

Institutional Authority: Borthwick, 'Defence Committee', p.72 [<]; Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.165 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Borthwick, 'Defence Committee', p.80 [>]; Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.172 [>].

Power Relationship: ◇

Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees - Voter

see Parliament - Voter

Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees - Interest Groups

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.168 [<]; Carstairs and Ware, *Parliament*, p.30 [<], pp.49f. [<]; Rush, 'Pressure Politics', p.6 [<]; Hobkirk, *Defence Budgeting*, p.47 [<]; Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', p.22 [<]; Jordan, 'Effective Lobbying', p.174 [<]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.169 [◇]; Marsh, 'Introduction', p.3 [<]; Shaw, 'Members of Parliament', p.108 [<], p.110 [>]; Shepherd, 'The Members' Need for Information', p.25 [<], p.27 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Foreign Affairs and Defence Parliamentary Committees - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Carstairs, 'Foreign Affairs Committee', p.176 [◇]; Kavanagh, *British Politics*, p.207 [◇]; Madgwick and Woodhouse, *Law and Politics*, p.185 [>]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.21 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democratic Party - Voter

see Parliament - Voter

Conservative Party, Labour Party - Interest Groups
see Parliament - Interest Groups

Conservative Party, Labour Party, Liberal Democratic Party - Media
see Parliament - Media

Conservative Party, Labour Party - US Congress
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.239 [◇].
Power Relationship: ◇

Voter - Interest Groups
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Marsh, 'Introduction', p.3 [◇]; Rush, 'Pressure Politics', p.5 [◇].
Power Relationship: ◇

Voter - Media
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, *British Politics*, pp.208f. [◇]; Norton, 'Parliament in the United Kingdom', p.25 [◇].
Power Relationship: ◇

Voter - WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, NATO-CM, OSCE, UN-SC
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: see webpages of international organisations [<].
Power Relationship: <

Voter - European Parliament
see European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Interest Groups - Media
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Jones and Kavanagh, 'Pressure Groups', p.224 [◇]; Rush, 'Pressure Politics', p.6 [>], p.13 [<].
Power Relationship: ◇

Industry - EC-Commission
Institutional Authority: /
Resource-Dependence: Franco Algieri and Dietrich Rometsch, 'Europäische Kommission und organisierte Interessen', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.131-149, p.134 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. The Eurofication of National Policy-Making* (London: Sage, 1993), pp.19-33, p.27 [>]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Complex Policy-Making: Lobbying the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. Th*

e Eurofeication of National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp.35-53, p.39 [>]; John McCormick, *The European Union. Politics and Policies* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996), p.117 [>]; Wolfgang Schumann, 'Das politische System der Europäischen Union als Rahmen für Verbandsaktivitäten', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.71-108, p.83 [>]

Power Relationship: >

Industry - other countries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, 'Introduction: Society and Foreign Policy - Implications for Theory and Practice', in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., *Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.1-15, p.3 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Media - WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, EP, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC, US Pre, US Nsa, US SS, US DS, US TR, US Wh, US Sd, US Pen, US Cd, US con, US vote, Ge, Fr, It, Ru, CA, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, *British Politics*, pp.207-223 [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.143 [>], p.151 [>]; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.347 [◇]; Evan Luard, *The United Nations. How it Works and What it Does* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.16f. [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

WEU - Heads of State, FS, DS, Fco and MoD of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, Gr (from 1995), Lu

Institutional Authority: Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel, eds., *The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU). Introduction and Basic Documents* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp.xix - xxiv [◇*]; *Brussels Treaty - Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence*, Brussels, 17 March 1948, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>, Article VIII, 4 [<*], Article X [>]; <http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members.htm> [<*].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: ◇

WEU - OSCE

Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

WEU - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <

EU-Council of Ministers - EU Commission

Institutional Authority: Neil Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp.176f. [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, pp.116f. [◇]; Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.20 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Peter Ludlow, 'The European Commission', in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.85-97, p.90 [<];

Power Relationship: ◇

EU- Council of Ministers - European Parliament

Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.25 [◇]; Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.175 [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.143 [◇], pp.157-159 [◇]

Resource-Dependence: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, p.185 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

EU-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, TS, Fco and Dti of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.24 [>]; Adrian Budd, *The EC and Foreign and Security Policy* (London: University of North London Press, 1993), pp.21f. [◇*]; *Treaty on European Union, M a a s t r i c h t , 7 F e b r u a r y 1 9 9 2*, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf, Title V 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy' [◇*]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.124 [<], pp.126-129 [<], p.126 [*], p.132 [>]; Milan Rai, *Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The Foreign and Security Policy Implications of the Treaty of the European Union* (London: Drava Papers, 1993), pp.6-9 [◇*].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: ◇*

EU-Commission - European Parliament

Institutional Authority: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.174-177 [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, pp.116f. [◇], p.143 [◇], p.157 [<]

Resource-Dependence: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, p.182 [<]

Power Relationship: ◇

EU-Commission - Heads of State and Cabinets in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: Ludlow, 'The European Commission', p.89 [<], p.90 [<]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.107 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: McCormick, *European Union*, pp.144f. [<], p.p148-150 [<]; Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.186f. [<]; *Treaty Establishing the European Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957, at <http://europa.eu.int/>, Article 138 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Nato-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, DS of UK, US, Ge, Fr, It, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 1998-99), pp.35-56 [◇*].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [>].

Power Relationship: ◇*

NATO-Council of Ministers - NATO-Organisation

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p.37 [>].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

NATO-Council of Ministers - OSCE

Institutional Authority: North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

NATO-Council of Ministers - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p.314 [<]; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm> [<]; Alexia Holstein, *Das Verhältnis des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NATO und OSZE* (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1996), pp.111-121 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Nato-Organisation - Fco and Mod of UK, US, Ger, It, Ca, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [◇].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [◇]; Nailor, 'Defence and Foreign Policy', p.229 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

OSCE - Heads of State, FS and Fco of Britain, Fr, Ger, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: http://www.osce.org/general/participating_states/partstat.htm

[<]; *Helsinki Final Act*, August 1975 [<*>]; *Prague Council*, January 1992 [* - 1]; Fact Sheet 'What is the OSCE' at <http://www.osceprag.cz>; Jens Bortloff, *Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Eine völkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme* (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996), p.405 [<];

Resource-Dependence: *Charter of Paris*, November 1990, [<>]; Miriam Shapiro, 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation', *American Journal of International Law* 89:3, 1995, pp.631-636.

Power Relationship: <>*

OSCE - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: *Budapest Summit*, December 1994 [<]; Bortloff, *Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa*, pp.414-425 [<]; Holstein, *Das Verhältnis des Sicherheitsrates*, pp.111-121 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

UN Security Council - Heads of State, Foreign Ministers of UK, US, Fr, Ru

Institutional Authority: Barry O'Neill, 'Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2, 1996, pp.219-237 [<>*>]; United Nations, *Basic Facts About the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p.9 [<*>], p.10 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and International Security', *Survival* 35:2, 1993, pp.3-30, p.5 [<>].

Power Relationship: <>*

UN Security Council - UN Organisation

Institutional Authority: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [>]; Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations in the 1990s* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p.28 [>].

Resource-Dependence: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [<]; Baehr and Gordenker, *United Nations*, p.28 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

UN Organisation - Foreign Offices in all member countries

Institutional Authority: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [[]].

Resource-Dependence: Baehr and Gordenker, *United Nations*, p.29 [<>].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - Departmental Secretaries

Institutional Authority: John Dumbrell, *The Making of US Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.92f. [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.339 [>], p.343 [>]; Loch K. Johnson, *America as a World Power. Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), p.187 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.88f. [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.343 [<], p.348 [<], p.363 [<], p.387 [<], p.388 [<], p.412 [<], p.413 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.185 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US White House

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.92 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.345 [>], p.363 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.91 [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.346 [<], pp.386f. [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US Pentagon

Institutional Authority: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.392 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.393 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US Congress

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.116f. [<], p.121 [<>], p.132 [<>], p.134 [<>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.341 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.186 [>], p.188 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.116 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US voter

Institutional Authority: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [<], p.219 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

US President - other heads of state

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

US departmental secretaries - other US departmental secretaries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.344 [<>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.195 [<>].

Power Relationship: <>

US departmental secretaries - their departments

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.93f. [>], p.97 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.378 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, pp.190f. [>].

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.192 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

NSA - White House

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.89 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.190 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.89 [<], p.91 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.190 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US departmental secretaries - US Congress

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.138 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.121 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <

US Pentagon, US Commerce Department - Industry

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.416 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [>].

Power Relationship: >

US departments - other US departments

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.95 [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.381 [<].

Power Relationship: <

White House - Congress

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [<], p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <

US departments - US Congress

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.121 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.388 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: >

US Congress - US voter

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.116 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.225 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Congress -Industry

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.138 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.388 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.88 [<], pp.90f. [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.184 [<], p.195 [<]; William Wallace, *Britain's Bilateral Links within Western Europe* (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1984), p.2 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Codes:

* veto positions

1 became WEU member in 1995

2 became EU member in 1995

X not analysed by German multilevel foreign policy network analysis

Detailed Linkages of International Organisations and Collective Decision Units:

** Dec. 1990-Nov. 1994: L [Par] = 24 linkages x 662 MPs = 15888

Nov. 1994-: L [Par] = 24 linkages x 672 MPs = 16128

1990-1994: 319 cdu/csu, 299 spd, 79 fdp, 8 grü, 17 pds

1994-: 295 cdu/csu, 251 spd, 47 fdp, 48 grü, 30 pds, 1 other

L [Weu] = (Cha, FM, DM, Fm, Dm in 9 member states) + Med + UN-SC = 47

L [EU-CM] = (Cha, FM, EM, Fm, Em in 12 member states) + Med + EU-Co + EP = 63

L [EU-Co] = (Cha, Cab in 12 member states) + Ind + Med + EU-CM + EP = 28

L [EP] = electorate in 15 member states

L [Nato-CM] = (Cha, FM, DM in 16 member states) + Med + Nato-Org + UN-SC = 51

L [Nato-Org] = (Fm, Dm in 14 member states) + Nato-CM = 29

L [Osce] = (Cha, FM, Fm in 21 states) + Med + UN-SC = 65

L [UN-SC] = (Cha, FM in 4 states) + Med + UN-Org = 10

L [UN-Org] = (Fm in member states) + Med = 22

References

Chancellor - Cabinet

Institutional Authority: *Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung* (GOBReg.) §1 [>], §15 [<], §20 [<]; Thomas Ellwein and Joachim Jens Hesse, *Das Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), p. 312 [>]; Renate Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership in Germany: Dispersion of Power or "Kanzlerdemokratie"', in Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., *Presidents and Prime Ministers* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), pp.139-170, p.157 [>]; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 'The Centre of Government in West Germany: Changing Patterns under 14 Legislatures (1949-1987)', *European Journal of Political Research* 16:2, 1988, pp.171-190, p.172 [>]; Jean-Louis Thiebault, 'The Organisational Structure of Western European Cabinets and its Impact on Decision-Making', in Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds., *Governing Together. The Extent and Limits of Joint Decision-Making in Western European Cabinets* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp.77-98, p.82 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.317 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Chancellor - Ministers

Institutional Authority: *Grundgesetz* (GG) Art.65 [[]]; *GOBReg.* §1 [>], §2 [>]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.300 [[]], p.316 [>], p.317 [[]]; Helga Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B43, 1983, pp.3-15, p.3 [[]]; Peter Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Von Adenauer bis Kohl', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 33:1, 1986, pp.44-66, p.47 [[]]; Wolfgang Ismayr, 'Parteien in Bundestag und Bundesregierung', in Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer and Richard

Stöß, eds., *Parteiendemokratie Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), pp.384-406, p.399 [>]; Ludger Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers in historisch und international vergleichender Perspektive', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 27:4, 1996, pp.697-711, p. 701 [>], p.703 [>]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', pp.142f. [>], pp.145f. [[]]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', pp.171f. [[]], p.172 [>]; Axel Murswiek, 'Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Kanzlerdemokratie, Koordinationsdemokratie oder was sonst?', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1990), pp.151-169, p.154 [>], p.157 [>], p.159 [>]; Thiebault, 'Organisational Structure', pp.88f. [[]]; Göttrik Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz und Koalitionsregierung: Wo wird die Politik definiert?', in Hans-Hermann Hartwich and Göttrik Wewer, eds., *Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland I. Konzeptionelle Grundlagen und Perspektiven der Forschung* (Opladen: Leske+Budrich, 1990), pp.145-150, p.146 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.317 [<].

Power Relationship: <|>

Chancellor - Ministries

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art. 64, 65 [>]; *GOBReg.*, §9 [>], Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.301[>], p.317 [[]]; Klaus König, 'Vom Umgang mit Komplexität in Organisationen: Das Bundeskanzleramt', *Der Staat* 28:1, 1989, pp.49-70, p.59 [>]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.701f [>]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.142 [>]; Thiebault, 'Organisational Structure', p.89 [[]].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.317 [<].

Power Relationship: <|>

Chancellor - Chancellor's Office

Institutional Authority: *GOBReg.*, §9 [>]; Phyllis Berry, 'The Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory during the Schmidt and Kohl Chancellorships', *Governance* 2:3, 1989, pp.339-355, p.349 [>]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.318 [>]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.47 [>]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.706 [>]; Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Gabriele Pieper, 'Das Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 91:B21-22, 1991, pp.3-13, p.6 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Berry, 'Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory', p.339 [<]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.317 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.47 [<]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.706; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.180; Müller-Rommel and Pieper, 'Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', p.12 [<]; Murswiek, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', pp.157f. [<].

Power Relationship: <◇>

Chancellor - Bundestag

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art. 63 Abs.1 [<], Art. 67 Abs.1 [<], Art. 68 [<]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.309 [<], p.316 [<]; Wolfgang Ismayr, 'Parteien in Bundestag und Bundesregierung', in Oscar W. Gabriel, Oskar Niedermayer and Richard Stöß, eds., *Parteiendemokratie Deutschland* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1997), pp.384-406, p.399 [<]; Werner Kaltefleiter, 'Die Kanzlerdemokratie des Helmut Kohl',

Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 27:1, 1996, pp.27-36, p.34 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', pp.141f. [<]; Müller-Rommel and Pieper, 'Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', p.5 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.154 [<]; Wilfried Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees in the Bundestag', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert Gerald Livingston, eds., *The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), pp.273-295, pp.273f. [<]; Lothar Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert Gerald Livingston, eds., *The U.S. Congress and the German Bundestag* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), pp.395-412, p.395 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.276 [>].

Power Relationship: ◊

Chancellor - Bundestag Committees

Institutional Authority: *Geschäftsordnung des Bundestages* (GOBT) §68 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Roland Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik - Zum Selbstverständnis der Haushaltsausschusses des Deutschen Bundestages', *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* 26:3, 1985, pp.245-269, p.251 [>], pp.257f. [>]; Michael Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit durch die Fraktionen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1131-1143, p.1133 [>].

Power Relationship: ◊

Chancellor - Coalition Meeting

Institutional Authority: Waldemar Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den Mehrheitsfraktionen: Koalitionsgespräche und Koalitionsrunden', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 25:3, 1994, pp.329-346, p.335 [<], p.340 [>]; Peter Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik im Vergleich: Adenauers Nachfolger', *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 89:B1-2, 1989, pp.28-39, p.35 [<]; Ludger Helms, 'Parteienregierung im Parteienstaat. Strukturelle Voraussetzungen und Charakteristika der Parteienregierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und in Österreich (1949 bis 1992)', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 24:4, 1993, pp.635-654, p.648 [<]; König, 'Umgang mit Komplexität', p.60 [<], p.62 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.160 [<]; Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.147 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: ◊

Chancellor - CDU, CSU

Institutional Authority: Berry, 'Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory', p.346 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik', p.53 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.37 [<]; Wolfgang Jäger, 'Von der Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie', *Zeitschrift für Politik* 35:1, 1988, pp.15-32, p.29 [<]; Wolfgang Jäger, 'Eine Lanze für den Kanzlerwahlverein!', in Manfred Mols, Hans-Otto Mühleisen, Theo Stamm, and Bernhard Vogel, eds., *Normative und institutionelle Ordnungsprobleme des modernen Staates* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1990), pp.96-110., p.103 [>]; König, 'Umgang mit Komplexität', p.60 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive

Leadership', p.144f. [<], p.147 [<]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.182 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.163 [<]; Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.148 [<].
Resource-Dependence: Berry, 'Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory', p.346 [<]; Müller-Rommel and Pieper, 'Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', p.12 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.158 [<]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschubarbeit', p.1132 [>]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].
Power Relationship: <>

Chancellor - FDP, SPD, Grüne, PDS

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Chancellor - Bundesrat

Institutional Authority: *GOBReg.*, Art. 31 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik', p.47 [<]; Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.148 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.148 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Chancellor - Voters

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art.70-82 [>]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.147 [<]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.182 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <>

Chancellor - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Franz Ronneberger, 'Die Rolle von Public Relations im politischen Entscheidungsprozess', in Frank E. Böckelmann, ed., *Medienmacht und Politik* (Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag Volker Spieß, 1989), pp.149-160, pp.151f. [<>]; Hermann Meyn, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Alte und neue Bundesländer* (Berlin: Colloquim Verlag, 1992), p.174 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

Chancellor - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE

see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE

Chancellor - Heads of State of US, Fr, UK, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their counterparts in other countries

Cabinet - Ministers

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art. 65; *GOBReg.*, §15 [>], §16 [>], §20 [>]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.302 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.154 [>], p.157 [<]; Müller-Rommel and Pieper, 'Bundeskanzleramt als Regierungszentrale', p.5 [>]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.172 [<]; Thiebault, 'Organisational Structure', pp.82f [<].

Resource-Dependence: /
Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Ministries

Institutional Authority: Thiebault, 'Organisational Structure', pp.88f [[]].

Resource-Dependence: Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.172 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Bundestag

Institutional Authority: GG, Art.24 [<], Art.59 [<]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.185 [<]; Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.12 [<], p.13 [<]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.274 [<]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.285 [<]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.396 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.276 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees

Institutional Authority: GOBT, §68 [<]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.254 [<]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.309 [<]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.396 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.251 [>], pp.257f. [>]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1133 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Coalition Meeting

Institutional Authority: Helms, 'Parteienregierung', p.648 [<]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.704 [<]; Haungs 1991: 120 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.400 [<]; Jaeger 1990: 1070 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.164 [<]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.335 [<]; Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.147 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - CDU, CSU, FDP

Institutional Authority: Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.37; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.399 [<], pp.400f. [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.164 [<].; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.399 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1132 [>]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - SPD, Grüne, PDS

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Cabinet - Bundesrat

Institutional Authority: GG, Art. 59 [<], Art.73 [<]; Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.12 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.47 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.141 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.12 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Federal Constitutional Court

Institutional Authority: BVerfGG, § 31 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerdemokratie in der Bundesrepublik', p.47 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.37 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Voters

Institutional Authority: GG, Art.70-82 [>]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.288 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Meyn, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p.174 [>]; Ronneberger, 'Rolle von Public Relations', pp.151f. [<];

Power Relationship: <

Cabinet - European Commission

see EU-Commission

Ministers - Ministers

Institutional Authority: Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.4 [[]]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.143 [[]], p.156 [[]]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.180 [<>]; Thiebault, 'Organisational Structure', p.88 [[]].

Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.152f. [<>].

Power Relationship: <>

Ministers - their own Ministry

Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.302 [>], p.312 [>]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.703 [>]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.188 [>]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.142 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.314f. [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.152f. [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - Bundestag

Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.312 [>], p.313 [<]; (Finance Minister - budget) Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.157 [<]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.274 [<]; Camilla Werner, 'Das Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., *Parlament und Gesellschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp.184-217, p.194 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.276 [>]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.194 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees

Institutional Authority: *GOBT*, §68 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.13 [>]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1133 [>]; Suzanne S. Schüttemeyer, 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1145-1157, p.1153 [>]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.251 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers -Coalition Meeting

Institutional Authority: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.310 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.35 [<]; Helms, 'Parteienregierung', p.648 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', pp.400f. [<]; König, 'Umgang mit Komplexität', p.62 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.160 [<]; Wewer, 'Richtlinienkompetenz', p.147 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.340 [>], p.336 [<], Rudzio, 'Informelle Entscheidungsmuster', p.135 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers -CDU, CSU, FDP

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1132 [>]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.336 [>]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.251 [>]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministers - their Party

(Foreign Minister/ Economics Minister - FDP, Defence Minister/ Chancellor's Office Minister - CDU, Finance Minister - CSU)

Institutional Authority: Berry, 'Organisation and Influence of the Chancellory', p.339 [<]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.312 [<]; Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.3 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.37 [<]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.702 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', pp.400f. [<]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.187 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.152 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.163 [<]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.331 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.153 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - SPD, Grüne, PDS

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1141 [>], 1136 [>]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.184 [>]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.404 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministers - Bundesrat

see Cabinet - Bundesrat

Ministers - Voters

Institutional Authority: GG, Art.70-82 [>]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.312 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.153 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Meyn, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p.174 [>]; Ronneberger, 'Rolle von Public Relations', pp.151f. [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministers - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE

see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-CM, OSCE

Ministers - their counterparts in other countries

see Heads of state, ministers, ministries - their counterparts in other countries

Ministries - Ministries

Institutional Authority: Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.4 [[]]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.184 [<>]; Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.180 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.318 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

Ministries - Bundestag

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Müller-Rommel, 'Centre of Government', p.172 [>]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.194 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministries - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees**Institutional Authority: /**

Resource-Dependence: Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.13 [>]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1133 [>], p.1136 [>]; Schüttemeyer, 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', p.1153 [>]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.251 [>], p.260 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministries - Coalition Meeting**Institutional Authority: /**

Resource-Dependence: Rudzio, 'Informelle Entscheidungsmuster', p.135 [>]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.331 [>], p.335 [>], p.340 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Ministries - CDU, CSU, FDP

Institutional Authority: Ismayr, 'Parteien', pp.401f. [<]; Renate Mayntz and Hans-Ulrich Derlien, 'Party Patronage and Politicization of the West German Administrative Elite 1970-1987 - Toward Hybridization?', *Governance* 2:4, 1989, pp.384-404, pp.387-404 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', pp.1133-1141 [>]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.184 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Ministries - SPD, Grüne, PDS**Institutional Authority: /**

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1136 [>]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.266 [>]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.199 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Defence and Economics Ministries - Industry and Unions

Institutional Authority: Rudolf Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.217-258., p.234 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.172 [<]; Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', pp.162f. [<]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.234 [<], p.239 [<]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.290 Footnote 17 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministries - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Meyn, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p.174 [>].

Power Relationship: <

Chancellor's Office - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Meyn, *Massenmedien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p.174 [>]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.244 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Ministries - WEU, EU-CM, NATO-Org, OSCE, UN-Org

see WEU, EU-CM, NATO-Org, OSCE, UN-Org

Ministries - their counterparts in other countries

see Heads of state, ministers, ministries - their counterparts in other countries

Bundestag - Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees

Institutional Authority: *GOBT*, § 64 Abs.1 [>], §60 Abs.1 [<]; R. Peter Dach, 'Das Ausschussverfahren nach der Geschäftsordnung und in der Praxis', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1103-1130, pp.1114f. [>]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.278 [>].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne, PDS

Institutional Authority: Jäger, 'Von der Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie', p.14 [<]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.708 [<]; Manfred Hirner, 'Der Deutsche Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', in Dietrich Herzog, Hilke Rebenstorf and Bernhard Wessels, eds., *Parlament und Gesellschaft* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), pp.138-183, p.161 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.386 [<]; Jürgen Jekewitz, 'Politische Bedeutung, Rechtstellung und Verfahren der Bundestagsfraktionen', in Hans-Peter Schneider and Wolfgang Zeh, eds., *Parlamentsrecht und Parlamentspraxis in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Berlin: DeGruyer, 1989), pp.1021-1053, p.1037 [<]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.288 [<], p.291 [<]; Jäger, 'Eine Lanze für den Kanzlerwahlverein!', p.103 [<]; Jekewitz, 'Politische Bedeutung, Rechtstellung und Verfahren der Bundestagsfraktionen', p.1037 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.385 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Jäger, 'Von der Kanzlerdemokratie zur Koordinationsdemokratie', p.14 [<>]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.385 [<>]; Wilker, 'Foreign Policy in the Bundestag', p.408 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - Bundesrat

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art.53a, [<>], Art 59 [<], Art. 73 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien',

p.406 [<]; Haftendorn, 'Das außen- und sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland', p.12 [<]; Helms, 'Parteienregierung', p.638 [<]; Mayntz, 'Executive Leadership', p.141 [<]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1135 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - Federal Constitutional Court

Institutional Authority: *BVerfGG*, §6 [>], §31 Abs.1 [<]; Haungs, 'Kanzlerprinzip und Regierungstechnik', p.37 [<]; Helms, 'Parteienregierung', p.637 [<]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.186 [<]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', pp.237f. [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - Industry, Unions

Institutional Authority: Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.290 [>]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', pp.222-225 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, pp.171f. [<], Helms, 'Parteienregierung', p.647 [<]; Hirner, 'Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', pp.140-2 [<]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.239 [<]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', pp.287f. [<], p.298 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - Voter

Institutional Authority: *Bundeswahlgesetz* (BwahlG) §12 [<]; Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.171 [<]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.238 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.286 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Ronneberger, 'Rolle von Public Relations', p.151 [<]; Werner, 'Dilemma parlamentarischer Opposition', p.191 [<], Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.286 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne, PDS

Institutional Authority: *GOBT*, §12, 57 [<]; Dach, 'Ausschussverfahren nach der Geschäftsordnung', p.1109 [<], p.1122 [<]; Helms, 'Das Amt des deutschen Bundeskanzlers', p.708 [<]; Ismayr, 'Parteien', p.396 [<]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und

Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1137 [<]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.284 [<], 278 [<]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.259 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1141 [<]; Schüttemeyer, 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', p.1153 [<]; Steffani, 'Parties (Parliamentary Groups) and Committees', p.288 [<]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.251 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Industry, Unions

Institutional Authority: Hirner, 'Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', p.142 [◇]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.224 [>].

Resource-Dependence: *GOBT*, §70 Abs.1 [>]; Dach, 'Ausschussverfahren nach der Geschäftsordnung', p.1126 [<]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1143 [<]; Schüttemeyer, 'Öffentliche Anhörungen', p.1148 [<], p.1155 [<]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', pp.224f. [<]; Sturm, 'Entscheidungsstrukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Haushaltspolitik', p.250 [<]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.290 [>], p.297 [<], p.309 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Voter

see Bundestag - Voter

Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees - Media

see Bundestag - Media

Coalition Meeting - CDU, CSU, FDP

Institutional Authority: Murswieck, 'Kanzlerdemokratie', p.159 [<]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.331 [<], p.336 [<]; Melzer, 'Vorbereitung und Gestaltung der Ausschussarbeit', p.1134 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Rudzio, 'Informelle Entscheidungsmuster', p.135 [◇]; Schreckenberger, 'Informelle Verfahren der Entscheidungsvorbereitung', p.335 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

Coalition Meeting - Voters

see Bundestag - Voters

Coalition Meeting - Media

see Bundestag - Media

CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne, PDS - Bundesrat

Institutional Authority: *GG*, Art. 51 [>].

Resource-Dependence: *GG*, Art. 30 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD - Industry, Unions

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, pp.172f. [◇]; Hirner, 'Bundestag im Netzwerk organisierter Interessen', p.154 [◇]; Jung, 'Einflußfaktoren und Entscheidungsprozesse in der Außen- und Europapolitik', p.186 [◇]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.237 [◇]; Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', pp.288f. [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne - Voters

see Bundestag - Voters

CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne, PDS - Media

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Ronneberger, 'Rolle von Public Relations', pp.150f. [◇];

Power Relationship: ◇

CDU, SPD - US Congress

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.239 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Bundesrat - Industry, Unions, Voters, Media

see CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Grüne - Industry, Unions, Voters, Media

Industry - Unions

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Ellwein and Hesse, *Regierungssystem*, p.174 [◇]; Jürgen Weber, *Die Interessengruppen im politischen System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1977), pp.86-169 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Industry, Unions - Voters

Institutional Authority: GG, Art.9 [◇].

Resource-Dependence: Wessels, 'Kommunikationspotentiale zwischen Bundestag und Gesellschaft', p.288 [◇]; Steinberg, 'Parlament und organisierte Interessen', p.239 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Industry -EU-Commission

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Franco Algieri and Dietrich Rometsch, 'Europäische Kommission und organisierte Interessen', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.131-149, p.134 [◇]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. The Eurofication of National Policy-Making* (London: Sage, 1993), pp.19-33, p.27 [◇]; Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, 'Complex Policy-Making: Lobbying the EC', in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, eds., *Making Policy in Europe. Th*

e Eurofeication of National Policy-Making (London: Sage, 1993), pp.35-53, p.39 [>]; John McCormick, *The European Union. Politics and Policies* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1996), p.117 [>]; Wolfgang Schumann, 'Das politische System der Europäischen Union als Rahmen für Verbandsaktivitäten', in Volker Eichener and Helmut Voelzkow, eds., *Europäische Integration und verbandliche Interessenvermittlung* (Marburg: Metropolis, 1994), pp.71-108, p.83 [>]

Power Relationship: >

Industry - other countries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, 'Introduction: Society and Foreign Policy - Implications for Theory and Practice', in Karl Kaiser and Roger Morgan, eds., *Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp.1-15, p.3 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Voter - European Parliament

see European Parliament - Voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Media - Ind, Uns, Voter, WEU, EU-CM, EU-Co, EP, Nato-CM, OSCE, UN-SC, US Pre, US Nsa, US SS, US DS, US TR, US Wh, US Sd, US Pen, US Cd, US con, US vote, Ge, Fr, It, Ru, CA, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kavanagh, *British Politics*, pp.207-223 [<]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.143 [>], p.151 [>]; Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy. Pattern and Process*, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p.347 [<]; Evan Luard, *The United Nations. How it Works and What it Does* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.16f. [<].

Power Relationship: <

WEU - Heads of State, FS, DS, Fco and MoD of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, Gr (from 1995), Lu

Institutional Authority: Arie Bloed and Ramses A. Wessel, eds., *The Changing Functions of the Western European Union (WEU). Introduction and Basic Documents* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), pp.xix - xxiv [<*]; *Brussels Treaty - Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence*, Brussels, 17 March 1948, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html>, Article VIII, 4 [<*], Article X [>]; <http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members.htm> [<*].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <*

WEU - OSCE

Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

WEU - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: WEU Council of Ministers, *Petersberg Declaration*, Bonn, 19 June 1992, at <http://www.weu.int/eng/index.html> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

EU-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, TS, Fco and Dti of UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.24 [>]; Adrian Budd, *The EC and Foreign and Security Policy* (London: University of North London Press, 1993), pp.21f. [◇*]; *Treaty on European Union, Maastricht, 7 February 1992*, at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf, Title V 'Provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy' [◇*]; McCormick, *European Union*, p. 124 [<], pp. 126-129 [<], p. 126 [*], p. 132 [>]; Milan Rai, *Britain, Maastricht and the Bomb. The Foreign and Security Policy Implications of the Treaty of the European Union* (London: Drava Papers, 1993), pp.6-9 [◇*].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: ◇*

EU-Council of Ministers - EU Commission

Institutional Authority: Neil Nugent, *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 3rd ed. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), pp.176f. [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, pp.116f. [◇]; Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.20 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Peter Ludlow, 'The European Commission', in Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change* (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991), pp.85-97, p.90 [<];

Power Relationship: ◇

EU-Council of Ministers - European Parliament

Institutional Authority: Andersen and Eliassen, 'Policy-making and Institutions in the EC', p.25 [◇]; Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.175 [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.143 [◇], pp.157-159 [◇]

Resource-Dependence: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, p.185 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

EU-Commission - European Parliament

Institutional Authority: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.174-177 [◇]; McCormick, *European Union*, pp.116f. [◇], p.143 [◇], p.157 [<]

Resource-Dependence: Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, p.182 [<]

Power Relationship: ◇

EU-Commission - Heads of State and Cabinets in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: Ludlow, 'The European Commission', p.89 [<], p.90 [<]; McCormick, *European Union*, p.107 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

European Parliament - voter in UK, Ge, Fr, It, Sp, Ne, Be, Po, De, Gr, Ir, Lu

Institutional Authority: McCormick, *European Union*, pp.144f. [<], p.p148-150 [<]; Nugent, *Government and Politics of the European Union*, pp.186f. [<]; *Treaty Establishing the European Community*, Rome, 25 March 1957, at <http://europa.eu.int/>, Article 138 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Nato-Council of Ministers - Heads of State, FS, DS of UK, US, Ge, Fr, It, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: NATO, *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO, 1998-99), pp.35-56 [◇*].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [>].

Power Relationship: ◇*

NATO-Council of Ministers - NATO-Organisation

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p.37 [>].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

NATO-Council of Ministers - OSCE

Institutional Authority: North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm> [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

NATO-Council of Ministers - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p.314 [<]; North Atlantic Council, *Final Communiqué*, Oslo, 4 June 1992, at <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c920604a.htm> [<]; Alexia Holstein, *Das Verhältnis des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen zu NATO und OSZE* (Stuttgart: Boorberg, 1996), pp.111-121 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

Nato-Organisation - Fco and Mod of UK, US, Ger, It, Ca, Tu, Ne, Be, Po, De, No, Gr, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [◇].

Resource-Dependence: NATO, *NATO Handbook*, pp.37f. [◇]; Nailor, 'Defence and Foreign Policy', p.229 [<].

Power Relationship: ◇

OSCE - Heads of State, FS and Fco of Britain, Fr, Ger, It, Ru, Ca, Sp, Tu, Ne, Be, Sw, Au, Po, De, No, Gr, Fi, Ir, Lu, Ic

Institutional Authority: http://www.osce.org/general/participating_states/partstat.htm [<]; *Helsinki Final Act*, August 1975 [<*]; *Prague Council*, January 1992 [* - 1]; Fact Sheet 'What is the OSCE' at <http://www.osceprag.cz>; Jens Bortloff, *Die Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa. Eine völkerrechtliche Bestandsaufnahme* (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1996), p.405 [<];

Resource-Dependence: *Charter of Paris*, November 1990, [<>]; Miriam Shapiro, 'Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation', *American Journal of International Law* 89:3, 1995, pp.631-636.

Power Relationship: <>*

OSCE - UN Security Council

Institutional Authority: *Budapest Summit*, December 1994 [<]; Bortloff, *Organisation für Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa*, pp.414-425 [<]; Holstein, *Das Verhältnis des Sicherheitsrates*, pp.111-121 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

UN Security Council - Heads of State, Foreign Ministers of UK, US, Fr, Ru

Institutional Authority: Sally Morphet, 'The Influence of States and Groups of States on and in the Security Council and General Assembly, 1980-94', *Review of International Studies* 21, 1995, pp.435-462, p.436 [<*]; Barry O'Neill, 'Power and Satisfaction in the United Nations Security Council', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 40:2, 1996, pp.219-237 [<>*]; United Nations, *Basic Facts About the United Nations* (New York: United Nations, 1995), p.9 [<*], p.10 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Adam Roberts, 'The United Nations and International Security', *Survival* 35:2, 1993, pp.3-30, p.5 [<>].

Power Relationship: <>*

UN Security Council - UN Organisation

Institutional Authority: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [>]; Peter R. Baehr and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations in the 1990s* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p.28 [>].

Resource-Dependence: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [<]; Baehr and Gordenker, *United Nations*, p.28 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

UN Organisation - Foreign Offices in all member countries

Institutional Authority: United Nations, *Basic Facts*, p.17 [[]].

Resource-Dependence: Baehr and Gordenker, *United Nations*, p.29 [<>].

Power Relationship: <|>

US President - Departmental Secretaries

Institutional Authority: John Dumbrell, *The Making of US Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp.92f. [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.339 [>], p.343 [>]; Loch K. Johnson, *America as a World Power. Foreign Policy in a Constitutional Framework* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995),

p.187 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.88f. [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.343 [<], p.348 [<], p.363 [<], p.387 [<], p.388 [<], p.412 [<], p.413 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.185 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US White House

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.92 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.345 [>], p.363 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.91 [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.346 [<], pp.386f. [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US Pentagon

Institutional Authority: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.392 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.393 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US Congress

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.116f. [<], p.121 [<>], p.132 [<>], p.134 [<>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.341 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.186 [>], p.188 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.116 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <>

US President - US voter

Institutional Authority: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [<], p.219 [<].

Resource-Dependence: /

Power Relationship: <

US President - other heads of state

see Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

US departmental secretaries - other US departmental secretaries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.344 [<>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.195 [<>].

Power Relationship: <>

US departmental secretaries - their departments

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, pp.93f. [>], p.97 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.378 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, pp.190f. [>].

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.192 [<].

Power Relationship: <>

NSA - White House

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.89 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.190 [>].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.89 [<], p.91 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.190 [<].

Power Relationship: <

US departmental secretaries - US Congress

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.138 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.121 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <

US Pentagon, US Commerce Department - Industry

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.416 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [>].

Power Relationship: >

US departments - other US departments

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.95 [<]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.381 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.195 [<].

Power Relationship: <

White House - Congress

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [<], p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: <

US departments - US Congress

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.121 [>]; Kegley and Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.388 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.200 [>].

Power Relationship: >

US Congress - US voter

Institutional Authority: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.116 [<]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [<].

Resource-Dependence: Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.225 [<].

Power Relationship: <

Congress -Industry

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Dumbrell, *Making of US Foreign Policy*, p.138 [>]; Kegley and

Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy*, p.388 [>]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.188 [>].

Power Relationship: >

Heads of state, ministers, officials - their respective counterparts in other countries

Institutional Authority: /

Resource-Dependence: Clarke, 'Policy-Making Process', p.88 [◇], pp.90f. [◇]; Burch and Holliday, *British Cabinet System*, p.88 [◇]; Johnson, *America as a World Power*, p.184 [◇], p.195 [◇]; Rose, 'British Government', p.34 [◇]; William Wallace, *Britain's Bilateral Links within Western Europe* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p.2 [◇].

Power Relationship: ◇

Appendix 3: Pressure for the Authorization of Air Strikes in Bosnia

1st Phase: 15 May - 8 August 1992					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	7	18	NC	lib US-Nsa US-SS US-Sd Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	8	22	NC	
DS	29	6	21	NC	
CE	11			/	
TS	33			/	
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	6	29	NC	
Tre	5			/	
Dti	27			/	
Par	10416	951	9	NC	
Com	16	0	0	NC	
con	12	0	0	NC	
lab	12	0	0	NC	
lib	9				
vote	21	1	5	NC	
Ind	29			/	
cnd	4			/	
Med	56	11	20	C	
Weu	47	25	53	B	
EU-CM	63	25	40	B	
EU-Co	28	10	36	NC	
EP	15	5	33	NC	
Nato-CM	51	19	37	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	23	35	B	
UN-SC	10	1	10	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32	9	28	NC	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	8	33	NC	
US-TR	27			/	
US-Wh	4	1	25	NC	
US-Sd	27				
US-Pen	19	7	37	NC	
US-Cd	24			/	
US-con	15	3	20	C	

2nd Phase: 8 - 10 August 1992

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	8	21	NC	lib Med US-Nsa US-SS US-Sd US-con Ge it Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	1	7	NC	
FS	36	9	25	NC	
DS	29	7	24	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	6	29	NC	
Tre	5				
Dli	27				
Par	10416	1582	15	NC	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12	2	17	NC	
lib	9				
vote	21	2	10	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	26	55	B	
EU-CM	63	26	41	B	
EU-Co	28	11	39	C	
EP	15	6	40	NC	
Nato-CM	51	20	39	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	24	37	B	
UN-SC	10	2	20	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32	11	34	U	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	10	42	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4	2	50	NC	
US-Sd	27				
US-Pen	19	7	37	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

3 rd Phase: 10 - 16 August 1992					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	8	21	NC	lib
Cab	14	1	7	NC	Med
FS	36	9	25	NC	EU-Co
DS	29	7	24	NC	US-Nsa
CE	11				US-SS
TS	33				US-Sd
Fco	30	8	27	NC	US-con
Mod	21	6	29	NC	Ge
Tre	5				It
Dti	27				Tu
Par	10416	1582	15	NC	Po
Com	16	1	6	NC	Ne
con	12	2	17	NC	Be
lab	12	2	17	NC	Au
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	26	55	B	
EU-CM	63	27	43	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	7	47	NC	
Nato-CM	51	20	39	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	24	37	B	
UN-SC	10	2	20	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32	11	34	C	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	10	42	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4	3	75	NC	
US-Sd	27				
US-Pen	19	7	37	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

4th Phase: 18 August - 29 September 1992

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	9	23	NC	lib Med EU-Co US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	1	7	NC	
FS	36	9	25	NC	
DS	29	7	24	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	6	29	NC	
Tre	5				
Dli	27				
Par	10416	1582	15	NC	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12	2	17	NC	
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	26	55	BB	
EU-CM	63	27	43		
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	7	47	NC	
Nato-CM	51	21	41	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	25	38	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4	4	100	C	
US-Sd	27				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

5th Phase: 29 September - 29 October 1992

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	9	23	NC	lib Med EU-Co US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	1	7	NC	
FS	36	9	25	NC	
DS	29	7	24	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	6	29	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	1582	15	NC	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12	2	17	NC	
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	26	55	B	
EU-CM	63	27	43	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	7	47	C	
Nato-CM	51	21	41	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	25	38	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	27				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

6th Phase: 29 October - 1 December 1992

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	9	23	NC	lib Med EU-Co EP US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	1	7	NC	
FS	36	9	25	NC	
DS	29	7	24	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	C	
Mod	21	6	29	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	1582	15	NC	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12	2	17	U	
lib	9				
vote	21	4	19	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	26	55	B	
EU-CM	63	28	44	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	B	
Nato-Org	29	13	45	NC	
Osce	65	25	38	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	8	36	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

7th Phase: 1 - 3 December 1982

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	10	26	NC	Fco lib Med EU-Co EP US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	2	14	NC	
FS	36	10	28	C	
DS	29	7	24	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30				
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	2213	15	NC	
Com	16	2	13	NC	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12	2	17	U	
lib	9				
vote	21	4	19	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	27	57	B	
EU-CM	63	29	46	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	26	40	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

8th Phase: 3 - 4 December 1992					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	11	28	NC	FS Fco lib Med EU-Co EP US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	3	21	NC	
FS	36				
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30				
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	2844	21	NC	
Com	16	3	19	NC	
con	12	3	25	NC	
lab	12	3	25	C	
lib	9				
vote	21	5	24	NC	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	28	60	B	
EU-CM	63	30	48	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	22	43	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	27	42	B	
UN-SC	10	4	40	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

9th Phase: 4 December 1992 - 19 January 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	11	28	NC	FS Fco lib lab Med EU-Co EP US-Pre US-Nsa US-SS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge It Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	3	21	NC	
FS	36				
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30				
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dii	27				
Par	10416	6096	59	U	
Com	16	4	25	NC	
con	12	3	25	U	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vole	21	6	29	U	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	28	60	B	
EU-CM	63	30	48	B	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	22	43	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	38	NC	
Osce	65	27	42	B	
UN-SC	10	4	40	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24	11	46	C	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	8	42	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

10th Phase: 19 January - 23 March 1993					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	11	28	NC	FS Fco lib lab Med EU-Co EP US-Pre US-Nsa US-DS US-Wh US-Sd US-con Ge ft Tu Po Ne Be Au
Cab	14	3	21	NC	
FS	36				
DS	29	9	31	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30				
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	6096	59	U	
Com	16	4	25	NC	
con	12	3	25	U	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vole	21	6	29	U	
Ind	29				
cnd	4				
Med	56				
Weu	47	28	60	B	
EU-CM	63	30	48	C	
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	22	43	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	26	40	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	13	43	NC	
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	9	47	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

11a Phase: 23 March - 7 April 1993					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	12	31	NC	FS
Cab	14	3	21	NC	Fco
FS	36				lib
DS	29	9	31	NC	lab
CE	11				Med
TS	33				EU-CM
Fco	30				EU-Co
Mod	21	7	33	NC	EP
Tre	5				US-Pre
Dti	27				US-Nsa
Par	10416	6096	59	U	US-DS
Com	16	4	25	U	US-Wh
con	12	3	25	U	US-Sd
lab	12				US-con
lib	9				Ge
vote	21	7	33	C	it
Ind	29				Tu
cnd	4				Po
Med	56				Ne
Weu	47	28	60	B	Be
EU-CM	63				Au
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	22	43	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	26	40	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	13	43	NC	
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	9	47	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

12th Phase: 7 - 25 April 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	13	33	NC	FS
Cab	14	4	29	U	Fco
FS	36				lib
DS	29	10	34	C	lab
CE	11	3	27	NC	vote
TS	33				Med
Fco	30				EU-CM
Mod	21	7	33	NC	EU-Co
Tre	5				EP
Dli	27				US-Pre
Par	10416	6456	62	U	US-Nsa
Com	16	5	31	U	US-DS
con	12	4	33	U	US-Wh
lab	12				US-Sd
lib	9				US-con
vote	21				Ge
Ind	29				it
cnd	4				Tu
Med	56				Po
Weu	47	28	60	B	Ne
EU-CM	63				Be
EU-Co	28				Au
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	22	43	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	26	40	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	13	43	NC	
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	9	47	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

13 th Phase: 25 - 29 April 1993					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39	14	36	C	FS
Cab	14	5	36	U	DS
FS	36				Fco
DS	29				lib
CE	11	4	36	NC	lab
TS	33				vote
Fco	30				Med
Mod	21	8	38	NC	EU-CM
Tre	5				EU-Co
Dti	27				EP
Par	10416	6816	65	U	US-Pre
Com	16	6	38	U	US-Nsa
con	12	5	42	U	US-DS
lab	12				US-Wh
lib	9				US-Sd
vote	21				US-con
Ind	29				Ge
cnd	4				It
Med	56				Tu
Weu	47	29	62	B	Po
EU-CM	63				Ne
EU-Co	28				Be
EP	15				Au
Nato-CM	51	23	45	B	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	26	40	B	
UN-SC	10	3	30	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	13	43	NC	
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	9	47	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

14th Phase: 29 - 30 April 1993					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Air Strike Supporters
PM	39				PM
Cab	14	6	43	C	FS
FS	36				DS
DS	29				Fco
CE	11	5	45	C	lib
TS	33				lab
Fco	30				vote
Mod	21	9	43	NC	Med
Tre	5				EU-CM
Dti	27				EU-Co
Par	10416	7176	69	U	EP
Com	16	7	44	U	US-Pre
con	12	6	50	U	US-Nsa
lab	12				US-DS
lib	9				US-Wh
vole	21				US-Sd
Ind	29				US-con
cnd	4				Ge
Med	56				It
Weu	47	30	64	B	Tu
EU-CM	63				Po
EU-Co	28				Ne
EP	15				Be
Nato-CM	51	24	47	B	Au
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65	27	42	B	
UN-SC	10	4	40	NC	
UN-Org	22	9	41	U	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	13	43	NC	
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19	9	47	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

Appendix 4: Pressure for the Abolition of the TASM Project

1 st Phase: 4 May 1990 - 11 August 1991					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	8	21	NC	lab lib cnd Ge it Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	8	22	NC	
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10400	4814	46	B	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	0	0	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30				
cnd	4				
Med	56	11	20	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	NC	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32	8	25	NC	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	8	27	NC	
US-DS	24	8	33	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26	8	31	NC	
US-Pen	19	7	37	NC	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15	2	13	C	

2nd Phase: 11 August - 30 September 1991

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	8	21	NC	lab lib cnd US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	8	22	NC	
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	7	33	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10400	4814	46	B	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	1	8	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vole	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30	1	3	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	12	21	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	NC	
Nato-Org	29	14	48	NC	
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32	9	28	NC	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	9	30	NC	
US-DS	24	9	38	NC	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26	8	31	NC	
US-Pen	19	7	37	C	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

3. Phase: 30 September - 3 October 1991

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	8	21	NC	lab lib cnd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	8	22	NC	
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	8	38	NC	
Tre	5				
Dli	27				
Par	10400	4814	46	B	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	1	8	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30	1	3	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	13	23	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	U	
Nato-Org	29	15	52	U	
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32	10	31	C	
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30	9	30	C	
US-DS	24	10	42	C	
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26	9	35	C	
US-Pen	19	7	37	C	
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

4th Phase: 3 - 12 October 1991					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	8	21	NC	lab lib cnd US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge ft Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	8	22	NC	
DS	29	8	28	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	8	27	NC	
Mod	21	8	38	NC	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10400	4814	46	B	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	1	8	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vole	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30	1	3	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	17	30	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	21	41	C	
Nato-Org	29	15	52	C	
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

5th Phase: 12 October 1991 - 8 July 1992

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	10	26	NC	lab lib cnd Nato-CM Nato-Org US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No ic
Cab	14	0	0	NC	
FS	36	10	28	NC	
DS	29	10	34	NC	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	10	33	NC	
Mod	21	9	43	C	
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10400	4814	46	B	
Com	16	1	6	NC	
con	12	1	8	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30	1	3	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	19	34	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

6th Phase: 8 July - 9 October 1992					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	11	28	NC	Mod lab lib cnd Nato-CM Nato-Org US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	1	7	NC	
FS	36	10	28	NC	
DS	29	11	38	C	
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	11	37	NC	
Mod	21				
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416 ¹	5376	52	B	
Com	16	2	13	NC	
con	12	1	8	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	3	14	U	
Ind	30	2	7	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	20	36	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

¹ Following the April 1992 general elections the composition of the House of Commons changed to 651 MPs, with 336 Conservatives, 271 Labour, 20 Liberal Democrats, and 24 other, thus, $L=16 \times 651=10416$.

7th Phase: 9 October 1992 - 3 July 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	12	31	NC	DS Mod lab lib cnd Nato-CM Nato-Org US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No lc
Cab	14	2	14	U	
FS	36	12	33	NC	
DS	29				
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	11	37	NC	
Mod	21				
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	5736	55	B	
Com	16	3	19	C	
con	12	2	17	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	4	19	U	
Ind	30	2	7	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	21	38	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

8th Phase: 3 July - 30 September 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39	13	33	C	DS Mod lab lib Com cnd Nato-CM Nato-Org US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No Ic
Cab	14	3	21	C	
FS	36	13	36	C	
DS	29				
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30	11	37	C	
Mod	21				
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	6096	59	B	
Com	16				
con	12	3	25	NC	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vole	21	5	24	U	
Ind	30	3	10	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	22	39	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

9th Phase: 30 September - 18 October 1993					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	TASM Opponents
PM	39				PM Cab FS DS Fco Mod lab lib Com cnd Nato-CM Nato-Org US-Pre US-SS US-DS US-Sd US-Pen US-con Ge It Ru Ne Be De No Ic
Cab	14				
FS	36				
DS	29				
CE	11				
TS	33				
Fco	30				
Mod	21				
Tre	5				
Dti	27				
Par	10416	7536	72	C	
Com	16				
con	12	6	50	C	
lab	12				
lib	9				
vote	21	8	38	U	
Ind	30	3	10	NC	
cnd	4				
Med	56	26	46	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Osce	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

Appendix 5: Pressure for the Despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia

1st Phase: 1 January - 12 June 1994					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42	7	17	NC	DM Dm cdu/csu Ind Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne
Cab	20	3	15	NC	
FM	38	5	13	NC	
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	2	15	NC	
Fm	33	8	24	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8	2	25	NC	
BT	15888	9028	57	B	
Com	20	4	20	U	
Coa	15	3	20	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19	3	16	U	
spd	20	4	20	NC	
grü	17	2	12	NC	
pds	17	2	12	NC	
BR	17	3	18	U	
BVG	1	0	0	C	
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vole	26	3	12	NC	
Med	63	10	16	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	14	27	NC	
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

2nd Phase: 12 June - 9 December 1994

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42	11	26	NC	DM Dm cdu/csu BVG Ind Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20	4	20	NC	
FM	38	9	24	NC	
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	2	15	NC	
Fm	33	12	36	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COf	8	2	25	NC	
BT	15888	9371	59	U	
Com	20	4	20	U	
Coa	15	3	20	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19	3	16	U	
spd	20	4	20	NC	
grü	17	2	12	NC	
pds	17	2	12	NC	
BR	17	3	18	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	3	12	NC	
Med	63	15	24	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51	26	51	C	
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

3rd Phase: 9 - 11 December 1994					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exorted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42	12	29	C	DM Dm cdu/csu BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20	4	20	NC	
FM	38	10	26	U	
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	2	15	NC	
Fm	33	12	36	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8	2	25	NC	
BT	16128*	8965	56	U	
Com	20	4	20	U	
Coa	15	3	20	U	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19	3	16	U	
spd	20	4	20	U	
grü	17	2	12	NC	
pds	17	2	12	NC	
BR	17	3	18	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	4	15	NC	
Med	63	27	43	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

* The distribution of party membership in the Bundestag changed after the 1994 general elections. See Appendix 2.

4th Phase: 11 - 13 December 1994

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42				Cha DM Dm cdu/csu BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20	5	25	U	
FM	38	11	29	C	
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	3	23	NC	
Fm	33	12	36	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8	3	38	NC	
BT	16128	9342	58	U	
Com	20	5	25	U	
Coa	15	4	27	U	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19	4	21	U	
spd	20	5	25	U	
gru	17	3	18	NC	
pds	17	3	18	NC	
BR	17	4	24	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	5	19	NC	
Med	63	28	44	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

5a Phase: 13 - 16 December 1994

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42				Cha FM DM Dm cdu/csu BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20	6	30	U	
FM	38				
DM	32				
FIM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	4	31	NC	
Fm	33	13	396	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8	3	38	NC	
BT	16128	9719	60	U	
Com	20	6	30	U	
Coa	15	5	33	C	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19	5	26	C	
spd	20	6	30	U	
grü	17	4	24	NC	
pds	17	4	24	NC	
BR	17	5	29	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	5	23	U	
Med	63	28	46	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

6th Phase: 16 - 20 December 1994					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42				Cha FM DM Dm cdu/csu fdp Coa BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20	8	40	C	
FM	38				
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13	5	38	C	
Fm	33	14	42	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COf	8	3	38	NC	
BT	16128	10848	67	U	
Com	20	7	35	U	
Coa	15				
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	6	30	U	
grü	17	4	24	NC	
pds	17	4	24	NC	
BR	17	6	35	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	8	31	U	
Med	63	31	49	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

7th Phase: 20 December 1994 - 28 June 1995

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42				Cha Cab FM DM CM Dm cdu/csu fdp Coa BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20				
FM	38				
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13				
Fm	33	14	42	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COf	8	4	50	NC	
BT	16128	11508	71	U	
Com	20	8	40	C	
Coa	15				
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	8	40	U	
grü	17	6	35	NC	
pds	17	6	35	NC	
BR	17	8	47	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	10	38	U	
Med	63	33	52	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

8th Phase: 28 - 30 June 1995

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Despatch Supporters
Cha	42				Cha Cab FM DM CM Dm Com cdu/csu fdp Coa BVG Ind Nato-CM Nato-Org UN-Org US Fr UK Ne 4 additional Nato members
Cab	20				
FM	38				
DM	32				
FIM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13				
Fm	33	14	42	NC	
Dm	25				
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8	4	50	NC	
BT	16128	11838	73	C	
Com	20				
Coa	15				
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	9	45	U	
grü	17	7	41	NC	
pds	17	7	41	NC	
BR	17	8	47	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	10	38	U	
Med	63	34	54	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15				
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10				
UN-Org	22				
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

Appendix 6: Pressure for a Reduction of German Dual-Use Export Controls

1 st Phase: 14 February - 31 August 1992					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	12	29	NC	Ind EU-CM Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	0	0	NC	
FM	38	12	32	NC	
DM	32	10	31	NC	
FiM	14				
EM	35	12	34	NC	
CM	13				
Fm	33	11	33	NC	
Dm	25	10	40	NC	
Fim	8				
Em	31	12	39	NC	
COF	8				
BT	15888	662	4	NC	
Com	20	1	5	NC	
Coa	15	0	0	NC	
cdu/csu	21	1	5	NC	
fdp	19	1	5	NC	
spd	20	1	5	NC	
grü	17	0	0	NC	
pds	17	0	0	NC	
BR	17	1	6	NC	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	2	8	NC	
Med	63	13	21	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28	23	82	C	
EP	15	1	7	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

2nd Phase: 31 August 1992 - 23 October 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	12	29	NC	Ind EU-CM EU-Co Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	0	0	NC	
FM	38	12	32	NC	
DM	32	10	31	U	
FIM	14				
EM	35	12	34	NC	
CM	13				
Fm	33	11	33	NC	
Dm	25	10	40	NC	
Fim	8				
Em	31	12	39	NC	
COF	8				
BT	15888	662	4	NC	
Com	20	1	5	NC	
Coa	15	0	0	NC	
cdu/csu	21	1	5	C	
fdp	19	1	5	C	
spd	20	1	5	NC	
grü	17	0	0	NC	
pds	17	0	0	NC	
BR	17	1	6	NC	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	1	11	NC	
vote	26	3	12	NC	
Med	63	14	22	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

3rd Phase: 23 - 28 October 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	13	31	NC	cdu/csu fdp Ind EU-CM EU-Co Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	2	10	NC	
FM	38	13	34	NC	
DM	32	11	34	U	
FiM	14				
EM	35	13	37	NC	
CM	13				
Fm	33	13	39	NC	
Dm	25	12	48	NC	
Fim	8				
Em	31	14	45	C	
COF	8				
BT	15888	10344	65	U	
Com	20	3	15	U	
Coa	15	2	13	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	1	5	NC	
grü	17	0	0	NC	
pds	17	0	0	NC	
BR	17	3	18	NC	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	2	22	NC	
vote	26	5	19	NC	
Med	63	16	25	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

4th Phase: 28 October - 12 November 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	14	33	NC	Em cdu/csu fdp Ind EU-CM EU-Co Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	3	15	NC	
FM	38	13	34	NC	
DM	32	11	34	U	
FiM	14				
EM	35	14	40	C	
CM	13				
Fm	33	14	42	NC	
Dm	25	13	52	NC	
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8				
BT	15888	10608	67	U	
Com	20	4	20	U	
Coa	15	3	20	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	2	10	NC	
grü	17	1	6	NC	
pds	17	1	6	NC	
BR	17	3	18	NC	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	3	33	NC	
vote	26	5	19	NC	
Med	63	17	27	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

5th Phase: 12 November - 5 December 1993

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	15	36	NC	EM Em cdu/csu fdp Ind EU-CM EU-Co Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	4	20	NC	
FM	38	14	37	NC	
DM	32	12	38	C	
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13				
Fm	33	14	42	NC	
Dm	25	13	52	NC	
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COf	8				
BT	15888	10872	68	U	
Com	20	5	25	U	
Coa	15	4	27	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	3	15	NC	
grü	17	2	12	NC	
pds	17	2	12	NC	
BR	17	4	24	NC	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	3	33	NC	
vote	26	6	23	NC	
Med	63	18	29	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

6th Phase: 5 December 1993 - 14 April 1994					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) In per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	18	43	NC	DM EM CM* Em COF* cdu/csu fdp Ind EU-CM EU-Co Fr UK It Sp Ne Be Po De Gr Ir Lu
Cab	20	7	35	U	
FM	38	16	42	NC	
DM	32				
FiM	14				
EM	35				
CM	13				
Fm	33	15	45	NC	
Dm	25	14	56	C	
Fim	8				
Em	31				
COF	8				
BT	15888	11664	73	U	
Com	20	6	30	U	
Coa	15	7	47	NC	
cdu/csu	21				
fdp	19				
spd	20	6	30	NC	
grü	17	5	29	NC	
pds	17	5	29	NC	
BR	17	6	35	U	
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	3	33	U	
vote	26	8	31	NC	
Med	63	21	33	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

* The Chancellor's Office Minister and his staff did not express any preferences before April 1994.

7th Phase: 14 April - 5 December 1994					
Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	18	43	NC	DM
Cab	20	8	40	U	EM
FM	38	16	42	NC	CM
DM	32				Em
FiM	14				COF
EM	35				cdu/csu
CM	13				fdp
Fm	33	16	48	NC	Ind
Dm	25				EU-CM
Fim	8				EU-Co
Em	31				Fr
COF	8				UK
BT	16128*	11178	69	U	It
Com	20	7	35	U	Sp
Coa	15	8	53	C	Ne
cdu/csu	21				Be
fdp	19				Po
spd	20	7	35	NC	De
grü	17	6	35	NC	Gr
pds	17	6	35	NC	Ir
BR	17	6	35	U	Lu
BVG	1				
Ind	33				
Uns	9	3	33	U	
vote	26	8	31	U	
Med	63	22	35	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				

* The distribution of party membership in the Bundestag changed after the 1994 general election. See Appendix 2.

8th Phase: 5 - 9 December 1994

Actor	Linkages (L)	Exerted Pressure (E)	Pressure (P=E/L) in per cent	Preference Behaviour	Control Reduction Supporters
Cha	42	19	45	C	DM
Cab	20	9	45	C	EM
FM	38	17	45	C	CM
DM	32				Em
FIM	14				Cof
EM	35				Coa
CM	13				cdu/csu
Fm	33	16	48	C	fdp
Dm	25				Ind
Fim	8				EU-CM
Em	31				EU-Co
COF	8				Fr
BT	16128	11178	69	U	UK
Com	20	7	35	U	It
Coa	15				Sp
cdu/csu	21				Ne
fdp	19				Be
spd	20	7	35	NC	Po
grü	17	6	35	NC	De
pds	17	6	35	NC	Gr
BR	17	6	35	U	Ir
BVG	1				Lu
Ind	33				
Uns	9	3	33	U	
vote	26	9	35	U	
Med	63	23	37	NC	
Weu	47				
EU-CM	63				
EU-Co	28				
EP	15	2	13	NC	
Nato-CM	51				
Nato-Org	29				
Ocse	65				
UN-SC	10	4	40	U	
UN-Org	22	2	9	NC	
US-Pre	32				
US-Nsa	7				
US-SS	30				
US-DS	24				
US-TR	27				
US-Wh	4				
US-Sd	26				
US-Pen	19				
US-Cd	24				
US-con	15				